SUMMARY

February 11, 2021

2021COA11

No. 16CA2200, People v. Blassingame — Juries — Challenges 

for Cause — Juror Bias 

The division considers the appropriate legal standard to be applied 

in determining whether a prospective juror exhibits bias sufficient 

to sustain a challenge for cause, and holds that the trial court erred 

when it stated that a juror only evinces an excusable bias in favor of 

a victim if she declares that she will believe the victim “no matter 

what the rest of the evidence is.”

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA11

Court of Appeals No. 16CA2200

City and County of Denver District Court No. 15CR4481

Honorable William D. Robbins, Jr., Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Daniel Blassingame,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE 

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE GROVE

Fox and Harris, JJ., concur

Announced February 11, 2021

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney 

General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Shann Jeffrey, Deputy State 

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1

¶ 1 Defendant, Daniel Blassingame, appeals the judgment entered 

on a jury verdict finding him guilty of sexual assault — victim 

incapable of appraising conduct. Because we conclude that the 

trial court erroneously denied a challenge for cause to a juror who 

sat on the jury, we reverse the conviction and remand the case for a 

new trial.

I. Background

¶ 2 Blassingame and the alleged victim, C.A., both testified at 

trial. According to C.A., she attended a party with a friend, B.H., 

and Blassingame, whom she had not previously met. Blassingame, 

C.A., and B.H. got to the party — at the apartment of another friend 

of B.H. — around 10 p.m., and there were about fifteen people in 

attendance. C.A. hung out at the kitchen island for most of the 

night, drinking alcohol with other women. According to C.A., the 

last thing she remembered was “taking shots at this island,” 

explaining that “I guess I got too drunk. I don’t remember anything 

else.” C.A. guessed that this was probably “an hour, hour and a 

half into [the party].” 

¶ 3 The next thing C.A. remembered was waking up, still feeling a 

little drunk, with no pants on. When she woke up, Blassingame
2

had his penis exposed and was attempting to have sex with her. 

C.A. told Blassingame “no” and proceeded to get dressed “as fast as 

[she] possibly could.” C.A. also noted that when she woke up she 

felt soreness between her legs and “just didn’t feel right.” 

¶ 4 Blassingame testified that, after arriving at the party, he drank 

five or six beers and had occasional “friendly” interactions with C.A. 

When the party wound down around 2 a.m., while preparing to 

sleep in the living room, he noticed that a bathroom light was on 

and went to turn it off. At that point he saw C.A. standing in the 

bathroom “just looking at herself” in the mirror. Blassingame

testified that he and C.A. talked for about ten minutes, after which 

he “ask[ed] her if she wanted to make out for a bit,” to which she 

responded “sure.” After a few minutes of kissing Blassingame “felt 

like there was another moment,” when he “decided to ask [C.A.] if 

she wanted to have sex,” to which C.A. again responded “sure.” 

Blassingame testified that she was not slurring her words or losing 

her balance, her eyes were not glazed over, and she did not smell 

like vomit. 

¶ 5 Blassingame proceeded to have sexual intercourse with C.A.

for “five to ten minutes,” after which he realized the condom had 
3

broken. He and C.A. then had a conversation about the emergency

contraceptive Plan B before falling asleep on the bathroom floor. 

When they woke up, Blassingame asked C.A. if she wanted to have 

sex again, to which she responded “no.” He put his clothes on and 

left the bathroom, while C.A. stayed behind and dressed herself.

¶ 6 A friend of C.A.’s urged her to make a report to the police and 

undergo an examination. She went to the hospital the evening after 

the party, where a sexual assault nurse examiner completed a rape 

kit and interviewed her about the incident. C.A. talked to a police 

officer but elected not to go forward with charges at that time.

¶ 7 Three years later, C.A. contacted Detective Brian Slay of the 

Denver Police Department about pressing charges. Blassingame

was arrested and charged with two counts of sexual assault, one 

under section 18-3-402(1)(b), (2), C.R.S. 2020 (victim incapable of 

appraising conduct, a class 4 felony), and the other under section 

18-3-402(1)(h), C.R.S. 2020 (victim physically helpless, a class 3

felony). Following a three-day trial, a jury found him guilty of 

sexual assault under section 18-3-402(1)(b) and acquitted him of 

the other charge. The trial court imposed a sentence of two years to 
4

life in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Blassingame 

now appeals. 

