:ITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

United States of America 

United States Coast Guard 

Docket No. 01-0375 

CG Activity No. 739022 

vs 

MERCHANT MARINER'S DOCUMENT 

NO. 608-01-3328 

ISSUED TO: 

RANDY PASQUARELLA 

Respondent 

APPEARANCES: 

LT Benjamin Benson, IO 

PO Rachel Lynn, IO 

For the Coast Guard 

Randy Pasquarella, Prose 

For the Respondent 

BEFORE: Hon. Parlen L. McKenna 

Administrative Law Judge 

DECISION AND ORDER 

-·'! 

'I 

This suspension and revocation proceeding was instituted by the United States Coast 

Guard in the discharge of its duty to promote the safety of life and property at sea. It was 

brought pursuant to the legal authority contained in 46 U.S.C. § 7701-7705 and was conducted in 

accordance with the procedural requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 551-559, Part 5 of Title 46 and Part 

20 Title 33 of the Code ofFederal Regulations (C.P.R.). 

I: I ' ., '-· ... / 

' \ j 

The hearing in this matter commenced on Monday, July 30, 2001, in San Diego, CA. LT 

Benjamin Benson and PO Rachel Lynn, USCG duly authorized Investigating Officers of Marine 

Safety Office, San Diego, CA, appeared for and represented the Coast Guard. Respondent 

appeared personally and elected to represent himself. A record of the hearing was made by Kusar 

& Harris, a certified court-reporting firm. A list ofthe exhibits entered into evidence are set forth 

in the Attachment A. 
DISCUSSION 

On June 1, 2001, the Coast Guard filed a Complaint pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 7704 and 33 

C.F.R Subpart G charging the Respondent with Use of or Addiction to the Use of Dangerous 

Drugs as follows (See Government Exhibit No. 1): 

Factual Allegation: Use of or addiction to the Use of Dangerous Drugs: 

The Coast Guard alleges that: 

1) That on 28 February 2001, the Respondent took a Pre-employment test; 

2) A urine specimen was collected by J.T. Plander of"Quest Diagnostics, Inc."; 

3) The Respondent signed a Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control Form; 

4) The urine specimen was collected and analyzed by Greystone Health Sciences using 

procedures approved by the Department of Transportation; 

5) That specimen subsequently tested positive for Marijuana Metabolite. 

The Respondent has entered a plea of "admit" to the above charge and allegations in his 

filed Answer. (See also July 30, 2001 TR at pg 6). However, he asked for a hearing in order to 

plead for leniency. The Respondent further stated that he was drinking at the time and used bad 

judgment. Finally, he states that this was his first time using marijuana and that he has no history 

of drugs in his life (See Government Exhibit No.2). 46 C.P.R. § 5.59(b) provides, in pertinent 

part, that in Misconduct cases involving marijuana, "the administrative law judge may enter an 

order less than revocation when satisfied that the use, possession, or association, was the result of 

experimentation .... " This case squarely falls within the ambit of this regulation. However, the 

Respondent was not charged with the lesser offense of Misconduct under 46 USC§ 7703. He 

was charged with the more serious offense of use of dangerous drugs under 46 USC§ 7704 

which carries only one sanction -- Revocation absent a showing of "cure". The record does not 

reflect why the Coast Guar decided to charge the Respondent with the more serious offense. 

Indeed, over the last twelve years, I have seen very few, if any, one-time marijuana users charged 

with Misconduct-- only use of dangerous drugs. If it is the Coast Guard's policy not to utilize 

the lesser charge in appropriate cases, it might want to delete§ 5.59(b). Administrative law 

judges do not set policy and rightfully so. However, the Coast Guard might want to look at its 

approach to this issue to determine if the judges should be allowed the discretion of ordering less 

than revocation in rare cases such as this. 

The finding of facts and conclusions of law which follow are prepared upon my analysis of 

the entire record, and applicable regulations, statutes, and case law. Each exhibit entered, 

although perhaps not specifically mentioned in this decision, has been carefully reviewed and 

given thoughtful consideration. 

