UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4592

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

STEPHEN F. CLARK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.,

Senior District Judge. (4:08-cr-00124-HCM-JEB-1)

Submitted: August 11, 2010 Decided: February 7, 2011

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. 

Pratt, Larry M. Dash, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, 

Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United 

States Attorney, Timothy R. Murphy, Special Assistant United 

States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Stephen F. Clark appeals his convictions and sentence 

for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii) (West 1999

& Supp. 2010) (Counts One and Three); using a firearm in 

relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1) (2006) (Count Two); and possession of marijuana, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2006) (Count Four). Clark raises 

two issues on appeal. First, Clark contends that the district 

court abused its discretion in denying his attorney’s motion to 

withdraw from representation. Second, though conceding his 

argument contravenes binding circuit precedent, Clark contends 

that the district court erred in determining he was subject to a 

five-year mandatory minimum consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1)(A) on Count Two, as Clark was already subject to a 

ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for Count One. We affirm.

Whether to allow a defendant to substitute counsel 

rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. United 

States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891, 895 (4th Cir. 1994). When 

determining whether a district court abused its discretion in 

disallowing the substitution of counsel, we consider three 

factors: “(1) the timeliness of [the request]; (2) the adequacy 

of the court’s inquiry into [Clark’s] complaint about counsel; 
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and (3) whether [Clark] and his counsel experienced a total lack 

of communication preventing an adequate defense.” United 

States v. Reevey, 364 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Mullen, 32 F.3d at 895) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Clark’s attorney’s 

motion to withdraw.

Next, Clark asserts that the district court erred in 

determining that he was subject to a five-year mandatory minimum 

consecutive sentence on Count Two, because he was already 

subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence on Count One. 

Clark concedes that this claim is foreclosed by this court’s 

holding in United States v. Studifin, 240 F.3d 415, 423 (4th 

Cir. 2001). Because a panel of this court cannot overrule the 

precedent set by a prior panel, Scotts Co. v. United Indus. 

Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 271 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002), and because the 

statutory interpretation adopted in Studifin was recently 

confirmed by Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 

18 (2010), we conclude that this claim is without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
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before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED