[Cite as McRae v. Salazar, 2019-Ohio-4638.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Charles E. McRae, : 

 Petitioner-Appellant/ : No. 18AP-749 

 Cross-Appellee, (C.P.C. No. 15JU-11518)

 : 

v. (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 : 

Joanna L. Erwin McRae Salazar, 

 : 

 Respondent-Appellee/ 

 Cross-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on November 12, 2019 

 

On brief: The Law Office of Nicholas W. Yaeger, LLC, and 

Nicholas W. Yaeger, for petitioner-appellant/cross-appellee. 

Argued: Nicholas W. Yaeger.

On brief: Eugene R. Butler; and R. Chris Harbold, for 

respondent-appellee/cross-appellant. Argued: R. Chris 

Harbold.

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Division 

LUPER SCHUSTER, J. 

{¶ 1} Petitioner-appellant/cross-appellee, Charles E. McRae ("Father"), appeals 

from a decision and judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, modifying his child support obligation he 

must pay respondent-appellee/cross-appellant, Joanna L. Erwin McRae Salazar 

("Mother"). Mother filed a cross-appeal from the amount of attorney fees awarded to her 

under the same decision and judgment entry. For the following reasons, we affirm. 
No. 18AP-749 2 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} Mother and Father were married in 1991 and had four children. In June 

2007, the parties divorced. As part of the distribution of property in their divorce, both 

Mother and Father received assets in the approximate amount of $2.6 million each. 

{¶ 3} On September 18, 2015, Mother registered a foreign divorce decree and 

parenting plan with the trial court for their two minor children. Mother's initial attempt to 

register the foreign divorce decree was unsuccessful, and she filed a second notice of 

registration on May 24, 2016. Under the foreign divorce decree and parenting plan, 

originating in Tennessee in 2011, Father paid $1,400 per month to Mother as child support. 

This amount reflected an agreed upon downward deviation from the child support 

guidelines to reflect Father's assumption of responsibility for the costs of private school. At 

the time the Tennessee court approved the parenting plan, Father's income was $185,000 

per year and Mother's income was $77,000 per year. 

{¶ 4} In November 2011, Father obtained new employment and relocated to 

Columbus. Father commuted between Columbus and Tennessee until 2014, at which time 

the children relocated to Columbus, pursuant to an agreed order in the parties' Tennessee 

case, to live full time with Father. The children moved in with Father in Columbus in 

August 2014. Mother then relocated to Columbus in September 2014 and purchased a 

home in Upper Arlington. 

{¶ 5} Subsequently, on July 19, 2016, Mother filed a motion for an increase in child 

support. In her motion, Mother argued that her income has decreased while Father's 

income has increased significantly since the time of the Tennessee child support obligation 

order. Mother additionally noted that the children stopped attending private school in 

2014, eliminating Father's obligation to pay one-half of the private school tuition. 

{¶ 6} The trial court conducted a hearing on Mother's motion to modify child 

support in May 2017. In a January 8, 2018 decision, the magistrate modified Father's child 

support to $3,300 per month, effective July 19, 2016. The magistrate determined the child 

support order was an upward deviation based on the $150,000 calculation cap due to the 

discrepancy in Father's and Mother's incomes and lifestyles. Additionally, the magistrate 

determined the children's basic needs were being met. The magistrate also ordered Father 

to pay $2,500 to Mother for her attorney fees and costs. 
No. 18AP-749 3 

{¶ 7} Both parties timely filed objections to the magistrate's decision, and the trial 

court held a hearing on those objections on June 13, 2018. Mother objected to the 

magistrate's finding that the children's basic needs were being met and the corresponding 

amount of child support ordered, and she additionally objected to the amount of attorney 

fees the magistrate recommended be awarded to her. Father objected to the modification 

of the child support order and to the magistrate's finding that Mother was entitled to 

attorney fees and expenses. 

{¶ 8} In an August 30, 2018 decision and judgment entry filed under seal, the trial 

court overruled Father's objections, sustained Mother's objections related to the 

magistrate's finding that the children's basic needs were being met and the amount of child 

support ordered, and overruled Mother's objections related to the amount of attorney fees 

the magistrate determined she be awarded related to her motion to modify child support. 

Specifically, the trial court increased Father's child support obligation to $4,800 per month 

for the two minor children. Effective May 29, 2017, pursuant to the emancipation of one of 

the minor children, the trial court ordered Father's child support obligation to be modified 

to $3,360 per month. The trial court also ordered Father to pay Mother $2,500 for her 

reasonable attorney fees and expenses related to her motion to modify child support. 

Additionally, the trial court ordered Father to pay Mother $6,800 for her reasonable 

attorney fees and costs related to her second motion for attorney fees, filed March 23, 2018, 

after the magistrate's decision. 

{¶ 9} Father timely appeals, and Mother timely cross-appeals. 

II. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 10} Father assigns the following errors for our review: 

[1.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

discretion by finding that the children's basic needs are not 

being met and by relying on that standard in order to justify a 

modification of the magistrate's child support. 

[2.] The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

discretion by modifying the magistrate's child support order 

where the magistrate's order was reasonable and based on the 

relevant facts. 
No. 18AP-749 4 

{¶ 11} In her cross-appeal, Mother assigns the following error for our review: 

The trial court erred as a matter of law and/or abused its 

discretion in its review of the magistrate's decision on the issue 

of attorney fees awarded to cross-appellee. 

III. First Assignment of Error – Children's Basic Needs 

{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, Father argues the trial court abused its 

discretion by finding that the children's basic needs are not being met and relying on that 

standard in order to modify the magistrate's child support order. 

{¶ 13} It is undisputed that the parties' combined yearly gross income exceeds 

$150,000. Under this circumstance, the court must calculate the child support obligation 

on a case-by-case basis and must consider the needs and the standard of living of the 

children and of the parents. Guertin v. Guertin, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-1101, 2007-Ohio2008, ¶ 4, citing R.C. 3119.04(B). The version of R.C. 3119.04(B) in effect when the parties 

litigated the matter in 2018 provided that "[i]f the combined gross income of both parents 

is greater than one hundred fifty thousand dollars per year, the court, with respect to a court 

child support order, * * * shall determine the amount of the obligor's child support 

obligation on a case-by-case basis and shall consider the needs and the standard of living 

of the children who are the subject of the child support order and of the parents." The 

statute further provides that "[t]he court * * * shall compute a basic combined child support 

obligation that is no less than the obligation that would have been computed under the basic 

child support schedule and applicable worksheet for a combined gross income of one 

hundred fifty thousand dollars, unless the court * * * determines that it would be unjust or 

inappropriate and would not be in the best interest of the child, obligor, or obligee to order 

that amount." Former R.C. 3119.04(B). The statute mandates that should the court make 

"such a determination, it shall enter in the journal the figure, determination, and findings." 

Former R.C. 3119.04(B).

{¶ 14} In view of former R.C. 3119.04(B), in cases where the parties' combined 

income exceeds $150,000, the court is bound by three requirements. Chawla v. Chawla, 

10th Dist. No. 13AP-399, 2014-Ohio-1188, ¶ 14. The court must (1) set the child support 

amount based on the qualitative needs and standard of living of the children and parents, 

(2) ensure that the amount set is not less than the $150,000-equivalent, unless appropriate, 
No. 18AP-749 5 

and (3) if it decides less than the $150,000-equivalent is appropriate, then journalize the 

justification for that decision. Id. 

{¶ 15} Here, the magistrate awarded $3,300 in child support, which the trial court, 

in the final decision and entry, increased to $4,800 per month to be reduced to $3,360 per 

month upon the emancipation of the older of the two minor children. Under his first 

assignment of error, Father argues the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded 

the children's basic needs were not being met and used that finding as the basis for its 

upward deviation from the standard child support order. However, after a thorough review 

of the trial court's decision and the underlying record, we conclude Father's argument in 

this regard lacks merit.

