SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4767-18T2

ANTHONY WISSEH, AS A

MEMBER and TREASURER OF

THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH

OF NEWARK, THE PRESBYTERY

OF NEWARK OF PRESBYTERIAN

CHURCH (USA) and THE 

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION

OF THE FIRST PRESBYTERIAN

CHURCH OF NEWARK,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ANA AQUINO, CATHERINE

CAMPBELL-WRIGHT, EMILE DUHO,

STEPHEN FINGAL, SR., SAMUEL

JAN, MICHAEL J. LUNGA and 

PAUL TAYLOR,

Defendants-Respondents.

_________________________________

Argued November 17, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Yannotti, Haas and Mawla.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 9, 2020
2

A-4767-18T2

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division and Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket 

Nos. L-2647-17 and C-000147-18.

Ellen O'Connell argued the cause for appellants 

(Inglesino, Webster, Wyciskala & Taylor, LLC, 

attorneys; Ellen O'Connell, of counsel and on the 

briefs; Owen T. Weaver, on the briefs).

Charles Z. Schalk argued the cause for respondents 

(Savo, Schalk, Gillespie, O'Grodnick & Fisher, PA, 

attorneys; Charles Z. Schalk, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

This appeal involves a dispute over control of the property of the First 

Presbyterian Church of Newark (First Church) between First Church's Board of 

Trustees (Board or defendants) on the one hand, and the Presbytery of Newark 

(Presbytery) of the Presbyterian Church (USA) (PCUSA), its Administrative 

Commission (AC), and Anthony Wisseh, a member of First Church (plaintiffs),

on the other. Following a multi-day bench trial, the trial court found in favor of 

defendants and held that control of the property lay with the Board under a Royal 

Charter (the Charter) granted to First Church by King George II in 1753. 

As they unsuccessfully did before the trial court, plaintiffs argue on appeal 

that the Charter is subject to N.J.S.A. 16:1-1 to -47 (Title 16), covering religious 

corporations, and more specifically N.J.S.A. 16:11-1 to -24 (Chapter 11), 
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A-4767-18T2

covering the Presbyterian Church, and that these provisions give plaintiffs

control of First Church's property. Plaintiffs also assert that the trial court 

violated the First Amendment by improperly entangling civil law with religion 

in making its decision and should have ruled that a certificate of incorporation 

filed by defendants in 2015 was invalid. Finally, plaintiffs argue that the court 

should have granted their motion for summary judgment instead of setting the 

matter down for trial.

Having considered plaintiffs' contentions in light of the record and the 

applicable law, we affirm.

I.

On April 11, 2017, plaintiffs, Anthony Wisseh, a First Church member 

and treasurer, and the Presbytery and its AC, filed a complaint in the Law 

Division against defendants for a declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs sought a 

declaration that the Charter had been amended by Chapter 11, N.J.S.A. 16:11-

1 to -24, and that the 2015 certificate of incorporation violated New Jersey law. 

After defendants filed an answer, the parties thereafter filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment. 

On August 14, 2018, the motion judge signed an order denying the parties' 

summary judgment motions because there were material issues of fact in 
4

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dispute, including the duties and responsibilities of the trustees under the 

Charter. In addition, the judge ordered the matter transferred to the Chancery 

Division because she found that the issues were primarily equitable rather than 

legal. The judge denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on September 14, 

2018.

II.

In the Chancery Division, the case was reassigned to Judge Jodi Lee 

Alper, who conducted a trial on eleven non-consecutive days between March 

and May 2019. The trial established the following facts.

First Church's history dates to 1644, when a congregational church was 

formed in Connecticut. The church moved to Newark in 1666 and reorganized 

as the First Presbyterian Church of Newark. The current church building was 

completed in 1792 and has attained landmark status.

