[Cite as State v. Glenn, 2011-Ohio-2628.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

VS. 

MICKELE GLENN, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

 CASE NO. 10-MA-49 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio 

Case No. 2009CR666 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee Paul Gains 

Prosecutor 

Ralph M. Rivera 

Assistant Prosecutor 

21 W. Boardman St., 6th Floor 

Youngstown, Ohio 44503-1426 

For Defendant-Appellant Attorney John D. Falgiani, Jr. 

8256 E. Market St. 

P. O. Box 8533 

Warren, Ohio 44484 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

 

 

 Dated: May 26, 2011 
[Cite as State v. Glenn, 2011-Ohio-2628.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Mickele Glenn, appeals from a Mahoning County 

Common Pleas Court judgment convicting him of having weapons under disability, 

following his guilty plea, and the resulting sentence. 

{¶2} On July 9, 2009, a Mahoning County grand jury indicted appellant on 

one count of having weapons while under disability, a third-degree felony in violation 

of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3)(B), and one count of aggravated assault, a fourth-degree 

felony in violation of R.C. 2903.12(A)(2)(B) with an accompanying firearm 

specification. Appellant initially entered a not guilty plea. 

{¶3} Appellant subsequently reached a plea agreement with plaintiffappellee, the State of Ohio. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, appellant 

entered a guilty plea to having weapons under disability. Correspondingly, the state 

dismissed the aggravated assault charge and the firearm specification. Additionally, 

the state agreed to make no recommendation as to appellant’s sentence. 

{¶4} The trial court later sentenced appellant to three years in prison. 

{¶5} This court granted appellant leave to file a delayed appeal, which he did 

on April 14, 2010. 

{¶6} Appellant raises a single assignment of error, which states: 

{¶7} “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ACTED 

CONTRARY TO LAW IN IMPOSING A TOTAL SENTENCE OF THREE YEARS 

WHERE THERE WAS NO PRESUMPTION OF INCARCERATION AND WHERE 

THE RECORD DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION OF IMPRISONMENT.” 

{¶8} Appellant argues that the court erred in sentencing him to prison when 

he was amenable to community control sanctions. 

{¶9} Our review of felony sentences is a limited, two-fold approach, as 

outlined by the plurality opinion in State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio4912, at ¶26. First, we must “examine the sentencing court's compliance with all 

applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence to determine whether the 

sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.” Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality 

opinion). In examining “all applicable rules and statutes,” the sentencing court must 
-2-

consider R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Id. at ¶¶13-14 (O'Connor, J., plurality 

opinion). If the sentence is clearly and convincingly not contrary to law, the court's 

exercise of discretion “in selecting a sentence within the permissible statutory range 

is subject to review for any abuse of discretion.” Id. at ¶17 (O'Connor, J., plurality 

opinion). Thus, we apply an abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the 

sentence satisfies R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Id. 

{¶10} Further, a sentencing court has “full discretion” to sentence an offender 

within the statutory range and is no longer required to make findings or give its 

reasons for imposing non-minimum, maximum, or consecutive sentences. State v. 

Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, at paragraph seven of the syllabus. 

{¶11} Appellant was convicted of a third-degree felony. The possible 

sentences for a third-degree felony are one, two, three, four, or five years. R.C. 

2929.14(A)(3). The trial court sentenced appellant to three years in prison. Thus, his 

sentence is clearly within the applicable statutory range. 

{¶12} Additionally, the trial court stated both at the sentencing hearing and in 

its judgment entry of sentence that it considered the principles and purposes of 

sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors 

under R.C. 2929.12. (Sentencing Tr. 7; Feb. 4, 2010 judgment entry). The trial 

court's simple statement that it considered the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 

2929.12 is sufficient to show compliance with its duty to consider those factors. State 

v. Watson, 7th Dist. No. 09-MA-62, 2011-Ohio-1178, at ¶8; State v. Barnette, 7th 

Dist. No. 06-MA-135, 2007-Ohio-7209, at ¶25. 

{¶13} Given the above considerations, appellant’s sentence is not contrary to 

law. 

{¶14} Next, we must move on to consider whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in sentencing appellant to three years of incarceration. 

{¶15} Appellant first contends that his sentence violates R.C. 2929.13(A), 

which provides in part: “The sentence shall not impose an unnecessary burden on 

state or local government resources.” In support, he points to the circumstances 
-3-

surrounding his crime. He states that he got into an argument with his father and his 

father fired a shot at him. Appellant states that he then returned a shot at his father. 

He also states that neither he nor his father suffered any life-threatening injuries. 

Appellant contends that his sentence places a burden on state resources that 

outweighs any benefit the people of Ohio would gain from his incarceration. This is 

so, he argues, because the chances of him repeating this offense are “practically 

non-existent” since his father passed away from unrelated causes. 

{¶16} While appellant cannot get into another gunfight with his father, this 

does not mean that he may not engage in such violent conduct with others. 

Furthermore, “‘[j]ust what constitutes a “burden” on state resources is undefined by 

the statute, but the plain language suggests that the costs, both economic and 

societal, should not outweigh the benefit that the people of the state derive from an 

offender's incarceration.’” State v. Goins, 7th Dist. No. 06-MA-131, 2008-Ohio-1170, 

at ¶35, quoting State v. Vlahopoulos, 154 Ohio App.3d 450, 2003-Ohio-5070, at ¶5. 

It would seem society would benefit from the incarceration of a person who, while 

already under a disability preventing him from possessing firearms, fired a gun at 

someone. 

{¶17} Appellant also argues that the court erred in sentencing him to five 

years in prison instead of following the prosecutor’s recommendation of four years. 

{¶18} Appellant is confused in making this argument. The trial court 

sentenced him to three years in prison, not five. And the state did not recommend a 

four-year sentence but instead stood silent at sentencing as promised in the plea 

agreement. 

{¶19} Appellant finally asserts that since his arrest, he moved out of the 

community in order to shield himself from negative influences, has cooperated with 

law enforcement in an unrelated prosecution, and has shown remorse. Additionally, 

appellant states that there was no record of him having being convicted of a prior 

felony nor was there any evidence that he was likely to commit future crimes. 

{¶20} As reflected in count one of the indictment to which appellant pleaded 
-4-

guilty, appellant does have a prior juvenile adjudication for possession of drugs. One 

of the elements of having weapons under disability is that the offender “is under 

indictment for or has been convicted of any offense involving the illegal possession, 

use, sale, administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse or has been 

adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an offense that, if committed by 

an adult, would have been an offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale, 

administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse.” R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). 

Thus, this case presents, at a minimum, appellant’s second run-in with the law. 

{¶21} Additionally, although the state dismissed the aggravated assault 

charge and firearm specification, the court was still free to consider these matters in 

sentencing appellant. A sentencing court is free to consider charges that were 

dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement. State v. Johnson, 7th Dist. No. 10-MA-32, 

2010-Ohio-6387, at ¶26. 

{¶22} Given the above factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused 

its discretion in sentencing appellant to three years in prison. 

{¶23} Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶24} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby 

affirmed. 

Vukovich, J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, J., concurs.