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ANNUAL REPORT 2021

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON

INTERNATIONAL

RELIGIOUS

FREEDOM

ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

April 2021

COMMISSIONERS

Gayle Manchin

Chair

Tony Perkins

Anurima Bhargava

Vice Chairs

Gary L. Bauer

James W. Carr

Frederick A. Davie

Nadine Maenza

Johnnie Moore

Nury Turkel

Erin D. Singshinsuk

Executive Director
PROFESSIONAL STAFF 

Dwight Bashir, Director of Outreach and Policy 

Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Director of Research and Policy

Roy Haskins, Director of Finance and Operations

Thomas Kraemer, Director of Human Resources

Danielle Ashbahian, Senior Communications Specialist

Kirsten Lavery, Supervisory Policy Analyst

Jamie Staley, Senior Congressional Relations Specialist

Scott Weiner, Supervisory Policy Analyst

Kurt Werthmuller, Supervisory Policy Analyst

Keely Bakken, Senior Policy Analyst

Mingzhi Chen, Policy Analyst

Patrick Greenwalt, Policy Analyst

Gabrielle Hasenstab, Communications Specialist

Niala Mohammad, Senior Policy Analyst

Jason Morton, Senior Policy Analyst

Mohyeldin Omer, Policy Analyst

Zachary Udin, Researcher

Nina Ullom, Congressional Relations Specialist

Madeline Vellturo, Policy Analyst

U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714

Washington, DC 20401

(P) 202–523–3240

www.uscirf.gov
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction and Overview. 

About this Report. 

Standards for CPC, SWL, and EPC Recommendations. 

USCIRF’s 2021 CPC, SWL, and EPC Recommendations. 

Changes in SWL Recommendations. 

Violations of Human Rights on the Basis of Religion. 

Implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act. 

Key Findings. 

Recommendations to the Administration. 

Recommendations to Congress. 

Key USCIRF Resources & Activities. 

Legal Framework. 

Key Developments in 2020 and Early 2021. 

Countries Recommended for Designation as 

Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs). .

Burma. .

China. .

Eritrea. .

India. .

Iran. .

Nigeria. .

North Korea. .

Pakistan. .

Russia. .

Saudi Arabia. .

Syria. .

Tajikistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Turkmenistan. .

Vietnam. .

Countries Recommended for the 

State Department’s Special Watch List (SWL). .

Afghanistan. .

Algeria. .

Azerbaijan. .

Cuba. .

Egypt. .

Indonesia. .

Iraq. .

Kazakhstan. .

Malaysia. .

Nicaragua. .

Turkey. .

Uzbekistan. .

Other Key Developments. .

COVID-19 and Religious Freedom  .

Attacks on Houses of Worship. .

Political Unrest Leading to Religious Freedom Violations. .

Blasphemy Laws. .

Global Antisemitism. .

China’s International Influence on Religious Freedom and Human Rights. .
Key USCIRF Recommendations Implemented in 2020 and Early 2021. .

Designating the Worst Violators. .

Increasing the Use of Targeted Sanctions. .

Increasing Prioritization of Religious Freedom. .

Filling IRF Related Appointments. .

Increasing the Refugee Ceiling. .

Raising IRF Issues in Bilateral and Multilateral Engagement. .

Advocating for Religious Prisoners of Conscience. .

Increasing Aid to Support Religious Minorities and Religious Freedom. .

Designating Uyghur Genocide. .

Adopting Laws and Passing Resolutions Related to Religious Freedom. .

Appendix 1 Commissioner Biographies. .

Appendix 2 Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project and Victims List. .
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021 1

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

I

n 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted daily life in 

every country across the world. By early January 2021, the World 

Health Organization (WHO) reported 83 million cases and 1.8 million 

deaths globally since the pandemic’s start, with the numbers continuing to climb. The year severely challenged individuals, families, 

religious and other communities, medical and educational systems, 

arts and cultural institutions, workplaces and economies, and governments worldwide. 

Public health measures to control the virus’ spread restricted 

in-person gatherings, including religious gatherings. As the U.S. 

Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) noted in 

March, in many cases these measures complied with international 

human rights standards protecting freedom of religion or belief, but in 

some cases they did not. Such measures must be necessary to protect 

the legitimate state interest of preventing disease and proportionate 

to meeting that aim, must not be discriminatory, and must be lifted 

once the crisis has passed. 

USCIRF’s monitoring revealed that in some countries, already 

marginalized religious minorities faced official and/or societal stigmatization, harassment, and 

discrimination for allegedly causing 

or spreading the virus. Additionally, 

since crowded prisons present a 

high risk of infection, USCIRF urged 

governments to release all prisoners held because of their religion 

or belief as part of their COVID19 response. On a positive note, 

some governments that have long 

repressed religious freedom, such 

as Eritrea, did release religious prisoners. By contrast, Iran, which reportedly furloughed 85,000 prisoners 

for health reasons, also incarcerated others, especially members of the 

Baha’i community, and placed prisoners from the Sufi Muslim religious 

minority in overcrowded wards, increasing their risk of exposure. 

About this Report 

Created by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as 

amended (IRFA), USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan U.S. government advisory body, separate from the U.S. Department of State, that 

monitors and reports on religious freedom abroad and makes policy 

recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress. 

USCIRF bases these recommendations on the provisions of its authorizing legislation and the standards in the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 

(ICCPR), and other international documents. USCIRF’s mandate and 

annual reports are different from, and complementary to, the mandate 

and annual reports of the State Department’s Office of International 

Religious Freedom. 

USCIRF’s 2021 Annual Report assesses religious freedom violations and progress during calendar year 2020 in 26 countries and 

makes independent recommendations for U.S. policy. The key findings, recommendations, and analysis in this report are based on a 

year’s research by USCIRF, including travel, hearings, meetings, and 

briefings, and are approved by a majority vote of Commissioners, with 

each Commissioner, under the statute, having the option to include 

a statement with his or her own individual views. During the first two 

months of 2020, Commissioners and/or staff visited Azerbaijan, Laos, 

Malaysia, and Sudan to assess religious freedom conditions. For the 

rest of the year and in early 2021, USCIRF did not travel due to the 

coronavirus pandemic. 

The report’s primary focus is on two groups of countries: first, 

those that USCIRF recommends the State Department should designate as “countries of particular concern,” or CPCs, under IRFA, 

and second, those that USCIRF recommends the State Department 

should place on its Special Watch List (SWL). The report also includes 

USCIRF’s recommendations of violent nonstate actors for designation by the State Department as “entities of particular concern,” 

or EPCs, under IRFA. In addition, 

the report analyzes the U.S. government’s implementation of 

IRFA during the reporting year 

and provides recommendations 

to bolster overall U.S. efforts to 

advance freedom of religion or 

belief abroad. It also includes 

a section discussing key trends 

and developments in religious 

freedom globally during the 

reporting period, including in 

countries that are not recommended for CPC or SWL status. This 

year, that section covers COVID-19 and religious freedom, attacks 

on houses of worship, political unrest leading to religious freedom 

violations, blasphemy laws, global antisemitism, and China’s international influence on religious freedom and human rights. Finally, 

the report’s last section highlights key USCIRF recommendations 

that the U.S. government has implemented since USCIRF’s previous 

annual report. 

In this report, USCIRF uses the terms “religious freedom,” “freedom of religion,” and “freedom of religion or belief” interchangeably 

to refer to the broad right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief, including the right to nonbelief, protected under 

international human rights law.

Standards for CPC, SWL, and EPC 

Recommendations 

IRFA defines CPCs as countries where the government engages in 

or tolerates “particularly severe” violations of religious freedom. It 

[I]n some countries, already 

marginalized religious minorities faced 

official and/or societal stigmatization, 

harassment, and discrimination for allegedly 

causing or spreading the virus.
2 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

defines the State Department’s SWL for countries where the government engages in or tolerates “severe” violations of religious freedom. 

Under IRFA, particularly severe violations of religious freedom 

mean “systematic, ongoing, [and] egregious violations . . . , including 

violations such as—(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (B) prolonged detention without charges; (C) 

causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine 

detention of those persons; or (D) other flagrant denial of the right to 

life, liberty, or the security of persons.” Although the statute does not 

specifically define severe violations of religious freedom, in making 

SWL recommendations USCIRF interprets it to mean violations that 

meet two of the elements of IRFA’s systematic, ongoing, and egregious standard (i.e., that the violations are systematic and ongoing, 

systematic and egregious, or ongoing and egregious).

To meet the legal standard for designation as an EPC, a nonstate 

group must engage in particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined above, and must also be “a nonsovereign entity that 

exercises significant political power and territorial control; is outside 

the control of a sovereign government; and often employs violence 

in pursuit of its objectives.”

The Annual Report’s emphasis on the countries and entities 

that, in USCIRF’s view, merit CPC, SWL, or EPC designation is 

intended to focus the attention 

of U.S. policymakers on the worst 

violators of religious freedom 

globally. The fact that a country 

or nonstate group is not covered 

in this report does not mean that 

it did not violate religious freedom during the reporting year. 

It only means that, based on the 

information available to USCIRF, 

the conditions during that year 

did not, in USCIRF’s view, meet the high threshold—the perpetration 

or toleration of particularly severe or severe violations of religious 

freedom—required to recommend the country or nonstate group 

for CPC, SWL, or EPC designation. In the case of a nonstate group, 

it also could mean that the group did not meet other statutory 

requirements, such as exercising significant political power and 

territorial control. 

USCIRF monitors and has concerns about religious freedom 

conditions worldwide, including violations of freedom of religion or 

belief perpetrated or tolerated by governments and entities not covered in this report. The full range of USCIRF’s work, on a wide variety 

of countries and topics, can be found at www.uscirf.gov. In addition, 

information on religious freedom conditions in all foreign countries 

can be found in the State Department’s annual International Religious 

Freedom reports.

USCIRF’S 2021 CPC, SWL, and 

EPC Recommendations

For 2021, based on religious freedom conditions in 2020, USCIRF 

recommends that the State Department:

• Redesignate as CPCs the following ten countries: Burma, China, 

Eritrea, Iran, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan; 

• Designate as additional CPCs the following four countries: India, 

Russia, Syria, and Vietnam; 

• Maintain on the SWL the following two countries: Cuba and 

Nicaragua; 

• Include on the SWL the following 10 countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, 

Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Turkey, 

and Uzbekistan; and

• Redesignate as EPCs the following seven nonstate actors: 

al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Houthis, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), 

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal 

Muslimin (JNIM), and the Taliban.

The conditions supporting the CPC or SWL recommendation 

for each country are described in the relevant country chapter of this 

report. The conditions supporting the EPC recommendations for 

Boko Haram are described in the Nigeria chapter, for HTS in the Syria 

chapter, and for the Taliban in the Afghanistan chapter. 

For al-Shabaab, the Houthis, ISGS, and JNIM, the EPC recommendations are based on the following conditions: 

Although al-Shabaab suffered a considerable territory loss in 

recent years, the terrorist group remained active and in control of 

rural areas in Somalia. In 2020, al-Shabaab carried out multiple attacks 

on both Muslims and non-Muslims. In March, al-Shabaab conducted 

a series of attacks targeting school teachers in the Kenya-Somalia 

border, forcing thousands of 

teachers to leave their posts. For 

example, in January, the group 

attacked and killed three local 

teachers in the village of Kamuthe 

in Garissa county. In September, 

the group stopped a bus on its 

way to Nairobi from Lafey town, 

Northern Kenya, from which it 

singled out and abducted three 

non-Muslims. Within its territory, 

the group targeted and killed individuals who were suspected of 

converting from Islam to another religion or becoming nontheists. 

In 2020, the Houthi movement, formally known as Ansar Allah, 

continued to hold territory throughout Yemen. The group’s slogan, 

posted widely throughout Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, includes 

the phrase “a curse on the Jews,” and the tiny remaining Jewish community faces ongoing and severe repression from Houthi authorities. 

In November, then Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo called for 

the Houthis to release Jewish prisoner Libi Marhabi who is suffering 

health problems and remains detained despite a court ordering his 

release in 2019. The Houthis released six Baha’is in July, including 

religious prisoner of conscience Hamid bin Haydara, but continue to 

pursue legal action against them and other members of the Baha’i 

community. Christians also face persecution at the hands of Houthi 

authorities, and were subject in 2020 to violent attacks. 

In 2020, ISGS reportedly executed individuals who refused to pay 

a religious obligation tax in its areas of control in Niger. It also placed 

restrictions on religious practice, including the prohibition of music and 

parties and limitations on women’s abilities to choose their own partners. 

Finally, ISGS controls religious preaching in its areas of control, allowing 

the traditional Tijani Sufi Brotherhood to preach only in some mosques.

In 2020, leaders of JNIM tolerated particularly severe religious 

freedom violations perpetrated by their Katiba Macina branch, under 

the leadership of Amadou Kouffa. Katiba Macina fighters publicly 

killed local imams and traditional leaders in central Mali and northern 

Burkina Faso who disagreed with Kouffa’s beliefs. The group also 

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The fact that a country or nonstate group 

is not covered in this report does not mean 

that it did not violate religious freedom 

during the reporting year.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021 3

imposed a harsh version of Shari'a and strict behavior rules, especially 

on women, in its areas of control in central Mali. 

Changes in SWL Recommendations 

In this report, USCIRF is not recommending SWL placement for three 

countries—Bahrain, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan—

that were among its SWL recommendations in the 2020 Annual Report 

and in prior years. USCIRF has concluded that, although religious freedom concerns remain in all three countries, conditions during calendar 

year 2020 did not meet the high threshold required to recommend 

SWL status. As previously discussed, a SWL recommendation is based 

on USCIRF finding that the government perpetrated or tolerated 

severe religious freedom violations, meaning violations that meet two 

of the elements of IRFA’s systematic, ongoing, and egregious test. 

USCIRF will continue to monitor all three countries on an ongoing 

basis. Should conditions in any of them deteriorate during 2021 to 

the level of severe violations, USCIRF will not hesitate to renew that 

country’s SWL recommendation.

Bahrain

The change in status for Bahrain reflects ongoing improvements in 

the government’s approach toward the country’s marginalized Shi’a 

Muslim majority in 2020. USCIRF began reporting on Bahrain in its 

2012 Annual Report in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings of 2011 

and, based on a sharp deterioration in conditions for the Shi’a Muslim 

community, placed the country on what USCIRF then called its “Tier 

2” in the 2017 Annual Report. 

These conditions have improved over the years, including in 2020. 

For example, Shi’a Muslims in Bahrain were able to observe the Ashura 

holiday in 2020 with mostly reasonable social distancing precautions 

for COVID-19 put into effect in coordination with Shi’a Muslim religious 

authorities. Bahrain remains the 

only Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC) country where Ashura is 

observed as a public holiday. Recent 

years have seen improvements relative to earlier ones, when Bahraini 

security forces deployed tear gas

during Ashura processionals.

Ad d i t io na ll y, in 2020, 

Bahrain’s King Hamad Centre 

for Global Coexistence signed a memorandum of understanding 

with the State Department to combat antisemitism and adopted the 

International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of the 

term. Bahrain was one of several Muslim-majority countries to normalize relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords. Domestically, 

Bahrain has continued to provide wide latitude for freedom of religion for the Hindu, Jewish, Buddhist, and Christian communities. A 

Catholic cathedral that will serve as a regional headquarters is nearing 

completion, and Bahrain hosts a Hindu community that worships in a 

200-year-old continuously operating temple.

USCIRF will continue to monitor religious freedom conditions 

in Bahrain and remains concerned that government authorities summoned and interrogated at least eight Shi’a Muslim religious figures 

over the content of their sermons and religious supplications in 2020. 

While Bahrain faces legitimate security threats from Iran and Iraniansupported terrorist organizations, continuing to integrate rather than 

marginalize Shi’a Muslims in Bahrain is the best way to mitigate these 

groups’ ability to disrupt Bahraini national security.

USCIRF commends Bahrain on the furlough of notable prisoner 

of conscience Nabeel Rajab. However, USCIRF remains concerned 

about restrictions on religious literature in prison and the treatment 

of Shi’a Muslim prisoners. USCIRF also notes that Shi’a Muslims continue to face employment discrimination in the private sector and 

in Bahrain’s military, but tracking the extent of progress in these 

areas is difficult due to a lack of data and restrictions on civil society. 

Reporting the percentages of Shi’a Muslim Bahrainis in the workforce 

and expanding space for civil society and the media to raise issues of 

religious freedom for Shi’a Muslims would enhance Bahrain’s efforts 

toward further progress. USCIRF also appreciates the government of 

Bahrain’s engagement with the Commission over the years.

CAR

USCIRF first recommended CAR’s designation as a CPC in its 2015 

Annual Report, due to elevated sectarian violence and ethnic targeting 

of Muslims amid the country’s civil conflict. In the 2020 Annual Report, 

USCIRF shifted its recommendation on CAR to placement on the SWL, 

due to the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement on the ground 

and reduced sectarian violence in 2019. In 2020, CAR continued to make 

progress on protecting religious freedom. For example, the government worked with international partners to implement key aspects of 

the peace agreement and hold violators accountable, while local organizations continued to implement successful programs to strengthen 

interfaith tolerance. As a result, there was a reduction in violence against 

individuals based on their religious identity. In January 2021, President 

Faustin-Archange Touadéra highlighted security, reconciliation, and 

justice as key priorities for his administration.

However, while certain religious freedom conditions improved 

in 2020, religious minorities in CAR continue to face ongoing religious freedom violations. The Touadéra government took no action 

to ensure that refugees, many 

of whom are religious minorities 

displaced by sectarian violence, 

would be represented in the 

December national elections. 

Muslims face discrimination from 

local government officials, and 

renewed post-election violence

has the potential to trigger backsliding of religious freedom gains 

in this fragile context. The situation in CAR remains dire, and USCIRF’s 

decision to remove it from the SWL reflects only USCIRF’s narrow 

mandate to focus on religious freedom conditions and not the overall 

political, security or human rights concerns, which are pervasive. 

Sudan

Until 2020, USCIRF had recommended that Sudan, under the Islamist 

regime of former president Omar al-Bashir, be designated as a CPC 

every year since USCIRF’s first set of CPC recommendations in 2000. 

After the overthrow of the Bashir regime in April 2019, Sudan’s transitional government, which assumed office that August, has taken 

concrete steps toward ending systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

religious freedom violations, and it has closely engaged with USCIRF 

and other international stakeholders in doing so. The transitional constitution no longer identifies Islam as the primary source of law, and 

it includes a provision ensuring the freedom of belief and worship. In 

November 2019, the transitional government repealed the repressive 

public order law that the former regime had long used to punish those, 

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Sudan’s transitional government . . . has 

taken concrete steps toward 

ending systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious religious freedom violations. . . .
particularly women, who did not conform to its strict interpretation 

of Sunni Islam. Based on these developments, in the 2020 Annual 

Report, USCIRF recommended Sudan for SWL placement rather than 

CPC designation.

Sudan continued to make significant steps toward improved 

religious freedom conditions in 2020. In February, USCIRF traveled 

to Khartoum to assess religious freedom conditions in the country, 

and it was encouraged by the evident progress. In July, the transitional government subsequently 

adopted the Fundament al 

Rights and Freedoms Act, which 

repealed the apostasy law, ended 

flogging for blasphemy, banned 

female genital mutilation, permitted non-Muslims to drink alcohol, 

and abolished the guardianship 

law that required women to get 

a permit from a male guardian 

when traveling abroad with their 

children. USCIRF’s visit also afforded the Commission the opportunity 

to engage again with the transitional leadership in Khartoum, including Prime Minister Hamdok and his cabinet.

As a result of these substantial and positive changes, USCIRF 

is not recommending Sudan for SWL status this year. USCIRF 

encourages Sudan’s transitional government to continue to make 

institutional reforms to further protect religious freedom and to 

ensure their effective implementation. These reforms should include 

establishing a religious freedom commission as mandated by the 

Juba Peace Agreement, addressing the claims of churches whose 

property the former regime destroyed or confiscated, and repealing 

the blasphemy law. 

Violations of Human Rights on the Basis of Religion

USCIRF’s mission is to advance international freedom of religion or 

belief (FoRB), by independently assessing and unflinchingly confronting threats to this fundamental right. Within this conception, USCIRF 

is also committed to addressing human rights violations perpetrated 

based on the coercive enforcement of interpretations of religion 

and has done so since it was created by Congress in 1998. USCIRF 

fulfills this commitment through its reporting, advocacy, and policy 

recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress. 

Some foreign governments enforce laws and policies that permit 

or condone violations of human rights of minority groups and other 

vulnerable communities on the basis of religion. Under international 

human rights law, however, religion is not a legitimate justification for 

egregiously violating individuals’ fundamental rights. As explained by 

the UN Human Rights Committee—the body of independent experts 

charged with interpreting provisions of the ICCPR—the existence of a 

state or majority religion cannot result in the impairment of the rights 

of individuals under the ICCPR. International law requires states to 

respect FoRB and other human rights for everyone, equally. Thus, 

states must not coercively enforce religious interpretations on individuals or communities who do not adhere to those interpretations. 

Individuals and religious communities enjoy the right to hold and 

follow diverse views on religious precepts free from government 

interference. Governments are accountable to international human 

rights standards guaranteeing FoRB and other fundamental human 

rights to all.

To that end, USCIRF has provided qualitative and quantitative 

information in its annual reports, publications, and other work highlighting problematic laws and policies of foreign countries that permit 

or condone violations of human rights of minority groups and other 

vulnerable communities on the basis of religion. Some of USCIRF’s key 

recent activities on this topic are discussed below.

In December 2020, USCIRF published a study on Violating 

Rights: Enforcing the World's Blasphemy Laws and held a hearing on Blasphemy Laws and the 

Violation of International Religious 

Freedom. Focusing on a five-year 

period from 2014 to 2018, the 

report provides extensive data 

and examples demonstrating the 

many ways that, in the 84 countries that have blasphemy laws, 

enforcement of such laws undermines human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief and 

freedom of expression. The Violating Rights study found that 81 

percent of the cases of state blasphemy law enforcement occurred 

in only 10 countries: Pakistan, Iran, Russia, India, Egypt, Indonesia, 

Yemen, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. In seven of these ten 

states, the governments identify and enforce Islam as the official 

state religion, and in the other three, the governments favor certain 

religions (Christianity for Russia, Hinduism for India, and six recognized 

faiths for Indonesia). 

In November 2020, USCIRF issued a report on Saudi Arabia’s 

guardianship system, which severely limits women’s rights based on 

the government’s interpretation of religion. In 2019, USCIRF published 

a report on Shari’ah Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria, addressing how 

the implementation of religion-based law can violate religious freedom and related rights. USCIRF also published reports on apostasy, 

blasphemy, and hate speech laws in Africa and on blasphemy cases 

in Indonesia and Pakistan in 2019. 

Additionally, USCIRF has published a series of factsheets outlining how laws that seek to enforce religious norms, such as blasphemy

and conversion laws, violate international human rights standards. 

Another recent factsheet, Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, examines permissible and impermissible limitations on religious 

freedom under international law. A December 2020 factsheet looked 

at Brunei’s Syariah Penal Code, which enforces a strict interpretation of 

Shari’a on all resident Muslims, with no ability to opt out or freedom to 

interpret or practice Islam according to their own conscience. In March 

2021, USCIRF released a factsheet on The Use of Shari’a as Religious 

Justification for Capital Punishment Against LGBTI Persons, discussing 

how such laws violate the human dignity and rights of lesbian, gay, 

bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons and embolden 

societal hostility, discrimination, and violence against them.

USCIRF also raises awareness on these issues through its public 

hearings, briefings, and other events, which seek to highlight the 

Commission’s research and recommendations and showcase diverse 

panelists offering a variety of perspectives. In November 2020, for 

example, USCIRF hosted an event with Nasreldin Mufrih, Sudan’s 

Minister of Religious Affairs, where he discussed how the country’s 

transitional government was addressing the previous regime’s violations of human rights based on religion. In December, a USCIRF 

hearing focused on ways the U.S. government can protect and assist 

4 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

[S]tates must not coercively enforce 

religious interpretations on individuals 

or communities who do not 

adhere to those interpretations.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021 5

refugees and asylum seekers, including those fleeing the coercive 

enforcement of religion. In 2020, USCIRF established a podcast 

series, Spotlight, which offers in-depth analysis about developments 

around the world that have implications for religious freedom and 

other human rights. Examples discussing the official imposition of 

religious norms include episodes on Legal Restrictions to Religious 

Freedom in Brunei, Global Blasphemy Laws, and Vulnerable Religious 

Communities in Pakistan. Additionally, USCIRF’s weekly News Digest 

compiles articles from diverse publications relevant to issues of 

religious freedom and related rights around the world, including 

violations based on the coercive enforcement of religion. 

Information on all of USCIRF’s activities can be found at 

https://www.uscirf.gov/.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021 7

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

Key Findings

During 2020, the administration of then President Donald J. Trump 

continued its prioritization of international religious freedom (IRF). In 

June, then President Trump signed an executive order on “Advancing 

International Religious Freedom,” which increased related foreign 

assistance funding to $50 million annually, expanded mandatory 

IRF training to more federal officials, and more explicitly integrated 

the issue into U.S. bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. USCIRF 

has long called on the U.S. government to develop an overall 

strategy for promoting religious freedom abroad, as well as countryspecific action plans, and welcomed that this executive order required 

the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) to do so. 

February 2020 marked the official launch of the International 

Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance (the Alliance), a network of likeminded countries committed to 

opposing religious persecution 

and advancing freedom of religion or belief for all. As of March 

2021, 32 countries have signed on 

to the Alliance’s Declaration of 

Principles, which is grounded in 

international human rights standards. The State Department’s 

IRF Office served as the Alliance’s 

Secretariat. In November, the Alliance issued a statement outlining 

its shared vision for advancing the freedom of religion or belief. To 

complement existing work on the freedom of religion or belief within 

the United Nations (UN) system, in September the Alliance made a 

statement at the Human Rights Council (HRC) inviting members to join 

its efforts to protect religious freedom. Following two Ministerials to 

Advance Religious Freedom hosted by the State Department in 2018 

and 2019, Poland, a founding member of the Alliance, hosted the 

third ministerial on the issue in November. The event, held virtually 

due to the coronavirus pandemic, convened more than 50 nations and 

international organizations. Eight statements of concern were issued. 

Brazil, another member of the Alliance, will host the next ministerial 

event in 2021. 

In December, the State Department designated 10 “countries 

of particular concern” (CPCs), the category under the International 

Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) for governments that engage in or tolerate particularly severe religious freedom violations. Nigeria was named 

a CPC for the first time, a step that USCIRF had recommended every 

year since 2009. For the 10 designated countries, the State Department 

reimposed existing sanctions on five and issued waivers on taking any 

action for the other five. USCIRF has long called on administrations 

to discontinue the practice of relying on waivers or existing sanctions in response to CPC designations. The State Department also 

placed four countries on its “Special Watch List” (SWL) for severe 

religious freedom violations, while it removed Uzbekistan and Sudan 

from this list, reflecting progress 

in these countries. In addition, the 

State Department designated 10 

“entities of particular concern” 

(EPCs) pursuant to IRFA, which 

are nonstate actors that engage 

in particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom, including for 

the first time Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham 

(HTS). USCIRF recommended the 

designation of HTS in its 2020 Annual Report. 

Since taking office in January 2021, after the reporting period, 

the administration of President Joseph R. Biden indicated that its foreign policy priorities will include championing human rights. During his 

confirmation process, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken expressed 

the administration’s commitment to human rights and IRF. In February 

2021, the Biden administration announced that it would reengage with 

the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) as an observer. As of the end 

of March 2021, President Biden had not yet nominated an ambassador-at-large for IRF or filled other key IRF-related positions. 

STATE DEPARTMENT 2020 DESIGNATIONS

CPC Designations Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan

SWL Countries Comoros, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Russia

EPC Designations Al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Houthis, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS), ISIS-Greater Sahara, ISIS-West Africa, Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, and the Taliban

Nigeria was named a CPC for the first time 

[by the State Department], a step that USCIRF 

had recommended every year since 2009.
8 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

• Promptly nominate or appoint well-qualified individuals to key IRF vacancies, 

including the positions of ambassador-at-large for IRF, special adviser for IRF 

on the National Security Council (NSC) 

staff, special coordinator for Tibetan 

issues, and special envoy to monitor and 

combat antisemitism, and provide them 

with the financial resources and staff 

needed to fulfill their mandates;

• Maintain the United States’ leadership 

roles in the Alliance and the International 

Contact Group on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief, participate in and support future 

Ministerials to Advance Religious Freedom, and continue to implement the 

executive order on “Advancing International Religious Freedom”; 

• Prioritize freedom of religion or belief 

in the United States’ renewed engagement with the UN human rights system, 

and work with countries, including those 

in the Alliance, to counter the efforts to 

undermine that system by states that 

egregiously violate religious freedom and 

other human rights; 

• Increase the use of human rights-related 

financial and visa authorities to impose 

asset freezes and/or visa bans on individuals and entities for severe religious 

freedom violations, citing specific abuses, 

and coordinate with other countries with 

similar sanctions regimes on such targeted 

sanctions whenever possible;

• Review U.S. policy toward the five CPC-designated countries for which waivers on 

taking any action based on those designations are in place—Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi 

Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—

and make appropriate policy changes to 

demonstrate meaningful consequences 

and encourage positive change;

• In accordance with the definition of who 

constitutes a refugee in international 

and U.S. law, prioritize for resettlement 

through the U.S. Refugee Admissions 

Program (USRAP) survivors of the most 

egregious forms of religious persecution, 

including Iranian religious minorities eligible for processing under the Lautenberg 

Amendment, members of other severely 

persecuted religious or belief communities, and survivors of genocide or other 

atrocity crimes; and

• Address longstanding flaws in the treatment of asylum seekers in Expedited 

Removal, including by enhancing the quality and oversight of the initial processing 

of noncitizens, improving detention 

conditions, and appointing a high-level 

official at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to coordinate and 

oversee reforms.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATION

• Prioritize the prompt confirmation of 

well-qualified nominees for key IRF positions that require Senate confirmation to 

avoid long vacancies in these positions; 

• Hold oversight hearings on U.S. IRF policy; 

highlight IRF issues through legislation, 

hearings, briefings, and other actions; and 

examine, during congressional delegation 

trips abroad, conditions for persons of all 

faiths and beliefs or none; 

• As individual members of Congress, 

advocate for IRF by sponsoring religious 

prisoners of conscience through the 

Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission’s 

(TLHRC) Defending Freedoms Project, collaborating with the International Panel of 

Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion 

or Belief, and joining the U.S. House of 

Representatives or U.S. Senate Bipartisan 

Task Force for Combating Anti-Semitism 

and caucuses such as the House IRF Caucus and Ahmadiyya Muslim Caucus; 

• Adopt S. Res 80 to create the Senate 

Human Rights Commission, as a similar 

initiative to the House’s TLHRC, to monitor 

and address human rights abuses abroad, 

including violations of the freedom of religion or belief; and

• Evaluate the policy tools available for 

targeted human rights-related sanctions 

to ensure maximum impact in curtailing 

abuses, and reauthorize and strengthen 

the Global Magnitsky sanctions regime 

by passing legislation like the Global 

Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability 

Reauthorization Act (S. 93).

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Hearing: Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution

• Factsheet: Key U.S. Government IRF Positions

• Factsheet: United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms

• Event: USCIRF Conversation on The President's Executive Order on International Religious Freedom

• Op-Ed: Washington Must Expand the List of Sanctioned Religious Freedom Violators (in Washington Examiner)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

In February 2021, consistent with USCIRF recommendations, 

the Biden administration announced its intent to increase the annual 

ceiling for refugees resettled to the United States from abroad for 

the current and upcoming fiscal years. It also indicated that it was 

considering creating several new priority categories for access to the 

resettlement program, including for certain severely persecuted religious groups. The same month, President Biden signed an executive 

order that, among other actions, initiated a review of the Expedited 

Removal process, the implementation of which USCIRF has monitored 

under IRFA and has found inadequately protects asylum seekers. 
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021 9

Legal Framework 

IRFA, as amended by the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom 

Act of 2016, seeks to make religious freedom a higher priority in 

U.S. foreign policy through a range of mechanisms and tools. These 

include: governmental institutions (the ambassador-at-large and the 

State Department’s IRF Office, USCIRF as an independent legislative 

branch agency, and a position on the White House NSC staff); ongoing 

monitoring and annual reports on religious freedom violations; and the 

imposition of consequences for the worst violators. The consequences 

set forth in IRFA consist of CPC designations and related actions, placement on the State Department’s SWL, the ability to bar entry to the 

United States of foreign officials responsible for particularly severe 

religious freedom violations, and EPC designations for nonstate actors.

IRFA includes religious freedom as an element of U.S. foreign 

assistance, cultural exchange, and international broadcasting programs 

and requires training on religious freedom and religious persecution for 

State Department foreign service officers and U.S. immigration officials. 

Further, it includes provisions on U.S. refugee and asylum policy. It also 

specifically cites U.S. participation in multilateral organizations as an 

avenue for advancing religious freedom abroad. IRFA is centered on 

the right to freedom of religion or belief as recognized in international 

law, as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other international instruments and regional agreements.

For a more detailed description of IRFA, its legislative history, 

and its implementation, please see USCIRF’s Factsheet: IRFA.

Alongside IRFA, other laws provide tools to sanction individual 

religious freedom abusers. Some apply to specific countries, such 

as the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act (CISADA, 

P.L.111-195). More broadly, the 2016 Global Magnitsky Human Rights 

Accountability Act allows the president, who has delegated these 

authorities to the secretaries of treasury and state, to deny U.S. visas 

to and freeze the U.S.-based assets of any foreigner responsible for 

“extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally protected human rights” against someone seeking to expose 

illegal government activity or to exercise or defend internationally 

protected rights. Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, issued in December 

2017 to implement and build on the Global Magnitsky Act, authorizes visa bans and asset freezes 

against foreign persons involved 

in “serious human rights abuse,” 

providing an even more expansive 

basis for targeted sanctions. 

In addition, Section 7031(c) 

of the State Department’s annual 

appropriations law (P.L. 116-94 for 

FY 2020) requires the secretary of 

state to make foreign officials and 

their immediate family members 

ineligible for U.S. entry if there is credible evidence that such individuals have been involved in “a gross violation of human rights.” Unlike 

the visa ineligibility provision enacted in IRFA, visa bans under this 

provision can be announced publicly. 

Key Developments in 2020 and Early 2021

Key U.S. Government IRF Positions

On January 20, 2021, Samuel D. Brownback completed his service as 

ambassador-at-large for IRF, a position he held since 2018. The fifth 

ambassador-at-large since IRFA’s enactment, Ambassador Brownback 

actively implemented his mandate, including through public speeches, 

travel, and meetings with the nongovernmental organization (NGO) 

IRF Roundtable and other stakeholders. 

In February 2020, the Trump administration appointed Sarah 

Makin to be the first-ever senior director for IRF on the National 

Security Council (NSC) staff. IRFA called for a dedicated NSC staff 

position on this issue, and the Frank Wolf Act reiterated that call. 

USCIRF for years had urged successive administrations to establish 

and fill the position and welcomed the long-needed action. Senior 

Director Makin completed her service in January 2021, and the position is now vacant.

In October, the Trump administration appointed then Assistant 

Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Robert 

A. Destro to serve concurrently as the special coordinator for Tibetan 

issues, which had been vacant since January 2017. USCIRF welcomed

this appointment but noted that “doublehatting” positions could 

undermine the U.S. government’s important efforts to promote religious freedom abroad. 

Other positions relevant to IRF that were filled during the Trump 

administration include the special envoy to monitor and combat 

antisemitism, held by Elan S. Carr from 2019 to 2021 and later elevated

to an ambassador-level position. 

International Partnerships

The positive trajectory of the past six years toward an international movement to advance religious freedom continued. The IRF 

Roundtable continued its work supporting 26 international religious 

freedom roundtables in countries including Sudan, Nigeria, Taiwan, 

Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. These roundtables are modeled after 

meetings NGOs hold regularly among themselves and with government representatives in Washington and aim to increase the global 

conversation on religious freedom. The Trump administration also 

leveraged momentum to convene meetings on specific IRF topics, 

including hosting a conference in October on combating online 

antisemitism. 

An increasing number of countries joined the United States in 

passing laws that enable targeted sanctions against human rights 

violators. In July, the United Kingdom (UK) launched its own Magnitskystyle law. Then Secretary of State 

Michael R. Pompeo welcomed 

the UK’s adoption of this law and 

noted that United States would 

continue to seek out additional 

allies and partners to leverage 

jointly all available tools to hold 

abusers of human rights accountable. In December, the European 

Union (EU) adopted the European 

Magnitsky Act. In addition to 

these recent developments, in 2017 Canada passed the Justice for 

Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, which includes visa ineligibilities and asset blocking for human rights violations. Australia and Japan 

are reportedly considering creating similar sanctions frameworks. 

Individual Violators

During 2020, there were no known visa denials to any foreign officials 

for particularly severe religious freedom violations under Section 

212(a)(2)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the provision 

added by IRFA. However, the U.S. government ramped up its use of 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

An increasing number of countries joined 

the United States in passing laws 

that enable targeted sanctions against 

human rights violators.
10 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

newer accountability tools to deny U.S. visas to or block the U.S.-based 

assets of foreigners for corruption or human rights abuses.

As of December 2020, the U.S. government had sanctioned 243 

foreign individuals and entities under the 2016 Global Magnitsky 

Human Rights Accountability Act and the related 2017 E.O. 13818. 

Of these sanctions, 30 related directly to religious freedom, including 14 out of the 35 (40 percent) total sanctions that were issued 

during the reporting period. In July, the U.S. Department of the 

Treasury imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions against eight Chinese 

government entities and senior Chinese officials for their direct 

participation in the surveillance, mass detention, and forced labor 

of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. In December, the 

Treasury Department imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions against 

Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and five associated individuals, citing Kadyrov’s many human rights violations against the lesbian, gay, 

bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) community and others in 

Chechnya. Although not explicit in the release announcing the designation, many of the human rights abuses overseen or condoned by 

Kadyrov are based on his coercive imposition of his religious beliefs 

on all of Chechen society.

The State Department also used other visa restriction authorities 

against human rights abusers, including violators of religious freedom. 

Several public designations of foreign officials and their immediate 

family members under Section 7031(c) of the fiscal year (FY) 2020 

Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Act 

(P.L. 116-94) that were announced in FY 2020 involved religious freedom violations. These designations were of: Kadyrov and his family 

for the abuses explained above; Huang Yuanxiong and his spouse for 

abuses against Falun Gong practitioners; and three Chinese officials 

and their immediate families for abuses against Muslims in Xinjiang, 

issued alongside the Treasury’s 

imposition of Global Magnitsky 

sanctions in July.

Additional targeted sanctions were imposed on Chinese 

individuals and entities, including visa restrictions on certain 

employees of Chinese technology 

companies that provide material 

support to regimes engaging in 

human rights abuses globally. 

Under the Iran-specific authority 

of E.O. 13876, Iranian officials and entities were sanctioned for serious 

human rights abuses, including for involvement in the persecution of 

Jews and Baha’is.

Programs

IRFA envisaged the funding of religious freedom programs, authorizing U.S. foreign assistance to promote and develop “legal protections 

and cultural respect for religious freedom.” For FY 2020, the State 

Department was required to make funds available for international 

religious freedom programs. During 2020, the State Department’s 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) issued several 

requests for proposals to advance religious freedom and/or provide 

protection to religious minorities groups, including to support projects in Brazil, Burma, China, Cuba, Iraq, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Syria, 

along with thematic and regionally focused programs on issues such 

as the preservation of cultural heritage in Africa and the creation of 

religious freedom roundtables. 

During 2020, as part of the Trump administration’s continued 

prioritization of religious freedom, USAID once again emphasized 

humanitarian aid for religious groups targeted for persecution or 

genocide and programs to promote religious freedom, tolerance, 

and pluralism. In 2020, USAID spent $38 million in development 

efforts for ethnic and religious minorities in northern Iraq. USAID 

also supported the U.S. Institute of Peace’s (USIP) Closing the Gap 

initiative, which analyzed the link between religious freedom, peace, 

and development. 

Refugee Resettlement

Under the USRAP, the president sets a ceiling for how many refugees 

the United States will accept from abroad each year; under IRFA, religious persecution should be considered in this determination. Over 

the course of the Trump administration, the refugee ceilings for FY 

2018, FY 2019, and FY 2020 were set at successively declining levels 

of 45,000, 30,000, and 18,000, respectively, with the administration 

focusing instead on humanitarian assistance for those displaced abroad 

and programs to help enable their return home. USCIRF consistently 

called for a return of the annual resettlement ceiling to the previously 

typical level of 95,000.

In October, then President Trump set the annual ceiling for FY 

2021, the current fiscal year, at 15,000, the lowest in the program’s 

history. The administration dedicated 5,000 of those slots to refugees 

fleeing religious persecution, including refugees eligible for U.S. 

resettlement under the Lautenberg Amendment—a special program 

for certain persecuted religious minority groups. At the end of 2020, 

nearly 80 Iranians remained in Vienna, Austria, awaiting final approval 

to travel to the United States for resettlement.

In February 2021, President Biden announced his intent to raise 

the refugee ceiling to 125,000 for 

FY 2022, which begins on October 

1, 2021, and issued an executive 

order to take steps to position the 

administration to be able to do 

so. The Biden administration also 

notified Congress that it intended 

to raise the refugee ceiling for FY 

2021 to 62,500 and develop new 

priority access categories for several especially vulnerable groups, 

including Turkic Muslim refugees 

who are nationals or last habitual residents of China, Rohingya Muslim 

refugees who are nationals or last habitual residents of Burma, and 

Iraqi and Syrian nationals who are members of a religious or ethnic minority. USCIRF held a hearing on “Refugees Fleeing Religious 

Persecution” in February 2021 that explored opportunities to improve 

U.S. refugee resettlement, asylum, and humanitarian aid policies.

Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal

As authorized by IRFA, USCIRF has examined the U.S. government’s 

treatment of asylum seekers in Expedited Removal, the process that 

allows DHS officers to deport quickly—without immigration court 

hearings—noncitizens who arrive at U.S. ports of entry or cross 

the border without proper documents, unless they can establish 

a credible fear of persecution or torture. USCIRF’s reports on the 

subject, released in 2005, 2007, 2013, and 2016, documented major 

problems that successive administrations have not addressed. 

Specifically, USCIRF found that DHS officials often fail to follow 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

USCIRF held a hearing on 

“Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution” 

in February 2021 that explored opportunities 

to improve U.S. refugee resettlement, 

asylum, and humanitarian aid policies.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021 11

required procedures to identify asylum seekers and refer them for 

credible fear determinations; that they detain asylum seekers in 

inappropriate, prison-like conditions; and that funding disparities 

and a lack of high-level oversight 

hamper the complicated, multiagency process. These flaws raise 

serious concerns that the United 

States is erroneously returning 

asylum seekers to countries 

where they could face persecution or torture in violation 

of both U.S. and international 

law—a risk that the expanded 

use of Expedited Removal over 

the years has only exacerbated. 

In February 2021 President 

Biden ordered the secretary of 

homeland security to review Expedited Removal procedures and make 

recommendations for “creating a more efficient and orderly process 

that facilitates timely adjudications and adherence to standards of 

fairness and due process,” a step that USCIRF welcomed.

Notable Congressional Efforts to Promote Religious 

Freedom Abroad

In 2020, Congress’ IRF promotion efforts included its oversight of 

the State Department’s implementation of IRFA. In September, a 

bipartisan group of senators wrote to then Secretary of State Pompeo 

to urge consideration of USCIRF’s recommendations when making 

CPC and SWL list designations. The joint explanatory statement for 

the FY 2021 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related 

Programs Appropriations Act (Division K of P.L. 116-260) requires 

that the secretary of state inform 

certain House and Senate committees of the reasoning if the 

State Department does not follow the CPC recommendations in 

USCIRF’s Annual Report within 30 

days of this decision. 

Congress also highlighted 

religious freedom violations 

through legislation, hearings, 

and other initiatives. Notable 

actions by Congress in 2020 to 

promote IRF included passage 

of the Uyghur Human Rights and 

Policy Act and the Tibetan Policy and Support Act, along with the 

adoption of a resolution calling for the global repeal of blasphemy, 

heresy, and apostasy laws. The House passed the Uyghur Forced 

Labor Prevention Act and the Ukraine Religious Freedom Act, and 

both bills were reintroduced into the 117th Congress as Members 

push for their full passage into law. Congressional hearings on topics 

related to IRF included hearings convened by the TLHRC on conflict 

in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, religious freedom in China, and human 

rights in Russia. Members of Congress also advocated for the release 

of religious prisoners of conscience through the TLHRC’s Defending 

Freedoms Project.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

Notable actions by Congress in 2020 

to promote IRF included passage 

of the Uyghur Human Rights and Policy Act 

and the Tibetan Policy and Support Act, 

along with the adoption of a resolution 

calling for the global repeal of blasphemy,

 heresy, and apostasy laws. 

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021 13

Burma

China

Eritrea

India

Iran

Nigeria

North Korea

Pakistan

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Vietnam

■ COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN

Afghanistan

Algeria

Azerbaijan

Cuba

Egypt

Indonesia

Iraq

Kazakhstan

Malaysia

Nicaragua

Turkey

Uzbekistan

■ SPECIAL WATCH LIST COUNTRIES

2021 USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS
14 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

BURMA

• Redesignate Burma as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Burmese 

military and government agencies and 

officials responsible for severe violations of religious freedom by freezing 

those individuals’ assets and/or banning 

their entry into the United States under 

human rights related financial and visa 

authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations;

• Definitively and publicly conclude whether 

the ongoing and severe atrocities committed by the Burmese military meet the legal 

definition of crimes against humanity and/

or genocide; and

• Actively support efforts to hold Burmese 

officials accountable through the international legal system, including assisting and 

strengthening the documentation of mass 

atrocities and pressuring American companies that have facilitated the sharing of 

hateful content targeting religious minorities to share information with investigative 

and judicial authorities.

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Provide increased funds to support atrocity prevention programs and response 

efforts to address the dire humanitarian 

crisis of the Rohingya in Burma and countries hosting Rohingya refugees and pass 

legislation addressing religious freedom 

violations in Burma, such as the Burma 

Human Rights and Freedom Act.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Burma remained poor. The 

government continued to commit widespread and egregious religious freedom violations, particularly against Rohingya Muslims. 

Denial of basic citizenship rights and systematic discrimination 

based on ethnic-religious affiliation severely restricted the freedom 

of religion or belief of minority communities.

November 2020 marked Burma’s second general election since 

the end of full military rule in 2011. Although two previously excluded 

Muslim candidates from democratically elected leader Aung San Suu 

Kyi’s National League of Democracy (NLD) won seats, the government utilized the 1982 Citizenship Law, which it interprets to bar the 

Rohingya from citizenship, and the Election Law, which requires candidates to prove citizenship, to again block Rohingya Muslims from 

running or voting. In October, Burma’s Union Election Commission 

cancelled the elections in over 50 majority-Muslim townships in conflict-ridden regions where religious minorities reside, including Karen, 

Shan, Kachin, and Rakhine states. In February 2021, the Burmese 

military, known as the Tatmadaw, seized power in a military coup and 

detained Leader Suu Kyi and other NLD officials. 

Ongoing clashes in 2020 between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups—including in Rakhine, Chin, Shan, Karen, and 

Kachin states, where Muslim and Christian religious minorities 

reside—resulted in civilian casualties, displacement, and property 

destruction, including of houses of worship. The ongoing conflict

between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army (AA) intensified. In 

June, Tatmadaw clearance operations against the AA in Rakhine’s 

Muslim-majority township of Rathedaung forcibly displaced thousands of civilians. The United Nations (UN) reported that at least 

500 civilians, mostly Rohingya Muslims and some Christians, were 

killed in 2020 in Rakhine and Chin states, and more than 100 children were killed or maimed during the first half of the year. In 

October, the Tatmadaw reportedly used Rohingya children as 

human shields to clear passage through landmines and to protect 

its soldiers from potential enemy fire.

In 2017, the Burmese military perpetrated mass killings and 

rapes with what the UN described as genocidal intent against 

the Rohingya in Rakhine State, forcing over 700,000 to flee to 

Bangladesh within days. Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya and 

other religious minorities have continued to flee due to violence. Of 

the 600,000 Rohingya who are still in Burma, approximately 130,000 

remain in government-run internment camps along with several 

thousand Kaman Muslims. Severe travel restrictions—enforced by 

arrests—on those living in these camps prevent internally displaced 

persons (IDPs) from obtaining employment, healthcare, and education. Although, in 2020, Burmese authorities dropped charges 

for travel against over 200 Rohingya, many remain imprisoned for 

attempting to flee ongoing violence. Muslims in IDP camps live in 

squalid conditions with limited access to aid and information due 

to government-imposed internet blockades. 

Efforts to hold the Burmese government accountable for 

international crimes, including genocide, continued. In January, 

the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague announced 

a provisional ruling in a case led by The Gambia that Burma must 

“take all measures within its power” to ensure that the military and 

any irregular armed units “do not commit acts of genocide” against 

the Rohingya. During the pendency of the case, Burma is required 

to report regularly on its implementation of the order. In September, 

The Netherlands and Canada joined the case to support The Gambia. 

The International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation launched in 

November 2019 into the military’s action in Rakhine remains ongoing. The government, including Suu Kyi, continued to deny that the 

military engaged in genocide against the Rohingya.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES 

• Event: USCIRF Conversation on An Update on Rohingya Refugees

• Factsheet: The Path Towards Justice: Accountability for International Crimes Against the Rohingya of Burma

• Factsheet: Rohingya Refugees

• Hearing: Citizenship Laws and Religious Freedom
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 15

BURMA

Background

Burma has a Buddhist majority (87.9 percent) with Christian (6.2 percent), Muslim (4.3 percent), Animist (0.8 percent), and Hindu (0.5 

percent) populations. The 2008 constitution recognizes all these 

religions, with Buddhism as the de facto state religion. Religious and 

ethnic minorities not belonging to the majority Bamar ethnicity and 

Buddhist faith have faced longstanding persecution. Burma’s race and 

religion laws regulate religious conversion, marriage, and births and 

restrict the religious freedom of non-Buddhists, particularly Muslims. 

In November 2020, Burma held its second democratic general 

election, where Suu Kyi’s NLD secured another majority win. The NLD 

government faced criticism for its inaction on the atrocities perpetrated against religious and ethnic minorities, most notably military 

operations in Rakhine; indeed, Suu Kyi defended the military in the 

ICJ. In February 2021, the Tatmadaw seized power from and detained 

Leader Suu Kyi and other NLD officials in a military coup. 

Rohingya Refugees 

Burma’s longstanding and continuous military operations in Rakhine 

have caused internal displacement and sparked mass migration to 

Bangladesh and other Southeast Asian countries for many years. At 

the end of 2020, there were nearly one million registered refugees 

residing in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, including Muslims, Christians, 

and Hindus. The Burmese government’s ongoing actions and policies have made it impossible for refugees to safely return home. In 

2020, the Bangladeshi government directed thousands of Rohingya 

refugees in Cox’s Bazar to relocate to the cyclone- and flood-prone 

island of Bhasan Char. 

While the majority of Rohingya refugees fled to Bangladesh, 

a significant number escaped to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. 

Some Rohingya refugees have managed to settle successfully in these 

countries, but others have faced discrimination or further religious 

freedom violations. During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments 

in Malaysia and Thailand turned back boats with Rohingya refugees, 

resulting in many deaths. In April 2020, at least 32 Rohingya Muslims 

died on a ship that drifted for weeks after it failed to reach Malaysia.

Violence, Discrimination, and Intolerance toward 

Rohingya Muslims

The government has effectively institutionalized discrimination against 

Rohingya Muslims through restrictions on participation in elections, 

marriage, family planning, employment, education, religious choice, 

property rights, and freedom of movement. The government has 

proclaimed that the Rohingya are not citizens of their birthplace and 

homeland of Burma; it fails to acknowledge the Rohingya as one of 

the 135 legally recognized national races or ethnic groups of Burma 

and instead refers to them as foreign migrants. 

The Tatmadaw has been accused of targeting the Rohingya with 

killings, mass rape, and other sexual violence; disappearances; forced 

starvation; arbitrary detentions and arrests; and looting, burning, 

and property confiscations. Two Tatmadaw soldiers reportedly in 

ICC custody confessed on video to committing atrocities against 

Rohingya, claiming that superiors ordered units to “exterminate all 

Kalar”—a derogatory name for the Rohingya. 

In June, the Tatmadaw resurfaced on Facebook, nearly two 

years after the platform removed numerous army accounts and 

pages for spreading hatred against Rohingya Muslims. The military 

spokesman said the Tatmadaw intends to combat information deemed 

anti-nationalist or fake news via Facebook through two newly created 

Burmese-language military accounts that remain open following the 

coup. Despite its role in hosting content inciting violence in the past, 

Facebook has not shared evidence from its platform with international 

justice mechanisms. 

Some political candidates employed anti-Muslim slogans and 

speech ahead of national elections in November. Days before the 

election, hardline Buddhist nationalist monk Ashin Wirathu— who had 

been charged with sedition and was removed by Facebook in 2018 

for posts inciting violence and genocide against Muslims—handed 

himself over to authorities after more than a year on the run. 

Abuses against Christians

The Burmese government also has violently targeted Christian communities. In March, in one example of Burmese military airstrikes on 

predominately Christian villages, 21 people were killed, including a 

seven-year-old boy, in Chin state. According to Chin Christian leaders, 

more than 1,500 villagers fled their homes. Chin Christian leaders 

suspect army personnel fired indiscriminately in part because the 

inhabitants were Christian. In February, the Tatmadaw filed charges 

against two Baptist pastors in Kachin for holding an event at their 

church which allegedly supported ethnic rebel groups.

Key U.S. Policy

During FY 2020, the United States provided more than $437 million to 

support Rohingya refugees’ host communities and internally displaced 

Rohingya within Burma, including those who fled mass atrocities in 

Rakhine State.

Several U.S. officials expressed concern over the ongoing conflict 

in Burma. Then Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo addressed the 

“violent oppression” of Rohingya Muslims by the Burmese military and 

called for justice and accountability for the Rohingya. In October, then 

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale spoke with 

Leader Suu Kyi to reaffirm U.S. support for democratic reform and an 

end to conflict, particularly in Rakhine State. On December 2, the U.S. 

Department of State redesignated Burma as a CPC under IRFA for 

engaging in or tolerating systematic, ongoing, egregious violations 

of religious freedom, and it reimposed as the relevant presidential 

action the existing ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1.

In January 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated during his 

confirmation hearing that the administration of President Joseph R. Biden 

would review whether the Burmese government’s persecution of the 

Rohingya constituted genocide. After the February 2021 coup, the Biden 

administration reimposed broad sanctions against the Burmese military. 
16 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

CHINA

• Redesignate China as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

• Enforce to the fullest extent existing 

U.S. laws—such as the Uyghur Human 

Rights Policy Act and Tibetan Policy and 

Support Act—and continue to impose 

targeted financial and visa sanctions on 

Chinese government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom;

• Urge like-minded countries to independently investigate and formally 

determine whether the abuses in Xinjiang 

meet the definitions of genocide and/

or crimes against humanity under international law, and work together to take 

measures to hold China accountable;

• Publicly express concerns about Beijing 

hosting the 2022 Winter Olympic Games 

and state that U.S. government officials 

will not attend the games if the Chinese 

government’s crackdown on religious 

freedom continues; and

• Continue and intensify efforts to counter 

Chinese government influence operations in the United States—including the 

Confucius Institutes—that suppress information or advocacy regarding religious 

freedom violations in China.

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Support legislation to promote religious freedom in China, including the 

Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act 

(H.R.6210/S.3471).

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in China deteriorated. The 

government intensified its “sinicization of religion” policy, particularly targeting religions perceived to have foreign connections, 

such as Christianity, Islam, and Tibetan Buddhism. The authorities 

also continued their unprecedented use of advanced surveillance 

technologies to monitor and track religious minorities, and the 

Measures on Managing Religious Groups became effective in 

February, further constricting the space in which religious groups 

can operate. 

In September, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute identified 380 detention centers across the Uyghur region (otherwise 

known as Xinjiang), including new facilities built in 2019 and 2020. 

This indicates that the Chinese government has continued to detain 

Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims despite claiming to have released 

all detainees. Since 2017, authorities reportedly have sent millions of 

Muslims to these camps for wearing long beards, refusing alcohol, 

or exhibiting other behaviors deemed signs of “religious extremism.” Former detainees reported torture, rape, sterilization, and 

other abuses in custody. Experts raised concerns that the Chinese 

government’s ongoing actions in Xinjiang could amount to genocide under international law. Reports also highlighted the use of 

Uyghur forced labor in internment and prison camps, factories, and 

industrial parks in the region. Moreover, authorities continued to 

carry out large-scale closures and destruction of Uyghur religious 

sites, including mosques and shrines important to that community’s 

religious, ethnic, and cultural identity. 

The Chinese government continued its pervasive control and 

suppression of Tibetan Buddhism. In August, at the Seventh Tibet 

Work Forum, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary 

Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of sinicizing Tibetan 

Buddhism to make it compatible with Chinese socialism and mobilizing Tibetans to “fight against separatism.” Subsequently, local 

authorities organized seminars at Tibetan Buddhist monasteries to 

indoctrinate monks and nuns on these policies. They placed tight 

restrictions on monasteries and temples—including the Yachen Gar 

Buddhist center in Sichuan Province—barring worshippers from 

entering these sites. Authorities broadly banned Tibetans, including 

students and government workers, from participating in traditional 

religious gatherings, and they detained and punished Tibetans for 

listening to the Dalai Lama’s teachings or possessing his portrait. 

Despite the Vatican-China agreement on Bishop appointments, Chinese authorities continued to harass, detain, and 

torture underground Catholic bishops—such as Cui Tai and Huang 

Jintong—who refuse to join the state-backed Catholic association. 

They also harassed, detained, arrested, and imprisoned members of 

Protestant house churches who refuse to join the state-sanctioned 

“Three-Self Patriotic Movement.” In April, authorities arrested and 

charged house church pastor Zhao Huaiguo for “inciting subversion of state power,” and in October, local authorities in Taizhou 

city, Zhejiang Province, sentenced Christian bookseller Chen Yu to 

seven years in prison and fined him roughly $30,000 USD for “illegal 

business operations.” The government also continued to demolish 

both Catholic and Protestant church buildings and crosses under its 

“sinicization of religion” campaign. In addition, there were reports

that authorities across China demolished Mahayana Buddhist, 

Daoist, and folk religion temples.

According to reports, thousands of Falun Gong practitioners 

were harassed and arrested during 2020 for practicing their faith, 

and some likely died due to abuse and torture while in custody. 

Credible international reports also suggested that organ harvesting, including from Falun Gong practitioners, likely continued. 

In October, 39 United Nations (UN) member states condemned the Chinese government’s abusive policies toward ethnic 

and religious minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet, including the use of 

internment camps, violations of religious freedom, forced labor, 

and forced birth control measures.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 17

CHINA

Background

Approximately 18 percent of China’s estimated 1.4 billion people are 

Buddhist, including Tibetan Buddhists; 5 percent are Christian; and 2 

percent are Muslim. Other significant religious traditions include the 

Falun Gong, Daoism, and indigenous practices. 

Although the CCP has long repressed religious freedom, in 

recent years it has become increasingly hostile toward religion, 

resulting in campaigns to “sinicize” Islam, Tibetan Buddhism, and 

Christianity to rid the religions of alleged “foreign” influences. These 

policies require religious groups to support CCP rule and its overall 

objectives and interests, including by altering their teachings to conform to CCP ideology and adopting architectural and other changes 

to their sites and symbols. Both registered and unregistered religious 

groups and individuals who run afoul of the CCP face harassment, 

detention, arrest, and imprisonment. 

The 2018 Revised Regulations on Religious Affairs effectively 

ban all “unauthorized” religious teachings and expand the role of 

local authorities in controlling religious activities. Under Article 300 

of the Chinese Criminal Code, simply belonging to certain religious 

movements, such as the Falun Gong or the Church of Almighty God, 

is punishable with three to seven years’ imprisonment—or up to life 

imprisonment for cases the authorities deem more serious. 

Religious Freedom under Hong Kong’s National 

Security Law

In June, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed 

the new National Security Law for Hong Kong amid large-scale 

protests. The law contains broad and vague provisions that punish 

“secession, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces.” 

In December, Hong Kong authorities charged Jimmy Lai with “collusion with foreign forces,” making him the first high-profile figure to 

face charges under the law. Lai, a devout Catholic, has advocated for 

religious freedom in China and expressed concern over the future of 

religious freedom in Hong Kong. In December, USCIRF Commissioner 

Johnnie Moore adopted Lai as a Religious Prisoner of Conscience 

(RPOC) through USCIRF’s RPOC Project. The law could be invoked by 

authorities to suppress religious freedom in Hong Kong, especially as 

many political activists and protest participants, leaders, and groups 

have religious backgrounds and affiliations.

Uyghur Forced Labor in Supply Chains of 

U.S. Companies

In 2020, reports continued to highlight labor abuses in the supply chains 

of U.S. companies. Forced labor involving Uyghurs and other Turkic 

Muslims took place in reeducation and prison camps, factories, and 

industrial parks in the Xinjiang region, and is often connected to government-sponsored “poverty alleviation” and “mutual pairing assistance” 

programs. In July, four U.S. government agencies issued a joint Xinjiang 

Supply Chain Business Advisory, warning businesses with potential supply 

chain exposure to forced labor to consider the reputational, economic, 

and legal risks of involvement with entities that engage in human rights 

abuses in the region and to conduct due diligence accordingly. Some 

companies responded by severing ties with suppliers suspected of using 

Uyghur forced labor, while others claimed to have conducted third-party 

audits to ensure no forced labor is used in their supply chains. 

Key U.S. Policy

In 2020, senior U.S. government officials continued to condemn 

deteriorating religious freedom conditions in China, including then 

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo in his address at the 2020 

Ministerial to Advance Freedom of Religion or Belief in November. 

Then Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom 

Samuel D. Brownback raised particular concern over the Chinese government’s use of artificial intelligence and facial recognition to oppress 

Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, many of whom are detained in 

internment camps for religious reasons. On December 2, the U.S. 

Department of State redesignated China as a CPC under IRFA and 

reimposed as the relevant presidential action existing restrictions 

on exports to China of crime control or detection instruments or 

equipment. In January 2021, after the reporting period, the State 

Department designated China’s treatment of Uyghurs and other 

Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang as genocide and crimes against humanity.

In May and July, the U.S. Department of Commerce added 

in total 19 Chinese companies and one government entity to the 

Entity List due to concerns about forced labor and other human 

rights violations in Xinjiang. In July, the U.S. Department of the 

Treasury imposed sanctions against Chinese government entities 

and senior Chinese officials, including Chen Quanguo, Communist 

Party Secretary for Xinjiang; the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau; and 

the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), which has 

directly participated in the surveillance, mass detention, and forced 

labor of Uyghurs.

In May, Congress passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act 

by an overwhelming, bipartisan vote, which then President Donald J. 

Trump signed into law in June. This law authorizes the U.S. government to impose sanctions on Chinese officials responsible for the 

persecution of Uyghur and other Muslims. In December, as part of 

an omnibus pandemic relief and government funding package, the 

U.S. House of Representatives and Senate passed, and the President 

signed, the Tibetan Policy and Support Act (H.R.4331), which promotes the human rights of the Tibetan people, including the right to 

select and venerate their own religious leaders. USCIRF had recommended the enactment of both the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act 

and the Tibetan Policy and Support Act. 

In September, the House of Representatives passed the Uyghur 

Forced Labor Prevention Act (H.R.6210), which would bar imports of textiles, cotton, and other goods produced using forced labor from Xinjiang. 

In October, six U.S. senators introduced a bipartisan resolution to designate human rights abuses perpetrated by the Chinese government 

against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang as genocide. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES 

• Hearing: Technological Surveillance of Religion in China

• Factsheet: The 2019 Regulation for Religious Groups in China 

• Op-Ed: Being Muslim Means You’re Never Safe from China (in The Hill)

• Op-Ed: China's war on religion – What US must do to support freedom (in Fox News)
18 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

Individual Views of Commissioner Gary L. Bauer 

Of the countries named each year by USCIRF as egregious violators 

of religious liberty, one is in a category by itself.

Communist China doesn’t only deny its citizens basic human 

rights, including the right to seek and worship God. It is also asserting 

itself as a new authoritarian model for developing nations around 

the world. It is actively engaged in undermining international human 

rights standards. It utilizes its growing military power to intimidate 

and threaten its neighbors. 

China’s Communist Party (CCP) believes the United States is in 

inevitable decline. They believe the growth of their economic and 

military might cannot be stopped. They think the 21st century will be 

the Chinese Communist Century. If they are right, the 21st century 

will be a time in which human freedom and dignity shrinks while 

oppression grows.

USCIRF policy recommendations are made annually to U.S. government officials. But in a constitutional republic like ours, public opinion 

is everything. I appeal to my fellow citizens to act now, individually. To 

U.S. corporate CEOs, stop putting your desire for greater profits in 

China ahead of the interests and values of our country. To the presidents 

of our great universities, stop accepting Chinese Communist money 

that will inevitably threaten academic freedom. To American consumers, 

don’t buy products made by suffering workers in Communist China’s 

slave labor camps and factories. You are subsidizing their persecution 

and strengthening an adversary of our country.

The United States has faced and defeated great threats to human 

liberty before, including Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The 

Communist Chinese don’t think we have the same courage today. They 

will be proven wrong, but only if each of us stands for American values. 

CHINA

Individual Views of Commissioner Johnnie Moore

China is relapsing to its cultural revolution, but with the aid of technology Mao could have only dreamed of—all of which it is using to 

pursue and enable genocide. Communist China is not a “strategic 

competitor.” The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a hostile actor 

whose actions imperil the world, and its abuses have been made 

possible by inexcusable policies endorsed by Congress and the White 

House over many administrations. 

It is time that the United States and its allies embrace a cleareyed view of the CCP, recognizing that it is singular and distinct in its 

disregard for human life—not just human rights and religious freedom. 

It aids and abets similar activities by other countries all around the 

world. We cannot allow the international order, in pursuit of self-interest, to continue to let China play by its own rules. Those nations 

around the world that ignore the CCP’s malevolence will eventually 

find themselves subservient to it. It is past time for our world bodies 

and our liberal democracies to stand up to the CCP. 

20 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

ERITREA

• Redesignate Eritrea as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and maintain the existing, 

ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 

CFR 126.1 (a) of the International Traffic 

in Arms Regulations;

• Impose targeted sanctions on Eritrean 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; 

• Urge the Eritrean government to release 

the remaining detainees held on account 

of their religious activities, including Patriarch Antonios;

• Call on the Eritrean government to end 

religious persecution of unregistered 

religious communities and grant full citizenship rights to Jehovah’s Witnesses; and

• Encourage the Eritrean government to 

extend an official invitation for unrestricted 

visits by the United Nations (UN) Special 

Rapporteur on the situation of human 

rights in Eritrea, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, the 

UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 

and the International Red Cross. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Highlight religious freedom issues in 

Eritrea through legislation, hearings and 

briefings, and a congressional delegation 

trip to Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, to 

engage with Eritrean officials to encourage them to advance human rights and 

religious freedom. 

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Eritrea improved incrementally, though overall remained poor. Authorities in Eritrea 

released 240 religious prisoners on bail, allegedly due to the 

COVID-19 pandemic, and eased restrictions on the Baha’i community, the Jewish community, and the Greek Orthodox Church. 

However, the repressive system governing religious groups 

remained in place, and members of “unofficial” religious groups 

continued to face systematic and egregious persecution for practicing their faiths. Since 2002, the Eritrean government has recognized 

and permitted only four religious entities to operate in the country: 

Sunni Islam, the Eritrean Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic 

Church, and the Evangelical Church of Eritrea. Although these 

groups were allowed to practice their faiths publicly, the government consistently intervened in their affairs to limit and direct their 

activities. The government also continued to invoke Proclamation 

No. 73 to persecute both religious and secular activists throughout 

the country on a regular basis, especially those who disagree with 

the government’s stated positions.

The government continued to require all Eritreans above the 

age of 18 to participate in mandatory military service indefinitely 

and restricted religious expression during that service. As a result, 

Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused to serve in the military due to 

their faith were stripped of their citizenship and thrown in jail. As 

of December 2020, 24 Jehovah’s Witnesses were imprisoned in 

Eritrea, some of whom have been in jail for more than 20 years. 

In 2020, approximately 500 to 1,200 individuals were estimated to be in prison in Eritrea due to their faith. Authorities 

continued to hold the Patriarch of the Eritrean Orthodox Church 

and USCIRF Religious Prisoner of Conscience Abune Antonios 

under house arrest. The government illegally removed Patriarch 

Antonios from his position in May 2007. In addition to Patriarch 

Antonios, the government also continued to imprison religious 

leaders—including from the Full Gospel Church and the Orthodox 

Church—and Sunni and Wahabi Muslims. The leaders of the Full 

Gospel Church and the Orthodox Church have been in jail since 

2004. Despite positive regional political changes, including in 

neighboring Sudan and Ethiopia, Eritrea continued to resist religious and secular activists’ ongoing calls for democratic reform. In 

2019, security forces met the demands of both religious and secular 

activists with lethal force, injuring and even killing tens of them. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES 

• Issue Update: The Global Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 21

ERITREA

Background

Eritrea is a single-party state led by the Popular Front for Democracy 

and Justice party (PFDJ) under the leadership of President Isaias Afwerki 

since its independence in 1993. The constitution of Eritrea states that 

the government must protect freedom of thought, conscience, and 

belief, as well as the right of individuals to practice the religion of their 

choice, but this right is not protected in practice. Eritrea’s population is 

split in half between Christians (49 percent) and Muslims (49 percent). 

The Christian population mainly resides in the southern and central 

regions of the country, whereas the Muslim population lives predominantly in the northern region. The Muslim population is predominantly 

Sunni, and the Christian community is predominantly Eritrean Orthodox, 

with various denominations including Catholics, Protestants, Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, and Pentecostals also represented. In addition to these two 

main religious groups, there is a small community of Baha’is (approximately 200 individuals) and a tiny Jewish community. Finally, about 2 

percent of the population, who resides in the southwestern region, 

practice African traditional religions. 

In 1995, the government passed Proclamation No. 73, allowing 

it to intervene in and exert full control of political, civic, and religious 

activities. Using this law, the government systematically oppresses 

secular and religious activists for advocating for human rights or 

dissenting from the government’s positions. Using intimidation, 

imprisonment, and torture against those who oppose his government, 

President Afwerki has consolidated power in Eritrea. For example, in 

2019 when Eritreans took to the street to demand the advancement 

of basic human rights, including religious freedom, the government 

deployed its security forces to disperse the protests, killing and injuring tens of peaceful protesters.

In July 2018, Eritrea signed the Joint Declaration of Peace and 

Friendship with its neighbor, Ethiopia, ending years of hostility and 

conflict between the two countries. The peace accord was anticipated 

to usher in a new era of respect for civic and political liberties as it ended 

Eritrea’s diplomatic isolation. However, the government continued its 

systematic oppression of political, human rights and religious activists 

by severely limiting their activities and imprisoning many of them.

The 2020 internal war in Ethiopia had a direct impact on religious 

freedom issues in Eritrea. According to reports, the Tigray People’s 

Liberation Front (TPLF) accused Eritrea of supporting and aiding the 

Ethiopian military to carry out air strikes against it. In retaliation, the 

TPLF launched attacks against Eritrea, forcing tens of thousands of 

Eritreans to flee to neighboring Sudan and Ethiopia, further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the region. Using this as a pretense, the 

Eritrean government further limited freedom of expression, including 

religious freedom. In 2020, refugees continued to flee Eritrea on a regular basis to the neighboring countries of Sudan, Ethiopia, and beyond 

to escape persecution and inhumane treatment by their government. 

Repression of Unregistered Religious Groups 

The government of Eritrea deems unregistered religious groups illegal 

and bans them from openly practicing their faiths. The most prominent unregistered religious groups include: Protestants (Pentecostals 

and Seventh-day Adventists), Salafi Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

Jews, Baha’is, Shi’a Muslims, and adherents of African Indigenous 

Religions. According to reports, members of these groups are constantly harassed, arrested, and deprived of their civic and human rights. 

Nontheists are also denied legal rights and equal protection and run 

the risk of arrest. Coming out as an atheist or agnostic in Eritrea would 

provoke arrest by the government and social pressure and isolation. The 

government particularly views Jehovah’s Witnesses and Salafi Muslims 

as political forces and therefore severely restricts their activities and 

punishes them with long prison sentences for practicing their faith. 

Positive Developments

In 2020, authorities in Asmara released from prison a total of 244 prisoners of conscience from various religions and denominations. Some 

of those religious prisoners were released conditionally. Releases 

included 22 Methodist Christians in July, 101 Muslims in August, 

27 Evangelical Christians and 66 Pentecostals in September and 28 

Jehovah’s Witnesses in December. Observers suggested these releases 

were made to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in overcrowded prisons. 

While these releases were positive steps, hundreds of individuals remain 

detained for practicing their faith. In addition to these prisoner releases, 

the government also eased some restrictions on the Baha’i community, 

the tiny Jewish community and Greek Orthodox by allowing their members to worship openly in 2020. Specifically, the government permitted 

the Baha’i community to operate its center in Asmara as well as join 

the international Baha’i community as an active member. However, the 

government banned the Baha’i community from soliciting or accepting 

foreign funding. Additionally, the Greek Orthodox church in Asmara 

was open to the public as a heritage site as well as a worship place in 

2020. The Greek Orthodox congregation worshiped there regularly 

throughout the year. Finally, the tiny Jewish community was allowed to 

worship at its synagogue in Asmara. 

Key U.S. Policy

Since 2010, Eritrea and the United States have not exchanged 

ambassadors due to poor diplomatic relations. In recent years, 

however, the two countries have been engaging to improve their 

bilateral relations. In May 2019, a congressional delegation led by 

Representative Karen Bass (D-CA) visited Eritrea—the first congressional visit in 14 years. In September 2019, a U.S. Department 

of State delegation visited Asmara to open a direct dialogue with 

Eritrean officials. The delegation also met with human rights activists 

and faith leaders. During both visits, the delegations highlighted the 

importance of advancing human rights issues, including freedom of 

religion or belief. They also discussed the unlawful imprisonment of 

religious leaders, human rights activists, and political leaders, as well 

as the need to allow for alternative civilian services for conscientious 

objectors. Finally, the U.S. Embassy in Asmara has engaged young 

Eritreans to build their leadership skills by participating in the East 

Africa regional leadership academies and attending trainings in 

Washington, DC, to advance civic and political rights in Eritrea. The 

State Department has designated Eritrea as a CPC for systematic, 

ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom since 2004. Most 

recently, on December 2, the State Department redesignated it and 

maintained an arms embargo on Eritrea under 22 CFR 126.1 of the 

International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
22 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

INDIA

• Designate India as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

and tolerating systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious religious freedom violations, 

as defined by the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA); 

• Impose targeted sanctions on individuals 

and entities responsible for severe violations of religious freedom by freezing 

those individuals’ or entities’ assets and/or 

barring their entry into the United States;

• Advance human rights of all religious communities in India and promote religious 

freedom and dignity and interfaith dialogue through bilateral and multilateral 

forums and agreements, such as the ministerial of the Quadrilateral; and

• Condemn ongoing religious freedom 

violations and support religious organizations and human rights groups being 

targeted for their advocacy of religious 

freedom.

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Continue to raise religious freedom 

concerns in the U.S.-India bilateral relationship and highlight concerns through 

hearings, briefings, letters, and congressional delegations.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in India continued their 

negative trajectory. The government, led by the Bharatiya Janata 

Party (BJP), promoted Hindu nationalist policies resulting in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom. In 

early 2020, the passage of the religiously discriminatory Citizenship 

(Amendment) Act (CAA)—a fast track to citizenship for non-Muslim 

migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan residing in 

India—led to nationwide protests against the CAA and spurred 

state and nonstate violence, largely targeting Muslims. 

In February, the worst Hindu-Muslim mob violence in more 

than three decades erupted in Delhi. More than 50 people died 

and 200 others were injured, mostly Muslims. Mobs sympathetic 

to Hindu nationalism operated with impunity, using brutal force

to single out Muslims, attack mosques, and destroy homes and 

businesses in majority-Muslim neighborhoods. The Delhi Minorities 

Commission investigated and found that the violence and allegations of police brutality and complicity were “seemingly planned 

and directed to teach a lesson to a certain community which dared 

to protest against a discriminatory law.” Citing COVID-19 concerns, 

in March police cleared the Shaheen Bagh protest in Delhi—a 

peaceful sit-in that had lasted more than 100 days and was led by 

Muslim and non-Muslim women protesting the CAA.

In conjunction with a proposed National Register of Citizens 

(NRC) requiring all residents to provide documentation of citizenship, the CAA could subject Muslims, in particular, to “statelessness, 

deportation or prolonged detention.” The northeastern state of 

Assam provides a chilling example: in 2019, a statewide NRC was 

implemented in Assam that ultimately excluded 1.9 million residents (both Muslims and Hindus) from the citizenship register. 

In some cases, families who had resided in India for generations 

were excluded; in other cases, a family member was included on 

the citizenship register while another was not. The consequences 

of exclusion—as exemplified by a large detention camp being built 

in Assam—are potentially devastating and underscore concerns 

about the impact such laws may have if extended to other states or 

nationwide. USCIRF highlighted this weaponization of citizenship 

laws and the potential for atrocities in a March hearing.

Another set of policies raising significant concerns—and too 

often resulting in violence—are the efforts to prohibit interfaith 

marriages or relationships using the false narrative of “forced conversion.” In late 2020, Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, 

passed an ordinance voiding any marriage conducted for the “sole 

purpose of unlawful conversion or vice-versa.” Similar legislation 

was approved in Madhya Pradesh and is being pushed in several 

states, including Haryana, Assam, and Karnataka. Hindu nationalist 

groups also launched inflammatory campaigns decrying interfaith 

relationships or engagements, including calling for boycotts and 

censorship of media depictions of interfaith relationships. These 

efforts targeting and delegitimizing interfaith relationships have led 

to attacks and arrests of non-Hindus and to innuendo, suspicion, 

and violence toward any interfaith interaction. 

In September, the Indian Parliament amended the Foreign 

Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) to increase restrictions on 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), further stifling civil society 

and forcing religious organizations and human rights organizations, 

including those advocating for religious freedom, to shut down. 

Amnesty International India closed operations in October after 

authorities froze its bank account. 

At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, disinformation and hateful rhetoric—including from government 

officials—often targeted religious minorities, continuing familiar 

patterns. Disinformation and intolerant content have emboldened 

intimidation, harassment, and mob violence in recent years, including numerous instances of violence mainly against Dalits, Muslims, 

Christians, Adivasis, and other religious communities.

Government action—including the acquittal of all individuals 

accused of demolishing the Babri Masjid mosque—as well as government inaction to address religious violence contributed to a culture of 

impunity for those promulgating hate and violence toward religious 

minorities. At the same time, the government cracked down on those 

expressing dissent, including detaining and even accusing individuals 

of sedition for their actual or perceived criticism of the CAA and other 

governmental (in)actions. United Nations (UN) officials expressed 

concern over the government’s repression of criticism. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 23

INDIA

Background

India is the world’s largest democracy, with a rich tradition of secular 

pluralism. Its estimated population exceeds 1.3 billion: 79.8 percent 

Hindu, 14.2 percent Muslim, 2.3 percent Christian, and 1.7 percent 

Sikh. Smaller religious groups include Buddhists, Jains, Baha’is, Jews, 

Zoroastrians (Parsis), and nonreligious persons. India’s constitution

establishes the nation as secular, and Article 25 grants all individuals 

freedom of conscience, including the right to practice, profess, and 

propagate religion. Yet, in recent years, the BJP-led government has 

challenged the secular principles of the constitution by implementing 

laws and policies at the national and state levels promoting Hindu 

nationalism, thereby posing severe challenges to freedom of religion 

or belief and related rights. Throughout 2020, the national and state 

governments’ perpetration and toleration of these systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations led to increasing repression of religious 

freedom and a growing climate of hostility and violence toward religious minorities, human rights advocates, and others speaking out 

against such violations.

Anti-Conversion Laws

Despite India’s constitutional protections for religious freedom, 

approximately one-third of India’s 28 states limit or prohibit religious 

conversion to protect the dominant religion from perceived threats 

from religious minorities. While the new legislation in Uttar Pradesh 

and Madhya Pradesh targets interfaith marriage in particular, several 

other states prohibit conversion based on vague criteria, including 

force, inducement, allurement, coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation. 

These anti-conversion laws are too often the basis for false accusations, harassment, and violence against non-Hindus that occur with 

impunity. In 2020, for example, mobs—fueled by false accusations 

of forced conversions—attacked Christians, destroyed churches, 

and disrupted religious worship services. In many cases, authorities 

did not prevent these abuses and ignored or chose not to investigate pleas to hold perpetrators accountable. This contributed to 

increased mob attacks and a fear of reprisal against those coming 

forward. Religious minorities remain concerned about the potential 

for a national anti-conversion law and additional state-level statutes. 

Disinformation and Incitement of Violence 

Targeting Religious Minorities

Government officials and nonstate actors continued to use social 

media and other forms of communication to harass and spread hatred 

and disinformation against minority communities, including Muslims, 

Christians, and Dalits. Experts suggest that in 2020, pervasive disinformation about the CAA protests and the COVID-19 pandemic 

specifically targeted religious minorities and marginalized communities, disproportionately affecting women. Dalits, who have long 

faced religious-based discrimination in all aspects of life, experienced 

heightened harassment and discrimination during the COVID-19 

pandemic. Additionally, false information—aided with images sent via 

social media—have implicated religious communities in cow slaughter 

and other alleged offenses, resulting in more than 120 cases of significant violence. The fervor around cow slaughter continues to take root 

in policy: in December, the state of Karnataka revised an earlier bill to 

impose fines and imprisonment for the transport, sale, and purchase 

of cattle for slaughter. 

Religious Freedom in Jammu and Kashmir 

In Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir, restrictions on freedom of 

movement and assembly negatively impacted religious freedom, 

including the observance of religious holy days and the ability to 

attend prayers. The shutdown of the internet for nearly 18 months—

the longest-ever shutdown in any democracy—and other restrictions 

on communications caused significant disruption and limited religious freedom. 

Closing Space for Civil Society through the FCRA 

and Other Laws

Throughout 2020, members of civil society, including human rights 

advocates and media reporting on religious freedom violations, faced 

intimidation and harassment. Government officials used the Unlawful 

Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) and other statutes to detain advocates, media, and academics, including religious minorities. 

The national government has taken several steps to limit 

engagement and support of NGOs, especially religious and human 

rights organizations. The FCRA regulates the inflow of foreign funds 

to NGOs. In September, the FCRA was amended to place further 

restrictions on NGOs, including reducing the amount of foreign funds 

that could be used for administrative expenses and requiring that 

accounts be held in a government-designated bank. In recent years, 

government officials have revoked or suspended the FCRA licenses of 

thousands of NGOs, including numerous Christian and other religious 

and human rights organizations.

