J-S47041-15

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

SHANNON DEGEORGE,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2054 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 2, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-38-CR-0000655-2013 

BEFORE: ALLEN, OTT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2015

Shannon DeGeorge (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his conviction for robbery. We affirm.

On February 13, 2013, Appellant was charged with the February 11, 

2013 robbery of the Metro Bank in Lebanon, Pennsylvania. This robbery was 

believed to be connected to two earlier robberies, perpetrated by the same 

individual, that occurred in Berks County on February 6 and 8, 2013. 

Appellant pled guilty to the Berks County cases on September 18, 2013, and 

was sentenced to three and a half to seven years’ incarceration. 

Trial in the instant case was scheduled for May 5, 2014. On April 29, 

2014, the Commonwealth filed notice pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b), indicating 

its intent to introduce evidence of certain prior bad acts during its case-inchief. Prior to trial, the court heard argument with respect to the 
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Commonwealth’s motion. At that time, the trial court granted the 

Commonwealth’s motion in part, ruling that the factual details of the Berks 

County robberies were admissible, but indicating that the jury would not be 

told of Appellant’s guilty pleas to those offenses unless he opened the door 

to the issue during his testimony. N.T., 5/5/2014, at 1-6.

On May 8, 2014, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the 

aforementioned offense. On July 2, 2014, Appellant was sentenced to a 

term of three to ten years’ incarceration. The sentence was directed to run 

consecutively to all other sentences Appellant was then serving. Appellant 

filed timely post-sentence motions, which were denied on October 30, 2014. 

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with 

the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises four issues for our review.

I. Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence at 

trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the 

person who robbed the Metro Bank on February 11, 2014?

II. Did the jury place too great a weight on the identification 

testimony of [Ms.] Aponte and [Ms.] Hartz that Appellant was 

the person [who] robbed the Metro Bank on February 11, 2014?

III. Did the [trial court] err in granting the Commonwealth’s 

404(b) Motion to introduce testimony at trial that Appellant was 

a suspect in two (2) different bank robberies on February 6, 

2014 and February 8, 2014 and the underlying facts of those 

robberies?

IV. Did the [sentencing court] commit a manifest abuse of 

discretion by sentencing Appellant in the aggravated range, and 
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running Appellant’s sentence consecutive to any other sentence 

Appellant was serving at the time?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (suggested answers omitted).

We begin by addressing Appellant’s argument that the evidence was 

insufficient to support his conviction for robbery under 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3701(a)(1)(vi). Our standard of review is as follows:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, 

part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Harden, 103 A.3d 107, 111 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations and quotations omitted).

The statute under which Appellant was convicted provides, in relevant 

part, that “[a] person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a 

theft, he ... takes or removes the money of a financial institution without the 

permission of the financial institution by making a demand of an employee 
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of the financial institution orally or in writing with the intent to deprive the 

financial institution thereof[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(vi). A “financial 

institution” is defined as a “bank, trust company, savings trust, credit union 

or similar institution.” Id. at (a)(3).

Appellant contends that his conviction should be reversed because

... the Commonwealth failed to present any physical evidence in 

the form of fingerprints, clothing, or money that [Appellant] 

committed the robbery, and of the four Commonwealth 

witnesses who testified at trial only two identified [Appellant], 

and those two witnesses acknowledged they only interacted with 

the robber for a short period of time and portions of the 

robber[‘]s facial features were not visible.

Appellant’s Brief at 12.

The Commonwealth presented the following evidence at trial. 

Kaitlin Aponte (hereinafter “Ms. Aponte”) was employed as 

a bank teller at the Metro Bank on East Cumberland on February 

11, 2013. On that date, a man was standing at the check writing 

station “for a little — for a while.” As soon as the man turned 

around and walked to the teller line, Ms. Aponte said “I can 

assist you here.” The man handed Ms. Aponte a deposit ticket, 

and she looked behind the ticket and it had a note on it telling 

her to give [him] all the money. The note stated, “No dye pack, 

tracking chips. All [$$], start with big bills on desk, nobody 

hurt.” She asked the man if he was serious, and “He told me, 

yes, just give me all your money.” Ms. Aponte gave him all of 

her strapped money, and asked him if that was all, to which he 

responded “yes.” The man left the bank, and ran off in the 

street. Ms. Aponte described the man’s voice as soft and deep 

toned. Ms. Aponte identified [Appellant] as the individual. It was 

ultimately determined that Ms. Aponte’s drawer was short 

$2,637.57. [The man Ms. Aponte observed on] the date of the 

robbery[] was wearing a dark sweatshirt and gloves. The man 

had a beanie right above his eyebrows. The man had a dark 

brown, full beard that went up a little bit on his cheeks, and he 

had a little bit of a mustache. After the robbery, a photo lineup 
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was shown to Ms. Aponte where she was able to select 

[Appellant] out of the lineup. She was not 100% sure, but she 

was “pretty sure” that he was the man. When she was finished, 

she did not tell anybody else in the bank who[m] she had 

selected. When asked if it was difficult to make out all the facial 

features of the person that committed the robbery, Ms. Aponte 

responded, “I remember his face. His face was out.” 

Amber Hevel (hereinafter “Ms. Hevel”) was also employed 

at the same branch on the same day. Ms. Hevel remembered the 

man wearing boots, jeans, a sweatshirt, gloves, and a beanie. 

The man went to the check writing station, then went up to Ms. 

Aponte. Ms. Hevel only remembered Ms. Aponte saying “all of 

it.” She then heard the man mumble “hurry.” Ms. Hevel never 

looked at the man’s face. Ms. Hevel thought the man was about 

6 foot tall and 200 pounds. The man appeared to be light 

skinned. Ms. Hevel also looked at the photo lineup, but she was 

not able to identify anyone. 

Erika Perez (hereinafter “Ms. Perez”) was employed at the 

same branch on the same date as a customer service 

representative. Ms. Perez saw a man come in, go to the check 

writing station, then go up to where the tellers were. The man 

appeared to be nervous and was looking over his shoulder. The 

man asked a co-worker what the date was. The man was 

wearing a dark hoodie with the hood up, and he also had dark 

pants. Ms. Perez did not recall if the man was wearing gloves. 

She thought he was 6 foot and 200 pounds. The man looked 

about 30. He was light skinned. Ms. Perez did not recall any 

facial hair. Ms. Perez could not identify anyone in the photo 

lineup. 

Lachan Hartz (hereinafter “Ms. Hartz”) is a teller who was 

working at the bank on February 11, 2013. Ms. Hartz was 

outside of the bank when the robbery took place. Prior to leaving 

the bank for lunch, Ms. Hartz noticed a male at the check 

cashing station that asked her what the date was. Ms. Hartz was 

provided the photo lineup and identified [Appellant]. At trial, Ms. 

Hartz identified [Appellant] as that individual. 

Christopher Mayer (hereinafter “Mr. Mayer”), a Criminal 

Investigator for the City of Reading Police Department, testified 

to two bank robberies that occurred on February 6, 2013 and 
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February 8, 2013 at the Citizens Bank in Reading. Photographs 

were obtained from the video surveillance from these robberies. 

Mr. Mayer testified that [Appellant] was the individual that was 

ultimately determined to be the individual in the surveillance 

video. 

Sergeant Johnathan Hess (hereinafter “Sergeant Hess”) 

was in charge of the investigation of the robbery on February 11, 

2013. A daily report is circulated throughout various law 

enforcement agencies in the state, and Sergeant Hess learned 

about the robberies in Reading in this report. Sergeant Hess 

contacted Mr. Mayer, and Mr. Mayer provided the name of 

[Appellant]. Based off this information, the photo lineup was 

compiled. The [women present during the Metro Bank robbery] 

were taken into a private room one at a time at the bank [to 

look] at the photo lineup. Sergeant Hess testified that only Ms. 

Aponte and Ms. Hartz identified [Appellant] when he showed 

them the photo lineup. The identification made by Ms. Hartz was 

“relatively quick and she identified him with a hundred percent 

certainty.’’ None of the [women] identified another individual 

other than [Appellant]. [Sergeant] Hess noticed when Ms. 

Aponte exited the conference room, Ms. Hartz entered the room, 

and they did not have any time to speak to each other. 

[Appellant] testified that he did not commit the robbery at 

the Metro Bank on February 11, 2013, but he was at home at his 

residence in Reading all day. [Appellant] also testified that he did 

not commit the robberies in Reading, and the only reason he 

pled guilty to [those] robberies was to receive a lower sentence 

pursuant to a plea deal. He testified, “... [I]t was an easy choice, 

not have to do anymore time and plead guilty, and/or fight it 

and risk getting two and a half to ten years extra.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/2014, at 1-4 (citations omitted).

When this evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we cannot agree that it is unreliable 

and speculative as claimed by Appellant. Two eyewitnesses who had the 

opportunity to observe the robber closely identified Appellant. Such 
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testimony, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to identify Appellant as the 

perpetrator. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276, 1283 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). Thus, we agree with the trial court that the evidence 

presented was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Appellant, “in the course of committing a theft, took money from Metro 

Bank without the bank’s permission by making a demand of Ms. Aponte, a 

bank employee, both orally and in writing with the intent to deprive the bank 

of the money.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/2014, at 7. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s first issue is without merit.