FINDINGS OF FACT 

1. Randy Pasquarella, the Respondent herein, was at all times the holder of Merchant Mariner's 

Document No. 608-01-3328. Respondent's document issued at Seattle, Washington and expires 

on October 30, 2005, authorizes him to serve as: Able bodied-Spec, wiper, Steward's 

Department (Food handler), Tankerman-Assistant (DL) (See Government Exhibit No.7). 

2 
2. Timely and proper notice w ;iven to the Respondent of the date, tir md place of hearing 

(See Government Exhibit No.6) (marked and admitted herein). 

3. Respondent was fully advised of his right to counsel and stated on the record that he wished to 

proceed prose (See July 30, 2001 TR at pg 4). 

4. The Respondent filed an answer of "admit" to Use of or Addiction to the Use of Dangerous 

Drugs and the supporting allegations pursuant to 33 C.F.R.§ 20.308. Respondent had been fully 

informed as to the consequences of such a plea. Respondent entered his answer of "admit" 

voluntarily, intelligently, knowingly and was at the time fully aware of the possible 

consequences of such an answer. 

5. The Respondent re-affirmed his answer of"admit" in open hearing. Such an answer operates 

as an admission of all matters of fact as charged and averred and constituted a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses, and obviates the requirement for establishing a prima facie 

case.(46 C.F.R. 5.527 (c); Appeal Decision No. 2363-Arnold; Appeal Decision No. 2376-Frank; 

Appeal Decision No. 2458-German and Appeal Decision No. 2480-Lett). 

6. The Respondent's prior disciplinary record, maintained by the U.S. Coast Guard, indicates a 

negative prior record. This exhibit was received post-hearing and admitted herein (See 

Government Exhibit No. 8). 

7. The acts and conduct of Respondent are within the suspension and revocation jurisdiction 

provided by Title 46 USC § 7704, 46 C.F .R. Part 5 and Title 33 C.F .R. Part 20. 

8. The Findings of Fact recited at the hearing and the rational discussed are specifically 

incorporated herein. 

9. 46 USC§ 7704 (c) provides that if a holder has been shown to be a user of a dangerous drug, 

his merchant mariner document shall be revoked absent satisfactory proof of "cure". The 

administrative law judge has no discretion in cases brought under 46 USC§ 7704 (c) to grant any 

respondent leniency. 

10. 46 C.F.R. § 5.521(b) provides that when a hearing is continued or delayed, the administrative 

law judge returns the document to the Respondent "unless a prima facie case has been 

established that the respondent committed an act or offense which shows that the respondent's 

service on a vessel would constitute a definite danger to public health, interest or safety at sea". 

11. The burden of proof for such a showing is on the Coast Guard. 

12. By the submission of reliable and probative evidence, the Coast Guard met that burden. 

Indeed, when the Coast Guard established a prima facie case that the Respondent was a user of 

dangerous drugs (marijuana), it concurrently made a prima facie case that the Respondent 

"committed an act or offense which shows that [his] service on a vessel would constitute a 

definite danger to public health, interest or safety at sea" under 46 C.F.R. § 5.521(b). 

13. Upon the establishment of a prima facie showing that the Respondent's "service on a vessel 

would constitute a definite danger to public health, interest or safety at sea", the burden of going 

forward shifts to the Respondent to rebut the Coast Guard's prima facie case (See Decision and 

3 
Order (Clay), Docket No. 11J ~7-PLM-92, dated March 18, 1992, paf ';Affirmed by Review 

No. 18, dated March 30, 1992). 

14. By the submission of Respondent's Exhibits A through Q, the Respondent rebutted the Coast 

Guard's prima facie showing that he should not get his merchant mariner document back pending 

completion of the "cure" process. The Coast Guard did not proffer any surrebuttal. Thus, 

pursuant to 46 C.P.R.§ 5.521(b), the Coast Guard has failed to demonstrate that the Respondent's 

return "service on a vessel would constitute a definite danger to public health, interest, or safety 

at sea and his document is required by that regulation to be returned pending completion of the 

"cure" process. 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

1. The Respondent and the subject matter of the hearing are within the jurisdiction vested in the 

United States Coast Guard by 46 § USC 7704. 

