In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 02-3896

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WALTER RICHESON, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 2:01-CR-54—James T. Moody, Judge.

____________

ARGUED MAY 30, 2003—DECIDED JULY 22, 2003

____________

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and

RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Chief Judge. A jury convicted Walter Richeson,

Jr., of four counts of conspiring to use interstate commerce in the commission of a murder for hire, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). Richeson appeals his conviction on

three grounds, arguing first that the evidence was insufficient to prove he provided any consideration for the

alleged murder-for-hire, second that the evidence failed

to establish he used a facility in interstate commerce

when he made only intrastate phone calls to plan the

murders, and third that the district court abused its

discretion by admitting unfairly prejudicial evidence of
2 No. 02-3896

his plans to murder the state prosecutor, intimidate a

juror, and bribe the trial judge. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In the fall of 1999, Richeson was arrested and charged

in Indiana state court with the murder of Brant Martin.

Eyewitness Bradley Koonce told state investigators that

Richeson killed Martin, and Steve Mucha informed investigators that Richeson confessed to him that he had

killed Martin. Mucha was released after giving his statement, but Koonce was taken into custody on unrelated

charges and placed in Lake County Jail. Richeson knew

that the state’s case against him was strong, and decided

that the best way to defeat the charges was to have witnesses Koonce and Mucha killed. Since Koonce was in

custody, however, Richeson thought killing him was not

feasible; instead, Richeson devised a plan to kidnap

Koonce’s parents (his mother and step-father) and use

threats of death to them as a way to force Koonce to

recant. Even after Koonce recanted, however, Richeson

still intended to kill Koonce’s parents.

Richeson next conspired with his wife Jennifer and fellow inmates Daniel Wolfe and Curtis Jones to commit

the murders. Richeson wrote letters to Jennifer outlining

his plans and asking her to contact a man named “Dice”

to carry out the actual kidnaping and killings. In one

letter, which Richeson sent to Jennifer with instructions

that it be forwarded to Dice, Richeson begged Dice to

kill Koonce and Mucha and told Dice he would make it up

to him anyway he wanted if Dice did what Richeson

asked him to do. Additionally, Richeson called Jennifer

numerous times from jail asking her to coordinate his

kidnaping and murder plans.

Richeson also sought help from Wolfe and Jones to

carry out his plan. The three inmates agreed that the first
No. 02-3896 3

one to “bond out” would help the others get out; Jones

also agreed that if he bonded out he would help find

weapons to use in the plan to murder Mucha and Koonce’s

parents. At that time Richeson offered to pay Jones between $700-$1000 if he could get a gun for the murder, but

Jones testified that he told Richeson he wasn’t worried

about the money. Wolfe bonded out first in August 2000,

without help from Jones or Richeson, and once out of jail

he avoided contact with Richeson. Jones made bond in

November 2000, again without help from Wolfe or Richeson;

shortly before Jones left the jail, Richeson asked him if

he was still in on the plan. Jones pointed out that

Richeson had not helped him make bond, as he had promised to do, but added that he would nevertheless see

what he could do to help. Richeson then sent Jones two

letters in December of 2000, imploring him to help him

kill Mucha and kidnap Koonce’s parents; the second of

the two letters was written in a crude code which was

supposed to be read using the “decoder” contained in the

first letter.

Unknown to either Jones or Richeson, Wolfe had informed

an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) of Richeson’s plan to murder Mucha and

Koonce’s parents while Wolfe was still incarcerated.

Although Wolfe had avoided contact with Richeson after

his release from jail in August of 2000, he received a call

from an unidentified person in December of 2000 telling

him that he had better start taking Richeson’s calls. Later

in December, Wolfe accepted a collect call from Richeson,

who wanted to tell Wolfe how to carry out the kidnaping

of Koonce’s parents. Immediately after this call, Wolfe

contacted ATF and told them that Richeson’s plot to kill

and kidnap witnesses was still active and seemingly

genuine; ATF then began taping Richeson’s calls from jail

to Wolfe, Jennifer, and Jones.
4 No. 02-3896

Wolfe next introduced undercover ATF agent Joe Molina

to Jennifer and Jones, telling them that Molina was his

partner who would help carry out Richeson’s plans. Several

phone conversations between Wolfe, Molina, Jennifer,

Jones, and Richeson were recorded during the month

of January 2001, and these conversations revealed that

Richeson was planning to enlist the help of Jones and

others to kill and intimidate witnesses who would testify against him at his upcoming trial in February. In

addition to Mucha and Koonce’s parents, Richeson plotted

to murder other witnesses (the O’Neal twins and Bob

Holota) and the state prosecutor; he also planned to

bribe the state trial judge and intimidate a juror by threatening his or her family.

Neither Richeson nor the government disputes that

Richeson conspired and planned to commit the murders, but

Richeson insists that the government never proved he

conspired and planned to commit a murder-for-hire.

Richeson claims that none of his phone conversations

with Jones, Molina, Wolfe, or Jennifer in which he discussed obtaining a murder weapon constituted “consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of

pecuniary value” as required by the murder-for-hire statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). In contrast, the government

maintains that the conversations between Richeson and

his coconspirators unquestionably reveal Richeson’s intent

to reimburse them for their purchase of a murder weapon

and to involve them in future crimes that would yield

money ($100,000-$200,000 by Richeson’s own account)

for them to share. Moreover, the government contends

that Richeson promised Molina $500 to buy a gun for

himself in exchange for his help with the murders.

At trial the government introduced evidence, over

Richeson’s Fed. R. Evid. 403 objection, that Richeson had

planned to kill the state prosecutor and steal his case

file, bribe the judge, and identify and intimidate a vul-
No. 02-3896 5

nerable juror in order to avoid a conviction for murdering

Brant Martin. Richeson argues this evidence should have

been kept out because it was unfairly prejudicial, in that

its sole purpose was to inflame the jury, and was of

little probative value, given the admission of so much

other evidence of Richeson’s plan to murder Mucha and

Koonce’s parents. The district court allowed the contested

evidence to be introduced because it was highly relevant

to the government’s case against Richeson, and denied

Richeson’s motion for a mistrial based on the admission

of the evidence.

The government presented its case against Richeson

over four trial days; at the close of evidence on the fourth

day, Richeson moved for judgment of acquittal, claiming

the government had not met its burden of proof regarding

the consideration element of the murder-for-hire statute,

nor had it proven the interstate commerce element with

respect to the intrastate phone calls charged in Counts II

and IV. The court denied his motion, and Richeson rested

without presenting any evidence. Richeson was found guilty

and sentenced to a term of 364 months federal imprisonment (91 months for each of the 4 counts running

consecutively), which was tacked onto his Indiana state

court sentence for the murder of Brant Martin.

II. Discussion

A. Consideration Element

The federal murder-for-hire statute requires the government to prove that the accused intended for a murder

to be committed “as consideration for the receipt of, or as

consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything

of pecuniary value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). The phrase

“anything of pecuniary value” is defined in the statute

as “anything of value in the form of money, a negotiable

instrument, a commercial interest, or anything else the
6 No. 02-3896

primary significance of which is economic advantage.”

§ 1958(b)(1). Not only money, but drugs, insurance policies,

and real estate can constitute consideration for the purpose of satisfying this element. See, e.g., United States v.

Scott, 145 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 1998) (cash payments

of $5,000 and $75,000); United States v. Washington, 318

F.3d 845, 854 (8th Cir. 2003) (payment of 5 ounces of

heroin); United States v. Hernandez, 141 F.3d 1042, 1057

(11th Cir. 1998) (promise to profit from insurance proceeds). Here, the government charged Richeson with promising to pay something of pecuniary value, namely money

and guns, in return for the murders of Mucha and Koonce’s

parents.

Richeson attacks the sufficiency of the evidence against

him on two fronts, claiming first that the evidence failed

to show that he paid or promised to pay anyone anything

of value to commit the murders; and second, even assuming he made such a promise, the evidence failed to establish that the charged mailings were made in connection

with a murder-for-hire since they preceded any discussion

of compensation for the murders. We review a challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979), and will reverse a jury’s verdict of conviction

only if “there is no evidence from which a jury could convict.” United States v. Hill, 187 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir.

1999). Under such a deferential standard of review, and

in light of the uncontroverted facts corroborating Richeson’s

scheme to murder and intimidate adverse witnesses, we

conclude the jury heard ample evidence of Richeson’s intent

to pay for the murders to sustain his conviction.

Richeson first argues that the government never established his intent to pay for the murders. Though he concedes the evidence presented at trial proved that he intended to murder certain witnesses, Richeson insists

that he and his coconspirators never reached an agree-
No. 02-3896 7

ment regarding remuneration for their assistance in

committing the crimes. According to Richeson, the evidence

shows only that he intended and conspired to commit

murder, not murder-for-hire. While this court has not yet

defined what consideration means in the context of the

murder-for-hire statute, we have said in other criminal

law cases that consideration retains its contract law

meaning of a bargained-for exchange of something of

value. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Kokot, 314 F.3d 311, 317 (7th

Cir. 2002) (finding agreement to dismiss criminal charges

in exchange for release of civil claims to be a valid contract supported by consideration). With respect to § 1958,

the language of the statute “undeniably contemplates

a quid-pro-quo (or at least the promise of such)” between

the solicitor and the murderer. Hernandez, 141 F.3d at

1057. Though the use of the word “consideration” in the

statute “does not import all of contract law,” it should be

interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning, which

is “in return for” or “in exchange for.” Id. See also Washington, 318 F.3d at 854 (“consideration requirement of

the statute has been interpreted in the traditional sense

of a bargained-for exchange”) (citing United States v. Wicklund, 114 F.3d 151, 154 (10th Cir. 1997).

In this case the government presented evidence at

trial showing that Richeson offered to pay both Jones and

Molina to commit the murders of Mucha and Koonce’s

parents. The payment offered took the form of money to

buy the murder weapons, with the promise to allow the

murderer to keep the weapon when he finished the job.

Richeson insists he never directly promised his coconspirators compensation, and even assuming he had, he

never reached an enforceable agreement as to the terms

of payment. In support of his position Richeson relies on

United States v. Ritter, 989 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1993),

in which the Ninth Circuit held there was no consideration under § 1958 where the only mention of payment

to commit a murder was vaguely and tentatively prom-
8 No. 02-3896

ised by the defendant after being rejected as unnecessary

by the undercover agent posing as a “hit man.” This case

is quite different from Ritter; here, the taped conversations between Richeson and Wolfe and Molina show that

Richeson, though vague and cautious in his speech, nevertheless was fully aware of his need to compensate his

coconspirators to carry out the murders. The following

excerpts of three phone calls between the men illustrate

this point:

Call number one

Richeson: So, what man, what’s he [Molina] wanting?

Wolfe: Well . . . I told him the gameboys [guns]

and that’s what I told him I had to talk

to you about. What you willing to offer this

man? You know. We need, we need

Richeson: We need the tools for this job, don’t we?

Wolfe: Huh?

Richeson: We need the tools for this job

Wolfe: Yeah . . . I’m a go this route, don’t worry,

I’m gonna, but he, he can keep ‘em, right?

Richeson: Huh?

Wolfe: He can keep ‘em, right?

Richeson: For sure.

Wolfe: Alright, well at least that’s one of the top

. . . 

Richeson: However you wanna play it.

Call number two

Molina: What a, hey, you know, B, [Richeson], when

all this is done, am I going to be taken care

of?
No. 02-3896 9

Richeson: Definitely.

Molina: Definitely? All right. Cause Dan [Wolfe],

Dan says you’re straight up, and you know,

we’re working hard on this. But the game,

the gameboy tips, they’re the hardest thing.

Richeson: Right. See, Danny knows what I got to do to

obtain the, the money first, though. You

know what I’m saying?

Molina: The money for me? . . .

Richeson: Well, actually, it’s for all of us.

Call number three

Molina: You know what I mean? Hey, if we, if we

get this done, you know we talked about,

are you compensating me?

Richeson: Uh-huh.

Molina: I got my eye on a pretty good-looking

gameboy at one of these gun stores about

500 bucks. What compensation are you

talking about, about how much?

Richeson: Say that again.

Molina: I said we talked earlier about you making

payment to me.

Richeson: Uh-huh . . . 

Molina: I said I got me, I got my eye on this new

little gameboy at one of the gun stores

down here. It’s about 500 bucks. Are we

talking 500 or so?

Richeson: Shit probably, more than that if you want.
10 No. 02-3896

In addition to these and other conversations concerning payment in the form of guns, Richeson admits that

he also talked to Wolfe and Molina about partnering in

future crime sprees, once the murders were committed

and Richeson was released from jail, that would provide

the men with cash profits. Combined with the uncontroverted evidence establishing Richeson’s intent to

murder Mucha and Koonce’s parents, this evidence

plainly reveals Richeson’s intent to compensate his coconspirators, with money and guns, in exchange for their

committing the murders while he waited in jail. Despite

the guarded language used by Richeson and the others in

their phone conversations, we can easily discern a promise by the coconspirators to carry out the scheme to murder in exchange for Richeson’s promise to get them money

for guns, which they would keep, and to involve them in

future crimes, which would yield cash profits. This constitutes a bargained-for-exchange for something of value

and therefore amounts to consideration under the murderfor-hire statute.

But Richeson also argues that even if his statements

over the phone amounted to consideration for a murder-forhire, the mailings charged in the indictment (Counts I

& III) do not. Richeson maintains that evidence from the

mailings cannot support his murder-for-hire conviction

because the letters contained no mention of remuneration

and preceded the phone conversations in which payment

for the murders was discussed. However, § 1958 does not

require that the mailings themselves prove all the essential elements of the crime, only that they be used “with

intent that a murder-for-hire be committed.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1958(a). The use of a facility in interstate commerce,

such as the mails, is an essential element of a murder-forhire because it justifies federal regulation of the crime.

See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1361 (7th

Cir. 1979) (analyzing Travel Act, under which murder-forhire used to be punished, and finding that use of inter-
No. 02-3896 11

state facilities merely provides the basis for federal jurisdiction). Moreover, § 1958 requires only that the interstate

facility employed in a particular case be useful, not integral, to the commission or planning of the contract killing.

See United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1292 (1st

Cir. 1996) (finding interstate commerce element of § 1958

satisfied where use of interstate facilities simply furthers

or aids the commission of the crime); United States v.

McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1104 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding murder-for-hire conviction where defendant did not

know of murder plan at time of interstate travel, but his

codefendants had planned a murder-for-hire and intended that defendant’s interstate travel facilitate their

murder scheme); United States v. Ransbottom, 914 F.2d

743, 746 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that § 1958 does not require contract to exist and consideration be provided at

time of interstate travel, so long as travel commenced for

purpose of facilitating the murder-for-hire).

The evidence in this case shows that Richeson wrote

and mailed several letters discussing his plans to murder

Mucha and Koonce’s parents. These mailings included

a letter to a man named “Dice” in which Richeson offered

to make it up to him any way he wanted if Dice would

help him with the murders, and a letter to Jones in which

Richeson told Jones how he wanted the kidnaping

and murder of Koonce’s parents to occur. Contrary to

Richeson’s assertion, the fact that neither of these letters

makes overt mention of compensation is of no consequence; section 1958 does not require that the mailings

themselves prove all the essential elements of the crime,

only that the mailings be used with the intent that the

murders be committed. In this case there is ample evidence, including the phone calls discussed above and

Richeson’s jailhouse offer to give Jones cash to buy and

keep a suitable murder weapon, showing that Richeson

intended to commit a murder-for-hire. We are confident

that the jury could infer from this evidence that Richeson’s
12 No. 02-3896

1 In fact, the Sixth Circuit has very recently issued an opinion

favorably citing Marek and limiting this part of Weathers to

(continued...)

letters were mailed with the intent to execute his murderfor-hire scheme.

B. Interstate Commerce Element

Richeson next challenges that part of his conviction

(Counts II & IV) which is based on his use of the telephone to commit a murder-for-hire. The murder-for-hire

statute requires the government to prove that the accused “use[d] or cause[d] another (including the intended

victim) to use the mail or any facility in interstate or

foreign commerce” with intent that a murder be committed.

18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). Richeson argues that because all of

his phone calls were made intrastate, he cannot be found

guilty of using a facility in interstate commerce under

§ 1958. In particular, though he concedes that the phone

lines themselves are facilities “of” interstate commerce,

Richeson insists that he did not use the phones “in” interstate commerce because he never placed a call across

state lines. Richeson’s construction would require us to

read “in interstate or foreign commerce” as modifying “to

use” rather than “facility”; or, in other words, to require

that both the facility and its use be in interstate commerce. We have not squarely faced this issue in prior cases,

but our sister circuits have. The Fifth Circuit, sitting

en banc, soundly rejected Richeson’s suggested interpretation of § 1958’s interstate commerce language in United

States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001). Richeson,

however, urges us to find persuasive the Sixth Circuit’s

decision in United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336 (6th

Cir. 1999), where that court opined that the distinction

between “in” interstate commerce and “of” interstate commerce is significant in the murder-for-hire statute.1
No. 02-3896 13

1 (...continued)

its facts. United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 771 (6th Cir. 2002)

(“As a matter of statutory construction [of § 1958], we agree with

the Fifth Circuit’s analysis.”). In Cope, the court cites to Marek for

the proposition that the language “in interstate of foreign commerce” modifies “facility” and not “mail” or “to use.” Cope, 312

F.3d at 771.

We believe there is only one way to read the plain

language of the murder-for-hire statute, and that is to

require that the facility, and not its use, be in interstate

or foreign commerce. We wholly agree with the Fifth Circuit that § 1958’s construction, plain language, context

in the realm of commerce clause jurisprudence, and legislative history all lead to the conclusion that “it is sufficient

[under § 1958] that the defendant used an interstate

commerce facility in an intra state fashion.” Marek, 238

F.3d at 315. This reading of the statute makes sense

from both a logical and legal standpoint; as noted in Marek,

even the title of the statute, “Use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire,”

shows that Congress intended “interstate commerce” to

modify “facility” and not “use.” Id. 238 F.3d at 321. Moreover, even if the language of § 1958 was ambiguous (we

believe it is not), the statute’s history indicates that Congress sought to punish contract killings pursuant to its

authority to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate

commerce, identified in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.

549, 558 (1995), as one of three broad categories of conduct

appropriately regulated by Congress using its commerce

power. And when Congress elects to regulate under the

second prong of Lopez, “federal jurisdiction is supplied

by the nature of the instrumentality or facility used, not

by separate proof of interstate movement.” Marek, 238 F.3d

at 317.

Applying this rule to this case, we easily conclude that

the record contains sufficient evidence of Richeson’s use
14 No. 02-3896

2 Rule 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading

the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or

needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”

of a facility in interstate commerce to satisfy the jurisdictional commerce element of § 1958. In his brief, Richeson

concedes that he used a facility of interstate commerce,

namely the telephone line of a carrier operating in several states, to carry out his plan to murder Mucha and

Koonce’s parents; this fact alone establishes federal jurisdiction under the murder-for-hire statute.

C. Rule 403 Evidence

Finally, Richeson claims that the district court erred

by admitting evidence of his plot to kill the state prosecutor, intimidate a vulnerable witness, and bribe the

judge prior to his state court trial. Richeson argues that

this evidence had little probative value and was unfairly

prejudicial, and therefore should have been excluded

under Fed. R. Evid. 403.2

 We review the district court’s

refusal to exclude evidence under Rule 403 for abuse of

discretion, and will reverse the court’s ruling only if no

reasonable person could agree with it. United States v.

Thomas, 321 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2003). Recognizing

that the balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect

is a highly discretionary exercise, we give the district

court’s evidentiary decisions great deference. Id. With this

in mind, we conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion by permitting the government to

introduce evidence of Richeson’s plan to murder the state

prosecutor, intimidate a juror, and bribe the judge in his

federal murder-for-hire trial.

The government maintains, and the district court presumably agreed, that the challenged evidence was highly
No. 02-3896 15

relevant to Richeson’s overarching scheme to avoid prosecution for his murder of Brant Martin. Specifically, the

evidence revealed Richeson’s back-up plan in case he

could not murder Mucha and force Koonce to recant prior

to his trial. The government explains that Richeson’s “Plan

B” was to murder the state prosecutor and steal his case

file; and if that course of action proved fruitless, he would

find and intimidate a vulnerable juror by threatening his

or her family, or perhaps bribe the judge. Each of these

plots, says the government, is highly probative of

Richeson’s intent to commit the murders-for-hire charged

in the federal indictment. Moreover, even assuming the

admission of this evidence was in error, the government

suggests that it was harmless in light of all the other

evidence presented to the jury establishing Richeson’s

“ruthlessness” in planning the murders-for-hire. 

Though we agree with the government that the challenged evidence is relevant to show Richeson’s intent to

commit the murders-for-hire for which he was on trial,

we also believe that the evidence could be viewed as

prejudicial and likely to inflame the jury—especially the

testimony regarding Richeson’s plan to intimidate one

of their own by threatening his or her family. Moreover,

there is an abundance of evidence in the record establishing Richeson’s intent to commit the murders of Mucha

and Koonce’s parents, and the addition of evidence relating to his plans to murder the prosecutor, intimidate a

juror, and bribe the judge could be seen as unnecessary. But

our view of the probative value and prejudicial effect of

the evidence is not relevant where, as here, the district

court’s decision is not entirely unreasonable; the court’s

admission of evidence over Richeson’s Rule 403 objection

simply did not amount to an abuse of discretion.
16 No. 02-3896

III. CONCLUSION

The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove

all of the essential elements of the federal murder-for-hire

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1958, including the interstate commerce and consideration elements challenged on appeal,

and the district court did not abuse its discretion by

admitting evidence of Richeson’s plan to murder the

state prosecutor, intimidate witnesses, and bribe the trial

judge. His conviction is therefore affirmed.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—7-22-03