Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-312 | December 18, 2019 Page 1 of 20

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

R. Patrick Magrath

Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Frances H. Barrow

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorneys General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Dawn Rauch

Certified Legal Intern

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of S.M., Mother, C.M., Father, 

and A.M. and B.M.M., Minor 

Children,

December 18, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-312

Appeal from the 

Jennings Circuit Court 

The Honorable 

Jon W. Webster, Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

40C01-1809-JT-32

40C01-1809-JT-33
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-312 | December 18, 2019 Page 2 of 20

S.M.,

1

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] S.M. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights to her children A.M. and B.M.M. (together, “Children”), raising the 

following restated issue: whether the trial court’s legal conclusion that it was in 

Children’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parent-child relationship was 

supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] We affirm.

1 We note that the juvenile court also terminated Father’s parental rights to A.M. and B.M.M. While Father

does not participate in this appeal, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A), a party of record in the trial 

court is a party on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-312 | December 18, 2019 Page 3 of 20

Facts and Procedural History2

[3] Mother and C.M. (“Father”) are the parents of A.M., born October 20, 2015, 

and B.M.M., born September 29, 2016.3 Tr. Vol. II at 5. On or about 

September 22, 2016, one week prior to B.M.M.’s birth, a caller to the Indiana 

Department of Child Services (“DCS”) hotline reported concern for the safety 

of A.M. Specifically, the caller alleged that Father had been hospitalized due to 

an infection from intravenous drug use, Mother and Father (“Parents”) were 

using drugs, and Mother was pregnant. Id. at 6; Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 

25, 31. The caller was concerned that A.M. was not being cared for. Tr. Vol. II 

at 6. The call prompted DCS to look for Parents; however, Parents could not 

be found at that time.

4

 Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 26. 

[4] On October 4, 2016, DCS received a second call concerning the safety of 

A.M.’s infant sibling, B.M.M. B.M.M., who was born to Mother four weeks

early and was experiencing symptoms of drug withdrawal, had been in the 

neonatal intensive care unit of a Kentucky hospital (“the Hospital”) since her 

September 29, 2016 birth. Tr. Vol. II at 6; Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 26, 31. 

2 Because Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings, our facts rely heavily on the findings in the 

juvenile court’s January 10, 2019 order. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 30-37. 

3 Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to A.M. and B.M.M. were terminated at the same time; however, 

because Father does not participate in this appeal, we recite only those facts necessary to address Mother’s 

appeal.

4 Mother reported that she lived in Kentucky prior to DCS involvement, and gave birth to B.M.M. in 

Kentucky, but she was visiting her seven-year old son in Indiana when DCS first became involved. 

Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 26. Mother did not have custody of her son. Id. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-312 | December 18, 2019 Page 4 of 20

The caller reported that Mother had tested positive for amphetamines and 

benzodiazepines in July 2016, while pregnant, and that “her prenatal care had 

been sporadic.” Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 26. It was later discovered that 

Mother had attended only three prenatal visits during her pregnancy. Id. at 32. 

The caller also stated that Mother had a history of heroin and 

methamphetamine use. Id. at 26, 32.

[5] In response to that call, Elizabeth Beesley (“FCM Beesley”), a DCS family case 

manager, visited B.M.M. in the Hospital on October 4, 2016. Tr. Vol. II at 6. 

FCM Beesley learned that Mother had been using methamphetamine, heroin, 

and Subutex during her pregnancy and that a screen of B.M.M.’s meconium 

“tested positive for Subutex.” Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 26. Mother did not 

have a valid prescription for Subutex at that time. Id. FCM Beesley also 

learned that Mother did not have stable housing or a legal source of income, 

and that Parents had been seen outside the Hospital “trying to sell some of the 

belongings that the [H]ospital had given them, car seat, clothing, diapers, things 

like that.” Tr. Vol. II at 6; Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 26, 32. Furthermore, 

Parents had brought a homeless man into the Hospital’s neonatal intensive care 

unit, where B.M.M. was receiving care, so that the man could shower and get 

food and a blanket and pillow. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 26, 32. 

[6] The Hospital staff reported that, earlier in B.M.M.’s stay, security had escorted 

Parents out of the Hospital after it was discovered that Parents had stolen 

hospital supplies, including syringes. Id. at 26, 32. Thereafter, Parents’ visits 

with B.M.M. were limited to supervised visits between the hours of 8 a.m. to 8 
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p.m. Tr. Vol. II at 7. On October 4, 2016, the Hospital notified DCS that 

B.M.M. was ready to be discharged, but Parents could not be located. Id. at 10; 

Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 26. Therefore, due to Parents’ absence and 

DCS’s concerns regarding Parents’ substance abuse, DCS took custody of 

B.M.M. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 26. 

[7] FCM Beesley’s first encounter with Mother occurred at the Hospital on October 

5, 2016; Mother told FCM Beesley that A.M. had been living with Mother’s 

sister. Tr. Vol. II at 8-9. In fact, A.M. had been living with Mother’s sister for 

“a couple of months.” Id. at 9. When DCS went to check on A.M., Mother’s 

sister was not cooperative; she did not let DCS personnel enter her home and

said that A.M. was with a babysitter. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 26. 

Mother’s sister refused to provide the name or address of the babysitter. Id.

That same day, Mother and her sister contacted DCS and agreed to meet with 

DCS staff and bring A.M. with them. Id. At that time, Mother’s sister tested

positive for cocaine and was ruled out as a placement option for Children. Id. 

DCS, therefore, took custody of A.M. on October 5, 2016 and placed Children 

together in a foster home. Id.

[8] On October 6, 2016, DCS filed a petition as to each of the Children, stating that 

each was a child in need of services (“CHINS”).

5

 Exs. Vol. III at 11-14, 40-43. 

5 The CHINS petitions for B.M.M. and A.M. were filed in Jennings County under Cause Numbers 40C01-

1610-JC-110 and 40C01-1610-JC-111, respectively. B.M.M. was born in Kentucky, and Parents provided 

Hospital staff with three different addresses, two in Kentucky and one in Indiana. Only one of those 
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The CHINS petitions alleged that each child’s physical or mental condition was 

seriously impaired or endangered because of Parents’ “inability, refusal, or 

neglect” to supply Children with “necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical 

care, education, or supervision.” Id. at 11, 40. B.M.M.’s CHINS petition

further alleged that she was born with a controlled substance in her system. Id.

at 40. An initial hearing was held on October 6, 2016, at which Parents 

appeared and denied the allegations. The CHINS court continued DCS’s 

custody of Children. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 32.

[9] In November 2016, DCS learned that Mother had been arrested in Kentucky on 

two bench warrants for burglary and shoplifting. Id. In March 2017, Mother 

called DCS and stated that she was living in Kentucky and had no way to get to

Indiana to visit Children. Id. In June 2017, DCS learned that Father was 

incarcerated in a Kentucky jail for a burglary conviction. Id. FCM Beesley 

testified that between October 2016 and June 2017, a period of nine months, 

DCS had only one phone call from Mother; no other contact occurred. Id. 

Elizabeth Beatty (“FCM Beatty”), a family case manager assigned to the case 

from June 2017 through March 2018, testified that during her involvement it 

was extremely difficult for her to communicate with and locate Mother. Id. at 

32-33. FCM Beatty also testified that Mother “burned through several visit 

providers due to her lack of compliance with visits, that Mother showed up 

addresses was valid, a residence in Commiskey, Jennings County, Indiana. As such, the CHINS cases were 

deemed to be under Indiana jurisdiction. Tr. Vol. II at 8. 
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unprepared for visits, and that Mother exhibited an overall lack of motivation in 

the case.” Id. at 33. 

[10] Mother completed her first substance abuse assessment with Centerstone on 

August 8, 2017,6 after her case had been open for ten months. Id. Sierra Rogers

(“Rogers”), a Centerstone employee who worked as a liaison with DCS, 

recommended that Mother work with a recovery coach and participate in 

individual therapy. Tr. Vol. II at 45-46; Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 22.

Rogers testified that Mother never engaged in those services, and the referral 

was closed in January 2018. Tr. Vol. II at 46. 

