State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). Both components of 

the inquiry must be shown. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 

(1984). 

First, appellant claimed that counsel was ineffective for 

advising him that he had stipulated in the plea agreement to a 50-year 

sentence rather than a life sentence. Appellant failed to demonstrate that 

his counsel's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced. At the 

plea canvass, the district court advised appellant that the plea agreement 

stipulated to the life sentence and appellant acknowledged that was an 

accurate statement of the agreement. Appellant failed to demonstrate a 

reasonable probability that he would have refused to plead guilty and 

would have insisted on trial had counsel further explained to him that he 

agreed to a life sentence. Therefore, the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Second, appellant claimed that counsel refused to file motions. 

Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or that he was prejudiced 

because he did not identify any motions that counsel refused to file. See 

Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). Therefore, 

the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Third, appellant claimed that counsel failed to properly 

communicate with, inform, or advise him. Appellant also claimed that 

counsel did not discuss, pursue, or investigate defense strategy. Appellant 

failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient or that 

he was prejudiced. Appellant acknowledged in the guilty plea agreement 

and at the plea canvass that he had discussed the charges and possible 

defense strategies with his attorney. Appellant failed to demonstrate that 

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he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial 

had counsel and he had further discussions. Therefore, the district court 

did not err in denying this claim. 

Fourth, appellant claimed that counsel did not acknowledge 

his assertions of innocence. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his 

counsel's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Appellant 

confessed to both the murder and to child abuse of the respective child 

victims. Appellant failed to demonstrate he would not have pleaded guilty 

and would have insisted on going to trial had counsel acknowledged his 

assertions of innocence. Therefore, the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Fifth, appellant claimed that counsel did not inform him of the 

possible minimum and maximum sentences, and misinformed him about 

parole eligibility. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's 

performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced. At the plea canvass, 

the district court informed appellant about the possible minimum and 

maximum sentences. In addition, appellant was correctly informed about 

parole eligibility in the guilty plea agreement and at the plea canvass. 

Appellant failed to demonstrate he would not have pleaded guilty and 

would have insisted on going to trial had counsel explained these issues in 

more detail. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Sixth, appellant claimed that his counsel was conflicted. 

However, appellant provided no facts regarding this claim and bare claims 

are insufficient to demonstrate that appellant was entitled to relief. See 

Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 502, 686 P.2d at 225. Accordingly, appellant failed 

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11.41 
to meet his burden to establish that his counsel was conflicted. Therefore, 

the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Seventh, appellant claimed that his counsel coerced his guilty 

plea. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance was 

deficient or that he was prejudiced. Appellant acknowledged in the guilty 

plea agreement and at the plea canvass that he entered his guilty plea 

voluntarily and did not act under duress or coercion. Therefore, the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Eighth, appellant claimed that his counsel convinced him to 

commit perjury. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's 

performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced. Appellant did not 

identify any statements he made which were untrue and made only a bare 

claim regarding this issue, which was insufficient to demonstrate he was 

entitled to relief. See id. Therefore, the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Ninth, appellant claimed that his counsel waived his right to a 

preliminary hearing without his consent and that both the State and his 

counsel committed perjury. These claims were not based on an allegation 

that his plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that his plea 

was entered without effective assistance of counsel, and therefore, were 

not permissible in a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

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kvev -, • 

stemming from a guilty plea. SeeNRS 34.810(1)(a). Therefore, the 

district court did not err in denying these claims. 2 

Having concluded that appellant is not entitled to relief, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Hardesty 

" p2....‘X 4

Parraguirre 

cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge 

Jesse Parsons 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2As a separate and independent ground for denying appellant's 

claim that his counsel waived his preliminary hearing without his consent, 

this claim is belied by the record. Appellant personally stated at the 

hearing that he understood he had a right to a preliminary hearing and 

agreed to waive his right to that hearing. 

5