FACTSHEET

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS IN LIBYA 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION on

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 N. Capitol Street, NW, Suite #A714

Washington, DC 20401

202-523-3240

 December 2023

Religious Freedom Conditions in Libya 

Overview

Religious freedom conditions in Libya reflect concerning trends. In 2023, authorities 

in Tripoli continued their campaign of arrest, interrogation, detention, and forced 

confessions of individuals accused of religious conversion and proselytization. Rival 

government actors in both the eastern and western parts of the country enforced 

religiously-justified restrictions on Libyans’ online and other expressions unaligned 

with government-endorsed interpretations of Islam.

Libya has a long history of religious diversity that encompasses ancient Jewish, 

Christian, and Muslim heritage, sites, and communities. For several decades in the 

20th century, Libya maintained a reputation within the Middle East and North Africa 

region for religious moderation. However, in recent years, pluralism—among other 

aspects of civil society—has deteriorated. Libya’s ongoing lack of stable governance 

has amplified its vulnerability both to natural disasters such as September 2023’s 

catastrophic Storm Daniel and to rampant political corruption, multi-actor armed 

conflict, and other factors unfavorable to freedom of religion or belief. 

This factsheet reports on recent religious freedom conditions in Libya, identifying 

some of the various actors, including successive Tripoli governments and their 

competitors in the east, that have restricted freedom of religion or belief. Both state 

and nonstate actors—some with the backing of foreign states—have targeted religious 

minorities, converts from Islam to other religions, migrants and other foreign 

nationals, as well as Libyan Muslims with dissenting religious views. 

Key Actors Affecting Religious Freedom

Rival Governments 

Libya has suffered severe political fragmentation and institutional instability since 

the 2011 populist “Arab Spring” uprisings and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO)-supported forces’ ousting of former ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi. Rival seats of 

government in Tripoli, Benghazi, and other cities have exacerbated this fragmentation, 

as have the numerous armed rebel groups and Islamist militias vying for power 

throughout the country. 

Abraham Cooper

Chair

Frederick A. Davie

Vice Chair

Commissioners

David Curry

Susie Gelman 

Mohamed Magid 

Stephen Schneck

Nury Turkel 

Eric Ueland

Frank Wolf

Erin D. Singshinsuk

Executive Director

USCIRF’s Mission

To advance international 

freedom of religion or 

belief, by independently 

assessing and unflinchingly 

confronting threats to this 

fundamental right.

www.USCIRF.gov

@USCIRF

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2 USCIRF Factsheet: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS IN LIBYA | DECEMBER 2023

Although in recent years the names, affiliations, and seats of 

power of various governmental contenders have varied, the 

east-west regional fault line remains at play in the ongoing 

political division. In 2015, the United Nations (UN) helped 

establish the internationally recognized Government of 

National Accord (GNA), based in the de jure capital of 

Tripoli on the northwestern coast and in command of 

western Libyan armed forces supported in part by military 

aid from countries such as Turkey and Italy. 

In 2019, General Khalifa Haftar, a former defector from 

Qaddafi’s military, marshaled a coalition of armed groups 

called the Libyan National Army (LNA)—also known as the 

Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF)—in an attempt to seize 

Tripoli. The GNA drew on Turkish support to successfully 

resist an LNA takeover, although Haftar helped set up a 

rival government based in the eastern port city of Benghazi, 

claiming control of large amounts of territory in the east 

and south. Like the GNA, the LNA has had powerful 

foreign state supporters including Russia and the Russianbacked Wagner Group, France, Egypt, and the United Arab 

Emirates (UAE)— with the latter two supporting Haftar 

in part to help counter the perceived threat of political 

Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood within the GNA. The 

LNA has faced challenges from not only the GNA and its 

successive iterations and competitor governments, but also 

from several Islamist and rebel militias. 

Since a 2020 internationally brokered ceasefire, 

the political landscape has undergone additional 

transformation. UN-led negotiations resulted in the 

formation in 2021 of Tripoli’s Government of National 

Unity (GNU), a provisional government led by Prime 

Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeiba and intended to replace the 

GNA and unify it with the country’s interim parliament, 

the Tobruk-relocated House of Representatives (HoR), in 

advance of long-anticipated national elections. However, 

later that year, the HoR passed a vote of no confidence 

against the GNU and approved the 2022 installation of 

a new Government of National Stability (GNS) in the 

central city of Sirte, asserting the leadership of Prime 

Minister Fathi Bashagha over objections from the UN. 

Haftar, bolstered by the LNA and related armed groups, is 

the presumed animating force behind many eastern-based 

bodies and their ostensible leaders, with each organization 

and politician varying in the degree of actual power they 

wield in the east and south. In May 2023, the HoR, led by 

House Speaker and potential presidential candidate Aguila 

Saleh, suspended Prime Minister Bashagha, foiling his 

aspirations to position himself within the GNS as the chief 

rival to Prime Minister Dbeiba’s GNU in Tripoli. 

The UN has continued to recognize the interim authority 

of the GNU while pushing for nation-wide presidential 

and parliamentary elections with “buy-in” from major 

political actors. Given the weakness of Libya’s institutions, 

electoral legitimacy relies on the consensus of these 

competing individuals more than that of the organizations 

they support or lead. One of these actors is Prime 

Minister Dbeiba, whose possible intention to remain in 

an originally temporary post could undermine Libyans’ 

confidence in any elections in which he stands. 

Under a 2015 agreement, the HoR must collaborate 

with the High Council of State (HCS) on a new electoral 

framework for presidential and parliamentary elections. 

The HCS is a secondary and unelected body that brings 

Egypt

Tunisia

Algeria

Morroco

Sudan

Niger

Chad

Tripoli

Libya
USCIRF Factsheet: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS IN LIBYA | DECEMBER 2023 3

together the competing Tripoli government and the HoR in 

Tobruk. However, the HCS and HoR each issued conflicting

electoral laws, postponing the 2021 elections. In 2022, 

the HoR established its own body to draft a constitution, 

further delaying elections. In July 2023, the HoR and HCS 

agreed to temporarily reunite in advance of elections. 

However, in October the HoR submitted to the United 

Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) a plan for 

elections by the end of 2023 that, like previous proposals, 

may not meet the UNSMIL’s standards for “consensual and 

implementable” election frameworks. In its initial review 

of the proposal, UNSMIL stressed the need for a “national 

compromise,” calling on all stakeholders to once and for 

all agree on “a unified government to lead the country to 

elections and close the chapter of interim governments.” 

In early December, UNSMIL head Abdoulaye Bathily, the 

UN’s Special Representative for Libya, urged all Libyan 

stakeholders to reach a comprehensive political settlement, 

allowing the country to move ahead with elections. 

Armed Militant Groups

Nonstate actors—including several U.S. designated foreign 

terrorist organizations—and other armed Islamist groups 

have capitalized on Libya’s ongoing government rivalries 

and lack of centralized state institutions to wage attacks 

on both political and civilian targets. Some armed groups 

in Libya resemble typical non-state actors but contribute 

to the leadership of or otherwise maintain strong links 

to the rival government institutions across the country. 

In the absence of a viable national military, each region’s 

executives have relied on non-state militias to maintain a 

semblance of order and help protect their seats of power. 

The LNA and related eastern armed groups—including 

the Tareq Bin Zayed (TBZ) militia run by Haftar’s son 

Saddam—have supported the HoR and the GNS regime, 

while a Salafist militia called the Special Deterrence Forces 

(SDF) has been linked to the GNU in Tripoli. 

Salafi-Jihadi and other Islamist militias without current 

government affiliations, territorial control, or governance 

capacity exist in Libya as well. These include the U.S.-

designated foreign terrorist organizations Ansar al-Sharia, 

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the selfdeclared Islamic State in Libya (IS-L), which is an affiliate 

of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 

Religious Freedom Conditions 

Religious Communities 

Libya’s population is largely Sunni Muslim. The Amazigh 

(sometimes called “Berber”) ethnic minority, especially 

populations in the northwest’s Nafusa mountains, includes 

practitioners of Ibadi Islam. A small number of Libyans 

from both the Arab-identified and Amazigh native 

communities have converted from Islam to other religions, 

particularly Christianity. Libya’s ancient Jewish population 

diminished dramatically beginning in the mid-20th 

century—when it numbered 45,000—due to increasing 

government restrictions, Libyan nationalists’ successive 

violent attacks, and Jews’ resulting emigration. Since 2002, 

when the last community member died, Libya has had no 

Jewish population. 

Year 

Established Entity Cities and/or Regions

Affiliated Security Forces or Armed Groups 

(examples)

2021 Government of National 

Unity (GNU)

Tripoli; northwest Special Deterrence Forces (SDF)

2015–2021 Government of National 

Accord (GNA)

Tripoli; northwest Special Deterrence Forces (SDF)

2014 House of Representatives 

(HoR)

Tobruk and Benghazi; northeast Libyan National Army (LNA) a.k.a. Libyan 

Arab Armed Forces (LAAF); Tareq Bin Zayed 

(TBZ) militia

2022 Government of National 

Stability (GNS)

Sirtre (north-central); affiliated 

with the HoR (northeast)

Libyan National Army (LNA) a.k.a. Libyan 

Arab Armed Forces (LAAF); Tareq Bin Zayed 

(TBZ) militia

2016 High Council of State 

(HCS)

Tripoli 

Figure 1: Select Key Actors Affecting Religious Freedom in Libya
4 USCIRF Factsheet: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS IN LIBYA | DECEMBER 2023

Today, the majority of non-Muslims—such as Christians, 

Baha’is, Hindus, Buddhists, and Ahmadi Muslims–in Libya 

are migrants or other foreign-born residents. Despite the 

dysfunction of parallel governments and ongoing security 

threats from multiple armed groups, Libya is both a final 

destination and a geographically convenient passingthrough point for refugees and economic migrants from 

other countries in Africa. The country’s lack of central 

authority has only added to its appeal for human traffickers 

and migrant smugglers to Europe via the Mediterranean. 

Some migrant communities were religious minorities in 

their countries of origin. Libya’s three Coptic Orthodox 

churches, for example, serve many Christian job seekers 

and other immigrants from neighboring Egypt. For 

other non-Muslim newcomers, such as workers from 

the Philippines or migrants from Christian-majority 

communities in Nigeria, life in Libya presents new 

potential restrictions on their ability to practice or share 

with others their religious beliefs. 

Religious Freedom Restrictions by Governments 

Libya’s splintered governments lack an updated 

constitution, other laws, and a unified judiciary. A 2011 

constitutional declaration by the National Transitional 

Council, an unelected body, remains in use during the 

protracted transitional period. This constitution names 

Islam as the state religion and Shari’a as the main source 

of legislation but “guarantee[s] for non-Muslims the 

freedom to practice their religious rituals” and establishes 

all Libyans’ equality before the law “without distinction 

on the grounds of religion [or] belief.” The HoR has called 

for amendments and posed other challenges to the 2011 

constitutional declaration.

The Libyan Penal Code covers the whole country, 

although eastern and western authorities may not 

have the ability to enforce it outside their respective 

regions. The Penal Code as amended includes provisions

that authorities and legal experts have over the past 

decade interpreted as prohibitions against apostasy and 

missionary work, with severe potential sentences. Article 

207 criminalizes and makes punishable by death the 

promotion of “theories or principles aimed at changing 

the fundamental principles of the constitution or the 

fundamental rules of the social structure.” Law No. 20 of 

2016, passed by a GNU body and enforceable in the west, 

amends article 291 of the Penal Code, which prohibits 

the renunciation of Islam in word or deed. Although the 

amendment allows for Muslims accused of apostasy to 

avoid the death penalty if they return to Islam, it adds 

non-Muslims who “publicly insult Islam” to those eligible 

for the death penalty. 

In recent years, converts from Islam to other religions, 

especially Christianity, have faced harassment and serious 

punitive measures from government and affiliated actors. 

In 2022, the Misrata Court of Appeal sentenced to death a 

young man for his conversion from Islam to Christianity 

four years earlier and after he refused to convert back 

to Islam. The same year, the Internal Security Agency 

(ISA) of Tripoli, an intelligence and law enforcement 

organization affiliated with successive western 

governments, arrested and detained at least seven young 

men “opposed to Libyan and Islamic values,” later posting 

alleged forced confession videos in which the detainees 

admitted “communicating with atheists, agnostics, 

Quranists, feminists, and secularists both online and in 

person.” The ISA reportedly issued online statements 

claiming the detainees had conspired to spread atheism. 

In 2023, the ISA and other western authorities have 

continued their pursuit of alleged apostates and 

proselytizers. In March and April, the ISA made a 

string of religiously based arrests targeting converts to 

and alleged proselytizers of Christianity. One series of 

investigations resulted in the detention of at least ten 

Libyans for alleged apostasy and two U.S. citizens and 

two other foreign nationals for alleged proselytizing. 

Although the U.S. citizens were released within days, the 

others are believed to remain in detention, with the ISA 

asserting their participation in an “organized gang action 

aiming to solicit and to make people leave Islam.” In 

October, reports suggested the ISA expressed an intention 

to reopen investigations in the cases of the remaining 

detainees. These detentions are notable for the ISA’s 

framing of the detainees as an “organized gang”—linking 

Libyan converts to Christianity, Christian U.S. nationals, 

and immigrants of Christian background. Further, the 

cases reflect apparent cooperation between Benghazi’s 

Interior Ministry, which initially apprehended some of 

the suspects, and the ISA in Tripoli, which carried out 

interrogations. 

Community liaisons describe the Libyan-born Christian 

population today as almost exclusively “underground” in 

response to the increasing threat of arrest and detention 

for alleged personal apostasy or proselytization of friends 

or neighbors. Christians from minority Protestant 

denominations have also reported government-initiated 

eviction from church properties with private owners. 
USCIRF Factsheet: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS IN LIBYA | DECEMBER 2023 5

Libyans of Sunni Muslim background also face potential 

arrest, detention, and prosecution. Increasingly, both 

eastern and western administrations have used legislation, 

detention, and courts to target Libyans for perceived 

violations against official interpretations of Islam. 

In February 2023, eastern authorities invoked the House 

of Representatives’ recently-passed Anti-Cybercrimes law 

in arresting two high profile women: folk singer Ahlam alYamani and blogger Haneen al-Abdali. Benghazi’s Interior 

Ministry accused them of insulting “the status of the 

chaste and dignified Libyan woman in our conservative 

society with acts and behaviors that are foreign to us and 

offend our customs, traditions and true religion.” 

In May 2023, Tripoli’s General Authority for Religious 

Endowment and Islamic Affairs announced the debut of 

the Guardians of Virtue program and administrative body, 

intended to purify society of vice, deviations, and atheism 

and targeting women, Sufi expressions of Islam, atheists, 

and apostates. Other Libyan Islamic institutions have 

objected to the program as a potential violation of Shari’a 

in its usurpation and weaponization of religious authority. 

Competition between and among these and other leading 

Islamic institutions itself reflects and fuels heightened 

Islamism in official circles, leading to increased 

government monitoring of and restrictions on religious 

minorities, converts from Islam to other religions, women, 

and other vulnerable members of the population. 

Militias and Armed Islamist Groups

In Benghazi and other parts of the east, the purportedly 

secular LNA and allied Salafi Islamist forces with close ties 

to that region’s government have sought to regulate other 

Islamist groups, ostensibly to fight terrorism—as in Haftar 

forces’ 2022 killing of suspected Islamic State militants—

but with the additional aim of usurping these Islamists’ 

religious power. To that end, LNA and related forces also 

reportedly control mosques and monitor Islamic sermons 

in the Benghazi area. 

