Filed 10/13/22 P. v. Deuter CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRANDY JAMIE JORDAN 

DEUTER,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B311353

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA485309)

 

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge. Affirmed.

Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Peggy Z. Huang, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________
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INTRODUCTION

Brandy Jaime Jordan Deuter (Jordan) stole a plaque from a 

city councilman’s office and a phone from a nearby hair salon, 

where she also tried to steal a touchscreen tablet and credit card 

reader that allows businesses to process credit card payments.

The trial court convicted Jordan of second degree burglary for the 

incident at the councilman’s office and attempted second degree 

burglary for the incident at the salon. Jordan appeals, arguing 

substantial evidence did not support the finding she had the 

requisite intent to steal when she entered the two premises. She 

also argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for 

judgment of acquittal at the close of the People’s case and that 

the abstract of judgment erroneously states she was convicted of 

burglary, rather than attempted burglary, for the incident at the 

salon.

We conclude that substantial evidence supported the 

verdicts and that the trial court did not err in denying Jordan’s 

motion for judgment of acquittal. We also agree with Jordan and 

the People the abstract of judgment must be corrected to 

accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment. In all 

other respects, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Jordan Takes a Plaque from a Councilman’s Office, 

Tries To Take a Tablet and Credit Card Reader from 

a Hair Salon, and Ultimately Takes a Phone 

One morning in September 2019 Sean Starkey was working 

at a city councilman’s district office on Sunset Boulevard when he

heard someone in the office screaming. He went to the front of 
3

the office and saw Jordan pacing back and forth. He asked her if 

she needed any assistance; she responded incoherently. Jordan 

grabbed a plaque off the wall, took some voter registration forms, 

and started to leave the office. Starkey demanded that Jordan 

return the plaque; Jordan again responded incoherently. She 

walked out the door and up Sunset Boulevard. (Jordan testified

that she went to the office intending to speak to the councilman, 

but that she became anxious when told she had to leave and then 

took the voter registration forms. Jordan stated she did not 

remember taking the plaque.)

Jordan went to a hair salon across the street from the 

councilman’s office and spoke with an employee. Jordan 

appeared lost, but became offended when asked to leave. Jordan 

tried to take a tablet and a credit card reader from the salon, but 

could not because they were mounted to a desk. She grabbed a 

phone instead and left the salon. (Jordan testified she asked an

employee to borrow a phone or a tablet so she could contact her 

mother.) The owner of the salon estimated that the value of the 

phone was $20 and that the value of the tablet and credit card 

reader was $1,100. 

After she left the salon, a group of people chased her, and 

she began to run. Eventually, someone sprayed pepper spray in 

her eyes. Jordan returned the phone and said, “Here. Have the 

phone.” A police officer later arrested Jordan in a parking lot and 

retrieved the councilman’s plaque. When questioned by the 

police, Jordan said she took the plaque to make a “motherfucking 

point.” 
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B. The Trial Court Convicts Jordan of Second Degree 

Burglary and Attempted Second Degree Burglary

The People charged Jordan with (1) assault with a deadly 

weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)); (2) making a criminal 

threat (id., § 422, subd. (a)); (3) second degree burglary of the 

councilman’s office (id., § 459); and (4) second degree burglary of

the salon (ibid.). After a court trial, the court found Jordan not 

guilty on counts 1 and 2, guilty on count 3, and guilty of

attempted burglary as a lesser included offense of count 4. (See 

People v. Michaels (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 194, 196 [attempted 

burglary is a lesser included offense of burglary].)

On the burglary and attempted burglary convictions, the 

court found that Jordan intended to steal from the councilman’s 

office and the salon and that she had the intent to steal when she 

entered the two premises. The court stated that the two thefts

occurred “in the same temporal period” and that the temporal 

proximity of the two crimes was circumstantial evidence Jordan

had the intent to steal upon entering the councilman’s office. 

Regarding the salon incident, the court found Jordan had the 

requisite intent because upon entering the salon she

unsuccessfully tried to take the tablet and the credit card reader

and later “grabbed the mobile phone and departed the premises.” 

The court also found Jordan’s entering the salon “after taking the 

plaque from the councilman’s office” was circumstantial evidence 

she had the intent to steal when she entered the salon.

