RENDERED: APRIL 5, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2023-CA-0745-MR

ANNA INSKO APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE JEREMY MICHAEL MATTOX, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-CI-00194

JEREMIAH PERRAUT APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND CALDWELL, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Anna Insko appeals from an order which granted 

summary judgment to Jeremiah Perraut. Appellant argues that the trial court 

erroneously interpreted Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 258.235, Kentucky’s 

strict liability dog bite statute, and erred in dismissing her premises liability cause 

of action. We find no error and affirm.
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 4, 2020, Appellee and his wife, Audra Perraut, invited 

Appellant and her children over to their home for a social gathering. At one point 

in the evening, Appellant, Appellee, and Ms. Perraut were gathered around a firepit 

located in the Perraut’s back yard. Appellee and Ms. Perraut were facing 

Appellant and the three of them were conversing. At some point, the Perraut’s dog 

approached the firepit and lay down behind Appellant. As Appellant was talking, 

she took a small step backward, without looking, and tripped over the dog. She 

fell and broke her wrist. Appellee testified during a deposition that he did not see 

the dog behind Appellant. Ms. Perraut was not deposed.

Appellant then filed the underlying lawsuit. She claimed that 

Appellant negligently kept the premises in an unsafe condition by not warning her 

of the dog’s position behind her and by not properly supervising the dog. She also 

claimed that he was strictly liable due to KRS 258.235(4), which states, “[a]ny 

owner whose dog is found to have caused damage to a person, livestock, or other 

property shall be responsible for that damage.” 

After some discovery, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, 

which the court granted. The trial court held that KRS 258.235(4) did not apply to 

this situation because the dog did not bite or attack Appellant. The court also held 

that, as a social guest, Appellant was a licensee on Appellee’s property. The court 
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found that Appellant did not act negligently in this instance. Appellant then filed a 

motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment order. That motion was 

denied and this appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review on appeal of a summary 

judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that 

there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and 

that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. . . . “The record must be viewed in a light 

most favorable to the party opposing the motion for 

summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in 

his favor.” Summary “judgment is only proper where the 

movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail 

under any circumstances.” Consequently, summary 

judgment must be granted “[o]nly when it appears 

impossible for the nonmoving party to produce evidence 

at trial warranting a judgment in his favor[.]”

Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996) (citations omitted). 

“Because summary judgment involves only legal questions and the existence of 

any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court need not defer to the trial 

court’s decision and will review the issue de novo.” Lewis v. B & R Corporation, 

56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001). 

ANALYSIS

Appellant’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in its 

interpretation of KRS 258.235(4). The trial court held that it did not apply in this 

matter because Appellant was not bitten or attacked by the dog. Appellant argues 
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that this interpretation is incorrect because the statute does not require a bite or 

attack from a dog, only that the dog cause damage. 

In concluding that the statute did not apply in this case, the trial court 

relied on Spalding v. Own Your Home, LLC, No. 2017-CA-001647-MR, 2019 WL 

4733072 (Ky. App. Sep. 27, 2019). In Spalding, David Spalding slipped on dog 

excrement outside of a home owned by Own Your Home, LLC, and injured 

himself. The home was being leased by John Segevan and Mr. Segevan was the 

owner of the dog. Mr. Spalding sued Own Your Home and Mr. Segevan.1

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Own Your 

Home by concluding that this type of injury was not one contemplated by the 

statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed and held the following:

Own Your Home persuasively argues that the overall 

tenor of KRS 258.235 provides that it was intended to 

encompass only damage stemming from dog bites or 

attacks. Indeed, the statute is frequently referred to as the 

“dog bite” statute. This interpretation is consistent with 

other subsections of the statute that explicitly address 

vicious, attacking dogs. The Kentucky Supreme Court 

explained in [Benningfield ex rel. Benningfield v.

Zinsmeister, 367 S.W.3d 561, 562 (Ky. 2012)] that KRS 

258.235 was part of a legislative “scheme to displace or 

abrogate the common law rule on dog-bite liability . . .

presumably to create incentives for various actors to take 

steps to reduce the chances of dog bites. And, more 

recently, our Supreme Court referred to KRS 258.235(4) 

as governing “dog bite law” and being “the progeny of 

1 At the time, landlords could be considered “owners” under KRS 258.235(4). The relevant 

statutes have since been revised to remove landlords from the definition of owner. 
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years of evolution in the law of dog attacks.” Maupin v.

Tankersley, 540 S.W.3d 357, 359-60 (Ky. 2018). Dog 

excrement is plainly neither a bite nor an attack. Thus, 

we agree with the trial court that Spalding’s ankle injury, 

caused by slipping on dog excrement, is not the type of 

“damage” that the legislature intended to address in KRS 

258.235(4). Accordingly, we cannot extend liability to a 

landlord under the facts of this case.

Spalding, 2019 WL 4733072, at *2 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

When engaging in statutory interpretation, 

our main goal is “to give effect to the intent of the 

General Assembly.” The clearest indicator of that intent 

is the “language the General Assembly chose, either as 

defined by the General Assembly or as generally 

understood in the context of the matter under 

consideration.” And “[w]here the words used in a statute 

are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative 

intent, there is no room for construction and the statute 

must be accepted as written.”

Bell v. Bell, 423 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Ky. 2014) (footnotes and citations omitted). 

“Generally, [t]he statute must be read as a whole and in context with other parts of 

the law.” Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Dixon, 572 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 

2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

However, [n]o rule of statutory construction has been 

more definitely stated or more often repeated than the 

cardinal rule that significance and effect shall, if possible, 

be accorded to every part of the Act. Additionally, [a]ll 

statutes of this state shall be liberally construed with a 

view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of 

the legislature[.] And, it is axiomatic that, when 

interpreting a provision of a statute, a court should not, if 

possible, adopt a construction that renders a provision 
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meaningless or ineffectual or interpret a provision in a 

manner that brings about an absurd or unreasonable 

result.

Schoenbachler v. Minyard, 110 S.W.3d 776, 783 (Ky. 2003) (footnotes, internal 

quotation marks, and citations omitted).

We agree with the trial court that KRS 258.235(4) does not apply to 

Appellant’s injury. First, let us examine KRS 258.235 as a whole. KRS 258.235 

states:

(1) Any person, without liability, may kill or seize any 

dog which is observed attacking any person.

(2) Any livestock owner or his agent, without liability, 

may kill any dog trespassing on that owner’s property 

and observed in the act of pursuing or wounding his 

livestock.

(3) Any dog determined to be vicious by a court and 

allowed to be returned to an owner shall be confined in a 

locked enclosure at least seven (7) feet high or a locked 

kennel run with a secured top. The dog may leave the 

enclosure only to visit the veterinarian or to be turned in 

to an animal shelter. The dog shall be muzzled if leaving 

the enclosure for either of these purposes.

(4) Any owner whose dog is found to have caused 

damage to a person, livestock, or other property shall be 

responsible for that damage.

(5) (a) Any person who has been attacked by a dog, or 

anyone acting on behalf of that person, may make a 

complaint before the district court, charging the owner or 

keeper of the dog with harboring a vicious dog. A copy 

of the complaint shall be served upon the person so 

charged in the same manner and subject to the laws 
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regulating the service of summons in civil actions 

directing him to appear for a hearing of the complaint at a 

time fixed in the complaint. If the person fails to appear 

at the time fixed, or if upon a hearing of the parties and 

their witnesses, the court finds the person so charged is 

the owner or keeper of the dog in question, and that the 

dog has viciously and without cause, attacked a human 

being when off the premises of the owner or keeper, the 

person shall be subject to the penalties set forth in KRS 

258.990(3)(b), and the court shall further order the owner 

or keeper to keep the dog securely confined as provided 

by subsection (3) of this section, or the court may order 

the dog to be destroyed.

(b) The animal control officer shall act as an officer of 

the court for the enforcement of any orders of the court in 

his jurisdiction pertaining to this subsection.

(6) For his services in the proceedings, a peace officer 

shall be entitled to the same fees to which he is entitled 

for performing similar services in civil cases. In all 

proceedings under this section, the court shall place the 

costs upon either party as it may determine.

(7) It shall be unlawful for the owner or keeper of any 

vicious dog, after receiving an order under subsection (5) 

of this section, to permit the dog to run at large, or to 

appear in public except as provided in subsection (3) of 

this section. Any vicious dog found running at large may 

be killed by any animal control officer or peace officer 

without liability for damages for the killing.

Based on our reading of the statute as a whole, and the perceived 

legislative intent, we believe KRS 258.235(4) requires some kind of act by a dog 

for strict liability to apply. Here, the dog was lying on the ground and did not act 

upon Appellant. The dog did not bite, attack, jump on, or even nudge Appellant. 
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The dog was simply peacefully existing. Allowing KRS 258.235(4) to apply to all 

actions in which an injury is somehow tangentially related to a dog would bring 

about an absurd and unreasonable result. We find no error with the trial court’s 

conclusion that the statute does not apply in this case. Appellee was entitled to 

summary judgment as a matter of law.