In the west, the SDF, which has reported to recent 

successive governments in Tripoli, enforces governmentapproved interpretations of Shari’a. In February 2023, the 

SDF “kidnapped” and arrested an Iraqi-born female model

who made social media postings allegedly in violation of 

government-endorsed Islamic norms for women. 

Militant Salafi groups throughout the country continue 

to vandalize Sufi shrines, objecting to interpretations of 

Islam that venerate saints.

Amid the political turbulence of the past several years, 

other armed Islamist groups have targeted religious 

minorities for attacks, restricted minorities’ worship, and 

enforced Salafist versions of Shari’a, policing Muslims’ 

expression of Islam. 

In February 2023, a Libyan driver facilitated the abduction

for ransom of six Christian Egyptians seeking work in 

eastern Libya, transporting them to a migrant detention 

facility near the city of Zawiya, reportedly controlled by 

a powerful western militia. Reports state the captors used 

torture against the migrants upon discovering the men 

were Christians, only releasing them upon their families’ 

payment of a high ransom. In response to Egypt’s efforts to 

achieve the prisoners’ release, Tripoli authorities—whom 

Egypt does not recognize—claimed a lack of jurisdiction 

over the detention center. In July, the UNSMIL stated

it was “deeply disturbed by the continued abductions, 

arbitrary arrests, and disappearances of citizens and 

public figures by various security actors in Libya.” While 

the statement directly addressed the recent abductions 

and travel bans of HSC and other officials, the UNSMIL 

admonished “Libyan authorities and security entities 

to release” any arbitrarily detained people and bring to 

justice their abductors and jailers. 

Other militant groups throughout Libya have targeted 

Copts from among Egyptian migrants. In previous years, 

IS-L held considerable power in Sirte and surrounding 

north-central coastal areas, mounting several deadly 

attacks on civilians including the 2015 abduction and 

mass execution by beheading of 21 Copts from Egypt 

based on their Christian faith. In May 2023, Pope Francis 

announced the formal recognition of the Coptic Orthodox 

victims as martyrs within the Catholic Church. In the 

same month, the appeals court in the western city of 

Misrata sentenced 23 people to death and 14 others 

to life in prison in connection to that IS-L campaign. 

International and Libyan military efforts in 2016 pushed 

IS-L out of Sirtre, substantially diminishing its virulence, 

although it maintains a small presence in the southern and 

eastern regions.
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The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) is an independent, bipartisan federal government entity established by the 

U.S. Congress to monitor, analyze, and report on religious freedom abroad. USCIRF makes foreign policy recommendations to the President, 

the Secretary of State, and Congress intended to deter religious persecution and promote freedom of religion and belief.

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UNITED STATES COMMISSION on INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Conclusion 

Libya’s persistent crisis of governance, prolonged delay 

in critical elections, and profound lack of security have 

contributed to a continued decline in conditions for 

freedom of religion or belief. Multiple actors including 

competing governments, their affiliated militias, and 

independent armed terrorist organizations have impeded 

the rights of Libyans and foreign nationals to worship 

publicly and freely; change their religion or communicate 

about religious ideas with members of other religions; 

or express thoughts divergent from the country’s various 

governments’ or militias’ approved interpretations of Islam 

or suggestive of non-belief. 

Both eastern and western administrations have imposed 

systematic and ongoing restrictions on religious freedom, 

including arrest, interrogation, detention and, in some 

cases, prosecution of alleged apostates and proselytizers. 

The Tripoli government’s recent invocation of death 

penalty sentences for apostasy from Islam is an egregious 

violation of religious freedom demonstrating Libya’s dire 

need for free and fair elections, a central government, and 

substantial constitutional and legislative reform to ensure 

freedom of religion or belief.