NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WITOLD KOWBEL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN 

CALIFORNIA, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

and 

C.L. MAX NIKIAS, USC President; 

AINSLEY CARRY, USC Vice President of 

Student Affairs, 

Defendants.

No. 19-55936 

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-07896-JAK-AS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 26, 2020**

Before: McKEOWN, RAWLINSON, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 29 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-55936 

Witold Kowbel appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing 

his diversity action alleging a breach of implied contract claim against defendant 

University of Southern California arising out of Kowbel’s son’s academic 

disciplinary proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 

1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Kowbel’s breach of implied contract

claim because Kowbel failed to allege facts sufficient to show the existence of an 

implied contract between himself and the University of Southern California. See 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings 

are construed liberally, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible 

claim); Retired Emps Ass’n. of Orange Cty., Inc. v. County of Orange, 266 P.3d 

287, 291 (Cal. 2011) (“[A] contract implied in fact consists of obligations arising 

from a mutual agreement and intent to promise where the agreement and promise 

have not been expressed in words.” (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, 

we do not consider the parties’ remaining arguments regarding the rule of judicial 

nonintervention into the academic affairs of schools. 
3 19-55936 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Kowbel’s 

operative second amended complaint without further leave to amend because 

amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041 (setting forth 

standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper 

when amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kowbel’s motion 

for reconsideration because Kowbel failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See 

C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-18 (explaining the grounds for reconsideration and noting that 

“[n]o motion for reconsideration shall in any manner repeat any oral or written 

argument made in support of or in opposition to the original motion”); Bias v. 

Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of review

for a district court’s enforcement of local rules); Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah 

Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth 

standard of review and grounds for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

59). 

We reject as meritless Kowbel’s contentions regarding the exhaustion of 

judicial remedies. 

AFFIRMED.