[11] After numerous continuances, a fact-finding hearing for the CHINS was held 

on January 9, 2018. At that time, Mother admitted to the CHINS allegations. 

Id. Accordingly, the CHINS court entered its order on February 5, 2018,

adjudicating Children to be CHINS and setting forth provisional orders for 

Mother, pending further order of the court. Exs. Vol. III at 24. A dispositional 

hearing was held on February 15, 2018, and Mother agreed to the CHINS 

court’s recommendations. On March 1, 2018, the CHINS court’s dispositional 

order kept Children in DCS’s care and custody and ordered Mother to (1) 

complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations, (2) complete 

a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations, (3) attend all 

scheduled visitation with Children, (4) maintain regular contact with the family 

6

Sierra Rogers, a Centerstone employee, stated that the first drug assessment was performed on July 14, 

2017. Tr. Vol. II at 45. 
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case manager, (5) maintain safe and suitable housing, (6) secure and maintain a 

legal and stable source of income, and (7) comply with random drug screens. 

Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 33; Exs. Vol. II at 55-57. 

[12] Meanwhile, in February 2018, Mother was referred to Amy Elliott (“Elliott”), a 

therapist and supervisor with Ireland Home Based Services. Elliott oversaw the 

Ireland employees who were present during Mother’s visits with Children. In 

May 2018, Elliott changed Mother’s visits from two visits per week to one visit 

per week due to reports that Mother’s irregular transportation was resulting in 

inconsistent visits. Tr. Vol. II at 36; Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 27, 33. At 

that time, Mother was also placed on “call ahead,” meaning she had to confirm 

in the morning that she would be attending a visit later that same day. Tr. Vol. 

II at 36-37; Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 33. Elliott noted that Mother’s visits 

improved after she obtained transportation; Mother came prepared and showed 

a bond with Children as they did with her. Id. at 37, 39. Mother admitted that 

she tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine on May 31, 2018. 

Tr. Vol. II at 56; Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 33. Elliott testified that visitation 

between Mother and Children was suspended in June 2018 after Mother left 

Indiana and missed over a month of visits.7 Tr. Vol. II at 37-38; Appellant’s Conf. 

App. Vol. 2 at 33. On July 2, 2018, Mother was arrested and charged with

7

“In May of 2018, [Mother] reported she was out of state because her father passed away in Florida and she 

was not able to attend any visits. [Mother] attended one visit in June 2018, after which time visits were 

placed on hold until [Mother] would meet with [DCS].” Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 27.
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unlawful possession of a legend drug and possession of a controlled substance;

a jury trial was set for March 2019.8 Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 34. 

[13] On July 10, 2018, Mother completed her second substance abuse assessment 

through Centerstone. Centerstone again recommended that Mother work with 

a recovery coach and participate in individual therapy. Id. at 28, 34. As of the

November 2018 fact-finding hearing, Mother had not completed any type of 

substance abuse treatment. Id. at 34. On July 24, 2018, Mother tested positive 

for THC and Xanax. Id. Mother had no prescription for Xanax. Id. On July 

30, 2018, Mother again tested positive for THC. Id. In a September 4, 2018 

order, DCS changed its plan of reunification of Children and Mother to adding

a concurrent plan of adoption. Exs. Vol. III at 59; Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 

11. On September 11, 2018, Mother tested positive for THC. Appellant’s Conf. 

App. Vol. 2 at 34. On September 21, 2018, Mother, citing medical issues, asked

FCM Beesley to administer a drug screen at Mother’s home. Mother, however,

was not home to meet FCM Beesley for the appointment. Id. Mother did not 

provide any written medical excuse for her absence. Id. Mother tested positive 

for THC on September 25, 2018 and again on November 11, 2018.9 Id. On 

8 At the time of the November 26, 2018 fact-finding hearing, Mother’s charges under 40C01-1808-F6-260

were still pending. 

9 Mother testified that the positive indication for the presence of THC must have been a mistake because she 

had not smoked marijuana. Tr. Vol. II at 77. Instead, Mother said that she had been around her fiancé who 

smoked marijuana. Id. DCS asked whether Mother was aware of the testimony of forensic fluid scientists 

who said that, in their opinion, the level of THC demonstrated that Mother must have “ingested or 

consumed the drug.” Id. at 78. Mother acknowledged that she was aware of that testimony. Id. 
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September 25, 2018, DCS filed two essentially identical petitions, one for each 

child, to terminate the parental rights (“TPR”) of Mother. Appellant’s Conf. App. 

Vol. 2 at 10-12; Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 3 at 12-14. 

[14] The juvenile court held a TPR fact-finding hearing on November 26, 2018 and 

heard testimony from witnesses FCM Beesley, Elliott, FCM Beatty, Rogers, 

and Laural French, the guardian ad litem (“the GAL”). FCM Beesley testified: 

(1) in 2018 alone, Mother was a “no show” for at least ten of her 2018 random 

drug screens, and under the terms of the dispositional decree, failure to appear 

was deemed to be a positive screen, tr. vol. II at 15; (2) Mother did not complete 

the required parenting assessment, id. at 13-14; and (3) Mother had numerous 

opportunities to address her drug addiction during the CHINS and TPR 

proceedings, a period of over two years, yet tested positive for illegal substances 

just two weeks before the TPR hearing, id. at 30; and (5) the permanency plan 

of adoption was in Children’s best interest, id. at 32. Rogers testified: (1)

Mother attended four out of nine scheduled appointments with a Centerstone

recovery coach but, of the five missed appointments, three were in November 

2018, the month of the TPR hearing, id. at 47; and (2) Mother was noncompliant with most of her services and lacked motivation, id. at 44. The GAL 

testified that Mother lacked motivation when working with the Centerstone

recovery coach. Id. at 82-83. 

[15] At the close of the hearing, the juvenile court took the matter under advisement, 

and on January 10, 2019 entered its order terminating Mother’s parental rights 

to Children. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 31. The juvenile court found: (1) 
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there were periods of time when Mother did not contact DCS for months at a 

time; (2) Mother regularly “no-shows” for drug screens and missed at least four 

Child and Family Team Meetings, one of which was just one month before the 

termination fact-finding hearing; (3) Mother has never completed any services 

and shows a lack of consistency and follow through; (4) Mother participates in 

only one DCS-provided service, visitation; (5) DCS has never been able to 

recommend that Mother have unsupervised time with Children or that either 

child be placed back in Mother’s care; (6) Mother has not satisfactorily 

addressed her substance abuse issues, nor has she consistently engaged in 

services for any meaningful amount of time in the over two years since the case 

has been open. Id. at 34-35. 

[16] The juvenile court, upon finding that DCS had established by clear and 

convincing evidence that the allegations in the TPR petitions were true,

concluded that: (1) Children had been removed from Mother for at least six 

months under a dispositional decree; (2) it is unlikely that the conditions that 

led to the removal of Children from Mother’s care will be remedied; (3) 

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Children’s best interest; and (4) 

DCS has a satisfactory plan for Children, adoption. Id. at 31-36. Mother now 

appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[17] As our Supreme Court has observed, “Decisions to terminate parental rights are 

among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also 

among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the 
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trial courts[.]” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). While the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a 

parent to establish a home and raise her child, and parental rights are of a 

constitutional dimension, we may terminate those rights when a parent is 

unable or unwilling to meet her responsibilities as a parent. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t 

of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). 

[18] Thus, parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s 

best interest in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate 

the parent-child relationship. Id. The purpose of terminating parental rights is 

not to punish the parent but to protect the child. Z.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 

108 N.E.3d 895, 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. The juvenile court need 

not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed, such that her physical, mental, 

and social development is permanently impaired, before terminating the parentchild relationship. Id. at 903. The court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for 

her child at the time of the termination hearing. A.D.S v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. However, 

requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions “does not 

preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of 

their future behavior.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[19] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Z.B., 108 N.E.3d at 900. 

Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most 

favorable to the judgment. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 
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2009). Where, like here, the juvenile court entered specific findings and 

conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 

14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. First, we determine whether the evidence 

supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support 

the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court’s unique position to 

assess the evidence, we will not set aside the court’s judgment terminating a 

parent-child relationship unless it is clearly erroneous. H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 148-

49. If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must 

affirm. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1156.