After Jordan asked the trial court not to sentence her to

probation, the court sentenced her to three years four months in 

county jail. Jordan filed a timely notice of appeal.
5

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Penal Code section 459 provides that a person who enters, 

among other things, a house, shop, or other building “with intent 

to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of 

burglary.” Burglary requires “not only that a defendant enter a 

structure, but that he do so with a particular objective in mind: 

larceny (or any other felony).” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 

13 Cal.5th 933, 939; see People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 

1077 [“Burglary requires an entry into a specified structure with 

the intent to commit theft or any felony.”].) Burglaries of 

structures other than inhabited dwelling houses and vessels, 

floating homes, and trailer coaches are second degree burglaries. 

(Pen. Code, § 460, subds. (a) & (b); Corona v. Superior Court 

(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 950, 955; see People v. Maestas (2006) 

143 Cal.App.4th 247, 252 [second degree burglary is “any 

burglary other than of a residence”].) A person is guilty of 

attempted burglary when he or she (1) has the specific intent to 

commit burglary and (2) commits a direct but ineffectual act 

toward its commission. (People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 

586, 605; see People v. Clark (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [an 

attempted crime requires “‘a specific intent to commit the crime, 

and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission’”].)

“Specific intent ‘“is rarely susceptible of direct proof and 

usually must be inferred from the facts and circumstances 

surrounding the offense.”’” (People v. Thompkins (2020) 

50 Cal.App.5th 365, 403.) This is true for burglary. (See 

People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 643 [“the intent required 

for . . . burglary is seldom established with direct evidence but 
6

instead is usually inferred from all the facts and circumstances 

surrounding the crime”]; People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 41 

[“Although the People must show that a defendant charged with 

burglary entered the premises with felonious intent, such intent 

must usually be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances 

disclosed by the evidence, rarely being directly provable.”].)

“When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Because the sufficiency of the 

evidence is ultimately a legal question, we must examine the 

record independently for substantial evidence—that is, evidence 

which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would 

support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Navarro

(2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302, internal quotation marks omitted.) 

“We must ‘view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

People’ and ‘presume in support of the judgment the existence of 

every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ 

[Citation.] We must also ‘accept logical inferences that the [trier 

of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’” 

(People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411.) We do not, however,

“reconsider the weight to be given any particular item of 

evidence” or ask whether the trier of fact’s “judgment was the 

most probable interpretation of the evidence, but simply whether 

it was a rational one.” (Navarro, at pp. 302, 307.) 
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B. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s 

Finding Jordan Intended To Steal When She Entered 

Both Premises

Jordan argues that she did not have the intent to commit 

burglary before or upon entering either premises and that it was 

her interactions with employees at the office and the salon that 

provoked her to take (or try to take) the items she stole (or tried

to steal).

1 Substantial circumstantial evidence, however, 

supported the trial court’s finding Jordan had the requisite intent 

for burglary of the councilman’s office and attempted burglary of 

the hair salon.

1. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s 

Finding Jordan Had the Intent To Commit 

Burglary at the Councilman’s Office

Jordan argues she entered the office to speak with the 

councilman, not to steal anything. Substantial evidence, 

however, supported the trial court’s contrary finding. When 

questioned by Starkey, Jordan never said she wanted to speak 

with the councilman or anyone else in the office. When Starkey 

asked her to return the plaque, she ignored him and left. And 

when police subsequently arrested Jordan, she said she took the 

plaque, not because she couldn’t speak with the councilman, but 

to make a statement. From this evidence the trial court could 

reasonably infer Jordan intended to commit theft when she went 

to the councilman’s office. (See People v. Matson, supra,

1 Although Jordan suggests her mental health may have 

precluded her from forming the intent to steal, the trial court 

excluded evidence of her mental health, and Jordan does not 

challenge that ruling.
8

13 Cal.3d at p. 41 [“When the evidence justifies a reasonable 

inference of felonious intent, the verdict may not be disturbed on 

appeal”]; People v. Mumin (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 36, fn. 4 [same]; 

People v. Nunley (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 225, 232 [“Where the 

facts and circumstances of a particular case and the conduct of 

the defendant reasonably indicate his purpose in entering the 

premises is to commit larceny or any felony, the conviction may 

not be disturbed on appeal”]; People v. Garcia (1963) 

214 Cal.App.2d 681, 683 [“Whether or not an accused had an 

intent to commit theft when he entered the building is for the 

trier of fact unless there is nothing from which it can be 

inferred”]. )

2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s 

Finding Jordan Had the Intent To Commit 

Burglary at the Salon

Jordan and the salon owner gave different accounts of the 

incident in the salon. Jordan claimed that, when she spoke with 

an employee of the salon, the employee allowed her to use the 

phone to call her mother and that she touched the tablet to check 

her email. The salon owner acknowledged that she saw Jordan 

speak with an employee, but stated that the salon employees 

asked Jordan to leave. The salon owner stated that, when they 

“asked her to leave,” Jordan became “offended and just reached to 

whatever was at the front desk [including the touchscreen tablet 

and credit card reader] and just grabbed the phone.”

