alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jerry CAPECI, Interested-Party-Appellant, Milana Murcia, Defendant.

No. 10-301.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 7, 2011.

Stephen Gikow, Media Freedom & Information Access Practicum, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, Nathan Siegel, Levine Sullivan Koch & Schultz, LLP, Washington, D.C. (on the brief), for Appellant.

Nicholas L. McQuaid, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York (Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York; Jesse M. Furman, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, on the brief), for Appellee.

Present: AMALYA L. KEARSE, ROSEMARY S. POOLER and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

Jerry Capeci seeks review of the January 6, 2010 order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Karas, *J.)*ordering that the transcript of certain proceedings that took place before it continue to be sealed. Ca*36peci sought to unseal the transcript, arguing its sealing violated the First Amendment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

For the purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that there was a presumptive public right of access to the proceeding in question, and that the presumption of openness may be overcome only “by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” *Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California,*478 U.S. 1, 9, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986).

We find no error with the district court’s reasons for sealing, set forth in its sealed order of January 6, 2010. The government is reminded that should the conditions for unsealing set forth in the sealed order come to pass, it is under a continuing obligation to inform the district court.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.
Immigration Status of Unlicensed Seamen on Fishing Vessels

Written By Mr. Robert Bruce

Recently, the Hearing Office has seen several civil penalty case files alleging a 

violation of 46 U.S.C. § 8103(i) in which the Narrative Overview of the 

Activity identified one or more unlicensed seamen as a “Mexican citizen” or a 

“Mexican national,” without further describing the immigration status of the 

seamen. Often there will be information in the case file that provides more 

information about the immigration status of the seamen, but it would be helpful 

to the Hearing Officer, and to the charged party, if the Narrative Overview of 

the Activity included the alleged immigration status of the seamen that violates 

46 U.S.C. § 8103(i). 

There are few, if any, stateless persons, so almost any unlicensed seaman you 

come across will be a citizen or national of some country. Foreign 

citizens/nationals in the United States may be here illegally either because they 

entered illegally or because they entered legally and then overstayed, for 

example, the duration of their visa. If an unlicensed seaman is in the United 

States illegally, there is a violation of 46 U.S.C. § 8103(i). This is because the 

provision prohibits such a person from being employed as an unlicensed 

seaman on a fishing vessel. In such a case, it would be helpful to state in the 

Narrative Overview of the Activity that the unlicensed seaman is a foreign 

citizen or national who is in the United States illegally. Naturally, there must be 

evidence in the civil penalty case file to support the allegation to meet the Coast 

Guard’s burden of proof. 

If the foreign citizens or nationals have some type of lawful immigration status 

in the United States, the Narrative Overview of the Activity should include the 

immigration status of those persons. There is no limit on the number of 

permanent resident aliens that 46 U.S.C. § 8103(i) allows to be employed as 

unlicensed seamen. Foreign citizens and nationals who are temporarily 

admitted to the United States and lawfully allowed to be employed are limited 

to no more than 25% of the unlicensed seamen onboard. 

Considering that 46 U.S.C. § 8103(i) is very specific about the status of the 

persons who may be employed as unlicensed seamen on a fishing vessel, it is a 
good practice to be very clear about the status of every unlicensed seaman 

onboard, if a violation of that provision is being alleged. Alleging that an 

unlicensed seaman is a foreign citizen or national is not, by itself, enough 

information for a Hearing Officer to find that a violation has occurred. The 

Hearing Officer will consider any reliable evidence in the case file that shows 

the person’s status. Additionally, a clear statement in the Narrative Overview of 

the Enforcement Summary of the status of each unlicensed seaman will make it 

much easier for the Hearing Officer, and the charged party, to understand why 

the Coast Guard is alleging that there was a violation of 46 U.S.C. § 8301(i).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE>               5
<MULTIPLIER>                               1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-2000
<CASH>                                           8,410
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   18,331
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                28,509
<PP&E>                                         173,586
<DEPRECIATION>                                  60,023
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 233,881
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           61,637
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     11,892
<COMMON>                                        82,303
<OTHER-SE>                                          16
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   233,881
<SALES>                                         50,941
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                50,941
<CGS>                                           43,360
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   43,360
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                12,249
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,619
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (6,124)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (1,906)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (4,218)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (4,218)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.37)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.37)


</TABLE>
#### Harold Bushnell, an Infant, by Margaret Bushnell, His Parent, et al., Appellants, v Berne-Knox-Westerlo School District, Respondent. (And Another Related Action.)

—Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Hughes, J.), entered January 16, 1986 in Albany County, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Order affirmed, without costs, upon the opinion of Justice Harold J. Hughes at Special Term. Kane, J. R, Main, Casey, Yesawich, Jr., and Levine, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
The Schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the financial
statements for Charter Municipal Mortgage Acceptance Company and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such financial statements
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0001043325
<NAME>                        Charter Municipal Mortgage Acceptance Company
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                   DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                      JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                        JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                1,396,518
<SECURITIES>                        384,870,228
<RECEIVABLES>                         8,984,801
<ALLOWANCES>                            452,119
<INVENTORY>                                   0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         75,316
<PP&E>                                        0
<DEPRECIATION>                                0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                      399,260,880
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                 6,561,394
<BONDS>                                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                         0
<PREFERRED>                                   0
<COMMON>                                      0
<OTHER-SE>                          331,633,925
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>        399,260,880
<SALES>                                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                     12,846,896
<CGS>                                         0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                      1,397,206
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                      673,645
<INCOME-PRETAX>                      10,776,045
<INCOME-TAX>                                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           0
<DISCONTINUED>                                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               0
<CHANGES>                                     0
<NET-INCOME>                         10,776,045
<EPS-PRIMARY>                               .49
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 0
        



</TABLE>
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2521 

To reinstate Federal Pell Grant eligibility for individuals incarcerated in 

Federal and State penal institutions, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 21, 2015 

Ms. EDWARDS (for herself, Mr. DANNY K. DAVIS of Illinois, Ms. LEE, Mr. 

SCOTT of Virginia, Ms. DELAURO, Mr. RICHMOND, Ms. NORTON, Mr. 

LEWIS, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. CA ́RDENAS, Ms. PLASKETT, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. 

KENNEDY, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. 

TED LIEU of California, and Mr. HASTINGS) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To reinstate Federal Pell Grant eligibility for individuals 

incarcerated in Federal and State penal institutions, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Restoring Education 

5 And Learning Act of 2015’’ or the ‘‘REAL Act of 2015’’. 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2521 IH

1 SEC. 2. REINSTATEMENT OF FEDERAL PELL GRANT ELIGI2 BILITY. 

3 Section 401(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 

4 (20 U.S.C. 1070a(b)) is amended— 

5 (1) by striking paragraph (6) and redesignating 

6 paragraph (7) as paragraph (6); and 

7 (2) in paragraph (2)(A)(ii), by striking 

8 ‘‘(7)(B)’’ each place it appears and inserting 

9 ‘‘(6)(B)’’. 

10 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

11 The amendments made by section 2 shall be effective 

12 for academic year 2015–2016 and succeeding academic 

13 years. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT
32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, George
E. Strickler, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer,
of Stoneridge, Inc. (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1)  the
report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the third quarter ended September 30,
2009 (“the Report”) which this certification accompanies fully complies with the
requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and





(2)  the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/
      George E. StricklerGeorge
      E. Strickler, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and
      TreasurerNovember
      9,
2009





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


     We have issued our report dated March 15, 2005, accompanying the
financial statements included in the amended Annual Report of Trycera
Financial, Inc. on Form 10-KSB/A-2 for the year ended December 31, 2004.
We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said report in the
Registration Statement of Trycera Financial, Inc. on Form S-2 (File No.
333-121651).

/s/ Chisholm, Bierwolf & Nilson LLC

CHISHOLM, BIERWOLF & NILSON LLC

Bountiful, Utah
June 8, 2005
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporation byreference in the Registration Statements (Form S-3 Nos. 333-130416 and 333-121852; and Form S-8 Nos. 333-128927 pertaining to the Amended and Restated 2003 Equity Incentive Plan and the Amended and Restated 2004 Equity Incentive Plan (Fundware) and333-112532 pertaining to the Kintera, Inc. 2000 Stock Option Plan, the 2003 Equity Incentive Plan and the 2003 Employee Stock Purchase Plan) of Kintera, Inc. of our reports dated March 14, 2006, with respect to the consolidated financialstatements and schedule of Kintera, Inc, Kintera, Inc. managements’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Kintera, Inc. included inthis Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2005. 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

San Diego, California 

March 14, 2006
EXHIBIT 32.2









CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002









In connection with the Annual Report of Trycera Financial, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Bryan Kenyon, CFO of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. SS. 1350, as adopted pursuant to SS. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:






1.  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and







2.  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.









By:
/s/ Bryan A. KenyonBryan A. Kenyon, CFOPrincipal Financial and Acounting Officer,April 20, 2011







A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-6037

DAVID COPPEDGE, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RON ANGELONE, Director of the Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge. (CA-01-640-AM) Submitted: July 18, 2002 Decided: July 23, 2002 Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. David Coppedge, Appellant Pro Se. Linwood Theodore Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: David Coppedge seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Coppedge v. Angelone , No. CA-01- 640-AM (E.D. Va. Dec. 12, 2001). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
386 P.2d 790

#### STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. George SALINAS, Appellant.

No. 1367.

Supreme Court of Arizona. In Division.

*Nov.*20, 1963.

*63Claude Olney, Jr., Phoenix, for appellant.

Robert W. Pickrell, Atty. Gen., Stirley Newell, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles N. Ronan, County Atty., for appellee.

BERNSTEIN, Chief Justice.

Defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of second degree rape and was sentenced to not less than 20 nor more than 40 years imprisonment. He appeals on the basis that the sentence is excessive.

Defendant was charged with the rape of his 11 year old step-daughter. He is the father of five other children by his common-law wife. He has no prior felony convictions. He contends that under the circumstances the sentence was excessive.

The statute under which defendant was sentenced authorizes imprisonment for any term of years in excess of one year, including a life sentence. A.R.S. § 13-614 (B). It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine an appropriate sentence under the statute. State v. Rubio, Ariz., 385 P.2d 1017; State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 308, 376 P.2d 773; State v. Castano, 89 Ariz. 231, 360 P.2d 479.

The legislature has empowered this court to reduce a penalty which under the circumstances appears to be excessive. A.R.S. § 13-1717. But this power must be exercised with extreme caution. The imposition of sentence is largely within the discretion of the trial court for the reason that the trial judge has the defendant before him and is thus in the best position to evaluate the possibilities for his rehabilitation. As we said in State v. Maberry, 93 Ariz. 306, 380 P.2d 604 (1963):

> “We have traditionally been prone to uphold a sentence declared by a trial judge when it is in conformity with the statute and there is no clear evidence that he has abused his power in the particular case.” 93 Ariz. at 309, 380 P.2d at 606.

It was apparently the conclusion of the trial judge that this defendant’s rehabilitation and the protection of society would be most effectively realized through confinement for a considerable period of time. Moreover, by good behavior the defendant *64can gain credit on time served so that he can obtain release before the expiration of the minimum 20 years of the sentence. A.R.S. §§ 31-251, 31-252.

Finding no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in the sentencing of the defendant, this court must affirm the judgment.

STRUCKMEYER and JENNINGS, J J., concurring.
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.19



                 AMENDMENT TO RETENTION AND SEVERANCE AGREEMENT

      This Amendment ("Amendment") dated as of February 20, 2003 is made between
MPOWER COMMUNICATIONS CORP., a New York corporation (the "Company"), and MIKE
TSCHIDERER ("Employee"). The parties agree as follows:

      1.    Reference to Agreement: Definitions. Reference is made to a
            Retention and Severance Agreement dated as of October 23, 2001, by
            and between the Company and the Employee (The "Agreement"). Terms
            defined in the Agreement and not otherwise defined herein are used
            herein with the meanings so defined.

      2.    Amendment to Agreements. Section 4 of the Agreement is amended to
            delete the phrase "$150,000" in the second line thereof and replace
            it with the phrase "$165,000."

      3.    Miscellaneous. Except as amended by this Amendment, all terms and
            conditions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
            This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts which
            together shall constitute one instrument, shall be governed by and
            construed in accordance with the laws (other than the conflict of
            laws rules) of the State of New York and shall bind and inure to the
            benefit of the parties hereto and their respective successors,
            assigns and heirs.

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this Agreement as of
the date first above written.

                                    MPOWER COMMUNICATIONS CORP.


                                    By:   /s/ Russell I. Zuckerman
                                          --------------------------------
                                          Russell I. Zuckerman, General Counsel

                                          /s/ Mike Tschiderer
                                          --------------------------------
                                          Mike Tschiderer