UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-5061

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

RAYSHAWN SHIPMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,

Chief District Judge. (CR-05-16)

Submitted: June 30, 2006 Decided: July 18, 2006

Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Darren Byers, LAW OFFICES OF J. DARREN BYERS, P.A., WinstonSalem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United

States Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney,

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Rayshawn Shipman of possession with

intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) (2000). The district court sentenced Shipman to 360

months’ imprisonment. Shipman’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating there were no

meritorious issues for appeal but challenging Shipman’s sentence in

light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In

addition, Shipman has filed a pro se supplemental brief. For the

reasons discussed below, we affirm.

The district court sentenced Shipman as a career

offender, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)

§ 4B1.1 (2004). Thus, Shipman’s offense level was thirty-seven and

his criminal history category was VI, see id., resulting in a range

of 360 months to life imprisonment under the sentencing guidelines.

See USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A (sentencing table). His sentence of 360

months’ imprisonment fell at the bottom of this range. 

After Booker, a sentencing court is no longer bound by

the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. United

States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 455-56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126

S. Ct. 2309 (2006); United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th

Cir. 2005). In determining the sentence, however, courts are still

required to calculate and consider the guidelines range, as well as

the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
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2005). We will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it is within the

statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable. Hughes, 401 F.3d

at 546-47. Further, “while we believe that the appropriate

circumstances for imposing a sentence outside the guideline range

will depend on the facts of individual cases, we have no reason to

doubt that most sentences will continue to fall within the

applicable guideline range.” United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208,

219 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 668 (2005). “[A] sentence

imposed within the properly calculated Guidelines range . . . is

presumptively reasonable.” Green, 436 F.3d at 457 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court,

appropriately treating the guidelines as advisory, sentenced

Shipman at the bottom of the applicable range. We conclude Shipman

has failed to rebut the presumption that this sentence was

reasonable.

We have considered the claims raised by Shipman in his

supplemental brief and subsequent filing, and find them without

merit. Contrary to Shipman’s claim, the district court possessed

jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2000). Furthermore, the

record reveals substantial evidence supporting the conviction. See

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); see also United

States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating we do

not “weigh the evidence or review the credibility of the

witnesses”); United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th
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Cir. 1982) (providing the “government the benefit of all reasonable

inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be

established”). Similarly, we find meritless Shipman’s conclusory

claims of prosecutorial misconduct, unduly cumulative evidence, and

a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), all of which

stem from Shipman’s unsupported allegations of dishonest testimony

by the Government’s witnesses. We also reject Shipman’s claims of

actual innocence and an alleged abuse of discretion by the district

court with respect to evidence of a photographic lineup identifying

Shipman that was never presented to the jury. Moreover, we find no

Confrontation Clause violation. See Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36 (2004). 

Finally, Shipman’s allegations of ineffective assistance

of counsel are more appropriately raised in a motion pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). See United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d

192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999). We do not find ineffective assistance of

counsel apparent on the face of the record on appeal.

As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire record

and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore

affirm Shipman’s conviction and sentence. This court requires that

counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the

client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that

such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
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court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion

must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED