### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 10, 200 5 S es sio n
RHONDA FAY DEMONBREUN v . RICHARD AUSTI N DEMONBREUN

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 01D-642 Walte r C. K urtz, Judge

No. M2004- 02105-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 28, 2005

I n this post-divorc e ca s e, R ichar d Austin Demonbreun ( “F ather ”), f iled a petition to modify

the parties’ visitation arrang ement, see king a dditional tim e with one of the p arties’ three c hildren. Rho nd a F a y De mon br e un (“ Mo the r” ), the prima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt o f the c hil dr e n, c ou nte re d w ith

a pe tit ion re qu e sti ng a n in c re a se in c hil d su pp ort a nd the imp os iti on of a n o bli g a tio n u po n F a the r t o pay the children’ s unreimburse d medical expenses. I n addition, Mothe r soug ht one -half of the ref und associate d with the parties’ 1998 income tax re turn, and a n awa rd of he r attorne y ’s fe es and court c osts. Following a

bench trial, the trial court (1) denie d Father’s pe tition t o modify visitation with h i s oldest son; (2) incre ased F ather ’s child support obligation and his share of non-cove red medical e x penses; (3) awa rded Mother

one-ha lf of t he 1998 income tax ref und; (4) a war ded Mother $5,000 in attorney ’s fees; and (5) order ed Father to pay all court costs. Father appeals all of the trial

c ou rt ’s de c re e s, a ndMo the r s e e ks a n a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s f

or the fi lin g of

a fri vo lo us app e a l. We affirm in part and re verse in part, but do not find this appeal to be f rivolous in nature.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in Par t; Re verse d in P art; Case Re m anded

C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined.

Richard Austin De monbreun, Na shville, Tennessee , Pro Se.

Rose Palermo, Na shville, Tennessee , for the a ppellee, Rhonda

Fay Demonbre un.F o r e a se o f re fer e n c e , w e w ill re fer to the c h ild re n i n t h e sa m e m a n n e r a s d id the p a rtie s, i

. e. , “ Jes s i ca”
, 1
“T i m o t hy ” and “ M i cah. ” N o dis res p ect i s i nt end ed by t hi s i nf o rma l ap p roac h.

-2- OP IN ION

I.

Th e pa rt ie s w e re marrie d o n A ug us t 13 , 1 99 4. At the tim e , Fathe r wa s an at torne y in p ri va te prac tice and Mothe r wa s employ ed as a pharma cist. Shortlyafte r their mar riag e, F ather

adopted J essica L aure n Demonbre un (DOB : June 25, 1988), Mother’s minor child by a pre vious marriag e. Two childre n wer e born to the parties’ union, TimothyAustin Demonbreun ( DOB : J uly 25, 1997) and Micah Steven Demonbr eun (D OB : April 24, 1999). 1
During the parties’ marriag e, they purchased a la

rg e, old home in Nashville, whic h they eventua lly

converted into a bed a nd brea kfast known a s the “Timothy Demonbre un House.” I n order to devote more time to their new ve nture, Father curta iled his la w prac tice and Mothe r quit her job. Father’s law prac tice in the fie ld of plaintiff’s pe rsonal injury litigation had be en adve rsely aff ecte d,

a ndse ve re ly

so , b y lim its pla c e d o n d ir e c t ma il s oli c itatio n b y the T e nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt

.
After eig ht y ear s of marriag e, Mother s o u g ht and was a war ded an a bsolute divorce f

rom Fa t h er

. I n i t s m em o ra n d u m o p i n i o n i n t h e di v o rc e c as e, t h e t ri al co u rt m ad e t h e f o l l o wi n g fi n d i n gs wi th r e sp e c t to the c us tod y of the thr e e c hil dr e n:

I n considering all the criteria set out at T.C.A. § 36-6-106, the Court g rants [Mother] custodyof all three (3) ch i l dren. The Court sp e c if ic a lly re je c ts j oin t le g a l c us tod y a s no t be ing in the be st i nte re sts of the children. [Father’ s] attitude towar d two (2) of his children and the pa rt ie s’ ina bil ity to h a ve a ny

me a nin g fu l com mu ni c a tio n w ou ld

make joi nt c us tod y

ina pp ropriat e a ndwo uldno t be in the be st interests of the c hildren.

[F a the r]’ s v isi ta tio n is dif fi c ult to r e so lve be caus e of

his dis pa rate trea tment [ of] the three ( 3) childre n

– J es s ica ( 6/25/88), Timothy (7/25/97), and Micah (4/24/99).

[F a the r] ap pa

re ntl y fa vo rs Ti mothy , ha s exer c ise d his v isi ta tio n w ith Ti mothy , a ndse e ms t o h a ve a g oo d r e la tio ns hip wi th h im.

Mic a h h a s D o w n ’ s s y n d r o me

. E v e n th o u g h [F a th e r ] h a s h a d an opp o r tu n it y

to h a v e o v e r n ig h t v is it a ti o n s w ith M ic ah
, h e h a s n ot availed himself of

that opportu n i t y s t ating that since his house [i.e, the Timothy

Demon breun H ouse] is not “child proof ,” it would be dang erous f

or Mi cah to visit and it would be difficult for him to run-3- his b ed and br eakf

ast with Micah pre sent. Even whe n picking up Timothyat the day

car e ce nter, [ Father] usually spends only

a fe w minutes with Micah. He pr ofesse s love for Mica h, b ut his actions be lie thi s e xpre ssi on . A t th e tr ia l of thi s c a se , h e a g a in r e ite rate d h is love and aff

ection for Micah and the Court w ishes to g ive [ Father]

every opportunity

to have a rela tionship wit h Micah.

