alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

IN RE: PETITION OF RETIRED JUDGE

FARLEY TOOTHMAN

PETITION OF: F ARLEY TOOTHMAN :

:

:

:

: No. 7 8 EM 2021

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 6 th day of December , 2021, the “Petition for Allowance of a

Subpoena,” seeking this Court’s permission to subpoena the Honorable Gerald R.

Solomon pursuant to Rule of Judicial Administration 1701, is D ISMISSED

.

Rule 1701 specifies that , “[f]or purposes of this rule, judge and magisterial district

judge includes those judicial officers in active judicial service or senior status.” Pa.R.J.A.

1701(a). This provision has no apparent application to a subpoena that would be issued

on Judge Solomon, as that jurist’s term as a senior judge expired on December 31, 2020.
exv10w3







Exhibit 10.3




DIRECTOR FEES



On August 24, 2009, the Board of Directors of Bank of Granite Corporation (the “Company”) approved
changes in the Company’s director fees for the remainder of 2009, as recommended by the Board of
Director’s Compensation Committee and its Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee. Beginning
in October 2009, the following fees will be paid to non-employee directors:



The Chairman will receive an annual retainer of $11,250, payable in quarterly installments of
$2,812.50, in addition to a meeting fee of $750 per board meeting chaired, payable quarterly.



The Vice Chairman will receive an annual retainer of $10,500, payable in quarterly installments of
$2,625, in addition to a meeting fee of $375 paid to directors for each board meeting attended,
payable quarterly.



Each director other than the Chairman and Vice-Chairman will receive an annual retainer in the
amount of $7,500, payable in quarterly installments of $1,875, in addition to a meeting fee of $375
for each board meeting attended, payable quarterly.



Committee members will receive a meeting fee, payable quarterly, in the amount of $187.50 for each
committee meeting attended. Committee chairpersons will receive a meeting fee, payable quarterly,
in the amount of $300 for each committee meeting they conduct, which is in lieu of the $187.50
committee meeting fee paid to the other committee members in attendance.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 9, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 05-50617

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JESUS MANUEL EK-CANUL, also 

known as Louis Flores-Tijerina,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:04-CR-2119-ALL

--------------------

Before REAVLEY, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Jesus Manuel 

Ek-Canul raises arguments that are foreclosed by AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held

that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The

Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-04-452-CR

MICHAEL SEAN KELLEY	APPELLANT

	V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS	STATE

	------------

	FROM THE 16TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	A jury convicted Appellant Michael Sean Kelley of two counts of indecency with a child, charged in a single indictment, and assessed his punishment at twelve years’ confinement for each count.  The trial court sentenced him accordingly.  In one issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial after the prosecutor engaged in improper jury argument.  Because we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

	During the guilt phase of the trial, evidence was admitted without objection regarding extraneous acts of misconduct by Appellant.  During the State’s closing argument the prosecutor said, “This case is not about other stuff.  But this case isn’t over yet.  We will have—when the right verdict is reached, we will hear more.  But for now, this case is about [the complainant].”  The trial court properly sustained Appellant’s objection and instructed the jury to disregard the patently improper jury argument but denied Appellant’s motion for mistrial.

	When the trial court sustains an objection and instructs the jury to disregard but denies a defendant’s motion for a mistrial, the issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the mistrial.2  Only in extreme circumstances, when the prejudice caused by the improper argument is incurable, that is, “so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile,” will a mistrial be required.3  In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the mistrial, we balance three factors:  (1) the severity of the misconduct (prejudicial effect), (2) curative measures, and (3) the certainty of the punishment assessed absent the misconduct.4

	Having closely examined the record, we note that it is replete with evidence not only of the offenses alleged but also of Appellant’s extraneous acts of misconduct.  Additionally, during voir dire, both the State and the defense indicated that if the guilt phase resulted in a conviction, the jury might hear additional evidence at the punishment phase of the trial.  After examining the record as a whole and balancing the appropriate factors, we conclude that the State’s argument was not sufficiently egregious to defeat the presumed efficacy of the trial court’s instruction to disregard.  We overrule Appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

								LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

								JUSTICE

PANEL B:	DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MCCOY, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED:  April 6, 2006
# C_2021082EN.01000101.xml

| 11.3.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 82/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.3.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 82/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.9857 — Volvo/Daimler/JV)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2021/C 82/01)

On 5 February 2021, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32021M9857. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32021M9857. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

RENALDO LAMAR WISE, 

Appellant, 

v. Case No. 5D22-1204

LT Case No. 2009-CF-2802

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee. 

________________________________/ 

Decision filed July 19, 2022

3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court

for Marion County, 

Lisa D. Herndon, Judge.

Renaldo Lamar Wise, Lake Butler,

pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General,

Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, 

Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 

Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

COHEN, EDWARDS and TRAVER, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF EGL, INC. FOR THE SIX MONTHS
ENDED MARCH 31, 2000, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN FORM 10-Q.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                          30,916
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  119,385
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,482
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               156,536
<PP&E>                                          52,966
<DEPRECIATION>                                  17,215
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           59,385
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            30
<OTHER-SE>                                     166,860
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   232,973
<SALES>                                        376,116
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               376,116
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  220,888
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               131,380
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 25,124
<INCOME-TAX>                                     9,886
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
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<NET-INCOME>                                    15,238
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.53
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.51


</TABLE>
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Liberté Investors Inc. (the Company)
on Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Donald J. Edwards,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d),
as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at
the dates and for the periods indicated.

/s/ DONALD J. EDWARDS

Donald J. Edwards
President and Chief Executive Officer

September 22, 2003

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Liberté Investors Inc. and will be retained by Liberté Investors
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
(9 Misc. Rep. 150.)

#### KAHN v. WEILL.

(Common Pleas of New York City and County, General Term.

June 4, 1894.)

Personal Liability op Agent—Undisclosed Principal.

In an action for breach of warranty of goods sold, it is no defense that defendant was acting as agent for another at the time of the sale, where he dealt with plaintiff in his own name, without disclosing that he was • an agent.

*54Appeal from ninth district court.

Action by Fannie Kahn against Leopold L. Weill for breach of warranty. There was a judgment in favor of defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Argued before BOOKSTAVER, BISCHOFF, and PRYOR, JJ.

Aaron Kahn, for appellant.

BOOKSTAVER, J.

This action was brought on a breach of warranty. From the return it appears that, on the sale of a gilt parlor suit of furniture, the defendant warranted the gilding for one year and the upholstering for two years, and agreed to keep it in repair for that length of time. This was in writing, and was not disputed; nor was it disputed that the gilding came off in patches, because of the careless manipulation on the part of the defendant in gluing on a portion of the upholstering. Repeated request» were made of the defendant to. repair the furniture, which he neglected to do. Finally, the plaintiff demanded back the purchase price, and offered to return the furniture to defendant.

The defense is extremely hazy. Some attempt was made to show that the frames of the furniture were purchased of other people, and that the defendant was only responsible for the upholstering, but this is clearly rebutted by the bill of sale in his own handwriting. He also claimed that he offered to repair the furniture, but he never made such offer until after this action was brought, although frequently requested to attend to it before. The justice probably rendered judgment in defendant’s favor because he testified that he did not own the business, but carried it on for hi» sister, Minnie Weill. In arriving at this conclusion he must have overlooked the fact that all the negotiations were carried on between the parties as principals. The defendant at no time revealed the fact (if it was a fact) that he was acting as agent for any one. The bill of sale was made out and signed by defendant in his own name, or rather the name of A. L. Weill, which certainly was not the name of Minnie Weill, and it was not shown that A. L. Weill was the name of any other person than the defendant. As the plaintiff was-corroborated by her husband, another witness,- and the bill of sale, and as this testimony was not denied by the -defendant, the verdict should have been in her favor. The judgment-is reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant.
#### Smith Bowen *against*John S. Mulford.

CERTIORARI.

If the summons is issued in the name of J. M. plaintiff, and in the stale of demand, a middle letter is inserted, in the name of the plaintiff, (vk. ,J. S. M.) and the defendant does not appear, hut judgment is rendered against him in his absence, the judgment will be reversed.

This was a *certiorari*to one of the justices of the peace of the county of Salem, to reverse a judgment, rendered by him in the court for the trial of small causes.

*L. Q. C. Elmer,*for plaintiff.

*M’Cullough,*for defendant.

*274The Chief Justice

delivered the opinion of the court.

The summons in‘this case was issued in the name of John Mulford.’ The state of demand was filed in the name of John S. Mulford. Judgment was rendered against the defendant below, for the amount of the state of demand.

The introduction of a letter or name between the Christian and surname is very common, for the purpose of distinction; and in the use and understanding of the people at large, and therefore in presumption of fact, John Mulford and John S. Mulford, are not the same but different persons. Hence the variance was material. To sanction it, might open the door to serious mischief. The defendant has notice by the summons to answer the suit of John Mulford, but he may be subjected to very deleterious surprise, if the account or demand of another person is exhibited and may pass into judgment against him. If subsequent to such a judgment either of the parties thus uncertainly ascertained, should commence another action against the defendant, he would have to accomplish an unreasonable, if not an insuperable task in sustaining a plea of former recovery; for by which of the persons is the recovery had ? he whose name is entered on the justice’s docket ? or he who is named in the state of demand ? And if in the lapse of a few years the state of demand be lost, it will become still more difficult to shew that a judgment has been rendered for the demand of John S. Mulford, if in truth he is the actual plaintiff in this case. To all these hazards and burthens, the defendant ought not to be exposed in order to save the plaintiff from the- consequences of carelessness or inattention. If the defendant had appeared and gone into trial without objection, we should have been unwilling to listen to any complaint from him on this ground; but judgment was given in his absence, and the plaintiff proceeded at his own peril.

*275The cases cited by the counsel of the defendant in *certiorari*are not in point. That of *Franklin*v. *Talmage,*5 *John.*84, turned on a grant, and depended upon principles not applicable here.

Let the judgment be reversed.
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES

v.

Staff Sergeant JESUS J. MEDELLIN

United States Air Force

ACM S32272

2 July 2015

Sentence adjudged 24 July 2014 by SPCM convened at Joint Base San 

Antonio-Lackland, Texas. Military Judge: Lyndell M. Powell (sitting 

alone).

Approved Sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 6 months, 

and reduction to E-1.

Appellate Counsel for the Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Lucy H. Carrillo 

and Major Thomas A. Smith.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Gerald R. Bruce, Esquire

Before

MITCHELL, TELLER, and BENNETT

Appellate Military Judges

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent 

under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 18.4.

PER CURIAM:

The approved findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error 

materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant occurred. Article 66(c), 

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c); United States v. Reed, 54 M.J. 37, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2000). 

 

 The court notes that the court-martial order (CMO), dated 5 November 2014, does not list the convening 

authority’s deferment of mandatory forfeitures from 7 August 2014 until action. The court orders the promulgation 

of a corrected CMO. See Air Force instruction 51-201, Administration of Military Justice, ¶ 9.29.1.3 and figure 

9.12 (6 June 2013).
2 ACM S32272

Accordingly, the approved findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT

STEVEN LUCAS

Clerk of the Court
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ivan Brajer, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Tomei, J.), rendered June 23, 1986, convicting him of criminally negligent homicide, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (5).

The defendant’s car struck and killed the victim as she crossed a well-lit intersection. The defendant driver had been drinking and he turned his head to converse with his passenger when the passenger saw the victim and called out a warning to the driver. The victim, a large woman, was wearing a white blouse when she was first spotted in the intersection by the defendant’s passenger about half a block to a block away. The defendant swerved in an effort to avoid the woman, but struck her so hard that her body was propelled through the air and bounced several times before coming to rest. The force of the impact and the severity of the fatal injuries inflicted on the victim belie the defendant’s claim that he was driving about 35 miles per hour. The jury’s conclusion that the defendant failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his inattentive driving while intoxicated and at an excessive speed would cause death, was supported by legally sufficient evidence *(see,*Penal Law § 15.05 [4]; § 125.10). Furthermore, in the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant’s objections concerning the court’s charge, which he raises for the first time on appeal, have not been preserved for our review (CPL 470.05 [2]), and we find no error in the charge in any event.

The defendant objects to the sentence imposed and requests that we modify it to a term of probation and community *773service. However, the defendant’s criminally negligent conduct caused a person’s death, and we agree with the sentencing court that incarceration is appropriate. We find no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Lawrence, J. P., Kunzeman, Hooper and Sullivan, JJ., concur.