SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3228-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

ANDRE HARRIS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Argued April 16, 2024 – Decided May 20, 2024 

Before Judges Mayer, Whipple and Augostini. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Monmouth County, Indictment Nos. 16-06-

0997 and 16-12-1998. 

Colin Sheehan argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer 

Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Taylor L. 

Napolitano, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of 

counsel and on the brief). 

Melinda A. Harrigan argued the cause for respondent

(Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, 

attorney; Melinda A. Harrigan, Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3228-21

PER CURIAM 

 Defendant Andre Harris appeals from his June 10, 2022 judgment of 

conviction for attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, weapons 

offenses, and desecration of human remains after entering a guilty plea. 

Defendant focuses his arguments on the April 16, 2019 order denying his motion 

to suppress statements he made to the police. He also appeals from the sentence 

imposed. We affirm the conviction but remand for resentencing. 

 We incorporate the facts from our opinion in a companion case, State v. 

Sweeney, No. A-3186-21 (App. Div. May 20, 2024), issued the same date as this 

opinion. In Sweeney, a jury convicted defendant Jennifer Sweeney of murder 

and other offenses in connection with the shooting of Tyrita Julius in November 

2015 and Julius's murder in March 2016. 

In brief, Sweeney contacted defendant and demanded he kill Julius. 

Sweeney threatened to contact defendant's family if he refused to kill Julius. In 

November 2015, Sweeney gave defendant a gun to shoot and kill Julius. 

Although defendant succeeded in shooting Julius several times, he did not kill 

her. 
3 A-3228-21

In March 2016, Julius disappeared. As part of the investigation into 

Julius's disappearance, the police obtained defendant and Sweeney's cell phone 

and E-ZPass records. 

In June 2016, unrelated to the murder of Julius, a grand jury indicted 

defendants on several drug related charges (drug case). On August 16, 2016, 

the police arrested defendant on a warrant for a motor vehicle violation. At the 

police station, defendant gave a recorded statement to the police. At the start of 

the interview, the police told defendant he was under arrest based on the motor 

vehicle warrant. The police gave defendant the Miranda1 warning and waiver 

form. Defendant acknowledged his rights by responding "yes" when asked by 

the officers if he understood his rights and agreed to waive his rights by

providing a voluntary statement. Defendant then initialed and signed the 

Miranda warning and waiver form. 

During his recorded statement, defendant consented to a search of his 

home. While still being interviewed at the police station, other police officers 

executed a search warrant of defendant's home and discovered Julius's body 

buried in a shallow grave in defendant's backyard. 

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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In December 2016, a grand jury indicted defendant on charges related to 

Julius's murder and other offenses (murder case). The charges in the murder 

case included the following: first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 

and 2C:11-3 (counts one and two); first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a) (count three); second-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) 

(count four); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count five); first-degree purposeful or knowing murder, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and/or (a)(2) (count six); third-degree possession of a 

weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count seven); seconddegree disturbing or desecrating human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1(a)(1) and/or 

(a)(2) (count eight); and fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) (count nine). 

Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress his statement to the police in 

the murder case. The judge conducted several days of testimonial hearings on 

defendant's motion.2 In a written opinion, the judge denied defendant's April 

16, 2019 motion. 

2

 The hearing included testimony related to Sweeney's motion to suppress her 

statements to the police. 
5 A-3228-21

On May 30, 2019, defendant pleaded guilty to certain charges under both 

indictments pursuant to a plea agreement and a cooperation agreement. Under 

the cooperation agreement, defendant agreed to testify truthfully against 

Sweeney at the murder trial. 

In accordance with a negotiated plea in the murder case, defendant agreed 

to plead guilty to attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, possession 

of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and disturbing or desecrating human 

remains. Defendant also agreed to plead guilty to obtaining controlled 

dangerous substances (CDS) by fraud in the drug case. 

In exchange for his guilty plea, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the 

remaining charges in each indictment and recommend an aggregate sixteen-year 

prison sentence, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-7.2(a), with the sentences to run concurrently. 

Also on May 30, 2019, defendant signed the plea form. In response to 

Question 4.d., defendant acknowledged he was not waiving his right to appeal 

the denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence under Rule 3:5-7(d), or the 

denial of acceptance into a pretrial intervention program under Rule 3:28. In 

response to Question 4.e., defendant circled, "Yes," indicating he "underst[ood] 

that by pleading guilty [he was] waiving [his] right to appeal the denial of all 
6 A-3228-21

other pretrial motions." In the blank space for listing any exceptions to waiving 

the right to appeal other pretrial motions, "N/A" was handwritten. Although 

defendant could have listed exceptions to his waiving the right to appeal any 

other pretrial motions in this section of the plea form, including the pretrial 

suppression motion, he did not do so. In responding to Question Thirteen, 

defendant expressly "reserved [the] right to argue for [a] lesser sentence." 

At the plea hearing, defendant testified he reviewed and discussed the 

terms of the plea agreement and cooperation agreement with his attorney. The 

judge also reviewed the plea agreement and cooperation agreement with 

defendant. After hearing defendant's testimony, the judge accepted defendant's 

guilty plea, concluding defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights 

in entering into the plea. 

 Defendant then testified against Sweeney at trial in the murder case. The 

jury ultimately convicted Sweeney of murder and other offenses. 

On May 6, 2022, defendant appeared for sentencing in accordance with 

his plea agreement. Defendant's attorney requested the judge sentence 

defendant to a lesser term than stated in the plea agreement. Specifically, 

counsel asked that defendant be sentenced in accordance with a second-degree 

offense and receive a term of seven years subject to NERA. 
7 A-3228-21

Defense counsel also asked the judge to find the following mitigating 

factors: mitigating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(3), defendant acted under 

strong provocation; mitigating factor four, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4), substantial 

grounds tending to excuse or justify defendant's conduct; mitigating factor six, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(6), defendant will compensate the victim or will participate 

in a program of community service; mitigating factor seven, N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-1(b)(7), defendant has no history of delinquency or criminal activity or 

has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time; mitigating factor eight, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8), defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances

unlikely to recur; mitigating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9), defendant's 

character and attitude indicate he is unlikely to commit another offense; and 

mitigating factor twelve, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(12), defendant's willingness to 

cooperate with law enforcement authorities. 

The State asked the judge to impose defendant's sentence in accordance 

with the plea agreement. Regarding the mitigating factors, the State agreed 

mitigating factor twelve applied. Regarding the aggravating factors, the State 

requested the following: aggravating factor one, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), the 

nature and circumstances of the offense and the role of the actor in committing 

the offense; aggravating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2), the gravity and 
8 A-3228-21

seriousness of harm inflicted, including the victim's vulnerability or inability to 

resist; aggravating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), the risk defendant will 

commit another offense; and aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), 

the need for deterrence. 

As part of the sentencing hearing, the judge considered the presentence 

report, as well as counsels' arguments and written submissions. After reviewing 

the matter, the judge applied mitigating factor nine based upon defendant's 

numerous letters of support but afforded little weight to this factor based on his 

findings in applying the aggravating factors. The judge also applied mitigating 

factor twelve based on defendant's "level of cooperation." The judge rejected 

the other mitigating factors requested by defendant and explained his reasons 

for declining to apply those factors. 

The judge then considered the aggravating factors. As requested by the 

State, the judge applied aggravating factors one, two, three, and nine. 

In applying aggravating factors one and two, the judge noted Sweeney 

"enlisted" defendant to kill Julius and defendant fired a handgun "at point blank 

range" into Julius's car knowing "there [were two people] sitting in that vehicle." 

Moreover, the judge found defendant not only "allow[ed] the body of [] Julius 

to be buried in his backyard, [but] he obliged defendant Sweeney by digging the 
9 A-3228-21

hole himself" and "[p]lacing [] Julius['s] lifeless body into it and covering it 

over." The judge found the circumstances were "heinous in the extreme." The 

judge applied aggravating factor two "because there [was] no question that both 

of these innocent victims were seriously hurt." The judge further explained 

defendant "surely knew or should have known that, both of [the victims] were 

vulnerable, particularly vulnerable, sitting helplessly in a vehicle. They were 

not capable of exercising normal physical or mental power of resistance at that 

point." 

In applying aggravating factor three, the judge explained that after 

defendant shot Julius and her daughter in November 2015, a mere four months 

later, defendant "committed wholly new acts of criminal depravity, by burying 

[]Julius in his backyard, and thereby hiding evidence of Sweeney's murder on 

his property." Based on "[t]he sequence of events alone," the judge applied 

aggravating factor three. Additionally, the judge stated defendant's "criminal 

history further underscore[d] the risk of future offenses." 

The judge applied aggravating factor nine for the reasons previously 

expressed in support of the other aggravating factors. 

Based upon his findings applying the aggravating and mitigating factors, 

the judge sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. He
10 A-3228-21

sentenced defendant as follows: a sixteen-year term, subject to NERA, on 

counts one, two, and three in the murder case; a ten-year term with five years of 

parole ineligibility on count five in the murder case; a concurrent ten-year term 

on count eight in the murder case; and a concurrent three-year term on count one 

in the drug case. 

 On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments: 

POINT I 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 

SUPPRESSION OF [DEFENDANT'S] STATEMENT 

BECAUSE [DEFENDANT'S] WAIVER OF THE 

PRIVILEGE OF SELF-INCRIMINATION WAS NOT 

KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY GIVEN HIS 

CONFUSION OVER HIS TRUE STATUS 

EXACERBATED BY THE EXISTENCE OF THE 

TRAFFIC WARRANT AND CDS CASE, AND THE 

POLICE'S COERCIVE INTERROGATION 

TACTICS. 

POINT II 

[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO RESENTENCING 

GIVEN THAT THE COURT IGNORED 

COMPETENT AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT 

HE ACTED UNDER DURESS, IMPROPERLY 

DOUBLE-COUNTED THE OFFENSES IN FINDING 

THE AGGRAVATING FACTORS, AND 

OTHERWISE FAILED TO GIVE ANY OF THE 

FACTORS THE APPROPRIATE WEIGHT TO 

ARRIVE AT AN EXCESSIVE 16-YEAR TERM. 
11 A-3228-21

I.

 Defendant contends he did not waive his appeal argument in Point I by 

entering into the plea agreement. He argues the judge never asked if he 

understood the waiver of the right to preserve the filing of an appeal from the 

denial of his motion to suppress his statement to the police. Having reviewed 

the record, we are satisfied defendant waived his right to appeal this issue. 

"Generally, a defendant who pleads guilty is prohibited from raising, on 

appeal, the contention that the State violated his constitutional rights prior to the 

plea." State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 470 (2005) (quoting State v. Crawley, 149 

N.J. 310, 316 (1997)). 

Rule 3:9-3(f) addresses "conditional pleas" and provides: 

With the approval of the court and the consent of the 

prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a 

conditional plea of guilty reserving on the record the 

right to appeal from the adverse determination of any 

specified pretrial motion. If the defendant prevails on 

appeal, the defendant shall be afforded the opportunity 

to withdraw his or her plea. Nothing in this rule shall 

be construed as limiting the right of appeal provided for 

in [Rule] 3:5-7(d).[3]

3

 Under Rule 3:5-7(d), a defendant who enters into a guilty plea retains the 

automatic right to appeal from the denial of any motions to suppress physical 

evidence. 
12 A-3228-21

 The automatic right to appeal under Rule 3:5-7(d) is limited to search and 

seizure claims and excludes claims alleging a violation of the right against selfincrimination. See Knight, 183 N.J. at 471. A defendant's entering a plea 

without the conditional reservation of the right to appellate review of issues 

other than the validity of a search and seizure and denial of admission to a 

pretrial intervention program. Ibid. Exceptions to the limitations under Rule 

3:9-3(f) require a defendant to demonstrate compelling circumstances. State v. 

Benjamin, 442 N.J. Super. 258, 263-64 (App. Div. 2015), aff'd on other grounds, 

228 N.J. 358 (2017). 

Here, in pleading guilty, defendant failed to preserve the right to appeal 

from the denial of his motion to suppress his statement to the police. Defendant 

unequivocally affirmed his understanding that by pleading guilty he waived his 

right to appeal the denial of all pretrial motions with the exception of a motion 

under Rule 3:5-7(d), related suppression of physical evidence, and Rule 3:28, 

the denial of entry into a pretrial intervention program. Therefore, defendant is 

precluded from challenging the denial of his motion to suppress his statement to 

the police. 

 Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence reflecting defendant's 

alleged confusion as to the nature of his plea or any compelling circumstances 
13 A-3228-21

warranting an exception to Rule 3:9-3(f). To the contrary, the record reflects 

defendant, with the assistance of counsel, carefully reviewed the plea form and 

cooperation agreement such that defendant understood the consequences of his 

plea, including the waiver of his right to challenge the denial of his motion to 

suppress his statement to the police. 

 If defendant sought to preserve his right to appeal the denial of his motion 

to suppress the statement to the police, defendant knew that right could be 

included in the plea agreement. Indeed, defendant preserved the right to argue 

for a lesser sentence as part of his plea agreement. Thus, on this record, we 

reject defendant's argument that he preserved the right to appeal from the denial 

of his motion to suppress his statement to the police. 

II. 

 We next consider defendant's arguments seeking a remand for 

resentencing. Defendant asserts the judge impermissibly double-counted certain 

components in applying the aggravating factors. He further contends the judge 

failed to properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. Additionally, 

defendant claims the sentence imposed was excessive. 

 We review a sentencing court's imposition of a sentence for abuse of 

discretion. State v. Miller, 237 N.J. 15, 28 (2019). "Appellate review of a 
14 A-3228-21

criminal sentence is limited; a reviewing court decides whether there is a 'clear 

showing of abuse of discretion.'" State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) 

(quoting State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 512 (1979)). 

 However, our deferential standard of review applies "only if the trial judge 

follows the [Criminal] Code and the basic precepts that channel sentencing 

discretion." State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 453 (2020) (quoting State v. Case, 

220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014)). Where the sentencing judge followed the Criminal 

Code "and the basic precepts that channel sentencing discretion," we will affirm 

provided the sentence does not "shock the judicial conscience." Case, 220 N.J. 

at 65. "On the other hand, if the trial court fails to identify relevant aggravating 

and mitigating factors, or merely enumerates them, or foregoes a qualitative 

analysis, or provides little 'insight into the sentencing decision,' then the 

deferential standard will not apply." Ibid.; see State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 363 

(1987). 

Regarding the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors, it is 

insufficient to merely count "whether one set of factors outnumbers the other." 

Case, 220 N.J. at 65. "Rather, the court must qualitatively assess the relevant 

aggravating and mitigating factors, assigning each factor its appropriate 

weight." Ibid. 
15 A-3228-21

Here, at the sentencing hearing, the judge omitted the assignment of 

weight to each aggravating and mitigating factor. Nor did the judge state on the 

record at the sentencing hearing that the aggravating factors outweighed the 

mitigating factors. Absent the judge assigning weight to each aggravating and 

mitigating factor, we are constrained to remand for resentencing. 

A defendant must be sentenced "anew" where resentencing is ordered 

unless the remand is for correction of a technical error, or the remand order is 

limited in scope. State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 610-11 (2014); State v. 

Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 350-51 (2012). Such a resentencing would entail "a 

new analysis of the aggravating and mitigating factors" applicable to defendant 

"as he appears on the day of resentencing." Randolph, 210 N.J. at 354. 

On remand, counsel may present arguments regarding the applicable 

aggravating and mitigating factors. The judge should provide a detailed 

explanation of the sentencing findings, assigning weight to each applicable 

aggravating and mitigating factor and then balancing the factors. 

Affirmed as to the conviction. The matter is remanded for resentencing 

consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.