Gen. 55] 55

PUBLIC ETHICS LAW 

ZONING AND PLANNING – REGIONAL DISTRICTS – SPECIAL 

DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS RELATING TO PRINCE 

GEORGE’S COUNTY

May 26, 2015 

Michael W. Lord, Esq. 

Executive Director 

Maryland State Ethics Commission 

You have asked for our opinion on how to interpret certain 

campaign finance disclosure requirements set forth in “special 

provisions” of the Maryland Public Ethics Law that pertain to land 

use matters for the portion of Prince George’s County that is 

located within the Maryland-Washington Regional District. 

Within the District, the members of the Prince George’s County 

Council sit as the “District Council” and, in that capacity, render 

decisions on various types of land use applications. As we will 

explain below, the ethics provisions in question—Part V of the 

Public Ethics Law, Md. Code Ann., Gen. Prov. (“GP”) §§ 5-833 

through 5-8411—were enacted over twenty years ago in response 

to published reports that members of the District Council had 

received significant campaign contributions from the developers 

and other applicants who appeared before them. 

Under the Part V ethics provisions, District Council members 

must recuse themselves from a land use matter if they have 

received a contribution from the applicant within a 36-month 

period before the filing of the application. See GP § 5-835(b)(1). 

To facilitate the recusal provision, the law also requires applicants 

to submit an affidavit disclosing any payments that they have made 

to a member of the District Council within the same 36-month 

period. GP § 5-835(c)(1)(i). The applicant must submit the 

affidavit “[a]fter an application is filed” but “at least 30 calendar 

days before” the District Council’s “consideration of the 

application.” GP § 5-835(c)(1), (2). Your questions relate to the 

timing of the affidavit requirement and the meaning of the term 

“consideration” for purposes of determining when an applicant 

must submit the affidavit. 

 

1

 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references in this opinion 

are to the 2014 volume of the General Provisions Article. 
56 [100 Op. Att’y 

The timing requirements are fairly easy to administer with 

respect to special exceptions, zoning map amendments, variances, 

and other quasi-judicial land use matters, where the proceeding 

before the District Council is initiated by an applicant’s submission 

of a written application that seeks an action specific to the 

applicant’s land. In those situations, the applicant can submit the 

affidavit with the application, and the District Council can ensure 

compliance with the statute by waiting 30 days before taking up the 

matter. The timing requirements are more difficult to apply, 

however, when it comes to area master plans and sectional map 

amendments—quasi-legislative actions that are formally initiated 

by the District Council, not an applicant. In these proceedings, 

there is no formal “application”; instead, a person who supports a 

master plan or sectional map amendment with “the intent to 

intensify the zoning category applicable to” the person’s land2

becomes an “applicant” merely by “appearance at a public hearing, 

filing a statement in the official record, or [making an] other similar 

communication to a member of the County Council or the Planning 

Board.” GP § 5-833(d)(3) (defining “application”). 

For these applicants—people who advocate for the “upzoning” of their property by testifying during council or board 

proceedings—the due date for the affidavit depends on how 

broadly one interprets the term “consideration.” If the Council 

“considers” a matter whenever it convenes publicly to hear 

testimony about it, the landowner’s appearance at that hearing 

would simultaneously qualify his remarks as the “application” and 

the hearing as “consideration” of his application. If so, how can an 

applicant file the affidavit “after” submitting the application but 30 

days “before” the council considers it? Seemingly, the only way to 

avoid this conundrum is to interpret “consideration” to mean a later 

step in the council’s proceedings. That approach, however, would 

potentially allow a campaign donor to appear and advocate before 

the very council members whom he has supported financially—a 

result that would seem to undercut the broader purpose of the ethics 

provisions.3

 

2

 A re-zoning that results in “the potential for a more intensive use” 

of a parcel is generally assumed to increase the value of the property. 

See Rouse-Fairwood Ltd. P’shp. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 120 Md. 

App. 667, 694 (1998). Prince George’s County Zoning Ordinance lists 

the zoning classes in order of intensity. See Prince George’s County 

Code, § 27-109(b). 

3

 At the time you submitted your request for an opinion, the District 

Council appears to have interpreted Part V as requiring prospective 
Gen. 55] 57

In light of this apparent statutory ambiguity, you ask us two 

questions: 

1. What actions by the Council constitute “consideration” 

such that an applicant must file an affidavit 30 days prior to that 

consideration? Specifically, does consideration occur when the 

Council holds a hearing on a matter that the Council will not decide 

until later? 

2. If an affidavit is filed inside of the 30 days of scheduled 

“consideration,” can the application move forward even though the 

affidavit was not filed 30 days prior to consideration? 

As to your first question, we conclude that the Council 

“considers” a matter when, as a body, it convenes to hear testimony 

or deliberate on a matter, not merely when it convenes to render a 

decision. We base that conclusion on (a) the legislative history of 

the provision, which makes clear that the General Assembly 

enacted the provision to guard against corruption of the Prince 

George’s County land use process, (b) the statutory requirement 

that we interpret the Ethics Law “liberally” to effectuate its intent, 

(c) the meaning that the Court of Appeals has given the word 

“consideration” in the similarly remedial Open Meetings Act, and 

(d) the fact that the General Assembly expressly prohibited the 

taking of “any action, directly or indirectly, with the intent to 

circumvent the intent of [Part V],” GP § 5-835(f). 

With respect to your second question, we conclude that Part 

V does not permit the Council to move forward with an application 

when the applicant has failed to provide the disclosures that might 

disqualify a member. Part V does not authorize the Council to 

grant exemptions from the filing deadline, and the land use powers 

granted to the County by the Maryland-Washington Regional 

District Act are expressly subject to Part V. GP § 5-834. The 

remedial discretion of the circuit court is also limited. Upon a 

petition timely filed under § 5-839(a)(1) or on appeal of a zoning 

amendment under § 22-407 of the Land Use Article, the circuit 

court “shall issue an order voiding” a Council action taken in 

 

applicants to submit their affidavits at least 30 days before the date the 

District Council is scheduled to hear testimony on a proposed master 

plan and sectional map amendment. See Letter from Wendy Irminger, 

Project Leader, Prince George’s County Planning Department, to 

Property Owner (Feb. 7, 2013).
58 [100 Op. Att’y 

violation of Part V. GP § 5-839(a)(2). The special provisions in 

Part V thus do not authorize the Council to move forward with an 

application when an applicant has not complied with the 30-day 

deadline for filing the affidavit.4 

I 

Background 

A. Land Use Planning Within the Maryland-Washington 

Regional District 

The Regional District Act created the Maryland-Washington 

Regional District, which is made up of Montgomery County and 

most of Prince George’s County. Md. Code Ann., Land Use 

(“LU”) § 20-101 (2013). The Act delegates land use planning 

within the District to two “district councils,” which are composed 

entirely of the elected officials who serve on the County Councils 

of the two counties. LU § 22-101; see Kirsch v. Prince George’s 

County, 331 Md. 89, 91 (1993); Pan Am. Health Org. v. 

Montgomery County, 338 Md. 214, 217 (1995); see also 84 

Opinions of the Attorney General 65, 66 (1999). Relevant to our 

purposes, the Prince George’s County District Council is 

authorized to adopt and amend the text of the zoning law for Prince 

George’s County, LU § 22-104(a), and to decide matters ranging 

from the approval of general and area master plans, see MarylandNat. Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Greater Baden-Aquasco 

Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. 73, 88-89 (2009), to special exceptions and 

departures from design standards. See County Council of Prince 

George’s County v. Billings, 420 Md. 84 (2011). 

The District Council does not, however, make these decisions 

on its own. The Prince George’s County Planning Board—an 

unelected body—adopts certain types of plans and makes certain 

 

4

 In accordance with established policy, this Office defers to the 

State Ethics Commission on the interpretation of the Public Ethics Law 

and for that reason typically does not entertain opinion requests 

concerning the meaning of that law. That policy is not implicated, 

however, when the Commission itself seeks our aid in interpreting the 

Ethics Law. We have reviewed the many advisory opinions and other 

Commission materials that relate to Part V, but none resolves the 

interpretive questions that we address here. See, e.g., State Ethics 

Opinions Nos. 93-16 (Dec. 15, 1993); 94-3 (July 6, 1994); and 96-2 (Jan. 

31, 1996). To the extent questions arise about how to apply the statute 

in specific circumstances, however, those questions should be directed 

to the Commission. 
Gen. 55] 59

types of zoning decisions, which then may come before the County 

Council sitting as the District Council.5 For some of these land use 

matters, the District Council also participates in the process before 

the Planning Board renders its decision. For example, the District 

Council initiates the process of preparing a sectional map 

amendment. Also, the District Council and the Planning Board 

hear some planning matters jointly.6 

B. Part V: The “Special Provisions” Applicable to the Prince 

George’s County Portion of the Maryland-Washington 

Regional District 

Part V of the Ethics Law contains several interrelated 

mechanisms for limiting the influence of campaign contributors on 

the District Council’s land use decisions. For example, applicants 

and their agents are prohibited from making contributions to a 

member or a member’s campaign while the application is pending, 

GP § 5-835(a), and must disclose their ex parte communications to 

a member about an application. GP § 5-836. The two provisions 

most relevant to your inquiry are the member disqualification 

requirement and the applicant affidavit requirement. See GP § 5-

835(b), (c). 

1. The Disqualification Requirement 

A member7

 of the District Council whose campaign treasurer, 

continuing political committee, or slate receives a payment from an 

 

5 Prince George’s County v. Zimmer Dev. Co., a case now pending 

before the Court of Appeals, involves the standard of review to be used 

by the District Council in reviewing a decision of the Planning Board. 

See 440 Md. 114 (2014) (granting certiorari). While the reported 

decision of the Court of Special Appeals is informative on that review 

process, the case does not bear on your specific questions. See County 

Council of Prince George’s County v. Zimmer Dev. Co., 217 Md. App. 

310 (2014). 

6

 For the County Council’s explanation of the County’s planning 

process, see http://www.princegeorgescountymd.gov/sites/CountyCouncil/ 

Resources/Planning-DevelopmentProcess/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 

Feb. 27, 2015). 

7

 The term “member” is defined to “include[] any candidate or 

person duly elected or appointed who takes the oath of office as a 

member of the County Council for Prince George’s County and who 

thereby serves on the District Council.” GP § 5-833(l); see also § 5-
60 [100 Op. Att’y 

applicant during the 36-month period before the applicant submits 

its application must refrain from participating in proceedings that 

involve that application: 

After an application has been filed, a member 

may not vote or participate in any way in the 

proceeding on the application if the member’s 

treasurer or continuing political committee, or 

a slate to which the member belongs or 

belonged during the 36-month period before 

the filing of the application, received a 

payment during the 36-month period before 

the filing of the application or during the 

pendency of the application from any of the 

applicants or the agents of the applicants. 

GP § 5-835(b)(1). The member need not recuse himself if the 

contribution came from a political action committee to which the 

applicant has made a payment, so long as the applicant made the 

payment “without any intent to subvert the purposes of this 

subtitle” and the member returns the payment to the committee.8

 

GP § 5-835(b)(2). 

2. The Affidavit Requirement 

To facilitate the member disqualification provision, the 

statute requires that an applicant for a land use approval file an 

affidavit stating whether he has made a contribution to the 

campaign of a Council member and, if so, to which campaign 

finance entity he made it: 

After an application is filed, the applicant 

shall file an affidavit under oath: 

(i) 1. stating to the best of the applicant’s 

information, knowledge, and belief that 

during the 36-month period before the filing 

of the application and during the pendency of 

 

833(f) (defining “candidate” as a “candidate for election to the County 

Council who becomes a member”). 

8

 Part V does not affect the disclosures that campaign finance entities 

must make to the State Board of Elections under the Election Law 

Article. See Md. Code Ann., Elec. § 13-501 (“As to contributions to the 

Prince George’s County Executive, a member of the Prince George’s 

County Council, or a candidate for either of those offices, Title 5, 

Subtitle 8, Part V of the General Provisions Article may apply.”). 
Gen. 55] 61

the application, the applicant has not made 

any payment to a member’s treasurer, a 

member’s continuing political committee, or 

a slate to which the member belongs or 

belonged during the 36-month period before 

the filing of the application; or 

 2. if any such payment was made, 

disclosing the name of the member to whose 

treasurer or continuing political committee, or 

slate to which the member belongs or 

belonged during the 36-month period before 

the filing of the application, the payment was 

made[.] 

GP § 5-835(c)(1). Applicants must make the same disclosure for 

contributions made by “a member of the applicant’s household,” 

GP § 5-835(c)(1)(iii), and must also disclose any solicitations that 

the applicant has made on a member’s behalf and identify the 

member if a solicitation resulted in a contribution. GP § 5-

835(c)(1)(ii). In some circumstances, the applicant’s “agents” with 

respect to an application must also file an affidavit.9

 GP § 5-835(d). 

Finally, “[a] supplemental affidavit shall be filed whenever a 

payment is made after the original affidavit was filed.” GP § 5-

835(c)(3). 

The affidavit requirement applies only to “individuals or 

business entities that would be subject to this subtitle.” GP § 5-

835(c)(5). Whether a person is “subject to the subtitle” is addressed 

in § 5-833, mostly through the definitions of “applicant” and 

“application.” 

 

9

 The affidavit requirement applies to an applicant’s agent only if the 

agent “has acted on behalf of the applicant with regard to the specific 

application.” GP § 5-835(d)(1)(i). If so, the agent must file an affidavit 

if the agent made or solicited a contribution for a member’s campaign 

within the 36-month period before the applicant files its application. GP 

§ 5-835(d)(1)(ii). The term “agent” includes a broad array of individuals 

or business entities, such as architects, attorneys, engineers, and real 

estate agents, “hired or retained by the applicant for any purpose relating 

to the land that is the subject of an application.” GP § 5-833(b). An 

applicant “is not required” to make any representation in the affidavit 

about the actions “of anyone other than that applicant.” GP § 5-

835(c)(4). 
62 [100 Op. Att’y 

Under § 5-833(c), a person’s status as an “applicant” depends 

on the type of interest the person has in the “land that is the subject 

of the application.” For example, title owners, contract purchasers, 

certain trustees, certain corporate directors and officers, and certain 

holders of “at least a 5% interest in a business entity that has an 

interest” in the land are “applicants”; certain lending institutions, 

public entities, and public utilities are not. GP § 5-833(c)(3). 

An “application” is defined both by the type of land use action 

sought and the method by which the applicant seeks it. As to the 

type of action sought, an “application” includes two categories of 

requests for land use actions. The first category includes quasijudicial zoning and subdivision proceedings that a person initiates 

by submitting a form or other materials, in the usual sense of the 

word “application,” and that involve the person’s use of a particular 

property. That category of applications consists of: 

(1) an application for a zoning map 

amendment; a special exception; a departure 

from design standards; a revision to a special 

exception site plan; an expansion of a legal 

nonconforming use; a revision to a legal 

nonconforming use site plan; or a request for 

a variance from the zoning ordinance; 

(2) an application to approve a 

comprehensive design plan; a conceptual site 

plan; or a specific design plan . . . . 

GP § 5-833(d)(1), (2) (internal paragraph enumeration omitted). 

The second category of application, addressed in § 5-833(d)(3), 

gives rise to your question. It comprises two types of quasilegislative planning proceedings that are initiated by the District 

Council: area master plans and sectional map amendments.10 The 

General Assembly specified how a person is deemed to be an 

applicant in those proceedings by broadening “application” to 

include: 

 

10 For an explanation of the sectional map amendment process in the 

County, see Part 3, Division 4 of the Prince George’s County Zoning 

Ordinance, §§ 27-220 through 27-228 of the Prince George’s County 

Code. For an explanation of the area master plan process, see §§ 27-

640 et seq. of the County Zoning Ordinance and Greater Baden-Aquasco 

Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. at 88-90. For a discussion of the quasilegislative and quasi-judicial functions of the County Council, see Prince 

George’s County v. Silverman, 58 Md. App. 41, 50-51 (1984). 
Gen. 55] 63

(3) participation in adopting and approving 

an area master plan or sectional map 

amendment by appearance at a public hearing, 

filing a statement in the official record, or 

other similar communication to a member of 

the County Council or the Planning Board, 

where the intent is to intensify the zoning 

category applicable to the land of the 

applicant. 

GP § 5-833(d)(3). However one qualifies as an applicant, the 

affidavit must be filed with the clerk of the County Council “[a]fter 

an application is filed,” GP § 5-835(c)(1), and “at least 30 calendar 

days before consideration of the application by the District 

Council.” GP § 5-835(c)(2); see also GP § 5-838(c) (generally 

pertaining to the clerk’s duties).11

As to all of the statute’s provisions, it is a violation for an 

applicant to “take any action, directly or indirectly, with the intent 

to circumvent the intent of this part.” GP § 5-835(f). Other 

provisions in Part V provide for enforcement through civil 

remedies and criminal penalties, GP § 5-839, and specify that the 

special provisions take precedence over any conflicting County 

laws. GP § 5-834. 

 

 

11 The Ethics Law also contains sets of “Special Provisions” for 

Montgomery, Howard, and Frederick counties. Those provisions are 

somewhat analogous to Part V in that all require the disclosure of certain 

campaign contributions to the elected officials who decide particular 

land use matters in those jurisdictions. For the Montgomery County 

provisions, first enacted in 1994, see Part VI (GP §§ 5-842 through 5-

847; 1994 Md. Laws, ch. 645); for the Howard County provisions, first 

enacted in 1995, see Part VIII (GP §§ 5-852 through 5-856; 1995 Md. 

Laws, ch. 614); and for the Frederick County provisions, first enacted in 

2007, see Part IX (GP §§ 5-857 through 5-862; 2007 Md. Laws, ch. 474). 

Only the Howard County provisions define “application” in such a way 

as to create a question about the disclosure deadline for persons who 

participate in proceedings that they did not initiate through the 

submission of a formal written application. As to that county, where the 

County Executive has veto power over legislation adopted by the County 

Council, the Ethics Law requires that the affidavit be filed “[w]hen an 

application is filed,” GP § 5-853(a)(1), and “at least 30 calendar days 

before any consideration of the application by an elected official.” GP 

§ 5-853(b). 
64 [100 Op. Att’y 

II 

The Legislative History of Part V 

The provisions we construe here are the result of an arduous 

legislative and judicial process. The first version was enacted in 

1989 but was promptly declared void under the “single subject 

rule” of Article III, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution. See Porten 

Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387 (1990). A second, more 

stringent, version was introduced in the General Assembly’s 1990 

session but failed. A third version, similar to the current law in 

many respects, was enacted in 1992, but it, too, succumbed to a 

challenge under the single-subject rule. See State v. Prince 

Georgians for Glendening, 329 Md. 68 (1993). Finally, much of 

the current version of Part V was enacted in 1993, with further 

modifications made in 2011. As we will describe in some detail, 

each step along the way informs our understanding of the statute’s 

purpose. 

A. The 1989 Enactment 

The story of how the General Assembly came to adopt

“special” ethics provisions for Prince George’s County land use 

matters begins during the 1989 Session.12 Early in the Session, the 

Prince George’s County delegation sponsored “two uncomplicated 

and brief” bills concerning Prince George’s County’s authority to 

impose certain energy and transfer taxes (H.B. 889 and H.B. 890), 

and a third bill authorizing the imposition of development impact 

fees (H.B. 891). None of the bills included ethics measures, and 

all passed the House and were sent to the Senate. Porten, 318 Md. 

at 389-90, 393-94. 

Then, in late March of that year, various newspapers reported 

on an unsuccessful attempt by Walter H. Maloney, the former 

County Attorney for Prince George’s County, to disqualify five 

members of the County Council from voting on a zoning 

application filed by a developer that had contributed to their 

campaigns. Id. at 394; E. 285, 460. According to the affidavit of 

then-Senator Frank J. Komenda, who chaired the County 

delegation, the case “accentuated concerns of members of the 

Delegation first felt during the summer of 1988 when constituents 

 

12 Much of this legislative history comes from the record in Porten, 

which included the parties’ stipulations on the progress of the legislation 

through the General Assembly. See 318 Md. at 395, n.4. Where 

necessary, we will cite to the pages of the record extract on file in our 

office, using the “E” designation required by Rule 8-503(b). 
Gen. 55] 65

conveyed their views about perceived conflicts of interest of 

Council members.” E. 255. Senator Komenda testified that the 

Maloney case had “troubled community activists” and that the 

Prince George’s Civic Foundation “urg[ed] a legislative remedy for 

this problem.” Id. In response, the Senate delegation 

subcommittee that Senator Komenda had appointed to address 

House Bills 889, 890, and 891 began to draft amendments “to 

address the problem.” Id. Those amendments were added onto 

H.B. 890, such that “[w]hat had been essentially a one-page bill 

concerning ‘Prince George’s County—Transfer Tax’ was . . . 

transmogrified into lengthy emergency legislation extending to 

‘Prince George’s County Council—Ethics and Taxing Authority.’” 

Porten, 318 Md. at 395. 

Meanwhile, the press continued to report on the council 

members’ fundraising practices. On April 2, the Washington Post 

reported that three council members had received one-third to onehalf of their contributions from development interests. E. 258, E. 

329-30 (Retha Hill, Eugene L. Meyer, Links with Developers 

Spotlighted by P.G. Bill; Council Members Deny Being Influenced, 

The Washington Post (April 2, 1989)). On April 4, the Prince 

George’s County Journal reported on another case in which County 

Council members had been asked to abstain from voting on a 

project proposed by a developer who had contributed to each of 

their campaigns. E. 258 (referring to article entitled “Abstention 

urged on MetroView vote”). 

The special ethics law, made part of H.B. 890, passed on the 

last day of the Session. 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 244. The new law 

added a subtitle 6 to the State Public Ethics Law, which was then 

codified in Article 40A of the Maryland Code. See Porten, 318 

Md. at 389-90 (summarizing the law). In its broad outline, the law 

was similar to the provisions currently in Part V; it provided for 

council members to abstain from participating in land use matters 

where the applicant had promoted their candidacy during the 

preceding 36 months and required applicants to file affidavits 

disclosing their contributions. Former Art. 40A, § 6-603. Many of 

the details, however, differed. For example, the 1989 law required 

applicants to file their affidavit “[a]t the time an application is 

filed,” id. § 6-603(b), did not define “application” to include a 

person’s appearance at hearings on sectional map amendments, and 

did not address contributions made through political action 

committees or to a slate of candidates that included a Council 

member. Porten, 318 Md. 391, n.1. Because it was enacted as an 
66 [100 Op. Att’y 

emergency measure, the new law took effect upon the Governor’s 

signature on May 5. Id. at 389. 

The 1989 legislation had an immediate impact. Even before 

the legislation was signed, the Prince George’s Chamber of 

Commerce “strongly recommend[ed]” that its members exercise 

“caution in considering any contribution to an elected official or 

candidate for public office, whether at the local or state level.” E. 

408. The Suburban Maryland Building Industry Association 

(“SMBIA”) “strongly recommended that no contributions be made 

to the County Executive, the County Council, or any other State or 

local elected official.” E. 407 (emphasis in the original). In a May 

legislative report to its members, the SMBIA stated that, “[f]rom 

the standpoint of the building community, this legislation has—and 

will have—a favorable impact. (Fundraisers for Council members 

were starting to get out of hand in terms of their frequency, and our 

industry was very heavily lobbied to contribute).” E. 604. The 

report then stated, “The practice has now come to a screeching 

halt.” Id., see also E. 573 (discussing legislative report). 

Meanwhile, the Ethics Commission was addressing questions 

about how, and to whom, the new law applied. In an extensive 

response to a publicly-traded corporation’s inquiry as to the filing 

requirements applicable to its stockholders, employees, and related 

entities, the Ethics Commission noted that “there continue to be 

other issues regarding implementation of this law” that would 

require further guidance. See State Ethics Opinion No. 89-7 (June 

20, 1989). In November, a Washington Post article noted that the 

campaigns of the eight council members who had filed reports had 

together collected only $865 after April 10, in contrast to the 

$237,450 they had collected in the approximately five-month 

period before the passage of the bill. Derald Everhart, Ethics law 

puts crimp in donations, The Prince George’s Journal (Nov. 10, 

1989). 

The law was short-lived. On July 26, the Porten Sullivan 

Corporation, a developer, challenged the statute on multiple 

grounds, including a claim that the legislation embraced more than 

one subject and thereby violated the “single subject” rule of Article 

III, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution. Porten, 318 Md. at 395. 

Although the circuit court denied all relief, the Court of Appeals 

granted certiorari before proceedings in the Court of Special 

Appeals and, on February 6, 1990, declared the ethics portions of 

the statute void under the single-subject rule. Id. at 409. 
Gen. 55] 67

B. The 1990 Legislation – The Extension of the Term 

“Application” to Area Master Plan and Sectional Map

Amendment Proceedings 

Shortly after the Court issued its decision in Porten, the 

General Assembly took up consideration of a new emergency bill 

(S.B. 832) designed to address continuing concerns about District 

Council members’ presiding over their campaign contributors’ land 

use applications. Although the new bill was similar in many 

respects to the previous year’s bill, it differed in several ways 

material to your question. For example, while Chapter 244 was in 

effect, a question had been raised about its applicability to the 

sectional map amendment process, which is initiated by the District 

Council and thus does not involve an “applicant” in the traditional 

sense of the word. E. 510. Senate Bill 832 proposed to resolve that 

question by broadening the definition of “application” to include a 

person’s “participation in adopting and approving an area master 

plan or sectional map amendment by appearance at a public 

hearing, filing a statement in the official record, or other similar 

communication to a member of the County Council or the Planning 

Board, where the intent is to intensify the zoning category 

applicable to the land of the applicant.” 1990 Sess., S.B. 832 

(proposed Art. 40A, § 6-601(d)(3), currently codified at GP § 5-

833(d)(3)). The 1990 bill also proposed to make the applicant’s 

affidavit due “[a]fter an application is filed,” “at any time prior to 

consideration of the application by the District Council,” but “in no 

event . . . less than 30 calendar days prior to consideration by the 

District Council of the application.”13 1990 Sess., S.B. 832 

(proposed Art. 40A, § 6-602(b)(1), (2)). The bill failed. 

 

13 The legislative record also indicates that the General Assembly was 

considering other adjustments in response to questions raised in Porten. 

See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Robert A. Zarnoch to Hon. 

Timothy F. Maloney (Feb. 12, 1990). Those questions included whether 

Chapter 244 applied to contributions to slates and political action 

committees and to persons with minor connections to an applicant. See 

Porten, 318 Md. at 391-92, nn. 1, 2. In addition, legislators sought our 

Office’s advice on various constitutional and other issues raised by the 

Court’s decision in Porten. See Letters of Assistant Attorney General 

Robert A. Zarnoch to Hon. Joseph F. Vallario, Jr. (March 9, 1990), Hon. 

Timothy F. Maloney (Feb. 2 and 13, 1990), Hon. Paul Pinsky (Feb. 27, 

1990), and Hon. Frank J. Komenda (March 15, 1990). 
68 [100 Op. Att’y 

C. The 1991 Legislation and the Amendment of the Open 

Meetings Act 

News reports in the bill file indicate that legislation similar to 

that introduced in 1990, but applicable to both Prince George’s and 

Howard Counties, was introduced in the 1991 Session but again 

failed.14 During that session, however, the General Assembly also 

considered another reform measure, S.B. 170, which proposed to 

make quasi-judicial land use proceedings subject to the State’s 

Open Meetings Act. At the time, the Open Meetings Act did not 

apply to a public body when it was performing a “quasi-judicial” 

function, and decisions on applications for land use actions were 

generally deemed quasi-judicial. Accordingly, many zoning 

boards had been deliberating behind closed doors. See Wesley 

Chapel Bluemount Ass’n v. Baltimore County, 347 Md. 125, 141 

(1997) (“The exemption in the 1977 law for quasi-judicial 

functions served, in effect, to permit zoning boards, boards of 

appeals, and other administrative agencies to continue deliberating 

in closed session with respect to contested case hearings.”). The 

change that S.B. 170 proposed gave rise to discussion as to whether 

a zoning board’s deliberations on an application, in addition to its 

decision, must be carried out in public. 

The bill initially proposed to clarify that the Open Meetings 

Act applied “to a public body when granting a license or permit or 

making a land use decision.” S.B. 170, 1991 Leg. Reg. Sess. (first 

reader). It was then amended in committee to extend the Act’s 

requirements to “a public body when it is meeting to consider: (1) 

Granting a license or permit; or (2) A special exception, variance, 

conditional use, zoning classification, the enforcement of any 

zoning law or regulation, or any other zoning matter.” Id. (second 

reader) (emphasis added). 

Prince George’s County and other local public bodies 

opposed making zoning board deliberations open to the public. 

The County proposed that S.B. 170 be amended further to provide 

that a public body “may conduct deliberations in closed session 

after the closing of the record, but that the decision and the reason 

for the decision shall be made in open session.” 1991 Sess., S.B. 

 

14 See Andy Markowitz, Developers in probe generous to 

campaigners, The Prince George’s Journal (Jan. 24, 1992) (reporting 

that two delegates had introduced legislation “mirroring the 1989 

measure for both Howard and Prince George’s counties” but it “died in 

committee”); Andy Markowitz, Fed probe brings bill back to life, The 

Prince George’s Journal (Jan. 31, 1992) (reporting that “[e]fforts to 

resurrect the [1989] law in 1990 and 1991 were defeated”).
Gen. 55] 69

170, “Prince George’s County Legislative Position” (Feb. 19, 

1991). The Maryland Association of Counties commented that 

“this provision is dealing with quasi-judicial functions,” and that, 

“[w]hile it is appropriate for the taking of testimony to be done in 

an open meeting, the deliberations of such bodies should be done 

in private, as are the deliberations of a jury.” 1991 Sess., S.B. 170, 

“Memorandum to the Senate Economic and Environmental Affairs 

Committee” (Feb. 21, 1991). The Maryland Municipal League 

(“MML”) also proposed amending the bill to provide that public 

bodies conducting the proceedings covered by the amendment be 

required to meet in public only when “hearing testimony.” MML 

stated that “there should be no requirement that the deliberations of 

any quasi-judicial body be held in open session,” and that “[d]uring 

these discussions candid and frank interchange is essential.” 

Maryland Municipal League, Proposed Amendments to S.B. 170, 

Amendment #3 (March 26, 1991). 

In response to these local government concerns, an 

amendment was offered to the committee that would have required 

a public body to meet in public only when “hearing testimony 

regarding” a land use matter and not, as the bill then read, when 

“meeting to consider” such a matter. The amendment was rejected. 

An undated and anonymous handwritten note in the bill file reflects 

one committee’s consideration of the amendment and records the 

committee’s view that the open meetings bill was an alternative to 

the Prince George’s County ethics bill: 

Amendment was offered to workgroup and to 

full Committee. Amendment was rejected. 

Committee intends to cover deliberations 

concern[ing] licenses, permits, and zoning. 

Decisions are to be based on the public record 

& therefore saw no reason for discussion of 

the public record to occur behind closed 

doors. . . . Also the current perception about 

local zoning processes was of concern to the 

Committee and it believed that opening these 

meetings would go a long way to combatting 

the negative perceptions & a better 1st 

approach than P[rince] G[eorge’s] Public 

Ethics bills, or similar efforts.
70 [100 Op. Att’y 

1991 Sess., S.B. 170, Amendment (Apr. 4, 1991) (emphasis 

added).15 The bill file reflects that the amendment was later 

introduced as a floor amendment and again was rejected. 

The General Assembly passed S.B. 170, and the Governor 

signed it into law. See 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 655. Now codified at 

GP § 3-103(b)(2), the provision makes the Open Meetings Act 

expressly applicable to a public body when it is “meeting to 

consider: . . . a special exception, variance, conditional use, or 

zoning classification, the enforcement of any zoning law or 

regulation, or any other zoning matter.” In using the word 

“consider,” the General Assembly was using a term that it had 

already used in the Open Meetings Act and that the Court of 

Appeals had already construed, for purposes of that law, as 

including “the deliberative and decision-making process in its 

entirety.” New Carrollton v. Rogers, 287 Md. 56, 72 (1980). 

D. The 1992 Enactment 

“Negative perceptions” about Prince George’s County land 

use proceedings again came to the General Assembly’s attention in 

1992. Early in that session, the Washington Post reported that a 

federal grand jury had subpoenaed the County’s zoning records 

relating to those developers who had been “among the biggest 

financial contributors to County Council campaigns” and the 

financial disclosure forms of all members of the Council since 

1986. Michele L. Norris and Paul Duggan, P.G. Probe Eyes Top 

Developers; Land-Use Inquiry targets Council’s Ties to 

Businessmen, Washington Post (Jan. 23, 1992). The article stated 

that the investigation had begun “almost two years ago, when civic 

groups began publicly complaining of allegedly corrupt land deals 

and calling for a full investigation by the U.S. attorney’s office in 

Baltimore.” Id. Citing a “federal law enforcement source,” the 

article reported that FBI agents assigned to the case had gathered 

“‘a lot of intelligence’ about the connections among developers, 

 

15 Although some commentators have described such undated and 

anonymous notes as “inherently dubious,” see Jack Schwartz & Amanda 

Stakem Conn, The Court of Appeals at the Cocktail Party: The Use and 

Misuse of Legislative History, 54 Md. L. Rev. 432, 453 (1995), the 

Maryland appellate courts sometimes use such materials to discern 

legislative intent. See id. (citing Webber v. State, 320 Md. 238, 247 

(1990), Franklin Square Hosp. v. Laubach, 318 Md. 615, 621-22 (1990), 

and Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474, 497-98 (1989)); see also McNeil v. 

State, 112 Md. App. 434, 452 n.9 (1996) (relying on “undated, 

handwritten notes” contained in the legislative committee’s working 

papers).
Gen. 55] 71

zoning lawyers and current and former council members.” Id. 

Another article in the bill file quoted the Senate President as stating 

that the offices of the members of the County delegation had been 

“besieged with calls from constituents . . . requesting that 

legislation be introduced again” and that the delegation would meet 

to consider re-introducing a county ethics bill. David Sokolik and 

Maria Douglas, Reviving ethics law considered in wake of 

constituents’ calls, The Prince George’s Journal (Jan. 24, 1992). 

In response, the Prince George’s County Senate delegation 

sponsored an ethics bill, S.B. 701, which would have imposed 

affidavit requirements and deadlines that were substantially the 

same as those that appear in the current law. Senate Bill 701 passed 

the Senate but died in the House. 

The Senate then amended H.B. 937—an unrelated piece of 

legislation addressing Montgomery County planning and zoning 

matters—to include the text of S.B. 701. The House passed the 

amended legislation on the last day of the session and, on May 29, 

1992, the Governor signed it into law. 1992 Md. Laws, ch. 643. 

The life of Chapter 643 was even shorter than that of Chapter 

244 of the 1989 laws, and it ended the same way. Two days after 

Chapter 643 took effect, the County Executive, a committee 

supporting his gubernatorial campaign, and two individuals filed a 

declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the law 

violated the single-subject rule. This time, the circuit court agreed 

and declared the ethics provisions severable and void. The Court 

of Appeals, again taking the case before the Court of Special 

Appeals heard it, affirmed that judgment on January 12, 1993, one 

day before the General Assembly convened its 1993 Session. State 

v. Prince Georgians for Glendening, 329 Md. 68 (1993). 

E. The Law Takes its Current Form 

Lasting ethics legislation for Prince George’s County was 

finally enacted in the 1993 session. The measure was introduced 

as H.B. 989, passed by the General Assembly, and signed by the 

Governor. See 1993 Md. Laws, ch. 577. In most respects, the 1993

legislation established the present contours of the law; it contained 

the same affidavit requirement, the same disqualification 

obligation, and the same timing provisions that we construe below. 

Two aspects of the current law were added in 2011, again in 

response to reports of corruption in Prince George’s County. Two 

months before the General Assembly convened for that session, the 
72 [100 Op. Att’y 

press reported the arrest of the outgoing County Executive and his 

wife—a newly-elected Council member—on charges related to his 

receipt of payments from developers and her tampering with and 

destroying evidence. See, e.g., Paul Schwartzman, Ruben 

Castaneda, and Cheryl W. Thompson, Jack Johnson, Prince 

George’s county executive, and his wife, Leslie, arrested, The 

Washington Post (Nov. 13, 2010). In February, 2011, Mr. Johnson 

was indicted on extortion and bribery charges related to his alleged 

receipt of more than $200,000 from developers starting in 2003. 

See, e.g., Associated Press, Former Prince George’s County exec 

Jack Johnson pleads not guilty in case, The Daily Record (March 

15, 2011). 

Meanwhile, Mr. Johnson’s newly-elected successor and the 

County’s delegation began working on legislative proposals. After 

considering a recommendation that the County Council members 

be stripped of all development review powers, the delegation 

instead agreed to introduce a bill to strengthen the State Ethics Law 

and the County Ethics Commission and curtail the County 

Council’s ability to delay development deals. See, e.g., Miranda S. 

Spivack, Bill would end ‘pay to play’ in Prince George’s County, 

The Washington Post (March 16, 2011) (reporting that “[t]he bill 

stems in part from longtime complaints that past councils have 

operated secretively, threatening developers that their plans would 

be held up indefinitely unless they offered concessions or hired an 

associate of a council member”). 

The legislation that emerged, and was enacted, made two 

changes to what is now Part V. See 2011 Md. Laws, ch. 91. The 

first change strengthened the disqualification requirement. At the 

time, the provisions that now comprise Part V only disqualified a 

member from voting or participating on a matter if an applicant or 

agent had filed an affidavit “naming the member or the member’s 

continuing political committee as the recipient of a payment.” Md. 

Code Ann., State Gov’t (“SG”), § 15-831(b)(2)(i) (2009 Repl. 

Vol.); see also State Ethics Opinion 96-02 (concluding that a 

member’s receipt of actual notice, through an interested party’s 

introduction of evidence into the record of the land use proceeding, 

would not disqualify the member). Chapter 91 deleted the filing of 

the affidavit as the trigger for the disqualification requirement with 

the result that the member’s duty no longer hinges entirely on the 

applicants’ compliance with the affidavit requirement. GP § 5-

835(b)(1). The second change broadened the definition of 

“payment” and other provisions in Part V to include contributions 

to a slate to which a member belonged. GP §§ 5-833(m), 5-835. 
Gen. 55] 73

Finally, in 2014, the relevant statutory provisions were 

recodified and transferred from Part IV of Title 15 of the State 

Government Article to its current place in Title 5 of the newlycreated General Provisions Article. 2014 Md. Laws, ch. 94. 

During that process, the code revision committee made a number 

of presumptively non-substantive wording changes to the statute, 

including the affidavit and disqualification provisions we address 

here. The most notable change occurred in the provision that 

governs the timing of the affidavit requirement. Prior to 

recodification, § 15-831(c)(2) of the State Government Article 

provided: 

The affidavit may be filed any time prior to consideration of 

the application by the District Council, at the discretion of the 

applicant. However, in no event may the affidavit be filed less than 

30 calendar days prior to consideration by the District Council of 

the application. 

As it now appears in Part V, the timing provision states: “The 

affidavit shall be filed at least 30 calendar days before 

consideration of the application by the District Council.” GP § 5-

835(c)(2). The Revisor’s note explains that “the former reference 

to filing the affidavit ‘any time prior to consideration . . . at the 

discretion of the applicant’ [wa]s deleted as surplusage.” Id. 

(ellipsis in original).

III 

Analysis 

A. Calculating the Affidavit Filing Deadline

Your first question requires us to address two subsidiary 

questions related to area master plan and sectional map amendment 

proceedings: (1) At what point does the District Council’s 

“consideration” of a person’s application begin?; and (2) If a 

person “applies” by testifying at a hearing at which the District 

Council is deemed to be “considering” that application, when must 

that person file the affidavit about campaign contributions? 

1. When “Consideration” Occurs 

The Ethics Law does not define the word “consideration,” and 

the appellate courts have not addressed its meaning for purposes of 

Part V. The General Assembly has instructed, however, that all but 

the criminal sanctions provisions of the Ethics Law must be 
74 [100 Op. Att’y 

“liberally construed” to accomplish the purpose behind the law. 

GP § 5-102(c). The statute makes that purpose explicit. After 

declaring that public “confidence and trust is eroded when the 

conduct of the State’s business is subject to improper influence or 

even the appearance of improper influence,” the General Assembly 

stated: 

For the purpose of guarding against improper 

influence, the General Assembly enacts this 

Maryland Public Ethics Law to require certain 

government officials and employees to 

disclose their financial affairs and to set 

minimum ethical standards for the conduct of 

State and local business. 

GP § 5-102(b); see also Carroll County Ethics Comm’n v. Lennon, 

119 Md. App. 49, 71 (1998) (describing the Legislature’s “clear 

intent” that the State Ethics Law be “liberally construed to 

accomplish this purpose”); 99 Opinions of the Attorney General

171, 186 (2014). 

More generally, the Court of Appeals instructs us to 

“ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the 

Legislature.” Maryland Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Montgomery County, 

431 Md. 189, 199 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted) 

(“MEDCO”). We “begin[] with the plain language of the statute, 

and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language 

dictates interpretation of its terminology.” Id. (citation and 

quotation marks omitted); see also Blue v. Prince George’s County, 

434 Md. 681, 689 (2013) (statutory language is “typically given its 

ordinary meaning, viewed in context, considered in light of the 

whole statute, and generally evaluated for ambiguity”). The goal 

of statutory interpretation “is always to discern the legislative 

purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied 

by a particular provision.” People’s Ins. Counsel Div. v. Allstate 

Ins. Co., 408 Md. 336, 351 (2009) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). In the end, the language “should be construed to carry 

out and effectuate, or aid in, the general purposes and policies of 

the statute being interpreted.” MEDCO, 431 Md. at 199 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Our discussion thus begins with the ordinary meaning of 

“consideration.” In determining a word’s “ordinary meaning,” the 

Court of Appeals often turns to a dictionary and has done so when 

construing undefined terms within the Ethics Law. See State Ethics 

Commission v. Antonetti, 365 Md. 428, 452 (2001) (construing the 

term “participate” in what is now GP § 5-501); see also, e.g., Blue,
Gen. 55] 75

434 Md. at 690 (turning to “[c]ommon dictionary definitions” 

when the “statute itself does not provide a specific definition”). 

The 1989 edition of Webster’s Ninth Collegiate Dictionary defines 

“consideration” as “continuous and careful thought,” as in, “after 

long consideration he agreed to their requests.” The 1984 edition 

of Webster’s New World Dictionary defines “consideration” as “1. 

The act of considering; deliberation.”16 These definitions do not 

confine the word to any particular stage of deliberation; they 

encompass the entire process. 

The dictionary definition of the term “consideration” 

comports with the Court’s understanding of the word as used in the 

Open Meetings Act. See New Carrollton, 287 Md. 56. The New 

Carrollton Court, noting that the act “covers all meetings at which 

a quorum of the . . . public body is convened ‘for the purpose of 

considering or transacting public business,’” stated: 

It is, therefore, the deliberative and decisionmaking process in its entirety which must be 

conducted in meetings open to the public 

since every step of the process, including the 

final decision itself, constitutes the consideration or transaction of public business. 

Id. at 72 (referring to a provision now codified at GP § 3-101(g)17); 

see also College Park v. Cotter, 309 Md. 573, 585 (1987) (quoting 

New Carrollton). Likewise, the ordinary definition of 

“consideration” comports with the way the General Assembly used 

the word in 1991, when it addressed the “negative perceptions” 

about local zoning processes by amending the Open Meetings Act 

to require a public body to meet openly when it is “meeting to 

 

16 Black’s Law Dictionary, often consulted by the Court, see, e.g., 

Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 669 (2006) (consulting that dictionary 

for an “ordinary, popular” meaning of a word), defined the noun 

“consideration” only by reference to its usage in contracts law. Black’s 

Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). Black’s defined the verb “to consider” 

in its ordinary sense as: “To fix the mind on, with a view to careful 

examination; to examine; to inspect. To deliberate about and ponder 

over. To entertain or give heed to.” Id. 

17 Under the Open Meetings Act, “meet” now means “to convene a 

quorum of a public body to consider or transact public business.” GP 

§ 3-101(g). 
76 [100 Op. Att’y 

consider” zoning matters, not just when it votes on them. See 1991 

Md. Laws, ch. 655.18 

We turn next to whether the ordinary meaning of 

“consideration” effectuates the Legislature’s intent, or, conversely, 

results in absurd and presumably unintended consequences. See, 

e.g., Blue, 434 Md. at 689 (stating that “the consequences of

alternative readings” should be evaluated and absurd consequences 

avoided). One potentially illogical consequence of interpreting 

“consideration” to include the hearing at which the applicantcontributor initially appears emerges quickly in the quasilegislative context: How can an applicant file the affidavit “[a]fter 

an application has been filed” (GP § 5-835(c)(1)) but 30 days 

“before” the council considers it (GP § 5-835(c)(2)) if the 

application and consideration occur simultaneously? The interplay 

of these two timing provisions would seem to compel the 

conclusion that “consideration” of area master plans and sectional 

map amendments must mean a later step in the council’s 

proceedings, whether that be a subsequent hearing or the actual 

decision on the application. 

Although reading “consideration” to mean a later step in the 

deliberative process would seem to preserve the logic of the 

statute’s timing provisions, it has other limitations that weigh 

against it. First, that reading would assume that the Legislature 

intended to assign greater deliberative significance to one hearing 

over another. We see no evidence of such intent or even a logical 

basis on which to make such a distinction. Equating 

“consideration” with “decision” might make logical sense, but it 

would seem to be inconsistent with § 5-837, which uses another 

term—“final action”—for the ultimate disposition of the 

application. More importantly, an interpretation of “consideration” 

that allows a Council member to attend a hearing at which a 

 

18 For one commentator’s description of the 1991 amendment of the 

Open Meetings Act as a way of promoting integrity in land use 

processes, see Philip J. Tierney, Bold Promises But Baby Steps: 

Maryland’s Growth Policy to the Year 2000, 23 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461, 

520, n.48 (1994) (“The element of greed is . . . a factor sometimes 

present in the land use regulatory process as illustrated by Maryland’s 

periodic history of political corruption by local zoning officials that 

prompted the state legislature and the courts to adopt a number of 

reforms that include among other requirements: open meetings, Md. 

Code Ann., State Gov’t §§ 10-501 to 10-512 (1993 & Supp. 1994); 

public ethics and financial disclosure requirements, Md. Ann. Code art. 

40A, §§ 1-101 to 7-104 (1993 & Supp. 1994); and adjudicatory 

safeguards . . . .”). 
Gen. 55] 77

campaign donor advocates in support of his application cannot be 

squared with other provisions of the statute or with its broader 

public policy goal of limiting the influence of campaign 

contributions on the County’s land use process. The statute 

provides that a council member “may not vote or participate in any 

way” in a proceeding involving a contributor’s application. GP 

§ 5-835(b)(1). Although the term “participation” is not defined in 

the statute, the Court of Appeals has construed that term, in another 

section of the Ethics Law, to mean “to have or take a part or share 

with others (in some activity, enterprise, etc.).” Antonetti, 365 Md. 

at 452 (adopting the definition in Webster’s New World College 

Dictionary in construing the requirement that an official may not 

“participate” in a matter if a relative has an interest in the matter). 

By that standard, a council member’s presence during his 

contributor’s testimony would constitute “participation” in the 

proceedings.19

In our opinion, the statute’s policy goal—limiting the 

influence of campaign contributions on the County’s land use 

process—would be undermined if the affidavit deadline were to be 

interpreted to allow a Council member to be present during a 

contributor’s presentation. The General Assembly sought not only 

to restrict influence, but also to improve public confidence in the 

integrity of the land use process by eliminating even “the 

appearance of improper influence.” GP § 5-102(a)(2) (emphasis 

added). That larger goal, too, would be undermined by giving the 

conflicted Council member a place at the table regardless of 

whether he overtly influences the Council’s deliberation. A 

member could influence, or appear to influence, his colleagues’ 

position on his contributor’s proposal in any number of ways 

during the hearing, whether by making comments, asking 

 

19 We recognize that the language of § 5-835(b)(1) suggests that the 

disqualification provision applies only “[a]fter [a contributor’s] 

application has been filed,” which could be read as authorizing the 

council member to participate while that application is being filed. As 

discussed above, these timing provisions seem to have been drafted for 

the type of traditional application that is submitted in a quasi-judicial 

proceeding, where the Council’s consideration would only come after 

the application is submitted. See supra at 2. In that context, giving effect 

to the timing provision in § 5-835(b)(1) makes sense. We believe it 

makes considerably less sense when read in the context of proceedings 

on an area master plan or sectional map amendments, which are quasilegislative actions that are initiated in ways other than the filing of a 

traditional application. 
78 [100 Op. Att’y 

questions, or even just seeming to convey his approval or 

disapproval of particular witnesses’ testimony. The potential for 

that influence could be magnified in a jurisdiction like Prince 

George’s County, where elected officials serve by district, rather 

than at large. In those circumstances, “councilmanic courtesy” can 

give decisive weight to an official’s views on a proposal involving 

the official’s home district.20 

The principles that guide the interpretation of statutes thus 

suggest a broad construction of the term “consideration.” A broad 

construction effectuates legislative intent, comports with the 

General Assembly’s direction that the Ethics Law “be liberally 

construed,” GP § 5-102(c), and gives this remedial statute the 

construction necessary “to suppress the evil and advance the 

remedy.” See Lark v. Montgomery Hospice, Inc., 414 Md. 215, 

228 (2010). In this regard, we note the observation of the Court of 

Appeals that the need for the enforcement of ethics laws is 

“‘perhaps even more acute . . . at the local government level, where 

the government and its citizens have greater contact with one 

another.’” Antonetti, 365 Md. at 447-48 (addressing the conduct of 

an employee of local board of elections, a State agency, quoting 

Lennon, 119 Md. App. at 61). If anything is clear from the long 

legislative history of this statute, it is the General Assembly’s 

repeatedly-demonstrated concern about the erosion of public 

confidence in the County’s land use process brought on by repeated 

reports of abuse. It thus makes sense—and does not lead to absurd 

consequences—to read the affidavit deadline in such a way as to 

disqualify Council members from their contributors’ land use 

applications in time to prevent them from participating in any phase 

of the Council’s deliberation. 

To summarize, we believe that a narrow interpretation of 

“consideration” to exclude the early stages of the District Council’s 

 

20 “In some large cities land-use decisions are determined by a system 

of ‘councilmanic courtesy’: all members of the elected governing body 

informally agree to follow the decision of the member from the district 

where the land-use problem has arisen.” David Schleicher, City 

Unplanning, 122 Yale L.J. 1670, 1710 (2013) (quoting Robert C. 

Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal 

Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385, 408 n.60 (1977)). The practice is related to 

“local courtesy,” which is “an unwritten, commonly observed custom 

where the members of both the House and the Senate of the General 

Assembly defer to the representatives of a particular jurisdiction, i.e. a 

county’s local legislative delegation, on matters affecting only that 

district.” Getty v. Carroll County Bd. of Elections, 399 Md. 710, 724-25 

n.13 (2007).
Gen. 55] 79

proceedings, whether in a meeting or by other action of that body, 

would weaken the disqualification requirement, run counter to the 

General Assembly’s likely understanding of the word when it 

enacted the law, and conflict with the statutory requirement that the 

Ethics Law be construed “liberally” to achieve its purposes. Given 

the shared purpose of Part V and the Open Meetings Act to enhance 

public faith in government through disclosure requirements, and 

the General Assembly’s consideration of both laws as a way of 

addressing the influence of campaign contributions on the District 

Council’s land use decisions, we believe that the New Carrollton

definition of “consideration” applies here. In our opinion, then, 

“consideration” for purposes of Part V means the Council’s 

“deliberative and decision-making process in its entirety.” See 

New Carrollton, 287 Md. at 72. 

2. When the Affidavit Must Be Filed 

We turn now to the more practical question of when, given 

our conclusion above, the applicant must submit his or her 

affidavit. Again, the statute contains two provisions that bear on 

the issue: § 5-835(c)(1), which requires that the applicant file the 

affidavit “[a]fter an application is filed,” and § 5-835(c)(2), which 

requires that the affidavit be filed “at least 30 calendar days before 

consideration of the application by the District Council.” When an 

applicant who has contributed to a member’s campaign applies 

only by testifying at a hearing, these two provisions conflict: the 

first would seem to allow the applicant to file the affidavit after 

testifying, while the second would require him to file it at least 30 

days before testifying. 

The only way to achieve the timely disqualification of the 

member from the proceeding is to require the applicant to file the 

affidavit before the hearing. So, given the choice between the two 

timing provisions, the provision that requires that the affidavit be 

filed “at least 30 calendar days before consideration of the 

application,” GP § 5-835(c)(2), best effectuates the Legislature’s 

intent that District Council members be timely barred from 

participating in, and voting on, their contributors’ land use matters. 

This conclusion is clearer still from the wording of the timing 

provision prior to its recodification in 2014: 

The affidavit may be filed any time prior to 

consideration of the application by the District 

Council, at the discretion of the applicant. 

However, in no event may the affidavit be 
80 [100 Op. Att’y 

filed less than 30 calendar days prior to 

consideration by the District Council of the 

application. 

Former SG § 15-831(c)(2) (emphasis added); see also Allen v. 

State, 402 Md. 59, 71-72, (2007) (observing that the “[r]ecodification of statutes is presumed to be for the purpose of clarity rather 

than change of meaning”). In our view, the legislative intent 

behind Part V would not be served by enabling an applicant to 

delay a council member’s disqualification by waiting to file the 

affidavit until after the hearing on whether to re-zone the planning 

area in which the applicant’s land lies. See GP § 5-835(f) 

(prohibiting an applicant from taking “any action, directly or 

indirectly, with the intent to circumvent the intent of this part”). 

We reach the same result by applying the formalistic rule that 

when two provisions in a statute conflict, the more specific prevails 

over the more general. See, e.g., A. S. Abell Pub. Co. v. Mezzanote, 

297 Md. 26, 40 (1983) (“Ordinarily, a specific enactment prevails 

over an incompatible general enactment in the same or another 

statute.”). Section 5-835(c)(1) focuses on the content of the 

affidavit and addresses timing only in a generally-worded preface 

to its detailed description of the disclosures to be made. By 

contrast, § 5-835(c)(2) focuses only on timing. Given the structure 

of the section and the emphasis given to the 30-day provision in its 

earlier form, we believe that § 5-835(c)(2)—“at least 30 calendar 

days before consideration of the application”—provides the 

operative deadline.21

 

In construing Part V, we have referred only to State law; our 

interpretation of what it means for the District Council to 

“consider” an application does not hinge on the procedures the 

Council has established by ordinance. We have done so because 

the General Assembly expressly provided that the County must 

carry out the land use powers granted to it by the Regional District 

Act “in accordance with” the Special Provisions, 

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.” GP § 5-834. 

Moreover, an uncodified section of Part V provides that “this Act: 

 

21 As noted above, there are similarities between the affidavit filing 

deadlines in the Howard County and Prince George’s County ethics 

provisions. See supra note 11. Although that might suggest that the 

conclusions we reach here can be applied in Howard County as well, we 

cannot rule out the possibility that the meaning of the term 

“consideration” might vary with the circumstances of each county’s 

“special” provisions. We do not mean to foreclose that possibility here; 

we construe only the Prince George’s County provisions.
Gen. 55] 81

(1) Supersedes any Prince George’s County ordinance dealing with 

subjects covered by this Act; and (2) May not be supplemented by 

any Prince George’s County ordinance.” 1993 Md. Laws, ch. 577, 

§ 4; see also, e.g., County Council of Prince George’s County v. 

Brandywine Enters., 350 Md. 339, 346 (1998) (observing that “any 

enactment concerning zoning in the county, which is at variance 

with the Regional District Act, is inoperative within the district”) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Northampton 

Corp. v. Prince George’s County, 273 Md. 93, 96 (1974) (same). 

Accordingly, a person who supports the up-zoning of property 

in which he has an interest must file the contribution affidavit 30 

days before any stage of the District Council’s deliberation on the 

matter, no matter how that person chooses to “apply.” For 

example, if a landowner “applies” by asking a Council or Planning 

Commission member to initiate the process for a sectional map 

amendment that would up-zone the landowner’s property, the 

landowner must file his affidavit 30 days before the District 

Council, as a body, addresses whether to initiate the process. 

Likewise, a landowner who wishes to “apply” by appearing at a 

District Council hearing on the matter must file the affidavit 30 

days in advance of the hearing.

We understand that, under this interpretation, a person who 

wants to participate only by speaking at a hearing before the 

District Council must form that intention in time to file an affidavit 

30 days in advance. We read the statute as requiring that level of 

foresight because the Ethics Law expressly requires that the 

County’s land use powers “shall be carried out in accordance with” 

Part V. See GP § 5-834. In other words, the County must adapt 

its land use decision-making process to accommodate the 

requirements of Part V, not the other way around. The County must 

therefore give landowners adequate notice of upcoming 

proceedings that might affect their property, and landowners who 

want their land up-zoned during those proceedings must plan 

accordingly. 

B. Whether an Application “Can Move Forward” When an 

Applicant Has Failed to File the Required Affidavit 30 Days 

Before the Council Meets to Consider the Application

In our view, the Council lacks the power to proceed with the 

application of a person who has failed to timely file the required 

affidavit. Although Part V does not explicitly provide as much, we 
82 [100 Op. Att’y 

believe the District Council is not authorized to proceed in the face 

of an applicant’s or agent’s violation of Part V. 

The Council does not have inherent zoning powers; instead, 

it has only those powers that the State has granted it. See

Montgomery Pres., Inc. v. Montgomery County Planning Bd. of the 

Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 424 Md. 

367, 377 (2012) (“The Council can only exercise its powers under 

the statute to the extent and in the manner directed by the 

legislature”). As to the Prince George’s County land within the 

Maryland-Washington Regional District, those powers are granted 

by the Regional District Act. See Brandywine, 350 Md. at 346 

(observing that “the Regional District Act is the exclusive source 

of zoning authority in those areas of Prince George’s County 

located within the Regional District”). Section 22-206(b) of the 

Land Use Article, which authorizes the District Council to adopt 

certain procedures, does not list the ethics deadlines as one of the 

procedures the District Council may alter. Moreover, as we noted 

in the preceding section, the District Council may only exercise its 

Regional District Act powers “in accordance” with Part V. GP 

§ 5-834. In our view, it would not accord with Part V for the 

District Council to consider the applications of landowners who 

have violated the affidavit requirement, especially as the efficacy 

of the disqualification requirement hinges largely on compliance 

with the affidavit requirement. See, e.g., GP § 5-839(b)(3) 

(providing that a member “is guilty of violating this part only if the 

member fails to abstain from voting or participating in a 

proceeding, based on information contained in an affidavit”). 

The importance of strict compliance with the affidavit 

requirement is also reflected in the judicial review provisions of the 

statute, which mandate that the circuit court “shall issue an order 

voiding an official action taken by the County Council if . . . the 

action taken by the County Council was in violation of this part.” 

GP § 5-839(a)(2) (emphasis added). In short, “any enactment 

concerning zoning in the county, which is at variance with the 

Regional District Act, is inoperative within the district.” 

Brandywine, 350 Md. at 346 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Finally, we note that nothing in Part V gives the District 

Council the discretion to grant extensions or exceptions to the 

statutory deadlines for the various disclosures that Part V requires. 

Affidavits and the other disclosures required by the statute are to 

be filed with the clerk of the County Council, who is to act under 

the “direction and control” of the State Ethics Commission and its 

Executive Director. GP § 5-838(a), (c); see also GP § 5-101(k) 
Gen. 55] 83

(defining “Ethics Commission” to mean the State Ethics 

Commission). The clerk “may only” perform four tasks: receive 

filings, maintain records, report violations, and perform “other 

ministerial duties necessary to administer this part.” GP § 5-

838(a). One of those “other ministerial duties” is putting the 

affidavits in the appropriate case files; another is submitting a 

“summary report” that compiles the affidavits and disclosures. GP 

§ 5-838(c). The Council clerk’s duties thus resemble those of a 

District or circuit court clerk; neither has the authority to extend 

deadlines set by rule or law. See, e.g., Mutual Ben. Soc. of 

Baltimore, Inc. v. Haywood, 257 Md. 538, 541 (1970) (court 

officials’ actions “must conform to the practices as defined in the 

Maryland Rules of Practice and Procedure”); see also re Kaela C., 

394 Md. 432, 471-72 (2006) (because filing deadlines in the 

Maryland Rules are “precise rubrics,” circuit court erred by 

adopting the master’s recommendations before the five-day period 

for filing exceptions had expired). 

We thus conclude that the Council may not proceed with an 

application when the applicant has not complied with Part V. 

Although the consequences of proceeding in the absence of 

affidavits will depend on the specific facts of the Council’s 

decision, we agree with the Ethics Commission that an applicant’s 

failure to file a timely affidavit would raise “serious questions” 

about the validity of the Council’s action. See Memorandum Re: 

Prince George’s County Zoning Ethics, Disclosure Participation 

and Contributions Provisions—Md. Code Ann., General

Provisions §§ 5-833 – 5-839, at 4 (Oct. 1, 2014). For example, in 

2012, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County struck down 

the portions of a 2009 sectional map amendment that related to 

properties for which affidavits were required but had not been filed. 

See Accokeek, Mattawoman, Piscataway Creeks Communities 

Council v. County Council of Prince George’s County, Maryland, 

sitting as the District Council, CAL Nos. 09-31402 and 09-32017, 

Memorandum and Order of Court (Pr. G. Cty. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 

2012). The court ordered that those properties were to “retain their 

original zones prior to the [amendment].” Id. at 5, 8. 

How to implement the statute so as to avoid such 

consequences will depend on factual circumstances that the District 

Council is better able to anticipate than we are. That said, several 

general approaches suggest themselves. It is our understanding, for 

example, that the District Council already informs potential 

applicants to submit their affidavits at least 30 days prior to the 

scheduled hearing date at which they intend to testify. See supra 
84 [100 Op. Att’y 

n.3. The Council might also wish to reiterate, at the opening of 

testimony, that applicants will not be allowed to testify unless they 

have filed a timely affidavit. And if an applicant’s failure to file an 

affidavit becomes apparent only later in the proceeding, Accokeek 

would seem to suggest that the Council should remove the 

applicant’s property from consideration and postpone any future 

consideration of it until after a timely affidavit has been filed. We 

only suggest these; what approach suits a particular set of 

circumstances is best addressed by the Council in accordance with 

the Ethics Commission’s guidance. 

IV 

Conclusion 

In our opinion, the Prince George’s County District Council’s 

“consideration” of an application for purposes of Part V of the 

Public Ethics Law occurs whenever the District Council, as a body, 

addresses the matter, whether or not the District Council intends to 

act on it at that time. Further, the Council may not move forward 

with an application if an applicant has failed to file the necessary 

affidavit at least 30 calendar days before the matter comes before 

the District Council. The Ethics Law does not grant to either the 

District Council or the clerk of the County Council the discretion 

to change the filing deadline or excuse applicants and agents from 

it. 

Brian E. Frosh 

Attorney General of Maryland 

Adam D. Snyder 

Chief Counsel Opinions 

 & Advice 

* Jeffrey G. Middleton, a former intern in this office, assisted in the 

preparation of this opinion.