Key U.S. Policy

In 2020, the United States and India strengthened their relationship, especially in security and defense. In February, then President 

Donald J. Trump visited India, highlighting the growing relationship. In 

October, then Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo traveled to India 

for the third U.S.-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, where the two governments signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement. 

Several members of Congress have expressed concern about 

the CAA and other human rights-related issues in India. For example, 

Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Ranking Member of the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee, urged the administration to “engage the 

Indian government at the highest levels on these concerns, press for 

a swift reversal of these policies and practices, and ensure protection 

of the human rights of all persons in India regardless of their religion.”

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Hearing: Citizenship Laws and Religious Freedom

• Hearing: Combatting Online Hate Speech and Disinformation Targeting Religious Communities

• Issue Brief: The Religious Freedom Implications of the National Register of Citizens in India

• Factsheet: The Citizenship (Amendment) Act in India
24 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

INDIA

Individual Views of Commissioner Johnnie Moore

I love India. I have floated early in the morning down the Ganges in 

Varanasi, walked every alley in Old Delhi, stood in awe of the architecture in Agra, sipped tea next to the Dalai Lama’s temple in Dharamsala, 

circled the shrine in Ajmer, and looked in awe at the Golden Temple. 

All along the way, I have met Christian brothers and sisters who serve 

the poor selflessly, often in difficult circumstances.

Of all the countries in the world, India should not be a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC. It is the world’s largest democracy and 

it is governed by a pristine constitution. It is diversity personified and 

its religious life has been its greatest historic blessing. 

Yet, India does seem to be at a crossroads. Its democracy—still 

young and freewheeling—is creating through the ballot box difficult 

challenges for itself. The answer, of course, is for India’s institutions to 

draw upon their rich history to protect their values. India must always 

resist allowing political and intercommunal conflict to be exacerbated 

by religious tensions. India’s government and people have everything 

to gain and absolutely nothing to lose from preserving social harmony 

and protecting the rights of everyone. India can. India must.

26 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

IRAN

• Redesignate Iran as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA);

• Continue to impose targeted sanctions 

on Iranian government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry 

into the United States under human rights 

related financial and visa authorities, citing 

specific religious freedom violations;

• Raise religious freedom and other human 

rights abuses in any discussions with Iran’s 

government regarding U.S. re-entry to 

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

(JCPOA);

• Work with members of the International 

Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance to 

exert multilateral pressure on Iran to 

improve religious freedom conditions and 

release religious prisoners of conscience; 

• Press for the release of all religious prisoners of conscience, including Youcef 

Nadarkhani and Golrokh Ebrahimi Iraee; 

and

• Reauthorize and ensure implementation 

of the Lautenberg Amendment, which 

aids persecuted Iranian religious minorities seeking refugee status in the United 

States. 

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Iran deteriorated, with 

the government escalating its severe repression of religious 

minorities and continuing to export religious extremism and 

intolerance abroad. During the year, scores of Christians were 

arrested, assaulted, and unjustly sentenced to years in prison. 

In January, Iran removed the “other” option from the religion 

category on national ID cards, forcing members of the Baha’i 

community to either deny their religion or be denied this crucial 

document. The government also continued to arrest Baha’is and 

impose lengthy prison sentences on them. Between 50 and 100

Baha’is were reported to be in prisons in Iran during 2020, despite 

the widespread prevalence of COVID-19. In October, officials 

confiscated Baha’i land near the city of Sari. In late November, 

Iran conducted a mass raid on Baha’i houses, arresting 20 people 

and searching about 50 houses. Iran also severely mistreated

Sunni activists and clerics in 2020. In September, Iran’s Supreme 

Court affirmed death sentences for seven Sunni prisoners on 

charges including “waging war against God” and “corruption on 

Earth.” The government continued to repress the Gonabadi Sufi 

community after hastening the death of its spiritual leader Noor 

Ali Tabandeh in 2019. During 2020, it continued to detain Sufis 

who had protested Tabandeh’s house arrest in 2018 and subjected 

several of them to egregious mistreatment. 

Throughout the year, Iran’s government continued to promote 

antisemitism. In March, several submissions to a COVID-19 cartoon 

contest sponsored by Iran’s Ministry of Health asserted that COVID19 was a Jewish conspiracy. The ministry took no action to reject 

these submissions. In September, state media advanced false ideas 

about Jewish victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks and Iran 

launched its third Holocaust denial cartoon contest. In February, a 

Basij student group in Hamedan made threats against the tomb of 

Esther and Mordechai. In May, unknown assailants attempted to set 

fire to the religious site. That same month, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 

tweeted that the United States is controlled by “wealthy Zionists and 

their corporate owners,” a common antisemitic dog-whistle.

Iran’s government closed 147 shops during Ramadan for “not 

following Shari’a law” and arrested three people for eating during 

the daily fast. It also imprisoned and prosecuted several women 

who peacefully protested mandatory headscarf laws. Imprisoned 

lawyer Nasrin Soutudeh, who defended many of these women in 

court, began a hunger strike on August 11, and was denied adequate medical care. She was granted a temporary release from 

prison on November 9 after contracting COVID-19 but ordered

to return on December 2 despite needing ongoing medical evaluation. Iran also continued to detain USCIRF Religious Prisoner of 

Conscience Golrokh Iraee at Qarchak Prison and deny her visits 

with her ill husband. In addition to invoking religion to restrict 

the religious freedom of women, Iran invokes its interpretation of 

Shari’a to justify religious freedom violations against the lesbian, 

gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) community and 

actively executes LGBTI people for their sexual identity.

USCIRF Religious Prisoner of Conscience Pastor Youcef 

Nadarkhani remained in prison on a six-year sentence for “promoting Zionist Christianity.” Pastor Victor Bet Tamraz and his wife fled

in August following a rejected appeal against charges of “gathering 

and colluding to commit crimes against national security.” In March 

2020, the government of Canada granted asylum to spiritualist 

leader and USCIRF Religious Prisoner of Conscience Mohammed 

Ali Taheri following threats to him and his followers by the Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC continued to threaten 

the lives of Taheri’s followers outside Iran in 2020. Taheri is the 

founder of the Erfan e-Halgheh spiritualist movement and was 

sentenced to death in 2015 before the sentence was overturned 

later that same year.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Factsheet: Iranian Government Officials Sanctioned for Violating Religious Freedom

• USCIRF Spotlight: Religious Freedom in Iran during COVID-19
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 27

IRAN

Background

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a theocratic, authoritarian state with 

restricted political participation. Ninety to 95 percent of the population are Shi’a Muslim, while Sunni Muslims account for 5–10 percent. 

Approximately 0.3 percent ascribe to other religions, including the 

Baha’i faith, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Judaism. While the 

Jaafari (Twelver) school of Shi’a Islam is the official religion, the constitution extends full respect to the five major Sunni schools. It also 

recognizes Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians as protected minorities. 

Five of the parliament’s 290 seats are reserved for religious minorities—two for Armenian Christians and one each for Assyrian/Chaldean 

Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. There are two Hindu temples, 

and Buddhism has historic influences. Iran is home to several other 

religious groups that face persecution, including Mandeans, Yarsanis, 

nonbelievers, and followers of spiritual movements. In December 

2016, President Hassan Rouhani publicly released a nonbinding 

Charter on Citizens’ Rights, but religious minorities have seen little 

change based on this document.

Persecution of Religious Minorities

In May, officials at Fashafoye Prison denied medical care to Sufi prisoners and moved four Sufis into Ward 5 of the prison, where there were 

known cases of COVID-19. In September, officials at Evin Prison gave 

medicines to Sufi activist Benham Majoubi without his consent that 

caused limb numbness, paralysis, and loss of consciousness. Officials 

then sent Majoubi to Aminabad Hospital while denying him access to 

crucial medicine. Mahjoubi died in February 2021.

Iran also escalated its persecution of Christians in 2020, particularly converts from Islam. Officials lashed Christian convert 

Mohammed Reza Omidi 80 times for drinking communion wine in 

October following his completion of a two-year sentence for participation in a house church. In February, the IRGC arrested Christian 

convert Mary Mohammadi at a peaceful protest in Tehran. She was 

held incognito and subjected to beatings and sexual assault at the 

Vozara Detention Center. At a court hearing in April, Judge Javad 

Ahmadi from Branch 1167 of the Criminal Court of Tehran asked 

Mohammadi repeated questions about her faith and conversion from 

Islam to Christianity that had no bearing on her charge of “disturbing 

public order.” In April she was sentenced to three months and one 

day in prison and ten lashes. However, her sentence was suspended 

for a year. In January 2020, Branch 105 of the Civil Court in Shiraz 

sentenced Christian convert Ismaeil Maghrebinejad to three years in 

prison for “insulting Islamic sacred beliefs.” In February, he was given 

an additional two-year sentence for promoting “Evangelical Zionist 

Christianity,” and in May he received an additional year for “propaganda against the state.” In September, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence 

coerced a judge in Bushire to rule that a Christian couple who converted from Islam must return their adopted daughter to the care of 

the state because she was Muslim. The ruling came despite fatwas 

from two Shi’a grand ayatollahs deeming the adoption consistent with 

Islamic legal interpretations.

Iran also continued its systematic repression of Baha’is, including a mass raid on about 50 Baha’i houses in late November. A court 

official in Shiraz threatened to “uproot” Baha’is in the city in late 

spring. In March, 30 Baha’is were summoned to Branch 10 of the 

Shiraz Revolutionary Court on grounds related to a 2016 Ministry of 

Intelligence case against them. In April, Judge Hojjat Nabavi from 

Branch 2 of the Birjand Revolutionary Court sentenced nine Baha’is 

to lengthy prison sentences for “membership in the illegal and antisecurity deviant Baha’i sect.” While one was acquitted, the court 

denied an October appeal by the eight other Baha’is. 

Key U.S. Policy

The Trump administration continued its “maximum pressure” tactic in 

2020 as high-level officials, including then Secretary of State Michael 

R. Pompeo, repeatedly highlighted the plight of persecuted religious 

minorities. In August, Elliot Abrams replaced U.S. Department of 

State Iran Envoy Brian H. Hook. In January 2020, the United States 

killed IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassim Soleimani in Baghdad, 

Iraq, for “actively developing plans to attack American diplomats 

and service members in Iraq and throughout the region.” Later that 

month, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 

Control (OFAC) blocked the domain of the semiofficial Iranian Fars 

News Agency. Throughout 2020, the Treasury Department sanctioned high-ranking Iranian officials responsible for severe religious 

freedom violations, including Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi. 

At the February 2020 National Prayer Breakfast in Washington, DC, 

then President Donald J. Trump called on Iran to free jailed Christian 

convert Mary Mohammadi. In October, the United States supported 

a United Nations resolution condemning human rights restrictions in 

Iran, including religious freedom violations. On December 2, the State 

Department redesignated Iran as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed 

existing travel restrictions on Iranian individuals connected with the 

commission of serious human rights abuses. While approximately 12 

religiously persecuted Iranians were admitted to the United States in 

2019 under the bipartisan Lautenberg Amendment, at the end of 2020 

nearly 80 fully vetted Iranians remained in Vienna, Austria, awaiting 

final approval to travel to the United States for resettlement.
28 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

Individual Views of Commissioner Johnnie Moore

Iran is the world’s leading proprietor of hostage diplomacy and the 

world’s leading sponsor of terrorism, especially through its proxies 

like the terrorist Houthis, Hezbollah, and various Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated groups active across Europe, South 

America, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Iran’s activities within and 

outside of the country target religious minorities and especially Jews, 

Evangelical Christians, and Baha’is. I’m appalled by reports that certain Biden administration officials would, in effect, reward Iran for 

its bad behavior by eliminating sanctions prematurely. Negotiations 

with Iran must only be pursued in consultation with America’s allies 

in the Middle East (including Saudi Arabia and Israel). They must 

involve the release of arbitrarily detained Americans (and others) and 

address Iran’s gross human rights abuses and proxy activities, and 

those negotiations are only reasonable if they produce an outcome 

that would be satisfactory to a bipartisan majority of members of 

Congress, as if a new deal were a treaty. Otherwise, Iran will only take 

advantage of American goodwill to lie more, kidnap more, kill more 

innocents, threaten the elimination of Israel, and further destabilize 

the world. Finally, I will give my remaining words to Wang Xiyue, the 

American PhD student from Princeton who was taken hostage by 

Iran during the Obama administration after the Joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Action (JCPOA): “The menace of the Islamic Republic can’t 

be appeased . . . for 42 years Iran has demonstrated that it changes 

its behavior only in response to strength in the form of American-led 

international pressure.” 

IRAN
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 29
30 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

NIGERIA

• Redesignate Nigeria as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

and tolerating systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious violations of religious freedom, 

as defined by the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA), and redesignate Boko 

Haram and ISWAP as “entities of particular 

concern,” or EPCs, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of 

religious freedom, as defined by IRFA;

• Enter into a binding agreement, as authorized under Section 405(c) of IRFA, and 

provide associated financial and technical 

support to obligate the Nigerian government to take substantial steps to address 

religious freedom violations, including but 

not limited to: 

• Enhance training for officials, the military, and police officers on countering 

hate speech based on religious identity, responding to sectarian violence, 

reporting on violence against religious 

communities, and holding accountable 

security officers accused of excessive use 

of force and other human rights abuses; 

• Promote and expand access to justice 

and strengthen secular courts in areas 

where ethnoreligious tensions overlap 

with trends of heightened violence, 

criminality, and mob justice;

• Increase funding for security sector 

reform and rule of law programming and 

include religious institutional actors in 

security and justice programs; and

• Allocate funding for programs that 

engage civil society, security, and official actors in inclusive efforts to protect 

places of worship and other holy sites;

• Conduct a comprehensive review of all 

U.S. aid to Nigeria and its impact on religious freedom conditions in the country;

• Develop localized strategies and engage 

diplomatically with key local government 

authorities in regions where state-sanctioned or tolerated violations are 

frequent to bring state practices in line 

with the constitution and international 

obligations; and

• Strengthen the public affairs capacity at 

the U.S. Embassy in Abuja to respond 

publicly to developments in religious 

freedom conditions in Nigeria, including 

commenting on court cases against religious prisoners of conscience, as well as 

to amplify domestic voices advocating for 

stronger religious freedom norms.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Nigeria deteriorated, with 

both state and nonstate actors committing egregious violations 

of the right to freedom of religion or belief. Despite Nigeria’s 

constitution protecting freedom of religion and belief, Nigerian 

citizens faced violence by militant Islamists and other nonstate 

armed actors, as well as discrimination, arbitrary detentions, and 

capital blasphemy sentences by state authorities.

State-sanctioned Shari’a courts handed down harsh sentences 

on several individuals convicted of blasphemy, including sentencing 22-year-old musician Yahaya Sharif-Aminu to death, although 

a higher court later demanded Sharif-Aminu’s case to be retried. 

Government authorities also arrested prominent humanist activist 

Mubarak Bala, reportedly in relation to his expression of his humanist beliefs on social media. Bala continues to be detained without 

charge, and authorities have restricted his access to his legal team.

Militant Islamist groups in Nigeria continued to violate religious 

freedom in the northeast and expanded to parts of the northwest of 

the country. Elements from Boko Haram and from the Islamic State 

in West Africa Province (ISWAP) abducted and executed several 

individuals based on their religious beliefs. Boko Haram fighters 

beheaded a local chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria 

(CAN) in Adamawa State because he refused to renounce his faith, 

while ISWAP fighters executed five aid workers as a warning to “all 

those being used by infidels to convert Muslims to Christianity.” 

Jihadists also conducted several attacks on religious ceremonies: 

in May they attacked villagers preparing to break their Ramadan 

fast, killing 20 people, and in July they attacked locals gathering to 

celebrate Eid al-Adha in Maiduguri.

In the center of the country, other nonstate armed groups also 

conducted attacks on houses of worship, religious ceremonies, and 

religious leaders. Christian communities were hit particularly hard 

in the country’s Middle Belt, with nonstate armed actors attacking 

at least 11 churches and Christian ceremonies. Survivors report 

that Fulani-affiliated armed groups used religious rhetoric while 

conducting myriad attacks on predominantly Christian villages in 

Kaduna State. Kidnappers also reportedly deliberately targeted 

Christians for abduction and execution. The Nigerian government 

has routinely failed to investigate these attacks and prosecute those 

responsible, demonstrating a problematic level of apathy on the 

part of state officials. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Factsheet: Violent Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria

• Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Nigeria in 2020

• Factsheet: Religious Tensions and Fulani Communities in West and Central Africa
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 31

NIGERIA

Background

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with an estimated 219 million people. Among these, an estimated 53.5 percent identify as Muslim; 

45.9 percent identify as Christian; and 0.6 percent identify with other 

religious beliefs, including atheism, the Baha’i faith, Judaism, Hinduism, 

Buddhism, and African traditional religions. 

The 1999 Constitution protects freedom of religion or belief and 

prohibits the state from establishing a state religion and from discriminating on the basis of religion. The Nigerian Criminal Code includes 

a penalty of up to two years imprisonment for insulting a person’s 

religion. Additionally, 12 Muslim-majority northern states use Islamic 

Shari’a criminal and family codes alongside civil and customary laws; 

these Shari’a codes prohibit blasphemy. 

Religion in Nigeria plays a strong role in social and political life. 

There are also deeply entrenched religious divisions and mistrust. 

Often, religious tensions overlap with ethnic identity, exacerbating 

ethnoreligious conflicts driven by both the religious and ethnic aspects 

of victims’ and perpetrators’ identities.

The Nigerian government is currently conducting military operations against Boko Haram and ISWAP in the northeast of the country. 

Despite federal government claims that it has defeated Boko Haram, 

these groups remain significant threats to civilians and religious freedom in the Lake Chad Basin region. Human rights abuses by Nigerian 

counterterrorism actors have reportedly exacerbated insecurity and 

put civilian lives at risk.

Attacks on Houses of Worship and Religious 

Ceremonies

In February, Boko Haram militants attacked Garkida, a town known as 

the foundation of the Church of the Brethren in the country, burning 

at least five churches. In a series of attacks in Kaduna State in March, 

suspected Fulani militants burned four churches. In April, armed assailants believed to be affiliated with Fulani militias attacked a Christian 

wedding ceremony in Niger State, killing 12 people and abducting 

the bride and groom. In July, unidentified gunmen killed 18 people 

at a Christian wedding party in Kaduna State and injured 30 others.

In May, reported Islamist extremists attacked a community as 

people were preparing to break their Ramadan fast, killing at least 20 

people. That same month, reported jihadist elements attacked the 

city of Maiduguri as locals were preparing celebrations of the Islamic 

festival Eid al-Adha, killing four people and wounding three others. In 

October, unidentified criminals burned down two mosques in Enugu 

in the south of the country.

Militant Islamist Extremism

Militant Islamist groups in northern Nigeria continue to hold territory and commit severe attacks and human rights abuses in northeast 

Nigeria and the broader Lake Chad Basin region. Moreover, these 

groups have expanded their territory west, with ISWAP now conducting 

activities in Sokoto State and Boko Haram operating in Kaduna State. 

ISWAP fighters abducted and executed Ropvil Daciya Dalep, 

a Christian university student, in January; abducted a Christian 

pastor and two women in Borno State in October; and executed 

five aid workers as a warning to “all those being used by infidels to 

convert Muslims to Christianity.” Boko Haram fighters abducted 

Reverend Lawan Andimi, local CAN chairman in Adamawa State, 

and later beheaded him, reportedly because he would not renounce 

his faith. In December, after threatening attacks against Christians 

during the Christmas season, Boko Haram fighters conducted three 

attacks against Christian communities in northern Nigeria, killing at 

least 12 people and abducting an Evangelical pastor. Additionally, 

in January, jihadist group Ansaru reemerged in Niger State for the 

first time since 2013, claiming responsibility for an attack on “apostates” in August.

Religious Prisoners of Conscience

In 2020, state authorities violated several Nigerian individuals’ rights to 

freedom of religion or belief, including by escalating enforcement of blasphemy laws in comparison to previous years. In August, a Shari’a court in 

Kano State convicted Yahaya Sharif-Aminu of blasphemy for insulting the 

Prophet Muhammad in a private WhatsApp message and sentenced him 

to death— a higher court later invalidated the conviction and demanded 

a retrial. Kano authorities also found 16-year-old Omar Farouk guilty of 

blasphemy and detained him throughout the year, although his conviction 

was overturned in early 2021 and he was released. 

Police also arrested prominent atheist activist Mubarak Bala in 

April 2020 after a coalition of lawyers in Kano State filed a petition 

accusing him of insulting the Prophet Muhammad in Facebook posts. 

For more than eight months, Kano State police detained Bala without 

charges, limiting his access to his legal team and refusing to provide 

proof of his whereabouts and wellbeing to his family. In December, 

after many months of delay, a federal court ruled Bala’s detention 

unconstitutional and ordered his release—however, as of the end of 

2020, Bala remained in Kano State police custody despite this order.

Key U.S. Policy

In December 2019, the U.S. Department of State included Nigeria for the 

first time on its Special Watch List for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to IRFA. A year later, on December 

2, 2020, the U.S. Department of State designated Nigeria as a CPC for 

engaging in or tolerating particularly severe violations under IRFA, an 

action USCIRF had recommended every year since 2009. However, at the 

same time it made the CPC designation, the State Department issued 

a waiver on any related sanctions as required in the “important national 

interest of the United States,” pursuant to Section 407 of IRFA.

U.S. funding to Nigeria continued to prioritize humanitarian 

assistance and economic development. In November, the United 

States and Nigeria cohosted a meeting of the coalition against the 

Islamic State and affirmed their commitment to defeating Boko 

Haram and ISWAP. U.S. diplomatic efforts in Nigeria included peaceful conflict resolution programming in regions experiencing high 

levels of violence as well as monitoring cases of religious prisoners 

of conscience. 

In November, following Nigerian authorities’ violent crackdown 

on peaceful demonstrators protesting police abuse, the Congressional 

Black Caucus sent a letter to President Muhammadu Buhari condemning state-sanctioned violence against peaceful nonviolent protesters 

in Nigeria and calling for dialogue. Texas Representatives Al Green 

and Joaquin Castro introduced a resolution supporting the protesters 

to the U.S. House of Representatives.
32 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

Individual Views of Commissioner Gary L. Bauer

Nigeria is quickly becoming a “killing field” for that nation’s Christians. 

The hour is late. Nigeria’s government seems unable or unwilling to 

stop the growing carnage. In large swaths of the country, Christian 

parents fear for their children every day when they go to school. Those 

children are targeted by savage Islamists who kidnap and force them 

to renounce Christ or face death. Every time a Nigerian Christian 

family worships at a church, they are painfully aware it may be the last 

thing they do on this earth. The churches are ripe targets for Boko 

Haram and other jihadists. Christians have been blown up or “mowed” 

down in their places of worship.

All too often this violence is attributed to mere “bandits” or 

explained away as hostility between farmers and herdsmen. While 

there is some truth in these assertions, they ignore the main truth: 

radical Islamists are committing violence inspired by what they believe 

is a religious imperative to “cleanse” Nigeria of its Christians. They 

must be stopped.

The failure of many in the international human rights community 

and the Western media to accurately describe what is really happening 

in Nigeria is inexcusable. More Christians have been killed for their 

faith in Nigeria in the last year than in the entire Middle East. Unless 

we find our voice, what is happening in Nigeria will move relentlessly 

toward a Christian genocide. 

We are pleased that in December of 2020, the U.S. Department 

of State finally included Nigeria as a country engaged in egregious 

violations of religious freedom. Much more must be done.

NIGERIA

Individual Views of Commissioner James W. Carr

Nigeria was considered by many to have a strong commitment to religious freedom. In the past decade or so, however, religious freedom 

conditions in Nigeria have significantly worsened. While all religious 

communities and people of no belief face dangerous conditions, the 

situation for Christians is extremely perilous. We now regularly read 

of kidnappings, rapes, and murders that are being committed against 

the Christian community. Sadly, as we look around the world, many 

now believe that religious freedom violations in Nigeria may be among 

the worst in the world, if not the worst. As a Commission member, I 

am concerned about the country’s inability, or reluctance, to protect 

the Christian community. I for one believe that Nigeria is better than 

this and that the Nigerian people and their leaders must step up and 

recommit themselves to the protection of ALL Nigerians to believe and 

worship freely as they choose. These atrocities being committed against 

Christian families must stop.

Individual Views of Commissioner Johnnie Moore

The persistent facts-be-damned approach to the conflict(s) in Africa’s 

most populated country has resulted in more loss of life, year in and 

year out. It is simply incomprehensible to me that proud and beautiful 

Nigeria remains in its present condition. How long will this continue? 

The world must do more. The United States must recognize and correct 

its policy failures. Unfortunately, the perilous situation is now spreading 

more and more to other countries. Will it take a caliphate in West Africa 

to awaken the international community? The status quo is unsustainable. This is a tinderbox.

34 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

NORTH KOREA

• Redesignate North Korea as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging 

in systematic, ongoing, and egregious religious freedom violations, as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

• Fill and maintain the position of Special 

Envoy for North Korean Human Rights 

Issues as a fulltime, independent position at the U.S. Department of State, and 

ensure religious freedom is a priority for 

that office;

• Urge the North Korean government to 

grant international human rights monitors 

unfettered access to document human 

rights conditions, including religious freedom, inside the country; and

• Integrate security and human rights as 

complementary objectives in U.S. policy 

toward North Korea, including considering 

the lifting of certain sanctions in return for 

concrete progress in religious freedom 

and related human rights.

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Work with the administration to clarify the 

conditions under which Congress would 

approve the partial or complete lifting of 

certain sanctions under the North Korea 

Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act 

of 2016 in return for significant progress 

on denuclearization and commitments to 

improve religious freedom conditions.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in North Korea—officially 

known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—

remained among the worst in the world. North Korea’s ruling 

ideology, known as Juche, deifies North Korean leaders and justifies their rule. It forbids competing ideologies—including religious 

ones—and treats religion as an existential threat. Rooted in 

Juche, the Ten Principles for Establishing a Korean Workers’ Party 

Transcendental Guidance System require unconditional loyalty and 

obedience to the North Korean leader. They also effectively override 

the rights and freedoms enshrined in international and North Korean 

law, including the North Korean constitution, which nominally grants 

freedom of religion. Internal Party legal commentaries, published in 

2018, which constitute authoritative guidance for interpreting North 

Korean constitutional and criminal law within the framework of the 

Ten Principles and Juche, contain explicit antireligion language.

The North Korean government attempts to provide an illusion 

of religious freedom to the outside world through state-backed religious organizations and sites such as the Korean Christian Federation, 

Korean Buddhist Federation, Changchung Cathedral, and Kwangbop 

Temple. In practice, authorities target and persecute various religious 

groups and adherents, including Protestants, Buddhists, adherents 

of shamanism or traditional Korean folk religion, Chondoists, and others. The songbun system classifies citizens based on their perceived 

loyalty to the state; religious practitioners belong to the “hostile” 

class and are considered enemies of the state, deserving “discrimination, punishment, isolation, and even execution.”

According to the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Korean 

Future Initiative’s (KFI) 2020 report on religious freedom violations 

in North Korea, authorities persecuted religious believers on a variety of charges, including religious practice, religious activities in 

China, possessing religious items such as Bibles, contact with religious persons, attending religious services, and sharing religious 

beliefs. Religious adherents suffered a range of official violations 

and mistreatments, including arbitrary surveillance, interrogation, 

arrest, detention, and imprisonment; punishment of family members; 

torture; sexual violence; forced labor; and execution. The report also 

provides details on North Korean government agencies that have 

been directly involved in carrying out egregious persecution of religious believers, including the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which 

operates internment camps, holding centers, political prison camps, 

and pretrial detention centers; the Ministry of People’s Security 

(MPS), which operates labor camps, holding centers, pretrial detention centers, long-term reeducation camps, and precinct offices; 

and the Border Security Command, which plays “a significant role in 

religious freedom violations alongside the MSS and MPS.” 

Consistent with past USCIRF reporting, KFI findings indicate that 

Protestant Christians are especially vulnerable to persecution, followed 

by adherents of shamanism. The NGO Open Doors has long ranked

North Korea as the country where Christians face the “most extreme” 

persecution, most recently in January 2021. Open Doors estimates that 

of around 400,000 Christians in North Korea, approximately 50,000 

to 70,000 are currently imprisoned. Most North Korean Christians 

are unable to meet for collective worship due to severe repression, 

and they suffer from harsh abuses such as long-term imprisonment 

in various prisons or prison-like facilities, severe beatings that result 

in broken bones and ruptured skin, strangulation, starvation, sexual 

violence, forced abortion, and execution. The MSS is believed to be 

principally responsible for persecution against Christians.

The practice of shamanism is pervasive in North Korean society, 

but its practitioners face severe persecution. As North Korean authorities define shamanism as a “crime of superstition,” practitioners have 

been subjected to detention, arrest, physical assault, and execution. 

The MPS is believed to be primarily responsible for abuses against 

adherents of shamanism. Information on the condition of adherents 

of other major religious traditions—such as Buddhism, Catholicism, 

and Chondoism—in North Korea remains very limited. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Policy Update: Can Human Rights Advocacy Resolve the North Korea Nuclear Impasse?

• Op-Ed: There Shall Be No God But Kim Jong Un (in The National Interest)
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 35

NORTH KOREA

Background

Information about religious demographics and religious freedom conditions in North Korea is difficult to confirm and often outdated. North 

Koreans traditionally followed Buddhism and an indigenous syncretic 

religious movement known as Chondoism (Religion of the Heavenly 

Way). The country had a sizeable Christian community before the 

Korean War (1950–1953), with Pyongyang known as the “Jerusalem 

of the East,” but successive crackdowns have shrunk the Christian 

population to an estimated 2 percent of the total population. Many 

North Koreans learn about the religion when they flee to South Korea 

via China. Although technically illegal, shamanism and traditional folk 

religion practices, such as fortunetelling, are widespread.

Defectors and Refugees

Defectors and refugees from North Korea are primary sources of information about religious freedom conditions in the country. In recent 

years, however, the number of North Koreans arriving in South Korea 

has decreased. The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a further decrease 

in 2020. According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, about 

230 North Koreans defected to South Korea during the year—the lowest 

number in 20 years and significantly less than the 2019 figure of 1,047. 

The Chinese government views all North Korean refugees as 

illegal economic migrants and repatriates them if discovered, without 

regard to their risk of persecution on return. This practice stands in 

direct violation of China’s obligations under the 1951 United Nations 

(UN) Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In addition, since 

2017, Chinese authorities have expelled hundreds of South Korean 

missionaries, many of whom played an instrumental role in helping 

North Korean refugees escape.

In December 2020, South Korea’s National Assembly passed a 

controversial law criminalizing activities that send anti-North Korea 

materials—including religious ones such as leaflets, Bibles, and cultural items—into North Korea by balloons. Many activists who send 

these materials across the border are North Korean defectors and 

Christian missionaries. The law has drawn criticism from human rights 

organizations and U.S. politicians, who have expressed concerns over 

the law’s impact on freedoms of expression and religion.

Religious Prisoners of Conscience

Given the country’s closed and isolated nature, information about 

specific religious and political prisoners of conscience is difficult to 

obtain. NGOs and rescue groups that work on North Korean human 

rights and refugee issues often conceal identities of North Korean 

individuals in order to protect them and their families from government persecution and retaliation. USCIRF continues to advocate for 

the release of Deacon Jang Moon Seok—also known by his Chinese 

name, Zhang Wen Shi—whom USCIRF adopted as a religious prisoner of conscience (RPOC). Zhang is a Chinese citizen of Korean 

descent. Prior to his abduction from China by North Korean agents 

in November 2014, Zhang provided assistance to—and shared his 

Christian faith with—North Koreans in China. North Korean authorities sentenced Zhang to 15 years in prison. 

United Nations Activity 

In June 2020, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted a resolution condemning “in the strongest terms the long-standing and 

ongoing systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations 

and other human rights abuses” committed by North Korea. The resolution expressed particular concerns over North Korea’s persecution 

of individuals and groups on religious and other grounds; “denial of 

the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including 

the right to adopt a religion or belief”; and discrimination based on 

the songbun system, which includes consideration of religion. The 

UNHRC also called on the North Korean government to ensure the 

right to freedom of religion or belief. As a member of the UNHRC, 

South Korea supported the passage of the resolution but did not 

cosponsor the draft resolution.

On December 16, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the “grave human rights situation” and “the lack 

of accountability for human rights violations” in North Korea. The 

General Assembly expressed specific concerns over North Korea’s 

imposition of the death penalty and execution of individuals on 

account of religion or belief; the pervasive and severe restrictions on 

the freedom of religion or belief; and the government’s discrimination 

against people based on the songbun system that includes consideration of religion. South Korea did not cosponsor this resolution.

Key U.S. Policy

In 2020, relations between the United States and North Korea deteriorated due to a lack of progress on security-related negotiations. The 

three historic summits that were held between then President Donald 

J. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2018 and 2019 did 

not lead to substantive progress toward full denuclearization. Neither 

human rights more broadly nor religious freedom specifically were 

included as an integral part of those bilateral negotiations. 

In December, seven of the 15 members of the UN Security 

Council—the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, the 

Dominican Republic, and Estonia—requested a public briefing on 

human rights abuses in North Korea. After China and Russia objected 

to the request, the seven countries brought up the issue at a closeddoor meeting on December 11, expressing concerns that North 

Korea’s “human rights violations pose an imminent threat to international peace and security.” Also in December, the State Department 

redesignated North Korea as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed existing ongoing restrictions to which the country is already subject under 

Sections 402 and 409 of the Trade Act of 1974.
36 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

PAKISTAN

• Redesignate Pakistan as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing 

the administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result of 

the designation;

• Enter into a binding agreement, under 

Section 405(c) of IRFA, with the Pakistani 

government to encourage substantial 

steps to address religious freedom violations with benchmarks, including but not 

limited to: 

• Release blasphemy prisoners and other 

individuals imprisoned for their religion 

or beliefs;

• Repeal blasphemy and anti-Ahmadiyya 

laws; until repeal is accomplished, enact 

reforms to make blasphemy a bailable 

offense, require evidence by accusers, 

ensure proper investigation by senior 

police officials, allow authorities to dismiss unfounded accusations, and enforce 

existing Penal Code articles criminalizing 

perjury and false accusations; 

• Address extremist rhetoric often preceding attacks on minorities, while 

protecting freedom of expression;

• Hold accountable individuals who incite 

or participate in vigilante violence, targeted killings, forced conversions, and 

other hate crimes;

• Reform public educational textbooks, 

curriculum, and teacher training 

materials to ensure content is inclusive 

of and not discriminatory toward religious minorities; and 

• Remove requirements for self-identification of religion on identity documents; 

• Impose targeted sanctions on Pakistani 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights-related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Advocate for the release of religious prisoners of conscience in Pakistan, including 

Junaid Hafeez, Ramzan Bibi, Shafqat 

Emmanuel, and Shagufta Kausar.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Pakistan continued to 

worsen. The government systematically enforced blasphemy and 

anti-Ahmadiyya laws and failed to protect religious minorities 

from abuses by nonstate actors. There was a sharp rise in targeted 

killings, blasphemy cases, forced conversions, and hate speech 

targeting religious minorities including Ahmadis, Shi’a Muslims, 

Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs. 

Pakistan’s treatment of religious minorities is best assessed 

through the prism of its treatment of the Ahmadiyya community, who 

continued to face severe official and societal persecution for their 

beliefs and self-identification as Muslims. The year saw a surge in targeted killings of Ahmadis. Between July and November, five Ahmadis 

were murdered, including 57-year-old Tahir Naseem, an American 

citizen accused of blasphemy who was shot in a courtroom in July. 

In May, the government formed the National Minorities 

Commission (NMC) required by a 2014 Supreme Court decision, 

however Ahmadis were excluded. During debates surrounding 

their possible inclusion, Noor-ul-Haq Qadri, Pakistan’s Minister for 

Religious and Inter-faith Harmony Affairs, publicly stated, “Whoever 

shows sympathy or compassion towards [Ahmadis] is neither loyal 

to Islam nor the state of Pakistan.” The government did not address 

statements made by Qadri or other officials who incited hatred and 

intolerance towards Ahmadis and other religious minorities. 

Pakistan’s religiously discriminatory legislation, such as the 

blasphemy and anti-Ahmadiyya laws, used in combination with new 

media rules, contributed to egregious human rights abuses and 

fostered an overall atmosphere of intolerance for religious minorities 

that often leads to violence and discrimination. In August alone, over 

40 blasphemy First Incident Reports (FIRs) were registered, mostly 

targeting the Shi’a minority during the month of Muharram. 

Other religious communities were also targeted with blasphemy 

charges. In 2020, there reportedly were 30 Christians, including seven 

on death row, jailed in Pakistan on charges of blasphemy. They include 

Asif Pervaiz, a 37-year-old Christian garment factory worker whom a 

Lahore court sentenced to death in September. 

The issue of abduction, forced conversion to Islam, rape, and 

forced marriage remained an imminent threat for religious minority 

women and children, particularly from the Hindu and Christian faiths. 

During 2020, USCIRF documented incidents of forced marriages, 

more than half involving minors. The government did little to ensure 

minor girls’ safety and return to their families. Authorities often do 

not take any action, and in abduction cases that are brought to the 

courts, officials have claimed that victims willingly converted to 

Islam. The head of the Parliamentary Committee on Forced Religious 

Conversions, Senator Anwarul Haq Kakar, claimed that most cases of 

forced conversion “have some degree of willingness on the part of 

the girl.” Pakistani courts systematically failed to protect and provide 

justice to victims, who are often forced to testify that they converted 

voluntarily to protect themselves and their families from further 

harm. In April, Myra Shahbaz, a 14-year-old Christian schoolgirl, was 

abducted at gunpoint. Despite Myra telling police she was drugged, 

raped, and forced to sign papers her abductor later used to allege 

that she was 19 and had voluntarily married and converted, the court 

ordered that she be returned to her abductor. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 37

PAKISTAN

Background

Pakistan’s population is 96.28 percent Muslim (85–90 percent Sunni, 

10–15 percent Shi’a, and 0.22 percent Ahmadi), with smaller populations of Hindus (1.6 percent); Christians (1.59 percent); and Sikhs, 

Buddhists, Baha’is, and Zoroastrians (<1 percent). Pakistan was established as an Islamic Republic in 1956 with special status for Islam (for 

example, only Muslims can serve as president and prime minister). 

Its constitution nominally protects religious freedom by prohibiting 

faith-based discrimination and guaranteeing the right to religious 

practices and religious education. The constitution also reserves for 

religious minorities 10 seats in the National Assembly, four seats in 

the Senate, and 23 seats in four provincial assemblies. However, the 

second amendment, added in 1974, declares Ahmadis non-Muslims, 

excluding them from representation. 

Blasphemy Law

Sections 295 and 298 of Pakistan’s Penal Code criminalize acts and 

speech insulting religion or defiling the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad, 

places of worship, or religious symbols. These vague provisions are 

frequently abused to levy false accusations against Ahmadis, Shi’a 

Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, and others who do not adhere to the 

majority Sunni interpretation of Islam. The law sets severe punishments, 

including the death penalty. Although some individuals have received 

death sentences, Pakistan has not executed anyone for blasphemy. A 

recent USCIRF report found that implementation of these blasphemy 

laws made Pakistan the world’s worst offender of blasphemy-related 

prosecutions and societal violence between 2014 and 2018.

In 2020, some individuals charged with blasphemy were acquitted: 

Sawin Masih, a Christian, was sentenced to death in 2014 and acquitted 

by the Lahore High Court in October 2020. Ramesh Kumar Malhi, a Hindu 

veterinary surgeon accused in May 2019 of delivering medicine for animals wrapped in paper with Qur’anic text, was acquitted by a trial court 

in March 2020. Malhi’s practice was burned down after blasphemy allegations emerged; he remains in hiding due to continued death threats. 

The Punjab Assembly passed the Protection of Foundation of 

Islam Bill in July, giving the Inter-Services Public Relations, the media 

and public relations wing of the Pakistan Armed Forces, powers to 

censor and monitor any literature considered anti-Islamic. 

Growing Intolerance and Hate Speech 

Influential Sunni Islamist extremists and groups actively promoted 

hate speech and incitement to violence against religious minorities via 

digital platforms and public sermons. Such extremist groups blamed 

Shi’a Muslims for bringing coronavirus to Pakistan, calling it the “Shi’a 

virus,” egged on by government and media claims that the virus came 

from pilgrims returning from Iran. The government’s failure to address 

hate speech and promote religious harmony contributed to mob violence. In September, after Sunni extremists led anti-Shi’a protests in 

Karachi, a mob attempted to lynch a Shi’a student at Kohat Technical 

University while another targeted an elderly man in Charsadda. 

Attacks on Houses of Worship

Pakistan’s Hindu and Sikh communities also faced discrimination and 

desecration of their religious sites. In 2020, five Hindu and Sikh temples were vandalized by extremist mobs. In July, the government also 

halted construction of Islamabad’s Hindu temple due to pressure from 

hardline Islamic clerics and politicians who argued that allocation of 

state money defied the country’s Islamic identity. The government did 

not openly push back on radical Islamist narratives that leave little or 

no room for religious tolerance and freedom of belief. 

Anti-Ahmadiyya Laws

In addition to the constitution’s second amendment declaring Ahmadis 

non-Muslim, Articles 298(b) and 298(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code prohibit Ahmadis, who consider themselves Muslim, from self-identifying as 

such. They are forced to sign a declaration swearing they are non-Muslim to obtain basic civil rights, such as the right to vote. It is a crime 

punishable by fine, imprisonment, or death for Ahmadis to profess their 

faith. They are prohibited from citing the Qur’an or Hadith; displaying 

Qur’anic text; sharing their faith; printing or obtaining material related 

to their faith; or calling their places of worship “mosques.” 

Key U.S. Policy

Pakistan played a key role in the U.S. Taliban Peace Agreement that 

took place in Doha, Qatar, in February 2020. Then President Donald J. 

Trump continued to emphasize Pakistan’s importance in the region for 

U.S. security interests, particularly with the Afghan peace process and 

the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Then Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Alice 

Wells visited Islamabad in January to discuss the growing bilateral 

relationship in light of Pakistan’s cooperation in promoting peace in 

Afghanistan and regional stability. In 2020, Pakistan was estimated 

to receive a total of $299 million in aid from the United States, significantly lower than the $766 million in 2019. 

In April, then Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 

Freedom Samuel D. Brownback called for the release of religious 

prisoners of conscience in Pakistan amid the coronavirus pandemic. In 

June, he raised concern regarding anti-Shi’a sentiments. Following the 

murder of Tahir Naseem in July, the U.S. Department of State called 

on Pakistan to reform its blasphemy law and court system. In August, 

then Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo issued a statement for 

Pakistan Independence Day, noting that the United States was looking 

forward to working with Pakistan to expand fundamental freedoms. 

On December 2, the State Department redesignated Pakistan as a 

CPC under IRFA, but again issued a waiver on any related sanctions 

“as required in the ‘important national interest of the United States.’”

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Policy Update: Pursuing an IRFA Binding Agreement

• Hearing: Blasphemy Laws and the Violation of International Religious Freedom 
38 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

RUSSIA

• Designate Russia as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of 

religious freedom, as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Russian 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom, including Chechen Minister of 

Information and Press Akhmed Dudaev 

and Abinsk district court judge Aleksandr 

Kholoshin, by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and

• Work with European allies to use advocacy, 

diplomacy, and targeted sanctions to pressure Russia to end religious freedom abuses, 

release religious prisoners of conscience, and 

permit the establishment of an international 

monitoring presence in occupied Crimea.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Pass the Ukraine Religious Freedom Support Act (H.R. 496), which calls on the U.S. 

administration to consider Russia’s religious freedom violations in Crimea and 

Donbas when determining CPC designations; and

• Hold briefings and hearings highlighting 

the Russian government’s failure to bring 

its religion and extremism laws in line with 

international human rights standards.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Russia deteriorated. 

The government continued to target “nontraditional” religious 

minorities with fines, detentions, and criminal charges. Russian 

legislation criminalizes “extremism” without adequately defining 

the term, enabling the state to prosecute a vast range of nonviolent religious activity. In 2020, the state brought 188 criminal cases 

against Jehovah’s Witnesses, who were banned as an extremist group in 2017. Since that time, there have been 1,274 raids 

and searches of members’ homes, with 477 occurring in 2020. 

Raids and interrogations included instances of torture that continue to go uninvestigated and unpunished. During the year, 72 

Jehovah’s Witnesses—including at least six from Russian-occupied 

Crimea—were detained under pretrial detention, house arrest, or 

incarceration. In 2020, the government also used its anti-extremism 

law to persecute religious minorities, particularly Muslims.

A 2020 USCIRF report on blasphemy laws determined Russia to 

have the world’s third-highest number of criminal blasphemy cases, 

behind Pakistan and Iran. It also found that Russia led the world in 

criminal blasphemy enforcement cases related to social media and 

had the highest incidence of such cases among countries without an 

official state religion between 2014 and 2018. Such cases continued 

in 2020, as did cases of enforcement of the religion law, which also 

sets strict registration requirements and empowers state officials 

to impede and monitor religious groups’ activities. It also broadly 

defines and prohibits “missionary activities,” including preaching, 

praying, disseminating religious materials, and answering questions 

about religion outside of officially designated sites.

In the North Caucasus, security forces acted with impunity, 

arresting or kidnapping persons suspected of even tangential links to 

Islamist militancy as well as for secular political opposition. Chechen 

leader Ramzan Kadyrov oversaw or condoned egregious abuses 

based on his religious views, including against women and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) 

community. Chechens routinely appear in humiliating televised 

confessions in which they must publicly apologize for a variety of 

offenses, including witchcraft, insulting Islam, and criticizing Kadyrov, 

in a ritual reminiscent of customary political and religious practice in 

the region. One young critic of the leader was kidnapped and forced 

to confess on video before sitting naked on a glass bottle. Chechen 

Minister of Information and Press Akhmed Dudaev advocates such 

policies, recently accusing two LGBTI bloggers arrested in April for 

insulting religion of aiding Islamist militants. Police across the North 

Caucasus have broadly targeted and harassed attendees at regional 

mosques, demanding their personal information and subjecting 

them to questioning. One mosque in Dagestan has been targeted 

so regularly that government raids are referred to as part of Friday 

services. Rather than effectively combatting violent extremism, these 

practices create resentment and lead some individuals to seek information about Islam from disreputable online sources.

In Russian-occupied Crimea, the occupation authorities continued to enforce Russia’s repressive laws and policies on religion, which 

has resulted in the prosecution of peaceful religious activity and bans 

on groups that were legal in Crimea under Ukrainian law. At least 16 

Crimean Muslims were sentenced to prison on made-up charges of 

extremism and terrorism, primarily based on religious discussions 

that prosecutors linked to the now-banned group Hizb ut-Tahrir. In 

the spring, the Russian government began to transfer ownership of 

the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) Cathedral of St. Vladimir and 

Olga to the state; it is the most important property of the UOC in 

Crimea and its congregation has already been evicted. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Hearing: Religious Freedom in Russia and Central Asia

• Issue Update: The Global Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses

• Issue Update: The Anti-Cult Movement and Religious Regulation in Russia and the Former Soviet Union
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 39

RUSSIA

Background

The Russian government views independent religious activity as a 

threat to social and political stability and to its own control, yet it 

simultaneously cultivates relationships with what it deems “traditional” religions. The population is religiously diverse: around 68 

percent identify as Russian Orthodox Christian; 7 percent identify as 

Muslim; and 25 percent comprise an array of communities, including 

Protestants, Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Buddhists, Jews, Baha’is, 

and indigenous religions. 

The government enforces laws that restrict religious freedom, 

including a 1996 religion law; a 2002 law on combating extremism; 

and more recent laws on blasphemy, “stirring up religious hatred,” 

and “missionary activity.” These vague laws give authorities broad 

powers to define and prosecute any religious speech or activity or to 

ban any religious literature they deem harmful. The anti-extremism 

law, for example, lacks a clear definition of extremism and includes no 

prerequisite for the use or advocacy of violence. The law is a powerful 

way to intimidate religious communities as it allows for the prosecution of virtually any speech; suspects can be financially blacklisted or 

liquidated, and they can face criminal prosecutions. 

Muslims

In February, seven members of the Muslim missionary organization 

Tablighi Jamaat were arrested, and in September at least seven previously arrested members were sentenced to prison for organizing a 

“conspiratorial extremist cell.” Readers of the moderate Sunni Muslim 

theologian Said Nursi were also prosecuted for extremism, including a 

62-year-old woman. Evgeny Kim, a convicted Nursi reader stripped of 

his citizenship after serving out his sentence, remained in a detention 

facility for stateless persons at year’s end. In August, the city of Saratov 

blocked efforts to reconstruct a historic mosque after local citizens 

objected. In the Russian republic of Mordovia, police raided at least 

two mosques with no explanation beyond the need for “prophylactic 

measures” against extremism prior to New Year’s celebrations. The 

mufti of one of the mosques had previously been fined for distributing 

literature linked to Tablighi Jamaat. In December, the city of Rostov 

gifted a historic mosque building to a jazz school despite objections 

from local Muslims. Roughly 300 people are serving harsh prison sentences of 10–20 years for their alleged involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir, 

including 19 men charged with terrorism in October despite a lack of 

evidence that they supported violence and amid allegations of torture 

during their interrogation. 

Jehovah’s Witnesses and Other Religious 

Minorities

At the end of the year, 45 Jehovah’s Witnesses were in prison and 26 

under house arrest; between late October and mid-December, 86 

house searches led to investigations against at least 26 members. 

Jehovah’s Witness prisoner Dennis Christensen was granted parole 

in June, but a state prosecutor immediately challenged the decision. 

Even though Christensen has been eligible for early release for a year 

due to time served in pretrial detention, he was instead placed in a 

poorly ventilated cell for allegedly violating prison rules. He has already 

contracted pneumonia once while in prison, and his pulmonary health 

remains a serious concern amid the continuing threat of COVID-19. 

Protestant Christians are frequently fined for “illegal missionary 

activity” and have been accused on state television of spreading 

COVID-19. There were numerous incidents of vandalism against 

religious minorities throughout the year, including the burning of a 

synagogue in Arkhangelsk, the placing of an Orthodox Christian icon 

in a sacred grove of the indigenous Mari religion, and the burning 

of a site sacred to the indigenous Khakas religion. Desecration of 

indigenous religious sites has increased in recent years, leading to 

the establishment of a monitoring group in 2020. Although Russia has 

many indigenous religions, they are not given the privileged status of 

“traditional religions” like Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism, or 

Buddhism. In June, a Yakut shaman who vowed to exorcise Russian 

President Vladimir Putin was forcibly confined to a psychiatric facility. 

Proposed Legislation

In December, the Russian Duma considered new legislation that would 

dramatically expand the state’s ability to restrict religious practice, 

including requiring all foreign-educated clergy to be recertified within 

Russia and prohibiting anyone on the government’s expansive extremism and terrorism list from participating in or leading religious groups. 

At the end of 2020, that list included many individuals who had not 

been convicted of a crime, since “evidence” of involvement was the 

only apparent prerequisite. Individuals may remain on the list even 

after serving out sentences, with their finances frozen or restricted. 

Although the law was not yet enacted, officials in one region began 

demanding information about clergy from local religious groups.

Key U.S. Policy

U.S.-Russia relations remain at a low point amid tensions over Russian 

military involvement in Syria, the illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory, and allegations of Russian tampering in U.S. elections. The U.S. 

government has implemented numerous sanctions over the occupation of Crimea, most recently in January 2020. In December, the U.S. 

Department of State again placed Russia on its Special Watch List for 

engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to IRFA. The same month, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 

announced new sanctions against Kadyrov and associated individuals and entities, citing his many human rights violations against the 

LGBTI community and others in Chechnya. In January 2021, the State 

Department announced sanctions against individuals and entities 

associated with Andrii Derkach, a Ukrainian citizen with close links to 

Russian intelligence services, who is accused of running a Russian disinformation campaign to influence the 2020 U.S. presidential election.
40 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

SAUDI ARABIA

• Redesignate Saudi Arabia as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing 

the administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result of 

the designation; and 

• Impose targeted sanctions on Saudi government agencies and officials responsible 

for severe violations of religious freedom 

by freezing those individuals’ assets and/

or barring their entry into the United 

States under human rights related financial and visa authorities, citing specific 

religious freedom violations.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Hold public hearings to amplify congressional concerns over prisoners of 

conscience in Saudi Arabia, including 

Raif Badawi and his counsel Waleed Abu 

al-Khair, and work with like-minded parliamentarians in other countries to advocate 

for their release; and

• Reintroduce and pass the bipartisan Saudi 

Educational Transparency and Reform Act, 

which requires the U.S. Department of 

State to report annually on religious intolerance in Saudi textbooks and efforts to 

remove this content.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Saudi Arabia remained 

poor despite some ongoing improvements. Saudi Arabia’s official religion is Islam. The construction of non-Muslim houses of 

worship and public non-Muslim prayer is forbidden. Non-Muslims 

are not permitted to construct houses of worship and are confined 

to worshipping in private settings. However, Saudi Arabia in 2020 

made public overtures to the global Jewish community. A review of 

the current year of Saudi textbooks also found significant improvements, including more religiously tolerant language and the removal 

of intolerant passages, while also noting that “problematic examples 

still remained.” 

According to the 1992 Saudi Basic Law of Governance, the 

constitution is the Qur’an and the sunna (traditions of the Prophet). 

The judicial system is largely governed by a Saudi interpretation of 

Shari’a as informed by Hanbali jurisprudence, which imposes capital punishment for apostasy; openly declaring one’s lesbian, gay, 

bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) identity; and peaceful 

religious or political dissent. Throughout 2020, Saudi Arabia continued to detain and mistreat individuals who dissented from the 

government’s interpretation of Islam, including USCIRF Religious 

Prisoner of Conscience Raif Badawi, his lawyer Waleed Abu al-Khair, 

and atheist poet Ashraf Fayadh. Saudi Arabia also targeted dissidents online, arresting three people in March for insulting God on 

social media and threatening to prosecute Ayasel Slay, who posted 

a rap video entitled “Daughter of Mecca” on YouTube in February. 

In July, Saudi Arabian officials arrested Mohammed al-Bokari for 

posting a Twitter video calling for LGBTI people to have equal 

rights. Prison officials sexually assaulted al-Bokari and held him in 

solitary confinement.

Following the outbreak of COVID-19, the Saudi government 

imposed a lockdown on the majority-Shi’a province of Qatif. 

It also failed to respond to incitement on television comparing COVID-19-positive Shi’a Muslims to “ISIS suicide bombers.” 

Despite the government’s promise to review death sentences 

against minors, several Shi’a prisoners convicted as children 

received either no change to their sentence or were sentenced 

to several years in prison. Four members of the Bohra Shi’a community also remained in prison on multiyear sentences following 

unsubstantiated charges of money laundering and violating charity collection regulations.

Saudi Arabia maintained key provisions of the religiously 

grounded guardianship system in 2020 that violate the religious 

freedom of Saudi women. It continues to persecute activists who 

peacefully protest this system. Following mistreatment in prison, 

including sexual assault and credible allegations of torture, Loujain 

al-Hathloul was sentenced alongside Mayaa al-Zahrani to nearly six 

years in prison, though a portion of the sentences were suspended. 

Guardianship denies women the rights of legal adulthood and 

allows abusive male guardians to procure Saudi state resources 

to force a female ward to return home. This power extends over 

women who have fled internationally or who are escaping domestic 

violence. It also denies women, including U.S. citizens, custody and 

visitation rights with their children regardless of the competence 

of a male legal guardian. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Saudi Arabia in 2020

• Issue Update: Guardianship, Women, and Religious Freedom in Saudi Arabia
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 41

SAUDI ARABIA

Background

Saudi Arabia is home to over 34 million Saudis, 85–90 percent of whom 

are Sunni Muslims and 10–15 percent of whom are Shi’a Muslims. 

The United Nations (UN) estimates that 37 percent of the population 

are expatriates, including at least two million Christians, Hindus, 

Buddhists, Sikhs, practitioners of folk religions, and the unaffiliated. 

Non-Muslim or atheist citizens often hide their identity to avoid harsh 

social and official consequences. The ruling monarch, King Salman 

bin Abdel Aziz Al Saud, holds the title “Custodian of the Two Holy 

Mosques.” Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has systematically 

cracked down on both religious and political dissent despite overseeing economic reforms associated with Saudi Vision 2030.

Positive Developments

In January, Muslim World League Chair Mohammed Al Isa visited the 

Auschwitz concentration camp, leading one of the most senior delegations of Muslim officials to visit the site. In February, a delegation from 

the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations 

visited Saudi Arabia to meet with Al Isa, the first visit by an American 

Jewish organization since 1993. That same month, an interfaith delegation including Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu leaders as 

well as an Israeli rabbi met with King Salman. In 2020, Saudi Arabia 

also relaxed restrictions on the sale of Christmas trees and Christmas 

decorations in the capital, Riyadh.

In April, the government announced its intent to abolish flogging, 

a punishment often used against religious prisoners of conscience. 

In August, the Saudi Human Rights Commission announced the 

Kingdom would review the death sentences of Shi’a prisoners who 

were minors when charged. While Saudi Arabia converted three such 

sentences to 10 years in prison by February 2021, eight such prisoners 

still remained at risk of receiving a death sentence.

Mistreatment of Religious Minorities 

Shi’a Muslims in Saudi Arabia continued to face discrimination in 

education, employment, and the judiciary, and they lack access to 

senior positions in the government and military. The building of Shi’a 

mosques continued to be restricted outside majority-Shi’a Muslim 

areas in the Eastern Province, and authorities often prohibited the use 

of the Shi’a Muslim call to prayer in these areas. In March 2020, the 

government locked down the majority-Shi’a Qatif Province, preventing 

entry and exit. No other province was subject to these restrictions.

Eight Bohra Shi’a in Riyadh were arrested in 2017 and 2018 after collecting funds for the community to participate in the hajj pilgrimage. Two 

were released in early 2020, but one was rearrested in the summer and 

the other cannot access his passport. Two of the Bohra Shi’a men in prison 

suffer health conditions that put them at elevated risk for COVID-19.

Religious Incitement in Textbooks

For more than 15 years, USCIRF has documented the government’s 

failure to address intolerant content in official textbooks sufficiently. 

A December 2020 nongovernmental organization report found that 

while “extremism persists” in Saudi textbooks, “many problematic 

examples” of religious intolerance “had been removed” from the 

most current versions. These include passages urging the death 

penalty for gay men. However, textbooks still teach that “infidels 

will be punished on Resurrection Day,” warn against “polytheists” (a 

reference to Shi’a Muslims), and include a story describing “Jewish 

wrongdoers” as “monkeys.”

Religious Prisoners of Conscience

Dissident Sheikh Salman al-Ouda remained in prison in 2020 despite 

a January letter from three UN Special Rapporteurs noting that his 

detention may violate international laws concerning freedom of religion and belief. Al-Ouda has been denied family visits and was not 

allowed to call his family for a period in early summer 2020. Following 

a secret hearing at the Specialized Criminal Court in November, al-Ouda’s son reported that he lost half his hearing and eyesight.

USCIRF Religious Prisoner of Conscience Raif Badawi and his lawyer Waleed Abu al-Khair faced worsening treatment in 2020. Al-Khair 

was hospitalized in January following a hunger strike to protest mistreatment. He remained on strike until February 2020. Raif Badawi was 

sentenced in 2013 on charges of “insulting Islam” and sentenced to 

600 lashes and seven years in prison over the content of posts on his 

blog. In 2020, he was hospitalized following a hunger strike in protest 

of being put in solitary confinement and was not permitted to speak 

with his wife. In May, he was moved out of solitary confinement into 

a prison cell with 15 other inmates. In August, Badawi’s wife reported 

that one of the inmates tried to assassinate him.

Saudi Arabia also continued to detain and mistreat Loujain 

al-Hathloul, who peacefully protested religious guardianship laws. 

Al-Hathloul’s health deteriorated considerably during a hunger strike 

protesting prison mistreatment. In November, Saudi Arabia referred 

her case to the Specialized Criminal Court, which deals with terrorism and national security cases. In December, following a series of 

hearings, al-Hathloul was sentenced alongside Mayaa al-Zahrani to 

a backdated sentence of five years and three months and a five-year 

travel ban. Al-Hathloul was released in February 2021 but remains 

under a five-year travel ban.

Key U.S. Policy

In 2020, the Trump administration continued to coordinate with highlevel Saudi officials while Congress pursued a more critical approach. 

On January 7, then President Donald J. Trump met with Vice Minister 

of Defense Khalid bin Salman. On February 12, then Secretary of State 

Michael R. Pompeo met with Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan. Later 

that month, then Secretary of State Pompeo travelled to Saudi Arabia for 

meetings with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

On January 28, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) called for the Trump 

administration to impose visa restrictions on officials involved in the 

detention and abuse of Loujain al-Hathloul. In September, five senators sponsored a bill calling for the release of Saudi women dissidents, 

including those persecuted for peacefully advocating for freedom 

of religion or belief. In November, Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) and 

Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) coordinated a bipartisan letter to 

the Saudi ambassador calling for their release. On December 2, the 

State Department redesignated Saudi Arabia as a CPC under IRFA, 

but again issued a waiver on any related sanctions on the country “as 

required in the ‘important national interest of the United States.’”
42 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

SAUDI ARABIA

Individual Views of Commissioner Johnnie Moore

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under Crown Prince Mohamed bin

Salman, continues to reform, outpacing expectations. This is a categorical fact. The work remains substantially incomplete, but the trajectory

is undeniable—the reforms are ongoing and often remarkable.

Objectively—and obviously—Saudi Arabia is still a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC, (without, for instance, a single public 

non-Islamic house of worship or pilgrimage site) but its progress must 

be measured against its past. I believe the international community 

should continue its positive reinforcement of the Crown Prince’s 

reform agenda. In fact, Saudi Arabia deserves much more credit for its 

reforms than it is receiving, rather than withering, politicized criticism. 

This is also why I continue to support the U.S. Department of 

State’s decision to maintain its waiver for Saudi Arabia. In fact, Saudi 

Arabia should be rewarded for its progress and not face threats of 

coercive action from the United States. Punitive measures will not 

speed the effect of change in the Kingdom; rather, they would complicate and likely slow it. A continued, strong relationship with the 

United States—contra malign actors—will likely accelerate change. 

It is clear that real change is possible. The change must continue and 

it can accelerate. 

44 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

SYRIA

• Designate Syria as a CPC and redesignate 

HTS as an EPC for engaging in systematic, 

ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by IRFA; 

• Impose targeted sanctions on Syrian 

government agencies and officials, HTS 

principals, and the leadership of militias 

within the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army 

(TFSA) responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry 

into the United States under human rights 

related financial and visa authorities, citing 

specific religious freedom violations;

• Exert pressure on and engage with Turkey 

to provide a timeline for its withdrawal 

from all territory that it occupies as a result 

of cross-border operations into north and 

east Syria, and in the interim demand that 

it order armed factions under its control or 

influence to cease all activities negatively 

impacting religious and ethnic minorities 

in that area;

• Recognize the AANES as a legitimate, 

local government, and accordingly expand 

U.S. engagement with its institutions, 

lift sanctions from all areas it governs, 

and demand its inclusion in all activities 

pursuant to United Nations (UN) Resolution 2254, including Geneva-based talks 

to resolve the Syrian conflict “as the basis 

for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political 

transition”; and

• Contribute to efforts in AANES-governed territory to fund and develop 

local programs to promote religious tolerance and pluralism; strengthen school 

curriculum to meet the needs of local 

families, including addressing the unique 

concerns of religious and ethnic minorities; and advance religious freedom and 

related rights.

I

n 2020, as in the prior year, religious freedom in Syria remained under 

serious threat, particularly amid the country’s ongoing conflict and 

humanitarian crisis. The regime of President Bashar al-Assad brutally 

enforced its authority over populations under its control, including 

its efforts to solidify an iron grip on religious affairs. In beleaguered 

Idlib Province, radical Islamist al-Qaeda affiliate Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

(HTS)—which the U.S. Department of State designated as an “entity of 

particular concern,” or EPC, under the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA) in December—continued to vie with other local factions 

within and outside of its so-called Syrian Salvation Government for 

political and military dominance over civilian areas. Meanwhile, Turkish 

armed forces maintained control over territory inside northern Syria 

that they had captured in three invasions between 2016 and 2019, 

endangering religious minorities in areas that included the vicinity of 

Afrin as well as a swath of land extending roughly 75 miles from west 

of Tel Abyad to east of Ras al-Ayn.

In regime-controlled areas, the Syrian government continued to 

brutalize communities and individuals that it perceived as having participated in or supported political or armed opposition movements. 

In areas over which it retained or regained control, the government 

continued to solidify its hold on all aspects of political, economic, 

and religious life. President Assad, for example, persisted in framing his rule in Islamic terms—alongside his standard Ba’athist-Arab 

Nationalist approach—and he has progressively shifted religious 

authority away from the traditional, marginally independent cadre 

of Sunni Muslim scholars (ulama’) in favor of the regime-controlled 

Ministry of Endowments. Despite the government’s indifference

toward houses of worship and other sites of importance to religious minorities throughout a decade of conflict, it continued to 

present itself as the sole defender of these communities—implicitly 

in exchange for their quiescence and support. Indeed, the regime 

largely left alone members of such minorities in regime-controlled 

territories if they had no specific record of opposition participation, 

essentially implementing the self-fulfilling prophecy it has long spun. 

Even so, it showed no change in its rigid rhetoric and control over 

such communities. For example, the Ministry of Justice reaffirmed in 

December—although not publicly announced until February 2021—

its de facto classification of Yazidism as an Islamic “sect” rather than 

a separate religion, thereby subjecting Yazidis to Islamic law and 

denying the community the right to self-identify as a distinct religion.

Meanwhile, as in prior years—and in stark contrast to other 

parts of Syria and most of the wider region—north and east Syria 

remained a uniquely promising area in terms of positive religious 

freedom conditions. The Autonomous Administration of North and 

East Syria (AANES) fostered these conditions through its political foundation in the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Syrian 

Democratic Council (SDC) and military support from the U.S.-allied 

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). It continued to allow Muslims, 

Christians, Yazidis, and others to practice openly, express, and even 

change their religious identities—while facing significant peril due 

to threats from Turkey, Turkish-allied militias, regime forces, and 

remnants of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Hearing: Safeguarding Religious Freedom in Northeast Syria

• Op-Ed: U.S. Leaders Must Stand against Turkey’s Atrocities in Northern Syria (in Newsweek)
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 45

SYRIA

Background

Estimates place Syria’s population at just over 20 million, but the 

office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees recorded 6.6 million 

Syrians as refugees and another 6.7 million as internally displaced persons (IDPs) by the end of 2020. That population is religiously diverse: 

Sunni Muslims account for 74 percent; Alawite, Shi’a, and Isma’ili 

Muslims comprise 13 percent; Assyrians, Maronites, Armenians, and 

other Christians comprise 10 percent; Druze account for 3 percent; 

and a small number of Syrian Jews remain in Damascus and Aleppo. 

However, it is difficult to confirm these figures amid the country’s 

10-year conflict, given the staggering number of displaced persons. 

A disproportionately high number of religious minority communities 

have fled during the decade of violence; some estimates suggest that 

as many as 677,000 Christians have left the country, diminishing from 

around 10 percent to 3.6 percent of the population.

While Syria is a Sunni Muslim-majority country, the Alawite religious minority has dominated its political and military classes since 

Hafez al-Assad, current president Bashar al-Assad’s father, seized 

power in 1970. Over the subsequent four decades, the two Assad 

regimes retained a stranglehold on power through a complicated 

framework of Ba’athist ideology, repressive coercion, enticement of 

economic elites, and the cultivation of a perception of protection for 

other religious minorities. However, that fragile framework collapsed 

following a popular uprising in March 2011, which, after a brutal government response, devolved into armed conflict—first domestic, but 

encompassing a range of regional and global actors by mid-2015. The 

conflict has since been marked by the government’s utter disregard 

for civilian casualties, including targeting of hospitals, churches, and 

even schools in its effort to crush opposition. 

Positive Conditions under the AANES 

Not only has the AANES declared its systematic commitment to religious freedom, but it has also implemented that framework against 

the backdrop of serious external threats, complicated tribal dynamics 

that cross fraught ethnic and religious divides, and other potential 

barriers. Some practical religious freedom and political challenges 

persist under the AANES, stemming from the complicated relationship of its founding constituents with Kurdish nationalism and armed 

movements. These challenges include reports of underage conscription and ongoing—if diminishing—concerns from the Syriac Christian 

community regarding school curriculum, as well as persistent and 

pervasive fear among religious minorities of ISIS, the Assad regime, 

and Turkish-allied militias. Despite the AANES’s sincere efforts to 

assure that religious and other freedoms extend to members of all 

ethnic and religious communities under its administration, the fragility 

of its circumstances throughout 2020 translated to a religiously and 

ethnically diverse population that was justifiably uncertain whether it 

would remain as such in the years to come.

Religious Freedom Violations under Turkish 

Occupation 

The Turkish occupation of a wide swath of territory across northern 

Syria remained a serious threat in 2020—not only to the vulnerable 

population of that area, but also to the AANES itself. A significant 

part of that danger came from Turkey, as its government and military 

make no distinction between U.S.-designated terrorist group the 

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the AANES—given the latter’s 

origins in Syria’s Kurdish-led opposition and waning ties between 

the PKK and the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is part of 

the SDF. Turkey’s incessant shelling of civilian areas in AANES/SDF 

areas across northern Syria, and the potential for expansion of its 

occupation, represented a direct threat to religious and ethnic minorities in those towns. However, its support for radical Islamist factions 

of the TFSA, also known as the Syrian National Army (SNA), was 

equally insidious and damaging, as they engaged in religious violence, 

abduction for ransom, and other atrocities. For example, Faylaq al-Sham—a TFSA faction operating in Turkish-occupied Afrin—laid siege 

to the town of Basufan and arrested a number of its inhabitants in 

December, including a Yazidi woman, Ghazala Mannan Salmo, who 

reportedly faced severe torture in detention. This militia and others 

also defaced or destroyed a series of Yazidi shrines in the same area 

and across the occupation zone, potentially as many as 18 since 2018. 

Syriac, Armenian, and other Christian communities, too, faced parallel 

threats; for example, in August, a TFSA-backed court in Afrin detained 

Radwan Muhammad, a Kurdish convert to Christianity, and charged 

him with apostasy for his beliefs.

Key U.S. Policy

U.S. policy toward Syria in 2020 continued to confront the complicated 

and shifting dynamics that have confounded it since the outbreak of 

the Syrian uprising in 2011 and the country’s subsequent devolution 

into armed conflict. In late 2019, then President Donald J. Trump 

announced the withdrawal of U.S. forces from northeast Syria, in 

part precipitating Turkey’s renewed invasion of parts of the area and 

prompting uncertainty regarding the sustainability of the U.S.-SDF 

partnership. It later became clear, however, that a limited U.S. military presence would remain in the area indefinitely, as was the case 

throughout 2020. 

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

remained a crucial conduit of help for beleaguered civilians in Syria; 

in September, then Acting Administrator John Barsa announced a new 

package of $720 million in humanitarian assistance for Syria, bringing 

the total of U.S. aid since the start of the conflict to over $12 billion. 

The Caesar Civilian Protection Act of 2019 also came into effect in 

June 2020, resulting in a series of U.S. sanctions on Syrian regime 

officials along with regime-affiliated entities and businesses suspected 

of enabling or committing atrocities on civilian populations.
46 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

Individual Views of Commissioners Gary L. Bauer, 

Anurima Bhargava, James W. Carr, Frederick 

A. Davie, Nadine Maenza, Gayle Manchin, Tony 

Perkins, and Nury Turkel

The recommendations to the U.S. government for Syria have strong 

bipartisan support among USCIRF’s Commissioners.

Many independent organizations, including Amnesty 

International, Human Rights Watch, and even the United Nations, 

have produced reports documenting the atrocities that the Turkish 

military and its Islamist militias are committing against Christians, 

Yazidis, and other religious and ethnic minorities in the areas Turkey 

has invaded and occupies in northeast Syria. Those atrocities include 

killings, kidnappings, rape, extortion, and forced conversion, among 

other crimes. By contrast, the areas governed by the Autonomous 

Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) have produced 

remarkable religious freedom conditions allowing all to practice their 

faith freely, even Islamic converts to Christianity, otherwise unheard 

of in the region. 

Our recommendations to give political recognition to AANES 

as a legitimate local government and to lift sanctions on just the area 

it governs would reward it as a government that supports religious 

freedom—in a way that is consistent with how USCIRF recommends 

sanctions for those that commit religious freedom violations. We are 

hopeful these actions would allow AANES to continue to be a refuge 

for Yazidis, Christians, and other religious and ethnic minorities.

SYRIA

48 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

TAJIKISTAN

• Redesignate Tajikistan as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging 

in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing 

the administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result of 

the designation;

• Condition U.S. assistance to the Tajikistani government, with the exception of 

aid to improve humanitarian conditions or 

advance human rights, on 1) reform of the 

2009 religion law and the improvement 

of conditions for freedom of religion or 

belief, and 2) mandated religious freedom 

training for Tajikistani officials, including 

education about the benefits of religious 

freedom for countering and preventing 

violent extremism, as part of all U.S. security assistance to Tajikistan;

• Impose targeted sanctions on Tajikistani 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and

• Press the Tajikistani government at the 

highest levels to identify and immediately 

release individuals imprisoned in Tajikistan for their peaceful religious activities 

or religious affiliations; account for the 

whereabouts of all prisoners of conscience, including those imprisoned on 

religious grounds; and allow international 

observers to monitor conditions in Tajikistani prisons.

I

n 2020, the Tajikistani government’s record on religious freedom 

showed little improvement. The regime of President Emomali 

Rahmon maintained its authoritarian policies, suppressing displays of public religiosity by individuals of all faiths and persecuting 

minority communities—especially actual and alleged Salafi Muslims, 

a term authorities apply broadly and indiscriminately. Authorities 

have banned Salafi Islam since 2009, calling it “extremist”; as a result, 

the mere performance of Islamic rituals in ways the authorities deem 

“foreign” or inconsistent with the government’s interpretation of the 

Hanafi school of Sunni Islam is subject to criminal prosecution. As 

detailed in USCIRF’s recent issue update, Tajikistan has legitimate 

concerns about violent extremism, but its current policies only exacerbate the problem—such as its extremism law that fails to define the 

category clearly and often leads to arbitrary detention. Extremist, 

terrorist, or revolutionary activities are punishable without requiring acts that involve violence or incitement of imminent violence, 

while trials under these charges lack due process and procedural 

safeguards. In January, the government amended legislation that 

expanded anti-extremism efforts and dramatically increased penalties for managing or funding the activities of unregistered religious 

organizations as well as for religious communities that establish 

relations with foreign groups. In a surprising move, the government 

reduced the penalty for inciting “religious hatred,” replacing prison 

sentences of up to five years with an administrative fine or 10 days 

imprisonment. However, prison overcrowding remains a critical 

issue, and prisons constitute a major vector of Islamist radicalization. Religious prisoners are singled out for harsh treatment by both 

authorities and fellow prisoners, while general conditions are inhumane and torture is endemic.

State repression of the country’s Muslim majority persisted 

as in prior years. Since 2017, authorities have closed more than 

2,000 mosques, converting many into cafes, garment factories, 

and other public facilities. Remaining mosques are frequently outfitted with security cameras that allow government surveillance of 

attendance and the content of sermons. In January, the government ordered the conversion of a popular mosque in Khujand, the 

nation’s second-largest city, into a movie theater due to the region’s 

relative lack of cinemas. In February, the head of the Department 

of Women’s and Family Issues publicly linked hijabs with terrorism and vowed that the government would do everything in its 

power to “preserve the national culture” and “defend the people” 

from the threat posed by female religious clothing. The authorities 

continued to torment former members of the banned opposition 

Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) under the guise of 

a struggle against religious extremism and terrorism, harassing 

and even imprisoning their family members. In June, one alleged 

IRPT member was sentenced to 20 years in prison after his illegal 

extradition from Austria. 

Many religious minorities hide their affiliations for fear of government scrutiny and social backlash, expressing concern over 

government plans to document individual religious affiliation in 

the October 2020 census. Social tolerance for religious minority 

communities continued to decline. For example, in January a Shi’a 

Muslim was imprisoned and allegedly tortured for sharing his faith, 

an act authorities characterized as spreading “extremist ideas.” 

Jehovah’s Witnesses have been illegal in Tajikistan since 2008; there 

are currently two members imprisoned for their faith, including a 

70-year-old man who is serving a five-and-a-half-year sentence.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Hearing: Religious Freedom in Russia and Central Asia

• Issue Update: Promoting Religious Freedom and Countering Violent Extremism in Tajikistan

• Issue Update: The Global Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 49

TAJIKISTAN

Background

Tajikistan is the poorest country in Central Asia and ruled since 1992 

by President Rahmon, who has concentrated power in his family’s 

hands. President Rahmon was elected to another seven-year term 

in October 2020, allegedly winning almost 91 percent of the vote in 

elections widely perceived as fraudulent. The government is weak and 

highly corrupt, and it faces financial catastrophe in the wake of the 

COVID-19 crisis. Tajikistan typically derives around 40 percent of its 

gross domestic product from labor remittances, primarily from Russia, 

but this dramatically declined as many laborers were forced to return 

home amid the pandemic. The population is predominantly Sunni 

Muslim—around 86 percent—while Shi’a Muslims, mostly located 

in the mountainous east, account for roughly 4 percent. The remaining 10 percent includes Russian Orthodox, Protestants, Catholics, 

Jehovah’s Witnesses, Buddhists, Jews, Baha’is, and Zoroastrians. 

Tajikistan’s legal environment for freedom of religion or belief 

sharply declined after the adoption of several highly restrictive laws in 

2009. In particular, the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 

Unions set onerous registration requirements; criminalized unregistered religious activity, private religious education, and proselytism; 

set strict limits on the number and size of mosques; allowed state 

interference in the appointment of imams and the content of sermons; 

required official permission for religious organizations to provide 

religious instruction and communicate with foreign coreligionists; 

and imposed state controls on the content, publication, and import 

of religious materials. In 2011 and 2012, administrative and Penal 

Code amendments set new penalties, including large fines and prison 

terms, for religion-related charges such as organizing or participating 

in “unapproved” religious meetings. A 2011 law on parental responsibility banned minors from any organized religious activity except 

funerals. Since 2014, the state has paid imams’ salaries and required 

them to wear state-manufactured religious garments, and the content 

of sermons is commonly dictated by the government. 

Misuse of Extremism Laws

The Tajikistani government continued to use concerns over Islamist 

extremism to justify actions against participants in certain religious or 

political activities in 2020. As in past years, Tajikistan used this pretext 

to crack down on individuals in the religious, media, and civil society 

sectors. For example, it leads Central Asia in imprisoning journalists 

for alleged extremism, terrorist links, and inciting religious hatred. 

In March, the government officially banned the Prague-based news 

outlet Akhbor, a website founded by a former employee of Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty to provide objective coverage largely 

unavailable inside Tajikistan, claiming that it was a “platform” for 

“extremists and terrorists.” Akhbor was forced to cease operations in 

November, citing official opposition and the threat it posed to journalists, experts, and participants. In April, a Tajikistani court sentenced 

the journalist Daler Sharipov to one year in prison for “inciting religious 

hatred,” likely for his coverage of religious freedom conditions in the 

country, including government anti-hijab campaigns. Government 

entities make all determinations about extremism through a closed 

and opaque process that favors the prosecution, and there is no provision for independent analysis. 

Government Persecution of Muslims

In 2020, the government conducted mass arrests and interrogations 

of Islamic leaders, including prominent Sufi Muslim clerics and many 

who received religious education abroad. This trend likely represented an attempt by the government to suppress dissent and ensure 

compliance ahead of the parliamentary and presidential elections by 

intimidating religious leaders who do not follow officially sanctioned 

Hanafi practice. Furthermore, since January the government has 

detained at least 154 people it accuses of membership in the banned 

Muslim Brotherhood; in June, a Muslim cleric and three of his brothers received suspended prison terms for alleged membership in the 

group, while 10 other defendants—including the cleric’s son, son-inlaw, and nephews—were sentenced to prison terms of between five 

and seven years. In August, a court sentenced 20 alleged members—

including academics, businessmen, and at least one government 

official—to prison terms that ranged from five to seven years. In 

November, authorities arrested Eshoni Sirojiddin, a prominent cleric 

previously imprisoned for teaching Salafi Islam. 

Key U.S. Policy

U.S. policy toward Tajikistan has emphasized security and regional 

connectivity. In January, then U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for South and Central Asian Affairs Alice Wells visited Tajikistan and 

announced that the United States was “deepening [its] security 

cooperation in the areas of border security, counterterrorism, law 

enforcement, and joint military exercises and training.” She referred 

several times to the more than $200 million in aid that the U.S. government had provided Tajikistan to secure its border with Afghanistan 

and expressed concern about restrictions on fundamental freedoms. 

General Frank McKenzie, commander of U.S. Central Command, made 

his first visit to Tajikistan in October, where he met with President 

Rahmon and senior military and security officials to discuss continued 

cooperation on security and stability in Tajikistan and the Central 

Asian region, including Afghanistan.

In October, the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) launched its first full mission in Tajikistan; its presence in 

the country had previously been a branch of the regional mission in 

Kazakhstan. USAID initiatives in Tajikistan work to foster food security, 

support civil society and nongovernmental organizations, improve 

education quality and access, combat human trafficking, and help 

reintegrate migrant workers into their home communities. The U.S. 

Department of State has designated Tajikistan as a CPC repeatedly 

since 2016, most recently on December 2, but it has also maintained a 

waiver on imposing any related sanctions on the country “as required 

in the important national interest of the United States.”
50 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

TURKMENISTAN

• Redesignate Turkmenistan as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing 

the administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result of 

the designation;

• Take presidential action to limit security 

assistance to Turkmenistan under IRFA Section 405(a)(22) to hold the government of 

Turkmenistan accountable for its particularly severe violations of religious freedom;

• Impose targeted sanctions on Turkmenistan government agencies and 

officials responsible for severe violations 

of religious freedom by freezing those 

individuals’ assets and/or barring their 

entry into the United States under human 

rights-related financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom 

violations; and

• Urge the government of Turkmenistan to 

provide a civilian alternative to military service and to release and pardon all those 

convicted for conscientious objection. 

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Turkmenistan remained 

among the worst in the world and showed no signs of improvement. Restrictive state policies have “virtually extinguished” the 

free practice of religion in the country, where the government 

appoints Muslim clerics, surveils and dictates religious practice, 

and punishes nonconformity through imprisonment, torture, and 

administrative harassment. 

Turkmenistan is an extremely closed society, described as an 

informational “black hole” with an abysmal record on freedom of 

the press. Despite the state’s iron grip on the media, in September 

President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov lashed out at journalists 

and threatened to demote responsible officials for not adequately 

reporting “on the country’s successes.” This landscape makes it 

difficult to chronicle the actual extent of religious freedom abuses 

in the country, which are certainly more extensive than the limited 

number of reports indicate. Nevertheless, the available information 

presents a bleak picture. 

The government continued to treat all independent religious 

activity with suspicion, maintaining a large surveillance apparatus that monitors believers at home and abroad. Turkmenistani 

law requires religious groups to register under intrusive criteria, 

strictly controls registered groups’ activities, and punishes religious activities by unregistered groups, which are effectively 

banned. There were reports during the year of the authorities 

raiding several Protestant meetings and subsequently fingerprinting participants, forcing them to write confessions that they had 

attended an illegal religious gathering, and threatening them with 

the loss of their children and their employment. The government 

accelerated its ongoing persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses for 

their conscientious objection to military service, sentencing at 

least five more members to prison in 2020, which brings the current known total to 11. These include two Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

Vepa Matyakubov and Kamiljan Ergashov, who in January and 

February, respectively, received sentences of two years imprisonment for their conscientious objection. In August, two brothers, 

Sanjarbek and Eldor Saburov, received two-year prison sentences 

for the same charge—their second time to face conviction for this 

offense, having already served out their first criminal sentences. 

In September, yet another Jehovah’s Witness, Myrat Orazgeldyev, 

was imprisoned for “avoiding mandatory military service.” Most 

conscientious objectors are held at the Seydi Labor Camp, where 

overcrowding, harsh climatic and health conditions, physical 

abuse, and a high mortality rate are the norm.

Persons accused of criminal religious offenses are often tried 

in closed-regime courts where sentences remain secret. Convicts 

are often disappeared in the state’s prison system and presumed 

to be held without contact with the outside world. The authorities 

likely hold many religious prisoners at the notorious Ovadan-Depe 

Prison, located in the remote desert 50 miles north of the capital 

city of Ashgabat. Ovadan-Depe was built to house high-level political dissidents and enemies of the state, and its prisoners routinely 

die from harsh conditions that include torture and starvation. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Issue Update: The Global Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses

• Issue Update: Religious Prisoners in Turkmenistan’s Gulag

• Op-Ed: Lift the National Security Waiver on Turkmenistan (in Eurasianet)
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 51

TURKMENISTAN

Background

Turkmenistan is a highly authoritarian country under the rule of 

President Berdymukhamedov since 2007, enforcing a cult of personality that proliferates his image in golden monuments and fawning 

official coverage. The 2016 Constitution removed the presidential 

age limit and Berdymukhamedov was “reelected” in 2017 with 97 

percent of the vote. Sources report that the government is extremely 

concerned about the possibility of mass unrest amid a crippling economic decline, and it is rapidly implementing an “anti-terrorist plan” 

that includes the installation of facial recognition cameras and “smart 

city” technology in public places, including small businesses. The 

government typically charges its critics with terrorism, targeting their 

families and friends if it cannot extradite them from abroad. 

A majority 89 percent of the population are Sunni Muslim, while 

Orthodox Christians represent the second-largest group, comprising around 9 percent. Although the 2016 Religion Law asserts that 

Turkmenistan is a secular state with religious freedom, it requires 

religious groups to register with the Ministry of Justice under intrusive 

criteria, mandates that the government be informed of all foreign 

financial support, bans private religious education and worship, and 

prohibits the public wearing of religious garb except by clerics. The 

State Commission on Religious Organizations and Expert Evaluation 

of Religious Information Resources (SCROEERIR) oversees all religious 

activity, including registrations, the appointment of religious leaders, 

the building of houses of worship, and the import and publication of 

religious literature. The registration process requires religious organizations to provide detailed information about founding members, 

including names, addresses, and birth dates. Recognized communities 

must reregister every three years, and religious activity is forbidden 

in prisons and the military. 

Government Control of Religion

In addition to this strict framework of registration, Muslims continued 

to face particular scrutiny in 2020. The government maintained its 

practice of appointing senior Islamic leaders and dictating the content 

of sermons and prayers. Sermons include tributes to the President, 

reminding the congregation that all that is good in their lives derives 

from Berdymukhamedov’s “wise policies.” Although the government 

denied the existence of coronavirus in Turkmenistan, all mosques have 

been closed as a “prophylactic” measure since July—a restriction that 

did not apply to the President’s dedication of a mosque in November 

or to its large accompanying feast.

The personality cult of President Berdymukhamedov functions 

as a virtual state religion. In 2020, the President published his alleged 

53rd book, The Spiritual Life of the Turkmens, which prescribes correct 

national belief and culture and is celebrated in state media as a work 

“of particular value in the spiritual and moral education of youth.” 

Berdymukhamedov noticeably adopted a more pious appearance 

in public, including at the dedication of massive prestige mosques 

in February and November, when he delivered speeches about the 

necessity of protecting national values and culture. State media 

increasingly refers to him as Hajji, in reference to his completion of 

the Umrah pilgrimage to Mecca, and emphasized at his 63rd birthday 

celebration that he is now the same age that the Prophet Muhammad 

was when he died. However, the state frowns on open religious piety 

among regular citizens and the civil service; in February, state employees in the Lebap region were forbidden outright from attending Friday 

prayers or praying at work, and the state employees were warned that 

they would lose their jobs if they entered a mosque.

Jehovah’s Witnesses

Although not technically banned, Jehovah’s Witnesses have not been 

granted registration and are therefore unable to operate legally. The 

government has arrested and imprisoned many Witnesses for their 

conscientious objection to military service, for which there is no civilian 

alternative available; Article 58 of the 2016 Constitution describes 

defense as a “sacred duty” incumbent on everyone. Since 2018, when 

the state renewed its campaign against conscientious objection, 

Turkmenistan has imprisoned at least 25 Jehovah’s Witnesses under 

Article 219(1) of the Criminal Code for the absence of a legal basis for 

exemption from military service. Although 14 of those prisoners have 

since been released after serving their one-year sentences, 11 others 

remain imprisoned. In September, President Berdymukhamedov 

pardoned more than 800 prisoners but did not include a single 

Jehovah’s Witness among them. In October, the Turkmen Initiative 

for Human Rights sent an open letter to the Turkmenistani Human 

Rights Ombudsman requesting an end to the persecution of Jehovah’s 

Witnesses for conscientious objection.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States engages with the Turkmenistan government in 

border and regional security programs, along with educational and 

cultural exchanges. Turkmenistan enjoys most-favored-nation trading 

status and receives direct U.S. assistance to strengthen the security of its border with Afghanistan. Although the U.S. government is 

cognizant of the deplorable state of human rights in Turkmenistan, 

it has prioritized security concerns related to the ongoing war in 

Afghanistan. In October, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political 

Affairs David Hale participated in a virtual trilateral meeting with counterparts from Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, where they discussed 

strengthening cooperation on regional security, economic growth, 

and development. The U.S. Department of State has designated 

Turkmenistan as a CPC under IRFA since 2014, and redesignated it 

on December 2, 2020, but has repeatedly used a waiver against any 

related sanctions “as required in the ‘important national interest of the 

United States.’” This waiver effectively neutralizes the consequences 

of Turkmenistan’s CPC designation, removes any incentive for the 

government to reform its brutal policies, and lends credence to the 

regime’s claims that security concerns warrant its harsh repression of 

religious freedom.
52 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

VIETNAM

• Designate Vietnam as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious religious freedom violations, as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), 

and enter into a new binding agreement 

with the government, as authorized by 

Section 405(c) of IRFA, setting forth commitments to further improve religious freedom; 

• Encourage the Vietnamese government 

to amend the Law on Belief and Religion 

to conform to international standards to 

which Vietnam is party, including by making registration optional and not using it 

as a burdensome tool to control religious 

groups and activities; 

• Encourage the effort by central, provincial, and local authorities to resettle Hmong 

Christians in Subdivision 179, urge similar 

efforts for other functionally stateless 

ethnic minority communities in the Northern and Central Highlands, and consider 

providing funding to facilitate improving 

religious freedom conditions among those 

communities; and

• Direct the U.S. Embassy and Consulate 

in Vietnam to track houses of worship or 

religious sites of unique spiritual, cultural, 

or historical importance and work with 

Vietnamese authorities to ensure those 

sites receive special protection from development projects or expropriation. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Send delegations focused on religious 

freedom and related human rights to Vietnam, and specifically request to visit areas 

impacted by religious freedom restrictions 

and individual prisoners of conscience—

such as Nguyen Bac Truyen—and urge 

authorities to release them.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Vietnam generally trended 

the same as in 2019. The government actively enforced the Law 

on Belief and Religion, which, as written and implemented, contravened international human rights standards and systematically 

violated religious freedom, particularly of independent religious 

groups but also of government-recognized groups. 

Authorities continued to actively persecute independent 

religious minority communities, including Protestant Hmong and 

Montagnard Christians, Hoa Hao Buddhists, the Unified Buddhists, 

Cao Dai followers, Catholics, and Falun Gong practitioners. Ethnic 

minority communities faced especially egregious persecution for 

the peaceful practice of their faith, including physical assault, banishment, detention, imprisonment, and forced renunciation of 

faith. An estimated 10,000 Hmong and Montagnard Christians in 

the Central Highlands remained effectively stateless because local 

authorities have refused to issue household registration documents 

and identity cards—in many instances in retaliation for refusal to 

renounce their faith. During the year, central and local authorities 

made efforts to resettle Hmong Christians in Subdivision 179 of 

Dam Rong District in Lam Dong Province, but as of December 

implementation of this process remained incomplete. 

The government also continued to harass and interfere in 

the religious activities of independent Hoa Hao Buddhists. In 

March and July, local officials disrupted and prevented members 

of this community from conducting religious rituals and observing 

important religious holidays. In February, following the death of 

Patriarch Thich Quang Do—former leader of the independent 

Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV)—authorities interfered in Do’s funeral arrangements. In addition, USCIRF received 

a report that local officials in the Huong Tra Township of Thua 

Thien-Hue Province disrupted UBCV’s disaster relief work this 

year, claiming that it was an “illegal church.” Authorities have in 

recent years also harassed independent Cao Dai believers and 

attempted to take over their temples or forcibly “reunite” them 

with state-recognized ones. 

Local authorities continued to expropriate or destroy Catholic 

Church properties. In August, government-led thugs harassed

and attacked members of a Benedictine monastery at Thuy Bang 

Commune in Thua Thien-Hue Province, forcing the monastery 

to relinquish its land. In Ho Chi Minh City, an ownership dispute 

involving a local parish school led one Catholic priest to sue the 

local government. During the year, authorities also detained and 

punished Falun Gong practitioners for practicing and distributing 

materials about their spiritual practice—including a school principal who was punished for practicing Falun Gong with others at his 

home—on the grounds that it is not a recognized religion. 

Reports of torture and mistreatment of religious leaders 

and religious freedom advocates persisted in 2020. Nguyen Bac 

Truyen—a Hoa Hao Buddhist advocate sentenced to 11 years in 

April 2018—remained imprisoned at the end of the year and is 

reportedly in poor health. In November, Truyen started a hunger 

strike protesting prison conditions, including the lack of medical 

care. Prison authorities in Nam Ha Province continued to refuse to 

provide a Bible to Catholic environmental activist Le Dinh Luong.

Authorities also targeted recognized groups for harassment. For example, USCIRF received reports that during the year 

authorities had cited Article 34 of the Law on Belief and Religion to 

interfere in the election of religious officers—known as “functionaries”—of recognized religious groups, leading at least one such 

group to suspend its election process.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Op-Ed: The Rising Cost of Religious Freedom in Vietnam (in The Hill)

• Op-Ed: Hopes and Fears for Religious Freedom in Vietnam (in The Hill)

• Country Update: Religious Prisoners of Conscience in Vietnam
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 53

VIETNAM

Background

Vietnam’s constitution permits citizens to “follow any religion or follow 

none” and mandates respect and protection for religious freedom. 

However, it also authorizes authorities to override human rights, including religious freedom, for reasons of “national security, social order and 

security, social morality, and community well-being.” The country’s Law 

on Belief and Religion, which went into effect in January 2018, requires 

religious communities to formally register their organizations, activities, 

and places of worship. It allows only religious organizations that have 

operated for at least five years to apply for registration, and it grants 

registered organizations status as legal entities. 

Roughly 20 percent of Vietnam’s estimated 97 million citizens 

identify with a religion. Approximately 8 percent of the population 

follow Buddhism, while 7 percent identify as Catholics. Other religious 

traditions with a significant presence include Hoa Hao Buddhism, Cao 

Dai, Evangelical Protestantism, and Islam. By the end of 2020, the 

government had officially recognized a total of 16 religions and 43 

religious organizations; however, many groups refused to register for 

fear of persecution or concern for their independence, which has led 

to both state-sponsored and independent organizations competing 

to represent the religion in some cases. 

Positive Developments

The government has reportedly made efforts to streamline administrative processes and procedures related to religion by implementing 

an interagency, one-stop online platform. The platform is also used 

by the government’s Committee on Religious Affairs (CRA), which 

monitors and evaluates the implementation of the Law on Belief and 

Religion, in addition to coordinating with central and local authorities 

to address complaints from religious organizations and individuals. 

In February, the Ministry of Public Security issued a circular on the 

regulation of detention facilities, which included a provision allowing 

prisoner access to religious publications. 

In early 2020, the government of Dam Rong District in Lam Dong 

Province announced a plan to resettle stateless Hmong Christian 

residents in Subdivision 179 and to issue them household registration 

documents. For decades, local authorities have discriminated against 

Hmong and Montagnard Christian communities in the Northern and 

Central Highlands because of their faith and refused to issue them 

household registration and identification cards, which are necessary to 

access public services such as education and healthcare. If successfully 

implemented, Subdivision 179 could serve as a model for central and 

local government officials to improve conditions for other ethnic and 

religious minority communities.

In September, the government released Pastor A Dao, leader 

of the Montagnard Evangelical Church of Christ and one of USCIRF’s 

Religious Prisoners of Conscience (RPOC). State authorities had 

arrested A Dao in 2016 after he attended the Southeast Asia Freedom 

of Religion or Belief Conference, where he had shared the challenges 

his church faced from the government. 

State-Sponsored Intolerance against Religious Groups

Human rights groups raised concerns that the government of Vietnam 

targets religious groups and individuals through online hate speech 

and defamation. In 2020, the state-backed “Red Flag Association” 

joined with government entities in spreading online propaganda that 

promoted discrimination and intolerance against religious groups 

and individuals such as Catholic priests, Montagnard Christians, and 

independent Cao Dai adherents. The Red Flag Association has been 

active since 2017 and was involved in violent incidents attacking the 

Catholic community. Although reportedly dissolved in 2018, the association has increasingly moved its operations to online platforms. In 

one instance, the Red Flag Association attacked three members of the 

Catholic community with derogatory language on its website, calling 

them “terrorists” and “brain dead.”

Cybersecurity and State Secret Laws and 

Regulations

Several new laws had potentially negative implications for religious 

freedom. Broad and vague provisions in the Cybersecurity Law (effective January 1, 2019) and Protection of State Secrets Law (effective 

July 1, 2020) could be used in conjunction with their implementing 

decrees and decisions to punish and persecute religious groups and 

individuals. For example, according to the State Secrets Law, certain 

documents concerning religion and belief—such as meeting minutes 

between religious groups and the government—could be classified 

as state secrets, while “unauthorized” possession or dissemination 

of such information could be grounds for criminal prosecution or 

administrative punishment. 

Key U.S. Policy

While the United States and Vietnam have close economic and 

defense relationships, religious freedom and broader human rights 

remain key U.S. concerns. In October 2020, during the 24th U.S.-

Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue, U.S. officials raised concerns with 

their Vietnamese counterparts about religious freedom conditions, 

the status of ethnic minority groups, and other related human rights 

issues. In April and during the third Ministerial to Advance Religious 

Freedom in November, then Ambassador-at-Large for International 

Religious Freedom Samuel D. Brownback called on countries, including Vietnam, to release prisoners of conscience. 

In August, U.S. Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and John Cornyn 

(R-TX) sent a joint letter to then Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo 

urging the U.S. Department of State to designate Vietnam as a CPC 

for its religious freedom violations and to consider imposing Global 

Magnitsky Act sanctions against perpetrators of grave human rights 

abuses in that country. While USCIRF has recommended Vietnam’s 

designation as a CPC every year since 2002— finding that despite 

some areas of progress, “systematic, ongoing, and egregious” violations of religious freedom within the meaning of IRFA persist—the 

State Department designated it as a CPC only in 2004 and 2005. 
54 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

AFGHANISTAN

• Include Afghanistan on the U.S. Department of State’s Special Watch List for 

engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) 

and continue to designate the Taliban as 

an “entity of particular concern” (EPC) 

for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious violations of religious freedom, 

as defined by IRFA;

• Incorporate protections for freedom of 

religion or belief into U.S.-supported 

peace negotiations between the Afghan 

government and the Taliban, emphasizing 

to Afghan political leadership the close 

relationship between religious freedom 

and overall security;

• Integrate religious freedom concerns, 

including the protection of houses of worship, into assistance and training programs 

focused on countering terrorism, resolving 

sectarian conflict, and bolstering law and 

order funded by the State Department, 

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation, and the U.S. Department of 

Defense; and

• Facilitate cooperation between faith leaders 

and scholars of all religions in Afghanistan 

to foster societal religious tolerance and 

encourage the Afghan Ministries of Education, Information and Culture, and Hajj and 

Religious Affairs to ensure that textbooks 

and curricula do not propagate intolerant 

teachings that denigrate religious minorities.

The U.S. Congress should: 

• Appropriate funding specifically for the 

protection of freedom of religion or 

belief in Afghanistan and continue oversight activities of these expenditures and 

related programs in conjunction with the 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction. 

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Afghanistan continued to 

trend negatively amid the country’s ongoing political instability. 

Lack of security remains the primary challenge to protecting the 

freedom of religion or belief in the country. In February 2020, the 

United States and the Taliban signed an agreement stipulating the 

withdrawal of foreign presence. In September, the Afghan government and the Taliban commenced peace negotiations. However, 

these landmark strides toward peace failed to improve security conditions. An increase in attacks by extremist groups—most notably 

the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and the Taliban—not 

only threatened Afghanistan’s overall stability but also decimated 

religious minorities, particularly the Sikh community, which faces near 

extinction in Afghanistan. The Afghan government’s limited control 

over the country’s territory and lack of capacity within the areas it 

did control continued to hamper its ability to protect its citizens. 

The United Nations (UN) documented 8,820 civilian casualties

(3,035 killed and 5,785 injured) in 2020, with some of the most brutal 

attacks targeting religious minorities. Antigovernment, nonstate 

actors, including ISIS-K and the Taliban, were blamed and some 

claimed responsibility for the deadliest attacks. The UN reported 

the Taliban were responsible for 45 percent of civilian casualties. 

While the Taliban rejected these findings and denied responsibility

for or involvement in attacks targeting civilians, particularly religious 

minority communities, the Afghan government alleges that the 

Taliban use Islamic militant groups as proxies and continue to target 

progovernment Muslim leaders, institutions, and leaders of other 

faiths throughout the country. Although their use of antiminority 

rhetoric has diminished, reports indicate that the Taliban continue 

to exclude religious minorities and punish residents in areas under 

their control in accordance with their extreme interpretation of 

Islamic law. During the current peace negotiations, the Taliban also 

refused to acknowledge or allow the integration of Shi’a jurisprudence in the current Afghan legal system, causing concern among 

Shi’a Muslims. During their time in power, the Taliban discriminated 

against and violently persecuted the Shi’a Hazara community, which 

they labeled as heretical.

Although ISIS-K lost significant territorial control in 2020, it 

continued to target minority faiths and Muslims who it believes 

deviate from Islam. Terrorist and criminal attacks against Sikh and 

Shi’a communities continued, targeting their leadership, neighborhoods, festivals, and houses of worship. In March, a gurdwara (Sikh 

house of worship) in Kabul was attacked, killing 25 Sikhs—including 

women and children—and causing many of the few Sikhs remaining 

in Afghanistan to flee. In March, ISIS-K once again attacked a memorial service held for a Shi’a Hazara leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, who was 

killed by the Taliban in 1995—killing 32 people and wounding over 

50. In November, two roadside bombings perpetrated by ISIS-K 

killed 14 and injured 45 others in the Shi’a province of Bamiyan. 

In May, terrorists attacked a maternity hospital in Dasht-eBarchi, a majority-Hazara neighborhood of Kabul. The attack killed 

more than 20, including two newborns, causing Doctors Without 

Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières to end its longstanding activities 

and withdraw from the hospital. In another incident in October, 

a suicide bomber detonated in the street outside the Kawsar-e 

Danish Centre, an educational institute in a Shi’a Hazara neighborhood, killing dozens of students. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Press Statement: USCIRF Strongly Condemns Terrorist Attack against Sikh House of Worship in Kabul
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 55

AFGHANISTAN

Background

Afghanistan is home to a diverse array of ethnic groups, including 

Pashtuns (42 percent), Tajiks (27 percent), Hazaras (9 percent), Uzbeks (9 

percent), Turkmen (3 percent), and Baloch (2 percent). Historically, the 

nation also was religiously diverse, but the vast majority of non-Muslims fled after the Taliban consolidated control of the government 

in 1996. The Hindu and Sikh population, for example, dropped from 

220,000 in the early 1990s to a little over 200 today. The country’s 

current population is approximately 99.7 percent Muslim (84.7–89.7 

percent Sunni and 10–15 percent Shi’a, including Ismailis), with the few 

remaining non-Muslims (Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is, Christians, Buddhists, 

Zoroastrians, and others, including one known Jew) comprising the 

remaining 0.3 percent.

Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution—which recognizes Islam as the 

official religion—requires all parliamentary laws to respect Islamic 

principles and educational curricula to be based on the Islamic faith. 

Moreover, the constitution requires the courts to rely on Hanafi Shari’a 

jurisprudence in the absence of governing constitutional or legal provisions, which has the effect of criminalizing blasphemy (subject to the 

death penalty), apostasy, and proselytizing by non-Muslims. In 2009, 

the Shi’a Personal Status Law allowed Shi’a Muslims to be judged by 

their own laws, the Ja’fari school of jurisprudence. 

Since the fall of the Taliban government in 2001, religious minority 

communities slowly regained footing in society. Shi’a Muslims’ sociopolitical standing improved, with members of the community holding 

key positions in government, media, and private industry. Additionally, 

Hindus and Sikhs have been represented in parliament since 2016 

with a reserved seat, and some have been employed in government 

service. Despite this representation, Hindus and Sikhs face systematic 

discrimination and increasing violence.

Exodus of Sikh and Hindu Community 

Driven by societal discrimination influenced by extremists, Sikhs and 

Hindus are subject to harassment, including physical assaults, abduction, land grabbing, looting, and pressure to convert. In addition to 

the incidents above, in June, insurgents reportedly kidnapped Sikh 

community leader Nidan Singh Sachdeva at Thala Sri Guru Nanak 

Sahib gurdwara in Paktia Province. Sachdeva was released due to 

government pressure and was among the first group of Afghan Sikh 

and Hindu community members who were granted legal entry to 

India in 2020. 

The Hindu and Sikh population dropped from about 250,000 

in the early 1990s to less than 1,000 in 2019. After the 2020 Kabul 

gurdwara attack and kidnapping of Sachdeva, the number dropped 

to around 200, a near extinction of the once robust community. 

Members of the Sikh and Hindu community have felt pressured to 

leave Afghanistan due to the lack of safety and security in the face of 

ongoing targeted attacks on their leadership and houses of worship 

by militant groups. 

Rising Fear for Other Religious Minorities 

Although the Afghan constitution stipulates followers of religions other 

than Islam may exercise their faith within the limits of the law, conversion 

from Islam to another religion is considered apostasy. This crime is 

punishable by death, imprisonment, confiscation of property, or deportation according to the Afghan government’s prevailing interpretation 

of Sunni Islam’s Hanafi school of jurisprudence, which according to the 

constitution applies if there is no relevant provision in the law. Small 

populations of the Christian, Baha’i, and Ahmadiyya religious communities exist in secret due to fear of reprisal. In 2020, fear among religious 

minorities markedly increased due to a variety of factors, including the 

downsizing of the U.S. troop presence, continued violence, and the 

government’s lack of control over the entirety of the country’s territory.

In 2007, the General Directorate of Fatwas and Accounts of 

the Supreme Court declared the Baha’i faith to be blasphemous. 

The Baha’i community has lived in secret since this ruling. According 

to sources, there are about 450 adherents of the Ahmadiyya faith 

residing in Kabul. Although the Afghan constitution does not legally 

define the Ahmadiyya faith as non-Muslim, most Afghan Muslims view 

the faith as heretical. 

Cases of Muslims converting to Christianity remain few, but 

Christian faith-based organizations maintain they are closeted due to 

fear of reprisal by Islamist extremists, familial-societal ostracization, ethnic 

antagonism, and official repercussions for those charged with apostasy. 

Society and the state often label instances of conversion as an attempt to 

flee Afghanistan through political asylum via Western Christian sympathy. 

Key U.S. Policy

In February, after 20 years of U.S. government involvement in 

Afghanistan, the administration of then President Donald J. Trump 

signed a peace agreement with the Taliban that stipulated complete 

withdrawal of the U.S. presence by May 2021. The agreement also 

called on the Taliban to cut ties with terrorist groups, reduce violence, 

and engage in negotiations with the Afghan government. As of January 

2021, there are 2,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, along with 6,346 U.S. 

contractors. The Taliban have called on the administration of President 

Joseph R. Biden to honor the previous administration’s commitment, 

but delays in the peace talks, increased violence, reports of continued 

Taliban ties with militant organizations, and ISIS-K presence has left the 

new administration reconsidering complete withdrawal. 

In 2020, the U.S. government continued to provide an estimated 

$1.1 billion in aid to Afghanistan despite the reduction in pledged 

assistance to the Afghan government at the November 2020 Geneva 

Conference and U.S. statements that future assistance will be conditioned on progress in the peace talks and protection of human rights.

On December 2, the State Department designated the Taliban 

as an EPC for engaging in particularly severe religious freedom violations. The designation of ISIS-K as an EPC was not renewed, as 

the State Department determined it lost control of the territory it 

previously controlled. 
56 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

ALGERIA

• Include Algeria on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

• Encourage U.S. Embassy officials to 

meet with the National Commission for 

Non-Muslim Religious Groups and other 

relevant government officials, and insist 

the government deliver clear and timely 

responses to registration requests by 

non-Muslim organizations as required by 

Ordinance 06-03;

• Encourage U.S. Embassy officials to attend 

and observe court proceedings on church 

closures and against Ahmadiyya Muslims 

to emphasize the U.S. government’s concerns about such cases; and

• Monitor the impact of changes in the 

new constitution regarding freedom of 

conscience and advocate that the government continue to protect the rights of 

its citizens to freedoms protected under 

international human rights law.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Hold public hearings to encourage Algeria to reverse decisions that have led to 

religious freedom violations and reform 

procedures related to religious minorities.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Algeria remained poor, 

with the government continuing its systematic repression of 

Christians as well as minority Muslim communities. The government resumed its campaign against the Ahmadiyya community, 

sentencing dozens of Ahmadis to multiyear prison sentences and 

often interrogating them about their religious beliefs during trials. In October, the government handed down several two-year 

prison sentences for Ahmadiyya Muslims in Constantine, while in 

December a court in Tizi Ouzou sentenced 25 Ahmadis to extended 

prison time. On December 14, a court in Khenchela sentenced a 

prominent Ahmadiyya leader to six months in prison and a fine of 

20,000 Algerian dinars (DA) ($150 USD), nearly half the country’s 

average monthly wage. The prosecutor has appealed the verdict to 

pursue a blasphemy conviction and harsher sentence.

Non-Muslim communities also faced discrimination. The governor of Oran forced two Protestant churches to close in January, 

and in August a court in Tizi Ouzou upheld the state governor’s 

October 2019 decision to close three Protestant churches. The 

government also collected information on the religious affiliations 

of teachers and reportedly handed the data over to the Department 

of Intelligence and Security. Moreover, having issued restrictions 

on places of worship in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 

government granted mosques and Catholic churches permission 

to reopen in August, but Evangelical churches remained closed 

through the end of the year.

In addition, a constitutional referendum passed in November 

indicated further erosion in religious freedom conditions in Algeria. 

Religious minority communities report that the government failed 

to consult them while drafting the referendum. The new constitution has removed language protecting “freedom of conscience” 

for all Algerians, raising concerns that the government may use this 

alteration to oppress religious minorities further. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Press Statement: USCIRF Raises Alarm about Speech Laws that Restrict Religious Freedom in More than Half of African Countries

• Event: USCIRF Conversation on Religious Freedom in Algeria
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 57

ALGERI

Background

A

Algeria is geographically the largest country in Africa and home to more 

than 43 million people. Algeria’s state religion is Islam, and an estimated 

99 percent of the population identify as Sunni Muslim, with the remaining 1 

percent of the population comprising of Jews, Christians, and Ahmadiyya 

and Shi’a Muslims. The Christian community of Algeria includes Roman 

Catholics, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, Evangelicals, Lutherans, 

the Reformed Church, and Egyptian Coptic Christians.

Algeria limits the free expression and practice of belief through 

the enforcement of laws that favor Islam specifically and restrict religious activities. Article 144 Section 2 of the Criminal Code penalizes 

blasphemy with punishments including imprisonment for up to five 

years and a fine of up to 100,000 DA ($753). A 2020 USCIRF report on 

the enforcement of blasphemy laws between 2014 and 2018 found that 

Algerian authorities have declared converts guilty of blasphemy. The 

report also highlighted incidents of state violence against individuals 

accused of blasphemy—for example, Slimane Bouhafs “suffered attacks 

within the prison system as a result of standing up for his Christian faith.” 

Algeria has a long history of repression and persecution of religious 

minorities. Baha’i activities have been banned by law in Algeria since 1969. 

The government has made little progress on its 2014 commitment to 

reopen synagogues that had been converted to mosques or churches. 

In 2006, Algeria adopted Ordinance 06-03 requiring non-Muslim organizations to register with the National Commission governing worship 

by non-Muslim groups, housed under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 

This commission rarely meets and often fails to respond to registration 

requests by non-Muslim groups in the time required by the ordinance.

Persecution of Ahmadiyya Muslims

In 2016, Algerian authorities refused to register the Ahmadiyya Muslim 

community as an association, and since then the government has prosecuted more than 280 Ahmadis on grounds of their faith. Government 

officials have made public statements denouncing Ahmadis in abusive 

terms and declaring them “non-Muslim.” 

In 2020, the government of Algeria continued its campaign 

against the Ahmadiyya community. In October 2020, a court in 

Constantine handed down two-year prison sentences to Ahmadis 

found guilty of worshipping without authorization. On November 29, 

seven Ahmadiyya Muslims in Khenchela appeared in court, where 

the prosecutor requested five-year prison sentences and heavy fines.

On Monday, December 14, the Khenchela court handed down 

a six-month prison sentence and 20,000 DA fine for the leader of 

a group of Ahmadis and a fine alongside suspended sentences for 

others on charges that included offending the Prophet Mohammad 

and degrading the principles of Islam. The prosecutor has appealed 

the decision to pursue longer prison sentences for the accused. On 

December 22, in Tizi Ouzou, the court sentenced four Ahmadiyya 

Muslims to multiyear prison terms and enforced fines against them. 

The judge in these cases refused to divulge the accuser and questioned the defendants about their Muslim faith. Several Ahmadis who 

were charged publicly recanted their faith in court.

Oppression of Christians and Other Non-Muslims

Since 2017, authorities have forced 13 Protestant churches to close, 

citing lack of registration, despite the fact that these parishes filed 

for registration and never received a response from the government. 

The government continued to close churches and restrict Christians’ 

rights to worship in 2020. The governor of Oran forced the closure of 

two Protestant churches in January. In 2020, many courts also ruled on 

several forced closures of Protestant churches that took place in 2019. 

A court in Tizi Ouzou Province upheld the closure of three Protestant 

churches in August, including two of the country’s largest congregations. In November, a court in Bejaia overturned the governor’s order 

to close five churches there, claiming that the authority to do so lies 

with the minister of the interior, not the state governor.

Churches also faced stricter COVID-19 restrictions than 

mosques. Having ordered all houses of worship to close in response 

to the pandemic, the Algerian government issued an order in August 

authorizing mosques with more than 1,000 worshippers to reopen. 

The order made no mention of churches. In October, authorities in 

Tizi Ouzou governorate in the Kabylie area, where most Algerian 

Christians live, allowed 183 mosques to reopen, including several 

that had fewer than 1,000 worshippers. It also permitted Catholic 

churches to open, but did not afford the same opportunity to 

Protestant churches.

Finally, in July the Tebboune Administration collected information 

on the religious affiliations of teachers in Tizi Ouzou Province, cataloguing 

the identities of Christian and atheist teachers and reportedly forwarding 

the list to the national Department of Intelligence and Security.

Constitutional Referendum

On November 1, Algeria held a constitutional referendum to respond 

to demands made by popular civil protesters to reform Algeria’s 

laws to better protect human rights and freedom of expression for 

its citizens. The new constitution does not necessarily enjoy strong 

support from the Algerian people, considering the vote was marred 

by low voter turnout. While the new constitution includes language 

protecting places of worship from any political or ideological influence, it also excludes language that had been included in the previous 

constitution protecting citizens’ rights to “freedom of conscience,” 

which raises serious concerns about the future prospects for religious 

freedom in Algeria.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States maintains close relations with Algeria focused on 

security and counterterrorism, economic ties, and cultural and educational programs. Algeria is an important U.S. partner for regional 

stability in North Africa and the Sahel.

In 2020, U.S. government representatives in Algeria continued to 

prioritize religious freedom concerns. U.S. officials engaged Algerian 

authorities several times to pressure the government to reverse its 

decisions discriminating against Protestant and Ahmadiyya individuals, as well as to revise and adequately implement its registration 

process for non-Muslim organizations.

The 2020 decision by then President Donald J. Trump to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara also had implications 

for the relationship between the United States and Algeria more 

broadly. The government of Algeria has long supported independence movements in Western Sahara and rejected claims of Moroccan 

sovereignty over the territory. 
58 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

AZERBAIJAN

• Include Azerbaijan on the U.S. Department of State’s Special Watch List for 

engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to 

the International Religious Freedom Act 

(IRFA);

• Work with the government of Azerbaijan 

to revise the 2009 religion law to comply 

with international human rights standards 

and to bring it into conformity with recommendations made in 2012 by the Council 

of Europe’s Venice Commission and the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); 

• Assist the Azerbaijani government, in 

collaboration with international partners, 

to develop an alternative civilian service 

and permit conscientious objection pursuant to its commitment to the Council of 

Europe, obligations under international 

human rights law, and the Azerbaijani constitution; and

• Allocate funding to the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and 

U.S. Embassy in Baku to restore, preserve, 

and protect places of worship and other 

religious or cultural sites in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Hold public hearings to investigate Azerbaijan’s religious freedom and broader human 

rights abuses, including its treatment of the 

MUM; raise related concerns directly with 

the Azerbaijani Embassy and other government officials; and advocate for the release 

of all prisoners of conscience.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Azerbaijan remained 

largely static, with the notable exception of recent violations 

committed amid renewed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and 

surrounding territories. The Azerbaijani government continued 

to regulate religious activity through its 2009 law On Freedom of 

Religious Beliefs (religion law), requiring all religious communities 

to register in order to operate, mandating state approval for religious literature and related materials, and placing limitations on 

certain other religious activities. In 2020, the Azerbaijani government reportedly registered 14 religious communities, including two 

Christian communities. It did not, however, provide registration to 

all unregistered communities—such as some Jehovah’s Witnesses 

and Lutherans—despite initial impressions that they would finally 

receive registration within the year. This issue remained a source of 

significant concern for unregistered religious communities, which 

the government attempted to alleviate in some cases by suggesting 

they “affiliate” with registered counterparts, or in one case by providing a letter to a small, unregistered Baptist community permitting 

their worship within the confines of a weekly two-hour time slot in 

a pastor’s yard. However, neither suggestion appeared to have any 

legal basis and therefore offered no guaranteed legal protections. 

The government continued to disallow conscientious objection 

to mandatory military service; while no reported prosecutions took 

place during the year, the Azerbaijani National Assembly failed to 

create an alternative civilian service, for which the country’s constitution provides and one Member of Parliament suggested. As in 2019, 

there were no known incidents of law enforcement raids on religious 

communities, although some interlocutors reported nevertheless 

limiting some of their activities for fear of possible repercussions. 

The government continued to imprison individuals related 

to their religious activism. Local nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) that maintain lists of political prisoners in the country 

estimate that between 43 and 51 current prisoners are religious 

activists. In 2020, authorities released at least three religious 

prisoners, including Shi’a Muslim imam Sardar Babayev, who 

had served his full sentence, and two others released in consideration of the COVID-19 threat. Members of the Muslim Unity 

Movement (MUM) announced that the government subjected 

them to increased pressure during the year through summonses, 

detentions, and arrests on questionable or politically motivated 

grounds. In one instance, authorities reportedly detained and 

then arrested alleged MUM member Elvin Muradov for poems 

and songs he had written about imprisoned MUM leader Taleh 

Bagirzade. Throughout the year, Rahim Akhundov pursued a 

lawsuit alleging that he was discriminated against and forcibly 

dismissed from his position as a staffer at the National Assembly 

due to his identity as a Christian and role as pastor of a house 

church. In January, a judge ruled his case inadmissible in a decision 

that the Baku Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld in 

June and September, respectively.

The reemergence of active fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh 

and surrounding territories in late September prompted serious 

concerns about the preservation and protection of Armenian 

places of worship and other religious sites in those areas. In 

October, Azerbaijani forces reportedly targeted and shelled the 

Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in the city of Shusha two times, resulting 

in extensive damage to that building and possibly constituting a war 

crime. Azerbaijan claimed that during the fighting, Armenian forces 

damaged various religious and cultural sites as a result of shelling 

as well. Following the November 10 ceasefire and the cession of 

some territories to Azerbaijan, media outlets documented the 

apparently recent vandalization and destruction of Armenian cemeteries and gravestones. That same month, Azerbaijani President 

Ilham Aliyev pledged to protect Christian churches and specified 

that “Christians of Azerbaijan” would be given access to those 

places of worship. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 59

AZERBAIJAN

Background

Approximately 96 percent of Azerbaijan’s estimated population of 

10.2 million people are Muslim; the Azerbaijani government estimates 

that around 65 percent identify as Shi’a Muslim, while the other 35 

percent identify as Sunni Muslim. The remaining 4 percent of the population consists of atheists, Armenian Apostolics, Baha’is, Catholics, 

Georgian Orthodox, members of the International Society for Krishna 

Consciousness, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Molokans, Protestants, and 

Russian Orthodox.

Azerbaijan is a secular state that stipulates the separation of state 

and religion in its constitution. Although the constitution protects the 

freedom of conscience and provides for the right to “profess individually or together with others any religion or to profess no religion, 

and to express and disseminate...beliefs concerning...religion,” the 

government has in practice limited such rights through the 2009 law 

On Freedom of Religious Beliefs, the administrative code, and the 

criminal code.

Government Control of Religious Practice and 

Literature

The Azerbaijani government wields extensive control over religious 

practice throughout the country, including that of majority Shi’a 

Muslims, Sunni Muslims, and non-Muslim minorities. The government 

actively differentiates between what it views as “traditional” and “nontraditional” religions, favoring those communities it places in the former 

category and interfering in the affairs of the latter—such as Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, Protestants, and others. In particular, the government perceives independent Muslims as potential threats to its authority or 

national security, and it regularly enacts policies “to counter and limit 

the influence of [those] unwanted religious groups.” To this end, the 

government oversees and strictly regulates Islamic practices through 

both the official State Committee for Work with Religious Associations 

(SCWRA) and the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB).

Although many non-Muslim religious communities have reported 

improved overall conditions for religious freedom in recent years, 

their practices remain subject to state approval. Religious minority 

communities frequently experience difficulty obtaining registration, as 

each community must first have at least 50 adult founding members in 

order to qualify, and at times officials have subjectively applied other 

discretionary guidelines to impede their registration. In addition to 

mandatory registration, other provisions of the law—such as those 

that limit a religious community’s activities to its legal, registered 

address; prohibit foreign citizens from engaging in “religious propaganda” or missionary activity; and require that the SCWRA approve 

all religious literature and related materials—also serve to inhibit the 

ability of these communities to practice their religion or belief freely.

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

In September 2020, armed conflict broke out between Armenia and 

Azerbaijan in connection with the long-running dispute over NagornoKarabakh and the surrounding territories. Although the conflict is 

predominantly territorial and ethnic in nature, some people involved in 

or directly affected by the conflict have characterized it as partially driven 

or exacerbated by religious differences. On two separate occasions in 

October, Azerbaijani forces reportedly shelled with precision-guided 

missiles the Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in Shusha, resulting in significant 

damage to some parts of the structure, including the roof. Human Rights 

Watch determined the attacks were likely deliberate and would therefore 

constitute a war crime that should be investigated and prosecuted.

Over the course of the fighting and in the immediate aftermath of the November ceasefire, numerous local and international 

observers raised concerns about safeguarding religious and other 

cultural sites, specifically underscoring the need to protect the 

various Armenian churches, monasteries, and cemeteries lost or 

subsequently ceded to Azerbaijani control. By the end of the reporting period, there was evidence that some of these sites—such as 

the cemetery of an Armenian church in Hadrut—had already been 

vandalized. At the end of the year, the Azerbaijani government 

announced that at least two Azerbaijani soldiers, Arzu Hüseynov and 

Umid Ag ̆ ayev, faced charges for destroying Armenian gravestones 

in a village in the district of Xocavənd. 

Key U.S. Policy

In their bilateral relationship, the United States and Azerbaijan 

continued to prioritize European energy security, trade and investment, and joint efforts to combat terrorism and transnational threats. 

The United States also remained engaged in seeking a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a cochair—alongside France 

and Russia—in the OSCE Minsk Group. Following the outbreak of 

conflict in late September, the United States condemned the use of 

force and urged the sides to bring an end to hostilities. In October, 

then Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo met separately with the 

Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers to urge both sides to 

cease fighting and resume negotiations. Although the United States 

brokered a ceasefire that commenced within days of that meeting, it 

was reportedly violated just minutes after coming into effect.

The State Department raised a number of religious freedom 

issues in Azerbaijan throughout the year. In June, then Ambassadorat-Large for International Religious Freedom Samuel D. Brownback 

expressed concern about the reported dismissal from Parliament of 

Rahim Akhundov due to his religious identity, pressed Azerbaijan to 

release all religious prisoners, and called for the country to protect 

religious sites in Nagorno-Karabakh.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Country Update: Stalled Progress in Azerbaijan

• Issue Update: The Global Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses

• Interview: Need to Release Prisoners of Conscience Is “More Urgent than Ever” (in Turan)

• Commissioner Delegation Visit: Baku and Quba in February 2020
60 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

AZERBAIJAN

Individual Views of Commissioner Johnnie Moore

Azerbaijan should not be on USCIRF’s list. Despite its legitimate 

security concerns, Azerbaijan is one of the only countries in the world 

where Sunni and Shi’a clerics pray together, where all Christian sects 

enjoy a reputation for cooperation, and where a thriving Jewish community has long reported freedom and security in an almost entirely 

Islamic country. Azerbaijan is a Shi’a-majority neighbor of Iran whose 

still-warm peace with the state of Israel was established almost 30 

years ago! The country has also made important strides toward 

increasing religious freedom despite a post-Soviet legal framework, 

certainly more so than its neighbors. 

I am afraid the Commission’s view on Azerbaijan may be interpreted by some as inserting itself into the politics of war between 

Armenia and Azerbaijan. The conflict between the two countries—

which is political and geographic, not religious—is often oversimplified 

as it cannot actually be understood in isolation from the interests of 

other countries like Iran, Turkey, and Russia. 

Finding a path to enduring peace between Azerbaijan and 

Armenia is a better use for religion. Religion should be the meeting 

place rather than a rhetorical weapon or a causality of war. This can 

begin with an assessment of any holy sites—Christian or Muslim—that 

were damaged during the recent war or the years of conflict that preceded it, and a joint effort should be undertaken to restore what has 

been damaged or desecrated, whether unintentionally or otherwise. 

62 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

CUBA

• Maintain Cuba on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Impose targeted sanctions on Cuban government agencies and officials responsible 

for severe violations of religious freedom—

including Caridad Diego, head of the 

ORA—by freezing those individuals’ assets 

and/or barring their entry into the United 

States under human rights related financial 

and visa authorities, citing specific religious 

freedom violations;

• Publicly denounce violations of religious 

freedom and related human rights in Cuba 

and convey that any changes in other areas 

of U.S. policy toward and engagement with 

Cuba do not diminish the Cuban government’s need to improve religious freedom 

conditions on the island;

• Encourage Cuban authorities to extend an 

official invitation for an unrestricted visits 

by USCIRF and the UN Special Rapporteur 

on freedom of religion or belief; and

• Increase opportunities for Cuban religious 

leaders from both registered and unregistered religious communities to engage 

with, exchange aid and materials with, and 

interact with coreligionists in the United 

States and globally.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Cuba remained challenging. The Cuban government used a system of laws and 

policies, surveillance, and harassment to control and suppress 

religious groups and others for their advocacy or support of religious freedom. 

The Cuban government, through the Office of Religious 

Affairs (ORA) continued its repressive enforcement of religious 

restrictions. The Law of Associations requires religious organizations to apply to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), where the ORA is 

housed, for registration. Despite existing criteria, registration decisions are often arbitrary and discriminatory. Unregistered religious 

groups are particularly vulnerable, as membership or association 

with an unregistered religious group is a crime. The ORA exercises 

direct and arbitrary control over the affairs of registered religious 

organizations, requiring permission for virtually any activity other 

than regular worship services. 

During 2020, the Cuban government harassed and intimidated certain religious communities and their leaders. Common 

tactics included threats, short-term detentions and interrogations, 

surveillance, and travel restrictions. The Apostolic Movement, an 

unregistered network of Protestant churches, reported an increase 

in arrests, threats, and fines of pastors and parishioners. Pastor 

Alain Toledano Valiente of the Apostolic Movement, his family, and 

his congregation were frequent targets of the regime’s harassment. 

In May, several United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteurs, including 

the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, issued 

a communication to Cuba regarding the ongoing harassment of 

Pastor Toledano and the Apostolic Movement, noting their concern that the group’s lack of legal registration prevents it from 

operating freely. An unregistered church in Victoria de las Tunas 

reported ongoing harassment, including stoning of worshippers, 

denial of permits to worship, and threats of criminal charges against 

the pastor. According to the pastor, security services encouraged 

the stoning and warned that the attacks would stop only if he 

ceased calling for religious freedom during his sermons. Several 

Santería religious leaders and practitioners, particularly members 

of the unregistered Free Yoruba Association of Cuba, were also frequent targets of government harassment. State security reportedly

detained, threatened, and surveilled Free Yoruba leaders, including 

detaining two high-ranking Free Yorubas in March and declaring 

that “there is only one god, Fidel Castro.” In May, state security 

reportedly broke up a religious meeting of an unregistered Islamic 

group studying the Qur’an, summoned participants to the police 

station the next day, and threatened them with criminal charges.

The government used its penal code against individuals 

whose religious beliefs conflict with the political teachings and 

practices in schools and education. The children of Olainis Tejeda 

Beltrán and Lescaille Prebal, members of the Jewish Sephardic 

Bnei Anusim community, endured violent bullying for wearing 

kippahs at school. Instead of protecting the children, authorities 

responded by threatening the parents with criminal penalties and 

loss of guardianship if the children continued to wear the religious symbols. The parents agreed in January that their children 

would attend school without kippahs. However, they continued 

to denounce their children’s treatment in independent online 

media, which resulted in authorities threatening charges under 

Decree Law 370. This law regulates the use of the internet and is 

applied to criminalize critical expression. Other religious leaders 

were threatened with charges under this law for “subversive posts 

on social media.” Pastor Ramón Rigal and his wife Adya Expósito 

Leyva were released from prison in July and March respectively. 

After homeschooling their children based on a concern regarding 

Cuban schools’ promotion of socialism and atheism, the couple 

was convicted in April 2019 for “illicit association”—as their church 

is unregistered—and other charges, including acts against the 

normal development of their children. While USCIRF welcomed 

their release, concerns about conflicts between religious beliefs 

and practice and schooling persist.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Factsheet: Santería Tradition in Cuba

• Press Statement: Release of Pastor Ramón Rigal

• Press Statement: Release of Ayda Expósito
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 63

CUBA

Background

While there are no independent sources on Cuba’s religious demographics, a reported 60–70 percent of Cuba’s estimated population 

of 11.1 million self-identify as Catholic. Approximately 25–30 percent 

identify as unaffiliated or another religion, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

Methodists, Seventh-day Adventists, Anglicans, Presbyterians, 

Episcopalians, Buddhists, Muslims, Jews, Quakers, Moravians, and 

members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. An estimated 70% of Cubans engage in one or more practices associated 

with Santería, a syncretic religion borne out of the Yoruba tradition 

mixed with elements of Catholicism, or another Afro-Cuban religion. 

Cuba is a one-party system under the ruling Cuban Communist 

Party, with no independent judiciary and where the state tightly controls religious institutions. A new constitution adopted in April 2019 

protects the freedom of religion or belief and prohibits religious discrimination. A timetable was set to review and amend corresponding 

legislation to codify the constitutional changes, including the Law of 

Associations. However, this process has been delayed, resulting in 

some constitutional rights existing only on paper. 

Restrictions on Religious Property

The right to establish and maintain places of worship is severely limited in Cuba. It is illegal to hold religious activities in buildings not 

dedicated for religious use. The ORA rarely grants permission for new 

religious buildings and seldomly approves any renovation or construction of designated religious buildings. In a positive development, in 

October the Catholic Church opened the last of three new churches 

built since the 1959 socialist revolution. 

Threats to demolish unregistered religious buildings reportedly 

increased, and even registered religious buildings were targeted. Cuban 

authorities, with permission from the ORA, demolished an Assemblies 

of God church in Santiago de Cuba in October. This church was one 

of the few Protestant churches with legal status, as it had been registered since 1959. Pastor Toledano, who lives in the neighborhood, was 

violently detained while broadcasting the demolition on social media. 

Authorities later detained the church’s pastor and superintendent. 

Many, if not most, Cubans’ place of worship is private residences. 

The Cuban government imposes complicated and repressive requirements on private residences used as places of worship, limiting the 

ability of Cubans to worship in community.

Conscientious Objectors

There are no legal provisions exempting conscientious objectors

from mandatory military service. In December, Oscar Kendri Fial 

Echavarría, who believes carrying and using weapons goes against 

his Christian beliefs, was detained and later prosecuted for disobedience because he did not enlist. In October, activist Osmel Rubio 

Santos was detained for several hours after refusing military service.

Targeting of Independent Journalists Who Report 

on Religious Freedom

The Cuban government frequently targeted independent journalists for reporting on religious freedom conditions. After serving 

over a year in a labor camp for disobedience and resistance for 

covering the trials of Pastors Rigal and Expósito, independent journalist Roberto Jesus Quiñones Haces was released in September. 

Cuban authorities also harassed other independent journalists who 

report on religious freedom, including Yoe Suárez, by threatening 

criminal charges and fines, often under Decree Law 370, and imposing travel restrictions.

Denial of Religious Freedom for Activists 

and Protesters

Cuban authorities also violated the religious freedom of human rights 

activists and protesters, often by blocking their access to religious 

services. The Ladies in White, the wives and relatives of dissidents 

imprisoned in 2003, suspended their weekly attendance at Mass and 

protest marches due to coronavirus. However, the group was denied 

access to religious services and arbitrarily detained when marches 

occurred at the beginning of the year and after restrictions were 

relaxed. In December, Lady in White Martha Sánchez González was 

released early on parole from prison, where she was serving a fouryear sentence that began in 2018 for disobedience.

In November, a crackdown on the San Isidro Movement (MSI), 

a civil society group opposed to restrictions on artistic expression, 

sparked rare protests calling for greater freedom of expression. 

Cuban authorities harassed, surveilled, and stopped some protesters from leaving their homes, including preventing individuals 

from attending religious services. Catholic officials were reportedly

blocked from visiting protesters. One priest who attempted to 

visit and attend to the protesters’ religious needs was fined for 

“enemy propaganda” and told he required a permit from the ORA 

to access protesters. 

Key U.S. Policy

The Trump administration’s policy toward Cuba was guided by 

the November 2017 National Security Presidential Memorandum 

entitled Strengthening the Policy of the United States toward Cuba, 

which focused on the need for human rights, democracy, and free 

enterprise in Cuba. In 2020, the Trump administration imposed a 

range of sanctions that aimed to deny the Cuban regime funds 

used to support Venezuela while strengthening Cuba’s civil society 

and private sector. Since 2018, the U.S. Embassy in Havana has 

operated with a permanently reduced staff and limited embassy 

operations. 

High-level government officials raised concern regarding Cuba’s 

poor human rights record, including then Secretary of State Michael 

R. Pompeo, who welcomed the release of Roberto Quiñones and 

condemned the crackdown on MSI. Then U.S. Agency for International 

Development Acting Administrator John Barsa noted the importance 

of religious freedom in Cuba during a webinar in September. Chargé 

d’Affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Havana Timothy Zuniga-Brown condemned religious freedom abuses in Cuba, including the demolition 

of the church in October. On December 2, the State Department 

again placed Cuba on its Special Watch List for severe violations of 

religious freedom.
64 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

CUBA

Individual Views of Commissioner Johnnie Moore

In my estimation, Cuba should not be recommended by USCIRF for 

the U.S. Department of State’s Special Watch List. It should be recommended for designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

Cuba’s ongoing, systematic, and egregious actions are not isolated to 

the country alone, but rather are characterized by transparent efforts 

to aid and abet the agendas of other hostile actors from around the 

world in the Western Hemisphere.

66 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

EGYPT

• Include Egypt on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging 

in or tolerating severe religious freedom 

violations pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Urge the Egyptian government to 1) take 

concrete steps toward phasing out the longstanding use of customary reconciliation 

councils to resolve incidents of sectarian 

mob violence, 2) repeal decrees banning 

Baha’is and Jehovah’s Witnesses, 3) remove 

religion from official identity documents, 

4) pass laws consistent with article 53 of 

Egypt’s constitution; and 5) repeal Article 

98(f) of the Criminal Code, which penalizes 

“ridiculing or insulting a heavenly religion 

or a sect following it,” and in the interim 

limit the conditions under which the law is 

applied and allow charged individuals to 

post bail; 

• Encourage Egypt to expedite approval of 

church registrations under Law 80 of 2016;

• Allocate a portion of U.S. assistance to 

programs supporting efforts to promote 

greater religious inclusivity throughout the 

country as well as to reform public school 

curriculum and teacher training; and 

• Conduct a comprehensive review of all U.S. 

assistance to Egypt and require the State 

Department to provide explicit justification 

for the release of any previously withheld 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF), including public disclosure of justification for its 

certification of Egypt’s progress toward 

improving human rights and religious freedom conditions.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Egypt remained largely 

static. Radical Islamist violence and anti-Christian mob attacks 

remained serious threats but occurred less frequently than in 

prior years. Despite some improvements, systematic and ongoing 

religious inequalities remained affixed in the Egyptian state and 

society, as various forms of religious bigotry and discrimination 

continued to plague the country’s Coptic Christians and other 

religious minorities.

In terms of positive trends, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and 

other officials continued to call for religious inclusivity, albeit less 

prominently than in the prior two years, including again attending

Coptic Orthodox Christmas Mass in January. The Cabinet committee for approving registration of churches and church-related 

buildings approved 388 such preexisting properties in 2020—a 

significant decline from 785 in 2019 and 627 in 2018. It has now 

approved 1,800 of the 5,515 applications received (32.6 percent) 

since the passage of Law 80/2016, commonly known as the Church 

Building Law. Several high-profile court cases resulted in the conviction of perpetrators of religiously motivated violence, including 

the June conviction and sentencing to 15 years in prison of seven 

individuals for the 2013 burning of a church in Giza. A Court of 

Appeals ruling in May affirmed the right of Christians to follow their 

own tradition of inheritance distribution, including gender equality. With the permission and often direct support of the Egyptian 

government, local and international initiatives furthered efforts to 

revitalize some non-Muslim religious heritage sites, including the 

completion of a project to restore the Basatin Cemetery in Cairo, 

one of the world’s oldest Jewish burial sites. 

Nevertheless, Egyptian authorities continued to perpetrate 

or tolerate various forms of systematic and ongoing religious 

freedom violations. Blasphemy cases continued to disproportionately impact non-Muslims as well as Muslims whose beliefs the 

state perceived as outside officially accepted interpretations of 

Sunni Islam. Religious discrimination remained pervasive, including a disparity in policies regarding places of worship, a lack of 

opportunities for non-Muslims to work in key areas of government 

service, state security harassment of former Muslims, and recurring incidents of anti-Christian mob violence, particularly in rural 

areas. For example, reports in 2020 pointed to the exclusion of 

non-Muslims from the roster of Egypt’s national soccer team, while 

the Coptic community continued to raise longstanding concerns

regarding the potential targeting of Christian women by radical 

Islamists for abduction and forcible conversion. In December, 

attackers in Alexandria stabbed one Christian to death and injured 

two others in what was likely a sectarian incident. Anti-Coptic 

violence in the Minya towns of Dabous and Barsha in October and 

November, respectively, illustrated Egypt’s ongoing impunity for 

sectarian violence, as each incident concluded with a so-called 

“customary reconciliation council” that absolved the attackers 

of responsibility.

The Egyptian government continued to fall short in balancing domestic security, protection of citizens’ fundamental rights, 

and economic development, despite a nearly 3 percent decline in 

poverty in 2020. Security forces continued to struggle with combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in North Sinai as its 

self-proclaimed “Sinai Province” carried out operations against government forces and civilians, including the November kidnapping

of a Coptic man in Bir al-Abd. Although 2020 saw few incidents of 

radical Islamist violence elsewhere in the country, the government 

continued to use counterterrorism as a pretense to repress journalists, human rights and religious freedom advocates, and other 

members of civil society—even prosecuting some resulting cases 

through a terrorism court. Such actions directly contradict the 

government’s assurances that it is working to improve conditions 

for civil society, including its passage of a revised version of the 

Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) Law in 2019.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Press Statement: USCIRF Condemns Egypt’s Detention of Mohamed Basheer, Ramy Kamel
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 67

EGYPT

Background

Egypt’s constitution identifies Islam as the state religion and the 

principles of Shari’a as the primary source of legislation. While 

Article 64 states that “freedom of belief is absolute,” only Muslims, 

Christians, and Jews can practice their religion publicly and build 

places of worship. Of the country’s estimated 104 million people, 

around 90 percent are Sunni Muslims, and non-Sunni Muslims, such 

as Shi’a Muslims, comprise less than 1 percent. An estimated 10 

percent are Christians, the majority of whom belong to the Coptic 

Orthodox Church; other Christians belong to various denominations 

that include Catholic, Anglican, Evangelical Protestant, Maronite, 

Armenian Apostolic, Greek and Syrian Orthodox, and others. There 

are at least 2,000 Baha’is, approximately 1,500 Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

and fewer than 20 Jews.

Legal and Security Repression

Egypt’s evolving crackdown on civil society demonstrated the overlapping interests of religious freedom and broader human rights. 

In November, security forces detained Mohamed Basheer, Karim 

Ennarah, and Gasser Abdelrazek, three members of the NGO the 

Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR). While authorities 

released them three days later, after an international outcry, prosecutors submitted their case to a terrorism court, which ordered the 

seizure of their personal assets. These arrests were likely in retaliation 

for EIPR’s discussion of issues facing Egyptian civil society with a visiting delegation of diplomats from the European Union and Canada in 

October, echoing Coptic activist Ramy Kamel’s November 2019 arrest 

and indefinite detention one day before he was expected to travel 

to Switzerland to testify at the United Nations Forum on Minority 

Issues. Both EIPR and Kamel have devoted significant emphasis in 

their advocacy to the challenges facing Coptic Christians and other 

religious minorities in Egypt. Their detentions, along with that of EIPR 

researcher Patrick Zaki earlier in the year, demonstrate a systematic 

and ongoing effort by the government to suppress any challenge 

to its narrative of progress and its efforts to bolster its international 

image—even against those whose work addresses the same challenges the government itself ostensibly recognizes.

At the same time, a recent USCIRF report has shown that implementation of Egypt’s blasphemy law—Article 98(f) of the Criminal 

Code—made it one of the world’s worst offenders of both blasphemy-related prosecutions and societal violence between 2014 and 

2018. Such arrests and prosecutions continued in 2020; they involved 

both Muslims and non-Muslims, but they most often targeted religious 

minorities, including Christians, nonbelievers, Qur’anists, and Shi’a 

Muslims. For example, in June an Alexandria court sentenced Anas 

Hassan to three years in prison for managing a Facebook page that 

promoted atheism, while Reda Abdel Rahman, a teacher at al-Azhar 

Institute in Sharqiya governorate, was detained in August for promoting Qur’anism.

Rural Sectarianism 

Anti-Christian mob attacks remain endemic in parts of rural Egypt. 

Although 2020 saw a modest decline in incidents in comparison to 

prior years, the decrease may have resulted from the months-long 

closures of houses of worship throughout Egypt to prevent the spread 

of COVID-19. Nevertheless, legal impunity for the perpetrators of 

such violence persisted in 2020 as the systematic norm. These sorts 

of attacks most commonly occur in response to a rumor of a perceived 

slight against the Muslim majority—such as an interreligious affair, a 

social media post perceived as insulting Islam, or an attempt to register an informal church legally—and they are almost always met with 

the convening of a “customary reconciliation council” that ultimately 

absolves the perpetrators of legal responsibility and punishes the 

victims. For example, in September the Minya Criminal Court convicted 23 defendants in absentia for burning several Coptic homes in 

2016 following rumors of an interreligious affair—a rare prosecution, 

likely due to the notoriety of the attack, which also involved the sexual 

assault of an elderly Coptic woman—but the terms of a last-minute 

reconciliation agreement led to the acquittal of three of the attackers.

Key U.S. Policy

Bilateral relations between the United States and Egypt remained 

steady in 2020—a partnership that has weathered countless 

challenges since the Camp David Accords of 1979. U.S. financial 

assistance, mostly in the form of FMF, remained largely consistent 

at $1.38 billion in FY 2020, and the same amount is expected for 

FY 2021. The administration of President Donald J. Trump broadly 

supported President El-Sisi’s efforts to counter radical Islamist 

violence and to improve religious freedom conditions in Egypt. In 

October, then U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

Acting Administrator John Barsa, then Deputy Assistant to the 

President Sarah Makin, and then Chief Advisor for International 

Religious Freedom Samah Norquist led a delegation to the country 

that included a rare visit by high-ranking U.S. officials to Upper 

Egypt, where they joined U.S. Ambassador Jonathan Cohen in 

meeting with local programs to promote religious freedom in sectarianism-plagued Minya. However, Egypt’s detention of EIPR staff 

members in November drew sharp, bipartisan rebuke from members 

of Congress and the State Department—only weeks after 55 members of Congress issued a letter calling on President El-Sisi to release 

imprisoned members of Egyptian civil society, naming Ramy Kamel 

and more than 20 others.
68 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

EGYPT

Individual Views of Commissioner Johnnie Moore

Despite all the complications of managing the Arab world’s largest 

country, often in the crosshairs of terrorists, Egypt’s President Abdel 

Fattah el-Sisi deserves credit for assuming personal responsibility 

for the republic’s interfaith harmony. He has often led by example, 

has always taken the issue seriously, and has worked personally to 

protect and foster peaceful coexistence among Egypt’s varied religious communities. I commend el-Sisi for it. I have also appreciated 

his willingness to indulge in direct and brutally honest conversations 

with various interlocutors along the way, unlike many world leaders. 

Of course, Egypt must continue along its path until every Egyptian 

citizen in every part of the country feels they can practice their faith 

without fear. 

70 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

INDONESIA

• Include Indonesia on the U.S. Department 

of State’s Special Watch List for engaging 

in or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Urge the Indonesian government to revise 

the draft Criminal Code bill to remove criminal sanctions for blasphemy; to repeal or 

amend the existing blasphemy laws, including Indonesia’s ITE law; and to release all 

individuals currently detained or imprisoned on blasphemy charges;

• Urge the Indonesian government to repeal 

or revise existing legislation and regulations on houses of worship, including the 

2006 Joint Regulation;

• Incorporate training on international 

human rights standards related to religious 

freedom—including concerns related to 

enforcement of blasphemy laws—into U.S.-

funded programs, such as the U.S. Agency 

for International Development’s (USAID) 

Harmoni and MAJu projects, and work with 

the Ministry of Education to incorporate 

programming on tolerance and inclusivity into compulsory education courses on 

religion; and

• Urge the Indonesian government to take 

the regional lead on human rights and 

religious freedom in its capacity in the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) Intergovernmental Commission 

on Human Rights, including by publicly 

advocating on behalf of Uyghurs and 

other persecuted Muslims throughout 

the region. 

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Indonesia stagnated. The 

administration of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) continued 

to pursue a policy of promoting its favored interpretation of 

Islam through state efforts that included attempting to revamp the 

state ideology of Pancasila, establishing a voluntary certification 

program for religious officials, and installing “moderate” voices 

inside the quasi-governmental Indonesia Ulema Council (MUI). 

However, these measures aimed to combat rising extremist or hardline Islamist trends and to promote tolerance exclusively among 

officially recognized religions; they did not promote greater religious freedom or expand recognition of other religious minorities.

Religious extremists continued to represent a serious threat 

against religious minorities and others. In June, a militant extremist attacked the deputy police chief in Central Java with a knife. In 

Sulawesi, the radical Islamist group, East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT), 

carried out a series of sectarian attacks, killing four Christians and 

burning a home that local Christians used for a house of worship. 

The enforcement of blasphemy laws, which Indonesia 

inherited from the Dutch colonial period but expanded under 

Presidential Decree No. 1/PNPS/1965 and the Law on Information 

and Electronic Transactions (ITE), continued to impact all religious 

communities. In May, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 

indicated an increase in blasphemy allegations, primarily through 

application of the ITE law—even as the coronavirus pandemic 

raged. For example, in March authorities in Probolinggo Regency, 

East Java, arrested a local man for sharing lewd religious images 

online; in July, the State Court of East Java sentenced him to four 

years’ imprisonment and fined him five million Indonesian rupiah 

($350 USD). Beginning in April, a number of people across the 

country faced arrest and blasphemy charges for sharing a song 

about a wife of the Prophet Muhammad with altered lyrics that 

some religious conservatives found offensive. These detainees 

included a popular YouTube celebrity who was arrested in April 

in Medan, North Sumatra, and sentenced in October to seven 

months’ imprisonment, as well as three young adults in Gorontalo 

Province who were arrested in May after posting a video of them 

dancing and singing to the song in question. While these cases 

involved the dissemination of potentially offensive material, none 

included incitement to violence. 

In July, hardline Islamist organizations and their supporters 

actively demonstrated against interfaith activities in West Java 

and contributed to obstructing government efforts to reform the 

official ideology of Pancasila due to concerns about both communism and secularization. In West Sumatra, the governor successfully 

petitioned for the removal of a Christian Bible app in the minority 

Minangkabau language from the Google Play store due to concerns 

about Christian proselytization to the Muslim-majority community. 

In May, acting Governor of Aceh Nova Iriansya was likewise successful in removing the Aceh Holy Bible app from the Google Play store. 

Last year, USCIRF reported on the September 2019 attempt 

by the Indonesian legislature to replace the existing Criminal Code, 

which dates back to the Dutch colonial era. This new code would 

have expanded the criminalization of blasphemy to include insulting 

a religious leader during a religious service, persuading someone 

to become an atheist, and defiling or unlawfully destroying houses 

of worship or religious artifacts. Civil society groups led massive 

protests in response to these and other proposed restrictions, leading the government to delay the bill indefinitely. Throughout 2020, 

this draft code was neither amended nor removed from consideration in the legislature. NGO reports indicate that the government 

has failed to soften the provisions in the code that would violate 

international human rights standards, including religious freedom.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Factsheet: Rohingya Refugees in Southeast Asia

• Factsheet: Indonesia’s Pancasila 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 71

INDONESIA

Background

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country. 

Muslims comprise 87.2 percent of Indonesia’s 267 million citizens, 

while Protestant Christians comprise 7 percent, Roman Catholics 

2.9 percent, and Hindus 1.7 percent; 0.9 percent identify as another 

minority religion such as Buddhism or Confucianism. In 2020, the 

World Bank upgraded Indonesia’s economic ranking from lower- to 

upper-middle income country.

In light of this diversity, Indonesia has a long tradition of religious 

pluralism. Article 29 of its constitution “guarantees the independence 

of each resident to embrace religion and worship according to their 

respective religions and beliefs.” The government has long promoted 

an ideology known as Pancasila, which comprises five principles: 

monotheism (broadly defined as any religion with a supreme deity, 

holy figure, scripture, and established rituals), civilized humanity, 

national unity, deliberative democracy, and social justice. Efforts in 

summer 2020 to pass legislation to reform Pancasila failed. These 

failed reforms included strengthening the government’s responsibility to promote the ideology in school and its ability to regulate 

Pancasila through the Agency for Pancasila Ideology Education. The 

government officially recognizes only six religions: Islam, Catholicism, 

Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism, based on 

a 1952 Ministry of Religious Affairs definition of religion that limits 

it to monotheistic traditions. Furthermore, the government views 

Sunnism as the only officially accepted variant of Islam. Violations 

of religious freedom tend to impact Ahmadiyya and Shi’a Muslims 

disproportionately as well as Christians, believers outside the six officially recognized faiths, nonbelievers, atheists, and certain indigenous 

religious communities.

The government also requires all citizens to list their religious 

affiliation on their identification cards—a practice that has historically forced nonbelievers and members of unrecognized religious 

minorities to misrepresent their faith or leave the field blank. This 

omission can impact access to licenses and permits, education, and 

government jobs. 

Shari’a Law in Aceh 

Aceh is the only province in Indonesia with the legal authority to 

enact Shari’a law. Religious police there enforce a strict interpretation of Shari’a that includes and administers corporal punishment. In 

December 2019, Aceh introduced its first all-female flogging squad, 

which it expanded in early 2020. This development was the end result 

of years of pushing by authorities to assemble such squads to punish 

women convicted in the Shari’a courts. Behavior is heavily regulated 

within this framework; for example, couples are in danger of flogging 

if they sit too close, women are prevented from straddling motorbikes 

and forced to wear hijabs, and unmarried sexual activity is severely 

punished. During the pandemic, officials modified but continued to 

enforce such corporal punishment.

Houses of Worship

The 2006 Joint Regulation on houses of worship remains an ongoing 

and systemic barrier to the religious freedom of minority communities, 

requiring at least 90 congregation members and approval from 60 

local households of other religions. In March, a group of petitioners referred to as the “People’s Lawsuit Presidium” requested that 

the Supreme Court review the regulation, but the request made no 

subsequent progress. In March and April, two mosques belonging 

to the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation (JAI) were sealed from 

use. In Karimun, the local Catholic community faced hardline Muslim 

resistance to efforts to renovate St. Joseph Catholic Church. The community had received a permit in October 2019, but protests spurred 

the local authorities to delay its approval. Construction finally began in 

April 2020, but only after President Jokowi intervened and the lawsuit 

that had prevented it was thrown out in court. 

Minority Faith Communities

Members of minority Muslim sects—such as the Milah Abraham faith 

community (also known as Gafatar), Shi’a Muslims, and Ahmadiyya 

Muslims—remained especially vulnerable in 2020. MUI has long 

issued fatwas (religious edicts) declaring these groups “deviant” and 

heretical to Islam; in 2005, MUI issued a fatwa declaring Ahmadiyya 

Muslims as apostates, and in 2008 the government banned them from 

proselytizing, a step that former Indonesia President Abdurrahman 

Wahid publicly condemned. In January 2020, Ade Munawaroh Yasin, 

the regent of Bogor, West Java, issued a letter with the support of 

local Islamists stating that Ahmadiyya Islam was illegal in Bogor. Shi’a 

Muslims who had been displaced from Madura Island in 2012 by 

anti-Shi’a violence remained unable to return home. In November, 

some members of that community publicly converted to Sunni Islam 

to return to their homes. In a positive sign, newly appointed Minister 

of Religious Affairs Yaqut Cholil Qoumas stated in December his 

intention to uphold the rights of both Shi’a and Ahmadiyya Muslims.

Key U.S. Policy

The U.S. and Indonesian governments have cooperated closely on 

counterterrorism and maritime security issues, including with regard 

to China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. The United States 

was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with 

Indonesia in 1949, following its independence from the Netherlands. 

In October, Indonesia hosted then U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. 

Pompeo to discuss continued cooperation. The United States also 

continues to support Indonesian efforts to build regional multilateral 

cooperation through organizations such as ASEAN. 

Throughout 2020, the USAID-funded Harmoni program continued to support the Ministry of Social Affairs and local organizations. 

Harmoni funding was applied to strengthen Inter-Religious Harmony 

Forums; to counter extremist narratives through community, university, 

and school-based campaigns; and to rehabilitate women and children 

returning from conflict zones in the Middle East and Philippines. 
72 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

INDONESIA

Individual Views of Commissioner Johnnie Moore

I commend the efforts by President Jokowi to promote peaceful 

coexistence in Indonesian society and to preserve Indonesia’s historic 

(and threatened) wasatiyyah Islam. Our report refers to the Jokowi 

administration “favoring their preferred view of Islam.” There are 

many issues in Indonesia worthy of concern, but this is not one of 

them. I am glad that Jokowi is combating extremism by favoring 

a tolerant, Indonesian Islam and not allowing extremists to hijack 

the religious culture of the world’s most populated Muslim country. 

Religious freedom and human rights must never be used as a shield 

for extremists, whether it’s via Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

(IRGC)-affiliated Shi’a extremists who threaten Bahrain or Lebanon or 

al-Qaeda-affiliated Sunni extremists who target Egypt or Indonesia. 

Religion certainly plays an outsized role in Indonesian society, but as 

long as it does, then the government should absolutely continue to 

empower and favor moderates. Thankfully, Indonesia has plenty of 

them as it has long been home to many of the world’s most admirable 

and credible Islamic scholars and leaders.

74 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

IRAQ

• Include Iraq on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Encourage the Iraqi government, as part 

of high-priority bilateral relations, to 

implement its own stated policy to rein in 

the PMF, particularly those factions that 

continue to engage in sectarian violence; 

present specific obstacles to the return and 

rehabilitation of Yazidis, Christians, Sunni 

Arab Muslims and other religious and ethnic 

components in northern Iraq; and/or intervene against the protest movement on 

behalf of Iranian interests; 

• Use diplomatic and other available channels to encourage the IFG and the KRG to 

resolve the disputed areas per article 140 of 

the Iraqi Constitution while including all religious and ethnic minorities in the process 

and comprehensively implement the Sinjar 

Security Agreement with full inclusion of 

the Yazidi community in particular;

• Impose targeted sanctions on additional 

PMF leaders who direct militia engagement 

in severe violations of religious freedom by 

freezing those individuals’ assets and/or 

barring their entry into the United States 

under human rights related financial and 

visa authorities, citing specific religious 

freedom violations; and

• Continue to assist Iraqi religious and ethnic 

minorities to rebuild communities devastated by ISIS and to advocate for their own 

interests, including opening a broad discussion on governance to hold fair and free 

local and regional elections to select their 

own representatives.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Iraq remained poor despite 

the ostensibly significant Sinjar Security Agreement signed by 

the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi Federal 

Government (IFG) in October to provide protection for religious 

minorities. Almost four years after the defeat of the Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria (ISIS), religious and ethnic minorities in the Nineveh 

Plains and Sinjar continued to face immense challenges to returning 

safely to their towns and homes from internally displaced persons (IDP) 

and refugee camps. Renewed fear of persecution is growing among 

these communities amid lingering potential for a re-emergence of ISIS 

or ISIS like groups. Iranian-backed militia groups under the Popular 

Mobilization Forces (PMF), also known as Popular Mobilization Units 

(PMUs), continued their constant harassment of religious and ethnic 

minorities, especially in northern Iraq, making the improvement of 

religious freedom conditions more difficult. In 2020, the PMF operated 

with impunity in the Nineveh Plains and Sinjar, committing heinous 

violations against these long-suffering communities. 

Although humanitarian assistance from the United States 

and other international donors contributed to improving the infrastructure that ISIS had ravaged across northern Iraq, a substantial 

proportion of displaced religious and ethnic minorities did not feel 

safe returning to or living in their homes in 2020. Over one million 

Sunni Arab Muslims remained forcibly displaced, both internally 

and externally. Accused or suspected of aiding ISIS, many of them 

continued to fear retaliation if they return to their homes in former 

ISIS-controlled territories. The Yazidi minority remained especially 

vulnerable, still largely scattered throughout the Middle East and 

beyond with limited opportunity to return safely to their heartland 

of Sinjar. Living in IDP and refugee camps further exposed Yazidis 

to threats from ISIS affiliates and other hostile militia groups; for 

example, throughout the year, ISIS hunted Yazidi boys and girls to 

traffic or force them into other illegal activities. Additionally, of the 

6,000 Yazidi girls and women whom ISIS abducted in 2014, only a 

few hundred or so were able to reunite with their families during the 

year; Iraq’s inability to address this atrocity continued to perpetuate 

collective trauma throughout the Yazidi community. Also, many 

Iraqi Christians in northern Iraq remained displaced in 2020; those 

who were able to return to their homelands found their property, 

including places of worship, destroyed or expropriated. 

Turkish airstrikes and other military operations against the 

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq, particularly in the 

area of Sinjar, have worsened the situation as they disproportionately impacted already devastated religious and ethnic minority 

communities. The Turkish military has reportedly taken minimal 

precautions to avoid civilian causalities in the area; for example, in 

June and July, the Turkish advance into Sinjar as part of “Operation 

Claw-Eagle” and “Operation Claw-Tiger” claimed the lives of five 

civilians and wounded dozens more. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Policy Update: Protecting Religious Minorities in Northern Iraq

• Press Statement: USCIRF Condemns Turkish Military Operations in Northern Iraq
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 75

IRAQ

Background

The Iraqi population is predominantly Muslim: 64–69 percent are 

Shi’a Muslim and 29–34 percent are Sunni Muslim. The Shi’a Muslim 

population resides predominantly in the south and eastern regions 

of the country, whereas the Sunnis live in the west, center, and north 

of the country. There are also about 200,000 Christians from various denominations, including Catholics, Orthodox, and Protestants, 

mainly located in the Nineveh Plains in the north. However, that population has drastically declined since 2003, when Iraqi Christians were 

estimated to number 1.5 million. Iraq is also home to almost 700,000 

Yazidis, who remained largely internally displaced, as well as about 

150,000 Kaka’is, also known as the Yarsan or Ahl al-Haq; these two 

communities are mainly spread across the north. Finally, a tiny Jewish 

community continues to reside in Baghdad and Erbil.

The Struggle of Religious Minorities in Northern Iraq

Six years after fleeing the ISIS genocide, the Yazidi community continued to face severe challenges to reclaiming its homeland along 

with its religious and ethnic identity. The whereabouts of thousands 

of kidnapped Yazidi women, girls, and boys remain unknown. Despite 

joint efforts between the KRG and the IFG to locate abductees and 

reunite them with their families, few were able to return to their 

homes in 2020. Around 2,800 abducted Yazidis were still missing, 

many of them reportedly still trafficked into sex, labor, or terrorism. 

Furthermore, many ISIS fighters responsible for those atrocities remain 

at large despite Yazidi demands for accountability. The 2020 United 

Nations (UN) Security Council renewal of the UN Investigative Team 

to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by ISIS, which continued to document atrocities and uncover mass graves throughout 

the year, offered some hope. 

Despite international development efforts by the U.S. government to improve living conditions for religious and ethnic minorities in 

northern Iraq, significant obstacles remained in 2020. The presence of 

armed groups and checkpoints in and around Sinjar and the Nineveh 

Plains, particularly from Iranian-backed PMF factions, have prevented 

religious and ethnic minorities from returning to their communities of 

origin. At checkpoints, PMF fighters demanded that IDPs and refugees, especially religious minorities, pay excessive amounts of money 

to cross or risk being sent back to the camps. As a result of these and 

other repressive practices, less than 50 percent of the population of 

displaced Christians have been able to return to their homes since 

ISIS was defeated in 2017. Tens of thousands from that community 

remained in IDP and refugee camps under difficult and inhumane 

conditions. Christians who managed to return to their communities 

also faced new challenges, including a lack of basic services, dire 

economic conditions, and stolen properties. 

Security Challenges in Northern Iraq

The continued presence of competing armed factions, backed by 

different regional players with varying interests in northern Iraq, 

represented a challenge to improved security in 2020. The Sinjar 

Security Agreement, signed in October, was aimed at reducing 

tensions between the KRG and the IFG that contributed to the security problems in northern Iraq. However, it was widely criticized for 

failing to address concerns of the Yazidis—Sinjar’s most vulnerable 

and traumatized community. For example, the agreement allowed 

the KRG to appoint a mayor in Sinjar without involving and consulting 

Yazidi locals. Religious minorities continued to fear that the KRG and 

IFG’s failure to agree on security measures for disputed areas opened 

the opportunity for ISIS to reemerge in areas with significant minority 

populations. For example, in April 2020, the Iraqi government raided 

a home in Hawija, Kirkuk, where dozens of ISIS members were hiding. 

Additionally, Turkish airstrikes in northern Iraq represented another 

security challenge as ongoing military operations further destabilized 

already vulnerable Yazidi areas in Sinjar. 

Other Religious Freedom Issues in Iraq

In 2020, religious freedom conditions in the KRG territory remained 

relatively consistent with the prior year, although the regional government created the new Ministry of Minority Affairs to advance the 

rights of both religious and ethnic minorities. Moreover, the KRG 

continued to host hundreds of thousands of IDPs who fled in prior 

years from ISIS territory—mainly from Yazidi, Christian, Turkmen, and 

Shabak communities. A lack of security for these communities in and 

along disputed areas persisted throughout the year. 

Religious freedom conditions in Iraq, apart from northern Iraq, 

remained poor. Although Sunni-Shi’a Muslim reconciliation efforts 

continued, there was reportedly little progress. The IFG refused to 

remove blasphemy and apostasy laws and continued to deny formal 

recognition of religious minority and nontheist groups, including 

Baha’is, Jehovah’s Witnesses, humanists, Kaka’is and others. Finally, 

the “de-Ba’athification” process, which was adopted to remove Baath 

party officials from the government post-2003 and has since remained 

a fixture in Iraqi law, continued to provide a basis for discrimination 

against Sunni Muslims. 

Key U.S. Policy

In 2020, the U.S. government maintained support for ethnic and 

religious minority groups to recover and rebuild their communities 

through financial and programmatic support as well as civic and political engagement. Since the defeat of ISIS in 2017, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) has spent over $438 million to help 

with reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including $38 million in 2020 alone. 

In addition, the U.S. government provided the Iraqi government with 

$60 million to help combat the spread of COVID-19. 