{¶ 16} While the magistrate stated "[e]ach party has the ability to provide for the 

children's basic needs," the trial court found that a review of the evidence indicated that 

Mother could not meet the needs and standard of living of the children compared to the 

lifestyle Father is able to provide. (Jan. 8, 2018 Mag. Decision at 26.) This conjunctive 

analysis, considering both the qualitative needs and the standard of living of the children 

and parents, is precisely the analysis contemplated under former R.C. 3119.04(B). 

Although Father disagrees with the trial court's ultimate conclusions related to the amount 

of child support, the subject of Father's second assignment of error, Father's argument that 

the trial court somehow applied the wrong standard in reaching those conclusions lacks 

merit. Thus, we overrule Father's first assignment of error. 

IV. Second Assignment of Error – Modification of the Magistrate's Child 

 Support Order 

{¶ 17} In his second assignment of error, Father argues the trial court abused its 

discretion in modifying the child support order. Specifically, Father asserts the trial court's 

decision is contrary to the weight of the evidence on the issues of the disparity in lifestyles 

of the parties and the budgets and expenses of the parties. 

{¶ 18} Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court's determination regarding child 

support obligations will not be disturbed on appeal. Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 

390 (1997), superseded by statute on other grounds. An abuse of discretion connotes more 

than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the attitude of the trial court was 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 
No. 18AP-749 6 

219 (1983). The trial court does not abuse its discretion where some competent, credible 

evidence supports the court's decision. Ross v. Ross, 64 Ohio St.2d 203, 208 (1980).

 A. The Parties' Lifestyles 

{¶ 19} Father first argues the trial court abused its discretion in determining the 

extent of the disparity in the parties' lifestyles. Father points to several factual conclusions 

by the trial court that he asserts are unsupported by the evidence.

{¶ 20} In concluding the parties had a significant disparity in their lifestyles, the trial 

court noted that Father owns a timeshare in Utah while Mother typically vacations in state 

parks. Additionally, the trial court noted Father owns a lake property used for vacations. 

Father argues the trial court erroneously concluded he uses the timeshare and lake house 

to actually take vacations and relied solely on Mother's testimony that she is unable to take 

lavish vacations like she did when Mother and Father were married. Despite Father's 

dissatisfaction that the trial court considered his ownership of the timeshare and lake 

property, the trial court nonetheless relied on competent, credible evidence regarding his 

vacation property ownership, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court 

considering the parties' vacation abilities in determining the disparity in the parties' 

lifestyles.

{¶ 21} Father next asserts the trial court unfairly compared the size and cost of the 

parties' Columbus homes. The trial court noted, in accordance with the evidence, that 

Father owns and lives in a 2,400 square-foot condominium while Mother owns and lives in 

a 1,000 square-foot freestanding home. As Mother notes, Father does not dispute this 

factual finding as supported by the evidence; rather, he disagrees with the trial court's 

manner of interpreting this factual finding in its overall depiction of the parties' lifestyles. 

In particular, Father argues Mother could increase her own standard of living, including 

the size of house she could afford in Columbus, by selling other assets. However, the trial 

court specifically noted that its findings regarding the disparity in the parties' lifestyles 

included its consideration that Father is able to maintain his lifestyle with his current 

income while Mother would not be able increase the standard of her lifestyle without 

liquidating her assets. Thus, while Father may disagree with the weight the trial court 

afforded to the parties home sizes, he does not demonstrate the trial court abused its 

discretion in assigning that weight. 
No. 18AP-749 7 

{¶ 22} Similarly, Father argues the trial court inappropriately considered his 

ownership of an airplane as a luxury item that would affect his standard of living. However, 

the evidence indicated that Father owned the airplane and used it for both business and 

personal travel. Again, Father disagrees with the trial court's consideration of the facts in 

evidence but does not demonstrate that the trial court lacked competent, credible evidence 

to support its findings. 

{¶ 23} Finally with respect to the disparity in the parties' lifestyles, Father argues the 

trial court erroneously concluded Mother can only meet the children's basic needs by 

liquidating her own assets. As we noted in our resolution of Father's first assignment of 

error, the trial court's finding in this regard applied both to the children's needs and their 

standard of living. Additionally, Mother testified that she regularly liquidates assets from 

her investments in order to cover her expenses for herself and for the children. Thus, there 

was competent, credible evidence to support the trial court's finding that Mother relies on 

liquidating her assets in order to provide a certain lifestyle for the children. 

 B. The Parties' Budgets and Expenses 

{¶ 24} Father additionally argues the trial court abused its discretion in its 

consideration of the evidence related to the parties' budgets and expenses. The crux of 

Father's argument in this regard is that the trial court erroneously relied on the financial 

and budget testimony of Mother while downplaying the significance of his own financial 

and budget testimony. The record shows, however, that the trial court carefully considered 

the financial and budget evidence as it related to both Mother and Father and calculated a 

child support order based on that evidence. Father may disagree with the trial court's 

decision, but he does not articulate how the trial court abused its discretion in fashioning 

the child support order. 

{¶ 25} The common theme of all of Father's arguments is that the trial court did not 

adequately consider or analyze the pertinent information relating to the child support 

award, especially given the substantial assets distributed to the parties when they divorced. 

However, the trial court conducted a de novo review of the evidence and found, based on 

that evidence, that the disparity in the parties' lifestyles justified the upward deviation in 

child support based upon the children's and the parties' standards of living. As there is 

competent, credible evidence in the record to support that decision, the trial court did not 
No. 18AP-749 8 

abuse its discretion in determining the amount of child support Father owes to Mother. See

Weaver v. Weaver, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-743, 2017-Ohio-4087, ¶ 14. Accordingly, we 

overrule Father's second and final assignment of error. 

V. Mother's Assignment of Error – Attorney Fees 

{¶ 26} In her sole assignment of error, Mother argues the trial court abused its 

discretion in not awarding her the full amount of attorney fees she requested. Mother 

asserts the trial court's award of $2,500 for her first motion for attorney fees is not 

equitable.

{¶ 27} In a post-decree motion arising out of a divorce, R.C. 3105.73(B) permits a 

trial court to award "all or part of reasonable attorney's fees and litigation expenses to either 

party if the court finds the award equitable." In determining whether an award under R.C. 

3105.73(B) is equitable, "the court may consider the parties' income, the conduct of the 

parties, and any other relevant factors the court deems appropriate, but it may not consider 

the parties' assets." An award of attorney fees in a domestic relations action is within the 

sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of 

discretion. Settele v. Settele, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-818, 2015-Ohio-3746, ¶ 51. 

{¶ 28} Here, the trial court found it fair and equitable to require Father to pay 

$2,500 towards Mother's attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(B). The trial court 

considered all relevant factors in making its attorney fees determination. After weighing 

the parties' income disparity against the additional attorney fees Father incurred related to 

Mother's improper filing of the foreign divorce decree prolonging the litigation of the 

motion to modify child support, the trial court concluded it was equitable that Father pay 

$2,500 to Mother for her reasonable attorney fees. R.C. 3105.73(B) expressly permits a 

trial court to award "all or part" of a party's reasonable attorney fees. That the trial court 

decided to award Mother less than the full amount of attorney fees she incurred in pursuing 

her motion to modify child support does not render the trial court's decision an abuse of 

discretion. Serra v. Serra, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-528, 2016-Ohio-950, ¶ 32.

{¶ 29} Because the trial court acted within its discretion when it awarded Mother 

$2,500 in attorney fees, we overrule Mother's sole assignment of error. 
No. 18AP-749 9 

VI. Disposition 

{¶ 30} Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not apply the wrong 

standard in reviewing the magistrate's determination of the appropriate amount of child 

support, did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of child support Father 

owes, and did not abuse its discretion in awarding Mother less than the full amount of 

attorney fees she incurred. Having overruled Father's two assignments of error and 

Mother's sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch.

Judgment affirmed. 

BROWN and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.