alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
JOHN EMANUEL OSEI,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-5828

_____________________________/

Opinion filed September 20, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Linda F. McCallum, Judge.

Caleb D. Rowland and William M. Blume of Blume and Rowland, PLLC, 

Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted of possession of firearm by a convicted felon and 

aggravated assault and was sentenced to a total of 35 years in prison with 

consecutive mandatory minimum terms under the 10-20-Life statute. Appellant 
2

did not challenge his sentences on direct appeal, case number 1D13-3414, and they 

became final on June 10, 2014, when the mandate issued that case.

In May 2016, Appellant filed a motion for postconviction relief under 

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 in which he argued that he was entitled 

to a new sentencing hearing because contrary to the trial court’s belief that it was 

required to impose the mandatory minimum terms consecutively, the Florida 

Supreme Court held in Williams v. State, 186 So. 3d 989, 993 (Fla. 2016), that 

consecutive mandatory minimum terms are “permissible but not mandatory” where 

multiple firearm offenses are committed contemporaneously and multiple victims 

are shot at. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Williams does not 

apply retroactively. We agree with the trial court.

In Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1980), the Florida Supreme Court held 

that a change in the law does not apply retroactively "unless the change: (a) 

emanates from [the Florida Supreme Court] or the United States Supreme Court, 

(b) is constitutional in nature, and (c) constitutes a development of fundamental 

significance.” A decision must satisfy all three of these prongs before it can be 

applied retroactively to a case that was already final.

Williams satisfies the first prong of Witt because it was decided by the 

Florida Supreme Court. But, Williams does not satisfy the second prong of Witt

because it only involved an issue of statutory interpretation, see Williams, 186 So. 
3

2d at 991-95, and was not “constitutional in nature.” Accordingly, Williams does 

not apply retroactively to cases such as Appellant’s that were final when Williams

was decided.

For these reasons, we affirm the order denying Appellant’s motion for 

postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTS, WETHERELL, and ROWE, JJ., CONCUR.
A92A1627.

#### McIVER v. THE STATE.

(423 SE2d 27)

Beasley, Judge.

Mclver was indicted December 3, 1990, in two counts for selling cocaine in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, OCGA § 16-13-30 (b). His motion for discharge under OCGA § 17-7-170, for the State’s alleged failure to try him within two terms following his demand for speedy trial, was denied. The question is whether Mc-Iver’s incarceration in custody of another sovereign extended the time. We hold that it did.

Mclver filed a demand for trial on March 27, 1991, during the court’s February 1991 term. Juries were impaneled and qualified then *649and until April 4, but Mclver was in federal custody until May 6. No jurors were impaneled in that term after Mclver’s release.

Decided September 16, 1992

Reconsideration denied September 30, 1992

*Richard Phillips,*for appellant.

*Dupont K. Cheney, District Attorney,*for appellee.

Jurors were impaneled during the May term (May 27 to September 8), but no jurors were impaneled during the September term (September 9 to December 1). Mclver sought discharge in the December term, in February 1992. Under the statute, two circumstances must coexist before discharge occurs: two terms of juries impaneled and qualified to try defendant, and the availability of defendant. The first is explicit in the statute and the second is implicit.

“It was incumbent upon [Mclver] to show by competent evidence both that a jury was impaneled and qualified to try him at the term when his demand was filed and that there was a jury impaneled and qualified to try him during the next succeeding term. [Cit.] . . . ‘(I)n computing the time allowed by the two-term requirement, terms or remainders of terms during which no jury is impaneled are not counted.’ [Cits.]” *Deadwiley v. State,*192 Ga. App. 229 (384 SE2d 221) (1989).

“There is no inherent authority in a court of this state to compel an accused’s presence or in-court attendance where such defendant is incarcerated by or in the control of a different sovereign. [Cits.]” *Luke v. State,*180 Ga. App. 378, 379 (349 SE2d 391) (1986), overruled by *State v. Collins,*201 Ga. App. 500 (411 SE2d 546) (1991), only to the extent that it required physical presence.

Mclver was not available for trial prior to his release from federal custody. *Collins,*supra at 501. If the State had placed his case on the trial calendar, his presence for trial would not have been secured. Mclver, however, could have followed the requirements of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, OCGA § 42-6-20, but he did not do so.

There were no jurors available on May 6, or thereafter during the February term, so the statutory time did not begin to run until the following term, i.e., the May term. The September term is excluded because no jurors were impaneled. *Deadwiley,*supra. Accordingly, the State was not required to try Mclver’s case prior to the conclusion of the December term. Mclver’s motion for discharge was premature.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Birdsong, P. J., and Andrews, J., concur.*
Exhibit 13.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I,
Philippe Ozanian, Chief Financial Officer of InfoVista, asociété anonymeorganized under French law, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of InfoVista on Form 20-F for the fiscal year
ended June 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, to my knowledge:



|                       |  | By: /s/ PHILIPPE OZANIAN
Name: Philippe Ozanian
Title: Chief Financial Officer
|---------------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: October 23, 2003 |  |                                                                               

---

QuickLinks
|   | (1) | the      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | the      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  Date:  April      11, 2008 |   |
|--------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                       |   |
|  /s/  Bryan      Kenyon     |   |
|  Bryan      Kenyon, COO               |   |
|  (Principal      executive officer)   |   |
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 31.1

                                 CERTIFICATIONS

I, Fiona A. Robertson, certify that:

1.    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Petsec Energy Ltd;

2.    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
      of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
      statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
      were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
      report;

3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
      information included in this report, fairly present in all material
      respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
      the registrant as of and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.    The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
      establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
      defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15e and 15d-15e) for the registrant and
      have:

      (a)   designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
            disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
            supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
            registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known
            to us by others within those entities, particularly during the
            period in which this annual report is being prepared;

      (b)   evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
            and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about
            the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of
            the end of the period covered by this report based on such
            evaluation; and

      (c)   disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
            control over financial reporting that occurred during period covered
            by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably
            likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over
            financial reporting; and

5.    The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on
      our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,
      to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's
      board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

      (a)   all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
            or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
            reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to
            record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

      (b)   any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
            other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's
            internal controls over financial reporting;

Date: June 28, 2005

/s/ Fiona A. Robertson
-------------------------------

Fiona A. Robertson
Chief Financial Officer
### UNPUBLISHED



# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT



#  U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA ,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 01-4540



# 
J AMES G. T URNER ,

Defendant-Appellant. 

# 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge.

(CR-98-324) Submitted: November 28, 2001 Decided: January 24, 2002 Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL Edwin Frederick Brooks, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Stephen W. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).OPINION PER CURIAM: James G. Turner appeals the revocation of his supervised release and the imposition of a nine-month prison term. Turner contends the district court erred in considering a conviction that was not noted in a "Petition on Probation." Turner also contends the district courtabused its discretion in failing to consider alternatives to incarceration. Finding no error, we affirm. Turner contends the district court committed plain error when it considered a charge that had not been previously noted in sentencing him. Because Turner did not raise this issue in the district court, we review for plain error. United States v. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 731-32(1993). We conclude the district court did not consider Turner’s second assault charge in its decisions to revoke supervised release and to sentence Turner to nine months’ imprisonment. Therefore, we find no plain error. We further conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Turner to nine months’ incarceration rather than to an alternative form of punishment. For these reasons, we affirm Turner’s conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentionsare adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED 2 U NITED S TATES v. T URNER
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Edwin Bolta, Appellant.

[945 NYS2d 423]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Kahn, J.), rendered September 24, 2010, convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree (two counts), and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Weber, J.), of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officials.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The County Court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officials, made on the ground that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to pursue and stop him. Upon the officers’ proper approach of the defendant’s vehicle, parked six feet into the street and facing *774the wrong direction, its engine running and its headlights interfering with the visibility of oncoming traffic *(see People v Ocasio,*85 NY2d 982, 985 [1995]; *People v Benjamin,*268 AD2d 486 [2000]; *People v Citron,*255 AD2d 452 [1998]), the defendant’s actions in exiting the driver’s seat, leaving the engine running and the headlights on, and walking toward a house in a stumbling fashion gave the officers a founded suspicion that criminality was afoot, triggering the common-law right of inquiry *(see People v De Bour,*40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]). The testifying officer’s actions thereafter only interfered with the defendant “to the extent necessary to gain explanatory information” and did not constitute a forcible seizure requiring reasonable suspicion *(id.*at 223; *People v Watts,*309 AD2d 1256, 1257 [2003] [internal quotation marks omitted]; *cf. People v Moore,*6 NY3d 496, 500-501 [2006]). The officer’s inquiry led to information and observations that provided him with probable cause to arrest the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and with a suspended license.

In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]; *People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor *(see People v Mateo,*2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], *cert denied*542 US 946 [2004]; *People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006]; *People v Westcott,*84 AD3d 1510, 1511-1512 [2011]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Angiolillo, J.P., Eng, Lott and Austin, JJ., concur.
# Apelaciones Administrativas

La Oficina de Apelaciones Administrativas (AAO, por sus siglas en inglés) lleva a cabo revisiones de las decisiones del Servicio de Ciudadanía e Inmigración de Estados Unidos relacionadas con peticiones de beneficios de inmigración, a fin de promover la consistencia y precisión de las leyes y políticas de inmigración. Tenemos jurisdicción sobre apelaciones en más de cincuenta tipos diferentes de solicitudes y peticiones.

## Temas

Decisiones

Tiempos de Procesamiento

Datos sobre Decisiones

0 / 2000Para proteger su privacidad, por favor no incluya ninguna información personal en sus comentarios. Revise nuestra Política de Privacidad.
# Forms Processed at a USCIS Lockbox

The list below shows all forms processed at a USCIS lockbox.

When filing with a USCIS Lockbox, you may pay the filing fee with a credit card or debit card using Form G-1450, Authorization for Credit Card Transactions.

For help calculating your fees, use our Fee Calculator. Our fee calculator will always have the most up-to-date fee information and can determine the exact filing and biometric services fee  (where applicable) for any form processed at a USCIS Lockbox.

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#### Lawrence *v.*The State.

Appeal from Tallapoosa Circuit Court.

Tried, before the Hon. N. H. Denson.

No counsel marked as appearing for appellant.

Charles G. Brown, Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The appellant in this case was indicted, tried and convicted for murder in the first degree, and sentenced to the penitentiary for life. On December 22, 1898, the escape of the defendant being suggested to the court, a motion was made to dismiss the appeal unless the appellant sub' mitted himself within sixty days to the .jurisdiction of the court- On the same day said motion was granted. On April 6, 1899, the defendant having failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court, the appeal was dismissed under the former order.
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 12

- 00233

- CR

RODOLFO RODRIGUEZ

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 103rd District Court of Cameron County , Texas Trial Cause No. 2011

- DCR

- 2207

- D

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered thi s cause on appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED . The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. April 17, 2014
Voluntary Reduction of Compensation letter signed by Mark A. Hoppe



 Exhibit 10.26 
 November 9, 2009 
 Compensation Committee of 
 The Board of Directors 
 Taylor Capital Group, Inc.

 9550 West Higgins Road 
 Rosemont, IL
60018 
  

	RE:	Voluntary Reduction in Compensation (Continuation) 

 Dear Fellow Board Members, 
 As you know, we have engaged in aggressive cost-cutting efforts at all levels of our organization in
response to the continuing challenging economic conditions. These initiatives have led to significant savings and thereby enhanced our ability to preserve capital and execute on our growth strategy. 
 With your oversight, management has specifically focused on ways in which to reduce our overall compensation expense. As part of our efforts in this area, I
have evaluated my own compensation and believe that it would be appropriate for me to forego certain elements of my compensation until market conditions and our performance improves. To that end, I hereby offer and agree to forego my auto allowance
and reimbursements for country club expenditures (with the exception of expenses directly associated with customer events). 
 I am requesting
that you re-evaluate these voluntary reductions of compensation each fiscal quarter after TCGI achieves a positive net income available to common shareholders. 
 Thank you for your continued leadership and please let me know if you have any questions or would like to discuss this matter further. 
  

	
	Very truly yours,
	
	 /s/ Mark A. Hoppe

	Mark A. Hoppe
	President and CEO
# FY 2012 Grant Recipients

#### Archived Content

The information on this page is out of date. However, some of the content may still be useful, so we have archived the page.

## FY 2012 Citizenship and Integration Grant Program Award Recipients

In FY 2012, USCIS awarded approximately $5 million in grants to 31 organizations. The performance period was October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2014.

For more information, please see the FY2012 grant program fact sheet  (PDF, 164.03 KB), individual program descriptions  (PDF, 153.17 KB), and news release.

10/01/2012

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Exhibit 32.2


                            Certification Pursuant to
                             18 U.S.C. Section 1350
                             as Adopted Pursuant to
                  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of China BAK Battery,  Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-KSB/A for the fiscal year ended  September 30, 2005 as filed with the
Securities  Exchange  Commission  on the  date  hereof  (the  "Report").  I, Han
Yongbin, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.  1350,  as adopted  pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
that:


     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.

By: /s/ Han Yongbin
   -----------------------
   Han Yongbin
   Chief Financial Officer
   February 1, 2006
# Welcome to the 2008 Civics Practice Test!

The 2008 civics practice test is a study tool to help you test your knowledge of U.S. history and government. Use this online tool in English to prepare for the civics portion of the naturalization test. The civics practice test is also available in Spanish, but please note that the actual test is in English.

This practice test contains 20 questions.

Start Practice Test 

## What to Expect During the Real Test

The actual civics test is NOT a multiple choice test. During the naturalization interview, a USCIS officer will ask you up to 10 questions from the list of 100 questions in English. You must answer correctly 6 of the 10 questions to pass the civics test.

Certain applicants, because of their age and time as a lawful permanent resident, are exempt from the English requirements for naturalization and may take the civics test in the language of their choice. For more information, see our Exceptions and Accommodations page.

## Tips for Studying

On the naturalization test, some answers may change because of elections or appointments. As you study for the test, make sure that you know the most current answers to the questions. Answer these questions with the name of the official who is serving at the time of your eligibility interview with USCIS. The USCIS officer will not accept an incorrect answer.

The instructions and content in this practice civics test are not intended to provide legal advice or guarantee that you will pass the civics test during your naturalization interview. If you have any questions, visit the Find Help in Your Community page.

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