UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON

INTERNATIONAL

RELIGIOUS

FREEDOM

ANNUAL REPORT

2020
Sufi dhikr ceremony in a cemetery in Omdurman, Sudan, 

just outside of the capital of Khartoum. Photo taken by 

USCIRF Supervisory Policy Analyst Kurt Werthmuller during 

a USCIRF country visit to Sudan in February and March 2020.

Sudanese Christians from the Nuba Mountains gather at 

a protest site near the military headquarters in the capital, 

Khartoum, on April 14, 2019. (Photo by AHMED MUSTAFA/

AFP via Getty Images)

A Sudanese demonstrator waves her national flag as people 

celebrate in Khartoum on August 4, 2019, following news 

that Sudan’s army rulers and protest leaders had agreed to 

a hard-won constitutional declaration that paves the way for 

a transition to civilian rule after more than seven months of 

often deadly street rallies. (Photo by EBRAHIM HAMID/AFP 

via Getty Images)

Alaa Salah, a Sudanese woman who was propelled to 

internet fame after clips went viral of her leading powerful 

protest chants against President Omar al-Bashir, addresses 

protesters during a demonstration in front of the military 

headquarters in the capital Khartoum on April 10, 2019. 

(Photo by AFP via Getty Images)

Transitional Prime Minister of Sudan Abdalla Hamdok gestures during a December 2019 meeting in Washington, 

D.C. with members of his cabinet and U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom Commissioners and staff. 

(Photo by Aaron Sweet)
ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

April 2020

Commissioners

Tony Perkins

Chair

Gayle Manchin

Nadine Maenza

Vice Chairs

Gary L. Bauer

Anurima Bhargava

James W. Carr

Tenzin Dorjee

Sharon Kleinbaum

Johnnie Moore

Ambassador Samuel D. Brownback, 

ex officio, non-voting member 

Erin D. Singshinsuk

Executive Director
Professional Staff 

Dwight Bashir, Director of Outreach and Policy 

Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Director of Research and Policy

Roy Haskins, Director of Finance and Office Management

Thomas Kraemer, Director of Human Resources and Senior Advisor for Strategic Outreach

Kirsten Lavery, International Legal Specialist and Team Lead, Victims Database

Jamie Staley, Senior Congressional Relations Specialist

Kurt Werthmuller, Supervisory Policy Analyst

Harrison Akins, Policy Analyst

Danielle Ashbahian, Communications Specialist

Keely Bakken, Policy Analyst

Patrick Greenwalt, Researcher

Jason Morton, Policy Analyst

Dominic Nardi, Policy Analyst

Scott Weiner, Policy Analyst

Zachary Udin, Project Specialist

U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714

Washington, DC 20401

(P) 202–523–3240

www.uscirf.gov
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction and Overview. 

Implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Key Findings. 

Recommendations to the Administration. 

Recommendations to Congress. 

Key USCIRF Resources and Activities. 

Legal Framework. 

Developments in 2019. 

Countries Recommended for Designation as Countries of Particular Concern. .

Burma. 

China. 

Eritrea. 

India. 

Iran. .

Nigeria. .

North Korea. .

Pakistan. .

Russia. .

Saudi Arabia. .

Syria. .

Tajikistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Turkmenistan. .

Vietnam. .

Countries Recommended for the State Department’s Special Watch List. .

Afghanistan. .

Algeria. .

Azerbaijan. .

Bahrain. .

Central African Republic. .

Cuba. .

Egypt. .

Indonesia. .

Iraq. .

Kazakhstan. 

Malaysia. 

Nicaragua. .

Sudan. .

Turkey. .

Uzbekistan. .

Other Key Developments. .

Appendix 1: Commissioner Biographies. .

Appendix 2: Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project and Victims List. .

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020 1

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

I

n 2019, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 

(USCIRF) was gratified by important progress to improve religious 

freedom conditions in two countries where the governments engaged 

closely with USCIRF to bring positive change. The year saw remarkable 

changes in Sudan, a country USCIRF has recommended for “country of particular concern” (CPC) designation under the International 

Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) every year since USCIRF’s first 

set of CPC recommendations in 2000. A brave, grassroots protest 

movement brought down the Islamist-led regime of former president 

Omar al-Bashir in April, followed by the establishment of a joint civilian-military transitional government four months later. The transitional 

constitution no longer identifies Islam as the primary source of law, 

and it includes a provision ensuring the freedom of belief and worship. 

In November, the transitional government, which has engaged closely 

with USCIRF on religious freedom concerns, repealed the repressive 

public order laws that the former regime used to punish individuals, 

particularly women, who did not conform to its interpretation of Sunni 

Islam. While much work remains to extend full religious freedom1

 to 

all Sudanese—including repealing apostasy and blasphemy laws—

enough positive change has come to the country that, in this Annual 

Report, USCIRF is now recommending Sudan for the U.S. Department 

of State’s Special Watch List (SWL), a lesser category, rather than for 

CPC designation. The positive trajectory in Sudan is depicted in the 

photographs on this year’s cover, 

which show the protests that led 

to the Bashir regime’s removal; 

transitional Prime Minister Abdalla 

Hamdok in a December meeting 

with USCIRF in Washington, DC; 

and a Sufi worship ceremony 

that USCIRF witnessed during its 

February 2020 visit to Sudan. 

Likewise, Uzbekistan took 

significant steps in 2019 to fulfill its 

commitments of the last few years 

to improve religious freedom conditions, also in close consultation with USCIRF. Under President Shavkat 

Mirziyoyev, the government ended its longstanding practice of raiding 

religious communities for unregistered activity or unauthorized distribution or possession of literature. In August, in a move recommended by 

USCIRF, the government announced it would close the infamous Jasliq 

Prison where, in the past, two religious prisoners had been boiled alive. 

Although the government of Uzbekistan has yet to revise its problematic 

laws regulating religion, as it has pledged to do, or to address its continued imprisonment of many peaceful Muslims, based on the encouraging 

changes over the past year USCIRF is recommending the country for 

the State Department’s SWL in this Annual Report, after having recommended it for CPC designation every year since 2005.

On the other hand, India took a sharp downward turn in 2019. The 

national government used its strengthened parliamentary majority 

to institute national-level policies violating religious freedom across 

India, especially for Muslims. Most notably, it enacted the Citizenship 

(Amendment) Act, which provides a fast track to Indian citizenship for 

non-Muslim migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan 

already residing in India. According to government officials’ statements, 

this law is meant to provide protection for listed non-Muslim religious 

communities—but not for Muslims—against exclusion from a nationwide 

National Register of Citizens and the resulting detention, deportation, 

and potential statelessness. The national and various state governments 

also allowed nationwide campaigns of harassment and violence against 

religious minorities to continue with impunity, and engaged in and tolerated hate speech and incitement to violence against them. Based on 

these developments, in this report 

USCIRF recommends CPC designation for India. 

Created by IRFA, USCIRF is 

an independent, bipartisan U.S. 

government advisory body, separate from the State Department, 

that monitors religious freedom 

abroad and makes policy recommendations to the president, 

secretary of state, and Congress. 

USCIRF bases these recommendations on its statutory mandate 

and the standards in the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights, the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other international documents. USCIRF’s mandate and annual reports are different 

from, and complementary to, the mandate and annual reports of the 

State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom. 

1

In this report, USCIRF uses the terms “religious freedom,” “freedom of religion,” and “freedom of religion or belief” interchangeably to refer to the broad right to 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, including the right to nonbelief, protected under international human rights law.

The positive trajectory in Sudan is depicted 

in the photographs on this year’s cover, 

which show the protests that led to the 

Bashir regime’s removal; transitional 

Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in a December 

meeting with USCIRF in Washington, DC; and a 

Sufi worship ceremony that USCIRF witnessed 

during its February 2020 visit to Sudan.
2 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

The 2020 Annual Report assesses religious freedom violations 

and progress during calendar year 2019 in 29 countries and makes 

independent recommendations for U.S. policy. The key findings, 

recommendations, and analysis in this report are based on a year’s 

research by USCIRF, including travel, hearings, meetings, and briefings, and are approved by a majority vote of Commissioners, with 

each Commissioner, under the statute, having the option to include a 

statement with his or her own individual views. In 2019 and early 2020, 

Commissioners and/or staff visited 11 countries in order to assess 

conditions: Egypt (January 2019), Bahrain (March 2019), Kazakhstan 

(May 2019), Burma (June 2019), Iraq (July 2019), Uzbekistan (May and 

September 2019), Vietnam (September 2019), Laos (February 2020), 

Malaysia (February 2020), Azerbaijan (February 2020), and Sudan 

(February 2020). 

Changes to 2020 Annual Report 

This report reflects changes in content and format from previous 

Annual Reports. The report’s main focus is on two groups of countries: first, those that USCIRF recommends the State Department 

should designate as CPCs under 

IRFA, and second, those that 

USCIRF recommends the State 

Department should place on 

its SWL. The second group is 

different from past years, when 

USCIRF had its own “Tier 2”—a 

category USCIRF created long 

before Congress, in 2016 amendments to IRFA, required the State 

Department to have the SWL. 

The change to making SWL recommendations this year, and going forward, is intended to better 

conform with the statutory scheme and with USCIRF’s oversight and 

advisory role. 

In addition, the country chapters this year are more concise 

to better emphasize the key findings justifying the CPC or SWL 

recommendation and to make more targeted recommendations for 

U.S. policy. Another change to the report this year is the addition 

of a section highlighting key trends and developments in religious 

freedom globally during the reporting period, with a particular 

focus on countries that do not meet the statutory criteria for a CPC 

or SWL recommendation. 

As in previous years, the report still includes a section analyzing 

the U.S. government’s implementation of IRFA during the reporting 

year and providing recommendations to bolster overall U.S. efforts to 

advance freedom of religion or belief abroad. The report also continues to include USCIRF’s recommendations of violent nonstate actors 

for designation by the State Department as “entities of particular 

concern,” or EPCs, under the 2016 amendments to IRFA. 

Standards for CPC, SWL, and EPC Recommendations 

IRFA defines CPCs as countries where the government engages in 

or tolerates “particularly severe” violations of religious freedom. 

The statute, as amended by the Frank Wolf International Religious 

Freedom Act of 2016 (Frank Wolf Act), defines the State Department’s 

SWL for countries where the government engages in or tolerates 

“severe” violations of religious freedom. 

Under IRFA, particularly severe violations of religious freedom 

means “systematic, ongoing, [and] egregious violations . . . , including 

violations such as—(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (B) prolonged detention without charges; (C) 

causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine 

detention of those persons; or (D) other flagrant denial of the right to 

life, liberty, or the security of persons.” Although the statute does not 

specifically define “severe” violations of religious freedom, in making 

SWL recommendations USCIRF interprets it to mean violations that 

meet two of the elements of IRFA’s “systematic, ongoing, [and] egregious” standard (i.e., that the violations are systematic and egregious, 

systematic and ongoing, or egregious and ongoing). 

The Frank Wolf Act requires the U.S. government to identify 

nonstate actors engaging in particularly severe violations of religious 

freedom and designate them as EPCs. The law defines a nonstate 

actor as “a nonsovereign entity 

that exercises significant political power and territorial control; 

is outside the control of a sovereign government; and often 

employs violence in pursuit of 

its objectives.”

The conditions supporting 

the CPC or SWL recommendation 

for each country are described in 

the relevant country chapter of 

this report. The conditions supporting the EPC recommendations for Boko Haram are described in 

the Nigeria chapter, for Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) and 

the Taliban in the Afghanistan chapter, and for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham 

(HTS), in the Syria chapter.

For al-Shabaab and the Houthis, the EPC recommendations are 

based on the following: 

• Throughout 2019, al-Shabaab continued to hold territory 

in Somalia and retained the ability to conduct attacks in 

Kenya. In Somalia, Christians pray in secret, partially out of 

fear al-Shabaab will attack them. In June 2019, al-Shabaab 

attempted to attack Christians at a hospital construction site 

in Madera, Kenya, but were thwarted by Muslim workers at the 

site who hid their Christian colleagues. In October, al-Shabaab 

unsuccessfully attacked a bus carrying eight Christian passengers in Madera. In December, an al-Shabaab bus attack in 

Wajir County killed at least nine Kenyan Christians after they 

refused to recite the Islamic declaration of faith (shahada).

• In 2019, the Houthi movement, formally known as Ansar Allah, 

continued to hold territory throughout Yemen. The group’s slogan, posted widely throughout Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, 

includes the phrase “a curse on the Jews,” and the tiny remaining 

The report’s main focus is on two groups 

of countries: first, those that USCIRF 

recommends the State Department should 

designate as CPCs under IRFA, and second, 

those that USCIRF recommends the State 

Department should place on its SWL.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020 3

Jewish community in Yemen faces discrimination by Houthi authorities. Christians, especially converts from Islam, face severe 

religious persecution as well. The Houthis also continued their 

systematic persecution of 

Baha’is in Yemen, including 

their detention of community 

leader and USCIRF religious 

prisoner of conscience 

Hamid bin Haydara. Twenty-four other Yemeni Baha’is 

faced charges of apostasy 

and espionage. A Houthi 

appeals court upheld a 

death sentence against Bin 

Haydara in early 2020, but a 

Houthi spokesperson then announced in March that he and six 

other detained Baha’is would be pardoned and released.

Religious Freedom Violations in Other Countries 

and by Other Entities 

The Annual Report’s emphasis on countries that, in USCIRF’s view, 

merit CPC or SWL designation is intended to focus the attention of 

U.S. policymakers on countries where the governments perpetrate 

or tolerate the worst violations of religious freedom globally. USCIRF 

monitors and has concerns about religious freedom conditions worldwide, including in countries not recommended for CPC or SWL status 

or not mentioned in the section of the report discussing other key 

trends and developments. The fact that a country is not covered in 

this report does not mean that religious freedom issues do not exist 

there, or that concerns discussed 

in previous annual reports have 

improved. It indicates only that 

USCIRF did not conclude that 

the conditions in the particular 

reporting year meet the statutory 

CPC or SWL standards. 

Similarly, the fact that a 

nonstate group is not recommended for EPC designation 

does not mean that it does not 

engage in religious freedom violations. Across the world, in countries discussed in this report and in 

other countries, there are numerous nonstate groups that commit 

particularly severe religious freedom violations but nevertheless 

do not meet the Frank Wolf Act’s standard for designation as EPCs 

because, for example, they do not exercise significant political power 

and territorial control. 

USCIRF issues publications throughout the year on a variety 

of countries and topics, which are available at www.uscirf.gov. In 

addition, information on religious freedom conditions in all foreign 

countries can be found in the State Department’s annual International 

Religious Freedom reports.

For 2020, based on religious freedom conditions in 2019, USCIRF recommends that the 

State Department:

• Redesignate as CPCs the following nine 

countries: Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, 

North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 

Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan; 

• Designate as additional CPCs the following five countries: India, Nigeria, Russia, 

Syria, and Vietnam; 

• Maintain on the SWL the following four 

countries: Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan, and 

Uzbekistan; 

• Include on the SWL the following 

11 countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Central African Republic 

(CAR), Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, 

Malaysia, and Turkey; 

• Redesignate as EPCs the following five 

nonstate actors: al-Shabaab in Somalia, 

Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Houthis in 

Yemen, ISKP in Afghanistan, and the 

Taliban in Afghanistan; and 

• Designate as an additional EPC the 

following nonstate actor: HTS in Syria. 

USCIRF’S 2020 CPC, SWL, AND EPC RECOMMENDATIONS 

The fact that a country is not covered 

in this report does not mean that 

religious freedom issues do not exist there, 

or that concerns discussed in 

previous annual reports have improved.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020 5

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

Key Findings

In 2019, the administration of President Donald J. Trump continued to prioritize international religious freedom. In July, the U.S. 

Department of State convened the second Ministerial to Advance 

Religious Freedom, bringing together more than 100 foreign delegations and 1,000 civil society and religious leaders. The ministerial 

provided a platform for survivors of religious persecution to share 

their stories, and included a meeting with President Trump. Nine 

statements of concern were issued, including on protecting places of 

worship and the use of technology and religious freedom. Secretary 

of State Michael R. Pompeo also announced plans to create the 

International Religious Freedom Alliance (IRF Alliance), a network of 

like-minded countries committed to opposing religious persecution 

and advancing freedom of religion or belief for all. The IRF Alliance 

officially launched after the reporting period, in February 2020, 

with 27 countries signing onto its Declaration of Principles, which is 

grounded in international human 

rights standards. 

In September, President 

Trump hosted an event on religious freedom on the sidelines of 

the United Nations (UN) General 

Assembly, where he dedicated 

an additional $25 million to 

programs to protect religious 

freedom and religious sites and 

relics. He also announced efforts 

to form a coalition of U.S. businesses for the protection of religious freedom. The U.S. government’s 

allocation of funds to protect religious sites was a key recommendation in USCIRF’s 2019 Annual Report and an area of focus for USCIRF 

throughout the year. 

During 2019, the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 

Freedom, Samuel D. Brownback, continued actively implementing 

the State Department’s mandate, including through public speeches, 

travel, and meetings with the nongovernmental organization (NGO) 

IRF Roundtable and other stakeholders. In February, the Trump administration appointed Elan S. Carr to the position of Special Envoy to 

Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, which had been vacant since 

January 2017; his role is to counter rising anti-Semitism across the 

world, an issue of great concern to USCIRF. After the reporting period, 

in February 2020, the administration appointed Sarah Makin-Acciani 

to be the first-ever Senior Director for International Religious Freedom 

on the National Security Council (NSC) staff. The International 

Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) called for a dedicated NSC staff 

position on this issue, and the Frank R. Wolf International Religious 

Freedom Act of 2016 (Frank Wolf Act) reiterated that call. USCIRF for 

years had urged successive administrations to establish and fill the 

position and welcomed the long-needed action.

In December 2019, the State Department named three new 

countries—Cuba, Nicaragua, and Nigeria—to its Special Watch 

List (SWL) for engaging in or 

tolerating severe violations of 

religious freedom, pursuant to 

IRFA as amended by the Frank 

Wolf Act. It made no new additions to the previous year’s list 

of “countries of particular concern,” or CPCs, the category 

under IRFA for countries that 

engage in or tolerate particularly severe religious freedom 

violations. However, it removed 

one country from its 2018 CPC list: Sudan, which it placed on the 

SWL instead. For the nine countries that the State Department 

redesignated as CPCs, it reimposed existing sanctions on six and 

reissued waivers on taking any action for the other three. The State 

Department also redesignated the same nine nonstate actors as 

“entities of particular concern” (EPCs) for particularly severe religious freedom violations.

STATE DEPARTMENT 2019 DESIGNATIONS

CPC Designations Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan

SWL Countries Comoros, Cuba, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Russia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan

EPC Designations Al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda, al-Shabab, Boko Haram, the Houthis, the Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria (ISIS), ISIS-Khorasan, and the Taliban

The U.S. government’s allocation of 

funds to protect religious sites was a key 

recommendation in USCIRF’s 2019 Annual 

Report and an area of focus for 

USCIRF throughout the year.
6 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

• Discontinue the repeated imposition 

of preexisting sanctions or waivers for 

CPC-designated countries; instead, 

for each such country, take a unique 

presidential action or commensurate 

action pursuant to Sections 6445(a)

(9) – (15) of IRFA, or negotiate a binding 

agreement pursuant to Section 6441(c)

(1)(C) of IRFA, in order to demonstrate 

meaningful consequences and encourage positive change; 

• Increase the use of targeted sanctions 

to deter religious persecution by using 

human rights-related financial and visa 

authorities to impose asset freezes 

and/or visa bans on individual officials, 

agencies, and military units for severe 

religious freedom violations, citing 

specific abuses; 

• Return the annual ceiling for the 

United States Refugee Admissions 

Program (USRAP) to the previously 

typical 95,000, and fully implement the 

Lautenberg Amendment, which aids 

persecuted Iranian religious minorities 

seeking refugee status in the United 

States; 

• Direct U.S. diplomats abroad to engage 

regularly with host government officials 

and key stakeholders about the risk 

of surveillance technology facilitating 

religious persecution, and fund efforts 

to train foreign officials on how to use 

surveillance technology to address 

legitimate public policy concerns while 

respecting religious freedom and related 

rights; and

• Ensure that combating anti-Semitism 

is a key priority of the IRF Alliance and 

encourage the UN Secretary-General to 

create a position in his office to engage 

with Jewish communities worldwide and 

to monitor and report on anti-Semitism 

globally.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATION

• Hold oversight hearings on the implementation of IRFA and the Frank Wolf Act;

• Highlight religious freedom issues 

through legislation, hearings, briefings, 

and other actions; and examine, during 

congressional delegation trips abroad, 

conditions for persons of all faiths and 

beliefs or none; 

• Advocate for international religious 

freedom by actively engaging in the IRF 

Caucus, as well as through advocating 

for religious prisoners of conscience 

through the Tom Lantos Human Rights 

Commission’s Defending Freedoms 

Project, participating in the International 

Panel of Parliamentarians for Freedom 

of Religion or Belief, and joining the U.S. 

House of Representatives or U.S. Senate 

Bipartisan Task Force for Combating 

Anti-Semitism; 

• Evaluate the policy tools available for 

targeted human rights-related sanctions 

to ensure maximum impact in curtailing abuses, including considering the 

permanent codification of the State 

Department’s authority under its annual 

appropriations law to impose individual visa bans for gross human rights 

violations and more clearly defining that 

authority’s relationship to Global Magnitsky sanctions; and

• Require the State Department to track 

and report annually on foreign governments’ exportation of religious 

intolerance to other countries in the form 

of media, school textbooks, religious 

training, and/or support for organizations 

or nonstate actors that perpetrate or 

espouse violence in the name of religion.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Legislation Factsheet: International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA)

• Hearing: Global Efforts to Counter Anti-Semitism

• Hearing: Protecting Houses of Worship and Holy Sites

• Factsheet: Religious Freedom in China’s High-Tech Surveillance State

• Op-Ed: Fighting Religious Persecution in China One Violator at a Time (in The Hill)

During 2019, the State Department and U.S. Department of 

the Treasury actively used the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 

Accountability Act, a related executive order, and other legal authorities to impose targeted sanctions on specific foreign officials, and in 

some cases also their immediate family members, for corruption or 

human rights abuses. Only a few of the human rights-based sanctions 

were related to religious freedom violations, however. 

In November, President Trump set the annual ceiling for the 

resettlement of refugees to the United States for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 

at 18,000, the lowest in the program’s history. The administration dedicated 5,000 of those slots to refugees fleeing religious persecution, 

and continued to focus on humanitarian assistance for those displaced 

abroad and for programs to help enable their return home, as it had 

the previous year. 
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020 7

Legal Framework

IRFA, as amended by the Frank Wolf Act, seeks to make religious 

freedom a higher priority in U.S. foreign policy through a range of 

mechanisms and tools. These include: governmental institutions, 

such as the Ambassador-at-Large and the State Department’s Office 

of International Religious Freedom (IRF Office), USCIRF as an independent legislative branch agency, and the position on the White 

House NSC staff; ongoing monitoring and annual reports on religious freedom violations; and the imposition of consequences for 

the worst violators, including through CPC designations and related 

actions and the ability to bar the entry to the United States of foreign officials responsible for particularly severe religious freedom 

violations. IRFA also includes religious freedom as an element of U.S. 

foreign assistance, cultural exchange, and international broadcasting 

programs, and requires training on religious freedom and religious 

persecution for State Department foreign service officers and U.S. 

immigration officials. Further, it includes provisions on refugee 

and asylum policy, including requiring that the president consider 

information about religious persecution as part of his annual determination of refugee admissions. IRFA is centered on promoting the 

right to freedom of religion or belief as recognized in international 

law, as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other 

international instruments and regional agreements.

For a more detailed description of IRFA, its legislative history, and 

its implementation, please see USCIRF’s Legislative Factsheet: IRFA.

Alongside IRFA, other laws provide tools to sanction individual 

religious freedom abusers. Some apply to specific countries, such 

as the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act (CISADA, 

P.L.111-195). More broadly, the 

2016 Global Magnitsky Human 

Rights Accountability Act allows 

the president, who has delegated

these authorities to the secretaries of treasury and state, to deny 

U.S. visas to and freeze the U.S.-

based assets of any foreigner 

responsible for “extrajudicial 

killings, torture, or other gross 

violations of internationally protected human rights” against 

someone seeking to expose 

illegal government activity or to 

exercise or defend internationally protected rights. Executive Order 

(E.O.) 13818, issued in December 2017 to implement and build on the 

Global Magnitsky Act, authorizes visa bans and asset freezes against 

foreign persons involved in “serious human rights abuse,” providing 

an even more expansive basis for targeted sanctions. 

In addition, Section 7031(c) of the Department of State’s annual 

appropriations law (P.L. 116-6 for FY 2019, and P.L. 116-94 for FY 2020) 

requires the secretary of state to make foreign officials and their 

immediate family members ineligible for U.S. entry if there is credible 

evidence that such individuals have been involved in “a gross violation 

of human rights.” Unlike the visa ineligibility provision enacted in IRFA, 

visa bans under this provision can be announced publicly. 

Key Developments In 2019

High-Level Commitment

During 2019, the Trump administration continued to emphasize its 

commitment to international religious freedom through statements 

from high-level officials, as it has since 2017. For example, speaking at 

the UN Event on Religious Freedom, President Trump said that “[a]s 

President, protecting religious freedom is one of my highest priorities” 

and that “America will always be a voice for victims of religious persecution everywhere.” Vice President Michael R. Pence and Secretary of 

State Michael R. Pompeo have similarly expressed their commitment 

to advancing religious freedom, including at the 2019 ministerial. In a 

statement on International Religious Freedom Day, then U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) Administrator Mark Green emphasized the “importance of religious freedom in all facets of a country’s 

development” and stated that USAID is committed to “continuing to 

support recovery and justice for those whose religious freedom has 

been violated through our humanitarian and development assistance.”

International Partnerships

The positive trajectory of the past five years toward an international 

movement to advance religious freedom continued, with an increasing 

number of entities and networks focused on international religious 

freedom emerging in 2019. The IRF Roundtable established 28 international religious freedom roundtables in countries including Sudan, 

Nigeria, Taiwan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. These roundtables 

are modeled after meetings NGOs hold regularly with government 

representatives in Washington, 

DC, and aim to increase the 

global conversation on religious 

freedom. Additionally, in March 

2019, Taiwan appointed Pusin 

Tali as its first Ambassador-atLarge for Religious Freedom. In 

September 2019, Rehman Chishti, 

a Member of Parliament (MP),

was appointed as the United 

Kingdom’s Prime Minister’s 

Special Envoy for Freedom of 

Religion or Belief. Special Envoy 

Chishti’s appointment was notable as he is the first UK Special Envoy to focus exclusively on freedom 

of religion or belief and not share his mandate with other thematic 

issues. Further expanding international partnerships, there is also an 

increasing number of MPs participating in the International Panel of 

Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion or Belief (IPPFoRB), a global 

network of legislators dedicated to advancing religious freedom. 

In 2019, the Trump administration leveraged this international 

momentum to convene regional meetings on specific religious freedom 

topics, including a conference on Interfaith Tolerance Education to 

Combat Extremism, held with the United Arab Emirates, which explored 

IRFA is centered on promoting the right to 

freedom of religion or belief as recognized in 

international law, as articulated in the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 

International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, and other international 

instruments and regional agreements.
8 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

opportunities to counter radicalization through religious teachings 

and led to the Abu Dhabi Guidelines on Teaching Interfaith Tolerance. 

Designations

On December 18, 2019, Secretary Pompeo redesignated nine countries as CPCs for engaging in or tolerating particularly severe religious 

freedom violations: Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, 

Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. There were no new additions to the CPC list. For all nine, the presidential actions taken in 

response to the designations were either preexisting or “double-hatted” sanctions or waivers.

On the same date, Secretary Pompeo renewed the placements of 

Comoros, Russia, and Uzbekistan 

on the State Department’s SWL 

for countries that engaged in 

or tolerated severe violations of 

religious freedom, and added 

Cuba, Nicaragua, Nigeria, and 

Sudan to this list. Sudan had 

been designated as a CPC since 

the State Department issued its 

first CPC designations in 1999, 

but was moved to the SWL due 

to the steps taken by the civilian-led transitional government 

to address the previous regime’s 

egregious violations of religious freedom. 

Secretary Pompeo also redesignated nine entities as EPCs: 

al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda, al-Shabab, 

Boko Haram, the Houthis, ISIS, ISIS-Khorasan, and the Taliban. 

USCIRF welcomed the 2019 designations, particularly that the State 

Department recognized the severity of violations in Nigeria, for which 

USCIRF has recommended CPC designation since 2009, and Cuba, a 

longstanding USCIRF Tier 2 country, by adding them to the SWL.

Individual Violators

During 2019, there were no known visa denials to any foreign officials 

for particularly severe religious freedom violations under Section 

212(a)(2)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the provision 

added by IRFA. However, the U.S. government ramped up its use 

of newer accountability tools to deny U.S. visas to or block the U.S.-

based assets of foreigners for corruption or human rights abuses. As 

of December 2019, the U.S. government had sanctioned 198 foreign 

individuals and entities under the 2016 Global Magnitsky Human 

Rights Accountability Act and the related 2017 executive order, E.O. 

13818. Of these sanctions, 16 related directly to religious freedom, 

including eight that were issued before the reporting period. In 2019, 

the Treasury Department announced Global Magnitsky sanctions 

against two Iraqi militia figures and two former Iraqi governors for 

corruption and serious human rights abuses. Explicit reference to 

the militia figures’ role in the persecution of religious minorities was 

included in the justification, while the corruption of the governors facilitated the conditions that allowed this persecution. In December, the 

Treasury Department announced Global Magnitsky sanctions against 

four Burmese military leaders for “serious human rights abuses” in 

Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan states.

The State Department also used other visa restriction authorities against human rights abusers, including violators of religious 

freedom. More than 100 public designations of foreign officials and 

their immediate family members under Section 7031(c) of the FY 2019 

Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Act 

were announced in FY 2019, although only a small number involved 

religious freedom. Notable designations for gross violations of human 

rights connected to religious freedom included the aforementioned 

four senior leaders of the Burmese military for “extrajudicial killings 

in Rakhine State during the ethnic 

cleansing of Rohingya,” the former director of Sudan’s National 

Intelligence and Security Service 

(NISS) for alleged torture, and 

two Russian officials for their 

involvement in the arrest and 

torture of Jehovah’s Witnesses. 

Additionally, in October, the 

State Department announced a 

new visa restrictions policy applicable to Chinese government and 

Communist Party officials implicated in the mass internment of 

Uighur and other Muslims in Xinjiang, China, in conjunction with 

the U.S. Department of Commerce’s imposition of export controls 

on 28 Chinese companies and organizations complicit in the same 

abuses. Under the Iran-specific authority of E.O. 13846, the Treasury 

Department imposed sanctions in December on two Iranian “hanging 

judges” known for imposing unusually harsh sentences and responsible for severe violations of religious freedom.

Programs

IRFA envisaged the funding of religious freedom programs, authorizing 

U.S. foreign assistance to promote and develop “legal protections 

and cultural respect for religious freedom.” For FY 2019, the State 

Department was appropriated $25 million for programs on international religious freedom and on protecting, investigating abuses 

against, and providing justice to vulnerable and persecuted religious 

minorities. During 2019, the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) issued several requests for proposals 

to advance religious freedom, including to support projects in Nigeria, 

Pakistan, Uzbekistan, the East Asia Pacific region, and the Middle 

East and North Africa region, along with thematic programs on issues 

including anti-Semitism and journalists reporting on religious freedom. 

During 2019, as part of the Trump administration’s continued 

prioritization of religious freedom, USAID once again emphasized 

humanitarian aid for religious groups targeted for persecution or genocide, as well as programs to promote religious freedom, tolerance, and 

pluralism. Building on its existing programs, including the Genocide 

Recovery and Persecution Response Program, USAID has provided

USCIRF welcomed the 2019 designations, 

particularly that the State Department 

recognized the severity of violations 

in Nigeria, for which USCIRF has 

recommended CPC designation since 2009, 

and Cuba, a longstanding USCIRF Tier 2 

country, by adding them to the SWL.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020 9

more than $400 million since 2017 in assistance to ethnic and religious 

minority communities in northern Iraq and continued to expand its 

partnerships with local partners and faith-based groups. Other notable programs that aim to support religious minorities and promote 

religious tolerance include a $46.4-million program to work with communities affected by conflict in Rakhine, Kachin, and northern Shan 

states in Burma, and programs to support Indonesian institutions and 

communities to resist the rise of violent extremism, promote religious 

tolerance, and increase access to 

justice and human rights for religious communities. 

The administration has also 

played a role in coordinating multilateral support to international 

religious freedom programs. The 

International Religious Freedom 

Fund was created in 2018, at 

the first Ministerial to Advance 

Religious Freedom, to allow governments and entities to extend 

final support to fund activities 

to protect and support religious freedom worldwide. The fund has 

received nearly $5 million in pledges and supported more than 435 

rapid response grants to assist communities suffering from religious 

persecution, including providing support to victims of the Easter 

Sunday attacks in Sri Lanka.

Refugee Resettlement

Under the USRAP, the president sets a ceiling for how many refugees 

the United States will accept from abroad each year; under IRFA, 

religious persecution should be considered in this determination. 

Since the program launched in 1980, the refugee admission ceiling 

has averaged 95,000 per year. While the Trump administration set the 

ceilings for FY 2018 and FY 2019 at 45,000 and 30,000, respectively, 

actual refugee admissions in FY 2018 totaled 22,491, the lowest in the 

program’s history, and 30,000 in FY 2019.

In September, USCIRF expressed alarm following reports that 

the ceiling would be significantly reduced for FY 2020 and called 

for a ceiling of 95,000 or, at the 

very least, the FY 2019 amount 

of 30,000. The refugee ceiling 

was ultimately set at 18,000, the 

lowest in the USRAP’s history. 

Unlike previous years, the presidential determination for FY 

2020 did not allocate the ceiling 

among the regions in the world. 

Instead, it set allocations based 

on groups of “special humanitarian concern to the United 

States,” including 5,000 for refugees who have been persecuted or have a well-founded fear of 

persecution based on religion. This includes refugees eligible for 

U.S. resettlement under the Lautenberg Amendment—a special 

program for certain persecuted religious minority groups. While 

approximately 12 Iranian religious minority refugees were admitted 

to the United States in 2019 under the Lautenberg Amendment, 

nearly 80 fully vetted Iranians remained in Vienna, Austria, at the end 

of the reporting period awaiting final approval to fly to the United 

States for resettlement. 

In September, USCIRF expressed alarm 

following reports that the 

[refugee resettlement] ceiling would be 

significantly reduced for FY 2020 and 

called for a ceiling of 95,000 or, at the very 

least, the FY 2019 amount of 30,000.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020 11

Burma

China

Eritrea

India

Iran

Nigeria

North Korea

Pakistan

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Vietnam

■ COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN

Afghanistan

Algeria

Azerbaijan

Bahrain

Central African Republic

Cuba

Egypt

Indonesia

Iraq

Kazakhstan

Malaysia

Nicaragua

Sudan

Turkey

Uzbekistan

■ SPECIAL WATCH LIST COUNTRIES

2020 USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS
12 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

BURMA

• Redesignate Burma as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Burmese 

government agencies and officials 

responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry 

into the United States under human 

rights-related financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom 

violations;

• Reinstate the designation of a National 

Emergency with respect to Burma—terminated by executive order in October 

2016—pursuant to the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 

U.S.C. 1701-1706, in response to the 

ongoing and severe atrocities, and refocus efforts to conclude definitively and 

publicly whether such atrocities meet the 

legal definition of crimes against humanity and/or genocide; and

• Actively support efforts to hold Burmese 

officials accountable through the international legal system, including assisting 

and strengthening the documentation of 

mass atrocities and facilitating information sharing. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Provide increased funds for assistance 

programs to support atrocity prevention 

and response efforts in Burma. 

I

n 2019, the Burmese government continued to commit widespread and egregious religious freedom violations, particularly 

against Rohingya Muslims. Ethnic-driven conflict and degradation 

of other civil rights often coincide with religious differences, thereby 

severely restricting freedom of religion or belief.

During 2019, the Burmese military continued operations in 

Rakhine State that have led to the large-scale displacement of 

Rohingya. As of July 2019, approximately 910,000 civilians reside in 

camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, including Muslims, Christians, and 

Hindus. In October 2019, United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on 

Myanmar Yanghee Lee found that Rohingya remaining in Rakhine are 

unable to leave their villages or earn a living with increasingly limited 

access to aid. Approximately 120,000 internally displaced Rohingya 

are confined to camps with severe limitations on their movement, 

little access to education or healthcare, lack of work, and inability to 

obtain ID cards, as USCIRF learned during a visit to Burma in June 

2019. In July, the government cut the Internet in areas of Rakhine 

and Chin states, with human rights groups expressing concern this 

would restrict humanitarian aid from reaching vulnerable populations 

and limit the ability to monitor military abuses. The Internet restrictions were lifted in September, but reimposed in February 2020. 

Reports continued of the military indiscriminately killing civilians and 

destroying homes, mosques, and food stores. As a result, Special 

Rapporteur Lee concluded that “it is not safe or sustainable for 

refugees to return.” An August 2019 UN Independent International 

Fact-Finding Mission report concluded that the military’s actions, 

including the use of sexual violence, indicated its “genocidal intent.” 

These abuses also impacted other groups in Rakhine, including 

Kaman Muslims and Buddhists. Violence between the Arakan Army 

(an ethnic Rakhine Buddhist group) and the military spilled over into 

Chin State, displacing many ethnic Chin. In addition to authorities, 

armed ethnic groups have been responsible for religious freedom 

violations. There were reports in 2019 of the Arakan Army abducting 

civilians, including Christian pastors. 

On January 23, 2020, after the reporting period, the International 

Court of Justice in The Hague announced a provisional ruling in a case 

brought by The Gambia that Burma must “take all measures within 

its power” to ensure that the military and any irregular armed units 

“do not commit acts of genocide” against the Rohingya. In 2019, a 

universal jurisdiction case was also filed in Argentina against Burma 

for abuses against Rohingya, and the International Criminal Court 

launched an investigation into the military’s actions in Rakhine. 

The ongoing violence has been fueled by hate speech, misinformation, and incitement to violence spread on social media, in 

particular Facebook, which nonstate actors and government officials have used to threaten minorities. The behavior and threats of 

Buddhist nationalist groups continued to play a role in restrictions 

on religious freedom. More than 40 mosques—shuttered after the 

2012 anti-Muslim violence—remained closed, with Muslim leaders 

continuing to advocate for their reopening. During Ramadan, the 

government temporarily closed Islamic places of worship following 

threats from Buddhist nationalists, despite the Muslim community 

having permits to conduct prayer services. In early 2019, USCIRF also 

received reports that officials closed madrassas and a mosque in 

Ayeyarwady Region. Non-Buddhist religious communities routinely 

faced difficulties in getting permission to construct or repair houses 

of worship and continued to face harassment from local authorities 

and nonstate actors. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES 

• Commission delegation visit: Rangoon and Nay Pyi Taw in June 2019

• Hearing: Citizenship Laws and Religious Freedom

• Factsheet: The Path toward Justice: Accountability for International Crimes against the Rohingya of Burma

• Webinar Series: Webinar #2: Burma 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 13

BURMA

Background

Burma has a Buddhist majority (87.9 percent) with Christian (6.2 percent), Muslim (4.3 percent), Animist (0.8 percent), and Hindu (0.5 

percent) populations. The 2008 constitution recognizes Buddhism 

as the de facto state religion, but also recognizes Christianity, Islam, 

Hinduism, and Animism. Despite this, religious and ethnic minorities 

not belonging to the majority Bamar ethnicity and Buddhist faith have 

faced longstanding persecution. In 2015, Burma passed race and religion laws supported by Buddhist nationalists such as the Ma Ba Tha. 

These laws regulate religious conversion, marriage, and births, and also 

restrict the religious freedom of non-Buddhists, particularly Muslims. 

In November 2015, the country transitioned to democracy with the 

election of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League of Democracy (NLD). 

However, the military still exercises significant political control with 

responsibility for home affairs, border affairs, and defense ministries, 

and with 25 percent of parliamentary seats reserved for military officers. 

In recent years, the NLD has come under increasing criticism for inaction 

on humanitarian crises involving ethnic and religious minorities, most 

notably military operations in Rakhine. 

The Rakhine State Crisis and Attacks against Muslims

Using the pretext of insurgent activity, Burma’s military dramatically 

escalated operations in Rakhine in August 2017, sparking a mass 

migration. Within a matter of weeks, nearly 700,000 civilians sought 

refuge from the violence in refugee camps in Bangladesh. During 

these operations, the military has been accused of indiscriminate 

killings of civilians; mass rape and other sexual violence; disappearances; forced starvation; arbitrary detentions and arrests; and looting, 

burning, and property destruction. Both government authorities 

and nonstate actors also have shuttered and destroyed mosques; 

prevented Rohingya from worshipping or attending religious schools; 

interfered with Islamic funeral rites; desecrated and burned Qur’ans; 

and targeted imams for detention, torture, and killings. 