Appellant also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment on her negligence claim. She claims that the court erred in 

deeming her a licensee as opposed to an invitee. She also argues that there were 

factual issues that needed to be decided by a jury.

[A] negligence case . . . requires proof that (1) the 

defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the 

defendant breached the standard by which his or her duty 

is measured, and (3) consequent injury. “Consequent 

injury” consists of what hornbooks separate into two 

distinct elements: actual injury or harm to the plaintiff 

and legal causation between the defendant’s breach and 

the plaintiff’s injury. Duty, the first element, presents a 

question of law. Breach and injury, are questions of fact 

for the jury to decide. The last element, legal causation, 

presents a mixed question of law and fact.

Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 88-89 (Ky. 2003) (citations omitted). 

The first step in proving negligence is determining what 

duty, if any, the defendant owed the plaintiff. In the 

Commonwealth, under the doctrine of premises liability, 

“a landowner has a general duty to maintain the premises 

in a reasonably safe manner; and the scope of that duty is 

outlined according to the status of the plaintiff.”
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Smith v. Smith, 563 S.W.3d 14, 16 (Ky. 2018) (emphasis in original) (citation 

omitted). The injured party can fall into one of three categories: invitee, licensee, 

or trespasser. Id. at 17. In this case, we only have to consider invitee and licensee. 

[A] licensee is defined as a “person who is privileged to 

enter or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor’s 

consent.” A possessor of land owes a licensee a duty to 

“not knowingly let[ ] her come upon a hidden peril or 

willfully or wantonly caus[e] her harm.”

On the other hand, an invitee is “either a public 

invitee or a business visitor.” In contrast to a licensee, an 

invitee is owed a duty of “reasonable care,” such that an 

invitee “enters the premises with the implied assurance of 

preparation and reasonable care for his protection and 

safety while he is there.” This duty extends beyond the 

protection owed a licensee and protects the invitee from 

“the risk of harm from activities of which the invitee 

knows or has reason to know, where it may reasonably be 

expected that he will fail to protect himself 

notwithstanding such knowledge.”

Id. at 17-18 (footnotes and citations omitted).

Kentucky case law holds that a social guest in someone’s home is a 

licensee. Shipp v. Johnson, 452 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Ky. 1969); Terry v. Timberlake, 

348 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Ky. 1961); Lawson v. Smith, 652 S.W.3d 643, 647 (Ky. 

App. 2022). As a licensee, Appellant 

was expected to take the premises as the [owners] used 

them and was not entitled to expect that they would be 

prepared for her reception or that precautions would be 

taken for her safety in any manner in which [the owners]

did not prepare or take precautions for their own safety or 

that of members of their family. No duty was owed to 
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the [social guest] other than that of not knowingly letting 

her come upon a hidden peril or willfully or wantonly 

causing her harm.

Terry, 348 S.W.2d at 920 (citations omitted).

In the case sub judice, the trial court held that there was no evidence 

that Appellee breached his duty to keep his premises safe for a licensee. While the

issue of breach is usually a fact question for the jury to decide, “summary 

judgment . . . will be appropriate only when, under all the circumstances of the 

given case, reasonable minds cannot differ . . . or when only one reasonable 

conclusion [as to that question] can be reached.” Grubb v. Smith, 523 S.W.3d 409, 

421 (Ky. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Here, Appellant presented no evidence that Appellee or his wife saw 

the dog lying behind her. “‘Belief’ is not evidence and does not create an issue of 

material fact. A plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a 

properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Humana of Kentucky, Inc. v.

Seitz, 796 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1990) (citation omitted). If Appellee did not see the 

dog, then there was no dangerous condition known by him to warn about. In 

addition, we do not believe the dog was a “hidden peril.” The dog was not 

obscured or hidden by anything, and had Appellant looked where she was 

stepping, she likely would have seen the dog.
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We also note that there was no allegation that Appellee “willfully or 

wantonly” caused her harm; therefore, we will not discuss that aspect of negligence 

toward a licensee. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

KRS 258.235(4) did not apply in this case and Appellant failed to provide evidence 

that Appellee breached his duty to protect her from known hidden perils on his 

property. 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Thomas K. Herren

Lexington, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Luke A. Wingfield

Cassidy L. Sorrells

Lexington, Kentucky