[20] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS is 

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least 

six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

. . . .

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has 

been under the supervision of a local office or probation 

department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most 

recent twenty-two (22) months . . .;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 
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placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

. . . .

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by 

clear and convincing evidence. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 149. If the juvenile

court finds that the allegations in a petition are true, it shall terminate the 

parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[21] Mother does not contest the accuracy of the juvenile court’s specific factual 

findings. Accordingly, we must accept those findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 

N.E.3d 605, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing McMaster v. McMaster, 681 N.E.2d 

744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)) (where factual findings are not challenged, court 

on appeal must accept findings as true). If the unchallenged findings support 

the court’s legal conclusions, then this court must affirm the juvenile court’s 

judgment. See T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012) (“[B]ecause the trial court’s unchallenged findings clearly and 
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convincingly support its ultimate decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

to [children], we find no error.”), trans. denied.

[22] Mother, likewise, does not contest the juvenile court’s conclusions that: (1) 

Children have been removed from Mother’s care for at least six months under a 

dispositional order; (2) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in Children’s removal from Mother will not be remedied;

10 and (3) 

adoption is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children.

11

 

Appellant’s Br. at 10-11. Instead, Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that DCS 

did not meet its burden of proving under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(C) that termination is in the best interest of Children. Appellant’s Br. at 

10, 14.

[23] “Our supreme court has recently recognized that one of the most difficult 

aspects of a termination of parental rights determination is the issue of whether 

the termination is in the child’s best interests.” R.L.-P., 119 N.E.3d 1098, 1104-

10 Mother does not agree that (1) it is likely that the reasons for Children’s removal will not be remedied and 

(2) maintaining the parent-child relationship will be detrimental to Children. Appellant’s Br. at 11. Even so, 

“she is forced to concede there is direct evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s findings . . . because 

[C]hildren were removed as a result of Mother’s substance abuse issues.” Id. Furthermore, Mother concedes 

that “DCS presented evidence that Mother had only recently addressed her substance abuse issues and had 

missed recent appointments for therapy.” Id. “Both the DCS case worker and the GAL testified that the 

reason for removal was not remedied and that Mother’s substance abuse could endanger the children.” Id.

“Again, Mother does not agree or concede that the trial court’s findings are accurate, but, for the purposes of 

[a]ppeal, no separate argument is raised on this issue.” Id. 

11 DCS alleges the satisfactory plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt Children. Appellant’s Br. at

10. Arguing that “the approval of a boilerplate undetailed care plan seems to fly in the face of the statutory 

requirement of clear and convincing evidence,” Mother, nevertheless, concedes that the “plan for care” 

element of the statute has been legally satisfied. Id. at 11. 
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05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (recognizing that conflict 

exists between a child’s interest in family preservation and need for 

permanency)). A trial court’s decision that termination was in the child’s best 

interests requires it to look at the totality of the evidence of a particular case. In

re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “In so doing, 

the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child 

involved.” Id. “Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where 

the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened.” Id. “The trial 

court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, 

mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the 

parent-child relationship.” Id. Furthermore, the testimony of the service 

providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. 

Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

[24] Mother argues that a parent’s failure to complete each element of a 

dispositional decree is not sufficient to demonstrate termination is in the best 

interest of Children. Appellant’s Br. at 11. Mother contends that she has made 

“marked and consistent improvement” over the course of the CHINS and 

termination proceedings. Id. at 12. While admitting that she initially failed to 

comply with the dispositional order to maintain consistent contact with FCM 

Beesley, address her substance abuse, and participate in parenting time, Mother 

asserts that she was able to address her transportation issues and that her 

visitation with Children improved in 2018. Id.
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[25] Explaining the initial erratic nature of her visits with Children, Mother argues

that she had no choice but to put visitation of Children on hold while she was 

in Florida for three or four weeks after her father died in late April 2018. Id. 

Mother explains that her visits with Children were reinstated when she returned 

from Florida and that the supervisor of the visitation reported that, since June 

2018, visits have “go[ne] well.” Id. (citing Tr. Vol. II at 39). The visitation 

supervisor said that Mother is prepared for the visits and minimal intervention 

is needed. Tr. Vol. II at 39. Children enjoy seeing Mother, with whom 

Children have a bond. Id. 

[26] We find that Mother’s improvement in visiting Children is commendable, yet 

more consistent visitation alone is not enough to support Mother’s claim that it 

is not in the best interest of Children to terminate Mother’s parental rights. 

Factors other than visitation do not reflect well on Mother. For instance, A.M. 

was removed from Mother’s care because Mother did not have stable housing 

or a legal source of income and left A.M., for months, in the care of Mother’s

sister, who tested positive for cocaine. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 32. 

B.M.M. was removed from Mother’s care because B.M.M. was born with drugs 

in her system, and Mother could not be found at the time of B.M.M.’s 

discharge from the Hospital. Id. at 31-32. Mother had more than two years to 

work toward reunification with Children. During the first nine months after 

Children were removed, Mother had little or no contact with DCS. Id. at 32. 

Mother was inconsistent and unmotivated in attending therapy and working 

with her recovery coach. Id. at 33, 34. In fact, Mother missed three scheduled 
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appointments during the month of the TPR hearing. Id. at 34. Furthermore, 

Mother missed numerous drug screens and tested positive for THC as late as 

the month of the TPR hearing. Id. at 34. Mother never completed any of the 

services and exhibited a lack of follow through and a lack of consistency. Id. at 

35. 

[27] FCM Beesley testified that it would not be in Children’s best interest to give 

Mother more time to complete services; instead, she believed it was in 

Children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Tr. Vol. II at 32, 

83. The GAL also believed that termination was in the best interest of Children 

because after two years “we’re no where [sic] near closer to being able to place 

them with either parent.” Id. at 83. “[R]ecommendations by the case manager 

and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the 

conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by 

clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.” 

In re J.S., 133 N.E.3d 707, 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[28] In finding that it was in the best interests of Children to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights, the juvenile court cited the following reasons:

1. Both parents have failed to address their substance abuse 

issues.

2. Both parents have failed to complete any services ordered by 

the Court.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-312 | December 18, 2019 Page 19 of 20

3. Both parents have failed to communicate effectively with DCS 

during the course of this case.

4. Both parents have been incarcerated on and off throughout this 

case for various crimes.

. . . . 

6. Parents have not enhanced their ability to safely and 

appropriately parent their children and are unable to provide the 

children with a safe, stable, and appropriate home free from

substance abuse.

7. GAL Laural French and FCM Beesley do not believe it would 

be in [C]hildren’s best interest to give Mother or Father more 

time to complete services and attempt to reunify with their 

children.

Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. 2 at 36.

[29] As we have discussed above, the juvenile court’s conclusions regarding best 

interest are supported by the evidence. By the juvenile court’s own findings, 

DCS presented clear and convincing evidence that Mother continued to use 

illegal substances, failed to complete any services designed to address substance 

abuse and stability issues, and had made no significant sustained progress 

toward reunification. We are not unsympathetic to the difficulty parents face 

when attempting to reunite with their children. However, children cannot 

remain in limbo forever. The evidence before the juvenile court supported its 

conclusion that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Children’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-312 | December 18, 2019 Page 20 of 20

best interest. The juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s parent-child

relationship with Children was not clearly erroneous.12

[30] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.

12 Mother contends: 

The practical effect of termination of the parent child relationship for the lives of these children 

is only the removal of a Mother who loves them and is bonded to them. [Children] will 

continue to reside with the same placement, they will continue to go to school in the same 

district, and they will continue to interact with the same friends. Termination in this case 

provides no extra stability, consistency, or assurance to these children. Termination only 

withdraws any assistance or services that can be afforded to Mother as she continues to get her 

life back in order. Termination cuts off a needed avenue of assistance to a person who is in a 

vulnerable transition.

Appellant’s Br. at 12-13. Regardless of whether Mother is correct in her assertions, we remind her that the 

court focuses on the best interests of Children and not the parents.