2. The allegations supported by the filing of the Complaint for Use of or Addiction to the Use of 

Dangerous Drugs (marijuana metabolite) is proved by Respondent's answer of "admit" filed 

herein and entered at the hearing. 

3. The only available sanction for a Charge of Use of or Addiction to the Use of Dangerous 

Drugs (marijuana metabolite) is REVOCATION absent "cure" under Appeal Decision No. 2536 

Sweeney. 

4. The Respondent met his burden of proof under Sweeney that he had enrolled in a drug 

rehabilitation program allowing a Stay Order pending proof of "cure". 

DISCUSSION 

The Respondent was charged in this case with "Use of or Addiction to the Use of 

Dangerous Drugs" which is defined for the purposes of these remedial suspension and revocation 

proceedings in 46 USC§ 7704. The supporting allegation alleges that on or about February 28, 

2001, the Respondent used a dangerous drug, to-wit, Marijuana (metabolite). The Respondent 

having plead "admit" resulted in a finding of charge proved. 

46 USC § 7704 (c) provides: If it is shown that a holder has been a user of, or 

addicted to, a dangerous drug, the license, certificate of registry, or merchant 

mariner's document shall be revoked unless the holder provides satisfactory 

proof that the holder is cured. 

46 USC§ 7704 (a) defined "dangerous drug" to include marijuana (as defined in section 

102 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 USC§ 802) 

(Present version at 46 USC§ 2101(8a)). In drug use cases, the only authorized sanction is 

revocation unless the Respondent successfully demonstrates "cure". 46 USC§ 7704(c); 46 

C.P.R.§ 5.59; Appeal Decision No. 2476 (BLAKE) affd sub nom Commandant v. Blake, NTSB 

Order EM-156 (1989); and 2518 (RENNARD). The burden of establishing "cure" is on 

Respondent. Appeal Decision 2526 (WILCOX). 

4 
In order to prove "cure' tder 46 USC § 7704( c), the Responder mst (1) successfully 

complete a bonafide drug abuse rehabilitation program and (2) demonstrate a complete nonassociation with drugs for a minimum period of one year following successful completion of the 

rehabilitation program (See Appeal Decision 2546 (Sweeney). These requirements include: 

(1) Demonstrates successful completion of a bona fide drug abuse rehabilitation program 

designed to eliminate physical and psychological dependence; 

(2) Demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the Administrative Law Judge, that the referenced 

program is certified by a governmental agency, or is accepted by an independent 

professional association; 

(3) Demonstrates complete non-association with drugs for a minimum period of one (1) 

year following successful completion of the above program; including the submission of 

the results of unannounced drug test for twelve (12) months following completion of the 

rehabilitation program;' and attendance at a minimum of one (1) AA/NA meeting per 

week for fifty-two (52) consecutive weeks; and 

( 4) Provide written consent by a Medical Review Officer (MRO), meeting the 

qualifications of 49 C.P.R. § 40.33, that the Respondent is a reasonably safe risk to be 

allowed to return to maritime employment in accordance with 46 C.P.R. § 16.370(d). 

Pursuant to Sweeney, a Respondent must have commenced the "cure" process prior to the 

hearing date in order to obtain a judicial stay of his revocation. Mr. Pasquarella entered an 

approved rehabilitation program on June 22, 2001 (See Respondent's Exhibit A?. Thus, the 

Respondent has fully complied with the legal requirements to obtain a stay of the Revocation 

Order for approximately twelve (12) months from July 20, 2001 for him to complete the "cure" 

process. The Coast Guard did not oppose a continuance in this case and did not dispute the fact 

that the Respondent had met his legal burden concerning the grant of a continuance to 

demonstrate "cure" (See July 30, 2001 TR at pg. 9). 

Separate and apart from the issue of"cure", the Respondent has requested leniency and 

raised the question of whether he can have his document returned to him prior to completing the 

one (1) year non-association with drugs. 46 C.P.R.§ 5.521(b) provides that when a hearing is 

continued or delayed, the judge shall return the document unless a prima facie case has been 

established that the individual would pose a definite danger to public health, interest or safety at 

sea. 

The Coast Guard proffered documentary and witness testimony sufficient to establish a 

prima facie case that the Respondent is a user of dangerous drugs. That showing was unrebutted 

and the charge was found proven. By such evidence, the Coast Guard also established a prima' 

facie case that the Respondent would pose a definite danger to public health, interest and safety 

at sea. Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the Respondent asked if he could get his 

1 The Respondent has agreed to furnish the Coast Guard with specific evidence of cure. The Coast Guard will be 

required to examine such evidence and indicate to the Judge by written pleading whether or not the Respondent is 

"cured" within the meaning of 46 U.S.C. § 7704(c) and whether or not he should get his Merchant Mariner's 

Document back. 

2 Importantly, this Respondent could have attended a two week approved program and started the clock running 15 

days earlier. Instead, he traveled to Valley Lee, Md. and enrolled in the Seafarers Addiction Rehabilitation Center. 

5 
document back in less than tv 'e months. Since he was not represente y counsel, I informed 

him that it was possible but omy if he produced evidence under 46 C.P.k. § 5.521(b) to rebut any 

showing that the Coast Guard might make that he should not get his document back pending the 

"cure" process after six (6) months. The Respondent indicated that he wanted the opportunity to 

present such evidence and I ordered the case re-opened. 46 C.P.R.§ 5.521(b) places the burden 

of proof that the Respondent not get his document back pending "cure" on the Coast Guard. This 

regulation does not make a prima facie showing by the Coast Guard conclusive nor does it 

establish a irrebuttable presumption. Thus, the Respondent has the legal right to present evidence 

in an attempt to rebut the Coast Guard's prima facie case. Moreover, this regulation is silent as to 

when the Respondent must submit his/her rebuttal of the Coast Guard's prima facie showing 

concerning the return of the merchant mariner papers. Using a rule of reasonableness, that 

showing would necessarily not occur until sufficient time had passed for the Respondent to show 

that he is no longer a definite danger and his papers should be returned pending "cure". A stay 

has already been granted in order for the Respondent to complete the "cure" process. Thus, 

absent a rational explanation, the question arises as to whether it would be an abuse of discretion 

not to allow the Respondent an opportunity to re-open the hearing so he can demonstrate that he 

is not a danger (See Khalaj v. Cole, 46 P.3d, 828, 832 (8111 Cir. 1995)). 

Importantly, in the case of marijuana use, that showing might occur as soon as he 

completes his initial rehabilitation program and has passed a minimum number of monthly 

random drug tests to insure that he no longer is using drugs. At that point, a respondent is eligible 

to be evaluated by an MRO under 46 C.P.R. § 16.370(d). In the case of other drugs such as 

cocaine or heroin, the full year might be required in order to protect the public. Indeed, marijuana 

metabolite stays in ones system for approximately twenty-one (21) days (See January 30, 2002 

TR at pg 54). Thus, if the judge imposes monthly random drug testing for one (1) year beyond 

the six (6) month period after completion of his initial rehabilitation program (no test being more 

than thirty (30) days apart), the Respondent could not use marijuana without getting caught. In 

other words, he is definitely not a danger given the fact that he has complied with 46 C.P.R. § 

16.370(d) and has obtained a letter from a Medical Review Office that he is drug-free and the 

risk of subsequent use of dangerous drugs is sufficiently low to justify his return to work. 

Conversely, cocaine only stays in one's system for approximately three (3) days. Thus, any 

rebuttal of the Coast Guard's prima facie case would appear to be very difficult. The margin of 

error in catching a mariner using this drug increases exponentially3

• This is not to say that a given 

respondent could not rebut the Coast Guard's prima facie showing, it only points out that such a 

showing is much more difficult and must be carefully weighed by the administrative law judge 

under the law as it now stands.4 

At the July 30, 2001 hearing, I asked what the Coast Guard's position was concerning the 

Respondent getting his document back after six (6) months under 46 C.P.R. § 5.52l(b) if he 

could show that he was not a definite danger to public health, interest or safety at sea. The Senior 

Investigating Officer replied as follows: 

3 Ironically, the Coast Guard's current policy under Sweeney is to require random dtug tests once every 60 days for 

all drug uses including Cocaine. Sixty days is too great of a spread for the short interval that a mariner would test 

positive. The public interest would seem to warrant a significantly great frequency. 4 Importantly, if the Coast Guard determines as a matter of policy that the danger is too great for users of illegal 

dtugs to have their papers returned in less than twelve months, it may so find as long as it sets forth a reasoned and 

non-arbitrary rationale in accordance with the requirements set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (5 USC§ 

554 ~.~). 

6 
Lieutenant Benson: Weu, your Honor, the matter before the court 1s about trust 

and how to re-establish trust, in that he is not using drugs. And the Commandant's 

decision on appeals establish a minimum of a one-year period of time that a 

person who has failed a drug test show that they are free of drugs to do that; so the 

Coast Guard's only position is that that is the only standard that he can be held to. 

(See July 30, 2001 TR at page 22). 

I disagree. The issue is not one of do we trust this Respondent to stay off of drugs. It is 

neither the Investigating Officer nor the judge's role to become involved in such an analysis. 46 

CFR § 16.370(d) places such decisions where they belong-- in the hands of the Medical Review 

Officer. If the medical doctor finds that the Respondent is a low risk of return to drug use, that 

medical opinion should be determinative absent rebuttal evidence to the contrary.5 

The re-opening date was set for January 30, 2002. At that time, the Respondent proffered 

his rebuttal to the Coast Guard's prima facie showing under 46 C.F.R. § 5.521(b).6 Specifically, 

the Respondent entered into and successfully completed a Continuing Care Agreement with the 

rehabilitation center (See Respondent's Exhibits No. Band M). He also proffered exhibits 

demonstrating that he has no prior drug or alcohol record (See Respondent's Exhibits No. C, D, 

E, G and H). The Respondent introduced negative drug test results and attendance at AA/NA 

meetings (See Respondent's Exhibits No. F, K, L, 0, P and Q). The Respondent introduced 

letters of recommendation (See Respondent's Exhibits I and J). Finally, the Respondent 

produced a letter from Greystone Health Sciences Corporation (the Medical Review Officer) 

finding that he is a reasonable safe risk to be allowed to return to maritime employment in 

accordance with 46 C.F.R. § 16.370(d) (See Respondent's Exhibit No. N). 

The seminal case concerning this issue was the United States Coast Guard v. David D. 

Clay (Merchant Mariner Document No. 2569-27-3733, Docket No. 11-0007-PLM-92, issued 

March 18, 1992). That case concerned the same factual circumstance as the case at bar. In order 

to explain the United States policy concerning illegal drug use by merchant mariners, the 

following historical reference was recited: 

In promulgating its regulations in 49 C.F .R. Part 40, the Coast Guard stated: 

This final rule is logical extension of existing regulations to ensure a drug-free 

working environment in the maritime community. The regulations provide for 

positive and aggressive action to identify users of dangerous drugs before they are 

involved in incidents which bring them to the attention of the Coast Guard. The 

regulations are intended to ensure that uses of dangerous drugs are not issued 

licenses, certificates of registry, or merchant mariner's documents, and are not 

accepted for employment on vessels engaged in commercial operations. Drug 

users and abusers will either be deterred from continued drug use or will be faced 

with sufficient probability of being identified in the workplace and precluded 

from employment in the industry when such use is detected through chemical 

testing. 

5 Coast Guard Investigating Officers have recommended the early return of licenses/documents in other cases cited 

herein. It is important that a uniform policy be developed. 

6 The Respondent had previously entered an exhibit showing his enrollment and completion of an approved drug 

rehabilitation program (See Respondent Exhibit No. A). 

7 
Federal Register, vol. 5 )age 47065, dated November 21, 1988. 

In Transportation Institute vs. U. S. Coast Guard, 727 F. Supp. 648, 654 (D.D.C. 

1989), the Court stated: 

The Government's interests can be summarized in one word: safety. Incorporated 

into this safety interest are the interests of maintaining a drug-free work-place, 

deterring employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks from using controlled 

substances, and ensuring that employees will be prepared to respond quickly and 

effectively in an emergency situation aboard a commercial vessel. These safety 

interests for the maritime industry are indistinguishable from those safety interests 

identified in Skinner for the railroad industry, which the Supreme Court found to 

be compelling. In each of the categories of testing analyzed by the Court, the 

Government's compelling interest in safety will be weighed against the 

individual's privacy interest to determine if the warrantless searches mandated by 

the regulations are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 

Thus, "ZERO TOLERANCE" is not just an empty slogan espoused by the. 

President of the United States, the Congress and the Coast Guard. It is the policy 

of our government to insure the health and welfare of its citizens and to protect 

the public interest. (See Clay Decision and Order at pages 5-6). 

Just like this case, the Respondent asked if he could have his document returned 

to him prior to completing the one (1) year demonstration of non-association with drugs 

as set forth in Sweeney. After fully considering the issue, I found that he could not until 

he had satisfied the requirements of 46 C.P.R.§ 16.370(d) and 46 C.P.R. Part 5. 46 

C.P.R. § 16.370(d) requires that before an individual may return to work, the Medical 

Review Officer must find that the individual is drug-free and the risk of subsequent use of 

dangerous is sufficiently low to justify his return to work. 46 C.P.R. Part 5 concerning 

Marine Investigation Regulations - Personnel Action - the hearing before an 

administrative law judge dealing with 46 USC § 7704 Suspension and Revocation 

proceedings. In such cases, I specifically found that 46 C.P.R.§ 5.52l(b) provides "that 

when a hearing is continued or delayed, for example pending a determination of "cure" 

(emphasis added), the judge shall return the document unless a prima facie case has been 

established that the individual would pose a danger to public health, interest or safety at 

sea" (Decision and Order at page 6). 

In the Clay case, the Respondent did not have a drug free letter from MRO to 

return to work and he had not rebutted the Coast Guard's prima facie showing that he was 

a definite danger to public health, interest or safety at sea. Thus, having failed to satisfy 

both conditions precedent, an Order issued denying Mr. Clay's request for the return of 

his document pending completion of the "cure" process. Because of the importance of 

this issue, the Vice Commandant called up for review my Decision and Order of March 

18, 1992 pursuant to 46 C.P.R. § 5.801. After fully considering the issue, the Vice 

Commandant's Decision on Review No. 18 was issued on March 30, 1992 AFFIRMING 

my Decision and Order, in Toto. The Vice Commandant stated: 

I specifically concur with the Administrative Law Judge's ruling and rationale 

(emphasis added) in refusing to return the document. Upon review, I conclude 

that, where a prima facie case of drug use is established by the Investigating 

8 
Officer to the satisfac1 of the Administrative Law Judge, suf' · ent cause exists 

to withhold return of the license and/or document pursuant to the provisions of 46 

C.P.R.§ 5.521(b). 

Accordingly, the legal framework concerning the "cure" process under Sweeney 

and whether a mariner can work under this license/document has been clearly defined by 

the Commandant since March 30, 1992. While there are only a handful of cases where a 

mariner's papers were returned in less than the time required to complete "cure", the 

Investigating Officer and the presiding judge used their best judgment to achieve the best 

result. @.g., See Docket Nos 00-0214 (Scrivens); 00-0833 (Sunquist); 07-0006-MEH-96 

(Miller); 07-0020-MEH-96 (Bills); 07-0067-MEH-96 (Vickery, Jr.); and 07-0007-MEH96 (Davis, Jr.). 