Appellant next challenges the weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief 

at 12-13.

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether 

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the 

trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence 

presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration 

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when 

reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons 

for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction 

that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of 

justice. 

However, the exercise of discretion by the trial court in 

granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence is not unfettered. The 

propriety of the exercise of discretion in such an instance may be 

assessed by the appellate process when it is apparent that there 

was an abuse of that discretion. 
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Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Appellant argues that the jury placed improper weight on the 

testimony of Ms. Hartz and Ms. Aponte, emphasizing the limited timeframe 

in which the women had to observe the robber and Ms. Aponte’s uncertainty 

during the photo lineup. Appellant’s Brief at 13. “When, [as here], the 

challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated on the credibility of ... 

testimony, our review of the trial court’s decision is extremely limited.” 

Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 282 (Pa. Super. 2009). Generally, 

unless the evidence is so unreliable or contradictory as to make any 

adjudication based thereon pure conjecture, these types of claims are 

meritless on appeal. Id.

The jury, sitting as the finder of fact in the present case, was free to 

evaluate and weigh all the testimony presented, especially related to the 

credibility of the witnesses. While Appellant offered a conflicting version of 

events from that testified to by the eyewitnesses at the bank, the jury found 

the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses with respect to the 

identification of Appellant to be credible. The jury is “free to believe all, 

part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the 

witnesses.” Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 835 A.2d 801, 809 (Pa. Super. 

2003). Moreover, the trial court did not find that verdict was so contrary to 

the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Trial Court Opinion, 
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10/30/2014, at 9. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion.

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred in granting the 

Commonwealth’s Rule 404(b) motion because the Commonwealth failed to 

provide reasonable notice prior to trial, as required by the Rule. Appellant’s 

Brief at 13-14.1 Appellant failed to preserve this issue by objecting to the 

alleged lack of notice at the pre-trial hearing. Moreover, Appellant failed to 

raise this issue in his 1925(b) statement. Accordingly this claim is waived. 

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues which were not raised before the trial 

court are waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal).

Appellant’s final claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. It is well-established that a criminal defendant does not have an 

absolute right to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence on 

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Bishop, 831 A.2d 656, 660 (Pa. Super. 

2003). Before we may reach the merits of a challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of sentencing, we must be satisfied that: (1) the appeal is timely 

filed; (2) the appellant has preserved his issues; and (3) the appellant has 

included in his brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) concise statement of the reasons 

relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects 

 

1 Appellant’s argument on this point is confined to the lack of reasonable 

notice. He does not challenge the propriety of the trial court’s ruling on the 

substance of the motion, accordingly we will not address that ruling on 

appeal.
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of sentence. Furthermore, the concise statement must raise a substantial 

question that the sentence is inappropriate under the sentencing code. See 

Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 295-96 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

The instant appeal was timely filed. Additionally, Appellant has 

preserved his claim in a timely filed post-sentence motion, and he has 

included in his brief a Rule 2119(f) statement. Accordingly, we must 

determine whether Appellant has raised a substantial question for our 

review.

“The determination of whether a substantial question exists must be 

determined on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Hartman, 908 

A.2d 316, 320 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “A substantial question 

exists where an appellant advances a colorable argument that the 

sentencing judge’s actions [were] either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms 

which underlie the sentencing process.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Koren, 646 A.2d 1205, 1208-1209 (Pa. Super. 1994)). 

Appellant contends that the sentencing court failed to place on the 

record sufficient reasons to warrant the imposition of an “aggravated range” 

sentence, and contends that the court committed an abuse of discretion by

imposing the instant sentence consecutive to any he was already serving. 

Appellant’s Brief at 9. “The imposition of consecutive, rather than 

concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most 
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extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly 

harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.” 

Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en 

banc) (citation omitted)(emphasis added). Further, this Court has held that 

claims that the sentencing court imposed a sentence outside the standard 

guidelines without stating adequate reasons on the record presents a 

substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 26 

(Pa. Super. 2007).

Instantly, contrary to Appellant’s argument, the sentence imposed falls 

at the bottom of the standard guideline range. Trial Court Opinion, 

10/30/2014, at 14-15. Moreover, given the trial court’s consideration of the 

serious nature of the crimes committed in this case, of Appellant’s prior 

record as a repeat offender, and of the pre-sentence investigation report2

prepared in this matter, we do not believe Appellant’s consecutive sentence 

appears, on its face, manifestly excessive. Accordingly, we find that 

Appellant has failed to raise a substantial question for our review, and we 

affirm his judgment of sentence.

 

2

“Where the sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence investigation 

report, we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant 

information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those 

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. 

Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quotes and citations 

omitted).
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/14/2015