Prior to these military operations, Rohingya Muslims have long 

been targeted for their ethnicity and religion, including being denied 

citizenship since 1982. While persecution against the Rohingya and 

broader Muslim community is not always religious in nature, it has 

impacted their ability to practice their faith. As anti-Muslim sentiment

and Buddhist nationalism blossomed alongside the democratization process that began in 2011, the Rohingya continued to face 

discrimination. In 2012, anti-Muslim violence in Rakhine State left 200 

dead and over 140,000 forcibly displaced, including 75,000 fleeing to 

Bangladesh. The following year in Meiktila, mobs—including Buddhist 

monks—burned over 1,500 Muslim homes; damaged or destroyed 

three Islamic schools and more than a dozen mosques; displaced 

thousands; and killed at least 100 people over three days. 

Abuses against Christians

While some Christians are able to practice their faith, others are targeted for their beliefs. In Kachin and Northern Shan states, renewed 

violence in August 2019 between the military and ethnic armed organizations displaced thousands, including many Christians. These 

displacements were in addition to more than 100,000 already displaced 

since a collapsed 2011 ceasefire between the military and the Kachin 

Independence Army. The longstanding conflicts, while not religious in 

nature, have deeply impacted Christian communities, with the military 

reportedly damaging or destroying over 300 churches. Blockades on 

humanitarian assistance also restricted access to basic necessities.

Beginning in 2018, the Chinese-backed United Wa State Army 

(UWSA) has targeted Christians in territory under its control. Under 

the guise of confronting “religious extremism,” UWSA soldiers interrogated and detained almost 100 pastors; ordered others to leave the 

region; closed religious schools and churches; destroyed unauthorized 

churches; banned new church construction; and forcibly recruited 

Christian students. In late 2018, the UWSA released those detained 

after signing a pledge to pray only at home. In December 2019, the 

UWSA reopened 51 of the more than 100 churches closed with the 

rest remaining closed. 

Hate Speech and Social Media

Over the last decade, international observers have noted the rapid 

rise of Internet penetration, mobile phone usage, and social media as 

key contributors to the spread of hate speech and misinformation as 

precursors to mass violence. To counter this trend, Facebook blocked 

the pages of Buddhist nationalists, such as Ma Ba Tha and the monk U 

Wirathu, known for incitement to violence against Muslims. However, 

authorities continue to use Facebook regularly to disseminate information that is discriminatory and even factually incorrect, especially 

against minorities. Despite Facebook banning several military officials in 2018 for spreading “hate and misinformation,” the company 

reported in August 2019 that individuals associated with the military 

continue to engage in this behavior. In May 2019, a court issued an 

arrest warrant for U Wirathu under charges of sedition for criticism 

of the government.

Key U.S. Policy

In 2019, the U.S. government imposed punitive actions for the 

Burmese government’s human rights and religious freedom violations, 

including travel bans against military leaders for “gross human rights 

violations.” In December, the U.S. Department of State redesignated 

Burma as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed as the relevant presidential 

action the existing ongoing restrictions referenced in 22 CFR 126.1. 

That same month, the U.S Department of the Treasury announced 

Global Magnitsky sanctions against four military leaders, including the 

military’s Commander-in-Chief and Deputy Commander-in-Chief, for 

“serious human rights abuses” in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan states. In 

a May 2019 visit to Burma, Under Secretary of State David Hale stated 

it is Burma’s responsibility to allow Rohingya refugees safe return, 

pursue credible and independent investigations, and improve access 

for humanitarian aid. The U.S. government also announced $72 million 

in U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding to support Burma’s democratic transition, focusing on civil society and media 

and a community-strengthening project for conflict-affected states, as 

well as a $127 million aid package for refugees in Bangladesh. 
14 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

CHINA

• Redesignate China as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging 

in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

religious freedom violations, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA); 

• Impose targeted sanctions on Chinese 

government agencies and officials 

responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom—particularly Xinjiang 

Communist Party Secretary Chen 

Quanguo and former Political and Legal 

Affairs Commission Chief Zhu Hailun—

by freezing those individuals’ assets and/

or barring their entry into the United 

States under human rights related financial and visa authorities, citing specific 

religious freedom violations; 

• Publicly express concerns about Beijing 

hosting the 2022 Winter Olympic Games 

and state that U.S. government officials 

will not attend the games if the Chinese 

government’s crackdown on religious 

freedom continues; and

• Continue and intensify efforts to counter 

Chinese government influence operations in the United States that are 

designed to suppress information about 

or advocacy in response to violations of 

religious freedom in China.

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Support the Tibetan Policy and Support 

Act of 2019 (H.R.4331/S.2539) and other 

legislation designed to promote religious 

freedom in China; and

• Support the Uyghur Forced Labor 

Prevention Act (H.R.6210/S.3471), which 

would prohibit the importation to the 

United States of textiles, cotton, and 

other goods from Xinjiang.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in China continued to deteriorate. The Chinese government has created a high-tech surveillance 

state, utilizing facial recognition and artificial intelligence to monitor religious minorities. On April 1, a new regulation requiring 

religious venues to have legal representatives and professional 

accountants went into effect. Some smaller religious venues, especially in rural areas, found these requirements impossible to fulfill. 

Independent experts estimate that between 900,000 and 

1.8 million Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims have been 

detained in more than 1,300 concentration camps in Xinjiang—

an estimate revised upward since the previous reporting period. 

Individuals have been sent to the camps for wearing long beards, 

refusing alcohol, or other behaviors authorities deem to be signs of 

“religious extremism.” Former detainees report that they suffered 

torture, rape, sterilization, and other abuses. In addition, nearly half 

a million Muslim children have been separated from their families 

and placed in boarding schools. During 2019, the camps increasingly transitioned from reeducation to forced labor as detainees 

were forced to work in cotton and textile factories. Outside the 

camps, the government continued to deploy officials to live with 

Muslim families and to report on any signs of “extremist” religious 

behavior. Meanwhile, authorities in Xinjiang and other parts of 

China have destroyed or damaged thousands of mosques and 

removed Arabic-language signs from Muslim businesses. 

The Chinese government continued to pursue a strategy 

of forced assimilation and suppression of Tibetan Buddhism, as 

demonstrated by the laws designed to control the next reincarnation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and those of other Tibetan 

eminent lamas. Monks and nuns who refused to denounce the Dalai 

Lama have been expelled from their monasteries, imprisoned, and 

tortured. During the summer of 2019, authorities demolished thousands of residences at the Yachen Gar Tibetan Buddhist center in 

Sichuan Province, displacing as many as 6,000 monks and nuns. In 

April, authorities closed the Larung Gar Buddhist Academy to new 

enrollment. Authorities also intensified a crackdown on possessing 

or displaying photos of the Dalai Lama, continued to monitor religious festivals, and, in some areas, banned students from attending 

festivals during their school holidays. In protest of repressive government policies, at least 156 Tibetans have self-immolated since 

February 2009. 

Chinese authorities raided or closed down hundreds of 

Protestant house churches in 2019, including Rock Church in 

Henan Province and Shouwang Church in Beijing. The government 

released some of the Early Rain Covenant Church congregants 

who had been arrested in December 2018, but in December 2019 

a court charged Pastor Wang Yi with “subversion of state power” 

and sentenced him to nine years imprisonment. Local authorities 

continued to harass and detain bishops, including Guo Xijin and 

Cui Tai, who refused to join the state-affiliated Catholic association. 

Several local governments, including Guangzho city, offered cash 

bounties for individuals who informed on underground churches. In 

addition, authorities across the country have removed crosses from 

churches, banned youth under the age of 18 from participating in 

religious services, and replaced images of Jesus Christ or the Virgin 

Mary with pictures of President Xi Jinping.

According to reports, thousands of Falun Gong practitioners 

were arrested during 2019 for practicing the movement’s meditation exercises or distributing literature about their beliefs. Human 

rights advocates and scientists presented evidence that the practice 

of harvesting organs from prisoners—many of whom are believed 

to be Falun Gong practitioners—continued on a significant scale. 

In addition, there were widespread reports that authorities across 

China demolished Mahayana Buddhist, Daoist, and Confucian 

statues they claimed were “unauthorized.” 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 15

CHINA

Background

According to the CIA World Factbook, of China’s estimated 1.4 billion 

people, approximately 18 percent are Buddhist, including Tibetan 

Buddhists; 5 percent are Christian; and 2 percent are Muslim. Most 

of the country’s estimated 70 million Christians refuse to join the 

state-run churches—the Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement 

and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association—and instead worship 

in underground house churches. Other significant religious traditions 

include the Falun Gong, Daoism, and traditional folk practices. 

Although the Communist Party has a long history of restricting religious freedom, in recent years it has become increasingly hostile toward 

religion and initiated campaigns to “sinicize” Islam, Tibetan Buddhism, 

and Christianity to rid them of what it deems “foreign” influences. The 

2018 Revised Regulations on Religious Affairs effectively ban “unauthorized” religious teaching and expand the role of local authorities in 

controlling religious activities. Under article 300 of the Chinese Criminal 

Code, belonging to certain religious movements, such as the Falun 

Gong, is punishable with three to seven years’ imprisonment. 

Hong Kong

In June 2019, more than one million Hong Kong residents marched in 

protest against a bill that would have allowed authorities to extradite 

criminal defendants to mainland China. Although the protests were 

not primarily about religious freedom issues, some church leaders 

joined the protests and religious freedom activists expressed concern 

that the bill would have undermined their ability to advocate without 

fear of retaliation. The city government withdrew the bill in October, 

but protests continued through the end of the reporting period.

International Reactions and Advocacy 

Throughout 2019, China’s suppression of religious freedom received 

widespread international attention. In July, a group of 22 European 

countries, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan signed a letter to the 

United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (HRC) condemning the 

persecution of Uighur and other Muslims. In October, those countries, 

as well as the United States, submitted a statement about Xinjiang 

to the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 

(CERD). In November, a panel of UN experts warned that “disproportionate emphasis placed by the authorities on the repression 

of rights of minorities risks worsening any security risk” in Xinjiang. 

Also in November, the World Bank reduced a $50 million project for 

vocational training in Xinjiang due to allegations that some funds were 

used to purchase police batons and tear gas launchers. However, the 

Chinese government reportedly used its economic and diplomatic 

leverage to dissuade some governments from criticizing its record. It 

presented letters signed by nearly 50 governments to both the HRC 

and CERD defending its record. In March, the Organization of Islamic 

Cooperation issued a resolution “commending” China for taking care 

of its Muslim population. 

Key U.S. Policy

In 2019, relations between the United States and China remained tense 

due to the trade war and Chinese security threats to U.S. interests. 

Senior U.S. government officials continued to condemn deteriorating 

religious freedom conditions in China. The State Department added 

a separate section about Xinjiang in its 2018 Report on International 

Religious Freedom. In May, U.S. Ambassador to China Terry Branstad 

visited Tibet and urged Chinese leaders to open “substantive 

dialogue” with the Dalai Lama. On July 17, as part of the second 

Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, President Donald J. Trump 

met with victims of religious persecution from China. In October, the 

U.S. Department of Commerce imposed restrictions on exports to 

28 Chinese companies and organizations and the State Department 

announced visa restrictions on Chinese officials implicated in the mass 

internment of Uighur Muslims. In addition, U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection issued orders to seize garment imports produced by Hetian 

Taida Apparel Co. due to concerns that they were made using forced 

labor in Xinjiang. Throughout 2019, the State Department, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), and other government 

agencies continued to provide funding to civil society organizations 

that promote religious freedom in China. On December 18, the State 

Department redesignated China as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed 

as the relevant presidential action ongoing restrictions on exports of 

certain equipment to China under the Foreign Relations Authorization 

Act (FY 1990 and 1991).

Members of Congress continued to criticize China’s crackdown on 

religious freedom in 2019. The Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China’s 2019 Annual Report noted that the mass internment of Uighur 

and other Muslims might constitute “crimes against humanity.” In 

December, the House of Representatives and the Senate both passed—

but had not fully reconciled—different versions of the Uighur Intervention 

and Global Humanitarian Unified Response Act (S.178), which would 

require the administration to impose targeted sanctions on Chinese 

officials responsible for serious abuses in Xinjiang. In September, legislators in both chambers introduced the Tibetan Policy and Support Act 

(H.R.4331/S.2539), which would authorize the U.S. government to impose 

targeted sanctions on Chinese officials who interfere in the process of 

recognizing a successor to the Dalai Lama. In January 2020, outside the 

reporting period, the House passed the bill. In July, Representative Vicky 

Hartzler (R-MO) introduced a resolution condemning the persecution 

of Christians in China (H.Res.493). In addition, legislators introduced a 

bill directing the U.S. government to oppose World Bank loans to China 

(S.3018), citing its religious freedom violations. The measure did not 

receive a vote before the end of the reporting period. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Religious Freedom in China’s High-Tech Surveillance State

• Webinar Series: Webinar #4: China

• Op-Ed: Fighting Religious Persecution in China One Violator at a Time (in The Hill)
16 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF 

COMMISSIONER TENZIN DORJEE

China is the classic example of a “country of particular concern,” or 

CPC, when it comes to religious freedom violations. Millions of Uighurs 

are kept in concentration camps and according to the latest Freedom 

House Report, Tibet is second only to Syria in terms of religious freedom and human rights violations. The situation in Tibet is worse than 

in North Korea according to the report and no international media has 

access to Tibet. To enslave Uighurs and Tibetans, China uses state of 

the art surveillance technology to collect DNA and sociodemographic 

information to restrict religious freedom and human rights. Even 

children are not allowed to learn their native languages and religions. 

I applaud bipartisan efforts in the U.S. Congress to address religious 

and human rights violations in China. China’s forced disappearance 

of the Panchen Lama Gedhun Choekyi Nyima for over 25 years and its 

most serious interference into the recognition of His Holiness the Dalai 

Lama’s next reincarnation for a political agenda deserve stern condemnation and counter measures. Thank you to the U.S. Congress for 

passing the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Support Act (RATSA). I urge the 

administration to implement the RATSA and urgently appoint a Tibet 

Coordinator to advance Sino-Tibetan dialogues for resolving issues 

based on mutually beneficial nonviolence and the Middle Way policy 

proposed by the Central Tibetan Administration and supported by 

the United States, European Parliament, and others. The time is now 

for serious multilateral government and global policy actions to end 

“systematic, ongoing, and egregious” religious freedom and human 

rights violations in China, including in Tibet and Xinjiang. 

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF 

COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE

There is no question that China is the world’s foremost violator of 

human rights and religious freedom. It cannot be compared to any 

other country in the world not only because of its inexcusable actions, 

but because of the way it aids and abets similar actions by other 

countries all around the world. Meanwhile, the international order, in 

pursuit of self-interest, continues to let China play by its own rules, 

and especially at the United Nations. This is absolutely inexcusable, 

and those nations around the world who ignore China’s malevolence 

may eventually find themselves subservient to it. It is past time for 

our world bodies, and our liberal democracies, to demand more 

from China. 

CHINA

18 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

ERITREA

• Redesignate Eritrea as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging 

in systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and maintain the existing, 

ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 

CFR 126.1(a) of the International Traffic in 

Arms Regulations; 

• Impose targeted sanctions on Eritrean 

government agencies and officials 

responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry 

into the United States under human rights 

related financial and visa authorities, 

citing specific religious freedom violations; and

• Use bilateral and multilateral diplomatic 

channels to urge the government of 

Eritrea to: 

• Release unconditionally detainees held 

on account of their religious activities, 

including Patriarch Antonios;

• Publish the registration law for religious 

groups along with clear guidelines for 

applying for or appealing decisions;

• End religious persecution of unregistered religious communities, and 

grant full citizenship rights to Jehovah’s Witnesses; 

• Extend an official invitation for unrestricted visits by the United Nations 

(UN) Special Rapporteur on the 

situation of human rights in Eritrea, the 

UN Special Rapporteur on freedom 

of religion or belief, the UN Working 

Group on Arbitrary Detention, and the 

International Red Cross; and

• Encourage the African Union to 

establish an accountability mechanism 

to investigate, prosecute, and try individuals accused of committing crimes 

against humanity in Eritrea, as recommended in 2016 by the UN Commission 

of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea 

and the UN Human Rights Council.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Eritrea worsened, with 

increasing interference in and restrictions on religious groups. 

In spite of the significant regional political changes and the 2018 

peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Eritrea continues 

to have one of the worst religious freedom records in the world, 

and has shown little interest in concretely improving the situation. No new religious institutions were officially registered, and 

thus only four religious communities remain legally permitted to 

operate: the Coptic Orthodox Church of Eritrea, Sunni Islam, the 

Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Church of Eritrea, a 

Lutheran-affiliated denomination. 

During 2019, there was an increase in political activism and calls 

for democratic reform by secular and religious Eritreans. The government responded harshly to both registered religious groups as 

well as unrecognized ones, such as the Pentecostal and Evangelical 

Christian communities, and accused religious actors of political interference for defending their beliefs and human rights. Christians were 

arbitrarily arrested and detained, including in waves of arrests in May 

of more than 171 adults and children gathering for worship around 

Asmara. In August, another 80 were reportedly arrested for practicing their faith. In April, Eritrean Catholic bishops wrote a joint letter 

calling for national truth and reconciliation. Throughout the year, 

the government forcibly took over and closed multiple faith-based 

schools as well as 22 additional Catholic Church-run health centers. 

In 2017 and 2018, security forces had conducted mass arrests of 

protestors of government interference into a prominent Islamic 

religious school—Al Diaa—including senior members of the school 

board. In 2019, some of those arrested died in prison, including a 

second member of the executive committee, Hajji Ibrahim Younes. 

In addition to being denied the right to freely practice their 

faith, Jehovah’s Witnesses were denied basic citizenship rights. 

Authorities explain this exclusionary policy as a result of Jehovah’s 

Witnesses’ abstention from voting in the referendum for Eritrea’s 

independence from Ethiopia in 1993, which was in adherence to 

their beliefs. Fifty-two Jehovah’s Witnesses remained imprisoned 

for observing their religion, in ways such as participating in religious 

meetings, preaching, or conscientiously objecting to military service. 

The Patriarch of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, Abune Antonios, 

remained in detention throughout 2019. In April, a secretly recorded 

video of Patriarch Antonios was published online. Hundreds of individuals were believed to be imprisoned for their faith in Eritrea, 

and USCIRF included some of those cases in its new Victims List. 

Some prisoners, such as leaders of the Full Gospel Church and the 

Orthodox Church, have been in prison for more than 15 years.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES 

• Country Update: Eritrea

• Special Report: Apostasy, Blasphemy, and Hate Speech Laws in Africa

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project adoption: Patriarch Abune Antonios
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 19

ERITREA

Background

Eritrea is under the authoritarian rule of President Isaias Afwerki 

and his political party, the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice 

(PFDJ). The government views human rights and political expression 

by the population as threats and thus strictly represses them. Many 

Eritreans cite violations of political and human rights as key reasons 

for fleeing the country, and, according to humanitarian actors, in 2019 

an average of at least 200 people arrived in Ethiopia and Sudan on 

a daily basis. The government continued to maintain an indefinite 

requirement of citizens to participate in national service, and restricted 

religious expression during that service. Human rights organizations 

reported that prayer, possession of religious books, and preaching also continue to be prohibited in prisons. Although the 1997 

Constitution pledges freedom of conscience, religion, expression 

of opinion, movement, assembly, and organization, the constitution 

has not been implemented. The government uses Proclamation No. 

73 of 1995 as its basis for limiting religious freedom, including the 

freedom of religious actors to express political views that differ from 

government-approved positions. 

Some sources estimate Eritrea’s population to be divided evenly 

between Muslims and Christians, while Pew Research estimates almost 

63 percent to be Christian and 37 percent Muslim, with less than 1 

percent comprising other faith groups. Most Eritrean Christians are 

members of the Eritrean Orthodox Church. Only four religious entities 

are officially recognized and permitted to operate to any extent in the 

country: the Eritrean Orthodox Church, Sunni Islam, the Roman Catholic 

Church, and the Evangelical Church of Eritrea. The government has not 

permitted any other groups to register since the requirement to do so 

went into effect in 2002. The government has published neither the 

registration law nor any procedures regarding applying for or appealing decisions. Authorities closely monitor the activities of the officially 

recognized groups, and also appoint leaders to key religious positions. 

Tightening the Grip on the Orthodox Community

In April 2019, a secretly recorded video of Patriarch Antonios was 

released, which allowed Eritreans around the world to hear Antonios’ 

personal account of his removal from his position and forcible detention, and led many of them to question the government’s narratives 

and decisions. Eritrean Orthodox Christians increasingly began to 

call on their church’s Holy Synod to cease its compliance with government demands. The Eritrean government reportedly heightened 

pressure on the Holy Synod to excommunicate Patriarch Antonios 

from the church, which it ultimately did in July in a letter accusing 

the patriarch of heresy and of engaging with heretics. Nevertheless, 

many Eritrean Orthodox Christians still view Patriarch Antonios 

as the lawful leader of the church. Throughout 2019, authorities 

continued to detain him unlawfully, and reportedly have warned religious leaders not to mention his name in sermons. Many Orthodox 

Eritreans have denounced the government’s actions against Patriarch 

Antonios and others, such as forcing monks to participate in military 

service against their religious beliefs. Multiple monastic fathers were 

also reportedly imprisoned in 2019 for expressing disagreement with 

the excommunication of Patriarch Antonios. 

International Human Rights Reviews

In January 2019, at Eritrea’s Universal Periodic Review before the UN 

Human Rights Council, more than a dozen states raised religious freedom issues in their statements, and specifically highlighted the need 

for Eritrea to allow conscientious objection and to release prisoners 

held on account of their beliefs. In May, the African Commission on 

Human and Peoples’ Rights published its Concluding Observations 

and Recommendations on Eritrea’s implementation of the African 

Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which included specific attention to religious freedom issues such as the treatment of Jehovah’s 

Witnesses and the need to ensure the right to registration and appeal 

for religious groups that seek to register officially. Furthermore, in 

May, the UN Human Rights Committee released its Concluding 

Observations on Eritrea’s adherence to the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). This report highlighted the detention of religious actors—including Patriarch Antonios for more than a 

decade—among other religious freedom violations.

Key U.S. Policy

Eritrea and the United States have not exchanged ambassadors 

since 2010. Diplomatic engagement improved during 2019 with several high-level U.S. official visits to Eritrea. In April, Acting Assistant 

Secretary for African Affairs Ambassador Donald Y. Yamamoto traveled to the country. In March, Representatives Karen Bass (D-CA), Joe 

Neguse (D-CO), and Ilhan Omar (D-MN) completed a congressional 

delegation to Ethiopia and Eritrea, and raised human rights and religious freedom concerns during their visit. Other State Department 

officials from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 

and the Office of International Religious Freedom also visited Eritrea 

in 2019 and raised human rights issues. The United States continued 

to support regional efforts for improving peace and security in the 

Horn of Africa. In addition to the broader diplomatic engagement, 

in May the United States removed Eritrea from its list of Countries 

Not Cooperating Fully with United States Antiterrorism Efforts. The 

State Department has designated Eritrea as a CPC repeatedly since 

2004, most recently redesignated it in December 2019, and as a consequence maintains an arms embargo on Eritrea under 22 CFR 126.1 

of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
20 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

INDIA

• Designate India as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

and tolerating systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious religious freedom violations, 

as defined by the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA); 

• Impose targeted sanctions on Indian government agencies and officials responsible 

for severe violations of religious freedom 

by freezing those individuals’ assets and/

or barring their entry into the United States 

under human rights-related financial and 

visa authorities, citing specific religious 

freedom violations;

• Strengthen the U.S. Embassy’s and 

consulates’ engagement with religious 

communities, local officials, and police, 

especially in regions impacted by religiously motivated violence; increase U.S. 

partnerships with Indian law enforcement 

to build capacity to protect religious 

minorities, houses of worship, and other 

holy sites, and confront religious-based 

hate crimes; and

• Allocate funding to support civil society to 

create a monitoring and early warning system in partnership with police to challenge 

hate speech and incitement to violence. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Continue to hold hearings highlighting 

religious freedom conditions in India and 

U.S. policy toward India. 

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in India experienced a drastic 

turn downward, with religious minorities under increasing assault. 

Following the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) re-election in May, 

the national government used its strengthened parliamentary 

majority to institute national level policies violating religious freedom across India, especially for Muslims. The national government 

allowed violence against minorities and their houses of worship to 

continue with impunity, and also engaged in and tolerated hate 

speech and incitement to violence. 

Significantly, the BJP-led government enacted the Citizenship 

(Amendment) Act (CAA)—a fast track to citizenship for non-Muslim migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan already 

residing in India—and approved a National Population Register 

(NPR) as a first step toward a nation-wide National Register of 

Citizens (NRC). The border state of Assam, under mandate of the 

Supreme Court, implemented a statewide NRC to identify illegal 

migrants within Assam. When the statewide NRC was released in 

August, 1.9 million residents—both Muslims and Hindus—were 

excluded. Those excluded live in fear of the consequences: three 

United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteurs warned that exclusion 

from the NRC could result in “statelessness, deportation, or prolonged detention.” Indeed, Home Minister Amit Shah referred to 

migrants as “termites” to be eradicated. Troubled that Hindus were 

excluded from Assam’s NRC, he and other BJP officials advocated 

for the CAA as a corrective measure to protect Hindus. The CAA 

provides listed non-Muslim religious communities a path to restore 

their citizenship and avoid detention or deportation. In its wake, 

BJP leaders have continued to advocate for a nation-wide NRC; 

the citizenship of millions would be placed under question, but, 

with the CAA in place, Muslims alone would bear the indignities 

and consequences of potential statelessness. 

The CAA’s passage in December sparked nationwide protests 

that police and government-aligned groups met with violence; in 

Uttar Pradesh (UP), the BJP chief minister Yogi Adityanath pledged 

“revenge” against anti-CAA protestors and stated they should be 

fed “bullets not biryani.” In December, close to 25 people died in 

attacks against protestors and universities in UP alone. According 

to reports, police action specifically targeted Muslims. 

Throughout 2019, government action—including the CAA, continued enforcement of cow slaughter and anti-conversion laws, and the 

November Supreme Court ruling on the Babri Masjid site—created 

a culture of impunity for nationwide campaigns of harassment and 

violence against religious minorities. In August, the government also 

revoked the autonomy of Muslim-majority state Jammu and Kashmir 

and imposed restrictions that negatively impacted religious freedom. 

Mob lynchings of persons suspected of cow slaughter or consuming 

beef continued, with most attacks occurring within BJP-ruled states. 

Lynch mobs often took on overtly Hindu nationalist tones. In June, 

in Jharkand, a mob attacked a Muslim, Tabrez Ansari, forcing him 

to chant “Jai Shri Ram (Hail Lord Ram)” as they beat him to death. 

Police often arrest those attacked for cow slaughter or conversion 

activities rather than the perpetrators. Violence against Christians also 

increased, with at least 328 violent incidents, often under accusations 

of forced conversions. These attacks frequently targeted prayer services and led to the widespread shuttering or destruction of churches.

In 2018, the Supreme Court urged the central and state governments to combat lynchings with stricter laws. When, by July 

2019, the central government and 10 states had failed to take 

appropriate action, the Supreme Court again directed them to do 

so. Rather than comply, Home Minister Shah called existing laws 

sufficient and denied lynchings had increased, while the Home 

Ministry instructed the National Crime Records Bureau to omit

lynchings from the 2019 crime data report. 

During 2019, discriminatory policies, inflammatory rhetoric, 

and tolerance for violence against minorities at the national, state, 

and local level increased the climate of fear among non-Hindu 

communities. After the reporting period, India continued on 

this negative trajectory. In February 2020, three days of violence 

erupted in Delhi with mobs attacking Muslim neighborhoods. There 

were reports of Delhi police, operating under the Home Ministry’s 

authority, failing to halt attacks and even directly participating in 

the violence. At least 50 people were killed.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 21

INDIA

Background

India’s population is 79.8 percent Hindu, 14.2 percent Muslim, 2.3 percent Christian, 1.7 percent Sikh, 0.7 percent Buddhist, and 0.4 percent 

Jain; smaller groups include Zoroastrians (Parsis), Jews, and Baha’is. 

India’s constitution defines the nation as secular and protects freedom 

of religion or belief—including the right to proselytize. However, religious freedom is “subject to public order,” a vague phrase allowing 

the suspension of rights to protect social “tranquility.” This qualification was used to justify anti-conversion laws in the 1977 Supreme 

Court case Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. The 

BJP has challenged the secular principles of the constitution by implementing policies reflecting Hindu nationalist ideology, or Hindutva.

The Citizenship (Amendment) Act and the 

National Register of Citizens

In December 2019, parliament passed the CAA, providing a pathway to 

citizenship for non-Muslim migrants already in India from Afghanistan, 

Bangladesh, and Pakistan by treating them as refugees fleeing religious 

persecution. The CAA would be even more problematic in conjunction 

with a nationwide NRC, which could be modeled after the statewide NRC 

in Assam, and is a goal outlined in the BJP’s manifesto and repeatedly 

promised by BJP leadership. The NRC process in Assam raised significant 

concerns: impoverished families could not present the necessary documents due to poor record keeping or illiteracy. Even with documentation, 

citizens were excluded because of minor inconsistencies; some were 

excluded despite using the same documents as included relatives. The 

Foreigners’ Tribunals that adjudicate citizenship status have been critiqued for their anti-minority bias. In December, the Parliament approved 

an NPR to collect residents’ citizenship data. According to government 

statements and under the Citizenship Rules, 2003, the NPR—which 

allows residents to be marked as “doubtful citizens” and placed under 

scrutiny—is the first step toward a nation-wide NRC. 

Cow Slaughter Laws 

In Hinduism, the cow is considered sacred. Article 48 of India’s constitution directs the state to “take steps . . . prohibiting the slaughter of 

cows and calves,” and 21 states criminalize cow slaughter in various 

forms. Cow protection has been promoted as a key issue by the BJP 

and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Lynch mobs, often organized over social media, have attacked minorities—including Muslims, 

Christians, and Dalits—under suspicion of eating beef, slaughtering 

cows, or transporting cattle for slaughter. Since the BJP came to 

power in 2014, there have been over 100 attacks, amounting to over 

98 percent of such attacks since 2010. Lynching victims, rather than 

the perpetrators, are often arrested under these laws.

Anti-Conversion Laws 

While the constitution protects the right to proselytize, 10 states 

have anti-conversion laws criminalizing conversion using force, allurement, inducement, or fraud, but many use vague language that can 

be interpreted as prohibiting consensual conversions. In 2019, BJPruled Himachal Pradesh increased the penalties for forced conversions. 

Authorities predominately arrest Muslims and Christians for conversion 

activities. To date, however, there are no known convictions for forced 

conversion. Hindutva groups pursue mass conversions through ceremonies known as ghar wapsi (homecoming), without interference 

from authorities. Empowered by anti-conversion laws and often with 

the police’s complicity, Hindutva groups also conduct campaigns of 

harassment, social exclusion, and violence against Christians, Muslims, 

and other religious minorities across the country. Following attacks by 

Hindutva groups against religious minorities for conversion activities, 

the police often arrest the religious minorities who have been attacked. 

In September 2019, the Home Ministry introduced new rules 

under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act requiring all members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to sign an affidavit 

affirming they have “not been prosecuted or convicted for indulging in 

forced religious conversion or creating communal tensions” to receive 

foreign funding. Faith-based NGOs, in particular Christian organizations, expressed fear that this is intended to limit their activities.

Religious Freedom in Jammu and Kashmir

In August 2019, the government stripped Muslim-majority Jammu 

and Kashmir’s autonomy and imposed security measures, including 

restricting freedom of movement and assembly, cutting Internet and 

phone access, and arresting Kashmiri leaders, including religious 

leaders. The restrictions on movement and assembly limited the ability to attend prayers and religious ceremonies. USCIRF also received 

several reports of mosques being closed, imams and Muslim leaders 

arrested and detained, and threats and violence by extremist groups.

Key U.S. Policy

During 2019, the United States and India strengthened their relationship, 

especially in security and defense. In December, the two governments 

signed an agreement for defense technology transfers during a 2+2 ministerial dialogue. President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Narendra 

Modi appeared together at the September “Howdy Modi” event in 

Houston, Texas, during which the President praised this relationship. Amid 

these positive developments, U.S. officials highlighted concerns with India’s 

religious freedom violations through public statements, congressional 

hearings, and bilateral engagements. In October, U.S. Ambassador-atLarge for Religious Freedom Samuel D. Brownback traveled to India. The 

Indian government, however, continued to reject the State Department’s 

and USCIRF’s reporting on religious freedom violations in India. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Hearing: Citizenship Laws and Religious Freedom 

• Testimony: Jammu and Kashmir in Context (before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission)

• Issue Brief: The Religious Freedom Implications of the National Register of Citizens in Assam

• Factsheet: The Citizenship (Amendment) Act in India
22 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF 

COMMISSIONER GARY L. BAUER

I must dissent from the decision of my fellow Commissioners to recommend India, the world’s largest democracy, for designation as a 

“country of particular concern,” or CPC, placing India in a gallery of 

rogue nations in which it does not belong.

The trend line on religious freedom in India is not reassuring. But 

India is not the equivalent of communist China, which wages war on 

all faiths; nor of North Korea, a prison masquerading as a country; nor 

of Iran, whose Islamic extremist leaders regularly threaten to unleash 

a second Holocaust. 

India is our ally. A young democracy, it only gained its sovereign 

freedom in 1947. I hope and pray India’s leaders will resist the impulse 

to punish or restrict any of their citizens based on faith. The United 

States should raise our concern over restrictions on religious liberty 

in all bilateral communications and negotiations with India, as allies 

do. I am deeply concerned that this public denunciation risks exactly 

the opposite outcome than the one we all desire. 

In conclusion, a brief word about our times. Increasingly, nation 

states are confronting a fundamental choice between two diametrically opposed visions of governance.

One recognizes that all human beings have equal dignity, value 

and worth. The United States believes this is so because we are made 

in the image of God. Countries following this vision believe in freedom, 

including the most fundamental freedom of all – freedom of religion. 

Communist China aggressively promotes an alternative that 

allows some economic liberty but demands that all other loyalties of 

the heart and soul be replaced by loyalty to the state. 

I am confident that India will reject any authoritarian temptation 

and stand with the United States and other free nations in defense of 

liberty, including religious liberty. 

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF 

COMMISSIONER TENZIN DORJEE

I want to express my concerns about the CAA, as all persecuted 

religious minorities deserve the same treatment. I also dissent from 

the recommendation that India should be designated as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC. India does not belong to the same 

category as authoritarian regimes like China and North Korea. India 

is the largest democratic nation in the world, where the CAA has 

been challenged openly by the opposition Congress Party and law 

makers, civil society, and various groups. By and large, the press freely 

reported both anti-and pro-CAA voices and chief ministers of states 

such as Kerala decided not to implement the CAA. The Supreme 

Court of India has been asked to adjudicate on its constitutionality. 

India is a free and open democratic society that allows for all possibilities; therefore, India is not a CPC country.

India is also an ancient, multifaith civilization where for the most 

part multiple faith groups respectfully and peacefully have co-existed 

for centuries. I am not oblivious to the worst interreligious conflicts and 

the partition of India. However, as major news sources reported, even 

during the violence over the CAA, Sikhs, Muslims, and Hindus protected each other’s homes and places of worship from mob violence 

and held interfaith ceremonies. As Tibetan refugees, we enjoyed 

complete religious freedom in India that is non-existent in Tibet and 

China. Recently, I was on a personal pilgrimage to major Buddhist 

holy sites in India and saw Hindus, Muslims, and other faiths enjoying 

religious freedom at their places of worship, shops, and homes. India 

and the United States are vital strategic partners. As I exit USCIRF as a 

Commissioner, I highly recommend constructive engagement among 

India, the U.S. government, and USCIRF to advance mutual interests 

including religious freedom and human rights.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF 

COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE

I am gravely concerned that political and inter-communal strife will 

be further exacerbated by religious tensions, yet I am also heartened that India remains the world’s largest democracy, governed 

by a pristine constitution, and I am also encouraged that this great 

nation is a tremendous friend and ally of the United States. It is also a 

nation that is the very definition of diverse. My hope, and my prayer, 

is that India’s still-young, and freewheeling, democracy will give way 

to an ever-brighter future through these challenges, for all of its citizens, whatever their religion or political affiliation. I am rooting for 

India’s institutions to draw upon her rich history in order to pull her 

through the present time. India also happens to be a country that I 

have loved for all of my adult life. It is a country I love because of its 

pluralism and because of the transformative impact it has had on my 

own life through my many visits (and visits to vibrantly religious places 

in Varanasi, Old Delhi, Amritsar, Dharamsala, Agra, Ajmer, Hyderabad, 

Kolkata, throughout Kerala, and many other places). 

INDIA

24 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

IRAN

• Redesignate Iran as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations 

of religious freedom, as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Iranian 

government agencies and officials 

responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom by freezing those 

individuals’ assets and/or barring their 

entry into the United States under 

human rights-related financial and visa 

authorities, citing specific religious 

freedom violations;

• Press for the release of all religious 

prisoners of conscience, including Youcef 

Nadarkhani, Golrokh Ebrahimi Iraee, and 

Robert Levinson; and

• Reauthorize and ensure implementation of the Lautenberg Amendment, 

which aids persecuted Iranian religious 

minorities seeking refugee status in the 

United States.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Iran remained egregiously 

poor. As in years past, the government responded to calls for 

reform by systematically cracking down on religious minorities. 

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the country has been governed 

under the religious doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (rule of the jurist); 

its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is a religious scholar 

appointed by the 88-member Assembly of Experts. Iran harasses, 

fines, and arrests those who dissent from its interpretation of Ja’afri 

Shi’a Islam. The government uses its official religious interpretation 

as an ongoing basis for denying freedom of religion and belief to 

citizens who express dissent through peaceful protest. Under Iran’s 

Penal Code, moharebeh (enmity against God) is vaguely defined and 

often used for political purposes; both this charge and sabb al-nabi

(insulting the prophet) are capital crimes. Apostasy is not codified 

as a crime in the Iranian Penal Code, but detainees are still tried as 

apostates because the constitution mandates the application of 

Shari’a to any cases that the law does not explicitly address. In June 

2019, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif claimed Iran’s execution 

of members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex 

(LGBTI) community was necessary according to “moral principles.”

USCIRF documented a particular uptick in the persecution of 

Baha’is and local government officials who supported them in 2019. 

Iran’s government blamed Baha’is—without evidence—for widespread popular protests, accusing the community of collaboration 

with Israel, where the Baha’i World Centre is located. Iran’s government also continued to promote hatred against Baha’is and other 

religious minorities on traditional and social media channels. In July, 

Twitter banned several official Iranian media accounts for incitement 

against Baha’is in Iran.

The Iranian government also targeted adherents of Sufi orders, 

which emphasize and practice Islamic mysticism, for “following a 

deviant sect” of the religion. Sufis who protested the house arrest of 

their spiritual leader, Dr. Noor Ali Tabandeh, faced ongoing harassment and mistreatment. Iran’s government also interfered in the 

selection of a successor to the leader of the Nematollahi Gonbadi 

Sufi community, who passed away in December 2019 following 

medical mistreatment and months under house arrest.

Christians, especially those who converted from Islam, also 

were persecuted and imprisoned for practicing their faith. In May, 

Iran forcibly closed an Assyrian church in Tabriz. In December in 

Mashhad, authorities destroyed the grave of the only Christian pastor 

in Iran to have been executed for apostasy. Iran also twice delayed 

a sentencing hearing for Assyrian pastor Victor Bet Tamraz, his wife 

Shamiram Isavi, and three Christian converts from Islam. Pastor Bet 

Tamraz was charged in 2015 with “conducting evangelism” and 

“illegal house church activities.” 

Women who peacefully protested the government’s mandatory 

religious head covering were summoned, interrogated, and arrested 

throughout 2019. These included three women sentenced to prison 

for handing out flowers on the Tehran metro to protest the religious 

head covering mandate. Judge Mohammed Moghiseh reportedly 

threatened the women during the hearing and denied them access to 

a lawyer. In several instances, judges imposed egregious sentences—

beyond those allowed under Iranian law—against these women. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Hearing: Global Efforts to Counter Anti-Semitism

• Policy Brief: Increased Persecution of Iran’s Baha’i Community in 2019

• Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: more than 100 prisoners from Iran added 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 25

IRAN

Background

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a theocratic, authoritarian state with 

restricted political participation. Ninety to 95 percent of the population are Shi’a Muslim, while Sunni Muslims account for 5–10 percent. 

Approximately 0.3 percent ascribe to other religions, including the 

Baha’i faith, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Judaism. While the 

Jaafari (Twelver) school of Shi’a Islam is the official religion, the constitution extends full respect to the five major Sunni schools. It also 

recognizes Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians as protected minorities. 

Five of the parliament’s 290 seats are reserved for religious minorities—two for Armenian Christians and one each for Assyrian/Chaldean 

Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. There are two Hindu temples, and 

Buddhism has historic influences. Iran is home to several other religious 

groups that face persecution, including Mandeans, Yarsanis, nonbelievers, 

and followers of spiritual movements. In December 2016, President Hassan 

Rouhani publicly released a nonbinding Charter on Citizens’ Rights that 

promised recognition of all religious identities and nondiscrimination, 

but religious minorities have seen little change based on this document. 

Persecution of Religious Minorities

In March, several Sufis were convicted on spurious national security 

charges and sentenced to prison, lashings, internal exile, and social 

media bans. At the end of 2019, scores of Sufis remained incarcerated at 

Fashafuyeh and Qarchak prisons. Several were denied medical care. Dr. 

Tabandeh, spiritual leader of the Nematollahi Gonbadi Sufi community, 

began a hunger strike in November 2019. He was hospitalized, denied 

access to his doctors and advisors, and after severe medical malpractice, died in December. Dr. Tabandeh had appointed Alireza Jazbi 

as his successor, but at year’s end Tabandeh’s nephew, Mohammed 

Tabandeh, who is linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, was contesting 

Jazbi for leadership of the movement with the assistance of an anti-Sufi 

cleric linked closely to senior Iranian government officials.

Iran’s nearly 300,000 Christians include traditional Armenian and 

Assyrian/Chaldean churches and newer Protestant and evangelical communities. Iran continued to target Christian converts from Islam; in July 

2019, for example, the Intelligence Ministry arrested eight Christian 

converts in Bushehr and sent them to solitary confinement. In May, 

Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi announced efforts to “counter the 

advocates of Christianity” and his ministry summoned people in Hamdan 

who showed interest in the faith. USCIRF Religious Prisoner of Conscience 

and Christian convert Youcef Nadarkhani remained in Evin Prison at year’s 

end and went on a three-week hunger strike in September after the 

government rejected his sons’ refusal to study Islam. 

In February, three Torah scrolls were stolen from the Ezra Yagoub 

synagogue in Tehran, but police did not investigate. On December 16, 

Ayatollah Khamenei praised a French Holocaust denier on Twitter. A 

follower of spiritual leader Mohammed Ali Taheri was arrested in March 

and put into solitary confinement in Evin Prison. Two other followers were 

sentenced to prison and a 100 million toman ($3,000) fine in June following 

a ten-minute trial. In August, Judge Moghiseh sentenced a Taheri follower to 20 years in prison on charges including “insulting the sacred.” In 

November, the president of the Zoroastrian Association of Yazd Province 

criticized hiring discrimination against Zoroastrians, restrictions on religious observance, and extralegal activity regarding Zoroastrian-held land.

Iran and Anti-Semitism

At a USCIRF hearing on anti-Semitism on January 8, 2020, U.S. Special 

Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism Elan Carr stated that Iran 

is the “world’s chief trafficker in anti-Semitism” and that “anti-Semitism isn’t ancillary to the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It 

is a central foundational component of the ideology of that regime, 

and we have to be clear about it, and we have to confront it and call 

it out for what it is.”

Women and Religious Freedom

In April, Iran’s Guidance Patrol (Gasht-e Ershad) in Tehran summoned 

hundreds of women to its headquarters for driving or riding in cars 

without headscarves. The women were forced to promise to cover 

their heads in cars. USCIRF Religious Prisoner of Conscience Golrokh 

Iraee was released on bail from Evin Prison in April 2019 but rearrested 

in November following a conviction by Judge Iman Afshari of Branch 

26 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court for “insulting the supreme 

leader” and “propaganda against the state.” Iraee had been jailed 

in 2016 for an unpublished story criticizing the practice of stoning 

women to death for adultery. In August 2019, Judge Afshari sentenced Saba Kord Afshari to an unenforceable 24 years in prison for 

protesting the mandatory head covering. Lawyer Nasrin Soutoudeh 

was sentenced to 38 years in prison and 148 lashes after defending 

women who had removed their headscarves in public as a protest.

Key U.S. Policy

In 2019, the United States escalated its “maximum pressure” strategy 

against Iran with the positioning of the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft 

carrier in the Persian Gulf and President Donald J. Trump’s April 

2019 designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 

as a foreign terrorist organization. The United States also imposed 

sanctions on cyber attackers and entities that support the IRGC 

and Basij militia. In November, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 

sanctioned Mohammed Mohammadi Golpayegani for his role in 

the systematic persecution of Baha’is, one of the U.S. government’s 

most explicit designations to date on religious freedom grounds. 

In December 2019, the Treasury Department also sanctioned two 

“Hanging Judges” for severe violations of religious freedom in Iran. 

On December 18, the State Department redesignated Iran as a CPC 

under IRFA and reimposed existing ongoing travel restrictions on 

Iranian individuals connected with the commission of serious human 

rights abuses.

At the second Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom in July 

2019, Vice President Michael R. Pence spoke about Iran’s violations of 

religious freedom and called on Iran to free Pastor Bet Tamraz and his 

wife. President Trump also met with the couple’s daughter Dabrina Bet 

Tamraz. In September, Vice President Pence and Secretary of State 

Michael R. Pompeo chaired an event at the UN highlighting the Bet 

Tamraz family and other religious persecution survivors.

While approximately 12 religiously persecuted Iranians were 

admitted to the United States in 2019 under the bipartisan Lautenberg 

Amendment, nearly 80 fully vetted Iranians remained in Vienna, 

Austria, at the end of the reporting period awaiting final approval to 

fly to the United States for resettlement.
26 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

NIGERIA

• Designate Nigeria as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging 

in or tolerating systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious violations of religious freedom, 

as defined by the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA), and continue to 

designate Boko Haram as an “entity of 

particular concern” for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations 

of religious freedom, as defined by IRFA; 

• Enter into a binding agreement, as 

authorized under Section 405(c) of 

IRFA, and provide associated financial 

and technical support, to obligate the 

Nigerian government to take substantial steps to address religious freedom 

violations, including but not limited to: 

• Enhance training for officials, the 

military, and police officers on countering hate speech based on religious 

identity, responding to sectarian violence, reporting on violence against 

religious communities, and holding 

accountable security officers accused 

of excessive use of force and other 

human rights abuses;

• Increase conflict resolution programming 

and research to reduce violence and 

discrimination based on religious identity; 

• Increase funding for security sector 

reform and rule of law programming, 

and include religious institutional actors 

in security and justice programs; 

• Establish an independent judicial commission of inquiry (COI) to investigate 

the Nigerian security forces’ ineffective 

efforts to protect vulnerable religious 

communities, including Christians 

and Muslims, in the north and central 

regions of the country as well as the 

killing of IMN members in 2018 and 

2019, then publicly releasing any relevant findings including evidence taken 

from police reports; and

• Allocate funding for programs that 

engage civil society, security, and official 

actors in inclusive efforts to protect 

places of worship and other holy sites.

Religious freedom conditions in Nigeria remained poor in 

2019, with both state- and societally perpetrated violations. 

The federal government continued to detain the leader of a 

Shi’a minority group, the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), and 

violently cracked down on its members during religious processions 

and protests. In July, the government banned the group, claiming 

it was violent and annoying to society. IMN members continued 

to protest in defiance of the ban, stating they were a nonviolent 

organization exercising their freedoms of religion, assembly, and 

speech. The IMN is the largest Shi’a organization in Nigeria, with an 

estimated three million followers. Since the Nigerian army’s 2015 

massacre of more than 340 IMN members, no military officials have 

been publicly held accountable.

Throughout the year, the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist 

Organizations Boko Haram and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS)-West Africa continued their insurgencies in northeast Nigeria 

and the Lake Chad region. During the week of Christmas, ISIS-West 

Africa released a video showing the horrific killing of 11 captives 

and stated it was executing Christians in retaliation for the death 

of ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. The terrorist groups targeted security forces more than in any previous year. Although 

military and civilian forces were able to stem some attacks, Boko 

Haram successfully targeted military posts and convoys, houses, 

farmlands, and mosques; abducted civilians; and killed hostages, 

including numerous humanitarian aid workers. Since 2009, Boko 

Haram has displaced more than two million people and killed tens 

of thousands.

The widespread security issues of intercommunal and militia 

violence, rampant kidnapping, and general criminality also negatively 

impacted religious freedom. There were multiple reports of criminal 

attacks on religious and traditional leaders and houses of worship. In 

the surge of hundreds of kidnappings in 2019, media reported numerous incidents of kidnappings for ransom and the killing of Protestant 

and Catholic priests, including in Enugu, Ondo, and Kaduna states. 

There was less reporting of religious-based targeting in intercommunal violence in the Middle Belt region as compared to 2018; however, 

there continued to be reports of communal or ethnic militia attacks 

on entire communities, such as in Kaduna between Christian Adara

and Muslim Fulani groups, in Zamfara, and in Taraba. The Nigerian 

government failed to effectively improve justice and security for its 

citizens, and was unsuccessful in addressing the immense need for 

accountability and reconciliation around past conflict.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Special Report: Central Nigeria: Overcoming Dangerous Speech and Endemic Religious Divides

• Special Report: Shari’ah Law in Northern Nigeria

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project adoption: Leah Sharibu
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 27

NIGERIA

Background

Nigeria is a highly religious country, with religion playing a prominent role 

in politics, governance, security, and justice. The CIA World Factbook 

estimates the population to be more than 203 million people, with 53.5 

percent identified as Muslim, 45.9 percent as Christian, and 0.6 percent 

as holding other beliefs. Other groups include atheists, Baha’is, Jews, 

Hindus, and Buddhists. Indigenous traditions and syncretic practices are 

also found throughout the country. The 1999 constitution protects the 

freedom of religion or belief, prohibits discrimination, and does not assert 

a state religion. Twelve Muslim-majority northern states use Islamic Shari’a 

criminal and family laws alongside civil and customary laws. Blasphemy 

is prohibited in the Shari’a Penal Codes, and the Nigerian Criminal Code 

also includes a penalty of up to two years imprisonment for insulting a 

person’s religion. USCIRF’s contracted report on Shari’a criminal law in 

northern Nigeria discussed the mixed public perceptions of Shari’a institutions and hisbah police, and found that flogging remains a common 

form of punishment. This report and others revealed ongoing social and 

institutional bias against religious minorities such as Shi’a and societal 

taboos against atheism and humanism.

Intercommunal conflict continues to affect many states, in particular 

rural areas, and is related to competition over land and water resources, 

the expansion of farming, growth in population, the spread of small arms, 

religious and historical grievances, and citizenship policies. As ethnic and 

religious identity are closely intertwined, conflict between two ethnic 

groups can sometimes be framed as being between religious groups 

or can lead to reprisals that target individuals based on their religion. 

The 2019 general elections did not see incidents of interreligious 

conflict. However, some campaigns did seek to appeal to voters along 

religious lines, and the elections were marred by disinformation, incitement to violence, vote buying, and other corrupt practices. 

Systematic Repression of the Islamic Movement 

In 2019, the Nigerian federal government continued to detain the leader 

of the IMN, Sheikh Ibrahim El Zakzaky, despite a 2016 court order 

demanding his release. In July, the government officially banned the IMN, 

but the group continued to organize religious occasions and protests 

around the country calling for Zakzaky’s release. As a result of clashes with 

police in July, the IMN and media reported that more than nine people 

were killed. During the religious Ashura processions in September, the 

IMN stated that Nigerian police killed more than one dozen followers. In 

August, the government allowed Zakzaky and his wife to travel to India 

for medical care; however, once there, Zakzaky declined treatment. 

In October, at least nine IMN members were reportedly acquitted of 

charges including of being members of the IMN and unlawful assembly; 

an unknown number of others remain in prison. Originally inspired by 

the 1979 Iranian revolution and maintaining photos of Ayatollah Ruhollah 

Khomeini and Ayatollah Ali Khamemei on its website, the group has 

become the target of violence by the Nigerian government, which uses 

excessive force to repress IMN members and activities.

Boko Haram & ISIS-West Africa 

In 2019, Boko Haram and the ISIS-affiliated faction (ISIS-West Africa) 

continued to wage an insurgency seeking to create an Islamic state 

that conforms to their Salafi-jihadi ideology. They were responsible for 

attacks against houses of worship, civilians, and military targets. The 

group again targeted members of the Ekklesiyar Yan’uwa a Nigeria 

(EYN, Church of the Brethren in Nigeria), abducting EYN members 

and destroying an EYN church in March. Media reported incidents of 

suspected Boko Haram members attacking mosques in Maiduguri, 

including in February and June. In July, Boko Haram militants attacked 

a funeral in Borno State and killed at least 65 people. The Nigerian 

army was repeatedly accused of human rights abuses against displaced 

persons and former or suspected Boko Haram members—including 

thousands of children. At the same time, the military engaged in efforts 

to prevent violent extremism and improve community relations, such 

as by holding interreligious seminars to promote counternarratives 

and attending prayer services to reassure worshippers fearing attacks.

Attacks in Houses of Worship 

Civil society actors continued to conduct community programs to 

improve the protection of houses of worship and other holy sites, 

yet they remain particularly vulnerable. In addition to the attacks by 

Boko Haram, in 2019 armed groups and mobs also attacked churches 

and mosques throughout the country. In June, officials arrested three 

suspects for attempting to burn the St. Augustine Catholic Church 

in Kaduna. In September, a group of Christian youths reportedly 

attacked a mosque in Delta State out of anger over its construction. In 

October, a gang was accused of attacking a mosque and injuring some 

members. In Anambra State in May, media reported that members 

of the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB)—a group seeking Biafran 

independence—attacked five Christians, including a priest, for holding a mass in defiance of IPOB orders to stay at home.

Key U.S. Policy

In August, U.S. Ambassador W. Stuart Symington left post, and 

on October 4, Mary Beth Leonard was sworn in as the new U.S. 

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Throughout the year, 

the United States supported projects in Nigeria aimed at reducing 

conflict and improving justice and security, including programming 

funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

focused on managing conflict between farmers and herders. U.S. 

officials consistently engaged with the Nigerian government and 

civil society on religious freedom issues. On December 18, the U.S. 

Department of State for the first time placed Nigeria on its Special 

Watch List for countries that have engaged in or tolerated “severe 

violations of religious freedom,” and again designated Boko Haram 

as an “entity of particular concern,” as it had in 2018. The majority 

of the United States’ fiscal year 2019 assistance was dedicated to 

emergency response and healthcare, and a smaller amount toward 

peace and security efforts. In May, Members of Congress introduced 

resolutions (H.Res.375/S.Res.170) recognizing the fifth anniversary 

of the Boko Haram kidnapping of hundreds of girls from Chibok and 

calling upon Nigeria to increase efforts to end the conflict and assist 

victims. In October, Members of Congress introduced a resolution 

(H.Res.640) “condemning the global persecution of Christians” and 

cited mass attacks on Christians in Nigeria in 2014 and 2018.
28 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

NIGERIA

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF COMMISSIONERS GARY L. 

BAUER AND JOHNNIE MOORE

This chapter under-emphasizes the systematic, ongoing and egregious attacks against the Christian communities in the north and 

central parts of Nigeria, and over-simplifies the Nigerian government's 

challenges related to the Islamic Movement of Nigeria [IMN]. 

While the Nigerian government has most certainly overreached, 

sometimes targeting innocent Shi'a, the government is justified in its 

suspicion of the IMN, a group which has sometimes been referred 

to as the “Nigerian Hezbollah.” Such a characterization is unsurprising given that group’s website prominently includes photos of the 

leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 

and his successor and Iran’s present Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali 

Khamemei—their inspiration. Moreover, their marches have included 

portraits of Khomeini as well as Lebanon’s Hezbollah chief, Hassan 

Nasrallah. The IMN’s leader, Sheikh Ibrahim El ZakZaky, is an avowed 

anti-Semite who has a well documented relationship with Iran, including prominent visits to Qom in the Islamic Republic and there have 

been credible allegations about his receiving training and funding 

directly from the Iranian regime.

Finally, it is our conviction that Boko Haram, and those tribesmen inspired by them, intend on ethnically cleansing Nigeria of any 

Christian it cannot subjugate while threatening everyone that stands 

in their way, whatever their religion or ethnicity. 

30 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

NORTH KOREA

• Redesignate North Korea as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for 

engaging in systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious religious freedom violations, 

as defined by the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA); 

• Fill the current vacancy and maintain the 

Special Envoy for North Korean Human 

Rights Issues as a fulltime, independent 

position at the U.S. Department of State 

and ensure religious freedom is a priority for that office;

• Urge the North Korean government 

to grant international human rights 

monitors unfettered access to 

document human rights conditions, 

including religious freedom, inside the 

country; and

• Instruct the U.S. Agency for Global 

Media’s Open Technology Fund to 

prioritize projects related to the dissemination of information in North Korea, 

including projects that utilize legacy 

broadcast and nonnetworked digital 

technologies, which are more difficult 

for authorities to monitor. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Work with the administration to clarify 

the conditions under which Congress 

would approve the partial or complete 

lifting of certain sanctions under the 

North Korea Sanctions and Policy 

Enhancement Act of 2016 in return for 

significant progress on denuclearization 

and commitments to improve religious 

freedom conditions.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in North Korea—also known 

as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK—remained 

among the worst in the world. The North Korean constitution 

nominally grants freedom of religious belief, but it also prohibits 

the use of religion for “drawing in foreign forces or for harming the 

State.” The government treats religion as a threat to the state-propagated ideology known as Juche, which preaches “self-reliance and 

self-development.” Christians are especially vulnerable because 

the government views them as susceptible to foreign influence. Any 

expression of religion outside the limited number of state-sponsored 

houses of worship happens in secret. Anyone caught practicing 

religion or even suspected of harboring religious views in private is 

subject to severe punishment, including arrest, torture, imprisonment, and execution. The possession and distribution of religious 

texts remains a criminal offense under North Korean law. Due to fear 

of arrest or persecution, most North Korean underground Christians 

do not engage in proselytization. The songbun system classifies 

citizens based on their perceived loyalty to the state; religious practitioners belong to the “hostile” class, which limits their access to 

educational and employment opportunities, as well as other state 

benefits. In 2019, there were also reports that the Falun Gong movement, which originated in China, was spreading to North Korea, 

prompting authorities to initiate a crackdown against Falun Gong 

practitioners. North Korea has a network of prison camps (kyohwaso) 

and labor training camps (rodongdanryondae) to house an estimated 

80,000–120,000 prisoners of conscience and other declared “enemies of the state.” Inmates are forced to provide hard labor and 

suffer poor living conditions, malnutrition, and other abuses. Some 

experts estimate that the camps hold tens of thousands of Christians. 

According to defectors, the majority of Christians detained in prison 

camps were arrested by the Ministry of State Security because they 

possessed a Bible—which is treated as proof of a political crime. 

These prison camps do not provide access to religious services; 

detained Christians must pray silently inside washrooms in order to 

avoid surveillance. 

Meanwhile, authorities on both sides of the Sino-Korean border have increased monitoring for North Korean refugees, in part 

to prevent “religious infiltration” from abroad. After the Hong Kong 

protests in June 2019, the Chinese government started scanning 

visitor identity cards and making it more difficult for South Korean 

missionaries and North Korean defectors to move around the border region. In addition, North Korean authorities monitor refugees 

and defectors deported from China for fear they were exposed to 

religion or foreign missionaries while outside the country.

There are no formally registered, independent houses of 

worship in North Korea. The government has established several 

state-sponsored religious organizations and permits five churches 

to operate in Pyongyang. However, human rights groups and defectors from the country allege that these institutions exist merely to 

provide the illusion of religious freedom. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Press Statement: USCIRF Disappointed UN Security Council Did Not Discuss Religious Freedom in North Korea 

• Press Statement: USCIRF Urges President Trump to Address Religious Freedom Abuses in North Korea
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 31

NORTH KOREA

Background

Information about religious demographics and religious freedom 

conditions in North Korea is difficult to confirm and often outdated. 

North Koreans had traditionally followed Buddhism and an indigenous syncretic religious movement known as Chondoism (Religion 

of the Heavenly Way), which currently are thought to account for 

an estimated 4 percent and 14 percent of the population, respectively. The country had a sizeable Christian community before the 

Korean War, with Pyongyang known as the “Jerusalem of the East.” 

Because of successive crackdowns, the Christian population has 

shrunk to an estimated less than 1 percent of the total population. 

Most remaining Christians in North Korea learned about the religion 

when they fled to China after a devastating famine during the mid1990s. Although technically illegal, traditional superstitions, such as 

fortune telling, are widespread. 

Defectors and Refugees

Defectors and refugees from North Korea are one of the primary 

sources of information about religious freedom conditions in the 

country. However, in recent years, there has been a decrease in the 

number of North Koreans arriving in South Korea. According to the 

South Korean Ministry of Unification, 1,047 North Koreans defected 

to South Korea in 2019—the lowest number in 18 years. In addition, 

some human rights advocates have questioned the South Korean 

government’s commitment to protecting all North Korean defectors. 

In November, two North Korean fishermen suspected of killing their 

fellow crew members fled to South Korea. Although South Korean 

law recognizes North Korean defectors as South Korean citizens, the 

South Korean government deported them because they had committed “serious non-political crimes,” which some human rights groups 

argued set a dangerous precedent.

The Chinese government views all North Korean refugees as 

illegal economic migrants and deports them if discovered, without 

regard to whether or not they are at risk of persecution on return. 

This is in direct violation of China’s obligations under the 1951 United 

Nations (UN) Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In early 

2019, Chinese raids rounded up dozens of North Korean refugees 

and disrupted parts of the informal network of brokers, charities, and 

middlemen who have been dubbed the “Underground Railroad.” In 

addition, since 2017, Chinese authorities have expelled hundreds of 

South Korean missionaries, some of who have helped North Korean 

refugees escape.

United Nations Activity 

In March 2019, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution 

calling on the Office of the High Commissioner to collect information 

and to develop strategies to be used in any future prosecution of 

North Korean officials responsible for crimes against humanity. In 

May, at North Korea’s third Universal Periodic Review before the 

Council, several country delegations, including the United States, 

condemned the country’s suppression of religion and belief. The 

North Korean government said it accepted recommendations urging 

it to allow religious believers to exercise their faith independently, but 

dismissed others as “severely distorting” the human rights situation. 

In October, UN Special Rapporteur for human rights issues in the 

DPRK Tomás Ojea Quintana issued a report about the general human 

rights situation and recommended integrating human rights into the 

ongoing negotiations about denuclearization. The North Korean 

government continued to deny the Special Rapporteur’s requests 

to visit the country throughout 2019. In December, the UN General 

Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the “ongoing systematic, 

widespread and gross violations” of religious freedom and human 

rights in North Korea.

Key U.S. Policy

In February, U.S. President Donald J. Trump and North Korean 

Chairman Kim Jong-un met in Hanoi, Vietnam, but the summit was 

cut short due to disagreements about sanctions relief. In June, the 

two leaders met—along with South Korean President Moon Jae-in—

at the Korean Demilitarized Zone at Panmunjom. President Trump 

stepped across the border, marking the first time a sitting U.S. president had set foot on North Korean territory. However, by the end of 

the reporting period, relations between the United States and North 

Korea deteriorated due to a lack of progress on security-related 

negotiations. In December, Congress passed and the president signed 

the Otto Warmbier Banking Restrictions Involving North Korea Act 

(S.667), as incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92). The act imposes secondary sanctions 

on financial entities doing business with North Korea. 

Throughout 2019, U.S. government officials continued to express 

concern about the human rights situation in North Korea. In July, as 

part of the second Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom hosted 

by the State Department, President Trump met with Illyong Ju, a 

North Korean Christian whose family defected to South Korea in 2012. 

In November, the U.S. Agency for Global Media launched the Open 

Technology Fund (OTF) to support the development and distribution 

of technologies to counter censorship in countries like North Korea. 

In December, Congress passed and the president signed a spending 

bill (P.L. 116-94) that included $4 million in funding for organizations 

promoting human rights in North Korea. However, in December the 

Trump administration reportedly blocked efforts to put North Korea’s 

human rights record on the agenda of the UN Security Council after 

North Korea’s ambassador to the UN warned that such a discussion 

would constitute a “serious provocation.” On December 18, the State 

Department redesignated North Korea as a CPC under IRFA and 

reimposed as the relevant presidential action ongoing sanctions to 

which the country is already subject under Sections 402 and 409 of 

the Trade Act of 1974. 
32 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

PAKISTAN

• Redesignate Pakistan as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC, for 

engaging in systematic, ongoing, 

and egregious violations of religious 

freedom, as defined by the International 

Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), and lift the 

waiver releasing the administration from 

taking otherwise legislatively mandated 

action as a result of the designation;

• Enter into a binding agreement, 

under Section 405(c) of IRFA, with the 

Pakistani government to encourage 

substantial steps to address religious 

freedom violations with benchmarks, 

including but not limited to:

• Release blasphemy prisoners and 

other individuals imprisoned for their 

religion or beliefs;

• Repeal blasphemy and anti-Ahmadiyya 

laws; until repeal is accomplished, enact 

reforms to make blasphemy a bailable 

offense, require evidence by accusers, 

ensure proper investigation by senior 

police officials, allow authorities to dismiss unfounded accusations, and enforce 

existing Penal Code articles criminalizing 

perjury and false accusations; 

• Address extremist rhetoric often 

preceding attacks on minorities, while 

protecting freedom of expression, and 

remove from education curricula any content discriminatory to religious minorities;

• Create the National Commission for 

Minorities’ Rights as mandated by the 

Supreme Court’s 2014 decision; and

• Remove requirements for self-identification of religion on identity 

documents;

• Impose targeted sanctions on Pakistani 

government agencies and officials 

responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom by freezing those 

individuals’ assets and/or barring their 

entry into the United States under 

human rights-related financial and visa 

authorities, citing specific religious 

freedom violations; and

• Assign a portion of existing U.S. 

Department of State programs to help 

increase security for at-risk religious 

communities and houses of worship.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions across Pakistan continued to 

trend negatively. The systematic enforcement of blasphemy and 

anti-Ahmadiyya laws, and authorities’ failure to address forced 

conversions of religious minorities—including Hindus, Christians, 

and Sikhs—to Islam, severely restricted freedom of religion or belief. 

While there were high-profile acquittals, the blasphemy law 

remained in effect. USCIRF is aware of nearly 80 individuals who 

remained imprisoned for blasphemy, with at least half facing a life 

sentence or death. After spending five years in solitary confinement 

for allegedly posting blasphemous content online, Junaid Hafeez 

was given the death sentence in December 2019. Many ongoing 

trials related to blasphemy experienced lengthy delays as cases 

were moved between judges. Moreover, these laws create a culture of impunity for violent attacks following accusations. In March 

2019, a student murdered Professor Khalid Hameed over perceived 

“anti-Islamic” remarks. Protestors in Sindh attacked and burned 

Hindu shops and houses of worship following two incidents: in the 

first, a cleric accused a Hindu veterinarian of wrapping medicine with 

paper printed with Qur’anic verses; in the second, a student leveled

blasphemy charges against a Hindu principal. A mob also attacked 

a Christian community in Punjab after a mosque claimed over its 

loudspeaker that the community had insulted Islam. In another incident, nearly 200 Christian families in Karachi were forced to flee their 

homes due to mob attacks after false blasphemy accusations against 

four Christian women. 

Ahmadi Muslims, with their faith essentially criminalized, continued to face severe persecution from authorities as well as societal 

harassment due to their beliefs, with both the authorities and mobs 

targeting their houses of worship. In October, for example, police 

partially demolished a 70-year-old Ahmadiyya mosque in Punjab. 

In Hindu, Christian, and Sikh communities, young women, often 

underage, continued to be kidnapped for forced conversion to Islam. 

Several independent institutions estimated that 1,000 women are 

forcibly converted to Islam each year; many are kidnapped, forcibly 

married, and subjected to rape. Local police, particularly in Punjab 

and Sindh, are often accused of complicity in these cases by failing 

to investigate them properly. If such cases are investigated or adjudicated, the women are reportedly questioned in front of the men they 

were forced to marry, creating pressure to deny coercion. In October 

2019, the Sindh Government rejected a bill seeking to criminalize 

forced conversion. Religious minorities also faced broader social 

discrimination, with reports of economic boycotts.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Policy Update: Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law

• Hearing: Protecting Houses of Worship and Holy Sites

• Press Statement: USCIRF Welcomes Release of Religious Prisoner of Conscience Abdul Shakoor
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 33

PAKISTAN

Background

Pakistan’s population is 96.28 percent Muslim (85–90 percent Sunni, 

10–15 percent Shi’a, and 0.22 percent Ahmadi), with smaller populations of Hindus (1.60 percent); Christians (1.59 percent); and Sikhs, 

Buddhists, Baha’is, and Zoroastrians/Parsis (<1 percent). Pakistan was 

established as an Islamic Republic in 1956 with special status for Islam 

(for example, only Muslims can serve as president and prime minister). 

In October 2019, Pakistan’s National Assembly blocked a bill allowing 

non-Muslims to hold these positions. Pakistan’s constitution nominally 

protects religious freedom by prohibiting faith-based discrimination 

and guaranteeing the right to religious practices and access religious 

education. The constitution also reserves for religious minorities 10 

seats in the National Assembly, four seats in the Senate, and 23 seats in 

four provincial assemblies. However, the constitution’s second amendment, added in 1974, declares Ahmadis non-Muslims.

Blasphemy Law

Sections 295 and 298 of Pakistan’s Penal Code criminalize acts and 

speech insulting a religion or belief or defiling the Qur’an, the Prophet 

Muhammad, a place of worship, or religious symbols. These vague provisions are frequently abused to target religious minorities through false 

accusations, with cases often violating legal procedures. Accusers are 

typically not required to present evidence, and judges are often under 

extreme pressure from religious groups to convict. The law sets severe 

punishments, including the death penalty. To date, Pakistan has not 

executed anyone for blasphemy. While Muslims represent the greatest 

number of individuals charged or sentenced, religious minorities face 

a disproportionately higher rate of allegations and arrests. Frequently, 

blasphemy charges occur in an atmosphere of societal harassment or 

mob violence. Many accused individuals never reach the courtroom; 

vigilante violence has killed 62 people since 1990, with few prosecutions. Even lawyers defending those charged with blasphemy, presiding 

judges, and individuals speaking against the law are targeted, as with 

the 2011 murder of Punjabi Governor Salman Taseer. 

Anti-Ahmadiyya Laws

Ahmadi Muslims face severe restrictions. Besides the constitution’s second amendment, articles 298(b) and 298(c) of the Penal Code prohibit 

Ahmadis from self-identifying as Muslims, propagating or disseminating 

materials about their faith, or calling their houses of worship mosques. 

Ahmadis have been imprisoned simply for sharing Ahmadiyya literature. 

They are prohibited from voting as Muslims and were previously denied 

registration under joint electoral lists, relegating them to separate 

electoral lists with less political power. In 2018, the Islamabad High 

Court ruled that individuals must disclose their faith to receive identity 

documents, with civil society arguing this was meant to target Ahmadis. 

Violence by Extremist Groups

While terrorism decreased in recent years, Pakistan remains a base 

for extremist groups, such as the Pakistani Taliban and Lashkar-eJhangvi. These groups often target Shi’a and Sufi Muslims in addition 

to non-Muslims. In May 2019, a Sufi shrine in Lahore was bombed, 

killing 10 people and wounding 20. The previous month, a bombing

claimed by the Pakistani Taliban and the Islamic State targeted a 

Hazara Shi’a neighborhood in Quetta, killing 24. Provincial and local

authorities increased security for Shi’a during Muharram. In July, as 

part of a crackdown on extremism after the Financial Action Task 

Force placed Pakistan on its “grey” list, authorities arrested Hafiz 

Saeed for supporting Lashkar-e-Taiba. In February 2020, an anti-terrorism court convicted him of terrorist financing.

Positive Developments 

There were positive developments in 2019, such as the opening of the 

Kartarpur Corridor with India, allowing Sikh pilgrims to visit the Gurdwara 

Darbar Sahib in Pakistan’s Punjab Province; Prime Minister Imran Khan 

laying the foundation stone of Pakistan’s first Sikh university; and the 

reopening and renovation of a Hindu temple in Sialkot. In January 

2019, the Supreme Court upheld Asia Bibi’s acquittal from blasphemy 

charges, and she departed for Canada later in the year. Abdul Shakoor, 

an Ahmadi who was part of USCIRF’s Religious Prisoners of Conscience 

Project, was released from prison in March after being sentenced to eight 

years in 2015 on terrorism charges for sharing Ahmadiyya literature. In 

September, the Supreme Court acquitted Wajih-ul Hassan, who spent 18 

years imprisoned with a death sentence under false blasphemy charges. 

The government has taken steps to address educational material with 

discriminatory content against religious minorities, including announcing 

in April that it would bring 30,000 madrassas under government control 

to combat religious extremism, despite earlier provincial governments’ 

failures to register madrassas comprehensively under the 2015 National 

Action Plan. In 2019, the government also announced it would implement 

a common national curriculum beginning in 2021.

Key U.S. Policy

During 2019, Pakistan continued to be a key partner for U.S. security interests, particularly with the Afghanistan peace process. After 

President Donald J. Trump suspended military assistance to Pakistan 

in 2018 due to its unwillingness to confront certain terrorist groups, in 

particular the Haqqani network, this bilateral relationship saw improvement in 2019, especially with Prime Minister Khan making his first visit 

to the United States in July and the U.S. government seeking Pakistani 

support for talks with the Taliban. Despite this progress, U.S. officials 

continued to raise concerns about religious freedom violations. In 

February, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom 

Samuel D. Brownback visited Islamabad to meet with Pakistani officials to push for positive change on religious freedom. A number of 

senior U.S. officials also highlighted Pakistan’s religious freedom violations during the second Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom 

and President Trump met with Abdul Shakoor in the White House. 

then Acting Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs 

Alice G. Wells further elaborated on these issues during an October 

hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the 

Pacific, and Nonproliferation. On December 18, the State Department 

redesignated Pakistan as a CPC under IRFA, but again issued a waiver 

on any related sanctions “as required in the ‘important national interest 

of the United States.’”
34 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

RUSSIA

• Designate Russia as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations 

of religious freedom, as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Russian 

government agencies and officials 

responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom by freezing those 

individuals’ assets and/or barring their 

entry into the United States under 

human rights-related financial and visa 

authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and

• Work with European allies to use advocacy, diplomacy, and targeted sanctions 

to pressure Russia to end religious freedom abuses, release religious prisoners 

of conscience, and permit the establishment of an international monitoring 

presence in occupied Crimea.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Pass legislation condemning the deteriorating religious freedom environment 

in Russia, and highlight—in briefings and 

hearings—the Russian government’s 

failure to bring its religion and extremism 

laws in line with international human 

rights standards; and

• Pass the Ukraine Religious Freedom 

Support Act (H.R.5408), which calls 

on the President to take into account 

Russia’s religious freedom violations 

in Russian-occupied Crimea and 

Russian-controlled Donbas when determining CPC designations under IRFA. 

During 2019, religious freedom conditions in Russia deteriorated. The government continued to target “nontraditional” religious minorities with fines, detentions, and criminal 

charges under the pretext of combating extremism. Russian legislation criminalizes “extremism” without adequately defining the term, 

enabling the state to prosecute a vast range of nonviolent religious 

activity. The Jehovah’s Witnesses, whom the government banned 

outright as “extremist” in 2017, faced intensified persecution in 

2019. By the end of the year, hundreds of members remained in 

detention, had travel restrictions imposed upon them, or were under 

investigation. The Jehovah’s Witnesses report that as of the end of 

2019, 313 members had been charged, put on trial, or convicted for 

involvement in the group, and that Russian authorities conducted 

489 raids on the private homes of their members during the year. 

According to Human Rights Watch, as of January 2020, 32 Jehovah’s 

Witnesses in Russia were imprisoned for their faith. In 2019, the 

Russian government also continued to use its anti-extremism law to 

prosecute Muslims—particularly adherents of the Islamic missionary 

movement Tablighi Jamaat and readers of the Turkish theologian 

Said Nursi—and Scientologists for peaceful religious activity.

In the North Caucasus, security forces acted with impunity, 

arresting and kidnapping persons suspected of even tangential 

links to Islamist militancy, and harassing Muslims at prayer services. 

In September, for example, suspected members of the Chechen 

Security Services allegedly abducted Ramzan Shaikhayev. Shaikhayev 

previously had been detained for what authorities described to his 

wife as “a check on his religious beliefs.” In December, police in the 

Dagestani capital of Makhachkala set up checkpoints outside a 

mosque and demanded the personal information of those leaving the 

prayer service. Local Muslims described such operations as typical 

and designed to intimidate them. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov 

oversaw or condoned egregious abuses based on his religious views, 

including against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex 

(LGBTI) community and women.

In Russian-occupied Crimea, the occupation authorities continued to enforce Russia’s repressive laws and policies on religion, 

which has resulted in the prosecution of peaceful religious activity 

and bans on groups that were legal in Crimea under Ukrainian law. 

In 2019, authorities conducted mass arrests of politically active 

Crimean Tatars, whom they accused of membership in the banned 

Islamic Party Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). Many face lengthy prison sentences. 

On June 28, 2019, occupation authorities seized and closed the 

Cathedral of Vladimir and Olga in Simferopol, the main cathedral of 

the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) in Crimea. Members report 

that, since the occupation, the OCU has faced systematic persecution for its perceived ties to Ukrainian nationalism, including the 

confiscation of church property and the harassment of clergy and 

congregants. On November 6, 2019, a court in the western Crimean 

city of Yevpatoriya ordered the destruction of an OCU chapel. 

Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine pursue an exclusionary religious policy that privileges the Moscow Patriarchate of 

the Russian Orthodox Church. In the so-called Luhansk People’s 

Republic (LPR) in eastern Ukraine, rebel authorities supported by 

Russia have effectively banned all religious groups that failed to 

obtain legal registration by October 15, 2018, which includes all 

Protestant communities, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the OCU. On 

November 26, 2019, the LPR banned 12 Baptist books as “extremist,” including a Russian translation of the Gospel of John.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project adoption: Dennis Christensen

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project adoption: Ivan Matsitsky 

• Press Statement: USCIRF Statement on Travel Ban for Russian Religious Freedom Violators
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 35

RUSSIA

Background

The Russian government views independent religious activity as 

threatening social and political stability and its own control, while 

simultaneously cultivating relationships with the country’s so-called 

“traditional” religions. The population is religiously diverse, with 

around 68 percent identifying as Russian Orthodox Christian, 7 percent 

identifying as Muslim, and 25 percent comprising an array of religious minorities including Protestants, Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

Buddhists, Jews, and Baha’is. 

The government enforces laws that restrict religious freedom, 

including a 1996 religion law; a 2002 law on combating extremism; 

and more recent laws on blasphemy, “stirring up religious hatred,” and 

“missionary activity.” These vague laws give Russian authorities broad 

powers to define and prosecute any religious speech or activity or ban 

any religious literature that they deem harmful. The anti-extremism 

law, for example, lacks a clear definition of extremism, and the use 

or advocacy of violence is not a prerequisite for such a designation. 

Because virtually any speech can be prosecuted, the law is a powerful way to intimidate religious communities; they can be financially 

blacklisted or liquidated, and individuals can be subjected to criminal 

prosecutions. At the end of the reporting period, the Federal List of 

Extremist Materials (maintained by the Ministry of Justice) contained 

5,003 items, the possession of which is criminalized. 

The religion law sets strict registration requirements and empowers state officials to impede religious groups’ activities. It also broadly 

defines and prohibits “missionary activities,” including preaching, 

praying, disseminating religious materials, and even answering questions about religion outside of officially designated sites. 

Administrative Harassment

For many minority religious communities, acquiring an officially designated place of worship is virtually impossible, forcing them to meet 

in residential or commercial buildings. Although the 1996 Religion 

Law allows religious meetings on private property, such communities 

remain vulnerable to local officials, who can seize, shutter, or destroy 

property for alleged usage violations. In a particularly severe case of 

government harassment, Yevgeny Kim was stripped of his Russian 

citizenship after serving out his sentence for studying the works of 

Turkish theologian Said Nursi. As a stateless person without papers, 

he was incarcerated in a detention center for foreigners.

