# FILED

Au gust 22, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COU RT OF CR IMINA L A PPEA LS OF TENN ESSEE

AT NA SHVILLE FEBRUA RY SESSION , 1997

STA TE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) No. 01C01-9604 -CC-00131 Ap pellee ) ) HUMPHREYS COUNTY vs. ) ) Hon. ROBERT E. BURCH, Judge ROBERT K. BOOHER, ) ) (Driv ing without a license; Appellant ) Driving without vehicle registration)
For the Appell ant : For the Appell ee : ROBERT K ENNETH BO OHER CHA RLES W. BUR SON Pro Se Attorney Gen eral and Repor ter 104 Capps Hill Waverly, TN 37185 MICHA EL J. FA HEY II Assistant Att orney Gener al Criminal J ustice Div ision 450 James Roberts on Parkway Nashvil le, TN 37243-0493
DAN M ITCHUM A LSOBROOKS Distric t Attorney General GEORGE C. SEX

TON Asst. Dist rict Attor ney General Room 206 Humphreys Co. Courthouse Waverly, TN 37185

OPINION FILE D: AFFIRMED

David G . Hayes Judge1 The offenses const it ute vi olat ions ofTenn. Code Ann. § 55-3-1 02 and 55-50- 301.
2 The appell ant di sputes t his court' s jur isdi cti on over h is appe al, argui ng that his a ppeal should li e dir ectl y t o our supr eme court. We reject t his ar gument. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-3- 201 (d)(2 )(C ) (19 94) a nd T enn . Co de A nn. § 16-5 -108 (a)(1 ) (19 94). 2 OPINION
The appellant, Robe rt K. Booher, appeals, as of right, his class C misdemeanor conv ictions in the Circui t Court of Humphreys County for drivi ng without a l icense and dri ving w ithout vehi cle regi stration. 1 2 The appellant raises a multitude of issues on appeal, which may be categorized into three main areas. In this pro se

appeal, he challenges: I. The authority

of the State to reg ulate the lic ensing of motori sts and the registration of vehicles; II. The Circuit Court of Humphreys County's jurisdiction to try him for the indicted misdemeanor charg es; and III. The State's "denial of due proces s of law."
After a revi ew of the iss ues before us and the a pplicable law, we conclude that the appellant's issues are without merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
I. Background
On June 30, 1995, the appellant vo luntarily surrendered "to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, by registered mail, all original registration papers, all certificates of title, all current or last renewal registration papers , and all cur rent license plat es for his three automobiles and t wo pickup trucks." Subs equent to this surre nder, the appell ant asserts t hat he travel ed as a "free man" for about three and a half weeks.
On July 25, 1995, Morris Rion, an officer with the W averly Police Departm ent, ob served th e appe llant, o n Main Str eet, op erating h is 1985 Do dge3 In Stat e v. Loudon , 857 S.W .2d 878, 882 (T enn. Crim . App. 1993), a pane l of thi s court held t hat “ [t ]her e is a compelli ng stat e int erest which j usti fi es the st atut oryrequi rement thatthe dri ver’ s social securi ty number appear on t he face of the l icense i ssued by the Depart ment of Safety

. . . . The social securi ty number serves t o dist ingui sh a person f rom others wi th t he same or sim ilar nam es. . . .” 3 Daytona automobile, displaying a poster upo n which was written "R.K. Booher, Tennessee Citiz en, Owner, Humphreys C ounty Resi dent." The automobile, however , did not displ ay a val id Tennessee lic ense plate. Upo n stopping the vehicle, Officer Rion req uested that the appel lant produce hi s driver 's license. Without responding to Rion' s request a nd refusing to identify hims elf, the appellant produc ed a "notice to ar resting officer with M iranda Warning," and began "filling it out." The of ficer then proceeded to run a driver's license check which revealed that t he appellant did not possess a Tennes see drive r's lice nse. The off icer then advised the appellant tha t he was issuing two citations which would req uire the appell ant's sig natures. The appell ant refused to sig n the citations. The appellant was then transpor ted to the Waverly Pol ice Department where arre st w arran ts w ere is sued an d served upon him.

At his be nch trial , the ap pellan t, appe aring pro se , denied that he was in violatio n of any law , arguing instead, that he was only exercis ing his r ight as an “unenfranchised citizen of Tennessee” to use his private property on the p ublic highway over w hich ever

y citiz en has a rig ht to pass. M oreover, t he appellant argued that a v

ehicle only

becomes a “motor vehicle” when it i s regist ered and, because his 1985 D odge was not regist ered, he could not be guilty of either misdemeanor offense. Fi nally, theappellant arg ued that, because he was not engaged in commerce, his vehicle was not requi red to be reg istered. The appellant also explained that h e did not have a Tennessee driver’s license because Tennessee re quires that the registrant’s soc ial securi ty number be placed on the li cense. 3

The trial cour

t found the appellant g uilty of both offenses and imposed a4

probated sentence of thirty day s for each offense wi th credit for j ail time ser ved. Additionally , the appellant w as fined $25.00 for each offense.

II. Driver's License and Vehicle Registration
The appellant's appe al is based upon the premise that it is unconstitutional for the State of Tennessee to req uire him to pr ocure a driv

er's lic ense and vehicle r egistrati on before operating a motor vehi cle on the publi c highways of this state. H e argues that he has a consti tutional ri ght to freedom of trav el and to use his pri vate proper

ty wi thout gover nmental interferenc e.
We agree with the appell ant that he enjoy s a fundamental rig ht to freedom of travel. See Dunn v. Blumstein , 405 U.S. 330, 338, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1001 (1972); Knowlton v . Board of Law E xaminers of Tenness ee , 513 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tenn. 1974). Trav

el, in the constitutional s ense, however, means more than locomotion; it means migrati on with the intent to settl e and abide. Id . Thus, any American is free to travel from state to state , and to change his state of residence or employment whenever he desires, un restricted by unreasonable government interference or regulati on. See 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §478 (1969). Whether a specific ty pe of travel i s protected by one's consti tutional ri ght to travel depends upon the int ent which motivates themovement. Id

.
In the present case, the appellant asserts that

the State of Tennessee has unduly infri nged upon his "r ight to tr avel" by requiri ng licensi ng and regi stration of his motor vehicles pri or to operatio n on the public roadways of this state. However, contrary to his assertions, at no time did the State of Tennessee place constraints upon the app ellant's exercise of this right. His right to travel within this state or to points beyond its bound aries remains unimpeded . Thus, not only4 Th e "po lice po wer " of the state is fou nde d in the con stitution, b eing bas ed u pon the d uty of the state to pro tect its c itizens a nd p rovide for the safe ty and g ood orde r of s ocie ty. See 16A C.J .S. Consti tut

ional Law § 433. 5 has t he ap pell ant' s right to f reed om o f tra vel no t bee n inf ringe d, bu t also , we cannot conclude t hat this ri ght is even implicated i n this case. Rather, based upon the context of his argume nt, the appellant asserts an infringement upon his right to op erate a motor vehicle on the publ ic highways of this state. This notio n is wholl y separate from the right to travel

.
The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway is not a fundamental "right. " See Goats v. St ate , 364 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tenn.1963) (emphasis added) ; Sullins v . Butler , 135 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tenn. 1940) (ci tations omitted). Instead, it is a revocable "privilege" that is granted upo n compliance with stat utory li censing pr ocedures. See Reitz v . Mealey , 314 U.S. 33, 36, 62 S.Ct. 24, 26-27 (1941), overrule d in part by , Perez v. Campbell , 402 U.S. 637, 91 S.Ct. 1704 (1971) ; Goats , 364 S.W.2d at 891; Sullins , 135 S.W.2d at 932.
State and local governments possess a n inherent power, i.e. police power, to e nact reasonable legislat ion for the health, safety, w elfare, morals, or convenience of the pub lic. 4 See Nashville, C & St. L. Ry. v. Walters , 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486 ( 1935); Erstin v. Moss , 430 S.W .2d 345, 348 (Tenn . 1968), appeal dismiss ed , 393 U.S. 318, 89 S.Ct. 554 (1969) ; State v. Sow der , 826 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) , appeal dismiss ed , (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 883, 114 S.Ct. 229 (1993 ). Thus, our l egislature, through i ts police pow er, may pre scribe condi tions under w hich the "priv ilege" of operat ing automobiles on publ ic highways may b e exercis ed. Sullins , 135 S.W.2d at 932. See also Goats , 364 S.W.2d at 891. Nonetheless, such regul ations may not be unreasonable, may

not violate federal or st ate constituti onal provi sions, as by discriminat ing betw een vehicl es or owner s of the same class ; and, in the cas e of ordinances, may

not conflict w ith state stat utes. See 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicl es §6

62.

The test to determin e the validity of statutes enacted th rough the state's police pow er is w hether or not th e ends sought t o be attained are appropriate and the regul ations prescr ibed are reaso nable. United States v . O'Brien , 391 U.S. 367, 382, 88 S .Ct. 1673, 1682 ( 1968). The test of reasonableness requires a balancing effort on privat e interests a nd the public g ood to be achieved. If the public benefits outweigh the interf erence with private rights, reasonableness is indicated, but if the p rivate injury outweighs the public advantage the measure is unreasonable. Id . In applyi ng this test, it must be remembered that the presumption is

in favor of the r

easonableness and v

alidity of the law, so

that the person challenging the validity of the regulation has the bu rden of clearly showing wherein it viol ates the consti tution. Id .; see also Darnell v. Shapard , 3 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tenn. 1928).
The appellant chall enges var ious prov isions of the Tenness ee Motor Vehicle Title and Registration Law. Requiring persons to obtain a driver's license and to register their aut omobiles wi th the State prov ides a means of identi fying the owner of the automobile if negl igently operated to the damag e of other persons. See State v. Bates , 30 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tenn. 1930); Erosion Control Cor p. v. Evans , 426 S.W .2d 202, 206 (Tenn . App. 1967). Moreover, because it is

a means of guaranteei ng a minimal l evel of driv er competence, licensing improves safety on our hi ghways and, thus, pr otects and enhances

the well being of the residents and visitors of our state. T hus, our state legislature may properl y wi thin the scope of i ts police power enact reaso nable regul ations requiri ng licensi ng and regi stration of motor vehicles as it furthers

the interests

of public safety

and welfare.7 Within his constitutional challenge, the appellant presents additiona l arguments rel ating to w hether his automobi le is a "motor vehicle" contemplated by the licensing and registration regulations; whether he is exempted fro m such regulations

because of his "use" of his automobile; an d whether he is requi red to obtain a Tennessee dr iver's license, as

he is only

a common law resident of Tenne ssee with a valid India na driver's license. The ap pellan t's 1985 Dodge Daytona is

a motor vehi cle contemplated by the reg ulations, Tenn. C ode Ann. § 55-1-103(d); said vehi cle is dri ven upon the publ ic roads of thi s state, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-3-101; an d, for purposes of the Tennessee Motor Ve hicle Title and Registr

ation Law, t he appellant is a resident of Tenness ee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-304. These issues are w ithout merit.

III. Jurisdi ction of the Trial C ourt

Next, he contends that the H umphreys Cou nty Circuit Court was w ithout jurisdiction to try him on the indicted charges. He argues that the trial court lacked both in personam and subject matter jurisdiction. In sup port of his argumen t concer ning in personam jurisdiction, he avers: That I, Private Citiz en Robert K. Booh er, am of lawful age and competent (sui j uris); and w as born on Januar

y 25, 1930 a F ree judicial Power Ci tizen of Indiana , and thereby in one of the fifty united [sic] States of Am erica, and have lived in Tennessee since 1989 thus making me a common law judicial C itizen of Tenness ee protected by

the Constitut ion of Tennessee (1870) , in fact, by right of blood and herita ge, (jui sanguinis) descending from my direct Family w ho all have been continuously in this count ry sinc e 1746, I am also protecte d by the Constitution of Indiana (1851), the Constitution for the United States of America ( 1789) includi ng its Preamble and the Bill of Rights (1791), the Northwest Ordinance (1787), the Articles of Conf ederation (1777), and th erefore retain the unalienable r ights gr anted by God, as

found and secured by

the posititve law embodied in the Declaration of Independence (177 6), therefo re sec uring and bi nding these righ ts upon myse lf and my posterity , this day

and for all ti me; and further. . . The appellant arg ues that his r ights are those that "exi sted by the l aw of the land8

long antecedent to the organi zation of the State", and that, as a "judicial pow er citizen, " he is governed only by "God and the common law of the C onstitution which is the law of the land." Thus, the appel lant asserts that he has never voluntari ly consent ed to or "gr ant[ed] any State agency the authority to try hi m for an alleged c riminal act or omission un der any jur isdiction ot her than a judi cial power jur isdiction an d proceeding. "

W e reject the appellant's argumen t that he is exempt from the laws of this state because he has

never cons ented to nor gr anted the State the aut hority to try him for criminal ac

ts or omissi ons. Consent to laws i s not a prereq uisite to their enforceabi lity ag ainst indiv iduals. See City of Sal ina v. Wisden , 737 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 1987). No person in the State of Ten nessee may exempt himself or herself from any law simply by declaring that he or she does not conse nt to it applying to them. See State v. Sku rdal , 767 P.2d 304, 308 ( Mont. 1988). To do so would r

esult in sheer

anarchy. We must all abide by the valid laws, even the ones with which we do not agree, or justic e will be served against us for the violatio n. Id . The appellant’s presence at his trial in Humphreys County is sufficient to establ ish juris diction over his pers on. See Johns v. Bow len , 942 S.W .2d 544, 547 (Tenn . Crim. App. 1996).
The appellant was charged w ith driv ing wi thout a licens e and drivi ng an unregister

ed vehicle , both class C misdemeanors. "The c ircuit cour t has exclusiv e original jurisdic

tion of all cr imes and misdemeanor s, either at common law or by statute, unless

expressl y prov ided by stat ute or this C ode." Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-10- 102 (1994). See also Tenn. Code Ann. §40- 1-107 (1993 Supp.); Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-1-108 ( 1990). This is sue is w ithout merit.

IV. A lleged Due P rocess Violati ons9 Finally , the appellant pr esents a myr iad of disordere d issues w hich he characteriz es as due proces s violat ions. Fir st, the appellan t argues that "Officer Rion lacked probable cause und er which to initially detain him." The appellant's argument is misplaced; pro bable cause has no application t o the present cas e. An officer may, without a warrant, arrest an of fender for a pub lic offense committed in the officer 's presence. See Tenn. Code Ann. §40- 7-103 (a)(1) (1995 Supp.). It is undisput ed that the appell ant committed an offense in the officer's presenc e. Thus, the officer's initial stop of the appellant w as proper. This issue is

without mer it.

Next, the appellant chall enges the sufficie ncy of the "affidavi ts of complaint" and the s ufficiency of the i ndictments in t he present case. The affidavits in the present case comply with Rule 3, Tenn. R. Crim. P. Moreover, the indictments satisfy the r equirements s et forth in Tenn. CodeAnn. § 40-13- 201 et seq. (1990). Fi nally, theappellant arg ues that his bai l was excessive, that his automobile w

as wrong fully impounded, that he was not provide d an initial appearance "promptl y after arrest," that the Gr and Jury w

as prevented from viewi ng documents file d on his behalf, and t hat the trial judge committ ed various infractions v iolating t he appellant's due process r ights. As the appellant has failed to prepare an adequate record from whic h this court can complete a meaningful review, we are precluded from conside ring such issues. Tenn. R. App. P. 24. Furthermore, the proof in the record bef ore us establishes these contentions arewithout mer it.

VII. Conclusion
The appellant has fail ed to show t hat the statutes r equiring licensing and registr ation for motor vehicles are unreasonable. Suc h regulati ons are both10

reasonable and benefic ial exercises of the stat e's police power, working the greatest g ood to the greatest number. See, e. g. , Goats , 364 S.W.2d at 891; Bates , 30 S.W.2d at 249. No constitut ional rig ht of the appellant w as violat ed. The judgment of the tr ial court i s affirmed.

____________________________________ DAVID G. HA YES, Judge
CONCUR:

______________________________ GARY R. W ADE, Jud ge

______________________________ CURW OOD W ITT, Judge