UnitedStatesCommissionon

International Religious Freedom
Annual Report of the 

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 

May 2010 

(Covering April 1, 2009 – March 31, 2010) 

Commissioners 

Leonard A. Leo 

Chair 

(July 2009 – June 2010) 

Felice D. Gaer 

Chair 

(July 2008 – June 2009) 

Michael Cromartie 

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou 

Vice Chairs 

(July 2008 – June 2010) 

Dr. Don Argue 

Imam Talal Y. Eid 

Felice D. Gaer 

Dr. Richard D. Land 

Nina Shea 

Ambassador Jackie Wolcott 

Executive Director 
Professional Staff 

Tom Carter, Director of Communications 

Walter G. DeSocio, General Counsel 

David Dettoni, Director of Operations and Outreach 

Judith E. Golub, Director of Government Relations 

Carmelita Hines, Director of Administration 

Knox Thames, Director of Policy and Research 

Dwight Bashir, Deputy Director for Policy and Research 

Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Deputy Director for Policy and Research 

Catherine Cosman, Senior Policy Analyst 

Deborah DuCre, Receptionist 

Scott Flipse, Senior Policy Analyst 

Yuna Jacobson, Associate Director for Government Relations 

Tiffany Lynch, Policy Analyst 

Jacqueline A. Mitchell, Executive Assistant 

Muthulakshmi Anu Narasimhan, Communications Specialist 

Stephen R. Snow, Senior Policy Analyst 

Front Cover: URUMQI, China, July 7, 2009 – A Uighur Muslim woman stands courageously before 

Chinese riot police sent to quell demonstrations by thousands of Uighurs calling for the government to 

respect their human rights. The Uighurs are a minority Muslim group in the autonomous Xinjiang Uighur 

region. Chinese government efforts to put down the ethnic and religious protest resulted in more than 150 

dead and hundreds of arrests. (Photo by Guang Niu/Getty Images) 

Back Cover: JUBA, Southern Sudan, April 10, 2010 – School children participate in a prayer service on 

the eve of Sudan’s first national elections in more than two decades. Those elections are called for under 

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South Sudan, the full implementation of which 

is widely believed to be essential to averting another bloody civil war marked by sectarian strife. 

Although the elections were deeply flawed, many Southern Sudanese saw them as a necessary milestone 

on the road to a January 2011 referendum on Southern Sudan's political future--the final major step in the 

peace agreement. (Photo by Jerome Delay/Associated Press) 

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 

800 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite 790 

Washington, DC 20002 

202-523-3240, 202-523-5020 (fax) 

www.uscirf.gov 
Annual Report of the 

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 

May 2010 

(Covering April 1, 2009 – March 31, 2010) 

Table of Contents 

Transmittal Letters to the President, Secretary of State, Speaker of the House, and 

President Pro Tempore......................................................................................i 

Introduction...................................................................................................1

Report Overview and Implementation of IRFA........................................................4 

Countries of Particular Concern and the Watch List.............................................4 

 Overview of CPC Recommendations and Watch List...........................................8 

 Implementation of IRFA...........................................................................16 

 Assessing the Status of Religious Freedom Firsthand..........................................21 

 Engaging the U.S. Executive Branch and Foreign Governments on 

Religious Freedom.........................................................................23 

 Convening Public Hearings, Testifying before Congress, Briefing 

 Congressional Staff, and other Public Events..........................................26 

 Working with Congress............................................................................28 

 Raising Public Awareness through the Media...................................................30 

Country Chapters: Countries of Particular Concern 

Burma..................................................................................................31 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).......................................40 

Eritrea..................................................................................................47 

Iran.....................................................................................................54 

Iraq.....................................................................................................67 

Nigeria................................................................................................80 

Pakistan...............................................................................................91 

People’s Republic of China.......................................................................103 

Saudi Arabia.......................................................................................123 

Sudan................................................................................................139 

Turkmenistan.......................................................................................158 

Uzbekistan..........................................................................................171 

Vietnam.............................................................................................184 
Country Chapters: USCIRF’s Watch List 

 Afghanistan.........................................................................................204 

Belarus..............................................................................................212 

Cuba.................................................................................................220 

Egypt.................................................................................................227 

India................................................................................................241 

Indonesia...........................................................................................255 

Laos.................................................................................................267 

Russian Federation................................................................................272 

Somalia.............................................................................................288 

Tajikistan...........................................................................................297 

Turkey..............................................................................................303 

Venezuela..........................................................................................318 

Additional Countries Closely Monitored

 Bangladesh.........................................................................................324 

 Kazakhstan.........................................................................................327 

 Sri Lanka............................................................................................331 

Promoting International Religious Freedom through Multilateral Institutions 

The United Nations................................................................................334 

 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)........................341 

USCIRF’s Expedited Removal Study.................................................................349

Appendix1: Biographies of Members of the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom........................................................................................357 

Appendix 2: The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Selected Provisions.........363 

Appendix 3: Summary of International Human Rights Standards on Freedom of 

Thought, Conscience, and Religion or Belief........................................................366 
i 

April 29, 2010 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, D.C. 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

I am pleased to transmit the 2010 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom (USCIRF). This report covers the period of April 2009 through March 2010, and was 

prepared in compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA), 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

The Annual Report documents religious freedom abuses and limitations in 28 countries around the 

world, as well as concerns at the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe. The Annual Report: 

• Recommends that the State Department designate five additional “countries of particular 

concern,” or CPCs, under IRFA for egregious violations of religious freedom – Iraq, Nigeria, 

Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam; 

• Recommends eight countries be re-designated as CPCs – Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North 

Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan – and that additional actions are taken; 

• Documents violations of religious freedom in countries placed on the USCIRF Watch List and 

urges increased U.S. government response; 

• Highlights efforts of some member states at the United Nations to undermine religious freedom 

standards through the flawed “defamation of religions” concept; and 

• Discusses measures still required to address flaws in U.S. policy regarding expedited removal 

of asylum seekers. 

USCIRF concludes that the adoption of these and other recommendations found in the Annual Report 

would considerably advance U.S. efforts to protect and promote the universal right to freedom of 

religion or belief worldwide. 

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss these policy recommendations with you. 

Sincerely, 

Leonard Leo 

Chair 
ii 

April 29, 2010 

The Honorable Hillary Clinton 

Secretary of State 

Washington, D.C. 20520 

Dear Madam Secretary: 

I am pleased to transmit the 2010 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom (USCIRF). This report covers the period of April 2009 through March 2010, and was 

prepared in compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA), 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

The Annual Report documents religious freedom abuses and limitations in 28 countries around the 

world, as well as concerns at the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe. The Annual Report: 

• Recommends that the State Department designate five additional “countries of particular 

concern,” or CPCs, under IRFA for egregious violations of religious freedom – Iraq, Nigeria, 

Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam; 

• Recommends eight countries be re-designated as CPCs – Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North 

Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan – and that additional actions are taken; 

• Documents violations of religious freedom in countries placed on the USCIRF Watch List and 

urges increased U.S. government response; 

• Highlights efforts of some member states at the United Nations to undermine religious freedom 

standards through the flawed “defamation of religions” concept; and 

• Discusses measures still required to address flaws in U.S. policy regarding expedited removal 

of asylum seekers. 

USCIRF concludes that the adoption of these and other recommendations found in the Annual Report 

would considerably advance U.S. efforts to protect and promote the universal right to freedom of 

religion or belief worldwide. 

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss these policy recommendations with you. 

Sincerely, 

Leonard Leo 

Chair 
iii 

April 29, 2010 

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi 

Speaker of the House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 20515 

Dear Madam Speaker: 

I am pleased to transmit the 2010 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom (USCIRF). This report covers the period of April 2009 through March 2010, and was 

prepared in compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA), 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

The Annual Report documents religious freedom abuses and limitations in 28 countries around the 

world, as well as concerns at the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe. The Annual Report: 

• Recommends that the State Department designate five additional “countries of particular 

concern,” or CPCs, under IRFA for egregious violations of religious freedom – Iraq, Nigeria, 

Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam; 

• Recommends eight countries be re-designated as CPCs – Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North 

Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan – and that additional actions are taken; 

• Documents violations of religious freedom in countries placed on the USCIRF Watch List and 

urges increased U.S. government response; 

• Highlights efforts of some member states at the United Nations to undermine religious freedom 

standards through the flawed “defamation of religions” concept; and 

• Discusses measures still required to address flaws in U.S. policy regarding expedited removal 

of asylum seekers. 

USCIRF concludes that the adoption of these and other recommendations found in the Annual Report 

would considerably advance U.S. efforts to protect and promote the universal right to freedom of 

religion or belief worldwide. 

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss these policy recommendations with you. 

Sincerely, 

Leonard Leo 

Chair 
iv 

April 29, 2010 

The Honorable Robert Byrd 

President Pro Tempore of the Senate 

Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Senator Byrd: 

I am pleased to transmit the 2010 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom (USCIRF). This report covers the period of April 2009 through March 2010, and was 

prepared in compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA), 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

The Annual Report documents religious freedom abuses and limitations in 28 countries around the 

world, as well as concerns at the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe. The Annual Report: 

• Recommends that the State Department designate five additional “countries of particular 

concern,” or CPCs, under IRFA for egregious violations of religious freedom – Iraq, Nigeria, 

Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam; 

• Recommends eight countries be re-designated as CPCs – Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North 

Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan – and that additional actions are taken; 

• Documents violations of religious freedom in countries placed on the USCIRF Watch List and 

urges increased U.S. government response; 

• Highlights efforts of some member states at the United Nations to undermine religious freedom 

standards through the flawed “defamation of religions” concept; and 

• Discusses measures still required to address flaws in U.S. policy regarding expedited removal 

of asylum seekers. 

USCIRF concludes that the adoption of these and other recommendations found in the Annual Report 

would considerably advance U.S. efforts to protect and promote the universal right to freedom of 

religion or belief worldwide. 

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss these policy recommendations with you. 

Sincerely, 

Leonard Leo 

Chair 
Introduction 

INTRODUCTION 

The term religious persecution brings to mind images of a foreign government preventing people from 

worshiping or otherwise mistreating them for their beliefs. A second and equally egregious threat to 

religious freedom, however, commonly occurs but receives far less attention. Many governments fail to 

punish religiously motivated violence perpetrated by private actors. This breakdown in justice—known 

as impunity—has been repeatedly confronted as a harsh reality in many places by the U.S. Commission 

on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). 

USCIRF has seen the effects of impunity firsthand—particularly on vulnerable minority religious 

groups—during fact-finding trips to Egypt, Nigeria, and Sudan. USCIRF also has monitored the state’s 

failure to punish private, religiously-motivated violence in Afghanistan, Eritrea, India, Iran, Iraq, and 

Pakistan. The absence of accountability breeds lawlessness, which encourages individuals to attack, and 

even kill, others who dissent from or fail to embrace their own religious views, including members of 

minority religious communities. This often leads to endless cycles of sectarian violence. Countering 

impunity is among the greatest challenges the United States government faces as it develops policies to 

effectively promote and protect freedom of religion or belief around the world. 

Nigeria is a tragic case in point. Having visited Nigeria three times over the past year, USCIRF has 

observed how unchecked waves of sectarian violence—for which no perpetrator has yet been brought to 

justice—have engulfed this key nation in a conflagration of impunity. Since 1999, as many as 12,000 

Nigerians have been killed in a dozen incidents. One religious community is pitted against another in 

repeated acts of retributive violence. Victims and perpetrators have included both Muslims and 

Christians. Most recently, in early 2010, 500 persons in a Christian village near the northern city of Jos 

were killed in such sectarian clashes. In this incident, men, women, and children were hacked to death 

with machetes and then dumped into wells. Not a single criminal, Muslim or Christian, has been 

convicted and sentenced in Nigeria’s ten years of religious violence. Therein lies the problem. The 

Nigerian government and judicial system have so far been unwilling or unable to protect either side. 

Until this changes, we can only expect more violence. Already we are seeing the creation of conditions 

for the proliferation of extremist ideology and terrorism. 

Of course, there are other disturbing trends that threaten freedom of religion across the globe. There is 

the exportation of extremist ideology, which USCIRF has observed in Saudi Arabia’s dissemination of 

educational materials that instill hate and incite violence throughout the world. In Iran, the government 

persecutes many of its political opponents in the name of religion under blasphemy and apostasy laws, 

and denies all rights to one disfavored religious group, the Baha’is. There are also countless instances of 

state-sponsored repression of religion: Vietnam imprisons individuals for reasons related to their exercise 

or advocacy of freedom of religion or belief; the Egyptian government fails to provide Baha’is, Coptic 

Christians and other religious minorities the very basic benefits and privileges that others enjoy; North 

Korea bans virtually all worship and imprisons in its infamous labor camps even the grandchildren of 

those caught praying; and China seriously restricts religious activities, church governance, and places of 

worship. 

Even in the most demoralizing of conditions, where repression seems to have all but smothered the 

human spirit, USCIRF has drawn inspiration and determination from people of faith who stand up for 

their freedom and human rights. In December 2009, USCIRF witnessed firsthand a group of irrepressible 

Sudanese political reformers in Khartoum who, only hours before, had been beaten and arrested for 

calling for faithful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement – implementation that is 

essential to preventing another bloody civil war that could result in the deaths of additional millions of 

people from the predominantly Christian and traditional-believing South. In Egypt, USCIRF visited 

Baha’is and Koranists whose co-religionists, because they refuse to compromise their religious principles, 

Page | 1 
Introduction 

have been imprisoned for apostasy and blasphemy, and, in some cases, dismissed from jobs, expelled 

from universities, prevented from receiving inheritance, and denied rights, among others, to open bank 

accounts, buy cars, or obtain marriage certificates, birth certificates, or driver’s licenses, all as a 

consequence of religious discrimination. 

The photo on the cover of this report captures this spirit well: a lone Uighur Muslim woman facing down 

a column of armed Chinese security forces, defiant with her fist raised, declaring that her hope and 

courage will prevail over repressive state policies that seek to crush Uighur rights to religious education 

and to appoint their own religious leaders. With these and other profiles in courage, can there be any 

doubt that it is right and just for the preservation of freedom of religion to be among the fundamental 

principles of our nation’s foreign policy, national security, and economic development agendas? 

Created by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), USCIRF is an independent U.S. 

government commission that monitors religious freedom worldwide and makes policy recommendations 

to the President, Secretary of State, and Congress. Separate from the State Department, USCIRF is the 

only government commission in the world with the sole mission of reviewing and making policy 

recommendations on the facts and circumstances of violations of religious freedom globally. The 

creation of USCIRF is one tangible example of the historic commitment of the United States to religious 

freedom for all. This 2010 Annual Report represents the culmination of a year’s work to expose, counter 

and correct religious freedom abuses. 

The Annual Report covers 28 countries from the period of April 2009 through March 2010. Country 

chapters provide a one-page overview of USCIRF’s findings, the justification for the country’s 

designation by USCIRF, and priority recommendations for action. Each chapter then more fully reports 

on events that took place over the reporting period, emphasizes important elements of the bilateral 

relationship, and details recommendations that would promote freedom of religion or belief as a more 

integral part of U.S. policy. The report is divided into five sections: the first section highlights countries 

which USCIRF has recommended that the State Department designate as “countries of particular 

concern” (CPCs) for severe violations of religious freedom; the second focuses on countries USCIRF has 

placed on a Watch List for violations of religious freedom not meeting the CPC threshold but requiring 

very close attention; the third on other countries USCIRF is closely monitoring; the fourth on multilateral 

organizations; and the fifth on U.S. policy on expedited removal of asylum seekers. 

Over the past year, USCIRF has placed particular emphasis on eight priority countries—China, Egypt, 

Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Vietnam—while continuing to monitor violations of 

religious freedom in other countries and recommending actions to address and to end these violations. 

To carry out its work on priority countries, USCIRF has undertaken delegations to Nigeria, Sudan, Egypt, 

and Vietnam, in addition to consultations at the European Union, the Holy See, the OSCE, and the 

Philippines. USCIRF has also convened civil society roundtables to monitor progress in Sudan; held 

press events focused on religious freedom and the rule of law in China and made detailed 

recommendations to the State Department on ways to improve human rights diplomacy with China; 

highlighted to President Obama needed U.S. engagement with Saudi Arabia; organized Congressional and 

NGO action before Vietnam’s May 2009 Universal Periodic Review session at the UN; met with 

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Deputy Secretary James Steinberg on separate occasions to raise 

concerns about severe religious freedom abuses in Iran and Pakistan, among other countries; and testified 

on the status of human rights and religious freedom in China, Iran, and Vietnam, stressing the need to 

improve U.S. engagement on religious freedom. USCIRF also has advocated on behalf of a diverse array 

of religious communities: Uighur Muslims in China; Shi’a and Ismaili Muslims in Saudi Arabia; Ahmadi 

Muslims in Pakistan and Indonesia; Baha’is, Christians and dissident Muslims in Iran; Buddhists in 

Page | 2 
Introduction 

Page | 3 

Vietnam and China; and a range of indigenous faiths and spiritual movements in China, Egypt, Iraq, and 

Vietnam. 

Additionally, USCIRF played a leading role in mobilizing Congress to engage key countries on the 

problematic “defamation of religions” resolutions when they came before the UN Human Rights Council 

and General Assembly. These are just some of the Commission’s activities over the past 12 months, but 

they fairly represent the nature and breadth of its work. 

In fulfilling its mandate and in response to the many abuses of religious freedom around the world, 

USCIRF repeatedly engaged the Obama administration on ways to promote religious freedom on issues 

critical to U.S. foreign policy. There have been a number of meetings with high-ranking officials from 

the State Department and National Security Council, as well as U.S. ambassadors to key countries. To 

create an “echo chamber” for having the U.S. government more fully address freedom of religion issues, 

Commissioners and staff met with representatives of religious communities and institutions, human rights 

groups, and academics, as well as other non-governmental organizations and policy experts. USCIRF 

advised members of Congress and their staffs, met with high-ranking officials from foreign governments 

and international organizations, participated with U.S. delegations to international meetings and 

conferences, and helped provide training to Foreign Service officers and other U.S. officials. USCIRF 

also held hearings and published op-eds in the Wall Street Journal, the Miami Herald, the Atlanta 

Journal-Constitution, the Washington Times, and the Huffington Post. 

USCIRF’s work is accomplished through the leadership of its Commissioners and engagement of its 

professional staff. Three Commissioners are appointed by the President, while six are appointed by the 

leadership of both parties in the House and Senate. This formula provides that four Commissioners are 

appointed by the Congressional leaders of the party that is not the President’s party, and the party in the 

White House appoints five. (One Commissioner seat was vacant during the reporting period.) The 

Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, a position at the State Department also created 

by IRFA, serves as a non-voting ex officio member. (To date, the position has not been filled by the 

Obama administration.) 

On June 30, 2009, Felice D. Gaer completed her term as Chair, which included the first quarter of this 

reporting period, and Michael Cromartie and Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou were Vice Chairs. On July 1, 

2010, Leonard Leo was elected as Chair, and Michael Cromartie and Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou were 

again elected Vice Chairs. 

In the end, USCIRF’s mandate is to delve into the human rights “hot spots” of the world where freedom 

of religion is being obstructed and trampled, and to offer policy solutions to improve conditions in that 

small but critically important point of intersection of foreign policy, national security, and international 

religious freedom standards. Regrettably, that small point seems to shrink year-after-year for the White 

House and the State Department. This is a deepening problem despite the fact that religious freedom 

should be increasingly more important as one of the core considerations in foreign policy and national 

security. Neither prior Democratic and Republican administrations, nor the current administration, have 

been sufficiently engaged in promoting the freedom of religion or belief abroad. The United States must 

redouble its efforts to raise these concerns at the highest levels of the world community. Anything less 

betrays our history and values, and fails to leverage the extraordinary capacity we have as a nation to 

promote religious freedom and related human rights for all. 
Overview and IRFA Implementation 

REPORT OVERVIEW AND IRFA IMPLEMENTATION 

Countries of Particular Concern and the Watch List 

In May 2009, for the first time, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 

(USCIRF or the Commission) recommended that Nigeria be designated a “country of 

particular concern” (CPC). This determination was based on the fact that after years of 

Muslim-Christian clashes resulting in over 12,000 deaths and many more displaced, not 

a single perpetrator had been brought to justice. The Commission warned that this 

climate of impunity could fuel further violent extremism. Just two months later, the 

radical Islamic sect Boko Haram ignited a wave of violence resulting in about 900 deaths 

in the name of having a stricter version of sharia law imposed in northern Nigeria. In 

December 2009, Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to destroy a Northwest 

Airline flight on approach to Detroit. USCIRF visited Nigeria again in March 2010 and 

found federal government officials, who previously did not meet with USCIRF, attentive 

and even grateful for its concerns and willing to work closely with the U.S. government in 

finding a solution to the breakdown in justice. Indeed, during this visit, the Ministry of 

Justice filed 41 prosecutions in the courts of Jos in response to the latest ChristianMuslim clashes. The State Department is now redoubling its efforts to work with 

Christian and Muslim leaders alike in northern Nigeria. Much more needs to be done, 

but it seems a process toward reform has at least started. 

USCIRF’s work relating to Nigeria over the past 12 months, Vietnam’s release of religious prisoner 

Father Ly, and the elimination by Saudi Arabia of some schoolbook passages that promote intolerance 

and incite violence, along with other developments described in this 2010 Annual Report, illustrate why 

the Commission is uniquely positioned to provide advice to the President, the Secretary of State, and the 

Congress as to which countries should be designated as “countries of particular concern,” or CPCs. 

USCIRF provides for each country detailed policy recommendations for improving religious freedom 

conditions. USCIRF missions abroad give a focus to USCIRF’s mandate: to identify “hot spots” where 

freedom of religion is obstructed and related human rights are trampled, and develop and recommend 

U.S. policy solutions at the critical convergence of foreign policy, national security, and international 

human rights. Advice and recommendations are based on USCIRF’s ongoing review of the facts and 

circumstances of violations of religious freedom through its contacts with non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs), religious groups, U.S. government agencies, and foreign governments, and its 

missions.1

 

 

1

 A note on sources: In addition to information gathered from USCIRF’s trips and meetings, this report is based on 

information from a variety of news sources; reports by the U.S. government and international organizations; written 

communications from foreign governments and embassies; communications from individuals abroad who are 

victims of religious freedom abuses; and reports by numerous U.S. and international non-governmental 

organizations. Non-governmental sources include, but are not limited to, the following: African Centre for Justice 

and Peace Studies, Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam USA, the Almaty Helsinki Committee, American Enterprise 

Institute, the American Islamic Congress, American Jewish Committee, Amnesty International, the Anti-Defamation 

League, Baha’i International Community, the Bangladesh Hindu, Buddhist and Christian Unity Council USA, Boat 

People SOS, Brookings Institution, Cardinal Kung Foundation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center 

“Demos,” Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Chatham 

House, Christian Solidarity International, Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Citizen’s Alliance for Human Rights in 

North Korea, Committee for Religious Freedom in Vietnam, Compass Direct, Coptic Assembly of America, Council 

on Foreign Relations, CubaNet, Democracy Network Against NK Gulag, the Enough Project, Falun Dafa 

Information Center, Farsi Christian News Network, Forum 18, Religious News Service, Free North Korea Radio, 

Freedom House, the Friends of St. Elizabeth’s Church, the Hindu American Foundation, Holy Spirit Study Center, 

the Hudson Institute Center for Religious Freedom, Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch, the Initiative Group 

Page | 4 
Overview and IRFA Implementation 

USCIRF is one of several mechanisms established by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA), along with the Office of International Religious Freedom at the Department of State, headed by 

an Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom. IRFA also mandated that the State 

Department review religious freedom conditions worldwide, by collecting information through its 

embassies and consulates abroad, and issue annually a global report on religious freedom (the Annual 

Report on International Religious Freedom). Based on that review, IRFA’s provisions require the 

President, who has delegated this authority to the Secretary of State, to designate “countries of particular 

concern” (CPCs) whose governments have engaged in or tolerated “particularly severe” violations of 

religious freedom. IRFA defines “particularly severe” violations as ones that are “systematic, ongoing, 

and egregious,” including acts such as torture, prolonged detention without charges, disappearances, or 

“other flagrant denial[s] of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons.” After a country is 

designated a CPC, the President is required by law to take one or more of the actions specified in IRFA, 

or to invoke a waiver if circumstances warrant. 

In this reporting period, USCIRF recommends that the Secretary of State designate the following 13 

countries as CPCs: Burma, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Eritrea, Iran, 

Iraq2

, Nigeria, Pakistan, the People’s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 

and Vietnam. 

The State Department’s January 2009 CPC designations repeated the 2006 designations of eight 

countries: Burma, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Eritrea, Iran, the People’s 

Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan. The State Department issued a 180-day waiver 

on taking any action against Uzbekistan and an indefinite waiver for Saudi Arabia, in both cases to 

“further the purposes of the [International Religious Freedom] Act.” As a result of these waivers, the 

United States will not implement any policy response to the particularly severe violations of religious 

freedom in either country. USCIRF continues to express concern and disappointment that the Secretary 

of State, in this as well as previous administrations, has declined to designate as CPCs the additional 

countries USCIRF has recommended. 

USCIRF also names countries to a Watch List, based on the need to closely monitor serious violations of 

religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by the governments of countries that do not meet the CPC 

threshold. The Watch List provides advance warning of negative trends that could develop into severe 

violations of religious freedom, thereby providing policymakers with the opportunity to engage early and 

 of Independent Human Rights Defenders of Uzbekistan, the Institute for Gulf Affairs, Institute for Security Studies, 

InterAmerican Dialogue, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, International Campaign for Tibet, International 

Christian Concern, the International Crisis Group, the International Rescue Committee, Iran Human Rights 

Documentation Center, the Jehovah’s Witnesses USA, Jubilee Campaign USA, Justice Africa, the Kazakhstan 

International Bureau on Human Rights and the Rule of Law, the Mandaean Human Rights Group, the Middle East 

Institute, Minority Rights Group International, the Moscow Helsinki Group, the Najot Human Rights Group, the 

National Conference on Soviet Jewry, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the National 

Endowment for Democracy, the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States, North Korea 

Freedom Coalition, Open Doors USA, the Open Society Institute, Project on Middle East Democracy, Public 

International Law and Policy Group, Que Me, Redress, Reporters Without Borders, the Russian-Chechen Friendship 

Society, SETARA Institute for Democracy and Peace, the Slavic Center for Law and Justice, the SOVA Center, the 

Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, the Union of Councils 

for Jews in the Former Soviet Union, United Sikhs, U.S. Campaign for Burma, U.S. Committee for Human Rights 

in North Korea, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, the United States Institute of Peace, Uyghur-American 

Conference, Vietnam Committee for Human Rights, Voices for a Democratic Egypt, Voices for Sudan, Wahid 

Institute, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 

2

 While joining the Commission’s report on Iraq, Commissioners Cromartie, Eid, and Land dissented from the CPC 

recommendation, concluding that Iraq should be placed on the Commission’s Watch List. 

Page | 5 
Overview and IRFA Implementation 

increasing the likelihood of preventing or diminishing the violations. USCIRF’s Watch List in this 

reporting period consists of Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, India3

, Indonesia, Laos, Russia, Somalia, 

Tajikistan, Turkey4

, and Venezuela. 

Countries Designated as CPCs 

by the Department of State 

USCIRF Recommendations for 

CPC Designation 

USCIRF 

Watch List Countries 

Burma 

China 

Eritrea 

Iran 

North Korea 

Saudi Arabia 

Sudan 

Uzbekistan 

Burma 

China 

Eritrea 

Iran 

North Korea 

Saudi Arabia 

Sudan 

Uzbekistan 

Iraq 

Nigeria 

Pakistan 

Turkmenistan 

Vietnam 

Afghanistan 

Belarus 

Cuba 

Egypt 

India 

Indonesia 

Laos 

Russia 

Somalia 

Tajikistan 

Turkey 

Venezuela 

Current CPC and Watch List Countries  

Designating a country as a CPC provides the Secretary of State with a range of flexible and specific 

policy options to address serious violations of religious freedom. Sanctions (referred to as Presidential 

actions in IRFA) are not automatically imposed. Rather, the Secretary of State is empowered to enter into 

direct consultations with a government to find ways to bring about improvements in religious freedom. 

While sanctions are a possible policy outcome, IRFA provides the Secretary with other options. For 

instance, IRFA permits the development of a binding agreement with the CPC-designated government on 

specific actions that it will take to end the violations that gave rise to the designation or the taking of a 

 

3

 Commissioner Gaer dissented from the placement of India on the Commission’s Watch List. The full dissent can 

be found in the India chapter. 

4

 Commissioner Eid abstained from the Watch List recommendation, concluding that the situation in Turkey is not 

as serious as in Greece, which is not on USCIRF’s Watch List. 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

“commensurate action.” Also, the Secretary may determine that pre-existing sanctions are adequate or 

waive the requirement of taking action in furtherance of the Act. 

However, in practice the flexibility provided in IRFA has been underutilized and, as a result, the statute 

has not been employed to bring about real progress. The U.S. government generally has not implemented 

new Presidential actions pursuant to CPC designations, but rather has relied on pre-existing sanctions. Of 

the eight countries designated as CPCs by the State Department, only one—Eritrea—faces sanctions 

specifically imposed under IRFA for religious freedom violations. While relying on pre-existing 

sanctions is technically correct under the statute, the practice of “double-hatting” has provided little 

incentive for the other CPC-designated governments to reduce or end egregious violations of religious 

freedom. For these mechanisms to have any real impact on promoting religious freedom, the designation 

of an egregious religious freedom violator as a CPC must be followed by the implementation of a clear, 

direct, and specific Presidential action. 

Actions taken under IRFA 

Burma 22 CFR 126.1: prohibition on exports or other transfers of defense articles 

and defense services pursuant to §§ 2, 38 and 42 of the Arms Export Control 

Act 

China Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, P.L. 101-

246: restriction of exports of crime control and detection instruments and 

equipment 

Eritrea International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 405(a)(13)(B): Denial of 

commercial export to Eritrea of defense articles and services covered by the 

Arms Control Export Act, with some items exempted 

Iran Arms Export Control Act, §40: restrictions on United States security 

assistance. 

North Korea Trade Act of 1974, §§402 and 409 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment): 

restrictions on normal trade relations and other trade benefits 

Saudi Arabia Indefinite waiver of Presidential actions under section 407(a)(2) of IRFA to 

further the purposes of the Act 

Sudan International Financial Institutions Act, §1621: use of the voice and vote of 

the United States to oppose any loan or other use of the funds of the 

International Financial Institutions to or for Sudan 

Uzbekistan 180-day waiver of Presidential actions under section 407(a)(2) of IRFA to 

further the purposes of the Act 

Actions Taken Under IRFA

In addition to implementing specific Presidential actions, the U.S. government should designate CPCs in 

a timely manner. While IRFA does not set a specific deadline, it indicates that CPC designations should 

take place soon after the State Department releases its Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom, as decisions are to be based on that review. 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

As of the end of the reporting period, the Obama administration has yet to make its CPC designations, 

although the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom was released on October 26, 2009. 

USCIRF had expressed concern about the lack of any CPC designations by the Bush State Department 

between November 2006 and January 2009. It is important that the Obama administration issue 

designations soon, so as to bring the timing of these deliberations into closer proximity to the issuance of 

the Annual Report, upon which such decisions are to be based. 

Overview of CPC Recommendations and Watch List 

In accordance with the Commission’s statutory obligations, USCIRF recommends to the Secretary of 

State that 13 countries be designated as CPC’s. In addition, the Commission offers a detailed list of 

specific policy recommendations in order to seek to improve conditions for freedom of religion for each 

CPC. Indeed, there are more than a hundred policy recommendations spanning dozens of pages that 

could be implemented by the State Department, Congress, or other component parts of the Federal 

government. 

This Overview section provides highlights of some of the conditions that justify CPC status, as well as a 

sampling of some of USCIRF’s policy recommendations. It is important to note, however, that the 

enumeration of CPC justifications and proposed policies in the Overview section is by no means 

exhaustive, and is not intended to, nor does it, prioritize recommendations. Each chapter should be 

consulted for a thorough treatment of in-country conditions that justify CPC status as well as a complete 

list of policy recommendations. 

The Overview section also contains a similar review and summary of the Commission’s Watch List 

designations and policy recommendations for those countries. The Watch List includes countries to be 

closely monitored for serious violations of religious freedom that do not meet the CPC threshold. The 

Watch List provides advance warning of negative trends that could develop into severe violations of 

religious freedom, thereby providing policymakers with the opportunity to engage early and increasing 

the likelihood of preventing or diminishing the violations. 

Justification of Commission Recommendations for CPC Designation and Highlights of Policy 

Recommendations 

• The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military junta governing Burma, has one 

of the world’s worst human rights records. In the past year, religious freedom conditions 

continued to deteriorate, as they have since the violent suppression of peacefully demonstrating 

Buddhist monks in September 2007. Burma’s military regime continued its policy of severely 

restricting religious practice, monitoring the activity of all religious organizations, and 

perpetuating or tolerating violence against religious leaders and their communities. The 

government launched a massive and violent crackdown, including the killing, arrest, torture, and 

disappearances of monks and others who participated in large scale, non-violent demonstrations 

calling for the release of political prisoners and greater democracy in late September 2007. The 

junta continues to target monasteries viewed as epicenters of the protests, severely restricting 

religious practice and detaining monks who commemorate the demonstration. The SPDC has 

taken steps to legally ban unregistered Protestant activity and continues to destroy religious sites 

and forcibly promote conversion to Buddhism in ethnic minority areas. The SPDC’s campaign to 

create “Muslim Free Zones” in parts of Burma has created an estimated 300,000 Rohingya 

Muslim refugees in Southeast Asia. Both Bangladesh and Thailand have repatriated or forcibly 

removed Ronhingya Muslims in the past year. Among other actions, the United States should use 

its engagement with the SPDC to ensure a peaceful and complete transition to democracy. In 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

addition, the U.S. should maintain targeted sanctions until the SPDC takes active steps to meet 

benchmarks established in UN resolutions and U.S. law, as well as coordinate with regional 

allies, particularly the democracies of Southeast and South Asia, about supporting such sanctions. 

• In China, the government continues to engage in systematic and egregious violations of the 

freedom of religion or belief. There was a marked deterioration in the past year, particularly in 

Tibetan Buddhist and Uighur Muslim areas. The government continues its campaign to 

“transform” unregistered Christian groups and “strike hard” against “evil cults,” leading to the 

arrest, imprisonment, and mistreatment of religious adherents. Thousands of “house church” 

Protestants have been detained in the past two years. Forty Catholic bishops remain imprisoned 

or disappeared. There also is credible evidence of the systematic torture and mistreatment of 

Falun Gong practitioners in detention. Though China has expanded the “zone of toleration” that 

allows millions of Chinese citizens the ability to worship, it continues to systematically deny the 

ability of religious communities to freely exercise their religion without severe restrictions. All 

religious activities are subject to a strict political and legal framework that represses many 

activities protected under international human rights law, including in treaties China has signed or 

ratified. Among its numerous policy recommendations, USCIRF recommends that the Secretary 

of State impose a new sanction targeting officials who perpetuate religious freedom abuses or 

provinces where religious freedom conditions are most egregious. In addition, USCIRF 

recommends that the United States raise religious freedom concerns in multilateral forums where 

the United States and China are members, coordinate potential sources of leverage within the 

U.S. government and with allies to build a consistent human rights diplomacy with China, 

develop and distribute proven technologies to counter internet censorship and protect Chinese 

activists from arrest and harassment, and raise religious freedom and negotiate binding human 

rights agreements at the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue. 

• The government of Eritrea continues to engage in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations 

of religious freedom. Arbitrary arrests for peaceful religious activities continue, along with 

reports of prolonged detention and harsh treatment of religious prisoners, including the deaths of 

certain religious prisoners due to ill treatment, denial of medical care, or torture. Other serious 

concerns include the continued ban on public religious activities by unofficial religious groups as 

well government closure of their places of worship; an onerous and lengthy registration process 

for religious groups that has never resulted in the government’s approving a registration 

application since the requirement was instituted in 2002; disruption by the security forces of 

private religious and even social gatherings of unregistered religious groups; denial of government 

services and civil and political rights to Jehovah’s Witnesses; and government interference in the 

internal affairs of some of the religious faiths that are recognized by the government, particularly 

the Orthodox Church of Eritrea, the country’s largest Christian community. In addition to 

maintaining existing sanctions against Eritrea, the United States should impose targeted sanctions 

against individuals and institutions identified as responsible for, or complicit in, serious human 

rights abuses. 

• The government of Iran continues to engage in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of 

religious freedom, including prolonged detention, torture, and executions based primarily or 

entirely upon the religion of the accused. During the past year, and particularly since the June 

2009 elections, the Iranian government’s poor religious freedom record deteriorated, especially 

for religious minorities, in particular Baha’is as well as Christians and Sufi Muslims, including 

intensified physical attacks, harassment, detention, arrests, and imprisonment. Dissident Muslims 

were increasingly subject to abuse and several were sentenced to death and even executed for the 

capital crime of moharebeh, or “waging war against God.” A revised penal code that would 

codify serious punishments, including the death penalty, on converts from Islam remains under 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

consideration by the Iranian parliament. Heightened anti-Semitism and repeated Holocaust denial 

by senior government officials have increased fear among Iran’s Jewish community. Since the 

1979 Iranian revolution, members of minority religious communities have fled Iran in significant 

numbers for fear of persecution. USCIRF recommends that the U.S. government fulfill IRFA’s 

statutory requirements by identifying those Iranian officials and entities responsible for severe 

religious freedom violations and imposing travel bans and asset freezes on them, while pressing 

our European allies to do the same. 

• In Iraq, the government continues to commit and tolerate severe abuses of freedom of religion or 

belief, particularly against the members of Iraq’s smallest, most vulnerable religious minorities – 

Chaldo-Assyrian and other Christians, Sabean Mandaeans, and Yazidis. Members of these 

groups continue to suffer from targeted violence, threats, and intimidation, against which they 

receive insufficient government protection. They also experience a pattern of official 

discrimination, marginalization, and neglect. In addition, there continue to be attacks and tense 

relations between Shi’a and Sunni Iraqis. Other egregious, religiously motivated violence against 

women and girls, homosexuals, and Muslims who reject certain strict interpretations of Islam also 

continues. To alleviate the plight of religious minorities, USCIRF has recommended that the 

United States emphasize, with both the new Iraqi government and the KRG, the urgent need, 

among other actions, to protect vulnerable religious minority communities and ensure them 

justice. 

• The government of Nigeria continues to respond inadequately and ineffectually to persistent 

religious freedom violations and violent sectarian and communal conflicts along religious lines. 

The toleration by Nigeria’s federal, state and local governments of systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious violations of religious freedom has created a climate of impunity, resulting in 

thousands of deaths. In 2010, several hundred people were killed in gruesome attacks in and 

around the city of Jos when ethnic and sectarian violence again erupted in that city. In July 2009, 

an Islamic sect wanting to impose a stricter version of sharia law, Boko Haram, fought Nigerian 

security forces and approximately 900 people were killed, including the sect’s leader and at least 

three Christian pastors. Other concerns include the expansion of sharia (Islamic law) into the 

criminal codes of several northern Nigerian states and discrimination against minority 

communities of Christians and Muslims. USCIRF urges that the United States press the Nigerian 

government to prevent and contain recurring sectarian violence by bringing perpetrators to 

justice, and ensure that these issues are an important part of discussions in the context of the 

newly established U.S.-Nigeria Bi-National Commission. 

• North Korea continues to be one the world’s most repressive regimes. Dissent is not tolerated 

and few protections exist for fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion. Existing religious institutions and activity are tightly controlled and 

employed primarily to gain the government foreign assistance from overseas religious groups and 

NGOs. New security measures are used to stop new religious activity from spreading from 

China. Churches, temples, and pagodas built for the government-approved organizations are 

directly controlled and operated by the National Security Agency. Other public and private 

religious activity is prohibited and anyone discovered engaging in clandestine religious practice 

faces official discrimination, arrest, imprisonment, and possibly execution. North Korean 

refugees attest that those viewed to have religious beliefs or to have extensive contact with South 

Korean religious groups are treated more harshly than other inmates. Among other 

recommendations, USCIRF has urged the United States to work with regional allies at the SixParty Talks to raise human rights concerns, including religious freedom, and link future 

economic, political, and diplomatic assistance to progress in these areas, and to fully implement 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

the provisions of the North Korea Human Rights Act, including support for NGOs working to 

build democracy and protect human rights in North Korea.

• Serious religious freedom concerns persist in Pakistan, where religiously discriminatory 

legislation has fostered an atmosphere of intolerance. Positive steps taken by the current 

government have failed to reverse the resulting erosion in the social and legal status of members 

of religious minority communities and the ability of members of the majority Muslim community 

to discuss freely sensitive religious and social issues. A number of Pakistan’s laws abridge 

freedom of religion or belief. Anti-Ahmadi legislation results in discrimination against individual 

Ahmadis and effectively criminalizes various practices of their faith. Blasphemy laws have been 

used to silence members of religious minorities and dissenters within the majority Muslim 

community, and frequently result in imprisonment on account of religion or belief and/or 

vigilante violence. The Hudood Ordinances, Islamic decrees predominantly affecting women that 

are enforced alongside Pakistan’s secular legal system, provide harsh punishments for alleged 

violations of Islamic law. Anti-government insurgents espousing an intolerant interpretation of 

Islam continue to impose a harsh, Taliban-style rule in areas under their control. The 

government’s response to sectarian and religiously motivated violence continues to be 

inadequate, despite increased security operations against extremists. The government of Pakistan 

also continues to promote the flawed “defamation of religions” concept at the United Nations that 

would violate the freedoms of religion and expression. USCIRF deems elimination of Pakistan’s 

blasphemy law as a priority, and urges the U.S. government to pursue this objective and to 

support interfaith dialogue efforts undertaken by the Ministry of Minorities Affairs. 

• Systematic, egregious, and ongoing religious freedom violations continue in Saudi Arabia. 

Despite King Abdullah undertaking some limited reform measures and promoting inter-religious 

dialogue in international fora in recent years, the Saudi government persists in banning all forms 

of public religious expression other than that of the government’s own interpretation of one 

school of Sunni Islam, and interferes with private religious practice of both Muslims and nonMuslim expatriate workers. Ismaili Muslims continue to suffer severe discrimination and abuse 

on account of their religious identity. There is an ongoing crackdown on Shi’a Muslim 

dissidents, which has resulted in numerous arrests and detentions. Members and volunteers of the 

Commission to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice (CPVPV), or religious police, regularly 

overstep its authority with impunity and are not subject to judicial review. Moreover, the 

government continues to be involved in supporting activities globally that promote an extremist 

ideology, and in some cases, violence toward non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. Because of 

these conditions, USCIRF urges the United States to lift the indefinite waiver of action, or at a 

minimum extend a limited 180-day waiver, during which time the Saudi government should 

complete reforms on textbooks and rein in the CPVPV. 

• The government of Sudan commits egregious and systematic violations of freedom of religion or 

belief in those areas under its control. Christians, Muslims who do not follow the government’s 

extreme interpretation of Islam, and those who follow traditional African religions are 

particularly targeted. Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended the North-South 

civil war in January 2005, conditions for religious freedom have improved in Southern Sudan and 

in contested areas in central Sudan. The Government of National Unity instituted by the CPA has 

officially operated under an Interim National Constitution with provisions guaranteeing universal 

human rights, including freedom of religion or belief. Despite these provisions, severe human 

rights violations continue against both non-Muslims and Muslims in government-controlled 

areas, as well as in Darfur where the State Department has determined that acts of genocide have 

taken place and still may be ongoing. The greatest danger to religious freedom and other human 

rights in Sudan is the collapse of the fragile peace brought about by the CPA. The ruling party in 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

Khartoum often has demonstrated a lack of will in seeing the peace agreement brought to a 

successful conclusion. In view of this situation, USCIRF urges the United States to, among other 

actions, insist on full CPA implementation, assist the parties in preparing for a successful 2011 

referendum on the South’s political future, and work with the parties to advance discussions on 

post-2011 issues. 

• Significant religious freedom problems and official harassment of religious adherents persist in 

Turkmenistan. Police raids and other forms of harassment of registered and unregistered 

religious groups continue more than three years after the death of longtime dictator Saparmurat 

Niyazov. The repressive 2003 religion law remains in force, imposing major difficulties for the 

legal functioning of religious groups. Despite decreased emphasis, the Turkmen government still 

maintains the former president’s personality cult through the Ruhnama as a mandatory feature of 

elementary public education. Although the new president has taken some isolated positive steps, 

including the release of the country’s former chief mufti, promised systemic legal reforms 

directly related to religious freedom and other human rights have not been made. Among other 

recommendations, USCIRF encourages the State Department to continue to press the Turkmen 

government to bring its human rights record into compliance with international standards, 

including on freedom of religion or belief, and establish regular bilateral meetings in that regard. 

• The government of Uzbekistan continues to systematically abuse religious freedom and related 

human rights throughout the country. The government exercises tight control over all religious 

practice, and continues to arrest Muslims and close mosques that do not conform to governmentprescribed practices or that it alleges are associated with extremist political programs. As of 

2009, at least 4,500 non-conforming Muslims, including an increasing numbers of women, were 

estimated to be in prison, many of whom reportedly are denied the right to due process and 

subjected to torture. Official repression has extended to members of the country’s small Protestant 

and Jehovah’s Witnesses communities that until recently had been somewhat shielded from the 

government’s anti-religious campaign. Uzbekistan has a highly restrictive law on religion that 

severely limits the ability of religious communities to function, leaving more than 100 religious 

groups currently denied registration. USCIRF recommends that the United States again designate 

Uzbekistan as a CPC. Upon re-designation, no waiver should be given and sanctions should be 

imposed, including a ban on visits to the United States by high-level Uzbek officials. 

• The government of Vietnam continues to impose major restrictions on, and commit egregious 

abuses of, religious freedom. While Vietnam did engage with the U.S. government after it was 

designated a CPC between 2004 and 2006, and that process led to some positive developments 

for religious communities and the release of many prisoners of concern, serious problems remain. 

Individuals continue to be imprisoned or detained for their peaceful religious activity or religious 

freedom advocacy; police and government officials are not held fully accountable for abuses; and 

independent religious activity remains illegal. In addition, improvements experienced by some 

religious communities are not experienced by others, including the Unified Buddhist Church of 

Vietnam, independent Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Protestant groups, and some ethnic minority 

Protestants and Buddhists. Property disputes between the government and the Catholic Church in 

Hanoi over the past year have led to detentions, threats, harassment, and violence by “contract 

thugs” against peaceful prayer vigils and religious leaders. In the past year, the Vietnamese 

government has detained dozens of ethnic minority Protestants for “independent” religious 

activity and tolerated societal violence. It also forcibly disbanded the Buddhist order associated 

with Thich Nhat Hanh. In addition, the government harassed, intimidated, and imprisoned human 

rights defenders who peacefully spoke about legal reform, human rights, and religious freedom. 

Human rights defender Le Thi Cong Nhan was released from prison after completing her 2007 

sentence; she is currently serving house detention. Religious freedom advocate Fr. Nguyen Van 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

Ly was granted temporary humanitarian parole in early 2010 after suffering two strokes while in 

prison. Vietnam, in short, illustrates the problem of lifting a CPC designation prematurely. 

USCIRF continues to urge the Obama administration to re-evaluate its diplomatic and political 

resources available to advance religious freedom and related human rights in its relations with 

Vietnam. The Administration should view CPC designation as a flexible tool in light of its 

previous success in spurring serious diplomatic engagement and achieving measurable 

improvements, while not hampering progress on other areas in the U.S.-Vietnam relationship. 

The Commission’s Watch List 

• In Afghanistan, conditions for religious freedom remain problematic, despite gains in freedom of 

religion or belief since the ouster of the Taliban regime in late 2001. The lack of effective 

government authority outside of Kabul and major provincial centers contributes to a deteriorating 

situation for religious freedom and other related human rights in many areas of the country. 

During the reporting period, a student journalist went into exile following a Presidential pardon 

on a charge of blasphemy. He had originally been sentenced to death, later commuted to 20 years 

in prison, for disseminating materials on women’s rights in Islam. The publishers of an 

independent translation of the Koran, who also had been sentenced to 20 years in prison in 2008, 

were released as part of a Nowruz amnesty. A government ministry announced that it had seized 

and destroyed a shipment of Shi’a religious books from Iran, apparently because they contained 

interpretations of Islam deemed offensive to the majority Sunni community. The government’s 

inclination to accommodate traditional, restrictive views of human rights, specifically regarding 

women, was demonstrated in the controversy over a new family or personal status law for Shi’a 

Muslims. Nascent efforts at national reconciliation could potentially return Taliban or other 

insurgents hostile to international human rights standards to positions of influence. Among a 

range of recommended actions needed to improve respect for freedom of religion, USCIRF urges 

the U.S. government to clearly state its concern for religious freedom as an essential element in 

U.S. policy in Afghanistan and use its influence to support those who advocate respect for human 

rights, including freedom of religion or belief. 

• Harsh religious freedom conditions in Belarus continued during the reporting period. The 

Belarusian government still restricts religious freedom under its 2002 religion law. Authorities 

harassed and fined members of certain religious groups, particularly Protestants. Foreign 

missionaries, clergy, and humanitarian workers affiliated with churches faced increased 

restrictions, including deportation and visa refusal or cancellation. Close supervision of religious 

life is state policy under the religion law, and an extensive government apparatus has stepped up 

efforts to limit the influence of religion and the activities of foreign religious workers. The U.S. 

government should ensure that promotion of freedom of religion or belief is a significant factor in 

its overall engagement to promote democracy and human rights. 

• In Cuba, religious belief and practice continue to be tightly controlled. While there have been 

some minor and inconsistent improvements, the government also has expanded efforts to crack 

down on religious leaders whose churches operate outside of the government-recognized 

umbrella organization for Protestant denominations. In this reporting period, several religious 

leaders were imprisoned and dozens were arrested. The government’s main interaction with, and 

control over, religious denominations is through the regular surveillance, infiltration, and/or 

harassment of religious professionals and laypersons and administrative mechanisms. The 

government continues to hinder the ability of religious organizations to build new or repair 

existing houses of worship. President Raul Castro and the government also have yet to institute 

or indicate plans for major improvements in freedom of religion or belief. Among other actions, 

USCIRF recommends that the United States set objectives for the Cuban government to meet 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

regarding the protection of freedom of religion or belief in Cuba before considering the 

resumption of full diplomatic relations with the island. 

• Serious problems of discrimination, intolerance, and other human rights violations against 

members of religious minorities, as well as disfavored Muslims, remain widespread in Egypt. 

Over the past year, there was an upsurge in violence targeting Coptic Orthodox Christians. The 

government has not taken sufficient steps to halt the repression of and discrimination against 

Christian and other religious believers or, in many cases, punish those responsible for violence or 

other severe violations of religious freedom. This increase in violence and the failure to 

prosecute those responsible fosters a growing climate of impunity. The government also has not 

responded adequately to combat widespread and virulent anti-Semitism in the governmentcontrolled media. Implementation of previous court rulings related to granting official identity 

documents to Baha’is and Christian converts has been limited and subject to onerous delays. 

Disfavored Muslims continue to face discrimination and repression. On a positive note, there 

continued to be public space to discuss and debate a wide range of religious freedom concerns, 

including sectarian violence, in the media and other public fora, which Egyptian authorities in the 

past had discouraged and prevented. To more effectively promote religious freedom in Egypt, the 

U.S. government should, inter alia, establish a timetable with Cairo for implementation of human 

rights and religious freedom reforms. If deadlines are not met, the U.S. government should 

reconsider the allocation of its assistance to the Egyptian government. 

• India is the world’s largest democracy and its multitude of religious communities has historically 

coexisted peacefully. However, India’s progress in protecting and promoting religious freedom 

during the past year was mixed. The Indian government at various levels recognized the problem 

of communal violence and created some structures to address these issues. However, justice for 

victims of communal violence was slow and often ineffective, thereby perpetuating a climate of 

impunity. While there was no large-scale communal violence against religious minorities during 

the reporting period, attacks on Christians and Muslims and their places of worship continued, 

along with incidences of intolerance against both. Among its numerous policy recommendations, 

USCIRF urges the U.S. government to integrate concern for religious freedom and related human 

rights into all bilateral contacts with India, and for the U.S. ambassador to India to speak out 

against, and seek to visit sites of, communal violence. 

• In Indonesia, the vast majority of the nation’s diverse religious communities worship with few 

restrictions, but some religious minorities face extensive governmental restrictions and societal 

violence perpetuated by extremist groups. Segments of the Indonesian government sometimes 

tolerated these acts. The Indonesian government also has made important progress in addressing 

past sectarian violence and arresting suspected terrorists. Concerns remain, however, about new 

government decrees that are used to severely restrict, and in some provinces even ban, the 

activities of the Ahmadiyya community; the forced closures and vandalism of places of worship 

belonging to Christian, Hindu, and Ahmadiyya groups in some localities; the growth and political 

influence of religious extremists; the deepening sectarian divisions in Papua due to human rights 

abuses perpetuated by the military and police; and the harassment and arrest of individuals 

considered “deviant” under Indonesian law. USCIRF policy recommendations include urging the 

Obama administration to deal with pressing social, political, and economic concerns by 

supporting government offices, religious groups, and civil society organizations in Indonesia 

working to promote religious freedom, counter extremism, teach tolerance and human rights, 

pursue legal reform, and build interfaith alliances. 

• In Laos, the central government appears unable or unwilling to address serious religious freedom 

abuses that target members of ethnic minority Protestant groups in provincial areas. Although 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

religious freedom conditions remained stable and even improved in the major urban areas, 

particularly for the majority Buddhist communities, corruption and lack of transparency at the 

provincial level led to increased abuses of religious freedom in the past year. Reports increased 

of local authorities surveilling, detaining, harassing, arresting, and confiscating property in order 

to stop the spread of Protestantism among ethnic minority populations. Reports of forced 

renunciations of faith and forced relocations of religious groups also rose. USCIRF recommends 

that the U.S. government continue to sponsor training for Lao officials on international religious 

freedom and the protection of religious minorities in practice and law. 

• The status of religious freedom in Russia continued to deteriorate due to several negative new 

policies and trends, particularly government use of anti-extremist legislation against religious 

groups that are not known to use or advocate violence. National and local government officials 

increasingly violate the religious freedoms of Muslims and groups they view as non-traditional by 

enforcing other laws, including those on religious organizations and non-governmental 

organizations. Russian officials continue to describe certain religious and other groups as alien to 

Russian culture and society, thereby contributing to a climate of intolerance. Continued high 

levels of xenophobia and intolerance, including anti-Semitism, have resulted in violent, 

sometimes lethal, hate crimes. The Russian government has chronically failed to address these 

serious problems adequately, consistently, or effectively. The U.S. government should urge 

Russia to reform its overly broad law on extremism and other laws negatively affecting human 

rights and freedom of religion or belief, so as to ensure that they are not used to limit the 

fundamental freedoms of peaceful religious groups. 

• Somalia’s internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) controls only a 

small area of the capital and does not have the capacity to enforce religious freedom protections 

or address religious freedom violations. In the absence of the rule of law due to the ongoing 

conflict with a strong sectarian nature, freedom of religion or belief, like all other human rights, is 

circumscribed by insurgents, warlords, self-appointed officials, local authorities, and prevailing 

societal attitudes. The U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization al-Shabaab solidified its 

control over central and southern Somalia, killed Sufi clerics and followers of other religions, 

desecrated Sufi religious sites, forcibly implemented a strict interpretation of Islamic law 

reminiscent of the Taliban, and suppressed practices it deemed “un-Islamic.” USCIRF 

recommends, among other actions, that the U.S. government increase efforts to promote freedom 

of religion or belief in Somalia through support of civil society organizations and engagement 

with Somali government officials, clerics, elders, and diaspora communities and increase 

assistance to education programs and rule of law programs in Somalia. 

• Religious freedom conditions in Tajikistan have deteriorated significantly over the past several 

years, as Tajik law and government policies place major restrictions on religious freedom. These 

restrictions primarily affect Muslims, but also single out minority religious communities. In 

2009, the Tajik government passed a new religion law that codified some restrictions that had 

been informally implemented and introduced a framework for further restrictions. Also in 2009, 

a court ordered a Protestant church to vacate its building and its property was expropriated by the 

Dushanbe city government. Tajik authorities demolished several mosques in 2007, and in 2008 

one church and the nation’s only synagogue were bulldozed. Bans imposed in 2007 continued on 

Jehovah’s Witnesses and two Protestant churches. The U.S. government should work with Tajik 

officials and civil society in adopting human rights reforms, including the amendment of the new 

Tajik religion law, to bring it into conformity with international commitments. 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

• In Turkey, serious limitations on the freedom of religion or belief continue to occur. The state’s 

attempt to control religion and exclude it from the public sphere based on its interpretation of 

secularism result in significant restrictions on religious freedom for the majority Sunni Muslim 

community, the minority Alevis, as well as Christian and other minority communities, such as the 

Greek, Armenian, and Syriac Orthodox Churches and others. Significant restrictions on religious 

freedom for minority communities, including state policies and actions that effectively deny nonMuslim communities the right to own and maintain property, train religious clergy, obtain and 

renew visas for religious personnel working for these communities, and offer religious education, 

have led to the decline—and in some cases virtual disappearance—of these communities. The 

government has not legally recognized minority religious communities, such as the Ecumenical 

Patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church, as independent entities with full legal status. Among 

other recommendations, USCIRF urges the United States to place greater emphasis on Turkey’s 

compliance with its international commitments regarding freedom of religion or belief, and inter 

alia, encourage the Turkish government to address the long-standing lack of full legal recognition 

for religious minorities. 

• Since Hugo Chavez became president of Venezuela in 1998, there has been a steady increase in 

government rhetoric, and in some cases government actions, against the Venezuelan Jewish and 

Catholic communities and U.S.-based Protestant groups. While there are no official restrictions 

on religious practice, actions by President Chavez and other government officials have created an 

environment in which Jewish and Catholic religious leaders and institutions face the risk of 

attack. Furthermore, the Venezuelan government has failed to take adequate measures to hold 

accountable perpetrators of attacks on Jewish and Catholic religious leaders and institutions. 

Recently passed legislation could, if fully implemented, negatively impact religious communities. 

USCIRF recommends that the U.S. government continue its policy of speaking out against 

attacks on religious leaders and institutions, and work with regional governments that may have 

influence with Caracas to encourage Venezuela to end its anti-Semitic statements, fully 

investigate attacks on religious communities, institutions, and leaders, and hold perpetrators 

accountable. 

Implementation of IRFA 

After more than ten years since the enactment of IRFA, the State Department either has not implemented 

or has underutilized key provisions of the law, leaving central aspects of the act unfulfilled. This is the 

case for both Democratic and Republican Administrations. While President Obama has emphasized 

religious freedom in major policy speeches abroad, the Administration to date has not demonstrated the 

intent to break from the practice of previous administrations. 

“Freedom of Religion” as a Priority 

IRFA established as the policy of the United States that the U.S. government would “condemn violations 

of religious freedom” and would work to “promote, and to assist other governments in the promotion of, 

the fundamental right to freedom of religion.” During his first year in office, President Obama 

emphasized religious freedom during high-profile speeches in Ankara and Cairo. In April 2009 in 

Ankara, he noted “freedom of religion and expression lead to a strong and vibrant civil society that only 

strengthens the state, which is why steps like reopening Halki Seminary will send such an important 

signal inside Turkey and beyond.” 

On June 4, 2009, in Cairo, the President directly addressed the issue of religious freedom in his speech to 

the Muslim world. He said in part: 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

The fifth issue that we must address together is religious freedom. Islam has a proud tradition of 

tolerance. We see it in the history of Andalusia and Cordoba during the Inquisition. I saw it 

firsthand as a child in Indonesia, where devout Christians worshiped freely in an overwhelmingly 

Muslim country. That is the spirit we need today. People in every country should be free to 

choose and live their faith based upon the persuasion of the mind and the heart and the soul. This 

tolerance is essential for religion to thrive, but it’s being challenged in many different ways. . . . 

Freedom of religion is central to the ability of peoples to live together. We must always examine 

the ways in which we protect it. 

However, since the Cairo speech presidential references to religious freedom have become rare, often 

replaced at most with references to “freedom of worship.” This change in phraseology could well be 

viewed by human rights defenders and officials in other countries as having concrete policy implications. 

Freedom of worship is only one aspect of religious freedom, and a purposeful change in language could 

signify a much narrower view of the right, ignoring for example, the components of religiously motivated 

expression and religious education. This is not the message our nation should be sending to the world’s 

religious freedom abusers. 

This change in phraseology was evident during the President’s November 2009 trip to Asia, when he 

referred to “freedom of worship” in Japan on November 14, as well as in his town hall meeting with 

Chinese students two days later. In China, he said, “We do not seek to impose any system of government 

on any other nation, but we also don’t believe that the principles that we stand for are unique to our 

nation. These freedoms of expression and worship—of access to information and political participation—

we believe are universal rights.” The President never referred to “freedom of religion” during speeches in 

either country. Moreover, by declaring that the basis for designating these rights as universal is because 

they stem from American “beliefs,” the President’s speech undercuts decades of unanimous affirmation 

and reaffirmation of their universal character in international instruments and conventions. 

Secretary Clinton’s remarks also have embodied this rhetorical shift. She referred to “freedom of 

worship” in her December 14, 2009 address on human rights at Georgetown University. In that speech, 

she said, “To fulfill their potential, people must be . . . free to worship, associate, and to love in the way 

that they choose.” She also called for “for the rights to express oneself and worship freely” in China. In 

her January 21, 2010 Internet freedom speech, she referred to religious freedom once, in a quote from 

President Obama’s Cairo speech, but repeatedly referred to “freedom of worship.” For example, she said, 

“We must work to advance the freedom of worship online just as we do in other areas of life.” 

Because of the policy implications of using “freedom of worship” language, USCIRF urges President 

Obama, Secretary Clinton and other high-ranking U.S. government officials to return to invoking or 

embracing “freedom of religion or belief” or similar language in all public statements and stress the 

universal nature of these and other rights. In doing so, they should also explicitly affirm their 

commitment to broad protection of the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief in all its 

manifestations. 

Appointment of the Ambassador-at-Large 

At the end of the reporting period, the Obama administration had not nominated or put forward for 

confirmation an individual as the State Department’s Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 

Freedom, the highest-ranking U.S. official on religious freedom. In contrast, the Obama administration 

has appointed the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, the Special Representative to 

Muslim Communities, and the Special Envoy to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, none of 

which require Senate confirmation. The Ambassador-at-Large is a key official for the coordination and 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

development of U.S. policy regarding freedom of religion or belief and serves as an ex officio member of 

USCIRF. The lack of an appointment leaves vacant an important policy position. 

Congress intended the Ambassador-at-Large to be a “principal adviser to the President and the Secretary 

of State regarding matters affecting religious freedom abroad,” but USCIRF is concerned that the position 

may have been diminished within the State Department hierarchy. Since the establishment of the 

position, both the Clinton and Bush administrations situated the Ambassador-at-Large in the Bureau of 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) and therefore under its Assistant Secretary. Reportedly, the 

next Ambassador-at-Large will be similarly situated, although other Ambassadors-at-Large, such as for 

Global Women’s Issues, Counterterrorism, and War Crime Issues, have direct access to the Secretary of 

State. The Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom is the only such ambassador not 

situated in the Secretary’s office; instead, he or she reports through four intermediate officials: the DRL 

Assistant Secretary, the Undersecretary for Global Affairs, the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, and 

the Deputy Secretary. Further, some in Congress have stated that DRL is considering structural changes 

that may result in the Ambassador-at-Large losing direct supervisory control over the staff of the Office 

of International Religious Freedom, a change that would break with the practice established over the past 

10 years. 

USCIRF encourages the Obama administration to fill this position promptly, fulfill IRFA’s intent that the 

Ambassador-at-Large be “a principal adviser,” and ensure that he or she is provided with all necessary 

resources, including direct oversight of the Office of International Religious Freedom. 

Other U.S. Government Activities 

Although the Ambassador-at-Large position remains vacant, the Administration has moved ahead with 

numerous follow-up activities to President Obama’s Cairo speech, establishing working groups on many 

of the issues raised. For the religious freedom component, no specific working group has been 

established, but several U.S. government offices and agencies have focused on inter-religious dialogue 

and engagement. Problematically, these efforts make only passing reference to religious freedom, if at 

all, thus ignoring the priority IRFA gave to the issue and the practical fact that religious freedom provides 

the foundation for any successful interreligious dialogue or engagement of religious actors. 

Some recent activities include: 

• At the White House, the President’s Advisory Council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood 

Partnerships has paid specific attention to interfaith dialogue at an international level. The 

Advisory Council, comprised of individuals representing an array of religious communities and 

civil society groups, established six task forces to report on a variety of issues, including 

Interreligious Cooperation. In March 2010, the Advisory Council issued a report with a specific 

chapter on ways the U.S. government could partner with faith groups internationally and 

formulated 11 recommendations. Only one recommendation focused on religious freedom: it 

urged the U.S. government to work with faith communities across religious lines to “expand 

respect for religious pluralism and freedom of religion or belief.” The remaining 

recommendations focused on initiatives to foster multi-religious partnerships both domestically 

and internationally. 

• At the State Department, the Office of International Religious Freedom and the Office of Policy 

Planning undertook new initiatives to promote interreligious dialogue abroad. These culminated 

in the Indonesia-U.S. Interfaith Cooperation Forum, “Building Collaborative Communities: 

Enhancing Cooperation among People of Different Faiths,” that was held in Jakarta in January 

2010. Billed as a follow-up to President Obama’s Cairo speech, the goals of the meeting were to 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

promote and foster multi-religious cooperation and discuss what role governments can play in 

this process. 

• On March 21-24, USAID hosted a regional conference in Bangladesh that focused on 

development and the role of religious and community leaders. This conference was centered 

around USAID’s new programming guide on “Religion, Conflict, & Peacebuilding.” Developed 

by USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Conflict 

Management and Mitigation, the guide explains how to evaluate whether to engage religious 

actors and institutions in USAID development plans and provides examples of appropriate and 

legal engagement. Additional meetings are planned in other regional capitals. 

• Distinct from Cairo follow up, but on the same theme, the Pentagon issued new regulations 

expanding the chaplaincy corps’ role into religious engagement. Under Joint Publication 1-05 

issued on November 13, 2009, commanders now have the option of deploying chaplains beyond 

their traditional pastoral roles to serve as religious leader liaisons in theaters of operation. 

Mindful of their noncombatant status, chaplains can engage religious leaders in humanitarian 

efforts and advise commanders about the concerns of the local religious community. As the 

chaplaincy corps is in the early stages of setting up their training, it is unclear whether personnel 

will be trained, and if so by whom, about the importance of religious freedom in the countries 

where they will be serving. 

 

The recognition by key U.S. government agencies of the need to enhance interaction with religious actors 

is a positive development. However, human rights and religious freedom are not central components of 

these efforts and are only tangentially considered, if at all, thereby implying that these activities can be 

conducted without due attention to either the universal norms of freedom of religion or the requirements 

of IRFA. Religious freedom considerations should be fully integrated into the process by which 

government policy is formulated, thereby strengthening all of these initiatives through a more tightly 

coordinated effort. 

Funding for Religious Freedom Programs

IRFA also envisaged the funding of religious freedom programs, authorizing foreign assistance to 

promote and develop “legal protections and cultural respect for religious freedom.” This authorization 

was unfunded until fiscal year 2008, when $4 million was appropriated for specific DRL grants on 

religious freedom programming under the Human Rights Democracy Fund (HRDF). As of 2009, seven 

religious freedom-specific programs with grants lasting up to three years were funded, a first since 

IRFA’s 1998 passage. 

While the fiscal year 2009 budget did not include a specific earmark for additional DRL grants on 

religious freedom, the Human Rights Bureau set aside $4 million from its HRDF funds. As of May 1, 

2010, the bureau was in the process of vetting proposals. Considering the statutory recognition of these 

programs and the demonstrated interest and capacity of human rights and religious freedom organizations, 

Congress should consider revising this appropriation in the fiscal year 2011 budget or provide a specific 

carve-out of HRDF funds for religious freedom programming. 

Monitoring Mechanisms 

IRFA also mandated that the Secretary of State establish monitoring mechanisms “consisting of lists of 

persons believed to be imprisoned, detained, or placed under house arrest for their religious faith, together 

with brief evaluations and critiques of the policies of the respective country restricting religious freedom.” 

In compiling this list, the State Department was directed to use the resources of the various bureaus and 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

embassies and to consult with NGOs and religious groups. USCIRF is not aware that the State 

Department has established or maintained a comprehensive list of such prisoners. However, USCIRF has 

compiled an informal list of prisoners (see below) that reflects only a small number of those detained, 

jailed, or disappeared. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China maintains a comprehensive 

database of prisoners in China. The ability of both commissions, operating with substantially fewer 

resources and access to international information than does the State Department, to track prisoners 

demonstrates that the State Department can fulfill this statutory mandate. 

Individuals Referenced in the Annual Report as Detained, Jailed or Disappeared on 

Account of Religious Beliefs and/or Activities 

(Individuals listed below reflect only a small number of those detained, jailed, or disappeared)

China: Gao Zhisheng, Xu Na, Fr. Zhang Li, Chen Zhenping, Bishop Jia Zhiguo, Shi Weihan, 

Alimjan Himit, Yang Maodong, Osman Imin, Abdukadir Mahsum, Imam Adil Qarim, Fr. Zhang 

Jianlin, Bishop Su Zhimin, and Gedhun Choekyi Nyima 

Cuba: Reverend Robert Rodriguez, Pastor Omar Gude Pérez, Pastor Bernardo de Quesada Saloman 

and his wife Damaris Marin, and Alexi Perez 

Egypt: Abdel Karim Suleiman, Hassan Shehata Moussa, Hani Nazeer 

Eritrea: Deposed Orthodox Patriarch Abune Antonios under house arrest 

Iran: Ayatollah Mohammad Kazemeni Boroujerdi, Fariba Kamalabadi, Jamaloddin Khanjani, Afif 

Naemi, Saeid Rezaie, Mahvash Sabet, Behrouz Tavakkoli, Vahid Tizfahm, Hamid Shafiee, 

Reyhaneh Aghajari, Vahik Abrahamian, Atiey Youseffi, Somayeh Rashidi, and Mansourreh 

Shojaaiei 

Saudi Arabia: Hadi Al-Mutif, Munir Jassas, Ali Sabat 

Turkmenistan: Sakhetmurad and Mukhammedmurad Annamamedov, Shadurdi Ushotov, Akmurat 

Egendurdiev, Navruz Nasyrlaev, Zafar Abdullaev and Dovran Kushmanov 

Uzbekistan: Dmitri Shestakov, Sergei Ivanov, Irfan Hamidov, Olim Turayev, Hairulla Hamidov; 

Hasan Karimov, Bahtiyor Fattaev, Nasratulla Ibadullaev, Bahodir Hamraev, Bahrom Aminov, 

Yusuf Jumaev 

Vietnam: Nguyen Van Dai, Li Thi Cong Nhan, Fr. Phan Van Loi, Thich Quang Do 

Admissibility to the U.S. of Severe Violators of Religious Freedom 

Another IRFA issue of relevance to both the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) relates to the admission to the United States of aliens who were “responsible for or directly carried 

out...particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” IRFA bars the entry of such individuals. This 

provision has been invoked only once: in March 2005, it was used to exclude Chief Minister Narendra 

Modi of Gujarat state in India due to his complicity in the 2002 riots that resulted in the deaths of an 

estimated 1,100 to 2,000 Muslims. USCIRF had urged such an action. The Commission also continues 

to urge the Departments of State and Homeland Security to develop a lookout list of aliens who are 

inadmissible to the United States on this basis. Directly related to identifying and barring from entry such 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

severe religious freedom violators, IRFA also requires the President to determine the specific officials 

responsible for violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by governments of CPCs, and, 

“when applicable and to the extent practicable,” publish the identities of these officials in the Federal 

Register. Despite these requirements, no individual officials from any CPC countries responsible for 

particularly severe religious freedom violations have been identified to date. 

Treatment of Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal 

IRFA authorized USCIRF to conduct a study into whether asylum seekers subject to Expedited Removal 

are being detained under inappropriate conditions and returned to countries where they might face 

persecution. Expedited Removal is a process established by the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and 

Immigration Responsibility Act that allows for the identification and removal to their countries of origin 

of aliens who arrive in the United States with improper documentation. USCIRF issued its Report on 

Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal (hereafter referred to as the Study) in 2005. The Study identified 

major implementation flaws that place asylum seekers at risk of being returned to countries where they 

may face persecution, as well as serious flaws in the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in 

detention. To address these concerns, USCIRF made a series of recommendations, none of which 

required Congressional action, to the responsible agencies in the Departments of Homeland Security and 

Justice. In 2007, two years after the Study’s release, USCIRF released a “report card” grading the 

agencies on their implementation of the report’s recommendations. In 2009, DHS announced efforts to 

reform its immigration detention policies which, if fully implemented, would address several of 

USCIRF’s recommendations. In addition, two bills were introduced in the Senate during the 111th

Congress that, if enacted, would significantly reform the system by which asylum seekers are detained 

and implement several of USCIRF’s recommendations related to the treatment of asylum seekers in 

detention. 

Assessing the Status of Religious Freedom Firsthand 

Each year, USCIRF delegations visit a number of foreign countries to examine the facts and 

circumstances on the ground for religious freedom and formulate recommendations for potential U.S. 

policy responses. During the current reporting period, USCIRF delegations made trips to Egypt, Nigeria, 

Sudan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. USCIRF delegations also visited Brussels to raise religious 

freedom issues with the European Union and traveled to Rome to meet with officials at the Holy See 

responsible for foreign relations. USCIRF participated in OSCE meetings in Vienna and Warsaw, and 

USCIRF staff visited Kazakhstan, Bahrain, Qatar, Azerbaijan, and Somali refugee camps in Kenya. The 

Commission attempted to visit India, but no visas were granted. USCIRF made two attempts to visit 

Turkmenistan, and while visas were issued both times, government meetings were canceled at the last 

moment and the trips postponed. USCIRF was also not provided visas by Cuba for a fact-finding trip to 

that country. 

Egypt: In January 2010, a USCIRF delegation traveled to Cairo on a fact-finding visit to assess religious 

freedom conditions throughout Egypt. The delegation’s visit took place just weeks after the Naga 

Hammadi incident in Upper Egypt in which six Copts and one Muslim were killed. The USCIRF 

delegation had planned to visit Upper Egypt to meet with victims of the violence, but the Egyptian 

government threatened to cancel the trip unless USCIRF confined its visit to Cairo. Meetings with highranking Egyptian officials also were canceled. Despite these restrictions, USCIRF met with a wide range 

of civil society actors and religious leaders, as well as the Minister of Islamic Endowments, the Grand 

Sheikh of Al-Azhar, and human rights officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

Nigeria: In October 2009 and March 2010, a USCIRF delegation traveled to Nigeria to investigate 

sectarian violence in Nigeria and its impact on religious freedom. During these trips, Commissioners 

engaged high-level federal and state officials on the government’s failure to prevent sectarian violence 

and discussed USCIRF’s previous recommendation that Nigeria be named a CPC. USCIRF delegations 

met several cabinet ministers whose agencies have jurisdiction in these matters, as well as Nigerian 

Senators and Assembly representatives who exercise oversight over these agencies. 

Sudan: USCIRF travelled to Sudan in December 2009 and January 2010. During the December 2009 

trip, Commissioners assessed progress on the implementation of provisions of the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement (CPA) relating to freedom of religion and gathered information on current religious freedom 

conditions and relevant U.S. policies and programs. The delegation witnessed firsthand a crackdown in 

Khartoum in reaction to a call by several members of the parliament for adoption of reformed national 

security and criminal procedure laws in accordance with the CPA. During the January 2010 trip, the 

USCIRF delegation visited Juba, the regional capital of Southern Sudan, and met with senior officials of 

the Government of Southern Sudan and the governing Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, the Human 

Rights Commission of Southern Sudan, and representatives of civil society and religious communities. 

U.S. personnel also briefed the delegation on U.S. programs to assist Southern Sudan in building 

institutions and protecting human rights. 

Vietnam: A USCIRF delegation traveled to Vietnam in May 2009 to discuss religious freedom concerns, 

the fourth USCIRF delegation to the country since 2004. Commissioners and staff met with top 

government officials, including Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem, as well as 

Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, Hoa Hao, and Muslim religious leaders. The delegation was granted 

access to dissidents and individuals detained for religious activity or religious freedom advocacy, 

including the Most Venerable Thich Quang Do, Father Nguyen Van Ly, and Nguyen Van Dai. The 

delegation traveled to Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and the northwest provinces of Dien Bien and Son La. 

OSCE Meetings: USCIRF participated in the official U.S. delegation to a special meeting on religious 

freedom of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) held in Vienna, Austria in 

July 2009. Chair Leonard Leo presented one of the official U.S. interventions. Commissioners also 

engaged in bilateral discussions on religious freedom issues with representatives of Turkey, Belarus, and 

Tajikistan, as well as with OSCE expert bodies, such as the OSCE Panel of Experts on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief and the Personal Representatives on combating anti-Semitism and on discrimination 

against Muslims. Later in 2009, USCIRF was part of the official U.S. delegation to the annual OSCE 

Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw, Poland. At Europe’s largest human rights 

conferences, attended by some 350 NGOs and delegations from the 56 OSCE participating 

States, Commissioners held bilateral meetings with representatives of the Russian, Kazakh, Uzbek, and 

Tajik delegations. 

EU and Vatican Meetings: In late 2009, between trips from Nigeria and to Sudan, USCIRF held meetings 

with European Union (EU) officials and Members of the European Parliament in Brussels to discuss 

religious freedom issues, the UN “defamation of religions” resolutions, and areas in which the EU can 

enhance its work on promoting international religious freedom and related human rights. At the EU, 

USCIRF met with the office of the EU Special Representative for Sudan, and in Rome with high-ranking 

Vatican officials in Rome to discuss the Vatican’s approach to the issue of “defamation of religions” and 

the promotion of religious freedom. USCIRF also met with nearly a dozen African bishops gathered for 

the Vatican’s second African synod to learn more about religious freedom problems in various African 

countries that are on the Commission’s lists. 

Philippines: USCIRF Commissioners and staff traveled to Manila, Philippines, in February 2010 and 

participated in an interfaith conference on religious freedom in Asia. The Philippine government’s 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

President’s Committee on Interfaith Initiatives hosted the conference during which Commissioners 

discussed the importance of religious freedom in U.S. foreign policy and explored ways Southeast Asian 

countries could better incorporate religious freedom initiatives into their policies. Commissioners also 

met with Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and urged her government to vote against 

“defamation of religions” resolutions at the UN. 

Commission Staff Travel: USCIRF staff made country visits to gain information about the status of 

freedom of religion or belief. In May 2009, USCIRF staff traveled to Bahrain and Qatar and met with 

government officials and a wide range of civil society representatives, including religious leaders, human 

rights groups, lawyers, academics, and other NGOs. USCIRF staff in May 2009 also visited Tajikistan, a 

country that USCIRF put on its Watch List for the first time in 2009. In June 2009, USCIRF staff visited 

Kazakhstan to better understand the country’s human rights situation in light of Kazakhstan’s upcoming 

chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010. In December 2009, staff visited Azerbaijan in order to ascertain the 

trends surrounding the new religion law. In January 2010, USCIRF staff traveled to Kenya to meet with 

Somali, U.S., and UN officials to explore religious freedom and human rights conditions in Somalia, 

particularly in the areas under militia control. Also in January 2010, staff travelled to Indonesia to learn 

more about the status of religious freedom in the world’s most populous Muslim country. 

Engaging the U.S. Executive Branch and Foreign Governments on Religious Freedom 

During the reporting period, USCIRF played an active role in working to raise awareness of religious 

freedom concerns to the executive branch of the U.S. governments. Engagement occurred through faceto-face meetings and letters to U.S. officials, including but not limited to President Obama and Secretary 

of State Hillary Clinton. USCIRF also engaged representatives of foreign governments in Washington, 

DC, and, in preparation for this Annual Report, USCIRF wrote to the Washington, DC embassies of all 

28 countries covered to request information relevant to their laws and policies affecting freedom of 

religion or belief. 

Raising Religious Freedom Concerns in Meetings with the Executive Branch and Foreign Governments 

Presentation of 2009 Annual Report: In June 2009, Commissioners met with Secretary of State Hillary 

Clinton and presented USCIRF’s Annual Report. During this meeting, Commissioners discussed issues 

including President Obama’s Cairo speech and the “defamation of religions” campaign at the UN. 

Commissioners also focused on religious freedom problems in countries including Pakistan, Saudi 

Arabia, Russia, and Vietnam. 

“Country of Particular Concern” Recommendations: In March 2010, USCIRF met with Deputy 

Secretary James B. Steinberg, the second highest-ranking official at the State Department, to discuss 

Commission recommendations for the designation of “countries of particular concern.” Specifically, 

Commissioners raised Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China. 

Egypt: In March 2010, a USCIRF delegation met with Egyptian Ambassador to the United States, Sameh 

Shoukry, in Washington to discuss the possibility of an expanded follow-up visit to Egypt and raise 

religious freedom concerns. Regrettably, the Egyptian Ambassador reacted in an inflammatory manner 

and rejected every USCIRF concern raised. 

Nigeria: USCIRF met with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Ambassador Johnnie Carson 

in February 2010 to discuss religious tensions as a source of instability in Nigeria and support for 

continued USCIRF engagement with Nigerian officials, as well as the continued need for high-level U.S. 

leadership on Sudan. 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

Pakistan: In September 2009, USCIRF briefly met with the Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, and had an extended meeting with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, Paul Jones. USCIRF also met with Scott Busby, Director for Human Rights in 

the National Security Council’s Office of Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights. In these meetings, 

USCIRF emphasized the correlation between the persecution of religious minorities and the rise of 

religious extremism in Pakistan and the importance of U.S. support for the efforts of the Pakistani 

Minister for Minorities Affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti, to promote religious tolerance and greater respect for the 

rights of members of religious minority communities. That same day, USCIRF also met briefly with 

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale to introduce her to 

Federal Minister Bhatti and discuss his initiatives in support of religious minorities in Pakistan. 

Saudi Arabia: In September 2009, USCIRF briefed the new U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James 

Smith, on ongoing religious freedom concerns. Commissioners urged him to make promotion of 

religious freedom a priority and address the creation and exportation of extremist literature. 

Sudan: USCIRF met with Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan General J. Scott Gration in May and 

September 2009. The meetings focused on the current human rights situation in Sudan, the upcoming 

elections and referendum, and the importance of engaging international support to help ensure full 

implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). USCIRF also had two meetings on 

Sudan with key officials at the National Security Council. In October, Commissioners and staff met with 

Michelle Gavin, the NSC Senior Director for Africa, to discuss USCIRF’s work. In December, 

Commissioners and staff met with the NSC Senior Director for International Organizations and Human 

Rights, Samantha Power, to brief her on a recent trip to Sudan and provide her with recommendations for 

U.S. government action. 

Detention of Asylum Seekers: USCIRF met Department of Homeland Security Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Policy Esther Olavarria and Brandon Prelogar, Special Advisor for Refugee & Asylum Affairs, in June 

2009 to discuss the agency’s views on expedited removal and the detention of asylum seekers. In 

October 2009, USCIRF met with Dora Schriro, Special Advisor on Detention and Removal for the U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), to discuss detention issues generally and reforming the 

asylum detention system specifically. These meetings helped facilitate an October meeting with Beth 

Gibson, Senior Counselor to John Morton, the ICE Assistant Secretary to discuss ICE’s detention policy 

and views on parole. 

Written Advocacy with U.S. Officials and Foreign Governments 

Bangladesh: In June 2009, USCIRF wrote the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, to raise key 

areas of concern regarding religious freedom. 

China: USCIRF wrote President Obama in November 2009 to urge him to raise religious freedom and the 

rule of law with Chinese officials and seek meetings with prominent human rights defenders 

Egypt and Saudi Arabia: In May 2009, USCIRF wrote President Obama urging him to raise concerns 

about religious freedom and related human rights during his meetings with King Abdullah of Saudi 

Arabia and President Mubarak of Egypt. USCIRF urged the President to request that King Abdullah 

spearhead Saudi government efforts to halt the exportation of extremist ideology. USCIRF also urged the 

President to raise concerns with President Mubarak about serious religious freedom violations affecting 

members of minority Muslim communities and Muslim dissidents. 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

Egypt: In September 2009, USCIRF urged the U.S. government, through a letter to Secretary Hillary 

Clinton, to vigorously oppose the candidacy of Farouk Hosni of Egypt to be Director General of the 

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), citing his public 

commitment to personally burn Israeli books if he found them in Egyptian libraries. Additionally, 

USCIRF wrote to President Obama in August 2009 urging the Administration to establish a timetable 

with the Egyptian government for implementation of specific political and human rights reforms. 

India: In November 2009, USCIRF wrote President Obama urging him to raise religious freedom 

concerns when meeting Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The letter, while noting the stated 

commitment of the Prime Minister’s Congress Party to religious tolerance, called attention to the Indian 

government’s inadequate responses to violence against religious minority communities, including 

Christians in Orissa in 2008 and Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. 

Iran: In October 2009, USCIRF wrote Secretary of State Clinton expressing the need for religious 

freedom and human rights to be an element of ongoing negotiations with the government of Iran. 

Iraq: In a July 2009 letter to Vice President Biden, USCIRF highlighted the deteriorating conditions for 

religious freedom and related human rights in Iraq, especially for the country’s smallest religious 

minorities. USCIRF also sent letters to General Raymond Odierno and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Christopher Hill in early February 2010 regarding the March election in Iraq, urging the U.S. to assist the 

Iraqi government in ensuring that the election was safe, fair, and free of intimidation and violence and 

that all Iraqi citizens, including religious minorities, could fully participate. 

Kazakhstan: USCIRF wrote the Ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan in August 2009 requesting 

information regarding the then upcoming trial of Evgeny Zhovtis, a leading Kazakh human rights lawyer 

and activist whom USCIRF had brought to the U.S., and asking for clarification of legal issues raised by 

his trial.

Libya: In February 2010, USCIRF wrote the Libyan ambassador to the United States requesting 

information about reports of Eritrean refugees in Libya being forcibly returned to Eritrea. 

Nigeria and Somalia: In July 2009, USCIRF urged Secretary of State Clinton to raise religious freedom 

concerns with officials of Nigeria and Somalia during an upcoming visit to Africa. Regarding Nigeria, 

the letter drew the Secretary’s attention to recurrent communal and sectarian violence, discrimination 

against minority communities, and the use of violence by extremists to promote the expansion of a stricter 

form of Islamic law throughout the country. Regarding Somalia, USCIRF advised the Secretary that 

religious extremism and lack of rule of law must be addressed as well as piracy, terrorism, and the 

security situation. 

Pakistan: In August 2009 USCIRF wrote to the Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador 

Richard C. Holbrooke, urging him to support efforts underway within Pakistan to remove the blasphemy 

laws and other discriminatory legislation that have had a negative impact on freedom of religion or belief 

and other universal human rights of Pakistan’s citizens, particularly members of religious minorities. 

Removing these laws would promote U.S. national security interests and human rights. 

Russia: In July 2009, USCIRF urged President Obama to raise human rights issues including freedom of 

religion or belief, in his meeting with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. 

Sudan: USCIRF sent an August 2009 letter to Special Envoy Gration that focused on recent developments 

in U.S.-Sudan policy. In a January letter to Secretary of State Clinton, USCIRF offered an analysis of the 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

situation in Sudan and made recommendations for consideration during the upcoming interagency 

quarterly review of U.S. Sudan policy. 

Turkmenistan: In October, USCIRF wrote the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkmenistan requesting 

information regarding the case of a jailed Turkmen civil society activist Andrei Zatoka. 

Uzbekistan: In December 2009, USCIRF wrote Secretary Clinton urging her to raise religious freedom 

concerns during her meeting with the Uzbek Foreign Minister, noting the significance of Uzbekistan 

being designated a “country of particular concern” and the need for U.S. government action. 

Vietnam: In January 2010, USCIRF wrote President Obama urging him to review current policy towards 

Vietnam and to consider designating the country as a CPC. 

Country of Particular Concern Recommendations: In a January 2010 letter to Secretary Clinton, USCIRF 

urged the Secretary to name additional countries as CPCs and to take additional towards countries 

previously designated as CPCs. 

Human Rights Council UPR Review: USCIRF wrote Secretary of State Clinton in January 2010 urging 

U.S. representatives to the United Nations office in Geneva to raise questions about violations of religious 

freedom and related human rights in Iran, Iraq, and Egypt during the Human Rights Council’s Universal 

Periodic Review. 

Convening Public Hearings, Testifying before Congress, Briefing Congressional Staff, and 

other Public Events 

In 2009-2010, USCIRF organized and participated in numerous public hearings and events, including the 

following: 

Iran Hearing – February 25, 2010: USCIRF Chair Leonard Leo testified before the Tom Lantos Human 

Rights Commission on The Current Status of Human Rights and Religious Freedom in Iran. In his 

testimony, Mr. Leo noted that the Iranian government has imposed harsh prison sentences on prominent 

reformers from the Shi’a majority community, many of whom have been tried on criminal charges of 

“insulting Islam,” and that systematic repression extends to religious minorities, particularly Baha’is, as 

well as Christians and Sufi Muslims. He also expressed concern about heightened anti-Semitism and 

repeated Holocaust denial by senior Iranian government officials. Mr. Leo urged Congress to impose 

sanctions against Iran due to the government’s violations of religious freedom. 

Pakistan’s Federal Minister for Minorities Affairs Shahbaz Bhatti, Briefings – February 2010 and 

September 2009: USCIRF facilitated a series of briefings by Federal Minister Bhatti for Members of 

Congress and their staff and Obama Administration officials, academic experts, and representatives of 

non-governmental organizations. These briefings focused on the current situation of Pakistan’s religious 

minority communities and the Pakistan government’s response to an upsurge in religiously motivated 

violence. 

Human Rights Day Briefing – December 11, 2009: The Dutch Embassy and USCIRF held a briefing in 

Congress to celebrate human rights day and mark the anniversary of the adoption of the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights. The event comprised a panel discussion on religious freedom. Panelists 

included Ambassador Jones-Bos of the Netherlands; Mr. Michael Cromartie, Vice-Chair of USCIRF; Ms. 

Lynne Davidson, Senior Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

Labor; Professor Thomas Melia, Deputy Executive Director of Freedom House; and Mr. William Davis, 

director of the United Nations Information Center in Washington. The discussion was moderated by 

USCIRF Director of Policy and Research, Mr. Knox Thames. 

Detention of Asylum Seekers Staff Briefing – November 16, 2009: Along with staff from Human Rights 

First and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, USCIRF briefed Congressional staff on problems with the 

current detention system, the key provisions in S. 1594, the Secure and Safe Detention and Asylum Act, 

and the Department of Homeland Security’s reform plans. 

Congressional Muslim Staffers Association (CMSA) Briefing – November 13, 2009: USCIRF briefed 

CMSA members on USCIRF’s work to engage domestic and international Muslim communities. 

“Defamation of Religions” Hearing – October 21, 2009: USCIRF Chair Leonard Leo testified before the 

Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission on Implications of the Promotion of “Defamation of Religions.” 

During his testimony, Mr. Leo noted that the “defamation of religions” concept promotes intolerance and 

human rights violations, creating wide latitude for governments to restrict free expression and religious 

freedom. This testimony was part of a USCIRF effort to alert Congressional offices to the problems with 

the defamation concept. 

Sudan Discussions – September - November 2009: USCIRF held three roundtable discussions, on 

September 11, October 21, and November 17, 2009 with non-governmental organizations and 

Congressional staff concerned with U.S. policy toward Sudan. The discussions focused on U.S. policies 

in support of the full implementation of Sudan’s CPA, particularly those dealing with the upcoming 

elections and the January 2011 referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan and the Obama 

Administration’s Sudan strategy that was announced on October 19, 2009. 

Nigeria Hearing – September 24, 2009: USCIRF Chair Leonard Leo testified before the congressional 

International Religious Freedom Caucus on Prospects for Justice in Northern and Central Nigeria: 

Government Responses to Religious Extremism and Root Causes. Mr. Leo discussed a USCIRF 

delegation trip to Abuja, Kaduna, Kano, and Bauchi city, and meetings with government officials and 

Muslim and Christian religious leaders. Mr. Leo conveyed the Commissioners’ views that the 

government of Nigeria had done little to prevent sectarian violence and made no serious efforts to 

investigate or prosecute the perpetrators of sectarian killings. 

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Conference Call – September 24, 2009: As part of CFR’s Religion 

and Foreign Policy conference call series for foreign policy analysts and religious leaders, USCIRF Chair 

Leonard Leo and Vice-Chair Elizabeth Prodromou led a discussion on religious freedom and U.S. foreign 

policy. Commissioners discussed USCIRF’s work and highlighted concerns in China, Saudi Arabia, 

Vietnam, and Nigeria and with the “defamation of religions” concept being promoted at the UN. 

Iran Staff Briefing – September 14, 2009: USCIRF briefed House staff on Human Rights and Religious 

Freedom Violations in Iran: What Can Congress Do to Raise Awareness and Advocate for 

Accountability? The briefing focused on human rights and religious freedom in Iran, especially after the 

June 12 elections, and suggested actions that Congress could take. Dr. Payam Akhavan, Professor of Law 

at McGill University and Co-Founder of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre, also participated. 

“Defamation of Religions” Staff Briefings – August 13 and May 28, 2009: USCIRF briefed 

Congressional staff on the campaign by some members of the United Nations to create a new 

international standard that would limit the freedoms of religion and expression by protecting religions, 

rather than individuals, from alleged “defamation.” Such a standard would violate key human rights 

principles, promote intolerance and human rights violations, and subvert international human rights law. 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

Vietnam Hearing – July 23, 2009: USCIRF Vice-Chair Michael Cromartie testified before the Tom 

Lantos Human Rights Commission on The Status of Human Rights and Religious Freedom in Vietnam. 

He reported on USCIRF’s fourth trip to Vietnam during which the delegation visited Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh 

City, and the Northwest provinces of Son La and Dien Bien. He noted that many religious communities 

and religious freedom advocates face harassment, restrictions, fines, detentions, property destruction, 

discrimination, and police intimidation, and that USCIRF continues to recommend that Vietnam be 

designated a CPC under IRFA for its severe violations of the freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion. 

Somalia Staff Briefing – July 14, 2009: USCIRF organized a roundtable of Congressional staff, other 

government representatives, and experts to discuss conditions in Somalia and developing a U.S.-Somali 

policy that would address a range of issues including security, terrorism, governance, and human rights in 

that country. 

Uighurs Hearing – June 10, 2009: USCIRF Chair Felice Gaer testified during a hearing before the House 

International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Uighurs: A History of Persecution. The hearing examined the persecution of the Uighur 

Muslim community in China. Other witnesses were the President of the World Uighur Congress Rebiya 

Kadeer, Uighur refugee Nury Turkel, and Georgetown University Professor James Millward. 

International Religious Freedom, Member Briefing – June 9, 2009: USCIRF Commissioners Felice Gaer 

and Elizabeth Prodromou briefed members of the House Democratic Faith Working Group on the 

Importance of Religious Freedom: Nexus between Religious Extremism, Poverty, Instability and Threats 

to National Security, and presented case studies on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sudan. 

Nigeria Briefing – April 22, 2009: Two of Nigeria’s most important religious leaders, Muhammad Sa’ad 

Abubakar III, the Sultan of Sokoto, and Rev. Dr. John Onaiyekan, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Abuja 

and president of the Christian Association of Nigeria, spoke on Capitol Hill about the opportunities and 

challenges for stemming Nigeria’s religious violence. They highlighted the challenges they face in 

addressing Nigeria’s recurring inter-religious and ethnic violence and met with members of Congress. 

Working with Congress 

USCIRF’s work with Congressional offices on both sides of the aisle has resulted in the incorporation of 

its findings and policy recommendations into many bills, resolutions, and letters from Members of 

Congress. USCIRF also is a regular source of information, counsel, and insight for many committees and 

Members of Congress. Highlights of USCIRF’s work with Congressional offices include: 

“Defamation of Religions” Letter Campaign – February 2010 and November and March 2009: In 

February 2010 and March 2009, USCIRF worked with House staff to send letters from House members to 

heads of state of 20 countries to urge opposition to the “defamation of religions” resolution in the UN 

Human Rights Council. In November 2009, a similar effort led to 35 Representatives sending letters to 

the foreign ministers of 188 countries prior to the vote in the UN General Assembly on the “defamation of 

religions” resolution. One version of the letter was sent to 44 countries that previously had opposed the 

“defamation” resolution, urging their continued opposition, and another version to 144 countries that had 

abstained or supported the resolution, urging them to vote “no.” 

Iraq Religious Minorities Resolutions (S. Res. 322 and H. Res. 944) – December 3 and October 26, 2009: 

USCIRF worked with House and Senate staff on these resolutions, which call on the U.S. government to 

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

urge the Iraqi government to protect religious minorities by encouraging free and fair elections, training 

Iraqi security forces, and providing safe places to worship. They also seek investigations into human 

rights violations, and call for the U.S. to work with the Iraqi government to ensure the physical and 

economic safety of those wishing to remain in Iraq. The House passed H. Res 944 in February 2010. 

Iran Sanctions Senate Legislation – November 19, 2009: The Senate-passed Comprehensive Iran 

Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009 (S. 2799) that was introduced by Senators Chris 

Dodd (D-CT) and Richard Shelby (R-AL) includes language that reflects USCIRF recommendations. 

More specifically, the bill includes sense of Congress language that the President should: press the Iranian 

government to respect its citizens’ human rights and religious freedoms; identify Iranian officials 

responsible for violating these rights; and respond appropriately, including prohibiting their entry into the 

U.S. and freezing their assets. The bill also calls for additional funds for the Secretary of State to collect 

and share information on human rights abuses. 

Engaging UN Ambassadors in New York – November 16, 2009: Commissioners and Representative 

Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), a Congressional member of the U.S. General Assembly delegation, hosted a 

meeting for selected UN ambassadors in New York to urge them to vote against the “defamation of 

religions” concept. 

Pakistan House Resolution H. Res. 764 – September 23, 2009: USCIRF worked with House offices on 

this bipartisan resolution that expressed the sense of the House of Representatives on the importance of 

inter-religious dialogue and the protection of religious freedom and related human rights for persons of all 

faiths in Pakistan. 

Saudi Arabia – Letter to Secretary of State Clinton, August 12, 2009: USCIRF worked with Senate 

offices on a letter to Secretary of State Clinton signed by ten Senators. The letter expressed concern 

about Saudi Arabia’s lack of progress in curbing the promotion of intolerance and extremism, given that 

three years had passed since the Saudi government agreed to take concrete steps to halt the dissemination 

of hatred toward non-Muslims. In the letter, the Senators urged the Administration to undertake a public 

assessment of these efforts. USCIRF also worked with House offices on a July 21 letter signed by 26 

Members of Congress sent to the Secretary expressing concern about the lack of progress toward 

removing passages from Saudi Arabian textbooks that promote hatred of Jews, Christians, and other nonMuslims, expound historical inaccuracies, and propagate the subjugation of women. 

Detention of Asylum Seekers Senate Legislation – August 6, 2009: Senator Lieberman (D-CT), along with 

Senators Kennedy (D-MA), Leahy (D-VT), and Akaka (D-HI), introduced the Secure and Safe Detention 

and Asylum Act (S. 1594) that would reform the U.S. system by which asylum seekers are detained, and 

help ensure that asylum seekers are treated in accordance with U.S. law. S. 1594 would address many 

problems that USCIRF identified in a 2005 report and a 2007 follow-up report on the treatment of asylum 

seekers in expedited removal. In addition to working on the bill, USCIRF organized a Senate staff 

briefing that focused on S. 1594, reforms announced by the Department of Homeland Security, and 

problems in the current detention system. 

Vietnam – April 1, 2009: The Congressional Caucus on Vietnam, co-chaired by Representatives Lofgren 

(D-CA), Smith (R-NJ), Sanchez (D-CA), and Cao (R-LA), worked with USCIRF to organize a meeting 

with non-governmental organizations in advance of the UN Human Rights Council’s review of Vietnam 

during the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). From this meeting, participants developed a list of 

suggested questions for the UPR, which the Representatives sent to the U.S. Mission to the United 

Nations in Geneva, along with urging the Obama Administration to actively participate in the review. 

U.S. officials cited individual cases in their questions, setting a new precedent at the UPR and 

demonstrating U.S. leadership can help improve the procedure.

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Overview and IRFA Implementation 

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Raising Public Awareness through the Media 

During the reporting period, USCIRF released more than seventy-five press releases regarding 

international religious freedom violations throughout the world. USCIRF’s work was cited thousands of 

times in prominent domestic and international media outlets, including in the Washington Post, the 

Economist, the Wall Street Journal, the Boston Globe, the New York Times, Salt Lake Tribune, Politico, 

the Associated Press, Reuters, Time, Agence France Press, and McClatchy News Service. USCIRF press 

releases focused on a wide range of religious groups and issues, including the plight of Uighurs, Tibetans 

and Christians in China, Bahai’s in Iran, Buddhists in Vietnam, and Copts in Egypt; ensuring full 

implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan as a means of preserving freedom of 

religion; and the flawed concept of “defamation of religions” resolutions at the United Nations. 

USCIRF Commissioners have been interviewed numerous times on major networks, including CNN, 

BBC, CBN, and Fox. They also have authored opinion articles that were published in the Wall Street 

Journal, the Miami Herald, the Huffington Post, the Washington Times, and the Atlanta JournalConstitution on U.S. immigration policy, Turkey’s treatment of religious minorities, Saudi Arabia’s 

extremist textbooks, and India’s treatment of its religious minorities, respectively. 

USCIRF press activity includes reaching out to the foreign press. In a recent month’s sampling, USCIRF 

Commissioners were quoted in Radio Free Asia, VOA, RFE/RL, The (Canada) Whig, Calcutta Telegraph, 

Times of India, Nigeria Guardian News, Pakistan Daily, Sudan Tribune, Irish Times, Sudan News Daily, 

Wall Street Journal Asia, Outlook India, India Journal, The Hindu, Hindustan Times, Vietnam Net, 

Varlden Idag, al-Jazeera, Al Arabiya, Asia News, and many others. 

As a means of building support of new U.S. policies promoting freedom of religion abroad, USCIRF 

press outreach also includes engaging the religious media. USCIRF Commissioners and press releases 

have been quoted in Baptist Standard, Christian Post, Epoch Times, Compass Direct, Crosswalk, 

Catholic Culture, Organizer, Zenit, Christianity Today, Christian Today India, Christian Telegraph, U.S. 

Copts Association, Anglican Media Melbourne, Catholic News Agency, and Pakistan Christian TV. 

USCIRF’s website—www.uscirf.gov—is a resource containing these and other documents and materials, 

as well as information about its activities. 
Countries of Particular Concern 

Country Chapters: Countries of Particular Concern 

Burma 

FINDINGS: The State Peace, and Development Council (SPDC), the military junta governing Burma, 

remains one of the world’s worst human rights violators. The SPDC severely restricts religious practice, 

monitors the activity of all religious organizations, and perpetrates violence against religious leaders and 

communities, particularly in ethnic minority areas. In the past year, the SPDC has engaged in severe 

violations of the freedom of religion and belief including: the arrest, mistreatment, and harassment of 

Buddhist monks who participated in peaceful demonstrations in 2007 or are suspected of antigovernment activity; the severe repression and forced relocation of the Rohingya Muslim minority; the 

banning of independent Protestant “house church” activities; and the abuses, including forced labor, 

relocations, and destruction of religious sites, against ethnic minority Protestants. 

 

In light of these systematic, egregious and ongoing violations, USCIRF again recommends in 2010 that 

Burma be designated as a “country of particular concern” (CPC). The State Department has designated 

Burma as a CPC since 1999. 

 

Religious freedom violations affect every religious group in Burma. Buddhist monks who participated 

in the 2007 peaceful demonstrations were killed, beaten, arrested, forced to do hard labor in prison, and 

defrocked. Buddhist monasteries viewed as epicenters of the demonstrations continue to face severe 

restrictions on religious practice. Monks suspected of anti-government activities have been detained in 

the past year. Muslims routinely experience strict controls on a wide range of religious activities, as 

well as government-sponsored societal violence. The Rohingya minority in particular are subject to 

pervasive discrimination and a relocation program that has produced thousands of refugees in Southeast 

Asia. In ethnic minority areas, where low-intensity conflict has been waged for decades, the Burmese 

military forcibly promotes Buddhism and seeks to control the growth of Protestantism by intimidating 

and harassing adherents. A 2009 law essentially bans independent “house church” religious venues and 

Protestant religious leaders in Rangoon have been pressured to sign pledges to stop meeting. 

 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: After a policy review in 2009, the Obama administration 

retained wide-ranging sanctions targeting the SPDC yet also started a “pragmatic dialogue” with senior 

SPDC leaders and expanded humanitarian aid. Administration officials have said that sanctions will not 

be lifted without concrete results on concerns such as nonproliferation assistance, free and fair elections, 

release of political prisoners, and humanitarian aid delivery. In USCIRF’s view, religious freedom 

improvements and democratization are closely linked in Burma. In addition, the SPDC’s human rights 

violations are regional security concerns, requiring U.S. leadership and coordination with regional and 

European allies and the UN. USCIRF recommends that the U.S. government use its engagement with 

the SPDC to ensure a peaceful and complete transition to democracy. Targeted sanctions should remain 

until the SPDC takes active steps to meet benchmarks established in UN resolutions and U.S. law. The 

United States should continue to build support for the implementation of targeted sanctions while 

coordinating the diplomatic actions of regional allies, particularly the democracies of Southeast and 

South Asia. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy towards Burma can be found at the end of this 

chapter. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Religious Freedom Conditions 

Crackdown on Buddhism after the 2007 “Saffron Revolution” 

 

Burma has experienced ongoing conflict since its independence in 1948. The SPDC deals harshly with 

any group it perceives as a threat to its hold on power, including and especially ethnic minority groups 

whose religious affiliation is an identifying feature. The government infiltrates and monitors the activities 

of all organizations, including religious groups. Religious groups are also subject to broad government 

restrictions on freedom of expression and association. The SPDC controls all media, including religious 

publications and sermons which are occasionally subject to censorship. 

While ethnic minority Christians and Muslims have encountered the most long-term difficulties, in the 

aftermath of the 2007 peaceful anti-government demonstrations, the regime also began systematically to 

repress Burmese Buddhists, closing monasteries, arresting and defrocking monks, and curtailing their 

public religious activities. Despite this crackdown on Buddhist monks and monasteries, the SPDC 

generally promotes Therevada Buddhism, particularly in the ethnic minority areas, sometimes pressuring 

or offering economic inducements to encourage conversion. Throughout Burma’s history, patronage of 

the Buddhist community was necessary to legitimize a government’s hold on power. SPDC leaders have 

continued this practice, publicly participating in Buddhist rituals. Buddhist doctrine is an optional course 

taught in all government run schools and daily prayer is required of all students; in some schools, children 

are reportedly allowed to leave the room during this time if they are not Buddhist, but in others they are 

compelled to recite the prayer. In addition, the Burmese military builds pagodas and has destroyed 

religious venues and other structures in Christian and Muslim areas. 

Nevertheless, government interference in Buddhist affairs predated the 2007 crackdown. Members of the 

Buddhist sangha are subject to a strict code of conduct that is reportedly enforced through criminal 

penalties. Monks are not allowed to preach political sermons or make public statements, or produce 

literature with views critical of SPDC policies. Monks are also prohibited from associating with or 

joining political parties. Military commanders retain jurisdiction to try Buddhist monks in military 

courts. In several instances between 1988 and 2009, monks and nuns were defrocked or detained, and an 

estimated 100 monks and novices remain imprisoned as prisoners of conscience for activities that 

occurred prior to the September 2007 events, according to the State Department’s 2009 Annual Report on 

International Religious Freedom. 

The importance of Buddhism in Burma’s life and culture is critical to understanding the significance of 

the September 2007 protests. Following the arrest, detention, and beating of activists who organized the 

initial protests against government increases in fuel prices, Buddhist monks took over the leadership of 

growing demonstrations. The monks broadened the scope of the protests and began calling for the release 

of all political prisoners and the initiation of a process leading to democratization in the country. In the 

ensuing weeks, Buddhist monks organized peaceful demonstrations in most of Burma’s major cities. 

After the SPDC ordered the military to crack down on the monk-led demonstrations, there were reports of 

at least 30 deaths, although some experts estimate that the actual number was much higher. Journalists 

and activists in Burma state that at least 4,000 people, an unknown portion of whom were monks, were 

arrested during the crackdown, with estimates that between 500 and 1,000 remained in detention months 

later. Many of the detained reportedly have been mistreated or tortured. Given the lack of transparency 

in Burma, it is difficult to determine how many people remain in prison or are missing. A September 

2009 Human Rights Watch report claims that, at that time, 240 monks were still in prison for their roles in 

the 2007 protests. In addition, since the crackdown, hundreds of Buddhist monks have fled to Thailand 

seeking asylum. They have reported torture, forced defrocking, hard labor, and other deprivations during 

detention. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Recent Repression of Buddhism 

In the immediate aftermath of the 2007 protests, the military raided 52 monasteries, detained many 

monks, and arrested those perceived to be the leaders of the demonstrations. These monks were then 

tortured, forcibly defrocked, and forced to return to their villages. Several monasteries remain closed, or 

are functioning in a more limited capacity, including Rangoon’s Ngwe Kyar Yan monastery, to which 

only approximately 50 of the original 180 monks in residence have been permitted to return. In addition, 

Maggin monastery in Thingan Gyun township, Rangoon was forcibly sealed off by the authorities in 

November 2007. Most of its monks and lay assistants were arrested or detained for supporting the 

protests and giving refuge to democracy activists. In addition to being a religious center, Maggin 

monastery was also an orphanage and a hospice for HIV/AIDS patients. 

Government authorities continue closely to monitor monasteries viewed as focal points of the protest and 

have restricted usual religious practices in these areas. Monks perceived to be protest organizers have 

been charged under vague national security provisions, including “creating public alarm;” “engaging in 

activities inconsistent with and detrimental to Buddhism;” “the deliberate and malicious...outraging of 

religious feelings;” and “engaging in prohibited “acts of speech intended for religious beliefs.” 

In April 2009, authorities arrested two monks, U Chit Phay and U Aung Soe Wai, after they led a prayer 

meeting for the release of the democratic political activist leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Also in April, a 

group of approximately 50 members of the opposition National League for Democracy were arrested after 

assembling for prayer at the Zee Phyu Village pagoda in Rakhine province. In March 2009, two monks 

were arrested and sentenced to five years imprisonment with hard labor for allegedly planning to hold a 

ceremony to support the All Burma Monk’s Association. 

In August 2008, authorities arrested monks U Damathara and U Nandara, both from the Thardu 

monastery in Rangoon. Their current whereabouts are unknown. 

During a February 2009 general amnesty of 6,313 prisoners, nine monks were released including U 

Kaytharam U Ingura, U Thireina, U Marlaina, U Ardatesa, U Takekanateya, U Damitika, U Nandathiri, 

and U Sandima. 

Active Repression of Religious Minorities 

In the past year, minority religious groups, especially Muslims and Christians, continued to face serious 

abuses of religious freedom and other human rights by the military. In some localities, military 

commanders have conscripted members of ethnic and religious minorities against their will for forced 

labor. Those who refuse conscription are threatened with criminal prosecution or fined. Those who do 

not carry out their tasks have been shot or beaten to death. Christians and Muslims have been forced to 

engage in the destruction of mosques, churches, and graveyards and to serve as military porters. They 

reportedly have also been forced to “donate” labor to build and maintain Buddhist pagodas and 

monasteries. There are reports from NGOs and international media that two Muslim activists seeking to 

document religious freedom and related human rights violations were arrested. Their whereabouts are 

unknown.

Burmese and Rohingya Muslims 

Tensions between the Buddhist and Muslim communities have resulted in outbreaks of societal violence 

over the past several years, some of it instigated by Burmese security forces. Muslims in Rakhine state, 

on the western coast, and particularly those of the Rohingya minority group, continued to experience the 

most severe forms of legal, economic, religious, educational, and social discrimination. The government 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

denies citizenship status to Rohingyas because their ancestors allegedly did not reside in the country at the 

start of British colonial rule. In 2007, five UN Special Rapporteurs called on the SPDC to repeal or 

amend its 1982 Citizenship Law to insure compliance with international human rights obligations. 

Without citizenship status, Rohingyas do not have access to secondary education in state-run schools, 

cannot be issued government identification cards (essential to receive government benefits), and face 

restrictions on freedoms of religion, association, and movement. Approximately 800,000 Rohingya live 

in Burma, primarily in Rakhine state. Refugees living in Bangledesh report that some Rohingya are 

prevented from owning property, residing in certain townships, or serving as government officials. Since 

1988, the government reportedly has permitted only three Muslim marriages per year in certain villages of 

Rakhine state. Efforts to lift this restriction have failed. Muslims also report difficulties in obtaining 

birth certificates for newborns, particularly in the city of Sittwe. 

Enforcement of discrimination policies targeting Muslims widened in the past year. Police and border 

guards also continue inspections of Muslim mosques in Rakhine state; if a mosque cannot show a valid 

building permit, the venue is ordered destroyed. Nine mosques were closed in the previous year. The 

government also permitted the destruction of religious centers and schools. During the reporting period, 

the Burmese government maintained a campaign to create “Muslim Free Areas” in parts of Rakhine state. 

Military commanders have closed mosques and madrassas, stoked ethnic violence, and built pagodas in 

areas without a Buddhist presence, often with forced labor. Refugees report that the military continues to 

entice conversion to Buddhism by offering charity, bribes, or promises of jobs or schooling for Muslim 

children. The Burmese military has stepped up its presence in Rakhine state recently, reportedly in 

advance of planned 2010 elections. 

An estimated 300,000 Muslim Rohingya live in refugee camps in Bangladesh, Thailand, and other 

Southeast Asian countries. They often live in squalid conditions and face discrimination, trafficking, and 

other hardships. In April 2009, 800 additional Rohingyas fled to Bangladesh, complicating an already 

dire refugee situation. In July 2009, Bangladeshi security forces destroyed the dwellings of Rohingya 

refugees and began repatriating them to Burma. In December 2009, 9000 Rohingyas were repatriated, 

reportedly as part of a new energy agreement between Bangladesh and Burma. In 2008, the Thai military 

began pushing back out to sea the boats of Rohingya asylum seekers. 

In 2004, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern over the plight of Rohingya 

children, particularly with regard to the denial of their right to food, health care, and education, as well as 

to their ability to survive, develop, and enjoy their own culture and be protected from discrimination. In 

2007, a panel of UN experts, including the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar and the 

UN Special Rapporteur on Racism, Racial Discrimination, and Xenophobia, declared that the Burmese 

government’s denial of citizenship to Rohingya Muslims “has seriously curtailed the full exercise of their 

civil political, economic, social and cultural rights and led to various discriminatory practices.” In March 

2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma reported to the UN Human Rights Council 

that he was “deeply concerned about the systematic and endemic discrimination faced by the Muslim 

community... [which] lead[s] to [their] basic and fundamental human rights being denied.” The specific 

concerns he identified included “restrictions of movement; limitations on permission to marry; various 

forms of extortion and arbitrary taxation; land confiscation and forced evictions; restricted access to 

medical care, food and adequate housing; forced labor; and restrictions on Muslim marriages.” 

Forced Closure of Protestant “House Churches” 

Christian groups in Burma continue regularly to experience difficulties in obtaining permission to build 

new churches, hold public ceremonies or festivals without permission, and import religious literature. A 

government regulation promulgated in early 2008 bans religious meetings in unregistered venues, such as 

homes, hotels, or restaurants. Burmese Christians claim that 80 percent of the country’s religious venues 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

could be closed by the regulation. “House churches” proliferated in the past decade because the 

government regularly denied permissions to build new churches. 

In January 2009, the SDPC took steps to enforce the regulation, ordering 100 churches and religious 

meeting places in Rangoon to stop holding services and forcing Protestant leaders to sign pledges to that 

effect. There are additional reports of church closings in Mandalay. Burmese Christians believe that 

enforcement of the government’s ban came in response to humanitarian aid they provided to Cyclone 

Nargis victims in May 2008. In the aftermath of the cyclone, the SPDC forcibly closed some religious 

charities providing humanitarian support, particularly those channeling foreign assistance. 

 Abuses Targeting Ethnic Minorities 

Christian groups in ethnic minority regions, where low-intensity conflicts have been waged for decades, 

face particularly severe and ongoing religious freedom abuses. The Burmese military has destroyed 

religious venues, actively promoted conversion to Buddhism, confiscated land, and mandated forced 

labor. The Chin, Naga, Kachin, Shan, Karen, and Karenni peoples, each with sizable Christian 

populations, have been the primary targets of these abuses. In the past year, for instance, authorities in 

Kachin state halted attempts by the Shatapru Baptist Church to build a Christian orphanage. In late 2007, 

a military general in Shan state confiscated land from a Catholic diocese and destroyed the home of the 

bishop. No compensation has been awarded. In ethnic minority areas, Christians are required to obtain a 

permit for any gathering of more than five people outside of a Sunday service. Permission is regularly 

denied, or secured only through bribes. 

There are credible reports that government and military authorities continue efforts actively to promote 

Buddhism among the Chin and Naga ethnic minorities as part of its pacification program. Although 

forced conversions reportedly have decreased in recent years, refugees continue to claim that government 

officials encourage conversion though promises of economic assistance or denial of government services. 

Chin families who agree to convert to Buddhism were offered monetary and material incentives, as well 

as exemption from forced labor. Chin women are particularly vulnerable, as there are a growing number 

of credible reports that the Burmese military encourages or condones rape by its soldiers as an instrument 

of war. Burmese Buddhists soldiers are also offered financial and career incentives to marry and convert 

Chin Christian women. 

Chin Christians claim that the government operated a high school that only Buddhist students could 

attend; students were guaranteed jobs upon graduation. Also, NGOs reported that Christian students in the 

Kachin state are not only forced to learn the Burmese language, but to become Buddhist, without their 

parents’ knowledge or consent. 

In 2007, a Christian pastor was arrested for writing a letter to General Than Shwe, the chief of the 

military junta, urging an end to the persecution of Christians. Naga Christian refugees leaving Burma 

report that members of the army, together with Buddhist monks, closed churches in their villages and 

attempted to force adherents to convert to Buddhism. 

Over the past five years, the Burmese military has expanded operations against ethnic minority militias in 

parts of eastern Burma, reportedly destroying schools, hospitals, religious sites, and homes, killing 

civilians, and raping women. New refugees have entered India and Thailand, where they face squalid 

conditions and possible forced relocation. According to international media and NGO reports, an 

estimated 100,000 Chin Christians fled to India during the past year, in hopes of escaping persecution. In 

early January 2010, international NGOs reported that more than 2000 Karen villagers were forced to flee 

following attacks by the Burmese Army. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

United Nations Efforts 

Burma has been a focus of the UN over the past few years. The European Union has annually introduced 

a resolution at the UN General Assembly critical of Burma’s human rights record, which the United 

States has always cosponsored. This resolution was adopted most recently in December 2009. The UN 

Human Rights Council also issued similar condemnations in 2008 and 2009, and extended the mandate of 

the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burma in 2010. 

The UN Secretary General also has had a Special Envoy for Burma, Ibrahim Gambari, who made seven 

trips to the country since 2006, most recently in 2009. Critics assert that the Special Envoy has been too 

solicitous of the SPDC and has achieved only a few symbolic prisoner releases, however. In December 

2009, Mr. Gambari was appointed to a different UN position; his replacement as Special Envoy for 

Burma has yet to be named. 

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burma recently called on the UN to set up 

a commission of inquiry to investigate possible “gross and systematic” violations by the SPDC that may 

entail crimes against humanity under the under the terms of the Statute of the International Criminal Court 

(ICC). Since Burma is not a member of the IC C, a successful referral to the ICC would require a UN 

Security Council resolution. However, future U.S. diplomatic options in the UN Security Council appear 

limited. 

U.S. Policy 

The United States has diplomatic relations with Burma but has not had an ambassador to the country 

since 1992. In February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that neither economic sanctions 

nor “constructive engagement” was working to halt egregious human rights abuses or expand democracy 

in Burma. After a policy review, the Obama administration announced the beginning of a “pragmatic 

dialogue” with Burmese authorities. Secretary Clinton stated that the United States was committed to 

engaging Burma’s generals in dialogue “without setting or dictating any conditions.” Since then, State 

Department officials have reportedly held numerous meetings with SPDC officials. However, Assistant 

Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has stated that the United States will not lift existing sanctions until the 

SPDC makes progress on a number of issues including nonproliferation, release of political prisoners, and 

progress toward free and fair elections. The Obama administration has also publicly expressed concern 

over growing Burma-North Korea relations. 

 

The United States has imposed a number of targeted sanctions on Burma, including a suspension of aid, 

opposition to new loans to Burma by international financial institutions, and prohibitions on U.S. private 

investments in Burma. In 2003, Congress passed the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act (P.L. 108-

61) banning imports to the United States from Burma. This ban was extended in 2006 by the U.S. JADE 

Act. Most members of Congress and Burmese exiles favor maintaining the full range of U.S. sanctions 

until the Burmese regime terminates major human rights abuses and makes fundamental political 

concessions to Aung San Suu Kyi in a comprehensive agreement for a democratic system. This is 

unlikely to happen anytime soon, as the SPDC has banned Aung San Suu Kyi from participating in 

planned 2010 elections and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), unanimously decided 

to boycott the elections. By not agreeing to participate, the NLD has to disband. 

 

Burma was a priority of the Bush administration in 2005-2007. The United States successfully pressed 

Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) governments to deny Burma leadership of ASEAN, 

and urged regional allies, as well as China, to step up bilateral pressure on the SPDC. The Bush 

administration’s major initiative was to place Burma on the agenda of the UN Security Council. In 2007, 

the United States proposed a formal resolution at the Security Council listing benchmarks for progress 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

and possible sanctions. However, despite U.S. diplomatic efforts, China and Russia vetoed the resolution, 

and Indonesia abstained on the vote. 

USCIRF believes that U.S. leadership is essential to bringing democratic change and an end to human 

rights violations in Burma, including religious freedom. The United States should continue to build 

support for targeted sanctions and full access to the country by various UN mechanisms, while also 

coordinating the diplomatic actions of regional allies, particularly the democracies of Southeast and South 

Asia. Engagement with the SPDC should focus on issues that will lead directly to the expansion of 

democracy and protection of vulnerable ethnic and religious minorities, an end to human rights and 

religious freedom violations, the release of all prisoners, including Aung San Sui Kyi, and the equal and 

transparent distribution of humanitarian assistance. 

Recommendations 

In addition to continuing to designate Burma as a CPC, the U.S. government should take the following 

policy actions towards Burma: 

I. Strengthening the Coordination of U.S. Policy on Burma, both within the U.S Government 

and with U.S. Allies 

The U.S. government should: 

• appoint a Special Envoy on Burma, with the rank of Ambassador, to coordinate multilateral and 

bilateral diplomatic efforts and serve as the Administration’s point person to bring about political 

reconciliation and democratic reform in Burma; coordinate with regional and European allies on 

sanctions, humanitarian aid, counternarcotics, nonproliferation, trafficking in persons, and other 

policy objectives, including religious freedom and related human rights; and 

• organize a coalition of democratic nations in Asia to replace the moribund Bangkok Process in order 

to construct a roadmap outlining concrete steps Burma needs to take in order to end economic and 

political sanctions and engage with Burma’s top leader on issues of concern, including addressing 

humanitarian and human rights abuses, the release of all political and religious prisoners, a durable 

solution for refugees, and the peaceful transition to civilian rule. 

II. Pressing for Immediate Improvements to End Religious Freedom Abuses 

The U.S. government should use its engagement with the government of Burma and with Burma’s closest 

allies to urge the government of Burma to address the following issues of concern: 

y release all persons detained or arrested for the peaceful exercise of religious freedom and related 

human rights, and reveal the whereabouts of people who are still detained and missing, including the 

Buddhist monks and others who led or participated in peaceful protests; 

 

y release NLD Chair Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners and directly engage with the NLD 

and leaders of the country’s ethnic minority groups in a dialogue leading to a peaceful, time-bound, 

and monitored transition to democratic civilian rule; 

y end the forced closures of churches and mosques, the destruction of religious shrines and symbols, the 

instigation of communal violence against Muslims, the forced promotion of Buddhism and the 

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renunciation of other religions among ethnic minorities, and discrimination against non-Buddhist 

minorities; 

y lift all restrictions on the construction and renovation of churches and mosques and on the printing of 

religious literature, consistent with international standards, and end policies of forced eviction from, 

and the confiscation and destruction of, Muslim and Christian properties, including mosques, 

churches, religious meeting points, schools, and cultural centers; 

y end the use of forced labor and the use of children and members of religious minorities as porters or 

military labor, and adhere to its own Order 1/99 (May 1999) and Order Supplementing 1/99 

(November 2000), which instruct SPDC officials and military commanders to refrain from employing 

forced labor of civilians, except in emergencies; 

y end policies that discriminate on the basis of religion in land use, education, allocation of land, job 

promotion, marriage, access to government services, citizenship, freedom of movement, and 

marriage, and invite international technical assistance to help draft laws that conform to international 

legal standards on these matters; 

y allow religious groups and civil society organizations to provide humanitarian and reconstruction 

assistance to the victims of natural disasters, including those still afflicted by the aftermath of 

Cyclone Nargis, and to work openly with the UN, the Tri-Partite Core Group, and other international 

donors; 

y grant unimpeded access to the country by relevant UN mechanisms including the UN Secretary 

General’s Special Envoy on Burma, the UN Special Rapporteur on Burma, and the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief; and 

y ratify core international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights. 

III. Assisting and Supporting UN and Other Multilateral Diplomatic Efforts 

The U.S. government should: 

• initiate action on a new UN Security Council resolution on Burma that offers the UN Secretary 

General a clear mandate for his interactions with Burmese authorities, including full and unimpeded 

access for the UN Special Envoy on Burma and the UN Special Rapporteur on Burma; a clear 

timetable, with repercussions, for the Burmese government if it does not immediately and 

unconditionally release all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi; the establishment of a 

UN monitoring mission of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights inside Burma; and the 

taking of steps to ensure a peaceful and orderly transition to civilian rule; 

• seek access to Burma by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief for an 

immediate visit with unrestricted access to religious communities and to regions where religious 

freedom abuses are reported; and 

• urge ASEAN to expand the Tri-Partite Core Group to discuss other issues of concern with Burma, 

including protections for ethnic minorities and refugee issues, particularly a durable solution for 

Rohingya Muslims. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

IV. Supporting Local Democracy Efforts through U.S. Programs 

The U.S. government should: 

y continue to provide assistance, through the State Department’s Economic Support Fund and all other 

means, to empower Burmese civil society groups organizing humanitarian assistance, conducting 

human rights documentation efforts (particularly religious freedom abuses faced by the Muslim and 

Buddhist communities), and providing public advocacy, leadership, and legal training to Burmese 

living in and outside of Burma. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

(North Korea) 

FINDINGS: The Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is one of the 

world’s most repressive regimes. Severe religious freedom abuses occur regularly, including: 

surveillance, discrimination, and harassment of both authorized and unauthorized religious activity; the 

arrest, torture, and possible execution of those conducting clandestine religious activity; and the 

mistreatment and imprisonment of asylum-seekers repatriated from China, particularly those suspected of 

engaging in religious activities or having religious affiliations. 

Based on these violations, USCIRF again recommends in 2010 that North Korea be designated as a 

“country of particular concern,” or CPC. The State Department has designated North Korea as a CPC 

since 2001. 

The North Korean government continues to have a deplorable human rights and religious freedom 

record. Dissent is not tolerated and few legal or political protections exist for universally recognized 

rights. The government controls most aspects of daily life, including religious activity, which is allowed 

only in government-operated religious “federations” or a small number of government-approved “house 

churches.” Other public and private religious activity is prohibited. Anyone discovered engaging in 

clandestine religious activity is subject to discrimination, arrest, arbitrary detention, disappearance, 

torture, and public execution. A large number of religious believers are incarcerated in kwan-li-so (North 

Korea’s infamous penal labor camps), though the exact number is difficult to verify given the 

government’s control over information. The situation for North Korean refugees remains acute. 

Asylum-seekers repatriated from China are interrogated about their religious belief and affiliations, and 

those suspected of distributing religious literature or having ongoing connections with South Korean 

religious groups are mistreated and imprisoned as security threats. Testimony from former North Korean 

refugees indicates that clandestine religious activity in North Korea is increasing, as are the 

government’s attempts to halt its spread. In recent years, police and security agency offices have 

infiltrated Protestant churches in China, started training police and soldiers about the dangers of religion, 

and set up fake prayer meetings to catch worshippers. There was one reported case of a public execution 

in the past year. A woman was executed for distributing Bibles and her entire family was sent to prison. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: U.S. officials have publicly supported the inclusion of human 

rights concerns within the structure of the Six-Party Talks on nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean 

peninsula, but these issues have been sidelined until North Korea agrees to verification of 

denuclearization. USCIRF believes that negotiations with North Korea will not succeed unless rooted in 

a broader security framework that includes agreements on humanitarian and human rights concerns. 

USCIRF urges the administration to work with regional allies at the Six-Party Talks to raise human rights 

concerns, including religious freedom, and link future economic, political, and diplomatic assistance to 

progress in these areas. The Commission also continues to recommend that the U.S. government 

implement fully the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2008, including its provisions to support NGOs 

working to build democracy and protect human rights in North Korea and to create a security cooperation 

regime in northeast Asia similar to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 

Additional recommendations for U.S. policy toward North Korea can be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Religious Freedom Conditions 

The Government-Imposed Cult of Personality 

Since 1945, North Korea’s once diverse and vibrant religious community has, for the most part, 

disappeared. This community once included Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, and Chondokoyists 

(followers of Chondokyo, or “Eastern Learning,” a syncretic belief system largely based on Confucianism 

but which also incorporates elements of Taoism, Shamanism, Buddhism, and Catholicism). An untold 

number of religious leaders and practitioners were killed, jailed, disappeared, or have fled to South Korea 

after World War II. The government forcefully propagates a nationalist ideology based upon the cult of 

personality surrounding both Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim Jong Il. All citizens are required to adhere to 

this belief system, often called Juche, or face onerous fines and penalties. Pictures of the “Great Leader” 

(Kim Il Sung) and the “Dear Leader” (Kim Jong Il) must be displayed on the walls of homes, schools, and 

workplaces. Every North Korean wears a lapel pin of the Great Leader, and students are required to study 

and memorize the “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System of the Party.” 

Juche’s ideological education takes precedence over all other academic subjects in the nation’s schools. 

Each North Korean community reportedly maintains a “Kim Il Sung Research Center” or similar 

institution where local citizens are required to attend weekly meetings to watch propaganda films, listen 

to educational sessions on the principles of Juche, and engage in public self-criticism sessions. Any 

functioning religious belief or practice outside of Juche is viewed by the government as a challenge to the 

cult of personality surrounding the Kim family, and their subsequent authority. 

Religious activity is either tightly controlled or repressed. In an attempt to blunt international criticism of 

North Korea’s religious freedom record, in 1988 the government created “religious federations” for 

Buddhists, Chondokyists, Protestants, and Catholics. These federations were intended to represent 

religious communities that had been long repressed by directing the building of churches and temples as 

well as negotiating development assistance from international humanitarian organizations. However, 

former refugees and defectors testify that the federations are led by political operatives whose goals are to 

substantiate the government’s policy of control over religious activity. These federations exist to conceal 

from international attention the government’s repression of religious activity, to maintain religious venues 

as both cultural relics and tourist attractions, and to direct assistance programs from foreign donors. 

Government Control of Buddhism 

Accounts provided by former North Korean refugees claim that Buddhist temples and shrines are 

maintained as cultural heritage sites by gwalliwon (caretaker monks) who do not perform religious 

functions. Instead, these monks are employed by the government and their activities are limited to giving 

lectures, leading tours, and meeting foreign dignitaries. The preservation of Buddhist temples, including 

the government’s ongoing refurbishment of an existing site at Anbul, South Hamgyeong Province and the 

rebuilding of the Shingye Temple, is mainly a testament to North Korea’s Buddhist material culture. 

Still, refugee testimony provides little evidence of an underground Buddhist presence. 

Government Control and Repression of Christianity 

The DPRK authorized the building of some Christian churches beginning in 1998. The capitol city of 

Pyongyang contains one Catholic and two Protestant churches. Services have reportedly been held in 

these churches since the mid-1990’s, when foreign humanitarian aid workers came to Pyongyang during 

North Korea’s famine. In 2006, the government authorized the construction of a Russian Orthodox 

church in Pyongyang. Nonetheless, defectors and refugees assert that these churches are heavily 

monitored and that the sites exist primarily as showpieces for foreign visitors. North Koreans who attend 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

services in the churches are not allowed to interact with foreign visitors. There is no Catholic clergy in 

North Korea. 

The government also claims that there are 500 approved “house churches” in the country. There are 

credible reports that participants are individuals whose families were Christians before 1950 and as such, 

are allowed to gather for worship without leaders or religious materials. Most of the “house churches” are 

in urban areas, and the families who are allowed to use them reportedly are segregated in separate housing 

units. 

There continue to be credible reports of clandestine religious activity in North Korea, though its scope 

remains difficult to verify. Refugee reports continue to confirm that illegal religious materials are 

available and secret religious meetings occur, spurred by cross-border contact with China. The North 

Korean government has always repressed clandestine religious activity; and this activity in the border 

regions is viewed as an additional threat to national security. The North Korean government sees new 

religious growth as spurred by South Korea humanitarian and missionary groups in China. Police and 

border security units are trained to halt the spread of religious ideas and root out clandestine religious 

activity. Anyone caught engaging in the distribution of religious materials, holding secret religious 

gatherings, or having ongoing contact with overseas religious groups is subject to severe punishment 

ranging from imprisonment in labor camps to execution. In March 2006, Son Jong Nam was sentenced to 

death for spying based on evidence that he converted to Protestantism. He has been severely tortured in 

prison and it is unclear, at this time, whether he has been executed. Reports from South Korean NGOs 

indicate that in June 2009 Ri Hyon Ok was publicly executed for distributing Bibles in the city of 

Ryongchon. Her family, including her parents, husband, and three children, were reportedly sent to a 

political prison camp the day after her execution. She was later accused of spying and organizing 

dissidents. However, these claims could not be verified. 

In 2007, Kim Je-Yell, a Canadian citizen who operated a dental clinic in the northeastern city of Rajin, 

was arrested for holding clandestine religious meetings. He was imprisoned and through diplomatic 

efforts was finally released in January 2008. 

Imprisoning religious believers remains a common practice, according to reports of former North Korean 

refugees. It is difficult to document the exact number of prisoners in kwan-li-so. North Korea researchers 

in South Korea recently estimated that 6,000 Christians are incarcerated in “Prison No. 15” in the 

northern part of the country. Reportedly, there may be as many as 40,000 religious prisoners in North 

Korea. Testimony from former prison inmates and prison guards confirms that religious prisoners are 

typically treated worse than other inmates. They are generally given the most dangerous tasks in the labor 

camps and are victims of constant abuse to force them to renounce their faith. There are also 

corroborated reports on forced abortions and cases of infanticide in the prison camps. 

North Korean Refugees in China 

Prolonged famine, food shortage, and repression in North Korea have created a cross-border refugee 

problem in northern China. Over the past decade, hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled across the 

border to neighboring China and South Korea escaping repeated persecution and famine conditions. It is 

estimated that 17,000 North Korean refugees currently live in South Korea. With the number of North 

Korean refugees rising in China, the issue of repatriation and general refugee conditions remains a vital 

international concern. The Chinese government continually labels North Korean refugees as “illegal” 

economic migrants and routinely repatriates them, despite the international obligation to offer protection 

to asylum-seekers and the documented proof that repatriated refugees suffer mistreatment and 

imprisonment. According to the concluding observations of the UN Committee on Torture’s (CAT) 2009 

review of China, repatriation of North Koreans may violate Article 3 of the Convention against Torture, 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

to which China is a party. Article 3 provides that no “State should expel, return or extradite” anyone to 

another country where there is “substantial grounds for believing” that they would be subjected to torture. 

The CAT urged China to halt forced repatriations and to adopt legislation to protect asylum seekers 

consistent with Article 3. However, though North Korean asylum-seekers continue to flow into China, no 

such actions have been taken. 

North Korean law criminalizes leaving the country without state permission. Due to the large number of 

citizens seeking food in China, the government has been forced to reduce punishments of those leaving in 

search of food or employment in China, sentencing those repatriated to short periods of detention and 

forced labor. However, over the past few years, refugees report that the government is returning to its 

harsher penalties for repatriated North Koreans, regardless of their reasons for fleeing. The harshest 

treatment is reserved for refugees suspected of having become Christian, distributing illegal religious 

materials, or having ongoing contact with either South Korean humanitarian or religious organizations 

working in China. Increasingly, the North Korean government views refugees with religious beliefs or 

contacts as potential security threats. Refugees continue to provide evidence that security forces use 

torture during interrogation sessions. Those suspected of religious conversation or contacts are sent to 

hard labor facilities designated for political prisoners. The government reportedly offers rewards to its 

citizens for providing information that leads to the arrest of individuals suspected of involvement in crossborder missionary activities or the distribution of Bibles or other religious literature. 

U.S. Policy 

The United States does not have diplomatic relations with North Korea and has no official presence 

within the country. The United States raises religious freedom and related human rights concerns in 

various multilateral fora, as well as through other governments who have diplomatic missions in North 

Korea. U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea Stephen Bosworth has held talks with North Korean 

counterparts over the past year. North Korea has expressed a desire to directly negotiate with the United 

States on a treaty formally to end the Korean War, before re-engaging in denuclearization talks. 

Ambassador Bosworth has stated publicly that the United States will not accept a nuclear North Korea 

and will only negotiate through the Six-Party Talks with regional allies. U.S. diplomatic efforts have 

focused on pressing Pyongyang and regional allies to restart denuclearization talks. 

After North Korea reportedly tested a second nuclear device in May 2009, the United States pushed for 

the implementation of tougher sanctions. In June 2009, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed 

Resolution 1874, which was co-sponsored by the United States, France, Japan, South Korea, and the 

United Kingdom. The measure calls on North Korea to suspend its missile program, directs all UN 

Members States to inspect cargo to and from North Korea, directs international financial and credit 

institutions to prevent financial services to North Korea (grants, assistance, loans) except for humanitarian 

and developmental purposes, and calls on North Korea to return immediately to the Six Party Talks 

without precondition. 

The 2008 North Korea Human Rights Act provides the agenda and tools to conduct human rights 

diplomacy with North Korea. The Act provides funds to support human rights and democracy programs, 

expands public diplomacy resources, sets guidelines for monitoring and reporting on U.S. humanitarian 

programs, and establishes the position of Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea. The Act 

seeks to facilitate resettlement to the United States of North Korea refugees. It also expresses the sense of 

Congress that a Northeast Asia Security and Cooperation regime should be created, following the model 

of the OSCE, a long-standing USCIRF recommendation. At this time, many of the Act’s provisions have 

not been fully implemented. In addition, human rights concerns have not been fully integrated into the 

full range of security discussions with North Korea. USCIRF contends that funds from the Act should be 

used to expand access to information and new media to counter government propaganda within North 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Korea and to support NGOs doing democracy and human rights training among the North Korean 

diaspora. 

Ambassador Robert King, the newly appointed Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights, has 

stated recently that human rights will have a significant impact on the prospects for improved U.S.-North 

Korea relations, and that specific improvements will be required before there is a full normalization of 

relations. USCIRF believes that negotiations with North Korea will not succeed unless rooted in a 

broader security framework that includes agreements on humanitarian and human rights concerns. 

USCIRF urges the administration to work with regional allies, including those at the Six-Party Talks, to 

raise human rights concerns, including religious freedom, and link future economic, political, and 

diplomatic assistance to progress in these areas. 

According to the State Department’s 2009 Report Advancing Freedom and Democracy, the United States 

seeks to continue to improve North Korean citizens’ access to outside sources of information and provide 

opportunities for exposure to the outside world, mainly by supporting radio broadcasts into the country. 

Recommendations 

I. Linking Human Rights and Human Security in Negotiations on Northeast Asian Security 

 Concerns 

In addition to continuing to designate North Korea as a CPC, the U.S. government should: 

• work with regional and European allies to fashion a comprehensive plan for security concerns on the 

Korean Peninsula that includes agreements on human rights and humanitarian concerns—modeled 

after the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—as 

suggested by the Commission and set forth in Sec. 106 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 

2008 (P.L. 108-333; 22 U.S.C. 7801); 

• in negotiations both on nuclear security and stability on the Korean Peninsula, including at the SixParty Talks, work with regional allies to reach agreements on pressing human rights and human 

security concerns, including monitoring of humanitarian aid, resettlement of refugees, family 

reunifications, abductions, and other pressing human rights issues, including religious freedom, and 

linking future economic assistance and diplomatic recognition to concrete progress in these areas; and 

 

• initiate, within the formal structure of the Six-Party Talks, targeted working groups on issues of 

regional and international concern, including monitoring of humanitarian aid, refugees, and 

abductions, fully integrate these issues into the agenda of the Six-Party Talks at the earliest possible 

date, and link future economic, political, and diplomatic assistance to progress in these areas.

II. Fully Implementing the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2008 

The U.S. government should: 

• ensure that all funds authorized under the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2008 are requested and 

used to fulfill the purposes of the Act, including assistance to expand public diplomacy, expand the 

capacity of NGOs working to promote democracy and human rights, protect and resettle refugees, 

monitor humanitarian aid, and support the mandate and diplomatic missions of the Special Envoy on 

Human Rights in North Korea. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

III. Protecting and Aiding North Korean Refugees 

The U.S. government should: 

• urge the Chinese government to uphold its international obligations to protect asylum seekers by: 

working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to establish a mechanism to confer 

temporary asylum on those seeking such protection and to permit safe transport to countries of final 

asylum; providing the UNHCR with unrestricted access to interview North Korean nationals in 

China; and ensuring that the return of any refugees pursuant to any bilateral agreement does not 

violate China’s obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol or under 

Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture; 

• urge the Chinese government to allow international humanitarian organizations greater access to 

North Koreans in China, to address growing social problems, abuses, and exploitation experienced by 

this vulnerable population, and work with regional and European allies to articulate a consistent and 

clear message about China’s need to protect North Korean refugees; 

• in bilateral relations with China, Russia, Mongolia, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and other 

countries in East Asia, continue to stress U.S. and international concerns about providing safe haven, 

secure transit, quick processing, and clear resettlement procedures for North Koreans; and 

• continue coordination among the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and 

regional allies, including South Korea, to facilitate the resolution of any remaining technical, legal, or 

diplomatic issues that hinder additional resettlement of North Koreans in the United States. 

IV. Pursuing Multilateral Diplomacy and Human Rights in North Korea 

The U.S. government should: 

• encourage the UN Secretary General to develop a coordinated plan of action to achieve access to 

North Korea and to carry out the recommendations of various UN bodies and special procedures, 

particularly those of the Special Rapporteur on North Korea; 

• urge the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights to open an office in Seoul, South 

Korea for the purpose of initiating technical assistance programs addressing regional and 

transnational issues including, but not limited to, abductions, human trafficking, police and border 

guard training, legal reform, political prisoners, and abuses of freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief; and 

• work with regional allies and appropriate international bodies to guarantee that future economic, 

energy, or humanitarian assistance to North Korea will be effectively monitored to ensure that aid 

reaches the most vulnerable populations and is not diverted to military use.

V. Congressional Action to Advance Religious Freedom and Related Rights on the Korean 

 Peninsula 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• work to build an international coalition of parliamentarians, experts, diplomats, and other opinionmakers to ensure that human rights and human security concerns are an integral part of future security 

Page | 45 
Countries of Particular Concern 

arrangements in Northeast Asia, including support for creating a new economic, human rights, and 

security zone in Asia similar to the OSCE; 

• continue to appropriate all the funds authorized in the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2008 for 

public diplomacy, refugee assistance, democratization programs, and relevant travel by the Special 

Envoy on North Korea; and 

• raise religious freedom and related human rights as a prominent concern in appropriate congressional 

or congressional staff visits to North Korea and China, including distributing Korean language reports 

of the Commission, and reiterate requests seeking access for international monitors to North Korean 

prisons as promised by North Korean officials to the visiting Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

delegation in August 2003. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Eritrea 

 FINDINGS: Systematic, ongoing, and egregious religious freedom violations continue in Eritrea. 

These violations include: arbitrary arrests and detentions without charge of members of unregistered 

religious groups; torture or other ill-treatment of religious prisoners, sometimes resulting in death; a 

prolonged ban on public religious activities by all unrecognized religious groups; closure by the 

authorities of the places of worship of these groups; inordinate delays on registration applications 

from religious groups; and the disruption of private religious gatherings and social events of members 

of unregistered groups. 

In light of these violations, USCIRF again recommends in 2010 that Eritrea be designated as a 

“country of particular,” or CPC. Since 2004, Eritrea has been recommended for CPC status by the 

Commission and designated as such by the State Department. In September 2005, when renewing the 

CPC designation, the State Department announced the denial of commercial export to Eritrea of 

defense articles and services covered by the Arms Export Control Act. This was the first, and so far 

only, unique presidential action under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) in 

response to a CPC designation. 

The religious freedom situation in Eritrea remains grave, particularly for Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

members of other smaller, non-traditional religious groups such as Evangelical and Pentecostal 

Christians, and dissident Muslims. The government continues to intervene in the internal affairs of 

the Orthodox Church of Eritrea, the country’s largest Christian denomination, and to suppress Muslim 

religious activities or groups viewed as radical or simply as opposed to the government-appointed 

head of the Muslim community. Despite these well documented reports, Eritrean officials continue to 

deny that there is religious repression in Eritrea, claiming that their actions are necessary to maintain 

social harmony. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: USCIRF recommends that, in addition to continuing the 

existing IRFA sanction on Eritrea, the U.S. government should impose targeted sanctions against 

individuals and institutions identified as responsible for, or complicit in, serious human rights abuses, 

as well prohibit any foreign company’s raising capital or listing its securities in the United States 

while engaged in developing Eritrea’s mineral resources. USCIRF further recommends that the U.S. 

government engage in vigorous advocacy of religious freedom at all levels of involvement with the 

government of Eritrea, draw international attention to religious freedom abuses in Eritrea, encourage 

unofficial dialogue with Eritreans on religious freedom issues, condition any resumption of 

development assistance to Eritrea on measurable improvements in religious freedom, and intensify 

international efforts to resolve the current political impasse between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Additional 

recommendations for U.S. policy toward Eritrea can be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Religious Freedom Conditions 

Government Policies toward Religious Groups and Activities 

Eritrea has been ruled by the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) since the country gained 

independence from Ethiopia in 1993, following a lengthy war (1961-1991). The former leader of the 

successful national liberation movement and the current head of the PFDJ, Isaias Afwerki, was chosen 

President in 1993 by the Transitional National Assembly. After an initially promising start toward 

democratization, the PFDJ government has become increasingly repressive, with power concentrated in 

the hands of the President and a small cadre of associates who fought in the liberation struggle. In 2001, 

following a second war with Ethiopia (1998-2000), the government suspended implementation of a 

democratic constitution, canceled elections, curtailed press freedom, began a crackdown on political 

opponents, and restricted religious groups it perceived as undermining national unity. The government 

maintains the country on a near-war footing, reportedly anticipating renewed hostilities with Ethiopia. 

 

The Eritrean government officially recognizes four religious communities: the (Coptic) Orthodox Church 

of Eritrea; Sunni Islam; the Roman Catholic Church; and the Evangelical Church of Eritrea, a Lutheranaffiliated denomination. Although there is no state religion, the government has close ties to the 

Orthodox Church, the largest and oldest of Eritrea’s Christian communities, and is hostile toward newer 

Christian groups particularly Evangelical and Pentecostal denominations. 

Government officials have criticized “non-traditional” Christian denominations for engaging in 

evangelism that is allegedly socially divisive, aggressive, and alien to Eritrea’s cultural traditions. 

Government officials have also pointed to the actions of foreign or foreign-inspired Muslim 

fundamentalists as seeking to radicalize the traditional Eritrean practice of Islam and thus possibly create 

tensions in a society that is roughly half Christian and half Muslim. Government concerns regarding 

foreign backing of religious groups have resulted in strict controls both on humanitarian activities by 

international faith-based organizations and on foreign funding to indigenous groups for religious or 

charitable activities. 

The government’s concerns regarding religious activities appear to be linked to real or perceived security 

threats, and government spokespersons have cited Pentecostals, along with Muslim extremists, as threats 

to national security. None of the accused Christian groups are known to have engaged in or advocated 

violence. 

In 2002, the government imposed a registration requirement on religious groups other than the four 

“sanctioned” religions, requiring detailed financial and membership information as well as background on 

their presence in Eritrea. Among those affected were Protestant Evangelical and Pentecostal Christian 

denominations, as well as the Baha’is. Some of these faith communities have operated in Eritrea for 

several decades. Jehovah’s Witnesses were not offered the opportunity to register. By stipulating that 

there could be no public religious activities until registration has been approved by the government, the 

decree effectively closed places of worship and prohibited public religious activities, including worship 

services, of all unregistered religious communities. Although some groups submitted the required 

applications, none have been approved during the past eight years since the imposition of the 

requirement. As a result of the registration requirement and of the government’s inaction on registration 

applications, all of Eritrea’s religious communities, except the four government-sanctioned ones, lack a 

legal basis on which to practice their faiths publicly. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

The Situation of Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians 

 

As part of the campaign against the religious activities of those persons not belonging to officially 

recognized religious denominations, Eritrean security forces continue to disrupt private worship, conduct 

mass arrests of participants at religious weddings, prayer meetings, and other gatherings, and detain those 

arrested without charge for indefinite periods of time. Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians frequently 

have been targeted. 

Because of government restrictions and the fact that releases sometimes go unreported, it is difficult to 

determine the precise number of persons imprisoned for their membership in or activities with 

unregistered religious groups. International human rights and Christian advocacy groups estimate those 

imprisoned on religious grounds as numbering 2,000 to 3,000, with the number reportedly declining 

toward the end of the reporting period. According to the State Department, Eritrean “authorities 

continued to detain, harass, and abuse hundreds of followers of various unregistered churches (mostly 

Protestant) during [2009].” For example, in December 2009 a group of 30 women, many described as 

“elderly” members of the Faith Mission Church, were arrested during a private prayer meeting at a home 

in Asmara. Although all were subsequently released, this mass arrest continued a pattern of disruption by 

the security forces of private religious and social gatherings of unregistered religious groups, thus denying 

these individuals the opportunity of even private worship. 

Persons detained for religious activities often were not formally charged, permitted access to legal 

counsel, accorded due process, or allowed access to their families. Some prisoners were released after 

detentions of several days or less, but others spent longer periods in detention. The government held 

individuals who were jailed on account of their religious affiliation at a variety of venues, including 

facilities administered by the military. There are credible reports, including during the past year, that the 

security forces have used coercion on detainees to secure repudiations of faith; some prisoners were 

required to recant their religious beliefs as a precondition of release. During the past year, there have 

been occasional reports of deaths of religious prisoners who refused to recant their beliefs and who were 

denied medical care or otherwise subjected to ill treatment. Detainees imprisoned in violation of freedom 

of religion and related human rights have reportedly been beaten, tortured, confined in crowded 

conditions, or subjected to extreme temperature fluctuations. 

 

Government violations of religious freedom are alleged to be particularly severe in the armed forces. 

During the war with Ethiopia, some Eritrean soldiers accepted various forms of Protestantism, reportedly 

alarming government officials and leading to the banning of prayer meetings among armed forces 

members. Attendance at such meetings is punishable by imprisonment. Moreover, armed forces 

members and national service inductees reportedly face severe punishment for possession of religious 

literature, including Bibles. 

The Situation of Dissident Muslims

In addition to Evangelical and Pentecostal Christians, scores of members of Eritrea’s large Sunni Muslim 

community are reportedly imprisoned, some for over 15 years. In January 2009, the security forces 

arrested 30 individuals described by the government as “radical Muslims.” They were subsequently 

released with warnings to cease their alleged radical activities and to keep their beards shaved. Eritrea 

has legitimate concerns regarding violent Islamists. Before Eritrea and Sudan normalized relations in 

2006, Islamists operating out of Sudan engaged in a low-level insurgency against the Eritrean 

government, occasionally employing terrorism in their campaign to establish an Islamic state. 

International human rights organizations report, however, that many of the Muslims detained without 

charge are non-violent critics of the government-imposed leadership of the Muslim community or policies 

that discriminate against independent Muslims. Ironically, during the reporting period, Eritrea has faced 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

mounting international pressure over its support of Islamist groups in Somalia opposed to Somalia’s 

Transitional Federal Government, which is recognized by Ethiopia. 

The Situation of the Jehovah’s Witnesses 

Since 1994, the government of Eritrea has denied a range of government services and civil and political 

rights to members of the country’s small community of Jehovah’s Witnesses. Many Jehovah’s Witnesses 

refused on religious grounds to participate in the 1993 referendum on independence or to accept the 

national military service required of all citizens, both male and female. The government chose to 

interpret these actions as a rejection of Eritrean citizenship. In accordance with a decree issued in 

October 1994 by Eritrea’s current President, Jehovah’s Witnesses are barred from obtaining government 

jobs, business licenses, and government-issued identity and travel documents. Without Eritrean identity 

cards Jehovah’s Witnesses are prevented from obtaining legal recognition of marriages and land 

purchases. 

Due to their beliefs on conscientious objection to military service, the requirement of a military training 

component for secondary school graduation without a non-military alternative service option effectively 

denies educational and employment opportunities to young Jehovah’s Witnesses, causing many to flee the 

country. Some children of Jehovah’s Witnesses have been expelled from school because of their refusal 

to salute the flag or to pay for membership in the officially sanctioned national organization for youth and 

students. 

There are 60 Jehovah’s Witnesses currently detained in Eritrea without trial, or administrative appeal, in 

violation of minimal rights to due process. Although the maximum legal penalty for refusing to perform 

national service is two years, some Jehovah’s Witnesses who have refused to serve in the military have 

been detained without trial for more than 15 years. Other Jehovah’s Witnesses have been arrested and 

imprisoned for meeting together for worship or for expressing their faith to others. Some of those 

arrested have been quickly released, while others have been held indefinitely without charge. On June 28, 

2009, 23 members of one congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Asmara were arrested when gathered 

for private worship. No reason was given for their arrests. In contrast to arrests of draft-age individuals 

made because of alleged refusal to participate in national service, a third of the Jehovah’s Witnesses 

currently detained are reported to be over 60 years of age. 

Jehovah’s Witnesses released from detention have reported being kept for months in a 20-foot metal 

shipping container holding over 20 individuals, most of whom were Jehovah’s Witnesses but including 

several Pentecostals. Prisoners were permitted to leave the container for limited periods twice a day. 

Prisoners were urged to renounce their faith in writing, to return to their “previous faith” (understood to 

be the Coptic Orthodox Church), and ordered not to pray aloud, sing, or preach. No books were allowed. 

The punishment for disobedience was to be chained outdoors for a day and a night. 

The Situation of the Coptic Orthodox Community 

Since 2005, the government has intervened in the internal affairs of the Orthodox Church of Eritrea, the 

country’s largest Christian denomination and the institutional expression of the country’s traditionallydominant Coptic form of Christianity. Security forces targeted reformist elements in the Orthodox 

Church, arresting religious activists and preventing their meetings. In July 2005, the government revoked 

the exemption of Orthodox priests, monks, and deacons from mandatory national service, reportedly 

resulting in a shortage of clergy, particularly in smaller, rural churches. Patriarch Abune Antonios 

reportedly opposed the government’s actions. In 2006, Patriarch Antonios was deposed and placed under 

a strict form of house arrest, prevented from communicating with the outside world, and reportedly 

denied medical care. In May 2007, a new, more compliant Orthodox Patriarch was installed under 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

government pressure. A government-appointed administrator who is not a member of the Orthodox 

clergy manages the Church’s affairs and controls the Church’s finances. However unlike previous years, 

there were no reports of new arrests of reformist members of the Orthodox clergy in 2009. 

U.S. Policy 

According to the State Department, U.S. interests in Eritrea include encouraging the government of 

Eritrea to contribute to regional stability, consolidating the peace with Ethiopia and Djibouti, encouraging 

progress toward establishing a democratic political culture, supporting Eritrean efforts to become 

involved constructively in solving regional problems, assisting Eritrean efforts in dealing with its 

humanitarian and development needs, and promoting economic reform. The United States closed its 

USAID Mission in December 2005, however, after the Eritrean government requested the termination of 

U.S. development assistance. 

U.S. relations with Eritrea have been heavily influenced, often adversely, by strong U.S. ties with 

Ethiopia. The United States opposed self-determination for Eritrea in the early 1950’s, favoring a union 

with Ethiopia. In 1961, Eritrean resistance to Ethiopian rule escalated into a 30-year old liberation 

struggle. During the first half of the conflict, Ethiopia received U.S. support; during the second, the 

Soviet Bloc intervened unsuccessfully by supporting the Ethiopian Mengistu regime against the Eritrean 

insurgents. 

After independence in 1993, Eritrea fought a costly border war with Ethiopia in 1998-2000. The United 

States, the UN, the European Union, and the now-defunct Organization of African Unity were formal 

witnesses to the 2000 accord ending that conflict. However, Eritrean-Ethiopian relations remain tense 

due to Ethiopia’s refusal to permit demarcation of the boundary according to the 2002 decision of an 

independent commission based at the International Court of Justice. The U.S. government views the 

commission’s decision as “final and binding” and expects both parties to comply. The United States was 

the largest financial contributor to the now-defunct UN peacekeeping force—the UN Mission in Ethiopia 

and Eritrea (UNMEE)—separating the two armies. The UN Security Council terminated the mandate of 

UNMEE in July 2008 “in response to crippling restrictions imposed by Eritrea on UNMEE.” 

The State Department designated Eritrea a CPC under IRFA in September 2004. When renewing the 

CPC designation in September 2005, the State Department announced the denial of commercial export to 

Eritrea of defense articles and services covered by the Arms Export Control Act, with some items 

exempted. This represents the only unique presidential action to be undertaken via the IRFA regime in 

response to a CPC designation. The Eritrean government subsequently intensified its repression of 

unregistered religious groups with a series of arrests and detentions of clergy and ordinary members of the 

affected groups. 

On December 23, 2009, the United States joined in a 13-member majority on the UN Security Council in 

adopting Resolution 1907, sanctioning Eritrea for having “provided support to armed groups undermining 

peace and reconciliation in Somalia” as well as for not having withdrawn its forces following clashes with 

its smaller neighbor Djibouti. There was only one vote against the measure (Libya), with China, a 

Permanent Member of the Security Council, abstaining. The sanctions include an arms embargo, travel 

restrictions, and asset freezes for the Eritrean government’s political and military leaders and other 

individuals designated by the Security Council’s Committee on Somalia Sanctions. The sanctions, which 

had been called for by the African Union, are in response to Eritrea’s refusal to withdraw troops from a 

border dispute with Djibouti and its arming, training, and equipping of armed opposition groups in 

Somalia, particularly the Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab, which is designated by the U.S. 

government as a “foreign terrorist organization.” 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Recommendations 

 

I. Advancing Religious Freedom through IRFA Mechanisms 

In addition to continuing to designate Eritrea as a CPC, the U.S. government should: 

 

y maintain the denial of commercial export to Eritrea of defense articles and services covered by the 

Arms Control Export Act, with some items exempted, as announced by the Secretary of State in 

September 2005; 

• impose targeted sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, against individuals and institutions 

identified as responsible for, or complicit in, serious human rights abuses, including, as appropriate, 

the President, the government-appointed administrator of the Orthodox Church of Eritrea, the security 

forces and their officers, and the ruling party and ruling party officials; and 

• prohibit any foreign company’s raising capital or listing its securities in U.S. markets if it is engaged 

in the development of Eritrea’s mineral resources or involved with ventures with the government or 

government-controlled entities. 

II. Pressing for Immediate Improvements to End Religious Freedom Violations 

The U.S. government should urge the government of Eritrea to undertake immediately the following 

actions to improve respect for religious freedom in that country: 

• release detainees held solely on account of their peaceful religious activities, and release the deposed 

Orthodox Patriarch Abune Antonios from house arrest and permit him to receive needed medical 

attention; 

• implement the constitution’s existing guarantees of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, 

including the freedom to practice any religion and to manifest such practice, regardless of registration 

status; 

• institute a registration process for religious groups that is transparent, non-discriminatory, not overly 

burdensome, and otherwise in accordance with international standards; 

• promptly register those religious groups that comply with the requirements issued in 2002, and not 

require religious groups to provide identifying information on individual members; 

• take official, public action to permit religious groups to resume their public religious activities 

pending registration, including reopening of places of worship closed by the ban in 2002; 

• issue a public order to the security forces reminding them that religious practice is not to be interfered 

with, except in those circumstances permitted by international law; and 

• extend an official invitation for visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

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Countries of Particular Concern 

III. Advancing Religious Freedom through Other Bilateral and Multilateral Efforts 

The U.S. government should: 

• engage in vigorous advocacy of religious freedom and other universal human rights at all levels of 

involvement with the government of Eritrea and draw international attention to religious freedom 

abuses there, including in multilateral fora such as the UN; 

• seek the creation by the UN Human Rights Council of a Special Rapporteur position for Eritrea or, or 

failing that, a visit to Eritrea by a team of thematic Special Rapporteurs, including the Special 

Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Freedom of Opinion and Expression; 

• condition any resumption of development assistance to Eritrea on measurable improvements in 

religious freedom and, if such assistance is to be resumed, ensure that it is directed to programs that 

contribute directly to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; 

• encourage unofficial dialogue with Eritreans on religious freedom issues, specifically by: 

--promoting a visit to Eritrea by U.S. leaders concerned with freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief to meet with Eritrean authorities and other opinion-makers and to facilitate 

dialogue among all of Eritrea’s religious communities; 

--expanding the use of educational and cultural exchanges, such as the Fulbright Program, the 

International Visitor Program, and lectures by visiting American scholars and experts, to introduce 

more Eritreans to the workings and benefits of societies in which religious freedom and other 

human rights are respected; 

• seek the cooperation of other countries in promoting greater understanding by Eritreans of 

international standards regarding freedom of religion or belief; 

• intensify international efforts to resolve the current impasse between Eritrea and Ethiopia regarding 

implementation of the boundary demarcation as determined by the “final and binding” decision of the 

International Boundary Commission that was established following the 1998-2000 war; and 

• in the event of the future creation, as previously recommended by USCIRF, of an independent 

national human rights commission in Eritrea, work to ensure that such a commission receives 

appropriate technical training in human rights and the law, operates according to due process and 

international human rights standards, and is established in accordance with the Paris Principles5

 for 

such organizations, including independence, adequate funding, a representative character, and a broad 

mandate that includes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

 

5 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human 

Rights, found in the Annex to Fact Sheet No. 19, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human 

Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm). 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Iran 

FINDINGS: The government of Iran continues to engage in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations 

of religious freedom, including prolonged detention, torture, and executions based primarily or entirely upon 

the religion of the accused. Iran is a constitutional, theocratic republic that discriminates against its citizens 

on the basis of religion or belief. During the past year, the Iranian government’s poor religious freedom 

record deteriorated, especially for religious minorities such as Baha’is, Christians and Sufi Muslims, and 

physical attacks, harassment, detention, arrests, and imprisonment intensified. Even the recognized nonMuslim religious minorities – Jews, Armenian and Assyrian Christians, and Zoroastrians – protected under 

Iran’s constitution faced increasing discrimination and repression. Dissident Muslims were increasingly 

subject to abuse and several were sentenced to death and even executed for the capital crime of moharebeh

(“waging war against God).” A revised penal code that would codify serious punishments, including the 

death penalty, for converts from Islam remains under consideration by the Iranian parliament. Heightened 

anti-Semitism and repeated Holocaust denials by senior government officials have increased fear among 

Iran’s Jewish community. Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, members of minority religious communities 

have fled Iran in significant numbers for fear of persecution. 

Since 1999, the State Department has designated Iran as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). The Commission recommends in 2010 that Iran again be 

designated as a CPC. 

Since the disputed June 12, 2009 elections, human rights and religious freedom conditions in Iran have 

regressed to a point not seen since the early days of the Islamic revolution. Killings, arrests, and physical 

abuse of detainees have increased, including for religious minorities and Muslims who dissent or express 

views perceived as threatening the legitimacy of the government. The Iranian government has repressed its 

citizens on the basis of religious identity for years. However, in recent months it has increasingly 

manipulated the reach of its religious laws to silence, and in some cases put to death, Shi’a Muslims simply 

for exercising their internationally protected rights to freedom of expression and freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: The U.S. government should invoke IRFA’s statutory provisions 

by identifying those Iranian officials and entities responsible for severe religious freedom violations and 

imposing travel bans and asset freezes on those individuals. The U.S. government should also work with its 

European allies to do the same. Current U.S. policy on human rights in Iran has primarily relied on the 

issuance of statements or reports, and USCIRF concludes that it is now time to go further and take concrete 

policy action against human rights violations in Iran. USCIRF urges the U.S. government to continue to 

vigorously speak out, including during P5+1 talks and in any other formal or informal bilateral or multilateral 

fora, about deteriorating human rights and religious freedom conditions, and to demand the release of all 

prisoners of conscience. In addition, the U.S. government should use appropriated funds to advance Internet 

freedom and protect Iranian activists from harassment and arrest by developing new technologies and 

immediately distributing proven and field-tested programs to counter censorship. Additional 

recommendations for U.S. policy toward Iran can be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Religious Freedom Conditions 

Heightened Concerns after the June 12 Disputed Elections 

Since the June 12, 2009 disputed elections, human rights and religious freedom conditions have regressed 

to a point not seen since the early days of the Islamic revolution 30 years ago. In the weeks and months 

following the elections, hundreds of thousands of Iranians demonstrated and protested in the streets. 

Security and paramilitary forces violently suppressed these demonstrations. Dozens of Iranians were 

killed and approximately 4,000-5,000 were arrested. Hundreds remain in detention. More than 100 

prominent activists and demonstrators were tried in a mass “show trial” which started in August. Human 

rights groups reported that at least 20 of these defendants were sentenced to six months to 15 years in 

prison. At least three were sentenced to death and executed on a variety of charges, including baseless 

religious crimes, such as “waging war against God,” “spreading corruption on earth,” and “moral 

corruption.” Since the election, the Iranian government has leveled unsubstantiated charges against 

members of religious minority communities and others of crimes such as “confronting the regime” and 

apostasy and has followed the same trial procedures as in other national security cases. 

Government Structure 

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran proclaims Islam, specifically the doctrine of the Twelver 

(Shi’a) Jaafari School, to be the official religion of the country. It stipulates that all laws and regulations, 

including the Constitution itself, be based on Islamic criteria. The head of state, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 

is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution and has direct control over the armed forces, the internal 

security forces, and the judiciary. The Supreme Leader is chosen by the Assembly of Experts, a group of 

86 Islamic scholars elected by popular vote from a government-screened list of candidates. All legislation 

passed by the Majlis (parliament) is reviewed for adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles by the 

Guardian Council, half of whose members are appointed by the Supreme Leader. The Guardian Council 

also has the power under the Constitution to screen and disqualify candidates for all elective offices, 

including the Assembly of Experts and the 290-member Majlis, based on a vague and arbitrary set of 

requirements, including candidates’ ideological and religious beliefs. Disputes over legislation between 

the Majlis and the Guardian Council are adjudicated by the Expediency Council, an advisory body 

appointed by the Supreme Leader. Five seats in the Majlis are reserved for recognized religious 

minorities, two for Armenian Christians, one for Assyrian Christians, and one each for Jews and 

Zoroastrians. 

Majority and Minority Muslims 

Over the past few years, and especially after the contested June 2009 presidential election, the Iranian 

government has imposed harsh prison sentences on prominent reformers from the Shi’a majority 

community, many of whom have been tried on criminal charges of “insulting Islam,” criticizing the 

Islamic Republic, and publishing materials that allegedly deviate from Islamic standards. The Iranian 

government has been repressing its citizens on the basis of religious identity for years, but in recent 

months it increasingly manipulated the reach of its religious laws to silence, and in some cases put to 

death, Shi’a Muslims simply for exercising their internationally protected rights of freedom of expression 

and freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief. 

In early 2010, the Iranian government started convicting and executing reformers and peaceful protestors 

on the charge of moharebeh. Reportedly, more than 10 individuals have been charged, convicted, and 

sentenced to death for moharebeh. At least three are known to have been executed during the past year. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Iranian authorities regularly detain and harass bloggers who write anything critical of the Islamic 

revolution or the Iranian government. The government requires bloggers to register their Web sites with 

the Ministry of Art and Culture. Government officials reportedly claim to have blocked millions of Web 

sites, particularly since the June 2009 elections. Pending legislation would make the creation of blogs 

promoting “corruption, prostitution, and apostasy” punishable by death. In November 2008, well-known 

Iranian-Canadian blogger Hossein Derakhshan was arrested in Tehran while visiting the country and 

remains in the notorious Evin prison in northwestern Iran. According to human rights groups, 

Derakhshan has been physically and psychologically abused while in prison. Although no formal charges 

have been filed, some groups have reported that Derakhshan may be charged with “insulting religion.” In 

March 2009, Iranian blogger Omid Mirsayafi died in prison while serving a 30-month sentence imposed 

by a revolutionary court in Tehran for “propaganda against the state” and criticism of religious leaders; 

Iranian authorities claim his death was a suicide, but his lawyer and family have demanded an 

investigation. 

 

A number of senior Shi’a religious leaders who have opposed various religious and political tenets and 

practices of the Iranian government also have been targets of state repression, including house arrest, 

detention without charge, trial without due process, torture, and other forms of ill treatment. Since the 

June 2009 elections, the government has cracked down on clerics, prohibiting them from questioning the 

election results and from criticizing the government’s response to protests. In December 2009, Grand 

Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri, once the designated successor to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, died 

after years of imprisonment, harassment, and house arrest because of his strong criticism of clerical rule 

in Iran. Authorities even prevented supporters and mourners from attending Ayatollah Montazeri’s 

funeral in Qom by blocking streets leading to the funeral site. During demonstrations in late December 

just after Ayatollah Montazeri’s death, nearly 1,000 people were arrested by authorities. Approximately 

200 remain in detention. 

In 2006, Ayatollah Mohammad Kazemeni Boroujerdi, a senior Shi’a cleric who advocates the separation 

of religion and state, was arrested and imprisoned. He and 17 of his followers were initially sentenced to 

death for moharebeh, but the death sentences were later withdrawn on appeal. Ayatollah Boroujerdi is 

serving an 11-year prison term and is reportedly in poor health. Some of his supporters have claimed that 

Ayatollah Boroujerdi has suffered physical abuse while in prison. He remains in jail. 

Muslim minorities continue to face repression. Some Iranian Sunni leaders have reported widespread 

abuses and restrictions on their religious practice, including detentions and torture of Sunni clerics, as 

well as bans on Sunni teachings in public schools and Sunni religious literature, even in predominantly 

Sunni areas. Sufi and Sunni Muslim leaders are regularly intimidated and harassed by intelligence and 

security services and report widespread official discrimination. The Sunni community still has not been 

able to build a mosque in Tehran. Also, there have been allegations that the Iranian government 

discriminates against the Sunni community in government employment, particularly in leadership 

positions in the executive and judicial branches. 

During the past year, arrests and harassment of Sufi Muslims increased significantly. If the religious 

identity of a Sufi Muslim student was made known, the university generally expelled him or her. 

According to human rights groups, in July 2009 riot police and security forces arrested 20 Sufi 

practitioners in the northeastern city of Gonabad. They were among more than 200 Sufi dervishes who 

gathered to protest the arrest of Hossein Zareya, a local leader. The police reportedly injured several 

protesters with the use of force and tear gas. In February 2009, at least 40 Sufis in the central city of 

Isfahan were arrested after protesting the destruction of a Sufi place of worship; all were released within 

days. 

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In January 2009, Jamshid Lak, a Gonabadi Dervish from the Nematollahi Sufi order, one of the country’s 

largest Sufi sects, was flogged 74 times after being convicted in 2006 of “slander” based on his public 

allegation of ill-treatment by a Ministry of Intelligence official. In late December 2008, after the closure 

of a Sufi Muslim place of worship, authorities arrested without charge at least six members of the 

Gonabadi Dervishes on Kish Island and confiscated their books and computer equipment; their status is 

unknown. In November 2008, Amir Ali Mohammad Labaf was sentenced to a five-year prison term, 74 

lashes, and internal exile to the southeastern town of Babak for “spreading lies,” based on his membership 

in the Nematollahi Gonabadi Sufi order. In October 2008, at least seven Sufi Muslims in Isfahan, and 

five others in Karaj, were arrested because of their affiliation with the Nematollahi Gonabadi Sufi order; 

they remain in detention. 

Non-Muslim Religious Minorities 

The constitution of Iran formally recognizes Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians as protected religious 

minorities who may worship freely and have autonomy over their own matters of personal status (e.g. 

marriage, divorce, and inheritance). Nevertheless, the primacy of Islam and Islamic laws and institutions 

adversely affects the rights and status of non-Muslims and the recognized religious minorities live, in 

effect, as second class citizens. Members of these groups are subject to legal and other forms of 

discrimination, particularly in education, government jobs and services, and the armed services. In 

addition, their places of worships are frequently defaced with graffiti and photos of the religious 

leadership. Their private schools are administered by Iran’s Ministry of Education, which imposes a 

state-approved religious curriculum. 

Non-Muslims may not engage with Muslims in public religious expression or persuasion; some also face 

restrictions on publishing religious material in Persian. In 2004, the Expediency Council authorized 

collection of equal blood money for the death of Muslim and non-Muslim men. Baha’is, Sabean 

Mandaean men, and all women remain excluded from the revised ruling. According to Iranian law, 

Baha’i blood is mobah, which means members of the Baha’i faith can be killed with impunity. 

Beginning in August 2005, and particularly since the June 2009 elections, the Iranian government has 

intensified its campaign against non-Muslim religious minorities. A consistent stream of virulent and 

inflammatory statements by political and religious leaders and an increase in harassment and 

imprisonment of, and physical attacks against, these groups has led to a renewal of the kind of oppression 

seen in the years immediately following the Iranian revolution in the early 1980s. Ayatollah Ahmad 

Jannati, head of the Guardian Council, has publicly attacked non-Muslims and referred to them as “sinful 

animals” and “corrupt.” In early 2008, the Iranian parliament began considering a new law that would 

impose serious punishments, including the death penalty, on converts from Islam. In September 2008, a 

committee in the Majlis approved advancing the amended language on apostasy, which could be passed 

by the full Majlis in the near future. Although the Iranian government has in the past applied the death 

penalty for apostasy under Islamic law, it has not been explicitly codified. If the proposed law is passed, 

it would further endanger the lives of all converts from Islam, particularly members of the Baha’i faith, 

who are already considered apostates, even if they are fourth- or fifth-generation Baha’i adherents. 

Baha’is 

The Baha’i community has long been subject to particularly severe religious freedom violations in Iran. 

Baha’is, who number at least 300,000, are viewed as “heretics” by Iranian authorities and may face 

repression on the grounds of apostasy. Since 1979, Iranian government authorities have executed more 

than 200 Baha’i leaders in Iran, and more than 10,000 have been dismissed from government and 

university jobs. Baha’is may not establish places of worship, schools, or any independent religious 

associations in Iran. In addition, Baha’is are barred from the military and denied government jobs and 

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pensions as well as the right to inherit property. Their marriages and divorces also are not recognized, and 

they have difficulty obtaining death certificates. Baha’i cemeteries, holy places, and community 

properties are often seized or desecrated and many important religious sites have been destroyed. In 

recent years, Baha’is in Iran have faced increasingly harsh treatment, including increasing numbers of 

arrests and detentions and violent attacks on private homes and personal property. Baha’i property has 

been confiscated or destroyed and dozens of Baha’is have been harassed, interrogated, detained, 

imprisoned, or physically attacked. 

Nearly 300 Baha’is have been arbitrarily arrested since early 2005 and, at present, at least 45 Baha’is 

remain in prison on account of their religious identity. In March and May 2008, seven Baha’i leaders – 

Fariba Kamalabadi, Jamaloddin Khanjani, Afif Naemi, Saeid Rezaie, Mahvash Sabet, Behrouz Tavakkoli, 

and Vahid Tizfahm – were arrested and taken to the notorious Evin prison in Tehran, where they remain 

today. After numerous postponements, the trial for the five men and two women started in January and is 

still ongoing. They were formally charged with espionage, propaganda activities against the Islamic 

order, the establishment of an illegal administration, cooperation with Israel, sending secret documents 

outside the country, acting against the security of the country, and “corruption on earth.” Attorneys for 

the seven Baha’is, who have had extremely limited access to their clients and files, say that the charges 

against them have no merit and are baseless. 

Since January 1, 2010, at least 50 Baha’is have been arbitrarily arrested. At least 14 Baha’is were 

arrested in March in several different cities throughout the country, including Marvdasht, Mashhad, 

Semnan, Isfahan, Shiraz, Kermanshah, and Sari. Approximately 13 Baha’is were detained in February, 

several of whom remain in jail. Another 13 Baha’is were arrested in early January and 10 remain in 

detention. Other arrests in 2010 occurred in several other cities, including Tehran, Babolsar, Karaj, 

Nazarabad, and Shahrekord. Most of the detentions followed the similar pattern of Ministry of 

Intelligence officials appearing at the homes of Baha’is, searching the premises and confiscating 

computers, books and other materials, and then making arrests. No charges have been filed. According 

to human rights groups, between October 2009 and mid-February 2010, there were 47 new cases of 

arbitrary detention of Baha’is. In addition, throughout 2009, Baha’is in several cities across the country 

were targets of arson attacks; in all cases, police said nothing could be done to find the perpetrators. 

Dozens of Baha’is are awaiting trial while others were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 90 days to 

several years in 2009 and 2010. All of those convicted are reportedly in the process of appealing the 

verdicts. In March 2010, at least 50 young Baha’is, some of whom received prison sentences ranging 

from one to four years for teaching underprivileged children in southeastern Iran in 2006, were banned 

from travel outside the country. 

In the past year, Baha’i cemeteries in various parts of the country, including Tehran, Ghaemshahr, 

Marvdasht, Semnan, Sari, and Isfahan, have been desecrated, defaced, or in some way blocked to the 

Baha’i community. In February 2009, a Baha’i cemetery in Semnan in northern Iran was desecrated, and 

in January, another Baha’i cemetery was destroyed in Ghaemshahr. Baha’i cemeteries also have been 

destroyed in Yazd and outside of Najafabad in central Iran. In the past several years, several articles in 

the government-controlled newspaper Kayhan, whose managing editor is appointed by Supreme Leader 

Ayatollah Khamenei, have vilified and demonized the Baha’i faith and its community in Iran. Iranian 

authorities also have gone to great lengths in recent years to collect information on all members of the 

Baha’i community in Iran and to monitor their activities. 

In the past, Baha’is in Iran have not been allowed to attend university. Although the Iranian government 

maintains publicly that Baha’is are free to attend university, reports over the past year indicate that the de 

facto policy of preventing Baha’is from obtaining higher education remains in effect. Of the very few 

Baha’is who are enrolled in universities, several were expelled during the past year once their religious 

beliefs became known. Furthermore, during the past few years, young Baha’i schoolchildren in primary 

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and high schools increasingly have been vilified, pressured to convert to Islam, and in some cases 

expelled on account of their religion. 

Christians 

During the reporting period, there has been a significant increase in the number of incidents of Iranian 

authorities raiding church services, detaining worshippers and church leaders, and harassing and 

threatening church members. Christians, particularly Evangelical and other Protestants, continue to be 

subject to harassment, arrests, close surveillance, and imprisonment; many are reported to have fled the 

country. Indigenous Assyrian and Armenian Christian religious leaders also have been targeted. Since 

becoming president, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has called for an end to the development 

of Christianity in Iran. The government requires Evangelical Christian groups to submit congregation 

membership lists.

In February 2010, Hamid Shafiee, a Christian priest, and his wife, Reyhaneh Aghajari, were arrested in 

the central city of Isfahan. Security agents seized their personal belongings, including books, telephones, 

CDs, and a number of Bibles in Persian. Their whereabouts and the charges against them are unknown. 

The same month, nine Christians, including Assyrian pastor Wilson Issavi, were arrested in Isfahan. 

Issavi was released in late March, but the whereabouts of the others are unknown and no charges have 

been filed. Also in February, an Armenian Christian pastor, Vahik Abrahamian, was arrested in Tehran; 

reportedly, he is being held in Evin prison. In January, Reverend Issavi’s Assyrian Evangelical Church in 

Kermanshah, western Iran, was shut down by authorities. Also in January, in the southwestern city of 

Shiraz, seven Christians were detained, and, according to the Farsi Christian News Network, most face 

charges of apostasy; their status is unknown. In late December 2009, at least 15 Christians were arrested 

in Tehran; 12 were released in January while three – Maryam Jalili, Mitra Zahmati, and Farzan Matin – 

were released in March after almost three months in prison. 

Between June and August 2009, there were at least 30 cases of Christians arrested and detained across the 

country, mostly during church gatherings. All were released by September. In March 2009, two women, 

Marzieh Esmaeilabad and Maryam Rustampoor, were arrested for practicing Christianity after authorities 

raided and confiscated materials from their home. Iranian officials reportedly claimed the two women 

were engaging in “anti-government” activities, although the charges were never substantiated. In 

October, the women reportedly were brought before the court and charged with additional crimes: 

propagation of the Christian faith and apostasy. However, in November, both women were released 

without bail, although they could still face charges of proselytization and/or apostasy. It is a common 

practice, particularly in cases involving offenses based on religious belief, for Iranian authorities to 

release prisoners but to leave the charges against them or their convictions in place in order to be able to 

threaten them with re-imprisonment at any future time.

In January 2009, three Christian converts, Jamal Ghalishorani, Nadereh Jamali and Hamik Khachikian, 

were arrested in Tehran for engaging in underground house church activity. No formal charges were 

made and all were released within one to two weeks, although Ghalishorani and Jamali have an open case 

against them. In August 2008, five Christian converts were arrested, including Ramtin Soodmand, the 

son of Assemblies of God pastor Hossein Soodmand, who was executed in 1990. All were released by 

October, although Soodmand continues to await trial on charges of “promoting propaganda against the 

Islamic Republic.” 

Sabean Mandaeans

During the past few years, the unrecognized Sabean Mandaean religious community, numbering between 

5,000 and 10,000 people, has been facing intensifying harassment and repression by authorities. There 

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were reports that members of the Sabean Mandaean community experienced societal discrimination and 

pressure to convert to Islam, and they were often denied access to higher education. 

Jews and Anti-Semitism 

 

In recent years, official policies promoting anti-Semitism have risen sharply in Iran, and members of the 

Jewish community have been targeted on the basis of “ties to Israel,” whether real or perceived. President 

Ahmadinejad and other top political and clerical leaders have made public remarks during the reporting 

period denying the Holocaust and calling for the elimination of the state of Israel. In 2009, there was an 

increase in this officially sanctioned, anti-Semitic propaganda, involving official statements, media 

outlets, publications, and books. In recent years, in line with a stepped-up state-sponsored campaign, 

numerous programs broadcast on state-run television advanced anti-Semitic messages, a prominent 

newspaper held a Holocaust denial editorial cartoon contest, and the Iranian government sponsored a 

Holocaust denial conference. Anti-Semitic editorial cartoons depicting demonic and stereotypical images 

of Jews, along with Jewish symbols, were also published in the past year. 

Official government discrimination against Jews continues to be pervasive, fostering a threatening 

atmosphere for the approximately 25,000-30,000 member Jewish community. According to the State 

Department, despite minimal restrictions on Jewish religious practice education of Jewish children has 

become increasingly difficult in recent years, and distribution of Hebrew religious texts is strongly 

discouraged. 

Women 

The government’s enforcement of its official interpretation of Islam negatively affects the human rights of 

women in Iran, including their freedom of movement, association, and thought, conscience, and religion 

or belief, as well as freedom from coercion in matters of religion or belief. The Iranian justice system 

does not grant women the same legal status as men. For example, testimony by a man is equivalent to the 

testimony of two women. Provisions from both the Civil and Penal Codes, in particular those sections 

dealing with family and property law, discriminate against women. 

Over the past few years, several women’s rights activists have been arrested, and some remain in prison, 

for their involvement in collecting signatures for the Campaign for Equality aimed at ending 

discrimination against women in the application of Islamic law in Iran. Some of the activists’ demands 

included: that women’s testimony in court carry the same weight as men’s; equal inheritance rights for 

men and women; eliminating polygamy; and equal compensation payments for women and men in the 

event of wrongful death. In March 2009, 10 members of the Campaign for Equality’s One Million 

Signatures Campaign were detained, along with two other women’s rights activists; all were released 

within days or weeks. However, in December 2009, authorities arrested three Campaign members – 

Atiey Youseffi, Somayeh Rashidi, and Mansourreh Shojaaiei. All three remain in prison, and some 

reports indicate that Rashidi is being held in solitary confinement. 

Human Rights Defenders and Internet Freedom 

During the past year, the Iranian government also cracked down on and arbitrarily arrested approximately 

30 human rights defenders and activists in the country who reported on human rights violations, including 

violations of freedom of religion or belief. The crackdown included cyber attacks on Persian and English 

language Web sites of several human rights groups, which limited the ability of these groups to send 

reports on human rights and religious freedom abuses outside the country. In addition, the Iranian 

government took measures to prevent its citizens from freely communicating and receiving information 

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through television, radio satellite broadcasting, and the Internet, including information related to 

violations of freedom of religion or belief. 

Government Rejection of UN Recommendations 

In February 2010, at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Iran at the UN Human Rights Council 

(HRC) in Geneva, the government of Iran rejected a number of recommendations from countries urging it 

to comply with its international human rights responsibilities, including those related to freedom of 

religion or belief. The U.S. delegation, headed by Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor Michael Posner, issued a strong written statement, which included several religious freedom 

concerns and recommendations. The United States was the first country to deliver an oral statement at the 

Iran UPR, although the statement as delivered did not adequately address the plight of the Baha’i 

community. The Iranian government agreed to a few recommendations that, if fully implemented in 

practice, would advance religious freedom in the country. Such recommendations include upholding 

constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of worship, respecting freedom of religion, protecting 

religious minorities, and ensuring a fair and transparent trial for the seven Baha’i leaders as guaranteed 

under international human rights treaties to which Iran is a party. 

During the UPR, Iran’s head of delegation, Secretary General of the High Council for Human Rights of 

the Judiciary, Mohammad Javad Larijani, and other delegation members claimed that religious minorities 

in Iran are protected under Iran’s constitution and allowed to engage in religious activity freely. 

However, these claims are contrary to the facts on the ground. In addition, Larijani specifically 

responded to a question about the status of Baha’is in Iran by saying that no Baha’i had ever been 

prosecuted because of his or her faith, but only because of “cult-like activity.” USCIRF is concerned that 

the U.S government and the international community did not vigorously refute these fabricated assertions 

at the session. 

In October 2009, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon issued a report on the situation of human rights in 

Iran, which included details of abuses, including arbitrary detentions and false imprisonment, against 

religious minorities, particularly Baha’is. The report also documented arbitrary arrests and abuse of Sufi 

and Sunni Muslims. In December 2009, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the 

Iranian government’s poor human rights record, including its continued abuses targeting religious 

minorities and the escalation and increasing frequency of violations against Baha’is, Christians, Jews, and 

Sufi and Sunni Muslims. 

U.S. Policy 

The U.S. government has not had diplomatic relations with the government of Iran for 30 years, and U.S. 

law prohibits nearly all trade with Iran. Sanctions have been imposed on Iran because of its sponsorship 

of terrorism and its refusal to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations 

regarding its nuclear program. According to the State Department, these sanctions target the Iranian 

government, not the people of Iran. As a result, there are a number of exemptions, including exports of 

U.S. agricultural and medical products to Iran, U.S. donations of humanitarian articles, and U.S. imports 

of Iranian carpets and certain food items. 

During the past year, in multilateral fora and through public statements, the United States has urged the 

Iranian government to respect its citizens’ human rights, including the right to religious freedom. It also 

has drawn attention to the country’s human rights abuses and encouraged the government to uphold its 

international human rights obligations. In December 2009, for the seventh year in a row, the U.S. 

government co-sponsored and supported a successful UN General Assembly resolution – which passed 

74-48, with 59 abstentions – condemning Iran’s ongoing and severe human rights abuses. 

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The Obama administration shares the goals of previous U.S. administrations to contain Iran’s strategic 

capabilities and regional influence and views Iran as a “profound threat to U.S. national security 

interests.” Unlike previous administrations, however, the Obama administration has sought direct 

diplomatic engagement with the Iranian government. In October 2009, the U.S. government and other 

world powers (Britain, France, Russia, China, Germany, a group referred to with the United States as the 

P5+1), began talks in Geneva with the Iranian government over its nuclear program. Reportedly, the U.S. 

delegation privately raised some human rights issues on the sidelines of those negotiations. However, by 

late 2009 and early 2010 the lack of progress on a tentative agreement related to Iran’s nuclear program 

resulted in a shift in policy, and the U.S. government began to express support for reformers in Iran and to 

issue more frequent public statements highlighting the Iranian government’s human rights and religious 

freedom abuses. 

In February 2010, the United States and the European Union condemned ongoing human rights violations 

in Iran and called on the Iranian government to fulfill its international human rights obligations. Also in 

February, the U.S. government sent its top human rights official, Assistant Secretary Michael Posner, as 

the head of delegation to the UPR of Iran. However, the U.S. government did not introduce a resolution 

on Iran at the UN HRC in March 2010. The Obama administration is currently pursuing a fourth round of 

UN Security Council sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Three previous Security Council 

resolutions have been passed since 2006, each imposing sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program. 

In January 2010, the U.S. Senate passed a bill (S. 2799) that would impose targeted sanctions on Iran due 

to its nuclear program. The bill also includes sense of Congress provisions reflecting USCIRF’s 

recommendations to urge the President to: press the Iranian government to respect its citizens’ human 

rights and religious freedoms; identify Iranian officials responsible for violating these rights; and prohibit 

their entry into the U.S. and freeze their assets. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) is pressing to ensure that a 

provision that would impose sanctions on human rights violators is included in the bill that emerges from 

conference with the House-passed measure (H.R. 2194). 

According to the State Department’s 2009 Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report, the U.S. 

government seeks to increase Iranian citizens’ access to information about international human rights 

standards and to publicize the Iranian government’s human rights abuses through Voice of America radio 

and television broadcasts, the Persian-language version of the America.gov Web site, and the Persianlanguage radio station Radio Farda, which broadcasts to Iran. Additionally, since 2004, the U.S. 

government has funded a wide range of programs to support civil society, human rights, and rule of law in 

Iran, as well as to expand the free flow of information and the documentation of human rights abuses in 

Iran. However, in 2009, a number of civil society groups that previously received State Department 

funding were informed they will no longer receive such support. U.S. government officials have stated 

that this is due to the funding origination shifting from the State Department’s Near East Bureau to the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). According to USAID, in 2010 funding will 

“continue to include support for civil society and advocacy, promoting the rule of law and human rights, 

and increasing access to alternative sources of information” in Iran. 

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, $65 million in Economic Support Funds was requested “to support the 

aspirations of the Iranian people for a democratic and open society by promoting civil society, civic 

participation, media freedom, and freedom of information.” In FY 2010 and 2011, no request was made 

for specific democracy or human rights programming, although some portion of the $40 million requested 

for Near East democracy programs likely will be used to support continued human rights and public 

diplomacy programming in Iran. 

IRFA requires that the President take at least one of an array of specified punitive actions, including 

economic sanctions, against those countries that are designated as “countries of particular concern,” or 

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CPCs, for their particularly severe religious freedom violations. Iran has been designated as a CPC for 10 

years, but no IRFA-related sanction has been ever been imposed. Instead, the U.S. government has relied 

merely on existing sanctions. USCIRF concludes that, in light of the rapidly deteriorating conditions for 

religious freedom in Iran over the past year, the time has come for the U.S. government to impose 

specific, additional sanctions under IRFA (see Recommendations, section II, below). The U.S. 

government should also work with its European allies so that they do the same. 

USCIRF Activities 

USCIRF spoke out on numerous occasions in 2009-10 about deteriorating religious freedom conditions in 

Iran. In February 2010, USCIRF chair Leonard Leo testified at a Tom Lantos Human Rights 

Commission hearing on The Current Status of Human Rights and Religious Freedom in Iran. Also in 

February, on the occasion of the 31st anniversary of the Islamic revolution in Iran, USCIRF released a 

statement condemning years of religious abuse, with a particular focus on recent Iranian government 

efforts to convict and execute peaceful activists and reformers on the charge of waging war against God. 

In January 2010, USCIRF issued a public statement condemning the start of the trial against seven Baha’i 

leaders and called for their immediate release. In October 2009, USCIRF wrote to Secretary of State 

Hillary Clinton urging the U.S. government to include human rights and religious freedom issues as part 

of the P5+1 negotiations with Iran, as well as to impose religious freedom-specific sanctions on Iran. In 

July 2009, Roxana Saberi, the Iranian-American journalist held in Iran for nearly four months in early 

2009, wrote to USCIRF urging increased U.S. attention to the situation of the seven imprisoned Baha’i 

leaders. She shared a prison cell with two of the Baha’i leaders in Evin prison in Tehran. In response, 

USCIRF called for the immediate release of the seven Baha’is. 

In September 2008, Commissioners Felice D. Gaer and Michael Cromartie published an op-ed on the 

Washington Post website called “Don’t Lend Despots the Veneer of Peace,” which expressed concern 

about American religious groups inviting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to be the guest of honor at an 

event they were sponsoring during his visit to the United Nations that month. The article also detailed a 

number of religious freedom violations in Iran. In March 2008, Commissioner Nina Shea briefed 

members of Congress on religious freedom conditions in Iran at a congressional Iran Working Group 

briefing titled “Assessing the Human Rights Situation of Ethnic Religious Groups in Iran.” In February 

2008, the Commission held a hearing chaired by Commissioner Michael Cromartie on Capitol Hill 

entitled “Advancing Religious Freedom and Related Human Rights in Iran: Strategies for an Effective 

U.S. Policy,” at which policy officials and Iran experts explored current U.S. policy toward Iran and 

highlighted the deteriorating religious freedom conditions and other human rights abuses taking place 

there. 

In addition, during the past year Commission staff met with members of non-governmental organizations 

representing various religious communities in Iran, as well as Iran experts, human rights groups, and U.S. 

government officials and policymakers. USCIRF staff also made presentations at various events and 

venues related to human rights and religious freedom conditions in Iran. 

Recommendations 

I. Stopping Abuses of Freedom of Religion or Belief and Supporting Human Rights and 

Democracy 

In addition to continuing to designate Iran as a CPC, the U.S. government should: 

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• at the highest levels, more frequently and vigorously speak out publicly about the severe religious 

freedom abuses in Iran, and draw attention to the need for the international community to hold Iranian 

authorities accountable in specific cases, including by calling on the Iranian government to: 

--release the seven Baha’i leaders—Fariba Kamalabadi, Jamaloddin Khanjani, Afif Naemi, Saeid 

Rezaie, Mahvash Sabet, Behrouz Tavakkoli, and Vahid Tizfahm—and other Baha’is in prison on 

account of their religion or belief, as well as drop all charges against those Baha’is who have cases 

pending against them; 

--permit the Baha’i community to practice their faith in Iran, rescind laws that permit members of the 

Baha’i faith to be killed with impunity, and allow full access for Baha’is to study in public 

universities without discrimination; 

--release all Christians, including Hamid Shafiee, Reyhaneh Aghajari, Maryam Jalili, Mitra Zahmati, 

Farzan Matin and Vahik Abrahamian, in prison on account of their religion or belief, and drop all 

pending charges against Christian converts, including Marzieh Esmaeilabad, Maryam Rustampoor 

Jamal Ghalishorani, Nadereh Jamali, and Ramtin Soodmand; 

--release Shi’a cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Kazemeni Boroujerdi and other dissident Muslims, 

including Sufi Muslims, in prison on account of their religion or belief; 

--halt state-sponsored acts of anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial promotion campaigns, and, while 

vigorously protecting freedom of expression, counteract anti-Semitic rhetoric and other organized 

anti-Semitic activities by the President and other high-level government officials; 

• work within its current overall policy framework to ensure that violations of freedom of religion or 

belief and related human rights are part of all formal and informal multilateral or bilateral discussions, 

including the P5+1 talks, with representatives of the Iranian government, including by pressing the 

Iranian government to: 

--release all prisoners of conscience, including members of Muslim and non-Muslim religious 

minority communities identified above; 

--ensure that the Penal Code is not amended to codify the death penalty for apostasy; 

--release from prison women’s rights activists, including Atiey Youseffi, Somayeh Rashidi, and 

Mansourreh Shojaaiei, who advocate for ending discrimination against women in the application of 

Islamic law in Iran; 

--release from prison human rights defenders and activists targeted for reporting human rights and 

religious freedom abuses in Iran on Persian and English language Web sites; 

--cease all messages of hatred and intolerance, particularly toward Jews and Baha’is, in the 

government-controlled media and remove the government-appointed editor of Kayhan; 

--cease the jamming of satellite broadcasting and Internet censorship and ensure the right to freedom 

of expression as set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Iran is a 

party; 

• use appropriated Internet freedom funds to develop free, secure email access for use in Iran; facilitate 

the provision of high-speech internet access via satellite; and distribute immediately proven and fieldPage | 64 
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tested counter-censorship programs in order to prevent the arrest and harassment of religious freedom 

and human rights activists and help them maintain their freedom of expression and legitimate 

expectations of privacy; 

• award funds appropriated by Congress to counter censorship in Iran, including from the FY10 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, through a competitive and merit-based process; 

• ensure that funding budgeted to promote democracy and human rights in Iran includes support for 

effective initiatives advancing freedom of religion or belief, as well as ways to promote rule of law 

and human rights defenders programs that specifically seek to protect religious minorities in Iran; and 

y adequately fund U.S. public diplomacy entities, such as Voice of America and Radio Farda, and 

expand and develop new programming focusing solely on the situation of human rights—including 

the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief—in Iran.

II. Fulfilling IRFA’s Requirements and Imposing Targeted Sanctions 

The U.S. government should: 

• invoke the statutory provisions of IRFA by identifying Iranian government agencies and officials 

responsible for particularly severe violations of religious freedom, including but not limited to: 

--General Mohammad Ali Jafari, Head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps; 

--Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, Minister of Interior; 

--Heydar Moslehi, Minister of Intelligence; 

--Sadegh Ardeshir Larijani, Head of the Judiciary; 

--Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, Prosecutor General and former Minister of Intelligence; 

--Hossein Taeb, Head of the Intelligence Unit of the Revolutionary Guard Corps and former head of 

the Basij militia; 

--Mohammad Reza Naghdi, Head of the Basij militia; 

--Saeed Mortazavi, Deputy Prosecutor General and former Prosecutor General of the Islamic 

Revolutionary Court; and 

--Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam, Head of the National Police. 

• bar from entry into the United States and freeze the assets of Iranian government officials identified 

as having engaged in particularly severe religious freedom violations, including but not limited to 

those listed above, and, where appropriate, immediate family members, and press our European allies 

to do the same. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

III. Promoting Freedom of Religion and Belief and Related Human Rights in 

Multilateral Fora 

The U.S. government should: 

• oppose, and encourage other UN Member States to oppose, Iran’s candidacy for membership to the 

UN HRC at the May 13, 2010 election; 

• call on the UN HRC to follow up vigorously on Iran’s compliance with the recommendations from 

the February 2010 UPR, including those related to freedom of religion or belief; 

• continue to support an annual UN General Assembly resolution condemning severe violations of 

human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, in Iran, and calling for officials responsible for 

such violations to be held accountable; 

• press for a resolution condemning severe violations of human rights in Iran, including freedom of 

religion or belief, at the UN General Assembly and at the UN Human Rights Council; 

• call on the UN HRC to restore the position of UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 

in Iran with the task of investigating and reporting on human rights abuses in Iran; 

• call on the UN HRC to monitor carefully and demand Iran’s compliance with the recommendations of 

the representatives of those UN special representatives that have already visited Iran, particularly the 

Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief (1995), the Working Group on Arbitrary 

Detention (2003), the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (2003), 

and the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard 

of living and on the right to non-discrimination in this context (2005); and 

• encourage the UN HRC to continue to use its existing procedures to maintain oversight of conditions 

for freedom of religion or belief in Iran, including continued visits and reporting by the Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and 

Expression, and other relevant special rapporteurs and working groups, to which Iran has issued a 

standing invitation. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Iraq

 

FINDINGS: Systematic, ongoing, and egregious religious freedom violations continue in Iraq. 

Members of the country’s smallest religious minorities still suffer from targeted violence, threats, and 

intimidation, against which they receive insufficient government protection. Perpetrators of such attacks 

are rarely identified, investigated, or punished, creating a climate of impunity. The small communities 

also experience a pattern of official discrimination, marginalization, and neglect. In addition, there 

continue to be sectarian attacks, often with impunity, and tense relations between Shi’a and Sunni Iraqis, 

and other egregious, religiously-motivated violence also continues. 

Based on these concerns, USCIRF again recommends in 2010 that Iraq be designated as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC.* The Commission recommended that Iraq be designated as a CPC in 2008 

and 2009, and placed Iraq on its Watch List in 2007. 

The religious freedom situation in Iraq remains grave, particularly for the country’s smallest, most 

vulnerable religious minorities. The violence, forced displacement, discrimination, marginalization, and 

neglect suffered by members of these groups threaten these ancient communities’ very existence in Iraq. 

These minorities, which include Chaldo-Assyrians and other Christians, Sabean Mandaeans, and 

Yazidis, continue to experience targeted violence, receive inadequate official protection or justice, and 

suffer discrimination. Since 2003, many have fled to neighboring countries, where they represent a 

disproportionately high percentage of registered Iraqi refugees. The diminished numbers remaining in 

the country are now concentrated in areas in the highly dangerous Nineveh governorate over which the 

Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is seeking to extend its control, and they suffer abuses and 

discrimination as a result. Although the Iraqi government has publicly condemned violence against these 

groups, it continues to fall short in investigating the continuing attacks and bringing perpetrators to 

justice, and its efforts to increase security to minority areas are not adequate. In addition, though greatly 

reduced from 2006-07 levels, violence between Shi’a and Sunni Iraqis continues. Significant tensions 

between these groups remain, including tensions due to the ongoing government formation process. 

Finally, other religiously-motivated violence and abuse continues. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: For Iraq to become a secure, diverse, and stable democracy, the 

United States must pay greater attention to helping ensure that the human rights of all Iraqis are 

guaranteed and enforced both in law and practice. With U.S. forces drawing down and a new Iraqi 

government being formed in the wake of the March 7 elections, the United States should emphasize, 

with both the new Iraqi government and the KRG, the urgent need to protect vulnerable religious 

minority communities and ensure them justice. USCIRF also recommends that the U.S. government 

appoint a special envoy for human rights in Iraq, create an inter-agency task force on Iraqi minority 

issues, and prioritize funding for projects that foster religious tolerance. Additional recommendations for 

U.S. policy towards Iraq can be found at the end of this chapter. 

*Commissioners Cromartie, Eid, and Land dissent from the CPC recommendation, believing that Iraq 

should be on the Watch List. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Religious Freedom Conditions 

The Smallest Religious Minorities 

Recent years in Iraq have seen alarming numbers of religiously-motivated killings, abductions, beatings, 

rapes, threats, intimidation, forced displacements, forced conversions, and attacks on religious leaders and 

holy sites. Many Iraqis—Muslim and non-Muslim alike—have suffered in this violence, but those from 

the country’s smallest, non-Muslim religious minorities have been particularly vulnerable. Members of 

these small groups continue to experience targeted violence and intimidation, do not have militia or tribal 

structures to defend themselves, and do not receive adequate official protection or justice. Many have 

fled to neighboring countries, and are not returning to Iraq. Those who remain in the country are now 

concentrated in the violent Nineveh governorate, where Kurdish and Arab parties dispute control. 

Today, only half of the pre-2003 Iraqi Christian community is believed to remain in the country, with 

Christian leaders warning that the result of this flight may be “the end of Christianity in Iraq.”6

 In 2003, 

there were approximately 1.4 million Chaldean Catholics, Assyrian Orthodox, Assyrian Church of the 

East members, Syriac Orthodox, Armenians (Catholic and Orthodox), Protestants, and Evangelicals in 

Iraq. Today, that number is estimated to be only 500,000. 

Sabean Mandaeans report that almost 90 percent of their small community either has fled Iraq or been 

killed, leaving some 3,500 to 5,000 Mandaeans in the country. This includes 150 families in Baghdad 

and only five Mandaean religious leaders. In 2003, the Mandaean community in Iraq reportedly 

numbered some 50,000 to 60,000. The Mandaean Associations Union and Mandaean leaders, refugees, 

and asylum seekers have told USCIRF that they do not see any future for Mandaeans in Iraq and have 

asked that the group be collectively resettled to a third country so that their religion, language, and culture 

can survive. 

 

The Yazidi community reportedly now numbers approximately 500,000, down from some 700,000 in 

2005. The Mandaean and Yazidi communities are particularly vulnerable because a person must be born 

into these religions, not convert or marry into them, and they do not proselytize or seek new adherents. 

Additionally, Mandaeans, followers of John the Baptist, are prohibited under their religion from using 

weapons and therefore cannot defend themselves. 

Little is known about Iraq’s tiny Baha’i and Jewish communities. The Baha’i faith, estimated to have 

only 2,000 adherents in Iraq, remains banned under a 1970 law. Iraq’s ancient and once large Jewish 

community now numbers fewer than 10, who essentially live in hiding. Many Jews left Iraq in the years 

following the founding of the state of Israel, and a 2006 law precludes Jews who emigrated from 

regaining Iraqi citizenship. 

Despite the overall drop in violence in the country, violence against religious minorities and their 

religious sites continued in 2009 and 2010, particularly in the northern disputed areas. As noted by the 

State Department in its 2009 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, “the ‘surge’ by the 

Multinational Forces in Iraq, in coordination with Iraqi Security Force operations, reduced the overall 

level of violence in the country; however, significant effects were slow to trickle down to the country’s 

minority communities.” As discussed below, the few official attempts in the past year to improve security 

in minority areas and for minority religious sites were largely ineffective. Moreover, perpetrators of 

attacks on minorities were rarely identified, investigated, or punished. As the State Department reported, 

 

6

 Simon Caldwell, “Bishop Asks: Is it the ‘End of Christianity in Iraq?’”, Catholic News Service, December 1, 

2007. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

“very few of the perpetrators of violence committed against Christians and other religious minorities in 

the country have been punished; arrests following a murder or other crime are rare.” 

The vast majority of the non-Muslim minorities displaced by violence within Iraq in recent years have 

gone to the north, mainly to Nineveh governorate and the three governorates controlled by the KRG. 

Northern Iraq, particularly the Nineveh Plains area of Nineveh governorate, is the historic homeland of 

Iraq’s Christian community, and the Yazidi community is indigenous to Nineveh and the KRG 

governorate of Dahuk. Although the three KRG governorates are relatively secure, Nineveh governorate, 

particularly in and around Mosul, remains one of Iraq’s most dangerous and unstable areas, as both 

insurgent and extremist groups continue to be active there. Moreover, control of this ethnically and 

religiously mixed area is disputed between the KRG and the central Iraqi government. The minorities are 

caught in the middle of this struggle for control and have been targeted for abuses and discrimination as a 

result, allegedly by both sides. 

The dispute stems from Kurdish efforts to annex into the KRG additional territories—including parts of 

the governorates of Nineveh, Kirkuk (Tamim), Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Waset—on the basis of their 

claim that these areas are historically Kurdish. Since 2003, Kurdish peshmerga (armed fighters) security 

forces and political parties have moved into these territories, effectively establishing de facto control over 

many of the contested areas. Religious and ethnic minorities in these areas, including non-Muslims and 

ethnic Shabak and Turkomen, have accused Kurdish peshmerga and officials of engaging in systemic 

abuses and discrimination against them to further Kurdish territorial claims. Their accusations include 

interfering with minorities’ voting rights; encroaching on, seizing, and refusing to return minority land; 

conditioning the provision of services and assistance to minority communities on support for Kurdish 

expansion; forcing minorities to identify themselves as either Arabs or Kurds; and impeding the 

formation of local minority police forces. The minorities also accuse both Arab and Kurdish officials of 

ignoring these vulnerable communities as they focus on their fight for territorial control. The ArabKurdish dispute also has paralyzed Nineveh’s provincial government, resulting in its failure to spend any 

of the 2009 provisional budget to provide services and benefits to Nineveh residents, including minorities. 

In recent years, there has been a pattern of violence targeting minorities in Nineveh governorate prior to 

important political events. This pattern continued in this reporting period. However, the provincial and 

national governments continued to fail to provide preventive security measures to protect the smallest 

religious minorities in this dangerous area. This is notable, given the preventive security measures that 

are put in place (although not always successful) during Shi’a religious pilgrimages, which in recent years 

have also attracted attacks. 

During a two-week period beginning on February 14, 2010, less than one month before the March 7 

national elections, 10 Christians were targeted and killed in Mosul, prompting some 4,300 Christians to 

flee the city, most to Christian villages in the Nineveh Plains area and some to the KRG region and Syria. 

This exodus was reminiscent of October 2008 when, over a 10-day period in the lead-up to the 

January 2009 provincial elections, 14 Christians were targeted and killed in Mosul and more than 12,000 

fled the city. 

In the wake of the February 2010 violence, both Iraqi and Kurdish government officials condemned the 

attacks, the government of Iraq said it had established an investigative committee, and the governor of 

Nineveh ordered increased security and called for an international investigation. To date, however, no 

perpetrators are known to have been identified or arrested. Moreover, as noted above, given that similar 

violence had occurred before previous elections, it is notable, if not negligent, that the governing 

authorities in Nineveh only reacted after the fact and did not provide advance, proactive security 

precautions for Mosul’s Christian population. After the October 2008 attacks, the Iraqi government also 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

said that it had established an investigative commission, although the results of its investigation, if any, 

are not publicly known. No individuals are known to have been arrested for involvement in those attacks. 

In August 2009, a series of bombings in Nineveh targeted religious and ethnic minorities. On August 7, a 

Shi’a Turkoman mosque in Mosul was bombed, destroying the mosque, killing at least 44, and wounding 

more than 200. On August 10, Khazna—a village outside Mosul inhabited by the Shabak ethnic, and 

predominantly Shi’a, minority—was leveled by two large truck bombs, killing at least 28 and injuring at 

least 150. Three days later, a café in the Yazidi town of Sinjar was attacked by two suicide bombers, 

killing at least 21 and injuring at least 30. On August 28, a market in Sinjar was bombed, killing four and 

injuring 28. In the wake of these attacks, the U.S. military proposed joint U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish security 

patrols and other cooperative measures aimed at improving security in disputed areas in Nineveh. 

However, due to the difficult Arab-Kurdish relationship, it took almost six months, until January 2010, 

for these measures to become operational. Given that the security patrols were proposed by the United 

States, not the KRG or central Iraqi government, and the protracted delay in beginning them, serious 

questions remain as to both the Iraqi government’s and the KRG’s commitment to address violence 

against minorities. 

A number of churches in Iraq were attacked during 2009. On July 12, seven churches in Baghdad were 

bombed, killing four and injuring 18. After these attacks, provincial security officials in Nineveh decided 

to dig trenches around several Christian towns, and the Iraqi interior ministry announced the creation of a 

committee to oversee security at churches nationwide. Nevertheless, in November-December 2009, there 

was another series of church attacks. On November 26, a church and a convent in Mosul were bombed, 

causing damage but no casualties. On December 15, two churches in Mosul were bombed, killing four 

and injuring 40, and on December 23, two more churches in Mosul were bombed, killing three. In the 

wake of these bombings and additional threats, the Iraqi government increased security at churches in 

both Baghdad and Mosul for Christmas 2009. The Chaldean Archdiocese of Kirkuk canceled Christmas 

Masses. In Basra, the Chaldean Bishop called on Christians in southern Iraq to refrain from public 

Christmas celebrations, out of respect for the Shi’a holiday of Ashura (the commemoration of the death of 

the Prophet Mohammed’s grandson, Imam Hussein), which was taking place at the same time. 

On Christmas Day 2009, Christians and Shi’a Shabak clashed outside a church in the northern town of 

Bartala, near Mosul. Iraqi and Kurdish security forces reportedly intervened to restore order. Reports on 

what caused the clash differed: some said the Christians had torn down a poster of Imam Hussein; others 

said the Shabak had torn down Christmas decorations in the Assyrian market and demanded to perform 

their self-flagellation ritual in the church. 

To address their lack of security and political and economic marginalization, some Iraqi minority groups, 

both inside and outside Iraq, have been seeking what is variously described as a protected, semiautonomous, or autonomous area for Christians, and some say for other minorities as well, in the Nineveh 

Plains area. These options are proposed to give effect to Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution, which 

“guarantee[s] the administrative, political, cultural and educational rights of the various nationalities, such 

as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all other constituents,” and provides that this “shall be regulated 

by” a future law. However, the specifics of what such a law would entail, including the territory that such 

an area would cover, its religious and ethnic make-up, how it would be secured, what governance and 

economic powers it would have, and how it would relate to the KRG and the central government remain 

disputed even among those who say that they favor autonomy. Many members of the smallest minorities 

also have urged reforms to provisions in Article 2 of the Iraqi constitution that give Islam a preferred 

status, which provides a potential justification for discrimination against non-Muslims. As far as is 

known, the Iraqi government has made no serious efforts to consider or address any of these proposals. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Additionally, some evangelical Christian groups urged less onerous requirements for government 

registration. To register, a church must have 500 members and must obtain approval from the Council of 

Iraqi Christian Church Leaders, which consists of representatives from the 14 officially-recognized 

churches. 

 

Sunnis and Shi’a 

In past years, many serious sectarian abuses were attributed to actors from the Shi’a-dominated Ministries 

of Interior and Defense and by armed Shi’a groups with ties to the Iraqi government or elements within it. 

Since 2007, such sectarian violence has markedly diminished. In its most recent Annual Report on

International Religious Freedom, the State Department reported that during 2008-09, the Iraqi 

government “became increasingly successful in restoring security, in a generally non-sectarian manner, 

throughout the country.” Nevertheless, the State Department still noted that the “sectarian 

misappropriation of official authority within the security apparatus” remained a concern. 

Sunni-Shi’a mistrust and tensions continue. Among other issues, the Shi’a-led government’s promised 

integration of Sunni Sons of Iraq members, which was supposed to occur by the end of 2009, is still far 

from complete.7

 In addition, a controversial Shi’a-led government commission barred hundreds of 

candidates in early 2010, including prominent Sunni and secular politicians, from competing in the March 

7 elections due to alleged Baathist ties. While this raised sectarian tensions in the run-up to the election, 

it did not result in a return to widespread sectarian violence or a Sunni boycott on participating in the 

election. However, it could lessen the chances of a political accommodation between these groups in the 

future. 

Serious sectarian abuses continue to be committed by organized groups outside of the government, 

notably the Sunni-dominated insurgency and foreign and indigenous extremist groups. Shi’a pilgrims and 

worshipers have been frequent targets, particularly around important holidays. In early February 2010, 

despite heavy security, there was a series of bombing attacks against Shi’a pilgrims traveling to Karbala 

to celebrate Arbaeen (the religious observance occurring forty days after Ashura)n. These attacks 

included two major bombings that killed at least 59 and injured more than 100, as well as several smaller 

bombings. In late December 2009, during the 10-day Ashura holiday, multiple bombings targeted Shi’a 

pilgrims and worshippers in Karbala, Baghdad, Hilla, and near Kirkuk. At least 30 were killed in these 

attacks, and at least 160 injured. As in past years, the Iraqi government provided heavy security on 

pilgrimage routes and at holy sites for Ashura. 

July and August 2009 also saw a wave of bombings, including against multiple Shi’a mosques in 

Baghdad during Friday prayers, Shi’a pilgrims returning from Karbala, and predominantly Shi’a areas in 

Baghdad, as well the attacks on the Shi’a Turkoman mosque and the Shi’a Shabak village in Nineveh 

mentioned above. Additionally, on June 20, a large suicide truck bomb exploded near a mosque in the 

Shi’a Turkoman town of Taza, near Kirkuk, killing 85 people, injuring 170, and destroying or damaging 

nearly 200 homes. 

There also was a series of bombings against Shi’a areas, sites and pilgrims in late April 2009, for which 

the extremist group the Islamic State of Iraq claimed responsibility. On April 23, a suicide bomber 

targeted Iranian pilgrims passing through a town in Diyala governorate, killing more than 50; another 

targeted women and children waiting to receive food aid in a predominately Shi’a neighborhood of 

Baghdad, killing at least 28. On April 24, as worshippers were arriving for Friday mid-day prayers at an 

 

7

 The Sons of Iraq are local security groups that include former insurgents who switched sides in exchange for U.S.-

paid salaries. The Iraqi government is now responsible for paying these groups, and agreed to give them jobs in the 

police, security forces, or public sector. 

Page | 71 
Countries of Particular Concern 

important Shi’a shrine in Baghdad, two suicide bombers killed at least 60 people and injured at least 125. 

According to press reports, Prime Minister al-Maliki promptly created a special committee to investigate 

this attack and ordered the detention of the police commanders responsible for security in the area around 

the shrine. 

 

Some attacks also targeted Sunnis. During summer and early fall 2009, several Sunni clerics who had 

spoken out against al-Qaeda in Iraq were killed, including in Baghdad and Mosul. Additionally, a suicide 

bombing on October 16 at a Sunni Turkoman mosque in Tal Afar, Nineveh province killed at least 9, 

including the imam, and injured at least 30. On April 22, 2009, a suicide bombing inside a Sunni mosque 

in the central Iraqi town of Dhuluiya killed at least 5 people and wounded 15. According to the Iraqi 

police, 52 Sunni political, religious, and community leaders were killed in a series of attacks in Anbar 

province between mid-October 2009 and January 2010. 

 Women and Other Vulnerable Groups 

In recent years in Iraq, women and girls have suffered religiously-motivated violence and abuses, 

including killings, abductions, forced conversions, restrictions on movement, forced marriages, and 

reportedly other violence including rape. Women considered to have violated Islamic teachings and 

politically active females have been targeted by Sunni and Shi’a extremists alike. So-called “honor 

crimes” against women by family members, particularly in the KRG region, also have been a problem. 

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) continues to express concern about violence 

against women in Iraq, including honor killings in the KRG region. According to its most recent human 

rights report, in the first half of 2009 UNAMI “did not see any significant changes regarding the scale and 

patterns of violence and abuse targeting women” in the country. During the Commission’s March 2008 

visit to Erbil, the KRG Minister for Human Rights stated that the incidence of so-called honor crimes had 

increased in the KRG since 2005. In July 2007, the KRG created a commission to try to reduce such 

crimes and made changes to its laws to help ensure the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators. This 

commission subsequently established a board to monitor implementation of the new laws. However, 

according to UNAMI, prosecution is often hampered by insufficient evidence, witnesses’ reluctance to 

testify, and courts granting leniency in the punishment of such crimes. 

 

Governmental and societal actors continued to attempt to enforce strict interpretations of Islamic religious 

norms, and radical groups continued to exert “tremendous pressure on individuals and groups to conform 

to extremist interpretations of Islamic precepts,” according to the State Department. The State 

Department’s 2009 religious freedom report gives details on how the education department of Salah ah 

Din governorate banned female teachers from wearing trousers, instead mandating “long and conservative 

clothing.” The State Department also reported that in some schools and other public places, non-Muslims 

and secular Muslims still felt pressured to comply with certain Islamic norms, such as veiling, though less 

so than in past years. In addition, the Iraqi parliament debated banning alcohol, but did not introduce 

legislation. In August 2009, the Basra provincial council banned alcohol in that governorate, but it lifted 

the ban four months later. 

Targeted, religiously-motivated violence against homosexuals also continued to be reported. During the 

first half of 2009, at least 25 homosexuals or individuals perceived to be homosexual were killed, and 

many others threatened, according to UNAMI, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International. The 

Mahdi Army, the militia of the Shi’a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, was suspected of perpetrating these attacks, 

most of which occurred in Baghdad’s Sadr City neighborhood. There were reports that the violence was 

being called for by some imams in Sadrist mosques. 

 

 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 

There have been few developments related to the situation of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced 

persons (IDPs) since the Commission last reported on Iraq in May 2009. Significant new displacements 

have not been reported in 2009-10, although by most estimates, more than 4 million Iraqis, or 

approximately 20 percent of the population, remain displaced in neighboring countries or other areas of 

Iraq. Many of these individuals fled religious-based persecution. Members of Iraq’s smallest religious 

minorities continue to make up a disproportionately high percentage of the refugees registered with the 

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in neighboring countries—nearly 20 percent, though 

they comprise only approximately three percent of Iraq’s pre-2003 population.8

 For the most part, these 

minorities are not returning to Iraq. 

Iraqi refugees and IDPs continue to need significant humanitarian assistance. Despite some efforts by the 

Iraqi government to promote returns, the UN reports that fewer than 15 percent of all displaced persons 

have returned to their areas of origin. The government’s policies to promote return, which include three 

months’ cash assistance and a procedure to evict squatters and return properties to returning displaced 

persons, have been haphazardly implemented. In addition, these policies fail to address other concerns, 

such as insecurity and lack of livelihood opportunities, which continue to make displaced individuals 

reluctant to return to their former homes. 

Nevertheless, some voluntary returns continued in 2009, particularly IDPs returning to Baghdad. 

UNHCR reported that between January and November 2009, about 189,000 Iraqis who fled their homes 

returned (155,000 IDPs and 34,000 refugees). In 2008, UNHCR reported 220,000 returnees. However, 

there are few reports of members of the small religious minorities being among the returnees. UNHCR 

remains concerned about continuing threats to the smallest religious minorities in Iraq and continues to 

recommend they be given prima facie refugee status. It also continues to recommend that Iraqis should 

not be forcibly returned to certain governorates in Iraq, including Nineveh, Kirkuk, and Baghdad, due to 

continuing insecurity, or to regions that are not their areas of origin, such as the KRG. 

U.S. Policy 

The United States is in the process of withdrawing its military forces from Iraq, with all but 50,000 troops 

scheduled to be out of the country by August 31, 2010 and the remainder by the end of 2011. Bilateral 

relations between the United States and Iraq are now governed by a “Strategic Framework Agreement” 

which emphasizes friendship, mutual respect, and cooperation in specified areas (political and diplomatic, 

defense and security, cultural, economic and energy, health and environmental, information technology 

and communications, and law enforcement and judicial). 

According to the State Department’s 2009 Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report, the United States 

seeks to assist Iraq “to develop just, representative, and accountable government institutions that secure 

the country’s inhabitants and their national infrastructure, deliver essential services, and govern in an 

equitable, nonsectarian manner.” To these ends, U.S. diplomacy and programs support “political and 

economic reform; political party development; respect for the rule of law and human rights; increased 

government capacity at the national, provincial, and local levels; and an engaged civil society and 

citizenry....” A number of the programs that are described include efforts to protect and promote the 

rights of women and ethnic and religious minorities. In its 2009 Annual Report on International 

Religious Freedom, the State Department stated that in 2008-09, it and U.S. Embassy Baghdad had 

 

8

 Registration with UNHCR is voluntary and is often of interest mainly to those refugees who wish to be resettled to 

a third country. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

“increased [their] attention to the country’s minority communities.” USCIRF welcomes this increase and 

hopes that it continues. 

The United States’ foreign assistance to Iraq includes funding for democracy, development, and human 

rights programs. For fiscal year (FY) 2010, Congress appropriated $382.5 million for Economic Support 

Fund (ESF) programs to support good governance, civic engagement, and economic growth in Iraq. In 

FY 2009, $551.5 million was appropriated for such programs. In 2008, Congress earmarked $10 million 

in unobligated ESF funds for projects benefiting minorities in the Nineveh Plains, which the Nineveh 

Provincial Reconstruction Team used during 2008-09 to fund education, microfinance, and infrastructure 

projects in that area. In December 2009, Congress again earmarked up to $10 million of ESF funding to 

continue programs for minorities in the Nineveh Plains during FY 2010. 

 

The United States also contributes to various UN and non-governmental organizations assisting Iraqi 

refugees and IDPs, including $303.4 million for these purposes in FY 2009. In addition, beginning in FY 

2007 the U.S. government increased its efforts to resettle Iraqi refugees to the United States. Since that 

time, more than 37,000 Iraqi refugees have been resettled to this country, including 18,838 in fiscal year 

2009. The United States is now the largest recipient of both UNHCR referrals of Iraqis and of resettled 

Iraqi refugees. 

In February 2008, the State Department increased direct access for certain Iraqis to the U.S. Refugee 

Admissions Program, as required by the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007. That Act created a new 

Priority 2 (P2) category for Iraqis from “religious or minority” communities with close family members 

in the United States, and authorized the Secretary of State to create additional P2 categories for other 

vulnerable Iraqis.9

 (A P2 category allows those covered to apply directly to the United States for 

resettlement, without first having to be referred by UNHCR.10) The new State Department policy covers 

Iraqis in Egypt or Jordan “who are the spouses, sons, daughters, parents, brothers or sisters of a citizen of 

the United States, or ... the spouses or unmarried sons or daughters of a Permanent Resident Alien of the 

United States....” 

USCIRF Activities 

Since 2003, USCIRF has advocated for universal human rights protections, including religious freedom, 

for all persons in Iraq, calling for constitutional and legal reforms to ensure that these rights are 

guaranteed and enforced. The Commission also has drawn attention to the serious religious freedom 

problems there, including alarming levels of religiously-motivated violence and human rights abuses and 

the extreme vulnerability of the smallest religious minorities. The Commission repeatedly has urged the 

U.S. and Iraqi governments to take action to reduce violence and protect all Iraqis. Over the years, 

USCIRF has recommended numerous specific security, legal, human rights, humanitarian, development, 

and reconciliation measures. The Commission also repeatedly has called attention to the plight of Iraqi 

refugees and IDPs and urged the U.S. government to increase humanitarian assistance and to expand and 

expedite its refugee and asylum programs for Iraqis fleeing religious persecution. 

 

9

 The Act was an amendment sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) to the FY 2008 National Defense 

Authorization Act. The relevant language is found in the sections 1243(a)(4) and 1243(b). 10 A P2 designation does not guarantee resettlement of all individuals from that category who apply. Each applicant 

still must undergo the refugee status determination interviews and background security and medical screenings 

required for all asylum-seekers by U.S. law. The P2 designation does, however, speed up the process for those 

applicants by bypassing the UNHCR referral process, and it also allows UNHCR to focus on other vulnerable 

groups. 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

In May 2007, citing escalating unchecked sectarian violence, mounting evidence of collusion between 

Shi’a militias and Iraqi government ministries, and the grave conditions affecting the country’s smallest 

religious minorities, USCIRF placed Iraq on its Watch List. Three Commissioners dissented, believing 

that Iraq should be designated as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. In December 2008, USCIRF 

issued an extensive report on religious freedom conditions in Iraq, based on travel to Syria, Jordan, and 

northern Iraq, as well as hearings, briefings, meetings, and other activities undertaken in 2007 and 2008. 

In that report, and again in May 2009, the Commission recommended Iraq for CPC designation, based on 

the government’s toleration of ongoing, severe religious freedom abuses, particularly against the smallest 

religious minorities. Four Commissioners dissented, concluding that, although the Iraqi government had 

not done enough to address the alarming plight of these minorities, it had not committed recurrent, 

affirmative, intentional acts of abuse and therefore the country should remain on the Watch List. 

Recommendations 

I. Ensuring Security and Justice for All Iraqis 

The U.S. government should urge the Iraqi government to: 

• undertake prompt, transparent, and effective investigations of all human rights abuses, including those 

stemming from sectarian, religiously-motivated, or other violence by Iraqi security forces, political 

factions, militias, or any other para-state actors affiliated with or otherwise linked to the Iraqi 

government or regional or local governments, and bring the perpetrators to justice; 

 

• ensure that Iraqi government revenues neither are directed to nor indirectly support any militia, parastate actor, or other organization credibly charged with involvement in severe human rights abuses; 

• continue the process of ensuring a greater sectarian integration into the government and security 

forces so that they better reflect the diversity of the country; 

• urgently establish, fund, train, and deploy police units for vulnerable minority communities that are as 

representative as possible of those communities, ensure that minority recruits are not excluded from 

nor discriminated against in the recruitment process, in promotion and command leadership 

opportunities, or in the terms and conditions of their employment, and ensure to the maximum extent 

possible that such police units remain in their locations of origin and are not transferred to other cities 

as has been done in the past; 

• promptly develop and issue new national identification cards that do not list religious or ethnic 

identity; 

• take steps to enhance security at places of worship, particularly in areas where religious minorities are 

known to be at risk; 

• direct the Ministry of Human Rights to investigate and issue a public report on the abuses against and 

marginalization of Iraq’s small minority communities and make recommendations to address these 

problems; 

• create and fully fund the independent national Human Rights Commission provided for in the 

Constitution and ensure that this Commission is non-sectarian, that it has a mandate to investigate 

individual complaints, and that its functions and operations are based on the UN’s Paris Principles; 

and 

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• replace the existing Prime Minister’s minorities committee with one that is independent and includes 

representatives of all of Iraq’s ethnic and religious minority communities selected by the communities 

themselves, and ensure that this committee has access to communicate minority concerns to senior 

officials of the Iraqi government and the international community. 

II. Ensuring Legal Protections for All Iraqis 

The U.S. government should urge the Iraqi government to: 

• enact constitutional amendments to strengthen the Iraqi Constitution’s human rights guarantees, 

including by: 

--clarifying sub-clause (B) in Article 2 that no law may contradict “the rights and basic freedoms 

stipulated in this constitution” to make clear that these rights and freedoms include the principles 

of equality and nondiscrimination and the human rights guaranteed under international 

agreements to which Iraq is a State party; 

--deleting sub-clause (A) in Article 2 that no law may contradict “the established provisions of 

Islam” because it heightens sectarian tensions over which interpretation of Islam prevails and 

improperly turns theological interpretations into constitutional questions; 

--revising Article 2’s guarantee of “the Islamic identity of the majority” to make certain that this 

identity is not used to justify violations of the individual right to freedom of thought, conscience, 

religion, or belief under international law; 

--ensuring that minority identity is also guaranteed, including the rights of all individual members 

of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities to enjoy and develop their culture and language and 

practice their religion; 

-- making clear that the default system for personal status cases in Iraq is civil law, that the free 

and informed consent of both parties is required to move a personal status case to the religious 

law system, that religious court rulings are subject to final review under civil law, and that the 

appointment of judges to courts adjudicating personal status matters, including any religious 

courts, should meet international standards for judicial training; 

--removing the ability of making appointments to the Federal Supreme Court based on training in 

Islamic jurisprudence alone, and requiring that, at a minimum, all judges have training in civil 

law, including a law degree; 

• work with minority communities and their representatives to develop measures to implement Article 

125 of the Constitution, which guarantees “the administrative, political, cultural, and educational 

rights of the various nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all the other 

constituents,” in Nineveh and other areas where these groups are concentrated; and 

• reduce onerous registration requirements, so that smaller religious groups are not disadvantaged in 

registering. 

 

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III. Prioritizing Human Rights, including Freedom of Religion or Belief, in U.S. Bilateral and 

Multilateral Diplomacy 

The U.S. government should: 

 

• ensure that all U.S.-Iraqi cooperation under the Strategic Framework Agreement to “promote Iraq’s 

efforts in the field of ... human rights” places a high priority on the intertwined rights to freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief and freedom of opinion and expression; 

• ensure that human rights issues, including freedom of religion or belief, are raised in the context of 

negotiations on Iraq’s accession to the World Trade Organization; 

• ensure that human rights issues, including freedom of religion or belief and minority rights, are raised 

in the context of negotiations between the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Regional 

Government (KRG) concerning disputed internal boundaries; 

• appoint and immediately dispatch a Special Envoy for Human Rights to Embassy Baghdad, reporting 

directly to the Secretary of State, to serve as the United States’ lead human rights official in Iraq, to 

lead an Embassy human rights working group, and to coordinate U.S. efforts to promote and protect 

human rights in Iraq; and 

 

• revive the U.S. government’s internal Inter-Agency Task Force on Iraqi Minority Issues and direct it 

to consider and recommend policies for the U.S. government to address the needs of Iraq’s vulnerable 

minority communities. 

IV. Prioritizing Human Rights, including Freedom of Religion or Belief, in the U.S. 

Relationship with the KRG 

The U.S. government should: 

• press the KRG and Kurdish officials in neighboring governorates to cease any interference with the 

creation, training, and deployment of representative police forces for minority communities, and link 

progress on representative policing to U.S. financial assistance and other forms of interaction with the 

KRG; 

 

• demand immediate investigations into and accounting for allegations of human rights abuses by 

Kurdish regional and local officials against minority communities, including reports of attacks on 

minorities and expropriation of minority property, and make clear that decisions on U.S. financial and 

other assistance will take into account whether perpetrators are being investigated and held 

accountable; and 

 

• work with Iraqi and KRG officials to establish a mechanism to examine and resolve outstanding real 

property claims involving religious and ethnic minorities in the KRG region and neighboring 

governorates. 

V. Promoting Human Rights, including Freedom of Religion or Belief, through U.S. Programs 

The U.S. government should: 

• fund programs to: train Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior personnel on international 

human rights standards; build capacity in the Ministry of Human Rights, the independent national 

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Human Rights Commission, and a minorities committee whose membership is selected by the 

communities themselves; and deploy human rights experts to assist the Council of Representatives’ 

constitutional amendment committee in strengthening the Constitution’s human rights provisions; 

• fund workshops and training on religion/state issues for Iraqi officials, policymakers, legal 

professionals, representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious leaders, and other 

members of key sectors of society, including expanding the State Department’s International Visitors 

Program for Iraqis to focus on exchange and educational opportunities related to religious freedom 

and tolerance; 

• give clear directives to U.S. officials and recipients of U.S. grants to assign greater priority to projects 

that promote multi-religious and multi-ethnic efforts to encourage religious tolerance and 

understanding, foster knowledge of and respect for universal human rights standards, build judicial 

capacity to foster the rule of law, and develop the political ability of ethnic and religious minorities to 

organize themselves and effectively convey their concerns to the government; 

• declare and establish a fair allocation of U.S. financial assistance for Chaldo-Assyrian Christian, 

Sabean Mandaean, Yazidi, and other small religious and ethnic minority communities, ensure that the 

use of these funds is determined by independent minority national and town representatives, and 

establish direct lines of communication between such independent structures and U.S. Provincial 

Reconstruction Team Nineveh, in order to ensure that U.S. assistance fairly benefits all religious and 

ethnic minority groups; and 

• require that the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction, or another appropriate entity conduct an independent audit of past and current U.S. 

and Iraqi government reconstruction and development assistance to religious and ethnic minority 

areas, and provide recommendations for future assistance. 

VI. Addressing the Situation of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees

 

The U.S. government should: 

 

• increase assistance, and encourage the Iraqi government and U.S. allies to do likewise, to the UN, 

humanitarian organizations, host nations, and host communities providing necessary aid to vulnerable 

Iraqi internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, including funding programs to provide 

medical care, psychosocial care, educational opportunities, direct financial assistance, basic needs 

packages, and information campaigns; 

• fund capacity-building programs for the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration to ensure that 

it can adequately provide assistance and protection to IDPs; 

• clearly state that the U.S. government does not encourage the return of Iraqi refugees to Iraq until 

necessary conditions are met, including security, assistance, legal frameworks, and integration 

programs; 

• encourage and fund information campaigns, including “go and see visits” by religious and/or 

community leaders selected by the refugees/IDPs themselves, to ensure that displaced Iraqis 

considering return have the information needed to make informed decisions; 

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• work with the government of Iraq and international organizations to help the Iraqi government 

develop a cohesive plan to assist voluntarily returning refugees and IDPs, including addressing 

property disputes, assistance upon return, livelihood opportunities, and lingering security problems; 

• increase the capacity of assistance organizations to provide long-term assistance, including shelter, 

food, and other essential services, to returning Iraqis; 

• continue to process a significant number of Iraqi refugees for resettlement to the United States, taking 

into account the continued targeted violence against members of Iraq’s smallest, most vulnerable 

religious minorities and the P2 designation in the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007; and 

• ensure that members of Iraq’s smallest, most vulnerable religious minorities scheduled to be resettled 

to the United States are not delayed unnecessarily by providing adequate personnel to conduct 

background screening procedures and by enforcing proper application of the existing waiver of the 

material support bar to those forced to provide support to terrorists under duress. 
Countries of Particular Concern 

Nigeria 

FINDINGS: The government of Nigeria continues to respond inadequately and ineffectively to recurrent 

communal and sectarian violence. Religion is a driving force in the violence, as a precipitating factor or 

proxy for political or social issues. Years of inaction by Nigeria’s federal, state and local governments has 

created a climate of impunity, resulting in thousands of deaths. Other religious freedom concerns in Nigeria 

include the expansion of sharia (Islamic law) into the criminal codes of several northern Nigerian states and 

discrimination against minority communities of Christians and Muslims. 

Based on these concerns, USCIRF recommends in 2010, for the second year, that Nigeria be designated as a 

“country of particular concern,” or CPC. Prior to the 2009 CPC recommendation, Nigeria had been on 

USCIRF’s Watch List since 2002. 

Since 1999, a disturbingly large number of Nigerians—12,000, if not more—have been killed in attacks and 

reprisals between Muslims and Christians. This trend continues: in the past year, two major outbreaks of 

sectarian violence took place since January 2010 in and around the city of Jos, Plateau State that resulted in 

as many as 1,000 people being killed. In addition, religiously-motivated violence by an extremist Islamic 

sect resulted in 900 – 2,000 deaths in several northern states in July 2009. The Jos violence was the most 

recent in a long line of violent incidents resulting in death and destruction, and instilling a sense of fear 

within Northern and Central Nigerian communities. The government of Nigeria has done little, if anything, 

to address sectarian and communal violence, making no serious effort to investigate or prosecute the 

perpetrators of the numerous killings and other crimes. Government leaders have failed to heed warning 

signs of violence, and the federal police have failed to respond effectively and appropriately—or even at 

all—when violence has erupted. The national legislature has exercised no discernible oversight over either 

the Ministry of Justice or the National Human Rights Commission to ensure adequate investigation and 

resolution of religious violence and intolerance. The Human Rights Commission, both by design and in 

effect, lacks the independence and resources to address these issues. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: Religion is a driving force in the sectarian violence, as a 

precipitating factor or a proxy for political or social issues. This, combined with the Nigerian government’s 

toleration of criminal acts, has created a permissive environment for continued sectarian and communal 

violence, leading to a culture of impunity. The culture of impunity must be broken by the top levels of 

Nigerian government, including the highest ranking state and federal officials. USCIRF has concluded that 

Nigeria could, if it wished, muster the resources and capacity necessary to address communal, sectarian, and 

religious violence and intolerance. It must do so for the country to realize lasting progress, security, 

stability, and prosperity as a democracy. The United States should urge Nigeria to prevent and contain 

recurring sectarian violence by bringing perpetrators to justice, and should ensure that these issues are an 

important component of discussions of the newly established U.S.-Nigeria Bi-National Commission. 

Additional recommendations for U.S. policy towards Nigeria can be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Recurrent Sectarian Violence in Jos 

Since 1999, acts of violence in Nigeria in which religion was a significant factor have resulted in more 

than 12,000 people killed and thousands displaced, with numerous churches, mosques, businesses, 

vehicles, private homes and other structures burned and destroyed. Fatalities include members of warring 

factions, security forces, and innocent bystanders, but no one to date has been prosecuted for their role in 

perpetrating violence. The most severe clashes have occurred in Jos, Plateau state (September 2001, 

November 2008, January 2010, March 2010); Kaduna state (February and May 2000 and November 

2002); Kano state and Yelwa, Plateau state (February-May 2004); and northern and southeastern Nigeria 

(February 2006). 

Most recently, in January and March 2010, the city of Jos and several surrounding villages in Plateau 

State experienced horrific sectarian clashes with close to 1,000 people killed. Religion became a driving 

force in the violence, although it is unclear whether religion was the precipitating or a proxy issue to the 

violence. 

In January 2010, more than 300 people were killed and thousands displaced in sectarian violence in Jos. 

Many of those killed reportedly were from the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani community, with the 

attackers coming from the predominantly Christian Berom tribe. Although many Christian 

representatives contest this account, most Muslim representatives the USCIRF delegation met with in 

March 2010 believe it to be true. This difference in perception is part of the dynamic that exists between 

the communities and cannot be ignored. 

The violence reportedly was sparked by the re-building of a home owned by a Muslim Hausa-Fulani 

resident of Jos. Simmering communal tensions from previous violence in the area and the lack of 

accountability for perpetrators also were contributing factors. The federal government reportedly 

arraigned approximately 200 people and transported them to Abuja for their involvement in the violence. 

However, federal-state jurisdictional disputes appear to be hampering prosecutions. At the time of 

writing, there was no clear resolution to these jurisdictional issues indicating when or by whom those 

arrested will be prosecuted. 

In March 2010, in a so-called ricochet attack against the Christian Berom villages of Dogo-Nahawa, Zot, 

and Rassat, approximately 500 people were killed, including many women and children, and thousands 

displaced. According a March 2010 New York Times interview with detained perpetrators, as well as 

USCIRF’s interlocutors in Abuja in March 2010, the perpetrators were from the predominantly Muslim 

Hausa-Fulani community and were carrying out reprisal attacks for the January 2010 violence. Several 

hundred people had been killed by the time the Nigerian police and army responded. The Nigerian 

military surrounded the city of Jos and nearby areas and imposed a dawn to dusk curfew, which continued 

at the end of the reporting period. Despite these measures, approximately twelve people were killed 

outside Jos in the predominantly Christian, ethnic Berom village of Byei less than a week after the initial 

attacks. As of this writing, no additional large-scale incidents have occurred, but news accounts indicate 

that individual reprisal murders are continuing, such as when a person enters a neighborhood and is 

identified as being of a different religious background. 

Nigerian authorities reportedly have arrested approximately 160 people for their participation in the 

March 2010 violence. Nigerian officials told a visiting USCIRF delegation in March 2010 that charges 

were being filed in federal courts against several perpetrators of the violence. Subsequent news reports 

indicate that charges were filed against several suspects. However, questions remain as to who has 

jurisdiction to prosecute -- federal or state authorities. Jurisdictional disputes aside, the prosecution of 

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perpetrators of sectarian violence is a matter of political will, and the USCIRF delegation heard reports 

that neither state nor federal officials have ever prosecuted individuals for these crimes. 

The fact that two large-scale, separate incidents occurred in the same area within two months of each 

other has led to fears that religious and ethnic tensions could spiral out of control in Plateau State and 

further divide Nigerians along religious lines. USCIRF urges federal and state officials to initiate 

prosecutions that result in fair and just convictions so as to begin to end the culture of impunity. 

Following the January and March 2010 violence, the Acting President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, 

formed a presidential advisory committee on the Jos crisis. The committee reportedly submitted an 

interim report to the Acting President in late March, with a more complete report possibly to be submitted 

later this year. However, the details of the March report have not been made public. There has been a 

pattern in Nigeria, after outbreaks of sectarian violence, of government entities initiating public hearings 

or creating advisory bodies to review the causes of the violence and develop recommendations to prevent 

recurrences. The March 2009 public hearings initiated by the Nigerian House of Representatives 

regarding the 2008 violence in Jos were openly critical of state governments and political parties for their 

negligence in preventing and igniting the violence. However, most federal or state level commission 

reports are never released to the public and the Nigerian government does not implement the 

recommendations. 

During its October 2009 visit to Nigeria, the USCIRF delegation met with then Attorney General and 

Minister of Justice Michael Aondoaka (who was replaced in February 2010; his successor, in turn, was 

replaced in April). USCIRF expressed concern at the years of impunity and failure to prosecute 

perpetrators of sectarian violence. Mr. Aondoaka responded that prosecution was the responsibility of the 

state attorneys general. He asked USCIRF to write him a letter of inquiry regarding the status of 

prosecutions for sectarian violence that he could then send to the various state attorneys general. On 

October 16, 2009, U.S. Ambassador Robin Sanders sent a letter on USCIRF’s behalf asking Mr. 

Aondoaka to “provide, in concert with state attorneys general, any information on the investigations and 

prosecutions” on the major violent sectarian incidents since 1999.” Neither the U.S. Embassy nor 

USCIRF has received any response from Minister Aondoaka or his successors, which suggests that the 

Nigerian government remains unwilling or unable to address these issues. 

USCIRF is hopeful that the Acting President and his administration will show the necessary political will 

to prosecute perpetrators of the January and March 2010 violence and end the longstanding culture of 

impunity surrounding sectarian conflicts in Nigeria. However, USCIRF is concerned that Nigeria now 

has its third Attorney General and Minister of Justice in three months and that prosecutions may be 

hampered by new personnel unfamiliar with the pending cases. The Nigerian government must hold 

accountable for their crimes the perpetrators of both outbreaks of violence; prosecuting individuals from 

only one side of the ethnic and religious divide will only exacerbate communal tensions. 

Other Incidents of Sectarian Violence 

There were other violent clashes between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria in 2009-10, predominantly 

in the northern states. According to the State Department’s Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom, a June 17, 2009 incident in Niger State resulted in the death of a Christian pastor and an April 

20, 2009 unverified incident in Kano resulted in Christians being attacked and their property being 

burned. 

In addition, in February 2009, Muslim-Christian clashes in Bauchi state resulted in at least 11 deaths, 

although some reports indicated as many as 20 people were killed, and 1,500 individuals were displaced. 

In addition, 14 churches, eight parsonages, one mosque and approximately 150 homes and businesses 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

were burned and/or destroyed. The causes of the violence reportedly included a dispute between 

Christians and Muslims in a church parking lot, reprisal for the burning of two mosques in the state 

capital, and retaliation for events in Jos in November 2008 when rioting Muslims were shot for defying a 

government imposed curfew. In an April 2009 incident, a group of Muslims in central Niger state 

reportedly attacked a procession of Christians celebrating Easter in two separate towns. Clashes ensued 

and dozens of Christians were injured and at least two churches and one mosque were burned. 

Intra-Islamic sectarian violence 

In December 2009 in Bauchi State, an extremist Islamist sect called Kalo Kato engaged in intra-sect 

violence in which at least 38 people, mostly co-religionists, were killed. The apparent cause of the 

violence was rivalry and suspicion between the leader of the Kalo Kato group and his followers. 

In July 2009, between 900 and 2,000 people were killed in the northern Nigerian states of Bauchi, Borno, 

Kano, and Yobe when a Muslim sect calling itself Boko Haram (“Western education is sacrilege” in the 

Hausa language) attacked police after several members of the sect were arrested. The group seeks the 

implementation of a harsh form of sharia law in Nigeria. In addition to attacking police, numerous 

churches were burned, and reports indicate at least three Christian pastors were murdered. Over 100 

individuals reportedly were arrested for their role in the violence or for membership in the group, but it is 

unclear how many, if any, prosecutions followed. The situation ended when the Nigerian military 

responded to the attacks, killing or capturing many Boko Haram members. Recently released photos and 

videos implicate Nigerian police in extrajudicial killings of members of the sect, including the group’s 

leader, while they were in custody. The government of Acting President Jonathan reportedly has made 

inquiries into these reports, but the status of those investigations is unknown. 

Concerning Shi’a Muslims, according to the State Department’s 2009 Annual Report on International 

Religious Freedom, “state officials in Sokoto State allegedly continue to engage in a coordinated 

campaign of persecution of Shi’a Muslims...detaining large numbers of Shi’a and their religious leaders.” 

The State Department report also notes that, based on NGO information, Shi’a homes and business were 

destroyed, with little to no response from state officials, and Shi’a were fired from jobs on account of 

their faith. 

The Sharia Controversy 

Since October 1999, 12 northern Nigerian states have established, or announced plans to establish, sharia 

law in their criminal code. However, there have not been further enactments in the past year. Despite 

differences between them, each of the 12 states are working to extend the jurisdiction of sharia courts 

beyond personal status matters to include sharia crimes and punishments for Muslims alone. Punishments 

include amputation, flogging, or death by stoning. Trials in the sharia courts often fall short of basic 

international legal standards, and defendants have limited rights of appeal and sometimes have no 

opportunity to seek legal representation. Women face discrimination under these provisions, especially in 

adultery cases where pregnancy alone has been used as adequate evidence of guilt. Allegations of rape 

and sexual violence rarely are investigated. 

In addition to changing the criminal code so that it purportedly would apply only to Muslims, some states 

in recent years have instituted or tolerated discriminatory practices based on religious precepts. These 

include banning the sale and consumption of alcohol and disadvantaging women in education, health care, 

and public transportation. These practices affect Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The Hisbah, or 

religious police, funded and supported by state governments in Zamfara, Niger, Kaduna, and Kano, 

enforce sharia statutes in their respective states. In some areas, the Hisbah primarily worked as traffic 

wardens and marketplace regulators. 

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A debate has arisen in recent years over whether sharia punishments, such as death by stoning and 

amputation, constitute torture or inhumane or degrading treatment under international law or the Nigerian 

Constitution. The UN Committee against Torture and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture have stated 

that flogging, stoning, and amputation do breach the prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment 

contained in international human rights standards and treaties. On this issue, the UN Special Rapporteur 

stated that the Nigerian government should ensure that practices and codes of all states are in compliance 

with international human rights conventions, and it should conduct an “assessment of all the laws in force 

and analyze their compatibility with international human rights law.” The government has not yet done 

so. However, in recent years a number of stoning cases have been reversed on appeal in Nigerian courts, 

and there have been no floggings or amputations carried out during the reporting period. 

Discrimination and Extremism 

Christians in northern Nigerian states complain of what they view as discrimination at the hands of 

Muslim-controlled governments and describe their communities as being “second-class citizens.” Most 

complaints predate the sharia initiatives discussed above, and include allegations of official 

discrimination through the denial of applications to build or repair places of worship, access to education 

and state-run media, representation in government bodies, and government employment. Reports indicate 

that in certain northern states, it is very difficult to obtain permits to repair or build a non-Muslim place of 

worship, and that some Christian churches have been torn down because they lacked appropriate 

government permits, and specific zoning laws are invoked to justify action or inaction by state authorities. 

Muslim communities in southeastern Nigeria echo some of the complaints of minority Christian 

communities in northern Nigeria. Southern Muslim leaders report official or officially sanctioned 

discrimination in the media, education, and representation in government institutions. Although the 

Nigerian constitution permits proselytizing, several northern states continue to ban some public religious 

activities under the guise of public safety and security. 

Several observers inside and outside of Nigeria have reported that financial support from Libya, Saudi 

Arabia, and Sudan has been used to build mosques and Islamic religious schools in northern Nigeria. 

Some have suggested that the extreme interpretation of Islam being preached in these mosques and 

religious schools is a nontraditional form of Islam in Nigeria. Also, there are reports that an increasing 

number of Nigerian Islamic scholars and clerics are being trained in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, and return 

with a politico-religious ideology that explicitly promotes hatred of, and violence against, non-Muslims. 

Similarly, there continue to be reports of foreign sources of funding and support for Islamist extremist 

activities in northern Nigeria. The July 2009 Boko Haram incident demonstrated that violent Islamist 

groups can gain a foothold in certain areas in Northern Nigeria. There have been a number of small, 

vocal Muslim groups in northern Nigeria that advocate strict application of sharia and which, some argue, 

are helping create a haven for radical Islamist militants from both inside and outside Nigeria. After the 

large-scale violence exhibited against the Nigerian government by members of the Boko Haram, Nigerian 

and American authorities could place a high priority on addressing the possible alignment of these groups 

with international terrorist groups. 

Other Developments 

Over the past year, some state governors, including those from northern states, actively encouraged 

interfaith and inter-communal discussions in an attempt to prevent further violence and tension along 

religious lines. However, implementation of such efforts is limited and varies from state to state. The two 

co-chairs of the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) -- the President of the Supreme Council for 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Islamic Affairs, the Sultan of Sokoto Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar and Archbishop John Onaiyekan, the 

Catholic Archbishop of Abuja and President of the Christian Association of Nigeria -- continue to jointly 

issue statements and conduct appearances around the country in an attempt to reduce inter-religious 

tension and promote inter-religious cooperation. Since assuming leadership of the NIREC which is 

composed of 25 Muslim and 25 Christian leaders, both co-chairs have made the Council more active and 

visible around the country. The Nigerian government continues to publicly support NIREC and other 

non-governmental organizations that promote reconciliation and inter-religious understanding. 

U.S. Policy 

The United States and Nigeria have a strong relationship. The most populous country in Africa and with 

a population evenly split between Christians and Muslims, Nigeria in important to U.S. foreign policy for 

a number of reasons. Having had its first transition of power since independence from one civilian 

government to another in 2003, democratic institutions remain underdeveloped. A large Nigerian 

diaspora community resides in the United States and significant trade relations exist between the two 

countries. The United States is Nigeria’s largest trading partner and Nigeria is, by some estimates, the 

fourth largest supplier of imported oil to the United States. Nigeria’s contribution to international 

peacekeeping missions has supported stability and peace in Africa and has generally been in concert with 

U.S. interests in promoting peace and stability on the continent. 

In April 2010, the two countries established a U.S.-Nigeria Bi-National Commission. Its purpose, in the 

words of Secretary Clinton, is to help the two countries “work together on issues of common concern and 

shared responsibility” and to “support the aspirations of the Nigerian people for a peaceful, prosperous, 

stable, democratic future.” The Bi-National Commission will have four working groups on: 1) good 

governance and transparency, focusing on the upcoming 2011 elections, corruption, and strengthening 

Nigeria’s democratic institutions and civil society; 2) regional cooperation and collaboration on security, 

terrorism, and the Niger Delta; 3) energy reform and investment; and 4) food security and agricultural 

development. USCIRF notes that the issue of recurrent sectarian violence and the culture of impunity 

surrounding the failure to prosecute perpetrators is not specifically addressed in any of the four working 

groups and strongly encourages Secretary Clinton and the Nigerian government to include this important 

issue in both the good governance and security groups. 

The administration requested over $480 million in foreign assistance to Nigeria for Fiscal Year 2009. By 

far the largest component of U.S. assistance is the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative, but U.S. assistance also 

has focused on democratic governance, professionalization of the security services, economic and 

agricultural support and assistance, and improving health and education services. Nigeria is a participant 

in the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, a regional U.S. security partnership, and according to 

the Congressional Research Service, also receives other security assistance through Department of 

Defense funds. 

With national elections scheduled to occur sometime in 2011, election assistance and related 

programming is a priority for U.S. assistance in FY 2010. According to the Department of State’s 2009 

Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report, the U.S. human rights and democracy strategy in the country 

“aims to help build an accountable and transparent democracy that respects human rights and rule of law, 

demonstrates good governance, and includes a robust civil society and conflict resolution mechanisms. 

U.S. priorities are focused on the need for the government to improve the political environment, to hold 

free and fair elections, and to strengthen the rule of law. Electoral reform, anticorruption efforts, 

mitigating ethnic and religious violence, improving judicial and legislative independence, and 

strengthening media freedom are important components of this strategy.” 

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Countries of Particular Concern 

Specific to religious freedom and sectarian violence issues, the report indicates that the United States 

works with the Nigerian government to provide human rights training to troops engaged in international 

peacekeeping and address issues of domestic conflict, has implemented a capacity building program at a 

mediation center in Kaduna to better address ethnic and religious violence, and works with state officials 

and Muslim and Christian leaders to promote peace and end religious discrimination. For example, a U.S. 

program operating in five states (Delta, Kaduna, Kano, Plateau, and Rivers) promotes local conflict 

mitigation by educating community and opinion leaders, youth groups, and faith-based organizations 

about the benefits of peaceful coexistence. 

USCIRF Activities 

Nigeria has been a high priority in the Commission’s work in 2009-10. USCIRF delegations traveled to 

Nigeria in March-April 2009, October 2009, and March 2010 to investigate reports of sectarian violence 

and its impact on religious freedom. During these three trips, Commissioners engaged high-level federal 

and state officials on the government’s failure to prevent sectarian violence and discussed USCIRF’s 

recommendation that Nigeria be designated a CPC. USCIRF delegations met several cabinet ministers 

whose agencies have jurisdiction in these matters, as well as Nigerian Senators and Assembly 

representatives who exercise oversight over these agencies. 

During the past year, Commissioners and staff also met with a broad range of U.S. government officials 

to discuss USCIRF’s recommendations and concerns regarding Nigeria, including officials from the 

National Security Council, Department of State, Congress and other officials. USCIRF also has raised 

the issue of sectarian violence in correspondence with Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. 

In September 2009, USCIRF Chair Leonard Leo testified before the congressional International Religious 

Freedom Caucus on Prospects for Justice in Northern and Central Nigeria: Government Responses to 

Religious Extremism and Root Causes. Mr. Leo discussed USCIRF’s trip to Abuja, Kaduna, Kano, and 

Bauchi city, and its meetings with government officials and Muslim and Christian religious leaders. Mr. 

Leo conveyed the Commissioners’ views that the government of Nigeria has done little to prevent 

sectarian violence and has made no serious efforts to investigate or prosecute the perpetrators of the 

numerous sectarian killings. 

In April 2009, USCIRF hosted a public briefing on Capitol Hill with Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar III, the 

Sultan of Sokoto, and Rev. Dr. John Onaiyekan, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Abuja and president of 

the Christian Association of Nigeria. They discussed the causes of and challenges in addressing Nigeria’s 

recurring inter-religious and ethnic violence. In addition, throughout the past year, USCIRF staff met 

with members of non-governmental organizations representing various religious communities in Nigeria, 

human rights organizations, academics, and other Nigeria experts. 

USCIRF is encouraged that some of its long-standing recommendations regarding Nigeria are being 

implemented, such as the gradual expansion of the Nigeria Inter Religious Council to some regional 

levels and the planned establishment by the Department of State of a consulate or other official presence 

in the city of Kano, Kano State. 

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Recommendations 

I. CPC Designation and Next Steps 

The U.S. government should: 

• designate the government of Nigeria as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the 

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), for tolerating particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom; 

• enter into a binding agreement with the Nigerian government, as defined in section 405(c) of the 

International Religious Freedom Act, that obligates the government to cease or take substantial steps 

to address policies leading to violations of religious freedom, or take an appropriate commensurate 

action; 

• ensure that the following benchmarks are part of any such binding agreement with the Nigerian 

government, including, but not limited to: 

--vigorously investigating and prosecuting perpetrators of sectarian and communal violence, 

including the March 2010, January 2010, and November 2008 Jos incidents, as well as other past 

instances where communal and sectarian violence has taken place; 

--developing effective conflict prevention and early warning system mechanisms at the local, 

state, and federal levels using practical and implementable criteria; 

--developing the capability to rapidly deploy specialized police and army units to prevent and 

combat sectarian violence in cities around the country where there has been a history of sectarian 

violence in central and northern Nigeria, including Jos, Kaduna, Kano, and Bauchi states, among 

others; 

--taking steps to professionalize its police and military forces in its investigative, community 

policing, crowd control, and conflict prevention capacities; 

--conducting specialized training for its military and security forces to be more 

adequately trained in human rights standards, as well as non-lethal responses to crowd 

control and in quelling mob or communal violence; 

• include the issue of Nigeria’s recurrent sectarian violence and failure to prosecute perpetrators in the 

discussions of the working groups of good governance and security of the newly formed U.S. – 

Nigeria Bi-National Commission; 

• urge the Nigerian government to carry out its responsibility to prevent and contain acts of sectarian 

and communal violence, prevent reprisal attacks, and bring those responsible for such violence to 

justice; 

• urge the Nigerian House of Representatives and Senate to conduct more rigorous oversight of 

executive branch agencies, including the Ministry of Justice, that are responsible for preventing 

sectarian violence, prosecuting perpetrators of sectarian violence, and responding to the various 

crises; 

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• call on UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to report on the January and March 2010 Jos violence to 

the Security Council, and urge Secretary-General Ban’s Special Adviser for the Prevention of 

Genocide, Francis Deng, whom Ban tasked with examining the March 2010 violence in Jos, to visit 

Nigeria and issue an extensive report of his findings; and 

• call on the UN Human Rights Council to monitor carefully and demand Nigeria’s compliance with 

the recommendations of the representatives of those UN special procedures that have already visited 

Nigeria, particularly the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief (2005) and the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (2005). 

II. Expanding U.S. Support for Communal Conflict Prevention and Mitigation 

The U.S. government should ensure sufficient funding for technical and programmatic assistance, while 

insisting that such assistance is consistent with all U.S. laws restricting foreign support and is otherwise

not provided to individuals or units whom the Secretary of State deems to have engaged in serious 

violations of human rights or religious freedom, by: 

• increasing funding, training, and assistance to the Nigerian federal police force through the U.S. 

Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; 

• increasing funds for the expansion of specialized training for Nigerian military and federal and state 

police forces so that they are more adequately trained in non-lethal responses to crowd control and in 

quelling mob or sectarian violence, and increase their investigative, community policing, crowd 

control, and conflict prevention capacities, including providing on-the-ground technical advisors; 

• providing technical assistance and engaging with federal and state government officials, including the 

National Assembly, on whether state governments should be allowed to have state level police forces, 

instead of the current system of having only a national federal police force; 

• providing technical assistance to help the Nigerian police and military procure and operate 

communications equipment and improve response mechanisms and coordination capacity to enhance 

the prevention of sectarian violence and increase emergency response times; 

• offering technical assistance to the office of the Federal Attorney General and Minister of Justice, and 

to the state attorneys general, to increase their capacity to prosecute perpetrators of sectarian violence, 

including training and retraining state and police prosecutors and assisting in the development of 

computer/electronic file and case storage; 

• analyzing and reporting to the Congress on ways U.S. assistance can be better utilized to promote 

reconciliation and prevent sectarian violence in Nigeria; 

• engaging existing social institutions, including indigenous religious bodies, and strengthening civil 

society organizations that have special expertise and a demonstrated commitment in the areas of interreligious and inter-ethnic reconciliation and conflict prevention, to promote a peaceful civil society; 

• supporting the expansion of NIREC, which was formed to promote dialogue between Christians and 

Muslims, and replicate NIREC at the regional, state, and local levels by providing technical advisors 

to help the institution better initiate and implement NIREC at all levels; 

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• increase USAID funding for conflict mitigation work with Nigerian NGOs engaging on communal 

conflict prevention, emphasizing capacity-building at the local level; 

• assisting human rights defenders, including legal aid groups that defend the constitutional and 

internationally recognized rights of individuals, especially women, who are impacted by sharia-based 

criminal codes; 

• assisting human rights defenders responding to credible allegations of religious discrimination in any 

part of Nigeria; and 

• creating programs and institutions, particularly in areas where communal violence has occurred, that 

promote objective, unbiased, and non-inflammatory reporting, consistent with the right to freedom of 

expression. 

III. Urging the Nigerian Government to Oppose Religious Extremism 

The U.S. government should urge the government of Nigeria to: 

• enhance the use of legal and law enforcement mechanisms and intelligence capabilities to prevent the 

formation of religiously based violent groups; 

• ensure that sharia codes, as applied, uphold the principle of equality under the law between men and 

women and between Muslims and non-Muslims, and do not result in violations of international 

human rights standards with regard to freedom of religion or belief, due process of law, equal 

treatment before the law, freedom of expression, and discriminatory practices against women; 

• ensure that sharia criminal codes do not apply to non-Muslims or to individual Muslims who do not 

wish to go before sharia courts, and prevent law enforcement activities in northern states by any 

quasi-official or private corps of sharia enforcers; and 

• cease any official, state-level support for the Hisbah, or religious police, by dissolving the Hisbah and 

entrusting law enforcement to professionals in law enforcement agencies with a precise jurisdiction 

and subject to judicial review. 

IV. Expanding U.S. Presence and Outreach Efforts, Primarily in Northern Nigeria 

The U.S. government should: 

• continue to proceed with plans to open a consulate or other official presence in Kano, and Congress 

should fully fund this effort in the current appropriations cycle; 

• provide Embassy and Consulate staff with appropriate local language skills, and require political and 

public affairs officers to regularly travel throughout Nigeria; 

• increase the capacity of the Hausa Service of the Voice of America to report fair and balanced views 

on communal conflict and human rights issues; 

• sponsor several exchange programs each year on the topics of freedom of religion or belief, religious 

tolerance, and Islamic law and human rights that target religious leaders, human rights advocates, 

government officials, and northern Nigerians; 

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• continue to support and adequately fund the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, a regional U.S. 

security partnership, succeeding the previous Pan-Sahel Initiative and comprised of African and 

Maghreb countries, including Nigeria, which helps to identify, publicize, and counter foreign sources 

of terrorism and religious extremism; and 

• increase the Embassy’s profile and understanding by dedicating one foreign service officer to 

coordinate outreach and relationships with, and conduct analysis of, Nigeria’s diverse religious 

communities. 

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Pakistan 

FINDINGS: Systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of freedom of religion or belief continue in 

Pakistan. Religiously discriminatory legislation, such as the anti-Ahmadi laws and blasphemy laws, 

foster an atmosphere of intolerance. Sectarian and religiously-motivated violence is chronic, and the 

government has failed to protect members of religious minorities from such violence and to bring 

perpetrators to justice. Growing religious extremism threatens the freedoms of expression and religion or 

belief, as well as other human rights, for everyone in Pakistan, particularly women, members of religious 

minorities, and those in the majority Muslim community who hold views deemed un-Islamic by 

extremists. 

In light of these severe violations, USCIRF again recommends in 2010 that Pakistan be designated a 

“country of particular concern,” or CPC. Since 2002, USCIRF has recommended Pakistan be named a 

CPC, but the U.S. State Department has not followed that recommendation. 

The religious freedom situation in Pakistan remains deeply troubling, with further deterioration possible 

due to the actions of religiously-motivated extremists, some of whom have ties to Al-Qaeda or to the 

Afghan Taliban. The current Zardari government has taken positive actions to promote religious 

tolerance. However, the government has failed to reverse the continuing erosion in the social and legal 

status of members of religious minority communities and in the ability of members of the majority 

Muslim community to discuss sensitive religious and social issues freely. A number of Pakistan’s laws 

abridge freedom of religion or belief. Anti-Ahmadi laws discriminate against individual Ahmadis and 

effectively criminalize various practices of their faith. Blasphemy laws have been used against members 

of religious minorities and dissenters within the majority Muslim community, and frequently result in 

imprisonment on account of religion or belief and/or vigilante violence. The Hudood Ordinances—

Islamic decrees predominantly affecting women that are enforced alongside Pakistan’s secular legal 

system—provide for harsh punishments for alleged violations of Islamic law by both Muslims and nonMuslims. Anti-government insurgents espousing an intolerant interpretation of Islam continue to impose 

a harsh, Taliban-style rule in areas under their control. The government’s response to religiouslymotivated extremism remains inadequate, despite increased security operations. Pakistan also continues 

to promote the flawed “defamation of religions” concept at the UN, which would undermine the 

freedoms of religion and expression internationally. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: Promoting respect for freedom of religion or belief must be an 

integral part of U.S. strategy in Pakistan. The forces that threaten Pakistani and U.S. security interests are 

largely motivated by a violent extremist ideology that rejects international human rights standards, 

including freedom of religion or belief, for both Pakistan’s non-Muslims citizens and members of the 

majority Muslim community. The U.S. government should clearly state its concern for religious freedom 

as an essential element in U.S. policy in Pakistan; urge Pakistan to reinforce the rule of law and to bring 

its laws, particularly those regarding blasphemy and the Ahmadis, in accordance with international 

human rights standards; urge Pakistan to halt its international promotion of the flawed “defamation of 

religions” concept; and urge Pakistani authorities, including at the provincial level, to promote respect for 

human rights and religious tolerance in public education. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy 

toward Pakistan can be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Government Policies toward Religious Groups and Activities 

The political landscape in Pakistan has changed significantly since the country’s return to constitutional, 

civilian government in 2008. Democratic parliamentary elections took place in February 2008. The 

winning coalition selected Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani as Prime Minister in March 2008, and Pervez 

Musharraf, a former general who had come to power through a military coup d’etat, was replaced by Asif 

Ali Zardari as President of Pakistan in September 2008. Both Zardari and Gilani are civilian politicians 

and leaders of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Zardari is also the widower of Benazir Bhutto, a 

popular political leader of the PPP and former Prime Minister who was assassinated in December 2007, 

reportedly by Sunni militants linked to Al-Qaeda. The Bhutto and Zardari families are Shi’a Muslims 

from the province of Sindh in a country traditionally dominated by Sunnis from Punjab. 

The political power of President Zardari and of the office of the Presidency, previously dominant under 

past military rulers, has eroded in the past year. In March 2009, under pressure from opposition parties 

and many of the country’s lawyers, President Zardari was forced to reinstate Supreme Court Chief Justice 

Chaudhury and other judges whom President Musharraf had suspended. President Zardari also was 

forced to accept the reinstatement of the opposition-led provincial government in Punjab, Pakistan’s most 

populous province. By the end of the reporting period, President Zardari’s official powers appeared 

certain to be further limited by proposed constitutional reforms effectively restoring a parliamentary form 

of government. The Pakistani military and intelligence services continued to be influential, particularly in 

regard to national security issues. 

Despite continuing political and security challenges, the Pakistani government under President Zardari 

and Prime Minister Gilani has taken positive steps regarding religious freedom. Both the President and 

the Prime Minister publicly committed to combating religious extremism and to protecting the rights of 

members of Pakistan’s religious minority communities (with the evident exception of the Ahmadis, who 

are viewed as a special case in Pakistan). In November 2008, the government appointed prominent 

minority-rights advocate Shahbaz Bhatti as Federal Minister for Minorities with cabinet rank. Mr. Bhatti 

has used his position as Federal Minister to obtain government assistance for victims of the worst 

instances of religiously-motivated mob violence, to advocate publicly for reform or repeal of the 

blasphemy laws, to gain increased public attention to the concerns of the religious minorities, to secure 

increased employment opportunities in public service for members of religious minority communities, 

and to promote religious tolerance through the creation of what are termed “District Interfaith Harmony 

Committees.” In addition, in March 2009 the government appointed a Christian jurist as a judge in the 

Lahore High Court (at the time of the appointment there were no other Christians serving as judges in 

Pakistan). In May 2009, the federal government announced a five percent quota in federal employment 

for members of religious minority communities. On May 28, 2009, “Minorities’ Solidarity Day” was first 

officially celebrated as a federal holiday in Pakistan, and the government designated August 11 as annual 

“Minorities’ Day.” 

Nevertheless, discriminatory laws, promulgated in previous decades and persistently enforced, have 

fostered an atmosphere of religious intolerance and eroded the social and legal status of members of 

religious minorities, including Shi’a Muslims, Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians. Government officials do 

not provide adequate protections from societal violence to members of these religious minority 

communities, and perpetrators of attacks on minorities seldom are brought to justice. This impunity is 

partly due to the fact that Pakistan’s democratic institutions, particularly the judiciary and the police, have 

been weakened by endemic corruption, ineffectiveness, and a general lack of accountability. 

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Religious Freedom Concerns in Pakistani Education 

A significant minority of Pakistan’s thousands of religious schools, or madrassas, reportedly continue to 

provide ongoing ideological training and motivation to those who take part in violence targeting religious 

minorities in Pakistan and abroad. In mid-2005, the Pakistani central government renewed its effort to 

require all madrassas to register with the government and to expel all foreign students. By that year’s 

end, despite an outcry from some violent extremist groups, most of the religious schools had registered. 

However, the registration process reportedly has had little if any effect on the curricula, which in many of 

these schools remains intolerant and includes exhortations to violence. The government also still lacks 

controls on the madrassas’ sources of funding. It remains doubtful whether these efforts to curb 

extremism through reform of the country’s Islamic religious schools will be accompanied by other 

measures that would make them effective. Moreover, these efforts do not adequately address the much 

wider problem of religious extremism in Pakistan and the continued and unwarranted influence of militant 

groups on the rights and freedoms of others. 

Religious freedom concerns are also evident in Pakistan’s public schools. Pakistani primary and 

secondary schools continue to use textbooks that foster prejudice and intolerance of religious minorities. 

Social Studies and Pakistan Studies textbooks frequently recount historically inaccurate events that paint 

Hindus and Christians in a negative light. Fifth-grade students read official textbooks claiming that 

“Hindus and Muslims are not one nation but two different nations. The Hindus could never become 

sincere in their dealings with the Muslims.” Hindu beliefs and practices are contrasted negatively with 

those of Islam. Bangladesh’s struggle for independence from Pakistan is blamed in part on the influence 

of Hindus in the education sector of the former East Pakistan. India is portrayed as Pakistan’s enemy. 

Israel is characterized as not being a legitimate state. Such materials are not restricted to Islamic studies 

textbooks but occur in both early elementary and more advanced social studies texts that are used by all 

public school students, including non-Muslims. Moreover, the subjects in textbooks are heavy on stories, 

biographies, and poems having an Islamic religious character. 

Efforts to improve curriculum guidelines and to produce and publish new public school textbooks have 

been delayed by practical and ideological hurdles. Although “The New Education Policy 2009” is being 

implemented predominantly to raise the literacy rate in Pakistan, the new policy maintains Islamic Studies 

as a compulsory subject. One positive change allows minorities the option of taking an ethics course 

from third grade onwards, whereas the previous policy offered this option only in grades 9 and 10. 

However, Pakistani non-governmental organizations argue that this option means little in practice because 

current ethics textbooks are based on previous curriculum guidelines which contain Islamic biases. 

Moreover, critics argue, minority students still tend to avoid opting out of Islamic Studies for fear of 

being isolated from the rest of the class. Some students also fear that if they take ethics and it becomes 

known that they belong to a religious minority their grades may be negatively impacted. 

Sectarian or Religiously-motivated Violence 

Over at least the past decade, Pakistan has suffered from sectarian and religiously-motivated violence, 

much of it committed against Shi’a Muslims by Sunni extremists, but also against Ahmadis, Christians, 

and Hindus. Beginning in early 2008, armed extremists, some of whom have ties to Al-Qaeda or to the 

Afghan Taliban, intensified their attacks, including bombings. The following examples of sectarian or 

religiously-motivated violence should be seen as illustrative rather than a comprehensive listing of the 

numerous and often fatal attacks perpetrated on innocent Pakistanis by extremists who claim religious 

justification for their crimes. 

 

By early 2009, Sunni extremists gained effective control in large portions of rural northwestern Pakistan, 

where they killed hundreds of Shi’a civilians, imposed a harsh, Taliban-style of justice, and displaced 

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Shi’a, Sikh, Hindu, and other minority populations. Jizya (the traditional tax on non-Muslims under 

Islamic law) was imposed on Sikhs and Hindus and violence was threatened for non-compliance. Sunni 

extremists destroyed shrines and tombs with religious or cultural significance to other Muslims, notably 

the shrine of revered Pashtun poet and Sufi mystic Rahman Baba, which was bombed in March 2009. 

This act, compared by some observers to the destruction by the Afghan Taliban of the monumental 

Buddhas of Bamiyan, appeared intended to erase visible expressions of other belief systems, in this case 

an inclusive, tolerant form of Islam. Also, as in Afghanistan, the extremists severely restricted women’s 

access to education, health care, and employment outside the home. 

The Pakistani government initially responded by attempting to accommodate the Pakistani Taliban. In 

April 2009, the central government accepted a locally-negotiated “peace plan” for the Malakand division, 

including the scenic Swat Valley, that permitted the imposition of sharia law in exchange for an end of 

hostilities with government forces. Under both international and domestic pressure, the government 

subsequently reversed course and launched military offensives that met with some success, although 

many internally displaced persons, particularly members of religious minority communities, including the 

Sikhs, feared to return. At the end of the reporting period, despite the Pakistani military maintaining a 

large presence in the division, insurgents remained in effective control of some areas. 

Sectarian or religiously-motivated violence reached beyond Pakistan’s tribal northwest. Two separate 

suicide attacks on Shi’a religious processions in December 2009 killed over 40 people in Karachi and 

eight in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Scores were injured in both instances. 

In June and September 2009, two prominent leaders of Pakistan’s large Barelvi Sunni Muslim community 

were assassinated, including Pakistan’s Minister for Religious Affairs. The first assassination was by 

suicide bomber, a tactic largely restricted to Sunni extremists. Barelvis are condemned by Sunni 

extremists for certain of their beliefs and practices, including the use of music for religious purposes and 

the veneration of living and dead religious figures. Both Barelvi leaders had publicly condemned the 

Pakistani Taliban and supported the government’s military campaign against Sunni insurgents. In March 

2010, a leading cleric and member of another Sunni group, Ahl-e-Sunna-wal-Jama’a, previously the 

banned group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, was wounded and his son killed in a shooting in Karachi. Sipahi-Sahaba had been implicated in attacks on Shi’a Muslims. Also in Karachi later the same day, another 

Sunni cleric identified as a prominent member of the Deobandi community and the head of an antiAhmadi organization was shot and killed along with his son and two associates. 

Sunni extremists have also targeted Ahmadis and Christians. 14 Ahmadis were murdered during the 

2009-2010 reporting period in attacks which appear to have been religiously-motivated (e.g., in attacks in 

which robbery does not appear to have been a motive). In the most recent case, three Ahmadi 

businessmen were shot to death on April 1, 2010 on the streets of Faisalabad, Punjab, the scene of 

previous anti-Ahmadi violence. None of the perpetrators have been brought to justice. From June to 

August 2009, a series of mob attacks took place against Christian communities in Punjab, most notably in 

Gojra, where in late July/early August, eight Christians were killed and 18 injured, and two churches and 

almost 75 houses burned, following an accusation that Christians had desecrated the Koran. A factfinding team by the independent, non-governmental Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported that 

the violence in Gojra had been planned in advance. 

Due to their minority status, Pakistan’s Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs may be more vulnerable to crime, 

including robbery and kidnapping for ransom. Hindu temples, due to their visibility, were particular 

targets for robbery. Hindu businessmen in Sindh have been increasingly subject to extortion or 

kidnappings for ransom. Hindus have also been targeted in the province of Balochistan, where they are 

the largest religious minority and where the security situation is problematic due to a long-running ethnic 

insurgency. Ransom, even of exorbitant amounts, is sometimes characterized as jizya, thus claiming an 

Islamic sanction for its imposition on non-Muslims. In February 2010, a kidnapped Sikh businessman 

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from Peshawar was beheaded by insurgents belonging to the Pakistani Taliban in a remote location on the 

border between Khyber and Orakzai Agencies. Two other Sikhs were rescued by the Pakistani military. 

There are persistent reports of kidnappings, rapes, and forced conversions to Islam of Hindu and Christian 

women, including minors. In March 2010, a Karachi-based Hindu attorney associated with the nongovernmental National Human Rights Commission of Pakistan was quoted as estimating that 20-25 

young Hindu women are abducted and forcibly converted every month. The attorney claimed that the 

victims’ families often fail to register cases with the police out of fear of violent retaliation. The Asian 

Human Rights Commission has highlighted the case of a 15-year-old Hindu domestic servant abducted in 

Punjab in October 2009. When, through the intervention of the National Peace Committee for Interfaith 

Harmony, she was later found to be in the custody of her and her parents’ employer, a Muslim landlord, at 

a village 130 kilometers away, the parents were told that she had converted to Islam. They were denied 

the opportunity to meet with her alone and have not been able to return her home. A Hindu advocacy 

group, the Hare Rama Foundation, reported that it was aware of ten similar cases in 2009 of apparent 

abductions and forced conversions of Hindu girls. In some such cases, certificates of conversion from 

Muslim clerics have been presented to legitimize the conversions. Marginalization and poverty also make 

the Christian community in Pakistan vulnerable. The most recent and notorious instance is the 

rape/murder in Lahore in January 2010 of a 12-year-old Christian girl, allegedly by her Muslim employer, 

a prominent attorney and former Lahore Bar Association president. 

The Ahmadi Minority and Anti-Ahmadi Legislation 

Among Pakistan’s religious minorities, Ahmadis are subject to the most severe legal restrictions and 

officially-sanctioned discrimination. Ahmadis, who may number between three and four million in 

Pakistan, are prevented by law from engaging in the full practice of their faith and may face criminal 

charges for a range of religious practices, including the use of religious terminology. Pakistan’s 

constitution declares members of the Ahmadi religious community to be “non-Muslims,” despite their 

insistence to the contrary. Barred by law from “posing” as Muslims, Ahmadis may not call their places of 

worship “mosques,” worship in non-Ahmadi mosques or public prayer rooms which are otherwise open 

to all Muslims, perform the Muslim call to prayer, use the traditional Islamic greeting in public, publicly 

quote from the Koran, or display the basic affirmation of the Muslim faith. It is also illegal for Ahmadis 

to preach in public, to seek converts, or to produce, publish, or disseminate their religious materials. 

Ahmadis also are restricted in building new houses of worship, holding public conferences or other 

gatherings, and traveling to Saudi Arabia for religious purposes, including the hajj (the pilgrimage to 

Mecca required of all able-bodied Muslims). According to the State Department’s annual Human Rights 

Report issued in March 2010, 94 Ahmadis faced criminal charges in Pakistan for religious offenses during 

the past year: 37 under the blasphemy laws and 57 under Ahmadi-specific laws. 

Obtaining a Pakistani national identity card or a passport requires a religious affirmation denouncing the 

founder of the Ahmadi faith as a false prophet. Moreover, because Ahmadis are required to register to 

vote as non-Muslims and national identity cards identify Ahmadis as non-Muslims, those who refuse to 

disavow their claim to being Muslims are effectively disenfranchised from participating in elections at 

any level. Since Ahmadis were declared non-Muslim in 1974, no Pakistani government has attempted to 

reform the anti-Ahmadi laws and regulations, with the sole exception of an abortive attempt in late 2004 

to remove the religious identification column in Pakistani passports, which would have enabled Ahmadis 

to participate in the hajj. This initiative was reversed in March 2005 when the government restored the 

column, reportedly in response to pressure from Islamist political parties.

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Widespread Abuse of the Blasphemy Laws 

Prescribed criminal penalties for what is deemed to be blasphemy include life imprisonment and the death 

penalty. Blasphemy allegations, which are often false, result in the lengthy detention of, and sometimes 

violence against, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and members of other religious minorities, as well as 

Muslims. Because the laws require neither proof of intent nor evidence to be presented after allegations 

are made, and include no penalties for leveling false allegations, they are commonly used by extremists to 

intimidate members of religious minorities and others with whom they disagree. Accusers also often use 

these laws to carry out a vendetta or gain an advantage over another. Minor procedural changes have not 

diminished the misuse of these laws. The negative impact of the blasphemy laws is further compounded 

by the absence of due process in the proceedings, and during blasphemy trials, Islamic militants often 

pack the courtroom and publicly threaten violence if there is an acquittal. Such threats have proven 

credible, since violence has sometimes followed an acquittal. Although no one has yet been executed by 

the state under the blasphemy laws, individuals have been sentenced to death. Several of those accused 

under the blasphemy laws have been attacked, even killed, by violent extremists, including while in police 

custody. Those who escape official punishment or attacks by extremists are sometimes forced to flee the 

country. 

Scores of arrests on blasphemy charges are reported each year in Pakistan. Among notable recent cases 

are the following. Five Ahmadi teenagers were released on bail in July 2009 after six months’ 

imprisonment following a blasphemy charge. They had been accused of writing the Prophet 

Muhammad’s name on the walls of a toilet in a Sunni mosque. No physical evidence of this existed. In 

September 2009, a 20-year old Christian man was found dead in his jail cell in Sialkot, Punjab two days 

after having been arrested on charges of desecrating the Koran. Family and friends alleged that his only 

“offense” had been to admire the daughter of Muslim neighbors. Pakistani human rights activists alleged 

that he had been murdered, although police maintained that the death was suicide. In January 2010, a 

young Christian man was sentenced to 10 years in prison for allegedly burning pages of the Koran. A 

Muslim neighbor had reportedly seen him disposing of trash. Despite calls by senior officials, including 

Prime Minister Gilani, for review of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws following the anti-Christian violence in 

Gojra, no action has yet taken place. 

Other Religiously-based Laws Negatively Affecting Human Rights, especially of Women 

Under the Hudood Ordinances, rape victims run a high risk of being charged with adultery, for which 

death by stoning remains a possible sentence. In October 2003, the National Commission on the Status of 

Women in Pakistan reported that as many as 88 percent of women prisoners, many of them rape victims, 

are serving time in prison for allegedly violating these decrees, which criminalize extramarital sex. The 

Hudood laws apply to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The UN Committee against Torture and the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Torture have stated that the punishments of stoning and amputation breach the 

obligation to prevent torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment under 

international human rights standards and treaties. Although these extreme corporal punishments may not 

have been carried out in practice in Pakistan, lesser punishments such as jail terms or fines have been 

imposed. In a positive development correcting one of the most heavily criticized aspects of these 

ordinances, in December 2006 then-President Musharraf signed into law a bill curtailing the scope of the 

Hudood Ordinances regarding rape charges. The new law removed the crime of rape from the sphere of 

the Hudood laws and put it under the penal code, thereby doing away with the requirement that a rape 

victim produce four male witnesses to prove the crime. Under the new legislation, convictions for rape 

must be based on forensic and circumstantial evidence. This change followed another amendment to the 

Ordinances enacted in July 2006 allowing women convicted of purported sexual transgressions to be 

released on bail rather than having to remain in prison—sometimes for lengthy periods—waiting for their 

cases to come to trial.

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International Terrorism Linked to Religious Extremism 

In addition to the serious religious freedom problems described above, Pakistan has become a significant 

locus of religious intolerance and religiously-motivated violence in the region and beyond. The wellplanned November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, have been linked to the Pakistan-based 

extremist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, a connection Pakistan’s then-Interior Minister publicly acknowledged in 

February 2009. Lashkar-e-Taiba has been designated by the State Department as a foreign terrorist 

organization. Pakistani authorities have made efforts to curb such extremists, who also threaten Pakistan’s 

own security. There are extensive reports, however, that the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies 

have provided safe havens, operational bases, and other support to Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Afghan Taliban, 

and other extremists operating against neighboring Afghanistan and India. Due to such support, the Afghan 

Taliban were able to regroup, re-arm, and intensify cross-border attacks inside Afghanistan after being 

ousted by U.S. and coalition forces, substantially increasing instability and violence in that country. The 

State Department had named the Taliban regime of Afghanistan a “particularly severe violator” of religious 

freedom from 1999 until the regime was deposed in 2001. 

Leadership in Seeking a Global Blasphemy Law 

The government of Pakistan also has been active in the international arena in promoting limitations on 

freedom of religion or belief. As it has done in UN bodies since 1999, in March 2010 Pakistan once again 

presented a resolution to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva supporting measures to halt the socalled “defamation of religions.” The backers of the resolution claim that their aim is to promote religious 

tolerance, but in practice such laws routinely criminalize and prosecute what is often deemed—capriciously 

by local officials in countries where such laws exist—to be “offensive” or “unacceptable” speech about a 

particular, favored religion or sect. Defamation of religion laws clearly violate principles outlined in 

international human rights instruments, which guarantee the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion, as well as freedom of expression. Moreover, they appear to grant rights to entire religions rather 

than to individuals. Regrettably, the resolution again passed the Council March 2010, although by the 

smallest margin ever. Seventeen countries voted against the resolution and 8 abstained. (For more 

information, see the discussion of the UN in this report’s chapter Promoting International Religious 

Freedom through Multilateral Institutions.) 

U.S. Policy 

The U.S. government has viewed Pakistan as a strategic country and, at least during some periods, as an 

important regional partner. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan was of crucial 

importance in U.S. efforts to bolster the anti-Soviet resistance. Following the September 11, 2001 

terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland, Pakistan was again crucial to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and 

to the global campaign against al-Qaeda. The relationship has often been marked, however, by strain, 

disappointment, and mistrust. Many Pakistanis view the United States as untrustworthy because of what 

they see as a lack of U.S. support in Pakistan’s conflicts with India, the cancellation of U.S. assistance 

over Pakistan’s acquiring of nuclear weapons, and the sharp drop-off in U.S. engagement with Pakistan 

following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the end of the Cold War. Many in 

Pakistani civil society also view the United States as prone to focus on the security component of the 

relationship, providing at times massive assistance to Pakistan’s powerful military establishment, 

excusing past military rule and downplaying attendant human rights abuses when this suits U.S. interests, 

and failing to support those elements of Pakistani society that espouse democracy and respect for human 

rights. Anti-Americanism is a popular sentiment in Pakistan, feeding off nationalist concerns over 

Pakistani sovereignty and the conviction of many religious conservatives that U.S. policy and values are 

hostile to Islam. 

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The Obama administration has actively engaged with Pakistan, viewing Afghanistan and Pakistan as a 

single theater in the on-going conflict with al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. On January 22, 2009, only 

two days after President Obama’s inauguration, he joined Vice President Biden and Secretary of State 

Clinton at the State Department for the announcement of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as U.S. Special 

Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In making the announcement, Secretary Clinton stated that 

“It has become clear that dealing with the situation in Afghanistan requires an integrated strategy that 

works with both Afghanistan and Pakistan as a whole, as well as engaging NATO and other key friends, 

allies, and those around the world who are interested in supporting these efforts.” 

In March 2009, following a two-month-long interagency policy review, the Administration announced “a 

comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” with an increased focus on Pakistan. The 

White Paper outlining this new strategy defined the core U.S. goal to be “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 

al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” The new 

strategy viewed the security of the two South Asian neighbors to be interrelated, seeing Pakistan-based 

insurgents as undermining Afghanistan while the “insurgency in Afghanistan feeds instability in 

Pakistan.” Among the announced objectives to achieving this goal was “assisting efforts to enhance 

civilian control and stabile constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides 

opportunity for the people of Pakistan.” Enhancing human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, 

was not among the announced objectives or the major recommendations in the new strategy. 

In October 2009, President Obama signed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (also 

known as the Kerry-Lugar Bill) authorizing an additional $7.5 billion in mostly non-military assistance to 

Pakistan ($1.5 billion annually over five years). The assistance is to support democratic institutions and 

to promote rule of law, to promote economic development, to build Pakistan’s human resources, with 

particular emphasis on women and children; and to strengthen U.S. public diplomacy efforts to combat 

extremism and to promote a better understanding of the United States among the Pakistani people. 

Particularly controversial in Pakistan, however, were provisions intended to lend U.S. support to effective 

civilian control of the powerful Pakistani military by the elected government. Many Pakistanis viewed 

these provisions, which include a reporting requirement to the U.S. Congress to describe civilian 

oversight of the Pakistani military, the process for determining Pakistan’s defense budget, and even the 

promotion process for senior military officers, as intrusive and as an alleged affront to Pakistani 

sovereignty. 

In March 2010, a session of the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue was held in Washington, DC at the 

Secretary of State/Foreign Minister level. According to the joint statement issued after the talks, the “core 

foundations of [U.S.-Pakistani] partnership are shared democratic values, mutual trust and mutual 

respect.” Human rights was once again absent from the list of bilateral concerns worthy of dialogue, 

which included “economy and trade; energy; security; strategic stability and non-proliferation; law 

enforcement and counter-terrorism; science and technology, education; agriculture; water; health; and 

communications and public diplomacy.” 

USCIRF Activities 

USCIRF has long been concerned with the serious religious freedom abuses taking place in Pakistan, some 

of which the government of Pakistan condones. Since 2002, USCIRF has recommended annually that 

Pakistan be designated a CPC. The Commission has highlighted religious freedom problems in Pakistan 

through public hearings, meetings with the Administration and the Congress, letters to senior U.S. 

government officials, and press statements. 

In March 2009, USCIRF held a hearing on Capitol Hill entitled, “Pakistan: The Threat of Religious 

Extremism to Religious Freedom and Security.” Experts discussed legal restrictions on religious freedom 

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in Pakistan; the threat, particularly to women and religious minorities, of religiously-motivated violence 

and intolerance; strategies for promoting tolerance in Pakistan’s educational system, including Islamic 

schools; and how U.S. policy toward Pakistan could better support the institutions that promote respect 

for human rights, including freedom of religion or belief. USCIRF welcomed the Administration’s 

March 27, 2009 announcement of “a comprehensive, new strategy” that “focuses more intensively on 

Pakistan than in the past, calling for more significant increases in U.S. and international support, both 

economic and military, linked to Pakistani performance against terror.” 

During a July 2009 meeting with a visiting delegation from Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology, an 

advisory body sponsored by the Pakistani government, USCIRF raised concerns about religious freedom 

in Pakistan, including Pakistan’s laws on blasphemy and those restricting the rights of members of the 

Ahmadi religious community. In August 2009, USCIRF wrote the U.S. Special Envoy for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, urging him to support efforts underway within Pakistan 

to remove the blasphemy laws and other discriminatory legislation that have had a negative impact on 

freedom of religion or belief and other universal human rights of Pakistan’s citizens, particularly 

members of religious minorities. 

In September 2009 and again in February 2010, USCIRF facilitated a series of briefings by Pakistan’s 

Federal Minister for Minorities Affairs for members of Congress and their staff, National Security 

Council and State Department officials, academic experts, and representatives of non-governmental 

organizations. These briefings focused on the current situation of Pakistan’s religious minority 

communities and the Pakistan government’s response to an upsurge in religiously-motivated violence. 

USCIRF also worked with House staff to develop H.Res. 764 that expressed the sense of the House of 

Representatives on the importance of inter-religious dialogue in Pakistan and of religious freedom and 

related human rights for Pakistanis of all religious faiths. 

Based on these contacts and USCIRF’s own research, the Commission concludes that the contest with 

religious extremists now taking place in Pakistan, and in neighboring Afghanistan, requires that the 

United States bolster the position of those elements within Pakistani society that respect democratic 

values, the rule of law, and international standards of human rights, including freedom of religion or 

belief. To this end, the Commission has the following recommendations. 

Recommendations 

I. Advancing Religious Freedom through U.S. Programs and Policies 

In addition to designating Pakistan as a CPC, the U.S. government should: 

y clearly articulate upholding religious freedom and related human rights as an essential element of the 

U.S. strategy toward Pakistan, and support Pakistani civil society institutions that work to uphold and 

guarantee these rights; 

• have Special Representative Richard Holbrooke increase his engagement on religious freedom and 

related human rights, as well as designate a member of his team to report to the Special 

Representative exclusively on human rights in Pakistan, specifically including religious freedom and 

sectarian violence; 

• from the funds provided through the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, make 

allocations in the Pakistan assistance package for fiscal years 2010-2014 to strengthen the promotion 

and protection of religious freedom and tolerance by: 

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--ensuring that assistance for government capacity development that goes to the Pakistani 

executive, legislative and judicial branches also addresses religious freedom and related human 

rights, such as the programs developed by the Federal Ministry of Minorities Affairs that promote 

pluralism and tolerance; 

--ensuring that assistance focusing on improving security and legal institutions through police 

training addresses religious freedom and related human rights; and 

--implementing programming that works to ensure the promotion of the rights and full 

participation of women and girls in Pakistan’s social and political life. 

• as the number of U.S.-based implementing partners declines, ensure that USAID engages Pakistani 

government offices and qualified Pakistani organizations to promote religious freedom and tolerance, 

including by: 

--supporting the work of religious communities and civil society groups to provide advocacy 

training and empowerment for minorities; 

--supporting the work of the Federal Ministry of Minorities Affairs to promote inter-religious 

respect and tolerance at the national and local levels, including by print, broadcast, and webbased media, to respond to the challenge of religious extremism and religiously-motivated or 

sectarian violence; 

--supporting the work of the Pakistan federal government’s District Interfaith Harmony 

Committees and similar efforts at the local level to promote conflict resolution and more effective 

responses by Pakistani authorities and civil society to instances of religiously-motivated 

discrimination, intimidation, or violence; 

y expand U.S. government contacts beyond the Pakistani government to include substantially more 

open and public dialogue with a variety of civil society representatives, including groups and political 

parties that may be critical of the government or represent diverse viewpoints; and 

• recognizing that lasting stability in Pakistan will come from a vibrant civil society, expand programs 

leading to the sustained engagement of the United States with the Pakistani people, such as the 

Fulbright Program, the International Visitor Program, and other exchanges for professionals, students, 

and religious and civil society leaders from all of Pakistan’s diverse religious and ethnic communities. 

 

II. Ending Violations of Religious Freedom in Pakistan 

The U.S. government should urge the government of Pakistan to: 

• decriminalize blasphemy and, in the interim period until that action is completed, immediately 

implement procedural changes to the blasphemy laws that will reduce and ultimately end their abuse, 

and ensure that those who are accused of blasphemy and their defenders are given adequate 

protection, including by investigating death threats and other actions carried out by militants, and that 

full due process is followed; 

• reinforce the rule of law, including by strengthening protections for the freedoms of religion, speech, 

association, assembly, and the media, and by strengthening an independent judiciary; 

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• prioritize the prevention of religiously-motivated and sectarian violence and the punishment of its 

perpetrators, including by: 

--making greater efforts to disarm violent extremist groups and provide the necessary security to 

Shi’a, Sufis, Christians, Ahmadis, Hindus, Sikhs, and other minority religious communities in 

their places of worship and other minority religious sites of public congregation; 

--investigating acts of religiously-motivated and sectarian violence, and punishing perpetrators in 

a timely manner; 

--constituting a government commission that is transparent, adequately funded, inclusive of 

women and minorities, and defined by a mandate to study and produce recommendations on ways 

that the Pakistani government can proactively diminish religiously-motivated and sectarian 

violence, particularly in areas with a heavy concentration of members of religious minority 

communities; 

• rescind the laws targeting Ahmadis, which effectively criminalize the public practice of their faith and 

violate their right to freedom of religion guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 

and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 

• cease toleration or support of the Taliban or other terrorist groups by any element of the Pakistani 

government, including the intelligence services; 

• confront and work to address the consequences of the political alliances maintained by past militarydominated governments with Islamist political parties, which afforded an excessive amount of 

influence to these groups, and which, in turn, had a strong negative impact on religious freedom in 

Pakistan; and 

y halt its practice at the UN Human Rights Council, General Assembly, and other international fora of 

promoting and supporting the problematic concept of “defamation of religions,” which seeks to 

undermine the international human rights guarantees of freedom of religion and freedom of 

expression. 

The U.S. government should urge the government of Pakistan, and provincial authorities, as appropriate,

to: 

• investigate and close any religious schools that provide weapons or illegal arms training in 

perpetrating acts of violence; 

• set national textbook and curricula standards that actively promote tolerance towards all religions, and 

establish appropriate review and enforcement mechanisms to guarantee that such standards are being 

met in government (public) schools; 

• initiate efforts through existing regional and international institutions to establish mechanisms for 

mutual review of textbook guidelines, textbook content, curricula, and teacher-training programs in 

order to promote positive concepts of tolerance and respect for the rights of others and to exclude 

material promoting intolerance, hatred, or violence against any group of persons based on religious or 

other differences; 

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• move quickly to implement improved guidelines for textbooks used in public schools and to replace 

current public school textbooks with ones that exclude messages of intolerance, hatred, or violence 

against any group of persons based on religious or other differences; 

• open the Federal Ministry of Education’s current process of development of textbook guidelines to 

participation by civil society and by representatives of religious minority communities in cooperation 

with the Federal Ministry of Minorities Affairs; and 

• ensure that a madrassa oversight board is empowered to develop, implement, and train teachers in 

human rights standards, and to provide oversight of madrassa curricula and teaching standards. 

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People’s Republic of China 

FINDINGS: The Chinese government strictly controls all religious practice and represses religious activity 

outside state-approved organizations. Some Chinese citizens can assemble to worship and conduct charitable 

projects within government-approved parameters. Unregistered religious groups, or those deemed by the 

government to threaten national security or social harmony, face severe violations, including fines, 

confiscation of property, imprisonment, and the destruction of religious sites. Religious freedom conditions 

for Tibetan Buddhists and Uighur Muslims are the worst they have been in the past ten years. After 

demonstrations and riots in 2008 and 2009, the Chinese government increased efforts to weaken religious 

devotion, discredit and imprison religious leaders, and ban religious gatherings and “illegal religious 

literature” in Tibetan and Uighur areas. Almost four hundred unregistered Protestants were detained in the 

past year and the Chinese government stepped up efforts to destroy churches and close “illegal” meeting 

points. Unregistered Catholic clergy and Falun Gong adherents remain in detention, in home confinement, 

under surveillance, or have disappeared. Detained Falun Gong adherents are tortured and mistreated. In 

addition, Chinese officials harassed, detained, physically abused, and in the prominent case of Gao Zhisheng, 

forcibly “disappeared” attorneys who defended Falun Gong, Tibetans, Uighurs, and unregistered Protestants. 

Because of these systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, USCIRF recommends 

in 2010 that China again be designated as a “country of particular concern”, or CPC. The State Department 

has designated China as a CPC since 1999. 

Religious adherence continues to grow rapidly in China. Hundreds of millions of Chinese manifest their 

belief openly. Senior-level government officials, including President Hu Jintao, have praised the positive 

role of religious communities and articulated a desire for religious groups to promote “economic and social 

development.” At the same time, the government has issued directives warning against foreign groups 

‘‘using religion’’ to ‘‘interfere” in Chinese affairs, supported an extralegal security force to suppress the 

activities of so-called cult organizations, and severely restricted online access to religious information and 

the rights of parents to teach their children religion. Chinese officials are increasingly adept at employing the 

language of human rights and the rule of law to defend repression of religious communities, citing purported 

national security concerns or using Chinese law to restrict rather than advance universal freedoms. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: Religious freedom is a bellwether issue in U.S.-China relations, 

encompassing issues including the rule of law, freedom of expression, and the well-being of ethnic 

minorities. Promoting religious freedom in China is a vital U.S. interest that can positively affect the United 

States’ future security, economic, and political relations with China. As part of China’s CPC designation, 

USCIRF urges the Secretary of State to impose a new sanction targeting officials who perpetuate religious 

freedom abuses or provinces where religious freedom conditions are most egregious. In addition, USCIRF 

recommends that the U.S. raise religious freedom concerns in multilateral fora where the U.S. and China are 

members, coordinate potential sources of leverage within the U.S. government and with allies to build a 

consistent human rights diplomacy with China, develop and distribute proven technologies to counter Internet 

censorship and protect Chinese activists from arrest and harassment, and raise religious freedom and 

negotiate binding human rights agreements at the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue. 
Countries of Particular Concern 

Religious Freedom Conditions 

Restrictive Legal Framework 

The National Regulations on Religious Affairs (NRRA), first issued in March 2005 and updated in 2007, 

require all religious groups and religious venues to affiliate with one of seven government-approved 

religious associations. The NRRA strengthens governmental management and supervision of religious 

affairs, offering Party officials extensive control over every aspect of religious practice and related 

activities. Within the bounds allowed by the Chinese legal system, the NRRA expanded some protections 

for registered religious communities to carry out religious activities and some charitable work. When 

registered, religious communities can apply for permission to possess property, provide social services, 

accept donations from overseas, conduct religious education and training, and host inter-provincial 

religious meetings. However, those protections are sometimes overridden by political considerations. 

The NRRA recognizes only “normal religious activity” and contains vague national security provisions 

that forbid religious groups from disrupting national unity or solidarity. The provisions are used to justify 

suppression of “unregistered” religious activity or the activity of “cult” organizations. 

The NRRA sets specific criminal penalties for religious communities that are not in compliance with 

registration requirements. Religious leaders or adherents detained or arrested for religious activity or 

religious freedom advocacy face criminal charges, under provisions of the Criminal Code, most often 

under vague national security or public morality charges. In addition, the Chinese government continues 

to use administrative detention, including reeducation through labor, to detain religious believers without 

trial and outside the formal legal system for up to three years. 

Religious and spiritual groups that do not meet registration requirements, or that choose not to register, 

risk harassment, detention, arrest, and closure of meeting and worship places. Some Catholics, 

Protestants, Muslims, and members of spiritual movements have refused to join the officially-sanctioned 

religious organizations because they do not want to, most prominently: provide the names and contact 

information of their followers; submit leadership decisions to the government or to one of the 

government-approved religious organizations; and seek advance permission from the government for all 

major religious activities or theological positions. During the past year, Protestant “house church” groups 

and underground Catholic priests faced increased pressure to register with government-approved 

associations. 

 

Repression of unregistered religious activity varies by region, province, politics, and ethnicity. In some 

localities, officials arbitrarily implement national government policy and allow some unregistered groups 

to carry out worship activities openly. That some unregistered religious activity is tolerated is not, in 

itself, evidence that the Chinese government protects the freedom of religion for all. 

In Tibetan Buddhist and Uighur Muslim regions, the NRRA includes additional restrictions on peaceful 

religious expression and leadership decisions. National laws are supplemented with extensive provincial 

regulations that go well beyond the NRRA’s provisions. During the past year, the Chinese government 

continued to pursue an intense campaign of “patriotic education” among monks, nuns, and imams. The 

government has long required Tibetan Buddhist and Uighur Muslim religious leaders to demonstrate 

political loyalty, but new laws give provincial officials the power to monitor the training, assembly, 

publications, selection, education, and speeches of Muslim and Tibetan Buddhist leaders. Patriotic 

education campaigns among religious leaders are intended to quell any activities viewed as political 

dissent and to promote leaders who are considered “patriotic and devoted.” 

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In addition to patriotism classes for clergy, the Education Ministry also announced in 2008 that children 

in both regions will be required to attend courses on “ethnic unity.” These classes are a reaction to the 

religious and ethnic based uprisings in Tibet and the unrest in Xinjiang province over the past several 

years. Authorities in Lhasa also warned parents about allowing their children to participate in religious 

holidays, including activities such as visiting or circumambulating temples and deities or wearing amulet 

cords. Students failing to comply with the orders were threatened with expulsion from school. There 

continue to be decrees in Xinjiang requiring extensive monitoring of the religious activities of students, 

including programs intended to “weaken religious consciousness.” 

Tibetan Buddhists 

On January 1, 2008, the government issued implementation guidelines for the NRRA in the Tibetan 

Autonomous Region (TAR). The regulations assert state control over all aspects of Tibetan Buddhist 

belief and practice, including more specific control over the movement and education of monks and nuns, 

the building or repairing of religious venues, and the conducting of large-scale religious gatherings. 

When the new implementation guidelines were issued, official media reports indicated that they were 

intended to “resist the Dalai Clique’s separatist activities.” 

In September 2007, the government also issued regulations allowing it to interfere directly in the selection 

of reincarnated lamas, an essential element of Tibetan Buddhist religious practice. These rules appear to 

be intended to ensure government control over the selection of the next Dalai Lama. Under the 

regulations, government officials must approve the choice of all reincarnated lamas and no individual or 

entity outside the country can influence the selection process. Depending on the importance of the 

reincarnation itself, candidates must receive permission from either provincial level government officials 

or from officials in Beijing. Monasteries must seek government permission to search for a reincarnated 

lama and to maintain one in residence. 

These regulations are part of the Chinese government’s longstanding campaign to diminish the stature and 

influence of the Dalai Lama among Tibetans. Zhang Qingli, party secretary of the TAR, during the 

closing ceremonies of the Olympic Torch rally in June 2008 predicted that China would “smash 

completely” the Dalai Lama’s “separatist plot.” He then referred to the Dalai Lama as a “wolf in monk’s 

robes” and “a devil with a human face but the heart of a beast.” He dismissed the exiled leader’s 

supporters as the “scum of Buddhism” and ordered monks, nuns, students, government workers, and 

business people throughout Tibet to participate in patriotic education and publicly denounce the Dalai 

Lama. As part of an “anti-crime” crackdown in early 2009, police searched homes and businesses for 

“illicit” images, pictures of the Dalai Lama, as another part of their patriotic education campaign. 

In the past year, the Chinese Communist Party adopted a policy of increased economic integration for 

Tibetan areas and attempted to control the traditional norms of Tibetan Buddhism and weaken devotion to 

the Dalai Lama. The government’s restrictions on religious freedom have nurtured deep resentments 

among Tibetans. 

Chinese government actions and policies to suppress peaceful religious activity in Tibetan areas played a 

primary role in stoking the 2008 demonstrations that led to violence, the detention of hundreds of Tibetan 

monks and nuns, and increased restrictions on peaceful religious activity. On March 10, 2008, the 

anniversary of the failed 1959 uprising against Chinese control of Tibet, monks from Drepung monastery 

peacefully protested against patriotic education and other religious freedom restrictions. In response, the 

Chinese government sealed off monasteries and arrested monks, touching off demonstrations in Lhasa 

that led to property destruction, violence, arrests, and numerous deaths. 

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There is extensive evidence of arrests, beatings, long prison sentences and torture in detention of monks 

and nuns whom security officials detained for participating in the 2008 protests. The Chinese government 

has not provided full details or a credible accounting of those detained, missing, or “disappeared,” trials 

have not been open, and those accused are not given adequate legal representation. 

Since the 2008 demonstrations, the government has intensified restrictions on Tibetan Buddhism. Tibetan 

monks and nuns continue to be detained and many have been sentenced to long prison terms for their 

alleged role in the 2008 protests or for subsequent peaceful demonstrations opposing new restrictions on 

religious life. Some monasteries and other holy sites have been forcibly closed or destroyed. A security 

presence has remained at some monasteries and nunneries, and local government officials have escalated 

their campaigns to require monks and nuns to sign statements denouncing the Dalai Lama. 

Monks and nuns who refuse to denounce the Dalai Lama or to pledge loyalty to Beijing have been 

expelled from their monasteries, imprisoned, and tortured. Phurbu Tsering, a prominent Tibetan Buddhist 

religious teacher, was detained on May 19, 2008 after police arrested more than 50 of his students for 

staging a peaceful protest against requirements that they denounce the Dalai Lama and their teacher. In 

December 2009, he was given an eight-year sentence for possessing weapons. His lawyer maintains that 

he confessed to the charges after being tortured by being deprived of sleep for four days. In October 

2008, authorities closed Pangsa Monastery in Lhasa after an increased flow of Tibetans came to pay 

tribute to a statue that had received a blessing from the Dalai Lama. 

There also continue to be severe restrictions and harassment in Tibetan areas outside the TAR, including 

in areas where monks and nuns staged peaceful demonstrations in 2008. For example, on April 14, 2008 

Chinese soldiers fired on several hundred monks and local residents at the Tongkor monastery in Ganzi 

prefecture, Sichuan province. Witnesses claim that between eight and 15 people were killed and others 

were arrested. Ganzi has more political and religious prisoners than any other Tibetan region outside of 

the TAR. Protesters called for the return of the Dalai Lama, the release of the Panchen Lama (Gedun 

Choekyi Nyima), the end to “patriotic education,” and more religious freedom in general. In Ganzi 

(Kardze) Prefecture, the local government issued regulations in June 2008 both to punish and remove 

from Ganzi monks and nuns accused of participating in peaceful protests. Punishments include arrest, reeducation, closure of a monastery or nunnery, and the forced removal of a religious teacher (reincarnated 

trulku) from his position. 

 

USCIRF also has received the following reports from Tibetan researchers and human rights organizations. 

In July 2009, Jamyang Tenzin, a Tibetan monk from Lithang County, Kardze (Ganzi) Prefecture was 

sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for opposing a patriotic education campaign at his monastery. In 

May 2009, monk Tsultrim Gyatso was sentenced to life imprisonment for allegedly “endangering state 

security” by organizing a peaceful protest opposing religious freedom restrictions. Gonpo Tserang was 

sentenced in Dechen, TAR to three years in prison for reportedly “inciting separatism” by sending e-mail 

and text messages about the March 2008 protests. In November 2008, Dorje Kangzhu, a nun from Ganzi 

Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, was sentenced to seven years in prison for allegedly “inciting secession” 

after being arrested for distributing Tibetan independence leaflets and shouting support for the Dalai 

Lama in May 2008. In March 2009, Public Security Bureau (PSB) personnel beat to death a monk from 

Drango Monastery in Kardze, Sichuan province after he passed out leaflets supporting the Dalai Lama on 

PSB property. In the same month, two nuns were arrested and beaten after staging a protest in the Kardze 

County market square. 

The Chinese government continues to deny repeated international requests for access to the disappeared 

19-year-old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, whom the Dalai Lama designated as the 11th Panchen Lama when 

he was six years old. No one has seen him since, nor have any independent or transparent interviews 

taken place. Government officials claim that he is in fact alive and well and being “held for his own 

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safety.” The Chinese government insists that another boy, Gyaltsen Norbu, is the “true” Panchen Lama, 

one of the most revered positions in Tibetan Buddhism and a religious figure who will play an important 

role in selecting the next Dalai Lama. In recent years, Chinese authorities have, on several occasions, 

featured Norbu in public ceremonies where he stresses the importance of loyalty to the Communist 

government and endorses the government’s official version of Tibetan history. The government 

continues to take active steps to pressure Tibetans to accept Norbu as Panchen Lama, 

Uighur Muslims 

In the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and other areas of Xinjiang province, religious 

freedom conditions continue to deteriorate. The Chinese government severely and illegitimately 

represses peaceful religious activity, invoking security-related campaigns that exaggerate the threat of 

separatism and domestic terrorism. Over the past decade, China similarly has overplayed the global war 

on terror as a pretext to crack down on even non-violent forms of dissent or religious activity. Both 

Muslims and Protestants in the XUAR have experienced increased harassment, arrests, and efforts to 

weaken religious adherence. Ethnic tensions in China’s western provinces have a long history. The 

government’s various campaigns to curtail potential secessionist and terrorist activity are a major source 

of Uighur resentment and may lead to the very type of extremism Beijing’s policies are trying to forestall. 

Uighur Muslim clerics and students have been detained for various “illegal” religious activities, “illegal 

religious centers” have been closed, and police continue to confiscate large quantities of “illegal religious 

publications.” XUAR Party Secretary Wang Lequan stated that the government would use “preemptive 

attacks” and institute “anti-separatist reeducation” in the XUAR to ensure national safety. In September 

2008, XUAR chairperson Nur Bekri gave details of new measures to “strike hard” against the threats of, 

among other things, “illegal religious activity” and “religious extremism” and called for new efforts to 

curtail “underground [religious] activities to teach religion and sermonize.“ A new February 2010 XUAR 

“Social Order” decree outlines additional security controls to battle the “three forces of terrorism, 

separatism, and religious extremism.” 

The new “Social Order” decree comes in the aftermath of July 2009 protests of the killing of a Uighur 

worker at the Guangdong toy factory. The protests became violent, leading to an unknown number of 

deaths and arrests. Hundreds of Uighurs reportedly have been sentenced for allegedly taking part in the 

violence. According to NGO and press reports, at least 15 Uighurs have been executed. The Chinese 

government has actively sought to punish those allegedly involved in the 2009 protests, including 

successfully pressuring Cambodia to return 20 Uighurs seeking asylum. 

The 2009 demonstrations and violence intensified long-standing “security” campaigns to control religious 

activity and “weaken religious consciousness” among Uighurs. The XUAR government continues to 

limit access to mosques, including by women, children, communist party members, and government 

employees. All imams in Xinjiang are required to undergo annual political training seminars to retain 

their licenses, and local security forces monitor imams and other religious leaders. Imams at Uighur 

mosques are reportedly required to meet monthly with officials from the Religious Affairs Bureau and the 

Public Security Bureau to receive “advice” on the content of their sermons. Failure to report to such 

meetings can result in the imam’s expulsion or detention. 

During the last few years, XUAR officials have issued new orders to extend governmental control over 

religion. For example, in August 2008 authorities in Kashgar called for increased surveillance and 

management of religious activity. In June 2008, officials in Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture called for 

increased inspections of mosques and religious venues to prevent “illegal reading of scriptures” and for 

the “infiltration” of religious groups. In June 2008, a mosque near Aksu city was demolished reportedly 

for “illegal renovations,” for having “illegal copies” of the Koran, and for engaging in “illegal religious 

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activities.” In February 2009, officials in Hotan started a campaign to halt “illegal” religious schools. 

According to reports, armed security personnel conducted nighttime searches, closing seven schools and 

detaining 39 people. In March 2009, according to a Radio Free Asia (RFA) report, Hotan officials stated 

that anyone engaged in “cross-village worship” will be charged with a “social crime” and subject to 

detention or fines. Also in March, according to RFA, the Ili Intermediate People’s Court in Kazakh 

Autonomous Prefecture sentenced 12 men for “splittism,” for teaching religion to children. 

 

Religious leaders and activists who attempt to publicize or criticize human rights abuses in the XUAR 

have received prolonged prison terms, on charges of “separatism,” “endangering social order,” and 

“incitement to subvert state power.” Numerous Uighur Muslims have been arrested for peacefully 

organizing and demonstrating for their religious freedom. In February 2009, Abdukadir Mahsum was 

sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for organizing peaceful demonstrations promoting religious freedom 

and other human rights concerns for Uighurs. In March 2008, Mutallip Hajim died in detention after 

being arrested for his activities helping underground Muslim schools. He was reportedly tortured, but his 

family was warned not to publicize his death. In August 2008, Imam Adil Qarim was arrested, and has 

since disappeared, allegedly because some suspects in a bomb attack attended his mosque. The imam 

denied having any links to the attacks. 

 

Officials in the XUAR prohibit teaching Islam outside the home to minors, and police have stepped up 

attempts to halt private religious education programs in some parts of Xinjiang province. Teachers and 

organizers can be charged with conducting an “illegal religious gathering,” a criminal offense. During 

USCIRF’s 2005 visit to China, local government officials confirmed that minors were prohibited from 

participating in any religious activity or instruction before finishing nine years of compulsory public 

education. This policy contradicted statements made by officials in the central government who claimed 

that there are no restrictions prohibiting the religious activities of minors. In March 2009, authorities in 

Hotan, XUAR closed seven religious schools and conducted house-to-house searches. Officials arrested 

39 people and claimed to have seized books, propaganda material, and weapons. 

In several localities in Xinjiang, plainclothes police are reportedly stationed outside mosques to enforce 

rules forbidding children and government employees from attending services. There are also reports that 

in some areas, individuals under the age of 30 are prohibited from attending a mosque. Throughout 

Xinjiang, teachers, professors, university students, and other government employees are prohibited from 

engaging in religious activities, such as reciting daily prayers, distributing religious materials, observing 

Ramadan, and wearing head coverings; they are reportedly subject to fines if they attempt to do so. These 

standards are enforced more strictly in southern Xinjiang and other areas where Uighurs account for a 

higher percentage of the population. In March 2009, 600 protestors, mostly women, marched in Hotan to 

protest a proposed ban on headscarves and other restrictions on religious freedom. 

The XUAR is reportedly considering regulations to further prohibit the rights of children to receive 

religious instruction or attend religious activities. Similar decrees are in place in other part of Xinjiang 

province. In the spring of 2009, Hotan district strengthened oversight of students during vacation periods. 

In February 2009, Yining City, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture started a propaganda campaign 

targeting women, teenagers, and juveniles in order to “weaken religious consciousness.” 

Regulations in the XUAR ensure that all hajj pilgrimages (the pilgrimage to Mecca required of all ablebodied Muslims) are controlled by the government-approved Chinese Patriotic Islamic Association. To 

enforce these regulations, XUAR authorities require Muslims to surrender their passports to local 

government offices for registration. To retrieve their passports, they must provide detailed information 

regarding their hajj travel plans to ensure their foreign visa is authorized. Uighur human rights activists 

outside of China are concerned that this policy will be used to identify and punish Uighurs who travel 

outside of the XUAR. Their worries may have been proved justified when the government confiscated 

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the passports of more than 2,000 Uighur Muslims in 2007 and arbitrarily detained men between the ages 

of 50 to 70 for participating in the hajj.

The State Department estimates that over 1,000 people were arrested in the XUAR on charges related to 

state security over the past year, a large increase from the previous year. Such charges have been used to 

detain religious adherents and other dissidents in the past. Due to the lack of judicial transparency, and 

the government’s equation of peaceful religious activity with religious extremism and promotion of 

terrorism, it is difficult to determine how many prisoners are being held for peaceful religious activity or 

for peacefully protesting restrictions on the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 

Three family members of Rebiya Kadeer, one of the most prominent Uighur human rights and religious 

freedom advocates, remain in prison. Kadeer’s three sons, Kahar, Alim, and Ablikim, were arrested in 

June 2006 to prevent them from meeting with a visiting U.S. congressional delegation. The following 

October, Kahar and Alim were tried for tax evasion, and Alim was sentenced to seven years 

imprisonment. The two were also fined a total of over $75,000. In February 2007, Ablikim was tried in 

secret on charges of “subversion of state power” and later sentenced to nine years imprisonment. In 

December 2007, family members were allowed to visit Ablikim for the first time in a year. Both Alim 

and Ablikim remain in prison, where they are reported to have been tortured and abused. Ablikim is 

reported to be in poor physical health without adequate medical care. 

Catholics 

The officially-sanctioned Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) does not allow its members or clergy to 

have official relations or communication with the Vatican or other foreign Catholic organizations. This 

prohibition continues to strain relations between the CPA and the unregistered Catholic Church in China 

and between the Chinese government and the Holy See. 

Despite official policy, an estimated 90 percent of CPA bishops and priests are secretly ordained by the 

Vatican and in many provinces CPA and unregistered Catholic clergy and congregations work closely 

together. In some cases, the Vatican and the Chinese government have worked together to select bishops. 

For example, in September 2007 bishops were ordained in Beijing, Guizhou, and three other dioceses 

with the approval of both the government and the Vatican. These ordinations reversed a trend of the 

government appointing bishops without Vatican approval. Nonetheless, the Chinese government took 

active steps to halt distribution of Pope Benedict’s 2007 open letter to Chinese Catholics. In the 2007 

papal letter, the Pope recognized that, although there have been some improvements, “grave limitations” 

on religious freedom in China remain, which the church cannot accept. Nevertheless, the Pope called on 

Chinese Catholics to adopt the approach of “respectful and constructive dialogue.” Despite the Chinese 

government’s efforts to undermine reconciliation efforts already underway in China, Pope Benedict 

renewed his call last year for continued reconciliation efforts between registered and unregistered bishops 

in China. 

The Chinese government continues to maintain that normalization of ties with the Holy See will begin 

only if the Vatican revokes its diplomatic relations with Taiwan and agrees to cease its “use of religion as 

a means to interfere in China’s internal affairs.” There has been no noticeable progress made toward 

establishing formal diplomatic relations in the past year. 

Harassment and detention of Catholics in China continued during the reporting period. In the two 

provinces with the largest Catholic communities, Hebei and Shaanxi, provincial governments have 

engaged in campaigns to suppress the activities of “underground” Catholic congregations and coerce 

Catholic clergy to join the CPA. According to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s 

2009 Annual Report, the Shaanxi Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau boasted of its efforts to “frighten” 

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Catholics and engage in a “transformation through reeducation” of 13 Catholic priests and Bishop Li 

Jingfeng. Shaanxi officials detained Bishop Wu Qinjing of the Zhouzhi diocese in March 2007. His 

whereabouts remain unknown. Bishop Wu was ordained in 2006 with Vatican approval, but without the 

approval of the local CPA. Fr. Wang Zhong is still serving the three-year sentence imposed in 2007 for 

reportedly organizing a ceremony to consecrate a new church registered with the government. Reports 

from NGOs indicate that Father Gao Jianli, from Fengziang county, Shaanxi province, was invited by the 

mayor of Xiangong province to discuss a land dispute over confiscated church property. At the meeting 

the priest was restrained by police and beaten repeatedly, according to reports from NGOs. 

Hebei province officials also stepped up efforts to target unregistered priests and strengthen management 

of Catholicism in the province. Provincial officials reportedly arrested 20 Catholic parishioners and two 

priests for their protests of the arrest of Bishop Yao Ling in 2008. Bishop Ling was released in January 

2009 after serving a two-year sentence. In May 2008, Fr. Zhang Jianlin and Fr. Zhang Li were detained 

in Hebei province as they travelled to a well-known shrine in Shanghai; they reportedly remain in some 

sort of detention at this time. In March 2009, provincial officials detained three Catholic clergy, 

including unregistered priest Ma Shengbao, Bishop Jia Zhiguo, and priest Paul Ma. Bishop Jia was 

arrested to prevent him from meeting another bishop who had reconciled with the Vatican. Chinese 

officials objected to the relationship between the two bishops because it was “desired by a foreign 

power,” and not by the government and the CPA. Father Ma was arrested for reportedly celebrating the 

sacraments with unregistered Catholics in the city of Donglu. The whereabouts of the three remain 

unknown. 

In the past year, Party and government officials continued to label unregistered Catholics as a threat to 

“social stability” and called for increased efforts to “transform...underground communities.” In addition 

to the efforts described above to Shaanxi and Hebei, according to press reports, provincial campaigns to 

“negate the severe impact” of unregistered Catholics occurred in Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Henan provinces. 

In 2009, at least 40 Roman Catholic bishops remain imprisoned, detained, or disappeared, including the 

elderly Bishop Su Zhimin, who has been in prison, in detention, under house arrest, or under strict 

surveillance since the 1970s. In addition, there is still no information on the whereabouts of Bishop Shi 

Enxiang, who was detained in April 2001. 

Protestants 

The Chinese government continues to control the religious activities of Protestants affiliated with the 

government-approved religious organizations. It encourages registered Protestant leaders to emphasize 

“theological reconstruction,” a doctrine that purges any elements of Christian faith and practice that the 

Communist Party regards as incompatible with its goals and policies. Registered Protestants have been 

given more latitude to operate charitable and social welfare programs by the NRRA. A growing number 

of Chinese “faith-based” nonprofits run clinics, homes for the elderly, and orphanages. These 

organizations have an uncertain legal status and limited capacity, but many are apparently allowed to 

operate because they fill a needed social service gap in some localities and rural areas. 

An estimated 10 million Chinese belong to the two approved Protestant organizations. However, even 

registered Protestant groups and leaders are not safe from harassment, detentions, and arrest due to the 

arbitrary nature of Chinese law and policy regarding religion. In April 2009, pastor Zhang Xiu-zhi was 

arrested and sentenced to a year in a labor camp, reportedly because she diverted church funds to aid 

earthquake relief in Sichuan province. In June 2009 in the Shandong province city of Jinan, local 

officials forcibly sealed the registered Changchunli Church in order to sell the property to real estate 

developers. Also in Shandong province during August 2009, authorities raided a religious training 

session and closed the registered church where the training was being conducted. 

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The government actively harasses, detains, fines, mistreats, and imprisons members and leaders of 

unregistered Protestant groups, whose membership may be between 40 and 60 million. According to the 

NGO China Aid, the number of unregistered Protestants detained fell somewhat in the last year. There 

were 389 detentions of between one day and a year. Twenty-three individuals were sentenced to terms of 

imprisonment over one year, including in China’s notorious “re-education through labor” system. 

Though the total number of arrests and imprisonments declined in the past year, government efforts to 

suppress the growth and activities of “house church” Protestants continue to be systematic and intense. 

The State Department estimates that “thousands” of house church members were detained for short 

periods in the past several years. Members of unregistered Protestant groups that the government deems 

“evil cults” were the most vulnerable to detention. The extrajudicial security apparatus, called the 6-10 

Office, which was started to monitor and suppress Falun Gong activity reportedly has broadened its 

mandate to include groups that self-identify as Protestant. 

China Aid and other NGOs report a significant rise in incidents of harassment, property confiscation and 

destruction, and intimidation of Protestants since the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. The Chinese 

government took active steps to impede religious groups and human rights defenders from having access 

to foreigners, including President George W. Bush and visiting members of Congress, destroyed churches 

and confiscated property, and harassed and mistreated religious leaders. 

In the lead-up to the Beijing Olympic Games, the government sought to impede contact between 

unregistered Protestant leaders and foreign organizations. Pastor Zhang “Bike” Mingxuan, head of the 

House Church Alliance, was detained several times, forcibly removed from Beijing during the Olympics, 

fined, and evicted from his apartment, and his sons were beaten by police. In March 2009, Pastor 

Mingxuan was arrested again in Beijing and sent to Henan Province to be questioned and detained. After 

intense international attention to his case, the government has reportedly stopped its overt harassment of 

Pastor Mingxuan in the past year. 

Many Protestant leaders reported that they were asked by local public security officials to disband their 

groups during the Games, especially high-profile congregations that met near Olympic venues. Several 

prominent Christian leaders were placed under strict surveillance during the Olympic Games. 

Approximately 100 foreign Christians were detained, interrogated, and eventually expelled from the 

country during the Olympics on charges of “illegal religious activity.” 

Pre-Olympic pressure on unregistered Protestants has continued. In the past year, the Chinese 

government conducted raids and destroyed religious venues, fined and beat religious leaders and 

confiscated their property, used local zoning laws to seal or close meeting places, and pressured 

unregistered congregations to affiliate instead with the government-approved religious organization. 

Raids on house churches continued in many provinces. In April 2009, security agents forcibly shut down 

a gathering of 1,000 unregistered Protestants in Chengdu, Sichuan province. In December 2009, 

authorities in Anhui province raided a Bible school, detaining 21 students and teachers and announcing 

plans to demolish the building. In Henan province during February 2009, 100 police and governmental 

officials disrupted a meeting between Chinese and South Korean religious leaders, briefly detaining and 

interrogating everyone in attendance. In January 2009, local authorities in the city of Muling, 

Heilongjiang province seized the property of Chang Fengying, a pastor who hosted a large house church 

gathering. In January 2010, public security officials raided the meeting of the Chinese House Church 

Alliance in Hanan city, Hebei province. 30 religious leaders were briefly detained and face possible 

administrative detention charges. 

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In the past year, Chinese government officials at various levels have forcibly closed large unregistered 

religious venues that previously had operated openly. In September 2009, government officials and 

police raised and later demolished the Linfen Church in Shanxi province. Authorities also arrested 10 

members of the church and later sentenced them to reeducation through labor detention. The Fushan 

Church is the second largest underground church in China, with membership totaling 50,000. 

Government officials stated that they were responding to complaints by local residents that the church had 

illegally taken land, a charge that church leaders deny. In November 2009, Beijing police raided the 

Shouwang Church and forced its members to find a new place of worship. Since a 2008 raid, Shouwang 

Church has repeatedly tried to register but has not been successful. Because it is unregistered, the church 

has been unable to purchase property in Beijing. In February 2009, Shanghai authorizes ordered the 

landlord of the Wanbang Missionary Church to evict the congregation because the pastor refused to 

cancel a meeting of urban house church leaders. In March 2010, in the city of Jinan, Shandong province, 

local officials closed a Seventh-day Adventist church with an estimated 700 members. The church was 

renting property because it was refused permission to build a permanent structure. Jinan officials 

reportedly stated that the church would be banned because it was not registered. 

Attempts to close unregistered Protestants churches and meeting points and detain religious leaders 

occurred in at least 17 provinces and two municipalities, with the greatest number of incidents occurring 

in Shaanxi, Henan, Xinjiang, Shandong, and the municipalities of Shanghai and Beijing. Officials in 

Sichuan, Heiongjiang, Jiangxi, and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region announced “bans” on some house 

church meetings, detentions of Protestant leaders in “transformation through reeducation” programs, and 

plans to “punish” missionaries and “cult” leaders. 

The Chairman of the XUAR, Ismail Tiliwaldi, has urged local police and religious affairs officials to 

“exercise stronger management” over Protestantism and Catholicism and to guard strictly against foreign 

infiltration and sabotage. In May 2007, police in the XUAR detained 30 house church leaders who were 

meeting with foreign religious leaders; those detained were reportedly mistreated and, in some cases, 

beaten in custody before they were released. In April 2008, XUAR police arrested 46 Christians while 

they worshipped in a house church. They were forced to pay fines and study government handbooks on 

religious policy, and were sentenced to 15 days of administrative detention. Osman Imin (also known as 

Wusimanyiming) was arrested in November 2007 and sentenced to two years of “re-education through 

labor” on charges that he assisted foreigners in conducting “illegal religious activities” related to public 

religious expression and persuasion among the Uighur community. Lou Yuanqi, the pastor of a growing 

house church, was detained on May 17, 2008 on charges of “utilizing superstition to undermine the law.” 

However, a XUAR court refused to take his case because of insufficient evidence and he was released 

without charges being filed in April 2009. 

In January 2008, Alimjan Himit (Alimujiang Yimiti)—a house church leader in the XUAR who had 

previously worked for a foreign-owned company shut down for “illegal religious infiltration activities”—

was detained and charged with subverting state power and endangering national security. Although a 

court in Kashgar returned Himit’s case to the procuratorate due to insufficient evidence in May 2008, he 

remains in detention. In September 2008, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that 

Himit had been arbitrarily detained in violation of international standards. In August 2009, Himit was 

sentenced to 15 years in prison despite his previous detention having been ruled as arbitrary by the UN. 

This is the harshest sentence given to a Christian in China in the last 10 years. 

Falun Gong and the Campaign against “Evil Cults” 

The Chinese government continues to maintain a severe campaign against adherents of the Falun Gong 

spiritual movement, which it considers an “evil cult” and was banned in 1999. Over the past decade, the 

government has carried out an unprecedented campaign against the Falun Gong, imprisoning large 

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numbers of practitioners and abusing them in detention. Practitioners who do not renounce their beliefs 

in detention are subject to torture. There are recent, credible reports of deaths in custody. The Chinese 

government’s systematic campaign to suppress the Falun Gong and other “evil cults” using extrajudicial 

means is a severe human rights problem. 

Credible first-hand accounts from Falun Gong adherents report, and official Chinese government 

statements confirm, long-term and arbitrary arrests, forced conversions of faith, and torture and 

mistreatment in detention. Though it is difficult to determine with specificity the number of Falun Gong 

practitioners in detention during the past year, some estimates place the number at 8,000, with most 

arrests having occurred prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In the year before the Olympic Games, 

police waged a concerted campaign to harass and detain known Falun Gong practitioners and brutally 

suppressed their activity. An estimated 8,037 Falun Gong were detained between December 2007 and 

August 2008. 

Targeting Falun Gong adherents continues to be a high priority for Chinese government security officials. 

There remains a nationwide campaign to suppress Falun Gong and “transform” its practitioners. A 2009 

directive by the Central Committee on the Comprehensive Management of Public Security urged security 

officials to “strike hard against hostile forces...[including] the infiltration, subversion, and sabotage by 

‘Falun Gong.’” Similar security instructions were issued in the provinces of Jiangsu, Hubei, Jilin, 

Guizhou, Yunnan, Henan, Hunan, Anhui, Sichuan, and Shandong, including recommendations for 

surveillance, cultivation of paid informants, and propaganda efforts. 

Current and former Falun Gong practitioners remain incarcerated in re-education through labor camps 

(RTL) and mental health institutions. Some international observers claim that Falun Gong adherents may 

comprise as many as half of the 250,000 Chinese detained in RTL camps over the past decade. Provincial 

officials reportedly offer sizable rewards to anyone who provides information leading to the arrest of a 

Falun Gong practitioner. 

Two Falun Gong practitioners are known to have died in police custody in 2008. The widow of one, Xu 

Na, remains jailed, serving a three-year sentence for possessing Falun Gong materials. Also in 2008, 

Chen Zhenping was sentenced to eight years imprisonment for being a Falun Gong practitioner. She was 

tried in secret without legal representation. In February 2009, public security officials in one municipality 

of Sichuan province reported that they had detained 114 Falun Gong practitioners. In April 2009, Zhang 

Xingwu, a retired physics professor from Shandong province, was sentenced to seven years in prison after 

police discovered Falun Gong literature in his apartment. In late November 2009, a Shanghai court 

sentenced Liu Jin to three and a half years in prison for downloading and distributing information about 

Falun Gong on the Internet. 

The 6–10 Offices throughout China are tasked with surveillance, investigations, “transformation,” and 

detention of Falun Gong practitioners. The 6-10 Offices reportedly have extrajudicial detention facilities 

used exclusively to hold Falun Gong practitioners who have completed RTL terms but are still considered 

harmful. 

The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture reported that Falun Gong practitioners allegedly make up twothirds of the alleged victims of torture presented to him in China. Numerous allegations of governmentsanctioned organ harvesting from incarcerated practitioners have surfaced within the last several years as 

well. Independent investigation into the practices of a hospital in Sujiatun, Shenyang proved 

inconclusive. However, based upon a report from two prominent Canadian human rights activists, 

international human rights organizations and the Special Rapporteur on Torture have called for an 

independent investigation and for continued international attention to allegations of organ harvesting from 

prisoners. The Committee on Torture, a UN treaty- monitoring body, also called on the government 

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during its 2008 review of China to conduct independent investigations to clarify discrepancies in statistics 

related to organ transplants and allegations of torture of Falun Gong practitioners. 

In August 2007, authorities in Hunan Province issued provincial-level regulations to administer folk 

religion venues. Folk religion, also called “feudal superstition,” has been a legal grey area in China 

because it does not fall within the five recognized religious groups (Buddhism, Daoism, Protestantism, 

Catholicism and Islam), but is often tolerated by local officials. The regulations are significant because 

they offer protections for religious practice outside the five recognized communities and because they 

allow venues to register directly with provincial government officials. However, the new regulations 

allow registration only of existing venues and stipulate that no new sites may be built. In addition, any 

venue that is destroyed may not be rebuilt unless it retains “historical stature” and “great influence.” The 

State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), the government agency tasked with overseeing most 

of China’s religious life, has established a division to deal directly with the management of folk religions. 

Human Rights Defenders 

During the past several years, there has been a continuing crackdown against human rights activists, 

lawyers, and others who attempted to use the Chinese legal system to defend the rights of Chinese 

citizens, including those who sought to practice their right to freedom of religion. Lawyers have been 

harassed, beaten, and threatened, disappeared, or have lost their legal licenses over the past year. 

In September 2007, attorney Li Heping, a prominent religious freedom advocate, was beaten with 

electronic batons for nearly five hours and ordered to stop practicing law. He refused and his legal 

license was revoked. In November 2007, human rights lawyer Yang Maodong (also known as Guo 

Feixiong) was sentenced to five years in prison on charges of “illegal business practices.” According to 

his wife and lawyer, he has been subjected to shocks from electric batons and other mistreatment while in 

prison. Yang Maodong is the former law partner of Gao Zhisheng, one of China’s best known human 

rights lawyers, who defended Falun Gong and unregistered Protestants and was a vocal critic of the 

Chinese government’s human rights record. Gao disappeared in February 2009 and his whereabouts 

remain unknown, though he was briefly allowed to make contact with friends in March 2010. Before his 

disappearance, Gao published a report of the torture he endured during a September 2007 interrogation. 

In February 2008, police seized lawyer Teng Biao in Beijing for questioning, warned him to stop writing 

articles criticizing China’s human rights record, and threatened him with jail time and the loss of his 

university job. After Teng agreed to defend Tibetans arrested following the March 2008 protests, 

officials refused to renew his legal license. In March 2009, the Chinese government revoked the legal 

license of Beijing’s Yitong Law Firm, whose lawyers handled human rights cases, including representing 

unregistered house church Protestants and the Falun Gong. Lawyers Li Subin, Liu Xiaoyuan, Zhang 

Jianguo, Cheng Hai, Wen Haibo, and Yang Huiwen were singled out for censure because of their human 

rights work. The government also shut down the legal assistance organization Open Constitution 

Initiative, or Gongmeng, and detained Xu Zhiyong, one of its cofounders, for alleged tax evasion. 

In the past year, authorities contacted nine law firms in Beijing and demanded that they not submit license 

renewal applications, or that they submit applications that could be turned down on technical grounds, for 

lawyers whose clients included Falun Gong or unregistered Protestants. In September 2009, the 

government revoked the licenses of at least 21 human rights lawyers. In December 2009, human rights 

lawyer Wang Yonghang was detained and sentenced to seven years in prison because of his work 

representing Falun Gong practitioners. 

In March 2010, noted Protestant leader and human rights lawyer Fan Yafeng was detained by security 

officials in order to stop him from meeting with foreign media. It was the second time in six months he 

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was detained. In November 2009, he was dismissed from his position at the Chinese Academy of Social 

Sciences “for political reasons.” Fan Yafeng represented several highly publicized cases in recent years 

involving unregistered Protestants, including defending pastor Cai Zhouan and representing the Linfen 

church in Shaanxi province. 

Despite experiencing ongoing harassment, arrest, and restrictions, human rights defenders have had some 

minimal success using the legal system to challenge official abuse or have sentences reduced. For 

example, in November 2007 house church members in Shandong province successfully filed suit against 

the local public security bureau and were awarded confiscated Bibles, computers, and other goods taken 

in a raid. In September 2008, a Chengdu church filed a suit against the local religious affairs bureau 

(RAB) for closing down the church earlier in the year. The provincial RAB reportedly later issued a 

decision overturning the local bureau’s decision. In some cases, lawyers for the Falun Gong have also 

been able to represent their clients without prior approval from the Ministry of Justice. This occasionally 

has led to reduced or suspended sentences; however, the practice is only allowed in Beijing and not in 

other parts of China. 

Failure to Protect Refugees 

China is a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol; however, 

there is no Chinese law that provides for the protection of asylum seekers. The government does 

cooperate with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) regarding some refugee or asylum 

cases. The UNHCR reported that 100 refugee claims were processed last year, all for non-Koreans. 

North Korean asylum-seekers continue to face hardship and repatriation. Beijing limits UNHCR access 

to North Korean asylum-seekers and does not allow UNHCR to operate in China’s border region with 

North Korea. 

 

The Chinese government considers all North Koreans economic migrants rather than refugees. Without 

access to a durable solution provided by the UNHCR, North Koreans continue to face repatriation, 

trafficking, and discrimination. Even North Korean refugees under UNCHR care were subjected to 

harassment and restrictions by authorities. 

 

North Koreans who are forcibly repatriated face torture, imprisonment in penal labor camps, and possible 

execution, particularly those suspected of having religious beliefs or affiliations. Since 2008, the Chinese 

government has intensified its campaign against North Korean refugees, harassing religious communities 

that assist refugees and offering rewards to those who turn over asylum seekers to authorities. The 

government also reportedly arrested individuals who organized food, shelter, transportation, and other 

assistance to North Koreans. In August 2009, a court in Erlianhoate, Inner Mongolia sentenced Protestant 

house church leaders Li Ming-shun and Zhang Yong-hu to 10 and seven years imprisonment, 

respectively, and substantial fines for their efforts to assist North Korean refugees. 

 

There also continue to be reports that North Korean agents operate clandestinely in China, infiltrating 

churches and religious groups assisting refugees. 

Restricting Peaceful Religious Expression

The Chinese government, as part of official policy, continues to restrict peaceful religious expression and 

the expansion of religious ideas or worship on the Internet. It confiscates or punishes the distribution of 

unapproved bibles, Muslim books, Falun Gong documents, and interpretations of religious texts. It also 

blocks access to Internet sites of religious groups or those with ‘‘illegal’’ religious content. According to 

a study conducted by the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, religious sites 

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are among the most censored Internet content in China, particularly Falun Gong, Muslim, and Buddhist 

sites. 

Chinese officials continue to use charges of “illegal business activity” to sentence individuals who are 

involved in the printing and distribution of Bibles and other religious materials and use national security 

directives to arrest those who use film and the Internet to publicize religious freedom abuses in China. In 

November 2007, Shi Weihan served 37 days of criminal detention in Beijing for illegally publishing 

Bibles and Christian literature. He was arrested again in March 2008 and detained until trial in June 

2009. At trial he was given a three-year sentence and fined heavily. In May 2008, Pastor Dong Yutao of 

Beijing was arrested for receiving a shipment of illegally imported Bibles. He remains in detention 

awaiting trial. In July 2009, a Xining Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Tibetan filmmaker 

Dhongdup Wangchen to six years in prison on charges of “inciting separatism” for producing the 

documentary film “Leaving Fear Behind,” which criticized Chinese government policies in Tibet. Kunga 

Tsayang, a monk from the Amdo Labrang Tashi Kyil Monastery, was sentenced in late November, 2009 

to five years in prison on charges of disclosing state secrets in his Internet writings. 

U.S. Policy 

U.S.-China relations have fluctuated widely in the past year. Attempts in early 2009 to downplay 

religious freedom and human rights concerns have not yet produced a significant return on the Obama 

administration’s stated financial, environmental, or security priorities with China. Instead, Beijing 

reacted with hostility to a long-planned arms deal with Taiwan and the President’s eventual meeting with 

the Dalai Lama in February 2010. Over the past year, the Administration publicly sketched out three 

general human rights priorities with China--minority rights, freedom of religion, and freedom of 

expression. However, the Administration’s success in advancing these three priorities remains difficult to 

assess. 

In a February 2009 statement during a trip to Asia, Secretary of State Clinton claimed that human rights 

“shouldn’t interfere” with other elements of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. In subsequent 

statements, the Secretary has highlighted China as a human rights priority, including mentioning freedom 

of religion and worship as priority concerns. Nevertheless, the Administration has not articulated a 

consistent or clear direction for human rights diplomacy with China beyond promising “to engage in 

tough [human rights] discussions behind closed doors.” 

In order to facilitate several bilateral platforms for private discussions, the United States and China 

renewed the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The two countries also agreed to reestablish a regular 

Human Rights Dialogue and reconvene the U.S.-China Legal Experts Dialogue. A new round of the 

Strategic and Economic Dialogue was held in July 2009. No binding agreements or joint statements 

emerged from that round of discussion regarding human rights or religious freedom, however. Despite 

bilateral tension, another round of U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue will take place on May 13-14, 

2010 in Washington, DC. 

During a visit to Beijing in November 2009, President Obama expressed publicly his desire for China to 

lift Internet restrictions and to re-start negotiations with representatives of the Dalai Lama. A meeting 

between Beijing and the Dalai Lama’s envoys occurred in late January 2010. Additional meetings have 

been postponed. The Chinese government continues to denounce the Dalai Lama and accuse him of 

fomenting unrest in Tibetan areas. It also has extended programs to weaken the devotion of Tibetan 

Buddhist monks and nuns to his leadership. 

Secretary Clinton also included freedom of worship as a part of a major speech on Internet freedom in 

January 2010. The freedom of religion, she stated, includes “advancing the freedom of worship online” 

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and working to overcome the ways some nations use “the internet to silence religious minorities and 

people of faith.” The Secretary pledged to hold the Chinese government accountable for its Internet 

censorship and to work to create and promote technologies to advance the freedom of expression online. 

Congress has appropriated funds to promote counter- censorship technologies in closed societies, and new 

legislation is pending in this area. The State Department has not yet awarded currently available funds to 

distribute technologies that can immediately assist human rights and religious freedom advocates in 

avoiding censorship online. 

According to the State Department, U.S. officials continue to encourage the Chinese government to 

support the growth of faith-based aid by both registered and unregistered religious groups, as well as to 

loosen government controls on religious practice and release prisoners detained on political charges. 

Recommendations

A stable China that is committed to protecting and advancing its citizens’ fundamental rights is in the 

interest of the United States. A robust religious freedom agenda should be a critical component of 

bilateral relations. Religious freedom is directly related to expanding the rule of law, developing civil 

society, aiding stability and trust-building in ethnic minority areas, expanding the freedom of expression, 

and bringing China firmly within the international system through assisted implementation of universal 

human rights obligations. 

USCIRF urges the Obama administration, as it continues to pursue various policy approaches, to raise 

religious freedom concerns in multilateral fora where the United States and China are members, to signal 

clearly, publicly, and unambiguously that human rights are a vital U.S. interest that effect the flexibility 

and scope of U.S.-China relations, and to coordinate potential sources of leverage, within the U.S. 

government and with allies, in order to build a consistent human rights diplomacy with China. In addition 

to these issues, the Commission makes the following recommendations concerning U.S. policy toward 

China. 

I. Ending Human Rights Abuses in China 

The U.S. government should: 

 

• fully employ the tools specified in the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) for countries 

designated as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs), including sanctions or some other 

commensurate action, and cease the practice of relying on pre-existing sanctions that do not address 

specific religious freedom abuses, by issuing a new presidential action focusing on either state 

agencies or actors who perpetuate religious freedom abuses or on provinces or localities where 

religious freedom conditions are most egregious; 

• develop a human rights strategy towards China that engages and utilizes the entire U.S. Government 

by creating an inter-agency human rights action plan and coordinating its implementation across all 

U.S. government agencies and entities, including developing targeted talking points and prisoner lists 

and providing staffing and support for all U.S. delegations visiting China; and 

• reinvigorate a process of multilateral cooperation on human rights and technical assistance programs 

with allies who conduct bilateral human rights dialogues with China. 

In addition, during its bilateral human rights discussions with China, the U.S. government should urge the 

Chinese government to: 

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• end its current crackdown on religious and spiritual groups throughout China, including harassment, 

surveillance, arrest, and detention of persons on account of their religion or belief, torture and illtreatment of persons in prisons, labor camps, psychiatric facilities, and other places of confinement, 

and the coercion of individuals to renounce or condemn any religion or belief; 

• release all those imprisoned, detained, or disappeared on account of their religious belief, activities, 

or religious freedom advocacy, including, among many others, Gao Zhisheng, Xu Na, Fr. Zhang Li, 

Chen Zhenping, Bishop Jia Zhiguo, Shi Weihan, Alimjan Himit, Yang Maodong, Osman Imin, 

Abdukadir Mahsum, Imam Adil Qarim, Fr. Zhang Jianlin, Alim and Ablikim Abdureyim, Phurbu 

Tsering, Bishop Su Zhimin, and Gedhun Choekyi Nyima; 

• provide a full accounting of all those detained, released, tried and sentenced and/or missing following 

public order disturbances in Tibet or in Xinjiang; allow immediate access for international observers, 

including the International Committee of the Red Cross, to all acknowledged or unacknowledged 

detention facilities; and implement all Tibet and Xinjiang related recommendations of the UN High 

Commissioner for Human Rights, the Committee against Torture, and the Special Rapporteurs on 

Torture, Freedom of Religion or Belief, Extrajudicial and Summary Executions, and Human Rights 

Defenders; 

• allow faith-based non-governmental organizations to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs and 

operate nationally, including in the border regions with North Korea; 

• cease the use of torture and implement mechanisms so that alleged incidents are consistently and 

impartially investigated, evidence procured through torture is excluded at proceeding, mistreatment of 

Falun Gong is ended, mistreatment of North Korean refugees in detention is halted, and no asylumseeker in China is returned to a country where he or she faces a real possibility of torture; 

• take additional steps to ensure that religious education for minors is not restricted and is fully 

guaranteed in national and provincial laws, including by directing the State Administration on 

Religious Affairs (SARA) to make a public statement that religious education for minors is allowable 

in all religious venues, which would help ensure that domestic audiences, including both citizens and 

local authorities, understand the meaning of this right and respect its implementation; 

• establish a mechanism for reviewing cases of persons, including religious leaders, detained under 

suspicion of, or charged with, offenses relating to state security, disturbing social order, 

“counterrevolutionary” or “splittist” activities, or organizing or participating in “illegal” gatherings or 

religious activities; 

• fulfill its commitment to allow individuals serving sentences for counter-revolutionary crimes to be 

eligible for sentence reduction and parole on the same basis as other prisoners, and publish statistics 

on the number of individuals still serving sentences for counter-revolutionary crimes and the number 

of individuals that received sentence reduction or parole; 

• end harassment, arrest, detention, and mistreatment of lawyers who take on cases of Falun Gong, 

unregistered Protestants, Uighur Muslims, and Tibetan Buddhists, re-instate the licenses arbitrarily 

removed from lawyers who take sensitive human rights cases, and engage in discussions with 

international legal institutions on new ways to train and license legal advocates; and 

• extend an unconditional invitation to visit China to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence 

of Lawyers and Judges, with full access in compliance with the terms of reference required by the 

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Special Rapporteur, and determine dates for visits to China by both the Special Rapporteur on the 

Freedom of Religion or Belief , the Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 

and the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, with full access in compliance with the 

terms of reference required by the Special Rapporteurs. 

III. The U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue and Human Rights Protections 

Within the planning and structure of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the U.S. government should: 

y prioritize human rights and religious freedom issues as principal issues in the Strategic Dialogue’s 

agenda; raise a full range of religious freedom concerns in high-level discussions in each session and 

seek binding agreements on key religious freedom and human rights concerns at the U.S.-China 

Strategic Dialogue in ways similar to other economic and security interests; and 

y ensure that religious freedom priorities raised in the Strategic Dialogue are implemented through 

appropriate U.S. government foreign assistance programs on such issues as legal reform, civil society 

capacity-building, public diplomacy, and cultural and religious preservation and exchanges. 

III. Improve the Rule of Law in China 

The U.S. government should make promoting the rule of law a greater priority of U.S. human rights 

diplomacy in China and urge the Chinese government to: 

• ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China 

signed in 1998, without reservations undermining religious freedom protections, and accept technical 

legal assistance to help harmonize Chinese law and international human rights obligations; 

• amend Article 36 of the Constitution to protect explicitly the right not only to believe but to manifest 

one’s religious belief without state interference; 

• amend or repeal Article 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which has been used against attorneys 

who have vigorously defended the rights of their clients; 

• amend or repeal Article 111 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which labels as “state secrets” any 

published information deemed embarrassing to the government, and raise the issue of China’s use of 

“state security” as a rationale for suppressing dissent in China; 

• repeal the Guiding Opinion on Lawyers Handling Collective Cases and similar local regulations that 

interfere with the ability of lawyers to represent the interests of their clients in collective cases, 

including cases involving the defense of religious freedom or related rights or violations on account 

of religion or belief; 

• abolish the system of re-education through labor (RTL) camps and all other administration and 

extrajudicial detention centers, including the “transformation through reeducation” facilities of the 6-

10 office; 

• revise the Ministry of Justice’s “Methods for the Management of Lawyers Professional Licenses” and 

similar local regulations to ensure that a lawyer’s annual registration is not subject to political 

considerations or other arbitrary factors and make sure that no lawyer should be denied renewal of 

registration on the basis of the cases he or she has represented or is representing; 

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• repeal Article 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which deals with individuals accused of crimes 

associated with “evil cults,” and also its associated legislation, the Decision of the Standing 

Committee of the National People’s Congress on Banning Heretical Cult Organizations, Preventing 

and Punishing Cult Activities; 

• end the use of government filters on Web sites and e-mail and remove official restrictions on Internet 

message boards, text messaging, and internet access, including the blockage of access to certain Web 

sites related to religion, belief, or human rights; and 

• revise the September 2000 State Council regulations on Internet Content Providers (ICPs) and offer 

ICPs clear and consistent guidelines for Web site content and usage to ensure that Chinese law and 

practice in this area conform to international standards on the freedoms of opinion and expression. 

IV. Supporting Chinese Dissidents and Rights Defenders 

To strengthen the ability of Chinese lawyers and activists to defend religious freedom or related rights, 

address violations on account of religion or belief, and encourage freedom of expression and a vibrant 

civil society, media, and the rule of law, the U.S. government should: 

• use appropriated Internet freedom funds to develop free and secure email access for use in China; 

facilitate the dissemination of high-speed Internet access via satellite; and distribute immediately 

proven and field-tested counter-censorship programs in order to prevent the arrest and harassment 

of religious freedom and human rights activists and help them maintain their freedom of 

expression and legitimate expectations of privacy; and, 

• award funds appropriated by Congress to counter censorship in China, including from the FY10 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, through a competitive and merit-based process. 

• Through the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund, institute new programs 

that: 

--build the capacity, training, and networking ability of non-governmental organizations in China 

that address issues of human rights, including religious freedom and legal reform, as well as the 

freedoms of expression, association, and assembly; 

--establish consultations between international human rights experts and Chinese officials, judges 

and lawyers on the compatibility of Chinese laws, regulations, and decrees with international 

standards on freedom of religion or belief; 

--create a regular religious freedom dialogue between U.S. and international experts and members 

of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; 

--make support available to Chinese human rights defenders and others who defend the 

internationally recognized rights of individuals and communities targeted because of their 

religious belief or practice; and 

--financially assist lawyers who take sensitive human rights cases, create a religious freedom 

handbook to educate religious leaders on their rights under Chinese and international law, and 

create legal materials and training seminars, accessible online, for Chinese law students, lawyers, 

and judges. 

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V. Expanding Diplomacy and Human Rights Programs in Tibet and Xinjiang 

The U.S. government should: 

y urge the Chinese government to allow a U.S. government presence, such as consulates in Lhasa, Tibet 

and Urumqi, Xinjiang which could monitor religious freedom and other human rights conditions; 

y strengthen efforts to highlight conditions faced by Uighur Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists by: 

--increasing educational opportunities in the United States for religious and other leaders from 

these regions, in order to enhance their understanding of religious freedom and other human 

rights according to international standards; 

--creating legal clinics to assist those in areas with high concentrations of Uighur Muslims and 

Tibetan Buddhists to enforce their human rights under the Chinese Constitution and international 

law, similar to existing programs that serve other ethnic minority areas in China; 

--giving political and financial support to assist religious groups and organizations address 

chronic needs, as articulated by the Tibetan and Uighur people, in such areas as education, 

conflict resolution, language and culture preservation, environmental protection, drug and alcohol 

abuse prevention, and sustainable development; 

-- ensuring continued availability of funds to maintain appropriate Tibetan and Uighur language 

broadcasting through the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia; and 

• publicly offering to facilitate meetings between Chinese officials and envoys of the Dalai Lama 

and seek to broker trust-building agreements to end religious freedom restrictions in Tibet and 

Tibetan areas. 

VI. Protecting and Aiding North Korean Refugees in China

The U.S. government should urge the Chinese government to: 

• uphold its international obligations to protect asylum seekers by: working with the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to establish a mechanism to confer temporary asylum on 

those seeking such protection and to permit safe transport to countries of final asylum; providing 

the UNHCR with unrestricted access to interview North Korean nationals in China; and ensuring 

that the return of any migrants pursuant to any bilateral agreement does not violate China’s 

obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol or under Article 3 of the 

Convention Against Torture; 

• allow international humanitarian organizations greater access to North Koreans in China, to 

address growing social problems, abuses, and exploitation experienced by this vulnerable 

population, and work with regional and European allies to articulate a consistent and clear 

message about China’s need to protect North Korean refugees; 

• allow greater numbers of North Korean migrants who desire resettlement to have safe haven and 

secure transit until they reach third countries; and grant legal residence to the North Korean 

spouses of Chinese citizens and their children. 

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VII. Recommendations for U.S. Congress 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• ensure that congressional oversight of U.S.-China human rights diplomacy is maintained by 

requiring the State Department to submit a regular public report (as is required on Vietnam) to the 

appropriate congressional committees detailing issues of concern discussed during the Strategic 

Dialogue and any future bilateral human rights dialogues, and describing progress made toward a 

series of “benchmarks” initiated by Congress; 

• authorize and appropriate the funds necessary to implement a comprehensive and integrated 

human rights strategy towards China, implemented at all levels of government and utilized in all 

bilateral and multilateral discussions, including creation of an inter-agency human rights strategy 

and efforts to coordinate human rights diplomacy with allies; and 

• ensure that the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2008 is fully implemented, including 

provisions to provide humanitarian support to asylum-seekers and remove legal obstacles to 

North Korea refugee resettlement in the United States. 

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Saudi Arabia

FINDINGS: Systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom continue in Saudi Arabia. 

Almost 10 years since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the Saudi government has failed 

to implement a number of promised reforms, including those related to religious practice and tolerance. 

Despite King Abdullah undertaking some limited reform measures and promoting inter-religious dialogue in 

international fora in recent years, the Saudi government persists in banning all forms of public religious 

expression other than that of the government’s own interpretation of one school of Sunni Islam and also 

interferes with private religious practice. Ismaili Muslims continue to suffer severe discrimination and abuse 

on account of their religious identity and there is an ongoing crackdown on Shi’a Muslim dissidents, which 

has resulted in numerous arrests and detentions. Members of the Commission to Promote Virtue and Prevent 

Vice (CPVPV or religious police) continue to commit abuses, overstep their authority with impunity, and are 

not subject to judicial oversight. Moreover, the government continues to be involved in supporting activities 

globally that promote an extremist ideology, and in some cases, violence toward non-Muslims and 

disfavored Muslims. 

USCIRF again recommends in 2010 that Saudi Arabia be designated as a “country of particular concern,” or 

CPC. Although so designated by the State Department since 2004, an indefinite waiver on taking any action 

in consequence of the CPC designation has been in place since 2006. 

Little discernible progress has been made nearly four years after the State Department publicly announced 

that, as a result of bilateral discussions, the Saudi government had confirmed that it would advance specific 

policies with the aim of improving religious freedom conditions. The Saudi government continues to engage 

in an array of severe violations of human rights as part of its repression of freedom of religion or belief. 

Abuses include: torture and cruel and degrading treatment or punishment imposed by judicial, security, and 

administrative authorities; prolonged detention without charges and often incommunicado; and blatant 

denials of the right to liberty and security of the person, including through coercive measures aimed at 

women and the broad jurisdiction and abusive actions of the CPVPV. The full implementation by the Saudi 

government of the July 2006 policies would diminish some of its institutionalized abusive practices that have 

resulted in severe violations of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief in Saudi Arabia and 

worldwide. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: USCIRF has concluded that U.S. policy in Saudi Arabia does not 

adequately prioritize issues of human rights, including freedom of religion or belief. The CPC designation 

and subsequent U.S.-Saudi bilateral discussions have not resulted in substantial reforms by the Saudi 

government concerning religious freedom. Therefore, the U.S. government should lift the indefinite waiver 

of action, or at a minimum extend a limited 180 day waiver, during which time the Saudi government should 

complete reforms on textbooks and rein in the CPVPV. In addition, Congress should fund USCIRF to 

conduct a study and report on progress by the Saudi government in implementing the religious freedom 

reforms announced by the State Department in July 2006 following bilateral discussions between the two 

countries. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy towards Saudi Arabia can be found at the end of this 

chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

State Coercion of Religious Conformity 

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia contains a diversity of peoples and religions, despite decades of Saudi 

government coercion of religious conformity. The Saudi government persists in severely restricting all 

forms of public religious expression, other than the government’s interpretation of its version of Sunni 

Islam. This policy violates the human rights of large, indigenous communities of Muslims from a variety 

of schools of Islam, including significant populations of Sunni Muslims who follow variant schools of 

thought, Shi’a Muslims, and Ismaili Muslims, as well as both Muslim and non-Muslim expatriate 

workers. The government enforces its tight controls by heavily restricting the religious activity it does 

permit—through limits on the building of mosques, the appointment of imams, the regulation of sermons 

and public celebrations, and the content of religious education in public schools—and suppresses the 

religious views of Saudi and non-Saudi Muslims who do not conform to official positions. In addition, 

the Saudi government continues its systematic practices of short-term detentions, without trial, of 

minority Muslims, particularly Shi’a Muslims, for religious observance not in accordance with the 

government’s interpretation of Islam. Such practices are intended to intimidate and harass these groups. 

Conservative Sunni Muslim clerics approved by the government continued to issue fatwas (religious 

edicts) and delivered sermons during the past year that justify committing violent acts against dissident 

Sunni Muslims, Shi’a Muslims, Jews, and Christians. In February 2010, a senior Sunni Muslim cleric, 

Sheikh Abdul-Rahman al-Barrak, issued a fatwa calling for the death of those who promote gender 

mixing at workplaces or educational institutions. In the past, Al-Barrak has issued fatwas denouncing 

Shi’a Muslims as infidels and calling for the death of two writers who questioned why Christians and 

Jews should be considered apostates. The State Department reports that inflammatory sermons have 

decreased in frequency since the Saudi government began encouraging moderation following a series of 

domestic terror attacks in 2003. Nevertheless, there were several instances in 2009 where mosque 

speakers prayed for the death of Jews and Christians. 

The Saudi government’s policy toward expatriate workers, particularly non-Muslim workers, reflects the 

view that they have come to Saudi Arabia only to work. As a result, the government curtails universal 

rights for non-Saudi visitors to the country and inhibits the enjoyment of human rights of expatriate 

workers coming for temporary employment, particularly for the two to three million non-Muslim 

workers, including Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and others. Restrictions are often included in labor 

contracts requiring expatriate workers to conform to Saudi religious customs and traditions, thereby 

forcing them to waive their inalienable human rights and submitting them to the limitations, and even 

human rights abuses, enforced by Saudi employers. 

Shi’a and Ismaili Muslims 

Shi’a Muslims—approximately 10-15 percent of the population most heavily concentrated in the Eastern 

Province—and members of indigenous Muslim communities who follow schools of thought other than 

that favored by the government are subject to government restrictions on public religious practices and 

official discrimination in numerous areas, particularly in government employment and education. There 

are no Shi’a ministers in the government, only five of the 150-member Shura (Consultative Council) are 

Shi’a Muslims, and there are very few Shi’a Muslim leaders in high-level government positions, 

particularly in the security agencies. 

Moreover, in recent years fatwas have been issued by conservative Sunni clerics that justify committing 

violent acts against Shi’a Muslims. Over the past year, the Shi’a community has expressed a desire to see 

more active government intervention when clerics issue such provocative edicts. Furthermore, in many 

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cases, application of criminal law includes harsher punishments for Shi’a and Ismaili Muslims. Since 

many Saudi judges consider Shi’a and Ismaili Muslims to be “non-believers,” they are frequently dealt 

with more severely by the courts. 

Over the past few years, Saudi authorities have carried out a series of short-term detentions of members of 

the Shi’a community, a pattern which continued in 2009-2010. Since early 2007, dozens of members, 

particularly prayer leaders, of the Shi’a community in the Eastern Province have been detained for up to 

30 days and then released for holding small religious gatherings in private homes. None have been 

charged with any crime, nor have Saudi authorities offered any explanation other than suggesting that the 

short-term detentions were punishment for holding private religious gatherings. For example, in March 

2010 three Shi’a religious leaders were detained for holding private religious services and allegedly for 

organizing an Ashura observance in December 2009 in Al Khobar in the Eastern Province. Reportedly, 

they each received a one month prison sentence. In addition, a number of Shi’a mosques were closed in 

the Eastern Province in the past year, including two in Al Khobar in August 2009 and two others in 

November. Authorities justified the closures by citing improper zoning and lack of mandated permits. 

According to press reports, in December 2009, the use of gravestones was officially banned in the Medina 

Governorate and all existing gravestones were removed. Marking gravestones is a Shi’a practice, 

whereas Sunni Muslims do not mark graves. 

In November 2009, Shi’a Muslim activist Munir Jassas was arrested allegedly after being warned by 

Saudi authorities to stop blogging on the Internet about the Saudi government’s poor treatment of Shi’a 

Muslims. Reportedly, he has spent at least four months in solitary confinement although no formal 

charges have been filed and currently he remains in prison. 

In February 2009, members of the CPVPV reportedly videotaped female Shi’a Muslim pilgrims in 

Medina visiting a cemetery containing the graves of revered Shi’a figures. Some of the Shi’a pilgrims 

demanded the videotape from the religious police, claiming that it infringed the women’s privacy and 

insulted their modesty. Saudi officials accused the Shi’a pilgrims of performing rituals offensive to other 

non-Shi’a pilgrims. Consequently, Shi’a pilgrims protested outside of CPVPV offices in Medina and 

nearly 20 were arrested, with some suffering injuries in the clashes; all were released after a week in 

detention. In March 2009, more than 40 Shi’a Muslims and 20 Sunni Muslims were arrested in Qatif, 

Safwa, and Awwamiya in the Eastern Province for “disturbing public order” in connection with protests 

related to the clashes described above in Medina. At least two dozen remained in prison until their release 

in early July. No charges were ever filed. Also in March 2009, a Shi’a cleric, Nimer Al-Nimer, publicly 

stated that Shi’a Muslims might one day secede from the country if authorities continue to discriminate 

against them. Saudi authorities issued an arrest warrant for the cleric, who remains in hiding. 

In May 2008, at least 22 Sunni Muslim clerics released a statement accusing the Shi’a community of 

destabilizing Muslim countries and humiliating Sunni Muslims. According to human rights groups, at 

least 11 of the signatories were government-appointed clerics. In response, a Shi’a cleric, Sheikh Tawfiq 

Al-Amer, in Al-Ahsa in the Eastern Province criticized the statement, and within days, was arrested by 

Saudi authorities. He was released only after spending a week in detention. In September 2008, Sheikh 

Al-Amer was arrested again, this time for performing prayers according to Shi’a practice. He was 

released after 11 days in detention. 

On a positive note, there have been some improvements for the Shi’a community in the Eastern Province, 

particularly regarding the public expression of religious practice. Members of the Shi’a community in 

Qatif, where they represent the majority of the population, have held large public gatherings since 2007 in 

observance of Ashura without government interference. However, authorities continue to prohibit 

observance in other areas of the Eastern Province, such as in Al-Ahsa and Dammam. While there has 

been increased dialogue between the Shi’a community and the Saudi government, there is limited 

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progress on a number of practical issues, such as the ability to teach Shi’a beliefs to Shi’a children in 

schools and the inability to re-open mosques and hussainiyas (Shi’a community centers) in Al-Ahsa and 

Dammam that have long been closed by the government. 

Ismaili Muslims, a Shi’a sect numbering some 700,000 in Saudi Arabia, continue to suffer severe 

discrimination and abuse by Saudi authorities, particularly in religious practice, government employment, 

the justice system, and education. Unlike support for other Muslim houses of worship, the government 

does not finance the building of mosques for Ismailis and has closed down several Ismaili places of 

worship in recent years. In 2000, after members of the CPVPV raided and closed down an Ismaili 

mosque in the Najran region, approximately 100 Ismailis, including clerics, were arrested. Many were 

released after serving reduced sentences, but dozens remained in prison for several years. In August 

2009, King Abdullah ordered the early release of the last group of 17 Ismailis associated with the Najran 

incident after they served more than nine years of a 10 year sentence. 

Another Ismaili Muslim, Hadi Al-Mutif, remains in prison after originally being sentenced to death for 

apostasy in 1994 for an offhand remark made as a teenager that was deemed blasphemous. In 1996, he 

was convicted and originally sentenced to death for apostasy, despite the fact that he remains a Muslim. 

Lawyers and experts familiar with the case have said that the judge was biased against Ismaili Muslims 

and that Al-Mutif’s trial was neither fair nor transparent. Al-Mutif has alleged physical abuse and 

mistreatment during his 16 years of incarceration. In September 2009, Al-Mutif received an additional 

five-year prison for criticizing the government’s justice system and human rights record on a tape that 

was smuggled out of prison and later broadcast. During a 2007 visit to Saudi Arabia, USCIRF was told 

by high-level Saudi government officials that Al-Mutif’s case would be resolved soon. Nearly three years 

after those assurances, Al-Mutif remains in prison, much of the time in solitary confinement. Al-Mutif 

has attempted to commit suicide, and his psychological and physical health remain a serious concern. 

In May 2008, Ahmad Turki al-Saab, an Ismaili activist, was detained in Riyadh after he was summoned 

from Najran to the capital for organizing a petition campaign demanding the removal from office of 

Najran’s governor, Prince Mishaal bin Saud, for alleged discrimination against Ismaili Muslims. After 18 

months in detention, al-Saab was released in September 2009. In November 2008, King Abdullah issued 

a royal decree relieving Prince Mishaal of his post as governor of Najran; a subsequent statement issued 

by the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC said Prince Mishaal himself requested to be relieved of the 

post. In March 2009, King Abdullah appointed his son, Prince Mashaal bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz AlSaud, as the new governor of Najran. 

Other Dissident Muslims 

The Saudi government uses criminal charges of apostasy, blasphemy, and criticizing the nature of the 

regime to suppress discussion and debate and to silence dissidents. Promoters of political and human 

rights reforms, as well as those seeking to debate the appropriate role of religion in relation to the state, its 

laws, and society, are typically the target of such charges. In January 2009, authorities arrested Hamoud 

Saleh Al-Amri, a Saudi blogger who described his conversion from Islam to Christianity on his Web site; 

he was released in March, after more than two months in prison, on condition that he not leave the 

country or speak to the media. After his conviction in 2007, a Turkish barber, Sabri Bogday, was 

sentenced to death for blasphemy in March 2008; in May, an appellate court upheld his conviction. In 

January 2009, after more than two years in prison, the barber was pardoned by King Abdullah after he 

allegedly repented. Bogday returned to Turkey upon his release. 

In May 2008, Saudi writer and blogger Ra’if Badawi was charged by a Saudi court with “setting up an 

electronic site that insults Islam” after it became known that he had set up a website to document abuses 

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by the CPVPV and discuss the Saudi government interpretation of Islam. Facing a potentially lengthy 

prison sentence and fine, Badawi fled the country. 

Several Sunni Muslims remain in prison on alleged sorcery charges. Historically, spurious charges of 

“sorcery” and “witchcraft” have been used by Saudi authorities against Muslims who do not adhere to the 

government’s interpretation of Islam. A lower court in Medina sentenced Ali Sabat, a Lebanese citizen, 

to death in November 2009 for practicing witchcraft. He was arrested by the CPVPV in May 2008 while 

visiting the country on pilgrimage. The charge was based on a Lebanese satellite television program, in 

which Sabat offered advice about general life questions as well as forecasts and predictions of the future. 

Sabat remains on death row. In October 2008, an appeals court confirmed the conviction of a Sudanese 

woman, who was charged with practicing sorcery and sentenced to three years in prison, 1500 lashes, and 

deportation. 

In addition, over the past few years, members of the Sufi and Ahmadi Muslim communities have been 

harassed, arrested, and detained because of their non-conforming religious views, but no such incidents 

were reported in the past year. 

Women’s Rights 

The government’s monopoly on the interpretation of Islam and its violations of freedom of religion 

adversely affect the human rights of women in Saudi Arabia, including freedom of speech, movement, 

association, and religion, freedom from coercion, access to education, and full equality before the law. 

Over the past few years, there has been some increase in public space to discuss human rights practices 

affecting women. Nevertheless, the Saudi government has continued discriminatory measures that violate 

women’s human rights. For example, women seeking medical care, whether emergency or not, may be 

admitted to a hospital for medical treatment only with the consent of a male relative. When appearing in 

public women must adhere to a strict dress code. Women require written permission from a male relative 

to travel inside or outside the country and are not permitted to drive motor vehicles. In addition, the 

Saudi justice system, in which courts apply Islamic law to the cases before them, does not grant a woman 

legal status equal to that of a man. Testimony by a woman is equivalent to one-half the testimony of a 

man; daughters receive half the inheritance that their brothers receive; and women have to demonstrate 

legally specified grounds for divorce, while men may divorce without giving cause. 

In February 2008, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Yakin Ertürk, undertook a 

formal visit to Saudi Arabia and offered several observations and recommendations. Among them, the 

Special Rapporteur found that while there has been a “demystification of the taboo around violence 

against women” in recent years, there still exist “practices surrounding divorce and child custody, the 

absence of a law criminalizing violence against women and inconsistencies in the application of laws and 

procedures” that “continue to prevent many women from escaping abusive environments.” She urged the 

Saudi government to develop “a legal framework based on international human rights standards,” 

including a law criminalizing violence against women and a family law on marriage and divorce. 

 Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur found that members of the CPVPV were “responsible for serious 

human rights abuses in harassing, threatening and arresting women who ‘deviate from accepted norms,’” 

and she also highlighted the situation facing female migrant domestic workers who continue to suffer 

serious human rights abuses.

State Harassment of Private Worship and Restrictions on Religious Materials 

Non-Muslims are not permitted to be citizens of Saudi Arabia and no places of worship other than 

mosques are permitted in the country. In addition, the Saudi government enforces and limits public 

worship to its sanctioned version of Sunni Islam. 

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For years, Saudi officials have argued that it is impossible to have places of worship other than mosques 

in the Kingdom because Saudi Arabia is home to Islam’s two holiest sites: Mecca and Medina. 

Moreover, government officials point to a hadith (oral tradition) from the Prophet Muhammad which says 

that only Islam can exist on the Arabian Peninsula, although other Islamic experts contend that this hadith

is subject to differing interpretations. Qatar, another country on the Arabian Peninsula that shares the 

same religious ideology as Saudi Arabia, permits non-Muslim public places of worship. Nevertheless, 

some Saudi officials continue to assert that having non-Muslim places of worship on Saudi soil would be 

equivalent to building mosques on Vatican property in Italy. In previous meetings with Saudi officials, 

the Commission drew a distinction between a geographic entity in Italy of two square miles with 800-900 

residents versus a country the size of Saudi Arabia with between two and three million non-Muslim 

residents. 

In 2009, Saudi officials reiterated the government position that non-Muslim expatriate workers are 

permitted to worship in private. However, guidelines as to what constitutes “private” worship remain 

unclear and vague. The Saudi government has said that as long as non-Muslims practice their religion in 

small groups in private homes, no security entity would interfere, since there is no law that prohibits nonMuslims from practicing in this manner. 

Nevertheless, the Saudi government continues in practice to violate its public position about permitting 

private worship. There continue to be instances in which members of the CPVPV have entered and 

raided private homes where non-Muslim expatriate workers were worshipping, although the number of 

such incidents reportedly decreased over the past year. Expatriate workers from the Philippines, India, 

Pakistan, and several African countries continue to be subject to surveillance and raids by Saudi 

authorities, despite the fact that CPVPV members technically are not permitted to conduct such 

surveillance. In fact, representatives of non-Muslim communities continue to assert that, in practice, 

religious freedom simply does not exist in the Kingdom. In the Nejd region in the central part of the 

country, private religious services continue to be surveilled and, in some cases, raided by Saudi 

authorities. Conditions for private worship are better in the Eastern Province than elsewhere in the 

country. 

Other than at a few compounds populated by foreign workers, where private worship is allowed to take 

place, expatriate workers continue to fear government interference with their private worship. This 

interference can occur for many reasons, such as if the worship service is too loud, has too many people 

in attendance, or occurs too often in the same place. Furthermore, Saudi officials do not accept that for 

members of some religious groups, the practice of religion requires more than an individual or a small 

group worshipping in private, but includes the need for religious leaders to conduct services in 

community with others. Foreign religious leaders continue to be prohibited from seeking and obtaining 

visas to enter Saudi Arabia and minister to local religious communities. 

During the past year, a number of people were detained for non-public, non-Muslim worship. Several 

cases involving non-Muslim detentions were not publicized in order to secure releases, largely as a result 

of U.S. government intervention. In March 2009, three Indian Christians were detained after their private 

religious gathering in the Eastern Province was raided by members of the CPVPV. Members of the 

CPVPV allegedly confiscated religious materials. The three were released within days. In January 2009, 

Yemane Gebriel, an Eritrean pastor, fled the country to an unknown location after multiple threats from 

the CPVPV. For 10 years, Gebriel led an underground church of more than 300 foreign-born Christians. 

In 2008, Saudi officials made several attempts to deport Gebriel and other church members, but each time 

higher authorities intervened to rescind the orders. In May 2008, government officials arrested 14 Indian 

Christians in the Qassim Province for conducting their religious worship in private. During the raid, a 

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CPVPV member reportedly beat the pastor, and Christian songbooks and Bibles were confiscated. All 

detainees were released after less than 24 hours in custody. 

On a positive note, there has been a decrease in recent years in the practice by customs officials of 

confiscating personal religious materials when expatriate workers or visitors enter the Kingdom. Also, in 

recent years senior Saudi government officials, including King Abdullah and the Grand Mufti, have made 

statements with the reported aim of improving the climate of tolerance toward other religions; both also 

continued publicly to call for moderation. In 2009, press reports confirmed that representatives of the 

Vatican were in negotiations with the Saudi government about building the first church in Saudi Arabia; 

the outcome of these discussions is presently unknown. 

Abuses by the Religious Police 

Restrictions on public religious practice by both Saudis and non-Saudis are officially enforced in large 

part by the CPVPV, a government entity that includes a force of approximately 5,000 field officers and 

10,000 employees in over 500 offices throughout the country. There are also hundreds of “unofficial” 

volunteers who take it upon themselves to carry out the work of the CPVPV. Saudi government officials 

claim it is the latter group, who are untrained and often over-zealous, who commit the most egregious 

violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. The CPVPV, which reports to 

the King, is tasked with enforcing public morality based on the Saudi government’s interpretation of 

Islamic law. Members of the CPVPV patrol the streets enforcing dress codes, maintaining the strict 

separation of men and women, and ensuring that restaurants and shops are closed during daily prayers. 

Members and volunteers of the CPVPV regularly overstep authority with impunity and are not subject to 

judicial review. Despite the fact that the CPVPV is not allowed to engage in surveillance, detain 

individuals for more than 24 hours, arrest individuals without police accompaniment, or carry out any 

kind of punishment, its members have been accused in recent years of killing, beating, whipping, 

detaining, and otherwise harassing individuals. Saudi government officials claim to have dismissed 

and/or disciplined members of the CPVPV for abuses of power, although reports of abuse persist and no 

details have been provided demonstrating that CPVPV members are, in fact, held accountable for abusive 

conduct. 

In June 2008, Saudi human rights lawyer Abdel Rahman al-Lahem appealed a Riyadh court’s acquittal of 

two members of the CPVPV in the beating death of Salman al-Huraisi, who was detained for possessing 

and selling alcohol in May 2007. The appeal is ongoing. In July 2007, the General Investigation and 

Prosecution Authority in the northern town of Tabuk cleared members of the CPVPV of any wrongdoing 

in the June 2007 case of Ahmad al-Bulaiwi, who died in CPVPV custody after officers arrested him on 

suspicion of being in “illegal seclusion” with an unrelated woman. It was later established that al-Bulaiwi 

was a part-time driver for the woman’s family. An autopsy revealed he had been beaten. 

Over the past few years, CPVPV abuses were the subject of numerous articles in the Arabic and English 

press, garnering unprecedented attention by the public and in international media. Numerous cases have 

gone to trial or are proceeding to trial, including alleged beatings and deaths of Saudi citizens. The 

number of investigations of abuses has increased, yet in the recent cases that have been prosecuted, 

CPVPV members have not been held accountable and complainants report summary dismissals of cases 

without due process. 

 

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Intolerant References in Educational Materials and Textbooks 

The State Department’s 2009 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom stated that during the 

past year, Saudi “textbooks continued to contain some overtly intolerant statements against Jews and 

Christians and subtly intolerant statements against Shi’a and other religious groups, notwithstanding 

Government efforts to review educational materials to remove or revise such statements.” According to 

the State Department’s 2009 human rights report released in March 2010, despite the government’s 

efforts to remove intolerant and extreme language from these books, “prejudiced concepts and 

expressions remained.” A January 26, 2010 op-ed by USCIRF Commissioners Talal Eid and Nina Shea 

in the Huffington Post highlighted the fact that textbooks posted on the Saudi Ministry of Education’s 

website11 continue to teach hatred toward other religions and, in some cases, promote violence. 

Furthermore, a 2009 study by a Saudi academic found that Saudi textbooks not only teach hatred and 

intolerance of non-Muslims, but also promote the “spread of hatred between Muslims.”12

In July 2006, the State Department stated that the Saudi government had confirmed that it planned to 

“revise and update textbooks to remove remaining intolerant references that disparage Muslims or nonMuslims or that promote hatred toward other religions or religious groups, a process the Saudi 

government expects to complete in one to two years [by July 2008].” According to the State 

Department’s 2009 human rights report, the Saudi government started in 2007 a multi-year project “to 

revise textbooks, curricula, and teaching methods to promote tolerance and remove content disparaging 

religions other than Islam.” As of December 2009, more than 83 school districts in 27 different regions 

and provinces had participated in the project. The goal of the project is to supplement the religious 

curriculum with knowledge-based subjects. Nevertheless, there continues to be very little transparency 

regarding the textbook revision process, curriculum reform, and teacher training efforts. 

During and after its visit to Saudi Arabia in 2007, USCIRF requested copies of Ministry of Education 

textbooks, which to date have not been provided. A July 2007 letter to USCIRF from the Saudi Human 

Rights Commission stated that textbooks currently were being reviewed and copies would be sent to 

USCIRF upon completion, although no completion date was given. Despite the promise of several 

officials to send the books to USCIRF’s office in Washington, DC and additional written requests by 

USCIRF, as of this writing nothing has been received. 

The Dissemination of Extremist Ideology and Intolerant Literature in Saudi Arabia and its Exportation 

around the World 

There continue to be reports that funding originating in Saudi Arabia has been used globally to finance 

religious schools, mosques, hate literature, and other activities that support religious intolerance and, in 

some cases, violence toward non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. In recent years, reports continue to 

surface about Saudi funding of intolerance in the Middle East, parts of Africa, South, Central and 

Southeast Asia, and parts of Western and Eastern Europe, including the Balkans. 

Over the past few years, the Saudi government has undertaken some measures to combat extremism 

inside the country, such as a rehabilitation program for convicted extremists and terrorists as well as 

retraining and/or dismissing imams and school teachers known to espouse extremist views. According to 

an October 2009 assessment by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, as part of the prevention 

program’s “mindset” component the Saudi government is distributing to its public millions of pamphlets, 

tracts, messages and ads of religious opinions condemning terror, and warning against the hijacking of 

airplanes, bombings and assassinations. Significantly, many of these initiatives, implemented through the 

 

11 See http://www2.moe.gov.sa/ebooks/index.htm. 12 See http://www.slate.com/id/2226874/entry/2226875/. 

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Saudi Interior Ministry’s guidance department, are designed to confront extremism through the 

propagation of a “more judicious interpretation of religious doctrine.”13 Examples include the dropping 

of the takfir doctrine, accusing another Muslim of being an apostate to justify his murder, and the 

insistence on strict jurisprudence of recognized authorities. However, these efforts appear to be designed 

to address security concerns rather than to implement reforms to protect human rights, including religious 

freedom. 

In 2009, the State Department reported that the Saudi government continued to screen and monitor 

prospective and current teachers who espoused extremist religious views. However, there were reports of 

teachers who, in defiance of government policy, promoted intolerant views in the classroom and did not 

face disciplinary measures as pledged in the July 2006 set of policies. The government also continued to 

screen and monitor government-paid clerics in mosques throughout the country, although a number of 

some public officials and clerics made discriminatory and intolerant statements. 

During the past year, there were continued reports, including from the State Department, of virulently 

anti-Semitic and anti-Christian sentiments expressed in the official media and in sermons delivered by 

clerics, who in some cases continue to pray for the death of Jews and Christians, despite having been 

disciplined for preaching extremist views. 

In 2008, the Saudi government announced that the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the King Abdulaziz 

National Center for Dialogue would carry out the retraining of 40,000 additional Muslim clerics in the 

Kingdom as part of a program to promote tolerance and moderation in Saudi society. Imams are 

reportedly provided special training that exposes them to more moderate views. According to the Saudi 

government, teachers, imams, or professors who promote hatred and intolerance are dismissed, although 

such assertions of government dismissals have not been supported by any statistics or details. 

Islamic Affairs sections in Saudi embassies worldwide reportedly have been responsible for both 

distributing extremist and intolerant materials and providing diplomatic status to Muslim, even nonSaudi, clerics. According to the Saudi government, these sections have been closed temporarily due to 

such reports. Their current status is unknown. 

Empowerment of Officially Sanctioned Human Rights Institutions 

In September 2005, the Council of Ministers, chaired by King Abdullah, approved the establishment of a 

government-appointed, 24-member Human Rights Commission (HRC) that reports directly to the King. 

The membership of the HRC was not finalized until early 2007 and does not include any women, 

although in March 2008, the HRC’s then-Chair, Turki Al Sudairy, announced that a new royal decree 

would allow women to be members. In September, the HRC announced the formation of a women’s 

branch to look into human rights abuses against women and children. In February 2009, former Shura 

Council member Bandar Al Aiban was appointed by royal decree as the new chair. The HRC is 

mandated to “protect and promote human rights in conformity with international human rights standards 

in all fields, to propagate awareness thereof, and to help ensure their application in a manner consistent 

with the provisions of the Islamic Sharia.” In March 2010, the HRC announced it had received more than 

4,700 complaints during the past year, 24 per cent of which were domestic violence cases. The HRC 

continues to engage the Saudi government on a variety of human rights concerns, although evidence of 

specific actions on religious freedom issues has been limited. 

 

13 See USCIRF January 26, 2010 op-ed at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/imam-talal-eid/saudi-governmentextremis_b_436786.html. 

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In March 2004, the Saudi government approved the formation of a National Society for Human Rights 

(NSHR), the country’s first and only independent, legally recognized human rights body. The NSHR is 

comprised of 41 members, including 10 women, and is chaired by a member of Saudi Arabia’s 

Consultative Council, or Shura, a 150-member advisory body. The NSHR, which was originally 

endowed by King Fahd, submits its reports and recommendations directly to King Abdullah. At times 

throughout the year, the NSHR publicly criticized alleged human rights violations committed by the 

Saudi government. The NSHR released its second annual report in March 2009, detailing abuses in the 

Kingdom on most international human rights issues and offering numerous recommendations for the 

Saudi government. While the report praised the government for taking some positive steps in protecting 

human rights, the NSHR criticized the manner in which the CPVPV operates and the slow pace of judicial 

reforms, and highlighted wide-ranging restrictions on the rights of women.

Other Developments Internationally and in the Kingdom 

In February 2009, at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Saudi Arabia at the UN Human Rights 

Council (UNHRC), there were a number of recommendations from countries related to freedom of 

religion or belief that the Saudi government agreed to follow up and respond to at the UNHRC’s June 

2009 session. At the June meeting, Saudi Arabia agreed to accept most of the recommendations 

contained in the final report. In its response, the Saudi government stated that non-Muslims in the 

Kingdom have a “fully guaranteed” right to private worship which “in no way detracts from the freedom 

of religion of non-Muslims in the Kingdom, nor does it indicate any lack of respect for other Faiths,” and 

that “no one has the right to interfere in their individual religious observances or compel them to renounce 

their beliefs.” However, these assertions are contrary to the facts on the ground, as discussed above. In 

addition, requests from five UN human rights special rapporteurs or working groups for in-country visits 

have not been answered since 2005. 

In July 2008, King Abdullah hosted an interfaith conference in Madrid, Spain which included 

representatives from Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Hindu and other faith communities. In November of that 

year, the UN General Assembly hosted a special session on interfaith dialogue, an event initiated by King 

Abdullah as a follow-up to the Madrid conference. A USCIRF op-ed by Commissioners Don Argue and 

Leonard Leo was published on November 12, 2008 in the Christian Science Monitor outlining the 

Commission’s concerns about the two-day session. A proposed Saudi resolution included language 

condemning the “mocking of religious symbols;” however, several European countries rejected the text, 

citing infringement on freedom of speech. The final declaration included no mention of defamation of 

religions or religious symbols. The most recent international conference on interfaith dialogue initiated 

by King Abdullah occurred in Geneva in October 2009. 

The text of the final declaration is noteworthy for other reasons. The text noted that the General 

Assembly meeting was convened at the initiative of King Abdullah. The declaration next stated, inter 

alia, that, “[t]he meeting reaffirmed the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United 

Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. The meeting further “recalled that all States 

have pledged themselves under the Charter to promote respect for human rights and fundamental 

freedoms for all, including freedoms of belief and expression, without distinction as to race, sex, language 

or religion.” The affiliation of King Abdullah to the declaration and its references to the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the “freedoms of belief and expression” are significant, as 

Saudi Arabia abstained during the vote on the UDHR in 1948. The explicit linkage of religious freedom 

and freedom of expression to the UN Charter’s language on human rights and fundamental freedoms, all 

under the name of King Abdullah, more directly ties the Kingdom to the international human rights 

framework. Saudi Arabia has affirmed the UDHR previously in other UN resolutions, instruments, and 

conferences. However, doing so explicitly at a conference focused on religion is noteworthy. 

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According to the State Department, as of December 2009, the King Abdulaziz Center for National 

Dialogue conducted nearly 2,700 training programs in which more than 150,000 people were trained to 

increase tolerance and encourage moderation and understanding. 

In February 2009, King Abdullah announced several changes among senior government officials. Among 

the King’s new appointments are a new head of the CPVPV, a new Minister of Education, a new Minister 

of Justice, a new head of the Supreme Judicial Council, and a new deputy minister for women’s 

education, the first woman in this post. Some observers have suggested that several of the appointees are 

known to be reform-minded, replacing some of the more conservative members among senior 

government leadership. To date, there has not been any clear indication that the new appointees have 

helped dismantle Saudi government policies that negatively impact religious freedom conditions in the 

country. 

U.S. Policy 

U.S.-Saudi relations remain close despite strains following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United 

States when it became known that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals. Nevertheless, U.S. efforts 

to encourage political reform and the protection of human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, 

in Saudi Arabia continue to face significant obstacles. Many experts agree that Saudi leaders seek to 

preserve their political authority by maintaining their legitimacy among the conservative religious 

establishment. For years, the U.S. government’s reliance on the Saudi government for cooperation on 

counterterrorism, regional security, and energy supplies has limited the U.S. government’s ability to press 

for more significant improvement in the Saudi government’s poor human rights record. 

The United States-Saudi Arabia Strategic Dialogue, inaugurated in November 2005, has constituted a 

high-level institutionalized forum for coordinating U.S. and Saudi interests. The Strategic Dialogue 

consists of six working groups focusing on human development, economy, energy, consular affairs, 

military cooperation, and counterterrorism. The Strategic Dialogue working groups have met periodically 

to address issues, including human rights and religious freedom, although substantial human rights 

improvements in the Kingdom have not resulted. 

According to the State Department’s 2009 Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report, the U.S. 

government works with government and civil society leaders “to encourage reforms that counter 

extremism and facilitate the development of a stable, responsive, transparent, and accountable state that 

embodies international human rights standards and welcomes civic participation in the political process.” 

According to the report, the U.S. government regularly raises religious freedom issues with senior 

government officials and encourages them to protect private religious worship, eliminate discrimination 

against religious minority communities, and promote tolerance towards non-Muslims and those Muslims 

who do not adhere to the government’s interpretation of Sunni Islam. The U.S. government supports 

King Abdullah’s interfaith and intercultural initiative to promote religious dialogue and tolerance and 

continues to encourage the government’s efforts to revise and update its textbooks and remove intolerant 

passages advocating violence. Several exchange programs and U.S. speaker programs promote religious 

tolerance and interfaith understanding.

Since 2000, USCIRF has recommended that Saudi Arabia be designated by the Secretary of State as a 

CPC for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of the right to freedom of religion or 

belief. In September 2004, the State Department followed the Commission’s recommendation and 

designated Saudi Arabia a CPC for the first time. In 2005, a temporary waiver was put in place, in lieu of 

any action as a consequence of CPC designation, to allow for continued diplomatic discussions between 

the U.S. and Saudi governments and “to further the purposes of the International Religious Freedom Act” 

(IRFA). In July 2006, the waiver was left in place when the State Department announced that ongoing 

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bilateral discussions with Saudi Arabia had enabled the U.S. government to identify and confirm a 

number of policies that the Saudi government “is pursuing and will continue to pursue for the purpose of 

promoting greater freedom for religious practice and increased tolerance for religious groups.” In January 

2009, the State Department re-designated Saudi Arabia a CPC but kept in place a waiver of any action to 

“further the purposes” of IRFA. 

Notwithstanding the CPC designation, many observers contend that, even now, the United States does not 

want to jeopardize important bilateral security and economic ties by pushing for political and human 

rights reforms. USCIRF continues to conclude that the CPC designation and subsequent U.S.-Saudi 

bilateral discussions have not resulted in the Saudi government making substantial reforms concerning 

religious freedom. In fact, the State Department’s policy has been to address reform issues with the 

Saudis privately and not make public findings that would demonstrate inadequate progress by the Saudi 

government. USCIRF urges the U.S. government more actively and publicly to address religious freedom 

and other human rights issues with the Saudi government and report openly on the success or failure to 

implement genuine reforms in these areas, in order to ensure that initiatives by the Saudi government will 

result in substantial, demonstrable progress. Specific recommendations are presented below. 

USCIRF Activities 

Over the past year, Saudi Arabia has been a high priority in the Commission’s work. USCIRF has spoken 

out numerous times about religious freedom concerns in Saudi Arabia, raising these issues with U.S. and 

Saudi officials as well as in the public sphere. In March 2010, USCIRF urged King Abdullah to release 

Hadi Al-Mutif, an Ismaili Shi’a Muslim who has been in prison for more than 16 years. On January 26, 

2010, USCIRF published an op-ed in the Huffington Post by Commissioners Talal Eid and Nina Shea on 

Saudi exportation of extremist ideology and ongoing concerns about intolerance in Saudi textbooks. In 

November 2009, USCIRF was briefed by the Director of International Affairs and Trade at the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) about a recently released report focusing on countering Saudi 

financing of terrorism. GAO representatives discussed findings about the Saudi rehabilitation program 

and the efforts to combat extremist ideology within Saudi Arabia. In September, Commissioners met with 

the new U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James Smith, to discuss ongoing religious freedom issues in 

the Kingdom. In May, USCIRF urged President Obama to raise concerns about religious freedom and 

related human rights during his meetings with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Mubarak of 

Egypt. With regard to Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s worst abusers of religious freedom, USCIRF 

urged the President to request that King Abdullah spearhead Saudi government efforts to halt the 

exportation of extremist ideology. 

In February 2009, the Commission urged Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to direct U.S. representatives 

to ask tough and incisive questions about religious freedom and related human rights violations in Saudi 

Arabia at the UN Human Rights Council’s UPR of that country. In November 2008, an op-ed by 

Commissioners Don Argue and Leonard Leo was published in the Christian Science Monitor outlining 

the Commission’s concerns about the Saudi-sponsored two-day session on interfaith dialogue at the UN 

General Assembly. Also in November, the Commission wrote a private letter to then-President Bush 

urging him to raise some specific religious prisoner cases with Saudi King Abdullah at their meeting at 

the UN General Assembly event. 

In addition, during the past year USCIRF met with members of non-governmental organizations 

representing various religious communities in Saudi Arabia, as well as Saudi experts, human rights 

groups, and policymakers. USCIRF also met with religious leaders and educators from Saudi Arabia as 

part of the State Department’s International Visitors Program. 

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Recommendations 

I. Strengthening U.S. Human Rights Diplomacy as Part of the Bilateral Relationship 

The U.S. government should: 

• continue to designate Saudi Arabia a CPC for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief; 

• lift the waiver, in place since 2005, or at a minimum extend a temporary 180-day waiver, as a 

consequence of CPC designation, during which time the Saudi government should complete the 

following religious freedom reforms agreed to in the July 2006 confirmed policies: 

--revise and update textbooks to remove remaining intolerant references that disparage Muslims or 

non-Muslims or that promote hatred toward other religions or religious groups; 

--ensure that members of the CPVPV, or religious police, do not detain or conduct investigations of 

suspects, implement punishment, violate the sanctity of private homes, conduct surveillance, or 

confiscate private religious materials; 

• at the highest levels, call for the release of Hadi Al-Mutif, Munir Jassas, Ali Sabat, and other religious 

prisoners, including Shi’a and Ismaili Muslims, who have been convicted and remain in prison on 

charges of apostasy, blasphemy, sorcery, or criticizing the government; 

• press the Saudi government to address incitement to violence and discrimination against disfavored 

Muslims and non-Muslims by: 

--prosecuting government-funded clerics and other officials who incite violence against Muslim 

minority communities or individual members of non-Muslim religious minority communities; 

--dismissing or disciplining government-funded clerics who espouse intolerance; 

--publicly and officially refuting incitement to violence and discrimination by clerics, government 

officials, and the government-controlled media against Muslim minority communities, such as Shi’a 

and Ismaili Muslims, and members of non-Muslim religious minorities; 

--rescinding fatwas issued by government-funded clerics that are discriminatory toward or incite 

violence against Muslim minority communities or non-Muslim religious minority communities; 

• report to Congress, as part of the reporting required under H.R. 1, Section 2043 (c) (1(b)) 

(“Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007”), on progress by the Saudi 

government to implement the July 2006 previously identified and confirmed policies related to 

religious practice and tolerance; a description of such progress should include Saudi government 

transparency and any benchmarks and timetables established for implementation of the July 2006 

confirmed policies; 

• expand the religious educators program—which brings Saudi religious leaders and scholars to the 

United States through a three-week International Visitor Program to learn about religious freedom in 

the United States—to include visits to Saudi Arabia by appropriate American leaders and educators, 

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and increase the numbers and diversity and range of experience of visitors to both countries; 

• address the work of the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and National Society for Human Rights 

(NSHR) by: 

--urging the Saudi government to ensure that all government agencies cooperate fully with the HRC 

and the NSHR, including by publishing the decree requiring cooperation and abiding by it, 

including penalties for failure to cooperate; 

--urging the HRC to study the situation of freedom of religion or belief in the Kingdom, based on 

universal human rights standards, and report its findings publicly; 

--urging the Saudi government to implement recommendations from the NSHR’s May 2007 and 

March 2009 reports, which, if implemented, could be a welcome initial step towards improving 

overall human rights compliance in the Kingdom; and 

• press Saudi Arabia to uphold the human rights norms found in the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights, especially the freedoms of religion and expression, which Saudi Arabia affirmed, inter alia, in 

the declaration of the high-level meeting on the Promotion of Inter-Religious and Inter-Cultural 

Dialogue, Understanding and Cooperation for Peace in November 2008. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• appropriate funds for USCIRF to conduct a study and report on progress by the Saudi government to 

implement the religious freedom reforms announced by the State Department in July 2006 following 

bilateral discussions between the two countries. 

 

II. Addressing Publicly the Exportation of Extremist Ideology and Intolerance in Education 

 Materials in Saudi Arabia and around the World 

Given that official Saudi school textbooks continue to include language encouraging hatred and violence 

that adversely affects the interests of the United States and that the Saudi government, despite repeated 

requests over a period of several years, has failed to make its current textbooks available to support its 

claims that such language has been eliminated, the U.S. government should: 

• undertake and make public an assessment of the Ministry of Education textbooks used during the 

current school year in Saudi Arabia to determine if they have been revised to remove passages that 

teach religious intolerance or hatred, which the Saudi government confirmed in July 2006 that it 

would do within one to two years; 

• request that the Saudi government: 

--make publicly available teacher training manuals used in state primary and secondary schools 

inside the country; 

--provide an accounting of what kinds of Saudi official support have been and continue to be 

provided to which religious schools, mosques, centers of learning, and other religious organizations 

globally, including in the United States; 

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--make public the content of educational and other materials sent abroad to demonstrate whether 

such activities promote hatred, intolerance, or justify or encourage other human rights violations; 

--establish a transparent public effort to monitor, regulate, and report publicly about the activities of 

Saudi charitable organizations based outside Saudi Arabia in countries throughout the world; 

--cease granting diplomatic status to Islamic clerics and educators teaching outside Saudi Arabia; 

--ensure that Islamic affairs sections in Saudi embassies throughout the world remain closed 

indefinitely in accordance with past promises; 

• report publicly to Congress on all the above areas as part of the reporting on progress of Saudi 

government implementation of the July 2006 confirmation of policies, referred to in the 

recommendation above; and 

y communicate and share information with other concerned governments related to Saudi exportation 

of hate literature and extremist ideology. 

III. Pressing for Immediate Improvements in Other Areas Related to Freedom of Religion or 

 Belief 

The U.S. government should continue to advance adherence to international human rights standards, 

including the freedom of everyone to “manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 

teaching” and prohibit coercion in matters of religion or belief. The Saudi government’s persistence in 

severely restricting all forms of public religious expression other than the government’s interpretation and 

enforcement of its version of Sunni Islam is a violation of the freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief. As initial steps, the U.S. government should press for immediate improvements in 

respect for religious freedom, including by urging the Saudi government to: 

• comply with the recommendations from the UN Human Rights Council’s February 2009 UPR, 

including those related to freedom of religion or belief; 

• establish genuine safeguards for the freedom to worship in accordance with international 

standards; 

• end state prosecution of individuals charged with apostasy, blasphemy, sorcery, and criticism of 

the government; 

• dissolve the CPVPV and entrust law enforcement to professionals in law enforcement agencies 

with a precise jurisdiction and subject to judicial review, and immediately ensure that members of 

the CPVPV are held accountable and prosecuted for abuses; conduct prompt and independent 

investigations into reported abuses; ensure complainants due process and other rights under 

international law, including the right to challenge the lawfulness of his/her detention and be 

released if it is not lawful; and provide the right to a remedy, including an enforceable right to 

compensation; 

• allow foreign clergy to enter the country to carry out worship services; 

 

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• review cases and release those who have been detained or imprisoned for violations of human 

rights including their religious belief or practices; 

• permit independent non-governmental organizations to monitor, promote, and protect human 

rights; 

• invite the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to conduct a visit to Saudi 

Arabia in accordance with the standard terms for such a UN visit; 

• ratify international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, and cooperate with UN human rights mechanisms; and 

• implement the recommendations made in Section II (“Addressing Exportation of Extremist 

Ideology and Intolerance in Education Materials in Saudi Arabia and around the World”).
Countries of Particular Concern 

Sudan 

FINDINGS: Systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of freedom of religion or belief 

continue to occur in Sudan. Violations include: the efforts by the Arab Muslim-dominated 

government in Khartoum to impose sharia on Muslims and non-Muslims alike; governmental 

promotion of Sudan’s identity as being Arab and Muslim, thus effectively relegating non-Arabs 

and non-Muslims to a secondary status in the society; the criminalization of conversion from 

Islam, a crime punishable by death, and the intense scrutiny, intimidation, and even torture of 

suspected converts by government security personnel; the denial of the rights of non-Muslims to 

public religious expression and persuasion, while allowing Muslims to proselytize; and the 

difficulty in obtaining permission to build churches, as compared to government funding of 

mosque construction. 

Based on these concerns, USCIRF again recommends in 2010 that Sudan be named a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC. The State Department designated Sudan as a CPC annually since 

1999. 

USCIRF identified Sudan as the world’s most violent abuser of the right to freedom of religion 

or belief for acts that took place during the North-South civil war (1983-2005). However, since 

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended the North-South civil war in January 2005, 

conditions for religious freedom have improved in Southern Sudan and in contested areas in 

central Sudan. The Government of National Unity (GNU) instituted by the CPA has officially 

operated under an Interim National Constitution with provisions guaranteeing universal human 

rights, including freedom of religion or belief. Despite these provisions, severe human rights 

violations continue against both non-Muslims and Muslims in government-controlled areas, as 

well as in Darfur, where the State Department has determined that acts of genocide have taken 

place and may still be ongoing. The greatest danger to religious freedom and other human rights 

in Sudan is the collapse of the fragile peace brought about by the CPA. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: U.S. involvement was instrumental in ending the 

North-South civil war, during which civilian victims overwhelmingly were Southern Christians 

and followers of traditional African religions. As a guarantor of the CPA, the U.S. government 

has an obligation to work to ensure its robust implementation. In addition to recommending that 

Sudan continue to be designated a CPC, USCIRF urges the U.S. government to remain engaged 

at the highest levels to bring about a just and lasting peace for all of Sudan. The U.S. 

government should insist on full CPA implementation; assist the parties in preparing for a 

successful 2011 referendum on the South’s political future; work with parties to advance 

discussions on post-2011 issues; insist on strengthened human rights protections in both North 

and South Sudan; work to prevent violence against civilians and hold perpetrators responsible; 

and help Southern Sudan build its governing structure and indigenous economy in anticipation of 

the 2011 referendum. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy towards Sudan can be found 

at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

The North-South Civil War and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

Resistance to Khartoum’s policies of Islamization and Arabization was a major factor in the North-South 

civil war (1983-2005). During the conflict, Northern leaders from the ruling National Congress Party 

(NCP), including Sudan’s current President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, exploited religion to 

mobilize northern Muslim opinion against both non-Muslim Southerners and Muslims who opposed the 

NCP regime. Appeals to Islam by NCP officials included calls by senior government officials for jihad. 

The civilian victims of the conflict, two million dead and four million driven from their homes, were 

overwhelmingly Southern Christians and followers of traditional African religions, in contrast to the 

Arabic-speaking Muslims dominant in Khartoum. 

Since the signing of the CPA ending the civil war in January 2005, Sudan has been governed by an 

unusual power-sharing arrangement between the NCP, which had seized power in Khartoum in 1989 with 

an Islamist agenda, and the Southern-dominated Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Most, 

but not all, of the SPLM’s supporters are Christians or followers of traditional African religions. 

The CPA put in place the following arrangements for a six-year interim period, to end in July 2011: 

• the 10 Southern states would be exempt from sharia (Islamic law), which would continue to 

prevail in the North, and special provision would be made to protect the rights of non-Muslims in 

Khartoum, the national capital; 

• the NCP and SPLM would form a GNU under the Interim National Constitution, with the SPLM 

having a minority share of offices in Khartoum but assuming full responsibility for governing 

Southern Sudan under the Interim Constitution for Southern Sudan; 

• the GNU would move forward on a path of “democratic transformation,” including comply[ing] 

fully with its obligations under the international human rights treaties and holding elections for 

President of Sudan, President of Southern Sudan, the national legislature, state governors, and all 

state legislatures; 

• the Southern Sudanese people would determine in a referendum to be held in January 2011 

whether the South stays within a united Sudan or becomes independent; 

• a special administration would be established in the oil-rich area of Abyei, the boundaries of 

which would be determined by an independent commission, and a popular referendum held in 

January 2011 would determine whether Abyei continues to have a special status in the North or 

becomes part of the South; 

• local autonomy would be granted to the contested areas of the Southern Kordofan/Nuba 

Mountains State and Southern Blue Nile State, which would remain part of the North, and 

popular consultations would be held at the end of the interim period to determine governance 

arrangements in the two states; and 

• the GNU would bring “peace dividends” in the form of economic development to marginalized 

areas in Southern Sudan, Abyei, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile states to 

encourage unity. 

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Status of CPA Implementation 

Full implementation of the CPA, which according to its preamble is a “concrete model for solving 

problems and other conflicts in the country,” is designed to address the marginalization, 

underdevelopment, and human rights violations which have led to several regional conflicts that are still 

ongoing in Sudan. 

Five years have passed since the signing of the CPA, and many provisions, particularly those related to 

human rights reforms and economic development, remain unimplemented, partially implemented, or 

severely delayed. There are serious disagreements, mistrust, and power inequity between the NCP and 

SPLM, but the GNU is functioning and power- and oil revenue-sharing arrangements are moving 

forward. The greatest success to date is that the North and the South are still at peace, although tensions 

remain high. 

Part of the problem is that following the CPA’s signing the crisis in Darfur distracted the international 

community’s attention from the implementation of the peace agreement. With less than one year 

remaining, international attention is now focused on the January 2011 referenda in Southern Sudan, in 

which it appears likely that the South will vote for independence, as well as in Abyei. Only those 

outstanding CPA provisions pertinent to these polls, as well as those related to post-2011 arrangements, 

are being addressed in a serious manner. Issues related to the promotion of human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief, governance in the North, and security and development in North-South 

border areas have been put aside. Unfortunately, failure to address these issues could exacerbate existing 

tensions or even reignite conflict. 

Human Rights Protections 

The CPA requires the GNU to implement a new constitution guaranteeing human rights, bring Sudan’s 

laws into compliance with its international agreements, and create three independent institutions to 

monitor and protect human rights conditions in the country. At the time of this writing, the human rights 

protections called for in the CPA have not been adequately implemented. 

An Interim National Constitution, based on the CPA and signed into law in July 2005, includes a Bill of 

Rights and human rights protections and gives primacy to Sudan’s international human rights 

commitments. Nevertheless, human rights protections in Sudan continue to be severely constrained by an 

undemocratic ruling elite led by an authoritarian president indicted by the International Criminal Court 

(ICC) for crimes against humanity, an oppressive national security system that operates with impunity, 

and several restrictive national laws. Of the three institutions mandated by the CPA to monitor and 

promote human rights in Sudan, only one—the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission—is truly 

functional. 

Freedom of Religion or Belief in the North 

The Interim National Constitution guarantees religious freedom protections, including freedom to worship 

and assembly, establish and maintain places of worship, establish and maintain appropriate charitable or 

humanitarian institutions, observe days of rest and celebrate holidays and ceremonies, and communicate 

with individuals and communities in matters of religion or belief at both the national and international 

levels. Despite these protections, severe violations of freedom of religion or belief continue in 

government-controlled areas of the North. 

All Sudanese in the North, including Christians and followers of traditional African religions, are subject 

to sharia. In meetings with Muslims and Christians in Khartoum in December 2009, followers of both 

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religions told USCIRF that they felt their religious freedom rights were infringed by the government’s 

imposition of a particular Islamic ideology on the entire population, including its enforcement of 

religiously-based morality codes and corporal punishments adopted from sharia. 

The state enforces corporal punishments and morality laws on both non-Muslims and Muslims who do 

not follow traditional practices, despite provisions in the CPA and the Interim National Constitution that 

non-Muslims would be provided alternatives to the punishments prescribed for Muslims. In the past year, 

under a 1991 “public order” law that prohibits acting in “a manner contrary to public morality, or 

wear[ing] an indecent or immoral dress, which causes annoyance to public feeling,” dozens of Muslim 

and Christian women and girls were flogged in Khartoum for indecency. What specifically constitutes 

immoral dress is not defined and is left to the discretion of arresting officers and prosecuting judges. The 

penalty for violating this provision is a maximum 40 lashes flogging, a fine, or both. According to the 

African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS), indecency charges are primarily used against poor 

Southern women and the specialized courts in which these cases are heard do not provide due process 

rights. The most celebrated recent indecency case, that of UN employee Lubna Hussein, ended when an 

unknown person believed to be acting for the government paid her fine, apparently as a way of avoiding 

further adverse international publicity. 

The “public order” law also is used to discriminate against women more broadly, including requiring all 

women to wear the hijab and restricting women’s economic activities. According to the ACJPS, the law 

is used to restrict the work hours of women in Darfur. 

Additionally, Christians in Khartoum complained to a visiting USCIRF delegation in December 2009 that 

they are frequently suspected of and harassed by the police for producing and selling illegal alcohol. 

Reportedly, the vast majority of inmates in Khartoum’s women’s prison are Christian women accused of 

selling alcohol. In April 2010, during an election campaign rally, President al-Bashir stated that all 

persons selling and drinking alcohol would be flogged. 

In addition to imposing an Islamic ideology on Muslims and non-Muslins, the government routinely 

discriminates against non-Muslims. Although permits to construct and operate mosques are routinely 

granted, and mosque construction is supported by government funds, permission to build churches often 

is difficult to obtain. Since the CPA’s signing in 2005, there appears to have been some progress on this 

issue; three churches have received building permits and are reportedly under construction. Churches 

built without official permission, by owners who register land for personal rather than church use, exist at 

the authorities’ sufferance. Even legally recognized church-owned properties are vulnerable to seizure. 

Muslims also receive preferential access to limited government services and preferential treatment in 

court cases involving Muslims against non-Muslims. Christians told the Commission during its 

December 2009 trip to Khartoum that foreign church officials are not permitted outside of Khartoum, that 

except for a Christmas Day broadcast the state media denies Christians air time, and that Christians are 

denied educational opportunities and employment services when administrators discover their religious 

background. In addition, school textbooks negatively stereotype non-Muslims and ignore their 

contribution to the country. 

Blasphemy is legally prohibited under Sudan’s criminal laws, and blasphemy accusations have been used 

to intimidate those expressing disfavored views. In 2005, a Khartoum newspaper editor was charged with 

blasphemy after publishing an article interpreted by some readers as disrespectful to the Prophet 

Muhammad. Subsequently released and later acquitted, the editor was murdered in September 2006. 

Nine suspects in the murder case were found guilty and executed in April 2009. That same month, 

several newspapers accused SLPM parliamentary caucus leader Yassir Arman of apostasy for calling for 

amendments to Sudan’s criminal code that would exempt non-Muslims from the application of sharia. 

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Additionally, in the past year such accusations have been made against the opposition Communist Party. 

The Association of Scholars and Preachers issued a fatwa declaring that “Communism is blasphemy, 

[and] whosoever believes in Communism is Kafir [i.e., an unbeliever] even if he observes prayer five 

times a day.” In September, after a cleric described a Communist party office as “a den of atheism, vice 

and fornication,” the premises were attacked.

Islamic proselytism is allowed, but proselytism by non-Muslims is prohibited. Conversion from Islam is 

a crime legally punishable by death. In practice, suspected converts are subjected to intense scrutiny, 

intimidation, and sometimes torture by government security personnel who act with impunity. Converts 

to Christianity from Islam face societal pressures and harassment from the security services to the point 

that they typically cannot remain in Sudan. 

In contrast, government policies and societal pressure promote conversion to Islam. There have been 

reports in the past of coerced conversions in government-controlled camps for internally displaced 

persons, as well as among prison inmates, Popular Defense Force trainees, and children in camps for 

vagrant minors. The government also has allegedly tolerated the use of humanitarian assistance to induce 

conversion to Islam. In government-controlled areas, children who have been abandoned or whose 

parentage is unknown are considered by the government to be Muslims and may not be adopted by nonMuslims. 

Finally, although Muslim-Christian violence has declined from the high levels seen during the NorthSouth civil war, some relatively minor incidents occurred in 2009 in South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains. In 

February 2009, two Popular Defense Force (PDF) members allegedly threatened to kill a local Christian 

leader. On March 1, 2009, PDF members reportedly interrupted a church service and broke a cross. 

Finally, on March 27, 2009, a mob razed a building used by two Christian groups. Renewed conflict 

between Khartoum and Southern Sudan would inevitably engender violence that would have religious as 

well as ethnic, political, and sectional dimensions. 

Freedom of Religion or Belief in the South 

The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan separates religion and the state and guarantees freedom of 

religion and equality before the law regardless of religious belief. These provisions are respected in 

practice by the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and by the SLPM. Although the SPLM draws its 

support largely from Christian Southerners, the party and the Southern government avoid appearing to 

favor Christians over Muslims. The SPLM Northern Sector head and former presidential candidate, 

Yassir Arman, is himself a Northern Muslim. 

USCIRF has traveled repeatedly to South Sudan since 2006, most recently in January 2010. On these 

visits, Southern Muslims and Christians told USCIRF that they feel that their right to freedom of religion 

or belief is respected, the GoSS is responsive to their needs and concerns, and relations between the 

religious communities in the South are generally good. Muslim leaders told USCIRF in January 2010 

that among Southerners, there are many inter-religious families and that where there is conflict in the 

South, it is along ethnic, not religious lines. Muslim leaders stated that they are working with the GoSS 

to form a Muslim counterpart to the Sudanese Council of Churches and that the government is receptive 

to their request for specialized courts to address personal status issues. They also said that the GoSS 

responded positively to concerns raised to USCIRF in October 2008 that a new registration law for 

religious communities unduly targets their community. However, USCIRF is concerned by reports it has 

received that several Arab Muslims and their businesses in the South have been targeted for attack and 

theft in 2009-10. Given the overlapping tensions based on North-South, Christian-Muslim, ethnic, and 

class identities, however, it is difficult to determine if religion is a motivating factor in these attacks. 

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Commission for the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital Area 

The mandate of the Commission for the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital Area 

(Commission) is to ensure that the rights of non-Muslims are protected in accordance with the Interim 

National Constitution’s human rights protections and that “non-Muslims are not adversely affected by the 

application of the Sharia law in the National Capital.” Chaired by a Southerner, the Commission is 

composed of Southern and northern religious scholars, community leaders, and representatives from 

Khartoum State, the judiciary, the Ministry of Justice, the police, and the security forces. Since its 

creation in 2007, the Commission has had some limited successes, including obtaining permission for 

church construction, obtaining the return of a portion of a Christian cemetery from the Khartoum State 

government, and voicing concerns about the treatment of non-Muslims by the police and an Islamic bias 

in the teaching of history. However, Sudanese Christians in Khartoum told USCIRF that the Commission 

is not widely known to the community and those who are aware of its existence feel that it is controlled 

by the government and its Muslim membership. 

The Commission often fails to intervene in cases violating the rights of non-Muslims. For example, 

according to ACJPS, although Commission members were present during a March 2009 hearing at which 

two young girls were sentenced to 40 lashes and a fine for wearing trousers, they did not intervene. The 

Commission also did not intervene when Christians were flogged who were arrested with Lubna Hussein 

in July 2009 for wearing trousers. In a meeting in December 2009, the Chair of the Commission told 

USCIRF that in many cases, the judge hands down sentences before intervention is possible. 

The Commission also told USCIRF that its aim is not to exempt non-Muslims from sharia but rather to 

urge that sharia be applied leniently to the entire population, including by seeking to prevent floggings 

and executions. According to the Commission chair, non-Muslims need to learn to live within the 

existing system. The Commission’s disappointing performance has been noted by CPA observers. In a 

2008 mid-term report evaluating CPA implementation, CPA-created Assessment and Evaluation 

Committee called on the GNU to increase support for the Commission. Additionally, UN officials in 

Khartoum told USCIRF in December 2009 that the Commission is in need of human rights training and 

capacity-building assistance to be more effective. 

Human Rights Commissions 

 

In April 2009, the Sudanese National Assembly enacted legislation establishing a National Human Rights 

Commission (NHRC). According to the legislation, the NHRC will monitor, research, and investigate 

human rights abuses in Sudan, and provide recommendations to improve human rights conditions and 

legal protections for human rights. Its yet-to-be-appointed 15 members are to be independent, 

experienced, impartial, and known for their commitment to human rights causes. However, in apparent 

contradiction to these provisions, the NHRC also will have six government representatives as advisors. 

In 2006, the GoSS established the independent Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission (SSHRC), 

with the mandate to monitor and investigate human rights conditions in the South, advocate for human 

rights protections, and educate the populace on human rights. The SSHCR currently has 20 staff 

members in eight states, and plans to expand to all 11 Southern States. It regularly takes cases from 

individuals alleging abuses by local authorities, and works to address these claims. According to the 

SSHRC’s Chair, the majority of complaints are about physical abuses by Southern security officers 

belonging to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Southern Sudan Police Forces (SSPF). 

In addition, throughout the early 2010 election period, the SSHRC conducted voter education and 

awareness campaigns. The institution also participated in registration and election monitoring activities. 

According to the SSHRC Chair, the SSHRC receives good cooperation from the GoSS, particularly 

President Salva Kiir and the Ministry of Justice. 

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Bringing National Laws into Compliance with International Obligations 

Despite CPA provisions requiring that legal reforms comply with international obligations, several 

national laws continue to circumscribe the freedoms of speech, assembly, and the press. In 2009, the 

GNU took steps to reform the 2004 Press and Publications Act, the 1999 National Security Forces Act, 

and the 1991 Criminal Procedures Act. However, the new laws fail to address the problems in the 

existing laws, and continue an atmosphere in which the freedoms of assembly, speech, and press are 

infringed. 

In June 2009, the National Assembly passed the Press and Printed Materials Bill 2009 amidst a 

parliamentary walk-out by the SPLM and other opposition parties. The new bill continues to give the 

government sweeping powers to censor, suspend, and heavily fine the press for articles it does not like. 

The legislation also retains clauses permitting national security officers to engage in pre-publication 

censorship of “issues pertaining to safeguarding the national security and public order and health.” In 

September 2009, President al-Bashir issued a decree purporting to end this practice, if journalists agreed 

to censor themselves under a code of conduct. The President warned editors-in-chief that failure to abide 

by the code of conduct would lead to “harsh sanctions.” 

The National Security Forces Act of 1999 provided broad powers of arrest and detention and granted 

procedural immunity to the National Intelligence Security Services (NISS). A new National Security Act 

was passed in December 2009, but it continues the practice of granting extensive powers to the NISS to 

arrest and detain persons without charge. The new Act also continues to grant procedural immunity to 

NISS officers, as well as continuing to permit government security forces to disperse peaceful 

demonstrations forcibly. 

In December 2009, USCIRF witnessed the dangerous implications of the National Security Act for 

opposition political parties and human rights activists. During USCIRF’s visit to Khartoum, the NISS 

and police officers arrested dozens of demonstrators, including National Assembly members, state 

legislators, and other officials, who had attempted to present a petition to the Assembly’s Speaker calling 

for urgent action to implement CPA legal reforms and prepare the country for the 2010 elections and 

2011 referenda. Many demonstrators, including Yassir Arman, the head of the SPLM’s Northern Sector, 

were beaten. USCIRF saw firsthand the busloads of security officers—police, national security, and 

army—being driven into Khartoum in unmarked vehicles to suppress the demonstration and, in a meeting 

the following day, saw Mr. Arman’s visible injuries. 

Elections 

The first elections in Sudan in almost 25 years took place from April 11-15 2010. Originally scheduled 

for February 2009, the elections were delayed by more than a year. Election observers reported serious 

problems during the campaign period, including the intimidation and detention of opposition activists by 

the security forces. These problems led the SPLM and some Northern opposition parties to boycott the 

Presidential contest and state elections in the troubled Darfur region and elsewhere. 

Regrettably, the elections neither created a more democratic government in Sudan nor addressed the 

history of concentration of power and wealth in Khartoum. Laws and logistical arrangements were 

implemented to ensure an NCP victory and keep President al-Bashir in power. Election observers, 

including the Carter Center and the European Union, found that the elections failed to meet international 

standards. Freedom of speech, association, and assembly were frequently infringed. Insecurity in some 

areas of Sudan, including Darfur and Southern Sudan, prevented open campaigning and voting. Voter 

fraud and district gerrymandering were common. Logistical problems disenfranchised many voters. 

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Organizations such as the Carter Center, Human Rights Watch, and African Centre for Justice and Peace 

Studies reported that the environment in Sudan prevented the elections from being free and fair. Many of 

the problems were due to the repressive press and national security laws. Despite the NCP’s promise to 

former-U.S. President Jimmy Carter that the most troubling provisions of the two laws would not be 

applied during the election period, journalists were prohibited or censored from reporting on purportedly 

“inappropriate” electoral content and opposition parties were denied access to state media. Human rights 

and party activists were harassed and arrested for engaging in voter education efforts and complaining 

about inappropriate NCP campaign behavior. Opposition parties were harassed in the South as well, 

where the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC) candidates accused 

Southern Sudanese security forces of arresting and harassing their candidates. 

The GNU also instituted rules infringing on the ability of candidates and parties to campaign freely. 

There were also logistical problems and concerns, including allegations of voter registration fraud, delays 

in reviewing voter registration lists, inconsistencies among such lists, a lack of trained polling staff, an 

inadequate number of polling centers, delays in distributing funds to state election committees, the 

printing of ballots by Khartoum-based companies as opposed to independent third country companies, 

and poor voter education. 

The Three Contested Areas: Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and Abyei 

Separate protocols in the CPA addressed the three contested areas of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains 

State, Blue Nile State, and Abyei (an area within Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State). These three 

ethnically- and religiously-mixed areas are along the border between North and South Sudan and were the 

front lines of the North-South civil war. The people in these areas broke along religious (Christian and 

Muslim) and ethnic (African and Arab) lines to join forces with either the Southern SPLA or Khartoum’s 

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and aligned militias. The separate CPA protocols establish local 

administrations in these areas, implement security mechanisms, call for increased development projects, 

and establish procedures to address governance of the areas following the referendum on Southern Sudan 

self-determination set for January 2011. However, lack of implementation of the protocols, particularly 

those related to security, administration, development, and education, makes these areas vulnerable to 

renewed conflict at any point, and in particular after 2011. 

Abyei 

The Abyei Protocol of the CPA provides that Abyei has “special status” in the North and that a 

referendum will be held in 2011 for residents to determine if the Abyei Area will retain that status or 

become part of Southern Sudan’s Bahr el Ghazal State. A “final and binding” determination of the area’s 

geographic boundaries would be made by an Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) composed of 

international experts, and residency and voter eligibility decisions by an Abyei Referendum Commission. 

As of this writing, however, the borders are not demarcated on the ground, a referendum commission has 

not yet been implemented, a local administration is not yet fully functional, development funds have not 

been devolved as required, services are not being provided to residents, and the security situation remains 

tense. 

In July 2006, the ABC presented its report determining the Abeyi Area’s borders to the SPLM and the 

NCP. However, the NCP rejected it, stating that the ABC had “exceeded its mandate.” In July 2008, 

after an outbreak of violence, the NCP and SPLM signed the Abyei Roadmap Agreement recommitting 

themselves to the Abyei Protocol and agreeing to submit the boundaries dispute to the International Court 

of Arbitration at The Hague and accept its decision as final. That body reached its decision in July 2009, 

finding that the ABC experts were correct in their delineation of the Southern border, but were incorrect 

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in their delineation of the Area’s northern, eastern and western boundaries. The Hague tribunal also ruled 

that the Abyei Area is the ancestral homeland of the Ngok Dinka. Although the parties agreed to 

demarcate the Abyei boundaries on the ground by September 30, 2009, per The Hague award’s 

instructions, lack of funding, local obstruction, and insecurity has impeded their work, which has stopped 

at the time of this writing. 

In December 2009, after months of negotiations, legislation concerning the Abyei referendum was passed 

in the National Assembly. The legislation calls for the establishment of the Abyei Referendum 

Commission this year to determine residency status and voter eligibility criteria and oversee the 

procedures for the poll. Of particular interest is the determination of the residency of the Misseriya, who 

are believed to be in favor of the Abyei area remaining in the North. 

Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State and Blue Nile State 

Under the CPA, the two states of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State and Blue Nile State continue 

to be part of the North. Unlike Southern Sudan and Abyei, however, residents of these two states will 

have “popular consultations” in 2011, which are vaguely defined in the CPA as “a democratic right and 

mechanism to ascertain the views of the people on the comprehensive agreement reached.” Throughout 

the interim period, the two states have governing autonomy but receive funds from Khartoum to address 

development inequalities and implement security measures. 

Over the past five years, implementation of the provisions related to the two states has been haphazard. 

Administrations have been set up in both states, although only the one in Blue Nile State reportedly 

operates relatively well. Inadequate security and underdevelopment remain serious concerns in both 

states. 

In December 2009, the National Assembly passed legislation governing the popular consultation process. 

That process has yet to start, however, and many residents of the two states believe that they will have a 

referendum like Abyei and Southern Sudan. According to the CPA, the popular consultation process is 

supposed to begin with elected state leaders consulting with their respective populations to rectify the 

shortcomings of the CPA’s constitutional, political, and administrative arrangements. The elected leaders 

are then to take up their concerns with the central government. However, reports indicate that the process 

will be led by governing officials with little citizen involvement and that residents have little education 

about the process. 

Referendum on Self-Determination for Southern Sudan 

The CPA provides that on January 9, 2011, Southerners will vote to remain in a united Sudan or opt for 

independence. To many Southerners, the GoSS, and the SPLM, this referendum is crucial in terms of 

CPA implementation. SPLM officials have threatened several times that if the referendum is not held as 

scheduled, they will unilaterally declare independence. After the April 2010 elections, the referendum is 

the remaining milestone of the CPA and preparations for the poll and post-referendum arrangements are 

now the focus of the international community. Additionally, with the expectation that Southerners will 

vote for independence, much of the work on post-referendum issues operates under the assumption that an 

independent state of Southern Sudan is inevitable. 

For Sudanese political leaders, much of the second half of 2009 was focused on debating, drafting, and 

passing legislation governing the referendum process, with periods of high tensions including a temporary 

boycott of the National Assembly by the SPLM. Disputes centered on vote and turnout thresholds for 

independence, voter eligibility, and the timeline for addressing post-referendum arrangements. 

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The legislation passed in December 2009 provides that independence will be granted with a simple 

majority vote and a minimum of 60 percent turnout of registered voters; all Southerners (in the South, the 

North, and the diaspora) will be eligible to register to vote; and the National Assembly will approve 

presidential nominations to the Khartoum-based commission that will oversee the holding of the 

referendum. 

In the upcoming year, much remains to be done to prepare for a referendum. Referendum commission 

members have to be appointed, logistical arrangements for the vote have to be decided, and voters have to 

be registered. Although the Ad-Hoc Border Committee submitted its initial report to the Presidency on 

the North-South border in February 2010, the border remains to be demarked on the ground. The two 

parties currently are working to resolve disputes over five locations. SPLA and SAF troops must be 

removed behind their respective borders. Voter education programs need to begin and funding for the 

registration and polling periods need to be raised. The parties need to decide on monitoring of the 

registration and voting periods. 

Finally, the two parties must urgently enter into negotiations over a number of post-2011 arrangements. 

The referendum legislation identified eight issues pertinent to a smooth and peaceful post-referendum 

period, including, but not limited to citizenship, status of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), oil concessions 

and production and transportation and exporting, and water. Beginning negotiations and reaching 

agreements on these and the other post-2011 issues as early as possible prior to the poll will help avoid 

conflicts and misunderstandings. USCIRF is particularly concerned about: the plight of Southerners in 

the North and Northerners in the South; governance and protections for human rights, including freedom 

of religion or belief, in the North; and development in the South. 

Southerners in the North and Northerners in the South 

An estimated one to two million Southerners continue to reside in the North, including long-term 

residents and IDPs. There are also many Northerners living in the South. The NCP and SPLM must 

decide on the citizenship rights of these populations should Southern Sudan vote for independence. These 

rights include not only legal standing in territories, but also the rights to work, access services and 

governing institutions, own property, and maintain residence. There is great concern that if Southerners 

vote for independence, these rights will be revoked and these populations, particularly Southerners in the 

North, will become stateless. 

Historical precedents elsewhere, including the Partition of Britain’s Indian Empire into the separate 

countries of India and Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh from East Pakistan, suggest that a lack of 

attention now to these issues could result in tremendous human suffering. Those who find themselves on 

the “wrong” side of a new international border could face discrimination and even violence. Large 

numbers of people could be left stateless in areas where they have lived for decades or even generations. 

The physical safety of these populations is also a concern. Will Southerners in the North be attacked in 

retaliation for the South’s independence? If this happens, or citizenship rights of Southerners in the North 

are revoked, will there be retaliation against Northerners in the South? During USCIRF’s visit to Juba in 

January 2006, local Muslim community leaders related having been targeted following the death of Dr. 

John Garang. 

USCIRF also is concerned about the plight of Southern IDPs in the North. In 2005, there were 

approximately four million Southern IDPs in the North. Over these past five years, almost two million 

IDPs have returned to the South and the three border areas of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, Blue 

Nile, and Abyei. The vast majority of these returns have been spontaneous, with no or little assistance 

from the international community. More recently, however, the pace of returns has slowed. In addition 

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to the lack of international assistance, the lack of livelihood opportunities, services, and education in the 

South led many Southerners to decide that they and their families were better off remaining in Khartoum, 

despite terrible camp conditions and pressure from authorities there, and discrimination and harassment 

based on religious identification. 

However, when USCIRF met with Southern IDPs at Jebel Aulia camp in Khartoum in December 2009, 

almost three quarters of those asked expressed plans to return to the South after the referendum vote. 

USCIRF is concerned that the international community, the GoSS, and authorities in the three border 

areas are not prepared to assist an increased number of returnees next year. The international community 

and key Sudanese stakeholders need to begin now to prepare for the likelihood of increasing returns, 

including return logistics and potential security problems. The potential of increased returns also 

highlights the need for dramatically increasing and coordinating development assistance to the South, 

both now and after the 2011 referendum, to make the return process run smoothly for the displaced 

persons, but also to help absorbing communities properly integrated returnees. Most of the returnees are 

settling in urban areas, because either rural areas lack the services or they have become accustomed to 

urban living, creating a significant “squatter” problem, increased competition for overtaxed resources, and 

in some cases, discrimination against returnees. 

Governance and Human Rights in the North 

The human rights institutions the CPA created and the human rights protections in both the CPA and 

Interim National Constitution have not been fully implemented and serious human rights abuses, 

including freedom of religion or belief, continue. Moreover, the underlying problems of political and 

economic marginalization of non-Arabs, non-Muslims, and in areas of the country beyond Khartoum 

have not been addressed. Genocide and conflict continues in Darfur, despite numerous and current efforts 

to sign a lasting peace deal. In addition to the Darfurians, the Beja people in East Sudan and the Nubian 

people north of Khartoum remain politically and economically marginalized. After the referendum in 

2011, these abuses and the underlying problems in Sudan’s governing structure will continue. They may 

even worsen if the international community focuses only on developing Southern Sudan and neglects 

human rights in the North. Some observers believe that Sudan could become even more Islamist in 

orientation should the South secede. 

The responsibility of the highest levels of the Sudanese government in egregious human rights violations 

in the North was underlined by the March 2009 decision of the ICC to authorize an arrest warrant against 

President al-Bashir on five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes in regard to 

his actions in the Darfur conflict. Khartoum’s expulsion of international humanitarian organizations in 

response to the indictment, and its arresting and silencing of Darfuri human rights activists, demonstrates 

a disregard for the welfare of Darfur’s civilian population. Abusive tactics and brutal violence against 

African Muslim civilians in Darfur continue with impunity. Additionally, even as it was engaging in 

peace talks with Darfuri rebel groups, the Khartoum government continued offensives in Darfur, killing 

hundreds and displacing tens of thousands in Jebel Marra and prohibiting UN and humanitarian agencies 

from accessing the region. The lack of accountability and persistent use of tactics against civilians 

amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes by the government of Sudan and its agents raise 

serious questions about the government’s commitment to abide by the terms of the CPA. 

The international community must redouble its efforts, both now and immediately following the end of 

the CPA interim period, to pressure the Khartoum government to meet its human rights obligations under 

international treaties and the human rights provisions of the CPA. Among other efforts, the government 

must bring the country’s laws into compliance with its international commitments. The two Northernbased human rights institutions created in the CPA, the Commission on the Protection of Non-Muslims in 

the National Capitol Area and the yet-to-be established National Human Rights Commission, also should 

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be retained and strengthened. The government also should be pressed to address the serious issues raised 

by successive UN special rapporteurs/experts on human rights in Sudan, the UN’s panel of Experts on 

Darfur, and the African Union Panel on Darfur. 

Development in the South 

The SPLM faces multiple challenges of participating in the GNU, establishing the GoSS, bringing 

economic development and providing services to the South, and transforming its armed wing from a rebel 

movement to a standing army. These staggering tasks are being undertaken in one of the most 

impoverished and least developed areas of the world that has been devastated by years of neglect from 

successive governments in Khartoum (before and after independence in 1956) and the long civil war. To 

date, international support has tended to focus on humanitarian assistance. A more long-term approach to 

development is needed. 

The GoSS and SPLM are forming a new government, despite lacking capacity and governing experience 

at all levels and across all government ministries and service providers. Poor management skills and lack 

of knowledge of contracts, financial management, payroll systems, and planning processes contribute to a 

serious corruption problem in the South. The need for training is even more acute at local levels as most 

training and assistance is focused on Juba. Despite the GoSS’s strong needs for technical assistance, 

USCIRF saw during its January 2010 trip to Juba that the numbers of technical advisors are shockingly 

inadequate -- only 150 are on the ground in Southern Sudan. International technical assistance in other 

post conflict situations has been much higher, with advisers numbering in the thousands. 

Development efforts in Southern Sudan are also hampered by increased insecurity in the South. Southern 

Sudan witnessed a dramatic increase in local level, inter-communal conflict in 2009, with more than 

2,500 deaths and 350,000 persons displaced because of the violence. This death toll exceeds that in 

Darfur in 2009, and the insecurity highlights the drastic needs of law and order institutions in the South. 

The Southern Sudan police force lacks training in civilian policing and human rights and lacks basic 

equipment. Civilians in many locations are better armed than officers. The Southern Sudan army itself 

has problems with lack of professionalization and training (including on human rights) among its troops 

and poor communication equipment. Failure by the GoSS to pay army and police salaries has led officers 

to sell guns and uniforms to civilians. 

The judicial sector needs even more assistance than the security sector, especially due to a considerable 

lack of qualified judges. In USCIRF’s meetings with Supreme Court judges in both October 2008 and 

January 2010, the Chief Justice stressed that the judicial system and judges are in great need of training 

and technical assistance, as well as computers and offices. 

Finally, Southern Sudan has some of the lowest human development indicators in the world. Insecurity 

and the lack of infrastructure prevent assistance organizations from reaching rural areas where the needs 

are most acute. At the end of the civil war, there were no paved roads in Southern Sudan outside of Juba 

and Wau. GoSS institutions still lack the capacity to meet its citizens’ food, water, education, health, and 

sanitation needs; these types of assistance continue to be provided by international non-governmental 

groups. 

U.S. Policy 

The United States is the leading, arguably indispensable, international actor in Sudan. U.S. involvement 

in the peace negotiations was vital to the signing the CPA ending the North-South civil war. As a 

guarantor of the CPA, with the United Kingdom and Norway, the U.S. government has an obligation to 

work with the signatories, the SPLM and NCP, to ensure its robust implementation. Since the CPA was 

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signed in 2005, its implementation has been ignored or severely delayed when the United States and the 

international community lost focus. 

In 2009, the Obama administration refocused attention on CPA implementation, as well as continuing 

efforts to bring peace to Darfur. In March 2009, President Obama appointed retired Major General J. 

Scott Gration as Special Envoy for Sudan. In October, the administration announced its long anticipated 

Sudan policy, which reportedly had been held up by internal administration disagreements. The policy 

aims to take a comprehensive approach to Sudan, simultaneously working to end genocide and conflict in 

Darfur, implement the CPA, ensure a peaceful post-2011 Sudan whatever the outcome of the referendum, 

and prevent Sudan from becoming a safe-haven for terrorists. The administration stated that it had 

developed benchmarks for the Sudanese government’s efforts to meet these goals, and that U.S. actions, 

particularly tightening or easing sanctions, would be determined by Khartoum’s progress on the 

benchmarks and “concrete improvements on the ground.” Quarterly reviews to measure progress are to 

be conducted by senior-level staff from various agencies. 

The policy’s benchmarks are classified in a secret “annex.” As a result, the policy community does not 

know what these benchmarks are, and is concerned that they may not be as strict as necessary to move 

Khartoum. History in Sudan has shown that the NCP only responds to strength. Additionally, there were 

reports that, at the first quarterly review in February 2010, there were serious disagreements within the 

administration on both the evaluation of the Sudanese government’s actions and the direction of U.S. 

policy. 

At times, Special Envoy Gration’s comments have seemed inconsistent with administration positions. In 

January 2010, when asked during a hearing before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs 

Committee about the classified annex, the Special Envoy denied its existence, stating that they had 

several different memos. A few days later, the Secretary of State insisted that there is an annex of 

benchmarks. Additionally, in Congressional testimony in July 2009, the Special Envoy stated that he 

believed the United States should consider easing sanctions in Sudan and said that genocide was not 

continuing in Darfur. A few days later Gen. Gration walked back these statements, and other 

administration officials, including U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, explicitly stated that genocide 

was continuing in that region. 

Even with these conflicting statements, the Special Envoy has made a concerted effort to implement the 

administration’s Sudan policy. Among the Special Envoy’s first acts was to travel to Sudan to engage the 

NCP to reinstate humanitarian organizations which were expelled following the ICC’s indictment of 

President al-Bashir. In June 2009, 13 organizations were readmitted, although under different names and 

with restricted access to the region. Also in June the Special Envoy held a three-day CPA Forum 

bringing key stakeholders, including the SPLM and NCP, European and other international partners, and 

East African regional states to Washington, DC to address the outstanding needs for CPA 

implementation, which USCIRF attended. In August, as the result of trilateral talks brokered by the 

Special Envoy, the NCP and SPLM announced agreement to implement several outstanding CPA 

provisions. The agreement contained deadlines for implementing the outstanding provisions. All of the 

deadlines have been missed. Since the agreement, the Special Envoy has traveled frequently to Sudan to 

engage the parties in negotiations over the outstanding provisions and to attempt to mitigate rising 

tensions. Most recently, he has traveled to Doha and the region to try to finalize a new peace agreement 

for Darfur. 

As part of its overall policy, the United States is increasing its assistance funds to Southern Sudan in 

anticipation of the vote for independence. Sudan is the largest recipient of U.S. assistance in Sub-Sahara 

Africa. Funding is used to solidify CPA implementation, bring peace to Darfur, and address the country’s 

massive humanitarian needs. U.S. assistance programs in Southern Sudan are aimed at conflict mitigation 

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and reconciliation, professionalization of Southern Sudan’s army, political party development, capacity 

building for the GoSS and state governments, tackling corruption, building infrastructure, extending heath 

and education services, addressing food insecurity, and improving agriculture development. Additionally, 

efforts to address gender imbalances in education, livelihoods, and public opportunities are found 

throughout the U.S.-Sudan assistance program. 

In addition, in advance of the April 2010 elections and with the January 2011 referendum approaching, 

the U.S. government has increased its assistance to train security officers to ensure that elections and the 

referendum are held in secure environments, and to work with local organizations on reconciliation 

efforts, to improve access to information on the referendum and popular consultation processes to avoid 

conflict, and to develop alarms to quickly respond to outbreaks of conflict. 

USCIRF Activities 

Sudan was one of the first countries on which the Commission focused. Since its inception, USCIRF has 

met with a broad range of government officials, religious leaders, human rights monitors, civil society 

representatives, and others knowledgeable about Sudan; held public events to focus attention on religious 

freedom abuses in Sudan; testified on Sudan at congressional hearings; and visited Sudan five times to 

see first hand the conditions on the ground. 

USCIRF had recommended repeatedly that the U.S. government appoint a nationally prominent 

individual to bring about a peaceful and just settlement of the North-South civil war. In September 2001, 

then-President Bush appointed former Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan, 

energizing the peace process. Senator Danforth was followed in September 2006 by former USAID 

Administrator and Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan Andrew Natsios, and in January 2008 by 

Richard Williamson. Following the inauguration of the Obama Administration, USCIRF called for a new 

Special Envoy who would demonstrate continued U.S. commitment to peace in Sudan. On March 18, 

2009, President Obama appointed retired Major General J. Scott Gration to this position. 

USCIRF has been extensively engaged in Sudan during this reporting period. The Commission traveled 

twice to Sudan, to Khartoum in December 2009 and Juba in January 2010. During these trips, USCIRF 

collected up-to-date information on religious freedom conditions in the North and South, CPA 

implementation, and development needs in Southern Sudan. While in Khartoum USCIRF witnessed firsthand the NCP’s human rights abuses, meeting with SPLM officials who had been arrested and beaten 

when peacefully attempting to present a petition to the National Assembly relating to legislation 

important for CPA implementation. Upon return from Khartoum, USCIRF held a press conference with 

Representatives Donald Payne (D-NJ), Frank Wolf (R-VA), and Chris Smith (R-NJ) to relay what was 

witnessed and call on the Administration to more forcefully engage the CPA parties on the 

implementation of the peace agreement. 

Throughout the year, USCIRF held several meetings with senior administration officials. USCIRF met 

twice with Special Envoy Gration, as well as with National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director for 

Multilateral Affairs Samantha Power, NSC Senior Director for African Affairs Michelle Gavin, and 

Assistant Secretary for State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson. 

USCIRF also engaged Sudan human rights activists in the Washington, D.C. area. In the fall of 2009, 

USCIRF held three roundtables addressing major issues relating to the CPA, including human rights in 

Sudan, the April elections, and the 2011 referendum on Southern Sudan’s political future. Finally, 

throughout the year, USCIRF issued numerous statements and press releases, including commenting on 

the Obama administration’s new Sudan policy and calling on the SPLM and NCP to abide by the 

international tribunal ruling on the Abyei boundaries. 

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Recommendations 

In addition to recommending that Sudan continue to be designated a CPC, USCIRF urges the U.S. 

government to remain engaged at the highest levels in bringing about a just and lasting peace for all of 

Sudan. The Commission believes that the normalization of relations with Sudan and any considerations 

of lifting U.S. sanctions must be preceded by concrete action and demonstrated progress by Khartoum in 

implementing peace agreements, ending abuses, and cooperating with efforts to protect civilians. 

I. Insist on Full CPA implementation to Serve as a Model for Political Accommodation of 

Legitimate Grievances throughout Sudan 

The U.S. government should: 

• enlist international support for peace in Sudan, including from CPA guarantors United Kingdom and 

Norway as well as China, and other nations that have major economic investments in Sudan, to press 

Khartoum to fulfill CPA implementation; 

• work with the CPA signatories, in coordination with international partners, to implement outstanding 

CPA provisions, including:

--holding the 2011 referenda in Southern Sudan and Abyei and the popular consultations in 

Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State and Blue Nile State as scheduled and in a free, fair, 

and credible manner; 

--implementing the Abyei border and the Abyei Roadmap Agreement; 

--demarcating the North-South border; and 

--establishing the National Human Rights Commission and bringing all national laws into 

compliance with international human rights commitments; 

• report, publicly and regularly, to the Congress on the status of CPA implementation, focusing on 

violations, responsibility, and U.S. government responses; and 

• consider new sanctions, as needed, to respond to non-compliance with CPA terms, including targeted 

sanctions such as asset freezes and travel bans against responsible individuals and institutions. 

II. Prepare for a Successful 2011 Referendum in Southern Sudan 

The U.S. government should: 

• make clear that the United States expects the choice of the people of Southern Sudan, as expressed in 

a free and fair referendum to be held in 2011 in accordance with the CPA, to be respected, whether 

the people of Southern Sudan choose to remain in Sudan or be independent; 

• directly engage and contribute resources and technical expertise to help ensure that the referendum 

is free, fair, and credible, including by ensuring that, during both registration and polling periods, 

there is: 

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--adequate international and GNU funding registering and educating voters and holding the poll; 

--international monitoring and observation; and 

--adequate security; 

• taking into account the possibilities of either unity or separation, work with the CPA signatories to 

advance discussions on post-2011 issues including: 

 

--citizenship rights of Southerners in the North and Northerners in South; 

--the terms of oil and wealth sharing accords between the regions; 

--the roles, responsibilities, and positions of the SAF, SPLA and Joint Integrated Units; 

--the parties’ obligations to Sudanese international agreements, including treaties and debt 

commitments; 

--the legal and human rights framework in the North after the expiration of the Interim National 

Constitution, including retaining those independent human rights institutions established by the 

CPA; and 

--preparation, including financial assistance, for an increase in IDPS voluntarily returning to the 

South after the vote. 

III. Strengthen Human Rights Protections, including Freedom of Religion or belief, in both the 

North and the South 

The U.S. government should:

• insist the government in Khartoum meet the following benchmarks to promote freedom of religion or 

belief before the United States will normalize relations or lift sanctions: 

--allow all religious groups to conduct their activities without harassment, discrimination or 

undue interference, including publishing or importing religious literature, building, repairing, and 

operating houses of worship, and operating social service programs; 

--repeal laws that punish changing one’s religion or encouraging another to do so and end the use 

of official accusations of blasphemy, apostasy, “offending Islam,” or similar charges to stifle 

public debate or restrict the right to freedom of expression; 

-- abandon efforts to force religious organizations to register as non-governmental organizations 

under regulations that give government officials control over their activities; 

--permit relations between national religious communities and their co-religionists abroad in 

accordance with universal human rights norms; 

--reform the state security services to be representative of all Sudanese and ensure that all 

national institutions such as the military, law enforcement agencies, and the highest levels of the 

judiciary are representative and equally protective of all Sudanese regardless of religious 

affiliation or belief; 

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--cease using government-controlled media for messages of intolerance and discrimination 

against non-Muslims; and 

--exclude negative stereotyping in school textbooks; include in school curricula, in textbooks, and 

in teacher training the concepts of tolerance and respect for human rights, including freedom of 

religion or belief; and incorporate into history texts the religious and cultural diversity of Sudan’s 

past; 

• appoint a ranking official at U.S. Embassy Khartoum, reporting directly to the Ambassador, to work 

full-time on human rights and monitor human rights abuses, including religious freedom, in the 

North, as well as to advance the U.S. human rights agenda in Sudan; 

• increase funding and technical assistance to the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission, the 

Commission for the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital, and the National Human Rights 

Commission, once it is established, to strengthen their capacity independently to protect, monitor, and 

investigate human rights abuses and to promote respect for internationally recognized standards on 

freedom of religion or belief and related human rights; 

• urge the government in Khartoum to end the impunity with which members of the security forces and 

others acting as agents of the government have engaged in human rights abuses; urge the 

establishment of effective mechanisms for accountability for past abuses; and in the absence of such 

bodies, provide full cooperation with international institutions, including those mandated by the UN 

Security Council; 

• urge the GNU to cooperate fully with international mechanisms on human rights issues, including 

inviting further visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, the Special 

Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Sudan, the UN Working Group on 

Arbitrary Detention, and the and comply with the UN Human Rights Council’s High-Level Mission 

on the Situation of Human Rights in Darfur’s recommendations; and 

• undertake programs to improve citizen awareness and enforcement of the legal protections for human 

rights included in the Interim National Constitution, the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, and 

the international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights (ICCPR), to which Sudan is a party. 

IV. Prevent Violence Against Civilians (including Mass Atrocities and Genocidal Acts) that would 

Result from Renewed Conflict and Hold Perpetrators Responsible 

The U.S. government should: 

• take the steps necessary to make feasible the establishment of various security guarantees for 

Southern Sudan in order to deter Khartoum from renewing the North-South civil war, including as 

appropriate, to improve the South’s ability to detect air attacks and therefore reduce civilian 

casualties; 

• increase technical assistance and expertise or other capacity to bolster the professionalization and 

human rights performance of the SPLA and the Southern Sudan Police Force to respond to insecurity 

and provide security for the 2011 referendum utilizing State Department’s International Military 

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Education and Training (IMET) and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 

programs; 

• increase support for the Government of Southern Sudan’s current, active efforts toward disarmament, 

demobilization, and reintegration of Southern Sudan’s many ex-combatants; 

• utilize existing social institutions, including indigenous religious bodies, and strengthen civil society 

organizations that have special expertise and a demonstrated commitment in the areas of interreligious and inter-ethnic reconciliation and conflict prevention, to promote a peaceful civil society; 

• expand technical assistance and training, education, provision of reference materials and facilities to 

the court system in Southern Sudan to address insecurity in the South and hold perpetrators of 

violence responsible; 

• support a stronger international presence in Darfur sufficient to protect civilian populations and to 

monitor compliance with the peace accords and UN Security Council resolutions, including by: 

--urging the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to protect civilians in accordance 

with the highest international peacekeeping standards; providing resources, logistics, equipment, 

and early warning systems to enable peacekeepers to move quickly to places where abuses are 

occurring; 

--bringing in experts on civilian protection issues and sexual violence to train and work with 

international force commanders, including female troops and police officers; 

--providing security to refugees and IDPs; 

--supporting the active enforcement of the UN Security Council aerial “no-fly zone;” 

--increasing substantially the number of human rights monitors from the UN Office of the High 

Commissioner for Human Rights and the number of international peacekeepers deployed in 

Darfur; and 

--insisting that relief organizations be permitted unimpeded, safe access to the region so that 

necessary humanitarian assistance can be provided to refugees and IDPs; and

• use bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to mount an international campaign to pressure the Sudanese 

authorities to cooperate fully with the ICC. 

V. Build a Successful Governing Structure and Indigenous Economy in Southern Sudan in 

Anticipation of the 2011 Referendum on the South’s Political Future 

The U.S. government should: 

• enhance the facilities and personnel resources of the U.S. Consulate General in Juba in order to 

support increased U.S. engagement and programming in Southern Sudan; 

• increase substantially the number of technical advisors from all relevant U.S. government agencies, 

including, but not limited to the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, 

Department of Justice, Department of Treasury, and Department of Agriculture, to the Government of 

Southern Sudan to promote good governance, administer rule of law, improve administration and 

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delivery of social services and education, and address corruption and encourage other potential 

donors to increase technical assistance to Southern Sudan in these area; 

• expand the opportunities for fellowships, internships, or similar exchange programs for Southern 

Sudanese professionals to increase the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan to promote 

good governance, administer the rule of law, improve the administration and delivery of social 

services and education, and address corruption; 

• expand the provision of U.S. assistance to indigenous civil-society, private-sector groups and provide 

appropriate technical assistance to enable such groups to prepare project proposals for U.S. grants; 

• encourage U.S. private investment in Southern Sudan while alleviating the impact of remaining U.S. 

sanctions on all areas under the control of the Government of Southern Sudan and in the border areas 

of Abyei, Southern Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains, including sanctions on communications 

equipment; 

• support the creation of an effective banking system in Southern Sudan, recognizing that such a system 

is crucial for the South’s economic development and political stability; 

• expand partnerships between U.S. universities and the University of Juba to enhance Southern 

Sudanese expertise in agriculture, business, law, health care, public administration, public works, 

education, and other areas to support development efforts; 

• while recognizing the urgent need for continued U.S. humanitarian assistance, begin shifting to 

recovery and development assistance, taking into account the needs of returning IDPs and the 

absorbing communities, through increased funding for education, health care, economic development, 

and infrastructure; 

• promote agricultural development in Southern Sudan with the goal of promoting greater food 

security; and 

• explore providing the SPLA with needed technical expertise and capacity, such as in road 

construction and other public works, to assist in creating an infrastructure that bolsters economic 

development. 

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Turkmenistan

FINDINGS: Significant religious freedom problems and official harassment of religious 

adherents persist in Turkmenistan despite steps taken by Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov 

since 2007 to reduce certain aspects of the repressive measures that existed under the country’s 

former president. The country’s laws, policies, and practices continue to violate international 

human rights norms, including on freedom of religion or belief. Police raids and other 

harassment of registered and unregistered religious groups continue more than three years after 

the death of longtime dictator Saparmurat Niyazov. The repressive 2003 religion law remains in 

force, causing major difficulties for religious groups to legally function. 

In light of these persistent and severe problems, and until systemic human rights reforms are 

implemented, USCIRF continues to recommend in 2010 that the U.S. government designate 

Turkmenistan as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. The Commission has recommended 

the CPC designation for Turkmenistan since 2000, but the State Department has never followed 

this recommendation. 

Under the late President Saparmurat Niyazov, who died in December 2006, Turkmenistan was 

among the world’s most repressive and isolated states. Virtually no independent public activity 

was permitted and Niyazov maintained a vast cult of personality. Today, despite decreased 

emphasis, the Turkmen government still promotes the former president’s personality cult 

through the Ruhnama (Niyazov’s book of “spiritual thoughts”) as a mandatory feature of public 

education. Turkmen law does not allow a civilian alternative to military service, and five 

Jehovah’s Witnesses have been imprisoned for conscientious objection to military service. 

Although the new president has taken a few positive steps, including the 2007 release of the 

country’s former chief mufti, systemic legal reforms directly related to religious freedom and 

other human rights have not been made. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: The United States should appoint an ambassador to 

Turkmenistan as soon as possible, in part because previous U.S. ambassadors have played a key 

role in addressing that country’s human rights issues. For four years, the United States has not 

been represented in this strategically important country by a fully accredited ambassador. The 

United States needs to increase exchange programs as well as broadcasts to Turkmenistan to 

attempt to overcome decades of isolation which have created a threatening cultural vacuum. The 

United States should also establish regular bilateral meetings with the Turkmen government on 

human rights and religious freedom, discuss ways Turkmenistan can implement laws and 

practices to comply with international human rights standards, and establish a regular reporting 

mechanism on these issues. In the absence of any measurable improvements in the human rights 

sphere by the Turkmen government, the United States should express its concern at appropriate 

international fora, including the United Nations and the OSCE. The United States should also 

consider whether relevant aspects of the human rights activities of the OSCE Center in Ashgabat 

can be replicated in OSCE states, including those of Central Asia. Additional recommendations 

for U.S. policy towards Turkmenistan can be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Governing and Legal Framework 

Until the 2006 death of President Saparmurat Niyazov, Turkmenistan was among the world’s most 

repressive and isolated states. Virtually no independent public activity was allowed, and the 2003 

religion law banned most religious activity. Moreover, Turkmenistan’s public life was dominated by 

Niyazov’s quasi-religious personality cult that was expressed in the Ruhnama, and that the state imposed 

on the country’s educational and religious life. 

After elections in early 2007, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov succeeded Niyazov as president. He has 

implemented limited educational reforms and promised, but not yet made, certain reforms of the country’s 

oppressive laws. He has also taken a few positive steps such as: the 2007 release of 11 political prisoners, 

including the former chief mufti; placing some limits on Niyazov’s personality cult; the establishment of 

two new official human rights commissions; and the registration of 13 minority religious groups. In 

addition, police controls on travel inside Turkmenistan were eased, and the country is somewhat more 

open to the outside world. 

The country’s constitution purports to guarantee religious freedom, the separation of religion from the 

state, and equality regardless of religion or belief. However, the Turkmen religion law, promulgated in 

2003, contradicts these provisions and violates international standards with regard to freedom of religion 

or belief. The law’s problematic provisions include: intrusive registration criteria; the requirement that 

the government be informed of all financial support received from abroad; a ban on worship in private 

homes and the public wearing of religious garb except by religious leaders; and severe and discriminatory 

restrictions on religious education. In a January 2010 report to the UN Human Rights Committee, the 

Turkmen government stated that “[t]he activity of unregistered religious organizations is banned” in the 

country. 

Religious matters fall under the purview of the government-appointed Council on Religious Affairs 

(CRA), which reports to the president. While the CRA’s membership includes government officials and 

Sunni Muslim and Russian Orthodox Church representatives, no other religious groups are represented on 

the council. The CRA controls the hiring, promotion, and firing of Sunni Muslim and Russian Orthodox 

clergy, who must report regularly to the CRA, and examines and controls all religious publications and 

activities of all registered groups. 

CRA Deputy Chair Andrei Sapunov, a Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) priest, oversees Christian affairs 

and reportedly has veto power over other Christian groups’ ability to function. Some ROC members have 

told human rights groups that Sapunov has disclosed to the secret police confidential information from the 

confessional. Moreover, members of religious minorities believe that recently-named CRA officials tend 

to favor state-controlled Islam and deny permission for non-Muslim activity more often than did their 

predecessors appointed under Niyazov. Four of the officials appointed in September 2009 to head CRA 

regional branches were also appointed as new regional chief imams. In their dual role as CRA officials 

and imams they also collaborate with government agencies, including the security police. 

Stalled Legal Reforms 

In 2007, President Berdimuhamedov set up a new government commission, headed by the Chairman of 

the Supreme Court but specifying no other members or any procedures, to examine citizens’ petitions on 

the work of law enforcement bodies. Reportedly, this commission received thousands of petitions on 

police abuse, bribery, and unjust arrests and prosecutions. In August 2007, the commission issued its first 

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decision: the pardon and release of 11 prisoners of conscience, including former Chief Mufti Nasrullah 

ibn Ibadullah, who had been sentenced to a 22-year prison term in a secret 2004 trial. Ibadullah had 

opposed Niyazov’s decree that the Ruhnama be displayed in mosques, and had been charged with treason 

for his alleged role in a 2002 coup attempt against Niyazov. Following his release, Ibadullah was allowed 

to resume work as a senior adviser to the CRA. 

During USCIRF’s August 2007 visit to Turkmenistan, the Turkmen President established a new 

commission to examine how the country’s laws conform to international human rights commitments. 

President Berdimuhamedov told USCIRF that his country “may have some shortcomings on religion and 

other issues.” In February 2008, the then-director of the Presidential Institute on Democracy and Human 

Rights, Shirin Akhmedova, pledged that the process amending the Turkmen religion law would be 

“transparent” and involve “international experts,” and claimed that Turkmen citizens could also suggest 

amendments. 

The Turkmen government requested in 2008 that the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) provide a technical critique of Turkmen laws affecting religious freedom. USAID awarded a 

grant to a U.S. non-governmental group, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNPL), to 

analyze the Turkmen religion law. ICNPL presented its review to the Turkmen government in July 2008. 

The Turkmen government postponed a follow-up seminar with international experts that had been 

scheduled for March 2010. Reportedly, the government has not yet even begun to draft a revised religion 

law; a draft NGO law, which would also affect religious communities, has been given priority. 

Registration 

In response to international pressure, President Niyazov issued several decrees in 2004 that reduced the 

registration requirement for religious groups from 500 members to five, eased other registration 

requirements, and decriminalized unregistered religious activity. However, unregistered groups still face 

administrative penalties that include imprisonment and large fines and, as mentioned above, the Turkmen 

government told the UN in January 2010 that it continues to ban unregistered religious activity. 

Moreover, the benefits of registration are not fully clear, since even registered groups are forbidden to 

meet for worship in private homes, print and import religious literature, and be led by foreign citizens. 

Registered groups also are subject to financial restrictions and required to provide the government with 

information about their meetings and activities. 

The Justice Ministry manages the registration process, with the CRA playing an advisory role. A 

commission which includes representatives from the Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs and the 

security services reviews applications. The review process is supposed to last no longer than three 

months and written denials are to be issued, but these standards are often not met. Reportedly, Justice 

Ministry officials have denied registration based on spurious clerical errors or required that religious 

groups change their church charters in order to register. 

Following the 2004 decrees, nine small minority religious groups were registered, including the Baha’i, 

several Pentecostal communities, Adventists, several Evangelical churches and the Society for Krishna 

Consciousness. The Ashgabat parish of the ROC was reregistered in 2005 and the Turkmenabat ROC 

parish was reregistered in early 2006. The Source of Life Church in Turkmenabat and a Muslim group in 

Akhal were registered in late 2007. According to the CRA, Shi’a Muslim groups were allowed to 

register collectively, most likely in 2008. 

In its January 2010 UN report, the Turkmen government claimed that 123 religious communities were 

registered in the country, a far lower number than previously cited. Of these, 100 are Muslim, both Sunni 

and Shi’a, and 13 are Russian Orthodox. The 10 others include Baptist, Pentecostal, Greater Grace, 

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Seventh-day Adventist, New Apostolic, Baha’i and Hare Krishna. After years of effort, Ashgabat’s 

Catholic community, protected by the Vatican diplomatic status of its two priests and chapel, gained local 

legal status in March 2010. Nevertheless, it is unclear how the Catholic congregation met the Turkmen 

legal requirement that any religious community must be headed by a Turkmen citizen. 

Also according to the January report, the Turkmen Justice Ministry was considering registration 

applications from four religious communities, including the Peace to the World Protestant Church in 

Mary and the Parth of Faith Church in Dashoguz, an independent ethnic Turkmen Baptist congregation 

whose registration has been under consideration for five years. According to Forum 18, some Shi'a 

Muslim groups, the Armenian Apostolic Church, some Protestant groups, and the Jehovah’s Witnesses 

have had applications rejected or have decided that they should not submit applications due to the onerous 

and opaque process. Reportedly, the Turkmen government has also pressured some groups to write 

promises that they will not gather for worship until they receive official registration. 

Government Interference in Internal Religious Structures 

The Turkmen government also continues to interfere in the internal leadership and organizational 

arrangements of religious communities. The current Chief Mufti, Gurban Haitliev, appointed in 

September 2009, is widely believed to have been chosen by the president. At the time he was appointed, 

numerous regional imams were transferred to new duties, thereby continuing former President Niyazov’s 

practice of frequent rotation of official leaders. 

Muslims in Turkmenistan have expressed concern about the state’s replacement of imams with formal 

Islamic theological education by those who lack such education. Indeed, the former Turkmen Chief 

Mufti, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, who was imprisoned from 2004-2007, is seen by many as the country’s 

last Muslim leader with a good knowledge of Islam. Turkmen officials have stated that imams cannot be 

appointed if they have received training outside the country. Furthermore, observers note official ethnic 

discrimination as a factor in the recent removal from office of ethnic Uzbek minority imams in the 

Dashoguz region and their replacement with ethnic Turkmen imams. 

Former President Niyazov requested that the ROC in Turkmenistan be removed from the Central Asian 

diocese in Tashkent and come under Moscow Patriarchate jurisdiction. The new president continued to 

press for this transfer. In October 2007, the ROC Holy Synod in Moscow voted to place Turkmenistan’s 

12 ROC parishes and one convent in Ashgabat under the Moscow Patriarchate’s jurisdiction. In May 

2008, subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate became official as a result of a meeting between 

President Berdimuhamedov and ROC officials. The ROC named Bishop Feofilakt (Kuryanov) as the first 

head of the Patriarchal Deanery for Turkmenistan. 

USCIRF also was informed in 2007 that the Turkmen Justice Ministry reportedly “advised” several 

smaller unregistered groups to combine with other, currently registered communities, without considering 

possible doctrinal differences or need for organizational autonomy. 

Penalties for Religious Activities 

In recent years, members of religious communities, including Muslims, Protestants, Jehovah’s Witnesses 

and a Hare Krishna, reportedly received prison terms or were sent into internal exile due to their religious 

convictions. There were, however, no reports of such punishments in the past year. A Sunni mullah 

reportedly has been held since 2006 in a closed psychiatric hospital; he gave sermons critical of the 

Turkmen government, according to Forum 18. His name and current status are unknown. 

 

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In April 2009, Turkmen officials ordered Shageldy Atakov, a Turkmen Baptist leader either to pay a fine 

of $12,000 for his alleged swindle of the equivalent sum in 1995 or his home would be confiscated. A 

former political prisoner who already has served time for the alleged swindle, Atakov claims this penalty 

is due to his religious activities; since May 2009, there reportedly have been no official efforts to make 

him pay. 

Local secret police officers reportedly require Muslim and Orthodox clerics to make regular reports on 

activities within their communities. At least six secret police agents, as well as informants, allegedly have 

been placed in each Muslim and Orthodox community and the secret police and ordinary police also try to 

recruit agents in unregistered religious groups. In addition, unregistered religious communities face raids 

by secret police, anti-terrorist police units, local government, and local CRA officials. Registered 

religious communities also are subjected to raids or check-ups. 

For example, in December 2009 the Path of Faith Baptist congregation in Dashoguz, which is awaiting a 

decision on its registration application, was subjected to a police raid. The country’s former Chief Mufti, 

who is now the senior regional CRA official, participated in the raid. Some 100 Christian books, 

including personal Bibles, were confiscated, Forum 18 reported. All 22 people at the service were taken 

to the local government building and pressured to sign statements not to attend the church. In January 

2010 the pastor of a registered Protestant church in Dashoguz, was questioned by police and local CRA 

after he gave a brief prayer at a birthday party. He was charged with violating the religion law, even 

though the host had requested the prayer and the church’s registration allows the pastor to conduct 

religious activity throughout Dashoguz region. 

The only reported instance of physical abuse against a member of a religious minority in the past year 

also led to the unprecedented imposition of a penalty against the police officer involved, according to the 

State Department. On May 6, 2009, a police officer in Turkmenabad reportedly beat a Jehovah’s 

Witness. Her mother later reported the incident to the local public prosecutor. The prosecutor reportedly 

summoned the police officer and ordered him to pay damages of about U.S. $540. 

 Conscientious Objectors 

Under Turkmen law, it is a crime for men to refuse military service and there are no legal provisions for a 

civilian service alternative. Those who refuse to serve in the Turkmen military face a maximum two-year 

term of imprisonment. Despite urging from the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, the UN Human Rights Council, and USCIRF, the Turkmen government has not introduced such 

an alternative. 

As of March 2010, five Jehovah’s Witnesses were imprisoned and two others were serving suspended 

sentences for refusing to perform military service. In December 2008, Sakhetmurad and 

Mukhammedmurad Annamamedov each received a two-year suspended sentence, but in May 2009 were 

transferred to prison for the rest of their terms. They became the first Jehovah’s Witnesses since 2007 to 

be jailed as conscientious objectors to military service. In July 2009, two other Jehovah’s Witnesses were 

sentenced to prison terms; Shadurdi Ushotov received a two-year sentence and Akmurat Egendurdiev 

received an 18-month term. In December 2009, Navruz Nasyrlaev was sentenced to two years of 

imprisonment. In April 2009, two Jehovah’s Witness conscientious objectors, Zafar Abdullaev and 

Dovran Kushmanov, received two-year suspended sentences. Both live under restrictions at home, 

having to report regularly to the police and requiring permission to travel out of the city. 

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Restrictions on Meeting for Worship 

It is illegal for unregistered religious groups to rent, purchase, or construct places of worship. Registered 

groups must obtain government permission, which is often difficult to obtain, to build or rent worship 

places. For meeting to worship in unapproved areas, such as private homes, congregations face police 

raids, court-imposed fines and other forms of harassment. For instance, in 2008 several Jehovah’s 

Witnesses who are members of an unregistered religious community were threatened by police with rape 

and efforts were made to force them to recant their faith due to their participation in “illegal” religious 

activities, according to Forum 18. 

While some new construction of mosques is underway according to the State Department, the government 

also refuses to allow the construction of three Shi’a mosques. The Turkmen government is building 

monumental mosques in Koneürgench in the northern Dashoguz region, in Mary in the east of the 

country, and in Gypchak. Reportedly, a mosque under construction in 2009 will be named in honor of 

President Berdimuhamedov; the equivalent of U.S. $1,000,000 for the building will be drawn from a 

special presidential fund. It is unclear how the construction of these mosques is in line with the 

constitutional separation of religion from the state since they are built at public expense. In addition, the 

Turkmen government reportedly has not adequately compensated the owners of private houses destroyed 

on the sites of the future state-funded mosques. 

With government permission, an ROC Cathedral is being constructed in Ashgabat, albeit slowly. The 

land for the cathedral was granted in 2007. In April 2009, for the first time in 12 years, Russian 

Orthodox church was consecrated in Turkmenistan, in the city of Tejan. In the summer of 2009, officials 

in the city of Dashoguz granted a construction permit for a new Russian Orthodox church. However, city 

authorities also reportedly decided to construct high-rise buildings around that church, apparently so that 

its domes will not be easily visible, according to the Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights. 

Five registered minority religious communities have managed to establish places of worship. Three are 

rented and two are in the private homes of members of Baha’i and Hare Krishna communities. Worship 

in private homes, however, is limited to nuclear family members who belong to registered religious 

communities. Turkmen officials have told the State Department that if neighbors do not object, worship 

in private homes is allowed. Nevertheless, security police reportedly continue to break up religious 

meetings in private homes and search homes without warrants. The leader of a registered Christian 

community told USCIRF in 2007 that after registration, he could no longer invite friends and family to 

worship, even in his own apartment. Officials told him that private worship must be limited to husband 

and wife and children and could not include adult parents and siblings. 

There have been no recent reports of destruction of houses of worship by the Turkmen authorities. In the 

Niyazov era the state reportedly closed, confiscated, or destroyed at least a dozen houses of worship. 

Despite the country’s vast financial resources from the sale of natural gas (most funds reportedly are held 

in personal accounts in western banks), Turkmen officials told Forum 18 in August 2008 that no 

compensation would be paid to any religious community for the destruction or confiscation of at least 17 

mosques and churches that took place under Niyazov. 

One leader of a registered Pentecostal church told USCIRF in 2007 that his home in Ashgabat had been 

confiscated because unsanctioned worship services were held there. Despite years of effort, his personal 

property has not yet been returned to him. 

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Restrictions on Religious Literature 

The publication of religious literature inside Turkmenistan is banned by decree. The CRA must approve 

all imported religious literature, but since Islam and Russian Orthodoxy are the only religions represented, 

the CRA’s knowledge of other religions is limited. The State Department reported that the Koran was 

“practically unavailable” at state bookstores in Ashgabat in 2009. While most homes have one Arabic 

copy of the Koran, few are available in Turkmen. The local CRA branches frequently confiscate and 

photocopy literature. Religious communities need a license to copy religious literature already in their 

possession. One leader of a registered Protestant community said that the Justice Ministry had threatened 

his church for trying to copy religious material without a license. 

By law, only registered religious communities can import religious literature, and the quantities must 

correlate to the number of members in their congregations. Members of religious minority communities 

report that they are usually denied official permission to import religious literature and it is often 

confiscated before it can be submitted for official examination. Customs officers restrict returning 

travelers, regardless of citizenship, to only a small amount of religious literature for personal use. The 

State Department reported in 2009 that Turks who reside in Turkmenistan have had their personal Korans 

confiscated at the border. Religious literature, CDs, and DVDs found during police raids are routinely 

confiscated and rarely returned. Bibles and other literature continue to be confiscated from minority 

religious communities. Unlike in previous years, however, ethnic Turkmen members of unregistered 

religious groups accused of disseminating religious material were not singled out for particularly harsh 

treatment. 

The ROC can receive and distribute Bibles easily, but reportedly it does not share them with Protestants 

because it views them as competitors. Moreover, the Russian Orthodox community is impacted by the 

government’s policy banning Turkmen residents from receiving Russian publications by mail, including 

the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. According to Protestant groups, neither a Bible Society nor 

Christian bookshops are allowed to exist. 

 

Internet users in Turkmenistan cannot access most international religious websites because the state has 

a monopoly on Internet access. The government also reportedly uses a computer program to search 

emails for coded words and blocks “suspicious” messages. Moreover, in 2009 the Turkmen government 

established a new government committee to approve all books, films, plays, art, and cultural programs, 

the State Department reported. 

Restrictions on Religious Education 

Turkmenistan’s religion law bans the private teaching of religion, as the Turkmen government recently 

acknowledged in its January 2010 report to the UN Human Rights Committee. Only individuals who 

have graduated from institutions of higher religious education (domestic or foreign is not specified) and 

are CRA-approved may offer religious instruction, and such instruction must take place in officiallyapproved institutions. However, some independent religious education unofficially takes place. 

Under the religion law, mosques are allowed to provide religious education to children after school for 

four hours per week, as long as parents have given their approval. Some Sunni mosques have regularly 

scheduled Koran instruction. The 2003 religion law prohibits the ROC from conducting religious 

education programs without CRA and presidential approval and there were, according to the State 

Department, no reports that such programs had been approved. 

 

Muslims are not allowed to travel abroad for religious education. In July 2009, the building of the 

Islamic Theology Department of Turkmen State University in Ashgabat reportedly was demolished. 

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Government officials refuted these claims, but an official at the university said that students have 

relocated to the main building of the university. According to Forum 18, the faculty only had 60 students 

in its five-year course and it no longer is allowed to employ foreign staff. 

The country’s largest religious minority, the Russian Orthodox community, has no institution in 

Turkmenistan to train clergy, although Russian Orthodox men are allowed to leave the country for clerical 

training. Shi’a Muslims, most belonging to Iranian and Azeri ethnic minorities, also have no religious 

training institutions in Turkmenistan. Even registered religious minority communities have difficulty 

with regard to training; one leader has said that most religious training is conducted informally and in 

private homes. 

Restrictions on International Travel and Foreign Religious Workers 

The current Turkmen government continues to interfere with the ability of Turkmen religious adherents to 

travel outside the country. In 2009, Turkmen authorities did not allow any Muslims to leave the country 

to perform the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), allegedly due to fear of swine flu infection. Instead, The 

Turkmen government organized “an internal hajj” for 188 officially-designated Muslim pilgrims to travel 

to 38 sites inside Turkmenistan. Some of these sites had religious significance, such as an eleventhcentury mosque that honors Sufi saints, but others allegedly were selected to display government efforts 

to improve public welfare. The government had long limited the annual number of Turkmen hajj

pilgrims to 188, even though the country’s official Saudi quota is at least 4,000 people and Turkmen 

reportedly have had to pay bribes to be included on the list. 

Obtaining entry visas continues to be difficult for certain groups of foreign religious workers and 

coreligionists. The last known visit to Turkmenistan by Armenian Apostolic Church clergy was in 1999, 

although the country has long had an ethnic Armenian minority. The Baha’is report that it is impossible 

for their foreign relatives to receive permission to visit Turkmenistan, although Baha’i adherents can 

leave the country on visits. However, in the past several years, the Turkmen government has allowed 

international travel for the representatives of certain religious communities. ROC Metropolitan Kyril was 

permitted to visit Turkmenistan in May 2008, the first visit by a ROC leader since 2003. During 2009, 

the Turkmen government permitted visits by foreign religious leaders to conduct religious services for at 

least three registered minority religious groups, according to the State Department. In addition, the New 

Apostolic Church received its first permission for a visit by a European church leader in April 2009. 

Status of Presidential Personality Cult 

The new Turkmen government appears to be moving away from Niyazov’s personality cult and the 

forceful official promotion of the Ruhnama. The Ruhnama has been removed from government buildings 

and from mosques, including the large mosque in Niyazov’s native village of Gipchak, although its 

inscriptions remain emblazoned on that mosque’s walls. A USCIRF delegation visited the Gipchak 

mosque in 2007; above the mikhrab, or the special bay in the mosque wall directed toward Mecca, was 

the word “Turkmenbashi,” Niyazov’s self-designated title, in a display that most Muslims would consider 

deeply offensive. 

Imams no longer are required to repeat a loyalty oath to the “fatherland” and Niyazov after each daily 

prayer. The amount of time public school students must spend studying the Ruhnama has been reduced, 

although Niyazov’s works remain part of the curriculum and students still must pass examinations on 

them for advancement, graduation, or admission to higher educational institutions. The Turkmen 

Academy of Sciences, closed at Niyazov’s order, has been re-opened. Articles by Turkmen historians and 

the works of four classical Turkmen authors have been published. Nevertheless, a university named in 

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honor of the Ruhnama was opened in 2009 and the Turkmen president recommended later in the year that 

the book be used to educate youth. 

There are concerns that President Berdimuhamedov is seeking to establish a new presidential personality 

cult around himself, but without religious overtones. Although the new president in 2008 ordered the 

removal of all Niyazov portraits and Ruhnama citations from the outside of buildings throughout the 

country, many were replaced with large portraits and posters of the current President. Most secondary 

school textbooks were revised to remove all text devoted to Niyazov and his family, but a picture of 

Niyazov still appears on the first page of textbooks. The new books also include pictures of the new 

president, and the text on his “New Revival” ideology has replaced the previous text on Niyazov and his 

family, according to the State Department. Reportedly, Presidential administration representatives now 

sell the new president’s books on medicine, the history of his family and on Akhal-Tekke horses to public 

institutions, including schools. 

The Turkmen government also requires teachers and students to spend 70 to 80 days of the academic year 

in state-sponsored extracurricular events. For example, in late 2009, hundreds were forced to stand on 

line overnight in sub-zero weather in the Dashoguz region to greet the new Turkmen president. The State 

Department reported in 2009 that secondary school teachers are now required to agree to salary cuts if 

they do not participate in such events, and participating students receive an “A” grade for the day. 

Relations with International Organizations 

After five years of requests, Asma Jahangir, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, visited Turkmenistan in September 2008. Her report, which was published in January 2009, noted 

some improvements since 2007, but expressed concern about continuing legal restrictions, including 

regarding religious activities, places of worship, religious materials, and the arbitrary implementation of 

laws. As the Special Rapporteur observed in a press release, the official Turkmen media ignored these 

concerns and reported only her praise of new Turkmen president’s reforms. Moreover, according to 

Human Rights Watch, Turkmen security services warned representatives of at least three religious 

communities in Ashgabat not to meet with the Special Rapporteur during her visit. 

In 2008, the UN Human Rights Council conducted its first Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of 

Turkmenistan’s human rights record. The Turkmen government rejected calls for various human rights 

reforms, such as the release of political prisoners. The government’s representative also stated during the 

UPR session that the government planned to amend the country’s religion law and address registration 

issues consistent with the USAID-funded ICNPL study. As discussed above, however, no such legal 

reforms have yet been undertaken. 

In 2009, the Turkmen government continued its policy of boycotting human rights meetings of the 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and has not released from imprisonment 

Batyr Berdiev, the former Turkmen ambassador to the OSCE. The OSCE’s Ashgabat Center in 2009, 

however, held numerous events relating to human rights, including various seminars with foreign human 

rights experts. In addition the Ashgabat Center has created a free-of-charge searchable database, 

available online, containing Turkmen laws and international treaties signed by Turkmenistan for the use 

of lawmakers, parliamentary staff, courts and prosecutor’s offices, government officials, legal experts and 

the general public. 

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U.S. Policy 

The United States for four years has not been represented in this strategically important country by a fully 

accredited ambassador, despite its many interests in Turkmenistan, including overflight rights to 

Afghanistan and the country’s huge natural gas supplies. Moreover, previous U.S. ambassadors played an 

important role in highlighting the importance of respect for human rights in Turkmenistan. 

The United States also has an interest in ensuring the Turkmen government does not again adopt 

isolationism as state policy. Such a policy, especially in view of the 20-year Niyazov era, runs the risk of 

continuing a cultural, ideological, and religious vacuum in Turkmenistan. Since Turkmenistan shares 

long and porous borders with Iran and Afghanistan, the country may also become open to radical Islamist 

influences. 

 

In 2009, there were two reminders that the Turkmen government may be returning to isolationism vis-ávis the United States, at least on policies that benefit the Turkmen population. In September, 47 U.S. 

Peace Corps volunteers were abruptly informed that they had been denied Turkmen entry visas. Even 

though it finally granted entry permits to seven Peace Corps members in March 2010, the Turkmen 

government reduced the total number of Peace Corps volunteers from 70 to 50. In the summer of 2009, 

the Turkmen government also refused exit permits to some 150 Turkmen who were students at the 

American University of Central Asia in Bishkek. While about half of those students were eventually 

given exit visas, others reportedly are still banned from foreign travel. 

In its programs in Turkmenistan, the U.S. government has stressed the importance of freedom of 

information and media. The United States has sent Turkmen professionals, government officials, and 

students to the United States for study, including foreign policy and broadcast journalism programs. The 

U.S. government also provides funding for local civil society projects, including leadership camps and 

seminars, and promotes greater access to information by funding a resource center to provide Turkmen 

with Internet access and computer training. The United States also encourages the Turkmen government 

to revise its laws on religion and mass media and reform its criminal code. The U.S. government also 

meets with representatives of Turkmen religious groups to promote religious freedom. 

Recommendations 

I. Expanding U.S.-Turkmen Bilateral Relations

The U.S. government should: 

• appoint an ambassador to Turkmenistan as soon as possible, as the United States has not been 

represented by a fully accredited ambassador for four years and previous U.S. ambassadors have 

played an important role in highlighting the importance of respect for human rights in Turkmenistan; 

• urge the full implementation of USAID’s technical critique of Turkmen laws affecting religious 

freedom; and 

• establish a program of bilateral meetings with the government of Turkmenistan on human rights and 

on freedom of religion or belief, to discuss ways Turkmenistan can implement laws and practices to 

comply with international human rights standards, as well as establish a regular reporting mechanism 

on these issues. 

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II. Promoting Freedom of Religion or Belief and Other Human Rights 

 

The U.S. government should urge the government of Turkmenistan to: 

• repeal all laws, decrees or regulations, and amend those articles of the religion law, that are found to 

be in violation of international norms on freedom of religion or belief, for example by implementation 

of the recommendations of the recent USAID-funded analysis of that law; 

• eliminate intrusive and onerous registration procedures and abolish criminal or other penalties for 

engaging in religious or other peaceful activity solely because it has not been approved by the state; 

• halt unlawful arrest, detention, harassment, deportation, fines, and residential and workplace 

intimidation of members of religious communities due to their peaceful practice of religious or other 

beliefs; 

• end fully the harassment and unlawful deportation of religious leaders and the imposition of fines on 

members of peaceful unregistered religious communities whose activities officially are deemed 

“illegal;” 

• end the imposition of the Ruhnama or other state-sponsored texts or ideology in public institutions 

and religious organizations; 

• promulgate new regulations and adopt new policies to ease the importation of religious and other 

material and permit the domestic printing and dissemination of such material in accordance with 

international standards; 

• restore genuine legal alternatives to military service on the grounds of religious or conscientious 

objection based on international precedents, including those of the OSCE, and cease the criminal 

prosecution of, and fully restore the civil and political rights of, Jehovah’s Witnesses and others who 

refuse to serve in the army on the grounds of conscience; 

• expand and regularize the work of the government’s Commission to Examine Turkmenistan’s Legal 

Obligations under International Human Rights Law, established in August 2007, including by the 

systematic and effective involvement of international legal experts, such as those of the OSCE Panel 

of Experts on Religion or Belief and the OSCE Panel on Freedom of Association, and relevant UN 

experts; 

• reform the government’s other policies toward religious practice, including the end of state 

interference in the management of religious communities and the selection and training of religious 

leaders, including from Sunni and Shi’a Muslim and the Russian Orthodox communities, as well as 

from Protestant and other minority communities; and 

• permit a USCIRF delegation to return to Turkmenistan to assess progress on implementation on 

freedom of religion or belief, including Constitutional amendments and legislative reforms, speak 

with current or former prisoners of conscience in places of detention and speak unimpeded with 

religious and other organizations and their members. 

 

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III. Expanding U.S. Programs and Other Activities to Promote Human Rights and Reform 

Efforts 

The U.S. government should: 

y increase and improve radio, Internet, and other broadcasts of objective news and information, 

including on topics such as freedom of religion or belief and on other human rights and religious 

tolerance, by: 

 

--expanding and improving broadcasts to Turkmenistan by the Turkmen Service of Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), including by increasing coverage of issues relating to freedom of 

religion or belief, adding Russian-language broadcasts, and providing additional programming for the 

estimated 12 million Turkmen in the diaspora, particularly in Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan; and 

--restoring Voice of America’s Russian-language television and radio broadcasts to Central Asia, 

particularly those broadcasts relating to human rights, including freedom of religion or belief. 

y assist in improving Turkmenistan’s educational system, particularly with regard to curricula on 

religious freedom and other human rights, by: 

--reprinting Russian and Turkmen language materials on human rights, particularly on international 

norms on freedom of religion or belief, including civic education materials such as “The Law that 

Unifies Us,” first published and distributed by the OSCE Center in Ashgabat; and 

--providing funds for libraries in Ashgabat and other cities, including materials on human rights, as 

well as freedom of religion or belief, tolerance, civic education, and international legal standards; 

y develop assistance programs to encourage civil society groups that protect human rights and promote 

freedom of religion or belief, including by expanding legal assistance programs for representatives of 

religious communities through grants that address freedom of religion or belief via the USAID 

Democracy and Conflict Mitigation or the Democracy Commission Small Grants program 

administered by the U.S. Embassy; 

• expand international contacts and increase U.S. involvement in communities in Turkmenistan by 

increasing the budgets of the Peace Corps and USAID programs, include religious leaders in 

community projects in efforts to address social problems and increase religious and ethnic tolerance, 

and expand exchange programs, including with civil society leaders, students, and others concerned 

with human rights; and 

• cooperating with the OSCE Center in Ashgabat, including by resuming joint activities with human 

rights activists from Turkmenistan to encourage civic education, including on international norms on 

freedom of religion or belief as well as other human rights, and also by encouraging the OSCE 

officially to respond to the Turkmen government’s offer in May 2007 to host an OSCE experts’ level 

meeting. 

 

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IV. Strengthening Efforts in the International Arena 

With regard to international fora, the U.S. government should urge the government of Turkmenistan to: 

y implement the recommendations of the October 2006 Report of the UN Secretary General on the 

Situation of Human Rights in Turkmenistan and the 2008 recommendations of the UN Human Rights 

Council during the UPR of Turkmenistan; 

y agree to the numerous requests for visits by the UN Special Rapporteurs, as well as representatives of 

the OSCE, including its Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief, and provide the full and 

necessary conditions for such visits; and 

y participate fully in the OSCE, including in the annual Human Dimension meeting in Warsaw and 

expand the activities of the OSCE Center in Ashgabat, particularly on human rights, including 

programs with local schools, universities, and institutes on human rights standards, including freedom 

of religion or belief. 

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Uzbekistan 

FINDINGS: Since Uzbekistan gained independence in 1991, fundamental human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief, have been under assault. The Uzbek government harshly penalizes 

individuals for independent religious activity, regardless of their religious affiliation. A restrictive 

religion law severely limits the rights of all religious communities and facilitates the Uzbek 

government’s control over them, particularly the majority Muslim community. The Uzbek 

government continues to arrest Muslims and repress individuals, groups, and mosques that do not 

conform to government-prescribed practices or that the government claims are associated with 

extremist political programs. This policy has resulted in the imprisonment of thousands of persons; 

many reportedly are denied due process and are subjected to torture. Though security threats do 

exist in Uzbekistan, including from members of groups that claim a religious linkage, these threats 

do not excuse or justify the scope and severity of the Uzbek government’s maltreatment of religious 

believers. 

Based on these severe violations, USCIRF continues to recommend in 2010 that Uzbekistan be 

designated as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. The State Department has so designated 

Uzbekistan since 2006. 

Uzbek police and security forces raid and repress members of registered and unregistered religious 

groups for peaceful religious activity. Members of non-violent unregistered Muslim groups have 

been convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms in trials that fall far short of international 

standards. Since 2008, the Uzbek government has initiated a campaign against the Nur group, 

charging them with alleged extremism, although they are not known to use or advocate violence. 

Uzbek courts in 2009 sentenced 47 individuals to prison terms totaling 380 years. Religious 

minority groups, especially those viewed as engaging in proselytism, also are targeted. A 

Pentecostal pastor and three Jehovah’s Witnesses recently have been imprisoned. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: The State Department should again designate Uzbekistan 

as a CPC. Upon re-designation, no waiver should be given and sanctions should be imposed, 

including a ban on visits to the United States by high-level Uzbek officials. U.S. policy on 

Uzbekistan should be coordinated across agencies to ensure that human rights concerns are reflected 

in all dealings with the Uzbek government and that U.S. security and other assistance does not go to 

agencies responsible for particularly severe violations of religious freedom. U.S. assistance, except 

humanitarian assistance and human rights programs, should be contingent on the Uzbek 

government’s actions to improve religious freedom conditions and comply with international human 

rights standards. These actions should include ending reliance on convictions based solely on 

confessions; establishing a review mechanism for those detained or charged with religious, political, 

or security offenses; making public a detailed list of individuals currently detained or imprisoned for 

such offenses; and releasing those imprisoned solely due to their religious beliefs or practices. The 

United States also should press the Uzbek government to revise its 1998 religion law to bring it into 

accord with international standards and to permit an independent international investigation into the 

May 2005 Andijon events. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy towards Uzbekistan can be 

found at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Legal Framework 

Uzbekistan’s 1998 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations severely restricts the 

exercise of religious freedom. Through regulations that are often arbitrarily applied, the law imposes 

onerous hurdles for the registration of religious groups, particularly minority religious groups. The law 

criminalizes unregistered religious activity; bans the production and distribution of unofficial religious 

publications; prohibits minors from participating in religious organizations; bans private teaching of 

religious principles; and forbids the wearing of religious clothing in public by anyone other than clerics. 

The term “religious clothing” is not defined. As a result, some Muslim men reportedly hesitate to grow 

beards or wear traditional clothing and women wearing head scarves have encountered official 

difficulties, although as of 2008 these difficulties seem to have decreased. The law also limits religious 

instruction to officially sanctioned religious schools and state-approved instructors, does not permit 

private instruction, and levies fines for violations. Only six entities meet the Uzbek religion law’s 

requirement to train religious personnel, and only seven have the legal right to import, publish, or 

distribute religious literature. 

Under Uzbek law, it is a criminal offense, punishable by up to five years imprisonment, to organize an 

“illegal” religious group (a group that is merely unregistered) or to resume such a group’s activities after 

it has been denied registration or ordered to disband. Individual participation in an unregistered group is a 

crime punishable by up to three years in prison. The Uzbek criminal code distinguishes between “illegal” 

groups, which are not properly registered, and “prohibited,” alleged extremist, groups. (See discussion 

under Extremism Laws below.) Those who participate in prohibited groups face imprisonment for up to 

20 years. Uzbek courts, however, have often ignored the distinction between illegal and prohibited 

groups, and convicted alleged members of unregistered Muslim groups under both statutes. 

The government modified the country’s criminal and administrative codes in late 2005 and 2006 to 

introduce heavier fines— as much as 200 to 300 times the minimum monthly wage— for repeated 

violations of the rules on religious meetings, processions, other ceremonies, and education. Repeated 

violations of the provisions related to religious literature may result in a fine of 100 to 200 times the 

minimum monthly wage or corrective labor of up to three years. 

Worship meetings and all other religious activities are illegal for unregistered religious groups. 

Unregistered religious congregations may be subject to massive fines and police raids, as well as threats 

of physical violence, detentions, and arrest. Without legal registration status, religious groups cannot 

open bank accounts; construct, rent, or buy buildings; print religious literature; or appoint or hire a 

religious leader. Many religious groups are unable to meet the registration requirements, which include: a 

minimum of 100 members who are Uzbek citizens; a fee amounting to 50 times the minimum monthly 

wage; the submission of numerous documents setting out the group’s rules, meeting protocol, and 

certification that other requirements have been fulfilled; and proof of a valid legal address. In addition, 

Uzbek officials reportedly create administrative barriers to registration, such as rejecting applications that 

meet the requirements, claiming that applicants have falsified congregation lists; discovering grammatical 

or other technical errors in a religious group’s charter, imposing obstacles in certifying addresses, or 

claiming improper certifications by fire inspectors, sanitation workers, or other officials. 

In 1998, the Uzbek government closed down approximately 3,000 of the 5,000 mosques that were open at 

that time. Since then, closed as well new mosques, continue to face difficulties in gaining registration. 

Several mosques in the Ferghana valley, viewed as the country’s most actively religious region, were not 

registered even though they meet the number of congregants required by Uzbek law. Nevertheless, a 

number of unofficial, independent mosques reportedly are allowed to operate quietly under the watch of 

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official imams. Uzbek authorities also permitted the operation of an unregistered Sufi monastery in 

Kokand in the Ferghana valley. The Uzbek government sometimes promotes Sufism, particularly the 

native Naqshbandi order, as an alternative to foreign Islam, which it views as extremist. 

Many non-Muslim religious groups also face great difficulty in registering with the government. For 

instance, since 1999 the registration applications of all Baptist churches have been rejected by Uzbek 

authorities. Churches which have repeatedly been denied registration include the Bethany Baptist Church 

in the Mirzo-Ulugbek District of Tashkent, the Pentecostal Church in Chirchik, the Emmanuel and Mir

(Peace) Churches in Nukus, the Hushkhabar Church in Guliston, the Pentecostal Church in Andijon, the 

Baptist Church in Gazalkent, and the Adventist, Greater Grace Christian, and Miral Protestant Churches, 

all in Samarkand. Some Protestant communities, however, such as the Council of Churches Baptists, 

refuse on principle to seek registration. Many churches, particularly evangelical churches with ethnic 

Uzbek membership, did not apply for registration because they expect local officials to refuse their 

applications. Other groups, particularly those with too few members to qualify for registration, reported 

that they did not want to draw official attention and possible official harassment. 

In November 2007, the Tashkent City Civil Court invalidated the property title of the Grace Presbyterian 

Church of Tashkent, thereby depriving it of the legal address required for registration. Since 1996, the 

Jehovah’s Witnesses have attempted to register in Tashkent on at least 23 occasions and to register in the 

provinces on 13 separate occasions. Only one Jehovah’s Witness group in the country, in Chirchik, has 

been registered, and the Uzbek government reportedly has made frequent attempts to restrict its activities. 

Application of Extremism Laws 

Over the past decade and particularly since 1999, the Uzbek government has arrested and imprisoned, 

with terms of up to 20 years, thousands of Muslims who reject the state’s control over religious practice, 

or whom the government claims are associated with extremist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). 

Reportedly, there are at least 5,000 such persons in prison, including sane individuals sent to psychiatric 

hospitals. According to international and Uzbek human rights activists, the only “crime” of many of these 

individuals is performing daily prayers and studying Islam. 

The Uzbek government bans Islamic organizations it deems extremist and criminalizes membership in 

these groups, including HT, Akromiya, Tabligh Jamoat, Nur, and other groups the government broadly 

labels “Wahhabi.” According to the Uzbek government, it does not consider repression of persons or 

groups suspected of extremism to be an issue of religious freedom, but rather of preventing armed 

resistance to the government. Security threats do exist in Uzbekistan, including from members of HT 

and other groups claiming a religious linkage. However, these threats do not excuse or justify the scope 

and severity of the government’s ill-treatment of religious believers. 

In an April 2009 report, the Moscow-based human rights group Memorial reported that 1,452 individuals 

had been prosecuted by Uzbek officials allegedly on politically motivated charges between 2004 and 

2008. Nearly 95 percent of these individuals were charged with religious extremism, including alleged 

HT membership. According to the State Department, in 2009 the number of individuals imprisoned for 

alleged HT membership appeared to decrease for the second year in a row. Alleged HT members are 

believed to comprise as many as 4,500 of the estimated 5,000 political prisoners in Uzbek prisons. In 

most of these cases, there was no evidence that the individual took part in violent acts and many of those 

arrested are wrongfully accused of membership or association. Some arrests are due to the alleged—or 

planted—possession of HT literature at the time of arrest. Additionally, according to the State 

Department, “authorities made little distinction between actual members [of HT] and those with marginal 

affiliation with the group, such as persons who had attended its Koranic study sessions.” Local human 

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rights activists have reported that police and security service officers, acting under pressure to break up 

HT cells, frequently detained family members and close associates of suspected members. 

While HT is not known to have engaged in violence, according to the State Department, its literature 

strongly suggests that it might resort to armed action. The group, which is banned in most Muslim 

countries, calls for a worldwide Islamic caliphate to replace existing governments and for the imposition 

of an extremist interpretation of Islamic law. HT literature expresses virulently anti-Semitic and antiWestern views. The Uzbek government’s prosecution of HT members appears mainly motivated by the 

group’s political activity. Nonetheless, those actions by the Uzbek government lack due process 

guarantees and also involve credible allegations of torture. 

The Uzbek government has also repressed and prosecuted members of Akromiya (or Akromiylar) since 

1997. Uzbek authorities claim that Akromiya is a branch of HT and that it, along with the terrorist Islamic 

Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), attempted to violently overthrow the Uzbek government in Andijon in 

May 2005. According to religious experts, Akromiya is an informal, peaceful association that promotes 

business with Islamic religious principles based on the 1992 writings of an imprisoned Uzbek 

mathematics teacher, Akram Yuldashev. The charges against the 23 businessmen on trial in Andijon 

included alleged membership in Akromiya. (See The Andijon Protest and its Aftermath, below.) 

Another prohibited group, Tabligh Jamoat, is an Islamic missionary group with origins in South Asia. Its 

members follow worship, dress, and grooming practices from the time of the Prophet Muhammad and 

according to the State Department claim to be exclusively religious and apolitical. In 2004, ten Tabligh

members were sentenced to prison terms in Uzbekistan after the group was listed as an extremist 

organization. 

The Uzbek government also prohibits groups and represses and prosecutes individuals it deems 

“Wahhabis.” The term “Wahhabi” usually refers to followers of the highly restrictive interpretation of 

Sunni Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. The government of Uzbekistan, however, uses the term to refer to 

a wide range of Muslim individuals or groups, including genuine extremists, political opponents of the 

Karimov regime, those educated abroad, those who practice Islam independently of government 

strictures, or those whose intellectual or religious roots derive from the teachings of three Uzbek imams 

prominent in the 1990s. (Two of these three imams have disappeared in Uzbek prisons. The third, 

Obidkhon Qori Nazarov, fled Uzbekistan after he was officially branded “Wahhabi” and was given 

political asylum in Sweden. Human rights sources say Nazarov was not promoting extremism but 

practicing independent Islam. 

After 1999, but particularly since 2008, the Uzbek government has harassed and imprisoned numerous 

alleged members of what it labels the Nur group: followers of Said Nursi, a Kurdish mullah who was 

active in Turkey after World War I. Many observers do not consider Nursi’s followers to constitute a 

formal movement, but rather to be informal groups of individuals who read his books, which were in wide 

public circulation in Uzbekistan and other post-Soviet countries in the 1990s. Although Nursi followers 

are not known to have advocated or engaged in violence, the Uzbek Religious Affairs Committee (RAC) 

listed Nur as a banned religious organization in 2000. In early 2009, Uzbek state television aired a 

documentary describing Nur as an extremist sect that aims to establish a pan-Turkic state and claiming 

that its activities “undermine our centuries-old values.” 

In 2009 and 2010, Uzbek authorities made dozens of arrests and imprisonments during a widespread 

crackdown on suspected Nur members. Two groups of Nursi’s followers were tried on charges of 

religious extremism in February 2009. These included a group of five journalists, Bahrom Ibragimov, 

Davron Kabilov, Ravshanbek Vafoyev, and U.S. exchange program alumni Abdulaziz Dadahanov and 

Botirbek Eshkuziyev, who were sentenced to between eight and 12 years in prison for producing a journal 

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called Irmoq supposedly linked to Nursi’s views. The defendants reportedly testified in court that they 

had been tortured in pretrial detention and that evidence against them had been fabricated. In April 2009, 

three individuals associated with the Yeti Iqlim newspaper, journalist Davron Tojiev, distributor Shavkat 

Ismoilov, and imam Madali Shahobiddinov, were sentenced to prison terms of eight to 12 years for 

alleged Nur membership. Two mass trials of alleged Nursi followers ended in July 2009, and 21 

defendants in Samarkand received long prison terms ranging from seven to 11 years: Hasan Karimov, 

Bahtiyor Fattaev, Nusratulla Ibadullaev, and Bahodir Hamraev received 11 years; Solejon Shirmatov, 

Bahodir Muhamadiev, and Shuhrat Hodiev received nine years; Jamshid Oblokulov and Abbos Toirov 

received eight years and Rahmatulla Ibadullaev and Fozil Ikromov received seven years. In parallel trials 

in Khorezm, ten men received prison terms between five and 11 years. According to reports, in 2009, a 

total of 47 individuals were convicted of “extremism” for being alleged Nursi followers and were 

sentenced to prison terms totaling 380 years. Local human rights groups, Veritas Youth Human Rights 

Group and the Khorezm-based Najot Human Rights Group, say that these individuals were merely 

practicing Islam outside the state-controlled framework. 

In January 2010, around 40 people were arrested by police in the central Uzbek city of Bukhara on the 

suspicion that they read Nursi literature. Local sources reported that these individuals were not 

necessarily Nursi followers, but were neighbors and friends of individuals charged as such in an earlier 

case. In early February 2010, five suspected Nursi readers reportedly have been arrested in the Ferghana 

region. In addition, 25 alleged Nursi readers serving in the Uzbek army were arrested in 2009 in 

Tashkent; reportedly, 12 are due to face a military tribunal. 

The Andijon Protest and its Aftermath 

In May 2005, after several thousand mostly unarmed civilians gathered on the Andijon central square to 

protest the trial of 23 local businessmen for alleged ties to Islamic extremism, Uzbek armed forces fired 

without warning into the crowd. Estimated fatalities range from an official Uzbek total of 187 to over 

700, according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) report that as many as 1,000 men, women, and children were killed. 

The Uzbek government continues to reject calls from the United States, the European Union (EU), the 

OSCE, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for an independent international investigation 

into these events. 

After the May 2005 Andijon events, the number of court cases in Uzbekistan against independent 

Muslims increased markedly. Uzbek authorities jailed hundreds of local residents, human rights activists, 

and journalists on suspicion of involvement in the events. The Uzbek government continues to seek out 

and persecute anyone it deems to have a connection to, or information about, the Andijon events. Even 

the relatives of human rights defenders have been threatened, dismissed from their jobs, beaten, and 

sometimes arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned on fabricated criminal charges. The government cracked 

down on both domestic and foreign-based NGOs, particularly those that focus on human rights, closing 

almost three-fourths of them. The Uzbek government also has pressured other countries forcibly to return 

Uzbek refugees who fled after the Andijon events and who were under the protection of the Office of the 

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In 2007, the UN Committee against Torture pointed to 

reports that some persons who had sought refuge abroad and were returned to Uzbekistan were subjected 

to torture. 

Conditions in Detention 

Human rights organizations report that many detainees in Uzbekistan were arrested, among other things, 

for possession of literature of a banned organization. Once arrested, they often are denied access to a 

lawyer or are held incommunicado for weeks or months. Many of those imprisoned or detained for 

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charges related to religion are treated particularly harshly; prisoners who pray or observe Muslim 

religious festivals reportedly are subjected to further harassment, beatings, and torture in an effort to 

force them to renounce their religious or political views. For example, eleven men who allegedly belong 

to a Nursi group were arrested by the Samarkand Regional National Security Service (NSS) in February 

2009 and held in that city’s investigation isolation cells where reportedly they were subjected to 

prolonged torture. 

In May 2009, Nigmat Zufarov, a labor camp inmate since 2000, began a hunger strike demanding 

permission to pray in prison. After six days, prison officials reportedly force-fed him and performed a 

forced enema using pepper solution, and they continued to beat him after he ended his hunger strike. In 

July 2009, he was found dead. Prison officials say he committed suicide, but his family reported signs of 

torture on his body. His brother Sobit, also a prisoner since 2000 in the same camp, reportedly was 

placed in an isolation cell for up to six months as punishment for praying. In September 2009, three UN 

Special Rapporteurs—on extrajudicial executions, torture, and freedom of religion or belief—wrote to the 

government of Uzbekistan raising concerns about these cases; the Uzbek government rejected the validity 

of these claims. 

Convictions in the cases described above are based almost entirely on confessions, which, according to 

the State Department, are often gained through the use of torture. Despite promises from the government 

to halt the practice, torture remains endemic in prisons, pretrial facilities, and local police and security 

service precincts, and reportedly includes the threat or use of physical violence, rape and the use of 

gasmasks to block victims’ air supply. Torture is allegedly used to force adults and children to renounce 

their beliefs or to implicate themselves or others. In 2008, the UN Committee against Torture confirmed 

numerous, on-going, and consistent allegations of the use of torture, often before formal charges are 

brought and often to extract confessions to be used in criminal proceedings. The Committee 

acknowledged that the Uzbek government had taken some limited steps to eliminate torture in detention, 

but noted continued and numerous reports that ill-treatment remained routine and systemic and that those 

who engaged in torture were rarely punished. The Committee has also called for the closure of the 

“special regimen” prison in Jaslyk where well-known poet, Yusuf Jumaev, is serving a 12-year term. 

According to Jumaev’s relatives, the poet is emaciated and beaten by guards. 

Particularly since the 2005 Andijon events, it has become increasingly difficult to gain independent 

verification of Uzbek government claims that it is combating torture and improving prison conditions. 

What is more, Uzbek authorities reportedly do not release prisoners, especially those convicted of 

religious extremism, at the end of their terms. Instead, prison authorities often extend inmates' terms 

simply by accusing them—without judicial review—of new crimes and claiming that the prisoners 

continue to represent a danger to society. 

The Uzbek authorities have also adopted repressive measures against entire families on charges of alleged 

religious extremism. One such individual is Akhmadjan Madmarov, a human rights activist from the city 

of Margilan in the Ferghana valley whom USCIRF met in 2004. In September 2007, Uzbek authorities 

extended by 16 and one-half years the sentence of Madmarov’s son, Habibullah, who was charged with 

taking part in an alleged extremist conspiracy even though he was incarcerated. Although one of 

Madmarov’s sons was released on parole after completion of his seven-year term, another son and his two 

nephews remain in prison; all have been charged with religious extremism. 

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Restrictions on Muslims 

Despite the constitutional separation of religion and state, the Uzbek government strictly regulates Islamic 

institutions and practice through the officially sanctioned Muslim Spiritual Board, the Muftiate. The state 

fully controls the training, appointments, and dismissals of Muslim leaders through the Muftiate. The 

Muftiate has banned imams in the Namangan region from preaching at Ramadan night prayers since 

2007; children were also banned from these prayers. 

In the Ferghana Valley, viewed as the country’s most active religious region, the state has confiscated a 

number of mosques in recent years and used them as warehouses or for other state purposes. Several 

years ago, the government introduced various administrative and other obstacles to religious practice in 

this region. For example, in the Andijon area, the regional head of administration in 2008 banned the five 

daily public calls to prayer from mosques and the preaching by mullahs at weddings. In addition, 

regional officials in Uzbekistan have been instructed by the central government that children should not 

attend mosque at any time. Nevertheless, despite these draconian efforts by the Uzbek government to 

limit young people’s interest in Islam, the country’s registered official mosques reportedly are very full. 

In January 2009, Uzbek authorities in Karshi threatened children and their parents for their attendance at 

worship services; several teachers asserted that Uzbek “children are not permitted to attend mosque.” The 

Deputy Hokim (governor) of Namangan region reportedly said that “school-age children should not attend 

religious meetings at all.” In the Bukhara region, an imam reportedly said that women are banned from 

attending Friday prayers in mosques, claiming this ban is “in accordance with Hanafi teachings.” 

Some 30 women reportedly were arrested in Karshi in November 2009, including Mehriniso 

Hamdamova, 40, a teacher of an officially-approved religious course for women at Karshi’s Kuk Gumbaz 

Mosque. Hamdanova was charged with providing private religious instruction for young people. Several 

of Hamdanova’s female relatives, including her sister, a daughter-in-law, and nieces, were also arrested 

on unknown charges. Allegedly, some of these women were threatened with rape if they did not testify 

against their relative. In another arrest linked to the Hamdamova case, her brother-in-law was arrested in 

January 2010 in the south-western Kashkadarya region. 

In January 2010, a Muslim newspaper and radio journalist, Hairulla Hamidov, was arrested in Tashkent 

and charged with illegal religious activity, reportedly for speaking positively about women wearing the 

hijab and for inviting independent religious leaders to speak on his radio show. Hamidov also reportedly 

founded a popular Islamic-inspired periodical in 2007 that was banned by the government six months 

later. 

Restrictions on Non-Muslims 

Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses are frequently branded by the Uzbek government as “extremists” 

for practicing religion outside state-sanctioned structures, and they face ongoing harassment, detention, 

and arrest for “illegal religious activity,” such as holding private prayer meetings or possessing “illegal” 

religious literature. In 2007, Pentecostal pastor Dmitri Shestakov from the city of Andijon was 

sentenced to a four-year term in a closed labor colony. Reportedly, Shestakov had been involved in the 

conversion of some ethnic Uzbeks to Christianity, but the official charges against him consisted of 

organizing an illegal religious group, inciting religious hatred, and distributing religious extremist 

literature. Three Jehovah’s Witnesses, Abdubannob Ahmedov, Sergei Ivanov, and Olim Turaev are 

serving prison terms ranging from two to four years on charges of teaching religion without official 

permission or for organizing unauthorized religious meetings or organizations. 

The Uzbek authorities continued their campaign against unregistered minority religious communities. In 

2009, at least 21 people reportedly were detained in Uzbekistan for taking part in unregistered religious 

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activity. Uzbek police invited a Russian Orthodox priest to take part in a March 2009 raid on a group of 

Baptists holding a prayer meeting in a private house. The priest reportedly told the Baptists that they 

should not attend unregistered worship services. In a similar incident, a pastor in the Surkhandarya region 

was fined over 83 times the minimum monthly wage for leading an unregistered worship service. 

Moreover, in 2009 various official actions have been taken against registered minority religious 

communities. In March, 20 officials raided the worship service of a registered ethnic Korean Baptist 

church in Tashkent, because official permission for the service had not been requested 10 days in 

advance. The church’s pastor was later jailed for 10 days. Administrative charges were brought against 

three leaders of the registered Full Gospel Holiness Church in the Umid village after police raided a 

Christmas service. In July, Gafur Yusupov, who lives in a facility for the disabled in eastern Uzbekistan, 

was banned from attending his registered Baptist church; the facility also forbade him contact with fellow 

congregants. After Baptists complained at Yusupov’s treatment, the facility’s official said that they 

should talk to the secret police. In September, two Baha’is received 15-day jail terms in Tashkent; one, 

whose wife and children live in Uzbekistan, was later expelled from the country. They were accused of 

missionary activity and proselytism, after police raided an officially authorized meeting of teenage 

Baha'is who also had parental consent. 

Some regions of Uzbekistan, such as Karakalpakstan and Khorezm, are noted for particularly severe antireligious campaigns, including expulsion of Hare Krishna and evangelical Protestant students from 

university and the state-ordered closure of almost all churches. 

The state-controlled media has encouraged prejudice against certain minority religious groups. It also has 

accused missionaries of posing a danger to society and equated them with religious extremists. In 

addition, government officials have held meetings at universities and schools around the country warning 

students about the “negative consequences of missionaries and religious extremism.” 

Restrictions on Religious Literature 

The official Council on Religious Affairs (CRA) must approve all religious literature. Under the religion 

law, importing, storing, producing or distributing unapproved religious materials is prohibited. 

Administrative violations are subject to fines of 20 to 100 times the minimum monthly wage for 

individuals, or 50 to 100 times the minimum monthly wage for officials of organizations. The materials 

and the means of producing and distributing them can also be confiscated and destroyed. Individuals 

already convicted of administrative offenses are liable under the criminal code to pay court-ordered fines 

of 100 to 200 tunes the minimum monthly wage or to serve a term of corrective labor of up to three years. 

The Uzbek criminal and administrative codes also punish the production and distribution of “literature 

promoting racial and religious hatred.” 

Only seven registered religious organizations (an inter-denominational Bible Society, the Muslim Board 

of Uzbekistan, two Islamic centers, and Russian Orthodox, Full Gospel, Baptist, and Roman Catholic 

offices) have the legal right to publish, import, and distribute religious literature. Moreover, a 2006 

instruction issued by the Uzbek government reportedly limits the press run of any religious book to 

fewer than 1,000 copies. 

It remains difficult to secure permission from the CRA and the Muftiate to publish Muslim literature, 

and the CRA chairman reportedly has said that the import of foreign Islamic literature has almost 

ceased. Imam Obidkhon Nazarov, the exiled former imam of Tashkent’s Tukhtaboi mosque, noted that 

even books by renowned Muslim scholars were no longer published in Uzbekistan. In addition to 

Islamic books and periodicals published by the state-controlled Muslim Board, the independent former 

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Chief Mufti, Muhamad Sadyk Muhamad Yusuf, whom the Commission met in 2004, has official 

permission to publish religious materials and to host a radio program. 

Uzbek officials also continued to confiscate imported religious literature, including two shipments of 

Jehovah’s Witness literature which were held for over a year. The CRA limits the import of Russianlanguage Jehovah’s Witnesses literature to their two registered congregations and does not allow imports 

to unregistered communities. Religious literature confiscated from Muslims, Protestants, Hare Krishna 

devotees, and Jehovah’s Witnesses is often burned and even legally imported literature is confiscated by 

police. A Protestant reported that the addressees in Uzbekistan who had requested religious literature 

never received the material sent. Many who would like to receive such material are afraid of official 

identification as Christians. 

In May 2009, a religious affairs official in Karakalpakstan region reportedly banned the Bible, a hymn 

book, and Bible commentaries. Baptists were also persecuted for distributing and owning religious 

literature. In July 2009, police raided a Baptist home and confiscated various books for “religious 

expert analysis,” including a Russian-language Koran and a Russian Orthodox prayer book. The Baptist 

faced charges of “illegal production, storage, import and distribution of materials of a religious nature.” 

In late 2009, 17 Protestants were fined for possessing “illegal” religious literature. The judge, when 

asked why he ordered an Uzbek-language copy of the New Testament to be destroyed, claimed that the 

literature had not been legally owned. In March 2010, Internet users in Uzbekistan were blocked from 

viewing a Russian-language news article on Lenta.ru about the difficulties a bearded Muslim in 

Samarkand had faced in obtaining an Uzbek passport. Other Russian and Uzbek religious news 

websites blocked by the Uzbek government include Uznews.net, Ferghana.ru, Portal-credo.ru, 

Religion.ng.ru and I-r-p.ru.

Restrictions on Religious Education 

Only six registered religious communities qualify for a central administrative body, which meets the legal 

requirement of eight regional branches, and allows them to engage in religious education. Moreover, 

Uzbek law limits religious instruction to officially sanctioned religious schools and state-approved 

instructors. The law permits no private instruction and provides for fines for violations. 

There are 10 state-controlled madrassas (including two for women) that provide secondary education in 

Uzbekistan and an official Islamic Institute and Islamic University in Tashkent that provides higher 

education. The official Muftiate conducts regulated Sunni Muslim religious education for adults. 

However, despite the presence of a Shi’a minority in the country, there is no training for Shi’a religious 

leaders, nor does the government recognize foreign Shi’a religious education, although Sunni madrassas

reportedly offer some courses in Shi’a jurisprudence. The state has also closed or confiscated privatelyfunded religious schools. 

Religious minorities in Uzbekistan are allowed only extremely limited educational opportunities by the 

Uzbek government. The Russian Orthodox Church operates two monasteries (one for women, one for 

men) and a seminary. The Jewish community lacks a rabbinate or yeshiva because it does not have 

synagogues in eight different Uzbek provinces and therefore cannot meet the legal requirements for a 

registered central office. A Jewish school in Tashkent provides instruction on Jewish culture. In 2008, 

the Uzbek government did not renew the visa of Uzbekistan’s chief rabbi, effectively expelling him from 

the country. 

Registered Christian groups and other religious communities may establish Sunday schools subject to 

numerous government restrictions, but registered religious communities that offer religious education 

have also been persecuted. In April 2009, the deacon of a registered Baptist church was given a 15-day 

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prison sentence for teaching religion to children. In December 2009, the director of the registered Baptist 

Union was banned for three years from holding an official position for tax evasion and involving children 

in religious activity without consent. Pentecostal preachers have also been detained and received massive 

fines for allegedly breaking the legal ban on teaching children religion. 

Restrictions on Foreign Travel for Religious Purposes

The Uzbek government continues to restrict international travel for religious purposes. It has also denied 

exit visas to religious minorities. For example, in March 2009, several Protestants reportedly were denied 

exit visas as punishment for their religious activity. Allegedly, Muslims and Jehovah’s Witnesses have 

also been denied exit visas. Several expatriate staff members of NGOs were deported for suspected 

missionary activity in 2009. In February, Uzbek authorities forced the departure of three U.S. citizens 

associated with the New Hope faith-based humanitarian assistance NGO, which provides medical care to 

disabled persons in Tashkent. 

For many years, the Uzbek government has allowed only 20 percent of the country’s official quota of 

25,000 pilgrims to make the religious hajj to Mecca. In 2009, only 5,000 were permitted to go. Those 

who travel must be approved by local authorities, the secret police, the CRA’s Hajj commission, and the 

Muftiate. Furthermore, hajj pilgrims reportedly must travel on state-run Uzbekistan Airlines and pay the 

equivalent of 200 times the monthly wage. 

U.S. Policy 

U.S. policy interest in Uzbekistan focuses on the county’s position as a supply route for U.S. and NATO 

International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s role has increased, with the 

establishment of the so-called “northern distribution network”— an alternative to insecure routes through 

Pakistan to supply NATO forces in Afghanistan. In January 2009, the United States entered into transit 

agreements with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to move supplies from Western Europe and the 

Baltic states to Afghanistan through those countries. Reportedly, a de-facto U.S. supply hub has been set 

up at the Uzbek airport of Navoi using a South Korean transport firm as a proxy. Uzbekistan also has 

allowed U.S. soldiers to be transferred to Afghanistan via Termez where German troops are based. These 

developments have led to concerns on the part of human rights groups that the U.S. government may 

temper its human rights criticisms of the Uzbek government and reduce its efforts to promote human 

rights in Uzbekistan to ensure the network’s continued operation. 

The U.S. State Department has designated Uzbekistan as a CPC for its systematic, egregious, ongoing 

violations of religious freedom since 2006. The CPC designation was most recently renewed in January 

2009. At that time, the State Department imposed a 180-day waiver on taking any action under IRFA to 

allow for negotiations with the government of Uzbekistan on steps to improve religious freedom. These 

negotiations have not led to the establishment of a binding agreement, despite the tolling of the 180-day 

period. USCIRF recommends that Uzbekistan be re-designated a CPC and that the waiver be dropped. 

As a consequence of the designation, the State Department should also impose sanctions, including a ban 

on visits to the United States by high-level Uzbek officials. 

In its 2009 Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report, the State Department described the goals of U.S. 

democracy and human rights policy in Uzbekistan as follows: “to promote respect for human rights 

(particularly eradicating the use of torture in the investigative process and abuse in prisons); legal reform 

and accountability; political pluralism and a strong civil society sector; freedom of the press and religion; 

and the rights of vulnerable groups, including children, women, persons with disabilities, and refugees.” 

It also stated that “U.S. security interests in the country are inseparable from its efforts to secure 

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democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as these will ultimately form the underpinning of the 

country's long-term stability and development.” 

Recommendations 

I. Speaking in a Unified Voice in its Relations with the Uzbek Government 

In addition to continuing to designate Uzbekistan as a CPC, the U.S. government should: 

• lift the waiver in place since January 2009 and impose sanctions, including a ban on visits to the 

United States by high-level Uzbek officials, as a consequence of Uzbekistan’s CPC designation;

• reduce aid and arms sales to Uzbekistan and ban visits by high-level Uzbek officials in response to 

the Uzbek government's refusal to allow an independent investigation into the violence in Andijon in 

May 2005;

• ensure that U.S. statements and actions are coordinated across agencies to ensure that U.S. concerns 

about human rights conditions in Uzbekistan are reflected in its public and private arrangements with 

the Uzbek government;

• press the Uzbek government to revise its 1998 religion law to bring it into compliance with 

international standards;

y ensure that U.S. assistance to the Uzbek government, with the exception of assistance to improve 

humanitarian conditions and advance human rights, be made contingent upon establishing and 

implementing a specific timetable for the government to take concrete steps to improve conditions of 

freedom of religion or belief and observe international human rights standards, steps which should 

include: 

--ending reliance on convictions based solely on confessions, a practice that often is linked to illtreatment of prisoners, and implementing the recommendations of the UN Committee Against 

Torture (June 2002) and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (February 2003); 

--establishing a mechanism to review the cases of persons previously detained under suspicion of or 

charged with religious, political, or security offenses, including Criminal Code Articles 159 

(criminalizing “anti-state activity”) and 216 (criminalizing membership in a “forbidden religious 

organization”); releasing those who have been imprisoned solely because of their religious beliefs 

or practices as well as any others who have been unjustly detained or sentenced; and making public 

a list of specific and detailed information about individuals who are currently detained under these 

articles or imprisoned following conviction; 

--implementing the recommendations of the OSCE Panel of Experts on Religion or Belief to revise 

the 1998 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations and bring it into accordance 

with international standards; 

--registering religious groups that have sought to comply with the legal requirements; and 

--ensuring that every prisoner has access to his or her family, human rights monitors, adequate 

medical care, and a lawyer, as specified in international human rights instruments, and allowing 

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prisoners to practice their religion while in detention to the fullest extent compatible with the 

specific nature of their detention; 

y ensure that U.S. security and other forms of assistance are scrutinized to make certain that this 

assistance does not go to Uzbek government agencies, such as certain branches of the Interior and 

Justice Ministries, which have been responsible for particularly severe violations of religious freedom 

as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998; and 

y use appropriate avenues of public diplomacy to explain to the people of Uzbekistan both why 

religious freedom is an important element of U.S. foreign policy, and what specific concerns about 

violations of religious freedom exist in their country. 

II. Encouraging Greater International Scrutiny of Uzbekistan’s Human Rights Record 

The U.S. government should: 

• work with other governments to urge the UN Human Rights Council to reverse its recent decision to 

end human rights scrutiny of Uzbekistan under the confidential 1503 procedure and to address this 

situation in a public country resolution at the Council; 

y encourage public scrutiny of Uzbek human rights concerns in appropriate international fora, such as 

the OSCE and other multilateral venues, and facilitate the participation of Uzbek human rights 

defenders in multilateral human rights mechanisms; and 

y urge the Uzbek government to agree to a visit by UN Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief and the Independence of the Judiciary, set specific visit dates, and provide the full and 

necessary conditions for such a visit. 

III. Supporting Uzbek Human Rights Defenders and Religious Freedom Initiatives 

The U.S. government should: 

y continue to carefully monitor the status of individuals who are arrested for alleged religious, political, 

and security offenses and continue efforts to improve the situation of Uzbek human rights defenders, 

including by pressing for the registration of human rights groups and religious communities; 

• support efforts to counteract the Uzbek government’s blockade on information into the country by 

increasing radio, Internet, and other broadcasting of objective news and information on issues 

relevant to Uzbekistan, including education, human rights, freedom of religion, and religious 

tolerance; 

• continue funding for the Voice of America VOA Uzbek Language Service so as to meet the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors’ stated goal of outreach to the Muslim world, including reaching 

the news-deprived population of Uzbekistan, as well as the large Uzbek diaspora in Afghanistan and 

other neighboring countries; 

 

• increase foreign travel opportunities for civil society activists, religious leaders, and others in 

Uzbekistan concerned with religious freedom to permit them to take part in relevant international 

conferences; 

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y continue to attempt to overcome the objections of the Uzbek government in order to develop 

assistance programs for Uzbekistan designed to encourage the creation of institutions of civil society 

that protect human rights and promote religious freedom, programs that could include training in 

human rights, the rule of law, and crime investigation for police and other law enforcement officials; 

since such programs have been attempted in the past with little effect, they should be carefully 

structured to accomplish, and carefully monitored and conditioned upon fulfillment of, these specific 

goals: 

--expanding legal assistance programs for Uzbek relatives of detainees, which have sometimes led to 

the release of detainees; 

-- expanding “train-the-trainer” legal assistance programs for representatives of religious 

communities to act as legal advisers in the registration process; 

--specifying freedom of religion as a grants category and area of activity in the Democracy and 

Conflict Mitigation program of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Democracy 

Commission Small Grants program administered by the U.S. Embassy; and 

--encouraging national and local public roundtables between Uzbek officials and representatives of 

Uzbek civil society on freedom of religion; and 

y increase opportunities in its exchange programs for Uzbek human rights advocates and religious 

figures, and more specifically: 

--expand exchange programs for Uzbek religious leaders to include representatives from all religious 

communities; and 

--ensure that the U.S. Embassy vigorously protests cases when an Uzbek participant in an exchange 

program encounters difficulties with the Uzbek authorities upon return to Uzbekistan, and if such 

difficulties continue, inform the Uzbek authorities that there will be negative consequences in other 

areas of U.S.-Uzbek bilateral relations, including a ban on high-level meetings. 

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Vietnam 

FINDINGS: The government of Vietnam continues to control government-approved religious 

communities, severely restrict independent religious practice, and repress individuals and groups 

viewed as challenging political authority. Religious activity continues to grow in Vietnam and the 

government has made some important changes in the past decade in response to international 

attention, including its designation as a “country of particular concern” (CPC). Nevertheless, 

individuals continue to be imprisoned or detained for reasons related to their religious activity or 

religious freedom advocacy; police and government officials are not held fully accountable for 

abuses; independent religious activity remains illegal; legal protections for government-approved 

religious organizations are both vague and subject to arbitrary or discriminatory interpretations 

based on political factors; and new converts to some Protestant and Buddhist communities face 

discrimination and pressure to renounce their faith. In addition, improvements experienced by 

some religious communities are not experienced by others, including the Unified Buddhist Church 

of Vietnam (UBCV), independent Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Protestant groups, and some ethnic 

minority Protestants and Buddhists. Property disputes between the government and the Catholic 

Church continue to lead to harassment, property destruction, and violence, sometimes by “contract 

thugs” hired by the government to break up peaceful prayer vigils. In the past year, the government 

harassed monks and nuns associated with Buddhist teacher Thich Nhat Hanh and forcibly 

disbanded his order. 

Given these ongoing and serious violations, the uneven pace of religious freedom progress after the 

CPC designation was lifted, the continued detention of prisoners of concern, and new evidence of 

severe religious freedom abuses, USCIRF again recommends that Vietnam be designated as a CPC 

in 2010. The Commission has recommended that Vietnam be named a (CPC) every year since 

2001. The State Department named Vietnam a CPC in 2004 and 2005, but removed the 

designation in 2006. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: Religious freedom conditions have not improved as 

quickly or as readily as have other areas of the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship, and there continues to 

be a marked deterioration of the human rights situation overall. Nevertheless, there is reason to 

believe that the government of Vietnam will engage on human rights concerns. Non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs) have engaged Hanoi on religious freedom concerns over the past year, and 

religious freedom was a part of the renewed annual U.S.-Vietnam human rights dialogue. 

However, the frequency of these exchanges is neither as structured nor as focused on concrete 

results as those that took place between 2004 and 2006, when Vietnam was named a CPC and was 

seeking entrance to the World Trade Organization (WTO). USCIRF continues to urge the Obama 

administration to re-evaluate the diplomatic and political resources employed to advance religious 

freedom and related human rights in its relations with Vietnam. USCIRF also encourages the 

Administration to view CPC designation as a flexible tool in light of its previous success in 

spurring serious diplomatic engagement and achieving measurable improvements, while not 

hampering progress on other areas in the U.S.-Vietnam relationship. Additional recommendations 

for U.S. policy towards Vietnam can be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Overall Human Rights Situation 

Vietnam’s overall human rights record remains poor, and has deteriorated since Vietnam joined the WTO 

in January 2007. Vietnam is an authoritarian state governed by the Communist Party. Over the past two 

years, the government has moved decisively to repress any perceived challenges to its authority, 

tightening controls on the freedom of expression, association, and assembly. New decrees were issued 

prohibiting peaceful protest in property disputes and limiting speech on the internet. In 2007, as many as 

40 legal and political reform advocates, free speech activists, human rights defenders, labor unionists, 

journalists, independent religious leaders, and religious freedom advocates have been arrested. Others 

have been placed under home detention or surveillance, threatened, intimidated, and harassed. In 2009, a 

new wave of arrests targeted bloggers, democracy advocates, and human rights defenders, including 

lawyer Le Cong Dinh who defended prominent human rights activists. Over the past year, two journalists 

were arrested and convicted in connection with their reporting on high-level corruption, and several 

journalists and editors at leading newspapers were fired. Several Internet bloggers were also jailed after 

writing about corruption and protesting China’s actions in the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands; one 

was convicted and sent to prison. 

Given the prominence of religious leaders in advocating for the legal and political reforms needed to fully 

guarantee religious freedom, their continued detention must be considered when measuring religious 

freedom progress in Vietnam. Over the past two years, individuals motivated by conscience or religion to 

peacefully organize or speak out against restrictions on religious freedom and related human rights 

continue to be arrested or detained, including Nguyen Van Dai, Nguyen Thi Hong, and over a dozen 

members of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai communities. There are also an unknown number of ethnic 

minority Montagnards, including religious leaders, still detained after 2001 and 2004 demonstrations for 

religious freedom and land rights. The Most Venerable Thich Quang Do and other UBCV leaders and Fr. 

Phan Van Loi remain under administrative detention orders and are restricted in their movements and 

activities. 

In 2009, the government released six Khmer Buddhists jailed in 2007 for taking part in peaceful 

demonstrations against restrictions on religious practice. Fr. Nguyen Van Ly was granted temporary 

medical parole in March 2010 after suffering two major strokes in prison. Human rights activist Le Thi 

Cong Nhan was released in March 2010 after completing a three year prison term; she is now under home 

detention orders. USCIRF was able to meet while they were still imprisoned Le Thi Cong Nhan and 

Nguyen Van Dai in 2007 and Fr. Nguyen Van Ly and Nguyen Van Dai in 2009. 

 

Despite significant restrictions and governmental interference, the number of religious adherents 

continues to grow in Vietnam. In large urban areas, the Vietnamese government continues to expand the 

zone of permissible religious activity for Catholics, non-UBCV Buddhists, some Protestant groups, and 

government approved Hoa Hao and Cao Dai communities, including allowing large religious gatherings 

and pilgrimages. Religious leaders in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City report fewer restrictions on their 

normal worship activities in recent years, and the government largely continues to support the building of 

religious venues and the training of religious leaders. Nevertheless, lingering property disputes over 

venues and facilities previously confiscated by the Communist government created serious tensions 

between Hanoi and some religious communities, leading to church demolitions, property confiscations, 

detentions, and societal violence. In some parts of the Central Highlands, particularly Gai Lai province, 

most of the churches and meeting points closed after 2001 and 2004 religious freedom demonstrations 

were re-opened, and the government and the officially-recognized Protestant organization have 

established a working relationship. However, groups that do not worship within government approved 

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parameters or are suspected of sympathizing with foreign groups seeking Montagnard autonomy face a 

growing number of problems, including property destruction, detentions, and beatings. 

When designated as a CPC, Hanoi released prisoners, expanded some legal protections for nationally 

recognized religious groups, prohibited the policy of forced renunciations of faith (which resulted in 

fewer forced renunciations), and expanded a zone of toleration for worship activities, particularly in urban 

areas. Nevertheless, during USCIRF’s October 2007 and May 2009 trips to Vietnam, religious leaders 

reported that while overt restrictions on their religious activity slowed in the past decade, there continue 

to be serious problems with the legal and policy framework the government uses to oversee religious 

activity. Improvements often depended on geographic area, ethnicity, the relationship established with 

local or provincial officials, or perceived “political” activity. Most religious leaders attributed these 

changes to the CPC designation and the priority placed on religious freedom concerns in U.S.-Vietnamese 

bilateral relations. 

Implementation of Vietnam’s Legal & Policy Framework on Religion 

The 2004 Ordinance on Religion and Belief requires religious groups to operate within government 

approved parameters. The Ordinance promises those who succeed at gaining “national” legal status fewer 

government intrusions in regular religious activities. However, the registration process is ill-defined and 

implementation of the Ordinance is problematic. Some provincial officials ignore recognition 

applications, require religious groups to include the names of all religious adherents in a church, or 

pressure religious leaders to join groups already given legal recognition, despite theological or other 

objections. In addition, the Ordinance provides for two levels of legal recognition, neither of which offers 

the same protections as “national” recognition. In fact, at the first level, “permission for religious 

operation,” religious groups report government intrusions in daily religious activity, including seeking 

from religious leaders the names of congregants or limiting participation in and the scope of worship 

services. Religious groups whose applications for legal recognition are denied or who do not meet the 

Ordinance’s vague standards are technically illegal and can be closed without warning. 

Contrary to its provisions, local officials have told religious groups and a visiting USICRF delegation that 

the Ordinance does not apply in their provinces. The central government has also delayed 

implementation and enforcement of the Ordinance and issued a training manual on how to deal with 

religious groups that counsels restricting rather than advancing religious freedom. The manual, issued by 

the central government’s Committee on Religious Affairs, has gone through several revisions because of 

international scrutiny. Nevertheless, problematic language remains regarding measures to halt the growth 

of religious communities. 

A USCIRF delegation traveled to Vietnam in May 2009 and ascertained that new converts to 

Protestantism in ethnic minority areas face official intimidation and discrimination if they do not 

renounce their faith (see discussion below under Hmong Protestants: Northwest Provinces). There are 

also reports that new monks and nuns of Buddhist teacher Thich Nhat Hanh face similar tactics as do 

individuals who frequent pagodas affiliated with the UBCV. 

 

Provisions of the Ordinance do not meet international standards and are sometimes used to restrict and 

discriminate rather than promote religious freedom. For example, national security and national solidarity 

provisions in the Ordinance are similar to those included in Vietnam’s Constitution and override any legal 

protections guaranteeing the rights of religious communities. These include Article 8 (2) of the 

Ordinance, which prohibits the “abuse” of religion to undermine national unity, to “sow division among 

the people, ethnic groups and religions” or to “spread superstitious practices”, and Article 15, which 

provides that religious activities will be suspended if they “negatively affect the unity of the people or the 

nation’s fine cultural traditions.” The government continues to significantly limit the organized activities 

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of independent religious groups and individuals viewed as a threat to party authority on these grounds. 

There are some reports that Vietnamese officials are considering revising the Ordinance on Religion and 

Belief, which would offer the international community an opportunity to engage the government on ways 

to change Vietnam’s legal structure on religion so that it conforms to international standards. 

In the past year, religious groups without legal status —whether because they do not meet established 

criteria, are deemed politically unreliable, or refuse to accept government oversight— were harassed, had 

venues destroyed, and faced severe discrimination. In addition, there were reports that ethnic minority 

Protestants were arrested and detained because their meeting points were not legally recognized or they 

were not affiliated with the government approved religious organization. 

The government continues to extend legal recognition to, and allows religious venues to affiliate with, 11 

officially recognized religious groups: Buddhism, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, 

Pure Land Buddhist Home Practice, Bani Muslim Sect, Threefold Enlightened Truth Path, Threefold 

Southern Tradition, and the Baha'i Community. In the past year the government has extended legal 

status to the Mysterious Fragrance from Precious Mountains and the Four Gratitudes and the Vietnam 

Christian Fellowship. In October, 2009, the Assembly of God denomination was granted permission to 

operate, an initial legal status that had previously been denied because the Assembly of God did not meet 

the Ordinance requirement for “20 years of stable operation.” 

Prisoners of Concern 

In the past, the State Department maintained that one of the reasons Vietnam’s CPC designation was 

lifted was because there are no longer any “prisoners of concern.” USCIRF contends that there remain 

dozens of prisoners of concern in Vietnam. As discussed above, a number of individuals remain 

incarcerated for actions related to their religious vocation, practice, activity, or conscience. Along with 

those incarcerated, over a dozen religious leaders are held under long-term administrative detention, 

including United Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) leader Thich Quang Do and Catholic Fr. Phan 

Van Loi. In addition, hundreds of Montagnard Protestants arrested after the 2001 and 2004 

demonstrations for religious freedom and land rights remain in detention in the Central Highlands. The 

circumstances and charges leveled against them are difficult to determine, but there is enough evidence 

available to determine that peaceful religious leaders and adherents were arrested and remain 

incarcerated. The continued detention of prisoners of concern, and the existence of vague “national 

security” laws that were used to arrest them, should be a primary factor in determining whether Vietnam 

should be designated as a CPC. 

In the past, the State Department has contended that only those individuals who are arrested “for reasons 

connected to their faith” will be considered in evaluating religious freedom conditions in Vietnam, as if 

the internationally recognized right to the freedom of religion guarantees only the freedom to worship. 

This narrow definition excludes from consideration anyone arrested or detained for peaceful public 

advocacy to protect religious freedom, including expressing support for the legal or political reforms 

needed to fully ensure it. The State Department’s criterion also excludes those who monitor the freedom 

of religion and are arrested or otherwise punished for the publication of their findings. It also excludes 

those who, motivated by ongoing restrictions on religious practice or the arrests of fellow-believers, 

peacefully organize or protest to draw attention to government repression. The State Department’s 

standard for determining who is a religious “prisoner of concern” draws an arbitrary line between 

“political” and “religious” activity not found in international human rights law. 

USCIRF contends that in all the most recent cases of arrest, detention, and imprisonment, religious 

leaders or religious-freedom advocates engaged in legitimate actions that are protected by international 

treaties and covenants to which both the United States and Vietnam are signatories. In addition to the 

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freedoms to believe and to worship, the freedom to peacefully advocate for religious freedom and express 

views critical of government policy are legitimate activities guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They protect not only the 

right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion14 but also the related rights to freedom of opinion 

and expression15 and to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.16 Moreover, the right to freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion or belief is “far-reaching and profound” and “encompasses freedom 

of thought on all matters [and] personal conviction,” as well as “the commitment to religion or belief.”17

 

In the past several years, Montagnard Protestants have been subject to a number of short-term detentions, 

disappearances, and one possible beating death in custody. According to reports from NGOs and several 

members of the European Parliament, Montagnard Protestant Puih H’Bat was arrested in April 2008 for 

leading an illegal prayer service in her home in Chu Se district, Gai Lai province—an area where there 

have been protests in the past over land rights and religious freedom abuses. In fact, according to Human 

Rights Watch, police arrested dozens of Montagnards in that area in April 2008 and forcibly dispersed 

crowds peacefully protesting recent land confiscations. Given historical animosities, past repression, and 

the region’s remoteness, it is difficult to determine the exact reasons why Puih H’Bat was arrested, though 

the fact that police have refused to allow her family to visit her and the lack of police and judicial 

transparency in the case is disturbing. Also in the same Gai Lai province district, as many as 11 

Montagnard Protestants were detained in February 2009 after police reportedly entered a worship service 

and asked everyone present to renounce their faith or join the officially recognized Southern Evangelical 

Church of Vietnam (SECV). Everyone who refused was arrested. Nine were released a month later, and 

two remain in detention. The State Department was able to confirm from other religious leaders in the 

region that these individuals were arrested for trying to organize an independent Protestant organization, 

which the Vietnamese government has refused to allow in this area since the large religious freedom 

protests in 2001 and 2004. In other parts of Gai Lai province, however, ethnic Montagnard Protestants 

associated with the government-approved SECV have established a working relationship with provincial 

officials, leading to the re-opening of many religious venues closed after 2001, new religious training 

courses for pastors, and the building of at least one new church property. 

In the past year’s reporting cycle, the government released six Khmer Buddhist prisoners of concern, 

including Cambodian monk Tim Sarkhorn and five Khmer Buddhist monks convicted for leading 

February 2007 religious freedom protests in Soc Trang province. The five monks were not allowed to 

rejoin their monasteries or return to their studies, and Tim Sarkhorn, though released from prison in July 

2008, was held under house arrest and constant police surveillance until early April 2009. The U.N. High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) granted them refugee status, and they were resettled in Europe. 

The situation of the Khmer Buddhist has been an underreported problem in Vietnam. The State 

Department, despite travelling to Soc Trang province in October 2007, did not report on the arrests of 

Khmer monks until after they were released. 

In March 2010, Le Thi Cong Nhan was released from prison after completing her prison sentence. The 

USCIRF delegation met with her in prison during a 2007 visit. She continues to serve a sentence of 

administrative parole, which is essentially house arrest. After granting interviews to international media 

after her release, she was detained and interrogated by police and remains under close scrutiny. 

 

14 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Art. 18; International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 

(ICCPR), Art. 18. 

15 UDHR, Art. 19; ICCPR, Art. 19. 

16 UDHR, Art. 20; ICCPR, Arts. 21 & 22. 

17 United Nations Human Rights Committee General Comment 22, Article 18 (Forty-eighth session, 1993), para 1. 18

Criteria for reviewing textbooks and other educational materials have been developed by several international 

bodies, including UNESCO. For the UNESCO criteria, see http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/34_71.pdf. 

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Also in March, Fr. Nguyen Van Ly was released on medical parole after suffering several strokes in 

prison. He will be returned to prison once his health improves. A USCIRF delegation was allowed to 

meet with Fr. Ly in May 2009 and discovered that he has been held in solitary confinement for over two 

years. Fr. Ly has been imprisoned numerous times for his religious freedom and human rights advocacy, 

including after he submitted testimony to a 2001 USCIRF hearing on Vietnam. USCIRF has consistently 

advocated for his unconditional release. 

Buddhists, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai 

The government continues to actively discourage independent Buddhist religious activity and refuses to 

legally recognize the UBCV and some Hoa Hao and Cao Dai groups. Government-approved 

organizations oversee Buddhist and other indigenous religions’ pagodas, temples, educational institutes, 

and activities. Approval is required for all ordinations and ceremonies, donations, and expansions of 

religious venues. The government-approved leaders of Buddhist, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai organizations 

also vet the content of publications and religious studies curricula offered at schools. 

The Vietnamese government requires the UBCV and independent Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai groups to 

affiliate only with the government approved religious organization. Those who refuse face ongoing and 

serious religious freedom abuses, including arrests, detentions, fines, forced renunciations of faith, 

destruction of property, and other harassment. This fact is important when deciding whether religious 

freedom conditions have improved in Vietnam overall, given that these groups, along with the ethnic 

minority Khmer Buddhists, represent the largest number of religious adherents in Vietnam. 

The UBCV is Vietnam’s largest religious organization with a history of peaceful social activism and 

moral reform. The UBCV has faced decades of harassment and repression for seeking independent status 

and appealing to the government to respect religious freedom and related human rights. Its leaders have 

been threatened, detained, put under pagoda arrest, imprisoned, and placed under strict travel restrictions 

for many years. The freedom of movement, expression, and assembly of UBCV leaders continues to be 

restricted. Monks, nuns, and youth leaders affiliated with the UBCV face harassment and threats. Senior 

UBCV monks, including the Most Venerable Thich Quang Do with whom USCIRF delegations were able 

to meet in both 2007 and 2009, remain under some form of administration probation or pagoda arrest. 

Charges issued in October 2004 against UBCV leaders for “possessing state secrets” have never been 

rescinded. Local attempts by monks to organize UBCV provincial boards or carry out charitable 

activities also are thwarted. Police routinely question UBCV monks and monitor their movement and 

activities. Foreign visitors to UBCV monasteries have been assaulted and harassed. 

In the recent past, UBCV monks have been detained, threatened and ordered to withdraw their names 

from provincial leadership boards and cease all connections with the UBCV. Government officials have 

taken steps to make sure that government affiliated monasteries do not affiliate overtly with the UBCV. 

In 2008, police and government officials in Lam Dong province sought to depose Thich Tri Khai from his 

post as superior monk of the Giac Hai pagoda, reportedly offering bribes to anyone who would denounce 

him and urging 12 monks in the region to sign a petition supporting his ouster. Two hundred and thirty 

nine monks affiliated with the UBCV signed a letter opposing the government’s action and, as a result, 

were threatened and subjected to “working sessions” with police. In April 2008, police arrested Thich Tri 

Khai, who went into hiding; two UBCV monks attempting to visit Khai were detained and questioned by 

police. Also in April 2008, police harassed, assaulted, and briefly detained monks from, and vandalized, 

the Phuoc Hue monastery in Quang Tri province. The monastery’s head Abbot, Thich Tu Giao, had 

declared allegiance to the UBCV. Police also assaulted and detained Thich Tu Giao’s mother and 

members of the Buddhist Youth Movement. Local officials set up barriers on roads leading to the pagoda 

and put up signs claiming the pagoda was a “Forbidden Area.” It was the second time police vandalized 

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the pagoda. The previous year, police destroyed a newly built kitchen and warehouse, and stole money 

contributed by local Buddhists for other buildings. 

UBCV adherents also experience harassment and intimidation. During its visits to Vietnam, the USCIRF 

delegation learned that the Vietnamese government’s Religious Security Police (cong an ton giao) 

routinely harasses and intimidates UBCV followers, warning that if they continue to frequent known 

UBCV pagodas they may be arrested, lose their jobs, or their children expelled from school. The 

government has actively sought to suppress the activities and growth of the Buddhist Youth Movement. 

The State Department also reports that, in the past year, a UBCV monk was detained and later expelled 

from his monastery for distributing humanitarian aid and food to land rights protestors in Hanoi. A UBCV 

monk in Ho Chi Minh City resigned from monastic life reportedly due to being constantly harassed by 

police for his activities organizing a Buddhist Youth Movement. A UBCV nun was also forced to leave 

the pagoda she founded in Khanh Hoa Province reportedly because she openly affiliated with the UBCV. 

There also continue to be reports of harassment and disbandment of religious ceremonies and other 

activities UBCV monks conduct. For instance, police in the past year routinely interrogated the 

Venerable Thich Vien Dinh and other monks from the Giac Hoa Pagoda in Saigon and issued fines for 

minor building code violations. Officials also have prevented them from holding festivals on Vesak

(Buddha’s Birthday) and the Lunar New Year. In late January, 2010, police reportedly raided the pagoda 

in order to break up a ceremony of the Buddhist Youth Movement. Parents and children were warned to 

cease participating in the group. Routine systematic harassment of UBCV monks and affiliated pagodas 

occurs in the provinces of Quang Nam-Danang, Thua Thien Hue, Binh Dinh, Khanh Hoa, Ba Ria-Vung 

Tau, Dong Nai, Hau Giang, and An Giang. 

 

The Vietnamese government continues to ban and actively discourage participation in independent 

factions of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, two religious traditions unique to Vietnam that claim memberships 

of four and three million respectively. While not providing details, the State Department continues to 

report repression of independent groups that includes intimidation, loss of jobs, discrimination, and 

harassment of Hoa Hao followers and imprisonment of individuals who peacefully protest religious 

freedom restrictions. 

Both the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao groups report ongoing government oversight and control of their 

communities’ internal affairs, including their rituals, celebrations, funerals, and selection of religious 

leaders, and even of government approved organizations. Other complaints concern the government’s 

rejection of the Cao Dai charter drawn up before the 1950s, official unwillingness to allow the 

community to maintain its own independent source of income, and the seizure without compensation of 

Cao Dai properties after 1975. Some Cao Dai traditionalists have refused to participate in the 

government-appointed management committees and have formed independent groups. Eight Cao Dai 

were arrested in 2005 for protesting government intrusion in Cao Dai affairs; five remain in prison at the 

time of this report. 

Independent Hoa Hao groups face severe restrictions and abuses of religious freedom, particularly in An 

Giang province. According to the State Department, members of the independent Hoa Hao Central 

Buddhist Church (HHCBC) face “significant official repression,” and there is continued friction between 

independent Hoa Hao and government officials in the Mekong Delta region, including reports of 

confiscation and destruction of HHCBC affiliated buildings. HHCBC religious leaders refuse to affiliate 

with the government-approved Hoa Hao Administrative Council (HHAC) and are openly critical of it, 

claiming that it is subservient to the government. HHCBC leaders and their followers have been arrested 

for distributing the writings of their founding prophet, had ceremonies and holiday celebrations broken up 

by police, had sacred properties confiscated or destroyed, and individual followers have faced 

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discrimination and loss of jobs. At least 12 Hoa Hao were arrested and sentenced for protesting religious 

freedom restrictions, including four who were sentenced to four years in prison for staging a peaceful 

hunger strike. 

The Vietnamese government’s ongoing repression of the language, culture, and religion of ethnic Khmer 

living in Vietnam has led to growing resentment in the Mekong Delta. Khmer Buddhism is associated 

with the Theravada branch of Buddhism and has religious and ethnic traditions distinct from the dominant 

Mahayana Buddhist tradition practiced in most parts of Vietnam. Some Khmer Buddhists have called for 

a separate religious organization, distinct from the government-approved Vietnamese Buddhist Sangha 

(VBS). Religious freedom concerns continue to be central to demands of ethnic minority Khmer for 

human rights protections and preservation of their unique language and culture. 

As many as one million ethnic minority Khmer Buddhists live in Vietnam, mostly in the Mekong Delta 

region. Long simmering tensions emerged there in 2006 and 2007, as Khmer Buddhist monks peacefully 

protested government restrictions on their freedom of religion and movement and Khmer language 

training. On January 19, 2007, according to Human Rights Watch, Buddhist monks in Tra Vinh province 

protested the arrest of a monk for possessing a publication from an overseas Khmer advocacy group. The 

protesting monks were interrogated and accused of allegedly separatist activities, and three monks were 

detained in their pagodas for three months and later defrocked. In February 2007, more than 200 monks 

staged a peaceful demonstration in Soc Trang province protesting the government’s restriction on the 

number of days allowed for certain Khmer religious festivals and calling on the government to allow 

Khmer Buddhist leaders—not government appointees—to make decisions regarding the ordinations of 

monks and the content of religious studies at pagoda schools. The protestors also called for more 

education in Khmer language and culture. Provincial officials initially promised to address the monk’s 

concerns, but several days later, monks suspected of leading the protest were arrested and some 

reportedly were beaten during interrogations. At least 20 monks were defrocked and expelled from their 

pagodas, and five monks sentenced to between two and four years in prison. Defrocked monks were sent 

home to their villages, where they were placed under house arrest or police detention. 

Five young monks arrested for leading the demonstrations were given sentences ranging from one to five 

years. In interviews with USCIRF, the monks described severe restrictions on the religious life of Khmer 

Buddhists. They stated that they had applied to hold a demonstration and it was not, as the government 

maintains, a spontaneous event. They also described in detail, the beatings and torture they endured in 

detention, including one monk stating that he was beaten every day for one year. 

After the 2007 demonstrations in Tra Vinh and Soc Trang, provincial officials and police expanded 

surveillance and restrictions on Khmer Buddhists religious activity and pressured Khmer Buddhist leaders 

to identify and defrock monks critical of the government. In July 2007, the Vietnamese government 

arrested Tim Sarkhorn, a Cambodian Khmer Buddhist monk on charges of “illegally crossing the border.” 

As mentioned above, the five Khmer monks and Tim Sarkhorn were released in early 2009. They were 

not allowed to return to the monkhood and are now living as refugees in Europe. 

The Vietnamese government, through the Vietnamese Buddhist Sangha (VBS), began an academy in 

2008 tin Can Tho hat focused on Theravada Buddhism. The government provided land for the building 

and expansion of a larger academy. In addition, the government expanded the Pali language school in 

Soc Trang Province, the site of the demonstrations. It is unclear whether these actions will be sufficient 

to address long-standing grievances over religious restrictions and discrimination based on ethnicity. 

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Crackdown on the Lang Mai Buddhists of Bat Nha Monastery 

In September 2009, over 300 Lang Mai (Plum Village) Buddhist monks and nuns, followers of the wellknown Buddhist Zen Master Thich Nhat Hanh, were forcibly removed from Bat Nha monastery in Lam 

Dong province. In 2008, the central government's Religious Affairs Committee stated that the Lang Mai 

Buddhists were no longer welcome in Vietnam and claimed that some monks and nuns in Bat Nha lacked 

legal rights to live at the monastery. The abbot of Bat Nha, under pressure from the government, ordered 

Thich Nhat Hanh’s followers to leave. Beginning in June 2009, government officials and police harassed 

the Lang Mai monks and nuns, turning off water, electricity, and telephone lines, and threatening 

adherents who came to study at the monastery. In July, local civilians and undercover police entered the 

monastery, threatened the residents, and confiscated food, furniture, and other property. 

Finally, in September 2009, police cordoned off the monastery and allowed more than 100 civilians and 

undercover police to enter and forcefully evict the Lang Mai Buddhists. Monks were beaten, degraded, 

and sexually assaulted. Over 200 Buddhist monks and nuns sought temporary refuge at the nearby 

pagoda of Phuoc Hue. Two senior monks, Phap Hoi and Phap Sy, were arrested. A senior monk at 

another Lang Mai meditation center in Khanh Hoa province has gone into hiding to avoid arrest. 

On December, 31, 2009 police and government officials forcibly evicted the 400 monks and nuns residing 

at Phouc Hue pagoda. 200 Lang Mai followers left to seek asylum in Thailand and, as of this writing, are 

seeking religious worker visas to reside in the U.S., Germany, Australia, and France. Another 200 

monks and nuns returned to their home provinces in Vietnam, where police harassment continues and 

authorities threaten family members with job loss and reduced government benefits unless they renounce 

their Lang Mai affiliation. 

In 2005, the Vietnamese government had welcomed Thich Nhat Hanh and the establishment of the Lang 

Mai order in Vietnam. His return was hailed as evidence of religious freedom progress by both Hanoi 

and the State Department when the CPC designation was removed in 2006. The government’s crackdown 

on the Lang Mai Buddhists started in late 2007, after Thich Nhat Hanh privately, and later publicly, urged 

the government to ease restrictions on religion. In addition, the Lang Mai teachings were very popular 

and therefore threatening to government officials and the leadership of government approved Vietnamese 

Buddhist Sangha (VBS). Thousands of Vietnamese attended Buddhist ceremonies, lectures, and 

monastic retreats led by Thich Nhat Hanh and other senior monks. The Bat Nha monastery grew quickly, 

drawing hundreds of novices and young people to study from all over Vietnam. Local officials and 

police regularly discouraged potential novices from joining the Lang Mai community. 

In October 2009, 180 Vietnamese academics, poets, teachers, and scientists, including Vietnamese 

Communist Party members, sent a petition to the government requesting an investigation. In addition, the 

local VBS management board in Lam Dong province sent a memorandum to national VBS leadership in 

Hanoi deploring the way the Lang Mai Buddhists had been treated. The Lang Mai Buddhists continue to 

seek a monastery in Vietnam to host their order and allow monks and nuns to live together in community. 

Montagnard Protestants: Central Highlands 

In some parts of the Central Highlands, particularly for those churches and meeting points affiliated with 

the SECV in Gai Lai province, religious freedom conditions have improved somewhat since Vietnam was 

designated as a CPC in 2004. Religious activity is tolerated within government approved parameters, and 

the government has re-opened closed religious venues and allowed new churches to be built, and 

provincial authorities have granted permission for some religious training classes to be conducted. 

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Religious freedom conditions have not improved uniformly, however, in all parts of the Central 

Highlands or Central Coast regions. There continue to be reports of restrictions, land seizures, 

discrimination, destruction of property, and other egregious religious freedom abuses that target 

independent or unregistered Protestant religious venues. In particular, in Dak Lak province, there was 

active harassment of independent Protestant groups who refused to join the SECV or those suspected of 

affiliation with the banned Tin Lanh Dega (Dega Protestant Church), which the government claims 

combines religion with advocacy of political autonomy. A 2007 study by the UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees, based on interviews with Montagnard asylum-seekers in Cambodia, found that few selfidentified adherents of Tin Lanh Dega sought political autonomy or had a political agenda, apart from 

“enhancement of their human rights position” and the “need to gather in independent church 

communities.” Respondents unanimously expressed suspicion of the SECV, as an organization lead by 

Vietnamese and controlled by the Vietnamese government. Even those Tin Lanh Dega leaders who 

expressed a desire for greater political autonomy sought to advance this position peacefully, according to 

the study. 

 

Government suspicion of a Tin Lanh Dega organized political movement has led to dozens of detentions 

and at least one beating death in recent years. According to Human Rights Watch and the European 

Parliament, Montagnard Protestant Y Ben Hdok died while in detention at a provincial police station in 

Dak Lak province in May 2008. Police claim that he was detained for suspicion of inciting 

demonstrations, though the family claims that he was organizing a group to seek asylum in Cambodia for 

reasons including religious persecution. In previous years, USCIRF has raised the cases of other ethnic 

minority Protestants beaten to death in police custody. There were no new developments related to the 

2006 and 2007 deaths of Y Ngo Adrong or Y Vin Het. In the latter case, credible reports indicated that 

the ethnic minority Protestant was beaten to death by police officers for refusing to recant his faith. 

According to the State Department, the Vietnamese government closely scrutinizes all ethnic minority 

religious communities in the Central Highlands, both legally recognized and independent groups, 

particularly in Dak Lak and Bien Phuoc provinces. In March 2008, religious leaders from the InterEvangelistic Movement (IEM) in Bien Phuoc were reportedly beaten and insulted by police when they 

traveled to Dak Nong province to hold services. On November 11, 2008, Vietnamese government 

officials issued fines and summons to everyone affiliated with an independent Protestant church of 

EahLeo hamlet, Dak Lak province. The church was later charged with operating an illegal Bible school 

for people outside the province and ordered to dismantle the school and cease religious activity because it 

was not legally recognized. The church continues to meet in another location. Also in November, in 

EaSup hamlet, Dak Lak province, police and provincial officials confiscated lumber purchased to build a 

chapel and issued an order telling the church in EaSup not to meet. In December 2008, hundreds of 

police and provincial officials destroyed a new Protestant church structure in Cu Dram hamlet; ethnic 

minority Protestants who protested the demolition were beaten with sticks and electric prods and some 

were severely injured and later were refused medical treatment. Leaders of this Cu Drom hamlet church 

continue to be threatened with arrest at this writing. Other independent ethnic minority congregations in 

EaSol and Thay Ynge hamlets and Krong Bong district of Dak Lak report that their leaders regularly are 

summoned to police stations and forced to sign papers agreeing that they will not gather “new” Christians 

for worship and that churches cannot be organized with believers from other hamlets or districts. 

Vietnamese government policy does not permit anyone who belongs to an unofficial religious group to 

speak publicly about their beliefs. 

In the past year, dozens of Montagnard Protestants were detained, beaten, and threatened in Chu Se 

district, Gai Lai province because they were suspected of belonging to unregistered Protestant churches or 

planning to convey information about rights abuses to activists abroad. USCIRF was able to confirm 

that 11 individuals in this district were arrested and asked to renounce their faith in February 2009. Two 

remain in detention at this time. Human Rights Watch reports that police routinely raided unregistered 

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churches in the Central Highlands, mostly in parts of Dak Lak and Gai Lai provinces. On several 

occasions church members were beaten and shocked with electric batons when they refused to sign 

pledges to join the government-approved Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam (SECV). In January 

2010 two Montagnard Protestants were sentenced to prison terms of nine and twelve years for allegedly 

organizing “reactionary underground” networks. Though the details of this case are not entirely clear, 

there are reports that the two men were organizing unregistered church groups. 

Similar charges were leveled against two Protestant evangelists working in Phu Yen province. In 

January 2010 police detained pastor Y Du reportedly because police suspected that he helped organize 

2004 demonstrations for land rights and religious freedom in Dak Lak province. Pastor Du was beaten 

and dragged behind a motorbike. He was imprisoned in Phu Lam prison in Phu Lam district. Police 

reportedly told local Protestants that they do not have enough evidence to charge Pastor Du, but they will 

continue to hold him until he provides evidence against another Protestant pastor, Mai Hong Sanh, for 

organizing demonstrations. Along with Pastor Du, Phu Yen province officials continue to detain Pastor Y 

Co until he signs a “confession” concerning his prior involvement in public protests. He has reportedly 

refused numerous times to sign the document. 

 

Provincial officials in the Central Highlands also target ethnic minority Protestants for official 

discrimination. Children reportedly are denied access to high school based on outdated laws prohibiting 

entrance of children from religious families. Protestants reportedly are denied access to government 

benefits readily available to non-Protestants, including housing and medical assistance programs. In 

addition, local officials reportedly pressure family elders, threatening to take away their government 

benefits unless they convince younger family members to renounce their faith. Montagnard Protestants 

have long complained of targeted discrimination, but at least one eyewitness report indicates that 

provincial officials are being trained in discriminatory tactics. At a 2007 religious training workshop in 

Kontum conducted by central government officials, local police and government officials were taught 

how to deny medical, educational, housing, financial, and other government services to “religious 

families” and families of recent converts. In addition, officials were instructed to divert foreign aid 

projects from known Protestant villages. It is unclear if this incident in Kontum is an isolated case, as the 

details of the official content of these training courses are unknown. The central government continues to 

conduct training courses for provincial officials on implementing Vietnam’s legal framework on religion. 

Hmong Protestants: Northwest Provinces 

The government continues to view with suspicion the growth of Christianity among Hmong in Vietnam’s 

northwest provinces. According to the State Department, over the past several years, the Vietnamese 

government has started to allow Hmong Protestants to organize religious venues and conduct religious 

activities in homes and “during the daytime.” However, unlike in some parts of the Central Highlands, 

the government has moved very slowly to extend legal recognition to Hmong Protestant churches. The 

number of legally recognized churches and meeting points has reached 100 in the past year, but an 

estimated 1,000 religious groups are seeking affiliation with the Evangelical Church of Vietnam (ECVN). 

Hundreds of applications for legal recognition have been declined or ignored, despite provisions in the 

Ordinance on Religion and Belief requiring government officials to respond to applications in a timely 

manner. 

The Vietnamese government recognizes that there is a “genuine need” for religion in the northwest 

provinces, opening the way for at least some religious activity in the region to be legally recognized. 

However, government policy seems focused on making sure that “new” religious growth is controlled and 

“new” converts discouraged. According to the State Department, over the past year, local officials 

repressed Protestant believers in some parts of the northwest provinces by forcing church gatherings to 

cease, closing house churches, and pressuring individuals to renounce their religious beliefs, though often 

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unsuccessfully, despite the prohibition on forced renunciations in the Prime Minister's 2005 Instruction on 

Protestantism. 

In the recent past, Hmong religious leaders reported that security officials attended religious services, 

checked church membership lists, and forced anyone not on the list to leave. In some locations, security 

officials reportedly barred anyone under the age of 14 from attending services, banned mid-week 

meetings and programs for children and young people, and insisted that religious leaders be chosen under 

their supervision. Since USCIRF’s last Annual Report, in Bat Xat district, Lao Cai province, police 

harassed and confiscated food and other materials from a group of unregistered “house church” 

Protestants celebrating Christmas. In another village in Bat Xat district, police reportedly confiscated 

livestock and other belongings from members of another Protestant “house church” celebrating the Lunar 

New Year. 

In August 2008, in Huoi Leng commune, Lao Cai province, a Protestant house church leader claimed that 

local officials constantly were pressuring him to give up his faith and threatening his congregants with 

deportation and cattle prods. Also, in Si Ma Cai district, Lao Cai province police beat and choked two 

Hmong Protestants in an attempt to force them to recant their faith. Police told them that there “could not 

be....Christians in the district.” In Son La province, ethnic minority Catholics reported that government 

officials and police regularly threatened the loss of government benefits and services unless they returned 

to traditional religious practices and in Ha Giang province, local officials have used similar tactics and 

refused to allow a Catholic priest residence in the province. 

In other regions, local authorities reportedly encouraged clan elders to pressure members of their 

extended families to cease practicing Christianity and return to traditional practices. Religious leaders 

also report that local authorities sometimes use “contract thugs” to harass, threaten, or beat them, 

according to the State Department. For example, in July 2007, a veterans group in Ha Giang province 

burned down a home where ethnic minority Protestants met for worship and damaged other buildings in 

an attempt to stop all worship activities. Though such activities are prohibited by law, there are no known 

cases of prosecution or punishment for attempted forced conversations or property destruction. 

In the past year, several unregistered religious gatherings were broken up or obstructed in the Northwest 

Highlands. Local authorities reportedly used “contract thugs” to harass or beat ethnic minority 

Protestants. During the USCIRF delegation’s visit to Dien Bien province, local congregations reported 

detentions, discriminations, and efforts to get Hmong Protestants to recent their faith, including the arrest 

of two individuals for conducting religious training in multiple villages. There are also credible reports 

that Vietnamese police in Dien Bien Dong district, Na Son commune arrested and beat Hmong Protestant 

Sung Cua Po after he converted to Christianity in November 2009. Before his arrest, police incited local 

villagers to harass and stone his house, beat his wife, and fined other Protestants in the commune in order 

to get him to return to traditional Hmong religious practices. Government authorities also threatened the 

heads of his extended family with the loss of government services unless they pressured him to deny his 

faith. Sung Cuo Po’s house was destroyed in late March, 2010 along with the homes of 14 other 

Christian families in Dien Bien Dong district. He and his family have disappeared. 

Unfortunately, cases like Sung Cua Po are not isolated. Abuses and restrictions targeting ethnic minority 

Christians in the Northwest provinces continue. Central government policy supports the actions of 

provincial officials. In 2006, the Committee on Religious Affairs in Hanoi published a handbook 

instructing provincial officials in the northwest provinces on how to manage and control religious practice 

among ethnic minorities. USCIRF was critical of the handbook because it offered instructions on ways to 

restrict religious freedom, including a command to “resolutely subdue” new religious growth, “mobilize 

and persuade” new converts to return to their traditional religious practice, and halt anyone who “abuses 

religion” to undermine “the revolution”—thus seemingly condoning forced renunciations of faith. 

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Although the 2006 handbook recognizes the legitimacy of some religious activity, it also indicates that the 

Vietnamese government continues to control and manage religious growth, label anyone spreading 

Christianity in the northwest provinces as a national security threat, and use unspecified tactics to 

“persuade” new converts to renounce their beliefs. 

In 2007, the Committee on Religious Affairs promised to revise the handbook and, since its 2007 visit to 

Vietnam, USCIRF has received two new versions. Neither, however, offers much improvement on the 

original. In the 2007 revision, provincial officials continue to be urged to control and manage existing 

religious practice through law, halt “enemy forces” from “abusing religion” to undermine the Vietnamese 

state, and “overcome the extraordinary...growth of Protestantism.” This last instruction is especially 

problematic, since it again suggests that the growth of Protestantism among ethnic minority groups should 

be viewed as a potential threat to public security and that it is the responsibility of officials to stem it. The 

2007 revised version also states that local officials must try to “solve the root cause” of Protestant growth 

by “mobilizing” ethnic groups to “preserve their own beautiful religious traditions.” A 2008 version of 

the handbook contains all the language in the 2007 revision but adds a final chapter which chides local 

officials for “loose control” over Protestantism, leading to an increase in illegal meetings places. Local 

officials are instructed that these meeting places “must be...disbanded.” These instructions are 

inconsistent with Vietnam’s international obligations to protect the freedom of religion and belief and can 

be read as instructions to abuse and restrict religious freedom. 

 

Catholics 

The relationship between the Vietnamese government and the Catholic church continues to be tense in 

some parts of Vietnam. Catholicism in Vietnam continues to grown rapidly and the church has expanded 

both clerical training and charitable activities in recent years. However, in response to peaceful prayer 

vigils at properties formerly owned by the Catholic church, police have used tear gas and batons and 

detained participants. In addition, government officials have employed “contract thugs” to assault and 

intimidate Catholics attending prayer vigils. 

Tensions escalated in January 2008 after Catholic parishioners conducted large-scale prayer vigils at the 

residence of the former papal nuncio in Hanoi that the government had confiscated in 1954. In February 

of that year, after the government promised to resolve the problem, the prayer vigils ceased. However, on 

September 19, 2008 city officials announced that they would turn two sites formerly owned by the 

Catholic church into public parks and make the former papal nuncio's home a library. City officials 

immediately began demolishing buildings on the site of the Papal Nuncio and the former Redemptorist 

monastery in Thai Ha parish. Large-scale protests followed, with as many as 15,000 Catholic 

parishioners attending a special mass and prayer vigil conducted by Archbishop Kiet on September 21, 

2008. Police used violence to disband crowds at the two sites and used “contract thugs,” some wearing 

the blue uniforms of the Communist Youth League, to harass and beat Catholic parishioners and 

vandalize churches. Eight individuals who participated in the vigils were arrested, and authorities 

detained and beat an American reporter covering the events. 

The Hanoi People’s Committee has called for the “severe punishment” and removal of Archbishop Kiet 

and the transfer of four priests from the Thai Ha parish for “inciting riots,” “disrespecting the nation,” and 

“breaking the law.” Catholic leaders in Hanoi have refused these demands and the Catholic Bishops 

Conference issued a public defense of the Archbishop and local priests, raising concerns about the 

government’s commitment to religious freedom, the right of property, the government’s control over the 

media, and other human rights issues. 

On December 8, 2008 the eight individuals arrested for participating in the prayer vigils at the Thai Ha 

parish were tried jointly at the Dong Da People's Court in Hanoi and convicted of disturbing public order 

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and destroying public property. Seven were given suspended sentences ranging from 12 to 15 months; of 

these, four were also sentenced to additional administrative probation ranging from 22 to 24 months. The 

eighth individual was given a warning. All were released with time served. The eight Catholics filed an 

appeal of the guilty verdict which was denied in April 2009. 

 

Disputes over property continued in the past year. In July 2009, as many as 200,000 Catholics peacefully 

protested in Quang Binh province after police destroyed a temporary church structure erected near the 

ruins of the historic Tam Toa Church in Vinh Diocese. Police used tear gas and electric batons to beat 

parishioners who resisted, arresting 19, of whom seven were charged with disturbing public order. 

Charges are pending in this case. 

In January 2010, an estimated 500 police and army engineers used explosives to blow up a crucifix at the 

cemetery of Hanoi's Dong Chiem Parish Church. Catholic laypeople that came to the site were held back 

by police and several people were beaten for protesting the action. The government alleges that the 

crucifix was erected illegally. In February 2010, Catholic laypeople and nuns who traveled to the Dong 

Chiem site to join peaceful prayer vigils were assaulted, harassed, and in one case briefly detained by 

police. Reportedly, not all Vietnamese government officials condoned the destruction of the crucifix. 

The local government in Dong Chiem released a statement expressing disagreement with the action. 

The government maintains veto power over appointments of bishops, but often cooperates with the 

Vatican in the appointment process. Catholic leaders in Ho Chi Minh City reported that they often move 

ahead with ordinations without seeking government approval. In 2007 two bishops and two priests were 

rejected because of inappropriate “family backgrounds.” In 2009, the government approved three Vatican 

affiliated bishops in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Buon Ma Thuot. All students must be approved by 

local authorities before enrolling in a seminary and again prior to their ordination as priests, and the 

province of Thien-Hue restricted the number of seminarians. However, the government allowed a new 

Jesuit seminary to be built in Ho Chi Minh City and permitted several local dioceses to conduct religious 

education classes for minors on weekends and some sizeable medical and charitable activities. 

During a May 2009 visit, a USCIRF delegation discovered severe restrictions on Catholic activities in 

Son La and Ha Giang provinces. In Son La, bishops and priests were restricted from traveling to dioceses 

in northwest Vietnam and provincial authorities refused to register a local Catholic diocese and mistreated 

lay Catholic leaders. Among ethnic minority Catholics in Ha Giang, some communities face pressure by 

authorities to renounce their faith. Following discussions by USCIRF with local officials, Catholics in 

Moc Chau District of Son La were able to celebrate Christmas and Easter last year and a priest is now 

allowed to give communion twice a month at a Catholic meeting point. 

Despite evolving tensions between Catholics and the Vietnamese government in the past several years, 

Hanoi continues to discuss with the Holy See conditions for the normalization of relations and other 

issues of concern. In December 2009, President Nguyen Minh Triet met with Pope Benedict XVI at the 

Vatican. Hanoi hosted a visit from a high-level Vatican delegation in February 2009. The delegation 

announced that Pope Benedict hoped to visit Vietnam by the end of 2010. 

Human Rights Defenders 

Over the past year, the Vietnamese government has harassed, threatened, detained and sentenced lawyers 

and human rights defenders who have assisted religious communities and other vulnerable populations in 

cases against the state. 

In January 2010, human right lawyer Le Cong Dinh was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment for 

“conducting propaganda” against the state. As a lawyer, he defended human rights and religious freedom 

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advocates Nguyen Van Dai and Le Thi Cong Nhan in 2007. Le Cong Dinh is one of a growing number 

of peaceful human rights defenders challenging convictions based on Vietnam’s vague national security 

laws and other laws inconsistent with the Vietnamese Constitution and international covenants and human 

right treaties to which Vietnam is a signatory. 

In March 2010, unidentified intruders assaulted human rights activist Pham Hong Son and vandalized his 

home. They threatened additional action unless he stopped writing articles in the online journal To Quoc, 

which was started, according to its founders, to “defend human rights, free expression and religious 

freedom...using moderate language and reasonable arguments.” USCIRF delegations met with Pham 

Hong Son in both 2007 and 2009. He is a peaceful reform advocate previously imprisoned for circulating 

via the internet an essay on democracy downloaded from the website of the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi. 

On March 1, 2009, Ho Chi Min city police raided the law office and seized the property of, and detained 

for questioning, human rights lawyer Le Tran Luat, who is defending Catholics arrested for taking part in 

peaceful prayer vigils in Hanoi. The government revoked his legal license in April 2009. The official 

media has alleged tax fraud and other business related improprieties in what is often an act of political 

intimidation that signals a future arrest. Hanoi lawyer Le Quoc Quan also had his legal license revoked, 

allegedly because he was under investigation for assisting in the Thai Ha protests, and he has been unable 

to get his license renewed. Le Quoc Quan also was arrested in 2007 when he returned to Vietnam after 

completing a fellowship at the National Endowment for Democracy. His activities remain restricted and 

he is under constant surveillance, but was able to travel. 

Mennonite pastor and human rights advocate Nguyen Thi Hong was given a three year sentence in 

January 2009 for “fraud” and other illegal business practices, allegedly for debts incurred by her late 

husband in 1999. Her lawyer claims that the debts were repaid and that she was singled out for her work 

as a human rights advocate and her association with the Mennonite group of Pastor Nguyen Quang which 

has not been allowed to legally register. 

U.S. Policy 

The U.S.-Vietnamese relationship expanded in many areas since relations were normalized in 1995. The 

United States is Vietnam’s largest trading partner and U.S. investments in Vietnam topped $1.5 billion in 

2009. The U.S. and Vietnamese governments hold regular dialogues on human rights and the return of 

Americans who died during the Vietnam War. Vietnam will chair ASEAN, the Association of South East 

Asian Nations, in 2010. 

The United States and Vietnam engage in a wide range of cooperative activities in the areas of 

peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, search and rescue, maritime and border 

security, law enforcement, and nonproliferation. The countries cooperate on counternarcotics and regional 

security issues, including an annual political-military strategic consultation. Vietnam has hosted multiple 

visits by American nuclear powered carriers and destroyers and humanitarian supply ships. In June 2008, 

Prime Minister Dung announced plans to take part in the multinational Global Peace Operations Initiative 

(GPOI) to train international peacekeepers. 

Vietnam's suppression of political dissent and religious freedom remains a source of bilateral contention. 

Since spring 2007, Vietnam's government has arrested dozens of political dissidents, and in 2008 and 

2009 further tightened controls over the press and freedom of speech. The U.S. government has 

commercial rule of law programs in Vietnam and has funded small human rights related programs for 

woman, labor, and religious freedom. The Vietnam Education Foundation has brought 300 Vietnamese 

to the United States for graduate study in the past five years. The U.S.-Vietnam Fulbright program 

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remains one of the largest per capita, with an estimated 2,500 Vietnamese students and scholars coming to 

the U.S. to study in the past decade. 

Recommendations 

I. Pressing for Immediate Improvements to End Religious Freedom Abuses, Ease 

Restrictions, and Release Prisoners 

In addition to designating Vietnam as a CPC, the U.S. government, in both its bilateral relations and in 

multilateral fora, should urge the Vietnamese government to: 

Prisoner Releases 

• release or commute the sentences of all religious prisoners of concern, including those imprisoned or 

detained on account of their peaceful advocacy of religious freedom and related human rights 

including, among others, Nguyen Van Dai, Le Cong Dinh, Nguyen Thi Hong, members of ethnic 

minorities in the Central Highlands and northwest provinces, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao followers, and 

those held under some form of administrative detention or medical parole, including Le Thi Cong 

Nhan, Father Nguyen Van Ly, Father Phan Van Loi, the Most Venerable Thich Quang Do, and other 

UBCV leaders detained since the 2003 crackdown on the UBCV’s leadership; and 

• publicize the names of all Montagnard Protestants currently in detention for reasons related to the 

2001 and 2004 demonstrations, allow visits from representatives of the International Committee of 

the Red Cross or other independent foreign observers, and announce publicly that a prompt review of 

all such prisoner cases will be conducted. 

 Revise Laws to Meet International Human Rights Standards 

• amend the 2004 Ordinance on Religious Beliefs and Religious Organizations, Decree 22, the “Prime 

Minister’s Instructions on Protestantism,” and other domestic legislation to ensure that such laws do 

not restrict the exercise of religious freedom and conform to international norms regarding the 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, including revising the vague national security 

provisions in the 2004 Ordinance; 

• enforce the provisions in the Prime Minister’s “Instructions on Protestantism” that outlaw forced 

renunciations of faith and establish specific penalties in the Vietnamese Criminal Code for anyone 

who carries out such practices; 

• end the use of such far-reaching “national security” provisions as Article 88 or Article 258 of the 

Criminal Code, which have resulted in the detention of advocates for religious freedom and related 

human rights such as the freedoms of speech, association, and assembly; 

• revise or repeal ordinances and decrees that empower local security police to arrest, imprison, or 

detain citizens in administrative detention for vague national security or national solidarity offenses, 

including Ordinance 44, Decree 38/CP, and Decree 56/CP, and Articles 258, 79, and 88, among 

others, of the Criminal Code, and end their de facto use to detain advocates; 

• revise or repeal ordinances and decrees that limit the freedom of expression, assembly or association, 

including new regulations banning peaceful public protests of property disputes; 

• end the harassment, threats, arrest, and revocation of legal licenses of human rights lawyers who take 

up political sensitive cases; 

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• establish a clear and consistent legal framework that allows religious groups to organize and engage 

in humanitarian, medical, educational, and charitable work; 

• investigate and publicly report on the beating deaths of Hmong and Montagnard Protestants and 

prosecute any government official or police found responsible for these deaths; and 

• implement the recommendations of the UN Human Rights Council pursuant to Vietnam’s May 2009 

UN Universal Periodic Review, including cooperation with various UN mechanism and special 

procedures.

Protect Peaceful Religious Practice 

• establish a non-discriminatory legal framework for religious groups to engage in peaceful religious 

activities protected by international law without requiring groups to affiliate with any officially 

registered religious organization, for example: 

--allow the banned Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) or the Khmer Buddhists to operate 

legally and independently of the official Buddhist organizations and the Vietnam Buddhist Sangha, 

including allowing the UBCV’s Provincial Committees and Buddhist Youth Movement to organize 

and operate without restrictions or harassment; 

--allow leaders chosen by all Hoa Hao adherents to participate in the Executive Board of the Hoa Hao 

Administrative Council or allow a separate Hoa Hao organization, such as the Hoa Hao Central 

Buddhist Church, to organize legally and operate with the same privileges as the Administrative 

Council; 

--allow Cao Dai leaders opposed to the Cao Dai Management Council to form a separate Cao Dai 

organization with management over its own affairs; 

--allow Protestant house church groups in the Central Highlands, central coast, and north and 

northwest provinces to organize independently and without harassment, and allow them to operate, 

if desired, outside of either the Southern Evangelical Church of Vietnam (SECV) or the Northern 

Evangelical Church of Vietnam (ECVN); 

• allow all Hoa Hao groups freely and fully to celebrate their founding Prophet’s Birthday, allow the 

printing and distribution of all the groups’ sacred writings, and allow the rebuilding of the Hoa Hao 

Buddhist Library in Phu Tan, An Giang province; 

• approve the registration applications of all 671 ethnic minority churches in the north and northwest 

provinces and allow them to affiliate immediately with the Evangelical Church of Vietnam (ECVN), 

consistent with the deadlines established in the Ordinance on Religious Belief and Religious 

Organizations; 

• create a national commission of religious groups, government officials, and independent, nongovernmental observers to find equitable solutions on returning confiscated properties to religious 

groups; 

• end the harassment and restrictions on monks and nuns affiliated with the Plum Village (Lang Mai) 

order associated with Thich Nhat Hanh, rescind the government decree to disband the order in 

Vietnam, and allow them to live and worship together legally and in community without harassment; 

and 

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• issue public orders to disband the Religious Security Police (cong an ton giao) and hold accountable 

all officials who beat, harass, or discriminate against those exercising the universal right to the 

freedom of religion and belief. 

 Train Government Officials 

• revise the Training Manual for the Work Concerning the Protestant Religion in the Northwest 

Mountainous Region to reflect fully international standards regarding the protection of religious 

freedom and remove language that urges authorities to control and manage existing religious practice 

through law, halt “enemy forces” from “abusing religion” in order to undermine the Vietnamese state, 

and “overcome the extraordinary...growth of Protestantism;” 

• issue clear public instructions for provincial officials on the registration process, consistent with the 

provisions of the Ordinance, including by restating the timetables for responding to applications; 

providing redress for denials; and ceasing unreasonable demands for information or other conditions 

placed on registration applications, such as demanding the names of all members of religious 

communities, requesting management changes, requiring denominational leaders to convene 

conferences to undergo indoctrination classes, and requesting that denominational leaders become 

informants on other religious groups; 

• issue a “National Handbook for Religious Work” to train the estimated 21,000 new government 

officials engaged in “religious work” that should include an unambiguous statement about the need to 

respect international standards regarding religious freedom; guidelines for interpreting the Ordinance 

on Religion and Belief; detailed procedures on how to oversee the legal recognition process; a clear 

explanation of the duties of provincial officials under the law; and a description of the rights of 

religious communities under Vietnamese law and international human rights standards, including 

providing avenues to report inappropriate actions by local officials or police; and 

• issue a public statement clearly stating that the denial of educational, medical, housing, and other 

government services or economic assistance, including foreign aid, based on religious belief, 

affiliation, or ethnicity is contrary to Vietnamese law and that government officials found using such 

tactics will be prosecuted under the law.

II. Establishing New Priorities for U.S. Assistance & Refugee Programs 

The U.S. government should assist the government of Vietnam and other international governmental and 

non-governmental organizations to develop protections for religious freedom and refugees in Vietnam, 

including by taking the following actions: 

• support the work of regional human rights organizations and civil society mechanisms to focus 

attention on Vietnam while it is the 2010 ASEAN chair, including supporting the participation of 

prominent dissidents, religious leaders, and legal reform advocates from Vietnam in regional human 

rights conferences, symposia, training, and capacity building; 

• fully implement the Montagnard Development Program (MDP) created as part of the House and 

Senate Foreign Operations conference report of 2005 and continued in the 2008 conference report, 

and consider expanding the MDP to assist all ethnic minority communities in Vietnam to provide 

targeted humanitarian and development funds to ethnic minorities whose demands for land rights and 

religious freedom are closely connected; 

• ensure that rule of law programs include regular exchanges between international experts on religion 

and law and appropriate representatives from the Vietnamese government, academia, and religious 

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communities to discuss the impact of Vietnam’s laws and decrees on religious freedom and other 

human rights, train public security forces on these issues, and discuss ways to incorporate 

international standards of human rights in Vietnamese laws and regulations; 

• work to improve the capacity and skills of Vietnamese civil society organizations, including medical, 

educational, development, relief, youth, and charitable organizations run by religious organizations; 

• offer some Fulbright Program grants to individuals and scholars whose work promotes understanding 

of religious freedom and related human rights; 

• encourage the Vietnam Educational Foundation, which offers scholarships to Vietnamese high 

school-age students to attend school in the United States, to select youth from ethnic minority group 

areas (Montagnard and Hmong), from minority religious communities (Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholic, 

Protestant, Cham Islamic, and Khmer Buddhists), or former novice monks associated with the 

Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam and Khmer Buddhists; 

• work with international corporations seeking new investments in Vietnam to promote international 

human rights standards in Vietnam and find ways their corporate presence can help promote and 

protect religious freedom and related human rights; and 

• expand funding for additional Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) programming for 

Vietnam and to overcome the jamming of VOA and RFA broadcasts; 

• seek access to the Central Highlands to monitor the safe resettlement of Montagnards repatriated from 

Cambodia and continue to assist the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) and other 

appropriate international organizations as they seek unimpeded access to the Central Highlands in 

order voluntarily to monitor repatriated Montagnards consistent with the Memorandum of 

Understanding (MoU) signed on January 25, 2005 between the UNHCR, Cambodia, and Vietnam; 

• increase the use of Priority 1 authority to accept refugees facing a well-founded fear of persecution, 

both those who have escaped to other countries in the region and those who are still in Vietnam, 

without the prerequisite of a referral by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 

including seeking to expand in-country processing in areas outside of Ho Chi Minh City; and 

• allow all monks and nuns affiliated with the Plum Village Buddhist order to enter the United States 

from Thailand under temporary religious worker visas (R-1), and remove any obstacles to the 

immediate granting of their visas so that they are able join a functioning religious community in the 

United States until their order in Vietnam is reestablished. 

III. Recommendations for U.S. Congressional Action 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• pass the Vietnam Human Rights Act (H.R. 1609 / S. 3678) and fully appropriate the funds 

authorized in the Act, including for programs in religious freedom, human rights, refugees, rule of 

law, public diplomacy, and anti-trafficking measures; 

• ensure that any new funds appropriated or allocated to expand bilateral economic or security relations 

are met with corresponding funding for new human rights, civil society capacity-building, noncommercial rule of law programs in Vietnam, and consider creating a pilot program for Vietnam as an 

Asian counterpart to Supporting Eastern European Democracy (SEED) program--which could be 

called Promoting Universal Rights and the Rule of Law (PURRL); 

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• continue oversight, establish benchmarks, and measure progress of the U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights 

Dialogues, renewed in 2007, by holding appropriate hearings on the progress report the State 

Department is required to submit to Congress on the trajectory and outcomes of bilateral discussions 

on human rights as required by Sec. 702 of PL 107-228; 

• appropriate additional funds for the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund for new 

technical assistance and religious freedom programming that should be at least commensurate with 

new and ongoing programs for Vietnamese workers, women, and rule of law training; and 

• engage Vietnamese leaders on needed legal revisions and protections of individuals related to the farreaching national security provisions that are currently used to arrest and detain peaceful advocates 

for religious freedom and related human rights. 
Watch List Countries

Country Chapters: USCIRF’s Watch List 

Afghanistan 

FINDINGS: The Afghan constitution fails to explicitly protect the right to freedom of religion or belief, allows 

other fundamental rights to be superseded by ordinary legislation, and contains a repugnancy clause stating that no 

law can be contrary to Islam. As a result, individuals lack protection to dissent from state-imposed orthodoxy, to 

debate the role and content of religion in law and society, to advocate for the rights of women and members of 

religious minorities, or to question interpretations of Islamic precepts. Doing so risks unjust accusations of 

religious crimes such as apostasy and blasphemy. In high-profile cases, Afghan courts have not protected freedom 

of religion or belief in accordance with international standards, with the result that members of the majority 

Muslim community have been imprisoned for exercising their internationally guaranteed rights of freedom of 

expression on sensitive religious or social issues. In addition, the Afghan government continues to be unable to 

protect citizens against violence and intimidation by the Taliban and other illegal armed groups. 

Based on these concerns, the Commission continues in 2010 to place Afghanistan on its Watch List. Afghanistan 

was first placed on the Commission’s Watch List in 2006. In 2000 and 2001, USCIRF had recommended that the 

Taliban regime, then in control of most of Afghanistan’s territory, be designated as a “particularly severe violator 

of religious freedom.” The Secretary of State designated the Taliban as such in 1999 and 2000. 

Conditions for religious freedom remain problematic, despite gains in human rights since the ouster of the Taliban 

regime in late 2001. Individuals who dissent from the prevailing orthodoxy regarding Islamic beliefs and practices 

are subject to legal action due to the influence of religious leaders. A government ministry announced it had 

destroyed Shi’a Muslim books from Iran, apparently because they contained material deemed offensive to the 

Sunni majority. Before final revision, a new Shi’a family or personal status law appeared to sanction marital rape 

and to require a husband’s permission for a wife to leave home except in an emergency. Violence and intimidation 

by the Taliban and other insurgents poses a serious threat to human rights of all Afghans. Efforts at national 

reconciliation could potentially return Taliban or other insurgents hostile to international standards of human rights 

to positions of influence. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: U.S. policy has not sufficiently prioritized human rights, including 

religious freedom, in Afghanistan. Promoting respect for freedom of religion or belief must be an integral part of 

U.S. strategy, particularly as the government of Afghanistan pursues a peace or reconciliation process with antigovernment insurgents. USCIRF recommends the U.S. government should continue to maintain a high level of 

diplomatic, development assistance, and military engagement to preserve and consolidate the Afghan people’s 

human rights gains since 2001. The U.S. government should clearly state its concern for religious freedom as an 

essential element in U.S. policy in Afghanistan; use its influence to support those who advocate respect for human 

rights, including freedom of religion or belief; support efforts to develop a judicial sector that upholds international 

standards of human rights; support the promotion of respect for human rights and of religious tolerance in public 

education; urge inclusion of representatives of civil society, including women and members of minority 

communities, in any reconciliation talks; and work to ensure that any reconciliation process does not provide 

immunity to known human-rights violators. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy towards Afghanistan can 

be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Government Policies toward Religious Groups and Activities 

In January 2004, Afghanistan adopted a constitution that provides for the freedom of non-Muslim 

religious groups to exercise their faith, contains an explicit recognition of equality between men and 

women, and declares the state will abide by “the UN charter, international treaties, international 

conventions . . . and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” However, the constitution does not 

extend explicit protections for the right to freedom of religion or belief, as it only provides that “followers 

of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the 

provisions of law.” Other fundamental rights, such as the right to life and free expression, can be 

superseded by ordinary legislation. These shortcomings are compounded by a repugnancy clause that 

states that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam,” as well as 

by provisions for a judicial system empowered to enforce the repugnancy clause and apply Hanafi sharia 

(Islamic) jurisprudence to cases where there is no other applicable law. In addition, the constitution 

prohibits any amendments that would be contrary to the “provisions of adherence to the fundamentals of 

the sacred religion of Islam.” 

The absence of a guarantee of the individual right to religious freedom and the empowerment of the 

judicial system to enforce Islamic principles and sharia law mean that the constitution does not fully 

protect individual Afghan citizens who dissent from state-imposed orthodoxy against unjust accusations 

of religious “crimes” such as apostasy and blasphemy. There are few protections for Afghans to debate 

the role and content of religion in law and society, to advocate the rights of women and religious 

minorities, and to question interpretations of Islamic precepts without fear of retribution or being charged 

with “insulting Islam.” These legal deficiencies have permitted the official imposition of harsh, unfair, 

and at times even abusive interpretations of religious orthodoxy, violating the human rights of 

individuals. 

For instance, in September 2009 former student journalist Parwiz Kambakhsh went into exile after being 

released from prison as the result of an unpublicized Presidential pardon. Kambakhsh had been sentenced 

to death for blasphemy in Balkh province in January 2008 for circulating material to other students, some 

of which he had downloaded from the Internet, concerning women’s rights in Islam. Although an 

influential council of religious scholars pressed for the execution to be carried out, others—including 

human rights groups, civic organizations, and groups of journalists—staged public protests in his defense. 

In October 2008, an appeals court in Kabul reduced his sentence to 20 years in prison. Another 

blasphemy case similarly ended with a presidential pardon with the release of three prisoners on March 

20, 2010, in conjunction with the Nowruz spring festival. In that case, in September 2008 a court in 

Kabul had sentenced veteran journalist Ahmed Ghous Zalmai and mosque leader Mullah Qari Mushtaq to 

20 years in prison, and publisher Mohammad Ateef Noori to five years, for their roles in publishing an 

independent translation of the Koran. Authorities were influenced by Afghan religious scholars who 

alleged that the translation misinterpreted verses on social issues, was un-Islamic, and did not have a 

parallel Arabic text next to the Dari translation. 

Such cases involving Muslim individuals exercising their internationally guaranteed rights demonstrate 

the inadequate guarantees for individual human rights in the Afghan constitution. These cases represent a 

problem for the country’s development as a democratic state based on the rule of law where fundamental 

human rights are protected. This problem has been exacerbated by the persistent weakness of the 

country’s central government, which continues to face substantial challenges that include mounting 

insecurity, a lack of basic infrastructure, massive corruption, an expanding illegal drug trade, and 

unresolved human rights violations from previous conflicts that have given rise to a climate of impunity 

in many parts of the country. 

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Religious sensitivities, heightened by the ongoing conflict with Taliban insurgents, have limited freedom 

of expression in the country. There has been a “backlash” by Afghanistan’s powerful traditionalist 

religious forces against the liberalization that occurred after the fall of the Taliban. A media law passed 

by parliament in September 2008 prohibits works and material that are contrary to the principles of Islam, 

works and materials offensive to other religions and sects, and propagation of religions other than Islam. 

President Karzai initially attempted to block the passage of this bill by veto, but the bill was passed with a 

two-thirds majority. At the end of the reporting period, the authorities do not appear to have implemented 

the law. Nevertheless, media outlets, including radio and television, face pressure and occasional legal 

action from authorities influenced by Muslim clerics who object to particular content, such as references 

to other religions or the scenes of women dancing common in Indian films. 

These concerns about freedom of religion and expression take place in a context of declining respect for 

democratic norms and human rights, including with regard to freedom of speech and the press. In 

addition to cases involving views on religious interpretation, journalists in Afghanistan are coming under 

increasing pressure—and facing legal consequences—for criticizing political leaders, powerful local 

politicians, drug dealers, or warlords. 

The security situation continues to be serious, and President Karzai’s government does not exercise full 

control over the country, particularly outside Kabul and the major provincial centers, even with the active 

support of U.S. and NATO International Security Assistance Forces. As a result, the situation for 

religious freedom and other human rights is precarious in many parts of the country. The Taliban 

continues to stage attacks inside Afghanistan, posing an ongoing threat to the stability of the government. 

In addition, illegal militias have not been disarmed, and they, as well as some nominally allied with the 

government, continue to exercise power throughout the country and often perpetrate human rights abuses. 

These abuses include political killings, torture, coercion to enforce social and religious conformity, and 

abuses against women and girls, sometimes with the active support of the local courts and police. In 

some areas of Afghanistan, the Taliban administer a virtual parallel state, and some Afghans reportedly 

prefer Taliban courts, as they are seen as less corrupt than government ones. These substantial security 

threats present a persistent danger to the establishment of democracy and the rule of law throughout 

Afghanistan. 

Women’s Rights 

The human rights of women were severely and egregiously violated in the name of religion by the 

Taliban regime. Since then, the status of women has improved significantly, although it remains under 

threat. Women, traditionally accorded a subordinate status in Afghan society, have become more 

prominent in public life. Women serve in both houses of Afghanistan’s national parliaments (some in 

seats reserved for women) and in provincial councils. Record numbers of women ran as candidates in the 

August 2009 presidential and provincial assembly elections. Two candidates for president, seven of the 

candidates for vice president, and approximately 10 percent of the candidates for provincial council seats 

were women. The governor of one of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces (Bamiyan) is a woman. A woman, Dr. 

Sima Samar, heads the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, a constitutional body. A 

few women also serve as judges, prosecutors, and ambassadors. 

Nevertheless, women’s progress in the public sphere is threatened today both by the Taliban resurgence 

and the continuing strong influence of religious traditionalists. Women who seek to engage in public life 

are likely to be seen as “immoral” by traditionalists and to be targeted for intimidation, harassment, or 

violence by Taliban or other extremists. The number of women in senior government positions has 

decreased since President Karzai dropped three female ministers from his cabinet in 2006. Currently, the 

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Minister of Women’s Affairs is the sole female cabinet minister. There are no women on the Supreme 

Court. 

Although the enveloping burqa, required during the Taliban regime, is less common in Kabul, almost all 

women wear some form of head covering, either out of personal piety or fear of communal pressure. In 

rural areas, local religious leaders continue to pressure women about their dress and most women wear 

the burqa. 

Pervasive discrimination continues to place women in a second-class status and to limit their 

opportunities to obtain education, employment, and even medical care. Women in Afghanistan frequently 

are denied equal access to legal representation and due process, especially in rural areas, where traditional 

councils mete out justice. Numerous reports by the UN and other international observers have 

documented the widespread and deeply-rooted problem of violence against women, including so-called 

“honor killings.” Lack of access to the legal system hampers efforts to combat violence against women, 

particularly domestic violence. The government has taken some steps to combat this problem. According 

to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Afghanistan’s new Law on the Elimination of Violence 

against Women, endorsed by presidential decree in July 2009 but still awaiting parliamentary approval, 

“explicitly criminalizes rape, as well as underage and forced marriage, and other forms of violence 

against women.” 

The Shi’a Muslim Minority 

The situation of Afghanistan’s Shi’a Muslim minority has improved markedly since the end of Taliban 

rule, when they were severely persecuted. Shi’a are now able to perform their traditional Ashura public 

processions and rituals in Kabul without incident or hindrance. Shi’a participate fully in public life, 

including in parliament and in senior positions in the Karzai government. Afghanistan’s Second Vice 

President, Abdul Karim Khalili, is a member of the Shi’a minority. Most Shi’a are from the Hazara 

ethnic group, which traditionally has been harshly discriminated against and segregated from the rest of 

society due to a combination of political, ethnic, and religious reasons. 

The constitution provides that Shi’a law will be applied in cases in which both parties are Shi’a. The 

government’s efforts to further accommodate Shi’a practices with the adoption of a Shi’a family or 

personal status law proved controversial, however, because of provisions that many Afghan and 

international observers believed to be contrary to constitutional guarantees of equal rights to men and 

women, particularly in regard to women’s rights in marriage. In its original form, the law appeared to 

sanction marital rape and to deny wives the right to leave home without permission from their husbands, 

except in emergencies. In response to such criticism, the Shi’a Personal Status Law underwent a process 

of technical review before an amended version was endorsed by presidential decree in July 2009. The 

most controversial article, that appearing to sanction marital rape, was removed and others reworded. In 

a December 2009 report, Ms. Navanethem Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated 

that the law, even following these changes, “legitimizes discriminatory practices against women” and 

“represent(s) a set-back for women’s rights” in Afghanistan. Judge Pillay personally recommended that 

the law be repealed. 

Despite the overall improvement in respect to the Shi’a Muslim community, there was one reported 

instance of a restriction on the importation of Shi’a religious literature in the current reporting period. In 

May 2009, the Ministry of Culture and Youth Affairs announced that in late 2008 it had seized and 

destroyed a shipment of Shi’a religious books from Iran. The stated reason for this action was that the 

books were dangerous to the unity of Afghanistan because they contained interpretations of Islam 

offensive to members of the majority Muslim community. This action appears to have been arbitrary and 

extralegal in nature as there are no legal restrictions on the importation of religious texts. 

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 Non-Muslim Minorities 

Although specifying that Islam is the state religion, the constitution states that “followers of other 

religions are free to practice their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions 

of law.” There were no known cases of non-Muslims being formally accused by Afghan authorities of 

blasphemy or prosecuted on other religious grounds. As in the case of Shi’a Muslims, the situation of 

Afghanistan’s small communities of Hindus and Sikhs has improved since the fall of the Taliban, as there 

is no longer any official discrimination. Hindus and Sikhs are allowed to practice their faith and to have 

places of public worship. However, they are effectively barred from most government jobs, and face 

societal hostility and harassment. The few Afghan Christians, converts from Islam or their children, are 

forced to conceal their faith and are unable to worship openly. Members of Afghanistan’s small Baha’i 

community also lead an essentially covert existence, particularly since May 2007 when the General 

Directorate of Fatwa and Accounts ruled that their faith is a form of blasphemy and that all Muslims who 

convert to the Baha’i faith are apostates. There were no reports, however, of anti-Baha’i incidents or 

court cases during the past year. 

U.S. Policy 

During the past year, U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, increasingly viewed as a single theater for 

U.S. diplomatic and military efforts, has been based on the results of a policy review announced in March 

2009. The declared goal of U.S. policy in both countries is to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda 

and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” The Obama 

Administration’s stated objectives for achieving this goal in Afghanistan include disrupting terrorist 

networks, promoting a more accountable and effective government, developing Afghan security forces, 

and involving the international community, with an important leadership role for the UN. The 

counterinsurgency strategy now being pursued in Afghanistan appears to be designed to improve the 

security of Afghanistan’s civilian population by providing better protection from insurgent violence and 

by better strengthening Afghanistan’s economy and institutions in order to increase popular support for 

the Afghan government. 

According to the Congressional Research Service, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan is intended to stabilize 

and strengthen the economic, social, political, and security environment in order to “blunt popular support 

for extremist forces in the region.” Since the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan after the September 11, 

2001 terrorist attacks, the United States has spent almost $40 billion on this effort, just over half of which 

has been assistance to Afghan military and police forces (primarily for training and equipment). 

Approximately a third has been development and humanitarian assistance, about 10 percent has gone to 

counter-narcotics efforts, and only 5 percent to promoting good governance and democratization. 

Early 2010 witnessed an intensification of U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan. In February 2010, U.S. 

forces, in conjunction with the NATO International Security Assistance Force and Afghan forces 

launched a major anti-Taliban offensive in Helmand province, in what was described as perhaps the 

largest such operation since 2001. In March 2010, preparations appeared underway for a similar 

offensive around Kandahar, a traditional area of Taliban support. 

The first quarter of 2010 also saw the tentative, beginning stages of a peace or “reconciliation” process 

that could possibly bring the current conflict to an end. At an international conference on Afghanistan 

held in London on January 28, 2010President Karzai sought support for plans to hold a “peace jirga” that 

would bring together tribal leaders, including those with ties to the Taliban, to be held in May. (A jirga is 

a traditional Afghan assembly of notables, often resorted to in Afghan history to provide legitimacy to 

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government insurgents who could accept the Afghan constitution and respect human rights, including the 

rights of Afghan women. Although the Taliban led by Mullah Omar appear to have rejected this 

initiative, in March 2010 a delegation arrived in Kabul representing another major insurgent group, the 

faction of Hizb-i-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a major mujahideen commander during the Afghan 

resistance to the Soviet occupation. Although there appeared to be widespread awareness among the 

Karzai government’s international supporters of the claimed need to reintegrate into Afghan society 

lower-level and less ideological elements among the insurgents, some observers cautioned about the 

human rights implications of reintegrating notorious human rights abusers such as Hikmatyar. 

Recommendations 

The United States bears a special responsibility toward Afghanistan as instrumental in ousting the Taliban 

regime following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, as the major outside 

actor in supporting subsequent efforts toward political and economic reconstruction, and as the major 

contributor to current military operations. In light of these circumstances and the priority placed on the 

U.S.-Afghanistan relationship by President Obama, USCIRF recommends that the U.S. government 

increase its diplomatic, development, and military engagement in Afghanistan to preserve and consolidate 

the Afghan people’s gains in the protection of human rights, including freedom of religion or belief. This 

engagement should involve new strategies for development assistance to promote human rights, 

transparency and mutual accountability. 

The failure of these efforts would threaten a return to the Taliban-era’s repression of women and 

independent thinkers within the majority population. Not only would Afghanistan be less free but it 

would also more be unstable, thereby contributing to regional insecurity and potentially serving again as a 

future haven for global terrorism that threatens U.S. interests. 

I. Vigorously Promoting Every Individual’s Human Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief 

 and Related Rights 

The U.S. government should: 

y clearly articulate a concern for religious freedom and related human rights as an essential element of 

U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and have Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard 

Holbrooke and his office increase their effective engagement on these issues, including by: 

--bolstering the position of Afghans who advocate respect for human rights and tolerance; 

--ensuring that U.S. assistance to educational programs promotes respect for human rights and 

religious tolerance; 

--supporting judicial sector and legal reforms conducive to protecting human rights; and 

-- ensuring that human rights concerns are integrated into the reconciliation process looking 

toward a post-conflict Afghanistan; 

• vigorously support respect for the right of every individual to freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief, and increase efforts to ensure the protection, in law and practice, of fundamental 

human rights, including freedom of conscience and the equal rights of women, as outlined in 

international human rights instruments to which Afghanistan is a party; 

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y use its influence to protect freedom of expression against charges that may be used to stifle debate, 

such as blasphemy, “offending Islam,” apostasy, or similar offenses, including expression on 

sensitive subjects such as the role of religion in society and the rights of women and members of 

minority groups; 

y act to bolster the position of those reformers who respect, and advocate respect for, religious freedom 

and human rights, since those persons currently are on the defensive and are threatened and need U.S. 

support to counter the influence of those who advocate an Islamic extremist agenda; 

• amplify the voices of political reformers and human rights defenders by, among other things, 

encouraging President Karzai to appoint independent human rights defenders to the country’s 

independent national human rights commission and court system; 

• in the context of increased military activity by U.S. and NATO International Security Assistance 

Forces throughout Afghanistan, but especially in the south, ensure that any engagement or partnership 

with Afghan religious leaders is mindful of international standards of freedom of religion or belief; 

and 

• utilize the engagement of the U.S. military’s chaplains corps with Afghan Religious and Cultural 

Affairs officers (the Afghan equivalent to U.S. military chaplains) to help ensure that religious 

extremists do not infiltrate the chaplaincy corps of the Afghan army. 

II. Advancing Institutional Reform 

The U.S. government should: 

y ensure that programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development to help develop 

primary and secondary education, including through printing textbooks and providing civic education, 

incorporate as part of the content education on international standards with regard to human rights, 

including freedom of religion or belief, and religious tolerance; 

y strengthen efforts to reform the judicial system, including by helping to develop needed infrastructure 

and supporting the reconstruction of a judicial sector operating under the rule of law and upholding 

civil law and international standards of human rights; 

y undertake efforts to reform the legal system to ensure that laws and legal systems uphold international 

standards on human rights; 

y work to ensure that all judges and prosecutors are trained in civil law and international human rights 

standards, women are recruited into the judiciary at all levels, and all Afghans have equal access to 

the courts; and 

• assist legal experts in visiting Afghanistan, engaging their Afghan counterparts, and providing 

information to the Afghan public on the universality of human rights and the compatibility of Islam 

and human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, and expand existing programs to bring 

Afghans to the United States to experience how Islam and other faiths may be practiced in a free 

society. 

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III. Integrating Human Rights into the Reconciliation Process 

In order to improve the prospects for human rights in a post-conflict Afghanistan, the U.S. government 

should press the government of Afghanistan, when engaging in reconciliation talks, to: 

y ensure that recognized representatives of civil society, including Shi’a Muslims, members of other 

religious and ethnic minorities, and women, are included in any reconciliation talks with antigovernment elements; and 

• ensure that any reconciliation process does not provide immunity to known human rights violators 

and that such individuals should be barred from appointive or elective office, as well as from 

leadership positions in political parties. 

The U.S. government should: 

y not negotiate with the Taliban leadership except to set terms of their surrender or to draw less 

ideological individuals and elements away from the Taliban structure. 

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Belarus 

FINDINGS: The government of Belarus continues to commit serious violations of the freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, both in law and in practice. Belarus has a highly 

authoritarian government, with most political power concentrated in the hands of President 

Aleksandr Lukashenko and his small circle of advisors. The Lukashenko regime maintains 

extensive and intrusive structures to control and restrict religious communities, causing some 

human rights groups to compare the current religious freedom situation in Belarus to that under 

the former Soviet Union. In addition, the government has engaged in serious human rights 

abuses, including involvement in the disappearances of several key opposition figures, the 

imprisonment of political opponents and journalists, and strict controls on the media and civil 

society. 

In light of these violations, the Commission maintains Belarus on its Watch List for 2010. 

Belarus has been on USCIRF’s Watch List since 2003. 

The 2002 Belarusian religion law is viewed as the most repressive in Europe, particularly 

because of its ban on unregistered religious activity. Participation in the activities of 

unregistered religious groups may result in a maximum two-year term of imprisonment. The 

government maintains an extensive bureaucracy that closely supervises religious life throughout 

the country, and continues to harass and fine members of some religious groups, particularly 

Protestants and others viewed as “foreign” or as having a political agenda. In fact, in recent 

years there has been an increased use of large court-imposed fines for unregistered religious 

activity. Conscientious objectors to military service have been detained for terms of several 

months and fined. Foreign religious workers continue to face many official obstacles, including 

deportation and visa refusals. Religious communities have been registered under the 2002 law, 

but some evangelical Protestant congregations and Orthodox communities that do not accept 

Moscow Patriarchate jurisdiction continue to be denied. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: U.S. policy on Belarus should pay more attention to 

the issue of freedom of religion or belief. Its importance in Belarusian public opinion was 

demonstrated by a 2008 popular petition urging reform of the religion law and greater religious 

freedom. It was the largest non-party political petition in Belarusian history, signed by 50,000 

people. As part of its effort, the United States should ensure continuation of democracy 

promotion activities as envisaged in the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act. The National 

Endowment for Democracy’s Belarus civil society programs and the broadcasts of U.S. 

government-funded radio broadcasts to Belarus, such as those of Radio Free Europe/Radio 

Liberty (RFE/RL), should focus on the right to freedom of religion or belief and the promotion 

of religious tolerance. In addition, the U.S. government should allocate funds to advance 

internet freedom and protect Belarusian human rights activists from harassment and arrest by 

developing new technologies and immediately distributing proven and field-tested programs to 

counter censorship. Such activists should also be assisted to participate in relevant international 

conferences, including those of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE). Additional recommendations for U.S. policy towards Belarus can be found at the end 

of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Legal Framework 

The country’s 2002 religion law set up severe regulatory obstacles and major bureaucratic and legal 

restrictions on the activities of religious communities. Essentially, the 2002 law prohibits all religious 

activity by unregistered groups, limits the activity of religious communities to their areas of official 

registration, bans foreign citizens from leading religious activities, forbids unapproved religious activity 

in private homes except small, occasional prayer meetings, denies religious communities the right to train 

clergy, and requires official permission for the printing, import, or distribution of religious materials. 

The religion law also set up three categories: religious communities, religious associations, and national 

religious associations, with varying legal rights and registration requirements. A complex registration 

process requires extensive personal information about the members of religious congregations. In 

addition, the law mandated that all religious communities in Belarus re-register by late 2004. While most 

groups were re-registered, some disfavored groups have had difficulty re-registering. 

Restrictions on Religious Activities 

Some religious groups, particularly Protestant congregations, have repeatedly been denied registration 

and in many cases officials do not provide reasons. One frequent basis for denial is failure to provide a 

valid legal address, although in some cases, registration is required before such an address can be 

obtained. Moreover, a religious organization cannot be located at a residential address unless that 

location has been re-designated as nonresidential. In 2009, religious groups continued to have difficulty 

obtaining local government permission to convert residential property for religious purposes. Another 

basis for denial can be the religious group’s alleged failure to limit activities to a specified location. 

In January 2008, a secret government ruling reportedly denied official registration to 12 groups the 

government deemed “destructive sects,” including Ahmadi Muslims. 

Without state registration, religious communities are subject to state harassment of and interference with 

religious activities that sometimes result in fines. In recent years, the Belarus courts have increased these 

fines and expanded the range of religious groups subject to them. Until 2006, such fines usually were the 

equivalent of about $15, and were imposed on Council of Churches Baptist congregations that refuse on 

theological grounds to register with state authorities. However, since 2006, administrative fines for 

unregistered religious activity have increased and members of other groups have been fined. For 

example, a disabled 68-year old pensioner, Yevgeny Bakun, was fined in August 2009 the equivalent of 

$49 for holding an unregistered Salvation Pentecostal service in his yard in the city of Grodno. In 

September, he was issued another fine the equivalent of $245 for “holding mass events.” In a late 2009 

incident, a member of an unregistered Baptist group in Brest received an administrative fine the 

equivalent of $63 (reportedly half her monthly wage) for allowing her home to be used for worship. 

 

Although the religion law, at least in theory, allows people to pray in private homes, it requires that 

individuals obtain permission from local authorities to hold rituals, rites, or ceremonies in homes. 

However, such permission usually is denied. For six years, Protestant leaders unsuccessfully have 

attempted to resolve this situation. Despite confirmation from the Presidential Administration’s 

Department for Communication with Citizens that religious organizations may legally meet in private 

homes if local state authorities agree, police on several occasions in 2009 interfered with private religious 

meetings and sometimes fined participants. Some registered religious organizations, however, including 

Muslims, Lutherans, and Baha’is, have held worship services at residential addresses without prosecution. 

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The government also continues to limit the ability of registered groups to own or use property for 

religious purposes. Authorities reject requests for property registration from many Protestant churches 

and other groups officially viewed as new to Belarus; these groups also have faced difficulty in renting 

property from state proprietors. Moreover, Protestants in particular have reported that securing 

permission to build new churches is almost impossible. In Minsk, city planners will not grant any such 

permits until 2030, according to official documents. Protestant churches seeking property permits also 

report that they are treated as commercial organizations and charged fees set by Minsk authorities that 

may be hundreds of thousands of dollars. Forum 18 also reports that some of the smaller religious 

communities continue to face great difficulties in rebuilding premises for worship. 

In 2009 and 2010, officials continued to harass the New Life Full Gospel Church and threaten to seize its 

building in Minsk. Court executors delivered an order to vacate the building by August 2009, but the 

congregation refused to vacate. In January 2010, the government charged the church with polluting the 

grounds around its building with oil. If convicted, the church could be liable for a fine, plus $91,000 for 

the alleged damage. If the judgment is not paid, the government can seize the church building as 

compensation. 

The 2002 religion law states that religious organizations do not have priority in reclaiming property 

confiscated in Soviet times if a former worship building is now used for culture or sports activities. As a 

result, only nine of 92 historic synagogues in Belarus have been returned to the Jewish community since 

the country gained independence in 1991. Lutheran and Calvinist communities have also had little 

success in the return of their historical churches from the Belarusian government. 

Other laws, regulations, and directives also restrict the activities of registered religious communities. For 

example, groups are not allowed to function outside their geographic area of registration. Additionally, if 

a registered religious community does not qualify as a “central association”—meaning it has not been 

legally recognized for over 20 years or it does not have enough members—it cannot own media outlets or 

invite people from outside Belarus to work with the community, as in the case of the Greek Catholic 

Church (also known as the Byzantine Rite or Uniate Catholic Church). The Society for Krishna 

Consciousness also does not qualify as a central association and therefore cannot rent a hall or produce a 

publication with a print run of over 300. 

Restrictions on Religious Literature 

All religious literature is subject to compulsory government censorship. Religious publishing is restricted 

to religious groups with 10 registered communities, including at least one that was in existence in 1982. 

This requirement is onerous, since 1982 was during the Soviet period when few religious groups were 

allowed to operate. Some members of religious communities continue to be harassed and fined for 

“illegally” distributing religious literature. In April 2009, the government confiscated Unification Church 

materials to prevent “violations of human rights and freedoms” and “risks to individual psychological and 

physical welfare.” In May 2009, a Baptist was fined $745, the largest known fine for unregistered 

religious activity in Belarus, for operating a Christian street library and ordered to turn the materials over 

to the state. The Belarusian government also continues to harass and fine Hare Krishnas for distributing 

religious literature. 

The Privileged Status of the Belarusian Orthodox Church

The 2002 religion law recognizes the “definitive role” of the Orthodox Church in the development of 

Belarusian traditions, and the historic “traditional faiths,” Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, and Evangelical 

Lutheranism, without mentioning the Old Believers and Calvinist Churches, both of which have roots in 

Belarus dating to the 17th century. Since he assumed power in 1994, President Lukashenko has 

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discriminated in favor of the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC), an Exarchate of the Moscow 

Patriarchate Russian Orthodox Church. In June 2003, the Belarus government and the BOC signed a 

concordat on the Church’s role in public life, thereby further enhancing its privileged position. Despite 

the concordat, however, BOC instruction has not been introduced into the state education system. In 

March 2004, the Belarusian government granted the BOC the sole right to use the word “Orthodox” in its 

title. 

The Belarusian government has denied registration to several Orthodox churches that do not accept the 

authority of the Moscow Patriarchate, including the Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the 

True Orthodox Church. Archbishop Jovan of the Holy Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church 

(BAOC), a religious freedom activist, continued to be denied entry into the country in 2009. The Russian 

Orthodox Church Abroad is also denied registration, and in recent years its members have had to pay 

numerous fines for private worship services. 

However, despite its privileged status, the BOC also has not been immune from government harassment. 

Belarusian officials have discouraged the BOC from commemorating those Orthodox Christians killed in 

Belarus during the Soviet period due to their religion. The Belarusian KGB has tried to convince BOC 

clergy to remove icons of the Orthodox “New Martyrs” from the city of Grodno cathedral, although the 

local bishop refused to do so. In addition, KGB officers often monitor visitors to the town of Kuropaty, 

where New Martyrs are among the mass graves; a BOC chapel planned for the site has never been built. 

 

Conscientious Objectors 

 

A decade after the Constitutional Court declared it “urgent” to adopt a law on alternative military service, 

a proposal included in the 2010 Legislative Program was removed at the last minute. 

In November 2009— nine years after the charges against him were first brought—a Jehovah’s Witness 

from the city of Gomel, Dmitry Smyk, was found guilty of refusing military service and assessed a large 

fine. He is appealing. In February 2010, Ivan Mikhailov, a Christian convert from Judaism, was 

sentenced to a three-month jail term for refusing compulsory military service; his case also is on appeal. 

Reportedly, criminal charges against another conscientious objector were dropped in 2009, but he has 

been informed that he will be charged if he again refuses compulsory military service. 

Muslims have complained that they are unable to observe their religious rites in the Belarus army. One 

Muslim, Mikhail Mikhalienya, who refused military service for this reason was sentenced in January 

2009 to three months of imprisonment for evading military service and refusing to pay the associated fine. 

Challenges to the Religion Law 

In 2007, thousands of individuals from diverse religious communities, as well as nonbelievers, initiated a 

petition to the Belarusian government to protest the country’s 2002 religion law and other restrictions on 

freedom of religion or belief. In March 2008, the petition gained the 50,000 signatures required for the 

document to be considered by the Belarusian government; it was sent to the Constitutional Court, 

Parliament, and Presidential Administration. The Constitutional Court rejected it that same month on the 

grounds that only the head of state or other government officials can question the constitutionality of 

laws. Parliamentary and presidential authorities also rejected the petition, claiming that there were no 

religious freedom violations in Belarus. In April 2008, three human rights defenders were fined the 

equivalent of two months average monthly wages for their involvement with the petition. 

In March 2009, the Belarusian Supreme Court rejected an appeal brought by a Pentecostal pastor against 

a fine for leading an unregistered religious organization. While the pastor argued that the legal 

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requirement to register violated the Belarusian Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, the court ruled against him. 

Anti-Semitism 

The Belarusian government continues to demonstrate a lax attitude towards the problem of anti-Semitism 

and has not taken effective measures against individuals responsible for vandalism against Jewish 

memorials, cemeteries, or other property. During 2009, anti-Semitic incidents were investigated only 

sporadically, according to the State Department. Although official periodicals did not attack Jewish 

groups in the past year, the sale and distribution of anti-Semitic literature continued through state press 

distributors, government agencies, and stores affiliated with the BOC. Anti-Semitic and ultranationalist 

Russian newspapers and literature, digital video disks, and videocassettes also continued to be sold at 

Pravoslavnaya Kniga (Orthodox Bookstore), which also sells the literature of the BOC, the officiallyfavored church. 

Although Judaism is viewed under the 2002 religion law as “traditional” to Belarus, Jews recently have 

been the targets of offensive remarks by government officials, including President Lukashenko and the 

state media. For example, in October 2007, on live national radio, President Lukashenko referred to the 

Belarusian town of Babruysk as a “pigsty,” and “mainly a Jewish town—and you know how Jews treat 

the place where they are living.” According to the State Department, the president and other government 

officials have not publicly made anti-Semitic remarks within the past year. 

Religion and Public Education 

The religion and education laws specify that the state education system is secular, and that state education 

institutions are can work with registered religious organizations only outside school hours. Belarusian 

official school textbooks continued to promote intolerance towards religions officially considered “nontraditional” to Belarus. One textbook, a chapter entitled “Beware of Sects” included language about 

Seventh-Day Adventists and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Another book labeled Protestants and Hare Krishnas 

as “sects,” although according to the State Department, the authorities promised to change the language in 

the next edition. 

Restrictions on Foreign Religious Workers 

In 2008, Belarus further tightened strict government regulations on foreign religious workers. A 

government official, the Plenipotentiary for Religious and Nationality Affairs, has the sole discretion to 

decide whether religious activity by foreign citizens is necessary. In addition, that official is not required 

to provide reasons for denials of a foreign religious worker’s request to visit. Moreover, there is no 

avenue for appeal of denials. A foreign religious worker must be invited by a registered religious 

association. The visa application must include relevant work experience, the timetable and syllabus of the 

relevant religious educational institution and proof of knowledge of the Belarusian and Russian 

languages, as well as the proposed dates and reason for the visit. The application procedure for visits by 

foreign religious workers is usually lengthy and highly bureaucratic. 

Belarusian authorities continue to question foreign religious workers, humanitarian workers, and local 

citizens on the sources and uses of their funding. There were also credible reports that foreign religious 

workers were under surveillance by security personnel. Since 2004, a total of 33 foreigners, about twothirds of whom are Catholics, have been expelled or have been denied extension of their residence 

permits due to their religious activities. In January 2010, two Catholic priests who had worked in 

Belarus for several decades reportedly were ordered by authorities to halt religious activities but were 

not barred from the country. 

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Furthermore, if foreign citizens have not explicitly stated that they plan to participate in religious 

activities in Belarus, they can be reprimanded or expelled. In February 2009, two Danish visitors to 

Belarus were detained by police and banned from the country for one year due to their expressions of 

“ideas of a religious nature,” in the words of the deportation order. Both were attending—but were not 

leading—a church service in the city of Gomel. 

U.S. Policy 

In October 2004, President Bush signed into law the Belarus Democracy Act (BDA) as an attempt to 

promote democratic development, human rights, and the rule of law in Belarus. The BDA bans the U.S. 

government from providing loans, credit guarantees, financing or other financial assistance for Belarus, 

excluding humanitarian assistance, until the Belarusian authorities conduct a thorough inquiry into the 

disappearances of opponents of President Lukashenko, release political prisoners, and end persecution of 

the independent media and pro-democracy organizations. The BDA was reauthorized in 2007. 

The United States first imposed sanctions on Belarus in 2006 which were expanded in 2007 and 2008, 

targeting government entities and officials responsible for human rights abuses. Belarus released its last 

remaining political prisoners in 2008. In March 2008, the Belarusian government requested that the 

United States withdraw its ambassador and the U.S. Embassy in Minsk reduce its American diplomatic 

staff from 35 to five. In response, the United States requested that the Belarusian ambassador also be 

withdrawn from Washington, D.C. Bilateral relations continue at this low ebb. 

Nevertheless, the United States continues to provide assistance to more than 90 local NGOs in order to 

promote human rights and the rule of law. The U.S. Embassy Small Grants Program for registered 

Belarusian NGO projects also continues, and in 2009 $300,000 was awarded in 13 grants, including for 

the preservation of the national cultural and historical heritage. 

Recommendations 

I. Advancing Religious Freedom through U.S. Programs and Policies

The U.S. government should: 

y institute fully the measures in the 2007 Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act, which expresses the 

sense of Congress that sanctions be applied against the government of Belarus until it makes 

significant human rights progress; specific sanctions would include denying entry into the United 

States to high-ranking Belarusian officials and prohibiting strategic exports and U.S. government 

financing to the Belarusian government, except for humanitarian goods and agricultural or medical 

products; 

y ensure that the activities to promote democracy authorized by the Belarus Democracy 

Reauthorization Act, as well as in the Belarus civil society programs of the National Endowment for 

Democracy, include the right to freedom of religion or belief and the promotion of religious 

tolerance;

• ensure that U.S. government-funded radio broadcasts to Belarus, including those of RFE/RL, 

continue at least at their present levels, that efforts are made to secure sufficient transmission capacity 

to ensure reliable reception throughout that country, and that the programs discuss issues relating to 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief; 

• use appropriated internet freedom funds to develop free and secure email access for use in Belarus; 

facilitate the dissemination of high-speed internet access via satellite; and distribute immediately 

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proven and field-tested counter-censorship programs in order to prevent the arrest and harassment of 

religious freedom and human rights activists and help them maintain their freedom of expression and 

legitimate expectations of privacy; 

• award funds appropriated by Congress to counter censorship in Belarus, including from the FY2010 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, through a competitive and merit based process; 

• provide increased international travel opportunities, particularly to attend international conferences, 

for Belarusian civil society leaders, including representatives of human rights and religious groups, 

and others who defend freedom of religion in that country; 

• continue to support, publicly and privately, persons and groups engaged in the struggle against 

repression in Belarus, including the group of religious and opposition activists who make up the 

Freedom of Religion Initiative that published the “White Book”; 

y organize roundtables inside Belarus between members of registered and unregistered religious 

communities and international experts on freedom of religion, particularly the OSCE Panel of Experts 

on Freedom of Religion or Belief; and 

• assist in funding Belarusian NGOs seeking reform of the country’s religion law. 

II. Advancing Religious Freedom through Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy 

The U.S. government should: 

• use public and private diplomacy to advance the protection of religious freedom and human rights in 

Belarus, such as enhanced monitoring and public reporting by the U.S. Department of State, including 

the Special Envoy on Anti-Semitism and the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 

Freedom, and by the appropriate international organizations, including the OSCE and the UN; 

y coordinate with the European Union on the application of financial sanctions and visa bans on highranking Belarusian officials, particularly those who are directly responsible for or who have carried 

out the government’s abuses of religious freedom; 

• work with international partners to reinstate the position of UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of 

human rights in Belarus and support that position’s efforts to gain unrestricted access to the country; 

and 

• urge the Belarusian government to issue invitations to relevant UN Special Procedures, including the 

Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the 

Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Expression; the 

Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders; the 

Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief; and the Working Group on Enforced and 

Involuntary Disappearances. 

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III. Ending Violations of Religious Freedom in Belarus 

The government of Belarus should: 

• repeal the highly restrictive 2002 religion law, as several of its provisions violate international norms 

on freedom of religion or belief, as called for in the 2008 popular petition urging reform of the 

religion law, which was the largest non-party political petition in Belarusian history; 

• end the practice of denying registration to religious groups and then erecting obstacles to religious 

practice because of that unregistered status; 

• ensure that no religious community is given a status that may result in or be used to justify 

discrimination against or impairment of the rights of members of other religious groups; 

• provide the right to conduct religious education and distribute religious material; 

• adopt effective measures to halt attacks on the persons and property of minority religious groups and 

prosecute individuals who perpetrate such attacks; 

• ensure a greater effort on the part of government officials to find and hold accountable perpetrators of 

attacks on the persons and property of members of religious minorities; 

• publicly condemn, investigate, and prosecute criminal acts targeting Jews and the Jewish community, 

as well as members of other ethnic and religious communities; and 

• provide free access by domestic and international human rights groups and others to sites of religious 

violence or the destruction of places of worship. 

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Cuba 

FINDINGS: Serious religious freedom violations continue in Cuba. These violations include, 

among others: harassment and occasional arrests and detentions of religious professionals and 

laypersons affiliated with both registered and unregistered religious groups; the government’s 

extensive efforts to control and monitor religious belief and practice, including through 

surveillance, infiltration, and legal restrictions prohibiting religious communities from operating 

without government permission; and the government’s delay in registering new religious groups, 

which obliges unregistered groups to operate “illegally” and places them at risk of punishment. 

Moreover, the one-party Communist government continues to have an overall poor record on 

human rights. 

Based on these concerns, USCIRF again places Cuba on its Watch List in 2010 and will continue 

to monitor conditions of freedom of religion or belief in Cuba to determine if they rise to a level 

warranting the country’s designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. Cuba has 

been on the Commission’s Watch List since 2004. 

Religious belief and practice continue to be tightly controlled in Cuba. Within this reporting 

period, a number of religious leaders were arrested and the government expanded its efforts to 

crack down on independent churches operating outside of government control. Although the 

Cuban government seeks to project the image that it respects the right to religious freedom, state 

authorities perceive the potential influence of religious organizations as a threat to the revolution 

and, hence, the government’s legitimacy. Furthermore, despite becoming a signatory to the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2008, President Raul Castro and the government have 

yet to indicate, let alone institute, plans for large-scale improvements in freedom of religion or 

belief and related human rights. There were several positive developments for certain religious 

groups during the past year. However, these developments were local, and not nationwide, in 

nature, did not benefit all religious groups and should be viewed within the context of strict 

government control of all aspects of life in Cuba. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: The promotion of freedom of religion or belief is not 

adequately addressed in the U.S. government’s programs to promote human rights in Cuba. 

USCIRF recommends that, in addition to demanding that Havana release religious leaders who 

have been unjustly imprisoned, the United States should set objectives for the Cuban government 

to meet regarding the protection of freedom of religion or belief in Cuba before it will consider 

resuming full diplomatic relations with that country. In addition, the U.S. government should use 

appropriated funds to advance Internet freedom and protect Cuban activists from harassment and 

arrest by developing new technologies and immediately distributing proven and field-tested 

programs to counter censorship. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy towards Cuba can 

be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Arrests of Religious Leaders 

In 2009, the Cuban government increased its efforts against religious leaders who have withdrawn from 

denominations that are part of the government-recognized Protestant umbrella group, the Cuban Council 

of Churches (CCC), criticized the government’s interference in their churches, and/or are outside of the 

government’s control of religion. Leaders of the unregistered “Apostolic Reformation”—a self-described 

non-political religious “movement” that has attracted many pastors who formerly belonged to CCC 

denominations—were particularly targeted. Apostolic Reformation leaders have reported that their 

phones are tapped, they are watched and threatened, and their members are threatened with loss of 

employment if they do not leave the group. 

 

In May 2008, Apostolic Reformation Pastor Omar Gude Pérez was imprisoned and his family was told he 

would be charged with “human trafficking.” The pastor had received numerous threats from government 

officials prior to his imprisonment. The human trafficking case was dismissed in March 2009, but in 

April 2009 Gude was charged with illicit economic activity and falsification of documents and given a 

six-year sentence—the longest sentence handed down to a religious leader in decades. Following the 

sentence, Gude’s house was searched and his family was threatened with eviction and confiscation of 

their belongings. In January 2010, Gude was denied the right to appeal his sentence. 

According to Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), more than 30 other Apostolic Reformation 

members were briefly detained in 2009. In April, Pastor Bernardo de Quesada Saloman and his wife 

Damaris Marin were arrested as they attempted to observe Gude’s court hearing. Other pastors from the 

Apostolic Reformation were also arrested and threatened with charges of “social dangerousness” to 

discourage movement members from attending the hearing. In June 2009, dozens of Apostolic 

Reformation pastors were arrested in Camaguey to prevent them from attending an interdenominational 

meeting with 200 other religious leaders. In July 2009, Alexi Perez was arrested and imprisoned for illicit 

economic activity. Charges were later changed to illegal reception of materials. Other actions against the 

Apostolic Reformation included the eviction of three pastors from their house churches. One pastor, 

Mario Alvarez, is appealing the confiscation of his house to the Supreme Tribunal. 

 

Several religious leaders were detained or remained in detention in 2009. Reverend Robert Rodriguez, 

president of the Interdenominational Fellowship of Evangelical Pastors and Ministers, has been detained 

since October 2008 on charges of “offensive behavior.” At present, no date for his trial has been set. 

Prior to his arrest, Rev. Rodriguez had pulled out of the CCC after publishing a letter complaining about 

state interference in church affairs. 

Two Baptist leaders, Rubén Ortiz-Columbié and Francisco “Pancho” Garcia, were jailed for more than 

two weeks in October 2009 for “illegal economic activities.” The two men were arrested in Guantanamo 

while distributing financial aid to churches damaged in the 2008 hurricanes. Their church, the Eastern 

Cuba Baptist Convention, is one of the largest denominations on the island. The two men were well 

known to government authorities and had been working in Guantanamo province continually since the 

2008 hurricanes. 

Independent Santeria priests also reportedly were threatened and pressured to assimilate into the 

government-sanctioned Yoruba Cultural Association during the past year. 

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Governmental Oversight and Legal Restrictions 

The Cuban government’s main interaction with, and control over, religious denominations is through its 

routine surveillance, infiltration, and/or harassment of religious, active laity, and the administrative 

apparatus of the various churches. The Cuban government requires churches and other religious groups to 

register with the relevant provincial office of the Registry of Associations within the Ministry of Justice. 

Registration requires religious communities to identify locations and funding sources for activities and 

obtain a government certificate that states that each registering community is not duplicating the activities 

of other registered religious communities. Registration permits religious leaders to receive foreign 

visitors, import religious materials, meet in approved houses of worship, and apply for travel abroad for 

religious purposes. 

The Cuban government is most tolerant of those religious groups that maintain “close relations” with the 

state or that “often [support] government policies,” according to the State Department. There are 

approximately 50 state-recognized religious groups, primarily Christian denominations, half of which 

have some form of association with the CCC. However, the government has not interfered with activities 

of the Baha’is and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), groups that are not 

officially registered. There is also a small Jewish community, primarily in Havana. 

As in past years, government permission to build new houses of worship, or to repair or restore existing 

ones, is difficult to obtain, although in 2009 some religious denominations did obtain permission to repair 

houses of worship that had been damaged during the 2008 hurricanes. 

Because of the difficulty in obtaining permission to build new houses of worship, many religious groups, 

both registered and unregistered, hold services in private homes or similar accommodations, commonly 

known as “house churches.” There are reports that at least 10,000 house churches exist nationwide, the 

majority of which are not registered. A 2005 law requires all house churches to register and submit to the 

government detailed information on membership, the house’s inhabitants, and the schedule of services. 

The law also permits no more than three meetings to be held per week, bars foreign citizens from 

participating in services without government permission, and requires house churches of the same 

denomination to be at least two kilometers apart. According to the State Department, of the 4,500 house 

churches that have applied, 2,400 have been registered. 

Since the 2005 law was enacted, several house churches from registered and unregistered denominations 

have been closed, confiscated, or destroyed, and some house church leaders have been briefly detained or 

evicted from their homes. Examples in this reporting period include the April 2009 attempted eviction of 

evangelical minister Julio Ibanez in Havana Province and the June detention of several evangelical 

pastors in Camaguey for holding an unauthorized meeting. There also have been reports that individual 

worshippers have received citations and some churches have been forced to pay large fines. The Cuban 

government justifies these actions by arguing that unregistered house churches are improperly using the 

buildings, citing the religious communities’ lack of government approval both to hold meetings and to 

hold them at that specific location. 

All publications are required to be registered with the Ministry of Culture. However, the Cuban 

Conference of Catholic Bishops has refused to register its publications, arguing that such registration 

would mean a loss of content and format control. Although the government has not blocked the printing 

or publication of Catholic publications completely, increased government pressure in recent years, 

sometimes in the form of questioning by state security agents and blocking the distribution of supplies, 

has led several such publications to close. 

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Other means by which the government restricts religious practice include the following: a regulation 

preventing any Cuban or joint enterprise, except those with specific authorization, from selling 

computers, facsimile machines, photocopiers, or other equipment to any church other than at the 

official—i.e. exorbitant—retail prices; an almost total state monopoly on printing presses; a prohibition 

on private religious schools; limitations on the entry of foreign religious workers; denial of Internet access 

to religious organizations; and denial of religious literature, such as Bibles, to persons in prison. 

Additionally, religious groups must receive permission from local Communist Party officials prior to 

holding processions or events outside religious buildings. Permission is often denied based on the 

decision of individual government officials rather than in accordance with the law. 

The government sometimes discriminates in the area of employment on the basis of religion. Converts 

from Santeria to Catholicism are reportedly encouraged to “retire,” are not given promotions or pay 

raises, or are excluded from work functions or meetings because colleagues no longer consider them 

“trustworthy.” Unofficially, people who are overtly religious also are excluded from diplomatic work, 

careers in journalism, or from joining the police, military, or other security forces. 

Improvements 

There were several positive developments for certain religious groups during the past year. However, 

these developments were local, and not nationwide, in nature, did not benefit all religious groups and 

should be viewed within the context of strict government control of all aspects of life in Cuba. 

The situation for the Catholic Church continued to improve slightly. The construction of a new Catholic 

seminary continued, with completion expected in 2010. Instruction is already occurring in completed 

classrooms. Cuba’s Roman Catholic Cardinal read a Christmas message on state television for the second 

straight year. 

In September 2009, government officials announced that Catholic and Protestant services would be 

permitted in prisons whenever requested by inmates. According to the State Department, religious 

leaders reported increased opportunities to hold such services. The State Department also reports that 

detainees’ requests for clerical visits were increasingly honored. 

In April 2009, the Cuban government agreed to assist the Jehovah’s Witnesses in seeking a larger branch 

facility to replace their current one. To alleviate space constraints in the private homes they currently use 

for worship, the government permitted the Jehovah’s Witnesses to obtain 40,000 chairs. In addition, 

Jehovah’s Witnesses and Seventh-day Adventists reported fewer instances of job discrimination and 

harassment than in previous years. These groups report that their members now are provided with 

alternative civic services in lieu of mandatory military service and are exempted from patriotic activities 

at school. Adventists report their members are normally excused from Saturday work or school activities. 

Some religious denominations reported increased opportunities to conduct humanitarian and charity work. 

Certain denominations also reported a slight improvement in the ability to receive contributions from coreligionists outside Cuba; however, receipt of financial assistance from persons in the United States 

continued to be troublesome for many denominations. Several religious denominations reported that 

bibles and travel permits were more easily obtainable. 

Religious leaders and organizations reported significant increases in membership, especially among the 

young, as well as increased participation by children in church religion classes since the state schools 

stopped scheduling activities on Sundays. 

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U.S. Policy

The United States and Cuba do not have full diplomatic relations, and U.S.-Cuba policy continues to be 

dominated by the U.S. trade sanctions and travel embargo on Cuba. Since 1963, when the first sanctions 

on Cuba were imposed through the Trading with the Enemy Act, there have been periods of tighter and 

looser sanctions, but relations between the two countries have always remained poor. 

In 2009, President Barack Obama moved to ease the U.S. sanctions on Cuba and improve relations. In 

April, the President lifted restrictions on the number of times Cubans in the United States can travel to 

Cuba visit and the amount of money they can send to relatives in that country. On the same day, 

President Obama also announced that the United States would begin issuing licenses for companies to 

provide cellular telephone and television services in Cuba. Additionally, during this reporting period 

meetings took place between senior-level U.S. and Cuban diplomats, and discussions took place on the 

resumption of mail services and migration issues. In March 2010, President Obama announced that 

technology companies would be permitted to export Internet services to Cuba to increase freedom of 

expression and allow human rights activists to collect and share information. 

Nevertheless, relations between the two countries remain poor. In the first half of 2009, President Raul 

Castro and Fidel Castro spoke in complimentary terms about President Obama. As it became apparent 

that the U.S. government would continue to call for the Cuban government to improve freedom of speech 

and association and release political prisoners before fully resuming diplomatic relations, the two Cuban 

leaders became more critical of the U.S. president. Relations further soured after the December arrest and 

the continued imprisonment of USAID contractor Alan Gross for working in Cuba to increase Internet 

access on the island. Gross was arrested for working without the proper visa. 

The U.S. government also continues to press allies to raise human rights concerns with Cuban authorities. 

For instance, in June 2009 when it appeared that the Organization of American States (OAS) would pass a 

resolution unconditionally readmitting Cuba to the regional body, the United States intervened. Secretary 

of State Hillary Clinton successfully urged the inclusion of a provision requiring Cuba to meet the OAS 

Charter’s requirements of respect for democracy and human rights prior to rejoining the group. In 

October, when the Spanish Foreign Minister traveled to Havana, President Obama requested that he raise 

the issue of political prisoners and human rights during his meeting with President Castro. 

U.S. assistance to Cuba seeks to promote democracy on the island, including through support for civil 

society and rule of law and human rights programs. Although the U.S. government says it promotes 

freedom of religion or belief within its overall democracy and human rights programs, the focus of these 

programs is on strengthening independent civil society organizations and independent media, including 

journalists and libraries. The U.S. government also provides humanitarian assistance to political 

prisoners and their families and funds the Miami-based Radio and TV Marti to broadcast independent 

news into Cuba. 

USCIRF Activities

In 2009, Commissioners and staff sought to travel to Cuba to research religious freedom conditions on the 

island, but were not granted visas. Throughout the year, the Commission met with religious communities 

and non-governmental organizations who promote religious freedom and human rights in Cuba. 

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Recommendations 

I. Advancing Religious Freedom through U.S. Programs and Policies 

The U.S. government should: 

• press the Cuban government to meet the following benchmarks concerning the freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief prior to resuming full diplomatic relations with the country, 

including: 

--unconditionally release all religious leaders detained or imprisoned and drop all charges 

against such persons or targeted by state security agencies because of their independence 

from the state, including Reverend Robert Rodriguez, Pastor Omar Gude Pérez, and Alexi 

Perez; 

--stop the arrests and harassment of religious persons and infiltration and intimidation of 

religious communities by state security agencies and hold those involved in any further such 

practices accountable for their conduct; 

--revise government Directive 43 and Resolution 46, which restrict religious services in 

homes or on other personal property, and other national laws and regulations on religious 

activities to conform them to international standards on freedom of religion or belief; 

--cease interference with religious activities and the internal affairs of religious communities, 

such as denials of visas to religious workers, limitations on freedom of movement of religious 

workers, arbitrary prevention of religious ceremonies and processions, and attempted 

interference in elections in religious bodies; 

--end the practice of arbitrarily denying registration to religious groups and detaining or 

harassing members of religious groups because of that unregistered status; 

--issue permits for construction of new places of worship; 

--end the practice of evictions and requisition of personal property of religious individuals or 

communities without due process and grant restitution or provision of alternative 

accommodation for previous instances of such illegal activity; 

--permit religious communities to operate private educational institutions; 

--end the restrictions on religious communities’ access to the media and publication 

equipment; and 

--lift restrictions on humanitarian, medical, charitable, or social service work provided by 

religious communities and protecting persons who conduct such work. 

• ensure that funding budgeted to promote human rights and democracy in Cuba includes support for 

effective initiatives advancing freedom of religion of belief; 

• encourage Radio Marti and TV Marti to report on the international standards of freedom of religion or 

belief and on religious freedom conditions in Cuba; 

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• continue to promote religious freedom and related human rights by eliminating barriers in U.S. law 

that result in the denial of Internet services to religious freedom and human rights activists in Cuba; 

• use appropriated Internet freedom funds to develop free and secure email access for use in Cuba; 

facilitate the dissemination of high-speed internet access via satellite; and distribute immediately 

proven and field-tested counter-censorship programs in order to prevent the arrest and harassment of 

religious freedom and human rights activists and help them maintain their freedom of expression and 

legitimate expectations of privacy; and 

• award funds appropriated by Congress to counter censorship in Cuba, including from the FY10 

Consolidated Appropriations Act, through a competitive and merit-based process. 

II. Advancing Religious Freedom through Multilateral Efforts 

The U.S. government should: 

• encourage international partners, including key Latin American and European countries, the European 

Union (EU), and Canada, to ensure that violations of freedom or religion or belief and related human 

rights are part of all formal and informal multilateral or bilateral discussions with Cuba; 

• work with international partners to reinstate the position of UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of 

human rights in Cuba and support the Rapporteur’s efforts to gain unrestricted access to that country; 

and 

• work with the EU to implement measures in response to Cuba’s noncompliance with the EU 

Common Policy’s human rights benchmarks and urge Canada to develop and use such benchmarks. 

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Egypt 

FINDINGS: Serious problems of discrimination, intolerance, and other human rights violations against 

members of religious minorities, as well as disfavored Muslims, remain widespread in Egypt. The 

reporting period marked a significant upsurge in violence targeting Coptic Orthodox Christians. The 

Egyptian government has not taken sufficient steps to halt the repression of and discrimination against 

Christians and other religious believers, or, in many cases, to punish those responsible for violence or other 

severe violations of religious freedom. This increase in violence, and the failure to prosecute those 

responsible, fosters a growing climate of impunity. Implementation of previous court rulings – related to 

granting official identity documents to Baha’is and changing religious affiliation on identity documents for 

Christian converts – has been limited and subject to onerous delays. Disfavored Muslims continue to face 

discrimination and repression. The government has not responded adequately to combat widespread and 

virulent anti-Semitism in the government-controlled media. On a positive note, there was increased public 

space to discuss and debate a wide range of religious freedom concerns, including sectarian violence, in the 

media and other public fora, which, in previous years, was discouraged or prevented by Egyptian 

authorities. 

Due to persistent and serious concerns, Egypt remains on USCIRF’s Watch List in 2010. Egypt has been 

on the Watch List since 2002. 

USCIRF traveled to Egypt in January 2010 to assess religious freedom conditions in the country. The visit 

took place just weeks after six Coptic Christians and one Muslim were killed outside a church on Coptic 

Christmas eve in the town of Naga Hammadi. This incident served as a wake-up call to many Egyptians 

about the government’s inadequate response to growing sectarian tensions and other religious freedom 

issues. USCIRF concludes that there is a window of opportunity for the Egyptian government to conduct 

thorough investigations and to bring to justice perpetrators of sectarian violence before societal and 

government attention shifts to the upcoming parliamentary elections later in 2010 and presidential elections 

in 2011. Other needed reforms also should be immediately implemented, such as removing religion from 

official identity documents and passing a unified law for the construction and repair of places of worship. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: U.S. policy towards Egypt does not adequately prioritize human 

rights and religious freedom. Despite documenting widespread abuses in the annual human rights and 

religious freedom reports, the United States has not pressed the Egyptian government sufficiently in 

numerous areas of concern. The U.S. government should establish a timetable with Cairo for 

implementation of human rights and religious freedom reforms. If deadlines are not met, the U.S. 

government should reconsider its allocation of its assistance to the Egyptian government. The United 

States should more aggressively press the Egyptian government to prosecute perpetrators responsible for 

sectarian violence and to remove de facto responsibility for religious affairs from the state security 

services, with the exception of cases involving violence or the advocacy of violence. The U.S. government 

also should do more to support, without vetting by the Egyptian government, Egyptian civil society groups 

who are pressing for political and democratic reform. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy towards 

Egypt can be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

General Concerns 

Egypt has a poor overall human rights record, including repressive practices that seriously violate 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. Human rights groups inside Egypt are concerned 

that extremism continues to advance in the country, with detrimental effects on the prospects for 

democratic reform, religious tolerance, and the rights of women, girls, and members of religious 

minorities. Some believe that the government is not acting to counteract this problem, especially in the 

areas of public education and the media, where extremist influence is growing. Many are concerned that 

if the Egyptian government does not implement reforms and address a range of democracy and human 

rights issues immediately, the status quo will remain up to and through the parliamentary elections in June 

and November 2010 and presidential elections in 2011. 

The Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981 and was renewed for another two years in May 

2008, restricts many human rights, including freedom of religion or belief as well as freedom of 

expression, assembly, and association. Under the Emergency Law, security forces arbitrarily arrest and 

detain persons, hold detainees in prolonged pretrial detention, mistreat and torture prisoners, and 

occasionally engage in mass arrests. Thousands of persons have been detained without charge on 

suspicion of illegal terrorist or political activity; others are serving sentences after being convicted on 

similar charges. Egyptian and international human rights groups have asserted that the primary purpose 

of the State Emergency and Military Courts is to punish political activism and dissent, even when that 

dissent is peaceful. These courts also are used to detain and try individuals deemed by the state to have 

“unorthodox” or “deviant” Islamic or other religious beliefs or practices. Since 2005, Egypt’s National 

Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has called for the Emergency Law to be lifted. 

Majority and Minority Muslims 

The government maintains tight control over all Muslim religious institutions, including mosques and 

religious endowments, which are encouraged to promote an officially sanctioned interpretation of Islam. 

According to Egyptian officials, the government regulates these Muslim institutions and activities as a 

necessary precaution against religious extremism and terrorism. The state appoints and pays the salaries 

of all Sunni Muslim imams, all mosques must be licensed by the government, and sermons are monitored 

by the government. 

The government-funded Al-Azhar University is one of the preeminent Sunni Muslim centers of learning 

in the region. The Islamic Research Center (IRC) of Al-Azhar has legal authority to censor and, since 

2004, to confiscate any publications dealing with the Koran and hadith (oral traditions). In recent years, 

the IRC has ruled on the suitability of non-religious books and artistic productions. Al-Azhar also has the 

legal right to recommend confiscations, but must obtain a court order to do so. The Egyptian government 

consults Al-Azhar on a wide range of religious issues impacting Muslims in the country. Over the years, 

clerics and scholars at Al-Azhar have issued discriminatory fatwas (religious edicts) and delivered 

controversial sermons about some non-Muslim faiths, particularly the Baha’i faith, as well as disfavored 

or dissenting Muslims. Non-Muslims are prohibited from attending Al-Azhar University. Grand Sheikh 

of Al-Azhar Muhammad Sayed Tantawi died suddenly in March 2010 while visiting Saudi Arabia. Days 

later, President Mubarak appointed the former Mufti of Egypt, Ahmed Al-Tayeb, as the new Grand 

Sheikh. 

Egyptian law prohibits blasphemy through Article 98(f) of its Penal Code, which prohibits citizens from 

“ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or inciting sectarian strife.” This provision has been applied to 

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detain and prosecute members of religious groups whose practices deviate from mainstream Islamic 

beliefs or whose activities are alleged to jeopardize “communal harmony” or to insult the three “heavenly 

religions:” Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 

These include Muslim groups, such as the Koranists—a very small group in Egypt that accepts only the 

Koran as the sole source of religious guidance and thus has been accused by the Egyptian government of 

deviating from Islamic law. Many from the Koranist community report discrimination in employment 

and continue to suffer from harassment and surveillance by security services. Some members are 

prevented from leaving the country by authorities. In November 2009, authorities detained Koranist 

Abdel Latif Said for one week after his attempt to travel to Sudan. Earlier in April, security officials at 

Cairo International Airport prevented Said from traveling to the United States to attend a conference. In 

October 2008, Reda Abdel Rahman, an Egyptian blogger affiliated with the Koranist movement, was 

arrested and charged with “insulting Islam,” reportedly because his blog called for political and religious 

reform in Egypt. After nearly three months in detention, during which he alleges he was physically 

abused, Rahman was released in January 2009. 

Over the years, the small Shi’a Muslim community has faced periodic discrimination, harassment, and 

arrests. There are approximately 300 Shi’a Muslims living in Egypt. In June 2009, a Shi’a Muslim 

cleric, Hassan Shehata Moussa, was arrested, along with 11 other Shi’a Muslims, after reportedly being 

charged by authorities with using Friday sermons to promote Shi’a ideals, recruiting “foreign elements,” 

leading a banned group, receiving financial support from foreign governments, and possessing books 

defaming Sunni Islam. Egyptian human rights groups have been prevented from closely monitoring 

developments in this case. The status of those detained is unknown. 

Hani Nazeer, a Coptic Christian blogger from Upper Egypt, has been detained since October 2008 under a 

succession of administrative detention orders issued by the Interior Minister using powers provided by the 

Emergency Law. Reportedly, Nazeer has been held because of posting on his blog a cover of a book 

deemed insulting to Islam. Although his lawyers have obtained at least four court orders mandating his 

release, most recently in January 2010, Nazeer remains in prison near Alexandria. According to his 

lawyers, Nazeer has been mistreated while in prison and pressured to convert to Islam by prison officials. 

In February 2007, a court in Alexandria convicted and sentenced Abdel Karim Suleiman, a 22 year-old 

Internet blogger and former student at Al-Azhar University, to four years in prison, three years for 

blaspheming Islam and inciting sectarian strife and one year for criticizing Egyptian President Hosni 

Mubarak. Suleiman had used his blog to criticize some activities of Al-Azhar University and attacks on 

Coptic Christians in Alexandria in October 2005. In March 2007, an appeals court upheld his sentence. 

He currently is serving the remainder of the four-year prison term. 

The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political groups which advocate or seek to establish an 

Islamic state in Egypt based on their interpretation of Islamic law are illegal organizations under a law 

prohibiting political parties based on religion. Despite these restrictions, the Muslim Brotherhood has 

become much more visible in Egypt’s political landscape. In fact, more than 100 members of the Muslim 

Brotherhood ran as independent candidates in the December 2005 parliamentary elections and won 88 

seats, up significantly from their previous 15. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political 

groups have used violence in the past to achieve their aims, including the assassination of President 

Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 and attacks on foreign tourists. Some of these groups persist in advocating 

violence. Egyptian security forces continue to arrest hundreds of suspected Islamists every year, and 

some are subject to torture and/or prolonged detention without charge. Human rights groups that closely 

monitor the detention of such individuals claim that the vast majority are in prison as a result of their 

political beliefs or activities, and not on the basis of religion. 

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Violence Targeting Christians 

During the past year, there has been a significant increase in violent attacks targeting Coptic Orthodox 

Christians and their property. In most cases, perpetrators have not been convicted. In other cases, the 

alleged perpetrators have been briefly detained but eventually released without charge. This increase in 

violence, and the failure to prosecute those responsible, fosters a growing climate of impunity, especially 

in Upper Egypt. In recent years, in response to sectarian violence, Egyptian authorities have conducted 

“reconciliation” sessions between Muslims and Christians as a way of easing tensions and resolving 

disputes. However, reconciliation efforts should not be utilized to undermine enforcement of the law and 

punishing perpetrators for wrongdoing. In fact, in its 2009 annual human rights report on Egypt, the State 

Department concluded that reconciliation sessions not only “prevented the prosecution of perpetrators of 

crimes against Copts and precluded their recourse to the judicial system for restitution” but also 

“contributed to a climate of impunity that encouraged further assaults.” Below is a sample of recent 

violent incidents impacting the Coptic Orthodox community, who comprise 10-15 per cent of the 

Egyptian population of 80 million people. 

On March 12, 2010 in Marsa Matrouh, northern Egypt, the prayer leader of the Al-Rifayah mosque 

allegedly incited some 250 Muslims worshippers to demolish a wall that was under construction by the 

nearby Coptic Church. The wall reportedly encroached on part of a road leading to the mosque. The 

Muslim worshippers left the mosque after Friday afternoon prayers and approached the Coptic Church 

compound and began throwing Molotov cocktails and stones at and over the wall. Approximately two 

dozen Coptic Christians inside the compound were injured. There were reprisal attacks by some 

Christians from inside the compound. According to the State Department and media reports, police and 

security forces responded adequately and arrested approximately 14 Copts and 16 Muslims. The 

compound suffered damage and at least two vehicles and three homes owned by Copts were set on fire. 

To date, no charges have been filed as police continue to investigate the incident. 

In February 2010, four Muslim men were acquitted of murdering a Coptic Christian man, Farouk 

Attallah, in October 2009 in the Upper Egypt town of Dairout. The murder reportedly was witnessed by a 

number of individuals. According to reports, Attallah’s Christian son was involved in a romantic 

relationship with a Muslim girl. The defendants allegedly had planned to attack the young man, but when 

they could not find him, they killed his father. The court stated the reason for the acquittal was 

insufficient evidence. 

On January 6, 2010 in the town of Naga Hammadi, Qena Governorate, three men with automatic weapons 

shot Coptic churchgoers leaving midnight Christmas Mass. At least seven people were killed – six 

Christians and one off-duty Muslim police officer – and several others wounded. Some argued the attack 

was in retaliation for a November incident in which a 12year-old Muslim girl was rumored to have been 

raped by a Christian man in a nearby town (see below); others suggested that a political vendetta could 

have been a factor. Three suspected perpetrators have been arrested and their trial started in February in a 

state emergency court and is ongoing. For days following the January 6 incident, riots ensued as 

Christians destroyed and burned the shops and property of private Muslim business-owners. At least 42 

individuals were arrested as a result of the riots; approximately 28 Christians and 14 Muslims. At least 12 

Christians and nine others remain in detention. Magdi Ayoub, the Qena Provincial Governor, and the 

only Coptic Christian Governor in the country, testified before parliament that the Naga Hammadi 

incident was not sectarian in nature, which drew the ire of Christian parliamentarians and Coptic Bishop 

Kyrollos of the Naga Hammadi Diocese. President Mubarak and Muslim and Christian religious leaders 

have spoken out repeatedly to condemn the January 6 killings and have called for bringing the 

perpetrators to justice. The killings also outraged many Egyptian citizens throughout the country and 

prompted a robust and wide-ranging debate in the press about the broader context and measures to 

prevent future incidents. 

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In November 2009, in Farshout and other villages in the Qena Governorate, rumors that a 20-year-old 

Coptic man had raped a 12-year-old Muslim girl sparked massive violence by Muslims against the Coptic 

Christian community. Rioting ensued for five days, resulting in millions of dollars in damage to 

Christian-owned businesses. Many Christian families were forced from their homes. The assailants also 

attacked the police station where the accused Christian man was being detained. Some eyewitness and 

media reports stated that security forces arrived hours after being called and did little to stop the attacks. 

Bishop Kyrollos denounced the security forces’ failure to restore calm and alleged that the attacks were 

pre-planned. The rape case against the Christian man has not yet gone to trial. Bishop Kyrollos had been 

receiving threats since the November incident, and after the January 6 shootings in Naga Hammadi, 

police asked him to stay at home for fear of further violence. 

On June 21, 2009, Muslim villagers looted and attacked private homes and a building used for Christian 

gatherings and religious services in Ezbet Boshra-East. According to reports, a group of Christians from 

Cairo were visiting a pastor who lives in the building. This apparently caught the attention of local 

residents and a group of Muslims reportedly soon began looting. Several Christians and Muslims 

sustained injuries and some of the homes and the building were damaged. In addition, crops on property 

owned by Christian farmers were uprooted by Muslim rioters. Christians remained in their homes for 

several days for fear of additional attacks. Some reports claimed that state security services did little to 

prevent the violence from occurring. To date, no one has been brought to justice for the violence. 

In January and May 2008, armed Muslim Bedouins attacked the Abu Fana monastery in Minya province. 

In the May attack, one Muslim died, at least three Christians were wounded, and several monks were 

abducted and abused. Three abducted monks reportedly were rescued by Egyptian security services. 

Even though ownership of the land at issue is disputed, advocacy groups claim that Egyptian authorities’ 

repeated characterization of the incident as a “land dispute” ignores the severity of violence faced by 

Coptic Orthodox Christians. Following the May incident and other previous attacks on the monastery, 

Egyptian authorities organized “reconciliation meetings” between the local Bedouin population and the 

monks. In August 2009, two Christians who were held in detention without charges since May 2008 were 

released; they alleged physical abuse while in detention. The two were accused of killing a Muslim 

during the armed attack by Muslim Bedouins on the Abu Fana Monastery. Their release reportedly 

followed an agreement in which the monastery dropped criminal charges against the attackers. Two 

Muslims, also held since the May 2008 attack, were also released. 

In September 2008, six Christians in Port Said were arrested after local authorities raided their café 

because it remained open during the Muslim fasting period of Ramadan. The six were charged with 

resisting arrest and assaulting authorities and were sentenced in January 2009 to three years in prison. 

The accused also alleged physical abuse while in custody. 

In 2004, the Court of Cassation upheld the acquittal of 94 of 96 persons suspected of involvement in the 

killing of 21 Christians in Al-Kosheh in late 1999 and early 2000. Some Egyptian human rights 

advocates believe that Egyptian authorities should still investigate claims of police negligence and 

inadequate prosecution of those involved in this violence. 

On a positive note, in February 2010 in the Qena Governorate of Upper Egypt, a court convicted and 

sentenced to life in prison five Muslim men for the murder of two Christian men in the spring of 2009. 

The Christian men themselves had just been released from prison after serving sentences for murdering a 

relative of the Muslim men. Although this case fits the pattern of an Upper Egypt vendetta killing and 

reprisal, the Christian men were reportedly shot outside a church, which created a sectarian overtone. 

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Discrimination against Christians 

In addition to violence, Christians face official and societal discrimination. Although Egyptian 

government officials claim that there is no law or policy that prevents Christians from holding senior 

positions, the Coptic Orthodox Christian community faces de facto discrimination in appointments to 

high-level government and military posts. There are only a handful of Christians in the upper ranks of the 

security services and armed forces. There is one Christian governor out of 28, one elected Member of 

Parliament out of 454 seats, no known university presidents or deans, and very few legislators or judges. 

According to the State Department, public university training programs for Arabic-language teachers 

exclude non-Muslims because the curriculum involves the study of the Koran. Under Egyptian law, 

Muslim men can marry Christian women but Muslim women are prohibited from marrying Christian 

men. Contacts between such persons are often a source of tension between Muslim and Christian 

communities in Egypt. 

For all Christian groups, government permission is required to build a new church or repair an existing 

one, and the approval process for church construction is time-consuming and inflexible. President 

Mubarak has the authority to approve applications for new construction of churches. Although most of 

these applications were submitted more than five years ago, the majority have not received a response. 

Even some permits that have been approved cannot, in fact, be acted upon because of interference by the 

state security services at both the local and national levels. 

In 2005, President Mubarak signed a decree transferring authority for granting permits to renovate or 

repair existing churches from the president to the country’s 28 governors. At the time, observers 

welcomed this step as a major improvement, but several years later, some churches continue to face 

delays in the issuance of permits. The Egyptian government claims most such requests are approved. 

According to government statistics received after USCIRF’s January 2010 visit, between 1998 and July 

2009 67 permits for new churches were approved and 2,475 existing churches were granted permission to 

expand or make repairs. However, even in cases where approval to build or maintain churches has been 

granted, many Christians continue to complain that local security services prevent construction or repair, 

in some cases for many years. 

A positive development in June 2009 concerned the granting of custody to Kamilia Lotfy of her 14-yearold twin sons, in a ruling that overturned a September 2008 Alexandria Appeals court decision giving 

custody to the boys’ father following his conversion from Christianity to Islam. This ruling marked the 

first time a non-Muslim was granted custody of children under the age of 15 following the conversion of a 

spouse to Islam. 

Converts and Reconverts to Christianity 

Although neither the Constitution nor the Penal Code prohibits proselytizing or conversion, the State 

Department has observed that the Egyptian government uses Article 98(f) of the Penal Code to prosecute 

any alleged proselytizing by non-Muslims. Known converts from Islam to Christianity generally receive 

scrutiny from the state security services; most conversions therefore are done privately. In some 

instances, converts, who fear government harassment if they officially register their change in religion 

from Islam to Christianity, reportedly have altered their own identification cards and other official 

documents to reflect their new religious affiliation. Some individuals have been arrested for falsifying 

identity documents following conversion. Other converts have fled the country for fear of government 

and societal repercussions. 

In December 2008, an administrative court in Alexandria awarded Fathi Labib Yousef the right to register 

as a Christian after spending 31 years officially identified as a Muslim. Yousef was raised Coptic 

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Orthodox Christian but converted to Islam in 1974 in order to divorce his Christian wife. He returned to 

Christianity in 2005, but the local civil registry office refused to acknowledge his change of religion. 

Despite the favorable court ruling, however, Yousef has not been able to obtain his new documents by the 

end of the reporting period. In recent years, many local government registry offices have not changed 

official identity documents to reflect new religious affiliations, citing various excuses, despite judicial 

rulings that legally mandate such action. 

In February 2008, Egypt’s Supreme Administrative Court ruled that 12 individuals who were born 

Christian could not be legally prohibited from returning to Christianity after converting to Islam. 

However the court ruled that their identity documents must list them as “formerly declared Muslim,” thus 

potentially making them subject to continued discrimination in the provision of public services, police 

harassment, and societal violence. In March 2008, an Egyptian judge appealed the ruling to the Supreme 

Constitutional Court. The appeal is pending. According to a lawyer for many of the plaintiffs, the 

government will not take any action until the Supreme Constitutional Court rules on more than 100 other 

reconvert cases, which may take years. In addition, several non-governmental entities have opposed the 

ruling. They argue that since Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution makes Islamic law the principal 

source of legislation, Muslims cannot have the right to convert from Islam. 

In addition, reports during the last year supported claims that there were cases of Muslim men forcing 

Coptic Christian women to convert to Islam. The State Department has asserted that such cases are often 

disputed and include “inflammatory allegations and categorical denials of kidnapping and rape.” 

Nevertheless, in November 2009, one human rights group found that there were credible cases where 

Coptic women were “deceptively lured” into marriages with Muslim men and forced to convert to Islam. 

According to the report, if a woman returns or escapes from the marriage and wants to convert back to 

Christianity, she faces the same legal hurdles in changing her religious affiliation on official identity 

documents discussed above. 

In contrast to the re-conversion cases, the Egyptian government generally does not recognize conversions 

of Muslims to other religions. Egyptian courts also have refused to allow Muslims who convert to 

Christianity to change their identity cards to reflect their conversions. In the first such case, brought by 

Muhammad Hegazy, a lower court ruled in January 2008 that Muslims are forbidden from converting 

away from Islam based on principles of Islamic law. The court also stated that such conversion would 

constitute a disparagement of the official state religion and an enticement for other Muslims to convert. 

Hegazy, who has been subjected to death threats and is currently in hiding, has appealed the ruling. 

The second such case was filed in August 2008 by Maher El-Gohary, who also is in hiding because of 

threats from extremists. In June 2009, the Seventh Circuit Court of Administrative Justice ruled against 

El-Gohary, finding that a convert must prove his conversion to the state and that El-Gohary’s behavior 

contradicted his claim to be a Christian. The court also ruled that, because Egypt had ratified the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights “taking into consideration the provisions of Islamic 

Law and the absence of contradiction between these provisions and the Covenant,” sharia takes 

precedence in the event of a contradiction. El-Gohary, with whom the USCIRF delegation met during its 

January 2010 visit, is seeking asylum for himself and his 15 year-old daughter. 

Baha’is 

All Baha’i institutions and community activities have been banned since 1960 by a presidential decree. 

As a result, Baha’is, who number approximately 2,000 in Egypt, are unable to meet or engage in group 

religious activities. Over the years, Baha’is have been arrested and imprisoned because of their religious 

beliefs, often on charges of insulting Islam. Almost all Baha’i community members are known to the 

state security services, and many are regularly subject to surveillance and other forms of harassment. AlPage | 233 
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Azhar’s Islamic Research Center has issued fatwas in recent years urging the continued ban on the Baha’i 

community and condemning Baha’is as apostates. 

Intolerance of Baha’is has increased in both the independent and government-controlled media in recent 

years. In March 2009, several Baha’i homes in a village in the Sohag province were vandalized by 

Muslim villagers. Egyptian human rights groups immediately condemned the violence and contended 

that a contributing factor to the attacks was incitement by a media commentator who, during a television 

program, labeled an individual member of the Baha’i faith an apostate and called for her to be killed. 

According to the Egyptian Interior Ministry, several alleged perpetrators were arrested; however, it is 

unclear if they were released. More than one year after the incident, there has been no investigation or 

prosecution related to the attacks. 

In March 2009, the Supreme Administrative Court rejected a final legal challenge to a 2008 lower court 

ruling that required the Egyptian government to issue national identification documents to three Baha’i 

plaintiffs containing a dash or other mark in the space designated for religious affiliation. Until this 

ruling, identification documents permitted registration in only one of the three officially approved 

faiths—Islam, Christianity, or Judaism—thereby effectively preventing Baha’is from gaining the official 

recognition necessary to have access to numerous public services, and without which it is illegal to go out 

in public. Since the 2008 decision, the government has issued birth certificates to at least 120 Baha’is, 

documents which it previously refused to issue. In addition, approximately 20-30 single male and female 

Baha’is have received identity cards. However, no married couples have been able to received identity 

cards because the Egyptian government does not recognize Baha’i marriages. Over the past few years, 

some Baha’is lost their jobs and a few young Baha’is were dismissed from universities because they did 

not have identity cards. 

Anti-Semitism and the Jewish Community 

Material vilifying Jews—with both historical and new anti-Semitic stereotypes—appears regularly in the 

state-controlled and semi-official media. This material includes anti-Semitic cartoons, television 

programming such as a 24-part series based on the notorious anti-Semitic “Protocols of the Elders of 

Zion,” and Holocaust denial literature. Egyptian authorities have not taken adequate steps to combat antiSemitism in the media, despite official claims that they have advised journalists to avoid anti-Semitism. 

According to the State Department, in 2009 anti-Semitism in the media was common but “less prevalent 

than in recent years.” Human rights groups cite persistent, virulent anti-Semitism in the education 

system, which is increasingly under the influence of Islamist extremists, a development the Egyptian 

government has not adequately addressed. 

The small Jewish community of approximately 125 people owns its property, and finances required 

maintenance largely through private donations. In 2007, Egyptian authorities, including the Minister of 

Culture and the head of the Ministry’s Supreme Council of Antiquities, pledged to move forward over the 

next few years with the restoration of at least seven synagogues, as well as the possible development of a 

Jewish museum. Restoration of the Maimonides synagogue in Cairo, named after a 12th century rabbinic 

scholar, was completed in March 2010. 

Jehovah’s Witnesses 

A 1960 presidential decree banned all Jehovah’s Witnesses activities. According to the State Department, 

there are between 800 and1200 Jehovah’s Witnesses living in Egypt. Over the past year, Egyptian 

authorities continued to monitor the homes, phones, and private meeting places of members of this small 

community. For years, the Jehovah’s Witnesses pursued legal recognition through the court system. In 

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December 2009, the Seventh Circuit Administrative Court handed down a verdict denying Jehovah’s 

Witnesses legal status. The local community is appealing the verdict. 

Other Developments Internationally and in Egypt 

In February 2010, Egypt underwent its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the UN Human Rights 

Council (HRC). The U.S. delegation issued a strong statement which included several religious freedom 

concerns and recommendations. The head of Egypt’s delegation, Mufid Shihab, Minister of State for 

Legal and Parliamentary Councils, stated that freedom of religion and worship are guaranteed in the 

constitution and are not limited by law. Despite such constitutional protections, in practice, the law is 

arbitrarily and inconsistently applied. The Egyptian delegation also characterized relations between 

Muslims and Coptic Christians as “healthy and positive,” attributing recent sectarian tensions to 

extremism and asserting that the law is implemented whenever violent incidents do occur. This assertion 

by the UPR delegation is contrary to repeated public statements by President Mubarak in the weeks after 

the Naga Hammadi incident in which he acknowledged a “sectarian problem” in the country and pledged 

that the state would ensure the application of constitutional provisions on citizenship and equal rights for 

all Egyptian citizens without discrimination. 

Among the recommendations that the Egyptian delegation supported at the UPR included those that urged 

the government to take all necessary measures to guarantee religious freedom, prevent discrimination that 

affects this freedom, and promote inter-religious dialogue and tolerance. The delegation rejected 

recommendations which urged the Egyptian government to remove any categorization of religion on 

official government documents, as well as to eliminate the legal and bureaucratic restrictions that 

complicate an individual’s right to choose his or her religion. 

In February 2010, the annual dialogue between the Vatican’s Joint Committee for Dialogue and the 

Permanent Committee of Al Azhar for Dialogue among the Monotheistic Religions was held in Cairo. 

The dialogue focused on understanding sectarian violence, its causes, and possible resolutions to end the 

ongoing violence. In 2009, Al Azhar also held its annual interfaith dialogue with the British Anglican 

Church. 

In May 2009, the National Council for Human Rights (NCHR), a government-appointed advisory body, 

released its fifth annual report. The report expressed serious concern about rising sectarian tensions. It 

also recommended ways to resolve official recognition of Baha’is and criticized religious textbooks both 

in schools and the Ministry of Higher Education’s Imams’ Institution for failing to address human rights 

topics. The report also encouraged the Egyptian government to pass a law for all religious groups 

addressing the construction of new places of worship. The NCHR also called for the formation of a 

permanent national anti-discrimination league and an end to the state of emergency. In the days 

following the Naga Hammadi incident, the NCHR dispatched a team of researchers to investigate the 

killings and sent a private letter to President Mubarak with its findings and recommendations. 

In addition, over the past few years the Egyptian government has adopted several measures to 

acknowledge the religious pluralism of Egyptian society, including increased efforts to promote interfaith 

activity. In 2008, the first national conference of the organization Egyptians Against Religious 

Discrimination was held in Cairo. 

U.S. Policy 

U.S. policy toward Egypt focuses on fostering strong bilateral relations, continuing security and military 

cooperation, maintaining regional stability, and sustaining the 1979 Camp David peace accords. 

Successive administrations have viewed Egypt as a key ally in the region. Until a few years ago, Egypt 

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was the second largest recipient of U.S. aid; however, it now ranks fifth behind Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, 

and Pakistan. In recent years, the U.S. government and Congress have increased efforts to urge the 

Egyptian government to make more expeditious progress on economic and political reforms, including on 

human rights and religious freedom issues. Following President Obama’s visit to Egypt in June 2009 to 

deliver his historic speech to the Muslim world, the United States and Egypt held their annual strategic 

dialogue. 

U.S. assistance reflects the recognition of Egypt’s continued and crucial role in ensuring Arab-Israeli 

peace. While Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance has remained at approximately $1.3 billion 

for 30 years, Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance has declined significantly over the last decade 

pursuant to a 10-year agreement reached in the late 1990s known as the “Glide Path Agreement.” As a 

result, economic aid to Egypt has decreased approximately $40 million each year from $815 million in 

FY1998 to approximately $411 million in FY2008. In FY 2009, total ESF assistance was $250 million 

and for FY2010, the Administration again requested $250 million. In FY 2008, $54 million was allotted 

for democracy and governance whereas in FY 2009, only $20 was budgeted for such programming. 

According to the State Department’s FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification, ESF funds will support 

democracy promotion programs designed to increase public participation “while promoting human rights, 

civic education, and administration of and access to justice.” Over the past year, observers have 

expressed serious concern that due to the overall decrease in ESF funding, human rights and religious 

freedom programming has decreased proportionally to an inconsequential amount. 

According to the State Department’s 2009 Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report, the U.S. 

government seeks, through programming and advocacy, to “build a more robust civil society, address 

human rights problems, promote the rule of law, increase democratic local governance, and encourage the 

growth of democratic institutions, including an independent media and judiciary.” Only a small portion 

of U.S. programming supports initiatives in areas related to religious freedom, including funding for 

programs of the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services that work with Coptic and Muslim 

community groups in Upper Egypt, as well as support for NGOs that monitor the country’s media for 

sectarian bias. 

 

In addition, there is concern about the degree of Egyptian government control over U.S. funding of civil 

society and human rights groups in Egypt. According to the USAID Mission in Cairo, direct grants to 

registered Egyptian NGOs are vetted by the Egyptian government. As a consequence, many Egyptian 

NGOs do not seek formal registration, and instead form as a civil corporation, to avoid unnecessary 

government interference and oversight. However, the Egyptian government recently has claimed that 

even U.S. funding of civil corporations is a violation of Egyptian law, which casts doubt on the ability of 

the U.S. government to continue to support the programs and activities it already funds. 

In recent years, Congress and others have urged that U.S. aid to Egypt should be conditioned on 

improvements in Egypt’s human rights and religious freedom record. In fact, some members of Congress 

and other experts have argued that U.S. assistance has not been effective in promoting democracy and 

human rights reform and that foreign assistance must be renegotiated to include benchmarks that the 

Egyptian government must meet to continue to receive aid. 

For three consecutive years, the State Department has concluded that religious freedom conditions in 

Egypt have declined. This assertion has not resulted in any significant change in U.S. policy towards 

Egypt other than a few public comments and statements. For example, in January 2010, Assistant 

Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Michael Posner publicly raised in Cairo 

concerns about a growing “atmosphere of intolerance” days after the incident in Naga Hammadi. In 

addition, the State Department issued some statements in early 2010 expressing concern about some 

troubling human rights and religious freedom developments following the Naga Hammadi incident. 

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Nevertheless, the United States continues to give insufficient priority to religious freedom in the bilateral 

relationship. 

USCIRF Activities 

In January 2010, USCIRF traveled to Cairo on a fact-finding visit to assess religious freedom conditions 

throughout Egypt. The delegation’s visit took place just weeks after the Naga Hammadi incident in 

Upper Egypt in which six Copts and one Muslim were killed. The USCIRF delegation intended to visit 

Upper Egypt to meet with the victims of the violence, but the Egyptian government threatened to cancel 

the trip unless USCIRF confined its visit to Cairo. Meetings with high-ranking Egyptian officials also 

were canceled. Despite these restrictions, USCIRF met with a wide range of civil society actors and 

religious leaders, as well as the Minister of Islamic Endowments, the Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar, and 

human rights officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

In March, a USCIRF delegation met with Egyptian Ambassador to the United States, Sameh Shoukry, in 

Washington, DC to discuss the possibility of an expanded follow-up visit to Egypt, as well as to raise 

religious freedom concerns. Regrettably, the Egyptian Ambassador was inflammatory and rejected every 

concern raised by USCIRF. In January 2010, USCIRF wrote a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 

Clinton calling for U.S. representatives to the United Nations office in Geneva to raise questions about 

violations of religious freedom and related human rights during the UN Human Rights Council’s UPR of 

Egypt in February. In September 2009, USCIRF urged the U.S. government, through a letter to Secretary 

Hillary Clinton, to vigorously oppose the candidacy of Farouk Hosni of Egypt to be Director General of 

the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) due to concerns about 

past discriminatory public comments and statements. In August 2009, USCIRF wrote to President 

Obama urging him to raise a number of religious freedom issues during Egyptian President Hosni 

Mubarak’s visit to the United States later that month. The letter also urged the Administration to 

establish a timetable with the Egyptian government for implementation of specific political and human 

rights reforms. In June 2009, USCIRF issued a press release expressing concern over attacks on Coptic 

Orthodox Christians in the small Egyptian village of Ezbet Boshra-East. In May 2009, USCIRF wrote 

President Obama urging him to raise concerns about religious freedom and related human rights in his 

meetings with President Mubarak during President Obama’s visit to Cairo to deliver his June 4 speech to 

the Muslim world. 

In March 2009, USCIRF wrote to U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey urging her to raise specific 

religious freedom issues with Egyptian officials. In February 2009, H.Res. 200, a resolution calling on 

the Egyptian government to respect human rights, was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives; 

the resolution includes findings and recommendations from the USCIRF’s May 2008 annual report. 

Throughout the past year, USCIRF continued to meet with representatives of the various religious 

communities in Egypt, as well as with human rights organizations, academics, and other experts. 

Recommendations 

I. Taking Most Responsibility for Religious Affairs Out of the Jurisdiction of the Egyptian 

 Security Services 

The U.S. government should urge the Egyptian government to: 

y remove de facto responsibility for religious affairs from the state security services, with the exception 

of cases involving violence or the advocacy of violence, including conspiracy to commit acts of 

terror; 

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y repeal the state of emergency, in existence since 1981, in order to allow for the full consolidation of 

the rule of law in Egypt; 

y implement procedures that would ensure that all places of worship are subject to the same transparent, 

non-discriminatory, and efficient regulations regarding construction and maintenance, such as the 

passage of a unified law, and take special measures to preserve Coptic Orthodox and other Christian 

properties and antiquities, which too often are subject to societal violence and official neglect; and 

y repeal Article 98(f) of the Penal Code, which “prohibits citizens from ridiculing or insulting heavenly 

religions or inciting sectarian strife”; allow for full access to the constitutional and international 

guarantees of the rule of law and due process for those individuals charged with violating Article 

98(f); and release Abdel Karim Suleiman and other individuals convicted under Article 98(f) on 

account of their religion or belief. 

II. Implementing Additional Reform in Order to Comply with International Human Rights 

 Standards 

The U.S. government should also urge the Egyptian government to: 

y facilitate a USCIRF visit to Egypt that would include meetings with high-level government officials; 

y discontinue the use of reconciliation sessions as a bypass for punishing perpetrators, commensurate 

with the gravity of the crime and in accordance with the rule of law; 

y promptly investigate sectarian violence against Egyptian citizens, particularly Coptic Orthodox 

Christians, vigorously prosecute and bring to justice perpetrators, and ensure compensation for 

victims; 

• address incitement to violence and discrimination against disfavored Muslims and non-Muslims by: 

--prosecuting government-funded clerics and other officials who incite violence against Muslim 

minority communities or individual members of non-Muslim religious minority communities; 

--dismissing or disciplining government-funded clerics who espouse intolerance; 

--publicly and officially refuting incitement to violence and discrimination by clerics and the 

government-controlled media against Muslim minority communities, such as the Koranists, and 

members of non-Muslim religious minorities, such as Baha’is; and 

--rescinding any previous fatwas issued by Al-Azhar that are discriminatory toward or incite violence 

against Muslim minority communities or non-Muslim religious minority communities; 

• repeal 1960 presidential decrees banning members of the Baha’i faith and Jehovah’s Witnesses from 

practicing their faith; 

y cease all messages of hatred and intolerance, particularly toward Jews and Baha’is, in the 

government-controlled media and take active measures to promote understanding and respect for 

members of these and other minority religious communities; 

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y take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish acts of anti-Semitism, including condemnation of 

anti-Semitic acts, and, while vigorously protecting freedom of expression, counteract anti-Semitic 

rhetoric and other organized anti-Semitic activities; 

• ensure that every Egyptian is protected against discrimination in social, labor, and other rights by 

modifying the national identity card either to omit mention of religious affiliation or make optional 

any mention of religious affiliation; 

• fully implement the January 2008 ruling of the Court of Administrative Justice, which overturned the 

ban on providing official identity documents to members of the Baha’i faith; 

• remove the designation “formerly declared Muslim” from identity cards for those Christians who 

have converted back to Christianity from Islam, which makes the persons involved vulnerable to 

official harassment and societal violence; 

• exclude from all educational textbooks any language or images that promote enmity, intolerance, 

hatred, or violence toward any group of persons based on faith, gender, ethnicity, or nationality, and 

include in school curricula, textbooks, and teacher training the concepts of tolerance and respect for 

human rights, including religious freedom, ensuring that textbooks meet the standards set out in the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights;18

• permit any Egyptian citizen to learn voluntarily the Coptic language in the public school system; and 

y investigate claims of police negligence and inadequate prosecution of those involved in the AlKosheh case, as well as other recent instances of violence targeting individuals on account of their 

religion or belief, particularly members of the vulnerable Coptic Orthodox Christian community. 

III. Ensuring that U.S. Government Aid Promotes Prompt and Genuine Political and Legal 

 Reforms and is Offered Directly to Egyptian Civil Society Groups 

The U.S. government should: 

• establish a timetable for implementation of political and human rights reforms, including steps 

described in the recommendations above; if deadlines are not met, the U.S. government should 

reconsider the appropriate allocation of its assistance to the Egyptian government; 

• provide direct support for human rights and other civil society or non-governmental organizations 

(NGOs) without vetting by the Egyptian government; 

• urge the Egyptian government to ensure that NGOs engaged in human rights work can pursue their 

activities without undue government interference, and monitor and report to what extent this is 

accomplished; and 

• expand support of initiatives to advance human rights, promote religious tolerance, and foster civic 

education among all Egyptians, including support for: 

 

18 Criteria for reviewing textbooks and other educational materials have been developed by several international 

bodies, including UNESCO. For the UNESCO criteria, see http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/34_71.pdf. 

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--civic education and public awareness programs that reflect the multi-confessional nature of 

Egyptian society and the diversity of Egypt’s religious past; 

--efforts by Egyptian and international NGOs to review Egyptian educational curricula and textbooks 

for messages of hatred, intolerance, and the advocacy of violence, and to monitor equal access to 

education by girls and boys regardless of religion or belief; and 

--the preservation and restoration of Egyptian Jewish properties and antiquities in publicly accessible 

sites, such as a museum, so that all Egyptians can better understand past and present Jewish 

contributions to their history and culture. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• in the context of the annual congressional appropriation for U.S. assistance to Egypt, require the State 

Department to report every six months on the government of Egypt’s progress on the issues described 

in this chapter, as well as on the U.S. government’s progress in offering funding directly to Egyptian 

NGOs without prior Egyptian government approval. 

IV. Promoting Freedom of Religion and Belief and Related Human Rights in 

Multilateral Fora 

The U.S. government should: 

• call on the Egyptian government to comply with and fully implement recommendations from the UN 

Human Rights Council’s February 2010 Universal Periodic Review of Egypt, including those related 

to freedom of religion or belief; 

• urge the Egyptian government to invite, provide specific dates, and admit UN special procedures 

mandate holders who are waiting for an invitation, including the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, and the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Torture; 

• urge the Egyptian government to halt its practice at the UN Human Rights Council and other 

international fora of introducing and supporting the so-called “defamation of religions” resolution, 

which violates the internationally-guaranteed rights to freedom of religion and expression; and 

• urge the Egyptian government to implement the 2002 recommendations of the UN Committee Against 

Torture, as well as other relevant international human rights treaties to which Egypt is a party.

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India 

FINDINGS: India is a critically important country in terms of religious freedom for several reasons: it is the 

world’s largest democracy; its multitude of religious communities have historically coexisted peacefully; it 

occupies a key geopolitical position; and its stature is rising on the global stage. Nonetheless, India’s 

progress in protecting and promoting religious freedom during the past year was mixed. The Indian 

government at various levels recognized the problem of communal violence and created some structures to 

address these issues. However, justice for victims of communal violence was slow and often ineffective, 

thereby perpetuating a climate of impunity. While there was no large-scale communal violence against 

religious minorities during the reporting period, attacks on Christians and Muslims and their places of 

worship continued, along with incidences of intolerance against both. 

Because the governmental response at the state and local levels continues to be largely inadequate and the 

national government has failed to take effective measures to ensure the rights of religious minorities in 

several states, USCIRF again places India on its Watch List for 2010.* USCIRF placed India on its Watch 

List for the first time in 2009. 

Despite the current national government’s commitment to religious tolerance, communal violence has 

continued to occur with disturbing regularity, and the governmental response, particularly at the state and 

local levels, has been largely inadequate. Following incidents and reprisals at and after Christmas 2007, the 

murder of an influential Hindu leader in August 2008 sparked a prolonged and violent campaign targeting 

Christians in the state of Orissa. Over several weeks, at least 40 individuals were indiscriminately killed, the 

vast majority of whom were Christians, church properties and thousands of homes were destroyed, and tens 

of thousands fled their homes, seeking refuge in the jungle or in government relief camps. An inadequate 

police response failed to quell the violence, and early central government intervention had little impact. 

Mass arrests following the Orissa violence did not translate into the actual filing of many cases, and the 

courts prosecuting the claims absolved a disproportionately high percentage of cases for lack of evidence. 

Also, efforts continue to lag to prosecute the perpetrators of the 2002 Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat, in 

which the official death toll was 1,272 (with some groups estimating double that number of actual fatalities), 

the majority of whom were Muslim. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: Infrastructure for investigating and prosecuting cases of 

religiously-motivated violence or harassment exists in India, but the legal system’s capacity and will is 

severely limited and is utilized inconsistently. These deficiencies have resulted in a culture of impunity that 

gives members of vulnerable minority communities few assurances of their safety, particularly in areas with a 

history of communal violence, and little hope of perpetrator accountability. USCIRF urges the U.S. 

government to encourage and assist the government of India to undertake measures to make more vigorous 

and effective efforts to halt violent attacks against members of religious minorities, as well as women and 

individuals deemed to be of lower caste; conduct timely investigations and prosecutions of individuals 

alleged to have perpetrated violence; hold state governments and officials accountable for violence and 

unlawful acts in their states; and enact policies to encourage religious tolerance in accordance with India’s 

rich history of religious pluralism and the peaceful coexistence of different linguistic, ethnic, and religious 

groups. USCIRF also urges the U.S. government to integrate concern for religious freedom and related 

human rights into all bilateral contacts with India and the U.S. ambassador to India to speak out against, and 

seek to visit sites of, communal violence such as Orissa. 

*Commissioner Gaer dissented from the placement of India on the Commission’s Watch List. The full 

dissent can be found at the end of this chapter.

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Challenges Facing Democratic India 

Unlike many of the other countries of concern to USCIRF, India has a democratically elected government 

with a tradition of secular governance. A country with a Hindu majority, India has one of the world’s 

largest Muslim populations, the current, two-term Prime Minister is Sikh, the past president is Muslim, 

and the head of the national governing alliance is a Catholic. Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, 

and Parsi holidays are recognized as public holidays. India also has an independent judiciary, an 

independent media that is relentlessly critical of the government, and a dynamic civil society with 

numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that provide oversight of government activities. In 

practice, however, India’s democratic institutions charged with upholding the rule of law, most notably 

state and central judiciaries and police, lack capacity to execute those functions and have emerged as 

unwilling or unable consistently to seek redress for victims of religiously-motivated violence or to 

challenge cultures of impunity in areas with a history of communal tensions. 

The Commission’s concerns about religious freedom conditions in India originated in 2002, based on a 

disturbing increase in communal violence against religious minorities associated with the rise of 

organizations with Hindu nationalist agendas, including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), one of the 

country’s major political parties. Under the national leadership of the BJP (in power from 1998 to 2004), 

USCIRF found the Indian government’s response to violent attacks against religious minorities to be 

inadequate. In response to severe riots in the state of Gujarat and elsewhere, the Commission 

recommended that India be designated as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) in 2002 and 2003. 

India was removed from USCIRF’s CPC list following the election in 2004 of the Congress Party, as the 

new government espoused an inclusive platform and repeatedly pledged its commitment to religious 

tolerance. This commitment was reiterated by the Congress Party in the 2009 general elections for the 

lower house of Parliament, in which the Congress Party emerged victorious. 

Hindu nationalist organizations retain broad popular support in many communities in India, and their 

activities, especially those with an extremist agenda or history of using violent force against minorities, 

often negatively impact the status of religious freedom in the country. Many of these organizations exist 

under the banner of the Sangh Parivar, a “family” of over 30 organizations that includes the Vishwa 

Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang Dal, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and the BJP. Sangh Parivar 

entities aggressively press for governmental policies to promote a Hindu nationalist agenda, and adhere in 

varying degrees to an ideology of Hindutva, which holds non-Hindus as foreign to India. 

The failure to provide justice to religious minorities targeted in violent riots in India is not a new 

development, and in some cases has helped foster a climate of impunity. In 1984, anti-Sikh riots erupted 

in Delhi, killing thousands following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by Sikh 

bodyguards. Few of the perpetrators of the anti-Sikh violence have been held accountable. In the late 

1990s, there was a marked increase throughout India of violent attacks against members of religious 

minority communities, particularly Muslims and Christians, including incidents of killings, torture, rape, 

and destruction of property. Perpetrators were rarely held responsible. For example, there has been little 

justice for the victims of riots between Hindus and Muslims after the 1992 destruction of the Babri 

mosque at a contested religious site in Ayodhya. At least 900 people, mostly Muslims, were killed in 

Bombay in the 1992-1993 riots, but few perpetrators have been successfully prosecuted. For instance, 

several high-profile trials that commenced over 10 years after the riots resulted in acquittals. A probe by 

India’s Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) into one high-profile act of riot violence was announced in 

February 2009, 16 years after the riots. Attacks on Christian churches and individuals, largely perpetrated 

by individuals associated with these Hindu nationalist groups, continue to occur across the country, and 

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perpetrators are rarely held to account. 

Orissa Violence in 2007 and 2008 

The Kandhamal district of the state of Orissa has been the site of repeated attacks by Hindu extremists 

against Christians. Kandhamal is the country’s poorest district, and unlike the rest of the state, it is 25-27 

percent Christian. Several of Kandhamal’s 2,500 villages are entirely Christian. Religion has played a 

significant factor in the violence in Kandhamal, with the Hindu majority often raising concerns about 

alleged “forced conversions.” However, according to the National Commission for Minorities, there have 

been no cases of forced conversions registered in Kandhamal in the past 40 years. In addition to religion, 

socio-economic tensions between Dalits and tribal groups also motivated the killings, assaults, and 

property destruction. 

In December 2007, violence in Kandhamal district between Christians and Hindus resulted in several 

deaths, dozens of injuries, the destruction of at least 20 churches and hundreds of homes, and the 

displacement of hundreds, many from minority religious communities. Reportedly, the influential local 

VHP leader Swami Lakshmanananda Saraswati played a central role in fomenting and encouraging the 

violence against Christians. Swami Saraswati was murdered on August 23, 2008, with Maoist extremists 

claiming responsibility. However, the murder sparked a violent campaign targeting Christians in Orissa. 

The State Department reported 40 individuals were killed and 134 injured, although some Christian 

groups report more. In addition, thousands of church properties and homes were destroyed; at least 

24,000 fled their homes to government-run relief camps, and thousands more were driven into hiding in 

jungles. There was no immediate police or state government reaction. Indian Christian leaders, religious 

leaders and aid agencies were denied access by state and/or district officials to refugees in the hardest-hit 

areas. 

Returns have been hampered by efforts to “reconvert” returning villagers to Hinduism. Numerous press 

and National Commission for Minorities (NCM) reports document widespread forced conversions of 

Christians to Hinduism in villages and relief camps in Orissa following the 2008 attacks. Insecurity and 

the threat of harassment, property destruction, and/or additional violence allegedly have caused many 

Christians to partake in “reconversion” ceremonies. According to a report by the NCM, even retired 

high-ranking officials were “threatened with every sort of retaliation if they did not forthwith change their 

religion and embrace Hinduism.” There was no immediate police or state government reaction. 

In both 2007 and 2008, the ineffective and/or belated police response failed to quell the violence in 

Orissa, and initial central government intervention was largely inadequate. In both years’ violence, the 

synchronization of some attacks across wooded and remote terrain suggests premeditation, as well as the 

awareness and perhaps assistance of local officials and/or police. While the 2008 violence was still 

ongoing, the Orissa state government permitted a funeral procession for Swami Saraswati to cover a 

distance of 150 kilometers across Kandhamal two weeks after his murder, despite calls from religious 

leaders that such a procession could further inflame communal tensions. According to news reports, 

some police watched passively as violence occurred. Central government paramilitary forces did not 

arrive in Orissa until August 27, but were reportedly prevented from reaching the most sensitive areas 

because of the strategic felling of trees across key access roads. 

In March 2009, Orissa’s ruling party, the Biju Janata Dal (BJD), ended its 11-year coalition with the BJP, 

a decision brought about in part by the BJD’s repudiation of the BJP’s Hindu nationalist agenda, and the 

alleged support of some state BJP officials for the VHP, the Sangh Parivar entity implicated in riots. 

Several high-profile state and central government investigative teams have visited Orissa. Almost none 

of the dozens of recommendations for state reform offered by the NCM, the UN Special Rapporteur, and 

Indian Christian organizations have been implemented. Nevertheless, fears that violence would resume in 

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Orissa on Christmas 2008 were assuaged by a series of preventative measures undertaken by the 

government, and the holiday occurred without incident. 

Despite mass arrests following the Orissa riots, victims have experienced difficulty in actually filing 

cases, exacerbating the existing culture of impunity. When attempting to file First Information Reports 

(FIRs), victims of the 2008 violence reported intimidation and lack of cooperation by police. 

Nevertheless, 3,223 complaints were filed, but only 831 cases were registered. Among those accused in 

the violence were 85 members of the RSS, 321 members of the VHP, and 118 members of Bajrang Dal. 

After preliminary investigations, 133 cases have been dropped. 

The Indian government set up two fast-track courts in April 2009 to deal with the complaints lodged after 

the Kandhamal violence. However, this process has been slow and a large number of cases have been 

dismissed because of “insufficient evidence.” The State Department reported approximately 60 to 70 

convictions and 100 acquittals, with 13 people sentenced to several years in jail. The effectiveness of the 

fast-track courts is limited by the fact that the prosecuting attorneys generally do not speak Oriya, the 

local language in which the trials are conducted. Furthermore, the majority of prosecutors are 

inexperienced in prosecuting cases of communal violence and have an excessively large case load. There 

also are reports of widespread witness intimidation as well as prejudice against the victims and their 

families. 

The Indian government has appropriated funds to rebuild some of the damaged homes and churches, as 

well as to provide assistance to families whose family members were killed. Approximately 4,600 houses 

were damaged, out of which 1981 are reportedly in some stage of repair or have been completely 

restored. Of the 196 religious institutions, including prayer halls and churches, which were destroyed, 

100 have received financial compensation for repairs from the state and national government. The state 

and national government also appropriated funds for victims and their families on a case-by-case basis. 

In late 2008, the state government of Orissa commissioned Justice Mohapatra, a retired judge of the 

Orissa high court, to conduct investigations into the Kandhamal violence. His interim report in July 2009 

found that the “sources of the violence were deeply rooted in land disputes, conversion and fake 

certificates” and recommended the government take steps to resolve land issues. He also reported that the 

state government should expedite the freeing of tribal land in possession of non-tribals, clear the fake 

certificate cases, and be vigilant about conversion and reconversion. Hindu hardliners have focused on 

land disputes as the main cause of the violence, minimizing religious factors. 

Violence in Karnataka State and Other Recent Incidents 

On September 14, 2008, shortly after the outbreak of violence in Orissa, over a dozen prayer halls and 

churches in three Karnataka state districts were attacked by individuals allegedly associated with the 

Bajrang Dal, a Hindu nationalist organization. In one district, six individuals were injured after attacks on 

two New Life Church prayer halls. The New Life Church has been accused of distributing pamphlets 

denigrating Hinduism. The state response to these attacks has been inconsistent, as police cases have 

been registered following some but not all of the incidents. Karnataka Chief Minister BS Yeddyurappa 

did not order additional state security for churches and prayer halls until over a week after the first attack. 

On September 19, 2008, Karnataka state leader of the Bajrang Dal, Mahendra Kumar, was arrested by 

state police after he publicly announced his group’s leading role in the attacks. However, in the aftermath 

of the attacks Mr. Yeddyurappa attributed the violence to conversion activity. 

As a response to the rising incidents, the Karnataka state government appointed a commission of inquiry, 

headed by Justice B.K. Somashekara, to probe the attacks. In February 2010, this commission submitted 

its interim report to the state government, in which it found members of the BJP responsible for the 2008 

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attacks on churches and places of worship. The report also stated that high-ranking police officials 

collaborated with Bajrang Dal and the right-wing Hindu nationalist group Sri Ram Sena in “directly or 

indirectly” attacking the churches. Although it implicates the aforementioned organizations, the interim 

report did not take a strong stance against the attacks or the lack of perpetrator accountability. Despite 

this report, Karnataka Chief Minister Yeddyurappa maintains that the attacks were carried out by an 

organized group seeking to tarnish the image of the BJP. There has yet to be any justice meted out to the 

perpetrators identified in the report. 

Attacks in Karnataka state continued during the 2009-10 reporting period against Christians and church 

properties. For instance, in February 2010 Hindu extremists reportedly beat two Christian pastors 

unconscious after literally dragging them from their church compound. In March 2010, a pastor was 

assaulted during a prayer service when reportedly 15 Hindu extremists forced themselves into the 

meeting. In neither case did authorities bring charges against the attackers. However, in recent months, 

police in Karnataka have detained several pastors and held them overnight on charges of “forcible” 

conversions. In March 2010, about 30 Hindu extremists reportedly forcibly entered the private home of a 

Christian family and accused the pastor of “forceful” conversions. Police arrested the pastor based on 

these allegations, while no action was taken against the intruders. 

Hindu nationalist groups have been implicated in attacks against Hindus as well. In January 2009, about 

40 members of Sri Ram Sena attacked a group of women at a pub in Mangalore, Karnataka, on the 

premise that the women’s behavior violated Hindu values. The attacks sparked a national outcry from 

activists, and several arrests were made, although all were released on bail. In July 2009, rioting between 

Muslims and Hinds resulted when a dead pig was through into the compound of a mosque in Karnataka. 

Dozens were reportedly injured but no known arrests were made. There were also repeated reports of 

incidents in Karnataka’s Dakshina Kannada district of Hindu extremists groups attacking women visiting 

pubs and Muslim boys who were seen talking to Hindu girls. Any response by authorities is unknown. 

Reports of attacks on Christian leaders repeatedly arose in 2010, with violence occurring throughout the 

country. In New Delhi, a Christian pastor was attacked by 25 RSS members wielding hockey sticks. 

Police did file an FIR, but no charges have been brought to date. In the state of Andhra Pradesh, Hindu 

extremists attacked a pastor and his wife, accusing them of preaching in the area. Local police reportedly 

refused to file an FIR. In the state of Chhattisgarh, an estimated 40 Hindu extremists from Bajrang Dal, 

reportedly motivated by concerns about “forced conversion,” crashed a Sunday worship service, 

destroying Bibles and Christian materials. The Bajrang Dal members called the police and the pastor and 

some church members were held for several hours; the police refused to file a report against the Bajrang 

Dal members. In Madhya Pradesh, approximately 45 Bajrang Dal supporters, accompanied by police, 

reportedly broke into a church service. Several church members were taken into custody on suspicion of 

“conversion activities” and were later released without charges since their activity was not illegal. 

In September 2008, a bomb attack in Malegaon, Maharashtra that killed seven and injured over 70 was 

traced to “Hindu extremists.” Eleven individuals were arrested by the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism 

Squad. This attack and the ensuing arrests prompted a national debate regarding the contours of emergent 

“Hindu terrorism” and allegations of anti-Hindu bias by political parties seeking to appease minority 

electorates. In Chhattisgarh state in November 2007, a mob of 150 members of a Hindu extremist group 

attacked a church, destroying the church building, beating the pastor, and kidnapping a young member of 

the church, who was later found dead. Despite the fact that the police were provided with the names of 

the attackers, officials reportedly waited until the following day to file a complaint. In January 2008, also 

in Chhattisgarh, more than 80 people were injured in an attack on a large Christian meeting carried out by 

extremists. The attackers reportedly beat the Christian worshippers and vandalized the makeshift church 

structure. The State Department also reports communal clashes between Hindus and Muslims in several 

districts in Maharashtra and Gujarat in 2007 and 2008, causing injuries and the destruction of property. 

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The State Department reported that the “levels of societal and insurgent violence declined in [the state of] 

Jammu and Kashmir,” but insurgents continued to kill individuals associated with the government or rival 

factions, as well as civilians. Because of the violence, over the past decade thousands of Kashmiri Pandit 

Hindus have left for other regions of India. In August 2009, the state government of Jammu and Kashmir 

reportedly provided approximately 16 billion rupees ($32 million) for the return and rehabilitation of 

Kashmiri Pandits to the state. In December 2009, around 40 people were injured when police fired tear 

gas and used batons to break up religious processions during the Muharram commemoration by Shi’a 

Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir. Local police also arrested 40 people. Large public gatherings of this 

sort have been banned since 1989. Authorities allow only small mourning rallies and processions in areas 

with sizable Shi’a populations, leading to annual friction between police and mourners. 

Gujarat Violence in 2002 

In February 2002 in the state of Gujarat, a train fire reportedly set by Muslims resulted in the death of 58 

Hindus returning from the disputed holy site of Ayodhya. Consequently, 1,200-2,500 Muslims were 

killed across Gujarat by Hindu mobs, thousands of mosques and Muslim-owned businesses were looted 

or destroyed, and more than 100,000 people fled their homes. Christians were also victims in Gujarat, 

and many churches were destroyed. Many have not returned, as a study recently commissioned by the 

NNCM found that approximately 5,000 Muslim families have still not been able to return to their homes 

and are currently housed in 46 different camps across the state. Their physical situation was described as 

“precarious.” India’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), an official government body, found 

evidence of premeditation in the killings by members of Hindu nationalist groups, complicity by Gujarat 

state government officials, and police inaction in the midst of attacks on Muslims. In 2007, the 

investigative newsmagazine Tehelka revealed further evidence of state government and police complicity 

in the riots, including the complicity of the then and current Gujarat Chief Minister, Narendra Modi. 

Chief Minister Modi has been re-elected twice since the riots. 

Court convictions of alleged perpetrators of the Gujarat riots are rare, due to the slow pace of 

prosecutions, the lack of evidence, insufficient effort by local police officials, or a combination of the 

three. Since there were many eyewitnesses to the attacks, the low number of convictions suggests 

endemic impediments to justice continue to exist within the police, the judiciary, and the state 

government apparatus. In August 2004, the Indian Supreme Court ordered the Gujarat government to 

reopen its investigation of the 2002 violence, criticizing the local police officials for poor investigative 

practices and inadequate follow-up. In July 2006, a report from a committee attached to the Prime 

Minister’s office again chastised the Gujarat government for failing to improve the situation for Muslims 

in that state, noting that a “state of fear and insecurity” still existed for many Muslims there. This was 

corroborated by the January 2009 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 

Asma Jahangir, who visited India in March 2008 and noted the systemic economic and social 

marginalization of members of Gujarat’s Muslim community. In February 2009, seven years after the 

riots, the Gujarat state government declared that the 228 (predominantly Muslim) individuals still missing 

would be presumed dead. Family members petitioned the Gujarat high court to direct the state 

government to release compensation, and the state government reportedly complied. 

In response to a complaint filed by the widow of Congress MP Ehsan Jaffri, who was killed in the 2002 

riots, the Supreme Court in 2009 ordered the Gujarat police to register a complaint against the Chief 

Minister and 60 other high-level officials of the Gujarat government regarding their alleged involvement 

in her husband’s murder. In January 2010, a Special Investigative Team (SIT) established by the 

Supreme Court disclosed that the Gujarat government had been uncooperative and did not relinquish 

copies of speeches that Chief Minister Modi made in the immediate aftermath of the riots and other 

requested documents. That same month, the Supreme Court ordered the Gujarat state government to 

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immediately release to the SIT copies of these materials to facilitate the probe. The SIT summoned Chief 

Minister Modi to appear before the Supreme Court in March 2010. Initially, he failed to appear on the 

date specified, claiming he had not been summoned. However, he did appear before the Supreme Court 

several days later, and was questioned for ten hours about his role in the Gujarat violence. The 

investigation is ongoing. 

International human rights groups have indentified the VHP, RSS, BJP, and Bajrang Dal as perpetrators 

of the violence in Gujarat, as well as other acts of violence against non-Hindus. The Supreme Court in 

April 2009 agreed to look into NGO allegations that the SIT is ignoring evidence against the perpetrators. 

After a controversial 2002 non-governmental organization report described links between a Marylandbased charity and India’s RSS and other “violent and sectarian Hindu organizations,” Silicon Valley 

companies Cisco and Oracle suspended matching company donations to the charity. India’s central and 

state police and judicial apparatuses have neglected to examine consistently or adequately the evidence 

linking Sangh Parivar entities such as the BHP, RSS, BJP, and Bajrang Dal to acts of violence. 

The State Department reported that on June 4, 2009, the Gujarat state government appointed a 

commission of inquiry to study “settlement patterns” in the state from 1947 to the present, so as to make 

recommendations for “stopping the polarization of population in the state.” The membership of the 

commission was criticized by civil society groups, as it is comprised of one member, a judge viewed to 

have made several anti-Muslim rulings. In light of the violence in 2002 and the lack of accountability, 

Muslim groups fear that the charting of their locations could be used in future attacks. The commission’s 

report is due by January 2011. 

The 1984 anti-Sikh Riots 

In 1984, anti-Sikh riots erupted in Delhi following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by 

Sikh bodyguards. Over four days, nearly 3,000 Sikhs were killed, allegedly with the support of Congress 

Party officials. Few perpetrators were ever held accountable, and then only years after the fact. In April 

2009, the Congress Party dropped two individuals, Jagdish Tytler and Sajjan Kumar, from its roster of 

general election candidates over their suspected role in the 1984 riots. As of early 2010, court 

proceedings in the Delhi high court against these two individuals were ongoing. As with many cases 

regarding the prosecution of alleged perpetrators of communal violence, Mr. Kumar and Mr. Tytler have 

been accused of delaying the trial and intimidating the witnesses and their families. The CBI, which is 

overseeing the investigation of the anti-Sikh riots, has also drawn criticism for not vigorously 

investigating and prosecuting the accused. In December 2009, amendments were made to the Code of 

Criminal Procedure, making it easier for victims of religious persecution to appeal judgments in court. 

Ten days after the amendment was enacted, the High Court accepted an appeal from a victim of the 1984 

anti-Sikh riots, Gurbakshish Singh. The case was ongoing at the end of the reporting period. 

Responses to Terrorism and the Prevention of Communal Violence 

Threats and fear of terrorism in India, perpetrated or threatened by domestic actors (including Maoists) 

and foreign, regional actors (particularly Pakistanis and Bangladeshis), remains high. India continues to 

witness terrorist bombings; however, unlike with the cases discussed previously, swift state and central 

government action followed to prevent communal violence. In May 2008, bomb attacks killed almost 

100 bystanders in crowded markets next to Hindu temples in Jaipur. At least 45 individuals died in bomb 

blasts in November 2008 in Ahmedabad, the capital city of Gujarat. Severe casualties also resulted from 

2008 bomb attacks in Delhi and Bangalore. The central government’s immediate appeals for calm and 

peace and the rapid response of state police helped prevent communal riots, despite varying religious 

undertones to the attacks, some of which occurred near places of worship, and/or were orchestrated by 

Islamic extremists. 

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In November 2008, 163 people were killed in coordinated attacks on ten prominent Mumbai sites, 

including two luxury hotels and a Jewish center. These attacks were carried out by members of the 

extremist Islamic organization Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group active in Kashmir and understood to have 

linkages with Pakistan’s intelligence agency. Lashkar-e-Taiba has been designated by the State 

Department as a foreign terrorist organization. The attackers purposefully sought out an American-born 

rabbi and his Israeli wife residing in the upper floor of an apartment building as targets for their murder. 

In February 2010, a bomb exploded in the German Bakery in Pune, Maharashtra, killing 17 and injuring 

over 50. The bakery was a popular meeting place for locals and tourists alike, prompting suspicion to fall 

on terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba. This was the first major terror attack in India after the 2008 

Mumbai attacks. Although the investigation is ongoing, the newspaper The Hindu reported that a 

spokesman for a group called Lashkar-e-Taiba al-Almi, an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, had claimed 

responsibility and asserted that the attack was in response to India’s “‘refusal’ to discuss the disputed 

region of Kashmir.” As was the case with the Mumbai attacks, no backlash against Muslim communities 

resulted following the attack in Pune. However, some observers attribute this to the level of education, 

integration, and efforts of the people of Pune rather than any endeavor by the government to ease interreligious tensions. 

Legal Climate 

While the Indian Constitution protects the right of citizens to change and propagate their religion, five 

Indian states —Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa —have 

controversial laws against “coerced” religious conversions. A law restricting religious conversions in the 

state of Arunachal Pradesh awaits implementing regulations for enforcement and is considered “inactive.” 

The Rajasthan state government passed an “anti-conversion” law in March 2008 that would restrict 

proselytism, but the governor refused to sign it into law. When the BJP lost to the Congress Party in 

December 2008 state assembly elections, no additional attempts were made to pass the law. Anticonversion laws require government officials to determine what is or is not a “sincere” conversion. These 

laws provide for fines and imprisonment for anyone who uses force, fraud, “inducement,” and in some 

cases, the threat of “divine displeasure” to convert another. In 2007, the Andhra Pradesh state government 

enacted a law against the “propagation of other religion in places of worship or prayer,” which prohibits 

the distribution of religious materials near the place of worship of another religion. 

The State Department reported approximately 17 arrests under “anti-conversion” and other restrictive 

laws in the states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra. These laws create a hostile 

atmosphere for religious minorities, particularly given that they exist in states in which attacks by 

extremist groups are more common—and often happen with greater impunity—than elsewhere in India. 

For example, the NCM report on the December 2007 violence in Orissa concluded that an important 

factor behind the attacks was the “anti-conversion” campaign carried out by groups associated with the 

Sangh Parivar. The UN Special Rapporteur has also expressed her concern over the impact of these laws 

on religious minorities and their inconsistency with international norms guaranteeing the freedom to 

change one’s religion, and has called for their repeal. 

According to the State Department, India’s central government maintained a list of banned books. The 

books were prohibited from importation or sale because censors deemed their content “inflammatory and 

apt to provoke communal or religious tensions.” The Rajasthan state government also banned books 

considered blasphemous of Hindu gods. 

An additional factor exacerbating tensions between Hindus and Christians in Orissa—tensions that 

erupted into violence in 2007 and more prolonged rioting in 2008—is a quota scheme offering certain 

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benefits to India’s most disadvantaged groups, the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes (also known as 

Dalits or “untouchables”). In Orissa, Hindus who are members of Scheduled Castes receive job quota 

benefits, but Christians and Muslims from Scheduled Castes do not, as they are considered to have 

removed themselves from the caste system. Although affirmative action is not an internationally 

recognized right, the quota system, which was enacted because Scheduled Castes and Tribes represent a 

historically underprivileged and impoverished demographic, is frequently applied discriminatorily so that 

disadvantaged Christians and Muslims are excluded from benefiting. However, in many cases, the 

economic and social challenges facing this demographic do not appear to be eliminated by their religious 

affiliation. The UN Special Rapporteur has condemned this discriminatory system and called for the 

abolition of links between religion and caste or tribal status. Christian groups have filed a case with the 

Supreme Court to allow converts to Christianity and Islam to access the same reservations as other 

Scheduled Castes. The Court was considering the case at the end of the reporting period. 

 

In November 2006, the Sachar Committee reported that Indian Muslims face discrimination and other 

hardships and Prime Minister Singh pledged to “address the imbalances.” Reports conflict about how 

many of the 22 recommendations have actually been implemented. In January 2009, the government 

announced that madrassa degrees would be equivalent to university degrees. In May 2008, at least 40 

unarmed protesters were killed and hundreds were detained during weeks of violent protests and counterprotests regarding the Jammu and Kashmir government’s decision to transfer 100 acres of forest land to 

the government-run, Sri Amarnath Shrine Board for the lodging of Hindu pilgrims. The state 

government’s decision to transfer the property in the Muslim-majority state was seen by many Kashmiri 

Muslims as an expression of pro-Hindu bias and an attempt by the Indian government to increase Hindu 

religious tourism and skew state religious demographics. In March 2009, at the urging of the Election 

Commission, BJP general election candidate Varun Gandhi of the Gandhi political dynasty was arrested 

by Uttar Pradesh state police under the National Security Act on charges of hate speech against Muslims 

during a campaign rally. After over two weeks in jail, the Supreme Court ordered Gandhi’s release on 

bail, pending his upholding of a commitment not to promote “disharmony or feelings or enmity, hatred or 

ill-will between different religion, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities.” Varun 

Gandhi was elected to the lower house of India’s national parliament in the 2009 national elections but 

subsequently faced a legal challenge on the grounds that his alleged hate speech rendered his victory 

invalid. 

In December 2009, the Singh government announced amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure. 

Changes to Section 372 permit individuals to appeal a court order without permission from the law 

enforcement or prosecuting agency. Previously, an appeal could be filed only after the prosecutor 

approved the appeal. The amendment makes it easier for victims of religious persecution or other 

violence to appeal unfavorable court judgments. 

U.S. Policy 

Since the end of the Cold War, India and the United States have enjoyed increasingly closer ties, with 

India now described as a “strategic” and “natural” partner of the United States, especially considering the 

two countries represent the two largest democracies in the world. India is a rising international power, 

with its economy growing rapidly over the past decade despite large- scale challenges of poverty, 

overpopulation, and corruption. Since 2004, Washington, DC and New Delhi have pursued a “strategic 

relationship” based on common concerns regarding the growing threat of terrorism, energy security, and 

global warming, as well as on the shared values of democracy and the rule of law. Most notably, three 

decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy toward India have been reversed through an initiative launched by 

President Bush in 2005 and finalized by the 110th Congress in 2008. In March 2010, India and the 

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United States successfully concluded negotiations allowing India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, a 

development which will open commercial opportunities for U.S. nuclear energy companies. 

In 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to India to launch the “Strategic Dialogue,” which 

called for greater collaboration in a number of areas, including energy, climate change, trade, education, 

and counterterrorism. However, human rights and religious freedom were not a part of the stated agenda. 

The first state visit hosted by President Obama was for Prime Minister Singh during his November 2009 

visit to Washington, DC. The United States views as important India’s role in its efforts of fighting and 

disrupting terrorist networks of al-Qaeda and other militant groups on the subcontinent, such as Lashkare-Taiba. Military-to-military ties have increased, especially after the signing in 2005 of a ten-year 

defense framework agreement expanding bilateral security cooperation. India purchased $25 million 

worth of arms through the Foreign Military Sales programs in 2006 and $93 million in 2007. 

Bilateral tensions have increased, however, with India concerned about increasing U.S. military aid to 

Pakistan, which New Delhi fears bolsters the Pakistani military capabilities against India rather than for 

counter-insurgency operations. There are also concerns about the Obama administration’s desire to 

increase relations with China and President’s Obama’s proposed protectionist and anti-outsourcing 

policies that may affect India’s economy. However, U.S. aid programs continue. USAID funds for FY 

2009 were $78 million and requested funds for FY 2010 are $99 million. The largest appropriations are 

for health-related programs and food aid. 

USCIRF Activities 

During the reporting period, USCIRF Commissioners and staff met with State Department officials as 

well as a variety of NGOs and religious groups to learn more about the religious freedom situation in 

India. In June 2009, USCIRF requested to visit India to discuss religious freedom conditions with 

officials, religious leaders, civil society activists and others, but the Indian government did not issue visas 

to the USCIRF delegation. Nor did the Indian government offer alternative dates for a visit, which the 

Commission requested. USCIRF would still welcome the opportunity to visit India. 

Recommendations 

I. Advancing Religious Freedom through U.S. diplomacy 

The U.S. government should: 

• integrate concern for religious freedom and related human rights into all bilateral contacts with India, 

such as with the follow-up work from the 2009 Strategic Dialogue; and 

• make clear to the Indian public the high priority the U.S. government gives this issue by directing the 

U.S. ambassador to: publicly denounce attacks against any religious community, be it in the majority 

or the minority; seek to visit the sites of communal violence, such as Orissa state; and meet with state 

and local officials to raise these concerns. 

II. Strengthening Law Enforcement and the Judiciary 

The U.S. government should urge the government of India to: 

• strengthen the ability of the state and central police and other law enforcement bodies to provide 

effective measures to prohibit and punish cases of religious violence, and protect victims and 

witnesses by: 

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--ensuring that complainants are able to file “First Information Reports” (FIRs); 

--ensuring adequate protection for witnesses and complainants after an FIR has been filed;

--ensuring that cases relating to religious violence are processed in a timely manner, including by 

ensuring that a sufficient number of investigators and public prosecutors are supplied to districts 

in which acts of communal violence have occurred, and that all such individuals are impartial and 

adequately trained on human rights and religious freedom standards; 

-- providing protection for witnesses in danger of retaliatory violence; 

--ensuring that all complainants are able to obtain legal representation, regardless of religion or 

caste status; 

--ensuring that standardized procedures for documenting and collecting evidence are promptly 

followed in instances of communal conflict; 

--ensuring that prosecutors have a working knowledge of the language of the court to which they 

are assigned; and

--ensuring that trials at all levels of the justice system are impartial, including by investigating 

allegations of corruption or official complicity in any acts of alleged religious violence; 

• strengthen the state and central judiciary by implementing measures to ensure that: 

--cases involving religious violence or harassment are processed and resolved in a timely manner; 

and 

--survivors of communal violence are made aware of their rights and avenues for legal recourse, 

for example by establishing free or low-cost community legal aid clinics in riot-hit areas; 

• ensure that the state and central police and other law enforcement agencies have the training and 

resources necessary to avert future communal violence, including by sharing information among 

central and state law enforcement bodies about measures that successfully prevented outbreaks of 

violence in previous high-tension situations; 

• provide training on human rights and religious freedom standards and practices to members of the 

state and central police and judiciary, particularly in areas with a history or likelihood of communal 

violence; 

• ensure that the perpetrators of terrorist attacks are brought to justice, and the victims and their families 

are provided aid and counseling; and 

• fulfill a pledge made in 2004 to enact a law criminalizing inter-religious violence. 

Regarding Orissa 

The U.S. government should urge the government of India to: 

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• initiate a Central Bureau of Investigation probe into the murder of Swami Lakshmanananda Saraswati 

and the ensuing violence in Orissa; 

• continue to pursue, investigate, and bring charges against the perpetrators of the killings and arson in 

Orissa, as well as any forced reconversions [see specific recommendations above under II. 

Strengthening Law Enforcement and the Judiciary]; 

• allow aid groups, regardless of religious affiliation, access to internally displaced persons still unable 

or unwilling to return to their home communities; 

• facilitate relocation of the more than 1,000 persons still displaced from the riots by assuring their 

safety; 

• establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that all compensation schemes, including those promised 

by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh soon after the outbreak of the Fall 2008 violence, are carried out 

in a timely manner and any families unable to produce the body of an individual killed by rioters are 

not excluded from compensation schemes; 

• take steps to ensure police access to Kandhamal district and other areas that may be prone to 

communal violence, including by improving road infrastructure and building capacity; 

• mobilize the necessary security forces over the timeframe necessary to ensure that internally 

displaced persons residing in government relief camps or elsewhere are allowed to safely return to 

their villages, without the threat of violence or harassment; 

• ensure that the use or threat of violence or harassment to bring about forced conversions or 

“reconversions” are prosecuted promptly under existing laws prohibiting harassment and violence; 

and 

• recognize the unique link between poverty, tribal identity, and communal violence in Orissa, and 

implement development schemes to address poverty, disadvantages associated with tribal or caste 

status, the lack of economic opportunity, and the lack of adequate education and health infrastructure. 

Regarding Gujarat 

The U.S. government should urge the government of India to: 

• continue to pursue, investigate, and lay charges against any individuals responsible for the deaths at 

Godhra, and the perpetrators of the killings, sexual violence, and arson in Gujarat in 2002; 

• urge the Supreme Court to look into allegations of its Special Investigative Team’s having disregarded 

evidence; 

• ensure that any efforts to bring a case against Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi are allowed to 

proceed in accordance with the law; 

• send a central government investigative team to Gujarat to assess the security of individuals displaced 

by the 2002 riots and look into reports that such individuals are systematically economically and 

socially marginalized, and provide recommendations for improving communal harmony in Gujarat; 

and 

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• facilitate relocation of the more than 5,000 families still displaced from the riots by assuring their 

safety. 

III. Reforming Existing Legislation That May Undermine Freedom of Religion or Belief 

The U.S. government should urge the government of India to: 

• establish an impartial body of interfaith religious leaders, human rights and legal experts, and other 

civil society representatives to study religious conversion activity and any allegations of forced, 

induced, or otherwise illegal or improper conversions in states with legislation regulating conversions 

and to make recommendations as to if and how such laws should be changed to comply with 

international standards on the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief; and 

• investigate job allocation and government benefit schemes for Scheduled Tribes and Castes to assess 

whether religion is used unfairly to provide or deny access to benefits. 

IV. Taking New Measures to Promote Communal Harmony, Protect Religious Minorities, and 

Prevent Communal Violence 

The U.S. government should urge the government of India to: 

• call on all political parties and religious or social organizations, including entities of the Sangh 

Parivar, including, but not limited to the Bharatiya Janata Party, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, 

Bajrang Dal, and Vishwa Hindu Parishad, to: publicly denounce violence against and harassment of 

religious minorities, women, and low-caste members; acknowledge that such violence constitutes a 

crime under Indian law;, and communicate to all members and affiliates that acts of violence or 

harassment will not be tolerated and will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law; 

• take immediate legal action against any charitable, social, or political organizations, or individuals 

associated with such organizations, about whom evidence of participation in acts of communal 

violence is found; 

• establish effective State Minority Commissions charged with the responsibility for examining 

minority affairs, including minority religious communities, issuing recommendations, and serving as 

a repository for minority grievances in those states that do not currently have such commissions, 

including Orissa, and ensure that these commissions are transparent, adequately funded, inclusive of 

women and minorities, and subject to periodic independent review; and 

• establish measures to build confidence among religious communities in areas with a history or 

likelihood of communal violence, including truth and reconciliation councils and social and cultural 

programming. 

Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Felice D. Gaer: 

I respectfully dissent from the decision to recommend that India be placed on the Commission’s Watch 

List of countries with egregious, severe violations of religious freedom that fall short of the statutory 

requirement for “countries of particular concern.” I continue to be deeply concerned over the religiouslymotivated violence in India in recent years – and the loss of life, physical abuse, displacement, and more 

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– as well as over the many matters of accountability or other remedies that remain to be addressed. 

However the Commission’s conclusion that the system’s “capacity and will is severely limited” and that 

government response to such incidents has been “largely inadequate” seems to fly in the face of the 

evidence of serious measures that have been undertaken. 

 

The responses of the Indian government during the past year have been significant. They have ranged 

from formal amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure that have enabled appeals of judgments of 

past incidents (including one from the 1984 anti-Sikh riots), to establishing fast track courts to take up 

cases in Orissa which according to the State Department had already resulted in 60-70 convictions, to 

appropriating funds for rebuilding and paying compensation to victims or the families of victims, to 

permitting a 10-country delegation of the European Union to travel to the region for a first-hand 

examination. National governmental bodies have taken other steps to correct insufficient action on the 

state level. For example, the Supreme Court has challenged Gujarat state authorities – ordering special 

investigative teams, summoning the Chief Minister to testify, demanding documentation, etc. Such proactive measures suggest that the state’s capacity and will can be and are being applied to prevent further 

outbreaks of inter-religious violence, including to address past evidence that its independent, albeit slowmoving and frequently unresponsive, judiciary can work to hold perpetrators accountable as well. Such 

measures should be continued. 

 

India has carried out these and other measures despite the ongoing threats of terrorist attacks and violence 

such as in Mumbai in 2008, in which 163 persons were killed. While there were no comparable attacks of 

this kind in 2010, it is nonetheless reliably reported that a total of 398 persons were killed in 2010 in 

violent incidents in Kashmir and Jammu, which remains a sizable and deeply troubling number, even if it 

is somewhat smaller than in 2009, as noted by the USCIRF report. 

 

The religious diversity and tolerance that exists in India has been remarked upon in the USCIRF report, 

and observers should also note the vibrant civil society with many independent and outspoken nongovernmental organizations that monitor and publish their findings on Indian government responses to 

such violence. Their actions draw attention to the unfinished business needed to redress religious-based 

violence in India. They are uniquely placed to urge sustained efforts to strengthen the ability of the state 

and central police to prohibit and punish cases of religious violence, and to monitor those responses in the 

public arena. India’s free press has widely reported on these matters as well. 

 

India has the legal and democratic traditions to deal with religious intolerance and should be strongly 

encouraged to do so. USCIRF recommendations that call for measures to strengthen law enforcement 

bodies, including the police and judiciary, merit sustained attention and follow- up. U.S. diplomacy has a 

role here as well; American diplomats have been unusually quiet on these matters in bilateral relations 

with India. USCIRF recommends that senior American diplomats should be more vocal in denouncing 

attacks against any religious community and seek to visit the sites of communal violence as well, making 

clear that the United States places a high priority on preventing such attacks, punishment of 

perpetrators and protection of victims and witnesses. 
Watch List Countries

Indonesia 

FINDINGS: Indonesia’s transition to democracy since 1998 has contributed to an overall 

improvement in conditions for human rights in the country. The majority of Indonesia’s diverse 

religious communities operate openly and with few restrictions, and there are vibrant public 

discussions among politicians, religious leaders, and civil society about the role of religion in 

political life. The government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has taken positive steps 

to address terrorism and past sectarian violence in the regions of Ambon and Central Sulawesi, 

to bring peace to the region of Aceh, and to build popular support for democracy. However, 

during his presidency, religious minorities have experienced harassment, intimidation, 

discrimination, and even violence perpetuated by groups espousing intolerance and extremism 

under the banner of Islamic orthodoxy. The activities of some extremist groups are sometimes 

tolerated by segments of the Indonesian government. In addition, despite legal protections for 

religious freedom, national decrees and provincial laws have been used to restrict rather than 

advance the freedom of religion and belief. 

 

Based on these concerns, USCIRF continues to place Indonesia on its Watch List for 2010. 

Indonesia has been on the Commission’s Watch List since 2002, after sectarian violence erupted 

in Central Sulawesi and the Makukus. 

 

Indonesia has a tradition of religious tolerance and pluralism. Nevertheless, religious radicalism 

and extremism have found converts in Indonesia, leading to sectarian violence, terrorism, and 

religious freedom violations. Indonesians have rejected extremism at the polls, but it often goes 

unchallenged by many political, civic, and religious leaders. In the past year, extremist groups 

have forcibly closed places of worship belonging to religious minorities, sometimes with the 

acquiescence of local or provincial officials. A 2008 joint ministerial decree curtailing the 

activities of the Ahmadiyya community remains in place, as do provincial bans that go further 

than the decree’s stated intent. Provincial officials have also employed Article 156(a) of the 

Indonesian penal code to harass and detain individuals considered religiously “deviant” and 

continue to enforce local perda syariah laws restricting the rights of women and some nonMuslims. In addition, USCIRF remains concerned about the situation in Papua, where longstanding political and economic grievances and human rights abuses have deepened sectarian 

tensions. 

 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: The interests of the United States are advanced by a 

democratic and prosperous Indonesia committed to countering terrorism and promoting religious 

freedom, religious tolerance and interfaith cooperation. As part of the formal bilateral 

partnership being pursued by the Obama Administration, USCIRF recommends that the 

Administration support any government offices, religious groups, and civil society organizations 

in Indonesia working to promote religious freedom, counter extremism, teach tolerance and 

human rights, pursue legal reform, and build interfaith alliances to deal with pressing social, 

political, and economic concerns. A vibrant U.S.-Indonesian partnership can be an important 

model, ensuring Indonesian stability, addressing regional human rights issues and the threat of 

terrorism, and expanding universal rights and freedoms in the “Muslim world.” Additional 

recommendations for U.S. policy towards Indonesia can be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Indonesia’s Tradition of Religious Tolerance and the Challenge of Extremism 

Islam in Indonesia is known historically for its tolerance and accommodation of a variety of indigenous 

cultural and religious traditions. Over the past decade, there has been a revival of Islamic awareness and 

piety, previously repressed by the former military government. The wearing of Islamic dress has reemerged as an outward sign of devotion; the number of Islamic banks, businesses, and publications is 

growing; and Islamic-themed art and fiction are becoming more popular. Indonesian Muslim leaders 

have engaged in lively discussions on the nature of democracy and pluralism, the separation of religion 

and state, women’s rights, and human rights more generally. There are numerous religiously-based 

political parties and the role of Islam in politics and society, as well as the growth of religiously-justified 

terrorism, are topics discussed widely on television and radio and in numerous public fora. 

The revival of Islamic piety, coupled with Indonesia’s new democratic openness, has strengthened 

Indonesia’s mainstream Muslim institutions and the rights of some religious minorities, but it also has 

nurtured a small number of groups espousing intolerance and extremism under the banner of Islamic 

orthodoxy. Over the past several years, the influence, visibility, and activities of extremist groups have 

lead to sectarian tensions and religious freedom violations. These violations include a troubling number 

of instances of societal violence targeting religious minorities and the intimidation, arrest, detention, and 

harassment of allegedly heterodox Muslims and some non-Muslims for allegedly “denigrating religion,” 

“deviancy,” or “blasphemy.” 

Extremists groups and more religiously conservative Islamic political parties have failed to win popular 

support, as evidenced by results of the April 2009 parliamentary elections and the overwhelming reelection of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in June 2009. However, they have successfully 

pressed their agenda both publicly and politically, pressuring government officials, judges, and politicians 

through private lobbying, demonstrations, threats, and mob action. Such efforts resulted in the 2008 Joint 

Ministerial Decree on the Ahmadiyya and the Anti-Pornography Law, as well as a number of local shariainspired laws in provincial areas. Coalitions of moderate Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and 

other religious and civil society groups have opposed these measures, both politically and in the public 

square. Though President Yudhoyono and his Democratic party won major electoral victories in 2009, 

they have not indicated whether they will support repeal of the ministerial decree on the Ahmadiyya or 

overturn or amend laws that restrict religious freedom. 

 

Addressing Past Sectarian Violence 

In 2002, the Commission placed Indonesia on its Watch List after sectarian violence in Central Sulawesi 

and the Malukus claimed thousands of lives and displaced tens of thousands of others. USCIRF remains 

concerned about the potential for renewed sectarian tensions in these regions, but notes that religiouslymotivated violence has declined sharply in recent years and police have arrested or killed—and local 

courts have sentenced or executed—dozens of individuals, Muslims and Christians, responsible for past 

acts of violence. Local civic and religious leaders and government officials have worked to promote 

reconciliation and diffuse tensions in former conflict areas. The Indonesian government reportedly has 

committed funds for local programs in conflict mediation and interfaith economic development. Local 

governments have projects to rebuild churches, mosques, and homes destroyed in past violence. In 

December 2009, Indonesian courts sentenced 17 individuals to 14 years imprisonment for taking part in 

sectarian violence in Ambon. Also, the Masohi District Court of Maluku began trials in February 2009 

for three suspects who instigated riots that destroyed parts of a Christian village. One of the individuals 

being tried is a schoolteacher who reportedly denigrated Islam in his classroom, setting off the riots. 

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Religious leaders and government officials reportedly visited the villages in order to promote 

reconciliation and gather weapons and ammunition. 

Indonesian extremist and terrorist groups continue to train, recruit, and operate in Sulawesi and in islands 

near the Philippines. These groups frequently have been responsible for attacks on members of religious 

minorities and police, instigating mob actions to restrict religious activities, stoking sectarian tensions, 

and organizing political efforts to segregate Central Sulwesi into Muslim and Christian enclaves. Since 

widespread rioting and sectarian clashes in late 2007, there have been few new incidents of violence. The 

Indonesian government has taken active steps to promote stability, but tensions continue to exist in the 

region fueled by political and economic rivalries between Muslim and Christian elites. 

In recent years, the police arrested and the courts sentenced individuals who organized the beheading of 

three young girls in 2006. Police also have apprehended at least 10 others who confessed to participating 

in various bombings, beheadings, and shootings in Central Sulawesi over the past two years. Police in 

Central Sulawesi claim that they have arrested or killed 18 of the 29 individuals “most wanted” for 

sectarian violence in that region, including two individuals accused of the 2006 assassination of Reverend 

Irianto Kongkoli. 

Despite some successes in rooting out suspected terrorists, police tactics, particularly those of the elite 

counter-terrorism unit Detachment 88, have exacerbated existing sectarian tensions in Sulawesi. Local 

religious leaders claim that Detachment 88’s harsh tactics increased sympathy for extremists in Central 

Sulawesi and attracted religious militants from other regions. For example, in April, 2008 police shot and 

killed Madi, a sect leader involved in a 2005 clash with police. 

Many grievances remain from the sectarian conflict that occurred in 1999-2001 in Central Sulawesi and 

the Malukus, and there continue to be large number of persons who remain displaced from the conflict. 

In addition, extremists groups still operate in the region, recruiting, and setting up terrorist training camps 

in remote regions. The June 2007 arrest of suspected terrorist leader Abu Dujana confirmed that the goal 

of terrorist networks was to stoke sectarian tensions in Central Sulawesi through bombings and 

assassinations of religious leaders. 

Success of Anti-Terrorism Campaign

The Indonesian government continues to make notable progress in capturing and prosecuting persons 

accused of specific terrorist activities, including killing or arresting 15 individuals on the United States’ 

most wanted list. In 2008, police raided a Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) compound in Central Sulawesi and 

arrested dozens of suspects including Ainul Bahri and Zuhroni, two top JI leaders. Ustadz Rian, one of 

the primary organizers of JI’s terrorist operations, was killed during the raid. In April 2008, an 

Indonesian court officially declared JI a terrorist organization and sentenced its military commander, Abu 

Dujana, to 15 years imprisonment for stockpiling weapons, harboring fugitives, and committing terrorist 

violence. In January 2009 ten militants with ties to JI were tried for killing a Christian schoolteacher, 

illegally possessing explosives, harboring fugitives, and plotting to bomb a café. The primary suspect, 

Mohammad Hasan, a Singaporean English teacher, trained with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and served as a 

courier for Osama bin Laden in 2000. He was given an 18 year prison sentence in April 2009. 

In February 2009, three JI terrorists were sentenced to eight to nine years in prison for aiding and abetting 

JI operatives. In April 2009, the government arrested and convicted members of the Palembang group, 

including Fajar Taslim, Zuber, and Yudi, who were sentenced to 18, 10, and 12 years respectively. Also 

in April, suspected terrorists Sugiarto, Agustiawarman, and Heri Purwanto were each sentenced in a 

Jakarta court to 12 years imprisonment for violating the antiterrorism law.

 

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The Indonesian government has been actively hunting JI’s top commanders, particularly after the July 

2009 bombings at the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Hotels in Jakarta. During the past year, counterterrorism units killed JI top commander Noordin Mohammed Top (September 2009) and Dulmantin 

(March 2010). Dulmantin was the reported mastermind of the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing and 

responsible for a string of church bombings in the Philippines in 2000. 

 

Extremist Groups and Societal Violence 

According to opinion polls, public support for terrorist organizations and suicide bombings has declined 

dramatically in Indonesia since the 2005 Bali bombing. Yet, at the same time, the number and influence 

of groups pressing political and religious agendas under the banner of Islamic orthodoxy has grown. 

Religiously based organizations and political parties have long been a feature of Indonesian society, but 

the proliferation of extremist groups is a recent phenomenon, coinciding with the growth of democratic 

openness in Indonesia and the spread of the most conservative forms of Islam throughout the “Muslim 

world.” 

Most of Indonesia’s sectarian tensions and societal violence have been instigated by groups such as the 

Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Council of Martyrs (MMI), the Alliances for AntiApostates (AGAP), the Islamic Umat Forum (FUI), among others. These groups have used pressure, 

intimidation, and violence against those whose views or actions they find unacceptable. Their actions 

have included intimidating judges and local officials; vandalizing and destroying buildings belonging to 

religious minorities, including Christian churches, Hindu temples, and Ahmadiyya and Shi’a mosques; 

threatening moderate Muslims or those considered to have “deviant” theological views; and forcing the 

closure of some non-Muslim businesses during Ramadan. Though these groups are a tiny minority of 

Indonesia’s diverse Muslim community, they remain an active religious force and a political challenge to 

Indonesia’s image as a democracy committed to religious tolerance and pluralism. 

The Indonesian government does not officially condone or encourage societal violence by extremist 

groups and has sometimes spoken out strongly against it. Police have arrested and sentenced members of 

some extremists groups who instigate violence, including the leaders of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) 

after they orchestrated violence at a June 2008 religious freedom rally in Jakarta. Nonetheless, the 

government has not been consistently vigilant about hindering the activities of extremist groups or 

holding leaders responsible for acts of societal violence, vandalism, discrimination, or intimidation. 

Additionally, the Indonesian government has been silent about local or provincial laws that contravene 

national laws concerning the protection of religious minorities. The Indonesian government also 

continues to provide funds for the Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakor 

Pacem) and the Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI). Both the Bakor Pacem and MUI panels called for a 

ban on Ahmadiyya religious activities, restrictions on interfaith marriage, interfaith worship, religious 

pluralism, and yoga, and also have called for widespread enforcement of the blasphemy law. Local MUI 

chapters, often in the name of religious harmony, pressure provincial officials to close the venues of 

religious minorities, ban the Ahmadiyya practice, or take action against groups viewed as having 

“deviant” religious views. 

 

Restrictions and Societal Violence Targeting the Ahmadiyya 

According to the Indonesian Institute on Democracy and Peace (SETARA) and the Wahid Institute, two 

Indonesian think tanks tracking human rights conditions in the country, societal violence targeting 

religious minorities and the use of the “deviancy” law have expanded in recent years. Religious leaders 

and human rights activists continue to express concern about the rise of intolerance and a weak response 

to societal violence from the Indonesian government. 

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Violence and legal restrictions targeting the Ahmadiyya community rose dramatically after the July 2005 

MUI fatwa that condemned them as a heretical sect. Under intense pressure from extremist groups and 

some mainstream religious leaders, including the staging of large protests and rallies to support a ban, the 

Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Home Ministry issued a Joint Ministerial Letter on the Restriction 

of Ahmadiyya in June 2008. While not an outright ban, the decree “froze” Ahmadiyya activities to 

private worship and prohibited Ahmadiyyas from proselytizing, although it also outlawed vigilantism 

against them. 

Following the decree, provincial governors in West Sumatra, South Sumatra, and West Nusa Tenngarra 

issued outright bans on Ahmadiyya activity. The Indonesian National Commission of the Human Rights 

(Komnas-HAM) issued a report condemning past atrocities against Ahmadiyya, blaming the MUI fatwa 

for trigging the violence and some governmental officials for helping to implement the fatwa. KomnasHAM officials also called the decree “unconstitutional.” The Indonesian government has not yet 

signaled whether it will review or overturn the provincial bans under the authority granted by the 2000 

Regional Autonomy Law. 

 

Since 2008, 35 Ahmadiyya mosques have been vandalized and 21 mosques and religious meeting points 

have been forcibly closed. However, there were fewer incidents in this reporting period than previously. 

Ahmadiyya leaders report that they have been allowed, in most parts of the country, to worship, though 

they are not free to proselytize or practice their faith publicly. In some parts of West Java, extremist 

groups interpret any visible Ahmadiyya activity as “proselytizing” and pressure local officials to close 

mosques or places of worship. 

On June 2, 2009, an Ahmadiyya mosque in South Jakarta was deliberately set on fire by unidentified 

arsonists during morning prayers. There were no injuries from the incident and no arrests were made. In 

August 2009, members of the Ciputat Muslim Community Forum (FMCC) forcibly sealed an Ahmadiyya 

mosque in the city of South Tangerang, Banten province, accusing the Ahmadiyya community of 

proselytizing. Also in August 2009, mobs vandalized an Ahmadiyya mosque in Sukabumi and sealed 

another mosque in Cianjur, West Java. In October 2009, a mob destroyed the Mubarak mosque in Medan 

village, Riau Province, after the Eid al-Fitr celebration. 

There continue to be an estimated 182 Ahmadiyya living in camps as internally displaced persons (IDPs) 

in Mataram, Lombok after a mob attacked and drove them from their residences in 2005. In April 2009, 

the local government requested that the IDPs cancel plans to return to their homes in Gegerungan village 

due to continued security concerns and negotiations over compensation. To date, 125 Ahmadiyya IDPs 

remain in the Transito Camp and 57 in the Praya Camp. It was reported that one family from the Praya 

Camp returned home for a brief period of time, only to return to the camp following a succession of 

violent threats. 

The government no longer subsidizes rice, electricity, and water to the IDP camps. The government has 

offered the IDPs the option of relocating together to other areas of Lombok or to disperse to government 

owned property. The Ahmadiyya community has found both options unacceptable. The Ahmadiyya 

community of Lombok has reportedly sought asylum in a third country, citing religious persecution. 

Detentions for Religious “Deviancy” 

According to human rights activists and other experts, the restrictions and societal violence faced by the 

Ahmadiyya community reflect a larger trend in Indonesia, as government officials have harassed groups 

and detained individuals associated primarily with allegedly heterodox forms of Islam. Since 2003, over 

150 individuals have been detained under Article 156(a) of the criminal code, according to which 

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“expressing feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt against religions” and “disgracing a religion” are 

punishable by up to five years in jail. 

Over the past two years, police, provincial officials, and local MUI have taken actions to break up sects 

associated with groups such as Al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah, Lia Eden, and Noto Ati, among others. The AlQiyadah al-Islamiyah sect has faced the most intense pressure. The group has approximately 40,000 

followers and its leaders claim to be prophets. In October and November 2007, police detained 125 AlQiyadah members during raids in West Lombok, Yogyakarta, East Lombok, and Central Java. Ninety-six 

members of Al-Qiyadah, including the sect’s leader Ahmad Moshaddeq, publicly signed documents 

renouncing their beliefs. Despite his recantation, Moshaddeq was sentenced to four years in prison in 

April 2008 for “violating the criminal code by committing blasphemous acts.” In May 2008, Dedi Priadi 

and Gerry Lufthi Yudistira, members of al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah sect, were sentenced in Padang district 

court to three years in prison under Article 156(a). 

During the current reporting period, Lia Eden, leader of the Jamaah Alamulla Group, was found guilty of 

“blasphemy and inciting hatred among religious adherents.” At the same, Wahyu Wisbisono, a Jamaah 

Alamulla member, received two years for publicizing Eden’s teachings. Eden had previously served a 

two and a half year sentence for proselytizing and delivering her messages to government institutions in 

2006. In November 2007, Lia Eden’s son was sentenced to three years in prison for claiming to be the 

reincarnation of the Prophet Muhammad. 

In May 2009, Agus Imam Solhin was indicted under Article 156 in a South Jakarta Court. Solhin, leader 

of a sect called Satria Piningit Weteng Buwono, claimed to be a prophet who received spiritual guidance 

from the country’s first president, Sukarno. He reportedly was accused of conducting ritual orgies and 

banning his followers from observing Muslim prayers. 

In September 2009, police arrested 24 members of the Daifillah sect under Article 156. This sect is led 

by Sensen Komara, who claims to be a prophet and has instructed his followers to change the direction of 

their daily prayers. Reportedly, prior to the arrests, local mobs had attacked the home where the Daifillah 

sect met. 

According to the Wahid Institute, since 2005, many small, primarily “messianic” Muslim groups were 

labeled “deviant” by local religious leaders and faced harassment or societal violence including such 

group as Dzikir Asmaul Husa, Dayak Segandhu Losarang Indramayu, Islam Model Baru, Tarekat 

Naqsabandiyah, and Hidup di Balik Hidup. In February 2009, the East Java MUI declared that Noto Ati 

teachings were heretical because they violated teachings of the Koran and Hadith and because the group 

predicted the end of the world in early 2009. Such MUI declarations, in the past, have lead to government 

harassment, fines, and arrest. 

Indonesia’s “deviancy laws” are not only used against allegedly heterodox Muslim groups. In April 

2007, police in Malang, East Java detained 42 Protestants for disseminating a “prayer” video that instructs 

individuals to put the Koran on the ground and pray for the conversion of Indonesia’s Muslim political 

leaders. In September 2007, a local court found all 42 guilty of “insulting religion” and sentenced each 

to five years in prison. All were pardoned in August, 2008. In June 2009, police in East Nusa Tenggara 

province arrested Nimbrot Lasbuan, leader of the Sion City of Allah sect, and 12 of his followers under 

Article 156. The sect encouraged members to read only the Book of Jeremiah, banned them from 

attending Sunday services or partaking in sacraments, and required women followers to remove 

underwear before prayer. Leaders of the local Timor Evangelical Church agreed with provincial officials, 

saying the sect was “illegal.” In addition, in the Malukus, the Christian teacher whose comment about 

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Islam reportedly sparked sectarian violence in city of Masohi will reportedly be tried under Article 

156(a). 

In December 2009, the late President Gus Dur and an interfaith coalition of civil society groups filed a 

petition with the Constitutional Court to overturn presidential order 1/PNPS of 1965, and by extension its 

later implementing legislation UU Nomor 5 1969, which outlaws distorting any of the six official 

religions of Indonesia. The Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs oppose 

judicial review of the law. They claim that the law is consistent with religious freedom guarantees in 

domestic law and international commitments. Recently, the Minister of Religious Affairs said that 

overturning the blasphemy statute would create “unlimited religious freedom,” including allowing 

proselytization by religious groups, which is prohibited by Indonesian law, and the proliferation of sects. 

He said such a development would lead to social upheaval and potential violence against religious 

minorities. On April 19, 2010, the Constitutional Court upheld presidential order 1/PNPS 1965 as 

constitutional. 

 

Forcible Closure of Religious Venues 

Indonesia’s religious minorities continued to face societal violence and pressure from local authorities in 

the past year. In some cases, police have arrested individuals responsible for vandalizing or destroying 

property of religious minority groups. In the past year, extremist groups reportedly forcibly closed as 

many as 15 religious venues and provincial officials have blocked and delayed building permits, despite 

religious groups meeting the stated legal criteria. In some areas, extremist groups interpret the existence 

of new Protestant or Catholic religious venues as evidence of “proselytization,” an activity banned by 

Indonesian law. 

Police and local officials have sometimes intervened to prevent property destruction and disperse crowds. 

But mob violence remains too frequent and punishments of perpetrators too infrequent to act as a 

deterrent. Local government officials also have sought to mediate between militant groups and religious 

minorities in some cases, but sometimes acquiesce to pressure from militants and revoke permits for 

longstanding places of worship or allow the destruction of religious venues operating without permits. 

Officials from the Ministry of Religious Affairs acted in some cases to prevent forced closures of 

Christian churches, but most often intervene after mob action occurs. 

West Java experienced the most incidents of societal violence during the past year, though there were also 

reported instances in the provinces of East Java, West Lombok, Madura, and Riau. Most targeted 

Protestant and Catholic congregations which have spread, along with better economic and housing 

options, to new areas of Indonesia. Hindu temples and Shi’a mosques have also been targeted. There 

also continue to be unverified reports that several Sunni mosques in predominately Christian Papua have 

been forced to close by local authorities. 

In recent years, Shi’a communities in East Java and Madura faced attacks, vandalism, threats, and legal 

actions. In January 2008 in Madura province, villagers surrounded the house of Shi’a followers 

demanding they stop religious activities. Local officials and religious leaders intervened to disperse the 

crowd. 

In January 2008, a mob burned the Sangkareang Hindu temple in Keru district, West Lombok, destroying 

the building and its contents. Also in West Lombok province, local officials revoked the building permit 

for a Hindu temple in Bayan District. As of this writing, building permits have not been granted to either 

temple. The Hindu community of Tangerang, West Java, was given permission to build a temple despite 

initial opposition from local Muslim groups, but the temple structure has not been built because of lack of 

funds. 

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In North Sumatra, during 2008, local authorities delayed the building of a Catholic church in Langkat 

regency, though the church met legal requirements. In Riau province, North Sumatra, the Love 

Evangelical Bethel Church ceased operations because of constant intimidation by protestors. In both 

cases, local officials reportedly were pressured by extremists groups. 

In July 2008, armed residents in Kampun Pulo District of West Jakarta attacked the Arastamar 

Evangelical School of Theology, known as Setia College, because they claimed students were responsible 

for a recent spate of petty thefts and public disturbances. The students and faculty deny these allegations. 

The police did not intervene during initial protests and 20 students were injured. Staff and students were 

evacuated to three different sites, where they continued to live and take classes. Students staged hunger 

strikes and peaceful rallies to protest the forced closure of their campus. On November 9, Setia College 

reached a settlement with the Jakarta governor’s office regarding a new campus. 

In December 2009, a mob attacked and damaged the Saint Albert’s Church in Bekasi regency, South 

Jakarta. Several buildings used to supervise construction of the new church were set on fire. Also in 

Bekasi in February 2010, 200 demonstrators from as many as 16 extremist groups, including FPI, 

gathered to pressure local officials to stop the activities of the 600 member Galilea Protestant Church. On 

February, 28, 2010 a mob gathered to protest the Batak Christian Protestant Church, which met in local 

homes because city authorities denied them permission to build a permanent structure. Local officials in 

Bekasi reportedly stated that “the congregation has the right to practice their religion... [but] they disrupt 

the neighborhood.” Church leaders were asked to hold services in a more “commercial area” or in an 

areas where there is a “larger number of Christians.” 

In April 2010, 200 people gathered to disrupt the Good Friday activities of the John the Baptist Catholic 

Church in Bogor, West Java. According to press reports, members of the Parung Ulema Forum protested 

the existence of the congregation, which has been meeting in tents on vacant land since 1990. Local 

authorities have not given the congregation permission to build a permanent structure. Similar protests 

occurred at the site during Easter 2008 and Christmas 2009. 

Religious venues are often forcibly closed because they do not have building permits. In response to 

persistent international and domestic criticism, the Ministry of Religion issued Joint Ministerial Decree 

1/2006 to replace a previous, vaguely-worded decree that required religious groups to gain “community 

approval” before they could expand, renovate, or open new religious venues. Decree 1/2006 requires a 

religious group with a membership of more than 90 persons to obtain the support of 60 local residents for 

any plans to build or expand a religious venue. That petition must then be sent to the Joint Forum for 

Religious Tolerance (FKUB), a provincial panel of religious leaders chosen proportionally by the number 

of religious adherents in the province. If there remains strong community opposition to the religious 

venue, the FKUB can find an alternative location. 

Critics of the decree claimed that it was designed to stop the proliferation of “house churches” and small 

Hindu temples (of fewer than 90 members). Prominent Muslim religious leaders have stated publicly that 

the new decree violates Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Overall, 

the number of church, temple, and mosque closures declined slightly since Joint Ministerial Decree 

1/2006 was issued, but the problem continues. Media attention has focused on the issue and each incident 

is reported internationally. 

The Ministry of Religion has made efforts to establish and train provincial FKUB panels, hoping that they 

can mediate problems with local communities. Former President Abdurrahman Wahid has commended 

the “sincere efforts” of some FKUB panels to promote religious tolerance, but added that without 

sufficient “control, evaluation, monitoring...and sanctions” the panels can be “used to promote the 

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interests of the majority religion.” In many provinces, the local FKUB’s are dominated by the majority 

religious group of the region and they oppose or stall issuing licenses to religious minorities. In several 

cases in West Java, Protestant and Catholic churches in the cities of Bandung, Cianjur, and Bogor 

churches faced difficulties obtaining licenses, frequently due to opposition by the FKUB. 

In many cases, Christian churches that meet in private homes or storefronts are denied permission to build 

permanent structures. In many cases, the visibility of the congregations raises community opposition, 

particularly if their membership grows. Five Protestant churches in North Bekasi, Jabotabek region, East 

Jakarta have faced vandalism and sporadic protests from the group Musholla (Cooperating Bureau of 

Mosques and Praying Rooms) because they meet in private homes. Although police protect the worship 

activities of these meeting points, local officials have refused to grant them permission to build permanent 

structures, despite their having met the criteria established in the 2006 decree. A similar situation 

occurred in South Rawa Badak, Koja region, North Jakarta. In August 2008, local officials pressured the 

pastor of a Protestant church to cease worship activities, despite his having received permission from the 

FKUB to operate the church. In July 2008, under an order from the subdistrict head, municipal police 

demolished the Indonesian Evangelical Prophet Church (Gekindo) in Bekasi, West Java. The church had 

not been operating for two years pending receiving a license from the local government. 

Provincial officials are not uniformly opposed to issuing building permits to religious minorities who met 

legal requirements, and court decisions have overturned the actions of local authorities. For example, 

despite two years of pressure to close the Barnabas Church in Tangerrang, West Java, authorities issued 

the church a building permit. Construction of the new facility is nearly complete. In September 2009, the 

Administrative Court of Bandung, West Java, granted the Huria Batak Kristen Protestant Church a 

building permit, overturning a decision of the mayor of Depok. 

Aceh & Provincial Sharia Laws 

USCIRF continues to monitor the implementation of sharia in Aceh. In August 2005, the Indonesian 

government concluded a comprehensive peace agreement with the insurgent group Free Aceh Movement 

(GAM), ending a 30-year conflict that had resulted in significant human rights abuses. The agreement led 

to local elections and formally instituted some regional autonomy for a region hard hit by the tsunami and 

decades of civil conflict. The Aceh peace agreement did not overturn Presidential Decree 11/2003, which 

allowed the province to establish and implement sharia law and establish sharia courts. Since the end of 

the civil war, sharia courts and their vice patrols, locally known as the Wilayatul Hisbah, have taken on a 

prominent public profile, enforcing dress codes and banning alcohol consumption, gambling, and 

unchaperoned male-female liaisons. The provincial government also enacted legislation regulating 

relations between members of the opposite sex, alcohol consumption, and gambling. The public caning 

of hundreds of individuals accused of sharia violations gained international attention. 

During the April 2009 election, the political parties that won an estimated 80 percent of the vote in 

regional elections promised to de-emphasize the continuation of sharia in Aceh and instead to fully 

implement the Helsinki Peace Accords granting Aceh political autonomy. 

Local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Aceh report that government oversight of Wilayatul 

Hisbah has improved recently, making the vice patrols less intrusive than in the past. The new provincial 

government also disbanded vice patrols in the city of Banda Aceh and civil courts gradually are taking up 

case loads previously heard in sharia courts. The incidents of public canings continue to decrease, though 

the vice patrols continue to publicly lecture individuals on proper dress and decorum. The State 

Department reports that there were no new reports of roadblocks being set up to enforce Islamic dress. 

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The existence of sharia in Aceh remains a problem for the new provincial government. In September 

2009, the outgoing provincial assembly passed a new law that allows convicted adulterers to be stoned to 

death and imposes flogging for “inappropriate” sexual conduct and gambling. Aceh’s new governor, 

Irwandi Yusuf, refused to sign the law. In January, 2010 police arrested three members of a local vice 

patrol for allegedly raping a 20 year old student. The woman was also reportedly beaten for wearing 

improper Islamic dress. A court date has not been set. 

The expansion of sharia in Aceh has influenced local initiatives elsewhere in Indonesia. Efforts to 

implement sharia provisions nationally have been defeated consistently by a coalition of the largest 

Muslim organizations together with religious minorities. However, some provinces and localities are 

enforcing Islamic law at the municipal and regional levels. Indonesian NGOs estimate that at least 66 

perda syaria, or local sharia laws, have been promulgated and enforced in the past five years. According 

to the International Center for Islam and Pluralism, an Indonesian think tank, half of Indonesia’s 32 

provinces have enacted sharia-inspired laws. In South Sulawesi, Madura, and West Sumatra, local 

authorities issued laws enforcing Islamic dress, prohibiting alcohol, and imposing public caning 

punishments. In Madura and South Sulawesi, civil servants are required to cease work activities during 

the call to prayer, and recitation of the Koran reportedly is being required for promotion. In Padang, West 

Sumatra, the local mayor instructed all schoolgirls, regardless of their religion, to wear headscarves. In 

Bulukumba regency, any woman not wearing a headscarf can be denied government services. Similar 

laws have already been implemented in parts of West Java, including Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, and Garut. 

In the city of Tangerang, Banten province, local laws have banned both Muslims and non-Muslims from 

public displays of affection, alcohol consumption, and prostitution. The anti-prostitution ban is being 

challenged in Indonesian courts because it defines a prostitute as anyone who draws attention to himself 

or herself by attitude, behavior, or dress or any woman found “loitering” alone on the street after 10 p.m. 

In the past year, according to the State Department, 31 women were arrested as prostitutes, including a 

married mother waiting alone at a bus stop during the early evening. 

Recently, 56 Indonesian parliamentarians issued a petition calling for a review of local sharia-inspired 

laws to determine if they violate constitutional protections and national laws. Home Affairs Minister 

Mardiyanto announced that there was no need to review or overturn most sharia-inspired laws, although 

the Indonesian government promised to review 37 ordinances deemed discriminatory and at odds with the 

constitution. At this time, a review has yet to be completed. 

Indonesian human rights advocates have expressed fears that local perda syaria ordinances are a 

backdoor attempt to implement sharia nationally. These laws also could threaten Indonesia’s fragile 

political consensus supporting pluralism, tolerance, and democracy. The head of Indonesia’s 

Constitutional Court, Dr. Mohammad Mahfud, told the Jakarta Post that, in his view, all perda syaria

laws should be overturned because they promote religious intolerance, particularly against minorities, are 

unconstitutional, and “threaten...national integrity.”

U.S. Policy 

U.S. assistance to Indonesia has supported programs in conflict resolution, multi-religious dialogue and 

tolerance, pluralism, public diplomacy, and education that are in line with recommendations made by 

USCIRF in previous years. Such programs included opportunities for Indonesian and American experts 

to collaborate and build curriculum to promote interfaith dialogue, religious pluralism, and legal reform. 

In October 2008, the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Indonesian 

National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas-HAM) to provide training and technical assistance to 

government officials in an effort to improve their understanding and implementation of laws protecting 

religious freedom. This MOU is expected to run through July 2010. 

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The Obama Administration is negotiating a “comprehensive partnership” with Indonesia, formalizing 

relations in a number of areas of bilateral interest, including educational reform, improved public health, 

enhanced trade and investment, food security, and cooperation on regional security concerns, including 

anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics efforts. Also, in January 2010, the Indonesia-U.S. Interfaith Cooperation 

Forum was held in Jakarta and focused on “Building Collaborative Communities: Enhancing Cooperation 

among People of Different Faiths.” The first U.S. initiative of its kind, the meeting promoted multireligious cooperation and discussed what role governments can play in this process. It is USCIRF’s belief 

that a vibrant U.S.-Indonesian partnership is an important model, promoting Indonesian stability, 

addressing both domestic and regional human rights concerns and the threat of terrorism, and expanding 

universal rights and freedoms in the “Muslim world.” 

Recommendations 

I. Establishing a Human Rights Dialogue 

As part of the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, the U.S. government should create a human 

rights dialogue with the government of Indonesia and discuss issues regarding the protection and 

promotion of religious freedom and related human rights, including: 

 

• urging the Indonesian government to overturn the Joint Ministerial Decree on the Ahmadiyya 

community, fully protect the ability of religious minority communities to freely practice in ways 

consistent with the Indonesian constitution and international law, and arrest or hold accountable any 

individual who organizes or carries out societal violence targeting the Ahmadiyya or other religious 

minorities; 

• urging the Indonesian government to amend or repeal Article 156(a) of the Penal Code, and overturn 

any provincial or local laws inconsistent with Indonesia’s constitution or international human right 

standards, including local perda syariah laws such as those in Aceh; 

• urging the Indonesian government to release anyone sentenced for “deviancy,” “denigrating religion,” 

or “blasphemy,” and ending the prosecution of those detained under Article 156(a) of the Penal Code; 

• urging the Indonesian government to amend the Joint Ministerial Decree No. 1/2006 (Regulation on 

Building Houses of Worship) to bring it into compliance with the Indonesian constitution’s protection 

of religious freedom as well as international standards, remove any restrictive barriers on building and 

refurbishing places of worship for all religious groups in Indonesia, and provide protection for 

religious venues, as well as restitution to religious communities whose venues have been destroyed or 

closed due to mob violence or protests, and ensure that those responsible for such acts are prosecuted; 

• establishing programs to support monitoring of the implementation of sharia law in Aceh and other 

parts of Indonesia to determine if individual rights and freedoms, including religious freedom, are 

being guaranteed for all citizens, and making sure that U.S. humanitarian and foreign assistance 

programs do not support virtue and vice patrols or sharia courts in Aceh or other municipalities in 

Indonesia; and 

• facilitating a durable solution for IDPs in Central Sulawesi, the Malukus, and West Lombok, and for 

Rohingya refugees in Aceh. 

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II. Supporting the Promotion of Religious Freedom and Human Rights, Countering 

Extremism, Teaching Tolerance, and Building Interfaith Alliances 

As part of the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, the U.S. government should support religious 

groups and other elements of civil society that promote religious freedom and human rights, counter 

extremism, teach tolerance, and build interfaith alliances to deal with pressing social, legal, political, and 

economic concerns including: 

• renewing the MOU with Komnas-HAM and seeking to expand the capacity, training, and reporting 

ability of Indonesian human rights defenders; 

• creating an agreement with the Ministry of Religious Affairs and other Indonesian civil society 

groups to train and equip members of provincial FKUBs, allowing FKUB members to mediate 

sectarian disputes in ways consistent with Indonesia’s national and international commitments to 

protect the freedom of religion and belief; 

• creating programs to train, equip, and build capacity and networks for Indonesia’s legal reform 

advocates, governmental judicial officials and judges, and legal and human rights-focused civil 

society organizations, including the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), the 

National Women’s Commission (Komnas Perempuan) the Constitutional Court, and the Directorate 

General of Human Rights in the Ministry of Justice; 

• expanding support for various forms of new media, including radio, television, internet, and 

publishing activities that advance interfaith cooperation, religious tolerance, and promote respect for 

religious freedom, women’s rights, and human rights; and 

• expanding support for media and publishing ventures for Indonesian organizations seeking to 

promote intra-Muslim dialogue on the compatibility of Islam and human rights, democracy, and 

pluralism, women’s rights, including the translation of books by prominent Indonesian scholars into, 

as appropriate, Arabic, Urdu, Persian, Turkish, and English. 

In addition, as part of U.S.-Indonesian counter-terrorism cooperation, the U.S. should ensure that any 

future ties with the Indonesian military and police should include, as priorities: 

• reform of the Indonesian military, including transfer to civilian control, training in international 

human rights standards, technical assistance in military law and tribunals; 

• transfer or removal from Papua, the Malukus, or Central Sulawesi any security, police, and militia 

personnel indicted for activities related to serious human rights abuses and war crimes by the UN’s 

Serious Crimes Investigation Unit (SCIU) and the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor in 

Jakarta; 

• dedicated funds for training Indonesian police in counter-terrorism techniques and protecting human 

rights in areas of sectarian conflict, including fellowships to the International Law Enforcement 

Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, Thailand and participation in UN Police training programs (UNPOL); 

and 

• denial of U.S. assistance, training, or visas for any police or military unit or security agency personnel 

found to have engaged in violations of human rights. 

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Laos 

 FINDINGS: USCIRF continues to be concerned about religious freedom conditions in Laos. The Lao 

government continues to restrict religious practices through its legal code, but has permitted increased 

freedom of worship in some cases. Conditions have incrementally improved for Lao Buddhists and for 

some religious minority groups in urban areas. Nonetheless, during the past year, conditions have 

deteriorated for some religious minorities, particularly ethnic minority Protestants in provincial areas. 

The Lao government is either unwilling or unable to curtail completely the activities of provincial 

officials that severely violate the freedom of religion or belief, including detentions, surveillance, 

harassment, threats of property loss, forced relocations, and forced renunciations of faith. However, 

Lao officials in charge of religious affairs reportedly intercede occasionally with provincial officials to 

mitigate some of the worst mistreatment of ethnic minority religious groups. 

Based on these concerns, USCIRF maintains Laos on its Watch List in 2010. The Commission had 

removed Laos from the Watch List in 2005, citing the Lao government’s steps to address serious 

religious freedom concerns in advance of the U.S. decision to grant Laos permanent normal trade 

relations (PNTR). Given the rising number of religious freedom abuses targeting ethnic and religious 

minorities, the Commission returned Laos to its Watch List in 2009. 

Since Laos was granted PNTR status in 2005, religious freedom conditions improved somewhat, 

though the Lao government’s toleration of religious practice varies by region and religious group. 

Buddhism, which is closely associated with Lao culture and is practiced by the vast majority of the 

population, is now generally free from the restrictions and oversight faced by some other religious 

groups. In urban areas, leaders of religious minority groups report few restrictions on their worship 

activities and the government has allowed them to re-open, build, and expand some new venues in 

recent years. For example, Lao Catholics were allowed to build churches and ordain new priests, the 

first since 1975. However, serious problems remain on the local level, particularly in the provinces of 

Bolikhamsai, Houaphan, Salavan, Luan Prabang, Attapeu, Oudamsai, and Luang Namtha. Reports of 

detentions, threats, and forced renunciations of faith spiked in the past year. Most recent religious 

freedom abuses center on the small, but fast growing, Lao Evangelical Church and related Protestant 

denominations. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: The United States and Laos have expanded relations in 

recent years. U.S. assistance focuses on humanitarian programs, economic development, trade 

expansion, military training, and issues remaining from the Vietnam War. The United States continues 

to express concern and seek transparent mechanisms to track ethnic Hmong repatriated from Thailand. 

The U.S. government has sponsored training for Lao officials on international religious freedom and 

the protection of religious minorities in practice and law. USCIRF recommends that the U.S. 

government initiate human rights and religious tolerance training for the Lao military as part of new 

U.S. programs to raise military professionalism and provide additional economic assistance to help to 

monitor and resettle Lao Hmong repatriated from Thailand. Additional recommendations for U.S. 

policy toward Laos can be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Governing and Legal Framework 

Laos is a single party, communist, authoritarian state with a poor human rights record overall, including 

harsh prison conditions, severe restrictions on the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, and 

widespread corruption among local police, administrators, and judges. 

The Lao Constitution provides for freedom of religion, but the Prime Minister’s 2002 Decree on 

Religious Practice (Decree 92) contains numerous mechanisms for government control of and 

interference in religious activities. Although Decree 92 authorized religious activities previously 

regarded as illegal (such as public religious persuasion, printing religious material, owning and building 

places of worship, and maintaining contact with overseas religious groups), many of these activities can 

be conducted only with government approval. Moreover, the decree contains a prohibition on activities 

that create “social division” or “chaos” that reiterates parts of the Lao criminal code used in the past by 

government officials to arrest and detain ethnic minority Christians arbitrarily. 

The Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC), a front group for the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, 

is the organization tasked with monitoring religious activity and carrying out the Lao government’s policy 

on religion. Decree 92 requires religious groups to register with the LFNC. The government has not 

allowed some of the most recently established Protestant denominations to apply for recognition, making 

their activities illegal. Religious leaders have reported that legally permitted religious activities, such as 

proselytizing and production of religious materials, are restricted in practice. Anyone caught engaging in 

these activities risks harassment or arrest. Foreigners who distribute religious material are subject to 

arrest or deportation. 

Conditions for “Recognized” Religions 

The government officially recognizes four religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and the Baha’i Faith. 

Recognized Christian groups included the Catholic Church, the Lao Evangelical Church (LEC), and the 

Seventh-day Adventist Church. Theravada Buddhism, the largest religion in Laos, occupies an elevated 

position in Lao society, a position ensured by government promotion. Despite its communist roots, the 

Lao government actively promotes Theravada Buddhism by incorporating its rituals and ceremonies into 

state functions and by exempting Buddhism from most of the legal requirements imposed on other 

religions. The government supports Buddhist temples administratively and financially. Buddhists in 

Laos generally do not report religious freedom abuses or restrictions, though in February 2007 two 

Buddhist monks were arrested and briefly detained for being ordained without government permission. 

In most urban areas, religious leaders report few restrictions on their worship activities. The government 

has allowed the officially recognized religious groups to re-open, build, and expand religious venues in 

recent years. Baha’is were permitted to reclaim two pieces of property seized by the government in 1975. 

The government also issued permits to build four new Baha’i centers in Vientiane province. Lao 

Protestants and Catholics also reclaimed several properties confiscated previously in Vientiane and Bokeo 

provinces. Four new Protestant churches were built in the former Saisomboun Special Zone and 

Bolikhamsai province, and churches formerly closed or destroyed were permitted to re-open or be rebuilt 

in Bolikhamsai, Vientiane, and Bokeo provinces. Two Catholic churches were built in villages where 

permits were long denied. Travel restrictions on the Roman Catholic Bishop of Luang Prabang were 

lifted and he was able to visit parish churches in northern Laos. The government permitted the ordination 

of a Catholic deacon in Champassak province, and the government eventually allowed the ordination of 

three new Catholic priests in Vientiane, despite initially blocking the ceremony. These were the first 

ordinations of Catholic clergy permitted in the country since 1975. In January 2008, 3,000 people, 

including foreign dignitaries and the regional Archbishop from Bangkok, were allowed to attend the 

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ordination of Father Benedict Bennakhone Inthirath, who now serves the Vientiane vicariate. Catholic 

ordinations continued into early 2009 with the ordination of Father Matthieu Somdet Kaluan on January 

10, 2009 in central Laos, a ceremony that also drew thousands of Laotian Catholics. 

Religious Freedom Abuses in Ethnic Minority Areas 

Most religious freedom abuses in Laos have affected the small but fast-growing Protestant groups in 

ethnic minority areas. Lao authorities in some areas continue to view the spread of Christianity among 

ethnic minorities as an “American import” that poses a potential threat to the communist political system, 

particularly as some ethnic minority groups have long resisted government control. Authorities in some 

provinces used threats of arrest to intimidate local religious communities. 

The Lao government recognizes the LEC and the Seventh Day Adventists, but has refused to recognize 

legally the Methodists and other small independent Protestant congregations. Most new Christian groups 

are required to join either the LEC or the Adventists to make it easier for the government to exercise 

management and oversight. Last year, there were more reports of provincial authorities restricting the 

activities of ethnic minority Protestants, particularly those who have not joined the LEC or who have 

established connections with other denominations abroad. For example, in some provincial areas, 

Methodist congregations cannot gather for worship, build religious venues, or conduct Christian funeral 

services. 

Decree 92 restricts worship services to officially sanctioned houses of worship, and both LEC and nonLEC affiliated “house churches” have experienced various levels of harassment, particularly in Luang 

Namtha, Oudomasai, and Bolikhamsai provinces. In March 2008, a religious leader and several 

congregates in Savannakhet were briefly detained and charged with holding “illegal worship services.” 

The religious leader was released and ordered to cease operation of his “house church” until he received 

permission from provincial authorities. In August 2008, a congregation of 150 adherents in Bolikhamsai 

province was banned from meeting in a member’s home by local authorities, who asserted that under 

current law they could only meet in a church. However, these local officials reportedly destroyed the 

group’s church earlier in the year and sought to get church members to renounce their faith. In the past, 

provincial authorities have refused to grant Protestants permission to build church structures. 

Detentions 

In the past year, according to a variety of sources, the number of individuals arrested and detained for 

reasons related to religion increased among ethnic minority Protestants. Individuals arrested for their 

religious activities were held for varying lengths of time up to a year without charges being filed. Many 

were forced to sign a renunciation of faith while imprisoned. Amnesty International estimates that 

between July and September 2009 at least 90 ethnic minority Protestants were arrested and detained 

without charge or trial. In September 2009, Lao officials arrested a church elder, Thao Oun, taking him 

from his home in Lainsai village, Savannakhet province. He was detained, interrogated, mistreated in 

detention, and finally charged with “bringing destruction to the Lao nation and government due to his 

Christian faith.” A few days later, authorities arrested another ethnic minority Protestant, Thao Aom, from 

the same village, and subjected him to interrogation until he renounced his faith. 

Forced Renunciations of Faith 

Reports of forced renunciations of faith also have increased in the past year, although it remains difficult 

to verify all emerging reports. Nevertheless, there is enough credible evidence available to report that 

some Lao officials use detention and mistreatment as a means to force individuals to renounce their faith. 

In addition, officials have threatened entire villages by denying schooling to children and access to water 

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projects, land, and medical care. In September 2009, Amnesty International reported that authorities 

arrested a teacher in Phonthong district, Champassack province for converting to Protestantism. He was 

detained for “re-education” and told that he would only be released if he renounced his faith. In 

September 2009, in Jinsangmai village, Luang Namtha province, local officials pressured ethnic minority 

Protestants to recant their faith or be forcibly relocated. All of the Christians in the village reportedly 

recanted their faith, including a man previously jailed for refusing to do so. 

In July 2009, in response to an apparent conflict among villagers in Katin, Saravan province, local 

officials banned the practice of Christianity. Police and local officials threatened Christian residents with 

confiscation of livestock and land unless they renounced their faith and began worshipping local spirits in 

accordance with their ethnic tradition. In February 2010, 48 Protestants in Katin were forcibly removed 

from their property and had their personal belongings confiscated. Police and local officials threatened to 

destroy even temporary shelters built by evicted Katin villagers. 

Lao Government Addresses Some of the Worst Abuses 

In March 2010, the provincial governor of Saravan province met with local Protestants in Katin village 

and reportedly assured them that they could worship freely and return to their property, apparently 

contravening the actions of local government officials. In recent years, officials associated with the 

LFNC have regularly sought to resolve disputes between religious groups and provincial officials, 

including intervening in some cases of detention or arrest, sometimes resulting in positive outcomes. 

However, the growing numbers of religious freedom abuses in provincial areas in the past year may 

indicate that local officials can act with impunity, particularly against ethnic minority Protestants. The 

Lao government has not been able to halt abuses or hold officials accountable. 

Repatriation of Lao Hmong Refugees 

In recent years, the Lao military has stepped up efforts to eradicate a moribund Hmong rebel group that 

has survived since the end of the Vietnam War. Indiscriminate military activity has targeted Hmong 

villages, killing civilians and destroying Protestant churches. Repression of ethnic minority Hmong has 

created an acute refugee problem, as Lao Hmong have sought asylum in Thailand only to be forcibly 

repatriated. In December 2009, the Thai government forcibly returned 4,000 Lao Hmong from Huay 

Nam Khao camp, as well as 158 Lao Hmong detained in the Nong Khai Immigration Detention Center 

since 2006. Despite repeated efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

and the United States, the Thai government continues to repatriate the Lao Hmong. There are reports 

that repatriated Lao Hmong are subject to imprisonment, re-education, mistreatment, and discrimination. 

U.S. Policy 

U.S.-Lao relations have expanded over the past few years as the United States has taken an active interest 

in both economic engagement and promoting human rights and religious freedom in Laos. Laos 

historically has had close ties with Vietnam and China. Major areas of U.S. assistance include counternarcotics programs, trade capacity and legal reform projects, HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, and the 

recovery of Americans missing in action since the Vietnam War. In 2008, the U.S. and Laos exchanged 

defense attaches for the first time in over thirty years and started military training and education 

programs. The Obama administration has expressed concerns over the plight of the Lao Hmong 

population, and 31 members of Congress signed a letter to Secretary of State Clinton urging her to appeal 

to the Thai government not to repatriate Lao Hmong asylum-seekers forcibly. The United States has also 

urged the Lao government to accept independent, international monitoring of the resettlement of 

repatriated Lao Hmong. 

 

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The U.S. Embassy in Laos has supported an ongoing program of training for Lao officials in international 

religious freedom, religion and law, and the protection of religious minorities. 

Recommendations 

The U.S. government should: 

• establish measurable goals and benchmarks, in consultation with USCIRF, for further human rights 

progress in Laos as a guide for diplomatic engagement between Laos and the United States and make 

clear to the government of Laos that improvements in the protection of freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief, including legal reforms, political accountability for government 

officials who perpetrate religious freedom abuses, and the release of any prisoners detained because 

of religious affiliation or activity, are essential to further improvements in, and expansion of, U.S.-

Laos relations; 

• initiate human rights and religious tolerance training for the Lao military as part of new military 

programs to raise professionalism; deny U.S. training, visas, or assistance to any military unit or 

security agency personnel found to have engaged in violations of human rights, including religious 

freedom; 

• urge the Lao government to allow international monitoring of the resettlement of Lao Hmong forcibly 

repatriated from Thailand and accept economic support and technical assistance to help with 

resettlement; 

• expand Lao language broadcasts on Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) while 

ensuring that the content of the Lao language broadcasts on VOA and RFA includes adequate 

information about the importance of human rights, including religious freedom, within Laos; and 

• initiate and expand technical assistance and human rights programs that support the goals of 

protecting and promoting religious freedom, including: 

--new programs and exchanges to produce civic education initiatives to combat intolerance and 

discrimination of religious and ethnic minorities; 

--rule of law programs that provide assistance in amending, drafting, and implementing laws and 

regulations, including Laos’ law on religion (Decree 92); 

--human rights and religious freedom training programs for specific sectors of Lao society, including 

government officials, religious leaders, academics, lawyers, police, and representatives of 

international non-governmental organizations; 

--training, networking, and capacity-building for Lao groups that carry out charitable, medical, and 

development activities in accordance with the Lao government’s new law on non-governmental 

organizations; and 

-- initiating a formal human rights dialogue with the government of Laos, addressing such issues as 

ethnic and religious discrimination, torture and other forms of ill-treatment in prisons, unlawful arrest 

and detention, lack of due process, and refugee resettlement, and taking practical steps to ensure the 

rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly. 

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The Russian Federation 

FINDINGS: Religious freedom conditions in Russia continue to deteriorate. In the past year, the 

government increased its use of anti-extremist legislation against religious groups that are not known to 

use or advocate violence. National and local government officials also harass religious groups they view 

as non-traditional and Muslims through enforcement of other laws. Difficulties include: denials of 

registration; detention and harassment of members of religious communities; and delays and refusals to 

permit construction of or grant permits to rent places of worship. Russian officials continue to describe 

certain religious and other groups as alien to Russian culture and society, thereby contributing to a 

climate of intolerance. Continued high levels of xenophobia and intolerance, including anti-Semitism, 

have resulted in violent and sometimes lethal hate crimes. Despite increased prosecution for violent hate 

crimes, the Russian government chronically has failed to address these serious problems consistently or 

effectively. 

Based on these concerns, USCIRF again places Russia on its Watch List in 2010. The Commission has 

reported on Russia every year since 1999, but placed Russia on the Watch List for the first time in 2009. 

While concerns about the Expert Religious Studies Council established by the Ministry of Justice in 2009 

have not resulted in official limits on religious freedom, Russia adopted several policies in 2009 that 

violate its constitutional provisions on secularism and the equal status of all religions. Specifically, the 

new official military chaplains and school curricula on religion are limited to the four religions officially 

viewed as traditional (Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism). Numerous violent hate crimes 

against members of various religious communities continue to occur. Violent chauvinistic groups have 

targeted individuals, groups, and judges and other government officials who defend and enforce minority 

rights. Although Moscow police officials stepped up arrests and prosecution of violent chauvinists in 

2009, most other regions lagged behind. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: As part of its “reset” of bilateral relations, freedom of religion 

or belief should be an important issue in the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship, recognizing that it is both 

a human rights and security concern in Russia. Although Russia does face genuine domestic security 

concerns, as evidenced most recently in the March Moscow Metro bombings, the U.S. and international 

community should press Russia to reform its overly broad law on extremism and ensure that it is not 

being used against peaceful religious believers, which risks increasing radicalism and instability. The 

U.S. should implement the “Smith Amendment” of the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act to prohibit 

U.S. financial assistance to the Russian Federation government due to its official policies on religious 

groups, particularly its wide use of the extremism law. The U.S. also should institute a visa ban and 

freeze the assets of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov due to his leadership of the Chechen armed 

forces, which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found involved in severe human rights 

abuses. U.S.-funded grants to NGOs should include the promotion of international legal guarantees on 

freedom of religion or belief, and U.S.-funded exchange programs should include participants from 

Russian regions with sizeable Muslim and other religious minority populations. In addition, the United 

States should initiate International Visitor’s Programs for Russian officials on the prevention and 

prosecution of hate crimes. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy toward Russia can be found at 

the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Overall Human Rights Climate 

In recent years, Russia has steadily retreated from democratic reform, endangering post-Soviet human 

rights gains, including those regarding freedom of religion or belief. Evidence of this general retreat 

includes further limitations on media freedom and on political parties, tighter controls on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religious communities, concerted harassment of human rights 

activists and organizations, legal restrictions on freedom of assembly, and constraints on popular 

referenda. Increasingly, Russian journalists, lawyers and others who have defended human rights—

particularly those who seek to bring such violations to international attention-- have been subjected to 

brazen killings and attacks, and the perpetrators usually act with impunity. Moreover, Moscow opposed 

international efforts to draw attention to these serious problems by terming such inquiries “meddling” or 

“interference in internal affairs.” This sharp deterioration in the human rights climate appears to be a 

direct consequence of the authoritarian stance of the Russian government as well as the growing influence 

of chauvinistic groups in Russian society. 

Russia’s weak judicial system, inconsistent adherence to the rule of law, and local officials’ arbitrary 

decisions in regard to the status of the four so-called traditional religions have also contributed to chronic 

problems for the country’s diverse religious communities. Official respect for freedom of religion or 

belief varies widely over Russia’s vast territory depending on the personal views of regional Ministry of 

Justice officials or even governors. For example, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov has declared that 

his republic “would be better off” if it were ruled by sharia law, and he has also justified polygamy and 

honor killings. Moreover, government respect for the legal rights of a religious community is often 

dependent on that group’s relationship with individual state officials. 

Application of Extremism Laws 

As is the case in many other countries, the Russian government faces major challenges as it addresses 

extremism and acts of terrorism that claim a religious linkage, while also protecting freedom of religion 

or belief and other human rights. The post-Soviet revival of Islam, along with the ongoing violence 

throughout the North Caucasus, compound difficulties for the Russian government in dealing with its 20 

million Muslims, the country’s second largest religious community. As evidenced by the March 2010 

terrorist attacks in the Moscow metro, Russia faces security threats from domestic terrorism, particularly 

those related to violence in the North Caucasus. The North Caucasus region also faces chronic instability 

due to severe economic dislocation, especially among young men; certain radical foreign influences on 

indigenous Muslims, and endemic corruption and local political grievances, particularly in Chechnya, 

Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. All these factors fuel increasingly widespread and 

sometimes violent expressions of popular dissatisfaction by Muslims with the local and national Russian 

government. 

Human rights groups report that, particularly in the North Caucuses, Muslims perceived as “overly 

observant” have been killed, disappeared, or arrested on vague official accusations of alleged Islamist 

extremism or for allegedly displaying Islamist sympathies, without any proven relationship to Islamist 

militancy. There are also at least 200 cases of Muslims who have been imprisoned on the basis of 

evidence, including banned religious literature, drugs, or weapons, allegedly planted by the police. 

Persons suspected of involvement in alleged Islamist extremism have also reportedly been subjected to 

torture and ill-treatment in pre-trial detention, prisons, and labor camps. In 2009, Amnesty International 

accused the Russian Internal Ministry’s Center for Extremism Prevention (known as Center “E”) of 

engaging in torture to extract confessions from suspects. Muslim prisoners in the Murmansk oblast filed 

a case in the ECtHR in 2008 alleging official mistreatment on the basis of their religion. 

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The Russian government has specifically equated the practice of Islam outside of government-approved 

structures with extremism and even terrorism. In a 2008 joint order, the Russian Federal Security Service 

(FSB), Procuracy General, and Ministry of Internal Affairs accused “Muslim communities and preachers 

not dependent on the Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs)” of “extremism under cover of Islam.” The 

director of the Interior Ministry’s Department for the Prevention of Extremism has also said that young 

Muslims who refuse to participate in the official MSDs thereby “transformed themselves” into antigovernment militants. 

Russia’s 2002 Extremism Law broadly defines extremist activity in a religious context. It refers to 

“propaganda of the exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of citizens according to their attitude towards 

religion or religious affiliation; incitement of religious hatred; obstruction of the lawful activity of 

religious associations accompanied by violence or the threat of violence; committing a crime motivated 

by religious hatred.” Russian government officials have used this provision to deny the verbal claims of 

the superiority of religious ideas, which is a basic tenet of religious freedom. In 2006, the legal definition 

of extremism was expanded to encompass “violation of the rights and freedoms of the person and citizen” 

and “harm to the health or property of citizens in connection with their beliefs.” In 2007, the definition 

was expanded to include “obstruction of the lawful activity (...) of social, religious or other 

organizations” without requiring the threat or application of actual violence. In addition, those alleged to 

have defended or even expressed sympathy with individuals charged with extremism were also made 

liable to charges of extremism. 

The Extremism Law also empowers the Procurator-General to file a suit against private organizations, 

including religious ones, after just one warning. The organization has two months after the warning to 

correct the alleged violation, and, if it does not do so, the Procurator-General may then file suit to close 

the organization. 

Under the Extremism Law, any Russian court may rule literature extremist. After such a ruling, the text 

is automatically added to the Justice Ministry’s official list of extremist materials and is banned 

throughout Russia. Anyone who publishes or distributes a banned text on the list faces a potential fouryear prison term. The list, which was established in July 2007 with 14 titles, included 573 items as of 

February 2010. Islamic materials reportedly constitute the majority of the religious items; 52 Jehovah’s 

Witnesses publications were added in the past year. Although the extremism law does not expressly 

prohibit private ownership of such material, the Russian police have interpreted the law in that fashion. 

The mass distribution, preparation, or storage of titles banned as extremist may also result in prosecution 

under Criminal Code Article 282 (“incitement of ethnic, racial or religious hatred”), with potential 

penalties ranging from a fine to up to five years in prison. Violators may also be prosecuted under Article 

20.29 of the Administrative Violations Code (“production and distribution of extremist material”), with 

penalties ranging from a fine to a maximum of a 15-day term of detention. 

In 2003, the Russian Supreme Court banned 15 Muslim groups for alleged ties to international terrorism 

without adequate process, review, or transparency. It was not until 2006 that the official government 

newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta published the Federal Security Service list of terrorist-designated 

organizations, even though such publication is a pre-condition for the ruling to have legal standing. 

Furthermore, the published list of the banned groups included 17 groups, without providing any reason 

for the inclusion of the two others. In May 2009, the Tabligh Jamaat was also officially banned in Russia 

for extremism. The Russian General Prosecutor maintained that Tabligh Jamaat is a radical organization 

whose goal is the re-establishment of an Islamic caliphate, but some human rights activists claimed that 

the organization scrupulously follows the law and exists only to educate people about Islam. According 

to the State Department, the Tabligh Jamaat is an “Islamic missionary organization” that is not known to 

have used or advocated violence. 

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Human rights groups are concerned that the 2003 ruling has facilitated arbitrary detentions, convictions 

and imprisonment of hundreds of individuals on extremism charges for unproven ties to the banned 

groups. Some Muslims have claimed that they were beaten or tortured by police in an effort to force them 

to testify against other suspects.

The chair of Russia’s officially-approved Council of Muftis, Ravil Gainutdin, has accused some local 

courts of “poor understanding of religious and theological issues,” noting that courts had banned as 

extremist books recommended by his own council, such as “The Personality of a Muslim,” a Koran-based 

life guide that espouses kindness, including towards non-Muslims. In May 2008, a criminal case for 

“incitement of religious hatred” was brought against Aslambek Ezhayev, the head of the Publishing 

Department of the Moscow Islamic University, which had printed “The Personality of a Muslim.” 

Authorities later dropped the incitement charge, but in March 2009 charged Ezhayev with copyright 

violations and use of harmful software. 

In 2007, a Russian court banned as extremist the Russian translations of fourteen parts of Risale-i Nur 

(Messages of Light), Turkish theologian’s Said Nursi’s commentaries on the Koran and Islam. In 2008, a 

lawyer from Izhevsk filed a case in the ECtHR challenging the ban on Nursi’s writings. Russia’s Human 

Rights Ombudsman has denounced the ban on Nursi’s writings, warning that “it is very important that we 

do not allow interference in the convictions and beliefs of millions of citizens on the poorly grounded, 

unproven pretext of fighting against extremism.” Since the Nursi texts were first banned in 2007, there 

have been dozens of police raids throughout Russia of individuals suspected of reading or owning his 

works, and seizures of those works; criminal charges have also been initiated against some individuals. 

More recently, official accusations of extremism have been leveled against Jehovah’s Witnesses. In 

December 2009, the Russian Supreme Court upheld a court decision liquidating the Jehovah’s Witness 

congregation in the city of Taganrog, partly on the grounds that 34 of its texts are extremist. As a result 

of this decision, all of the congregation’s property will be seized and the congregation will not be allowed 

to meet as a community. In addition, in January 2009 a city court in Altai, in the Gorno-Altai republic, 

ruled 16 Jehovah’s Witness publications extremist. Since these rulings, numerous members of the 

Jehovah’s Witnesses community across Russia have been detained by police for up to several hours, 

usually without official documentation. In one recent example, a Jehovah’s Witness who was driving on 

the main Moscow-Ryazan road in March 2010 was stopped by traffic police to check for the transport of 

extremist literature. Although he did not have literature on the federal list of banned texts, he 

nevertheless was ordered to report to local police. 

In May 2009, authorities in the town of Ramon in the Voronezh region detained two Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, allegedly on suspicion of involvement in local robberies. When the men denied the 

allegations, police reportedly forced one to confess by making him wear a gas mask to which they cut off 

the oxygen supply, subjecting him to electric shock, and threatening him with sexual assault. The police 

later released both men and dropped all charges. 

Jehovah’s Witnesses view their recent official treatment unfortunately as reminiscent of the Soviet era. In 

February 2010, 160,000 members of this community distributed 12 million copies of a publication 

making this comparison and refuting official allegations that they are extremist. In Nizhny Novgorod in 

late February 2010, two Jehovah’s Witnesses, one a minor, were detained by police for distributing this 

leaflet. Although the father tried to enter the room in the police station where his son was detained, the 

son was first interrogated alone. When the boy refused to answer questions, he reportedly was told that 

documents confirming he had parents would be burnt and he would be sent to an orphanage. 

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In February 2010, armed police in the city of Kaluga, acting on a tip about a “sect” using “extremist” 

literature, raided a Lutheran ordination service attended by Archbishop Iosif Baron of the Augsburg 

Lutheran Church. During the one-hour search, copies of the Bible and hymnals were the only texts 

discovered; nevertheless, the church’s pastor was summoned to the local police station. 

The Official Distinction between Traditional and Non-Traditional Religions 

Despite provisions in the Russian constitution establishing a secular state with equal legal status for all 

religions as well as the 1997 religion law’s declaration that all religions are equal under the law, the 

preface to that law claims that only four religions—Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism—

have traditional status in the country. The de facto favored status of the Moscow Patriarchate Russian 

Orthodox Church (MPROC) also results in official discrimination against other religious groups, 

including the other three officially traditional faiths. Russian government officials and police also have 

made frequent negative comments about Protestant and other religious communities. Official statements 

have stressed the alien character and foreign funding of these communities. Such statements have gone 

so far as to imply espionage, much as the Soviet system promoted suspicion of enemies, traitors and 

“wreckers” of society. Such allegations contribute to a climate of intolerance that has led to 

discrimination and hate crimes. 

The MPROC claims adherents among 60 percent of Russians and has a special role in Russian history and 

culture. The MPROC receives the bulk of Russian state support for religious groups, including subsidies 

for church maintenance and construction. For example, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced on 

Orthodox Christmas in January 2010 that the Russian government would provide almost $100 million to 

restore holy sites, monasteries and churches destroyed by the Soviet government. Nevertheless, Islam, 

Buddhism and Judaism also sometimes benefit from government funding, as do other groups. For 

example, the Moscow city government has funded major renovations of the buildings of Old Believers, 

which in the 1600s was Russia’s majority Orthodox community but is not part of the MPROC. In 

December 2009, the Kremlin signed a concordat with the Vatican. 

The MPROC has special arrangements with numerous government agencies and bodies to conduct 

religious education and to provide spiritual counseling, including with the Ministries of Education, 

Defense, Health, Internal Affairs, and Emergency Situations. For example, the vast majority of religious 

facilities in Russian prisons are Russian Orthodox. 

In July 2009, President Medvedev issued an executive order establishing state-funded military chaplains. 

By January 2010, 200 MPROC clergy had been appointed to Russian military units. Under the executive 

order, Muslims, Jews, or Buddhists must comprise 10 percent of a military unit before an official chaplain 

of that religion would be appointed. According to a Russian Defense Ministry survey, two-thirds of the 

country’s soldiers are religious adherents, and of these, 83 percent are Russian Orthodox, eight percent 

are Muslims, and the remaining nine percent are from other religions or denominations, including 

Protestants. The Slavic Center for Law and Justice observes that the survey is replete with “insulting 

remarks against those religious associations that do not belong to the announced four ‘traditional’ 

religions.” 

In addition to the military chaplains paid by the Russian state, an estimated total of 2,000 MPROC priests 

also work in the Russian military, as do a small number of Muslim and Protestant clergy. Various 

Russian military units have adopted Russian Orthodox saints in official insignia and there are MPROC 

chapels on army bases, but authorities reportedly rarely allow Islamic services and often deny Muslim 

conscripts time for daily prayers or alternatives to pork-based meals. 

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Also in July 2009, President Medvedev issued an order that, beginning in September, fourth-grade 

students in 19 diverse regions of Russia -- ranging from the Muslim-majority North Caucasus to Russian 

Orthodox majority areas in Central Russia to the Jewish autonomous region in Siberia – could, with 

parental permission, choose to study the new curriculum of “Foundations of Religious Cultures and 

Secular Ethics.” The course is divided into three sections over six months: one on Orthodoxy, Islam, 

Buddhism, and Judaism; another on the history of religious cultures, and a third on secular ethics. Parents 

are supposed to be allowed to select, if they wish, one of the three sections for their children to study. 

The Russian Ministry of Education claims that the course is based on, and its teachers will rely on, 

scholarly information. Russian human rights groups have reported instances in which Russian Orthodox 

Church officials are alleged to have pressured parents not to allow their children to select the secular 

ethics portion of the course. 

Parliament also continues its consideration of a draft law to transfer property of religious significance to 

religious organizations, including land, buildings and movable property. The draft law would grant 

religious organizations ownership of all historical property in their use. Currently, religious organizations 

have the right to use such property indefinitely, but that property remains Russian state property. If the 

draft law is passed – and several informed observers think its chances of passage are good -- the MPROC 

would become one of Russia’s major property holders and Muslim communities will also claim pre-1917 

titles to land and other property. Many Russian cultural figures oppose this bill because it will remove, 

for example, many historical icons from public museums.

Legal Status Issues 

Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience is complex and contains numerous ambiguous provisions. 

The law defines three categories of religious communities with varying legal status and privileges: 

groups, local organizations, and centralized organizations. An unregistered “religious group” can hold 

worship services and teach religion to its members, but lacks legal status to open a bank account, own 

property, issue invitations to foreign guests, and publish literature; its individual members in theory can 

rent or buy property, and invite guests to engage in religious instruction, and import religious material. A 

“religious organization” requires at least 10 citizen members to register, either as part of a centralized 

organization or as a local organization that has existed for at least 15 years. Since such organizations are 

registered, they can conduct activities denied to unregistered groups, including operating houses of 

worship, and engage in religious activities in prisons, public hospitals and the military. “Centralized 

religious organizations” are comprised of a minimum of three local registered organizations and can open 

local organizations without a waiting period. A minimum of 50 years of existence is required for the use 

of “Russia” or “Russian” in the titles of religious organizations. Registered groups must re-register 

annually at both the national and local levels. The law also allows officials to bring court cases which 

may result in decisions to ban the activities of particular religious communities found to have violated 

Russian law. 

The law’s 15-year existence requirement for religious groups to register disfavors groups new to the 

country. Moreover, at the time the law was enacted it effectively meant that a group must have existed 

during the highly restrictive Soviet era. In October 2009, the ECtHR found that the 15-year requirement 

violated the European Convention on Human Rights’ provisions on the freedoms of religion and 

association. The case, Kimlya and Others v. Russia, was brought by the Church of Scientology of 

Nizhnekamsk, which had been denied registration on the grounds that it had existed in that locality for 

less than 15 years. This ruling could have a major impact on the Russian religion law, since according to 

the Russian Constitution, international legal obligations take precedence over domestic law. Furthermore, 

in February 2010 the Russian Constitutional Court ordered Russian national courts to review and change 

legal decisions after a negative ECtHR ruling, rather than simply awarding monetary compensation to the 

plaintiffs, as had been the usual Russian government practice. 

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The 1997 law required all religious organizations previously registered under the more liberal 1990 law to 

reregister by December 31, 2000. This process, which involved simultaneous registration at both the 

federal and local levels, required considerable time, effort, and legal expense. Some Pentecostal and 

Baptist congregations refused to register out of religious conviction. Reportedly as many as half of the 

functioning Muslim communities decided not to undergo the cumbersome process and some Muslim 

clerics have reported that since 1999 it has become “much harder” to register new Muslim communities. 

At the federal level, most religious organizations who have applied have been registered by federal 

officials and the Russian Constitutional Court. Religious groups that have gone to court to overturn 

denials of registration have often been successful, but local administrative authorities have sometimes 

delayed or refused to implement these rulings. The Salvation Army was finally re-registered in the city of 

Moscow in April 2009, as required by the Russian Constitutional Court in 2002 and the ECtHR in 2006. 

The Salvation Army case was the first case involving a religious community where the Russian state took 

the remedial action required by the ECtHR, rather than only paying compensation. 

According to the Ministry of Justice, as of January 1, 2009 there were 23,078 registered religious groups 

operating in Russia, of which 55 percent are affiliated with the MPROC. In 2005 (the last year for which 

statistics are available), authorities investigated the activities of 3,526 religious organizations. The 

Ministry of Justice sent notifications of violations to 2,996 such organizations. The courts issued rulings 

to liquidate 59 local organizations for alleged violations of constitutional norms and federal legislation 

during that period. 

Reports indicate that in 2009 no religious group has been denied registration due to its lack of required 

documentation, although some communities were asked to provide updated data. On other grounds, 

however, the Russian authorities continued to deny registration to certain religious communities, such as 

the Falun Gang and Scientologists. 

After Aleksandr Konovalov was named Russian Minister of Justice in 2008, two individuals known for 

their intolerant views were appointed to senior positions: Aleksei Velichko, as Deputy Justice Minister, 

and Sergei Milushkin, as director of the Department of Noncommercial organizations. These two 

officials were dismissed in early 2010. The Justice Ministry, however, has expanded its activities in 2009 

to include oversight over unregistered as well as registered religious communities. For example, in March 

2009 the Ministry replaced a 1998 law on the status of representational offices of foreign religious 

organizations operating in Russia; the new law set complex registration procedures, including for proving 

registration and establishing an official register. In October 2009, the Ministry of Justice proposed 

amendments to the 1997 religion law to require every religious community, even if they do not plan to 

apply for registration, to provide the government a membership list, unlike the current law that requires 

religious organizations to provide such a list only during the registration process. The proposal also 

called for closer regulation of “missionary activity,” mandating that anyone engaged in missionary 

activity outside of designated religious sites must present proof of authorization by the relevant religious 

association or such activity would be banned. After protests from religious groups and by some Russian 

officials, in November 2009 the proposed amendments were removed from the Ministry of Justice’s 

website. 

Russia’s 2006 NGO law granted the Ministry of Justice extensive oversight functions which also apply to 

religious communities. The law enables the Ministry to interfere with the activities of NGOs, examine 

their documents, attend their meetings with advance notice, and initiate court proceedings which may 

deny the registration of groups. NGOs are also required to submit detailed annual reports on their 

activities, governing bodies, and funding, including from foreign sources. In 2007, after lobbying by the 

Russian Orthodox Church, the reporting requirements for religious groups under the NGO law were 

reduced, but still required documentation of foreign donations, as well as the full names, addresses, and 

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passport details of executive board members. In July 2009, President Medvedev further amended the 

NGO law to ease registration and reporting requirements, particularly for small NGOs. Representatives 

of numerous religious communities in Moscow informed USCIRF staff in late 2008 that they had not 

encountered difficulties due to the requirements of the NGO law at that time. 

Official Religious Affairs Agencies 

Governmental mechanisms to interact with religious communities and monitor implementation of the 

religion law exist at the national, regional, and local levels. At the national level, there is a Presidential 

Council on Cooperation with Religious Associations, chaired by the Presidential Administration chief. 

This Council is comprised of Presidential Administration officials, academic specialists, and 

representatives of traditional and major non-traditional communities. There also is a Governmental 

Commission for the Affairs of Religious Associations. In addition, in 2009 the Ministry of Justice 

established two new bodies in this area: an Expert Religious Studies Council and a Council for the Expert 

Analysis of Religious Literature with regard to Extremism. 

The Expert Religious Studies Council has wide powers to recommend investigations of religious groups 

during the registration procedure, to assess if a registered community’s activity is in accord with its 

charter, and to ascertain if an organization, one of its members, or the literature it produces or 

distributes is extremist. While governments must combat acts of violent extremism as part of their 

obligation to protect citizens, there have been numerous expressions of concern over the establishment, 

composition, and expansive mandate of this Council. Aleksandr Dvorkin, the Council’s chairman, is 

Russia’s most prominent “anti-cult” activist and lacks academic credentials as a religion specialist. His 

deputy, Roman Silantyev, has written numerous intolerant articles on Islam. The Council’s members 

include five individuals known for their “anti-sect” activities. As a result, observers are concerned that 

the council may call for the closure of minority religious communities, although thus far the council’s 

only known official recommendation has been to declare Russia’s 70,000 member Yezidi community 

eligible for registration. Nevertheless, Council members continue to make intolerant (or absurd) public 

comments: in a May 2009 Radio Vesti interview, Dvorkin stated that the “tiny, totalitarian Church of 

Scientology was the government religion of the United States.” 

The Council for Expert Analysis of Religious Literature with Regard to Extremism is chaired by Vitaly 

Naumkin, a member of the Russian Academy Sciences Oriental Institute, with his deputy, Aleksandr 

Zaluzhny, a professor on the national security faculty at the Russian Academy of State Service. The role 

of this Council is advisory; it does not have the authority to counteract court decisions finding literature 

extremist 

On the regional and local level, religious organizations interact with various authorities, including the 

sub-offices of some of the seven Plenipotentiary Presidential Representatives that address social and 

religious questions. In addition, regional administrations and many city administrations have named 

certain officials to interact with religious organizations. 

Restrictions on Places of Worship 

Building or renting worship space remains difficult for a number of religious communities, including 

Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Pentecostal 

congregations, Orthodox groups that do not recognize the Moscow Patriarchate, Molokans, and Old 

Believer communities. Protestant, Catholic, Muslim and some Orthodox congregations also allege 

inordinate official interest in fire safety and other details in regard to their worship buildings, which may 

result in court-ordered fines, temporary closures or official demolition threats. 

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In 2009 and 2010, Russian regional and local officials denied building permits or confiscated buildings 

already in use by religious communities. In December 2009, the administration of the city of Izhevsk 

again refused, as it has since 2002, a permit to the Evangelical Christian community for church 

construction. Another case involved properties of the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church (ROAC), 

which is not affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate, in the town of Suzdal. In February 2009, a regional 

court ordered that 11 of the ROAC’s historic churches must be returned to the state; one year later, three 

more churches in the Suzdal region were removed. Reportedly, the ROAC may be forced out of its Saint 

Petersburg church. The autonomous Russian Orthodox Church (AROC) was ordered by the Pacific coast 

city of Vladivostok in December 2009 to vacate its church building. 

Nevertheless, several lengthy official refusals regarding houses of worship were reversed, including for 

the Lutheran community in Krasnodar. In addition, the Baptist community and the MPROC reached a 

positive settlement regarding a dispute over a house of worship in Lipetsk. 

Muslims have also encountered difficulties in gaining official permission to open and maintain mosques. 

Although in 2009 local authorities in Balashikh allowed a local mosque to open and in Tambov Muslim 

communities were finally granted land for mosque construction, there reportedly has been no official 

response to longstanding requests for permission to build mosques from Muslim communities in the 

widely scattered regions of Perm, Oryol, and Komsomolsk in Chuvashia. In August 2006, the Russian 

Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision ordering that the local Muslim community in the city of 

Astrakhan on the Caspian pay for the demolition of its new mosque. In May 2007, the Supreme Court 

agreed to reconsider the case. Allegedly, the city’s Muslim community had not received all the required 

building permits, although construction of the mosque had been partly funded by the previous local 

government. In July 2007, the ECtHR prioritized the Astrakhan case application and presently is still 

under consideration. 

Restrictions on Religious Education 

Under the 1997 religion law, religious organizations encounter confusing definitions over what type of 

religious activity requires an education license; educational activity might require a license, while 

teaching does not. The Smolensk Regional Court dissolved a local Methodist church for running an 

unlicensed Sunday school, but in June 2008 Russia’s Supreme Court overturned that ruling. After they 

sang hymns in public, members of unregistered Baptist communities in Kaliningrad were twice detained 

in 2009 and fined for violating public assembly rules. In the Ryazan region, police raided an unregistered 

Baptist 2009 summer youth camp and charged them with ecological violations. 

Restrictions on Foreign Religious Workers 

The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, last updated in 2000, states that “ensuring 

national security includes countering the negative influence of foreign religious organizations and 

missionaries.” As in previous years, the Russian authorities in 2008 denied a visa request from the Dalai 

Lama to visit Buddhist-majority regions, such as Kalmykia. Over 50 foreign religious workers, including 

Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Buddhists and Jews, have been barred from Russia since 1998 and only a 

small number have since been allowed to return. New visa rules introduced in October 2007 for business 

or humanitarian visas, including religious work, permit visa holders to spend only 90 out of every 180 

days in Russia; procedures to extend visas are lengthy and complex. These visa regulations have had a 

harsh impact on many religious organizations, particularly those which for historical reasons depend upon 

foreigners, such as the Catholic Church and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Three 

rabbis, one from the Primorye region and two from Rostov-on-Don, were expelled from Russia in 2008 

on charges of violating their visas by serving as religious leaders. In 2009, three Jehovah’s Witnesses 

defense lawyers were deported from southern Russia.

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Hate Crimes against Persons and Property 

Russian officials, especially on the local level, continue to respond inadequately to numerous violent hate 

crimes directed against members of various religious communities. Moreover, chauvinist groups have 

stepped up their campaign against individuals, and some government officials, and groups who defend the 

rights of religious and ethnic minorities as well as migrants, including issuing death threats. Russian neoNazi and other hate groups maintain websites which post death threats against lawyers, judges, Russian 

human rights activists and journalists whom they view as enemies. While Russian police have offered 

some assistance to these defenders, their efforts usually are ineffective and inconsistent. In all too many 

cases involving members of Russia’s ethnic and religious minorities -- not to mention the killings of 

human rights activists -- Russian authorities, particularly on the local level, have not treated hate crimes in 

a serious and consistent manner. Although police officials in Moscow stepped up arrests and prosecution 

of violent chauvinists in 2009, other regions, particularly Nizhny Novgorod, have lagged behind. 

Human rights groups have expressed concern that hate crimes, often the result of attacks by “skinhead” 

racist groups, are growing dramatically in Russia, particularly against people from Central Asia, who are 

predominantly Muslim. It should be noted that the number of victims of racist and neo-Nazi motivated 

violence in Russia dropped slightly in 2009 from the very high levels of the six previous years. Some 

credit belongs to the Moscow region law enforcement agencies which in the latter half of 2008 and in 

2009 undertook more decisive steps against the largest and most aggressive ultra-nationalist groups. 

Racists faced concerted and consistent official pressure, as seen in numerous detentions, arrests and 

trials, resulting in at least 45 successful prosecutions of violent crimes in which hate was as an 

aggravating factor (compared to 35 in 2008), for a total of 135 convictions. 

In 2009, according to a leading Russian human rights group, at least 71 people were killed and at least 33 

injured in racist/Neo Nazi violence. These numbers declined from a high of 109 and 486, respectively, in 

2008. Individuals from Central Asia and the Caucasus, who are predominantly Muslim, were the most 

frequent victims in xenophobic attacks. There were 42 documented violent attacks motivated by religious 

hatred on individuals from January 2009 until April 2010: 20 on Jehovah’s Witnesses, 17 on Muslims, 

two on Protestants, and two on Russian Orthodox priests.

In addition, from January 2009 until April 2010 there were 65 documented acts of vandalism against the 

property of religious communities: Russian Orthodox (27); Jehovah’s Witnesses (23); Jewish (7); Muslim 

(3); and one each for Evangelical Protestants, Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Mormons, and pagan. 

While such cases are usually prosecuted with appropriate charges, very few cases result in conviction. As 

a result, members of religious communities often feel that they lack protection even during religious 

services, and express concerns about the security of their organizations’ property. 

It is also important to note that neo-Nazi groups seem to be changing tactics from street attacks on 

minorities and migrants to targeted attacks on human rights activists and state facilities. These groups 

now more frequently direct their attacks against government buildings, police stations, military draft 

offices, and the homes of law enforcement personnel in efforts to pressure state authorities to adopt antiimmigrant measures or to take revenge for official prosecutions. These groups appear to have decided that 

the murders of minorities and migrants produce less publicity than the murders of judges, civil society 

activists, lawyers and journalists. 

Most officials and NGOs agree that many of these attacks are motivated largely by ethnic intolerance, 

although religious and ethnic identities often overlap. Nevertheless, members of Muslim, Jewish, Russian 

Orthodox, Protestant, Catholic, and other religious communities have been subjected to attacks apparently 

motivated by religious factors. MPROC priest Daniil Sysoev was shot by a gunman at his Moscow 

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church in November 2009; Sysoev was known for his missionary activity, including among Russia’s 

Muslim community, neo-pagans, and Protestants. In December 2009, a Moscow court sentenced a 

Muscovite to a 14-year term of imprisonment for the October 2008 murder of one of two Roman Catholic 

priests. Religious minority leaders have concerns that Russian government officials provide tacit or active 

support for a view held by many ethnic Russians that their country should be reserved for them. Civil 

society leaders link this to a perception that Russian identity is threatened by a declining birthrate and 

high mortality among ethnic Russians. 

Russian officials also respond inconsistently—and often inadequately—to violent attacks associated with 

anti-Semitism. In December 2009, two Jews were subjected to a violent attack outside a Moscow yeshiva 

and a young Jewish man was assaulted by a neo-Nazi who shouted “Heil” in the Moscow subway. In the 

latter incident, the alleged attacker was detained by police but only charged with “minor hooliganism.” In 

the city of Khabarovsk, two Molotov cocktails were thrown at a synagogue in September 2009. Four 

young “skinheads” were arrested and charged with arson; on the same night, the home of a police officer 

in Khabarovsk who investigates racist crimes was also firebombed. 

Protestant groups in Russia are frequent victims of hostile media attacks. Russian human rights groups 

report that journalists often seek guidance from the Russian Orthodox Church when researching articles 

about Protestants and the media tend to portray Protestants as dangerous “sectarians.” 

Russian rights advocates say that senior Russian government officials should do more to support publicly 

the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nature of the Russian state and society. In fact, some western and 

other observers have suggested that Russian authorities have manipulated xenophobia for political 

purposes. The Kremlin is believed, for example, to have supported the formation of the ultra-nationalist 

Rodina political party. It also backed the five-year-old nationalist youth movement Nashi, which has 

staged numerous anti-sectarian public protests. Others have observed that the Kremlin, by issuing 

nationalistic statements as well as demonstrating a tendency to blame non-Russians for crime, has 

encouraged intolerant attitudes toward non-Russians and those who do not identify with the Russian 

Orthodox Church. In USCIRF’s view, more can and should be done to ensure that Russian law 

enforcement agencies do not dismiss hate crimes as “hooliganism,” but recognize them for what they 

are—human rights abuses—and take steps to prevent and punish such crimes, including those involving 

ethnicity and religion. 

Defamation of Religions 

 

Free speech concerns also arise in connection with several recent law suits brought under Russia’s law 

against “insulting religious feelings.” For example, two cases, allegedly instigated by elements within the 

Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, were brought against Andrei Erofeev, former 

curator of contemporary art at the Tretyakov Museum, andYuri Samodurov, former director of the 

Sakharov Center, for art shows they organized in 2004 in the Sakharov Center. As of March 2010, their 

trial is ongoing. In addition, Russia’s official Muslim community pressured the Russian version of 

“Newsweek” magazine to issue a public apology for reprinting one of the Danish cartoons of Mohammed 

in a special issue on Islam in Europe. 

U.S. Policy 

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Moscow in April 2009 and presented a “reset” button 

to her Russian counterpart Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, signaling that the Obama administration 

believes that the future possibilities in U.S.-Russian relations outweigh the past problems. Under 

Secretary of State William J. Burns, who was U.S. ambassador to Russia from 2005 until 2008, has 

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traveled to Moscow several times in his new role, mainly to broker a fourth UN Security Council 

resolution to sanction Iran over its nuclear program. In the past year, the United States and Russia reached 

an agreement to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The United States imported $18 billion in 

goods from Russia in 2009 and exported just over $5 billion last year. The Obama administration 

supports Russia’s accession to the WTO. 

According to the State Department’s 2009 Advancing Freedom and Democracy Report, the overall 

objective of U.S. human rights policy in Russia is to “support the country in becoming a more 

democratic, vibrant, and stable geopolitical partner that increasingly moves toward a free-market 

democratic system built on checks and balances, and acts as a strong and effective partner in areas of 

common interest within the international community.” The State Department seeks “to strengthen and 

encourage the Russian government and society's own support for the development of civil society and 

respect for the rule of law,” but admits there are serious impediments, including due to the Russian 

government’s restrictions on and harassment of civil society groups and independent media. According 

to the 2009 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, the U.S. government discusses freedom 

of religion or belief with the Russian government, religious groups, NGOs, and others, as part of its 

overall policy to promote human rights. The U.S. Embassy also supports the development of programs to 

sensitize officials to recognize discrimination, prejudice, and crimes motivated by ethnic or religious 

intolerance. 

USCIRF believes that that the issue of freedom of religion or belief should be given a high priority in the 

“reset” of bilateral relations, since it is both a human rights and security concern in Russia. Although 

Russia faces domestic security concerns, as evidenced most recently in the March Moscow Metro 

bombings, the government’s sweeping anti-extremism efforts against even peaceful religious believers 

risk increasing radicalism and instability. 

Recommendations 

I. Strengthening U.S. Promotion of Human Rights, including Freedom of Religion or Belief 

The U.S. government should: 

• urge, in public and at high political levels, the Russian government to undertake programs and adopt 

legal reforms to ensure respect for international norms on freedom of religion or belief; 

• implement the provisions of the “Smith Amendment” of the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act 

(Section 7074 of P.L. 111-117) to prohibit U.S. financial assistance to the Russian Federation 

government due to, inter alia, its discrimination against religious groups through laws and 

government actions, excessive application of the extremism law, and reported restrictions by regional 

and local officials on minority religious groups; 

• maintain a mechanism to monitor publicly the status of human rights in Russia, including freedom of 

religion or belief, particularly in the case of repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect to 

Russia, as well as establish a program to monitor implementation of Russia’s law on non-commercial 

organizations (NGO Law), including its impact on religious organizations; 

• organize regular roundtables in Washington with members of the National Security Council, and 

representatives of religious communities and civil society as well as academic specialists, on the 

status of freedom of religion or belief in Russia; 

 

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• ensure that U.S. government-funded grants to NGOs and other sectors in Russian society include 

projects to promote legal protections and respect for freedom of religion or belief and methods to 

combat xenophobia, such as by funding training programs on freedom of religion or belief, 

promoting inter-religious cooperation, encouraging pluralism, and combating hate crimes; 

• support programs to train lawyers to contest violations of Russian and international law regarding 

freedom of religion or belief in Russian courts and before the European Court of Human Rights 

(ECtHR); 

• translate into Russian and make available, including by posting on the U.S. Embassy Web site, U.S. 

Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice materials on combating hate crimes and 

information relating to international standards on freedom of religion or belief, xenophobia, and hate 

crimes, including relevant U.S. Department of State and USCIRF reports; 

y ensure that Russia’s citizens have access to U.S. government-funded radio and TV broadcasts, as well 

as Internet communications, including information on freedom of religion or belief and on combating 

xenophobia and hate crimes, in particular by: 

--restoring the previous levels of Russian-language radio broadcasts of Voice of America and 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), restoring staffing levels, and considering new 

broadcast vehicles; and 

--increasing funding for programs in minority languages, including the RFE/RL Tatar and North 

Caucasus services; 

y include in U.S.-funded exchange programs a wider ethnic and religious mix of students, including 

from the North Caucasus, Tatarstan, and other regions of Russia with sizeable Muslim and other 

religious and ethnic minority populations; 

 

• implement a U.S. visa ban and asset freeze against Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov due to: his 

leadership of the Chechen armed forces, which the ECtHR has found responsible for severe human 

rights abuses; his alleged killings of political opponents and local human rights activists; and his 

institution of strict sharia law in Chechnya in violation of international religious freedom standards; 

• ensure that U.S.-funded conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction programs for the North 

Caucasus also fund credible local partners; and 

y initiate International Visitor’s Programs on the prevention and prosecution of hate crimes for Russian 

officials and other relevant figures and include training sessions by the Department of Justice and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as relevant NGOs and academic experts. 

II. Prioritizing Freedom of Religion or Belief in U.S. Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy 

The U.S. government should: 

• organize as part of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission a working group comprised of 

legal experts on international norms on freedom of religion or belief; 

 

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• ensure that U.S. Embassy officials and programs engage with local officials throughout the Russian 

Federation and disseminate information on international norms on freedom of religion or belief, 

including regarding unregistered religious communities;

• urge the Russian government to invite and schedule dates for one or more of the three Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Personal Representatives on combating intolerance 

and the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to visit the country during 2010;

y ensure that human rights issues, including freedom of religion or belief, are raised in the context of 

negotiations on Russian accession to the World Trade Organization, and work with members of the 

G-8 to ensure that human rights issues, including concerning migration and counter-terrorism, are 

raised at bilateral and multilateral meetings; 

• ensure that the humanitarian crisis in Chechnya and human rights abuses perpetrated by the Russian 

federal military and local security and police forces there, as well as in other North Caucasus 

republics, are issues raised in U.S.-Russian bilateral relations; 

• urge that the governments of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Poland, France and Denmark do not accept 

the official Chechen culture centers that the republic would like to institute in those countries; 

y urge the Russian government to respect all resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 

of Europe on the human rights and humanitarian situation in the North Caucasus and reinstate regular 

on-site visits by the Council of Europe’s Special Rapporteur for Chechnya; 

• urge the Russian government to address the issues raised by the UN Human Rights Council’s 

Universal Periodic Review and relevant treaty bodies concerning Chechnya, accept visits to 

Chechnya by the UN Special Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial Executions and Torture, and fully 

cooperate with those Special Rapporteurs; and 

• work with other OSCE States to ensure that human rights abuses in the North Caucasus receive 

greater attention in OSCE deliberations and encourage the OSCE to raise humanitarian and other 

assistance to the civilian populations affected by the decade-long conflict in Chechnya. 

III. Addressing Russian Human Rights Issues 

The U.S. government should urge the Russian government to: 

• implement the February 2010 Constitutional Court decision that the Civil Procedural Code be 

amended to require Russian courts to implement decisions by the ECtHR rather than the payment of 

fines as is current practice; 

• reform the Ministry of Internal Affairs system of quotas for arrests and detentions of alleged suspects 

which may result in denials of justice; 

• amend the Russian extremism law to address acts that involve violence or incitement to imminent 

violence, and drop bans on non-violent organizations, literature and religious communities; 

 

• halt current investigations, and reconsider previous legal cases, against individuals and organizations 

accused of extremism solely for their exercise of internationally protected rights, including freedom 

of religion or belief; 

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• withdraw or substantially amend the NGO law or, failing that, develop regulations consistent with 

international standards limiting the state’s discretion to interfere with the activities of NGOs, 

including religious organizations; and 

• cease and prosecute all alleged acts of involuntary detention, disappearances, torture, rape, and other 

human rights abuses by the Russian security services in Chechnya, including by pro-Kremlin 

Chechen forces, and in other republics of the North Caucasus.

IV. Ensuring the Equal Legal Status and Treatment of Russia’s Religious Communities 

The Russian government should: 

• affirm publicly at a high political level the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nature of Russian 

society and that all religious communities in Russia are equal under the law and entitled to equal 

treatment regardless of registration status, and direct government officials at all levels not to grant 

preferences to or discriminate against members of religious, ethnic and migrant groups; 

y refrain from media attacks on any peaceful religious community and adopt administrative measures 

against government officials who engage in such attacks; 

• cease interference in the internal affairs of religious communities, unless stipulated by law and in 

conformity with international human rights standards; 

• ensure that law enforcement officials investigate and prosecute crimes against members of all 

religious communities and establish a fair and effective review mechanism outside the Procuracy to 

investigate and sanction any officials who are found to have encouraged or condoned such crimes; 

• amend the legal provision of the extremism law whereby any court can rule the Russian translation of 

a text to constitute extremism, which automatically adds that text to the Federal List of Extremist 

Literature and bans that text throughout Russia, and re-examine recent court rulings deeming 

publications of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and of the Turkish theologian Said Nursi extremist; 

• undertake a thorough reform of the mandate and personnel of the Ministry of Justice’s 2009 Expert 

Religious Studies Council so as to diversify its membership and to revoke its authority to recommend 

investigations of religious groups, including of their activities and literature; 

y distribute on a regular basis updated information on freedom of religion or belief, including Russian 

constitutional provisions, relevant legislation and court decisions, to the Russian judiciary, religious 

affairs officials, the Justice Ministry, the Procuracy, and law enforcement bodies; 

• extend the current annual training program for regional and local religious affairs officials to include 

the judiciary, Procuracy, law enforcement agencies, and the Justice Ministry; 

y direct the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman to set up a nationwide monitoring system 

on the status of freedom of religion or belief in the 84 regions of Russia; and 

 

y accept visits from the three OSCE Tolerance Representatives and the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief, and grant unrestricted access for these officials to religious 

communities and regions. 

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V. Combating Xenophobia, Intolerance, and Hate Crimes 

The Russian government should: 

y condemn, publicly, promptly and specifically, acts of xenophobia, anti-Semitism, intolerance, and 

hate crimes, and make clear that such acts will be fully and promptly investigated and prosecuted as 

human rights abuses and not “hooliganism;” 

y while vigorously promoting freedom of expression, publicly condemn rhetoric that promotes 

xenophobia or intolerance, including religious intolerance; 

y provide training programs for law enforcement officers and other officials to address ethnic and 

religious hatred and promote tolerance; 

y establish a special nationwide anti-discrimination body that provides regular reports to the public, 

press, and parliament; 

y implement recommendations on addressing anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and hate crimes from the 

Russia Federation Presidential Council on Human Rights, the Russian Federation Human Rights 

Ombudsman, the Council of Europe’s Commission against Racism and Intolerance, and implement 

the decisions of the ECtHR; and 

y report, as required, to the OSCE on national measures to address hate crimes, including legislative 

initiatives and statistics, and participate in relevant OSCE training programs for law enforcement and 

judicial officials. 

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Somalia 

FINDINGS: Serious religious freedom abuses continue in Somalia. These violations are the 

result of: an on-going conflict with a strong sectarian nature; the implementation of a strict 

interpretation of Islamic law reminiscent of the Taliban, under which practices deemed “unIslamic” are repressed, Sufi clerics and non-Muslims are killed, and Sufi religious sites are 

desecrated; and an increase in manifestations of radical interpretations of Islam and growth of 

extremist Islamic schools. The internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 

only controls a small area of the capital and does not have the capacity to enforce religious freedom 

protections or address religious freedom violations. 

Based on these concerns, USCIRF again places Somalia on its Watch List for 2010. Somalia has 

been on the Commission’s Watch List since 2009. 

Somalia has not had an effective, central government since the fall of former dictator Siad Barre in 

1991. The ensuing civil war and continuing conflicts have destroyed all national governing 

structures. In the absence of the rule of law, freedom of religion or belief, like all other human 

rights, is undermined by insurgents, warlords, self-appointed officials, local authorities, and 

prevailing societal attitudes. Throughout 2009, the U.S.-designated “foreign terrorist organization” 

al-Shabaab (the Youth) and Hizbul Islam (Party of Islam) mounted an increasingly successful 

insurgency against the TFG. Despite efforts by the TFG to placate these groups, including by 

establishing sharia law as state law, the two militias continued to oppose the new government. A 

third Islamic militia, which finalized a cooperation agreement with the TFG in March 2010, Ahlu 

Summa waa Jaama (ASWJ), also committed a small number of religious freedom violations. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: The promotion of freedom of religion or belief is not 

adequately addressed in U.S.-Somalia policy, especially given the sectarian elements of the conflict 

and the increasing manifestations of radical Islam. USCIRF understands the emphasis on 

providing security assistance to the TFG, which addresses significant U.S. national security 

concerns by helping the TFG exert control over Somalia to attempt to govern the country. 

However, radical interpretations of Islam continue to perpetuate severe violations of religious 

freedom and related human rights, as well as turn Somalia into a safe haven for terrorists. To 

address this phenomenon, USCIRF recommends that the U.S. government increase efforts to 

promote freedom of religion or belief in Somalia through support of civil society organizations and 

engagement with Somali government officials, clerics, elders, and diaspora communities as well as 

increase assistance to develop an education and rule of law sector in Somalia. Additional 

recommendations for U.S. policy towards Somalia can be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Governing and Legal Environment 

The TFG was formed in January and February of 2009, following the election of President Sheik Sharif 

Ahmed, TFG Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, and the TFG parliament. President Sheik 

Sharif was previously the leader of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a group that ruled Somalia for a 

short period of time in 2006 before being ousted by U.S.-backed Ethiopian troops. Although considered 

unacceptable to the international community when he was the UIC leader (due to concerns about radical 

elements within that body), President Sheik Sharif and the current iteration of the TFG are internationally 

recognized as the legitimate Somali government. By the end of the year, the TFG controlled only a small 

number of districts in Mogadishu and is reliant on a 5,300 strong African Union peacekeeping force for 

survival. In June, President Sheik Sharif declared a state of emergency in the country and sought 

increased international support to strengthen the TFG’s security forces. 

The TFG is governed by a hybrid legal system based on the Transitional Federal Charter and the 1960 

constitution. Despite the passage of the Charter in 2006, the 1960 constitution continues to have legal 

standing to address issues not found in the Charter, such as freedom of religion or belief. The constitution 

guarantees the rights to worship, discuss, and study one’s religion of choice, although the Charter 

establishes Islam as the official state religion and proselytizing for any other religion is strictly prohibited. 

However, the lack of a functioning government and the TFG’s limited control over the country make 

these provisions unenforceable and hence irrelevant at the present time. 

The informal process for adjudicating disputes varies by region and relies on some combination of sharia, 

customary law, and the former Barre regime’s penal code. On May 10, 2009, the TFG Parliament 

unanimously approved the implementation of sharia law nationwide. However, Somali officials have 

given little insight as to what sharia law would look like in practice. Agreement on sharia law will likely 

be difficult to achieve, given the differing opinions by Somali officials, opposition groups and clerics, as 

well as international partners. President Sheik Sharif said sharia law will respect democracy, human 

rights, and women’s rights, and that he would appoint legal experts to nullify differences between sharia 

and state law, so as to implement it “properly.” The ongoing constitution drafting process will work 

through these challenges, although it is severely delayed and sharia law will be one of the last issues 

addressed. 

Al-Shabaab 

The vast majority of religious freedom abuses in Somalia were carried out by al-Shabaab (also known as 

the Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin, Shabaab, Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth 

Movement, Mujahidin Youth Movement), which constitutes the greatest threat to the TFG. The goal of 

this extremist militia, which came to prominence as the military wing of the UIC in 2006, is to turn 

Somalia into an Islamic state, build a greater Somalia (incorporating regional areas with large ethnicallySomali populations such as Djibouti, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and the Northern Frontier District of 

Kenya), and spread its strict version of Islam throughout the region. The movement is opposed to 

democracy, desiring a theocracy, and has assassinated its opponents. For many al-Shabaab and other 

extremist leaders, the formation of a Somali Islamic state has been a goal for more than 20 years. A 

number of movement leaders reportedly received military training in the 1990s in Afghanistan and fought 

with the Somalia-based militia al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), which had loose ties with al-Qaeda and was 

designated a foreign terrorist organization by the United States. Al-Shabaab announced a formal alliance 

with al-Qaeda in February 2010 although questions still remain about the extent of financial and military 

support and coordination between the two groups. According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, 

al-Shabaab is financed by donations from the Somali diaspora, other jihad groups, and sources in Eritrea 

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and the Middle East. Control over several ports along the southern coast also provides the movement 

with significant resources. 

Al-Shabaab’s ideologues are believed to be a small number of Somalis and an unknown number of 

foreigners, primarily from the Somali diaspora in the United States, Canada, and Europe, but also from 

South Asia. A large number of al-Shabaab soldiers are either unemployed youth who were forcefully 

recruited or bribed into joining into the militia, mercenaries, or individuals indoctrinated and/or recruited 

from mosque study circles or other electronic media that popularize martyrdom. The militia also 

incorporates clan militias and various business leaders and their militias. 

Despite having a central decision-making council, or shura, al-Shabaab is highly fractured along 

ideological and clan lines, and there were several leadership changes during the past year. Reports 

indicate there are divisions over the role of foreign fighters, use of suicide bombers, and political dialogue 

with the TFG. Al-Shabaab is divided into regional units, with regional leaders who are given flexibility 

in administering their territories. Some leaders employ a more hard-line interpretation of sharia, 

implementing their agenda by violent means, dispensing punishments such as stoning for adultery and 

amputations for theft, and forbidding the presence of international humanitarian organizations. Other 

more “moderate” al-Shabaab leaders favor engaging in talks with rivals and the local community to 

maintain popular support. Despite these divisions, the movement is able to overcome internal 

disagreements to remain militarily unified against the TFG. Reports indicate that foreigners in the 

movement may now be making decisions. 

Sharia Law 

Although different al-Shabaab administrations vary somewhat, overall the militia continues to pursue its 

goal to turn Somalia into an Islamic state, stop “un-Islamic” behavior, and to “cleanse” Somali society of 

so-called “moral pollution.” 

Some al-Shabaab administrations have implemented hudood punishments for adultery and theft. Such 

punishments are carried out without minimum due process guarantees or adequate legal proceedings and 

constitute torture. Most amputations and stonings occurred along the southern coast, where the most 

radical of al-Shabaab’s leadership is located. Witnesses report they were forced to observe the 

punishments. On November 18, 2009 in Kismayo, a woman accused of adultery was stoned to death after 

she gave birth to her baby. The man with whom she was accused of having an adulterous affair was also 

tortured to death by stoning. Also in November 2009, in the southern coastal town of Merka, a man 

accused of rape was stoned to death. Another man accused of rape and murder was stoned to death 

northwest of Mogadishu in Wanlaweyn in June 2009. In January 2010 in Mogadishu, al-Shabaab 

amputated the right hand of a man accused of stealing cell phones. In October 2009, three boys accused 

of theft in Kismayo had limbs amputated. Similar amputations were held throughout the year. 

Persons deemed to have deviated from “accepted” behavior are punished through detentions and 

floggings. Women are required to wear the veil and socks, and in October, al-Shabaab members flogged 

more than 200 women for wearing brassieres. Men are forbidden to shave their beards or wear their pants 

below their ankles; those deemed as having “inappropriate hairstyles” have had their heads forcibly 

shaved. The militia forcibly removed gold and silver teeth. It closed cinemas, set fire to markets selling 

the mild stimulant khat, forbade cell phone ringtones unless they were verses from the Koran, forbade all 

forms of smoking, banned videogames, dancing at weddings, watching and in some places playing soccer, 

and listening to non-Islamic music. Radio stations nationwide were ordered to close or play only the call 

for prayer. Businesses are ordered to close during prayer times, when all residents are required to be 

praying. Public transporters in Mogadishu and Kismayo must segregate passengers by sex, with male 

passengers sitting in the front and female passengers in the rear seats. 

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Attacks on Sufis 

The majority of Somalis follow the Sufi tradition. Islam arrived in Somalia at the time of the Prophet 

Mohammed when several of his followers fled Mecca and sought refuge in the Horn of Africa. Sufi 

orders and rituals play a significant role in Somalia Islam, principally the Qadiriyah, AhmadiyahIdrisiyah, and Salihiyah orders. Observance of Islam is stronger in the more settled regions in Southern 

Somalia, as opposed to the more nomadic areas in the North. 

Al-Shabaab views Sufis as apostates, and attacked the Sufi religion and assaulted its followers, including 

destroying and closing Sufi mosques and attacking and killing Sufi clerics, including those who speak out 

against al-Shabaab and its interpretation of Islam. In January 2010, al-Shabaab was accused of 

attempting to assassinate a Somaliland Sufi cleric who was highly critical of the group’s use of suicide 

bombings and interpretation of Islam. Two Sufi clerics from Mogadishu were kidnapped in June 2009. 

Al-Shabaab members kidnapped another Sufi cleric from a refugee camp in Kenya. The State 

Department reports that on March 19, 2009 two Sufi clerics in Balad were beheaded by al-Shabaab. 

Within the Somali Sufi tradition, Somali saints are venerated, and their tombs are considered national 

shrines that are often highly decorated. Religious ceremonies, including annual pilgrimages, frequently 

occur at these sites. Al-Shabaab has deemed it “un-Islamic” to honor the shrines of sheiks, accusing those 

who do of being idol worshippers, blasphemous, or heretics. In 2009 and 2010, al-Shabaab engaged in a 

campaign of desecrating gravesites, including those of some of the most revered religious leaders in 

Somalia. Most recently, despite large public protests, in March 2010 al-Shabaab destroyed the graves of 

seven Sufi clerics in Mogadishu. In March 2009, in the southern coastal town of Brave, the militia 

destroyed the graves of five saints and removed their remains and told grave caretakers that if they return 

to work they will be arrested. During the following two months, al-Shabaab destroyed more than 100 

gravesites, almost 100 near Kismayo. Similar actions have been taken in the south-central Somalia towns 

of Bardhere and Biyoley, where the remains of Sheik Aweys a-Qadiri, a founder of one of the Somali Sufi 

orders, are buried. 

Additionally, al-Shabaab has stopped Sufis from participating in religious rituals and pilgrimages, 

including most recently on December 6, 2009 when militia members attacked a mosque in Basra where 

people were gathering for a pilgrimage. Seven people, including two al-Shabaab members, were killed in 

the ensuing fight. On September 21, 2009, two clerics from a pro-TFG militia were killed when alShabaab opened fire on a group gathered for Eid prayers. The militia has also officially banned 

commemoration of Maulid (the Prophet’s birth) celebrations, stating that some of the traditions that take 

place during these celebrations are “un-Islamic.” The State Department reports that in 2009, two people 

were killed when al-Shabaab raided a mosque in Bardhere where worshippers congregated for the 

commemoration. In another location on the same day, 50 Sufi clerics were arrested for their role in the 

celebrations; they were released after public protest. 

Killings of Christians/Converts 

The small, extremely quiet, and low-profile Christian and Christian convert community in Somalia is also 

under attack by al-Shabaab. Although conversion is not illegal in Somali, it is not accepted socially. The 

TFG Charter has banned proselytization. The few remaining Christians worship secretly in house 

churches. Reportedly, more than a dozen Christians were killed during this reporting period. Christians 

in Somalia and those who have sought refuge in neighboring countries report receiving death threats from 

al-Shabaab. 

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One of the most gruesome killings of Christians was the February 2009 beheading of two boys in 

Yonday, west of Kismayo, because their father refused to divulge information about members of their 

church. After the father fled the town, al-Shabaab soldiers took his three sons from their mother, 

beheaded two, and sent the third boy to warn the father they were looking for him. In another incident, on 

July 27, 2009 in Merka, four Christian converts were beheaded after they refused to renounce their faith. 

In November 2008, two Italian nuns were kidnapped from Kenya by al-Shabaab and held in Mogadishu 

until they were freed in February 2009. 

Hizbul Islam 

The other Islamic militia opposed to the TFG that engaged in religious freedom violations during this 

reporting period is Hizbul Islam. This umbrella group, formed in April 2009, was composed of four 

militias: Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia – Asmara Wing (ARS-A), Somali Islamic Front, Raas 

Kaambooni Forces, and Anoole Forces. Each militia is structured along clan lines. Hizbul Islam’s leader, 

Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, has been designated a terrorist by the United States for his activities with the 

1990s AIAI. Hizbul Islam has a nationalist focus, seeking a unified, Islamic Somali state. Hizbul Islam 

opposes the TFG because of its backing by Ethiopia and Western powers, believing that these outside 

influences will prevent the TFG from fully implementing sharia law. It receives support from Eritrea. 

Hizbul Islam is less organized and coordinated than al-Shabaab. According to the UN Monitoring Group 

on Somalia, it had “all but disintegrated by the end of 2009” due to internal division; however individual 

leaders continue to exert control over areas of central Somalia. For part of 2009, Hizbul Islam and alShabaab were united in their fight against the TFG, but a falling out in Kismayo at the end of September 

left the two groups fighting each other. During the fight, according to the UN Monitoring Group, key 

members of the Hizbul Islam alliance either remained neutral or joined with al-Shabaab. 

Also like al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam implements sharia law in the territories under its control, although 

with less frequency. Women are ordered to wear the veil and businessmen are required to close their 

shops at the time of praying. In July 2009, Hizbul Islam banned Istun, (the traditional ceremony) and 

later arrested nine clerics for violating the ban. 

Ahlu Sunna waa Jamma 

Ahlu Sunna waa Jamma (ASWJ) was created in 1991 as an apolitical organization to represent the 

practice of Sufi Islam in Somalia in response to the growth of radical Islam and the activities of AIAI. 

ASWJ is the only group thus far to effectively battle al-Shabaab, despite lacking a unified chain of 

command and having a fractured structure. Following the desecration of Sufi gravesites and killing of 

Sufi clerics in 2008, ASWJ took up arms to fight al-Shabaab’s strict interpretation of Islam. 

ASWJ is composed of Sufi clerics and various clan militias, and controls large parts of central Somalia, 

including Galguduud, the Middle Shabelle regions, Gedo, and most recently Hiraan. ASWJ signed an 

agreement with the TFG in March to integrate its forces with TFG security forces and to take up five 

ministerial posts in the TFG cabinet. Some ASWJ parties objected to the agreement. ASWJ receives 

financial support and training from Ethiopia. 

ASWJ also wants to implement sharia law nationwide, but according to its leadership, their version would 

only be implemented by a state, not militias, and would take into account traditional Somali Islam and 

“mitigating circumstances.” However, even in areas under ASWJ administration, there have been some 

restrictions on behavior. In November 2009, the Abudwaq district administration banned the watching of 

films, stating that they would lead people in “wrong and evil deeds.” In December 2009, an ASWJ 

administration forbade the wearing of veils, calling them a security risk. 

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Somaliland and Puntland 

In the north, the two regional governments of the self-declared “Republic of Somaliland” and Puntland 

are governed by their own constitutions. Both establish Islam as the official religion of their regions, 

prohibit promotion of another religion (though the right to study and discuss one’s religion is permitted), 

prohibit and set penalties for conversion from Islam, and require presidential candidates be Muslim. 

The Somaliland Constitution requires Islamic education and mandates that laws must derive from and not 

contradict Islam. Religious schools and places of worship in Somaliland must be approved by the 

Ministry of Religion. Christian-based NGOs are free to operate so long as they refrain from 

proselytizing. 

The Puntland Constitution, established in May 2009, provides non-Muslims the freedom to practice their 

religion, yet Puntland officials closely monitor religion and only the Shaf’iyyah Sufi order is allowed to 

practice publicly. Schools and places of worship must receive permission for activities from the Ministry 

of Justice and Religious Affairs. Permission for activities espousing Shaf’iyyah is frequently provided. 

Religious freedom violations by both state and non-state actors occurred in these two regions in this 

reporting period. Many of these events were the result of spillover violence by al-Shabaab, which has 

cells in the two regions. In September 2009, an al-Shabaab leader stated that the militia planned to wage 

“jihad battles” in Puntland and Somaliland. In Somaliland, however, a border official beat a pastor trying 

to enter Somaliland with a Bible and other Christian literature in February 2009. 

In Puntland, all reported violations were by non-state actors. In October 2009, a Somali Christian who 

refused to wear the veil was killed. In August, unknown masked gunmen killed five men from a 

Pakistani Tabliiq group in a mosque. There were a number of killings in Puntland attributed to alShabaab in which government officials, including the security minister, police officers, and 

parliamentarian Ibrahim Elmi Warsame, were murdered. Warsame had sought reforms to address the 

growth of radical Islam in Puntland, including requiring the registration of religious schools. There also 

was an assassination attempt on a judge who had recently sentenced five al-Shabaab suspects to five to 10 

years imprisonment. On February 8, 2010, al-Shabaab was accused of attempting to kill a police force 

commander and a mayor. 

Humanitarian crisis

Continuing and escalating violence in Somalia has created a humanitarian crisis that is among the worst in 

the world. Half of the population, or more than three million people, is dependent on international 

assistance for food. There are 1.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 560,000 refugees in the 

region. 

Attacks on aid workers and low funding levels make it difficult for humanitarian and refugee assistance 

organizations to provide adequate aid to IDPs within Somalia and to refugees in neighboring countries. 

The population of Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp is three times its capacity; built in 1990 to hold 90,000 

refugees, the camp currently holds almost 270,000. An expected increase in violence in Mogadishu in 

2010 will make assistance resources scarcer. 

U.S. Policy 

The United States has had no embassy or on-the-ground presence in Somalia since 1992. Outreach to 

Somali TFG officials, and operation of U.S. government programs, is conducted through a Somalia unit at 

the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Given the poor security situation in the country, U.S. government 

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officials are prohibited from traveling to Somalia, including to the relatively stable autonomous areas of 

Somaliland and Puntland. 

The U.S. government recognizes and supports the TFG. In a July 2009 meeting with President Sheik 

Sharif, Secretary of State Clinton pledged to provide military and diplomatic support and called the TFG 

Somalia’s “best hope” for stability not only for Somalia, but also for the Horn of Africa. 

In June 2009, the State Department announced it was providing cash, ammunition, and equipment to the 

TFG, as well as training TFG security officers in neighboring Djibouti. The UN Monitoring Group on 

Somalia reports that the U.S. government contributed a total of 94 tons of weapons and ammunition and 

$2 million in assistance to the TFG. The U.S. government also supports the African Union peacekeeping 

force in Mogadishu, with $185 million in funds the past two years. In the administration’s budget request 

for fiscal year 2010, peacekeeping operations receive the largest share, at an estimated $82 million. 

The security assistance programs while controversial, seek to further the U.S. government’s priorities of 

eliminating terrorist threats, supporting peace and stability, and rebuilding law enforcement institutions in 

Somalia. Additionally, in this reporting period both the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Amnesty 

International reported on the lack of professionalization among the security forces. Because many 

officers are not properly paid or fed, reports surfaced of many selling their weapons and ammunition to 

militias, including al-Shabaab. 

The United States also funds efforts to increase livelihood opportunities for young Somali men, support 

for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration activities, support local peace building efforts, 

governance, and democracy building programs. These programs include: capacity-building and training 

programs for TFG officials; supporting the constitution drafting process, the preparations for national 

elections scheduled for 2011, and efforts to build local and national judicial systems; and funding human 

rights awareness programs by indigenous civil society organizations. In fiscal year 2010, the 

administration requested only $12.5 million for these programs. The United States also funds programs 

to increase democratization, the rule of law, and economic development in Somaliland and Puntland. 

Funding for these programs is within the overall budget for Somalia. 

Finally, the U.S. government significantly contributes to appeals addressing the humanitarian crisis in 

Somalia. In fiscal year 2009, it donated $174 million in humanitarian assistance, including $150 million 

in food aid. In 2009 there were reports, confirmed by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, that 

humanitarian organizations operating in territories controlled by al-Shabaab or other opposition groups 

were required to pay “taxes” or forced to surrender assistance goods at checkpoints. Department of 

Treasury regulations prohibit U.S. funds from going to terrorists or terrorist organizations. Concerned by 

these reports, the U.S. government withheld some funding and worked with relief groups to temporarily 

suspend non-food related programs, so that they could monitor and review operations to ensure that they 

abided by U.S. regulations and no U.S. assistance reached al-Shabaab. 

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Recommendations 

USCIRF recommends that the U.S. government address human rights violations, increasing religious 

extremism and the humanitarian situation in Somalia and in Dadaab refugee camps in neighboring Kenya 

and take prompt measures to promote good governance, reconciliation, and respect for universal human 

rights, including freedom of religion or belief. 

I. Improving Human Rights, including Freedom of Religion or Belief 

The U.S. government should: 

• press the TFG not to tolerate human rights abuses by security personnel and to hold perpetrators 

accountable; 

• ensure that the new constitution incorporates international human rights standards, including freedom of 

religion or belief as defined in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 

• fund rule of law programs by the UN and non-governmental organizations in Somalia, Somaliland, and 

Puntland to establish a legal system the respects international legal standards, including freedom of 

religion or belief; 

• engage government officials, religious leaders, and clan elders in Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland on 

universal human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, and good governance; 

• increase funding for indigenous civil society organizations that promote human rights, including freedom 

of religion or belief; 

• fund non-governmental organizations that operate education programs in Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, 

and in Dadaab refugee camps, ensuring that such programs include lessons on the promotion of freedom 

of religion or belief, tolerance, and human rights to limit religious extremism; 

• increase International Visitor Program opportunities for Somalis from Somalia and the diaspora to learn 

about human rights, religious freedom, and democracy; 

• encourage Radio Mogadishu and Voice of America to increase coverage of issues related to freedom of 

religion or belief and religious tolerance; 

• support human rights training and monitoring programs by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 

Human Rights; 

• support livelihood and education opportunities for young Somali men to discourage them from joining 

militias and being co-opted by religious extremism; and 

• assess existing U.S. training programs involving Somali security officials as to whether or not they 

adequately include universal human rights and religious freedom standards and ensure the findings are 

publicly reported in Congress. 

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II. Ensuring High-Level and Consistent U.S. and International Engagement in Somalia 

The U.S. government should: 

• appoint a Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa region to ensure that Somalia receives attention at the 

highest levels of government and sustained U.S. engagement to address security, terrorism, governance, 

human rights, humanitarian, and piracy concerns; support grassroots and international peace and 

reconciliation efforts; and work with regional partners to address the regional aspects of the problem; 

• increase engagement by U.S. Department of State and other relevant agencies with the Somali diaspora 

community in the United States on human rights, freedom of religion or belief, rule of law, and good 

governance; 

• encourage international partners to engage with Somali diaspora communities in their countries on human 

rights, freedom of religion or belief, rule of law, and good governance; and 

• encourage international partners, including the UN, to increase support and funding for programs to 

promote human rights, reconciliation, and security in Somalia.

III. Addressing the Humanitarian Situation 

The U.S. government should: 

• press Kenya to approve land for the building of a fourth refugee camp site in Dadaab, to address the 

overcrowded conditions in the current camps; 

• increase support for UN and non-governmental agencies providing elementary and secondary education 

and humanitarian assistance inside Somalia; and 

• increase funding to UNHCR, and encourage international partners to do likewise, to provide humanitarian 

assistance in the Dadaab refugee camps. 

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Tajikistan 

FINDINGS: There are serious restrictions, in both law and practice, on freedom of religion or 

belief in Tajikistan. The religious freedom situation in Tajikistan has deteriorated significantly 

over the past several years. In 2009, the Tajik government passed a new religion law that codified 

some restrictions that had been informally implemented and introduced a framework for further 

restrictions. The Tajik government’s restrictions on religious freedom primarily affect Muslims, 

but also single out minority communities viewed as “foreign influenced,” particularly Protestants 

and Jehovah’s Witnesses. In 2008, a synagogue, three mosques and a church were bulldozed. In 

June 2009 a court ordered a Protestant church to vacate its building and its property by the 

Dushanbe city government expropriated its property. 

Based on this downward trend, USCIRF in 2010, as it first did in 2009, again places Tajikistan on 

its Watch List. While conditions in Tajikistan do not support designation as a “country of particular 

concern,” they require close monitoring due to the nature and extent of the violations engaged in or 

tolerated by the government. 

The Tajik government “expanded its efforts to control virtually all aspects of religious life, and 

government officials actively monitored religious groups, institutions, and figures,” the State 

Department reported in 2009, noting a decline in respect for the right to religious freedom for the 

third year in a row. The 2009 religion law extended these policies aimed at the country’s majority 

Muslim population. The law includes provisions that violate international standards on the 

freedom of religion or belief, such as onerous and intrusive registration requirements; 

criminalization of unregistered religious activity, private religious education, and proselytism; 

strict limits on mosque construction; state interference with the appointment of imams; the 

requirement of official permission for religious organizations to provide religious instruction and 

for contacts with foreign co-religionists; and state censorship of religious literature and controls on 

its import. Previous bans remain in effect on women attending mosque ,the public wearing of 

religious dress as well as Jehovah’s Witnesses and two Protestant churches. Eleven Jehovah’s 

Witnesses currently face criminal charges of inciting inter-religious discord. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: U.S. policy towards Tajikistan should place greater 

priority on the importance of the issue of freedom of religion or belief, especially because of the 

potentially destabilizing impact of the new religion law on the many observant Muslims in 

Tajikistan. The religion law’s severe restrictions on Tajikistan’s majority population should also 

be seen as a regional security issue. The U.S. government should work with Tajik officials and 

civil society to assist in amending the new religion law to bring it into conformity with 

international commitments, particularly because some officials have indicated that the new law 

could be amended. U.S. Embassy representatives should continue to monitor the trials of those 

charged in connection with religion, and work with the international community to provide training 

for judges and prosecutors in civil law and international human rights standards. U.S. officials 

should publicly criticize violations by the Tajik government of its international and Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) human rights commitments, including on freedom 

of religion or belief. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy towards Tajikistan can be found 

at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Restrictive Legal Framework 

Tajikistan enacted a problematic new religion law in March 2009. According to observers, due to 

political considerations the Tajik government was expected to begin implementing the new religion law’s 

provisions after the February 28, 2010 parliamentary elections, but has yet to do so. Tajikistan has the 

only legal Islamic political party in Central Asia, and, as the law will impose particularly serious 

restrictions on the rights of the country’s Muslim majority, its implementation could increase support for 

the Tajik political opposition. 

The law singles out mosques for specific regulation, including population quotas. According to the State 

Department, Friday prayer mosques can function in districts with 10,000-20,000 persons; five-time prayer 

mosques can function in areas with populations of 100-1,000 (the quotas are higher for Dushanbe). The 

law stipulates that imams and imam-khatibs of mosques are selected by “the appropriate state bodies in 

charge of religious affairs,” as the State Department notes, while other religions appear to be allowed to 

appoint their own leaders. Further, the place of Muslim worship is restricted to mosques, homes and 

cemeteries, and specifically excludes places of work and streets around mosques. Moreover, while any 

mosque previously could hold Koran study classes, in the future only central mosques licensed by the 

government will have permission to do so. Further, the preamble of the law notes the “special role of the 

Hanafi school of Islam” in Tajik culture, ignoring the important role of the country’s Ismaili Shi’a, who 

constitute about ten percent of the country’s population. 

More generally, the new law prohibits private religious education and requires state permits before an 

institution or organization can provide religious instruction. The law also requires both parents’ written 

permission for a child to receive religious education. Police already try to prevent children from praying 

at mosques after school hours on Fridays, and it is unclear whether children attending a religious service 

will be viewed as involving them in religious education. 

The law further mandates government approval of all published or “appropriate quantities” of imported 

religious literature, bans proselytism, and requires religious organizations to obtain government consent to 

invite foreigners to the country or attend religious conferences outside the country. The law also forbids 

religious associations from participating in political activities. 

Registration 

The new law increases to 400 the number of members required for a religious group to register. The law 

also requires the legal founders of a religious organization seeking registration to present a document 

from their local government attesting that they have lived in the area for at least five years and adhered to 

the same religion. Under the new law, all religious communities in the country were required to reregister by January 1, 2010. As the State Department noted in 2009, the Tajik government “continued to 

use the registration process to hinder, influence, or intimidate religious organizations and communities.” 

Groups that do not register or are denied registration will become illegal. 

On December 10, 2009, Tajik government officials reportedly said that as of that date, only 1,500 of the 

country’s 3,500 mosques and less than ten of the 84 non-Muslim organizations had been re-registered. 

As of March 2010, even Tajikistan’s highest officially-approved Islamic body, the Council of Ulema 

(Council of Islamic Scholars), also reportedly had not been reregistered. 

Tajikistan also has a Law on Observing National Traditions and Rituals that regulates private celebrations 

allegedly to protect the public from spending excessive amounts of money. This law also restricts the 

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manner in which individuals can conduct private celebrations, including those with religious significance, 

such as weddings, funerals, and the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. 

Criticism of the 2009 Religion Law and Response 

The international community, including the OSCE and USCIRF, raised numerous concerns about various 

aspects of the new law while it was under consideration. In March 2009, the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief told the UN Human Rights Council that the law “could lead to undue 

limitations on the rights of religious communities and could impermissibly restrict religious activities of 

minority communities.” The OSCE’s Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief also 

found that many of the law’s provisions do not meet international standards regarding the freedom of 

religion or belief. 

The country’s former chief mufti Akbar Turajonzoda—who is a leading member of the Islamic 

Renaissance Party (the legal Islamic political party)—offered an alternative, more liberal, draft religion 

law in parliament. His bill did not pass and he has condemned the new law because of its severe 

restrictions on the rights of both Muslims and non-Muslims. As a result, Turajonzoda was deprived of his 

official transportation, on which he relies due to his severe disabilities, and he resigned from the Tajik 

parliament. Members of various Tajik minority religious communities have expressed similar concerns 

about the law’s impact on freedom of religion or belief. 

Tajik officials have made contradictory statements on possible future amendments to the new religion 

law. While President Rahmon has said that the law “will not be changed,” Mavlon Mukhtarov, the 

Deputy Ministry of Culture, told USCIRF staff that the law is “not a dogma.” In March 2010, President 

Rakhmon announced a reorganization of Tajik government bodies under which the Religious Affairs 

Committee will be moved from the Ministry of Culture to the Presidential Administration. 

Restrictions on Muslims 

Government policies reflected official anxiety about Islamic extremism which was used to justify 

imposing restrictions, engaging in surveillance, and passing the 2009 religion law that included major 

restrictions on religious expression, particularly on the majority Muslim population. Authorities 

unofficially were implementing some provisions before the law was passed in 2009, but they were not 

enforced uniformly throughout Tajikistan. 

Tajik officials, including those from the State Committee on National Security, monitor mosques 

throughout the country. Officials attend services to listen to imams and observe individuals attending the 

mosques, as well as monitor audio and video cassettes for possible extremist and anti-government views. 

Officials also monitor weddings and funerals for compliance with the law on traditions and rituals. 

The Tajik government attempts to control Islamic clergy through the Council of Ulamo, a group of 

scholars and imams that interprets religious practice. While state officials refer to the Council as an 

independent body, it usually is seen being under government influence or control. Therefore, the 

Council’s “decisions and fatwas are viewed as government policies,” according to the State Department. 

In addition, Council members draft and approve sermons for distribution to imams throughout Tajikistan 

so that these texts will be read as Friday sermons.

In recent years, the Tajik government has closed many unregistered mosques and prayer rooms, ordered 

the demolition of three unregistered mosques in the capital, Dushanbe, and allowed sermons at Friday 

prayers to take place only in central mosques. The government also indirectly controls the selection and 

retention of imams, including through “attestations” on Islamic teachings and religious principles. In 

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addition, the government controls and limits the numbers of those who participate in the hajj; in early 

2009 that number was reduced from 5,200 to 4,800. In contrast, the first center for Ismaili Muslims in 

Central Asia, the Aga Khan Cultural Center, opened in Dushanbe in October 2009. 

The Tajik government “continued to enforce official and unofficial dress codes that hindered religious 

expression, including an unevenly enforced ban on girls wearing the hijab at public schools and 

universities,” the State Department noted in 2009. Although four women students reportedly were 

expelled from Tajikistan State University for wearing the hijab in 2009, government and university 

officials have made conflicting comments on the existence of an official hijab ban. Women wearing the 

hijab may be photographed for official identification purposes, particularly on the hajj, but authorities 

reportedly prevented women from wearing “non-traditional” headscarves and men from wearing Islamicstyle beards in public. The Minister of Education told the founders of a private madrassa in Dushanbe 

that they would not obtain an education license if they allowed women or girls to wear the hijab. Tajik 

authorities also have told observant Muslim men they would have to shave their beards if they wanted to 

work in bazaars, obtain passports, or work in government offices, the State Department reported. 

Government officials also harassed a prominent imam-khatib, Eshoni Nuriddin, who leads a large mosque 

in the Dushanbe area, in part because of his comments during Friday sermons, including criticism of hijab 

bans. A fatwa that bans women from praying in mosques was issued by the government-influenced 

Council of Ulema in 2004 and remains in effect, although reportedly some unregistered mosques still 

allow women to pray there. 

In 2008, the government nationalized the previously independent Islamic University, the country’s only 

religious institution of higher learning. Teachers underwent a vetting process, and the institution was 

downgraded from a university to an “Islamic institute.” The Tajik president also established a Center for 

Islamic Studies to direct religious policy under the Presidential Administration, headed by the former 

Committee on Religious Affairs director, Murodullo Dovlatov, who reportedly is also linked to the 

security services. During a meeting with USCIRF staff in May 2009, he denied that the new religion law 

violated international law, but expressed interest in cooperating with the international community. 

There are 19 private post-secondary school madrassas in Tajikistan, including one that opened in May 

2009 in Dushanbe. The religion law permits parents to teach religious beliefs to their own children at 

home, but religious homeschooling outside the nuclear family is forbidden. In southern Tajikistan, 

officials have ordered Muslim leaders to prevent school-age boys from attending any prayers at local 

mosques. 

The government has, however, relaxed a ban on printing in Arabic script by government publishing 

houses. However, state censors sill review texts to determine whether the material is nonthreatening. In 

2009, the Tajik government printed Tajik-language versions of the Koran and several Koranic 

commentaries in Tajik and Arabic. 

Restrictions on Religious Minorities 

Bans imposed in 2007 continue in effect on Jehovah’s Witnesses and two Protestant churches, Ehyo 

Church and Abundant Life Christian Center. Although the Jehovah’s Witnesses had been registered in 

Tajikistan since 1994, the Ministry of Culture banned the group in 2007 for alleged violations of the 

Constitution and the religion law. In 2008, a higher court in Dushanbe upheld the ban. In October 2009, 

a court in Dushanbe banned an unregistered Baptist group because it had met for worship in a private 

home and also because it was not registered. 

The Grace Sunmin Church, the country’s largest Protestant congregation, lost its appeal to save its 

property from repossession by Dushanbe city authorities, and the congregation was ordered to vacate its 

church in July 2009. Church leaders told USCIRF staff that the courts finally gave in to pressure from the 

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Dushanbe mayor who wanted to take over the property that the congregation had renovated. Another 

registered Protestant church in Dushanbe, whose building was demolished in 2008, had not received 

compensation after ten months, and the Culture Ministry still had not approved its rented place of 

worship, Forum 18 reported in June 2009. 

The Ministry of Culture also has banned the religious literature of organizations it considered 

inappropriate, including from the Jehovah’s Witnesses. In September 2009, 16 Jehovah’s Witnesses in 

the city of Khujand face possible criminal prosecution on charges of inciting inter-religious hatred, with a 

maximum sentence of nine years; in June religious literature was confiscated from them, Forum 18 

reported. In April 2008, the Tajik government refused to allow into the country a shipment of books by a 

Baptist organization because the size of the shipment was deemed disproportionate to the organization’s 

membership. 

In 2008, the nation’s only synagogue, located in Dushanbe, was bulldozed. The Tajik delegation at a 

2008 OSCE meeting stated that the government could not provide compensation for the building, citing 

“separation of church and state.” Dushanbe’s Jewish community received a building for use as a 

synagogue, which is now being used for worship services. The new building, however, was not provided 

as compensation by the city of Dushanbe, but donated by one of the country’s richest bankers who is also 

President Rakhmon’s brother-in-law. 

An estimated 15,000 Jews lived in Tajikistan during the Soviet period; today the community is estimated 

at a few hundred. Although there were no confirmed public anti-Semitic acts, some imams and mullahs 

preached anti-Semitic messages in mosques, according to the State Department. In addition, Tajik 

government officials have occasionally stated to the press that minority religious groups undermine 

national unity. 

U.S. Policy 

Tajikistan has strategic importance for the U.S., due in part to the key role that ethnic Tajiks also play in 

Afghanistan, the country’s southern neighbor. Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan 

and have included such major figures as that country’s former president, as well as Ahmad Shah Masoud, 

the head of the Northern Alliance who fought the Soviets and the Taliban. Moreover, Tajikistan 

resembles Afghanistan, in that it is a weak state with an inadequate and highly corrupt government. 

Tajikistan also is an isolated and impoverished country that experienced a five-year civil war in the 1990s 

that resulted in as many as 100,000 deaths. In the aftermath of the civil war, most Tajik officials, 

allegedly responsible for torture and maltreatment of detainees and prisoners, were amnestied. The UN 

Committee against Torture called on the Tajik government in 2006 to establish an independent body to 

investigate numerous allegations of torture and to punish those found responsible for such acts including 

during the civil war. 

The country’s economy is heavily dependent on labor remittances, mainly from migrant laborers in 

Russia, which, due to the economic crisis, have decreased sharply. Many Tajik migrant workers have 

returned, giving rise to new social tensions in the country. U.S. foreign, 

humanitarian, and security assistance to Tajikistan amounted to approximately $30 million in fiscal year 

2009; more than $50 million has been requested for fiscal year 2010. According to the State Department, 

the U.S.’s priority in terms of human rights and democracy promotion in Tajikistan is the development of 

democracy over the long term—a difficult task “due to the country’s isolation, isolation and other 

environmental challenges, citizens’ lack of exposure to democratic principles, and government resistance 

to meaningful democratic reforms.” U.S. programs focus on efforts to improve government capacity to 

function more fairly and competently, develop mutual accountability between local government and civil 

society, and assist the country in making needed legal reforms. The United States also would like to 

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establish a Peace Corps program in Tajikistan. The United States also assists in funding legal support for 

NGOs in their efforts to meet highly technical official registration requirements. U.S. projects also focus 

on reforming local law in Tajikistan in four key areas: criminal justice, land use, basic freedoms, and the 

business environment. 

The State Department’s 2009 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom stated that, “respect for 

religious freedom continued to decline during the reporting period,” the third consecutive year that the 

Department has noted a marked deterioration. The State Department also highlighted the following 

human rights problems: torture and abuse of detainees and other persons by security forces; impunity for 

security forces; denial of right to fair trial; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; prohibition of 

international monitor access to prisons; and restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, association, and 

religion. Specific to religious freedom, the U.S. Embassy reported that it held programs intended to foster 

a better understanding of how democracies address secularism and religious freedom, including 

roundtables with students, journalists, religious leaders, and political figures, as well as sending key 

individuals on exchange and International Visitors Programs to the United States. 

Recommendations 

The U.S. government should: 

• work with Tajik government officials responsible for religious affairs, human rights, and legal issues, 

as well as Tajik parliamentarians, civil society representatives, and the international community, to 

assist Tajikistan in amending the new religion law to bring it into conformity with Tajikistan’s 

international commitments on freedom of religion or belief, including those of the OSCE; 

• publicly criticize Tajik government violations of international and OSCE commitments on human 

rights, including respect for freedom of religion or belief, in Tajikistan and at international meetings; 

• continue to monitor the trials of leaders or members of religious communities that lose their registration 

and urge that appropriate legal measures be adopted; 

• work with the international community in Tajikistan to improve judicial standards as well as provide 

training for judges and prosecutors in civil law and international human rights standards; 

• urge the OSCE Mission in Tajikistan to pay particular attention to violations of freedom of religion or 

belief and to undertake programs in that regard, including by conducting training sessions with local 

media on international obligations; and 

• urge the Tajik government, particularly President Rakhmon, to publicly affirm his intention to fully 

comply with Tajikistan’s international commitments to respect freedom of religion or belief, as well as 

the rights of members of all peaceful religious communities in his country. 

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Turkey 

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FINDINGS: Serious limitations on the freedom of religion or belief continue to occur in Turkey. Turkey’s 

active civil society, media, and political parties influence the climate for religious freedom and help define the 

debate about the appropriate role of religion in society. Turkey has a democratic government, and the country’s 

constitution calls for the protection of the freedom of belief and worship and the private dissemination of 

religious ideas. Nonetheless, the Turkish government’s attempt to control religion and its effort to exclude 

religion from the public sphere based on its interpretation of secularism result in serious religious freedom 

violations for many of the country’s citizens, including members of majority and, especially, minority religious 

communities. The European Union (EU) continues to find that, despite some improvements since its 2001 bid to 

join the EU, “Turkey needs to make additional efforts to create an environment conducive to full respect for 

freedom of religion in practice.” An additional factor influencing the climate during the past year includes the 

alleged involvement of state and military officials in the Ergenekon plot, which included alleged plans to 

assassinate the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox patriarchs and to bomb mosques. 

Due to these concerns, USCIRF continues to place Turkey on its Watch List in 2010.* Turkey was first placed 

on the USCIRF Watch List in 2009. 

State secularism in Turkey continues to depend on full government control over all religions, and has resulted in 

significant restrictions on religious freedom, including for the majority Sunni Muslim community, the minority 

Alevis (usually viewed as a unique sect of Islam), as well as Christian and other minority communities, such as 

the Greek, Armenian, and Syriac Orthodox Churches and others. Only Sunni Islam is officially permitted, and 

the state controls all official mosques, training of Muslim clergy and the content of sermons. Despite Turkey’s 

obligations under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, the government legally has not recognized minority religious 

communities as independent entities with full legal status, such as the Ecumenical Patriarchate of the Greek 

Orthodox Church. The resulting restrictions on religious minority communities, including state policies and 

actions that effectively deny non-Muslim communities the right to own and maintain property, train religious 

clergy, obtain and renew visas for religious personnel working for these communities, and offer religious 

education, have led to the decline—and in some cases the virtual disappearance—of these communities. 

The Turkish government, in recent years, has responded quickly to arrest those suspected of violent hate crimes 

against members of religious minorities, such as individuals believed to be involved in several high profile 

murders of Christians. However, the resulting trials, like all Turkish trials, are protracted. The ruling party has 

instituted legal reforms aimed at preventing military involvement in civilian politics and providing a greater role 

for religion in public life; a constitutional reform package was before the parliament in March 2010. AntiSemitism remains a problem in the media and public discourse, due in some measure to statements and gestures 

of the Prime Minister that have been reported publicly. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: The United States regards Turkey as an important strategic partner, 

especially in light of its NATO membership, shared borders with Iraq and Iran, and emerging leadership role in 

the Middle East and Central Asia. The United States also continues to support Turkey’s bid to join the European 

Union. U.S. policy should place greater emphasis on Turkey’s compliance with its international commitments 

regarding freedom of religion or belief. For instance, the United States should encourage the Turkish 

government to address the long-standing lack of full legal recognition for religious minorities, including Alevis; 

Greek, Armenian, and Georgian Orthodox; Roman and Syriac Catholics; Protestants; and Jews. As President 

Obama noted in his April 2009 address to the Turkish parliament, the United States should continue to urge 

Turkey to permit all religious minorities to train religious clergy in Turkey, including by reopening the Greek 

Orthodox Theological Seminary of Halki. The United States also should work with Turkish authorities to allow 

women the freedom to express their religious or non-religious views through dress in order to respect both their 

beliefs and the secular status of the Turkish republic, as well as to remove legal restrictions on the wearing of 

clerical garb by non-Muslims in public. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy towards Turkey can be 

found at the end of this chapter. 
Watch List Countries

Religious Freedom Conditions 

 

Secularism in Turkish Politics 

According to the founding constitution of the Republic of Turkey established in 1923, Turkey is a secular 

state. Secularism, equated as the ideology of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, has been a continuous source of 

political-social tension, and sometimes violence. Turkey has experienced four military coups since 1923. 

Ataturk and subsequent Turkish leaders adopted policies to subject religion to state control and remove 

the public influence of religion, including expressions of personal belief. The election of the Justice and 

Development Party (known in Turkish as the AKP, or the AK Party) in 2002 was viewed by some as the 

start of the rejection of secularism as the limitation of religion in public life, although the AKP’s leader, 

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has made repeated public statements that his party supports 

secularism. 

Over the decades, political parties that disagreed with the state’s definition of secularism have been 

suppressed or banned, even though many Turks disagree with the absence of religion from public life. In 

1960, 1971, and 1980, the Turkish military ousted governments, in part, due to concerns that secularism 

was under threat. In the 1990s, the Refah (Welfare) Party confronted Turkish secularism and won a 

plurality in elections, but in 1997 was maneuvered out of power by a soft coup by the military and forced 

to disband. 

Despite its roots in the Islamist Refah Party, the AKP platform includes Turkey’s accession to the EU and 

the democratic integration of Islam into public life. Nevertheless, while some view the AKP as a 

moderate party that espouses Islamic religious values within a modern, democratic society, others contend 

that it has more radical intentions, such as the eventual introduction of Islamic law in Turkey. In July 

2008, the constitutional court ruled that the AKP had violated the constitution by serving as a center for 

“anti-secularist activities,” but rather than ban the AKP, the constitutional court reduced the party’s state 

funding by half, a more moderate action than in the past. 

In March 2010, the AKP announced a constitutional reform package focused on judicial reform. The 

changes would restructure Turkish judicial institutions, increase presidential appointments to the 

judiciary, thereby weakening the role of the courts vis-á-vis AKP legislative initiatives, and grant 

parliament power to prevent the closure of political parties. In a speech that month to parliament, Prime 

Minister Erdoğan said that the proposed constitutional amendments would “pave the way to EU accession 

and global integration for Turkey.” Critics, however, note that the proposed measures appear to be aimed 

at solidifying AKP power before the 2011 elections. The prime minister threatened to take the proposed 

amendments to a popular referendum if the parliament does not ratify them. Although the AKP has a 

majority of votes in the parliament, it lacks the two-thirds majority needed to pass constitutional 

amendments. Observers believe that the parliament is unlikely to vote on these issues before mid-April; a 

popular referendum is likely by mid-June. 

During the past year, Turkish authorities have taken action against an underground ultra-nationalist 

organization known as “Ergenekon,” which is a constellation of military groups, organized crime 

operations, right-wing political actors, and hyper-secularist groups. Viewed as part of the “deep state,” 

the Ergenekon network allegedly planned several actions that, taken together, were aimed at fomenting 

domestic societal unrest, in order to lead to a collapse of the government and/or a military coup. In 

addition, authorities alleged the group kept lists of potential targets, including Christians and Jews, and it 

* Commissioner Eid abstained from the Watch List recommendation, concluding that the situation in Turkey 

is not as serious as in Greece, which is not on USCIRF’s Watch List. 

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has been implicated in the murders of a Catholic priest in Trabzon in February 2006, three Protestants 

working for an evangelical Christian publishing house in Malatya in April 2007, and the ethnic Armenian 

journalist, Hrant Dink, in 2007. Under the so-called Cage plan, non-Muslim community leaders allegedly 

were named for assassination, including the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of the Greek Orthodox 

Church, Patriarch Mutafyan of the Armenian Orthodox Church, and Ishak Alaton of the Jewish 

community in Turkey. In one Ergenekon-related case, a Turkish army general is alleged to have plotted 

to plant weapons in the homes of followers of Muslim preacher Fethullal Gulen to create fears of Islamic 

militancy. 

In early 2010, more than 30 current and retired military officers were arrested in 13 Turkish cities in 

connection with allegations of another separate plot to overthrow the AKP government, known as the 

“Sledgehammer Plot.” First revealed by the little known Taraf newspaper and then widely circulated in 

many of the country’s best known newspapers, this plot allegedly included plans to bomb two Istanbul 

mosques, to bring down Turkish military aircraft and blame the event as a provocation by Greece, and to 

attack NATO facilities. Some Turkish military representatives have denied institutional involvement by 

the army in any plans for a coup. 

By March 2010, nearly 200 alleged Ergenekon members reportedly had been charged in Turkish courts, 

including police and retired and active army officials, businesspeople, lawyers, academics, politicians, 

journalists, and organized crime figures. Some analysts have criticized the Ergenekon investigation, 

noting that numerous detainees are prominent critics of Erdoğan’s government and individuals known to 

support strict secularism. The Ergenekon controversy has deeply polarized Turkish politics and society 

regarding the role of Islam in politics and public life; the safety of non-Muslim religious and ethnic 

minorities in Turkey; and the role of the military in civilian political institutions. Observers have widely 

divergent views on whether the Ergenekon case represents progress or regression on the Turkish road to 

democratization and the rule of law. In the first instance, the investigation and arrests of alleged members 

of a coup against a democratically elected government shows the strengthening of Turkish democracy. 

By the same token, the allegations of a plot could be used to arrest individuals opposed to the AKP and its 

political agenda. Furthermore, the case underscores the continuing challenges to the full civilianization of 

politics in Turkey. 

Restrictions on the Expression of Islam 

The Directorate of Religious Affairs, or the Diyanet, a taxpayer-funded government body under the prime 

minister’s office, controls all 80,000 mosques in Turkey and employs imams as state functionaries. The 

Diyanet only allows propagation of the Hanafi Sunni school of Islam, including through its control of the 

content of sermons in Turkey’s mosques. Religious practice and education (compulsory in state schools 

for Muslim children) only follow Hanafi doctrines, although up to 20 percent of Turkey’s Muslims are 

Alevis. Only the Diyanet is allowed to provide religious education courses outside of school for children 

above the age of 12. The practice of Islam outside of government-regulated institutions is not condoned. 

Turkey’s renowned Sufi orders were officially prohibited in the 1920s, though some still operate 

unofficially. 

Turkish secularism bans religious dress as well as the wearing of head scarves in state buildings, 

including public and private universities, the parliament, courts, and schools. Women who wear 

headscarves, and those who advocate on their behalf, have lost public sector jobs such as nursing and 

teaching. Headscarf-wearing students officially are not permitted to register even for classes at private 

institutions. In December 2008, authorities charged five members of the military with “lack of discipline” 

for allowing their wives to wear headscarves or for performing Muslim prayers. In 2006, a court upheld a 

school’s decision to fire a teacher who wore the headscarf outside of school hours. More recently, in 

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March 2009, the Supreme Election Committee declared that workers at polling stations could not wear the 

headscarf during work hours. 

The “headscarf issue” (turban) has long been the focus of political debate in Turkey. In 2005, the 

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that in view of Turkey’s constitutional legal definition 

of secularism the headscarf ban by a Turkish university did not violate the European Convention on 

Human Rights, even though it contravened religious freedom standards. In February 2008, the Turkish 

parliament voted overwhelmingly to change the 1982 constitution (written by a military-led caretaker 

government following the military coup of 1980) to guarantee all citizens the right to attend university, 

regardless of dress. Under the amendment, only traditional scarves—tied loosely under the chin—would 

be allowed. Headscarves that cover the neck, as well as the full veil, would still be banned. In June 2008, 

however, the Turkish constitutional court ruled that these amendments were unconstitutional because they 

violated the Turkish requirement of secularism. As a result, the headscarf ban remains in effect, and only 

uncovered women are permitted access to public and private universities in Turkey. 

In February 2010, the ECtHR ruled that a Turkish court violated the rights of 127 members of an Islamic 

group, Aczimendi tarikaty, by sentencing them for wearing religious dress in public. According to the 

ECtHR, the plaintiffs had been punished for wearing these traditional clothes in the street as they walked 

to a mosque, not in public institutional buildings, where religious neutrality is permitted and can override 

the right to express one’s religion. The ECtHR also ruled that the Turkish authorities had not proven that 

the plaintiffs’ dress constituted a danger to public order or that they had proselytized en route to the 

mosque, putting inappropriate pressure on passersby. The ban on public religious dress is more 

extensively targeted at non-Muslim groups, as all Christians (Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant) and 

Jews are prohibited from wearing clerical garb in the public sphere in general, not only in state buildings. 

Restrictions on Alevis 

The Alevis are Turkey’s largest religious minority community, comprising 15 to 25 percent of the 

population, though not recognized as an official minority by the state. The beliefs and practices of the 

Alevis remain a source of debate within Islam, and some Muslims consider the Alevis to be a sect of 

Twelver Shi’a Islam that has assimilated some elements of Sufi Islam, Gnostic, and Zoroastrian theology 

and rituals. The Turkish government generally views the Alevis as heterodox Muslims, although many 

Sunni Muslims and some Alevis maintain that Alevis are not Muslims. Though not granted status as a 

religious minority, Alevis reportedly are able to practice their beliefs relatively freely. Nevertheless, the 

Alevis are still subject to some discriminatory state practices, though their situation has improved in 

recent years. 

Alevis worship in what are called “gathering places” (or “cem evleri,” in Turkish). The Turkish 

government does not officially recognize cem houses as houses of worship, but rather considers them 

“cultural centers.” Alevis have reported denials and protracted delays in receiving permission to build 

cem houses. These problems reportedly have decreased in recent years. In 2008, a Turkish regional court 

ruled that cem evleri are not houses of worship, while the same year two Turkish municipalities ruled that 

they will be considered places of worship in their jurisdiction. Moreover, Alevis note that while all 

Turkish taxpayers, including Alevis, fund the construction of Sunni mosques in Alevi villages, Alevis are 

sometimes denied permission to build cem houses even in areas where they are in the majority. Some of 

the 300 groups within the large Alevi community have called for the abolition of the Diyanet because it 

exercises state control over Islamic religious life, promotes only Sunni Islam, and is funded by taxes from 

all Turkish citizens. Alevi leaders – called “Dede” or elders – are not entitled to that title under a 1925 

law, which, under the Turkish Constitution, cannot be amended. 

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Alevis object to their children having to take part in compulsory religious education for Muslims. Some 

Alevis believe that these classes should be optional for members of their community, others have 

advocated for curriculum reform so that that their religion is accurately presented, while others advocate 

the abolition of required religion courses. A member of the Turkish Alevi community brought the issue 

of compulsory Muslim education before the ECtHR, which ruled in 2007 that religious education should 

be optional for Alevis since the curriculum was limited to Sunni Islam. A Turkish regional court later 

upheld that ECtHR opinion. The religion curriculum for Turkish schools was modified in 2008, but some 

Alevis maintain that the new texts are still inadequate as they treat their community as a mystic order 

within Islam. 

In the past several years, and most recently in June 2009, the Turkish government held several workshops 

with the Alevi community to discuss their concerns. The Alevis are seeking to address five key issues: 

legal status for Alevi houses of worship; the abolishment of compulsory religious education classes; an 

end to the building of mosques in Alevi villages; the return of Alevi properties confiscated under a 1925 

law; and the establishment of a museum at the Madimak Hotel in Sivas where Alevis were killed in a 

1993 arson attack. In late 2009, as many as 200,000 Alevis demonstrated peacefully in Istanbul to urge 

the Turkish government to implement these five requests. According to information received in February 

2010 from the Turkish embassy in Washington, DC, a final document from these workshops will be 

submitted to Prime Minister Erdogan in the spring of 2010. 

Restrictions on Legal Status of Non-Muslim Minorities 

The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, a peace treaty signed between Turkish military forces and several 

European powers that formally established the Republic of Turkey, contained specific guarantees and 

protections for all non-Muslim religious minorities in Turkey.19 Since that time, however, the Turkish 

government has interpreted those treaty obligations as limited to the Greek Orthodox, Armenian 

Orthodox, and Jewish communities. Nevertheless, despite this unique status, legal recognition of these 

three religious minority communities, and guarantees cited, have not been implemented in Turkish law or 

practice, and the Turkish government continues to use the denial of legal personality to these groups as a 

mechanism to restrict their rights of religious freedom. 

Furthermore, religious groups that fall outside the Turkish government’s view of the Lausanne Treaty’s 

definition of religious minorities are severely limited in their right to freedom of religion or belief. Over 

the decades, the absence of legal personality has resulted in serious problems with regard to minority 

communities’ right to own, maintain, and transfer both communal and individual property. They also 

face major obstacles in deciding internal arrangements and training religious clergy. In some cases, these 

obstacles have led to a critical decline in these communities on their historic lands. The problems for the 

Christian minorities—including on property rights, education, and in some instances, physical security—

partly arise from the fact that most are both religious and ethnic minorities, and therefore are viewed with 

suspicion by some ethnic Turks. 

In Turkey today, there are about 65,000 Armenian Orthodox Christians, 23,000 Jews, and approximately 

1,700 Greek Orthodox Christians. When Turkey was founded in 1923, there were 200,000 Greek 

Orthodox Christians in the country. By 1955, the number had fallen to 100,000; that year, pogroms 

 

19 “Article 40 – Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security 

in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and 

control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments 

for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely 

therein.” 

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against the Greek Orthodox resulted in the destruction of private and commercial properties, desecration 

of religious sites, and killings. Due to ongoing threats, the Greek Orthodox community’s numbers 

continued to decline to their present level. In addition to the three so-called “Lausanne minorities,” at 

present, there are approximately 15,000 Syriac Christians, 10,000 Baha’is, 5,000 Yezidis, 3,300 

Jehovah’s Witnesses, and 3,000 Protestant Christians in Turkey, as well as small Georgian Orthodox, 

Bulgarian Orthodox, Maronite, Chaldean, Nestorian Assyrian, and Roman Catholic communities. The 

number of Syriac Christians in southeastern Turkey was once much higher, but government pressures and 

the war against secessionist Kurdish forces resulted in a major emigration. 

A government agency, the General Directorate for Foundations (Vakiflar), regulates all activities of nonMuslim religious groups and their affiliated houses of worship and other property. According to the State 

Department, 161 religious community foundations that existed during the Ottoman Empire were 

legislated into the foundation system. The Vakiflar recognizes these 161 “minority community 

foundations,” which include Greek Orthodox with some 74 sites; Armenian Orthodox with 48 sites, and 

Jewish foundations with 12 sites, as well as Syriac, Bulgarian and Georgian Orthodox, and Chaldean and 

Maronite Catholics. Establishing a foundation enables a religious community to gain the status of a 

collective legal entity, but rules on foundations are intrusive and onerous. Contrary to the Lausanne 

provisions, however, the properties of religious minorities in Turkey, including on the islands of Imvros 

and Tenedos, have been expropriated— private property of individuals and communal properties such as 

schools, cultural buildings, churches, and orphanages—and legal personality requirements irregularly are 

applied or suspended, with arbitrary, and sometimes, no access to the judicial system for recourse. 

A religious organization also may apply to register for official status as a non-profit association, but such 

associations cannot own property. Obtaining association status is simpler and faster than gaining 

foundation status. Nevertheless, it is granted and also may be denied by provincial governors and 

provides fewer long-term protections. 

For more than fifty years, the Turkish government has used convoluted regulations and undemocratic 

laws to confiscate hundreds of religious minority properties, primarily those belonging to the Greek and 

Armenian Orthodox communities, as well as those of the Catholic and Jewish communities. In 1936, the 

government required all foundations to declare their sources of income. Since the time of Turkey’s 

invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the Turkish High Court of Appeals ruled that minority foundations had no 

right to acquire properties other than those recognized by the state in 1936. Since that time, the 

government has seized control of hundreds of properties acquired after 1936. Although religious minority 

foundations can acquire property, previously expropriated property cannot be reclaimed, nor is there any 

state compensation for expropriated properties. Moreover, these government actions are not subject to 

appeal. Greek, Armenian, and Syriac Christians also have been restricted in the maintenance of religious 

and cultural sites, partly due to the complex process for acquiring necessary official documents. 

Additionally, minority groups cannot use funds from their properties in one part of Turkey to support 

their population elsewhere in the country. 

In recent years, some older members of the Syriac Christian community have returned to Turkey, and in 

one case, the Turkish government helped to evict a local group which had occupied homes that belonged 

to Syriac Christians. Metropolitan Yusuf Çetin of the Syrian Orthodox Church told USCIRF in 2006 that 

the Turkish government had provided some assistance in restoring churches and monasteries. More 

recently, however, a dispute has arisen over the attempted seizure by Turkish authorities of some territory 

of the 1,600-year-old Mor Gabriel monastery, the Syriac Patriarch’s residence from 1160 to 1932. 

Turkish officials reportedly have attempted to redraw the monastery’s boundary lines, claiming that the 

current boundaries impinge on the land of three neighboring, primarily Kurdish, villages. Some village 

leaders also have accused the local monks of “proselytism” for talking with students about their beliefs 

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and in their Aramaic language. There have been two court hearings related to the case, which began in 

early 2009 and are ongoing. 

Roman Catholics also have had their property confiscated by the Turkish government. In January 2010, 

Pope Benedict noted that the Catholic Church in Turkey still lacks legal status. 

Protestants in Turkey, who number about 3,000, are primarily ethnic Turkish converts from Islam. They 

often meet in the churches of other denominations, homes, and in other venues. Meeting in homes is 

often viewed with suspicion and police sometimes prevent such services, including by detaining and 

prosecuting participants. In February 2009, the ECtHR ruled that a Protestant church in Izmir had the 

right to legal status as an association and, according to the State Department, the Turkish government has 

complied with that ruling.

Jehovah’s Witnesses reportedly experience continuing harassment of their worship services, even though 

they gained the legal status of an association in 2007, thereby enabling the group to rent meeting space 

and collectively defend its legal interests in court. The State Department reported that in early 2009, 

court decisions, based on zoning laws against the use of two Jehovah’s Witnesses places of worship, were 

reversed on appeal and two other similar cases were appealed and are awaiting a verdict. 

In November 2006, the Turkish parliament, as part of EU accession reforms, passed a new law on 

Lausanne religious minority foundations, easing procedures and allowing non-Turkish citizens to 

establish such foundations. Although the law permitted the Vakiflar to continue to expropriate properties, 

it enabled religious minorities to recover limited categories of expropriated property, not including those 

that had been sold to third parties or were under government control. Then-President Ahmet Necdet 

Sezer, vetoed the law. In February 2008, the parliament passed a similar law on the return of non-Muslim 

minority properties, including orphanages, hospitals, and churches. However, the 2008 law still exempts 

property sold to third parties and the Vakiflar’s expropriation authority continues. President Gul signed 

this legislation, supported by Prime Minister Erdoğan.20

Other Restrictions on Non-Muslim Minorities 

The three officially-designated “Lausanne minorities” may operate primary and secondary schools as 

communities under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. Until 2007, in violation of the Lausanne 

Treaty, these schools were required to appoint a Muslim as deputy principal. However, in 2007, a new 

law allowed non-Muslims to take up the position. Nevertheless, regulations make it difficult for nonMuslim children to register and attend their community schools, thereby leading to the gradual 

disappearance of the community schools protected under Lausanne. School registration must be carried 

out in the presence of Ministry of National Education inspectors, who reportedly ensure that the child’s 

father is from the relevant minority community. 

 

20 On July 22, 2009, USCIRF received a delegation led by Ambassador Andreas Kakouris from the Embassy of The 

Republic of Cyprus to the United States, which consisted of Dr. Charalampos Chotzakoglou (Professor of Byzantine 

Art and Archaeology, Hellenic Open University and Museum of Kykkos Monastery), Dr. Klaus Gallas (art historian 

and Byzantine expert), and Michael Jansen (author, “War and Cultural Heritage: Cyprus After the 1974 Turkish 

Invasion”). These individuals, accompanied by the Ambassador, made a presentation respecting the actions of 

Turkish Cypriot officials and the Turkish military in connection with the destruction and/or vandalism of Greek 

Orthodox churches, monasteries and cemeteries in northern Cyprus, as well as with ongoing limitations on access to 

and worship at Greek Orthodox Christian religious sites in Northern Cyprus. USCIRF has not examined this issue 

and cannot address it at the present time, but is in the process of considering what action, if any, the Commission 

should undertake. 

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The Turkish state also has closed minority communities’ seminaries, denying these communities the right 

to train clergy, and has interfered with their internal arrangements and leadership decisions. For example, 

the Turkish government still does not recognize the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate as a legal entity. 

Moreover, it only acknowledges the Patriarch as head of the Greek Orthodox community in Turkey, not 

as Ecumenical Patriarch, despite Prime Minister Erdoğan’s January 2008 statement in parliament that 

Patriarch Bartholomew’s “Ecumenical” title was an internal church issue. In March 2010, the Venice 

Commission, a Council of Europe advisory body, stated that there is no factual or legal reason, including 

the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, for the Turkish government not to acknowledge the status of the Patriarch 

as “ecumenical,” based on the historically recognized title and prerogatives. The Turkish government 

also maintains that only Turkish citizens can be candidates to be Patriarch or hierarchs in the Church’s 

Holy Synod. The Turkish embassy in Washington, DC informed USCIRF in February 2010 that the 

government had discussed the possible application for Turkish citizenship of the relevant Greek Orthodox 

Metropolitans in August 2009 in a meeting with the Patriarchate, but no action has been taken. 

In 1971, the government’s nationalization of higher education institutions included the Greek Orthodox 

Theological School of Halki on the island of Heybeli, thereby depriving the Greek Orthodox community 

of its only educational institution for its religious leadership in Turkey. Furthermore, in November 1998, 

the school’s Board of Trustees was dismissed by the General Authority for Public Institutions. The Halki 

seminary remains closed; according to the Turkish embassy in Washington, DC, as of early 2010, the 

Turkish authorities continued to explore with the Patriarchate possible venues for its reopening. 

In 2008, the ECtHR ruled in a case brought by the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate that Turkey 

was in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) of the European Convention on 

Human Rights. The case concerned the Turkish government’s expropriation of the Greek Orthodox 

orphanage on the Turkish island of Buyukada. The court unanimously ruled against the Turkish state for 

improperly taking the orphanage owned by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Turkish government has yet 

to implement the court’s ruling. 

 

The Armenian Orthodox community, which is Turkey’s largest non-Muslim religious minority, also lacks 

a seminary in Turkey to educate its clerics and today only has 26 priests. In 2006, the Armenian Patriarch 

submitted a proposal to the Minister of Education to enable the Armenian Orthodox community to 

establish at a state university a faculty on Christian theology with instruction by the Patriarch. To date, 

the Turkish government has not responded to this request. Additionally, like the Greek Orthodox 

Patriarch, the Armenian Patriarch lacks legal personality. The Armenian Patriarch reportedly receives 

about 300 email threats daily, and has two secret police bodyguards who accompany him at all times. 

Due to the Turkish law banning the public wearing of clerical garb, foreign Christian clergy, including 

Georgian, Greek and Russian Orthodox, were required in 2009 to remove their church vestments before 

they were allowed to enter Turkey. Christian clerics in Turkey who are Turkish citizens cannot wear their 

clerical dress anywhere in public. 

Hate Crimes and Intolerance against Members of Non-Muslim Minorities 

Hrant Dink, a prominent journalist of Armenian background, was murdered in January 2007. Dink had 

been convicted under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code for “insulting” the Turkish state by publicly 

referring to the “Armenian genocide.” Due to international pressure, his conviction was changed to a 

suspended sentence. Some reports suggested that Dink had been targeted for murder because he was a 

Christian. When a USCIRF delegation met with Dink in Istanbul in 2006, he referred to repeated threats 

against his life. The trial of Dink’s alleged killer, who now has been linked to the Ergenekon plot, 

continues. According to Reporters without Borders, the trial is being conducted in a “disappointing” 

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manner. In February 2010, seven hundred activists, who called themselves Dink’s “deep family,” called 

for a parliamentary investigation into the murder. 

Roman Catholics in Turkey occasionally have been subjected to violent societal attacks. In February 

2006, an Italian Catholic priest was shot to death in his church in Trabzon by a youth angered over the 

caricatures of the Muslim prophet in Danish newspapers. Prime Minister Erdoğan and other government 

officials strongly condemned the killing. A 16 year-old boy later was charged with the murder, tried, and 

sentenced to 19 years in prison. In July 2009, Gregor Kerkeling, a Catholic German businessman, was 

murdered in an anti-Christian hate crime by a mentally disturbed young man who later confessed and has 

gone on trial. 

Although Protestants and their property have, in the past, been subject to violent attacks, reports indicated 

that there had been a decline in such incidents in 2009. Yet in August 2009, Ismail Aydin, who belongs 

to a Protestant church in Istanbul, was taken hostage at knife point. His captor announced he intended to 

kill Aydin for his missionary activities, but police persuaded the attacker to release him without harm. As 

of this writing, the trial is ongoing. Another trial also continues of two Muslim converts to Christianity 

who were charged in 2006 under Criminal Code Article 301 with “insulting Turkishness,” inciting hatred 

against Islam, and secretly compiling data on private citizens for a Bible correspondence course. 

In April 2007, three employees of an Evangelical Protestant publishing house in the city of Malatya were 

murdered. A total of 10 suspects have been arrested. Later evidence indicated that the five who 

confessed to the murders were linked to local political officers, the special military forces, and regional 

members of Turkey’s nationalist political party allegedly involved with the Ergenekon plot. In December 

2007, Turkey’s Interior Ministry also opened a judicial investigation into the alleged collusion of public 

officials in these murders; the trial is ongoing.

Although engaging in public religious expression and persuasion is not illegal in Turkey, those who do so 

are sometimes harassed and arrested. Two Christians went on trial in October 2009 for “insulting” 

Turkish identity after being arrested for discussing their faith. The issue is also the subject of public 

discussion. A day after the 2007 Malatya murders, a senior Justice Ministry official told the Milliyet 

newspaper that “missionary work is even more dangerous than terrorism and unfortunately is not 

considered a crime in Turkey.” Missionary activity also has been on the agenda of the National Security 

Council, but the major Turkish media has reduced intolerant coverage of religious minorities since the 

2007 Malatya murders. For example, ATV, a popular national TV channel, reportedly has dropped 

broadcasts on “illegal” churches or the conversion of Turks to Christianity. Nevertheless, intolerant 

reports continue in local and ultra-nationalist newspapers, as well as on Web sites and blogs, according to 

sources in Turkey. In addition, “missionary activity” is listed as a national threat linked to foreign 

funding in compulsory eighth-grade public school texts on the History of Turkish Republican Reforms 

and Atatürkism. 

Approximately 96 percent of Jews in Turkey are descendants of those who fled religious persecution in 

Spain or Portugal in 1492. According to Jewish community representatives in Turkey, their situation is 

better than in other majority Muslim countries. They are able to worship freely and their places of 

worship generally receive government protection if needed. Jews also operate their own schools, 

hospitals, two elderly persons’ homes, and welfare institutions, as well as a newspaper. 

Nevertheless, in 2003 and 2004, extremists attacked synagogues in Turkey, and in recent years there has 

been growing anti-Semitism in some sectors of Turkish media and society. Some link increased antiSemitism to Turkish opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the 2009 Israeli military campaign in Gaza, 

and an incident in which Prime Minister Erdoğan left a roundtable at the G-8 meeting in Davos to protest 

comments by Israeli President Peres about the Gaza campaign. During the Gaza campaign, virulently 

anti-Semitic signs, posters, and caricatures appeared at anti-Israel demonstrations and in many Turkish 

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newspapers. Jewish community organizations reportedly received anti-Semitic mailings and phone calls. 

Nevertheless, in a 2009 interview with Turkey’s Milliyet newspaper, the president of the Turkish Jewish 

community said that he “does not believe that anti-Semitism exists throughout Turkey.” He also praised 

Prime Minister Erdoğan for publicly denouncing anti-Semitism, stating that the Jewish community’s 

“only problem is the majority’s tendency to view minorities as removed from the general population.” 

National Identity Cards 

Religious affiliation is listed on Turkish national identity cards, but some religious groups, such as the 

Baha’is, are unable to state their religion because it is not on the official list of options. Although a 2006 

law allowed individuals to leave the religion section of their identity cards blank or apply to change the 

religious designation, the Turkish government reportedly continued to restrict applicants’ choice of 

religion. These denials cause difficulties for religious minority students to opt out of Islamic religion 

classes in public schools. In a case brought by an Alevi librarian, the ECtHR ruled in February 2010 that 

Turkish identity cards should not require the listing of religious affiliation. 

Conscientious Objectors 

Turkish law does not include a provision for alternative military service. Although a draft law was 

introduced in late 2008, it is considered unlikely to be adopted. A July 2008 Ministry of Justice decree 

states that deserters can only be arrested and detained by police with a court warrant, so that conscientious 

objectors no longer can be arrested by the military at a recruitment office. Nevertheless, if an objector 

refuses conscription, or to wear a military uniform, these acts are treated under the Military Criminal 

Code as a refusal to obey orders and may initiate a cycle of prosecution and imprisonment. 

Conscientious objectors fall mainly into two groups: pacifists who totally refuse any compulsory state 

service, including civilian service, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, who reject military service but are willing to 

serve in an alternative capacity that is strictly civilian. Although Turkish law does not provide for official 

conscientious objector status, reportedly there are about 89 conscientious objectors in Turkey who are not 

Jehovah’s Witnesses, and about 30 Jehovah’s Witnesses. In December 2009, a Muslim man, Enver 

Aydemir, who refused to serve in the secular Turkish army was arrested and put in military detention. In 

March 2010, he was sentenced to 10 months imprisonment for desertion. Aydemir alleged torture while 

in detention and his father sent a letter of complaint to the Turkish parliament’s Human Rights 

Commission which is investigating the claim. In recent years, young Jehovah’s Witnesses have been 

maltreated and repeatedly prosecuted for conscientious objection to military service. At the end of this 

reporting period, there are no known Jehovah’s Witnesses in detention. 

EU Accession and Legal Reforms 

In March 2001, the EU adopted the Accession Partnership as a roadmap for the process of Turkey’s bid to 

join the Union, requiring the Turkish government to implement numerous reforms to ensure that its laws 

are consistent with EU standards. In accord with his goal of EU membership, since 2002 Prime Minister 

Erdoğan has instituted a number of unprecedented democratic reforms, including domestic human rights 

reforms. The Turkish constitution was amended to ensure the primacy of international and European 

human rights conventions over domestic law. Various laws, including the Penal Code, Anti-Terror Law, 

and the Press Law, also have been amended. Changes to the Penal Code limited convictions on 

incitement charges, narrowed the scope of defamation, and strengthened the principle of equality between 

men and women. In addition, Turkey has boosted efforts since 2002 to comply with the decisions of the 

ECtHR. 

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Due to Turkey’s failure to implement the customs union arrangement with Cyprus, however, the 

European Union suspended eight chapters of the Accession Protocol in 2006. In February 2008, the 

Council of the European Union issued a revised accession partnership with Turkey and set goals that 

include human rights and religious freedom. 

The Turkish government has ratified three major international human rights treaties, including the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). However, the Turkish government placed 

a reservation on Article 27 of the ICCPR, thereby setting conditions on its commitment to cultural, 

religious, and linguistic rights for members of those religious minority groups to which the Lausanne 

Treaty refers. Article 27 reads, “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 

persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members 

of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 

language.” The Turkish government reservation states, “The Republic of Turkey reserves the right to 

interpret and apply the provisions of Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 

in accordance with the related provisions and rules of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and the 

Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923 and its Appendixes.” Considering the government’s narrow 

definition of the rights and status of those minorities under the treaty, the reservation potentially 

undermines the guarantees to “profess and practice” religion in Article 27, and possibly the more 

extensive religious freedom guarantees found in Article 18. 

In a set of EU-related reforms passed in April 2008, the parliament amended Article 301of the Turkish 

Criminal Code, which criminalizes alleged insults to the Turkish state or “Turkish identity.” While the 

amendment appears to expand free speech protections, its vague language increases the possibility of 

abuse as has occurred in the past. Although EU concerns with this provision focused on freedom of 

expression, there also are implications for freedom of religion or belief. Turkish prosecutors have 

brought charges under Article 301 to restrict the rights of religious expression and persuasion of members 

of minority religious and ethnic groups. 

In 2009, according to the Turkish embassy, the Turkish government announced the establishment of an 

autonomous National Human Rights Institution that will serve also as the national preventive mechanism 

when parliament adopts the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Prevention of Torture. The 

Turkish government also reportedly plans to establish a Commission against Discrimination, as well as a 

complaints mechanism on the work of law enforcement authorities. 

Nevertheless, in its most recent progress report on Turkey, issued in October 2009, the European Union 

concluded that, although there had been some progress, serious religious freedom problems remained. 

The report stated: “Overall, implementation of the 2008 law on foundations has been smooth. The 

Government has undertaken a dialogue with the Alevi and non-Muslim religious communities. However, 

their specific problems have yet to be addressed. Attacks against minority religions still occur. A legal 

framework in line with the [European Convention on Human Rights] has yet to be established, so that all 

non-Muslim religious communities and Alevi community can function without undue constraints, 

including as regards training of clergy. Further efforts are needed to create an environment conducive to 

full respect of freedom of religion in practice.” 

U.S. Policy 

The U.S. government has long viewed Turkey as an important strategic partner: Turkey is a NATO ally 

and there is a U.S. airbase in Incirlik, Turkey; the country has partnered with Azerbaijan and Georgia to 

open an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea, thereby avoiding Russian- owned transit routes; and Turkey’s 

proximity to Iraq and Iran put it literally on the frontlines of U.S. foreign policy. Although bilateral 

relations were strained in 2003 when Turkey refused to allow U.S. troops to deploy through its territory to 

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Iraq, relations have since improved. The United States strongly supports Turkey’s accession into the 

European Union. There also is significant U.S. trade and direct investment in Turkey. 

According to the State Department’s 2009 religious freedom report, the government of Turkey “generally 

respected religious freedom in practice; however, the government imposes limitations on Islamic and 

other religious groups and significant restrictions on Islamic religious expression in government offices 

and state-run institutions, including universities, for the stated reason of preserving the ‘secular state.’” 

The primary goals of U.S. human rights policy in Turkey are to promote a more democratic government 

and to support relevant legal reforms, including constitutional revisions, an independent, professional 

press, and greater religious freedom. The United States also emphasizes that it is important to express 

and discuss minority viewpoints or controversial topics. In March 2010, the Foreign Affairs Committee 

of the U.S. House of Representatives narrowly condemned, by a 23 to 22 vote, as genocide the deaths of 

as many as 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Turks in 1915 during World War I. The Turkish 

government, which has long denied that those mass killings constituted planned genocide, protested the 

resolution by recalling its ambassador from the United States and calling on the Obama administration to 

prevent the resolution from reaching the House floor. 

The United States also promotes policies to protect freedom of religion and to allow the free functioning 

of non-Muslim religious institutions, and U.S. presidents have called consistently since the 1970s for 

Turkey to re-open the Greek Orthodox Theological School of Halki under the auspices of the Ecumenical 

Patriarchate and to take specific steps to address concerns of the ethnic Kurdish population and other 

minority communities. The U.S. government cooperates with Turkey to assist in the advancement of 

freedom of expression and religion, respect for individual human rights, civil society, and promotion of 

ethnic diversity. Several Congressional resolutions reiterate this focus. On March 6, 2009, H.Res.220 

was introduced, urging Turkey to respect the rights and freedoms of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 

Congress also called upon the government of Turkey to facilitate the reopening of the Ecumenical 

Patriarchate’s Theological School of Halki (H.Res.356). 

On April 6, 2009, President Obama visited Turkey and addressed Turkish Parliament. He emphasized the 

U.S. interest in Turkey’s recognition of the importance of religious freedom, for example by reopening 

the Halki seminary. While in the country, President Obama also met with the leaders of Turkey’s 

majority and diverse religious minority communities. 

Recommendations 

I. Pressing for Immediate Improvements to End Religious Freedom Violations 

In its bilateral relations with Turkey, the U.S. government should urge the Turkish government to bring 

its laws and practices into compliance with international standards on freedom of religion or belief, 

including by promptly taking the following steps: 

• allow for the independent and peaceful practice of Islam outside of the Diyanet and end the legal 

prohibition on Sufi spiritual orders; 

• allow women the freedom to express their religious or nonreligious views through dress so as to 

respect their beliefs as well as the secular status of the Turkish republic, while ensuring a lack of 

coercion for those choosing not to wear headscarves and protecting the rights and freedoms of others, 

and providing access to public education and to public sector employment for those choosing to wear 

a headscarf; 

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• remove restrictions on the ability of leaders of majority and religious minority communities to wear 

clerical garb in public areas, state institutions, and public and private universities, and remove 

additional restrictions on leaders of the minority Christian, Jewish, or other communities from 

wearing clerical garb in the public space; 

• encourage the Prime Minister’s office and the Diyanet to work with the Alevi community regarding 

the recognition of that community in Turkey; grant official status to Alevi cem houses of worship for 

those communities which have applied for such status; amend school curricula on religion in line with 

the 2010 European Court of Human Rights ruling; and act in accordance with international human 

rights obligations to protect and punish discrimination against Alevis; 

• grant full legal recognition for religious minorities, including Alevis; Greek, Armenian, Georgian and 

Syrian Orthodox; Roman and Syriac Catholics; Protestants; and Jews; by 

--fully implementing the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and providing all non-Muslim communities with 

legal status that affords them full property rights including the right to inherit, purchase, possess, 

maintain, and sell property; or 

--amending the Law on Associations so that it provides religious communities with legal status 

that affords them the right to inherit, purchase, possess, maintain, and sell property; 

• expand the process to regain clear title or fair compensation for expropriated holdings to include 

properties sold to third parties or held by the government, and to end the authority of the Vakiflar or 

any government agency to seize the property of any religious community; 

• instruct officials to drop their legal case to seize some of the land which is the property of the Mor 

Gabriel Syrian Orthodox monastery; 

• instruct officials to uphold the decision of the European Court of Human Rights and return the 

orphanage on the Turkish island of Buyukada to the Greek Orthodox Church; 

• carry out Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 2008 statement that the Ecumenical status of the Greek Orthodox 

Patriarchate should be an internal church issue by granting official recognition to the Ecumenical 

status of the Patriarch, in line with the 2010 opinion by the Council of Europe Venice Commission; 

• permit all religious minorities, including those not covered by the Lausanne Treaty, to train religious 

clergy, including by: 

--as repeatedly and formally requested by every U.S. President since 1971, permitting the 

reopening of the Halki Seminary, according to Turkey’s international obligations, and allowing 

for religious training to occur; and 

--encouraging the Ministry of Education to respond favorably to the official request of the 

Armenian Patriarch to permit his community to establish a theological faculty on Christian 

theology that incorporates instruction from the Patriarch, as required under Turkey’s international 

obligations; 

• permit religious communities to select and appoint their leadership in accordance with their internal 

guidelines and beliefs, according to Turkey’s international obligations, and end Turkish citizenship 

requirements for the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Holy Synod; 

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• continue to condemn violent hate crimes against members of religious and ethnic communities and 

ensure prompt investigation and prosecutions of such crimes; 

 

• take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish acts of anti-Semitism, including condemnation of 

anti-Semitic acts, and, while vigorously protecting freedom of expression, counteract anti-Semitic 

rhetoric and other organized anti-Semitic activities; 

• further amend Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which restricts freedom of expression and has 

associated negative effects on freedom of religion or belief; 

• omit the legal requirement to list religious affiliation on official identification cards, in line with the 

March 2010 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights; and 

• continue to undertake practical initiatives to establish and enhance trust among the country’s diverse 

religious and ethnic communities, including convening public roundtables on the local and national 

levels; at a high political level, publicly expressing commitments to a democratic and diverse Turkish 

society; and developing civic education programs that reflect the religious and ethnic diversity of 

Turkish society, past and present.

II. Advancing Religious Freedom through Multilateral Efforts 

The U.S. government should: 

• encourage the Turkish government, in view of its standing invitation to receive visits by UN human 

rights special rapporteurs, and, in the near future, actively to schedule and receive such visits, by 

relevant rapporteurs, including the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the 

UN Independent Expert on Minority Issues; 

 

• to ensure full respect for the protection of freedom of religion or belief to minority communities, 

encourage the Turkish government to remove its reservation to Article 27 of the ICCPR; 

• speak out publicly at Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) meetings and 

events about violations by the government of Turkey of OSCE human rights commitments, including 

those concerning respect for freedom of religion or belief; 

• urge the Turkish government to request that the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human 

Rights (ODIHR) Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief to: 

--provide an assessment of Turkey’s legislation relating to that issue; 

--conduct conferences with relevant government officials, leaders of religious communities, and 

members of civil society on teaching about religion in public schools from a human rights 

perspective; and 

--provide training sessions for members of the Turkish judiciary and law enforcement on how to 

combat hate crimes, including those motivated by religious prejudice; and 

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• interpret the Turkish Constitution and the Lausanne Treaty consistent with international obligations, 

such as Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and OSCE 

commitments on freedom of religion or belief. 

 

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Venezuela 

FINDINGS: Violations of freedom of religion or belief continue in Venezuela. These 

violations include: government rhetoric, and in some cases government actions, against the 

Jewish and Catholic communities and certain Protestant groups; virulent anti-Semitic 

statements by President Hugo Chavez, senior government officials, state media, and proChavez media; societal attacks on Jewish and Catholic institutions and Catholic leaders and the 

Venezuelan government’s failure to investigate or hold accountable the perpetrators of these 

attacks; and the potential negative impact of new laws on religious communities. 

Based on these concerns, USCIRF again places Venezuela on its Watch List in 2010. In 2009, 

the Commission placed Venezuela on its Watch List for the first time. 

Since 1998, the country has witnessed a steady increase in government rhetoric, and in some 

cases government actions, directed against the Venezuelan Jewish and Catholic communities 

and Protestant groups supported by U.S.-based counterparts. These developments occurred 

against a backdrop of efforts by President Hugo Chavez to extend his political control over 

government institutions, the economy, and society; his backtracking on democracy; and the 

imposition of his state-run programs on “Bolivarian socialist” doctrine. While there are no 

official restrictions on religious practice, actions by President Chavez and other government 

officials have created an environment in which Jewish and Catholic religious leaders and 

institutions are at risk of attack. Furthermore, the Venezuelan government has failed to take 

adequate measures to bring to justice perpetrators of attacks on Jewish and Catholic religious 

leaders and institutions. 

PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: The U.S. government should increase its efforts to 

promote freedom of religion or belief in Venezuela, but this must be done in a way so as not to 

put religious communities in danger, considering the poor state of relations between the two 

countries and President Chavez’s efforts to stand in opposition to the United States. The U.S. 

government should continue its policy of speaking out against attacks on religious leaders and 

institutions as they occur. The U.S. government should also work with countries such as Spain 

and Brazil that may have influence with the Venezuelan government to encourage it to end its 

anti-Semitic statements; fully investigate attacks on religious communities, institutions, and 

leaders; and hold perpetrators accountable. Additional recommendations for U.S. policy 

towards Venezuela can be found at the end of this chapter. 

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Religious Freedom Conditions 

Legal Environment 

The Constitution of Venezuela provides for freedom of religion on the condition that its practice does not 

violate public morality, decency, or public order. Religious groups are required to register with the 

Directorate of Justice and Religion (DJR) in the Ministry of Interior and Justice, but this is largely an 

administrative requirement. The DJR provides religious groups with subsidies to conduct educational and 

social programs, which has historically been distributed to Catholic organizations. Recent years have 

seen a reduction in subsidies provided to Catholic organizations and the Episcopal Conference of 

Venezuela, and an increase in funding to evangelical groups implementing government-approved social 

programs, as well as larger shares of government revenue directed to state-operated social programs. 

In the past year, there have been some legislative initiatives that, if implemented, would negatively impact 

religious communities in Venezuela. The Catholic Church feels particularly threatened by these 

initiatives, viewing them as punitive measures in the government’s effort to silence voices critical of 

Venezuelan government policies. 

In August 2009, the National Assembly passed an education reform bill that if fully implemented would 

negatively impact religious instruction in Venezuelan private schools. The law creates “communal 

councils” to supervise and control all public and private schools, including religious schools. These 

councils, which are to be dominated by the ruling party, will have the authority to determine curriculum, 

teachers, and school administrators. The law also prohibits the teaching of lessons which run counter to 

the state’s Bolivarian socialist doctrine. Given that the Venezuelan government has severed relations 

with the state of Israel and frequently denounces Israeli foreign and regional policy, Jewish schools are 

concerned that this prohibition against certain topics deemed contrary to the Bolivarian doctrine would 

impact their lessons on Israel and the Jewish people. The law also calls for the promotion of indigenous 

languages in schools. Jewish institutions are concerned this could negatively impact Hebrew language 

courses. 

The Catholic Church is also concerned that a law passed in 2009 to protect nationally important historic 

buildings would allow the government to confiscate Church property, including churches, schools, and 

other ecclesiastical buildings. The Church reports that in Caracas, the local district council leader in 

October announced plans to seize several church-run schools as part of this initiative. 

Finally, the National Assembly is currently working on draft legislation that would increase oversight of 

all non-governmental organizations, including religious organizations. At the time of this writing, the 

current draft would reportedly require organizations that receive at least 10 percent of their support from 

foreign sources to obtain advanced government approval of their activities and funding sources. The 

legislation would also require such organizations to provide the government with information on their 

sources of funding, organizational leadership, and activities. 

Anti-Semitism 

Thousands of Jews have left the country in the 10 years since President Chavez came to power, and the 

population today is estimated to be between 10,000 and 15,000, down from an estimated 22,000 in 1998. 

The emigration has resulted in part due to fear of potential negative results of the president’s socialist 

agenda, but more recently because of anti-Semitism and targeting of the Jewish community. Notably, 

prior to President Chavez’s rule, the country was not known to have problems of anti-Semitism; rather it 

enjoyed a reputation of welcoming Jews during and after the Holocaust. However, increased incidents of 

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societal anti-Semitism and the increasing rate of verbal attacks on the community by government officials 

is undermining that legacy and is creating fear of future attacks in the Venezuelan Jewish community.

For many years, President Chavez, government officials, government-controlled media, and President 

Chavez’s supporters have used a variety of methods to intimidate the country’s Jewish community. AntiSemitism in the country has appeared in waves, with upsurges corresponding with important international 

events or domestic political periods, such as the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict and the lead-up to a 2007 

national referendum on proposed changes to the Venezuelan constitution. Anti-Semitic rhetoric and acts 

in Venezuela escalated to a new level at the end of 2008 and in the early months of 2009, corresponding 

to the Israel-Gaza conflict, fostering a climate permissive of anti-Semitic actions. 

President Chavez and other senior government officials’ severe criticisms of the state of Israel frequently 

cross the line to be anti-Semitic, including comparing the actions of Israeli officials to those of Nazis, 

blaming Israel and Jews for the world’s problems, and promoting stereotypes of Jewish financial 

influence and control. Government media echo anti-Semitic sentiments across the country that can be 

found in cartoons and opinion pieces, heard on radio programs and in rallies. Anti-Semitic cartoons and 

graffiti repeatedly have equated the Star of David with a swastika. Often, the actions of the state of Israel 

are conflated with Venezuelan Jews, who are in turn held responsible for Israel’s policies. While reports 

of anti-Semitism in Venezuela have decreased since February 2009, this pattern suggests that government 

and societal anti-Semitic statements and actions can target Venezuelan Jews at any time, especially if 

Israel undertakes policies opposed by the Venezuelan government. 

While it is not anti-Semitic to criticize the policies of the state of Israel, such criticism can take on antiSemitic qualities. Several international organizations in Europe have noted that anti-Semitism can 

include actions beyond verbal and physical assaults, such as promoting the stereotype that Jews control 

the media, economy, government and social institutions; questioning the loyalty of Jews to their own 

nations; comparing Israel’s actions to those of Nazis; and holding Jews responsible for Israeli actions. 

Such statements and government raids against the Jewish community center La Hebraica in Caracas in 

2004 and 2007 led the State Department to list Venezuela as a state sponsor of anti-Semitism in the 

March 2008 Contemporary Global Anti-Semitism Report. 

In its February 2010 report documenting human rights violations in Venezuela, the Organization for 

American States’ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also expressed concern for increasing 

anti-Semitism and attacks on the Jewish community in Venezuela. The report concludes that the state’s 

actions are “creating an atmosphere of intimidation and violence against the Jewish community in 

Venezuela,” and calls on the Venezuelan government to investigate attacks on the Jewish community and 

hold perpetrators accountable. 

President Chavez continued to make anti-Semitic statements throughout 2009, including comparing the 

actions of Israel in Gaza to genocide and stating that Israel aims to “terminate the Palestinian people.” 

For example, President Chavez made these statements in Venezuela as well as on state trips to Syria and 

France in September. 

In July and August 2009, President Chavez and pro-Chavez media in Venezuela made several statements 

in connection with the removal of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, accusing Israel and Jews of 

playing a role in the ouster and working with the de facto Honduran president, Robert Micheletti. Many 

of these statements were perceived as anti-Semitic; some compared the activities in Honduras to Israeli 

actions in the Middle East, as well as expounded conspiracy theories such as that Israel controlled the UN 

and Organization of American States. 

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There were no new violent attacks on Jewish institutions since the Commission’s May 2009 annual 

report. However, there also was no progress in investigating or prosecuting individuals responsible for 

the attacks on the Tiferet Israel Synagogue and the Beth Shmuel synagogue, which occurred in January 

and February 2009, respectively. 

The Venezuelan Jewish community also is concerned by the increasing diplomatic, military, financial, 

and trade ties between Iran and Venezuela and the growing relationship between Iranian President 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and President Chavez. Head of state visits are frequent and joint ventures are 

estimated to be worth $20 billion. In April 2008, the two countries signed a Memorandum of 

Understanding pledging full military support and cooperation. Former Manhattan District Attorney 

Robert Morgenthau has said that investigations by his office show Iran is using Venezuela’s established 

banking network to skirt international sanctions and acquire the materials needed for its nuclear program 

and fund terrorist groups. Of particular concern is the fact that direct flights between Caracas and Tehran 

undergo less stringent security checks than other flights to Caracas. The State Department has warned 

that these flights may allow Hezbollah agents to enter Venezuela. Hezbollah is cited on the U.S. 

terrorism list. 

Government-Catholic Church Tensions 

There are also tensions between the Catholic Church and the Venezuelan government over Catholic 

leaders’ criticism of the government’s actions and direction. In response to such criticism, President 

Chavez has claimed that Venezuela’s Catholic Church and the Vatican are conspiring with the United 

States against his government. On several occasions, he has accused the Church of attempting a coup or 

being party to plans to assassinate him, and has called Catholic leaders “oligarchs” and “the devil.” 

As is the case with the Jewish community, the Venezuelan government’s posture toward the Catholic 

Church has been reflected in some societal attacks on Catholic institutions. On several occasions, proChavez supporters have forcefully entered and occupied the residence of Catholic leaders or staged 

protests outside of their churches to hold a press conference to denounce leaders of the Catholic Church 

and the Papal Nunciature. No arrests have been made in these incidents. Additionally, no arrests have 

been made in the January 2009 attack on the house of the Apostolic Nunciature. 

In November 2009, in Los Teques, Chavez supporters played loud music outside of the church of a priest 

critical of the government to drown out his preaching. In August 2009, a similar event took place outside 

of the church of Cardinal Jose Urosa Savino of Caracas, who has been very critical of the President and 

helped lead opposition to a new education law. In addition, some priests have been threatened for 

preaching against Chavez’s proposed reforms. 

U.S. Policy

U.S.-Venezuelan relations remained poor in 2009, although the two nations returned their ambassadors to 

their posts in June and July, after recalling them to their respective capitals in 2008. In April 2009, 

Presidents Obama and Chavez had some brief exchanges at the Fifth Summit of the Americas, but no oneon-one meeting took place. However, the brief encounters drew attention when the Venezuelan president 

gave President Obama a book describing the European and U.S. “pillage” of Latin America. Since 

bilateral relations first deteriorated in 2002, Venezuelan President Chavez has continued to insult the 

United States and seek relations with nations, including those with numerous dictators and human rights 

abusers, to stand in opposition to “the Empire.” 

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There are some areas of cooperation between the two nations, principally on trade, and notably oil. The 

United States is Venezuela’s most important trading partner, with approximately 60 percent of 

Venezuelan exports going to the United States. Venezuela is the United States’ third-largest export 

market in Latin America. Previously, the two nations cooperated extensively to stop narcotics trafficking, 

but in 2005, the Venezuelan government accused the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration of espionage 

and ended its cooperation with the agency. 

The U.S. government continues to be concerned by President Chavez’s efforts to increase his control over 

state institutions and silence independent and critical voices, including opposition politicians and 

independent media. U.S. government assistance in Venezuela is relatively small, standing at only $6 

million in fiscal year 2009. There is no USAID presence in the country; programs are carried out by 

U.S.-based and indigenous non-governmental organizations. U.S. funds support both pro-government 

and opposition civil society organizations in order to increase dialogue and positive debates between the 

two sides. Funds to civil society groups support efforts to promote and protect human rights in the 

country through training in community activism, increase civic engagement, and develop strategies to 

protect human rights defenders. One-fifth of the funds were devoted to increasing political competition 

and pluralism in the nation. 

The U.S. government routinely meets with religious communities and speaks out against anti-Semitic 

attacks as they occur. Given the poor state of relations between the two nations, there is little interaction 

between U.S. Embassy officials and Venezuelan officials, preventing a thorough discussion of freedom of 

religion or belief between the two nations. 

Recommendations 

I. Advancing Religious Freedom through U.S. Programs and Policies 

The U.S. government should: 

• at the highest levels, publicly denounce Venezuelan government rhetoric and raids against, as well as 

societal attacks on, religious communities, institutions, and leaders, and urge the Venezuelan 

government to promptly investigate, arrest, vigorously prosecute, and hold to account all perpetrators 

of such attacks; 

• at the highest levels, speak out publicly and continue to draw international attention to statesponsored anti-Semitism in Venezuela; 

• work within the current overall policy framework to ensure that violations of freedom of religion and 

belief, and related human rights, are included in all bilateral discussions with the Venezuelan 

government, including economic and energy sector discussions; 

• ensure that funding for democracy and human rights promotion in Venezuela includes support for 

activities advancing freedom of religion or belief; and 

• dispatch the Ambassador-at-Large for Religious Freedom and the Special Envoy to Monitor and 

Combat Anti-Semitism to Venezuela and report on religious freedom abuses in that country. 

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II. Advancing Religious Freedom through Multilateral Efforts 

The U.S. government should: 

• work with countries that may have influence with the Venezuelan government to encourage the 

government to end its instigation, complicity, promotion of, or acquiescence in anti-Semitic activities 

taking place in the country, including anti-Semitic statements by government officials and antiSemitic cartoons and statements in the state media, as well as to fully investigate all reported 

incidents of anti-Semitism and bring perpetrators to justice;

• work with countries who may have influence with the Venezuelan government to encourage the 

government to fully investigate attacks on religious communities, institutions, and leaders, and hold 

perpetrators accountable, including prosecuting those persons arrested for the attack on the Tiferet 

Israel Synagogue and arresting and prosecuting individuals of La Piedra, the group that took credit for 

the January 2009 attack on the house of the Apostolic Nunciature; 

• work with the Organization of American States, including the OAS General Assembly and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, to investigate and condemn religious freedom violations in 

Venezuela, including state-sponsored anti-Semitism and attacks on religious communities, 

institutions, and leaders; 

• encourage the UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief and the UN Special 

Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Expression to request a visit 

to the country; and 

• support a UN General Assembly resolution condemning severe violations of human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief, in Venezuela, and calling for impartial and effective investigations and 

for officials responsible for such violations to be held accountable. 
Additional Countries Closely Monitored 

Additional Countries Closely Monitored 

Bangladesh 

USCIRF placed Bangladesh on the Watch List from 2005 to 2008. That placement was due to past 

election-related violence targeting religious minorities and the then-government’s failure to investigate or 

prosecute perpetrators of such violence; attacks by Islamist extremists on the country’s secular judicial 

system, civil society, and democratic political institutions; religiously-motivated threats to freedom of 

expression to discuss sensitive social issues; the seizure of Hindu-owned property and continued failure to 

restore such properties or to reimburse the rightful owners; and the greater vulnerability of members of 

religious minority communities, particularly women, to exploitation or violence. 

In December 2008, free and fair elections restored democratic government in Bangladesh, following a 

two-year interruption by a military-backed caretaker regime. The 2008 elections brought to power the 

Awami League, considered to be the most secular and favorably disposed toward minority rights among 

Bangladesh’s major political parties. The 2008 elections were free of the anti-minority violence that 

followed the last national elections in October 2001. Following those earlier elections, the thengovernment, composed of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its Islamist coalition partners, 

failed to investigate or prosecute acts of severe violence, including killings, rape, land seizures, arson, and 

extortion against religious minorities, particularly Hindus, who were perceived to be allied with the thenopposition Awami League. 

 

The new government, headed by Sheikh Hasina Wajed, included three non-Muslims among the 38 

ministerial positions. Members of minority communities also were appointed to other senior government 

and diplomatic positions. In April 2009, the Prime Minister made a public commitment that her 

government would repeal all laws that discriminate against members of minority communities, ensure 

freedom of expression for members of all religious communities, and uphold equality of opportunity and 

equal rights for all citizens. The Prime Minister also declared that the government would keep past 

commitments to the predominantly non-Muslim indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) 

region. In light of these positive developments, USCIRF removed Bangladesh from its Watch List in 

2009. 

Despite some improvements, the government of Bangladesh nevertheless continues to show serious 

weaknesses in protecting human rights, including religious freedom, and religious extremism remains a 

persistent threat to rule of law and democratic institutions. Accordingly, USCIRF continues to urge the 

government to strengthen protections for all Bangladeshis to enjoy the right to freedom of religion or 

belief, and to undertake further efforts to improve conditions for minority religious communities. 

USCIRF hopes that the government of Bangladesh will investigate and to the fullest extent of the law 

prosecute perpetrators of violent acts against members of minority religious communities, women, and 

non-governmental organizations. Reforms of the judiciary and the police also are necessary to ensure that 

law enforcement and security services are equally protective of the rights of all, including Hindus, 

Buddhists, Christians, Ahmadis, tribal peoples, and other minorities. Additional efforts are needed to 

counter societal and governmental discrimination in access to public services, the legal system, and 

government, military, and police employment.

Since assuming office, the Awami League government has initiated a number of steps affecting freedom 

of religion or belief. The government’s appointments and public statements have given increased 

confidence to members of religious minority communities and have put Islamist groups on the defensive. 

For example, in October 2009, President Zillur Rahman called publicly for inter-religious harmony as a 

means of combating religious extremism. President Rahman is the widower of the Awami League 

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women’s affairs secretary who was among the victims of a grenade attack by Islamist extremists in 2004. 

Despite opposition criticism, the government passed legislation that could lead to trials of pro-Pakistan 

Islamists implicated in war crimes during Bangladesh’s 1971 war for independence, including former 

cabinet member and Jamaat-e-Islami leader Motiur Rahman Nizami. The government also welcomed 

recent court rulings restoring pro-secular provisions in Bangladesh’s constitution. These rulings could 

provide a legal basis for banning existing Islamist political parties, even those that espouse achieving 

Islamist goals through democratic means. 

The government has continued the process, begun under the previous caretaker government, of 

establishing a National Human Rights Commission. Although human rights conditions have improved 

since the return of democratic government, the security forces continue to be implicated in extrajudicial 

killings, arbitrary detentions, torture, and intimidation of the media. The Commission, chaired by a former 

Supreme Court justice, has the authority to investigate and request reports from the government on such 

abuses, whether by military personnel, police, or members of other security forces. As of this writing, the 

Commission has not established a high public profile, perhaps due to its having only three members and 

limited staff. The Commission has publicly expressed concern at reports of extrajudicial killings, calling 

in one case for the establishment of an impartial high-level inquiry and making specific recommendations 

regarding the conduct of such inquiries. The Commission does not appear to have taken on any cases 

involving religious freedom issues or concerning members of religious minority communities. 

Despite the existence of the Human Rights Commission and in response to a court order, the government 

in December 2009 announced that it would establish another official commission to investigate the 

violence, primarily against Hindus, that followed the October 2001 elections. Since beginning its 

activities in February 2010, this commission has sent letters to political figures and to human rights and 

other civil society groups seeking information on the 2001 violence, held several public meetings, and 

undertaken field visits to the most affected areas. . Originally given four months to complete its work, 

this commission has requested that the government extend its mandate until July 2010 due to the number 

and serious nature of the reported abuses. 

The government also has pursued action in the courts to restore, to some degree, the original secular 

character of Bangladesh’s constitution by removing some of the changes introduced by previous military 

regimes. Court decisions in January and February 2010 appeared to support this policy. Following 

independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh was established as a secular state in which national 

identity was based on Bengali language and culture. The 1972 constitution established a secular state and 

guaranteed freedom of religion and conscience and equality before the law. Other provisions banned “all 

kinds of communalism,” the misuse of religion for political purposes, and the forming of groups that “in 

the name of or on the basis of any religion has for its object or pursues a political purpose.” Subsequent 

military regimes removed these restrictions, added in Arabic the traditional Islamic invocation 

customarily translated as “In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful,” and substituted “absolute 

trust and faith in Allah” for “secularism” as one of the fundamental principles of state policy. “Absolute 

trust and faith in Allah” was furthermore to be “the basis for all [government] actions.” Islam was made 

Bangladesh’s state religion in 1988 under H.M. Ershad’s military dictatorship. The Prime Minister has 

indicated, however, that she has no intention of disestablishing Islam as the state religion or removing the 

Islamic invocation added to the constitution by her military predecessors. 

Aided by the expansion of madrassas (Islamic schools) and charities, many of which receive foreign 

funding with varying degrees of government oversight, Islamist activists have gained political, economic, 

and social influence. When in power during the coalition with the larger BNP between 2001 and 2006, 

members of Jamaat-e-Islami allegedly used their positions to deny funding to or otherwise disadvantage 

groups viewed as opposing Jamaat’s Islamist political and social agenda. Although some calling for a 

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more Islamist Bangladesh have engaged in peaceful political and social activities, others have adopted an 

approach sanctioning violence towards perceived opponents of Islam.

Even during periods of democratic governance, Bangladesh’s high levels of political violence and 

instability have provided opportunities for religious and other extremist groups to engage in criminal 

activities with relative impunity. Authors, journalists, academics, and women’s rights and civil society 

activists debating sensitive social or political issues, or expressing opinions deemed by radical Islamists to 

be offensive to Islam, have been subject to violent, sometimes fatal, attacks. Some Muslim clerics, 

especially in rural areas, have also sanctioned vigilante punishments against women for alleged moral 

transgressions. Rape is reportedly a common form of anti-minority violence. The government often fails 

to punish perpetrators, since the law enforcement and the judicial systems, especially at the local level, 

are vulnerable to corruption, intimidation, and political interference. Bangladesh was ranked at the 

bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index between 2001 and 2005. 

Bangladesh improved its ranking significantly by 2009 to 139th of 180 countries listed. 

During the past year, Bangladesh generally was free of Islamist violence that had escalated earlier in the 

decade, reaching a peak when Islamist extremists coordinated a wave of hundreds of almost simultaneous 

bomb attacks on August 17, 2005 in all but one of Bangladesh’s 64 districts. These extremists also were 

implicated in a series of bomb attacks on Bangladesh’s judiciary in October-November 2005 which 

accompanied a demand to substitute sharia law for Bangladesh’s secular jurisprudence system. In March 

2007, six members of an armed Islamist group were executed for their involvement in the 2005 bombings. 

Attacks on members of religious or ethnic minorities or their properties, including thefts and vandalism at 

Hindu temples, continue to be a problem, although it is difficult to distinguish criminal intent from 

religious animosity or other possible motives. Weak and corrupt law enforcement leaves members of 

religious minority communities vulnerable to harassment and sometimes violence, particularly sexual 

violence against women, by members of the Muslim majority. Although the constitution provides 

protections for women and minorities, Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, Ahmadis, tribal peoples, and other 

minorities must regularly grapple with societal discrimination, as well as face prejudice that hinders their 

ability to access public services, the legal system, and government, military, and police employment. 

Religious minorities are also underrepresented in elected political offices, including the national 

parliament. 

Since the Pakistan era, Muslims, particularly those who are well-connected politically, have used The 

Vested Property Act (VPA) to seize Hindu-owned land. The VPA’s implicit presumption that Hindus do 

not belong in Bangladesh contributes to the perception that Hindu-owned property can be seized with 

impunity. Bangladesh’s National Assembly began consideration in January 2010 of government-backed 

legislation on this issue and minority-group representatives were permitted to express their concerns in 

testimony before parliament. USCIRF welcomed this development in a public statement urging the 

government to consult legal scholars and representatives of the affected communities in order to devise 

remedies for past abuses and prevent further property seizures based on the owners’ religious affiliation. 

However, as of this writing, no new legislation has been passed. Despite attention to this issue at the 

national political level, Hindu-owned property continued to be seized. In the Sutrapu district of Dhaka in 

March/April 2009, police reportedly stood by as Muslims violently disposed poor Hindus of land given to 

them by Hindu landowners leaving for India in 1947. In March 2010, local officials of the governing 

Awami League were reported to have seized land belonging to a temple in Kaliazuri in the remote 

northern district of Netrakona. 

Ethnically, Bangladesh is highly homogeneous, with more than 98 percent of the population being 

Bengali. Members of ethnic minority communities, mostly tribal peoples in the north and in the east, are 

often non-Muslim. The most serious and sustained conflict along ethnic and religious lines has been in the 

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CHT, an area with a high concentration of non-Bengali, non-Muslim indigenous peoples. Resentment 

among members of indigenous groups remains strong over settler encroachment on traditional tribal 

lands, human rights abuses by the Bangladeshi military, and the slow, inconsistent implementation of the 

1997 CHT Peace Accords. Muslim Bengalis, once a tiny minority in the CHT, now reportedly equal or 

outnumber indigenous groups. In February 2010, ethnic Bengali settlers reportedly attacked indigenous 

inhabitants of the CHT’s Rangamati Hill District, leaving two indigenous Chakma dead and a number of 

homes and shops destroyed. The government sent senior central and local government officials, including 

members of indigenous groups, to investigate. They determined that the conflict originated in a land 

dispute. In what appears to have been another land dispute with ethnic/religious overtones in northern 

Bangladesh’s Rangpur district in March 2010, Catholics who were members of a tribal community were 

attacked by neighboring Muslims after a local court favored a church over a Muslim-run school regarding 

ownership of some property. There were also credible reports in early 2010 of Bangladeshi security 

forces using violence to force members of the Rohingya ethnic group back into Burma, from which 

members of this Muslim minority community had fled due to severe persecution. 

Bangladesh’s small Ahmadi community of about 100,000 has been the target of a campaign to designate 

the Ahmadis as “non-Muslim” heretics. In January 2004, the then-government, led by the BNP in 

coalition with Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh and a smaller Islamist party, banned the publication and 

distribution of Ahmadi religious literature. Police seized Ahmadi publications on a few occasions before 

the courts in December 2004 stayed the ban. . Since then, the ban has not been enforced, although it has 

never been officially rescinded. In some instances, local anti-Ahmadi agitation has been accompanied by 

mob violence in which Ahmadi homes have been destroyed and Ahmadis are held against their will and 

pressured to recant. However, violence against Ahmadis has diminished in recent years due to improved 

and more vigorous police protection. Bangladeshi Ahmadis were able to hold their annual national 

convention in March 2010, in the eastern city of Brahmanbaria, although they received death threats from 

anti-Ahmadi groups. They also were subject to written restrictions from the police (including regarding 

religious content), who entered the Ahmadi mosque to order the cutting off the mosque’s internal sound 

system. 

Based on the foregoing concerns, USCIRF continues to recommend that the U.S. government encourage 

the government of Bangladesh to take action on the following issues and ensure consistent 

implementation: investigate and prosecute to the fullest extent of the law perpetrators of violent acts 

against members of religious minority communities, women, and non-governmental organizations 

promoting international human rights standards; repeal the Vested Property Act and commit to restoring 

or compensating for properties seized, including to the heirs of original owners; rescind the 2004 order 

banning Ahmadi publications, and ensure adequate police response to attacks against Ahmadis; enforce 

all provisions of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accords and ensure that members of all tribal 

communities are afforded the full rights of Bangladeshi citizenship; ensure that the National Human 

Rights Commission is truly independent, adequately funded, inclusive of women and minorities, and 

possessed of a broad mandate that includes freedom of religion or belief; include in all public and 

madrassa school curricula, textbooks, and teacher trainings information on tolerance and respect for 

freedom of religion or belief; and ensure that members of minority communities have equal access to 

government services and public employment, including in the judiciary and high-level government 

positions. 

Kazakhstan

USCIRF reported on Kazakhstan in its 2008 and 2009 Annual Reports, but did not place the country on 

either its “country of particular concern” (CPC) or Watch Lists. In recent years, Kazakhstan’s human 

rights practices, including regarding freedom of religion or belief, have come under increased international 

scrutiny partly due to its 2010 chairmanship of the 56-nation Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

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Europe (OSCE). The Kazakh government had been known for its relatively good human rights record and 

tolerant policies towards its more than 90 ethnic minorities. However, the country’s policies on religious 

freedom recently have regressed and its civil society sector has come under increased pressure, most 

notably due to the 2009 imprisonment of leading human rights defender, Evgeny Zhovtis. The government 

also has tightened its control over Kazakhstan’s highly diverse religious communities. 

In 2008, the Kazakh parliament enacted restrictive amendments to the country’s existing religion law, 

establishing stricter registration procedures and requiring all existing religious groups to re-register, 

banning unregistered religious activity and private religious education, prohibiting proselytism and the 

production of religious literature, prohibiting groups from opening worship facilities to the public, and 

significantly increasing fines and penalties for violating the law. Both the OSCE Panel of Experts on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief 

found the amendments inconsistent with international human rights standards. In February 2009, 

Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Council declared the amendments unconstitutional for violating the Kazakh 

constitutional guarantee of equality before the law. 

However, even without the rejected amendments, Kazakh law allows fines and detentions to be imposed 

against individuals who lead or participate in unregistered religious organizations or otherwise violate the 

religion law. The Kazakh authorities continue to enforce these penalties, particularly against unregistered 

Baptists, registered Ahmadi Muslims, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. For example, in January 2010 ZhannaTereza Raudovich, a Baptist from the Kyzylorda region, was fined 100 times the minimum monthly wage 

for hosting a worship service in her home. In addition, the Kazakh parliament currently is considering 

amendments to the administrative code provisions that set penalties for such infractions that would 

establish minimum as well as maximum penalties. 

Kazakhstan’s criminal law includes a broad and vague provision (Article 164.1) criminalizing “deliberate 

actions aimed at the incitement of social, national, clan, racial, or religious enmity or antagonism, or at 

offence to the national honor and dignity, or religious feelings of citizens, as well as propaganda of 

exclusiveness, superiority, or inferiority of citizens based on their attitude towards religion, or their genetic 

or racial belonging, if these acts are committed publicly or with the use of the mass information media.” In 

June 2009, a Protestant preacher in the city of Taraz, Sarybai Tanabaev, was sentenced to a two-year 

suspended term for violating this provision. Last year, Elizaveta Drenicheva, a Russian missionary for the 

registered Unification Church, was sentenced under this provision to a two-year prison term that was later 

commuted to a fine. 

The Law on Extremism, effective since February 2005, gives the government wide latitude to identify and 

designate religious or other groups as extremist organizations, ban a designated group’s activities, and 

criminalize membership in a banned organization. Government officials have expressed concern about 

possible political and religious extremism, particularly in southern Kazakhstan, where many Uzbeks reside. 

The Kazakh government has imprisoned individuals alleged to be members of certain Muslim groups, 

including some groups that espouse extremist political agendas. Human rights groups have expressed 

concerns that the government has also used this law to punish non-extremist Muslims for independent 

views. Kazakh civil society activists maintain that due process is not followed in many of these trials, and 

that police, and investigatory and judicial officials have not provided public access either to trials or 

information about these cases. Indeed, according to some leading Kazakh human rights activists, several 

hundred Muslim individuals may be imprisoned in Kazakhstan on religion-related charges, although it is 

impossible to ascertain the veracity of these claims. 

Although the Kazakh Constitution bans discrimination on the basis of religion and the religion law states 

that all religious communities are equal under the law, official rhetoric often describes the state-backed 

Muslim Board and the Russian Orthodox Church as “traditional” faiths. Government officials often seem to 

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divide other communities into those they tolerate, such as Jews, Catholics and small communities of 

Buddhists, from other groups they deem ”sects,” including independent Muslims, Ahmadi Muslims, most 

Protestants, Hare Krishna devotees and Jehovah's Witnesses. 

The National Administration of Muslims in Kazakhstan (SAMK), directed by the Muslim Board and 

headed by the Chief Mufti, exerts significant influence over the country’s practice of Islam, including 

selecting imams and regulating the construction of mosques. In 2002, however, the Kazakh Constitutional 

Council ruled against a proposed legal requirement that the SAMK must approve the registration of any 

Muslim group. Nevertheless, the SAMK reportedly occasionally pressures non-aligned imams and 

congregations to join it. However, according to the State Department, the Kazakh government continues to 

register some mosques and Muslim communities not affiliated with the SAMK. 

The government’s 2007-2009 “Program for Ensuring Religious Freedom and Improvement of Relations 

between the Government and Religions” outlined plans for “increasing the stability of the religious 

situation” and called for new laws to increase control over activities by foreign religious workers and the 

dissemination of religious materials. The Internal Policy Department in the capital Astana reportedly is 

funding a center for work with “victims of destructive sects” that opened in September 2009, although the 

Department has refused to name any “destructive sect.” 

Nevertheless, in practice, most minority religious communities registered with the government without 

difficulty, although some Protestant groups and other groups viewed by officials as non-traditional have 

experienced long delays. There were no reported incidents of official anti-Semitism. Although local 

officials may attempt to limit the practice of religion by some “non-traditional” groups, higher-level 

officials or courts, at least until recently, have usually overturned such actions. 

Members of unregistered religious communities—including the Council of Churches Baptists who refuse 

on principle to register any of their congregations with the state —continue to face official harassment. In a 

notable case, authorities fined the pastor of a Council of Churches Baptist congregation in the Akmola 

region for unregistered religious activity, and in February 2009, a court order permanently banned his 

church, the first time that such a ban has been imposed in Kazakhstan. In March 2010, the Akmola 

regional police conducted a seminar on combating religious extremism. According to an article posted on 

the Kazakh interior ministry’s website, participants included officials from the secret police, the regional 

prosecutor's office, the regional justice department, the state-funded “Centre for Assistance to Victims of 

Destructive Religious Movements,” unnamed representatives of “traditional religions,” and members of 

parliament and the President’s political party. Unregistered Baptists were reportedly mentioned by name 

by police officials as the “main lawbreakers on religion” and the targets of the anti-extremism campaign. 

The police noted that “six regional [Evangelical Baptist] leaders had been punished under the 

Administrative Code.” 

Council of Churches Baptist churches continue to report being subject to surveillance, secret recordings of 

services and sermons, raids, short-term detentions, and court-ordered fines for unregistered religious 

activity that they usually refuse to pay. Baptist pastor Vasily Kliver, who had been repeatedly fined for 

leading unregistered worship, was imprisoned for five days in June 2009 for refusing to pay the fines. He 

is the fourth Baptist leader to be subject to short-term detention since 2006. Police raided Council of 

Churches Baptist churches in Rudny in August 2009 and Kostanai in September. A Baptist pastor from 

Rudny was fined in September 2009. In early 2010, ten Baptists in Oral (Uralsk) were questioned, 

fingerprinted, and photographed by police: four members of the same group were fined for administrative 

offenses in the autumn of 2009. 

Other unregistered Protestant communities are increasingly subject to official harassment. In late 2009, 

Pastor Vissa Kim of the Grace Light of Love Protestant Church in the city of Taraz faced criminal charges 

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brought by the Jambyl regional secret police for “causing severe damage to health due to negligence” after 

he allegedly harmed a woman’s health by praying for her. In late 2009, a criminal case was brought against 

Sergei Mironov, a Protestant Christian who founded a drug and alcohol rehabilitation center in the city of 

Semey. That center was closed after a September 2009 raid by 25 police carrying sub-machine guns. 

Although the Hare Krishna movement is registered at the national and local levels, its leaders report 

continuing harassment, including destruction of buildings. The problems date back to an April 2006 

appeals court decision that the community’s farm outside Almaty must revert to the county government, 

allegedly because the farmer from whom the Hare Krishnas bought the land in 1999 did not hold title. 

Even though the Jehovah’s Witnesses were registered in January 2009, in September 2009 the Kazakh 

Justice Ministry’s Committee for Religious Affairs accused the Jehovah’s Witness magazines, “The 

Watchtower” and ”Awake,” of “creat[ing] preconditions for the development of conflicts on interconfessional grounds [and] present[ing] a potential threat for the security of the state.” However, after 

meetings with government officials and human rights organizations, the Jehovah’s Witnesses announced at 

an October 2009 session of the OSCE Human Dimension conference in Warsaw that they had resolved this 

dispute with the government of Kazakhstan. 

In 2008, President Nursultan Nazarbayev publicly criticized foreign religious workers, noting that they 

should not be allowed to operate freely, as “we don’t know their purposes and intentions.” He also 

declared that “religion is separate from the state, but it does not mean that Kazakhstan should become a 

dumping ground for various religious movements.” The President has not retracted these remarks, and 

since the speech, there has been a marked increase in governmental restrictions targeting unregistered and 

minority religious communities. 

In December 2009, the Kazakh government announced visa requirements for foreign religious workers. As 

of March 1, 2010, temporary residence for foreigners engaged in religious educational activities in 

Kazakhstan is limited to 180 days. 

Several groups reported difficulty registering foreign religious workers, while others reported greater 

difficulties than in previous years with being issued visas, and denied special or shorter-term visas. The 

registered Ahmadi Muslim community has encountered major delays in being granted visas to bring 

foreign religious workers to Kazakhstan. Under Kazakh law, non-citizens who are found to have engaged 

in “missionary activity without local registration” are liable to pay a fine and are subject to deportation 

from the country. Viktor Leven, a Kazakh-born Baptist from Akmola who later became a German citizen, 

is currently facing deportation for preaching at a September 2009 worship service. An Uzbek citizen who 

gave a 12-year-old girl a Christian children’s magazine was deported in November 2009 and the New Life 

Church, to which the Uzbek citizen belonged, was banned for six-months.

In recent years, however, the Kazakh government also has organized numerous international events to 

showcase what it views as its record of official religious tolerance. President Nazarbayev has hosted three 

high-profile conferences hundreds of leaders of “traditional” religious communities from around the world 

attended. In February 2009 several official Kazakh organizations and the OSCE Astana Center also hosted 

a meeting for representatives of several registered religious organizations, civil society groups, and the 

diplomatic community that highlighted Kazahkstan’s “unique experience of interethnic and 

interdenominational accord.” 

After a hasty and unfair trial in September 2009, Evgeny Zhovtis, a leading Kazakh human rights defender 

who had also been active on religious freedom, was sentenced to four years imprisonment for a traffic 

accident that resulted in a pedestrian’s death. Zhovtis was denied an adequate legal defense, and serious 

procedural flaws marked the investigation and the trial that led to his conviction. In December 2009, a 

Kazakh appellate court rejected his appeal. A complaint concerning Zhovtis’ case has been filed with the 

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UN Human Rights Committee. President Obama raised the Zhovtis case when he met with President 

Nazarbayev in April 2010. 

Despite official Kazakh promotion of its record of tolerance, USCIRF concludes that, in view of 

Kazakhstan’s OSCE chairmanship, the Kazakh government should publicly clarify its policies on human 

rights, including on freedom of religion or belief, and ensure that its laws conform to OSCE and other 

international commitments. Such official clarifications are particularly necessary in light of President 

Nazarbayev’s hostile public statements about various religious groups and the Kazakh government’s 

publications that reflect these statements. . Moreover, although the Constitutional Council rejected the 

stricter religion law as unconstitutional, Kazakh law enforcement entities have indicated they will again 

consider major revisions to the religion law in late 2012, and Kazakh authorities have taken repressive 

actions against various religious groups that fly in the face of that constitutional ruling. USCIRF also calls 

on the Kazakh government to include relevant government officials and Kazakh legal and other experts in 

official exchange programs and allow them to participate in international conferences, particularly those of 

the OSCE. Finally, Kazakh authorities should unconditionally pardon Mr. Zhovtis in light of the serious 

mishandling of his case. 

Sri Lanka 

In recent years, USCIRF has been concerned about religious freedom in Sri Lanka because of attacks 

targeting religious minorities and proposed legislation on religious conversion that, if enacted, would 

violate international norms regarding freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. Although 

USCIRF has never placed Sri Lanka on its CPC or Watch Lists, the Commission continued to monitor Sri 

Lanka in 2009-10. 

 

Until 2009, Sri Lanka was ravaged by a 26-year civil war between government troops and the Liberation 

Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an ethnically-based insurgent movement seeking an independent state in 

the north and east of the country. In January 2009, the ongoing violence escalated dramatically, as 

government forces successfully attacked LTTE positions, pushing them into an area of about 36 square 

miles. In May 2009, the government declared victory announcing that it had killed LTTE leader 

Prabhakaran. During the final days of fighting in April and May 2009, there were unconfirmed reports 

both of the LTTE locating artillery pieces next to religious facilities and the army firing heavy weapons at 

the same sites, often while they were in use as shelters for civilians. 

In the context of the civil war, violence against civilians based on ethnicity and/or religion occurred 

throughout the country. Both sides in the conflict failed to take steps to prevent or stop incidents of 

communal violence involving Buddhist Sinhalese, Hindu Tamils, Muslims, and Christians. Both 

government and LTTE forces targeted places of worship of various faith communities, and attacks took 

place during religious holidays and festivals. 

Moreover, for years, entire communities of Sri Lankan Muslims in the north and northeastern parts of the 

country were displaced by LTTE forces seeking to consolidate Tamil hold over certain areas. Since the 

government defeated the LTTE, many of the more than 100,000 Muslims who were displaced have still 

not returned. Many fled as long ago as 1990 and do not have the proper documentation required to 

reclaim their homes and ancestral lands. 

Over the course of the conflict, severe restrictions on the movement of journalists and humanitarian 

workers also were routine. While human rights groups frequently cite a cumulative conflict death toll of 

70,000, the Sri Lankan government suppresses evidence of the death of its own troops, making 

impossible an accurate count of casualties. The frequent “disappearances” of Sinhalese and civilian and 

insurgent Tamils by government forces also are underreported. Despite harassment, killings, and 

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restrictions placed on the movement of human rights activists and journalists, evidence of severe 

atrocities carried out on both sides of the conflict has been well-documented. The UN long has called for 

an investigation of human rights abuses, but the Sri Lankan government continues to insist it did nothing 

wrong and calls allegations of human rights abuses “misinterpretations.” 

While not directly connected to the civil conflict, violent attacks on churches, clergy, and individual 

Christians have taken place during the past few years, reportedly carried out by members of, or persons 

affiliated with, extremist groups espousing Buddhist nationalism. Attacks on Christians have ranged from 

harassment and threats to vandalizing properties and arson. Cases were rarely investigated and 

perpetrators rarely brought to justice, resulting in a culture of impunity. This problem is compounded by 

wider, more chronic deficiencies in the judicial system in Sri Lanka, including corruption, an absence of 

police training, and inadequate infrastructure. 

There are continuing reports that in the rural areas, churches have been attacked and Christians (who 

comprise approximately 7 percent of the country’s population) have been physically assaulted by 

individuals or groups, particularly for alleged attempts to convert Buddhists to Christianity. Examples in 

2009-10 include the March 2009 attack by a man wielding a machete of an assistant pastor and a church 

worker of the Vineyard Community Church at Pannala in Kurunegala district. Although the crime was 

reported, the police failed to make any arrests. In April 2009, a pastor in Weeraketiya, Hambanthota 

district was harassed and threatened by four people. The harassment escalated and one of the attackers 

was taken into police custody, but released the next day. The attacker then gathered Buddhist monks and 

other villagers to sign a petition against the church. In response, the pastor canceled Good Friday and 

Easter Sunday celebrations and relocated his children to a safer location. A mob of more than 100 people, 

including Buddhist monks, in June 2009 surrounded the home of a female pastor in a Foursquare Gospel 

Church in Radawana village, Gampaha district, and vandalized her house. When the police called her in 

for questioning on July 11, protestors tried to bar her and other pastors from entering the police station. 

She was later forced in the presence of Buddhist monks and protestors to sign a document promising not 

to host worship services for non-family members. 

In recent years, and particularly in the period immediately after the December 2004 tsunami, there have 

been allegations that groups and individuals have engaged in “unethical practices” to encourage people to 

change their religion, and that these actions take advantage of impoverished and unemployed populations 

and lead to increased tensions among religious communities in Sri Lanka. These practices allegedly have 

included, for example, the offering of money, employment, access to education or health care, or some 

other material good as an incentive to convert or join a particular church. However, the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief was unable to confirm any such cases when she visited Sri 

Lanka in 2005. 

In January 2009, in response to this purported problem, the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) party, which is 

comprised of nationalist Buddhist monks, brought to parliament a draft anti-conversion law, the 

Prohibition of Forcible Conversion of Religion Bill. The bill was largely the same proposal the JHU put 

forth in 2004, minus several provisions the Sri Lankan Supreme Court had ruled unconstitutional. The 

UN Special Rapporteur indicated that the 2004 bill was neither an appropriate response to religious 

tensions nor compatible with international human rights law. 

The 2009 bill, if enacted, would provide for prison terms of up to five years for anyone who, by “the use 

of force or by allurement or by any fraudulent means,” converts or attempts to convert a person from one 

religion to another, or aids or abets such a conversion. Because the bill’s proponents consider women, 

minors, inmates, the poor, and the physically or mentally disabled to be particularly vulnerable, their 

conversion would warrant even harsher prison terms of up to seven years. 

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The bill defines “allurement” as the offer of any temptation for the purpose of converting, including any 

gift, gratification, or material benefit. It describes “force” as including not only threat of physical harm, 

but also the “threat of religious disgrace or condemnation of any religion for the purpose of converting.” 

The bill defines “fraudulent” as “any willful misinterpretation or any other fraudulent contrivance.” 

Opponents of the bill are concerned that its broad language would encompass all religious conversions, 

not just “unethical conversions,” and would criminalize the charitable activities of religious groups. 

In February 2009, the anti-conversion bill was submitted back to parliament for its third reading, and a 

vote was expected to take place in March 2009. However, amidst international pressure, including from 

members of the U.S. Congress, the Sri Lankan government referred the bill for discussion to the 

Consultative Committee on Religious Affairs and Moral Upliftment. The Committee’s meeting, and 

therefore any further discussion of the bill, has been indefinitely postponed. The JHU has indicated that it 

would like to bring up the bill again in 2010, but this has not yet happened. USCIRF will continue to 

monitor closely the status of this draft bill. 
Multilateral Institutions 

Promoting International Religious Freedom through Multilateral Institutions 

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) specifically cites U.S. participation in multilateral 

organizations as an avenue for advancing freedom of religion or belief, which is enshrined in numerous 

international conventions and declarations, including those of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 

At the UN, religious freedom issues are addressed primarily at the Human Rights Council, including through its 

new Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, as well as through monitoring by its Special Rapporteur 

(independent expert) on Freedom of Religion or Belief. The UPR process provides rights-supporting states the 

opportunity to ask questions of, and make strong recommendations to, nations whose records on human rights, 

including religious freedom, do not meet international standards. USCIRF urges the United States to continue to 

use the UPR process to raise serious concerns, particularly when “countries of particular concern” are reviewed. 

USCIRF also recommends that the United States seek additional UN scrutiny of countries violating religious 

freedom and related human rights, such as through Human Rights Council and General Assembly resolutions, 

monitoring by relevant thematic experts including the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, and 

the appointment or continuation of country-specific Special Rapporteurs. 

In recent years, USCIRF has been increasingly concerned about initiatives by some UN member states that 

threaten to endanger religious freedom and related human rights worldwide. Some states have been 

campaigning in various UN fora to create an international legal norm, or redefine existing norms, to protect 

religions, rather than individuals, from alleged “defamation.” Instead of helping to address religious persecution 

and discrimination, as its proponents allege, a global ban on “defamation of religions” would exacerbate these 

problems and undermine fundamental individual rights, including religious freedom and free expression. 

Essentially, it would be an international blasphemy law. Rather than banning speech that “defames” religions, 

governments should address religious intolerance through education, public diplomacy, and the enforcement of 

laws against bias-motivated violence and discrimination. The United States should reaffirm unequivocally that 

it does not support speech bans, except where speech incites imminent violence, and thereby clarify the 

language used in the 2009 Human Rights Council resolution it co-sponsored with Egypt that seems to suggest 

otherwise. In addition, the United States and other rights-supporting governments should work to ensure that 

the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, and the person who holds that 

mandate, will continue to focus on the individual right to religious freedom, not the purported rights of religions. 

 

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the OSCE continues to be an important forum where the 56 participating 

States are held accountable for their extensive religious freedom commitments. In recent years, however, some 

participating States, particularly Russia, have sought to curtail or derail the organization’s focus on human rights 

activities. These activities are particularly important at a time when Russia and other countries of the former 

Soviet Union are demonstrating an increasing lack of commitment to their human rights and religious freedom 

obligations, including efforts to combat racism, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance and discrimination. 

USCIRF urges the United States to lead an effort to revitalize the OSCE’s human rights activities and help it 

build on its ability to address urgent societal problems such as violent hate crimes. The U.S. should resist 

proposals by Kazakhstan, the 2010 OSCE Chair, to organize an OSCE security summit in 2010. 

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The United Nations 

UN Religious Freedom and Tolerance Commitments 

The 192 member states of the United Nations have agreed, by signing the UN Charter, to “practice 

tolerance” and to “promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 

all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” These fundamental freedoms include the 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, which is protected and affirmed in numerous 

international human rights instruments, including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 

1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the 1981 Declaration on the 

Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.

UN Venues for Addressing Religious Freedom Issues 

The UN Human Rights Council and UPR 

In 2006, the UN Commission on Human Rights was replaced by a new body, the UN Human Rights 

Council, which meets more often, is marginally smaller, and has certain new procedures such as the 

Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The Human Rights Council was intended to address and correct the 

perception that the Commission on Human Rights unfairly singled out some states for repeated scrutiny 

while ignoring many others. Through the UPR process, which commenced in 2008, UN members will 

assess the human rights performance of every UN member state, some of whose records have never 

before been subject to human rights review by an intergovernmental body. The first cycle of review of all 

192 UN member states will be complete in late 2011. 

 

The UPR process provides the United States, and other rights-supporting UN member states, the 

opportunity to ask hard questions of nations whose records on religious freedom and related human rights 

do not meet international standards. Although the Bush administration participated in the initial UPR 

session, it did not do so later in 2008 as part of its policy of not engaging with the Human Rights Council 

except in narrow circumstances. The Obama administration did not speak at the February 2009 UPR 

session, which was also regrettable since several countries with particularly poor religious freedom 

records and designated as “countries of particular concern,” or CPCs under IRFA, including China and 

Saudi Arabia, were reviewed. Beginning with the May 2009 session, however, the Obama administration 

has participated actively in the UPR process, including raising religious freedom concerns during the 

reviews of Vietnam, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Kazakhstan. The United States raised individual cases of 

religious prisoners at the Vietnam UPR and sent the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights 

and Labor to Geneva to participate in the UPR of Iran. 

USCIRF urges the United States to continue to use the UPR process to ask probing questions and make 

strong recommendations concerning religious freedom in key countries, particularly those designated as 

CPCs. USCIRF also recommends that the United States seek additional UN scrutiny of states violating 

religious freedom and related human rights, for example through Human Rights Council and General 

Assembly resolutions, monitoring by the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, and the 

appointment or continuation of country-specific Special Rapporteurs. 

The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

In 1986, on the initiative of the United States, the Human Rights Council’s predecessor appointed an 

independent expert, or Special Rapporteur, to investigate and report on instances of religious intolerance 

and violations of the internationally-protected right to freedom of religion or belief around the world. The 

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Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief monitors this fundamental freedom worldwide, 

communicates with governments about alleged violations, conducts country visits, and, perhaps most 

importantly, brings religious freedom concerns to the UN and public attention. 

The Special Rapporteur’s mandate was last renewed by the Human Rights Council in December 2007. 

USCIRF participated as part of the U.S. delegation. The mandate is next up for renewal in June 2010. 

Additionally, the term of the current mandate holder, Ms. Asma Jahangir, will expire at the end of June. 

Ms. Jahangir was appointed in 2004 and has now served the maximum two consecutive three-year terms. 

The United States and other rights-supporting states must work to ensure that both the Special 

Rapporteur’s mandate and the next person who holds it will continue to focus on protecting individuals 

from violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief, not on protecting religions from alleged 

“defamation” as sought by the proponents of the campaign discussed below. 

The Campaign to Protect Religions from Alleged “Defamation” 

The Flawed “Defamation of Religions” Concept 

Since 1999, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)—a regional organization of 57 nations 

with Muslim majority or significant Muslim populations—annually has sponsored non-binding 

resolutions in the Human Rights Council and its predecessor calling on UN member states to outlaw the 

so-called “defamation of religions.” Similar resolutions have been adopted at the General Assembly each 

year since 2005. At the Human Rights Council, these efforts have been led by Pakistan; at the General 

Assembly, Egypt has played a leading role. The OIC’s stated goal is the adoption of a binding UN 

document protecting religions from “defamation”—which it is now pursuing in a subsidiary body called 

the “Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards” (see The Erroneous Efforts to 

Conflate “Defamation of Religions” and Incitement, below). 

The “defamation of religions” resolutions continue to be adopted each year in both the General Assembly 

and the Human Rights Council, most recently in March 2010. Since 2008, however, the support for these 

problematic resolutions has eroded. The last five times they were considered (in 2008 and 2009 in both 

bodies and 2010 in the Council), the votes in favor decreased from a majority to only a plurality of 

member governments, and the combined number of no votes and abstentions outnumbered the yes votes. 

In fact, the March 2010 Human Rights Council vote saw the fewest yes votes and most no votes ever cast 

on this issue in that body or its predecessor. More than half of the Council’s members did not vote in 

favor, and the resolution came within only 3 votes of a tie and 4 votes of defeat.21 

The “defamation of religions” resolutions purport to seek protection for religions in general, but the only 

religion and religious adherents specifically mentioned are Islam and Muslims. Aside from Islam, the 

resolutions do not specify which religions are deserving of protection, or explain how or by whom this 

would be determined. The resolutions also do not define what would make a statement defamatory to 

religions or explain who decides this question. For its part, the OIC appears to consider any speech that 

the organization, or even a single cleric or individual, deems critical of or offensive to Islam or Muslims 

to automatically constitute religiously defamatory speech.22 This view goes far beyond the existing 

 

21 The March 25, 2010 vote was 20 in favor, 17 against, 8 abstentions. 

22For example, the March 2008 First OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia cites as religiously defamatory 

speech the publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed or Allah in newspapers in several European 

countries and South Africa, Pope Benedict’s quotation of a fourteenth-century Byzantine emperor’s allegation that 

Mohammed was “bad and inhuman” for commanding his followers to spread Islam by the sword, and comments 

critical of Islam or Muslims by Dutch, Austrian, Norwegian, Italian, and Swiss politicians, mostly from far-right 

parties. Also mentioned is right-wing Dutch MP Geert Wilders’ production of a then-unreleased film that the OIC 

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domestic legal concept of defamation, which protects individuals against false statements of fact that 

damage their reputation and livelihood. Implementing this approach would violate international human 

rights guarantees that protect, with only narrow exceptions, every individual’s right to receive and impart 

information and speak out. 

In essence, the “defamation of religions” campaign is an attempt to export to the international level the 

repressive blasphemy laws found in some OIC countries. Under these laws, criminal charges can be 

levied against individuals for allegedly defaming, denigrating, insulting, offending, disparaging, and 

blaspheming Islam—often resulting in gross human rights violations. These laws allow repressive 

governments and religious extremists to suppress and punish whatever they deem to be offensive or 

unacceptable speech about a particular favored religion or sect. Laws of this type have been used in 

various countries, including Pakistan and Egypt, to restrict peaceful discussion of the appropriate role of 

religion in state and society, prevent criticism of specific figures or parties, curb dissent from prevailing 

views and beliefs, and even incite and justify violence. 

In Pakistan, for example, domestic law makes blasphemy against Islam a criminal offense subject to 

severe penalties, including death. Blasphemy allegations in Pakistan, which are often false, have resulted 

in imprisonment on the basis of religion or belief and/or vigilante violence. These broad provisions have 

been used by extremists to intimidate and detain arbitrarily members of religious minority communities, 

including disfavored minority Muslim sects, and by the unscrupulous to settle personal scores. In Egypt, 

the government has used charges of blaspheming or insulting Islam to imprison purportedly “unorthodox” 

Muslims and individuals, including bloggers, who have called for political and religious reforms. 

 

UN members from North America, Europe, and Asia, including the Holy See, have consistently voted or 

spoken out against the “defamation of religions” concept. By early 2010, those voting against the concept 

also grew to include a number of Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Panama, and 

Uruguay), as well as the African countries of Liberia and Zambia. 

International human rights experts also oppose the concept. In December 2008, the freedom of 

expression rapporteurs of the UN, OSCE, Organization of American States (OAS), and African 

Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) issued a joint statement urging international 

organizations to stop supporting the idea of “defamation of religions,” because it “does not accord with 

international standards accepted by pluralistic and free societies.”23 The UN Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief likewise has criticized the concept, pointing out that international human 

rights law protects individuals, not belief systems, and the individual right to freedom of religion or belief 

does not include the right to have one’s religion or belief be free from criticism. To the contrary, as Ms. 

Jahangir noted, “the recognition, respect and practice of religious pluralism . . . encompasses criticism, 

discussion and questioning of each other’s values.”24 

The Erroneous Efforts to Conflate “Defamation of Religions” and Incitement 

Countries advancing the flawed “defamation of religions” concept also have sought, in various UN 

contexts, to redefine existing international standards that prohibit incitement so as to outlaw speech 

 believed would “vilify” the Koran, and an article by a British columnist that called Islam “an uncompromising 

seventh-century ideology.” 

23 Joint Declaration on Defamation of Religions and Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Extremism Legislation, Frank La Rue, 

UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Miklos Haraszti, OSCE Representative on Freedom 

of the Media, Catalina Botero, OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and Faith Pansy Tlakula, 

ACHPR Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, page 2 (December 10, 2008). 24 UN Document A/HRC/2/3, para. 65 (2006). 

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insulting or criticizing religions. The current focus of these efforts is primarily in two bodies. These are: 

1) the Human Rights Council’s “Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards” 

which is considering whether to amend or make additions to the International Convention on the 

Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and 2) the Human Rights Committee, the 

ICCPR treaty body which is working on a new General Comment explaining its interpretation of that 

covenant’s freedom of expression guarantee. 

In these efforts, the “defamation” proponents mainly look to ICCPR Article 20(2), which prohibits 

“advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 

violence.” They also cite Article 4 of ICERD, despite the fact that this treaty addresses race, not 

religion.25 ICERD Article 4 prohibits the “dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred” 

and “incitement to racial discrimination, as well as acts of violence or incitement to such acts.”26 The 

United States has reservations to both ICCPR Article 20 and ICERD Article 4 to the extent that they 

interfere with rights protected under the U.S. Constitution.27

The efforts by the “defamation” proponents to redefine and broaden significantly these two provisions to 

encompass allegedly religiously defamatory speech are of serious concern. ICCPR Article 20(2) and 

ICERD Article 4 provide only limited exceptions to the fundamental freedoms of expression and religion. 

Triggering them requires more than just the expression of critical, or even insulting, views on religious 

matters. These provisions are intended to protect individuals from acts of violence or discrimination, not 

to protect religious institutions or ideas from criticism. In addition, they have always been interpreted 

together with treaty provisions protecting the freedoms of religion and expression, ensuring equality 

before the law, and prohibiting any measures that would destroy guaranteed rights. 

In addition, conflating race and religion to bring “defamation of religions” within ICERD’s ambit would 

raise serious religious freedom problems. A person’s race is immutable, but his or her religion is not. 

Indeed, the individual right to freedom of religion or belief includes the right to freely choose to change 

one’s religion, whether to another religion or no religion at all.28 Moreover, deeming speech that is 

critical of or insulting to religions as equivalent to racist hate speech would suppress any discussion of 

truth claims about, among, or within religions—the peaceful sharing of which is an integral part of the 

freedom of religion or belief. 

Unfortunately, the OIC-led efforts to reinterpret the incitement provisions may have been lent support by 

language in an October 2009 Human Rights Council resolution on freedom of expression which the 

United States co-sponsored with Egypt. The resolution urged states to “take effective measures, 

consistent with their international human rights obligations” to address and combat incidents of “negative 

racial and religious stereotyping” and of “advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes 

incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.” This broad language can be read as urging legal 

measures against speech “defaming” religions, and OIC members, from their statements since the 

resolution was introduced, clearly have interpreted it that way. The United States previously had always 

 

25 In fact, as the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (the ICERD treaty body) has noted, the 

treaty’s drafting history shows that the General Assembly expressly “rejected the proposal to include racial 

discrimination and religious intolerance in a single instrument, and decided in the ICERD to focus exclusively on 

racial discrimination.” P.S.N. v. Denmark, UN Document CERD/C/71/D/36/2006, para. 6.3 (2007) 26 The 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 

Religion or Belief, which is not a treaty, does not contain a prohibition on incitement to religious discrimination. 27 A number of other countries also have made reservations or declarations to these provisions, for various reasons. 

In addition to the United States, 15 countries have reservations or declarations on all or part of ICCPR Article 20, 

and 19 countries have reservations or declarations on ICERD Article 4. 

28 Article 18, Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 18, ICCPR; UN Human Rights Committee, General 

Comment 22, UN Document CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (1993). 

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opposed UN resolutions calling for laws banning speech, even hateful speech, except where it incites 

imminent violence. While the State Department’s position is that the resolution does not require the 

United States to enact or enforce hate speech laws,29 USCIRF is concerned that it gives the United States’ 

imprimatur, for the first time, to a demand in a UN resolution that other countries do so. In the wake of 

this resolution, the United States needs to clarify its position and reaffirm its strong opposition to both 

domestic and international bans on speech that does not amount to incitement to imminent violence. 

USCIRF Activities 

In 2009-10, USCIRF actively sought to counter the OIC’s dangerous campaign to protect religions from 

“defamation.” These activities included raising awareness in Congressional offices, including through 

staff briefings and meetings. In October 2009, USCIRF Chair Leonard Leo testified before the Tom 

Lantos Human Rights Commission on Implications of the Promotion of “Defamation of Religions.” As a 

result of these efforts, in March and December 2009 and February 2010, members of Congress wrote 

letters to numerous UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly members, urging them to oppose 

the concept in upcoming votes. In addition, in November 2009, USCIRF and Representative Chris Smith 

(R-NJ), a Congressional member of the U.S. General Assembly delegation, hosted a meeting for selected 

UN ambassadors in New York, at which Commissioners urged them to vote against the concept. 

In November 2009, USCIRF issued a Policy Focus entitled The Dangerous Idea of Protecting Religions 

from “Defamation”: A Threat to Universal Human Rights Standards. The document describes the 

dangers in outlawing speech criticizing religions, explains why international incitement prohibitions do 

not encompass such speech, and makes recommendations on how to combat religious intolerance without 

speech bans. 

In 2009-10, USCIRF also raised “defamation of religions” concerns in letters to and/or meetings with 

U.S. executive branch officials, including President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton, as well as the 

Prime Minister of Bangladesh and the President and Ambassador to the United States of the Philippines. 

In addition, Commissioners discussed these concerns in meetings with an Egyptian foreign ministry 

representative, European Union officials, and officials from the Holy See. 

Recommendations 

In order to ensure that the United Nations fully upholds its crucial mandate to protect and promote 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, the U.S. government should: 

• participate actively in the UN Human Rights Council, including its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 

process, and in particular seek to ensure that each country’s compliance with international religious 

freedom standards constitutes an important part of the UPR and any country-specific resolutions in 

both the Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly; 

• continue firmly and unequivocally to support a mandate and mandate-holder for the position of UN 

Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief that focuses on the universal right of every 

individual to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief, rather than on the purported 

rights of religions; 

• continue to support the existing UN Special Rapporteur positions that focus on the human rights 

situations in countries that have been designated as “countries of particular concern” under IRFA and, 

 

29 This position is based on the resolution’s “consistent with their international human rights obligations” language 

and the U.S. reservation to Article 20(2). 

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for the other countries on that list, seek either 1) the creation of additional Special Rapporteur 

positions and other country specific measures or 2) visits to those countries by teams of thematic 

Special Rapporteurs, including the Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Religion or Belief and 

Freedom of Opinion and Expression; 

• at the highest levels, both in Geneva and in capitals, formally demarche the Organization of the 

Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and the governments of Pakistan and Egypt, among 

others, to raise concerns about the problematic “defamation of religions,” ICCPR Article 20, and 

ICERD Article 4 initiatives, and make clear that their continued support will negatively impact the 

emerging relationship between the OIC and the United States, as well as the bilateral relationships 

between other such governments and the United States; and 

• include in the mandate of the Special Envoy to the OIC the task of raising with OIC countries U.S. 

opposition to the “defamation of religions” concept and any efforts to reinterpret ICCPR Article 20 

and ICERD Article 4. 

The U.S. government and all other UN members that support universal human rights, including freedom 

of religion, should: 

• emphasize, at every possible opportunity, the vital importance of the intertwined rights to freedom of 

thought, conscience and religion or belief and freedom of opinion and expression to the enjoyment of 

all other rights, as well as to stability, development, and democracy; 

• continue to oppose efforts in international fora to establish an international legal principle that would 

claim to protect religions from “defamation” or criticism, offering new rights to religions that would 

undermine many fundamental, individual human rights; 

• educate member states who have not voted against past “defamation” resolutions, as well as moderate 

OIC countries, about the human rights abuses perpetrated under this concept and urge them to oppose 

the resolutions and any attempts to reinterpret ICCPR Article 20 or ICERD Article 4; 

• work diplomatically and more diligently to persuade OIC members and others who support the 

“defamation” concept that religious intolerance can best be fought not through national or 

international laws prohibiting speech that “defames” religions, but rather through efforts, including 

education, public diplomacy, and the enforcement of laws against bias-motivated violence and 

discrimination, to ensure respect for the human rights of every individual; and 

• reaffirm and clarify to independent expert members of the Human Rights Committee and the 

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and to governmental representatives on the 

Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards the extent and content of 

specific concerns over any reinterpretation or expansion of ICCPR Article 20 or ICERD Article 4. 
Multilateral Institutions 

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

OSCE Religious Freedom and Tolerance Commitments 

The 56 participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 

comprising Eastern and Western Europe, the states of the former Soviet Union, the United States, and 

Canada, have committed themselves to uphold extensive standards to protect freedom of religion or belief 

and to combat discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance, and anti-Semitism. Freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief is singled out for protection in the OSCE founding document, the 1975 

Helsinki Final Act, and in many subsequent political agreements. 

In recent years, however, some participating states have sought to curtail or derail the organization’s 

focus on human rights activities. Russia, in particular, has often protested that the OSCE focuses too 

much of its criticism on the countries of the former USSR, while downplaying human rights problems in 

the West. The Kremlin has proposed that the OSCE should be primarily concerned with military security, 

and has launched a major “Helsinki Plus” initiative to negotiate a new treaty on European security, 

ostensibly based on the OSCE. Russia in the past has also withheld needed consensus for the OSCE 

budget, thereby jeopardizing many OSCE human rights activities. These OSCE activities are key when 

the governments of Russia and many other former Soviet states are demonstrating increasing disdain for 

their human rights and religious freedom obligations, including efforts to combat racism, xenophobia, as 

well as religious and other forms of intolerance and discrimination. 

In light of the OSCE’s origin during the Cold War, USCIRF views as hopeful the March 2010 

appointment of Ian Kelly, former State Department spokesman and Russia specialist, as U.S. ambassador 

to the OSCE. USCIRF recommends that Ambassador Kelly lead a U.S. effort to revitalize the OSCE by 

building on its institutional strengths, such as its activities to promote human rights, including freedom of 

religion or belief, and to combat violent hate crimes, its field presences, and its cooperation with civil 

society. In light of Kazakhstan’s legal restrictions on freedom of religion or belief and the imprisonment 

of its leading human rights activist, Evgeny Zhovtis, the United States should oppose proposals by 

Kazakhstan, the 2010 OSCE Chair-in-Office, to organize a summit of the 56 OSCE participating States in 

2010. 

OSCE Venues to Address Religious Freedom Issues 

Participating States are held accountable to their OSCE commitments, including those on freedom of 

religion or belief, through a variety of mechanisms. These include review meetings by the OSCE and its 

Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ODIHR reports, and the activities of 

many of the 18 OSCE Field Presences. 

ODIHR Meetings 

ODIHR sponsors an annual conference, usually held in Warsaw in October, to review OSCE participating 

States’ implementation of their human rights commitments, including freedom of religion or belief. 

Known as Human Dimension Implementation Meetings (HDIMs), these 10-day meetings bring together 

diplomats, representatives of other international organizations, and hundreds of NGOs. The most recent 

HDIM, which is said to be the largest European human rights conference, was held in October 2009. 

Under ODIHR auspices, the OSCE convened a Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting (SHDM) on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief in Vienna in July 2009. The meeting brought together 288 participants, 

including 136 representatives of 47 governmental delegations, as well as 116 representatives of 100 civil 

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society organizations, six OSCE field operations, two OSCE institutions plus ODIHR, and four 

international organizations. The SHDM provided an opportunity to evaluate more thoroughly the status 

of freedom of religion or belief in the OSCE region since the last SHDM on this topic in 2003. Another 

two-day SHDM on freedom of religion or belief is scheduled for November 2010. 

The ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief 

The ODIHR also provides technical assistance to participating States on religious freedom issues through 

its Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief. This Panel is comprised of 60 persons 

nominated by OSCE countries, including a 15-member Advisory Council appointed by the ODIHR 

Director. The Panel is primarily a consultative resource for OSCE governments considering new or 

amended legislation affecting freedom of religion, but also provides expert opinions on individual cases. 

The Panel’s Advisory Council reviews both proposed and enacted legislation under guidelines developed 

by the ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission and presents recommendations that 

would bring legislation into conformity with these international and OSCE standards. The Panel also 

issues publications, such as the 2007 “Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching about Religions and Beliefs 

in Public Schools,” which offers a human rights framework for the development of curricula and was 

officially approved by the 2008 OSCE Ministerial. The Panel is currently updating its 2004 publication, 

“Guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining to Religion or Belief.” 

The Panel has advised governments, including those of Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Tajikistan, 

Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, on relevant legislation. The Bulgarian government adopted some of the 

Panel’s recommendations on legislation, but the Uzbek government has not responded to 

recommendations on its religion laws offered in 2003. In 2008, two expert reviews by the Panel found 

problems with a draft religion law then being considered in Kazakhstan. Although it had requested the 

reviews, the Kazakh government refused to make them public. While the Kazakh parliament passed the 

problematic draft law and President Nazarbayev signed it, the Kazakh Constitutional Council in February 

2009 ruled that it was unconstitutional. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also largely disregarded the Panel’s 

recommendations. In 2009, these governments passed highly restrictive new religion laws that USCIRF 

criticized. In addition, USCIRF in 2009 criticized restrictive amendments to the Azeri religion law and 

urged Azerbaijan to request a Panel review. However, the government of Azerbaijan did not turn to the 

Panel for recommendations on these draft provisions. 

In an example of an expert opinion on a specific case, the Panel noted that the situation of Jehovah’s 

Witnesses in Moscow illustrates the systemic problem in many post-Soviet countries of strict registration 

requirements being used to control non-violent religious groups. 

USCIRF recommends that the Panel should better publicize its activities and make them more 

transparent, in particular with respect to those governments that ignore its recommendations. In addition, 

the OSCE should provide the Panel with sufficient staff and funding so that it can hold at least one annual 

meeting of its entire membership. 

The OSCE Response to Racism, Xenophobia, Discrimination, and Intolerance 

The past few years have witnessed a sharp rise in incidents of discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance and 

violent hate crimes directed toward members of ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Muslims and 

Jews, in a number of countries in the OSCE region. By not contesting extremist rhetoric, political and 

societal leaders contribute to an intolerant environment for ethnic and religious minorities. Even worse, 

in some OSCE countries, officials and state-run media have inflamed public opinion against minority 

groups. While violent acts against minority individuals and their property often are well documented, 

they rarely are investigated and prosecuted as hate crimes. All too often, particularly in Russia, such acts 

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are treated as mere “hooliganism.” When acts of violence or discrimination target members of a 

particular group because of who they are and what they believe, such acts should be viewed as human 

rights violations that require an unequivocal response. 

In recent years, the OSCE has set up several mechanisms to address intolerance and related human rights 

issues. Due in part to U.S. diplomatic leadership, the OSCE has convened since 2003 at least 10 highlevel and expert conferences to address racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, discrimination against 

religious groups including Muslims and Christians, and other tolerance-related issues. As USCIRF 

recommended, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office in late 2004 appointed three Personal Representatives to 

monitor anti-Semitism, intolerance toward Muslims, and intolerance toward Christians and members of 

other religions, respectively. A new Tolerance Program within ODIHR also was created in 2004 to 

monitor and encourage compliance with OSCE commitments to combat xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and 

Islamophobia, as well as to promote freedom of religion or belief. 

OSCE Meetings on Tolerance and Related Topics 

The OSCE Ministerial Council in 2003 mandated a major international conference in Vienna to address 

anti-Semitism in the then-55 states of the OSCE region and in 2004, a ministerial-level conference in 

Berlin. Since then, OSCE has held many other high level meetings on racism, xenophobia, discrimination 

against Muslims, anti-Semitism, and other forms of intolerance. In 2007, two tolerance-related OSCE 

conferences were held, one in Romania on Combating Discrimination and Promoting Mutual Respect and 

Understanding, and the other in Spain where the Spanish OSCE Chair hosted a conference on Intolerance 

and Discrimination against Muslims. In May 2009, an OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting 

focused on ways to implement effectively hate crimes legislation and the challenges posed by violent hate 

groups. The 2010 Kazakh Chair-in-Office has proposed a high-level ODIHR meeting to discuss tolerance 

issues in late June 2010 in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. 

These conferences have generated political support within the OSCE to address anti-Semitism and other 

forms of intolerance. They also have raised awareness among NGOs and the public about discrimination 

against Muslims and related issues. However, challenges remain for the OSCE and all its 56 participating 

States to translate these ideas into concrete policies that will combat intolerance. Regrettably, 

participating States in 2009 could not reach consensus on a draft declaration proposed by the United 

States and Canada that would have expressed concern about hate incidents and trends in the OSCE 

region. 

OSCE Personal Representatives 

 

In December 2004, the 55 OSCE participating States authorized the then-Chair-in-Office (CiO), 

Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy, to name three Personal Representatives to promote tolerance. 

The mandates of the three Personal Representatives address separate but interrelated issues that call for 

distinct, yet coordinated, responses that focus on improving the implementation of decisions on tolerance 

and non-discrimination that the OSCE Ministerial and Permanent Councils makes. . The persons selected 

by the OSCE CiO for these part-time and unpaid positions come from a variety of backgrounds. 

In 2009, the Greek Chair-in-Office appointed three new Personal Representatives: Rabbi Andrew Baker, 

Director of International Jewish Affairs at the American Jewish Committee, as the Personal 

Representative on Combating Anti-Semitism; Adil Akhmetov, a member of the Kazakh Senate and 

former First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the Personal Representative on Combating Intolerance 

and Discrimination against Muslims; and Mario Mauro, an Italian member of the European Parliament, as 

the Personal Representative on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination, also focusing on 

Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians and Members of Other Religions. 

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During 2009, the Personal Representatives contributed to relevant OSCE meetings, including the Warsaw 

HDIM, and made several country visits. For example, Rabbi Baker visited Slovakia, Hungary, and 

Romania and issued public reports that were posted on the OSCE website. Invitations from additional 

participating States to the Personal Representatives would enable them to raise issues of concern directly 

with government officials, as well as hold direct meetings with NGOs and community and religious 

leaders. Also during 2009, Ambassador Akhmetov discussed methods to combat anti-Muslim 

discrimination at meetings with the ODIHR, the Permanent Council, and the CiO. In October 2009, the 

three Personal Representatives visited the United States and testified at a Helsinki Commission hearing 

on their role in promoting tolerance in the OSCE region. 

USCIRF remains concerned that the Representatives’ work has been hampered by inadequate funding for 

staff and travel expenses. The OSCE also should give more prominence to the activities of the Personal 

Representatives to increase the impact of their findings and recommendations. For example, the 

Representatives should report in person to the annual OSCE ministerial meetings and their reports should 

be published and distributed throughout and beyond the OSCE system. USCIRF welcomes the U.S. 

OSCE Mission’s initiative in November 2009 to invite the three Personal Tolerance Representatives to 

the Permanent Council in Vienna. 

The ODIHR Tolerance Program 

One major OSCE institutional response to growing concerns on religious intolerance was creating in late 

2004 the ODIHR Tolerance Program. Its mandate includes promoting tolerance, combating xenophobia, 

and advancing freedom of religion or belief. The Tolerance Program’s staff monitors tolerance-related 

issues and provides staff support for both the three Personal Representatives and the ODIHR Advisory 

Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief. The Tolerance Program was charged with setting up 

a database, collecting data on hate crimes legislation, training police on hate crimes, and providing 

Holocaust education in specific countries. The Program also serves as a focal point for various national 

contact points on hate crimes set up by the OSCE states. Although the United States had been an early 

advocate of the Tolerance Program and provided much of its initial funding, USCIRF is concerned that 

the U.S. is not funding this important program at an appropriate level. 

 

The Tolerance Program also has developed a “Web Site Guide to Tolerance Education,” a curriculum unit 

on “Holocaust Education and Anti-Semitism,” and “Teaching Materials on the History of Jews and AntiSemitism in Europe.” A “Reference Guide on Muslims in Spain” was released in April 2009 as the first 

in a series intended to raise awareness about anti-Muslim prejudices and stereotypes. The Tolerance 

Program also continues to issue publications on priorities in various OSCE States. In October 2009, 

ODHIR released a publication, “Preventing and Responding to Hate Crimes,” to provide information to 

NGOs on how to recognize, monitor, and prevent hate crimes. In November 2009, ODIHR released its 

hate crimes annual report. The Tolerance Program translates many of its publications into Russian, which 

is particularly useful in light of the rising levels of xenophobia, racism, and various forms of intolerance 

in Russia and other former Soviet republics. In March 2010, ODIHR brought together 100 experts from 

56 OSCE states in Warsaw to address the need for increased efforts to combat hate crimes inspired by 

Internet content without interfering with freedom of expression. 

To date, the ODIHR’s Tolerance Program has emphasized activities with external organizations, although 

the Program could expand its work with the 18 OSCE Field Presences and other OSCE institutions. As 

noted, the Tolerance Program’s current mandate includes the issue of freedom of religion or belief which 

had been addressed by the ODIHR Human Rights Department until 2004. USCIRF remains concerned 

that freedom of religion or belief is treated mainly under the rubric of tolerance activities and not human 

rights. The Tolerance Program should better coordinate freedom of religion activities with the Human 

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Rights Department, particularly because only one staff person in the Tolerance Program is assigned parttime to the issue of freedom of religion or belief. Furthermore, in 2007, this position was removed from 

the unified budget, thus endangering its permanent status and changing its recruitment basis. 

USCIRF Activities 

Since 2001, the Commission has participated in U.S. delegations to numerous OSCE meetings and has 

issued extensive recommendations on OSCE activities to protect freedom of religion or belief and combat 

intolerance and anti-Semitism. USCIRF was one of the first official bodies to speak out against the rise in 

anti-Semitic violence in Europe, and has addressed anti-Semitism and other intolerance issues in countries 

including Belarus, Belgium, Egypt, France, Russia, and Uzbekistan. 

In the current reporting period, Commission Chair Leonard Leo and Commissioners Cromartie, Gaer, Eid 

and Prodromou were members of the U.S. delegation to the OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension 

Meeting (SHDM) on Freedom of Religion or Belief in July 2009. USCIRF Chair Leo delivered a plenary 

statement on behalf of the United States about the status of religious or belief communities in the OSCE 

region. Commissioner Eid discussed the status of freedom of religion or belief in Central Asia at a 

meeting organized by Freedom House. USCIRF hosted a meeting with delegates from EU countries, 

including Germany, Greece, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom. Members of the USCIRF delegation 

also held bilateral meetings with the Belarusian, Greek, Kazakh Tajik, and Turkish delegations, as well as 

with representatives of the Greek Chairman-in-Office, the ODIHR Panel of Experts on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief, and the two Personal Tolerance Representatives who were present at the SHDM. 

In September-October 2009, Commission Chair Leo and Commissioner Argue served on the official U.S. 

delegation to the Warsaw HDIM conference. They met with delegations including those from Russia, 

Uzbekistan and Belarus, the Personal Representatives on Tolerance, and ODIHR staff. 

During 2009, Commission staff visited OSCE participating States Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan 

to assess the status of freedom of religion or belief in those countries and meet with government officials, 

academic experts, journalists, representatives of diverse religious communities, and civil society groups. 

Recommendations 

I. Supporting the OSCE 

The U.S. government should: 

• oppose efforts by the 2010 OSCE Chair-in-Office Kazakhstan to organize a security summit of the 

56 OSCE participating States in 2010 in light of its legal restrictions on religious activity and 

imprisonment of leading human rights activist Evgeny Zhovtis; 

• express strong support for the OSCE at the highest levels of the U.S. government in the face of 

attacks by other participating States, particularly against the OSCE’s human rights, freedom of 

religion or belief, and tolerance activities carried out by the Office of Democratic Institutions and 

Human Rights (ODIHR); 

• authorize and appropriate specially designated funds, in addition to the 2010 U.S. contributions to the 

OSCE, to expand programs that advance freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief and 

that combat anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia, and discrimination against Muslims, Christians, and 

members of other religions; 

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y hold regular consultations at the State Department for members of the U.S. government and NGO 

community concerned with OSCE issues and expand the number and range of invitees; 

• include in official U.S. OSCE delegations representatives of relevant U.S. government agencies in 

addition to the State Department, such as the Homeland Security and the Justice Departments, as well 

as increase the number and variety of civil society groups involved in the OSCE process; and 

• ensure that U.S. OSCE delegations organize regular informational briefings on U.S. priorities for the 

civil society groups at OSCE meetings. 

 

II. Promoting Religious Freedom and Tolerance within the OSCE’s Participating States 

The U.S. government should urge that OSCE participating States undertake the following measures: 

• ensure compliance with their commitments to protect freedom of religion or belief, as well as combat 

discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism, as detailed in the Vienna and Copenhagen Documents 

on the Human Dimension; 

• engage in a regular public review of compliance with OSCE commitments on freedom of religion or 

belief, racial and religious discrimination, and anti-Semitism, including by facilitating a more active 

role by NGOs as part of that process; 

 

• commit promptly, publicly, and specifically to condemn hate crimes and investigate and prosecute 

their perpetrators; 

• take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish acts of anti-Semitism, such as condemning publicly 

specific anti-Semitic acts, pursuing and prosecuting the perpetrators of attacks against Jews, and, 

while vigorously protecting freedom of expression, counteracting anti-Semitic rhetoric and organized 

anti-Semitic activities; 

• condemn in a public fashion, while vigorously protecting freedom of expression, attacks targeting 

Muslims and pursue and prosecute the perpetrators of such attacks; 

 

• ensure that efforts to combat terrorism not be used as a justification to restrict the human rights, 

including freedom of religion or belief, of members of religious minorities; 

 

• bring national legislation and practice, as well as local laws, into conformity with international human 

rights standards and OSCE commitments by: permitting all religious groups to organize and conduct 

their activities without undue interference; discontinuing excessive regulation of the free practice of 

religion, including registration or recognition requirements that effectively prevent members of 

religious communities from exercising their freedom to manifest religion or belief; and permitting 

limitations on the right to freedom of religion or belief only as provided by law and consistent with 

participating States’ obligations under international law; 

 

• monitor the actions of regional and local officials who violate the right to freedom of religion or 

belief and provide effective remedies for any such violations; and 

• establish mechanisms to review the cases of persons detained under suspicion of, or charged with, 

religious, political, or security offenses and release those who have been imprisoned solely because of 

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their religious beliefs or practices, as well as any others who have been unjustly detained or 

sentenced. 

III. Promoting Religious Freedom and Tolerance through the OSCE’s Institutional 

 Mechanisms 

The U.S. government should urge the OSCE to: 

• promote freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief throughout the OSCE region, both east 

and west of Vienna, including focusing on issues such as discriminatory registration systems, 

limitations on religious expression, state interference in the internal hierarchical and property 

arrangements of religious communities, and limitations on the rights of parents to ensure the 

religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own peaceful religious or 

other beliefs; 

• consider ways to bring greater public attention to the activities of the OSCE Panel of Experts on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief, such as enhancing the transparency of its activities, providing funds to 

enable the Panel to hold training seminars, including in the Mediterranean Partner States, about 

OSCE commitments on freedom of religious or belief; 

• encourage the convening of an annual meeting of the OSCE Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief that is open to its entire membership; 

• ensure, as a matter of priority, the reappointment of the three Chair-in-Office Personal 

Representatives on tolerance issues and make the country-specific reports of the three Personal 

Representatives available to the public; 

• urge the Personal Representative on Combating Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims to 

report on conditions in OSCE participating States in which Muslims constitute a majority population, 

focusing particularly on government repression of peaceful religious expression; 

• request that the three Personal Representatives report in person to the annual OSCE ministerial 

meetings, and that the OSCE Chairman-in-Office invite the three Personal Representatives to 

participate on his or her official visits and refer to their work and conclusions in speeches and other 

presentations; 

• encourage OSCE participating States and the 18 OSCE Field Presences to invite the Personal 

Representatives on official visits; 

• convene on a regular basis public review meetings to assess compliance by OSCE participating States 

of their commitments to combat discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism; 

• ensure that all participating States take concrete actions to meet their commitments to combat 

discrimination and intolerance, including measures to combat anti-Semitism, as detailed in the 1990 

Copenhagen Document; these measures should include adopting laws to protect against incitement to 

violence based on discrimination, including anti-Semitism, and providing individuals with effective 

remedies to initiate complaints against acts of discrimination; 

• convene expert conferences on anti-Semitism and freedom of religion or belief, as well as other 

tolerance issues, during 2010 and 2011;

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• assist ODIHR in making it possible for the OSCE Field Presences and the ODIHR to hold public 

roundtables with local government officials, NGOs, and community leaders to discuss commitments 

on freedom of religion or belief, as well as the concept and definition of hate crimes and the 

implementation of hate crimes legislation; 

• provide voluntary, extra-budgetary funding for additional staff to deal with freedom of religion or 

belief, working within the ODIHR Human Rights Program, and encourage the ODIHR Tolerance 

Program staff take part in ODIHR training of Field Presences and other OSCE staff; 

• provide the ODIHR with the necessary mandate and adequate resources to hire as part of the Unified 

Budget experienced staff at the working level, to direct the Tolerance Program, monitor compliance 

with OSCE obligations on freedom of religion or belief, and combat discrimination, xenophobia, and 

anti-Semitism; and 

• provide funding for the translation of additional ODIHR Tolerance Program reports into OSCE 

languages, particularly Russian, and for the employment of at least one ODIHR Tolerance Program 

staffer with Russian-language capability. 
Expedited Removal 

USCIRF’s Expedited Removal Study 

 

In 2003 and 2004, USCIRF conducted a major research study, as authorized by the International 

Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), to examine whether asylum seekers subject to Expedited 

Removal are being detained under inappropriate conditions and whether they are being returned to 

countries where they might face persecution. Specifically, IRFA authorized USCIRF to appoint 

experts to examine whether immigration officers, in exercising Expedited Removal authority over 

aliens who may be eligible for asylum, were: 

1) improperly encouraging withdrawals of applications for admission; 

2) incorrectly failing to refer such aliens for credible fear determinations; 

3) incorrectly removing such aliens to countries where they may face 

persecution; or 

4) improperly detaining such aliens, or detaining them under inappropriate 

conditions. 

USCIRF released its findings in the 2005 Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal (hereafter 

referred to as the Study). 

The Study identified serious flaws that place asylum seekers at risk of being returned to countries 

where they may face persecution and being mistreated while in detention. To address these concerns, 

USCIRF issued recommendations, none of which require congressional action, to agencies in the 

Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ). The recommendations were geared to 

help protect U.S. borders and ensure fair and humane treatment for bona fide asylum seekers, two 

goals of the 1996 immigration reform law that established the Expedited Removal procedure. In 2007, 

two years after the release of the Study, USCIRF released a “report card” grading the federal agencies 

on their implementation of the Study’s recommendations. 

Prior to 2009, DHS had failed to adequately address several areas of concern the Study had identified, 

including the low profile and absence of inter-bureau coordination of asylum issues; the use of jail-like 

facilities to house asylum seekers; the absence of parole policies to ensure that asylum seekers who 

pose no risk of flight or danger are not subject to unnecessary detention; and insufficient oversight of 

the Expedited Removal process. In 2009, DHS announced efforts to reform its immigration detention 

policies which, if fully implemented, would address several of these areas of concern. . In addition, 

two bills were introduced in the Senate in 2009 that, if enacted, would significantly reform the system 

by which asylum seekers are detained and implement several of USCIRF’s recommendations related to 

the treatment of asylum seekers in detention. USCIRF welcomes the efforts of DHS and Congress. 

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The Expedited Removal Process 

The Expedited Removal process authorizes immigration officials to summarily return people arriving in 

the United States without proper documentation to their country of origin. Congress was concerned that 

bona fide asylum seekers, who often travel without proper documents, might mistakenly be returned to 

their persecutors. In response, Congress included provisions to prevent the Expedited Removal of 

refugees fleeing persecution. Under these provisions, asylum seekers are detained while a determination 

is made if they have a “credible fear” of persecution. If credible fear is found, the case is sent to an 

immigration judge (IJ), and the asylum seeker may be paroled while the case is pending. However, if 

credible fear of persecution is not found, the asylum seeker is put back in the Expedited Removal process 

and removed promptly. 

At least five separate agencies play a role in Expedited Removal. Within DHS, Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) first encounters aliens, either at a port of entry or anywhere within 100 miles of U.S. 

land or sea borders. CBP then identifies those subject to Expedited Removal, and from that group, those 

seeking asylum. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for detaining asylum 

seekers until Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) makes the credible fear determination. For 

those asylum seekers found to have a credible fear, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Executive Office 

for Immigration Review (EOIR) takes over; IJs hear the cases, and the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(BIA) reviews any appeals. With so many agencies and immigration officers involved in so many 

locations, coordination has been and remains a major challenge within DHS and between DHS and DOJ. 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP): Identifying Asylum Seekers 

In more than half of the Expedited Removal interviews observed, the Study found that immigration 

officers failed to read a script advising aliens that they should ask for protection without delay if they 

have any reason to fear being returned home. The Study further found that in 72 percent of the cases 

reviewed, asylum seekers were not given an opportunity before signing to review and correct sworn 

statements taken by immigration officers. The Study also found that, although they resemble verbatim 

transcripts, these sworn statements are neither verbatim nor verifiable, often suggest that information was 

conveyed to the asylum seeker which was in fact never conveyed, and sometimes contain questions that 

never were asked. The Study found that these unreliable documents often are used against asylum 

seekers when their cases come before an immigration judge. 

DHS regulations require that, when asylum seekers express a fear of return, they must be referred to an 

Asylum Officer to determine whether the fear is “credible.” Yet, in nearly 15 percent of the cases that 

Study experts observed in person, asylum seekers who expressed a fear of return were nevertheless 

removed without being referred to an Asylum Officer. Of those cases, nearly half of the files indicated 

that the asylum seeker had not expressed any fear. 

The Study made five recommendations to CBP: 1) expand existing videotape systems to all ports of entry 

and border patrol stations and have “testers” verify that Expedited Removal procedures are correctly 

followed; 2) reconcile conflicting field guidance to clarify that any alien who expressed fear must be 

referred for a credible fear interview; 3) inform immigration judges that forms used at ports of entry and 

the border are not verbatim transcripts of the alien’s entire asylum case, despite their appearance as such, 

so that they can be given proper weight; 4) save scarce detention resources by not placing asylum seekers 

with valid travel documents in Expedited Removal; and 5) improve monitoring so that existing 

procedures are followed correctly. 

Since the Study was released in 2005, CBP has implemented few of USCIRF’s recommendations. DHS 

has told the Commission that CBP took steps to increase enforcement and review of its procedures and 

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field guidance related to cases of Expedited Removal, and improve and enhance field officer training. 

CBP also informed USCIRF that it is willing to train IJs, as well as other DHS officers, on the sworn 

statements. However, USCIRF’s primary recommendations, expanding existing videotape systems and 

employing “testers” to verify that procedures are correctly followed, have yet to be implemented. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE): Detaining Asylum Seekers 

Despite the existence of national criteria that determines when asylum seekers in Expedited Removal 

should be released from detention pending their asylum hearing, the Study found that the criteria were not 

being implemented. The Study also found wide variations in release rates nationwide: from 0.5 percent in 

New Orleans and 4 percent in New Jersey, to 81 percent in Chicago and 94 percent in San Antonio. 

Additionally, the Study found that the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers referred for credible fear 

are detained—for weeks or months and occasionally years—in penal or penitentiary-like facilities. On 

average, asylum seekers with a credible fear of persecution are detained for 60 days, and one third for 90 

days or more. The non-governmental organization Human Rights First (HRF) also reported in 2009 that 

asylum seekers are detained for months, if not years, before being granted asylum. In some of the jails 

and prisons in which they are detained, the Study and HRF also found that asylum seekers live alongside 

U.S. citizens serving criminal sentences or criminal aliens, even though ICE detention standards do not 

permit non-criminal detainees to be co-mingled with criminals. The Study found that some asylum 

seekers in these facilities were required to wear prison uniforms and were handcuffed and shackled like 

regular criminals. Similar findings are reported by HRF. ICE has experimented with alternatives to 

detention, and at the time of the Study was operating one secure facility in Broward County, Florida, that 

resembled a refugee center rather than a penal institution. Unfortunately, since the Study was released, 

changes at Broward have made it more institutional. 

The Study made five recommendations to ICE: 1) train detention center personnel to work with noncriminal, psychologically vulnerable asylum seekers; 2) work with the immigration courts to ensure that 

detained aliens in Expedited Removal, including those who have not been referred for a credible fear 

determination, have access to legal service providers; 3) change detention standards so that non-criminal 

asylum seekers are not detained under penal conditions; 4) codify existing parole criteria into regulations; 

and 5) ensure consistent and correct parole decisions by developing standardized forms and national 

review procedures. 

After the release of the 2007 report card, ICE took some steps to address concerns raised in the Study, but 

also enacted policies contrary to recommendations in the Study. In December 2007, ICE and the DHS 

Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties jointly released a training module on cultural awareness and 

asylum issues for detention officers. USCIRF welcomed this module, the fact that it is available to all 

USCIS staff, and that it has been integrated into some CBP training programs. This training, however, is 

not mandatory for intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA) staff, who work at facilities where more 

than 50 percent of asylum seekers are held. 

ICE in 2009 undertook steps to change many of their policies and more closely follow USCIRF’s 

recommendations. In December 2009, ICE issued new parole guidelines for asylum seekers in Expedited 

Removal that are more in line with the Study’s recommendations than the policy the agency had followed 

for the past several years. Under the new directive, parole may be granted once asylum seekers establish 

credible fear, identity, community ties, and that they are not security risks, unless there are “exceptional 

overriding factors.” The directive also establishes procedures for informing all asylum seekers of their 

right to request parole, documenting parole decisions, and reviewing and reporting on adjudications. This 

directive supersedes a November 2007 ICE directive which, contrary to USCIRF’s recommendations, had 

expanded the criteria asylum seekers must meet to be granted parole. 

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Until 2009, ICE was unwilling to develop alternatives to detention. Rather, contrary to USCIRF’s 

recommendation, the use of jails and jail-like detention facilities increased after the release of the Study in 

2005. ICE then responded that new performance-based standards for detention facilities had been 

implemented. However, since these new standards still were correction-based, they did not address 

USCIRF’s concerns. 

In the fall of 2009, ICE announced planned reforms which, if fully implemented, would address some of 

the problems related to the detention of asylum seekers identified in the Study and not addressed by ICE’s 

performance-based standards. Specifically, ICE announced that it plans over the next three to five years 

to design facilities located and operated solely for immigration detention purposes. By the end of fiscal 

year 2010, DHS plans to have revised its immigration detention standards to reflect the conditions 

appropriate for various immigration detainee populations, to have reviewed its contracts with detention 

facilities to ensure that they are in compliance with the new standards, and to have devised a risk 

assessment and custody classification to place detainees in appropriate facilities. ICE also plans to 

establish an Office of Detention Policy and Planning (ODPP) to help the agency develop standards for 

new immigration facilities that are based on civil, not penal, models, including considerations such as 

access to legal services, emergency rooms and transportation hubs. DHS also plans to hire new ICE 

detention managers to work at and monitor facilities housing immigration detainees and create an Office 

of Detention Oversight to conduct more routine and random investigations of detainee grievances. 

Finally, ICE is forming two advisory groups (one on general policies and practices, and another on 

detainee health care) of local and national organizations interested in ICE’s detention system. Several of 

these recommendations were included in an internal review of U.S. immigration detention policies issued 

by the Special Advisor on Detention and Removal Operations, Dora Schriro, whose position DHS 

Secretary Janet Napolitano created in early 2009. Special Advisor Schriro’s report, released that 

September, identified several problems the Study also raised, including the use of correctional models for 

asylum seekers. 

DHS has already instituted one reform of importance to USCIRF. As of September 18, 2009, ICE began 

housing non-criminal, non-violent populations, including asylum seekers, at less penal facilities based on 

risk, including Broward, and near immigration service providers. 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS): Making Credible Fear Determinations 

The Study found that, despite their expertise and authority to grant asylum outside the Expedited 

Removal context, USCIS Asylum Officers have a limited role in the Expedited Removal process. The 

Study found a high rate of positive credible fear determinations, reflecting the deliberately generous 

preliminary screening standard used to ensure that bona fide refugees are not mistakenly returned. 

However, review procedures for negative credible fear determinations were found to be more onerous, 

and might have the unintended consequence of encouraging positive determinations. The Study also 

found that the partnership between the Arlington, Virginia Asylum Office and the Capital Area 

Immigrants Rights Coalition to ensure pro bono legal advice for asylum seekers in the credible fear 

determinations was a success worth replicating. The partnership not only provides detained asylum 

seekers with legal advice, but has also improved efficiency by increasing the number of asylum seekers 

who chose not to pursue their claims after consultation with counsel. 

The Study made three recommendations to USCIS: 1) subject both positive and negative credible fear 

findings to similar review procedures; 2) expand the existing pro bono program for the credible fear 

process to all eight asylum offices; and 3) allow Asylum Officers to grant asylum at the credible fear 

stage. 

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USCIRF commends USCIS for its April 2006 memorandum increasing quality assurance review for 

positive credible fear determinations, its 2007 release of an updated Asylum Officer Basic Training 

Course Lesson Plan, and its announcement in December 2006 that it welcomes approaches by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to expand the existing pro bono legal program to the other seven 

asylum offices. 

In 2008, DHS informed USCIRF, contrary to one of the Commission’s key recommendations, that it had 

concluded that allowing Asylum Officers to grant asylum at the credible fear stage would be too resourceintensive, would benefit only a small number of asylum seekers and may disadvantage others, and 

therefore, it would not implement that recommendation. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Agency-Wide: Management and Coordination 

The Study found extensive problems with DHS’s overall management and coordination of the Expedited 

Removal process, including insufficient quality assurance practices, inadequate data management 

systems, poor communication between responsible bureaus, and no mechanism to address system-wide 

issues. USCIRF made four recommendations to address these flaws: 1) create a high-level refugee 

coordinator position; 2) address implementation and coordination issues before expanding the Expedited 

Removal program; 3) create a reliable data management system that allows for real-time information on 

asylum seekers in Expedited Removal; and 4) allow Asylum Officers to grant asylum at the credible fear 

stage. 

While former Secretary Chertoff appointed a Senior Advisor for Refugee and Asylum Policy in February 

2006, no other of the USCIRF recommendations noted above were implemented. Moreover, USCIRF 

remains concerned that, unless supported by a fully staffed office and with the necessary authority within 

DHS to make needed changes, the Senior Advisor cannot implement the Study’s recommendations, 

ensure consistent asylum policy and legal interpretations, and monitor the Expedited Removal system to 

ensure that reforms remain in place and problems are addressed as they arise. USCIRF is further 

concerned that the Senior Advisor was given the additional responsibility of addressing broader 

immigration reform and recently was moved under the jurisdiction of the Senior Advisor on Immigration, 

impairing the advisor’s ability to address effectively refugee and asylum policy. 

USCIRF’s overarching recommendation was that Expedited Removal should not be expanded until the 

serious problems identified in the Study were resolved. Despite this recommendation—and the failure to 

resolve the problems cited in the Study—in 2006 DHS expanded Expedited Removal from a port of entry 

program to encompass the entire land and sea border of the United States to a distance of 100 miles 

inland. USCIRF has expressed concern about this expansion of Expedited Removal. 

The Commission learned from the April 2006 DHS OIG Audit Report that ICE lacks data analysis 

capabilities to manage the detention and removal program in an efficient and effective manner. DHS has 

informed USCIRF that in 2008, it began using a computer program called the ENFORCE Alien Removal 

Module to allow for real-time tracking of asylum seekers as they moved through the Expedited Removal 

process. USCIRF tentatively welcomed this move, but urges regular reviews of the system to ensure that 

information sharing takes place. 

Department of Justice (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR): Hearing and 

Reviewing Cases 

The Study found that sworn statements taken at ports of entry and the border are inaccurate and 

incomplete, and that credible fear determination records do not document the asylum seeker’s entire 

claim. Nevertheless, the Study found that in 57 percent of all cases, IJs allowed sworn statements and/or 

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credible fear determination records to be used to impeach the asylum seeker. In 39 percent of all cases, 

the IJs cited these documents in denying the claim. The Study also found that one in four asylum seekers 

who are represented by pro bono attorneys are granted asylum, compared to only one in 40 unrepresented 

asylum seekers. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) also has found that having an 

attorney more than doubled an asylum seeker’s chance of being granted asylum. 

The outcome of an asylum seeker’s case depends largely on chance; namely, the IJ who happens to be 

assigned to hear the case. Among IJs sitting in the same city who hear a significant number of asylum 

cases, the Study found that some grant almost zero percent of the applications, while others grant 80 

percent. The GAO found similar discrepancies. Of the asylum cases appealed to the BIA, only two to 

four percent were reversed. Of particular concern is the use of “summary affirmances without opinion,” 

whereby a single Board member can endorse an IJ decision without providing a reasoned written opinion 

discussing the issues raised on appeal. This practice, while allowing the Board to work through some of 

its backlog, can reduce confidence in the rigor of the Board’s review and has led to an increase in appeals 

of BIA decisions to federal circuit courts. Another drawback of summary affirmances is that they do not 

provide any guidance to IJs, since the Board does not correct any errors other than those requiring 

reversal of the decision. 

USCIRF made six recommendations to improve consistency in asylum determinations by IJs: 1) reinstate 

funding for immigration judge training; 2) expand the Legal Orientation Program (LOP), conducted by 

NGOs under EOIR’s direction in order to provide legal information to detained aliens, improve their 

access to pro bono counsel, reduce detention costs, and increase immigration cost efficiency; 3) improve 

the quality of immigration court decisions; 4) work with ICE to ensure that detained aliens in Expedited 

Removal, including those who have not been referred for a credible fear determination, have access to 

legal service providers; 5) improve administrative review of asylum appeals; and 6) allow Asylum 

Officers to grant asylum at the credible fear stage. 

USCIRF welcomes the efforts EOIR has made to address the concerns raised in the Study. In August 

2006, DOJ made a number of reforms based on USCIRF’s recommendations including: implementing 

performance and supervision measures to promote better consistency and quality of IJ decisions; 

improving and increasing the explanation of BIA decisions; increasing training of IJs, BIA members, and 

EOIR staff; and expanding and improving EOIR’s pro bono programs. 

EOIR also has increased training opportunities provided to all IJs, including some country-specific 

trainings; expanded training and mentorship opportunities for new judges; and provided judges with more 

resource materials. In August 2006, 2007, and 2009, all IJs participated in a five-day training conference, 

which included presentations on religious freedom by USCIRF and the State Department’s Office of 

International Religious Freedom, and mandatory workshops on asylum law and procedures and 

improving oral decisions. Additionally, a one-week training course for new IJs was held in March 2007 

that included lectures on asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention against 

Torture, a discussion of credibility issues, and a mock asylum hearing. 

USCIRF was pleased to learn that EOIR in January 2007 doubled the number of LOP sites from six to 12, 

with an additional four pilot sites for unaccompanied minors in the custody of the Office of Refugee 

Resettlement. The Commission has further learned that 13 new LOP sites were opened in 2008, and that 

EOIR formed a pro bono committee to oversee expansion and improvement of its pro bono programs. 

USCIRF further notes that the BIA has decreased the number of summary affirmances and also has added 

new Board members. It continues to urge the BIA to increase the number of written opinions in asylum 

cases. 

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Congressional Action 

Members of Congress have long sought to address problems in the U.S. government’s treatment of 

asylum seekers. Two bills introduced in the Senate in 2009 that would significantly reform the system by 

which asylum seekers are detained reflect key USCIRF recommendations. In the 111th Congress, 

Senators Joseph Lieberman (I-CT), Edward Kennedy (D-MA), and Daniel Akaka (D-HI) introduced S. 

1594, the Secure and Safe Detention and Asylum Act, earlier versions of which were introduced in 2006, 

2007, and 2008. Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Carl Levin (D-MI) introduced S. 3113, the Refugee 

Protection Act of 2010. Both bills would increase protections for asylum seekers and address flaws in the 

conditions under which they are detained. Both bills also would authorize USCIRF to undertake another 

study on the effect of Expedited Removal provisions, practice and procedures on asylum claimants. 

Recommendations 

I. Recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security 

The Department of Homeland Security should: 

• maintain and strengthen the position of Senior Advisor for Refugee and Asylum Affairs, including 

giving the position the necessary status and resources, including staff, to coordinate DHS policy and 

regulations and monitor the implementation of procedures affecting refugees or asylum seekers, 

particularly those in Expedited Removal, and tasking this position only with addressing refugee and 

asylum policy, not broader immigration reform efforts; 

• ensure that, as planned, revised immigration detention facilities and standards reflect the conditions 

appropriate for asylum seekers and review contracts with detention facilities to ensure that they are in 

compliance with the new standards; 

• decrease the use of jails and jail-like facilities to detain asylum seekers, develop a small number of 

centrally-managed facilities specific to and appropriate for these individuals, and ensure that asylum 

seekers are placed in these appropriate centers; 

• allow asylum officers to grant asylum to asylum seekers in Expedited Removal at the time of the 

credible fear interview, just as they are already trained and authorized to do for other asylum seekers; 

• ensure that parole criteria are applied consistently nation-wide; 

• require intergovernmental service agreement (IGSA) staff to take the training course on cultural 

awareness and the unique characteristics of asylum seekers developed by the Office of Civil Rights 

and Civil Liberties, and continue to require that this course be taken by personnel at Contract 

Detention Facilities; 

• expand and enhance the videotape systems currently used at only two locations to all major ports of 

entry and Border Patrol stations to record all secondary interviews, and employ undercover “testers” 

to verify that Expedited Removal procedures are being properly followed; 

• require CBP and Border Protection to include an explanation on Sworn Statement Form I-867B 

stating the document’s purpose and limitations, and conduct training for immigration judges and other 

DHS personnel on the statement as offered in the past; 

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• monitor more vigorously current DHS procedures concerning the administration of the Forms I-867A 

and B; 

• exercise the discretion to not place a properly documented alien in Expedited Removal and 

mandatory detention when the sole basis for doing so is the alien’s expression of a desire to apply for 

asylum at the port of entry; 

• continue to work with the EOIR within the DOJ to ensure that detained asylum seekers in Expedited 

Removal, including those who have not been referred for a credible fear determination, have access to 

legal service providers. 

II. Recommendations to the Department of Justice 

The Department of Justice should: 

• expand existing pro bono legal programs for the credible fear process from Arlington, Virginia, San 

Francisco, California, and Atlanta, Georgia, to all eight asylum offices; 

• increase funding for IJ training; 

• continue to expand the LOP nationwide, in partnership with NGOs, and further expand the program 

to asylum seekers not yet in proceedings; 

• continue to work with ICE t within DHS to ensure that detained asylum seekers in Expedited 

Removal, including those who have not been referred for a credible fear determination, have access to 

legal service providers; 

• continue to improve the quality of immigration court decisions through training IJs and the decreased 

use of summary affirmances; and 

• continue to improve administrative review of asylum appeals. 
Appendices 

APPENDIX 1 

BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL 

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Leonard A. Leo, Chair

Leonard A. Leo serves as the Executive Vice President of the Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy 

Studies, an organization of over 40,000 conservatives and libertarians dedicated to limited, constitutional 

government and interested in the current state of the legal order. He manages the projects, programs and 

publications of the Lawyers Division. He also helps manage the Federalist Society’s government, media, 

and corporate relations, as well as special initiatives such as the organization's Supreme Court Project and 

International Law Project. 

Mr. Leo has participated actively in a number of international forums. He served as a U.S. delegate to the 

UN Commission on Human Rights in 2005, has been an observer to the World Intellectual Property 

Organization, participated in two World Health Organization delegations in 2007, and is involved with 

the U.S. National Commission to UNESCO. 

Mr. Leo has published articles on religious liberty under the U.S. Constitution, presidential war powers, 

executive privilege, legislative responses to judicial activism, property rights, and several federal civil 

procedure issues. With James Taranto of The Wall Street Journal, he is the co-editor of Presidential 

Leadership: Rating the Best and Worst in the White House (Simon & Shuster, 2004). 

Mr. Leo received his undergraduate degree with high honors from Cornell University in 1987 and his law 

degree from Cornell Law School with honors in 1989. 

Mr. Leo is active in the affairs of the Catholic Church, serving as a member of the Sovereign Military 

Order of Malta and a member of the board of the National Catholic Prayer Breakfast. 

Commissioner Leo was first appointed to the Commission in 2007 and reappointed in August 2008 by 

President George W. Bush. 

Michael Cromartie, Vice Chair 

Michael Cromartie is the Vice President of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, D.C., 

where he directs the Evangelicals in Civic Life program and the Media and Religion program. The Ethics 

and Public Policy Center was established in 1976 to clarify and reinforce the bond between the JudeoChristian moral tradition and domestic and foreign policy issues. Cromartie is also a Senior Advisor to 

The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life in Washington and a Senior Fellow with The Trinity Forum. 

Mr. Cromartie has contributed book reviews and articles to First Things, Books and Culture, The 

Washington Post, the Washington Times, The Reformed Journal, Insight, Christianity Today, Stewardship 

Journal, and World. He is the editor of 16 books including, most recently, Religion, Culture, and 

International Conflict: A Conversation; Religion and Politics in America: A Conversation; and A Public 

Faith: Evangelicals and Civic Engagement. 

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He is an advisory editor at Christianity Today and an adjunct professor at Reformed Theological 

Seminary, and was an advisor to the PBS documentary series “With God on Our Side: The Rise of the 

Christian Right in America.” 

Frequently asked to explicate the dynamics between religious faith and political convictions, Mr. 

Cromartie has been interviewed on numerous radio and television programs, including National Public 

Radio, CNN, ABC News, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, MSNBC, and PBS. He has been quoted 

frequently in The Washington Post, New York Times, The New Republic, Christianity Today, Time, the 

National Catholic Reporter and U.S. News and World Report. He holds an M.A. in Justice from 

American University and a B.A. from Covenant College in Georgia. 

Mr. Cromartie served as chair of the Commission for 2005-06 and for 2007-08. He was appointed to the 

Commission in September 2004 by President George W. Bush and reappointed in May 2006 and August 

2008 by President Bush. 

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Vice Chair 

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou is Asst. Professor in the Department of International Relations at Boston 

University, where she is also the Coordinator of the M.A. Program in International Relations and Religion 

and a Research Associate at the Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs. She holds a Ph.D. and 

an M.S. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; she received her M.A.L.D. 

from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, as well as a B.A. in International Relations and History 

from Tufts University. 

She has published widely on issues of religion and human rights, democracy, and security in Europe and 

the United States. Her publications have appeared in scholarly and policy journals, such as European 

Journal of Political Research, Social Compass, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Journal of 

Democracy, Orbis, Survival, and Journal of Faith & International Affairs, as well as in numerous edited 

volumes on human rights and religious freedom and on politics and culture in Southeastern Europe. 

She has a forthcoming book dealing with religion and politics (a monograph on Church-State Relations in 

Greece: Pluralism, Democracy and European Integration), and has published the volume (as co-editor and 

contributor) Thinking through Faith: Perspectives from Orthodox Christian Scholars. 

A regional expert on Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, Dr. Prodromou has been an 

invited policy consultant in the U.S., with the U.S. National Intelligence Council, Department of State, 

Defense Intelligence Agency, and Central Intelligence Agency; and in Europe, with NATO and Ministries 

and non-governmental organizations in various EU member-states. 

She was appointed to the Commission in October 2004 by now-Speaker of the House and 

Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and is serving her third term as Commissioner. She is currently 

Vice Chair for 2009-2010, and previously served as Vice Chair for 2008-2009 and 2006-2007. 

Dr. Don Argue

Don Argue, Ed.D., was appointed Chancellor of Northwest University in Kirkland, Washington, on 

August 15, 2007, after serving as President of Northwest for nine years. During his tenure as 

President, Northwest experienced substantial growth, including an increase in the number of faculty and 

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the addition of 14 new buildings, including the Center for Graduate and Professional Studies and the 

Health and Sciences Center. During his tenure, enrollment also grew by 52 percent. 

Dr. Argue previously served as president of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). The NAE is 

comprised of approximately 42,500 congregations nationwide from 51 member denominations, and 

individual congregations from an additional 26 denominations, as well as several hundred independent 

churches. 

He also served as President of North Central University in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for 16 years. Under 

his leadership, the university received the Christianity Today “Decade of Growth Award” in recognition 

of being the fastest-growing college of its kind in the nation. 

Dr. Argue earned a Bachelor’s degree at Central Bible College in Springfield, Missouri, a Master's degree 

at Santa Clara University in Santa Clara, California, and a Doctorate in Education at the University of the 

Pacific in Stockton, California. 

President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright invited Dr. Argue to serve on the 

President's Advisory Committee on International Religious Freedom, for which he chaired the 

subcommittee dealing with international religious persecution. 

President Clinton appointed Dr. Argue, Theodore Cardinal McCarrick (Washington, D.C.) and Rabbi 

Arthur Schneier (New York City, New York) to the first official delegation of religious leaders from the 

United States to visit The People's Republic of China to discuss religious freedom and religious 

persecution with high-ranking officials including President Jiang Zemin. 

Dr. Argue has served as pastor of churches in Missouri and California. 

Dr. Argue was appointed to the Commission by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) in 2007. 

Imam Talal Y. Eid 

Imam Dr. Talal Y. Eid is Founder and Executive/Religious Director of the Islamic Institute of Boston. 

He is also the Muslim chaplain at Brandeis University and at the Massachusetts General Hospital. He is 

Adjunct Professor of Arts of Ministry at Hartford Seminary. A native of Lebanon, he served as Imam 

at Al-Naaser Mosque in Tripoli for six years and as Imam and Religious Director of the Islamic Center of 

New England (MA) for 23 years. 

Imam Eid earned a Master of Theological Studies (MTS) in 1991 from Harvard Divinity School, where 

he also earned his Doctor of Theology (Th.D.) in Comparative Religion in 2005. He wrote his thesis on 

“Marriage, Divorce, and Child Custody as Experienced by American Muslims: Religious, Social, and 

Legal Considerations.” Imam Eid also holds a degree in Islamic Law (sharia), which he received in 1974 

from Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. 

Imam Eid is a well-known Muslim scholar, activist, and lecturer on Islam and Muslims, and on Christian, 

Jewish, and Muslim relations in North America and around the globe. He promotes the knowledge of 

Islam through local and national radio and television programs, and through articles published in local 

and national magazines. He is a marital and family therapist and acts as an expert consultant on Islamic 

law, including on issues of marital dispute, marital violence, divorce, and child custody. 

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Imam Eid has served for a period of 20 years as the Chairman of Majlis Ash-Shura (Committee on 

Islamic Consultation) of the Islamic Council of New England in Massachusetts. He is also a member of 

the Quincy and Boston Clergy associations. He co-chaired the Archives for Historical Documentation

of Boston, Massachusetts. He has received recognition awards from many local and national institutions, 

including the Massachusetts State Senate; the office of the District Attorney of 

Norfolk, Massachusetts; the Quincy (MA) City Council; the Quincy Human Rights Commission, Partners 

in Excellence Award (MGH); and Toastmasters International. 

Imam Eid was appointed to the Commission by President George W. Bush in May 2007. 

 

Felice D. Gaer 

Felice D. Gaer directs the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights of the 

American Jewish Committee, which conducts research and advocacy to strengthen international human 

rights protections and institutions worldwide. 

 

Gaer was a 2010 Regents Professor at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). She was and 

remains the first American to serve as an Independent Expert on the UN Committee against Torture, a 

body which monitors compliance of 146 countries with the Convention against Torture. Ms. Gaer has 

been a member of the Committee since she was nominated by the Clinton Administration in 1999, and 

has been elected to three terms on it, serving as Vice Chair (2004-2006), as General Rapporteur (2006-

2008), and as year-round Rapporteur on Follow-up to Country Conclusions (2003 to present). 

 

In 2010, Gaer was awarded the National Religious Freedom award by the First Freedom Center in 

Richmond, Virginia. Encyclopedia Judaica describes Ms. Gaer as having “played the key role in assuring 

passage by consensus of the UN General Assembly’s first-ever condemnation of anti-Semitism” in 1998, 

and being an “architect of many initiatives linking women's rights to human rights.” 

 

Ms. Gaer writes and lectures widely on U.S. and UN human rights policy, addressing issues including 

protecting civilians under threat, advancing the human rights of women, eradicating religious persecution 

abroad, resolving ethnic conflicts, and preventing genocide. One of the first to call for the issue of rape in 

armed conflicts to be addressed by the international war crimes tribunal on former Yugoslavia, she was a 

key negotiator on the U.S. delegation to the Beijing World Conference on Women. Two recent articles on 

freedom of religion and human rights include “Echoes of the Future? Religious Repression as a 

Challenge to US Human Rights Policy” in the volume, The Future of Human Rights: US Policy for a 

New Era (U. of Penn. Press, 2008), and “Religious Freedom,” in the Encyclopedia of Human Rights, 

(Oxford Univ. Press, 2009). 

 

In 2009, the Obama Administration asked Ms. Gaer to serve on a delegation to the UN in Geneva to 

assess the Durban Review Conference negotiations, and to be a delegate to the UN Commission on the 

Status of Women. Ms. Gaer was a public member of nine U.S. delegations to UN human rights 

negotiations, including the Commission on Human Rights and the Beijing World Conference on Women 

in the 1990s. More recently, she served on several OSCE delegations in her capacities as Chair or Vice 

Chair of the Commission. 

A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Ms. Gaer serves on the advisory committee of Human 

Rights Watch/Europe and Central Asia. She is a member of the board of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation

and the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute. In 2002 and 2003 she was cited in the annual Forward 

50 list of Jewish Americans who are making a difference. 

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Ms. Gaer is a graduate of Wellesley College, from which she received the Alumni Achievement Award in 

1995. She also received advanced degrees from Columbia University. 

Ms. Gaer, who has served on the Commission since 2001, including three times as Chair, three times as 

Vice Chair, and one time on the Executive Committee, was appointed by now-Speaker of the House and 

Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). 

Dr. Richard D. Land

Richard Land has served as president of the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics & Religious Liberty 

Commission since 1988. During his tenure as representative for the largest Protestant denomination in the 

country, Dr. Land has represented Southern Baptist and other Evangelicals' interests in the halls of 

Congress, before U.S. Presidents, and in the major media. 

As host of For Faith & Family, For Faith & Family's Insight and Richard Land Live!, three nationally 

syndicated radio programs, Dr. Land has spoken widely on the social, ethical, and public policy issues 

facing the United States. He is also Executive Editor of FFV, a national magazine dedicated to coverage 

of traditional religious values, Christian ethics, and cultural trends. 

Dr. Land was featured in Time magazine in 2005 as one of “The Twenty-five Most Influential 

Evangelicals in America.” The previous year, he was recognized by the National Journal as one of the 10 

top church-state experts “politicians will call on when they get serious about addressing an important 

public policy issue.” 

Dr. Land's latest book is The Divided States of America? What Liberals and Conservatives Are Missing in 

the God-and-Country Shouting Match (2007). Dr. Land has also recently authored Imagine! A GodBlessed America (2005) and Real Homeland Security: The America God Will Bless (2004). He earned his 

A.B. magna cum laude at Princeton University and his D.Phil. at Oxford University. 

Then-Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) reappointed Dr. Land to the Commission in 2005. 

President George W. Bush selected him for his two previous terms at the Commission (September 2001 

to September 2004). Dr. Land was reappointed in October 2007 by Senate Republican leader Mitch 

McConnell (R-KY). 

Dr. Land served as Vice Chair of the Commission for 2007-2008. 

Nina Shea

An international human-rights lawyer for 25 years, Nina Shea joined Hudson Institute as a senior scholar, 

where she directs the Center for Religious Freedom, in November 2006. 

For the 10 years prior to joining Hudson, Ms. Shea worked at Freedom House, where she directed the 

Center for Religious Freedom, an office which she had helped found in 1986 as the Puebla Institute. 

Ms. Shea has served as a Commissioner since the Commission’s founding in 1999. She was appointed as 

a U.S. delegate to the United Nations’ Commission on Human Rights by both Republican and Democratic 

administrations. 

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For over a decade, she has worked extensively for the advancement of individual religious freedom and 

other human rights in U.S. foreign policy as it confronts Islamist extremism, as well as authoritarian 

regimes. For seven years, until 2005, she helped organize and lead a coalition of churches and religious 

groups that worked to end a religious war against Christians, traditional African believers, and dissident 

Muslims in southern Sudan; in 2004 and 2005, she contributed to the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution’s 

religious freedom provision; and she authored and edited two widely acclaimed reports, Saudi Arabia’s 

Curriculum of Intolerance (2006) and Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Invade American Mosques

(2005), both of which translated and analyzed Saudi governmental publications that teach hatred and 

violence against the religious “other.” She regularly presents testimony before Congress, delivers public 

lectures, organizes briefings and conferences, and writes frequently on religious freedom issues. Her 1997 

book on anti-Christian persecution, In the Lion’s Den, remains a standard in the field. 

In January 2009, Ms. Shea was appointed as a commissioner on the U.S. National Commission 

to UNESCO. 

Ms. Shea is a member of the bar of the District of Columbia. She is a graduate of Smith College 

and American University's Washington College of Law. 

Commissioner Shea was first appointed to the Commission in 1999 by then-Speaker of the 

House Dennis Hastert (R-IL) and was reappointed in July 2007 by Rep. John Boehner (R-OH). 

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APPENDIX 2 

THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 199830

Selected Provisions 

Section 3. DEFINITIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6402) 

(11) PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term ``particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom'' means systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious 

freedom, including violations such as— 

(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 

(B) prolonged detention without charges; 

(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of those persons; or 

(D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons. 

(13) VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term ``violations of religious freedom'' means 

violations of the internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and religious belief and practice, 

as set forth in the international instruments referred to in section 2(a)(2) and as described in section 

2(a)(3), including violations such as— 

(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for— 

(i) assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, including arbitrary 

registration requirements; 

(ii) speaking freely about one's religious beliefs; 

(iii) changing one's religious beliefs and affiliation; 

(iv) possession and distribution of religious literature, including Bibles; or 

(v) raising one's children in the religious teachings and practices of one's choice; or 

(B) any of the following acts if committed on account of an individual's religious belief or practice: 

detention, interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, forced mass 

resettlement, imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, enslavement, 

murder, and execution. 

Section 402. PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO PARTICULARLY SEVERE 

VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (22 U.S.C. § 6442)

(b) DESIGNATIONS OF COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR RELIGIOUS 

FREEDOM.— 

(1) ANNUAL REVIEW.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.— Not later than September 1 of each year, the President31 shall review the status of 

religious freedom in each foreign country to determine whether the government of that country has 

engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom in that country during the 

preceding 12 months or since the date of the last review of that country under this subparagraph, 

whichever period is longer. The President shall designate each country the government of which has 

engaged in or tolerated violations described in this subparagraph as a country of particular concern for 

religious freedom. 

 

30 P.L. 105-292, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 6401, et seq. The full text of IRFA can be found on the Commission’s 

Web site, www.uscirf.gov. 

31 The authority to make decisions and take actions under IRFA has been delegated by the President to the Secretary 

of State. 

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Section 405. DESCRIPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6445) 

[With respect to each country named a “country of particular concern” (CPC), the President shall, 

according to section 402(c)(1)(a) and, in general, following an attempt to carry out consultations with the 

foreign government in question, carry out one or more of the actions described in paragraphs (9) through 

(15) of section 405(a), as determined by the President. The President may substitute a commensurate 

action. IRFA § 405(b).] 

405(a)(9) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States development assistance in 

accordance with section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 

405(a)(10) Directing the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment 

Corporation, or the Trade and Development Agency not to approve the issuance of any (or a specified 

number of ) guarantees, insurance, extensions of credit, or participations in the extension of credit with 

respect to the specific government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the 

President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402; 

405(a)(11) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security assistance in accordance 

with section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 

405(a)(12) Consistent with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, directing 

the United States executive directors of international financial institutions to oppose and vote against 

loans primarily benefiting the specific foreign government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or 

determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402; 

405(a)(13) Ordering the heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to issue any (or a specified 

number of ) specific licenses, and not to grant any other specific authority (or a specified number of 

authorities), to export any goods or technology to the specific foreign government, agency, 

instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under 

section 401 or 402, under— 

(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979; 

(B) the Arms Export Control Act; 

(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or 

(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a 

condition for the export or reexport of goods or services; 

405(a)(14) Prohibiting any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits 

totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period to the specific foreign government, agency, 

instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under 

section 401 or 402; and/or 

405(a)(15) Prohibiting the United States Government from procuring, or entering into any contract for the 

procurement of, any goods or services from the foreign government, entities, or officials found or 

determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 or 402. 

[In lieu of carrying out action as described above, the President may conclude a binding agreement with 

the respective foreign government that obligates such government to cease, or take substantial steps to 

address and phase out, the act, policy, or practice constituting the violation of religious freedom. IRFA § 

402(c)(2). Moreover, “[a]t the time the President determines a country to be a country of particular 

concern, if that country is already subject to multiple, broad-based sanctions imposed in significant part in 

response to human rights abuses, and such sanctions are ongoing, the President may determine that one or 

more of these sanctions also satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” IRFA § 402(c)(5).] 

Section 407. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER. (22 U.S.C. § 6447)

(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the President may waive the application of any of the actions 

described in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a) (or commensurate action in substitution 

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thereto) with respect to a country, if the President determines and so reports to the appropriate 

congressional committees that-- 

(1) the respective foreign government has ceased the violations giving rise to the Presidential action; 

(2) the exercise of such waiver authority would further the purposes of this Act; or 

(3) the important national interest of the United States requires the exercise of such waiver authority. 

(b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than the date of the exercise of a waiver under subsection (a), 

the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the waiver or the intention to 

exercise the waiver, together with a detailed justification thereof. 

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APPENDIX 3 

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS: SELECTED PROVISIONS ON 

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND RELIGION OR BELIEF 

This document sets forth the relevant provisions of international instruments, as well as further 

information concerning international standards concerning the protection of freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief. 

A. EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE, AND 

RELIGION 

• Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), Art. 18: 

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 

change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 

private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), Art. 18: 

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 

include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either 

individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 

belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 

2. No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a 

religion or belief of his choice. 

3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are 

prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 

fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, 

when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in 

conformity with their own convictions. 

• In general, according to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), the treaty body that 

reviews compliance with the ICCPR, Article 18 of the ICCPR protects: 

theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. The 

terms “belief” and “religion” are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to 

traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to 

those of traditional religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate 

against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are newly established, or 

represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility on the part of a predominant religious 

community. 

 —Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22 

• European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 

1950 (ECHR), Art. 9: 

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 

change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 

private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 

• Helsinki Final Act 1975, Principle VII: 

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The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of 

thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. 

• UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based 

on Religion or Belief 1981 (UN 1981 Dec.), Art. 1: 

(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include 

freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in 

community with others and in public or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. (2) No one 

shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice. (3) 

Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by 

law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and 

freedoms of others. 

Components of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief include: 

1. Freedom to Change One’s Religion or Belief 

[UDHR, Art. 18, ECHR, Art. 9(1), OSCE Copenhagen Document, Art. 9(4)] 

2. Freedom to Have or to Adopt a Religion or Belief of One’s Choice 

[ICCPR Art. 18(1)] 

• Necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s 

current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain 

one's religion or belief; 

• No limitations permitted on this freedom; and 

• No individual shall be compelled to reveal his or her thoughts or adherence to a religion or belief. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 22 (paras. 3, 5)

3. Freedom From Coercion Which Would Impair an Individual’s Freedom to Have or To Adopt a 

Religion or Belief of His or Her Choice 

[ICCPR, Art. 18(2) and UN 1981 Dec. Art. 1(2)] 

• No limitations are permitted on this freedom. 

• The same protection is enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature. 

• Examples of impermissible coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or 

belief include: 

(a) The use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or nonbelievers to adhere to specific beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief, 

or to convert; and 

(b) Policies or practices having the same intention or effect, such as, for example, those 

restricting political rights protected under article 25 of the ICCPR or access to education, 

medical care or employment 

 –Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22 (para. 5)

4. Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief in Worship, Observance, Practice, and Teaching 

[UDHR, Art. 18, ICCPR, Art. 18(1), UN 1981 Dec., Art. 1, OSCE Vienna Document, Art. 16(d)] 

• This freedom may be exercised in public or in private, individually or in community with others. 

• This freedom, at a minimum, encompasses the following freedoms: 

(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and 

maintain, including the building of places of worship, freely accessible places for these 

purposes; 

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(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions, and 

seminaries or religious schools; 

(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials related 

to the rites or customs of a religion or belief, including the use of ritual formulae and 

objects, the display of symbols, observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of 

distinctive clothing or head coverings, participation in rituals associated with certain stages 

of life, and the use of a particular language customarily spoken by a group; 

(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas; 

(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes; 

(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and 

institutions; 

(g) To organize, train, appoint, elect, designate by succession, or replace appropriate leaders, 

priests and teachers called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief; 

(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the 

precepts of one’s religion or belief; and 

(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of 

religion and belief at the national and international levels.32

5. Permissible Limitations on the Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief 

[ICCPR, Art. 18(3) and UN 1981 Dec., Art. 1(3)] 

Freedom to manifest religion or belief may be subject to only such limitations as are prescribed by law 

and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms 

of others. 

• No derogation33 may be made from freedom of thought, conscience and religion, even during 

“time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.” (ICCPR, Art. 4(2) and UDHR, 

Arts. 29 & 30) 

• Limitations must be established by law and must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate the 

rights guaranteed in article 18. 

• Paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: limitations are not allowed on grounds not 

specified there, even if they would be allowed as limitations to other rights protected in the 

Covenant (for example, a limitation based on national security is impermissible). 

• Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be 

directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. 

• Limitations may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory 

manner. 

• Limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals 

must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition or religion. 

• Persons already subject to certain legitimate constraints, such as prisoners, continue to enjoy their 

rights to manifest their religion or belief to the fullest extent compatible with the specific nature 

of the constraint. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 8)

• Nothing in the UDHR shall be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or person any right to 

engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 

freedoms set forth therein. 

 — UDHR Art. 30 

 

32 See Para. 4, UN HRC General Comment No. 22; Art. 6, UN 1981 Dec.; Art. 16(h-j), Vienna Document. 

33 Derogation of rights is different than a limitation. Under the ICCPR, a state can, in a case of war or serious public 

emergency, take measures that limit the applicability of certain rights for the period of the emergency. Such 

measures could go well beyond the scope of limitations to rights that are permissible at any other time. 

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Appendices 

B. PERSONS BELONGING TO RELIGIOUS MINORITIES SHALL NOT BE DENIED THE 

RIGHT, IN COMMUNITY WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THEIR GROUP, TO PROFESS AND 

PRACTICE THEIR OWN RELIGION 

[ICCPR, Art. 27, OSCE Vienna Document Art. 19, OSCE Copenhagen Document, and UN Declaration 

on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, Arts. 1-2 

and 4] 

• In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 

minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to 

enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language 

 —ICCPR, Article 27

• States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic 

identity of minorities within their respective territories, shall encourage conditions for the 

promotion of that identity, and shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve 

those ends. 

 —UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities

• The State “will protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic 

and religious identity of national minorities on their territory. They will respect the free exercise 

of rights by persons belonging to such minorities and ensure their full equality with others.” 

 —OSCE Vienna Document 

C. EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO EQUAL AND EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AGAINST 

DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION OR BELIEF 

[ICCPR, Arts. 2(1) and 26, OSCE Vienna Document, Art. 16(a), and OSCE Copenhagen Document, Art. 

40(1-2)] 

This right includes the following components: 

1. States Undertake to Respect and to Ensure for All Individuals Within its Territory and Subject 

to its Jurisdiction the Rights Recognized in the ICCPR Without Distinction of Any Kind, Including 

Religion 

[ICCPR Art. 2(1)] 

2. All Persons Are Equal Before the Law and Are Entitled Without Any Discrimination to the 

Equal Protection of the Law. 

[ICCPR, Art. 26] 

3. The Law Shall Prohibit Any Discrimination and Guarantee to All Persons Equal and Effective 

Protection Against Discrimination on Any Ground, Including Religion. 

[ICCPR, Art. 26] 

• The application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in article 26 of the ICCPR is not 

limited to those rights which are provided for in the Covenant, and extends to prohibit 

discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public authorities; 

• The term “discrimination” as used in the ICCPR should be understood to imply any distinction, 

exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, color, sex, 

language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 

status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment 

or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms; 

• The enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing, however, does not mean identical 

treatment in every instance; 

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Appendices 

• The principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to 

diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by 

the ICCPR; and 

• Not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such 

differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is 

legitimate under the ICCPR. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 18 (paras. 7, 8, 10, 12, 13) 

4. Protection Against Discrimination by Any State, Institution, Group of Persons or Person on the 

Grounds of Religion or Other Belief 

[UN 1981 Dec., Arts. 2(1) and 4] 

• States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of 

religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 

freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural life. 

• States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such 

discrimination. 

• States shall take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or 

other beliefs in this matter. 

 —UN 1981 Dec., Arts. 4(1) and 4(2) 

• Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 

strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 

understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups .... 

 —UDHR Art. 26(2)

• State parties will “foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between believers of different 

communities as well as between believers and non-believers.” 

 —OSCE Vienna Document, principle 16b

D. STATES SHALL PROHIBIT BY LAW ANY ADVOCACY OF NATIONAL, RACIAL OR 

RELIGIOUS HATRED THAT CONSTITUTES INCITEMENT TO DISCRIMINATION, 

HOSTILITY OR VIOLENCE 

[ICCPR, Art. 20] 

• No manifestation of religion or belief may amount to propaganda for war or advocacy of 

national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination; hostility 

or violence... [and] States parties are under the obligation to enact laws to prohibit such 

acts. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 7) 

• State parties should take the measures necessary to fulfill the obligations contained in 

article 20 of the ICCPR, and should themselves refrain from any such propaganda or 

advocacy. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 11 (para. 2) 

• Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States 

that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution 

and laws of the United States. 

 —United States reservation to ICCPR Art. 20 

• States will take effective measures, including the adoption of laws, to provide protection 

against any acts that constitute incitement to violence against persons or groups based on 

national, racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, hostility or hatred, including antiSemitism. 

 —OSCE Copenhagen Document

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Appendices 

• States commit themselves to take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect 

persons or groups who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or 

violence as a result of their racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, and to 

protect their property; 

 —OSCE Copenhagen Document

E. THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS IN RELATION TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF

[ICCPR Art. 18(4), OSCE Vienna Document Art. 16(f) and 16(g)] 

• State Parties undertake to respect the liberty of parents and legal guardians to ensure the 

religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 

 —ICCPR Article 18(4) 

• The liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be 

restricted. 

• Public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics is 

permitted if it is given in a neutral and objective way. 

• Public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent 

with ICCPR Art. 18 (4) unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or 

alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 22 (paras. 6 & 8) 

• Parents or legal guardians have the right to organize family life in accordance with their religion 

or belief and bearing in mind the moral education in which they believe the child should be 

brought up. 

• Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion or belief in 

accordance with the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, and shall not be compelled to 

receive teaching on religion or belief against the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, the best 

interests of the child being the guiding principle. 

• The child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of religion or belief. 

• In the case of a child who is not under the care either of his parents or of legal guardians, due 

account shall be taken of their expressed wishes or of any other proof of their wishes in the matter 

of religion or belief, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle. 

• Practices of a religion or belief in which a child is brought up must not be injurious to his 

physical or mental health or to his full development, taking into account article 1(3) of the present 

Declaration. 

 —UN 1981 Dec., art. 5 

F. FURTHER ELABORATION ON SELECTED TOPICS 

1. Obligation to Ensure Rights/Provide Remedies for Violations 

[ICCPR Arts. 2(2) and 2(3), UDHR Art. 8, UN 1981 Dec. Art. 7] 

The ICCPR requires State parties to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect 

to the rights recognized in the Covenant. This obligation includes ensuring: 

• effective remedies for any person whose rights or freedoms are violated; 

• that such remedies are determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities; 

and 

• that such remedies are enforced when granted. 

2. Relationship between Religion and the State 

• The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or established as official or traditional, or 

that its followers comprise the majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of 

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the enjoyment of any of the rights under the ICCPR, nor in any discrimination against adherents 

to other religions or non-believers. 

• In particular, measures restricting eligibility for government service to members of the 

predominant religion, or giving economic privileges to them, or imposing special restrictions on 

the practice of other faiths are not in accordance with the prohibition of discrimination based on 

religion or belief and the guarantee of equal protection under ICCPR article 26. 

• If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes, proclamations of ruling 

parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not result in any impairment of the freedoms under 

article 18 or any other rights recognized under the ICCPR nor in any discrimination against 

persons who do not accept the official ideology or who oppose it. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 9) 

• State parties are required to grant communities of believers, practicing or prepared to practice 

their faith within constitutional boundaries, “recognition of the status provided for them in their 

respective countries.” 

 —OSCE Vienna Document 

3. Women’s Equal Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief 

• The principle of non-discrimination is so basic that each State party is obligated to ensure the 

equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of the rights set forth in the ICCPR. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 18 (para. 2) 

• Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply embedded in 

tradition, history and culture, including religious attitudes. The subordinate role of women in 

some countries is illustrated by the high incidence of prenatal sex selection and abortion of 

female fetuses. States parties should ensure that traditional, historical, religious or cultural 

attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s right to equality before the law and to equal 

enjoyment of all ICCPR rights. 

• State parties should report and provide data on a number of issues related to religion and 

women’s rights, including: 

o pregnancy- and childbirth-related deaths of women, as well as gender-disaggregated data 

on infant mortality rates; 

o information on the extent of any practice of genital mutilation, and on measures to 

eliminate it; 

o measures to protect women from practices that violate their right to life, such as female 

infanticide, the burning of widows and dowry killings; 

o regulation of clothing to be worn by women in public; and 

o whether women may give evidence as witnesses on the same terms as men; whether 

measures are taken to ensure women equal access to legal aid, in particular in family 

matters; and whether certain categories of women are denied the enjoyment of the 

presumption of innocence. 

• Freedoms protected by article 18 must not be subject to restrictions other than those authorized by 

the ICCPR and must not be constrained by, inter alia, rules requiring permission from third 

parties, or by interference from fathers, husbands, brothers or others. Article 18 may not be relied 

upon to justify discrimination against women by reference to freedom of thought, conscience and 

religion; 

• The commission of so-called “honor crimes” which remain unpunished constitutes a serious 

violation of the ICCPR and laws which impose more severe penalties on women than on men for 

adultery or other offences also violate the requirement of equal treatment. 

 —HRC General Comment No. 28 (paras. 5, 10, 11, 13, 18, 21, 31)

• Certain religious practices have an adverse effect on women’s rights. These practices include : 

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o cultural stereotypes, including preference for male children, religious extremism, and 

regulation of women’s clothing; 

o discrimination in medical well-being, including genital mutilation, traditional childbirth 

practices, and dietary restrictions; 

o discrimination resulting from the condition of women within the family, including 

practices related to marriage and divorce (e.g.: polygamy, family planning, division of 

responsibilities); 

o discrimination related to transmission of nationality; 

o discrimination related to inheritance and independent management of finances; 

o discrimination related to right to life, including infanticide, cruel treatment of widows, 

and honor crimes, 

o attacks on dignity, including sexual abuse; 

o social ostracism, including denial of the right to education, and denial of access to 

professional fields such as politics and religion; and 

o aggravated discrimination against women who also are members of a minority 

community. 

To ensure that freedom of religion does not undermine the rights of women, it is essential that this 

freedom not be understood as a right of indifference with respect to the status of women. 

—UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Study on Freedom of Religion or Belief and 

the Status of Women with Regard to Religion and Traditions (Amor Report)34

34 Commission staff translation.