Jehovah’s Witnesses

In 2019, the Russian government accelerated its persecution of 

Jehovah’s Witnesses. In February 2019, a court in Oryol sentenced 

Dennis Christensen to six years in prison for leading a Jehovah’s 

Witness group. During the same month, local law enforcement in 

Surgut detained and tortured a group of 19 Jehovah’s Witnesses. In 

September 2019, five Jehovah’s Witnesses from Saratov were given 

sentences ranging from two to three and a half years. On November 

5, 2019, a court in the Siberian city of Tomsk sentenced another man, 

Sergei Klimov, to six years in prison for his leadership of a Jehovah’s 

Witness group. On December 13, 2019, a court in Penza sentenced 

Vladimir Alushkin to six years in prison for participating in Jehovah’s 

Witness worship services and sharing his beliefs. In October 2019 

alone, there were reportedly 83 house raids against Jehovah’s 

Witnesses across Russia and in Russian-occupied Crimea. On March 

20, 2019, in perhaps the biggest raid against Jehovah’s Witnesses in 

Crimea to date, armed members of the Russian security service (FSB) 

raided at least eight homes and detained six members for interrogation. Russian authorities subsequently charged one of them with 

“extremism,” while another remains under investigation.

Occupied Ukraine

On March 27, 2019, authorities conducted massive raids across the 

Crimean capital city of Simferopol, arresting 24 Crimean Tatars for 

alleged membership in HT, as well as terrorism. Authorities allegedly 

tortured at least four of the men and planted evidence, including 

Islamic literature banned in Russia. All were active in, or affiliated 

with, Crimean Solidarity, a secular human rights group opposed to the 

Russian occupation. On June 10, another eight men were arrested and 

charged with membership in HT. On November 12, 2019, six Crimean 

Tatars were given between seven and 19 years in prison for alleged 

membership in HT. No evidence of involvement in terrorism or acts 

of violence is necessary for such convictions. 

Since the 2014 invasion, the larger Muslim community in occupied Crimea has faced persistent harassment. USCIRF has heard 

reports of electricity to mosques being shut off right before Ramadan 

and only restored by bribing local authorities. Communities cannot 

celebrate holidays like Ramadan without official permits, which are 

often denied or withheld unless a bribe is paid. Video cameras have 

been installed in mosques throughout the region, and many communities report constant surveillance and frequent raids. 

Key U.S. Policy

U.S.-Russia relations remain at a low point amid tensions over Russian 

military involvement in Syria, the illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory, and allegations of Russian tampering in U.S. elections. On 

March 15, 2019, the United States, Canada, and the European Union 

announced sanctions against Russian individuals and companies for 

their involvement in the occupation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict 

in eastern Ukraine. On December 23, 2019, John J. Sullivan was sworn 

in as the U.S. Ambassador to Russia, having previously served as the 

deputy secretary of state. The U.S. government has implemented 

numerous sanctions over the occupation of Crimea, most recently 

in January 2020. In September, the State Department banned two 

high-ranking regional officers in Russia's Investigative Committee from 

entering the country for allegedly torturing seven Jehovah's Witnesses 

in Surgut. The department noted Russia’s declining religious freedom 

environment and called on the government to end its campaign 

against the Jehovah’s Witnesses. On December 18, 2019, the U.S. 

Department of State again placed Russia on its “Special Watch List” 

for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom 

pursuant to IRFA, as it had in 2018.
36 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

SAUDI ARABIA

• Redesignate Saudi Arabia as a “country of particular concern” (CPC), for 

engaging in systematic, ongoing, 

and egregious violations of religious 

freedom, as defined by the International 

Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), and lift 

the waiver releasing the administration 

from taking otherwise legislatively 

mandated action as a result of the 

designation.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Press the administration to determine 

whether Saudi officials responsible 

for the detention and mistreatment of 

religious prisoners of conscience are 

subject to sanctions or visa bans under 

the Global Magnitsky Act;

• Hold public hearings in order to pressure Saudi Arabia to release prisoners 

of conscience in Saudi Arabia, including 

Raif Badawi and his counsel Waleed 

Abu al-Khair, and work with like-minded 

parliamentarians in other countries to 

advocate for their release; and

• Pass the bipartisan Saudi Educational 

Transparency and Reform Act, which 

requires the U.S. Department of State 

to report annually on religious intolerance in Saudi textbooks and efforts to 

remove this content.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Saudi Arabia remained 

poor, despite some recent improvements. At the Organization of 

Islamic Cooperation’s 14th summit in May, Muslim clerics from 139 

countries convened by the Muslim World League signed the Mecca 

Declaration, which rejects extremism and religious intolerance. The 

Saudi government lifted several religious restrictions on women’s 

rights and passed a parliamentary bill restricting child marriages. 

However, it continued to engage in other systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious violations of religious freedom. The government prohibits public practice of any religion other than Islam, and no houses 

of worship other than mosques are allowed in the kingdom. NonMuslims who gather in private houses are subject to surveillance and 

Saudi security services may break up their private worship services. 

Saudi Arabia continued to advance the economic changes of Saudi 

Vision 2030 under King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and Crown 

Prince Mohammed bin Salman. However, the government’s tolerance 

remained low for those who chose not to accept its state-endorsed 

version of Hanbali Sunni Islam. In December 2019, police arrested 120 

people for offending public morals, including by wearing “inappropriate clothes.” The government also arrested or persecuted several 

Muslim clerics from the dissident Sahwa movement in 2019. One of 

these sheikhs, Fahd al-Qadi, died in December following alleged 

medical neglect in prison. The Committee for the Promotion of Virtue 

and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV) continued to operate with a limited mandate, as CPVPV President Sheikh Abdullah al-Sanad assured 

USCIRF it would during a September 2018 meeting. Nonetheless, 

comedian Yaser Baker was detained briefly by police in February 

after making jokes about the CPVPV during a standup comedy act. 

Shi’a Muslims in Saudi Arabia continue to face discrimination 

in education, employment, and the judiciary, and lack access to 

senior government and military positions. The building of Shi’a 

mosques is restricted outside majority-Shi’a Muslim areas in the 

Eastern Province, and Saudi authorities often prohibit use of the 

Shi’a Muslim call to prayer in these areas. Authorities arrest and 

imprison Shi’a Muslims for holding religious gatherings in private 

homes without permits and reading religious materials in husseiniyas

(prayer halls). Saudi Arabia also restricts the establishment of Shi’a 

Muslim cemeteries. In 2019, government authorities conducted a 

mass execution of 37 Shi’a Muslim protesters, including some who 

were minors at the time of their alleged crimes.

The kingdom continues to impose the religious guardianship 

system on Saudi women, regardless of their individual beliefs. 

In August 2019, it amended its laws to allow women to obtain 

passports and travel without a guardian’s permission; to register 

births, marriages, and divorces; to be issued official family documents; and to serve as guardians to minors. However, it continues 

to enforce the religious prohibitions on parental disobedience 

(‘uquq) and absence from the home (taghayyub), significantly 

limiting women’s autonomy on religious grounds. Saudi Arabia has 

used egregious violence against women like Loujain al-Hathloul 

for peacefully asserting their right to be free of these religious 

restrictions. In several instances in 2019, the government used 

state resources internationally to try to use force to repatriate 

women fleeing the guardianship system. Domestically and on 

social media, the Saudi government repeatedly characterized 

feminism as a form of radical extremism, comparing women who 

espouse it to members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 

In one egregious case, the Saudi Human Rights Commission 

issued a statement clarifying that “feminism is not criminalized in 

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Saudi Arabia in 2019

• Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List: four prisoners from Saudi Arabia added
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 37

SAUDI ARABIA

Background

Saudi Arabia is officially an Islamic state. There are more than 33 

million Saudis, 85–90 percent of whom are Sunni Muslims and 10–15 

percent of whom are Shi’a Muslims. The United Nations (UN) estimates 

that 37 percent of the Saudi population are expatriates, including at 

least two million non-Muslims, including Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, 

practitioners of folk religions, and the unaffiliated. Some Saudi citizens 

identify as non-Muslim or atheist, but hide this identity to avoid the 

harsh social and official consequences of leaving Islam. According 

to the 1992 Saudi Basic Law of Governance, the constitution is the 

Qur’an and the sunna (traditions of the Prophet). The judicial system 

is largely governed by a Saudi interpretation of Shari’a as informed by 

Hanbali jurisprudence, which imposes capital punishment for apostasy, identification with the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 

intersex (LGBTI) community, and peaceful political dissent, among 

other activities. The ruling monarch holds the title “Custodian of 

the Two Holy Mosques.” Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has 

overseen the Saudi Vision 2030 economic reform program while also 

cracking down on religious and political dissent. 

Mistreatment of Religious Minorities

In April 2019, Saudi Arabia executed 37 people, 32 of whom were Shi’a 

Muslims, on charges including “provoking sectarian strife,” “spreading 

chaos,” and “disturbing security.” Those beheaded included prominent Shi’a Muslim cleric Sheikh Mohammed al-Atiya, who was charged 

with attempting to “spread the Shi’a confession,” and Abdulkareem 

al-Hawaj, a Shi’a Muslim arrested after participating in a protest at the 

age of 16. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet 

condemned the killings.

Christians in Saudi Arabia cannot practice their religion freely 

without fear. Expatriate Christian communities face government surveillance and occasional raiding of their worship services by the Saudi 

security apparatus. Saudi Muslim converts to Christianity cannot identify as such without facing severe repercussions from Saudi authorities, 

including the CPVPV. While these severe violations continued in 2019, 

the King Faisal Center in Riyadh displayed a first edition King James 

Bible, and the government allowed a group of Evangelical Christian 

leaders to visit several significant Christian and Jewish sites.

Religious Incitement in Textbooks

For more than 15 years, USCIRF has documented the Saudi government’s failure to address intolerant content in official textbooks 

sufficiently. Despite progress in recent years, Saudi textbooks have 

seen some backsliding regarding language inciting hatred and violence toward non-Muslims. While the 2019–2020 textbooks showed 

marginal improvements in the discussion of Christians, textbooks 

still teach that Christians and Jews “are the enemy of Islam and its 

people,” and that members of the LGBTI community will “be struck 

[killed] in the same manner as those in Sodom.” An unknown number 

of old textbooks with even stronger intolerant passages reportedly 

remain in circulation both within Saudi Arabia and at Saudi-funded 

schools abroad.

Religious Prisoners of Conscience

Raif Badawi, a USCIRF Religious Prisoner of Conscience, is among 

Saudi Arabia’s highest-profile prisoners of conscience. Badawi, the 

founder and editor of the website Free Saudi Liberals, has been in 

prison since 2012 for “insulting Islam through electronic channels.” A 

2015 court ruling upheld his sentence of 10 years, 1,000 lashes, and a 

fine of one million Saudi riyals ($266,000). In September 2019, Badawi 

was denied access to books and crucial medicine, and declared a 

hunger strike in protest. His lawyer, Waleed Abu al-Khair, is also in 

prison and began a hunger strike in early 2020 after being moved 

into solitary confinement and denied access to books. Both were 

hospitalized multiple times. In early 2020, al-Khair was moved out of 

solitary confinement.

Palestinian poet Ashraf Fayadh remains in prison for allegedly 

questioning religion through his poetry and for spreading atheist 

thought during an argument at a coffee shop in 2013. In November 

2015, Fayadh was sentenced to death for apostasy, but in February 

2016 the sentence was reduced to eight years, 800 lashes, and a renunciation of his poetry on Saudi state media.

Sheikh Mohammed Habib was arrested in 2016 after delivering 

sermons critical of the government and in support of his close associate, Shi’a Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, whom Saudi Arabia executed in 2016. 

Sheikh Habib was sentenced to a total of 12 years in prison with a 

subsequent five-year travel ban. 

Key U.S. Policy

In February, the White House declined to respond to a request from 

Congress under the Global Magnitsky Act to determine whether 

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman bore responsibility for the 

killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Saudi Arabia has continued to support U.S. policy in the Middle East, including cooperation 

on counterterrorism initiatives and the administration’s maximum 

pressure strategy toward Iran. Following a September 2019 attack 

on Saudi oil facilities likely conducted by Iran, Secretary of State 

Michael R. Pompeo visited Saudi Arabia to emphasize that it had U.S. 

support. In October, Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper announced 

the deployment of two additional squadrons to Saudi Arabia. Despite 

this tightening of relations, in July 2019, at the State Department’s 

second Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, Vice President 

Michael R. Pence called on Saudi Arabia to release Badawi. In January, 

Representatives Joe Wilson (R-SC) and William Keating (D-MA) reintroduced the bipartisan Saudi Educational Transparency and Reform 

Act of 2019 (H.R.554) while Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL), Ron Wyden 

(D-OR), and Edward Markey (D-MA) introduced a bipartisan companion bill (S.R.357). The bills would require the State Department to 

issue an annual report on religious intolerance in Saudi textbooks. On 

December 18, the State Department redesignated Saudi Arabia as a 

CPC under IRFA, but again issued a waiver on imposing any related 

sanctions on the country “as required in the ‘important national interest of the United States.’” 
38 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF 

COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE

While objectively—and, obviously—still a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, Saudi Arabia continues to reform in ways that are 

remarkable and transformative and the Kingdom’s progress must 

be measured against its past. I believe the international community 

should continue to positively reinforce these historic reforms. While it 

remains incomplete, the progress is undeniable. Therefore, I continue 

to support the State Department’s decision to maintain its waver for 

Saudi Arabia. Punitive measures will not speed the effect of change; 

rather it would complicate it, and likely, slow it. A strong relationship 

with the United States—contra malign actors—will likely accelerate 

change. It is now clear that change is possible and it must continue 

and it must accelerate.

SAUDI ARABIA

40 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

SYRIA

• Designate Syria as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA);

• Designate Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as 

an “entity of particular concern,” or EPC, 

for engaging in systematic, ongoing, 

and egregious violations of religious 

freedom, as defined by IRFA, rather than 

limiting the EPC designation only to its 

al-Nusra Front subsidiary;

• Provide assistance to support Syria’s 

vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities 

under the terms of the Iraq and Syria 

Genocide Relief and Accountability 

Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-300); utilize the 

resources enacted under the Elie Wiesel 

Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act 

of 2018 (P.L. 115-441), and release the 

full amount of the additional $50 million 

that the White House announced in 

mid-October;

• Exert significant pressure on Turkey to 

provide a timeline for its withdrawal 

from Syria, while ensuring that neither 

its military nor FSA allies expand their 

area of control in northeast Syria, carry 

out religious and ethnic cleansing of that 

area, or otherwise abuse the rights of 

vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities 

there; and

• Expand U.S. engagement with and 

assistance to the AANES, including 

examining a potential sanctions exemption for only AANES-governed areas as 

well as contributing to efforts, through 

relevant nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) and like-minded international 

partners, to fund and develop local 

programs to promote intra- and interreligious tolerance, alleviate sectarian 

tensions, and advance religious freedom 

and related rights.

I

n 2019, religious freedom in Syria remained under serious 

threat, particularly amid the country’s ongoing conflict and 

humanitarian crisis. The most notable positive development 

was the successful conclusion in March to the Global Coalition to 

Defeat ISIS (GCDI) campaign to clear Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS) fighters from their final stronghold, in the eastern town of 

Baghouz. While it still actively controlled territory, ISIS’ genocidal 

ideology and actions represented the single greatest threat to 

religious freedom for the country’s myriad of religious minorities as well as the Sunni Muslim majority. However, the failure to 

provide a durable solution to the more than 68,000 fighters and 

family members placed in detention camps, and the persistence 

of attacks by ISIS remnants on civilians as well as GCDI and Syrian 

Democratic Forces (SDF) personnel, were important reminders 

that the ISIS threat remained. 

Furthermore, although the year began with a reversal of 

U.S. plans to withdraw forces from the northeast, that pullout 

and a long-threatened Turkish invasion took place in October, 

precipitating the displacement of some ethnic and religious communities from a so-called “safe zone” that Turkey established with 

its Free Syrian Army (FSA) allies. These events also raised fears

that the Turkish government had begun to move Syrian refugees 

en masse—many originally from other parts of Syria—into this 

occupation zone in the sort of forced religious, ethnic, and cultural replacement that it oversaw in Afrin in 2018. Meanwhile, the 

Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) 

maintained control of the rest of the northeast and continued to 

uphold its commitment to providing for a relatively high degree of 

religious freedom and other civil rights in areas under its authority.

While there was less evidence in 2019 of explicit religious 

freedom violations in areas under regime control, the government 

continued to perpetrate massive repression of human rights, including severe repercussions for returnees and communities suspected 

of participation in anti-regime activism or fighting. Conditions for 

religious and ethnic minorities—along with all civilians—remained 

dire in Idlib Province where regime forces and Iranian, Lebanese 

Hezbollah, and Russian allies targeted armed factions and civilian infrastructure in their effort since April to retake remaining 

rebel-held areas. Although it remained difficult to clearly assess 

religious freedom conditions under such circumstances, reports 

emerged that the U.S.-designated terrorist group Hay’at Tahrir 

al-Sham (HTS), which operates in Idlib province, persisted in religious repression, including the assault and stoning of an Armenian 

woman in July.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Hearing: Protecting Houses of Worship and Holy Sites

• Press Statement: Turkish Offensive in Northeast Syria

• Press Statement: International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 41

SYRIA

Background

Estimates place Syria’s population at just under 20 million, but, as of 

November 2019, 6.7 million Syrians remained outside of the country 

as refugees and another 6.1 million were internally displaced persons 

(IDPs). That population is both ethnically and religiously diverse; around 

74 percent is Sunni Muslim and 13 percent Alawite, Shi’a, and Isma’ili 

Muslim, while Assyrian, Maronite, Armenian and other Christians comprise 10 percent, Druze 3 percent, and a small number of Syrian Jews 

remain in Damascus and Aleppo. However, it is difficult to assess the 

accuracy of these figures amid the country’s nine-year conflict, given 

the staggering number of refugees and IDPs.

While Syria is a Sunni Muslim-majority country, the Alawite religious minority has dominated its political and military classes since 

Hafez al-Assad, current president Bashar al-Assad’s father, seized 

power in 1970. Over the subsequent four decades, the two Assad 

regimes retained a stranglehold on power through a complicated 

framework of Ba’athist ideology, repressive coercion, enticement of 

economic elites, and the cultivation of a perception of protection for 

other religious minorities. However, that fragile framework collapsed 

following a popular uprising in March 2011 which, after a brutal government response, devolved into armed conflict—first domestic, but 

encompassing a range of regional and global actors by mid-2015. The 

conflict has since been marked by the government’s utter disregard 

for civilian casualties, including targeting of hospitals, churches, and 

even schools in its effort to crush all opposition. 

End of ISIS-Controlled Territory 

During its time in power, ISIS perpetrated massive atrocities across the 

areas under its control, including kidnapping and executing thousands 

of Christians, Yazidis, Shi’a Muslims, and fellow Sunni Muslims who 

opposed its authority. The fall of its last outpost in Syria in March 2019 

therefore represented an important step for the protection of religious 

freedom in the entire region. However, despite the loss of territory and 

the indefinite imprisonment of fighters and their families under harsh 

conditions, ISIS remnants continued to attack GCDI and SDF forces as 

well as religious minorities and other vulnerable communities. In July

and December, for example, ISIS-suspected car bombs detonated near 

churches in Qamishli, wounding a number of civilians. On November 11, 

ISIS claimed responsibility for the assassination of Armenian Catholic 

Father Hovsep Bedoyan and his father near Deir al-Zor. Furthermore, 

an August report to U.S. Congress on GCDI operations, from the Lead 

Inspector General for oversight of overseas contingency operations, 

warned that ISIS likely retained 14,000-18,000 fighters between Syria 

and Iraq, who were already showing signs of resurgence. 

Fragile Conditions in the Northeast 

Areas of northeastern Syria under AANES control—under SDF protection but with limited support from the United States and GCDI at 

year’s end—remained a crucial center of positive religious freedom 

conditions in Syria. As in the prior year, AANES authorities continued 

to allow Muslims, Christians, Yazidis, and others to openly practice their 

faiths and express their religious identities. 

However, the AANES’s hard-fought ability to foster an environment of religious and other freedoms remained at serious risk 

at the end of 2019, due to the partial withdrawal of U.S. forces in 

October and the subsequent incursion of Turkish forces. While the 

latter claimed to limit their attacks on civilians within the 75-mile 

strip of territorial control, human rights groups have accused the 

FSA—under Turkey’s control—of serious human rights abuses. On 

October 12, Ahrar al-Sharqiya fighters pulled Kurdish politician Hevrin 

Khalaf from her car and executed her, while just days later, members 

of another militia reportedly defaced an Armenian church in Tel Abyad 

in an attempt to make it appear that Kurdish People’s Protection Units 

(YPG) had filled it with their propaganda. Over 200,000 people fled 

initially from the area as a result of this violence and for fear of an 

expansion of Turkish operations; around 75,000 remained in IDP shelters or schools in the northeast or in refugee camps in northern Iraq 

by late 2019, and estimated 117,000 civilians had returned. According 

to USCIRF sources, others who stayed in place—including members 

of a community of Kurdish Christians from Muslim backgrounds—had 

not yet faced direct violence, but remained in a constant state of fear. 

A fragile détente developed in that border zone by the end of the year 

as a result of the Turkish, Russian, Syrian, and U.S. contingents who 

patrolled the main roads to prevent escalation. Religious minorities 

in other areas that Turkey seized earlier, such as Afrin, continued to 

experience persecution and marginalization, especially displaced 

Yazidis and Christians.

Key U.S. Policy

U.S. policy toward Syria in 2019 continued to face the shifting dynamics that have confounded it since the outbreak of armed conflict. 

U.S. leadership of the GCDI, in partnership with the SDF and other 

allies, contributed to the most significant breakthrough in 2019: the 

collapse of ISIS territory in March. However, northeastern Syria—

once the center of ISIS power and yet the area that has shown the 

most potential for expanded religious freedom over the last two 

years—once again presented a policy challenge to the administration of President Donald J. Trump. The White House announced a 

full U.S. withdrawal from northeastern Syria on October 6, following 

talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdog ̆ an. The subsequent 

incursion of Turkish forces prompted a flurry of negotiations among 

the area’s major players, a White House warning to Turkey to limit 

operations to the border region, and an eventual ceasefire, brokered 

by Vice President Michael R. Pence and Secretary of State Michael 

R. Pompeo. U.S. forces resumed limited patrols and pledged to protect vital resources in AANES-governed territory, contributing to an 

awkward détente among the various armed forces operating along 

the border. The United States continued to support humanitarian 

relief efforts throughout Syria, including the distribution of nearly 

$1.5 million to such initiatives in 2019. In October, the White House 

announced its allotment of an additional $50 million toward stabilization and relief efforts for vulnerable communities in Syria, but the 

actual disbursement of those funds remained unclear at the end of 

the reporting period.
42 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

TAJIKISTAN

• Redesignate Tajikistan as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC, for 

engaging in systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious violations of religious freedom 

as defined by the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver 

releasing the administration from taking 

otherwise legislatively mandated action 

as a result of the designation;

• Condition U.S. assistance to the Tajikistani government, with the exception of 

aid to improve humanitarian conditions 

or advance human rights, on the 

reform of the 2009 religion law and the 

improvement of conditions for freedom 

of religion or belief; 

• Impose targeted sanctions on Tajikistani 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights-related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and

• Press the Tajikistani government at the 

highest levels to identify and immediately release individuals imprisoned in 

Tajikistan for their peaceful religious 

activities or religious affiliations; account 

for the whereabouts of all prisoners of 

conscience, including those imprisoned 

on religious grounds; and allow international observers to monitor conditions 

in Tajikistani prisons and investigate the 

recent prison riots.

I

n 2019, the Tajikistani government’s already dismal record on 

religious freedom deteriorated. The regime of President Emomali 

Rahmon maintained its repressive policies, suppressing displays 

of public religiosity by individuals of all faiths and persecuting 

minority communities—especially actual and alleged Salafists, a 

term that is broadly applied. Authorities pursued a crackdown on 

various attributes of faith, including restrictions on wedding and 

funerary banquets, and pursued extralegal bans on beards and 

hijabs. Under the guise of a struggle against religious extremism, 

the government continued to torment former members of the 

banned Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), sentencing rank-and-file former party members to extensive jail time and 

extraditing former party elites from abroad. Tajikistani authorities 

harassed family members of imprisoned IRPT members for speaking at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE) Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in 

Warsaw in September, earning Tajikistan a rebuke from the U.S. 

delegation in its closing remarks. 

On July 29, 2019, President Rahmon signed an order prohibiting the import and sale of clothing representing a “foreign national 

culture.” The ban is widely perceived as a further assault on female 

Islamic dress. Women are already forbidden from wearing hijabs 

in numerous public places, including hospitals and schools. Locals 

report that officials stop women in hijabs, record their personal 

information, and force them to wear their headscarves in the “Tajik 

fashion” (shortened and pulled back to reveal hair). In December, 

Nilufar Rajabova reported that she had been detained with more 

than 20 other women by the police in Dushanbe, who told them 

to go back to Iran or Afghanistan if they wanted to wear the hijab. 

Rajabova was eventually fined for “hooliganism.”

Many religious minorities hide their affiliations for fear of government scrutiny and social backlash, and expressed concern over 

government plans to document individual religious affiliation in 

the upcoming census. As reported in the Russian-language press, 

one Member of Parliament explained that the government already 

believes that around 90 percent of the population is Muslim, so the 

goal of the census is to get an accurate breakdown of the remaining 

10 percent. The Jehovah’s Witness community has been deemed 

illegal since 2007, and on September 10, 2019, Shamil Hakimov was 

sentenced to seven and a half years in prison—followed by three 

years prohibition from working in a religious organization—for 

sharing his beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness. In early 2019, government 

officials burned 5,000 Baptist calendars that had been seized at 

Dushanbe International Airport after being deemed “propaganda 

of an alien religion.” Social tolerance for religious minority communities continued to decline. Members of less traditional faiths 

in Tajikistan, like Seventh-Day Adventists and Presbyterians, as 

well members of communities with ancient ties to the region, like 

Zoroastrians and Shi’a Muslims, all report a rise in pressure and 

hostility from family and community. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Commission delegation visit: OSCE HDIM in Warsaw in September 2019

• Briefing: Freedom of Religion or Belief and Security: New Policy Guidance from the OSCE

• Legislation Factsheet: Anti-Extremism Laws
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 43

TAJIKISTAN

Background

Tajikistan is the poorest country in Central Asia and has been ruled since 

1992 by President Rahmon, who has concentrated power in the hands 

of his family. Tajikistan experienced a five-year civil war (1992–1997) 

following his ascension to power, resulting in more than 100,000 deaths; 

the post-war amnesty included many Tajikistani officials responsible for 

torture. The government is weak and highly corrupt, and 40 percent 

of the country’s gross domestic product is from labor remittances, 

mostly from Russia. The population is predominantly Sunni Muslim—

around 86 percent Sunni—while Shi’a Muslims, mostly located in the 

mountainous east, comprise roughly 4 percent. The remaining 10 percent includes Russian Orthodox, Protestants, Catholics, Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, Buddhists, Jews, Baha’is, and Zoroastrians. 

Tajikistan’s legal environment for freedom of religion or belief 

sharply declined after the adoption of several highly restrictive laws in 

2009. In particular, the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 

Unions set onerous registration requirements; criminalized unregistered religious activity, private religious education, and proselytism; 

set strict limits on the number and size of mosques; allowed state interference with the appointment of imams and the content of sermons; 

required official permission for religious organizations to provide 

religious instruction and communicate with foreign coreligionists; 

and imposed state controls on the content, publication, and import of 

religious materials. Small Protestant and other groups cannot obtain 

legal status under these burdensome registration requirements. In 

2011 and 2012, administrative and Penal Code amendments set new 

penalties—including large fines and prison terms—for religion-related 

charges such as organizing or participating in “unapproved” religious 

meetings. A 2011 law on parental responsibility banned minors from 

any organized religious activity except funerals. 

Tajikistan’s anti-extremism law fails to define extremism clearly 

and often leads to arbitrary detention. Extremist, terrorist, or revolutionary activities are punishable without requiring acts that involve 

violence or incitement of imminent violence, while trials under these 

charges lack due process and procedural safeguards. The Tajikistani 

government continued to use concerns over Islamist extremism to 

justify actions against participants in certain religious or political activities. Although the existence of the IRPT—the former Soviet Union’s 

only legal Islamic political party—was a condition of the post-civil 

war peace treaty, the Tajikistani government banned the IRPT as an 

extremist group in September 2015. The government’s suppression of 

the IRPT is intertwined with its broader repression of Muslim religious 

practices; the group had called for respecting Tajikistan’s secular constitution as well as its international religious freedom commitments, 

and it opposed restrictions on beards, headscarves, religious education, and children attending mosques. “Salafism” has been banned 

as extremist since 2009; as a result, the mere performance of Muslim 

rituals in ways the government deems “foreign” or inconsistent with 

the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam is tantamount to criminal activity. 

Prisoners

An unknown number of individuals are imprisoned under dubious 

charges of religious extremism and terrorism, and there are worrying 

signs that the country’s prison system is straining to accommodate 

them. On May 20, 2019, a massive prison riot in Vakhdat resulted in 

the deaths of at least 29 prisoners, including several senior members 

of the IRPT. This was the second prison riot in six months, and in both 

instances the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) claimed responsibility. Observers fear that Tajikistan’s overburdened prison system is 

becoming fertile ground for ISIS recruiters. Torture and corruption are 

commonplace, with bribery alleged as a common means for escaping 

harsh treatment. The International Committee for the Red Cross has 

been denied access to Tajikistani prisons since 2004. On October 25, 

2019, Tajikistani officials approved an amnesty legislation that would 

release around 20,000 people to mark the 25th anniversary of the 

country’s constitution; that figure exceeded some estimates placing 

the entire prison population at around 10,000 inmates.

Government Control of Islam

Despite constitutional guarantees of separation between religion 

and state, the government maintained strict control over both the 

Muslim clergy and Islamic practice. Imams are often salaried by the 

government and act as agents of the state. Clergy are required to visit 

important historical sites and state museums, and they can be fired 

for insufficient knowledge of national culture and official symbolism. 

In September 2019, imams in the district of Mastchoh were reportedly using money raised through offerings and payments for clerical 

services to fund the construction of a local branch of the president’s 

political party. 

In 2019, the building that once housed the only madrassa in the 

region of Khovalinsk was turned into a music school. Most madrassas 

were closed after passage of the 2009 religion law. Students can only 

receive a Muslim education at the Islamic Institute of Tajikistan and 

the government does not appoint or recognize any imams who were 

educated abroad. Children brought back to Tajikistan from foreign 

madrassas are forced to stay for an indefinite period in special boarding schools for “readjustment,” and parents report not even being 

allowed to bring their children home on weekends.

Key U.S. Policy

U.S. policy toward Tajikistan has emphasized the importance of security 

and regional connectivity. Securing Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan 

and reducing the flow of narcotics and illicit goods that finance terrorist 

groups in that country remains a priority. On January 6–7, 2020, just 

after the reporting period, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Alice G. Wells visited 

Tajikistan and announced that the United States was “deepening our 

security cooperation in the areas of border security, counterterrorism, 

law enforcement, and joint military exercises and training.” She referred

several times to the “more than $200 million” in aid that the U.S. government had provided Tajikistan to secure its border and expressed 

concern about restrictions on fundamental freedoms. 

The State Department has designated Tajikistan as a CPC repeatedly since 2016, most recently in December 2019, but has maintained a 

waiver on imposing any related sanctions on the country “as required 

in the ‘important national interest of the United States.’” 
44 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

TURKMENISTAN

• Redesignate Turkmenistan as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), lift the waiver releasing the 

administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result 

of the designation, and take presidential 

action to limit security assistance to Turkmenistan under IRFA Section 405(a)(22);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Turkmenistani government agencies and officials 

responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry 

into the United States under human 

rights related financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom 

violations; and

• Press at the highest levels to secure the 

identification and immediate release of 

individuals imprisoned in Turkmenistan 

for their peaceful religious activities 

or religious affiliations, and urge the 

government of Turkmenistan to desist 

immediately from the practice of “disappearing” prisoners; account for the 

whereabouts of all prisoners of conscience, including those imprisoned on 

religious grounds; and close the prison at 

Ovadan-Depe.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Turkmenistan remained 

among the worst in the world and showed no signs of improvement. Turkmenistan is an extremely closed society, described as 

an informational “black hole” with an abysmal record on freedom 

of the press. This landscape makes it difficult to chronicle the actual 

extent of religious freedom abuses in the country, which are certainly more extensive than the limited number of reports indicate. 

Nevertheless, the available information presents a bleak picture. 

The government continued to be suspicious of all independent 

religious activity and maintained a large surveillance apparatus that 

monitors believers at home and abroad. Turkmenistani law requires 

religious groups to register under intrusive criteria, strictly controls 

registered groups’ activities, and bans and punishes religious activities by unregistered groups. Persons accused of criminal religious 

offenses may be tried in closed-regime courts where sentences 

remain secret. Convicts often are disappeared in the state’s prison 

system and presumed to be held without contact with the outside 

world. Many religious prisoners are believed to be held at the notorious Ovadan-Depe Prison, located in the remote desert 50 miles 

north of the capital city of Ashgabat. Ovadan-Depe was built to 

house high-level political dissidents and enemies of the state, and 

its prisoners routinely die from harsh conditions that include torture 

and starvation. In 2019, Akmyrat Soyunov and Eziz Hudayberdiyev, 

two alleged followers of the Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen, reportedly died in this prison. The closed informational environment of 

Turkmenistan makes it impossible to determine how many other religious prisoners the government is holding under similar conditions, 

or how many have likewise died in its custody in 2019. 

The government also continued its practice of imprisoning conscientious objectors to military service, and it intensified punishment 

for them in 2019, arresting seven conscientious objectors during 

the year and imposing the harshest prison sentence known to date. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Commission delegation: OSCE HDIM in Warsaw in September 2019

• Legislation Factsheet: Registration Laws 

• Briefing: Freedom of Religion or Belief and Security: New Policy Guidance from the OSCE
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 45

TURKMENISTAN

Background

Turkmenistan is a highly authoritarian country under the rule of 

President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, who enforces a cult of 

personality that proliferates his image in golden monuments and 

fawning official coverage, and who demands that the population 

conform to his personal whims. Since taking power in 2007, President 

Berdymukhamedov has steadily consolidated his grip on power and 

the ostentation of his cultic image. A new 2016 constitution removed 

the presidential age limit and Berdymukhamedov was reelected in 

2017 with 97 percent of the vote in an election widely regarded as 

unfair. Turkmenistan’s primary security concerns relate to its long 

border with Afghanistan and the government’s fears about extremist 

infiltration and influence on the domestic Turkmen population. The 

government effectively leverages this perceived threat to maintain 

its iron grip over every aspect of Turkmenistani society, including 

religion. The majority of the population—around 89 percent—is 

Sunni Muslim, with Orthodox Christians as the second-largest group, 

comprising around 9 percent of the population. These statistics are 

more a reflection of ethnicity than of actual religious practice; Turkmen 

ethnic identity includes cultural Islam, but the secular government’s 

Soviet-type approach to religion strictly regulates and often discourages active religious practice. 

The 2016 Religion Law asserts that Turkmenistan is a secular 

state with religious freedom. However, it requires religious groups to 

register with the Ministry of Justice under intrusive criteria (including 

having 50 adult citizen founders), prohibits any activity by unregistered groups, requires that the government be informed of all 

foreign financial support, bans worship in private homes and private 

religious education, and prohibits the wearing of religious garb in 

public except by clerics. All religious activity is overseen by the State 

Commission on Religious Organizations and Expert Evaluation of 

Religious Information Resources (SCROEERIR), which approves the 

appointment of religious leaders, the building of houses of worship, 

the import and publication of religious literature, and the registration 

of all religious organizations. The law does not specify the criteria for 

gaining SCROEERIR approval, which enables arbitrary enforcement. 

The registration process requires religious organizations to provide 

the government with detailed information about founding members, 

including names, addresses, and birth dates. Registered communities 

must reregister every three years, and religious activity is not permitted in prisons or the military. 

Conscientious Objectors

In 2018, after a four-year moratorium, Turkmenistan resumed its practice of imprisoning conscientious objectors to compulsory military 

service. This practice has not only continued in 2019, but penalties 

have also become more severe. Seven of the 10 conscientious objectors currently known to be in prison were arrested in 2019 and charged 

under article 219(1) of the Criminal Code for the absence of a legal 

basis for exemption from military service. In July 2019, authorities 

sentenced 19-year-old Bahtiyar Atahanov to four years in prison, the 

harshest sentence to date for conscientious objection. Most sentences are between one and two years; however, the military forcibly 

conscripted Atahanov before he was charged, which allowed the 

courts to treat him as an active-duty soldier in dereliction of his duty. 

In November 2019, a court sentenced Serdar Dovletov to three years 

for “fraudulently” attempting to evade service. All those charged 

for conscientious objection are Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused to 

comply with compulsory military service on religious grounds. There 

is no civilian alternative to military service available to conscientious 

objectors in Turkmenistan. David Petrosov and Selim Taganov, two 

Jehovah’s Witnesses imprisoned in September and October 2019, 

respectively, attempted to obtain alternative service, but the military 

refused their requests. 

Government Control and Suppression of Islam

All religious activity is under tight government control in Turkmenistan, 

but Islam faces particular scrutiny. Unlike its approach to other faiths, 

the government directly controls the practice of Islam by appointing 

religious leaders and dictating the content of sermons and prayers. 

The state-mandated content for imams regularly includes prayers 

for President Berdymukhamedov, asking not only for his health and 

long life, but also for God to punish his enemies. Sermons include 

tributes to the president, reminding the congregation that all that is 

good in their lives derives from Berdymukhamedov’s “wise policies.” 

Unlike in previous years, there was no public announcement from 

the state-controlled Muslim Board marking the start of Ramadan in 

2019 and no guidelines published for the traditional tithe. In fact, the 

state-controlled media made no mention of the observance. Citizens 

reported being afraid to celebrate the holiday, concerned they would 

be labelled as extremists. In early 2019, there were scattered reports 

of police summoning and questioning individuals about whether their 

ultimate loyalty was to God or the president. In January and February, 

authorities in the capital city of Ashgabat forcibly detained and shaved 

an unknown number of young men under 40. Police in Lebap Region 

reportedly detained a young man with a beard for several days and 

forced him to drink alcohol. 

Key U.S. Policy

The government of Turkmenistan engages in a number of border 

and regional security programs with the U.S. government, as well as 

educational and cultural exchanges. Turkmenistan enjoys most-favored-nation trading status with the United States and receives U.S. 

foreign aid to strengthen the security of its border with Afghanistan. 

Although cognizant of the deplorable state of human rights in 

Turkmenistan, the U.S. government has prioritized security concerns 

related to the ongoing war in Afghanistan in its policy with the country. The State Department has designated Turkmenistan as a CPC 

under IRFA since 2014, and redesignated it in December 2019, but has 

repeatedly used a waiver against any related sanctions “as required 

in the ‘important national interest of the United States.’” This waiver 

effectively neutralizes the consequences of Turkmenistan’s CPC designation, removes any incentive for the government to reform its brutal 

policies, and lends credence to the regime’s claims that these policies 

are warranted by security concerns.
46 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

VIETNAM

• Designate Vietnam as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging 

in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

religious freedom violations, as defined by 

the International Religious Freedom Act 

(IRFA), and enter into a binding agreement 

with the government, as authorized under 

Section 405(c) of IRFA, setting forth commitments to improve religious freedom; 

• Prioritize funding for programs that 

build the capacity of local authorities to 

respect and protect religious freedom 

and related human rights, focusing on 

programs that help officials manage 

interreligious disputes; and

• Direct the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi and 

Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City to track 

applications to register religious organizations and religious activities to monitor 

authorities’ compliance with the Law on 

Belief and Religion, and to develop a list 

of houses of worship or religious sites 

of unique spiritual, cultural, or historical 

importance and work with Vietnamese 

authorities to ensure that they receive 

special protection from land grabbing or 

development projects. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Send regular delegations focused on 

religious freedom and related human 

rights to Vietnam and request to visit 

areas impacted by restrictions on religious 

freedom, such as the Central Highlands, 

Northern Highlands, and Mekong Delta, 

as well as request to visit prisoners of 

conscience, such as Nguyen Bac Truyen.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Vietnam generally trended 

the same as the previous year. The government continued to 

enforce the Law on Belief and Religion, which requires religious 

organizations to register with the state, and to harass unregistered 

religious groups. During USCIRF’s September 2019 visit, multiple religious groups applying for registration reported that local 

officials regularly exceeded their authority by demanding information—such as congregants’ names—not explicitly required by 

the law. Applications were often pending with no formal decision 

for months or even years. Throughout the year, authorities interrogated, harassed, or physically assaulted individuals affiliated with 

unregistered religious groups—including the independent Cao 

Dai, Khmer Krom Buddhists, and Duong Van Minh—when they 

attempted to attend religious ceremonies. 

Ethnic minority communities faced especially egregious persecution for the peaceful practice of their religious beliefs, including 

physical assault, detention, or banishment. An estimated 10,000 

Hmong and Montagnard Christians in the Central Highlands remain 

effectively stateless because local authorities have refused to issue 

identity cards, in many instances in retaliation against Christians who 

refuse to renounce their faith. During USCIRF’s 2019 visit, multiple 

pastors reported that authorities in the Central Highlands regularly 

raided or closed down house churches. In October, authorities initiated a campaign to limit the length and scale of traditional funerals, 

effectively prohibiting Hmong funeral practices, which typically 

last several days to a week. In addition, USCIRF received reports 

during the year that police interrogated and detained Montagnard 

Christians for participating in religious freedom conferences overseas 

and for meeting with U.S. government officials. 

Local authorities continued to expropriate or destroy property belonging to religious communities. For example, in January, 

authorities in Kontum Province demolished Son Linh Tu Pagoda, 

which had been affiliated with the independent Unified Buddhist 

Church of Vietnam. In October, plainclothes police beat up six 

independent Hoa Hao Buddhists protesting plans by the state-recognized Hoa Hao Buddhist Church to demolish and rebuild An Hoa 

Tu temple in An Giang Province. In several northeastern provinces, 

authorities burned at least 35 funeral sheds central to the Duong 

Van Minh’s core practices. Local authorities also expropriated land

claimed by the Catholic Church in Loc Hung Garden in Ho Chi Minh 

City and Con Dau parish in Danang. In some instances, the national 

government encouraged local officials to reach a settlement with 

victims of expropriation, but it generally failed to hold local authorities accountable for such abuses. 

In 2019, the Vietnamese government continued to arrest 

and imprison peaceful religious leaders and religious freedom 

advocates. Nguyen Bac Truyen—a Hoa Hao Buddhist advocate sentenced to 11 years in April 2018—remained imprisoned at the end 

of the reporting period and is reportedly in poor health. In some 

cases, authorities physically assaulted prisoners of conscience who 

protested prison conditions. During its visit, USCIRF learned that 

authorities at Ba Sao prison, Nam Ha Province, refused to provide a 

Bible or a priest to Le Dinh Luong, a Catholic environmental activist 

and prisoner of conscience since 2017. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Commission delegation visit: Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi in September 2019

• Country Update: An Assessment of Vietnam’s Law on Belief and Religion

• Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project adoption: Nguyen Bac Truyen 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 47

VIETNAM

Background

Vietnam’s constitution permits citizens to “follow any religion or follow 

none” and requires the government to respect and protect freedom 

of religion. However, the constitution also authorizes authorities to 

override human rights, including religious freedom, for reasons of 

“national security, social order and security, social morality, and community well-being.” Vietnam’s Law on Belief and Religion, which 

went into effect on January 1, 2018, requires religious communities 

to register their organizations, activities, and places of worship with 

the government. The law requires religious organizations to have 

operated for at least five years before applying for registration. It 

also grants registered religious organizations status as legal entities. 

According to the CIA World Factbook, a quarter of Vietnam’s 

estimated 97 million citizens identify with a formal religion, while many 

more partake in traditional folk practices. Approximately 15 percent 

of the population follow Buddhism, while 7 percent belong to the 

Catholic Church. Other religious traditions with a significant presence 

include Hoa Hao Buddhism, Cao Dai, Evangelical Protestantism, and 

Islam. By the end of 2019, the government officially recognized 16 

religions. However, many religious groups refused to register due to 

fear of persecution or concern for their independence, leading to both 

government-sponsored and independent organizations competing to 

represent the religion. 

Positive Developments

Religious followers in urban, economically developed areas usually 

are able to exercise their religion or belief freely, openly, and without 

fear. For example, in September 2019, members of the recognized Cao 

Dai church held an outdoor festival with more than 250,000 people. 

In August, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc attended a conference 

of religious dignitaries in Danang and praised the contributions of 

religious groups to Vietnam’s social welfare. In May, the government 

released the Venerable Thach Thuol, a Khmer Krom Buddhist monk 

imprisoned in 2013 for teaching the Khmer language in his temple. 

In December, authorities in Ho Chi Minh City listed the historic Thu 

Thiem church and convent as a “heritage site,” which protects it from 

anticipated urban development. There were no reports of Red Flag 

Associations—state-affiliated militant groups—engaging in open 

attacks against religious groups in 2019. Finally, the Government 

Committee for Religious Affairs has taken proactive steps to investigate complaints against local authorities who allegedly abuse their 

authority under the Law on Belief and Religion. 

United Nations Human Rights Reviews 

In January 2019, at Vietnam’s third Universal Periodic Review before 

the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, several country delegations, including the United States, advised the government of 

Vietnam to remove the mandatory registration requirements from the 

Law on Belief and Religion to comply with international human rights 

standards. In March, the UN Human Rights Committee’s concluding 

observations in its review of Vietnam’s record under the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) expressed concern 

that unregistered and unrecognized religious groups face harassment, surveillance, pressure to renounce their faith, and seizure or 

destruction of property and houses of worship. The Committee also 

recommended that the government prosecute members of the Red 

Flag Associations involved in attacks against Catholics and other 

religious minorities. In September, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc 

announced that his government would study the Committee’s recommendations and take steps to improve implementation of the ICCPR. 

In addition, the UN Secretary General’s report about intimidation and 

reprisals highlighted incidents from Vietnam, including the imposition 

of a travel ban on Bui Thi Kim Phuong, wife of Nguyen Bac Truyen, 

before her planned departure to Germany and the United States to 

advocate on her husband’s behalf.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States and Vietnam have close economic and defense 

relationships and regularly cooperate on maritime security and humanitarian aid. In May 2019, during the 23rd U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights 

Dialogue in Hanoi, U.S. diplomats raised concerns with Vietnamese 

officials about religious freedom conditions and individual prisoners of 

conscience. Vietnamese authorities prevented Hua Phi—subdignitary 

of the independent Cao Dai—from meeting with the U.S. delegation. 

In July, as part of the second Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom 

hosted by the State Department, President Donald J. Trump met 

with two victims of religious persecution from Vietnam: Luong Xuan 

Duong, a Cao Dai practitioner, and A Ga, a Montagnard Evangelical 

pastor. Also in July, the U.S. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board cancelled the state-affiliated Cao Dai Overseas Missionary’s trademark 

registration for the official name of the Cao Dai religion, which had 

undermined temples affiliated with the independent Cao Dai.

USCIRF has recommended that Vietnam be designated as a CPC 

every year since 2002. The U.S. Department of State had designated 

Vietnam as a CPC in 2004 and entered into a binding agreement 

with the government under IRFA. When the State Department lifted 

the CPC designation in 2006, USCIRF concluded it was too soon to 

determine if progress on religious freedom would endure. 
48 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

AFGHANISTAN

• Include Afghanistan on the State 

Department’s Special Watch List for 

engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to 

the International Religious Freedom Act 

(IRFA), and continue to designate the 

Taliban and ISKP as “entities of particular 

concern” for engaging in systematic, 

ongoing, and egregious violations of 

religious freedom, as defined by IRFA;

• Ensure that protections for freedom of 

religion or belief are integrated into any 

future negotiations between the Taliban 

and Afghan government, emphasizing 

to Afghan political leadership the close 

relationship between religious freedom 

and overall security;

• Integrate religious freedom concerns, 

including the protection of houses of 

worship, into assistance and training 

programs focused on countering terrorism, resolving sectarian conflict, and 

bolstering law and order funded by the 

State Department, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), the 

Millennium Challenge Corporation, and 

the U.S. Department of Defense; and

• Encourage the Afghan Ministries of 

Education, Information and Culture, and 

Hajj and Religious Affairs to ensure that 

textbooks and curricula do not propagate intolerant teachings that denigrate 

religious minorities and work to facilitate 

cooperation between faith leaders and 

scholars of all religions in Afghanistan to 

foster societal religious tolerance.

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Appropriate funding specifically for 

the protection of freedom of religion or belief in Afghanistan and 

continue oversight activities of these 

expenditures and related programs 

in conjunction with the Special 

Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction. 

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Afghanistan continued to trend negatively amid the country’s ongoing political 

instability and civil war. Lack of security remains the primary 

challenge to protecting the freedom of religion or belief in the 

country. Despite peace talks between the U.S. government and 

the Taliban, ongoing attacks by extremist groups, most notably 

the Taliban and Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), not only 

threatened Afghanistan’s overall stability but also endangered 

Shi’a Muslims in particular. Terrorist attacks against the Shi’a community, targeting its leadership, neighborhoods, festivals, and 

houses of worship, have intensified in recent years, with this trend 

continuing in 2019. These terrorist attacks against religious minority 

communities mirror broader concerns with the ongoing problem of 

terrorism directed against Afghan civilian, government, and military 

targets. In October 2019, the United Nations Assistance Mission 

in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported comparable levels of civilian 

casualties in 2019 as in the previous year (8,239), the majority of 

which were a result of attacks by nonstate actors. Throughout the 

year, terrorist attacks in Afghanistan intensified due to opposition 

to the U.S.-Taliban peace negotiations and violence linked to the 

September 2019 presidential election, a flashpoint for conflict 

within Afghan society. 

In recent years, Afghanistan has made efforts to address 

inequalities facing religious minority communities. Since the fall of 

the Taliban government, Shi’a Muslims’ sociopolitical standing has 

improved, with members of the community holding key positions in 

government, media, and private industry. Hindus and Sikhs have been 

represented in parliament since 2016 with a reserved seat and some 

have been employed in government service. In November 2019, the 

Afghan government also instituted visa-free travel for Afghan-origin 

Sikhs and Hindus currently residing in India. Despite such efforts, the 

small communities of religious minorities—including Hindus, Sikhs, 

Christians, Ahmadi Muslims, and Baha’is, who experienced egregious 

human rights violations under Taliban rule—remained endangered, 

without the ability to observe their faith publicly for fear of violent 

reprisal by terrorist groups or society at large. 

The Afghan government has taken some steps to improve 

security for religious minorities in recent years, such as increasing the presence of security forces in Shi’a neighborhoods and 

authorizing the arming of Shi’a civilians under police authority 

during festivals such as Ashura. In part due to these efforts, 

there has been a decline in terrorist attacks against Shi’a religious festivals. However, the government’s lack of control over 

the entirety of the country’s territory, ongoing problems with 

corruption, and security forces’ lack of capacity in the areas the 

government does control hampered the overall effectiveness of 

these efforts. According to a January 2019 special report by the 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, the 

government had direct control over territory representing only 

63.5 percent of the total Afghan population. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Hearing: Protecting Houses of Worship and Holy Sites

• Country Update: Promoting Religious Freedom in Afghanistan 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 49

AFGHANISTAN

Background

Afghanistan has a diverse array of ethnic groups, including Pashtuns 

(42 percent), Tajiks (27 percent), Hazaras (9 percent), Uzbeks (9 percent), Turkmen (3 percent), and Baloch (2 percent). Historically, the 

nation also had a religiously diverse population; however, the vast 

majority of non-Muslims fled the country after the Taliban consolidated control of the government in 1996. The Hindu and Sikh 

population, for example, dropped from 220,000 in the early 1990s to 

just around 1,000 today. Afghanistan’s current population is approximately 99.7 percent Muslim (84.7–89.7 percent Sunni and 10–15 

percent Shi’a, including Ismailis), with non-Muslims (Hindus, Sikhs, 

Baha’is, Christians, Buddhists, Zoroastrians, and others) comprising 

the remaining 0.3 percent.

Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution recognizes Islam as the official 

state religion and requires all parliamentary laws to respect Islamic 

principles and educational curricula to be based on the Islamic faith. 

Moreover, the constitution requires the courts to rely on Hanafi Shari’a 

jurisprudence in the absence of governing constitutional or legal provisions, which has the effect of criminalizing blasphemy (subject to the 

death penalty), apostasy, and proselytizing by non-Muslims. A vaguely 

worded media law also criminalizes “anti-Islamic content” with its 

enforcement delegated to a commission of government officials and 

journalists. The constitution does provide that non-Muslims are free 

to perform their “religious rituals” but “within the bounds of law,” 

which allows for laws limiting their religious practices in violation of 

international human rights standards. 

Violence by Nonstate Actors

Terrorist groups continued to operate in the country following the 

2001 U.S. military invasion, launching attacks against a wide range 

of U.S., Afghan government, and civilian targets, including religious 

minorities. In 2019, amid the ongoing antigovernment insurgency, the 

Taliban and ISKP, which emerged in 2015, continued attacks against 

religious minority communities, in particular Shi’a Hazara who were 

denounced as infidels and violently persecuted under Taliban rule. 

Recent attacks included an August 17, 2019, suicide bombing of a wedding reception of a Shi’a Hazara couple in Kabul, killing 63 people and 

wounding 182; the July 6, 2019, bombing of a Shi’a mosque in Ghazni, 

killing two people and wounding 20; a March 31, 2019, attack against 

a Shi’a shrine and cemetery in Kabul during Nowruz celebrations, 

killing six people and wounding 20; and a March 7, 2019, attack on a 

memorial service—held for a Hazara leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, who 

was killed by the Taliban in 1995—in a Shi’a Hazara neighborhood in 

Kabul, killing 11 people and wounding 95. 

The Afghan government’s ability to provide security for its citizens 

has been hampered by its limited control over the entirety of its sovereign territory. The government also possesses limited capacity within 

the territory it does control. This includes lack of government oversight 

over religious educational institutions, with nearly 100,000 of 160,000 

madrassas across the country remaining unregistered, according to the 

State Department’s 2018 Country Reports on Terrorism. The Ministry of 

Hajj and Religious Affairs reports that this lack of oversight has resulted 

in these institutions being used to propagate teachings in line with the 

Taliban’s extremist ideology and to serve as a key recruiting ground for 

extremist groups among vulnerable populations.

Other Concerns for Religious Minorities

Despite an expressed commitment to their homeland, many members of the dwindling non-Muslim communities have felt pressured 

to leave Afghanistan due to social, political, and economic discrimination, ongoing attacks by extremist groups, and the government’s 

perceived unwillingness to provide adequate security. A number of 

Sikh families have resorted to living in gurdwaras due to lack of available housing and faced restrictions on practicing Sikh funeral rites 

requiring cremation, an act opposed by local Muslim communities. 

Despite the government not restricting religious minorities from constructing houses of worship, Hindus—as well as Christians—have also 

abandoned visually distinctive houses of worship in favor of plain, nondescript buildings to avoid potential reprisals from extremist groups. In 

2007, the General Directorate of Fatwas and Accounts of the Supreme 

Court declared the Baha’i faith to be blasphemous. The Baha’i community has lived in secret since this ruling. 

Key U.S. Policy

The U.S. government has been heavily engaged with Afghanistan 

since 2001 through varying military, counterterrorism, economic, and 

humanitarian assistance programs. While Afghanistan has remained 

a central focus of U.S. policy in South Asia, the Trump administration 

has expressed its desire to withdraw the remaining 14,000 U.S. troops 

in the country. In pursuit of this goal, the United States’ priority in 

2019 was the difficult peace negotiations with Taliban leadership in 

Doha, Qatar, resulting in a peace agreement signed in late February 

2020. The Afghan government, however, was not invited to any of 

the numerous rounds of talks during 2019 as the Taliban refused to 

negotiate with Afghan political leadership until a U.S. withdrawal 

deal has been reached. During the talks between U.S. and Taliban 

representatives, U.S. negotiators, led by U.S. Special Representative 

for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad, focused their efforts on U.S. counterterrorism interests. They sought to ensure that the Taliban severs 

ties with al Qaeda and that Afghanistan does not again become a 

base of operations for international terrorist groups. Little had been 

said publicly about any discussion of guarantees for the protection 

of religious freedom in these negotiations. In December 2019, the 

State Department designated both the Taliban and ISKP as “entities 

of particular concern” for engaging in particularly severe religious 

freedom violations.
50 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

ALGERIA

• Include Algeria on the U.S. Department 

of State’s Special Watch List for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of 

religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Encourage U.S. Embassy officials to 

meet with the Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups to clarify and assess 

its process for reviewing and approving 

registration and permits for houses of 

worship; and

• Condition future cultural exchange 

programs between the United States 

and Algeria on the improvement of religious freedom conditions and related 

human rights.

I

n 2019, Algeria escalated its ongoing repression of religious 

minorities. The government systematically cracked down on the 

Evangelical Protestant community in particular through a string 

of church closures and raids, including two of the largest Protestant 

churches in the country. The current crackdown mirrors the scale 

of past waves of church closures in 2008 and 2011, and has been 

ongoing since November 2017 and worsened in 2019. Officials have 

made arbitrary demands that churches cease all religious activities, 

accusing them of violating safety regulations, operating illegally, or 

evangelizing, or giving them other justifications for sealing off their 

places of worship. 

The Algerian government forcibly closed three of the country’s 

largest Protestant churches in October 2019. The Association of 

Protestant Churches of Algeria (L’Eglise Protestant d’Algerie, or 

EPA) has not been permitted to register officially since the Law 

on Associations came into effect in 2012 and required churches to 

reapply for official authorization. The EPA currently represents 45 

churches in Algeria, many of which have been targeted for closure 

over the past two years—in particular in the Tizi Ouzou and Béjaia 

provinces. In 2019, USCIRF met with EPA leadership, who reported 

that 12 of their member churches remained closed by authorities at 

the end of the reporting period.

The government of Algeria systematically restricts non-Muslims’ ability to register, operate houses of worship, proselytize, 

and practice their faith in other ways. Passed in 2006, Algeria’s 

Ordinance 06-03 places unique limitations on non-Muslims’ freedom 

of religion or belief. It requires non-Muslim religious groups to register formally with the National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious 

Groups, which reportedly meets rarely and has not issued permits 

for any churches. Ordinance 06-03 also limits proselytization by 

prohibiting anyone from “shaking the faith of a Muslim.” Executive 

Decrees 07-135 and 07-158 further elaborated on the responsibilities 

of the National Commission for Non-Muslim Religious Groups and 

limitations on religious activities of non-Muslims. These laws are 

actively used to arrest and charge individuals for proselytism, or for 

transporting or possessing religious objects such as Bibles.

The Algerian government further discriminates against 

minority communities that do not conform to mainstream Sunni 

Islam, such as Shi’a and Ahmadi Muslims, often asserting that they 

are not Muslim. In addition to placing specific restrictions on these 

communities, the government also exerts control over the Sunni 

Muslim majority. It directly hires and trains imams and places speech 

restrictions on religious leaders. Under the Penal Code, authorities 

may fine or imprison anyone who preaches in a mosque or other 

public place without being appointed or authorized, or anyone who 

preaches “against the noble mission of the mosque” to “undermine 

social cohesion” or who advocates for such preaching. In 2019, the 

government further closed civic space by arresting and intimidating 

human rights defenders, restricting free assembly, and constraining 

journalists and the media.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Special Report: Apostasy, Blasphemy, and Hate Speech Laws in Africa

• Press Release: USCIRF Alarmed over Systematic Church Closures in Algeria
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 51

ALGERI

Background

A

Algeria is a presidential republic and its state religion is Islam; the 

government often penalizes those who do not conform to the 

state-endorsed interpretation of Islam. The population is estimated 

to be 99 percent Sunni Muslim, with the remaining 1 percent of 

the population comprising Jews, Ahmadi Muslims, Shi’a Muslims, 

Catholics, Methodists, Anglicans, Coptic Christians, and other 

communities. The Christian community of Algeria includes Roman 

Catholics, Seventh-Day Adventists, Methodists, members of the 

EPA, Lutherans, the Reformed Church, Anglicans, and an estimated 

1,000 to 1,500 Egyptian Coptic Christians. Algeria’s Jewish community mostly fled following popular riots and government persecution 

after the country gained independence in 1962, and the government has made little progress on its 2014 commitment to reopen 

synagogues it seized between 1967 and 1968, many of which were 

converted to mosques or churches. Baha’i activities in Algeria have 

been banned by law since 1969.

Following sustained popular protests that began in February 

2019, the president of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, resigned on April 

2. Bouteflika had been president since 1999, when he ran as an independent candidate supported by Algeria’s military. He was replaced 

on April 9, 2019, by Interim President Abdelkader Bensalah, the leader 

of Algeria’s upper house of parliament. In December 2019, Algerians 

elected Abdelmadjid Tebboune president. Tebboune was a member 

of several of then President Bouteflika’s former cabinets and faces 

ongoing pressure from protestors to rout corruption and manage the 

strong influence of Algeria’s military. 

Algeria limits the free expression and practice of belief through 

the enforcement of laws that favor Islam specifically and restrict religious activities. Article 144 Section 2 of the Criminal Code and article 

77 of the Information Code of 1990 prohibit blasphemy against Islam 

and other “heavenly religions.” The punishment for blasphemy in 

Algeria includes imprisonment for up to five years and a fine of up 

to 100,000 Algerian dinars ($829). Article 26 of the Criminal Code 

censors publications by prohibiting content that is “contrary to Islamic 

morals, national values, [or] human rights, or which defends racism, 

fanaticism, or treason.” 

Closure of Protestant Churches

On October 15, the government forcibly closed three EPA churches 

in Tizi Ouzou Province, including the two with the country’s largest 

congregations: the Church of the Full Gospel of Tizi Ouzou, headed 

by Pastor Salah Chalah, who is also the head of the EPA; and the 

Source of Life Church in Makouda, led by Pastor Nourredine Benzid. 

Police violently beat and removed Pastor Salah and other congregants during their afternoon worship service before sealing off the 

church building. Other churches in Tizi Ouzou, Tigzirt, Boghni, Ighzer 

Amokrane, Akbou, and Boudjima have faced similar notices and closures. Congregants have tried to protest through sit-ins or appeals 

to authorities to stop the closures, and some have reportedly been 

arrested or detained for protesting.

Blasphemy Charges and Treatment of 

Muslim Minorities

The government particularly restricts the Ahmadi community 

in Algeria—estimated to have around 2,000 followers—through 

Ordinance 06-03 and blasphemy provisions. In 2019, at least three 

Ahmadis appealed charges from 2017 for crimes such as insult to Islam, 

illegal association, or illegal fundraising. In November, a European 

Parliament resolution called for “an end to violations of the freedom of 

worship of Christians, Ahmadis, and other religious minorities” in the 

country. More than 315 Ahmadis have stood trial in Algeria between 

June 2016 and March 2018, often on charges of insulting Islam or collecting donations without a license. Ahmadis have reported hundreds 

of arrests and prosecutions over the past three years.

Key U.S. Policy

The U.S. maintains close relations with Algeria focused on security 

and counterterrorism, economic ties, and cultural and educational 

programs. In January 2019, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and 

Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdelkader Messahel convened

the fourth session of the U.S.-Algeria Strategic Dialogue to discuss 

these issues. Algeria is an important U.S. partner for regional stability 

in North Africa and the Sahel. U.S. foreign aid to Algeria is focused 

on supporting economic growth, counterterrorism, and educational 

exchange. The U.S. government also supported humanitarian efforts 

in Algeria in 2019, including $2 million through the Food for Peace

program for Sahrawi refugees in Algeria. During the year, multiple 

U.S. officials raised religious freedom concerns with the government 

of Algeria, including the situation of church closures. In October 2019, 

Representative Steven Lynch (D-MA) led a congressional delegation 

to the country to discuss economic issues and counterterrorism cooperation between Algeria and the United States.
52 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

AZERBAIJAN

• Include Azerbaijan on the U.S. Department of State’s Special Watch List for 

engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant 

to the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA);

• Work with the government of Azerbaijan to revise the 2009 religion law to 

comply with international human rights 

standards, and bring it into conformity 

with recommendations made in 2012 

by the Council of Europe’s Venice 

Commission and the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE); and

• Assist the government of Azerbaijan, 

in collaboration with international partners, to develop an alternative civilian 

service and permit conscientious 

objection pursuant to Azerbaijan’s 

commitment to the Council of Europe, 

obligations under international 

human rights law, and the Azerbaijani 

constitution.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Hold public hearings to investigate 

Azerbaijan’s religious freedom and 

broader human rights abuses, including its treatment of the Muslim Unity 

Movement; raise related concerns 

directly with the Azerbaijani Embassy 

and other government officials; and 

advocate for the release of all prisoners 

of conscience.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Azerbaijan trended positively, as the government largely ceased conducting raids on 

religious communities and similarly reduced its longstanding 

practice of detaining and fining individuals in connection with 

the unauthorized, peaceful practice of their religion or beliefs. In 

March 2019, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev issued a presidential 

pardon that resulted in the release of 51 political and religious prisoners. In another positive development, the State Committee for 

Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA) granted registration to 

31 Muslim communities and three Christian communities over the 

course of the year. Throughout the year, the Azerbaijani Embassy 

to the United States and other government officials continued to 

engage closely with USCIRF on religious freedom concerns.

Despite these improvements, the government continued to 

exert undue control and oversight over all religious communities 

and their activities. Government officials continued to manage 

and limit religious practices through the 2009 Law on Freedom 

of Religion and related articles of the administrative and criminal codes. Among other restrictions, the law requires religious 

communities to register with the government; criminalizes all 

unregistered religious activity; restricts religious activity to each 

community’s registered legal address; and requires state approval 

for the content, production, import, export, distribution, and 

sale of all religious literature. As a result, Christian communities 

and individuals reported limiting or conducting some of their 

religious activities in secret out of fear of a possible government 

crackdown. Although Azerbaijan’s constitution guarantees the 

right to alternative civilian service when mandatory military service 

conflicts with an individual’s convictions, the government has 

not provided an alternative service option and has prosecuted 

Jehovah’s Witnesses in the past for exercising their right to conscientious objection, charging them with “evading military service.” 

Additionally, the government has reportedly applied travel bans to 

some Jehovah’s Witness members, preventing them from leaving 

the country and leaving them no clear means to contest or appeal 

the bans.

Azerbaijan continued to imprison individuals in connection 

with their religious activities. According to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) tracking political prisoners in the country, as many 

as 45 religious activists remained incarcerated at the end of the 

year. Sardar Babayev, a Shi’a Muslim imam sentenced in 2017 for 

illegally leading Islamic ceremonies after having received a foreign 

religious education, remained imprisoned through the end of 2019. 

The majority of prisoners of conscience in Azerbaijan comprise 

members of the Muslim Unity Movement (MUM). A 2019 report 

by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 

highlighted the continued imprisonment of MUM leaders Taleh 

Bagirzade and Abbas Huseynov and noted that they and others 

associated with MUM had reported being tortured. In response to 

“unprecedented pressure” in early 2019, Bagirzade and Huseynov 

went on a hunger strike and were reportedly denied access to their 

lawyers and families. Local human rights activists maintained that 

the government had targeted and detained tens of individuals in 

connection with violence in the city of Ganja in 2018 as part of its 

effort to “start repressions against believers,” and they expressed 

concern that those detainees were also at risk for torture.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Commissioner delegation visit: Baku and Quba in February 2020

• Press Release: USCIRF Delegation Travels to Azerbaijan to Assess Religious Freedom Conditions

• Interview: Azerbaijani Government Continues to Restrict Freedom of Religion or Belief (in Turan)
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 53

AZERBAIJAN

Background

Approximately 96 percent of Azerbaijan’s estimated population of 

10.2 million people is Muslim. Although there are no recent statistics 

available, the government of Azerbaijan has generally held that 65 

percent of the Muslim population identifies as Shi’a Muslim and 35 

percent as Sunni Muslim. The remaining 4 percent of the population 

consists of Armenian Apostolics, atheists, Baha’is, Catholics, Georgian 

Orthodox, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Molokans, 

Protestants, and Russian Orthodox.

Azerbaijan is a secular state that stipulates the separation of state 

and religion in its constitution. Although the constitution protects the 

freedom of conscience and provides for the right to “profess individually or together with others any religion or to profess no religion, 

and to express and disseminate . . . beliefs concerning . . . religion,” 

the government has in practice limited such rights through the 2009 

Law on Freedom of Religion, the administrative code, and the criminal 

code. While the state formally prohibits discrimination on the basis of 

religion, Muslim women who wear the hijab have reported discrimination when seeking employment and claimed that the government 

maintains an unofficial ban on the hijab in government and schools.

Government Control of Religious Practice 

and Literature

In 2019, religious communities largely described improved religious 

freedom conditions and better relations with the government. 

Notwithstanding the reduction in state harassment, however, religious 

communities remained under both the constraints of existing laws that 

govern religious activity as well as the threat that government officials 

and law enforcement authorities could return to previous abusive practices. Some groups of Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Lutherans 

remained unable to register by the end of the year, and they characterized the registration process as onerous and arbitrary; in particular, a 

requirement that every religious community have at least 50 founding 

members proved exceptionally difficult for small communities outside 

the capital to achieve. Foreigners remained prohibited from engaging 

in “religious propaganda”—which has been understood to mean proselytization or missionary activity—without special permission.

A provision of the religion law confining a community’s religious 

activities to its legal, registered address continued to expose some 

communities to police intimidation. For example, in June police threatened two Jehovah’s Witnesses in L e

nk eran, ordering them not to host 

guests in their home, hold religious meetings in their home, or share 

their beliefs. In separate incidents in Xaçmaz and Baku in February and 

March, respectively, police officers brought Jehovah’s Witnesses to 

their local police stations for interrogation, threatened them, insulted 

their beliefs, and asked them why they did not instead speak to others about the Qur’an. In one instance, police officers reportedly told 

Jehovah’s Witnesses that they would be “exterminated.” 

The government continued to require that all religious literature and related materials receive the approval of the SCWRA and 

be marked with a holographic sticker, and it restricted the sale of 

religious literature to certain preapproved points of sale. Muslim 

theologian Elshad Miri, whose book Things Not Found in Islam was 

banned in 2018, sought to appeal the ban at the Supreme Court, but 

it rejected his appeal in June 2019. In September, a court fined Kamran 

Huseynzade for the unauthorized sale of religious books outside 

of a Baku mosque. According to the NGO Forum 18, the SCWRA 

stated that the books in question were “suspected of propagating 

religious radicalism and extremism,” but it later dropped that claim. 

Similarly, regional courts in Şirvan and Ş eki rejected appeals against 

fines that were related to the unapproved distribution and possession 

of religious books by Baptists and others. During the year, courts also 

rejected appeals concerning “illegal” religious meetings.

Religious Prisoners

In November 2019, the Working Group on a Unified List of Political 

Prisoners in Azerbaijan released its updated list, which classified 45 

prisoners as religious activists—marking a decline in the total number of religious prisoners from the previous year. The majority of such 

prisoners continued to consist of MUM members, whom the government has imprisoned on dubious charges and sentenced to prison 

terms ranging as high as 20 years. In March, Turkey extradited MUM 

member Anar Jabbarov to Azerbaijan in a manner that human rights 

defenders have characterized as illegal, and it reportedly planned to 

do the same with alleged MUM member Elnur Mehdiyev. According 

to media outlets, Jabbarov was released without charges in April.

In December, the PACE adopted a resolution on political prisoners in Azerbaijan. The report the resolution was based on specifically 

raised the continued imprisonment of MUM leaders Taleh Bagirzade 

and Abbas Huseynov and cited “the authorities’ clear hostility towards 

and prior attempts to repress [their] political/religious activities.”

Religious prisoner and Shi’a Muslim imam Sardar Babayev, who 

was sentenced in 2017 to three years in prison for leading Friday prayers 

despite having received a foreign religious education in Iran, remained 

imprisoned throughout 2019. He was released upon the completion of 

his sentence in February 2020, after the reporting period.

Key U.S. Policy

The bilateral relationship between the United States and Azerbaijan 

focuses on European energy security, trade and investment, and joint 

efforts to combat terrorism and transnational threats. The United 

States is also a cochair, together with France and Russia, of the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk 

Group, which seeks the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 

conflict. While the United States continued to provide assistance to 

Azerbaijan for security, economic development, and civil society 

development, it has in recent years increased military aid with the 

purported intent of countering Iran.

In July 2019, Azerbaijan participated for the first time in the 

annual Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom hosted by the U.S. 

Department of State. SCWRA Chairman Mubariz Gurbanli attended 

and met with Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 

Freedom Samuel D. Brownback. At the conclusion of the ministerial, 

Azerbaijan signed on to four of the nine Statements of Concern, but 

declined to sign on to the statement on “Counterterrorism as a Pretext 

for the Repression of Religious Freedom.” 
54 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF 

COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE

Azerbaijan does not meet the threshold necessary to be included 

in this report. As I have said before: it is a country where Sunni and 

Shi’a clerics pray together, where Evangelical and Russian Orthodox 

Christians serve together, and where thriving Jewish communities 

enjoy freedom and total security in their almost entirely Islamic country. It is a Muslim-majority country that has hosted prominent Hindu 

leaders and it is a Shi’a majority neighbor of Iran whose commitment 

to peace led it long ago to forge a vibrant, public, and diplomatic relationship with the state of Israel. Azerbaijan has had the challenge of 

bringing religious freedom into a post-Soviet legal framework, but—

even in this—it has achieved much more than any of its neighbors. 

The religious freedom community would also be wise to not arbitrarily 

disregard the government’s concerns about violent, religious extremism and its national security. Finally, I also join with religious leaders 

throughout the world in the prayer that one day soon the governments 

of Azerbaijan and Armenia will find a way to address the grievances 

and injustices between them in pursuit of true peace.

AZERBAIJAN

56 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

BAHRAIN

• Include Bahrain on the U.S. Department 

of State’s Special Watch List for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of 

religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Publish an updated assessment of 

Bahrain’s compliance with the Bahrain 

Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) 

report, with particular focus on recommendation 1724a, relating to censorship 

of beliefs, and recommendation 1722d, 

relating to the detention of prisoners 

incognito; and

• Continue to provide guidance and 

training for Bahrain’s security services to 

prepare for Ashura observances in ways 

that protect observers’ religious freedom rights and minimize the potential 

for the outbreak of violence.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Continue to conduct periodic fact-finding missions and congressional 

delegation trips to Bahrain to assess 

religious freedom conditions there; and

• Highlight in religious freedom and 

human rights-related hearings and other 

official proceedings Bahrain’s treatment 

of Shi’a Muslims.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Bahrain remained similar 

to previous years, trending positive in some areas but remaining 

the same in others. The government generally continued to allow 

freedom of worship for religious minorities. In November, the King 

Hamad Global Centre for Peaceful Coexistence hosted a conference on education and tolerance, and in December it hosted the 

Arabian International Religious Freedom Roundtable, which USCIRF 

attended. At the same time, Bahrain continued its ongoing and 

systematic discrimination against some Shi’a Muslims on the basis 

of their religious identity. While they are generally free to worship, 

Shi’a Bahrainis have long faced difficulties in an array of areas, 

including employment, political representation, freedom of expression, promotion within the military, and mosque construction. In 

2019, Bahraini authorities interrogated religious leaders about 

their sermons and restricted Shi’a prisoners’ religious practice. 

Some laws premised on protecting Bahraini security lack clarity 

to ensure they cannot be used to target Shi’a Muslims, and laws 

restricting speech on social media have the effect of encouraging 

self-censorship among Shi’a Muslims in particular. 

One of Bahrain’s most troubling instruments of discrimination 

has been collective citizenship revocations. In April 2019, Bahrain 

stripped citizenship en masse from 138 Shi’a Muslims in a single 

trial based on alleged links to Iran. Since 2012, the government 

has applied this punitive measure to more than 990 Bahrainis, the 

vast majority of whom are Shi’a Muslims. United Nations (UN) High 

Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet expressed alarm

over the mass revocation. Bahraini authorities also have deported 

some of those individuals as security threats, but have not always 

substantiated such claims. Following international pressure, King 

Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa reinstated citizenship to 550 Bahrainis in 

late April. This mass reinstatement, while undoubtedly a positive 

development, indicates that there were insufficient threats to justify 

the revocations in hundreds of cases. 

Bahrain is the only Gulf country to recognize the Shi’a Muslim 

commemoration of Ashura as a government holiday. In 2019, the 

government showed some improvement in allowing Shi’a Muslims 

to observe Ashura publicly, including deploying social service police 

rather than riot police to keep order, holding meetings between 

government officials and the heads of matams (ritual mourning 

spaces), and refraining from using tear gas and other violent measures like in previous years. However, during the Ashura season, the 

government summoned at least 20 religious leaders regarding the 

content of their sermons and prayers, and it restricted Ashura ritual 

processions to designated areas. Government officials also warned 

against speech during the holiday that would harm civic peace or 

disturb the social fabric.

In August 2019, 600 inmates at Jaw and Dry Dock prisons began 

a hunger strike. Shi’a prisoners participating in the strike demanded, 

among other things, their right to practice religious rituals. While 

intervention from Bahrain’s National Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) 

alleviated some restrictions, others remained in place. Certain prisoners remained prohibited from commemorating Ashura altogether, 

including Hajer Mansoor, the mother-in-law of Bahraini dissident 

Sayed al-Wadaei, who also was denied access to religious materials. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Commissioner delegation visit: Manama in March 2019

• Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Bahrain in 2019
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 57

BAHRAI

N

Background

According to Bahrain’s constitution, Islam is the religion of the state 

and Shari’a is a principal source for legislation. The constitution provides for freedom of conscience, the inviolability of places of worship, 

and freedom to perform religious rites. Of the country’s population 

of approximately 1.4 million, slightly less than half are Bahraini citizens, with a small majority comprising expatriate workers, primarily 

from South and Southeast Asia. The majority of Bahraini citizens are 

Shi’a Muslims. Bahraini authorities have cited Iran’s ongoing efforts 

to expand its influence in the country as the reason for heightened 

government concern about subversive activity by Iranian-backed Shi’a 

militants. While Iran’s support for such activities has been documented 

widely, the Bahraini government has sometimes used this pretext to 

crack down on Shi’a opposition leaders, clerics, and activists, without 

consistently substantiating charges of subversion or terrorist activity.

In 2011, Bahraini citizens protested in public spaces, including 

Pearl Roundabout in Manama, calling for political reforms. While the 

government initially allowed these protests to take place, it eventually 

cracked down with the assistance of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, 

killing scores of protestors, demolishing dozens of Shi’a mosques, and 

destroying the roundabout itself. In June 2011, King Hamad established 

the BICI to investigate these events; the commission released its report 

along with a set of 26 recommendations in a live televised event in 

November 2011. Bahrain’s government committed to implementing 

those reforms, and it announced full implementation in 2016. However, 

a June 2016 State Department assessment challenged that conclusion 

and noted that “more work remains to be done.” 

Treatment of Non-Muslims 

Bahrain’s treatment of non-Muslim minorities is generally respectful of 

their freedom of worship. Approximately half of the expatriate workers 

in Bahrain are non-Muslim. The government officially recognizes 19 

religious entities, including more than a dozen Christian denominations, a small Jewish community, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Baha’is. 

In June 2019, the first Jewish prayer service held in a synagogue in 

Bahrain in over 70 years took place on the sidelines of the American 

“Peace to Prosperity” conference hosted in Manama. Christians in 

Bahrain comprise 14.5 percent of the population. There are several 

churches representing Catholic, Anglican, Evangelical, Orthodox, 

and nondenominational communities, among others. Bahrain hosts 

the seat of the Catholic Vicarate of Northern Arabia, which includes 

Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. A third Catholic church under construction, Our Lady of Arabia, will be the largest Catholic church in the 

Gulf region upon its completion, scheduled for 2021.

Ashura in Bahrain 2019

Ahead of Ashura in 2019, Interior Minister General Rashid bin Abdullah 

Al Khalifa met with the heads of matams before the holiday, and on 

September 3 said that Bahrain would respect freedom of worship. 

Head of General Security Major General Tariq bin Hassan al-Hassan 

also visited local police officials to ensure proper preparations for 

Ashura processions. Bahrain allowed traditional Ashura processions 

in 2019 and, unlike previous years, did not use tear gas or other violent 

forms of crowd control. However, security forces summoned multiple 

clerics over the content of their religious sermons. In at least 17 cases, 

Bahraini security officials removed religious banners and signs associated with the observance of Ashura.

Treatment of Shi’a Bahrainis in Prison

Shi’a Bahrainis who advocate for greater freedom of religion in 

Bahrain, including activist Nabeel Rajab, have been thrown in prison 

for criticizing government policy on social media. In August 2019, 600 

prisoners at Jaw and Dry Dock prisons joined a hunger strike to appeal 

for better treatment. Among their demands was the right to participate in religious rituals and to be housed near prisoners with the same 

religious affiliation in order to better facilitate group prayer. Following 

intervention by Bahrain’s National Institute for Human Rights (NIHR), 

prison officials doubled the allotted time for prisoners’ Ashura observance. However, prisoners in Isa Town Prison and Jaw Prison were 

allegedly prohibited from commemorating Ashura in groups, and 

prison authorities—who appealed to security concerns regarding 

large prisoner gatherings—restricted the times in which they were 

allowed to conduct their commemorations. Shi’a prisoners also were 

denied access to religious books. USCIRF has expressed concern 

that Bahraini prisons have barred dissemination of many Shi’a Muslim 

religious texts ahead of Muharram, the month in which Ashura falls.

Key U.S. Policy

The Trump administration has prioritized a close defense relationship with Bahrain in order to counter Iran’s influence in the region 

and its attempts to destabilize Bahrain. Following a February 

2019 meeting between then U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 

Commander Joseph Votel and Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad, the 

United States and Bahrain concluded several major arms agreements. 

Bahrain also hosted the June “Peace to Prosperity” workshop on an 

Israeli-Palestinian final status plan. In July, at the State Department’s 

Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, Bahraini Foreign Minister 

Khaled bin Ahmed Al Khalifa met with Israeli Foreign Minister Israel 

Katz, the first-ever public meeting between officials from those two 

countries. In December, Bahrain also hosted Sephardic Chief Rabbi 

of Jerusalem Shlomo Amar at a regional meeting of the International 

Religious Freedom Roundtable in Manama.

Although the United States and Bahrain enjoy a close defense 

relationship, Congress has continued to express concerns about 

freedom of religion or belief in the country. A bipartisan delegation 

of members of the House of Representatives visited Bahrain in late 

December 2019. During Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad’s visit to the 

White House in September 2019, Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL), Ronald 

Wyden (D-OR), and Christopher Murphy (D-CT) released a bipartisan 

letter to President Donald J. Trump noting that they were “concerned 

by the government of Bahrain’s concerted efforts to silence peaceful 

opposition and quash free expression.” This statement addressed 

broader human rights issues, but it also included the banning of Shi’a 

Muslim-majority political parties and the issuance of a life sentence 

against Shi’a Muslim Sheikh Ali Salman.
58 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF 

COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE

The Kingdom of Bahrain does not meet the threshold to be included in 

this report. It is a country whose struggle against Iranian intervention 

and terrorism (often cleverly and intentionally disguised in a religious 

context) has been given too little regard by the international community and it is a country whose unique and historic pluralism, still 

unrivaled in the region, has been given too little credit. Moreover, 

Bahrain’s commitment to social harmony has not just been an internal 

matter, it has also become an integral part of its foreign policy through 

courageous efforts—direct and indirect—to promote interfaith tolerance and to facilitate peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, 

especially in 2019. Sure, Bahrain remains imperfect, but these days it 

is far more worthy of immense praise, than of withering criticism. It 

should absolutely be removed from USCIRF’s Annual Report, a decision that should have been made long ago.

BAHRAIN

60 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

• Include CAR on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International 

Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

• Establish a high-level panel on human 

rights protection with international stakeholders and CAR authorities to:

• monitor religious freedom violations 

and the proliferation of hate speech, in 

particular ahead of elections;

• support peace and reconciliation 

efforts such as expanding interfaith 

dialogues; and

• contribute to improving the human 

rights training of official security actors; 

• Fund programs that support both official 

and traditional justice processes, including CAR’s judiciary and Special Criminal 

Court (SCC); 

• Provide assistance to CAR authorities 

to undertake initiatives to ensure that 

Muslims have a future in the country, 

including by rebuilding destroyed 

mosques; ensuring Muslim participation in the upcoming 2020 elections 

and in government administration, 

security forces, and police units; and 

safeguarding sustainable returns of 

Muslim refugees and internally displaced 

persons (IDPs) to their homes; and 

• Increase funding for humanitarian assistance for refugees, IDPs, and returnees, 

and for rebuilding projects; and collaborate with humanitarian actors to collect 

data on religious demographics to 

protect religious freedom and minorities 

more effectively.

Religious freedom conditions in the Central African Republic 

(CAR) did not significantly improve in 2019, despite the 

government and 14 nonstate armed groups signing a new 

Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (also referred to as 

the “Khartoum Agreement”) on February 6. The agreement, which 

was a momentous effort with international support, includes a commitment to respect human rights, human dignity, and fundamental 

and religious freedoms. Nevertheless, armed groups continued 

to conduct violent attacks during the year, primarily in pursuit of 

control over pockets of CAR’s rich natural resources. At year’s end, 

armed groups maintained control over a majority of the territory of 

CAR. The government relied on United Nations (UN) peacekeepers in many areas, through the UN Multidimensional Integrated 

Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), to defend vulnerable 

civilians and attempt to prevent further violence. 

Thousands of Central Africans remained displaced due to the 

conflict over the past eight years, which involved militias organized 

in part along religious lines targeting entire communities for violence and persecution based on their religious beliefs. At the height 

of the conflict in 2013-14, militias committed abuses that a UN panel 

later deemed ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity against 

Muslims; 95 percent of the mosques were destroyed and 80 percent 

of the Muslim community fled CAR. Between June and August 

2019, CAR, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), and neighboring countries signed agreements on the 

facilitation of voluntary returns of refugees displaced in Cameroon, 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Congo. While some 

returns did begin, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 

reported returns of displaced Muslim communities in southern 

parts of CAR, vast numbers of refugees opted to stay abroad due 

to security risks. 

Although some positive steps were reported during the 

year following the peace agreement, including security sector 

reforms and the disarmament of some armed actors, violence 

and violations of the peace agreement continued. NGOs and the 

UN Panel of Experts on CAR reported new incidents of discrimination, mistreatment, and violence against civilians by armed 

groups and security actors based on perceived religious affiliation, although at lesser levels than in previous years. In a cycle of 

attacks in the Carnot area in January, fighters associated with the 

anti-balaka targeted a Muslim community. Militias also reportedly 

continued attempts to manipulate community sentiments about 

MINUSCA by promoting the narrative that the UN peacekeepers 

were anti-Muslim. Multiple attacks against civilians were reported

in April, resulting in the death, injury, and abduction of civilians. 

In a major series of attacks in May, the 3R armed group killed 

more than 50 people in the Ouham-Pendé region. In September, 

violent clashes between militias reportedly caused the further displacement of 13,000 people. The continued tensions, attacks, and 

the government’s reliance on MINUSCA to manage the conflict 

underscored the tenuous nature of the initial progress pursuant 

to the peace agreement.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Special Report: Apostasy, Blasphemy, and Hate Speech Laws in Africa

• Congressional Briefing: Silencing Religious Freedom in Africa: The Impact of Speech Restrictions
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 61

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Background

The population of CAR is estimated to be more than 5.9 million. Pew 

Research estimates that 89 percent of the population is Christian, and 

a minority of 9 percent is Muslim. Religious practice in CAR is syncretic, 

with many Christians and Muslims also incorporating traditional and 

other beliefs into their lives. 

Historic ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic tensions in the 

country were significantly amplified in 2013 with the overthrow of 

then President Francois Bozizé, a Christian, by predominantly Muslim 

Séléka militias. In the process, the militias perpetrated mass violence against non-Muslim populations, including Christian actors 

and churches, prompting the formation of mainly Christian armed 

groups known as anti-balaka. Anti-balaka conducted reprisal attacks 

on Muslim civilians, killing and displacing thousands. Some militias 

claimed to be representing the interests of a particular religious or 

ethnic group, and fomented division and violence among civilians. The 

U.S. Ambassador to the UN stated in 2015 that 417 of the country’s 

435 mosques were destroyed in the violence. A UN Commission of 

Inquiry report that investigated violence between 2013 and 2014 concluded that “although the Commission cannot conclude that there was 

genocide, ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population by the anti-balaka constitutes a crime against humanity.” Religious-based targeting 

and cycles of violence continued in subsequent years, although militias 

were largely focused on maintaining power through territorial and 

resource control, and blurred lines of religious affiliation. 

Due to the torrent of violence, hundreds of thousands of people 

were displaced, and by the end of the reporting period more than 

600,000 remained displaced within CAR. The peacekeeping force, 

MINUSCA, was deployed in 2014 and given a broad mandate that 

includes protecting civilians, reforming the security sector, improving 

rule of law, supporting the peace process and 2020 electoral process, 

and other efforts. It reported more than 14,000 personnel in 2019 and 

continues to be an essential provider of security. 

In December 2019, Bozizé, who was accused of incitement to 

genocide and supporting the anti-balaka militias, returned to CAR 

from exile and declared his desire to run for president in 2020. It 

remains unclear if the many Muslim refugees still living outside CAR 

will be able to vote in the elections. 

The Khartoum Agreement 

Signatories to the Khartoum Agreement committed to actions that 

would minimize separatism or the manipulation of religious and ethnic differences, and agreed to refrain immediately from “any form of 

propaganda, hate speech, and divisive discourse that makes reference 

to ethnic, regional, religious, or sectarian identity or that incites violence.” Although the agreement is the latest in a long list of attempts 

at peace deals over the past decade, it led to notable optimism and 

a reduction in violence. Nevertheless, NGOs continue to report a 

range of challenges with its implementation, and believe that the 

context remains extremely fragile. They note that Christians and 

Muslims continue to feel uncomfortable living next to each other in 

many areas, and much work remains to provide a path for the return 

of displaced Muslims and the rebuilding of properties and houses of 

worship destroyed during the height of the conflict.

While some religious actors were hopeful about the peace 

agreement, others were skeptical. Religious actors and communities 

continued to be active in interfaith and peacebuilding efforts, despite 

also being impacted negatively by violent events and limited in activity 

by security risks. In May, a Spanish missionary was brutally murdered 

in southwest CAR. Militias also continued attacking civilians, including an incident in May reportedly in retaliation for an attack on an 

ethnic Peuhl. This attack tested citizens’ confidence in the new peace 

agreement and resulted in swift condemnation from the international 

community. The UN reported weekly violations of the agreement.

Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation 

The SCC, a tribunal set up in CAR to help hold accountable human 

rights violators of the ongoing conflict, continued to face challenges in 

funding and staffing for most of the year. It also appeared to be stalled 

significantly in conducting its investigations. The SCC announced that 

it might conclude the examination of some of its first cases, and potentially begin trials, by the end of 2020. In December, the International 

Criminal Court (ICC) confirmed it was charging two anti-balaka militia 

leaders—Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaissona—with 

crimes against humanity that took place between 2013 and 2014. 

Crimes referenced included the displacement of Muslim populations 

from towns and neighborhoods, as well as the destruction and looting 

of Muslim houses and places of worship.

In tandem with achieving justice through formal and informal 

means, citizens also desire a broader truth and reconciliation process. The Khartoum Agreement committed parties to establish 

within 90 days a national Commission on Truth, Justice, Reparation, 

and Reconciliation (TJRRC), initially prescribed by the 2015 Bangui 

National Forum. The agreement also ordered a second interim commission to examine the conflict and begin community consultations. 

Consultations were launched in June and faced mixed reviews. 

Key U.S. Policy

U.S. Ambassador to CAR Lucy Tamlyn was sworn in on January 11, 

2019. Throughout the year, the United States provided a range of 

technical and financial assistance for humanitarian, peace, and security goals. More than $6 million was requested in FY 2020. The State 

Department continued to support MINUSCA, whose mandate was 

again extended until November 15, 2020. The United States provided 

$80,000 in support of the creation of the CAR Justice Sector Policy, 

which includes among its priorities transitional justice and human 

rights. In September, the UN eased the arms embargo on CAR in 

order to support the government’s stabilization efforts through the 

unanimous adoption of Resolution 2488 (2019). U.S. Ambassador to 

the UN Kelly Craft restated the United States’ commitment to bilateral support of CAR to achieve the implementation of the Khartoum 

Agreement. In May, U.S. Representative David Cicilline (D-RI) introduced H.Res.387 condemning the continued violence against civilians 

in CAR and recognizing the commission of atrocities based on perceived or actual ethnic or religious identities.
62 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

CUBA

• Maintain Cuba on the State Department’s 

Special Watch List for engaging in or 

tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International 

Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Cuban 

government agencies and officials 

responsible for severe violations of religious freedom—including Caridad Diego, 

head of the ORA—by freezing those 

individuals’ assets and/or barring their 

entry into the United States under human 

rights-related financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom 

violations;

• Ensure that programs that support 

independent journalism in Cuba are 

responsive in aiding journalists who 

face increased harassment as a result of 

reporting on religious freedom conditions; and

• Enable the processing of visas in Havana 

for religious leaders, along with activists 

and journalists who advocate for religious 

freedom protections, to facilitate their 

travel to the United States without requiring travel to a third country.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Cuba trended negatively. 

The new constitution adopted in April changed religious freedom 

protections, and the government aggressively targeted religious 

leaders who opposed these changes. While gathering information 

on religious freedom conditions in Cuba remains a challenge, a nongovernmental organization documented 260 cases of violations of 

freedom of religion or belief in Cuba in 2019, including harassments, 

arrests, and travel bans, up from 151 in 2018. Religious leaders who 

raised concern that the new constitution weakened religious freedom protections faced severe hostility and pressure leading up to 

the constitutional referendum in February. Tactics used to pressure 

religious leaders included repeated police summons and interrogations, threats of detention, and labeling religious leaders as 

“counterrevolutionaries.” Yoruba Priest Alexei Mora Montalvo went 

on a 15-day hunger strike to protest the harassment he and his family were experiencing leading up to the constitutional referendum.

The Office of Religious Affairs (ORA), an entity within the 

Cuban Communist Party (CCP) operating out of the Ministry of 

Justice (MOJ), continued to control religious activity tightly. The ORA 

requires religious organizations to apply to the MOJ for official registration. Membership or association with an unregistered religious 

group is a crime. The ORA exercises direct and arbitrary control 

over the affairs of religious organizations, requiring permission for 

virtually any activity other than regular worship services. High-level 

CCP officials utilize the permit system to meddle in the affairs of 

religious groups and coerce cooperation with government officials.

Beyond the constitutional process, the Cuban government 

employed persistent harassment and intimidation campaigns 

against religious leaders throughout 2019. Common tactics 

included threats, short-term detentions, travel restrictions, and 

violence against some religious leaders. Cuban authorities manipulated the laws to charge or threaten religious leaders with criminal 

and civil violations for peaceful religious activity and social work. 

During the reporting period, Pastor Alain Toledano Valiente of the 

Apostolic Movement was consistently summoned to the police 

station, accused of the crime of “disobedience,” and threatened 

with detention and confiscation of church property. The harassment was connected to his religious activities, including hosting 

events on the role of women and youth in society. After homeschooling their children based on a concern regarding Cuban 

schools’ promotion of socialism and atheism, Pastor Ramón Rigal 

and his wife Adya Expósito Leyva were convicted in April for “illicit 

association”—as their church is unregistered—and other charges, 

including acts against the normal development of their children. 

Expósito was released after the reporting period in March 2020. In 

December, the authorities threatened similar legal charges against 

parents Olainis Tejeda Beltrán and Lescaille Prebal, members of 

the Sephardic Bnei Anusim community, following harassment 

and physical assaults of their children at school that led to a ban 

on kippahs. There are an estimated 1,200 Jews in Cuba. As of 

November 2019, roughly 20 religious leaders had been arbitrarily 

prevented from leaving Cuba during the year. The ORA is effectively cutting off religious communities by increasingly blocking 

foreign visitors from visiting their coreligionists, while at the same 

time stopping religious leaders from leaving the island. Seven 

denominations broke off from the Cuban Council of Churches 

to form the Cuban Evangelical Alliance (CEA). CEA members 

were aggressively targeted during the constitutional process and 

continued to experience sustained harassment in reprisal for their 

constitutional advocacy and organization, including the denial of 

foreign visitors. Notably, Cuban authorities stopped four members 

of the CEA, along with another religious leader, from traveling to 

the United States for the Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom

hosted by the U.S. Department of State in July. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Policy Update: Religious Freedom in Cuba in 2019

• Press Statement: Cuba Preventing Religious Leaders from Attending International Religious Freedom Meeting

• Press Statement: Condemning Cuban Authorities’ Crackdown on Homeschooling Pastor and Wife
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 63

CUBA

Background

While there are no independent sources on religious demographics 

in Cuba, a reported 60–70 percent of Cuba’s population of an estimated 11.1 million self-identify as Catholic, while Protestants account 

for 5 percent. Approximately 25–30 percent identify as unaffiliated 

or another religion including syncretic religions (as well as Santería, 

Jehovah’s Witnesses, Methodists, Seventh-day Adventists, Anglicans, 

Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Muslims, Jews, Quakers, Moravians, and 

members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints). Cuba is a 

one-party system with no independent judiciary and where the state 

tightly controls religious institutions. A new constitution was adopted 

in April 2019 following so-called “public consultations” and a referendum. The new constitution maintains the one-party Communist 

system and changes protections for the freedom of religion or belief 

by removing the prior specific references to freedom of conscience 

and to changing religious beliefs. USCIRF will closely monitor the 

implementation of these new constitutional provisions to assess their 

impact on religious freedom. 

Alongside the constitution, the government uses a restrictive 

system of laws and policies, surveillance, and harassment to control 

religious groups and suppress the freedom of religion or belief. The 

ORA and other government authorities repressively enforce these 

restrictions to ensure tight control over religious leaders, members of 

religious communities, and others deemed threats to the Communist 

agenda due to their advocacy or support for religious freedom.

Denial of Religious Freedom for Activists and 

Independent Journalists 

The Cuban government frequently violated the religious freedom of 

prodemocracy and human rights activists during 2019. Independent 

journalists were targeted for documenting and reporting on religious 

freedom conditions. In the most severe cases, journalists, such as 

Roberto Jesus Quinones Haces and Ricardo Fernandez Izaguirre, were 

arrested. Additional tactics employed to intimidate journalists and other 

religious freedom activists include interrogations, legal harassment, 

and travel restrictions. Cuban authorities also denied human rights 

activists and journalists their right to freedom of religion or belief, often 

by blocking their access to religious services, including special religious 

events. Religious leaders faced pressure by government officials to 

expel members of their congregations involved in political activity or 

human rights advocacy, or labeled as “counterrevolutionaries.”

The most consistent and severe attempts to block activists from 

religious services were against the Ladies in White, the wives and 

relatives of dissidents imprisoned in 2003. Every Sunday during the 

reporting period, Cuban authorities detained Ladies in White on their 

way to Mass and other religious services. According to reports, members of the Ladies in White were often informed that they were being 

detained because they were not allowed to attend religious services. 

Restrictions on Religious Buildings

In Cuba, it is illegal to hold religious activities in buildings not 

dedicated for religious use. Religious organizations must receive 

permission from the ORA—which is rarely granted—for any renovation or construction of religious buildings. These restrictions, coupled 

with the growth in faith communities, have severely limited the right 

of many Cubans to worship in a community.

The Cuban government also used a 2005 law regulating house 

churches to impose complicated and repressive requirements on the 

estimated 2,000−10,000 private residences used as Protestant places 

of worship in Cuba. This law includes mandating registration according 

to strict procedures, such as the requirement that there cannot be 

two house churches of the same registered religious group within two 

kilometers of each other. The law also empowers authorities to supervise and control the religious activities of these groups. There were 

reports of frequent visits by state security agents to house churches. 

Unregistered religious groups could not apply to legalize the buildings 

used for religious services, and risked penalties for congregating in 

unauthorized buildings. 

In positive developments, in January the Catholic Church opened 

the first of three new churches to be built since the 1959 socialist 

revolution. After the ORA arbitrarily revoked the Maranatha Baptist 

Church’s permit to build a new church in April, the highest administrative and governing body of the CCP reversed the ORA’s decision 

in October. While this case demonstrates the high-level control the 

CCP exerts on the affairs of religious communities, it is positive that 

construction of the church is allowed to proceed.

Key U.S. Policy

The Trump administration’s policy toward Cuba is guided by the 

National Security Presidential Memorandum entitled “Strengthening 

the Policy of the United States toward Cuba,” issued in November 

2017. This policy focuses on the need for human rights, democracy, and 

free enterprise in Cuba. In 2019, the Trump administration imposed a 

series of sanctions against Cuba for its poor human rights record and 

its support of the Maduro government in Venezuela, including placing 

visa restrictions on former president and first secretary of the CCP 

Raúl Castro in September. Also, in September, the State Department 

issued a statement condemning violations of religious freedom in 

Cuba. Following unexplained health issues for U.S. diplomats and their 

families between 2016 and 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Havana began 

to operate with a permanently reduced staff and limited embassy 

operations, including the processing of visas. The State Department 

announced in March 2019 that it was eliminating the five-year multi-entry visa for Cubans and replacing it with a three-month single-entry 

visa. Most nonimmigrant visa applicants, including religious leaders 

traveling to the United States to meet with coreligionists or attend 

meetings on freedom of religion or belief, must now travel to a third 

country to obtain a visa, which is often prohibitively expensive, and 

in some cases particularly burdensome due to travel restrictions. On 

December 18, the State Department for the first time placed Cuba on 

its Special Watch List for severe violators of religious freedom.
64 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF 

COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE

In my estimation, Cuba should not be recommended by USCIRF for the 

State Department’s Special Watch List. It should be recommended for 

designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. Its actions 

continue to be ongoing, systematic, and egregious. 

CUBA

66 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

EGYPT

• Include Egypt on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging 

in or tolerating severe religious freedom 

violations pursuant to the International 

Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Explicitly dedicate a portion of 

resources, set aside as part of the U.S. 

efforts to train and equip Egyptian 

security forces to combat terrorism, for 

the protection of places of worship and 

other holy sites;

• Urge the Egyptian government to cease 

the longstanding practice of ceding legal 

authority to customary reconciliation 

councils to resolve incidents of sectarian 

mob violence, repeal decrees banning 

Baha’is and Jehovah’s Witnesses, remove 

religion from official identity documents, 

and pass laws consistent with article 53 of 

the constitution;

• Allocate a portion of U.S. assistance 

to U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs supporting 

efforts to reform public school curriculum 

and teacher training and to promote 

greater religious inclusivity throughout 

the country; and 

• Require the State Department to provide 

explicit justification for the release to 

Egypt of any previously withheld Foreign 

Military Financing (FMF), including 

public disclosure of its assessment and 

certification of Egypt’s progress toward 

improving human rights and religious 

freedom conditions.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Egypt continued to trend 

tentatively in a positive direction. The country saw a decrease in 

radical Islamist violence and anti-Christian mob attacks, some 

progress in implementing the registration process for unlicensed 

churches and related buildings, and the launch of a government 

program to address religious intolerance in rural areas. However, 

systematic and ongoing religious inequalities remain affixed in 

the Egyptian state and society, and various forms of religious bigotry and discrimination continued to plague the country’s Coptic 

Christians and other religious minorities.

In terms of positive trends, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and 

other high-ranking government officials continued to advocate 

publicly for religious inclusivity, including again attending Coptic 

Orthodox Christmas Mass in January and remarking during an Islamic 

holiday in June on the need for mutual respect between Muslims 

and Christians. Grand Imam Ahmed El-Tayeb of al-Azhar, Egypt’s 

renowned institution of Sunni Islamic learning, joined with Pope 

Francis and other religious leaders in signing a landmark statement 

on interfaith co-existence, “Document on Human Fraternity for World 

Peace and Living Together,” in Abu Dhabi in February. Egyptian government sources reported to USCIRF on the launch of a new program 

by the Supreme Committee for Confronting Sectarian Incidents to 

promote religious tolerance in sectarianism-plagued Minya Province, 

including a door-to-door messaging campaign in 44 villages. The 

Ministry of Education continued efforts, previously reported to 

USCIRF, to reform public school curriculum to eliminate intolerant 

references and promote inclusivity and respect, although how much 

progress the ministry made during 2019 was unclear. Several high-profile court cases resulted in the conviction of perpetrators of religiously 

motivated violence, including the April conviction of a police officer 

for killing two Coptic men in front of a church in Minya in late 2018. 

Other government initiatives sought to support efforts to revitalize 

several important non-Muslim religious heritage sites, including the 

completion of a project to restore the fourteenth-century Eliyahu 

Hanavi Synagogue in Alexandria as well as ongoing projects to restore 

Christian monasteries in the Sinai and Naga Hammadi. 

Despite those positive signs, religious discrimination remained 

pervasive, including a disparity in policies regarding places of worship, a lack of opportunities for non-Muslims to work in key areas of 

government service, state security harassment of former Muslims, 

and recurring incidents of anti-Christian violence, particularly in 

rural areas. In June in the village of Naga al-Ghafir in Sohag governorate, for example, Muslim rioters surrounded a Coptic Orthodox 

church, chanted sectarian slogans, and beat congregants with 

sticks. The violence led local security forces to close the church in 

direct violation of Law 80/2016, commonly known as the Church 

Building Law, which mandates the continuing operation of such 

facilities as they await approval for formal registration. Such violations have become commonplace; local government authorities 

have closed at least 25 churches and church-related facilities since 

the passage of the law in 2016, including three in 2019—one of 

which was reopened in January 2020—while the government has 

issued few permits for new churches in previously occupied residential areas. Instead, authorities have granted nearly all such permits 

or pledges in planned satellite cities rather than in Upper Egypt, 

where thousands of Christians have no local churches in which 

to worship, such as Copts in the Qena-area village of Faw Bahari 

whose de facto place of worship police shuttered in December.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 67

EGYPT

Background

Egypt’s constitution identifies Islam as the state religion and the 

principles of Shari’a as the primary source of legislation. While article 

64 of the constitution states that “freedom of belief is absolute,” 

only Muslims, Christians, and Jews can practice their religion publicly 

and build places of worship. Of the country’s estimated 104 million 

people, around 90 percent are Sunni Muslims, and non-Sunni Muslims, 

such as Shi’a Muslims, comprise less than 1 percent. An estimated 10 

percent are Christians, the majority of whom belong to the Coptic 

Orthodox Church; other Christians belong to various denominations 

that include Catholic, Anglican, Evangelical Protestant, Maronite, 

Armenian Apostolic, Greek and Syrian Orthodox, and others. There 

are at least 2,000 Baha’is, approximately 1,500 Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

and fewer than 20 Jews.

The Egyptian government continues to struggle with balancing 

domestic security, advancing economic development, and protecting 

citizens’ fundamental rights. Security forces have struggled to end 

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) activity in North Sinai, and the 

country faces active threats from Muslim Brotherhood-related radical 

Islamist groups, such as Hasm. Government authorities have used 

these real security threats as a pretense to repress civil society, harassing and imprisoning journalists, lawyers, and activists. In the most 

recent such wave of harassment, security forces raided the offices 

of Mada Masr—one of the last remaining independent news outlets in the country—just one day after they arrested and indefinitely 

detained Ramy Kamel, a prominent Coptic activist, and announced 

plans to try him on spurious charges. Such activities directly contradict the government’s assurances that it is working to improve 

conditions for civil society, including a highly touted reform of the 

Nongovernmental Organizations Law that was announced in August 

to mostly mixed-to-critical reactions. Kamel’s arrest illustrates that 

religious freedom—at the core of his activism in prior years—is an integral part of a broader context of human right and societal freedoms.

Implementation of the Church Building Law

In 2019, the Cabinet committee charged with implementing the registration of informal churches and church-related buildings under Law 

80/2016 made some limited progress in approving applications—a 

process for which Coptic Orthodox and Protestant leaders alike have 

expressed their support, including Pope Tawadros II. The committee 

had approved only 627 applications by the end of 2018; in 2019, it 

cleared an additional 725—bringing the total to 1,412 approved 

applications, or just over 25 percent of 5,515 currently in process. 

However, most of these approvals have been conditional, pending 

security, safety, and other forms of review; only around 200 church 

properties have received final approvals for registration. Furthermore, 

this progress has only taken place for preexisting, de facto churches, 

mainly for rural Christian communities that had no other access to local 

places of worship. The governing authorities have issued few to no 

permits for new churches in previously inhabited communities while 

shuttering around 25 churches since the passage of the law, including several in 2019. At its root, Law 80/2016 also avoids addressing 

the long-term, systematic disparity between religious communities. 

Muslim worshippers face no such registration restrictions, so even with 

the recent church approvals, there is approximately one mosque for 

every 820 Muslims and one church for every 2,430 Christians—roughly 

a 320 percent disparity.

Rural Sectarianism 

Anti-Christian mob attacks remain endemic in parts of rural Egypt 

despite a clear decline in the number of such incidents in 2019, but 

legal impunity for the perpetrators persisted as the systematic norm. 

Compared to eight mob attacks in 2018, only three were reported in 

2019, although each incident resulted in the usual impunity for attackers and two resulted in illegal church closures. In January, a mob forced 

the closure of an informal church in Manshiyet Zaafarana, Minya; a 

similar incident occurred in Sohag governorate in April, as noted previously. In June, rumors circulated in the village of Eshnein al-Nasara, 

Minya, that a Coptic man, Fady Youssef Todari, had posted comments 

critical of Islam on Facebook, resulting in a group of Muslims from 

the village attacking his family’s home. Police briefly detained several 

members of the victimized family and arrested Todari, and it is unclear 

whether he remains in detention. Furthermore, local authorities stood 

by as community leaders convened a “calming meeting” shortly after 

the incident—which, given the lack of any subsequent legal proceedings, implicitly absolved the attackers of responsibility. 

Key U.S. Policy

Bilateral relations between the United States and Egypt remained steady 

in 2019, a crucial partnership that has weathered countless challenges 

since its establishment following the Camp David Accords of 1979. U.S. 

financial assistance, mostly in the form of FMF, remained largely consistent at $1.4 billion in FY 2019 and an anticipated $1.38 billion for FY 2020. 

The administration of President Donald J. Trump has praised President 

El-Sisi’s efforts to counter radical Islamist violence and ideology and 

initiatives to improve religious freedom conditions in Egypt. The United 

States also announced in December $6 million in additional support 

through USAID to bolster educational and economic development 

programs in North Sinai. However, U.S. officials harshly criticized Egypt’s 

unfair imprisonment of Mustafa Kassem, a U.S. citizen imprisoned since 

2013 who died in January 2020 following a hunger strike. During a subsequent event in Berlin, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo reportedly 

"expressed outrage" to President El-Sisi over Kassem’s “pointless and 

tragic death.”

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Hearing: Protecting Houses of Worship and Holy Sites

• Webinar Series: Webinar #1: Egypt

• Press Statement: USCIRF Condemns Egypt’s Arrest of Coptic Activist Ramy Kamel
68 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF 

COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE

Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi deserves enormous credit 

for taking the religious freedom agenda into his personal portfolio. 

It is he, the Egyptian President himself, who has led by example on 

many occasions and, despite, all the complications of running the 

Arab world’s largest country, often in the crosshairs of terrorists, he 

continues to take seriously, and to work personally, to create interfaith 

harmony and peaceful coexistence among religious communities 

within Egypt. His grand gestures have mattered, and his attention 

to detail has made a profound difference. I commend him for it all. I 

have also appreciated his absolute willingness to indulge in direct and 

brutally honest conversations with various interlocutors along the way. 

EGYPT

70 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

INDONESIA

• Include Indonesia on the U.S. Department 

of State’s Special Watch List for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of 

religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Urge the Indonesian government to 

revise the draft Criminal Code bill to 

remove criminal sanctions for blasphemy, 

as well as to repeal or amend the existing 

blasphemy laws and release any individuals currently held on blasphemy charges;

• Incorporate training on international 

human rights standards related to 

freedom of religion or belief—including 

concerns related to enforcement of blasphemy laws—into U.S.-funded programs, 

such as the U.S. Agency for International 

Development’s (USAID) Harmoni and 

MAJu projects; and

• Urge the Indonesian government to take 

the lead on human rights and religious 

freedom regionally in its capacity as 

party to the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN) Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, 

including by publicly advocating on 

behalf of Uighurs and other persecuted 

Muslims in China. 

The U.S. Congress should:

• Support measures such as H.Res.512 and 

S.Res.458, which urge the global repeal of 

blasphemy, heresy, and apostasy laws.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Indonesia generally 

trended negatively compared to the previous year. Reports from 

local nongovernmental organizations indicated that the provinces 

of West Java, Jakarta, and East Java had the highest number of 

incidents of religious intolerance—including discrimination, hate 

speech, acts of violence, and rejections of permits to build houses 

of worship for minority religious communities. The government 

continued to prosecute blasphemy allegations and to impose disproportionate prison sentences. Three women were put on trial for 

blasphemy, two with diagnosed mental health challenges and one 

for comments posted on social media. Suzethe Margaret, a Roman 

Catholic who has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, was 

detained on June 30, 2019, for entering a mosque with her dog. 

In September, after months of pressure from Muslim hardliners, 

authorities announced that she would face trial for blasphemy. On 

February 5, 2020, after the reporting period, the Cibinong District 

Court in West Java acquitted Suzethe of blasphemy charges due 

to her mental incapacity. In April, the Supreme Court rejected the 

appeal of Meliana, a Buddhist woman who had been convicted of 

blasphemy in 2018 for asking a local mosque to lower the volume 

of the call to prayer. However, in May, Meliana was released on 

parole. Islamic preacher Abdul Somad was also investigated for 

blasphemy after giving a speech in which he insulted the Christian 

cross, although he was not officially charged. 

Hardliners and other intolerant groups continued to threaten 

houses of worship associated with minority faiths, including by 

exploiting the 2006 Joint Regulation on Houses of Worship, which 

requires religious communities to obtain signatures from 90 congregation members and from at least 60 local households of a different 

faith, as well as receive approval from the local government before 

building a house of worship. In May 2019, hardliner groups protested—and reportedly threatened jihad—against proposed plans 

to build a Hindu temple in Bekasi. In July, after hardliner groups 

demonstrated and issued threats of violence, authorities in Bantul 

district, Yogyakarta, cited the 2006 decree in rescinding the permit 

of a Pentecostal church. In an ongoing dispute that started in 2008, 

the GKI Yasmin church still had not received permits for its house 

of worship in Bogor, despite promises by local officials and a ruling 

from the Supreme Court in its favor. 

There were reports that political opportunists attempted to 

exploit religious tensions for electoral gain ahead of the general elections on April 17, 2019. Prabowo Subianto, the primary challenger to 

incumbent President Joko Widodo, attempted to mobilize supporters 

of the 212 movement, which played a key role in pressuring the government to charge then Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama—a 

Chinese Christian—with blasphemy in early 2017. Following President 

Widodo’s reelection, there were reports that the government 

planned to introduce stricter background checks to identify religious extremists in the bureaucracy and remove them. In November, 

the government launched a website that allowed members of the 

public to report on alleged “radical content” shared by public servants online. The Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform 

banned employees from wearing the niqab headdress. In October, 

Indonesia’s chief security minister was stabbed by a man suspected 

to be an Islamist influenced by the Islamic State.

In September 2019, the Indonesian legislature considered a 

bill to replace the existing Criminal Code, which dates back to the 

Dutch colonial era. This new code would have expanded the criminalization of blasphemy to include insulting a religious leader during 

a religious service, persuading someone to become an atheist, and 

defiling or unlawfully destroying houses of worship or religious 

artifacts. Civil society groups led massive protests in response to 

these and other proposed restrictions, leading the government to 

delay the bill indefinitely. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 71

INDONESIA

Background

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country. 

Muslims comprise 87.2 percent of Indonesia’s 267 million citizens, while 

Protestant Christians comprise 7 percent, Roman Catholics 2.9 percent, 

and Hindus 1.7 percent; 0.9 percent identify as another minority faith, 

such as Buddhism and Confucianism. Indonesia has a long tradition of 

religious pluralism. Article 29 of its constitution “guarantees the independence of each resident to embrace religion and worship according 

to their respective religions and beliefs.” The Indonesian government 

has promoted an ideology known as Pancasila, which comprises five 

principles: monotheism, civilized humanity, national unity, deliberative 

democracy, and social justice (“monotheism” is broadly defined as 

any religion with a supreme deity, a holy figure, a scripture, and established rituals). However, the government officially recognizes only six 

religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and 

Confucianism. Violations of religious freedom tend to have the greatest 

impact on Ahmadiyya and Shi’a Muslims, Christians, believers outside 

the six officially recognized faiths, and nonbelievers.

The government also requires all citizens to list their religious 

affiliation on their ID cards, which has historically forced members of 

unrecognized minority faith communities, and those belonging to no 

faith community, to misrepresent their faith or leave the field blank. 

This can impact their access to licenses and permits, education, and 

government jobs. In February 2019, Bandung in West Java became the 

first area in Indonesia to grant a designation “Faith in One God” for 

members of indigenous faith communities. 

Shari’a Law in Aceh 

Aceh is the only province in Indonesia with the legal authority to 

enact Shari’a law. Religious police enforce a strict form of Shari’a that 

includes corporal punishment. In January 2019, two 18-year-olds were 

flogged 17 times for hugging each other in public and a second man 

was flogged for being intimate with a woman in a grocery store. In 

December, in two separate cases, a man and a woman convicted of 

committing adultery were beaten unconscious while being publicly 

caned. The provincial government prohibits women from straddling 

motorbikes and forces them to wear hijabs. Muslims living in Aceh do 

not have the option of opting out of the Shari’a legal system. 

Extremism in Education Institutions 

Some local human rights groups claim that Indonesian university students 

are becoming more radicalized. A Ministry of Defense study released in 

2017 reported that 23.3 percent of high school and university students 

do not believe in Pancasila, while approximately 23.4 percent supported 

jihad to establish an Islamic state. Some Muslim schools forbid their students from interacting with non-Muslims. In recent years, anti-pluralist 

Salafist religious groups have grown in universities across Indonesia. 

The government has pledged to revise the religious studies curriculum 

and to ban textbooks that propagate intolerance. Some universities 

have restricted the type of religious clothing female students can wear 

by banning the niqab; although the universities claim these measures 

are necessary to combat extremism, they potentially violate the right of 

individuals to choose how they express their faith.

“Deviant” Groups

Minority Muslim sects—such as the Milah Abraham faith community 

(also known as Gafatar), Shi’a Muslims, and Ahmadiyya Muslims—

continued to face social hostility and state harassment throughout 

2019. The quasi-governmental Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI) 

has issued fatwas (religious edicts) declaring these groups “deviant” and heretical to Islam. In 2005, MUI issued a fatwa declaring 

Ahmadiyya Muslims as apostates. In 2008, the Indonesian government 

banned the Ahmadiyya community from proselytizing, a step that 

former Indonesia President Abdurrahman Wahid publicly condemned. 

In January 2019, hardliners in Bandung protested a discussion of 

Ahmadiyya teachings at a mosque. Although the event was allowed to 

occur, the pressure did lead organizers to shorten it. In addition, in certain parts of the country, such as East Lombok, local authorities could 

not guarantee the safety of members of the Ahmadiyya community.

Key U.S. Policy

The U.S. and Indonesian governments have worked closely on counterterrorism and maritime security issues, including with regard to the 

Chinese government’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. The 

United States was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic 

relations with Indonesia in 1949, following its independence from the 

Netherlands, and November 2019 marked the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations. In August, a congressional delegation visited Jakarta to 

discuss trade and investment opportunities. In June, U.S. Ambassador 

Joseph E. Donovan and Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan welcomed 

the return of 88 Indonesian students who participated in the State 

Department’s Youth Exchange and Study (YES) program to study in 

the United States, where they learned about tolerance and diversity. 

Throughout 2019, the USAID-funded Harmoni program continued to 

support Indonesian institutions and communities working to resist the 

rise of violent extremism and religious intolerance and to promote 

tolerant democratic values. USAID’s MAJu program continued to work 

with the Indonesian government as well as local civil society actors 

to widen access to justice and human rights for religious and ethnic 

minorities. USAID increased its overall budget for development projects 

in Indonesia by $3 million, for a total of $93 million. In addition, U.S. 

diplomats met with Indonesian government officials and key civil society 

stakeholders to urge them to publicly condemn the Chinese government’s detention of more than one million Uighur and other Muslims. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Policy Update: Blasphemy Allegations in a Polarized Indonesia

• Op-Ed: Indonesia Should Prevent Religious Conflict, but its Blasphemy Law Does More Harm than Good (in The Globe Post)

• Press Statement: USCIRF Welcomes Release of Jailed Jakarta Governor; Denounces Indonesia’s Blasphemy Law
72 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

IRAQ

• Include Iraq on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International 

Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• As part of high-priority bilateral relations, 

maintain pressure on the Iraqi government to implement its own stated policy 

to rein in the PMF, particularly those factions that continue to engage in sectarian 

violence; present specific obstacles to 

the return and rehabilitation of Yazidis, 

Christians, and other religious and ethnic 

components in northern Iraq; and/or 

intervene against the protest movement 

on behalf of Iranian interests;

• Impose targeted sanctions on additional 

PMF leaders who direct militia engagement in severe violations of religious 

freedom by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights-related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations;

• Highlight religious freedom as part of U.S. 

engagement with Iraqi President Barham 

Salih and the incoming prime minister, 

urging them to prioritize the rehabilitation, preservation, and representation 

of the country’s vulnerable religious and 

ethnic components; and

• Assist in the empowerment of Iraqi 

religious and ethnic minorities—through 

their political and civic representatives as 

well as religious leaders—to initiate and 

advocate for their own interests, including 

opening a broad discussion into governance and a representational security 

framework for the Nineveh Plains area.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Iraq improved incrementally in key areas, but remained concerning overall. Religious 

minorities in the Nineveh Plains and Sinjar faced major barriers 

to their safe return in the short term and their secure, ongoing 

presence in the long term. Although a coalition of Iraqi armed 

forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, U.S. military, and other multinational 

partners successfully ended the territorial threat of ISIS in late 

2017, many of the areas that the terrorist group once controlled 

remained under- or uninhabited in 2019. Substantial humanitarian 

assistance from the United States and other international donors 

bolstered reconstruction and stabilization efforts in those areas, 

and yet tens of thousands of civilians from religious and ethnic 

minorities were still at serious risk. The majority of Iraqi Christians 

remained displaced and their challenges even after return have 

been significant, while Yazidis—500,000 of whom fled ISIS atrocities in 2014—still faced serious distress in 2019. Their collective 

trauma from ISIS atrocities remained largely unaddressed, typified by the fact that the fates of nearly 3,000 abducted Yazidi 

women and children are unknown. In a United Nations (UN) High 

Commissioner for Refugees survey in February, only 3 percent 

of Yazidi IDPs who were interviewed planned to return to Sinjar; 

there is little evidence that this number subsequently improved. 

Meanwhile, new sources of upheaval, including protests in Iraqi 

cities and renewed multinational violence in neighboring northeastern Syria, highlighted the fragility of any improved stability 

in northwestern Iraq.

More than any other single factor, a lack of security, mainly 

due to the corrosive presence of largely Iranian-backed militias 

of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—al-Hashd al-Sha’bi, 

also known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMU)—continued to 

impede progress toward improved religious freedom conditions. 

The PMF continued to operate largely with impunity, despite nominal efforts to bring them under the oversight and accountability 

of the Iraqi armed forces. Some factions, such as the Iran-backed 

30th (“Shabak”) and 50th (“Babylon”) brigades, have played an 

instrumental role in either making key towns in the area increasingly 

inhospitable to minority returnees, or limiting their movement to 

or from those areas. Some of those factions have continued to 

harass and threaten Christian returnees in Bartella, Qaraqosh, and 

elsewhere; for example, in September, the 30th Brigade placed 

a curfew on Christians in Bartella during the Shi’a Muslim commemoration of Ashura—an inflammatory action in a community 

already plagued by sectarian tensions. The behavior of those two 

brigades has been so destructive that in July the U.S. Department 

of the Treasury placed Global Magnitsky sanctions on both of their 

respective leaders, Waad Qado and Rayan al-Kildani. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Commission delegation visit: Baghdad in July-August 2019 to participate in commemoration of 2014 Yazidi genocide under ISIS

• Hearing: Religious Minorities’ Fight to Remain in Iraq

• Policy Update: Protecting Religious Minorities in Northern Iraq
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 73

IRAQ

Background

Iraq is a religiously and ethnically diverse country, although that diversity has diminished as a result of the country’s recent history of political 

instability, sectarian violence, and Islamist insurgency. Most Iraqis 

identify as Muslim, consisting of around 64–69 percent Shi’a Muslim 

and 29–34 percent Sunni Muslim. The country is also home to an estimated 200,000 Christians from a variety of Catholic, Orthodox, and 

Protestant denominations—who remain from a pre-2003 population 

of around 1.5 million—as well as up to 700,000 Yazidis, most of whom 

remain internally displaced.

Religion and ethnicity are often bound closely together in the 

Iraqi context. Many of the country’s smaller communities—such as 

Sabean-Mandaeans, Turkmen, Kak’ais, and Shabaks—have in recent 

years faced serious threats that cannot be easily defined as exclusively 

religious or ethnic. Many of these smaller communities experienced 

severe hardship under ISIS rule or fleeing from it—including Yazidis 

and Turkmen, from whom ISIS abducted thousands of women and 

children into sexual and domestic slavery—and they still struggle to 

find their place in a post-ISIS Iraq. Some of their internally displaced 

people (IDPs) have found stable if imperfect refuge alongside indigenous communities within Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 

territory; others have sought to return to their traditional towns and 

villages that are slowly but persistently rebuilding and recovering. 

Post-ISIS Rehabilitation of Religious Minorities to 

Northern Iraq

Sources in Iraq told USCIRF in 2019 that only an estimated 30–50 percent of the population of Chaldeans, Assyrians, and other Christians 

have likely returned to their communities of origin since the fall of 

ISIS in late 2017, mostly from refuge in Erbil and other parts of KRG 

territory. Meanwhile, most Yazidi survivors of ISIS atrocities still languished in IDP camps in Duhok, atop Mount Sinjar, and elsewhere in 

exile. Their historic homeland of Sinjar remained mostly inhospitable 

for returnees, as PMF checkpoints made the road between there and 

Duhok nearly impassable at times, the crippled local economy hampered livelihood opportunities, the former lifeline of Mosul for goods 

and services remained inaccessible, and fear of an ISIS resurgence 

lingered. To make matters worse, Turkish airstrikes have repeatedly 

targeted positions of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and its allies in 

and near Sinjar since 2017, including the most recent such incidents in 

November 2019 and January 2020. The threat of more such airstrikes 

has contributed to the fragile state of security and stability in that area.

The Yazidi community was also haunted throughout 2019 by 

the absence of justice for the atrocities of five years earlier. Since 

2017, Iraqi courts have tried thousands of suspected ISIS fighters 

on charges of terrorism, most often in large groups of mostly Sunni 

Muslim defendants on the basis of forced confessions rather than 

evidence. In fact, a rare bright spot in Iraq’s transitional justice context 

came in the form of efforts by courts in Nineveh Province to rely on 

a higher standard of evidence rather than coerced confessions, the 

latter of which remained alarmingly prevalent elsewhere in the country. However, the judiciary has ignored Yazidi leaders’ demands for 

war crimes trials of ISIS fighters and commanders. This lack of justice 

is also closely tied to international efforts to document the atrocities, 

as the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes 

Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) 

began work in March to uncover mass graves in and around Sinjar that 

hold the remains of Yazidi victims of ISIS violence. 

Other Religious Freedom Issues across Iraq

In 2019, religious freedom conditions in KRG territory remained largely 

consistent relative to prior years, in that the Muslim majority and various religious minorities share reasonably free conditions relative to 

the rest of Iraq, despite some lingering issues such as the unresolved 

status of some Christian properties. Relations between the KRG and 

the Iraqi Federal Government continued to improve following tensions 

surrounding the failed 2017 independence referendum, allowing for 

the resumption of joint anti-ISIS operations and other areas of cooperation—which lessen the potential for the sorts of social and political 

instability in disputed areas that have historically represented serious 

threats to religious freedom in Iraq. 

In Iraqi Federal Government territory, there were few signs 

of change from prior years in regard to reconciliation among Shi’a 

and Sunni Muslims or other religious groups, or specific reforms 

to promote religious inclusivity, such as the revision of the public 

school curriculum. Blasphemy and apostasy laws likewise remained 

unchanged, and there was no movement toward extending formal 

recognition or freedom of worship to smaller religious groups such 

as Baha’is, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and others. 

Key U.S. Policy

In 2019, U.S. policy with the most direct relevance to religious freedom 

conditions in Iraq mainly involved humanitarian aid and targeted sanctions. As of October, the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) had allocated nearly $400 million to helping ISIS victims recover 

and rebuild through its Iraqi and international nongovernmental partners. 

The U.S. government also increasingly used punitive measures to single 

out Iraqi PMF leaders, corrupt politicians, and other individuals who 

have played a particularly destructive role in abusing religious freedom 

and/or broader human rights. In addition to the two PMF leaders noted 

earlier, in July the Treasury Department listed as “Specially Designated 

Nationals” Nawfal Hammadi al-Sultan and Ahmed al-Jubouri, two politicians whose negligence and corruption have negatively impacted 

religious minorities and other constituents in Nineveh and Salah al-Din 

provinces, respectively. In December, the Treasury Department extended 

Global Magnitsky sanctions to another corrupt politician and three additional individuals who, as leaders of armed proxies for Iran, have directly 

contributed to violence against civilian protestors who participated in 

anti-Iran and antigovernment demonstrations beginning in October. On 

January 3, 2020, just after the reporting period, a U.S. airstrike in Baghdad 

killed two figures who were central to PMF operations: General Qassem 

Soleimani, who headed the Qods Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy commander of the 

PMF and founder of the Kata’ib Hizbullah militia.
74 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

KAZAKHSTAN

• Include on the State Department’s 

Special Watch List for engaging in or 

tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International 

Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Continue engaging with the Kazakhstani 

government through the U.S.-Kazakhstan 

Religious Freedom Working Group to 

press the government of Kazakhstan to: 

• Repeal or amend its religious registration laws, in part by setting the required 

number of founding members at no 

more than 10 individuals; 

• End mandatory expert review of founding documents and religious literature, 

or significantly reform the process to 

make it more transparent;

• Cease the detention and sentencing of 

individuals for their peaceful religious 

expression and practice; 

• Provide an alternative to military service 

for conscientious objectors; and

• Open the Congress of the Leaders of 

the World and Traditional Religions to 

representatives of all faiths in cooperation with the recently founded Religious 

Freedom Roundtables; and

• Ensure continued U.S. funding for Radio 

Azattyq, the Kazakh service of Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, to allow for the 

dissemination of uncensored information 

about events inside Kazakhstan, including 

those related to religious freedom.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Kazakhstan moved in a 

positive direction. The government made a concerted effort to 

improve its record on religious freedom, working to design and 

implement reforms in conversation with U.S. counterparts. In May, 

Kazakhstan hosted the first U.S.-Kazakhstan Religious Freedom 

Working Group, with the participation of both the U.S. Department 

of State and USCIRF, at which Kazakhstani officials openly discussed 

deficiencies in their regulation of religion and expressed their desire 

to address them. The government subsequently committed to a 

road map for religious legislation and oversight reform. This sustained shift in policy began in January 2019, when the government 

abandoned adding amendments to the country’s restrictive 2011 

religion law that it had proposed a year and a half earlier. If enacted, 

the amendments would have further restricted who may legally 

proselytize and under what circumstances; required both parents’ 

approval for children to participate in religious activities; and limited 

worship to designated locations. Between October 2019 and early 

2020, four Religious Freedom Roundtables were held in cities across 

Kazakhstan, at which government officials participated alongside 

representatives of various faith communities, including historically 

persecuted minority groups. Meanwhile, the number of administrative prosecutions for religious offenses continued to decline, 

reaching 160 in 2019—down from 171 in 2018 and 284 in 2017.

Nevertheless, significant problems persisted. The 2011 religion law maintains elements that systematically restrict religious 

freedom—especially onerous registration requirements and the 

mandatory “expert” review of founding documents and religious 

literature. During 2019, members of the Hare Krishna community, 

Protestant Christians, and observant Muslims reported harassment by government authorities, including questioning about their 

religious beliefs. The government keeps a database of “founding 

members” of religious organizations in the country; some on the 

list complain of persecution with late-night visits, mandatory trips 

to the Religious Affairs Department, and pressure to remove their 

signatures from registration applications. 

As of the end of 2019, 24 Sunni Muslims remained imprisoned

for their religious beliefs, mostly members or alleged members of 

the Islamic missionary movement Tablighi Jamaat. Between August 

and December, Kazakhstani courts gave nine men sentences of 

between five and eight years for participating in a private discussion 

about Islam on the messaging service WhatsApp, which officials 

determined to constitute “propagation of terrorism” and “inciting 

hatred.” Outside analysts found no evidence of such intent and 

questioned the proficiency of the government’s experts. In July, a 

criminal court in Almaty sentenced three pastors of the Protestant 

New Life Church, in absentia, to between four and five years in 

prison and ordered the confiscation of their and the church’s 

property. The court deemed the church’s founding a criminal act 

designed to cause bodily harm and commit theft, and considered all 

sermons, music, and meetings at the church part of a criminal plot.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Staff visit: Nur-Sultan in May 2019, including participation in the U.S.-Kazakhstan Religious Freedom Working Group 

• Country Update: Kazakhstan

• Legislation Factsheet: Registration Laws
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 75

KAZAKHSTAN

Background

Kazakhstan is territorially the largest state in Central Asia and has 

the region’s second-largest population, with around 19 million 

citizens. The population is around 70 percent Sunni Muslim, 26 

percent Christian (including Orthodox, Protestants, Catholics, and 

Jehovah’s Witnesses), three percent other (including Jews, Buddhists, 

Baha’is, and Hare Krishnas), and one percent Shi’a and Sufi Muslim. 

Approximately two-thirds of the population are ethnic Kazakhs, a 

Turkic people, while the rest are ethnic Slavs and other Turkic peoples, 

including Uzbeks and Uighurs. Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian 

country with a large ethnic Russian population, mostly in the north. 

The Soviet Union deported many ethnic and religious minorities to Kazakhstan, establishing a number of faith communities that 

endure today. Nursultan Nazarbayev, the country’s first independent 

president, sought to cultivate Kazakhstan’s image as a model of religious pluralism, which the government considers one of the country’s 

distinctive historical legacies. President Kassym Tokayev, who succeeded Nazarbayev in 2019, has expressed his eagerness to improve 

Kazakhstan’s record on international religious freedom.

The government is avowedly secular and seeks to control religion, which it views as a potentially destabilizing force. It maintains 

influence over, and preference for, what it considers the “traditional” 

Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence; it is generally wary of 

Islamic practices emanating from the wider Muslim world. It classifies 

as traditional and non-threatening other religions with a long-established presence and good relations with the government—like 

Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, and Judaism—while it 

views newer arrivals to the region, such as evangelical Christianity and 

Scientology, with suspicion. The government is particularly concerned 

about the spread of religious extremism—which it defines broadly 

and uses to target political opponents—as well as the potential for 

perceived social disruption from proselytism and missionary activity. 

Although the government has legitimate concerns about extremist 

violence, its vague concept of religious extremism is applicable to 

any activity it sees as potentially disruptive, even at the family level.

2011 Religion Law

Before it enacted the 2011 religion law, Kazakhstan was one of the least 

repressive post-Soviet Central Asian states with regard to freedom of 

religion or belief. That law, however, set stringent registration requirements with high membership thresholds, and it banned or restricted 

unregistered religious activities, including those relating to offering 

education, distributing literature, and training clergy. Other vague 

criminal and administrative statutes enable the state to punish most 

unauthorized religious or political activities. Religious groups have 

since been subject to state surveillance. The total number of registered 

religious groups plummeted after 2011 as a result of that law, especially 

the number of “nontraditional” groups, which declined from 48 to 16. 

Treatment of Prisoners

Kuanysh Bashpayev has been jailed since 2016 for a series of lectures in 

which he criticized the state-controlled Muslim Board. Sources close to 

his case told USCIRF that prison authorities have since kept him in solitary 

confinement, following a closed court hearing in which the prosecution 

refused to detail which elements of his lectures it had deemed incriminating. Meanwhile, relatives of Muslim prisoner Dadash Mazhenov, 

who is serving more than seven years for posting lectures critical of the 

Muslim Board, reported that he was tortured while held at a labor camp 

in Shymkent in 2019. Prisoners at the camp who observed the Muslim 

holiday of Eid al-Fitr were allegedly served rotten food, and many became 

ill. In June, prison authorities forbade Muslim inmates from praying during 

daytime hours, threatening them with additional jail time. 

Restrictions on Religious Dress

Muslim parents and students continued to resist the Kazakh Education 

Ministry’s ban on wearing the hijab in school. Education officials in 

Aqtobe claimed that due to the ban, at least 11 girls in the province 

enrolled in an Internet school rather than attend public school. At an 

August 29 meeting with concerned parents, the regional governor told 

them that hijabs were not “part of Kazakh culture.”

Ethnic Kazakh Refugees from Xinjiang

In late 2019 and early 2020, Kazakhstan shifted its policy toward refugees from the Chinese province of Xinjiang by passing legal judgments 

that prohibited the deportation of ethnic Kazakhs who fled across 

the border from China. For much of the year, the government had 

resisted efforts to counter China and actively prosecuted activists who 

drew attention to the issue. In March, Kazakhstan publicly declared 

its support for Chinese efforts to fight “terrorism, separatism, and 

extremism.” On March 10, 2019, Serikzhan Bilash, the leader of a human 

rights group dedicated to the cause of ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang, was 

arrested for “inciting national discord or hatred.” Bilash was released 

in August after extensive international pressure, promising to end his 

advocacy against China. In June, Aiman Omarova—a human rights 

lawyer who represented Bilash and former prisoners from Xinjiang, and 

a 2018 recipient of the U.S. State Department’s International Women of 

Courage Award—found her pet dog dead from an apparent poisoning, 

which she accused the government of perpetrating in order to scare her. 

KEY U.S. POLICY

The United States and Kazakhstan enjoyed a close and deepening partnership in 2019, including the establishment in May of the 

U.S.-Kazakhstan Religious Freedom Working Group. In October, 

Ambassador Nathan A. Sales, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for 

Counterterrorism, met with government officials in Kazakhstan to 

discuss their “groundbreaking work” rehabilitating and reintegrating returnees from Syria, as well as regional efforts to counter violent 

extremism. In December, the two countries met for the annual U.S.-

Kazakhstan Enhanced Strategic Partnership Dialogue (ESPD), and 

engaged on a range of issues, including regional stability, human rights, 

labor, and religious freedom. The same month, Secretary of State 

Michael R. Pompeo met with Kazakhstani Foreign Minister Mukhtar 

Tileuberdi in Washington, DC, and discussed improving bilateral relations. Secretary Pompeo encouraged the government of Kazakhstan 

to implement reforms and to strengthen the protection of fundamental 

freedoms for the people of Kazakhstan. He also raised the ongoing 

human rights crisis in Xinjiang and praised Kazakhstan for ensuring the 

safety of those who have fled China seeking refuge.
76 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

MALAYSIA

• Include Malaysia on the U.S. Department of State’s Special Watch List for 

engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to 

the International Religious Freedom Act 

(IRFA);

• As part of U.S. support to build capacity 

for Malaysian law enforcement, fund and 

implement training on community-based 

policing between the U.S. Department 

of Justice and Department of Homeland 

Security and their Malaysian counterparts 

to promote better shared practices on 

interacting with faith communities and 

protecting houses of worship and other 

religious sites; and

• Expand the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) to include bringing 

Malaysian lawyers and human rights 

activists to the United States.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Malaysia again trended 

negatively as they did in 2018. Conditions for minority faith believers as well as for majority Sunni Muslims stagnated or, in some 

cases, worsened. Members of the Sunni majority must adhere to 

a strict, state-approved interpretation of Islam, which leaves little 

freedom to practice according to their conscience. For example, in 

December 2019, six men in the state of Terengganu were handed 

one-month jail terms and fines ranging from $575 to $600 for missing Friday prayers. In April 2019, authorities linked with the Islamic 

religious authority in Selangor, Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor 

(JAIS), opened an investigation into three Sunni women who held 

a discussion about their decision to stop wearing the hijab. In addition, all Muslim students are mandated to take religious classes. In 

Form 5 (for ages 16–17), religious textbooks condemn non-Sunni 

sects of Islam. The state-issued sermons each Friday often warn 

Muslims against these “deviant” sects and the so-called threats 

they present to Islam.

The pairing of Malay ethnicity with the Islamic religion continues to infringe on the human rights of individual Malays. Historically, 

the religious Shari’a courts have declared several minority Muslim 

groups as non-Muslim, which persistently creates a grey area for 

those Malays who adhere to officially “deviant” sects of Islam. In 

2019, Shi’a Muslims continued to face state hostility and detentions, 

sparking fears of an escalating crackdown. At least 50 members 

of the Milah Abraham community faced ongoing Shari’a court 

trials for their faith activities. In May, there were reports that religious authorities forced entry into an Ahmadiyya religious building. 

Religious authorities justified their intimidation of the Ahmadiyya 

Muslim community on the basis that these members are registered 

as Muslims on their national identification cards. 

In August 2019, the Sabah state legislative assembly passed 

a bill amending Section 52 of the Syariah Criminal Offences 

Enactment 1995, which officially defines Islam as Sunni Islam 

and criminalizes alternative interpretations. This bill adds Section 

52A, which prohibits sharing with Muslims any religious doctrines 

or beliefs that are not in accordance with the state-sponsored 

version of the faith, with penalties of up two years in prison and/

or a maximum fine of 3,000 Malaysian ringgit. This bill went into 

effect on September 9. Authorities have claimed the bill is not 

aimed toward non-Muslims such as Buddhists or Christians, who 

have sounded the alarm about the bill, but rather toward “deviant” 

Islamic practices, which include all non-Sunni Muslim faith groups.

Throughout 2019, non-Muslim communities, such as 

Buddhists, Christians, and Hindus, reported feeling increasing strain 

and social hostility. A September directive issued by the Federal 

Islamic Affairs Department, an agency under the Prime Minister’s 

Department, barred interfaith prayers for Muslims at events involving both Muslims and non-Muslims. In a positive development, 

in June 2019 the government established a special task force to 

investigate the enforced disappearances of two prominent religious 

minority leaders. Nevertheless, the whereabouts of Christian pastor 

Raymond Koh and social activist and Shi’a convert Amri Che Mat, 

as well as of Pastor Joshua Hilmy and his wife, remained unknown 

at the end of the reporting period.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Staff visit: Kuala Lumpur in February 2020

• Factsheet: Enforced Disappearances in Malaysia
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 77

MALAYSIA

Background

Malaysia is a highly pluralistic society. Around 61.3 percent of the 

population identifies as Muslim, the vast majority belonging to the 

state-sponsored Sunni sect. Buddhists comprise 19.8 percent; 9.2 percent 

are Christian; Hindus are 6.3 percent; Confucianism, Taoism, and other 

traditional Chinese religions are 1.3 percent; and about 0.8 percent identifies with no faith community. Though Malaysia was founded as a secular 

state, the 1957 constitution’s article 3 places Islam—interpreted as Sunni 

Islam—as the official religion of the federation. Article 160 of the constitution links the ethnic identity of Malay with the religious identity of Islam. 

The ruling coalition during 2019, the Pakatan Harapan (PH), which 

came into power in May 2018, pledged support for a number of reforms 

that largely failed to materialize, including the ratification of certain 

international human rights treaties. Then Prime Minister Mahathir 

Mohamad has a history of anti-Semitic remarks. The then opposition 

parties United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and Parti Islam 

Se Malaysia (PAS) agreed in 2019 to work together, citing their shared 

perception that the PH was challenging the supremacy of Islam and 

ethnic Malays. This rhetoric encourages already divisive popular sentiment at the local and national levels. At the end of summer, a social 

media campaign called for Muslims to boycott non-Muslims goods. On 

December 3, UMNO Member of Parliament (MP) Datuk Seri Tajuddin 

Abdul Rahman used religiously charged insults to ridicule a fellow 

parliamentarian of the Hindu faith community. This caused an uproar 

in parliament that ultimately ended with the speaker of parliament suspending MP Rahman for two days. Christian leaders have spoken out

against tactics by UMNO and PAS that portray Christianity as a threat 

to the Muslim majority. In December, the Malaysian government hosted 

a summit of Muslim countries including Iran and Turkey on issues facing 

the Muslim world. In February 2020, after the reporting period, then 

Prime Minister Mahathir resigned and was replaced by Prime Minister 

Muhyiddin Yassin, who has the support of UMNO and PAS. 

Government Control of Islam

The state regulates the internal affairs of Muslims, including by funding mosques and providing preapproved talking points to imams. 

Imams are salaried under the federal Department of Islamic Affairs 

(JAKIM). In 2019, the state continued to vet all foreign missionaries, 

restricting non-Muslims and those Muslims it deems “deviant.” 

In 2017, the Malaysian federal government determined atheism 

to be unconstitutional. Nonreligious individuals continue to face official and societal harassment. For those who are ethnically Malay and 

identify as nonreligious, there is the risk of criminal prosecution for 

apostasy. At least six states—Perak, Melaka, Sabah, Pahang, Kelantan, 

and Terengganu—criminalize apostasy with fines, imprisonment, 

and/or detention in a “rehabilitation center.” While not enforced, the 

maximum penalty for apostasy in Kelantan and Terengganu is death.

All Malaysian citizens over the age of 12 are required by law to 

carry a national ID card that identifies their faith. Muslims’ cards state 

their faith in print, while other faiths are encrypted in the card’s smart 

strip and only accessed electronically. While the ability to change 

faith is limited for any conversions outside of Islam, some individuals 

have won the right only after taking their cases to the High Court. 

The Dual Legal System

Malaysia maintains a system of two independent but equal courts: 

secular and religious. Muslims are subjected to both the general laws 

enacted by parliament and religious laws enacted by their state legislature. The legal age of children to marry varies in each state between 

Muslims and non-Muslims, with a lower age and fewer protections for 

Muslim children. Marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims remains 

illegal unless the non-Muslim partner converts.

In 2014, the Selangor Islamic Religious Council (MAIS) issued a 

fatwa (religious edict) declaring the civil society organization Sisters 

in Islam (SIS) a deviant group. Fatwas issued by state religious institutions can be used to confiscate documents and prevent organizations’ 

activities. In August 2019, the High Court dismissed the group’s case 

to remove the fatwa, declaring the matter the exclusive domain of 

the Shari’a courts. In 1996, the Fatwa Committee for Religious Affairs 

issued a fatwa prohibiting the proselytism, promulgation, and professing of Shi’a Islam, which at least 11 of the 13 states have adopted. 

In 1975, the Selangor Fatwa Council decreed that Ahmadis were not 

Muslim. Malaysian authorities often accuse minority Islamic faith 

communities of threatening the unity of Muslims. 

Pressures against Non-Muslim Minority Groups 

In 2019, authorities did little to address past attacks on Hindu temples 

and other houses of worship of minority faith communities. Hundreds 

of Hindu temples have been demolished by authorities in recent years. 

Minority faith houses of worship are regulated. Members of faith communities reported that Buddhist temples are restricted from building 

higher than local mosques and that Sikh gurdwaras are prevented from 

building domes, since domes are associated with Islamic architecture. 

As many as 31 words remained banned for non-Muslims under the 

pretense of protecting public order. In August, the High Court deferred 

an appeal on the use of the word “Allah” in Sabah and Sarawak. These 

language restrictions largely affect members of Christian communities, 

but also limit the freedom of expression of individuals who follow official “deviant” sects of Islam. Authorities and societal actors often use

exaggerated fears of “Christianization” for political purposes to motivate support from Muslim communities and escalate tensions between 

majority and minority groups. Non-Muslim indigenous communities 

complained of state-sponsored forced conversion.

Key U.S. Policy

Malaysia and the United States maintain strong bilateral ties. The United 

States is Malaysia’s third-largest trading partner, and there exist numerous educational and cultural exchange programs between the two 

countries, including the IVLP program, which each year since 2008 has 

brought Muslim educational leaders to the United States. The U.S. 

government supports capacity building programs for Malaysian law 

enforcement, as well as security cooperation and training for Malaysia’s 

military. In October 2019, the Department of Justice concluded an 

agreement with the Malaysian government resolving the so-called 

1MDB scandal in which the U.S. government seized over $1 billion due 

to corruption stemming from former Prime Minister Najib Razak. Over 

the course of 2019, the U.S. government continued to support anticorruption efforts and the democratic transition to the ruling PH coalition.
78 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

NICARAGUA

• Maintain Nicaragua on the U.S. Department of State’s Special Watch List for 

engaging in or tolerating severe violations 

of religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Nicaraguan government agencies and officials 

responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom by freezing those 

individuals’ assets and/or barring their 

entry into the United States under human 

rights-related financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom 

violations; and

• Encourage key countries, particularly 

those in Latin America, to ensure that 

violations of freedom of religion or belief 

are part of all multilateral or bilateral 

discussions with or about Nicaragua.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Support H.Res.754—“Expressing the 

sense of the House of Representatives 

that the United States should continue to 

support the people of Nicaragua in their 

peaceful efforts to promote democracy 

and human rights, and use the tools 

under United States law to increase 

political and financial pressure on the 

government of Daniel Ortega”—and 

other legislation designed to condemn violations of religious freedom in 

Nicaragua. 

I

n 2019, the government of Nicaragua continued a campaign targeting religious institutions, most notably the Catholic Church. When 

protests against the government broke out in April 2018 and authorities responded with excessive force, the Catholic Church—in keeping 

with its religious views—provided aid and sanctuary to protesters, 

condemned the excessive government force, and attempted to mediate a National Dialogue between the protesters and the government. 

Many of the same religious freedom violations and abuses committed 

by the Ortega regime and its supporters against the Church and its 

followers in the wake of the 2018 protests continued into 2019. These 

abuses include the intimidation and harassment of worshippers and 

religious leaders and the violent targeting of churches.

Government forces and citizens sympathetic to the regime 

routinely harassed Catholic Church clergy, with tactics including 

defamatory accusations, arbitrary arrests, death threats on social 

media, and violent attacks. Bishop Abelardo Mata Guevara, leader 

of the Nicaraguan bishop’s conference, reported that he and at 

least seven other priests in his archdiocese have received death 

threats, causing him to limit his pastoral work. In December, police 

detained Father Ramón Alcides Peña Silva for 12 hours. He was 

forced to sleep on the ground in his cell and was given no food 

or drink during his arrest. The police accused Father Alcides Peña 

of disturbing the peace by conducting Mass at his church. Police 

have twice stopped Father Edwin Román of Masaya, including in 

February 2019 when eight police officers surrounded his car and 

slapped him. Two months prior, police detained him at a checkpoint 

for three hours. They inspected his documents and vehicle, but told 

him that he was not free to go until they had an order from superiors. A mysterious van with a Sandinista flag came to the scene and 

the individuals inside told the officers to let him go. Afterward, the 

van followed his car. In a statement following the incident, authorities accused him of zigzagging while driving intoxicated, which 

Román denies. He has also had to contend with plainclothes officers 

trailing him, government spies asking him where to buy bombs, and 

paramilitaries surrounding his church during Mass. Additionally, in 

April 2019, Pope Francis called Managua’s auxiliary bishop Silvio 

Báez to Rome for an indefinite period following sustained harassment by the Nicaraguan government and its supporters since the 

start of the conflict, including an assassination plot.

President Daniel Ortega has inflamed tensions by denouncing 

the Church as “coup mongers,” “terrorists,” and “pedophiles” and 

accusing priests of stockpiling weapons in their churches on behalf 

of protesters. Many religious leaders in the country contend that 

the government is politicizing religion during a political and social 

crisis. The government has utilized religious language and sought 

to infiltrate parishes.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Nicaragua in 2019
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 79

NICARAGUA

Background

The Republic of Nicaragua is a presidential republic with a multiparty 

system. The president is both head of state and head of government 

with no term limits. The unicameral National Assembly is the legislative branch and the judiciary is supposed to be independent of the 

executive and the legislature. However, President Ortega and his 

party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, exercise authoritarian control over all three branches of government and the electoral 

process. An estimated 46 percent of the population of Nicaragua are 

Catholic, compared to 33 percent Evangelical Protestants, 14 percent 

religiously nonaffiliated, and less than 4 percent of other religions. 

The country’s current social and political crisis began in April 

2018 when President Ortega announced reforms to the public pension 

system that precipitated major peaceful protests around the country. 

The government responded with excessive force and repression, 

leading to at least 325 persons killed, 2,000 injured, hundreds illegally 

detained and tortured, and more than 62,000 fleeing to neighboring 

countries. The Catholic Church emerged as a key actor in the crisis, 

providing sanctuary and medical aid to protesters and accepting an 

invitation to mediate a National Dialogue between the protesters 

and the government. Talks were underway in May 2018, but with the 

Church’s insistence on not turning away demonstrators in need of aid 

and some clergy’s support of the protesters, the Ortega administration 

began to lash out at the Church and the dialogue dissolved.

Since the end of the National Dialogue, the government has 

continued its brutal repression of human rights. The tactics used by 

the government to quell the protests and keep its grip on public life 

include rampant corruption, arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearances, the curtailment of civil liberties, and the hindrance of civil 

society organizations’ operations.

Damage to Churches 

With the Catholic Church opening up its doors, protesters congregated in churches because security forces typically avoided entering 

them. Nevertheless, in 2019, church buildings suffered significant 

damage from clashes between protesters and Ortega supporters. 

Supporters of the regime besieged, desecrated, assaulted, and threatened churches in many cities around the country. Sometimes, these 

offenses occurred with the police standing nearby while mobs attacked 

the churches and worshippers. 

In November, the government shut off the electricity and water 

to the San Miguel Arcángel church in Masaya because a group of 14 

hunger strikers had sought refuge there, protesting the detention of 

family members. Police cordoned off a two-block radius around the 

church to stop activists from delivering water to the strikers. After a 

priest at the nearby San Juan Bautista church planned to march in solidarity with the hunger strikers at San Miguel Arcángel, a mob of Ortega 

supporters formed around the San Juan Bautista church during Mass. 

They eventually forced their way through a barricade of pews at the 

front door, attacking parishioners and altar boys with clubs, machetes, 

and metal bars. Police were nearby but did nothing to halt the violence.

Also in November, a group of mothers conducting a hunger 

strike against the regime’s detention of their children sought refuge in 

the Managua Cathedral. A mob burst into the cathedral, brandished 

crude weapons, stole items, broke locks around the building, and 

assaulted the priest and nun caring for the building until the pair had 

to flee in order to protect themselves. The Inter-American Commission 

on Human Rights (IACHR) swiftly condemned the desecration of the 

cathedral and the harassment of the hunger strikers.

Intimidation and Inability to Worship

Pro-Ortega forces sought to instill fear in Catholic clergy and devotees 

by maintaining a threatening presence near churches. Security forces 

surrounded churches during Mass and filmed those entering and 

exiting church buildings. Father Román says that officers surrounded 

his church during masses held in honor of those killed during protests 

and to celebrate the release of political prisoners. 

In some cases, the violent disruption of church services by regime 

supporters was done with the acquiescence of police forces. On June 

15, pro-government civilians threatened, beat, and threw stones at worshippers attending a service commemorating the death of a 15-year-old 

boy killed in the 2018 protests. Police were outside the cathedral but 

did not prevent the attack. In November, Ortega supporters threw 

rocks toward the San Felipe de Molagüina church in the northern city 

of Matagalpa while police looked on, though no injuries were reported. 

In one instance, the Ortega government sought to disrupt a 

ritual that is fundamental to the Catholic faith. Cardinal Leopoldo 

Brenes reported in October 2019 that the General Directorate of 

Customs, controlled by the regime, was withholding several containers 

of donated goods from abroad, including vessels of wine used in the 

Eucharist sacrament.

Key U.S. Policy

At the 2018 and 2019 Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, 

Vice President Michael R. Pence highlighted the Ortega government’s campaign against the Catholic Church. Ambassador-at-Large 

for International Religious Freedom Samuel D. Brownback said on 

International Religious Freedom Day in October 2018 that he was 

“strongly concerned” with the situation and called on the government 

to protect religious freedom and the Church’s right to operate freely. 

On December 18, 2019, the State Department placed Nicaragua on 

its Special Watch List for severe violators of religious freedom. 

In December 2018, Congress passed the Nicaragua Human 

Rights and Anticorruption Act (P.L. 115-335), a bill that imposed sanctions on institutions and individuals responsible for violence against 

and infringement of the civil rights of protesters. It also directed the 

U.S. Department of the Treasury to limit the ability of international 

financial institutions to lend assistance to the Nicaraguan government. 

The U.S. government has imposed targeted sanctions on a number 

of Nicaraguan officials for corruption, human rights abuses, and/or 

undermining democracy in Nicaragua, including three in July 2018, 

four in June 2019, and three in November 2019. Among those targeted 

were members of President Ortega’s immediate family, including his 

wife Rosario Murillo and two of his sons, Rafael and Laureano. The U.S. 

government also offered humanitarian assistance to Nicaraguans who 

have fled their country due to the ongoing conflict. 
80 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

SUDAN

• Maintain Sudan on the U.S. Department 

of State’s Special Watch List for engaging 

in or tolerating severe religious freedom 

violations pursuant to IRFA;

• Provide Sudan’s Ministry of Education 

with funding and technical support for 

its program of comprehensive curricular 

reform to replace intolerant content in 

textbooks issued by the former regime 

with new materials and accompanying 

teacher training that support religious 

freedom and inclusivity;

• Allocate funding and other forms of 

economic assistance to provide the 

transitional government with technical 

support on transitional justice and other 

legal and constitutional reforms, in order 

to improve Sudan’s ability to achieve 

a stable and lasting transition that will 

foster a social and political environment 

conducive to religious freedom and other 

basic human rights; and

• Prioritize, through the work of the U.S. 

Special Envoy on Sudan, efforts to 1) 

create a high-level international advisory 

body for human rights in Sudan to hold 

regular dialogues on reform and progress 

with its international allies; and 2) encourage the transitional government to invite 

the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur for freedom of religion or belief, 

Ahmed Shaheed, to Sudan. 

Religious freedom conditions in Sudan improved significantly in 

2019, although serious challenges remain. It was a historic year 

for the country, with the removal of President Omar al-Bashir 

from power in April and the installation of a joint civilian-military 

transitional government in August, empowering civilian leaders for 

the first time in three decades. Religious freedom conditions prior 

to the fall of the former regime were similarly poor to those in 2018; 

under al-Bashir, the government engaged in dialogue with international actors and domestic stakeholders on religious freedom issues, 

but religious minority communities and the Sunni Muslim majority 

continued to face egregious restrictions and abuses. Based on the 

former government’s particularly severe violations of religious freedom, USCIRF had recommended Sudan’s designation as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA) every year since 2000, including in April 2019. 

However, within the first several months of assuming power in 

August, the transitional government, under the leadership of Prime 

Minister Abdalla Hamdok, made concrete moves to improve religious freedom. It informally allowed the Muslim-minority Republican 

Party to operate openly for the first time, and extended improved 

representation to what it deems “traditional” Christian communities, 

including the appointment of a Coptic Christian woman as a member 

of the Sovereign Council. Most notably, the government announced 

in December the repeal of a public order law that the former regime 

had used to enforce—often violently—its Islamist vision of severe 

constraints on Sudanese society, with the harshest restrictions directed 

toward women and other vulnerable segments of the population. 

Transitional government officials also launched an ambitious 

program of outreach to domestic and international stakeholders 

to seek support for reforms. Senior officials from the Ministry of 

Religious Affairs and Endowments and the Ministry of Education, 

among others, visited some of Sudan’s long-marginalized peripheral areas. A high-ranking delegation visited Washington, DC, in 

December 2019; in the group’s meeting with USCIRF, Prime Minister 

Hamdok expressed his government’s commitment to implementing 

substantive improvements to religious freedom, including repealing the notorious blasphemy and apostasy laws—articles 125 and 

126 of the Penal Code, respectively—in the near future. Later that 

month, the transitional government announced the designation 

of December 25 as a national holiday in celebration of Christmas, 

out of respect for the country’s sizeable Christian community. In 

February 2020, shortly after the reporting period, USCIRF visited 

Sudan to assess religious freedom conditions—meeting with Prime 

Minister Hamdok, other senior officials, and representatives of 

religious communities and civil society. Based on this visit, USCIRF 

determined that the transitional government has ended the former 

regime’s most egregious forms of religious repression and reaffirmed its commitment to substantive change. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Commission delegation visit: Khartoum in February and March 2020

• Special Report: Apostasy, Blasphemy, and Hate Speech Laws in Africa

• Press Statement: USCIRF Applauds Sanctions on Salah Gosh for Gross Human Rights Violations 

• Press Statement: USCIRF Encouraged by Appointment of Special Envoy to Sudan, Urges Close Scrutiny of Religious Freedom 

during Transition
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 81

SUDAN

Background

The population of Sudan is estimated at more than 43 million people; 

Pew Research estimates that 90.7 percent of the population is Muslim; 

5.4 percent is Christian; and the remaining groups include Buddhists, 

Hindus, Baha’is, followers of indigenous religions, and others. Although 

the Interim National Constitution of 2005 enshrined the freedom of 

religion or belief, it affixed Islam—according to a narrow, Islamist interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence—as the source of law and, in practice, 

the former regime consistently and egregiously violated religious freedom. It systematically oppressed religious minorities, including some 

Christian groups whose churches, businesses, and other properties it 

targeted for confiscation and demolition, and whose leadership it systematically harassed and arrested. At the same time, minority-Muslim 

groups, such as the Republican Party, Shi’a Muslims, and Quranists, 

also faced ongoing persecution. The National Intelligence and Security 

Services (NISS) often perpetrated these violations, and its personnel 

closely monitored the activities of religious leaders.

In addition to such repression and persecution, the former 

regime also directed particular disdain, neglect, and violence to 

peripheral areas of the country, such as Darfur and the “Two Areas” of 

South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The regime’s antagonism toward those 

regions resulted in massive underdevelopment, severe repression of 

traditional religious communities and ethnic minorities, and a series of 

brutal civil conflicts that remained unresolved at the time of al-Bashir’s 

deposition in April 2019. 

In August, civilian and military leaders signed the Draft 

Constitutional Charter for a 39-month transitional period, including 

the formation of a Sovereign Council and Council of Ministers to 

oversee the process in lieu of elected leadership or an independent 

legislative branch. The new charter prioritizes transitional justice 

and legal reforms, and it protects freedom of religion or belief while 

notably excluding reference to Islam as the primary source of law, 

signaling a fundamental—if still ongoing—shift in the relationship 

between religion and state. However, it continued to reference Shari’a 

enforcement, and the Transitional Military Council said in May before 

its agreement to share power in a transitional government that it still 

planned to rely on Islamic law to inform legislation—suggesting that 

this entrenched Islamic framework is likely to still influence Sudanese 

governance in the short to medium term. The transitional government 

also moved quickly to provide justice for crimes committed by the 

deposed former regime; in August it indicted al-Bashir on the first 

round of corruption charges, and in December a court convicted and 

sentenced him to two years in prison.

Transitional Reforms 

The transitional government signaled a series of crucial shifts in discourse and policy by the end of 2019. At a September 24 meeting of the 

UN Human Rights Council, Justice Minister Nasr Al Deen Abdel Bary 

explicitly called out the former regime’s marginalization of peripheral 

regions—where indigenous religious communities play a significant 

role—as the “root cause” of their respective conflicts. The following 

day, Sudan signed a crucial agreement with the UN High Commissioner 

for Human Rights to open offices in several of those peripheral areas, 

in a sign that the concurrent peace processes in those regions represented an immediate priority. Meanwhile, the transitional government 

continued to take positive steps in early 2020, including deliberation 

on a “Miscellaneous Law” that is expected to abolish articles 125 

and 126, as well as the issuance of a March 2020 decree disbanding 

former regime-appointed church councils. Finally, following a decade 

of former president al-Bashir flouting the international warrant for his 

arrest—which the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued in 2009 for 

genocide and war crimes Darfur during the conflict in the mid-2000s—

in February 2020 the transitional government agreed in principle to 

allow al-Bashir to stand trial before the ICC.

Ongoing and Systematic Challenges 

Widespread optimism surrounding Sudan’s efforts to leave behind a 

deeply repressive system is inescapable. However, the bureaucratic, 

legal, and ideological burdens of the former regime’s 30 years in power 

still weigh heavily on religious minorities and other vulnerable populations. Protestant Christian groups who bore the brunt of the former 

regime’s persecution of Christians—including oppressive surveillance, 

property confiscations, church destructions, and the creation of shadow 

church councils to obfuscate its actions—continued to have concerns, 

despite some improvements. They have acknowledged that the transitional government decisively ended the most egregious forms of 

persecution, but they insisted that it has not yet dismantled the convoluted system of zoning restrictions, bureaucratic impasses, and other 

obstacles that prevent them from reclaiming property, receiving formal 

recognition, and otherwise trusting that their situation has irrevocably 

changed. Other religious minorities—including Shi’a Muslims, Baha’is, 

Hindus, and adherents of indigenous practices in peripheral areas—

remain marginalized from formal institutions and from the emerging 

national discourse regarding the advancement of religious freedom.

Key U.S. Policy

Bilateral relations improved significantly in 2019. U.S. officials had 

repeatedly put forward over the prior four years a Religious Freedom 

Action Plan for the former government, which suggested reforms 

to align Sudan with international standards for freedom of religion 

or belief, including changes to its legal framework and an end to 

abusive practices such as the demolition of churches. The United 

States has continued to uphold this plan in its consultations with transitional authorities regarding their commitment to advancing religious 

freedom. In June, the United States appointed a new special envoy, 

Ambassador Donald E. Booth, to support Sudan closely during the 

political transition—a step that USCIRF had recommended. During 

Prime Minister Hamdok’s visit to the United States in December, 

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo announced that the United 

States and Sudan would begin the process of exchanging ambassadors. Later that month, the State Department removed Sudan from its 

list of CPCs and placed it on the Special Watch List. However, Sudan 

remained a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), even as 

U.S. officials expressed hope that it would soon meet conditions for 

removal and continued to engage in negotiations with the transitional 

government to this end.
82 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

TURKEY

• Include Turkey on the U.S. Department 

of State’s Special Watch List for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of 

religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Raise in all meetings with Turkish government officials and press at the highest 

levels for the reopening of the Greek 

Orthodox Halki Seminary and for the 

Turkish government to comply fully with 

ECtHR rulings on freedom of religion or 

belief; and

• Direct the U.S. Embassy in Ankara and 

Consulates in Istanbul and Adana to track 

religious communities’ efforts to open, 

regain, renovate, and protect places 

of worship and other religious sites of 

spiritual, cultural, or historic importance, 

and work with the Turkish government to 

ensure the protection of such sites.

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Pass the Defending United States Citizens and Diplomatic Staff from Political 

Prosecutions Act of 2019 (S.1075) to 

defend U.S. citizens and diplomatic staff 

from political prosecution in Turkey, 

particularly when they are targeted in 

connection with religion or belief, and 

to require the imposition of sanctions on 

responsible Turkish officials.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Turkey remained 

worrisome, with the perpetuation of restrictive and intrusive governmental policies on religious practice and a marked increase 

in incidents of vandalism and societal violence against religious 

minorities. As in previous years, the government continued to 

unduly interfere in the internal affairs of religious communities by 

preventing the election of board members for non-Muslim foundations and introducing new limitations on the long-delayed election 

of the Armenian Apostolic Church’s patriarch. The Interior Ministry 

curtailed the candidacies of certain individuals in the latter election 

despite a May 2019 Constitutional Court ruling that prior acts of 

such state interference had violated religious freedom. Alevis, the 

country’s largest religious minority community, remained unable 

to gain official recognition for their gathering houses (cemevleri) 

as places of worship or to exempt their children from compulsory 

religious classes, despite European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 

rulings finding that these policies violated Alevis’ rights. 

Religious minorities in Turkey expressed concerns that governmental rhetoric and policies contributed to an increasingly 

hostile environment and implicitly encouraged acts of societal 

aggression and violence. Government officials and politicians 

continued to propagate expressions of anti-Semitism and hate 

speech, and no progress was made during the year to repeal 

Turkey’s blasphemy law or to provide an alternative to mandatory military service and permit conscientious objection. Many 

longstanding issues concerning religious sites, such as the inability 

of the Greek Orthodox community to train clergy at the Halki 

Seminary, remained unresolved. In several instances in 2019, 

Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek religious and cultural sites, including numerous cemeteries, faced severe damage or destruction—in 

some cases because of neglect, but also due to vandalism or 

state-endorsed construction projects—while Alevi holy sites in the 

province of Sivas faced similar threats after the government issued 

mining permits for the surrounding area. In August 2019, Turkish 

President Recep Tayyip Erdog ̆an attended the foundation-laying 

ceremony for a Syriac Orthodox church in Istanbul, which has been 

characterized as the first newly constructed church in the history 

of the Turkish republic. However, throughout the year, President 

Erdog ̆an called multiple times for the Hagia Sophia, a historic 

Greek Orthodox basilica that has held legal status as a museum 

since 1935, to be converted back into a mosque. In November 

2019, a Turkish higher court also issued a decision permitting the 

Chora (Kariye) Museum, a former Greek Orthodox church, to be 

converted back into a mosque—thereby possibly setting a precedent for the similar conversion of the Hagia Sophia. 

Throughout the year, the Turkish government continued to 

dismiss, detain, and arrest individuals affiliated with, or accused 

of affiliation with, the U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gülen, for 

alleged complicity in a July 2016 coup attempt or involvement 

in terrorist activity.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Hearing: Religious Freedom in Turkey

• Press Statement: USCIRF Urges U.S. Policymakers to Remain Engaged on Religious Freedom in Turkey

• Press Statement: USCIRF Condemns Erdog ̆an’s Threats to Change Status of Hagia Sophia
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 83

TURKEY

Background

According to the CIA World Factbook, the population of Turkey is approximately 82 million, of which 99.8 percent identifies as Muslim; an estimated 

77.5 percent majority adheres to Sunni Islam. Between 10 million and 25 

million people identify as Alevi, a community that the Turkish government largely refuses to differentiate from majority Sunni Muslims. The 

remaining 0.2 percent of the population comprises atheists, Armenian 

Apostolics, Baha’is, Bulgarian Orthodox, Chaldean Catholics, Greek 

Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Protestants, Roman Catholics, 

Syriac Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, and other religious communities. 

The Turkish constitution defines the country as a secular state 

and guarantees the freedom of conscience, religious belief, and conviction. However, the Turkish government also exercises extensive 

control over both majority Muslim and non-Muslim religious communities through either the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), 

which oversees the practice of Islam, or the General Directorate of 

Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüg ̆ü), which regulates the activities 

of other religious communities. Some observers have characterized 

the Diyanet under President Erdog ̆an’s leadership as “an instrument 

of [his] party's political and ideological agenda” abroad, employing 

a fusion of Turkish nationalism and Sunni Islam as a foreign policy 

tool. Within Turkey, no religious community has been permitted legal 

personality (recognition as a legal entity). Although discrimination 

on religious grounds is prohibited, non-Sunni Muslim individuals in 

particular have reported incidents of discrimination in the workplace.

State Interference in Religious Affairs 

The Turkish government remained involved—and in certain cases 

directly interfered—in the selection processes for leadership positions 

of many religious groups. As the Directorate of Religious Affairs is 

responsible for the appointment of all imams throughout the country, 

Muslim communities lacked the means to select their own religious 

leaders independently. Some imams who declined or failed to adhere 

to the Directorate of Religious Affairs’ guidelines were reportedly 

dismissed from their positions. The government also continued to 

block the election of new board members to Turkey’s non-Muslim 

foundations by failing to provide the necessary regulations to allow 

for an election, as has been the case since 2013. 

After the passing of Armenian Patriarch Mesrob Mutafyan in 

March 2019, the Armenian Apostolic community undertook preparations to hold a long-sought election for the position of patriarch. 

Patriarch Mutafyan had been unable to fulfill his duties since 2008 

due to illness, leading the community beginning in 2010 to petition 

the Turkish government to hold elections for his replacement. The 

government blocked all attempts in the intervening years to hold an 

election, and it interfered again in September 2019 when the Interior 

Ministry introduced a new regulation barring the candidacies of any 

otherwise eligible individuals if they were serving abroad. The community finally elected a new patriarch in December 2019.

Societal Persecution and Violence against 

Religious Minorities

Throughout 2019, members of Turkey’s various religious and ethnic minority communities faced both threats of violence and actual 

violence, including at least two killings. In May, 86-year-old Zafir 

Pinari, a Greek man, was found murdered in his home on the island of 

Gökçeada. In November, Christian missionary and South Korean citizen 

Jinwook Kim was stabbed to death in the streets of the southeastern 

city of Diyarbakır. In Istanbul, an Armenian citizen was stabbed at her 

front door two months after a message arranged in the shape of a cross 

was posted on the wall of her home, containing profanity and referring 

to the residents as “infidels.” In multiple incidents in 2019, Alevi homes 

were similarly vandalized with graffiti and threatening messages, and in 

November, burglars broke into the home of the Ecumenical Patriarch 

of Constantinople, Bartholomew I. In March, an unidentified individual threw a Molotov cocktail at the Beth Israel Synagogue in Izmir; 

according to reports, local authorities apprehended the individual and 

charged them with “damaging places of worship.”

Blasphemy Charges

Turkey has occasionally charged individuals for blasphemy under article 216 (3) of the Penal Code, which punishes “openly insulting the 

religious values held by a segment of society.” In May 2019, Turkish 

actress Berna Laçin was acquitted of blasphemy charges brought 

against her the previous year in connection with social media posts; 

however, authorities then appealed her acquittal, which was later 

upheld after the end of the reporting period, in January 2020. Similarly, 

officials detained two local staffers of the U.S. Consulate in Adana in 

November 2019 for “mocking Islamic values” in a video posted on 

social media. Although authorities launched an investigation, they 

reportedly released the two individuals shortly after their arrest.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States and Turkey maintain close relations as strategic allies 

and as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

However, as in the previous year, the bilateral relationship remained 

strained in 2019. On October 6, 2019, President Donald J. Trump 

announced the withdrawal of U.S. forces from northern Syria, making 

way for a Turkish military operation into the region. Following Turkey’s 

unilateral invasion into Syria, and amid concerns of war crimes and a 

possible ISIS resurgence, President Trump issued an executive order 

(E.O. 13894) to sanction Turkish officials contributing to the deteriorating situation in Syria, increase tariffs on Turkish steel, and suspend 

trade negotiations. The U.S. Department of the Treasury subsequently 

designated two Turkish ministries and three ministers under the E.O. 

That same month, Vice President Michael R. Pence and Secretary 

of State Michael R. Pompeo visited Ankara to negotiate a 120-hour 

ceasefire in Syria that expressly committed the two governments to 

protect religious and ethnic minorities. In November 2019, President 

Erdog ̆an visited the White House to meet with President Trump and 

some members of the U.S. Senate to discuss Syria, including the security of Christian minorities along the Syrian-Turkish border.

In June 2019, Secretary Pompeo and Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom Samuel D. Brownback urged the 

Turkish government to reopen the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary. 

In January 2020, shortly after the reporting period, Ambassador 

Brownback traveled to Turkey to meet with Patriarch Bartholomew 

to discuss religious freedom issues.
84 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

UZBEKISTAN

• Maintain Uzbekistan on the State Department’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International 

Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Work with the government of Uzbekistan 

to revise the 1998 religion law to comply 

with international human rights standards, and encourage the government 

to remove registration requirements 

on religious communities, permit the 

possession and distribution of religious 

literature, and permit the sharing of religious beliefs; and

• Press at the highest levels for the immediate release of individuals imprisoned 

for their peaceful religious activities or 

religious affiliations, and press the government of Uzbekistan to treat prisoners 

humanely and allow for independent 

prison monitoring.

I

n 2019, religious freedom conditions in Uzbekistan trended positively. The government took notable steps to address some of 

the long-standing and significant religious freedom concerns 

that had led USCIRF to recommend Uzbekistan’s designation as 

a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International 

Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), every year since 2005, including in 

April 2019. Throughout 2019, the government by and large successfully enforced a ban on law enforcement authorities raiding 

and harassing religious communities, and in August announced the 

closure of the notorious Jasliq Prison, a course of action USCIRF 

had recommended. The government also continued to engage 

closely with the United States and other international partners to 

improve religious freedom. However, some issues saw little to no 

improvement or experienced backsliding. Thousands of religious 

prisoners—mostly observant Muslims—are estimated to remain 

behind bars on fabricated charges of “religious extremism” or 

membership in a banned religious group. Many religious prisoners 

subjected to multiple arbitrary extensions of their prison terms 

under the previous government continued to serve those sentences, and claimed to have experienced torture, which remains 

widespread and routine. 

Some incidents throughout 2019 reinforced concerns that 

the government continued to restrict Muslim religious practice 

not in line with the state-prescribed interpretation of Islam. The 

government opposes Muslims growing beards or wearing hijabs 

as expressions of their religious beliefs, and both local government 

and law enforcement officials singled out and violated the rights 

of visibly religious Muslims. In separate episodes in the cities of 

Tashkent and Namangan, authorities rounded up and forced more 

than 100 men to shave their beards. Other government officials 

embarked on a campaign to actively discourage girls and women 

from wearing the hijab, with some authorities reportedly compiling 

lists of hijab-wearing girls and women for monitoring purposes. In 

a number of instances, Fergana Regional Governor Shuhrat Ganiev 

expressed open hostility toward Muslims, including by threatening

subordinates who tolerated the hijab.

The Uzbek government also failed during 2019 to fulfill its 

May 2018 pledge to revise the restrictive 1998 Law on Freedom of 

Conscience and Religious Organizations (1998 religion law), which 

continues to regulate and restrict all religious activity. The Ministry 

of Justice and other government officials continued to work on 

a revised draft of the law and sought some international feedback on their changes. Throughout the year, government officials 

stated that many of the law’s most demanding and burdensome 

provisions would remain, including the mandatory registration of 

religious groups; the requirement that religious groups secure the 

approval of the mahalla (local community) to register; state review 

and approval of all religious literature; and bans on proselytism, 

missionary activity, the private teaching of religion, and any unregistered or unapproved religious activity. After the reporting period, 

however, government officials informed USCIRF that they intended 

to remove the mahalla from the registration process. Although 

eight minority communities were registered during the year, many 

religious minorities, such as some Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

and Protestants, remained unable to register because of their small 

numbers or local opposition.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Commission delegation visit: Tashkent and Fergana in September 2019

• Staff visit: Tashkent, Samarqand, and Bukhara in May 2019

• Country Update: Assessing Religious Freedom in Uzbekistan 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 85

UZBEKISTAN

Background

The government of Uzbekistan estimates that between 93 and 94 

percent of the country’s estimated population of 33 million identifies 

as Muslim. The majority adheres to Sunni Islam, and approximately 

1 percent identifies as Shi’a Muslim. Around 3.5 percent of the population identifies as Russian Orthodox, and the remaining 3 percent 

comprises atheists, Baha’is, Buddhists, Catholics, Hare Krishnas, 

Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, and Protestants.

Under the administration of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev beginning in late 2016, Uzbekistan has taken some positive steps to allow 

for religious freedom. Uzbekistan’s constitution guarantees freedom 

of religion or belief; however, it also allows for its limitation where it 

encroaches on the “lawful interests, rights, and freedoms of other citizens, the state, or society.” Other legislation—such as the 1998 religion 

law, the Administrative Code, and the Criminal Code—facilitates government control of all religious activity, such as by requiring registration 

of all religious groups, criminalizing unregistered religious activity, and 

subjecting all religious literature and other materials to state approval.

Religious Prisoners

It is impossible to definitively ascertain the number of prisoners incarcerated in Uzbekistan in connection with their peaceful religious beliefs 

or practices. Estimates from international and local human rights organizations generally range from 1,500 to 5,000 prisoners. According to 

human rights activists in Uzbekistan, many of the remaining religious 

prisoners were sentenced in connection with real or fabricated membership in the Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is banned in 

Uzbekistan. However, they contend that few were legitimately guilty of 

committing or inciting violence. Religious prisoners Aramais Avakian 

and Ruhiddin Fahrutdinov, who have been covered in previous USCIRF 

Annual Reports and are listed in USCIRF’s Freedom of Religion or Belief 

Victims List, remained imprisoned through the end of 2019. However, 

Avakian was released in February 2020, after the reporting period.

In a positive development, President Mirziyoyev announced in 

August 2019 that the government would close the infamous Jasliq 

Prison, an isolated facility in the country’s northwest that is notorious for 

torture and the incarceration of religious prisoners. Uzbekistan’s Ministry 

of Interior Affairs stated that approximately 10 percent of Jasliq inmates 

were imprisoned for crimes connected with “religious extremism.” By 

the end of the year, however, concerns remained that Jasliq Prison 

would not be closed completely, and would instead be transferred to 

the control of local authorities to be used as a pretrial detention center. 

Government Control of Religious Practice 

and Expression

Throughout the year, high-level government officials from Uzbekistan 

made commitments—both in Uzbekistan and during visits to the 

United States—to ensure greater religious freedom for all citizens. 

However, the government continued to wield extensive control and 

influence over all aspects of religious activity throughout the country. 

Although the government pledged to revise the 1998 religion law with 

the parliament’s adoption of a “road map” on freedom of religion or 

belief in May 2018, the restrictive law still governs the everyday practice and activities of all religious groups. According to interlocutors 

in Uzbekistan, many non-Muslim religious minorities, such as some 

Catholic, Jehovah’s Witness, and Protestant communities, were unable 

to acquire legal registration. 

The government remained primarily concerned with controlling 

the practice of Islam out of fear of the potential for “radical Islam” and 

religious extremism. This position was exemplified by the government’s 

decisions in August and September 2019, respectively, to reassign then 

deputy chairman of the Committee on Religious Affairs (CRA) Nuriyman 

Abulhasan to the Department for Combating Terrorism and Extremism in 

the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and to appoint Abdujafur Ahmedov from 

the State Security Service (SSS) to lead the CRA. Authorities continued 

to target Muslims who adhere to a more conservative interpretation of 

Islam or are outwardly observant. In August, law enforcement detained 

around 100 men in a market in Tashkent and forced them to shave their 

beards, ostensibly to bring their appearances in line with their biometric 

passports so they could be identified by smart cameras. At least one 

other such incident also took place in Namangan the following month. 

Similarly, during the year, there were reports that officials instructed 

school administrators to confiscate girls’ hijabs at the gates of schools, 

and compiled lists of girls who wore the hijab to be monitored. In June, 

Uzbekistan’s Supreme Court dismissed the case of Luiza Muminjonova, 

a 19-year-old student expelled from the International Islamic Academy 

in Tashkent the previous year for refusing to remove her hijab.

The government reportedly places its own limitations on hajj and 

umrah pilgrimages separate from the quotas and requirements established by Saudi Arabia. Muslims who wish to perform the hajj or umrah 

must secure permission from the government, which has allegedly 

excluded particularly religious Muslims and enforces an unofficial age 

limit. Moreover, pilgrims are required to use state-approved travel 

agencies and are barred from joining tours organized by other companies. In August, the SSS reportedly detained and interrogated a group 

of 35 pilgrims, who had completed the hajj through a private company 

based in the United Arab Emirates, in Tashkent International Airport.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States and Uzbekistan cooperate closely on issues of 

regional stability and security, including combatting terrorism. In 

April 2019, the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance 

program sponsored training for 13 Ministry of Internal Affairs participants. Uzbekistan also participates in the C5+1 forum with the other 

countries of Central Asia and the United States, and in May it hosted 

a workshop on religious tolerance and countering violent extremism 

sponsored in part by the United States Institute of Peace. Human 

rights and religious freedom remain a priority for the United States 

in the bilateral relationship. In February, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Alice G. 

Wells visited Uzbekistan, where she raised religious freedom issues 

and specifically cited the release of prisoners of conscience as a positive step. The State Department removed Uzbekistan from the CPC list 

and placed it on the Special Watch List for the first time in December 

2018, and did so again in November 2019.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020 87

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 

(USCIRF) Annual Report focuses on those countries that USCIRF 

finds meet the statutory criteria for the State Department to 

designate as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) or include on 

its Special Watch List (SWL) pursuant to the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA). The Annual Report is intended to focus the attention of U.S. government policymakers on the most severe violations 

of religious freedom globally. However, consistent with its mandate 

under IRFA, USCIRF also monitors religious freedom conditions in 

countries that do not meet the statutory criteria for CPC or SWL. 

This section summarizes key trends and developments in religious 

freedom conditions around the world in 2019. It is not intended to be an 

exhaustive overview of the reporting year, but rather to note significant 

events, such as the passage of national legislation pertaining to religion, 

a noticeable change in the number or severity of incidents of religiously 

motivated intolerance, or trends that have important transnational or 

international impacts. For details about specific incidents or trends 

in countries that USCIRF recommends for CPC designation or SWL 

placement, see the individual country chapters contained in this report. 

Chinese Influence on 

Religious Freedom Internationally 

The Chinese government’s actions have resulted in the persecution of 

religious groups within China’s borders, as discussed elsewhere in this 

report, and also have negatively affected religious freedom conditions 

internationally. Chinese diplomats continued to subvert the international human rights system by 

opposing United Nations (UN) 

resolutions condemning human 

rights violations and by arguing 

that economic progress should 

precede respect for individual 

rights. For example, in February 

2020, China’s permanent representative to the UN vetoed a UN 

Security Council declaration supporting the International Court of 

Justice’s ruling ordering the Burmese government to protect Rohingya 

refugees. Chinese diplomats also reportedly used economic and 

diplomatic leverage to dissuade other governments from criticizing 

China’s record before UN human rights mechanisms. 

The Chinese government has exerted pressure on governments—

particularly in Central and South Asia—to target activists criticizing the 

Chinese government’s religious persecution and to repatriate refugees 

fleeing such persecution. In August, Kazakh authorities—reportedly 

under pressure from China—prosecuted Serikzhan Bilash, a prominent critic of the concentration camps in Xinjiang, and only released 

him after he accepted restrictions on his activism. In October 2019, 

the Chinese and Nepalese governments signed a secret extradition 

treaty requiring the handover of individuals entering illegally to each 

other’s country, which Tibetan advocacy groups fear could be used to 

extradite Tibetans attempting to flee China. In addition, in July, the 

Nepalese government banned Tibetan Buddhists from celebrating the 

Dalai Lama’s 84th birthday. In October, during a visit to Kathmandu by 

Chinese President Xi Jinping, Nepalese authorities reportedly restricted

the return of 33 Tibetans who had attended a meeting in Dharamshala, 

home of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. 

In addition, China has exported surveillance technology and systems training to more than 100 countries. Although some recipients of 

this technology have used it for legitimate public policy goals, others 

have used it to target political opponents or oppress religious freedom. 

For example, in August 2019, Uzbek authorities forced approximately 

100 Muslim men to shave their beards, claiming that the beards hindered Chinese facial recognition technology used by the government. 

In 2019, the U.S. government increased diplomatic efforts to 

counter Chinese influence on religious freedom internationally. In 

September, the State Department hosted a side event at the UN General Assembly about Xinjiang. In January 2020, outside the reporting 

period, the State Department appointed Mark Lambert as a special 

envoy to counter the “malign influence” of China at the UN. 

Rising Anti-Semitism in 

Europe and Elsewhere

In 2019, the global Jewish community experienced a further 

increase in anti-Semitic incidents, 

including discrimination, defamation, Holocaust denial, hate 

speech on the Internet, and vandalism of synagogues, cemeteries, and other community institutions. 

Anti-Semitism is common in countries that USCIRF recommends for 

designation as CPCs or placement on the SWL—such as Iran and Saudi 

Arabia—but is also increasingly common in other countries, including: 

• Argentina: In February, vandals desecrated a Jewish cemetery 

with Nazi symbols. In addition, in June, three youths shouted

anti-Semitic insults at an Argentinian rabbi before violently 

assaulting him.

China has exported surveillance 

technology and systems training to 

more than 100 countries.
88 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

• France: In 2019, France experienced a 27 percent increase in the 

number of anti-Semitic acts. In eastern France, more than 180 

graves in Jewish cemeteries were desecrated with Nazi symbols.

• Germany: In one particularly alarming incident, a gunman 

attempted to break into a synagogue in Halle on October 9, 

2019, during Yom Kippur (the holiest day in the Jewish calendar).

• Italy: Due to increased threats, the government assigned 

paramilitary officers to guard Liliana Segre, an 89-year-old 

woman who is both a Holocaust survivor and a senator in the 

Italian parliament.

• United Kingdom: The United Kingdom experienced a 7 

percent increase in the number of anti-Semitic incidents in 

2019. In February, nine Members of Parliament left the Labour 

Party, partly due to their dissatisfaction with party leader 

Jeremy Corbyn’s handling of anti-Semitism allegations within 

the party. 

• Sweden: Neo-Nazis blocked the entrance to a Holocaust exhibition in southern Sweden and intimidated visitors. This follows 

a pattern of anti-Semitic bullying, including at the renowned 

Karolinska University Hospital in Solna.

Due to this increasingly dangerous situation, many Jews were 

fearful of expressing their religious identity; in surveys, four in ten 

young Jewish Europeans reported that they had considered emigrating from their home country because they are concerned for 

their safety. Additionally, surveys find that non-Jewish Europeans 

have an inaccurate understanding of Jews and anti-Semitism. 

In a recent poll, one third of 

Europeans indicated that they 

knew little or nothing at all 

about the Holocaust.

There were reasons for 

optimism during the reporting 

period. More countries created

positions similar to the U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism. Eight countries 

adopted the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s 

“Working Definition of Antisemitism”. Some governments actively 

sought to improve the situation for their Jewish communities. 

French Minister of the Interior Christophe Castener announced the 

creation of a new national hate crime office charged with investigating all anti-Semitic acts. Germany opened an online reporting 

center for victims to report anti-Semitic attacks. Additionally, German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer and the 16 state-level interior 

ministers agreed to procedures meant to prevent more attacks 

like the incident in Halle, including measures specifically aimed at 

targeting violence against Jewish people and institutions. 

New or Increased Penalties for Blasphemy

As of April 2020, USCIRF was aware of at least 84 countries that 

have laws against blasphemy. Additionally, authorities in some 

countries utilize broad laws that prohibit other forms of speech—

instead of specific blasphemy laws—in order to target speech 

deemed blasphemous. Many of these laws allow courts to impose 

lengthy prison sentences on individuals found guilty. In 2019, Indonesia considered expanding the criminalization of blasphemy, as 

discussed previously in this report. Several countries not included 

elsewhere adopted or newly implemented legislation that increased 

the penalties for blasphemy:

• Bangladesh: In 2019, Bangladesh began enforcing article 

28 of the Digital Security Act of 2018, which criminalizes any 

“publication, broadcast, etc.” that “hurts religious sentiment 

or values.” The government reportedly arrested 29 individuals 

under this law, including a Hindu man after individuals hacked 

his Facebook account and posted material deemed critical of 

the Prophet of Islam, and a Sufi singer for comments he made 

during a concert. 

• Brunei: In April, the government of Brunei implemented the 

Shari’a Penal Code, which had been announced in 2013. The 

law introduced the death penalty for any insult to or defamation of the Prophet Muhammad. After an international 

backlash, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah claimed his government 

would not enforce the death penalty sentences provided for 

under the law. 

• Singapore: In October, Singapore’s parliament amended the 

Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act to increase penalties 

against acts or speech allegedly 

undermining religious harmony 

or insulting a religion. The 

amendments also make it easier 

to prosecute religious leaders 

for such offenses, allegedly 

because they have a greater 

ability to influence and mobilize 

followers. The amendments 

allow restraining orders against 

offensive material online to go 

into effect immediately, in contrast to the previously required 

14-day notice period. 

In a positive development, the governments of New Zealand and 

Greece both removed blasphemy provisions from their respective 

criminal codes in 2019, making them the seventh and eighth countries 

to have repealed a blasphemy law since 2015. 

Targeting of Religious Groups for Their 

Political Advocacy

In certain situations, a government’s repression of a religious group 

or its followers for political or social advocacy has implications for 

religious freedom. In some countries, authorities have cracked down 

on or publicly attempted to stigmatize entire religious communities 

because members criticized—or were perceived to have criticized—

government policies. In 2019, there were reports that governments 

. . . four in ten young Jewish Europeans 

reported that they had considered 

emigrating from their home country because 

they are concerned for their safety.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020 89

engaged in collective retaliation against religious groups in the following countries, in addition to India, Iran, and Nicaragua, which are 

discussed elsewhere in this report: 

• Cameroon: Multiple Catholic priests have been kidnapped 

and killed in the violence between separatists and state security forces. Some priests were targeted for trying to preach 

peace, while others were accused of actively supporting one 

side or another.

• Philippines: President Rodrigo Duterte publicly denounced

and called for the assassination of Catholic bishops who 

criticized his administration’s war on drugs, which human rights 

groups estimate has led to thousands of extrajudicial killings. 

In November, the Armed Forces named the National Council 

of Churches in the Philippines—an ecumenical fellowship representing 10 Protestant churches—as a front for “communist 

terror groups,” which potentially could subject members to 

detention without charges and restrictions on travel. 

The Rise of Ethnoreligious Nationalism 

In addition to the ongoing ethnoreligious nationalism in countries 

like Burma, India and Russia, 2019 saw a marked rise in ethnoreligious nationalism, particularly in South Asia. Hardliners and political 

opportunists attempted to redefine the national identity on strict 

ethnoreligious grounds, excluding religious minority communities. 

• Nepal: During 2019, a number of leading Nepalese politicians 

continued to push to redefine Nepal as a Hindu state, which 

would violate a parliamentary resolution in 2008 declaring 

Nepal a secular state. In 2019, the government also began 

implementation of a new, strict anti-conversion law, leading to 

the arrests of members of religious minority communities for 

proselytization activities, as well as inspiring Hindu extremists 

to attack Christian pastors accused of conversion activities. 

• Sri Lanka: Several major political parties, as well as newly 

elected President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, actively promoted 

Sinhalese Buddhist 

nationalism, breeding 

mistrust and antagonism 

against religious minorities. 

After suicide bombings 

killed approximately 

250 Christians on Easter 

Sunday (April 21), hardline 

Buddhist mobs launched

attacks and economic boycotts against Sri Lanka’s Muslim community. There were also 

reports of an attack against a group of Muslims heading to the 

polls during the November 2019 presidential election.

• Thailand: In November 2019, a primarily Buddhist community 

in the northeast voted against a local Muslim cleric’s proposal 

to register a mosque (according to a 2005 regulation, a referendum is required to approve the registration of any house of 

worship). In addition, Thai police had issued an order directing 

universities to provide information on Muslim students, but 

later canceled the order after a backlash.

Spike in Attacks on Places of Worship or Holy Sites

In 2019, attacks on places of worship occurred with greater frequency 

around the globe. Places of worship are often harmed more subtly 

through the misuse of registration procedures to prevent their construction or renovation, or the malicious surveillance of holy sites to 

intimidate worshippers. Different types of buildings and properties 

that are significant to religious communities, such as cemeteries, 

monasteries, or community centers, also have been targeted.

• New Zealand: In March 2019, shooters attacked worshippers 

attending Friday prayers at Masjid Al Noor in central Christchurch, the largest city on the country’s southern island; 42 

people were killed. A second shooting took place at Linwood 

Masjid in an eastern suburb of Christchurch; seven people 

were killed. 

• Sri Lanka: During Easter services in 2019, suicide bombers violently attacked three churches in Colombo, Sri Lanka, as well 

as three luxury hotels, killing 259 people. The bombing was 

conducted by the local extremist group National Thowheeth 

Jama’ath and later claimed by the Islamic State.

• France: In February 2019, swastikas and other Nazi symbols 

and anti-Semitic slogans were spray painted on roughly 80 

gravestones in a Jewish cemetery in France. The damage was 

discovered the day marches were planned to protest against a 

rise in anti-Semitic attacks in the country.

Exportation of Religious Intolerance

Some governments in 2019 exported intolerant religious interpretations that called for violence and severe persecution of those with 

different religious beliefs. Governments export these interpretations 

in order to build a global community of like-minded people, and to 

frame themselves as guardians 

of the religion. Among other 

governments, Saudi Arabia and 

Iran stand out as countries that 

actively export their religious 

beliefs abroad. Saudi Arabia 

continues to send its official 

textbooks promoting its government-endorsed version of Islam 

to schools overseas. It is unclear 

whether old textbooks that promote violence against non-Muslim 

communities have been recalled. Iran has pursued a more broadbased approach, developing relationships with senior Shi’a clerics 

at Iraqi centers of Shi’a learning in Najaf and Qarbala and supporting proxy groups whose religious ideas broadly align with Iran’s. 

Throughout 2019, Houthi authorities in Yemen prosecuted members 

of the Baha’i community on charges similar to those levied against 

Baha’is in Iran.

In March 2019, shooters attacked worshippers 

attending Friday prayers at 

Masjid Al Noor in central Christchurch.

APPENDIX 1: COMMISSIONERS BIOGRAPHIES 91

APPENDIX 1: COMMISSIONERS BIOGRAPHIES

Tony Perkins, 

Chair

Appointed by: Hon. Mitch McConnell 

(R), Senate Majority Leader, for a term 

expiring in May 2020. 

President of the Family Research 

Council (FRC), a religious public policy 

organization.

Gayle Manchin, 

Vice Chair

Appointed by: Hon. Charles Schumer 

(D), Senate Minority Leader, for a term 

expiring in May 2020. 

Educator, former First Lady of West 

Virginia and past president of the State 

Board of Education.

Tenzin Dorjee, 

Commissioner

Reappointed by: Hon. Nancy Pelosi (D), 

Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, for a term expiring in May 2020.

Associate Professor, California State University Fullerton.

Sharon Kleinbaum, 

Commissioner

Appointed by: Hon. Charles Schumer 

(D), Senate Minority Leader, for a term 

expiring in May 2020. 

Rabbi and spiritual leader of Congregation Beit Simchat Torah.

Johnnie Moore, 

Commissioner

Appointed by: President Donald J. 

Trump, for a term expiring in May 2020.

Founder and CEO of the KAIROS Company, a public relations consultancy, and 

former Chief of Staff and Vice President 

of Faith Content for the United Artists 

Media Group.

Nadine Maenza, 

Vice Chair

Appointed by: President Donald J. 

Trump, for a term expiring in May 2020. 

Executive Director of Patriot Voices and 

former Chairman of Hardwired Global, 

an organization working to stop religious 

oppression around the world.

Gary L. Bauer, 

Commissioner

Reappointed by: President Donald J. 

Trump, for a term expiring in May 2021. 

President of American Values, a public policy think tank, and Washington 

Director of Christians United for Israel 

Action Fund.

Anurima Bhargava, 

Commissioner

Appointed by: Hon. Nancy Pelosi (D), 

Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, for a term expiring in May 2020. 

Civil rights lawyer and founder and president of Anthem of Us.

James W. Carr, 

Commissioner

Appointed by: Hon. Kevin McCarthy 

(R), House Minority Leader, for a term 

expiring in May 2020. 

President and Chairman of Highland 

Home Holdings investment fund, and 

formerly served on the National Security 

Education Board.

APPENDIX 2: RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT AND VICTIMS LIST 93

APPENDIX 2: RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF 

CONSCIENCE PROJECT AND VICTIMS LIST

RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT

Through the Religious Prisoners of Conscience (RPOC) Project, 

USCIRF seeks to raise awareness of those imprisoned for their 

religion or belief, reduce their numbers, and highlight the country 

conditions that led to their imprisonment.

Current RPOCs:

Leah Sharibu

USCIRF Advocate

Chair Tony Perkins

The Panchen Lama

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Tenzin Dorjee 

and Vice Chair Nadine Maenza

Dennis Christensen

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner 

Sharon Kleinbaum

Hu Shigen

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Gary Bauer

Golrokh Iraee

USCIRF Advocate

Vice Chair Gayle Manchin

Gulmira Imin

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Tenzin Dorjee

Nguyen Bac Truyen

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner 

Anurima Bhargava

Raif Badawi 

USCIRF Advocate

Vice Chair Nadine Maenza

Youcef Nadarkhani

USCIRF Advocate

Vice Chair Nadine Maenza

Patriarch Antonios

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Johnnie Moore

Hamid bin Haydara

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Johnnie Moore

Robert Levinson

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Johnnie Moore
94 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2020

RPOCs Released in 2019:

Abdul Shakoor 

(March 2019)

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Johnnie Moore

Dilshat Ataman 

(July 2019)

USCIRF Advocate

Chair Tony Perkins

Ivan Matsitsky 

(November 2019)

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner 

Sharon Kleinbaum
APPENDIX 2: RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT AND VICTIMS LIST 95

FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), as amended 

by the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2016, 

requires USCIRF to:

“make publicly available, to the extent practicable . . . lists of 

persons it determines are imprisoned or detained, have disappeared, been placed under house arrest, been tortured, 

or subjected to forced renunciation of faith for their religious 

activity or religious freedom advocacy by the government 

of a foreign country that the Commission recommends for 

designation as a country of particular concern [CPC] . . . or 

by a nonstate actor that the Commission recommends for 

designation as an entity of particular concern [EPC].”

In October 2019, USCIRF launched its Freedom of Religion or 

Belief (FoRB) Victims List, a database that catalogues select victims 

targeted due to their religion or belief from countries that USCIRF 

recommends for CPC designation. The Act further provides USCIRF 

with discretion on whether to include a victim based on safety and 

security concerns. To date, the FoRB Victims List includes over 400 

victims from 11 countries representing a diverse number of faith communities, as demonstrated in the chart below. Victims included in this 

list may have been targeted for one of these violations due to their 

faith-based activity or advocacy, or by laws that conflict with religious 

freedom, such as blasphemy or apostasy laws.

Please refer to the USCIRF website for more information on the 

FoRB Victims list.


UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714

Washington, DC 20401

Telephone: (202) 523–3240

www.uscirf.gov

2020 USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS

Burma

China

Eritrea

India

Iran

Nigeria

North Korea

Pakistan

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Vietnam

■ COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN

Afghanistan

Algeria

Azerbaijan

Bahrain

Central African Republic

Cuba

Egypt

Indonesia

Iraq

Kazakhstan

Malaysia

Nicaragua

Sudan

Turkey

Uzbekistan

■ SPECIAL WATCH LIST COUNTRIES