alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Birmingham Railway & Electric Co. v. Watkins.

Appeal from Birmingham City Court.

Tried before the Hon. J. W. Bush, Special Judge.

Walker, Porter & Walker, for appellant.

Bowman & Harsh, for appellee.

Opinion by

McClellan, C. J.

This action was brought by the appellee against the appellant, claiming $7,500 as damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff on account of the negligence of the defendants and its employés.

This is the second appeal in this case. On the first trial in the city court of Birmingham a judgment was rendered in favor of the Birmingham Railway & Electric Company, and William R. Watkins appealed to this court, and on the 16th day of June, 1898, the case was reversed and remanded. Since that time the case has been tried again in the city court of Birmingham, and a judgment rendered against the Birmingham Railway & Electric Company for the sum of ,$1,500. From this judgment defendant brings his cause to this court.

The judgment is affirmed on the authority of *Watkins v. Birmingham R. & E. Co.,*120 Ala. 147; *Birmingham, R. & E. Co. v. James,*121 Ala. 120.
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<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       7,876,083
<SECURITIES>                                    10,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,486,434
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  3,006,997
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            13,393,078
<PP&E>                                       1,353,631
<DEPRECIATION>                                 280,647
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              16,871,278
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,090,474
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (218,417)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,872,057)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (1,872,057)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,872,057)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.40)
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#### Barbara Weinstein, Appellant, v Warren Weinstein, Respondent.

— In a matrimonial action wherein the parties were divorced by judgment entered December 11, 1985, the plaintiff wife appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Collins, J.), dated March 5, 1986, which denied her motion pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 for an interim award of counsel fees, costs and disbursements incurred in connection with the appeal from the judgment *(see, Weinstein v Weinstein,*125 AD2d 301 [No. 23] [decided herewith]).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Under the circumstances of this case, the court properly exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s request. Mollen, P. J., Mangano, Niehoff and Weinstein, JJ., concur.
*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-40028

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SHANNON CARROLL,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:95-CR-23

- - - - - - - - - -

July 5, 1996

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:* 

Shannon Carroll appeals his sentence following a guilty plea

for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Carroll argues

that the district clearly erred in making the factual

determinations that he possessed firearms during the commission

of the offense and that he exercised a leadership role in the

offense.
No. 96-40028

- 2 -

Several firearms were found in Carroll’s residence which was

also where Carroll stored cocaine and where he received telephone

calls regarding drug transactions. This is a sufficient nexus to

allow the firearm adjustment. United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.2d

337, 350 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 1310 (1994).

Carroll employed at least one other person, and more likely two

people, during his course of conduct. All Carroll’s relevant

conduct, and not just the transaction at issue, was pertinent to

this leadership adjustment. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, intro.

comment. The district court did not clearly err in its

sentencing findings.

AFFIRMED.
#### In the Matter of LOUIS SCHAFFER, an attorney at law.

September 26, 1961.

Resignation accepted with prejudice and name of respondent stricken from roll of attorneys at law.
Exhibit 3.1



CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT

TO

CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION

OF

FIBERNET TELECOM GROUP, INC.



FiberNet Telecom Group, Inc. (the Corporation), a Delaware corporation, hereby certifies as follows:



1. The date of filing of the Corporations Certificate of
Incorporation (the Certificate) with the Secretary of State of Delaware was May 17, 2000 under the name FiberNet Holdco, Inc.



2. The Certificate is hereby amended by deleting paragraph (c) of ARTICLE IV in its entirety and replacing it with the following:



ARTICLE IV

***



(c) The Corporation hereby declares that each ten (10) shares of the outstanding shares of the Corporations Common Stock as of the date of filing of
this Certificate of Amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation, be converted and reconstituted into one share of Common Stock. No fractional shares shall be issued upon such conversion and reconstitution. Instead, the Corporation will pay cash
equal to such fraction multiplied by the average of the high and low trading prices of the Corporations Common Stock on the Nasdaq SmallCap Market during regular trading hours for the five trading days immediately preceding the effective time
of the Reverse Split, which amount is hereby determined to equal the fair market value of the Corporations Common Stock upon the effective time of the Reverse Split.



3. This Certificate of Amendment has been duly adopted in accordance with Sections 228 and 242 of the General Corporation
Law of the State of Delaware.



4. This Certificate of Amendment
shall be effective on May 25, 2005 at 8:30 A.M. EST.



IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned officer of FiberNet Telecom Group, Inc. has executed this Certificate of Amendment to the Certificate of Incorporation this 24thday of May 2005.



FIBERNET TELECOM GROUP, INC.By:

/s/ Edward GranaghanName:  Edward GranaghanTitle:    Senior Vice President  Finance        & Chief Financial
Officer
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<CASH>                                        18980487
<SECURITIES>                                  20767141
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              40074675
<PP&E>                                         6246720
<DEPRECIATION>                                 4413557
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                41976597
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          3842823
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<PREFERRED>                                    5450298
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<OTHER-SE>                                    32255251
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<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              18079301
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 16161432
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                1917869
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            1917869
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   1917869
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .12
        

</TABLE>
# Office of Performance and Quality

## Leadership

Katherine Lotspeich, is the chief of the Office of Performance and Quality.

The Office of Performance and Quality provides data and operational analyses to senior decision makers and key stakeholders, including Congress, DHS, and other governmental agencies to promote a USCIS that is effective and efficient. The Chief Data Officer, who is in the Office of Performance and Quality, is responsible for executing the USCIS Data Strategy, promoting the management and utility of data as a corporate asset, building a data-driven culture, and facilitating data governance across the immigration system.

The Workforce Analysis and Resource Modeling Division (WARM) is responsible for forecasting the over 100 different forms that USCIS handles, as well as other workloads. Using these forecasts, the Division also compiles staffing models designed to ensure that USCIS has enough personnel on hand to complete the work. WARM is also responsible for monitoring production metrics, such as how long each type of form takes to complete and what proportion of time officers are spending adjudicating forms. These metrics and others are also used for comprehensive models that predict USCIS production and backlog in the future.

The Performance Analysis and External Reporting (PAER) Division provides accurate, relevant, and timely immigration data and analysis for operational, policy, and regulatory agency decision-making. PAER also provides data and reports to USCIS stakeholders and the public on immigration trends and USCIS operations.

The Data Management Division is responsible for developing the USCIS Data Strategy, developing enterprise-wide data governance and data sharing policies, for data standards development and implementation, and for data quality analysis, monitoring, and improvement.

The Data Analytics Division provides advanced analytics to solve Agency-wide challenges through data science, research, and applied mathematics. The Division also enables business intelligence by making data available for decision-making and providing resources to grow data knowledge. In partnership with other offices, the DA Division advances agency initiatives like backlog reduction, risk and fraud evaluation, enterprise collaboration and learning.

05/17/2022

0 / 2000To protect your privacy, please do not include any personal information in your feedback. Review our Privacy Policy.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Roy Lee DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-30528

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 21, 2011.

Joseph Edwin Blackwell, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Roy Davis, Beaumont, TX, pro se.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and STEWART and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

*430PER CURIAM: *

The attorney appointed to represent Roy Lee Davis has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Davis has filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein, as well as Davis’s response. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Philip Boothe, Appellant, v Benjamin H. Weiss, Respondent.

— In an action to recover damages for fraud and deceit, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Durante, J.), dated July 19, 1984, which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The record indicates that the plaintiff has failed to set forth any cause of action against the defendant sounding in deceit or fraud. The bare allegation that the defendant, a licensed optometrist, had provided treatment to the plaintiff at a *604location other than the one for which the defendant was registered with the New York State Education Department does not satisfy the requisite elements of a tort cause of action sounding in deceit or fraud (Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 105, at 728 [5th ed]). Accepting the plaintiffs allegations as true, as we must on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) *(see, Holly v Pennysaver Corp.,*98 AD2d 570, 572), we conclude that Special Term did not err in granting the defendant’s motion.

The plaintiff’s omission from his opposition papers of any indication that he desired leave to plead again in the event the defendant’s motion was granted, coupled with his failure to submit any showing of the validity of his claim, mandates the conclusion, on this record, that his request on appeal for leave to replead should be denied *(see, Metro Envelope Corp. v Westvaco,*72 AD2d 695). Weinstein, J. P., Rubin, Kunzeman and Kooper, JJ., concur.
(October 15, 1987)

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v *902Bruce T. Reiter, Appellant.

Harvey, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer (Dwyer, Jr., J.), rendered December 20, 1985, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree.

On this appeal, defendant challenges the amount of restitution County Court ordered him to pay to his former employer. Defendant worked as a bookkeeper for Oviatt Plumbing and Heating Distributing Company for approximately two years. In March 1983 it became evident that he had been embezzling company funds. Defendant was subsequently indicted for grand larceny in the second degree. After he pleaded guilty to the charged crime, a restitution hearing was held in order to determine the amount of money defendant had gained from the commission of his crime. County Court eventually determined that defendant was obligated to repay $80,792.81 to Oviatt Plumbing. This appeal ensued.

It was the People’s burden at the restitution hearing to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of money gained by defendant from Oviatt Plumbing through his criminal activity *(see,*Penal Law § 60.27 [2]; CPL 400.30 [4]). It is uncontested that defendant illegally obtained $54,769.20 from Oviatt Plumbing’s general account and $9,945.90 from its payroll account. The primary dispute is whether the evidence established that defendant also embezzled cash received by Oviatt Plumbing from its customers.

Defendant’s duties as bookkeeper included the handling of virtually all of the checks and cash received from customers. This entailed physically receiving the money, crediting it to the proper account and depositing the funds in the bank. When the amount received was credited to the customer’s account, a carbon copy of that amount was recorded in a cash receipts journal. An analysis of this journal by John Carella, a certified public accountant, revealed substantial discrepancies between the amounts recorded as received and those actually deposited into Oviatt Plumbing’s bank account. It was also discovered that defendant had deposited $39,274.91 from his personal account into Oviatt’s Plumbing’s account in an apparent attempt to conceal his activities. However, even with defendant’s deposits from his personal account, there was still a $53,262.52 net shortage. In light of the above evidence, all of which was well supported at the hearing, we cannot say that County Court incorrectly concluded that it was more likely than not that defendant embezzled cash received from customers of Oviatt Plumbing.

*903Since a preponderance of the evidence establishes that defendant gained from his criminal activities at Oviatt Plumbing an amount of money in excess of the amount of restitution ordered by County Court,. we conclude that defendant’s request for a reduction of the restitution figure must fail.

Judgment affirmed. Kane, J. P., Main, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.
# C_2021022EN.01004601.xml

| 21.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 22/46 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 22/46

---

Notice concerning a request in accordance with Article 34 of Directive 2014/25/EU

Suspension of the period for adoption of implementing acts

(2021/C 22/10)

On 2 October 2020, the Commission received a request pursuant to Article 35 of Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (1). The first working day following receipt of the request was 5 October 2020 and the initial period available to the Commission for deciding on this request was of 145 working days.

1

This request, made by Österreichische Postbus AG, concerns operation of non-commercial bus services in Austria. The relevant notice was published on page number 17 of OJ C 361 of 27 October 2020. The initial deadline was 10 May 2021.

Pursuant to Annex IV, paragraph 2, of Directive 2014/25/EU, the Commission may require the Member State or the contracting entity concerned or the competent independent national authority or any other competent national authority to provide all necessary information or to supplement or clarify information given within an appropriate time limit. On 11 November 2020, the Commission asked the Austrian authorities to provide additional information by 3 December 2020 at the latest.

In the event of late or incomplete answers, the initial deadline shall be suspended for the period between the expiry of the time limit set in the request for information, and the receipt of the complete and correct information.

The final deadline will therefore expire after 102 working days after the receipt of the complete and correct information.

---

(1)  Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 243).

1

---
#### MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY *v.*CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

No. 66.

Submitted November 5, 1889.

Decided November 25, 1889.

In regard to motions for a new trial, and bills of exceptions, the courts of the United States are independent of any statute or practice prevailing in the courts of the State in- which the trial is had.

The case is stated in the opinion.

*Mr. John F. Dillon*for plaintiff in error.

*Mr. Alexander Martin*and *Mr. Robert II. Kern*for defendant in error.

Mr.. Justice Gray

delivered the opinion of the court.

In this action, tried by the Circuit Court without a jury, there is' no case stated by the parties, or finding of facts by the court. The bill of exceptions, after setting forth all the evidence introduced at the trial, states that “there were no declarations of law asked for, or given by the court;” and the single exception taken is to the overruling of a motion for a new trial, which is a matter of discretion, and not a subject of exception, according to the practice of the courts of the United States. In regard to motions for a new trial, and bills of exceptions, those courts are independent of any statute or practice prevailing in the courts of the State in which the *192trial is had. *Indianapolis Railroad*v. *Horst,*93 U. S. 291; *Newcomb*v. *Wood, 97*U. S. 581; *Chateaugay Iron Co., Petitioner,*128 U. S. 544.

*Judgment affirmed.*