J essica is the natura l da

ug hter of [Mot her] and the a dopted daug hter of [F a the r]. At pr e se nt the ir re la tio ns hip is e str a ng e d. [F a the r] c la ims that [Mot her] has poisoned Jessica’s attitude towar d him and he has

no t vi sit e d w ith J ess ica

in m a ny mon ths . [F a the r’ s] r e sp on se to h is perc eptions of J essi ca’s attitude has bee n an ef fort to set aside the adoption. He has filed sever al pleading s contending that the adoption was proc ured by

fraud and that this Court should act to set a side the adoption. He ha s wanted to re pudiate his relationship as father of Jess ic a . H e e xpla ine d th a t he too k thi s a c tio n be c a us e his wi fe wo uld not a llow him a rela tionship with J essica. I f [Father’ s] al l egations about [ Mother] are true, he could well have reque sted the aid of the Court in insuring visit ation with J essica. His immature re sponse was to completely

turn his back on Jessica and at tempt to neg ate the

a do pti on . A t th e fi na l he ari ng , he pro fes se d s ome re mor se fo r this pr ior a c tio n a ndno w s a y s h e wa nts to r e e sta bli sh a re la tio ns hip wi th J essica.

* * *
[Father’ s] professed commitment to his business and his stated la ck

o f ti me a n din ap p r o p r iate lo c a ti o n w h ic h h a s c a u s e d h im to a ll b ut exclude Micah fr om his li fe w hile co n tinuing to devote time a nd attention to Timothyhave not impre ssed the Court as actions of a committed and loving pa rent. One has to q u estion why a par ent woul d ma

ke vo lun tary

de c isi on s a

bo ut h is v oc a tio n w hic h w ou ld drastica lly limit his a vailable time w ith a son suffe ring from Down’ s sy ndrome while, at the same time, not limit ing time with anothe r son. Until [Fa ther] show s full pare ntal commitment to Micah, t h e C ourt wi ll c on tin ue to d ou bt h is c omp e te nc e a s a re sp on sib le pa

re nt.
( Pa r a g r ap h le tt e r in g in o r ig in a l o mi tt e d )

. T h e c o u r t o r d e r e d F a th e r to p a y c h il d s u p p o r t in the amount of $2,000 per

month; ordered th e p ar t ies to equally divide the cost of a ll of the children’ s medical a nd dental expenses not cove red b y insurance ; ordere d Father to obtain a suppleme ntal health insuranc e policy

coveri n g t h e ch i l dren; a nd order ed F ather to pay $6,500 toward Mother ’s attorney ’s fe es. B eca

use of Father ’s propensity not to exercise visi tation with Micah, the tria l court order ed that F ather

pay an additional $100 in child support for eac h wee kend and holiday under the-4-

p ar e n ti n g p la n th a t h e d o e s n o t s p e n d w ith M ic ah, i.e. , ef fe c tiv e ly , a n a dd iti on a l $2 00 of c hil d support per month. The f inal judgme nt of divorce was e ntere d on J uly 3, 2002.

On F e br ua ry 18 , 2 00 4, F a the r f

ile d a pe tit ion to mod if

y the tr ia l c ou rt ’s div or c e jud g me nt, reque sting, i n t e r

a l ia , incre ased visitation time with Timot hy . Mother filed a counter -petition, reque sting an incre ase in child support and an incre ase in F ather ’s contribution toward the children’ s
non-cove red medical expenses; a n awa rd of one-ha lf of the pa

rties’ 1998 fe dera l income tax refund; and an a war d of fe es and c ourt costs.
Following a hearing on J une 15, 2004, the t rial court announce d its ruling fr om the bench,

no tin g , in pe rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:

I do want to re turn to my

memorandum [opinion fr o m the divorce proce ed in g ] o f Ju n e 2 0 0 2 b e c a u s e th e r e ’ s

– th e r e ’ s a p ar a g r ap h – I know th is is p ar t o f

th e r e c o r d
, b u t I

th in k th is –th is p ar ti cular para g raph ne eds to be repe ated beca use I don’t think there’ s been a ny chang e in this in 24 mont hs, and i t ’s per haps the most salient fac t here impacting the Court’s dec ision.
[“Fathe r’s] professe d commitment to his business and his stated lac k of time and inappr opriate loc ati on which has c aused him to all but exclude Micah fr om his li fe wh ile continuing to de vote time and attention t o Timothyhas not impressed the Court a s actions of a committed and loving p arent. One ha s to question why a par ent
wo uldmake vo lun tary

de c isi on s abo ut h is v oc a tio n w hic h w ou ld drastica lly

limit his available time with his s o n suffe ring from Do wn ’s sy nd ro me wh ile at the sa me tim e no t li mit ing tim e wi th

a no the r s on . U nti l [F a the r] s ho ws fu ll p are nta l c omm itm e nt to Mic a h, th e Cou rt

wi ll c on tin ue to d ou bt h is c omp e te nc e a s a
re sp on s i b l e p ar e n t

. [” ] It–I m e a n , i t ’ s r e a l l y

o f n o t e h e r e t h a tthi s p e t i t i o n a s k s f

o r a d d i t i o n a l t i m e , o v e r n i g h tv i s i t a t i o n w i t h T i m o t h y, and y et as k s n o modification that would aff ect his ability

to have overnig ht visitation with Mic ah while by his own testimonyhe hasn’ t had an ove rnig ht visitation with Micah since late summer of ‘ 03, and

acc ording to [ Mother] that’s not even acc urate ; it really didn’t happen for 3 1/2 y ear s, but I

won’t – I

won’t res o l ve that dis – or I won’t

make that cr e dib ili ty c a ll. L e t’ s g ive [F a the r] the be ne fi t of the do ub t; he hasn’ t had overnigh t v i s i tation with Micah since the summer of ‘03.

Wel l, s i n c e –t h e r e –t h e r e ’ s a n o t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g –i n –i n [F a t he r’ s] long te stimony , and I don’t fault hi m making – as a – as a w itness, he didn’t have a

lawy er , s o h e rea lly

has no option but to eng ag e in a-5- kin d o f s tr e a m of

c on sc iou sn e ss. B ut i n th a t st re a m of c on sc iou sn e ss, he w as d i s cussing his various businesses, his law pra ctice, be d and brea kfast, catering , sp ec i al events venue, and he did say that – y ou know, he – he hesi t at ed to go bac k to being a full-time lawy er b e c a u s e h e ’ d h a v e

– e v e n h a v e le s s ti me to s p e n d w ith h is c hildren beca use it would be extremely – he’d be extremely

busy as a la wy er. But I would note that, y ou know, even busy lawy ers usuallyhave the

wee kends off. And his pr oblem, his e x presse d problem in v i s i t ing with Micah is his commitm ents on the we ekend.

Well, let me turn first t o t h e request for visitation for Timothy , and I ’m g oing to deny that petition beca use at thi s point it strikes me that if [F a the r] is g oin g to c omm it a dd iti on a l pa re nta l ti me a ndre so ur c e s, it’s got to be f

or Micah. And until he beg ins to fill t he void of Micah for a – for a fa t h er , I

don’t nee d to tinker with the visitation for Ti mothy , I

g ue ss su bscribi ng to the olda da g e y ou ’v e g ot t o w a lk befor e y ou can r

un.

I wi ll, ho we ve r, g ra nt h is o ra l r e qu e st to mod if y his vis itatio n w ith Mic a h

. A n d le t’ s s ta

r t th is w a y

. T w ic e a

mo n thh e c a n have overnig ht visit ations with Micah on either a Tuesda y or Wednesday night, a nd all he has to do is give notice to [Mother] on Sunday night the Sunday befor e, say ing, “I wish to ex erc ise overnig ht visit ation on Tuesday or Wednesday .” And he can e x erc ise that option twice in a

mo n t h
, and we ’ll have that beg in J uly 1, and we ’ll see how that
wo rk s. An d if

– if he c a n g e t of

f his fe e t a ndbe g in t o g e t so me vis it a t i o n w i t h M i c a h
, t o b e g i n t o e s t ab l i s h a r e a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w ith Mic a h, the n I

wo uldc e rt a inl y

c on sid e r, do wn the ro a d, e xpa nd ing his vis itatio n w ith Ti mothy . B ut right no w, as f ar a s th e Cou rt

is

c on c erne d, in the be st i nte re st o f the se c hil dr e n a nd[F a the r’ s] expressed love of both – both his sons and his daug hter – I mean, he – h e ne e ds to mod if

y his sc he du le a s muc h a s h e c a n to sp e ndso me tim e wi th – wi th Mic a h, a nd so that wo uld be my jud g me nt o n th is – this iss ue.

On the issue o f the medic al expenses, the par ental plan, whic h was incorporated into the final dec re e, contemplated [ Father] being responsible for

medica l ex penses ove r and a bove that paid by [Mot her’ s] i nsuranc e policy by procur ing a policy of his own for the

e xce ss. He sa y s he ca n’ t do tha t, andI do n’ t ha ve a ny

pr oo f h e re to ind ic a te oth e rw ise , b ut I thi nk , g ive n th e c on te mpl a tio n th a t he wo uld have that policy and he doesn’t, that it’s equitable to modify the final decr ee to sa y

that he is responsible f

or two-thirds of the medical-6- expenses o v er tha t cover ed by [Mot her’ s] i nsuranc e, and that he’s relieve d of – g iven that orde r, we ’l l amend out the pr ovision that

re qu ir e s h im t o g e t ins ur a nc e , wh ic h he sa y s he c a n’ t. An d I a lso no te that “med ic a l e xpe ns e s” is d e fi ne d in the pa re nti ng plan, a ndI ’l l adher e to that def

inition, and it i ncludes menta l, dental, orthodontic, and ey e car e, and pre scription drug s, so that will be a modification of that provision.

As far as the I RS che ck is – I mean, [Mot her] did not learn a bout the I RS check till months afte r the divorce

. I t se ems to the Court that it’s marital p r o p e r ty

. . . . We h a v e a jo in t c h e c k a n d f o r th e li f e o f me I can’ t imagine how the

– t he bank ne g otiated the che ck without [Mot her’ s] s ignature on it, but that appea rs to be the c ase.

But c onsistent with the de cision I made in [a previous c ase], I think

– a nd c on sis te nt wi th princ ipl e s of e qu ity – [Mothe r] is e ntitl ed to $1,600. And part of t hat di vision comes from this judge ’s vi ew of the unauthorized cashing of that chec k made out to both of them, so I ’m g oing to g rant he r a judg ment of $1,600 base d upon that unauthorized cashing of that – of that chec k, which has g ot to be define d as marital property . Now, g rante d, just li ke in [a previous case ], [ Father’s] g ot
a ca se that if the matter ha d g otten to court, per haps he should have be e n th e be ne fi c iary

of the a mou nt, bu t he de c ide d to take that on his

ow n s ho uld e rs

.
* * *

No w, l e t m e g o b a c k t o o n e m a t t e r ab o u t M i c a h

. I t s e e m s t o me in addition to the visit ation that I ’ve g rante d with Mic ah that if [Father ] wants to sort of I

g uess y ou’d say

take Micah out of t h e d aycar e fa c ili t y , I t h i n k h e s h o u l d b e a l l o w e d t o d o t h i s u p t o f o u r t ime s a
mon th, a s lon g a s it’ s c oo rd inate d wi th the fa c ili ty ; so that if he g e ts a spar e couple of hours in the afte rnoon and he calls down ther e and there ’s not any

planned a ctivity and he can drive down there and take Mic a h o ut, I

thi nk that’ s ok a y ; a nd it ou g ht to be a uth orize d, a ndI ’l l trus t him to ca ll ah e a d an d ju st m ake su re that it do e sn ’t int e rf e re wi th

a n y p l a n n e d a c t i v i t y. Child support. You know, this i ssue o f d etermining income f or the

