SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0727-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JHON VELENCIA, a/k/a JHON J.

VALENCIA, JHON J. RENDON,

JOHN J. VALENCIA, and JHON J.

VALENCIARENDON,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Submitted January 26, 2021 – Decided

Before Judges Yannotti and Haas.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New, Law 

Division, Union County, Indictment No. 17-03-0223.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Daniel V. Gautieri, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Michele C. Buckley, Special 

Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 11, 2021
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PER CURIAM

A Union County grand jury charged defendant Jhon Velencia in a twocount indictment with second degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), and thirddegree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7). Following a multi-day trial, 

the jury convicted defendant of third-degree aggravated assault, and acquitted 

him of the robbery charge. The trial judge granted the State's motion for an 

extended term and sentenced defendant to four years in prison. This appeal 

followed.

On appeal, defendant raises the following contention:

POINT I

THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT 

AND REDUCED THE STATE'S BURDEN OF 

PROOF IN HER SUMMATION WHEN SHE 

PROVIDED AN INACCURATE DEFINITION 

WHILE DISCUSSING THE INTOXICATION 

DEFENSE. (Not Raised Below).

After reviewing the record in light of this contention, we affirm 

defendant's conviction and sentence.

I.

The State's proofs against defendant at trial were overwhelming. The 

victim testified he was walking to his car on a city street at approximately 10:00 

p.m. Before he could open the car door, defendant approached the victim from 
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behind and demanded the key. The victim refused, and defendant pushed him 

into the car.

The victim crossed the street where there was a Bank of America on the 

corner. Defendant followed him and again demanded the key to the victim's car. 

Defendant also told the victim to give him money.

The victim crossed the street a second time in an attempt to get away from 

defendant. At that point, defendant struck the victim from behind so hard that 

the victim incorrectly believed he had been hit with a metal pipe.1 Defendant 

punched the victim multiple times and tried to reach into the victim's pockets. 

During the attack, the victim's telephone and key fell to the ground. 

The victim thought that defendant had taken these items and he began to 

fight back. Defendant attempted to flee into a bar, but security guards prevented 

him from doing so. 

The police then arrived. Officer Guiliana Alessandri testified that 

defendant was "screaming" when the police got to the scene. According to the 

officer, defendant "looked like he was drunk . . . . [H]e looked like[] he was 

heavily intoxicated, and he kept saying that somebody stabbed him." However, 

1

 A surveillance video of a portion of the incident showed that defendant used 

only his hands to strike the victim.
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Officer Alessandri determined that defendant only had some scratches on his 

face. On the other hand, the victim suffered a fractured nose and required 

several stitches to close a wound on his lip.

The State introduced a surveillance video taken from a security camera 

that captured a portion of the assault. The video showed defendant punching 

the victim first, and the victim then defending himself. At one point, defendant 

attempted to strike the victim, but he missed and fell to the ground. However, 

defendant got back up and continued the assault. The State also presented body 

cam footage taken by Officer Alessandri showing the police ordering defendant 

to "get down" on the ground after they arrived at the scene and defendant 

understanding and complying with this command.

Defendant did not testify at trial and he presented no witnesses.

II.

In his closing statement to the jury, defendant's attorney raised a voluntary 

intoxication defense. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a crime "unless 

it negat[es] an element of the offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8(a). In order for 

intoxication to negate an element of the offense, there must be a "prostration of 

faculties," which is "a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting 

from the introduction of substances into the body" so that the actor is unable to 
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form the requisite purpose to commit the crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8(e)(1). See also

State v. Cameron, 104 N.J. 42, 54 (1986) ("firmly fixed in our case law is the 

requirement of 'prostration of faculties' as the minimum requirement for an 

intoxication defense").

In Cameron, the Supreme Court addressed the extreme level of 

intoxication necessary to satisfy the "prostration of faculties" test. Id. at 54. 

The Court stated:

[I]t is not the case that every defendant who has had a 

few drinks may successfully urge the defense. The 

mere intake of even large quantities of alcohol will not 

suffice. Moreover, the defense cannot be established 

solely by showing that the defendant might not have 

committed the offense had he been sober. What is 

required is a showing of such a great prostration of the 

faculties that the requisite mental state was totally 

lacking. That is, to successfully invoke the defense, an 

accused must show that he was so intoxicated that he 

did not have the intent to commit an offense. Such a 

state of affairs will likely exist in very few cases.

[Ibid. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 

State v. Stasio, 78 N.J. 467, 495 (1979) (Pashman, J., 

concurring and dissenting)).]

Further, the Court described "some of the factors pertinent to the 

determination of intoxication sufficient to satisfy the test of 'prostration of 

faculties.'" Id. at 56. Those factors included:
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[T]he quantity of intoxicant consumed, the period of 

time involved, the actor's conduct as perceived by 

others (what he said, how he said it, how he appeared, 

how he acted, how his coordination or lack thereof 

manifested itself), any odor of alcohol or other 

intoxicating substance, the results of any tests to 

determine blood-alcohol content, and the actor's ability 

to recall significant events.

[Ibid.]

In his summation, defense counsel pointed to the testimony of Officer 

Alessandri, who stated that defendant "looked like he was drunk" and "looked 

like[] he was heavily intoxicated" when the police arrived at the assault scene. 

He also argued that defendant fell to the ground after swinging and missing the 

victim with a punch, and later claimed he had been stabbed when all he had were 

a few scratches. Based on this "erratic" behavior, defense counsel argued that 

defendant was too "drunk" to have formed the intent necessary to commit either 

of the two offenses, robbery and aggravated assault, that were the subject of the 

trial.

The prosecutor responded to the defense's argument with a lengthy 

summary of the testimony in an attempt to show that defendant did not satisfy 

the prostration of faculties test. She began by stating:

The defendant was persistent. He was focused, and he 

was intent on taking what was not his, and he followed 

that victim across two streets and down Elizabeth 
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Avenue until he got angry. The victim was not giving 

him the items.

. . . .

Before I play the [video of the] assault, I just 

want to remind you that the State submits that it's clear 

from this video that the defendant was acting 

purposively and knowingly. The defendant was 

focused, motivated and he was very persistent in his 

actions. He knew exactly what he was doing. He knew 

that he was assaulting [the victim]. The State submits 

that he was acting purposeful, and it was a conscious 

objective to assault [the victim].

The prosecutor also asked the jurors to pay attention to specific actions 

defendant took during the assault because they were indicative of the fact that 

he acted with the required mental state to commit the offenses. For example, 

the prosecutor noted that defendant did not demand the victim's car key until the 

victim was near the car and did not order the victim to give him money until it 

appeared the victim was crossing the street toward a bank. The prosecutor 

stated:

The State would also submit that it was the 

defendant's conscious objective when he was near the 

vehicle to take the keys, because when the defendant 

saw the victim near his vehicle, what does he ask for? 

He asks for the car keys. So, it's not that he was so 

drunk out of his mind he doesn’t know what he was 

doing. He's near a vehicle when he sees [the victim] 

with the car keys in his hand. He's leaning into the car. 

He's coming up to him and saying give me your keys. 
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He's not asking the people at the bus stop for their keys. 

He's not in Central Park in the middle of it asking those 

people for keys. He's asking a man who is near his 

vehicle for his car keys.

And then the defendant waits until the victim 

crosses the street towards the Bank of America to start 

demanding money from him, because it's clicking in the 

defendant's head that there's money, Bank of America, 

give me your money.

The prosecutor then began playing the surveillance video for the jury. 

Addressing the defense argument that defendant fell to the ground after missing 

the victim with one of his punches, the prosecutor stated:

On the video, it shows that the defendant just, in 

a stance, threw a right hook at [the victim]. The defense 

wants you to believe that the defendant was so drunk 

that he didn't know what he doing. [sic] He threw a 

pretty good right hook, and he didn't fall to the ground. 

There was force behind that hook, and that caused [the 

victim] to stumble.

If you look at the defendant's feet when he is 

engaging with the victim, what is he doing? He's in a 

fighter's stance. One foot and one foot in the behind. 

And what is that fighter's stance for? It's to maintain 

your balance. He . . . doesn't maintain his balance the 

whole time. But as soon as he falls down, what does he 

do? He gets right back up. He's so drunk, he falls and 

he's able to get right back up keep going.

The State would submit that at this point, the 

defendant has enough knowledge of what he's doing,

that when he gets the victim down on the ground, now
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he's on top of him, and he's wailing on him in an attempt 

to finish what he started.

After completing that portion of the video, the prosecutor asserted that 

defendant was acting purposely and knowingly:

Now, the defense has made arguments to you that 

the defendant was . . . drunk. He wasn't acting 

purposely or knowing. He was just so intoxicated. He 

was acting like a fool. Now the defendant was 

demanding certain items at appropriate times. So how 

can he not be acting with purpose when he's by the 

vehicle where the victim is and he's saying give me 

those keys. Or when he's walking to the bank and he's 

saying give me the money, give me the money. 

What do we really know about the defendant's 

intoxication other than this video? Officer Alessandri 

testified that she believes that he was highly 

intoxicated, but couldn't remember if he smelled like 

alcohol. [The victim] testified that he didn't really 

smell alcohol, but he believes that he was on something. 

So those two statements, plus this video, that's all the 

intoxication we have here.

The State would submit that just because [you're]

drunk or you're on something, that doesn’t mean that 

you don't know what you're doing. The defendant knew 

exactly what he was doing.

The prosecutor next played the excerpt from the video that occurred after 

the police arrived and ordered defendant to get on the ground. Arguing that 

defendant responded immediately and appropriately to the officers' orders, the 

prosecutor noted that defendant was not so intoxicated that he was unable to 
10 A-0727-18

understand and comply with their commands. The prosecutor stated that the 

police told defendant:

Get Down. Get down. What does the defendant do? 

He gets down. [Are] members of the Elizabeth Police 

Department, are they touching him? Are they using 

force to put him down to the ground? No. They're just 

asking him to get down, get down. He complied.

The prosecutor concluded her lengthy summation on this point by 

referring to the fact that the judge would instruct the jurors on the voluntary 

intoxication defense. The prosecutor explained: 

Ladies and gentlemen, [the trial judge] will read 

you the law in this case, but in order for intoxication to 

negate an element of one of the offenses charged, 

namely that intoxication would negate a purposefully 

or knowing intent crime, this is essentially what the 

model jury [charge] says, and if I say something 

different than the judge, obviously it's what the judge 

says that controls.

In considering the question of intoxication, you 

should carefully distinguish between the condition of 

mind, which is merely excited by intoxicating drink or 

drug and yet capable of acting with purpose or 

knowledge and the conditions in which one's mental 

facilities are so prostrated as to deprive one of his will 

to act and ability to reason thereby rendering a person 

incapable of acting, and thus, preventing a person from 

committing the crimes charged with the mental state 

required of either purposely or knowing.
11 A-0727-18

The prosecutor then discussed the prostration of faculties test by referring 

to a dictionary definition of the word "prostrate":

Now, I pulled this definition off of MerriamWebster Dictionary. What does the prostrate word 

mean? Prostrate means:

"1. Stretched out with face on ground in 

adoration or submission, also lying flat;

2. Completely overcome and lacking vitality, 

will or power to rise; or

3. Trailing on the ground."

You've seen those two surveillance videos where 

the defendant is following way behind the victim, 

stalking him towards the Bank of America, then again 

following him after the victim crosses the street, goes 

onto Sixth Avenue and then turns and tries to make his 

way to Elizabeth Avenue. Was the defendant so 

prostrated there? At that time, was he stretched out 

with his face on the ground?

You saw the video where the defendant 

roundhouse hooks the victim, and he's standing. He 

used such force with that blow, that he broke the 

victim's nose. Was he so prostrated then? No.

The prosecutor later completed her summation by again referring to 

defendant's specific intent to commit the crimes charged:

The defendant was intent on taking what didn't 

belong to him and would not stop with a no near the 

vehicle. He was intent, he was focused and he was 

persistent, and he would not stop because he wanted 
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something of value, and [the victim] was not willing to 

give that up.

Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's comments during her summation.

For the first time on appeal, defendant now argues that the prosecutor 

misstated the law in the final section of her summation when she referred to a 

dictionary definition of the word "prostrate." Defendant claims that by 

suggesting that he had to be lying helpless on the ground at the time of the 

offense for the voluntary intoxication defense to apply, the prosecutor comments 

improperly lowered the State's burden of proof and deprived him of a fair trial. 

We disagree.

"[P]rosecutorial misconduct is not grounds for reversal of a criminal 

conviction unless the conduct was so egregious as to deprive [the] defendant of 

a fair trial." State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 575 (1999) (citing State v. 

Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 84 (1997)). "To justify reversal, the prosecutor's conduct 

must have been clearly and unmistakably improper, and must have substantially 

prejudiced [the] defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the 

merits of his [or her] defense." State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 460 (2002) 

(alterations in original) (quoting State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 625 (2000)). 

"[P]rosecutors are permitted considerable leeway to make forceful, 

vigorous arguments in summation," but must generally limit their comments to 
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the evidence presented and reasonable inferences therefrom. Id. at 472. On 

appeal, the court must assess the prosecutor's comments in the context of the 

entire record. Ibid. "[A] 'fleeting and isolated' remark is not grounds for 

reversal." State v. Gorthy, 226 N.J. 516, 540 (2016) (quoting State v. Watson, 

224 N.J. Super. 354, 362 (App. Div. 1988)).

When counsel fails to object to a prosecutor's remarks, the plain error 

standard applies and, to warrant reversal, the remarks must be "of such a nature 

as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Id. at 540 

(quoting R. 2:10-2). Generally, if there is no objection, the remarks will not be 

deemed prejudicial. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. at 576. Counsel's failure to object 

suggests that counsel did not consider the remarks to be prejudicial at the time 

they were made. Ibid. Moreover, the failure to raise a timely objection deprives 

the trial court of the opportunity to address any impropriety. Ibid.

Applying these standards, we are satisfied that the prosecutor's comments 

did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Throughout her lengthy comments 

concerning the voluntary intoxication defense, the prosecutor was merely 

highlighting the factors that our Supreme Court found should be considered in 

determining whether there was "intoxication sufficient to satisfy the 'prostration 

of faculties'" test. Cameron, 104 N.J. at 56. Thus, the prosecutor noted that 
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defendant did not lack coordination throughout the assault because he threw a 

number of punches that landed with force and maintained himself in a fighter's 

stance in order maintain his balance. She also asserted that defendant was 

persistent in his attempts to force the victim to relinquish the key to his car and 

his money and appeared to have planned the attack to take place at a time the 

victim was in close proximity to both the car and the bank. In addition, the 

prosecutor pointed out that defendant was able to understand and comply with 

the police officers' commands that he get down on the ground.

Taken in this context, the prosecutor's brief comments about the dictionary 

definition of the word "prostrate," and her observations that instead of lying on 

the ground, defendant was able to pursue and then assault the victim for an 

extended period of time before he attempted to flee, were clearly intended to 

underscore the appropriate theme of her summation that defendant was not so 

intoxicated that he was unable to act with the required mental state. Therefore, 

we detect no misconduct on her part.

Even if the prosecutor's discussion of the word "prostrate" was deemed 

misleading, it did not rise to the level of plain error. Defendant did not object 

to the remarks, which indicates he did not believe they were prejudicial. As 

outlined above, there was overwhelming evidence that defendant was capable of 
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acting purposely and knowingly and was not so intoxicated that he met the 

"prostration of faculties" test. Moreover, the prosecutor reminded the jurors 

during her summation that the judge would provide them with instructions on 

the law and that they must follow the judge's instructions.

The judge thereafter properly charged the jury to disregard statements of 

the law by the prosecutor and defense counsel and accept only the law as stated 

by the court. In addition, the judge delivered the following Model Charge 2 on 

intoxication negating an element of an offense:

In considering the question of intoxication, you should 

carefully distinguish between the condition of mind, 

which is merely excited by intoxicating drink or drugs 

and yet capable of acting with purpose or knowledge 

[and] . . . the condition in which one's mental faculties 

are so prostrated, as to deprive one of his will to act and 

the ability to reason, therefore rendering a person 

incapable of acting, and thus, preventing the person 

from committing the crimes charged with the mental 

state required of either purposely or knowingly.

In sum, we perceive no error that was clearly capable of producing an 

unjust result. We therefore affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.

Affirmed.

2

 Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Intoxication Negating an Element of the 

Offense" (N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8(a)) (rev. Oct. 18, 2005).