The U.S. government also enacted punitive measures against 

individuals responsible for human rights violations; for example, 

in January 2021, immediately after the reporting period, the U.S. 

Department of the Treasury imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions 

on PMF Chairman and Iraq’s former National Security Advisor Falih 

al-Fayyadh for engaging in egregious human rights abuses. U.S. government officials in Bagdad, Erbil, and Washington, DC, continued 

to raise religious freedom issues through bilateral engagement with 

their Iraqi counterparts.
76 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

KAZAKHSTAN

• Include Kazakhstan on the State Department’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating violations of religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious 

Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Continue engaging with the Kazakhstani 

government through the U.S.-Kazakhstan 

Religious Freedom Working Group to press 

the government of Kazakhstan to: 

• Repeal or amend its religious registration laws, in part by setting the required 

number of founding members at no more 

than 10 individuals; 

• End mandatory expert review of founding documents and religious literature or 

significantly reform the process to make 

it more transparent;

• Cease the detention and sentencing of 

individuals for their peaceful religious 

expression and practice; 

• Hold local officials accountable for religious freedom abuses; and

• Open the Congress of the Leaders of the 

World and Traditional Religions in 2021 

to representatives of all faiths, in cooperation with the recently founded Religious 

Freedom Roundtables; and

• Provide religious freedom training to law 

enforcement and local officials through the 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) mission in Kazakhstan as part of 

broader initiatives to combat corruption 

and promote good governance.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Kazakhstan continued 

to improve. The government remained committed to reforming 

its approach to religion in conversation with U.S. counterparts; 

President Kassym Tokayev, who assumed the presidency in 2019, 

has explicitly sought to improve Kazakhstan’s record on international religious freedom. In February, government officials joined 

the second U.S.-Kazakhstan Religious Freedom Working Group, 

held at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, DC, with 

the participation of civilian experts and U.S. officials, including 

from USCIRF. The Kazakhstani government representatives presented their road map for religious legislation and oversight reform 

over the next two years and responded to suggestions and concerns from the U.S. side. At a third working group held virtually 

in November, the Kazakhstani government provided an updated 

version of the road map and a tentative timeline for its realization.

Problematic legislation remained in force in Kazakhstan during 

2020, but significant reforms are likely in the upcoming year. Those 

reforms may include simplification of the registration process and 

a reduction in the number of founding members needed to register, removal of official approval for religious events, elimination of 

expert review of religious documents, and implementation of an 

appeals process in cases in which registration has been denied. 

Such reforms, if enacted, would significantly reduce Kazakhstan’s 

systematic limitations on religious freedom. Other positive indicators in 2020 included the government hosting a religious freedom 

roundtable in the capital of Nur-Sultan early in the year, prior to the 

outbreak of COVID-19. The government also announced its intention to convene such meetings regularly across Kazakhstan in a joint 

effort between the Ministry of Social Development and Information 

and Love Your Neighbor Community (LYNC), a nongovernmental 

organization (NGO) that works on international religious freedom. 

Meanwhile, the number of administrative prosecutions for religious 

offenses continued to decline, reaching 131 in 2020—down from 

160 in 2019, 171 in 2018, and 284 in 2017. 

Despite these noteworthy signs of improvement, ongoing 

religious freedom violations and allegations of abuse continued 

to plague Kazakhstan. Legislation that restricts religious freedom 

was the primary source of such systematic and ongoing violations. 

Before it enacted the 2011 religion law, Kazakhstan was one of 

the least repressive post-Soviet Central Asian states with regard 

to freedom of religion or belief. That law, however, set stringent 

registration requirements with high membership thresholds, and 

it banned or restricted unregistered religious activities, including 

those related to offering education, distributing literature, and 

training clergy. Other vague criminal and administrative statutes 

enable the state to punish most unauthorized religious or political 

activities, and religious groups have since been subject to ongoing 

and intrusive state surveillance. The total number of registered 

religious groups plummeted after 2011 as a result of that law—

especially “nontraditional” groups, which declined from 48 to 16. 

Government experts can deny registration in a closed process, 

which applicant groups have no ability to appeal. For example, 

Scientologists have been denied status as a religion since 2012, 

and Ahmadiyya Muslims cannot receive official registration unless 

they remove “Muslim” from their community’s title. Without a 

clear legal framework in place to protect religious freedom for 

all, such abuses are likely to persist and the overall situation could 

deteriorate once again.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Hearing: Religious Freedom in Russia and Central Asia

• Issue Update: The Anti-Cult Movement and Religious Regulation in Russia and the Former Soviet Union
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 77

KAZAKHSTAN

Background

Kazakhstan is the largest country in Central Asia and home to the 

region’s second-largest population, with around 19 million citizens. The 

population is around 70 percent Sunni Muslim, 26 percent Christian 

(including Orthodox, Protestants, Catholics, and Jehovah’s Witnesses), 

3 percent other (including Jews, Buddhists, Baha’is, and Hare Krishnas), 

and less than 1 percent Shi’a Muslims, mostly ethnic Azeris. A total 

of 3,826 officially registered religious associations represent 18 religious groups in Kazakhstan and 3,597 registered places of worship. 

Approximately two-thirds of the population are ethnic Kazakhs—a 

Turkic people group—while the rest are ethnic Slavs and other Turkic 

peoples, including Uzbeks and Uyghurs. Kazakhstan is the only Central 

Asian country with a large ethnic Russian population, mostly in the north. 

The government is avowedly secular and seeks to control religion, which it views as a potentially destabilizing force. It maintains 

influence over, and preference for, what it considers the “traditional” 

Hanafi school of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence; it is generally wary of 

other Islamic practices emanating from the wider Muslim world. It 

classifies as traditional and nonthreatening other religions with a 

long-established presence and good relations with the government—

like Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, and Judaism—while 

viewing with suspicion newer arrivals to the region, such as evangelical Christianity and Scientology. The government is particularly 

concerned about the spread of religious extremism, which it defines 

broadly and uses to target political opponents, as well as the potential for perceived social disruption from proselytism and missionary 

activity. Although concerns about extremist violence are legitimate, 

the government’s vague conception of religious extremism is applicable to any nonviolent activity it sees as potentially disruptive—even 

private religious practice and instruction.

Ongoing Challenges

Although the number of administrative charges has dropped, in 2020 

religious minorities still reported facing intimidation tactics from 

government authorities, including hostile interrogations, threats 

of punishment, surveillance, and periodic detention. The government seized the property of several Protestant churches, groups 

advocating for religious freedom and broader human rights faced 

official smear campaigns and fines, and peaceful religious minorities 

continued to face prosecution as extremists. For example, beginning in May, the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights 

and Rule of Law (KMBPCh) and other NGOs faced a concerted government smear campaign, in which they were accused of trying to 

destabilize the country at the behest of foreign interests. Yevgeny 

Zhovtis, the director of KMBPCh, is a frequent and vocal critic of 

official religious policy; he argued in October that all restrictions on 

the individual right to freedom of religion and belief clearly violate 

the Constitution of Kazakhstan. Furthermore, Scientologists reported 

that members in Nur-Sultan were required to attend “preventative 

consultations,” where they were threatened and ordered to sign a 

statement denouncing and disavowing Scientology.

Corruption, particularly at the local level, remained one of the 

more persistent problems impeding religious freedom; for example, 

some religious groups reported attempts at blackmail or bribery by 

local officials. The solicitation of bribes by local police was reportedly a contributing factor behind deadly clashes in February when 

angry Kazakh mobs targeted the ethnic Dungan community, a Muslim 

Chinese minority. Official religious policy may have contributed to 

these clashes by linking Kazakh national identity with Hanafi Islam and 

equating “foreign” Islam with extremism; in doing so, the government 

has arguably helped to foster an environment hostile to religious and 

ethnic minorities like the Dungan. 

Ethnic Kazakh Refugees from Xinjiang

The Chinese Communist Party has imprisoned large numbers of 

ethnic Kazakhs alongside Uyghur Muslims in China’s massive concentration camps in the Xinjiang region. Partly in response to this 

crisis, President Tokayev signed amendments to Kazakhstan’s migration law in May, changing the term used to describe ethnic Kazakh 

migrants from oralman (returnee) to kandas (native/blood related) 

as part of a broader effort to ease legal residency and citizenship 

for Kazakh refugees from Xinjiang. In October, four ethnic Kazakhs 

who had fled Xinjiang and entered Kazakhstan illegally were granted 

temporary refugee status, marking this shift in policy. Even so, relations between Beijing and Nur-Sultan remained close; in August, 

the Chinese ambassador praised military cooperation between the 

two countries and vowed to strengthen mutual efforts to combat 

extremism. This statement fueled concerns about China’s influence 

in Kazakhstani security policy and the potential spread of expansive counterextremism tactics modeled on those China has used 

in Xinjiang. 

Key U.S. Policy

The United States and Kazakhstan enjoyed a close partnership in 

2020, including two sessions of the U.S.-Kazakhstan Working Group 

on Religious Freedom. In February, then Secretary of State Michael 

R. Pompeo traveled to Kazakhstan and met with President Tokayev 

to discuss improving relations between the two countries. The then 

secretary also reiterated his admiration for Kazakhstan’s leadership in reintegrating citizens from Syria and Iraq, and he expressed 

concern over the situation in neighboring Xinjiang. The U.S. government delivered $6.2 million of assistance, including essential 

laboratory equipment and supplies, to support Kazakhstani efforts 

to fight COVID-19. Meanwhile, USAID continued to support programs in Kazakhstan to promote civil society, good governance, and 

human rights, including efforts to foster relationships between the 

Kazakhstani government and civil society organizations and support 

partnerships for reform. In November, then Assistant Secretary of 

State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Marie Royce met with Kazakh 

and Uyghur refugees from Xinjiang during her visit to Kazakhstan, 

where she also discussed bilateral engagement on education and 

culture with government officials.
78 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

MALAYSIA

• Include Malaysia on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Fund and implement training on community-based policing between the U.S. 

Department of Justice and Department 

of Homeland Security and their Malaysian counterparts to promote better 

shared practices on interacting with faith 

communities and protecting houses of worship and other religious sites;

• Urge the Malaysian government to repeal 

the federal and state-level laws criminalizing blasphemy and apostasy, to remove 

the constitutional link between the ethnic 

Malay identity and Islam, and to release the 

findings of the special task force investigating forced disappearances such as the case 

of Pastor Koh; and

• Work with Malaysia and regional partners to 

ensure the safety of migrants and refugees, 

including those fleeing ethnic and religious 

conflict, by facilitating access for the United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) to refugee and migrant camps as 

well as by contributing to the Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Trust 

Fund for Humanitarian Relief Efforts.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions for religious minorities and 

the Sunni Muslim majority in Malaysia remained largely the same 

as in 2019.

The Malaysian government requires members of the Sunni 

Muslim majority to adhere to a strict, state-approved interpretation 

of Islam and regulates the internal affairs of Muslims, leaving them 

little freedom to practice according to their conscience. The pairing 

of Malay ethnicity with Islam continues to infringe on the religious 

freedom rights of ethnic Malays. In addition, Shari’a courts have 

historically declared several minority Muslim groups as non-Muslim, 

which persistently creates a grey area for those Malays who adhere 

to what the government considers “deviant” forms of Islam. For 

example, an ongoing court case to determine whether Ahmadiyya 

Muslims can legally identify as Muslims remained unresolved after 

being remitted to the High Court in August. 

In February, the two-year-old pluralist Pakatan Harapan coalition collapsed and was replaced by the Perikatan Nasional (PN) 

coalition. The PN coalition brought together the United Malay 

National Organisation (UMNO) and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic 

Party (PAS), a political party that has sought to incorporate corporal 

hudud penalties into the state-level Shari’a system. In a November 

coalition meeting, Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin stated that the 

PN coalition would fight secularism and liberalism and insisted that 

his government would hold fast against challenges to Shari’a. The 

transition of power has spurred an increase in judicial harassment 

from the police of human rights activists.

Malaysia’s systematic emphasis on Sunni Muslim identity continued to place particular pressures on non-Muslim communities. 

On December 1, the state of Kedah in northwestern insular Malaysia 

demolished a Hindu temple on land ostensibly unauthorized for the 

building. This demolition follows a trend in recent years in which 

authorities have ordered the destruction of hundreds of Hindu 

temples, which officials disingenuously explain as a matter of land 

usage to avoid framing the destruction as religiously motivated. NonMuslim communities remain forbidden from using Arabic words that 

authorities claim are exclusive to Islam, such as the word “Allah”. Such 

restriction affects the ability of Christians and others to import, print, 

and distribute religious materials such as Bibles. However, Malaysia’s 

top court has set a date in 2021 to hear the case—first raised in 2008—

of an indigenous Christian community’s right to use such language. 

Non-Muslim communities are also prohibited from proselytizing 

to Muslims. All religious conversions, including between non-Muslim 

faiths, face serious restrictions. Some converts have won the right to 

adopt their new religious identity openly, but only after taking the 

issue to the High Court. The Malaysian federal government deemed 

atheism unconstitutional, and those who are ethnically Malay and 

identify as nonreligious are at risk of criminal prosecution for apostasy. Blasphemy is criminalized at the federal level in Malaysia’s 

secular Penal Code, and at least five states criminalize apostasy with 

fines, imprisonment, and/or detention in a “rehabilitation” center.

The special task force set up in June 2019 to investigate the disappearances of five individuals, including Pastor Raymond Koh and 

Shi’a Muslim convert Amri Che Mat, continued to delay the release 

of its findings throughout 2020. In November, Commissioner James 

Carr adopted Pastor Koh through USCIRF’s Religious Prisoners of 

Conscience Project. 

During the coronavirus pandemic, public and official attitudes 

hardened toward migrants, including Rohingya refugees. In May 

and June, officials temporarily banned refugees and migrants 

from mosques as they reopened religious buildings following the 

Movement Control Order issued to stop the spread of the virus. In 

addition, non-Muslim houses of worship, including Hindu temples 

and Christian churches, were not prioritized for reopening and 

faced different reopening times than mosques.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Factsheet: Rohingya Refugees in Southeast Asia

• Op-Ed: Malaysia’s Unwelcoming Shore for Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution (in The Diplomat)
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 79

MALAYSIA

Background

Malaysia is a highly pluralistic society. Around 61.3 percent of 

the population identify as Muslim, the vast majority adhering to 

state-sponsored Sunni Islam. Buddhists comprise 19.8 percent; 9.2 

percent are Christian; 6.3 percent are Hindu; 1.3 percent practice 

Confucianism, Taoism, and other traditional Chinese religions; and 

about 0.8 percent identify with no religion. Although Malaysia was 

founded as a secular state, Article 3 of the 1957 constitution places 

Islam—interpreted as Sunni Islam—as the federation’s official religion, 

while Article 160 links Malay ethnic identity with Islam. This constitutional construct has long been used to advance social policies—many 

of which amount to legally mandated religious discrimination—that 

give ethnic Malays preferential treatment, including in education and 

employment, to offset historical economic disparities. 

Government Regulation of Religious Practice 

and Identity 

The federal Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM) 

provides funding for mosques and preapproved talking points for 

imams. In January, guidelines from JAKIM prompted the Ministry of 

Education to declare the Pongal harvest festival as a Hindu religious 

event, raising concerns among the Malaysian Tamil community of 

crackdowns on celebrating the festival in public schools similar to 

those preventing the celebration of the Chinese New Year. JAKIM 

takes a proactive role in regulating religion, including monitoring 

perceived insults against Islam and the Prophet Muhammad as part 

of the country’s enforcement of blasphemy laws. It also regulates 

and monitors independent Islamic preachers to ensure they follow 

officially accepted interpretations of Islam. All Muslim students in 

public schools at the Form 5 level must take a course that includes 

federally-approved material claiming Sunni Islam as the “superior” and 

only acceptable form of Islam, while labeling Shi’a Islam as “deviant.” 

In 1996, the Fatwa Committee for Religious Affairs issued a fatwa 

prohibiting the proselytism, promulgation, and profession of Shi’a 

Islam; at least 11 of the 13 states have adopted the fatwa.

At the same time, individual states have a high degree of autonomy in regulating Islamic practice. In August, the PAS-dominated state 

government of Kelantan began to investigate the indigenous Main 

Puteri dance to make it “Shari’a compliant,” continuing a trend in more 

conservative states of banning “un-Islamic” indigenous practices such 

as traditional dances and dramas. JAKIM, along with states and federal territories through their individual Shari’a codes, often target the 

lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) community; 

for example, JAKIM runs a conversion therapy camp (Mukhayyam) 

portrayed as a job program that targets LGBTI Muslims to guide them 

to the “correct path.” In August, minority rights activist Nicole Fong 

tweeted against JAKIM efforts to “heal” the Muslim LGBTI community, prompting Director-General Datuk Paimuzi Yahya to report her 

for defamation. In July, Zulkifli Mohamad Al-Bakri, minister in charge of 

religious affairs to the Federal Territories Islamic Religious Department 

(JAWI), ordered his department to force members of the transgender 

community of the federal territories, including Kuala Lumpur, into 

religious education programs. 

Religious identification on national identification cards, known 

as MyKad, continued to present difficulties for minority faith communities. Only Muslims’ cards visibly state their faith in print, while 

the cards of individuals belonging to other communities include their 

religious affiliation in electronic form—an easily identifiable difference 

that some local sources report leads to discrimination in government 

services. Some Malaysians who identify with or convert to non-Muslim religions have been falsely labeled as Muslim or prevented from 

changing their religious identity on their MyKad, which brings them 

under the jurisdiction of the Shari’a courts. In a positive development, 

the Federal Court determined that Rosiliza Ibrahim, who was born of 

a Muslim father and Buddhist mother, could identify as a non-Muslim, 

following a five-year legal battle to change her registration. 

The Dual Court System

Malaysia maintains a system of two independent but equal courts: 

secular and religious. Muslims are subjected to general laws enacted 

by parliament as well as religious laws enacted by either the federal 

government or the legislature of the state in which they reside. This 

dual system enables varying levels of protection under the law based 

on one’s religious status. The Shari’a court system appears to place 

an unequal burden on women, as evidenced by the fact that Muslim 

women who choose not to wear a headscarf often face societal discrimination with no legal recourse. For example, in 2020, Maryam 

Lee— who published a book in 2019 about her choice to stop wearing 

the headscarf—continued to receive death threats and faced investigation by religious authorities for her decision. The legal age of 

children to marry varies in each state between those who are Muslim 

and those who are not, with lower age restrictions and fewer protections for children who are Muslim. Marriage between Muslims and 

non-Muslims remains illegal unless the non-Muslim partner converts. 

Key U.S. Policy

Malaysia and the United States maintain strong bilateral ties. The 

United States is Malaysia’s third-largest trading partner, and the two 

countries share numerous educational and cultural exchange programs. Those programs include the International Visitor Leadership 

Program (IVLP), which since 2008 has brought Muslim educational 

leaders to the United States in part to observe conditions for freedom 

of religion and belief. The two countries also continue to partner 

in counterterrorism efforts through information sharing, capacity-building programs for law enforcement and judicial authorities, 

and assistance to improve immigration security and border controls. 

In March, the State Department awarded Susanna Liew, wife of 

Pastor Koh, the International Women of Courage Award for her advocacy on behalf of her husband and others who have been disappeared 

by government forces.
80 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

NICARAGUA

• Maintain Nicaragua on the U.S. Department of State’s Special Watch List for 

engaging in or tolerating severe violations 

of religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• In addition to existing sanctions based on 

human rights violations, impose targeted 

sanctions on Nicaraguan government 

agencies and officials responsible for 

severe violations of religious freedom by 

freezing those individuals’ assets and/or 

barring their entry into the United States 

under human rights related financial and 

visa authorities, citing specific religious 

freedom violations; 

• Encourage multilateral organizations such 

as the Organization of American States 

to investigate religious freedom violations that occur in Nicaragua and hold to 

account the perpetrators or instigators of 

criminal acts; and

• Support and collaborate with multilateral 

and/or nongovernmental organization 

(NGO) partners to monitor religious freedom violations and hate speech against 

religious actors, particularly ahead of the 

presidential election on November 7, 2021. 

The U.S. Congress should:

• Hold public hearings highlighting religious 

freedom conditions in Nicaragua and U.S. 

policy toward Nicaragua.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Nicaragua remained the 

same as in 2019. The government of Nicaragua maintained its 

campaign against the Catholic Church, continuing a pattern of 

harassment that began during April 2018 protests against reforms 

to the public pension system. Members of the Catholic Church 

acted upon their religious convictions by providing sanctuary to and 

voicing support for the protesters. Following the Church’s support 

of the protesters, President Daniel Ortega used his government and 

his supporters to persecute members of the clergy, worshippers, 

and Catholic organizations. Many of the abuses in 2020—violent 

attacks on churches, intimidation of worshippers, threats and hate 

speech, and harassment of Catholic institutions—emulate those 

committed by the Ortega regime since the civil uprising. 

The Ortega government harassed Catholic officials and institutions in ways that disrupted the normal functions of the Church. In 

September, the Diocese of Estelí announced that one of its priests 

had his visa cancelled. According to the Episcopal Conference of 

Nicaragua, several other foreign-born priests who have worked in 

Nicaragua for decades face deportation. Additionally, the government repeatedly hampered the operations of the Church’s primary 

charitable organization, Caritas. Following the outbreak of COVID19, Caritas had its tax exemption status denied in April. Without 

the tax exemption, the organization is unable to withdraw foreign 

donations from customs. Additionally, the Regulation of Foreign 

Agents Law, passed in October, stipulates that citizens working for 

foreign governments, companies, foundations, or organizations are 

required to register as foreign agents with the Interior Ministry and 

must report monthly income and spending as well as the intended 

use of foreign funds. Among other concerns regarding the law’s 

impact on religious organizations, observers worry it could be used 

to hamper arbitrarily the operations of Caritas and other foreign 

humanitarian organizations that receive donations from abroad.

As in preceding years, in 2020 senior members of the Ortega 

regime made inflammatory statements against the Catholic Church 

that contributed to the perilous environment in which the Church 

operated. For example, after President Ortega refused to initiate 

measures to safeguard the country against the COVID-19 pandemic and Catholic leaders expressed concern for the safety of 

Nicaraguans, Vice President Rosario Murillo, President Ortega’s 

wife, called Catholic leaders “demons” who espouse hatred. 

Gustavo Porras Cortés, the president of the National Assembly and 

member of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), falsely 

claimed on December 20 that priests beat and torture Sandinistas.

Additionally, there were numerous violent attacks on 

Catholic churches around the country throughout the reporting 

period. These attacks usually involved known or suspected Ortega 

supporters forcibly entering churches and committing acts of 

vandalism and desecration. Often, perpetrators wore Sandinista 

emblems or colors. The most brazen instance of violence occurred 

in July, when an unknown assailant set off an incendiary device in 

a chapel attached to the Cathedral of Managua in what Catholic 

officials called a premeditated assault. The arson attack resulted 

in extensive damage to the interior of the building, including 

the charring of a 400-year-old wooden crucifix in the center 

of the room. It was not an isolated incident; USCIRF received 

reports indicating that nearly a dozen smaller attacks on churches 

occurred in the weeks leading up to and following the arson in 

Managua. Vice President Murillo peddled falsehoods against the 

Church in the wake of the attack when she baselessly claimed that 

a candle igniting a curtain was responsible for the blaze, despite 

neither candles nor curtains existing in the structure. The lack of 

credible government investigations into such attacks or prosecutions for perpetrators contributes to an environment of impunity 

for abuses against the Catholic Church.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Factsheet: Controlling Civil Society’s Purse Strings 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 81

NICARAGUA

Background

President Ortega is the head of state and head of government of 

the Republic of Nicaragua. He and his party, the FSLN, exercise 

authoritarian control over all three branches of government and the 

electoral process. Roman Catholics account for about 50 percent of 

the population, followed by Evangelical Christians at 33.2 percent, 

followers of unspecified religions at 13.2 percent, “other” religions 

(including Jews and Muslims) at 2.9 percent, and 0.7 percent adhering to no religion. 

Nicaragua is embroiled in a social and political crisis that started 

in April 2018 when peaceful protests erupted after President Ortega 

announced reforms to the public pension system. Law enforcement 

responded to the protests with excessive force and repression. The 

Catholic Church stepped in to provide aid to protesters and mediate 

a National Dialogue. Since the Church refused to turn away demonstrators in need of aid and individual clergymen voiced opposition 

to the government, the Ortega Administration abandoned the talks 

and began lashing out at the Church. Over two years later, the Ortega 

regime’s ire against the Catholic Church has not abated. A presidential 

election is set for November 7, 2021, and Catholic Church officials in 

the country fear more violence leading up to election day. 

Impunity for Violent Attacks on Churches

Attacks on Catholic churches were common occurrences throughout the country in 2020. In addition to the incendiary attack on the 

Cathedral of Managua, supporters of the regime threatened, vandalized, besieged, and desecrated churches across Nicaragua. Unlike in 

previous years, the attacks appear to have been perpetrated by citizens who support President Ortega, as opposed to law enforcement 

or paramilitary groups. No one—citizens, law enforcement, or paramilitary members—has been held to account for crimes committed 

against Catholic churches, officials, or worshippers since April 2018.

Harassment of Worshippers

Ortega supporters repeatedly entered churches prior to or during Mass 

to harass worshippers. On February 25, a group of agitators entered 

the San Felipe Apostol church in Matagalpa ten minutes before Mass 

to harass and film the parishioners. As parishioners and clergy scuffled 

with the group, a man approached the sacristan and punched him in the 

eye and a woman sprayed him with pepper spray. The church’s priest, 

Monsignor Roger Garcia, said that Sandinista “mobs” sought to take 

photographs of parishioners at that church in the past. On March 3, a 

group of Sandinistas clad in clothing the colors of the party disrupted 

the funeral service held at the Metropolitan Cathedral of Managua 

in honor of well-known priest and poet Ernesto Cardenal. The group 

chanted anti-Catholic slogans, stole personal belongings of attendees, 

and made it difficult for Cardenal’s family to move the coffin to the 

hearse waiting outside. Law enforcement stood nearby the cathedral 

but did nothing to disperse the regime supporters. On July 19, services 

at two different churches in León and Matagalpa were suspended due 

to loud noise caused by Ortega supporters. 

Vandalism of Church Property

Incidents of vandalism included smashing religious icons and stealing 

in Tipitapa; splashing paint on religious icons and throwing away 

communion wafers in Mateare; “breaking images, [offending] the 

tabernacle, trampling [communion wafers], breaking benches, and 

causing damage to furniture, doors and pipes” in Nindirí; stealing 

paintings in Managua; and defecating in various locations around a 

church in Nindirí. These are only a small sample of the incidents that 

occurred at Catholic churches in Nicaragua in 2020.

Key U.S. Policy

In January, then Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo traveled to 

Central America to meet with Nicaraguan opposition leaders. During 

this meeting, then Secretary Pompeo urged President Ortega to 

end “repression, and to restore the fundamental civil liberties and 

support free and fair elections.” He also stated that the United States 

has provided Costa Rica with at least $13 million to assist vulnerable 

populations, including Nicaraguans who fled their country to Costa 

Rica following the outbreak of civil unrest in April 2018. On December 

2, 2020, the State Department again placed Nicaragua on its Special 

Watch List for severe violators of religious freedom.

The U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, on March 9 and 

June 16, respectively, passed resolutions supporting the Nicaraguan 

peoples’ pursuit of democracy and human rights and the use of tools 

under U.S. law to pressure the Ortega government. USCIRF had urged 

Congress to pass these measures. The U.S. government continued to 

enact robust sanctions against Nicaraguan officials and companies, 

though none referred to religious freedom violations. On March 5, the 

U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 

(OFAC) imposed sanctions on the Nicaraguan National Police as well 

as police commissioners Juan Valle Valle, Luis Alberto Perez Olivas, 

and Juan Pastor Urbina for engaging in serious human rights abuses 

against protesters. Further, on July 17 OFAC imposed sanctions on 

Juan Carlos Ortega Murillo, son of President Ortega; Jose Jorge 

Mojica Mejia; and “two companies they use in an effort to distribute 

regime propaganda and launder money.”
82 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

TURKEY

• Include Turkey on the U.S. Department of 

State’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Raise in all meetings with Turkish government officials and press at the highest levels 

for the reopening of the Greek Orthodox 

Halki Seminary and for full compliance with 

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 

rulings on freedom of religion or belief;

• Direct the U.S. Embassy in Ankara and 

Consulates in Istanbul and Adana to track 

religious communities’ efforts to open, 

regain, renovate, and protect places of 

worship and other religious sites of spiritual, cultural, or historic importance, and 

work with the Turkish government to 

ensure the protection of such sites; and

• Require a thorough review regarding the 

inclusion of objects that constitute the 

religious and cultural heritage of religious 

and ethnic minority communities—previously or currently residing within the 

territory of the Republic of Turkey—in 

any designated list of materials subject to 

import restrictions under a bilateral cultural property agreement between the 

United States and Turkey, and support 

cultural and educational exchanges that 

highlight the histories and contributions 

of those communities.

The U.S. Congress should:

• Incorporate consideration of Turkey’s treatment of religious minorities and broader 

human rights issues into its continued 

evaluation of the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship, for example by passing S. Res. 

755 requesting information on the government of Turkey’s human rights practices 

pursuant to section 502B(c) of the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Turkey continued to follow 

a troubling trajectory. In July, Turkish President Recep Tayyip 

Erdog ̆ an issued a decree converting back into a mosque the 

famous Hagia Sophia, a former church that had been serving as a 

museum, in a move that many denounced as divisive and hostile 

to Turkey’s religious minorities. While the government took similar 

steps to reopen as a mosque another former church, the Chora 

Museum, it reportedly paused those efforts. The government 

furthermore made little to no effort to address many longstanding 

religious freedom issues and it ignored the continued targeting and 

vandalization of religious minority properties throughout the country. Despite repeated requests by religious minority communities 

for permission to hold board member elections for non-Muslim 

foundations, the government did not permit those elections during 

the year. Similarly, the government disregarded calls for the reopening of the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary and continued to deny

legal personality to all religious communities. Members of the 

ruling party and its coalition partner rejected efforts to recognize 

Alevi gathering houses (cemevleri) as places of worship, and the 

government declined to resolve other religious freedom concerns 

for Alevis and other communities, such as their objection to compulsory religious courses and other educational policies. Although 

officials made a point to meet with some religious minority community leaders, the government appeared to take no subsequent 

action following that meeting to address those communities’ concerns. In December, Turkey’s parliament passed a law that human 

rights groups warned would increase governmental control over 

civil society, including religious groups, by subjecting them to 

intensified oversight and new limitations on online fundraising.

Many religious minorities continued to feel threatened in connection with incidents perpetrated by nonstate actors or due to 

direct pressure from the state. Alevi, Armenian, and Protestant 

communities and organizations reported receiving death threats, 

whereas Jews described an increase in antisemitism largely linked 

to the COVID-19 pandemic. Assyrians remained deeply disturbed

by the detention and trial of Syriac Orthodox priest Sefer Bileçen 

(aka Father Aho) for allegedly providing food and water to Kurdistan 

Workers’ Party (PKK) members, and by the apparent kidnapping of 

an elderly Chaldean couple—one of whom was later found dead. 

The Turkish government continued to expel or bar the entry into 

the country of foreign Protestants for posing a purported “national 

security threat.” Throughout the year, authorities brought politically 

motivated charges of blasphemy against individuals and groups, 

while others in official positions utilized rhetoric characterized as hate 

speech that denigrated nonreligious individuals and members of the 

lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) community.

Religious sites—including places of worship and cemeteries—were subject to vandalism, damage, and, in some cases, 

destruction, which the government regularly fails to prevent or punish. In January, unknown individuals broke into the Pir Sultan cemevi 

in Istanbul and graffitied the interior with threatening messages. In 

May, an individual attempted to set fire to an Armenian church for 

“bringing the coronavirus,” and that same month, another person 

scaled the gate of another Armenian church and tore down its cross. 

In other instances, unknown actors destroyed a Yazidi cemetery 

in Mardin Province and damaged a Catholic cemetery in Trabzon. 

Local officials in Bursa demolished a Greek Orthodox church after 

many years of neglect. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Event: USCIRF Conversation on Religious Freedom in Turkey

• Press Statement: USCIRF Decries Decision to Change Status of the Hagia Sophia

• Op-Ed: U.S. Leaders Must Stand against Turkey’s Atrocities in Northern Syria (in Newsweek)

• Annual Report Chapter on Syria: For information on religious freedom violations by Turkey and Turkish-backed forces in the areas 

they occupy in Syria.
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 83

TURKEY

Background

The U.S. government estimates that Turkey’s population is approximately 82.5 million, of which 99.8 percent is Muslim; an estimated 77.5 

percent majority adheres to Sunni Islam. Between 10 million and 25 million people identify as Alevi, a community that the government largely 

refuses to differentiate from majority Sunni Muslims. The remaining 0.2 

percent comprises atheists, Armenian Apostolics, Baha’is, Bulgarian 

Orthodox, Chaldean Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

Jews, Protestants, Roman Catholics, Russian Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, 

Syriac Orthodox, Yazidis, and other religious communities.

The constitution defines the country as a secular state and guarantees the freedom of conscience, religious belief, and conviction. 

However, the government also exercises extensive control over both 

majority Muslim and non-Muslim religious communities through either 

the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which oversees the practice of Islam, or the General Directorate of Foundations (Vakıflar Genel 

Müdürlüg ̆ü), which regulates other religious communities.

The Turkish government has become increasingly repressive 

since a July 2016 coup attempt, detaining numerous journalists and 

perceived political opponents, including a reported 292,000 individuals affiliated with—or accused of affiliation with—the U.S.-based cleric 

Fethullah Gülen. Turkey also remained actively engaged in or supported numerous military operations beyond its borders throughout 

2020. At the end of the year, members of Turkey’s significant Uyghur 

diaspora community remained concerned about possible deportation 

to China, as the Chinese Communist Party pursued the adoption of a 

bilateral extradition treaty with Turkey.

Government Antisemitism and Rhetoric against 

Minorities

Throughout the year, government rhetoric at various levels increasingly targeted religious minorities and nonreligious individuals and 

promoted a “conquest mentality” that not only ostracized those 

communities but also risked encouraging hate crimes against them. 

For example, in November, Diyanet President Ali Erbas ̧ stated during 

an opening ceremony for a mosque that “all manner of evil can be 

expected from those who don’t believe in the afterlife,” prompting 

Turkey’s Atheism Association to open a criminal complaint for “targeting nonbelievers.” In a January speech considered one of the 

most antisemitic incidents of the year, President Erdog ̆an lashed out 

at Muslim majority countries that normalized relations with Israel and 

celebrated it with “those with kippahs on their heads.” 

In July, after recent hints and multiple threats to do so, President 

Erdog ̆an signed a decree converting the Hagia Sophia back into a 

mosque after a court revoked the historic site’s status as a museum. 

During the first Friday prayers held at the former Greek Orthodox 

cathedral, Diyanet President Erbas ̧ held aloft a sword as a “symbol of 

conquest” that many decried for the marginalizing message it sent to 

Turkey’s religious minorities.

Politically Motivated Blasphemy Charges

Authorities continued to threaten or pursue blasphemy charges under 

Article 216(3) of the Penal Code, which penalizes “openly insulting the 

religious values held by a segment of society.” In April, authorities 

took into custody former editor Hakan Aygün for social media posts 

in which he used religious wordplay to criticize President Erdog ̆ an’s 

COVID-19 fundraising campaign; his trial was ongoing at the end of the 

reporting period. That same month, the Ankara Prosecutor’s Office 

launched a retaliatory investigation into the Ankara Bar Association for 

characterizing anti-LGBTI statements by Diyanet President Erbas ̧ as 

hate speech. Following an incident in May in which hackers played the 

song “Bella Ciao” from the minarets of mosques in Izmir, local authorities detained a handful of people for “insulting religious values” by 

sharing and “praising” videos of the episode on social media. Among 

those detained was former opposition party politician Banu Özdemir, 

who had tweeted about the incident. During the year, authorities also 

investigated and prosecuted journalist Enver Aysever for posting 

online a caricature that mocked religious figures.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States and Turkey are allies as members of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) and cooperate on international security 

concerns. Despite this cooperation, however, several issues continued 

to plague the bilateral relationship, including U.S. concerns regarding 

Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system. Such concerns 

prompted Members of Congress to adopt legislation requiring the 

imposition of sanctions against Turkey under the Countering America’s 

Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), and in December, the 

United States sanctioned Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries.

The U.S. government regularly raised religious freedom matters 

in Turkey and frequently engaged with representatives of Turkey’s religious minorities. In July, then Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo 

urged Turkey to maintain the Hagia Sophia as a museum. Following 

the government’s decision to convert the site into a mosque, then Vice 

President Michael R. Pence reiterated a call for it to remain accessible 

to all. In October, head of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 

Ambassador Phillip T. Reeker traveled to Turkey and met with Ecumenical 

Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew I. In November, then Secretary 

Pompeo also visited Turkey to discuss religious freedom; he met Patriarch 

Bartholomew, toured the Rüstem Pas ̧a Mosque, and discussed regional 

interfaith peace efforts with Archbishop Paul Fitzpatrick Russell, Apostolic 

Nuncio to Turkey. After the reporting period, in January 2021, the United 

States and Turkey signed a bilateral cultural property agreement to curb 

the looting and trafficking of cultural property.
84 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

UZBEKISTAN

• Include Uzbekistan on the State Department’s Special Watch List for engaging in 

or tolerating severe violations of religious 

freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

• Work with the government of Uzbekistan to 

revise the 1998 religion law and other relevant legislation to comply with international 

human rights standards and encourage 

the government to remove registration 

requirements on religious communities, 

permit the possession and distribution of 

religious literature, and permit the sharing 

of religious beliefs; 

• Press at the highest levels for the immediate release of individuals imprisoned for 

their peaceful religious activities or religious affiliations, and press the government 

of Uzbekistan to treat prisoners humanely 

and allow for independent prison monitoring; and

• Allocate funding for the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and 

U.S. Embassy in Tashkent to provide litigation support to individuals and religious 

communities prosecuted in connection 

with their peaceful religious activities.

I

n 2020, religious freedom conditions in Uzbekistan trended positively. Over the course of the year, the government registered at 

least eight non-Muslim religious organizations, ended a de facto 

ban on children attending mosques, interceded to prevent the 

eviction and demolition of a synagogue located in Tashkent, and 

released some religious prisoners. Government officials continued 

to engage closely with the United States and other international partners on religious freedom concerns, particularly the ongoing efforts 

to reform the 1998 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 

Organizations (1998 religion law). On multiple occasions, the Oliy 

Majlis, Uzbekistan’s parliament, invited international observers—

including USCIRF, the U.S. Department of State, and the United 

Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief—to 

participate in open parliamentary discussions of the draft law. In 

August, the government formally requested an opinion on the draft 

from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s 

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and 

the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission. In October, the two 

organizations issued a joint opinion that criticized the draft because 

it “maintains major restrictions and suffers from deficiencies that are 

incompatible with international human rights standards.” Although 

the government stated at the end of the year that it was still considering some recommendations provided by the ODIHR, the Venice 

Commission, and others, it was unwilling to accept the more substantive revisions required to bring the draft law into full compliance 

with international standards. On the contrary, the government stated 

that it will preserve in the law many problematic provisions, including 

those prohibiting unregistered religious activity, private religious 

education, and missionary activity. According to the draft, the law 

also will continue to set difficult and potentially discretionary registration requirements, place limitations on the location of religious 

rites and ceremonies, and subject all religious literature and related 

materials to official review and approval.

Reports throughout the year indicated that authorities in 

Uzbekistan continued to harass, detain, and imprison Muslims who 

practiced Islam independently of strict state controls or possessed 

unauthorized or allegedly “extremist” sermons and other religious 

texts in print or electronic form. In March, human rights activist 

Musajon Bobojonov was arrested and sentenced to five days in 

prison for conducting a nikah, an Islamic marriage ceremony, without 

state permission. In April, authorities visited Dr. Alimardon Sultonov 

following an inquiry he made about the prevalence of COVID-19 

cases in the area, seized his computer for containing illegal religious texts, and sentenced him to 14 months restricted freedom. In 

December, authorities pulled Shi’a Muslim Rashid Ibrahimov from a 

taxi, brought him in for questioning, and forcibly gained access to 

his phone where they discovered religious materials. It was unclear 

by the end of the year whether he would face charges. Although 

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev issued multiple pardons releasing and 

reducing the sentences of many religious prisoners throughout the 

year—including releasing prisoners Aramais Avakian and Ruhiddin 

Fahriddinov, who were included in USCIRF’s Freedom of Religion or 

Belief (FoRB) Victims List—a few thousand religious prisoners are 

estimated to remain in prison. Moreover, in 2020 the government 

arrested an undetermined number of individuals under broad and 

ill-defined charges of “extremism” that many observers viewed 

with skepticism given Uzbekistan’s “history of alleging extremism 

accusations to target political opposition” and religious individuals. 

In March, the United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed 

concern about the persistence of torture in prisons and other detention facilities and the use of arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture 

against independent Muslims.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

KEY FINDINGS

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

• Podcast: How Far Has Tashkent Gone in Greater Respect for Religious Rights? (in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)

• Issue Update: The Global Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses

• Press Statement: USCIRF Welcomes Legal Reform Efforts in Uzbekistan, Urges Conformity with International Standards

• Country Update: Assessing Religious Freedom in Uzbekistan
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 85

UZBEKISTAN

Background

The U.S. government estimates that roughly 88 percent of Uzbekistan’s 

population identifies as Muslim, while Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs estimates that between 93 and 94 percent of the population is 

Muslim. The majority of Muslims in Uzbekistan are Sunni, while approximately 1 percent are Shi’a. Around 3.5 percent of the population is 

Russian Orthodox, and the remaining 3 percent comprises atheists, 

Baha’is, Buddhists, Catholics, members of the International Society for 

Krishna Consciousness, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, and Protestants. 

In recent years, Uzbekistan has sought to enact a number of legal 

and policy reforms to improve conditions for religious freedom and 

actively address some concerns raised primarily at the international 

level. Despite these efforts, however, and although the constitution 

guarantees freedom of religion or belief, the government largely 

preserved its interest in maintaining extensive state control over the 

practice of religion. Various officials remained actively involved in the 

effort to revise the 1998 religion law, but they did not pass an amended 

version of that law during 2020 and appeared likely to reject many of 

the recommendations that the ODIHR and the Venice Commission put 

forward. In addition, the Administrative Code and Criminal Code also 

continued to limit and allow for the punishment of religious activity 

that the government had not expressly sanctioned. 

Legal Restrictions and Reforms

The government of Uzbekistan first pledged to revise the country’s 

1998 religion law in May 2018 with the parliament’s adoption of a 

“roadmap” to improve religious freedom conditions. Initial versions 

of a revised draft law made some important improvements by lowering the number of persons required to register a local religious 

organization from 100 to 50, reducing the time to process registration 

applications, and eliminating a formal prohibition against wearing 

religious clothing in public, among others. However, despite the 

government’s continued engagement with international partners and 

other interlocutors who advised additional revisions to make that law 

compliant with international standards, officials remained adamant 

that under the amended law they would not allow any unregistered 

religious activity, missionary activity, or private teaching of religion. 

Other aspects of the draft law also raised concerns, such as new and 

potentially discretionary requirements that religious communities 

seeking registration obtain a “letter of consent” from the government’s Committee on Religious Affairs and a “letter of guarantee” 

from local authorities—as the text of the draft law specified no criteria 

for either the provision or denial of such letters. 

Government Control of Islam and Imprisonment 

of Muslims

Officials in Uzbekistan remained most preoccupied with maintaining 

control over the practice of Islam in the country. Although the government made some progress regarding the ability of non-Muslim 

religious minorities to practice their beliefs—including by registering 

some Christian communities and upholding a ban on police raids—it 

devoted comparatively less effort to easing restrictions on Muslim 

religious practice. On the contrary, one imam at a mosque in Tashkent 

said that “all mosques in Uzbekistan are under constant video surveillance” to monitor the ways attendees pray and worship, and 

that a person who “ignores the government’s policy in the religious 

sphere can find themselves behind bars.” The nongovernmental 

organization Forum 18 reported that in multiple instances authorities searched Muslims’ homes for unauthorized or banned religious 

texts, often seizing even those texts that are officially permitted. In 

the beginning of the year, Uzbekistan significantly expanded its list 

of banned religious literature and websites to include, among other 

things, a number of poems and materials critical of the government’s 

stance on Islam. Muslims frequently faced charges of “extremism” 

or terrorism, and they were prosecuted under various provisions of 

the Criminal Code—such as Articles 244.1 and 244.2—for possessing 

such literature in either print or electronic form or for meeting to 

discuss Islam. By the end of 2020, an undisclosed number of religious 

prisoners remained imprisoned, including Khayrullo Tursunov, who 

is included in USCIRF’s FoRB Victims List. However, one source indicated that the government has released as many as 1,600 religious 

prisoners since 2016.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States and Uzbekistan pursued an expanded bilateral 

relationship in 2020. In February, the State Department released a 

new Strategy for Central Asia 2019–2025 that underscored continued 

U.S. commitment to the region, including through the promotion of 

rule of law reform and respect for human rights. In September, then 

USAID Acting Administrator John Barsa announced the opening of a 

new bilateral USAID Mission in Uzbekistan. At the conclusion of the 

State Department’s Annual Bilateral Consultations with Uzbekistan in 

November, the two sides announced that they would upgrade those 

discussions in 2021 to the status of a Strategic Partnership Dialogue. 

The United States also continued to prioritize religious freedom 

through sustained high-level engagement with the government of 

Uzbekistan. In February, then Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo 

traveled to Uzbekistan where he met with religious leaders to discuss 

reforms, and that same month he urged Uzbekistan to continue its 

“good work in granting greater degrees of religious freedom to [its] 

own people.” Over the course of the year, the United States worked 

closely with the government of Uzbekistan to reform its 1998 religion law and to advocate for the release of religious prisoners. On 

December 2, the State Department removed Uzbekistan from its 

Special Watch List “based on significant, concrete progress,” two 

years after delisting it from the department’s list of Countries of 

Particular Concern. Despite the State Department’s decision to take 

Uzbekistan off the Special Watch List, USCIRF concludes that the 

violations during 2020 remained sufficiently severe to meet IRFA’s 

standard for inclusion on that list.
86 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

UZBEKISTAN

Individual Views of Commissioner Johnnie Moore

Why is Uzbekistan still in this report? Very few countries have ever 

engaged as proactively as Uzbekistan has with the international 

community. Its progress is significant and worthy of commendation. 

Uzbekistan is an example to other countries.

As I read it, among the reasons for Uzbekistan remaining on 

USCIRF’s list: (1) the country has not met the international community’s expectations when it comes to the passage of the law mentioned 

in this report; (2) there remains among some authority figures in 

Uzbekistan a visceral bias against its citizens changing religions; and 

(3) there is an ongoing need to review any relevant cases of those 

individuals actually imprisoned on the basis of religion alone. 

I understand the procedural complexities with the first and third 

concerns, but I find the second issue very easy to solve. Uzbekistan’s 

authorities, including its religious leaders, need to make it clear they 

actually believe in the celebrated Islamic teaching that “there is no 

compulsion in religion” and acknowledge—as all Abrahamic faiths 

do—that the freedom of choice is a divine gift (see Section 2 of the 

“Kingdom of Bahrain Declaration”). It may be that Uzbekistan’s authorities are somehow confusing coercive proselytization with the freedom 

of religion and belief. Surely this at least can be overcome, and it 

should be overcome.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021 87

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

COVID-19 and Religious Freedom 

Governments responded with sweeping action to the COVID-19 

global pandemic in 2020. While many of these restrictions were justifiable under public health exceptions defined in international law, 

some restrictions harmed religious minorities or otherwise violated 

freedom of religion or belief. In Sri Lanka, authorities insisted on the 

cremation of those who died from COVID-19, including Muslims for 

whom the practice is religiously prohibited. However, the World Health 

Organization (WHO) cites a lack of evidence that cremation of COVID19 victims is necessary for public health reasons. USCIRF expressed 

concern about this requirement, and welcomed its lifting in early 2021. 

Vietnam arrested members of the Ha Mon religious group on charges 

of “sabotaging implementation of solidarity practices.” In Pakistan and 

Saudi Arabia, government authorities indicated Shi’a religious communities were responsible for the spread of coronavirus and subjected 

some neighborhoods and localities to stricter lockdown measures. On 

a positive note, however, in several countries, as part of efforts 

to reduce prison populations 

for health reasons, nonviolent 

offenders, including prisoners of 

conscience, were furloughed or 

sent to house arrest.

The pandemic also fostered 

a wave of misinformation targeting religious minorities. Despite being obligated to do so under 

international law, many governments failed to respond adequately 

to this misinformation. In India, for example, Muslims were accused 

of spreading COVID-19, leading to a reported increase in attacks on 

members of the community. In April, the United Nations (UN) Special 

Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Ahmed Shaheed, issued 

a statement warning that the pandemic has precipitated a “flare-up in 

existing religious intolerance in many countries.” For example, USCIRF 

received reports of numerous anti-Hindu incidents in Bangladesh that 

occurred with impunity, particularly during COVID-19 lockdowns.

As reported at a USCIRF panel in September, a rise in antisemitism also coincided with the outbreak of COVID-19, particularly in 

Europe. In Germany, protests against public health measures to 

reduce the spread of COVID-19 involved the invocation of Holocaust 

imagery and antisemitic conspiracy theories about mandatory vaccination. Social media users in France used antisemitic tropes to 

criticize Jewish former health minister Agnes Buzyn, and a Polish 

Holocaust revisionist claimed that COVID-19 was being used to introduce “Jewish” values into “Western Christian culture.”

Attacks on Houses of Worship

The desecration or destruction of houses of worship continued around 

the world in 2020. As part of its ongoing campaign against the Uyghur 

Muslim minority, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) destroyed and 

closed mosques and shrines and removed religious symbols as well. 

It also destroyed a thousand-year-old Buddhist temple in Shangxi 

Province as well as Taoist temples across the country. The CCP continued its ongoing demolition of churches and removal of crosses 

from church buildings, affecting both government-sanctioned and 

underground Catholic and Protestant churches.

Several other countries experienced attacks on churches in 2020. 

Weeks after a terrorist beheaded a teacher in France for showing 

images in class of the Prophet Muhammad, a man killed three people 

in a church in Nice. In Azerbaijan, security forces party to the conflict 

in Nagorno-Karabakh allegedly conducted two strikes on a church. 

During protests related to a constitutional referendum in Chile, one 

church was firebombed and another set alight. 

In Pakistan, armed men attacked a church in Punjab, and a mob 

attacked Christians at a Christmas celebration at a church in Lahore. 

Also, a mob destroyed a Hindu 

temple in northwestern Pakistan 

and attacked the construction 

site of the first Hindu temple in 

Islamabad. Sikh gurdwaras also 

came under attack in 2020. In 

Pakistan, protesters surrounded 

a gurdwara in Nankana Sahib and 

threatened to overrun the site. 

In Afghanistan, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attacked a 

gurdwara in Kabul, killing 25 Sikh worshippers. 

The government of Vietnam continued the expropriation and 

destruction of property belonging to the Catholic Church, and the 

government worked with state-backed Cao Dai groups to forcibly take 

over temples belonging to the independent Cao Dai. 

In November, Eritrean troops fighting in Ethiopia’s northern 

region of Tigray allegedly killed hundreds of people in the holy city of 

Aksum, a city of major significance for Ethiopian Orthodox Christians. 

Close by, fighters also shelled and looted the al-Nejashi Mosque, 

one of the oldest mosques in the world believed to have been built 

during the time of the Prophet Muhammad by the first Muslims to 

migrate to Africa.

In Burkina Faso, an unknown assailant threw a flammable bottle 

into a mosque in the capital city in November, reportedly wounding six 

people. Witnesses to the event reported that a note left on the ground 

nearby the attack read: “Close the mosque or we’ll launch grenades 

at you.” In February, unidentified gunmen attacked a church during 

Mass in the village of Pansi in the Yagha region, killing 24 people, 

including a pastor. 

In recognition of increasing attacks on houses of worship, in 

January 2021, after the reporting period, the UN General Assembly 

adopted a resolution condemning attacks on religious sites.

The pandemic also fostered a wave of 

misinformation targeting religious minorities.
88 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

Political Unrest Leading to 

Religious Freedom Violations 

In 2020, several post-Soviet countries experienced political unrest that 

prompted the emergence of religious freedom violations. In August, 

the reelection of President Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus, widely 

viewed as fraudulent, was quickly followed by sustained protests 

across the country that drew hundreds of thousands despite brutal 

government crackdowns. The Catholic Church organized some of 

those protests, spoke out against regime violence, and protected 

protesters within its facilities. In August, state media responded to 

this participation by stopping the broadcast of Catholic Mass on 

Sundays. Belarusian officials blocked Catholic Archbishop Tadeusz 

Kondrusiewicz from reentering the country after a short trip to 

Poland, eventually annulling his passport. Despite his readmission on 

Christmas Eve, the archbishop promptly resigned in January 2021. In 

September, the authorities deported a long-serving Catholic priest 

without explanation and have since harassed, fined, and detained 

other priests. Other religious communities faced similar consequences: for example, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church 

dismissed Metropolitan Pavel, the head of the Belarusian Orthodox 

Church (BOC) in August, after he visited protesters in the hospital and 

spoke out against regime violence. 

In October, Kyrgyzstan experienced a political revolution, with 

resulting unrest leading to religious freedom restrictions. The former 

Kyrgyz president was quickly replaced by Sadyr Japarov, a jailed 

politician who was freed during the uprising. Japarov’s base is highly 

nationalistic, and his ascension heralds an authoritarian shift in what 

has historically been the most democratic former Soviet republic 

in Central Asia. Among his first decrees were several that ordered 

educators and the media to promote “traditional” moral, family, and 

spiritual values. He also reportedly plans to introduce Islamic education in Kyrgyz schools while characterizing minority religions like 

Christianity and Buddhism as foreign. 

Political unrest in Yemen continued to undermine the religious 

freedom of Jews, Baha’is, and Christians severely, especially in areas 

controlled by the Houthis. Since 

2014, the Houthis have sought 

greater political influence and 

control in Yemen, all while 

espousing the slogan “Allah is 

great/Death to America/Death 

to Israel/ Curses on the Jews/

Victory to Islam.” In 2020, Jewish 

prisoner of conscience Libi Salem 

Musa Marhabi remained in prison 

even though a court had ordered 

his release. Despite the release of several Baha’is from Houthi prisons, 

the community remained a target of regular persecution throughout 

the year. Christians reportedly faced an uptick in violent attacks as well. 

Blasphemy Laws

There were many changes to blasphemy laws around the world in 

2020. Some of these changes were positive. Early in the year, Ireland 

abolished its blasphemy laws. Scotland also announced in April it would 

repeal its blasphemy law, though debate endured on whether the hate 

crimes bill replacing the law would allow for criticism of religion. In July, 

Sudan decriminalized apostasy and eliminated flogging as a punishment for blasphemy, although the blasphemy law remained in force.

Other countries actively enforced blasphemy laws in 2020. In Sri 

Lanka, after a Buddhist monk filed a complaint citing the country’s 

blasphemy laws, police summoned a nontheist activist and told him 

not to speak about Buddhism. Sri Lankan authorities charged a writer 

under these laws for posting a short story on Facebook deemed critical 

of Buddhism. In Morocco, officials charged an actor under blasphemy 

laws for posting a video on social media deemed critical of Islam. A 

court in Morocco sentenced a member of the Youssoufia city council 

to six months in prison over a Facebook post about Islam. In Egypt, 

a court sentenced a man to prison for managing a Facebook page 

that promoted atheism, and security forces detained a teacher for 

promoting Qur’anism. Poland used blasphemy laws to charge lesbian, 

gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) protesters in August 

2020. In Brazil, a judge ruled that a Netflix movie depicting Jesus as 

gay be removed on the grounds that it hurt “the honor of millions of 

Catholics,” though Brazil’s supreme court later overturned the order. 

Global Antisemitism

In 2020, far-right (including neo-Nazis), far-left, and Islamist extremists increasingly threatened Jewish communities in Europe. The 

Nordic Resistance Movement harassed Jews in 20 cities across four 

Scandinavian countries during the week leading up to Yom Kippur, 

utilizing antisemitic posters and confronting Jewish worshippers outside of synagogues. In Germany, the government began to examine 

closely the extent to which individuals associated with the far right 

are represented in the country’s security forces. In one instance, 

29 officers were suspended for sharing images of Hitler and violent 

neo-Nazi propaganda in multiple group chats. Nationalist groups and 

other far-right extremists held marches in Spain and Ukraine featuring 

antisemitic imagery and chants. 

Germany and the United Kingdom again witnessed record levels 

of antisemitic incidents throughout the year. The chief of German 

domestic intelligence acknowledged that nearly all popular Islamist 

organizations that are active in Germany include antisemitism as a 

part of their ideology. In October, the British Equality and Human 

Rights Commission found that 

the British Labour Party had 

failed to respond sufficiently 

to far-left antisemitism within 

the party, including Holocaust 

denial and Rothschild conspiracy 

theories posted by party members on social media in previous 

years. Throughout Europe, Jews 

faced threats to ban or limit ritual 

slaughter, physical attacks, discrimination, and rampant vandalism. In France, in a July television 

interview, the leader of the far-left La France Insoumise party accused

Jews of being responsible for the death of Jesus.

In October, USCIRF reported on the importance of ritual slaughter to Jewish individuals who follow their faith’s dietary laws. Yet in 

a far-reaching decision, the Court of Justice of the European Union 

(EU) ruled in December that “member countries may ban the practice 

of ritual slaughter in order to promote animal welfare.” Additionally, 

the Polish government came close to ending its $1.8 billion kosher/

halal meat export industry, which would severely hamper the ability 

of Jews and Muslims in neighboring countries to access religiously 

permissible meat.

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Throughout Europe, Jews faced 

threats to ban or limit ritual slaughter, 

physical attacks, discrimination, 

and rampant vandalism.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021 89

Jews faced physical attacks and threats of violence at places of 

worship and in public throughout the year. In Germany, a man with a 

shovel badly injured a Jewish student leaving a synagogue in Hamburg 

on Sukkot. Likewise, a man wielding an ax entered a synagogue compound in Ukraine, though security guards stopped him before he 

entered the building. Assailants attacked Jewish families in Argentina 

and France as well as a Brazilian man wearing a kippah. 

Jews were also victims of xenophobic discrimination. 

Antisemitism featured heavily in Poland’s presidential campaign. 

There were multiple instances reported of Jews being refused service due to their faith, Jewish professionals enduring antisemitic 

stereotypes in their places of work, and even a police request for 

a list of all Jews living in a Ukrainian city. Jewish cemeteries were 

frequent targets for acts of vandalism, including spray-painted Nazi 

rhetoric and imagery, smashed headstones, and stolen property. 

A spate of such attacks occurred in Greece in the fall and winter, 

and cemeteries in at least eight other countries around the world 

suffered similar circumstances. 

Textbooks in countries whose governments profess Islam as an 

official religion continued to contain antisemitic content. Iran’s textbooks portrayed Jews as “conspirational” and referenced “Jewish 

gold hoarders and capitalists.” Saudi Arabia’s textbooks, while 

significantly improved from previous years, still discussed Jewish 

“treachery” and referred to Christians and Jews alike as “infidels.”

There were promising signs in 2020 as well. France, a country 

normally associated with ever-increasing numbers of yearly antisemitic 

incidents, recorded a 50 percent drop in such cases though France also 

had some of the most enduring lockdown policies in Europe to manage the Covid-19 pandemic. At least three countries announced the 

creation of positions similar to the U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and 

Combat Anti-Semitism, as well as the UN and the Council of Europe. 

Albania, Argentina, Italy, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay and 

organizations like the Global Imams Council adopted the International 

H o l o c a u s t Re m e m b r a n c e 

Alliance’s “Working Definition 

of Antisemitism.” Crucially, 

numerous countries and multilateral organizations announced 

Holocaust and antisemitism

awareness education programs, 

millions of dollars in security

funding, and comprehensive

strategies for combating antisemitism. USCIRF held two events on 

antisemitism in 2020: a hearing

entitled “Global Efforts to Combat Antisemitism” and a virtual event 

focused on antisemitism in Europe amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

China’s International Influence on Religious 

Freedom and Human Rights

While the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) policies and actions 

have resulted in severe persecution of religious groups within China’s 

borders, its growing overseas influence and activities also negatively affected religious freedom and other human rights far beyond. 

According to Freedom House, China’s transnational repression campaign is by far the “most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive”; 

Human Rights Watch similarly declared that China “remained the 

biggest threat to global human rights” in 2020. 

The CCP government exercises its broad economic and geopolitical influence to pressure foreign countries near and far to accept its 

demands without concern for human rights. Tactics include harassment, 

intimidation, and detainment of human rights activists, ethnic and religious minorities, and other critics and dissidents. For instance, in 2020, 

reports revealed that Turkey—a country with linguistic and cultural 

ties to the Uyghurs and home to thousands of Uyghur refugees—has 

increasingly yielded to China’s pressure, reportedly silenced Uyghur 

critics in Turkey, and even repatriated Uyghur refugees to China where 

they face atrocities that the U.S. government has deemed genocide and 

crimes against humanity. Furthermore, there are growing concerns that 

Turkey might enter into an extradition agreement with China that could 

result in more forcible repatriations of Uyghur refugees. Many Uyghur 

refugees in countries such as Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and 

Thailand remained in similarly precarious situations in 2020. In addition, 

in February 2020, then Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo revealed 

that China had pressured several countries to not join the newly established International Religious Freedom Alliance.

The CCP government also exerted pressure on international 

companies, including U.S. companies, to disregard human rights 

abuses in, and international scrutiny over, their business operations in 

China. Following growing concerns over U.S. companies’ complicity 

both in facilitating China’s digital authoritarianism targeting ethnic 

and religious minorities in China and Uyghur forced labor in their 

Chinese supply chains, the U.S. government enacted and enforced 

domestic laws and regulations to curb human rights abuses involving U.S. companies. In retaliation, the Chinese government issued 

countermeasures in January 2021, effectively forcing U.S. companies 

to choose between complying with U.S. laws and Chinese laws. 

The CCP has intensified its covert influence and infiltration activities overseas through the United Front Work Department (UFWD), 

with top CCP leaders issuing directives. Termed a “magic weapon” 

of the CCP, the UFWD has undergone significant reorganization 

under CCP General Secretary Xi 

Jinping with a renewed focus on 

overseas Chinese populations, 

ethnic minority affairs, and religious groups. For example, U.S. 

authorities arrested a Tibetan 

New York Police Department 

officer in September 2020 for 

spying on the local Tibetan diaspora community. The officer’s 

family members reportedly work 

for the CCP, the government, and 

the military, while one of his handlers was identified as a Chinese 

consulate official with direct ties to the UFWD. Similar incidents of 

surveillance and intimidation targeting Tibetans in the diaspora also 

took place in Sweden, Switzerland, and Canada. 

In August 2020, the State Department designated the 

Confucius Institute U.S. Center (CIUS)—the de facto headquarters 

for all Confucius Institutes operating in the United States, which have 

close ties to the UFWD—as a foreign mission, following widespread 

concerns over censorship and threats to academic freedom that 

have implications for religious freedom. For example, the Confucius 

Institutes’ influence operations in the United States and in other 

countries have in the past resulted in universities rescinding speaking 

invitations to the Dalai Lama. In 2020, many U.S. universities severed 

their ties with the Confucius Institutes. 

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The CCP government also exerted pressure 

on international companies, including 

U.S. companies, to disregard human rights 

abuses in, and international scrutiny over, 

their business operations in China.
90 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

Alarmingly, China also has been exporting both its internet governance model and advanced surveillance technology and equipment 

to countries—such as Belarus, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe—where 

repressive governments actively persecute and oppress human rights 

activists and political opponents. Honed and refined at home—specifically in the repression of ethnic and religious minorities in Xinjiang 

and Tibet—China’s digital authoritarianism has become attractive 

to repressive regimes worldwide that may seek to replicate a “China 

model” in their own countries that could result in religious freedom 

violations. Chinese technology companies that have intimate ties to 

the CCP, such as Huawei and ZTE, play an important role in implementing and deploying such technology abroad. 

China’s coercive policies at home have negative transnational 

implications for religious freedom. In some cases, such policies 

amount to the active aiding and abetting of religious freedom violations in other countries. Uyghur, Kazakh, and other Turkic Muslims 

in foreign countries reported in 

2020 that Chinese authorities 

harassed them through messaging apps and phone calls, 

and by targeting their relatives 

back home, to silence and suppress their speech and activities 

overseas. Chinese authorities 

also rescinded their passports to 

lure them back to China where 

they faced persecution, such as 

internment. In addition, Chinese 

authorities continued to carry out 

a policy of forced repatriation of North Korean refugees in China who 

faced severe persecution upon their return to North Korea, in many 

cases due to their exposure and connection to Christianity and to 

South Korean Christian missionaries who play a crucial role in assisting 

them to escape North Korea. 

Lastly, the Chinese government and its allies continued to 

weaken and subvert the international human rights system and norms 

within the United Nations (UN) by arguing that economic progress 

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

should precede respect for individual rights, including the right to 

religious freedom. Additionally, following its election as a UN Human 

Rights Council member in October 2020, China attempted to frame 

international human rights law as merely a matter of “state-to-state” 

relations by emphasizing so-called “mutually beneficial cooperation” 

and “constructive dialogue,” thereby downplaying states’ responsibility to protect human rights. By doing so, China not only attempted 

to minimize international scrutiny over its human rights abuses, but 

also to further its increasing efforts to promote a distorted concept of 

human rights to other countries in the international fora. Those efforts 

could have far-reaching implications around the world, particularly in 

countries and regions where authoritarian regimes suppress human 

rights and religious freedom.

For example, in October 2020, Germany led 39 countries at 

the UN to condemn jointly China’s abusive policies toward ethnic 

and religious minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet. In response, China 

rallied 45 countries to support

its abusive policies, including 

some with records of severe 

human rights abuses, such as 

North Korea, Russia, Iran, and 

Eritrea, along with Organization 

of Islamic Cooperation members such as Pakistan, the United 

Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. 

China reportedly pressured 

some Western diplomats not to 

support the statement made by 

those 39 countries. Moreover, it 

has exercised its veto power as a permanent member of the UN 

Security Council to protect Burma from international scrutiny over its 

brutal treatment of Rohingya Muslims.

China is unapologetic as it increasingly disregards international 

rules, norms, and criticism of its actions and violations of human rights. 

Indeed, if left unchallenged and unchecked, China will continue to 

erode and undermine the universal human rights system with an 

emboldened sense of impunity.

China not only attempted to 

minimize international scrutiny over its 

human rights abuses, but also to further 

its increasing efforts to promote a 

distorted concept of human rights. . . .
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021 91

KEY USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS 

IMPLEMENTED IN 2020 AND EARLY 2021

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as amended 

(IRFA) mandates USCIRF to make independent policy recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress. 

The recommendations are based on USCIRF’s research on religious 

freedom conditions abroad and assessment of U.S. policy. In addition 

to making recommendations, USCIRF’s mandate was recently amended 

to include tracking the U.S. government’s implementation of USCIRF’s 

recommendations. While notable U.S. government actions pursuant to 

USCIRF recommendations are detailed throughout this report, this section highlights the key USCIRF recommendations implemented during 

2020 and early 2021, including several longstanding recommendations. 

The list is not exhaustive, but instead is meant to showcase particularly 

impactful U.S. government actions that implemented USCIRF’s recommendations. Unless otherwise noted, the recommendations highlighted 

here were included in USCIRF’s 2020 Annual Report. 

Designating the Worst Violators

• In December 2020, the U.S. Department of State designated 10 

countries as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) under IRFA, 

all of which USCIRF recommended for such designation. The State 

Department designated Nigeria as a CPC for the first time, an 

action USCIRF had recommended every year since 2009. 

• In December, the State Department also placed four countries on 

its Special Watch List (SWL) under IRFA, two of which—Cuba and 

Nicaragua—were recommended by USCIRF for such placement. 

While USCIRF recommended that Russia be designated as a CPC, 

its placement on the State Department’s SWL is a recognition of 

the severity of the religious freedom violations occurring there. 

• The State Department also designated in December five entities 

as “entities of particular concern” (EPCs) pursuant to USCIRF’s 

recommendations, including for the first time Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham 

(HTS), an entity that USCIRF had recommended be designated as 

an EPC since 2019.

Increasing the Use of Targeted Sanctions

• USCIRF has repeatedly called on the U.S. government to increase 

the use of human rights related financial and visa authorities to 

impose asset freezes and/or visa bans on individuals and entities 

for severe religious freedom violations, citing specific abuses. 

Notably, a higher percent of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 

Accountability Act (Global Magnitsky) sanctions issued in 2020 

were in response to religious freedom abuses than in previous 

years. Global Magnitsky sanctions were issued against Xinjiang 

Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo and former Political 

and Legal Affairs Commission chief Zhu Hailun, both of whom 

were explicitly named in USCIRF’s 2020 Annual Report. USCIRF 

also called for the use of targeted sanctions against perpetrators 

of religious freedom violations in Russia and Iran; this report’s 

IRFA Implementation section details the implementation of 

these sanctions.

• USCIRF continues to advocate for the increased use of targeted 

sanctions as a tool to deter religious freedom violations. In January 2021, after the reporting period, the U.S. Department of the 

Treasury imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on Iraq’s Popular 

Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chairman and Iraq’s former national 

security advisor Falih al-Fayyadh for engaging in egregious human 

rights abuses. 

• USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government urge U.S. allies 

to condemn publicly China’s treatment of religious minorities in 

conjunction with a multilateral effort to coordinate targeted sanctions against Chinese leaders. Pursuant to this recommendation, 

in March 2021, the U.S. government imposed Global Magnitsky 

sanctions on two Chinese officials for their involvement in atrocities committed against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in 

Xinjiang. These sanctions were issued in conjunction with the 

United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union, which concurrently sanctioned abusers to ensure global accountability for 

these violations.

2020 State Department Designations Pursuant to USCIRF Recommendations

CPC Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan

SWL Cuba, Nicaragua

EPC al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the Houthis, the Taliban, HTS
92 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

Increasing Prioritization of Religious Freedom

• The executive order on Advancing International Religious Freedom, 

signed by then President Donald J. Trump in June, implemented 

several of USCIRF’s longstanding recommendations related to the 

prioritization of religious freedom abroad in U.S. foreign policy. 

This included increasing related foreign assistance and developing 

an overall strategy for promoting religious freedom abroad and 

country-specific action plans. 

Filling IRF-Related Appointments

• USCIRF for years had urged successive administrations to establish 

and fill a National Security Council (NSC) staff position dedicated 

to international religious freedom (IRF), as urged by IRFA and reiterated by the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act 

of 2016. In February 2020, the Trump administration appointed

Sarah Makin-Acciani to be the first-ever senior director for IRF on 

the NSC staff. 

• USCIRF repeated its call to fill the vacancy for a special coordinator 

for Tibetan issues during 2020. In October, the Trump administration appointed then Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor Robert A. Destro to serve concurrently as 

the special coordinator for Tibetan issues, which had been vacant 

since January 2017.

Increasing the Refugee Ceiling

• In recent years, USCIRF has consistently called for a return of the 

annual refugee resettlement ceiling to the previously established 

level of 95,000. In February 2021, President Joseph R. Biden 

announced his intent to raise the refugee ceiling to 125,000 for FY 

2022, which begins on October 1, 2021. The Biden administration 

also notified Congress that it intended to raise the refugee ceiling 

for FY 2021 to 62,500 from 15,000.

Raising IRF Issues in Bilateral and 

Multilateral Engagement

• In certain contexts, USCIRF has recommended that the U.S. administration raise religious freedom issues consistently in its bilateral 

engagement. In line with these recommendations, U.S. government officials raised concerns with their counterparts in many 

countries, including Eritrea, Iraq, Sudan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. 

Sustained U.S. attention likely contributed to or encouraged tangible actions and/or improvements to religious freedom conditions in 

some of these countries. This includes the government of Eritrea’s 

eased restrictions on the Baha’i and Jewish communities and the 

Greek Orthodox Church, the government of Sudan’s invitation 

to the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur for freedom of 

religion or belief to visit the country and assess religious freedom 

conditions, and the government of Uzbekistan’s ongoing work to 

revise the 1998 religion law to comply with international human 

rights standards.

• USCIRF provided suggestions to the U.S. government for opportunities to guide foreign countries toward improving religious 

freedom conditions. This included, for example, USCIRF’s recommendations that the administration continue to provide guidance 

and training for Bahrain’s security services to prepare for Ashura 

observances in ways that protect observers’ religious freedom 

rights and minimize the potential for the outbreak of violence. As 

detailed in the Introduction to this report, Shi’a Muslims in Bahrain 

were generally able to observe the Ashura holiday in 2020.

• USCIRF has recommended that the U.S. government encourage foreign governments to create positions like the U.S. Special Envoy to 

Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism and also urge the UN to create 

a position to engage with Jewish communities and monitor antisemitism globally. Pursuant to these recommendations and resulting 

U.S. government action, Canada, the Netherlands, and Romania

created such positions in 2020. Further, UN Secretary-General 

António Guterres appointed Spanish diplomat Miguel Ángel Moratinos as the UN Focal Point in charge of monitoring antisemitism 

and enhancing a system-wide response to global antisemitism.

• USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government support the UN 

Alliance of Civilization in the implementation of the UN Plan of 

Action to Safeguard Holy Sites. In January 2021, the United States 

supported a UN General Assembly resolution condemning attacks 

on religious sites. Among its provisions, this resolution called on UN 

member states and other stakeholders to support the continued 

implementation of this plan.

Advocating for Religious Prisoners of Conscience

• USCIRF has recommended that U.S. government officials and members of Congress press foreign governments for the release of 

religious prisoners of conscience (RPOCs). Pursuant to this recommendation, U.S. officials actively engaged on RPOC cases around 

the globe. This included drawing attention to RPOCs and prison 

conditions in engagement with their foreign counterparts, including in Eritrea and Uzbekistan, two countries where RPOCs were 

released during 2020. High-level engagement by Trump administration officials on this issue included then Secretary of State Michael 

R. Pompeo welcoming the release of Roberto Quiñones, an independent journalist in Cuba imprisoned for reporting on religious 

freedom issues, and then Ambassador-at-Large for IRF Samuel 

D. Brownback drawing attention to the plight of RPOCs during 

the coronavirus pandemic. Members of Congress also actively 

advocated for the release of RPOCs, including by adopting RPOCs 

through the Defending Freedoms project, pushing for the release

of Iranian RPOCs, and holding a hearing to pressure Saudi Arabia 

to release prisoners of conscience, including Raif Badawi and his 

counsel Waleed Abu al-Khair.

Increasing Aid to Support Religious Freedom and 

Religious Minorities

• Several of USCIRF’s recommendations regarding the U.S. government increasing aid to support religious freedom and religious 

monitories were implemented in 2020. Examples where such 

support occurred include the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) providing $38 million dollars in aid to support 

religious and ethnic minorities with reconstruction efforts in northern Iraq and $356.2 million to help stabilize Sudan’s economy. 

Designating Uyghur Genocide

• In June, USCIRF warned that the Chinese government’s repressive 

population control measures against Uyghurs and other Turkic 

KEY USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTED IN 2020 AND EARLY 2021
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021 93

Muslims were evidence of genocide and urged the State Department to investigate whether these policies meet the legal definition 

for genocide under international law. In January 2021, after the 

reporting period, the State Department designated China’s treatment of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang as genocide 

and crimes against humanity.

Adopting Laws and Passing Resolutions Related to 

Religious Freedom

• USCIRF advocated for the adoption of several laws to promote 

international religious freedom, including the Uyghur Human Rights 

and Policy Act and the Tibetan Policy and Support Act. USCIRF 

also supported the adoption of a resolution calling for the global 

repeal of blasphemy, heresy, and apostasy laws and a resolution 

condemning human rights violations in Nicaragua.

USCIRF applauds the U.S. government for taking strong action, 

including the developments highlighted above, to advance the freedom of religion or belief internationally during 2020 and early 2021. 

Pursuant to USCIRF’s new mandate, USCIRF will continue to track the 

implementation by the U.S. government of USCIRF recommendations 

and their effectiveness, to the extent practicable. To support continued advancement of religious freedom globally, USCIRF encourages 

the Biden administration and Congress to continue to implement 

USCIRF’s recommendations, including those detailed throughout 

this report. 

KEY USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTED IN 2020 AND EARLY 2021

APPENDIX 1 95

APPENDIX 1 COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES

Gayle Manchin, 

Chair

REAPPOINTED BY

Hon. Charles Schumer (D), Senate Majority Leader, for a term expiring in May 

2022. Educator, former First Lady of 

West Virginia, and past President of the 

State Board of Education.

Tony Perkins, 

Vice Chair

REAPPOINTED BY

Hon. Mitch McConnell (R), Senate 

Minority Leader, for a term expiring 

in May 2022. President of the Family 

Research Council (FRC), a religious public policy organization.

Nadine Maenza, 

Commissioner

REAPPOINTED BY

Former President Donald J. Trump (R), 

for a term expiring in May 2022. President of Patriot Voices and serves on the 

Board of Directors for the Institute for 

Global Engagement, Sinjar Academy, 

and Freedom Research Foundation.

Johnnie Moore, 

Commissioner

REAPPOINTED BY

Former President Donald J. Trump (R), 

for a term expiring in May 2022. Founder 

and CEO of The KAIROS Company, and 

President of The Congress of Christian 

Leaders. “Medal of Valor” recipient from 

the Simon Wiesenthal Center.

Nury Turkel, 

Commissioner

APPOINTED BY

Hon. Nancy Pelosi (D), Speaker of the 

U.S. House of Representatives, for a 

term expiring in May 2022. Lawyer, 

Uyghur rights advocate, Senior Fellow 

at the Hudson Institute, and member of 

the Council on Foreign Relations.

Anurima Bhargava,

Vice Chair

REAPPOINTED BY

Hon. Nancy Pelosi (D), Speaker of the 

U.S. House of Representatives, for a 

term expiring in May 2022. Dignity and 

Justice Advocate, President of Anthem 

of Us, fmr. Justice Department Official.

Gary L. Bauer, 

Commissioner

REAPPOINTED BY

Former President Donald J. Trump (R), 

for a term expiring in May 2021. President of American Values, a public policy 

think tank, and Washington Director 

Emeritus of Christians United for Israel 

Action Fund.

James W. Carr, 

Commissioner

REAPPOINTED BY

Hon. Kevin McCarthy (R), House Minority 

Leader, for a term expiring in May 2022. 

President and Chairman of Highland 

Home Holdings investment fund, and 

formerly served on the National Security 

Education Board.

Frederick A. Davie, 

Commissioner

APPOINTED BY

Hon. Charles Schumer (D), Senate Majority Leader, for a term expiring in May 

2022. Executive Vice President of the 

Union Theological Seminary in New York 

City and Chief Administrative Officer at 

the Union Theological Seminary.

APPENDIX 2 97

APPENDIX 2 RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF 

CONSCIENCE PROJECT AND VICTIMS LIST

RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT

Through the Religious Prisoners of Conscience (RPOC) Project, USCIRF seeks to raise awareness of illustrative 

cases of individuals imprisoned for their religion or belief, reduce their numbers, and highlight the country 

conditions that led to their imprisonment.

Dennis Christensen

USCIRF Advocate

Chair Gayle Manchin

Golrokh Ebrahim Iraee

USCIRF Advocate

Chair Gayle Manchin

Mubarak Bala

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Frederick A. Davie

Patriarch Abune Antonios

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Johnnie Moore

Raymond Koh

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner James W. Carr

Current RPOCs

Shamil Khakimov

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Nury Turkel

Jimmy Lai

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Johnnie Moore

Raif Badawi 

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Nadine Maenza

Ramzan Bibi

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner James W. Carr

Gulmira Imin

USCIRF Advocate

Vice Chair Anurima Bhargava

Youcef Nadarkhani

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Nadine Maenza
98 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2021

Pastor A Dao 

Released: September 2020

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner James W. Carr

Hamid bin Haydara 

Released: July 2020

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Johnnie Moore

Mohammad Ali Taheri 

Released: May 2020

USCIRF Advocate

Chair Gayle Manchin

RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT AND VICTIMS LIST

Nguyen Bac Truyen

USCIRF Advocate

Vice Chair Anurima Bhargava

Current RPOCs (continued)

RPOCs Released in 2020

The Panchen Lama

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Nadine Maenza

Yahaya Sharif-Aminu 

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Frederick A. Davie

Zhang Wen Shi

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner James W. Carr

Leah Sharibu

USCIRF Advocate

Vice Chair Tony Perkins

Hu Shigen

USCIRF Advocate

Commissioner Gary Bauer
APPENDIX 2 99

FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), as amended by the Frank R. Wolf International 

Religious Freedom Act of 2016, requires USCIRF to:

“make publicly available, to the extent practicable . . . lists of persons it determines are imprisoned 

or detained, have disappeared, been placed under house arrest, been tortured, or subjected 

to forced renunciation of faith for their religious activity or religious freedom advocacy by the 

government of a foreign country that the Commission recommends for designation as a country 

of particular concern [CPC] . . . or by a nonstate actor that the Commission recommends for 

designation as an entity of particular concern [EPC].”

USCIRF’s Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) Victims List is a database that catalogues select victims 

targeted due to their religion or belief from countries that USCIRF recommends for CPC and Special Watch 

list designations, as well as EPCs. To date, the FoRB Victims List includes over 1,000 individuals detained 

by 18 countries and entities of particular concern. These victims represent a diverse number of faith communities, as shown in the chart below.

RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT AND VICTIMS LIST

Atheist

Scientologist

ECKist

Erfan-e Halgheh Practitioner

Buddhist - Hoa Hao

Buddhist - Unspecified/Other

Baha'i

Christian - Orthodox

Humanist

Buddhist - Tibetan

Christian - Catholic

Unspecified

Muslim - Ahmadiyya

Muslim - Sunni

Unknown

Muslim - Unspecified/Other

Muslim - Sufi

Christian - Protestant

Hindu

Falun Gong

Christian - Unspecified/Other

Jehovah's Witness

Muslim - Shi'a

BY FAITH

Please refer to the USCIRF website for more information on the FoRB Victims List.

Due to limited resources, USCIRF has been unable to identify and document all victims that meet the 

statutory requirements to be included on the FoRB Victims List. As such, the data contained in the database 

does not reflect country, regional, or global trends.

To support this project, USCIRF invites those with credible information on victims to submit information 

using the intake form here. Please refer to the About Section of the FoRB Victims List for more information 

on the scope of the database.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF (FORB) VICTIMS LIST


UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714

Washington, DC 20401

Telephone: (202) 523–3240

www.uscirf.gov

Burma

China

Eritrea

India

Iran

Nigeria

North Korea

Pakistan

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Vietnam

■ COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN

Afghanistan

Algeria

Azerbaijan

Cuba

Egypt

Indonesia

Iraq

Kazakhstan

Malaysia

Nicaragua

Turkey

Uzbekistan

■ SPECIAL WATCH LIST COUNTRIES

2021 USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS