Annual Report

United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

2009
Annual Report of the 

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

May 2009

Commissioners

Felice D. Gaer

Chair

Michael Cromartie

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou

Vice Chairs

Dr. Don Argue

Preeta D. Bansal (until February 9, 2009)

Imam Talal Y. Eid

Dr. Richard D. Land

Leonard A. Leo

Nina Shea

John V. Hanford, III, ex officio, nonvoting member (until January 20, 2009)

James D. Standish 

Executive Director

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

800 North Capitol Street, NW

Suite 790

Washington, DC 20002

202-523-3240

202-523-5020 (fax)

www.uscirf.gov
Professional Staff

Tom Carter, Director of Communications

Walter G. DeSocio, General Counsel

David Dettoni, Director of Operations and Outreach

Judith E. Golub, Director of Government Relations

Carmelita Hines, Director of Administration

Knox Thames, Director of Policy and Research

Dwight Bashir, Associate Director for Policy and Research

Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Associate Director for Policy and Research

Catherine Cosman, Senior Policy Analyst

Deborah DuCre, Receptionist

Scott Flipse, Senior Policy Analyst

Kody Kness, Assistant Director for Government Relations

Bridget Kustin, South Asia Researcher

Tiffany Lynch, Researcher

Jacqueline A. Mitchell, Executive Assistant

Muthulakshmi Anu Narasimhan, Communications Specialist

Stephen R. Snow, Senior Policy Analyst

ON THE COVER: Members of Pakistan’s Women Action Forum in Lahore, Pakistan rally 

against the presence of Taliban and militants in the northwest of Pakistan on Thursday, February 

12, 2009. The banners condemn religious extremism, domestic violence, and the burning down 

of girls’ schools in Swat. (AP Photo/K.M. Chaudary)
Annual Report of the 

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

May 2009

Table of Contents 

Transmittal Letters to the President, Secretary of State, Speaker of the House, and 

President Pro Tempore ....................................................................................i

Introduction.................................................................................................v

Report Overview............................................................................................1

Countries of Particular Concern 

Burma................................................................................................16

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)......................................22

Eritrea................................................................................................28

Iran...................................................................................................32

Iraq...................................................................................................39

Nigeria.............................................................................................. 57

Pakistan.............................................................................................65

People’s Republic of China.......................................................................73

Saudi Arabia........................................................................................85

Sudan.................................................................................................97

Turkmenistan.......................................................................................110

Uzbekistan..........................................................................................121

Vietnam.............................................................................................130

The Commission’s Watch List

Afghanistan........................................................................................144

Belarus..............................................................................................149

Cuba................................................................................................156

Egypt................................................................................................161

Indonesia...........................................................................................169

Laos.................................................................................................177

Russian Federation................................................................................181

Somalia.............................................................................................194

Tajikistan...........................................................................................198

Turkey..............................................................................................202

Venezuela..........................................................................................213 
Additional Countries Closely Monitored

Bangladesh.......................................................................................218

Kazakhstan.......................................................................................220

Sri Lanka...........................................................................................224

Pending

India...............................................................................................226 

Promoting International Religious Freedom through Multilateral Institutions

The United Nations..............................................................................227

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).......................233 

The Commission’s Expedited Removal Study: Four Years Later.............................241

Appendix1: Biographies of Members of the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom........................................................................................248

Appendix 2: The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Selected Provisions.........253

Appendix 3: Summary of International Human Rights Standards on Freedom of 

Thought, Conscience, and Religion or Belief........................................................256
i

May 1, 2009

The President 

The White House

Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased formally to transmit the 2009 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom (USCIRF). The Report is the most extensive in the Commission’s ten-year history, documenting serious 

abuses of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief around the world. The Report also: 

Recommends that the President designate thirteen countries as “countries of particular concern” under the 1998 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) for egregious violations of religious freedom, and provides policy 

prescriptions for each nation. These countries are: Burma, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Eritrea, 

Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 

Vietnam; 

Names the following countries to the USCIRF Watch List: Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, 

Laos, Russia, Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Venezuela. While not rising to the statutory level set forth in 

IRFA requiring designation as a country of particular concern, these countries require close monitoring due to 

the nature and extent of violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by the governments;

Highlights efforts of some member states at the United Nations to limit free speech and freedom of religion by 

banning the so-called “defamation of religions;” and 

Discusses measures still required to address the flaws in the U.S. policy of expedited removal for asylum 

seekers. 

Each country chapter in the Annual Report documents religious freedom abuses and includes specific 

recommendations for U.S. policy. The Commission encourages you to consider ways to implement these 

recommendations. If adopted, they would advance considerably U.S. protection of the universal right to freedom of 

religion or belief, together with related human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in the process increase U.S. 

security in the face of the growing threat from religious extremists who advocate or use violence to achieve their 

aims. 

Thank you for your consideration of the Annual Report, which the Commission is required to submit annually to the 

President, Secretary of State, and Congress in accordance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious 

Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

The Commission would welcome the opportunity to discuss the Annual Report with you. 

Sincerely yours,

Felice D. Gaer

Chair
ii

May 1, 2009

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State

U.S. Department of State

Washington, DC 20520 

Dear Madam Secretary:

I am pleased formally to transmit the 2009 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom (USCIRF). The Report is the most extensive in the Commission’s ten-year history, documenting serious 

abuses of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief around the world. The Report also: 

Recommends that the President designate thirteen countries as “countries of particular concern” under the 1998 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) for egregious violations of religious freedom, and provides policy 

prescriptions for each nation. These countries are: Burma, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Eritrea, 

Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 

Vietnam; 

Names the following countries to the USCIRF Watch List: Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, 

Laos, Russia, Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Venezuela. While not rising to the statutory level set forth in 

IRFA requiring designation as a country of particular concern, these countries require close monitoring due to 

the nature and extent of violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by the governments;

Highlights efforts of some member states at the United Nations to limit free speech and freedom of religion by 

banning the so-called “defamation of religions;” and 

Discusses measures still required to address the flaws in the U.S. policy of expedited removal for asylum 

seekers. 

Each country chapter in the Annual Report documents religious freedom abuses and includes specific 

recommendations for U.S. policy. The Commission encourages you to consider ways to implement these 

recommendations. If adopted, they would advance considerably U.S. protection of the universal right to freedom of 

religion or belief, together with related human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in the process increase U.S. 

security in the face of the growing threat from religious extremists who advocate or use violence to achieve their 

aims. 

Thank you for your consideration of the Annual Report, which the Commission is required to submit annually to the 

President, Secretary of State, and Congress in accordance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious 

Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

The Commission would welcome the opportunity to discuss the Annual Report with you. 

Sincerely yours,

Felice D. Gaer

Chair
iii

May 1, 2009

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi

United States House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Madam Speaker:

I am pleased formally to transmit the 2009 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom (USCIRF). The Report is the most extensive in the Commission’s ten-year history, documenting serious 

abuses of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief around the world. The Report also: 

Recommends that the President designate thirteen countries as “countries of particular concern” under the 1998 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) for egregious violations of religious freedom, and provides policy 

prescriptions for each nation. These countries are: Burma, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Eritrea, 

Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 

Vietnam; 

Names the following countries to the USCIRF Watch List: Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, 

Laos, Russia, Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Venezuela. While not rising to the statutory level set forth in 

IRFA requiring designation as a country of particular concern, these countries require close monitoring due to 

the nature and extent of violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by the governments;

Highlights efforts of some member states at the United Nations to limit free speech and freedom of religion by 

banning the so-called “defamation of religions;” and 

Discusses measures still required to address the flaws in the U.S. policy of expedited removal for asylum 

seekers. 

Each country chapter in the Annual Report documents religious freedom abuses and includes specific 

recommendations for U.S. policy. The Commission encourages you to consider ways to implement these 

recommendations. If adopted, they would advance considerably U.S. protection of the universal right to freedom of 

religion or belief, together with related human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in the process increase U.S. 

security in the face of the growing threat from religious extremists who advocate or use violence to achieve their 

aims. 

Thank you for your consideration of the Annual Report, which the Commission is required to submit annually to the 

President, Secretary of State, and Congress in accordance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious 

Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

The Commission would welcome the opportunity to discuss the Annual Report with you. 

Sincerely yours,

Felice D. Gaer

Chair
iv

May 1, 2009

The Honorable Robert Byrd

President Pro Tempore

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Senator Byrd:

I am pleased formally to transmit the 2009 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom (USCIRF). The Report is the most extensive in the Commission’s ten-year history, documenting serious 

abuses of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief around the world. The Report also: 

Recommends that the President designate thirteen countries as “countries of particular concern” under the 1998 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) for egregious violations of religious freedom, and provides policy 

prescriptions for each nation. These countries are: Burma, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Eritrea, 

Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 

Vietnam; 

Names the following countries to the USCIRF Watch List: Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, 

Laos, Russia, Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Venezuela. While not rising to the statutory level set forth in 

IRFA requiring designation as a country of particular concern, these countries require close monitoring due to 

the nature and extent of violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by the governments;

Highlights efforts of some member states at the United Nations to limit free speech and freedom of religion by 

banning the so-called “defamation of religions;” and 

Discusses measures still required to address the flaws in the U.S. policy of expedited removal for asylum 

seekers. 

Each country chapter in the Annual Report documents religious freedom abuses and includes specific 

recommendations for U.S. policy. The Commission encourages you to consider ways to implement these 

recommendations. If adopted, they would advance considerably U.S. protection of the universal right to freedom of 

religion or belief, together with related human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in the process increase U.S. 

security in the face of the growing threat from religious extremists who advocate or use violence to achieve their 

aims. 

Thank you for your consideration of the Annual Report, which the Commission is required to submit annually to the 

President, Secretary of State, and Congress in accordance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious 

Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

The Commission would welcome the opportunity to discuss the Annual Report with you. 

Sincerely yours,

Felice D. Gaer

Chair
v

INTRODUCTION

“The Threat of Religious Extremism to 

Religious Freedom and Security” has been the 

Commission’s overarching theme during this 

reporting period, and unfolding events in Pakistan 

make clear the relevance of this theme to the 2009 

Annual Report. At the time of writing, emboldened 

Taliban-associated extremists had advanced to within 

60 miles of the Pakistani capital of Islamabad. In the 

areas they already control, these groups are imposing 

draconian restrictions on human rights and religious 

freedom and engaging in brutal acts against 

individuals, particularly women and local police, who 

refused to accede to their repressive policies. 

The Commission predicted this result in 

February 2009, as the Pakistani government 

considered entering into a so-called “peace deal” with 

these elements in the Swat Valley. On February 25, 

the Commission publicly warned that the agreement 

“would represent a significant victory for Talibanassociated extremists fighting in the Swat Valley, and 

could embolden other violent extremists and Taliban 

militants who would seek to expand their influence 

and control elsewhere in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” 

The Commission’s concerns sadly were borne out 

when, soon after Pakistan’s Parliament and President 

approved the deal, the extremists moved to duplicate 

their success in neighboring regions.

While Pakistani leaders have acquiesced to 

the rule of Taliban-associated extremists in some 

regions, members of civil society have courageously 

objected. The front cover of this report features 

Pakistani women standing up against these violent 

extremist groups. Their signs, written in Urdu, 

protest violent religious fanaticism and the systematic 

destruction of girls’ schools, 150 of which reportedly 

have been demolished. These brave women are on 

the frontlines of the battle to preserve human rights, 

including religious freedom, in their country. Their 

voices must be amplified. 

Since its inception, the Commission has 

strived to place religious freedom at the forefront of 

the U.S. foreign policy agenda, and the 10th Annual 

Report is a key component of those efforts. In this 

reporting period, the Commission engaged both the 

Bush and Obama Administrations on ways to 

promote religious freedom and highlighted a number 

of critical issues to U.S. foreign policy.

Created by the International Religious 

Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), the Commission is an 

independent U.S. government commission that 

monitors violations of the right to freedom religion or 

belief abroad, and gives independent policy 

recommendations to the President, Secretary of State, 

and Congress. The passage of IRFA reinforced the 

historic commitment of the United States to religious 

freedom, and the Commission, separate from the 

State Department, is the first government commission 

in the world with the sole mission of reviewing and 

making policy recommendations on the facts and 

circumstances of violations of religious freedom 

globally. In passing IRFA, the U.S. Congress was 

not trying to enforce an American standard of 

religious freedom, but rather to promote the universal 

standard of freedom of religion or belief set forth in 

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights and other international instruments.

During this reporting period, the 

Commission met with human rights defenders from 

many nations where violent extremists or repressive 

regimes threaten fundamental rights and national 

security. The Commission held public hearings that 

examined the threat to religious freedom and security 

posed by violent religious extremists in Sudan, 

Bangladesh, and Pakistan, and reviewed possible 

U.S. government responses. China represents 

another example of Commission focus. The 

Commission wrote Secretary Clinton before her trip

to Asia, urging her to speak forcefully about the 

importance of religious freedom in the U.S./China 

relationship, and to ensure that the United States raise 

human rights concerns during China’s Universal 

Periodic Review session at the UN Human Rights 

Council.
vi

The Annual Report also describes conditions 

for freedom of religion or belief in countries of 

concern to the Commission and provides policy 

recommendations to ensure that the promotion of 

freedom of religion or belief becomes a more integral 

part of U.S. foreign policy. The Annual Report 

contains chapters on countries the Commission has 

recommended for designation as “Countries of 

Particular Concern” (CPCs) for severe violations of 

religious freedom; countries the Commission has 

placed on a Watch List for violations of religious 

freedom that do not meet the CPC threshold but 

require attention; and other countries the Commission 

is monitoring closely. The Annual Report also 

includes chapters on U.S. policy on expedited 

removal and multilateral organizations.

The Commission is composed of 10 

members. Three Commissioners are appointed by 

the President. Six are appointed by the leadership of 

both parties in both houses of Congress, under a 

formula that provides that four Commissioners are 

appointed by the leaders of the party that is not the 

President’s party. The Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom, a position at the 

State Department also created by IRFA, serves as a 

non-voting ex officio member of the Commission. 

 Commissioners bring a wealth of expertise 

and experience in foreign affairs, human rights, 

religious freedom, and international law. During the 

decade of the Commission’s existence, 

Commissioners have included Catholic Bishops, a 

Muslim Imam, a Jewish human rights activist and a 

Rabbi, Protestant clergy, and legal, foreign policy, 

and other experts with diverse backgrounds including 

Orthodox Christian, Mormon, Hindu, Buddhist, and 

Baha’i. Under their leadership, the Commission has 

raised concerns about religious freedom violations 

impacting a wide array of issues, countries, and 

faiths. For example, the Commission has worked on 

behalf of Buddhists in Burma, Hindus in Bangladesh, 

Shi’a Muslims in Saudi Arabia, Jews in Venezuela, 

Ahmadis in Pakistan, Uighur Muslims in China, 

Christians in Sudan, and Baha’is in Iran.

The report covers the period May 2008 

through April 2009. In June 2008, Michael 

Cromartie completed his term as Chair of the 

Commission, during which Preeta D. Bansal and Dr. 

Richard D. Land served as Vice Chairs. In July 

2008, Felice D. Gaer was elected as Chair of the 

Commission, and Michael Cromartie and Dr. 

Elizabeth H. Prodromou became Vice Chairs. 

During the past year, Commissioners have 

testified before congressional committees and

caucuses, advised Members of Congress and their 

staffs, met with high-ranking officials from the U.S. 

and foreign governments and international 

organizations, participated in U.S. delegations to 

international meetings and conferences, and helped 

train Foreign Service officers and other U.S. officials. 

The Commission also held hearings and press 

conferences on pressing religious freedom issues, 

conducted fact-finding missions to other countries, 

and issued policy reports, press releases, and op-eds.

Commissioners and staff also met with 

representatives of religious communities and 

institutions, human rights groups, and other nongovernmental organizations, as well as academics 

and other policy experts.

In 10 years, the Commission has been an 

articulate advocate on ways to improve U.S. foreign 

policy on issues of religious freedom and related 

human rights. Engaging in countries as diverse as 

Saudi Arabia, China, Uzbekistan, and Sudan, 

Commission recommendations have influenced U.S. 

policy and helped improve the status of religious 

freedom worldwide. The Commission also has raised 

concerns and highlighted a variety of problematic 

regional and global trends, such as the expansion of 

highly restrictive religion laws in many countries of 

the former Soviet Union, the promotion of the 

pernicious “defamation of religions” concept at the 

United Nations, and major limitations on religious 

freedom throughout Asia.

Despite the efforts of the Commission, the 

State Department, and Congress, individuals and 

communities around the world continue to suffer 

severe violations of their human rights on account of 

their religious beliefs or because they hold no 

beliefs. As it has done with prior administrations, the 

Commission will continue to engage the President 
vii

and other U.S. government leaders, providing 

recommendations and raising public and private 

concerns about issues affecting respect for freedom 

of religion or belief. While much has been 

accomplished in the past decade, the Commission, as 

well as U.S. international religious freedom policy, 

still has a great deal to accomplish. 
1

REPORT OVERVIEW

Countries of Particular Concern and the Watch 

List

Each year the Commission makes 

recommendations to the President, the Secretary of 

State, and the Congress, based on its ongoing review 

of the facts and circumstances of violations of 

religious freedom, as to which countries should be 

designated as ―countries of particular concern,‖ or 

CPCs. In doing this, the Commission works 

alongside an array of diplomatic mechanisms also 

established by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), such as the Office of International 

Religious Freedom at the Department of State, 

headed by the Ambassador-at-Large for International 

Religious Freedom. IRFA mandated that the State 

Department work through its embassies and 

consulates abroad to collect information on religious 

freedom conditions and by September 1 of each year 

review the status of freedom of religion or belief 

worldwide. That review comes in the form of the 

Annual Report on International Religious Freedom. 

Based on that review, IRFA directs the 

Secretary of State, delegated by the President, to 

designate ―countries of particular concern,‖ or CPCs, 

which are countries whose governments have 

engaged in or tolerated ―particularly severe‖ 

violations of religious freedom. IRFA defines 

―particularly severe‖ violations as ones that are 

―systematic, ongoing, and egregious,‖ including acts 

such as torture, prolonged detention without charges, 

disappearances, or ―other flagrant denial[s] of the 

right to life, liberty, or the security of persons.‖ After 

a country is designated as a CPC, the president is 

required by law to oppose the violations by taking 

actions specified in IRFA. 

In this reporting period, the Commission 

recommends that the Secretary of State designate the 

following 13 countries as CPCs: Burma, the 

Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (North 

Korea), Eritrea, Iran, Iraq,1 Nigeria,2Pakistan, the 

 

1 While joining the Commission‘s report on Iraq, 

Commissioners Cromartie, Eid, Land, and Leo

People‘s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 

The State Department‘s January 2009 CPC 

designations repeated the 2006 designations of eight 

countries: Burma, the Democratic People‘s Republic 

of Korea (North Korea), Eritrea, Iran, the People‘s 

Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and 

Uzbekistan. The State Department issued a 180-day 

waiver on taking any action against Uzbekistan, and 

an indefinite waiver for Saudi Arabia, in both cases 

to ―further the purposes of the [International 

Religious Freedom] Act.‖ As a result of these 

waivers, the United States will not implement any 

policy response to the particularly severe violations 

of religious freedom in either country. 

The Commission also names countries to a 

Watch List, based on the need to closely monitor 

serious violations of religious freedom engaged in or 

tolerated by the governments of countries that do not 

meet the CPC threshold. These countries also merit 

close attention and, in some cases, targeted 

diplomatic action by the State Department and 

multilateral organizations. The Commission‘s Watch 

List in this reporting period includes Afghanistan, 

Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Laos, Russia, 

Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Venezuela. 

 

dissented from the CPC recommendation, concluding 

that Iraq should remain on the Commission‘s Watch 

List. 

2 Commissioner Cromartie dissents from the CPC 

recommendation, concluding that Nigeria should 

remain on the Commission‘s Watch List.
2

Current CPC and Watch List Countries

Countries Named as CPCs by the 

Department of State

Commission Recommendations for 

CPC Designation

Commission

Watch List Countries

Burma

China

Eritrea

Iran

North Korea

Saudi Arabia

Sudan

Uzbekistan

Burma

China

Eritrea

Iran

Iraq

Nigeria

North Korea

Pakistan

Saudi Arabia

Sudan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Vietnam

Afghanistan

Belarus

Cuba

Egypt

Indonesia

Laos

Russia

Somalia

Tajikistan

Turkey

Venezuela

The designation of a country as CPC 

provides the Secretary of State with a range of 

specific policy options to address serious violations 

of religious freedom. Notably, the designation does 

not automatically trigger sanctions (referred to as 

Presidential actions in IRFA); rather, it requires the 

Secretary of State to enter into direct consultations 

with a government to find ways to bring about 

improvements in the respect for religious freedom. 

While sanctions are a possible policy option, the 

Secretary may decide to develop a binding agreement 

with the CPC government on specific actions that it 

will take to end the violations that gave rise to the 

designation or take a ―commensurate action.‖ Also, 

the Secretary may determine that pre-existing 

sanctions are adequate or waive the requirement of 

taking action in furtherance of the Act. 

In practice, the U.S. government generally 

has not implemented new Presidential actions 

pursuant to a CPC designation but rather has relied 

on pre-existing sanctions. This practice of ―doublehatting‖ has provided little incentive for the other 

CPC governments to reduce or end egregious 

violations of religious freedom, although relying on 

pre-existing sanctions is technically correct under the 

statute. For these mechanisms to have any real effect 

in promoting religious freedom, the designation of an 

egregious religious freedom violator as a CPC must 

be followed by the implementation of a clear and 

direct Presidential action. 
3

Actions taken under IRFA

Burma 22 CFR 126.1: prohibition on exports or other transfers of defense articles and 

defense services pursuant to §§ 2, 38 and 42 of the Arms Export Control Act

China Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, P.L. 101-246: 

restriction of exports of crime control and detection instruments and equipment 

Eritrea International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 405(a)(13)(B): Denial of commercial 

export to Eritrea of defense articles and services covered by the Arms Control Export 

Act, with some items exempted 

Iran Arms Export Control Act, §40: restrictions on United States security assistance.

North Korea Trade Act of 1974, §§402 and 409 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment): restrictions on 

normal trade relations and other trade benefits

Saudi Arabia Indefinite waiver of Presidential actions

Sudan International Financial Institutions Act, §1621: use of the voice and vote of the 

United States to oppose any loan or other use of the funds of the International 

Financial Institutions to or for Sudan

Uzbekistan 180 day waiver of Presidential actions

In addition to implementing specific 

Presidential actions, the U.S. government should 

designate CPCs in a timely manner. While IRFA 

does not set a specific deadline for CPC designations, 

the fact that the decision is based on the State 

Department‘s annual review indicates it should occur 

soon thereafter. During this reporting period, the 

Commission expressed concern about the lack of any 

CPC designations by the State Department between 

November 2006 and January 2009. Designating after 

more than two years is particularly problematic, as 

Presidential actions taken under IRFA terminate after 

two years if not expressly reauthorized. 

Consequently, the two-year delay of CPC 

designations puts into question the standing of the 

only set of specific Presidential actions implemented 

under IRFA—those placed on Eritrea in 2005. In 

September 2005, Secretary Rice announced the 

denial of commercial export to Eritrea of defense 

articles and services covered by the Arms Control 

Export Act, with some items exempted. The 

Commission commended this decision and has 

recommended subsequent actions that the U.S. 

government should take in this regard. Yet as a result 

of the delay in CPC designations, the sanctions 

imposed on Eritrea may have lapsed and may need to 

be expressly reauthorized. 

Overview of CPC Recommendations and Watch 

List

Justification of Commission Recommendations for 

CPC Designation

The State Peace and Development Council, 

the military junta governing Burma, has one 

of the world‘s worst human rights records. 

In the past year, religious freedom 

conditions deteriorated, particularly 

following the violent suppression of 

peacefully demonstrating Buddhist monks in 

September 2007, and Burma‘s military 

regime continued its policy of severely 

restricting religious practice, monitoring the 

activity of all religious organizations, and 

perpetuating or tolerating violence against 

religious leaders and their communities. 

The government launched a massive 

crackdown targeting monks, student 
4

activists, and other civilians who had 

participated in large scale, non-violent 

demonstrations calling for the release of 

political prisoners and greater democracy in 

late September 2007. An estimated 136 

monks remain in prison, awaiting trials. In 

November 2008, eight monks were given 

sentences ranging from 6 to 19 years in 

prison for ―creating public alarm‖ and 

―engaging in seditious activities.‖ 

Monasteries remain closed or function in a 

limited capacity. Ethnic minority Christians 

and Muslims continue to encounter 

difficulties. In addition, a new law passed in 

early 2009 essentially bans independent 

religious activity in ―house churches.‖ 

In China, there has been no improvement in

the religious freedom situation and, in fact, 

there has been a marked deterioration in the 

past year, particularly in Tibetan Buddhist 

and Uighur Muslim areas. The Chinese 

government continues to engage in 

systematic and egregious violations of the 

freedom of religion or belief, with religious 

activities tightly controlled and some 

religious adherents detained, imprisoned, 

fined, beaten, and harassed. The number of 

unregistered Protestants arrested has 

increased. There also is evidence of the 

systematic torture and mistreatment of Falun 

Gong practitioners in detention. China 

continues to deny its citizens the ability to 

freely exercise their religion and continued 

in the past year to subject religion to a strict 

political and legal framework that represses 

many activities protected under international 

human rights law, including in treaties 

China has signed or ratified. Repression of 

many religious groups intensified before the 

2008 Beijing Olympics. 

The government of Eritrea continues to 

engage in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom. Arbitrary 

arrests for peaceful religious activities 

continue, along with reports of prolonged 

detention and harsh treatment of religious 

prisoners, including of the deaths of certain 

religious prisoners due to ill treatment, denial 

of medical care, or torture. Other serious 

concerns include the continued ban on public 

religious activities by unofficial religious 

groups as well government, closure of their 

places of worship, an onerous and lengthy 

registration process for religious groups, and 

official disruption of private religious and 

even social gatherings of unregistered 

religious groups. 

In Iran, official rhetoric and government 

policy resulted in a deterioration in 

conditions for nearly all non-Shi‘a religious 

groups, most notably for Baha‘is, as well as 

Sufi Muslims, Evangelical Christians, and 

members of the Jewish community. The 

government continues to engage in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom, including 

prolonged detention, torture, and executions 

based primarily or entirely upon the religion 

of the accused. In September 2008, the 

Iranian parliament took further steps toward 

passing a revised penal code that would 

codify serious punishments, including the 

death penalty, on converts from Islam. 

Heightened anti-Semitism and repeated 

Holocaust denials by senior government 

officials have increased fear among Iran‘s 

Jewish community. As in the past, some 

Sunni and dissident Shi‘a Muslim leaders 

continued to face imprisonment, harassment, 

and discrimination by Iranian authorities.

In Iraq, the government continues to 

commit and tolerate severe abuses of 

freedom of religion or belief, particularly 

against the members of Iraq‘s smallest, most 

vulnerable religious minorities –

ChaldoAssyrian and other Christians, 

Sabean Mandaeans, and Yazidis. The 

targeted violence, forced displacement, 

discrimination, marginalization, and neglect 

suffered by these communities seriously 

threaten their continued existence in the 

country. Other concerns include continued 
5

attacks and tense relations between Shi‘a 

and Sunni Iraqis and egregious, religiouslymotivated violence against women and girls, 

homosexuals, Muslims who reject certain 

strict interpretations of Islam, and 

academics. Four Commissioners dissented 

from the CPC recommendation, concluding 

that Iraq should remain on the 

Commission‘s Watch List, where it had 

been since May 2007. These 

Commissioners believed that, although the 

Iraqi government had not done enough to 

address the alarming plight of the country‘s 

small religious minorities, IRFA‘s 

requirements of intent and a pattern of 

recurrent affirmative acts of abuse on the 

part of the government were not met. 

The government of Nigeria continues to 

respond in an inadequate and ineffectual 

way to persistent religious freedom 

violations and violent sectarian and 

communal conflicts along religious lines. 

The toleration by Nigeria‘s federal, state and 

local governments of systematic, ongoing, 

and egregious violations of religious 

freedom has created a climate of impunity, 

resulting in thousands of deaths. In late 

November 2008, hundreds of people were 

killed and at least 10,000 displaced when 

ethnic and sectarian violence erupted in the 

city of Jos, where the number of deaths 

reached the greatest level in over four years. 

Other concerns include an ongoing series of 

violent communal and sectarian conflicts 

along religious lines; the expansion of sharia 

(Islamic law) into the criminal codes of 

several northern Nigerian states; and 

discrimination against minority communities 

of Christians and Muslims. 

North Korea continues to be one the 

world‘s most repressive regimes, where 

dissent is not tolerated and few protections 

exist for fundamental freedoms, including

the freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion. Reports continue to document that 

existing religious institutions and activity 

are tightly controlled and employed 

primarily to gain the government foreign 

assistance from overseas religious groups 

and NGOs, and of new security measures 

issued to stop new religious activity 

spreading from China. Churches, temples, 

and pagodas built for the governmentapproved organizations are directly 

controlled and operated by the National 

Security Agency. Other public and private 

religious activity is prohibited and anyone 

discovered engaging in clandestine religious 

practice faces official discrimination, arrest, 

imprisonment, and possibly execution. 

There are continued reports of forced 

repatriations of North Koreans from China. 

Refugees attest that those viewed to have 

religious beliefs or to have extensive contact 

with South Korean religious groups are 

treated more harshly than other inmates. 

Serious religious freedom concerns persist 

in Pakistan, due to continuing sectarian and 

religiously-motivated violence and the 

government‘s inadequate response. The past 

year has seen the largely unchecked growth 

in the power and reach of extremist groups 

whose members are engaged in religiouslymotivated violence in Pakistan and abroad. 

A number of the country‘s laws abridge 

freedom of religion or belief. Anti-Ahmadi 

legislation results in discrimination against 

individual Ahmadis and effectively 

criminalizes various practices of their faith. 

Anti-blasphemy laws have been used to 

silence members of religious minorities and 

dissenters, and frequently result in 

imprisonment on account of religion or 

belief and/or vigilante violence. The 

Hudood Ordinances—Islamic decrees 

predominantly affecting women that are 

enforced alongside Pakistan‘s secular legal 

system—provide for harsh punishments for 

alleged violations of Islamic law. 

Extremists have imposed a harsh, Talibanstyle rule in the Swat Valley and 

neighboring districts, with the acquiescence 

of provincial and Federal government 
6

authorities. The government of Pakistan 

also continues to promote the flawed 

―defamation of religions‖ concept at the 

United Nations, which would violate the 

freedoms of religion and expression.

In Saudi Arabia, despite King Abdullah 

undertaking some limited reform measures 

and promoting inter-religious dialogue in 

international fora over the past year, the 

government persists in banning all forms of 

public religious expression other than that of 

the government‘s own interpretation of one 

school of Sunni Islam, and even interferes 

with private religious practice. In addition, 

numerous Ismaili Muslims continue to 

remain in prison on account of their religion 

or belief and there has been an increased 

crackdown on Shi‘a Muslim dissidents, 

which has resulted in numerous arrests and 

detentions. Moreover, on the international 

level the government continues to support 

activities that promote an extremist 

ideology, including in some cases, violence 

toward non-Muslims and disfavored 

Muslims. There continue to be instances of 

detaining and deporting non-Muslims and 

non-conforming Muslims for religious 

reasons, and a number of people were 

detained for non-public, non-Muslim 

worship. 

The government of Sudan commits 

egregious and systematic violations of 

freedom of religion or belief in those areas 

under its control. Christians, Muslims who 

do not follow the government‘s extreme 

interpretation of Islam, and those who 

follow traditional African religions are 

particularly targeted. Since January 2005, 

Sudan has been governed by a powersharing arrangement between the Northerndominated National Congress Party, which 

had seized power in Khartoum in 1989 with 

an Islamist agenda, and the Southerndominated Sudan People's Liberation 

Movement/Army, most but not all of whose 

supporters are Christians or followers of 

traditional African religions. Security forces 

under the control of both parties, various 

militias, and rebel groups in Darfur have 

engaged in serious human rights abuses in 

the past year. The responsibility of the 

highest levels of the Sudanese government 

in egregious human rights violations was 

underscored by the March 2009 decision of 

the International Criminal Court to authorize 

an arrest warrant against President Bashir on 

crimes against humanity and war crimes in 

regard to his actions in the Darfur conflict.

Significant religious freedom problems and 

official harassment of religious adherents 

persist in Turkmenistan, where police raids 

and other forms of harassment of registered 

and unregistered religious groups continue 

more than two years after the death of 

longtime dictator Saparmurat Niyazov. The 

repressive 2003 religion law remains in 

force, causing difficulties for the legal 

functioning of religious groups. Despite 

decreased emphasis, the Turkmen 

government still promotes the former 

president‘s personality cult through the 

Ruhnama as a mandatory feature of public 

education. Although the new president has 

taken some isolated positive steps, including 

the release of the country‘s former chief 

mufti, systemic legal reforms directly related 

to religious freedom and other human rights 

have not been made. 

The government of Uzbekistan continues to 

systematically abuse religious freedom and 

related human rights throughout the country. 

The government exercises tight control over 

all religious practice, including the continued 

arrest of Muslims, and also the harsh 

repression of groups and the closure of those 

mosques that do not conform to 

government-prescribed practices or that it 

alleges to be associated with extremist 

political programs. As of 2008, at least 

4,500 non-conforming Muslims were 

estimated to be in prison, many whom are 

reportedly denied the right to due process 
7

and are subjected to torture. Official 

repression has extended to members of the 

country‘s small Protestant and Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses communities, which until recently 

had been somewhat shielded from the 

government‘s anti-religious campaign. 

Uzbekistan has a highly restrictive law on 

religion that severely limits the ability of 

religious communities to function, leaving 

more than 100 religious groups currently 

denied registration.

The Commission continues to recommend 

that Vietnam be re-designated as a CPC for 

the government‘s ongoing religious freedom 

violations. Vietnam engaged with the U.S. 

government after it was designated a CPC 

between 2004-2006; that process led to 

some positive developments for religious 

communities and the release of many 

prisoners of concern. Nevertheless, the 

Vietnamese government continues to impose 

major restrictions on religious freedom, as 

well as to commit egregious abuses. 

Individuals continue to be imprisoned or 

detained for their peaceful religious activity 

or religious freedom advocacy; police and 

government officials are not held fully 

accountable for abuses; independent 

religious activity remains illegal; and legal 

protections for government-approved 

religious organizations are vague and 

subject to arbitrary or discriminatory 

interpretations based on political factors. In 

addition, improvements experienced by 

some religious communities are not 

experienced by others, including the Unified 

Buddhist Church of Vietnam, independent 

Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Protestant groups, 

and some ethnic minority Protestants and 

Buddhists. In addition, property disputes 

between the government and the Catholic 

Church in Hanoi over the past year have led 

to detentions, threats, harassment, and 

violence by ―contract thugs‖ against 

peaceful prayer vigils and religious leaders. 

The Commission’s Watch List

In Afghanistan, conditions for freedom of 

religion or belief have become increasingly 

problematic. The failure of the constitution 

to protect individuals in the majority Muslim 

nation who dissent from the prevailing 

orthodoxy regarding Islamic beliefs and 

practices continues to result occasionally in 

serious violations—violations that also 

demonstrate the continuing and growing 

power and influence of highly traditionalist 

religious leaders, even those not associated 

with the Taliban. During the reporting 

period, a student journalist charged with 

blasphemy for disseminating materials on 

women‘s rights in Islam had an original 

sentence of death commuted to 20 years in 

prison. The publishers of an independent 

translation of the Koran were also sentenced 

to 20 years in prison. Further, the failure or 

inability of the Afghan government to 

exercise authority outside of Kabul 

contributes in many provinces to a 

deteriorating situation for religious freedom 

and other related human rights. 

 Harsh religious freedom conditions in 

Belarus continued during the reporting 

period. The Belarusian government still 

restricts religious freedom under its 2002 

religion law and authorities harassed and 

fined members of certain religious groups, 

particularly Protestants. Foreign

missionaries, clergy, and humanitarian 

workers affiliated with churches faced 

increased restrictions, including deportation 

and visa refusal or cancellation. Close 

supervision of religious life is state policy 

under the religion law, and an extensive 

government apparatus has stepped up efforts 

to limit the influence of religion on children 

as well as the activities of foreign religious 

workers. 

In Cuba, religious belief and practice 

continue to be tightly controlled. While 

there have been some minor improvements, 
8

the government has expanded efforts to 

silence critics of its religious freedom 

policies and crack down on religious leaders 

whose churches operate outside of the 

government-recognized umbrella 

organization for Protestant denominations. 

The government‘s main interaction with, 

and control over, religious denominations is 

through the regular surveillance, infiltration, 

and/or harassment of religious professionals 

and lay persons and administrative 

mechanisms. The government continues to 

hinder the ability of religious organizations 

to build new or repair existing houses of 

worship. President Raul Castro and the 

government have also yet to institute or 

indicate plans for major improvements in 

freedom of religion or belief.

 In Egypt, serious problems of 

discrimination, intolerance, and other human 

rights violations against members of 

religious minorities, as well as nonconforming Muslims, remain widespread. 

Despite some increased public space to 

discuss religious freedom issues in the 

media and other fora as well as some 

positive, but limited, judicial rulings on 

some religious freedom cases, serious 

religious freedom violations continue to 

affect Coptic Orthodox Christians, Jews, and 

Baha‘is, as well as members of minority 

Muslim communities. The government has 

not taken sufficient steps to halt the 

repression and discrimination against 

religious believers, or, in many cases, to 

punish those responsible for violence or 

other severe violations of religious freedom. 

The government also has not responded 

adequately to combat widespread and 

virulent anti-Semitism in the governmentcontrolled media. 

 In Indonesia, the overall picture was mixed. 

Over the past several years, minority 

religious groups have faced increased 

discrimination, harassment, and even 

violence perpetrated by extremist groups, 

state agencies, and community 

organizations. These acts are sometimes 

tolerated by segments of the Indonesian 

government. At the same time, the 

Indonesian government has made important 

progress in addressing past sectarian 

violence and arresting suspected terrorists. 

Concerns remain, however, about new 

government decrees used to severely restrict, 

and even ban, the activities of the Ahmadi 

community; forced closures and vandalism 

of places of worship belonging to religious 

minorities; the growth and political 

influence of religious extremists; human 

rights abuses perpetrated by the military and 

police; and the harassment and arrest of 

individuals considered ―deviant‖ under 

Indonesian law. 

In Laos, the central government appears 

unable or unwilling to address serious 

religious freedom abuses that target 

members of ethnic minority Protestant 

groups in provincial areas. Although 

religious freedom conditions remained 

stable and even improved in the major urban 

areas, corruption and lack of transparency at 

the provincial level led to increased abuses 

of religious freedom in the past year. 

Reports increased of local authorities 

surveilling, detaining, harassing, arresting, 

and confiscating property in order to stop 

the spread of Protestantism among ethnic 

minority populations. Reports of forced 

relocation also arose. 

The status of religious freedom in Russia

continued to deteriorate due to several 

negative new policies and trends, 

particularly a new body in the Ministry of 

Justice with unprecedented powers to 

control and monitor religious groups that 

was established in early 2009. There also 

are increasing violations of religious 

freedom by state officials, particularly 

against allegedly ―non-traditional‖ religious 

groups and Muslims, based on the 

government‘s interpretation and application 
9

of various Russian laws, including the laws 

on religious organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and particularly 

on extremism. Russian officials continue to 

describe certain religious and other groups 

as alien to Russian culture and society, and 

there has been a sharp rise in xenophobia 

and intolerance, including anti-Semitism, 

which has resulted in numerous violent 

attacks and other hate crimes. The Russian 

government has chronically failed to address 

these serious problems adequately, 

consistently or effectively. 

Somalia has no universally recognized or 

enforced constitution and no legal provision 

for the protection of religious freedom or 

other human rights. Freedom of religion or 

belief exists in Somalia only to the extent 

that the population can practice their religion 

within the framework of either Sufiinfluenced popular Islam or Sunni 

orthodoxy. In the absence of the rule of law, 

freedom of religion or belief, like all other 

human rights, are circumscribed by 

insurgents, warlords, self-appointed 

officials, local authorities, and prevailing 

societal attitudes. During the reporting 

period, the terrorist organization al-Shabaab 

increased its control over central and 

southern parts of the country, killed 

followers of other religions, forcibly 

implemented a strict interpretation of 

Islamic law reminiscent of the Taliban, and 

suppressed practices it deemed ―unIslamic.‖ 

Religious freedom conditions in Tajikistan

have deteriorated significantly over the past 

several years. Tajik law and government 

policies place major restrictions on religious 

freedom. The Tajik government‘s efforts to 

control religious practice disproportionately 

affect Muslims, such as the ban by a statecontrolled Muslim group on women 

attending mosques, but Tajik state officials 

also target minority religious organizations 

that are viewed as having ―foreign 

influences.‖ Tajik authorities demolished 

several mosques in 2007, and in 2008 one 

church and the nation‘s only synagogue 

were bulldozed. Bans imposed in 2007 

continued on Jehovah‘s Witnesses and on 

two Protestant churches. In April 2009, the 

president signed a highly restrictive new 

religion law into force, despite numerous 

objections from Tajik religious groups and 

the international community. 

In Turkey, the state‘s interpretation of 

secularism has resulted in religious freedom 

violations for many of the country‘s citizens, 

including members of majority and, 

especially, minority religious communities. 

Despite the government‘s efforts to lift the 

long-standing ban on the Islamic headscarf 

in universities by amending the Constitution 

in 2008, the Constitutional Court annulled 

the legislation and the ban remains in effect. 

Significant restrictions on religious freedom 

for religious minority communities, 

including state policies and actions that 

effectively deny non-Muslim communities 

the right to own and maintain property, to 

train religious clergy, and to offer religious 

education, have led to the decline—and in 

some cases virtual disappearance—of some 

religious minorities. The government also 

does not recognize as legal entities minority 

religious groups, such as some Alevi 

communities, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of 

the Greek Orthodox Church, the Armenian 

Orthodox Church and others. 

Since Hugo Chavez became president of 

Venezuela in 1998, there has been a steady 

increase in government rhetoric, and in 

some cases government actions, against the 

Venezuelan Jewish and Catholic 

communities and U.S.-based Protestant 

groups. While there are no official 

restrictions on religious practice, actions by 

President Chavez and other government 

officials have created an environment where 

Jewish and Catholic religious leaders and 

institutions face the risk of attack. 
10

Furthermore, the Venezuelan government 

has failed to take adequate measures to hold 

accountable perpetrators of attacks on 

Jewish and Catholic religious leaders and 

institutions. Anti-Semitic statements by 

government officials and state media have 

created a hostile environment whereby some 

Venezuelan citizens have harassed and 

threatened rabbis, vandalized Jewish 

businesses with anti-Semitic slogans, and 

called for a boycott of all Jewish businesses 

in Venezuela. In February 2009, the Tiferet 

Israel synagogue in Caracas was vandalized.

Implementation of IRFA

After more than ten years, the State 

Department either has not implemented or 

underutilized key provisions of IRFA. Both 

Democratic and Republican administrations have not 

adequately utilized important components of the 

legislation, leaving central aspects of the Act 

unfulfilled. 

The Commission encourages the Obama 

Administration to quickly fill the position of 

Ambassador-at-Large, and give due consideration to 

IRFA‘s intent that the Ambassador be ―a principal 

adviser to the President and the Secretary of State 

regarding matters affecting religious freedom 

abroad.‖ In addition, the Commission notes that the 

Office of International Religious Freedom, which 

supports the Ambassador-at-Large, has struggled to 

maintain an appropriate staff size due to a general 

hiring freeze for civil service employees in the State 

Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor (DRL).

IRFA also addresses the issue of ―Assistance 

for Promoting Religious Freedom,‖ and allows for 

the provision of foreign assistance to promote and 

develop ―legal protections and cultural respect for 

religious freedom.‖ This mandate was not funded 

until fiscal year 2008, when Congress appropriated 

$4 million for specific DRL grants on religious 

freedom programming under the Human Rights 

Democracy Fund (HRDF). DRL circulated a request 

for proposals that resulted in 50 grant applications. 

As of May 1, the grantees had not been announced, 

but funding will likely be provided for six to seven 

religious freedom-specific programs with grants 

lasting up to 3 years. Unfortunately, the fiscal year 

2009 budget did not include a specific earmark for 

additional DRL grants on religious freedom. 

Considering the statutory provision under IRFA for 

these programs and the demonstrated interest and 

capacity of human rights and religious organizations, 

Congress should consider revising the earmark in the 

fiscal year 2010 budget or providing a carve-out of 

HRDF funds for specific religious freedom 

programming. 

In addition, IRFA mandated that the 

Secretary of State establish monitoring mechanisms 

―consisting of lists of persons believed to be 

imprisoned, detained, or placed under house arrest for 

their religious faith, together with brief evaluations 

and critiques of the policies of the respective country 

restricting religious freedom.‖ In constructing this 

list, the State Department was directed to use the 

resources of the various bureaus and embassies, as 

well as consult with NGOs and religious groups. As 

of the end of the reporting period, the Commission is 

not aware that the State Department has established 

or maintained a comprehensive list of such prisoners.

Another IRFA issue of relevance to the State 

Department is the admission of aliens who were 

―responsible for or directly carried out...particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom.‖ IRFA bars 

the entry of such individuals, and this provision has 

been invoked only once: in March 2005, it was used 

to exclude Chief Minister Narendra Modi of the state 

of Gujarat in India for his complicity in the 2002 riots 

that resulted in the deaths of nearly 2,000 Muslims. 

The Commission had issued a statement urging such 

an action. The Commission also continues to urge 

the Departments of State and Homeland Security to 

develop a lookout list of aliens who are inadmissible 

on this basis. 

Directly related to identifying and barring 

severe religious freedom violators from entry to the 

United States, IRFA also requires that the President 

determine the specific officials responsible for 

violations of religious freedom engaged in or 
11

tolerated by governments of CPCs, and, ―when 

applicable and to the extent practicable,‖ publish the 

identities of these officials in the Federal Register. 

To date, despite these requirements, no individual 

officials responsible for particularly severe religious 

freedom violations have been identified from any 

CPC country.

Finally, IRFA authorized the Commission to 

conduct a study into whether asylum seekers subject 

to Expedited Removal—a program established by the 

1996 immigration reform law allowing for the 

summary return to their country of origin of aliens 

who arrive in the United States without proper 

documentation— are being detained under 

inappropriate conditions and whether they are being 

returned to countries where they might face 

persecution. The Commission issued its Report on 

Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal (hereafter 

referred to as the Study) in 2005. The Study 

identified major implementation flaws that place 

asylum seekers at risk of being returned to countries 

where they may face persecution, as well as serious 

flaws in the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers 

in detention. To address these concerns, the 

Commission made a series of recommendations, none 

of which require Congressional action, to the 

responsible agencies in the Departments of 

Homeland Security and Justice. In 2007, two years 

after the release of the Study, the Commission issued 

a ―report card‖ grading the agencies on their 

implementation of the report‘s recommendations. 

Regrettably, as described in the chapter, ―The 

Commission’s Expedited Removal Study: Four Years 

Later,” to date, few of the Commission‘s 

recommendations have been adequately or fully 

implemented by the responsible agencies, particularly 

those within the Department of Homeland Security. 

Assessing the Status of Religious Freedom 

Firsthand

The Commission each year visits foreign 

countries to examine religious freedom issues and to 

formulate recommendations for potential U.S. policy 

responses. During the reporting period, Commission 

delegations made nine country visits. The 

conclusions and recommendations resulting from 

these visits can be found in this report.

In May 2008, in follow-up to a March 2008 

visit, Commission delegations, which included 

Commissioners Argue, Bansal, Cromartie, Eid, Gaer, 

Leo, and Prodromou, traveled to Jordan, Iraq, and 

Syria to meet with Iraqi asylum seekers, refugees, 

and internally displaced persons, including members 

of Iraq‘s smallest religious minorities, and various 

Iraqi and U.S. government officials. The 

Commission traveled to South Korea in May 2008 to 

release a Korean-language version of its report A 

Prison Without Bars: Refugee and Defector 

Testimonies of Severe Violations of Freedom of 

Religion or Belief in North Korea, and to speak at a 

conference on human rights in North Korea, as well 

as to confer with government officials, academics, 

religious leaders, and former North Korean refugees 

on current human rights conditions there.

Commissioners Gaer and Cromartie traveled 

in October 2008 to Warsaw, Poland as official 

members of the U.S. delegation to the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe‘s (OSCE) 

Human Dimension Implementation Meeting. In 

addition to making an intervention on the issue of 

compliance with OSCE obligations to respect 

freedom of religion or belief, the Commissioners also 

met with numerous foreign delegates and nongovernmental groups. Also in October 2008, 

Commissioner Leo traveled to Southern Sudan to 

meet with religious leaders and government officials 

to investigate religious freedom conditions, the 

implementation of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement, and security for religious minority 

communities. Commission staff traveled to Russia in 

October 2008 to investigate the deteriorating 

situation of freedom of religion or belief and assess 

new laws and methods Russian authorities are 

deploying against civil society, including members of 

various religious groups. 

In March 2009, Commissioners Argue, Eid, 

and Leo traveled to Nigeria to acquire first-hand 

information about persistent ethnic and sectarian 

violence and efforts being made to address this 

problem by the Nigerian government and other 
12

relevant actors. Also in March, Commission staff 

participated in a meeting by the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe on 

discrimination against Christians in the OSCE region. 

In the spring of 2009, the Commission 

requested visas so that it could undertake official 

visits to Vietnam and Cuba, to investigate the status 

of religious freedom in each country. Neither 

government issued visas before the scheduled 

departure date. The government of Vietnam did offer 

alternative dates, but the Cuban government did not 

provide any alternative time for a visit to occur. 

The Commission also engaged with 

representatives of foreign governments in 

Washington, D.C. For instance, during the reporting 

period the Commission wrote the ambassadors of 

Afghanistan and Bahrain, and met with the 

Ambassador of Turkmenistan, to inquire about the 

status of religious freedom in each country.

Engaging the U.S. Executive Branch on Religious 

Freedom

During the reporting period, the 

Commission played an active role in highlighting 

religious freedom concerns to the executive branch, 

both with the previous Bush Administration and with 

the new Obama Administration. In September 2008, 

the Commission sent a letter to President Bush urging 

him to raise with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan

Singh U.S. concerns regarding anti-Christian 

violence in Orissa and broader issues of violence and 

intolerance between India‘s religious communities. 

In December 2008, the Commission published a 

report on religious freedom conditions in Iraq and 

urged the U.S. government to take steps to ensure fair 

elections and security for all Iraqis, to prevent abuses 

against religious minorities, to refocus U.S. financial 

assistance, to counter religious extremism and 

promote respect for human rights, and address the

situation of internally displaced persons and refugees. 

President Obama and members of his 

administration have proposed new policies on a 

variety of issues, all of which will have implications 

for religious freedom and related human rights in 

U.S. foreign policy. In a February 27, 2009 speech 

setting out the new Administration‘s policy on Iraq, 

President Obama emphasized U.S. support to assist 

Iraqi institutions ―strengthen their capacity to protect 

the rule of law.‖ These efforts could provide U.S. 

support for the legal, judicial, and other institutional 

reforms necessary to implement human rights and 

religious freedom protections. The President also 

announced increased U.S. assistance for the 

resettlement of displaced Iraqis. On March 13, 

President Obama announced he would lift restrictions 

on the ability of Cuban-Americans to visit and send 

remittances to their family in Cuba. However, the 

President later stated that his administration will not 

lift the current trade embargo until Cuba improves its 

record on human rights, including religious freedom. 

Despite expressing an intent to press the ―re-set‖ 

button in U.S.-Russian bilateral relations, before the 

April 2009 G-20 meeting President Obama raised 

with President Dmitri Medvedev the recent attack on 

a leading Russian human rights advocate, Lev 

Ponomarev. U.S.-Russian working groups are also 

reportedly being established on a range of issues, 

including on human rights. In April, President 

Obama condemned as ―abhorrent‖ legislation 

approved by the Afghan Parliament and President 

restricting the rights of Shi‘a women. 

The Obama Administration‘s announced 

new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, 

contains no reference to human rights. Also of 

concern were Secretary Clinton‘s remarks during her 

Asia trip that seemed to make human rights a low 

priority in U.S.-China relations. These remarks were 

followed by similar comments in Egypt that 

underplayed the State Department‘s characterization 

of human rights there as ―poor.‖ Since then, 

Secretary Clinton has stated that she raised human 

rights and religious freedom privately with Chinese 

leaders and she also issued a strong statement on 

Tibet. Nevertheless, Secretary Clinton‘s previous 

public remarks seemed to signal a turn away from 

U.S. public diplomatic engagement on human rights. 

This could be problematic, as these statements are 

read not only by the countries of reference, but also 

by governments worldwide that are assessing the 

United States‘ commitment to human rights in 

bilateral relations.
13

As the Obama Administration has begun a 

review of U.S. policies towards critical countries, the 

Commission has repeatedly highlighted the 

importance of religious freedom as a key foreign 

policy priority. In February 2009, the Commission 

wrote Secretary Clinton urging her to speak 

forcefully about the importance of religious freedom 

and related human rights as a necessary component 

of the U.S.-China relationship, as well as that the 

United States should be raising human rights 

concerns at the UN Human Rights Council during the 

Universal Periodic Review. The Commission also 

highlighted to the Secretary the need for the new 

administration to issue new CPC designations, the 

importance of women‘s equal rights to religious 

freedom and freedom from abuse, and Commission 

concerns about the problematic ―defamation of 

religions‖ concept. In reply to the Commission‘s 

letter, Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Karen B. 

Stewart revealed for the first time publicly that the 

Bush Administration had re-designated the same 

eight countries as CPCs just days before it left office 

in January 2009. 

The Commission wrote the Secretary of the 

Department of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, 

about the Commission‘s 2005 report on expedited 

removal. In response, Secretary Napolitano 

expressed a commitment to reexamine the 

Commission‘s recommendations, including the 

protection of bona fide asylum seekers. Also in 

February 2009, the Commission urged the State 

Department to focus on the recent escalation of 

attacks on the Jewish community in Venezuela and to 

work with countries that may have influence on the 

actions of the Venezuelan government. In April 

2009, the Commission wrote President Obama urging 

him to raise the importance of religious freedom 

during his trip to Turkey, as well as to ensure that the 

Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I was invited to 

an international meeting in Istanbul in his role as 

Ecumenical Patriarch. That same month, the 

Commission was invited to give a presentation about 

its work to members of the White House Advisory 

Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood 

Partnerships.

Keeping Congress Apprised of Religious Freedom 

Issues

The Commission has worked with many 

Congressional offices to include elements of its 

findings and policy recommendations in over twentyfive bills and resolutions in the 110th Congress, a 

number of which were enacted into law. 

Commission staff also prepared briefing documents 

for staff and Members of Congress traveling on 

congressional delegations to countries on which the 

Commission reports. The Commission also has 

participated in over 25 congressional hearings, 

briefings, or press conferences in recent years. 

The Commission held a series of hearings 

during the reporting period, many of which explored 

religious extremism and U.S. national security 

interests. Two hearings focused on the impact of 

religious extremism on religious freedom and 

security in Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively, 

while the other discussed the peace process in Sudan 

and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement. 

The first hearing held in September 2008 

was entitled Sudan’s Unraveling Peace and the 

Challenge to U.S. Policy, and examined U.S. options 

for encouraging the full implementation of the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Commissioners 

took testimony from nine panelists, including the 

U.S. Special Envoy on Sudan, Ambassador Richard 

Williamson. Representatives Capuano (D-MA), 

Payne (D-NJ), and McGovern (D-MA) gave remarks 

at the hearing and Senator Feingold (D-WI) and 

Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) provided 

statements for the record.

In December 2008, the Commission 

convened a hearing entitled Bangladesh: Religious 

Freedom, Extremism, Security, and the Upcoming 

National Elections. In light of the anti-minority, 

particularly anti-Hindu, violence associated with 

Bangladesh‘s 2001 national elections, 
14

Commissioners examined the national elections 

scheduled to be held later that month, the prospects 

for Bangladesh re-joining the ranks of the Muslim 

world‘s functioning, moderate democracies, and the 

Commission‘s long-standing concerns regarding the 

threat to the human rights posed by religious 

intolerance and extremism. Seven witnesses 

participated, including U.S. Ambassador to 

Bangladesh James F. Moriarty. Representative 

Crowley (D-NY) participated in the event. 

In March 2009, the Commission convened a 

hearing to discuss Pakistan and the threat posed by 

religious extremism to religious freedom and related 

human rights, particularly for women, members of 

religious minorities, and other vulnerable 

communities. Entitled Pakistan: The Threat of 

Religious Extremism to Religious Freedom and 

Security, Commissioners heard testimony from five 

witnesses who discussed limitations on religious 

freedom and violence against women and religious 

minorities, including Shi‘a Muslims, Ahmadis, 

Christians, and Hindus, as well as the extremist threat 

to democratic institutions and the rule of law and 

Pakistan‘s relationship with Taliban-associated 

religious extremists. Witnesses included the former 

U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, William Milam, and 

Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Steve Coll. 

Representative Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) 

participated and provided opening remarks.

During the reporting period, Commissioners 

also appeared before congressional bodies. 

Commissioner Leo testified in May 2008 at the 

Congressional Caucus on Vietnam hearing entitled 

Human Rights Conditions in Vietnam and 

Suggestions for U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights 

Dialogue. The Commission cosponsored a forum in 

April 2009 on the human rights situation in Vietnam, 

convened by the Congressional Caucus on Vietnam, 

which Commissioner Gaer moderated. 

Raising Public Awareness

During this reporting period, the 

Commission also highlighted religious freedom 

issues by sponsoring public events and press 

conferences. The Commission participated in a panel 

discussion at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies (CSIS) in November 2008 on 

Intolerance and Discrimination in Today’s Russia. 

The Commission in April 2009 co-sponsored an 

event with the Kennan Institute for Advanced 

Russian Studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center for 

Scholars to highlight religious freedom concerns in 

Russia.

The Commission participated in a press 

conference in May 2008 sponsored by Senators 

Brownback (R-KS), Menendez (D-NJ), and Bunning 

(R-KY) and Representatives Wolf (R-VA) and 

Watson (D-CA) to address the Olympics and China‘s 

complicity in human rights violations in North Korea, 

Burma, and Sudan. In June 2008, the Commission 

participated in a press conference sponsored by the 

Congressional Vietnam Caucus on religious freedom 

abuses in Vietnam with Representatives Wolf (RVA), Lungren (R-CA), Lofgren (D-CA), Smith (RNJ), Loretta Sanchez (D-CA), and Royce (D-CA). In 

July 2008, the Commission participated in a press 

conference on the state of religious freedom and 

human rights in China on the eve of the Beijing 

Olympics with Representatives McGovern (D-MA), 

Chris Smith (R-NJ), Wamp (R-TN), Rohrabacher (RCA), Jackson Lee (D-TX), and Woolsey (D-CA). 

In December 2008, the Commission held a 

press conference at which it issued recommendations 

to the Administration, the State Department and 

Congress on U.S. Iraq policy, particularly on the need 

to protect Iraqi religious minority communities. 

Representative Wolf (R-VA) participated. In 

February 2009, the Commission released its 

recommendations for promoting religious freedom in 

Sudan, including U.S. efforts to ensure 

implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement, protect civilian populations, support 

upcoming elections, strengthen reconciliation and the 

rule of law, and promote economic development in 

Southern Sudan to better secure the peace. 

Representatives Payne (D-NJ), Chris Smith (R-NJ),

Wolf (R-VA), and Lee (D-CA) participated; 

Representative McGovern (D-MA) provided a 

statement. 
15

The Commission has also voiced public 

concern relating to freedom of religion or belief 

during this reporting period through the issuance of 

reports, press releases, and op-eds. For instance, the 

Commission issued press releases calling on the State 

Department to make prompt CPC designations; 

welcoming the tenth anniversary of IRFA; calling for 

justice for Baha‘i prisoners in Iran; expressing alarm 

at the imposition of Taliban-influenced Islamic 

jurisprudence in the Swat Valley of the North-West 

Frontier Province of Pakistan; and protesting highly 

restrictive draft religion laws in Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
16

COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN

Burma 

The State Peace and Development Council 

(SPDC), the military junta governing Burma, has one 

of the world‘s worst human rights records. In the 

past year, religious freedom conditions deteriorated 

in Burma, particularly following the violent 

suppression of peacefully demonstrating Buddhist 

monks in September 2007, and Burma‘s military 

regime continued its policy of severely restricting 

religious practice, monitoring the activity of all 

religious organizations, and perpetuating or tolerating 

violence against religious leaders and their 

communities. Buddhist monasteries viewed as 

epicenters of the September 2007 ―Saffron 

Revolution‖ continue to face the most severe 

restrictions, including harsh limitations on everyday 

religious activities. Muslims routinely experience 

strict controls on a wide range of religious activities, 

as well government-sponsored or supported societal 

violence. Burma‘s Christian populations face forced 

promotion of Buddhism and other hardships in ethnic 

minority areas where low-intensity conflict has been 

waged for decades. In addition, a new law passed in 

early 2009 essentially bans independent ―house 

church‖ religious venues, many of which operate 

because permission to build church buildings is 

regularly denied. Burma has been designated as a 

CPC by the Department of State since 1999. 

Burma has experienced ongoing conflict 

since its independence in 1948 and the SPDC deals 

harshly with any group it perceives as a threat to its 

hold on power, including and especially ethnic 

minority groups whose religious affiliation is an 

identifying feature. Although ethnic minority 

Christians and Muslims have encountered the most 

long-term difficulties, in the aftermath of the 2007 

anti-government demonstrations, the regime also 

began systematically to repress Burmese Buddhists, 

closing monasteries, arresting and defrocking monks, 

and curtailing their public religious activities. 

Despite this crackdown on Buddhist monks and 

monasteries, the SPDC generally promotes 

Therevada Buddhism, particularly in the ethnic

minority areas, sometimes pressuring or offering 

economic inducements to encourage conversion. 

Throughout Burma‘s history, patronage of the 

Buddhist community was necessary to legitimate a 

government‘s hold on power. SPDC leaders have 

continued this practice, publicly participating in 

Buddhist rituals. Buddhist doctrine is an optional 

course taught in all government run schools and daily 

prayer is required of all students; in some schools, 

children are reportedly allowed to leave the room 

during this time if they are not Buddhist, but in others 

they are compelled to recite the prayer. In addition, 

the Burmese military builds pagodas and has 

destroyed religious venues and other structures in 

Christian and Muslim areas. 

The importance of Buddhism in Burma‘s 

life and culture is critical to understanding the 

significance of the September 2007 protests. 

Following the arrest, detention, and beating of 

activists who organized the initial protests against 

government increases in fuel prices, Buddhist monks 

took over the leadership of growing demonstrations. 

The monks broadened the scope of the protests and 

began calling for the release of all political prisoners 

and the initiation of a process leading to 

democratization in the country. In the ensuing 

weeks, Buddhist monks organized peaceful 

demonstrations in most of Burma‘s major cities. 

After the SPDC ordered the military to crack down 

on the monk-led demonstrations, there were reports 

of at least 30 deaths, although some experts estimate 

that the actual number was much higher. Journalists 

and activists in Burma state that at least 4,000 people, 

an unknown portion of which were monks, were 

arrested during the crackdown, with estimates that 

between 500 and 1,000 remained in detention months 

later and many reportedly were mistreated or tortured 

in detention. Given the lack of transparency in 

Burma, it is difficult to determine how many people 

remain in prison or are missing though, in January 

2009, a reported 270 activists, including monks, 

student leaders, and political activists were given 

long jail terms for their roles in the 2007 protests. 
17

In the immediate aftermath of the protests, 

the military raided 52 monasteries, detained many 

monks, and arrested those perceived to be the leaders 

of the demonstrations. These monks were then 

tortured, forcibly defrocked, and required to return to 

their villages. Several monasteries remain closed or 

are functioning in a more limited capacity, including 

Ngwe Kyar Yan monastery, to which only 

approximately 50 of the original 180 monks in 

residence have been permitted to return. In addition, 

Maggin monastery, Thingan Gyun township, 

Rangoon was forcibly sealed off by the authorities in 

November 2007 and most of the monks and civilian 

assistants were arrested or detained for supporting the 

protests and giving refuge to democracy activists. 

Maggin monastery, in addition to being a religious 

center, was also an orphanage and a hospice for 

HIV/AIDS patients. 

Government authorities continue closely to 

monitor monasteries viewed as focal points of the 

protest and have restricted usual religious practices in 

these areas. Monks perceived to be protest 

organizers have been charged with sedition, ―creating 

public alarm,‖ and ―activities inconsistent with and 

detrimental to Buddhism.‖ Jail sentences of between 

two and 65 years have been given. For example, 

monk U Kitharihya from Seikthathukhah monastery 

was sentenced to seven and one half years 

imprisonment; U Kawmala from Adithan monastery 

to two and one half years; U Wunnathiri from 

Yadanabonmyay monastery to three years; and U 

Eindiya from Myoma monastery to seven and one 

half years. They join monk U Gambira, who was 

charged under Section 17/1 of the Unlawful 

Association Act, Section 13/1 of the Immigration Act 

(for illegal movement across borders), and Article 

5(J) of the Emergency Provisions Act (for 

encouraging demonstrations). In July 2008, nine 

monks were arrested and charged with the ―deliberate 

and malicious...outraging of religious feelings‖ and 

given a two year sentence. The following month, 

monks U Damathara and U Nandara from the Thardu 

monastery in Rangoon were arrested; they remain in 

custody. Although the SPDC released a reported 

9,002 prisoners, including some prominent political 

activists, in September 2008, that same month there 

were reports that 39 political activists, including 

monks, were arrested and 21 sentenced to prison 

terms. It was reported in January 2009 that monk U 

Arnanda, of Thitsa Tharaphu monastery, died in 

detention in Insein prison of unknown causes. Since 

the 2007 protests, hundreds of monks have fled to 

Thailand to seek asylum. They have described 

torture, hard labor, and other deprivations during 

detention. 

Government interference in Buddhist affairs 

predated the crackdown that occurred after the 

―Saffron Revolution.‖ According to the State 

Department‘s 2008 Country Reports on Human 

Rights Practices, members of the Buddhist sangha

were and continue to be subject to a strict code of 

conduct that is reportedly enforced through criminal 

penalties. Monks are not allowed to preach political 

sermons, make public statements, or produce 

literature with views critical of SPDC policies. 

Monks are also prohibited from associating with or 

joining political parties. Military commanders retain 

jurisdiction to try Buddhist monks in military courts. 

In several instances between 1988 and 2008, monks 

and nuns were defrocked or detained, and an 

estimated 100 monks and novices remain imprisoned 

as prisoners of conscience for activities that occurred 

prior to the September 2007 events.

Minority religious groups, especially 

Muslims and Christians, continued to face serious 

abuses of religious freedom and other human rights 

by the military. In some localities, military 

commanders have conscripted members of ethnic and 

religious minorities against their will for forced labor. 

Those who refuse conscription are threatened with 

criminal prosecution or fined. Those who do not 

carry out their tasks have been shot or beaten to 

death. Christians and Muslims have been forced to 

engage in the destruction of mosques, churches, and 

graveyards and to serve as military porters. They 

reportedly have also been forced to ―donate‖ labor to 

build and maintain Buddhist pagodas and 

monasteries. 

Tensions between the Buddhist and Muslim 

communities have resulted in outbreaks of societal 

violence over the past several years, some of it 

instigated by Burmese security forces against ethnic 
18

minority Muslims. Discrimination and religious 

freedom abuses are particularly severe for Rohingya 

Muslims, who are denied citizenship on the grounds 

that their ancestors did not reside in the country prior 

to British colonial rule. Approximately 800,000 

Rohingya live in Burma, primarily in Rakhine state. 

Without citizenship, Rohingya Muslims face 

restrictions on their freedom of movement, and 

refugees report that some Rohingya are prevented 

from owning property legally, residing in certain 

townships, or attending state-run schools beyond the 

primary level. Since 1988, the government has 

permitted only three marriages per year per village in 

the predominantly Muslim parts of Rakhine state; 

efforts to lift this restriction have failed. Muslims 

also report difficulties in obtaining birth certificates 

for newborns, particularly in the city of Sittwe. 

Enforcement of such policies widened in the past 

year. Police and border guards also continue 

inspections of Muslim mosques in this area; if a 

mosque cannot show a valid building permit, the 

venue is ordered destroyed. Nine mosques were 

closed in the previous year. The government also 

permitted the destruction of religious centers and 

schools.

In June 2004, the UN Committee on the 

Rights of the Child expressed concern over the 

situation among Rohingya children, particularly with

regard to the denial of their right to food, health care, 

and education, as well as to their ability to survive, 

develop, and enjoy their own culture and be protected 

from discrimination. In April 2007, a panel of UN 

experts, including the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Human Rights in Myanmar and the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Racism, Racial Discrimination, and 

Xenophobia, issued a statement declaring that the 

Burmese government‘s denial of citizenship for 

Rohingya Muslims ―has seriously curtailed the full 

exercise of their civil political, economic, social and 

cultural rights and led to various discriminatory 

practices. This includes severe restrictions on 

freedom of movement; various forms of extortion and 

arbitrary taxation; land confiscation and forced 

evictions; restricted access to medical care, food and 

adequate housing; forced labor; and restrictions on 

marriages.‖ An estimated 30,000 Muslim Rohingya 

live in refugee camps in Bangladesh, Thailand, and 

other Asian countries. 

Christian groups continue regularly to 

experience difficulties in obtaining permission to 

build new churches, as well as to hold public 

ceremonies and festivals and import religious 

literature. Authorities have reportedly denied 

permission for the construction of new churches since 

1997 in certain parts of Chin state. Similar 

restrictions are reportedly imposed in the capital of 

Kachin state, in some localities in Karen state, and 

among Catholics and Baptists in Karenni state. In 

late 2007, a military general in Shan state confiscated 

land from a Catholic diocese and destroyed the home 

of the bishop. No compensation has been awarded. 

In all these areas, Christians are required to obtain a 

permit for any gathering of more than five people 

outside of a Sunday service. Permission is regularly 

denied, or secured only through bribes. Additional 

reports of church closings in Rangoon and Mandalay 

have been received within the last year. 

In January 2009, authorities in Rangoon 

ordered at least 100 churches to stop holding services 

and forced them to sign pledges to that effect. The 

order disproportionately affects churches that were 

forced to operate in rented apartments because they 

were denied permission to build a new church. Some 

Christians fear that these acts are retribution for the 

aid they provided in the relief efforts after Cyclone 

Nargis in May 2008, as it was at that time that the 

SPDC moved to disenfranchise some religious and 

ethnic minority populations and forcibly close 

religious charities assisting cyclone victims. In 

advance of a referendum on a new constitution, the 

national legislature passed a law disenfranchising 

leaders of ethnic minority religious communities, 

internally displaced people (IDPs), and Muslim 

Rohingyas. Religious and minority communities 

were—and continue to be—important constituencies 

that supported Burma‘s main opposition party, the 

National Democracy League (NLD). The new 

constitution has been roundly criticized by 

international observers, as it attempts formally to 

legitimize the SPDC regime‘s rule, provide immunity 

to the SPDC for all human rights abuses committed 

since 1988, and prohibit NLD leader Aung San Suu 
19

Kyi from holding national office. Though the 

constitution acknowledges the ―special position of 

Buddhism,‖ it also notes the existence of other 

religions in the country, and contains language 

protecting all religions recognized in the constitution 

and prohibiting discrimination based on religious 

belief. However, given the SPDC‘s extremely poor 

human rights record, as long it holds a monopoly on 

power, such constitutional provisions are unlikely to 

be upheld. 

Among the Chin and Naga ethnic minorities, 

there are credible reports that government and 

military authorities made active efforts to convert 

Christians to Buddhism. Although some groups 

reported that these measures had decreased in the 

past year, local human rights organizations claim that 

the government persists in encouraging conversion. 

In Chin state, government authorities offered 

financial and career incentives to ethnic Burman 

Buddhist soldiers to marry Chin Christian women. 

Chin families who agreed to convert to Buddhism 

were offered monetary and material incentives, as 

well as exemption from forced labor. Christian Chins 

claim that the government operated a high school that 

only Buddhist students could attend; students were 

guaranteed jobs upon graduation. In February 2007, 

a Christian pastor was arrested for writing a letter to 

General Than Shwe, the chief of the military junta, 

urging an end to the persecution of Christians. Naga 

Christian refugees leaving Burma continually report 

that members of the army, together with Buddhist 

monks, closed churches in their villages and 

attempted to force adherents to convert to Buddhism. 

In an unprecedented unanimous resolution

passed shortly after the Burmese military 

government‘s crackdown during the Saffron 

Revolution, members of the UN Security Council 

condemned the Burmese junta‘s violent response to 

the peaceful demonstrations and called for the prompt 

release of political prisoners and for cooperation with 

a UN-led effort to engage the government in dialogue 

on a transition to civilian rule. In 2008, the UN 

General Assembly again passed a resolution 

condemning the continued human rights violations 

and urged the government to restore democracy. The 

UN Human Rights Council also issued similar 

condemnations in 2008 and 2009. The Secretary 

General‘s Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari has made 

seven trips to Burma since 2006, meeting with NLD 

and SPDC officials and twice with Aung San Suu 

Kyi. Mr. Gambari last visited Burma in February 

2009. Critics of the Special Envoy, however, claim 

that his mission has thus far not achieved any 

tangible results. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, UN Special 

Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar, visited

Burma for the first time in three years in 2007 and 

again in August 2008, during which time he met with 

government officials. His report details the 

government‘s failures in the recovery efforts after 

Cyclone Nargis and the inadequacies of the May 

2008 constitutional referendum. A planned trip by 

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon was canceled in 

December 2008. The Secretary General said he 

would visit Burma only when Burma has made 

―tangible progress‖ toward the goals the UN has set.

In the past year, Commission staff continued 

to meet with exiled Burmese ethnic and religious 

leaders, including Buddhists, Christians, and 

Muslims, and with members of congressional and 

international delegations that visited Burma. In 

December 2007, the Commission held a public 

hearing entitled ―After the Saffron Revolution: 

Religion, Repression, and Options for U.S. Policy in 

Burma.‖ In February 2008, Commissioner Nina Shea 

made a presentation on religious freedom concerns at 

a ―Briefing on Burma‖ held by the Congressional 

Taskforce on International Religious Freedom and 

the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has stated 

that U.S. policy toward Burma is under review. 

Repression of ethnic and religious minorities, severe 

restrictions of religious freedom and related human 

rights, and the imprisonment of Buddhist monks and 

other peaceful dissidents are critical concerns that 

require U.S. leadership and cooperation with regional 

and European allies and the United Nations. In 

addition to recommending that Burma be designated 

as a CPC, the Commission recommends that, as part 

of any Burma policy review, the U.S. government 

should: 
20

I. Strengthen the coordination of U.S. policy on 

Burma, both within the U.S government and with 

U.S. allies: 

appoint a Special Envoy on Burma, with the rank 

of Ambassador, to coordinate multilateral and 

bilateral diplomatic efforts and serve as the 

Administration‘s point person to bring about 

political reconciliation and democratic reform in 

Burma;

create an interagency taskforce on Burma at the 

National Security Council (NSC), staffed by a 

senior ranking official, to coordinate policy and 

actions on Burma throughout the U.S. 

government, including implementation of 

sanctions, humanitarian aid, democracy 

promotion, counternarcotics, trafficking in 

persons, and other policy objectives, including 

religious freedom and related human rights; and

organize a coalition of democratic nations in 

Asia to replace the moribund Bangkok Process 

in order to construct a roadmap outlining 

concrete steps Burma needs to take in order to 

end economic and political sanctions and engage 

with Burma‘s top leader on issues of concern, 

including addressing humanitarian and human 

rights abuses, the release of political and 

religious prisoners, a durable solution for 

refugees, and a transition to civilian rule. 

II. Assist and support U.N. and other multilateral 

diplomatic efforts: 

initiate action on a new UN Security Council 

resolution on Burma that offers the UN Secretary 

General a clear mandate for his interactions with 

Burmese authorities, including full and 

unimpeded access for the UN Special Envoy on 

Burma and the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Burma; a clear timetable, with repercussions, for 

the Burmese government if it does not 

immediately and unconditionally release all 

political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi; 

the establishment of a UN monitoring mission of 

the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 

inside Burma; and the taking of steps to ensure a 

peaceful and orderly transition to civilian rule; 

support the mission of the UN Secretary 

General‘s Special Envoy on Burma and the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Burma, including their 

unrestricted access to opposition political 

leaders, prisoners, independent human rights 

monitors, and humanitarian aid organizations in 

all parts of Burma; 

seek access to Burma by the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief 

for an immediate visit with unrestricted access to 

religious communities and to regions where 

religious freedom abuses are reported; and

urge ASEAN to expand the Tri-Partite Core 

Group to discuss other issues of concern with 

Burma, including protections for ethnic 

minorities and refugee issues.

III. Engage with the government of Burma and 

with Burma’s closest allies to urge the government 

of Burma to address issues of concern:

 release all persons detained or arrested for the 

peaceful exercise of religious freedom and 

related human rights, including revealing the 

whereabouts of people who are still detained and 

missing, including the Buddhist monks and 

others who led or participated in peaceful 

protests during August and September, 2008; 

 release National League for Democracy (NLD) 

Chair Aung San Suu Kyi and other political 

prisoners and urging the direct engagement with 

the NLD and leaders of the country‘s ethnic 

minority groups in a dialogue leading to a 

peaceful, time-bound, and monitored transition 

to democratic civilian rule;

 end the forced closures of churches and 

mosques, the destruction of religious shrines and 

symbols, the instigation of communal violence 

against Muslims, the forced promotion of 

Buddhism and the renunciation of other religions 
21

among ethnic minorities, and discrimination 

against non-Buddhist minorities;

 lift all restrictions on the construction and 

renovation of churches and mosques and on the 

printing of religious literature, consistent with 

international standards, and an end to policies of 

forced eviction from, and the confiscation and 

destruction of, Muslim and Christian properties, 

including mosques, churches, religious meeting 

points, schools, and cultural centers; 

 end the use of forced labor and the use of 

children and members of religious minorities as 

porters or military labor, and the active 

enforcement of its own Order 1/99 (May 1999) 

and Order Supplementing 1/99 (November 

2000), which instruct SPDC officials and 

military commanders to refrain from employing 

forced labor of civilians, except in emergencies;

 end policies that discriminate on the basis of 

religion in land use, education, allocation of 

land, job promotion, marriage, access to 

government services, citizenship, freedom of 

movement, and marriage, and the invitation of 

international technical assistance to help draft 

laws that conform to international legal standards 

on these matters;

 allow religious groups and civil society 

organizations to provide humanitarian and 

reconstruction assistance to the victims of natural 

disasters, including those still afflicted by the 

aftermath of Cyclone Nargis and allowing them 

to work openly with the UN, the Tri-Partite Core 

Group, and other international donors; 

 press for compliance with the recommendations 

of UN General Assembly Resolution 

A/C.3/60/L.53 on the Situation of Human Rights 

in Burma, adopted by the General Assembly in 

November 2005, which includes the granting of 

unimpeded access to both the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Burma and the UN Secretary 

General‘s Special Envoy on Burma; and 

 ratify core international human rights 

instruments, including the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

IV. Support local democracy efforts: 

 continue to provide assistance, through the State 

Department‘s Economic Support Fund (ESF) 

and all other means, to empower Burmese civil 

society groups organizing humanitarian 

assistance, conducting human rights 

documentation efforts (particularly religious 

freedom abuses faced by the Muslim and 

Buddhist communities), and providing public 

advocacy, leadership, and legal training to 

Burmese living in and outside of Burma. 
22

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

(North Korea)

The Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea 

(DPRK or North Korea) continues to be one the 

world‘s most repressive regimes, where dissent is not 

tolerated and few protections exist for fundamental 

freedoms, including the freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion. Although the DPRK 

committed to protect religious freedom in its 

constitution and international human rights treaties, 

and claims to adhere to those commitments, there is

little evidence that the freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion exists in North Korea. The 

North Korean government officially sanctions a 

limited number of religious ―federations,‖ but they 

are headed by government officials, and are often 

used as diplomatic liaisons with international 

religious and humanitarian aid organizations. What 

religious practice or venues exist under the 

federation‘s purview is tightly controlled and used to 

advance the government‘s political or diplomatic 

agenda. Other public and private religious activity is 

prohibited and anyone discovered engaging in 

clandestine religious practice faces official 

discrimination, arrest, imprisonment, and possibly 

execution. Over the past year there have been no 

indications that the status of religious freedom has 

improved. In fact, reports continue to indicate that 

the North Korean government has taken new steps to 

combat the growth of clandestine religious activity, 

particularly that which reportedly is spread by crossborder contact with China. According to the 

testimony of North Korean refugees, anyone engaged 

in such activity can be arrested, tortured, and 

imprisoned. There were no new eyewitness reports 

of religious adherents being executed, though North 

Korea resumed public executions during the past year 

after a brief hiatus. The situation for North Korean 

refugees remains acute, both in China and upon 

forced repatriation, particularly if it is discovered that 

they had contact with South Koreans or foreign 

religious groups. The Commission continues to 

recommend that North Korea be designated as a 

―country of particular concern,‖ or CPC, which the 

Department of State has done since 2001.

North Korea once had a diverse and vibrant 

religious community comprised of Buddhists, 

Catholics, Protestants, and Chondokoyists (followers 

of Chondokyo, or ―Eastern Learning,‖ a syncretic 

belief largely based on Confucianism but which also 

incorporates elements of Taoism, Shamanism, 

Buddhism, and Catholicism). Since 1945, these 

communities have, for the most part, disappeared. 

Both Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim Jong Il, have 

severely repressed religious activity and replaced it 

with a nationalist ideology and a ―cult of personality‖ 

called Juche or Kim Il Sungism. All citizens are 

required to adhere to this belief system or face fines 

and other penalties, including imprisonment. 

Pictures of the ―Great Leader‖ (Kim Il Sung) and the 

―Dear Leader‖ (Kim Jong Il) must be displayed on 

the walls of homes, schools, and workplaces. Every 

North Korean wears a lapel pin of the Great Leader 

and students are required to study and memorize the 

―Ten Principles for the Establishment of the OneIdeology System of the Party.‖ Juche is considered 

preeminent ideology and Kim Jong Il has been 

quoted in North Korean media sources as saying that 

Juche should be given precedence over all other 

academic subjects in the nation‘s schools. In addition 

to teaching Juche in schools, each North Korean 

community reportedly maintains a ―Kim Il Sung 

Research Center‖ or similar institution where local 

citizens are required to attend weekly meetings to 

watch propaganda films, listen to indoctrination 

sessions on the principles of Juche, and engage in 

public self criticism sessions. Any functioning 

religious belief or practice is viewed, by the 

government, as a challenge to the pre-eminence of 

the cult of personality surrounding the Kim family.

In addition to the government‘s strict control 

over religion, the DPRK also tightly controls the flow 

of information in and out of the country. This tight 

control makes it difficult to gather detailed and 

timely data about religious freedom and related 

human rights in North Korea. Therefore, in 2005 the 

Commission authorized researchers to begin 

interviews with North Korean refugees to study 

conditions in the country and for refugees seeking 

asylum in China. These interviews resulted in two 

studies.1 These interviews confirmed the pervasive 

strength of the ―cult of personality‖ surrounding the 
23

Kim family and provided eyewitness accounts of 

arrests and executions of individuals engaged in 

clandestine religious activity. The latest series of 

interviews also confirmed that refugees who are 

forcibly repatriated from China are extremely 

vulnerable to ill treatment in custody, hard labor, and 

imprisonment in North Korea‘s infamous prison 

camps if they admit, or are suspected, to have contact 

with South Korean aid organizations, have converted 

to Christianity, or had smuggled Bibles. Interviews 

with former police and security officials provided 

extremely useful insight into the government‘s 

growing fear that the recent spread of Christianity 

through cross-border contacts with China poses a 

new national security threat. The interviews detailed 

the tactics the North Korean government uses to 

uncover clandestine religious activity by infiltrating 

churches, training border guards to spot Christian 

converts, and setting up mock prayer meetings to 

entrap converts. 

In 1988, following the model used by the 

former Soviet Union, the DPRK created ―religious 

federations‖ for Buddhists, Chondokyists, Protestants 

and Catholics. The federations were used to blunt 

international criticism of North Korea‘s religious 

freedom record by purporting to represent religious 

communities long repressed through a compliant 

front organization. The federations oversee the 

building of churches and temples in Pyongyang and 

recently have refurbished Buddhist temples as tourist 

attractions in other parts of North Korea. During the 

famine years of the 1990s, these federations helped 

negotiate foreign aid and development assistance 

from international humanitarian organizations. 

Former refugees and defectors have testified that the 

federations are led by political operatives whose 

goals are to implement the government‘s policy of 

control over religious activity, gain foreign 

humanitarian assistance, and maintain religious sites 

as cultural centers. A former member of the National 

Security Agency testified to the Commission that 

religious venues in Pyongyang are intended to be 

showcases of religious openness, though foreigners 

are not allowed to interact with anyone who is not a 

security agent and all sanctioned religious activity is 

limited to Pyongyang. 

Despite its deep historical roots in Korean 

culture, Buddhism has been systematically repressed 

in North Korea. Recent refugees provide scarce 

eyewitness evidence of clandestine Buddhist 

religious activity. Temples and shrines are 

maintained as cultural heritage sites by caretaker 

monks (gwalliwon) who do not perform religious 

functions. These monks are reportedly employed by 

the government and their activities are limited to 

giving lectures, leading tours, and meeting foreign 

dignitaries. Refugees testify that the government has 

started actively to restore Buddhist temples and 

shrines, including refurbishing of a site at Anbul, 

South Hamgyeong Province in 2000 and the 

rebuilding of the Shingye Temple in 2005. 

The North Korean government has also 

authorized the building of some Christian churches. 

Between 1988 and 1992, one Catholic and two 

Protestant churches were built in Pyongyang, and 

services have been held in these churches since the 

mid-1990s in response to the growing presence of 

foreign aid workers in Pyongyang. However, former 

intelligence officers testify to the fact that these series 

are tightly controlled and heavily monitored. Most 

refugees believe these sites exist solely as showpieces 

for foreign visitors. Reports indicate that North 

Koreans attend services in the Christian churches, but 

attendance is limited to those whose families were 

Christians prior to the Korean War who reportedly 

are bussed by the government to the venues when 

foreign dignitaries visit. The government will not 

allow the Catholic Church to have an ordained priest. 

However, a group of Catholic priests was allowed to 

travel from South Korea in September 2008 to hold a 

mass. The government also authorized the building 

of the Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church in 

Pyongyang in August 2006. Kim Jong Il visited a 

Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow in 2005 and 

said that he wanted to build a similar church in North 

Korea. He allowed two North Koreans to train at the 

Russian Orthodox Seminary in Moscow and they 

now serve as Holy Trinity‘s ordained priests. 

The North Korean government also claims 

there are 500 approved ―house churches‖ in the 

country. South Korean scholars allowed to attend 

some ―house church‖ services have reported that the 
24

participants are primarily individuals whose families 

were Christians before 1950 and are allowed to 

gather for worship without leaders or religious 

materials. The tiny number of ―house church‖ 

adherents reportedly are no longer viewed as security 

threats. Nevertheless, ―house church‖ members are 

grouped together in certain housing blocks and face 

official discrimination and constant surveillance. The 

North Korean government views new religious 

growth, particularly Protestantism spread through 

cross-border contacts with China or repatriated 

refugee converts, as the threat that requires new 

measures to repress. 

According to refugee testimony and credible 

reports received by the Commission, underground 

religious activity is growing in North Korea, though 

the extent of such activity is unclear. Clandestine 

religious activity can include distributing religious 

literature, proselytizing, or gathering for worship, 

most of which occurs in the border region with 

China. Anyone caught engaging in these activities is 

subject to severe punishment including imprisonment 

in labor camps, torture, and possibly execution. New 

Protestant manifestations of religious activity are 

viewed as a South Korean or U.S. effort to undermine 

the government and as a direct challenge to the ―one 

and only faith‖ of Kim Il Sungism. In March 2006, 

Son Jong Nam was sentenced to death for spying 

based on evidence that he converted to Protestantism 

and has been reportedly severely tortured in prison. 

It is unclear, at this time, whether he has been 

executed. In past years persons sentenced to death 

for religious reasons, such as Son Jong Nam, were 

executed publicly. However, there has not been new 

eyewitness testimony from refugees about public 

executions of religious adherents. There is also no 

new eyewitness information available to determine 

whether such executions continue in secret. 

In 2007, Kim Je-Yell, a Canadian citizen 

who operated a dental clinic in the northeastern city 

of Rajin, was arrested for holding clandestine 

religious meetings in the northeastern city of Rajin. 

He was imprisoned and through diplomatic efforts 

was finally released in January 2008.

Imprisoning religious believers is reportedly 

quite common, according to refugee testimony, but 

neither the State Department nor any other official or 

non-governmental source has been able to document 

the number of religious prisoners. The most reliable 

information comes from North Korean groups in 

South Korea, who report that an estimated 6,000 

Christians are incarcerated in ―Prison No. 15‖ in the 

northern part of the country. Refugee testimony 

confirms that religious prisoners are treated worse 

than other inmates. They are typically given the most 

dangerous tasks in the labor camps and are subject to 

constant abuse to force them to renounce their faith. 

When they refuse renunciation, they are often beaten 

and tortured. There are also corroborated reports on 

forced abortions and cases of infanticide in the North 

Korean prison camps. Christianity is reportedly 

spreading amongst the North Korean population 

because of increased proselytizing efforts from 

refugees who are converted and trained in China. 

Prolonged famine and food shortage in 

North Korea have created a cross-border refugee 

problem in northern China. Over the past decade, 

hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled across 

the border to China because of famine conditions and 

repression and many have sought refuge in South 

Korea. China considers all North Koreas to be 

―economic migrants‖ and forcibly repatriates them, 

for which it has come under sustained, but to date 

inconsequential, international criticism. According to 

the concluding observations of the UN Committee on 

Torture‘s (CAT) review of China, the repatriation of 

North Korea may violate Article 3 of the Convention 

Against Torture, to which China is a party, which 

provides that no ―State should expel, return or 

extradite‖ anyone to another country where there is 

―substantial grounds for believing‖ that they would 

be subjected to torture. The CAT urged China to halt 

forced repatriations and to adopt legislation to protect 

asylum seekers consistent with Article 3. 

It is illegal to leave North Korea and those 

who do are punished, some severely. Due to the vast 

number of citizens seeking food in China, the 

government has been forced to ease its punishments, 

sentencing those repatriated to short period of 

detention or forced labor. However, over the past 
25

few years, refugees report that the government is 

returning to its harsher penalties for repatriated North 

Koreans, regardless of their reasons for fleeing. 

Anyone suspected of having contact with either 

South Korean humanitarian or religious organizations 

is extensively interrogated to determine if they have 

become Christian or have otherwise been 

―contaminated‖ by their contact with religious groups 

and subject to mistreatment and imprisonment. 

Refugees continue to provide evidence that security 

forces often use torture during these interrogation 

sessions and then imprison the refugees in hard labor 

facilities designated for political prisoners. The 

regime has always been suspect of Christianity and 

religious activity, but increased cross-border contact 

with China and the presence of foreign humanitarian 

and religious organizations working among North 

Korean refugee populations has heightened the 

regime‘s fears. In fact, the government continues to 

offer rewards to its citizens for providing information 

that leads to the arrest of individuals suspected of 

involvement in cross-border missionary activities or 

the distribution of Bibles or other religious literature. 

Commissioners and staff have met with 

North Korean refugees, South Korean experts and 

religious leaders, and U.S. Government officials 

regarding religious freedom and related human rights 

in North Korea. The Commission has also urged that 

China‘s obligations to protect North Korean refugees 

be a top international concern and has met with 

Chinese officials and officials from the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees. Joined by both 

Congressmen and Senators, the Commission publicly 

released its report, A Prison Without Bars, in April 

2008. The Commission also traveled in May 2008 to 

Seoul, South Korea to release the Korean language 

version of the report and meet with South Korean 

government officials, journalists, and members of 

civil society and participant in an academic 

conference concerning international religious 

freedom and the repatriation and torture of repatriated 

refugees. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

In addition to recommending that North 

Korea continue to be designated as a CPC, the 

Commission makes the following recommendations.

I. Integrating Human Rights and Human 

Security Issues into Negotiations on Security 

Concerns in Northeast Asia

The U.S. government should:

work with regional and European allies to 

fashion a comprehensive plan for security 

concerns on the Korean Peninsula that includes 

agreements on human rights and humanitarian 

concerns—modeled after the Helsinki Final Act 

of 1975 and the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe—as suggested by the 

Commission and in Sec. 106 of the North 

Korean Human Rights Act of 2008 (Public Law 

108-333; 22 U.S.C. 7801); 

in negotiations both on nuclear security and 

stability on the Korean Peninsula, including at 

the Six-Party Talks, work with regional allies to 

reach agreements on pressing human rights and 

human security concerns, including monitoring 

of humanitarian aid, resettlement of refugees, 

family reunifications, abductions, and other 

pressing human rights issues, including religious 

freedom, and linking future economic assistance 

and diplomatic recognition to concrete progress 

in these areas; and

initiate, within the formal structure of the Six 

Party Talks, targeted working groups on issues 

of regional and international concern, including 

monitoring of humanitarian aid, refugees, and

abductions, fully integrate these issues into the 

agenda of the Six Party Talks at the earliest 

possible date, and link future economic, political, 

and diplomatic assistance to progress in these 

areas.
26

II. Fulfilling the Mandate of the Special 

Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea

The U.S. government should:

ensure that all funds authorized under the North 

Korean Human Rights Act of 2008 (the Act) are 

requested and used to fulfill the purposes of the 

Act; and

ensure that the Special Envoy on Human Rights 

in North Korea, appointed by the President in 

accordance with the Act, fully implements key 

provisions of the Act including new human 

rights and democracy programming, promotion 

of information into and out of North Korea, and 

discussions with foreign governments about a 

durable solution to the plight of North Korean 

refugees including seeking broader permission 

and greater cooperation from foreign 

governments on refugee protection and 

resettlement.

III. Protecting and Aiding North Korean 

Refugees

The U.S. government should:

urge the Chinese government to uphold its 

international obligations to protect asylum 

seekers, by 1) working with the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to 

establish a mechanism to confer temporary 

asylum on those seeking such protection and to 

permit safe transport to countries of final 

asylum; 2) providing the UNHCR with 

unrestricted access to interview North Korean 

nationals in China; and 3) ensuring that the 

return of any migrants pursuant to any bilateral 

agreement does not violate China‘s obligations 

under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 

Protocol or under Article 3 of the Convention 

Against Torture; 

urge the Chinese government to allow 

international humanitarian organizations greater 

access to North Koreans in China, to address 

growing social problems, abuses, and 

exploitation experienced by this vulnerable 

population, and work with regional and 

European allies to articulate a consistent and 

clear message about China‘s need to protect 

North Korean refugees; 

in bilateral relations with China, Russia, 

Mongolia, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and 

other countries in East Asia, continue to stress 

U.S. and international concerns about providing 

safe haven, secure transit, and clear resettlement 

procedures for North Koreans; 

make every effort to ensure that its screening, 

processing, and resettlement of North Korean 

refugees are as efficient and expeditious as 

possible; and

continue coordination among the Department of 

State, the Department of Homeland Security, and 

regional allies, including South Korea, to 

facilitate the resolution of any remaining 

technical, legal, or diplomatic issues that hinder 

additional resettlement of North Koreans in the 

United States. 

IV. Pursuing Multilateral Diplomacy and 

Human Rights in North Korea 

The U.S. government should:

encourage nations with diplomatic relations with 

North Korea to include religious freedom and 

other human rights in their talks with North 

Korea, and to urge the North Korean government 

to invite UN Special Rapporteurs and other 

appropriate UN bodies to assess the human 

rights and humanitarian situation in the country, 

to monitor the delivery of humanitarian 

assistance, and to recommend reforms and 

technical assistance programs; 

urge the Office of the UN High Commissioner 

on Human Rights to open an office in Seoul, 

South Korea for the purpose of initiating 

technical assistance programs addressing 

regional and transnational issues including, but 

not limited to, abductions, human trafficking, 

police and border guard training, legal reform, 
27

political prisoners, and abuses of freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief; and

work with regional allies and appropriate 

international bodies to ensure that future 

economic, energy, or humanitarian assistance to 

North Korea will be effectively monitored to 

ensure that aid reaches the most vulnerable 

populations and is not diverted to military use.

V. Expanding Public Diplomacy Programs 

for North Korea 

The U.S. government should:

continue to expand radio, television, Internet, 

and print information available to the North 

Korean people through:

-- additional appropriations to the Broadcasting 

Board of Governors to allow Radio Free Asia 

and Voice of America to increase shortwave 

and medium-wave broadcasting to North 

Korea; and 

 

-- additional funding through the National 

Endowment for Democracy and the 

Department of State Human Rights and 

Democracy Fund to disseminate information 

on human rights, including religious freedom, 

inside North Korea in the form of written and 

electronic materials, DVDs, and digital 

programming.

VI. Congressional Action to Advance 

Religious Freedom and Related Rights on the 

Korean Peninsula: 

The U.S. Congress should: 

create an inter-parliamentary working group that 

includes current and former elected officials and 

other experts from the United States, Europe, and 

Asia to discuss ways to include human rights and 

human security concerns in any future security 

arrangement in Northeast Asia, provide ideas for 

diplomats and policymakers, and build public 

and political support for creating a framework 

that addresses both human rights and other 

outstanding security and economic concerns on 

the Korean Peninsula;

continue to appropriate all the funds authorized 

in the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2008 

for public diplomacy, refugee assistance, 

democratization programs, and relevant travel by 

the Special Envoy on North Korea; and

raise religious freedom and related human rights 

as a prominent concern in appropriate 

congressional or congressional staff visits to 

North Korea, including distributing Korean 

language reports of the Commission, and 

reiterate requests seeking access for international 

monitors to North Korean prisons as promised 

by North Korean officials to visiting Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee delegation in 

August 2003. 

 

1

 ̳Thank You Father Kim Il Sung:’ Eyewitness 

Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of 

Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea 

(authored by David Hawk) and a follow-up study 

entitled  ̳A Prison Without Bars:’ Refugee and 

Defector Testimony of Severe Violations of Religion 

and Belief in North Korea. Over the past four years, 

the Commission has interviewed 78 refugees and 

defectors who escaped North Korea between the 

years 2000-2007. Both of the Commission‘s reports 

on North Korea can be found on its website, 

http://www.uscirf.gov.
28

Eritrea

 

The government of Eritrea continues to 

engage in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom. Violations include 

arbitrary arrests and detention without charge of 

members of unregistered religious groups, and the 

torture or other ill-treatment of hundreds of persons 

on account of their religion, sometimes resulting in 

death. Other serious concerns continue to include 

the prolonged ban on public religious activities by all 

religious groups that are not officially recognized, 

closure by the authorities of the places of worship of 

these religious groups, inordinate delays in acting on 

registration applications by religious groups, and the 

disruption of private religious and even social 

gatherings of members of unregistered groups. Since 

February 2004, the Commission has recommended 

that the State Department designate Eritrea as a 

―country of particular concern,‖ or CPC. The State 

Department did so in September 2004, September 

2005, November 2006, and January 2009. (The gap 

between November 2006 and January 2009 resulted 

from an absence of new designations rather than any 

improvement in conditions in 2007 or 2008.) 

Because religious freedom conditions have remained 

severe in the past year, with new mass arrests of 

members of unregistered churches, a renewed 

campaign of arrests of Jehovah's Witnesses, and 

reportedly thousands of long-term religious prisoners, 

both Christian and Muslim, the Commission 

continues to recommend that Eritrea remain a CPC.

In September 2005, when renewing the CPC 

designation, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza 

Rice announced the denial of commercial export to 

Eritrea of defense articles and services covered by the 

Arms Control Export Act, with some items 

exempted. This was the first unique presidential 

action to be undertaken under the International 

Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) in response 

to a CPC designation.

Eritrea has been ruled by the Popular Front 

for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) since the country 

gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 

following a lengthy war. After an initially promising 

start toward democratization, the PFDJ government 

has become increasingly repressive, with power 

concentrated in the hands of the President and a small 

cadre of associates who fought in the liberation 

struggle. In 2001, the government suspended 

implementation of a democratic constitution, 

canceled elections, curtailed press freedom, began a 

crackdown on political opponents, and restricted 

religious groups it perceived as undermining national 

unity. The government maintains the country on a 

near-war footing, reportedly anticipating renewed 

hostilities with Ethiopia. 

The Eritrean government officially 

recognizes four religious communities: the (Coptic) 

Orthodox Church of Eritrea; Sunni Islam; the Roman 

Catholic Church; and the Evangelical Church of 

Eritrea, a Lutheran-affiliated denomination.

Although there is no state religion, the government 

has close ties to the Orthodox Church, the largest and 

oldest of Eritrea‘s Christian communities, and is 

hostile toward newer Christian groups—in particular, 

Evangelical and Pentecostal denominations. 

Government officials have criticized ―nontraditional‖ Christian denominations for engaging in 

evangelism that is allegedly socially divisive, 

aggressive, and alien to Eritrea‘s cultural traditions. 

Government officials have also pointed to the actions 

of foreign or foreign-inspired Muslim 

fundamentalists as seeking to radicalize traditional 

Eritrean practice of Islam and thus create tensions in 

a society that is roughly half Christian and half 

Muslim. Government concerns regarding foreign 

backing of religious groups have resulted in strict 

controls both on humanitarian activities by 

international faith-based organizations and on foreign 

funding to indigenous groups for reportedly religious 

or charitable activities. 

In 2002, the government imposed a 

registration requirement on religious groups other 

than the four ―sanctioned‖ religions, requiring 

detailed financial and membership information, as 

well as background on their presence in Eritrea. 

Among those affected were Protestant Evangelical 

and Pentecostal Christian denominations, as well as 

the Baha‘is. Some of these faith communities have 

operated in Eritrea for several decades. Jehovah‘s 
29

Witnesses were not offered the opportunity to 

register. By stipulating that there could be no public 

religious activities until registration has been 

approved by the government, the decree effectively 

closed places of worship and prohibited public 

religious activities, including worship services, of all 

unregistered religious communities. Although some 

groups submitted the required applications, none 

have been approved to date. As a result of the 

registration requirement and of the government‘s 

inaction on registration applications, all of Eritrea‘s 

religious communities except the four governmentsanctioned ones lack a legal basis on which to 

practice their faiths publicly. 

 As part of the campaign against the religious 

activities of those persons not belonging to officially 

recognized religious denominations, Eritrean security 

forces have disrupted private worship, conducted 

mass arrests of participants at religious weddings, 

prayer meetings, and other gatherings, and detained 

those arrested without charge for indefinite periods of 

time. Because of government restrictions, it is 

difficult to determine the precise number of persons 

imprisoned for their practice of or participation in

religious activities, and releases sometimes go 

unreported; however, the State Department reports 

that ―hundreds of followers of various unregistered 

churches‖ were ―detained, harassed, and abused‖ 

during the past year. For example, in November 

2008 there were reports of arrests of over 110 

members of unregistered churches in Barentu, 

Dekemhare, Mendefera, and Abi-Kuala. In 

December 2008, approximately 50 members of 

unregistered churches were reportedly arrested in 

Asmara over a two-week period. In January 2009, 

15 members of one unregistered church were arrested 

in Keren. A total of 180 Muslims are reportedly 

imprisoned, some for as long as15 years, due to their 

opposition to the government-appointed mufti. Some 

prisoners, both Christians and Muslims, are believed 

to be held at military training camps. 

Persons detained for religious activities 

often were not formally charged, permitted access to 

legal counsel, accorded due process, or allowed 

access to their families. Some prisoners 

were released after detentions of several days or less, 

but others spent longer periods in detention. The 

government held individuals who were jailed on 

account of their religious affiliation at a variety of 

venues, including facilities administered by the 

military. There are credible reports, including during 

the past year, that the security forces have used 

coercion on detainees to secure repudiations of faith; 

some prisoners were required to recant their religious 

beliefs as a precondition of release. During the past 

year, there have been occasional reports of deaths of 

religious prisoners who refused to recant their beliefs 

and who were denied medical care or otherwise 

subjected to ill treatment. Detainees imprisoned in 

violation of freedom of religion and related human 

rights have reportedly been beaten, tortured, confined 

in crowded conditions, or subjected to extreme 

temperature fluctuations.

 

Government violations of religious freedom 

are alleged to be particularly severe in the armed 

forces. During the war with Ethiopia, some Eritrean 

soldiers accepted various forms of Protestantism, 

reportedly alarming government officials and leading 

to the banning of prayer meetings among armed 

forces members. Attendance at such meetings is 

punishable by imprisonment. Moreover, armed 

forces members and national service inductees 

reportedly face severe punishment for possession of 

religious literature, including Bibles.

Since 1994, the government of Eritrea has 

denied a range of government services and civil and 

political rights to members of the country‘s small 

community of Jehovah‘s Witnesses. Many Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses refused on religious grounds to participate 

in the 1993 referendum on independence or to accept 

the national military service required of all citizens, 

both male and female. The government chose to 

interpret these actions as a rejection of Eritrean 

citizenship. In accordance with a presidential decree 

issued in October 1994, Jehovah‘s Witnesses have 

been barred from obtaining government jobs, 

business licenses, and government-issued identity 

and travel documents. Lack of Eritrean identity cards 

prevents Jehovah‘s Witnesses from obtaining legal 

recognition of marriages and land purchases.
30

The requirement of a military training 

component for secondary school graduation 

effectively denies educational and employment 

opportunities to young Jehovah‘s Witnesses, causing 

many to flee the country. Some children of 

Jehovah‘s Witnesses have been expelled from school 

because of their refusal to salute the flag or to pay for 

membership in the officially sanctioned national 

organization for youth and students. 

Over 40 Jehovah's Witnesses are currently 

being detained in Eritrea without trial or 

administrative appeal, in violation of minimal rights 

to due process. Although the maximum legal penalty 

for refusing to perform national service is two years, 

some Jehovah's Witnesses who have refused to serve 

in the military have been detained for over a decade. 

Individual members of the Jehovah‘s Witnesses are

regularly arrested and imprisoned for expressing their 

faith to others. Some are quickly released, while 

others are held indefinitely without charge. In a 

series of arrests beginning in July 2008 and extending 

into January 2009, 25 Jehovah's Witnesses, mostly 

adult males with families, were detained with no 

reason given for their arrests. 

Since 2005, the government has intervened 

in the internal affairs of the (Coptic) Orthodox 

Church of Eritrea, including by appointing a lay 

administrator for the Church and, in May 2007, 

engineering the replacement of Orthodox Patriarch 

Antonios with a more compliant successor. Security 

forces have targeted reformist elements in the 

Orthodox Church, arresting religious activists and 

preventing their meetings. Patriarch Antonios is 

reportedly under a strict form of house arrest and is 

being denied medical care. 

The government‘s concerns regarding 

religious activities appear to be linked to real or 

perceived security threats, and government 

spokespersons have cited Pentecostals, along with 

Muslim extremists, as threats to national security. 

Before Eritrea and Sudan normalized relations in 

2006, Islamic militants operating out of Sudan 

engaged in a low-level insurgency against the 

Eritrean government, occasionally employing 

terrorism as a tactic in their campaign to establish an 

Islamic state. International human rights 

organizations report, however, that many of the 

Muslims detained without charge are non-violent 

critics of alleged anti-Muslim discrimination or of the 

government-recognized leadership of the Muslim 

community. None of the suspected Christian groups 

are known to have engaged in or advocated violence. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

 

As a consequence of the designation of 

Eritrea as a CPC, the Commission again recommends 

that the U.S. government should:

 maintain the denial of commercial export to 

Eritrea of defense articles and services covered 

by the Arms Control Export Act, with some 

items exempted, as announced by the Secretary 

of State in September 2005;

engage in vigorous advocacy of religious 

freedom and other universal human rights at all 

levels of involvement with the government of 

Eritrea and draw international attention to 

religious freedom abuses there, including in 

multilateral fora such as the United Nations; and

thoroughly review development assistance to 

Eritrea and condition any resumption of 

development assistance to Eritrea on measurable 

improvements in religious freedom; if such 

assistance is to be resumed, ensure that it is 

directed to programs that contribute directly to 

democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. 

With regard to religious freedom conditions 

in Eritrea, the Commission has recommended that the 

U.S. government should:

urge the government of Eritrea to undertake the 

following actions to improve respect for 

religious freedom in that country by:

--releasing detainees held solely on account of 

their peaceful religious activities; 

--implementing the constitution‘s existing 

guarantees of freedom of thought, conscience, 
31

and religion, including the freedom to practice 

any religion and to manifest such practice;

--instituting a registration process for religious 

groups that is transparent, non-discriminatory, 

not overly burdensome, and otherwise in 

accordance with international standards;

--promptly registering those religious groups that 

comply with the requirements issued in 2002, 

and not requiring religious groups to provide 

identifying information on individual 

members;

--taking official, public action to permit religious 

groups to resume their public religious 

activities pending registration, including 

reopening of places of worship closed by the 

ban in 2002;

--issuing a public order to the security forces 

reminding them that religious practice is not to 

be interfered with except in those 

circumstances permitted by international law; 

and

--extending an official invitation for visits by the 

UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief and by the UN Working 

Group on Arbitrary Detention;

encourage unofficial dialogue with Eritreans on 

religious freedom issues, specifically by:

--the promotion of a visit to Eritrea by U.S. 

leaders concerned with freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief in order to 

meet with Eritrean authorities and other 

opinion-makers and to facilitate dialogue 

among all of Eritrea‘s religious communities;

--the expanded use of educational and cultural 

exchanges, such as the Fulbright Program, the 

International Visitor Program, and lectures by 

visiting American scholars and experts, in 

order to introduce more Eritreans to the 

workings and benefits of societies in which 

religious freedom and other human rights are 

respected; 

seek the cooperation of other countries in 

promoting greater understanding by Eritreans of 

international standards regarding freedom of 

religion or belief;

intensify international efforts to resolve the 

current impasse between Eritrea and Ethiopia 

regarding implementation of the boundary 

demarcation as determined by the ―final and 

binding‖ decision of the International Boundary 

Commission that was established following the 

1998-2000 war; and

support, and offer to provide funding for, the 

creation of an independent human rights 

commission in Eritrea, in line with the Paris 

Principles1for such organizations, including 

independence, adequate funding, a representative 

character, and a broad mandate that includes 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief.

 

1 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of 

National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of 

Human Rights, found in the Annex to Fact Sheet No. 

19, National Institutions for the Promotion and 

Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High 

Commissioner for Human Rights 

(http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm).
32

Iran

The government of Iran continues to engage 

in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of 

religious freedom, including prolonged detention, 

torture, and executions based primarily or entirely 

upon the religion of the accused. Iran is a 

constitutional, theocratic republic that inherently 

discriminates against its citizens on the basis of 

religion or belief. Over the past few years, the 

Iranian government‘s poor religious freedom record 

has deteriorated, especially for religious minorities 

and in particular for Baha‘is as well as Sufi Muslims 

and Evangelical Christians, including intensified 

physical attacks, harassment, detention, arrests, and 

imprisonment. In September 2008, the Iranian 

parliament took further steps toward passing a 

revised penal code that would codify serious 

punishments, including the death penalty, on converts 

from Islam. Heightened anti-Semitism and repeated 

Holocaust denial threats and activities by senior 

government officials have increased fear among 

Iran‘s Jewish community. Since the 1979 Iranian 

Revolution, significant numbers from religious 

minority communities have fled Iran for fear of 

persecution. Dissident Muslims also continue to be 

subject to abuse. Since 1999, the State Department 

has designated Iran as a ―country of particular 

concern,‖ or CPC. The Commission recommends 

that Iran again be designated as a CPC. 

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 

Iran proclaims Islam, specifically the doctrine of the 

Twelver (Shi‘a) Jaafari School, to be the official 

religion of the country. It stipulates that all laws and 

regulations, including the Constitution itself, be 

based on Islamic criteria. The head of state, 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the Supreme Leader of 

the Islamic Revolution and has direct control over the 

armed forces, the internal security forces, and the 

judiciary. The Supreme Leader is chosen by the 

Assembly of Experts, a group of 86 Islamic scholars 

elected by popular vote from a government-screened 

list of candidates. All legislation passed by the 

Majlis (parliament) is reviewed for adherence to 

Islamic and constitutional principles by the Guardian 

Council, half of whose members are appointed by the 

Supreme Leader. The Guardian Council also has the 

power under the Constitution to screen and disqualify 

candidates for all elective offices, including the 

Assembly of Experts and the 290-member Majlis,

based on a vague and arbitrary set of requirements, 

including candidates‘ ideological and religious 

beliefs. Disputes over legislation between the Majlis

and the Guardian Council are adjudicated by the 

Expediency Council, an advisory body appointed by 

the Supreme Leader. Five seats in the Majlis are 

reserved for recognized religious minorities: two for 

Armenian Christians, one for Assyrian Christians, 

and one each for Jews and Zoroastrians. 

In recent years, hundreds of prominent 

Muslim activists and dissidents from among the Shi‘a 

majority advocating political reform have been 

sentenced to lengthy prison terms by the 

Revolutionary Court on charges of seeking to 

overthrow the Islamic system in Iran; many others 

have been arrested and detained for alleged 

blasphemy and criticizing the nature of the Islamic 

regime. Reformists and journalists are regularly tried 

under current press laws and the Penal Code on 

charges of ―insulting Islam,‖ criticizing the Islamic 

Republic, and publishing materials that deviate from 

Islamic standards. Following a visit to Iran in 2004, 

the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom 

of Opinion and Expression concluded that such 

charges brought by Iranian courts ―lack any objective 

criteria‖ and are open to ―subjective and arbitrary 

interpretation by judges implementing them.‖ In 

March 2009, Iranian blogger Omid Mirsayafi died in 

prison while serving a 30-month sentence imposed by 

a revolutionary court in Tehran for ―propaganda 

against the state‖ and criticism of religious leaders; 

Iranian authorities claim his death was a suicide but 

his lawyer and family have demanded an 

investigation. 

 

A number of senior Shi‘a religious leaders 

who have opposed various religious and/or political 

tenets and practices of the Iranian government have 

also been targets of state repression, including house 

arrest, detention without charge, trial without due 

process, torture, and other forms of ill treatment. In 

October 2006, Ayatollah Mohammad Kazemeni 

Boroujerdi, a senior Shi‘a cleric who advocates the 

separation of religion and state, and a number of his 
33

followers were arrested and imprisoned after clashes 

with riot police. He and 17 of his followers were 

initially sentenced to death, but the death sentences 

were later withdrawn. In August 2007, he was 

sentenced to one year in prison in Tehran followed by 

another ten years in prison in another part of the 

country. In addition, Ayatollah Boroujerdi was 

reportedly defrocked and his house and all his 

belongings were confiscated. According to the State 

Department, in November 2008, supporters of 

Ayatollah Boroujerdi, who is said to be in poor 

health, reported that prison officials ―severely beat 

him and moved him from Evin Prison to an 

undisclosed location despite appeals for release on 

medical grounds.‖ In October 2008, Iranian 

authorities rearrested nine of his followers who were 

originally arrested in 2006; their status is unknown.

Muslim minorities continue to face 

repression. Some Iranian Sunni leaders have 

reported widespread abuses and restrictions on their 

religious practice, including detentions and torture of 

Sunni clerics, as well as bans on Sunni teachings in 

public schools and Sunni religious literature, even in 

predominantly Sunni areas. Sufi and Sunni Muslim 

leaders are regularly intimidated and harassed by 

intelligence and security services and report 

widespread official discrimination. The Sunni 

community still has not been able to build a mosque 

in Tehran. Also, there have been allegations that the 

Iranian government discriminates against the Sunni 

community in government employment, particularly 

leadership positions in the executive and judicial 

branches. 

During the past year, arrests and harassment 

of Sufis increased significantly. In February 2009, at 

least 40 Sufis in Isfahan were arrested after protesting 

the destruction of a Sufi place of worship; all were 

released within days. In January, Jamshid Lak, a 

Gonabadi Dervish from the Nematollahi Sufi order, 

one of the country‘s largest Sufi sects, was flogged 

74 times after being convicted in 2006 of ―slander‖ 

following his public allegation of ill-treatment by a 

Ministry of Intelligence official. In late December 

2008, after the closure of a Sufi place of worship, 

authorities arrested without charge at least six 

members of the Gonabadi Dervishes on Kish Island 

and confiscated their books and computer equipment; 

their status is unknown. In November 2008, Amir 

Ali Mohammad Labaf was sentenced to a five-year 

prison term, 74 lashes, and internal exile to the 

southeastern town of Babak for ―spreading lies,‖ 

based on his membership in the Nematollahi 

Gonabadi Sufi order. In October, at least seven Sufi 

Muslims in Isfahan, and five others in Karaj, were 

arrested because of their affiliation with the 

Nematollahi Gonabadi Sufi order; they remain in 

detention. In November 2007, clashes in the western 

city of Borujerd between security forces and 

followers of a mystic Sufi order resulted in dozens of 

injuries and the arrests of approximately 180 Sufi 

Muslims. The clashes occurred after authorities 

began bulldozing a Sufi monastery. It is unclear how 

many remain in detention or if any charges have been 

brought against those arrested. During the past year, 

there were numerous reports of Shi‘a clerics and 

prayer leaders, particularly in Qom, denouncing 

Sufism and the activities of Sufi Muslims in the 

country in both sermons and public statements. In 

addition, there were reports that the government is 

considering banning Sufism outright. 

The constitution of Iran formally recognizes 

Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians as protected 

religious minorities who may worship freely and 

have autonomy over their own matters of personal 

status (e.g. marriage, divorce, and inheritance). 

Nevertheless, the primacy of Islam and Islamic laws 

and institutions adversely affects the rights and status 

of non-Muslims. Members of these groups are 

subject to legal and other forms of discrimination, 

particularly in education, government jobs and 

services, and the armed services. Non-Muslims may 

not engage with Muslims in public religious 

expression or persuasion; some also face restrictions 

on publishing religious material in Persian. In 2004, 

the Expediency Council authorized collection of 

equal blood money for the death of Muslim and nonMuslim men. Baha‘is, Sabean Mandaean men, and 

all women remain excluded from the revised ruling. 

According to Iranian law, Baha‘i blood is mobah,

which means members of the Baha‘i faith can be 

killed with impunity.
34

Since August 2005, the Iranian government 

has intensified its campaign against non-Muslim 

religious minorities. A consistent stream of virulent 

and inflammatory statements by political and 

religious leaders and an increase in harassment and 

imprisonment of, and physical attacks against, these 

groups indicate a renewal of the kind of oppression 

seen in the years immediately following the Iranian 

revolution in the late 1970s. Ayatollah Ahmad 

Jannati, head of the Guardian Council, has publicly 

attacked non-Muslims and referred to them as ―sinful 

animals‖ and ―corrupt.‖ In October 2008, UN 

Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon issued a report on 

the situation of human rights in Iran, which included 

details of abuses against religious minorities by 

authorities, including arbitrary detentions, false 

imprisonment, and violent attacks against Baha‘is 

and arbitrary arrests and physical abuse of Sufi and 

Sunni Muslims and Christians. In December 2008, 

the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution 

condemning the Iranian government‘s poor human 

rights record, including its continued abuses targeting 

religious minorities and the escalation and increasing 

frequency of violations against members of the 

Baha‘i faith. In early 2008, the Iranian parliament 

began considering a new law that would impose 

serious punishments, including the death penalty, on 

converts from Islam. In September 2008, a 

committee in the Majlis approved advancing the 

amended language on apostasy, which could be 

passed by the full Majlis in the near future. Although 

the Iranian government has in the past applied the 

death penalty for apostasy under Islamic law, it has 

not been explicitly codified. If the proposed law is 

passed, it would further endanger the lives of all 

converts from Islam, particularly members of the 

Baha‘i faith, who are already considered apostates, 

even if they are fourth- or fifth-generation Baha‘i 

adherents.

The Baha‘i community has long been 

subject to particularly severe religious freedom 

violations in Iran. Baha‘is, who number 

approximately 300,000, are viewed as ―heretics‖ by 

Iranian authorities, and may face repression on the 

grounds of apostasy. Since 1979, Iranian government 

authorities have executed more than 200 Baha‘i 

leaders in Iran, and more than 10,000 have been 

dismissed from government and university jobs. 

Baha‘is may not establish places of worship, schools, 

or any independent religious associations in Iran. In 

addition, Baha‘is are barred from the military and 

denied government jobs and pensions as well as the 

right to inherit property, and their marriages and 

divorces are also not recognized. Baha‘i cemeteries, 

holy places, and community properties are often 

seized or desecrated and many important religious 

sites have been destroyed. 

In recent years, Baha‘is in Iran have faced 

increasingly harsh treatment, including increasing 

numbers of arrests and detentions and violent attacks 

on private homes and personal property. Baha‘i 

property has been confiscated or destroyed and 

dozens of Baha‘is have been harassed, interrogated, 

detained, imprisoned, or physically attacked. In 

February 2009, a Baha‘i cemetery in Semnan was 

desecrated, and in January, another Baha‘i cemetery 

was destroyed in Ghaemshahr. Baha‘i cemeteries 

also have been destroyed in Yazd and outside of 

Najafabad. In the past several years, a series of 

articles in the government-controlled newspaper 

Kayhan, whose managing editor is appointed by 

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, have vilified 

and demonized the Baha‘i faith and its community in 

Iran. Iranian authorities also have gone to great 

lengths to collect information on all members of the 

Baha‘i community in Iran and to monitor their 

activities. In the past, waves of repression against 

Baha‘is began with government orders to collect such 

information, and the latest 2006 directives have 

created a renewed sense of insecurity and heightened 

fear among Baha‘i adherents.

Nearly 200 Baha‘is have been arbitrarily 

arrested since early 2005 and, at present, more than 

30 Baha‘is remain in prison on account of their 

religion or belief. Dozens are awaiting trial while 

others have been sentenced to prison terms ranging 

from 90 days to several years. All of those convicted 

are in the process of appealing the verdicts. Charges 

typically ranged from ―causing anxiety in the minds 

of the public and of officials‖ to ―spreading 

propaganda against the regime.‖ In March and May 

2008, seven Baha‘i leaders – Fariba Kamalabadi, 

Jamaloddin Khanjani, Afif Naemi, Saeid Rezaie, 
35

Mahvash Sabet, Behrouz Tavakkoli, and Vahid 

Tizfahm – were arrested and taken to the notorious 

Evin prison in Tehran. All are members of an 

informal Baha‘i national coordinating group, known 

to the Iranian government, which was established to 

help meet the educational and social needs of the 

Baha‘i community after the Iranian government 

banned all formal Baha‘i activity in 1983. In 

February 2009, they were charged with espionage, 

―insulting religious sanctities,‖ and ―propaganda 

against the Islamic Republic‖—charges that could 

result in the death penalty. They have not had access 

to their legal counsel, Shirin Ebadi, the 2003 Nobel 

Laureate. Although statements by Iranian officials 

have suggested that a trial was imminent, no trial has 

yet taken place and a date is not known. In March 

and April 2009, several Baha‘is were arrested in 

Yazd, Semnan, Sari, and Shiraz, some of whom 

remain in detention. In January, four Baha‘is were 

arrested in Ghaemshahr after their homes were raided 

by Ministry of Intelligence officials. Also in January, 

at least six Baha‘is were arrested in Tehran on 

charges of ―insulting religious sanctities,‖ including a 

woman who worked at a human rights organization 

connected with Ebadi; five were released in March, 

including one who worked for Ebadi‘s center, which 

was closed by authorities in December 2008. In 

December 2008, at least eight Baha‘is were arrested 

on Kish Island, including two persons visiting from 

Canada; their status is unknown. 

In the past, Baha‘is in Iran have not been 

allowed to attend university. Significantly, in the fall 

of 2006, because the 2006-2007 applications did not 

require students to list religious affiliation, for the 

first time in decades nearly 300 Baha‘i students were 

admitted to a number of Iranian universities and 

colleges. However, the majority were later expelled 

when it became known that they were Baha‘is.

Although more than 1,000 Iranian Baha‘i students 

registered for the national university entrance 

examination for the 2007-2008 academic year, only 

77 were permitted to enroll. The low number is 

reportedly due to the fact that more than 800 Baha‘i 

students were only told months after they had 

completed the examination that their files were 

―incomplete.‖ Although the Iranian government 

maintains publicly that Baha‘is are free to attend 

university, reports over the past year indicate that the 

de facto policy of preventing Baha‘is from obtaining 

higher education remains in effect. Of the very few 

Baha‘is who are enrolled in universities, several were 

expelled during the past year once their religious 

beliefs became known. Furthermore, during the past 

few years, young Baha‘i schoolchildren in primary 

and high schools increasingly have been vilified, 

pressured to convert to Islam, and in some cases, 

expelled on account of their religion. 

Christians in Iran, in particular Evangelical 

and other Protestants, continue to be subject to 

harassment, arrests, close surveillance, and 

imprisonment; many are reported to have fled the 

country in recent years. Iranian President Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad reportedly has called for an end to the 

development of Christianity in Iran. Over the past 

few years, there have been several incidents of 

Iranian authorities raiding church services, detaining 

worshippers and church leaders, and harassing and 

threatening church members. According to advocacy 

and human rights organizations, dozens of house 

church leaders were arrested and interrogated in the 

past year for engaging in religious activities in their 

homes. One group reported that approximately 73 

Christians were arrested in 2008 on account of their 

religion, although most were released after short-term 

detentions. It is a common practice, particularly in 

cases involving offenses based on religious belief, for 

Iranian authorities to release prisoners but to leave 

the charges against them or their convictions in place 

in order to be able to threaten them with reimprisonment at any future time.

In March 2009, two women, Marzieh 

Esmaeilabad and Maryam Rustampoor, were arrested 

for practicing Christianity after authorities raided and 

confiscated materials from their home. Iranian 

officials reportedly claimed the two women were 

engaging in ―anti government‖ activities, although 

the charges have not been substantiated. As of this 

writing, they are being held in Evin prison. In 

January, three Christian converts, Jamal 

Ghalishorani, Nadereh Jamali and Hamik 

Khachikian, were arrested in Tehran for engaging in 

underground house church activity. No formal 

charges were made and all were released within one 
36

to two weeks, although Ghalishorani and Jamali have 

an open case against them. In August 2008, five 

Christian converts were arrested, including Ramtin 

Soodmand, the son of Assemblies of God pastor 

Hossein Soodmand, who was executed in 1990. All 

were released by October, although Soodmand 

continues to await trial on charges of ―promoting 

propaganda against the Islamic Republic.‖ In June, a 

couple who converted to Christianity was arrested 

and allegedly beaten for four days, then released on 

bail without being formally charged. In May 2008, 

more than a dozen Christian converts from Islam 

were arrested and detained in the southern city of 

Shiraz. All but two were released after several 

weeks, but subsequently informed that legal cases 

remain pending against them. In September, the 

Iranian government leveled apostasy charges against 

the two converts still in detention, Mahmoud Matin 

and Arash Basirat, but they were released later that 

month after a court ruled that the apostasy charges 

were invalid. 

During the past few years, the unrecognized 

Sabean Mandaean religious community, numbering 

between five and ten thousand people, has been 

facing intensifying harassment and repression by 

authorities. There were reports that members of the 

Sabean Mandaean community experienced societal 

discrimination and pressure to convert to Islam, and 

they were often denied access to higher education.

Official policies promoting anti-Semitism 

are on the rise in Iran, though members of the Jewish 

community have usually been targeted on the basis of

―ties to Israel,‖ whether real or perceived. President 

Ahmadinejad and other top political and clerical 

leaders have made public remarks in the past year 

denying the event of the Holocaust and calling for the 

elimination of the state of Israel. In 2008, there was a 

rise in officially sanctioned anti-Semitic propaganda, 

involving official statements, media outlets, 

publications, and books; anti-Semitic editorial 

cartoons depicting demonic and stereotypical images 

of Jews, along with Jewish symbols, were also 

published in the past year. For example, in May 

2008, a government-sponsored exhibition titled the 

―Fraudulent Myth‖ opened in Qom with the goal of 

marking the ―Anniversary of the Establishment of the 

Zionist Regime.‖ According to the State Department, 

most of the items in the exhibit represent Jews in an 

anti-Semitic manner. Official government 

discrimination against Jews continues to be 

pervasive. In recent years, numerous programs 

broadcast on state-run television depicted antiSemitic messages, a prominent newspaper held a 

Holocaust denial editorial cartoon contest, and the 

Iranian government sponsored a Holocaust denial 

conference. According to the State Department, 

despite minimal restrictions on Jewish religious 

practice, education of Jewish children has become 

increasingly difficult in recent years, and distribution 

of Hebrew religious texts is strongly discouraged. 

The government‘s monopoly on, and 

enforcement of, the official interpretation of Islam 

negatively affect the human rights of women in Iran, 

including their right to freedoms of movement, 

association, and thought, conscience, and religion, as 

well as freedom from coercion in matters of religion 

or belief. The Iranian justice system does not grant 

women the same legal status as men; for example, 

testimony by a man is equivalent to the testimony of 

two women. Provisions of both the Civil and Penal 

Codes, in particular those sections dealing with 

family and property law, discriminate against 

women. Over the past few years, several women‘s 

rights activists were arrested by authorities and some 

remain in prison for their involvement in collecting 

signatures for the Campaign for Equality aimed at 

ending discrimination against women in the 

application of Islamic law in Iran. Some of the 

activists‘ demands included: 1) that women‘s 

testimony in court carry the same weight as that of 

men; 2) equality of inheritance rights between men 

and women; 3) eliminating polygamy; and 4) equality 

of compensation payments between women and men 

in the event of wrongful death. In March 2009, 

Iranian authorities arrested 12 women‘s rights 

activists, including 10 members of the Campaign for 

Equality‘s One Million Signatures Campaign, who 

were visiting families of political prisoners on the 

occasion of the Iranian New Year. Ten were 

subsequently released, but two involved with the 

signature campaign, Khadijeh Moghadam and 

Mahbubeh Karami, remain imprisoned without 

charges in Evin prison.
37

In March 2008, Freedom House released a 

study on ―Discrimination and Intolerance in Iran‘s 

Textbooks.‖ The study found that the country‘s 

textbooks published for the 2006-2007 school year, 

including religious subjects for grades 1 – 11, teach 

―the country‘s children to discriminate against 

women and minorities, to view non-Muslims with 

suspicion if not contempt, and to perpetuate the 

regime‘s theocratic ideology.‖ While the study 

found that the textbooks did not contain any ―direct 

hostility‖ toward recognized religious minorities, the 

textbooks include intolerant content about the Baha‘i 

religion, including asserting that the Baha‘i faith is a 

―hidden‖ minority and a ―false sect‖ used as a tool 

for foreign governments.

Throughout the past year, Commission staff 

met with members of non-governmental 

organizations representing various religious 

communities in Iran, as well as human rights groups 

and other Iran experts and policymakers. In May 

2008 and February 2009, the Commission issued 

public statements expressing concern over the arrests 

and then the charges against the seven Baha‘i leaders, 

and urging the U.S. government and international 

community to call for their release. In September 

2008, the Commission sent a letter to the leadership 

of Religions for Peace, the American Friends Service 

Committee, the Mennonite Central Committee, the 

Quaker United Nations Office, and the World 

Council of Churches-United Nations Liaison Office 

to protest their invitation to President Ahmadinejad to 

take part in a ―dialogue‖ on ―the significance of 

religious contributions to peace.‖ Also, in September 

the Commission released a statement expressing 

concern about the proposed changes to the penal law 

to include the death penalty for apostasy. In March 

2008, Commissioner Nina Shea briefed Members of 

Congress on religious freedom conditions in Iran at a 

congressional Iran Working Group briefing titled 

―Assessing the Human Rights Situation of Ethnic 

Religious Groups in Iran.‖ In February 2008, the 

Commission held a hearing chaired by Commissioner 

Michael Cromartie on Capitol Hill entitled 

―Advancing Religious Freedom and Related Human 

Rights in Iran: Strategies for an Effective U.S. 

Policy,‖ at which policy officials and Iran experts 

explored current U.S. policy toward Iran and 

highlighted the deteriorating religious freedom 

conditions and other human rights abuses taking 

place there. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy 

I. Stopping Abuses of Freedom of Religion 

or Belief and Supporting Human Rights and 

Democracy

In addition to recommending that Iran 

continue to be designated a CPC, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government should:

at the highest levels, vigorously speak out 

publicly about the deteriorating conditions for 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief in Iran, and draw attention to the need for 

the international community to hold authorities 

accountable in specific cases where severe 

violations have occurred, such as:

--extremely poor treatment of the Baha‘i 

community;

--increasing problems facing Christians, Sufi 

Muslims, and dissident Muslims; and

--state-sponsored anti-Semitism and Holocaust 

denial activities; 

work within its current overall policy framework 

to ensure that violations of freedom of religion 

and belief, and related human rights, are part of 

all formal and informal multilateral or bilateral 

discussions with representatives of the Iranian 

government, including:

--ensuring that the revised amendment to the 

Penal Code, which would codify the death 

penalty for apostasy, is rescinded;

--permitting Baha‘is to practice their faith, 

rescinding any existing laws that permit 

members of the Baha‘i faith to be killed with 

impunity, and allowing full access for Baha‘is to 
38

study in public universities without 

discrimination;

-- releasing from prison the seven Baha‘i 

leaders—Fariba Kamalabadi, Jamaloddin 

Khanjani, Afif Naemi, Saeid Rezaie, Mahvash 

Sabet, Behrouz Tavakkoli, and Vahid Tizfahm—

and other Baha‘is in prison on account of their 

religion or belief as well as dropping all charges 

against those Baha‘is who have cases pending;

--releasing all Christians, including Marzieh 

Esmaeilabad and Maryam Rustampoor, in prison 

on account of their religion or belief and 

dropping all pending charges against any 

Christian converts, including Jamal 

Ghalishorani, Nadereh Jamali, and Ramtin 

Soodmand;

--releasing from prison Ayatollah Boroujerdi and 

other dissident Muslims, including any Sufi 

Muslims in prison on account of their religion or 

belief;

--ceasing all messages of hatred and intolerance, 

particularly toward Jews and Baha‘is, in the 

government-controlled media and removing the 

government-appointed editor of Kayhan;

--halting state-sponsored acts of anti-Semitism, 

and, while vigorously protecting freedom of 

expression, counteract anti-Semitic rhetoric and 

other organized anti-Semitic activities by the 

President and other high-level government 

officials;

--releasing from prison all women‘s rights 

activists, including Khadijeh Moghadam and 

Mahbubeh Karami, who advocate for ending 

discrimination against women in the application 

of Islamic law in Iran;

ensure that funding budgeted to promote 

democracy and human rights in Iran includes 

support for effective initiatives advancing 

freedom of religion or belief, as well as ways to 

promote rule of law and human rights defenders 

programs that specifically seek to protect 

religious minorities in Iran; 

 adequately fund U.S. public diplomacy entities, 

such as Voice of America and Radio Farda, and 

expand and develop new programming focusing 

solely on the situation of human rights—

including the freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief—in Iran;

II. Promoting Freedom of Religion and 

Belief and Related Human Rights in 

Multilateral Fora

continue to support an annual UN General 

Assembly resolution condemning severe 

violations of human rights, including freedom of 

religion or belief, in Iran, and calling for officials 

responsible for such violations to be held 

accountable;

press for a resolution condemning severe 

violations of human rights, including freedom of 

religion or belief, in Iran at the UN Human 

Rights Council;

call on the UN Human Rights Council to monitor 

carefully and demand Iran‘s compliance with the 

recommendations of the representatives of those 

UN special procedures that have already visited 

Iran, particularly the Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief (1995), the 

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (2003), 

and the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 

Opinion and Expression (2003), and restore the 

position of UN Special Representative on the 

Islamic Republic of Iran with the task of 

investigating and reporting on human rights 

abuses in Iran; and

encourage the UN Human Rights Council to 

continue to use its procedures to maintain 

oversight of conditions for freedom of religion or 

belief in Iran, including continued visits and 

reporting by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom 

of Religion or Belief, and other relevant special 

rapporteurs and working groups, to which Iran 

has issued a standing invitation.
39

Iraq

In December 2008, the Commission 

recommended that the U.S. Department of State 

should designate Iraq as a ―country of particular 

concern,‖ or CPC, based on the ongoing, severe 

abuses of religious freedom in the country and the 

government‘s toleration of these abuses, particularly 

against Iraq‘s smallest and most vulnerable religious 

minorities.* The Commission‘s recommendation was 

based on the following concerns, outlined in an 

extensive report: continued targeted violence, threats, 

and intimidation against members of the country‘s 

smallest religious minorities; the lack of effective 

government action to protect these minorities; an 

ongoing pattern of official discrimination, 

marginalization, and neglect against the smallest 

minorities, particularly in the northern areas where 

these groups are now concentrated; continued attacks 

and tense relations between Shi‘a and Sunni Iraqis; 

and continued egregious, religiously-motivated 

violence against women and girls, homosexuals, 

Muslims who reject certain strict interpretations of 

Islam, and academics.1

The religious freedom situation in Iraq 

remains grave, particularly for the smallest, most 

vulnerable religious minorities which include 

ChaldoAssyrian and other Christians, Sabean 

Mandaeans, and Yazidis. Since 2007, violence 

against civilians in Iraq has diminished substantially, 

but the improved security, according to the U.S. 

Department of Defense, is ―fragile, reversible, and 

uneven.‖2 Nineveh governorate—the northern 

province with the largest concentration of the 

smallest religious minorities and where they are 

 

* While joining the December 2008 report, 

Commissioners Cromartie, Eid, Land, and Leo 

dissented from the CPC recommendation, concluding 

that Iraq should remain on the Commission‘s Watch 

List, where it had been since May 2007. These 

Commissioners believed that, although the Iraqi 

government had not done enough to address the 

alarming plight of the country‘s small religious 

minorities, IRFA‘s requirements of intent and a 

pattern of recurrent affirmative acts of abuse on the 

part of the government were not met. 

caught in the middle of a struggle for territorial 

control between the Kurdistan Regional Government 

(KRG) and the central Iraqi government—has 

remained one of the most dangerous areas. 

In recent years in Iraq, and particularly since 

2006, there have been alarming numbers of 

religiously-motivated killings, abductions, beatings, 

rapes, threats, intimidation, forced resettlements, and 

attacks on religious leaders, pilgrims, and holy sites. 

Iraqis from many religious communities, Muslim and 

non-Muslim alike, have suffered in this violence, but 

those from Iraq‘s smallest religious minorities have 

been among the most vulnerable. Members of these 

small communities do not have militia or tribal 

structures to defend them and do not receive adequate 

official protection. Many have fled to other areas 

within Iraq or to other countries, where they represent 

a disproportionately high percentage of registered 

Iraqi refugees. These communities report that their 

numbers in Iraq have substantially diminished, and 

that their members who have left the country have 

not showed signs of returning in significant numbers. 

In addition to lacking security, these small minorities 

are legally, politically, and economically 

marginalized, and they allege that their communities 

are discriminated against in the provision of essential 

government services and reconstruction and 

development aid. The cumulative effect of this 

violence, forced displacement, discrimination, 

marginalization, and neglect has been to create a 

serious threat to these ancient communities‘ very 

existence in Iraq, where they have lived for 

millennia. These threats against Iraq‘s smallest 

religious minorities jeopardize Iraq‘s future as a 

diverse, pluralistic and free society. 

Religious Freedom Conditions 

The Situation of the Smallest Religious Minorities

In 2003, there were approximately 1.4 

million Christians in Iraq, including Chaldean 

Catholics, Assyrian Orthodox, Assyrian Church of 

the East, Syriac Orthodox, Armenians (Catholic and 

Orthodox), Protestants, and Evangelicals. Today, it 

is estimated that only 500,000 to 700,000 indigenous 

Christians remain in the country. Christian leaders 
40

have warned that the result of this flight may be ―the 

end of Christianity in Iraq.‖3 The Chaldean 

Archbishop of Kirkuk was recently quoted in the 

press as saying that 750 Christians have been killed 

in Iraq in the past five years. 

Sabean Mandaeans, followers of John the 

Baptist who are prohibited under their religion from 

using weapons and therefore cannot defend 

themselves, report that almost 90 percent of their 

small community either has fled Iraq or been killed, 

leaving only an estimated 3,500 to 5,000 Mandaeans, 

including 150 families in Baghdad, and five 

Mandaean religious leaders in the country. In 2003, 

the Mandaean community in Iraq reportedly 

numbered some 50,000 – 60,000. The Mandaean 

Human Rights Group reported in April 2009 that, 

since 2003, Mandaeans in Iraq had suffered 167 

killings, 275 kidnappings, and 298 assaults and 

forced conversions to Islam. The Mandaean 

Associations Union and Mandaean leaders, refugees, 

and asylum seekers have universally told the 

Commission that they do not see any future for their 

community in Iraq and have asked that the entire 

group be collectively resettled to a third country so 

that their religion, language, and culture can survive.

 

The Yazidi community—which suffered the 

most devastating single attack on any group in Iraq in 

August 2007, when four coordinated suicide truck 

bombings destroyed two Yazidi towns, killing 796 

civilians, wounding 1,562, and leaving more than 

1,000 families homeless—reportedly now number 

approximately 500,000, down from 700,000 in 2005. 

The Mandaean and Yazidi communities are 

particularly vulnerable to annihilation because a 

person must be born into these religions, not convert 

or marry into them, and they do not proselytize or 

seek new adherents. 

As detailed extensively in the Commission‘s 

December 2008 report, in recent years members of 

these small, vulnerable minorities have experienced 

targeted intimidation and violence, including killings, 

beatings, abductions, and rapes, forced conversions, 

forced marriages, forced displacement from their 

homes and businesses, and violent attacks on their 

houses of worship and religious leaders. Despite the 

overall drop in violence in the country, these 

incidents continued in 2008 and 2009, particularly in 

the unstable northern areas where these minorities are 

now concentrated. 

The vast majority of non-Muslim minorities 

who have been displaced from other areas in Iraq 

have gone to the north, mainly to Nineveh 

governorate, and to the three governorates controlled 

by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG): 

Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Northern Iraq, 

particularly the Nineveh Plains area of Nineveh 

governorate, is the historic homeland of Iraq‘s 

Christian community, and the Yazidi community is 

indigenous to Nineveh and Dahuk. Although the 

three KRG governorates are relatively secure, 

Nineveh governorate, especially in and around 

Mosul, remains one of the most dangerous and 

unstable parts of Iraq. Insurgent and extremist 

activity continues to be a significant problem there. 

Moreover, control of the ethnically and religiously 

mixed area is disputed between the KRG and the 

central Iraqi government. The minorities are caught 

in the middle of this struggle for control and have 

been targeted for abuses and discrimination as a 

result. 

The dispute stems from Kurdish efforts to 

annex into the KRG additional territories—including 

parts of the governorates of Kirkuk (Tamim), 

Nineveh, Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Waset—on the 

basis of their claim that these areas were ―Arabized‖ 

under Saddam Hussein and are historically Kurdish. 

Since 2003, Kurdish peshmerga security forces and 

political parties have moved into these territories, 

effectively establishing de facto control over many of 

the contested areas. Religious and ethnic minorities, 

including non-Muslims and ethnic Shabak and 

Turkomen, have accused Kurdish peshmerga and 

officials of engaging in abuses and discrimination 

against them to further Kurdish claims in the 

territorial dispute including encroaching on, seizing, 

and refusing to return minority land; making the 

provision of services and assistance to minority 

communities contingent on support for Kurdish 

expansion; forcing minorities to identify themselves 

as either Arabs or Kurds; and impeding the formation 

of local minority police forces.4
41

The dispute also has affected the political 

rights of these small minorities. In the January 2005 

elections, many non-Muslims in Nineveh governorate 

were disenfranchised due to fraud, intimidation, and 

the refusal by Kurdish security forces to permit the 

distribution of ballot boxes. More recently, the 

September 2008 law to govern upcoming provincial 

elections was stripped, just before its adoption, of a 

provision guaranteeing a set number of seats to 

minorities in certain provincial councils, including 

Nineveh. An amendment was later adopted, but it set 

aside fewer seats than either the original provision or 

the UN‘s proposed compromise,5reportedly because 

of Arab politicians‘ fears that minorities would vote 

with the Kurds in disputed governorates. In addition, 

the political conflict between Kurds and Arabs has 

led to a stalemate in the distribution of Nineveh‘s 

provincial budget, with only 0.4 percent of the budget 

being spent in 2008, the lowest rate for any Iraqi 

governorate.

Provincial elections were held on January 

31, 2009, in 14 of Iraq‘s 18 governorates, including 

Nineveh. Security was tight throughout the country, 

and no major violence was reported. According to 

the State Department, more than 400 international 

observers and 200,000 national observers monitored 

the polling, and U.S. and UN officials reportedly 

dispatched more observers to Nineveh than to any

other governorate. The Iraqi High Electoral 

Commission received a number of complaints of 

election irregularities throughout the country—

including allegations from Yazidi and Christian 

parliamentarians that Kurdish parties tried to 

intimidate minorities in Nineveh from attending 

campaign rallies or voting for candidates from the 

non-Kurdish lists—but it found none of these 

complaints sufficient to call into question the 

outcome. In Nineveh, the election resulted in a 

change in control of the provincial council from 

Kurdish parties to the Sunni Arab al-Hadba party, 

which some minority groups view as potentially more 

sympathetic to their rights than the Kurdish parties. 

Yazidi candidates won the second largest share of the 

Nineveh council‘s seats.

Despite reduced violence in Iraq overall, 

violent attacks against minorities continued to occur 

in 2008 and 2009, particularly but not exclusively in 

the northern disputed areas. In January 2008, six 

church buildings in Mosul and Baghdad were 

bombed in coordinated attacks on Epiphany and 

Orthodox Christmas Eve, feast dates when many 

Catholic and Syriac Orthodox Iraqis hold baptisms. 

In February 2008, the Chaldean Archbishop of Mosul 

was abducted and killed. In April 2008, an Assyrian 

Orthodox priest was shot and killed in a drive-by 

attack in Baghdad. The UN Assistance Mission for 

Iraq (UNAMI) has reported that from January 

through June 2008 it received 17 reports of attacks 

and kidnappings, including 10 killings, of Christians 

throughout Iraq. 

In July 2008, the Assyrian International 

News Agency (AINA) reported that a group called 

―The Battalion of Just Punishment, Jihad Base in 

Mesopotamia,‖ which is thought to be affiliated with 

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), sent threatening letters to 

Christians in and around the city of Mosul, in 

Nineveh governorate. On September 2, 2008, two 

Christians reportedly were kidnapped and killed in 

Mosul, including a doctor whose family reportedly 

had paid a ransom of $20,000. 

In late September and early October 2008, 

there was a wave of threats and attacks against 

Christians in Mosul, in which at least 14 Christians 

were killed and many more reported being 

threatened, spurring some 13,000 individuals to flee 

to villages east and north of the city and an estimated 

400 families to flee to Syria. The United Nations 

estimated that this number is half of the current 

Christian population in Mosul. The Iraqi government 

dispatched additional security forces to the city and 

said that it was investigating the incidents, though as 

of the end of the reporting period the attackers had 

not been identified. Christian leaders also called for 

an international investigation. In a November 11 

attack, two Christian girls were killed in Mosul, their 

mother injured, and their home bombed. By early 

2009, however, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) 

reported that approximately 80% Christians who had 

fled Mosul in the wake of the fall attacks had 

returned to their homes. 
42

In mid-January 2009, a Christian man in 

Mosul reportedly was shot execution-style and killed, 

and earlier in the month another Christian was 

kidnapped, held for four days, and released after 

paying a $50,000 ransom. In early April 2009, 

International Christian Concern reported that four 

Christians were killed in two days in Baghdad and 

Kirkuk. On April 26, 2009, three Christians 

reportedly were killed and two others wounded in 

two different attacks in Kirkuk. 

According to press reports, Iraqi Christians 

celebrated Christmas 2008 without incident, 

including in Baghdad and Mosul, though some 

churches held services during the daytime or on 

December 23 for security reasons. In addition, the 

Iraqi government declared Christmas an official 

holiday for the first time, and the Interior Ministry 

sponsored a public Christmas fair in a Baghdad park. 

In early April 2009, according to AINA, thousands of 

Assyrian Christians participated in an incident-free 

Palm Sunday procession in the Nineveh province 

town of Baghdede. Easter services also were 

celebrated without violence this year, including in 

Baghdad and Basra. An Easter service in Baghdad‘s 

Mansour neighborhood presided over by Chaldean 

Cardinal Emmanuel III Delly was broadcast on Iraqi 

state television.

According to the Mandaean Human Rights 

Group, from January 2007 to February 2008, the 

Mandaean community in Iraq suffered 42 killings, 46 

kidnappings, 10 threats, and 21 attacks. On February 

2, 2008, 10 members of a Mandaean family in Kut 

were killed in a rocket attack. The Commission met 

with family members of the deceased in Syria in May 

2008, and was told that, before the attack, this family, 

the only Mandaean family in Kut, had received 

numerous threats and warnings from extremists 

highlighting their religion. In September 2008, 

masked gunmen attacked a Mandaean family‘s shop 

in Baghdad, killing the owner, his brother, and his 

eight-year-old son, and looting the shop. On April 

19, 2009, three Mandaeans reportedly were shot and 

killed in their jewellery shop in Baghdad; two others 

were injured seriously. 

UNAMI has reported that, in the first half of 

2008, at least five Yazidis were killed in the northern 

Iraqi town of Sinjar. On December 7, 2008, two 

Yazidis reportedly were killed in a liquor store in 

Mosul. On the night of December 14, 2008, seven 

members of a Yazidi family were gunned down in 

their home in Sinjar. Over two days in late March 

2009, according to press reports, the bodies of two 

Yazidi men were found in fields near Mosul. 

Little is known about the situation of Iraq‘s 

tiny Baha‘i and Jewish communities. The Baha‘i 

faith, estimated to have only 2,000 adherents in Iraq, 

remains prohibited under a 1970 law. Iraq‘s ancient 

and once large Jewish community now numbers 

fewer than 10, who essentially live in hiding. Many 

Jews left Iraq in the years following the founding of 

the state of Israel, and a law passed in March 2006 

precludes Jews who emigrated from regaining Iraqi 

citizenship. According to the State Department, antiSemitism remains a ―cultural undercurrent‖ in Iraq. 

In September 2008, the Iraqi government announced 

the prosecution of parliamentarian Mithal al-Alusi for 

the ―crime‖ of traveling to Israel, an ―enemy country‖ 

under a Saddam-era law that has not been enforced 

against anyone other than al-Alusi.6 The parliament 

also voted to prevent al-Alusi from attending future 

parliamentary sessions or from traveling outside Iraq, 

and stripped him of his immunity and parliamentfunded body guards. On November 24, al-Alusi was 

acquitted by an Iraqi court, which ruled that his visit 

was not contrary to Iraqi law because passports no 

longer prohibited Iraqis from entering Israel.

 

To address their lack of security and 

political and economic marginalization, some Iraqi 

minority groups, both inside and outside Iraq, have 

been campaigning for what is variously described as 

a protected, semi-autonomous, or autonomous area 

for Christians, and some say for other minorities as 

well, in the Nineveh Plains area of Nineveh 

governorate. These options are proposed to give 

effect to Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution, which 

―guarantee[s] the administrative, political, cultural 

and educational rights of the various nationalities, 

such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all 

other constituents,‖ and provides that this ―shall be 

regulated by‖ a future law. However, the specifics of 
43

what such a law would entail, including the territory 

that such an area would cover, its religious and ethnic 

make-up, how it would be secured, what governance 

and economic powers it would have, and how it 

would relate to the KRG and the central Iraqi 

government remain disputed even among those who 

say that they favor autonomy. The idea of greater 

autonomy for minorities in Iraq was recently 

discussed and endorsed, though with disagreement as 

to the details, by most members of Iraqi minority 

diaspora communities at a conference at George 

Washington University in November 2008. By 

contrast, some Iraqi minority individuals and groups 

with whom the Commission met in Iraq, Jordan, 

Syria, and Sweden, as well as a minority at the 

George Washington diaspora conference, oppose the 

idea.

In June 2008, the Iraqi Prime Minister 

reportedly established a committee, said to include 

Christians and Yazidis, to advise him on minority 

issues, although the committee‘s specific 

membership, duties, and powers remain undisclosed. 

However, in discussions with representatives of Iraqi 

religious minority communities in November 2008, 

the Commission was told that many in these 

communities view this committee as illegitimate 

because its members were selected by the Prime 

Minister, not by the communities themselves, and do 

not actively advance minority concerns. 

Additionally, the Mandaean representative with 

whom the Commission spoke was completely 

unaware of the Prime Minister‘s committee or 

whether his community was represented on it. Also, 

little is known about the committee‘s activities or 

meetings since its creation. 

Sunni-Shi’a Relations

In past years, many serious sectarian abuses 

were attributed to actors from the Shi‘a-dominated 

Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Ministry of 

Defense (MOD), and by armed Shi‘a groups with ties 

to the Iraqi government or elements within it. The 

apparent collusion between state security forces and 

paramilitary groups featured prominently in the 

Commission‘s 2007 Annual Report, as well as in the 

State Department‘s 2007 human rights and religious 

freedom reports. 

In its 2008 International Religious Freedom 

Report, the State Department reported a marked 

decline in the sectarian misappropriation of official 

Iraqi government authority. However, the 

Department‘s 2008 human rights report, released in 

February 2009, continues to identify 

―misappropriation of official authority by sectarian, 

criminal and extremist groups‖ as among the 

significant and continuing human rights problems in 

the country. According to that report, during 2008, 

government agents continued to commit documented 

instances of torture and other abuses along sectarian 

lines, particularly by the security forces and in 

detention facilities. In addition, the State Department 

reported that during 2008 ―Shia militias and armed 

paramilitary groups, some substantially incorporated 

into the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] ... frequently 

attacked civilians and government officials.‖ The 

report also expressed concern about the 

predominately Shi‘a security forces‘ ―inability to ... 

retain Sunni personnel and convince Sunni 

communities that they were not biased in their 

enforcement.‖ 

Other reports confirm that sectarian 

influences on government authority have not been 

fully eliminated. In May 2008, a U.S. Institute of 

Peace report concluded that, although improvements 

had been made by the post-2006 Interior Minister and 

his coalition advisors, ―the U.S. remains far from its 

goal of creating an effective Interior Ministry and 

Iraqi police force that can protect all Iraqi citizens.‖ 

The report urged heightened efforts to improve the 

MOI‘s institutional capacity, to focus less on meeting 

the numbers of police recruited and more on quality 

and results, and to address the force‘s continuing 

sectarian imbalance. Also in May 2008, the U.S. 

Embassy in Baghdad reported continuing problems 

with the professionalism of the Iraqi police. In June 

2008, a report by the Government Accountability 

Office concluded that sectarian and militia influences 

remained a problem undermining Iraq‘s security 

forces.

 
44

Recent escalating tensions and violence 

between the Iraqi government and some Sunni ―Sons 

of Iraq‖ groups are particularly troubling. The Sons 

of Iraq are local security groups that include former 

insurgents who switched sides in exchange for U.S.-

paid salaries. The Iraqi government is now 

responsible for paying these groups, and has 

promised to find them jobs in the police, security 

forces, or public sector. In recent months, however, 

there have been widespread complaints from the Sons 

of Iraq that the government has stopped paying them, 

given only a few of them jobs, and arrested or issued 

arrest warrants for some of their leaders and 

members. In late March 2009, the government‘s 

arrest of a Sons of Iraq leader in the Baghdad 

neighborhood of Fadhil led to several days of clashes 

between Sons of Iraq members and Iraqi government 

and coalition forces. The following week, there was 

a spate of bombings that killed at least 40 people in 

Shi‘a neighborhoods in Baghdad, including one near 

the city‘s most important Shi‘a shrine, raising fears of 

renewed sectarian conflict. 

The State Department also reported that 

there were allegations during 2008 of religiouslybased employment discrimination by the government, 

in which ―[s]everal ministries reportedly hired and 

favored employees who conformed to the religious 

preference of the respective minister.‖

Organized groups outside of the government 

continue to commit serious sectarian abuses, notably 

by the Sunni-dominated insurgency and indigenous 

and foreign extremist groups. Despite the decline in 

violence in the country, religiously-motivated 

insurgent and extremist attacks continued to occur in 

2008 and 2009. 

On January 17, 2008, a suicide bomber 

killed eight religious pilgrims celebrating Ashura 

near a Shi‘a mosque in Baquba, the capital of the 

volatile Diyala province. On February 15, 2008, two 

suicide bombers attacked a Shi‘a mosque in the 

Turkomen town of Tal Afar in northern Iraq.7 On 

February 24 and 25, suicide bombers targeted Shi‘a 

pilgrims en route to Karbala for the festival of 

Arbaeen, killing 63 people and injuring more than 

100. At the end of July, Shi‘a pilgrims taking part in 

a festival in the Karrada section of Baghdad were 

targeted in a shooting that killed seven and, the 

following day, in coordinated suicide bombings that 

killed 32 and injured at least 64. Although Baghdad 

experienced the quietest Ramadan in three years, 

there still were five suicide attacks in the city during 

the late September/early October 2008 Eid al-Fitr 

holiday marking the end of the holy month, several of 

which were directed at Shi‘a mosques. On December 

27, 2008—just before the beginning of the holiest 

month in the Shi‘a calendar, which includes the 

holiday of Ashura—a car bomb exploded near the 

entrance to an important Shi‘a shrine in Baghdad, 

killing at least 24 people and wounding at least 46, 

many of whom were Shi‘a pilgrims. 

On January 3, 2009, a suicide bomber killed 

at least 40 people and wounded at least 76 at the 

same shrine. Following the latter incident, the Iraqi 

government banned women from the area around the 

shrine, citing security concerns and the lack of female 

security officers to search women. The government 

also increased security for Ashura celebrations 

elsewhere, including in the cities of Najaf and 

Karbala. However, despite these efforts, on February 

13, a suicide bomber killed 35 people in a charity tent 

providing food and drink to pilgrims en route to 

Karbala and on February 16, the last day of the holy 

month, eight Shi‘a pilgrims returning from Karbala to 

Baghdad were killed by two separate roadside 

bombs. 

Over several days in late April 2009, there 

were a number of attacks against Shi‘a areas, sites, 

and pilgrims for which the extremist group the 

Islamic State of Iraq reportedly claimed 

responsibility on a website. On April 23, one suicide 

bombing targeted Iranian pilgrims passing through a 

town in Diyala governorate, killing more than 50; 

another targeted women and children waiting to 

receive food aid in a predominately Shi‘a 

neighborhood of Baghdad, killing at least 28. On 

April 24, as worshippers were arriving for Friday 

mid-day prayers, two suicide bombers killed at least 

60 people and injured 125 outside the same Baghdad 

shrine that had been targeted in December and 

January. Iraqi officials said that this was the 

deadliest single attack in Iraq this year and the most 
45

serious attack on a Shi‘a holy site since the February 

2006 Samarra mosque bombing. The press reported 

that Prime Minister al-Maliki promptly created a 

special committee to investigate the attack and 

ordered the detention of the police commanders 

responsible for security in the area around the shrine. 

In addition, on April 22, 2009, a suicide 

bombing inside a Sunni mosque in the central Iraqi 

town of Dhuluiya killed at least five people and 

wounded 15. 

The Situation of Women and Other Vulnerable 

Groups

Women and girls in Iraq also have suffered 

religiously-motivated violence and abuses, including 

killings, abductions, forced conversions, restrictions 

on movement, forced marriages, and reportedly other 

violence including rape. Women considered to have 

violated Islamic teachings and other politically active 

females have been targeted by Sunni and Shi‘a 

extremists alike. Fearing attacks, some women 

reportedly decided against running as candidates in 

the January 2009 provincial elections. Some parents 

reportedly have taken their daughters out of school 

fearing attacks or because they have been told that 

girls‘ education is forbidden by Islam. According to 

the State Department, in 2008 women in Iraq 

continued to be ―pressured to wear veils or face 

security threats, regardless of the individual‘s 

religious affiliation.‖

The State Department recently reported that 

during 2008, according to local statistics, 72 women 

were killed in the Basra area for various reasons, 

including honor killings and domestic violence. 

According to the State Department, Basra police told 

reporters in mid-2008 that 15 women a month were 

killed there allegedly for breaching Islamic dress 

codes.

 

So-called ―honor‖ killings continue to be a 

serious problem in the Kurdish regions, where during 

the Commission‘s March 2008 visit, the KRG 

Minister for Human Rights stated that the incidence 

of such crimes has continued to increase since 2005. 

UNAMI has reported that from January to June 2008, 

56 women were murdered and 150 burned in 

Kurdistan, and that many of these instances followed 

the pattern of ―honor‖ killings. On the 2008 

International Day on the Elimination of Violence 

against Women, the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Violence against Women reported that ―honor‖ 

killings are among the primary causes of unnatural 

deaths among women in northern Iraq and that 

incidents of self-immolation are increasing. 

Throughout the country, the Special Rapporteur said, 

perpetrators of ―honor‖ killings, even if known, are 

rarely brought to justice. 

In July 2007, the KRG created a commission 

to try to reduce ―honor‖ killings and made changes to 

its laws to help ensure the prosecution and 

punishment of perpetrators. The commission has 

subsequently established a board to monitor the 

implementation of the new laws. However, 

according to UNAMI, prosecution is often hampered 

by insufficient evidence, reluctance of witnesses to 

testify, and courts granting leniency in the 

punishment of such crimes. 

UNAMI has reported that the Women‘s Committee 

of the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) has 

drafted proposed legislation to address a wideranging list of concerns to women, including 

underage and forced marriages, physical and other 

forms of violence, matrimonial entitlements, grounds 

for divorce, inheritance, and social status edicts found 

in the Personal Status Law. In November 2008, the 

KNA passed amendments to the 1959 personal status 

law forbidding forced marriages and punishing 

relatives who forced unwanted or prevented wanted 

marriages. 

Religiously-motivated violence and abuses 

also continue to be serious threats to Muslims who 

reject orthodox interpretations of Islam, particularly 

academics targeted for their allegedly secular views 

and teachings. Professors have experienced 

persistent threats of kidnapping and murder (often 

along sectarian lines) and university campuses have 

been targets of violent attacks. According to the 

Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education, from 2003 to 

March 2007, more than 200 incidents of targeted 

assassinations and abductions of academic 
46

professionals were reported. The State Department 

reported the killings of two academics in Baghdad 

and Mosul in early 2008. The UN Scientific, 

Education, and Culture Organization (UNESCO) 

reported in 2007 that thousands of teachers had fled 

Iraq, and there have been reports that Iraqi public 

universities and their departments have fractured 

along sectarian lines. According to the State 

Department‘s most recent human rights report, in 

2008 ―in the central and southern parts of the 

country, there were a number of reports of threats by 

militia, extremists, or insurgent groups against 

schools and universities, urging them to modify 

activities, favor certain students, or face violence,‖ 

and the institutions often complied with these threats. 

Finally, as the Commission previously has 

reported, homosexuals in Iraq also have been victims 

of religiously-motivated violence and abuses. In 

October 2005, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani issued a 

fatwa forbidding homosexuality and calling for gays 

and lesbians to be killed ―in the most severe way.‖ 

Subsequent reporting, later verified by UNAMI, 

revealed the establishment of ad hoc religious 

tribunals led by Shi‘a clerics, with penalties ranging 

from lashes to arbitrary killings. Members of Iraq‘s 

gay and lesbian community have reported muggings, 

severe beatings and even rape by members of the 

Shi‘a-dominated Iraqi Security Forces. In a May 

2006 letter to a U.S.-based advocacy group, the State 

Department said that it was ―troubled‖ by reports of 

―threats, violence, executions, and other violations of 

humanitarian law against members of the gay and 

lesbian community in Iraq.‖ 8 According to the State 

Department, there continued to be reports of societal 

discrimination and violence against individuals based 

on their sexual orientation in 2008. 

According to press reports, over two months 

in early 2009, as many as 25 men and boys suspected 

of being homosexual were found dead in Baghdad‘s 

Sadr City neighborhood, some with notes with the 

word ―pervert‖ pinned to their bodies. Reportedly, 

Shi‘a clerics in local mosques have been preaching 

regularly that homosexuality in Iraq must be 

destroyed, and a Sadr City police official, quoted in 

the New York Times, attributed many of the killings 

to family members seeking to restore the family‘s 

honor. Others, however, suspected Shi‘a militias. 

The Plight of Iraqi Refugees and Internally 

Displaced Persons

The Extent and Causes of the Crisis

The confluence of sectarian violence, 

religious persecution, and other serious human rights 

violations has driven millions of Iraqis from their 

homes to other areas of the country and to countries 

outside Iraq. UNHCR reports that an estimated two 

million Iraqis have taken refuge in neighboring 

countries, primarily Syria and Jordan.9 UNHCR also 

estimates there are 2.8 internally displaced persons 

(IDPs) within Iraq. Most of the displaced, including 

more than half of the IDPs, left in the aftermath of 

the February 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari mosque 

in Samarra and the wave of sectarian violence that 

followed. 

The International Organization for 

Migration (IOM) has reported that 61 percent of the 

Iraqi IDPs it has interviewed said that they had fled 

their previous homes because of a direct threat to 

their lives, and of these, 85 percent reported being 

targeted because of their religious or sectarian 

identity. According to a 2007 UNHCR-sponsored 

survey of Iraqi refugees in Syria, 57 percent of 

respondents fled because of a direct threat to his/her 

life, 78 percent had a family member who had been 

killed between 2003 and the time of the survey, 62 

percent of whom were killed by a militia, 28 percent 

by unknown persons, and two percent by al-Qaeda in 

Iraq. 

 

Members of Iraq‘s smallest religious 

minority communities, particularly ChaldoAssyrian 

Christians, Sabean Mandaeans, and Yazidis, 

comprise a disproportionate number of registered 

Iraqi refugees. Although they comprise only 

approximately three percent of Iraq‘s pre-war total 

population, these minorities represent approximately 

17 percent of the refugees who have registered with 

UNHCR in Jordan and in Syria to date.10 In Turkey 

and Lebanon, Christians represent 57 and 25 percent 

of registered refugees, respectively. Yazidis have 
47

fled overwhelmingly to Syria, where they represent 

approximately 0.6 percent of the registered refugees. 

According to the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and 

Migration, almost half of Iraq‘s smallest religious 

minority population has fled abroad. 

Non-Muslim religious minorities, 

particularly Christians, were among the first to flee 

Iraq in response to bombings of churches, 

kidnappings and killings of religious leaders, and 

targeted violence against them because of their 

religion. During Commission trips to the region in 

2007 and 2008, Christian, Mandaean, and Yazidi 

refugees and IDPs provided accounts of violent 

attacks, kidnapping, rape, murder, torture, forced 

conversion, and the destruction or seizure of 

property, particularly businesses such as liquor stores 

or hair salons deemed un-Islamic. These individuals 

told the Commission that they were targeted because 

they do not conform to orthodox Islamic practices 

and/or because, as non-Muslims, they are perceived 

to be working for the U.S.-led coalition forces. They 

also reported being forced to pay a protection tax. 

Many reported fleeing their homes in fear after 

receiving threats to ―convert, leave, or die.‖ In 

addition, they told of their places of worship being 

bombed and forced to close and their religious 

leaders being kidnapped and/or killed. 

Large numbers of Iraqi Muslims have been 

displaced as well. IOM reports that Shi‘a Arabs 

represent 60 percent of IDPs and Sunni Arabs 28 

percent. In Jordan, Sunni Muslims comprise 59 

percent of the registered refugees while Shi‘a 

Muslims make up only 27 percent. In Syria, Sunni 

Muslims represent 58 percent of the registered 

refugees and Shi‘a Muslims 19.5 percent. 

Sunni and Shi‘a Muslim refugees told the 

Commission of receiving death threats, of family 

members being killed and kidnapped, of their houses 

being destroyed, and of forced displacements. Some 

refugees reported being targeted because of jobs held 

by them or their relatives, either connected to the 

U.S. government or to the former Ba‘athist regime. 

Other refugees spoke of being targeted because they 

were part of a mixed Muslim marriage or because 

their family was Sunni in a predominately Shi‘a 

neighborhood or vice versa. Many stated that the 

sectarian identities of their relatives and friends were 

either not known or not important before 2003, and 

several spoke of their families including both Sunnis 

and Shi‘as and of the diverse nature of 

neighborhoods before the sectarian violence. 

Protection and Assistance 

In neighboring countries and throughout 

Iraq, the initial welcome of displaced Iraqis has worn 

increasingly thin. The increased influx of refugees in 

2006 and 2007 strained public service resources in 

Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, and all imposed 

strict entry requirements. It is now almost impossible 

for Iraqi refugees to seek refuge in these countries. 

UNHCR and IOM report that 11 of 18 Iraqi 

governorates have imposed entry requirements for 

economic and security reasons. 

Iraqi refugees and IDPs face great 

humanitarian needs. Other than in Lebanon, where a 

sponsorship is required, Iraqi refugees are not 

permitted to work legally in any of the neighboring 

countries to which they have fled, and many are 

running out of or have already exhausted the money 

they brought from Iraq. Access to adequate shelter, 

food, and medical care remain serious problems for 

all displaced persons, as host countries find their 

basic services overburdened. Many children do not 

attend school. Refugees International has reported 

that militias and other non-state actors are filling the 

humanitarian void by providing assistance such as 

settling housing disputes and providing food and 

other items to IDPs. 

Returns

Since the end of 2007 and throughout 2008, 

a number of Iraqi refugees and IDPs have returned to 

their previous homes or areas. The vast majority 

settled into neighborhoods or governorates controlled 

by members of their own religious community. 

UNHCR reported that 220,610 refugees and IDPs 

returned to their areas of origin in 2008, though not 

necessarily to their original homes. The vast 

majority, more than 195,000, were IDPs. 

ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Mandaeans, and Yazidis 
48

are not believed to have been among these returnees. 

Refugee advocates, humanitarian organizations, and 

UNHCR continues to caution against returns due to 

insecurity in the country and the lack of an adequate 

system to manage returns. 

Interviews with some returning refugees 

indicate that they are returning because of the 

difficult economic conditions in their countries of 

asylum. The Iraqi government is providing returning 

families with cash assistance, but concerns remain 

about security, inadequate employment opportunities, 

and services. 

In July 2008, the Iraqi Ministry of 

Displacement and Migration (MoDM) announced a 

national policy on IDPs which prohibits 

discrimination against displaced persons; affirms the 

government‘s commitment to prevent displacement, 

confront perpetrators, and protect property left 

behind; and affirms that IDPs have the right to return 

to their places of origin, to integrate locally, or to 

resettle elsewhere in Iraq. 

In May 2008, Prime Minister al-Maliki 

announced that the Iraqi government would provide 

the MoDM with $195 million to promote returns. In 

August 2008, the government of Iraq announced an 

effort to identify and remove squatters occupying the 

homes of refugees and IDPs and provide 

compensation to those who leave voluntarily. The 

order also established centers in Baghdad to facilitate 

returns and called for the development of a system to 

duplicate these centers countrywide. However, this 

property return program is available only to refugees 

and IDPs who fled their homes between January 1, 

2006 and January 1, 2008. Furthermore, the program 

only applies to property disputes in Baghdad, not the 

entire country. 

U.S. Government Policies toward Iraqi Refugees and 

IDPs

Since fiscal year 2007, the United States has 

contributed approximately $569 million to various 

UN and non-governmental organizations assisting 

Iraqi refugees and IDPs. Also beginning in fiscal 

year 2007, the U.S. government increased its efforts 

to resettle Iraqi refugees to the United States. From 

January 2007 to February 2009, more than 19,000 

Iraqi refugees were resettled to this country, 

including 13,823 in fiscal year 2008. While the 

numbers initially referred to and admitted in to this 

country were low, the United States is now the 

largest recipient of UNHCR referrals of Iraqis for 

resettlement and the largest recipient of resettled Iraq 

refugees. The State Department has announced that 

the U.S. government expects to admit a minimum of 

17,000 Iraqi refugees for resettlement in fiscal year 

2009.

In February 2008, the State Department 

announced a new policy increasing direct access for 

certain Iraqis to the U.S. Refugee Admissions 

Program, as required by the Refugee Crisis in Iraq 

Act of 2007.11 Among the requirements of that Act is 

the creation of a new Priority 2 (P2) category in the 

U.S. Refugee Admission Program for certain Iraqis 

from ―religious or minority‖ communities with close 

family members in the United States, allowing them 

to apply directly for resettlement in the U.S. without 

first having to be referred by UNHCR.12 The 

amendment also authorized the Secretary of State to 

create additional P2 categories for other vulnerable 

Iraqis.13

The policy announced by the State 

Department does not expressly refer to any particular 

community or communities, nor to ―religious or 

minority‖ communities as the Act stipulated. Instead, 

it focuses on the close family aspect of the statutory 

provision. The new category applies to Iraqis in 

Egypt or Jordan ―who are the spouses, sons, 

daughters, parents, brothers or sisters of a citizen of 

the United States, or who are the spouses or 

unmarried sons or daughters of a Permanent Resident 

Alien of the United States, as established by their 

being or becoming beneficiaries of approved familybased I-130 Immigrant Visa Petitions.‖ Many of the 

religious minority asylum seekers, refugees, and 

IDPs with whom the Commission met in Sweden, 

Jordan, Syria, and Iraq have family members in the 

United States, but in most cases, they are extended 

family or the family members are not yet U.S. 

citizens or permanent residents; thus, the new P2 
49

category that was created pursuant to the Act will not 

apply to them.

Commission Activities

The Commission‘s December 2008 Iraq 

report reflected travel, interviews, briefings, 

meetings, and other activities undertaken in 2007 and 

2008. These activities included two public hearings 

in Congress in July and September 2007, the first 

examining threats to Iraq‘s smallest religious 

minorities and the second focusing on links between 

sectarian violence and the Iraqi refugee crisis. In 

November 2007, Commission staff traveled to Jordan 

and Sweden, and in March and May 2008, 

Commissioners traveled to Jordan, Iraq, and Syria to 

meet with Iraqi asylum seekers, refugees, and 

internally displaced persons, as well as officials of 

the Iraqi, Kurdish, and U.S. governments and 

international and non-governmental organizations. 

The Commission also met with administration 

officials and Iraq experts in Washington and had 

several video conferences with key U.S. and Iraqi 

government officials and minority community leaders 

in Baghdad.14 

Since 2003, the Commission has advocated 

for religious freedom and universal human rights 

protections for all persons in Iraq, primarily by 

calling for constitutional and legal reforms to ensure 

these rights are guaranteed and enforced in law. The 

Commission also has reported on other religious 

freedom issues, noting improvements in some areas 

but new and continuing problems in others—

including the alarming levels of religiously-motivated 

violence and human rights abuses and the extreme 

vulnerability of non-Muslims, including 

ChaldoAssyrian Christians, other Christians, Sabean 

Mandaeans, and Yazidis.

In 2006, the Commission concluded that the 

United States‘ direct involvement in Iraq‘s political 

reconstruction created a special obligation to act 

vigorously, together with the Iraqi leadership, to 

address the alarming levels of sectarian violence and 

religiously-motivated human rights abuses taking 

place in Iraq and to implement the legal, judicial and 

other institutional reforms necessary to implement 

human rights protections there. The Commission 

also warned that the level of violence and abuses, and 

the resulting flight, of members of Iraq‘s smallest 

minorities threatened to end these ancient 

communities‘ presence in Iraq. The Commission 

recommended a number of security and other 

measures for immediate adoption, including the 

placement of a senior official at Embassy Baghdad to 

address human rights violations. 

In May 2007, the Commission placed Iraq 

on its Watch List, citing escalating unchecked 

sectarian violence, mounting evidence of collusion 

between Shi‘a militias and Iraqi government 

ministries, and the grave conditions affecting the 

country‘s smallest religious minorities.15 In a 

subsequent May 2007 meeting with, and September 

2007 letter to, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, 

the Commission urged U.S. action to address the 

severe threats to these minorities, including through 

security, humanitarian, development, and 

reconciliation measures. Among other 

recommendations, the Commission proposed that the 

State Department convene urgent meetings both 

inside and outside Iraq, bringing together 

representatives of Iraq‘s non-Muslim minorities to 

hear directly from them what the U.S. and Iraqi 

governments could do to protect their communities. 

In December 2008, the Commission recommended 

that Iraq be considered by the State Department for 

CPC designation and issued a lengthy report with 

detailed policy recommendations urging, among 

other measures, greater U.S. focus on the prevention 

of abuses against religious minorities. 

The Commission also repeatedly has called 

attention to the dire plight of Iraqi refugees and IDPs 

and urged the U.S. government both to increase 

humanitarian assistance and to expand and expedite 

its refugee and asylum programs for Iraqis fleeing 

religious persecution. Since 2007, the Commission 

has advocated for a P2 category to allow Iraq‘s 

smallest, most vulnerable religious minorities, 

including ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Sabean 

Mandaeans, and Yazidis, direct access to the U.S. 

resettlement program without having to be referred 

by UNHCR, as well as for expanded family 
50

reunification options for these particularly vulnerable 

refugees. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

The Commission recommends the following 

actions to advance human rights protections for all 

Iraqis, including the freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief, and to address the plight of 

Iraq‘s most vulnerable and smallest religious 

minorities.

I. Ensuring Safe and Fair Elections

To ensure that upcoming national elections, 

expected in December, are safe, fair, and free of 

intimidation and violence, the U.S. government 

should: 

lead an international effort to protect voters and 

voting places and to monitor the elections;

direct U.S. military and coalition forces, where 

feasible and appropriate, to provide heightened 

security for the elections, particularly in minority 

areas, such as in Nineveh governorate, where 

there were irregularities in previous elections; 

and 

urge the Iraqi government at the highest levels to 

ensure security and to permit and facilitate 

election monitoring by experts from local and 

international NGOs, the international 

community, and the United Nations, particularly 

in minority areas, such as in Nineveh 

governorate, where there were irregularities in 

previous elections. 

II. Ensuring Security and Safety for all 

Iraqis

To protect the security and human rights of 

all members of religious communities, particularly 

vulnerable religious minorities such as 

ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Sabean Mandaeans and 

Yazidis, the U.S. government should urge the Iraqi 

government at the highest levels to:

urgently establish, fund, train, and deploy police 

units for vulnerable minority communities that 

are as representative as possible of those 

communities, ensure that minority police recruits 

are not excluded from nor discriminated against 

in the recruitment process, in promotion and 

command leadership opportunities, or in the 

terms and conditions of their employment, and 

ensure to the maximum extent possible that such 

police units remain in their locations of origin 

and are not transferred to other cities as has been 

done in the past;

continue efforts to ensure that new national 

identification cards do not list religious or ethnic 

identity, and expedite the development and 

issuance of such cards; and 

take steps to enhance security at places of 

worship, particularly in areas where religious 

minorities are known to be at risk.

To eliminate remaining sectarianism in the 

Iraqi government and security forces and reduce 

sectarian violence and human rights abuses, the U.S. 

government should urge the Iraqi government at the 

highest levels to:

ensure that Iraqi government revenues neither 

are directed to nor indirectly support any militia, 

para-state actor, or other organization credibly 

charged with involvement in severe human rights 

abuses;

suspend immediately any government personnel 

charged with engagement in sectarian violence 

and other human rights abuses, undertake 

transparent and effective investigations of such 

charges, and bring the perpetrators to justice; and

continue the process of ensuring a greater 

sectarian integration into the government and 

security forces so that they better reflect the 

diversity of the country.
51

III. Making Prevention of Abuses against 

Religious Minorities a High Priority

To address the severe abuses against Iraq‘s 

most vulnerable and smallest religious minorities, the 

U.S. government should urge the Iraqi government at 

the highest levels to:

replace the existing Prime Minister‘s minorities 

committee with one that is independent and 

includes representatives of all of Iraq‘s ethnic 

and religious minority communities who are 

selected by the communities themselves, and 

ensure that this committee has access for 

communicating minority concerns to senior 

officials of the Iraqi government and the 

international community;

work with minority communities and their 

representatives to develop measures to 

implement Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution, 

which guarantees ―the administrative, political, 

cultural, and educational rights of the various 

nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, 

Assyrians, and all the other constituents,‖ in 

Nineveh and other areas where these groups are 

concentrated; 

direct the Ministry of Human Rights to 

investigate and issue a public report on abuses 

against and the marginalization of Iraq‘s 

minority communities and make 

recommendations to address such abuses; 

make public the results of the Iraqi government‘s 

reported investigation into the fall 2008 attacks 

against Christians in Mosul when that 

investigation is completed, and bring the 

perpetrators of those attacks to justice; and 

enact constitutional amendments to strengthen 

human rights guarantees in the Iraqi 

Constitution, including by:

--clarifying sub-clause (B) in Article 2 that no 

law may contradict ―the rights and basic 

freedoms stipulated in this constitution‖ to make 

clear that these rights and freedoms include the 

principles of equality and nondiscrimination and 

the human rights guaranteed under international 

agreements to which Iraq is a State party;

--deleting sub-clause (A) in Article 2 that no law 

may contradict ―the established provisions of 

Islam‖ because it heightens sectarian tensions 

over which interpretation of Islam prevails and 

improperly turns theological interpretations into 

constitutional questions;

--revising Article 2‘s guarantee of ―the Islamic 

identity of the majority‖ to make certain that this 

identity is not used to justify violations of the 

individual right to freedom of thought, 

conscience, religion or belief under international 

law; 

--ensuring that minority identity is also 

guaranteed, including the rights of all individual 

members of ethnic, religious or linguistic 

minorities to enjoy and develop their culture and 

language and practice their religion; 

--making clear that the default system for 

personal status cases in Iraq is civil law, that the 

free and informed consent of both parties is 

required to move a personal status case to the 

religious law system, that religious court rulings 

are subject to final review under Iraq's civil law, 

and that the appointment of judges to courts 

adjudicating personal status matters, including 

any religious courts, should meet international 

standards with respect to judicial training; and

--removing the ability of making appointments to 

the Federal Supreme Court based on training in 

Islamic jurisprudence alone, and requiring that, 

at a minimum, all judges have training in civil 

law, including a law degree. 

In addition, the U.S. government should: 

immediately revive the U.S. government‘s 

internal Inter-Agency Task Force on Iraqi 

Minority Issues and direct it to consider and 

recommend policies for the U.S. government to 
52

implement to address the needs of these 

vulnerable communities; and 

facilitate a series of conferences, both inside and 

outside Iraq, bringing together representatives of 

Iraq's smallest religious minorities to allow them 

to discuss and help them come to consensus on 

recommendations to the U.S. and Iraqi 

governments on measures to protect their 

communities.

IV. Ensuring that the Kurdistan Regional 

Government Upholds Minority Rights

To address the marginalization of religious 

and ethnic minorities in northern Iraq, including in 

disputed areas, the U.S. government should:

press the Kurdistan Regional Government 

(KRG) and Kurdish officials in neighboring 

governorates to cease alleged interference with 

the creation, training, and deployment of 

representative police forces for minority 

communities, and link progress on representative 

policing to U.S. financial assistance and other 

forms of interaction with the KRG;

demand immediate investigations into and 

accounting for allegations of human rights 

abuses by Kurdish regional and local officials 

against minority communities, including reports 

of attacks on minorities and expropriation of 

minority property, and make clear that decisions 

on U.S. financial and other assistance will take 

into account whether perpetrators are being 

investigated and held accountable; and

work with Iraqi and KRG officials to establish a 

mechanism to examine and resolve outstanding 

real property claims involving religious and 

ethnic minorities in the KRG region and 

neighboring governorates.

V. Re-Focusing U.S. Financial Assistance

To address the marginalization of religious 

and ethnic minorities in northern Iraq, including in 

disputed areas, the U.S. government should: 

direct U.S. assistance funds to projects that 

develop the political ability of ethnic and 

religious minorities to organize themselves and 

effectively convey their concerns to the 

government; 

declare and establish a fair allocation of U.S. 

foreign assistance funding for ChaldoAssyrian 

Christian, Sabean Mandaean, Yazidi, and other 

small religious and ethnic minority communities, 

ensure that the use of these funds is determined 

by independent minority national and town 

representatives, and establish direct lines of 

communication between such independent 

structures and U.S. Provincial Reconstruction 

Team Nineveh, separate from the Iraqi 

government and the Kurdistan Regional 

Government, in order to ensure that U.S. 

assistance fairly benefits all religious and ethnic 

minority groups and is not being withheld by 

local and regional government officials; and

require that the Government Accountability 

Office, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction, or another appropriate entity 

conduct an independent audit of past and current 

U.S. and Iraqi government reconstruction and 

development assistance to religious and ethnic 

minority areas, and provide recommendations for 

future assistance.

To eliminate remaining sectarianism in the 

Iraqi government and security forces and reduce 

sectarian violence and human rights abuses, the U.S. 

government should: 

ensure that U.S. foreign assistance and security 

assistance programs do not directly or indirectly 

provide financial, material or other benefits to 1) 

government security units and/or paragovernmental militias responsible for severe 

human rights abuses or otherwise engaged in 

sectarian violence; or 2) political parties or other 

organizations that advocate or condone policies 

at odds with Iraq‘s international human rights 

obligations, or whose aims include the 
53

destruction or undermining of such international 

human rights guarantees; and

fund programs to educate and train Ministry of 

Interior and Ministry of Defense personnel on 

international human rights standards, particularly 

as they relate to religious freedom.

To advance human rights protections for all 

Iraqis, the U.S. government should:

fund capacity-building programs for the Iraqi 

Ministry of Human Rights, the independent 

national Human Rights Commission, and a new 

independent minorities committee whose 

membership is selected by the communities;

fund the deployment of human rights experts to 

consult with the Iraqi Council of Representatives 

and the constitutional amendment committee and 

assist with legal drafting and implementation 

matters related to strengthening human rights 

provisions, including freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief;

fund workshops and training sessions on 

religion/state issues for Iraqi officials, 

policymakers, legal professionals, 

representatives of non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs), religious leaders, and 

other members of key sectors of society; and 

expand the Iraqi visitors program through the 

State Department to focus on exchange and 

educational opportunities in the United States 

related to freedom of religion and religious 

tolerance for Iraqi officials, policymakers, legal 

professionals, representatives of NGOs, religious 

leaders, and other members of key sectors of 

society.

VI. Addressing Religious Extremism 

To address concerns of religious extremism 

in Iraq, the U.S. government should:

continue to speak out at the highest levels to 

condemn religiously-motivated violence by both 

Shi‘a and Sunni groups, including violence 

targeting women and members of religious 

minorities, as well as efforts by local officials 

and extremist groups to enforce religious law in 

violation of the Iraqi Constitution and 

international human rights standards;

urge the Iraqi government at the highest levels to 

locate and close illegal courts unlawfully 

imposing extremist interpretations of Islamic 

law; 

give clear directives to U.S. officials and 

recipients of U.S. democracy-building grants to 

assign greater priority to projects that promote 

multi-religious and multi-ethnic efforts to 

encourage religious tolerance and understanding, 

foster knowledge of and respect for universal 

human rights standards, and build judicial 

capacity to foster the rule of law; and

fund civic education programs in schools that 

teach religious tolerance and the historical nature 

of Iraq as a multi-religious and multi-ethnic 

state. 

VII. Promoting Respect for Human Rights

To address past and current reports of 

human rights violations in Iraq, the U.S. government 

should:

appoint and immediately dispatch a Special 

Envoy for Human Rights in Iraq to Embassy 

Baghdad, reporting directly to the Secretary of 

State, to serve as the United States‘ lead human 

rights official in Iraq; to lead an Embassy human 

rights working group, including the senior 

coordinators on Article 140 issues, on 

corruption, and on the rule of law, as well as 

other relevant officials including those focusing 

on minority issues; and to coordinate U.S. efforts 

to promote and protect human rights in Iraq; and

appoint immediately one or more U.S. advisors 

under the Department of State‘s Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office to serve as 

liaisons to the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights.
54

To address past and current reports of 

human rights violations in Iraq, the U.S. government 

should urge the Iraqi government at the highest levels 

to: 

undertake transparent and effective 

investigations of human rights abuses, including 

those stemming from sectarian, religiouslymotivated, or other violence by Iraqi security 

forces, political factions, militias or any other 

para-state actors affiliated with or otherwise 

linked to the Iraqi government or regional or 

local governments, and bring the perpetrators to 

justice; 

cooperate with international investigations of 

such abuses; and

create and fully fund the independent national 

Human Rights Commission provided for in the 

Iraqi Constitution and ensure that this 

Commission is non-sectarian, that it has a 

mandate to investigate individual complaints, 

and that its functions and operations are based on 

the UN‘s Paris Principles. 

To respond to reports of the confiscation of 

houses of worship, the U.S. government should urge 

the Iraqi government at the highest levels to: 

promptly terminate any seizures and conversions 

of places of worship and other religious 

properties, restore previously seized and 

converted properties to their rightful owners, and 

provide appropriate compensation.

VIII. Addressing the Situation of Internally 

Displaced Persons and Refugees

To address the humanitarian needs of Iraqi 

internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, the 

U.S. government should:

fund a much larger proportion of all UN appeals 

for humanitarian assistance to Iraqi IDPs and 

refugees; 

urge the Iraqi government to fund a much larger 

proportion of all UN appeals for humanitarian 

assistance to Iraqis and to increase its own 

assistance to IDPs; 

utilize diplomatic efforts to urge U.S. allies in 

Iraq to increase humanitarian assistance to, and 

resettlement opportunities for, vulnerable Iraqi 

refugees and IDPs; 

increase assistance to humanitarian 

organizations, host nations, and host 

communities that are providing necessary aid to 

vulnerable Iraqi IDPs and refugees, including 

funding programs to provide medical care for 

basic, advanced and chronic medical concerns, 

including prescription drugs; psychosocial care 

for victims of trauma; formal, informal, and nonformal education opportunities; direct financial 

assistance to alleviate the high costs of shelter; 

packages to provide for basic needs, including 

increased food distribution programs; and 

information campaigns;

fund capacity-building programs for the Iraqi 

Ministry of Displacement and Migration to 

ensure that it can adequately provide assistance 

and protection to internally displaced persons; 

provide assistance from and guidance by the 

U.S. Agency for International Development to 

the government of Iraq to reform the Public 

Distribution System so that displaced Iraqis can 

register for and receive food rations in their new 

locations; 

work to ensure that no assistance is provided to 

IDPs by political factions, militias, or any other 

actor implicated in sectarian violence or other 

human rights abuses; and 

encourage countries to which Iraqis have fled, in 

particular Jordan and Syria, to allow refugees to 

work.

To ensure freedom of movement for Iraqis 

fleeing religious or other persecution, the U.S. 

government should:
55

encourage neighboring countries, in particular 

Jordan and Syria, to reform border policies to 

enable vulnerable refugees to enter; and 

encourage Iraqi governorates to remove entry 

restrictions and registration policies that limit the 

ability of vulnerable Iraqis to enter.

To address the increasing incidents of

returns or attempted returns by IDPs and refugees to 

their locations of origin, the U.S. government should:

clearly state that the U.S. government does not 

encourage the premature return of Iraqi refugees 

to Iraq until necessary conditions are met, 

including security, assistance, legal frameworks, 

and integration programs; 

encourage and fund information campaigns, 

including ―go and see visits‖ by religious and/or 

community leaders selected by the refugees/IDPs 

to ensure that displaced Iraqis considering return 

have the proper information needed to make 

informed decisions;

work with the government of Iraq and 

international organizations to help the Iraqi 

government develop the legal framework 

necessary to address property disputes resulting 

when displaced Iraqis attempt to return to homes 

that have been occupied by others or destroyed, 

and stop the efforts of sectarian militias to 

resolve such property disputes; and

increase the capacity of assistance organizations 

to provide long-term assistance, including 

shelter, food, and other essential services, to 

returning Iraqis.

To facilitate the resettlement to the United 

States of the most vulnerable Iraqis, the U.S. 

government should 

amend the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program‘s 

new P2 category to allow Iraq‘s smallest, most 

vulnerable religious minorities direct access to 

the program, and expand family reunification for 

these refugees with relatives in the United States 

to include not only immediate family members, 

but also extended family such as grandparents, 

aunts and uncles, cousins, etc., as has been done 

in prior refugee crisis situations; 

ensure that members of Iraq‘s smallest, most 

vulnerable religious minorities scheduled to be 

resettled to the United States are not delayed 

unnecessarily by 1) providing adequate 

personnel to conduct background screening 

procedures, and 2) enforcing proper application 

of the existing waiver of the material support bar 

to those forced to provide support to terrorists 

under duress;

enhance the resettlement processing capabilities 

of the Department of Homeland Security by 

increasing the number of interviewing officers 

and allowing State Department officials to 

conduct interviews in order to keep pace with 

referrals from the UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees (UNHCR) and meet the statutorilypermitted maximum of admissions for the 

region; and 

continue to raise with UNHCR any reports of 

discrimination by local employees against 

religious minority refugees in the resettlement 

process. 

 

1 The Commission‘s December 2008 report is 

available at www.uscirf.gov.

2 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, U.S. 

Department of Defense, January 9, 2009

3

Simon Caldwell, ―Bishop Asks: Is it the  ̳End of 

Christianity in Iraq?‘‖, Catholic News Service, 

Decmeber 1, 2007.

4

For more detail, see the Commission‘s December 

16, 2008 Iraq report, available at www.uscirf.gov.

5

The provision deleted from the law would have set 

aside 15 seats for minorities (13 for Christians and 

one each for Yazidis and Shabaks) in six provincial 

councils. The compromise proposed by the United 

Nations would have set aside 12 minority seats in 

three councils (Nineveh, Baghdad, and Basra). The 

amendment ultimately adopted by the parliament in 

early November provided for six minority seats in 
56

 

these councils. The United Nations proposed that 

Christians should get three seats on each of the three 

councils, but the amendment that was adopted gave 

Christians only one seat on each. The UN also 

proposed that Yazidis should get three seats on the 

Nineveh council, but the amendment provided for 

only one. In addition, Shabaks were allotted one seat 

in Nineveh and Mandaeans one seat in Baghdad, as 

the UN proposed.

6

 The law prohibits travel to the ―enemy states‖ of 

Israel, Iran, and the United States.

7

It is not clear whether the perpetrators of this attack 

were Sunni Arabs or Sunni Turkomen. If the latter, 

this particular incident could mark the first sign of 

organized sectarian violence within Iraq‘s Turkomen 

minority community, which has both Sunni and Shi‘a 

elements.

8 Lou Chibbaro, ―State Dept.  ̳troubled‘ over anti-gay 

violence in Iraq,‖ The Washington Blade, May 25, 

2006.

9 There are currently thought to be 1.2 million Iraqi 

refugees in Syria, 450,000 – 500,000 in Jordan, 

50,000 in Lebanon, 50,000 in Iran, 20,000 – 40,000 

in Egypt, 10,000 in Turkey, and 200,000 in various 

Persian Gulf states. These numbers are estimates 

only. It is difficult for the UN or the host nations to 

accurately tally the number of Iraqi refugees because, 

unlike most refugee situations, the refugees are living 

in cities, not in camps where they can be easily 

counted. 

10 Registration with UNHCR is voluntary and is often 

of interest mainly to those refugees who wish to be 

resettled to a third country. As of February 2009, 

UNHCR had registered a little more than 310,000 

Iraqi refugees throughout the region (active cases 

only), including 224,343 in Syria and 52,656 in 

Jordan. 

11 This Act was an amendment sponsored by Senator 

Edward Kennedy (D-MA) to the FY 2008 National 

Defense Authorization Act.

12 A P2 designation does not guarantee resettlement 

of all individuals from that category who apply. 

Each applicant still must undergo the refugee status 

determination interviews and background security 

and medical screenings required for all asylumseekers by U.S. law. The P2 designation does, 

however, speed up the process for those applicants by 

bypassing the UNHCR referral process, and it also 

allows UNHCR to focus on other vulnerable groups. 

13 The relevant language is found in the following 

two sections: 

Section 1243(a)(4): “Refugees of special 

humanitarian concern eligible for Priority 2 

processing under the refugee resettlement 

priority system who may apply directly to the 

 

United States Admission Program shall include . 

. . Iraqis who are members of a religious or 

minority community, have been identified by the 

Secretary of State, or the designee of the 

Secretary, as a persecuted group, and have close 

family members (as described in section 

201(b)(2)(A)(i) or 203(a) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) and 

1153(a))) in the United States.‖

Section 1243(b): ―The Secretary of State, or the 

designee of the Secretary, is authorized to 

identify other Priority 2 groups of Iraqis, 

including vulnerable populations.‖

14 The Commission was scheduled to travel to 

Baghdad in late October 2008, but the trip was 

postponed by the U.S. Embassy because it was 

moving into a new building. In place of the trip, the 

Department of State kindly facilitated a number of 

videoconferences with officials and individuals in 

Baghdad.

15 At that time, in dissent, three Commissioners 

concluded that based on the severe human rights and 

religious freedom conditions extant in the 

country, and the sovereign government‘s complicity 

with, or toleration of, abuses as outlined in the Iraq 

chapter of the Commission‘s 2007 Annual 

Report, Iraq should have been recommended for 

designation as a country of particular concern (CPC).
57

Nigeria

The response of the government of Nigeria 

to persistent religious freedom violations and violent 

sectarian and communal conflicts along religious 

lines has been inadequate and ineffectual. Years of 

inaction by Nigeria‘s federal, state and local 

governments has created a climate of impunity, 

resulting in thousands of deaths. In March-April 

2009, the Commission traveled to Nigeria to assess 

religious freedom conditions in the country. 

Concerns include an ongoing series of violent 

communal and sectarian conflicts along religious 

lines; the expansion of sharia (Islamic law) into the 

criminal codes of several northern Nigerian states; 

and discrimination against minority communities of 

Christians and Muslims. Therefore, the Commission, 

for the first time, is recommending that Nigeria be 

designated as a country of particular concern, or 

CPC, for tolerating systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious violations of religious freedom.*

Sectarian violence 

In November 2008, the city of Jos, Plateau 

state, experienced several days of intense sectarian 

and communal violence. At least several hundred 

Muslims and Christians were killed, with some 

independent groups estimating the death toll closer to 

3,000. Even the lowest reported death tolls from Jos 

represent a significant spike in the number of deaths 

that the country has seen from a single sectarian and 

ethnic flare-up in several years. 

Jos has been deeply scarred from this 

violence. At least 10,000 have been displaced. 

Dozens of churches, mosques, businesses, vehicles, 

and private homes were burned and destroyed. In the 

weeks that followed, investigations into the violence 

were launched by the President and the governor of 

Plateau state. Both are still ongoing. But in March 

2009 a third investigation, by a committee of the 

Nigerian House of Representatives, concluded that 

the violence was ―absolutely avoidable‖ and that its 

 

* Commissioner Cromartie dissents from the CPC 

recommendation, concluding that Nigeria should 

remain on the Commission‘s Watch List.

immediate cause was the role of the state government 

and political parties in igniting violence and 

manipulating voting results during campaigning for 

local government councils. The report found, among 

other things, that that the state government failed to 

act on intelligence from the state security services 

about violence being planned. 

Less than three months later, in February 

2009, Muslim-Christian clashes in Bauchi state 

resulted in at least 11 deaths, although some reports 

indicated as many as 20 people were killed, with 

1,500 individuals displaced. In addition, fourteen 

churches, eight parsonages, one mosque and 

approximately 150 homes and businesses were 

burned and/or destroyed. The causes of the violence 

reportedly include a dispute between Christians and 

Muslims in a church parking lot, reprisal for the 

burning of two mosques in the state capital, and 

retaliation for events which took place in Jos in 

November 2008 when rioting Muslims were shot for 

defying a government imposed curfew. In addition, 

in April 2009, a group of Muslims in central Niger 

state reportedly attacked a procession of Christians 

who were celebrating Easter in two separate towns. 

Clashes ensued and dozens of Christians were injured 

and at least two churches and one mosque were 

burned.

The sectarian conflicts recently witnessed in 

Jos and Bauchi are just the most recent in a long line 

of violent incidents resulting in death, destruction, 

and a sense of fear within Northern and Central 

Nigerian communities. Indeed, since 1999, a 

disturbingly large number of Nigerians—12,000, if 

not more—have been killed in sectarian and 

communal attacks and reprisals between Muslims 

and Christians. The most severe clashes occurred in 

Kaduna state (February and May 2000 and November 

2002); Jos, Plateau state (September 2001); Kano 

state and Yelwa, Plateau state (February-May 2004); 

and in northern and southeastern Nigeria, in the wake 

of the controversy over depictions of the Prophet 

Muhammad in the Danish press (February 2006). 

It is this continued pattern of sectarian 

violence that intensified the Commission's review of 

conditions in Nigeria, that prompted a delegation to 
58

visit the country in March-April of this year, and that, 

ultimately, has led the Commission to conclude that, 

for the first time, Nigeria should be designated as a 

CPC. 

The government of Nigeria has done little, if 

anything, to address sectarian and communal 

violence. There have been no serious efforts to 

investigate or prosecute the perpetrators of the 

numerous killings and other crimes that have 

occurred in Bauchi, Jos, and the other incidents noted 

above. There are reports of specific instances of 

failures to heed warning signs of violence on the part 

of various government leaders, and failures on the 

part of federal police to respond effectively and 

appropriately—at times, if at all—to violence once it 

has erupted. 

The national legislature has exercised no 

discernible oversight over either the Ministry of 

Justice or the National Human Rights Commission in 

an effort to ensure adequate investigation and 

resolution of religious violence and intolerance. The 

Human Rights Commission is, both by design and in 

practical effect, bereft of the independence it needs to 

investigate and speak out boldly to address religious 

conflict. It lacks satisfactory funding or the tools for 

investigation, and all of its members serve at the 

pleasure of the President. 

Put simply, the Nigerian Government has 

permitted religious violence and other severe 

violations of the freedom of religion to occur with 

impunity. The toleration of such violence is an 

ample ground under the International Religious 

Freedom Act to designate Nigeria as a CPC. 

The government‘s toleration of violence has 

created numerous points of leverage for religious 

intolerance. In the North, state governments engage 

in various forms of discrimination in relation to 

access to education, employment, zoning, and the 

allocation of benefits. In Kano, state-funded 

religious police are reported to have been enforcing 

forms of sharia that abuse human rights as well as 

creating an environment that leads to the harassment 

of Christians. Religion is often used by politicians as 

a proxy for political or economic disputes within 

northern communities. Without leadership from top 

government officials and elected leaders in Abuja, 

there is little incentive for the governments in Kano 

and other northern states to create an environment 

that is more hospitable to Christians in the north, as 

well as to Muslim minority communities in the south, 

and to those throughout the country who choose not 

to conform to whatever the prevailing views of Islam 

might be. 

The Commission concludes that Nigeria 

could, if it wished, muster the resources and capacity 

necessary to address communal, sectarian, and 

religious violence and intolerance. It is among the 

most economically prosperous countries in all of 

Africa. It boasts a large, diverse population and a 

civil society community that seek resolution of these 

conflicts. In a number of respects, it has the 

constitutional and governmental structural features 

that could lead to greater peace and stability if proper 

stewardship were in place. The United States and 

other countries provide significant aid, training, and 

technical assistance for governance, law enforcement, 

and conflict resolution, and have demonstrated a 

willingness to do more if resources are not 

squandered. The severe violations of religious 

freedom in Nigeria can be addressed, and must be for 

that country to realize lasting progress, security, 

stability, and prosperity as a democracy. 

After her visit to Nigeria in 2005, the UN 

Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, Asma Jahangir, concluded that in most cases 

of communal and sectarian violence, Nigerian federal 

authorities ―did not initiate the mechanisms designed 

to prosecute the offenders and compensate the 

victims.‖ The Special Rapporteur found that rather 

than prosecution and punishment for the violence, the 

promotion of peace and reconciliation was the 

authorities‘ priority. She further concluded that 

―impunity further strengthens the fears of those who 

have been affected by previous instances of violence 

and inherently limits the enjoyment of their right to 

freely manifest their religion or belief...impunity 

therefore only escalates religious intolerance.‖ The 

Special Rapporteur recommended that the Nigerian 

government should ensure that investigations of 

communal and sectarian violence are thorough, 
59

including through the identification and prosecution 

of the alleged perpetrators, and that victims should be 

able to file claims for the damage they incurred and 

be awarded appropriate compensation. In addition, 

her report recommended that the Nigerian 

government ―should take very firm positions 

whenever religion is at the origin of human rights 

violations, regardless of which religious community 

is concerned.‖ To date, none of these 

recommendations have been implemented fully by 

the Nigerian government.

The Sharia Controversy

Since October 1999, 12 northern Nigerian 

states have expanded, or announced plans to expand, 

the application of sharia in their states‘ criminal law; 

however, there have not been further enactments in 

the past year. Although the particulars vary from 

state to state, each of the 12 states are working to 

extend the jurisdiction of sharia courts beyond 

personal status matters to include sharia crimes and 

punishments for Muslims only. Punishments include 

amputation, flogging, or death by stoning, often after 

trials that fall short of basic international legal 

standards. Defendants have limited rights of appeal 

and sometimes have no opportunity to seek legal 

representation. Women have faced particular 

discrimination under these codes, especially in 

adultery cases where pregnancy alone has been used 

as adequate evidence of guilt, and allegations of rape 

and sexual violence are rarely investigated. In 

addition to criminal code changes that purportedly 

apply only to Muslims, in recent years, some states 

have instituted or tolerated discriminatory practices 

based on religious precepts such as banning the sale 

and consumption of alcohol and disadvantaging 

women in education, health care, and public 

transportation. These practices affect Muslims and 

non-Muslims alike. 

There are some sharia cases pending appeal 

or implementation of sentence, including pending 

amputation and stoning sentences in Jigawa, Bauchi, 

Niger, Kano, and Zamfara states. Many of these 

cases have been delayed continuously for various 

reasons. However, as noted above, a number of 

stoning cases have been reversed on appeal and there 

have been no floggings or amputations carried out 

during the past year. The Hisbah, or religious police, 

funded and supported by state governments in 

Zamfara, Niger, Kaduna, and Kano, enforce some 

sharia statutes in their respective states. In some 

areas, the Hisbah primarily worked as traffic wardens 

and marketplace regulators.

Sharia punishments such as death by stoning 

and amputation have been topics of a national debate 

in recent years on whether these punishments 

constitute torture or inhumane or degrading treatment 

under the Nigerian Constitution. The UN Committee 

Against Torture, as well as the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Torture, have stated that flogging, 

stoning, and amputation do breach the prohibition 

against inhuman or degrading treatment under 

international human rights standards and treaties. On 

this issue, the UN Special Rapporteur stated that the 

Nigerian government should ensure that practices and 

codes of all states are in compliance with 

international human rights conventions and it should 

conduct an ―assessment of all the laws in force and 

analyze their compatibility with international human 

rights law.‖

Discrimination and Extremism

In addition to the sharia controversy and the 

violence it incites, Nigeria faces a number of other 

serious problems regarding freedom of religion or 

belief. Christians in the northern states complain of 

what they view as discrimination at the hands of 

Muslim-controlled governments and describe their 

communities as having the status of ―second-class 

citizens.‖ Most complaints predate the recent 

initiatives regarding sharia, and include allegations of 

official discrimination in the denial of applications to 

build or repair places of worship, access to education 

and state-run media, representation in government 

bodies, and government employment. Reports 

indicate that in certain northern states, it is very 

difficult to obtain permits to repair or build a nonMuslim place of worship, and that some Christian 

churches have been torn down because they lacked 

appropriate government permits; specific zoning laws 

were invoked to justify action or inaction by state 

authorities. Muslim communities in southeastern 
60

Nigeria echo some of the complaints of minority 

Christian communities in northern Nigeria. Southern 

Muslim leaders report official or officially sanctioned 

discrimination in the media, education, and 

representation in government institutions. Although 

proselytizing is permitted by the Constitution, several 

northern states continue to ban some public religious 

activities to address public safety and security 

concerns. 

In addition, there continue to be reports of 

foreign sources of funding and support for Islamist 

extremist activities in northern Nigeria, activities that 

threaten to fracture the already fragile relations 

between the two main religious groups. Since 2003, 

there have been a number of small, vocal Muslim 

groups in northern Nigeria that advocate strict 

application of sharia, and which, some argue, are 

helping create a haven for radical Islamist militants 

from outside Nigeria. Though not organized as a 

nationwide movement, some of these groups 

advocate a more forcible Islamization of all Nigerian 

society, regardless of religious affiliation. In recent 

years, Nigerian security forces have dealt more 

decisively with Islamic extremist groups. However, 

in April 2007, 12 Nigerian police officers were killed 

after Islamist extremists attacked a police station in 

Kano. Nigerian security forces responded by killing 

at least 25 of the self-styled ―Taliban‖ militants, who 

Nigerian authorities said came into Nigeria from 

neighboring Chad.

Several observers inside and outside Nigeria 

have reported that financial support from Libya, 

Saudi Arabia, and Sudan has been used to build 

mosques and Islamic religious schools in northern 

Nigeria. Some have suggested that the extreme 

interpretation of Islam being preached in these 

mosques and religious schools is not a form of Islam 

that is traditional to Nigeria. Also, there are reports 

that an increasing number of Nigerian Islamic 

scholars and clerics are being trained in Saudi Arabia 

and return with a politico-religious ideology that

explicitly promotes hatred of, and violence against, 

non-Muslims.

Other Developments

Over the past year, some state governors, 

including from northern states, actively encouraged 

interfaith and inter-communal discussions and 

undertook efforts to prevent further violence and 

tension along religious lines; however, 

implementation of such efforts is limited and varied 

from state to state. In 2008, the Nigerian InterReligious Council (NIREC), composed of 25 Muslim 

and 25 Christian leaders, issued a communiqué 

pledging to reduce religious conflict in the country. 

NIREC decided to ―sustain and step up efforts of the 

leadership of the council aimed at reducing interreligious tensions; and foster and promote interreligious cooperation for the common good of the 

people of Nigeria.‖ The meeting was co-chaired by 

the President of the Supreme Council for Islamic 

Affairs, the Sultan of Sokoto Muhammad Sa‘ad 

Abubakar and Archbishop John Onaiyekan, the 

Catholic Archbishop of Abuja and President of the 

Christian Association of Nigeria. President Umaru 

Yar‘Adua continues to publicly support the 

government-funded NIREC and other nongovernmental organizations that promote 

reconciliation and inter-religious understanding.

Commission Activities

Throughout the past year, Commission staff 

met with members of non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) representing various religious 

communities in Nigeria, as well as human rights 

organizations, academics, and other Nigeria experts. 

The Commission traveled to Nigeria in March-April 

2009 to assess religious freedom conditions; the 

detailed findings from that visit and the full set of 

recommendation for U.S. policy will be released later 

in 2009. In December 2008, the Commission 

expressed concern about the sectarian and ethnic 

violence in Jos; the Commission called on the U.S. 

government to urge the Nigerian government to 

launch an immediate and independent investigation 

of the clashes that broke out between Muslims and 

Christians following local elections and to prosecute 

the perpetrators. In April 2009, the Commission 

hosted a public briefing on Capitol Hill with 

Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar III, the Sultan of Sokoto, 
61

and Rev. Dr. John Onaiyekan, Roman Catholic 

Archbishop of Abuja and president of the Christian 

Association of Nigeria, who discussed the causes of 

and challenges in addressing Nigeria‘s recurring 

inter-religious and ethnic violence.
62

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

I. CPC Designation and Next Steps

The U.S. government should:

designate the government of Nigeria as a 

―country of particular concern,‖ or CPC, under 

the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA), for tolerating particularly severe 

violations of religious freedom; 

enter into a binding agreement with the Nigerian 

government, as defined in section 405(c) of the 

International Religious Freedom Act, that 

obligates the government to cease or take 

substantial steps to address policies leading to 

violations of religious freedom, or take an 

appropriate commensurate action;

ensure that the following benchmarks are part of 

any such binding agreement with the Nigerian 

government, including, but not limited to:

--vigorously investigating and prosecuting 

perpetrators of sectarian and communal 

violence, including the November 2008 Jos 

incident, but also other past instances where 

communal and sectarian violence has taken 

place;

--developing effective conflict prevention 

and early warning system mechanisms at the 

local, state, and federal levels using practical 

and implementable criteria;

--developing the capability to rapidly deploy 

specialized police and army units to prevent 

and combat sectarian violence in cities 

around the country where there has been a 

history of sectarian violence in central and 

northern Nigeria, including Jos, Kaduna, 

Kano, and Bauchi states, among others;

--taking steps to professionalize its police 

and military forces in its investigative, 

community policing, crowd control, and 

conflict prevention capacities; and

--conducting specialized training for its 

military and security forces to be more 

adequately trained in human rights 

standards, as well as non-lethal responses to 

crowd control and in quelling mob or 

communal violence; 

urge the Nigerian government to carry out its 

responsibility to prevent and contain acts of 

sectarian and communal violence, prevent 

reprisal attacks, and bring those responsible for 

such violence to justice;

urge the Nigerian House of Representatives and 

Senate to conduct more rigorous oversight of 

executive branch agencies, including the 

Ministry of Justice, responsible for preventing 

sectarian violence, prosecuting perpetrators of 

sectarian violence, and responding to the various 

crises; and

call on the UN Human Rights Council to monitor 

carefully and demand Nigeria‘s compliance with 

the recommendations of the representatives of 

those UN special procedures that have already 

visited Nigeria, particularly the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

(2005) and the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions 

(2005).

II. Expanding U.S. Support for Communal 

Conflict Prevention and Mitigation

The U.S. government should offer technical 

and programmatic assistance by:

increasing funding, training, and assistance to the 

Nigerian federal police force through the U.S. 

Department of State‘s Bureau of International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; 

increasing funds for the expansion of specialized 

training for Nigerian military and federal and 

state police forces to be more adequately trained 

in non-lethal responses to crowd control and in 

quelling mob or sectarian violence, as well as to 
63

increase their investigative, community policing, 

crowd control, and conflict prevention 

capacities;

engaging existing social institutions, including 

indigenous religious bodies, and strengthening 

civil society organizations that have special 

expertise and a demonstrated commitment in the 

areas of inter-religious and inter-ethnic 

reconciliation and conflict prevention, to 

promote a peaceful civil society;

supporting the expansion of NIREC, formed to 

promote dialogue between Christians and 

Muslims, and replicate NIREC at the state and 

local levels; 

working with Nigerian NGOs engaging on 

communal conflict prevention and mitigation, 

emphasizing capacity-building at the local level;

assisting human rights defenders, including legal 

aid groups that defend the constitutional and 

internationally recognized rights of individuals, 

especially women, who are impacted by shariabased criminal codes;

assisting human rights defenders responding to 

credible allegations of religious discrimination in 

any part of Nigeria; and

creating programs and institutions, particularly in 

areas where communal violence has occurred, 

that promote objective, unbiased, and noninflammatory reporting, consistent with the right 

to freedom of expression.

III. Urging the Nigerian Government to 

Oppose Religious Extremism 

The U.S. government should urge the 

government of Nigeria to:

ensure that sharia codes, as applied, uphold the 

principle of equality under the law between men 

and women and between Muslims and nonMuslims, and do not result in violations of 

international human rights standards with regard 

to freedom of religion or belief, due process of 

law, equal treatment before the law, freedom of 

expression, and discriminatory practices against 

women;

ensure that sharia criminal codes do not apply to 

non-Muslims or to individual Muslims who do 

not wish to go before sharia courts, and prevent 

law enforcement activities in northern states by 

any quasi-official or private corps of sharia 

enforcers; and

cease any official, state-level support for the 

Hisbah, or religious police, by dissolving the 

Hisbah and entrusting law enforcement to 

professionals in law enforcement agencies with a 

precise jurisdiction and subject to judicial 

review.

IV. Expanding U.S. Presence and Outreach 

Efforts, Primarily in Northern Nigeria

The U.S. government should:

open a consulate or other official presence in 

Kano or elsewhere in the north;

provide Embassy and Consulate staff with 

appropriate local language skills, and requiring 

political and public affairs officers to regularly 

travel throughout Nigeria;

increase the capacity of the Hausa Service of the 

Voice of America to report fair and balanced 

views on communal conflict and human rights 

issues; 

sponsor several exchange programs each year on 

the topics of freedom of religion or belief, 

religious tolerance, and Islamic law and human 

rights that target religious leaders, human rights 

advocates, government officials, and northern 

Nigerians; and

continue to support and adequately fund the 

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, a 

regional U.S. security partnership, succeeding 

the previous Pan-Sahel Initiative and comprised 
64

of African and Maghreb countries, including 

Nigeria, which helps to identify, publicize, and 

counter foreign sources of terrorism and 

religious extremism.
65

Pakistan

Dramatic political events unfolded in 

Pakistan in the past year, some of them with a 

potentially significant impact on the rule of law and 

human rights protections generally, including 

freedom of religion or belief. This year also has seen 

the largely unchecked growth in the power and reach 

of religiously-motivated extremist groups whose 

members are engaged in violence in Pakistan and 

abroad, with Pakistani authorities ceding effective 

control to armed insurgents espousing a radical 

Islamist ideology. In addition, all of the serious 

religious freedom concerns on which the 

Commission has reported in the past persist. 

Sectarian and religiously-motivated violence 

continues, particularly against Shi‘a Muslims, 

Ahmadis, Christians, and Hindus, and the 

government‘s response continues to be insufficient, 

and in some cases, is outright complicit. A number 

of the country‘s laws, including those restricting the 

rights of Ahmadis and criminalizing blasphemy, 

frequently result in imprisonment on account of 

religion or belief and/or vigilante violence against the 

accused. 

Moreover, despite some minor 

improvements, Pakistan‘s Hudood Ordinances, 

Islamic decrees introduced in 1979 and enforced 

alongside the country‘s secular legal system, provide 

for harsh punishments, including amputation and 

death by stoning, for violations of Islamic law. 

Pakistan also has taken a leadership role in promoting 

in various international fora the concept of 

―defamation of religions,‖ an attempted globalization 

of its own blasphemy laws, which this Commission 

believes would limit seriously and criminalize the 

rights to freedom of religion and expression of 

individuals worldwide. Finally, according to both 

Pakistani and international observers, elements of 

Pakistan's intelligence services maintain ties with and 

provide support to the Taliban and other violent 

extremist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, 

implicated in the terrorist attack on Mumbai, India in 

November 2008. In light of these persistent, serious 

concerns, the Commission continues to recommend 

that Pakistan be designated a ―country of particular 

concern,‖ or CPC. To date, the State Department has 

not designated Pakistan a CPC.

The political landscape in Pakistan has 

changed substantially over the past year. Civil rule 

was re-established through parliamentary elections in 

February 2008 and the replacement of Pervez 

Musharraf by Asif Ali Zardari as President of 

Pakistan in September 2008. President Zardari is the 

widower of Benazir Bhutto, a popular political leader 

and former Prime Minister assassinated by extremists 

in December 2007. In March 2009, under pressure 

from opposition parties and many of the country's 

lawyers, President Zardari was forced to reinstate 

Supreme Court Chief Justice Chaudhury and other 

judges who had been suspended by President 

Musharraf. President Zardari also was forced to 

accept the reinstatement of the opposition-led 

provincial government in Punjab, Pakistan's most 

populous province. 

The Zardari government has taken some 

positive steps regarding religious freedom. In 

November 2008, the government appointed 

prominent minority-rights advocate Shahbaz Bhatti 

as Federal Minister for Minorities with cabinet rank. 

Mr. Bhatti has publicly promised that the Zardari 

government will review Pakistan's blasphemy laws 

and that the government is committed to protecting 

the rights of minority religious communities, 

including by implementing a five percent quota for 

religious minorities in federal government 

employment. In March 2009, the government 

appointed a Christian jurist as a judge in the Lahore 

High Court. It is not yet clear what impact these 

developments will have on religious freedom, which 

has been severely violated by successive Pakistani 

governments in the past. Discriminatory legislation, 

promulgated in previous decades and persistently 

enforced, has fostered an atmosphere of religious 

intolerance and eroded the social and legal status of 

members of religious minorities, including Shi‘a 

Muslims, Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians. 

Government officials do not provide adequate 

protections from societal violence to members of 

these religious minority communities, and 

perpetrators of attacks on minorities seldom are

brought to justice. This is partly due to the fact that 
66

Pakistan‘s democratic institutions, particularly the 

judiciary and the police, are weakened by endemic 

corruption, ineffectiveness, and a general lack of 

accountability. 

Many religious schools, or madrassas, in 

Pakistan provide ongoing ideological training and 

motivation to those who take part in violence 

targeting religious minorities in Pakistan and abroad. 

In mid-2005, the government of Pakistan renewed its 

effort to require all madrassas to register with the 

government and ordered them to expel all foreign 

students. By that year‘s end, despite an outcry from 

some violent extremist groups, most of the religious 

schools had registered. However, reports indicate 

that the registration process has had little if any effect 

on the content of the schools‘ curricula, which 

remains extremist and includes exhortations to 

violence, and there are still no government controls 

on the madrassas’ sources of funding. It remains 

doubtful whether these belated official efforts to curb 

extremism through reform of the country‘s Islamic 

religious schools will be accompanied by other 

measures to make them effective. Moreover, these 

efforts do not adequately address the much wider 

problem of religious extremism in Pakistan and the 

continued, unwarranted influence of militant groups 

on the rights and freedoms of others. 

Beginning in early 2008, Pakistan 

experienced an intensified bombing campaign carried 

out by armed extremists who use such violence to 

disrupt life in Pakistan and gain local control. 

According to the State Department, even outside 

Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the 

scene of an active insurgency, ―attacks on houses of 

worship, religious gatherings, and religious leaders 

linked to sectarian, religious extremist, and terrorist 

groups...resulted in hundreds of deaths during the 

year.‖ The attack inside Pakistan that received the 

most international attention was the September 2008 

bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, a 

terrorist attack apparently timed for when guests were 

breaking their Ramadan fast. Among several attacks 

on places of worship, 22 people were killed in a 

bomb blast near a Shi‘a mosque in Dera Gazi Khan, 

Punjab in February 2009. Fifty were killed and over 

100 injured in the bombing of a mosque during 

Friday prayers on March 27, 2009 in Jamrud in the 

Khyber Agency, near Pakistan's border with 

Afghanistan. Although the latter was a Sunni 

mosque, Sunni extremists were blamed for the attack. 

On April 5, a suicide bombing of a Shi'a mosque in 

Chakwal, Punjab, killed 22 and wounded many more. 

Chronic levels of religiously-motivated 

violence, much of it committed against the Shi‘a 

minority by Sunni extremists, continue throughout 

the country. During the past year, Sunni extremists 

have expanded their sway in rural areas of 

northwestern Pakistan, including in the Swat Valley 

in the North-West Frontier Province. These violent 

extremists, some of whom have ties to Taliban 

groups, are reported to have engaged with impunity 

in the killing of hundreds of Shi‘a civilians, imposing 

a harsh, Taliban-style of justice, and displacing Shi‘a 

and other minority populations. In April 2009, the 

central government accepted a locally-negotiated 

―peace plan‖ with Taliban-associated extremists in 

the Swat Valley that permitted the imposition of 

sharia law in the entire Malakand division, of which 

Swat is a part, in exchange for an end of hostilities 

with government forces. Although an inconsistentlyapplied system of sharia-inspired law already existed 

in the Swat Valley, this new development appears to 

signify the ceding of local control to Talibanassociated extremists who routinely use violence to 

enforce their political and theological agendas.

Following an extraordinarily sharp rise in 

violence in the Swat Valley in 2003, thousands of 

civilians have endured unspeakable brutality and 

social tumult, as Taliban-linked groups summarily 

issue edicts restricting movement, education, and 

local customs in the name of their interpretation of 

Islam. According to news reports, by December 

2008, approximately 60 percent of the 1.8 million 

Swat residents had fled heavy violence and over 150 

schools were destroyed, the majority of which were 

providing education to girls. Women refusing to give

up their jobs have been murdered, and police, 

political opponents and other critics of the Taliban 

have been beheaded in public. In December 2008, 

female education was banned amidst widespread 

protest. The ban was eased in late January 2009 to 

allow for education up to the fifth grade. Nightly 
67

Taliban radio broadcasts in Swat have communicated 

edicts against so-called un-Islamic activities, 

including singing, dancing, watching television, and 

shaving beards. 

Other religiously-motivated measures 

undertaken by violent extremist groups in 

northwestern Pakistan have reportedly included the 

denial of polio vaccinations to populations under 

their control, on the grounds that such vaccinations 

are an anti-Muslim plot, and the destruction of 

shrines and tombs with religious or cultural 

significance to other Muslims. Notable among the 

latter was the bombing on March 5, 2009 near 

Peshawar of the shrine of revered Pashtun poet and 

Sufi mystic Rahman Baba. This act of vandalism, 

compared by some observers to the destruction by the 

Afghan Taliban of the monumental Buddhas of 

Bamiyan, represents an effort by the extremists to 

erase visible expressions of other belief systems, in 

this case an inclusive, tolerant form of Islam. 

Ahmadis, Christians, and Hindus also have 

been targeted in attacks by Sunni extremists and in 

mob violence conducted with apparent impunity. In 

September 2008, the Pakistani television network 

Geo TV broadcast a religious affairs program about 

the Pakistani parliament's 1974 decision to declare 

Ahmadis ―non-Muslim.‖ The host of the program 

reportedly encouraged his guests, who were religious 

scholars, not only to endorse this decision but to 

affirm the duty of killing Ahmadis. A day later, a 

prominent Ahmadi doctor was assassinated, and a 

local Ahmadi leader was killed the following day. 

Perpetrators of such attacks on minorities are seldom 

brought to justice. Indeed, according to the State 

Department, the government stalled investigation of 

these two murders. 

Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs faced less 

systematic, but still frequent attacks, and may 

generally be more vulnerable to crime, including 

robbery and kidnapping for ransom, due to their 

minority status. There are persistent reports of 

kidnappings, rapes, and forced conversions to Islam 

of Hindu and Christian women, including minors. 

The accused typically defend themselves by 

presenting certificates of conversion from Muslim 

clerics to legitimate the conversions. According to 

some activists, ―violence is disproportionately used 

against Hindu women as a weapon of subjugation 

and religious persecution.‖ Hindu temples have also 

been the object of violence in the province of 

Baluchistan, where Hindus are the largest religious 

minority and where ethnic Baluchi insurgents have 

been waging a struggle against the central 

government for many years. 

Among Pakistan's religious minorities, 

Ahmadis are subject to the most severe legal 

restrictions and officially-sanctioned discrimination. 

Ahmadis, who number between 3 and 4 million in 

Pakistan, are prevented by law from engaging in the 

full practice of their faith and may face criminal 

charges for a range of religious practices, including 

the use of religious terminology. Pakistan‘s 

constitution declares members of the Ahmadi 

religious community to be ―non-Muslims,‖ despite 

their insistence to the contrary. Barred by law from 

―posing‖ as Muslims, Ahmadis may not call their 

places of worship ―mosques,‖ worship in nonAhmadi mosques or public prayer rooms which are 

otherwise open to all Muslims, perform the Muslim 

call to prayer, use the traditional Islamic greeting in 

public, publicly quote from the Koran, or display the 

basic affirmation of the Muslim faith. It is also 

illegal for Ahmadis to preach in public; to seek 

converts; or to produce, publish, or disseminate their 

religious materials. Over two days in late May 2008, 

the inhabitants of the majority-Ahmadi town of 

Rabwah, Punjab (called Chenab Nagar by Pakistani 

authorities) celebrated their faith through distinctive 

clothing, badges with religious slogans, lighting 

displays, and fireworks. Two weeks later, police 

lodged charges against the entire community under 

the anti-Ahmadi laws. In a separate incident in June 

2008, 23 Ahmadis were expelled from medical 

school in Faisalabad, Punjab for allegedly preaching 

their faith to others. Moreover, because they are 

required to register to vote as non-Muslims, Ahmadis 

who refuse to disavow their claim to being Muslims 

are effectively disenfranchised. The one potentially 

positive development—the December 2004 abolition 

of the religious identification column in Pakistani 

passports, which, among other advances, enabled 

Ahmadis to participate in the hajj—was derailed in 
68

March 2005, when members of a government 

ministerial committee restored the column, reportedly 

in response to pressure from Islamist religious 

parties. As far as is known, there has never been an 

effort on the part of any Pakistani government to 

reform the anti-Ahmadi laws.

Prescribed criminal penalties for what is 

deemed to be blasphemy include life imprisonment 

and the death penalty. Blasphemy allegations, which 

are often false, result in the lengthy detention of, and 

sometimes violence against, Ahmadis, Christians, 

Hindus, and members of other religious minorities, as 

well as Muslims. Because the laws require no 

evidence to be presented after allegations are made 

and no proof of intent, and contain no penalty for 

leveling false allegations, they are commonly used by 

extremists to intimidate members of religious 

minorities and others with whom they disagree. They 

also are often used by the unscrupulous simply to 

carry out a vendetta or gain an advantage over 

another. Although the penalties were amended in 

October 2004 with the aim of reducing the more 

maliciously applied charges, the minor procedural 

changes have not had a significant effect on the way 

the blasphemy laws are exploited in Pakistan. The 

negative impact of the blasphemy laws is further 

compounded by the lack of due process involved in 

these proceedings. In addition, during blasphemy 

trials, Islamic militants often pack the courtroom and 

make public threats of violence as a consequence of 

an acquittal. Such threats have proven credible since 

they have sometimes been followed by violence. 

Although no one has yet been executed by the state 

under the blasphemy laws, individuals have been 

sentenced to death. Several of those accused under 

the blasphemy laws have been attacked, even killed, 

by violent extremists, including while in police 

custody. Those who escape official punishment or 

attacks by extremists are sometimes forced to flee the 

country. 

Scores of arrests on blasphemy charges are 

reported each year and most of the accused are 

refused bail because of the danger of mob violence. 

In one case, five Ahmadi teenagers were arrested in 

January 2009 for allegedly writing the Prophet 

Mohammed's name on the walls of a toilet in a Sunni 

mosque. The arrest reportedly occurred when they 

voluntarily appeared before the police to deny the 

allegation. A fact-finding mission by the Human 

Rights Commission of Pakistan concluded that there 

was no witness to the deed and no evidence linking 

the accused with the alleged action. In January 2009, 

five Christians, held on blasphemy charges since 

April 2007, were acquitted and released from custody 

in Punjab following reconciliation meetings between 

Muslim clerics and Christian representatives. 

Another two Christians, both elderly men from 

Faisalabad, Punjab, were acquitted by the Lahore 

High Court in April 2009. In November 2006, the 

two had been sentenced to 10 years in prison for 

allegedly burning pages from the Koran, a charge 

reportedly fabricated due to a land dispute. 

Although there have been occasional acquittals on 

blasphemy charges, in virtually all cases those 

acquitted have been forced into hiding or even exile, 

out of fear of attacks by religiously-motivated 

extremists.

Under the Hudood Ordinances, rape victims 

run a high risk of being charged with adultery, for 

which death by stoning remains a possible sentence. 

In October 2003, the National Commission on the 

Status of Women in Pakistan issued a report on the 

Hudood Ordinances that stated that as many as 88 

percent of women prisoners, many of them rape 

victims, are serving time in prison for allegedly 

violating these decrees, which criminalize 

extramarital sex. The Hudood laws apply to Muslims 

and non-Muslims alike. The UN Committee Against 

Torture, as well as the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Torture, have stated that stoning and amputation 

breach the obligation to prevent torture or cruel, 

inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment 

under international human rights standards and 

treaties. Although these extreme corporal 

punishments have not been carried out in practice, 

lesser punishments such as jail terms or fines have 

been imposed. In a positive development correcting 

one of the most heavily criticized aspects of these 

religious ordinances, in December 2006 thenPresident Musharraf signed into law a bill curtailing 

the scope of the Hudood Ordinances regarding rape 

charges. The new law removed the crime of rape 

from the sphere of the Hudood laws and put it under 
69

the penal code, thereby doing away with the 

requirement that a rape victim produce four male 

witnesses to prove the crime. Under the new 

legislation, convictions for rape will be based on 

forensic and circumstantial evidence. This change 

followed another amendment to the Ordinances 

enacted in July 2006 allowing women convicted of 

purported sexual transgressions to be released on bail 

rather than having to remain in prison—sometimes 

for lengthy periods—waiting for their cases to come 

to trial.

In addition to the serious religious freedom 

problems described above, Pakistan has become a 

significant source of religious intolerance and 

religiously-motivated violence in the region and 

beyond. The well-planned November 2008 terrorist 

attacks in Mumbai, India, have been linked to the 

Pakistan-based extremist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, a 

connection publicly acknowledged by Pakistan‘s thenInterior Minister in February 2009. Pakistani 

authorities have made efforts to curb such extremists, 

who also threaten Pakistan's own security. There are 

extensive reports, however, that the Pakistani military 

and intelligence agencies have given Taliban-associated 

and other extremists operating against neighboring 

Afghanistan and India safe havens, operational bases, 

and other support. As the result of such support, the 

Afghan Taliban were able to regroup, re-arm, and 

intensify cross-border attacks inside Afghanistan after 

being ousted by U.S. and coalition forces, substantially 

increasing instability and violence in that country. The 

State Department had named the Taliban regime of 

Afghanistan a ―particularly severe violator‖ of religious 

freedom from 1999 until the regime was deposed in 

2001.

The government of Pakistan also has been 

active in the international arena in promoting 

limitations on freedom of religion or belief. As it has 

done in UN bodies since 1999, in March 2009 

Pakistan once again presented a resolution to the UN 

Human Rights Council in Geneva supporting 

measures to halt the so-called ―defamation of 

religions.‖ The backers of the resolution claim that 

their aim is to promote religious tolerance, but in 

practice such laws routinely criminalize and 

prosecute what is often deemed—capriciously by 

local officials in countries where such laws exist—to 

be ―offensive‖ or ―unacceptable‖ speech about a 

particular, favored religion or sect. Defamation of 

religion laws clearly violate principles outlined in 

international human rights instruments, which 

guarantee the right to freedom of expression, as well 

as freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 

Moreover, they appear to grant rights to entire 

religions rather than to individuals. Regrettably, the 

resolution passed the Council with 23 votes. Eleven 

countries voted against the resolution and 13 

countries abstained. 

The Commission has long been concerned 

with the serious religious freedom abuses that are 

perpetrated in Pakistan, some of which are condoned 

by the government of Pakistan itself. Since 2002, the 

Commission has recommended each year that 

Pakistan be designated a country of particular 

concern. The Commission has highlighted religious 

freedom problems in Pakistan through public 

hearings, meetings with the Administration and the 

Congress, letters to senior U.S. government officials, 

and press statements. In February and April 2009, 

the Commission called attention to the willingness of 

Pakistan‘s provincial and central governments to 

accept an agreement conceding local control of the 

Malakand division, of which the Swat Valley is a 

part, to Taliban-associated extremists who routinely 

use violence to enforce their political and theological 

agendas, resulting in systematic human rights abuses 

and severe limitations on religious freedom. 

In March 2009, the Commission held a 

hearing on Capitol Hill entitled, ―Pakistan: The 

Threat of Religious Extremism to Religious Freedom 

and Security.‖ Experts discussed legal restrictions on 

religious freedom in Pakistan; the threat, particularly 

to women and religious minorities, of religiouslymotivated violence and intolerance; strategies for 

promoting tolerance in Pakistan's educational system, 

including Islamic schools; and how U.S. policy 

toward Pakistan could better support the institutions 

that promote respect for human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief. 

Based on that hearing and the Commission's 

earlier work on Pakistan, the Commission welcomes 
70

the Administration's announcement on March 27, 

2009 of ―a comprehensive, new strategy‖ that 

―focuses more intensively on Pakistan than in the 

past, calling for more significant increases in U.S. 

and international support, both economic and 

military, linked to Pakistani performance against 

terror.‖ The Commission concludes strongly, 

however, that the contest with religious extremists 

now taking place in Pakistan, and neighboring 

Afghanistan, requires, in addition to economic and 

military assistance, that the United States bolster the 

position of those elements within Pakistani society 

that respect democratic values, the rule of law, and 

international standards of human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief. To this end, the 

Commission has made a number of 

recommendations, the most recent of which appear 

below. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

In addition to recommending that Pakistan 

be designated a CPC, the Commission has the 

following recommendations for the U.S. government 

regarding Pakistan.

I. Stopping Abuses of Religious Freedom 

and Other Human Rights

The U.S. government should urge the 

government of Pakistan to:

oppose agreements that would empower violent 

Taliban-associated groups to control local justice 

systems, whether sharia or secular, which would 

result in human rights abuses and religious 

freedom restrictions for the citizens of Pakistan, 

and rescind any agreements made to date, 

including the agreement affecting the Swat 

Valley approved by the central government in 

April 2009;

decriminalize blasphemy and, in the interim

period until that action is taken, implement 

procedural changes to the blasphemy laws that 

will reduce and ultimately end their abuse; and 

ensure that those who are accused of blasphemy 

and their defenders are given adequate 

protection, including by investigating death 

threats and other actions carried out by militants, 

and that full due process is followed; 

prioritize the prevention of religiously-motivated 

and sectarian violence and the punishment of its 

perpetrators, including by: 

--making greater efforts to disarm violent 

extremist groups and provide the necessary 

security to Shi‘a, Sufis, Christians, 

Ahmadis, Hindus, Sikhs, and other minority 

religious communities in their places of 

worship and other minority religious sites of 

public congregation; 

--investigating acts of religiously-motivated 

and sectarian violence, and punishing 

perpetrators in a timely manner; and

--constituting a government commission that 

is transparent, adequately funded, inclusive 

of women and minorities, and defined by a 

mandate to study and produce 

recommendations on ways that the Pakistani 

government can proactively diminish 

religiously-motivated and sectarian violence, 

particularly in areas with a heavy 

concentration of members of religious 

minority communities, such as Shi‘a 

Muslims in Kurram Agency. 

rescind the laws targeting Ahmadis, which 

effectively criminalize the public practice of 

their faith and violate their right to freedom of 

religion guaranteed in the Universal Declaration 

of Human Rights and the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights; and

 halt its practice at the UN Human Rights Council 

and other international fora of introducing the socalled ―defamation of religions‖ resolution, 

which violates the internationally-guaranteed 

rights to freedom of religion and expression.

The U.S. government should:
71

 clearly articulate a concern for upholding 

religious freedom and related human rights as an 

essential element of the new U.S. strategy toward 

Pakistan, and support Pakistani civil society

institutions that work to uphold and guarantee

those rights; and

designate a member of Special Representative to 

Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke‘s 

team to report to the Special Representative 

exclusively on human rights in Pakistan, 

specifically including religious freedom and 

sectarian violence.

II. Strengthening Law Enforcement, the 

Judiciary, and Civil Society

The U.S. government should urge the 

government of Pakistan to:

 reinforce the rule of law, including by 

strengthening protections for the freedoms of 

religion, speech, association, assembly, and the 

media, and by restoring and resolutely defending 

an independent judiciary.

The U.S. government should:

 use its civilian financial assistance to Pakistan to 

strengthen institutions crucial to Pakistan‘s 

democratic development, particularly the 

judiciary and the police, which are reported to be 

especially corrupt, ineffective, and lacking 

accountability, thereby contributing to violations 

of human rights, including religious freedom;

ensure that non-military assistance emphasizes 

respect for human rights, civil society, 

constitutional processes, and democratic 

institutions, rather than the previous strategy of 

emphasizing the importance of certain political 

parties or particular political or military leaders 

to Pakistan‘s stability;

 expand U.S. government contacts beyond the 

Pakistani government to include substantially 

more open and public dialogue with a variety of 

civil society representatives, including groups 

and political parties that may be critical of the 

government or represent diverse viewpoints; and 

recognizing that lasting stability in Pakistan will 

come from a vibrant civil society, expand 

programs leading to the sustained engagement of 

the United States with the Pakistani people, such 

as the Fulbright Program, the International 

Visitor Program, and other exchanges for 

professionals, students, and religious and civil 

society leaders from all of Pakistan‘s diverse 

communities.

III. Fighting Extremism and Government 

Alliances with Extremist Groups 

The U.S. government should urge the 

government of Pakistan to:

cease toleration or support of the Taliban or 

other terrorist groups by any element of the 

Pakistani government, including the intelligence 

services; and

confront and work to address the consequences 

of the political alliances maintained by past 

military-dominated governments with Islamist 

political parties, which afforded an excessive 

amount of influence to these groups, and which, 

in turn, had a strong negative impact on religious 

freedom in Pakistan. 

The U.S. government should:

set detailed, transparent, and measurable 

benchmarks for the use of civilian and military 

assistance to ensure, inter alia, that U.S. aid does 

not bolster Taliban-associated or other violent 

extremist groups; serves as a confidence-building 

measure that can help restore the trust of the 

Pakistani people in the United States and its 

commitment to Pakistan‘s security, stability and 

prosperity; and promotes consistency in how aid 

is disbursed and goals are pursued. 
72

IV. Focusing on Education and Tolerance in 

Schools

The U.S. government should urge the 

government of Pakistan to:

investigate and close any religious schools that 

provide weapons or illegal arms training in 

perpetrating acts of violence; 

set national textbook and curricula standards that 

actively promote tolerance towards all religions, 

and establish appropriate review and 

enforcement mechanisms to guarantee that such 

standards are being met in government (public) 

schools; and

ensure that a madrassa oversight board is 

empowered to develop, implement, and train 

teachers in human rights standards, and to 

provide oversight of madrassa curricula and 

teaching standards.

The U.S. government should:

 in administering its education assistance to 

Pakistan, focus more specifically on promoting 

reform in the state schools and madrassas, where 

textbooks regularly present religious intolerance 

as acceptable and include derogatory statements 

about religious minorities, particularly Jews and 

Hindus; and

request an annual progress report from the U.S. 

State Department and/or the U.S. Agency for 

International Development to Congress and the 

U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom regarding U.S. education assistance to 

diminish intolerance in Pakistan‘s state schools 

and madrassas, and progress made toward 

detailed, transparent, and measurable 

benchmarks. 
73

People’s Republic of China

The Chinese government engages in 

systematic and egregious violations of the freedom of 

religion or belief. Religious activities are tightly 

controlled and some religious adherents were 

detained, imprisoned, fined, beaten, and harassed. 

Yet, religious communities continue to grow rapidly 

in China and the freedom to participate in officiallysanctioned religious activity increased in many areas 

of the country over the past year. High-ranking 

Chinese government officials, including President Hu 

Jintao, have praised the positive role of religious 

communities in China and articulated a desire to have 

religious groups promote ―economic and social 

development‖—an endorsement that some believe 

may open legal space in the future for religious 

groups to conduct charitable, medical, and economic 

development activities. However, despite a growing 

―zone of toleration‖ for religious worship and 

charitable activities, the government continues to 

restrict religious practice to government-approved 

religious associations and seeks to control the 

activities, growth, and leadership of both ―registered‖ 

and ―unregistered‖ religious groups. In addition, the 

Chinese government hinders cooperation between 

religious communities and co-religionists abroad. In 

Tibetan Buddhist areas, religious freedom conditions 

may be worse now than at any time since the 

Commission‘s inception. In the year leading up to 

the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the Chinese 

government placed severe restrictions on the peaceful 

religious activity of Uighur Muslims and increased 

the number of arrests and detentions of 

―unregistered‖ Protestants, Catholics, Tibetan 

Buddhist, and Falun Gong adherents. These 

restrictions have not been lifted in the months 

following the Olympics. Since 1999, the 

Commission has recommended that China be 

designated a ―country of particular concern,‖ or CPC. 

China has been designated a CPC by the Department 

of State since 2000. 

The law governing religion in China is the 

National Regulations on Religious Affairs (NRRA), 

first issued in March 2005 and updated in 2007. The 

regulations include provisions that require all 

religious groups and religious venues to affiliate with 

one of seven government-approved religious 

associations. When registered, religious communities 

can apply for permission to possess property, provide 

social services, accept donations from overseas, 

conduct religious education and training, and host 

inter-provincial religious meetings. Within the 

bounds allowed by the Chinese legal system where 

legal protections are sometimes overridden by 

political considerations, the NRRA expanded some 

protections for registered religious communities to 

carry out religious activities. However, the NRRA 

imposes restrictions that violate international norms 

regarding the protection of the freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion, and it has been used to 

justify some arrests. By stipulating registration in 

government-sanctioned religious associations, 

insisting that permission be sought for most routine 

religious activities, and including specific 

requirements for government approval of Catholic 

and Tibetan Buddhist groups‘ leadership decisions, 

the NRRA strengthens governmental management or 

supervision of religious affairs, thereby offering Party 

officials extensive control over religious practice and 

related activities. In addition, vague national security 

provisions in the NRRA override stated protections if 

a religious group is deemed to disrupt national unity 

or solidarity. 

The NRRA only protects what the 

government considers ―normal‖ religious activity, 

making unregistered religious groups illegal and 

subject to restriction, harassment or other 

punishments, including coercion, forced closure, 

beatings, confiscation of personal property, fines, and 

criminal prosecution. Enforcement varies by region 

and unregistered religious activity is tolerated in 

some provinces. Some Catholics, Protestants, 

Muslims, and members of spiritual movements have 

refused to join the officially-sanctioned religious 

organizations due to their reluctance to: 1) provide 

the names and contact information of their followers; 

2) submit leadership decisions to the government or 

to one of the government-approved religious 

organizations; and 3) seek advance permission from 

the government for all major religious activities or 

theological positions. During the past year, 

Protestant ―house church‖ groups and ―underground‖ 
74

Catholic priests faced pressure to register with 

government-approved associations increased. 

 In the lead up to the 2008 Olympic Games, 

many unregistered Protestant and Catholic groups 

reported increased harassment, detentions, and arrest. 

In May 2008, the Beijing Police raided the 

unregistered Shouwang Church and ordered the 

members to leave and stop meeting. The Shouwang 

Church has tried to register with the local 

government, but their application has been denied 

repeatedly because their clergy was not trained by the 

officially recognized Christian association. 

―Unregistered‖ Catholic priest Wang Zhong was 

sentenced to three years imprisonment for organizing 

a July ceremony at a new church that was legally 

registered with the government. Provincial 

authorities in Sichuan also interfered with the 

humanitarian activities sponsored by unregistered 

house church Protestants following the May 2008 

earthquake. Two Protestants from Henan Province 

were detained and questioned about their efforts to 

help earthquake victims; they were held for about a 

week and ordered to pay a hefty fine for engaging in 

―illegal religious activity.‖ 

In Tibetan Buddhist and Muslim regions, the 

NRRA sets forth additional restrictions on peaceful 

religious activity. During the past year, the 

government continued to pursue an intense campaign 

of ―patriotic education‖ among monks, nuns, and 

imams. The government has long required Tibetan 

Buddhist and Uighur Muslim religious leaders to 

demonstrate political loyalty, but new laws give 

provincial officials the power to monitor the training, 

assembly, publications, selection, education, and 

speeches of Muslim and Tibetan Buddhist leaders. 

Patriotic education campaigns are intended to quell 

any activities viewed as political dissent and to 

promote leaders who are considered ―patriotic and 

devoted.‖ In addition to patriotism classes for 

clergy, the Education Ministry also announced in 

2008 that children in both regions will be required to 

attend courses on ―ethnic unity.‖ These classes are a 

reaction to the religious and ethnic based uprisings in 

Tibet and the unrest in Xinjiang province over the 

past few years. Authorities in Lhasa also warned 

parents about allowing their children to participate in 

religious holidays, including activities such as 

visiting or circumambulating temples and deities or 

wearing amulet cords. Students failing to comply 

with the orders were threatened with expulsion from 

school. 

Religious repression and restrictions in 

Tibetan Buddhist areas continue unabated. Hundreds 

of Buddhists monks and nuns are in prison or subject 

to intense restrictions on their religious activities, 

some monasteries and other holy sites are being 

forcibly closed or destroyed, and Chinese officials 

have stepped up campaigns to pressure Buddhist 

monks and nuns to denounce the Dalai Lama and 

show loyalty to the Chinese communist rule. The 

Chinese government‘s active attempts to mold and 

control the traditional norms of Tibetan Buddhism 

have nurtured deep resentments among Tibetans. 

On January 1, 2008, the government issued 

implementation guidelines for the NRRA in the 

Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). The regulations 

assert state control over all aspects of Tibetan 

Buddhist belief and practice, including more specific 

control over the movement and education of monks 

and nuns, the building or repairing of religious 

venues, and the conducting of large-scale religious 

gatherings. When the new implementation guidelines 

were issued, official media reports indicated that they 

were intended to ―resist the Dalai Clique‘s separatist 

activities.‖ 

In September 2007, the government also 

issued regulations allowing it to directly interfere in 

the selection of reincarnated lamas, an essential 

element of Tibetan Buddhist religious practice. 

These rules appear to be intended to ensure 

government control over the selection of the next 

Dalai Lama. Under the regulations, government 

officials must approve the choice of all reincarnated 

lamas and no individual or entity outside the country 

can influence the selection process. Depending on 

the importance of the reincarnation itself, candidates 

must receive permission from either provincial level 

government officials or from officials in Beijing. 

Monasteries must seek government permission to 

search for a reincarnated lama and to maintain one in 

residence. 
75

These regulations are part of the Chinese 

government‘s continued campaign to diminish the 

stature and influence of the Dalai Lama among 

Tibetans. Zhang Qingli, party secretary of the TAR, 

during the closing ceremonies of the Olympic Torch 

rally last June, predicted that China would ―smash 

completely‖ the Dalai Lama‘s ―separatist plot.‖ He 

then referred to the Dalai Lama as a ―wolf in monk‘s 

robes‖ and ―a devil with a human face but the heart 

of a beast.‖ He dismissed the exiled leader‘s 

supporters as the ―scum of Buddhism‖ and ordered 

monks, nuns, students, government workers, and 

business people throughout Tibet to participate in 

patriotic education and publicly denounce the Dalai 

Lama. Monks and nuns who refuse to denounce the 

Dalai Lama or to pledge loyalty to Beijing have been 

expelled from their monasteries, imprisoned, and 

tortured. Phurbu Tsering, a Tibetan Buddhist 

religious teacher was detained on May 19, 2008 after 

police detained more than fifty of his students for 

staging a peaceful protest against requirements that 

they denounce the Dalai Lama and their teacher. In 

October 2008 authorities closed Pangsa Monastery in 

Lhasa after an increased flow of Tibetans came to 

pay tribute to a statute that had received a blessing 

from the Dalai Lama.

Chinese government actions and policies to 

suppress peaceful religious activity in Tibetan areas 

played a primary role in stoking last year‘s 

demonstrations there. On March 10, 2008, the 

anniversary of the failed 1959 uprising against 

Chinese control of Tibet, monks from Drepung 

monastery peacefully protested against patriotic 

education and other religious freedom restrictions. In 

response, the Chinese government sealed off 

monasteries and arrested monks, touching off 

demonstrations in Lhasa that led to property 

destruction, arrests, and numerous deaths. 

Demonstrations spread to Tibetan areas outside the 

TAR. For example, on April 14, 2008, Chinese 

soldiers fired on several hundred monks and local 

residents at the Tongkor monastery in Ganzi 

prefecture, Sichuan province; witnesses claim that 

between eight and 15 people were killed and others 

were arrested. Reports have identified hundreds of 

Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns whom security 

officials detained for participating in the 2008 

protests, in which protesters called for the return of 

the Dalai Lama, the release of the Panchen Lama 

(Gedun Choekyi Nyima), the end to ―patriotic 

education,‖ and more religious freedom in general. 

The Chinese government has not provided full details 

or a credible accounting of the monks and nuns 

detained. Over the past year, a security presence has 

remained at some monasteries and nunneries, and 

local government officials have escalated their 

campaigns to require monks and nuns to sign 

statements denouncing the Dalai Lama. In Ganzi 

(Kardze) Prefecture, the local government issued 

regulations in June 2008 to both punish and remove 

from Ganzi monks and nuns accused of participating 

in peaceful protests. Punishments include arrest, reeducation, closure of a monastery or nunnery, and the 

forced removal of a religious teacher (reincarnated 

trulku) from his position. Ganzi has more political 

and religious prisoners than any other Tibetan region 

outside of the TAR. 

 

 The Chinese government continues to deny 

repeated international requests for access to 19-yearold Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, whom the Dalai Lama 

designated as the 11th Panchen Lama when he was 

six years old. No one has seen him since, nor have 

any independent or transparent interviews taken 

place. While he is a ―disappeared‖ person, 

government officials claim that he is in fact alive and 

well and being ―held for his own safety.‖ They insist 

that another boy, Gyaltsen Norbu, is the ―true‖ 

Panchen Lama. In recent years, Chinese authorities 

have, on several occasions, featured Norbu in public 

ceremonies where he stresses the importance of 

loyalty to the Communist government and endorses 

the government‘s official version of Tibetan history. 

In the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 

(XUAR), governmental repression of religious 

freedom increased in the past year. Chinese 

government authorities routinely have equated 

peaceful religious practices among Uighur Muslims 

with religious extremism and separatism and have 

used the global war on terror as a pretext to crack 

down on even the most peaceful forms of dissent or 

religious activity. Uighur Muslim clerics and 

students have been detained for various ―illegal‖ 

religious activities, ―illegal religious centers‖ have 
76

been closed, and police continue to confiscate large 

quantities of ―illegal religious publications.‖ XUAR 

Party Secretary Wang Lequan stated that the 

government would use ―preemptive attacks‖ and 

institute ―anti-separatist reeducation‖ in the XUAR to 

ensure national safety. 

The government continues to limit access to 

mosques, including the participation of women, 

children, communist party members, and government 

employees. All imams in Xinjiang are required to 

undergo annual political training seminars to retain 

their licenses, and local security forces monitor 

imams and other religious leaders. Imams at Uighur 

mosques are reportedly required to meet monthly 

with officials from the Religious Affairs Bureau and 

the Public Security Bureau to receive ―advice‖ on the 

content of their sermons. Failure to report to such 

meetings can result in the imam‘s expulsion or 

detention. Over the past year, XUAR officials have 

issued new orders to extend governmental control 

over religion. For example, in August 2008, 

authorities in Kashgar called for increased 

surveillance and management of religious activity. In 

June 2008, officials in Kazakh Autonomous 

Prefecture called for increased inspections of 

mosques and religious venues to prevent ―illegal 

reading of scriptures‖ and for the ―infiltration‖ of 

religious groups. In June 2008, a mosque near Aksu 

city was demolished reportedly for ―illegal 

renovations,‖ for having ―illegal copies‖ of the 

Koran, and for engaging in ―illegal religious 

activities.‖ In February 2009, officials in Hotan 

started a campaign to halt ―illegal‖ religious schools. 

According to reports, armed security personnel 

conducted nighttime searches, closing seven schools 

and detaining 39 people. In March 2009, according 

to a Radio Free Asia report, Hotan officials stated 

that anyone engaged in ―cross-village worship‖ will 

be charged with a ―social crime‖ and subject to 

detention or fines.

 

Religious leaders and activists who attempt 

to publicize or criticize human rights abuses in the 

XUAR have received prolonged prison terms, on 

charges of ―separatism,‖ ―endangering social order,‖ 

and ―incitement to subvert state power.‖ Numerous 

Uighur Muslims have been arrested for peacefully 

organizing and demonstrating for their religious 

freedom, including in the past year. In February 

2009, Abdukadir Mahsum was sentenced to 15 years 

imprisonment for organizing peaceful demonstrations 

promoting religious freedom and other human rights 

concerns for Uighurs. In March 2008, Mutallip 

Hajim died in detention after being arrested for his 

activities helping underground Muslim schools. He 

was reportedly tortured, but his family was warned 

not to publicize his death. On August 10, 2008, 

Imam Adil Qarim was arrested, and has since 

disappeared, allegedly because some suspects in a 

bomb attack attended his mosque. The imam denied 

having any links to the attacks. 

Officials in the XUAR prohibit teaching 

Islam outside the home to minors, and police have 

stepped up attempts to halt private religious 

education programs in some parts of Xinjiang 

province. Teachers and organizers can be charged 

with conducting an ―illegal religious gathering,‖ a 

criminal offense. During the Commission‘s 2005 

visit to China, local government officials confirmed 

that minors were prohibited from participating in any 

religious activity or instruction before finishing nine 

years of compulsory public education. This policy 

contradicts statements made by officials in the central 

government who claim that there are no restrictions 

prohibiting the religious activities of minors. 

Furthermore, in several localities in Xinjiang, 

plainclothes police are reportedly stationed outside 

mosques to enforce rules forbidding children and 

government employees from attending services. 

There are also reports that in some areas, individuals 

under the age of 30 are prohibited from attending a 

mosque. Throughout Xinjiang, teachers, professors, 

university students, and other government employees 

are prohibited from engaging in religious activities, 

such as reciting daily prayers, distributing religious 

materials, observing Ramadan, and wearing head 

coverings; they are reportedly subject to fines if they 

attempt to do so. These standards are enforced more 

strictly in southern Xinjiang and other areas where 

Uighurs account for a higher percentage of the 

population. In March 2009, 600 protestors, mostly 

women, marched in Hotan to protest a proposed ban 

on headscarves and other religious freedom 

restrictions. 
77

Regulations in the XUAR ensure that all 

hajj pilgrimages are controlled by the governmentapproved Chinese Patriotic Islamic Association. To 

enforce these regulations, XUAR authorities require 

Muslims to surrender their passports to local 

government offices for registration. To retrieve their 

passports, they must provide detailed information 

regarding their hajj travel plans to ensure their 

foreign visa is authorized. Uighur human rights 

activists outside of China are concerned that this 

policy will be used to identify and punish Uighurs 

who travel outside of the XUAR. Their worries may 

have been proved justified when the government 

confiscated the passports of more than 2,000 Uighur 

Muslims in 2007 and arbitrarily detained men 

between the ages of 50 to 70 for participating in the 

hajj.

The State Department estimates that over 

1,300 people were arrested in the XUAR on charges 

related to state security over the past year, a large 

increase from the previous year. Such charges have 

been used to detain religious adherents and other 

dissidents in the past. Due to the lack of judicial 

transparency, and the government‘s equation of 

peaceful religious activity with religious extremism 

and terrorism, it is difficult to determine how many 

prisoners are being held for peaceful religious 

activity or for peacefully protesting restrictions on the 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Three 

family members of Rebiya Kadeer, one of the most 

prominent Uighur advocates, remain in prison. 

Kadeer‘s three sons, Kahar, Alim, and Ablikim, were 

arrested in June 2006 to prevent them from meeting 

with a visiting U.S. congressional delegation. The 

following October, Kahar and Alim were tried for tax 

evasion, and Alim was sentenced to seven years 

imprisonment. The two were also fined a total of 

over $75,000. In February 2007, Ablikim was tried 

in secret on charges of ―subversion of state power‖ 

and later sentenced to nine years imprisonment. In 

December 2007, family members were allowed to 

visit Ablikim for the first time in a year. Both Alim 

and Ablikim remain in prison, where they are 

reported to have been tortured and abused, and 

Ablikim is reported to be in poor physical health 

without adequate medical care.

The officially-sanctioned Catholic Patriotic 

Association (CPA) does not allow its members or 

clergy to have relations or communication with the 

Vatican or other foreign Catholic organizations. This 

prohibition continues to strain relations between the 

CPA and the unregistered Catholic Church in China 

and between the Chinese government and the Holy 

See. Despite the official policy, an estimated 90 

percent of CPA bishops and priests are secretly 

ordained by the Vatican and in many provinces, CPA 

and unregistered Catholic clergy and congregations 

work closely together. In some cases, the Vatican 

and the Chinese government have worked together on 

the selections of bishops. For example, in September 

2007, bishops were ordained in Beijing, Guizhou, 

and three other dioceses with the approval of both the 

government and the Vatican. These ordinations 

reversed a trend of the government appointing 

bishops without Vatican approval. Nonetheless, the 

Chinese government took active steps to halt 

distribution of Pope Benedict‘s 2007 open letter to 

Chinese Catholics, including twice detaining Bishop 

Jia Zhiguo of Hebei province, and beating him while 

in custody, to prevent him from distributing the letter. 

In that letter, the Pope recognized that, although there 

have been some improvements, ―grave limitations‖ 

on religious freedom in China remain, which the 

Church cannot accept. Nevertheless, the Pope called 

on Chinese Catholics to adopt the approach of 

―respectful and constructive dialogue.‖ More 

recently, Bishop Jia was arrested again on March 30, 

2009 to prevent him from meeting with another 

bishop who had reconciled with the Vatican. Chinese 

officials objected to the relationship between the two 

bishops because it was ―desired by a foreign power,‖ 

the Vatican, not by the government and the CPA. 

The Chinese government continues to maintain that 

normalization of ties with the Holy See will begin 

only if the Vatican revokes its diplomatic relations 

with Taiwan and agrees to cease its ―use of religion 

as a means to interfere in China‘s internal affairs.‖

In the past year, harassment and detention of 

Catholics in China, especially unregistered bishops 

and priests, continued. The whereabouts of Catholic 

Bishop Wu Qinjing of the Zhouzhi diocese, who was 

detained in March 2007 by authorities in Shaanxi 

province, remain unknown. Bishop Wu was ordained 
78

in 2006 with Vatican approval, but without the 

approval of the local CPA. Fr. Wang Zhong is still 

serving the three-year sentence imposed in 2007 for 

reportedly organizing a ceremony to consecrate a 

new church registered with the government. In May 

2008, Fr. Zhang Jianlin and Fr. Zhang Li were 

detained in Hebei province as they travelled to a 

well-known shrine in Shanghai; they reportedly 

remain in some sort of detention at this time. 

Although Bishop Yao Ling was released in January 

2009 after serving a two year sentence, at least 40 

Roman Catholic bishops or priests remain 

imprisoned, detained, or disappeared, including the 

elderly Bishop Su Zhimin, who has been in prison, in 

detention, under house arrest, or under strict 

surveillance since the 1970s. In addition, there is still 

no information on the whereabouts of Bishop Shi 

Enxiang, who was arrested in April 2001. 

Members and leaders of unregistered 

Protestant groups in China continued to face 

harassment and harsh punishments, including 

detention, fines, beatings, confiscation of property, 

arrest, and mistreatment and torture in custody. In 

the last year, according to credible reports, 764 

Protestant leaders and adherents were arrested for 

some period of time during the past year, 35 of whom 

were sentenced to terms of imprisonment over one 

year, including in China‘s infamous ―re-education 

through labor‖ system. The State Department 

estimates that ―thousands‖ of house church members 

were detained for short periods in the last year. 

Arrests for and harassment of peaceful Protestant 

religious activity occurred in at least 17 provinces 

and two municipalities, with the most incidents 

occurring in Henan, Xinjiang, Shandong, Hebei, and 

Zhejiang provinces. Members of unregistered 

churches that the government deems ―evil cults‖ were 

the most vulnerable to detention. An extrajudicial 

security apparatus called the 6-10 Office, which was 

started to monitor and suppress Falun Gong activity, 

has broadened its mandate reportedly to include 

groups that self-identify as Protestant. 

The Chinese government also took active 

steps to impede religious groups and human rights 

defenders access to visiting foreign delegations and 

overseas contact, threatening to ―strike hard‖ against 

anyone involved with ―hostile‖ foreign groups. 

During the Olympics, religious leaders were 

prevented from attending a worship service with 

President George W. Bush, and several human rights 

defenders active in religious cases were prevented 

from meeting with visiting Members of Congress. 

Pastor Zhang ―Bike‖ Mingxuan, head of the Chinese 

House Church Alliance, was prevented from meeting 

a visiting European Parliament delegation and 

reporters covering the Beijing Olympics Games. 

Over the past year Pastor Mingxuan was detained 

several times, forcibly removed from Beijing during 

the Olympics, fined, evicted from his apartment, and 

his sons were beaten by police. In March 2009, 

Pastor Mingxuan was arrested again in Beijing and 

sent to Henan Province to be questioned and 

detained. 

In the lead up to the Beijing Olympic 

Games, the government‘s repression of house church 

and unregistered Protestant groups increased 

dramatically. Many house churches report that they 

were asked by local public security officials to 

disband during the Games, especially high-profile 

congregations that met near Olympic venues. The 

Beijing Gospel Church, with a membership of 1,000 

people, was raided by officials from four different 

agencies in May 2008. The congregation‘s minister, 

Pastor Gao Zhen, was detained, interrogated, and 

then released. Also in May, local police raided the 

Chengdu Qiuyu Blessings Church near Shangliu, 

Chengdu Province, telling church they were 

suspected of ―illegal religious practices‖ and 

confiscating Bibles, hymnals, and other educational 

materials. Five members of a church associated with 

the Honghui Coal Mine in Baiyin City, Gansu 

Province, were detained in June 2008. They were 

sentenced to administrative detention and forced to 

pay fines of $145. Several prominent Christian 

leaders were placed under strict surveillance during 

the Olympic Games last August including Christian 

writer Yu Jie and Pastor Zhang Mingxuan and his 

wife. Approximately 100 foreign Christians were 

detained, interrogated, and eventually expelled from

the country during the Olympics on charges of 

―illegal religious activity.‖
79

The Chairman of the XUAR, Ismail 

Tiliwaldi, has urged local police and religious affairs 

officials to ―exercise stronger management‖ over 

Protestantism and Catholicism and to guard strictly 

against foreign infiltration and sabotage. In May 

2007, police in the XUAR detained 30 house church 

leaders who were meeting with foreign religious 

leaders; those detained were mistreated or, in some 

cases beaten in custody before they were released. In 

April 2008, XUAR police arrested 46 Christians 

while they worshipped in a house church. They were 

forced to pay fines, study government handbooks on 

religious policy, and were sentenced to 15 days of 

administrative detention. Osman Imin (also known 

as Wusimanyiming) was arrested in November 2007 

and sentenced to two years of ―re-education through 

labor‖ on charges that he assisted foreigners in 

conducting ―illegal religious activities‖ related to 

public religious expression and persuasion among the 

Uighur community. Lou Yuanqi, the pastor of a 

growing house church, was detained on May 17, 

2008 on charges of ―utilizing superstition to 

undermine the law.‖ A XUAR court refused to take 

his case because of insufficient evidence; however, 

he remains in detention. In January 2008, Alimjan 

Himit (Alimujiang Yimiti)—a house church leader in 

the XUAR who had previously worked for a foreignowned company shut down for ―illegal religious 

infiltration activities‖—was detained and charged 

with subverting state power and endangering national 

security. Although a court in Kashgar returned 

Himit‘s case to the procuratorate due to insufficient 

evidence in May 2008, he remains in detention. In 

September 2008, the UN Working Group on 

Arbitrary Detention decided that Himit had been 

arbitrarily detained in violation of international 

standards. 

Chinese officials continue to use charges of 

―illegal business activity‖ to sentence house church 

leaders who are involved in the printing and 

distribution of Bibles and other religious materials. 

In November 2007, Shi Weihan served 37 days of 

criminal detention in Beijing for illegally publishing 

Bibles and Christian literature. He was arrested again 

in March 2008 and denied access to his lawyer until 

April; in June his sentence was extended for two 

months. He is currently awaiting trial. In May 

2008, Pastor Dong Yutao was arrested for receiving a 

shipment of illegally imported Bibles. 

The Chinese government continues to 

maintain a harsh campaign against adherents of the 

Falun Gong spiritual movement, which it considers 

an ―evil cult‖ and has banned since 1999. Police 

continued to detain current and former Falun Gong 

practitioners and to place them in re-education 

through labor camps (RTL) without trial or in mental

health institutions. There is no credible information 

on just how many Falun Gong practitioners were 

imprisoned over the past decade, but some 

international observers claim that they may be as 

many as half of the total number of the 250,000 

Chinese detained in RTL camps. Provincial officials 

reportedly offer sizable rewards to anyone who 

provides information leading to the arrest of a Falun 

Gong practioner. In the year before the Olympic 

Games, police waged a concerted campaign to harass 

and detain known Falun Gong practioners and 

brutally suppress their activity, an estimated 8,037 

Falun Gong were detained between December 2007 

and August 2008. In February 2008, Falun Gong 

practitioner Yu Zhou died in police custody. Police 

claimed that he died of complications related to 

diabetes, but his family claims he was healthy before 

his arrest and they were denied an autopsy. In 

November 2008, Xu Na, a member of Falun Gong, 

and her husband were detained for possessing Falun 

Gong materials, which is considered a criminal 

offense. Her husband died after 11 days in detention, 

and Xu Na was sentenced to three years in prison. In 

May, 2008 Yang Xiyao of Yanshan county, Hebei 

province, was detained after police raided his home 

and found Falun Gong publications. Most recently, 

in July 2008, Chen Zhenping was arrested and tried 

in secret without legal representation for being a 

Falun Gong practioner. She was sentenced to eight 

years imprisonment. 

The 6–10 Offices throughout China are 

tasked with surveillance, investigations, 

―transformation,‖ and detention of Falun Gong 

practioners. The 6-10 office reportedly has 

extrajudicial detention facilities used exclusively to 

hold Falun Gong practioners who have completed 

RTL terms, but who are still considered harmful. 
80

Imprisoned Falun Gong reportedly are subject to 

mistreatment and torture. The UN Special 

Rapporteur on Torture reported that Falun Gong 

practitioners make up two-thirds of the alleged 

victims of torture. Numerous allegations of 

government-sanctioned organ harvesting from 

incarcerated practitioners have surfaced within the 

last several years as well. Independent investigation 

into the practices of a hospital in Sujiatun, Shenyang 

proved inconclusive. However, based upon a report 

from two prominent Canadian human rights activists, 

international human rights organizations have called 

for an independent investigation and for continued 

international attention to allegations of organ 

harvesting from prisoners. The UN Committee on 

Torture, during its 2008 review of China, also called 

on the government to conduct independent 

investigations to clarify discrepancies in statistics 

related to organ transplants and allegations of torture 

of Falun Gong practitioners. 

In August 2007, authorities in Hunan 

Province issued provincial-level regulations to 

administer folk religion venues. Folk religion, also 

called ―feudal superstition,‖ has been a legal grey 

area in China because it does not fall within the five 

recognized religious groups (Buddhism, Daoism, 

Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam), but is often 

tolerated by local officials. The regulations are 

significant because they offer protections for 

religious practice outside the five recognized 

communities and because they allow venues to 

register directly with provincial government officials. 

However, the new regulations allow registration only 

of existing venues and stipulate that no new sites may 

be built. In addition, any venue that is destroyed may 

not be rebuilt unless it retains ―historical stature‖ and 

―great influence.‖ The State Administration for 

Religious Affairs (SARA), the government agency 

tasked with overseeing most of China‘s religious life, 

has established a division to deal directly with the 

management of folk religions. 

During the past several years, there has been 

a continuing crackdown against human rights 

activists, lawyers, and others who attempted to use 

the Chinese legal system to defend the rights of 

Chinese citizens, including those who sought to 

practice their right to freedom of religion. Lawyers 

have been harassed, beaten, threatened, disappeared, 

or have lost their legal licenses over the past year. In 

September 2007, attorney Li Heping, a prominent 

religious freedom advocate, was beaten with 

electronic batons for nearly five hours and ordered to 

stop practicing law. He refused and his legal license 

was revoked. In November 2007, human rights 

lawyer Yang Maodong (also known as Guo Feixiong) 

was sentenced to five years imprisonment on charges 

of ―illegal business practices.‖ According to his wife 

and lawyer, he has been subjected to shocks from 

electric batons and other mistreatment while in 

prison. Yang Maodong is the former law partner of 

Gao Zhisheng, one of China‘s best known human 

rights lawyers, who defended Falun Gong and 

unregistered Protestants and was a vocal critic of the 

Chinese government‘s human rights record. Gao 

disappeared in February 2009 and his whereabouts, at 

this time, remain unknown. Before his 

disappearance, Gao published a report of the torture 

he endured during a September 2007 interrogation. 

In February 2008, police seized lawyer Teng Biao in 

Beijing for questioning, warned him to stop writing 

articles criticizing China's human rights record, and 

threatened him with jail time and the loss of his 

university job. After Teng agreed to defend Tibetans 

arrested following the March 2008 protests, officials 

refused to renew his legal license. On March 3, 

2009, the Chinese government revoked the legal 

license of Beijing‘s Yitong Law Firm, whose lawyers 

handled human rights cases, including representing 

unregistered house church Protestants and the Falun 

Gong. Lawyers Li Subin, Liu Xiaoyuan, Zhang 

Jianguo, Cheng Hai, Wen Haibo, and Yang Huiwen 

were singled out for censure, in particular, because of 

their human rights work. 

Despite experiencing ongoing harassment, 

arrest, and restrictions, human rights defenders have 

had some minimal success using the legal system to 

challenge official abuse or have sentences reduced. 

For example, in November 2007, house church 

members in Shandong province successfully filed 

suit against the local public security bureau and were 

awarded confiscated Bibles, computers, and other 

goods taken in a raid. In September 2008, a Chengdu 

church filed a suit against the local religious affairs 
81

bureau (RAB) for closing down the church earlier in 

the year. The provincial RAB reportedly later issued 

a decision overturning the local bureau‘s decision. In 

some cases, lawyers for the Falun Gong have also 

been able to represent their clients without prior 

approval from the Ministry of Justice. This 

occasionally has led to reduced or suspended 

sentences; however, the practice is only allowed in 

Beijing and not in other parts of China. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

Given that religious freedom and related 

human rights concerns are directly related to 

expanding the rule of law, security, and China‘s 

compliance with international obligations, the 

Commission urges the Obama Administration, as it 

reviews various policy approaches, to included 

religious freedom concerns in discussions at that 

highest level and signal clearly that human rights are 

a vital U.S. interest that will affect the flexibility and 

scope of U.S.-China relations. In both bilateral 

relations and in multilateral institutions where the 

United States and China are members, the 

Commission makes the following recommendations 

concerning U.S. policy toward China.

I. Ending Human Rights Abuses in China

The U.S. government should: 

fully employ all the available tools specified in 

the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) 

for countries designated as ―countries of 

particular concern‖ (CPCs), including sanctions 

or some other commensurate action, and cease 

the practice of prior Administrations of relying 

on ―pre-existing sanctions‖ that do not address 

specific religious freedom abuses, by issuing a 

new presidential action that would focus on 

either state agencies or actors who perpetrate 

religious freedom abuses or on provinces or 

localities where religious freedom conditions are 

most egregious; and 

raise publicly concerns about Chinese human 

rights abuses in appropriate multilateral and 

international fora, including the UN General 

Assembly and Human Rights Council, and 

ensure that preparations for such actions be made 

at appropriately high levels with other UN 

member states.

In addition, the U.S. government should 

urge the Chinese government to: 

end its current crackdown on religious and 

spiritual groups throughout China, including 

harassment, surveillance, arrest, and detention of 

persons on account of their religion or belief; 

torture and ill-treatment of persons in prisons, 

labor camps, psychiatric facilities, and other 

places of confinement; and the coercion of 

individuals to renounce or condemn any religion 

or belief; 

release all those imprisoned, detained, or 

disappeared on account of their manifestation of 

religious belief or activities, including Gao 

Zhisheng, Xu Na, Fr. Zhang Li, Chen Zhenping, 

Bishop Jia Zhiguo, Shi Weihan, Alimjan Himit, 

Yang Maodong, Osman Imin, Abdukadir 

Mahsum, Imam Adil Qarim, Fr. Zhang Jianlin, 

Bishop Su Zhimin, and Gedhun Choekyi Nyima;

provide a full accounting of all those detained, 

released, tried and sentenced in public order 

disturbances in Tibet in the last year; allow 

immediate access for international observers, 

including the International Committee of the Red 

Cross, to all acknowledged or unacknowledged 

detention facilities; and implement all Tibetrelated recommendations of the UN High 

Commissioner for Human Rights, the Committee 

on Torture, and the Special Rapporteurs on 

Torture, Freedom of Religion or Belief, 

Extrajudicial and Summary Executions, and 

Human Rights Defenders; 

cease the use of torture and implement and 

mechanisms so that alleged incidents are 

consistently and impartially investigated, 

evidence procured through torture is excluded at 

trial, mistreatment of North Korean refugees in 

detention is halted and no asylum-seeker in 
82

China is returned to a country where they face a 

real possibility of torture; 

issue a national decree that guarantees the right 

of minors to manifest their religion or belief and 

the right of parents to ensure the religious and 

moral education of their children; 

establish a mechanism for reviewing cases of 

persons, including religious leaders, detained 

under suspicion of, or charged with, offenses 

relating to state security, disturbing social order, 

―counterrevolutionary‖ or ―splittist‖ activities, or 

organizing or participating in ―illegal‖ gatherings 

or religious activities; and

extend an unconditional invitation to visit China 

to the UN Special Rapporteur on the 

Independence of Lawyers and Judges to visit 

China with full access in compliance with the 

terms of reference required by the Special 

Rapporteur, and determine dates for visits to 

China by both the Special Rapporteur on the 

Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Special 

Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, with 

full access in compliance with the terms of 

reference required by the Special Rapporteurs. 

II. Building on Existing Efforts to Improve 

the Rule of Law in China

The U.S. government should make the 

promotion of the rule of law a greater priority of U.S. 

human rights diplomacy in China by continuing to 

urge the Chinese government to: 

ratify and implement the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which 

China signed in 1998, without reservations 

undermining religious freedom protections, and 

sign and ratify the Optional Protocol to the 

ICCPR;

amend Article 36 of the Constitution to explicitly 

protect the right not only to believe but to 

manifest one‘s religious belief without state 

interference; 

amend or repeal Article 306 of the Criminal 

Procedure Code, which has been used against 

attorneys who have vigorously defended the 

rights of their clients; 

amend or repeal Article 111 of the Criminal 

Procedure Code, which labels as ―state secrets‖ 

any published information deemed embarrassing 

to the government, and raise the issue of China‘s 

use of ―state security‖ as a rationale for 

suppressing dissent in bilateral and multilateral 

discussions and exchanges;

repeal the Guiding Opinion on Lawyers 

Handling Collective Cases and similar local 

regulations that interfere with the ability of 

lawyers to represent the interests of their clients 

in collective cases, including cases involving the 

defense of religious freedom or related rights or 

violations on account of religion or belief;

abolish the system of re-education through labor 

(RTL) camps and all other administration and 

extrajudicial detention centers, including the 

―transformation through reeducation‖ facilities 

of the 6-10 office; 

revise the Ministry of Justice‘s ―Methods for the 

Management of Lawyers Professional Licenses‖ 

and similar local regulations to ensure that 

lawyers‘ annual registration is not subject to 

political considerations or other arbitrary factors 

and make sure that no lawyer should be denied 

renewal of registration on the basis of the cases 

he or she has represented or is representing; 

repeal Article 300 of the Criminal Procedure 

Code, which deals with individuals accused of 

crimes associated with ―evil cults,‖ and also its 

associated legislation, the Decision of the 

Standing Committee of the National People‘s 

Congress on Banning Heretical Cult 

Organizations, Preventing and Punishing Cult 

Activities; and

end the use of government filters on Web sites 

and e-mail and remove official restrictions on 

Internet message boards and text messaging, 
83

including the blockage of access to certain Web 

sites related to religion, belief, or human rights; 

and revise the September 2000 State Council 

regulations on Internet Content Providers (ICPs) 

and offer ICPs clear and consistent guidelines for 

Web site content and usage to ensure that 

Chinese law and practice in this area conform to 

international standards on the freedoms of 

opinion and expression.

III. Building Programs to Support Chinese 

Rights Defenders

To strengthen the ability of Chinese lawyers 

and activists to defend religious freedom or related 

rights or violations on account of religion or belief 

and encourage a vibrant civil society, media, and the 

rule of law the U.S. government should:

through the State Department‘s Human Rights 

and Democracy Fund, institute new programs 

that: 

--increase the capacity and networking 

ability of non-governmental organizations in 

China that address issues of human rights, 

including religious freedom, as well as the 

freedoms of expression, association, and 

assembly; 

--expand contacts between U.S. human 

rights experts and Chinese government 

officials, academics, representatives of both 

registered and unregistered religious 

communities, and non-governmental 

organizations on international standards 

relating to the right of freedom of religion or 

belief; on the importance and benefits of 

upholding human rights, including religious 

freedom; on reforms to the Chinese criminal 

justice system, including planned changes in 

the criminal procedure code; and on the role 

of defense lawyers; and

--increase consultations between 

international human rights experts and 

Chinese officials, judges and lawyers on the 

compatibility of Chinese laws, regulations, 

and practices with international standards on 

freedom of religion or belief; 

through the Human Rights Defenders Fund, 

make support available to Chinese lawyers and 

others who defend the internationally recognized 

rights of individuals and communities targeted 

because of their religious belief or practice.

IV. Expanding U.S. Public Diplomacy and 

Human Rights Programs in Tibet and 

Xinjiang

The U.S. government should:

 urge the Chinese government to allow a U.S. 

government presence, such as consulates in 

Lhasa, Tibet and Urumqi, Xinjiang which could 

monitor religious freedom and other human 

rights conditions; 

 appoint promptly a Special Coordinator on 

Tibetan issues at the State Department in order to

press Beijing to end the criminalization of 

peaceful advocacy in Tibet, to engage in 

constructive dialogue over the future of Tibetans 

within China, and to coordinate with other 

nations on issues related to Tibet for bilateral 

discussion and multilateral diplomacy; and

strengthen efforts to highlight conditions faced 

by Uighur Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists by:

--increasing educational opportunities in the 

United States for religious and other leaders 

from these regions, in order to enhance their 

understanding of religious freedom and 

other human rights according to 

international standards;

--creating legal clinics to assist those in 

areas with high concentrations of Uighur 

Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists to enforce 

their human rights under the Chinese 

Constitution and international law, similar to 

existing programs that serve other ethnic 

minority areas in China; 
84

--giving political and financial support to 

programs that address chronic needs, as 

articulated by the Tibetan and Uighur 

people, in such areas as education, work 

force development, language and culture 

preservation, environmental protection, and 

sustainable development; and 

--as the Broadcasting Board of Governors 

modifies its global priorities, ensuring 

continued availability of funds to maintain 

appropriate Tibetan and Uighur language 

broadcasting through the Voice of America 

and Radio Free Asia.

V. The U.S.-China Senior Strategic Dialogue 

& Human Rights Protections 

Within the planning and structure of the new 

Senior Strategic Dialogue, the U.S. government 

should: 

 prioritize human rights and religious freedom 

issues as key issues in the Senior Dialogue‘s 

agenda, in addition to raising them in a regular 

human rights dialogue; raise a full range of 

religious freedom concerns in high-level 

discussions in each session and, where 

appropriate, invite human rights experts from 

within the State Department and other U.S. 

government agencies, as well as nongovernmental experts, to participate in both preDialogue planning and negotiating sessions; and

 

 ensure that religious freedom priorities raised in 

the Senior Dialogue are implemented through 

appropriate U.S. government foreign assistance 

programs on such issues as legal reform, civil 

society capacity-building, public diplomacy, and 

cultural and religious preservation and 

exchanges. 

In addition, the U.S. Congress should:

ensure that congressional oversight of U.S.-

China human rights diplomacy is maintained by 

requiring the State Department to submit a 

regular public report to the appropriate 

congressional committees detailing issues of 

concern discussed during the Senior Dialogue, or 

any future bilateral human rights dialogues, and 

describing progress made toward a series of

―benchmarks‖ initiated by Congress. 

VI. Protecting and Aiding North Korean 

Refugees in China

The U.S. government should urge the 

Chinese government to:

uphold its international obligations to 

protect asylum seekers, by 1) working with 

the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) to establish a mechanism to 

confer temporary asylum on those seeking 

such protection and to permit safe transport 

to countries of final asylum; 2) providing the 

UNHCR with unrestricted access to 

interview North Korean nationals in China; 

and 3) ensuring that the return of any 

migrants pursuant to any bilateral agreement 

does not violate China‘s obligations under 

the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 

Protocol or under Article 3 of the 

Convention Against Torture; 

allow international humanitarian 

organizations greater access to North 

Koreans in China, to address growing social 

problems, abuses, and exploitation 

experienced by this vulnerable population, 

and work with regional and European allies 

to articulate a consistent and clear message 

about China‘s need to protect North Korean 

refugees; 

allow greater numbers of North Korean 

migrants who desire resettlement to have 

safe haven and secure transit until they reach 

third countries; and

grant legal residence to the North Korean 

spouses of Chinese citizens and their 

children.
85

Saudi Arabia

Since 2000, the Commission has raised 

serious concerns about religious freedom conditions 

in Saudi Arabia and recommended that the country 

be designated by the Secretary of State as a ―country 

of particular concern,‖ or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of the 

right to freedom of religion or belief. In September 

2004, the State Department followed the 

Commission‘s recommendation and designated Saudi 

Arabia a CPC for the first time. Despite King 

Abdullah undertaking some limited reform measures 

and promoting inter-religious dialogue in 

international fora over the past year, the Saudi 

government persists in banning all forms of public 

religious expression other than that of the 

government‘s own interpretation of one school of 

Sunni Islam and even interferes with private religious 

practice. In addition, numerous Ismaili Muslims 

continue to remain in prison on account of their 

religion or belief and there has been an increased 

crackdown on Shi‘a Muslim dissidents, which has 

resulted in numerous arrests and detentions. 

Moreover, the government continues to be involved 

in supporting activities globally that promote an 

extremist ideology, and in some cases, violence 

toward non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. 

Nearly three years after the State Department 

announced that the Saudi government had confirmed 

that it would advance various policies with the aim of 

improving religious freedom conditions, the 

Commission concludes that very little progress has 

been made. Therefore, the Commission again 

recommends that Saudi Arabia should continue to be 

designated a CPC.

The Commission played an active role in 

advocating for the initial designation of Saudi Arabia 

as a CPC. But even after formally naming Saudi 

Arabia as a CPC, then-Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice, in September 2005, approved a 

temporary 180-day waiver of further action in 

consequence of CPC designation, to allow for 

continued diplomatic discussions between the U.S. 

and Saudi governments and ―to further the purposes 

of the International Religious Freedom Act‖ (IRFA). 

In July 2006, Secretary Rice left the waiver in place 

and announced that ongoing bilateral discussions 

with Saudi Arabia had enabled the U.S. government 

to identify and confirm a number of policies that the 

Saudi government ―is pursuing and will continue to 

pursue for the purpose of promoting greater freedom 

for religious practice and increased tolerance for 

religious groups.‖ The Commission traveled to Saudi 

Arabia in May-June 2007 to discuss religious 

freedom concerns and assess the Saudi government‘s 

progress in implementing its stated policies related to 

religious practice and tolerance. In January 2009, the 

State Department re-designated Saudi Arabia a CPC 

but kept in place a waiver of any action to ―further 

the purposes‖ of IRFA. 

 The Saudi government continues to engage 

in an array of severe violations of human rights as 

part of its repression of freedom of religion or belief. 

Abuses include: 1) torture and cruel and degrading 

treatment or punishment imposed by judicial and 

administrative authorities; 2) prolonged detention 

without charges and often incommunicado; and 3) 

blatant denials of the right to liberty and security of 

the person, including through coercive measures 

aimed at women and the broad jurisdiction of the 

Commission to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice 

(CPVPV), or religious police. The CPVPV‘s powers 

are vaguely defined and exercised in ways that 

violate the religious freedom of others, including the 

use of physical force and ill-treatment. The 

Commission continues to conclude that if the Saudi 

government were to implement fully the July 2006 

policies it has previously identified and confirmed to 

the U.S. government, it would begin to diminish 

some of its institutionalized abusive practices that 

have resulted in severe violations of freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief in Saudi 

Arabia and worldwide. However, the Commission 

also concludes again that the Saudi government has 

not demonstrated evidence of progress on these 

policies, nor established adequate measures to 

implement universal human rights standards and 

provide enforceable remedies to alleged victims. 

State Enforcement of Religious Conformity 

Saudi Arabia has a very diverse population, 

both regionally and religiously, despite decades of 
86

Saudi government enforcement of religious 

conformity. The Saudi government persists in 

severely restricting all forms of public religious 

expression other than the government‘s interpretation 

and enforcement of its version of Sunni Islam. This 

policy is implemented in violation of the human 

rights of large, indigenous communities of Muslims 

from a variety of schools of Islam who reside in 

Saudi Arabia, including large populations of Sunnis 

who follow other schools of thought, Shi‘a Muslims, 

and Ismailis, as well as both Muslim and non-Muslim 

expatriate workers. The government tightly controls 

even the restricted religious activity it does permit—

through limits on the building of mosques, the 

appointment of imams, the regulation of sermons and 

public celebrations, and the content of religious 

education in public schools—and suppresses the 

religious views of Saudi and non-Saudi Muslims who 

do not conform to official positions. In addition, the 

Saudi government continues its systematic practice of 

short-term detentions, without trial, of minority 

Muslims, particularly Shi‘a Muslims, for religious 

practice that is not in accordance with the 

government‘s interpretation of Islam; this practice 

constitutes a form of intimidation and harassment.

The Saudi government‘s policy toward 

expatriate workers, particularly non-Muslim workers, 

reflects the view that they have come to Saudi Arabia 

only to work. As a result, the government curtails 

universal rights for non-Saudi visitors to the country 

and inhibits the enjoyment of human rights on an 

equal basis for expatriate workers, particularly for the 

two to three million non-Muslim workers, including 

Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and others, who have 

come to Saudi Arabia for temporary employment. 

Restrictions and abusive provisions are often 

included in labor contracts requiring expatriate 

workers to conform to Saudi religious customs and 

traditions, thereby forcing them to waive their 

inalienable human rights and submitting them to the 

limitations, and even human rights abuses, enforced 

by Saudi employers.

Shi’a and Ismaili Muslims

Shi‘a Muslims—who comprise 

approximately 10-15 percent of the population—and 

members of indigenous Muslim communities who 

follow other schools of thought than that favored by 

the government are subject to government restrictions 

on public religious practices and official 

discrimination in numerous areas, particularly in 

government employment and education. There are 

no Shi‘a ministers in the government, only three of 

the 150 member Consultative Council (Shura) are 

Shi‘a Muslims, and there are very few Shi‘a Muslim 

leaders in large corporations or in high-level 

government positions, particularly in the security 

agencies. 

Moreover, in recent years, fatwas (religious 

edicts) have been issued by conservative Sunni 

clerics that justify committing violent acts against 

Shi‘a Muslims. Over the past year, the Shi‘a 

community has expressed a desire to see more active 

government intervention when clerics issue such 

provocative edicts. Furthermore, in many cases, 

application of criminal law includes harsher 

punishments for Shi‘a Muslims as well as Ismailis. 

Since many Saudi judges consider Shi‘a and Ismaili 

Muslims to be ―non-believers,‖ they are frequently 

dealt with more severely by the courts. 

Over the past few years, Saudi authorities 

have carried out a series of short-term detentions of 

members of the Shi‘a community, a pattern which 

continued in 2008-2009. Since January 2007, dozens 

of members of the Shi‘a community in the Eastern 

Province have been detained for up to 30 days and 

then released for holding small religious gatherings in 

private homes. None have been charged with any 

crime, nor have Saudi authorities offered any 

explanation other than suggesting that the short-term 

detentions were punishment for holding private 

religious gatherings. In addition, over the past year, 

several Shi‘a mosques have been closed down by 

Saudi authorities.

In June 2008, at least 22 Sunni Muslim 

clerics in the Kingdom released a statement accusing 

the Shi‘a community of destabilizing Muslim 

countries and humiliating Sunnis. In response, a 

Shi‘a cleric, Sheikh Tawfiq Al-Amer, in Al-Ahsa in 

the Eastern Province criticized the statement, and 

within days, was arrested by Saudi authorities. He 
87

was released only after spending a week in detention. 

In September, Sheikh Al-Amer was arrested again, 

this time for performing prayers according to Shi‘a 

practice. He was released after 11 days in detention.

In February 2009, members of the CPVPV 

reportedly videotaped female Shi‘a Muslim pilgrims 

in Medina who were visiting a cemetery containing 

the graves of revered Shi‘a figures. Some of the 

Shi‘a pilgrims demanded the videotape from the 

religious police claiming that it infringed the 

women‘s privacy and insulted their modesty. Saudi 

officials accused the Shi‘a pilgrims of performing 

rituals offensive to other non-Shi‘a pilgrims. 

Consequently, some Shi‘a pilgrims protested outside 

of CPVPV offices in Medina and nearly 20 were 

arrested, with some suffering injuries in the clashes; 

all were released after a week in detention. In March 

2009, another 10 Shi‘a Muslims, including several 

juveniles, were arrested for ―disturbing public order‖ 

in the Eastern Province in connection with protests 

related to the clashes described above in Medina; as 

of this writing, they remain in detention. Also in 

March, a Shi‘a cleric, Nimer Al-Nimer, publicly 

stated that Shi‘a Muslims might one day secede from 

the country if authorities continue to discriminate 

against them. Saudi authorities issued an arrest 

warrant for the cleric, who reportedly remains in 

hiding. 

On a positive note, there have been some 

improvements for the Shi‘a community in the Eastern 

Province, particularly regarding the public expression 

of religious practice. Members of the Shi‘a 

community in Qatif, where they represent the 

majority of the population, held large public 

gatherings in 2007 and 2008 in observance of Ashura 

without government interference. However, 

authorities continue to prohibit observance in other 

areas of the Eastern Province, such as in Al-Ahsa and 

Dammam. While there has been increased dialogue 

between the Shi‘a community and the Saudi 

government, there is limited progress on a number of 

practical issues, such as the ability to teach Shi‘a 

beliefs to Shi‘a children in schools and the inability 

to re-open mosques and hussainiyas (Shi‘a 

community centers) in Al-Ahsa and Dammam that 

have long been closed by the government. 

Ismailis, a Shi‘a sect numbering some 

700,000 inside Saudi Arabia, continue to suffer 

severe discrimination and abuse by Saudi authorities, 

particularly in religious practice, government 

employment, the justice system, and education. 

Unlike support for other Muslim houses of worship, 

the government does not finance the building of 

mosques for Ismailis and has closed down several 

Shi‘a places of worship in recent years. In 2000, 

after members of the CPVPV raided and closed down 

an Ismaili mosque in the Najran region, 

approximately 100 Ismailis, including clerics, were 

arrested. Many were released after serving reduced 

sentences, but dozens remained in prison for several 

years. As of this writing, at least 17 Ismailis remain 

in prison, some of whom reportedly have been 

flogged. 

Another Ismaili, Hadi Al-Mutaif, also 

remains in prison after originally being sentenced to 

death for apostasy in 1994 for a remark which he 

made as a teenager that was deemed blasphemous.

Al-Mutaif continues to serve a life sentence on 

reduced blasphemy charges. According to Saudi 

government officials, because Al-Mutaif‘s offense is 

considered a hadd crime by the court and not a tahzir

crime, there are fewer options for intervention.1 AlMutaif, whose mental health has been adversely 

impacted due to his lengthy incarceration, has spent 

long periods of time in solitary confinement, 

particularly after numerous suicide attempts.

In May 2008, Ahmad Turki al-Saab, an 

Ismaili activist, was detained in Riyadh after he was 

summoned from Najran to the capital for organizing 

a petition campaign demanding the removal from 

office of Najran‘s Governor, Prince Mishaal bin 

Saud, for alleged discrimination against Ismaili 

Muslims. As of this writing, al-Saab remains in 

detention. In November 2008, King Abdullah issued 

a royal decree relieving Prince Mishaal of his post as 

governor of Najran; a subsequent statement issued by 

the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC said Prince 

Mishaal himself requested to be relieved of the post. 
88

Other Dissident Muslims

Criminal charges of apostasy, blasphemy, 

and criticizing the nature of the regime are used by 

the Saudi government to suppress discussion and 

debate and to silence dissidents. Promoters of 

political and human rights reforms, as well as those 

seeking to debate the appropriate role of religion in 

relation to the state, its laws, and society are typically 

the target of such charges. In January 2009, 

authorities arrested Hamoud Saleh Al-Amri, a Saudi 

blogger who described his conversion from Islam to 

Christianity on his Web site; he was released in 

March, after more than two months in prison, on 

condition that he not leave the country or speak to the 

media. After his conviction in 2007, a Turkish 

barber, Sabri Bogday, was sentenced to death for 

blasphemy in March 2008; in May, an appellate court 

upheld his conviction. In January 2009, after more 

than two years in prison, the barber was pardoned by 

King Abdullah after he allegedly repented. Bogday 

returned to Turkey upon his release. In May 2008, 

another Turkish barber was arrested by the CPVPV 

for allegedly blaspheming the Prophet Muhammad. 

After nearly one month in detention, he was released 

and all charges were dropped after a reported 

intervention by the Turkish Embassy. 

Also in May, Saudi writer and blogger Ra‘if 

Badawi was charged by a Saudi court with ―setting 

up an electronic site that insults Islam‖ after it 

became known that Badawi had set up a website to 

document abuses by the CPVPV and the Saudi 

government interpretation of Islam. Facing a 

potentially lengthy prison sentence and fine, Badawi 

fled the country. In March 2008, a senior Sunni 

Muslim cleric, Sheikh Abdul-Rahman al-Barrak, 

issued a fatwa calling for the death of two writers 

who questioned why Christians and Jews should be 

considered apostates. 

Several Sunni Muslims remain in prison on 

alleged sorcery charges. Historically, spurious 

charges of ―sorcery‖ and ―witchcraft‖ have been used 

by Saudi authorities against Muslims who do not 

adhere to the government‘s interpretation of Islam. 

For example, in October 2008, an appeals court 

confirmed the conviction of a Sudanese woman, who 

was charged with practicing sorcery and sentenced to 

three years in prison, 1500 lashes, and deportation. 

In addition, over the past few years, 

members of the Sufi community have been harassed, 

arrested, and detained because of their nonconforming religious views, but no such incidents 

were reported in the past year.

The Human Rights of Women

The government‘s monopoly on the 

interpretation of Islam and other violations of 

freedom of religion adversely affect the human rights 

of women in Saudi Arabia, including freedom of 

speech, movement, association, and religion, freedom 

from coercion, access to education, and full equality 

before the law. Over the past few years, there has 

been some increase in public space to discuss human 

rights practices affecting women. Nevertheless, the 

Saudi government has continued discriminatory 

measures aimed at the destruction, rather than 

realization, of many of the human rights guaranteed 

to women. For example, women seeking medical 

care, whether emergency or not, can be admitted to a 

hospital for medical treatment only with the consent 

of a male relative. When appearing in public women 

must adhere to a strict dress code. Women require 

written permission from a male relative to travel 

inside or outside the country and are not permitted to 

drive motor vehicles. In addition, the Saudi justice 

system, in which courts apply Islamic law to the 

cases before them, does not grant a woman legal 

status equal to that of a man. Testimony by a woman 

is equivalent to one-half the testimony of a man; 

daughters receive half the inheritance that their 

brothers receive; and women have to demonstrate 

legally specified grounds for divorce, while men may 

divorce without giving cause. 

In February 2008, the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Yakin 

Ertürk, undertook a formal visit to Saudi Arabia and 

offered several observations and recommendations. 

Among them, the Special Rapporteur found that 

while there has been a ―demystification of the taboo 

around violence against women‖ in recent years, 

there still exist ―practices surrounding divorce and 
89

child custody, the absence of a law criminalizing 

violence against women and inconsistencies in the 

application of laws and procedures‖ that ―continue to 

prevent many women from escaping abusive 

environments.‖ She urged the Saudi government to 

develop ―a legal framework based on international 

human rights standards,‖ including a law 

criminalizing violence against women and a family 

law on marriage and divorce. Furthermore, the 

Special Rapporteur found that members of the 

CPVPV were ―responsible for serious human rights 

abuses in harassing, threatening and arresting women 

who  ̳deviate from accepted norms,‘‖ and she also 

highlighted the situation facing female migrant 

domestic workers who continue to suffer serious 

human rights abuses.

State Harassment of Private Worship and the 

Inability to Obtain and Possess Religious 

Materials without Harassment

Non-Muslims are not permitted to be 

citizens of Saudi Arabia and no places of worship 

other than mosques are permitted in the country. In 

addition, the Saudi government enforces and limits 

public worship to its sanctioned version of Sunni 

Islam.

For years, Saudi officials have argued that it 

is impossible to have places of worship other than 

mosques in the Kingdom because Saudi Arabia is 

home to Islam‘s two holiest sites: Mecca and Medina. 

Moreover, government officials point to a hadith

(oral tradition) from the Prophet Muhammad which 

says that only Islam can exist on the Arabian 

Peninsula, although other Islamic experts contend 

that this hadith is subject to differing interpretations. 

Qatar, another country on the Arabian Peninsula that 

shares the same religious ideology as Saudi Arabia, 

permits non-Muslim public places of worship. 

Nevertheless, some Saudi officials continue to assert 

that having non-Muslim places of worship on Saudi 

soil would be equivalent to building mosques on 

Vatican property in Italy. In previous meetings with 

Saudi officials, the Commission drew a distinction 

between a geographic entity in Italy of two square 

miles with 800-900 residents versus a country the 

size of Saudi Arabia with between two and three 

million non-Muslim residents.

In 2008, Saudi officials reiterated the 

government position that non-Muslim expatriate 

workers are permitted to worship in private. 

However, guidelines as to what constitutes ―private‖ 

worship remain unclear and vague. The Saudi 

government has said that as long as non-Muslims 

practice their religion in small groups in private 

homes, no security entity would interfere, since there 

is no law that prohibits non-Muslims from practicing 

in this manner. 

Nevertheless, the Saudi government 

continues in practice to violate its public position 

about permitting private worship. There continue to 

be instances in which members of the CPVPV have 

entered and raided private homes where non-Muslim 

expatriate workers were worshipping, although the 

number of such incidents reportedly decreased over 

the past year. Expatriate workers from countries such 

as the Philippines, India, Pakistan, and some African 

countries continue to be subject to surveillance and

raids by Saudi authorities, despite the fact that 

CPVPV members technically are not permitted to 

conduct such surveillance. In fact, representatives of 

non-Muslim communities continue to assert that, in 

practice, religious freedom simply does not exist in 

the Kingdom. In the Nejd region in the central part 

of the country, private religious services continue to 

be surveilled and, in some cases, raided by Saudi 

authorities. Conditions for private worship 

reportedly are better in the Eastern Province than 

elsewhere in the country.

Other than at a few compounds populated by 

foreign workers, where private worship is allowed to 

take place, expatriate workers continue to fear 

government interference with their private worship. 

This interference can occur for many reasons, such as 

if the worship service is too loud, has too many 

people in attendance, or occurs too often in the same 

place. Furthermore, Saudi officials do not accept that 

for members of some religious groups, the practice of 

religion requires more than an individual or a small 

group worshipping in private, but includes the need 

for religious leaders to conduct services in 
90

community with others. Foreign religious leaders 

continue to be prohibited from seeking and obtaining 

visas to enter Saudi Arabia and minister to local 

religious communities. 

According to the State Department, during 

the past year, a number of people were detained for 

non-public, non-Muslim worship. Several cases 

involving non-Muslim detentions were not publicized 

in order to secure releases, largely as a result of U.S. 

government intervention. In May 2008, government 

officials arrested 15 Indian Christians in the Qassim 

Province for conducting their religious worship in 

private. During the raid, a CPVPV member 

reportedly beat the pastor, and Christian songbooks 

and Bibles were confiscated. All detainees were 

released after less than 24 hours in detention. In 

April 2008, Saudi officials arrested 16 Asian 

Christians, including women and children, for 

conducting a worship service in the Western part of 

the country. Police raided a private residence, 

questioned the group, and then transported them to 

jail. All were released within days. 

On a positive note, there has been a decrease 

in recent years in the practice by customs officials of 

confiscating personal religious materials when 

expatriate workers or visitors enter the Kingdom. 

Also, in recent years, senior Saudi government 

officials, including King Abdullah and the Grand 

Mufti, have made statements with the reported aim of 

improving the climate of tolerance toward other 

religions; both also continued publicly to call for 

moderation. In early 2008, press reports confirmed 

that representatives of the Vatican were in 

negotiations with the Saudi government about 

building the first church in Saudi Arabia; as of this 

writing, the outcome of these discussions is 

unknown.

Official Harassment of Religious Practice 

Restrictions on public religious practice by 

both Saudis and non-Saudis are officially enforced in 

large part by the Commission to Promote Virtue and 

Prevent Vice, the government entity that includes a 

force of approximately 5,000 field officers and 

10,000 employees in over 500 offices throughout the 

country. There are also hundreds of ―unofficial‖ 

volunteers who take it upon themselves to carry out 

the work of the CPVPV. Saudi government officials 

claim it is the latter group, who are untrained and 

often over-zealous, who commit the most egregious 

violations of the right to freedom of thought, 

conscience, religion or belief. The CPVPV, which 

reports to the King, is tasked with enforcing public 

morality based on the Saudi government‘s 

interpretation of Islamic law. Members of the 

CPVPV patrol the streets enforcing dress codes, 

maintaining the strict separation of men and women, 

and ensuring that restaurants and shops are closed 

during daily prayers. 

Members and volunteers of the CPVPV 

regularly overstep its authority with impunity and are 

not subject to judicial review. Despite the fact that 

the CPVPV is not allowed to engage in surveillance, 

detain individuals for more than 24 hours, arrest 

individuals without police accompaniment, or carry 

out any kind of punishment, its members have been 

accused of killing, beating, whipping, detaining, and 

otherwise harassing individuals. Saudi government 

officials claim to have dismissed and/or disciplined 

members of the CPVPV for abuses of power, 

although reports of abuse persist and no details have 

been provided demonstrating that CPVPV members 

are, in fact, held accountable for abusive conduct. 

In June 2008, Saudi human rights lawyer 

Abdel Rahman al-Lahem appealed a Riyadh court‘s 

acquittal of two members of the CPVPV in the 

beating death of Salman al-Huraisi, who was 

detained for possessing and selling alcohol in May 

2007. As of this writing, the appeal is ongoing. In 

July 2007, the General Investigation and Prosecution 

Authority in the northern town of Tabuk cleared 

members of the CPVPV of any wrongdoing in the 

June 2007 case of Ahmad al-Bulaiwi, who died in 

CPVPV custody after officers arrested him on 

suspicion of being in ―illegal seclusion‖ with an 

unrelated woman. It was later established that alBulaiwi was a part-time driver for the woman‘s 

family. An autopsy revealed he had been beaten. 
91

Over the past few years, CPVPV abuses 

were the subject of numerous articles in the Arabic 

and English press, garnering unprecedented attention 

by the public and in international media. Numerous 

cases have gone to trial or are proceeding to trial, 

including alleged beatings and deaths of Saudi 

citizens. The number of investigations of abuses has 

increased, yet in the recent cases that have been 

prosecuted, CPVPV members have not been held 

accountable and complainants report summary 

dismissals of cases without due process. 

Intolerant References in Educational Materials 

and Textbooks 

In July 2006, the State Department stated 

that the Saudi government had confirmed that it 

planned to ―revise and update textbooks to remove 

remaining intolerant references that disparage 

Muslims or non-Muslims or that promote hatred 

toward other religions or religious groups, a process 

the Saudi government expects to complete in one to 

two years [by July 2008].‖ In March 2006 and May 

2008, the Saudi Embassy in Washington published 

reports summarizing the government‘s efforts to 

revise the state curriculum and the school textbooks 

published by the Ministry of Education. 

Early in 2008, the Saudi government posted 

on one of its Web sites2the current school year‘s 

curriculum, including all relevant religious texts 

taught in primary, middle, and secondary schools in 

Saudi Arabia. However, an independent report from 

a U.S.-based group which surveyed the Web site 

concluded that these textbooks still contained highly 

intolerant and discriminatory language, including 

encouraging violence, particularly against Shi‘a 

Muslims, Jews, and Christians.3 The State 

Department‘s 2008 human rights report, released in 

February 2009, also concluded that Saudi 

government ―elementary and secondary education 

textbooks still retained some language that was 

intolerant of other religious traditions, especially 

Jewish, Christian, and Shia beliefs, and in some cases 

provided justification for violence against nonMuslims.‖ The State Department‘s 2008 religious 

freedom report, released in September 2008, 

similarly reported ―concerns about Saudi textbooks 

that continued to contain overtly intolerant statements 

against Jews and Christians and subtly intolerant 

statements against Shi‘a, Isma‘ilis, and other 

religious groups, notwithstanding government claims 

that it was reviewing educational materials to remove 

or revise such statements.‖ In addition, there 

continues to be very little transparency regarding the 

textbook revision process, curriculum reform, and 

teacher training efforts. 

During and after its visit to Saudi Arabia in 

2007, the Commission requested copies of Ministry 

of Education textbooks, which to this date have never 

been provided. A July 2007 letter to the Commission 

from the Saudi Human Rights Commission stated 

that textbooks currently were being reviewed and 

copies would be sent to the Commission upon 

completion, although no completion date was given. 

Despite the promise of several officials to send the 

books to the Commission‘s office in Washington and 

additional written requests by the Commission, as of 

this writing nothing has been received. 

The Dissemination of Extremist Ideology and 

Intolerant Literature in Saudi Arabia and its 

Exportation around the World

For years, the Commission has expressed 

concern that Saudi government funding and other 

funding originating in Saudi Arabia have been used 

globally to finance religious schools, hate literature, 

and other activities that support religious intolerance 

and, in some cases, violence toward non-Muslims 

and disfavored Muslims. During the past year, there 

were continued reports, including from the State 

Department, of virulently anti-Semitic and antiChristian sentiments expressed in the official media 

and in sermons delivered by clerics, who in some

cases continue to pray for the death of Jews and 

Christians, despite having been disciplined for 

preaching extremist views. Despite requests for 

further clarification, the Commission has not been 

able to confirm whether a formal mechanism exists in 

Saudi Arabia to review thoroughly and revise 

educational materials and other materials exported 

from the country. 
92

Over the past few years, the Saudi 

government has undertaken some security measures 

to combat extremism inside the country, such as a 

―re-education‖ program for convicted ―extremists‖ 

and the retraining or dismissal of imams known to 

espouse extremist views. However, these efforts 

appear to be designed to address security concerns 

rather than to implement reforms to protect human 

rights, including religious freedom.

In March 2008, the Saudi government 

announced that the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and 

the King Abdul Aziz National Center for Dialogue

would carry out the retraining of 40,000 additional 

Muslim clerics in the Kingdom as part of a program 

to promote tolerance and moderation in Saudi 

society. Imams are reportedly provided special 

training that exposes them to more moderate views. 

According to the Saudi government, teachers, imams, 

or professors who promote hatred and intolerance are 

dismissed, although such assertions by the 

government regarding dismissals have not been 

supported by any statistics or details. During its 2007 

visit, the Commission was informed by Saudi 

officials that even those who are dismissed continue 

to receive government salaries. 

Islamic Affairs sections in Saudi embassies 

worldwide reportedly have been responsible for both 

distributing extremist and intolerant materials and 

providing diplomatic status to Muslim, even nonSaudi, clerics. According to the Saudi government, 

these sections have been closed temporarily due to 

such reports. Their current status is unknown. 

Empowerment of Officially Sanctioned Human 

Rights Institutions 

In September 2005, the Council of 

Ministers, chaired by King Abdullah, approved the 

establishment of a government-appointed, 24-

member Human Rights Commission (HRC) that 

reports directly to the King. The membership of the 

HRC was not finalized until early 2007 and does not 

include any women, although in March 2008, the 

HRC‘s Chair, Turki Al Sudairy, announced that a 

new royal decree would allow women to be members 

of the Commission. In September, the HRC 

announced the formation of a women‘s branch to 

look into human rights abuses against women and 

children. The HRC is mandated to ―protect and 

promote human rights in conformity with 

international human rights standards in all fields, to 

propagate awareness thereof, and to help ensure their 

application in a manner consistent with the provisions 

of the Islamic Sharia.‖ The HRC continues to engage 

the Saudi government on a variety of human rights 

concerns, although evidence of specific actions on 

religious freedom issues has been limited.

In March 2004, the Saudi government 

approved the formation of a National Society for 

Human Rights (NSHR), the country‘s first and only 

independent, legally recognized human rights body. 

The NSHR is comprised of 41 members, including 10 

women, and is chaired by a member of Saudi 

Arabia‘s Consultative Council (or Shura), a 150-

member advisory body. The NSHR, which was 

originally endowed by King Fahd, submits its reports 

and recommendations directly to King Abdullah. 

At times throughout the year, the NSHR 

publicly criticized alleged human rights violations 

committed by the Saudi government. The NSHR 

released its second annual report in March 2009, 

detailing abuses in the Kingdom on most 

international human rights issues and offering 

numerous recommendations for the Saudi 

government. While the report praised the 

government for taking some positive steps in 

protecting human rights, the NSHR criticized the 

manner in which the CPVPV operates and the slow 

pace of judicial reforms, and highlighted wideranging restrictions on the rights of women.

Other Developments

In July 2008, King Abdullah hosted an 

interfaith conference in Madrid, Spain which 

included representatives from Muslim, Christian, 

Jewish, Hindu and other faith communities. The 

communiqué issued after the event included a 

troubling conclusion seeking to criminalize the socalled defamation of religions. In November, the UN 

General Assembly hosted a high-level meeting on the 

―Promotion of Inter-Religious and Inter-Cultural 
93

Dialogue, Understanding and Cooperation for 

Peace,‖ an event initiated by King Abdullah as a 

follow-up to the Madrid conference. The original 

Saudi proposed declaration included language 

reflecting the Madrid conference that would have 

condemned the ―mocking of religious symbols.‖ 

However, several European countries rejected the 

text, citing infringement on freedom of speech. The 

final declaration included no mention of defamation 

of religions or religious symbols.

The text of the final declaration is 

noteworthy for other reasons. The text noted that the 

General Assembly meeting was convened at the 

initiative of King Abdullah. The declaration next 

stated, inter alia, that, ―[t]he meeting reaffirmed the 

purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of 

the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration 

of Human Rights. The meeting further ―recalled that 

all States have pledged themselves under the Charter 

to promote respect for human rights and fundamental 

freedoms for all, including freedoms of belief and 

expression, without distinction as to race, sex, 

language or religion.‖ 

The affiliation of King Abdullah to the

declaration and its references to the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 

―freedoms of belief and expression‖ are significant, 

as Saudi Arabia was the only country to abstain 

during the vote on the UDHR in 1948. The explicit 

linkage of religious freedom and freedom of 

expression to the UN Charter‘s language on human 

rights and fundamental freedoms, all under the name 

of King Abdullah, more directly ties the Kingdom to 

the international human rights framework. Saudi 

Arabia has affirmed the UDHR previously in other 

UN resolutions, instruments, and conferences. 

However, doing so explicitly at a conference focused 

on religion is noteworthy.

In February 2009, King Abdullah announced 

several changes among senior government officials. 

Among the King‘s new appointments are a new head 

of the Commission to Promote Virtue and Prevent 

Vice, a new Minister of Education, a new Minister of 

Justice, a new head of the Supreme Judicial Council, 

and a new deputy minister for women‘s education, 

the first ever woman in this post. Some observers 

have suggested that several of the appointees are 

known to be reform-minded, replacing some of the 

more conservative members among senior 

government leadership. It is too early to tell if the 

new appointees will help dismantle some of the Saudi 

government policies that negatively impact religious 

freedom conditions in the country.

Commission Activities

Over the past year, the Commission has 

spoken out numerous times about religious freedom 

concerns in Saudi Arabia. In February 2009, the 

Commission recommended that Secretary of State 

Hillary Clinton urge U.S. representatives to ask tough 

and incisive questions about religious freedom and 

related human rights violations in Saudi Arabia at the 

UN Human Rights Council‘s Universal Periodic 

Review of that country. In November 2008, an op-ed 

by Commissioners Don Argue and Leonard Leo was 

published in the Christian Science Monitor outlining 

the Commission‘s concerns about the Saudisponsored two-day session on interfaith dialogue at 

the UN General Assembly. Also in November, the 

Commission wrote a private letter to then-President 

Bush urging him to raise some specific religious 

prisoner cases with Saudi King Abdullah at their 

meeting at the UN General Assembly event. In June 

2008, the Commission released findings which 

confirmed that some of the Arabic language 

textbooks used at the Islamic Saudi Academy in 

Fairfax, Virginia continue to justify violence and 

promote intolerance. In January 2008, the 

Commission released a public statement calling on 

President Bush to raise ongoing Saudi violations of 

the freedom of religion and other human rights 

during his meetings that month with Saudi leaders in 

the Kingdom. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

I. Strengthening U.S. Human Rights 

Diplomacy as Part of the Bilateral Relationship

The U.S. government should:
94

continue to designate Saudi Arabia a ―country of 

particular concern,‖ or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of 

the right to freedom of religion or belief;

lift the waiver, in place since 2005, as a 

consequence of CPC designation, and take action 

as mandated under IRFA due to the continuance 

of systematic abuses and the lack of sufficient 

progress by the Saudi government in 

implementing its July 2006 confirmed policies 

related to religious practice and tolerance;

create a formal mechanism to monitor 

implementation of the July 2006 policies as part 

of every meeting of the United States-Saudi 

Arabia Strategic Dialogue, co-chaired by the 

U.S. Secretary of State and the Saudi Foreign 

Minister; and ensure that U.S. representatives to 

each relevant Working Group of the Strategic 

Dialogue, after each session, or at least every six 

months, report its findings to Congress; 

work with the Saudi government to establish a 

civil society component of the United StatesSaudi Arabia Strategic Dialogue so that nongovernmental entities from both countries can be 

given a platform to discuss mutual human rights 

concerns, including freedom of religion or belief; 

report to Congress, as part of the reporting 

required under H.R. 1, Section 2043 (c) (1(b)) 

(―Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act of 2007‖), on progress by the 

Saudi government to implement the July 2006 

previously identified and confirmed policies 

related to religious practice and tolerance; a 

description of such progress should include 

Saudi government transparency and any 

benchmarks and timetables established for 

implementation of the July 2006 confirmed 

policies;

expand the religious educators program—which 

brings Saudi religious leaders and scholars to the 

United States through a three week International 

Visitor Program ( IVP) to learn about religious 

freedom in the United States—to include visits 

to Saudi Arabia by appropriate American leaders 

and educators, and increase the numbers and 

diversity and range of experience of visitors to 

both countries;

address the work of the Human Rights 

Commission (HRC) and National Society for 

Human Rights (NSHR) by:

--urging the Saudi government to ensure that all 

government agencies cooperate fully with the 

HRC and the NSHR, including by publishing 

the decree requiring cooperation and abiding 

by it, including penalties for failure to 

cooperate;

--urging the HRC to study the situation of 

freedom of religion or belief in the Kingdom, 

based on universal human rights standards, 

and report its findings publicly;

--offering to facilitate training and fund 

international experts from the Office of the 

High Commissioner for Human Rights or 

elsewhere on universal human rights 

standards, including the right to freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief, as 

well as to provide limited technical support on 

universal norms to the HRC and NSHR; 

--urging the Saudi government to implement 

recommendations from the NSHR‘s May 2007 

and March 2009 reports, which, if 

implemented, could be a welcome initial step 

towards improving overall human rights 

compliance in the Kingdom; and

press Saudi Arabia to uphold the human rights 

norms found in the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights, especially the freedoms of 

religion and expression, which Saudi Arabia 

affirmed, inter alia, in the declaration of the 

high-level meeting on the Promotion of InterReligious and Inter-Cultural Dialogue, 

Understanding and Cooperation for Peace in 

November 2008.
95

II. Addressing the Exportation of Extremist 

Ideology and Intolerance in Education Materials 

in Saudi Arabia and around the World

Given that official Saudi school textbooks 

continue to include language encouraging hatred and 

violence that adversely affects the interests of the 

United States and that the Saudi government, despite 

repeated requests over a period of several years, has 

failed to make its current textbooks available to 

support its claims that such language has been 

eliminated, the U.S. government should:

undertake and make public an assessment of the 

Ministry of Education textbooks used during the 

2008-2009 school year in Saudi Arabia to 

determine if they have been revised to remove 

passages that teach religious intolerance or 

hatred, which the Saudi government confirmed 

in July 2006 that it would do within one to two 

years; 

request that the Saudi government:

--make publicly available teacher training 

manuals used in state primary and secondary 

schools inside the country;

--provide an accounting of what kinds of Saudi 

official support have been and continue to be 

provided to which religious schools, mosques, 

centers of learning, and other religious 

organizations globally, including in the United 

States;

--make public the content of educational and 

other materials sent abroad to demonstrate 

whether such activities promote hatred, 

intolerance, or justify or encourage other 

human rights violations; 

--establish a transparent public effort to monitor, 

regulate, and report publicly about the 

activities of Saudi charitable organizations 

based outside Saudi Arabia in countries 

throughout the world;

--cease granting diplomatic status to Islamic 

clerics and educators teaching outside Saudi 

Arabia; and

--ensure that Islamic affairs sections in Saudi 

embassies throughout the world remain closed 

indefinitely in accordance with past promises;

report publicly to Congress on all the above 

areas as part of the reporting on progress of 

Saudi government implementation of the July 

2006 confirmation of policies, referred to in the 

recommendation above; and

communicate and share information with other 

concerned governments about the July 2006 

policies related to Saudi exportation of hate 

literature and extremist ideology. 

III. Pressing for Immediate Improvements in 

Other Areas Related to Freedom of Religion or 

Belief

The U.S. government should continue to 

advance adherence to international human rights 

standards, including the freedom of everyone to 

―manifest his religion or belief in worship, 

observance, practice and teaching‖ and prohibit 

coercion in matters of religion or belief. Saudi 

government persistence in severely restricting all 

forms of public religious expression other than the 

government‘s interpretation and enforcement of its 

version of Sunni Islam is a violation of the freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. As 

initial steps, the U.S. government should press for 

immediate improvements in respect for religious 

freedom, including by urging the Saudi government 

to: 

establish genuine safeguards for the freedom 

to worship in accordance with international 

standards; 

end state prosecution of individuals charged 

with apostasy, blasphemy, sorcery, and 

criticism of the government; 
96

dissolve the Commission to Promote Virtue 

and Prevent Vice (CPVPV) and entrust law 

enforcement to professionals in law 

enforcement agencies with a precise 

jurisdiction and subject to judicial review, 

and immediately ensure that members of the 

CPVPV are held accountable and prosecuted 

for abuses; conduct prompt and independent 

investigations into reported abuses; ensure 

complainants due process and other rights 

under international law, including the right 

to challenge the lawfulness of his/her 

detention and be released if it is not lawful; 

and provide the right to a remedy, including 

an enforceable right to compensation; 

allow foreign clergy to enter the country to 

carry out worship services;

review cases and release those who have 

been detained or imprisoned for violations 

of human rights including their religious 

belief or practices; 

permit independent non-governmental 

organizations to monitor, promote, and 

protect human rights; 

invite the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief to conduct a 

visit to Saudi Arabia in accordance with the 

standard terms for such a UN visit; 

ratify international human rights 

instruments, including the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 

cooperate with UN human rights 

mechanisms; and

implement the recommendations made in 

Section II (―Addressing Exportation of 

Extremist Ideology and Intolerance in 

Education Materials in Saudi Arabia and 

around the World‖).

 

1

Hadd, a punishment mandated by the Koran, 

generally cannot be overturned by the state. Tahzir, a 

punishment not mandated by the Koran, is considered 

 

discretionary and less serious and can be overturned 

by the state.

2

http://www.eschool.gov.sa/index.php?option=com_w

rapper&Itemid=109.

3

See the Center for Religious Freedom and Institute 

for Gulf Affairs July 2008 report here: 

http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/saudi_textb

ooks_final.pdf.
97

Sudan

The government of Sudan commits 

egregious and systematic violations of freedom of 

religion or belief in the areas under its control, 

particularly against Christians, Muslims who do not 

follow the government‘s extreme interpretation of 

Islam, and followers of traditional African religions. 

Since January 2005, Sudan has been governed by an 

unusual power-sharing arrangement between the 

Northern-dominated National Congress Party, which 

had seized power in Khartoum in 1989 with an 

Islamist agenda, and the Southern-dominated Sudan 

People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), 

most but not all of whose supporters are Christians or 

followers of traditional African religions. Security 

forces under the control of both parties, various 

militias, rebel groups in Darfur, and the Ugandan 

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which has made 

incursions into Southern Sudan, have engaged in 

serious human rights abuses in the past year. Due to 

these ongoing, severe violations, the Commission 

continues to recommend that Sudan be named a 

―country of particular concern,‖ or CPC, which the 

State Department has done annually since 1999.

During the North-South civil war (1983-

2005), the Commission identified Sudan as the 

world‘s most violent abuser of the right to freedom of 

religion or belief. The Commission also has drawn 

attention to the Sudanese government‘s genocidal 

atrocities against civilian populations in other 

regions. Successive regimes in Khartoum have 

emphasized Sudan's identity as being Arab and 

Muslim, thus effectively relegating non-Arabs and 

non-Muslims to a secondary status in the society. 

Resistance to Khartoum's policies of Islamization and 

Arabization was a major factor in the North-South 

civil war. Northern leaders, including Sudan's 

current President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, 

used religion as a tool for popular mobilization 

against both non-Muslim Southerners and Muslims 

who opposed the regime's policies. The civilian 

victims of that conflict, two million dead and four 

million driven from their homes, were 

overwhelmingly Southern Christians and followers of 

traditional African religions, in contrast to the 

Arabic-speaking Muslims dominant in Khartoum. 

Since the signing of the Comprehensive 

Peace Agreement (CPA) ending the North-South 

civil war on January 9, 2005, conditions for religious 

freedom have improved in the South and in the 

contested areas in central Sudan. The Commission 

continues to be seriously concerned, however, about 

severe human rights violations being committed by 

the Sudanese government in other regions of the 

country, including against both non-Muslims and 

Muslims who dissent from the government‘s 

interpretation of Islam, as well as in the western 

region of Darfur, where the State Department has 

determined that acts of genocide have taken place 

and may still be ongoing. 

The responsibility of the highest levels of 

the Sudanese government in egregious human rights 

violations was underlined by the March 2009 

decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to 

authorize an arrest warrant against President Bashir 

on five counts of crimes against humanity and two 

counts of war crimes in regard to his actions in the 

Darfur conflict. Sudan's President was the first head 

of state to be so charged. In response to the ICC 

action, President Bashir expelled 13 international 

humanitarian organizations which had provided 

roughly half of the international assistance to Darfur. 

This action threatens the well-being and potentially 

the survival of many victims of the Darfur conflict 

who are dependent on international assistance for 

access to food, water, and medical care, including a 

vaccination program in the face of an imminent 

meningitis epidemic. 

Khartoum's expulsion of international 

humanitarian organizations not only demonstrates a 

callous disregard for the welfare of Darfur‘s civilian 

population, but also diverts needed attention from 

international efforts to press for further progress in 

implementing the CPA. Continued attention and 

monitoring by the United States and the international 

community are necessary to ensure that the terms of 

the CPA, particularly those relating to freedom of 

religion or belief and other universal human rights, 

are implemented fully. 

The CPA followed and subsumed a series of 

partial and preliminary agreements addressing the 
98

relationship of state and religion, the national capital, 

power-sharing, wealth-sharing (i.e., of oil revenue), 

and security. The CPA affirmed the Machakos 

Protocol of July 2002, whose Agreed Text on State 

and Religion established a number of principles 

regarding freedom of religion or belief, and the 

Protocol on Power-Sharing of May 2004, which 

committed the parties to respecting a range of human 

rights. Moreover, the Protocol on Power-Sharing 

states explicitly that ―The Republic of Sudan, 

including all levels of Government throughout the 

country, shall comply fully with its obligations under 

the international human rights treaties to which it is 

or becomes a party.‖ 

The CPA committed the parties to a number 

of interim measures for the governance of Sudan 

during a six-year Interim Period, to end in July 2011. 

According to the CPA:

the Southern Sudanese people will 

determine in a referendum to be held at the 

end of the Interim Period whether the South 

stays within a united Sudan or becomes 

independent; 

the 10 Southern states would be exempt 

from sharia (Islamic law), which would 

continue to prevail in the North, and special 

provision would be made to protect the 

rights of non-Muslims in the national 

capital; 

the National Congress Party in power in 

Khartoum and the Sudan People‘s 

Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) 

dominant in the South would form a 

Government of National Unity, with the 

SPLM/A having a minority share of offices; 

the SPLM/A would assume responsibility 

for the government of Southern Sudan;

local autonomy would be granted to the 

contested areas of the Nuba Mountains and

Southern Blue Nile State, which would 

remain part of the North, and a special 

administration would be established in the 

oil-rich area of Abyei, whose boundaries 

would be determined by an independent 

commission; a popular referendum would 

determine whether Abyei continues to have 

a special status in the North or becomes part 

of the South; 

elections for President of Sudan, President 

of Southern Sudan, the national legislature, 

state governors, and all state legislatures 

would be held ―not later than the end of the 

fourth year of the Interim Period‖ (i.e., by 

July 2009, but now delayed until February 

2010); and 

constitutional arrangements for the Interim 

Period would be according to an Interim 

National Constitution and an Interim 

Constitution for Southern Sudan. 

Since July 2005, Sudan‘s current 

Government of National Unity officially has 

governed under the Interim National Constitution, 

which contains provisions guaranteeing universal 

human rights, including freedom of religion or 

belief. As of this writing, however, many of these 

provisions, including those advancing human rights, 

have yet to be implemented or have experienced 

prolonged delays. For example, over two years 

passed between the signing of the CPA and the 

appointment in February 2007 of a chairman for the 

constitutionally-required Commission on the Rights 

of Non-Muslims in the National Capital. The chair 

of the Commission is a Christian Southerner. Other 

members of the Commission include judges, national 

and Khartoum State officials, and representatives of 

various Muslim, Christian, and other religious 

communities. Since its establishment, the 

Commission reportedly has handled a number of 

complaints from non-Muslims, particularly regarding 

difficulties in obtaining permission for church 

construction, treatment of non-Muslims by the police, 

and educational issues such as an Islamic bias in the 

teaching of history and inadequate numbers of 

Christian teachers for religious education. The 

Commission is reported to have intervened 

successfully to obtain the return of a portion of a 

Christian cemetery from the Khartoum State 

Government. The National Human Rights 
99

Commission, called for in Sudan‘s Interim 

Constitution, has yet to be created.

In the now-autonomous South, the Interim 

Constitution of Southern Sudan, adopted in 

December 2005, separates religion and state and 

contains provisions for freedom of religion and for 

equality before the law regardless of religious belief.

These provisions appear to be observed in practice. 

In government-controlled areas of the North, 

the religious freedom and other human rights 

protections agreed to in the CPA and enshrined in 

Sudan‘s Interim National Constitution have not yet 

resulted in significant changes to the government‘s 

practice of enforcing its interpretation of Islam to the 

detriment of those holding other views. Muslims 

reportedly receive preferential access to limited 

government services and preferential treatment in 

court cases involving Muslims against non-Muslims.

All Sudanese in the North, including Christians and 

followers of traditional African religions, are subject 

to sharia. Corporal punishments adopted from sharia 

are imposed on both non-Muslims and on Muslims 

who do not traditionally follow such practices. 

There is discrimination in granting 

governmental approvals required for the construction 

and use of places of worship. Although permits are 

routinely granted to build mosques, permission to 

build churches often is difficult to obtain. Since the 

establishment of the Commission on the Rights of 

Non-Muslims in the National Capital, there appears 

to have been some progress on this issue; three 

churches have received building permits and are 

under construction. Churches built without such 

official permission by owners who register land for 

personal rather than church use exist at the 

authorities‘ sufferance. Church-owned properties that 

legally are recognized are nevertheless vulnerable to 

seizure in a legal atmosphere in which government 

action is not constrained by an independent judiciary. 

Prior to the establishment of the Government of 

National Unity, governments confiscated church 

property in the North without adequate 

compensation.

Public religious expression and persuasion 

of non-Muslims by Muslims is allowed, but that of 

Muslims by non-Muslims is forbidden. Conversion 

from Islam is a crime legally punishable by death. In 

practice, suspected converts are subjected to intense 

scrutiny, intimidation, and sometimes torture by 

government security personnel who act with 

impunity. Converts to Christianity from Islam face 

societal pressures and harassment from the security 

services to the point that they typically cannot remain 

in Sudan. The law against apostasy is also of concern 

to Muslims; the last instance in which the death 

penalty was applied was to a Muslim reformer in 

1985. Those charged with blasphemy also are 

subject to harsh punishment.

In contrast, government policies and societal 

pressure promote conversion to Islam. During the 

North-South civil war, some children from nonMuslim families who were captured and sold into 

slavery by pro-government militias were reportedly 

forced to convert. Reports continue of coerced 

conversions in government-controlled camps for 

internally displaced persons, as well as among prison 

inmates, Popular Defense Force trainees, and 

children in camps for vagrant minors. The 

government also has allegedly tolerated the use of 

humanitarian assistance to induce conversion to 

Islam. In government-controlled areas, children who 

have been abandoned or whose parentage is unknown 

are considered by the government to be Muslims and 

may not be adopted by non-Muslims.

Although relative North-South peace has 

brought improvements in human rights conditions in 

the South and in the Nuba Mountains, in the western 

region of Darfur, government forces and ―Janjaweed‖ 

soldiers (government-backed militias from Arab 

tribes) since 2003 have employed abusive tactics and 

brutal violence against African Muslim civilians, 

tactics similar to those used previously against nonMuslim Africans during the North-South civil 

war. Serious human rights abuses have included 

aerial bombardment of civilians, forced starvation as 

the result of deliberate denial of international 

humanitarian assistance, and the forcible 

displacement of civilian populations. To date, efforts 

by the international community to protect Darfur‘s 

civilian population have been wholly inadequate. 

With villages destroyed and lives at risk from further 
100

attack by Khartoum's armed forces or governmentsupported Arab militiamen, many civilians remain in 

camps, dependent upon international humanitarian 

assistance. 

The perpetrators of these crimes, both 

members of the Sudanese armed forces and allied 

militias, have acted with impunity. The government 

of Sudan thus far has refused to surrender to the 

International Criminal Court any of the individuals, 

including President Bashir, charged with crimes 

against humanity and war crimes. This lack of 

accountability and the persistent use of tactics 

amounting to crimes against humanity and war 

crimes by the government of Sudan and its agents 

against civilian populations raise serious questions 

about the government‘s commitment to abide by the 

terms of the CPA.

Actions resulting in mass killings by the 

government of Sudan against its own citizens 

repeatedly have been condemned as genocide. In the 

Sudan Peace Act of 2002, Congress found that the 

Sudanese government had committed acts of 

genocide during the civil war. By concurrent 

resolution in July 2004, Congress found the atrocities 

being committed in Darfur to constitute genocide. In 

congressional testimony delivered in September 

2004, then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell 

announced that the State Department ―had concluded 

that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that 

the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear 

responsibility—and genocide may still be 

continuing.‖ In a statement issued by the White 

House the same day, then-President Bush urged the 

international community to work with the United 

States to prevent and suppress acts of genocide in 

Darfur. In April 2007, in an address announcing 

new sanctions against Sudan and individuals 

responsible for the violence in Darfur, President Bush 

once again referred to actions in Darfur as genocide.

The government‘s genocidal actions stem in 

part from a policy of the governing elite in Khartoum 

to advance forcibly an Arab and Muslim identity in 

all parts of Sudan. This policy effectively relegates 

non-Arabs and non-Muslims to a secondary status. It 

also conflicts with the reality that Sudan is a 

religiously diverse country with a large minority of 

Christians and followers of traditional African 

beliefs, as well as Muslims from a variety of Islamic 

traditions. Opposition to this coercive policy has 

fueled support for armed resistance by non-Muslim 

and non-Arab populations in the South, the Nuba 

Mountains, and elsewhere. During the North-South 

civil war, the current regime in particular used 

appeals to Islam, including calls by senior 

government officials for jihad, to mobilize northern 

Muslim opinion. Religious incitement by 

government officials contributed to the horrific 

human rights abuses perpetrated by government 

security forces and government-backed militias.

The Plight of Sudan’s Internally Displaced Persons 

and Refugees

One of the major issues facing Sudan is the 

situation of refugees and internally displaced persons 

(IDPs). The North-South civil war and the conflict 

in Darfur have together driven approximately 7 

million Sudanese from their homes, including 5.4 

million who are currently internally 

displaced, making Sudan the locus of the largest IDP 

crisis in the world. Sudan‘s total population today is 

just over 40 million. Most of the 4 million displaced 

from the North-South civil war are displaced

internally, having fled to other parts of Sudan, 

particularly to the North. Of the 4 million, 500,000 

became refugees in the Central African Republic, the 

Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Egypt, 

Kenya, and Uganda. The overwhelming majority of 

those who fled as a result of the North-South civil 

war are Christians or followers of traditional African 

religions. Since 2003, the Darfur conflict has 

produced an additional two million IDPs and sent 

another 250,000 into neighboring Chad and the 

Central African Republic as refugees. Unlike those 

who fled the North-South civil war, the Darfuris are 

almost all Muslims, members of tribes identified as 

African rather than Arab. 

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) oversees refugee returns, and the 

International Organization for Migration (IOM), in 

collaboration with Southern and central Sudanese 

authorities, coordinates IDP returns in Sudan. Both 
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agencies emphasize that all returns by refugees and 

IDPs must be voluntary. Surveys indicate that most

displaced Southerners indeed wish to return to the 

South because of a desire to return to their areas of 

origin, to take part in a new Southern Sudan, and to 

leave the harsh or restrictive living conditions in 

camps.

Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, more 

than 2 million refugees and IDPs have returned to the 

South. However, only 13 percent of all returnees 

have returned through a process organized by the 

UNHCR, IOM, a state government, or the 

Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Returnees 

assisted by the UN or IOM receive a reintegration kit, 

which includes food rations for three months, 

cooking utensils, agricultural tools, landmine 

protection kits, and applications for micro-credit 

schemes to support the local economy. Those who 

return on their own, however, receive little 

assistance, either in transit or in their destination 

community. Furthermore, poor coordination among 

return operations has left many returnees and local 

communities without the proper resources for 

integration. Most of the returnees are settling in 

urban areas, because either rural areas lack the 

services required to integrate them or they have 

become accustomed to urban living after years of 

living in urban-like camp settings or in Khartoum. 

This has led to a significant ―squatter‖ problem, 

increased competition for overtaxed resources, and in 

some cases, discrimination against returnees.

The return of refugees and IDPs to the South 

is important for the planned elections and 2011 

referendum. A much-delayed national census was 

finally conducted at the end of April 2008, despite 

SPLM objections that IDPs and refugees who had not 

yet returned to the South were not to be included in 

the count. Returns to the South increased prior to the 

April census, as many refugees and IDPs wanted to 

take part in that process and state governments and 

the GoSS heavily promoted returns. UNHCR 

expects a similar uptick in returns prior to the 

elections and 2011 referendum. (In Darfur, many 

IDPs refused to cooperate with the census, 

presumably further skewing the results in favor of 

populations under Khartoum's control.) As of this 

writing, the final results of the census have not yet 

been announced. 

Southern Sudan faces major challenges in its 

capacity to absorb and provide services to the large 

number of returnees. Years of civil war have 

devastated the South, making the development of 

infrastructure, including mass communications, 

schools, health clinics, and water and sanitation 

facilities, one of the steepest challenges to be met by 

the new government. Returnees also face limited 

employment opportunities, continuing security 

concerns, difficulties obtaining restitution for land 

and property, potential communal tensions, and a 

lack of assistance and development. These 

challenges, coupled with the expectation by many 

Sudanese that development in the South should be 

faster, have led many IDPs to return to Khartoum, 

despite pressure from authorities there, including 

discrimination and harassment based on religious 

identification, and terrible camp conditions. There are 

also reports of families splitting up, with children 

remaining in Khartoum or in refugee camps so that 

they can access better education services.

Commission visit to Southern Sudan

In October 2008, a Commission delegation 

led by Commissioner Leonard Leo visited Southern 

Sudan, including Juba, the regional capital, and 

Malakal, the capital of Upper Nile State. 

Accompanied by State Department officers from the 

U.S. Embassy in Khartoum and the Consulate 

General in Juba, the delegation met with a number of 

officials of the Government of Southern Sudan, 

officials of the ruling SPLM, and representatives of 

the Christian and Muslim religious communities and 

of civil society. Among the senior officials with 

whom the Commission delegation met in Juba were 

First Vice President of Sudan and President of 

Southern Sudan Salva Kiir Mayardit, the GoSS 

Minister for Legal Affairs and Constitutional 

Development, the Secretary General of the SPLM, 

and the Chair of the Southern Sudan Human Rights 

Commission. In Malakal, the delegation was 

received by the governor of Upper Nile State Sudan 

Armed Forces Major General Tatluak Deng Garang, 

the only governor among the ten Southern states who 
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is a member of the Northern-dominated National 

Congress Party. 

Major findings of the Commission's visit to 

Southern Sudan were:

Religious freedom conditions are relatively 

good in Southern Sudan and the GoSS 

generally appears to respect freedom of 

religion or belief. A GoSS registration 

requirement for new religious organizations 

could, however, be abused to exclude groups 

on the basis of their beliefs. 

The GoSS is to be commended for the 

establishment of the Southern Sudan Human 

Rights Commission, which appears to be 

operating under energetic leadership, in 

stark contrast to the yet-to-be-established 

national Human Rights Commission called 

for in the CPA and Sudan‘s Interim National 

Constitution. 

The GoSS promotes inter-religious 

harmony. Official occasions typically begin 

with prayer by both Christian and Muslim 

clergy. On the other hand, the secular stance 

taken by the GoSS has disappointed some 

Christian leaders who had expected more 

deference in view of the churches‘ role in 

the liberation struggle, as well as 

government support for the churches‘ 

educational and social programs. Major 

Christian groups actively promote conflict 

resolution across ethnic and religious lines. 

Although Islam no longer receives 

preferential treatment as it did when Juba 

and other urban centers were under Northern 

occupation, the National Congress Party is 

still trying to influence Southern Muslims. 

On the other hand, the concerns of Southern 

Muslims about their security appear to have 

eased since the earlier Commission visit. 

Despite serious problems with CPA 

implementation and questions regarding 

Khartoum‘s willingness to complete the 

peace process, the CPA has brought tangible 

benefits to the people of Southern Sudan: a 

real albeit uneasy peace with the North, a 

functioning regional government, real

though limited economic development, and 

greater freedom, including in the exercise of 

the freedom of religion or belief.

The ruling party in the South, the Sudan 

People‘s Liberation Movement (SPLM) is to 

be commended for the progress made in 

assuming the responsibilities of government 

at the state, regional (in the GoSS), and 

national levels (in the Government of 

National Unity). 

With U.S. assistance, progress is being made 

in professionalizing an insurgent force, the 

Sudan People‘s Liberation Army (SPLA). 

However, more could be done, including by 

the U.S. military, to strengthen and to 

professionalize the SPLA. The South is 

particularly vulnerable to aerial 

bombardment, a fact that Khartoum 

exploited during the civil war. Improved air 

defense and communications would help to 

deter or counter aerial bombardment by the 

North. Improved radar, air traffic control, 

and communications, all crucial for air 

defense, also would have civilian benefits 

and would aid Southern Sudan‘s economic 

development. 

The human rights performance of Southern 

Sudan's security forces would benefit from 

greater professionalism on the part of the 

SPLA and the police. Improved security 

also would enhance the prospects for free, 

fair, and peaceful elections. 

U.S. leadership remains crucial to protecting 

the gains made by the CPA. The 

Commission delegation was impressed by 

the strong expression of support, both by 

GoSS officials and by representatives of 

civil society, for past U.S. diplomatic and 

humanitarian efforts in Sudan. 
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Southern Sudan should be strengthened – in 

terms of economic development, 

institutional resources, human capacity, and 

defensive ability – in order to deter 

Khartoum from reneging on the CPA‘s 

promise of free and fair elections and of 

referenda on Southern independence and on 

whether the border region of Abyei will go 

with the North or the South. More emphasis 

needs to be given to development, as 

opposed to humanitarian assistance, in order 

to strengthen the South in ways that produce 

a better climate for peace with the North.

Southern Sudan‘s judicial sector is 

particularly weak and under-resourced. Not 

only are some judges holding court under 

trees and in dilapidated buildings, according 

to the Chief Justice of Southern Sudan‘s 

Supreme Court, but many younger judges 

lacked both training and access to reference 

materials. 

Due in significant part to foot-dragging by 

Khartoum, Sudan is unlikely to be able to 

hold credible elections on the schedule 

mandated by the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement, i.e., before July 2009. 

U.S. sanctions continue to have a negative 

impact on the South, including in the 

development of a viable banking system, 

necessary for increased economic growth 

and greater stability.

The facilities and personnel resources of the

U.S. Consulate General in Juba should be 

significantly upgraded and strengthened in 

order to support increased U.S. engagement 

and programming in Southern Sudan. 

Other Commission Actions on Sudan

Sudan was one of the first countries to be a 

focus of the Commission‘s attention. Since its 

inception, the Commission has met with a broad 

range of government officials, religious leaders, 

human rights monitors, civil society representatives, 

and others knowledgeable about Sudan; held public 

events to focus attention on religious freedom abuses 

in Sudan; testified on Sudan at congressional 

hearings; and visited Sudan three times to see 

conditions on the ground first hand. 

Following a serious outbreak of fighting in 

the sensitive North-South border region of Abyei in 

May 2008, the Commission issued a public statement 

calling on the U.S. government to tell President 

Bashir that nothing less than full implementation of 

the CPA, including provisions relating to Abyei and 

other contested areas, is acceptable. Beginning in 

mid-May in Abyei, units of the Northern-controlled 

Sudan Armed Forces and associated tribal militia 

brutally attacked local residents and destroyed private 

property, laying waste to the region‘s main town, also 

called Abyei, and driving 90,000 civilians from their 

homes.

In September 2008, the Commission held 

the first of a series of public hearings exploring the 

impact of religious extremism on U.S. national 

security interests, including one on Sudan entitled 

Sudan’s Unraveling Peace and the Challenge to U.S. 

Policy. Witnesses, including the U.S. Special Envoy 

on Sudan, Ambassador Richard Williamson,

examined U.S. options for encouraging the full 

implementation of the CPA. Representatives 

Capuano (D-MA), Payne (D-NJ), and McGovern (DMA) gave remarks at the hearing and Senator 

Feingold (D-WI) and Representative Chris Smith (RNJ) provided statements for the record.

In February 2009, the Commission held a 

press conference to announce its latest set of 

recommendations for U.S. policy on Sudan. The 

recommendations reflect the public hearing and visit 

to Southern Sudan described above. Representatives 

Payne (D-NJ), Chris Smith (R-NJ), Wolf (R-VA), 

and Lee (D-CA) participated in the press conference, 

and Representative McGovern (D-MA) provided a 

statement.

The Commission, since its establishment, 

has made a series of recommendations regarding U.S. 

policy toward Sudan. In September 2001, following 

a Commission recommendation that the U.S. 
104

government appoint a nationally prominent 

individual to bring about a peaceful and just 

settlement of the North-South civil war in Sudan, 

then-President Bush appointed former Senator John 

Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan, 

energizing the peace process. Senator Danforth was 

followed in September 2006 by former USAID 

Administrator and Special Humanitarian Coordinator 

for Sudan Andrew Natsios, and in January 2008 by 

Richard Williamson. Following the inauguration of 

the Obama Administration, the Commission 

announced a new set of recommendations for U.S. 

policy in Sudan, including a call for a new Special 

Envoy who would demonstrate continued U.S. 

commitment to peace in Sudan. On March 18, 2009, 

President Obama appointed retired Major General J. 

Scott Gration to this position. The Commission has 

successfully influenced other U.S. actions, including 

the Administration‘s decisions to give peace in Sudan 

a higher priority on its foreign policy agenda, engage 

actively to move the warring parties toward peace, 

monitor progress toward implementation of a series 

of partial and preliminary peace agreements, limit the 

impact of U.S. Sudan sanctions on the South and 

other areas that have suffered from Khartoum‘s 

abuses, and use U.S. assistance more effectively in 

alleviating the suffering of the Sudanese people and 

in aiding development in Southern Sudan. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

In addition to recommending that Sudan 

continue to be designated a CPC, the Commission 

urges the U.S. government to remain engaged at the 

highest levels in bringing about a just and lasting 

peace for all of Sudan. The Commission believes 

that the normalization of relations with Sudan and the 

lifting of U.S. sanctions must be preceded by 

concrete action and demonstrated progress by 

Khartoum in ending abuses, cooperating with 

international peacekeeping and humanitarian 

assistance operations in Darfur, and fully 

implementing the CPA.

I. Focusing U.S. diplomacy on the successful 

implementation of the CPA 

In order to maintain the level of U.S. 

engagement during the early part of the new U.S. 

Administration, the U.S. government should:

ensure that the Special Envoy for Sudan has the 

bureaucratic authority, the appropriate personnel, 

and other support needed to coordinate 

successfully U.S. efforts toward the complete 

and timely implementation of the CPA and 

secure a just and lasting peace for all of Sudan, 

including in Darfur; and

build on past efforts by the Special Envoy to 

enlist international support for peace in Sudan, 

including from China and other nations that have 

major economic investments in Sudan, to press 

Khartoum to end its delaying tactics on CPA 

implementation.

II. Encouraging the parties to implement the 

CPA fully 

The U.S. government should:

insist on the full implementation of the CPA 

(including power-sharing, wealth-sharing, 

respect for human rights, democratic 

accountability through elections, resolution of 

the Abyei issue, the 2011 referenda, and 

termination of all support for militias) as the 

agreed basis for North-South peace and a model 

for political accommodation of legitimate 

grievances in other regions such as Darfur; 

help ensure that the parties conduct the national, 

Southern, and state elections mandated by the 

CPA; insist that these elections be free and fair, 

that adequate security be provided to enable 

participation by all eligible voters regardless of 

religious or ethnic background, and that the 

results be accepted by both the National 

Congress Party and the Sudan People's 

Liberation Movement;
105

recognize the importance of a peaceful resolution 

of the Abyei issue to continued North-South 

peace and the role of the United States in 

formulating the compromise on Abyei that was 

incorporated in the CPA; insist upon acceptance 

by the parties of the findings of the Abyei 

Boundaries Commission and implementation of 

the Abyei Roadmap Agreement; 

investigate and publicly report to the Congress 

every six months on the status of implementation 

of the CPA, with a particular focus on violations, 

assessing responsibility and indicating what 

actions are to be taken by the U.S. government in 

response; 

make clear that the United States expects the 

choice of the people of Southern Sudan, as 

expressed in a free and fair referendum to be 

held in 2011 in accordance with the CPA, to be 

respected, whether the people of Southern Sudan 

choose to remain in Sudan or be independent; 

strengthen the capability of the U.S. Embassy in 

Khartoum to monitor implementation of the 

crucial human rights provisions of the CPA and 

to report on human rights abuses, including 

religious freedom in the North, as well as to 

advance the U.S. human rights agenda in Sudan 

by appointing a ranking official reporting to the 

Ambassador and working full-time on human 

rights; 

consider new sanctions as needed to respond to 

non-compliance with the terms of the CPA, 

including targeted sanctions such as asset freezes 

and travel bans against individuals and 

institutions, such as the National Congress Party, 

identified as responsible for serious human rights 

abuses or for impeding CPA implementation; 

and 

expand international radio broadcasting to Sudan 

to provide objective sources of news and 

information and to improve awareness of the 

CPA and its implementation, including specific 

programming promoting grass-roots 

reconciliation and respect for freedom of 

religion; support independent television and 

radio broadcasting, including in the South, to the 

same end. 

III. Protecting civilians

To prevent violence against civilians 

(including mass atrocities and genocidal acts) that 

would result from renewed conflict, the U.S. 

government should:

take the steps necessary to make feasible the 

establishment of various security guarantees for 

Southern Sudan in order to deter Khartoum from 

renewing the North-South civil war or otherwise 

impose its will by force in violation of the CPA;

provide Southern Sudan with the technical 

assistance and expertise or other capacity it 

might need to bolster professionalization of the 

Sudan People's Liberation Army, such as 

International Military Education and Training 

(IMET), and secure radar, communications, and 

other passive, defensive equipment, as 

appropriate, to improve the South's ability to 

detect air attacks and therefore reduce civilian 

casualties; and

support the Government of Southern Sudan's 

current, active efforts toward disarmament, 

demobilization, and reintegration of Southern 

Sudan's many ex-combatants.

IV. Strengthening reconciliation and the rule 

of law in Southern Sudan

The U.S. government should:

utilize existing social institutions, including 

indigenous religious bodies, and strengthen civil 

society organizations that have special expertise 

and a demonstrated commitment in the areas of 

inter-religious and inter-ethnic reconciliation and 

conflict prevention, to promote a peaceful civil 

society; 

continue and strengthen existing programs 

through the State Department's Bureau of 
106

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs to improve the professional competence 

and human rights performance of Southern 

Sudan's police and security forces;

expand U.S. assistance to the court system in 

Southern Sudan, which is in dire need of 

training, reference materials, improved court 

security, and facilities; encourage greater 

involvement by the U.S. private sector, including 

professional associations, law schools, and 

corporations, in this effort; and

provide scholarships to promising students to 

attend law school in the United States under the 

requirement that they return home at the 

completion of their training to build a modern 

legal system in Southern Sudan, including a law 

school with an advanced curriculum built upon 

democratic principles, but targeted to the needs 

of the area.

V. Strengthening human rights protections 

The U.S. government should:

continue to support and strengthen the 

Government of Southern Sudan‘s institutions 

and infrastructure, including the Southern Sudan 

Human Rights Commission, necessary to 

protect, monitor, and investigate human rights 

abuses and promote respect for internationally 

recognized freedom of religion or belief and 

related human rights; 

improve citizen awareness and enforcement of 

the legal protections for human rights included in 

the CPA, the Interim National Constitution, the 

Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, and the 

international human rights treaties, including the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights (ICCPR), to which Sudan is a party; 

urge the establishment of an independent and 

impartial national Human Rights Commission as 

called for in the Interim National Constitution 

and in accordance with international standards1

for such bodies in terms of independence, 

adequate funding, a representative character, and 

a broad mandate that includes freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief; and

urge the Government of National Unity to 

cooperate fully with international mechanisms on 

human rights issues, including inviting further 

visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom 

of Religion or Belief, the Special Rapporteur on 

the Situation of Human Rights in Sudan, the UN 

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and the 

UN Human Rights Council‘s High-Level 

Mission on the Situation of Human Rights in 

Darfur and comply with the Mission‘s 

recommendations.

VI. Building a successful indigenous 

economy in Southern Sudan

The U.S. government should:

support the creation of an effective banking 

system in Southern Sudan, recognizing that such 

a system is crucial for the South's economic 

development and political stability;

encourage U.S. private investment in Southern 

Sudan while ensuring that U.S. sanctions are 

targeted more effectively in support of U.S. 

diplomatic efforts to ensure a just and lasting 

peace in all of Sudan;

alleviate the impact of remaining U.S. sanctions 

on all areas under the control of the Government 

of Southern Sudan and local institutions in the 

border areas of Abyei, Southern Blue Nile, and 

the Nuba Mountains, including sanctions on 

communications equipment;

expand U.S. educational assistance, including 

building the capacity of the University of Juba, 

to enhance Southern Sudanese expertise in 

agriculture, business, law, and other areas to 

support development efforts;

promote agricultural development in Southern 

Sudan with the goal of promoting greater food 

security;
107

expand the provision of U.S. assistance to 

indigenous civil-society, private-sector groups 

and provide appropriate technical assistance to 

enable such groups to prepare project proposals 

for U.S. grants; 

explore providing the Sudan People's Liberation 

Army with needed technical expertise and 

capacity, such as in road construction and other 

public works, to assist in creating an 

infrastructure that bolsters economic 

development; and

while recognizing the urgent need for continued 

U.S. assistance for returning refugees and 

internally displaced persons, begin shifting from 

humanitarian to development assistance in order 

to enhance the economic viability and political 

stability of Southern Sudan in anticipation of the 

2011 referendum on the South's political future.

VII. Expanding U.S. diplomatic capacity in 

Southern Sudan 

The U.S. government should:

enhance the facilities and personnel resources of 

the U.S. Consulate General in Juba in order to 

support increased U.S. engagement and 

programming in Southern Sudan.

VIII. Promoting Freedom of Religion or Belief

The U.S. government should:

use U.S. bilateral discussions with Sudan, as well 

as UN mechanisms and bilateral discussions with 

third countries with influence in Sudan, to urge 

Sudan‘s Government of National Unity to:

--allow all religious groups to conduct their 

activities without harassment, discrimination 

or undue interference, including publishing 

or importing religious literature, building, 

repairing, and operating houses of worship, 

and operating social service programs;

--repeal laws that punish changing one‘s 

religion or encouraging another to do so and 

end official accusations of blasphemy, 

apostasy, ―offending Islam,‖ or similar 

charges used to stifle public debate or 

restrict the right to freedom of expression;

--eliminate the bureaucratic obstacles the 

government places on international 

humanitarian assistance and remove the 

state security services from their current role 

in regulating humanitarian assistance;

--abandon efforts to force religious 

organizations to register as nongovernmental organizations under 

regulations that give government officials 

control over their activities;

--permit relations between national religious 

communities and their co-religionists abroad 

in accordance with universal human rights 

norms;

--reform the state security services to be 

representative of all Sudanese and ensure 

that all national institutions such as the 

military, law enforcement agencies, and the 

highest levels of the judiciary are 

representative and equally protective of all 

Sudanese regardless of religious affiliation 

or belief;

--end the impunity with which members of 

the security forces and others acting as 

agents of the government have engaged in 

human rights abuses; urge the establishment 

of effective mechanisms for accountability 

for past abuses; and in the absence of such 

bodies, provide full cooperation with 

international institutions, including those 

mandated by the UN Security Council;

--cease using government-controlled media 

for messages of intolerance and 

discrimination against non-Muslims; and
108

--exclude negative stereotyping in school 

textbooks; include in school curricula, in 

textbooks, and in teacher training the 

concepts of tolerance and respect for human 

rights, including freedom of religion or 

belief; and incorporate into history texts the 

religious and cultural diversity of Sudan‘s 

past.

IX. Assisting Refugees and Internally 

Displaced Persons

The U.S. government should:

increase support to UN agencies and their NGO 

partners in facilitating the voluntary return of 

refugees and the internally displaced, including 

through intensified efforts to monitor 

spontaneous or ―self-assisted‖ returns to the 

South, provide safer modes of transportation, demine roadways, and develop a comprehensive 

return and reintegration strategy, as well as 

development plans, to enhance the capacity of 

Southern Sudan to absorb large numbers of IDPs 

and refugees; 

 increase technical assistance programs to assist 

the Government of Southern Sudan in providing 

basic services, including education, health, and 

water sanitation, to the returnees;

work with UN agencies and NGO partners to 

ensure that the populations that remain in refugee 

and IDP camps continue to receive at least the 

same level of humanitarian assistance as before, 

so they are not unduly pressured into making 

returns; and

work with other resettlement countries, UNHCR, 

and its NGO partners to ensure that UNHCR 

expeditiously identifies those refugees for whom 

repatriation is not an appropriate or imminent 

solution, including those who have suffered from 

past persecution; secure, as appropriate, timely 

local integration in countries of first asylum or 

resettlement to third countries for such refugees; 

and promptly devise a strategy to achieve this 

concurrent with efforts to repatriate refugees to 

Sudan.

X. Protecting Victims of Slavery and Human 

Trafficking

The U.S. government should:

urge Sudan‘s Government of National Unity to 

prosecute the crime of abduction into slavery, 

most of whose victims are women and children 

taken during the North-South civil war or in 

Darfur by government-sponsored militias, and 

ensure the speedy identification, voluntary 

return, and family reunification of victims, as 

well as measures for their rehabilitation and 

reparation.

XI. Protecting Civilians and Promoting Peace 

in Darfur

The U.S. government should: 

support a stronger international presence in 

Sudan sufficient to protect civilian populations 

and to monitor compliance with the peace 

accords and UN Security Council resolutions, 

including by:

--urging the United Nations-African Union 

Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to protect 

civilians in accordance with the highest 

international standards for peacekeeping 

operations;

--providing resources such as improved 

communications equipment, reliable 

vehicles and helicopters, and logistics 

assistance to enable peacekeepers to move 

quickly to places where abuses are 

occurring;

--bringing in advisers on civilian protection 

issues in armed conflict to train and work 

with international force commanders;

--ensuring that there is a secure environment 

for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the 
109

return of refugees and the internally 

displaced and providing an early warning 

system with GPS (global positioning 

system) capability to warn camps and 

villages of approaching forces;

--supporting the assignment of designated 

protection teams to camps for internally 

displaced persons;

--supporting the active enforcement of the 

aerial ―no-fly‖ zone already specified in the 

UN Security Council‘s resolution of March 

29, 2005, which calls for the immediate 

cessation of ―offensive military flights in 

and over the Darfur region‖;

--taking measures to prevent—and providing 

aid to those victimized by—widespread 

sexual violence and rape in Darfur, 

including by training advisers for the 

international forces in Darfur and by 

encouraging participating nations to include 

female troops and female police officers in 

their deployment to handle rape cases 

effectively; and

--supporting a substantial increase in the 

number of human rights monitors from the 

UN Office of the High Commissioner for 

Human Rights and in the number of 

international peacekeepers deployed in 

Darfur;

lead an international effort to pressure the 

government of Sudan to reinstate all 

international relief organizations expelled 

following the International Criminal Court's 

authorization of an arrest warrant against 

President Bashir and permit unimpeded, safe 

access by such organizations to the region so that 

necessary humanitarian assistance can be 

provided to refugees and internally displaced 

persons;

work with international partners to end the 

suffering of the civilian population of Darfur, 

including by seeking an end to killing, ethnic 

cleansing, forced displacement, and interference 

with the distribution of international 

humanitarian assistance; by assisting refugees 

and internally displaced persons to return home 

in safety; and by promoting a ceasefire as well 

as a peaceful and just resolution of the 

grievances that underlie the crisis; and

use bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to mount 

an international campaign to pressure the 

Sudanese authorities to cooperate fully with the 

International Criminal Court.

 

1 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of 

National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of 

Human Rights, found in the Annex to Fact Sheet No. 

19, National Institutions for the Promotion and 

Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High 

Commissioner for Human Rights 

(http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm, 

accessed April 6, 2009).
110

Turkmenistan

The Commission has recommended every 

year since 2000 that Turkmenistan be designated by 

the Secretary of State as a ―country of particular 

concern,‖ or CPC, under the International Religious 

Freedom Act of 1998 for its systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious violations of religious freedom. Despite 

the Commission‘s repeated recommendations, the 

U.S. government has never designated the country as 

a CPC. The Commission has noted initial steps 

undertaken by the government of President 

Berdimuhamedov to lessen certain aspects of the 

repression mandated by former President Niyazov, 

and encourages the new government to implement

further specific steps to bring Turkmenistan‘s law, 

policies, and practices in line with international 

human rights norms, including for freedom of 

religion or belief. Nevertheless, in light of persistent 

and severe problems, until tangible and systemic 

reforms have been implemented, the Commission 

continues to recommend that the U.S. government 

designate Turkmenistan as a CPC. 

Under the late President Saparmurat 

Niyazov, who died in December 2006, Turkmenistan 

was among the world‘s most repressive and isolated 

states. Virtually no independent public activity was 

allowed. In effect, the 2003 religion law banned 

most religious activity. Moreover, Turkmenistan‘s 

public life was dominated by Niyazov‘s quasireligious personality cult, expressed in his work of 

―spiritual thoughts,‖ the Ruhnama, which the state 

imposed on the country‘s educational and religious 

life. 

In early 2007 Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov 

succeeded Niyasov as president. He has ordered 

educational reforms and, while he has not made 

changes to the country‘s oppressive laws, he has 

made a few positive steps relevant to human rights 

and religious freedom. These steps include the 2007 

release of 11 political prisoners, including the former 

chief mufti; some limits on Niyazov‘s personality 

cult; the establishment of two new official human 

rights commissions; an expressed willingness to 

reform of the country‘s religion law; and the 

registration of 13 minority religious groups. Police 

and street controls on travel inside Turkmenistan 

have been eased and the country has been made more 

open to the outside world. According to the State 

Department‘s 2008 religious freedom report, ―There 

were small improvements in the status of respect for 

religious freedom by the Government . . . but 

troubling developments in the treatment of some 

registered and unregistered groups continued.‖ 

Human Rights Watch also noted in 2008 that, 

―although the Turkmen government of President 

Berdimuhamedov has begun to reverse some of the 

most ruinous social policies and the cult of 

personality that characterized President Niyazov‘s 

rule, Turkmenistan remains one of the most 

repressive and authoritarian in the world.‖

In order to examine religious freedom and 

related human rights conditions under the new 

Turkmen government, the Commission traveled to 

the country in August 2007 and discussed relevant 

concerns with President Berdimuhamedov and other 

government officials, as well as with diverse 

religious communities and civil society members. 

The Commission delegation also took part in the first 

public meeting with the country‘s former chief mufti, 

Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, who was released from 

prison on the eve of the Commission‘s visit. In 

addition, the delegation met with representatives of 

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE), the Papal Nuncio, and ambassadors 

from several Western countries. 

Religious matters technically are governed 

by the Council on Religious Affairs (CRA), whose 

members are appointed by the government and report 

to the president. CRA membership includes 

government officials and Sunni Muslim and Russian 

Orthodox Church representatives, but does not 

include other minority religious groups. The CRA 

controls the hiring, promotion, and firing of Sunni 

Muslim and Russian Orthodox clergy, who are 

required to report regularly to the CRA. It also 

examines and controls all religious publications and 

activities. 
111

CRA Deputy Chair Andrei Sapunov, a 

Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) priest, has 

oversight for Christian affairs, reportedly including 

official veto power over other Christian groups. 

According to Forum 18, Sapunov‘s permission is a 

precondition for the functioning of other Christian 

groups. Moreover, according to a 2008 Forum 18 

report, some ROC members claim that Sapunov 

provides confidential information from the 

confessional to the secret police and members of 

religious minorities also claim that CRA officials 

appointed under President Berdimuhamedov tend to 

favor state-controlled Islam and deny permission for 

non-Muslim activity even more often than did their 

predecessors appointed under Niyazov. 

The Turkmen government continues to 

interfere in the internal leadership and organizational 

arrangements of various religious communities. 

Former President Niyazov requested that the Russian 

Orthodox Church in Turkmenistan fall under 

Moscow Patriarchate jurisdiction and be removed 

from the Central Asian diocese in Tashkent. In 

October 2007, the ROC Holy Synod in Moscow 

placed Turkmenistan‘s 12 ROC parishes and convent 

in Ashgabat under the Moscow Patriarchate‘s 

jurisdiction. One year later, the ROC Holy Synod 

named Bishop Feofilakt (Kuryanov) as the first head 

of the Patriarchal Deanery. The Commission also 

was informed in 2007 that the Turkmen Justice 

Ministry reportedly has taken upon itself to advise 

several smaller unregistered groups to combine with 

other, currently registered communities, without 

giving any consideration to possible doctrinal 

differences or some groups‘ need for organizational 

autonomy.

According to the State Department, 

members of religious minority communities in 2008 

faced less harassment and detention than in previous 

years, although the situation reportedly remains more 

difficult outside Ashgabat. Several religious 

communities have been registered since 2004, a 

requirement in order for communities to engage in 

―legal‖ religious activities in the country. Registered 

religious communities, however, are also subject to 

check-up visits by local government or by secret or 

regular police units, Forum 18 reported in August 

2008. 

In response to international pressure, 

President Niyazov issued a decree in March 2004 

stating that religious communities may register ―in 

the prescribed manner,‖ and reduced the registration 

requirement from 500 members to five. Nine small 

minority religious groups were registered soon after 

its enactment, including the Baha‘i, several 

Pentecostal communities, Adventists, several 

Evangelical churches and the Society for Krishna 

Consciousness. In 2004, President Niyazov issued 

several additional decrees decriminalizing 

unregistered religious activities and easing other 

requirements for registration. These changes 

afforded officials the legal right to access information 

about the meetings of a religious group, and 

unregistered religious groups that did not meet the 

often arbitrary registration rules still faced 

administrative penalties that may include 

imprisonment and large fines. However, the 

Ashgabat parish of the Russian Orthodox Church was 

reregistered in 2005 and the Turkmenabat ROC 

parish reregistered in early 2006. The Source of Life 

Church in Turkmenabat and a Muslim group in 

Akhal were registered in late 2007. Reportedly, Shi'a 

Muslim groups were allowed to register collectively, 

but it is unclear when that occurred. Minority 

Christian religious groups reported that the climate 

for religious freedom did improve somewhat after the 

passage of the decrees. 

The benefits of such formal registration are 

not fully clear, since even registered groups still face 

bans on meeting for worship in private homes, 

printing and importing religious literature, and on 

foreign citizens leading religious communities; they 

are also subject to financial restrictions. The religion 

law remains highly problematic and some of its 

provisions continue to violate international standards 

with regard to freedom of religion or belief. These 

problems include: intrusive registration criteria; the 

requirement that the government be informed of all 

financial support received from abroad; a ban on 

worship in private homes for unregistered groups; a 

prohibition on the public wearing of religious garb 

except by religious leaders; and severe and 
112

discriminatory restrictions on public and private 

religious education. 

Under the official registration procedure, the

CRA advises the government on registration, the 

Justice Ministry manages the actual registration 

process and all applications are reviewed by a 

commission which also includes representatives from 

the Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs, and the 

Security Service. The review process should take 

from one to three months and groups denied 

registration are supposed to receive a written 

explanation. In practice, however, various 

difficulties arise. For example, the CRA may not 

find problems with a registration application, but the 

Justice Ministry may oppose it reportedly for 

arbitrary reasons. Officials refuse to issue written 

registration denials, but reportedly Justice Ministry 

officials have not only based refusals on spurious 

clerical errors but have sometimes suggested that in 

order to be registered, religious groups must remove 

points from their church charter documents. In 

addition, the registration status of branch religious 

organizations remains unclear, despite a temporary 

registration procedure in 2005. The head of the 

Justice Ministry‘s Registration Department told the 

Commission in 2007 that a branch organization 

automatically receives legal status after it is entered 

in the national register.

Reportedly, Jehovah‘s Witnesses applied for

registration in April 2008, but are not known to have 

received a response up to the present. Roman 

Catholics have not requested registration because 

their senior priest is required under Turkmen law to 

be a Turkmen citizen, but they are permitted to hold

services administered by two Polish priests in a 

Vatican diplomatic entity in Ashgabat. Ethnic 

Turkmen Protestant congregations hesitate to apply 

to register since they still cite likely official 

opposition due to the view of many Turkmen 

officials that ethnic Turkmen are supposed to be 

Muslim. The Armenian Apostolic Church is not 

registered and local residents told Forum 18 that 

Armenians constitute about 15 percent of Russian 

Orthodox Church attendees in Turkmenistan.

In February 2007, President 

Berdimuhamedov ordered the establishment of a 

government commission, led by the Chairman of the 

Supreme Court, to examine citizens‘ petitions on the 

work of law enforcement bodies, though neither its 

membership nor procedures were specified. This 

commission continued a Niyazov tradition that 

citizens may petition the president, but this time 

government agencies were designated to respond to 

petitions. Reportedly, this commission received 

thousands of petitions on police abuse, bribery, and 

unjust arrests and prosecutions. However, it is not 

known if authorities have followed up on these 

complaints or whether they have addressed these 

petitions either individually or through the adoption 

of new policies. 

In August 2007, the new commission issued 

its first decision, namely to pardon and release 11 

prisoners of conscience, including former Chief 

Mufti Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, who had been serving 

a 22-year prison term imposed in a closed 2004 trial. 

The former chief mufti, who had opposed Niyazov‘s 

decree that the Ruhnama be displayed in mosques, 

had been charged with treason for an alleged role in a 

2002 coup attempt against Niyazov. Ibadullah was 

allowed to resume work with the official Council of 

Religious Affairs, no longer as a deputy chairman but 

as a senior adviser. There is currently another 

reported case of a Sunni mullah who reportedly has 

been held since 2006 in a closed psychiatric hospital 

in the Lebap region after giving sermons critical of 

the Turkmen government in a village in the Kaakha 

district near Ashgabat, according to Forum 18. His 

name and current status are unknown. 

Turkmen law requires all males to serve in 

the military, makes criminal the refusal to do so, and 

provides no civilian service alternative for 

conscientious objectors. In September 2008, the UN 

Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion and 

Belief, Asma Jahangir, expressed concern over this 

issue, stressing that the right to perform an 

alternative, non-military service is part of the 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 

guaranteed in Article 18 of the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 

introduction of alternative civilian service was one 
113

recommendation to Turkmenistan under the 

December 2008 Universal Periodic Review of that 

country by the UN Human Rights Council. In March 

2009, however, a Turkmen government official 

rejected that recommendation. Shirin Akhmedova, 

director of the Presidential Institute on Democracy 

and Human Rights, pointed to the Turkmen 

Constitution, as revised by President 

Berdimuhamedov in September 2008, which refers to 

the defense of Turkmenistan as the ―sacred duty of 

every citizen.‖ The Commission also raised the issue 

of alternative service during its meeting with 

President Berdimuhamedov in August 2007.

Those who refuse to serve in the Turkmen 

military face a maximum penalty of two years‘ 

imprisonment. In 2007, six members of the 

Jehovah‘s Witnesses were sentenced to prison for 

their refusal of military service, though four were 

later pardoned and the other two received suspended 

sentences; those with suspended sentences also had 

some of their wages garnished by the state. In 2008 

and 2009, three other Jehovah‘s Witnesses also 

received suspended sentences for refusal to serve in 

the military. Of these, one Jehovah‘s Witness has 

indicated that his local military commission intends 

to reinstate charges against him at the end of the 

suspended sentence, according to Forum 18. 

During the Commission‘s visit to 

Turkmenistan, President Berdimuhamedov 

announced a new commission to examine how the 

country‘s laws conform to international human rights 

commitments. President Berdimuhamedov 

acknowledged in August 2007 that his country ―may 

have some shortcomings on religion and other 

issues.‖ In February 2008, Forum 18 reported that 

the director of the Presidential Institute on 

Democracy and Human Rights, Shirin Akhmedova, 

pledged that the process of amending the Turkmen 

religion law would be ―transparent‖ and would 

involve ―international experts‖ and claimed that 

Turkmen citizens could also suggest amendments. 

The Turkmen government requested in 2008 

that the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) provide a technical critique of Turkmen 

laws affecting religious freedom. USAID awarded a 

grant in 2008 to a U.S. non-governmental group, the 

International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, (ICNPL) 

to analyze the laws. As of this date, the ICNPL legal 

review is not known to have been incorporated into 

new legislation. 

By requiring official permission for 

construction, the Turkmen government restricts the 

number of mosques and other houses of worship. 

Many denominations are not allowed a place of 

worship and it is illegal for unregistered religious 

groups to rent, purchase, or construct buildings. 

Even registered communities often cannot rent 

premises for worship and therefore cannot meet as 

communities. Some registered religious communities 

have had to move their meeting places more than a 

dozen times over the period of a year, Forum 18 

reported in 2008. Meeting for worship in unapproved 

areas, such as private homes, can lead to police raids 

and court-imposed fines. For instance, in 2008, 

several Jehovah‘s Witnesses were threatened by 

police with rape and forced to recant their faith, 

according to Forum 18. 

President Berdimuhamedov told the 

Commission in 2007 that the Turkmen government 

recently had granted land to build a new Russian 

Orthodox Church in Ashgabat. Reportedly,

construction of the Russian Orthodox cathedral is 

proceeding, albeit slowly, allegedly due to the need 

to design the building to withstand earthquakes. 

Five registered minority religious 

communities have managed to establish places of 

worship, three of which are rented and two are in the 

private homes of Baha‘i and Krishna Consciousness 

community members. It is illegal for religious 

groups to rent or buy worship space. Worship in 

private homes is limited to members of nuclear 

families who belong to registered religious 

communities, although Turkmen officials have told 

the State Department that worship in private homes is 

allowed if neighbors do not object. Nevertheless, 

security police reportedly break up religious meetings 

in private homes and search homes without warrants. 

The leader of a registered Christian community told 

the Commission in 2007 that after his group was 

registered he could no longer invite friends and 
114

family to worship, even in his own apartment. His 

group reportedly was told by the government that 

private worship must be limited to husband and wife 

and children and could not include adult parents and 

siblings. 

Reportedly, the Turkmen government has 

pressured some groups to write letters stating that 

they will not gather for worship until they are 

officially registered and that the registration 

requirements promulgated in 2004 still will require 

religious adherents to request official permission 

before holding worship services. One leader of a 

registered Pentecostal church told the Commission in 

2007 that his home in Ashgabat had been confiscated 

by the government in 2003 because unsanctioned 

worship services were held there. Despite years of 

effort, he has been unsuccessful in efforts to have his 

personal property returned to him. 

Under the new government there have been 

no reports of the destruction of any houses of worship 

by the Turkmen authorities, unlike under the Niyazov 

government when at least a dozen houses of worship 

were reported to have been closed, confiscated, or 

destroyed. Some new construction of houses of 

worship is underway, although according to the State 

Department, the government refuses to allow the 

construction of three Shi‘a mosques. In March 2007, 

the parliament voted funds to finish construction of a 

mosque in the city of Mary and in October, the 

governor of the Dashoguz region announced a tender 

for construction of a large new mosque. The 

Turkmen state announced in 2008 that it is building 

mosques at state expense in Koneürgench in the 

northern Dashoguz region, and in Mary in the east of 

the country. Reportedly, a mosque is under 

construction in 2009 and will be named in honor of 

President Berdimuhamedov; one million dollars for 

the building will be drawn from a special presidential 

fund. In all these cases, however, the Turkmen 

government has provided grossly inadequate 

compensation to the owners of private houses 

destroyed on the sites of the future state-funded 

mosques. 

A court ruling in 2006 denied compensation 

to the Seventh Day Adventist community for the 

government‘s destruction of its church. Despite the 

country‘s vast financial resources from the sale of 

natural gas (most funds reportedly are held in 

personal accounts in western banks) Turkmen 

officials told Forum 18 in August 2008 that no 

compensation would be paid to any religious 

community for the destruction or confiscation of their 

houses of worship under Niyazov. Thus, Muslims in 

various parts of Turkmenistan will not receive any 

compensation for the dozen destroyed or confiscated 

mosques; the Armenian Apostolic Church would get 

neither compensation nor the return of their centuryold church in Turkmenbashi, partially destroyed by 

the state in 2005; the Adventist and Hare Krishna 

communities would not be compensated for their 

places of worship destroyed by the state in 1999; nor 

would Ashgabat's Baptist and Pentecostal 

communities be returned their places of worship 

confiscated by the government in 2001. 

The publication of religious literature inside 

Turkmenistan is banned by decree. The CRA must 

approve the content of all religious literature, but 

since Islam and Russian Orthodoxy are the only 

religions represented, CRA experts‘ knowledge on 

other religions is limited. The local CRA frequently 

confiscates literature and photocopies it. Religious 

communities reportedly need a government license to 

reproduce religious literature already in their 

possession. One leader of a registered Protestant 

community said that the Justice Ministry had 

threatened his church for attempting to make copies 

of religious material without a license. 

By law, only registered religious 

communities are permitted to import religious 

literature, depending on the number of people in a 

given congregation. Unlike in previous years, ethnic 

Turkmen members of unregistered religious groups 

accused of disseminating religious material were not 

singled out for harsh treatment, the State Department 

reported. Members of religious minority 

communities report that they are usually denied 

official permission to import religious literature and it 

is often confiscated before it can be submitted for 

official examination. One leader of a registered 

religious minority community told the Commission 

in 2007 that one may receive some religious material 
115

from abroad, but it cannot be shared. The head of 

one registered religious community told the 

Commission in 2007 that no pastor in his church had 

received official permission to import the legal 

allotment of any religious text, even though his 

church had translated some religious literature into 

Turkmen for government officials. The leader of one 

minority religious community told the Commission 

in 2007 that he had been detained for receiving 

Christian materials in the mail and was instructed to 

ask the sender not to send any more religious 

material. 

The Russian Orthodox Church can receive 

and distribute Bibles easily, but reportedly it does not 

share them with Protestants because they are viewed 

as competitors. Moreover, the Russian Orthodox 

community was itself affected by past official 

policies, which banned Turkmen residents from 

receiving Russian publications by mail, including the 

Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. As of this 

writing, that ban remains in effect.

Most international religious websites are not 

accessible by Internet users in Turkmenistan, 

especially since Internet access is provided only via 

state providers. Moreover, a special computer 

program reportedly searches emails for coded words 

that could be used to send ―unreliable information‖, 

and ―a suspicious message‖ will not reach the 

intended addressee, Forum 18 reported in 2008. 

Religious literature, CDs, and DVDs found during 

police raids on private religious meetings are 

routinely confiscated and rarely returned unless 

owners persist in their efforts at risk to themselves. 

Bibles and other literature were confiscated from

Jehovah's Witnesses in Ashgabat in March 2008.

Customs officers restrict returning travelers, 

regardless of citizenship, to only a small amount of 

religious literature for personal use. One Orthodox 

believer told Forum 18 in 2008 that on at least five 

occasions religious material had been confiscated 

from Orthodox priests at the Turkmen border. Some 

Russian Orthodox churches have small bookstalls, 

but supplies of books, baptismal crosses, and icons 

are limited and often too expensive for local people. 

Protestants have expressed regret to Forum 18 that 

neither a Bible Society nor Christian bookshops are 

allowed to exist. When the Commission delegation 

raised the issue of religious literature with the CRA, 

ROC representative Father Sapunov stated that in his 

church‘s view, Turkmenistan had enough religious 

literature. Deputy Chairman Nurmukhamet 

Gurbanov said that there is no evidence that Turkmen 

citizens did not have the right to import religious 

literature.

Turkmenistan‘s religion law bans the private

teaching of religion and those who engage in such 

instruction are legally liable. Only those who have 

graduated from institutions of higher religious 

education (domestic or foreign is not specified) and 

approved by the CRA may offer religious instruction. 

Citizens have the right to receive religious education 

alone or with others from these official institutions; 

some independent religious education takes place 

unofficially. 

Under the religion law, mosques are allowed 

to provide religious education to children after school 

for four hours per week, as long as parents have 

given their approval. Some Sunni mosques have 

regularly scheduled Koran instruction. The 2003 

religion law prohibits the Russian Orthodox Church 

from conducting religious education programs 

without CRA and presidential approval and there 

were, according to the State Department, no reports 

that such programs had been approved. 

Until its 2005 dissolution under the Niyazov 

government, Turkmen State University maintained a 

Muslim theology faculty. The State Department 

reported that the CRA planned to reestablish the 

theology faculty, but no action has yet been taken. 

Devout Muslims have also expressed concern that the 

government had replaced imams with Islamic 

theological education by those without such training, 

Forum 18 reported in 2008. Muslims have stated that 

they view the authorities' removal from office of 

ethnic Uzbek minority imams and their replacement 

with ethnic Turkmen imams, as constituting ethnic 

discrimination, Forum 18 reported in August 2008.

The country‘s largest religious minority, the 

Russian Orthodox, has no institution for religious 
116

education in Turkmenistan, although under Niyazov, 

men were allowed to leave the country to train for the 

clergy. The Shi‘a, mainly found among Iranian and 

Azeri ethnic minorities, also have no religious 

training institutions in Turkmenistan. Religious 

minorities, even those with registration status, are 

also in a difficult situation. One religious minority 

leader has said that most religious training is 

conducted informally, in private homes. 

Under Niyazov, there was deliberate official 

interference in the ability of Turkmen religious 

adherents to travel outside the country. Many of 

these policies have continued under the new 

government. Entry visas are refused to religious 

workers who are, in many cases, critical to the 

functions of a particular religious community, and 

other individuals known to participate in religious 

activities have been prevented from leaving the

country. In 2008, Turkmen authorities continued to 

limit the number of Muslims permitted to perform the 

hajj to only 188 of the country‘s official quota of 

4,600. President Berdimuhamedov has claimed that 

while the government will pay for only one planeload 

(188 people) of Muslim hajj pilgrims, there is no 

legal limit on those who make the hajj at their own 

expense. The State Department reported that 

apparently ―significantly‖ more self-financed 

pilgrims were permitted in 2008 to undertake the hajj

than in previous years.

Although the Turkmen government has 

opened the country to numerous representatives of 

international organizations and has somewhat eased 

foreign travel, nevertheless, in March 2009 it rejected 

a Russian proposal for visa-free travel between their 

countries. Moreover, despite official denials, the 

Turkmen government reportedly maintains a secret 

―black list‖ of individuals who are denied permission 

to enter or leave the country. A Baha‘i activist told 

the Commission in 2007 that there is a secret ban on 

invitations for relatives to visit Turkmenistan, 

although Baha‘i adherents can leave the country on 

visits. Artygul Atakova, wife of former Baptist 

prisoner Shageldy Atakov, was not allowed to leave 

Turkmenistan in June 2008. The last known visit to 

Turkmenistan by a clergyman of the Armenian 

Apostolic Church was in 1999, although the country 

has a long-standing ethnic Armenian minority. The 

State Department reported that in April 2008, a 

Turkmen Evangelical pastor was prevented from 

travelling to Ukraine to attend a wedding.

Nevertheless, the new Turkmen government 

has also allowed international travel for the 

representatives of certain religious communities. In 

2007, the government granted visas to four priests 

who are Russian citizens invited by the church to 

serve in Turkmenistan. ROC Metropolitan Kyril 

visited Turkmenistan in May 2008, the first visit by a 

ROC leader since 2003. Though Muslims are not 

allowed to travel abroad for religious education, ROC 

men are allowed to study for the priesthood at ROC 

seminaries outside Turkmenistan. For the first time 

in many years, a Hare Krishna devotee was allowed 

to travel to India in early 2008 to take part in a 

religious festival. In March 2008, regional Catholic 

leaders visited the country for a religious retreat. A 

few foreign visitors invited by local religious 

communities have also been able to visit 

Turkmenistan. For example, the head of the Seventh 

Day Adventist‘s Euro-Asia Division visited in 

September 2008, the first time in eight years that a 

member of that denomination was permitted to visit 

the country on an official work visa. 

There is evidence that the new Turkmen 

government is moving away from Niyazov‘s 

personality cult and the forceful official promotion of 

a book containing the late president‘s ―spiritual 

thoughts,‖ known as Ruhnama. Under Niyazov, 

imams were also reportedly instructed to repeat a 

loyalty oath to the ―fatherland‖ and to Niyazov after 

each daily prayer. The oath of loyalty to Niyazov has 

been curtailed and limited only to certain occasions. 

Students were also required to study the Ruhnama at 

public schools and institutes and study of that text 

replaced many academic subjects. The Turkmen 

Academy of Sciences, closed at Niyazov‘s order, has 

been re-opened. Articles by Turkmen historians and 

the works of four classical Turkmen authors have 

been published. In August 2008, the country hosted 

an international conference on the archeology of 

Turkmenistan, in a shift from Niyazov‘s insistence 

that such topics be viewed through the distorted 

prism of the Ruhnama. 
117

Nevertheless, the future of the presidential 

personality cult in Turkmenistan remains unclear. A 

Turkmen official told Radio Free Europe/Radio 

Liberty in February 2008 that Berdimuhamedov had 

ordered the removal of all Niyazov portraits and of 

Ruhnama citations from the outside of buildings 

throughout the country. Although Niyazov‘s 

portraits are being removed, many large portraits and 

posters of the new president are now visible, marking 

the possible start of a new presidential personality 

cult, but without religious overtones. Indeed, 

according to the March 2009 Silk Road publication, 

―Dismantling Totalitarianism? Turkmenistan under 

Berdimuhamedow,‖ the new presidential concept of 

the ―Great Renaissance‖ has supplanted Niyazov‘s 

―Golden Age of the Turkmens‖ and is linked to the 

new president‘s grandiose project of economic, 

social, as well as spiritual advance; by 2008 all 

references to the Ruhnama and Niyazov had 

disappeared. In this regard, according to the Silk 

Road publication, President Berdimuhamedow is 

―pragmatic and cautious‖ as he ―gradually dismantles 

old ideological concepts without causing major 

disruptions.‖ The new president preserves ―selected 

elements and institutions of the old regime, which 

can lend support‖ to his ideology, but at least for 

now, Berdimuhamedov seems less interested than 

[Niyazov] ―in calling upon the divine nature of the 

presidency or other extreme manifestations of the 

personality cult.‖

The State Department reported that the 

Ruhnama has been removed from many mosques, 

including the large mosque in Niyazov‘s native 

village of Gipchak, although the Ruhnama

inscriptions continue to dominate the exterior and 

interior walls. The Commission delegation visited 

the Gipchak mosque, and inside, above the mikhrab, 

or the special bay in the main mosque wall directed 

toward Mecca, was inscribed the word 

―Turkmenbashi,‖ Niyazov‘s self-designated title, in a 

display that most Muslims would consider deeply 

offensive. Turkmenistan‘s chief mufti stated that 

―the Ruhnama citations do not violate Islamic law 

because there is no requirement that there be writings 

inside a mosque.‖ An Interior Ministry official 

claimed that the mosque inscriptions had been 

discussed with Arab representatives prior to the 

mosque construction and that no one had expressed 

concern ―because all of the verses from the Ruhnama

that appear within the mosque relate to 

Turkmenistan‘s relationship with God.‖ 

Nevertheless, a new mosque has reportedly been 

dedicated to the new president and its one milliondollar construction cost comes from a special 

presidential fund. 

Official and unofficial sources report a 

decreased role for the Ruhnama in the Turkmen 

educational system, although it is difficult to assess 

as press freedom and internal travel by foreigners are 

severely curtailed. Under Niyazov, one hour per day 

in institutions of higher learning was devoted to study 

of the text; currently, reportedly study of the 

Ruhnama has been reduced to one hour per week, 

although students apparently must still pass exams on 

it. The State Department reported that President 

Berdimuhamedov continued with plans first 

developed in 2006 to open a Ruhnama university in 

2009, though the projected university‘s focus

reportedly includes a more international outlook. In 

fact, all of Niyazov‘s texts remain in the curriculum 

but teachers are now advised not to mention the 

chapters about Niyazov and his family, the Turkmen 

Initiative for Human Rights (TIHR) reported in 

March 2009. Copies of the Ruhnama are being 

removed by officials from the Presidential 

Administration from government agencies and 

organizations in various regions of the country. The 

Ruhnama corners in every public institution are also 

reportedly being closed. New textbooks hurriedly 

produced and printed in the past year, reportedly are 

a mix of new and Soviet-era educational materials, 

embellished with photographs of the new president in 

place of those of Niyazov. In addition, reportedly 

Presidential Administration representatives now sell 

public institutions, including schools, books on 

medicine, on the history of his family and on AkhalTekke horses written by President 

Berdimukhamedov.

In 2008, Turkmenistan has hosted 

representatives of various international organizations, 

such as the United Nations and OSCE. In September 
118

2008, after five years of requests, Asma Jahangir, the 

UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, visited Turkmenistan. In her report, she noted 

that religious freedom has improved since 2007. 

Nevertheless, she raised concerns about: vague or 

excessive legislation on religion and its arbitrary 

implementation; prohibition of the activities of 

unregistered religious communities, and continued 

restrictions on places of worship and on the import of 

religious material. As the Special Rapporteur stated 

in a press release, however, these concerns were 

ignored in the official Turkmen media, which 

reported only her remarks that praised the reforms 

initiated by the new Turkmen president. The OSCE‘s 

Ashgabat Center held a May 2008 workshop to 

provide Turkmen lawmakers with the tools for an 

effective legal reform process.

During the initial universal periodic review 

of Turkmenistan in December 2008 by the UN 

Human Rights Council, the country rejected calls for 

various human rights reforms, such as the release of 

political prisoners. The Turkmen government 

representative, however, said that the inter-agency 

Commission established in August 2007 had sent a 

proposal to parliament to amend the religion law and 

address registration issues, citing the USAID-funded 

study as the basis for that proposal. To date, no 

known proposal has been sent to the parliament. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

I. Expanding U.S.-Turkmen Bilateral 

Relations

The Commission recommends that the U.S. 

government should: 

appoint an ambassador to Turkmenistan as soon 

as possible, as the United States has not been 

represented by a fully accredited ambassador for 

three years; previous U.S. ambassadors have 

played an important role in highlighting the 

importance of respect for human rights in 

Turkmenistan; and

establish a program of bilateral meetings with the 

government of Turkmenistan on human rights 

and on freedom of religion or belief, to discuss 

ways Turkmenistan can implement laws and 

practices to comply with international human 

rights standards, as well as establish a regular 

reporting mechanism on these issues.

II. Promoting Freedom of Religion or Belief 

and Other Human Rights

 

The Commission recommends that the U.S. 

government should encourage the government of 

Turkmenistan to: 

repeal all laws, decrees or regulations, including 

through amendments to those articles of the 

religion law, that are found to be in violation of 

international norms on freedom of religion or 

belief, for example, by implementation of the 

recommendations of the recent USAID-funded 

analysis of that law; 

eliminate intrusive and onerous registration 

procedures and abolish criminal or other 

penalties for engaging in religious or other 

peaceful activity solely because it has not been 

approved by the state;

halt unlawful arrest, detention, harassment, 

deportation, fines, as well as residential and 

workplace intimidation of members of religious 

communities due to their peaceful practice of 

religious or other beliefs; 

end fully the harassment and unlawfully 

deportation of religious leaders and the 

imposition of fines on members of peaceful 

unregistered religious communities whose 

activities officially are deemed ―illegal;‖ 

end the imposition of the Ruhnama or other 

state-sponsored texts or ideology in public 

institutions and religious organizations; 

promulgate new regulations and adopt new 

policies to ease the importation of religious and 

other material and permit the domestic printing 
119

and dissemination of such material in accordance 

with international standards; 

reestablish the Muslim theology faculty at 

Turkmen State University;

restore genuine legal alternatives to military 

service on grounds of religious or conscientious 

objection based on international precedents, 

including those of the OSCE, and cease the 

criminal prosecution of, and fully restore the 

civil and political rights of, Jehovah‘s Witnesses 

and others who refuse to serve in the army on the 

grounds of conscience;

expand and regularize the work of the 

government‘s Commission to Examine 

Turkmenistan‘s Legal Obligations under 

International Human Rights Law, established in 

August 2007, including by the systematic and 

effective involvement of international legal 

experts, such as those of the OSCE Panel of 

Experts on Religion or Belief and the OSCE 

Panel on Freedom of Association, and relevant 

UN experts; 

reform the government‘s other policies toward 

religious practice, including the end of state 

interference in the management of religious 

communities and the selection and training of 

religious leaders, including from Sunni and Shi‘a 

Muslim and the Russian Orthodox communities, 

as well as from Protestant and other minority 

communities; and

permit a Commission delegation to return to 

Turkmenistan to assess progress on 

implementation on freedom of religion or belief, 

including Constitutional amendments and 

legislative reforms, to speak with current or 

former prisoners of conscience in places of 

detention and to speak unimpeded with religious 

and other organizations and their members. 

III. Expanding U.S. Programs and Other 

Activities to Promote Reform 

The Commission also recommends that, in 

the longer term, the U.S. government make the 

following efforts to expand activities in 

Turkmenistan that would protect and promote human 

rights:

 increase and improve radio, Internet, and other 

broadcasts of objective news and information, 

including on topics such as freedom of religion 

or belief and on other human rights and religious 

tolerance, by:

--expanding and improving broadcasts to 

Turkmenistan by the Turkmen Service of Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), including 

by increasing coverage of issues relating to 

freedom of religion or belief and by adding 

Russian-language broadcasts and providing 

additional programming for the estimated 12 

million Turkmen in the diaspora, particularly in 

Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan; and 

--restoring Voice of America‘s Russian-language 

television and radio broadcasts to Central Asia, 

particularly relating to human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief.

 assist in improving Turkmenistan‘s educational 

system, particularly with regard to curricula on 

religious freedom and other human rights, by:

--expanding ―American corner‖ reading rooms 

and Internet access in various regions; 

--reprinting Russian and Turkmen-language 

materials on human rights, particularly on 

international norms on freedom of religion or 

belief including civic education materials, such

as ―The Law that Unifies Us,‖ first published 

and distributed by the OSCE Center in Ashgabat; 

and 

--providing funds for libraries in Ashgabat and 

other cities, including materials on human rights, 

as well as on freedom of religion or belief, 
120

tolerance, civic education, and international legal 

standards; 

 develop assistance programs to encourage civil 

society groups that protect human rights and 

promote freedom of religion or belief, including 

by expanding legal assistance programs for 

representatives of religious communities through 

grants that address freedom of religion or belief 

via the USAID Democracy and Conflict 

Mitigation or the Democracy Commission Small 

Grants program administered by the U.S. 

Embassy; 

expand international contacts and increase U.S. 

involvement in communities in Turkmenistan by 

increasing the budgets of Peace Corps and 

USAID programs, include religious leaders in 

community projects in efforts to address social 

problems and to increase religious and ethnic 

tolerance, and expand exchange programs, 

including with civil society leaders, students, and 

others concerned with human rights; and

cooperating with the OSCE Center in Ashgabat, 

including by resuming joint activities with 

human rights activists from Turkmenistan to 

encourage civic education, including on 

international norms on freedom of religion or 

belief as well as other human rights, and also by 

encouraging the OSCE officially to respond to 

the Turkmen government‘s offer in May 2007 to 

host an OSCE experts‘ level meeting.

III. Strengthening Efforts in the International 

Arena

With regard to international fora, the 

Commission recommends that the U.S. government 

urge the government of Turkmenistan to: 

 implement the recommendations of the October 

2006 Report of the UN Secretary General on the 

Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan and 

the 2008 recommendations of the UN Human 

Rights Council during the Universal Periodic 

Review of Turkmenistan;

 agree to the numerous requests for visits by the 

UN Special Rapporteurs, as well as 

representatives of the OSCE, including its Panel 

of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief, and 

provide the full and necessary conditions for 

such visits; and 

 participate fully in the OSCE, including in the 

annual Human Dimension meeting in Warsaw and 

expanding the activities of the OSCE Center in 

Ashgabat, particularly on human rights, including 

programs with local schools, universities, and 

institutes on human rights standards, including on 

freedom of religion or belief.
121

Uzbekistan 

Since Uzbekistan gained independence in 

1991, fundamental human rights, including freedom 

of religion or belief, have been under assault. A 

restrictive law on religion severely limits the ability 

of religious communities to function and facilitates 

the Uzbek government‘s exercise of a high degree of 

control over religious communities and the approved 

manner in which the Islamic religion is practiced. 

The Uzbek government has continued to arrest 

Muslim individuals and harshly repress those groups 

and mosques that do not conform to governmentprescribed practices or that the government claims 

are associated with extremist political programs. 

This policy has resulted in the imprisonment of 

thousands of persons in recent years; many are 

reportedly denied the right to due process and are 

subjected to torture. Though security threats do exist 

in Uzbekistan, including from members of Hizb utTahrir and other groups that claim a religious 

linkage, these threats do not excuse or justify the 

scope and harshness of the government‘s illtreatment of religious believers. The Commission 

recommends that the Secretary of State continue to 

designate Uzbekistan as a ―country of particular 

concern,‖ or CPC. The Commission‘s CPC 

recommendation for Uzbekistan should not be 

construed as an exculpatory defense of Hizb utTahrir, an extremist and highly intolerant 

organization that promotes hatred of the West, 

moderate Muslims, Jews, and others. Since 2006, the 

State Department has designated Uzbekistan a CPC.

Despite the constitutional separation of 

religion and state, the Uzbek government strictly 

regulates Islamic institutions and practice through the 

officially sanctioned Muslim Spiritual Board (the 

Muftiate). In 1998, the Uzbek government closed 

down approximately 3,000 of the 5,000 mosques that 

were open at that time. According to the State 

Department, a few independent mosques were 

allowed to operate quietly under the watch of official 

imams. In the Ferghana Valley, viewed as the 

country‘s most actively religious region, the state has 

confiscated a number of mosques and used them as 

warehouses or for other state purposes. Several years 

ago, the government introduced various 

administrative and other obstacles to daily practice in 

this region. For example, in the Andijon area, the 

regional head of administration instituted restrictions 

on Islamic practice, such as bans on the five daily 

public calls to prayer from mosques and on the 

preaching by mullahs at weddings. The State 

Department reported in 2006 that regional officials in 

Uzbekistan have been instructed that children should 

not attend mosque.

The state fully controls the training, 

appointments, and dismissals of Muslim leaders 

through the Muftiate. There are 10 state-controlled 

madrassas (including two for women) that provide 

secondary education in Uzbekistan and an official 

Islamic Institute and Islamic University in Tashkent 

that provides higher educational instruction. Despite 

the presence of a Shi‘a minority in the country, there 

is no training for Shi‘a religious leaders, nor does the 

government recognize foreign Shi‘a religious 

education, though the State Department reports that 

Sunni madrassas offer some courses in Shi‘a 

jurisprudence. The state also closes or confiscates 

privately-funded religious schools. 

Over the past decade and particularly since 

1999, the Uzbek government has arrested and 

imprisoned, with sentences of up to 20 years, 

thousands of Muslims who reject the state‘s control 

over religious practice, or whom the government 

claims are associated with extremist groups such as 

Hizb ut-Tahrir. As of 2007, according to a State 

Department estimate, there were at least 5,000–5,500 

such persons in prison, including individuals sent to 

psychiatric hospitals. According to international and 

Uzbek human rights activists, the only ―crime‖ of 

these individuals is performing daily prayers and 

studying Islam. In 2008, the State Department 

reported that the Uzbek government has instructed 

some neighborhood committees and imams to 

identify local residents who might become involved 

in extremist activity or groups, using those who 

prayed daily or were overtly devout as criteria. 

Moreover, ―authorities made little distinction 

between actual members [of the extremist group Hizb 

ut-Tahrir] and those with marginal affiliation with 

the group, such as persons who had attended Koranic 
122

study sessions with the group.‖ Human rights 

organizations report that many of those in detention 

were arrested on false drug charges or for possession 

of literature of a banned organization. Once arrested, 

they often are denied access to a lawyer or are held 

incommunicado for weeks or months. Many of those 

imprisoned or detained for charges related to religion 

are treated particularly harshly; prisoners who pray or 

observe Muslim religious festivals reportedly are 

subjected to further harassment, beatings, and torture 

in an effort to force them to renounce their religious 

or political views. 

The use of torture continues to be 

widespread in Uzbekistan, despite promises from the 

government to halt the practice. The UN Special 

Rapporteur on Torture, in his February 2003 report 

on Uzbekistan, concluded that ―torture or similar illtreatment is systematic‖ and that the ―pervasive and 

persistent nature of torture throughout the 

investigative process cannot be denied.‖ Reliance on 

the use of torture in detention did not significantly 

decrease, despite the Uzbek Supreme Court‘s 2004 

decree banning the use of evidence obtained by 

torture or other illegal means. In 2007, the UN 

Committee against Torture confirmed numerous, ongoing, and consistent allegations that torture 

continues to be used during criminal procedures, 

often before formal charges are brought. The Uzbek 

government has taken some limited steps to eliminate 

torture in detention, but there were numerous reports 

that ill-treatment remained routine and systemic and 

that those who engaged in torture were rarely 

punished.

Torture and other abuses are common in 

prisons, pretrial facilities, and local police and 

security service precincts. In August 2008, Forum 18 

reported that ―the threat or use of physical violence, 

including rape and the use of gasmasks to block 

victims‘ air supply,‖ are among the methods used to 

―try to force adults and children to renounce their 

beliefs or to make confessions implicating 

themselves or others. Torture and threats often follow 

frequent police and secret police raids against 

unregistered religious communities, frequently while 

people are detained after arrest.‖ In May 2008, 

authorities delivered to his family the body of Odil 

Azizov, who had been sentenced to a 15 year-term 

for alleged religious extremism; according to the 

State Department, there reportedly were signs of 

torture on his body. Informants reported several 

cases of medical abuse, including forced psychiatric 

treatment on political grounds. There were also 

reports of attempted suicides by prisoners. 

Convictions in the cases described above are based 

almost entirely on confessions, which, according to 

the State Department, are frequently gained through 

the use of torture. Human Rights Watch reported that 

particularly since the 2005 Andijon events (see 

below), it has become much more difficult to verify 

independently government claims of combating 

torture and improving prison conditions. What is 

more, Uzbek authorities reportedly do not release 

prisoners, especially those convicted of religious 

extremism, at the end of their terms. Instead, prison 

authorities often extend inmates' terms simply by 

accusing them—without judicial review—of new 

crimes and claiming that the prisoners still represent 

a danger to society. According to the State 

Department, in 2008 the Uzbek government 

permitted a prison visit by the International 

Committee of the Red Cross. 

The government of Uzbekistan does face 

threats to its security from certain extremist or 

terrorist groups that claim religious links, including 

the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has used 

violence but whose membership reportedly declined 

after U.S. military action in Afghanistan in late 2001 

killed its leaders. Uzbekistan continues to experience 

occasional violent attacks of unclear motivation. In 

May 2005, after several thousand mostly unarmed 

civilians gathered on the Andijon central square to 

protest the trial of 23 local businessmen for alleged 

ties to Islamic extremism, Uzbek armed forces fired 

without warning into the crowd. Estimated fatalities 

range from an official Uzbek total of 187 to over 700, 

according to the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) report that as 

many as 1,000 men, women, and children were 

killed. The Uzbek government continues to reject 

calls from the United States, the European Union 
123

(EU), the OSCE, and the UN High Commissioner for 

Human Rights for an independent international 

investigation into these events. 

In the aftermath of Andijon, Uzbek 

authorities jailed hundreds of local residents, human 

rights activists, and journalists on suspicion of 

involvement in the events. Human Rights Watch 

reported in December 2008 that the Uzbek 

government ―continues to seek out and persecute 

anyone it deems to have a connection to, or 

information about, the Andijan events.‖ One such 

individual is Saidjahon Zaynabitdinov, who had 

shown journalists bullet casings reportedly used by 

Uzbek armed forces in Andijon and with whom the 

Commission met on its visit to Uzbekistan in 2004. 

In February 2008, Zaynabitdinov, together with five 

other political prisoners, was released from his sevenyear prison term—the day before the Uzbek 

government met with officials from the EU. 

Relatives of human rights defenders have also been 

targeted in attempts to pressure activists to stop 

speaking out about human rights violations; relatives 

of human rights activists have reportedly been 

threatened, dismissed from their jobs, beaten, and 

sometimes arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned on 

fabricated criminal charges. The State Department 

reported that in several cases, the Uzbek government 

has pressured other countries forcibly to return Uzbek 

refugees who fled the Andijon events and who were 

under the protection of the Office of the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In 2007, the 

UN Committee against Torture pointed to reports that 

some persons who had sought refuge abroad and 

were returned to Uzbekistan were kept in isolation in 

unknown places, and possibly subjected to breaches 

of the Convention against Torture. 

 Hizb ut-Tahrir, banned in most Muslim 

countries, purports not to engage in violence but is 

intolerant of other religions and has in some 

circumstances sanctioned violence. The group calls 

for a worldwide caliphate to replace existing 

governments and for the imposition of an extremist 

interpretation of Islamic law. Although it does not 

specify the methods it would use to attain those goals, 

it does, according to the State Department‘s religious 

freedom report, reserve the ―possibility that its own 

members might resort to violence.‖ In addition, the 

State Department reports that Hizb ut-Tahrir material 

includes ―strong anti-Semitic and anti-Western 

rhetoric.‖ Alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir

comprise many of the thousands in prison; in most 

court cases, however, Uzbek authorities have not 

presented evidence that these persons took part in 

violent acts. Many of those arrested are wrongfully 

accused of membership or association, sometimes 

due to alleged—or planted—possession of Hizb utTahrir literature at the time of arrest. The State 

Department reported in 2008 that as many as 4,500 of 

the estimated 5,000–5,500 political prisoners being 

held in detention were imprisoned based on alleged 

Hizb ut-Tahrir membership. It was also reported that 

in November 2007, three men who had been 

convicted of membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir died at a 

prison in Andijon; the bodies of reportedly showed 

signs of torture. According to the State Department, 

local human rights activists reported in the past year 

that police and security service officers, acting under 

pressure to break up Hizb ut-Tahrir cells, frequently 

detained family members and close associates of 

suspected members.

After the May 2005 Andijon events, the 

number of court cases against independent Muslims 

in Uzbekistan reportedly increased markedly. Before 

May 2005, the authorities often accused arrested 

Muslims of being members of Hizb ut-Tahrir; since 

that time, however, arrested Muslims are usually 

accused—frequently without evidence—of being 

―Wahhabis‖ or members of another banned Islamist 

group, Akromiya (see below), which played a key 

role in the Andijon events. Although in Saudi Arabia 

the term ―Wahhabi‖ usually refers to followers of a 

highly restrictive interpretation of Sunni Islam, in 

Uzbekistan, it is an official catchphrase used to refer 

to a wide range of Muslim individuals and groups, 

including genuine extremists, those that are political 

opponents to the Karimov regime, and those who 

practice Islam independently of government 

strictures. For the Uzbek authorities, all these groups 

and individuals are equally suspect and subject to 

government repression. In June 2006, police 

confiscated a copy of the Koran, the hadith (sayings 

attributed to the prophet Muhammad), other religious 

books, and tape recordings of the exiled mullah Obid 
124

kori Nazarov and his pupil Hairullah Hamidov, the 

Human Rights Initiative Group in Uzbekistan 

reported. The two men were arrested and accused of 

―Wahhabism,‖ although reportedly they only sought 

independent religious education. Human rights 

sources indicate that Nazarov, forced to flee the 

country after the authorities branded him a 

―Wahhabi‖ leader, was not promoting extremism, but 

simply operating outside of government strictures. 

The Uzbek authorities have also adopted 

repressive measures against entire families on 

charges of alleged religious extremism. Akhmadjan 

Madmarov, a human rights activist from the city of 

Margilan with whom the Commission met in 2004, is 

one example. In September 2007, Uzbek authorities 

extended by 16 and one-half years the sentence on 

Akhmadjan‘s son, Habibullah, charged with an

alleged extremist conspiracy while he was in Navoi 

prison. Although one of Madmarov's sons was 

released on parole after he completed his seven-year 

term, another son and two nephews remain in prison; 

all have been charged with religious extremism, the 

State Department reported in 2008.

The Uzbek criminal code distinguishes 

between ―illegal‖ groups, which are not properly 

registered, and ―prohibited‖ groups, such as Hizb utTahrir, Tabligh, a Muslim missionary movement 

which originated in South Asia in 1920, and

Akromiya, a group based on the 1992 writings of an 

imprisoned Uzbek mathematics teacher, Akram 

Yuldashev, which, according to human 

rights defenders in Uzbekistan, espouse 

charitable work and a return to Islamic 

moral principles. According to the State 

Department, the Uzbek government has pressured 

and prosecuted members of Akromiya (also known as 

Akromiylar) since 1997, claiming that the group is a 

branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, and that it attempted, 

together with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 

to overthrow the government through an armed 

rebellion in May 2005 in Andijon. The charges 

against the 23 businessmen on trial at that time 

included alleged membership in Akromiya.

Followers of the Turkish theologian Said 

Nursi appear to be the latest movement to have 

joined the roster of officially ―prohibited‖ groups in 

Uzbekistan, although reportedly the ―Nursular‖ are 

only a voluntary group of Muslims studying about 

their religion. Most recently, two groups of Nursi‘s 

followers were tried on charges of religious 

extremism in February 2009, including a group of 

five journalists who were sentenced to eight years 

in prison for producing a journal, ―Spring,‖ 

supposedly linked to Nursi. In December 2008, a 

third group of nine men were arrested in Bukhara 

after a secret police raid on a home of where the 

nine were discussing Nursi‘s writings. The police 

confiscated 79 religious books and other materials, 

although they reportedly had no search warrants. 

At a closed court hearing in late December, a 

criminal court ordered their continued detention in 

isolation. Their trial on charges of belonging to an 

extremist organization began in late April 2009. 

Uzbekistan‘s Law on Freedom of 

Conscience and Religious Organizations, passed in 

May 1998, severely restricts the exercise of religious 

freedom. Through regulations that are often 

arbitrarily applied, the law imposes onerous hurdles 

for the registration of religious groups, particularly 

minority religious groups, such as stipulating that a 

group must have a list of at least 100 members who 

are Uzbek citizens and a legal address; criminalizing 

unregistered religious activity; banning the 

production and distribution of unofficial religious 

publications; prohibiting minors from participating in 

religious organizations; prohibiting private teaching 

of religious principles; and forbidding the wearing of 

religious clothing in public by anyone other than 

clerics. Only six entities meet the law‘s requirement 

that religious groups must have a registered central 

administrative body so as to train religious personnel. 

The law also limits religious instruction to officially 

sanctioned religious schools and state-approved 

instructors, does not permit private instruction, and 

levies fines for violations. 

The government modified the country‘s 

criminal and administrative codes in late 2005 to 

introduce heavier fines for repeated violations of 

rules on religious meetings, processions, and other 

religious ceremonies, as well as for violations of the 

law on religious organizations. Forum 18 reported 
125

in 2007 that the Uzbek National Security Service 

(NSS or secret police), particularly its Department to 

Fight Terrorism, enforces controls on all religious 

activity. According to an official Andijon regional 

government document, a regional branch of the 

Muftiate and the state Religious Affairs Committee 

were ordered ―to bring under constant close 

observation‖ all registered religious organizations. 

Methods included stationing agents in and around 

places of worship, planting hidden microphones in 

houses of worship, and recruiting spies within 

communities. They were also ordered to ―strengthen 

the struggle with individuals conducting illegal 

religious education and organizing small religious 

gatherings.‖ 

The law‘s effects on minority religious 

groups are evident. Many churches, particularly 

evangelical churches with ethnic Uzbek members, 

did not apply or reapply for registration because they 

did not expect local officials to approve their 

registration applications. Other groups, particularly 

those with too few members to qualify for 

registration, reported that they did not want to bring 

themselves to the attention of the authorities and 

possibly invite harassment, the State Department 

reported in 2008. Churches whose registration 

requests have been repeatedly refused included 

Bethany Baptist Church in the Mirzo-Ulugbek 

District of Tashkent, the Pentecostal Church in 

Chirchik, the Emmanuel and Mir (Peace) Churches 

in Nukus, the Hushkhabar Church in Guliston, the 

Pentecostal Church in Andijon, the Baptist Church in 

Gazalkent, and the Adventist, Greater Grace 

Christian, and Miral Protestant Churches, all in 

Samarkand. No Baptist church has successfully 

registered in the country since 1999; however, some 

groups, such as the Council of Churches Baptists, 

refuse on principle to seek registration. In November 

2007, the Tashkent City Civil Court revoked the 

registration of the Grace Presbyterian Church of 

Tashkent by invalidating its property title and thereby 

depriving it of the legal address required for 

registration. The Uzbek government continues to 

threaten to halt the practicing of the country‘s last 

registered Jehovah‘s Witnesses community in 

Chirchik. The 10 Jehovah's Witnesses applied for 

registration at the local, regional, and national levels 

and received either a denial or no official answer, the 

State Department reported in 2008. 

 

Uzbek government repression of nonMuslim groups increased in 2008, including threats 

of violence and arrest, police raids, massive fines, 

confiscation and destruction of religious literature, 

disruption of religious services, and detentions. Like 

Muslims who practice their faith outside of statesanctioned structures, Protestants and Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses are frequently branded ―extremists,‖ and 

face ongoing harassment, detention, and arrest for 

―illegal religious activity,‖ such as holding private 

prayer meetings or possessing ―illegal‖ religious 

literature. In what may mark the start of a new 

repressive tactic, Uzbek police invited a Russian 

Orthodox priest to take part in a March 2009 raid on 

a group of Baptists holding a prayer meeting in a 

private house, Forum 18 reported. Also in March 

2009, 20 officials raided the worship service of a 

registered ethnic Korean Baptist church in Tashkent, 

because official permission for the service had not 

been requested 10 days in advance; its pastor was 

later jailed for 10 days. After receiving an official 

warning for alleged violations of laws on public 

religious expression, the Presbyterian Church of 

Tashkent ceased regular worship in March 2008. In 

February 2008, a Baptist in the city of Ferghana was 

fined the equivalent of nine months‘ average wages 

for holding an unauthorized prayer meeting at his 

house, and the pastor of a registered Pentecostal 

church near Tashkent was fined over two months‘ 

average wages for violating the rules on teaching 

religion. 

Although previously Protestants had not 

been threatened with lengthy prison sentences, in 

2007 Pentecostal pastor Dmitri Shestakov from the 

city of Andijon was sentenced to a four-year term. 

Reportedly, Shestakov had been involved in the 

conversion of some ethnic Uzbeks to Christianity, but 

the official charges against him consisted of 

organizing an illegal religious group, inciting 

religious hatred, and distributing religious extremist 

literature. Four Jehovah‘s Witnesses, Abdumanob 

Ahmedov, Sergei Ivanov, Irfan Hamidov and Olim 

Turayev are serving prison terms ranging from two to 

four years on charges of teaching religion without 
126

official permission or for organizing unauthorized 

religious meetings or organizations. Some regions, 

such as Karakalpakstan and Khorezm, are noted for 

particularly severe anti-religious campaigns, 

including expulsion of Hare Krishna and evangelical 

Protestant students from university and the stateordered closure of almost all churches. 

Although the Council on Religious Affairs 

(CRA) must approve all religious literature, the 

Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), NSS, Customs 

Service, and police may also suppress or confiscate 

religious literature, the State Department reports. 

Under the Religion Law, only seven registered 

religious organizations (an interdenominational 

Bible Society, the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan, 

two Islamic centers, and Russian Orthodox, Full 

Gospel, Baptist, and Roman Catholic offices) have 

the legal right to publish, import, and distribute 

religious literature. Under 2006 amendments to the 

criminal and administrative codes, those who 

engage repeatedly in the ―illegal‖ production, 

storage, import, and distribution of religious 

literature can be imprisoned for up to three years. 

Moreover, a secret 2006 instruction reportedly 

limits the press runs of any religious book to fewer 

than 1,000 copies. 

It is remains very difficult to secure 

permission from the CRA and the Muftiate to 

publish Muslim literature, and the CRA chairman 

has reportedly said that the import of foreign 

literature for Muslims had practically ceased. 

Imam Obidkhon Nazarov, the exiled former imam 

of Tashkent‘s Tukhtaboi mosque, told Forum 18 in 

2008 that even books by renowned Muslim 

scholars were no longer published in Uzbekistan, 

including those of Said Nursi, whose followers 

continue to face arrests, as noted above. However, 

in addition to some books and periodicals published 

by the state-controlled Muslim Board, the 

independent former Chief Mufti, Muhamad Sadyk 

Muhamad Yusuf, does publish materials and host a 

regular radio show. Nonetheless, even legal 

imports of religious literature are subject to 

confiscation by police, while unregistered religious 

minority communities are banned entirely from 

producing religious literature, especially in the 

Uzbek language. Uzbek authorities continued to 

seize and destroy religious literature from 

Protestants, Hare Krishna adherents, Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses and others. In July 2008, the CRA 

informed the Bible Society that it had denied the 

import of 11,000 Bibles and Bible-related books in 

Uzbek, Karakalpak, and Russian, Forum 18 

reported.

The Uzbek government continues to restrict 

international travel for religious purposes. In April 

2008, the Ministry of Justice rejected the visa 

renewal application of Rabbi David Gurevich, who is 

a dual American-Israeli citizen and Head Emissary of 

the Hasidic World Lubavitch Movement; in June 

2008 he was deported. For many years, the Uzbek 

government has allowed only 20 percent of the 

country‘s official quota of 25,000 pilgrims to make 

the religious hajj to Mecca, according to the State 

Department; in 2007, only 5,000 were permitted to 

go. Those who go must be approved by local 

authorities, the secret police, the CRA‘s Hajj

Commission, and the Muftiate. Furthermore, hajj

pilgrims reportedly must travel on state-run 

Uzbekistan Airlines and pay the equivalent of 200 

times the monthly wage. 

The Uzbek government has intensified its 

efforts to isolate the people of Uzbekistan since the 

2005 Andijon events, cracking down on both 

domestic and foreign-based NGOs, particularly those 

that focus on human rights, and closing almost threefourths of them in 2006. None of the 17 or more 

foreign-funded organizations closed temporarily or 

permanently by court decisions in 2006 and 2007 

were able to reopen during the past year. Human 

Rights Watch re-established an office in Tashkent in 

early 2008, but in May 2007 its Uzbek staff member, 

Umida Niyazova, had been given a suspended sevenyear prison term for allegedly storing ―extremist 

materials‖ on her computer, referring to the 

organization‘s report on the Andijon events. One day 

before a meeting between EU and Uzbek officials in 

February 2008, Niyazova was ―amnestied.‖ In July 

2008, however, the Uzbek government refused to 

accredit Human Rights Watch‘s country director, 

thereby effectively ending that organization‘s 

presence in Uzbekistan. Foreign NGOs accused by 
127

the Uzbek government of engaging in proselytism 

also remained closed, the State Department reported 

in 2008. The Justice Ministry controls the 

accreditation required for the foreign staff of any 

NGO, enabling the government to expel or deny 

entry to those it suspects of proselytism. In 

December 2008, the Ministry of Justice re-registered 

the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 

(JDC), which distributes humanitarian aid, despite a 

threat the previous April to de-register the 

organization for allegedly violating Uzbek law. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

In addition to recommending that 

Uzbekistan be designated a CPC, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government should: 

I. Speaking in a Unified Voice in its 

Relations with the Uzbek Government

 ensure that U.S. statements and actions are 

coordinated across agencies to ensure that U.S. 

concerns about human rights conditions in 

Uzbekistan are reflected in all its dealings with 

the Uzbek government; 

following the European Union‘s October 2005 

decision, reduce aid and arms sales to 

Uzbekistan and ban visits by high-level Uzbek 

officials in response to the Uzbek government's 

refusal to allow an independent investigation into 

the violence in Andijon in May 2005; 

 ensure that U.S. assistance to the Uzbek 

government, with the exception of assistance to 

improve humanitarian conditions and advance 

human rights, be made contingent upon 

establishing and implementing a specific 

timetable for the government to take concrete 

steps to improve conditions of freedom of 

religion or belief and observe international 

human rights standards, steps which should 

include:

--ending reliance on convictions based solely on 

confessions, a practice that often is linked to 

ill-treatment of prisoners, and implementing 

the recommendations of the UN Committee 

Against Torture (June 2002) and the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Torture (February 

2003);

--establishing a mechanism to review the cases 

of persons previously detained under 

suspicion of or charged with religious, 

political, or security offenses, including 

Criminal Code Articles 159 (criminalizing 

―anti-state activity‖) and 216 (criminalizing 

membership in a ―forbidden religious 

organization‖); releasing those who have been 

imprisoned solely because of their religious 

beliefs or practices as well as any others who 

have been unjustly detained or sentenced; and 

making public a list of specific and detailed 

information about individuals who are 

currently detained under these articles or 

imprisoned following conviction;

--implementing the recommendations of the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE) Panel of Experts on Religion 

or Belief to revise the 1998 Law on Freedom 

of Conscience and Religious Organizations 

and bring it into accordance with international 

standards;

--registering religious groups that have sought to 

comply with the legal requirements; and 

--ensuring that every prisoner has access to his 

or her family, human rights monitors, 

adequate medical care, and a lawyer, as 

specified in international human rights 

instruments, and allowing prisoners to practice 

their religion while in detention to the fullest 

extent compatible with the specific nature of 

their detention;

 ensure that U.S. security and other forms of 

assistance are scrutinized to make certain that 

this assistance does not go to Uzbek government 

agencies, such as certain branches of the Interior 

and Justice Ministries, which have been 

responsible for particularly severe violations of 
128

religious freedom as defined by the International 

Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA); and

 use appropriate avenues of public diplomacy to 

explain to the people of Uzbekistan both why 

religious freedom is an important element of 

U.S. foreign policy, and what specific concerns 

about violations of religious freedom exist in 

their country.

II. Encouraging Greater International 

Scrutiny of Uzbekistan’s Human Rights Record

work with other governments to urge the UN 

Human Rights Council to reverse its recent 

decision to end human rights scrutiny of 

Uzbekistan under confidential resolution 1503 

and to address this situation in a public country 

resolution at the Council;

 encourage scrutiny of Uzbek human rights 

concerns in appropriate international fora such as 

the OSCE and other multilateral venues, and 

facilitate the participation of Uzbek human rights 

defenders in multilateral human rights 

mechanisms; and

 urge the Uzbek government to agree to a visit by 

UN Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief and the Independence of the Judiciary 

and provide the full and necessary conditions for 

such a visit.

III. Supporting Uzbek Human Rights 

Defenders and Religious Freedom Initiatives

 respond publicly and privately to the recent 

expulsions of U.S. non-governmental 

organizations and the numerous new restrictions 

placed on their activities; unless these 

restrictions are rescinded, the U.S. government 

should make clear that there will be serious 

consequences in the U.S.-Uzbek bilateral 

relationship, including a ban on high-level 

meetings; 

 continue the careful monitoring of the status of 

individuals who are arrested for alleged 

religious, political, and security offenses and 

continue efforts to improve the situation of 

Uzbek human rights defenders, including by 

pressing for the registration of human rights 

groups and religious communities;

support efforts to counteract the Uzbek 

government‘s blockade on information into the 

country by increasing radio, Internet, and other 

broadcasting of objective news and information 

on issues relevant to Uzbekistan, including 

education, human rights, freedom of religion, 

and religious tolerance;

continue funding for the Voice of America 

(VOA) Uzbek Language Service so as to meet 

the Broadcasting Board of Governors‘ stated 

goal of outreach to the Muslim world, including 

reaching the news-deprived population of 

Uzbekistan, as well as the large Uzbek diaspora 

in Afghanistan and other neighboring countries; 

increase foreign travel opportunities for civil 

society activists, religious leaders, and others in 

Uzbekistan concerned with religious freedom to 

permit them to take part in relevant international 

conferences;

 continue to attempt to overcome the objections 

of the Uzbek government in order to develop 

assistance programs for Uzbekistan designed to 

encourage the creation of institutions of civil 

society that protect human rights and promote 

religious freedom, programs that could include 

training in human rights, the rule of law, and 

crime investigation for police and other law 

enforcement officials; since such programs have 

been attempted in the past with little effect, they 

should be carefully structured to accomplish, and 

carefully monitored and conditioned upon 

fulfillment of, these specific goals: 

--expanding legal assistance programs for Uzbek 

relatives of detainees, which have sometimes 

led to the release of detainees;

-- expanding ―train-the-trainer‖ legal assistance 

programs for representatives of religious 
129

communities to act as legal advisers in the 

registration process;

--specifying freedom of religion as a grants 

category and area of activity in the Democracy 

and Conflict Mitigation program of the U.S. 

Agency for International Development and the 

Democracy Commission Small Grants 

program administered by the U.S. Embassy; 

and

--encouraging national and local public 

roundtables between Uzbek officials and 

representatives of Uzbek civil society on 

freedom of religion; and

 increase opportunities in its exchange programs 

for Uzbek human rights advocates and religious 

figures, and more specifically:

--expand exchange programs for Uzbek religious 

leaders to include representatives from all 

religious communities; and

--ensure that the U.S. Embassy vigorously 

protests cases when an Uzbek participant in an 

exchange program encounters difficulties with 

the Uzbek authorities upon return to 

Uzbekistan, and if such difficulties continue, 

inform the Uzbek authorities that there will be 

negative consequences in other areas of U.S.-

Uzbek bilateral relations, including a ban on 

high-level meetings. 
130

Vietnam 

The Commission has recommended that 

Vietnam be named a ―country of particular concern‖ 

(CPC) every year since 2001. The State Department 

named Vietnam a CPC in 2004 and 2005, but 

removed the designation in 2006, two months before 

Vietnam received Permanent Normal Trade Relations 

(PNTR) with the United States, which enabled 

Vietnam to join the World Trade Organization 

(WTO). At the time, the State Department cited 

religious freedom progress and the release of 

―prisoners of concern‖ as reasons for lifting the CPC 

designation. The Commission recognizes that the 

CPC designation spurred important changes in 

Vietnam, including: the release of prisoners; new 

legal protections for nationally recognized religious 

groups; the prohibition of the policy of, and an 

ensuing overall reduction in, forced renunciations of 

faith; and an expanded zone of toleration for worship 

activities, particularly in urban areas. Nevertheless, 

there continue to be far too many serious abuses and 

restrictions of religious freedom in the country. 

Individuals continue to be imprisoned or detained for 

reasons related to their religious activity or religious 

freedom advocacy; police and government officials 

are not held fully accountable for abuses;

independent religious activity remains illegal; and 

legal protections for government-approved religious 

organizations are both vague and subject to arbitrary 

or discriminatory interpretations based on political 

factors. In addition, improvements experienced by 

some religious communities are not experienced by 

others, including the Unified Buddhist Church of 

Vietnam (UBCV), independent Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, 

and Protestant groups, and some ethnic minority 

Protestants and Buddhists. Also, over the past year, 

property disputes between the government and the 

Catholic Church in Hanoi led to detentions, threats, 

harassment, and violence by ―contract thugs‖ against 

peaceful prayer vigils and religious leaders. Given 

the ongoing and serious problems faced by Vietnam‘s 

religious communities, the uneven pace of religious 

freedom progress after the CPC designation was 

lifted, the continued detention of prisoners of 

concern, and a deteriorating human rights situation 

overall, the Commission again recommends that 

Vietnam be designated as a CPC in 2009. 

Over the past year, religious freedom 

conditions have not improved as quickly or as readily 

as other areas of the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship. 

Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the 

government of Vietnam will engage on the 

international community‘s concerns about restrictions 

and abuses of religious freedom. The Commission 

traveled to Vietnam in October 2007 and was given 

access to high level government and provincial 

officials, religious prisoners and their families, and 

other dissidents. Non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs) have also engaged the government on 

religious freedom concerns over the past year, and 

religious freedom was a part of the renewed annual 

U.S.-Vietnam human rights dialogue. However, the 

frequency of these exchanges is neither as structured 

nor as focused on concrete results as those between 

2004 and 2006, when Vietnam was named a CPC. 

The Commission will seek to travel to Vietnam in 

2009 to engage government officials on ongoing 

concerns and seek additional information on current 

conditions. The Commission urges the Obama 

Administration to re-evaluate its use of diplomatic 

and political resources to advance religious freedom 

and related human rights in its relations with 

Vietnam, and encourages the Administration to view 

CPC designation as a flexible tool in light of its 

previous success in spurring serious diplomatic 

engagement and achieving measurable 

improvements, while not hampering progress on 

other areas in the U.S.-Vietnam relationship. 

Vietnam's overall human rights record 

remains poor, and has deteriorated since Vietnam 

joined the WTO in January 2007. Vietnam is an 

authoritarian state governed by the Communist Party. 

Over the past two years, the government has moved 

decisively to repress any perceived challenges to its 

authority, tightening controls on the freedom of 

expression, association, and assembly. New decrees 

were issued last year prohibiting peaceful protest in 

property disputes and limiting speech on the internet. 

As many as 40 legal and political reform advocates, 

free speech activists, human rights defenders, labor 

unionists, journalists, bloggers, and independent 

religious leaders and religious freedom advocates 

have been arrested and others have been placed under 
131

home detention or surveillance, threatened, 

intimidated, and harassed. Given the prominence of 

religious leaders in advocating for the legal and 

political reforms needed to fully guarantee religious 

freedom, their continued imprisonment or detention 

must be considered when measuring religious 

freedom progress in Vietnam. Over the past two 

years, individuals motivated by conscience or 

religion to peacefully organize or to speak out against 

restrictions on religious freedom and related human 

rights continue to be arrested or detained, including 

Nguyen Van Dai, Fr. Nguyen Van Ly, Le Thi Cong 

Nhan, and at least two dozen members from the Hoa 

Hao, Cao Dai, and Khmer Buddhist communities. 

 

Yet despite these significant problems, the 

number of religious adherents continues to grow in 

Vietnam. In large urban areas, the Vietnamese 

government continues to expand the zone of 

permissible religious activity for Catholics, nonUBCV Buddhists, and some Protestant groups. 

Religious leaders in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City 

report few overt restrictions on their normal worship 

activities, and the government continues to support, 

for the most part, the building of religious venues and 

the training of religious leaders. However, lingering 

property disputes over venues and facilities 

previously confiscated by the Communist 

government created serious tensions in Hanoi last 

year, including church demolitions, arrests, and 

societal violence. In some parts of the Central 

Highlands, particularly Gia Lai province, most of the 

churches and meeting points closed after 2001 and 

2004 demonstrations by ethnic minority Montagnards 

were re-opened, and the government and the 

officially-recognized Protestant organization have 

established a working relationship. 

Vietnam‘s legal framework on religion, the 

2004 Ordinance on Religion and Belief, regularizes 

rules for religious groups seeking legal recognition 

and promises groups granted ―national‖ legal status 

fewer government intrusions in regular religious 

activity. Religious communities granted ―national‖ 

legal status over the past year include the Baha‘is, the 

Adventists, Grace Baptist, the Pure Land Home 

Worship Buddhist group, and Mennonite 

congregations not affiliated with Pastor Nguyen 

Quang. However, there continue to be serious 

problems in the implementation of the Ordinance, 

with reports that some provincial officials ignore 

recognition applications, require them to include the 

names of all religious adherents in a church, or 

pressure religious leaders to join groups already 

given legal recognition, despite theological or other 

objections. In addition, the Ordinance provides for 

two other levels of legal recognition, neither of which 

provides the same protections as ―national‖ 

recognition. In fact, at the first level, ―permission for 

religious operation,‖ religious groups report 

government intrusions in daily religious activity, 

including seeking from religious leaders the names of 

congregants or limiting participation in and the scope 

of worship services. Religious groups whose 

applications for legal recognition are denied or who 

do not meet the Ordinance‘s vague standards are 

technically illegal and can be closed without warning.

 

In the past year, religious groups were 

harassed and their venues destroyed because they did 

not have legal status. In addition, there were reports 

that ethnic minority Protestants were arrested and 

detained for over a month because their meeting 

point was not legally recognized or because they 

were not affiliated with the government approved 

religious organization. Nevertheless, during the 

Commission‘s October 2007 trip to Vietnam, 

Protestant religious leaders reported that in recent 

years police harassment had declined overall, 

particularly in urban areas, though improvements 

often depended on geographic area, ethnicity, the 

relationship established with local or provincial 

officials, or perceived ―political‖ activity. Most 

religious leaders attributed these changes to the CPC 

designation and the priority placed on religious 

freedom concerns in U.S.-Vietnamese bilateral 

relations. 

The Ordinance is also problematic because 

some of its provisions do not meet international 

standards and are sometimes used to restrict and 

discriminate rather than promote religious freedom. 

For example, national security and national solidarity 

provisions in the Ordinance are similar to those 

included in Vietnam‘s Constitution and override any 

legal protections in the Ordinance or other laws 
132

guaranteeing the religious rights of ethnic minorities. 

Vietnam‘s Penal Code also contains penalties for 

vaguely-defined offenses, such as ―attempting to 

undermine national unity‖ by promoting ―division 

between religious believers and nonbelievers.‖ The 

government continued to significantly limit the 

organized activities of independent religious groups 

and individuals regarded as a threat to party authority 

on these grounds. There are some reports that 

Vietnamese officials are considering revising the 

Ordinance on Religion and Belief, offering the 

international community an opportunity to engage the 

government on ways to change Vietnam‘s legal 

structure on religion so that it conforms to 

international standards. 

In the past, the State Department maintained 

that one of the reasons Vietnam‘s CPC designation 

was lifted was because there are no longer any 

―prisoners of concern.‖ The Commission contends 

that there remain dozens of prisoners of concern in 

Vietnam, individuals arrested or detained for actions 

related their religious vocation, practice, activity, or 

conscience. Along with those incarcerated, over a 

dozen religious leaders are held under long-term 

administrative detention, such as United Buddhist 

Church of Vietnam (UBCV) leader Thich Quang Do 

and Catholic Fr. Phan Van Loi. In addition, hundreds 

of Montagnard Protestants arrested after 2001 and 

2004 demonstrations for religious freedom and land 

rights remain in detention in the Central Highlands. 

The circumstances and charges leveled against them 

are difficult to determine, but there is enough 

evidence available to determine that peaceful 

religious leaders and adherents were arrested and are 

still incarcerated. The continued detention of 

prisoners of concern, and the existence of vague 

―national security‖ laws used to arrest them, should 

be a primary factor in determining whether Vietnam 

remains a ―serious violator of religious freedom.‖ 

In the past, the State Department has 

contended that only those individuals who are 

arrested ―for reasons connected to their faith‖ will be 

considered in evaluating religious freedom conditions 

in Vietnam, as if the internationally recognized right 

to the freedom of religion guarantees only the 

freedom to worship. It remains the Commission‘s 

contention that this narrow definition excludes from 

consideration anyone arrested or detained for 

peaceful public advocacy to protect religious freedom 

including expressing support for the legal or political 

reforms needed to fully ensure it. The State 

Department‘s criterion also excludes those who 

monitor the freedom of religion and are arrested or 

otherwise punished for the publication of their 

findings. It also excludes those who, motivated by 

ongoing restrictions on religious practice or the 

arrests of fellow-believers, peacefully organize or 

protest to draw attention to government repression. 

The State Department‘s standard for determining 

who is a religious ―prisoner of concern‖ draws an 

arbitrary line between ―political‖ and ―religious‖ 

activity not found in international human rights law. 

It is the Commission‘s contention that, in all the most 

recent cases of arrest and imprisonment, religious 

leaders or religious-freedom advocates engaged in 

legitimate actions, protected by international treaties 

and covenants to which both the United States and 

Vietnam are signatories. In addition to the freedoms 

to believe and to worship, the freedom to peacefully 

advocate for religious freedom is a legitimate activity 

guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, which protect not only the right to 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion1but 

also the related rights to freedom of opinion and 

expression2and to freedom of peaceful assembly and 

association.3 Moreover, the right to freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief is ―farreaching and profound‖ and ―encompasses freedom 

of thought on all matters [and] personal conviction,‖ 

as well as ―the commitment to religion or belief.‖4

 

Most of the prisoners of concern previously 

cited by the Commission and other human rights 

organizations remain incarcerated. Over the past 

year, six prisoners of concern were released, 

including Cambodian monk Tim Sarkhorn and five 

Khmer Buddhist monks convicted for leading 

February 2007 religious freedom protests in Soc 

Trang province. The five monks, however, have not 

been allowed to rejoin their monasteries or return to 

their studies, and Tim Sarkhorn, though released 

from prison in July 2008, was held under house arrest 
133

and constant police surveillance until early April 

2009. 

During the past year, UBCV monk Thich Tri 

Khai was arrested at his monastery in Lam Dong 

province, and remains missing. Also in the past year, 

Montagnard Protestants have been subject to a 

number of short-term detentions, disappearances, and 

one possible beating death in custody. According to 

reports from NGOs and several members of the 

European Parliament, Montagnard Protestant Puih 

H‘Bat was arrested in April 2008 for leading an 

illegal prayer service in her home in Chu Se district, 

Gia Lai province—an area where there have been 

protests over land rights and religious freedom abuses 

in the past. In fact, according to Human Rights 

Watch, in April 2008 police arrested dozens of 

Montagnards in that area and forcibly dispersed 

crowds peacefully protesting recent land 

confiscations. Given historical animosities, past 

repression, and the region‘s remoteness, it is difficult 

to determine the exact reasons why Puih H‘Bat was 

arrested, though the fact that police have refused to 

allow her family to visit her and the lack of police 

and judicial transparency in the case is disturbing. 

Also in the same Gia Lai province district, as many 

as 11 Montagnard Protestants were detained in 

February 2009, after police reportedly entered a 

worship service and asked everyone present to 

renounce their faith or join the officially recognized 

Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam (SECV). 

Everyone who refused was arrested. Nine were 

released a month later, and two remain in detention at 

this writing. The State Department was able to 

confirm, from other religious leaders in the region, 

that these individuals were arrested for trying to 

organize an independent Protestant organization, an 

activity the Vietnamese government has refused to 

allow in this area since the large religious freedom 

protests in 2001 and 2004. In other parts of Gia Lai 

province, however, ethnic Montagnard Protestants 

associated with the government-approved SECV 

have established a working relationship with 

provincial officials, leading to the re-opening of 

many religious venues closed after 2001, new 

religious training courses for pastors, and the 

building of at least one new church property. 

In other ethnic minority areas of the Central 

Highlands and Central Coast region, religious 

freedom conditions varied with reports of restrictions, 

land seizures, discrimination, destruction of property, 

and other egregious religious freedom abuses. In 

particular, in Dak Lak province, there was active 

harassment of independent Protestant groups who 

refused to join the SECV or those suspected of 

affiliation with the banned Tin Lanh Dega (Dega 

Protestant Church), which the government claims 

combines religion with advocacy of political 

autonomy. However, a 2007 study by the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees, based on interviews 

with Montagnard asylum-seekers in Cambodia, found 

that few self-identified adherents of Tin Lanh Dega

sought political autonomy or had a political agenda, 

apart from ―enhancement of their human rights 

position‖ and the ―need to gather in independent Tin 

Lahn Dega church communities‖ separate from what 

they viewed as the Vietnamese-led SECV. Even 

those Tin Lanh Dega leaders who expressed a desire 

for greater political autonomy sought to advance this 

position peacefully, according to the study.

 

Suspicion of engagement with the Tin Lanh 

Dega may have lead to at least one beating death in 

the past year. According to Human Rights Watch, 

Montagnard Protestant Y Ben Hdok died while in 

detention at a provincial police station in Dak Lak 

province in May 2008. Police claim that he was 

detained for suspicion of inciting demonstrations, 

though the family claims that he was organizing a 

group to seek asylum in Cambodia for reasons 

including religious persecution. In previous years, 

the Commission has raised the cases of other ethnic 

minority Protestants beaten to death in police 

custody. There were no new developments related 

to the 2006 and 2007 deaths of Y Ngo Adrong or Y 

Vin Het. In the latter case, credible reports indicated 

that the ethnic minority Protestant was beaten to 

death by police officers for refusing to recant his 

faith.

According to the State Department, all 

ethnic minority religious communities in the Central 

Highlands, both legally recognized and independent 

groups, experience close government scrutiny,

particularly in Dak Lak and Bien Phuoc provinces. 
134

In March 2008, religious leaders from the InterEvangelistic Movement (IEM) in Bien Phuoc were 

reportedly beaten and insulted by police when they 

traveled to Dak Nong province to hold services. On 

November 11, 2008, Vietnamese government 

officials issued fines and summons to everyone 

affiliated with an independent Protestant church of 

EahLeo hamlet, Dak Lak province. Charges were 

later filed accusing the church of operating an illegal 

Bible school for people outside the province, and 

ordering it to dismantle the school and to cease 

religious activity because it was not legally 

recognized. The church continues to meet in another 

location. Also in November, in EaSup hamlet, Dak 

Lak province, police and provincial officials 

confiscated lumber purchased to build a chapel and 

issued an order telling the church in EaSup not to 

meet. In December 2008, hundreds of police and 

provincial officials destroyed a new Protestant church 

structure in Cu Dram hamlet; ethnic minority 

Protestants who protested the demolition were beaten 

with sticks and electric prods, some were severely 

injured and later were refused medical treatment. 

Leaders of this Cu Drom hamlet church continue to 

be threatened with arrest at this writing. Other 

independent ethnic minority congregations in EaSol 

and Thay Ynge hamlets and Krong Bong district of 

Dak Lak report that their leaders are regularly 

summoned to police stations and forced to sign 

papers agreeing that they will not gather ―new‖ 

Christians for worship and that churches cannot be 

organized with believers from other hamlets or 

districts. Vietnamese government policy does not 

permit anyone who belongs to an unofficial religious 

group to speak publicly about their beliefs. 

There is also disturbing evidence that 

provincial officials in the Central Highlands are 

targeting ethnic minority Protestants for official 

discrimination. Children are denied access to high 

school, based on outdated laws prohibiting entrance 

of children from religious families. There are also 

reports that Protestants are denied access to 

government benefits readily available to nonProtestants, including housing and medical assistance 

programs. In addition, local officials reportedly 

pressure family elders, threatening to take away their 

government benefits unless they convince younger 

family members to renounce their faith. Montagnard 

Protestants have long complained of targeted 

discrimination, but at least one eyewitness report 

indicates that provincial officials are being trained in 

discriminatory tactics. At a 2007 religious training 

workshop in Kontum conducted by central 

government officials, local police and government 

officials were taught how to deny medical, 

educational, housing, financial, and other government 

services to ―religious families‖ and families of recent 

converts. In addition, officials were instructed to 

divert foreign aid projects from known Protestant 

villages. It is not clear if this incident in Kontum is 

an isolated case, as the details of the official content 

of these training courses are unknown. The central 

government continues to conduct training courses for 

provincial officials on implementing Vietnam‘s legal 

framework on religion. 

The government continues to view the 

growth of Christianity among Hmong in Vietnam‘s 

northwest provinces with suspicion. According to 

the State Department, over the past several years, the 

Vietnamese government has started to allow Hmong 

Protestants to organize religious venues and conduct 

religious activity in homes and ―during the daytime.‖ 

However, unlike in some parts of the Central 

Highlands, the government has moved very slowly in 

extending legal recognition to Hmong Protestant 

churches. The number of legally recognized 

churches and meeting points has reached 100 in the 

past year, but an estimated 1,000 religious groups are 

seeking affiliation with the Evangelical Church of 

Vietnam (ECVN). Hundreds of applications for legal 

recognition have been declined or ignored, despite 

provisions in the Ordinance on Religion and Belief 

requiring government officials to respond to 

applications in a timely manner. 

The Vietnamese government recognizes that 

there is a ―genuine need‖ for religion in the northwest 

provinces, opening the way for at least some religious 

activity in the region to be legally recognized. 

However, government policy seems focused on 

making sure that ―new‖ religious growth is controlled 

and ―new‖ converts discouraged. According to the 

State Department, over the past year, local officials 

repressed Protestant believers in some parts of the 
135

northwest provinces by forcing church gatherings to 

cease, closing house churches, and pressuring 

individuals to renounce their religious beliefs, though 

often unsuccessfully, despite the prohibition on 

forced renunciations in the Prime Minister's 2005 

Instruction on Protestantism. 

In the recent past, Hmong religious leaders 

reported that security officials attended religious 

services, checked church membership lists, and 

forced anyone not on the list to leave. In some 

locations, security officials reportedly barred anyone 

under the age of 14 from attending services, banned 

mid-week meetings and programs for children and 

young people, and insisted that religious leaders be 

chosen under their supervision. Since the 

Commission‘s last Annual Report, in Bat Xat 

district, Lao Cai province, police harassed and 

confiscated food and other materials from a group of 

unregistered ―house church‖ Protestants celebrating 

Christmas. In another village in Bat Xat district, 

police reportedly confiscated livestock and other 

belongings from members of another Protestant 

―house church‖ celebrating the Lunar New Year. In 

August 2008, in Huoi Leng commune, Lao Cai 

province, a Protestant house church leader claimed 

that local officials constantly were pressuring him to 

give up his faith and threatening his congregants with 

deportation and cattle prods. Also, in Si Ma Cai 

district, Lao Cai province police beat and choked two 

Hmong Protestants in an attempt to force them to 

recant their faith. Police told them that there ―could 

not be....Christians in the district.‖ In Son La 

province, ethnic minority Catholics reported that 

government officials and police regularly threatened 

the loss of government benefits and services unless 

they returned to traditional religious practices and in 

Ha Giang province, local officials have used similar 

tactics in the past and have refused to allow a 

Catholic priest residence in the province. In other 

regions, local authorities reportedly encouraged clan 

elders to pressure members of their extended families 

to cease practicing Christianity and to return to 

traditional practices. Religious leaders also report 

that local authorities sometimes use ―contract thugs‖ 

to harass, threaten, or beat them, according to the 

State Department. For example, in July 2007, a 

veterans group in Ha Giang province burned down a 

home where ethnic minority Protestant met for 

worship and damaged other buildings in an attempt to 

stop all worship activities. Though such activities are 

prohibited by law, there are no known cases of 

prosecution or punishment for attempted forced 

conversations or property destruction.

It remains unclear whether the abuses and 

restrictions targeting ethnic minority Christians are 

the actions of recalcitrant provincial officials or part 

of central government policy. In 2006, the 

Committee on Religious Affairs in Hanoi published a 

handbook instructing provincial officials in the 

northwest provinces on how to manage and control 

religious practice among ethnic minorities. The 

Commission was critical of the handbook because it 

offered instructions on ways to restrict religious 

freedom, including a command to ―resolutely 

subdue‖ new religious growth, ―mobilize and 

persuade‖ new converts to return to their traditional 

religious practice, and halt anyone who ―abuses 

religion‖ to undermine ―the revolution‖—thus 

seemingly condoning forced renunciations of faith. 

Although the 2006 handbook does recognize the 

legitimacy of some religious activity, it also indicates 

that the Vietnamese government continues to control 

and manage religious growth, label anyone spreading 

Christianity in the northwest provinces as a national 

security threat, and use unspecified tactics to 

―persuade‖ new converts to renounce their beliefs. 

In 2007, the Committee on Religious Affairs 

promised to revise the handbook and, since its 2007 

visit to Vietnam, the Commission has received two 

new versions. Neither, however, improves much on 

the original. In the 2007 revision, provincial officials 

continue to be urged to control and manage existing 

religious practice through law, halt ―enemy forces‖ 

from ―abusing religion‖ to undermine the Vietnamese 

state, and ―overcome the extraordinary...growth of 

Protestantism.‖ This last instruction is especially 

problematic, since it again suggests that the growth of 

Protestantism among ethnic minority groups should 

be viewed as a potential threat to public security and 

that it is the ―responsibility‖ of officials to stem it. 

The 2007 revised version also states that local 

officials must try to ―solve the root cause‖ of 

Protestant growth by ―mobilizing‖ ethnic groups to 

―preserve their own beautiful religious traditions.‖ A 
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2008 version of the handbook contains all the 

language used in the 2007 revision but adds a final 

chapter which chides local officials for ―loose 

control‖ over Protestantism leading to an increase in 

illegal meetings places. Local officials are instructed 

that these meeting places ―must be...disbanded.‖ 

These instructions are not consistent with Vietnam‘s 

international obligations to protect the freedom of 

religion and belief and can be read as instructions to 

abuse and restrict religious freedom. 

The government continues to actively 

discourage any independent Buddhist religious 

activity and refuses to legally recognize the UBCV 

and some Hoa Hao and Cao Dai groups. The 

government requires UBCV, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai 

religious leaders and followers to affiliate only with 

the government approved religious organization; 

those who do not face ongoing and serious religious 

freedom abuses, including arrests, detentions, fines, 

forced renunciations of faith, destruction of property, 

and other harassment. This fact is important when 

deciding whether religious freedom conditions have 

improved in Vietnam overall, given that these groups, 

along with the ethnic minority Khmer Buddhists, 

represent the largest number of religious adherents in 

Vietnam. 

The UBCV‘s attempts to create an 

independent organizational structure have been met 

with violence, harassment, interrogations, public 

denouncements, and long-term administrative 

detention of the UBCV leadership, including the 

Most Venerable Thich Quang. The freedom of 

movement, expression, and assembly of UBCV 

leaders continues to be restricted and there continues 

to be official harassment of monks, nuns, youth 

leaders associated with the UBCV. Senior UBCV 

monks remain under some form of administration 

probation or ―pagoda arrest.‖ Charges issued in 

October 2004 against UBCV leaders for ―possessing 

state secrets‖ have never been rescinded. Local 

attempts by monks to organize UBCV ―provincial 

boards‖ or carry out charitable activities are also 

thwarted. In the recent past, UBCV monks have been 

detained and threatened and ordered to withdraw 

their names from such boards and cease all 

connections with the UBCV. Over the past year, 

police and government officials in Lam Dong 

province sought to depose Thich Tri Khai from his 

post as superior monk of the Giac Hai pagoda, 

reportedly offering bribes to anyone who would 

denounce him and urging 12 monks in the region to 

sign a petition supporting his ouster. Two hundred 

and thirty nine monks affiliated with the UBCV 

signed a letter opposing the government‘s action and, 

as a result, were threatened and subjected to 

―working sessions‖ with police. In April 2008, 

police arrested Thich Tri Khai, who remains missing; 

two UBCV monks attempting to visit Khai were 

detained and questioned by police. Also in April 

2008, police harassed, assaulted, and briefly detained 

monks from, and vandalized, the Phuoc Hue 

monastery in Quang Tri province, whose head Abbot, 

Thich Tu Giao, had declared allegiance to the UBCV. 

Police also assaulted and detained Thich Tu Giao‘s 

mother and members of the Buddhist Youth 

Movement. Local officials set up barriers on roads 

leading to the pagoda and put up signs claiming the 

pagoda as a ―Forbidden Area.‖ It was the second 

time police vandalized the pagoda. The previous 

year, police destroyed a newly built kitchen and 

warehouse, and stole money contributed by local 

Buddhists for other buildings. In January 2007, 

security officials in Binh Dinh province issued orders 

prohibiting future religious gatherings at the Thap 

Thap monastery, reportedly threatening that local 

Buddhists would lose their jobs or their children 

would be expelled from school if they did not stop 

patronizing the monastery. 

The UBCV‘s Supreme Patriarch Thich 

Huyen Quang, who had been administratively 

detained since 2003, died in July 2008. Most of the 

UBCV leadership, including Thich Quang Do and 

Thich Thien Hanh were allowed to attend the funeral 

and UBCV leaders were allowed to elect Thich 

Quang Do as Supreme Patriarch. The State 

Department reports that some UBCV monks were not

allowed to attend the funeral. UCBV monks report 

that 19 out of 21 provincial committee leaders were 

prevented from attending the funeral, one monk was 

physically assaulted while preparing to leave for the 

funeral. Both Thich Quang Do and Thich Thien 

Hanh have been allowed to meet with foreign 

diplomats during the past year. 
137

The State Department also reports that, in 

the past year, a UBCV monk was detained and later 

expelled from his monastery for distributing 

humanitarian aid and food to land rights protestors in 

Hanoi. A UBCV monk in Ho Chi Minh City 

resigned from monastic life reportedly because of the 

constant harassment by police for his activities to 

organize a Buddhist Youth Movement, and a UBCV 

nun was also forced to leave the pagoda she founded 

in Khanh Hoa Province reportedly because she 

openly affiliated with the UBCV. 

 

The Vietnamese government continues to 

ban and actively discourage participation in 

independent factions of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, 

two religious traditions unique to Vietnam claiming 

memberships of four and three million respectively. 

Both the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao report ongoing 

government oversight and control of their 

communities‘ internal affairs, including their rituals, 

celebrations, funerals, and selection of religious 

leaders. Other complaints concern the government‘s 

rejection of the Cao Dai charter drawn up before the 

1950s, the official unwillingness to allow the 

community to maintain its own independent source of 

income, and the seizure without compensation of Cao 

Dai properties after 1975. Some Cao Dai 

traditionalists have refused to participate in the 

government-appointed management committees and 

have formed independent groups. Eight Cao Dai 

were arrested in 2005 for protesting government 

intrusion in Cao Dai affairs; five remain in prison. 

Independent Hoa Hao groups face severe 

restrictions and abuses of religious freedom, 

particularly in An Giang province. According to the 

State Department, members of the independent Hoa 

Hao Central Buddhist Church (HHCBC) face 

―significant official repression,‖ and there is 

continued friction between independent Hoa Hao and 

government officials in the Mekong Delta region, 

including reports of confiscation and destruction of 

HHCBC affiliated buildings. HHCBC religious 

leaders refuse to affiliate with the governmentapproved Hoa Hao Administrative Council (HHAC) 

and are openly critical of it, claiming that it is 

subservient to the government. HHCBC leaders and 

their followers have been arrested for distributing the 

writings of their founding prophet, have had 

ceremonies and holiday celebrations broken up by 

police, and have had sacred properties confiscated or 

destroyed. At least 12 Hoa Hao were arrested and 

sentenced for protesting religious freedom 

restrictions, including four who were sentenced to 

four years in prison for staging a peaceful hunger 

strike. 

The Vietnamese government‘s ongoing 

repression of the language, culture, and religion of 

ethnic Khmer living in Vietnam has led to growing 

resentment. Khmer Buddhism is associated with 

Theravada branch of Buddhism and has religious and 

ethnic traditions distinct from the dominant 

Mahayana Buddhist tradition practiced in most places 

of Vietnam. Some Khmer Buddhists have called for 

a separate religious organization, distinct from the 

government-approved Vietnamese Buddhist Sangha 

(VBS). Religious freedom concerns continue to be 

central to demands of ethnic minority Khmer for 

human rights protections and preservation of their 

unique language and culture. 

There are as many as one million ethnic 

minority Khmer Buddhists in Vietnam, centered in 

the Mekong Delta region. Long simmering tensions 

emerged there in 2006 and 2007, as Khmer Buddhist 

monks peacefully started to protest government 

restrictions on their freedom of religion and 

movement and Khmer language training. On January 

19, 2007, according to Human Rights Watch, 

Buddhist monks in Tra Vinh province protested the 

arrest of a monk for possessing a publication from an 

overseas Khmer advocacy group. The protesting 

monks were interrogated and accused of allegedly 

separatist activities, and three monks were detained 

in their pagodas for three months and later defrocked. 

In February 2007, more than 200 monks staged a 

peaceful demonstration in Soc Trang province 

protesting the government‘s restriction on the number 

of days allowed for certain Khmer religious festivals 

and calling on the government to allow Khmer 

Buddhist leaders—not government appointees—to 

make decisions regarding the ordinations of monks 

and the content of religious studies at pagoda schools. 

The protestors also called for more education in 
138

Khmer language and culture. Provincial officials 

initially promised to address the monk‘s concerns, 

but several days later, monks suspected of leading the 

protest were arrested and some reportedly beaten 

during interrogations. At least 20 monks were 

defrocked and expelled from their pagodas, and five 

monks sentenced to between two and four years in 

prison. Defrocked monks were sent home to their 

villages were they were placed under house arrest or 

police detention. As mentioned above, in January 

2009, the five Khmer monks were released from 

prison, but they were not allowed to return to the 

monkhood. 

After the 2007 demonstrations in Tra Vinh 

and Soc Trang, provincial officials and police 

expanded surveillance and restrictions on Khmer 

Buddhists religious activity and pressured Khmer 

Buddhist leaders to identify and defrock monks 

critical of the government. In July 2007, the 

Vietnamese government arrested Tim Sarkhorn, a 

Cambodian Khmer Buddhist monk on charges of 

―illegally crossing the border.‖ Sarkhorn was 

released in November 2008 but placed under house 

arrest. He has since reportedly been allowed to 

return to Cambodia and is seeking asylum.

 

The relationship between the Vietnamese 

government and the Catholic Church deteriorated 

over the past year over the issue of property 

confiscated by the Communist Party in the 1950s. 

Peaceful prayer vigils for the return of two formerly 

Catholic owned properties in Hanoi ended with the 

police using tear gas and batons and arresting 

participants. The government also harassed, 

threatened, and restricted the movement of Hanoi 

Archbishop Joseph Ngo Quang Kiet, who publicly 

defended the rights of the Catholic protesters and 

visited the families of those arrested. 

In January 2008, Catholic parishioners 

conducted large-scale prayer vigils at the residence of 

the former papal nuncio in Hanoi, which was 

confiscated by the government in 1954. In February, 

after the government promised to resolve the 

problem, the prayer vigils ceased. However, on 

September 19, 2008 city officials announced that 

they would turn two sites formerly owned by the 

Catholic Church into public parks and make the 

former papal nuncio's home into a library. City 

officials immediately began demolishing buildings on 

the site of the Papal Nuncio and the former 

Redemptorist monastery in Thai Ha parish. Largescale protests followed, with as many as 15,000 

Catholic parishioners attending a special Mass and 

prayer vigil conducted by Archbishop Kiet on 

September 21, 2008. Police used violence to disband 

crowds at the two sites and used ―contract thugs,‖ 

some wearing the blue uniforms of the Communist 

Youth League, to harass and best Catholic 

parishioners and vandalize churches. Eight 

individuals who participated in the vigils were 

arrested, and authorities detained and beat an 

American reporter covering the events. 

The Hanoi People‘s Committee has called 

for the ―severe punishment‖ and removal of 

Archbishop Kiet and the transfer of four priests from 

the Thai Ha parish for ―inciting riots,‖ ―disrespecting 

the nation,‖ and ―breaking the law.‖ Catholic leaders 

in Hanoi have refused these demands and the 

Catholic Bishops Conference issued a public defense 

of the Archbishop and local priests, raising concerns 

about the government‘s commitment to religious 

freedom, the right of property, the government‘s 

control over the media, and other human rights 

issues. 

On December 8, 2008 the eight individuals 

arrested for participating in the prayer vigils at the 

Thai Ha parish were tried jointly at the Dong Da 

People's Court in Hanoi and convicted of disturbing 

public order and destroying public property. Seven 

were given suspended sentences ranging from 12 to 

15 months; of these, four were also sentenced to 

additional administrative probation ranging from 22 

to 24 months. The eighth individual was given a 

warning. All were released with time served. The 

eight Catholics filed an appeal of the guilty verdict; it 

was denied in April, 2009. 

 

During the Commission‘s 2007 visit, 

Vietnamese Catholics reported that the relationship 

between the Catholic Church and the Vietnamese 

government was evolving, with some progress and 

some restrictions remaining, and that Catholicism 
139

continued to grow rapidly in Vietnam. The 

government maintains veto power over appointments 

of bishops, but often cooperates with the Vatican in 

the appointment process, though in 2007 two bishops 

and two priests were rejected because of 

inappropriate ―family backgrounds.‖ However, 

Catholic leaders in Ho Chi Minh City reported that 

they often move ahead with ordinations without 

seeking government approval. All students must be 

approved by local authorities before enrolling in a 

seminary and again prior to their ordination as 

priests, and the province of Thua Thien-Hue 

restricted the number of seminarians. However, the 

government allowed a new Jesuit seminary to be built 

in Ho Chi Minh City and permitted several local 

dioceses to conduct religious education classes for 

minors on weekends and some charitable activities. 

Archbishop Kiet told the Commission that he was 

restricted from traveling to dioceses in northwest 

Vietnam and that provincial authorities in Son La and 

Dien Bien provinces refused to register a local 

Catholic diocese and mistreated lay Catholic leaders. 

There continue to be problems for ethnic minority 

Catholics in some parts of the Central Highlands and 

northwest provinces as well. There also are credible 

reports that Catholic students were discriminated 

against in gaining entrance to colleges and schools at 

the beginning of 2008. 

Hanoi continues to discuss with the Holy 

See conditions for the normalization of relations, 

discussions that included a meeting between Pope 

Benedict XVI and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 

at the Vatican and a corresponding visit of a highlevel Vatican delegation to Vietnam in February 

2007. In February 2009, a Vatican delegation came 

to Hanoi to discuss establishing relations between the 

Holy See and Hanoi. The delegation announced that 

Pope Benedict would like to visit Vietnam by the end 

of 2009. 

Over the past year, the Vietnamese 

government has also harassed, threatened, detained 

and sentenced lawyers and human rights defenders 

who have assisted religious communities and other 

vulnerable populations in cases against the state. On 

March 1, 2009, Ho Chi Minh city police raided the 

law office and seized the property of, and detained 

for questioning, human rights lawyer Le Tran Luat, 

who is defending Catholics arrested for taking part in 

peaceful prayer vigils in Hanoi. The government 

revoked his legal license in April 2009 and the 

official media has alleged tax fraud and other 

business related improprieties in what is often an act 

of political intimidation that signals a future arrest. 

Hanoi lawyer Le Quoc Quan also had his legal 

license revoked, allegedly because he was under 

investigation for assisting in the Thai Ha protests, and 

he has not been able to get his license renewed. Le 

Quoc Quan also was arrested in 2007 when he 

returned to Vietnam upon completion of a fellowship 

at the National Endowment for Democracy. 

Mennonite pastor and human rights 

advocate, Nguyen Thi Hong was given a three year 

sentence in January 2009 for ―fraud‖ and other illegal 

business practices, allegedly for debts incurred by her 

late husband in 1999. Her lawyer claims that the 

debts were repaid and that she was singled out for her 

work as a human rights advocate and for being 

associated with the Mennonite group associated with 

Pastor Nguyen Quang. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

In addition to recommending that Vietnam 

continue to be named a CPC, the Commission has 

other recommendations for U.S. government action.

I. Press for Immediate Improvements to 

End Religious Freedom Abuses, Ease Restrictions, 

and Release Prisoners

In both its bilateral relations and in 

multilateral fora, the U.S. government should urge 

the Vietnamese government to: 

Prisoner Releases

release or commute the sentences of all religious 

prisoners of concern, including those 

imprisoned or detained on account of their 

peaceful advocacy of religious freedom and 

related human rights including, among others, 

Fr. Nguyen Van Ly, Nguyen Van Dai, LeThi 

Cong Nhan, members of ethnic minorities in the 
140

Central Highlands and northwest provinces, the 

Cao Dai and Hoa Hao followers, and those held 

under administrative detention including Fr. 

Phan Van Loi, Thich Quang Do, and other 

UBCV leaders detained since the 2003 

crackdown on the UBCV‘s leadership; 

publicize the names of all Montagnard 

Protestants currently in detention for reasons 

related to the 2001 and 2004 demonstrations, 

allow visits to prisoners from representatives of 

the International Committee of the Red Cross or 

other independent foreign observers, and 

announce publicly that a prompt review of all 

such prisoner cases will be conducted; 

The Revision of Laws to Reflect International Human 

Rights Standards

amend the 2004 Ordinance on Religious Beliefs 

and Religious Organizations, Decree 22, and the 

―Prime Minister‘s Instructions on Protestantism‖ 

and other domestic legislation to ensure that such 

laws do not restrict the exercise of religious 

freedom and but do conform to international 

norms regarding the freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief, including 

revising the vague national security provisions in 

the 2004 Ordinance; 

enforce the provisions in the Prime Minister‘s 

―Instructions on Protestantism‖ that outlaw 

forced renunciations of faith and establishing 

specific penalties in the Vietnamese Criminal 

Code for anyone who carries out such practices; 

end the use of such far-reaching ―national 

security‖ provisions as Article 88 or Article 258 

of the Criminal Code, which have resulted in the 

detention of advocates for religious freedom and 

related human rights such as the freedoms of 

speech, association, and assembly; 

revise or repeal ordinances and decrees that 

empower local security police to arrest, 

imprison, or detain citizens in administrative 

detention for vague national security or national 

solidarity offenses, including Ordinance 44, 

Decree 38/CP, and Decree 56/CP, and Articles 

258, 79, and 88, among others, of the Criminal 

Code, and end their de facto use to detain 

advocates;

revise or repeal ordinances and decrees that limit 

the freedom of expression, assembly or 

association, including new regulations banning 

peaceful public protests of property disputes; 

end the harassment, threats, arrest, and 

revocation of legal licenses of human rights 

lawyers who take up political sensitive cases; 

establish a clear and consistent legal framework 

that allows religious groups to organize and 

engage in humanitarian, medical, educational, 

and charitable work; 

investigate and publicly report on the beating 

deaths of Hmong and Montagnard Protestants 

and prosecute any government official or police 

found responsible for these deaths; 

Protecting Independent Religious Practice

establish a non-discriminatory legal framework 

for religious groups to engage in peaceful 

religious activities protected by international law 

without requiring groups to affiliate with any 

officially registered religious organization, for 

example:

--allow the banned Unified Buddhist Church of 

Vietnam (UBCV) or the Khmer Buddhists to 

operate legally and independently of the 

official Buddhist organizations and the 

Vietnam Buddhist Sangha, including allowing 

the UBCV‘s Provincial Committees and 

Buddhist Youth Movement to organize and 

operate without restrictions or harassment;

--allow leaders chosen by all Hoa Hao adherents 

to participate in the Executive Board of the 

Hoa Hao Administrative Council or allowing a 

separate Hoa Hao organization, such as the 

Hoa Hao Central Buddhist Church, to organize 

legally and operate with the same privileges as 

the Administrative Council;
141

--allow Cao Dai leaders opposed to the Cao Dai 

Management Council to form a separate Cao 

Dai organization with management over its 

own affairs; and 

--allow Protestant house church groups in the 

Central Highlands, central coast, and north and 

northwest provinces to organize independently 

and without harassment, and allowing them to 

operate, if desired, outside of either the 

Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam 

(SECV) or the Northern Evangelical Church of 

Vietnam (ECVN);

allow all Hoa Hao groups freely and fully to 

celebrate their founding Prophet‘s Birthday, 

allow the printing and distribution of all the 

groups‘ sacred writings, and allow the rebuilding 

of the Hoa Hao Buddhist Library in Phu Tan, An 

Giang province;

approve the registration applications of all 671 

ethnic minority churches in the north and 

northwest provinces and allow them to affiliate 

immediately with the Evangelical Church of 

Vietnam (ECVN), consistent with the deadlines 

established in the Ordinance on Religious Belief 

and Religious Organizations; 

create a national commission of religious groups, 

government officials, and independent, nongovernmental observers to find equitable 

solutions on returning confiscated properties to 

religious groups;

The Training of Government Officials

revise the Training Manual for the Work 

Concerning the Protestant Religion in the 

Northwest Mountainous Region to reflect fully 

international standards regarding the protection 

of religious freedom and remove language that 

urges authorities to control and manage existing 

religious practice through law, halt ―enemy 

forces‖ from ―abusing religion‖ in order to 

undermine the Vietnamese state, and ―overcome 

the extraordinary...growth of Protestantism;‖ 

issue clear, public instructions for provincial 

officials regarding the registration process, 

consistent with the provisions of the Ordinance, 

including by restating the timetables for 

responding to applications; providing redress for 

denials; and ceasing unreasonable demands for 

information or other conditions placed on 

registration applications, such as demanding 

names of all members of religious communities, 

requesting management changes, requiring 

denominational leaders to convene conferences 

to undergo indoctrination classes, and requesting 

that denominational leaders become informants 

on other religious groups; 

issue a ―National Handbook for Religious Work‖ 

to train the estimated 21,000 new government 

officials engaged in ―religious work,‖ that should 

include an unambiguous statement about the 

need to respect international standards regarding 

religious freedom; guidelines for interpreting the 

Ordinance on Religion and Belief; detailed 

procedures on how to oversee the legal 

recognition process; a clear explanation of the 

duties of provincial officials under the law; and a 

description of the rights of religious communities 

under Vietnamese law and international human 

rights standards, including providing avenues to 

report inappropriate actions by local officials or 

police; 

issue a public statement clearly stating that the 

denial of educational, medical, housing, and 

other government services or economic 

assistance, including foreign aid, based on 

religious belief, affiliation, or ethnicity is 

contrary to Vietnamese law and that government 

officials found using such tactics will be 

prosecuted under the law;

Asylum and Refugee Issues

allow ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands 

or northwest provinces to seek asylum safely in 

Cambodia and continue to allow representatives 

of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNCHR) and other appropriate international 

organizations unimpeded access to the Central 
142

Highlands in order voluntarily to monitor 

repatriated Montagnards consistent with the 

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed 

on January 25, 2005 between the UNHCR, 

Cambodia, and Vietnam, and provide unhindered 

access for diplomats, journalists, and NGOs to 

members of all religious communities in 

Vietnam, particularly those in the Central 

Highlands and the northwestern provinces; and

halt incursions into Laos and Cambodia by the 

Vietnamese military and police in pursuit of 

those seeking asylum because of abuses of and 

restrictions on their religious freedom. 

II. Establish New Priorities for U.S. 

Assistance Programs

The U.S. government should assist the 

government of Vietnam in the development of 

protections for religious freedom in Vietnam, 

including by taking the following actions: 

fully implement the Montagnard Development 

Program (MDP) created as part of the House and 

Senate Foreign Operations conference report of 

2005 and continued in the 2008 conference 

report, and use the MDP to provide targeted 

humanitarian and development funds to ethnic 

minorities whose demands for land rights and 

religious freedom are closely connected; 

re-allocate some funds that formerly supported 

the STAR (Support for Trade Acceleration 

Program) to new projects in human rights 

training, civil society capacity-building, noncommercial rule of law programs in Vietnam, 

education programs for minors and young adults, 

and exchange programs between the Vietnamese 

National Assembly and the U.S. Congress—for 

example by creating a pilot program in Vietnam 

to be the Asian counterpart to Supporting 

Eastern European Democracy (SEED) program, 

which could be called Promoting Universal 

Rights and the Rule of Law (PURRL); 

ensure that rule of law programs include regular 

exchanges between international experts on 

religion and law and appropriate representatives 

from the Vietnamese government, academia, and 

religious communities to discuss the impact of 

Vietnam‘s laws and decrees on religious freedom 

and other human rights, to train public security 

forces on these issues, and to discuss ways to 

incorporate international standards of human 

rights in Vietnamese laws and regulations;

work to improve the capacity and skills of 

Vietnamese civil society organizations, including 

medical, educational, development, relief, youth, 

and charitable organizations run by religious 

organizations;

offer some Fulbright Program grants to 

individuals and scholars whose work promotes 

understanding of religious freedom and related 

human rights;

encourage the Vietnam Educational Foundation, 

which offers scholarships to Vietnamese high 

school-age students to attend school in the 

United States, to select youth from ethnic 

minority group areas (Montagnard and Hmong), 

from minority religious communities (Cao Dai, 

Hoa Hao, Catholic, Protestant, Cham Islamic, 

and Khmer Buddhists), or former novice monks 

associated with the Unified Buddhist Church of 

Vietnam and Khmer Buddhists;

work with international corporations seeking 

new investment in Vietnam to promote 

international human rights standards in Vietnam 

and find ways their corporate presence can help 

promote and protect religious freedom and 

related human rights; and

expand funding for additional Voice of America 

(VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) 

programming for Vietnam and to overcome the 

jamming of VOA and RFA broadcasts. 

In addition, the U.S. Congress should: 

continue oversight, establish benchmarks, and 

measure progress of the U.S.-Vietnam Human 

Rights Dialogues, renewed in 2007, by holding 

appropriate hearings on the progress report the 

State Department is required to submit to 
143

Congress on the trajectory and outcomes of 

bilateral discussions on human rights (see Sec. 

702 of PL 107-228);

appropriate additional funds for the State 

Department‘s Human Rights and Democracy 

Fund for new technical assistance and religious 

freedom programming, funding that should be 

commensurate, at least, with new and ongoing 

programs for Vietnamese workers, women, and 

rule of law training; and

engage Vietnamese leaders on needed legal 

revisions and protections of individuals related to 

the far-reaching national security provisions that 

are currently used to arrest and detain peaceful 

advocates for religious freedom and related 

human rights.

 

1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 

Art. 18; International Covenant of Civil and Political 

Rights (ICCPR), Art. 18. 

2 UDHR, Art. 19; ICCPR, Art. 19. 

3 UDHR, Art. 20; ICCPR, Arts. 21 & 22.

4 United Nations Human Rights Committee General 

Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993), 

para 1.
144

THE COMMISSION’S WATCH LIST

Afghanistan

Conditions for freedom of religion or belief 

in Afghanistan have become increasingly problematic 

in recent years. The failure of the new constitution to 

protect individuals from within the majority Muslim 

community to dissent from the prevailing Islamic 

orthodoxy continues to result in serious abuses, 

including criminal court cases that violate the

country‘s international commitments. In addition, 

the failure or inability of the Afghan government to 

exercise authority over much of the country outside 

Kabul contributes to a progressively deteriorating 

situation for religious freedom and other related 

human rights in many of the provinces. Although the 

status of religious freedom has improved since the 

fall of the Taliban regime, religious extremism, 

including violence and intimidation by resurgent 

Taliban insurgents, poses an increasingly serious 

threat to human rights in the country. In light of 

these very real dangers to the progress made toward 

establishing democracy, rule of law, and human 

rights protections in Afghanistan, the Commission 

has determined that Afghanistan should remain on its 

Watch List. Considering the major role the United 

States plays in Afghanistan‘s defense and 

institutional development, the Commission will 

continue to monitor the deteriorating situation in the 

country for religious freedom and related human 

rights. 

In January 2004, Afghanistan adopted a new 

constitution that provides for the freedom of nonMuslim religious groups to exercise their faith, 

contains an explicit recognition of equality between 

men and women, and declares the state will abide by 

―the UN charter, international treaties, international 

conventions . . . and the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights.‖ However, the constitution does not 

extend explicit protections for the right to freedom of 

religion or belief to every individual, particularly to 

individual Muslims, the overwhelming majority of 

Afghanistan‘s population, or minority religious 

communities. Other fundamental rights, such as the 

right to life and free expression, can be superseded by 

ordinary legislation. These shortcomings are 

compounded by a repugnancy clause that states that 

―no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions 

of the sacred religion of Islam,‖ as well as by 

provisions for a judicial system empowered to 

enforce the repugnancy clause and apply Hanafi 

sharia (Islamic) jurisprudence to cases where there is 

no other applicable law.

The absence of a guarantee of the individual 

right to religious freedom and the empowerment of 

the judicial system to enforce Islamic principles and 

sharia law mean that the constitution does not fully 

protect individual Afghan citizens who dissent from 

state-imposed orthodoxy against unjust accusations 

of religious ―crimes,‖ such as apostasy and 

blasphemy. There are few protections for Afghans to 

debate the role and content of religion in law and 

society, to advocate the rights of women and 

religious minorities, and to question interpretations of 

Islamic precepts without fear of retribution or being 

charged with ―insulting Islam.‖ These legal 

deficiencies have permitted the official imposition of 

harsh, unfair, and at times even abusive 

interpretations of religious orthodoxy, violating 

numerous human rights of individuals by stifling 

dissent within the Afghan population. 

For instance, in January 2008 in Balkh 

province, student journalist Parwiz Kambakhsh was 

sentenced to death for blasphemy. The conduct that 

led to this charge was circulating to other students 

material, some of which he had downloaded from the 

Internet, concerning women‘s rights in Islam. 

Although an influential council of religious scholars 

pressed for the execution to be carried out, others—

including human rights and other civic organizations 

and groups of journalists—staged public protests in 

his defense. In October 2008, an appeals court in 

Kabul changed his sentence to 20 years in prison. 

Similarly, in September 2008, a court in Kabul 

sentenced veteran journalist Ahmed Ghous Zalmai 

and mosque leader Mullah Qari Mushtaq to 20 years 

in prison for publishing an independent translation of 

the Koran. Authorities were influenced by Afghan 

religious scholars who alleged that the translation 

misinterpreted verses on social issues, was un-
145

Islamic, and did not have a parallel Arabic text next 

to the Dari translation. 

Such cases involving Muslim individuals 

exercising their internationally guaranteed rights 

demonstrate the inadequate guarantees for individual 

human rights in the constitution. These cases 

represent a significant problem for the country‘s 

development as a democratic state based on the rule 

of law where fundamental human rights are 

protected. This problem has been exacerbated by the 

persistent weakness of the country‘s central 

government, which continues to face substantial 

challenges that include mounting insecurity, a lack of 

basic infrastructure, massive corruption, an 

expanding illegal drug trade, and unresolved human 

rights violations from previous conflicts that have 

given rise to a climate of impunity in many parts of 

the country. 

 Religious sensitivities, heightened by the 

ongoing conflict with Taliban insurgents, have 

increasingly limited freedom of expression in the 

country. Observers note a growing ―backlash‖ by 

Afghanistan‘s powerful traditionalist religious forces 

against the liberalization that occurred after the fall of 

the Taliban. A new media law passed by parliament 

in September 2008 prohibits works and material that 

are contrary to the principles of Islam, works and 

materials offensive to other religions and sects, and 

propagation of religions other than Islam. Media 

outlets, including radio and television, face pressure 

and occasional legal action from authorities 

influenced by Muslim clerics who object to particular 

content, such as references to other religions or the 

scenes of women dancing common in Indian films. 

These religious freedom concerns take place 

in a context of declining respect for democratic 

norms and human rights, including with regard to 

freedom of speech and the press. In addition to cases 

involving views on religious interpretation, 

journalists in Afghanistan are coming under 

increasing pressure—and facing legal 

consequences—for criticizing political leaders, 

powerful local politicians, drug dealers, or warlords. 

The security situation continues to 

deteriorate, and the government of President Karzai 

does not exercise full control over the country. As a 

result, the situation for religious freedom and other 

human rights is increasingly precarious in many parts 

of the country. Some experts claim that Afghanistan 

is at risk of collapsing into chaos due to the 

resurgence of the Taliban, the failure of 

reconstruction efforts, and record-level opium 

production. Concerns that the government of 

Pakistan has been providing sanctuary to the Taliban 

intensified in the past year, as the Taliban stepped up 

attacks inside Afghanistan, posing a threat to the 

stability of the government. In addition, illegal 

militias have not been disarmed. Numerous illegally 

armed groups, some of them nominally allied with 

the government, continue to exercise power 

throughout the country and often perpetrate human 

rights abuses. These abuses include political killings, 

torture, coercion to enforce social and religious

conformity, and abuses against women and girls, 

sometimes with the active support of the local courts 

and police. In some areas of Afghanistan, the 

Taliban administer a virtual parallel state, and 

Afghans are increasingly receptive to Taliban courts, 

as they are seen as less corrupt than government 

courts. These substantial security threats, which have 

increased in the past year, present a persistent danger 

to the establishment of democracy and the rule of law 

throughout Afghanistan. 

As far back as 2002, the Commission raised 

concerns about the decision not to extend the 

international security presence outside of Kabul and 

the repercussions for religious freedom and related 

human rights. In its report from that year, the 

Commission recommended that the ―U.S. 

government should actively support expanding the 

international security presence beyond Kabul, as 

there [is] an urgent need to expand security in order 

to safeguard the process of political reconstruction in 

the country and to protect religious freedom and 

other human rights for all Afghans both in the near 

term and into the future.‖ The deteriorating security 

conditions over the past year continue to threaten the 

political reconstruction process.
146

The rights of women were severely and 

egregiously violated in the name of religion by the 

Taliban regime. Since then, rights for women have 

improved significantly, especially in light of the fact 

that Afghan society has hardly ever experienced the 

notion of gender equality. However, women‘s 

progress in the public sphere is threatened today both 

by the Taliban resurgence and the increased influence 

of religious traditionalists. Although there are a 

number of women serving in the parliament and on 

provincial councils, as well as a few women judges 

and prosecutors, the number of women in senior 

government positions has decreased since President 

Karzai dropped three female ministers from his 

cabinet in 2006. Currently, the Minister of Women ̳s 

Affairs is the sole female Minister. There are no 

women on the Supreme Court. According to a 

January 2009 report by the UN High Commissioner 

for Human Rights, ―important gains made recently by 

women in the public sphere are in danger of 

receding.‖ 

Although the all-covering burqa, required 

during the Taliban regime, is less common in Kabul, 

almost all women wear some form of head covering, 

either out of personal piety or fear of communal 

pressure. The State Department reported that in rural 

areas, local religious leaders continue to pressure 

women about their dress and most women wear the 

burqa. The UN report cited above also noted the 

widespread problem of violence and discrimination 

against women, which appears ―deeply rooted in 

conservative religious and traditional values in 

Afghan society‖ and continues to place women in a 

second-class status. Women in Afghanistan 

frequently are denied equal access to legal 

representation and due process, especially in rural 

areas, where traditional councils mete out justice. 

Lack of access to the legal system hampers efforts to 

combat violence against women, particularly 

domestic violence. 

Court cases on family issues are dealt with 

under a civil code based on the Hanafi school of 

Sunni Islam, which is applied regardless of whether 

the individuals are Sunni or Shi‘a. In April 2009, 

Parliament passed and President Hamid Karzai 

signed a law to enact a Shi‘a Muslim family code. 

However, as written, the code would have sanctioned 

marital rape and the inability of a woman to leave 

home without her husband‘s permission, except in 

emergencies. Proponents of the measure stated it 

would have recognized the distinct practices of 

Afghanistan‘s Shi‘a minority, constituting about 15 

percent of the population. However, a swift 

international outcry prompted suspension of the 

legislation. According to Afghan government 

officials, the law will be reviewed for its 

permissibility under the Afghan Constitution and 

international human rights instruments.

Despite these concerns, some religious 

freedom problems have diminished since the rule of 

the Taliban. For example, the active persecution of 

Afghanistan‘s Shi‘a minority perpetrated by the 

Taliban has largely ended, and Shi‘as once again are 

able to perform their traditional processions and to 

participate in public life, including in parliament and 

in senior positions in the Karzai government. 

Afghanistan‘s Second Vice President Abdul Karim 

Khalili is a member of the Shi‘a minority. According 

to news reports, the Shi‘a commemoration in Kabul 

of Ashura, banned under the Taliban, was particularly 

prominent, as well as incident-free, in January 2009. 

Most Shi‘a are from the Hazara ethnic group, which 

traditionally has been harshly discriminated against 

and segregated from the rest of society due to a 

combination of political, ethnic, and religious 

reasons. 

The situation of Afghanistan‘s small 

communities of Hindus and Sikhs also has improved 

since the fall of the Taliban, as there is no longer any 

official discrimination. Hindus and Sikhs are 

allowed to practice their faith and to have places of 

public worship. However, they are effectively barred 

from most government jobs, and face societal 

hostility and harassment. The few Afghan Christians, 

converts from Islam or their children, are forced to 

conceal their faith and are unable to worship openly. 

Members of Afghanistan‘s small Baha‘i community 

also lead an essentially covert existence, particularly 

since May 2007 when the General Directorate of 

Fatwa and Accounts ruled that their faith is a form of 

blasphemy and that all Muslims who convert to the 

Baha‘i faith are apostates.
147

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

In light of these serious concerns, the 

priority placed on the U.S.-Afghanistan relationship 

by President Obama and Special Representative for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, and the 

direct involvement of the United States in 

Afghanistan‘s political reconstruction, the 

Commission believes that the U.S. government 

should increase its diplomatic, development, and 

military engagement in Afghanistan to preserve and 

consolidate the Afghan people‘s gains in the 

protection of human rights, including freedom of 

religion or belief. Beyond the commitment of more 

troops, this engagement will involve new strategies 

for development assistance to promote human rights, 

transparency and mutual accountability. 

In this regard, the Commission welcomes 

the Administration's announcement on March 27, 

2009 of ―a comprehensive, new strategy for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan,‖ including the allocation 

of ―significantly more resources‖ to civilian efforts to 

both countries and new diplomatic efforts to enlist 

the cooperation of ―all who should have a stake in the 

security of the region,‖ specifically naming the 

United Nations, NATO, the Central Asian states, the 

Gulf nations, Iran, Russia, India, and China. The 

Commission notes that the failure of these U.S.-led 

efforts will leave Afghanistan not only less free but 

also more unstable, thereby contributing to regional 

insecurity and potentially serving again as a future 

haven for global terrorism that threatens U.S. 

interests. 

With regard to Afghanistan, the Commission 

also recommends that the U.S. government should:

I. Vigorously Promote Every Individual’s Human 

Right to Religious Freedom and Other Related 

Rights

 clearly articulate a concern for religious freedom 

and related human rights as an essential element 

of the new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan; 

vigorously support respect for the right of every 

individual to freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief, and increase efforts to 

ensure the protection, in law and practice, of 

fundamental human rights, including freedom of 

conscience and the equal rights of women, as 

outlined in international human rights 

instruments to which Afghanistan is a party; 

 use its influence to protect freedom of expression 

against charges that may be used to stifle debate, 

such as blasphemy, ―offending Islam,‖ apostasy, 

or similar offenses, including expression on 

sensitive subjects such as the role of religion in 

society and the rights of women and members of 

minority groups; 

 act to bolster the position of those reformers who 

respect, and advocate respect for, religious 

freedom and human rights, since those persons 

currently are on the defensive and are threatened 

and need U.S. support to counter the influence of 

those who advocate an Islamic extremist agenda; 

amplify the voices of political reformers and 

human rights defenders by, among other things, 

encouraging President Karzai to appoint 

independent human rights defenders to the 

country‘s independent national human rights 

commission and court system; 

II. Address Deteriorating Security Conditions

make greater efforts to improve security outside 

Kabul in order for Afghanistan‘s political 

reconstruction to succeed, because without 

adequate security, Taliban insurgents will 

continue to hold sway over much of the country, 

undermining the rule of law and Afghanistan‘s 

nascent democratic institutions; 

direct concrete support and benefits, including 

the improved, country-wide security referred to 

above, to the Afghan people, which, in turn, will 

enable the Karzai government and other 

moderates to make the hard choices necessary to 

oppose religious extremism;
148

III. Advance Institutional Reform

 ensure that programs administered by the U.S. 

Agency for International Development to help 

develop primary and secondary education, 

including through printing textbooks and 

providing civic education, incorporate as part of 

the content education on international standards 

with regard to human rights, including freedom 

of religion or belief, and religious tolerance;

 strengthen efforts to reform the judicial system, 

including by helping to develop needed 

infrastructure and supporting the reconstruction 

of a judicial sector operating under the rule of 

law and upholding civil law and international 

standards of human rights; 

 undertake efforts to reform the legal system to 

ensure that laws and legal systems uphold 

international standards on human rights;

 work to ensure that all judges and prosecutors 

are trained in civil law and international human 

rights standards, women are recruited into the 

judiciary at all levels, and all Afghans have equal 

access to the courts; and

assist legal experts in visiting Afghanistan, 

engaging their Afghan counterparts, and 

providing information to the Afghan public on 

the universality of human rights and the 

compatibility of Islam and human rights, 

including freedom of religion and belief, and 

expand existing programs to bring Afghans to 

the United States to experience how Islam and 

other faiths may be practiced in a free society. 
149

Belarus 

Belarus has a highly authoritarian 

government, with almost all political power 

concentrated in the hands of President Aleksandr 

Lukashenko and his small circle of advisors. The 

Lukashenko regime has engaged in numerous serious 

human rights abuses, including involvement in the 

―disappearances‖ of several key opposition figures,

the imprisonment of political opponents and 

journalists, and strict controls on the media and civil 

society. The government of Belarus also continues to 

commit serious violations of the right of its citizens 

to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief. In 2008, the Belarusian government kept in 

place its pervasive and highly restrictive apparatus to 

control freedom of religion or belief; therefore, the 

Commission continues to place Belarus on its Watch 

List.

Government structures to control and restrict 

religious communities are extensive and intrusive, 

leading some human rights groups to compare the 

situation for religious freedom in Belarus to that 

under the former Soviet regime. For example, 

Belarus has maintained its Soviet-era religious affairs 

bureaucracy, which maintains offices in the capitol of 

Minsk, in each of the country‘s six regions, and in 20 

districts. The country‘s religion law, passed in 

October 2002, set up severe regulatory obstacles and 

major bureaucratic and legal restrictions on the 

activities of many religious communities. 

Essentially, the 2002 law prohibits all religious 

activity by unregistered groups, any activity by 

religious communities except in areas in which they 

are registered, foreign citizens from leading religious 

activities, and unapproved religious activity in private 

homes, with the exception of small, occasional prayer 

meetings. The law set up a three-tiered system of 

registration and particularly restricts the activities of 

groups on the lowest tier. The law also mandated 

that all existing religious communities in Belarus reregister with the government by November 2004. 

While most previously registered groups were reregistered, the law increased official mechanisms to 

deny registration to disfavored religious groups. 

Since coming to power in 1994, President 

Lukashenko has openly favored the Belarusian 

Orthodox Church (BOC), an Exarchate of the 

Moscow Patriarchate Russian Orthodox Church, 

resulting in a privileged position for the BOC. 

Indeed, the 2002 religion law pointedly notes the key 

role of the BOC in the development of Belarusian 

traditions. This relationship was further codified in 

June 2003, when the Belarus government and the 

BOC signed a concordat setting out the Church‘s 

influence in public life, which has contributed to the 

difficulties for many religious minorities (see below). 

In March 2004, the Belarusian government granted 

the BOC the exclusive right to use the word 

―Orthodox‖ in its title. As a consequence, several 

―independent‖ Orthodox churches that do not accept 

the authority of the Orthodox Patriarch in Moscow 

continue to be denied registration, including the 

Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the 

True Orthodox Church, a branch of the Orthodox 

Church that rejected the compromise with the Soviet 

government made by the Russian Orthodox Church 

in the 1920s. Another independent Orthodox group 

frequently denied registration is the Russian 

Orthodox Church Abroad, whose members in recent 

years have been ordered to pay multiple fines for 

worshiping in private homes. 

Despite its privileged status, the BOC is 

itself not immune from government harassment. 

Forum 18 reported that in March 2007 the Committee 

for State Security (KGB) raided a prayer meeting of 

the BOC Transfiguration Fellowship in the city of 

Gomel, in the first known instance since the Soviet 

period of BOC adherents being targeted in Belarus 

for their religious activity. Moreover, Belarusian 

officials have discouraged the BOC from 

commemorating those Orthodox Christians in 

Belarus who were killed during the Soviet period on 

account of their religion. The Belarusian KGB has 

tried to convince BOC clergy to remove icons of the 

Orthodox ―New Martyrs‖ from the city of Grodno 

cathedral, although the local bishop refused to take 

them down. In addition, KGB officers often monitor 

visitors to the town of Kuropaty, where New Martyrs 

are among the mass graves; a BOC chapel planned 

for the site has never been built.
150

Other religious groups have consistently 

been denied registration and in many cases officials 

do not provide any reason for repeated denials of 

requests to re-register. One frequent basis for 

registration or re-registration denials has been failure 

to provide a valid legal address, although in some 

cases, registration is required before such an address 

can be obtained, leaving these communities in a nowin situation. Another ground for denial can be the 

religious group‘s alleged failure to limit activities to a 

specified location. In 2006, the Belarus government 

rejected a decision of the UN Human Rights 

Committee that the government had violated 

religious freedom by refusing to register a nationwide 

Hare Krishna association. The Committee found that 

the government‘s requirement that a group must 

secure state-approved physical premises before legal 

registration can be granted is ―a disproportionate 

limitation of the Krishna devotees‘ right to manifest 

their religion‖ under the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights. In 2008, after six years of 

registration applications, law suits, and fines, 

Belarusian officials registered six of the country‘s 

seven Hare Krishna communities, according to the 

State Department; the one community that remains 

unregistered also has been able to function. 

Without state registration, religious 

communities can be liable for fines. Since 2004, the 

Belarus courts have increased the amount of the 

fines, as well as expanded the range of religious 

groups that are subject to them. Until three years 

ago, such fines were usually in the range of $15, and 

most often imposed on Council of Churches Baptist 

congregations, which refuse on theological grounds 

to register with any state authorities. Since 2006, 

however, fines have been increased, in some cases 

dramatically. For example, in January 2009 a court 

in Bobruisk fined Aleksandr Yermalitsky $65 (a 

considerable sum in Belarus) for holding a worship 

service in his home. Forum 18 reported that in 

January 2008 the Baranovichi Emergencies 

Department fined the pastor and administrator of the 

New Life Pentecostal Church a total of $228 for fire 

safety violations, which is the equivalent of almost 

three weeks‘ average wages. The head of the church 

suggested that the fire safety demands were an 

indirect way of putting pressure on his church. In 

July 2008, a Russian Orthodox priest of an 

unregistered Russian Orthodox Abroad parish, who 

previously had been fined for holding religious 

services, was shown a reported KGB order banning 

him from conducting a funeral in the village of

Ruzhany, Forum 18 reported. Local villagers 

reportedly protested the ban; the priest was allowed 

to conduct the funeral. 

In March 2009, the Belarusian Supreme 

Court rejected an appeal brought by a Pentecostal 

pastor against a fine for leading an unregistered 

religious organization, Forum 18 reported. The 

pastor argued that the legal requirement to register 

violated the Belarusian Constitution and the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 

but the court ruled that the pastor‘s rights had not 

been violated. 

In addition to fines, the Belarusian 

authorities, over several years in the recent past, have 

ordered short-term detentions and imprisonment of 

church leaders and parishioners for participation in 

unregistered religious activity. In March 2006, the 

pastor of the Minsk-based Christ‘s Covenant 

Reformed Baptist Church received a 10-day prison 

term for conducting religious worship in his home. It 

was the first time in 20 years that a religious leader 

had been sentenced to imprisonment in Belarus. 

Pentecostal Bishop Sergey Tsvor faced similar 

charges, but they were dropped because of technical 

errors made by the police. Also in March 2006, 

human rights lawyer Sergey Shavtsov was sentenced 

to 10 days in detention for holding an unsanctioned 

seminar on religion in a private cafe. In June 2007, 

Baptist Pastor Antoni Bokun was given a three-day 

prison term for leading a service, making him the 

third known person to be sentenced to short-term 

detention in post-Soviet Belarus for religious activity. 

There also have been more recent reports that 

political prisoners in Belarus have been denied access 

to clergy. 

While re-registered religious organizations, 

including Muslims, Lutherans, and Baha‘is, have 

held worship services at residential addresses without 

prosecution, the 2002 religion law forbids most 
151

religious activity outside designated houses of 

worship without advance approval from state 

authorities. A first offense is punishable by a 

warning, a fine of 20 to 150 times the minimum 

monthly wage, or three to 15 days‘ imprisonment. A 

second violation within one year is punishable by a 

fine of 150 to 300 times the minimum monthly wage 

or 10 to 15 days‘ imprisonment. Although the law, at 

least in theory, permits persons to gather in private 

homes to pray, it requires that individuals obtain 

permission from local authorities to hold rituals, rites, 

or ceremonies in homes, which, in practice, is usually 

denied. Moreover, a religious organization cannot be 

located at a residential address unless that location 

has been re-designated as nonresidential. For five 

years, Protestant leaders have unsuccessfully 

attempted to resolve this situation. Despite 

confirmation from the Presidential Administration‘s 

Department for Communication with Citizens that 

religious organizations may legally meet in private 

homes if local state authorities agree, in 2008 police 

interfered with private religious meetings on several 

occasions, sometimes fining participants. 

In addition, the government continues to 

limit the ability of a number of groups to own or use 

other property for religious purposes, including via 

the requirement that residential property may be used 

for religious services only after it has been formally 

re-designated from residential use. Authorities 

continue to reject requests for property registration 

from many Protestant churches and other groups 

viewed as new to Belarus. Such communities also 

have faced difficulty in renting property from state 

proprietors. Moreover, Protestants in particular have 

reported that securing permission to build new 

churches is almost impossible. In Minsk, city 

planners, according to official documents, will not 

grant any such permits until 2030. Protestant 

churches seeking property permits also report that 

they are treated as commercial organizations and 

charged fees set by Minsk authorities that may range 

into hundreds of thousands of dollars. Forum 18 also 

reports that some of the smaller religious 

communities continue to face great difficulties in 

rebuilding premises for worship. 

In February 2008, in response to the 

indefinite adjournment of a court case on the fate of 

their church building, the New Life Church in Minsk 

opted for civil disobedience, refusing to allow state 

inspectors, who can impose fines, onto church 

property. In January 2009, after two years of delays, 

the Belarus Higher Economic Court denied the New 

Life Church‘s appeal to prevent government 

authorities from seizing its building.

Various other laws, regulations, and 

directives also restrict the activities of registered 

religious communities. For example, groups are not 

allowed to function outside their geographic area of 

registration. In the summer of 2008, officials in the 

Grodno region prevented three Protestant 

communities from conducting religious activities 

because they were officially registered in a different 

region. If a registered religious community does not 

qualify as a ―central association‖—meaning it has not 

been legally recognized for over 20 years or it does 

not have enough members—it cannot own media 

outlets or invite people from outside Belarus to work 

with the community, as in the case of the Greek 

Catholic Church (also known as the Byzantine Rite 

or Uniate Catholic Church). The Society for Krishna 

Consciousness also does not qualify as a central 

association and therefore cannot rent a hall or 

produce a publication with a print run of over 300. 

In 2007, thousands of individuals from 

various religious communities, as well as 

nonbelievers, signed a petition to the Belarusian 

government to protest the country‘s 2002 religion law 

and other restrictions on freedom of religion or belief. 

In July 2007, Belarusian police in Minsk and at a 

Catholic pilgrimage site in Budslav detained 

individuals involved in obtaining signatures for the 

petition and confiscated literature related to it. In 

March 2008, the petition gained the necessary 50,000 

signatures and was submitted to the Constitutional 

Court, parliament, and Presidential Administration. 

The Constitutional Court rejected it that same month, 

on the grounds that only the head of state or other 

government officials can question the 

constitutionality of laws. Parliamentary and 

presidential authorities also rejected the petition, 

claiming that there were no religious freedom 
152

violations in the country. In April 2008, three human 

rights defenders were fined an amount equal to two 

months of the average monthly wage for their 

involvement with the petition protesting the Belarus 

religion law and other religious freedom restrictions. 

Belarusian officials took measures in 2008 

against other public activities linked to religious 

expression. In September 2008, Forum 18 reported 

that a local ideology official halted a six-day music 

festival, organized by local Catholic, Orthodox, and 

Protestant groups in Borisov, despite the fact that 

event organizers had obtained written state 

permission one week in advance, as required by law. 

All religious literature is subject to 

compulsory government censorship. Religious 

publishing is restricted to religious groups that have 

10 registered communities, including at least one that 

was in existence in 1982. This requirement is 

onerous, since 1982 was during the Soviet period of 

religious repression when few religious groups could 

operate. Some members of religious communities 

are harassed, fined, and detained for ―illegally‖ 

distributing religious literature. In January 2009, two 

Council of Churches Baptist members who operated 

a Christian street library in Osipovichi in the Mogilev 

region were detained and their literature was 

confiscated, Forum 18 reported. In December 2008, 

15 members of an unregistered Baptist community 

who ran a street library in the city of Kobrin were 

detained by police for illegally distributing religious 

literature and referred to court; the group was 

reportedly issued an official warning—but was not 

subjected to fines—in January 2009.

The Belarus government continues to 

demonstrate a lax attitude towards the problem of 

anti-Semitism and has not adopted effective measures 

in regard to those responsible for vandalism against 

Jewish memorials, cemeteries, or other property. 

During 2008, anti-Semitic incidents were 

investigated only sporadically, according to the State 

Department. Although official periodicals did not 

attack Jewish groups in the past year, the sale and 

distribution of anti-Semitic literature continued 

through state press distributors, government agencies, 

and stores affiliated with the BOC. Anti-Semitic and 

ultranationalist Russian newspapers and literature, 

digital video disks, and videocassettes also continued 

to be sold at Pravoslavnaya Kniga (Orthodox 

Bookstore), which also sells the literature of the 

BOC, the officially-favored church. 

 Although Judaism is viewed under the 

2002 religion law as ―traditional‖ to Belarus, Jews 

have been the targets of offensive remarks by 

government officials and the state media. In past 

years, President Lukashenko himself is reported to 

have made public anti-Semitic comments. For 

example, in October 2007, on live national radio, he 

referred to the Belarusian town of Babruysk as a 

―pigsty,‖ and ―mainly a Jewish town—and you know 

how Jews treat the place where they are living.‖ In 

contrast with 2007, according to the State 

Department, the president and other government 

officials have not made anti-Semitic remarks in 

public during the past year. In October 2008, 

President Lukashenko took part in a commemoration 

of the 65th anniversary of the Nazi destruction of the 

Minsk Jewish ghetto. Reportedly, he publicly 

remembered the victims and their families, stating 

that Belarus ―took the grief of the Jewish people as 

its own grief.‖

In 2008 the Belarusian authorities continued 

to use textbooks that promoted intolerance towards 

religions officially considered ―non-traditional‖ to 

Belarus. Leaders of Protestant groups criticized the 

chapter entitled ―Beware of Sects,‖ which includes a 

paragraph on Seventh-Day Adventists and Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses. The Ministry of Education continued to 

use another textbook which labels Protestants and 

Hare Krishnas as ―sects,‖ although according to the 

State Department, the authorities promised to change 

the language in the next edition. In the recent past, 

state-controlled print and broadcast media have also 

promoted intolerant views of ―new‖ religious groups. 

Religious communities are also sometimes denigrated 

by official bodies. Forum 18 reported in January 

2008 that a secret ruling by the State Committee for 

Religious and Ethnic Affairs allegedly denied official 

registration to 12 groups it termed ―destructive 

sects,‖ including Ahmadiyya Muslims.
153

The 2002 religion law states that religious 

organizations do not have priority in reclaiming 

property confiscated in Soviet times if a former 

worship building is now used for culture or sports 

activities. As a result, only nine of 92 historic 

synagogues in Belarus have been returned to the 

Jewish community since the country gained 

independence in 1991. Lutheran and Calvinist 

communities have also had little success in the return 

of their historical churches from the Belarusian 

government.

In January 2008, Belarus issued a decree 

that further tightened strict government regulations 

on foreign religious workers. A government official, 

the Plenipotentiary for Religious and Nationality 

Affairs, has the sole discretion to decide whether 

religious activity by foreign citizens is necessary. In 

addition, that official is not required to provide 

reasons for denials of a foreign religious worker‘s 

request to visit. Moreover, there is no avenue for 

appeal of denials. A foreign religious worker must 

be invited by a registered religious association. The 

visa application must include relevant work 

experience, the timetable and syllabus of the relevant 

religious educational institution and proof of 

knowledge of the Belarusian and Russian languages, 

as well as the proposed dates and reason for the visit. 

The application procedure for visits by foreign 

religious workers is usually lengthy and highly 

bureaucratic. 

In the past year, Belarusian authorities 

have often questioned foreign religious workers, 

humanitarian workers, and local citizens on the 

sources and uses of their funding. There were also 

credible reports that foreign religious workers were 

under surveillance by security personnel. Since 

2004, a total of 31 foreigners have been expelled or 

have been denied extension of their residence 

permits due to their religious activities, according 

to Forum 18. In December 2008, a foreign 

Catholic priest and three foreign nuns working in 

the Minsk-Mohilov Archdiocese, as well as three 

foreign Catholic priests working in the Grodno 

diocese, were expelled. In October 2008, a bishop 

in the Pentecostal Full Gospel Church, who is a 

Ukrainian citizen, was deported from the country. 

Furthermore, if foreign citizens have not explicitly 

stated that they plan to participate in religious 

activities in Belarus, they can be reprimanded or 

expelled. In February 2009, two Danish visitors to 

Belarus were detained by police and banned from 

the country for one year due to their expressions of 

―ideas of a religious nature,‖ in the words of the 

deportation order. Both were attending—but were 

not leading—a church service in the city of Gomel. 

Nevertheless, the situation for the Roman 

Catholic Church in Belarus improved somewhat in 

the past year, as have Catholic relations with the 

BOC. According to the State Department, the 

Belarusian government in April 2008 reportedly 

scaled back plans to convert the Bernadine 

Monastery in Minsk—which Belarusian authorities 

have long promised to return to the Catholic 

community—into a luxury hotel and entertainment 

complex. However, the Belarus authorities did not, as 

promised, find a new location for the state archives 

stored in that monastery. Vatican Secretary of State 

Cardinal Bertone visited Minsk in June 2008, where 

he held services and consecrated the cornerstone of 

the first Catholic Church to be built in Minsk since 

1910. The Cardinal also held meetings with President 

Lukashenko, the BOC Metropolitan Filaret, and other 

officials. 

In that same month, the Greek Catholic 

Church (also known as the Byzantine Rite or the 

Uniate Catholic Church) opened the St. Joseph Greek 

Catholic Center with a chapel and library in Minsk; 

the center reportedly offers Sunday school classes as 

well as charity assistance. 

In May 2008, the European Parliament 

passed a resolution criticizing the 2002 Belarusian 

religion law and the government‘s ―harassment, 

prosecution, fines, and imprisonment‖ of religious 

communities and leaders. The resolution urged the 

government of Belarus to comply with international 

principles of religious freedom and human rights. 
154

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

Regarding multilateral approaches and 

international organizations, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government should:

use every measure of public and private 

diplomacy to advance the protection of human 

rights, including religious freedom, in Belarus, 

such as enhanced monitoring and public 

reporting by the U.S. Department of State, 

including the Special Envoy on Anti-Semitism 

and the Ambassador-at-Large on International 

Religious Freedom, and by the appropriate 

international organizations, including the OSCE 

and the UN;

 coordinate with the European Union on the 

application of financial sanctions and visa bans 

on high-ranking Belarusian officials, particularly 

those who are directly responsible for or who 

have carried out the government‘s abuses of 

religious freedom; and

urge the Belarus government to issue invitations 

to relevant UN Human Rights Council Special 

Procedures, including: the Special Rapporteur on 

the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus; the 

Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 

Punishment; the Special Rapporteur on the 

Promotion and Protection of the Right to 

Freedom of Expression; the Special 

Representative of the Secretary-General on the 

Situation of Human Rights Defenders; the 

Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, as well as the Working Group on 

Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances.

Regarding its bilateral relations with 

Belarus, the U.S. government should:

urge the Belarus government to take immediate 

steps to end repression, including: 

--repeal of the highly restrictive 2002 religion 

law, as several of its provision violate 

international norms on freedom of religion or 

belief; 

--end the practice of denying registration to 

religious groups and then erecting obstacles to 

religious practice because of that unregistered 

status; 

--provide the right to conduct religious education 

and distribute religious material; 

--adopt effective measures to halt attacks on the 

persons and property of minority religious 

groups and prosecute individuals who 

perpetrate such attacks; 

--ensure a greater effort on the part of 

government officials to find and hold to 

account perpetrators of attacks on the persons 

and property of members of religious 

minorities; and 

-- provide free access by domestic and 

international human rights groups and others 

to sites of religious violence or the destruction 

of places of worship; 

 urge the Belarus government to ensure that no 

religious community is given a status that may 

result in or be used to justify discrimination 

against or impairment of the rights of members 

of other religious groups; 

 urge the Belarus government to publicly 

condemn, investigate, and prosecute criminal 

acts targeting Jews and the Jewish community, 

as well as members of other ethnic and religious 

communities;

continue to support, publicly and privately, 

persons and groups engaged in the struggle 

against repression in Belarus, including the 

group of religious and opposition activists who 

make up the Freedom of Religion Initiative that 

published the ―White Book‖; and

 organize roundtables inside Belarus between 

members of registered and unregistered religious 

communities and international experts on 
155

freedom of religion, particularly the OSCE Panel 

of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief.

Regarding U.S. programs and policies, the 

U.S. government should:  institute fully the measures in the 2007 Belarus 

Democracy Reauthorization Act, which 

expresses the sense of Congress that sanctions be 

applied against the government of Belarus until 

it makes significant human rights progress; 

specific sanctions would include: the denial of

entry into the United States to high-ranking 

Belarusian officials, and the prohibition of 

strategic exports and U.S. government financing 

to the Belarusian government, except for 

humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical 

products;

 ensure that the activities to promote democracy 

authorized by the Belarus Democracy 

Reauthorization Act, as well as in the Belarus 

civil society programs of the National 

Endowment for Democracy, include the right to 

freedom of religion or belief and the promotion 

of religious tolerance;

urge Congress and the State Department to 

ensure that U.S. government-funded radio 

broadcasts to Belarus, including those of Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), continue 

at least at their present levels, that efforts are 

made to secure sufficient transmission capacity 

to ensure reliable reception throughout that 

country, and that RFE/RL programs discuss 

issues relating to freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief; and

 provide increased international travel 

opportunities, particularly to attend international 

conferences, for Belarusian civil society leaders, 

including representatives of human rights groups 

and religious leaders, and others who defend 

freedom of religion in that country. 
156

Cuba 

Religious belief and practice continue to be 

tightly controlled in Cuba. Although Cuba seeks to 

project the image that the right to religious freedom is 

respected, the potential influence of religious 

organizations is perceived by state authorities as a 

threat to the revolution and hence, the government‘s 

legitimacy. Within this reporting period, the 

government expanded its efforts to silence critics of 

its religious freedom policies and crack down on 

religious leaders whose churches operate outside of 

the government-recognized umbrella organization for 

Protestant denominations. Furthermore, despite 

becoming a signatory to the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights and International 

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 

and some positive developments regarding the 

Catholic Church, President Raul Castro and the 

government have yet to institute or indicate plans for 

large-scale improvements in freedom of religion or 

belief and related human rights. While welcoming the 

small, positive steps taken by the Cuban government 

in the past year, the Commission continues to place 

Cuba on its Watch List, and will monitor conditions 

of freedom of religion or belief in Cuba to determine 

if they rise to a level warranting the country‘s 

designation as a ―country of particular concern,‖ or 

CPC. 

The government‘s main interaction with, 

and control over, religious denominations is through 

the regular surveillance, infiltration, and/or 

harassment of religious professionals and lay persons 

and administrative mechanisms. The Cuban 

government requires churches and other religious 

groups to register with the relevant provincial office 

of the Registry of Associations within the Ministry of 

Justice. Registration requires religious communities 

to identify locations and funding sources for 

activities, as well as a government certificate that 

states the community is not duplicating the activities 

of other registered religious communities. 

Registration permits religious leaders to receive 

foreign visitors, import religious materials, meet in 

approved houses of worship, and if permitted, travel 

abroad for religious purposes. There are 

approximately 50 state-recognized religious groups, 

primarily Christian denominations, more than half of 

which have some form of association with the 

government-recognized Cuban Council of Churches 

(CCC). The government has not prevented activities 

of the Baha‘is and the Church of Jesus Christ of 

Latter-day Saints (Mormons), groups that are not 

officially registered, and has registered groups that do 

not belong to the CCC, including the Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses. There is also a small Jewish community, 

primarily in Havana. In recent years, the government 

has not granted recognition to new religious groups. 

According to the State Department, the 

Cuban government is most tolerant of those religious 

groups that maintain ―close relations‖ with the state 

or those who ―often [support] government policies.‖ 

In 2008, the Greek Orthodox Church and Pentecostal 

Church of Sovereign Grace in Cuba became full CCC 

members and three churches became associate 

members. The CCC is the distributor of Bibles.

As in past years, government permission to 

build new houses of worship is difficult to obtain, 

although in 2008 a new Russian Orthodox church 

opened and construction of a Catholic seminary 

continued. While it is still administratively difficult 

for existing houses of worship to repair or expand 

facilities, according to the CCC and the State 

Department, in 2008 many houses of worship did 

receive permission. Construction, however, remains 

logistically expensive and time-consuming. 

Because of the difficulty in obtaining 

permission to build new houses of worship, many 

religious groups, registered and unregistered, hold 

services in private homes or similar accommodations, 

commonly known as ―house churches.‖ There are 

reports that at least 10,000 house churches exist 

nationwide, the majority of which are technically 

illegal. A September 2005 law requires the 

registration of all house churches and the submission 

of detailed information on the number of members, 

schedule of services, and names and ages of the 

house‘s inhabitants. Moreover, no more than three 

meetings may be held per week, no foreign citizens 

may participate in services without government 

permission, and a house church cannot be within two 

kilometers of another house church of the same 
157

denomination. The State Department reports that 

Pentecostal church officials feel targeted by these 

regulations because they meet more than three times 

a week. If a complaint is made against a house 

church meeting, it can be broken up and the attendees 

imprisoned. Although there is no evidence that the 

new legislation has resulted in a systematic 

crackdown on house churches, since 2005 several 

house churches from registered and unregistered 

denominations reportedly have been confiscated or 

destroyed. In many of these cases, local authorities 

told house church leaders and members that their 

buildings were ―unsuitable‖ and then seized the 

buildings. There are also reports that individual 

worshippers have received citations and some 

churches are forced to pay large fines. Such reports 

continued in 2008. 

All publications are required to be registered 

with the Ministry of Culture. However, the Cuban 

Conference of Catholic Bishops has refused to 

register its publications, arguing that such registration 

would mean a loss of content and format control. 

Although the government has not blocked the 

printing or publication of Catholic publications, 

increased government pressure in recent years, 

sometimes in the form of questioning by state 

security agents and blocking the distribution of 

supplies, has led to the closing of several 

publications. In April 2007, Vitral magazine, an 

independent Catholic magazine that in the past 

published articles critical of the Cuban government, 

announced that due to a lack of paper, ink, and 

Internet access, it would shut down. The magazine 

resumed publication in June 2007 under new 

management and with less politically sensitive 

content.

Other means by which the government 

restricts religious practice include: the enforcement 

of a regulation that prevents any Cuban or joint 

enterprise, except those with specific authorization, 

from selling computers, facsimile machines, 

photocopiers, or other equipment to any church other 

than at the official—i.e. exorbitant—retail prices; an 

almost total state monopoly on printing presses; a 

prohibition on private religious schools; limitations 

on the entry of foreign religious workers; denial of 

Internet access to religious organizations; restrictions 

on making repairs to church buildings; and denial of 

religious literature such as Bibles to persons in 

prison. Additionally, there is a requirement that 

religious groups receive permission from local 

Communist Party officials prior to holding 

processions or events outside of religious buildings. 

Refusal of such permission often is based on the 

decision of individual government officials rather 

than in accordance with the law. According to the 

State Department, since 2005 the Catholic Church 

has not sought permits for religious processions in 

some areas. 

In the past year, both registered and 

unregistered religious groups continued to be subject 

to varying degrees of official interference, 

harassment, and repression. Because an estimated 70 

percent of the Afro-Caribbean population engages in 

at least some religious practice, which the 

government views as a potential grassroots threat, the 

government targets religious groups in these 

communities more heavily than political opposition 

organizations. According to the State Department, in 

the past year, independent Santeria priests have been 

threatened and pressured to assimilate into the 

government-sanctioned Yoruba Cultural Association. 

The government continues to harass

churches whose members include pro-democracy or 

human rights activists and the leaders of such 

churches. On March 20, 2008, state security agents 

and members of the Cuban Revolution Association 

and the Committees for the Defense of the 

Revolution (CDRs) surrounded the First Baptist 

Church of Santa Clara during a church service. 

Several pro-democracy activists were present during 

the service. In May 2008, state security agents and 

Rapid Response Brigade members were present at an 

inter-denominational event organized by the same 

church. The agents‘ presence was meant to intimate 

the 300 participants, including 15 pro-democracy and 

human rights activists, as they publicly celebrated the 

Baptist campaign, ―Fifty Days of Prayer for Cuba.‖ 

Harassment continued of church leaders of the Santa 

Teresita de Nino Jesus Roman Catholic Church in 

Santiago, where on Dec. 6, 2007, security officers 
158

forcefully entered the church and beat several human 

rights activists attending mass. 

 

In 2008, the government expanded efforts to 

threaten religious leaders who are perceived to be 

critical of the government or outside of the 

government‘s control of religion. For example, 

religious leaders who have withdrawn from 

denominations that are part of the CCC have 

reportedly been watched, had their phones tapped, or 

faced other threats. Some have fled the country due 

to state harassment. Several evangelical pastors 

whose churches are outside of the CCC and who have 

attracted large followings, as well as pastors who 

have criticized the government‘s interference in their 

churches, have been arrested and detained in the past 

year. 

A father and two sons were arrested and 

charged with ―offensive behavior‖ in October 2008. 

The previous month, the father, Reverend Robert 

Rodriguez, president of the Interdenominational 

Fellowship of Evangelical Pastors and Ministers, had 

pulled out of the CCC after publishing a letter 

complaining about state interference in church 

affairs. Prior to the arrest, the Cuban government 

stripped Reverend Rodriguez of his position as 

president of the umbrella organization, a move the 

organization condemned as unconstitutional. One of 

his sons, Pastor Eric Gabriel Rodriguez, was 

convicted of ―offensive behavior‖ and sentenced to 

three months to one year of house arrest, with the 

possibility of imprisonment if he ―re-offends‖. The 

trial date for his father, originally set for December 

29, 2008, was moved to late February 2009, and then 

to March 19, 2009. The trial has since been 

suspended again, and no new date has been set. 

One pastor, Omar Gude Perez, has been 

imprisoned since May 2008 because of his leadership 

position in the ―Apostolic Reformation,‖ a growing 

evangelical non-denominational and non-political 

religious movement. His family was told he would 

be charged with ―human trafficking,‖ but thus far no 

charges have been filed and no date set for his trial. 

Similar charges also were brought against another 

evangelical pastor in 2006 after he criticized the 

state‘s interference in his church, though those 

charges were eventually dropped. Following Pastor 

Perez‘s imprisonment, government officials 

conducted a full inventory of his family‘s home and 

threatened to confiscate the house and possessions. 

Leaders of the unregistered Apostolic Nations for 

Christ Movement have reported that their phones are 

tapped, they are watched and threatened, and their 

members have been threatened with loss of 

employment if they do not leave their churches. 

In December 2008, parishioners of an 

unregistered church in Havana were abused by men 

who entered their church and threatened them with 

the loss of their jobs if they continued to attend the 

church. Also in the past year, some pastors from 

non-CCC churches have had their work deemed 

―illegal,‖ and have received threats that unless they 

stop their activities, their homes would be 

confiscated. 

There are also reports that the Bible 

Committee of the CCC is refusing to supply nonCCC denominations and churches with Bibles to 

distribute. Reportedly, the Bible Committee has 

acknowledged that a denomination‘s refusal to join 

the CCC is the reason for the denial of Bibles.

Political prisoners continue to be limited in 

their right to practice their religion, although the State 

Department reports access to religious leaders has 

improved in the past year. These prisoners report 

that they are not being informed of their right to 

religious assistance, there are frequent delays in their 

receiving responses to requests for religious visits, 

they are denied the right to receive visits from clergy 

members, Bibles and rosaries are confiscated, and 

they are prevented from attending religious services 

with other prisoners. 

The government sometimes discriminates in 

the area of employment. Converts to Christianity are 

reportedly encouraged to ―retire,‖ are not given 

promotions or pay raises, or are excluded from work 

functions or meetings because colleagues no longer 

consider them ―trustworthy.‖ Unofficially, people 

who are overtly religious also are excluded from 

diplomatic work or careers in journalism. 
159

Additionally, many are prohibited from joining the 

police, military, or other security forces.

Discrimination against Jehovah‘s Witnesses 

and Seventh-day Adventists persists. There continue 

to be many reports of discrimination and 

maltreatment in schools, in part because of the 

groups‘ refusal to participate in mandatory patriotic 

activities on Saturdays. Students who are Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses reported being severely punished, 

including public ridicule and physical abuse by 

school staff, for not saluting the flag or singing the 

national anthem. The State Department reports that 

many Seventh-day Adventists and Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses reportedly left school after the ninth grade 

because of ridicule and harassment and students from 

these groups who graduated with good grades 

reportedly were denied university admittance.

There were some small, positive religious 

freedom developments in Cuba in 2008, particularly 

for the Catholic Church following a February 2008 

visit by the Vatican‘s Secretary of State, Cardinal 

Tarcisio Bertone. In November, the Catholic Church 

held its first beatification ceremony in Cuba. 

President Castro and thousands of followers attended 

the ceremony, which was publicized countrywide 

leading up to the event. Additionally, for the first 

time in 50 years, five Catholic bishops celebrated 

Christmas mass in Cuba‘s largest prison, Combinado 

del Este penitentiary. The bishops were able to speak 

with inmates after the mass. The auxiliary bishop of 

Havana also said mass at La Condesa, a prison for 

foreigners in Havana province. More generally, there 

are reports that in the aftermath of the three 

hurricanes that hit Cuba in the fall of 2008, the 

government permitted religious organizations to 

expand their social service operations to assist those 

affected by the storms. 

In 2008, the ―Ladies in White‖—the wives 

of those arrested on ―Black Spring,‖ the day in 2003 

when 75 human rights activists, independent 

journalists, and opposition political figures were 

arrested on various charges—were for the most part 

not harassed as they attended Santa Rita Church in 

Havana, nor were they prevented from attending 

mass. However, the women were prevented from 

attending a mass in January 2009 at which Argentina 

President Kristina de Kirchner was in attendance. 

Religious denominations were granted some 

increased access to the state media. As in years past, 

Santeria, viewed as representative of the country‘s 

culture, is a regular feature of television 

programming. The government granted the CCC 

time for periodic broadcasts early Sunday mornings, 

and the Catholic Church, generally not allowed 

access to the public media, was permitted 15 minutes 

on Christmas day to air the Cardinal‘s Christmas 

mass. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

With regard to Cuba, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government should use all 

diplomatic means to urge the Cuban government to 

undertake the following measures aimed at bringing 

Cuba into compliance with its international legal 

obligations with respect to the freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief:

instruct, publicly and officially, the state security 

agencies to end the following practices and to 

hold those involved in any further such practices 

accountable for their conduct: the harassment of 

religious persons and other human rights 

activists, including those recently released from 

prison; the mistreatment of indigenous religious 

communities; and the harassment during 

religious services of the spouses of imprisoned 

human rights activists; 

revise government Directive 43 and Resolution 

46 restricting religious services in homes or on 

other personal property, as well as other national 

laws and regulations on religious activities, to 

bring them into conformity with international 

standards on freedom of religion or belief; 

cease, in accordance with international standards, 

interference with religious activities and the 

internal affairs of religious communities, such as 

denials of visas to religious workers, limitations 

on freedom of movement of religious workers, 

infiltration and intimidation of religious 
160

communities, arbitrary prevention of religious 

ceremonies and processions, and attempted 

interference in elections in religious bodies; and

take immediate steps to end restrictions on 

religious activities protected by international 

treaties and covenants, including: 

--ending the practice of arbitrarily denying 

registration to religious groups, as well as 

detaining or harassing members of religious 

groups and interfering with religious 

activities because of that unregistered status; 

--issuing permits for construction of new 

places of worship; 

--ending the practice of evictions and 

requisition of personal property of 

religious individuals or communities 

without due process, restitution, or 

provision of alternative accommodation; 

--securing the right to conduct religious 

education and distribute religious 

materials; and 

--lifting restrictions on humanitarian, 

medical, charitable, or social service work 

provided by religious communities and 

protecting persons who conduct such. 
161

Egypt

Serious problems of discrimination, 

intolerance, and other human rights violations against 

members of religious minorities, as well as nonconforming Muslims, remain widespread in Egypt.

The government has not taken sufficient steps to halt 

the repression of and discrimination against religious 

believers, including indigenous Coptic Orthodox 

Christians, or, in many cases, to punish those 

responsible for violence or other severe violations of 

religious freedom. The government also has not 

responded adequately to combat widespread and 

virulent anti-Semitism in the government-controlled 

media. On a positive note, in March 2009, Egypt‘s 

Supreme Administrative Court dismissed final 

appeals to a 2008 lower court verdict which 

overturned the ban on providing official identity 

documents to members of the Baha‘i faith, thus 

paving the way for Baha‘is to obtain such 

documents—though it is too soon to tell if this ruling 

will be implemented. In addition, there was 

increased public space to discuss and debate a wide 

range of religious freedom concerns in the media and 

other public fora, which, in previous years, was 

discouraged and prevented by Egyptian authorities. 

Nevertheless, due to persistent, serious concerns, 

Egypt remains on the Commission‘s Watch List and 

the situation will continue to be monitored to 

determine if it rises to a level that warrants 

designation as a ―country of particular concern,‖ or 

CPC. 

Egypt has a poor overall human rights 

record, including repressive practices that seriously 

violate freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 

or belief. The government maintains tight control 

over all Muslim religious institutions, including 

mosques and religious endowments, which are 

encouraged to promote an officially sanctioned 

interpretation of Islam. According to Egyptian 

officials, the government regulates these Muslim 

institutions and activities as a necessary precaution 

against religious extremism and terrorism. The state 

appoints and pays the salaries of all Sunni Muslim 

imams, all mosques must be licensed by the 

government, and sermons are monitored by the 

government. 

Human rights organizations inside the 

country are concerned that Islamist extremism 

continues to advance in Egypt, with detrimental 

effects on the prospects for democratic reform, 

religious tolerance, and the rights of women, girls, 

and members of religious minorities. Some believe 

that the government is not acting to counteract this 

problem, especially in the areas of public education 

and the media, where extremist influence is growing.

There is continued prosecution in state 

security courts and imprisonment for those accused 

of ―unorthodox‖ Islamic religious beliefs or practices 

that insult the three ―heavenly religions‖: Judaism, 

Christianity, and Islam. Article 98(f) of the Penal 

Code, which prohibits citizens from ―ridiculing or 

insulting heavenly religions or inciting sectarian 

strife,‖ has been applied to prosecute alleged acts by 

purportedly ―unorthodox‖ Muslims. These include 

Muslim groups, such as the Koranists—a very small 

group in Egypt that accepts only the Koran as the 

sole source of religious guidance and thus has been 

accused by the Egyptian government of deviating 

from Islamic law. In October 2008, an Egyptian 

blogger, Reda Abdel Rahman, affiliated with the 

Koranist movement, was arrested and charged with 

―insulting Islam,‖ reportedly because his blog called 

for political and religious reform in Egypt. After 

nearly three months in detention, during which he 

alleges he was physically abused, Rahman was 

released in January 2009. 

In February 2007, a court in Alexandria 

convicted and sentenced Abdel Karim Suleiman, a 22 

year-old Internet blogger and former student at AlAzhar University, to four years in prison: three years 

for blaspheming Islam and inciting sectarian strife 

and one year for criticizing Egyptian President Hosni 

Mubarak. Suleiman had used his blog to criticize 

some activities of Al-Azhar University and attacks on 

Coptic Christians in Alexandria in October 2005. In 

March 2007, an appeals court upheld his sentence. 

He currently is serving the remainder of the four-year 

prison term. 
162

The Emergency Law, which has been in 

effect since 1981 and was renewed for another two 

years in May 2008, restricts many human rights, 

including freedom of religion or belief as well as 

freedom of expression, assembly, and association. 

Under the Emergency Law, the security forces 

mistreat and torture prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and 

detain persons, hold detainees in prolonged pretrial 

detention, and occasionally engage in mass arrests. 

Thousands of persons have been detained without 

charge on suspicion of illegal terrorist or political 

activity; others are serving sentences after being 

convicted on similar charges. Egyptian and 

international human rights groups have asserted that 

the primary purpose of the State Emergency and 

Military Courts is to punish political activism and 

dissent, even when that dissent is peaceful. These 

courts also are used to detain and try individuals 

deemed by the state to have ―unorthodox‖ or 

―deviant‖ Islamic or other religious beliefs or 

practices. Since 2005, Egypt‘s National Human 

Rights Commission has called for the Emergency 

Law to be lifted.

Members of Egypt‘s non-Muslim religious 

minorities, particularly Christians and Baha‘is, report 

discrimination, interference, harassment, and 

surveillance by the Egyptian state security services. 

Over the past few years, there has been an upsurge of 

attacks by Islamists targeting Coptic Orthodox 

Christians. Only in very few cases have perpetrators 

been arrested and convicted. In November 2008, 

thousands of Muslim protestors attacked a Coptic 

Orthodox church in a Cairo suburb, burning part of it 

as well as a nearby shop, and leaving five people 

injured. In January and May 2008, armed Muslim 

Bedouins attacked the Abu Fana monastery in Minya 

province. In the May attack, one Muslim died, at 

least three Christians were wounded, and several 

monks were abducted and abused. Three abducted 

monks reportedly were rescued by Egyptian security 

services. Even though ownership of the land at issue 

is disputed, Christian advocacy groups claim that 

Egyptian authorities‘ repeated characterization of the 

incident as a ―land dispute‖ ignores the severity of 

violence faced by Coptic Orthodox Christians. 

Several of the Muslim attackers remain in custody, 

but no charges have been filed against them. Two 

Christians were detained and accused of killing the 

Muslim man; they have alleged physical abuse while 

in detention. Following the May incident and other 

previous attacks on the monastery, Egyptian 

authorities organized ―reconciliation meetings‖ 

between the local Bedouin population and the monks. 

In September 2008, six Christians in Port 

Said were arrested after local authorities raided their 

café because it remained open during the Muslim 

fasting period of Ramadan. The six were charged 

with resisting arrest and assaulting authorities and 

were sentenced in January 2009 to three years in 

prison. They also alleged physical abuse. In 

February 2008, Muslims set fire to Christian-owned 

shops in the village of Armant in Upper Egypt after 

reports surfaced of a relationship between a Muslim 

woman and a Coptic Christian man. Security forces 

closed shops under a security decree and detained 

eight Muslims and one Copt, all of whom were 

subsequently released. In December 2007, in the 

Upper Egypt town of Esna, a number of Muslims 

attacked a church and 26 Christian-owned shops. 

This incident reportedly was sparked by rumors that a 

Coptic Christian shop owner lifted the veil of a 

Muslim women he suspected of shoplifting. Local 

authorities responded by arresting more than a dozen 

alleged perpetrators. However, the authorities 

subsequently released them without charges. Instead, 

the local and national governments agreed to provide 

compensation to the Coptic victims. The governor of 

Qena distributed compensation that totaled $230,000 

to the shop owners whose property had been 

destroyed or damaged. 

Violent attacks on Christian communities 

over the years have resulted in very few prosecutions, 

including the 2004 Court of Cassation decision to 

uphold the acquittal of 94 of 96 persons suspected of 

involvement in the killing of 21 Christians in AlKosheh in late 1999 and early 2000. Some Egyptian 

human rights advocates believe that Egyptian 

authorities should investigate claims of police 

negligence and inadequate prosecution of those 

involved in this violence. 
163

In addition to violence, Christians face 

official and societal discrimination. Although 

Egyptian government officials claim that there is no 

law or policy that prevents Christians from holding 

senior positions, the Coptic Orthodox Christian 

community faces de facto discrimination in 

appointments to high-level government and military 

posts. There are only a handful of Christians in the 

upper ranks of the security services and armed forces. 

There is one Christian governor out of 28, one 

elected Member of Parliament out of 454 seats, no 

known university presidents or deans, and very few 

legislators or judges. According to the State 

Department, public university training programs for 

Arabic-language teachers exclude non-Muslims 

because the curriculum involves the study of the 

Koran. Under Egyptian law, Muslim men can marry 

Christian women but Muslim women are prohibited 

from marrying Christian men. Contacts between 

such persons are often a source of tension between 

Muslim and Christian communities in Egypt. 

For all Christian groups, government 

permission is required to build a new church or repair 

an existing one, and the approval process for church 

construction is time-consuming and inflexible. 

President Mubarak has the authority to approve 

applications for new construction of churches, and 

more than 100 applications to build new churches 

await his decision. Although most of these 

applications were submitted more than five years 

ago, the majority have not received a response. Even 

some permits that have been approved cannot, in fact, 

be acted upon because of interference by the state 

security services at both the local and national levels. 

In December 2005, President Mubarak signed a 

decree transferring authority for granting permits to 

renovate or repair existing churches from the 

president to the country‘s 28 governors. Although 

this was initially viewed as a welcome step, some 

churches continue to face significant delays in 

receiving permits and some local authorities continue 

to prevent maintenance and renovation of existing 

churches.

Although neither the Constitution nor the 

Penal Code prohibits proselytizing or conversion, the 

State Department has observed that the Egyptian 

government uses Article 98(f) of the Penal Code to 

prosecute any alleged proselytizing by non-Muslims. 

Known converts from Islam to Christianity generally 

receive scrutiny from the state security services; most 

conversions therefore are done privately. In some 

instances, converts, who fear government harassment 

if they officially register their change in religion from 

Islam to Christianity, reportedly have altered their 

own identification cards and other official documents 

to reflect their new religious affiliation. Some 

individuals have been arrested for falsifying identity 

documents following conversion. Other converts 

have fled the country for fear of government and 

societal repercussions.

In February 2008, in an important case, 

Egypt‘s Supreme Administrative Court reversed a 

lower court‘s ruling prohibiting citizens from 

returning to Christianity after converting to Islam. 

However, the court also ruled that, while the 12 

individuals‘ identity cards could list their religious 

affiliation as ―Christian,‖ the documents also must 

state that the individual is a ―formerly declared 

Muslim‖—opening a new potential justification for

police harassment, prejudicial treatment by officials 

responsible for providing public services, and/or 

societal violence. The ruling, moreover, may be 

short-lived. In March 2008, an Egyptian judge 

appealed it to the Supreme Constitutional Court, 

arguing that the decision conflicts with the Egyptian 

constitutional provision that makes Islamic law the 

principal source of legislation. As of this writing, the 

appeal is pending. In December 2008, an 

administrative court in Alexandria awarded Fathi 

Labib Yousef the right to register as a Christian after 

spending 31 years officially identified as a Muslim. 

Yousef was raised Coptic Orthodox Christian but 

converted to Islam in 1974 in order to divorce his 

Christian wife. He returned to Christianity in 2005, 

but the local civil registry office refused to 

acknowledge his change of religion. Despite the 

favorable court ruling, however, it is not clear if 

Yousef has been able to obtain his new documents. 

In recent years, many local government registry 

offices have not changed official identity documents 

to reflect new religious affiliations, citing various 

excuses, despite judicial rulings that legally mandate 

such action.
164

In contrast to these re-conversion cases, the 

Egyptian government generally does not recognize 

conversions of Muslims to other religions. In 

January 2008, an Egyptian court denied Mohammed 

Hegazy the right to change his identity card to reflect 

his conversion to Christianity from Islam. Citing the 

constitutional provision that Islamic law is the 

principal source of legislation, the judge ruled that, 

since Hegazy was born Muslim and Islam is the 

―final and most complete religion,‖ he could not 

convert to another, allegedly less ―complete‖ belief. 

Hegazy, the first Egyptian Muslim convert to 

Christianity to sue the government to recognize such 

a conversion, has received death threats for trying to 

exercise the right to change his religion and is in 

hiding. Hegazy has appealed the January 2008 

ruling. In the past year, a second convert from Islam 

to Christianity, Maher El-Gohary, who also is in 

hiding because of threats from extremists, has sued to 

change the religious status on his identity card. 

Islamist lawyers who are not parties to the case have 

argued that the court not only should deny the 

change, but convict El-Gohary of apostasy. In 

February 2009, when requesting legal documents at 

the local registry office, a government official 

berated him, which incited some patrons to verbally 

assault and shove him, and one individual struck ElGohary with a broom. Because El-Gohary felt 

compelled to leave the office without obtaining the 

desired papers needed for the court hearing in the 

case, the judge postponed the case citing the lack of 

documentation.

All Baha‘i institutions and community 

activities have been banned since 1960 by a 

presidential decree. As a result, Baha‘is, who 

number approximately 2000 in Egypt, are unable to 

meet or engage in group religious activities. Over the 

years, Baha‘is have been arrested and imprisoned 

because of their religious beliefs, often on charges of 

insulting Islam. Almost all Baha‘i community 

members are known to the state security services, and 

many are regularly subject to surveillance and other 

forms of harassment. Al-Azhar‘s Islamic Research 

Center has issued fatwas (religious edicts) in recent 

years urging the continued ban on the Baha‘i 

community and condemning Baha‘is as apostates. 

There has been increased intolerance of 

Baha‘is in both the independent and governmentcontrolled media in recent years. In March 2009, 

several Baha‘i homes in a village in the Sohag 

province were vandalized by Muslim villagers. 

Egyptian human rights groups immediately 

condemned the violence and said that a contributing 

factor to the attacks was incitement by a media 

commentator who, during a television program, 

labeled an individual member of the Baha‘i faith an 

apostate and called for her to be killed. According to 

the Egyptian Interior Ministry, several alleged 

perpetrators have been arrested.

In January 2008, Cairo‘s Court of 

Administrative Justice overturned the ban on 

providing official identity documents to members of 

the Baha‘i faith, allowing them to put a dash or a 

symbol in the space designated for religious 

affiliation. Until this ruling, identity documents 

permitted registration in only one of the three 

officially approved religions—Islam, Christianity, or 

Judaism—thereby effectively preventing Baha‘is 

from obtaining such documents, which are required 

in Egypt for many basic transactions and public 

services, and without which it is illegal to go out in 

public. However, the ruling only permits Baha‘is 

who were issued identity documents in the past to 

receive the new version, and does not apply to those 

who have never been issued such documents. Over 

the past few years, some Baha‘is lost their jobs and a 

few young Baha‘is were dismissed from universities 

because they did not have identity cards. Because the 

Baha‘i faith is banned, the community also has 

difficulty obtaining birth and death certificates, as

well as obtaining or renewing passports. 

Although the Egyptian government did not 

challenge the January 2008 court ruling within the 

time period in which a party to the case could appeal, 

the implementation of the verdict was stalled for 

more than a year due to lawsuits filed by Islamist 

groups who were not parties. Finally, in March 2009, 

the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that it would 

dismiss all remaining appeals and thus pave the way 

for Baha‘is to obtain government-mandated identity 

cards. In April, the Egyptian Ministry of Interior 
165

published a decree permitting individuals to obtain 

government documents without identifying 

themselves as belonging to any particular religion. As 

of this writing, however, it is not clear if the decree 

has been implemented in practice and whether or not 

any Baha‘is in Egypt have been able to secure official 

identity documents. 

Material vilifying Jews—with both 

historical and new anti-Semitic stereotypes—appears 

regularly in the state-controlled and semi-official 

media. This material includes anti-Semitic cartoons, 

television programming such as a 24-part series 

based on the notorious anti-Semitic ―Protocols of the 

Elders of Zion,‖ and Holocaust denial literature. 

Egyptian authorities have not taken adequate steps to 

combat anti-Semitism in the media, despite official 

claims that they have advised journalists to avoid 

anti-Semitism. According to the State Department, in 

2008, anti-Semitism in the media was common but 

―less prevalent than in recent years.‖ Human rights 

groups cite persistent, virulent anti-Semitism in the 

education system, which is increasingly under the 

influence of Islamist extremists, a development the 

Egyptian government has not adequately addressed. 

The small Jewish community of approximately 125 

people owns its property, and finances required 

maintenance largely through private donations. In 

2007, Egyptian authorities, including the Minister of 

Culture and the head of the Ministry‘s Supreme 

Council of Antiquities, pledged to move forward over 

the next few years with the restoration of at least 

seven synagogues under the Council‘s supervision as 

well as the possible development of a Jewish 

museum in Egypt.

After several years of close surveillance, 

authorities increased repressive measures in late 2005 

and early 2006 against the small community of 

Jehovah‘s Witnesses, who are not recognized by the 

Egyptian government. After a period of improved 

conditions and a significant decrease in harassment 

and abuse by government officials in 2006, the 

number of interrogations by Egypt‘s state security 

services of Jehovah‘s Witnesses increased in 2007 

and 2008. In particular, one member of the state 

security services in Cairo increasingly has used 

intimidation and threats of physical abuse to extract 

information about co-religionists. Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses in Egypt continued to pursue legal 

recognition but have not made any significant 

progress with Egyptian authorities in the past year.

The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist 

political groups which advocate or seek to establish 

an Islamic state in Egypt based on their interpretation 

of Islamic law are illegal organizations under a law 

prohibiting political parties based on religion. 

Despite these restrictions, the Muslim Brotherhood 

has become much more visible in Egypt‘s political 

landscape. In fact, more than 100 members of the 

Muslim Brotherhood ran as independent candidates 

in the December 2005 parliamentary elections and 

won 88 seats, up significantly from their previous 15. 

The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political 

groups have used violence in the past to achieve their 

aims, including the assassination of President Anwar 

al-Sadat in 1981 and attacks on foreign tourists. 

Some of these groups persist in advocating violence. 

Egyptian security forces continue to arrest hundreds 

of suspected Islamists every year, and some are 

subject to torture and/or prolonged detention without 

charge. Human rights groups that closely monitor the 

detention of such individuals claim that the vast 

majority are in prison as a result of their political 

beliefs or activities, and not on the basis of religion. 

On a positive note, in 2008 the National 

Council for Human Rights (NCHR), a governmentappointed advisory body, released its fourth annual 

report in which it documented cases impacting Coptic 

Orthodox and other Christians, recommended a 

resolution for official recognition of Baha‘is, 

discussed concerns facing the Jehovah‘s Witnesses, 

and criticized both religious textbooks in schools and 

the curriculum in the Ministry of Higher Education‘s 

Imams‘ Institution for failing to address human rights 

topics. The report also encouraged the Egyptian 

government to pass a law for all religious groups 

addressing the construction of new places of worship. 

The NCHR also called for the formation of a 

permanent national anti-discrimination league which 

would be charged with the elimination of any form of 

discrimination based on religion, gender, or ethnic 

origin. 
166

In addition, over the past few years, the 

Egyptian government has adopted several measures 

to acknowledge the religious pluralism of Egyptian 

society, including increased efforts to promote 

interfaith activity. In April 2008, the first national 

conference of the organization Egyptians Against 

Religious Discrimination was held in Cairo. In 

February 2008, Sheikh Tantawy of Al-Azhar 

University opened the Al-Azhar-Vatican Interreligious Dialogue Conference. This conference 

issued a final communiqué highlighting statements 

by Pope Benedict on the need for Christianity and 

Islam to respect each other‘s religious beliefs and 

symbols. 

Throughout the past year, the Commission 

continued to meet with representatives of the various 

religious communities in Egypt, as well as with 

human rights organizations, academics, and other 

experts. 

In March 2009, the Commission wrote to 

U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey urging 

her to raise specific religious freedom issues with 

Egyptian officials. In February, H.Res. 200, a 

resolution calling on the Egyptian government to 

respect human rights, was introduced in the U.S. 

House of Representatives; the resolution includes 

findings and recommendations from the 

Commission‘s May 2008 annual report. In October 

2008, Commission staff presented on religious 

freedom conditions in Egypt at the American Islamic 

Congress‘ Capitol Hill Distinguished Speaker‘s 

Series on ―Democracy in Egypt: Can it Wait?‖ In 

February 2008, the Commission issued a statement 

calling on the Egyptian government to respect the 

judicial rulings discussed above on identity cards for 

Baha‘is and Christian converts. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

I. Taking Most Responsibility for Religious 

Affairs Out of the Hands of the Egyptian Security 

Services

The Commission recommends that the U.S. 

government urge the Egyptian government to:

 remove de facto responsibility for religious 

affairs from the state security services, with the 

exception of cases involving violence or the 

advocacy of violence, including conspiracy to 

commit acts of terror;

 repeal the state of emergency, in existence since 

1981, in order to allow for the full consolidation 

of the rule of law in Egypt;

 implement procedures that would ensure that all 

places of worship are subject to the same 

transparent, non-discriminatory, and efficient 

regulations regarding construction and 

maintenance, and take special measures to 

preserve Coptic Orthodox and other Christian 

properties and antiquities, which too often are 

subject to societal violence and official neglect; 

and

 repeal Article 98(f) of the Penal Code, which 

―prohibits citizens from ridiculing or insulting 

heavenly religions or inciting sectarian strife‖; 

allow for full access to the constitutional and 

international guarantees of the rule of law and 

due process for those individuals charged with 

violating Article 98(f); and release all individuals 

convicted under Article 98(f) on account of their 

religion or belief.

II. Implementing Additional Reform in Order to 

Comply with International Human Rights 

Standards

The U.S. government should also urge the 

Egyptian government to:

 repeal a 1960 presidential decree banning 

members of the Baha‘i community from 

practicing their faith;

exclude from all educational textbooks any 

language or images that promote enmity, 

intolerance, hatred, or violence toward any group 

of persons based on faith, gender, ethnicity, or 

nationality, and include in school curricula, 

textbooks, and teacher training the concepts of 

tolerance and respect for human rights, including 
167

religious freedom, ensuring that textbooks meet 

the standards set out in the Universal Declaration 

of Human Rights;*

permit any Egyptian citizen to learn voluntarily 

the Coptic language in the public school system; 

 cease all messages of hatred and intolerance, 

particularly toward Jews and Baha‘is, in the 

government-controlled media and take active 

measures to promote understanding and respect 

for members of these and other minority 

religious communities;

 take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish 

acts of anti-Semitism, including condemnation of 

anti-Semitic acts, and, while vigorously 

protecting freedom of expression, counteract 

anti-Semitic rhetoric and other organized antiSemitic activities;

fully implement the January 2008 ruling of the 

Court of Administrative Justice, which 

overturned the ban on providing official identity 

documents to members of the Baha‘i faith;

remove the designation ―formerly declared 

Muslim‖ from identity cards for those Christians 

who have converted back to Christianity from 

Islam, which makes the persons involved 

vulnerable to official harassment and societal 

violence;

 ensure that every Egyptian is protected against 

discrimination in social, labor, and other rights 

by modifying the national identity card either to 

omit mention of religious affiliation or make 

optional any mention of religious affiliation;

 more actively investigate religious-based 

violence against Egyptian citizens, particularly 

 

* Criteria for reviewing textbooks and other 

educational materials have been developed by several 

international bodies, including UNESCO. For the 

UNESCO criteria, see 

http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/34_71.pdf.

Coptic Christians, prosecute perpetrators 

responsible for the violence, and ensure 

compensation for victims;

 investigate claims of police negligence and 

inadequate prosecution of those involved in the 

Al-Kosheh case, as well as other recent instances 

of violence targeting individuals on account of 

their religion or belief, particularly members of 

the vulnerable Coptic Orthodox Christian 

community; 

 implement the 2002 recommendations of the UN 

Committee Against Torture, as well as other 

relevant international human rights treaties to 

which Egypt is a party; and

halt its practice at the UN Human Rights Council 

and other international fora of introducing the socalled ―defamation of religions‖ resolution, 

which violates the internationally-guaranteed 

rights to freedom of religion and expression.

III. Ensuring that U.S. Government Aid 

Promotes Prompt and Genuine Political and Legal 

Reforms and is Offered Directly to Egyptian Civil 

Society Groups

In addition, the Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should: 

establish a timetable for implementation of 

political and human rights reforms, including 

steps described in the recommendations above; if 

deadlines are not met, the U.S. government 

should reconsider the appropriate allocation of 

its assistance to the Egyptian government;

continue direct support for human rights and 

other civil society or non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) without vetting by the 

Egyptian government;

urge the Egyptian government to ensure that 

NGOs engaged in human rights work can pursue 

their activities without undue government 

interference, and monitor and report to what 

extent this is accomplished; and
168

expand support of initiatives to advance human 

rights, promote religious tolerance, and foster 

civic education among all Egyptians, including 

support for:

--civic education and public awareness programs 

that reflect the multi-confessional nature of 

Egyptian society and the diversity of Egypt‘s 

religious past;

--efforts by Egyptian and international NGOs to 

review Egyptian educational curricula and 

textbooks for messages of hatred, intolerance, 

and the advocacy of violence, and to monitor 

equal access to education by girls and boys 

regardless of religion or belief; and

--preservation of Egyptian Jewish properties and 

antiquities in publicly accessible sites, such as 

a museum, so that all Egyptians can better 

understand past and present Jewish 

contributions to their history and culture. 

The Commission also recommends that the U.S. 

Congress should: 

in the context of the annual congressional 

appropriation for U.S. assistance to Egypt, 

require the State Department to report every six 

months on the government of Egypt‘s progress 

on the issues described in this chapter, as well as 

on the U.S. government‘s progress in offering 

funding directly to Egyptian NGOs without prior 

Egyptian government approval. 
169

Indonesia

Indonesia‘s transition to democracy since 

1998 has contributed to an overall improvement in 

conditions for human rights in the country. The 

majority of Indonesia‘s diverse religious 

communities operate openly and with few 

restrictions, and there are vibrant public discussions 

among politicians and religious leaders about the role 

of religion in political life. However, over the past 

several years, minority religious groups have faced 

increased discrimination, harassment, and even 

violence perpetrated by extremist groups, state 

agencies, and community organizations and 

sometimes tolerated by segments of the Indonesian 

government. Indonesia was placed on the 

Commission‘s Watch List in 2002 due to sectarian 

violence in Central Sulawesi and the Malukus. 

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono‘s government 

continues to take active steps to address terrorism and 

past sectarian violence in these regions. The 

Commission remains concerned, however, about new 

government decrees used to severely restrict, and 

even ban, the activities of the Ahmadi community; 

forced closures and vandalism of places of worship 

belonging to religious minorities; the growth and 

political influence of religious extremists; human 

rights abuses perpetrated by the military and police; 

and the harassment and arrest of individuals 

considered ―deviant‖ under Indonesian law. Because 

of these persistent concerns, the Commission 

continues to place Indonesia on its Watch List in 

2009. Given the Obama Administration‘s interest in 

creating a new ―comprehensive partnership‖ with 

Indonesia, there will be important opportunities to 

work together to advance the freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion and related human rights in 

both Indonesia and the Southeast Asian region. 

Islam in Indonesia is known historically for 

its tolerance and accommodation of a variety of 

indigenous cultural traditions. Over the past decade, 

there has been a revival of Islamic awareness and 

piety, previously repressed by the former military 

government. The wearing of Islamic dress has reemerged as an outward sign of devotion; the number 

of Islamic banks, businesses, and publications is 

growing; and Islamic-themed art and fiction are 

becoming more popular. Indonesian Muslim leaders 

have engaged in lively discussions on the nature of 

democracy and pluralism, the separation of religion 

and state, women‘s rights, and human rights more 

generally. There are numerous religiously-based 

political parties and the role of Islam in politics and 

society, as well as the growth of religiously-justified 

terrorism, are topics discussed widely on television 

and radio and in numerous public fora. 

The revival of Islamic piety, coupled with 

Indonesia‘s new democratic openness, has 

strengthened Indonesia‘s mainstream Muslim 

institutions, but it also has nurtured a small but 

growing number of groups espousing intolerance and 

extremism under the banner of Islamic orthodoxy. 

Over the past several years, the influence, visibility, 

and activities of extremist groups have increased. 

Although the most radical groups do not have deep 

political support, as evidenced by initial results of the 

April 2009 parliamentary elections, they have 

successfully pressed their agenda both publicly and 

politically, pressuring government officials through 

private lobbying, demonstrations, threats, and mob 

action. The recent Joint Ministerial Decree on the 

Ahmadi and the Anti-Pornography Law, as well as 

the proliferation of local sharia-inspired laws in 

provincial areas, were supported actively by 

extremist groups to advance a certain religious 

agenda. Coalitions of moderate Muslims, Christians, 

Hindus, Buddhists, and other religious and civil 

society groups have opposed these measures, but 

without much recent success. In addition to the 

measures cited above, there continue to be a 

disturbing number of instances of societal violence 

targeting religious minorities and the intimidation, 

arrest, detention, and harassment of allegedly 

heterodox Muslims and some non-Muslims for 

allegedly ―denigrating religion,‖ ―deviancy,‖ or 

―blasphemy.‖ Given that 2009 is an important 

election year in Indonesia, the full protection of 

religious freedom for all of Indonesia‘s diverse 

religious communities will be an important 

bellwether of Indonesia‘s commitment to democracy, 

religious tolerance, and pluralism. 

 

In 2002, the Commission placed Indonesia 

on its Watch List after sectarian violence in Central 
170

Sulawesi and the Malukus claimed thousands of lives 

and displaced tens of thousands of others. The 

Commission remains concerned about ongoing 

sectarian tensions in these regions, but notes that 

religiously-motivated violence has declined sharply 

in recent years and police have arrested or killed—

and local courts have sentenced or executed—

individuals responsible for past acts of violence. 

Local civic and religious leaders and government 

officials, including Vice President Josef Kalla, have 

worked to promote reconciliation and defuse tensions 

in former conflict areas. The Indonesian Government 

reportedly has committed funds for local programs in 

conflict mediation and interfaith economic 

development. Local governments have instituted 

interfaith development projects to rebuild churches, 

mosques, and homes destroyed in past violence. 

According to the State Department‘s 2008 Country 

Reports on Human Rights Practices, police have 

arrested dozens of suspects, both Christians and 

Muslims, for past involvement in sectarian violence. 

Sectarian tensions, however, persisted in the Malukus 

during the past year. Isolated incidents of sectarian 

violence caused at least five deaths and the 

destruction of dozens of homes and religious venues 

in the region. Over the past year, the village of 

Horale on the island of Seram was attacked, leaving 

four dead and dozens injured. Police quickly named 

four suspects, but there is no indication that arrests 

have been made. In December 2008, police and 

military units were sent to calm tensions in Masohi, 

Northern Maluku as a mob burned houses and a 

church and injured dozens after a Christian teacher 

was accused of denigrating Islam in her classroom. 

Both the teacher and the leader of the mob were 

arrested. The local inter-religious harmony board 

(FKUB) criticized the police for not taking 

preventive action when the accusations against the 

teacher first surfaced. These incidents were the 

largest of several clashes between Christians and 

Muslims in the Malukus, including bomb blasts, 

fights, and drive-by shootings. Reports indicate that 

the police acted quickly in most cases. Local 

religious leaders also have condemned violence and 

jointly expressed their desire to avoid the type of 

large-scale violence that occurred between 1999 and 

2002. 

Extremist and terrorist groups continue to 

train, recruit, and operate in Central and South 

Sulawesi. These groups frequently have been 

responsible for attacks on members of religious 

minorities and police, instigating mob actions to 

restrict religious activities, and organizing political 

efforts to segregate Central Sulwesi into Muslim and 

Christian enclaves. Since widespread rioting and 

sectarian clashes in late 2007, there have been few 

new incidents of violence. The Indonesian 

government has taken active steps to promote 

stability, but tensions continue to exist in the region 

stoked by political and economic rivalries between 

Muslim and Christian elites. Police action has led to 

the arrest and sentencing of individuals who 

organized the beheading of three young girls in 2006. 

Police also have apprehended recently at least 10 

others who confessed to participating in various 

bombings, beheadings, and shootings in Central 

Sulawesi over the past two years. Police in Central 

Sulawesi claim that they have arrested or killed 18 of 

the 29 individuals ―most wanted‖ for sectarian 

violence in that region, including two individuals 

accused of the 2006 assassination of Reverend Irianto 

Kongkoli. However, despite some successes in 

rooting out suspected terrorists, police tactics, 

particularly those of an elite counter-terrorism unit 

Detachment 88, may be exacerbating sectarian 

tensions in Sulawesi. Local religious leaders claim 

that Detachment 88‘s harsh tactics increased 

sympathy for extremists in Central Sulawesi and 

attracted religious militants from other regions. 

Many grievances remain from the sectarian conflict 

that occurred in 1999-2001, including fears that few 

of the instigators of the violence will be held 

accountable, and a large number of persons remain 

displaced. Extremist groups, such as Mujahidin 

Kompak (MK) and Tanah Runtuh continue to train 

and operate in remote areas of Sulawesi. The June 

2007 arrest of suspected terrorist leader Abu Dujana 

confirmed that terrorist networks aim to stoke 

sectarian tensions in Central Sulawesi through 

bombings and assassinations of religious leaders. 

The Indonesian government continues to 

make notable progress in capturing and prosecuting 

persons accused of specific terrorist activities, 

including individuals on the United States‘ most 
171

wanted list. In 2008, police raided a Jemaah 

Islamiyah (JI) compound in Central Sulawesi and 

arrested dozens of suspects including Ainul Bahri and 

Zuhroni, two top JI leaders. Ustadz Rian, one of the 

primary organizers of JI‘s terrorist operations, was 

killed during the raid. In April 2008, an Indonesian 

court officially declared JI a terrorist organization 

and sentenced its military commander, Abu Dujana, 

to 15 years imprisonment for stockpiling weapons, 

harboring fugitives, and committing terrorist 

violence. The court‘s decision could pave the way 

for the banning of JI in Indonesia, something that the 

Indonesian government has heretofore been reluctant 

to do. In January 2009 ten militants with ties to JI 

were tried for killing a Christian schoolteacher, 

illegally possessing explosives, harboring fugitives, 

and plotting to bomb a café. The primary suspect, 

Mohammad Hasan, a Singaporean English teacher, 

trained with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and served as a 

courier for Osama bin Laden in 2000. 

Public support for terrorist organizations and 

tactics has declined dramatically in Indonesia since 

the 2005 Bali bombing. However, at the same time, 

the number and influence of groups pressing political 

and religious agendas under the banner of Islamic 

orthodoxy continues to grow. Though these groups 

are a small minority of Indonesia‘s diverse Muslim 

community, they are a challenge to Indonesia‘s 

image as a democracy committed to religious 

tolerance and pluralism. Mainstream Muslim leaders 

and members of religious minorities report that they 

continue to face pressure, intimidation, or sometimes 

violence from protests organized by extremist groups. 

According to the Indonesian Institute on Democracy 

and Peace (SETARA) and the Wahid Institute, two 

Indonesian think tanks tracking human rights 

conditions in the country, communal violence and the 

arrest and detention of predominantly Muslim 

individuals considered ―deviant‖ under Indonesia law 

have expanded in recent years, and mob violence 

targeting the Ahmadi community and some Christian 

religious venues also have continued to increase. 

Members of extremist religious groups such as the 

Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian 

Council of Martyrs (MMI), the Alliances for AntiApostates (AGAP), the Islamic Umat Forum (FUI), 

and Laskar Jundullah have used pressure, 

intimidation, and violence against those whose views 

or actions they found unacceptable. Their actions 

have included intimidating judges and local officials; 

vandalizing and destroying buildings belonging to 

religious minorities, including Christian churches, 

Hindu temples, and Ahmadi and Shi‘a mosques; 

threatening moderate Muslims or those considered to 

have ―deviant‖ theological views; and forcing the 

closure of some non-Muslim businesses during 

Ramadan. The Indonesian government does not 

officially condone or encourage societal violence by 

extremist groups and has sometimes spoken out 

strongly against it. Nevertheless, perpetrators of 

violence are not always arrested by local officials, 

provincial laws that differ from national laws 

concerning the protection of religious minorities are 

not challenged, and the government continues to 

provide funds for the Coordinating Board for 

Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakor 

Pacem) and the Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI), 

both which have called for action to ban ―deviant‖ 

religious groups and other peaceful religious 

activities, including interfaith prayer, interfaith 

marriage, religious pluralism, and yoga. 

In the past year, according to Indonesian 

religious groups and human rights activists, there 

have been at least 35 separate incidents of mob action 

targeting the worship activities, venues, or activities 

of religious groups and organizations. Members of 

the Ahmadi Muslim religious minority continue to 

experience the most severe restrictions. Violence and 

legal restrictions targeting the Ahmadi have risen 

dramatically since the July 2005 fatwa by the 

Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI) that condemned 

them as a heretical sect. Since the MUI fatwa was 

issued, extremist groups, some religious leaders, and 

the government‘s Coordinating Board for Monitoring 

Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakor Pakem) have 

sought a nationwide ban on Ahmadi practice. In June 

2008, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Home 

Ministry issued a Joint Ministerial Letter on the 

Restriction of Ahmadi. While not an outright ban, 

the Joint Ministerial letter ―froze‖ their activities to 

private worship and prohibited them from 

proselytizing, although it also outlawed vigilantism 

against them. Following the decree, provincial 

governors in West Sumatra, South Sumatra, and West 
172

Nusa Tenngarra issued outright bans on Ahmadi 

activity. The National Commission of the Indonesian 

Human Rights (Komnas-HAM) issued a report 

condemning atrocities against Ahmadi in the past, 

blaming the MUI fatwa for trigging the violence and 

some governmental officials for helping to 

implement the fatwa. The Indonesian government 

has not yet signaled whether it will review or 

overturn the provincial bans under the authority 

granted it by the 2000 Regional Autonomy Law. 

The SETARA Institute tallied 188 incidents 

of violence and ―religious intolerance‖ targeting the 

Ahmadi since January 2008, including the 

vandalizing or closure of 20 mosques and other 

facilities owned by the Ahmadi community. On 

April 28, 2008, a mob attacked and tried to burn 

down a house where members of the Ahmadi 

religious group were meeting in Sukabumi, Curug 

district, West Java. During April 2008, four 

additional Ahmadi meeting places were vandalized in 

West Java. Police arrested and interrogated several 

suspects and are reportedly now guarding Ahmadi 

mosques in the region. In June 2008, mobs attacked 

Ahmadi mosques in Cianjur, West Java and forcibly 

closed the local Ahmadi headquarters in Makassar, 

South Sulawesi. There continue to be at least 180 

Ahmadi residents living in an internally displaced 

persons (IDP) camp in Mataram, Lombok after a mob 

attacked their residences in 2005. They have not 

been allowed to return to their homes and some have 

indicated that they want to seek asylum. On June 1, 

2008, the National Alliance for the Freedom of 

Religion and Faith (AKKBB) held a rally in Jakarta 

to support the right of the Ahmadi to exist free from 

persecution. The rally was attacked by members of 

the FPI, and more than 70 people were injured, some 

seriously. Reports indicate that approximately 1,200 

police were present during the attacks, but they 

neither stopped the violence nor arrested anyone at 

the scene. President Yudhoyono condemned the FPI 

attack and police arrested 10 suspects, including FPI 

chief Rizieq Shibab and chair Munarman, who were 

given 18 month sentences for inciting the June 1

attacks. 

The restrictions and violence faced by the 

Ahmadi community reflect a larger trend in 

Indonesia, as provincial officials have harassed, 

detained, and sentenced allegedly hereterodox 

Muslims for ―deviancy.‖ Since 2003, over 150 

individuals have been arrested or briefly detained 

under Article 156a of the criminal code, according to 

which ―expressing feelings of hostility, hatred or 

contempt against religions‖ and ―disgracing a 

religion‖ are punishable by up to five years in jail. 

Over the past two years, police and local officials 

have taken concerted actions to break up the sect AlQiyadah al-Islamiyah. The group has approximately 

40,000 followers and its leaders claim to be prophets. 

In October and November 2007, police detained 125 

members of Al-Qiyadah during raids in West 

Lombok, Yogyakarta, East Lombok, and Central 

Java. Ninety six members of Al-Qiyadah publically 

signed documents renouncing their beliefs, including 

the sect‘s leader, Ahmad Moshaddeq. Despite his 

recantation, Moshaddeq was sentenced to four years 

in prison in April 2008 for ―violating the criminal 

code by committing blasphemous acts.‖ On May 2, 

2008, Dedi Priadi and Gerry Lufthi Yudistira, 

members of al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah sect, were 

sentenced in Padang district court to three years in 

prison under Article 156a. Over the past several 

years, other small, primarily ―messianic‖ Muslim 

groups were labeled ―deviant‖ by local religious 

leaders and faced government harassment or 

communal violence, including Dzikir Asmaul Husa, 

Dayak Segandhu LosarangIndramayu, Tarekat 

Naqsabandiyah, Islam Model Baru, Hidup di Balik 

Hidup, and Nural Yaqin. 

In the past, Indonesia‘s ―deviancy laws‖ 

primarily have targeted small groups regarded as 

heterodox by Muslim religious leaders. However, in 

April 2007, police in Malang, East Java detained 42 

Protestants for disseminating a ―prayer‖ video that 

instructs individuals to put the Koran on the ground 

and pray for the conversion of Indonesia‘s Muslim 

political leaders. In September 2007, a local court 

found all 42 guilty of ―insulting religion‖ and 

sentenced each to five years in prison. An appeal of 

the convictions is pending in the East Java High 

Court. 

Indonesia‘s Christians and other religious 

minorities faced additional societal violence in the 
173

past year, including mob attacks, harassment, and 

church closures. However, the number of church 

closures and mob attacks were slightly fewer than in 

the past. In July 2008, armed residents in Kampun 

Pulo District of West Jakarta attacked the Arastamar 

Evangelical School of Theology, known as Setia 

College, because they claimed students were 

responsible for a recent spate of petty thefts and 

public disturbances. The students and faculty deny 

these allegations. The police refused to intervene and 

20 students were injured. Staff and students were 

forced to evacuate and the campus remains closed. 

In August 2008, Father Benny Susetyo, the General 

Secretary of the Interreligious Commission of the 

Indonesian Bishops' Conference and an outspoken 

advocate for religious freedom for the Ahmadi 

community, was severely beaten by unknown 

assailants. In January 2008 in Madura province, 

villagers surrounded the house of Shi‘a followers 

demanding they stop religious activities. Local 

officials and religious leaders intervened to disperse 

the crowd. In recent years, Shi‘a communities in 

East Java and Madura faced attacks, vandalism, 

threats, and legal actions. In January 2008, a mob 

burned the Sangkareang Hindu temple in Keru 

district, West Lombok, destroying the building and 

its contents. As of this writing, the temple has not 

received a permit to rebuild. That same month, the 

Love Evangelical Bethel Church in Riau province, 

North Sumatra ceased its services after 60 Muslim 

protestors demanded it be closed. 

In some cases, police have arrested 

individuals responsible for vandalizing or destroying 

property of minority religious groups and have 

intervened to prevent property destruction and 

disperse crowds. But mob violence remains too 

frequent and punishments of perpetrators too 

infrequent to act as a deterrent. Local government 

officials also have sought to mediate between militant 

groups and religious minorities in some cases, but 

sometimes acquiesce to pressure from militants and 

revoke permits for longstanding places of worship or 

allow the destruction of religious venues operating 

without permits. In response to persistent criticism 

from religious minorities and international observers 

over the number of religious venues closed or 

destroyed in Indonesia, the Ministry of Religion 

issued Joint Ministerial Decree 1/2006 to replace a 

previous, vaguely-worded decree that required 

religious groups to gain ―community approval‖ 

before they could expand, renovate, or open new 

religious venues. Decree 1/2006 requires a religious 

group with a membership of more than 90 persons to 

obtain the support of 60 local residents for any plans 

to build or expand a religious venue. That petition 

must then be sent to the Joint Forum for Religious 

Tolerance (FKUB), a provincial panel of religious 

leaders chosen proportionally by the number of 

religious adherents in the province. If there remains 

strong community opposition to the religious venue, 

the FKUB can find an alternative location. 

At the time, critics of the decree claimed 

that it was designed to stop the proliferation of 

―house churches‖ and small Hindu temples (of fewer 

than 90 members). Prominent Muslim religious 

leaders have stated publicly that the new decree 

might violate Article 18 of the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights. Overall, the number of 

church, temple, and mosque closures has declined 

slightly since Joint Ministerial Decree 1/2006 was 

issued. In addition, over the past year, the Ministry 

of Religion has made efforts to establish provincial 

FKUB panels. Former President Abdurrahman 

Wahid has commended the ―sincere efforts‖ of 

FKUB panels to promote religious tolerance, but 

added that without sufficient ―control, evaluation, 

monitoring...and sanctions‖ the panels can be ―used 

to promote the interests of the majority religion.‖ 

Indeed, despite the existence of FKUB panels, Hindu 

and Christian groups report that they are sometimes 

refused building permits even though they have 

accumulated the necessary signatures. For example, 

five Protestant churches in North Bekasi, Jabotabek 

region, East Jakarta continue to face vandalism and 

sporadic protests from the group Musholla 

(Cooperating Bureau of Mosques and Praying 

Rooms) because they meet in private homes. 

Although police continue to protect the worship 

activities of these groups, local officials have refused 

to grant them permission to build permanent 

structures, despite their having met the criteria 

established in the 2006 decree. A similar situation 

occurred in South Rawa Badak, Koja region, North 

Jakarta in August 2008, when local officials 
174

pressured the pastor of a Protestant church to cease 

worship activities, despite his having received 

permission from the FKUB to operate the church. 

 

The Commission continues to monitor the 

implementation of sharia in Aceh. In August 2005, 

the Indonesian government concluded a 

comprehensive peace agreement with the insurgent 

group Free Aceh Movement (GAM), ending a 30-

year conflict that had resulted in significant human 

rights abuses. The agreement led to a newly elected 

government and hope for a region hard hit by the 

tsunami and decades of civil conflict. However, 

neither the peace agreement nor the elections 

overturned Presidential Decree 11/2003, which 

allowed the province to establish and implement 

sharia law and establish sharia courts. Since the end 

of the civil war, sharia courts and their vice patrols, 

locally known as the Wilayatul Hisbah, have taken on 

a prominent public profile, enforcing dress codes and 

banning alcohol consumption, gambling, and 

unchaperoned liaisons between the opposite sex. The 

jurisdiction of sharia courts and the power of the 

Wilayatul Hisbah are controversial issues for the new 

Acehnese government. Local non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) in Aceh report that 

government oversight of Wilayatul Hisbah has 

improved recently, making the vice patrols less 

intrusive than in the past. In addition, the new 

Acehnese government disbanded vice patrols in the 

city of Banda Aceh and civil courts gradually are 

taking up case loads previously heard in sharia 

courts. The number of public canings in Aceh 

decreased from 90 to 36 in the past year, all related to 

gambling. Political parties that won an estimated 

80% of the vote in regional elections in April 2009 

promised to de-emphasize the continuation of sharia 

in Aceh and instead to fully implement the Helsinki 

Peace Accords granting Aceh political autonomy, 

except in international relations, defense, fiscal and 

monetary policy, and religious affairs, which would 

be managed in Jakarta. 

 

The expansion of sharia in Aceh has 

influenced local initiatives elsewhere in Indonesia. 

Efforts to implement sharia provisions nationally 

consistently have been defeated by a coalition of the 

largest Muslim organizations together with religious 

minorities. However, some provinces and localities 

are enforcing Islamic law at the municipal and 

regional levels. Indonesian NGOs estimate that at 

least 66 perda syaria, or local sharia laws, have been 

promulgated and enforced in the past five years. 

According to the International Center for Islam and 

Pluralism, an Indonesian think tank, half of 

Indonesia‘s 32 provinces have enacted shariainspired laws. In South Sulawesi, Madura, and West 

Sumatra, local authorities issued laws enforcing 

Islamic dress, prohibiting alcohol, and imposing 

public caning punishments. In Madura and South 

Sulawesi, civil servants are required to cease work 

activities during the call to prayer, and recitation of 

the Koran reportedly is being required for promotion. 

In Padang, West Sumatra, the local mayor instructed 

all schoolgirls, regardless of their religion, to wear a 

headscarf. In Bulukumba regency, any woman not 

wearing a headscarf can be denied government 

services. Similar laws have already been 

implemented in parts of West Java, including 

Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, and Garut. In the city of 

Tangerang, Banten province, local laws have banned 

both Muslims and non-Muslims from public displays 

of affection, alcohol consumption, and prostitution. 

The anti-prostitution ban is being challenged in 

Indonesian courts because it defines a prostitute as 

anyone who draws attention to himself or herself by 

attitude, behavior, or dress or any woman found 

―loitering‖ alone on the street after 10 pm. In the 

past year, according to the State Department, 31 

women were arrested as prostitutes, including a 

married mother waiting alone at a bus stop during the 

early evening. 

Recently, 56 Indonesian parliamentarians 

issued a petition calling for a review of local shariainspired laws to determine if they violate 

constitutional protections and national laws. Home 

Affairs Minister Mardiyanto announced that there 

was no need to review or overturn most shariainspired laws, although the Indonesian government 

promised to review 37 ordinances deemed 

discriminatory and at odds with the constitution. 

However, this review is not likely to be completed 

until after the 2009 election season.
175

Indonesian human rights advocates have 

expressed fears that local perda syaria ordinances are 

a backdoor attempt to implement sharia nationally 

and may be used to mobilize political support for the 

more extremist Muslim political parties during the 

2009 elections. These laws also could threaten 

Indonesia‘s fragile political consensus supporting 

pluralism, tolerance, and democracy. The head of 

Indonesia‘s Constitutional Court, Dr. Mohammad 

Mahfud, recently told the Jakarta Post that, in his 

view, all perda syaria laws should be overturned 

because they promote religious intolerance, 

particularly against minorities, violate the 

constitution, and ―threaten...national integrity.‖ 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

U.S. assistance to Indonesia currently 

supports programs in conflict resolution, multireligious dialogue and tolerance, pluralism, public 

diplomacy, and education that are in line with 

recommendations made by the Commission in 

previous years. During a February 2009 visit to 

Indonesia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called 

for establishing a ―comprehensive partnership‖ 

between the United States and Indonesia. To 

advance that partnership, the Commission 

recommends that the U.S. government create a 

bilateral human rights dialogue with the government 

of Indonesia and discuss issues regarding the 

protection and promotion of religious freedom and 

related human rights, including: 

urging the Indonesian government to overturn 

the Joint Ministerial Decree on the Ahmadi, fully 

protect the ability of religious minority 

communities to freely practice in ways consistent 

with the Indonesian constitution and 

international law, arrest or hold accountable any 

individual who organizes, allows or participates 

in violence or harassment of religious 

communities, and amend or overturn any 

provincial or local laws or practice inconsistent 

with Indonesia‘s constitution or international 

human right standards, including Article 156a of 

the Penal Code; 

urging the Indonesian government to amend the 

Joint Ministerial Decree No. 1/2006 (Regulation 

on Building Houses of Worship) to bring it into 

compliance with the Indonesian constitution‘s 

protection of religious freedom as well as 

international standards, remove any restrictive 

barriers on building and refurbishing places of 

worship for all religious groups in Indonesia, 

expand the role of provincial Joint Forums for 

Religious Tolerance (FKUB), and provide 

protection for religious venues, as well as 

restitution to religious communities whose 

venues have been destroyed or closed due to 

mob violence or protests, and ensure that those 

responsible for such acts are prosecuted; 

supporting Indonesia‘s evolving legal and human 

rights reform agenda by providing training, 

capacity building, and targeted exchanges with 

Indonesian government agencies, legal and 

judicial institutions, and legal and human rightsfocused civil society organizations, including the 

National Human Rights Commission (Komnas 

HAM), the Supreme Court, and the Directorate 

General of Human Rights in the Ministry of 

Justice and Human Rights;

expanding exchange programs that bring 

Indonesian scholars, judges, lawyers, and 

activists to the United States to initiate 

discussions with governmental, academic, and 

non-governmental experts on human rights, 

including religious freedom, rule of law, and the 

relationship between religion and the state;

establishing programs to support monitoring of 

the implementation of sharia law in Aceh and 

other parts of Indonesia to determine if 

individual rights and freedoms, including 

religious freedom, are being guaranteed for all 

citizens, and making sure that U.S. humanitarian 

and foreign assistance programs do not support 

sharia police or courts in Aceh or other 

municipalities in Indonesia; 

establishing programs that promote training and 

capacity-building for Indonesian human rightsfocused civil society organizations involved in 
176

programs of building multi-religious coalitions 

to promote legal, political, and economic 

programs consistent with Indonesia‘s 

constitution and international human rights 

standards; 

prioritizing financial support for NGOs and 

human rights-focused civil society organizations 

pursuing programs on inter-religious economic 

development, conflict prevention and social 

cohesion, and the resettlement of internally 

displaced persons, and public interest law in 

potential flashpoint areas such as Central 

Sulawesi, the Malukus, Papua, or parts of West 

Java;

expanding U.S. government support for the 

promotion of religious pluralism in Indonesia by 

supporting seminars and conferences, 

international exchanges, intra-religious dialogue, 

and new radio, television, and publishing 

activities of interfaith and private organizations 

that promote respect for religious freedom and 

human rights; and

expanding support for media, dialogue, and 

publishing ventures of Indonesian organizations 

seeking to promote intra-Muslim dialogue on the 

compatibility of Islam and human rights, 

democracy, and pluralism, including the 

translation of books by prominent Indonesian 

scholars into, as appropriate, Arabic, Urdu, 

Persian, Turkish, and English.

In addition, as part of U.S.-Indonesian 

counter-terrorism cooperation, the U.S. should ensure 

that any future ties with the Indonesian military and 

police should include, as priorities:

reform of the Indonesian military, including 

transfer to civilian control, training in 

international human rights standards, and 

technical assistance in military law and tribunals; 

transfer or removal from Papua, the Malukus, or 

Central Sulawesi any security, police, and militia 

personnel indicted for activities related to serious 

human rights abuses and war crimes by the UN‘s 

Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCIU) and 

the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor 

in Jakarta;

dedicated funds for training Indonesian police in 

counter-terrorism techniques and protecting 

human rights in areas of sectarian conflict, 

including fellowships to the International Law 

Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, 

Thailand and participation in UN Police training 

programs (UNPOL); and 

denial of U.S. assistance, training, or visas for 

any police or military unit or security agency 

personnel found to have engaged in violations of 

human rights. 
177

Laos

The Commission removed Laos from the 

Watch List in 2005, citing the Lao government‘s 

steps to address serious religious freedom concerns in 

advance of the U.S. decision to grant Laos permanent 

normal trade relations (PNTR). At the time, the 

government‘s actions brought about some positive 

changes for religious groups in Laos, particularly in 

urban areas and for the majority Buddhist 

community. However, for several years the 

Commission has been concerned about the rising 

number of religious freedom abuses occurring in 

provincial areas. Over the last year, there have been 

arrests, detentions, forced renunciations of faith, and 

forced evictions from villages, particularly in Luang 

Prabang, Xiang Khoung, Bolikhamsai, Phongsali, 

Oudomsai, and Bokeo provinces, and the central 

government seems unable or unwilling to hold 

provincial authorities fully accountable for these 

abuses. Because of an increase in religious freedom 

abuses and restrictions targeting ethnic minority 

Protestants in provincial areas in the past year, the 

Commission is returning Laos to the Watch List. 

These developments are particularly troubling given 

the positive direction the central government has 

taken in some other areas and the willingness of some 

elements of the Lao government to engage on 

religious freedom concerns. The Commission will 

continue to monitor closely the actions of the Lao 

government with regard to religious freedom.

Laos is a single party, communist, 

authoritarian state with a poor human rights record 

overall, including harsh prison conditions; severe 

restrictions on the freedoms of expression, 

association, and assembly; and widespread corruption 

among local police, administrators, and judges. The 

Lao Constitution provides for freedom of religion, 

but the Prime Minister‘s 2002 Decree on Religious 

Practice (Decree 92) contains numerous mechanisms 

for government control of and interference in 

religious activities. Although Decree 92 legitimized 

religious activities previously regarded as illegal 

(such as public religious persuasion, printing 

religious material, owning and building places of 

worship, and maintaining contact with overseas 

religious groups), many of these activities can be 

conducted only with government approval. 

Moreover, the decree contains a prohibition on 

activities that create ―social division‖ or ―chaos‖ that 

reiterates parts of the Lao criminal code used in the 

past by government officials to arrest and arbitrarily 

detain ethnic minority Christians. The Lao Front for 

National Construction (LFNC), a front group for the 

Lao People‘s Revolutionary Party, is the organization 

tasked with monitoring religious activity and carrying 

out the Lao government‘s policy on religion. Decree 

92 requires religious groups to register with the 

LFNC.

The government of Laos officially 

recognizes five religions, Buddhism, the Baha‘i faith, 

Catholicism, Islam, and, Protestantism. Theravada 

Buddhism, the largest religion in Laos, occupies an 

elevated position in Lao society, a position ensured 

by government promotion. Despite its communist 

roots, the Lao government actively promotes 

Theravada Buddhism by incorporating its rituals and 

ceremonies into state functions and by exempting 

Buddhism from most of the legal requirements 

imposed on other religions. The government 

supports Buddhist temples administratively and 

financially. Buddhists in Laos generally do not 

report religious freedom abuses or restrictions, 

though in February 2007 two Buddhist monks were 

arrested and briefly detained for being ordained 

without government permission.

Non-Buddhist religious leaders report few 

restrictions on their worship activities in urban areas. 

The government has allowed the officially 

recognized religious groups to re-open, build, and 

expand religious venues in recent years. Baha‘is 

were permitted to reclaim two pieces of property 

seized by the government in 1975. The government 

also issued permits to build four new Baha‘i centers 

in Vientianne province. Lao Protestants and 

Catholics also reclaimed several properties 

confiscated previously in Vientianne and Bokeo 

provinces. Four new Protestant churches were built 

in the former Saisomboun Special Zone and 

Bolikhamsai province, and churches formerly closed 

or destroyed were permitted to re-open in 

Bolikhamsai, Vientiane, and Bokeo provinces. Two 

Catholic churches were built in villages where 
178

permits were long denied. Travel restrictions on the 

Roman Catholic Bishop of Luang Prabang were lifted 

and he was able to visit parish churches in northern 

Laos. The government permitted the ordination of a 

Catholic deacon in Champassak province, and the 

government eventually allowed the ordination of 

three new Catholic priests in Vientianne, despite 

initially blocking the ceremony. These were the first 

ordinations of Catholic clergy permitted in the 

country since 1975. In January 2008, 3,000 people, 

including foreign dignitaries and the regional 

Archbishop from Bangkok were allowed to attend the 

ordination of Father Benedict Bennakhone Inthirath, 

who now serves the Vientiane vicariate. Catholic 

ordinations continued into early 2009 with the 

ordination of Father Matthieu Somdet Kaluan on 

January 10, 2009 in central Laos, a ceremony that 

also drew thousands of Laotian Catholics. 

Most religious freedom abuses in Laos have 

affected the small but fast growing Protestant groups 

in ethnic minority areas. Lao authorities in some 

areas continue to view the spread of Christianity 

among ethnic minorities as an ―American import‖ 

that poses a potential threat to the communist 

political system, particularly as some ethnic minority 

groups have long resisted government control. 

The Lao government recognizes the Lao 

Evangelical Church (LEC) and the Seventh Day 

Adventists, but has refused to recognize legally the 

Methodists and other small independent Protestant 

congregations. Most new Christian groups are 

required to join either the LEC or the Adventists to 

make it easier for the government to exercise 

management and oversight. Last year, there were 

more reports of provincial authorities restricting the 

activities of ethnic minority Protestants, particularly 

those who have not joined the LEC or who have 

established connections with other denominations 

abroad. For example, in some provincial areas, 

Methodist congregations cannot gather for worship, 

build religious venues, or conduct Christian funeral 

services. Decree 92 restricts worship services to 

officially sanctioned houses of worship, and both 

LEC and non-LEC affiliated ―house churches‖ have 

experienced various levels of harassment, particularly 

in Luang Namtha, Oudomasai and Bolikhamsai 

provinces. In the last year, a religious leader and 

several congregates in Savannakhet were briefly 

detained and charged with holding ―illegal worship 

services.‖ The religious leader was released and 

ordered to cease operation of his ―house church‖ until 

he received permission from provincial authorities. 

In August 2008, a congregation of 150 adherents in 

Bolikhamsai province was banned from meeting in a 

member‘s home by local authorities, who asserted 

that under current law they could only meet in a 

church. However, these local officials reportedly 

destroyed the group‘s church earlier in the year and 

sought to get church members to renounce their faith. 

In the past, provincial authorities have refused to 

grant Protestants permission to build church 

structures. 

In the past year, according to a variety of 

sources, the number of individuals arrested and 

detained for reasons related to religion increased. 

Individuals arrested for their religious activities were 

held for varying lengths of time up to a year without 

charges being filed. Many were forced to sign a 

renunciation of faith while they were imprisoned. 

Ethnic minority Protestants were detained in 

Phongsali province during 2008 for the purpose of 

forcing them to renounce their faith. In February 

2008, 58 Hmong Christians were arrested in Bokeo 

province. The Lao government denies their 

imprisonment and claims they were in the country 

illegally and were deported to Vietnam. However, 

other reports indicate that these arrests are related to 

village and family level religious conflict stoked by 

provincial officials. In July, 80 Christians in Saravan 

province were detained to force a renunciation of 

their faith following the murder of a local Christian 

by non-Christian residents. Recent arrests and 

detentions occurred most often in Oudomsai, Luang 

Namtha, and Salavan provinces. The Lao 

government released some prisoners this past year: in 

November 2008, 8 Khmu pastors were released, but 

each was charged $350 for detention fees. According 

to the State Department these pastors may not have 

been held solely on religious grounds. Some reports 

indicate that they were arrested for trying to cross the 

border into Thailand without authorization, while 

others suggest that they may have been carrying 
179

documentation about religious discrimination in 

Laos. 

In addition to forced renunciations 

concerning prisoners, there are reports that over 500 

Christians around the country were pressured to 

renounce their faith in July 2008. It is difficult to 

verify exactly the numbers of Christians harassed in 

this way, but Protestant families in Attapeu Province 

were pressured to give up their Christian faith. 

Reports also indicate that an LFNC official was able 

to resolve this dispute with provincial officials. In 

November 2008, seven families from Nam Reng 

Village in Oudomsai Province were forced to sign a 

statement renouncing their faith or face expulsion 

from the village. Other methods of forced 

renunciation included threats to deny government 

identification cards and household registration

documents, denying education opportunities, and 

withholding food from prisoners. Some Christians 

have also been forced to leave their villages as a 

result of the discrimination perpetrated by local 

officials. In August 2008, 55 Christian villagers from 

Boukham village in Savannakhet were expelled from 

their village. The local security officers were unable 

to provide any explanation for this action.

In recent years, the LFNC reportedly has 

sought to resolve disputes between religious groups 

and provincial officials, including intervening in 

some cases of detention or arrest, and sometimes 

resulting in positive outcomes. However, the 

growing numbers of religious freedom abuses in 

provincial areas in the past year may indicate that 

local officials can act with impunity, particularly 

against ethnic minority Protestants. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

With regard to Laos, the Commission recommends 

that the U.S. government should: 

establish measurable goals and benchmarks, in 

consultation with the Commission, for further 

human rights progress in Laos as a guide for 

diplomatic engagement between Laos and the 

United States or for initiating a formal human 

rights dialogue with the government of Laos, 

addressing such human rights issues as ethnic 

and religious discrimination, torture and other 

forms of ill-treatment in prisons, unlawful arrest 

and detention, lack of due process, and practical 

steps to ensure the rights to freedom of 

expression, association, and assembly; 

make clear to the government of Laos that 

continued improvements in the protection of 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief, including legal reforms, political 

accountability for government officials who 

perpetrate religious freedom abuses, and the 

release of any prisoners detained because of 

religious affiliation or activity, is essential to 

further improvements in, and expansion of, U.S.-

Laos relations;

expand Lao language broadcasts on Voice of 

America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) 

while ensuring that the content of the Lao 

language broadcasts on VOA and RFA includes 

adequate information about the importance of 

human rights, including religious freedom, 

within Laos; and

initiate and expand technical assistance and 

human rights programs that support the goals of 

protecting and promoting religious freedom, 

including: 

--rule of law programs that provide assistance in 

amending, drafting, and implementing laws 

and regulations, including Laos‘ law on 

religion; 

--human rights and religious freedom training 

programs for specific sectors of Lao society, 

including government officials, religious 

leaders, academics, lawyers, police, and 

representatives of international nongovernmental organizations; 

--training, networking, and capacity-building for 

Lao groups that carry out charitable, medical, 

and development activities; 
180

--educational initiatives to combat intolerance of 

religious and ethnic minorities and to promote 

human rights education; and 

--the expansion of the number and funding of 

educational, academic, government, and 

private exchange programs with Laos that will 

bring a wide cross-section of Lao society to 

the United States. 
181

Russian Federation

For ten years the Commission has reported 

on the status of freedom of religion or belief in 

Russia. Although the Commission has never 

recommended that Russia be named a ―country of 

particular concern,‖ or CPC, for the most severe 

violations of religious freedom, this year the 

Commission decided to add Russia to its Watch List. 

The decision to place Russia on the Commission‘s 

Watch List is based on several negative new policies 

and trends, particularly the establishment in early 

2009 of a new body in the Ministry of Justice with 

unprecedented powers to control religious groups. 

There also are increasing violations of religious 

freedom by government officials, particularly 

against allegedly ―non-traditional‖ religious groups 

and Muslims, based on the government‘s 

interpretation and application of various Russian 

laws including the laws on religious organizations, 

non-governmental organizations, and extremism. 

The Russian government also uses laws against 

incitement of hatred to suppress or punish critical or 

humorous portrayals of religion in publications or 

visual art. Russian officials continue to describe 

certain religious and other groups as alien to Russian 

culture and society, and there has been a sharp rise in 

the country in xenophobia and intolerance, including 

anti-Semitism, which has resulted in numerous 

violent attacks and other hate crimes. The Russian 

government has chronically failed to address these 

serious problems adequately, consistently or 

effectively. 

In recent years, Russia has steadily retreated 

from democratic reform, endangering post-Soviet 

human rights gains, including in regard to freedom of 

religion or belief. Evidence of this retreat includes 

further limitations on media freedom and on political 

parties; tighter controls on non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) and religious communities; 

concerted harassment of human rights activists and

organizations; legal restrictions on freedom of 

assembly; and constraints on popular referenda. 

Increasingly, Russian journalists, lawyers and others 

who have defended human rights have been subjected 

to brazen killings and attacks, and the perpetrators 

usually act with impunity.1 Moreover, Moscow has 

rallied other countries with dubious human rights 

practices to oppose international efforts to draw 

attention to these serious problems by terming such 

inquiries ―meddling‖ or ―interference in internal 

affairs.‖ This sharp deterioration in the human rights 

climate appears to be a direct consequence of the 

authoritarian stance of the Russian government, as 

well as the growing influence of chauvinistic groups 

in Russian society, which seem to be tolerated by the 

government. 

In February 2009, the Justice Ministry 

established the Expert Religious Studies Council, 

which was given extremely wide powers to 

investigate religious organizations, including their 

activities and literature, for a broad array of reasons, 

including extremism. While governments have a 

duty to combat acts of violent extremism as part of 

their obligation to protect citizens, there have been 

expressions of serious concern over the 

establishment, as well as the composition and 

expansive mandate, of this new council. The Expert 

Religious Studies Council‘s powers enable it to 

investigate religious organizations during the 

registration procedure; to assess whether the activity 

of a registered group accords with its charter; to 

ascertain if an organization, one of its members, or 

the literature it produces or distributes is extremist; 

and to conduct investigations in ―other cases 

requiring specialist knowledge‖ which might arise 

when the Russian Justice Ministry is monitoring the 

activity of religious organizations. 

The Expert Religious Studies Council‘s new 

chairman, Aleksandr Dvorkin, is Russia‘s most 

prominent ―anti-cult‖ activist and he lacks academic 

credentials as a religion specialist. Furthermore, 

Dvorkin‘s deputy, Roman Silantyev, is noted for 

intolerant articles on so-called radical Islam. 

Observers are concerned that under Dvorkin‘s 

leadership, the council may call for the closure of 

registered as well as unregistered minority religious 

communities. This concern is based on Dvorkin‘s 

previous positions on independent Muslims, 

Jehovah‘s Witnesses, Hare Krishnas, ―neoPentecostals,‖ and other new religious movements. 

Concerns have also been expressed that the new 

council‘s members include five individuals reported 
182

to be close to the Moscow Patriarchate Russian 

Orthodox Church who are known for ―anti-sect‖ 

activities.

Many of the problems faced by Russia‘s 

diverse minority religious communities stem from the 

notion set forth in the preface to the 1997 religion 

law that four religions—Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, 

Judaism, and Buddhism—have ―traditional‖ status in 

that country. The de facto favored status of the 

Moscow Patriarchate Russian Orthodox Church 

(MPROC) results in restrictions and discrimination 

against other religious groups. Officials of the 

MPROC also sometimes use their influence with 

regional authorities to restrict the activities of other 

religious groups. There are frequent reports, 

particularly on the local level, that minority religious 

communities must secure MPROC permission before 

officials grant access to houses of worship and that 

local authorities sometimes deny them registration at 

the behest of local MPROC officials. According to 

the State Department, Russian government officials 

and police often make public negative comments 

about Protestant churches and other allegedly new 

religious movements, referring to them as 

―totalitarian sects,‖ stressing their alien character and 

foreign funding, and making implications of 

espionage.

The MPROC, the world‘s largest Orthodox 

church which claims adherents among 60 percent of 

Russians, has played a special role in Russian history 

and culture; it receives the bulk of state support for 

religious groups, including subsidies for church 

maintenance and construction. The three other socalled ―traditional‖ religious communities, Islam, 

Buddhism and Judaism, also sometimes benefit from 

government funding. In addition, the Moscow city 

government has funded extensive renovations of Old 

Believer buildings. The MPROC also has 

agreements with government ministries on guidelines 

for public education, religious training for military 

personnel and on law enforcement decisions. The 

authorities permit MPROC chapels and priests on 

army bases, but provide some Protestant groups 

limited access to military facilities. In late 2007, the 

Russian military appointed its first Jewish chaplain 

since 1917, according to the State Department. 

Authorities largely ban Islamic services in the 

military and usually fail to give Muslim conscripts 

time for daily prayers or alternatives to pork-based 

meals. According to the SOVA Center, a leading 

Russian NGO monitoring group, some Muslim army 

recruits reported that their fellow servicemen insulted 

and abused them on the basis of their religion 

Other systemic problems result from 

Russia‘s weak judicial system, inconsistent 

adherence to the rule of law, and local officials‘ 

arbitrary interpretations regarding the status of the socalled ―traditional‖ religions. These problems 

include denials of registration (status of legal person) 

requests; refusals to allot land or to grant construction 

permits for places of worship; restrictions on rental 

space for religious activities; lengthy delays in the 

return of religious property; and attacks in the statecontrolled media that incite intolerance. Official 

respect for freedom of religion or belief varies widely 

from region to region. In Chechnya, for example, 

President Ramzan Kadyrov announced in 2006 that 

his republic ―would be better off‖ if it were ruled by 

sharia law, and he has also justified polygamy and 

honor killings. In many parts of Russia, however, a 

given religious community‘s relationship with 

individual state officials is frequently the key to 

determining government respect for its rights. 

In October 2007, a Russian law came into 

effect setting out the conditions and procedures for 

state-owned land appropriation that permits religious 

organizations to retain their current land plots for 

unlimited use until January 1, 2010. Prior to this 

amendment, there had been no legal mechanism for 

religious organizations to privatize land plots. In 

early 2009, Russia was considering a draft law on the 

transfer of property of religious significance to 

religious organizations and which would define the 

procedure for allocating such property. The draft law 

also grants religious organizations ownership of all 

historical property currently in their use. Currently, 

religious organizations have the right to use such 

property indefinitely, but it remains in the possession 

of the Russian state. If this draft law were to be 

passed, the MPROC would become one of the largest 

property holders in Russia.
183

In 2008, Russian regional and local officials 

continued to confiscate buildings already in use by 

religious communities. The mayor of St. Petersburg 

ordered that a Lutheran church be given to the 

MPROC, according to the SOVA Center. A Baptist 

congregation in the city of Lipetsk lost its rented 

prayer house in 2008 because the local MPROC had 

filed suit for the building, the State Department 

reported. Another case involved properties of the 

Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church (ROAC), 

which is not affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate, 

in the town of Suzdal. In February 2009, a regional 

court ordered that the 11 historic churches and 2 bell 

towers must be returned to the state, although the 

ROAC has used these properties since the 1990s.

The 1997 religion law requires registration 

at both federal and local levels, thereby creating 

difficulties for previously unregistered as well as new 

religious groups. At the federal level, most religious 

organizations have been registered by federal 

officials and the Russian Constitutional Court. 

Religious groups that have gone to court to overturn 

denials of registration have often been successful, but 

administrative authorities have sometimes been 

unwilling or slow to implement court decisions. The 

Salvation Army was finally re-registered in the city 

of Moscow in April 2009, as required by a 2002 

Russian Constitutional Court ruling and a 2006 

European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) ruling. 

In cases when the ECtHR has ruled against Russia, 

the state has later paid full compensation, for 

example, to the Jehovah's Witnesses in the city of 

Chelyabinsk and to an evangelical church in 

Chekhov. The Salvation Army case marks the first 

known instance involving a religious community in 

which the Russian state has taken remedial action as 

required by the ECtHR. 

Moreover, Russian authorities have denied 

registration to certain religious communities based 

on the allegedly insufficient time they have existed. 

Such denials continue, even though the Russian 

Constitutional Court ruled in 2002 that an active 

religious organization registered before the 1997 law 

could not be deprived of legal status for failing to reregister. Local officials sometimes simply refuse to 

register groups or create prohibitive obstacles to 

registration. 

The 1997 religion law gives 10 citizens the 

right to form a religious association, which, in turn, 

provides them the legal right to a house of worship. 

Yet, despite this legal guarantee, building or renting 

worship space remains difficult for a number of 

religious communities. Jehovah's Witnesses, the 

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 

(Mormons), and Pentecostal congregations face 

particular problems, as do Orthodox groups that do 

not recognize the Moscow Patriarchate, Molokans, 

and Old Believer communities. Protestant, Catholic, 

Muslim and some Orthodox congregations allege 

inordinate official interest in fire safety and other 

details in regard to their worship buildings, which 

may result in court-ordered fines, temporary closures 

or official demolition threats, Forum 18 reported in 

February 2009. 

Russian authorities also continue to deny 

registration to certain religious communities, 

particularly those deemed by Russian officials to be 

―non-traditional.‖ A local religious organization was 

even banned in June 2004, when the Russian 

Supreme Court upheld a Moscow court decision 

banning the Jehovah‘s Witnesses in that city, making 

them the first national religious organization to have 

a local branch banned under the 1997 religion law. 

According to Forum 18, Jehovah's Witnesses viewed 

the 500 coordinated and centrally directed 

investigations by procuracy officials in March 2009 

as ―trawling‖ for grounds to shut down their St. 

Petersburg headquarters and over 400 dependent 

organizations. In 2008, two Baptist congregations in 

the city of Lipetsk lost their legal status due to 

alleged tax violations, the State Department reported. 

Under the 1997 religion law, religious 

organizations encounter confusing definitions over 

what type of religious activity requires an education 

license: ―educational‖ activity might require a 

license, while ―teaching‖ does not. In March 2008, 

the Smolensk Regional Court dissolved a local 

Methodist church for running a Sunday school with 

only four pupils without an education license. In 

June 2008, Russia's Supreme Court overturned that 
184

ruling, holding that a license is needed only if it is 

―accompanied by confirmation that the student has 

attained levels of education prescribed by the state.‖ 

A Pentecostal Bible center in the Volga republic of 

Chuvashia lost its registration for allegedly 

conducting unlicensed educational activity in August 

2007; in April 2008 the Pentecostal center appealed 

to the ECtHR, Forum 18 reported. 

In September 2008, the Russian Justice 

Ministry published a list of 22 religious organizations 

for which it was seeking to liquidate their registration 

status through the courts for the alleged conduct of 

unlicensed educational activities. Four of these 

organizations (the Russian Union of Independent 

Churches of Evangelical Christian Baptists in 

Rostov-on-Don, the Theological Seminary of the 

Siberian Association of Evangelical-Lutheran 

Missions in Novosibirsk, and two Moscow yeshivas) 

have successfully challenged immediate liquidation. 

Two others, the Presbyterian Christian Theological 

Academy and the Institute of Contemporary Judaism,

liquidated their own registration status, while five of 

the groups were no longer functioning, according to 

Forum 18. In March 2009, the Russian media 

reported that the Ministry of Justice recently had 

been granted the right to conduct state inspections of 

theological institutions and that it planned to establish 

an expert council for that purpose.

In January 2006, then-President Putin signed 

a restrictive law on non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs) that also affects the country‘s 23,000 

registered religious communities and granted the 

Ministry of Justice‘s Federal Registration Service 

(FRS) extensive oversight functions. The law 

enables the FRS to interfere with the activities of 

NGOs, examine their documents, attend their 

meetings with advance notice, and initiate court 

proceedings which may result in denials of the 

registration of groups that do not meet numerous 

legal requirements, including minor or trivial ones. 

NGOs are required to submit detailed annual reports 

on their activities, governing bodies, and funding, 

including from foreign sources. (The FRS was 

eliminated as a separate unit in the Ministry of Justice 

in July 2008 and its functions transferred to another 

office. It is too early to ascertain what impact, if any, 

this change will have in regard to religious freedom 

and related human rights in Russia.) 

The provisions of the NGO law which are 

applicable to religious organizations went into effect 

in mid-2007. Several months later, however, after 

lobbying by many religious groups, including the 

Russian Orthodox Church, the government reduced 

their reporting requirements. Russian religious 

organizations are no longer required to report income 

from Russian individuals or the Russian state, but 

they must document foreign donations. Each 

religious group must still report the full names, 

addresses, and passport details of its governing body 

members, although requirements were dropped that 

they provide details of religious congresses, 

conferences, or meetings of governing bodies. In 

addition, accounting procedures for such 

organizations were simplified, though financial 

documents must also be supplied to the Russian tax 

authorities. 

In October 2008, the Justice Ministry 

published a list of 56 centralized religious 

organizations throughout Russia for which it planned 

to request the deprivation of legal status for alleged 

violations of reporting requirements under the NGO 

law. The list includes Old Believer, Armenian 

Apostolic, Catholic, Protestant, Nestorian, Muslim 

and Buddhist organizations. Fifteen groups on that 

list had not received any prior warning from the 

Ministry on alleged violations, Forum 18 reported. 

The Coordinating Center of North Caucasus Muslims 

publicly noted that it had neglected to file a minor 

financial report. Although 309 of Russia‘s 562 

centralized religious organizations belong to the 

MPROC, no MPROC groups appeared on the Justice 

Ministry‘s list. Some groups have alleged that the 

Justice Ministry provided the MPROC advance 

notice on how to file reports. 

In March 2009, Russian President 

Medvedev chaired the Presidential Council on 

Cooperation with Religious Associations, an official 

advisory body previously headed by a Presidential 

Administration official. Medvedev also announced 
185

that he planned to convene the group more regularly

and give it decision-making power. In April 2009, 

President Medvedev named Ivan Demidov the head 

of the Presidential Administration‘s department for 

humanitarian policy and social relations, which 

includes responsibility for relations with Russia‘s 

religious communities. Reportedly, Demidov has 

close connections to the MPROC Patriarch and is a 

proponent of Russian nationalist causes, including in 

his previous role as coordinator of ―Young Guard,‖ 

the youth branch of the ruling political party ―United 

Russia.‖

A voluntary course on the ―Foundations of 

Russian Orthodox Culture‖ in the national school 

curriculum, proposed by the MPROC and adopted in 

at least nine regions of Russia, reportedly will be 

dropped as of the 2009 academic year. Instead, 

students reportedly will be able to choose an ethics 

course or a course on world religions for which the 

Russian Ministry of Education is drafting a 300-page 

text ―The Basis of Moral Culture.‖ Religious figures 

allegedly will be barred from teaching courses on 

religion in state schools. Informed observers note, 

however, that these alleged curriculum changes are 

part of a general educational reform that will likely 

take many years. In this context, a recent legal case 

in the Voronezh oblast is relevant. A Protestant 

pastor brought suit after his son was beaten by 

schoolmates because the boy refused to participate in 

MPROC prayers in his local public school. In 

December 2008, the court refused to rule that 

MPROC prayers in a public school had violated the 

religious freedom of the pastor‘s son or that the 

pastor had been denied the right to educate his child 

in accordance with his religious principles, the 

SOVA Center reported. In a case that caused 

numerous protests, university instructor Svetlana 

Shestakova in the Siberian city of Tyumen was 

charged in August 2008 for criminal incitement of 

hatred for her public insults of Jews, Muslims, 

Catholics and Protestants during her training sessions 

for instructors for the ―Foundations‖ course. 

Over the past several years, a serious threat 

to religious freedom has emerged in the Russian 

government‘s amendment and application of the 

country‘s anti-extremism laws. The June 2002 

Extremism Law defines extremist activity in a 

religious context, by referring to ―propaganda of the 

exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of citizens 

according to their attitude towards religion or 

religious affiliation; incitement of religious hatred; 

obstruction of the lawful activity of religious 

associations accompanied by violence or the threat of 

violence; committing a crime motivated by religious 

hatred.‖ In 2006, the legal definition of extremism 

was expanded to encompass ―violation of the rights 

and freedoms of the person and citizen‖ and ―harm to 

the health or property of citizens in connection with 

their beliefs.‖ In 2007, the definition was further 

broadened to include ―obstruction of the lawful 

activity (...) of social, religious or other 

organizations‖ without requiring the threat or 

application of actual violence. In addition, those 

alleged to have defended or even expressed sympathy 

with individuals charged with extremism were also 

made liable to charges of extremism. Indeed, 

according to Forum 18, the ―gravest current threat to 

freedom of religion or belief in Russia comes from 

the federal government's approach to combating 

religious extremism.‖ 

Even a low-level court may rule literature 

extremist, with the result that the literature is 

automatically added to the Justice Ministry‘s Federal 

List of Extremist Materials and thereby banned 

throughout Russia. This list, established in July 2007 

with 14 titles and updated four times a year, by April 

2009 had expanded to 365 items, according to the 

SOVA Center. While the list of banned texts 

includes some extreme nationalist and virulently antiSemitic materials, Islamic materials, such as the 

works of Said Nursi and ―The Personality of a 

Muslim‖ (see below), constitute the majority of 

theological entries. According to Forum 18, local 

courts have also banned some Jehovah's Witness and 

Russian Orthodox literature even though one senior 

Russian official recently admitted that some titles 

were blacklisted ―by mistake.‖ 

In November 2008, the chair of Russia's 

Council of Muftis, Ravil Gainutdin, accused some 

local courts of ―poor understanding of religious and 

theological issues‖ in their bans of Islamic texts. He 
186

noted that courts had even banned books 

recommended by his own Council, such as ―The 

Personality of a Muslim‖ by Muhammad ali AlHashimi, a Koran-based life guide which advocates 

kindness and generosity, including towards nonMuslims. In May 2008, a criminal case for 

―incitement to religious hatred‖ was brought against 

Aslambek Ezhayev, the Moscow publisher of ―The 

Personality of a Muslim.‖ In October 2008, 

Ezhayev's offices were subjected to a six-hour police 

search, but no further official action has been taken 

against him as of this date. 

In 2007, a Russian court banned as extremist 

the Russian translations of the works of Said Nursi, a 

pacifist Turkish Islamic theologian with six million 

adherents in Turkey. According to Forum 18, 

regional public prosecutors‘ offices and the secret 

police have searched homes of Nursi readers and 

confiscated his texts across Russia, and students of 

Nursi‘s work in Tatarstan have been subjected to 

forced psychiatric examinations. In April 2008, 

Tatarstan officials issued warnings about extremist 

activity to its Tatar-Turkish secular secondary 

schools as part of a criminal investigation into 

Nursi‘s followers. Because of the ban, those who 

popularize Nursi‘s writings may receive a four-year 

prison sentence under Criminal Code Article 282. 

Reportedly, Nursi‘s Russian translator and his family 

were forced to flee Russia in 2008 as a result of 

police harassment. Russia‘s Human Rights 

Ombudsman has denounced the ban on Nursi‘s 

writings, warning that ―it is very important that we do 

not allow interference in the convictions and beliefs 

of millions of citizens on the poorly grounded, 

unproven pretext of fighting against extremism.‖

As is the case in many other countries, the 

Russian government does face major challenges as it 

addresses extremism and acts of terrorism that claim 

a religious linkage, while also protecting freedom of 

religion or belief and other human rights. The rapid 

post-Soviet revival of Islam, along with the ongoing 

violence in Chechnya and growing instability 

throughout the North Caucasus, compound 

difficulties for the Russian government in dealing 

with its 20 million Muslims, the country‘s second 

largest religious community. Security threats from 

domestic terrorism, particularly those related to the 

conflict in Chechnya, are genuine. The North 

Caucasus region also faces chronic instability due to 

various other factors: severe economic dislocation, 

especially among young men; some radical foreign 

influences on indigenous Muslims; endemic 

corruption and local political grievances, particularly 

in Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. All these 

factors have combined to fuel volatile and 

increasingly widespread expressions of popular 

dissatisfaction by Muslims with the local and national 

Russian government. 

Yet human rights groups are concerned that 

the methods used by the Russian government to 

address security threats could increase instability and 

exacerbate radicalism among Russia‘s Muslim 

community. NGOs and human rights activists have 

provided evidence of numerous cases of Muslims 

being prosecuted for extremism or terrorism although 

these individuals had no apparent relation to such 

activities. For example, there are dozens of cases of 

detentions for possession of religious literature, such 

as the Koran, or on the basis of evidence—including 

banned literature, drugs, or explosives—allegedly 

planted by the police. The Commission has been 

informed of at least 200 cases of Muslims imprisoned 

on reportedly fabricated criminal charges of 

possession of weapons and drugs. Moreover, 

according to human rights groups, a 2003 Russian 

Supreme Court decision to ban 15 Muslim groups for 

alleged ties to international terrorism has made it 

easier for officials arbitrarily to detain and courts to 

imprison hundreds of individuals on extremism 

charges for alleged ties to these groups. It was not 

until July 2006 that the official government 

newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta published a list of 

terrorist-designated organizations drawn up by the 

Federal Security Service (FSB)—a necessary step to 

give the ruling legal force—and this list contained the 

names of two additional groups, without any 

supporting explanation for their inclusion. 

The Russian human rights group 

―Memorial‖ reports that Muslims perceived as 

―overly devout‖ are now viewed with suspicion and 

may be arrested or ―be disappeared‖ on vague official 

accusations of alleged Islamist extremism or for 
187

allegedly displaying Islamist sympathies, particularly 

in the volatile North Caucasus region. For example, 

Forum 18 reported in August 2008 that the 

government of the republic of Kabardino-Balkaria 

had brutally cracked down on young devout Muslims 

there. According to a February 2008 report by the 

Institute for War and Peace Reporting, more than 150 

people were abducted in Ingushetia by Russian 

authorities or were ―disappeared‖ in recent years, 

including many who have no proven relationship to 

Islamist militancy. In early 2008, outside 

Ingushetia‘s largest city, Nazran, three men were shot 

without warning as alleged extremists by security 

forces. In November 2008, ―Memorial‖ reported an 

operation by security forces against ―religious 

residents‖ of a village in Dagestan that resulted in 

three deaths. Persons suspected of involvement in 

alleged Islamist extremism have also reportedly been 

subjected to torture and ill-treatment in pre-trial 

detention, prisons, and labor camps. Indeed, Muslim 

prisoners in the Murmansk oblast filed suit in 2008 

with the ECtHR alleging official mistreatment on the 

basis of their religion, the SOVA Center reported in 

2009. 

This hostile atmosphere also affects 

Muslims‘ ability to open and maintain mosques. 

Although local authorities in Kaliningrad and 

Kostomushki in 2008 finally granted Muslim 

communities land for mosque construction, there 

reportedly has been no official response to 

longstanding requests from Muslim communities in 

Sochi and St. Petersburg for permission to build 

mosques. In August 2006, the Russian Supreme 

Court upheld a lower court decision ordering that the 

local Muslim community in the city of Astrakhan pay 

for the demolition of its new mosque. In May 2007, 

the Supreme Court agreed to reconsider the case. 

Allegedly, the city‘s Muslim community had not 

received all the required building permits, although 

construction of the mosque had been partly funded by 

the previous local government. In July 2007, the 

ECtHR prioritized the Astrakhan case application 

and, as of this writing, it is still under consideration.

Russian officials, especially on the local 

level, continue to respond inadequately to numerous 

violent hate crimes directed against members of 

various religious communities. For example, in April 

2008 a group shouting ―you must be destroyed!‖ 

burst into the Pentecostal Living Word Church in 

Kuznetsk, threatening parishioners with pistols and 

beating up the church‘s pastor. Three weeks later, 

the pastor appealed to local police and two hours later 

seven men attacked the congregation. In response, 

the local prosecutor brought an administrative charge 

of petty hooliganism against the attack‘s leader. 

Moreover, chauvinist groups have stepped up their 

campaign against individuals and groups who defend 

the rights of religious and ethnic minorities as well as 

migrants, including issuing death threats. While 

Russian police have offered some assistance to these 

defenders, their efforts remain ineffective and 

inconsistent. Due to such threats, Aleksandr 

Verkhovsky and Galina Kozhevnikov, co-directors of 

the SOVA Center, decided in March 2009 to take up 

temporary residence outside Russia. 

Russian law includes several provisions 

that address crimes motivated by ethnic or religious 

hatred. For example, Article 282 of the Russian 

Criminal Code forbids the incitement of ethnic and 

religious hatred. Unfortunately, Russia‘s law 

enforcement agencies and the judicial system apply 

these provisions infrequently, inconsistently, and 

even arbitrarily and inappropriately. In all too many 

cases involving members of Russia‘s ethnic and 

religious minorities, Russian authorities, particularly 

on the local level, have not treated hate crimes in a 

serious and consistent manner. On November 7, 

2008, the anniversary of the 1917 Bolshevik 

revolution, President Dmitri Medvedev instructed 

police officers to ―pay particular attention to 

investigation of cases related to extremism and 

xenophobia‖ and called on law enforcement bodies at 

federal and regional levels to try to prevent such 

crimes and to develop ―high-quality‖ legal materials, 

including the application of relevant criminal code 

articles. 

Human rights groups have expressed 

concern that hate crimes, often the result of attacks 

by ―skinhead‖ racist groups, are growing 

dramatically in Russia, particularly against people 

from Central Asia, who are predominately Muslim. 

The Office of the Russian Procuracy reported in early 
188

2009 that 460 extremism-related crimes were 

registered in the country in 2008, a 30 percent 

increase from 2007, although the official attributed 

this increase to amendments in the criminal code and 

not to increased violence. Russian NGOs assert that 

in 2008 there were 269 hate crimes in the country, 

resulting in the deaths of 114 people, more than twice 

as many as in 2007. The SOVA Center reported that 

in 2008, 33 guilty verdicts for hate crimes had been 

handed down in 19 regions of Russia.

In 2008, the SOVA Center documented 78 

acts of vandalism of the property of religious and 

ethnic minorities; of the 36 affected houses of 

worship and cemeteries, 48 were Russian Orthodox, 

13 were synagogues and Jewish cemeteries, 9 were 

Muslim mosques and cemeteries, 6 were Protestant 

churches, one was a Jehovah‘s Witness Kingdom 

Hall, one was a pagan site and one was an Armenian 

cemetery. While illegal activities motivated by 

religious hatred are usually investigated with 

appropriate charges by law enforcement officials, 

very few cases result in conviction. As a result, 

members of religious communities often feel that

they lack protection even during religious services, 

and express concerns about the security of their 

organizations‘ property.

Most officials and NGOs agree that many of 

these attacks are motivated largely by ethnic 

intolerance, although religious and ethnic identities 

often overlap. Nevertheless, members of Muslim, 

Jewish, Protestant, and other religious communities 

have been subjected to attacks motivated by religious 

factors. Religious minority leaders are apprehensive 

that Russian government officials provide tacit or 

active support for a view held by many ethnic 

Russians that their country should be reserved for 

them and that Russian Orthodoxy is the country‘s socalled ―true religion.‖ Civil society leaders link this 

view to a perception that Russian identity is currently 

threatened due to a demographic crisis stemming 

from a declining birthrate and high mortality among 

ethnic Russians. 

Russian officials also display an 

inconsistent—and often inadequate—record in 

responding to media attacks and violence associated 

with anti-Semitism. Kommersant reported that 

during a Moscow rally of several hundred nationalists 

in April 2008, in addition to expressions of hatred of 

Jews, there were calls for the murder of some Jewish 

government officials, but police reportedly did not 

react. Moreover, there are at least 80 Russia-based 

anti-Semitic Web sites and, in various regions of 

Russia, approximately 100 small, ultranationalist 

newspapers that regularly print anti-Semitic, antiMuslim, and other religiously and ethnically-based 

intolerant content. The St. Petersburg Ministry of 

Internal Affairs (MVD) University, which trains 

future leaders of Russian police agencies, reportedly 

authored and published anti-Semitic materials twice 

in 2008. After protests from the Jewish community 

and human rights groups, the MVD recalled all 1,000 

copies of a textbook that promoted Jewish conspiracy 

theories from the university. 

Russian rights advocates say that senior 

Russian government officials should do more to 

publicly support the multi-ethnic and multiconfessional nature of the Russian state and society. 

In fact, some western and other observers have 

suggested that Russian authorities have manipulated 

xenophobia for political purposes. The Kremlin is 

believed, for example, to have supported the 

formation of the ultra-nationalist Rodina political 

party and the nationalist youth movement Nashi. 

Others have observed that the Kremlin, by issuing 

nationalistic statements as well as demonstrating a 

tendency to blame non-Russians for crime, has 

encouraged intolerant attitudes toward non-Russians 

and people who do not identify with the Russian 

Orthodox Church. In the Commission‘s view, more 

can and should be done to ensure that Russian law 

enforcement agencies do not dismiss hate crimes as 

―hooliganism,‖ but recognize them for what they 

are—human rights abuses—and take steps to prevent 

and punish such crimes, including those involving 

ethnicity and religion. 

Protestant groups in Russia are frequent 

victims of hostile media attacks. According to the 

SOVA Center, journalists often seek guidance from 

the Russian Orthodox Church when researching 

articles about Protestants, and as a result the media 
189

tend to portray Protestants as dangerous ―sectarians.‖ 

Moreover, pro-Kremlin nationalist youth movements 

have staged so-called ―anti-sectarian,‖ i.e., antiProtestant, public protests. For several months in 

2008, Nashi activists worked with the local 

government in Mordovia to prevent a planned Baptist 

conference. In Bryansk oblast, also in 2008, a 

Russian Orthodox branch of Nashi acted with local 

militia to break up a Baptist procession. 

The National Security Concept of the 

Russian Federation, last updated in 2000, states that 

―ensuring national security includes countering the 

negative influence of foreign religious organizations 

and missionaries.‖ As in previous years, the Russian 

authorities in 2008 denied a visa request from the 

Dalai Lama to visit Buddhist-majority regions, such 

as Kalmykia. Over 50 foreign religious workers, 

including Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Buddhists 

and Jews, have been barred from Russia since 1998 

and only a small number of those barred have since 

been allowed to return. New visa rules introduced in 

October 2007 for business or humanitarian visas, 

including religious work, permit visa holders to 

spend only 90 out of every 180 days in Russia; 

procedures for visa arrangements to allow more 

extended stays are lengthy and complex. The new 

visa regulations have had a harsh impact on many 

religious organizations, particularly those which for 

historical reasons depend upon foreigners, such as the 

Catholic Church. An American rabbi who had been 

working in the Primorye region for over two years 

was expelled from Russia after a court ruled in 

February 2009 that he had violated his visa by 

serving as a religious leader. Two rabbis in Rostovon-Don were also expelled recently on similar 

charges. In March 2009, the Justice Ministry told the 

Russian media that by December 2009 it planned to 

introduce amendments to the religion law setting out 

new conditions of activity by foreign religious 

workers as well as administrative liability for 

unlawful activity.

Also in March 2009, the Ministry of Justice 

replaced a 1998 law governing representations of 

foreign religious organizations operating in Russia. 

The new law reportedly established new and complex 

procedures for registration of such representations, as 

well as rules for their opening and closing. The law 

also defined requirements for the proof of registration 

for foreign religious organizations and set up an 

official register. It is too early to assess the impact of 

this new law.

Free speech concerns also arise in 

connection to several recent law suits brought under 

Russia‘s law against ―insulting religious feelings.‖ 

For example, two cases, allegedly instigated by 

elements within the Moscow Patriarchate of the 

Russian Orthodox Church, were brought against Yuri 

Samodurov for art shows he organized in the 

Sakharov Museum; Samodurov faces a trial in May 

2009. A Pentecostal leader also brought suit against 

the ―2x2‖ television channel for airing a particular 

episode of the program ―South Park.‖ In addition, 

Russia‘s official Muslim community pressured the 

Russian version of ―Newsweek‖ magazine to issue a 

public apology for reprinting one of the Danish 

cartoons of Muhammed in a special issue on Islam in 

Europe.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

I. Ensuring the Equal Legal Status and 

Treatment of the Members of Russia’s Religious 

Communities

The U.S. government should encourage the 

Russian government to: 

dissolve the Ministry of Justice‘s Expert 

Religious Studies Council, established in 

February 2009;

 ensure that law enforcement officials vigorously 

investigate and prosecute acts of violence, arson,

and desecration perpetrated against members of 

any religious community, their property, or 

houses of worship; and set up a credible, 

impartial and effective review mechanism 

outside the procuracy to ensure that government 

authorities and law enforcement personnel are 

investigated and sanctioned, as appropriate, if 

they are found to have encouraged or condoned 

such incidents;
190

 affirm publicly on a high political level the 

positive significance of the multi-ethnic and 

multi-confessional nature of Russian society;

affirm publicly that all religious communities in 

Russia are equal under the law and entitled to 

equal treatment, whether registered or 

unregistered, ―traditional‖ or other; publicly 

express opposition to any legislation that would 

grant preferences to the purported ―traditional‖ 

religions over other groups; and direct national 

government agencies to address and resolve 

continuing violations of religious freedom at the 

regional and local levels, including by:

--issuing instructions to local law 

enforcement, prosecutors, and registration 

officials as well as publicly affirming that 

members of all religious communities are to 

be treated equally under the law; 

--enforcing non-discriminatory, generally 

applicable zoning and building codes, and 

ordering an end to the practice of using local 

public opinion surveys that serve as a basis 

to deny land and building permits to 

minority religious communities; and

 

--deleting from the preface to the 1997 Law 

on ―Freedom of Conscience and Religious 

Organizations‖ the reference to the four 

―traditional‖ religions—Russian Orthodoxy, 

Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism— as that 

reference, although it does not have legal 

standing, implicitly contradicts the Russian 

constitutional provision that ―religious 

associations are separate from the state and 

are equal before the law‖ and has led 

Russian officials to establish inappropriate 

limits or demands against members of 

Russia‘s other religious communities;

 refrain from media attacks on any religious 

community and adopt administrative measures 

against government officials who fuel them;

 cease all forms of interference in the internal 

affairs of religious communities, unless 

stipulated by law and in conformity with 

international human rights standards; 

 avoid taking steps that could exacerbate religious 

extremism by 1) developing policies and 

strategies to protect the religious freedom and 

other human rights of the members of Russia‘s 

Muslim community and 2) reviewing and 

remedying past cases of alleged arbitrary 

detention or arrest of members of this 

community;

distribute on a regular basis updated information 

on freedom of religion or belief, as well as on 

Russian constitutional provisions and 

jurisprudence on separation of church and state 

and the equal status of religious denominations, 

to the Russian judiciary, religious affairs 

officials at all levels of government, the FRS, the 

procuracy, and all law enforcement bodies;

extend the current annual training program for 

regional and local religious affairs officials to 

include their counterparts in the judiciary, 

procuracy, law enforcement agencies, and to the 

FRS; 

 direct the Russian Federation Human Rights 

Ombudsman to set up a nationwide monitoring 

system on the status of freedom of religion or 

belief in the 84 regions of Russia; and

 accept a site visit to Russia from the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

and grant her unrestricted access to religious 

communities and regions where religious 

freedom abuses are reported.

II. Combating Xenophobia, Intolerance, 

and Hate Crimes 

The U.S. government should urge the 

Russian government to: 

 condemn specific acts of xenophobia, antiSemitism, and intolerance, as well as incidents 
191

of hate crimes, and to make clear that such 

crimes are to be treated by officials as human 

rights abuses, not ―hooliganism,‖ and that they 

will be fully and promptly investigated and 

prosecuted;

 while vigorously promoting freedom of 

expression, publicly condemn rhetoric that 

promotes xenophobia or intolerance, including 

religious intolerance;

 provide special training and other programs for 

law enforcement officers and other officials to 

address ethnic hatred and promote tolerance; 

 establish a special nationwide antidiscrimination body, as recommended by the 

Council of Europe‘s European Commission 

Against Racism and Intolerance, that provides 

regular reports to the public, press and 

parliament about its findings; 

 implement the numerous specific 

recommendations made by Russia‘s Presidential 

Council on Human Rights, the official Russian 

Human Rights Ombudsman, and the Council of 

Europe‘s Commission against Racism and 

Intolerance to address anti-Semitism and 

xenophobia and prevent and punish hate crimes, 

including full implementation by regional and 

local law enforcement personnel of criminal 

code provisions prohibiting incitement and 

violence motivated by ethnic or religious hatred, 

in accordance with standards established by the 

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR); and

 report, as required, to the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 

the specific measures that have been undertaken 

on a national level to address hate crimes, 

including maintaining statistics on these crimes, 

and strengthening legislative initiatives to 

combat them, and to take advantage of relevant 

OSCE training programs for Russian law 

enforcement and judicial officials. 

III. Reforming or Withdrawing the 2006 

Russian Law on Non-Commercial Organizations 

The U.S. government should:

 establish a program to monitor implementation 

of Russia‘s law on NGOs, including its impact 

on religious organizations; and

 encourage the Russian government to withdraw 

or substantially amend the NGO law; failing 

that, the government should be urged to develop 

regulations that clarify and sharply limit the 

state‘s discretion to interfere with the activities 

of NGOs, including religious organizations. 

These regulations should be developed in 

accordance with international standards and in 

conformance with international best practices. 

IV. Strengthening Attention to the Issue of 

Freedom of Religion or Belief in U.S. Diplomacy

The U.S. government should: 

ensure that the U.S. Congress maintains a 

mechanism to monitor publicly the status of 

human rights in Russia, including freedom of 

religion or belief, particularly in the case of any 

repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment with 

respect to Russia, and maintain the Smith 

Amendment as U.S. law; 

 urge the government of the Russian Federation 

to invite each of the three OSCE Personal 

Representatives on combating intolerance as well 

as the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief to visit the Russian Federation 

during 2009-2010, without this being made 

contingent on other visits to other countries;

 ensure that U.S. Embassy officials and programs 

1) engage with regional and local officials 

throughout the Russian Federation, especially 

when violations of freedom of religion occur, 

and 2) disseminate information to local officials 

concerning international legal norms on freedom 

of religion or belief, including the rights of 

unregistered religious communities; 
192

 ensure that the issue of human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief, be raised within the 

context of negotiations on Russian accession to 

the World Trade Organization; and 

 work with the other members of the G-8 to 

ensure that the issue of human rights, including 

the human rights aspects of migration and 

protecting human rights in the context of 

counter-terrorism, are raised at all bilateral and 

multilateral meetings.

V. Strengthening U.S. Programs on 

Promoting Religious Freedom and Combating 

Religious Intolerance 

The U.S. government should:

 ensure that U.S. government-funded grants to 

NGOs and other sectors in Russian society 

include the promotion of legal protections and 

respect for religious freedom as well as methods 

to combat xenophobia, including intolerance 

based on religion, ensure that solicitations and 

requests for proposals should include these 

objectives and monitor the effectiveness of such 

grants;

support programs developed by Russian 

institutions, including universities, libraries, 

NGOs, and associations of journalists, 

particularly those who have engaged in the 

activities described in the above 

recommendation, to organize conferences and 

training programs on issues relating to freedom 

of religion or belief, as well as on promoting 

inter-religious cooperation, encouraging 

pluralism, and combating hate crimes and 

xenophobia;

support programs to train lawyers to contest 

violations of the rights to freedom of religion or 

belief as guaranteed in Russian law and under its 

international obligations both in Russian courts 

and before the ECtHR; 

 translate where necessary into Russian and print 

or otherwise make available to Russian citizens 

relevant documents and materials, including: 

--hate crimes guidelines developed by the 

U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, as 

well as U.S. Department of Justice materials 

on combating hate crimes and religiouslymotivated attacks; and

--international documents and materials 

generated by Russian institutions relating to 

freedom of religion or belief, xenophobia, 

and hate crimes, as well as relevant U.S. 

Department of State and Commission 

reports, posting such documents on the U.S. 

Embassy Web site; 

 ensure that Russia‘s citizens continue to have 

access to alternative sources of information 

through U.S.-government-funded radio and TV 

broadcasts, as well as Internet communications, 

and that these broadcasts include information 

about freedom of religion or belief and the need 

to combat xenophobia and hate crimes; in 

particular by:

--restoring the broadcast hours of Russianlanguage radio broadcasts of Voice of 

America and Radio Free Europe/Radio 

Liberty (RFE/RL) that have been cut, 

restoring staffing levels, and considering 

new vehicles for delivery of broadcasts; and

--increasing funding for radio broadcast 

programs in minority languages spoken in 

Russia, including the RFE/RL Tatar and 

North Caucasus services, which are often 

the primary source of independent broadcast 

media in regions of Russia with majority 

Muslim populations;

 include in U.S.-funded exchange programs a 

wider ethnic and religious cross section of the 

Russian population, with particular focus on 

educational and leadership development 

programs for students from the North Caucasus, 

Tatarstan, and other regions of Russia with 
193

sizeable Muslim and other religious and ethnic 

minority populations; and 

 initiate International Visitor‘s Programs relating 

to the prevention and prosecution of hate crimes 

for Russian officials and other relevant figures.

VI. Addressing the Crisis in Chechnya and 

the North Caucasus 

The U.S. government should:

 ensure that the continued humanitarian crisis in 

Chechnya and allegations of human rights abuses 

perpetrated by the Russian federal military and 

local security and police forces there and in other 

North Caucasus republics remain a key issue in 

U.S. bilateral relations with Russia;

 urge the Russian government to end and 

vigorously prosecute all alleged acts of 

involuntary detention, torture, rape, and other 

human rights abuses perpetrated by members of 

the Russian security services in Chechnya, 

including those by pro-Kremlin Chechen forces;

 urge the Russian government to address the 

conclusions and recommendations of the UN 

Universal Periodic Review and relevant treaty 

bodies in regard to Chechnya and abide by all 

resolutions passed by the Parliamentary 

Assembly of the Council of Europe relating to 

the human rights and humanitarian situation in 

the North Caucasus, and reinstate regular on-site 

visits by the Council of Europe‘s Special 

Rapporteur for Chechnya; 

urge the Russian government to accept a site 

visit to Chechnya from the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, to 

reconsider the October 2006 decision to deny 

access to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 

and to extend full cooperation in accordance with 

the standard mandates of those special 

procedures;

 work with other OSCE Member States to ensure 

that issues related to human rights abuses in the 

North Caucasus play a more prominent role in 

OSCE deliberations, and encourage the OSCE to 

raise humanitarian and other forms of assistance 

to the civilian populations affected by the 

decade-long conflict in Chechnya; and

 ensure that U.S.-funded conflict resolution and 

post-conflict reconstruction programs for the 

North Caucasus also fund credible local partners 

in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Daghestan. 

 

1 The most frequent targets of such attacks seem to be 

those who bring Russian human rights violations to 

international attention, particularly to the European 

Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as well as 

government critics, particularly of Chechen President 

Ramzan Kadyrov. For example, in January 2009, 

Moscow human rights lawyer Stanislav Merkelov 

was shot dead and Anastasiya Baburova, an intern for 

Novaya Gazeta, was mortally wounded near the 

Kremlin. President Medvedev did not issue an 

official statement denouncing these killings; instead, 

he held a private Kremlin meeting with the Novaya 

Gazeta editor and former President Mikhail 

Gorbachev nine days after the attacks, to express his 

sympathy. In February 2009, four ethnic Chechen 

suspects on trial for the 2006 murder of journalist 

Anna Politkovskaya were acquitted for lack of 

evidence. In March 2009, the Ingush Prosecutor's 

Office launched an official 4-day probe into the 2008 

killing of Ingush human rights activist Magomed 

Yevloyev, ―accidentally‖ shot while in police 

custody. Also in March 2009, human rights activist 

Lev Ponomaryov was beaten in Moscow; his passport 

had been revoked one month earlier and he was 

charged with slander for his statements on Russian 

human-rights abuses. Moreover, at least six Chechen 

opposition leaders have been killed in the past six 

months, including Umar Izrailov, who had filed a 

case against Russia at the ECtHR and was shot dead 

in Vienna in January 2009.
194

Somalia

Somalia has not had an effective, central 

government since 1991. In the absence of the rule of 

law, freedom of religion or belief, like all other 

human rights, is circumscribed by insurgents, 

warlords, self-appointed officials, local authorities, 

and prevailing societal attitudes. Although Somalis 

have traditionally practiced a Sufi-influenced version 

of Islam, radical interpretations of Islam are 

increasingly manifested. Throughout 2008, alShabaab (literally ―the Youth‖ in Arabic) increased 

control over central and southern parts of the country, 

killed followers of other religions, forcibly 

implemented a strict interpretation of Islamic law 

reminiscent of the Taliban, and suppressed practices 

it deemed ―un-Islamic.‖ Al-Shabaab has links to alQaeda and has been formally designated a ―foreign 

terrorist organization‖ by the United States. Reports 

of non-Muslims and Christian converts being 

attacked and killed throughout the country arose 

throughout the reporting period. The Commission 

places Somalia on its Watch List because of the 

deteriorating situation for freedom of religion or 

belief and related human rights and the inability of 

the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to limit 

such abuses and protect religious freedom. The 

Commission will continue to monitor religious 

freedom in Somalia to determine whether conditions 

warrant it be named a country of particular concern. 

After the fall of former Somali dictator Siad 

Barre from power in January 1991, inter-clan and 

inter-factional warfare created a massive 

humanitarian crisis. The UN and U.S. intervention 

starting in 1992 ended in 1994. Subsequent, repeated 

internal and international efforts to stabilize Somalia 

proved unsuccessful, with local clans and 

neighboring states competing for dominance. In the 

north, two regional governments emerged: Puntland 

and the self-declared ―Republic of Somaliland,‖ the 

latter based on the former British Somaliland 

Protectorate. Although in existence since 1991, the 

Republic of Somaliland has failed to gain 

international recognition of its de facto independence. 

Puntland, under control of a local strongman, has 

claimed only autonomy within a hypothetical future 

federal structure for Somalia. 

Somalia has no universally recognized or 

enforced constitution and no legal provision for the 

protection of religious freedom or any other human 

rights. The TFG adopted a Transitional Federal 

Charter that establishes Islam as the national religion. 

The de facto administrations in Somaliland and 

Puntland have made Islam the official religion in 

their respective regions. The judiciary, in most 

regions, relies on some combination of sharia, 

traditional, and customary law, as well as the pre1991 penal code. A newly elected government will 

implement a variation of sharia; the new president 

has said it will respect human rights and women‘s 

rights. 

The failure of the TFG, created in 2004, to 

provide law and order and deliver government 

services led to an atmosphere of corruption and 

lawlessness, and allowed warlords to impose 

themselves over local communities. Seeking to oust 

the warlords and re-establish law and order through a 

clan-based sharia court system, the Union of Islamic 

Courts (UIC) emerged in 2006. The UIC was a loose 

coalition composed of moderate and extremist 

Muslims, sharia court judges, and businessmen. 

Backed by local supporters, militia groups affiliated 

with the UIC captured the capital Mogadishu from 

the warlords in June 2006 and by fall, the movement 

established military dominance over most of southern 

and central Somalia and began to threaten the TFG 

based in Baidoa. 

However, the UIC quickly came under the 

influence of radical elements that sought to impose a 

more extreme version of Islamic behavior 

reminiscent of the Taliban in Afghanistan. One of 

the most radical elements, al-Shabaab, served as an 

important and successful militia wing of the UIC. 

The militia was well-armed, well-trained, and led by 

Adan Hashi `Ayro, who fought in Afghanistan and 

had links with al-Qaeda. `Ayro worked with Hassan 

Dahir Aweys, the most radical of the UIC leadership 

and a U.S.-designated terror suspect. 

The U.S. and Ethiopian governments viewed 

the strengthening and radicalization of the UIC with 

alarm, particularly in light of suspected links to al-
195

Qaeda. In December 2006, the TFG and Ethiopian 

forces launched a counteroffensive. The allied forces 

quickly routed the UIC, seizing control of Mogadishu 

and much of the south. The U.S. government 

provided diplomatic and intelligence support and 

used U.S. airstrikes against al-Qaeda elements 

reported to be among the UIC forces retreating 

toward the Kenyan border. This attack and support 

for Ethiopia led Somalis to believe that the Ethiopian 

occupation of Somalia was directed by the United 

States in its global war on terror. 

Following this defeat, the UIC splintered 

into several different factions. Some of the more 

radical elements, including al-Shabaab, regrouped to 

continue their insurgency against the TFG and 

oppose Ethiopia‘s presence in Somalia. Throughout 

2007 and 2008, al-Shabaab scored military victories, 

winning control over key ports and towns in central 

and southern Somalia. At the end of 2008, alShabaab captured Baidoa, though not Mogadishu. 

By the end of January 2009, al-Shabaab and other 

militias succeeded in forcing the last Ethiopian troops 

to withdraw from the country, leaving behind an 

understaffed African Union (AU) peacekeeping 

force.

As the UIC had done, al-Shabaab and other 

Islamic insurgents gained popularity by providing 

law and order, opposing and defeating the Ethiopians, 

tackling corruption, dismantling illegal checkpoints, 

and providing some humanitarian assistance. As alShabaab fighters moved into towns, they imposed 

sharia law and settled disputes and tried criminals by 

means of a ―mobile Sharia court.‖ 

 

Throughout 2008 al-Shabaab stopped ―unIslamic‖ behavior to ―cleanse‖ Somali society of 

―moral pollution.‖ The militia closed cinemas, set 

fire to markets selling khat (an indigenous plant 

whose leaves are chewed to produce a mild euphoric 

state), shaved the heads of men deemed to have 

―inappropriate hairstyles,‖ forbade all forms of 

smoking, and banned music. 

Al-Shabaab also perpetrated religiouslybased violence. In April 2008, an al-Shabaabaffiliated militia group killed four Christian teachers, 

two of whom were reportedly Somali converts from 

Islam. In October 2008, a fifteen-year old girl in a 

town captured by the group was stoned to death by 

50 men in front of 1,000 persons. The young girl‘s 

―crime‖ was that she had been raped by three men. 

In January 2009, Islamic insurgents killed a Somali 

politician because of his ties to the Ethiopian 

government after leveling the bogus charge of 

―apostasy.‖

This form of extremely strict interpretation 

of Islam promoted by al-Shabaab is new to Somali 

society, which has a reputation for following a more 

moderate, Sufi-influenced Islam. In fact, moderate 

elements of Somali society have voiced their 

concerns about some of the goals and tactics of the 

Islamic insurgent groups, including the use of suicide 

bombers, which is socially unacceptable to Somalis. 

In February 2009, a group of citizens, moderate 

clerics, and Islamists calling themselves Ahlu Sunna 

wa Jamma (apparently from an Arabic phrase 

meaning ―People of the Tradition of the Prophet and 

the Community of Believers‖) came together to fight 

the more militant al-Shabaab. The group has had 

some success in driving al-Shabaab from some towns 

and remains in battle with the radical Islamic group. 

Nevertheless, al-Shabaab continues to control large 

parts of the country and attack AU troops, and is 

blamed for the killing of officials allied with the 

TFG. 

In addition to scoring military victories, alShabaab increased its recruitment by exploiting the 

national hostility to Ethiopia‘s presence in Somalia 

and its use of indiscriminate force and human rights 

violations and by appealing to Islamic solidarity 

shared by many Somalis. The militia group 

portrayed Ethiopia as an ―occupier‖ continuing an 

historical effort to expand Christianity in the Horn of 

Africa. Reportedly, al-Shabaab attracted unemployed 

youth by paying new recruits, indoctrinated and 

recruited students of mosque study circles, and used 

CDs and other electronic media to popularize 

martyrdom. Even those who did not approve of alShabaab‘s extremist interpretations of Islam or its 

heavy-handed military tactics provided passive 

support as they believed the group was justified in its 

operations against the Ethiopian troops. 
196

Al-Shabaab also succeeded in recruiting 

internationally, including in the United States. 

Dozens of young Somali men living in America are 

fighting with al-Shabaab in Somalia; one young man 

from Minnesota was discovered to be the suicide 

bomber in an October 2008 attack in the northern part 

of the country. According to FBI officials, 

nationalist sentiments, not jihadism, are believed to 

be the reason the men were attracted to al-Shabaab. 

While there is no evidence they are planning attacks 

on the United States, the U.S. government is paying 

close attention to the recruitment effort. Individuals 

from Europe and elsewhere in Africa are also in 

Somalia for training and fighting with al-Shabaab. 

It is widely known that there are links 

between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, including alQaeda providing training, funding, and weapons to 

the militia through Eritrea; the extent of the links is 

not known. There is no current evidence that alQaeda is using territory held by al-Shabaab to plan 

attacks on the West. It is known that al-Shabaab 

leadership has had contacts with al-Qaeda leaders in 

Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

(FATA), as well as those responsible for the 1998 

bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. 

Al-Qaeda has made several public statements in 

support of al-Shabaab; in a February 2008 video, 

Ayman al-Zawahiri stated that al-Shabaab‘s success 

in Somalia was ―a step on the path of victory of 

Islam.‖ Despite the unknown strength of its ties to 

al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab remains quite dangerous.

After the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, in 

January and February 2009 the TFG selected a new 

president, prime minister and parliament, and in 

February 2009 moved from its base in Djibouti to 

Mogadishu. The new Somali President, Sheik Sharif, 

was a former leader of the moderate wing of the UIC. 

In response, al-Shabaab‘s stated goal is to oppose the 

TFG and turn Somalia into an Islamic state where its 

interpretation of sharia law is implemented 

nationwide. In February 2009, President Sharif 

announced that sharia would become the basis for 

law in Somalia; this move was subsequently 

unanimously approved by the Somali parliament. 

However, it is not known what sharia in Somalia will 

look like in practice; President Sharif has stated that 

sharia in Somalia should respect human rights and 

women‘s rights. Experts believe that the creation of 

a new government with broad public support, the 

withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, and the new 

government‘s promise to implement sharia may 

succeed in undercutting support for the militias. 

Reports indicate that Somalis are tired of fighting and 

that popular support for al-Shabaab has fallen.

In addition to the increase of radical Islam in 

Somalia, the country‘s small and dwindling Christian 

community is under attack. The community 

maintains an extremely low profile and information 

about Somalia‘s non-Muslims is very limited. 

Christianity is considered suspect from the 

perspective of most Somalis because of its perceived 

identification with long-time enemy Ethiopia, as well 

as British and Italian colonialism. The few remaining 

Christians worship only in house churches. 

Muslims converts to Christianity also have 

been attacked. Although conversion is not illegal in 

Somali, it is not accepted socially. Muslim 

extremists reportedly killed six Christian converts in 

2008. Following one conversion, a church was 

demolished and the Christians worshipping at the 

church were attacked. This same church previously 

was attacked in 2007. 

Followers of the Tabligh movement (an 

international Muslim missionary and revival group) 

also have been attacked. In May 2008, Ethiopian 

forces detained fifteen members of the movement for 

several hours, and, according to the State 

Department, nine clerics affiliated with the 

movement were killed in a Mogadishu mosque in 

April by Ethiopian troops. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

The Commission concludes that the 

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) provides an 

opportunity for Somalia to address security, 

governance, human rights, and humanitarian needs 

and take prompt measures to limit the rise in violent 

religious extremism. The U.S. government should 

work with the international community to assist the 
197

TFG as it moves forward to address the needs of the 

country and the citizens. 

The Commission recommends that the U.S. 

government should:

I. Addressing the continuing security 

situation

work with international partners and the 

Transitional Federal Government to bring peace 

and stability to Somalia, including ensuring that 

peacekeeping operations are fully staffed; 

militias are disarmed, demobilized, and 

reintegrated; Somali intelligence, military, and 

police officers do not commit human rights 

abuses and are well-educated on universal 

human rights; and abuses of human rights are not 

tolerated and perpetrators are held accountable;

II. Developing a successful governing 

structure 

work with international partners, the Transitional 

Federal Government, and the UN SecretaryGeneral‘s Special Representative to Somalia to 

1) develop a governing structure and institutions 

which are responsive to and address the needs of 

Somali citizens; 2) ensure that government 

officials and the legal system respect universal 

human rights, including freedom of religion or 

belief and 3) promote reconciliation among 

political leaders, and between political leaders 

and Somali citizens, to prevent factionalism from 

impeding the work of the new government; 

III. Ensuring high-level and consistent U.S. 

engagement in Somalia

ensure that Somalia receives attention at the 

highest levels of government and sustained U.S. 

engagement, including through the appointment 

of a Special Envoy, to address security, 

terrorism, governance, human rights, 

humanitarian, and piracy concerns, as well as 

work with regional partners to address the 

regional aspects of the problem; and 

IV. Improving religious freedom and other 

human rights

ensure that the protection of religious freedom 

and related human rights are addressed in 

Somalia, including by funding indigenous civil 

society organizations that promote human rights, 

including freedom of religion or belief; 

awareness programs; national reconciliation 

efforts; education programs to limit religious 

extremism; and human rights training and 

monitoring programs by the UN Office of the 

High Commissioner for Human Rights.
198

Tajikistan

The situation for religious freedom in 

Tajikistan has deteriorated significantly over the past 

several years. While under its constitution Tajikistan 

is a secular state and provides for freedom of religion 

or belief, Tajik law and government policies place 

major restrictions on this right. The Tajik 

government‘s efforts to control religious practice 

disproportionately affect Muslims, but Tajik state 

officials also single out religious organizations that 

are viewed as having ―foreign influences.‖ 

Moreover, in March 2009 a highly restrictive new 

religion law was adopted and signed by President 

Imamoli Rakhmon. Due to the marked decline in 

respect for and protection of freedom of religion or 

belief in Tajikistan, the Commission determined in 

2009 that the country should be added to its Watch 

List. While religious freedom conditions in 

Tajikistan do not rise to the statutory level meriting 

designation as a ―country of particular concern,‖ they 

require additional monitoring due to the nature and 

extent of violations of religious freedom engaged in 

or tolerated by the government.

Under the new Tajik religion law, the number 

required for registration is increased to 400; private 

religious education is prohibited; proselytism is 

banned; and religious associations cannot participate in 

political activities. The Tajik political opposition, 

various civil society activists, representatives of 

minority religious groups, and the international 

community, including the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and this 

Commission, raised numerous concerns about various 

aspects of the law while it was under consideration. In 

March 2009, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief told the UN Human 

Rights Council that she was seriously concerned about 

the law, which had just been approved by the Tajik 

parliament. She warned that it ―could lead to undue 

limitations on the rights of religious communities and 

could impermissibly restrict religious activities of 

minority communities.‖ The OSCE‘s Advisory Panel 

of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief also found 

that many of the law‘s provisions do not meet 

international standards.

Nevertheless, President Emomali Rakhmon 

signed the new religion law on March 26, 2009. 

According to Forum 18, problematic parts of the law 

include the following: its preamble notes the ―special 

role of the Hanafi school of Islam‖ in Tajik culture, 

ignoring the important role of the country‘s Ismaili 

Shia tradition; it limits the establishment of new 

mosques based on the number of local residents; it 

permits state interference in the appointment of 

imams (other faiths appear free to appoint their own 

leaders); and it limits worship locations to mosques, 

homes and cemeteries, and does not include places of 

work or on the streets around mosques. Moreover, 

while currently any mosque can hold Koran study 

classes, only central mosques licensed by the Culture 

Ministry will have permission to do this in the future. 

The new law also requires that the legal 

founders of a religious organization seeking 

registration must present a document from their local 

government that they have lived in the area for at 

least five years and adhered to that religion. The 

government must now approve all published or 

―appropriate quantities‖ of imported religious 

literature. Written permission from both parents is 

required before children can take part in religious 

education. Police already try to prevent children 

from attending mosques, and it is unclear whether 

children attending a religious service will be viewed 

as involving children in religious education. 

Religious organizations must obtain the consent of 

the Ministry of Culture‘s Religious Affairs 

Committee to invite foreigners to the country or 

attend religious conferences outside the country. 

Statements made by the Deputy Minister of Culture 

after the passing of the new law gave rise to 

questions as to whether the Religious Affairs 

Committee must grant permission or be informed of 

certain activities, such as religious education, 

publishing specific literature, or inviting foreigners 

for religious purposes.

The country‘s former chief mufti Akbar 

Turajonzoda—who is a leading member of the 

Islamic Renaissance Party and had offered an 

alternative, more liberal, draft religion law—has 

condemned the new law on the grounds that it would 

severely restrict the rights of Muslims as well as non-
199

Muslims. Reportedly in reprisal for these remarks, 

Turajonzoda was deprived of his official 

transportation, on which he relies due to his severe 

disabilities, and he has tendered his resignation from 

the Tajik parliament. Minority religious communities 

have expressed similar concerns about the law‘s 

impact on freedom of religion or belief.

The State Department reported in 2008 that 

the Tajik government ―expanded its efforts to control 

virtually all aspects of religious life, and government 

officials actively monitored religious groups, 

institutions, and figures.‖ The new religion law will 

still require religious communities to register with the 

Department for Religious Affairs (DRA) in the 

Ministry of Culture, as has been required in the past. 

Moreover, the Law on Observing National Traditions 

and Rituals regulates private celebrations, allegedly to 

protect the public from spending excessive amounts of 

money. The law, however, restricts the manner in 

which individuals can conduct private celebrations, 

including those with religious significance, such as 

weddings, funerals, and the birthday of the Prophet 

Muhammad.

Muslims

The government has closed many 

unregistered mosques and prayer rooms, and while it 

usually allows most to reopen, in 2007-08 the 

government ordered the demolition of three 

unregistered mosques in the capital, Dushanbe. The 

Tajik government permits only one ―Friday mosque‖ 

(for weekly prayers) per 15,000 residents in a given 

geographic area. The government also indirectly 

controls the selection and retention of imams, 

including through ―attestations‖ with tests on Islamic 

teachings and religious principles. In addition, the 

government controls and limits the numbers of those 

who participate in the hajj.

Government officials, including members of 

the State Committee on National Security, monitor 

mosques throughout the country. Officials attend 

services to listen to imams and observe those 

attending the mosques, as well as listen to audio and 

video cassettes to ascertain the presence of alleged 

extremist and anti-government views. Officials also 

monitor weddings and funerals for compliance with 

the law on traditions and rituals. In addition, Tajik 

law enforcement officials reportedly remove children 

from mosques. Restrictions on home-based religious 

education remain in place. 

In 2008, the Tajik government installed the 

former head of the Department for Religious Affairs 

as the chairman of the Islamic Center, which will 

oversee the country‘s Islamic institutions. A fatwa 

that bans women from praying in mosques was 

issued by the government-influenced Council of 

Ulema in 2004 and remains in effect, although 

reportedly on an unofficial basis some unregistered 

mosques still allow women to pray there. While the 

Council justified the fatwa based on the country‘s 

alleged historical tradition, other observers have said 

that it was a politically-motivated decision by the 

government to reduce women‘s access to the Islamic 

Renaissance Party, a legal Islamic opposition party, 

as well as their ability to provide religious teaching to 

their children. 

Since 2007, the Ministry of Education has 

prohibited girls from wearing the hijab, an Islamic 

head covering, at public schools and universities. 

Although this ban is implemented unevenly 

throughout the country, female students and teachers 

have been expelled for wearing headscarves. Women 

wearing the hijab may be photographed for official 

identification purposes, particularly on the hajj. 

Nevertheless, there were reports that authorities 

prevented women from wearing ―non-traditional‖ 

headscarves in public. In January 2008, the 

government nationalized the previously independent 

Islamic University, the country‘s only religious 

institution of higher learning. The government 

placed it under the administration of the Ministry of 

Education and teachers underwent an ideological 

vetting process.

In February 2009, the Tajik Supreme Court 

banned Salafism and Salafi literature. No Salafi 

Muslim has been charged with a crime, but a 

Religious Affairs Committee official reportedly 

claimed that Salafis may be ―harmful‖ in the future. 

The Supreme Court decision has not been released, 

but reportedly the ban was imposed to protect the 
200

constitutional order, strengthen national security, and 

prevent conflict on religious grounds. 

Since 2000, the Tajik government has 

banned Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), a highly intolerant 

organization that promotes hatred of the West, 

moderate Muslims, Jews, and others. In March 2008 

the Tajik Supreme Court ruled that HT was an 

―extremist organization‖—providing a legal basis for 

tighter restrictions on its Internet presence and media 

use. Despite lack of legal evidence of responsibility 

for violent crimes, the Tajik authorities in 2008 

continued to arrest, detain, and sentence alleged HT 

members who face possible prison sentences of up to 

12 years. 

The government has, however, relaxed a ban 

on printing in Arabic script by government 

publishing houses, but only if the material is deemed 

by state officials to be nonthreatening. 

Religious Minorities

Bans imposed in 2007 continued in effect on 

Jehovah‘s Witnesses and on two Protestant churches, 

Ehyo Church and Abundant Life Christian Center. 

Although the Jehovah‘s Witnesses had been 

registered since 1994, the Ministry of Culture banned 

the group in 2007 for alleged violations of the 

Constitution and the religion law. In 2008, a higher 

court in Dushanbe upheld the ban. The Grace 

Sunmin Church lost its appeal to save its property 

from repossession by local authorities, and the 

congregation was ordered to vacate its church. 

The Ministry of Culture also banned 

religious literature from organizations it considered 

inappropriate, including from the Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses. In April 2008, the Tajik government 

refused to allow into the country a shipment of books 

by a Baptist organization because the size of the 

shipment was disproportionate to the organization‘s 

membership.

In 2008, the Abundant Life church and the 

nation‘s only synagogue in Dushanbe were 

bulldozed; neither of the two communities was 

compensated for the destruction. The Rabbi 

reportedly asked authorities to allow the community 

to disassemble the synagogue brick by brick, but the 

chief engineer grew impatient and ordered bulldozers 

to complete the task. The Jewish community was 

forced to halt its worship and its food aid program. 

At a 2008 OSCE conference, the Tajik delegation 

stated that the government could not provide 

compensation for the building, citing ―separation of 

church and state.‖ The Jewish community has been 

unable to conduct religious services since the 

destruction. A week before the signing of the new 

religion law, Dushanbe‘s Jewish community was 

donated a building for use as a synagogue and that 

building is currently being used for worship services. 

The new building was not provided as compensation 

by the city of Dushanbe, however, but by a private 

businessman, who reportedly is the brother-in-law of 

President Rakhmon. 

In addition, government officials have 

occasionally expressed their opinions in the press that 

minority religious groups undermine national unity. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

The Commission recommends that the U.S. 

Government should:

urge the Tajik government, particularly President 

Rakhmon, to publicly affirm his intention to fully 

comply with Tajikistan‘s international 

commitments to respect freedom of religion or 

belief, as well as the rights of members of all 

peaceful religious communities in his country;

work with relevant Tajik government officials 

responsible for religious affairs, human rights and 

legal issues, as well as with Tajik 

parliamentarians, civil society, and the 

international community, to amend the new 

religion law to bring it into conformity with 

Tajikistan‘s international commitments on 

freedom of religion or belief;

continue to monitor the trials of leaders or 

members of religious communities that lose their 

registration and work with the international 

community in Tajikistan to provide training for 
201

judges and prosecutors in civil law and 

international human rights standards;

urge United States officials, as well as the U.S. 

delegation to the OSCE, to publicly criticize 

violations by the government of Tajikistan of 

OSCE commitments on human rights, including 

respect for freedom of religion or belief; and 

urge the OSCE Mission in Tajikistan to continue 

to pay particular attention to violations of freedom 

of religion or belief and to undertake specific 

programs in that regard, including by conducting 

training sessions with the local media on 

international obligation. 
202

Turkey 

Turkey has a democratic government and a 

strong tradition of ―secularism,‖ defined in that 

country as the exclusion of religion from public life. 

Turkey‘s active civil society, media, and political 

parties influence the climate for religious freedom as 

part of that country‘s continuing debate about the 

appropriate role of religion in society. Nevertheless, 

the Turkish state‘s interpretation of secularism has 

resulted in religious freedom violations for many of 

Turkey‘s citizens, including members of majority 

and, especially, for minority religious communities. 

According to the State Department‘s 2008 religious 

freedom report, the government of Turkey ―generally 

respected religious freedom in practice; however, the 

government imposes limitations on Islamic and other 

religious groups and significant restrictions on 

Islamic religious expression in government offices 

and state-run institutions, including universities, for 

the stated reason of preserving the  ̳secular state.‘‖ In 

February 2008, the Turkish parliament passed 

amendments to the constitution removing the 

longstanding ban on wearing headscarves on 

university campuses. However, in June, the 

Constitutional Court held that these amendments 

violated the secular nature of the Turkish state and 

were unconstitutional, and the amendments were not 

implemented. The significant restrictions on 

religious freedom for religious minority 

communities, including state policies and actions that 

effectively deny non-Muslim communities the right 

to own and maintain property, to train religious 

clergy, and to offer religious education, have led to 

the decline—and in some cases virtual 

disappearance—of some religious minorities on lands 

they have inhabited for millennia. Because these and 

other religious freedom problems persist, and the 

existence of several religious communities in Turkey 

remains imperiled, the Commission decided this year 

to place Turkey on its Watch List. 

In 2001, the European Union (EU) accepted 

Turkey‘s bid to join the Union, which encouraged 

Turkey to undertake a series of reforms. Despite 

some improvements, however, a late 2008 EU report 

stated, ―Turkey needs to make further efforts to 

create an environment conducive to full respect for 

freedom of religion in practice.‖ The Commission 

traveled to Turkey in November 2006 and met with 

Turkish government religious affairs officials, as well 

as parliamentarians and leaders of diverse religious 

communities and civil society activists. Throughout 

the Commission‘s visit, people of almost every 

religious tradition stated that, despite serious 

problems regarding the opening, maintaining, and 

operation of houses of worship, they were free to 

gather and worship as provided in the country‘s

constitution. Moreover, most groups reported that 

conditions for religious freedom had improved in the 

past decade, particularly citing the reforms 

undertaken during the EU accession process. 

However, the Commission also learned of significant 

restrictions on religious freedom, including for the 

majority Sunni Muslim community, the minority 

Alevis (usually viewed as a unique sect of Islam), as 

well as Christian and other minority communities. 

As will be discussed below, these concerns continue.

Secularism and Political Parties

Turkey‘s constitution establishes the country 

as a ―secular state,‖ under a policy set by Mustafa 

Kemal Ataturk, the country‘s founder and first 

president. This concept of secularism was built on 

Ataturk‘s conviction that religion was the primary 

cause for the Ottoman Empire‘s lag in modernization 

vis à vis Europe. Consequently, Ataturk and 

Turkey‘s subsequent political leaders were 

determined to remove the influence of religion, 

including expressions of personal belief, from public 

life in Turkey and to subject religion to state control. 

As such, the Turkish government‘s concept of 

secularism differs from the American version of 

separation of religion and state, as it reflects state 

control over any religious activity in the public 

sphere. 

Over the decades, political parties that 

confronted the state‘s definition of secularism have 

been suppressed or banned under Article 68 of the 

Turkish Constitution. Nevertheless, for many Turks 

the absence of religion from public life has remained 

controversial. In 1950, the Democrat Party, which 

was less rigid on government policies of religious 

expression for Muslims, won the country‘s first free 
203

parliamentary elections but was overthrown by a 

1960 military coup. The military has staged two 

additional coups to oust governments in 1971 and 

1980, the latter in part because the military 

determined that the policy of secularism was under 

threat. In the 1990s, the Refah (Welfare) Party, 

which also confronted the state‘s definition of 

secularism, won a plurality in the polls, but was 

―maneuvered‖ out of power by the military in 1997 in 

a ―soft coup‖ and forced to disband. 

Turkey‘s current governing party, the Justice 

and Development Party (known by its initials in 

Turkish, the AKP, or the AK Party), which has roots 

in the Refah Party, won a majority 34 percent in 

national elections in November 2002. Although its 

platform under leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 

included Turkey‘s accession to the EU and the 

reintegration of Islam into public life in a manner 

consistent with modernity and democracy, observers 

in and outside Turkey have conflicting views on the 

AK Party‘s true goals. Some view the party as a 

moderate, religiously-oriented party that espouses 

Islamic religious values within a modern, democratic 

society, while others contend that the AK Party has 

more radical intentions, including the eventual 

introduction of Islamic law in Turkey. In July 2007, 

the AK Party won parliamentary elections in Turkey 

by a wide margin of 47 percent; in March 2009 local 

elections, however, AK Party support declined to 39 

percent.

In April 2009, the Turkish Military General 

Staff Chief, General İlker Başbuğ, publicly addressed 

a range of issues, including religion and secularism. 

Unlike his predecessors who assert their claim as the 

traditional defenders of Ataturk-style secularism, the 

general reportedly avoided politically charged terms 

referring to religious fundamentalism in the country. 

Rather, he distinguished the religious practices of 

devout Turks from certain faith ―communities‖ with 

significant economic and media profiles, a possible 

reference to particular independent Islamic 

movements in Turkey. 

 

Muslims

The Directorate of Religious Affairs, or the 

Diyanet, a government body under the Prime 

Minister‘s office, controls all 80,000 mosques in 

Turkey and employs all imams as state functionaries. 

Through the Diyanet, the government is able to exert 

control over the practice of Islam by permitting only 

government-sponsored mosques and governmentpaid imams to teach, while also only allowing the 

propagation of the Hanafi Sunni branch of Islam. 

Religious practice and education (compulsory in the 

state schools for all Muslim children, but nonMuslim religious minorities are exempted) 

exclusively follows Hanafi doctrines, although up to 

20 percent of Turkey‘s Muslims are Alevis (see 

below). The individual or communal practice of 

Islam outside of government-regulated institutions is 

not condoned. For example, although Turkey is 

renowned for its Sufi orders and while they still exist, 

they have been officially prohibited since the 1920s. 

Only the Diyanet is authorized to provide religious 

education courses outside of school, and only 

children ages 12 and older may register for these 

state-sanctioned classes.

Under the Turkish concept of secularism, 

religious dress, including the wearing of a head scarf, 

has long been banned in all public institutions, 

including government buildings, both state and 

private universities, and schools. Women who wore 

headscarves or their advocates lost their public sector 

jobs, including as nurses or teachers. Students who 

wore headscarves were not officially permitted to 

register for classes, even at private institutions. 

Members of the military have been charged with 

―lack of discipline‖ for performing Muslim prayers or 

for allowing their wives to wear headscarves. Even 

the private sphere is affected, as in 2006, a court 

upheld a school‘s decision to fire a teacher who wore 

the headscarf outside of school hours. More recently, 

in March 2009, the Supreme Election Committee 

declared that workers at polling stations could not 

wear the headscarf during their work at the station. 

The ―headscarf issue‖ has long been the 

subject of considerable political debate in Turkey. In 

2005, the issue went before the European Court of 
204

Human Rights (ECtHR), which ruled that while the 

headscarf ban by a Turkish university contravened 

religious freedom standards, it did not violate the 

European Convention on Human Rights in view of 

Turkey‘s historical legal definition of secularism. In 

February 2008, the Turkish Parliament voted 

overwhelmingly to change the 1982 constitution 

(which had been written by a military-led caretaker 

government that took power in 1980) to guarantee all 

citizens the right to attend university regardless of 

dress. Under the amendment, only traditional 

scarves—tied loosely under the chin—would be 

allowed; headscarves that cover the neck, as well as 

the full veil, would still be banned, as would 

headscarves in government buildings. On June 5, 

2008, however, the Turkish Constitutional Court 

ruled that these amendments violated the secular state 

and were therefore unconstitutional. As a result, the 

ban on the wearing of Islamic headscarves in 

government offices, as well as in public educational 

institutions, remains in effect. 

Alevis 

Alevis are a minority religious community 

in Turkey comprising 15 to 25 percent of the 

population, though they are not recognized as an 

official minority by the state. The beliefs and 

practices of the Alevis are described in many, often 

contradictory, ways and even today, remain 

somewhat obscure. Some consider the Alevi to be a 

sect of Twelver Shi‘a Islam, which also incorporates 

aspects of Sufi, Gnostic, and Zoroastrian theology 

and pre-Islamic ritual. The Turkish government 

generally views the Alevis as heterodox Muslims, but 

many Sunnis and some Alevis maintain that Alevis 

are not Muslims. Though not granted status as a 

religious minority, Alevis reportedly are able to 

practice their beliefs relatively freely. Nevertheless, 

the Alevi continue to be subject to some 

discriminatory state practices, though reportedly their 

situation has improved in recent years. 

Alevis do not worship in mosques but in 

what are called ―gathering places‖ (or ―cem evleri,‖ 

in Turkish). Technically, however, cem houses are 

not officially recognized as houses of worship and 

officials usually referred to them as ―cultural 

centers.‖ In 2008, a Turkish regional court affirmed 

that policy by ruling that cem evleri are not houses of 

worship, though two municipalities also ruled in 

2008 that in their jurisdiction they will consider cem 

houses as places of worship. While they generally 

are allowed to build cem houses, Alevis reportedly 

sometimes have been denied permission to do so. 

According to an Alevi leader, obstacles to building 

new cem houses include long delays—often lasting 

years—on building requests, although reportedly the 

process recently has become easier. Alevis also point 

out that while Turkish taxpayers, including Alevis, 

fund the building of Sunni mosques in Alevi villages, 

Alevis may be denied permission to build cem houses 

even in areas where they constitute the majority 

population. 

Some of the 300 groups within the Alevi 

community have called for the abolition of the 

Diyanet because it exercises state control over 

Islamic religious life, totally favors Sunni Islam, and 

is funded by taxes from all Turkish citizens, 

including the Alevi. Important Diyanet functions 

include the recruiting of tens of thousands of Muslim 

imams and paying their salaries, as well as making 

hajj arrangements, though neither of these is relevant 

to the Alevi community. Nevertheless, the Alevi 

community is divided on appropriate remedies. 

Some question whether the Alevi community should 

fall under the jurisdiction of the Diyanet; others 

contend that private contributions should fund the 

Diyanet; while others advocate the establishment of a 

government department for Alevis either inside or 

outside the Diyanet. 

Alevis report some harassment and official 

discrimination, particularly regarding compulsory 

religious education for Muslims. Again, the 

community is divided as to possible remedies: some 

Alevis believe that these classes should be optional 

for members of their community, others have 

advocated for curriculum reform to ensure that their 

religion is presented in an accurate fashion, while 

others advocate the abolition of required religion 

courses. A member of the Turkish Alevi community 

brought the issue of compulsory Muslim education 

before the ECtHR, which in October 2007 ruled that 

religious education should be optional for Alevis 
205

since the curriculum only presented information 

about Sunni Islam. A Turkish regional court has 

since upheld that ECtHR opinion. While the religion 

curriculum for Turkish schools was modified in 

2008, Alevis maintain that the new texts relegate 

their community to the status of a mystic order within 

Islam, which they contend does not adequately 

represent their religion. 

Reha Çamuroğlu, an AK Party deputy of 

Alevi origin and formerly Prime Minister Erdoğan‘s 

consultant on the Alevi community, resigned from 

his post in June 2008, claiming that the promises 

regarding the Alevis had not been kept. In November 

2008, the Alevi Bektaşi Federation held a rally in 

Ankara in which thousands of Alevis took part to 

urge the government to make state-run religious 

courses optional; to abolish the Diyanet, which they 

alleged conducts missionary activities to convert 

Alevis to Sunni Islam; to grant official recognition to 

cem evleri; and to establish a museum at the 

Madimak Hotel, where 37 Alevis were killed 15 

years ago. They also demanded that the principle of 

―equal citizenship‖ be implemented. In a positive 

response, the AKP government announced in 

November 2008 that it will pay a monthly salary to 

Alevi religious leaders, provide state-funded water 

and electricity to cem evleri as is the case for 

mosques, establish a museum at the Madimak hotel, 

and make religion courses optional as of the 2009 

academic year. In another significant move, the 

Turkish Culture and Tourism Minister, Ertuğrul 

Günay, made an official apology in December 2008 

to the Alevi community ―for past mistakes.‖ 

Non-Muslim Minorities and Property Issues

The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, a peace treaty 

signed between Turkish military forces and several 

European powers that formally established the 

Republic of Turkey, contained specific guarantees 

and protections for all non-Muslim religious 

minorities, which have since been interpreted by the 

Turkish government to refer only to the Greek 

Orthodox, the Armenian Orthodox, and the Jewish 

communities. There are approximately 65,000 

Armenian Orthodox in Turkey, 23,000 Jews, and 

2,500 Greek Orthodox in Turkey today. Despite their 

unique status, legal recognition of these religious 

minority communities has not been implemented in 

Turkish law and practice, and religious groups which 

fall outside the Turkish government‘s view of the 

Lausanne Treaty‘s definition of religious minorities 

are severely limited in their means to obtain official 

government recognition. The absence of legal 

personality has, over the decades, resulted in serious 

problems with regard to minority communities‘ right 

to own, maintain, and transfer property as a 

community and as individuals, and to train religious 

clergy, leading in some cases to a critical decline in 

these communities on their historic lands. The 

problems for the Christian minorities—including on 

property rights, education, and, in some instances, 

physical security— partly arise from the fact that 

most are not only religious but also ethnic minorities, 

and thus face suspicion by some ethnic Turks about 

their loyalty to the Turkish state. 

The three officially-designated ―Lausanne 

minorities‖ may operate community primary and 

secondary schools under the supervision of the 

Ministry of Education. Until February 2007, in 

violation of the Lausanne Treaty, these schools were 

required to appoint a Muslim as deputy principal; but 

a new law was passed allowing non-Muslims to take 

up the position. Nevertheless, regulations dating 

back to the 1980‘s have made it more difficult for 

non-Muslim children to register and attend their 

community schools. School registration must be 

carried out in the presence of inspectors from the 

Ministry of National Education, who reportedly 

ensure that the child‘s father is from the relevant 

minority community—thereby leading to the gradual 

disappearance of the community schools protected 

under Lausanne.

Many of the problems faced by religious 

minorities in Turkey involve property rights and 

ownership. While the Directorate of Religious 

Affairs has oversight and control of Sunni Muslim 

affairs, another government agency, the General 

Directorate for Foundations (Vakiflar), regulates all 

activities of non-Muslim religious groups and their 

affiliated houses of worship and other property. The 

Lausanne Treaty also permits the three minority 
206

communities to establish foundations to own 

property, including worship buildings, schools, and 

other institutions. In practice, the Turkish 

Government has only permitted the three Lausanne 

religious minorities to open foundations. Although 

establishing a foundation enables a religious 

community to gain the status of a collective legal 

entity, the rules on foundations are intrusive and 

onerous. The Commission also learned during the 

country visit that, contrary to the Lausanne 

provisions, minority properties are systematically 

expropriated and requirements for legal personality 

for existing and new religious groups are either 

irregularly applied or arbitrarily suspended.

A religious organization may also apply to 

register as an association, which provides a certain 

official status. Associations must be nonprofit in 

nature, can only receive income through donations, 

and cannot own property. The State Department 

reports that the process for obtaining association 

status is simpler and faster than that to gain 

foundation status. However, association status is 

granted by provincial governors, and can be also 

removed by them, thereby providing fewer long-term

protections than foundation status.

Over more than fifty years, the Turkish 

government has used convoluted regulations and 

undemocratic laws to confiscate hundreds of 

religious minority properties, primarily those 

belonging to the Greek Orthodox community, as well 

as Armenian Orthodox, Catholics, and Jews. The 

state also has closed seminaries, denying these 

communities the right to train clergy. In 1936, the 

government required all foundations to declare their 

sources of income; in 1974, at the time of Turkey‘s 

invasion of Cyprus, the Turkish High Court of 

Appeals ruled that minority foundations had no right 

to acquire properties other than those listed in those 

1936 declarations. Since that time, the government 

has seized control of hundreds of properties acquired 

after 1936. Religious minority foundations that are 

recognized by the state can acquire property, but 

previously expropriated property cannot be 

reclaimed, nor is there any compensation provided by 

the state for expropriated properties. These 

government actions are not subject to appeal, so there 

is no due process available to these religious minority 

groups on property rights. Greek and Armenian 

Christians have also been subjected to limitations on 

the maintenance of religious and cultural sites, due in 

part to bureaucratic obstacles in gaining the required 

official documents. Groups cannot use funds from 

their properties in one part of Turkey to support their 

existing population elsewhere in the country. 

 In November 2006, the Turkish parliament, as 

part of the reforms related to possible EU accession, 

passed a new law governing Lausanne religious 

minority foundations, easing procedures to establish 

foundations and allowing non-Turkish citizens in 

Turkey to open them. The law also enabled religious 

minorities to recover limited categories of 

expropriated property: the law did not enable 

foundations to regain property that the state had 

already sold to third parties, nor did it enable 

religious minority foundations to recover property 

that is under government control, reportedly a major 

category. The law also enabled the Vakiflar to 

continue to expropriate additional properties. ThenPresident Ahmet Necdet Sezer, however, vetoed the 

legislation. In February 2008, the parliament passed 

a similar law on the return of property confiscated 

from non-Muslim minorities, including orphanages, 

hospitals, and churches, although this law still does 

not apply to property sold to third parties and left in 

place the Vakiflar‘s expropriation authority.. 

President Gul signed the legislation, which was also 

supported by Prime Minister Erdoğan, but was 

vehemently opposed by Turkish nationalists on the 

grounds that the law granted too many rights to 

minority communities. Reportedly, 13 non-Muslim 

congregations have applied to Turkish courts to 

reclaim 128 properties; as of this writing, three of 

these cases have been successful. 

Other Issues for Non-Muslim Minorities

Members of non-Muslim communities 

continue to face other governmental and societal 

obstacles to the full enjoyment of their religious 

freedoms. Many Turkish nationalists view these 

communities with suspicion due to past conflicts with 

Christian European powers and believe that they 

constitute a potential threat to Turkey's territorial 
207

integrity or national identity. In addition to the socalled Lausanne minorities, in Turkey there are 

approximately 15,000 Syriac Christians, 10,000 

Baha‘is, 5,000 Yezidis, 3,300 Jehovah‘s Witnesses, 

and 3,000 Protestant Christians, as well as small 

communities of Chaldean, Nestorian, Georgian 

Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Maronite Christians.

When Turkey was founded in 1923, there 

were approximately 200,000 Greek Orthodox 

Christians in the country. In 1955, by which time the 

number had fallen to 100,000, progroms targeted the 

Greek Orthodox community, resulting in destruction 

of private and commercial properties, desecration of 

religious sites, and killings. As a result of these 

pogroms and other difficulties, the Greek Orthodox 

Christian community has fallen to its current low 

level, which the State Department reports to be no 

more than 3,000. Although the Ecumenical Patriarch 

of the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey has 

been under Ottoman Turkish jurisdiction since 1453, 

the Turkish government today still does not recognize 

the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate as a legal entity. 

Moreover, the Turkish government also refuses to 

acknowledge the Patriarch‘s Ecumenical status, 

recognizing only his role as head of the Greek 

Orthodox community in Turkey. Although Prime 

Minister Erdoğan reportedly stated in parliament in 

January 2008 that the issue of Patriarch 

Bartholomew‘s title as ―Ecumenical‖ is an ―internal‖ 

one for the Patriarchate and that the state should not 

interfere, the Turkish government still does not 

officially recognize the Patriarch‘s Ecumenical 

status. The Turkish government also maintains that 

only Turkish citizens can be candidates for the 

position of Ecumenical Patriarch and for hierarchs in 

the Church‘s Holy Synod. 

In 1971, the government‘s nationalization of 

institutions of higher education included the 

Orthodox Theological School of Halki on the island 

of Heybeli, thereby depriving the Greek Orthodox 

community of its only educational institution for its 

leadership in Turkey. Furthermore, in November 

1998, the school‘s Board of Trustees was dismissed 

by the General Authority for Public Institutions. Due 

to the factors mentioned above and because of the 

continuing expropriation of income-generating 

properties from Greek Orthodox private citizens, the 

very survival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the 

Greek Orthodox community in Turkey is at risk. 

In the summer of 2008, the European Court 

of Human Rights ruled unanimously in a case 

brought by the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical 

Patriarchate that Turkey was in violation of Article 1 

of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) of the 

European Convention on Human Rights. The case 

concerned an orphanage on the Turkish island of 

Buyukada owned by the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

The Turkish government has yet to implement the 

court‘s ruling.

The Armenian Patriarch, head of the 

Armenian Orthodox Church, also lacks the status of 

legal personality and there is no seminary in Turkey 

to educate its clerics. As with the Ecumenical 

Patriarch, the Armenian Patriarchate experiences 

direct Turkish government interference in the 

selection of its religious leadership, and the Turkish 

state also prevents the Armenian Orthodox 

community, which the State Department estimates at 

65,000, from operating an independent seminary. In 

2006, the Armenian Patriarch submitted a proposal to 

the Minister of Education to enable his community to 

establish a faculty in Armenian at a state university 

with instruction by the Patriarch. Under current 

restrictions, only the Sunni Muslim community can 

legally operate institutions to train new clergy in 

Turkey for future leadership. 

Syriac Christians experience problems 

similar to those of the Greek and Armenian 

Orthodox, particularly in obtaining permission to 

maintain ancient sites. The number of Syriac 

Christians in southeastern Turkey was once much 

higher, but government pressure and the war against 

secessionist Kurdish forces resulted in a significant 

migration from that area to other countries. In recent 

years, some older members of the Syriac community 

have returned, and in one case, the Turkish 

government helped to evict a local group who had 

occupied the homes which had belonged to Syriac 

Christians. Metropolitan Yusuf Çetin of the Syrian 

Orthodox Church told the Commission in 2006 that 

the Turkish government had also provided some 
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assistance in restoring churches and monasteries. In 

November 2007, a Syrian Orthodox priest in 

southeastern Turkey was kidnapped and released 

unharmed several days later. The motive apparently 

was ransom. 

More recently, a dispute has arisen over the 

attempted seizure by Turkish authorities of the 

territory of the 1,600-year-old Mor Gabriel Syrian 

Orthodox monastery. Turkish officials reportedly 

have attempted to redraw the monastery‘s boundary 

lines, claiming that when the monastery had drawn 

the boundaries 15 years ago, it impinged on land 

belonging to three neighboring, primarily Kurdish, 

villages. Some village leaders also have accused the 

local monks of ―proselytism‖ for communicating 

their beliefs and language (Aramaic) to their students. 

Earlier efforts reportedly had been made to declare 

that the monastery had been reconstructed illegally. 

Two local court hearings in the case, initiated in early 

2009, are ongoing. 

Most Jews in Turkey (96 percent) are 

descendants of those who fled religious persecution 

in Spain or Portugal in 1492 and have lived in Turkey 

for centuries. According to representatives of the 

Jewish community in Turkey, the situation for Jews 

in Turkey is better than in other majority Muslim 

countries. Jews report being able to worship freely 

and their places of worship generally receive 

government protection when it is required. Jews also 

operate their own schools, hospitals, two elderly 

persons‘ homes, and welfare institutions, as well as a 

newspaper. 

Nevertheless, concerns have arisen in recent 

years because of attacks by extremists on synagogues 

in 2003 and 2004, as well as growing anti-Semitism 

in some sectors of the Turkish media and society. 

Such anti-Semitism is viewed by some as linked to 

wide popular opposition in Turkey to the U.S. 

invasion of Iraq and to the 2009 Israeli military 

campaign in Gaza. The traditionally warm relations 

between Turkey and Israel were severely strained in 

late January 2009 after Prime Minister Erdogan left a 

roundtable at the G-8 meeting in Davos to protest 

comments by Israeli President Peres about his 

country‘s military campaign in Gaza. During the 

Gaza campaign, virulently anti-Semitic signs, posters 

and caricatures appeared at anti-Israel demonstrations 

and in many newspapers throughout Turkey, and 

Jewish community organizations reportedly received 

anti-Semitic mailings and phone calls. Nevertheless, 

in a January 2009 interview with Turkey‘s Milliyet

newspaper, the president of the Turkish Jewish 

Community said that he ―does not believe that antiSemitism exists throughout Turkey.‖ He also praised 

Prime Minister Erdoğan for publicly denouncing 

anti-Semitism, stating that the Jewish community‘s 

―only problem is the majority‘s tendency to view 

minorities as removed from the general population.‖ 

Roman Catholics have sometimes also been 

subjected to violent societal attacks. In February 

2006, an Italian Catholic priest was shot to death in 

his church in Trabzon, reportedly by a youth angered 

over the caricatures of the Muslim prophet in Danish 

newspapers. Prime Minister Erdoğan and other 

government officials strongly condemned the killing. 

A 16 year-old boy was subsequently charged with the 

murder and sentenced to 19 years in prison. In 

December 2007, a 19 year-old stabbed a Catholic 

priest outside a church in Izmir; the priest was treated 

and released the following day. According to 

newspaper reports, the assailant, who had been 

arrested, admitted that he had been influenced by a 

recent television program that depicted Christian 

missionaries as ―infiltrators‖ who take advantage of 

poor people. Roman Catholics also have had their 

property confiscated by the government. 

Protestants in Turkey, who number about 

3,000, are primarily ethnic Turkish converts from 

other religions. Protestant Christians often meet in 

the churches of other denominations, homes, and in 

other venues. Meeting in homes is often viewed with 

suspicion and possibly subversive. Police sometimes 

bar Protestant groups from holding services in private 

homes and have detained and prosecuted individual 

Protestants for holding unauthorized gatherings. 

Although engaging in public religious expression and 

persuasion is not illegal in Turkey, persons involved 

in such activities are sometimes harassed and 

arrested. 
209

Protestant individuals and/or property also 

have been subject to violent attacks. In April 2007, 

three employees of an Evangelical Protestant 

publishing house in the city of Malatya were 

murdered. Five persons suspected of committing the 

murders were arrested soon after the attack, and five 

others were detained days later. Later evidence 

indicated that the five who confessed to the murders 

were linked to local political officers, members of the 

special military forces, as well as regional members 

of Turkey‘s nationalist political party. In December 

2007, Turkey‘s Interior Ministry also opened a 

judicial investigation into the alleged collusion of 

public officials in these murders. By January 2009, 

lawyers in the case reportedly were lining up 

additional witnesses to include members of the 

Turkish ultra-nationalist group Ergenekon, which 

allegedly had planned to engineer a coup d‘état in 

Turkey as well as the killings of members of religious 

and ethnic minorities.

The murder of Hrant Dink in January 2007 

was also allegedly linked to the Ergenekon group. 

Dink, a Turkish citizen and respected journalist of 

Armenian ethnicity whom the Commission met in 

2006, had been convicted under Article 301 of the 

Turkish Penal Code for ―insulting‖ the Turkish state 

due to his public use of ―Armenian genocide.‖ Dink‘s 

conviction on this charge was later changed to a 

suspended sentence due to pressure from the EU and 

other foreign governments. Some reports suggested 

that Dink had been targeted because he was not a 

Muslim, indicating that for some religious extremism 

has fused with extreme nationalism. When 

Commission members met with Dink in Istanbul in 

2006, he referred to the repeated threats against his 

life, which included references to his identity as an 

Armenian Christian. 

Jehovah‘s Witnesses reportedly experienced 

continuing harassment of their worship services 

because they are not members of an officially 

recognized religion. In a positive development, the 

EU reported in November 2007 that the Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses gained legal personality as an association, 

thereby enabling the group to rent meeting space and 

collectively defend its legal interests in court. The 

State Department reported, however, that the group‘s 

stance on conscientious objection to military service 

often results in governmental and societal 

harassment.

Religious affiliation is listed on national 

identity cards, but some religious groups, such as the 

Baha‘is, are unable to state their religion because it is 

not included on the official list of options. In April 

2006, Parliament adopted legislation allowing 

persons to leave the religion section of their identity 

cards blank or change the religious designation by 

written application. However, according to the State 

Department, the government reportedly continued to 

restrict applicants‘ choice of religion and individual 

Baha‘is have reportedly been informed they would 

not be able to list their religion. The lack of a correct 

religious identity also makes it difficult for students 

from minority religious communities to opt out of 

Islamic religion classes in public schools.

Legal Reforms and EU Accession

In March 2001, the EU adopted the 

Accession Partnership as a roadmap for the process 

of Turkey‘s bid to join the Union, requiring the 

Turkish government to implement numerous reforms 

to ensure that its laws are consistent with EU 

standards. As part of his aim of EU membership, 

Prime Minister Erdoğan since 2002 has instituted a 

number of unprecedented democratic reforms, 

including domestic human rights reforms. Various 

laws, including the Penal Code, Anti-Terror Law, and 

the Press Law, have been amended; the Constitution 

was also amended to ensure the primacy of 

international and European human rights conventions 

over domestic law. The changes to the Penal Code 

included limiting convictions on incitement charges, 

narrowing the scope of defamation, and strengthening 

the principle of equality between men and women. 

In addition, Turkey has boosted efforts since 2002 to 

comply with the decisions of the ECtHR. 

The most recent Progress Report on Turkey 

issued by the European Commission (EC) in late 

2008 stated that, ―The government expressed its 

commitment to the EU accession process and to 

political reforms.‖ However, the report also added 

that, ―despite its strong political mandate, the 
210

government did not put forward a consistent and 

comprehensive programme of political reforms.‖ 

The EC report also noted that while Turkey has 

continued to make progress on implementation of 

ECtHR judgments, further efforts are needed, such as 

the ratification of additional international human 

rights instruments and increased independence and 

transparency for the Turkish institutional human 

rights framework. For example, the Human Rights 

Advisory Board, a Turkish body representing NGOs, 

experts and ministries, has not operated since it 

published a report on minority rights in October 

2004.

Regarding religious freedom, the progress 

report stated that, ―freedom of worship continues to 

be generally respected. The Law on Foundations 

adopted in February 2008 addresses, among other 

things, a number of property issues regarding nonMuslim minorities.‖ However, the report cited as 

continuing problems the inability of minority 

religious groups to obtain legal personality and the 

limitations on religious training. The report also 

cited attacks against non-Muslim clergy and places of 

worship throughout the country, and said that 

―[m]issionaries continue to be portrayed and/or 

perceived as a threat to the integrity of the country 

and to the Muslim religion.‖ The report also 

criticized Turkey for ―not following through‖ on its 

initiative to increase dialogue with the Alevis. The 

report concluded that ―[a] legal framework in line 

with the [European Convention on Human Rights] 

has yet to be established, so that all non-Muslim 

religious communities and Alevis can function 

without undue constraints‖ and that ―Turkey needs to 

make further efforts to create an environment 

conducive to full respect for freedom of religion in 

practice and to carry out consistent initiatives aimed 

at improving dialogue with the various religious 

communities.‖ 

The Turkish government has ratified three 

major international human rights treaties, including 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights (ICCPR) in September 2003. However, the 

Turkish government placed a reservation on Article 

27 of the ICCPR, thereby setting conditions on its 

commitment to religious freedom for those religious 

minority groups to which the Lausanne Treaty refers. 

Article 27 reads, ―In those States in which ethnic, 

religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 

belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 

right, in community with the other members of their 

group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 

practice their own religion, or to use their own 

language.‖ The Turkish government reservation 

stated, ―The Republic of Turkey reserves the right to 

interpret and apply the provisions of Article 27 of the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 

in accordance with the related provisions and rules of 

the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and the 

Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923 and its 

Appendixes.‖ Considering the government‘s narrow 

definition of the rights and status of those minorities 

under the treaty, the reservation potentially 

undermines the guarantees to ―profess and practice‖ 

religion in Article 27, and possibly the more 

extensive religious freedom guarantees found in 

ICCPR Article 18. 

Finally, in a set of EU reforms passed in 

April 2008, the parliament amended Article 301of the 

Turkish Criminal Code, which criminalizes alleged 

insults to the Turkish state or ―Turkish identity.‖ 

While the amendment seems to expand free speech 

protections, its vague language increases the 

possibility of abuse, as has occurred in the past. The 

EC progress report highlights these shortcomings in 

regard to freedom of expression, but there are also 

implications for freedom of religion or belief. 

Turkish prosecutors have brought suit under Article 

301 to restrict the rights of religious expression and 

persuasion of members of minority religious and 

ethnic groups.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

Regarding Turkey, the Commission 

recommends that that U.S. government should: 

I. Urging Legal Reforms to Improve 

Religious Freedom

explore cooperation with Turkish authorities to 

allow women the freedom to express their 

religious or nonreligious views through dress so 
211

as to respect their beliefs as well as the secular 

status of the Turkish republic, while ensuring a 

lack of coercion for those choosing not to wear 

headscarves and protecting the rights and 

freedoms of others, and providing access to 

public education and to public sector 

employment for those choosing to wear a 

headscarf;

urge the government of Turkey to remove 

restrictions on the ability of leaders of majority 

and minority religious communities to wear 

clerical garb in public areas, state institutions, 

and public and private universities, and to 

remove restrictions on leaders of the Christian, 

Jewish or other communities from wearing 

clerical garb in the public space;

urge Prime Minister Erdogan to follow-up on his 

January 2008 statement that the Ecumenical 

status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate should 

be an internal church issue by granting official 

recognition to the Ecumenical status of the 

Patriarch;

urge the government of Turkey to permit all 

religious minorities, including those not covered 

by the Lausanne Treaty, to train religious clergy, 

including by: 

--permitting the reopening of the Halki 

Seminary under the control of the 

Ecumenical Patriarch, and not under the 

supervision of the Turkish government, and 

allowing for religious training to occur;

--instructing officials to drop their legal case 

to seize the property of the Mor Gabriel 

Syrian Orthodox monastery; and

--encouraging the Ministry of Education to 

respond favorably to the official request of 

the Armenian Patriarch to permit his 

community to establish an Armenian 

language faculty at a Turkish state 

university, including instruction by the 

Patriarch;

urge expansion of the process to regain clear 

title or fair compensation for expropriated 

holdings to include properties sold to third 

parties or held by the government, and to end the 

authority of the Vakiflar or any government 

agency to seize the property of any religious 

community;

urge the government of Turkey to permit 

religious communities to select and appoint their 

leadership in accordance with their internal 

guidelines and beliefs;

urge Turkish officials to allow for the 

independent and peaceful practice of Islam 

outside of the Diyanet and end the prohibition on 

Sufi spiritual orders;

encourage the Prime Minister‘s office and the 

Diyanet to work with the Alevi community 

regarding the recognition and the administration 

of that community in Turkey, and grant official 

status to Alevi cem houses of worship to those 

communities which have applied for such status; 

and to prevent general societal discrimination 

against Alevis in other areas of life in Turkey;

urge the government of Turkey to address the 

absence of full legal recognition for religious 

minorities, including Alevis; Greek, Armenian, 

Georgian and Syrian Orthodox; Roman and 

Syriac Catholics; Protestants; and Jews; by: 

--fully implementing the 1923 Lausanne 

treaty and providing all non-Muslim 

communities with legal status that affords 

them the right to inherit, purchase, possess, 

maintain, and sell property; or

--amending the Law on Associations so that 

it provides religious communities with legal 

status that affords them the right to inherit, 

purchase, possess, maintain, and sell 

property;

urge the Turkish government to further amend 

Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which 

restricts freedom of expression and has 
212

associated negative effects on freedom of 

religion or belief;

urge the government of Turkey to omit the legal 

requirement to list religious affiliation on official 

identification cards;

encourage the Turkish government to undertake 

practical initiatives to establish and enhance trust 

among the country‘s diverse religious and ethnic 

communities, including convening public 

roundtables on the local and national levels; at a 

high political level publicly expressing 

commitments to a democratic and diverse 

Turkish society; and developing civic education 

programs that reflect the religious and ethnic 

diversity of Turkish society, past and present; 

urge Turkish officials to continue to condemn 

violent hate crimes against members of religious 

and ethnic communities and to ensure prompt 

investigation and prosecutions, especially in 

regard to the Alevi, Greek and Armenian 

Orthodox communities, as well as against 

members of the Catholic and Protestant 

communities, and growing anti-Semitism in 

some sectors of the Turkish media;

II. Raising Religious Freedom Concerns 

through Multilateral Fora

in view of Turkey‘s standing invitation to 

receive visits by UN special rapporteurs on 

human rights, encourage the government to 

invite relevant rapporteurs, including the UN 

Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion 

or Belief, in the near future;

encourage the Turkish government to remove its 

reservation to Art. 27 of the ICCPR, which limits 

the protection of freedom of religion or belief 

for members of minority communities; 

urge the European Commission to raise with the 

Turkish government the issue of the headscarf 

ban, its implications for freedom of religion or 

belief as well as the right of Turkish women to 

education and perform professional functions 

consistent with their beliefs and without fear of 

coercion;

speak out publicly at Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) meetings 

and events about violations by the government of 

Turkey of OSCE human rights commitments, 

including on respect for freedom of religion or 

belief; and 

urge the Turkish government to request that the

OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and 

Human Rights (ODIHR) Panel of Experts on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief to:

--provide an assessment of Turkey‘s legislation 

relating to that issue; 

--conduct conferences with relevant government 

officials, leaders of religious communities, and 

members of civil society on teaching about 

religion in public schools from a human rights 

perspective; and 

--provide training sessions for members of the 

Turkish judiciary and law enforcement on how to 

combat hate crimes, including those motivated 

by religious prejudice.
213

Venezuela

Since Hugo Chavez became president of 

Venezuela in 1998, the country has witnessed a 

steady increase in government rhetoric, and in some 

cases government actions, against the Venezuelan 

Jewish and Catholic communities and U.S.-based 

Protestant groups. These developments occurred 

against a backdrop of efforts by President Chavez to 

extend his political control over government 

institutions, the economy, and society, his 

backtracking on democracy, and his imposition of 

socialism. While there are no official restrictions on 

religious practice, actions by President Chavez and 

other government officials have created an 

environment where Jewish and Catholic religious 

leaders and institutions are at risk of attack. 

Furthermore, the Venezuelan government has failed 

to take adequate measures to hold perpetrators of 

attacks on Jewish and Catholic religious leaders and 

institutions accountable. For these reasons, the 

Commission places Venezuela on its Watch List and 

will continue to monitor closely the conditions in the 

country. 

The Constitution of Venezuela provides for 

freedom of religion on the condition that its practice 

does not violate public morality, decency, or public 

order. While the government of Venezuela generally 

respects the rights of citizens and religious leaders to 

practice religion, religious communities and leaders 

viewed as political opponents are routinely targeted 

and harassed by government officials. 

Religious groups are required to register 

with the Directorate of Justice and Religion (DJR) 

within the Ministry of Interior and Justice, but this is 

largely an administrative requirement. The DJR 

provides religious groups with subsidies to conduct 

educational and social programs, which has 

historically been distributed to Catholic 

organizations. Recent years have seen a reduction in 

subsidies provided to Catholic organizations and the 

Episcopal Conference of Venezuela, and an increase 

in funding to evangelical groups implementing 

government-approved social programs, as well as 

larger shares of government revenue directed to stateoperated social programs. 

Thousands of Jews have left the country in 

the 10 years since President Chavez came to power in 

part due to fear of potential negative results of the 

president‘s socialist agenda, but more recently 

because of anti-Semitism. The Jewish population 

today is estimated to be between 10,000 and 15,000, 

down from an estimated 22,000. The targeting of the 

Jewish community and subsequent emigration is new 

to the country. Prior to President Chavez‘s rule, the 

country was not known to have problems of antiSemitism; rather it enjoyed a reputation of 

welcoming Jews during and after the Holocaust. 

However, the increase of societal incidents of antiSemitism and the increasing rate of verbal attacks on 

the community by government officials is 

undermining that legacy and is creating fear in the 

Venezuelan Jewish community of future attacks.

For many years, President Chavez, 

government officials, government-controlled media, 

and President Chavez‘s supporters have used a 

variety of methods to intimidate the country‘s Jewish 

community. Anti-Semitism in the country has 

appeared in waves, with upsurges corresponding with 

important international events or domestic political 

periods, such as the 2006 Lebanon-Israel conflict and 

the lead-up to a 2007 national referendum on 

proposed changes to the Venezuelan constitution. 

Anti-Semitic rhetoric and acts in Venezuela escalated 

to a new level at the end of 2008 and in the early 

months of 2009, which fostered a climate permissive 

of anti-Semitic actions.

Observers note a pattern in the recent 

incidents of anti-Semitism, where the actions of the 

state of Israel are conflated with Venezuelan Jews, 

who are then held responsible for Israel‘s policies. 

During both the 2006 Lebanon-Israel and 2008-2009 

Israel-Gaza conflicts, President Chavez and other 

senior government officials severely criticized the 

actions of Israel, often crossing the line into antiSemitism. For instance, the President compared the 

actions of Israel to the Nazis. Government media 

then echoed these sentiments across the country. 

Anti-Semitic statements appeared in cartoons and 

opinion pieces in state media, were heard on state 

radio programs and in rallies, and were graffitied on 
214

synagogues and other Jewish institutions. AntiSemitic cartoons and graffiti repeatedly equated the 

Star of David with a swastika. While reports of antiSemitism in Venezuela have decreased since 

February 2009, this pattern suggests that government 

and societal anti-Semitic statements and actions can 

target Venezuelan Jews at any time, especially if 

Israel undertakes policies criticized by the 

Venezuelan government.

While it is not anti-Semitic to criticize the 

policies of the state of Israel, such criticism can take 

on anti-Semitic qualities. Several international 

organizations in Europe have noted that antiSemitism can include actions beyond verbal and 

physical assaults, such as promoting the stereotype 

that Jews control the media, economy, and 

government and social institutions; questioning the

loyalty of Jews to Israel or their own nations; 

comparing Israel‘s actions to those of Nazis; and 

holding Jews responsible for Israeli actions. 

As stated above, President Chavez, members 

of the Venezuelan government, governmentcontrolled media, and pro-Chavez media outlets have 

publicly made anti-Semitic remarks and published 

anti-Semitic cartoons and opinions. President 

Chavez and other government officials have blamed 

Israel and Jews for the world‘s problems and 

promoted stereotypes of Jewish financial influence 

and control. In 2005, President Chavez referred to 

Jews as the ―descendants of those who crucified 

Christ and threw founding father Simon Bolivar out 

of Venezuela...‖ In the same speech, the President 

stated, ―A minority has taken possession of all of the 

wealth of the world...‖ Government-affiliated media 

have called for Jews to be expelled from Venezuela 

and printed cartoons with the Star of David imposed 

over or adjacent to a swastika. Similar graphics have 

appeared as graffiti on synagogue walls. 

The highest profile government actions 

against the Jewish community occurred in 2004 and 

2007, when government security agents raided a 

Jewish community center in Caracas, La Hebraica, 

supposedly looking for weapons. The center is the 

focal point for Jewish communal life in the country, 

housing a private school and providing a venue for 

weddings and other religious ceremonies, and the 

raids have been viewed as an attack on the entire 

Jewish community. The November 2004 raid 

occurred as parents and children were arriving for the 

start of the school day. The political context of the 

December 2007 raid was the referendum on 

constitutional changes proposed by President Chavez, 

which occurred that same day. Government security 

agents entered the facility as a wedding was taking 

place. Despite calls to do so, the government has not 

taken any action to investigate the raids. Since the 

two raids, enrollment at the Hebraica Community 

School has dropped by half. 

 

These statements and incidents led the State 

Department to list Venezuela as a state sponsor of 

anti-Semitism in the March 2008 Contemporary 

Global Anti-Semitism report. 

The government did make overtures to the 

Jewish community in 2008, including meetings 

between government officials and community 

leaders, and the signing by President Chavez of a 

declaration to condemn and fight anti-Semitism in 

South America. However, the situation worsened 

significantly during the Israeli-Gaza conflict at the 

end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. During this 

period, President Chavez and other Venezuelan 

government officials escalated their denunciations of 

and opposition to the state of Israel, reportedly stating 

that Israel, as an ―assassin government,‖ was 

committing ―genocide‖ in Gaza. Venezuela severed 

ties with Israel and President Chavez also called on 

all Jews in Venezuela to denounce Israel. He said, ―I 

hope that the Jewish community in Venezuela 

pronounces itself against these barbaric acts. Do it! 

Don‘t you reject forcefully any act of persecution? 

Don‘t the Jews reject the Holocaust? And what are 

we living now? Do it! Put your hands in the air. Be 

fair.‖ A similar anti-Semitic statement was made by 

Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro. 

As the official rhetoric against the state of 

Israel increased, some Venezuelans attacked the 

Jewish community in late 2008 and 2009. A rabbi 

was assaulted on the street; a death threat was sent to 

another; other rabbis were harassed and threatened, 
215

causing some to flee the country; tear gas was thrown 

into a synagogue; synagogues and Jewish businesses 

were sprayed with anti-Semitic slogans; and there 

were calls for a boycott of all Jewish businesses in 

Venezuela. There were also reports that congregants 

at some synagogues in Caracas were filmed as they 

entered the houses of worship and that some 

Venezuelans questioned the ―Venezuelanness‖ of the 

Jewish community and called on Jews to profess their 

loyalty to Venezuela. 

On January 30, 2009, 15 masked men 

overran security guards and broke into, and 

vandalized, the Tiferet Israel synagogue in Caracas. 

For five hours the attackers threw Torah scrolls on 

the floor, and spray-painted hateful messages, such as 

―Death to all‖ and ―Jews, get out.‖ The intruders also 

stole the synagogue‘s computers which contained 

personal information about the congregants. This 

was the second time in a month that the synagogue 

was graffitied with anti-Semitic messages; earlier in 

January the message ―Property of Islam‖ had been 

sprayed on the walls. 

President Chavez publicly condemned the 

synagogue attack the next day, and the foreign 

minister and communications minister met with 

Jewish leaders. Following an international outcry, 11 

individuals, including the bodyguard to a rabbi at the 

synagogue and eight intelligence officers, were 

arrested on suspected involvement in the attacks. 

The men have been charged with robbery, ―acts of 

contempt against a religion,‖ and concealing 

firearms. However, President Chavez also used the 

synagogue attack as a political opportunity before the 

February 15 referendum on presidential term limits to 

assail his opposition, stating several times that the 

―oligarchs‖ and those opposed to his government 

were behind the attack. Further, many government 

officials described the attack as ―just a burglary‖ 

rather than an incident of anti-Semitism.

Following the Tiferet Israel attack, a small 

grenade was thrown into the Beth Shmuel synagogue 

on February 26. No injuries were reported and no 

investigations have been made into this incident. 

Since this last incident, the state has provided police 

protection to Jewish institutions.

There are also tensions between the 

Venezuelan government and the Catholic Church. 

Over the past few years, several Catholic leaders in 

Venezuela have criticized actions of the Chavez 

government. For example, Catholic leaders have 

stated that Venezuela had ―lost its democratic course 

and presents the semblance of a dictatorship.‖

In response, President Chavez has claimed 

that Venezuela‘s Catholic Church and the Vatican are 

conspiring with the United States against his 

government, and on several occasions he has accused 

the Church of attempting a coup or being party to 

plans to assassinate him. In the past, President 

Chavez referred to the Church as a ―tumor‖ and its 

leaders as ―mental retards‖ and the ―devil.‖ Senior 

government officials have called on Church leaders 

to refrain from making political statements, saying it 

should instead focus only on its spiritual mission. In 

response, the Vatican stated that it is the Church‘s 

duty to ―defend the dignity of the human person‖ and 

reiterated the important role the Church plays in 

providing social and educational services to the 

people of Venezuela. 

Thus far, this strong rhetoric has not been 

accompanied by any official actions against Catholic 

Church activities. However, there have been several 

reported attacks by pro-Chavez groups on Catholic 

leaders and institutions. The government has made 

no arrests.

In January 2009, a pro-Chavez organization, 

―La Piedrita,‖ threw tear gas canisters into the house 

of the Apostolic Nunciature—reportedly the sixth 

attack by this organization on the Nunciature in the 

past year— and the attackers left pamphlets insulting 

Catholic leaders who have criticized President 

Chavez. The attacks are believed to be due to the 

Nunciature providing asylum to a student activist and 

opposition members. No arrests have been made in 

the attacks on the Nunciature, although President 

Chavez recently said a manhunt is underway for the 

leader of ―La Piedrita.‖ In February 2008, some proChavez supporters forcefully entered and occupied 
216

the residence of the archbishop of Caracas and held a 

press conference to denounce leaders of the Catholic 

Church and the Papal Nunciature. No arrests have 

been made in this incident, which President Chavez 

described as an attempt by infiltrators to discredit his 

government. 

In recent months, the Ibrahim al-Ibrahim 

mosque, the largest mosque in Venezuela and second 

largest in Latin America, has been robbed and 

vandalized twice, although the reasons for the attacks 

are unknown and the mosque is located in a crimeridden part of Caracas. The most recent attack took 

place on March 23, 2009 when intruders stole jewels, 

computers, and other objects, threw sacred objects on 

the floor, and vandalized copies of the Koran. The 

mosque has asked for the government to provide 

protection for holy places in Venezuela.

The Venezuelan government has also 

restricted foreign missionary activity in the country. 

Foreign missionaries are required to hold special 

visas to operate in the country, and for several years 

the rates of refusal for first-time applicants have 

increased and the rates of renewals decreased, 

particularly for groups based in the United States. 

In recent years, two U.S. Protestant groups 

have had to leave the country. In October 2005, 

President Chavez accused members from the New 

Tribes Mission (NTM) of being ―agents of imperial 

penetration‖ that were ―contaminating‖ the cultures 

of indigenous populations,‖ as well as ―gathering 

strategic information for the United States.‖ The 

government rescinded the NTM‘s permission, 

granted in 1953, to conduct social programs among 

indigenous tribes, and in November 2008 the 

Supreme Court affirmed the removal order. More 

than 100 NTM missionaries left the country in 

compliance with the government‘s order. In 2005, 

219 U.S. missionaries from the Church of JesusChrist of Latter-day Saints also withdrew from the 

country after having difficulties obtaining visas to 

conduct its activities. 

According to Christian Solidarity 

Worldwide, in 2007 and 2008 the government 

requested Evangelical churches to provide it with the 

names and addresses of any foreigners who attend 

services. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

The Commission recommends that the U.S. 

government should:

I. Stopping Abuses of Religious Freedom 

and Related Human Rights

at the highest levels, publicly denounce 

Venezuelan government rhetoric against and 

raids on, as well as societal attacks on, religious 

communities, institutions, and leaders;

at the highest levels, speak out publicly and 

continue to draw international attention to statesponsored anti-Semitism in Venezuela; 

urge the Venezuelan government to immediately 

stop the use of hostile rhetoric that places 

religious communities, institutions, and leaders 

at risk of attack;

urge the Venezuelan government to arrest all 

persons responsible for attacks on religious 

communities, institutions, and leaders and 

vigorously prosecute and hold perpetrators 

accountable;

monitor religious freedom in Venezuela, and if 

conditions deteriorate to where there are 

systematic, egregious, and ongoing violations of 

religious freedom, work to restrict the sale of oil 

from Venezuela; 

work within the current overall policy 

framework to ensure that violations of freedom 

of religion and belief, and related human rights, 

are included in all bilateral discussions with the 

Venezuelan government; 

ensure that funding for democracy and human 

rights promotion in Venezuela includes support 

for activities advancing freedom of religion or 

belief; 
217

instruct the Ambassador-at-Large for Religious 

Freedom and the Special Envoy to Monitor and 

Combat Anti-Semitism to travel to Venezuela 

and report on religious freedom abuses in that 

country; 

II. Undertaking Multilateral Approaches 

and Working with International 

Organizations to Improve Respect for 

Religious Communities, Institutions, and 

Leaders 

work with countries who may have influence 

with the Venezuelan government to encourage 

the government to end anti-Semitic activities 

taking place in the country, including anti-

Semitic statements by government officials and 

anti-Semitic cartoons and statements in the state 

media, as well as to fully investigate all reported 

incidents of anti-Semitism and bring perpetrators 

to justice;

work with countries who may have influence 

with the Venezuelan government to encourage 

the government to fully investigate attacks on 

religious communities, institutions, and leaders, 

and hold perpetrators accountable;

work with the Organization of American States, 

including the OAS General Assembly and the 

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 

to investigate and condemn instances of religious 

freedom violations in Venezuela, including state-

sponsored anti-Semitism and attacks on religious 

communities, institutions, and leaders;

encourage the UN Special Rapporteur on the 

Freedom of Religion or Belief and the UN 

Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 

Protection of the Right to Freedom of Expression 

to request a visit to the country; and

support a UN General Assembly resolution 

condemning severe violations of human rights, 

including freedom of religion or belief, in 

Venezuela, and calling for officials responsible 

for such violations to be held accountable.
218

ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES CLOSELY MONITORED

Bangladesh 

The Commission placed Bangladesh on its 

Watch List from 2005 to 2008 due to a number of 

concerns, including past election related violence 

targeting religious minorities and a range of serious 

violations of human rights under the previous 

military-backed ―caretaker government.‖ On 

December 29, 2008, national elections took place, 

ending a two-year suspension of democratic 

governance. International and local observers 

characterized the elections as free, fair, and peaceful. 

The elections brought the Awami League to power, 

headed by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The 

Awami League is considered more favorably 

disposed toward minority rights protection, based in 

part on the fact that the 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts 

Peace Accords and the Vested Property Return Act, 

both measures meant to safeguard minority rights, 

were established under a previous Awami League 

administration. The 2008 elections allowed for 

minorities to exercise their voting rights and 

proceeded without the anti-minority violence that 

followed the last national elections in 2001. At that 

time, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-led 

government failed to investigate or prosecute acts of 

severe violence, including killings, rape, land 

seizures, arson, and extortion against religious 

minorities, particularly Hindus, who were perceived 

to be allied with the then-opposition Awami League. 

The absence of measures to promote minority voting 

rights and the failure of the government to investigate 

the severe anti-minority violence of 2001 were 

among the reasons for placing Bangladesh on the 

Watch List from 2005 to 2008. In light of the 

positive developments witnessed during the 2008 

elections, the Commission is removing Bangladesh 

from its Watch List in 2009. 

Despite these improvements, Bangladesh 

continues to have outstanding religious freedom 

issues and face threats from religious extremism. 

The Commission therefore urges the new Awami 

League administration to strengthen protections for 

all Bangladeshis to enjoy the right to freedom of 

religion or belief, and undertake efforts to improve 

conditions for minority religious communities. The 

Commission hopes that the government of 

Bangladesh will investigate and prosecute to the 

fullest extent of the law perpetrators of violent acts 

against members of minority religious communities, 

women, and non-governmental organizations. 

Reforms of the judiciary and the police are also 

necessary to ensure that law enforcement and security 

services are equally protective of the rights of all, 

including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, Ahmadis, 

and other minorities. Additional efforts are needed to 

counter societal and governmental discrimination in 

access to public services, the legal system, and 

government, military, and police employment.

Following independence from Pakistan in 

1971, Bangladesh was established as a secular state 

in which national identity was based on Bengali 

language and culture. Although the 1972 constitution 

guaranteed the freedom of religion, subsequent 

military regimes added amendments affirming that 

―absolute trust and faith in Allah‖ is ―the basis for all 

[government] actions.‖ Islam was made 

Bangladesh‘s state religion in 1988 under H.M. 

Ershad‘s military dictatorship.

Aided by the expansion of Islamic schools 

(madrassas) and charities, many of which receive 

foreign funding with varying degrees of government 

oversight, Islamist activists have gained significantly 

in political, economic, and social influence in recent 

years. Members of Jamaat-e-Islami allegedly used 

their influence in the previous BNP-led government 

to deny funding to or otherwise disadvantage groups 

viewed as opposing Jamaat‘s Islamist political and 

social agenda. Although some calling for a more 

Islamist Bangladesh engaged in peaceful political and 

social activities, others adopted an approach 

sanctioning violence towards perceived opponents of 

Islam.

On January 11, 2007, threats by the thenopposition party, the Awami League, to boycott the 

national elections, alongside an ongoing controversy 
219

over voter registration and the impartiality of the 

electoral process, prompted the caretaker government 

to declare emergency rule and indefinitely suspend 

the upcoming national elections. The military was 

given sanction to enforce emergency rule, which 

included the suspension of the freedoms of speech 

and assembly, and due process, among other rights. 

The caretaker government was widely criticized by 

international and local human rights agencies for 

serious human rights abuses, including suspected 

extrajudicial killings by the security forces, arbitrary 

detentions, torture, curbs on press freedom, and 

violations of the right of due process. 

Even during periods of democratic 

governance, Bangladesh‘s high levels of political 

violence and instability have provided opportunities 

for religious and other extremist groups to engage in 

criminal activities with relative impunity. Authors, 

journalists, academics, and women‘s rights and civil 

society activists debating sensitive social or political 

issues, or expressing opinions deemed by radical 

Islamists to be offensive to Islam, have been subject 

to violent, sometimes fatal, attacks. Some Muslim 

clerics, especially in rural areas, have also sanctioned 

vigilante punishments against women for alleged 

moral transgressions. Rape is reportedly a common 

form of anti-minority violence, and sexual assaults on 

Hindu women were reported in 2008. The 

government commonly fails to punish perpetrators, 

since the law enforcement and the judicial systems, 

especially at the local level, are vulnerable to 

corruption, intimidation, and political interference. 

Bangladesh was ranked tenth from the bottom on 

Transparency International‘s 2008 Corruption 

Perceptions Index. From 2001-2005, Bangladesh 

was ranked at the bottom of the list. 

Islamist extremists coordinated a wave of 

hundreds of almost simultaneous bomb attacks, 

carried out in all but one of Bangladesh‘s 64 districts 

on August 17, 2005. These extremists were also 

implicated in a series of bomb attacks on 

Bangladesh‘s judiciary in October-November 2005 

which accompanied a demand to substitute sharia law 

for Bangladesh‘s secular jurisprudence system. In 

March 2007, six members of the armed Islamist 

group Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), 

including JMB leader Sheikh Abdur Rahman and 

Siddiqul Islam, alias ―Bangla Bhai,‖ were executed 

for their involvement in the 2005 bombings. 

During the 2007-2008 emergency, Islamist 

groups rose in political prominence and public 

visibility. In September 2007, emergency restrictions 

on assembly were apparently waived to allow Jamaat 

and other Islamist supporters to burn effigies and 

stage public protests against the publication of a 

newspaper cartoon they believed mocked an element 

of Bangladeshi Islamic culture. Cartoonist Arifur 

Rahman was jailed without charge for six months. In 

March 2008, restrictions on assembly were again 

ostensibly lifted to allow protests by Islamic groups 

against a policy proposed by a consortium of 

women‘s organizations to strengthen constitutional 

provision for the equal rights of women. In October 

2008, federal agencies removed five sculptures of 

traditional Bengali musicians opposite Zia 

International Airport in Dhaka at the behest of 

Islamic leaders, who allegedly deemed the sculptures 

―un-Islamic.‖

In February 2009, during a mutiny of the 

border security force, the Bangladesh Rifles, 74 

Army officers were killed. Some news reports 

alleged the involvement of Bangladesh- and 

Pakistan-based Islamists, although details 

surrounding the revolt remain unclear. In March 

2009, a cache of weapons was found at a madrassa in 

the south of Bangladesh. According to news reports, 

some government officials fear a re-arming of 

Islamist extremist groups in the lull following the 

government crackdown and executions.

Although the constitution provides 

protections for women and minorities, Hindus, 

Buddhists, Christians, Ahmadis, and other minorities 

must regularly grapple with societal discrimination, 

as well as face prejudice that hinders their ability to 

access public services, the legal system, and 

government, military, and police employment. 

Religious minorities are also underrepresented in 

elected political offices, including the national 

parliament. The Vested Property Act (VPA) 

continues to be used as justification by some 

Muslims to seize Hindu-owned land. The VPA‘s 
220

implicit presumption that Hindus do not belong in 

Bangladesh contributes to the perception that Hinduowned property can be seized with impunity.

The most serious and sustained conflict 

along ethnic and religious lines has been in the 

Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), an area with a high 

concentration of non-Bengali, non-Muslim 

indigenous peoples (often referred to as Adivasis, 

Paharis, or Jumma). Resentment among members of 

indigenous groups remains strong over settler 

encroachment, human rights abuses by the 

Bangladeshi military, and the slow, inconsistent 

implementation of the 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts 

Peace Accords. Muslim Bengalis, once a tiny 

minority in the CHT, now reportedly equal or 

outnumber indigenous groups. In 2007, Bangladesh 

human rights organizations reported a surge in 

Bengali settlements on tribal land in the CHT. In 

2008 in the Sajek area of the CHT, tribal residents 

endured military-backed encroachment by Muslim 

Bengali settlers, via home burnings and land seizures. 

On December 29, 2008, a few hours before the 

general elections, a Buddhist temple and three homes 

in a minority-dominated part of Fatikchari, CHT 

were subject to an arson attack, reportedly to 

intimidate minorities and scare them into nonparticipation on voting day. 

 

Bangladesh‘s small Ahmadi community of 

about 100,000 is the target of a campaign to 

designate the Ahmadis as ―non-Muslim‖ heretics. In 

January 2004, the BNP government bent to extremist 

Islamist pressure and banned the publication and 

distribution of Ahmadi religious literature. Police 

seized Ahmadi publications on a few occasions 

before the ban was stayed by the courts in December 

2004. The ban is not currently enforced. An Ahmadi 

library, closed by local officials in Dinajur district in 

March 2008, remained closed through the reporting 

period. In some instances, local anti-Ahmadi 

agitation has been accompanied by mob violence in 

which Ahmadi homes have been destroyed and 

Ahmadis are held against their will and pressured to 

recant. However, violence against Ahmadis has 

diminished due to improved and more vigorous 

police protection. 

The Commission has recommended that the 

U.S. government encourage the new government of 

Bangladesh to take early action on the following 

issues and ensure consistent implementation: 1) 

investigate and prosecute perpetrators of the antiminority violence that occurred in the wake of the 

2001 national elections; 2) repeal the Vested Property 

Act and commit to restoring or compensating for 

properties seized, including to the heirs of original 

owners; 3) rescind the 2004 order banning Ahmadi 

publications, and ensure adequate police response to 

attacks against Ahmadis; 4) enforce all provisions of 

the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accords and declare 

that members of Bangladesh's tribal communities are 

deserving of the full rights of Bangladeshi 

citizenship; 5) create and support the promised 

National Human Rights Commission, which should 

be independent, adequately funded, inclusive of 

women and minorities, and defined by a broad 

mandate that includes freedom of religion or belief; 

6) include in all public and madrassa school 

curricula, textbooks, and teacher trainings 

information on tolerance and respect for freedom of 

religion or belief; and 7) ensure that members of 

minority communities have equal access to 

government services and public employment, 

including in the judiciary and high-level government 

positions. 

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan‘s record on religious freedom and 

related human rights has come under increasing 

international scrutiny because in 2010 it will serve as 

Chair of the 56-nation Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Kazakh 

government had been noted for its relatively good 

human rights record and tolerant policies towards its 

more than 90 ethnic minorities. In recent years, 

however, the country‘s civil society sector, particularly 

independent journalists and members of the political 

opposition, has come under increasing pressure. 

Moreover, the government‘s recent efforts to amend 

the country‘s religion law threatened increased official 

control over Kazakhstan‘s highly diverse religious 

communities.

 
221

In late 2008, Kazakhstan‘s parliament passed 

highly restrictive amendments to the country‘s religion 

law. The amendments established more restrictive 

registration procedures and required all existing 

religious groups to re-register; prohibited proselytism 

and the production of religious literature; prohibited 

groups from maintaining worship facilities open to the 

public; and significantly increased fines and penalties 

for violations of the law. According to Kazakh human 

rights activists, these amendments originated in the 

office of the Kazakh Presidential Administration. 

Kazakh human rights defenders, as well as Muslim, 

Russian Orthodox, Catholic, Lutheran, Hare Krishna, 

and Baptist representatives, expressed concern over the 

amendments. 

International experts also expressed concern. 

The OSCE‘s Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief (the Panel) analyzed two versions of the 

amendments and found ―many serious compliance 

issues with human rights standards, including OSCE 

commitments.‖ The Kazakh government, which had 

requested the Panel‘s analysis, refused to publish its 

findings, claiming that this was done at the request of 

the OSCE; OSCE officials, however, publicly refuted 

this claim. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on 

the Freedom of Religion or Belief also concluded that 

the amendments ―would impose undue restrictions on 

freedom of religion or belief.‖ Her concerns included 

the ban on unregistered religious activity; the 

restrictions on missionary activity; the controls on the 

distribution of religious materials; the ―theological 

analysis‖ of registration applications; the ban on 

private religious education; ―vague provisions‖ giving 

rise to possible ―abusive interpretation and 

discrimination‖ by law enforcement agencies; and the 

lack of "public and open debate" about the proposed 

law.

On February 12, 2009, Kazakhstan‘s 

Constitutional Council declared the amendments 

unconstitutional. The Constitutional Council‘s Chair

stated that the proposals violated the constitutional 

principle of equality before the law by setting 

different registration conditions for religions 

―previously unknown in Kazakhstan‖ and not 

affording legal residents the same rights as citizens. 

Nevertheless, some Kazakh officials reportedly still 

treat the overturned amendments as valid, and 

Kazakh human rights activists claim that the 

government will enact the changes after 

Kazakhstan‘s OSCE chairmanship in 2010. 

The constitution defines Kazakhstan as a 

secular state and provides for freedom of religion. 

Under 2005 amendments to the country‘s religion law, 

religious organizations must register both with the 

national and regional Ministry of Justice offices. 

Unregistered religious activity is an administrative 

offense, and the authorities may suspend the activities 

or impose fines on the leaders of unregistered groups. 

To register, a religious organization is required to have 

at least 10 members and to submit an application to the 

Ministry of Justice; registration may be denied if the 

organization lacks sufficient membership or if its 

charter violates the law. If literature has not been 

vetted during the registration process, it is deemed 

illegal. Foreigners may register religious 

organizations, but Kazakh citizens must comprise the 

majority of the 10 founders. 

 

Under the current religion law, a religious 

organization whose charter includes religious education 

may be denied registration if it does not obtain 

approval from the Ministry of Education. Religious 

instruction is not permitted in public schools, but 

parents may enroll children in supplemental religious 

classes provided by registered religious organizations. 

Neither law nor regulation prohibits foreign missionary 

activity, although foreign missionaries are required to 

register annually with the Justice Ministry and provide 

data on religious affiliation, geographic area, and 

duration of stay, as well as on all religious literature. 

―The religion laws narrow the legal protections of 

religious freedom found in the Constitution,‖ the State 

Department reported in 2008.

The National Administration of Muslims in 

Kazakhstan (SAMK), headed by the Chief Mufti, 

exerts significant influence over the country‘s practice 

of Islam, including selecting imams and regulating the 

construction of mosques. In 2002, however, the 

Kazakh Constitutional Council ruled against a 

proposed legal requirement that the SAMK must 

approve the registration of any Muslim group. 

Nevertheless, the SAMK reportedly occasionally 
222

pressures non-aligned imams and congregations to join 

it, but, according to the State Department, the Kazakh 

government continues to register some mosques and 

Muslim communities not affiliated with the SAMK.

The Law on Extremism, effective since 

February 2005, gives the government wide latitude to 

identify and designate religious or other groups as 

extremist organizations, to ban a designated group‘s 

activities, and to criminalize membership in a banned 

organization. Government officials have expressed 

concern about possible political and religious 

extremism, particularly in southern Kazakhstan, where 

many Uzbeks reside. The Kazakh government has 

imprisoned individuals alleged to be members of 

certain Muslim groups, including some groups that 

espouse extremist political agendas. For example, in 

2007 65 individuals in the cities of Karaganda, 

Stepnogorsk, and Shymkent were sentenced to lengthy 

terms of imprisonment in secret trials for alleged 

membership in various Muslim groups. Human rights 

groups have expressed concerns that the government 

has also used this law to punish non-extremist Muslims 

for independent views. Kazakh civil society activists 

maintain that due process is not followed in many of 

these trials, and that police, investigatory, and judicial 

officials have not provided public access either to trials 

or to information about these cases. Indeed, according 

to some leading Kazakh human rights activists, as 

many as 300 Muslim individuals may be imprisoned in 

Kazakhstan on religion-related charges. Due to the 

lack of information, however, it is impossible to 

ascertain the veracity of these claims.

The government‘s 2007-2009 ―Program for 

Ensuring Religious Freedom and Improvement of 

Relations between the Government and Religions‖ 

outlined plans for ―increasing the stability of the 

religious situation‖ and called for new laws to increase 

control over activities by foreign religious workers and 

the dissemination of religious materials. Two official 

documents issued in April 2007 give rise to concern: 

the ―State Program of Patriotic Education,‖ approved 

by presidential decree, and a Justice Ministry booklet, 

―How not to fall under the influence of religious sects‖ 

which includes the claim that ―transferring to other 

religious faiths represents treason to one‘s country and 

faith.‖ 

Statements by Kazakh authorities that single 

out certain minority religious groups officially viewed 

as ―sects‖ or ―non-traditional,‖ including Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses and Hare Krishnas, have created a hostile 

public atmosphere. In early 2008, President Nursultan 

Nazarbayev publicly criticized foreign religious 

workers, saying that they should not be allowed to 

operate freely, as ―we don‘t know their purposes and 

intentions.‖ He also declared that ―religion is separate 

from the state, but it does not mean that Kazakhstan 

should become a dumping ground for various religious 

movements.‖ The President has not retracted these 

remarks, and since the speech, there has been a marked 

increase in governmental restrictions targeting 

unregistered and minority religious communities.

At an April 2008 press conference, an official 

Kazakh spokesperson claimed that 40,000 adherents of 

1,870 religious organizations, including Scientologists 

and the New Life Church, represented a national 

security threat. In February 2008, the national 

Express-K newspaper interviewed a Kazakh secret 

service officer who described the dangers of what he 

called ―sects,‖ claimed that foreign intelligence agents 

may work undercover as ―missionaries,‖ and equated 

new Christian and Buddhist organizations with Islamic 

extremists. In early 2008, several media outlets 

published or broadcast stories critical of ―nontraditional‖ religious groups such as evangelical 

Protestant Christians, Jehovah‘s Witnesses, 

Scientologists, and Hare Krishnas, depicting them as 

dangerous ―sects.‖

Nevertheless, in practice, most minority 

religious communities registered with the government 

without difficulty, although some Protestant groups and 

other groups viewed by officials as non-traditional 

have experienced long delays. There were no reported 

incidents of official anti-Semitism. Although local 

officials may attempt to limit the practice of religion by 

some ―non-traditional‖ groups, higher-level officials or 

courts, at least until recently, have usually overturned 

such attempts. 

Members of unregistered religious 

communities, including the Council of Churches 

Baptists, who refuse on principle to register any of 
223

their congregations with the state, continue to face 

official harassment. In a notable case, authorities fined 

the pastor of a Council of Churches Baptist 

congregation in the Akmola region for unregistered 

religious activity, and in February 2009, a court order 

permanently banned his church—the first time that 

such a ban has been imposed in Kazakhstan. Council 

of Churches Baptist churches also continue to report 

surveillance, secret recordings of services and sermons, 

raids, short-term detentions, and court-ordered fines for 

unregistered religious activity, which they usually 

refuse to pay. In February 2009, Pastor Yuri Rudenko 

from the Almaty region was jailed for three days for 

refusing to pay fines for unregistered worship and his 

musical instruments were confiscated. Authorities 

have raided Baptist churches in the Akmola region and 

their members have been interrogated. 

Other unregistered Protestant communities are 

increasingly subject to official harassment. In 

November 2008, officers from the Aktobe city 

Department for the Struggle against Extremism, 

Separatism, and Terrorism raided a restaurant dinner 

held by members of the New Life Church, Forum 18 

reported. Several months earlier, the New Life Church 

had been evicted from its church building and was 

attempting to obtain an official permit to purchase land 

on which to build a church. In October 2008, police 

raided the Sunday service of a small unregistered 

Protestant Church in Kazakhstan‘s Kyzylorda region. 

Although the Hare Krishna movement is 

registered at the national and local levels, its leaders 

report continuing harassment, dating back to an April 

2006 appeals court decision that the community‘s 

farm outside Almaty must revert to the county 

government, allegedly because the farmer from 

whom the Hare Krishnas bought the land in 1999 did 

not hold title. The government has ordered the 

community to leave the farm by March 1, 2009, and 

to take as compensation a garbage dump without 

irrigation or potable water, or face new legal 

proceedings. Moreover, on January 27, 2009, a Hare 

Krishna leader, Govinda Swami, an American 

citizen, was denied entry into Kazakhstan, reportedly 

because he was on an entry blacklist. One month 

later, however, Kazakh officials allowed Govinda 

Swami to re-enter the country, RFE/RL Kazakh 

Service reported.

The national Jehovah‘s Witnesses Religious 

Center alleged that local officials harass its 

communities. Reportedly, a local religious affairs 

official told Jehovah‘s Witnesses not to go to Atyrau 

because ―that‘s where Muslims live.‖ It also has been 

reported that for seven years, the Justice Ministry in 

Atyrau has used minor technical infractions to deny 

numerous registration applications of the local 

Jehovah‘s Witness community. In January 2009, 

however, a court in the southern city of Kentau closed 

a case against the Jehovah‘s Witnesses and later the 

local government head cancelled a 2008 decision 

alleging violation of rules for the use of a building for 

religious purposes. Nevertheless, the Jehovah‘s 

Witnesses reported in mid-February that they are still 

waiting for official authorization to use the house. 

As of July 2008, the Kazakh Ministry of 

Justice reported that 362 foreign religious workers of 

various denominations were present in Kazakhstan. 

Several groups reported difficulty in registering foreign 

religious workers, while others reported greater 

difficulties than in previous years with the issuance of 

visas, denials of special visas, or shorter-term visas. In 

2008, the Kazakh Justice Minister is reported to have 

said that ―a large number of foreigners from the United 

States, Georgia, South Korea, and Japan were expelled 

from the country by law enforcement authorities after 

courts have ruled that they violated regulations because 

they worked as missionaries without the required 

registration.‖

 

In January 2009, a court in Almaty sentenced 

Elizaveta Drenicheva, a Russian citizen, to two years in 

a general regime labor camp for teaching Unification 

Church beliefs at private seminars. Drenicheva was 

convicted under a criminal law provision prohibiting 

―incitement to social, national, racial or religious 

hatred.‖ In March 2009, Drenicheva‘s prison term was 

commuted to a fine of 25 times the minimum monthly 

wage, approximately $211. Since she had already 

served two months' imprisonment, she will not have to 

pay the fine, but she will still have a criminal record. 

Her case has been perceived by human rights groups as 
224

an official warning on the strict limits to officially 

tolerated activities.

On the international level, however, the 

Kazakh government has organized events to showcase 

what it views as its record of official religious 

tolerance. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has 

hosted two conferences attended by hundreds of 

leaders of religious communities from around the 

world; a third such conference is planned for July 

2009. In February 2009 several official Kazakh 

organizations and the OSCE Astana Center hosted a 

meeting for several representatives of registered 

religious organizations and civil society groups, as well 

as the diplomatic community, on Kazahkstan‘s ―unique 

experience of interethnic and interdenominational 

accord.‖ 

Despite such official Kazakh promotion, the 

Commission believes that, in view of Kazakhstan‘s 

upcoming OSCE chairmanship, the Kazakh 

government should publicly clarify its actual policies 

on human rights, including on freedom of religion or 

belief, and ensure that its laws conform to OSCE and 

other international commitments. Such official 

clarifications are particularly necessary in light of 

President Nazarbayev‘s hostile public statements about 

various religious groups and the Kazakh government‘s 

publications along these lines. Moreover, even though 

the Constitutional Council has rejected the restrictive 

draft religion law as unconstitutional, Kazakh law 

enforcement bodies reportedly have undertaken 

repressive actions against various religious groups that 

fly in the face of that constitutional ruling. Finally, the 

Commission calls on the Kazakh government to 

include relevant government officials and Kazakh legal 

and other experts in official exchange programs and to 

allow them to participate in international conferences, 

particularly those of the OSCE. 

Sri Lanka

The Commission has remained concerned in 

recent years about religious freedom in Sri Lanka 

because of attacks targeting members of religious 

minorities and their places of worship and proposed 

legislation on religious conversion that, if enacted, 

would have violated international law norms and 

resulted in abuses of freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief. Both issues are occurring 

against the backdrop of a 26-year civil war between 

government troops and the Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who are seeking an 

independent state in the north of the country. 

In January 2009, ongoing violence escalated 

dramatically in the northern Vanni region of the 

Mullaithivu district, as the LTTE sought to maintain 

control of a narrow conflict zone. The Commission 

joins the international human rights community in 

expressing its serious concern about the humanitarian 

crisis that has emerged in the wake of the renewed 

violence. According to estimates from early April, 

60,000 individuals have fled the violence and 

150,000 to 200,000 civilians remained trapped in 17-

square kilometers controlled by the LTTE. UN 

agencies place the civilian death toll from late 

January to March at 2,800, with at least an additional 

7,000 injured.

Despite harassment, killings, and restrictions 

upon the movement of human rights activists and 

journalists throughout the 26 year conflict, evidence 

of severe atrocities carried out on both sides of the 

conflict has been well-documented. In the context of 

the civil war, violence against civilians based on 

ethnicity and/or religion has occurred throughout the 

country. Reports indicate that both sides in the 

conflict fail to take steps to prevent or stop incidents 

of communal violence between or among Buddhist 

Sinhalese, Hindu Tamils, Muslims, and Christians in 

Sri Lanka. Places of worship from various faith 

communities have been targeted by both government 

and LTTE forces. Attacks have occurred on religious 

holidays or during festivals. Moreover, for years, 

entire communities of Sri Lankan Muslims in the 

north and northeastern parts of the country have been 

displaced by LTTE forces seeking to consolidate 

Tamil hold over certain areas. While the LTTE has 

apparently encouraged displaced Muslims in some 

areas to return, a lack of safety guarantees has kept 

many Muslims from returning to LTTE-dominated 

areas. 

Not directly connected to the civil conflict, 

there have been continuing instances of violent 
225

attacks on churches, ministers, and other Christian 

individuals in the past few years, reportedly carried 

out by members of, or persons affiliated with, 

extremist groups espousing Buddhist nationalism. 

There are reports that in the rural areas, churches and 

individual Christians, who comprise approximately 7 

percent of the population, have been physically 

assaulted by one or more persons or by large groups, 

particularly for alleged attempts to convert Buddhists 

to Christianity. According to activists with whom the 

Commission delegation met during its February 2006 

visit, there were about 400 incidents against Christian 

institutions or persons between 2000 and 2005; 

approximately half of those involved violence of 

varying levels and half were verbal threats. More 

recently, in June 2008, an anti-Christian rally and 

petition against a local church was sponsored in 

Hambantota district by a local Buddhist temple. 

Prior to the rally, which attracted 500 participants, a 

Christian girl was attacked for attending church in the 

district. In March 2008, a crowd of 200 surrounded 

the home of a pastor in Galle district and threatened 

him with death if he did not permanently leave the 

area. Arson attacks on church properties and assaults 

on Christians leaving church services were also 

reported. In February 2008, two men killed Neil 

Sampson Edirisinghe, pastor of the House Church 

Foundation in Ampara District. According to news 

reports, the pastor was ordered killed by a man whose 

wife converted to Christianity. 

The UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 

Religion or Belief noted in her 2005 report on Sri 

Lanka that attacks against religious minorities by 

non-state actors were neither adequately investigated 

nor punished by the government, resulting in a 

culture of impunity. This problem is compounded by 

wider, more chronic deficiencies in the judicial 

system in Sri Lanka, including corruption, a lack of 

police training, and inadequate infrastructure.

In recent years, there have been allegations, 

particularly in the period immediately after the 

December 2004 tsunami, of groups and individuals 

engaging in ―unethical practices‖ to encourage 

people to change their religion, which are said to take 

advantage of impoverished populations and lead to 

increased tensions among religious communities in 

Sri Lanka. These practices allegedly have included, 

for example, the offering of money, employment, 

access to education or health care, or some other 

material good as an incentive to convert or join a 

particular church. Some religious organizations 

claim to have evidence that the poverty and 

unemployment of Buddhists in particular is being 

exploited via conversions to other religions by 

unethical or unfair means.

With regard to these reports and allegations, 

the UN Special Rapporteur reported after her May 

2005 visit to Sri Lanka that ―despite repeated 

requests, the Special Rapporteur did not meet any 

person who had changed his or her religion because 

of allurement or other form of inducement. She has 

also not received any substantiated cases of 

conversion that would constitute a violation of the 

right to freedom of religion or belief, such as forced 

conversions.‖ However, she noted that that ―some 

religious communities or religiously-affiliated nongovernmental organizations have demonstrated 

behavior that, while not constituting per se violations 

of the freedom of religion of others, were very 

disrespectful and dishonest vis-à-vis the local 

population they were addressing.‖ 

In January 2009, the Jathika Hela Urumaya 

(JHU) party, which is comprised of nationalist 

Buddhist monks, again brought to Parliament a draft 

anti-conversion law, the Prohibition of Forcible 

Conversion of Religion Bill. The bill, if enacted, 

would provide for prison terms of up to five years for 

anyone who, by ―the use of force or by allurement or 

by any fraudulent means,‖ converts or attempts to 

convert a person from one religion to another, or aids 

or abets such conversion. Because women, minors, 

inmates, the poor, and the physically or mentally 

disabled are considered by the bill‘s proponents to be 

particularly vulnerable, their conversion would 

warrant even harsher prison terms of up to seven 

years.

The bill defines ―allurement‖ as the offer of 

any temptation for the purpose of converting, 

including any gift, gratification, or material benefit. 

It describes ―force‖ as including not only threat of 

physical harm, but also the ―threat of religious 
226

disgrace or condemnation of any religion for the 

purpose of converting.‖ The bill defines ―fraudulent‖ 

as ―any willful misinterpretation or any other 

fraudulent contrivance.‖ Opponents of the bill are 

concerned that its broad language would encompass 

all religious conversions, not just ―unethical 

conversions,‖ and would criminalize the charitable 

activities of religious groups. 

The bill is largely the same proposal put 

forth in 2004 by the JHU, except without provisions 

requiring that conversions be reported to the 

government and providing punishments for failure to 

report, which the Sri Lankan Supreme Court ruled 

would be unconstitutional in August 2004. 

Regarding the bill‘s other provisions, however, the 

court found that the provisions criminalizing 

conversion by force, allurement, and fraudulent 

means were designed to ensure public order and 

welfare and therefore were constitutional. After 

amending the bill in light of the Supreme Court‘s 

decision, the bill had its first and second readings, 

and in 2005 was referred to a parliamentary 

committee. The Commission investigated the status 

of the proposed bill during its February 2006 factfinding trip to Sri Lanka. In February 2009, the bill 

was submitted back to Parliament for its third reading 

and vote, which was then expected to take place in 

March 2009. 

The JHU contends that the views of all 

religious communities in Sri Lanka have been 

incorporated into the bill, but this assertion has been 

challenged by both government and opposition party 

leaders. Proponents of anti-conversion legislation 

assert that their proposals are promulgated in 

response to reports of forced or unethical 

conversions. Indeed, the preamble to the 2004 and 

2009 draft anti-conversion law states that Buddhism 

and other religions are faced with a threat from 

forcible conversions, and that religious leaders have 

realized the need to protect religious harmony in Sri 

Lanka. However, according to the UN Special 

Rapporteur, the proposed law was not ―an 

appropriate response to the religious tensions and is 

not compatible with international human rights law.‖ 

In February 2009, amidst international pressure, 

including from members of the U.S. Congress, the Sri 

Lankan government referred the anti-conversion bill 

to the Consultative Committee on Religious Affairs 

and Moral Upliftment for discussion. In April 2009, 

the Religious Liberty Partnership, an international 

coalition of Christian organizations, expressed its 

support for this action in its Toronto Statement: 

―although extreme elements within religious sectors 

have called for anti-conversion laws, the government 

of Sri Lanka has taken care to protect the 

constitutional right to freedom of religious choice by 

not enacting proposed laws subjecting religious 

conversion to criminal scrutiny.‖

Although the committee‘s meeting has been 

indefinitely postponed, thus also indefinitely 

postponing further discussion of the draft anticonversion legislation, the Commission will continue 

to monitor closely the status of the draft bill. 

In February 2006, the Commission visited 

Sri Lanka and met with government officials, 

Members of Parliament, political parties, human 

rights organizations, and representatives of the

Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, and Muslim 

communities. 

PENDING

India

The Commission is planning to travel to 

India for the first time in June 2009. Therefore the 

Commission will release its report on India during 

this summer.
227

PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM THROUGH 

MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS

The International Religious Freedom Act of 

1998 (IRFA) specifically cites U.S. participation in 

multilateral organizations as an avenue for advancing 

freedom of religion or belief, which is enshrined in 

numerous international human rights declarations and 

conventions. 

The 192 member states of the United 

Nations have agreed, by signing the UN Charter, to 

―practice tolerance‖ and to ―promot[e] and 

encourag[e] respect for human rights and for 

fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 

race, sex, language or religion.‖ These fundamental 

freedoms include the freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion, which is protected and affirmed in 

numerous international human rights instruments, 

including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, and the 1981 Declaration on the 

Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 

Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. 

The 56 participating States of the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE), comprising Eastern and Western Europe, 

the states of the former Soviet Union, the United 

States, and Canada, also have committed themselves 

to uphold extensive standards to protect freedom of 

religion or belief and to combat discrimination, 

xenophobia, intolerance, and anti-Semitism. 

Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief is singled out in the OSCE founding document, 

the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and in many subsequent 

political agreements.

The United Nations

The UN Human Rights Council 

In 2006, the UN Commission on Human 

Rights was replaced by a new body, the UN Human 

Rights Council, which meets more often, is 

marginally smaller, and has certain new procedures 

such as the ―universal periodic review‖ (UPR), to 

which all UN member states are subject. The Human 

Rights Council was intended to address and correct 

the perception that the Commission on Human Rights 

unfairly singled out some states for repeated scrutiny 

while ignoring many others. The UPR process offers 

UN members the opportunity to assess the human 

rights performance of all 192 member states, some of 

whose records have 

never before been subject to human rights review by 

an intergovernmental body. 

In February 2009, the Commission wrote to 

Secretary of State Clinton to urge the United States to 

ask questions and make recommendations concerning 

key countries being reviewed in that month‘s UPR 

session, such as China and Saudi Arabia, that are 

designated as ―countries of particular concern‖ under 

the International Religious Freedom Act. While the 

Bush Administration participated in the initial 

sessions of the UPR process, this was halted in the 

latter part of 2008 as part of that administration‘s 

policy of not engaging with the Human Rights 

Council except in narrow circumstances. The Obama 

Administration did not speak in the February UPR 

session, but on March 31, 2009, the State Department 

announced that the U.S. will run for election to the

Council. The Commission hopes that the new 

administration will take advantage of the opportunity, 

in future sessions of the UPR, to ask hard questions 

of nations whose records on religious freedom and 

related human rights do not meet UN standards. In 

various country-specific chapters of this report, the 

Commission also recommends that the United States 

should vigorously demand scrutiny of such states, 

with special attention to freedom of religion and 

related human rights.

The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief 

In 1986, on the initiative of the United 

States, the former UN Commission on Human Rights 

(the aforementioned predecessor to the Human 
228

Rights Council) appointed an independent expert, or 

Special Rapporteur, to investigate and report on 

instances of religious intolerance and violations of 

the internationally-protected right to freedom of 

religion or belief around the world. The Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

monitors this fundamental freedom worldwide, 

communicates with governments about alleged 

violations, conducts country visits, and, perhaps most 

importantly, brings religious freedom concerns to the 

UN and public attention. The Special Rapporteur‘s 

mandate was most recently renewed by the Human 

Rights Council in December 2007, at which USCIRF 

participated as part of the U.S. delegation. 

At that session, the Organization of the 

Islamic Conference (OIC)— a regional organization 

headquartered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, comprised of 

57 nations with Muslim majority or significant 

Muslim populations—attempted to amend the 

resolution extending the Special Rapporteur‘s 

mandate to remove a reference to the right of 

individuals to change their religion. The U.S., 

European Union members, and Canada mounted a 

vigorous opposition effort, and ultimately the 

resolution was passed without the OIC‘s desired 

change. However, because of the rejection of their 

request, the OIC members of the Council abstained.1 

 

The position of Special Rapporteur was held 

from 1986 to 1993 by Mr. Angelo d'Almeida Ribeiro 

of Portugal, from 1993 to 2004 by Mr. Abdelfattah 

Amor of Tunisia, and since 2004 by Ms. Asma 

Jahangir of Pakistan. Over the years, the successive 

Special Rapporteurs have visited and reported on the 

religious freedom situations in 25 countries: China, 

Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Greece, India, Australia, 

Germany, the United States, Vietnam, Turkey, 

Bangladesh, Argentina, Algeria, Georgia, Romania, 

Nigeria, Sri Lanka, France, Azerbaijan, the Maldives, 

Angola, Israel and the Palestinian territories, India, 

and Turkmenistan. The Special Rapporteur reports to 

the Human Rights Council and the Third Committee 

of the UN General Assembly each year. During the 

2008 interactive dialogue at the Third Committee, the 

U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for International 

Religious Freedom for the first time participated in 

the discussion and spoke publicly in support of the 

Special Rapporteur‘s work. 

The Campaign to Protect Religions from 

Alleged Defamation 

Over the past several years, the Commission 

has become increasingly concerned about the 

campaign by some UN member states to create an 

international legal principle protecting religions, 

rather than individuals, from alleged ―defamation,‖ 

which would violate key principles that guarantee the 

freedoms of religion and expression. At the Human 

Rights Council, these efforts have been led by 

Pakistan, as chair of the OIC. OIC member Egypt 

has played a leading role at the General Assembly in 

New York, as well as in Geneva. 

In recent years, and particularly since the 

controversy over a Danish newspaper‘s publication 

of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed in September 

2005, some countries with predominately Muslim 

populations have increasingly demanded formal 

measures to combat the so-called ―defamation of 

religions,‖ a flawed concept without basis in 

international law. Though justified by its proponents 

as protecting religious practice and promoting 

tolerance, the ―defamation of religions‖ concept in 

fact promotes intolerance and human rights 

violations, including violations of religious freedom 

and freedom of expression. The concept subverts 

international human rights law by subordinating 

individual rights to the purported rights of religions. 

It also empowers repressive governments and 

religious extremists to suppress and punish whatever 

they deem to be offensive or unacceptable speech 

about a particular, favored religion or sect. The 

concept has been used in some states to justify 

actions that selectively curtail civil dissent, halt 

criticism of political or religious structures, and 

restrict the religious speech of members of minority 

faith communities, dissenting members of the 

majority faith, and persons of no religious faith.

 

The ―defamation of religions‖ concept seeks 

to export the blasphemy laws found in some OIC 

countries to the international level. Under these laws, 

criminal charges can be levied against individuals for 
229

defaming, denigrating, insulting, offending, 

disparaging, and blaspheming Islam, often resulting 

in gross human rights violations.2 For example, in 

Pakistan, the domestic law makes blasphemy against 

Islam a criminal offense subject to severe penalties, 

including death. These broad provisions have been 

abused by extremists to intimidate members of 

religious minorities, including members of disfavored 

minority Muslim sects, and others with whom they 

disagree. Blasphemy allegations in Pakistan, which 

are often false, have resulted in the lengthy detention 

of, as well as threats of violence and actual violence 

against, the accused. Even persons who have been 

acquitted of blasphemy have been forced into hiding 

or to flee the country because of fears of vigilante 

violence. Recent cases in Pakistan include the 

following: In June 2008, four Ahmadis were arrested 

and charged with blasphemy following a dispute over 

the construction of an Ahmadi prayer center and 

protests from local mullahs. In May 2008, authorities 

arrested a Christian after a mob that suspected him of 

committing blasphemy attacked his home; local 

Islamist groups reportedly have threatened to kill the 

man if he is acquitted. 

Since 1999, the OIC has brought annual 

resolutions to the UN Human Rights Council and its 

predecessor, the UN Commission on Human Rights, 

calling on UN member states to outlaw ―defamation 

of religions‖—most recently, in March 2009. Similar 

resolutions have been adopted at the General 

Assembly each year since 2005. At the March 2008 

Human Rights Council session, the OIC succeeded in 

amending the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on 

the Freedom of Opinion and Expression to require 

that expert ―to report on instances in which the abuse 

of the right of freedom of expression constitutes an 

act of racial or religious discrimination‖—by which 

they mean instances of ―defamation of religions.‖ 

The OIC has indicated that its goal is the adoption of 

a binding international covenant to protect religions, 

particularly Islam, from ―defamation.‖

International support for the flawed 

―defamation of religions‖ concept appears to be 

eroding, however. While the resolutions continue to 

pass, the last three times the world community has 

considered these resolutions, the votes in favor 

diminished, resulting in a plurality instead of a clear 

majority of all members. At both the March 2008 

and March 2009 Human Rights Council sessions, as 

well as the December 2008 General Assembly, the no 

votes and abstentions combined outnumbered the yes 

votes, although those voting for the defamation 

resolutions still outnumbered those voting against. 

Countries in Asia, North America, and Europe, 

including the Holy See, have consistently voted or 

spoken out against the concept. In addition, in 

December 2008, the four international experts 

serving as freedom of expression rapporteurs of, 

respectively, the United Nations, the OSCE, the 

Organization of American States, and the African 

Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights issued a 

joint statement urging international organizations to 

stop issuing statements supporting the idea of 

―defamation of religions,‖ because it ―does not 

accord with international standards accepted by 

pluralistic and free societies.‖ The UN Special 

Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief also 

has spoken separately against the concept, pointing 

out that international human rights law protects 

individuals, not belief systems, and the individual 

right to freedom of religion or belief does not include 

the right to have one‘s religion or belief be free from 

criticism. 

Recently, some countries advancing the 

flawed ―defamation of religions‖ concept have begun 

to argue that speech insulting or criticizing religions 

is outlawed under existing international norms. They 

mainly cite the prohibition of ―advocacy of national, 

racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement 

to discrimination, hostility, or violence‖ in Article 20 

of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights (ICCPR), but also point to Article 4 of the 

Covenant on the Elimination of Racial 

Discrimination (CERD), which prohibits the 

―dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or 

hatred‖ and ―incitement to racial discrimination.‖ 

The United States has reservations to both ICCPR 

Article 20 and CERD Article 4 to the extent that they 

restrict the rights to free expression and association 

protected under the U.S. Constitution.

Article 20 is a narrow exception to the 

ICCPR‘s broad free speech guarantee, and requires 
230

much more than the expression of critical or even 

insulting views on religious matters. As the Special 

Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief has 

explained, 

[t]he threshold of the acts that are 

referred to in article 20 is relatively 

high because they have to 

constitute advocacy of national, 

racial, or religious hatred.... 

[E]xpressions should only be 

prohibited under article 20 if they 

constitute incitement to imminent 

acts of violence or discrimination 

against a specific individual or 

group.... At the global level, any 

attempt to lower the threshold of 

article 20 of the Covenant would 

not only shrink the frontiers of free 

expression, but also limit freedom 

of religion or belief itself. Such an 

attempt could be counterproductive 

and may promote an atmosphere of 

religious intolerance.3 

The Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Opinion 

and Expression also has noted that the limitation in

Article 20 is narrow and meant to protect individuals, 

not belief systems, and that the freedom of expression 

applies ―not only to comfortable, inoffensive or 

politically correct opinions, but also to ideas that 

 ̳offend, shock and disturb.‘‖4 

The Commission is seriously concerned by 

these efforts. The UN Human Rights Committee has 

decided to prepare a new General Comment 

interpreting Article 19 of the ICCPR, which protects 

the freedom of opinion and expression. In so doing it 

should resist attempts to lower Article 20‘s high 

standard and thereby limit Article 18 and 19 religion 

and expression rights. The Human Rights Council‘s 

Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of 

Complementary Standards, which is working on a 

possible additional protocol to the CERD, also should 

not include allegedly religiously defamatory speech 

within the ambit of Article 4 of the CERD, which 

addresses race, not religion. 

A related issue has arisen in connection with 

the European Union‘s annual resolution in both the 

UN Human Rights Council and the General 

Assembly entitled ―Elimination of all forms of 

intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or 

belief.‖ This resolution traditionally has had two 

foci—ways to combat religious intolerance, and also 

admonitions to member states on the importance of 

protecting religious freedom. Over the past two 

years, however, the European Union has proposed 

new language limiting speech freedoms, urging 

member states to ensure that ―any advocacy of 

religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 

discrimination, hostility or violence is prohibited by 

law.‖ In the past, the resolutions have merely sought 

condemnation of this kind of speech. Going further 

to call for legal prohibitions is problematic, as it 

introduces language from ICCPR Article 20 into the 

context of religious freedom. An express call for 

legal prohibitions on forms of speech concerning 

religions could lend support to the efforts of OIC 

countries to reinterpret Article 20 to fulfill their goal 

of prohibiting ―defamation of religions.‖ 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy 

In order to ensure that the United Nations 

fully upholds its crucial mandate to protect and 

promote freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion, the U.S. government should: 

participate actively in the UN Human Rights 

Council, including its Universal Periodic Review 

process, and in particular seek to ensure that each 

country‘s compliance with international religious 

freedom standards constitutes an important part 

of the UPR review, as well as all countryspecific resolutions;

continue firmly and unequivocally to support a 

mandate and mandate-holder for the position of 

UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief that focuses on the universal right of 

every individual to the freedom of thought, 

conscience and religion, rather than on the 

purported rights of religions; 
231

continue to support the existing UN Special 

Rapporteur positions that focus on the human 

rights situations in countries that have been 

designated as ―countries of particular concern‖ 

(CPCs) under IRFA, and seek either the creation 

of additional Special Rapporteur positions for the 

other countries on that list or visits to those 

countries by teams of thematic Special 

Rapporteurs including the Special Rapporteur on 

the Freedom of Religion or Belief and the 

Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 

Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 

and Expression; 

continue to oppose efforts in international fora to 

establish an international legal principle that 

would claim to protect religions from 

―defamation‖ or criticism, offering new rights to 

religions that would undermine many 

fundamental, individual human rights; 

if a Special Envoy to the Organization of the 

Islamic Conference is reappointed, include in the 

Special Envoy‘s mandate the task of raising 

with OIC countries U.S. concerns about 

―defamation of religions‖ and efforts to 

reinterpret ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 

4; 

work diplomatically, through its ambassadors in 

OIC countries, its Special Envoy to the OIC (if 

reappointed), its Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom, and its 

Ambassadors to the UN in New York and 

Geneva to persuade OIC members that religious 

intolerance and discrimination can best be fought 

not through national or international legal 

prohibitions that purport to stop criticism or 

―defamation‖ of religions, but rather through 

efforts to encourage respect for the human rights 

of every individual;

continue to educate member states who have not 

voted against past ―defamation‖ resolutions, as 

well as moderate OIC countries, about the 

human rights abuses perpetrated under this 

concept and urge them to oppose the resolutions 

and any attempts to reinterpret ICCPR Article 20 

or CERD Article 4;

reach out to the OIC Secretary General and to the 

governments of Pakistan and Egypt, among 

others, to raise concerns about the ―defamation 

of religions,‖ ICCPR Article 20, and CERD 

Article 4 initiatives, and to make clear that their 

continuance will negatively impact the emerging 

relationship between the OIC and the United 

States, as well as the bilateral relationships 

between other governments and the United 

States;

clarify to members of the Human Rights 

Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of 

Racial Discrimination, and the Ad Hoc 

Committee on the Elaboration of 

Complementary Standards the nature of U.S. 

concerns, given its previous reservations on 

these provisions, with any reinterpretation of 

ICCPR Article 20 or CERD Article 4; and 

urge the European Union to stop offering 

language in their annual resolution on 

―Elimination of all forms of intolerance and of 

discrimination based on religion or belief‖ 

calling for legal prohibitions against ―advocacy 

of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 

discrimination, hostility or violence‖ and explain 

how this could support OIC efforts to undermine 

international human rights norms.

 

1 The OIC members also expressly disassociated 

themselves from the resolution‘s reference to the 

right to change one‘s religion, which they said they 

do not consider to be binding—despite the fact that 

this right is a long-recognized element of 

international human rights law. See Human Rights 

Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18 (Fortyeighth session, 1993), para. 5 (―The Committee 

observes that the freedom to  ̳have or adopt‘ a 

religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to 

choose a religion or belief, including the right to 

replace one‘s current religion or belief with another 

or to adopt atheistic views. . . .‖).

2 The Commission has spoken out repeatedly against 

repressive domestic blasphemy laws in Pakistan and 

elsewhere. See, e.g., U.S. Commission on 
232

 

International Religious Freedom, Sudan: USCIRF 

Condemns Punishment of Teacher for Allegedly 

Insulting Religion, Urges her Release and Safe 

Passage, December 1, 2007; U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, Pakistan: USCIRF 

Decries Abuse of Blasphemy Laws, Apostasy Bill, 

June 11, 2007. 

3 A/HRC/2/3, paras 44-47 (2006). 

4 A/HRC/7/14, paras 63-66 (2008).
233

The OSCE 

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the OSCE 

continues to be an important forum in which 

participating States are accountable for their human 

rights and religious freedom commitments. In recent 

years, however, some participating states have sought 

to curtail or derail the organization‘s focus on human 

rights activities. Russia, in particular, has often 

protested that the OSCE focuses too much of its

criticism on the countries of the former USSR, while 

downplaying human rights problems in the West, and 

has also proposed that OSCE should be primarily 

concerned with military security. In 2008, for 

example, the Kremlin launched a major ―Helsinki 

Plus‖ initiative to negotiate a new treaty on European 

security, allegedly based on the OSCE. In the past, 

Russia has withheld needed consensus approval for 

the OSCE budget, thereby putting in jeopardy many 

of the OSCE‘s human rights activities. These OSCE 

activities are particularly important at a time when 

the governments of Russia and many other countries 

of the former Soviet Union are demonstrating an 

increasing lack of commitment to their human rights 

obligations, including efforts to combat racism, 

xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance and 

discrimination.

OSCE Venues for Addressing Freedom of 

Religion or Belief Issues

In 1975, the Helsinki Final Act affirmed 

freedom of religion or belief as a basic human rights 

principle; this was later expanded and reinforced 

through later OSCE agreements. OSCE participating 

States are held accountable to these commitments 

through a variety of mechanisms, such as periodic 

review meetings by the OSCE and its Office of 

Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); 

ODIHR reports; and the monitoring, reports, and 

related program activities of many of the 18 OSCE 

Field Presences. 

Under the auspices of the ODIHR, the 

OSCE convenes an annual conference, traditionally 

held in Warsaw in October, to review implementation 

by the 56 OSCE participating States of their human 

rights commitments, including freedom of religion or 

belief. Known as the Human Dimension 

Implementation Meeting (HDIM), these 10-day 

meetings bring together diplomats, representatives of 

other international organizations and hundreds of 

NGOs. Reportedly, the HDIM is the largest 

European human rights conference. In 2008, at a 

U.S. initiative, the HDIM had a special focus on 

freedom of religion or belief, with a day set aside for 

review of participating States compliance with the 

OSCE commitments on freedom of religion or belief 

and on promotion in this regard. The OSCE also 

decided to convene a special two-day July 2009 

Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting in 

Vienna to further discuss issues relating to freedom 

of religion or belief.

ODIHR provides technical assistance to 

participating States on religious freedom matters 

through its Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief, comprised of 60 persons 

nominated by countries throughout the OSCE region, 

including an Advisory Council of 15 members. A 

unique international body focused solely on freedom 

of religion or belief, the Panel functions primarily as 

a consultative resource for the governments of 

participating States which are considering new or 

amended legislation affecting freedom of religion, as 

well as for providing expert opinions on individual 

cases. The Panel reviews both proposed and enacted 

legislation under guidelines developed by the ODIHR 

and the Council of Europe Venice Commission based 

on international conventions and OSCE 

commitments. The Panel then issues 

recommendations to the participating States on 

bringing such legislation into conformity with 

international human rights standards. The Panel also 

issues publications to provide guidance on frequently 

raised concerns, most recently, the 2007 ―Toledo 

Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and 

Beliefs in Public Schools,‖ which offers a human 

rights framework for curricula. 

The Panel has advised governments, 

including those of Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, 

Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, on relevant legislation. 

The Panel‘s recommendations on legislation have 

been taken into consideration by the government of 

Bulgaria. In the case of Uzbekistan, however, the 
234

government has not responded to the Panel‘s 2003 

recommendations for revisions to its religion laws. 

In 2008, at the request of the Kazakh government, the 

Panel conducted two expert reviews of a highly 

restrictive draft religion law then under consideration 

in that country. The Kazakh government refused to 

make public the Panel‘s reviews, which were critical 

of the draft law, claiming that the refusal was at 

ODIHR‘s request. This claim, however, was publicly 

rejected in November 2008 by Ambassador Janez 

Lenarcic, ODIHR director. While the restrictive draft 

law was passed by the Kazakh parliament and signed 

by President Nazarbayev, it was ruled 

unconstitutional by the country‘s Constitutional 

Council in February 2009.

In two examples of expert opinions on 

individual cases, the Panel determined that the 

situation of Jehovah‘s Witnesses in Moscow is 

illustrative of a systemic problem in other post-Soviet 

countries, where registration requirements are used to 

control peaceful religious groups. The Panel has also 

been critical of official threats to destroy Hare 

Krishna property in an agricultural cooperative in 

Kazakhstan, and has offered its assistance in 

resolving this dispute. The Commission has 

observed that the activities of the Panel should be 

better publicized and more transparent, in particular 

with respect to those governments that ignore its 

recommendations. In addition, every year the Panel 

should hold at least one meeting of its entire 

membership. 

The OSCE Response to Racism, 

Xenophobia, Discrimination, and Intolerance

The past few years have witnessed a rise in 

incidents of racist discrimination, xenophobia, and 

intolerance toward members of religious and ethnic 

minorities in the OSCE region, including, for 

example, in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, as well 

as in such democratic countries as France, Germany, 

and the United Kingdom. Extremist rhetoric that 

goes uncontested by political and societal leaders has 

also promoted an environment of intolerance toward 

members of various ethnic and religious minorities. 

Indeed, officials and state-run media are sometimes 

involved in efforts to inflame public opinion against 

minority groups in some parts of the OSCE region. 

Anti-Semitic views and actions also 

continue to be problems in many OSCE participating 

States and officials often fail to hold the perpetrators 

of anti-Semitic attacks to account. Anti-Zionism and 

vilification of Israel can also mask anti-Semitism. 

Individuals and organizations monitoring these 

incidents, including OSCE‘s ODIHR, have found that 

when tensions escalate in the Middle East, such as 

during the late 2008/early 2009 Israel-Gaza conflict, 

anti-Semitic incidents increase worldwide. 

Opposition to the existence of Israel and political 

resentment regarding the conflict in the Middle East 

can cross the line into anti-Semitic acts. ―Skinhead‖ 

gangs and neo-Nazi groups are other sources of hatefilled rhetoric and violence in many countries in the 

OSCE region. Migrants and members of various 

ethnic and religious minorities, including Muslims 

and Jews, are targeted. Vandalism against religious 

and other property is also on the rise. Violent acts 

are often well documented, but they are rarely 

investigated and prosecuted as hate crimes. Instead, 

officials, prosecutors, and judges often trivialize such 

violence by treating it as ―hooliganism,‖ particularly 

in Russia. When burnings, beatings, and other acts of 

violence target members of a particular group 

because of who they are and what they believe, such 

acts should be viewed not merely as police problems, 

but as human rights violations that require an 

unequivocal response. 

In the last few years, the OSCE has set up 

several mechanisms to address intolerance and 

related human rights issues. As a result of U.S. 

diplomatic leadership on this issue, since 2003 the 

OSCE has convened 10 high-level and expert 

conferences to address racism, xenophobia, antiSemitism, discrimination against Muslims and 

Christians, and other tolerance-related issues. As the 

Commission recommended, in late 2004, the OSCE 

Chairman-in-Office appointed three Personal 

Representatives to promote tolerance. The OSCE 

also became the first international organization to 

name a prominent independent appointee specifically 

to examine anti-Semitism. At the same time, it 

established a Personal Representative monitoring 
235

intolerance toward Muslims, and a third who tracks 

other forms of intolerance, including xenophobia, 

racism, and intolerance against Christians and 

members of other religions. Finally, a new Tolerance 

Program within the OSCE‘s Office of Human Rights 

and Democratic Institutions (ODIHR) was set up in 

late 2004 to monitor and encourage compliance with 

OSCE commitments to combat xenophobia, antiSemitism, and Islamophobia, as well as to promote 

freedom of religion or belief.

OSCE Meetings on Tolerance and Related 

Topics

The OSCE Ministerial Council in 2003 

mandated a major international conference to address 

anti-Semitism in the then-55 states of the OSCE 

region. Since then, the Organization has held many 

high level meetings to discuss anti-Semitism and 

other forms of intolerance. In 2007, there were two 

other tolerance-related OSCE conferences, in 

Romania on Combating Discrimination and 

Promoting Mutual Respect and Understanding, and in 

Spain the Spanish OSCE Chair hosted a conference 

on Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims. 

These conferences have mobilized political support 

within OSCE participating States to address antiSemitism and other forms of intolerance in a 

sustained manner and have raised awareness among 

NGOs and the public regarding anti-Semitism, 

discrimination against Muslims, and other tolerancerelated issues in the OSCE region. The challenge 

remains, however, for the OSCE and its 56 

participating States to act on the ideas that have 

emerged from these conferences and reports and to 

translate them into activities and programs that will 

combat these forms of intolerance in all the OSCE 

participating States.

In December 2008, the OSCE sponsored a 

NGO roundtable focusing on intolerance and 

discrimination in the area of education and Muslim 

youth. In March 2009, the OSCE convened a 

Roundtable on Intolerance and Discrimination 

against Christians in Vienna. Mario Mauro, the 

Personal Representative of the Greek OSCE 

Chairmanship on this issue, chaired the event where 

delegations, religious groups and NGOs discussed 

ways to promote tolerance and combat racism, 

xenophobia and discrimination against Christians. 

ODIHR hosted another event in March 2009 on the 

International Day for the Elimination of Racial 

Discrimination, a discussion on methods to combat 

racism and discrimination in the OSCE region. On 

April 15, 2009, OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin 

de Brichambaut had a private audience with Pope 

Benedict XVI, in which they discussed cooperation 

on security in the OSCE region as well as the 

promotion of tolerance and non-discrimination.

OSCE Personal Representatives 

In December 2004, the 55 OSCE 

participating States authorized the then-Chairman-inOffice (CiO), Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon 

Passy, to name three Personal Representatives to 

promote tolerance. The mandates of the three 

Personal Representatives address separate but 

interrelated issues that call for distinct, yet 

coordinated, responses, and all focus on better 

implementation of decisions by the OSCE Ministerial 

and Permanent Councils on Tolerance and Nondiscrimination. The persons selected by the OSCE 

CiO for these part-time and unpaid positions come 

from a variety of backgrounds. 

For the first time since 2004, the Greek CiO 

appointed new representatives in January 2009: 

Rabbi Andrew Baker, Director of International 

Affairs at the American Jewish Committee, was 

named the Personal Representative on Combating 

Anti-Semitism; Ambassador Vyacheslav Gizzatov, 

former Kazakh ambassador to Turkmenistan, 

Germany and Iran, was named the Personal 

Representative on Combating Intolerance and 

Discrimination against Muslims; and Mario Mauro, 

an Italian parliamentarian, was named the Personal 

Representative on Combating Racism, Xenophobia 

and Discrimination, also focusing on Intolerance and 

Discrimination against Christians and Members of 

Other Religions. 

The Commission remains concerned that the 

work of the Representatives has been hampered by 

inadequate funding for staff and travel expenses, as 

well as other demands on their time and attention. 
236

The Commission also has recommended that the 

activities of the Personal Representatives should be 

given more prominence in the OSCE. For example, 

they should report in person to the annual OSCE 

ministerial meetings and their reports should be 

published and disseminated throughout and beyond 

the OSCE system. In addition, the OSCE CiO should 

invite them on some of her visits, refer to their work 

and conclusions in speeches, and encourage OSCE 

participating States and the 18 OSCE Field Presences 

to invite them on official visits. Such measures could 

help enhance the prominence of the Personal 

Representatives on Tolerance, but also increase the 

impact of their findings and recommendations. 

During 2008 and 2009, the Personal 

Representatives made contributions to various 

relevant OSCE meetings. These include the Warsaw 

HDIM as well as meetings with the ODIHR, the 

Permanent Council, and the CiO. Rabbi Andrew 

Baker, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairin-Office on Combating Anti-Semitism, spoke at a 

conference on combating anti-Semitism, held in 

London in February 2009; his remarks were 

published by the OSCE in March. Country visits 

play a key role in the work of the Personal 

Representatives and in their regular reports to the 

OSCE Permanent Council. According to an OSCE 

CiO report, invitations from additional participating 

States to the Personal Representatives would enable 

them to meet with relevant government officials and 

raise key issues of concern directly with them, as 

well as to meet with NGOs and community and 

religious leaders without interference. The 

Commission also encourages each of the three 

Personal Representatives to undertake events with 

relevant NGOs as well as with the media. 

The Office of Democratic Institutions and 

Human Rights Tolerance Program

One of the major institutional responses of 

the OSCE to growing concerns regarding religious 

intolerance was to set up a new Tolerance Program 

within the ODIHR in late 2004. The mandate of the 

Tolerance Program includes OSCE efforts to promote 

tolerance and to combat intolerance and xenophobia, 

as well as to advance freedom of religion or belief. 

The United States was a strong advocate for the 

establishment of the program and for sufficient 

funding for its activities. The Tolerance Program 

staff monitors a range of issues, as well as provides 

expertise for the three Personal Representatives and 

the ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom 

of Religion or Belief. The Tolerance Program was 

charged with setting up a database of information, as 

well as data collection on hate crimes legislation, 

police training on hate crimes, and Holocaust 

education in specific countries. 

The Tolerance Program has also developed a 

―Web site Guide to Tolerance Education,‖ a 

curriculum unit on ―Holocaust Education and AntiSemitism,‖ and ―Teaching Materials on the History 

of Jews and Anti-Semitism in Europe.‖ A 

―Reference Guide on Muslims in Spain,‖ developed 

by Casa Arabe with ODIHR and released in April 

2009, is the first in a series intended to raise 

awareness among journalists, educators and public 

officials of anti-Muslim prejudices and stereotypes 

with information on the history, demography, 

diversity and role of Spanish Muslims. The 

Tolerance Program also has issued several useful 

publications on addressing priorities in various OSCE 

States. For example, in June 2008, the 

OSCE/ODIHR Panel on Freedom of Assembly 

issued ―Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful 

Assembly,‖ released in conjunction with the Council 

of Europe‘s Venice Commission. In March 2009, 

ODIHR published ―Hate Crime Laws: a Practical 

Guide‖ in several languages, including Russian and 

English. The purpose of this guide is to provide 

States with benchmarks for drafting hate crime 

legislation within a simple, clear and accessible 

document. The guide will assist states who wish 

either to enact new legislation or to review and 

improve their current legislation. It will also be a 

resource for civil society when advocating for better 

laws. The Tolerance Program continues to translate 

many of its key publications into the Russian 

language—particularly useful in light of the rising 

levels of xenophobia, racism, and various forms of 

intolerance in Russia and other former Soviet 

republics. 
237

To date, the ODIHR‘s Tolerance Program 

has emphasized activities with external organizations, 

although the Program could further expand its work 

with the 18 OSCE Field Presences and other OSCE 

institutions. The 2003 OSCE Ministerial Council 

also tasked the Tolerance Program with acting as a 

focal point for the various national contact points on 

hate crime set up by the OSCE participating States. 

Information about practical initiatives from 

participating States, NGOs, and other institutions can 

also be submitted online. 

As mentioned above, part of the Tolerance 

Program‘s current mandate is to address freedom of 

religion or belief. Responsibility for the issue of 

religious freedom was removed from the ODIHR 

Human Rights Department when the issue was 

assigned to the Tolerance Program in late 2004. The 

Commission is concerned that as a result of this 

bureaucratic reassignment, freedom of religion or 

belief will be treated solely as a corollary to 

tolerance activities and no longer will be part of the 

ODIHR human rights programs. Instead, it should be 

anchored in the Human Rights Department and 

cooperate with the activities of the Tolerance 

Program. Furthermore, only one staff person in the 

Tolerance Program is assigned part-time to the issue 

of freedom of religion or belief since that person is 

also assigned to work with NGOs; in 2007, this 

position was removed from the unified budget, thus 

endangering its permanent status and changing its 

recruitment basis. 

Commission Activities 

Since 2001, the Commission has 

participated with and often been members of U.S. 

delegations to OSCE meetings. The Commission has 

also made extensive recommendations relating to the 

work of the OSCE on protecting freedom of religion 

or belief and on combating intolerance and antiSemitism in the OSCE region. In 2008, 

Commissioners Gaer and Cromartie served on the 

official U.S. delegation to the HDIM conference, 

during which they met with various delegations, the 

Personal Representatives on Tolerance, and ODIHR 

staff. The Commission was one of the first official 

bodies to speak out against the rise in anti-Semitic 

violence in Europe; it has also addressed antiSemitism and related issues in countries such as 

Belarus, Belgium, Egypt, Iran, France, Russia, Saudi 

Arabia, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. In February 2008, 

Commissioner Gaer testified at a hearing of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(the Helsinki Commission) entitled, ―U.S. and Civil 

Society Efforts to Combat Anti-Semitism.‖ In her 

testimony, Gaer addressed Commission concerns 

about the rise of anti-Semitism, racial discrimination, 

xenophobia, discrimination, and intolerance in the 

OSCE region, the OSCE‘s efforts to deal with these 

problems, and the record of the U.S. government on 

combating anti-Semitism and other forms of 

intolerance through OSCE mechanisms.

Commission staff participated in the March 

2009 OSCE roundtable on Intolerance and 

Discrimination against Christians, and Commissioner 

Leonard Leo participated in his personal capacity. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy 

I. Supporting the OSCE

The U.S. government should:

express strong support for the OSCE at the 

highest levels of the U.S. government in the face 

of attacks led by the Russian government, 

particularly on the OSCE‘s human rights, 

freedom of religion or belief, and tolerance 

activities carried out by the Office of Democratic 

Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); 

authorize and appropriate specially designated 

funds in addition to 2008 U.S. contributions to 

the OSCE for the purpose of expanding 

programs developing ways to advance freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion or belief and 

that combat anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and 

discrimination against Muslims, Christians, and 

members of other religions;

 hold regular briefings at the State Department for 

members of the U.S. government and NGO 

community concerned with OSCE issues and 
238

make efforts to expand the number and scope of 

invitees; 

recommend that the State Department routinely 

include in U.S. OSCE delegations 

representatives of relevant U.S. government 

agencies, such as Homeland Security and the 

Justice Department, as well as expand the 

number and range of civil society groups 

involved in the OSCE process; and

ensure that U.S. OSCE delegations organize 

regular informational briefings for the civil 

society groups at OSCE meetings.

 

II. Promoting Religious Freedom and 

Tolerance within the OSCE’s Participating States

The U.S. government should urge that 

OSCE participating States undertake the following 

steps:

ensure compliance with their commitments to 

protect freedom of religion or belief, as well as 

combat discrimination, xenophobia, and antiSemitism, as detailed in the Vienna and 

Copenhagen Documents on the Human 

Dimension;

engage in a regular public review of compliance 

with OSCE commitments on freedom of religion 

or belief, on racial and religious discrimination, 

and on anti-Semitism, including by facilitating a 

more active role by NGOs as part of that process;

commit to condemn promptly, publicly, and 

specifically hate crimes and to investigate and 

prosecute their perpetrators; 

take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish 

acts of anti-Semitism, such as to condemn 

publicly specific anti-Semitic acts, to pursue and 

prosecute the perpetrators of attacks on Jews and 

their communal property, and, while vigorously 

protecting freedom of expression, to counteract 

anti-Semitic rhetoric and organized anti-Semitic 

activities;

condemn in a public fashion, while vigorously 

protecting freedom of expression, attacks 

targeting Muslims and pursue and prosecute the 

perpetrators of such attacks;

 

ensure that efforts to combat terrorism not be 

used as an unrestrained justification to restrict 

the human rights, including freedom of religion 

or belief, of members of religious minorities;

 

bring national legislation and practice, as well as 

local laws, into conformity with international 

human rights standards and OSCE commitments 

by: permitting all religious groups to organize 

and conduct their activities without undue 

interference; discontinuing excessive regulation 

of the free practice of religion, including 

registration or recognition requirements that 

effectively prevent members of religious 

communities from exercising their freedom to 

manifest religion or belief; and permitting 

limitations on the right to freedom of religion or 

belief only as provided by law and consistent 

with participating States‘ obligations under 

international law; 

 

monitor the actions of regional and local officials 

who violate the right to freedom of religion or 

belief and provide effective remedies for any 

such violations; and

establish mechanisms to review the cases of 

persons detained under suspicion of, or charged 

with, religious, political, or security offenses and 

to release those who have been imprisoned solely 

because of their religious beliefs or practices, as 

well as any others who have been unjustly 

detained or sentenced.

III. Promoting Religious Freedom and 

Tolerance through the OSCE’s Institutional 

Mechanisms

The U.S. government should urge the OSCE 

to:

promote freedom of thought, conscience, religion 

and belief throughout the OSCE region, both east 
239

and west of Vienna, including focusing on issues 

such as discriminatory registration systems, 

limitations on religious expression, and 

limitations on the rights of parents to ensure the 

religious and moral education of their children in 

conformity with their own peaceful religious or 

other beliefs;

consider ways to bring greater public attention 

to the activities of the OSCE Panel of Experts on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief, such as 

enhancing the transparency to its activities, 

involving prominent cultural figures in its 

proceedings and providing funds to enable the 

Panel to hold training seminars, including in the 

Mediterranean Partner States, about pertinent 

information on freedom of religious or belief;

encourage the convening of an annual meeting of 

the OSCE Panel of Experts on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief that is open to its entire 

membership;

ensure, as a matter of priority, the reappointment 

of the three Chairman-in-Office Personal 

Representatives on tolerance issues, and make 

the country-specific reports of the three Personal 

Representatives available to the public;

request that the three Personal Representatives 

report in person to the annual OSCE ministerial 

meetings, and that the OSCE Chairman-in-Office 

to invite the three Personal Representatives to 

participate on his or her official visits and refer 

to their work and conclusions in speeches and 

other presentations; 

encourage OSCE participating States and the 18 

OSCE Field Presences to invite the Personal 

Representatives on official visits;

convene on a regular basis public review 

meetings to assess compliance by OSCE 

participating States of their commitments to 

combat discrimination, xenophobia, and antiSemitism; 

ensure that all participating States individually 

are taking concrete actions to live up to their 

commitments to combat discrimination and 

intolerance, in particular to combat antiSemitism, as detailed in the 1990 Copenhagen 

Document, action which should include adopting 

laws to protect against incitement to violence 

based on discrimination, including antiSemitism, and providing the individual with 

effective remedies to initiate complaints against 

acts of discrimination;

convene expert conferences on anti-Semitism 

and freedom of religion or belief, as well as other 

tolerance issues, during 2008 and 2009;

consider reorganization of the HDIM conference, 

including, for example, thematically-linked 

issues, such as Rule of Law (Elections; 

Judiciary; Penal System), Fundamental 

Freedoms (Religion, Expression/Media, 

Assembly/Association, Movement), and 

Tolerance and Non-Discrimination (Gender and 

Minorities—Religious, Ethnic, Economic); 

assist ODIHR in making it possible for the 

OSCE Field Presences and the ODIHR to hold 

public roundtables with local government 

officials, NGOs, and community leaders to 

discuss commitments on freedom of religion or 

belief, as well as the concept and definition of 

hate crimes and the implementation of hate 

crimes legislation;

provide voluntary, extra-budgetary funding for 

added staff to deal with freedom of religion or 

belief, working within the ODIHR Human 

Rights Program, and encourage the ODIHR 

Tolerance Program staff take part in ODIHR 

training of Field Presences and other OSCE 

staff; 

provide the ODIHR the necessary mandate and 

adequate resources to hire as part of the Unified 

Budget experienced staff at the working level, to 

direct the Tolerance Program, to monitor 

compliance with OSCE obligations on freedom 

of religion or belief, and to combat 
240

discrimination, xenophobia, and antiSemitism; and 

provide funding for the translation of additional 

ODIHR Tolerance Program reports into OSCE 

languages, particularly Russian, and for the 

employment of at least one ODIHR Tolerance 

Program staffer with Russian-language 

capability. 
241

The Commission’s Expedited Removal Study: Four Years Later

The International Religious Freedom Act of 

1998 (IRFA) authorized the Commission to examine 

whether asylum seekers subject to Expedited 

Removal1are being detained under inappropriate 

conditions and whether they are being returned to 

countries where they might face persecution. 

Specifically, IRFA authorized the Commission to 

appoint experts to examine whether immigration 

officers, in exercising Expedited Removal authority 

over aliens who may be eligible for asylum, were:

(1) improperly encouraging 

withdrawals of applications for 

admission; 

(2) incorrectly failing to refer such 

aliens for credible fear 

determinations; 

(3) incorrectly removing such 

aliens to countries where they may 

face persecution; or 

(4) improperly detaining such 

aliens, or detaining them under 

inappropriate conditions.

With these four questions as the basis for 

investigation, the Commission launched a major 

research study in 2003 and 2004. The findings were 

released in the 2005 Report on Asylum Seekers in 

Expedited Removal (hereafter referred to as the 

Study). The Study identified serious flaws that place 

asylum seekers at risk of being returned to countries 

where they may face persecution, as well as serious 

flaws in the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers 

in detention. To address these concerns, the 

Commission made a series of recommendations, none 

of which require Congressional action, to the 

responsible agencies in the Departments of 

Homeland Security and Justice. These 

recommendations would further the aims of both 

protecting U.S. borders and ensuring fair and humane 

treatment for bona fide asylum seekers—goals of the 

1996 immigration reform law that established the 

Expedited Removal procedure. In 2007, two years 

after the release of the Study, the Commission 

released a ―report card‖ grading the federal agencies 

on their implementation of the Study‘s 

recommendations.2 To date, few of the 

Commission‘s recommendations have been 

adequately or fully implemented by the responsible 

agencies, particularly those within the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). An official DHS 

response to the Study was not issued until November 

28, 2008, almost four years after the Study and in the 

last days of the Bush Administration.

The Commission hopes that the Obama 

Administration will fully implement the Study‘s 

recommendations. A number of areas of concern 

identified in the Study have yet to be adequately 

addressed by DHS, including: the low profile and 

lack of inter-bureau coordination of asylum issues; 

the use of jail-like facilities to house asylum seekers; 

the need for parole policies that ensure that asylum 

seekers who pose no risk of flight or danger are not 

subject to unnecessary detention; and insufficient 

oversight of the Expedited Removal process. 

At least five separate entities play a role in 

Expedited Removal. Within DHS, Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) first encounters aliens, 

either at a port-of-entry or anywhere within 100 miles 

of U.S. land or sea borders, and is responsible for 

identifying those subject to Expedited Removal, and 

from that group, those seeking asylum. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for 

detaining asylum seekers until Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (USCIS) makes the credible 

fear determination. For those asylum seekers found 

to have a credible fear, the Department of Justice‘s 

(DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review 

(EOIR) takes over; immigration judges (IJs) hear the 

cases, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 

reviews any appeals. With so many immigration 

officers involved in so many locations, coordination 

has been and remains a major challenge within DHS 

and between DHS and DOJ.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
242

The Study found that in more than half of 

the Expedited Removal interviews observed, 

immigration officers failed to read a script advising 

aliens that they should ask for protection without 

delay if they have any reason to fear being returned 

home. The Study further found that in 72 percent of 

the cases reviewed, asylum seekers were not 

provided an opportunity before signing to review and 

correct sworn statements taken by immigration 

officers. The Study also found that, although they 

resemble verbatim transcripts, these sworn statements 

are neither verbatim nor verifiable, often suggest that 

information was conveyed to the asylum seeker 

which was in fact never conveyed, and sometimes 

contain questions that never were asked. The Study 

found that these unreliable documents often are used 

against asylum seekers when their cases are presented 

before an immigration judge. 

DHS regulations require that, when an 

asylum seeker expresses a fear of return, he or she 

must be referred to an Asylum Officer to determine 

whether the fear is ―credible.‖ Yet, in nearly 15 

percent of the cases that Study experts observed in 

person, asylum seekers who expressed a fear of 

return were nevertheless removed without a referral 

to an Asylum Officer. Of those cases, nearly half of 

the files indicated that the asylum seeker had not 

expressed any fear.

The Study put forth five recommendations 

to CBP: 1) expand existing videotape systems to all 

ports of entry and border patrol stations and have 

―testers‖ verify that Expedited Removal procedures 

are correctly followed; 2) reconcile conflicting field 

guidance to clarify that any alien who expressed fear 

must be referred for a credible fear interview; 3) 

inform immigration judges that forms used at ports of 

entry and the border are not verbatim transcripts of 

the alien‘s entire asylum case, despite their 

appearance as such, so that they can be given proper 

weight; 4) save scarce detention resources by not 

placing asylum seekers with valid travel documents 

in Expedited Removal; and 5) improve monitoring so 

that existing procedures are followed correctly. 

Since the Study was released in 2005, CBP 

has implemented few of the Commission‘s 

recommendations. DHS has told the Commission 

that CBP did take steps to increase enforcement and 

review of its procedures and field guidance related to 

cases of Expedited Removal, as well as to improve 

and enhance training of field officers. CBP also has 

informed the Commission that it is willing to train 

immigration judges, as well as other DHS officers, on 

the sworn statements. However, the Commission‘s 

primary recommendations, the expansion of existing 

videotape systems and the employment of ―testers‖ to 

verify that procedures are correctly followed, have 

yet to be implemented.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

The Study found that despite established 

national criteria to determine when asylum seekers in 

Expedited Removal should be released from 

detention pending their asylum hearing, there was no 

evidence that the criteria actually are being 

implemented. The Study found wide variations in 

release rates across the country, from 0.5 percent in 

New Orleans and 4 percent in New Jersey, to 81 

percent in Chicago and 94 percent in San Antonio. 

Additionally, the Study found that the overwhelming 

majority of asylum seekers referred for credible fear 

are detained—for weeks or months and occasionally 

years—in penal or penitentiary-like facilities. On 

average, asylum seekers with a credible fear of 

persecution are detained for 60 days, and one third 

are held for 90 days or more. The non-governmental 

organization Human Rights First (HRF) also has 

reported that asylum seekers are detained for months, 

if not years, before being granted asylum. Many of 

the facilities in which they are detained are, in fact, 

jails and prisons, and in some of these facilities, 

asylum seekers live alongside U.S. citizens serving 

criminal sentences or criminal aliens—even though 

ICE detention standards do not permit non-criminal 

detainees to be co-mingled with criminals. The 

Study found that some asylum seekers in these 

facilities were required to wear prison uniforms and 

were handcuffed and shackled like regular criminals. 

Similar findings are reported by HRF. ICE has 

experimented with alternatives to detention, and has 

opened one secure facility in Broward County, 

Florida that resembles a refugee center rather than a 
243

penal institution, but Broward, unfortunately, remains 

the exception. 

The Study put forth five recommendations 

to ICE: 1) train detention center personnel to work 

with non-criminal, psychologically vulnerable 

asylum-seekers; 2) work with the immigration courts 

to ensure that detained aliens in Expedited Removal, 

including those who have not been referred for a 

credible fear determination, have access to legal 

service providers; 3) change detention standards so 

that non-criminal asylum seekers are not detained 

under penal conditions; 4) codify existing parole 

criteria into regulations; and 5) ensure consistent and 

correct parole decisions by developing standardized 

forms and national review procedures. 

Since the release of the 2007 report card, 

ICE has taken some steps to address concerns raised 

in the Study. In December 2007, in compliance with 

a Commission recommendation, ICE and the DHS 

Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties jointly 

released a training module on cultural awareness and 

asylum issues for detention officers. The 

Commission welcomes this module and the fact that 

it is available to all USCIS staff and has been 

integrated into some CBP training programs. This 

training, however, is not mandatory for 

intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA) staff, 

who work at facilities where more than 50 percent of 

asylum seekers are held. 

Unfortunately, ICE also enacted policies 

contrary to Commission recommendations. In 

November 2007, ICE announced new quality 

assurance procedures to track and bi-annually review 

parole decisions and statistics. Yet, the same policy 

directive expanded the criteria that must be met to 

allow asylum seekers to be paroled, rather than 

simply codify the existing criteria as the Commission 

recommended. Unfortunately, this actually may 

extend detention for asylum seekers. According to 

ICE, from the time the parole directive was 

announced through June 2008, only 107 asylum 

seekers were granted parole out of 215 who requested 

it. The Commission was not given further 

information about the number of asylum seekers who 

were informed of the parole possibilities, those who 

did not apply for parole because they did not meet the 

parole criteria, or the reasons why parole was denied 

for half of those who requested it. 

ICE also has been unwilling to develop 

alternatives to detention. A December 2006 Audit 

Report by the DHS Office of the Inspector General 

(OIG) found instances of non-compliance with 

existing ICE Detention Standards at all five of the 

facilities surveyed, three of which were included in 

the Commission‘s Study. Moreover, an April 2006 

DHS OIG Audit Report recommended that ICE 

expedite alternatives to detention and improve the 

capacity of data management systems to track the 

rationale underlying parole decisions. In addition, 

HRF reports that, contrary to the Commission‘s 

recommendation, use of jails and jail-like detention 

facilities have increased since the release of the Study 

in 2005. ICE has responded that new performancebased standards for detention facilities have been 

implemented, but the new standards do not address 

this recommendation, and the Commission is 

concerned that they are based on correctional 

standards which are inappropriate for asylum seekers. 

Secretary of Homeland Security Janet 

Napolitano has made two announcements regarding 

U.S. detention centers. The first was naming a 

Special Advisor on Detention and Removal 

Operations, Dora Schriro. Secondly, in a January 30, 

2009 agency-wide directive requiring a review of 

DHS‘s immigration and border security programs, 

Secretary Napolitano specifically ordered that 

immigration detention policies be evaluated, 

including the new performance-based detention 

standards, efforts to segregate different groups of 

detainees, and the prospects of expanding 

community-based alternatives to detention or 

facilities such as the one in Broward County, Florida. 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

The Study found that, despite their expertise 

and authority to grant asylum outside the Expedited 

Removal context, USCIS Asylum Officers have a 

limited role in the Expedited Removal process. The 

Study found a high rate of positive credible fear 

determinations, reflecting the deliberately generous 
244

preliminary screening standard used to ensure that 

bona fide refugees are not mistakenly returned. 

However, review procedures for negative credible 

fear determinations were found to be more onerous, 

and might have the unintended consequence of 

encouraging positive determinations. The Study also 

found that the partnership between the Arlington, 

Virginia Asylum Office and the Capital Area 

Immigrants Rights Coalition to ensure pro bono legal 

advice for asylum seekers in the credible fear 

determinations was a success worth repeating. The 

partnership not only provides detained asylum 

seekers with legal advice, but has also improved 

efficiency by increasing the number of asylum 

seekers who, following consultation with counsel, 

chose not to pursue their claims. 

The Study put forth three recommendations 

to USCIS: 1) subject both positive and negative 

credible fear findings to similar review procedures; 2) 

expand the existing pro bono program for the 

credible fear process to all eight asylum offices; and 

3) allow Asylum Officers to grant asylum at the 

credible fear stage. 

The Commission commends USCIS for its 

April 2006 memorandum increasing quality 

assurance review for positive credible fear 

determinations, its 2007 release of an updated 

Asylum Officer Basic Training Course Lesson Plan, 

and its announcement in December 2006 that it 

welcomes approaches by non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) to expand the existing pro 

bono legal program to the other seven asylum offices. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Agencywide

The Study found extensive problems with 

DHS‘s overall management and coordination of the 

Expedited Removal process, including insufficient 

quality assurance practices, inadequate data 

management systems, poor communication between 

responsible bureaus, and no mechanism to address 

system-wide issues. The Commission put forth four 

recommendations to address these flaws: 1) create a 

high-level refugee coordinator position; 2) address 

implementation and coordination issues before 

expanding the Expedited Removal program; 3) create 

a reliable data management system that allows for 

real-time information on asylum seekers in Expedited 

Removal; and 4) allow Asylum Officers to grant 

asylum at the credible fear stage.

While former Secretary Chertoff did appoint 

a Senior Advisor for Refugee and Asylum Policy in 

February 2006, no other recommendations were 

implemented. Moreover, the Commission remains 

concerned that, unless supported by a fully staffed 

office and with the necessary authority within DHS 

to make the needed changes, the Senior Advisor 

cannot implement the Study‘s recommendations, 

ensure consistent asylum policy and legal 

interpretations, and monitor the Expedited Removal 

system to ensure that changes remain in place and 

problems are addressed as they arise. The 

Commission is further concerned that the Senior 

Advisor was given the additional responsibility to 

address broader immigration reform and recently was 

moved under the jurisdiction of the Senior Advisor 

on Immigration, impairing the advisor‘s ability to 

address effectively refugee and asylum policy.

The Commission‘s overarching 

recommendation was that Expedited Removal should 

not be expanded until the serious problems identified 

in the Study were resolved. Despite this 

recommendation—and the failure to resolve the 

problems cited in the Study—in 2006 DHS expanded 

Expedited Removal from a port-of-entry program to 

encompass the entire land and sea border of the 

United States to a distance of 100 miles inland. The 

Commission has expressed concern about this 

expansion of Expedited Removal. 

The Commission learned from the April 

2006 DHS OIG Audit Report that ICE lacks data 

analysis capabilities to manage the detention and 

removal program in an efficient and effective 

manner. DHS has informed the Commission that in 

2008 it began using a computer program called the 

ENFORCE Alien Removal Module to allow for realtime tracking of asylum seekers as they moved 

through the Expedited Removal process. The 

Commission tentatively welcomes this move, but 
245

urges regular reviews of the system to ensure that 

information sharing is functioning. 

In DHS‘s November 28, 2008 response to 

the Study, the Commission was told that the agency 

had concluded that allowing Asylum Officers to grant 

asylum at the credible fear stage would be too 

resource-intensive, would only benefit a small 

number of asylum-seekers and may disadvantage 

others, and therefore, it will not implement the 

recommendation. 

Department of Justice, Executive Office for 

Immigration Review (EOIR)

The Study found that sworn statements 

taken at ports of entry and the border are inaccurate 

and incomplete, and that credible fear determination 

records do not document the asylum seeker‘s entire 

claim. Nevertheless, the Study found that in 57 

percent of all cases, immigration judges allowed 

sworn statements and/or credible fear determination 

records to be used to impeach the asylum seeker. In 

39 percent of all cases, the immigration judge (IJ) 

cited these documents in denying the claim. The 

Study also found that one in four asylum seekers who 

are represented by pro bono attorneys are granted 

asylum, compared to only one in 40 unrepresented 

asylum seekers. The U.S. Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) also has found that 

having an attorney more than doubled an asylum 

seeker‘s chance of being granted asylum. 

The outcome of an asylum seeker‘s case 

depends largely on chance; namely, the IJ who 

happens to be assigned to hear the case. Among IJs 

sitting in the same city who hear a significant number 

of asylum cases, the Study found that some grant 

almost zero percent of the applications, while others 

grant 80 percent. Similar discrepancies were found 

by the GAO. Of the asylum cases appealed to the 

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), only 2 to 4 

percent were reversed. Of particular concern is the 

use of ―summary affirmances without opinion,‖ 

whereby a single Board member can endorse an IJ 

decision without providing a reasoned written 

opinion discussing the issues raised on appeal. This 

practice, while allowing the Board to work through 

some of its backlog, can reduce confidence in the 

rigor of the Board‘s review and has led to an increase 

in appeals of BIA decisions to federal circuit courts. 

Another drawback of summary affirmances is that 

they do not provide any guidance to IJs, since any 

errors other than those requiring reversal of the 

decision are not corrected by the Board. 

The Commission put forth six 

recommendations to improve consistency in asylum 

determinations by IJs. These are: 1) reinstate funding 

for immigration judge training; 2) expand the Legal 

Orientation Program (LOP), conducted by NGOs 

under EOIR‘s direction in order to provide legal 

information to detained aliens, improve their access 

to pro bono counsel, reduce detention costs, and 

increase immigration cost efficiency; 3) improve the 

quality of immigration court decisions; 4) work with 

ICE to ensure that detained aliens in Expedited 

Removal, including those who have not been referred 

for a credible fear determination, have access to legal 

service providers; 5) improve administrative review 

of asylum appeals; and 6) allow Asylum Officers to 

grant asylum at the credible fear stage. 

The Commission welcomes the efforts 

EOIR has made to address the concerns raised in the 

Study. In August 2006, DOJ made a number of 

reforms based on the Commission‘s 

recommendations including: implementation of 

performance and supervision measures to promote 

better consistency and quality of IJ decisions; 

improvement and increased explanation of BIA 

decisions; increased training of IJs, BIA members, 

and EOIR staff; and expansion and improvement of 

EOIR‘s pro bono programs.

EOIR also has increased training 

opportunities provided to all immigration judges, 

including some country-specific trainings; expanded 

training and mentorship opportunities for new judges; 

and provided judges with more resource materials. In 

August 2006 and August 2007, all IJs participated in 

a five-day training conference, which included 

presentations on religious freedom by the 

Commission and the State Department‘s Office of 

International Religious Freedom, and mandatory 

workshops concerning asylum law and procedures 
246

and improving oral decisions. Additionally, a oneweek training course for new IJs was held in March 

2007 that included lectures on asylum, withholding 

of removal and protection under the Convention 

against Torture, a discussion of credibility issues, and 

a mock asylum hearing. The Commission was 

disappointed to learn that in 2008, due to decreased 

funding, in-person IJ training was replaced with prerecorded video presentations.

The Commission was pleased to learn that 

EOIR in January 2007 doubled the number of LOP 

sites from six to 12, with an additional four pilot sites 

for unaccompanied minors in the custody of the 

Office of Refugee Resettlement. The Commission 

has further learned that 13 new LOP sites were 

opened in 2008. In addition, EOIR formed a Pro 

Bono Committee to oversee expansion and 

improvement of its pro bono programs. 

The Commission further notes that the BIA 

has decreased the number of summary affirmances 

and also has added new Board members. It continues 

to urge the BIA to increase the number of written 

opinions in asylum cases. 

Recommendations

The Department of Homeland Security 

should: 

maintain and strengthen the position of Senior 

Advisor for Refugee and Asylum Affairs, 

including giving the position the necessary status 

and resources, including staff, to coordinate DHS 

policy and regulations and monitor the 

implementation of procedures affecting refugees 

or asylum seekers, particularly those in 

Expedited Removal, and tasking this position 

only with addressing refugee policy, not broader 

immigration reform efforts;

under the supervision of the strengthened Senior 

Advisor for Refugee and Asylum Affairs, 

formulate and implement nationwide detention 

standards created specifically for asylum seekers 

that are not based on correctional standards, to be 

implemented by an office dedicated to the 

detention of non-criminal asylum seekers;

decrease the use of jails and jail-like facilities to 

detain asylum seekers and develop a small 

number of centrally-managed facilities specific 

to and appropriate for these individuals; 

rescind the November 2007 ICE Policy Directive 

on parole criteria which imposes additional 

hurdles for the parole of asylum seekers, and in 

its place codify the 1997 INS memorandum that 

―parole is a viable option and should be 

considered for aliens who meet the credible fear 

standard, can establish identity and community 

ties, and are not subject to any possible bars to 

asylum involving violence or misconduct;‖3

allow asylum officers to grant asylum to asylum 

seekers in Expedited Removal at the time of the 

credible fear interview, just as they are already 

trained and authorized to do for other asylum 

seekers;

ensure that parole criteria are applied 

consistently nation-wide, including by 

developing standardized forms and conducting 

routine national reviews that are made public;

require intergovernmental service agreement 

(IGSA) staff to take the training course on 

cultural awareness and the unique characteristics 

of asylum seekers developed by the Office of 

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and continue to 

require that this course be taken by personnel at 

Contract Detention Facilities;

require Customs and Border Protection to 

include an explanation on Sworn Statement 

Form I-867B stating the document‘s purpose and 

limitations, and conduct training for immigration 

judges and other DHS personnel on the 

statement as offered in the past;

expand and enhance the videotape systems 

currently used at only two locations to all major 

ports of entry and Border Patrol stations to 

record all secondary interviews, and employ 

undercover ―testers‖ to verify that Expedited 
247

Removal procedures are being properly 

followed;

monitor more vigorously current DHS 

procedures concerning the administration of the 

Forms I-867A and B;

exercise the discretion to not place a properly 

documented alien in Expedited Removal and 

mandatory detention when the sole basis for 

doing so is the alien‘s expression of a desire to 

apply for asylum at the port of entry;

ensure that the new ENFORCE Alien Removal 

Module adequately allows for reliable data 

management of asylum seekers in Expedited 

Removal, conduct routine reviews to ensure that 

the system functions properly, and make such 

reviews public; and

continue to work with the Executive Office of 

Immigration Review within the Justice 

Department to ensure that detained asylum 

seekers in Expedited Removal, including those 

who have not been referred for a credible fear 

determination, have access to legal service 

providers.

The Department of Justice should:

expand existing pro bono legal programs for the 

credible fear process from Arlington, Virginia, 

San Francisco, California, and Atlanta, Georgia, 

to all eight asylum offices;

increase funding for immigration judge training;

continue to expand the Legal Orientation 

Program (LOP) nationwide, in partnership with 

non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 

further expand the program to asylum seekers 

not yet in proceedings;

continue to work with Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement within the Department of 

Homeland Security to ensure that detained 

asylum seekers in Expedited Removal, including 

those who have not been referred for a credible 

fear determination, have access to legal service 

providers;

continue to improve the quality of immigration 

court decisions through training of immigration 

judges and the decreased use of summary 

affirmances; and

continue to improve administrative review of 

asylum appeals.

 

1 The Expedited Removal process authorizes 

immigration officials to summarily return people 

arriving in the United States without proper 

documentation to their country of origin. Concerned, 

however, that bona fide asylum seekers, who often 

travel without proper documents, might be 

mistakenly returned to their persecutors, Congress 

also included provisions to prevent the Expedited 

Removal of refugees fleeing persecution, including 

detention of asylum seekers while a determination is 

made if the alien has a ―credible fear‖ of persecution 

(credible fear determination) and, if the asylum 

seeker goes before an immigration judge (IJ), 

allowing some to be paroled while their asylum case 

is pending. If it is determined that the asylum seeker 

does not have a credible fear of persecution, he or she 

is put back in the Expedited Removal process and 

removed promptly.

2 The Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited 

Removal can be accessed at 

http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/global/asylum_refug

ees/2005/february/index.html. The report card can be 

accessed at 

http://www.uscirf.gov/reports/scorecard_FINAL.pdf. 

3

INS Memorandum from Michael A. Pearson, 

Executive Associate Commissioner for Field 

Operations, Office of Field Operations, to Regional 

Directors, District Directors, Asylum Office 

Directors, Expedited Removal: Additional Policy 

Guidance (Dec. 30, 1997), reproduced in 75 

Interpreter Releases 270 (Feb. 23, 1998). 
248

APPENDIX 1

BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL 

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Felice D. Gaer, Chair

Felice D. Gaer directs the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights of the American Jewish 

Committee, which conducts research and advocacy to strengthen international human rights protections and 

institutions. 

Ms. Gaer is the first American to serve as an Independent Expert on the UN Committee against Torture. Nominated 

by the Clinton Administration and renominated by the Bush Administration, she has served on the Committee since 

2000, including as Vice Chair (2004-2006), as General Rapporteur (2006-2008), and as year-round Rapporteur on 

Follow-up to Country Conclusions (2003 to present).

A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Ms. Gaer serves on the advisory committee of Human Rights 

Watch/Europe and Central Asia and is Vice President of the International League for Human Rights. Encyclopedia 

Judaica describes Ms. Gaer as having ―played the key role in assuring passage by consensus of the UN General 

Assembly's first-ever condemnation of anti-Semitism‖ in 1998, and being an ―architect of many initiatives linking 

women's rights to human rights.‖ 

Ms. Gaer writes and lectures widely on U.S. and UN human rights policy, addressing issues including protecting 

civilians under threat, advancing the human rights of women, eradicating religious persecution abroad, resolving 

ethnic conflicts, and preventing genocide. One of the first to call for the issue of rape in armed conflicts to be 

addressed by the international war crimes tribunal on former Yugoslavia, she was a key negotiator on the U.S. 

delegation to the Beijing World Conference on Women. Most recently, her article ―Echoes of the Future? Religious 

Repression as a Challenge to US Human Rights Policy‖ appears in the volume, The Future of Human Rights: US 

Policy for a New Era, published in April 2008 by the University of Pennsylvania Press.

Ms. Gaer was a public member of nine U.S. delegations to UN human rights negotiations in the 1990s and has 

served on several OSCE delegations since then in her capacity as Chair and Vice Chair of the U.S. Commission. 

She serves on the board of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation, the Eleanor Roosevelt Center and the Franklin and 

Eleanor Roosevelt Institute. In 2002 and 2003 she was cited in the annual Forward 50 list of Jewish Americans who 

are making a difference. 

Ms. Gaer is a graduate of Wellesley College, from which she received the Alumni Achievement Award in 1995. 

She also received advanced degrees from Columbia University. 

Commissioner Gaer, who has served on the Commission since 2001, including two terms as Chair, three terms as 

Vice Chair, and one term on the Executive Committee, was appointed by Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.).

Michael Cromartie, Vice Chair

Michael Cromartie is Vice President of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C., where he directs 

the Evangelicals in Civic Life and the Media and Religion programs. The Ethics and Public Policy Center was 

established in 1976 to clarify and reinforce the bond between the Judeo-Christian moral tradition and domestic and 

foreign policy issues. Cromartie is also a Senior Advisor to The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life in 

Washington and a Senior Fellow with The Trinity Forum.

Mr. Cromartie has contributed book reviews and articles to First Things, Books and Culture, The Washington Post, 

The Washington Times, The Reformed Journal, Insight, Christianity Today, Stewardship Journal, and World. He is 

the editor of 16 books on religion and politics including, most recently, Religion, Culture, and International 
249

Conflict: A Conversation; Religion and Politics in America: A Conversation; and A Public Faith: Evangelicals and 

Civic Engagement.

He is an advisory editor at Christianity Today and an adjunct professor at Reformed Theological Seminary, and was 

an advisor to the PBS documentary series ―With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Christian Right in America.‖

Frequently asked to comment on the dynamics between religious faith and political convictions, Mr. Cromartie has 

been interviewed on numerous radio and television programs, including National Public Radio, CNN, ABC News, 

The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, MSNBC, and PBS. He has been quoted frequently in the Washington Post, New 

York Times, The New Republic, Christianity Today, Time, the National Catholic Reporter, and U.S. News and World 

Report. He holds an M.A. in Justice from The American University and a B.A. from Covenant College in Georgia.

Commissioner Cromartie was appointed by President George W. Bush.

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Vice Chair

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Boston 

University, where she is also a Research Associate at the Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs. She has 

published widely on issues of religion and security, and democracy and human rights in Europe and the United 

States. Her publications have appeared in scholarly and policy journals such as European Journal of Political 

Research, Social Compass, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Orbis, and Survival, as well as in 

numerous anthologies dealing with religion and world affairs.

A regional expert on Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, Dr. Prodromou has been an invited policy 

consultant in the United States and Europe, and has received academic awards and grants from Harvard University, 

New York University, Princeton University, and the Commission of the European Union; she was recently awarded 

a Distinguished Service Award by the Tufts Alumni Association.

She is author of the forthcoming Church-State Relations in Greece: European Enlargement, Democracy, and 

Religion, and is the co-editor of Thinking through Faith: Perspectives from Orthodox Christian Scholars.

Dr. Prodromou holds a Ph.D. and an M.S. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

(MIT), as well as an M.A.L.D. from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a B.A. in International 

Relations and History from Tufts University. She has served as consultant at the U.S. State Department, the Foreign 

Affairs Training Center of the Foreign Service Institute, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Council, the U.S. Central 

Intelligence Agency, and the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Commissioner Prodromou was appointed to the Commission by then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) 

in October 2004. She served as Commission Vice Chair in 2007. She is currently in her third term on the USCIRF 

and is serving again as Commission Vice Chair.

Dr. Don Argue

Don Argue, Ed.D., was appointed Chancellor of Northwest University in Kirkland, Washington, on August 15, 

2007, after serving as President of Northwest for nine years. During his tenure as President, Northwest experienced 

substantial growth, including an increase in the number of faculty and the addition of 14 new buildings, including 

the Center for Graduate and Professional Studies and the Health and Sciences Center. During his tenure, enrollment 

also grew by 52 percent. 

Dr. Argue previously served as president of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). The NAE is comprised 

of approximately 42,500 congregations nationwide from 51 member denominations, and individual congregations 

from an additional 26 denominations, as well as several hundred independent churches. 
250

He also served as President of North Central University in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for 16 years. Under his 

leadership, the university received the Christianity Today "Decade of Growth Award" in recognition of being the 

fastest-growing college of its kind in the nation. 

Dr. Argue earned a Bachelor's degree at Central Bible College in Springfield, Missouri, a Master's degree at Santa 

Clara University in Santa Clara, California, and a Doctorate in Education at the University of the Pacific in 

Stockton, California. 

President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright invited Dr. Argue to serve on the President's 

Advisory Committee on International Religious Freedom, for which he chaired the subcommittee dealing with 

international religious persecution. 

President Clinton appointed Dr. Argue, Theodore Cardinal McCarrick (Washington, DC) and Rabbi Arthur Schneier 

(New York City) to the first official delegation of religious leaders from the United States to visit The People's 

Republic of China to discuss religious freedom and religious persecution with high-ranking officials including 

President Jiang Zemin. 

Commissioner Argue was appointed by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV). 

Preeta D. Bansal (until February 9, 2009)

Preeta D. Bansal is a lawyer whose career has spanned government service and private practice. A partner at the 

international law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Ms. Bansal heads the appellate litigation 

group. She regularly represents major Wall Street and corporate clients on significant issues of law before the 

federal and state appellate courts, including the United States Supreme Court. A member of the Council on Foreign 

Relations, she also serves on the advisory boards of several leading human rights and civil rights organizations, 

including Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the National Women's 

Law Center. 

Ms. Bansal served as the Solicitor General of the State of New York from 1999 through 2001. The New York Times 

called her a "legal superstar" and the New York Law Journal referred to her as "one of the most gifted lawyers of her 

generation, who combines a brilliant analytical mind with solid, mature judgment." 

Ms. Bansal is a magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Harvard-Radcliffe College, and a magna cum laude

graduate of Harvard Law School, where she was Supervising Editor of the Harvard Law Review. She served as a 

law clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens of the United States Supreme Court (1990-1991) and to Chief Judge James L. 

Oakes of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1989-1990). She served as Counselor in the 

U.S. Justice Department and as Special Counsel in the Office of the White House Counsel from 1993-1996. She has 

taught constitutional law, and was a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Politics at Harvard University's John F. 

Kennedy School of Government. 

Ms. Bansal was appointed to the Commission by former Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD), and 

reappointed by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV). She served as Chair of the Commission in 2004-2005. 

Imam Talal Y. Eid

Imam Talal Eid is Founder and Executive/Religious Director of the Islamic Institute of Boston. He is 

also the Muslim chaplain at Brandeis University and at the Massachusetts General Hospital. He is an Adjunct 

Professor of Arts of Ministry at Hartford Seminary, Connecticut. A native of Lebanon, he served as Imam at AlNaaser Mosque in Tripoli for six years and as Imam and Religious Director of the Islamic Center of New England 

(MA) for 23 years.
251

Imam Eid earned a Doctor of Theology (Th.D.) in Comparative Religion in 2005 from Harvard Divinity School, 

where he also earned his Master of Theological Studies (MTS) in 1991. He wrote his Th.D. thesis on ―Marriage, 

Divorce, and Child Custody as Experienced by American Muslims: Religious, Social, and Legal Considerations.‖ 

Imam Eid also holds a Licensee degree in Islamic Law and Sharī ̳ah, which he received in 1974 from Al-Azhar 

University in Cairo, Egypt. 

Imam Eid is a well-known Muslim scholar, activist, and lecturer on Islam and Muslims, and on Christian, Jewish, 

and Muslim relations in North America. He promotes the knowledge of Islam through local and national radio and 

television programs, and through articles published in local and national magazines. He is a marital and family 

therapist and acts as an expert consultant on Islamic law, including on issues of marital dispute, marital violence, 

divorce, and child custody. 

Imam Eid has served for a period of 20 years as the Chairman of Majlis Ash-Shura (Committee on Islamic 

Consultation) of the Islamic Council of New England in Massachusetts. He is also a member of the Quincy and 

Boston Clergy associations. He co-chaired the Archives for Historical Documentation of Boston, Massachusetts. 

He has received recognition awards from many local and national institutions, including the Massachusetts State 

Senate; the office of the District Attorney of Norfolk, Massachusetts; the Quincy (MA) City Council; the 

Quincy Human Rights Commission, Partners in Excellence Award (MGH); and Toastmasters International.

Commissioner Eid was appointed by President George W. Bush.

Dr. Richard D. Land

Dr. Richard Land has served as president of the Southern Baptist Convention‘s Ethics & Religious Liberty 

Commission since 1988. During his tenure as representative for the largest Protestant denomination in the country, 

Dr. Land has represented Southern Baptist and other Evangelicals‘ concerns in the halls of Congress, before U.S. 

Presidents, and in the media.

As host of For Faith & Family, For Faith & Family's Insight, and Richard Land Live!, three nationally syndicated 

radio programs, Dr. Land has spoken widely on the social, ethical, and public policy issues facing the United States. 

He is also Executive Editor of FFV, a national magazine dedicated to coverage of traditional religious values, 

Christian ethics, and cultural trends.

Dr. Land was featured in Time Magazine in 2005 as one of ―The Twenty-five Most Influential Evangelicals in 

America.‖ The previous year, he was recognized by the National Journal as one of the 10 top church-state experts 

―politicians will call on when they get serious about addressing an important public policy issue.‖

Dr. Land earned his A.B. magna cum laude at Princeton University and his D.Phil. at Oxford University.

His latest book is The Divided States of America? What Liberals and Conservatives are Missing in the God-andCountry Shouting Match. Dr. Land has also recently authored Imagine! A God-Blessed America (2005) and Real 

Homeland Security (2004). 

Dr. Land is currently serving his fourth term with the Commission. Former President Bush selected him for his first 

two terms (September 2001 to September 2004). Then-Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist reappointed Dr. Land in 

2005, and Senator Mitch McConnell reappointed him in 2007.

Leonard A. Leo

Leonard A. Leo serves as the Executive Vice President of the Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy Studies, an 

organization of over 40,000 conservatives and libertarians dedicated to limited, constitutional government and 

interested in the current state of the legal order. He manages the projects, programs and publications of the Lawyers 
252

Division. He also helps manage the Federalist Society's government, media, and corporate relations, as well as 

special initiatives such as the organization's Supreme Court Project and International Law Project.

Mr. Leo has participated actively in a number of international forums. He served as a U.S. delegate to the U.N. 

Commission on Human Rights in 2005, has been an observer to the World Intellectual Property Organization, 

participated in two World Health Organization delegations in 2007, and is involved with the U.S. National 

Commission to UNESCO.

Mr. Leo has published articles on religious liberty under the U.S. Constitution, presidential war powers, executive 

privilege, legislative responses to judicial activism, property rights, and several federal civil procedure issues. With 

James Taranto of the Wall Street Journal, he is the co-editor of Presidential Leadership: Rating the Best and Worst 

in the White House (Simon & Shuster, 2004).

Mr. Leo received his undergraduate degree with high honors from Cornell University in 1987 and his law degree 

from Cornell Law School with honors in 1989.

Mr. Leo is active in the affairs of the Catholic Church, serving as a member of the Sovereign Military Order of 

Malta and a member of the board of the National Catholic Prayer Breakfast.

Commissioner Leo was appointed by President George W. Bush.

Nina Shea

An international human-rights lawyer for 25 years, Nina Shea joined Hudson Institute as a senior scholar, where she 

directs the Center for Religious Freedom, in November 2006.

For the 10 years prior to joining Hudson, Ms. Shea worked at Freedom House, where she directed the Center for 

Religious Freedom, an office which she had helped found in 1986 as the Puebla Institute.

Ms. Shea has served as a Commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom since its 

founding in 1999. She was appointed as a U.S. delegate to the United Nations‘ Commission on Human Rights by 

both Republican and Democratic administrations. In January 2009, Ms. Shea was appointed as a commissioner on 

the U.S. National Commission to UNESCO.

For over a decade, she has worked extensively for the advancement of individual religious freedom and other human 

rights in U.S. foreign policy as it confronts Islamist extremism, as well as authoritarian regimes. For seven years, 

until 2005, she helped organize and lead a coalition of churches and religious groups that worked to end a religious 

war against Christians, traditional African believers, and dissident Muslims in southern Sudan; in 2004 and 2005, 

she contributed to the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution‘s religious freedom provision; and she authored and edited 

two widely acclaimed reports, Saudi Arabia’s Curriculum of Intolerance (2006) and Saudi Publications on Hate 

Ideology Invade American Mosques (2005), both of which translated and analyzed Saudi governmental publications 

that teach hatred and violence against the religious ―other.‖ She regularly presents testimony before Congress, 

delivers public lectures, organizes briefings and conferences, and writes frequently on religious freedom issues. Her 

1997 book on anti-Christian persecution, In the Lion’s Den, remains a standard in the field.

Ms. Shea is a member of the bar of the District of Columbia. She is a graduate of Smith College and American 

University‘s Washington College of Law.

Commissioner Shea was appointed to the Commission by then-Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-IL).
253

APPENDIX 2

THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 19986

Selected Provisions

Section 3. DEFINITIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6402)

(11) PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term ``particularly severe 

violations of religious freedom'' means systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom, including 

violations such as—

(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;

(B) prolonged detention without charges;

(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of those persons; or

(D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons. 

(13) VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term ``violations of religious freedom'' means violations of 

the internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and religious belief and practice, as set forth in the 

international instruments referred to in section 2(a)(2) and as described in section 2(a)(3), including violations such 

as—

(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for—

(i) assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, including arbitrary 

registration requirements;

(ii) speaking freely about one's religious beliefs;

(iii) changing one's religious beliefs and affiliation;

(iv) possession and distribution of religious literature, including Bibles; or

(v) raising one's children in the religious teachings and practices of one's choice; or

(B) any of the following acts if committed on account of an individual's religious belief or practice: detention, 

interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, forced mass resettlement, imprisonment, 

forced religious conversion, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, enslavement, murder, and execution. 

Section 402. PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS 

OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (22 U.S.C. § 6442)

(b) DESIGNATIONS OF COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—

(1) ANNUAL REVIEW.—

(A) IN GENERAL.— Not later than September 1 of each year, the President7shall review the status of religious 

freedom in each foreign country to determine whether the government of that country has engaged in or tolerated 

 

6

P.L. 105-292, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 6401, et seq. The full text of IRFA can be found on the Commission‘s 

Web site, www.uscirf.gov.
254

particularly severe violations of religious freedom in that country during the preceding 12 months or since the date 

of the last review of that country under this subparagraph, whichever period is longer. The President shall designate 

each country the government of which has engaged in or tolerated violations described in this subparagraph as a 

country of particular concern for religious freedom. 

Section 405. DESCRIPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6445)

[With respect to each country named a ―country of particular concern‖ (CPC), the President shall, according to 

section 402(c)(1)(a) and, in general, following an attempt to carry out consultations with the foreign government in 

question, carry out one or more of the actions described in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a), as 

determined by the President. The President may substitute a commensurate action. IRFA § 405(b).] 

405(a)(9) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States development assistance in accordance with 

section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

405(a)(10) Directing the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or 

the Trade and Development Agency not to approve the issuance of any (or a specified number of ) guarantees, 

insurance, extensions of credit, or participations in the extension of credit with respect to the specific government, 

agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under 

section 401 or 402;

405(a)(11) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security assistance in accordance with section 

502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

405(a)(12) Consistent with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, directing the United 

States executive directors of international financial institutions to oppose and vote against loans primarily benefiting 

the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be 

responsible for violations under section 401 or 402;

405(a)(13) Ordering the heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to issue any (or a specified number of ) 

specific licenses, and not to grant any other specific authority (or a specified number of authorities), to export any 

goods or technology to the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by 

the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402, under—

(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979;

(B) the Arms Export Control Act;

(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or

(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for 

the export or reexport of goods or services;

405(a)(14) Prohibiting any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits totaling more 

than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period to the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official 

found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402; and/or

405(a)(15) Prohibiting the United States Government from procuring, or entering into any contract for the 

procurement of, any goods or services from the foreign government, entities, or officials found or determined by the 

President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402.

 

7 The authority to make decisions and take actions under IRFA has been delegated by the President to the Secretary 

of State.
255

[In lieu of carrying out action as described above, the President may conclude a binding agreement with the 

respective foreign government that obligates such government to cease, or take substantial steps to address and 

phase out, the act, policy, or practice constituting the violation of religious freedom. IRFA § 402(c)(2). Moreover, 

―[a]t the time the President determines a country to be a country of particular concern, if that country is already 

subject to multiple, broad-based sanctions imposed in significant part in response to human rights abuses, and such 

sanctions are ongoing, the President may determine that one or more of these sanctions also satisfies the 

requirements of this subsection.‖ IRFA § 402(c)(5).]

Section 407. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER. (22 U.S.C. § 6447)

(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the President may waive the application of any of the actions described in 

paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a) (or commensurate action in substitution thereto) with respect to a 

country, if the President determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees that--

(1) the respective foreign government has ceased the violations giving rise to the Presidential action;

(2) the exercise of such waiver authority would further the purposes of this Act; or

(3) the important national interest of the United States requires the exercise of such waiver authority.

(b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than the date of the exercise of a waiver under subsection (a), the 

President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the waiver or the intention to exercise the waiver, 

together with a detailed justification thereof.
256

APPENDIX 3 

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS: SELECTED PROVISIONS ON 

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND RELIGION OR BELIEF

This document sets forth the relevant provisions of international instruments, as well as further information concerning 

international standards concerning the protection of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

A. EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND RELIGION

Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), Art. 18:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom 

to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 

public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), Art. 18:

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 

include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either 

individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 

in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 

2. No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion 

or belief of his choice.

3. Freedom to manifest one‘s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are 

prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 

fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, 

when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in 

conformity with their own convictions.

In general, according to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), the treaty body that reviews 

compliance with the ICCPR, Article 18 of the ICCPR protects:

theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion 

or belief. The terms ―belief‖ and ―religion‖ are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not 

limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with 

institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The 

Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate against any 

religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are newly established, or 

represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility on the part of a 

predominant religious community.

—Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR), 

Art. 9: 

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 

change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, 

to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

Helsinki Final Act 1975, Principle VII:

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of 

thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion 

or Belief 1981 (UN 1981 Dec.), Art. 1: 

(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 

include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either 
257

individually or in community with others and in public or belief in worship, observance, practice 

and teaching. (2) No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a 

religion or belief of his choice. (3) Freedom to manifest one‘s religion or belief may be subject 

only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 

health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

Components of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief include:

1. Freedom to Change One’s Religion or Belief

[UDHR, Art. 18, ECHR, Art. 9(1), OSCE Copenhagen Document, Art. 9(4)]

2. Freedom to Have or to Adopt a Religion or Belief of One’s Choice

[ICCPR Art. 18(1)]

Necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one‘s 

current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain 

one's religion or belief; 

No limitations permitted on this freedom; and

No individual shall be compelled to reveal his or her thoughts or adherence to a religion or belief.

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (paras. 3, 5)

3. Freedom From Coercion Which Would Impair an Individual’s Freedom to Have or To Adopt a Religion or 

Belief of His or Her Choice

[ICCPR, Art. 18(2) and UN 1981 Dec. Art. 1(2)]

No limitations are permitted on this freedom.

The same protection is enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature.

Examples of impermissible coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief 

include:

(a) The use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or nonbelievers to adhere to specific beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief, 

or to convert; and

(b) Policies or practices having the same intention or effect, such as, for example, those 

restricting political rights protected under article 25 of the ICCPR or access to education, 

medical care or employment

–Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22 (para. 5)

4. Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief in Worship, Observance, Practice, and Teaching 

[UDHR, Art. 18, ICCPR, Art. 18(1), UN 1981 Dec., Art. 1, OSCE Vienna Document, Art. 16(d)]

This freedom may be exercised in public or in private, individually or in community with others.

This freedom, at a minimum, encompasses the following freedoms:

(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and 

maintain, including the building of places of worship, freely accessible places for these 

purposes;

(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions, and 

seminaries or religious schools;

(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related 

to the rites or customs of a religion or belief, including the use of ritual formulae and 

objects, the display of symbols, observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive 

clothing or head coverings, participation in rituals associated with certain stages of life, and 

the use of a particular language customarily spoken by a group;

(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;

(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;

(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and 

institutions;

(g) To organize, train, appoint, elect, designate by succession, or replace appropriate leaders, 

priests and teachers called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief; 
258

(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the 

precepts of one‘s religion or belief; and

(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of 

religion and belief at the national and international levels.8

5. Permissible Limitations on the Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief

[ICCPR, Art. 18(3) and UN 1981 Dec., Art. 1(3)]

Freedom to manifest religion or belief may be subject to only such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 

necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 

No derogation9 may be made from freedom of thought, conscience and religion, even during ―time of 

public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.‖ (ICCPR, Art. 4(2) and UDHR, Arts. 29 & 30)

Limitations must be established by law and must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights 

guaranteed in article 18. 

Paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: limitations are not allowed on grounds not specified 

there, even if they would be allowed as limitations to other rights protected in the Covenant (for example, a 

limitation based on national security is impermissible). 

Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly 

related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. 

Limitations may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner. 

Limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be 

based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition or religion.

Persons already subject to certain legitimate constraints, such as prisoners, continue to enjoy their rights to 

manifest their religion or belief to the fullest extent compatible with the specific nature of the constraint. 

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 8)

Nothing in the UDHR shall be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or person any right to 

engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 

freedoms set forth therein. 

— UDHR Art. 30

B. PERSONS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS MINORITIES SHALL NOT BE DENIED THE RIGHT, IN 

COMMUNITY WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THEIR GROUP, TO PROFESS AND PRACTICE THEIR 

OWN RELIGION

[ICCPR, Art. 27, OSCE Vienna Document Art. 19, OSCE Copenhagen Document, and UN Declaration on the 

Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, Arts. 1-2 and 4]

In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 

minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 

their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language

—ICCPR, Article 27

States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of 

minorities within their respective territories, shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that 

identity, and shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends.

—UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities

The State ―will protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and 

religious identity of national minorities on their territory. They will respect the free exercise of rights 

by persons belonging to such minorities and ensure their full equality with others.‖

—OSCE Vienna Document

C. EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO EQUAL AND EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AGAINST 

DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION OR BELIEF

[ICCPR, Arts. 2(1) and 26, OSCE Vienna Document, Art. 16(a), and OSCE Copenhagen Document, Art. 40(1-2)] 

 

8

See Para. 4, UN HRC General Comment No. 22; Art. 6, UN 1981 Dec.; Art. 16(h-j), Vienna Document.

9 Derogation of rights is different than a limitation. Under the ICCPR, a state can, in a case of war or serious public 

emergency, take measures that limit the applicability of certain rights for the period of the emergency. Such 

measures could go well beyond the scope of limitations to rights that are permissible at any other time. 
259

This right includes the following components:

1. States Undertake to Respect and to Ensure for All Individuals Within its Territory and Subject to its 

Jurisdiction the Rights Recognized in the ICCPR Without Distinction of Any Kind, Including Religion

[ICCPR Art. 2(1)] 

2. All Persons Are Equal Before the Law and Are Entitled Without Any Discrimination to the Equal 

Protection of the Law.

[ICCPR, Art. 26]

3. The Law Shall Prohibit Any Discrimination and Guarantee to All Persons Equal and Effective 

Protection Against Discrimination on Any Ground, Including Religion.

[ICCPR, Art. 26]

The application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in article 26 of the ICCPR is not limited to 

those rights which are provided for in the Covenant, and extends to prohibit discrimination in law or in fact 

in any field regulated and protected by public authorities; 

The term ―discrimination‖ as used in the ICCPR should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, 

restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political 

or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or 

effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, 

of all rights and freedoms;

The enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing, however, does not mean identical treatment in 

every instance;

The principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish or 

eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the ICCPR; and

Not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation 

are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the ICCPR.

—HRC General Comment No. 18 (paras. 7, 8, 10, 12, 13)

4. Protection Against Discrimination by Any State, Institution, Group of Persons or Person on the Grounds of 

Religion or Other Belief 

[UN 1981 Dec., Arts. 2(1) and 4]

States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion or 

belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of 

civil, economic, political, social and cultural life.

States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such 

discrimination.

States shall take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs 

in this matter.

—UN 1981 Dec., Arts. 4(1) and 4(2)

Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of 

respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance, and 

friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups ....

—UDHR Art. 26(2)

State parties will ―foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between believers of different 

communities as well as between believers and non-believers.‖

 —OSCE Vienna Document, principle 16b

D. STATES SHALL PROHIBIT BY LAW ANY ADVOCACY OF NATIONAL, RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS 

HATRED THAT CONSTITUTES INCITEMENT TO DISCRIMINATION, HOSTILITY OR VIOLENCE

[ICCPR, Art. 20]

No manifestation of religion or belief may amount to propaganda for war or advocacy of national, 

racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination; hostility or violence... [and] 

States parties are under the obligation to enact laws to prohibit such acts.

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 7) 
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State parties should take the measures necessary to fulfill the obligations contained in article 20 of the 

ICCPR, and should themselves refrain from any such propaganda or advocacy.

—HRC General Comment No. 11 (para. 2)

Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that would 

restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United 

States.

—United States reservation to ICCPR Art. 20

States will take effective measures, including the adoption of laws, to provide protection against any 

acts that constitute incitement to violence against persons or groups based on national, racial, ethnic or 

religious discrimination, hostility or hatred, including anti-Semitism.

—OSCE Copenhagen Document

States commit themselves to take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect persons or groups 

who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their racial, 

ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, and to protect their property;

—OSCE Copenhagen Document

E. THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS IN RELATION TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF

[ICCPR Art. 18(4), OSCE Vienna Document Art. 16(f) and 16(g)]

State Parties undertake to respect the liberty of parents and legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral 

education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

—ICCPR Article 18(4)

The liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted.

Public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics is permitted if it is given 

in a neutral and objective way.

Public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with ICCPR 

Art. 18 (4) unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would 

accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians.

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (paras. 6 & 8)

Parents or legal guardians have the right to organize family life in accordance with their religion or belief and 

bearing in mind the moral education in which they believe the child should be brought up.

Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or belief in accordance 

with the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, and shall not be compelled to receive teaching on religion or 

belief against the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, the best interests of the child being the guiding 

principle.

The child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of religion or belief.

In the case of a child who is not under the care either of his parents or of legal guardians, due account shall be 

taken of their expressed wishes or of any other proof of their wishes in the matter of religion or belief, the best 

interests of the child being the guiding principle. 

Practices of a religion or belief in which a child is brought up must not be injurious to his physical or mental 

health or to his full development, taking into account article 1(3) of the present Declaration.

—UN 1981 Dec., art. 5

F. FURTHER ELABORATION ON SELECTED TOPICS

1. Obligation to Ensure Rights/Provide Remedies for Violations

[ICCPR Arts. 2(2) and 2(3), UDHR Art. 8, UN 1981 Dec. Art. 7]

The ICCPR requires State parties to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the 

rights recognized in the Covenant. This obligation includes ensuring:

effective remedies for any person whose rights or freedoms are violated;

that such remedies are determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities; and

that such remedies are enforced when granted.

2. Relationship between Religion and the State
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The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or established as official or traditional, or 

that its followers comprise the majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of the 

enjoyment of any of the rights under the ICCPR, nor in any discrimination against adherents to 

other religions or non-believers. 

In particular, measures restricting eligibility for government service to members of the 

predominant religion, or giving economic privileges to them, or imposing special restrictions on 

the practice of other faiths are not in accordance with the prohibition of discrimination based on 

religion or belief and the guarantee of equal protection under ICCPR article 26.

If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes, proclamations of ruling 

parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not result in any impairment of the freedoms under 

article 18 or any other rights recognized under the ICCPR nor in any discrimination against 

persons who do not accept the official ideology or who oppose it. 

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 9)

State parties are required to grant communities of believers, practicing or prepared to practice their 

faith within constitutional boundaries, ―recognition of the status provided for them in their 

respective countries.‖

—OSCE Vienna Document

3. Women’s Equal Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief

The principle of non-discrimination is so basic that each State party is obligated to ensure the equal right of 

men and women to the enjoyment of the rights set forth in the ICCPR.

—HRC General Comment No. 18 (para. 2)

Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply embedded in tradition, 

history and culture, including religious attitudes. The subordinate role of women in some countries is 

illustrated by the high incidence of prenatal sex selection and abortion of female fetuses. States parties 

should ensure that traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations of 

women‘s right to equality before the law and to equal enjoyment of all ICCPR rights.

State parties should report and provide data on a number of issues related to religion and women‘s rights, 

including:

o pregnancy- and childbirth-related deaths of women, as well as gender-disaggregated data 

on infant mortality rates; 

o information on the extent of any practice of genital mutilation, and on measures to 

eliminate it; 

o measures to protect women from practices that violate their right to life, such as female 

infanticide, the burning of widows and dowry killings; 

o regulation of clothing to be worn by women in public; and

o whether women may give evidence as witnesses on the same terms as men; whether 

measures are taken to ensure women equal access to legal aid, in particular in family 

matters; and whether certain categories of women are denied the enjoyment of the 

presumption of innocence.

Freedoms protected by article 18 must not be subject to restrictions other than those authorized by the 

ICCPR and must not be constrained by, inter alia, rules requiring permission from third parties, or by 

interference from fathers, husbands, brothers or others. Article 18 may not be relied upon to justify 

discrimination against women by reference to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;

The commission of so-called ―honor crimes‖ which remain unpunished constitutes a serious violation of 

the ICCPR and laws which impose more severe penalties on women than on men for adultery or other 

offences also violate the requirement of equal treatment.

—HRC General Comment No. 28 (paras. 5, 10, 11, 13, 18, 21, 31)

Certain religious practices have an adverse effect on women‘s rights. These practices include :

o cultural stereotypes, including preference for male children, religious extremism, and 

regulation of women‘s clothing;

o discrimination in medical well-being, including genital mutilation, traditional childbirth 

practices, and dietary restrictions;

o discrimination resulting from the condition of women within the family, including 

practices related to marriage and divorce (e.g.: polygamy, family planning, division of 

responsibilities);
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o discrimination related to transmission of nationality;

o discrimination related to inheritance and independent management of finances;

o discrimination related to right to life, including infanticide, cruel treatment of widows, 

and honor crimes, 

o attacks on dignity, including sexual abuse;

o social ostracism, including denial of the right to education, and denial of access to 

professional fields such as politics and religion; and

o aggravated discrimination against women who also are members of a minority 

community.

To ensure that freedom of religion does not undermine the rights of women, it is essential that this freedom 

not be understood as a right of indifference with respect to the status of women. 

—UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Study on Freedom of Religion or Belief and 

the Status of Women with Regard to Religion and Traditions (Amor Report)10

 

10 Commission staff translation.