PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

DOUGLAS BRUCE, an individual, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, a 

municipal government within the State of 

Colorado; STERLING CONSULTING 

CORPORATION, a Colorado corporation; 

STATE OF COLORADO; FAIRFIELD & 

WOODS, P.C., a Colorado professional 

corporation; MACHOL & JOHANNES 

LLC, a Colorado limited liability 

corporation, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 21-1388 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 1:20-CV-02099-RBJ)

_________________________________ 

Aaron C. Garrett, Nonprofit Legal Services of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff – 

Appellant. 

Edward J. Gorman, Assistant City Attorney, Denver City Attorney’s Office (Philip J. 

Weiser, Attorney General, Amy C. Colony, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and 

Lauren Davison, Assistant Attorney General, Colorado Attorney General’s Office; John 

M. Tanner, Fairfield and Woods, P.C.; Paige A. Arrants, Assistant City Attorney, Denver 

City Attorney’s Office; and Jacques A. Machol, III, Machol & Johannes, LLC, with him 

on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Defendants – Appellees. 

_________________________________ 

Before McHUGH, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 10, 2023

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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_________________________________ 

McHUGH, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

Douglas Bruce sued the City and County of Denver (“Denver”) and others 

(collectively, “Appellees”) in federal district court for alleged constitutional 

violations arising from a Colorado state court’s determination that Mr. Bruce’s liens 

on several properties were inferior to Denver’s liens. The district court dismissed for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1

 Mr. Bruce 

contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because he was not a party 

to the state court litigation. We disagree and affirm the dismissal. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Mr. Bruce formerly owned several multi-family residential properties in 

Denver, Colorado, known here as the “Lipan Property” and the “York Property” 

(collectively, the “Properties”).2

 In 1997 and 2003, respectively, Mr. Bruce 

1 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (holding lower federal 

courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or modify state court judgments); District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (explaining federal 

district courts may not review constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined 

with state court decisions). 

2

 Although we accept the complaint’s uncontroverted facts about the 

Properties’ history as true for purposes of this motion, we do not confine our review 

to the facts in the complaint when evaluating a factual challenge to subject matter 

jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss. Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. And Energy Workers 

Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that, 

when addressing a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the court has wide 

discretion to consider evidence outside the complaint bearing on the court’s 

jurisdiction). 

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transferred the parcels to Tele Comm Resources LP (“Tele Comm”) in exchange for 

promissory notes secured by trust deeds. Mr. Bruce alleges Tele Comm later deeded 

the Properties, subject to his encumbrances, to an individual who then transferred 

them back to Tele Comm. Mr. Bruce claims the final transfer was invalid because 

Tele Comm lacked notice that the deeds had been re-recorded in its name, so the 

other individual remained the Properties’ owner despite Tele Comm being the owner 

of record. 

We first examine the administrative proceedings against Tele Comm that led to 

Denver obtaining liens on the Properties before turning to the state court proceedings 

Denver initiated to collect the funds Tele Comm owed (the “State Court Litigation”). 

We then provide an overview of Mr. Bruce’s federal complaint and the district 

court’s dismissal of the complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

A. State Procedural History 

1. Administrative Proceedings 

Records from Denver’s Office of Community Planning and Development3

 (the 

“Department”) reflect that by 2005, the York Property was vacant and had been 

3

 These records were later filed in the State Court Litigation and then 

submitted to the district court, and they are in the appendix submitted on appeal. In 

ruling on a motion to dismiss, a federal court may take judicial notice of another 

court’s publicly filed records if they have a direct relation to matters at issue. See Tal 

v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1265 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006); see also St. Louis Baptist 

Temple, Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979). However, “the 

documents may only be considered to show their contents, not to prove the truth of 

matters asserted therein.” Tal, 453 F.3d at 1265 n.24 (quotation marks and brackets 

omitted). 

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placed under Department supervision for violations of municipal ordinances 

forbidding neglected and derelict properties. At a 2010 administrative hearing, a city 

inspector testified about ongoing violations and the failure of Tele Comm’s 

representative, Mr. Bruce, to submit a satisfactory remediation plan. The hearing 

officer noted that Mr. Bruce had participated in prior interactions with the 

Department and raised objections, but neither Mr. Bruce nor any other representative 

of Tele Comm appeared at the hearing. The hearing officer imposed fines of up to 

$999 per day on Tele Comm and granted Denver’s request for appointment of a 

receiver pursuant to the Denver Revised Municipal Code (“DRMC” or the 

“Municipal Code”) §§ 10-139(k)4

 and 10-140(2).5 

Department records show that Tele Comm failed to appear at another hearing 

in 2014, this time about the Lipan Property. Denver presented evidence that the Lipan 

Property had changed hands multiple times among Mr. Bruce, Tele Comm, and 

another individual, allegedly to conceal ownership and to avoid enforcement of 

ordinances on neglected and derelict buildings. The hearing officer found the 

property to be in violation of the Municipal Code and imposed fines of up to $999 

4

 As of 2010, DRMC § 10-139(k) allowed a civil penalty of up to $999 per day 

for each day any building or property was found to have violated ordinances 

prohibiting neglected or derelict buildings or properties. 

5

 As of 2010, DRMC § 10-140(2) authorized appointment of a receiver to 

abate a violation of ordinances prohibiting neglected or derelict buildings or 

properties if the owner failed to abate a violation or comply with abatement 

deadlines. 

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per day up to 110% of the actual property value. The hearing officer also noted 

existing unpaid fines of over $180,000 and imposed further fines and penalties for 

other violations. 

2. State Court Litigation 

Denver sued Tele Comm repeatedly to obtain judgments against it for unpaid 

fines and penalties. Mr. Bruce’s federal complaint arises from a set of cases 

consolidated in 2015.6

 Among Tele Comm’s asserted defenses in the State Court 

Litigation was that Tele Comm did not own the Properties. 

Mr. Bruce participated in the State Court Litigation on his own behalf as a 

lienholder. He made over a dozen filings in the case and participated in several 

hearings.7

 We now review the aspects of the State Court Litigation relevant to 

Mr. Bruce’s federal complaint. 

a. Mr. Bruce’s objection to summary judgment and receivership 

In 2016, Denver moved for summary judgment and for the appointment of a 

receiver to manage the disposition of the Properties. The state court granted both 

motions over Tele Comm’s objection. The court explained that Tele Comm should 

6

 Appellee Machol & Johannes, LLC represented Denver. 

7

 These hearings concerned a contempt citation, not the merits of the State 

Court Litigation or Mr. Bruce’s claim in the receivership. They are relevant to our 

analysis insofar as Mr. Bruce argued he was not subject to the state court’s 

jurisdiction because he was not a named party. At the final hearing, the judge stated, 

“[T]he Court previously found that Mr. Bruce had submitted himself to the 

jurisdiction of the Court by his filings [and] his . . . appearances. So I just wanted to 

make sure the record was clear about that.” App. Vol. 2 at 185. 

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have raised its defenses at the administrative hearing at which it failed to appear. The 

court appointed Sterling Consulting Corporation (the “Receiver”) to oversee the 

management and disposition of the Properties.8

 

Several months after the state court granted summary judgment against Tele 

Comm and after the Receiver was appointed, Mr. Bruce filed an objection to the 

appointment of a receiver, submitted a “partial” claim “under protest,” and requested 

a continuance. App. Vol. I at 109. He explained that he had never received any 

papers in the case other than an invoice from the Receiver and noted he was not a 

named defendant. He alleged he had tried to foreclose on the Lipan Property earlier 

that year and viewed the State Court Litigation as an “attempt to pre-empt the equity 

in his two promissory notes,” which he believed had priority over Denver’s liens. 

App. Vol. 1 at 111. Mr. Bruce argued he could not defend himself adequately against 

what he viewed as an unconstitutional effort to deprive him of his property interest 

without due process because he was in prison at the time of the litigation. 

The state court denied Mr. Bruce’s motion, explaining this was the first time it 

had been notified Mr. Bruce might have an interest in the Properties and his 

imprisonment would not have prevented earlier participation in the case. The state 

court found Mr. Bruce’s objection to the receivership untimely, denied a continuance, 

and instructed Mr. Bruce to file his claims with the Receiver. 

8

 Appellee Fairfield & Woods, P.C. represented the Receiver. 

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b. Mr. Bruce’s motion to enjoin sale of Properties and dismiss the case 

In 2017, Mr. Bruce filed a motion requesting that the court enjoin the 

Receiver’s sale of the Properties and dismiss the case. He accused the Receiver and 

the court of an illegal scheme and the Receiver of fraudulently paying himself 

inflated amounts out of Mr. Bruce’s equity. He argued that the municipal ordinances 

giving priority to Denver’s liens were unconstitutional because they were enacted 

after his trust deeds were recorded. Finally, Mr. Bruce argued that Denver’s fines 

were unjustified, unlawful, and motivated by personal hatred because of his past 

political activism. The state court docket does not indicate whether the state court 

ruled on Mr. Bruce’s motion, but the court did not enjoin the sale of the Properties or 

dismiss the case as Mr. Bruce requested. 

c. Mr. Bruce’s objection to determination of lien priority 

In 2018, Denver filed a “Motion to Determine Priority of Liens,” to which 

Mr. Bruce filed an objection. Mr. Bruce renewed several motions he claimed the 

court had ignored, including motions to dismiss the receivership and to dismiss the 

case with prejudice. He stated he was “still not a party,” claimed he was not being 

allowed to defend his interests, and accused the state court and Denver of acting 

unlawfully and unconstitutionally. Id. at 140. 

In its Order Determining Priority of Liens, the state court explained that 

Denver had lawfully assessed the penalties against Tele Comm under DRMC § 10-

139. The court noted that DRMC § 10-140 allowed Denver to bring an action for a 

receiver for abatement of a neglected or derelict building and DRMC § 10-140(4) 

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converted “all costs, expenses and fees of the receivership, and penalties assessed 

against the owner” for violations of the relevant provisions into liens on the 

Properties. App. Vol. 1 at 154. The court explained that § 10-140(4) made such liens 

“superior to all other liens of record, except liens for general taxes and special 

assessments.” Id. 

In its order, the state court acknowledged that Mr. Bruce held trust deeds on 

the Properties. The court stated it had previously ordered Mr. Bruce’s claims 

disallowed in the receivership and Mr. Bruce had not sought reconsideration of that 

order within the allotted thirty-five days. The court also explained why it rejected 

Mr. Bruce’s arguments. The court determined that the relevant sections of the 

Municipal Code had been enacted before Mr. Bruce recorded his trust deeds, so 

Mr. Bruce should have been on notice of the priority of Denver’s liens. Reviewing 

relevant case law, the court concluded that statutes giving priority to municipal liens 

were valid if they were enacted before the recorded trust deeds and if the penalties 

underlying the liens were for violations of ordinances advancing public health, 

safety, and welfare. The court determined that Denver’s liens met both criteria and 

were therefore superior to Mr. Bruce’s. The state court authorized the sale of the 

Properties to pay the penalty assessment liens and the 10% penalty for the cost of the 

assessment, as well as interest to Denver, the costs of the receivership, and attorney 

fees and expenses. 

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d. Denver’s motion to add Mr. Bruce as a defendant 

The docket originally referred to Mr. Bruce as “Non-Party” on his filings. In 

2018, Denver moved unsuccessfully to add Mr. Bruce as a party defendant. Although 

the court denied the motion, it had already begun listing “Douglas Bruce” as the 

“Party” making filings prior to Denver’s motion. Under “Party Information,” the 

docket listed Mr. Bruce as an “Other Interested Party.” Id. at 101. 

e. Mr. Bruce’s objections to acts of the Receiver 

In 2018, Mr. Bruce objected to the sale of the Lipan Property, but the state 

court confirmed the sale. He later objected to the sale of the York Property, but the 

sale appears to have fallen through on its own. He continued to file objections to at 

least two more of the Receiver’s motions in late 2018 and early 2019, and filed 

various other letters and documents. The court granted the Receiver’s motions over 

Mr. Bruce’s objections. 

f. State court’s certification of orders for appeal 

The Receiver filed a motion to certify as final the Order Determining Priority 

of Liens and the sales of the Properties. In its motion, the Receiver stated, “The 

Receiver has conferred with all parties to this action. All parties support this motion 

except Mr. Bruce, who opposes it.” Id. at 168. The Receiver expressed concern that 

(1) Mr. Bruce had indicated he “intends to continue to litigate this matter forever,” 

and (2) if the orders were not appealable until the entire case was resolved then the 

Receiver might be without funds to defend the appeal. Id. at 169. The Receiver 

explained the orders were certified as final, and “if Mr. Bruce intends to appeal, he 

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will have to do so immediately. If he does not, all appeals will be waived, and it will 

be much easier to wrap up the Estate.” Id. at 170. Mr. Bruce did not file any 

response, the state court certified the orders as final, and Mr. Bruce never appealed 

them. 

B. Federal Procedural History 

1. Complaint

After the completion of the State Court Litigation, Mr. Bruce filed a federal 

complaint. At the heart of Mr. Bruce’s complaint is his contention that his trust deeds 

should be given priority over Denver’s liens. He challenges Denver’s ordinances 

allowing Denver to levy hefty fines and penalties and then assert priority over earlierfiled liens, claiming the ordinances do not advance any legitimate public purpose and 

exist as a method for Denver and other Appellants to enrich themselves at the 

expense of property owners and prior lienholders. Mr. Bruce claims damages of at 

least $7 million. 

a. Constitutional claims (42 U.S.C. § 1983) 

Mr. Bruce asserts four constitutional claims against Denver and Colorado 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These include takings, denial of procedural due process, and 

denial of substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as 

well as excessive fines under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In all these 

claims, Mr. Bruce alleges that Denver maintains unconstitutional policies, practices, 

and ordinances through which it issues excessive or arbitrary fines against real 

property and then places any such lien ahead of those held by others. Mr. Bruce 

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further contends that Colorado actively participated in these constitutional violations 

“through its judicial branch and the employment of judicial officers,” whose “explicit 

consent and affirmative actions” allowed Denver to enforce its unconstitutional laws. 

Id. at 18, 19, 21, 22. In his complaint, Mr. Bruce states that Colorado “permitted the 

action to proceed in this fashion and in fact actively encouraged the same through the 

decisions of the judges who oversaw the State Court Litigation.” Id. at 13. 

Mr. Bruce also makes a § 1983 conspiracy claim against all Appellees (Claim 

6). He alleges Appellees reached an agreement to (1) proceed in the State Court 

Litigation against Tele Comm, rather than the alleged true owner, knowing Tele 

Comm had neither the resources, the incentive, nor the ability to defend against 

Denver’s claims; (2) deny Tele Comm’s right to appear and defend its interest by 

claiming it had to be done through counsel;9

 (3) deny Mr. Bruce’s right to appear and 

defend his interests by arguing against making Mr. Bruce a party to the State Court 

Litigation; (4) use the State Court Litigation to sell the Properties and keep the 

proceeds for themselves; and (5) time the State Court Litigation to transpire when he 

was in prison. Mr. Bruce suggests Appellees were motivated by a desire to retaliate 

against him for his past political activism. 

9

 Colorado law requires limited partnerships to be represented by counsel if the 

amount in controversy exceeds $15,000. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-127(1)(e), (2)(a). 

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b. Breach of fiduciary duty 

Mr. Bruce claims the Receiver breached its fiduciary duty by committing 

waste for its own benefit in the management of the receivership and failing to treat 

his claims fairly and pay what was owed to him. He alleges the Receiver baselessly 

treated Mr. Bruce’s trust deeds as fraudulent or illegitimate and lied in order to void 

them; prevented Mr. Bruce from foreclosing on the Lipan trust deed; and otherwise 

worked for the Receiver’s own benefit. 

2. Dismissal

In two separate motions, Appellees moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Mr. Bruce responded that the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine did not bar his suit because he was not a party to the State Court Litigation. 

The district court disagreed with Mr. Bruce, determining he was a “party” for 

purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because he had a reasonable opportunity to, 

and did, raise his claims in the State Court Litigation and the remedies he sought 

would be available only by effectively undoing the state court judgment. The district 

court concluded it did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Bruce’s claims and dismissed 

the complaint without prejudice. 

Mr. Bruce timely appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Mr. Bruce challenges the district court’s dismissal of his complaint, arguing 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar his federal suit because he was not a party 

to the State Court Litigation. “We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of 

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subject matter jurisdiction de novo, and any factual findings relevant to the court’s 

jurisdiction for clear error.” Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th 

Cir. 2006). We disagree with Mr. Bruce and affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

his complaint. 

A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine10 prevents lower federal courts from exercising 

jurisdiction “over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused 

by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced 

and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil 

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Lance v. 

Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (explaining the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies 

“where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision 

to a lower federal court”). This reflects Congress’s decision to locate federal 

appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments exclusively in the Supreme Court. 

Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 

263 U.S. 413 (1923)). 

10 The doctrine is named for Rooker, 263 U.S. 413 (holding lower federal 

courts lack jurisdiction to reverse or modify state court judgments) and Feldman, 460 

U.S. 462 (explaining federal district courts may not review constitutional claims that 

are inextricably intertwined with state court decisions). After several decades of 

expansion of the doctrine in lower federal courts, the Supreme Court narrowed it to 

its current form in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 

(2005). 

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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine recognizes a jurisdictional bar on lower federal 

courts’ review of claims where (1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the state court 

judgment caused the plaintiff’s injuries, (3) the state court rendered judgment before 

the plaintiff filed the federal claim, and (4) the plaintiff is asking the district court to 

review and reject the state court judgment. Id. at 284. Where these factors exist, we 

lack subject matter jurisdiction. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 465. 

Although the Rooker-Feldman doctrine represents a firm jurisdictional bar, it 

is narrow in scope. See id. at 464 (“[O]ur cases since Feldman have tended to 

emphasize the narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman rule.” (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 

U.S. at 292)). It generally does not bar a suit by a federal-court plaintiff who was not 

a party in the state court litigation, nor does it bar a claim that does not seek to 

modify or set aside a state court judgment. See Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco), 226 

F.3d 1103, 1111–12 (10th Cir. 2000), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en 

banc (Oct. 12, 2000) (holding Rooker-Feldman did not bar claim for declaration of 

adoption laws’ unconstitutionality where plaintiff had not been a party to adoption 

proceeding and mounted only a general challenge to the validity of state adoption 

laws); cf. Mayotte v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 880 F.3d 1169, 1174–76 (10th Cir. 2018) 

(explaining the doctrine does not bar a federal claim “just because it could result in a 

judgment inconsistent with a state-court judgment”); Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 

F.3d 1129, 1145 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Rooker-Feldman does not bar federal-court 

claims that would be identical even had there been no state-court judgment; that is, 

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claims that do not rest on any allegation concerning the state-court proceedings or 

judgment.”). 

B. Analysis 

We first address Mr. Bruce’s contention that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

does not bar his federal lawsuit because he was not a party to the State Court 

Litigation. We conclude that Mr. Bruce’s status in the State Court Litigation does not 

prevent application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We then evaluate whether the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars his claims and conclude that it does. 

1. Whether Mr. Bruce’s Party Status in the State Court Litigation Prevents 

Application of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 

As a general rule, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar a suit by a federal 

court plaintiff who was not a party to the state court judgment. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 

465 (rejecting application of Rooker-Feldman doctrine to non-parties who were in 

privity with a party); Mo’s Express, 441 F.3d at 1234–37 (concluding RookerFeldman doctrine did not bar suit by plaintiffs who were “not parties, they were not 

bound by the judgment, and they were neither predecessors nor successors in interest 

to the parties” in the state court litigation, even if they had interests identical to those 

of a party). The underlying rationale for this general rule is that a federal court cannot 

be said to be entertaining an appeal from a state court judgment if the individual 

bringing the challenge is not one who could ordinarily appeal that judgment. See 

Lance, 546 U.S. at 465 (determining Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply where 

federal plaintiffs had not participated in state court proceeding and thus were not in a 

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position to appeal it (citing Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 (1987) (“[T]he general 

rule [is] that one who is not a party or has not been treated as a party to a judgment 

has no right to appeal therefrom.” (emphasis added)))); cf. Rodrigues (Orozco), 226 

F.3d at 1109 (explaining Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not apply to non-parties 

who had not litigated their claims in the action). 

Mr. Bruce maintains that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar his claims 

because he was not a party to the State Court Litigation.11 Mr. Bruce points to the 

state court’s refusal to name him a defendant as preventing application of the 

doctrine.12 But under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the question is whether a federal 

claimant seeks to appeal a state court judgment that the claimant could have appealed 

in state court, not whether the federal claimant was listed as a party on a state court 

docket. See Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 105 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding the 

doctrine barred the federal claim of former owners of property foreclosed in an in 

rem proceeding); id. at 103 n.24 (rejecting argument that only named parties are 

11 The state court arguably did name Mr. Bruce a “party” to the lawsuit. The 

state court docket in the record includes an entry for Mr. Bruce under “Party 

Information.” App. Vol. 1 at 101. Under “Party Name” the docket states, “Douglas 

Bruce”; the “Party Type” is “Other Interested Party”; and the “Party Status” is 

“Active.” Id. Although some of Mr. Bruce’s early filings were labeled as being filed 

by a “Non-Party,” id. at 96, as of early 2018, the docket listed Mr. Bruce as the 

“Filing Party,” id. at 83. 

12 It is unclear whether Colorado procedural rules would have allowed the state 

court to name Mr. Bruce a defendant. Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 66(d)(2) 

requires the defendants in a receivership suit to include “the current owner of the 

property as shown by the records of the clerk and recorder, and any other person then 

collecting the rents and profits as a result of that person’s lien.” 

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subject to Rooker-Feldman doctrine). The axiom that the doctrine generally applies 

to the claims of those who were parties in the prior state proceeding does not reflect a 

requirement; it reflects the reality that the doctrine usually affects such litigants 

because they are typically the ones bound by the state court judgment and would 

attempt to undo it. Lance, 546 U.S. at 465. But this is not always true. 

A claimant in a receivership proceeding, although neither plaintiff nor 

defendant, is equally bound by a state court judgment and would have a similar right 

to and interest in appealing it. See Ralph Ewing Clark, 3 Clark on Receivers §§ 646 

and 649(b) (3d ed. 1959) (explaining that a claimant in a receivership becomes a 

party to a proceeding ancillary to that between the plaintiff and defendant in which 

the claimant may challenge the demands of other creditors, assert its own defenses, 

seek review of the receiver’s decisions by the court, and appeal to the reviewing 

court); cf. Belknap Sav. Bank v. Lamar Land & Canal Co., 64 P. 212, 215–16 (Colo. 

1901) (referring to bondholders with interests in property under receivership as 

“parties” to the “ancillary proceeding of the receivership”). Mr. Bruce had a right to 

submit his claim for adjudication and he did so. The state court adjudicated the claim 

with input from and participation by Mr. Bruce; it acknowledged his liens, evaluated 

his arguments, explained how the law applied to the facts to justify its determination 

that Denver’s liens took priority over his, and addressed his challenge to the validity 

of the law. Mr. Bruce also had a right to appeal the state court’s rulings in state 

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court.13 Mr. Bruce is materially indistinguishable from a party to the State Court 

Litigation for Rooker-Feldman purposes and a lower federal court has no more 

jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal than one brought by a named party. 

Mr. Bruce’s argument that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not apply 

because he was “excluded from participating in the State Court Litigation and 

ignored by the state court,” Appellant’s Br. at 15, is both incorrect in its premise and 

an inaccurate representation of the record. A party’s ability to participate in the state 

court litigation does not dictate whether Rooker-Feldman applies. See Shelby Cnty. 

Health Care Corp. v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 836, 840–41 (8th Cir. 

2017) (concluding that a federal litigant’s ability to have intervened in the state court 

action was relevant to preclusion, not to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under the 

Supreme Court’s narrowing of the doctrine in and after Exxon Mobil). Even if such a 

consideration were relevant, Mr. Bruce had a full and fair opportunity to participate 

in the State Court Litigation. Mr. Bruce filed a claim with the Receiver, motions on 

which the state court ruled, and objections that the state court considered. The state 

court did not ignore Mr. Bruce or refuse to allow him to participate; it just disagreed 

with him. 

13 At oral argument, counsel for Mr. Bruce expressed doubt that Mr. Bruce had 

a right to appeal the state court judgment. However, counsel eventually conceded 

Mr. Bruce had such a right. Indeed, the state court granted Denver’s motion to certify 

its orders as final to enable Mr. Bruce to appeal more quickly. App. Vol. 1 at 167–71. 

See 3 Clark on Receivers § 646 (explaining that a disappointed claimant in a 

receivership proceeding may appeal the court’s decisions).

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In an effort to show why his claims survive the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 

Mr. Bruce points to Dorce, 2 F.4th 82. In Dorce, former property owners brought a 

§ 1983 due process challenge to the foreclosure of their buildings for non-payment of 

property taxes on the basis that they received inadequate notice of the in rem

proceedings. 2 F.4th at 92. The Second Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman 

doctrine barred the claim, explaining that their ownership gave them a right to 

participate in the proceedings. Id. at 104. Mr. Bruce tries to distinguish Dorce on the 

basis that it was an in rem proceeding so “the owners had the chance to participate in 

the state court litigation through their ownership of the real estate at issue.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 15; see also Reply at 4–5. But receivership proceedings are quasi 

in rem and, like in rem proceedings, allow parties not named in the suit to have their 

interests adjudicated and to appeal. See 1 Clark on Receivers §§ 46, 70, 289(f). 

Furthermore, the Second Circuit applied the doctrine even though the plaintiffs had 

not participated in the state court proceedings because their ownership gave them a 

right to do so. Mr. Bruce not only had such a right but actively exercised it. Far from 

suggesting the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not apply, Dorce supports applying 

it here. 

In sum, Mr. Bruce’s status as a non-defendant in the State Court Litigation 

does not prevent application of Rooker-Feldman’s jurisdictional bar. 

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2. Whether the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars Mr. Bruce’s Claims

Having concluded that the nature of Mr. Bruce’s participation in the State 

Court Litigation does not prevent application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we 

now evaluate whether the doctrine bars his claims. We conclude that it does. 

Attempts to recast state court losses as deprivations of constitutional rights do 

not overcome the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar. See Campbell v. City of 

Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1284–85 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining the doctrine bars a 

§ 1983 claim where “an element of the claim is that the [state] judgment was 

wrongful”); see also Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007); 

Market v. City of Garden City, 723 F. App’x 571, 574 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) 

(holding doctrine barred § 1983 claim where “for [plaintiff] to win, the municipal 

court’s judgment had to be wrong”). The doctrine forbids review of state judgments 

“based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s 

federal rights,” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1006 (1994), or based on a 

claim that “a state court violated the Constitution by giving effect to an 

unconstitutional state statute,” Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369–70, n.16 (1990). 

Mr. Bruce makes just such an attempt. His alleged injuries arose from, and are 

inseparable from, the state court judgment. He alleges that Denver issued excessive 

fines against Tele Comm and enacted/enforced an ordinance giving its own liens 

priority, and that the state court ignored him. But none of these allegedly 

unconstitutional acts plausibly injured Mr. Bruce until the state court upheld the 

fines, adjudicated the liens, and ordered the sale of the Properties and the distribution 

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of funds. Mr. Bruce objected to all these acts in the State Court Litigation and had a 

right to appeal to seek relief for injuries from these acts. Tellingly, Mr. Bruce now 

seeks monetary relief that would directly compensate him for losses caused by the 

state court’s determination of lien priority and other decisions, which would 

effectively undo those decisions. This is precisely the relief the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine says lower federal courts are powerless to provide. Cf. Rodrigues (Orozco), 

226 F.3d at 1105–07 (determining the doctrine did not bar a request for a declaration 

of adoption law’s unconstitutionality where plaintiff did not ask the federal court to 

undo the adoption). 

Mr. Bruce’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty fares no better. He alleges the 

Receiver converted Mr. Bruce’s property to itself “through the imposition of 

exorbitant receivership fees, and to Denver through Denver’s retention of the 

remaining sale proceeds.” App. Vol. 1 at 23. But the Receiver carried out the state 

court’s orders; without the state court’s orders, there was no injury. See McDonald v. 

Arapahoe Cnty., 755 F. App’x 786, 789–90 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (holding 

Rooker-Feldman barred Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims against county for 

evicting plaintiff where eviction was ordered by court). 

Because Mr. Bruce has alleged no injury apart from those caused by the state 

court judgment and the remedy he seeks would amount to reversal of that judgment, 

the district court lacked jurisdiction over his complaint. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

Mr. Bruce seeks compensation for injuries caused by his losses in state court. 

Congress has not authorized lower federal courts to provide such relief. Accordingly, 

we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Bruce’s complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. 

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