### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10
- 14
- 00015
- CR JENNIFER KELLY , Appellant
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

From the 278th District Court Madison County, Texas Trial Court No. 13
- 11915
- 278
- 15

O P I N I O N
A jury convicted Appellant Jennifer Kelly of the offenses of trafficking of persons and compelling prostitution and assessed her punishment at fifteen and ten years’ imprisonment, respectively. This appeal ensued. Sufficiency of the Evidence In her first two issues, Kelly contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions for trafficking of persons and compelling prostitution.Kelly v. State Page 2

Standard of Review The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of a sufficiency issue as follows:

In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt

. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318

- 19 (1979); Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This "familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the ev idence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319. "Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction." Hooper , 214 S.W.3d at 13.
Lucio v. State , 351 S.W.3d 878 , 894 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
I f the record supports conflicting inferences, we must presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that
determination. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 326 . Further, d irect and circumstantial evidence are treated equally: “ Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. ” Hooper , 214 S.W.3d at 13. Finally , it is well established that t he factfinder is entitled to judge the credibility of witnesses and can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. Chambers v. State , 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
The Evidence The evidence presented in this case was as follows: Madisonville Police OfficerKelly v. State Page 3

Aaron Campbell testif ied that on April 26, 2013, the Department executed a search warrant at 702 East Collard Street in Madisonville, a residence known to be Kelly’s. Campbell took photographs of everything. T he photographs show ed three bedrooms , one of which was Kelly’s. Above Kelly’s bed was a photograph of M.M. Campbell stated that he believed the photograph was important because it verified that M.M. was

connec ted with the residence. Dorothy Carnal testified that both Kelly and Kelly’s mother took into their home people who had nowhere else to go. In fact, Carnal met Kelly in April 2012 when,
because Carnal had nowhere to go, Kelly said that she could stay in t he home as long as she helped around the house and paid a little bit of money to Kelly’s mother if she could. Kelly usually took in females, and, besides Carnal, Kelly took in M.M., Nicole Shelton, Stephanie Stansbury, and Jessica Hoot. A man named Jason McKinney also lived there for about a month. Kelly would feed the people that she took in and buy clothes for them, if needed. This included M.M. M.M. needed things every now and then, and Kelly would help her if she could.
Carnal testified that sh e met M.M. about a week after meeting Kelly in April 2012. On the first or second day after meeting, M.M. asked Carnal to go to the park with her so that Carnal could be a lookout while M.M. had sex with a guy. Carnal said
that M.M. would also “come look ing for trouble” at the house. M.M. did not live at the house, but she did stay there every now and then. M.M. would come over to Kelly’s house and tell Kelly that she needed her to make phone calls to guys with whom she
could have sex because she needed money. M.M. would have sex with the guys in theKelly v. State Page 4

middle bedroom of the house and receive money from them. Carnal said that she did not know how much money M.M. got from the guys but that M.M. would always flash her money around in front of everyone. Whe n asked if Kelly ever received any money when M.M. would have sex with guys in the house for money , Carnal replied that she

t hou ght M.M. would give Kelly $5 but that she did not know if the guys paid Kelly. When asked what her response would be to an all egation that Kelly forced M.M. to engage in prostitution, Carnal replied that Kelly never forced anyone to do anything. Carnal stated, “Well, you know, we had a little set up. But [Kelly] didn’t force nobody to do nothing that they didn’t want to do.” C arnal said that she heard that M.M.’s mother was the one who forced M.M. into prostitution. M.M.’s mother came over to Kelly’s house a few times, and Carnal thought that M.M.’s mother had actually engaged in prostitution at the house once or twice.
Carn al remembered seeing M.M. over at the house in the May/June 2012 timeframe. Carnal stated, “After [M.M.] first came around that was it, she was there all
the time.” Carnal was positive about the timeframe even though her own overall drug use, including h aving done heavy drugs in the preceding two or three years and having smoked pot as recently as three days before testifying, had affected her memory. Carnal remembered M.M. having sex for money in the middle bedroom of the house during those months. Car nal finally left Kelly’s house in about November or December 2012 with Stephanie Stan s bury

. Stansbury testified that Kelly would take people in if they did not have anywhere to go. She considered Kelly her friend, and Kelly helped her out, includingKelly v. State Page 5

providing her food and clothing and allowing her to live with her from about August to
December 2012. Carnal , M.M. , and a woman named Nicole also l ived at Kelly’s house at some point

. Stansbury confirmed that there was a picture of M.M. in Kelly’s
bedroo m. Stansbury testified that she met M.M. in early August 2012. She and M.M. did not get along because of a dispute over a guy named Alfredo. Beginning in about June 2012, Stansbury would take Alfredo over to Kelly’s house, drop him off, and then pick
h im back up later. When she herself then started going over to Kelly’s house, she found
out that Alfredo had been going over to the house to see M.M. When asked if M.M. was at Kelly’s house in June 2012, however, Stansbury replied , “I’m not sure. I just know I would drop [Alfredo] off and pick him up.” S tansbury moved on from Alfredo and started seeing Michael Briock on August 2, 2012, but she and M.M. had a dispute over
Alfredo until about December 2012. Stansbury testified that M.M. engaged in sex at Kelly’s house and other places of
her own free will ; Kelly did not force M.M. to engage in sex. M.M. would get into fights with her mother and just show up at Kelly’s house. When asked how M.M. would then end up having sex at the house, Stansbury repl ied, “Just if somebody would show up that decided that they wanted her she would go

- - she would do it.” M.M. would use the middle bedroom at Kelly’s house

. M.M. would bring Xanax bars with her to the house and said that the more Xanax bars she took, the easier it was for her to have sex. Stansbury said that she believed that M.M. got paid for having sex. Stansbury had also engaged in prostitution, and based on that experience, she knew what M.M. was doing.Kelly v. State Page 6

Briock had also bragged to her that he and M.M.’s mother were the ones that had gotten M.M. into having sex for money. When asked if M.M. ever paid Kelly out of the money that she made from the guys, Stansbury replied that the guys would pay Kelly only
“like five dollars for use of the room.” St ansbury saw this during “August

- September, September

- October

- ish” 2012. Stansbury testified that she left Kelly’s house in December 2012 because Briock
asked her to leave

. When asked how well she knew M.M. after December 2012, Stansbury replied that s he took M.M. to Huntsville where they were “turning tricks”
and that she also too k M.M. down to Galveston once. Stansbury said that her dad called her when Kelly was arrested. She got on the internet and read the news websites.
She then wrote a comment online that stated : [Kelly] has never forced nobody to sell themselves, if anyone was even doing that to begin with it was of their own choosing. [Kelly] did however try to take in people when they had nowhere to go, even if the person was undeserving of it. They would steal from her and she would still let them back, and I’ve never known there to be minors there except for [M.M.] and she was 17 , wh ich I believe is legal age to g ive consent. Stansbury explained that she was angry and using methamp hetamin e when she wrote
the comment and had no idea how old M.M. was. She believed that M.M. was eighteen years old when she met her at Kelly’s house. At the time of trial, Stansbury was in the Walker County jail. M.M. testified that she was born on September 3, 1994 , and h er birth certificate was admitted into evidence. She turned eighteen years old on September 3, 2012, and

was nineteen years old at the time of trial. M.M. stated that s he ha d never lived withKelly v. State Page 7

her father and ha d nothing to do with him ; h e on ly call ed her when he wa s drunk. S he
ha d a good relationship with her mother.
M.M. testified that s he first met Kelly in Normangee when she was fourteen years old. They became friends, and at some point M.M. lived with her there . When Kelly moved to Centerville, M.M. went with her , and they became best friends. M.M. said that she did not live with Kelly in Centerville but that she did stay off and on with her. When she was with Kelly, they would just “[c]hill and hang out and party.” M.M.
eventuall y went to Madisonville to Kelly’s house. Kelly’s grandmother owned the house, and Kelly’s mother lived in the house. Kelly’s mother ran the house when she was alive and would g ive M.M. a place to stay. M.M. would stay at the house off and

on. M.M.’s mo ther and Kelly also knew each other, and M.M.’s mother hung out at the
house at times. Kelly’s mother passed away when M.M. was eig hteen years old

. M.M. testified that she had engaged in prostitution to earn money. Her mother had engaged in prostitutio n at times as well. M.M. said that no one forced her or her
mother to do it. The first time M.M. engaged in prostitution was in Centerville when
she was fourteen years old. Kelly called a guy, and they went to a motel w here M.M. had sex for money. M.M. also engaged in sex , sometimes for money, at Kelly’s house in
Madisonville , as well as at other places in Madisonville

. Several photographs that M.M. posted to Facebook during June and July 2012 were admitted into evidence. M.M.
would have been seventee n years old when the pictures were taken. The photogr aphs show M.M. in Kelly’s house, and M.M. stated that when she was at Kelly’s house during those dates, she was having sex for money over there. When asked how sheKelly v. State Page 8

would get the guy s to Kelly’s house, M.M. replied, “[Kelly] would call them and then get them, and then I would tell her to call some licks for me because I need money.” 1 The guys would be of Mexican nationality only . When asked why just the one nationality, M.M. replied that she did not kn ow. M.M. said that she made different prices for having sex with different guys. When asked if she ever had to give Kelly any of the money, M.M. responded, “I mean, I would give her, you know, just give her money like man, quit, here.” When asked how mu ch she would give her, M.M. said, “I
don’t know the

- - exactly price. I would just give her money, you know. Just get her what she needs, you know, cigarettes.” T he guy or “lick” would give $5 to Kelly when
he came over.
Madisonville Police Lieute nant Jonathan Zitzmann testified that he and Corporal Gary Laws 2 conducted an interview with Kelly on April 16 , 2013, regarding prostitution and human trafficking. Portions of the audio/video recording of the interview were admitted into evidence. During the interview, Kelly stated that the females, including Dorothy Carnal, Stephanie Stansbury, Nicole Shelton, and M.M. , would use the middle
bedroom of the house fo r prostitution. Kelly said that t he females had a preference for Hispanic men because they thought that the men were less likely to be the law. Kelly
sp eaks Spanish fluently, so she would translate for the females . Kelly stated that she would receive $5 from the female and $5 from the male to use the middle bedroom for prostitution. Kelly said that M.M. always argued with her about how much she should

1 M.M. explained that t he guys with the money we re referred to as “licks

. ”

2 M.M. testified that she knew Laws from when “they” would come over to Kelly’s house. M.M. stated that she had told Laws that he was “hot” but that that would not make her lie while testifying.Kelly v. State Page 9

give her, but M.M. would also give her gifts sometimes

. On cross

- examination, Zitzmann acknowledg ed that h e never mentioned in the
interview the timeframe that these acts occurred. He never talked specifically about June to July 2012. Zitzmann also acknowledged that he was aware that Kelly’s mother was living in the house during June and July 2012 b ut that he had never talked to Kelly’s mother in reference to this case. Zitzmann acknowledged that M.M. was eighteen years old at the time the interview occurred. Finally, Lieutenant Melinda Poe, the jail administrator for the Madison County jail, t estified that she wa s in charge of the jail calls, meaning any communication the
inmates ha d with the outside world. The jail calls are all recorded for the safety and security of the facility. Clips of several of Kelly’s jail calls were admitted into ev idence. During these call s , Kelly stated, “I didn’t do nothing. I mean I might have translated a little bit before for people that don’t speak English

– I’m just helping people you
know?” Kelly said that she was just putting a roof over homeless people’s heads ; they were already prostitutes when they got there. Kelly admit ted , however, that she let
M.M. use the middle room, and i n speaking of M.M., Kelly said, “The only way they got a case is if she takes the stand, you know.”
After the State re sted, Nicole Shelton testified that she ha d lived in the middle

room of the house at 702 East Collard for about seven or eight months beginning on October 2, 2012. Kelly’s mother was still alive at that time ; she owned the house and
controll ed who lived a nd visited there. Kelly’s mother passed away on February 4,
2013. Shelton was still living in the house when the search was conducted on the house,Kelly v. State Page 10

and Jason McKinney was her boyfriend at the time.
Shelton testified that she knew of M.M. but never associated with her until she began living at Kelly’s house in October 2012. M.M. was eighteen at that time. M.M.’s mother usually drove M.M. to and from the house, and M.M.’s mother would stay at
the hou se with M.M. They were at the house fairly often. Shelton did not remember seeing M.M. at the house without her mother there. Shelton and M.M. did not get along, but M.M. would talk to Shelton about Laws often. When asked what M.M. said about Laws, She lton replied, “She said that her and Officer Gary Laws would mess around and basically have sex.” “She would mention that she had strings she could pull. But which basically means she could get out of trouble because of what she was doing with Officer La ws.” Shelton testified that M.M. would engage in prostitution at Kelly’s house but that Kelly never forced M.M. to do so. Shelton, Carnal, and Stansbury also prostituted at the house. When asked how M.M. found the guys with whom she engaged in prostitut ion, Shelton replied, “It was just friends that she had had.” When asked how she herself got the guys over to the house , Shelton replied, “They were friends that I knew that would
come over.” But Shelton also said that the guys that would come over to en gage in prostitution were guys that would work in the oil field or weld. They were “[r]aces of any kind.” Kelly speaks Spanish, and when asked if it was true that Kelly was a translator that set up the dates with a lot of the guys that came over, Shelton replied, “Only with the ones that anybody couldn’t speak with.” T hey would use the middle room of the house to engage in prostitution. She, Carnal, Stansbury, and M.M. neverKelly v. State Page 11

gave Kelly any money for the guys that came over. Carnal would be lying if she said that she gave Kelly $5 from each transaction. When asked , however, if it would surprise her that Stansbury testified that Kelly would get $5 from each transaction, she replied that it would not surprise her. Shelton then stated, “ Honestly, I don’t know. I have never seen any money transfer.” Shelton testified that she cares a lot for Kelly

. Kelly gave her a place to live when she had nowhere to live. Kelly bought her food and clothes and provided friendship. Kelly’s mother also gave her food an d shelter. Shelton said that she is not a big fan of
M.M. because M.M. wa s ungrateful for what Kelly did for her ; Kelly had provided M.M. her house, food, friendship , and an opportunity to make money out of her house. Jason McKinney then testified that h e lived in Kelly’s house during part of 2012 and 2013. He moved into the house when he started dating M.M. in October 2012. The relationship lasted about a month. He then dated Shelton and was living in the middle
room of the house. He saw M.M. and her mother at the house many times. He stated that Kelly’s grandmother owned the house and that Kelly and her mother lived in the
house and controlled the house. In rebuttal, Madisonville Police Officer Jonathan Lawrenz testified that he was on street patr ol on February 22, 2011 , when t hey received an anonymous phone call about possible drug activity at the Western Lodge

. When they got to the Western Lodge, they informed the manager why they were there. They then pulled around to
the room and saw that the door was open and that Kelly was standing outside the room by the door. Lawrenz got out of his patrol car and walked up to the door. When heKelly v. State Page 12

looked inside the room , he saw an older white gentleman laying on the bed and a young white female standing at t he foot of the bed naked. There was also another female standing by the door where Kelly was.
Lawrenz testified that h e made contact with Kelly , who said that she had rented
the room. Kelly provided her birthdate a s November 7, 1979, making her thirty

- one years old at the time. They told the young girl who was naked to put on her clothes

. She was identified as M.M. M.M. said that she was seventeen years old ; however, w hen they got to the jail, they found out that M.M. was actually only sixteen years old at the
time

. The older gentleman was fifty

- three years old at the time.
Lawrenz testified that the y got consent to search the room . When they walked
in , they found used condoms all over the floor. Lawrenz state d that i t appeared to him that sex had been occurring in the room. He tried to ascertain whether prostitution was going on in the room, but they denied it. N o one was arrested for prostitution that
ni ght. Compelling Prostitution
A person commits the o ffense of compelling prostitution if the person knowingly “causes by any means a child younger than 18 years to commit prostitution , regardless of whether the actor knows the age of the child at the time the actor commits the
offense.” T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 43.05(a)(2) (West Supp. 2014 ). Because M.M. turned eighteen years old on September 3, 2012, the indictment and the jury charge limited the alleged compelling prostitution to a period of time of “on or about and between” June 1, 2012 and July 31, 2012. Kelly argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove that (1)Kelly v. State Page 13

she “caused” M.M. to engage in prostitution and (2) if such conduct occurred, it
occurred before M.M. turned eighteen years old. We begin with causation. In Waggoner v. State , 897 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. App.

— Austin 1995, no pet.), the appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he was guilty of compelling prostitution because there was
insufficient evidence of causation. Id. at 511

- 12. In addressing this issue, the Austin Court of Appeals observed that Texas law provides little guidance as to the meaning of causing a minor to commit prostitution “by any means” beyond the Penal Code ’s general definition of causation : “A person is criminall y responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.” Id. at 512 (citing T EX
. P ENAL C ODE
A NN
. § 6.04(a) (West 2011 ) )

. T he Austin co urt th us looked at State v. Wood , 579 P.2d 294 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), a case in which the Oregon Court of Appeals construed a similar penal statute. Waggoner , 897 S.W.2d at 512. The statute at issue in Wood provided: “A person commits the crime of compelling prostitution if the person knowingly ... [i]nduces or causes a person under 18 years of age to engage in prostitution.” Wood , 579
P.2d at 295

- 96 (citing O R
. R EV
. S TAT
. A NN
. § 167.017(1)(b) )

. The Oregon cour t stated: “The purpose of ... this statute is to provide maximum protection for minors from the harmful, cumulative effects of a life of prostitution.... [The statute] is intended to prohibit ‘conduct that exploits the immat ure’ regardless of coercion.” Id. at 296. The Oregon c ourt therefore held: “[O]ne who provides opportunity for a willing minor toKelly v. State Page 14

engage in prostitution and influences, persuades or prevails upon her to do so has induced or caused the prostitution withi n the meaning of the statute regardless of her
consent.” Id. In light of this, the Austin c ourt held in Waggoner that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the appellant knowingly caused the minor to commit prostitution because t he record established that (1) the appellant clearly provided the opportunity for the minor to engage in prostitution and (2) the appellant persuaded the minor to go through with the encounter. Waggoner , 897 S.W.2d at 512

- 13. Kelly argues that under the standard stated in Wood and approved of in Waggoner , it is not sufficient that she provided an opportunity for a willing minor to engage in prostitution but that she must have also influenced, persuaded, or prevailed upon the minor to engage in prostitution and that there is no evidence that she influenced, persuaded, or prevailed upon M.M. to engage in prostitution. Kelly asserts
that the evidence showed that M.M.’s decisions duri ng the time set out in the indictment and jury charge were made independent of her influence. Kelly further argues that the evidence is insufficient under the “but for” test of causation stated in section 6.04(a) of the Penal Code and discussed in Waggone r because the evidence
showed that the same conduct of M.M. that occurred at her house also occurred at other locations away from her.
We conclude that th e evidence was sufficient to prove that Kelly “caused” M.M. “by any means” to engage in prostitution. The evidence that Kelly complied with M.M.’s request to make phone calls to the men for her and acted as a translator is arguably sufficient to show that Kelly “influenced” M.M. to engage in prostitution. ButKelly v. State Page 15

the compelling

- prostitution statute states t hat a person commits the offense if she

causes a child younger than eighteen years to commit prostitution “ by any means , ” not

“ b y providing opportunity for a willing minor to engage in prostitution and influencing, persuading or prevailing upon her to do s o.” In other words, w hile providing a willing minor the opportunity to engage in prostit ution and influencing, persuading, or prevailing upon her to do so is one way to commit the offense of compelling prostitution, the statute does not limit that conduct to the only conduct by which a person commits the offense. Instead, we look back at the Penal Code’s general definition of causation: “A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone o r concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.” T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 6.04(a). And in this case , viewing the evidence in the light most favor able to the verdict, we conclude that the jury could have found that but for Kelly’s conduct in making the phone calls to the men for M.M., acting as a translator, and providing a bedroom in her house, M.M. would not have engaged in prostitution with those men at Kelly’s house. 3 We now turn to whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the conduct of Kelly’s that caused M.M. to engage in prostitution occurred before M.M. turned eighteen years old. The foregoing evidence show ed that M.M. was engaging in prostitution at Kelly’s house before she turned eighteen years old

. The evidence also

3 It is irrelevant that the evidence showed that M.M. engaged in prostitution at other locations away from Kelly as long as the jury could have found that but for Kelly’s conduct, M.M. would not have engaged in the specific acts of prostitution that occurre d at Kelly’s house.Kelly v. State Page 16

showed that Kelly made calls to the men at M.M.’s request to get the m to Kelly’s house and that Kelly acted as a translator during those calls

. While the evidence does not directly show that Kelly’s conduct of making the calls for M.M. and of acting as a translator occurred before M.M. turned eighteen, the jury could have drawn that
inference. See Lucio , 351 S.W.3d at 894 (quoting Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319 ) (stating that sufficiency standard “’ gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly

... to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’”). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, w e therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the conduct of Kelly’s that caused M.M. to engage in prostitution occurred before M.M. turned eighteen years old.
T he evidence was thus sufficient to support Kelly’s conviction for compelling prostitution. We overrule Kelly’s first issue. Trafficking of Persons
A person commits the offense of trafficking of persons if the person knowingly “traffics a child and by any means causes the trafficked child to engage in, or become
the vic tim of, conduct prohibited by” Section 43.05 (Compelling Prostitution). T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 20A.02(a)(7)(H) (West Supp. 2014 ). Again, because M.M. turned eighteen years old on September 3, 2012, the indictment and the jury charge limited the alleged t rafficking of persons to a period of time “on or about and between” June 1, 2012 and July 31, 2012. Kelly argues that (1) for the reasons discussed with regard to compelling prostitution, the evidence is insufficient to support the “causes” element of
the offense of trafficking of persons and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support aKelly v. State Page 17

finding that she “trafficked” a child. Having already addressed and overruled Kelly’s causation argument above, we turn directly to Kelly’s argument that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding
that she “trafficked” a child. “Traffic” means to transport, entice, recruit, harbor, provide, or otherwise obtain another person by any means. Id. § 20A.01(4). At a minimum, Kelly “harbored” M.M. The most commonly re cognized meanings of the word “harbor” as a verb are “to give shelter to” and “to give refuge to.”
Urbanski v. State , 993 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 1999, no pet.) (holding that definition of “harbor” is broad enough to encompass providing runaway child with shelter, transportation, or a home). The definition of “refuge” includes protection, or a source of help, relief, or comfort. Id. Kelly argues that the undisputed evidence that M.M. did not live a t her home
and that she would be brought there by her mother precludes a rational factfinder from finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she “harbored” M.M. But even if M.M. did not live at Kelly’s house, the evidence shows that M.M. stayed there at times and that Kelly provided M.M. with necessities like food and clothing when she needed it. Specifically, Stansbury testified that M.M. would get into fights with her mother and just show up at Kelly’s house. Carnal testified that Kelly would feed the people that she took in and buy clothes for them, if needed, that t his included M.M. , and that M.M. needed things every now and then and Kelly would help M.M. if she could. Even Shelton, a defense
witness , stated that she thought M.M. was ungrateful because Kelly provided her house, food, and friendship and gave M.M. an opportunity to make money out of herKelly v. State Page 18

house. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Kelly “harbored” and thus
“trafficked” M.M. The evidence was therefore sufficient to support Kelly’s conviction for trafficking of persons. We overrule Kelly’s second issue. Attorney’s Fees In her third issue, Kelly contends that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for attorney’s fee s in the absence of evidence of her ability to pay attorney’s fees. The State concedes that the judgments should be modified

. The clerk’s record reflects that, before trial, the trial court found that Kelly was indigent and appoin ted an attorney to repres ent her . Once Kelly was initially found to be indigent, s he was presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings
unless it was sho wn that a material change in her financial resources had occurred. See
T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC

. A NN
. art. 26.04 ( p ) (West Supp. 2014 ). The trial court did not make any findings or otherwise address Kelly ’s financial condition again before signing the judgments. Furthermore, after signing the judgments, the trial court appointed an attorney for appeal , stating: “T he Court finds that Jennifer Kelly, Defendant, is indigent, and is entitled to the appointment of counsel to represent said Defendant on appeal.” Therefore, we sustain Kelly’s third issue and modify the judgments to delete the assessment of attorney’s fee s . See Mayer v. State , 309 S.W.3d 552, 555

- 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).Kelly v. State Page 19 Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we modify the trial court’ s judgments to delete the assessment of attorney’s fees. We affirm the judgments as modified in all other respects.

REX D. DAVIS Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Affirmed as modified Opinion delivered and filed January 8, 2015 P ublish [C R25]