II. Challenge For Cause

¶ 8 Blassingame contends that the trial court erroneously denied

his challenge for cause to Juror S.1 We agree. 

A. Standard of Review

¶ 9 We review a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause for an 

abuse of discretion. People v. Oliver, 2020 COA 97, ¶ 7. A court 

abuses its discretion when it issues a ruling that is manifestly 

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misconstrues or 

misapplies the law. Id. We consider the entire voir dire of the 

prospective juror, People v. Wilson, 114 P.3d 19, 22 (Colo. App. 

2004), but because the trial court is uniquely able to “evaluat[e] . . . 

demeanor and body language,” we generally defer to the trial court’s 

assessment of a juror’s credibility and sincerity in explaining her 

 1 Blassingame also contends that the trial court committed several

unpreserved evidentiary errors, that there was prosecutorial 

misconduct during closing arguments, that the cumulative effect of 

these errors requires reversal, and that, if his conviction is affirmed, 

the mittimus should be corrected. Because we hold that 

Blassingame is entitled to a new trial, we do not address either of 

his contentions of trial error or his assertion that the mittimus is 

incorrect. 
5

state of mind. Carillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 485-86 (Colo. 1999). 

This deference extends to statements that “may appear to be 

inconsistent or self-contradictory.” Id. at 487 (quoting People v. 

Sandoval, 733 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo. 1987)).

B. Applicable Law

¶ 10 The right to challenge jurors for cause stems from a 

defendant’s right to due process and to a trial before a fair and 

impartial jury. Morrison v. People, 19 P.3d 668, 672 (Colo. 2000). A 

defendant’s right to an impartial jury is violated if the trial court 

fails to remove a juror biased against the defendant. See Nailor v. 

People, 200 Colo. 30, 32, 612 P.2d 79, 80 (1980) (“To insure that [a 

defendant’s right to an impartial jury] is protected, the trial court 

must excuse prejudiced or biased persons from the jury.”).

¶ 11 To this end, section 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S. 2020, requires a 

trial court to sustain a challenge for cause if a juror’s state of mind 

evinces “enmity or bias toward the defendant or the state.” 

Similarly, Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(X) requires disqualification of a juror if 

his or her state of mind “manifest[s] a bias for or against the 

defendant, or for or against the prosecution, or the 

acknowledgement of a previously formed or expressed opinion 
6

regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant,” unless “the court 

is satisfied that the juror will render an impartial verdict based 

solely upon the evidence and instructions of the court.”

¶ 12 The purpose of challenges for cause, as relevant here, is not to 

remove jurors who simply enter the courtroom with a 

misunderstanding of the law. See § 16-10-103(1). Those jurors 

should not be removed for cause if, after explanation and 

rehabilitative efforts, the court believes that they can render a fair 

and impartial verdict based on the instructions given by the judge 

and the evidence presented at trial. People v. Clemens, 2017 CO 

89, ¶ 16.

C. Relevant Facts

¶ 13 Juror S disclosed on her questionnaire that she had been 

molested by a family member when she was a young child and, 

during individual voir dire, revealed that her father had not believed 

her allegation. The court inquired further:

COURT: Is [the molestation] something you 

think about a whole lot?

JUROR S: Yeah, I do. Especially now that I 

have my own daughters.
7

COURT: What do you think that means in 

terms of being a juror on this case?

JUROR S: I’m not really sure. I haven’t heard 

any of the facts of the case. I think that I 

could try to be impartial, like I said in there. 

Do my best. But, you know . . .

COURT: A serious question: As you sit here 

right now, do you think Mr. Blassingame must 

be guilty? 

JUROR S: I don’t know.

COURT: You heard me read the instruction 

this morning about the presumption of 

innocence and the burden of proof.

JUROR S: Correct.

COURT: Do you think you can follow those 

things?

JUROR S: I could try. I suppose, from the two 

events that I listed there, in both cases, when 

my aunt and uncle were murdered, they never 

found the people who did it. You know, my 

dad’s cousin, no one ever said anything to him 

or did anything about it. I guess my thought 

is that people just get away with things, and –

COURT: So here’s the real question: Are you 

going to -- is there any reason why you think 

that you would put yourself in the position to 

be sure that Mr. Blassingame didn’t get away 

with something?

