[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11997

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

JEROMY SCHIEDENHELM, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondents-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cv-00168-CEM-PRL

USCA11 Case: 22-11997 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2024 Page: 1 of 8
2 Opinion of the Court 22-11997

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:

Jeromy Schiedenhelm, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. As relevant here, a Florida state 

court convicted Schiedenhelm for the battery of a police officer

while the officer was lawfully performing his official duties. On 

appeal, Schiedenhelm argues that (1) a Florida statute governing 

strip searches rendered the police encounter that gave rise to his 

battery conviction unlawful, and thus (2) his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to explicitly raise that statute as part of 

his defense. After careful consideration, we AFFIRM the district 

court’s order.1

I. 

The events giving rise to this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel appeal concern the initial traffic stop and subsequent jailing of 

Schiedenhelm. During a run-of-the-mill traffic stop, a Florida state 

police officer patted down Schiedenhelm. While doing so, the officer felt a hard, blunt object between Schiedenhelm’s thighs. After 

the officer informed Schiedenhelm that he had something between 

1 Schiedenhelm has also moved for leave to supplement the record and to 

strike the state’s brief as moot. We conclude that these motions are unnecessary or meritless, so we DENY them without further discussion. 

USCA11 Case: 22-11997 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2024 Page: 2 of 8
22-11997 Opinion of the Court 3

his legs, Schiedenhelm became aggressive and uncooperative, 

clenching his thighs and legs. The officers proceeded to arrest

Schiedenhelm and took him to jail. 

Upon arriving at the jail, officers conducted an additional pat 

down and clothing search. Schiedenhelm continued to behave uncooperatively, so officers took him into a jail bathroom. There, he 

was instructed to remove his clothing and underwear. While doing so, Schiedenhelm pulled out a plastic bag and sought to flush it 

down the toilet. As an officer attempted to intervene, Schiedenhelm pushed the officer up against the wall. The officers successfully retrieved the small bag, which contained fourteen smaller 

bags of narcotics. 

As relevant here, Schiedenhelm’s pushing of the officer in 

the bathroom led to his conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer while in the lawful performance of his official duties. 

Fla. Stat. §§ 784.03(1)(a), 784.07(2). In his state post-conviction proceedings, Schiedenhelm, proceeding pro se, argued—among other 

things—that his trial counsel was ineffective. After an evidentiary 

hearing, the state post-conviction court disagreed in a reasoned 

opinion. Schiedenhelm subsequently appealed, but a state court 

affirmed in a per curiam opinion. Schiedenhelm v. State, 286 So. 3d 

278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019). 

After exhausting his state remedies, Schiedenhelm filed a §

2254 petition in federal district court, making the same ineffectiveUSCA11 Case: 22-11997 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2024 Page: 3 of 8
4 Opinion of the Court 22-11997

assistance-of-counsel argument. The district court denied his petition, and this appeal followed.2

II. 

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a federal habeas petition raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 

Johnson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 643 F.3d 907, 929 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Crucially, though, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act imposes a “highly deferential standard for evaluating statecourt rulings . . . and demands that state-court decisions be given 

the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–

55. Thus, we review the district court’s decision de novo but review the state court’s decision with deference. Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. 

Dep’t of Corr., 593 F.3d 1217, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010).

If a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the decision of the state 

court was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or 

(2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1), (2). A federal habeas court making the unreasonableapplication inquiry “should ask [itself] whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively 

2 Schiedenhelm raised other grounds for relief in his § 2254 petition, but we 

granted a certificate of appealability covering only the single ineffective assistance of counsel claim discussed here. 

USCA11 Case: 22-11997 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2024 Page: 4 of 8
22-11997 Opinion of the Court 5

unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). “[A]n

unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect

application of federal law.” Id. at 410 (emphasis in original). When 

demonstrating that a state court unreasonably applied federal law, 

a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief “must show that the 

state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court 

was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 

(2011).

To succeed on an ineffective-assistance claim, a movant 

must show that (1) his attorney’s conduct was deficient and (2) the 

deficient conduct prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must 

show “that, but for his counsel’s deficient performance, there is a 

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.” Johnson, 643 F.3d at 928. 

“[A]lthough the issue of ineffective assistance—even when 

based on the failure of counsel to raise a state law claim—is one of 

constitutional dimension, we must defer to the state’s construction 

of its own law when the validity of the claim . . . turns on state law.” 

Pinkney v. Sec'y, Dep’t of Corr., 876 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2017)

(quotation marks omitted). Relatedly, we have recognized that establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is all the more difficult because 

the standards created by § 2254(d) and Strickland are both highly 

USCA11 Case: 22-11997 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2024 Page: 5 of 8
6 Opinion of the Court 22-11997

deferential. Jenkins v. Commissioner, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 963 F.3d 

1248, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, when 

reviewing state-court determinations about the application of 

Strickland’s performance prong, our deference is “doubly so.” Id. 

III. 

On appeal, Schiedenhelm argues that his trial counsel was 

ineffective because she failed to raise a statute relevant to his defense. Specifically, Schiedenhelm asserts that his counsel did not 

mention Fla. Stat. § 901.211(5) when defending him against the 

charge that he battered a police officer lawfully performing his duties. That statute says that “[n]o law enforcement officer shall order a strip search within the agency or facility without obtaining 

the written authorization of the supervising officer on duty.” Fla. 

Stat. § 901.211(5). Because no supervising officer authorized his 

strip search while at the jail in writing, Schiedenhelm contends that 

the entire search giving rise to his battery conviction was unlawful. 

Additionally, and as pertinent here, Schiedenhelm argues that his 

counsel’s failure to directly raise Fla. Stat. § 901.211(5) when she 

asked for a judgment of acquittal for the relevant battery count was 

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland and (2) the 

state post-conviction’s court decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

We conclude the district court did not err in denying Schiedenhelm’s § 2254 petition. When denying his request for post-conviction relief, the state post-conviction court concluded that § 

USCA11 Case: 22-11997 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2024 Page: 6 of 8
22-11997 Opinion of the Court 7

901.211(5) was inapplicable to the facts of Schiedenhelm’s case.3 Its 

reasoning emphasized a distinction in Florida law between seizing 

previously discovered evidence and searching for new evidence. 

And when determining if that legal distinction applied to Schiedenhelm’s case, the court relied on testimony by police officers that 

the strip search at the jail directly flowed from concerns arising during the traffic stop that Schiedenhelm was hiding something in his 

groin area. Thus, according to the state post-conviction court, the 

strip search at the jail was not a new search falling under § 

901.211(5)’s purview but rather the seizing of previous evidence 

discovered during the traffic stop. 

The state post-conviction court’s distinction between 

searches and seizures is consistent with prior case law in Florida. 

State v. Days, 751 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Likewise, 

we conclude that officers’ testimony at Schiedenhelm’s trial that 

the jail search was motivated by initial concerns raised during the 

traffic stop about a hard, blunt object concealed between Schiedenhelm’s legs reasonably supports the state court’s legal application in this case. 

Given that the state post-conviction court reasonably applied state law to the specific facts of Schiedenhelm’s case, we must 

3 Because a state appellate court affirmed the denial of Schiedenhelm’s relevant 

motion for post-conviction relief per curiam without providing a reasoned 

opinion, we “look through” the un-explained decision to the state post-conviction court’s reasoned denial, presuming that the unexplained appellate 

court decision adopted the reasoning. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 

(2018).

USCA11 Case: 22-11997 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2024 Page: 7 of 8
8 Opinion of the Court 22-11997

defer to the state court’s determination. Pinkney, 876 F.3d at 1295. 

Because that court determined § 901.211(5) was inapplicable to his 

case, Schiedenhelm cannot demonstrate his counsel’s performance 

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” or “was outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Johnson, 643 F.3d at 928 (quotation marks omitted). For the same reason, Schiedenhelm cannot show his counsel’s failure to raise this 

argument prejudiced him in any way. Id. at 928–29. Accordingly, 

the district court did not err in denying his § 2254 petition.

* * *

In sum, Schiedenhelm’s pending motions are DENIED, and 

the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition is 

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 22-11997 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/21/2024 Page: 8 of 8