### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN
NO. 03-00-00538-CR

Gera ld C. Z uliani, Appell ant
v. The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 299T H JUDICIAL DIST RICT NO. 0970158, HONORABLE FRED A. MOORE, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

A jury fou nd ap pellant Ger ald C. Zuliani guilty o f involunt ar y manslaught er . T he dis trictco ur t as se ss ed pu nis hme n t at te n yea rs ’ i m pri son men t an d a f i n e of $1 0,0 00 . In

si x poi n ts of er ror, appe l l an

t con ten dsth e d i str i ct court er re d by ove rr uling his mot ion t o q uas h t he indict ment an

d th at t he ev i den ce i s l eg al l y an d f ac tual l y i n suf f i ci en t. F i n di n g th es e c on ten ti on s to be wit hou t merit , w e affirm the judg ment o f co nvictio n. BACKGROUND Ap pel l an t and Robbi Boutwel l were married i n D ecem ber 1989
. Boutwell

had two chi ldren by a prev i ous m arriage: Ch

ri stophe r Woh l ers, a ge two, and

Jen ni f er Wohlers, a

ge f our. Boutwel l and the chi l dren had li ve d wi th appel l an t for s ev eral

weeks b ef

ore the m arriage. At 10: 44 p .m. on J anua ry 2, 199 0, emerg ency medica l servi c es workers responded to a 911 ca ll fro m Bo ut we ll wh o r eq ue st ed an amb ula nc e b ec au se he rso n ha d “ pa ss ed o ut wh ile2

he was t aking a bath” an d had “ slippe d under the water.” Boutwell reported, “We h ave b een t ryingto adm

in is ter CPR, but he is

not responding. He has a heartbeat and . . . he i s throwing up st uff, but I c an’t get him to like bre at he. He is lo sing co lor and c oming bac k and losing co lor and
co ming ba ck
. ” W it hin e igh t min ut es of th e c al l , a s th e E MS di sp atch er

ga v e C PR i n str uc ti on s to Bout we ll o ve rt he t ele ph o ne , E MS pe r so nne l an d A us t in p o lice o ffice r s a rr ive d a t t he Zu lia n i home
. Bo ut well informed t hem tha t she had l eft the chi ld a lone for a m in ute or two and had returned to f

i nd h i m sub merged i n w ater. Paramedi cs treat in g Chri stopher at t he sc ene o bser ved t hat he wa s no t bre at hing and that his

hai r and body

were dry. On

e param edi c observed m

ulti pl e b r uis es on Christ opher ’s bo dy, in cl udin g swel li ng an d brui si ng on the sc ro t um and a ligat ur e mark on t he pe nis. App ellant attempted to cover Christopher’s genitals with a swe at shirt , bu t t he pa ra medic inst ru ct ed t he pa r en t s no t t o “c o ve rup t he ba by an ymo r e” so t he y co uld co nt inu e t o wo r k o n him.

Chri stopher wa s t ak en t o t he ho sp it al e me rgency roo m a t appro xi ma tely 11:30 p. m. Th e tre ati

ng ph y si ci an , Dr . Joh

n J af f e, ob serv ed

tha t he wa s n ot con sc i ousor brea

thi ng on his ow n. D r. Jaffe qu ickly det er mined t hat t he child wa s no t a dr ow ning vict im and t hat t he parents’ r ep o r t o f an immer sio n inju ry wa s no t co nsis t en t wit h t he ac t ua l in juri es. Bas ed

on mult iple retinal

hem orrhages and the l

ack of ne urological fun ction, the doctor determi ned that Chri stopher had a cl

osed head i

nj ury an d was sev erely brai n dam aged. He a lso o bse r ve d mu lt iple brui ses on various parts o f the ch il d’s b ody, i

ncl udin g hi s penis. A l

ater CT scan conf

irm ed that Chri stopher had a severely in jured b rain, with two dif

feren t areas of bleed ingin

the subdural

space in the br ain, a nd a fr act ur ed s kull. D r. Jaffe co nclude d t hat Christ op her had be en bea t en.1 Thi s convi ction f oll owed ap pe llant ’s se co nd t r ial o n t he o r igin al ind ict men t . His fi rst t rial en ded in a m is trial after i t was disc overed that certain i tems n ot in evi dence, i ncl udin g ap pe l l an

t’ s co nfessio n, had been i

nadvertently s ent to the jury room with the exh ib its pr ope

rl y ad m i tted i n to evi den ce. 3 At t he po lice st at ion, aft er initially t elling the po lic e t ha t he rso n ha d b ec o me subm erged in wa t er whe n she left him alo ne in t he b at ht ub, Bo ut we ll des cr ibed fi nd in g ap pellant in the bathroom wi

th Chri stopher, who was ly in g un conscious on the fl

oor . She al so related conduct by

appella nt that caused the in

juri es. Chri stopher was pronounced de ad on the af tern oon of Janu ar y 3, 1 990 . O n J anu ary 4, an autopsy determi

ned that death was caus ed by bi la teral sub dural hemorrhagi

ng w i th m arked edem a of the b rai n du e to bl unt trau ma to the h

ead. Appe llantwas f

i rs t indict ed a nd t ried for intent ionally and kno wingly caus ing seri ous bodi

l y i nj ury to a chi l d. SeeAct of May

29, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S ., ch. 357, § 1, 1989 Te x. Gen . Law s 144 1, 1441 (Tex
. Pe na l Code Ann . § 22.04(a)(1) , sin ce am ended). He was convi cted of the lesser i

ncl uded off en se o f reckl

essl y c ausi ng the i nj ury, b ut t he conv

iction was reversed by thi s Court i

n 19 95 an

d the caus e was

rem anded f or a ne w tri al
. See Zulian i v. State , 903 S.W .2d 812(Tex . App.—A usti n 19 95, pet. ref

’d). 1 O n Janu ar y 21, 199 7, app ellant w as r e- indict ed fo r mur der on t he t he ory th at h e ca us ed Ch ri sto ph er ’s de ath by pre ve nti ng Bou twe l l f rom obta i ni ng medi cal ca re f orthe chi l d. See Act of M ay 28, 197 3, 63rd

Leg ., R.S., ch . 426, a

rt. II, sec . 1, § 19.0 2, 1 973 Tex. Gen. Law s 1122, 1123 ( Tex . Penal

Code A nn . § 19.02 (a)(1), since am en ded). A second count, all egi ng that app ellant recklessl

y caused serious bo dily in j ur y to th e ch i l d, was

ab an don ed b y th e S tate pri or to t r ial. The j ury f ound a ppel l an t guil ty of the l ess er i nc lude d of

f en se of i nv olu ntary man slaugh

ter.4

SeeAct of May

29, 1987, 70t h Leg., R.S., ch. 307, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 16 98, 169 8 ( Te x. Penal Code A nn . § 19.05 (a)(1), s i

nc e rec odi f

i ed as § 19.04 (a)). DISCUSSI ON I. Prosecutorial Vindict iveness

In hi s f irst poin t o f error, appe llant contends his Fourteenth Am endm ent due pro cess right s we re violated when the Stat e i

ndicted hi m f or murder, a fi

rst degree fel

ony, af ter his co nvictio n f

or reckl ess l y i nj uri ng a chi l d, a thi

rd deg ree f elony, wasrev erse d on a

ppea l
. See U.S. Cons

t. amend. XIV. A

ppel l ant arg ue s th

at a pre su m ption of vindict iveness a pplies w hen a
sec ond pr os ecu t ion “pr ese nt s a r isk o f gre at er puni shme nt.” Once the presum ption was raised, app ellant cont ends, it wa s the S tat e’s bur den to reb ut the p res

um ption b y pre senti ng rea sons or circu msta nces demo nst ra t ingthat t he decisi on to rein dict for a greater o ff

ense was m

ot iv ated by a l egi tim ate purp ose. The Stat e responds that because the origi

nal in dictment accuse d a

pp ella nt of in tentional inj ur y t o a child, a first deg re e felony, t he se co nd indict ment d id no t acc use app ellant of a gre ater offen se an d t he r efo r e n o pr es ump t io n w as r ais ed
. T he St at e fu r t he rco nt en ds t ha t it had a constitutional

ly le giti ma te reason for rein

di cting a ppe llant and t hat , in any event , a ppe llant suf fered no harm

becaus e he r ece ived t he sa me pena lty at t he se co nd t rial as he re ceived at t he f i rs t. At t he hea ring o n app ellant’ s mot ion t o q uas h, the prosecuto r denied that the new indict ment was obtain

ed to r etali

ate against ap pe lla nt for his successf ul appeal of the fi

rst co nvictio n. H e st at ed t hat t he deci si on to seek the m urder in dictment was b ased

on h i s eva l ua ti on5

of th e f ac ts w h en h e too k ov

er th e c as e f

rom an oth er p r o se cu t o r . Be ca us e t he o ffen se ch ar ge d in t he se co nd ind ict men t ca rr ied t he sa me penal ty as that charged i

n the origi

nal in dictment, he urged that there was no potential for vi ndictive ness . The trial

court found n

o vin dictiven ess an d deni ed t he mot ion. In North Car oli na v. Pearce , the Supreme Court addressed whether a tri al judge
co uld inc r ea se a d efe nd an t ’s se nt en ce aft er co nvic t io n a t a r et r ial fo llo win g a su cc es sfu l ap pe al. NorthCarolina v. Pearce , 395 U. S. 711 ( 1969). Two separat e case s were bef o r e t he Co ur t in Pearce . In both cases, the def endan ts succe ss full y

appe al ed the i r ori gi na l con vi cti ons an d on retrial recei

ved greater sentence s than they had origi nal ly recei ved. The Court held that nei ther t he Do ub le J eo pa r dy C lau se no rt he E qu al P r o t ec t io n C la use barred i

mposi tion of the greater sentence s at the retr ia

ls . But it held that t he Due Process Cl ause barred

the in creased se nt en ce s if they wereac tual l

y moti v ate d b y v i n di cti v e r eta l i ati on : “ Du e p roc es s of

l aw , then, requires tha

t vi ndi ctiveness

agai nst a def endan t for havi ng succes sf

ull y a tt acked his f

irst co nvi ct ion m ust play
no part in the s ent ence h e recei ves af ter a new trial .” Id . at 725. Because fear of s uch vi ndi ctiveness

mi ght chi ll a defe ndan t’s deci si on to appeal , the Court went on to say that “du e process als o requires tha

t a d ef en da nt b e f ree d of appre he ns i on of such a re tal i atory moti va ti on on the part o f the s entenci

ng j udge
. ” Id
. To ensure the absence of vi ndi ctiveness and to as su

re d ef en da nts tha t the y wi l l not be pen aliz ed for asserti

ng thei r righ ts on appeal, the Suprem

e Court fashi

oned a r ule requiri

ng that wh enev er a j udge

i m poses a m ore sev eresent ence on a defend ant aft er a new t rial, t he judge m ust affir mat ive ly

sta te ob je ctive reas ons f

or the i ncreas e i n s en tenc e. Id . at 726. In Pearce , the S tate6

off ered no e vidence t o ju st ify

t he incre ase d se nt ence and a dvanc ed no re aso n f or the greater pe na lt y. Fi

n di n g n o ex pl an ati on f or th e i n cr ea se d s en

te nces in ei

ther of the two ca ses , the c ourt af f i rmed th e j udgm

en ts gran tin g rel i ef
. Id
. The Su pr eme Co ur t ext end ed t he r at io nale o f Pearce to a cl ai m of prosecuto rial vi ndi ctive n es s in Blackledg e v. Perry , 417 U.S. 21 (1974) . In that case, the defen dant was convi cted of a m i sdemean or by a lower state court . Af

ter t he def

endan t clai me d hi s righ

t t o t rial de novo in a higher co ur t , t he pr os ecu t or obt ained a sup er sed ing indict ment c har ging t he defen dant wi th a fel ony rather than

a m is dem eanor. As wi

th a judge who resentence s a def

en da n t, t he Court concl

uded that a prosecu to r’s di scr etion to reindi ct a defen

dant is li mi ted by the Due Pro cess Claus e. Id
. at 27-29
. T he Court hel d that a defen dant’s ri ght to due process is

off ended when t he go ver nment r esp ond s t o his invo cat ion o f the right t o a ppe al by bring in g a more seri

ous charge b ef

orere trial : “

A pers on con v i cte d of an of f ense i s e n ti tl ed to pu rs ue h i s statu tory ri gh t to a t r ial de novo , without apprehensi on that t he State wil

l retal ia te by substi tut in g a m ore s erious chargefo rt he o r igin al o ne , th ussu bj ec ti ng hi m to a s i gn

i f i ca ntl y i nc rea se d pote

nti al pe riod of i nc arce rati on.” Id . at 28. The Court n oted, h o wever, that the Due Process Cla use i s not offen

ded by all pos sibil

ities o f increa sed punishment , b ut on l y by thos e that p res en

t a re al i sti c l i ke l i hood of vi ndi cti vene ss. Id . at 27. Appe llantdoes not clai

m that there i s evi

dence o f ac t ua l vind ict ive ne ss in t his case. Instead, he ass erts that t he ci rcumstances create a presum ption of v

in dictiven ess that coul d be
ov ercom e on l y b y af f i rm ati v e ev i den ce

of a n on v i n di cti v e r ea son f or s eeki n g th e n ew i n di ctm en t.7 A pre su m ption of vi ndictive ness aris es when

the ci rcumstances of the ca se create a
r ea list ic l i kel i hood of prosec utoria l vi ndi cti vene ss. U

nited States v. Johnson , 171 F.3d 139, 141 (2dCi r. 19 99) ; see also United S tates v . Goodw in , 45 7 U . S. 36 8, 37 4 ( 19 82 ) ( de clinin g t o ap ply pre su m ption of vi ndictive ness when prosecuto r obtained i

ndictmen t for more seri ous offen

se af ter defend ant in

voked righ

t t o jury trial ). Al thougha prosecuto r may

n ot us e th

e ch argi n g p roc es s to penal iz e a defe

ndan t for the exerci se of h

is constitutional

righ ts, co ur t s have re sist ed d ra wing bright li nes an d cl assify in g any par ticular prosecut orial deci sion as per sevi ndi cti ve . See United States v. Krezdorn , 71 8 F .2d 13 60 , 13 64 -6 5 ( 5th

Ci r. 1983 ). The relevan

t question i s whether there is a re alistic likelihoo d t hat t he pr os ecu t or act ed o ut of a vindict ive mot ive rat her t han a l egi tim ate one . See Good

win , 45 7 U. S. at 373 ; Blackledge , 417 U .S. at 27. Reindict ment does not aut omatic al ly giv e r is e t o an inf

erence of vi

ndi ctiveness. See, e.g., Johns on , 1 71 F .3 d at 140 -4 1. The pr act ice co ndemned in Blackledge was t he pro secut or ’s “upp ing t he ant e” in re spo nse t o t he de fendant ’s invoc at ion o f his right t o a ppe al by bringing a more serious charge agai nst hi m . Blackledge , 4 17 U. S. at 28 . I n t he c o nt ext o f a
r et r ial, a p re su

m pti on of v i n di cti veness m

ay ari se w hen, i n the ab sen

ce of new ev i den ce, a defend ant i s i

ndi cted f or a ne w, m ore ser i ou s o ffens e aft er suc ces sfully appea ling his convict ion. See Ronk v

. State , 57 8 S
. W. 2d 12 0, 12 1 ( T ex . Cr im. App. 1979). The presumption does not arise if the new cha

rge s a re no more ser

i ous tha n those i n the ori gi

na l i ndi ctmen t. See, e.g., Neal v. Cain , 14 1 F .3d

20 7, 2 14 (5 th

Ci r. 1998 ).2 Thatin tentional in jury to a chi ld was a f irst degree f

el ony a t t he t ime the instant offense was commi

tt ed distinguishes appellan t’s ca se fr o m Ronk v. State , 578 S.W.2d120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)
. In Ronk , t he defen dants w er e ind ict ed fo rmur de raft er t he y su cc es sfu lly ap pe ale d t he ir co nvictio ns f

or in j ury to a c hi l d. A t the ti me of t he o ffense in Ronk , in

tentional in jury to a chi ld was a sec ond de gree f

elony . SeePenal

Code, 63rd Leg., R.S. , ch. 399, sec . 1 , § 22. 04, 197 3 T ex. Gen. Laws 883, 920 (Tex. Penal Code Ann . § 22.04, since ame nd ed )
. T he co ur t o f cr iminal a pp ea ls he ld that i t wa s i m perm i ss i b l e f or th e S tate to re sp on d to t he de fendant s’ su cce ssful ap pea ls of t he origi nal conv i cti ons b y bri ngi ng th e m ore ser i ous ch arge a gai nst them
. Ronk , 578 S.W.2d at 121. 8 Unl ike t he de fendant in Blackledge , appellan t was n ot in

dicted for a more serious offense fo llo win g h is su ccessful appeal of hi s fi rst conviction. I nstead , t he pro secut or ’s
asse ssment o f t he se ve r it y o f t he cr ime was t he same both befor e and after appellant’s firs t ap pe al. Appe llantwas o r igin ally ind ict ed fo rint en t io na lly and kn o win gly c au sing se r io us bo dily i njury to a ch ild , a f ir st de gr ee fe lo ny. 2 The second i ndictmen t also accused

appell ant of a fi rst de gr ee fe lo ny, m urder. Bo t h indict ment s s ubject ed a ppe llant t o t he sa me po t ent ial per iod of incar cer at ion. Al thought he se co nd indict ment c ont aine d a second count, the Stat e aban doned i t and proceeded to trial on the si ngle m urder charge. We hold that appel

la nt’s conv iction f or a lesser of

fen se at the f i rs t tri al di d n ot c re ate a due process ceili

ng f or any s ubsequen t indi ctmen t based on the sam

e conduct. Becau s e th e two i ndictmen ts carried i

dentic al penal ties an d the num

ber of ch arges agai

nst appel la nt was
n ot i n cr ea se d, n

o pres um pti on of pr ose cu tori al v i n di cti v en es s a ri se s f rom th e s ec on d i

n di ctm en t. Even apart f rom the number an

d severity of

charges, we cannot say that there is a
r ea list ic li kel ihood of vindict iveness in light of t he pu nishments asse ssed at t he t wo t rials. At t he fi rst trial , the jury

co nvicted app ellant o f a lesser -includ ed t hird- deg re e felony o ffense and
assess ed puni shm ent at ten years’ im

prisonm ent and a $10,000 f

in e. On ret r ial, the jury al so9

fo un d a pp ella nt gu ilt y o f a le ss er - inc lud ed t hir d- de gr ee felo ny o ffen se an d t he jud ge se nt en ce d h im to ten y ears ’ i m pri sonm en t and a $10 ,000 f

i ne . Th us , b ot h trial s res

ul ted i n c onv i cti ons f or thi rd degree fe loni

es and the s entences

im posed were the sam

e. Appe llantwo uld ha ve us pr es ume vind ict ive ne ss fr o m t he pr o se cu t o r ’s de lay in
see king t he se co nd ind ic tm en t a nd the f

ai lure to in

cl ude the m

urder charge i

n the origi

nal i n di ctm en t. A pp el l an t h as ci ted u s to no case, and we hav e found n one, in whi ch a court has presum ed or upheld a c la

im of prosecutor ia

l v in dictiven ess b ased on del

ay in rei nd ic tm en t. Li kewi se, we decli

ne to acce pt app ell

ant’s i n v i tation t o c ond emn the St at e fo r p ro cee ding o n a ch arge i t cou l d have i

nc l ude d i n th e ori gi na l i nd i ctm en t. The ori

gi na l de ci si on to prosecut e app ellant f

or i nte nti ona l i njury to a c hi l d ra the r th an m urder wasa q

ue sti on o f t r ial s t r at eg y; it had
no pu nishme nt implica t io ns s ince bo t h o ffe ns es ar e fir st de gr ee felo nie s. T he mo st pla us ible
ex pl an ati on for the St ate’s decision to pro secute app ell ant for murder at the se cond trial i s n ot retr i bu ti on f or ap pe l l an t’s succ es sf ul ap pe al of his fir st co nvictio n, bu t a de sire t o o bt ain a
c onv i cti on for an o ff

ense commensurat e with the S tat e’s view of the seriou sness of appellant’s cond uct. See Neal , 141 F.3d at 214.

In the a bs ence of a pres um pti on of pro secutorial

vi ndictive ness , then, the burden
was on ap

pel l an t to come f

orward wi

th proof of re tal i atory m otiv e or o ther circum stances i ndi cati ng v i ndi cti vene ss. Wasman v. United States , 468 U .S. 559 (1 984). Th i s he f ail ed to do. In su m , we f i nd no e vi de nc e of a vi ndi ctive mot ive on t he pa rt of t he St at e and no ci rcumstances th at ind ic at e a r eas ona ble likelihoo d o f vindictivene ss in t his case . B eca use no direct evidence of actual vi

ndi ctiveness was presen

ted by appe l l an t, th e n um be r an d s everi ty of10

chargeswere not inc

reased, and the senten ce wa s no t gr ea t er t ha n t ha t impo se d in t he firs t t r ial,
we ov errul

e app el l an t’s f i rst poi nt of error. II. Sufficiency of

the Evidence The ind ict men t alle ge d t ha t ap pe llan t int en t io na lly an d k no win gl y c au sed C hri stopher Woh

l ers’ death

by prev en tin g Boutwel

l f rom ob tai ni ng m edi cal care f or h i m . A t appellant’s r e quest, the court ’s ch arge gave the j ury the options of fi ndi ng that appella

nt acted
r ec kle ss ly o rwit h c r iminal n eg li gen ce. T he j ury f ound that appell

ant reckle ssl

y prev ented Boutwel l f rom ob tai ni ng m edi cal care , and thus

conv i cted h i m of i nv olu ntary man slaugh

ter. In his re maini

ng poin ts of error, appella

nt contests t he suf

fi ci ency of the evi

dence to sust ain the jury’s

verdict. He co nt ends t he evide nce is leg ally and fact ually insuffi cient t o p ro ve (1) that he preven

ted Bout well f

rom obtain

in g me di ca lcare f

or Christ op her , a nd ( 2) t hat by pr event ingBo ut well fro m obt aining medical ca re , he cau sed t he child’s d eat h. I n his final point of
er r o r , ap pe llan t co nt en ds t he S t at e f aile d t o co rr o bo r at e B o ut we ll’s ac co mp lice wit ne ss t es t imo ny. The Stat e argues that because a ppel la nt asked t he co ur t t o au t ho r ize his con vi cti on f orthe le sser i

ncl uded off ense, h e i s estopped from ch

al le ngi ng t h e s uf f i ci en cy of th e ev i den ce

to sus tai n hi s convi ction f or t hat off

ense. A defen dant who i

nvokes the b enef

it of a l esser i ncl uded offense in struction at tr ia

l i s estopped from com

pla in in g on appeal

that t he evi dence is le ga lly insufficientwi

th respec t to a ma

tter rai sed

by the s ubm i ssi on of the l ess er of f en se. See State v. Lee , 818 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (murder d efendan t who r equested inst ru ction on volun tary m ansl au gh ter es to pped from

chal le ngi ng suf fi ci ency of evi dence to prove sudden pas sion ari

si ng f rom a dequate ca

use ), overruled

on other grounds , Moore v. St ate , 969 S.W.2d 4,11

10 (T ex. Crim. Ap p. 199 8) . I n Otting v. Sta te , 8 S.W.3d 681, 686-87 (T ex. App .— Aust in 1999, pe t. re f’d unt imely filed) , t his C o ur t wr o t e t hat a d efe n dant t ried on a cap ital mur der indict ment butco nvic t ed fo rinju ry t o a c hildwa s e st o pp ed fr o m co nt es t ing t he leg al a n d factual suf fi ci ency of the evi dence to sustain

the convi ction. Comm

entator s hav

e argued, however, that the estoppel
rule ann oun ced in Lee should be l im ited to t hose m

atter s rai sed by

subm is si on of the lesser in cl ude d off en se. 4 2 George

E. Di x & Robe rt O. Daws on, Criminal Practice a nd Procedure § 31. 75, at 177 (T exas Pr act ice 19 95) . T he issue s ra ised by ap pellant also wo uld have pr ev en te d hi s c onv i cti on f or the m urder of f en se a l l eged i n the i ndi ctmen t. See id. Ex

pre ss i ng no op i ni on on the estoppel i ssue, we wi

ll address appel

la nt’s contenti ons i

n the i nterest of jus

tice. A. Fai lure t o O bt ai n M edi cal C are In hi s second poi

nt of error, appell ant asserts that the e vi dence is le ga lly insufficientto prove b ey ond a re asonable do ubt t hat he pr event ed B ou t well fro m obt aining
me dic al care f or Christopher. He argues that becaus e the evi dence is i nsuf fi ci ent to show t hat Bo ut we ll was under duress

or im mi nen t thr eat of

de ath or s eri ousbod i l y ha rm, h e h ad no c ontr ol over her actions

and di d not prevent her f

rom cal li ng f or medical

assi stance. In de t er mining t he le ga l su fficienc y of the evi de nce to support a crim in al
co nvictio n, the

que sti on i s w h eth er , a f ter v i ewi n g al l th e ev i den ce

i n th e l i gh t m ost f av ora b l e to the verdict, any rati onal

trier of f act could hav

e found the e ssen

tial element s o f the offense beyond
a reas onab l e doubt. Jacks on v. Virgin ia , 44 3 U. S. 307 , 32 4 (1 979 ); Griffin v. State , 614 S.W.2d 155, 15 8-59 (Tex. C

ri m . App. 1981 ).12 The Sta te’ s m ai n wi tn e ss, Robbi

Boutwell , testifi

ed at len gth about her bri ef
r ela t io nsh ip with a

ppel la nt. Bout well testi fi

ed that af ter e nc oun teri ng ap pe l l an t at a hi gh school
re unio n, she rekin

dled a f riendsh ip wi th him in August 19 89 an d mo ve d in wit h him several weeks be f ore t heir mar riag e in Dec ember. So on a fte r mo ving in, Bout well n ot ic ed a chan

ge i n the way app ellant treat ed her ch

il dren . He took over the dis ci pli ni ng an d to il et tr ai ni ng of Ch ristopher be caus e, h e com

plai ne d, Boutwel

l wasi ne f f ecti ve and too len

i en t. E xt ensive testim

ony b y v arious wi tnesses es

tabli shed that appel

la nt was ab us iv e to wards Christ op her . O n one oc cas ion, ap pe l l an t ad m i tted to B outwe l l

tha t he ca us ed br ui se s on t he ch i l d. On an oth er occ as i on , i

n Nov em b er , B outw el l left Chr isto pher wit h app ellant w hen she went on a

br i ef tri p to the gro cery st or e. When she r et ur ned, app ellant w as ho lding t he unconsci ous child in h

is ar ms. Bo ut well obs er ved t hat Christ op her ’s br eat hing was shallow and his ha nds h ad turn ed i nward . A

ppe l l an t ex pl ai ne d that C hr

i stop he r h ad f al l en of f the toilet. On Decem ber 22, at t he urgi

ng of Boutwel l’ s parents, Chri stopher was admit t e d to the hospi tal because he was l ethargic a nd sh aki ng. On Decem ber 31, 1989, appella

nt, Bout well a

nd t he two chil

dren wen t o n an ove rnight cam

pin g trip. The nex

t day, appel

la nt to ok Chris

to pher deer hun

ting b y h im sel f. W hen t hey returned to the cam

psi te, appellant was carry

in g Chri stopher in

hi s arm s. Chri stopher appeared to be un

cons cious. A

ppel l an t told i nc onsi sten t storie s ab out wha

t had trans pi re d
. Al thoughChri stopher regain ed consci ousness, Boutwell

noticed th at one of hi s ey es did not t rack wi th the other ey e.13 On the morni

ng of January

2, 1990, aft er dr op ping ap pe llant o ff at wo r k, Bo ut we ll performe d

ch ores t hat had be en as signed t o he r by ap pellant . La t er in the d ay, Bo ut well and appella n t quarreled

about the time

she took t o perform the al lotted t asks. That even

in g, after di sciplining

Christ op her for not eat ing co rr ect ly, app ellant inst ru ct ed him t o w at ch t elevision s o that he could exerci se his “l azy ” ey e. As Ch

ristopher ’s at t ent ion st ra yed fro m the t elevision, app ellant tol d Jen

ni f er to hi t her b rother on the h and wi th a s poon. A s he b eca

me m ore an gry wi th Christ op her , he t old Jennifer t o p ush him into t he wa ll. When she d id no t pus h C hr i stop her ha rd en o ug h t o sa t isfy him, ap pe llant be ga n t o pu sh C hr ist o ph er int o t he wa ll un t il he f ell d own . At approx

i matel y 9:30 p .m ., a pp ella nt t o o k C hr ist o ph er int o t he ba t hr o o m, t elling Bo ut we ll, “K ids lea rn fr o m pa i n. ” A s B ou twell huddled wi

th her daughter on the couch, sh e heard sounds of w ater run

ni ng a nd “ thuds ” com

i ng f rom w i thi n the b athroom
. Several mi nutes later, appellant opened the door and call ed for Boutwell . When sh e arriv ed at the bathroom, Bout well s aw that both appell ant and Ch

ristopher were na

ked. Chri stopher was l

yi ng unc onscious on the fl

oor . As both appel

la nt and Boutwelltri ed t o r evive him, Boutwell

to ld a pp ell an t that t hey

should call f

or an amb

ula nce. He ref

used, tell in g her that he wa s “ n ot goi n g down f or m ur der.” Bou twe l l th en su gg es te d that t hey

call a ppel la nt’s m ot her f orhe lp. Ap pe llant ag r ee d t o t his, bu t o nly appell ant’s father was

home when Boutwell calle d. Ap pellant h ad a brief telephone co nversat ion with hi s father. Shor tly thereafte r, a ppellant’s par ent s ar rived at t he sc ene. Bo ut well’s t est imony reflect s t hat , in t he mea n ti me, sh e p l eade d w i

th appe l l an t three m ore ti mes b ef ore he al l owed h er to cal l f or an a m bul ance.14 Appe llantse ek s t o di sc r ed it Bo ut we ll’s t es t imo ny by ar gu ing t ha t Bo ut we ll mer ely “requested

permission” to call

for an am

bul ance an d that th e evi

dence is i nsuf fi ci ent to show t hat he actuall y prev ented her f

rom takin g action. Dr. Toby My

ers, an ex pert witness i

n the f ie ld o f do mes t ic vi

ole nc e, t es ti fied t hat app ellant’ s re latio nship wit h Bo ut well was abus ive and t hat he had esta bli shed co ntro l over her. Based o n her interview of Bou twe ll and review of Bo ut well ’s pri ortesti mony, Dr. My

ers tes tif i ed th at appe l l an

t exe rted con tro love r Bou

twell through in tim ida tion, i solati on, and verb al abuse. Dr. My

ers opin ed that, based on appel

la nt’s control over Boutwel l , she was prev en ted f rom ob tai ni ng m edi cal care f or her c hi l d. Evidence of appel la nt’s controll

in g beh av i or i n t he we ek s p r ec ed ing Ja nu ar y 2 dem onstrates that appell

ant had power and control over Boutwell and that she was f

ea rf ul of him. He warned her that he would have h er kil led b y a h it man if sh e tried to leav

e hi m. He al so threatened

her wi th various con seq

uen ces i f she di scu sse d hi

s con duct wi th her f ami l y or f riends. Several wi tnes ses testi f i ed to i nc i den ts exem pli f y i ng a ppel l an t’s c ontrol

over B o ut we llas wel

l a s his ab us e o f Bo ut we ll and Ch r ist o ph er . I n a dd it io n t o t es t imo ny o f fr ie nds a nd f am il y, two ne i gh bor s in the apartm

en t comp l ex

wh ere they

l i ve d obs erv ed ab

usi ve be ha vi or and overh eard family disturbances. Two p olice of fi cers test i f i ed to the i r ob serv ati

ons when the y res pon de d to a f am i l y di stu rb an ce repor t. Viewing t he ev ide nc e in t he lig ht most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that t he j ury coul d have f

oun d b ey ond a re as ona

bl e doubt tha

t ap pe l l an t exerc i se d suf

f i ci en t con tro l
over Bo ut we ll t o ha ve pr ev en t ed Bo ut we ll fro m o bt ain ing me dical ca re for Christ op her on t he ni ght of Jan uary 2, 1990 . We

overru l e app el l an t’s s econ d poi nt of error.15 Wh en conductin

g a fac tual suf fi ci ency review, the evi

dence is not vi ewed i

nth e lightmost fa

vorabl e to the verdi

ct. In st ea d, all t he evide nce is co nsider ed e qua lly , includ ing t he exi stence of a

l terna tiv e h y pothes es. Oron a v. S

tat e , 83 6 S
. W. 2d 31 9, 32 1 ( T ex . Ap p. —A us t in 1992, no pet.) . A f

actual suf fi ci ency reviewaskswh

eth er a n eu tral re v i ew of al l th e ev i den ce , b oth f or a n d agai n st th e f i n di n g of gui l t, demonstrat es that t he proo f of gui lt is so obviousl

y weak or so gr ea t ly out wei ghed b

y c o ntrary pr oo f as t o u nder mine confidenc e in the jury’s d et er minatio n. Johnso n v. State , 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex . Cri m . App. 2000 ). A

verdict may

be set asi de for f actual in suf fi ci ency only if a fi

nd ing of gui l t b ey on d a re as on ab l e doub

t i s c l ea rl y wron g a n d u n j us t. Clew is v. State , 922 S. W.2d 126 , 12 9 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 96) ; Stone v. Sta te , 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. A

pp.—A usti n 19 92, pet. ref

’d u nti mel y f i l ed). Because Bout well

did not seek medi cal assi stance until

appella nt dragged Chri stopher i

nto t he b at hro om, app ellant c ont ends t hat Bo ut well—no t app ellant— was re luct ant to see k medica l care . I n th e 9 11 ca l l to EM S, B outw el

l aske d th at Ch ri sto ph er b e ta ken to Sou th Au st in Ho spit al inste ad o f Bra cke nridg e Ho spit al. Ap pellant ar gue s t hat, bec ause of a prev ious visit to Brackenri

dge, Boutwell wa s af

raid sh e w o ul d b ec o me t he fo cu s o f a n a bu se inq ui ry. Appe llantal so urges that Bout well f ai le d to take Chris

to pher to the do cto r on previous o ccasions. On Dec em be r 18, a ppel la nt stayed wi

th Chri stopher whi le

Boutwell went to wo rk. He call

ed her at wo r k a nd t o ld h er t ha t Ch r ist o ph er ha d fa llen o ff t he co un t er an d a sk ed Bo ut we ll if he s ho uld take the chil

d to the do cto r. Bo utwe ll le ft the deci si on up to appella nt and sh e stayed a

t wor k. Li kewi se, Boutwell

did n ot take Chri stopher to the hospi tal af ter t he cam

pin g trip o n Jan

uar y 1, when the chi l d app eare d to be kn o ck ed o ut an d u nc o nsc io us . On cr o ss - ex amina t io n, Bo ut we ll16

acknowl edged

that the re were n um erous i nstanc es i n w hi ch she di d not take

Ch ri sto ph er to th e docto r when h

e was i nj ured. She adm

itted that she had n

ot been prevented

fro m tak ing him to t he doctor on thos e occa sions.

Bout we ll was described as a di scredited witness even b y the Stat e. Nevert heless , t he jury was f ree to accept any par t of Bo ut well’s t est imony. Be cau se t he jur y is the sol e j udg e of t he f acts, w e m

ust gi ve def eren ce to i ts ve rdict. Cain v. Sta te , 95 8 S
. W. 2d 40 4, 40 7 ( T ex . Cr im. App. 199 7). Th e w ei

gh t to gi ve con trad i ctory tes ti mony i s wi thi n th e s ol e p rovi

nc e of the j ury , be cause it turns on an e

val uation of credi

bi li ty an d dem eanor, and we are n

ot free to reweigh

th e evidence merel

y b ecause we f

eel that a d i f f eren t resul t is m ore reas onab l e. Clew

is , 922 S.W.2d at 135. A decisi on is

not mani fes tly unj ust sim

ply because the fact fi

nder resolv

ed confl icting v ie ws of the ev i den ce i n the State’ s f

av or. Cain , 958 S.W .2d at 41 0. Giv en the tes ti m ony by va riouswi tne ss esreg ard

i ng appe l l an t’s con trol ov er Bou tw ell ’s actions, th

e ex pert testi mony of D r. My

ers, a nd B outwel

l ’sex tens i ve testi mony, w e ca nn ot say that t he j ury’ s concl

usi on that appell

ant preven

ted Bout well f

rom seeki

ng m edi cal atte nti on f or Ch ri stop h er on th e n igh t in q ue st io n w as man ifes t ly un jus t . Po int o f er r o rt hr ee is overruled. B. Causation In his fourth and f

if th points of error, appell

ant contends the ev

ide nceis legally and fac t ua lly insufficient t o s upp or t t he jur y’s co nclusio n t hat by p re vent ing Bo ut well fro m obt aining
me dic al care fo rCh r ist o ph er , he ca us ed t he ch ild’ s d ea t h. T he St at e a gr ee s t ha t it wa s req ui re d to3 Section 6.04 was not changed by the 1994 penal code amen dmen ts. 17 pr ove caus ati on as

one of the e l em en ts of th e of f en se. S ec ti on 6.04(a) of the Texas Pen al Code sets t he standard for causat ion as f ollows: A pe r so n is c r iminally r es po nsib le if t he r es ult wo uld not have occurred but f or his conduct, o perating ei ther alone or concurrentl y w ith an ot her cause, un

le s s t he co ncur re nt cau se w as c learly sufficient t o p ro duc e t he r esu lt and t he con duc t of th e actor cl ea rl y i n suf f i ci en t. Tex . Penal

Code A nn . § 6.04 ( a) (West 199 4). 3 In i nte rpreti ng thi s statute , th e C ourt of

Cri m i na l A ppe als h ascon cluded t hat t he “b ut for” requi

remen t is sati sf ie d if ei ther the defen

dant’s conduct was “ suf

fic ient by it self to have caused the h arm, regardles s of the ex is tence of a concurren

t cause” or “the defe

ndan t’s conduct and the other cause together ma y b e suf fi ci ent to have ca

used t he h

arm.” Robbins v

. State , 717 S.W .2d348, 351 (Tex. Crim . App. 1986). The court added, “If the addi tional caus e, ot her t ha n t he defen dant’s conduct, is

cl early suf fi ci ent, by itsel f, to pro duce the resul

t and the de fendant’s conduct, by i

tself , is cl early in suf fi ci ent, then the def

endan t cannot be convi

cted.” Id
. In the di strict court ’s ch

arge, the jury

was i nstructed: A pe r so n is c r iminally r es po nsib le if t he r es ult wo uld not have occurred but f or hi s con

duct, opera

tin g ei ther a l one or con

currentl y wi th an other ca use , unl es s t he co nc ur r en t ca us e w as cle ar ly suf f i ci en t to prod uc e the re sul

t an d the c ond

uc t of th e def en da n t cl ea rl y i n suf f i ci en t. You ar e fu r t he rinst ruc t ed t ha t yo u c an no t find t he de fen da nt , Ge r ald Ch r is to pher

Zu l i an i , gu i l ty un l es s y ou b el i ev e b ey on d a re as on ab l e doub

t th at th e de ath of Christopher Wohl ers would n ot have occurred b ut f

or t he co nduc t of t he de f en da n t; so t hat if y

ou believe t he phy

si cal in jury , if any , receiv ed by Chri stopher18

Woh l ers on January

2, 1990, was a concurrent cause suf fi ci ent to cause h isde ath and the con duc t, i f an y , of the de f en da nt i n prev en ti ng Rob bi Bou twe l l f rom obt aining medi cal ca re f or th e s ai d C hr i stop he r Wohl ers wa s c l ea rl y i ns uf f i ci en t, or i f y ou ha ve a rea sona bl e doubt thereof

, you wil l acqu i t the de f endan t . . . . Thus, th e j ury wascalle d upon to answer two questions: (1) whethe r the concurrent cause, Christo pher’s phy

si cal in jury , was cl early

suf fi ci ent to cause his

death, and (2) w het her t he appellant’s co nd uc t in p r ev en t ing Bo ut we ll fro m ca ll in g f o rmed ica l as sis t an ce wa s c lea r ly insufficientto ca

us e h i s dea th. Be f ore c on vi cting a pp el l an t of i nv olu ntary man slaugh

ter, the j ury must have bel ie ved bey ond a r eas ona ble do ubt t hat had it not been fo r a ppe llant p re vent ing Bou twe l l f rom calli ng f or medical

care, Chri stopher would hav e survi ved. If the

jury bel ie ved that Christo pher’s physical injury was sufficient t o c aus e his de at h and th at a ppel lan t ’s co nd uc t in pr event ingBo ut we ll fr om ca lli ng f or m ed i ca l h el p w as i n suf f i ci en t, the j ur y wa s i n str uc ted to ac qu it ap pe llan t . Ap pe llan t do es no t ch alle ng e t he ch ar ge de live r ed t o t he ju ry.

Bo ut we ll testifi ed t hat wh en she we nt int o t he ba t hr o o m, Ch r ist o ph er wa s s t ill b re ath in g. The e me

rgency servi ces techn ic ia ns testif ie d general

ly that when a ch

il d stops brea t hingtim

e i s cri tical . Dr. Jaff

e testif ie d that Chris

to pher was n

ot conscious or breathing o n his o wn wh en t he ch ild

fi rst arrived

at the emergen

cy roo m. He was

“n ear brai n dead” an

d “n ear t he end.” Dr. Jaf

fe testi fi ed that the delay

in treat me nt was si gnifi cant: “[I]f h

e is no t bre at hing ad eq ua t ely, t he n u

nl es s h i s b rea thi ng i s r es tored

to nor mal , th en the pur e f ac t tha t he i s n ot bre at hingad eq

ua tel y wi l l l ead to a ddi

ti ona l i njury to t he br ai

n an d worseni

ng an al ready b ad si tuati on.”Dr. Jaff

e concl uded that “m

ore li kel y tha n not” Chri stopher would hav e sur vive d had
me dic al personnel

been abl e to get to hi

m b efore he s

to pped breathi

ng. He al so test if

ie d that19

i nte rv en ti on wit hinfo ur t o fift ee n min ut es fr o m t he “c es sa t io n o f o xyg en ” w ou ld “had t o ha ve he l ped the si tuati on.” Dr. Vin cen t Di Maio, the chi

ef medi cal ex am i ner f or Bexar Coun

ty, c onf i rmed Dr. Jaffe’s me dic al opini on that Chris

to pher’s prognosi s would h ave been go od if Chri stopher was st ill br ea thi ng when medi cal pe rs onn el arr i ve d b ec au se

he ha d n o s ign of brai n stem hem orrhage
orirrev ersi ble i nj ury. Dr. Di

Maio wa s of

t he o pin io n t ha t if do ct o r s ha d b ee n a ble t o dr ain so me of the bl ood co ll ectin g in Chri stopher’s brai

n be fore the pressure f

orce d the bra in ste m do wn t he
s pinal can al , he woul d have had “ a tot al ly uneventful

recovery.” Dr. Di

Maio estim

ated that Christo pher’s i

n j ur y occ ur re d b etw een one- hal

f h our and three hours bef

ore his coll apse and tha

t t he amo un t o f blo o d in his s ku ll indic at ed t ha t it t o o k C hr ist o ph er lo ng er t ha n ha lf an ho ur to die : “S o if you kn o w t ha t t he ch ild w as up an d w alk ing ar o un d a nd ap pe ar ed r ela t ive ly no r mal, he did not have a subd ur al. N ow , yo u kno w t hat when t he ch ild fin ally c o llap se d, t he ch ild h ad a b ig
su bd ur al. And t he qu es t io n w as, how so on be for e t hat co uld he ha ve go t t en a s ignifi cant sub dural ? Th e answe r i s a h alf -hour or a n h our or two hours or th

ree h ours.” Fr om Dr. Di Mai o’s a nd Dr. Jaf

f e’s testi mony, a jury coul d h av e r ea so na bly concl uded t hat t he t ime after Bo ut well fou nd Chr isto pher bre at hing in a shallow manner o n t he ba thr oom fl oo r was critical

and that it was t he de lay in obt aining medical ca re t hat cau sed t he chil d’s deat h. Ac co rd ing ly

, we concl

ude there is

le gal ly suf fi ci ent evi dence of causation an

d we
overru l e app el l an t’s f ourth poi nt of error. Appe llantcha lleng es t he fa ctual su ff ic ie ncy of the causation evi

dence b ecause: (1) Bo ut we ll did n ot attempt t o summ

on me dic al

care until

she f ound her son on the flo or in the20

bat hr oom and (2) the do cto r who condu cte d t he aut opsy express ed do ubts abo ut Christo pher’s
surv i va l ev en wi th prom pt medi cal i nterv en tion
. Dr. Roberto Bayardo, t he ch ie f m edi cal exam i ner f or Tr avi s County, testif

ie d that t he au t o ps y wa s p er fo r med by t he ch ief med ica l ex amin er fr o m Ha rr is C o un t y who was co ver ing f orDr. Bayardo while h

e was o nv ac ation. Dr. Ba yard o tes ti f i ed tha t Ch ri stop he r’ s i njury wa s of such a s er io us na t ur e t ha t he ha d r es er va t io ns w he t he rmed ica l i nterven t ion wo uld have save d t he boy’s li fe. But on cross-exam

i na tion , he de ferr ed t o t he exp er t ise o f the t re at ing physician o n t he child’s s urviv al prognosis. Applyingthe factual suf

fi ci ency standard of revi

ew, view ing t he ev ide nc e n eu t r ally and giv in g due defe

rence to the jury ’s verdict, we concl ud e th at t he jur y’s det er minatio n on t he is sue of causation was not s o con t r ar y t o t he o ve rwh elming we igh t o f ev ide nc e a s t o be cle ar ly wrong and unjust. Appell ant’s f if th point of error is overrul ed. C. Cor robor

ation of A ccomp lice

Witness Testim ony In his fin al p o int o f er r o r , ap pe ll an t urg es t hat t he evide nce is leg ally i nsufficient because the Stat e fai

le d to corro borate t he testim ony of Robbi Bout well , w hich was requi red be caus e sh

e was an acc omp l i ce wi

tnes s. See Tex. Cod e Crim . Pro c. Ann. art. 3 8.14 ( West 1979)
. The St at e do es no t dispu t e t hat Bo ut well was an ac co mplice witne ss, but co nt ends t hat he r test im ony was corro borat ed by

ot her witnesses. To t est t he su ffi

ciency o f the co rr obo ra t ion o f an ac co mplic e wi tness, we set asi

de t he accompli

ce’s testimony

and determin

e whether t he remai

ni ng evi dence tends t o con

nect t he
accu sed wi th com m i ssi on of the cri me. Walke

r v. State , 615 S.W .2d 728 , 731-3 2 (T ex . Cr im
.21

App. 19 81 )
. We vie w t he co rr o bo r at ing ev id en ce i n the l i ght m ost fa vorabl e to the verdi

ct. Gill
v. State , 873 S. W.2d 45, 48 ( Tex. Crim. App. 199 4); Utsey v. State , 9 21 S .W. 2d 4 51, 453 (T ex. App. —T exar kana 1996, pet . ref’d). The acco mpl ice wi tness’ s t es t imo ny ne ed no t be en t ire ly
corro borated, nor need the corroborat ion di rectly li nk the accus ed to t he cri

me or be s uffic ien t in it se lf to estab l i sh

gui l t. He rnan dez

v. State , 93 9 S. W.2d 173 , 17 6 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 97) ; Gill , 873 S. W.2 d at 48. The co rr obo ra t ion i s su ffi cient if the c umulat ive weight of a ll the indep ende nt facts an d ci rcumstances tends to connectthe def en dan t to t he off en se. Hernandez , 939 S.W.2d at 176 ; Reed v. State , 744 S.W .2d 112 , 126 (Tex. Cri m . App. 1988 ). The St at e cit es t he tes ti

mony of two wi tn es se s a s te

n di n g to c on n ec t appe l l an

t wi th the commission of the off ense. The fi

rst witness, Mel

vi n Si mm s, was a j ai l c ounselor who not if ie d app ellant of Chris

to pher’s death. Simm

s t estif ie d t ha t he ove rh ea rd a tel ep hon e c onv ers ati on between ap pe llant an d h is gran dm other i n wh i ch appe l l an t told h er , “ I’ m sor ry . I d i dn ’t m ea n to hurt Chri s. I was j ust disci pli ni ng hi m the way

my dad di sci pli ned m e.” The sec ond wi

tnes s wa s Ch

ri stophe r’ssi ster J enni f

er, wh o wa s f our a t the ti me of these event s. R eca lli

ng t he night of Ja nuar y 2, 1 990 , she t est ifi ed t hat app ellant w as in t he ba thr oom wit h t he do o rclo se d: “And I jus t r eme mbe r , I do n’t kn o w if my lit t le b r o t he rwa s in there with h im , but I’m pretty sure h

e was, becaus e he was

n’t anywhe re els e.” Wh il e her t est imony was co nt ra dict or y and

he r m emor y dim, it wa s su ffi cient for a r at ional jur y to have be l i ev ed th at appe l l an

t was i n the b athroom

wi th Ch ri stophe r as B outwel

l testi f i ed.22 While the testim

ony of these wi tnesses is not suff

ic ie nt to co nv i ct a

ppe l l an t of i nv olu ntary manslaughter, it is suf

fi cien t t o co nnect hi

m to t he off

ense . Th ere f

or e, Bo ut well ’s testi m ony wasadeq uatel y corroborated . We

overru l e app el l an t’s s i xth poi nt of error. Having over ruled appe ll ant’s six points o f erro r, w e affi rm the t rial court ’s j udgm en t.

Jan P. Patterson, Justice Be f ore C hi ef Ju sti ceA bou ss i e, J us ti ce s Y ea

ke l an d Pa tters on Af fi rmed File d: June 29, 2001 Do No t Publis

h