COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Retired Judge Olitsky*

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ODEH BENJAMIN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION** BY 

v. Record No. 2254-98-2 JUDGE NORMAN OLITSKY 

 JULY 18, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG 

Oliver A. Pollard, Jr., Judge 

 Mary Katherine Martin, Senior Assistant 

Public Defender, for appellant. 

 Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 *

 Retired Judge Norman Olitsky took part in the 

consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code 

§ 17.1-400, recodifying Code § 17-116.01. 

** Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Odeh Benjamin, appellant, was convicted of felony failure to 

stop at the scene of an accident involving physical injury in 

violation of Code § 46.2-894. He argues the evidence was 

insufficient to convict him of this offense. We affirm his 

conviction. 

FACTS

 Reginald Morris testified that on November 28, 1996 at about 

11:00 p.m., he was in his car, stopped at an intersection, waiting 
to make a left turn. A car driven by appellant struck Morris' car 

on the rear passenger side. Morris testified the impact "knocked 

[his car] up maybe two or three feet." Appellant's car drove onto 

the sidewalk and stopped about forty or fifty feet away from 

Morris' car. Morris estimated "[a]bout two-thirds" of appellant's 

car was on the sidewalk. 

 Morris saw appellant "look back" at Morris' car, then 

appellant made a right turn and drove away. Morris obtained 

appellant's license plate number and gave the police a description 

of appellant's car. 

 Morris testified the impact "took out like a good portion of 

the trunk," pushing the trunk up. It also damaged chrome fender 

trim on the side of the car and damaged rear lights. Morris saw 

headlight damage on appellant's car. Officer Kevin Johnson 

reported to the accident scene and described Morris' vehicle as 

"pretty severely damaged." 

 Morris suffered back and neck pain from the incident and had 

to be assisted into an ambulance. He testified he felt "tense as 

if [he]'d fallen or something." Hospital staff administered 

x-rays and gave Morris "some shots." Morris later obtained 

prescription pills for the pain, which lasted for several months 

after the accident. Morris also received "heat and traction" 

treatments after the incident. 

 Officer Mark Stefaniak looked for the car after the accident. 

He saw appellant's vehicle, which had a damaged driver's side 

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headlight and matched the description Morris gave the police. 

Stefaniak stopped the car at 11:53 p.m. about three or four miles 

from the scene of the accident. Stefaniak stated the driver's 

side door was "difficult to open," and there was "pretty extensive 

damage" to appellant's car. Stefaniak had to wrench open the 

door. Stefaniak arrested appellant for driving under the 

influence of alcohol. 

 Appellant testified Morris' car suddenly stopped in front of 

appellant's car without using a turn signal. Appellant stated he 

tried to avoid striking Morris' car, and he turned his car to the 

right. However, the left side of appellant's car struck Morris' 

car. Appellant said he stopped "briefly," but because his 

driver's license was suspended at the time, he drove toward his 

home. Appellant also testified he did not believe the accident 

damaged Morris' vehicle. 

ANALYSIS

 "On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" Archer v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) 

(citation omitted). 

 Appellant was convicted of violating Code § 46.2-894, which 

provides in pertinent part: 

The driver of any vehicle involved in an 

accident in which a person is killed or 

injured or in which an attended vehicle or 

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other attended property is damaged shall 

immediately stop as close to the scene of 

the accident as possible without obstructing 

traffic, as provided in § 46.2-888, and 

report his name, address, driver's license 

number, and vehicle registration number 

forthwith to the State Police or local 

law-enforcement agency, to the person struck 

and injured if such person appears to be 

capable of understanding and retaining the 

information, or to the driver or some other 

occupant of the vehicle collided with or to 

the custodian of other damaged property. 

 "The duty imposed upon the driver of a vehicle involved in an 

accident is not passive. It requires positive, affirmative 

action; -- that is, to stop and give the aid and information 

specified." Herchenbach v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 217, 220, 38 

S.E.2d 328, 329 (1946). 

Knowledge necessarily is an essential 

element of the crime. This does not mean 

that the person should have positive 

knowledge of the extent of the damage or 

injuries inflicted. It does mean that, in 

order to be guilty of violating the statute, 

"the driver must be aware that harm has been 

done; it must be present in his mind that 

there has been an injury; and then, with 

that in his mind, he must deliberately go 

away without making himself known. If an 

injury is inflicted under such circumstances 

as would ordinarily superinduce the belief 

in a reasonable person that injury would 

flow, or had flowed, from the accident or 

collision, then it is the duty of the 

operator to stop his vehicle." 

Id. (citation omitted). 

 In Kil v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 802, 811, 407 S.E.2d 

674, 679 (1991), we held, "the Commonwealth must prove that the 

defendant possessed actual knowledge of the occurrence of the 

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accident, and such knowledge of injury which would be attributed 

to a reasonable person under the circumstances of the case." 

 Appellant admits he had actual knowledge of the occurrence of 

the accident. However, he argues he did not have knowledge of any 

injury to Morris. 

 The evidence proved appellant's car struck Morris' car with 

such force that it caused Morris' car to move forward two to 

three feet from a stationary position, and it caused appellant's 

vehicle to veer out of control, stopping on the sidewalk forty 

or fifty feet from the point of collision. The impact pushed up 

the trunk on Morris' car and damaged the side chrome fender trim 

on the side of the car. An officer at the scene described 

Morris' car as "pretty severely damaged." Appellant looked 

toward Morris' car before leaving the scene, but he testified at 

the trial that he did not believe the accident caused any damage 

to Morris' car. The trial judge was not required to accept 

appellant's testimony. "In its role of judging witness 

credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the 

self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the 

accused is lying to conceal his guilt." Marable v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 

(1998). 

 In addition, after the impact, appellant's car was damaged 

to the point where the officer had difficulty opening the 

driver's side door. Under the circumstances of this accident, a 

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reasonable person would have known that Morris was injured by 

the force of the collision. Furthermore, the evidence proved 

Morris complained of back and neck pain at the scene of the 

accident and received treatment at the hospital immediately 

after the accident. Therefore, from the evidence of the 

circumstances of the accident, the damage caused to both 

vehicles, and the nature of Morris' injuries, the trial judge 

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant 

feloniously violated Code § 46.2-894. 

 Accordingly, we affirm appellant's conviction. 

 Affirmed.

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