On June 7, 1753, a Royal Charter was given to First Church by King 

George II incorporating a board of seven trustees and their successors as a body 

politic. Specifically, the Charter provided that seven individuals

and their Successors forever hereafter shall be & 

remain one body Politick and Corporate in Deed, Fact, 

and Name, by the Name of the Trustees of the First 

Presbyterian Church in Newark . . . . And by that Name 

they shall & may have perpetual Succession, [a]nd . . . 

be and forever hereafter shall be Persons able in Law to 
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A-4767-18T2

purchase, take, hold, receive, and enjoy any Messuages, 

Houses, Lands, Tenements, Rents, Possessions, and 

other Hereditaments, & Real Estate, in Fee Simple or 

otherwise . . . . And also that they & their Successors

. . . shall & may give, grant & demise, assign, sell or 

otherwise despose [sic] of all or any of their Messuages, 

Houses, Buildings, Lands, Tenements, Rents, 

Possessions, and other Hereditaments, & Real Estate, 

and all their Goods, Chattels, & other Things aforesaid 

as to them shall seem meet . . . .

The Charter required that the Church's money and assets be used to "erect 

& repair [p]ublic [b]uildings for the [w]orship of God [and] the [u]se of the 

[m]inistry and [s]chool, [h]ouses & Alms [h]ouses and suitably to support the 

[m]inistry . . . and to do & perform other [a]cts of [p]iety & [c]harity." The 

trustees were given perpetual succession, and were authorized to manage, lease,

and sell property. The Charter did not require the trustees to obtain a 

Presbytery's permission to engage in such transactions and did not limit the 

number of terms of a member of the Board.

The Presbyterian denomination is a hierarchical church. Presbyterian 

Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 

U.S. 440, 446 n.5 (1969). It consists, in descending order, of a General 

Assembly, a Synod, a Presbytery and the individual congregation, represented 

by a Session. The Session is a group of seven "elders" elected by the 

congregation which constitutes the governing body of the church. The 
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A-4767-18T2

Presbytery of Newark, of which First Church was a member, covered Essex 

County. A Presbytery has authority over the Sessions and congregations that 

fall within its geographical region, including compliance with the General 

Assembly's Book of Order. The Synod covered the northeast, including New 

England, New York, and New Jersey, and has authority over the Presbyteries. 

The General Assembly covered the entire country and has authority over the 

Synods and Presbyteries. The PCUSA is considered the General Assembly. 

Reverend Stephen Phelps, a Presbyterian Minister, testified on behalf of 

plaintiffs that the Constitution of the PCUSA has two elements: a Book of Order 

and a Book of Confessions. The Book of Order, which dates back to the 18th 

Century, sets forth guidance as to how to rule in matters pertaining to 

governance, worship, discipline, and theology. Under the Book of Order, each 

church is encouraged to form a corporation for the handling of assets for the 

benefit of the church's mission. According to the Book of Order, all property 

held by a congregation is held in trust for the use and benefit of the PCUSA. 

Phelps stated that when property is held contrary to the mission of the PCUSA, 

it can become the property of the supervising Presbytery. Moreover, the Book 

of Order requires the Sessions to seek Presbytery approval of any real estate 

transactions, including leases and sales.
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A-4767-18T2

As to real property, the Book of Order provides:

The provisions of this Constitution prescribing 

the manner in which decisions are made, reviewed, and 

corrected within this church are applicable to all 

matters pertaining to property. 

All property held by or for a congregation, a 

presbytery, a synod, the General Assembly, or the 

Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) . . . is held in trust 

nevertheless for the use and benefit of the Presbyterian 

Church (U.S.A.).

. . . .

A congregation shall not sell, mortgage or 

otherwise encumber any of its real property and it shall 

not acquire real property subject to an encumbrance or 

condition without the written permission of the 

presbytery transmitted through the [S]ession of the 

congregation.

A congregation shall not lease its real property 

used for purposes of worship, or lease for more than 

five years any of its other real property, without the 

written permission of the presbytery transmitted 

through the [S]ession of the congregation.

[(Subsection headings omitted).]

According to Phelps, the first Presbytery on the eastern seaboard was 

formed in 1706. First Church joined in 1725. The PCUSA was formed in 1983, 

as a result of a merger between the United Presbyterian Church and the 

Presbyterian Church in the United States. 
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Defendant Michael Lunga, a member of First Church's Board of Trustees, 

testified that the Board managed the Church's investments and expenditures to 

make sure that the funds were being used appropriately and in the best interests 

of the congregation. Lunga testified that the Church's total assets at the time of 

trial totaled about $20 million.

The trustees entered into a thirty-year lease with Devils Broad Street LLC 

in 2007 for the construction of the Prudential Center Arena and a parking garage. 

In conjunction with this transaction, the trustees engaged in a land swap with

the City of Newark. The deal was not presented to the Presbytery or the PCUSA 

for approval. Lunga testified that neither of those entities had ever been 

involved with approving any of the Church's financial transactions.

According to Lunga, the Church's real estate transactions "have always 

been within the purview of the trustees and the trustees alone." He added that 

during the course of First Church's history, neither the Newark Presbytery, the 

Synod, the PCUSA, or its predecessors, had been involved with nor approved 

any real estate transactions. Rather, the trustees had the sole and exclusive 

power to deal with the real property and financial assets of First Church without 

obtaining approval from any other entity. This power included the leasing of

church property. 
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Lunga also testified regarding other real estate transactions the Church 

had undertaken between 1936 and 2000. The Newark Presbytery, the Synod,

and the PCUSA and its predecessors were not involved in any of the 

transactions. In addition, he testified that an "overture" handed down by the 

General Assembly in 1946 that a church may not sell or mortgage property 

without the permission of the local presbytery was contrary to both the Charter 

and First Church's practice, and thus was rejected at that time. According to 

Lunga, the Board always remained in full control of all First Church property, 

and it rebuffed similar efforts by the Synod in 1953 and by the General Assembly 

in 1980. Lunga further asserted that the Board had never followed the Book of 

Order with regard to its directives on property interests. 

Lunga testified the Board of Trustees controls all the financial aspects of 

First Church, including investments and property, while the Presbytery, Synod,

and Assembly are involved only in the ecclesiastical aspects of the church. 

Lunga believed that plaintiffs were seeking to gain control of First Church's 

property because the Presbytery was having financial difficulties. 

Defendant Paul Taylor testified that he was a trustee for fifteen years. He 

stated that neither the Presbytery, the Synod, nor the PCUSA had any authority 

over First Church's property and financial affairs during the time he was on the 
10 A-4767-18T2

Board. In addition, the Board always followed the Charter, and not the Book of 

Order when it came to those matters.

In November 2012, the Board hired Glen Misick to be pastor. His 

employment agreement, signed by a representative of the Presbytery, stated: "At 

all times all parties shall strive to fulfill all of their respective obligations and 

duties in accordance with the Book of Order of the [PCUSA] to the extent that 

such do not conflict with the Charter of First Presbyterian Church of Newark or 

its historic traditions and precedents." Jeanette Oliver, who served as both 

deacon and trustee at the Church, testified that the Presbytery assisted in the 

hiring of the Church's minister.

According to Lunga, at Misick's insistence, the Board drafted a certificate 

of incorporation in 2015. The certificate stated that its purpose was to reaffirm 

the Church's corporate status dating back to the Charter granted by King George 

II. The Charter itself was incorporated by reference and appended to the 

certificate. The certificate further noted that in 1786, incorporated religious 

societies were given the right to file certificates of incorporation with the 

applicable county. However, "[t]he book where such certificate should appear 

in the Essex County Clerk's office is not to be found." Thus, the 2015 certificate 

stated:
11 A-4767-18T2

While the Trustees have no question of the existence of 

the corporate entity since the Charter . . . it is deemed 

prudent, although not totally necessary, to reaffirm said 

corporate status dating back to the original Charter 

. . . . 

Lunga described the certificate as a reincorporation to ensure that the 

formalities of incorporation were met and could withstand any challenge to First 

Church's corporate status, in addition to reaffirming the Charter. He claimed 

that the church's incorporation had never been challenged. The certificate also 

reaffirmed and ratified all contracts, deeds, leases, and other actions taken by 

the Board of Trustees from the date of the Charter to the present. The trustees 

were given the sole power to adopt and amend any bylaws. This was contrary 

to the Book of Order, which gave that authority to the congregation.

Misick resigned as pastor in mid-2016. Lunga claimed that Misick 

believed that the provisions of the Charter did not apply to First Church and that 

he had never attended meetings of the Board. The Board refused to pay Misick

a severance salary of approximately $55,000 that he requested with PCUSA's 

approval. Lunga testified that the Board refused to do so because, among other 

things, there had never been a policy to pay a pastor severance.

A report written for First Church by attorney Irving Riker (the Riker 

Report) in 1967 was also introduced into evidence. The report relied on a book, 
12 A-4767-18T2

Walter S. Nichols, The Old Town Endowment (1916), that stated that First 

Church "has long claimed the right of independent action with respect to its own 

properties," and that it would be "a grave mistake to allow external bodies with 

which it may be ecclesiastically associated to have any voice or control over the 

disposition of its funds."

1

III.

Following the trial, Judge Alper rendered a comprehensive oral decision 

in which she framed the issue as whether First Church was "bound by the 

umbrella of the [PCUSA] and the Book of Order, or whether it is an independent 

congregation by virtue of the Royal Charter and is a corporation which controls 

its own assets and property." In finding the latter, Judge Alper stated:

The [c]ourt finds that the Royal Charter of 1753 which 

created the Board of Trustees of the First Presbyterian 

Church in Newark is an enforceable contract between 

the private parties. Pursuant to the Royal Charter, the 

Board of Trustees has the ongoing right to give, assign, 

or sell any of the lands, property, real estate, and goods 

of the Church as [it] deem[s] fit.

1

 In June 2015, the Presbytery appointed an AC headed by Phelps to investigate 

alleged improprieties by the Board. In January 2019, the AC eventually 

established a new board of trustees for First Church in a process that Lunga 

described as "basically . . . an end-run around the lawsuit." However, plaintiffs 

did not seek to enforce this action in the present litigation, and they do not claim 

that the selection of a new board rendered this appeal moot. Similarly, 

defendants do not ask that the AC's action be nullified as a violation of the 

Charter. Therefore, we do not address it further in this opinion.
13 A-4767-18T2

The judge found that First Church was created well before the formation 

of the national Presbyterian Church, and that the Board had controlled its

property since 1753 without exception. The judge stated, "It received its 

property not through the national church, but rather through the Royal Charter 

which conditioned the properties['] conveyance upon the Board of Trustees 

controlling and governing the property" of First Church. Based on long-standing 

United States Supreme Court precedent, the judge found that the Charter 

qualified as a contract between private parties that the State was forbidden to 

impair. 

In this regard, Judge Alper cited N.J.S.A. 16:1-28, which states that where 

religious societies hold their property under charters of incorporation granted by 

the government of Great Britain prior to the American Revolution, "any such 

real and personal property shall be vested in and held by the corporation that 

may have been created." The judge rejected plaintiffs' argument that Chapter 

11, governing the incorporation and powers of Presbyterian congregations and 

the Presbytery, applied to this dispute because First Church had remained 

incorporated since 1753, and Chapter 11 only applied to unincorporated 

Presbyterian churches. Judge Alper also cited the May 2015 certificate of 

incorporation filed by the Board "reaffirm[ing] the corporate status of the 
14 A-4767-18T2

Trustees of the First Presbyterian Church in Newark," and reaffirming and 

ratifying all actions taken by the Board from the date of the Charter to the present 

time.

Examining the historical property transactions, the judge noted that none 

of the transactions required the permission of the Newark Presbytery. The judge

also found that the written employment agreement entered into in 2012 between 

the Board and Misick was "[m]ost telling," because it specifically acknowledged

that the employment must not conflict with the Charter. As noted above, the 

Presbytery consented to this provision.

In addition, Judge Alper found that "in every instance where the [PCUSA]

did attempt to assert control over property and/or assets of First Presbyterian

Church, they were promptly rebuffed." The judge cited the Board's rejection of 

the General Assembly's effort in 1980 to amend its constitution to provide that 

all church property was to be held in trust for the whole church. Furthermore, 

the judge found there was no evidence that First Church had ever followed the 

Book of Order's directives on property interests. Judge Alper also held that any 

association between First Church and the PCUSA was "purely ecclesiastical" 

and "confined chiefly to the maintenance of sound doctrine[,]" and that "[t]he 
15 A-4767-18T2

property rights and interest of the Church have, since its inception, belonged 

exclusively to the congregation."

In sum, Judge Alper held that plaintiffs had failed to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that they were entitled to a declaratory judgment

as sought in their complaint. This appeal followed.

IV.

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial judge erred in determining that 

the Charter was not subject to N.J.S.A. 16:11-1 to -24, and in interpreting 

applicable United States Supreme Court precedent to bar such application. We 

disagree.

In general, "[f]inal determinations made by the trial court sitting in a nonjury case are subject to a limited and well-established scope of review[.]" 

Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011). "[W]e do not disturb 

the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are 

convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the 

competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests 

of justice[.]" In re Tr. Created By Agreement Dated Dec. 20, 1961, 194 N.J. 

276, 284 (2008) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 

484 (1974)). The court's findings of fact are "binding on appeal when supported 
16 A-4767-18T2

by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 

411-12 (1998).

That said, we review rulings on pure questions of law de novo. Manalapan 

Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). However, 

findings that "may be regarded as mixed resolutions of law and fact" generally 

receive deference on appeal, with review "limited to determining whether there 

is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support these findings." P.T. & 

L. Constr. Co. v. State, Dep't of Transp., 108 N.J. 539, 560 (1987).

Applying these standards, we discern no basis for disturbing Judge Alper's 

reasoned determination that the Charter was the governing document in matters 

concerning First Church's property and assets. In so ruling, the judge properly 

relied upon Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 624-

32 (1819). In that case, King George III granted Dartmouth College a charter 

in 1769, which established its governing structure, including a board of trustees. 

Ibid. In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to alter the charter in 

order to reinstate Dartmouth's deposed president. Ibid. It placed the power to 

appoint members to the board of trustees in the hands of the governor and 

created a state board with power to veto the trustees' decisions. Ibid. 
17 A-4767-18T2

The Supreme Court invalidated the law, holding that the charter qualified 

as a contract between private parties with which the legislature could not 

interfere under the United States Constitution's "impairment of contract" clause. 

Id. at 636-54. Although the present case does not involve an attempt by a 

governmental entity to change the terms of a Royal Charter, Woodward still 

strongly supports Judge Alper's conclusion that state laws, like Chapter 11, may 

not be used in derogation of the terms of such an instrument.

In this regard, Chapter 11 sets forth provisions for the incorporation and 

governance of Presbyterian congregations, as well as for the Presbytery, of 

organizations that were not already incorporated at the time of its enactment. 

See N.J.S.A. 16:11-1 (stating that "[a]ny Christian congregation . . . not having 

an incorporated board of trustees, may elect and incorporate a board of trustees 

. . . .") (emphasis added). As Judge Alper found, First Church has been 

incorporated since 1753 by virtue of the Charter. Therefore, Chapter 11 is not 

applicable to defendants.

In 1786, New Jersey passed a statute, L. 1786, c. 129, permitting an 

incorporated religious society to file a certificate of incorporation with the clerk 

of the county where it was located. In 1846, a statute was passed confirming 

the titles of such corporations. Nixon's Digest of the Laws of New Jersey, p. 
18 A-4767-18T2

687, Sec. 10. As noted above, in its 2015 certificate, the Board stated that while 

it believed First Church had filed a certificate pursuant to the 1786 law, the 

Charter itself established First Church's incorporation. Therefore, the Board's 

failure to find a certificate of incorporation in the county clerk's office did not 

mean that First Church had not been incorporated. Plaintiffs offered no evidence 

to contradict these assertions.

Moreover, under N.J.S.A. 16:1-28, titled saving of rights under charters 

granted by Great Britain, Rev. 1877, p. 960 § 12, "[an] act to incorporate the 

trustees of religious societies," approved April 9, 1875, such charters were saved 

from repeal. That law provided:

Whereas some religious societies have held property 

under charters of incorporation, granted by the 

government of Great Britain, previous to the 

Revolution, and doubts may arise whether such estate, 

so held, will descend and vest in the corporation created

under the laws of this state—therefore be it enacted, 

that all of the estate, real and personal, held in fee or 

otherwise, in consequence of any charter granted 

aforesaid, shall be vested and held by the corporation 

in and held by the corporation that may have been 

created in the place thereof, in consequence of the act 

passed the sixth day of March . . . seventeen hundred 

and eighty-six, or the supplement thereto, passed the 

twenty-fifth day of November . . . seventeen hundred 

and eighty-nine, although no transfer of such property 

shall have been made by the trustee incorporated by 

such charter, to the trustees of the corporation created 
19 A-4767-18T2

under the said laws, anything in such charter or in any 

law to the contrary notwithstanding.

[Rev. 1877, p. 960 § 12.]

Thus, Judge Alper did not err in finding that First Church has been 

incorporated since at least the 1870s and, as a result, is not subject to the 

provisions of Chapter 11.

Plaintiffs argue, primarily in their reply brief, that the 2015 certificate of 

incorporation filed by the trustees subjected First Church to Title 16. 

Specifically, they cite N.J.S.A. 16:1-25, which provides in pertinent part:

No . . . trustees . . . of any incorporated church . . . shall 

divert the estate, property or revenue belonging thereto 

to any purpose other than the support and maintenance 

of the church . . . connected with the church or 

denomination to which the corporation belongs. The 

highest judicatory of any denomination from which the 

property is attempted to be diverted in violation hereof, 

may enforce this provision, but nothing herein 

contained shall prevent action being taken by members 

of the congregation or otherwise to enforce this 

provision.

See also Kelly v. McIntire, 123 N.J. Eq. 351, 361 (Ch. 1938) ("The principle 

seems to be firmly established that a congregation belonging to a religious 

denomination and subject to the constitution, faith and doctrines thereof, cannot 

use its property for a purpose other than that sanctioned by the denomination").
20 A-4767-18T2

However, the issue here is not the purpose to which the property is being 

put, but whether First Church has the authority and power to dispose of such 

property. Thus, there is no conflict between the Charter and Title 16. As the 

1967 Riker Report stated:

Here the problem is one of control. There is no question 

of a diversion of property from its proper use. Nothing 

in the cases cited lends credence to the assertion that 

mere connection with the United Presbyterian Church 

in ecclesiastical matters constitutes a relinquishment of 

the right to deal independently in property matters 

essentially secular in nature.

Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that Judge Alper correctly 

concluded, based upon sufficient credible evidence presented at trial, that the 

Charter continues to apply to First Church. Therefore, the judge properly denied 

plaintiffs' request for a declaration that the Charter was amended by Chapter 11.

V.

Plaintiffs also contend that Judge Alper erred by examining First Church's 

polity and whether the congregation was independent of the PCUSA, thereby 

"entangling" church and state in violation of the First Amendment. Again, we 

disagree.

Under the First Amendment, civil courts are barred from deciding issues 

of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity. Elmora Hebrew Ctr. v. Fishman, 
21 A-4767-18T2

125 N.J. 404, 413 (1991). However, that prohibition does not apply to civil 

adjudication of purely secular legal questions. Ibid. Thus, courts can decide 

secular legal questions in cases involving some background issues of religious 

doctrine so long as they do not intrude into the determination of the doctrinal 

issues. Id. at 414. In those instances, courts must confine their adjudications to 

their proper civil sphere by accepting the authority of a recognized religious 

body in resolving a particular doctrinal legal question while applying neutral 

principles of law to determine disputed questions which do not implicate 

religious doctrine. Ibid. 

In Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 597 (1979), the Court addressed the 

question of whether civil courts may address a dispute over the ownership of 

church property without becoming entangled in religious doctrine in violation 

of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The case involved a dispute between 

factions of a local Presbyterian church. Id. at 597-98. Noting that the First 

Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in 

resolving church property disputes, the Court nonetheless held that application 

of "neutral principles of law" to resolve such disputes is permissible. Id. at 602-

03. That method relies exclusively on secular, objective, and well-established 

concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges, thereby 
22 A-4767-18T2

avoiding entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice. 

Id. at 603. However, in undertaking such an examination, the civil court must 

take special care to scrutinize the relevant documents in purely secular terms. 

Id. at 604. Thus, where the corporate charter incorporates religious concepts in 

the provisions relating to the ownership of property, if its interpretation would 

require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, the court must leave 

resolution of that issue to the authoritative ecclesiastical body. Ibid. 

Plaintiffs claim that Judge Alper improperly examined and relied upon the 

Book of Order in determining that the Charter gave defendants the right to 

control First Church's property. However, in rendering her ruling, the judge 

merely analyzed the provisions regarding disposition of church property. The 

judge did not delve into, nor decide, ecclesiastical questions. Moreover, the 

provisions that govern First Church's property are specifically set forth in the 

Charter, not in the Book of Order. Therefore, the judge's decision did not run 

afoul of the First Amendment.

