alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

O2DIESEL CORPORATION  (A Development Stage Company)

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER  PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT  TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of O2Diesel Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB/A for the year ended December 31, 2007, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Alan Rae, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and I, David H. Shipman, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge that:



This
certificate is being made for the exclusive purpose of compliance by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company with the requirements of
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, and may not be disclosed, distributed or used by any person or for any reason other than as specifically required by law.

Date:
August 6, 2008

|/s/ALAN RAEAlan Rae
Chief Executive Officer |  | /s/DAVID H. SHIPMANDavid H. Shipman
Chief Financial Officer
|------------------------------------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
The Schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the financial
statements for Charter Municipal Mortgage Acceptance Company and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such financial statements
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         0001043325
<NAME>                        Charter Municipal Mortgage Acceptance Company
<MULTIPLIER>                                         1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                       7,492,149
<SECURITIES>                               464,969,214
<RECEIVABLES>                                9,484,771
<ALLOWANCES>                                   138,000
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                26,692
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             491,748,694
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       13,700,026
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                 328,048,668
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               491,748,694
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             8,267,701
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,253,811
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,368
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              6,005,522
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 6,005,522
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .27
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .27
        


</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Kendall, Appellant.

— Judgment unanimously affirmed. Counsel’s application to withdraw granted *(see, People v Crawford,*71 AD2d 38). (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Green, J. — sexual abuse, first degree.) Present— Dillon, P. J., Denman, Balio, Lawton and Davis, JJ.
# C_2021398EN.01001501.xml

| 1.10.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 398/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.10.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 398/15

---

Commission notice pursuant to Article 17(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community

Invitation to tender in respect of the operation of scheduled air services in accordance with public service obligations

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2021/C 398/10)

| Member State | France |
| --- | --- |
| Route concerned | Tarbes – Paris (Orly) |
| Period of validity of the contract | From 1 June 2022 to 31 May 2026 |
| Deadline for the submission of applications and tenders | 1 December 2021 (12.00, Paris time) |
| Address where the text of the invitation to tender and any relevant information and/or documentation relating to the public tender and the public service obligation can be obtained | Syndicat mixte PYRÉNIA |
| Bâtiment Pic du Midi |
| Aéroport Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénées |
| 65290 Juillan |
| FRANCE |

Member State

France

Route concerned

Tarbes – Paris (Orly)

Period of validity of the contract

From 1 June 2022 to 31 May 2026

Deadline for the submission of applications and tenders

1 December 2021 (12.00, Paris time)

Address where the text of the invitation to tender and any relevant information and/or documentation relating to the public tender and the public service obligation can be obtained

Syndicat mixte PYRÉNIA

Bâtiment Pic du Midi

Aéroport Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénées

65290 Juillan

FRANCE

Tel. +33 0562325651

Email: syndicat.mixte@pyrenia.fr

Buyer profile (website): www.marches-publics.info

---
#### Fantroy v. The State.

Appeal from Montgomery City Court.

Tried before tbe Hon. A. D. Sayre.

No counsel marked as appearing for appellant.

Charles* G. Brown, Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion by

Sharpe, J.

The appellant in this case was indicted, tried and convicted for embezzlement, and sentenced to hard labor for the county for eight months.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
February 14, 2012

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

R.M SPRAGUE, Appellant

NO. 14-08-00700-CV V.

D.L. SPRAGUE, Appellee

____________________

This cause, an appeal from the judgment in favor of appellee, D.L. Sprague, 

signed June 16, 2008, was heard on the transcript of the record. We have inspected the 

record and find the trial court erred in excluding all evidence that any portion of the 

amounts payable to appellant, R.M. Sprague, under his employer’s “Cash Deferral 

Program” was his separate property; sanctioning appellant, R.M. Sprague, for a claimed 

delay in transferring certain funds to appellee, D.L. Sprague; and in awarding attorneys’ 

fees for appellee, D.L. Sprague.. We therefore order that We therefore order that the 

property-division portion of the divorce decree, as well as the trial court’s post-judgment 

sanctions order and the associated temporary order pending the appeal of the sanctions 

order, are REVERSED and ordered severed and REMANDED for proceedings in 

accordance with this court’s opinion.

Further, we find no error in the remainder of the judgment and order it 

AFFIRMED.

We order appellant, R.M. Sprague, to pay all costs incurred in this appeal. We 

further order this decision certified below for observance.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.3



                                March 31, 1999


First National Bank of Chicago
One North State Street, 9th Floor
Chicago, IL 60602-0126
Attn: Corporate Trust Administration Department

Ambac Assurance Corporation
One State Street Plaza
New York, NY 10004
Attn: Structured Finance Department-MBS


          RE:  Headlands Home Equity Loan Trust (Series 1998-1);
               Annual Statement as to Compliance by the Issuer
               -----------------------------------------------


Ladies and Gentlemen:


     Pursuant to Section 3.9 of the Indenture with respect to the above-
referenced offering, the undersigned officer of Headlands Mortgage Company (as
"Manager") hereby certifies as to the following:

     1.   a review of the activities of the Issuer and its performance under the
          Indenture during the preceding fiscal year since the inception of the
          trust has been made under the direct supervision of the undersigned
          officer; and

     2.   to the best knowledge of the undersigned officer, based on such
          review, the Issuer has fulfilled all of its material obligations under
          the Indenture throughout the applicable period, and there has been no
          known default in the fulfillment of the Issuer's material obligations
          throughout such period.


                                        Very truly yours
                                        HEADLANDS HOME EQUITY
                                        LOAN TRUST (Series 1998-1)

                                        By: HEADLANDS MORTGAGE COMPANY,
                                        as Manager



                                        /s/ Gilbert J. MacQuarrie
                                        -------------------------
                                        Gilbert J. MacQuarrie
                                        Vice President, Treasurer and Secretary

                                      12
#### In the Matter of Salvatore B., Appellant.

— In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Gallet, J.), dated June 4, 1985, which, upon a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Nassau County (Capilli, J.), dated April 18, 1985, made after an admission that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of petit larceny (two counts), and placed him on probation for one year. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated April 18, 1985.

Ordered that the order dated June 4, 1985, is reversed, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, without costs or disbursements, the fact-finding determination is vacated, and the petition is dismissed.

The Corporation Counsel concedes that the fact-finding Judge did not advise the appellant and his parents of the appellant’s relevant constitutional and statutory rights or the consequences flowing from a waiver of those rights *(see, Boy-*
      *395
      *kin v Alabama, 395*US 238; *People v Gina M. M.,*40 NY2d 595; *Matter of Lawrence S.,*29 NY2d 206; *Matter of John R.,*71 AD2d 896; *Matter of Steven W.,*75 AD2d 756; *Matter of Kim F.,*109 AD2d 706; *Matter of Yolanda C.,*118 AD2d 778; Family Ct Act §§ 320.3, 321.3). Under these circumstances, the dispositional order appealed from must be reversed, and the fact-finding determination vacated. Moreover, since the one-year probation period imposed upon the appellant has expired, it is unnecessary to remit the proceeding to the Family Court for a new fact-finding hearing. Instead the petition should be dismissed *(see, Matter of Yolanda C., supra).*Mangano, J. P., Weinstein, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Lea Katz, Appellant. *857Lillian Roberts, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

Mikoll, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed December 18, 1985, which ruled that claimant was ineligible for benefits because she was not available for employment and failed to comply with reporting requirements.

A benefit ledger transcript for the benefit year ending April 27, 1986, submitted by the Commissioner of Labor, reveals that claimant was paid benefits for 26 statutory weeks (104 effective days) exclusive of the weeks in dispute. This is the maximum amount of benefits payable in a benefit year (Labor Law § 590 [4]). Consequently, a reversal would result in no additional benefits to claimant. This appeal therefore should be dismissed as academic *(see, Matter of Lipsman [Roberts],*98 AD2d 905).

Appeal dismissed, as academic, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Weiss, Mikoll and Harvey, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

 

| Each of the undersigned officers of Patient Infosystems, Inc. (the “Company”), certifies that: |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| (1) | the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the twelve month period ended December 31, 2004 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

 

| Dated:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | March 31, 2005 | /s/ Roger L. Chaufournier |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|
|  
Roger L. Chaufournier

 
 
Chief Executive Officer

 
 

 

Dated:

March 31, 2005

/s/Kent A. Tapper

 
 
Kent A. Tapper

 
 
Vice President, Financial Planning

 
(principal accounting officer)

 
 

This certification is made solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other purpose.

 

 

 

 

 

  |
#### In the Matter of Joseph R. Pisani, a Suspended Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District, Petitioner.

Second Department,

February 17, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Gary L. Casella*for petitioner.

*James T. McFarland*for respondent.

*9OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

The respondent was admitted to practice by this court on February 10, 1954, By order of this court dated September 14, 1984, the respondent was suspended from the practice of law until further order of the court. In this proceeding to discipline him for professional misconduct, the Special Referee sustained six of the charges against him. The petitioner moves to confirm the report of the Special Referee and the respondent moves, *inter alia,*for an order "rejecting” the Referee’s report.

The respondent was charged in this proceeding with, *inter alia,*(1) having been convicted of a "serious crime”, in that, on August 1, 1984, in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, the respondent was found guilty of a count of mail fraud in violation of 18 USC §§ 1341 and 1342, (2) converting to his own use and failing to account for approximately $14,000 of funds belonging to a client, (3) forging and/or causing to be forged the signature of his client on a check in the amount of $1,000 and converting the proceeds thereof to his own use, (4) converting to his own use and failing to account for a client’s funds in the amount of $1,480, (5) forging or causing to be forged a signature on a check, and (6) failing to maintain a duly constituted escrow account and commingling clients’ and personal funds. The Special Referee sustained all of the above-mentioned allegations of professional misconduct although other charges not enumerated above were dismissed by the Special Referee.

After reviewing all of the evidence, we are in full agreement with the findings contained in the report of the Special Referee. The petitioner’s motion to confirm said report is granted. The respondent’s motion, *inter alia,*for an order "rejecting” the Special Referee’s report is denied.

The respondent is adjudged guilty of serious professional misconduct. Accordingly, the respondent should be, and hereby is, disbarred and it is directed that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law forthwith.

Bracken, J. P., Niehoff, Lawrence, Fiber and Hooper, JJ., concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE HARRY W. ANDERSON, Defendant Below, Appellant,

v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. § § § No. 329, 2019 § § Court Below: Superior Court § of the State of Delaware § § Cr. ID No. 1206018361(N) § § § § Submitted: August 14, 2019 Decided: August 16, 2019

Before VAUGHN , SEITZ , and TRAYNOR , Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the notice to s how cause and the appellant’s response, it appears to the Court that: (1) On July 30, 2019, the appellant, Ha rry Anderson, filed a notice of appeal from a Superior Court order date d and docketed on June 26, 2019, in which the Superior Court denied Anderson’s moti on for correction of an illegal sentence and denied his motion for reargument of the court’s denial of postconviction relief. Under Supreme Court Rule 6, a timely notice of appeal should have been filed on or before July 26, 2019.2 (2) A notice of appeal must be timely filed to invoke the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 1 The jurisdictional defect created by the untimely filing of a notice of appeal cannot be excused unle ss the appellant can demonstrat e that the delay in filing is attributable to court-related personnel. 2 (3) On July 30, 2019, the Senior Cour t Clerk issued a notice directing Anderson to show cause why this appeal s hould not be dismissed as untimely filed. In response to the notice to show cause, Anderson attributes the delay to the prison mail system, stating that he deposited the no tice of appeal into the prison mail system at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center on July 22, 2019. To demonstrate the date of mailing, Anderson has submitted a copy of his inmate account statement, which reflects charges for postage on July 22, 2019. (4) Anderson’s response to the notice to show cause does not provide a basis for excusing the untimely filing of th e notice of appeal. A notice of appeal must be received by the Court within the applicable time period to be effective. 3 Delaware has not adopted a rule similar to the federa l prison mailbox rule, which deems a notice of appeal as filed at the tim e it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing. 4 Because the record does not reflect that Anderson’s failure to file a timely

1 Carr v. State , 554 A.2d 778, 779 (Del. 1989). 2 Bey v. State , 402 A.2d 362, 363 (Del. 1979). 3 D EL

. S UPR

. C T

. R. 10(a). 4 Schafferman v. State , 2016 WL 5929953 (Del. Oct. 11, 2016).3 notice of appeal is attributable to cour t-related personnel, th e appeal must be

dismissed. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, under Supreme Court Rule 29(b), that the appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Justice
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**

**EDWARD DURHAM BRADY,**

**Petitioner :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 718 MAL 2015** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 28th day of December, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of** 

**Appeal is** DENIED

**.**

**Mr. Justice Eakin did not participate in the decision of t his matter.**
#### HETTERLINE, Appellant, v. STODDARD et al., Respondents.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

December 8, 1896.)

Action by Frederick Hetterline against Willard F. Stoddard and others.

No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.
#### VAN RENSSELAER et al. v. MOULD.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department.

May 8, 1894.)

Damages—Rule Adopted at Instance op Party.

The correctness of a rule of damages adopted at the instance of a party cannot be questioned by such party.

Appeal from judgment on report of referee.

Action by Katherine Van Rensselaer and Cornelia Bolton, as executrices of the will of Catherine W. Van Rensselaer, deceased, against Horatio D. Mould, for wrongfully entering on certain lands under water, situate on the east bank of the Hudson river, in the town of East G-reenbush, in cutting and removing ice therefrom. There was a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before MAYHAM, P. J., and PUTNAM and HERRICK, JJ.

Hale, Cowen & Bulkley (Esek Cowen, of counsel), for appellant.

Richard W. Brass (William F. Beutler, of counsel), for respondents.

HERRICK, J.

There seems to be no question in this case but that the defendant, for a series of years, trespassed upon the property of the plaintiffs’ testatrix, and took and carried away ice therefrom, without permission, and against her repeated warnings and protests. It is not seriously contested but what the plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages for such trespass. The only serious question in the case is as to the measure of damage adopted by the referee. I do not see that appellant can justly complain of the ruling of the referee, for in response to his request the referee found “that under the circumstances the true measure of damages is the value to the plaintiffs’ testatrix of the right to sell to others the privilege of cutting and removing the ice in question,” and that was the rule adopted by the referee. The rule for measuring the damage, thus adopted, whether correct or incorrect, was adopted by the referee at the defendant’s special request, and he cannot now *902challenge its correctness. What the value of that right was, was a question of fact for the referee to determine from all the evidence before him; and all the eAfidence bearing upon that question that from the nature of the case could be given seems to have been given, and from it the good sense of the referee had to be exercised to arrive at a proper conclusion. Drucker v. Railway Co., 106 N. Y. 157-164, 12 N. E. 568. From the conclusion that he arrived at upon such question of fact I can find nothing in the evidence that justifies me in concluding that he erred, and found a value for the right in question not justified by the evidence. Judgment, therefore, should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
EXHIBIT 99.3











CERTIFICATIONS





Each of the undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, in his capacity as an officer of SPACEHAB, Incorporated (SPACEHAB), that, to the best of his knowledge, the
Quarterly Report of SPACEHAB on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2002, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of SPACEHAB.








Date: November 13, 2002











/s/  DR. SHELLEY A. HARRISONDr. Shelley A. HarrisonChairman of the Boardand Chief Executive Officer