JUROR S: If I feel that he’s guilty, I want to 

make sure he doesn’t get away with it. But I 
8

probably wouldn’t say he’s guilty without 

hearing the case.

¶ 14 The prosecution then attempted to rehabilitate Juror S by 

asking a series of leading questions regarding the relevant legal 

standards: 

PROSECUTOR: Are you fine following the 

presumption of innocence and burden of 

proof? You’re going to hold me to my burden 

of proof to prove beyond a reasonable doubt?

JUROR S: Yeah.

PROSECUTOR: Okay, and if I don’t, you can 

find [him] not guilty even with the charges?

JUROR S: Yeah.

PROSECUTOR: If I don’t meet that burden?

JUROR S: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. And if I do, then you 

can find him guilty? If you find that I’ve met 

my burden, you can find him guilty?

JUROR S: Yep.

¶ 15 But, as the prosecutor pressed on, Juror S began wavering

once again.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. And you can follow 

those instructions regardless of what else 

happened in your life?

JUROR S: I hope so.
9

PROSECUTOR: Well, it’s important to know if 

you can. If you’re instructed to by the judge 

that you only find guilty if I proved my case, 

every element, beyond a reasonable doubt. All 

right?

JUROR S: Uh-huh. I’ve got to tell you, when 

the judge talked about what the case was 

going to be, my heart just went from here to 

here (indicating). Anything but that, you 

know. Anything but sexual assault. But I feel 

like I can. I think I can. I can be impartial.

PROSECUTOR: Okay. Everyone hates sexual 

assault. Everybody feels that way, as well as 

murders. And what happened to your aunt 

and uncle, it’s horrible. But it’s important that 

you listen to the evidence and apply it to the 

law. Do you think you can do that?

JUROR S: Uh-huh.

¶ 16 Defense counsel took this opportunity to dive more deeply into

Juror S’s apprehension with a series of open-ended questions:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: When you heard those 

charges being read, what was your emotional 

reaction?

JUROR S: It just felt like – I don’t know if I 

would want to listen to it. I don’t want to 

listen to what happened. I don’t want other 

people to look at it as a victim not being 

believed again, you know. That’s part of – I 

don’t know. It just – it’s not really that 

straightforward of a train of thought.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Right.
10

JUROR S: It’s more of a feeling.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Can you put that feeling 

into words though? I mean, the -- so you said 

-- anxiety or emotional turmoil? Does that 

make sense?

JUROR S: Right. Yeah.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: So in your situation, 

when you were not believed, would that impact 

your ability to see the evidence, and would you 

be more willing to believe a witness who is the 

-- who is the alleged victim?

JUROR S: I guess that’s my main concern is 

that I might be more apt to believe, especially 

since I was told that I just was wanting 

attention is why I was telling people about it 

10 years or 12 years later, you know, after it 

happened.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And so if there are a 

number of witnesses, and everything else being 

equal, you would believe the victim more 

readily than another witness?

JUROR S: I’m not saying that I would. I’m 

saying I’m afraid that I would.

¶ 17 The voir dire of Juror S ended there, as it began, with Juror S 

unsure of her own ability to be a fair and impartial juror. Defense 

counsel challenged Juror S for cause, expressing concern over “her 

emotional state as it pertains to her own experiences and how she 

would more readily identify with the victim and believe the victim 
11

over other witnesses, all things being equal, that’s not the burden, 

and that’s not the standard.” 

¶ 18 The trial court denied the challenge for cause, ruling as 

follows. 

I’m not going to strike her. I think the 

overriding -- well, at least for me, what came 

out is that she understands the burden of 

proof and she could abide by that.

So the other thing about believing the victim 

more, I think it has to be more definite than 

that. I think the way the case law reads, it has 

to be something to the effect of no matter what 

the rest of the evidence is -- not all things 

being equal, but no matter what the rest of the 

evidence is, I’m going to believe the victim. 

And I don’t think she rises to that level. So 

she stays. The challenge is denied.

D. Analysis

¶ 19 According to Blassingame, Juror S should have been excused 

because she stated a “clear expression of doubt in her ability to 

judge the credibility of that testimony in an impartial manner,” and 

she was not adequately rehabilitated afterward. The People respond 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because, despite her 

initial apprehension, Juror S assured the court that she “could 

judge the matter fairly and impartially.” In fact, the People assert 
12

that Juror S did not evince any disqualifying bias during her voir 

dire, and that her statements instead “simply reflect[ed] an honest 

effort to express feelings and convictions about matters of 

importance in an emotionally charged setting.” Sandoval, 733 P.2d 

at 321. Thus, they argue, no rehabilitation was required at all. 

¶ 20 As we have already noted, depending on how the questions 

were framed, Juror S shifted back and forth between unambiguous 

and equivocal answers throughout voir dire. When asked leading 

questions by the prosecutor about her ability to impartially assess 

the evidence, she generally confirmed that she would hold the 

People to their burden of proof. But she wavered in her responses 

to open-ended questions posed by both the court and defense 

counsel (and to some extent, the prosecutor), repeatedly giving 

answers like “I hope so,” and “I could try,” and expressing genuine 

concern about whether her own traumatic experiences would color 

her ability to evaluate the evidence without favoring the 

prosecution. 

¶ 21 Juror S’s candor was commendable, and the record makes 

clear that, if selected for the jury, she would be willing to try to set 

aside her preconceived notions about whether, and why, claims of 
13

sexual assault should be credited. But the record does not clearly 

demonstrate that Juror S’s efforts would be successful. For 

example, when the court asked Juror S if she would be able to 

“follow” the presumption of innocence and burden of proof if 

selected as a juror, she replied that she “could try,” and that, “I 

guess my thought is that people just get away with things.” 

(Emphasis added.) In response to the court’s next question she 

stated that she “probably wouldn’t say he’s guilty without hearing 

the case.” (Emphasis added.) These answers, among others,

suggested that Juror S would struggle to follow the instructions and 

evaluate the competing stories without relying on her preconceived 

notions about the credibility of sexual assault victims. Accordingly, 

some rehabilitation was needed before she could be deemed fit to 

serve on the jury. 

¶ 22 To be sure, the prosecution attempted to rehabilitate Juror S, 

but it did so by asking general, leading questions2 focused on jury 

instructions and the burden of proof. Juror S initially agreed that 

 2 “[A]nswers to leading questions are viewed with suspicion.” People 

v. Merrow, 181 P.3d 319, 323 (Colo. App. 2007) (Webb, J., specially 

concurring). 
14

she could follow the instructions and hold the prosecution to its 

burden, but when defense counsel followed up with more openended questions, she returned to expressing fear that she “would be 

more apt to believe” the victim given her prior experience. There 

were thus very few answers to counterbalance Juror S’s 

uncertainty. See People v. Merrow, 181 P.3d 319, 321 (Colo. App. 

2007) (“[W]hen . . . a potential juror’s statements compel the 

inference that he or she cannot decide crucial issues fairly, a 

challenge for cause must be granted in the absence of rehabilitative 

questioning or other counter-balancing information.”). 

¶ 23 It is of course up to the trial court to decide whether it believes 

a particular juror “can render a fair and impartial verdict based on 

the instructions given by the judge and the evidence presented at 

trial.” Clemens, ¶ 16. And because it can observe the dynamics of 

the voir dire and personally evaluate the juror’s tone and demeanor

during the discussion, the trial court is uniquely positioned to make 

that judgment. Thus, under the circumstances here, we do not 

question the trial court’s conclusion that “what came out is that 

[Juror S] understands the burden of proof and she could abide by 

that.” 
15

¶ 24 But that does not end our inquiry because, as the trial court 

acknowledged, Blassingame’s challenge for cause cited two 

concerns: (1) the burden of proof and (2) whether Juror S would 

consider the evidence presented at trial without favoring one side 

over the other. On the second issue, Blassingame contends that 

the trial court “employed an incorrect legal standard for the 

determination of bias sufficient to sustain a challenge for cause.” 

And indeed, the second part of the trial court’s ruling misstated the

governing legal standard. 

So the other thing about believing the victim 

more, I think it has to be more definite than 

that. I think the way the case law reads, it has 

to be something to the effect of no matter what 

the rest of the evidence is . . . I’m going to 

believe the victim. And I don’t think she rises 

to that level.

¶ 25 As we understand it, the trial court ruled that in order for 

Juror S to have evinced excusable bias in favor of the prosecution,

she would have needed to be unwavering in her resolve to believe 

the victim over any other witness. Or, put another way, the trial 

court concluded that Juror S should not be removed unless she 

would credit the victim no matter what the rest of the evidence 

established. That is incorrect, see, e.g., People v. Prator, 833 P.2d 
16

819, 820-21 (Colo. App. 1992), aff’d, 856 P.2d 837 (Colo. 1993), 

and on appeal, the People neither defend this characterization of 

the governing standard nor cite any authority that would support it.

Instead, the People assert that, rather than demonstrating 

disqualifying bias, Juror S’s voir dire instead reflects her honest 

effort to express her feelings and convictions. See Sandoval, 733 

P.2d at 321. 

¶ 26 Juror S’s sincerity, however, is beside the point. Rather, the 

key question is whether, as a matter of law, the trial court 

adequately accounted for Juror S’s repeated suggestions that her 

own past trauma would adversely impact her ability to fairly 

evaluate the evidence. A prospective juror does not need to 

unequivocally state her partiality for one side to be deemed unfit to 

serve on a jury. See, e.g., Nailor, 200 Colo. at 32, 612 P.2d at 80, 

(holding that challenge for cause should have been granted because 

“the fact that the juror doubted she could be fair because of her 

recent ‘bad experience’” was a “clear expression of bias”); Merrow, 

181 P.3d at 321 (holding that prospective juror should have been 

excused where “the record contain[ed] nothing to support an

inference that [the juror] would be able to resolve credibility fairly, 
17

given her views about drug usage”); People v. Luman, 994 P.2d 432, 

434-36 (Colo. App. 1999) (holding that challenge for cause should 

have been granted where juror made equivocal statements about 

her ability to be fair and then was inadequately rehabilitated). And 

here, despite the prosecutor’s attempts at rehabilitation, Juror S’s 

equivocation quickly reappeared once defense counsel began to 

pose open-ended questions. 

¶ 27 We acknowledge the trial court’s broad discretion, guided by 

section 16-10-103(1)(j) and Crim. P. 24(b)(1)(X), to determine if a

juror can be fair and impartial. But the appropriate exercise of that 

discretion depends on an accurate articulation of the governing 

standard. Thus, although the trial court found that Juror S could 

hold the prosecution to its burden of proof, its consideration of 

whether Juror S could fairly weigh the alleged victim’s testimony 

was fatally flawed. The combination of (1) Juror S’s uncertain

answers, which established bias sufficient to require rehabilitation, 

(2) her return to equivocation after the prosecutor’s attempt to 

rehabilitate her via leading questions, and (3) the trial court’s 

incorrect statement of law concerning the degree of bias necessary 
18

to sustain a challenge for cause demonstrates that the trial court 

did not properly evaluate the issue before it. 

¶ 28 When it comes to challenges for cause, we may not “abdicate 

[our] responsibility to ensure that the requirements of fairness are 

fulfilled.” Morgan v. People, 624 P.2d 1331, 1332 (Colo. 1981). 

Juror S’s last statement (“I’m not saying that I would [believe the 

victim more readily than another witness]. I’m saying I’m afraid I 

would.”), which was consistent with much of what she had already 

said, leaves us with considerable uncertainty that she could abide 

by the requirement to decide crucial issues fairly. See Nailor, 200 

Colo. at 31, 612 P.2d at 80 (error to deny challenge for cause where 

juror’s “final position was that there was a serious doubt in her own 

mind about her ability to be fair and impartial”). And because that 

uncertainty is heightened by the trial court’s inaccurate recitation 

of the governing standard, we conclude that Juror S’s equivocation 

required the court to grant the challenge for cause. Because Juror 

S sat on the jury, reversal is required. See People v. Abu-NantambuEl, 2019 CO 106, ¶¶ 28-30. 
19

III. Conclusion

¶ 29 The judgment of conviction is reversed and the case is 

remanded for a new trial. 

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE HARRIS concur.