VI.

Plaintiffs next argue that the motion judge erred by denying their motion 

for summary judgment prior to the trial. This argument lacks merit.
23 A-4767-18T2

A motion for summary judgment should only be granted when, 

considering the competent evidence presented, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brill v. Guardian 

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). Summary judgment should be 

denied unless the moving party's right to judgment is so clear that there is no 

room for controversy. Akhtar v. JDN Props. at Florham Park, L.L.C., 439 N.J. 

Super. 391, 399 (App. Div. 2015).

Here, the motion judge denied both parties' summary judgment motions 

because she wanted to examine further "the duties and responsibilities entrusted 

to [defendants] since the 1753 Charter." In addition, the judge believed the 

matter was more properly addressed in the Chancery Division than the Law 

Division.

Plaintiffs assert there was no dispute as to any of the material facts, but 

the eleven-day trial that followed the motion judge's decision established that 

the facts were sharply contested by the parties. Under these circumstances, we 

discern no basis for disturbing the motion judge's decision to allow the matter 

to proceed to trial. See Blunt v. Klapproth, 309 N.J. Super. 493, 504 (App. Div. 

1998) (noting that the denial of a motion for summary judgment decides nothing 
24 A-4767-18T2

and merely reserves the issue for future disposition). Therefore, we reject 

plaintiffs' contention on this point.

VII.

Finally, plaintiffs argue that the 2015 certificate of incorporation filed by 

the Board to memorialize that it had already been incorporated by the Charter 

should be voided because it was allegedly incorrectly filed under N.J.S.A. 16:1-

2 rather than N.J.S.A. 16:11-2. This argument also lacks merit.

N.J.S.A. 16:1-2, dealing with the incorporation of religious societies or 

congregations, provides that the "trustees shall make a certificate . . . and shall 

transmit such certificate to the county clerk, who shall forthwith record the same 

. . . . Thereupon the trustees and their successors shall be a corporation by the 

name stated in the certificate."

N.J.S.A. 16:11-2, which covers the Presbyterian Church, states that the 

board of trustees 

shall make, sign and seal a certificate of incorporation 

as soon as possible after the first election, setting forth:

a. The location of the usual place of meeting for public 

worship of the congregation;

b. The names of the trustees elected at the first election 

and their respective terms of office; and
25 A-4767-18T2

c. The name chosen by the congregation by which the 

board of trustees shall be known.

In addition, N.J.S.A. 16:1-3 provides that where the trustees of any 

religious society recorded their certification of incorporation with a county 

clerk, pursuant to certain nineteenth century laws, but have failed to file the 

certificate with the secretary of state, the corporation is authorized to file a 

certified copy of the certificate with the secretary of state. "[U]pon the filing of 

such certificate . . . the incorporation and all de facto acts done in pursuance 

thereof are hereby validated, ratified and confirmed." Ibid. 

N.J.S.A. 16:11-2 requires that the certificate be acknowledged by each 

trustee "before such officer and in such manner as may be required by law for 

the acknowledgement of deeds of lands, a certificate of which acknowledgement 

shall be indorsed in writing on the certificate of incorporation by the officer 

taking the same." Then the certificate must be recorded with the applicable 

county clerk and filed and recorded with the State. Ibid.

Plaintiffs claim that the 2015 certificate was void because it was filed 

under Chapter 1 and not Chapter 11. However, they do not explain how the 

certificate violated Chapter 11. It is essential for a party on appeal to present an 

adequate legal argument. State v. Hild, 148 N.J. Super. 294, 296 (App. Div. 

1977). Plaintiffs have not done so here. Even assuming defendants were 
26 A-4767-18T2

required to file under Chapter 11, and that plaintiffs' claim is that defendants did 

not acknowledge the certificate before the county recording office, in violation 

of N.J.S.A. 16:11-2, plaintiffs do not point to such evidence in the record. 

Therefore, we reject plaintiffs' unsupported contention on this point.

To the extent that any of plaintiffs' remaining contentions are not 

specifically addressed herein, we have concluded that they lack sufficient merit 

to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.