ORDERED 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Merchant Mariner's Document No.608-01-3328 issued to 

Randy Pasquarella, the Respondent herein, and all other valid licenses and/or documents issued 

to him by the United States Coast Guard, or any predecessor authority, now held by him, are 

hereby REVOKED effective July 30, 2001 (the date of the hearing where the Charge was found 

proven). However, in consideration of the remedial nature of these proceedings, this Order of 

Revocation is STAYED and shall not be effective under the following conditions and in 

accordance with Sweeney, he will: 

( 1) Demonstrate successful completion of a bona fide drug abuse rehabilitation program 

designed to eliminate physical and psychological dependence; and to provide a copy of 

the certificate of completion to the U.S. Coast Guard immediately upon graduation. 

Provide proof that the referenced program is certified by a governmental agency, or is 

accepted by an independent professional association; 7 

(2) Demonstrate, complete non-association with drugs for a minimum period of one ( 1) 

year following successful completion of the above program; by completing and 

submitting results for the following on a monthly basis to the U.S. Coast Guard 

a) During the one (1) year period following the return of the Respondent's 

document pursuant to the 46 C.P.R. § 5.521(b) hearing, submit to at least 

twelve (12) random unannounced drug tests (with no two tests more than 

thirty days apart); 

b) Demonstrate that the random tests were scheduled by an independent third 

party, not the Respondent; that notification of each required test was made by 

a third party to the Respondent and that the Respondent provided a urinalysis 

specimen within twelve (12) hours of notification; 

c) Demonstrate that each random drug test was done at an approved Collection 

site and Laboratory facility, using proper chain of custody and testing cutoff 

levels as required by 49 C.P.R. Part 40. 

(3) Attend and provide written record of attendance at a minimum of one ( 1) AA/NA 

meeting per week for twenty-six (26) consecutive weeks; and 

7 This requirement has already been meet. 

9 
(4) Provide written con t by a Medical Review Officer (MRO) ,eeting the 

qualifications of 49 C.F.K § 40.33 that the Respondent is a reasonably safe risk to be 

allowed to return to maritime employment in accordance with 46 C.F.R. § 16.370(d).8 

ORDERED, that the Coast Guard has made a prima facie case pursuant to 46 C.F.R. § 

5.521(b) that the Respondent is a definite danger to public health, interest or safety at sea. The 

Respondent was Ordered at the July 30, 2001, hearing to immediately surrender his document to 

the Coast Guard; 

ORDERED, that at the January 30, 2002, reopening, the Respondent rebutted the Coast 

Guard's prima facie case that he was a definite danger to public health, interest and safety at sea. 

Accordingly, the Coast Guard was ORDERED to immediately return the Respondent's 

document to him; 

ORDERED, that if the Respondent successfully establishes "cure" under the 

requirements established in SWEENEY, a finding of"cure" will be entered and an Order of 

Modification containing the following sanction, will take effect: 

ORDERED, that Merchant Mariner's Document No. 608-01-3328 and all other valid 

licenses and certificates issued to RANDY PASQUARELLA, by the United States Coast Guard 

are hereby SUSPENDED for a period of Six (6) months following Respondent's successful 

completion of the initial rehabilitation program set forth above. In addition, the Respondent shall 

be on probation for the twelve (12) months following the date his merchant mariner's document 

was returned (January 30, 2002). Any violation of the requirements set forth herein may result in 

the REVOCATION of the Respondent's document. 

Done and dated this 191

h day of February 2002 

Alameda, California 

Copy: 

MSO San Diego 

CGD11(m); 

ALJ Docket Center 

8 This requirement has already been meet. 

10 

S. 

Hon. PARLEN L. MCKENNA 

Administrative Law Judge