Filed 4/17/13 In re Luis V. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re LUIS V.,

a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B238829

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. FJ48648)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LUIS V.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superi or Court of Los Angeles County, Shep Zebberman, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed. Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal , for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistan t Attorney General, Ja mes William Bilderback II and Sonya Roth, Deputy Attorneys Gene ral, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________ ___________2 INTRODUCTION

Appellant Luis V. appeals from an orde r of the juvenile court committing him to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). He contends the juvenile court ab used its discretion when it ordered the DJJ

commitment. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND

Appellant’s DJJ commitment resulted fro m two delinquency petitions, the first concerning an incident in Or ange County that o ccurred when appellant was 14 years old, and the second concerning an incident occurring two years later in Los Angeles County, when appellant was 16 years old. Howe ver, the Los Angeles County delinquency petition was adjudicated prior to the ear lier Orange County delinquency petition. In January 2009, Rafael N. and Jonathan M. were in Rafael’s car in Santa Ana, when they were approached by appellant and two companions. Appellant demanded Rafael’s keys at gunpoint, and his companio ns assaulted Jonathan M. After Rafael surrendered his car keys, wallet and cell phone, appellant and his companions fled in

Rafael’s car. 1 Jonathan suffered multiple lacera tions and bruising to his face. On March 17, 2011, Norma Martinez was on a street in Los Angeles when appellant and a companion snatched her purse and fled, causing injury to her finger. The Los Angeles District Attorney filed a de linquency petition alleging appellant had committed robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). In a negotiated dispos ition, appellant waived his

1 Because this case was resolved by ne gotiated disposition, the facts of the underlying offenses are taken from probation officers’ reports, which we reviewed after granting appellant’s motion to augment the record on appeal with the Los Angeles County Superior Court file.3 constitutional rights and admitted he had committed grand theft person ( id ., § 487, subd. (c)). The juvenile court declared appell ant a ward of the cour t, ordered him into a six-month camp community placement program, and dismissed the robbery allegation on the People’s motion. On August 26, 2011, the Orange County District Attorney filed a delinquency petition alleging as to count 1, appellant had committed carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)), with a special allegation he ha d personally used a fi rearm to commit the offense ( id ., § 12022.53, subd. (b)). As to counts 2 and 3, the petition alleged respectively appellant had committed the o ffenses of receiving stolen property ( id

., § 496d) and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury ( id ., § 245, subd. (a)(1)). On October 14, 2011, appellant was transferred from th e camp community placement program to the juvenile court in Orange County for a ju risdiction hearing on the August 26 petition. In a negotiated plea, appellant waived his constitutional rights

and admitted he had committed carjacking and had personally used a firearm to commit the offense. The juvenile court found tr ue the allegations as to count 1 and the enhancement, calculated the ma ximum term of confinement as 19 years, dismissed the remaining counts and ordered the case tran sferred back to Los Angeles County for disposition. Before entertaining arguments by counse l at the January 11, 2012 disposition hearing, the juvenile court in Los Ange les indicated it had read and considered appellant’s “entire” juvenile court file, and its tentative ruling was to order appellant

committed to the DJJ. 2

2 Specifically, the juvenile court stated it ha d read and considered appellant’s entire juvenile court file, including the April 5, 2011 psychological assessment by Dr. Haig Kojian, the April 7, 2011 pre- plea report, the camp progress reports, the Santa Ana Police Department’s reports, the December 22, 201 1 probation officer’s disposition report, which recommended camp community placement , and the January 11, 2012 report of appellant’s conduct in juvenile hall pending the disposition hearing.4 Defense counsel argued that appellant should be ordered into a nine-month camp community placement program. Counsel noted that, apart from two recent episodes at juvenile hall, appellant ha d behaved well and was on the verge of successfully completing the six-month camp community placem ent program. However, on the date of his release, appellant was served with a no-ba il arrest warrant and transferred to Orange County to face allegations rela ting to three-year old offenses . Counsel maintained that had the carjacking and related allegations been resolved pr ior to the grand theft person allegation, 3 appellant would likely ha ve been ordered into a nine-month camp community placement program, which is a suitable less re strictive alternative to a commitment to the DJJ and an appropriate disposition in this case. The prosecutor argued in favor of a commi tment to the DJJ, in light of the serious nature of the carjacking offense, the personal use of a firearm, and the beating suffered by

one of the victims. Following argument, the juvenile court stated it was aware appellant was 14 years old at the time of the carjacking and his current age was 17 years 8 months, and the carjacking predated the grand theft offense. Of concern to the court was the serious nature of appellant’s criminal conduct, and his history of self-admitted gang involvement and of marijuana and methamphetamine use. The court was also troubled by appellant’s behavior in juvenile hall befo re the disposition hearing: He was disciplined for flashing gang signs and for using a telephone without permission. The juvenile court found that “[t]he mental and physical condition and qua lifications of [appellant] render it probable that [he] will benefit from the reformatory di scipline or other treatm ent provided by the [DJJ].” The court ordered that appellant rema in a ward of the court and be committed to the DJJ for a period not to exceed 19 years, which it calculated as nine years for carjacking, plus 10 years for the firearm-use enhancement.

3 During argument, defense counsel repeatedly referred to the offense appellant had committed in Los Angele s County as robbery. The ju venile court noted the robbery allegation had been dismissed after appella nt had admitted committi ng grand theft person as part of a negotiated disposition.5 DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review “The decision of the juvenile court to commit a juvenile offender to [the DJJ] may be reversed on appeal only by a showing that the court abused its discretion. [Citation.] ‘[D]iscretion is abused whenev er the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’ [Citation.]” ( In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 423, 431-432.) “A decision by the juvenile c ourt to commit a minor to the [DJJ] will not

be deemed to constitute an abuse of discretion where th e evidence ‘demonstrate[s] probable benefit to the minor from commitment to the [DJJ ] and that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappr opriate. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( In re Pedro

M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556, disapproved on another ground in People v. Gonzales (2013) 56 Cal.4th 353, 37 5, fn. 6.) “Although the D JJ is normally a placement of last resort, there is no absolute rule that a DJJ commitment cannot be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been attempted. [Citations.]” ( In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250.) More over, “[i]n evaluating the [juvenile] court’s exercise of discretion in committing a minor to [the DJJ ], we now do so with punishment, public safety, and protection in mind.” ( In re Luisa Z. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 978, 987-988.) “An appellate court will not lightly substitu te its decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. We must in dulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not di sturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citation.]” ( In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395.) “The

term ‘substantial evidence’ me ans such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is evidence which is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. [Citation.]” ( In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.Ap p.4th 1426, 1433.)

B . The DJJ Commitment Was No t an Abuse of Discretion Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion because there was insufficient evidence to suppor t the finding that the less rest rictive alternative disposition6 of the nine-month camp community placem ent program would be ineffective or inappropriate compared to a commitment to the DJJ. We disagree. The record before the j uvenile court supports the court’s decision to commit appellant, who was nearly 18 year s old at the time of disposition, to the DJJ. The court carefully considered the less restrictive altern ative urged by defense counsel in light of appellant’s history of delinquenc y, his gang involvement, drug use and criminal conduct. Of particular significance to the court was th at appellant still self-identified as a gang member and violated rules, despite havi ng recently completed a six-month camp community placement program. While the court was also aware appellant had done well at camp, it could reasonably find that another camp commitment would be ineffective in

his rehabilitation.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

JACKSON, J.

We concur:

WOODS, Acting P. J.

ZELON, J.