SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3707-21 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

NATASHA WHITE, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Submitted December 19, 2023 – Decided January 8, 2024 

Before Judges Rose and Perez Friscia. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 07-10-3478.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs).

Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E. 

Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3707-21

Defendant Natasha White appeals from a June 30, 2022 Law Division 

order, which denied her second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without 

an evidentiary hearing. We affirm because the petition was untimely filed and 

otherwise lacked merit. 

We incorporate by reference the facts and procedural history set forth in 

our prior opinion, affirming defendant's convictions and sentence on direct 

appeal. State v. White (White I), No. A-0304-09 (App. Div. July 10, 2012) (slip 

op. at 3-11). Defendant's "convictions arose out of two related incidents." Id. 

at 3. "In the first incident, defendant purposefully rammed her vehicle" into her 

paramour Zachary Sanders's vehicle after they argued outside of a bar. Id. at 3-

4. She then "attempted to hit Sanders" before driving off. Id. at 4. The second 

incident occurred several days later at the same bar. Id. at 5. Defendant and 

Sanders had another argument and exited the bar. Id. at 6. While intoxicated, 

defendant intentionally drove her vehicle into Sanders and another individual. 

Id. at 7-8. Sanders "landed on the middle of the [vehicle's] hood," and defendant 

nonetheless continued to drive, dragging Sanders under her vehicle, which 

resulted in his death. Ibid. 

In 2009, a jury convicted defendant of multiple offenses charged in an 

Essex County indictment, including murder and vehicular homicide by 
3 A-3707-21

recklessly operating a motor vehicle, and related offenses. The trial judge 

sentenced defendant to an aggregate sentence of forty-four-and-one-half years 

in prison with a period of parole eligibility of thirty-four years. 

Defendant appealed, challenging the admission of trial testimony, jury 

charges, causation, and sentencing, among other issues. See id. at 11-12. We 

affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. Id. at 2. 

In March 2013, defendant filed a timely petition for PCR, asserting trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to: "assert an intoxication defense"; 

"adequately cross-examine and impeach witnesses"; "properly advise defendant 

about a plea offer"; and "preserve evidence[,]her vehicle[,]for inspection by an 

expert." State v. White (White II), No. A-4595-13 (App. Div. Sept. 14, 2016) 

(slip op. at 3). We affirmed the denial of her PCR petition. Id. at 7. 

In May 2018, defendant filed a self-represented motion to correct an 

illegal sentence. In July 2019, a different judge denied the motion without 

prejudice because the motion was improperly filed. 

In the Fall of 2019, defendant filed her second PCR petition and a motion 

requesting appointment of counsel for her second petition. In December 2021, 

a new PCR judge denied defendant's application but thereafter vacated the order, 

permitting appointment of counsel on the refiling of the second PCR. 
4 A-3707-21

In the refiled second PCR petition, defendant mainly alleged ineffective 

assistance of counsel (IAC) of prior motion counsel, stating: "[m]otion counsel 

lacked diligence and failed to zealously represent" her; "[c]umulative [e]rrors 

denied [her] of the effective assistance of motion counsel"; and the application 

was "timely and properly filed and should be considered on the merits." In her 

self-represented supplemental brief, defendant additionally argued her 

convictions should be vacated and a new trial granted because "the trial court's 

instructions to [the jury] were unduly confusing and did not accurately reflect 

the state of [the law]" on the charges for murder and vehicular homicide; "thus[,] 

the sentences . . . are illegal because the verdicts are inconsistent and mutually 

exclusive." In support of her petition, defendant submitted a certification from 

one of her two trial attorneys. 

After hearing argument, the PCR judge reserved decision and thereafter 

issued a written statement of reasons that accompanied the June 30, 2022 order 

denying defendant's petition. The judge accurately summarized the procedural 

history regarding defendant's prior PCR applications and squarely addressed the 

issues raised in view of the governing law. The judge succinctly addressed the 

timeliness of defendant's present petition and concluded: 

Here, defendant's second PCR petition was clearly 

untimely. Indeed, she does not assert a newly 
5 A-3707-21

recognized constitutional right, [R.] 3:22-12(a)(2)(A), 

or that her ineffectiveness claim is based on 

information or evidence that could not have been 

discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable 

diligence. [R.] 3:22-12(a)(2)(B). Further, defendant's 

second PCR petition was not timely under [Rule] 3:22-

12(a)(2)(C) because she does not allege IAC of her first 

PCR counsel and in any event, it was not filed within 

one year of November 30, 2016, the date the Supreme

Court denied her first PCR petition. 

The judge, "[f]or completeness," then addressed the issues defendant 

raised, finding the contentions "were previously decided in her direct appeal and 

her first PCR," vaguely asserted, or without merit. The judge specifically 

addressed defendant's IAC claims against motion counsel and the alleged 

resulting illegal sentence: 

It is apparent that by styling this motion as one to 

correct an illegal sentence, defendant attempted to

circumvent the limitations established in R[ule] 3:22-

4(b) and R[ule] 3:22-12(a)(2), for a second PCR 

petition. While an order to correct an illegal sentence, 

"may be entered at any time," R. 3:21-10(b)(5), 

recasting the arguments does not permit them to be 

reasserted. Defendant's claims are based on substantive 

challenges to her convictions that were or could have 

been raised in her direct appeal. Absent the limited 

circumstances in which a second PCR petition is 

permitted, none of which are present here for the 

reasons stated above, defendant has exhausted the legal 

avenues for challenging the evidence supporting her

convictions or the validity of the jury instructions at her 

trial. 
6 A-3707-21

. . . . 

Therefore, based on the facts of . . . defendant's case, 

where the jury found that . . . defendant drove her car 

at the victim with the intent to kill him and in doing so 

drove the vehicle in a reckless manner that resulted in 

the victim's death, properly supports a conviction on the 

vehicular charge. There is nothing inconsistent in those 

findings. 

Finding the assertions time-barred and without merit, while noting the 

substantial evidence adduced at trial, the PCR judge denied the claims without 

an evidentiary hearing. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration: 

POINT I 

DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE WAS ILLEGAL AS IT 

WAS THE PRODUCT OF MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE 

AND INCONSISTENT VERDICTS IN 

CONTRAVENTION OF N.J.S.A. 2C:11-8(a)(3). 

POINT II 

AS DEFENDANT HAD SHOWN THAT SHE HAD 

RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF FIRST 

PCR COUNSEL AND THAT SHE HAD BEEN 

PREJUDICED THEREBY, THE PCR COURT ERRED 

BY DENYING HER SECOND PCR PETITION 

WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 

(1) The interests of justice and fundamental 

fairness require[] relaxation of the procedural 

bars in this case. 
7 A-3707-21

(2) Defendant's first PCR counsel failed to 

properly investigate the case and present all of 

defendant's cognizable issues. 

We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the PCR judge's cogent 

statement of reasons. We add only the following comments. 

In the absence of an evidentiary hearing, on the claims defendant now 

raises on appeal, we "conduct a de novo review." State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. 

Super. 284, 291 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 

(2004)). 

Rule 3:22-4(b) places strict limitations on second and subsequent petitions 

for PCR. The Rule compels dismissal of a subsequent PCR petition unless the 

defendant can satisfy the time requirement under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), and alleges 

the following grounds for relief: 

(A) that the petition relies on a new rule of 

constitutional law, made retroactive to defendant's

petition by the United States Supreme Court or the 

Supreme Court of New Jersey, that was unavailable 

during the pendency of any prior proceedings; or 

(B) that the factual predicate for the relief sought could 

not have been discovered earlier through the exercise 

of reasonable diligence, and the facts underlying the 

ground for relief, if proven and viewed in light of the 

evidence as a whole, would raise a reasonable 

probability that the relief sought would be granted; or 
8 A-3707-21

(C) that the petition alleges a prima facie case of [IAC] 

that represented the defendant on the first or subsequent 

application for [PCR]. 

[R. 3:22-4(b).] 

In turn, Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) imposes a time limitation for subsequent PCR 

petitions. Under the Rule, a second or subsequent petition for PCR must be filed 

within one year after the latest of: 

(A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted 

was initially recognized by the United States Supreme 

Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that right 

has been newly recognized by either of those Courts

and made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases 

on collateral review; or 

(B) the date on which the factual predicate for the relief 

sought was discovered, if that factual predicate could 

not have been discovered earlier through the exercise 

of reasonable diligence; or 

(C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent 

application for [PCR] where [IAC] that represented the 

defendant on the first or subsequent application for 

[PCR] is being alleged. 

[R. 3:22-12(a)(2).] 

Although the time limitations are not absolute and may be waived to 

prevent a fundamental injustice, the Rules must be viewed in light of their dual 

key purposes: "to ensure . . . the passage of time does not prejudice the State's 

retrial of a defendant" and "'to respect the need for achieving finality.'" State v. 
9 A-3707-21

DiFrisco, 187 N.J. 156, 166-67 (2006) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 

576 (1992)). However, the Rule makes it clear that this relaxation rule only 

applies to first PCR petitions, not to second or subsequent ones. See R. 3:22-

12(b); Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. at 293; see also R. 1:3-4(c) (prohibiting the court 

and the parties from enlarging the time to file a petition for PCR under Rule 

3:22-12). 

Here, we denied defendant's first PCR appeal in September 2016, White 

II, slip op. at 1. Yet, defendant did not file her second petition until 2019. 

Defendant acknowledged her second petition was untimely. We are 

unpersuaded by defendant's argument that her claims should not be "dismissed 

out of hand based on procedural technicalities." 

We conclude, as did the PCR judge in his cogent written decision, that 

defendant's present petition was time-barred. See R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(B). 

Additionally, the PCR judge correctly recognized, Rule 3:22-5 bars defendant's 

contentions against trial counsel, which were previously decided. Rule 3:22-5 

provides: "[a] prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground for relief is 

conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting in the conviction or in any 

post-conviction proceeding brought pursuant to this rule . . . or in any appeal 

taken from such proceedings." A PCR petition is not "an opportunity to 
10 A-3707-21

relitigate cases already decided on the merits." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 

459 (App. Div. 1999).

Although we agree defendant's second PCR petition is untimely, for the 

sake of completeness, we address defendant's illegal sentence contention. It is 

clear a sentencing error may be corrected at any time before the sentence is 

completed and "relief may be granted to a PCR applicant based on the 

'[i]mposition of [a] sentence in excess of or otherwise not in accordance with 

the sentence authorized by law.'" State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000) 

(alterations in original) (quoting R. 3:22-2(c)). Our Supreme Court has 

recognized "th[e] two [discrete] categories of illegal sentences have been 

'defined narrowly.'" State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 145 (2019) (quoting Murray, 

162 N.J. at 246). 

Defendant argues her sentence "was illegal," and the "sentences should 

not have been imposed" for murder and vehicular homicide because the 

convictions resulted from "conflicting verdicts" and were "mutually exclusive." 

We conclude, as did the PCR judge that defendant's contention that the trial 

judge failed "to instruct the jury that it must find one or the other states-of-mind 

but not both and then apply the facts to determine what crime, if any, was 

committed by defendant" is without merit. Defendant was convicted of the
11 A-3707-21

separate and distinct charges of: murder, first-degree vehicular homicide, and 

second-degree vehicular homicide. Defendant does not dispute the jury was 

instructed on the required elements for each offense but argues "a defendant may 

[not] be convicted of different offenses requiring different states-of-mind." As 

the PCR judge correctly noted, "the jury instructions were held adequate on 

direct appeal and reframing the argument here does not preclude the substantive 

bar to issues previously decided." Again, defendant has not alleged an illegal 

sentence because her sentence was neither excessive nor unauthorized by law. 

Defendant has not cited, nor has our research revealed, any authority for 

her contention that N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(a) provides "a defendant may [not] be 

convicted of two different offenses requiring different states-of-mind." N.J.S.A. 

2C:1-8(a) also provides: "When the same conduct of a defendant may establish 

the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for 

each offense[,]" unless certain exceptions apply. None is applicable here. 

Further, defendant's convictions were not based on "[i]nconsistent 

findings of fact . . . required to establish the commission of the offenses." See 

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(a)(3). Simply because the charged offenses have different 

requisite states of mind does not make them mutually exclusive. A defendant 

may be convicted of separate offenses with separate elements, including
12 A-3707-21

different states of mind. See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(2) ("When the law provides 

that a particular kind of culpability suffices to establish an element of an offense 

such element is also established if a person acts with higher kind of culpability"). 

As the PCR judge correctly found, defendant has recast her prior arguments 

posited in her direct appeal as an alleged illegal sentence. We are unpersuaded 

and see no reason to disturb the PCR judge's well-reasoned decision. 

We also reject defendant's claims, raised for the first time on appeal, that 

her first and second PCR counsel were ineffective in their representation. 

Defendant argues first PCR counsel neglected to "investigate and timely raise 

all of her cognizable claims" and specifically failed to: "inform her she must 

file a second PCR within one year"; raise "why trial counsel failed to investigate 

and advance a Battered Women Syndrome defense"; interview her second trial 

counsel; investigate trial counsel's inadequate preparation and examination of 

the "defense accident reconstructionist expert"; and examine why "trial counsel 

failed to engage with defendant." As defendant raised or could have raised these 

issues in her prior applications, they are barred under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(C). 

Finally, defendant's contention that second PCR counsel was ineffective 

for failing to argue her first PCR attorney was ineffective is equally unavailing. 

As defendant indirectly acknowledges, her IAC claims against first PCR 
13 A-3707-21

attorney are raised for the first time on this appeal. As such, those claims are 

barred under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(C). 

To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments, we 

determine they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Affirmed.