The trial court found Jordan entered the salon with the 

intent to commit theft because she tried to take the tablet,

grabbed the phone, and left the premises. The trial court 

reasonably found Jordan had the requisite intent based on the 
9

evidence she tried to steal two items, successfully stole one, and 

fled the scene. (See People v. Smith (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 698,

704 [“‘an intent to commit theft at the time of entry may be 

inferred from flight from the premises’”]; People v. Moody (1976)

59 Cal.App.3d 357, 363 [same]; see also People v. Prince (2007) 

40 Cal.4th 1179, 1256 [“the similar crimes [the defendant] 

committed in other homes provided a basis for a jury to 

reasonably conclude that his intent was, at least in part, to 

commit theft”].)

Of course, Jordan’s version of what happened in the salon 

differed from the salon owner’s. The trial court, however, found 

that the People’s witnesses were credible and that Jordan was 

not. We defer to the version of the facts the trial court found 

true, which was that Jordan tried to take the touchscreen tablet 

and credit card reader, later took the phone without permission,

and fled the salon, all of which evidenced an intent to steal upon 

entry. (See People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890 

[a “‘reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a 

witness’s credibility’”]; In re M.S. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1177, 

1187 [“we defer to the [trial] court’s express and implied findings 

of fact that are supported by substantial evidence”].) 

Finally, although substantial evidence would have 

supported a finding Joran committed a burglary at the salon (see 

People v. Washington (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 568, 578-579 

[burglary “is complete . . . upon entry with requisite intent”]; 

People v. Escobar (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1436 [“burglary is 

complete once the perpetrator enters the premises with the 

requisite intent”]), the trial court found Jordan guilty of only 

attempted second degree burglary. Because substantial evidence 

supported a conviction for the completed crime, it also supported 
10

a conviction for the attempted crime. (See People v. Lowen (1895) 

109 Cal. 381, 383-384 [commission of a burglary implies an 

attempt to commit it, so that a conviction of attempted burglary 

must be upheld where there is substantial evidence of a 

completed burglary]; People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 

796 [defendant could not “complain that the jury chose to find 

him guilty of attempted grand theft” where there was substantial 

evidence of a completed grand theft]; see also People v. McConnell

(1927) 80 Cal.App. 789, 792 [“A defendant informed against for 

the crime of burglary may be convicted of an attempt to commit 

burglary in the second degree, where the evidence tends to 

sustain a verdict of burglary in the first degree.”].)2

C. The Abstract of Judgment Must Be Corrected To 

Accurately Reflect the Oral Pronouncement of 

Judgment

In announcing its verdict, the trial court stated: “As to 

count 4, burglary in the second degree, in reference to the hair 

salon, the court finds the defendant guilty of an attempt to 

commit a second degree burglary.” The abstract of judgment, 

however, states Jordan was convicted of second degree burglary 

2 Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Jordan’s motion

for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Penal Code 

section 1118.1. (See People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212-

1213 [“[i]n ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant 

to section 1118.1, a trial court applies the same standard an 

appellate court applies in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a conviction, that is, ‘“whether from the 

evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of 

each element of the offense charged”’”].)
11

of the hair salon. Jordan argues, the People concede, and we 

agree the trial court must correct the abstract of judgment to 

reflect a conviction for attempted burglary, rather than burglary, 

for the incident at the hair salon. (See People v. Leon (2020) 8 

Cal.5th 831, 855 [“Any discrepancy between the judgment as 

orally pronounced and as recorded in the clerk’s minutes or 

abstract of judgment is presumed to be the result of clerical 

error.”]; People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [an 

appellate court can order “correction of abstracts of judgment 

that [do] not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing 

courts”]; People v. Whalum (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1, 15 [“Where 

there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of 

judgment and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement 

controls.”].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to 

prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting Jordan was 

convicted of attempted second degree burglary on count 4 and 

send it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J. FEUER, J.