T he result in this case comports with the views that Judge Floyd R. Gibso n 1 expressed in our post-argument conference. Judge Gibson’s temporary disability due to illness has prevented his further participation in the case.



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-2005

___________

* * In re: Michael J. Hoare, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Respondent/Appellant. * Eastern District of Missouri. * *

___________ Submitted: December 11, 1997 Filed: July 2, 1998

___________ Before WOLLMAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges. 1

___________ WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
Mich ael J. Hoare appeals from an order of disbarment entered by the Unite d States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. We affirm.-2- I.

Prior to his disbarment, Hoare, a former law professor and United State s Department of Justice attorney, was engag ed in a successful private law practice in St. Louis, Missouri . Hoare had been admitted to practice in the jurisdictions of Missouri and M assachusetts, and was a member of the Bar of the Eighth Circuit Court o f Appeals, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court of th e United States. Before the incident that resulted in his disbarment, Hoare had neve r been subject to criminal prosecution or professional discipline in any jurisdiction.

After having two or three glasses of wine at a neighborhood party in St. Louis on the evening of April 24, 1993 , Hoare drove across the Mississippi River to Illinois, where he drank wine and beer throughout the remainder of the evening and into th e early hours of the next morning. According to Hoare’s own testimony, he may have consumed as many as twelve drinks in all. Shortly before 5:00 a.m. on April 25, sev enteen-year-old Joshua Roedersheimer and his younger brother, Drew, were traveling south on Interstate 255 in Joshua’s car
on their way to work at their grandfather’s produce stand at the Farmer’s Market i n South St. Louis County. Herman Roedersheimer, the boys’ grandfather , followed close behind in another vehicle.
Meanwhile, having slept for a short time in his car, Hoare awoke and started for home. He apparently lost his bearings, and after mistakenly turning south on Illinois Route 3 n ear Cahokia, ultimately entered an I-255 exit ramp. Driving past one “D o Not Enter” and two “Wrong Way” signs, Hoare, traveling northward, entered th e interstate’ s southbound lanes. He drove for more than two miles in the wron g direction.-3-

The d awn was just about to break as Hoare collided with Joshu a Roedershei mer’s southbound car. Drew Roedersheimer, who had been dozing in the passenger seat, was injured and bleeding bu t was able to pull Joshua free from the car. Herman Roedersheimer, who witnessed th e collision, went to Joshua’s side as the boy lay mortall y injured on the side of the road. After calling out, “Help me, help me, ” Joshua died in his grandfather’s arms.

When police and emergency vehicles arrived at the scene, Hoare, who ha d suffered a b roken ankle and dislocated hip, refused to allow police to draw a bloo d sample t o be tested for alcohol. Blood drawn from Hoare for medical purposes b y hospital personnel, approxima tely two and a half hours later, revealed a blood-alcohol content of .12 percent. At the time, the legal limit was .10 percent in Illinois. A n accident reconstruction specialist later testified that Hoare’s automobile was straddling two l anes at the time of the crash and that there was no evidence Hoare had take n ev asive action. Joshua’s vehicle, in contrast, had veered right and had skidded some 126 feet prior to the point of impact. Hoare was charged in St. Clair County, Illinois, circuit court with the aggravated reckless homicide of Joshua Roedersheimer . He rejected an offer by state prosecutors of a recommendation of probation in exchange for a guilty plea to the reduced charge of reckless homicide. The case proceeded to trial. At Hoare’s first trial, in July o f 1995, a mistrial was declared when a juror changed her mind and refused to affirm , when polled, the guilty verdict that had been returned. A second trial resulted i n Hoare’s conviction for aggravated reckless homicide in March of 1996. See State v. Hoare , No. 93-CF-583 (20th Judicial Circuit, St. Clair County, Illinois, March 12 , 1996).
Hoare did not appeal. At sentencing, he read a statement of remorse. Facing a maximum of fourteen years in prison, Hoare was sentenced ins tead to six months in the St. Clair County jail in Belleville, Illinois, and was placed on probation for fortyOn August 21, 1996, a similar proceeding was initiated by the Bar of th e 2 Supreme Court of the United States. The Court’s final order of disbar ment was entered on November 4, 1996. See In the Matter of Disbarment of Michael J. Hoare , 117 S. Ct. 414 (1996). The Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, as well, has initiated disciplinary

proceedings against Hoare. Recently, the Hearing Committee of its B oard on Professional Responsibility issued a report and recommendation tha t Ho are be suspended for two years. See In the Matter of Michael J. Hoare, Esq. , Bar Docket No. 241-96 (D.C. Cir. May 29, 1998). In addition, the Massac husetts Supreme Judicial Court has issued a two-year suspension. See In re Hoare , No. BD-96-03 7 (Suffolk County, Mass. Feb. 19, 1998).
On October 9, 1996, we entered an order holding in abeyance the disciplinary proceedings against Hoare pending the entry of a final order in the district court. See In Re: Michael J. Hoare , No. 97-2005 (8th Cir. Oct. 9, 1996). -4- mo nths. He was ordered to perform forty hours of community service during eac h month of his probation, half of which was requi red to involve the assistance of persons with alcohol problems. A civil suit filed against Hoare by the Roedersheimer family was later settled by his insurance carrier. Following Hoare’s conviction, the Supreme Court of Missouri, pursuant t o Mis souri Supreme Court Rule 5.21 (Suspension for Criminal Activities), issued a n orde r requiring Hoare to show cause why his license to practice law should not b e suspended. After considering Hoare’s response, the court entered an order on June 10, 1996, suspending him from the practice of law p ending final disposition of disciplinary proceedin gs initiated as a result of his felony conviction. Approximately one month later, without further proc eedings, the court issued an order disbarring Hoare from the practice of law in Missouri. See In re Michael Hoare , No. 78870 (July 16, 1996).

On J une 20, 1996, the United States District Court for the Eastern District o f Missouri entered an order requiring Hoare to show cause why the identical discipline of disbarment should not be imposed pursuant to Local Rule 12.02. See Missour i Court Rules, State and Federal 738 (West 1997). A second order was issued on 2-5-

August 1, 1996, pla cing Hoare on interim suspension pending a final resolution of the mat ter. The court then proceeded in accordance with its Rules of Disciplinar y Enforcement. Rule II (Discipline Imposed by Other Courts) provides that whe n det ermining whether to discipline a member of its bar consistent with a stat e disciplinary adjudication, the court

may impose the identical discipline unless the respondent-attorne y demonstrates, and this court finds: (1) that the procedure in the other jurisdiction was s o lacking i n notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or (2) that there was such an infirmity of proof establishing the miscondu ctas to give rise to the clear conviction that thi s cour t could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion of the other jurisdiction on that subject; or (3) that the imposition of the same discipline by this court would result in grave injustice; or (4) that the mi sconduct established is deemed by this court to warrant substantially different discipline.
Rule II(D ), Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, United States District Court for th e Eastern District of Missouri (January 18, 1996).
On March 11, 1997, the dis trict court issued its order that Hoare be “disbarred, that his right to practice law in this court is terminated, and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys authorized to practice law in this court.” See In the Matter of Michael J. Hoare , No. 96-MC-187 (E.D. Mo. March 11, 1997) (en banc). Hoare now appeals from that order.-6- II.

Courts have long recognized their authority to suspend or disbar attorneys, a n inherent power derived from the attorney’s role as an officer of the court that granted admissio n. See In re Snyder , 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985). Although a state cour t disciplinary action is not conclusively binding upon the federal judiciary, federal courts
a re nevertheless obliged to accord a high level of deference to state court disbarment proceed ings. See Theard v. United States , 354 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1957); Selling v

. Radford , 2 43 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1917); In re Attorney Discipline Matter , 98 F.3d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 1996); Matter of Randall , 640 F.2d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 1981); In r e Rhodes , 370 F.2d 411, 413 (8th Cir. 1967). Thus, when a district court learns that a member of its bar has been subject to discipline by another jurisdiction, the identical discipline is typically imposed. See Randall , 640 F.2d at 901.

We will reverse a district court’s disciplinary order only when an abuse o f discretion has occurred. See Attorney Discipline Matter , 98 F.3d at 1087; Matter of Discipline of Olkon , 795 F.2d 1379, 1381 (8th Cir. 1986).
Hoare first asserts that the district court erred in requiring him to demonstrate the inappropriateness of reciprocal discipline by cl ear and convincing evidence, a standard of p roof not set forth in the court’s Rules of Disciplinary enforcement. It was for the district court to determine what standard of proof is appropriate under its rules, and we perceive no unfairness resulting from the Rules’ silence on the matter.
Next, Hoare argues that the court abused its discretion in concluding tha t d i scipline substantially different from disbarment was not warranted in his case. See Rule o f Disciplinary Enforcement II(D)(4). In particular, he asserts that (1) an y misconduct on his par

t does not reflect adversely upon his fitness to practice law; and (2) the di scipline imposed in this case is substantially harsher than that imposed upon-7-

atto rneys in other jurisdictions who have been involved in alcohol-related vehicular homicides.

We reject Hoare’s argument that his misconduct does not reflect adversely on his fitness to practice law. Hoare is guilty of committing a felony. He elected to drive whil e intoxicated, drove for more than two miles on the wrong side of an interstat e highway, and ended th e life of an innocent young man. Upon his arrest, he refused to cooperate with police officers by forbidding them to test his blood for alcohol. Such condu ct, when committed by an officer of the court, constitutes a failure to maintai n personal integrity, reflects upon one’s fitne ss to practice law, and brings the bench and the bar into disrepute. See, e.g. , Matter of Horwitz , 881 P.2d 352, 356 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc); People v. Fahselt , 807 P.2d 586, 587-88 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Jones , 759 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Ky. 1988). Offending conduct need no t involve direct questio ns of honesty or trustworthiness, nor have an immediate relation to the da ily business conducted by an attorney, in order to warrant substantia l discipline. See, e.g. , In re Brown , 674 So. 2d 243, 246 (La. 1996) (“Conviction of a crime may warrant disbarment, even tho ugh the crime was not directly connected with the practice of law.”).

With respect to the harshness of the discipline imposed upon Hoare, we agree that a suspension of one or two years, rather than disbarment, appears to be a mor e typical sanction imposed in disciplinary cases involving an alcohol-related vehicula r homicide. See, e.g. , Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Michaels , 527 N .E.2d 299 (Ohio 1988) (eighteen-month suspension); Jones , 759 S.W.2d at 63 (two-year suspension); Matter of Disciplinary Proceeding Against Curran , 801 P.2d 962 (Wash. 1990) (e n banc) (holding that pres umptive sanction for two counts of vehicular homicide is twoyear su spension); Matter of Howard , 673 A.2d 800 (N.J. 1996) (three-mont h
s u spension when vehicular homicide did not involve alcohol); In re Alkow , 415 P.2d 800 (Cal. 1966) (en banc) (six-month suspension when vehicular homicide did no t involve alcohol).-8-

Nonetheless, the sanction of disbarme nt in cases involving a negligent homicide is not wi thout precedent. See Horwitz , 881 P.2d at 360 (conviction for negligen t vehicular homi cide involving alcohol and illegal drugs warranted disbarment); Matter of Souls , 669 A.2d 532 (R.I. 1996) (disbarment ordered for conviction of leaving the scene of a fatal accident in which a lcohol may have been a factor); Brown , 674 So. 2d at 249 (conviction of negligent homicide arising out of shoot ing warranted disbarment); Matter of Holt , 451 S.E.2d 884 (S.C. 1994) (felony conviction for driving under th e influence resulting in los s of human life warranted indefinite suspension; attorney also admitted use of cocaine); In re Morris , 397 P.2d 475 (N.M. 1964) (conviction fo r a l cohol-related involuntary manslaughter justified indefinite suspension). In fact, the dis ciplinary rules of some jurisdictions provide for automatic disbarment when a n attorney is convicted of any felony, without regard to its nature and absen t consideration of any mitigating circumstances. See, e.g. , N.Y. J UD
. LAW § 9 0 (McKinney 1993) (any attorney convicted of a felony is automatically disbarred).
Whether we would have imp osed a substantial period of suspension rather than disbarment had we been sitting in original judgment of this matter, is not at issue in this ap peal. Rather, we hold only that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in concluding that discipline substantially different from disbarment was not warranted in this case. See Attorne y Discipline Matter , 98 F.3d at 1089 (“It was well within the district court’s i nherent power to discipline appellant based on Missouri’s disbarment order.”).
Lastly, Hoare asserts that the court abused its discretion in concluding that the reciprocaldiscipline of disbarment would not “result in grave injustice.” See Rule of Disciplinary En forcement II(D)(3). Hoare advances several arguments in this regard, most of which center on the Missouri Supreme Court’s failure to articulate th e reasoning behind its order of disbarment and on the disparity perceived by Hoar e between t he sanction imposed by that court upon him and the discipline imposed i n other cases.-9-

Althou gh a conviction for negligent vehicular homicide has apparently neve r before resulted in an attorney’s disbarmen t in Missouri, that fact does not conclusively establish that disba

rment is unwarranted or gravely unjust in the circumstances of this
case. In each disciplinary proceeding, a state’s highest court considers many factors and “mus t be given considerable leeway in meting out the sanctions imposed. ” Attorney Discipline Matter , 98 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Randall , 640 F.2d at 904). I f disbarment is within the appropriate range of sanctio ns, “[w]e are not in a position, nor autho rized, to second-guess the highest state court on the sanctions it imposes. ” Attorney Discipline Matter , 98 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Randall , 640 F.2d at 904)

. Rather, we are empowered only to review the exercise of discretion by the district court in determining whether it should order the typical sanction of r eciprocal discipline. See Attorney Discipline Matter , 98 F.3d at 1088-89.

Actions produce consequences; reckless actions sometimes beget tragi c consequences. The consequences of Hoare’s reckless actions, though uninte nded, were in no sen se unforeseeable. Having considered Hoare’s arguments and all of th e relevan t circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion i n co ncluding that the reciprocal discipline of disbarment would not result in grav e injustice.

The order of disbarment is affirmed.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.