alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Solicitar Expedientes a Través de La Ley de Libertad de Información y la Ley de Privacidad

**Aviso:**Para responder a su solicitud de expediente de a través de la Ley de Libertad de Información (FOIA) y la Ley de Privacidad (PA) lo más rápido posible, dejaremos de aceptar solicitudes de expedientes por fax o correo electrónico el 16 de diciembre de 2022. Le exhortamos a utilizar nuestro servicio en línea de solicitud de expedientes y ver preguntas y respuestas de FOIA.

**Solicitar Expedientes a través de FOIA en Línea**

Nuestro servicio de FOIA en línea provee varias ventajas:
                      - Enviar su solicitud de expediente a través de FOIA o PA al instante;
                      - Verificar el progreso de expediente a través de FOIA o PA;
                      - Recibir nuestra respuesta en cuanto esté listo; y
                      - Descargar expedientes cuando los necesite.

**Presentar Expedientes a través de FOIA desde su Aplicación**

Si crea o envía una petición de expediente a través de FOIA a USCIS por medio de una aplicación adicional y desea continuar haciéndolo, ahora ofrecemos una Interfaz de Programación de Aplicaciones (API).

Pregunte a su desarrollador de aplicaciones para visitar el sitio de USCIS Torch y aprender más.

Bajo la Ley de Libertad de Información (FOIA) y la Ley de Privacidad (PA), usted puede solicitar:
                - Expedientes de inmigración suyos o para alguien más con el permiso escrito de esa persona; y
                - Políticas, datos y comunicaciones de la agencia, así como otros registros.

**Cómo Solicitar y Recibir los Expedientes lo más Rápido Posible**

**Paso 1**: Lea esta página en su totalidad para asegurarse que solicita los expedientes de la manera correcta, con la oficina correcta.

**Paso 2**: Confirme que no hemos publicado los expedientes que usted necesita en la Sala de Lectura Electrónica de USCIS.

**Paso 3**: Planifique solicitar solo los documentos específicos que usted necesita. Podemos procesar solicitudes de específicas de expedientes solicitudes más rápido que un expediente completo.

**Paso 4**: Haga su solicitud FOIA en línea para evitar el envío de correspondencia, procesamiento de documentos impresos y correspondencia devuelta, que podría añadir tiempo significativo al procesamiento a su solicitud. También puede utilizar este servicio para recibir expedientes en línea si anteriormente solicitó un expediente por correo postal. Vea a continuación.

**Paso 5**: Verifique el estatus de su solicitud en línea. Le enviaremos un correo electrónico para que vaya a su cuenta una vez los archivos están listos para descargar.

12/09/2022

0 / 2000Para proteger su privacidad, por favor no incluya ninguna información personal en sus comentarios. Revise nuestra Política de Privacidad.
```

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Chinawe.com Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2006, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Vivian
Chu, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
              or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all
              material respects, the financial condition and result of
              operations of the Company.

Date: August 14, 2006

/s/  Vivian Chu
---------------
Vivian Chu
Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to Chinawe.com Inc. and will be
retained by Chinawe.com Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
```
# C_2021272EN.01003401.xml

| 8.7.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 272/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.7.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 272/34

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.10346 — ICG/Circet)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2021/C 272/07)

1.

This notification concerns the following undertakings:

| — | Intermediate Capital Group plc (‘ICG’, United Kingdom), |
| --- | --- |

—

Intermediate Capital Group plc (‘ICG’, United Kingdom),

| — | Circet Odyssée SAS (‘Circet’, France); |
| --- | --- |

—

Circet Odyssée SAS (‘Circet’, France);

ICG acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of the whole of Circet.

The concentration is accomplished by way of purchase of shares.

2.

| — | for ICG: investment firm active in the structuring and provision of mezzanine finance, leveraged credit and equity investments in various companies across Europe, Asia Pacific and the US; and |
| --- | --- |

—

for ICG: investment firm active in the structuring and provision of mezzanine finance, leveraged credit and equity investments in various companies across Europe, Asia Pacific and the US; and

| — | for Circet: a France-based network infrastructure services provider, active exclusively in the telecommunications sector. It offers a full range of services from design, engineering and installation to maintenance of telecommunication networks. |
| --- | --- |

—

for Circet: a France-based network infrastructure services provider, active exclusively in the telecommunications sector. It offers a full range of services from design, engineering and installation to maintenance of telecommunication networks.

3.

Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in the Notice.

4.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. The following reference should always be specified:

M.10346 — ICG/Circet

Observations can be sent to the Commission by email, by fax, or by post. Please use the contact details below:

Email: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

Fax +32 22964301

Postal address:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

1

(2)  OJ C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.

2

---
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gaspar CASTANEDA-PELEAZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-14623

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 26, 2011.

*920Zahra S. Karinshak, Lawrence R. Sommerfeld, Sally Yates, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

W. Matthew Dodge, Stephanie Kearns, Federal Defender Program, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before WILSON, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Gaspar Castañeda-Peleaz appeals his 37-month sentence, imposed at the high end of the applicable Guideline range, after pleading guilty to one count of re-entry of a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). Castañeda now contends that his 37-month sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court placed undue weight on and improperly relied on his prior criminal conduct, which had already been included in calculating his Guideline range. Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm Castañeda’s sentence.

Castañeda’s sentence fell at the top of the applicable 30-37 month range, and we ordinarily expect guideline sentences to be reasonable. *United States v. Talley,*431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam). Moreover, Castañeda’s 37-month sentence was also well below the 20-year statutory maximum penalty. *See United States v. Gonzalez,*550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum).

The district court did emphasize Castañeda’s prior criminal convictions. However, the court also explicitly or implicitly referenced several other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. For example, the court inquired about sentences for defendants in illegal re-entry cases with a criminal history category V. § 3553(a)(6). The court also discussed the need for deterrence, the need to protect the community, and the hope that incarceration would help Castañeda deal with his alcohol addiction. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), (D). To Castañeda’s benefit, the district court considered that Castañeda’s family resides in Mexico, but ultimately determined that his family was not a sufficient deterrent to prevent a future attempt to re-enter the United States.

*921Therefore, although the court placed emphasis on Castaheda’s prior convictions, it did not do so “single-mindedly” to the detriment of the other § 3553(a) factors. *See United States v. Crisp,*454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.2006) (holding a sentence unreasonable when the court focused “single-mindedly” on restitution). The weight to be given any particular factor is left to the sound discretion of the district court absent a clear error of judgment. *United States v. Pugh,*515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir.2008). Because Castañeda’s sentence was supported by the § 3553(a) factors, the court did not commit a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors. As the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the sentence as reasonable.

AFFIRMED.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5873 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

218 North Milwaukee Street in Waterford, Wisconsin, as the ‘‘Captain 

Rhett W. Schiller Post Office’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 27, 2010 

Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin (for himself, Ms. BALDWIN, Mr. KIND, Ms. MOORE

of Wisconsin, Mr. SENSENBRENNER, Mr. PETRI, Mr. OBEY, and Mr. 

KAGEN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 218 North Milwaukee Street in Waterford, 

Wisconsin, as the ‘‘Captain Rhett W. Schiller Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. CAPTAIN RHETT W. SCHILLER POST OFFICE. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 218 North Milwaukee Street in 

6 Waterford, Wisconsin, shall be known and designated as 

7 the ‘‘Captain Rhett W. Schiller Post Office’’. 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5873 IH

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Captain Rhett W. 

5 Schiller Post Office’’. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
On respondent’s motion to dismiss filed November 2,

and appellant’s response to motion to dismiss filed November 18, 1998,

motion allowed; opinion (157 Or App 189, 966 P2d 832 (1998)) vacated; appeal dismissed February 24, 1999

#### ROLAND J. MONTOYA, *Appellant, v.*Dan JOHNSON, Superintendent, Snake River Correctional Institution, *Respondent.*

(97-06-28971M; CA A100422)

976 P2d 81

Bob Pangbum for appellant.

Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General, and Judy C. Lucas, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Before De Muniz, Presiding Judge, and Haselton and Armstrong, Judges.

PER CURIAM

*653PER CURIAM

Respondent has moved pursuant to ORAP 7.05 to dismiss this appeal as moot under the rationale of *Jones v. Thompson,*156 Or App 226, 968 P2d 380 (1998). We grant and allow the motion and vacate our prior opinion. *Montoya v. Johnson,*157 Or App 189, 966 P2d 832 (1998).

Motion allowed; opinion vacated; appeal dismissed.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

STEPHEN L. MITCHELL, JANIE 

MITCHELL BELEW, LISA MITCHELL 

SEIGMANN, and LINDA MITCHELL 

STAPLETON,

 Appellants,

v.

MAP RESOURCES, INC., PECOS BEND 

ROYALTIES, LLP, PBR PROPERTIES 

JOINT VENTURE, and TOMMY 

VASCOCU,

 Appellees.

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-17-00155-CV

Appeal from the

143rd District Court

of Reeves County, Texas

(TC# 15-06-21057-CVR)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the 

judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. We further order that Appellees

recover from Appellants and their sureties, if any, see TEX.R.APP.P. 43.5, on the judgment and 

all costs, for which let execution issue. This decision shall be certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 29TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2020.

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

Before Alley, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.

Alley, C.J., concurring

Rodriguez, J., dissenting
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John E. Bonsignore, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mclnerney, J.), rendered August 5, 1986.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed *(see, People v Kazepis,*101 AD2d 816). Thompson, J. P., Niehoff, Eiber, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 10.21
 BUSINESS FINANCING AGREEMENT    BRIDGE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
  1.
    
    Definitions and Construction.
 Definitions
 Account Balance
 Account Debtor
 Adjustments
 Advance
 Advance Rate
 Agreement
  Borrowing Base
 Collateral
 Collections
 Compliance Certificate
 Credit Limit
 Default
 Eligible Receivable
    1




---



##### 



Event of Default
 Facility Fee
 Finance Charge
  2




---



##### 



Finance Charge Percentage
 Funding Request
 Lender
 Obligations
 Overadvance
 Prime Rate
 Receivable Amount
 Receivables
 Reconciliation Date
 Reconciliation Period
 Termination Date
 Termination Fee
 Construction
     3




---



##### 



2.
    
    Advances.
 Funding Requests
 Revolving Credit Line
 Intentionally omitted.
 Rights in Respect of Receivables
 Due Diligence
 3.
    
    Collections, Charges and Remittances.
 Collections
 Finance Charges
 Fees
 Facility Fee
 Termination Fee
 Reporting
 Adjustments
  4




---



##### 



Lockbox Account Collection Services
 4.
    
    Overadvances.
 Overadvances
 Borrowers Payment
 Power of Attorney
 6.
    
    Representations and Warranties. Borrower represents and warrants:
        5




---



##### 



7.
    
    Miscellaneous Provisions. Borrower will:
           th
    6




---



##### 



Security Interest
 9.
    
    Default and Remedies.
 Events of Default
 Failure to Pay
 Lien Priority
 False Information
 Death
 Bankruptcy
 Receivers
 Judgments
 Material Adverse Change
  7




---



##### 



Cross-default
 Default under Related Documents
 Other Agreements
 Change of Control
  Remedies
 Accrual of Interest
 Fees, Costs and Expenses; Indemnification
  8




---



##### 



Integration, Severability, Waiver, and Choice of Law
 Notices
 Jury Trial
 15.
    
    REFERENCE PROVISION.
     9




---



##### 



Term and Termination
  10




---



##### 



17.
    
    Joint and Several Liability of Borrowers; Waiver of Certain Defenses
 Independent obligation
 Waivers
      11




---



##### 



Consent to Alterations and Releases
 Other Agreements
 Remainder of page intentionally left blank
  12




---



##### 



BORROWER:
    
    LENDER:CANEUM, INC., a Nevada corporation,
    
    BRIDGE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONBy
    
    /s/ Gary Allhusen
    
    By
    
    /s/ Betty L. LinvillName:
    
    Gary Allhusen
    
    Name:
    
    Betty L. LinvillTitle:
    
    Executive Vice President and COO
    
    Title:
    
    Senior Vice PresidentAddress for Notices:
    
    Address for Notices:170 Newport Center Dr. Ste. 210
Newport Beach, CA 92660
Fax: (949) 273-4001
    
    55 Almaden Blvd.
San Jose, CA 95113
Fax: (408) 423-8510BORROWER:TIER ONE CONSULTING INC, a California
corporation,By:
    
    /s/ Robert J. MorrisName:
    
    Robert J. MorrisTitle:
    
    CFOAddress for Notices:170 Newport Center Dr. Ste. 210
Newport Beach, CA 92660
Fax: (949)269-0111
  13
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUL 8 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 97-4139

v. (D.C. No. 97-CR-95) ROBERTO RODRIQUEZ-VASQUEZ, a/k/a Roberto Rodriguez-Martinez, a/k/a Blas R. Valdez, a/k/a Blas Rincon-Valdez, a/k/a Rogelio Medina, a/k/a Francisco Valdez, a/k/a Miguel Rincon-Valdez, (D. Utah)

Defendant - Appellant.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before ANDERSON , McKAY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and the appellate record , this panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ reques t for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. SeeFed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Defendant Roberto Rodriguez-Vasquez pled guilty to one count of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326, reentry of a deported alien. Defe ndant appeals a sentence enhancement imposed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)( 2) for illegal reentry after a prior deportation following a conviction for an agg ravated felony. In February of 1996, Defendant was charged and conv icted of a seconddegree felony, namely, violating Utah Code Annotate d § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) by knowingly and intentionally distributing cocaine. Defendant does not challenge, nor can there be any serious question, that distrib ution of a controlled substance is a felony under both federal and Utah state law and therefore qualifies as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B ) and 1326. See21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). Ins tead, Defendant argues that he was convicted of distributing what he claims was a counterfeit substance and his penalty under state law is a misdemeanor, not a fel ony. This is not the proper forum for Defendant to chall enge the validity of his underlying state conviction. See Custis v. United States , 511 U.S. 485, 496-97 (1994); United States v. Simpson , 94 F.3d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , U.S. , 117 S. Ct. 411 (1996). Because Defendant does n ot complain of a violation of the right to counsel or in any other w ay challenge the constitutionality of his state conviction, we affirm Defendant’s 8 U. S.C. § 1326-3-

sentence and conviction.
AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>      5
<MULTIPLIER>   1000

       

<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                           JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         917
<SECURITIES>                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                                6,187
<ALLOWANCES>                                   120
<INVENTORY>                                 13,819
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            21,786
<PP&E>                                      16,731
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,654
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              38,951
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        5,098
<BONDS>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                                    840
<COMMON>                                     3,192
<OTHER-SE>                                  (1,212)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                38,951
<SALES>                                     18,156
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            18,156
<CGS>                                       12,606
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               16,562
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               124
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,238
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                232
<INCOME-TAX>                                   607
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (375)
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (375)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    0
        


</TABLE>
**Exhibit 10.1**

 

**Learning Tree**

**International**

 

**Learning Tree International**

400 N. Continental Boulevard, Suite 200 

ElSegundo, California 90245 

Telephone: (310) 417-9700 

Fax: (310) 417-9053 

**www.learningtree.com**

 

October 1, 2005 

 

Learning Tree International 

Attn: Board of Directors 

 

I hereby resign as Chief Executive Officer of Learning Tree International, Inc. 

 

Sincerely,
#### GULF COAST FACILITIES MANAGEMENT, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BG LNG SERVICES, L.L.C.; BG North America, L.L.C.; BG Exploration America, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-30984.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 9, 2011.

Gladstone Nathaniel Jones, III, Esq., Attorney, Harvey Sylvanous Bartlett, III, Catherine E. Lasky, Lynn Elizabeth Swanson, Jones, Swanson, Huddell & Garrison, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Phillip A. Wittmann, John Mark Fezio, Keith B. Hall, Stone, Pigman, Walther & Wittmann, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Defendants-Appellees.

*319Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Gulf Coast Facilities Management, L.L.C. (“Gulf Coast”), was employed by BG LNG Services, L.L.C. (“BG”) to administer some land owned by BG. Gulf Coast would be responsible for, among other things, negotiating subleases, helping collect rent, evict non-paying sublessees, and provide advice related to BG’s interests in the area. BG eventually terminated Gulf Coast’s services.

Gulf Coast sued, alleging breach of an oral agreement and unjust enrichment, seeking to recover fees earned from subleases entered into by BG during the time it was associated with Gulf Coast. BG moved for summary judgment, arguing that Louisiana law prohibits an unlicensed entity — such as Gulf Coast was — from receiving compensation for real estate services. Under the same theory, BG also sought summary judgment on a counterclaim seeking a return of the funds Gulf Coast had already received from BG. The district court granted summary judgment for BG on Gulf Coast’s claims and on BG’s counterclaims but left the amount of the refund for trial on the merits. BG then voluntarily dismissed its counterclaim without prejudice.

Gulf Coast appeals the summary judgment. We have read the briefs and pertinent portions of the record and have consulted the applicable law and have heard the arguments of counsel. Because there is no reversible error, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5tii Cir. R. 47.5.4.