s e l f

- e m p l o ye d i s d i f

f i c u l t , a n d t h e c a s e l a w r e c o g n i z e s t h a td i f f i c u l t y; but I think by [Fat h er ’s ] own admission, while g rante d this is a – a sort of a r oug h calc ulation and it almost has t o be a roug h calc ulation, but I think he conce ded in his testimonythat his gr o s s income has-7- inc re a se d s inc e 20 02 , a ndhe ’s e xpla ine d abo ut the $8 9, 00 0 in w a g e s, the $9 0, 00 0 a

y e ar i n mo rt g a g e pa y me nts , th e $1 20 ,0 00 a y e ar i n
o th e r e xp e n s e s b e tw e e n e ig h t o r te n th o u s a n d d o ll ar s , and Irea li ze any body who runs a sma ll business has to make other pe rm anent
no nr ou tin e pa y me nts . But st il l by his ow n a dmi ssi on in the e -m a il, it’ s – “ I t is app are nt no w that bu sin e ss andc a sh fl ow are su ff ic ie nt t o sustain gr owth, so I

can now b egi n to pay

others to do many

of the things I ’ve been force d to do the past three y ear s. I ’m also beg inning to a dv e rt ise a nd c a mpa ig n r e g ard ing my la w p ra c tic e , w hic h s ho uld

serve to ree stablish it s o that I ca n o n ce ag ain enjoy what I was educated to do.” So I

– I can c onclude a s a matter of fac t that he has ha d a n in c re a se in h is f inanc ia l f ortun e s a nda n in c re a se in h is

a va ila ble fu nd s.

Now let me turn to a nother fa ctor. I mean, whe n t h i s o rd er was enter ed in J une 2002, I

mean, I was a war e that, y ou know, Micah wa s a child that took a lot of ext ra c are . That’s not only extra emotional

car e, an e x tra c ommitm ent by espec ially [Mot her], but, obviously , an
a dd iti on a l f

ina ncial st rai n b y

wh a t sh e is r e qu ir e d to do . A ndI did have an e xp e c tati o n th a t [F a th e r ] w o u ld e xe r c is e h is v is it a ti o n to a t least a muc h g reater de g ree than he did as set out in the final de cre e,
a ndhe ha s n ot d on e th at. The – I me a n, g os h, I

do n’ t kn ow ho w t o put a per centa g e on it, but it would seem to be tha t 95 perc ent of the

re sp on sib ili ty – g os h, ma y be mor e – fo r Mic a h is on he r sh ou lder s. Th e c hil d s up port

g uid e lin e s, y ou kn ow , c on te mpl a te re a so na ble vis itatio n b e c a us e wh e n y ou vis it w ith so me on e , y ou a c c e pt s ome living expenses, but that hasn’t ha ppened he re.

I think taking into consider ation the almost 100 perc ent obligation of

car e p l ac ed on her f

or Micah, the fac t that [ Father’s] financ ial

c o n d i t i o n h a s i m p r o v e d
, a n d r e c o g n i z i n g t h e v a g ar i e s i n v o l ve d in determinin g e xac titud e wh e n y ou ’r e – w he n y ou ’r e de a lin g wi th somebody who is se lf-employ ed, which is r ecog nized in the ca se law, that a child support incr ease of $500 per month here is wa

rra nted.
Now, the $200 nonvisitation penalty is – I gu es s , I ’m ca lling it that for lac k of anything else – is set aside, so the monthly child support pay ment will be incre ased t o $2,500. And I think under all the circ umstances, that’ s consistent with the principles of equity ; and it’s consist en t with the child support g uidelines based upon the inf or ma tio n I

ha ve a va ila

ble to m e . I

a lso thi nk

that un de r the se circ umstances [Mot her] is e ntitled to an attorney fee in the amount of $5,000, and that – that’s the judg ment of the Court, . . . .-8-

The trial c ourt subsequently enter ed its final judg ment. I t wa s co n s i s tent with the memorandum opinion. From this judgment, F ather appea ls.

II.

Ou r re vie w of

thi s n on -j ury

c a se is de novo up on the re c or d witha pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss as to the trial court’s fac tual finding s, “u n l es s t he pre pondera nce of the evidenc e is otherwise .” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The trial court’ s conclusions of law a re not a ccor ded the same de fer ence

. Brumit v . Br umit , 948 S.W .2d 739, 740 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

III

.
A.

Father ra ises the following issues for our r eview:

1. Di d th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr in o rd e ri ng a n in c re a se in F ath er’s c hil d support obligation?

2. Di d th e tr ia l c ou rt abu se its dis c re tio n in or de ri ng F a the r t o p a y a ll

c ou rt c os ts a ndMo the r’ s a tto rn e y ’s fe e s?

3. Did the trial court err i n i n cr easing Father’s oblig ation for nonc ov e re d me dic a l e xpe ns e s?

4. Di d th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr in a wa rd ing Mo the r on e -h a lf

of the pa rt ie s’ 2002 income tax return?

5. Did the trial court err in r efusing to awar d Fa t her a dditional

v i s i t a t i o n t i m e w i t h T i m o t h y?

Mother, on the other

hand, urg es us to hold that Fathe r’s a ppeal is frivolous in nature. She see ks an

awa rd of attorney ’s fe es for

a frivolous appeal. We will addre ss eac h of these issues in turn.

B.

Father fir st contends that the trial court erre d in incre asing his basic child support obli g ation from $2,000 per

month to $2,500 per month. W e ag ree with this contention.W e say “ i n an ap p rop ri at e case” be cause al l chi l d s up p o rt award s and m o d i f i cat i o ns o f

s am e are s ub ject t o t he 2

ov er ar c h i n g c o n c e p t o f n o n

- a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e g u i d e l i n e s i n t h e e v e n t t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f t h o s e p r o v i s i o n s w o u l d be

“ un j us t or i nappropri at e. ” See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 5

- 1 0 1 (e)( 1 )( A ) ( 2 0 0 5 ).

T he Supre me C our t ha s cont r as t ed t he prec i s e n at ur e of t he perc ent age ch i l d s uppo r t cal cul at i on for a s al ar i ed 3
i nd i vi d ual wi t h t hat of a sel f

- em p l o y ed ob l i go r:

T hese gui d el i nes, when ap p l i ed t o an ob l i go r whose i nco m e i s d eri ved f rom a sal ary and an oc casi o nal bo nus o r di vi d en d , yie ld a n easi l y qua nt i t at ed chi l d s up p o rt

am o unt

. O nce t he o b l i go r’ s i nco m e has been d et erm i ned a n d t he C hi l d Sup p o rt G u id e li n e s h a v e b e e n a p p lied , t h e c a lc u la tio n o f ch ild su p p o rt is m a d e w ith
cert ai nt y , pred i ct ab i l i t y , and precis i o n. A l t houg h a chi evi ng s uch pre ci s i on i s poss i bl e whe n c al cul at i ng ch i l d s uppo r t owed b y a salaried o b l i go r, t he ca l cu l ati o n is m uc h m o re d i f f i cu l t an d m uc h less p rec i se wh en t h e obl i g or i s s el f

- empl oy ed. T h e Chi l d Su ppor t G u i del i n es t h er ef or e pr ov i de

a d iff e re n t m e tho d fo r c a lc u la ting a se lf- e m p lo ye d o b ligo r’s inc o m e . In th e se lfe m p lo ye d o b ligo r’s situa tio n , t h e gu id e line s re q u ire the trial c o u rt to c o n sid e r a ll i nco m e o f

t he o b l i go r p arent , red uced o nl y b y reaso nab l e exp enses t o pro d uce t he i ncome. Tayl or , 15 8 S.W

. 3 d 35 2
, 35 7

- 5 8 (i nt ernal ci t at i o n om i t t ed ).

-9- When a petition to modifychild support is filed based upon a ch an ge i n an obli g or’s ne t income, a trial court, in an a ppropriate ca s e, ca n o rd er a n incre ase or decr ease in support “when 2 there is found to be a sig nificant va rianc e, as de fined in the child support g uidelines . . ., betwee n the g uidelines and the a mount of support curr ently order ed.” T enn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)( 1)(A) (Supp. 2004). The c h i ld support guide lines define a signific ant variance as “at least 15% if the

curr ent support is one hundre d dollars ($100.00) or g reater pe r m o n t h

. . . .” Te nn. Comp. R. & Reg s., ch. 1240-2- 4-.02(3) (2003). The party seeking the modification of the c hild support order ha s the burden o f p ro v i n g t he existence of a signific ant variance

. See Turner v. Turn er , 919 S.W .2d 34 0, 34 5 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 5) ; Seal v. Seal , 802 S.W .2d 617, 620 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

Father is a sole pr oprietor, i.e. , the self- em p l o y ed owne r of a law pra ctice and a bed and brea kfast fa cility . Mother esse ntially bases he r re quest for more chil d s u pport on Father’s 2003 gros s income of $500,000 and an email he sent her indicating that his “business and ca sh flow ar e sufficie nt to sustain g rowth.” Mother take s the position that all of this s hows that therehas bee n a “sig nificant va

rianc e,” a s define d in the g uidelines. The trial court tacitly ag ree d with Mother that there had been the nece ssary predic ate showing to justify another look at F ather ’s child s u p p o rt obligation. W e re spectfully disag ree with this conclusion.

“ [T]he c hil d sup po rt a wa

rd is ba se d on a fla t per c e nta g e of the ob lig or ’s net income” as that

conce pt is define d in the guidelines. Tenn. Com p. R & Reg s., ch. 1240-2- 4-.03(2) (empha sis added). Whil e a n o bli g or ’s gros s inc ome is the sta rt ing po int

of the pe rc e nta g e c hil d s up po rt c a lc ulatio n, it is far f rom the final step. The gros s income of a self-e mploy ed individual, such as F ather , must be reduc ed by

“re asonable expenses nece ssary to pr oduce such income.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s., ch. 1240-2-4- .03(3)( a)( 2). Once this has be en acc omplished, a further adjustment must be made for the 3 signific ant matter of

fede ral income taxes. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4- .03(4)( b). I n theSuch e x pens es ar e l i kel y t o hav e i ncl uded t he fol l owi ng : pay r ol l
, foo d, i nt er es t , proper t y t axe s , ot her l ocal t axe s 4

a n d fee s, o ff

ic e su p p lies, b u ild ing su p p lies, la u n d ry, re p a irs, m a inte n a n c e , utili ties, tra v e l, p rin ting , ad v e rtising , f re igh t, and of f i ce expen s es , t o name a few.

W e d o n o t u n d e rs ta n d h o w this ne b u lo u s sta te m e n t c a n h a v e a sig n ifi c a n t b e a rin g o n F a the r’s “b o tto m li n e ,” 5

i

. e. , his n e t i ncome.

T he propri et y of

t he t r i al cour t ’ s d el et i on o f t he $2 00 p er m ont h add

- on f or Fat her ’ s f ai l ur e t o vi s i t M i cah was 6

n o t ra ise d a s a n issu e o n a p p e a l.

-10- instant case , Mother, as the moving pa rty , had the bur den to show that there had bee n a “sig nificant varia nce.” Thus, it was her bur den to show the e x penses “nec essary to produce ” the $500,000 of 4 g ross income a nd the appr opriate de duction for taxes. I t was not F ather ’s obligation to prove w hat these e x penses a nd taxes were.

This is not a case w here an oblig or fails to produce the ne cessa ry “evide nce of

income.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s., ch. 1240-2-4-.03(3) (f)

. Father contends – and Mot her does not deny – that sh e wa s a ff

or de d a c c e ss t o all of F a the r’ s re c or ds be ari ng up on the c on ve rs ion of his gros s inc ome to net i n c o m e

. F o r

w h a t e v e r r e a s o n , s h e c h o s e n o tt o p r e s e n te v i d e n c e o f F a the r’ s net

income, rely ing instea d on Father’s g ross income and his “ sufficie nt to sustain g rowth” statement re g arding 5 his bu sin e sse s.

We r e c og nize th at the re is p ro of in the re c or d o f “ in kind ” re mun e ratio n. I t is c le ar tha t a court can take such remune ration into c onsideration in e stablishing one’ s g ross income. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Re g s., ch. 1240-2- 4-.03(3) (a) (3). How ever , no attempt was made in this case to value Father’s lodg ing a nd other be nefits of the multi-use of his be d an d breakfast with its attendant inkind benef

its to Father.

Ch il d s u p p o r t u n d e r

th e g u id e li n e s is e xp r e s s e d a s a p e r c e n ta g e of net income. It was inc umb e nt up on Mo the r, a s th e mov ing pa rt y to p re se nt e vid e nc e of

F a the r’ s net

income. This she fa ile d to do . Be c a us e Mo the r fa ile d to carry he r bur de n of pr ov ing a sig nif ic a nt vari a nc e , we ho ld that the evi dence preponde rate s ag ainst the trial court’s finding that there has bee n a sig nificant varia nce supporting a n incre ase in F ather ’s child support obligation. Accor dingly , we r einstate the previous child support aw ard of $2,000 per month, retroa ctive to July 1, 2004, the eff ective date of 6 the tr ia l c ou rt ’s mod if

ic a tio n o f c hil d s up po rt

.
C.

Father ne x t asserts that the trial court a bused its discretion in taxi ng all court c osts to Father and in orde ring Father to pay $5,000 toward Mother ’s attorne y ’s fe es. We disag ree

.
Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 5- 10 3( c ) ( 20 05 ) p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:Fa t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e c ou l d n ot ob t a i n s u c h a po l i c y be c a u s e t h e c h i l dr e n di d n ot l i v e w i t h h i m. 7

-11- The plaintiff spouse may rec over f rom the def

endant spouse, and the spouse or other

person to whom the c ustody of the child, or c hildren, is awar ded may

rec o v er fr om the other spouse r easona ble attorne y fe e s in c ur

re d in enfor c ing a ny

de c re e fo r a lim on y

a nd /or c hil d support, or in r eg ard to any suit or action conce rning the adjudication

o f t h e custody

or the c hang e of c ustody of any child, or childre n, of the p ar ti e s , b o thu p o n th e o r ig in a l d iv o r c e h e ar in g a n d a t any subsequent hea

ring , which fe es may

be fixed and allowe d by the court, before whom such ac tion or proce eding is pending , in the dis c re tio n o f s uc h c ou rt

.
Under this statute, an awa

rd of leg al expenses in a suit pertaining to visit ation, an obvious aspec t of custody , “is discre tionary with the trial court.” She rro d v . W ix , 8 49 S.W. 2d78 0, 78 5 ( Te nn. Ct

. Ap p. 19 92 ). Whil e the abil ity to p a y of the pa rt y re qu e sti ng fe e s is a

fa c tor to b e con si dere d in determining whe ther the othe r party should be onerated with the fee s of the other, a trial court “ may
awa rd attorne y ’s fe es witho u t p ro o f t h at the re questing party is unable to pay

them as long as the

awa rd is just and equitable unde r the fa cts of the c ase.” Id

.
Mother succ essfully

defe nded F ather ’s petition with respec t to visi tation. Under the circ umstances presented by the record before us, we find no support for a conclusion that the trial

c ou rt abu se d it s disc re tio n in aw ard ing Mo the r he r at torne y ’s fe e s. F urthe rm or e , w e fi ndno abu se of dis c re tio n in the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to b ur de n F a the r w ith the pa y me nt o f c ou rt c os ts.

D.

Next, Father arg ues t hat t he trial court e rre d in increa sing F ather ’s monetary obligation for the c h il d r e n ’ s u n r e imb u r s e d me d ic a l e xp e n s e s f r o m o n e

- h a lf

to tw o

- th ir d s

. We f

in d F a ther’s

arg ume nt o n th is i ssu e to b e wi tho ut m e ri t.

I n the par enting plan which a ccompa nied the parties’ final jud g me n t o f divorce , the trial court
or de re d F a the r t o p a y

on e -h a lf of a ll o f t he c hil dr e n’ s me dic a l e xpe ns e s n ot c ov e re d b y he a lth insurance . I n addition, the trial court order ed F ather to obtain a supplemental he alth insurance policy

on the c hil dr e n. At

the he ari ng on the pe tit ion to m od if y , F a the r t e sti fi ed th at he wa s u na ble to ob ta in s uc h a

su pp le me nta l po lic y , a ndthe tr ia l c ou rt no ted th a t it

ha d n o p ro of

“ to i nd ic a te 7 otherwise.” The trial c ourt there fore remove d from the pare nting plan the provision requiring Father to obta in a supplemental insurance policy

. Howeve r, to compensate for the la ck of this policy , the

c ou rt inc re a se d F a the r’ s o bli g a tio n f or no n- c ov e re d med ic a l expe ns e s fr om one -h a lf to t wo -thir ds

. We find no abuse of

discretion in t h i s i n cr ea s e, and ac cording ly , we de cline to disturb the trial court’s r uling on this matter.-12- E.

F a the r n e xt con tend s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in a wa

rd ing Mo the r o ne -h a lf

of the pa rt ie s’ 1998 income tax refund. We ag ain disag ree

. As a g ener al rule, a

trial court’ s division of mar i t al as s et s is not subject to modification. Johns on v. Johns on , 37 S.W .3d 892, 895 (Tenn. 2001) . Howeve r, if a pa rticular ma

rital asset wa s not addre ssed in the final judg ment of divorce
, it is permissible for a court to make a division of that asset at a later date. See Simpkins v . Bl ank , No. M2002-02383-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 23093849, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. M..S., fil ed De cembe r 30, 2003). By definition, such a d i v i s i o n ca nnot be interpre ted as a modification of t he original judgment si nce the asset in question was not mentioned and addr essed in that judg ment.

I n the instant case, F ather

– in Aug ust, 2002 – filed an ame nded tax return for the y ear 1998. The I nterna l Revenue Ser vice then issued a chec k pay able to F ather and Mother joi ntl

y in the amount of $3,26 7

. F a th e r

s o me h o w ma n a g e d to d e p o s it th is c h e c k

in to h is o p e r a ti n g a c c o u n t w ith out Mother’s signature. Be cause this re fund was not even r equeste d, much less re ceive d, until after the parties’ divorce became final, it is difficult to und er stand how it could have been c ontemplated at the time of the divorce

. Not surprising ly
, it is not spe cifica lly mentioned in the judgme nt of divorce

. The trial c ourt did not err in dividing this asset at the June, 2004, hearing

.
Be cause the re fund chec k was issued for a y ear in which the parties were marrie d, we c annot say that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the t ri al court’s de cision to consider the r efund to be marital prope rty

and to awa

rd Mother $1,600, w hich constitutes half of the ref unded amount.

F.

F ina lly , F a the r a

rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in re fu sin g to m od if y vis itatio n to a llo w h im inc re a se d ti me wi th h is o lde r s on , T imo thy . We fi ndno e rr or i n th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g on thi s matter.
When seeking a modifica tion of visitation, t he moving party must show, by

a pre pondera nce
o f t h e ev i d en ce , (1 ) t h at a m at er i al ch an ge o f c i rc u m s t an ce s h as o cc u rr ed
, an d (2 ) t h at s u ch a c h an ge has affec ted t he child’s best interest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)( 2)(C) ( 2005). I f the moving party is succe ssful in proving a chang e of circ umstance, suc h a chang e mer ely opens the door to a

re- examination of the visitation arrang ement; it does not, ips o fa c to , require a modi fica tion of that

arr a ng e me nt.

I n the instant case , the trial court – in its memorandum opinion at the time of the divor ce – admonished F ather

reg arding his prefe rential tre atment of Timothy and urg ed F ather to show more of a c ommitm ent to Micah by exercising the visitation with Micah to which he w as entitled. A y ear
a nda ha lf la te r, F a the r f

ile d a pe tit ion to m od if

y , a ndhis so le re qu e st w a s th a t th e c ou rt a wa rdhim-13-

additional visitation wit h Timothy . Whil e F ather acknow ledg ed at the hearing on his pe tition t hat he had only

exercised ove rnig ht visitation with Mic ah on one occ asion, he c laimed that this was due to the fac t that he was unable to e x erc ise the wee kend visitation which he had bee n awa rded. F ather advanc ed various rea sons f or this inability ; to wit, he c annot devote an additional bedroom in his bed

a ndbr e akf

a st f or Mic a h; h e c a nn ot p la c e a la tc h o n th e do or of a be dr oo m f or Mic a h in or de r t o preve nt him from try ing to g et out of the bedroom during the nig ht; he cannot take Micah to a hote l room as h e i s occa sionally forc ed to do for himself and his wife whe n every bedroom – including their own – is re nted; and he c annot hire a sitter for a n entire w eeke nd in order to watch Micah. F a the r d id, ho we ve r, make a n o ra l r e qu e st at tria l th a t th e pa re nti ng plan b e a me nd e d to a llo w h im to exercise overnight visitation with Mica h on wee knights, when Father is le ss likely to ha ve bed a nd brea kfast g uests and whe n he would ostensibly have mor e time to devote to Micah.

At the conc lusion of the most rece nt hearing, the trial court re iterate d its concern that Father was not showing enoug h of a commitment to Micah, and as a re sult of that conce rn, the trial c ourt de nie d F a the r’ s r e qu e st f

or inc re a se d v isi ta tion with T imo thy , s ta tin g that “ if [F a the r] i s g oin g to commit additional parental tim e and r esourc es, it’s g ot to be for Micah.” The trial court did, ho we ve r, g ra nt F a the r’ s r e qu e st t o mo dif y the vis itatio n s c he du le fo r M ic a h, a llo wi ng F a the r t o exercise ove rnig ht visit ation with the child twice a month on either a Tue sday or Wednesday . The

c ou rt we nt o n to a ddthat if F a the r d e mon str a te d p ro g re ss i n h is c omm itm e nt t o M ic a h, that it wo uld consider a llowing more visitation wit h Timothyin the future.

The fac t that the court obviously took a new look at the issue of visitation g oing fo rw ard indica te s a n imp li c it f

in d in g o f a c h a n g e o f c ir c u ms tan c e s ; o th e r w is e , th e r e w o u ld h a v e b e en no
rea son for the tria l court to take a fre sh look at this is sue. However, having examined anew the issue of i ncre ased visitation with Timothy , the trial court determined that such an incr ease would not be in the be st i nte re st o f the c hil dr e n a ndthe re fo re de nie d F a the r’ s r e qu e st.

Father a rg ues this deni al wa s in error , contending that the fa ct Timothy is two y ear s older than he wa s at the time of the divorc e and tha t t h e ch i l d i s having some difficulty with school are

su ff ic ie nt r e a so ns to j us tif

y the inc re a se d v isi ta tio n s ou g ht b y F a the r. Whil e it i s tr

ue that “ changes relat[ ed] to ag e,” ( emphasis adde d), can constitute a materia l c hang e of circ umstance, it is only one fac tor that “may ” be considere d when determining the proprie ty of a modification of visitation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-101(a )( 2 )( C ). The trial court listened to all of the testimonyand, af ter hearing a nd considering all of i t, determined that a modifica tion of Father’s visitation with Timothy

wa s n ot i n th e be st i nte re st of Ti mothy or the oth e r t wo c hil dr e n. F urthe rm or e , w ith re sp e c t to Father’s assertion that Timothy ’s difficulty in sc hool is enoug h to w arr ant a ch an ge i n v i sitation, Father failed to show that the difficulty in school was attributable to any thing Mother was or w as not doing, or that Father’s a dditional tim e with the child would do something to re medy the situation. Acc ording ly , we f

ind nothing in this recor d to indicate that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the t r i a l c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n t o d e n y F a t h e r ’ s r e q u e s tf o r i n c r e a s e d v i s i t a t i o n w i t h T i m o t h y.

Father c ontends that the trial court ’s decision not to increa se his visitation wit h Timothy ref lects the c ourt’s ef

fort to “punish” him for

not visit ing w ith Micah. We d o n o t v i ew the trial-14-

c ou rt ’s mos t r e c e nt de c re e re g ard ing the su bje c t of vis itatio n a s a n a c t of pu nis hme nt. Th e c ou rt did nothing to lessen Father’s visitation time with T imothy
, and it e ven went so far as to adjust Father’s visitation t ime with Micah in an a ttempt to acc ommodate Father’s sc hedule. Indeed, the court indicated to F ather

that, if his relationship with Micah developed and improved, it would consider expanding F ather ’s visitation time with T imothy in the future. I t is clea r to us that these ac tions by the trial court are not punitive in nature; rathe r, they are a reasonable attempt by the court to foster

a re lationship between F ather and Micah.

Whil e F a the r m ake s mu c h o f the f a c t th at M i c a h ’ s “ s p e c i a l ne e ds ” status imp os e s “ int ole ra ble require ment[s] ” on F ather ’s ab i l i t y t o keep him overnight, we believe F ather ’s protestations ring hollow. The fa ct is that Fa ther did nothing to de monstrate to the court that the c ircumstance s were such that he was unable to keep Micah overnig ht. Fathe r states that he would have to c onvert one of the g ue st roo ms for Mic a h’ s u se , w hic h w ou ld p re ve nt F a the r f ro m r e nti ng ou t th a t r oo m. Howeve r, F ather

testified that Timothy

slept on a sofa

in a sitting room ad

jace nt to the master be dr oo m w he n h e stay e d with F a the r on w e e ke nd s. Com mon se ns e wo ulddic ta te that Mi c a h w ou ld be able to s le e p o n th e fl oo r i n a sle e pin g ba g or

on a n a ir ma ttr e ss. F a the r a

rg ue s th a t, i n o rd e r t o keep Micah overnig ht, he would have to pla ce a latch on the bedroom door, and that t h i s childproofing “would rende r [t he room] unusable for g uests.” We simplycannot c onceive that a patr on of F ather ’s bed a nd brea

kfast would in any

way be off ended by a latch on the ir bedroom door . Father

a sse rt s that he c ou ld no t a ff or d no r wo uld he trus t “ a we e ke nd
, liv e -i n ba by sit te r, ” wh ic h h e c la ims h e w o u ldn e e d in o r d e r

to k e e p M ic a h o v e r n ig h t an d to p r o v id e h im w ith c o n s tan t s u p e r v is io n

. We f ir s t n o te th a t m o s t y o u n g c h il d r e n r e q u ir e c o n s tan t s u p e r v is io n , r e g ar d le s s o f th e ir d is ab il it ie s

. We must also point out that Mother fac es these same supervisory issues on a daily basis and hires a sitter when ne cessa

ry , and, unlike F ather , Mother does not ha ve the a ssistance of a spouse.

Howeve r, F ather ’s conc erns ove r his bed and br eakf ast g uests and h i s wee kend

re sp on sib ili tie s sh ou ld n o lo ng e r b e a n is su e , a s the tr ia l c ou rt g rante d h is r e qu e st t o a lte r h is visitation wit h Micah to permit Micah to spend a wee knight with Father twice a mont h. We do find it puz zli ng that Father re peate dly emphasizes in his brief bef ore this court his utt er ina bilityto keep Mic a h o ve rn ig ht at any time , n ot j us t on we e ke nd s, pa rt ic ula rl y in l ig ht o f F a the r’ s sp e c ifi c re qu e st fo r w e e kn ig ht v isi ta tio n d ur ing the c ou rs e of the he ari ng . It app e ars a s if F a the r h a s fa ll en vic tim to the old adag e, “B e ca

ref ul what y ou wish for – y ou might just g et it.”

I n s ho rt , w e ho ld tha t th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n in ho ldi ng that F a the r mus t spend more time with Micah befor e conside ring an incr ease in visit ation with Timothy

.
G.
By way of a separ ate issue, Mother urg es us to f ind F ather ’s appea l to be a frivolous one, a nd,

as a c onsequenc e of this re quested finding , asks for an awa rd of her attorney ’s fees on appe al. As F a the r h a s p re va ile d o n th e iss ue of c hil d s up po rt , the re is n o b a sis fo r a fi nd ing of

a frivo lou s a

pp e a l. Ac c or din g ly , w e de c lin e Mo the r’ s r e qu e st f or a n a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s f

or a frivo lou s a

pp e a l.-15- I V.

Th e jud g me nt of the tr ia l c ou rt is a ff ir me d in pa

rt a ndre ve rs e d in pa

rt . F a the r’ s o ri g ina l c hil d support obligation of $2,000 per mo nth is hereby reinstated r etroa ctive to the date when it was incre ased. This c ase is re manded to the tria l court for enfor cemen t of that portion of the c ourt’s jud g me nt tha t is c on sis te nt w ith thi s o pinio n a ndfo r the c oll e c tio n o f c os ts a sse sse d b e low , a ll pursuant to applica

ble law. Exercising our di scre tion, we tax the costs of t his appea l one-ha lf to eac h p ar t y.

_______________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE