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United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Annual Report 2006

Annual Report 

of the

United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

May 2006
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

800 North Capitol Street, NW

Suite 790

Washington, DC 20002

202-523-3240

202-523-5020 (fax)

www.uscirf.gov
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Commissioners

Michael Cromartie

Chair

Felice D. Gaer

Nina Shea

Vice Chairs

Dr. Khaled M. Abou El Fadl

Preeta D. Bansal

Archbishop Charles J. Chaput

Dr. Richard D. Land

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou

Bishop Ricardo Ramirez

John V. Hanford, III, ex officio

Joseph R. Crapa

Executive Director
United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Staff

Tad Stahnke, Deputy Director for Policy

David Dettoni, Deputy Director for Outreach

Christy Klaassen, Director of Government Affairs

Anne Johnson, Director of Communications

Mark Hetfield, Director of International Refugee Issues

Carmelita Hines, Director of Administration

Patricia Carley, Associate Director for Policy

Angela Stephens, Assistant Communications Director

Dwight N. Bashir, Senior Policy Analyst

Robert Blitt, International Law Specialist

Catherine Cosman, Senior Policy Analyst

Deborah DuCre, Receptionist

Scott Flipse, Senior Policy Analyst

Mindy Larmore, East Asia Researcher

Tiffany Lynch, Assistant to the Deputy Director for Policy

Jacqueline A. Mitchell, Executive Assistant

Tina Ramirez, Human Rights Researcher

Allison Salyer, Legislative Assistant

Stephen R. Snow, Senior Policy Analyst
The President

The White House 

Dear Mr. President: On behalf of the United States Commission 

on International Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the 

annual report, prepared in compliance with section 202(a)(2) of 

the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et 

seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy recommendations that it contains. 

Sincerely, 

Michael Cromartie

Chair 

Enclosure

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United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Washington, DC, May 1, 2006
Hon. Condoleezza Rice

Secretary of State

Department of State

Dear Madame Secretary: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you 

the annual report, prepared in compliance with section 202(a)(2) 

of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 

et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy recommendations that it contains. 

Sincerely, 

Michael Cromartie

Chair

Enclosure

United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Washington, DC, May 1, 2006

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Hon. Dennis Hastert

Speaker of the House

U.S. House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Speaker: On behalf of the United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the 

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et 

seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy recommendations that it contains. 

Sincerely, 

Michael Cromartie

Chair

Enclosure

United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Washington, DC, May 1, 2006

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Hon. Ted Stevens

President Pro Tempore

U.S. Senate

Dear Mr. Stevens: On behalf of the United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the annual report, prepared in compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the 

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et 

seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy recommendations that it contains. 

Sincerely, 

Michael Cromartie

Chair 

Enclosure

United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom

Washington, DC, May 1, 2006

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INTRODUCTION

About The Commission

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom was created by 

the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) to monitor violations of the 

right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief abroad, as defined in 

IRFA and set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international 

instruments, and to give independent policy recommendations to the President, Secretary 

of State, and Congress. 

The Commission is the first government commission in the world with the sole mission of reviewing and making policy recommendations on the facts and circumstances of 

violations of religious freedom globally. The Commission’s impact and success in accomplishing its mission is achieved through its efforts to bring advice and accountability to U.S. 

foreign policy in the promotion of religious freedom abroad. By providing reliable information and analysis, and careful and specific policy recommendations, the Commission 

provides the U.S. government and the American public with the tools necessary to promote 

this fundamental freedom throughout the world.

In the words of a key drafter of IRFA, the Commission was established for the purpose of 

ensuring “that the President and the Congress receive independent recommendations and, where 

necessary, criticism of American policy that does not promote international religious freedom.”1

The Commission, which began its work in May 1999, is not a part of the State Department and is independent from the Executive Branch.

1 Congressional Record, S12999, November 12, 1998.

The United States Commission on 

International Religious Freedom was created by the 

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA) to monitor violations of the right 

to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 

or belief abroad, as defined in IRFA 

and set forth in the Universal Declaration 

of Human Rights and related international 

instruments, and to give independent policy 

recommendations to the President, Secretary 

of State, and Congress.

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The Commission is composed of 10 members. Three are appointed by the President. 

Three are appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, of which two are appointed upon the recommendation of the Senate Minority Leader. Three are appointed by the 

Speaker of the House of Representatives, of which two are appointed upon the recommendation of the House Minority Leader. The system of appointments thus provides that leaders of the party in the White House appoint five voting members, and leaders of the other 

party appoint four. The Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom serves 

ex officio as a non-voting member. 

Commissioners bring a wealth of expertise and experience in foreign affairs, human 

rights, religious freedom, and international law; the membership also reflects the religious 

diversity of the United States.

The report covers the period May 2005 through April 2006. In June of 2005 Preeta D. 

Bansal completed her term as the Chair of the Commission, and Felice D. Gaer and Nina 

Shea served as Vice Chairs. In July 2005, Michael Cromartie became Chair, and Felice D. 

Gaer and Nina Shea were re-elected to serve as Co-Vice Chairs. Each member of the Commission is currently serving a two-year term and can be reappointed. Terms are staggered, 

with some having begun on May 15, 2004 and others on May 15, 2005.

In carrying out its mandate, the Commission reviews information on violations of religious freedom as presented in the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights 

Practices and its Annual Report on International Religious Freedom. The Commission also 

consults regularly with State Department and National Security Council officials, U.S. Ambassadors, and officials of foreign governments, as well as with representatives of religious 

communities and institutions, human rights groups, other non-governmental organizations, 

academics, and other policy experts. It visits foreign countries to examine religious freedom 

conditions firsthand. The Commission also holds public hearings, briefings and roundtables.

The Commission has met with President George W. Bush and senior members of his Administration, including the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, to discuss its 

findings and recommendations. The Commission also briefs Members of Congress, U.S. Ambassadors, and officials from international organizations. In addition, the Commission testifies 

before Congress, participates with U.S. delegations to international meetings and conferences, 

helps provide training to Foreign Service officers and other U.S. officials, and advises the Administration and Members of Congress and their staff on executive and legislative initiatives. 

The Commission raises issues and brings its findings and recommendations to the 

American public through its public speaking activities, press conferences, other public 

events such as roundtables and briefings, its publications, Web site, and media outreach. 

During this reporting period the Commission’s activities were covered by the Christian 

Science Monitor, International Herald Tribune, Miami Herald, Los Angeles Times, New York 

Times, The Washington Post, The Washington Times, the wires, ABC World News, CNN, National Public Radio, and PBS, to name a few.

Commissioners reside throughout the United States, and the Commission has traveled around the country to hold public hearings, public meetings, and other activities to 

inform the American people of its work. 

While the work of the Commission is conducted year round, the Commission delivers an annual report of its policy recommendations in May to the President, the Secretary 

of State, and Congress. 
xiii

Table of Contents

Introduction: the Commission’s Role in Advancing Religious Freedom 1

Iraq: Human Rights in Jeopardy 8

China: Commission Makes First Official Visit 17

Sudan: Weak Implementation of the Peace Agreement 

Imperils Human Rights 32 

North Korea: Commission Study Provides Evidence of Severe 

Religious Freedom Violations 48

IRFA and the U.S. Refugee and Asylum Programs 57

The State Department’s Annual Report on 

International Religious Freedom 65

Countries of Particular Concern and the Commission Watch List 73

Country Reports: Africa

Eritrea 84

Nigeria 89
2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

xiv

Country Reports: East Asia 94

Burma 94

China 99

Indonesia 109

Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of 116

Laos 122

Vietnam 126

Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia 134

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 134

Belarus 143

Georgia 148

The Russian Federation 151

Turkmenistan 158

Uzbekistan 163

Country Reports: Middle East 170

Egypt 170

Iran 177

Saudi Arabia 182

Country Reports: South Asia 190

Afghanistan 190

Bangladesh 196

India 201

Pakistan 205

Sri Lanka 209

Country Reports: Western Hemisphere 212

Cuba 212

Appendix 1: 

Biographies of Members of the U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom 217 

Appendix 2:

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Selected Provisions 227

Appendix 3: 

International Human Rights Standards: Summary of Provisions 

on Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion or Belief 230
Introduction

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom was created by Congress to advocate within 

U.S. policy a prominent place for the promotion of religious 

freedom and other freedoms throughout the world. Now in 

its seventh year of operation, the Commission is drawing 

the attention of the policy community to the growing strategic importance of the protection of religious freedom to 

U.S. national interests, raising greater public awareness as to 

why religious freedom is a critical component of how countries treat their own people and deal with the world around 

them, and working with Members of Congress in a truly 

bipartisan effort to promote religious freedom abroad.

This annual report of the Commission provides a comprehensive review of the Commission’s activities—its findings, recommendations, and achievements—during the past 

year to promote the universal right to freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion or belief. This report describes 

conditions for religious freedom and inter-related human 

rights in the countries of concern to the Commission, highlights key findings, reports on the actions the Commission 

has taken to raise the public’s awareness of persistent religious freedom violations, refers to the Commission’s efforts 

to keep Congress informed of religious freedom conditions 

throughout the world, and presents the Commission’s U.S. 

Introduction

USCIRF meets with President George W. Bush

Through its focus on critical foreign policy concerns of the day, 

especially in China, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, and Sudan, 

and its ongoing work of drawing 

attention to religious freedom 

conditions worldwide, the Commission has sought to promote a 

foreign policy that furthers our 

nation’s humanitarian as well 

as national security interests.

1
2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

2

policy recommendations to ensure that the promotion of freedom of religion or belief becomes a more integral part of U.S. foreign policy. In the seven years of its operation, many 

of the Commission’s recommendations concerning countries which violate international 

norms of freedom of religion or belief have been implemented by the President, the State 

Department, and Congress, and have had a significant impact on the protection of human 

rights, including religious freedom, in those countries. 

Through its focus on critical foreign policy concerns of the day, especially in China, 

Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, and Sudan, and its ongoing work of drawing attention to 

religious freedom conditions worldwide, the Commission has sought to promote a foreign 

policy that furthers our nation’s humanitarian as well as national security interests.

Focusing on Critical Foreign Policy Concerns

China

In August 2005, the Commission made an official two-week delegation visit to China, 

traveling to the cities of Beijing, Urumqi, Kashgar, Chengdu, Lhasa, and Shanghai. In November 2005, the Commission released Policy Focus on China at a bi-partisan press conference in the Capitol. The release of Policy Focus on China and its recommendations for U.S. 

policy were especially timely in light of President George W. Bush’s November 14 meeting 

in Beijing with Chinese President Hu Jintao. Policy Focus on China includes recommendations for U.S. policy as a result of the findings from that visit. More on those findings and 

recommendations can be found in the country chapter on China and the special report on 

the Commission’s visit to China in this report, as well as in Policy Focus on China on the 

Commission’s web site, www.uscirf.gov. 

During its visit, which followed three years of diplomatic effort by the U.S. government, the Commission engaged senior Chinese officials, including Vice Premier Hui Liangyu, at the national, provincial, and local levels who are responsible for the management 

of religious affairs and the protection of human rights. In addition, the Commission met 

with Chinese academics and lawyers, UN officials, and representatives of government-sanctioned Buddhist, Catholic, Taoist, Islamic, and Protestant religious organizations. 

The Commission raised questions on Chinese law and international human rights 

norms, the management of religious affairs in China, Chinese policies concerning the religious education of minors and unregistered religious organizations, new regulations on 

cults and religious affairs, conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang, and the situation for North Korean asylum-seekers in China. The Commission also raised specific cases of concern with 

law enforcement officials and was allowed to meet with Tibetan Buddhist nun Phuntsog 

Nyidron during its visit to Lhasa.

Phuntsog Nyidron was permitted to leave China in March 2006, and that same 

month, the Commission participated in an event in Washington sponsored by The International Campaign for Tibet and The Capitol Area Tibetan Association welcoming her to 

the United States. The Commission had worked with Congress, the White House, the State 

Department, U.S. Ambassador Clark Randt, and the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, as well as with 

the International Campaign for Tibet and other groups, on her behalf.

In April 2006, the Commission co-sponsored an event with the National Endowment for Democracy on “Religion and Rule of Law in China.” In March 2005, China’s State 
3

Council enacted Regulations on Religious Affairs, stressing that they would offer increased 

protection for domestic religious practice. One year after the enactment of these regulations, and shortly before President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States in April, the roundtable offered an opportunity to assess the impact of these regulations on religious freedom 

in China.

North Korea

In November 2005, the Commission released a study, “Thank You, Father Kim Il Sung: 

Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion in 

North Korea” at a bi-partisan Capitol Hill press conference. The Commission’s study, led by 

human rights expert David Hawk, author of The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps, presents evidence based on extensive, in-depth interviews with North Korean 

refugees and escapees on the policies used by the North Korean government to stamp out 

religious faith and practice, including eyewitness accounts of public executions of religious 

believers and indoctrination sessions at “Kim Il Sung Revolutionary Research Centers.” The 

study is the first of its kind by a U.S. government agency and reports on the forceful suppression of North Korea’s once vibrant religious and intellectual life, the establishment of a 

quasi-religious cult of personality centered on Kim Il Sung and his son Kim Jong Il, and the 

survival of limited religious activity in North Korea. The study and its findings and recommendations for U.S. policy were discussed at an on-the-record event co-sponsored with the 

American Enterprise Institute in March 2006.

As the international community deals with North Korea’s nuclear aspirations, human rights objectives should not be put aside. Negotiations to end nuclear proliferation 

should include religious freedom, as well as issues such as family reunification, abductions, rule-of-law development, market reforms, needs-based food distribution, and economic development. 

More details of the study can be found in the special section on the study in this 

report and in “Thank You, Father Kim Il Sung”: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of 

Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion in North Korea,” which can be found on the 

Commission’s web site.

Sudan

In January 2006, the Commission undertook a two-week delegation to Sudan to assess the state of religious freedom and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement that ended a two-decades long civil war between the North and South. The delegation traveled to Khartoum, Southern Sudan, and Nairobi, Kenya. The following March, 

the Commission released Policy Focus on Sudan at a bi-partisan press conference in the 

Capitol with Members of Congress. 

Sudan is a nation where U.S. influence has already made a difference and should continue to do so. Since its inception, including after the signing of the Peace Agreement, the 

Commission has determined that Sudan should be designated as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC. The State Department has repeatedly adopted this recommendation. In 

the past, the Commission has identified Sudan as the world’s most violent abuser of the 

right to freedom of religion and belief and has drawn attention to the Sudanese government’s genocidal atrocities against civilian populations, including in Darfur. As a result of 

INTRODUCTION
2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

4

the government’s policies of Islamization and Arabization, 2 million people, mostly Christians and followers of traditional African religions in southern and central Sudan, died in 

the now-concluded North-South civil war. 

The Commission also has made a series of recommendations regarding U.S. policy 

toward Sudan, including that the U.S. government appoint a nationally prominent individual to bring about a peaceful and just settlement of the war in Sudan. In September 2001, 

President Bush appointed former Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan, energizing the Sudan peace process. The Commission’s consistent advocacy of strong 

U.S. pressure on the Khartoum regime also was reflected in the Comprehensive Peace in 

Sudan Act of 2004, signed by President Bush on December 23, 2004.

Policy Focus on Sudan includes new recommendations for U.S. policy as a result of 

the findings from the Commission’s trip. More on those findings and recommendations 

can be found in the chapter on Sudan in this report and in Policy Focus on Sudan on the 

Commission’s web site. 

Drawing Attention to Religious Freedom Violators

One of the Commission’s chief statutory responsibilities is to make recommendations to the Secretary of State on countries whose governments have engaged in or tolerated systematic and egregious violations of the universal right to freedom of religion or 

belief. Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), those countries that 

meet the statutory criteria must be designated by the Secretary of State as CPCs. In May 

2006, concurrent with the release of this report, the Commission wrote to Secretary of 

State Condoleezza Rice to recommend that 11 countries be designated as CPCs this year. It 

recommended that eight countries remain on the CPC list: Burma, China, the Democratic 

People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Eritrea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Vietnam. 

It also identified three countries not previously designated by the U.S. government: Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The Commission has also drawn attention to the Secretary of State’s responses to the CPC designations of Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Eritrea, 

three countries that require direct responses by the Secretary under IRFA as none is subject 

to pre-existing sanctions. 

In addition to CPC recommendations, the Commission wrote that it was adding 

Afghanistan to its Watch List. Bangladesh, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, and Nigeria 

would remain on the Watch List. More information about the 2006 CPC designations and 

Watch List countries can be found in this report.

Raising Public Awareness

Over the past year, the Commission has held numerous public events highlighting 

critical religious freedom concerns, in addition to the events with the American Enterprise Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy noted above. In June 2005, the 

Commission released two policy briefs at events co-sponsored by Washington policy think 

tanks. The first event was held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 

for the release of Policy Focus on Egypt. Commissioners were joined by prominent Egyptian human rights activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who was the commentator and endorsed 

the Commission’s work on Egypt. The second event was held at the Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace for the release of Policy Focus on Uzbekistan. The Commission was 
INTRODUCTION

5

joined by Robert Templer, Director of the Asia Program at the International Crisis Group, 

who presented Crisis Group’s report, “Uzbekistan: the Andijon Uprising.” The roundtable 

was chaired by Dr. Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate at Carnegie. 

Also in June, the Commission presented the findings of its March 2005 comparative study of the constitutions of 44 predominately Muslim countries at an event at Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty on “Religion and Iraq’s Permanent Constitution: Constitutional 

Models of Predominantly Muslim Countries.” In addition, the Commission held a hearing 

on Pakistan on Capitol Hill titled “The United States and Pakistan: Navigating a Complex 

Relationship.” Witnesses provided testimony about the situation in Pakistan and made recommendations for U.S. policy. Transcripts of this and other Commission hearings can be 

found on the Commission’s web site.

In February 2005, the Commission released the findings of its Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal and recommendations for the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and Department of Justice. Congress authorized the Commission to appoint experts 

to conduct a study examining how expedited removal is implemented and if the process 

offers sufficient protection to legitimate asylum seekers. Congress asked for the study to 

examine whether asylum seekers subject to expedited removal are being detained under inappropriate conditions and whether they are being returned to countries where they might 

face persecution. Included in the study’s recommendations was the recommendation that 

Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff appoint a Senior Refugee and Asylum Policy Advisor. The Commission welcomed Secretary Chertoff ’s February 2006 announcement 

of the appointment of Igor Timofeyev as DHS’s first Senior Refugee and Asylum Policy 

Advisor. The Commission had urged Secretary Chertoff to establish such a post when it met 

with him in April 2005.

At the end of June, the Commission traveled to Salt Lake City, Utah, to receive the 

2005 Arthur C. Helton Human Rights Award from The American Immigration Lawyers 

Association (AILA). The AILA presented the award to the Commission, its Expedited Removal Study experts, and their team of researchers. The Award was established in 1983 

to recognize outstanding service in advancing the cause of human rights and was being 

presented to the Commission in recognition of the Expedited Removal Study and the Commission’s efforts to promote the protection of asylum seekers who flee to the United States. 

In July 2005, Commissioner Preeta D. Bansal spoke at the Chautauqua Institution’s 

summer lecture series on the role that international religious freedom plays in U.S. foreign 

policy. This summer series is an annual event that brings together a wide variety of individuals to discuss issues ranging from faith and politics to the law in religion and society.

In September, Commission Chair Michael Cromartie and Commissioner Richard 

Land traveled to Houston, Texas, to address the conference “Tolerance and Its Limits” at the 

Boniuk Center for the Study and Advancement of Religious Tolerance at Rice University. 

Commissioners also met with the Editorial Board of The Houston Chronicle. 

In February 2006, the Commission held an on-the-record roundtable at the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace assessing U.S. policy towards the human rights situation in 

Russia. The roundtable reviewed how the U.S. government should be responding to the rollback 

in human rights, including religious freedom, in Russia and increasing Russian nationalism. 

Commission members also pressed issues of concern to the public through several 

appearances on television and radio broadcast programs and interviews with the print me-
2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

6

dia, including appearances on ABC World News, CNN, and National Public Radio. In addition, the Commission published opinion-editorials in The Washington Post, Dallas Morning 

News, The New York Sun, and The Philadelphia Inquirer. 

Assessing Religious Freedom First Hand 

As part of its annual deliberative process, the Commission assesses religious freedom 

conditions first hand. As noted earlier, in August 2005, the Commission sent an official 

two-week delegation to China and in January 2006, the Commission traveled to Sudan. In 

February 2006, the Commission traveled to Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. In each country, 

Commission delegations met with a broad range of individuals including senior government officials, human rights organizations and other non-governmental organizations, religious leaders, scholars, educators, legal specialists, and others. The Commission consulted 

with these individuals on human rights concerns, including freedom of religion or belief, 

as protected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights, and other instruments.

In February 2006, Commissioner Elizabeth Prodromou traveled to Moscow to make 

a presentation on “Human Rights and Tolerance in Today’s Russia: an International View” 

at a conference in Moscow organized by the Russian Presidential Administration Training 

Academy. The conference brought together scores of national, regional, and local government officials responsible for the regulation of religious affairs in Russia. The Commission 

also made a similar presentation at a conference on religion in Russia at the Moscow Humanities University. During the visit, Commissioner Prodromou met with several representatives of human rights and other civil society organizations, as well as academic experts, 

concerned with freedom of religion and growing intolerance in Russia.

In addition, the Commission has participated through the U.S. delegations in various meetings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In 

June 2005, Commissioner Archbishop Charles J. Chaput was named by Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice as a member of the nine-member U.S. delegation to the Conference on 

Anti-Semitism and on Other Forms of Intolerance sponsored by the OSCE, which was 

held in Cordoba, Spain. Commission Vice Chair Nina Shea and Commissioner Michael 

Cromartie were named as advisors to the U.S. delegation. The Cordoba conference focused 

on practical steps to combat intolerance, including discrimination against religious and 

other minorities, building on the OSCE’s 2004 Conference on Anti-Semitism in Berlin and 

the Conference on Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination in Brussels. 

In October 2005, Commission Vice Chair Felice D. Gaer was an official member of 

the U.S. delegation to the OSCE’s Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw, 

Poland. The annual Warsaw meeting is Europe’s largest human rights conference, and the 

OSCE’s most important human rights event of the year. Its purpose is to examine implementation of the human rights commitments in OSCE’s founding document, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and other commitments made since then. Participants from government 

and civil society devoted special attention to future planning to combat intolerance and 

discrimination, including anti-Semitism, discrimination against Muslims, xenophobia and 

related intolerance, including Christianophobia. These topics have been a special focus of 

Commission concern in the OSCE. The OSCE consists of 55 nations, including the nations 

of Europe and Eurasia, the United States, and Canada.
7

Keeping Congress Informed

In Washington, Commissioners testified before Congress addressing a number 

of Commission concerns. In May 2005, Commissioner Michael Cromartie testified at 

a briefing of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or Helsinki 

Commission, on “Unrest in Uzbekistan: Crisis and Prospects.” In June 2005, Commission 

Vice Chair Shea testified before the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations at a 

hearing on human rights and religious freedom in Vietnam. In July 2005, Commission 

Vice Chair Gaer testified before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus Members’ 

Briefing titled, “The Human Rights Situation in Egypt: An Overview.” In October 2005, 

Commission Chair Cromartie testified before a joint members’ briefing of the Congressional Caucus on Vietnam and the Congressional Human Rights Caucus to examine the 

ongoing religious freedom violations in Vietnam. In November 2005, Commission Chair 

Cromartie testified at a hearing on the State Department’s 2005 International Religious 

Freedom Report and its designation of CPCs held by the HIRC Subcommittee on Africa, 

Global Human Rights and International Operations. Also in November, Commissioner 

Elizabeth Prodromou spoke before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus (CHRC) at 

a briefing titled “Religious Freedom and Democracy in Egypt: The Role of Coptic Christians and Muslims.” In March 2006, Commission Chair Cromartie testified before the 

HIRC Subcommittee on Africa, Human Rights, and International Organizations at a 

hearing titled “The Human Rights Dialogue with Vietnam: Is Vietnam Making Significant Progress?” In April 2006, Commission Vice Chair Gaer testified before the CHRC 

at a briefing titled “Anti-Conversion Laws and Religious Freedom in South Asia and the 

Middle East: The Case of Abdul Rahman.” The individual country chapters in this report 

contain more information about these events as well as other Commission activities. All 

Commission testimony can be found on the Commission’s web site.

In addition to testifying before Congress, the Commission held congressional staff 

briefings and worked with a number of individual congressional offices to include its findings and policy recommendations in almost two dozen bills and resolutions, including 

religious freedom conditions and U.S. policy in Afghanistan, China, Egypt, India, Saudi 

Arabia, and Uzbekistan. On several occasions, the Commission’s findings and recommendations were also cited in congressional letters and statements.

Through its activities and publications, the Commission seeks positive ways to protect freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief globally. In the coming year, the 

Commission will continue to work with policymakers, the public, the non-governmental 

community, religious communities, the media, and others to promote universal rights and 

fundamental freedoms.

INTRODUCTION
8

Iraq: Human Rights 

in Jeopardy

The Iraqi people face considerable human 

rights challenges as their political leaders 

continue to try to forge a new government 

to advance the political process, and as U.S. coalition forces and their Iraqi counterparts address serious, ongoing security concerns. In the last year, 

there has been a grave escalation of Sunni-Shi’a 

violence, and religiously motivated violence at the 

hands of insurgents and Islamic militants continued unabated. These attacks have had an impact 

on all elements of Iraqi society, including ChaldoAssyrians, Sabean Mandaeans, and Yazidis—nonMuslim groups targeted on account of their religion—as well as secular Muslims, Sufi Muslims, 

Roma, women, homosexuals, and others. As the 

U.S. Department of State acknowledged in its 2005 

International Religious Freedom Report, “While the 

general lawlessness that permitted criminal gangs 

and insurgents to victimize citizens with impunity 

affected Iraqis of all ethnicities and religions, many 

individuals were targeted because of their religious 

identity or secular leanings.”

The Commission has concluded 

that because the United States 

has been so directly involved 

in Iraq’s political reconstruction, it has a special obligation 

to act vigorously, together with 

the Iraqi leadership, to identify and promptly remedy the 

systemic flaws that continue 

to undermine the protection of 

universal human rights in Iraq. 

Members of the Iraqi Governing Council celebrate the signing of the Interim Constitution in Baghdad.

Photo: Peter Andrews (March 8, 2004), Reuters
9

The Commission has concluded that because the United States has been so directly 

involved in Iraq’s political reconstruction, it has a special obligation to act vigorously, together with the Iraqi leadership, to identify and promptly remedy the systemic flaws that 

continue to undermine the protection of universal human rights in Iraq. Specific policy 

recommendations for the U.S. government are presented at the end of this chapter.

Sunni-Shi’a Sectarian Violence and Intra-Shi’a Strife

There has been an escalation in the level of sectarian violence between Sunni and 

Shi’a Muslim factions, which some observers liken to a so-called civil war either already 

in progress or increasingly inevitable. The Commission has previously called attention to 

the danger posed by sectarian violence. In early 2006, there was a dramatic spike in these 

attacks and reprisals, particularly following the bombing of Samarra’s Askariya shrine, or 

Golden Mosque, a site revered by Shi’a Muslims. In retaliation for this attack, media sources 

reported that mobs struck 27 Sunni mosques in the capital, killing three imams and kidnapping a fourth. The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) reported at the end of February 2006 that violence following the destruction of the Askariya shine resulted in “hundreds 

of cases of killings, torture, illegal detention and displacement,” and cited figures provided 

by the Sunni Muslim Iraqi Islamic Party reporting damage to 106 mosques and the assassination of 20 imams and sheikhs.1

 At the time of this writing, murderous attacks by 

insurgent groups and sectarian militias continue on an almost daily basis. Moreover, there 

are reportedly mounting intra-Shi’a tensions, including the recent flare-ups of violence between the country’s two largest Shi’a militias, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution 

in Iraq’s (SCIRI) Badr Brigade and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

The growing level of sectarian tension is exacerbated by reports of related human 

rights abuses, including the unlawful abduction, torture, and extrajudicial killing of Sunni Arabs at the hands of Iraqi Security Forces, including the Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) 

Quick Reaction Forces (Wolf Brigade), and others.2

 Likewise, Sunni insurgents and other 

forces were responsible for the kidnapping and killing of Shi’a Muslims. Although the MOI 

announced it would launch investigations into these incidents, according to the State Department, no information regarding such investigations had been released to the public. 

Human rights organizations have asserted that the Iraqi government has failed to establish 

an effective mechanism for monitoring abuses by law enforcement personnel or the armed 

forces, and for bringing those accused of such offenses to justice.

Throughout the past year, there were numerous bombings targeting worshippers at 

mosques, as well as assassinations of clerics and other community leaders. Additionally, 

UNAMI and media sources reported that Shi’a and Sunni families are being forcibly evicted 

from their homes in certain neighborhoods,3

 and Sunni Muslims arbitrarily detained and 

arrested, “often on the basis of their Sunni-sounding last names.”4

The Future of Religious Minorities Hangs in the Balance

Amid this growing cycle of sectarian violence, religious minorities in Iraq continued to suffer a disproportionate burden of violent attacks and other human rights abuses. 

Minority communities, including Christian Iraqis, are forced to fend for themselves in 

an atmosphere of impunity, and lack any tribal or militia structure to provide for their 

security. The result is that members of these communities continue to flee the country in 

the face of violence, in an exodus that may mean the end of the presence in Iraq of ancient 

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2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

10

Christian and other religious minority communities that have lived on those same lands 

for 2,000 years.5

 The UN has reported on “an explosion of Islamist extremist movements 

and militias which target, among others, members of religious minorities,” concluding 

that religious minorities “have become the regular victims of discrimination, harassment, 

and at times persecution, with incidents ranging from intimidation and threats to the 

destruction of property, kidnapping and murder,” and that “members of the Christian 

minority...appear to be particularly targeted.”6

 As discussed below, this violence is also 

directed against women, including non-Muslim women, who are deemed as not complying with Islamic strictures, which are being imposed unlawfully.

The indigenous, ancient Iraqi Christian community has been the target of coordinated bombing attacks. At the end of January 2006, five simultaneous bombings targeted two 

churches in Baghdad, two churches in Kirkuk, and the Vatican embassy. According to press 

reports, 16 people were killed and 20 injured in these coordinated attacks, prompting Archbishop Fernando Filoni, the apostolic nuncio in Iraq, to conclude that the situation in Iraq:

is insecure and continues to be difficult, very, very difficult. It has worsened 

because of the fact that threats against Christians, against ecclesiastics, are increasing. Kidnappings continue to take place. All this makes the situation totally precarious.7

During the past year, as a consequence of this constant threat of violence, many worshippers reportedly did not attend religious services or participate in religious events. In addition, the destruction and looting by Islamic extremists of businesses deemed un-Islamic 

resulted in approximately 95 percent of stores that sell alcohol being closed, according to 

Iraqi officials. As traditional owners of these establishments, this violence has had a disproportionate economic and social impact on Christian and Yazidi communities in Baghdad, 

Mosul, and Basrah, among other places.

Reports also alleged that the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) engaged in discriminatory behavior against religious minorities. According to the State Department, 

Christian and other minorities “living in areas north of Mosul asserted that the KRG 

confiscated their property...without compensation and...Assyrian Christians also alleged that the Kurdish Democratic Party-dominated judiciary routinely discriminated 

against non-Muslims.8

 Additional reports alleged that reconstruction assistance for ChaldoAssyrian communities was being diverted and/or controlled by the KRG without input 

from legitimate community leadership. 

Sabean Mandaean organizations continue to report that extremist Islamic elements 

are targeting individual members of the Iraqi Sabean community, solely on the basis of 

their religious belief. In a number of instances, attackers reportedly attempted to forcibly 

convert their victims before murdering them, sometimes going so far as to leave the victims’ valuables behind to underscore the religious motivation for their acts. Other violence 

directed against the Sabean community reportedly included kidnapping, rape, immolation, 

and the gouging of eyes. According to the Germany-based Society for Threatened Peoples, 

17,000 of the 30,000 Mandaeans have already fled Iraq in the wake of this violence. According to sources cited by the UN, Iraqi religious leaders issued several fatwas during the 

past year which “have provided Islamic fundamentalists with the religious justification for 

acts carried out against the Mandaeans, and have accentuated the level of fear among the 

Mandaean community.”9
11

A 1970 law still on the books in Iraq effectively outlaws the Baha’i religion in the 

country and criminalizes any Baha’i activities.10 Despite constitutional protection of the 

religious freedom for all Iraqis, to date no action has been taken by the Iraqi government 

to repeal this law. 

Religiously Motivated Abuses Against Women in Iraq

The security situation for women in Iraq continued to deteriorate because of the actions of extremist Islamic elements. Over the past year, the Commission has called attention 

to the fact that women are being forced to contend with the unlawful imposition of Islamic 

laws and principles by grassroots vigilante groups, as well as by the operation of illegal 

courts that seek to impose an extremist version of Islamic law on all Iraqis, regardless of 

their beliefs. The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief received similar 

reports during this period concerning religious groups targeting women perceived to be 

politically active, and the issuing of death threats by these groups against women pursuing 

advocacy or other political work.11

In the past year, religiously motivated attacks on women continued, including acid 

attacks, kidnappings, and killings. Attackers reportedly sprayed or threw acid onto women, 

including their face and eyes, for being “immodestly” dressed. Widespread reports also 

continued of both Muslim and non-Muslim women being compelled to wear headscarves 

or veils in order to protect themselves from such attacks. Among other reports, according to 

the State Department, education officials in Basrah have instituted a policy requiring all females in the schools to cover their heads, and “all female university students in Mosul, even 

non-Muslims, were required to wear the hijab, or headscarf.” This manner of dress was not 

forced, required, or even expected of women under the previous regime. The UN Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief concluded that these developments “led to a 

reduction in the number of girls and women attending schools and universities,” reporting 

that Iraq’s “Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research had been informed of 

3,000 cases of women and girls who had requested postponement of their studies as a result 

of the security situation linked to this matter.”12

Stalled Formation of a National Unity Government and 

Implementation of the Constitution

The escalation in sectarian violence and continued deterioration in security conditions 

have obstructed efforts of the Iraqi government to consolidate control over law and order in 

the country. Militia groups, insurgent elements, and religious extremist groups continue to 

commit human rights abuses with impunity. As noted above, severe human rights violations 

by Iraqi security forces continue without an effective response by the government.

As of this writing, despite certification of the election results, a new government has 

yet to be formed, in part due to Shi’a infighting and other disagreements among the main 

political parties. Due to the delay in setting up a new government, plans for an expected 

constitutional amendment process have been set back. This, in turn, has stalled implementation of the new constitution, as well as legal, judicial, and other institutional reforms necessary to implement human rights protections.

IRAQ: HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEOPARDY
2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

12

An Ambiguous Permanent Constitution 

In the face of continuing religiously motivated violence in Iraq, the Commission 

strongly reiterates its longstanding recommendation that Iraq’s government be urged to 

incorporate—into both the constitution and related implementing legislation—clear protections for the individual right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief in 

accordance with the international standards Iraq has pledged to uphold, as well as strong 

protections for related human rights. 

While international standards explicitly bestow upon every individual the right to 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, this right has all too frequently been 

diluted or misconstrued. For example, international attention typically is directed toward 

protecting the freedoms of religious groups or communities, including their freedom to 

worship, educate, and organize affairs according to their own doctrines. As important as 

these communal aspects of freedom of religion are, particularly for religious communities themselves, protecting religious freedom extends beyond guaranteeing the freedom of 

groups to engage in religious activities.

Advancing the right to freedom of religion or belief in a manner that fully comports 

with international standards requires that protection from repression by the majority not be 

limited to members of religious minorities. Rather, freedom of religion or belief also entails 

protection for individual members of a majority religion from those who use prevailing 

religious orthodoxy as a weapon to stifle political dissent and democratic debate. In other 

words, the right to religious freedom ought to include the freedom of every Iraqi, including 

individual Muslims, not only to worship and to practice his or her faith, but also the right to 

debate and dissent from state-imposed orthodoxy on issues related to religion. 

Given the content of Iraq’s new constitution, this undertaking remains in jeopardy. 

Although the new constitution incorporates positive provisions related to human rights 

protections, the Commission has concluded that several provisions remain cause for concern and may threaten to compromise the scope and extent of human rights protections. 

Specifically, the Commission remains troubled by the constitution’s overarching ambiguities and contradictions, and particularly by references to Islam which ultimately may be 

interpreted to negate these guarantees and to discriminate against and repress non-Muslims and non-conforming Muslims alike. Furthermore, sectarian tension between Shi’a 

and Sunni Muslims is also liable to be exacerbated by the interpretation and application 

of sharia in favor of the dominant sect’s beliefs. In its discussions with senior Iraqi leaders, 

the Commission was concerned that these leaders did not appreciate fully the distinction 

between the individual right of freedom of religion or belief and the collective or communal 

aspect of the right to freedom of worship; questions the Commission raised with regard to 

individual rights for all Iraqis were met with answers focused only on the rights of collective 

entities—religious minority groups.

The constitution’s contradictions underscore two competing visions of Iraq, and leave 

up to the future how—if at all—these visions may be reconciled. On the one hand, the 

constitution promises a country based on protections for individual freedoms and rights, 

and on the other, augurs a country where every Iraqi is required to conform to the religious 

strictures of one group. If Iraq is to indeed become a state that genuinely respects fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, and the 

principles of equality and non-discrimination, the scales must be tipped more decisively in 
13

favor of individual human rights guarantees. All ambiguity and contradictions with respect 

to these rights should be clarified to leave no uncertainty regarding the supremacy of human rights.

Commission Activities on Iraq

During the course of the year, the Commission met with senior U.S. officials, Iraqi 

political leaders, congressional staff, representatives from religious groups, and others concerning matters related to Iraq’s constitution, conditions for religious minorities, and the 

promotion of international human rights standards. In addition to meeting with President 

Bush, the Commission briefed Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq; David Welch, 

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs; Richard Jones, Senior Advisor to the 

Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq; and Meghan O’Sullivan, Deputy National Security Adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan, on its concerns and recommendations. 

In June 2005, Commission Vice Chair Felice D. Gaer and staff met with senior Iraqi 

leaders attending the International Donors’ Conference in Brussels, including the National Security Advisor, the Ministers of Justice and Interior, the Chair of the Constitutional 

Drafting Committee, and senior representatives of several political parties. Then-Commission Chair Preeta D. Bansal and staff also participated in international conferences held in 

Jordan designed to bring Iraqis and international experts together for discussions concerning the constitution. In August 2005, Commissioner Bansal and Vice Chair Nina Shea published an op-ed in The Washington Post, calling attention to some of the existing shortcomings in Iraq’s draft constitution and recommending steps for ensuring the final document’s 

compliance with international human rights standards.

Throughout the May–October 2005 constitution-drafting period, the Commission 

worked closely with the State Department and the White House to make recommendations on constitutional drafts, among other things, assessing how draft articles measured 

up to human rights norms. In addition, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and others involved 

in the constitutional drafting process widely disseminated the Commission’s comparative 

analysis of the constitutions of predominantly Muslim countries.13 Following ratification 

of the Iraqi constitution in October 2005, the Commission published its analysis of articles 

identified as being of potential concern to the future status of individual human rights and 

freedoms in Iraq, as well as recommendations for potential modifications to be considered 

by the constitutional amendment committee in 2006. This analysis was subsequently translated into Arabic and has been distributed to U.S. policymakers, international experts, and 

others. The Commission’s constitutional analysis and recommendations were also adopted 

by a number of Iraqi non-governmental organizations, including “The Pledge for Iraq,” 

a nationwide campaign organized by Iraqi activists and organizations seeking to ensure 

protections for human rights, rights for women, and political freedoms in Iraq’s emerging 

political order.

During the year, the Commission also served as an information resource for Members of Congress, holding a number of private meetings, as well as larger briefings with 

congressional staff and the Congressional Working Group on Religious Freedom. The Congress has explicitly endorsed a key Commission recommendation that the U.S. Embassy in 

Baghdad increase efforts directed towards the promotion of human rights in Iraq. In the 

Conference Report attached to H.R. 2862, Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related 

Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, the conferees expressed their expectation that:

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2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

14

[W]ithin the planned personnel complement for Baghdad, Iraq, that one Senior Foreign Service Officer who reports directly to the Ambassador will be 

assigned as the lead human rights official in Baghdad. This officer should be 

tasked with encouraging incorporation of human rights principles during 

Iraq’s constitutional and legal reconstruction, and especially to secure for all 

individuals strong human rights provisions, including freedom of thought, 

conscience, religion or belief, and due process of law, through the Iraqi legal 

system and the implementation of the Iraqi constitution. 14

It remains up to the State Department to implement this recommendation by selecting and appointing the appropriate candidate, which the Commission hopes will occur 

without delay.

Commission Recommendations

In order to advance protections of human rights, including freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, for all Iraqis, the U.S. government should:

■ speak out at the highest level against religiously motivated violence, including violence 

targeting women and members of religious minorities, as well as efforts by local officials 

and extremist groups to enforce religious law in violation of the Iraqi constitution and 

international human rights standards;

■ take steps, in cooperation with Iraqi law enforcement, (a) to enhance security at places 

of worship, particularly in areas where religious minorities are known to be at risk, and 

(b) to locate and shut down illegal courts unlawfully imposing an extremist version of 

Islamic law;

■ immediately appoint and dispatch a senior Foreign Service officer to the U.S. Embassy 

in Baghdad to report directly to the Ambassador and to serve as the lead human rights 

official in Iraq, as endorsed by the Congress;

■ urge Iraqi leaders, with direct U.S. government support, to: 

● establish effective Iraqi institutions to protect human rights in accordance with international standards, including the establishment of an independent and adequately financed 

national human rights commission; 

● undertake transparent and effective investigations of human rights abuses, including abuses 

stemming from sectarian, religiously motivated, and other violence by Iraqi security forces 

and others; and

● enhance efforts to bring perpetrators of such abuses to justice;

■ immediately appoint one or more U.S. advisors under the Department of State’s Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to serve as liaisons to the Iraqi Ministry of 

Human Rights;

■ advocate constitutional amendments to strengthen human rights guarantees, including the 

specific recommendations formulated by the Commission in its analysis of the constitution;15

■ urge Iraq’s new government and Council of Representatives to include underrepresented religious minorities, i.e. Sunnis and Christians, in the work of the constitutional 

amendment committee;
15

■ give clear directives to U.S. officials and recipients of U.S. democracy building grants to 

assign priority to projects that seek to encourage the inclusion of effective human rights 

guarantees for every Iraqi in the permanent constitution and its implementing legislation, and also emphasize projects that promote multi-religious and multi-ethnic efforts to 

address religious tolerance and understanding, as well as knowledge among Iraqis about 

universal human rights standards;

■ re-allocate Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund16 money to support human rights by:

● directing unobligated Iraq reconstruction funds to deploy a group of human rights experts 

for consultations with the Iraqi Council of Representatives and the constitutional amendment committee, and to assist with legal drafting and implementation matters related to 

strengthening human rights provisions, including freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief;

● declaring a proportional allocation of funds for ChaldoAssyrian communities, ensuring 

that the use of these funds are determined by independent ChaldoAssyrian national and 

town representatives, and establishing direct lines of input by such independent ChaldoAssyrian structures into the allocation process of the Iraqi central government in Baghdad, 

separate from the Kurdish Regional Government;

● funding workshops and training sessions on religion/state issues for Iraqi officials, policymakers, legal professionals, representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 

religious leaders, and other members of key sectors of society who will have input on constitutional amendments and implementation; and

● establishing an Iraqi visitors program through the State Department to focus on exchange 

and education opportunities in the United States related to freedom of religion and religious 

tolerance for Iraqi officials, policymakers, legal professionals, representatives of NGOs, religious leaders, and other members of key sectors of society;

■ ensure that U.S. funding and other forms of support are not going to Iraqi political parties 

or other organizations that advocate or condone policies at odds with Iraq’s international 

human rights obligations, or whose aims include the destruction of such international 

rights guarantees;

■ address with regional Kurdish authorities reports of attacks on religious and other minorities and the expropriation of ChaldoAssyrian property, and seek the return of property 

or restitution, as well as assurances that there will be no official discrimination practiced 

against minority communities; and 

■ urge the Iraqi government to reconsider and revise a proposed new law regulating NGOs, 

drafted by the Ministry of Civil Society, which reportedly imposes harsh restrictions on 

both national and international NGOs; any such regulations should comport with international human rights standards.

In addition, the U.S. Congress should:

■ ensure continued funding through Fiscal Year 2007 for democracy and governance programs in Iraq, including the specific programs discussed above; and 

■ invite Iraqi legislators to visit the United States to interact with U.S. legislators, government 

officials, and civil society leaders on human rights protections and religion/state issues.

IRAQ: HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEOPARDY
16

1

 UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), “Human Rights Report,” (1 January-28 February 2006), pp. 1-2 (http://www.uniraq.org/

aboutus/HR.asp). 2

 See U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2005. These allegations are reinforced by the UNAMI, which 

recently reported that “extra-judicial executions [carried out by forces linked to the Ministry of Interior] underline a deterioration 

in the situation of law and order.” UNAMI, “Human Rights Report,” (1 July – 31 August 2005), p. 2.

3

 UNAMI, “Human Rights Report,” (1 January-28 February 2006), p. 4. 

4

 Sabrina Tavernise, “As Iraqi Shiites Police Sunnis, Rough Justice Feeds Bitterness,” The New York Times, February 6, 2006 (http://

www.nytimes.com/2006/02/06/international/middleeast/06enforcers.html?ex=1296882000&en=3679c6a4af45c6a4&ei=5088&partn

er=rssnyt&emc=rss). 

5

 According to the UNHCR, “Iraqi Christians continue to arrive in Syria and Jordan, however, in smaller numbers than in 2004.” 

UNHCR, Guidelines Relating to the Eligibility of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers (October, 2005), p. 9 (http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/

publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RSDLEGAL&id=4354e3594&page=publ).

6

 Ibid. 

7

 Zenit News Agency, “Nuncio in Iraq: The Situation is Insecure,” February 1, 2006.

8

 U.S. Department of State, 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

9

 UNHCR, Guidelines Relating to the Eligibility of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers (October, 2005), p. 11.

10 Official Gazette of Iraq No. 1880, May 18, 1970. Among other things, Law 105 outlawed the approval or promotion of the Baha’i 

faith, as well as association with any Baha’i organization; banned the sale, distribution, printing, and possession of Baha’i 

literature; ordered all Baha’i institutions shut down; and seized properties and assets associated with these institutions. Anyone 

found in violation of the law was originally subject to a minimum ten-year imprisonment. Law No. 141 of 1979 increased the 

penalty to life imprisonment and, in some cases, the death penalty. Official Gazette of Iraq No. 2741, Nov. 19, 1979 and Decree No. 

1447 of 1979 of the Revolutionary Council.

11 UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, “Addendum: Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies 

Received,” March 27, 2006, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/5/Add.1, p. 50.

12 Ibid.

13 Tad Stahnke and Robert C. Blitt, “The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative 

Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly Muslim Countries,” 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 947-1078 (http://www.uscirf.gov/

countries/global/comparative_constitutions/03082005/03082005_study.html).

14 Available at http://www.rules.house.gov/109/text/hr2862cr/109_hr2862cr.htm. 

15 The analysis of the Iraq constitution and related recommendations, in English and Arabic, is available on the Commission’s website, 

www.uscirf.gov.

16 Pub. Law 108-106, 117 Stat. 1209 (November 6, 2003).

2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
China: Commission Makes First 

Official Visit

In August 2005, the Commission traveled to China for the 

first time. The purpose of the visit was to engage senior officials 

responsible for the management of religious affairs and the protection of human rights in discussions on Chinese policies and 

practices relating to religious freedom. The Commission’s visit 

to China followed several years of diplomatic effort by the U.S. 

government. An invitation was first promised during the 2002 

U.S.-China human rights dialogue; however, two subsequent attempts to travel to China were postponed due to unacceptable 

conditions placed on these trips by Beijing, including denial of 

access to Hong Kong by the Chinese government.1

 Following 

further requests by the U.S. State Department, congressional 

leaders, and the White House, the Chinese government issued 

another invitation to the Commission in 2005.

The Commission delegation was led by Chair Michael 

Cromartie and Vice Chair Felice D. Gaer and included Commissioners Preeta D. Bansal, Archbishop Charles Chaput, 

Dr. Richard Land, Dr. Elizabeth Prodromou, and Bishop Ricardo Ramirez. During the two week visit, the Commission 

traveled to the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Chengdu, 

The space for political openness, 

public activism, and greater civil 

and individual freedoms is narrowing in China. Over the past 

year, the Communist Party has 

tightened its control over religious 

leaders as well as journalists, 

intellectuals, the Internet, and 

non-governmental organizations. 

China Policy Focus press conference on Capitol Hill with Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi and Congressmen Frank 

Wolf, Tom Lantos, Christopher Smith, and Mark Kennedy, and Commissioners Richard Land (left, rear), Preeta 

Bansal and Chair Michael Cromartie (at podium)

17
2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

18

Urumqi and Kashgar in Xinjiang, and Lhasa in Tibet. The delegation met with Chinese 

Vice-Premier Hui Liangyu, senior officials from the Foreign, Justice, and State Ethnic Affairs Ministries, the National People’s Congress, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the 

State Administration on Religious Affairs, as well as provincial and local officials from the 

various Religious and Ethnic Affairs and other relevant bureaus. The Commission also met 

with Chinese academics and lawyers, UN officials, and representatives of the governmentsanctioned Buddhist, Catholic, Islamic, Protestant, and Taoist religious organizations. 

During the visit, the Commission raised questions on Chinese law and international 

human rights norms, the management of religious affairs, Chinese policies concerning unregistered religious organizations and the religious education of minors, new regulations on cults 

and religious affairs, the situations in Tibet and Xinjiang, and the conditions facing North Korean asylum-seekers in China. The Commission also raised several specific cases of concern 

with law enforcement officials and others. Notably, when in Lhasa, the delegation was allowed 

to meet briefly with Tibetan Buddhist nun Phuntsog Nyidron, who had recently been released 

after 15 years in prison and who, at that time, remained restricted in her movements by the 

Chinese authorities. (In March 2006, she was allowed to go to the United States.) 

The Commission appreciated the opportunity to gain familiarity with several places 

in China, including Xinjiang and Tibet, as well as the efforts of its Chinese hosts, the State 

Administration on Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to arrange meetings 

with a range of senior national and local officials. Nevertheless, virtually all of the delegation’s 

interactions and activities were monitored and controlled by 

government representatives. 

Commissioners sought to have candid, comprehensive, 

and constructive discussions on international human rights 

norms and Chinese law and practice. The delegation recognizes 

the effort of several Chinese officials to respond to the Commission’s questions. Unfortunately, however, discussions were often 

far from candid. Chinese government officials were present at all 

meetings, including those with religious leaders and others who 

were not part of the government. At one meeting, the Catholic 

Bishop from Shenyang, affiliated with the government approved 

Catholic Patriotic Association, responded to a Commission 

question stating that he was aware of the harassment and arrest of 

neighboring Bishop Wei Jingyi, who was associated with the unregistered Catholic Church. 

Chinese officials present at the meeting did not allow the remarks to be translated and immediately ended the Bishop’s presentation.2

 Moreover, the delegation was not able to meet and 

talk freely and privately with interlocutors of its own choosing. The Commission’s requests for 

access to prominent religious prisoners were denied.

For a summary of religious freedom conditions in China, as well as recommendations to 

advance U.S. human rights diplomacy with China, see the country chapter on China in this report.

The “Patriotic Religious Associations” 

The Commission met with representatives of the five officially recognized “patriotic” 

religious organizations, visited various religious sites associated with these organizations, and 

observed their use. Chinese government officials and religious leaders told the Commission 

Zhongnanhai, where Chinese leaders live and work
19

delegation that the number of religious believers associated with the five recognized groups 

was growing steadily.

In order to operate legally, all religious organizations and “venues” for religious activities must be registered with the appropriate government agency. In order to do so, they 

must be affiliated with one of the five officially recognized religious organizations. Registration is thus limited in practice to the five recognized religions—Buddhism, Catholicism, 

Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism. In response to Commission inquiries as to whether the 

Chinese government would allow other religious communities to register organizations or 

sites for religious activities, Chinese officials told the delegation that they are considering 

accepting registration from Orthodox Christians, Jews, Mormons, and Baha’is. The Commission was unable to verify with leaders from these communities whether Chinese officials have approached them to discuss this possibility. 

Registered religious organizations submit to government monitoring of their activities and the requirement of government approval of several religious activities—such as 

selecting a leader, printing materials, building or renovating religious venues, inviting religious leaders from other provinces, or holding a joint religious ceremony—that are explicitly protected from government interference under international human rights standards. 

In addition, most religious activities can only be conducted at registered venues. Religious 

groups that are legally registered in China have also accepted restrictions on what doctrines 

and traditions can be conveyed and taught. There are numerous credible reports, for example, of Christian leaders having to refrain from teachings involving the second coming of 

Jesus, divine healing, the practice of fasting, and the virgin birth because these doctrines or 

practices are considered by the government to be superstitious or contrary to the Chinese 

Communist Party’s social policies.3

In meetings with government officials in attendance, religious leaders in the government sanctioned religious organizations denied that any restrictions were placed on what 

they could preach or teach. They claimed, however, that direct criticism of government 

policy was disruptive to “social harmony,” and that they tried to emphasize the aspects of 

their faith traditions that, in their view, “strengthened socialistic society.” This is in line with 

official Chinese policy that religion must adapt to the development of a socialist society. 

Over the last decade, the Chinese government and the Communist Party have made 

some accommodation for the spiritual aspirations of the people of China, and have openly 

praised the contributions to society of government sanctioned religious organizations. The 

Commission was able to observe a “zone of toleration” where members of the approved 

religious organizations, working within the limitations described above, are given some 

latitude to practice their religion. The delegation was told that Chinese law now protects 

the property of registered groups, allows them to bring charges against abusive government 

officials, and permits them to perform some charitable and social service work in local 

communities. Religious leaders from the government approved organizations believed that 

these legal reforms were beneficial, though most could not be independently verified by the 

delegation. Commissioners met with religious leaders conducting social welfare work, noting that several programs of this nature have been started or are under development. 

Government relations with the five patriotic religious associations appear to differ 

from religion to religion and region to region. For example, official tolerance for Buddhism (among Han Chinese) and Taoism appears to be greater than for other groups in 

China. Religious leaders from these communities claimed that they face few restrictions. 

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Nevertheless, Tibetan Buddhists and Uighur Muslims have more difficulties than their 

religious counterparts in other parts of the country, despite being affiliated with the government sanctioned religious organizations. 

Commissioners were able to gain some insight into the relationship between the 

Catholic patriotic religious organization and the Chinese government through their discussions with representatives of the government sanctioned Catholic Patriotic Association. 

Commissioners were told there was a growing communion between the Vatican and the 

clergy of the officially sanctioned church. At recent ordination ceremonies, clergy from the 

government approved church openly pledged fidelity to the Holy See. Catholic religious 

leaders in China told Commissioners that, though difficulties and suspicions remain, there 

was some reconciliation between the officially registered church and unregistered Catholics. However, most unregistered Catholics will not worship in churches of the Catholic 

Patriotic Association unless the bishop or priest is known to be in communion with Rome. 

The Chinese government does not allow Catholics to run schools or recognize openly the 

authority of the Papacy in many fundamental matters of faith and morals. 

The Chinese government continues to insist, as a precondition for establishing diplomatic relations, that the Vatican renounce the Papal role in the selection of bishops and 

break all relations with Taiwan. The Commission was told that the Chinese government’s 

insistence on approving and selecting bishops has made the ordination process very slow. 

At least twelve bishops are needed to fill current openings. The Commission learned that 

in the last year, the Chinese government has quietly arranged for the ordination of at least 

some bishops approved by the Holy See. In Shanghai and Xi’an, auxiliary bishops from the 

“unregistered” Catholic Church were chosen with the full right of succession and with the 

approval of both the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Vatican. During its 

meeting with two bishops of the Catholic Patriotic Association in Shanghai, the Commission was told that the Chinese government and the Holy See cooperated quietly to reconcile 

the registered and unregistered Catholic communities in the Shanghai diocese. 

Also in Shanghai, the Commission was told of improved educational and spiritual formation opportunities for clergy and nuns and of expanding Catholic social service programs. 

The Commission was shown a new government sanctioned Catholic seminary in Beijing and 

was told that it would expand the number and quality of clergy. The Commission noted, however, that the Chinese government monitors and inspects all the registered seminaries and 

has severely restricted foreign professors from teaching at these institutions. In addition, the 

transmission of traditional Catholic moral teaching on such subjects as abortion, contraceptives, and divorce is forcefully suppressed as contradicting official Communist Party policy. 

The Problem of the Unregistered

Most of China’s religious practice occurs outside the system of government approved 

religious organizations. Yet, the Chinese government actively seeks to control and suppress 

the activities of “unregistered” religious organizations to prevent the rise of sources of authority outside the control of the government and the Communist Party. The Commission 

raised concern over these practices with Chinese government officials, but did not seek to 

meet with leaders of “unregistered” religious groups because concerns were raised regarding their safety and their continued ability to operate in the country. 
21

Chinese law bans unregistered religious organizations and provides severe penalties 

for engaging in unregistered religious activities. The Commission pointed out to government officials that under international human rights standards, failure to register cannot 

alone justify government imposed limitations on religious activities, or the harassment, 

detention, and imprisonment of members of unregistered religious groups. A senior official with the Communist Party’s United Front Works Department said that because the 

process of registering all religious groups under the new Regulations on Religious Affairs 

(see below) would take time, he did not think unregistered groups should be harassed or 

punished during that process. Nevertheless, Chinese officials confirmed that unregistered 

activity was illegal and would continue to be suppressed.

Tibet and Xinjiang

Tibetan Buddhists and Uighur Muslims face serious restrictions on the free practice 

of their respective religions and severe abuses of their human rights. China’s policies on religious affairs have produced ongoing tensions between the government and these religious 

communities in regions where they predominantly reside, including the Tibet Autonomous 

Region (TAR or Tibet) and Sichuan province for Tibetans and the Uighur Autonomous Region, or Xinjiang, for Uighurs. Because the Chinese government fears secessionist activities 

and recent calls for greater autonomy in these regions, crackdowns on religious activities in 

Xinjiang, Sichuan, and the TAR are often harsher than in other parts of China. Although religion is an important aspect of ethnic identity for both Tibetans and Uighurs, Chinese government officials told the Commission that fervent religious practice among these groups 

was an impediment to economic modernization and an organizational pole around which 

terrorists or “splittists” may gather. 

There are similarities in the methods used by the Chinese government to control the 

practice of religion by Uighur Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists. The Commission delegation was told that “patriotic education” of religious leaders continues to occur in both Tibet 

and Xinjiang. Muslim imams and Tibetan monks and nuns are required to attend patriotic 

education sessions, all religious publications are controlled, and there are tight restrictions 

on religious celebrations, the religious education of minors, as well as the number of religious venues and religious leaders. In Xinjiang, even government officials must participate 

in “patriotic education.” The Commission was told that government officials dealing with 

religious affairs in Xinjiang must complete political education to avoid “paralyzed thinking” 

and to “distinguish between normal and illegal religious activities” and, as in all other areas 

of China, are required to be atheists. 

Xinjiang

In Xinjiang, all collective home worship services, after-school religious instruction, 

and other unauthorized religious instruction are strictly prohibited. The Commission was 

informed that Uighur Muslims have not received permission to build new mosques for 

the past six years. The Commission was also told that all imams are required to undergo 

yearly political training seminars in order to retain their licenses. Commissioners learned 

of the existence of an “Islamic Affairs Steering Committee,” which is reported to author and 

approve sermons and censor religious texts and any material with religious content. The 

purpose of such oversight by the government is to create Muslim religious leaders who will 

“ardently love their country.”4

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Chinese authorities in Xinjiang use the “war on terror” as a pretext to monitor and 

control Uighur Muslim religious activity. This manipulation of terrorist concerns was evident during the Commission’s visit. Upon arrival in Xinjiang, provincial officials announced 

to the Commission delegation that “elements of Al-Qaeda” were targeting the Commission 

itself during its visit. The Commission requested that such threats be reported through official channels, and the unspecified threat, found later not to be credible by U.S. and Chinese 

security officials in Beijing, seemed to have been issued to restrict Commission activities 

and to monitor its contact with local people not approved by government officials. Commission requests to visit specific mosques, imams, and churches in Xinjiang were subsequently denied. There was particularly tight control on Commission movement during its 

visit to the city of Kashgar.

In March 2005, the Chinese government issued a press statement declaring that Chinese law does not prohibit the religious education of minors. Yet in Xinjiang, the Commission was told by provincial officials that the religious education of minors in mosques, 

madrassas, or any type of multi-family setting was prohibited until the child has completed 

the requisite nine years of compulsory general education. Officials stated that minors who 

have completed their education but were not selected to attend university could receive religious training and attend mosque, and that parents could give private religious instruction 

to their children. While the Commission delegation was in China, security forces arrested a 

woman in Xinjiang for teaching a religious class on the Quran. She was reportedly detained 

for “illegally possessing religious material and subversive historical material.” 

The Commission noted that the Chinese government does allow some Muslim groups 

in Xinjiang to engage in social welfare programs. Commissioners met with imams who 

participate in alcohol, drug, and HIV/AIDS education programs. The Chinese government 

has praised the positive contributions of such officially approved religious organizations in 

meeting China’s growing social welfare and medical needs. 

Tibet

The Chinese government continues to control tightly religious activity, including 

education and places of worship, in Tibet. Although the Commission was able to observe 

instances of private religious devotion at Tibetan Buddhist temples and monasteries, the activities and education of monks and nuns are closely monitored, monasteries are governed 

by government approved management committees, and the Communist Party continues 

to insist on approving the designation and training of all reincarnate lamas. In addition, 

Commissioners learned that monks and nuns are required to renounce the Dalai Lama as 

the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists. When asked why this is required, government 

officials answered either that the Dalai Lama supported independence or “splittist” activities, or that continued public religious devotion to the Dalai Lama and his “clique” was a 

hindrance to economic modernization. Government officials claimed that the Dalai Lama’s 

influence had to be eliminated to protect “social harmony” and to raise the standard of living in Tibet and other regions with Tibetan Buddhist populations. 

Commissioners asked whether Tibetans were permitted to own or display pictures 

of the Dalai Lama or his chosen Panchen Lama, Gendun Choekyi Nyima, or hold prayer 

ceremonies for them. Religious leaders responded that Tibetans may own pictures of the 

Dalai Lama and hold private devotions for him, but that they may not publicly display or 

distribute the portrait or engage others in their ceremonies. In a separate meeting, public 
23

security officials agreed that private ownership of his portrait was not a punishable offense, 

only its public display was. Security officials conceded that no provision of Chinese law 

specifically prohibited arranging a prayer for the Dalai Lama, but told the Commission that 

the Dalai Lama’s political activities rendered any public recognition of him a threat to public 

order and social harmony and thus was prohibited. Owning pictures or holding ceremonies 

for the Dalai Lama’s chosen Panchen Lama was prohibited, they stated.

During its visit, the Commission asked to meet with the Dalai Lama’s chosen Panchen 

Lama. The young man has not been seen in more than a decade after being kidnapped by 

Chinese officials upon receiving recognition by the Dalai Lama. The Commission’s request 

was denied. Chinese government officials claimed that he was safe and studying Tibetan 

Buddhism but that his family was “unwilling for him to have a public life.” The Commission 

urged Chinese officials to end restrictions on access to the young man and his family and to 

allow them to receive visits from international representatives. 

On the subject of the religious education of minors in Tibet, Commissioners were 

told that, with the exception of boys approved by the government and formally designated 

as reincarnate lamas, persons under the age of eighteen were not permitted to receive religious education. Tibetan children must spend their time in public education and there was 

no time for both. When pressed on this issue by the delegation, one Chinese official said 

that “Tibet cannot be developed by chanting.” Yet, religious education of minors apparently 

goes on in some places despite official prohibitions. There have been reports of monastic 

schools in some remote parts of the TAR and other provinces with significant Tibetan populations. Government officials insisted, however, that such schools were prohibited from 

teaching religious subjects to minors. 

During a visit to Drepung monastery in Lhasa, one of the largest in Tibet, the Commission was able to observe that a monk, sitting near where the delegation passed, was 

visibly younger than the other monks. When questioned in private by a Tibetan-speaking 

member of the delegation, the monk acknowledged that he was 14 years old. He also said 

that he was a full-time monk and had been at Drepung for “a few years,” and that there were 

some twenty monks under the age of 18 at the monastery. Religious leaders at the monastery did not have any insight on the apparent discrepancy between official pronouncements 

on religious education of minors and monastery practice.

Despite some ambiguity regarding the religious education of minors in Tibet, it is the 

Commission’s conclusion that Chinese government controls on religious practice in Tibet 

and Xinjiang contravene both China’s own constitution and its international human rights 

obligations. Policies enforced by Chinese officials that restrict human rights in order ostensibly to protect “national unity” or “national security” exceed those restrictions permitted 

under international standards and override other protections in Chinese law. Like other 

governments, the Chinese government does have a duty to protect its nationals from terrorist attacks, but it too often conflates peaceful political opposition or efforts to maintain 

religious and ethnic identity with violent separatist activity, extremism, and terrorism. 

The National Regulations on Religious Affairs 

In March 2005, the Chinese government officially implemented new National Regulations on Religious Affairs. The regulations were introduced in order to clarify a patchwork 

of laws, ordinances, and regulations regarding religious practice. Chinese leaders heralded 

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the regulations as “a significant step forward in the protection of Chinese citizens’ religious 

freedom.” However, when the new regulations were officially implemented, a senior official 

from the State Administration of Religious Affairs emphasized that the primary goal of the 

new regulations was to help expand government management of religious affairs.5

The new regulations have not been in place long enough to assess their implementation and actual impact. However, it is important to note that one year prior to the announced 

implementation of the present regulations and until the present, the crackdown targeting unregistered Christians intensified in several parts of China. It is the Commission’s position that 

until it is clear how the provisions of the new rules are interpreted and implemented, the new 

regulations threaten the rights and security of religious believers and are not fully consistent 

with international norms on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

The new regulations contain provisions that could be used to limit the activities of 

registered religious groups and punish those who engage in unregistered activities. For example, criteria for the approval of registration of a site for religious activities includes an 

official determination that there is a “need” for local religious practitioners to “frequently 

carry out collective religious activities,” as well as that the site is “rationally located without 

interfering with the normal production and livelihood” of the local area.6

The new regulations also make clear that religious activities on a national level can only 

be conducted by registered religious bodies at approved religious sites.7

 As noted above, Chinese officials confirmed to the Commission that religious activities conducted by unregistered 

groups are illegal under the new regulations,8

 which provide for civil fines for individuals who 

engage in such activities.9

 The Public Security Bureau is also authorized to impose penalties if 

religious activity is being carried out at a venue that has not been properly registered with the 

relevant authorities.10 In addition, the Religious Affairs Department is authorized to disband 

any religious group that fails to gain official approval for its leadership, membership or management procedures; accepts donations without receiving prior approval; or refuses “to accept 

supervision and administration conducted by the Religious Affairs Department according to 

law.”11 Individuals who participate in religious activities not authorized under the new regulations are subject to criminal punishment.12

In discussions with Chinese officials, the Commission raised questions about the clarity of the registration requirements in the regulations, the language used in regulating religious publications, and the official oversight required with regard to leadership decisions. 

The new regulations do include several provisions that are, on their face, potentially 

significant advances. These include establishing conditions under which religious organizations can provide social services in local communities, protect their property, bring 

complaints against abusive government officials, accept donations from overseas religious 

groups, and receive prompt responses from government agencies on registration applications. However, a group must be registered in order to engage in these activities or take 

advantage of the provisions under the regulations. 

It may be a positive step that the planned release of implementation guidelines for 

Shanghai was withdrawn, reportedly so that Chinese government officials could study 

reservations raised by the Commission and other international legal scholars and commentators. The Commission plans to offer Chinese officials a detailed analysis of the new 

regulations and to compare them with international human rights standards regarding the 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 
25

The Rule of Law

Although Communist Party leaders have made it clear that they intend to strengthen 

the one-party state, they have also promised to move toward a system governed by the rule 

of law. Similar promises were expressed in almost all of the Commission’s meetings with 

Chinese government officials. However, although many statements have been made about 

legal reform and establishing the rule of law in China, few concrete steps have actually 

been taken, particularly in the area of protecting the rights of the individual. Thus, despite 

promises of legal reform, redress for violations of human rights by government officials is 

not available on a consistent basis.

There has been some discussion by Chinese officials of extending greater legal protections to individuals. In 2002, the Chinese government called for a complete review of its civil, administrative, and criminal procedure codes. In recent years, the Chinese government 

has also shown a willingness to permit some independence of the courts in cases involving 

official corruption, to hold qualifying examinations to raise the competency level of judges, 

and to consider amending laws to protect detained suspects. Notably, in March 2004, China 

amended its Constitution to include a provision that the state should protect human rights. 

This last measure is largely symbolic because the Constitution is not enforceable in Chinese 

courts, but it signals, at the very least, a growing awareness in official circles of human rights 

concerns. It represents an important commitment, but at present there is no way to require 

its implementation. 

In the last year, the Chinese government has permitted public criticism of the criminal justice system after cases of wrongful prosecution and death in police custody became 

national scandals. In response to the scandals, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate has taken 

steps to investigate cases of illegal detentions and to punish law enforcement officers who 

use torture to extract confessions. It is hoped that these reforms will bring more transparency and accountability into legal proceedings. 

Yet, Chinese legal reforms appear to be hindered by widespread and persistent corruption and lack of official accountability. The Chinese legal system does not provide individuals the means to seek full or fair redress for human rights violations though the courts. 

In addition, the criminal system still relies on confessions, which are frequently obtained 

through torture; lawyers who are outspoken in defense of defendants’ rights are themselves 

often threatened, disbarred, or imprisoned. Too often, the law is used as a tool of repression 

to harass, detain, and imprison dissidents, religious practitioners, the disadvantaged, or the 

politically suspect. For example, vague criminal law provisions prohibiting acts “endangering national security,” “subversion,” or “inciting splittism” are often used to detain individuals for political offenses. 

One of the more significant steps that could be taken by the Chinese government 

to provide legal protections for human rights would be to ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was signed by China in 

1998. In response to questions about the status of ratification, the Commission delegation 

was told that, while China intended to ratify the ICCPR at some point, changes to the legal 

system had to be considered first in order to bring Chinese law into line with international 

standards. The parameters of needed legal reforms are, the Commission was told, currently 

under study by the National People’s Congress and others. Despite specific questions, no 

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one could identify for the Commission the points in need of further study or provide a 

timetable for the ratification process.

The Commission is convinced that many reforms are needed to bring Chinese law 

in the areas of religious affairs and protections for human rights into conformity with international standards. China’s Constitution, its new regulations on religious affairs, and its 

Criminal Code are all at odds with standards set forth in the ICCPR. Prompt legal reforms 

in these areas, rather than being delayed for further discussion, should be implemented. 

Prompt ratification of the ICCPR would demonstrate China’s commitment to protecting 

the rights of individuals. 

The Commission discussed the issue of arbitrary detention and the use of torture to 

gain confessions with senior officials of the Justice Ministry and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. The Commission discussed potential changes to Article 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides penalties for lawyers whose clients are accused of perjury and 

has been used to curtail the active legal defense of individuals accused of political crimes. 

Noting allegations of irregular trial procedures and/or reported evidence of torture in the 

cases of Pastor Gong Shengliang of the South China Church and Tibetan Buddhist Tenzin 

Delek Rinpoche, the Commission reiterated requests by the U.S. government and others in 

the international community for a review of the cases by the Supreme People’s Court. The 

Justice Ministry and the SPP agreed to accept further evidence from the Commission in 

these two cases. One senior official stated that investigations should be opened if there was 

evidence of torture and legal irregularities in these cases.

Meeting with Phuntsog Nyidron and Cases of Special Concern 

During its visit to China, the Commission raised a number of individual cases with 

Chinese authorities of alleged arbitrary detention or “enforced disappearance” on account of 

religious belief or practice or of other religious freedom violations in China. The Commission discussed in detail with Chinese officials a list of known religious prisoners, including 

Buddhists, Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, and members of the Falun Gong. The delegation 

asked for information on the current status of these cases and requested they be considered for 

immediate review and/or release. The Commission also asked to meet with several prominent 

religious figures whose detention or disappearance has raised international concern, including 

the Dalai Lama’s chosen Panchen Lama, Gendum Choekyi Nyima; Catholic Bishops Su Zhimin and An Shuxin; Tibetan Buddhist monk Ngawang Phuljung; Protestant “house church” 

leader Cai Zhuohua; and Uighur historian Tonti Tunyaz. The Commission also asked to meet 

with former Tibetan nun Phuntsog Nyidron, in light of reports that her freedom of movement 

and association remain highly restricted, despite her release from prison a year earlier.

The Commission’s requests to meet with all but one of these prisoners were denied. In 

addition, the information that Chinese government eventually formally transmitted to the 

Commission on the status of the individuals on its list was cursory, adding nothing to previous statements by the Chinese government on the status of these persons. The Commission 

also did not receive any information on the list of Uighur prisoners it submitted to Chinese officials. In a formal response to the Commission, the Chinese government continued to claim 

that “no one has ever been punished by law or put into prison for his/her religious belief” 

and that information on “criminals involved in separatist activity...was an internal affair” of 

China. Such responses clearly indicate that Chinese law and practice do not fully allow for 

religious activities that are protected by international human rights treaties to which China is 
27

a signatory, not least because such activities are often interpreted by the government as illegal 

political acts of subversion or separatism. The Commission called on the Chinese government 

to release all those imprisoned or detained on account of the manifestation of religious belief 

in contravention of international human rights standards, and to establish a mechanism for 

a full and fair review of cases of persons detained under suspicion of, or charged with, offenses relating to state security, disturbing social order, “counterrevolutionary” or “splittist” 

activities, or organizing “illegal” gatherings or religious activities. This mechanism should also 

review cases of detained or imprisoned religious leaders, many of whom have been charged 

with specious criminal offenses related to national security.

The Commission was granted a brief interview with 

Phuntsog Nyidron in the presence of Chinese officials, who 

denied the Commission’s request to conduct the interview 

in private. In 1989, Phuntsog Nyidron was sentenced to nine 

years in prison for holding a peaceful demonstration celebrating the Dalai Lama’s Nobel Peace Prize award. Her sentence 

was extended by eight years after she recorded songs about 

Tibet and the Dalai Lama that were smuggled from prison. 

According to numerous witnesses, Phuntsog Nyidron and the 

other nuns imprisoned with her were beaten during their imprisonment.

During the interview, Phuntsog Nyidron told the Commission that she had debilitating health problems that required special medical attention and limited her ability to make 

a living as a farmer in the village where she now resides. She was unable to address these 

health concerns, however, because of a lack of money and restrictions on her movement. In 

response to the Commission’s question of whether a passport might facilitate needed medical treatment, she said that it was impossible for her to travel because of her conviction on 

“counter-revolutionary crimes.” She also stated that due to her status as a “counter-revolutionary criminal,” security officials accompany her at all times. She did not discuss whether 

she was subjected to other restrictions. 

The day after the meeting, ostensibly to “clarify” Phuntsog Nyidron’s statements, government officials told Commissioners that public security officials no longer accompany 

her because her parole was completed in February 2005. Commissioners were also told that 

she was now “free to travel.” The Commission is pleased to note that in March 2006, she was 

in fact permitted to leave Tibet for the United States.

Bishop Su Zhimin

Background: Unregistered Catholic bishop arrested in 1996 along with auxiliary 

Bishop An Shuxin. Neither have been seen publicly since 1997, nor has the Chinese government offered information on their status or whereabouts.

Chinese response: Relevant departments have taken no coercive action to punish the 

Bishops and they are not under Chinese government control.

USCIRF Assessment: Response from the Chinese government includes no new information. Both Bishop Su and Bishop An were detained without trial and have been in custody 

without acknowledgement by the Chinese government for nearly a decade. Commission 

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Commissioners Land, Gaer, Bansal and Ramirez with 

Tibetan Nun Phuntsog Nyidron (center)
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requests to meet with them were denied. Bishop Xin of Shanghai told the USCIRF delegation 

that Bishop Su was in good health and was being held in a government rest home in Hebei. 

Gedun Choekyi Nyima

Background: Recognized by the Dalai Lama on May 14, 1995 as the Panchen Lama. 

Chinese officials denounced the choice as “illegal and invalid” and named another boy as 

Panchen Lama. Gedun Choekyi Nyima and his parents were taken into Chinese custody on 

May 17, 1995 and remain in incommunicado detention. The Chinese government has not 

revealed the precise location where they are being held, nor has anyone been permitted to 

meet with them.

Chinese response: Request to meet with him denied. The boy’s parents do not want 

him to have a public life. The boy, age 16, is studying and in the care of his parents. 

USCIRF Assessment: Response from the Chinese government includes no new information. Continues pattern of repeated denials for access by international observers to 

Gedun Choekyi Nyima. Shows government interference with leadership decisions of a religious community, as well as the rights of Gedun Choekyi Nyima. 

Liu Fenggang

Background: House Church leader arrested and tried in secret on charges of “gathering and illegally providing state intelligence to foreign entities.” Sentenced to three years 

imprisonment in 2004. 

Chinese government response: Liu Fenggang was imprisoned on charges related to 

“spying.” The trial was conducted in secret in accordance with PRC criminal law regarding 

national security cases.

USCIRF assessment: Response from the Chinese government includes no new information. Implies evidence of the use of national security provisions to quell information that 

may be deemed embarrassing to the government. Liu Fenggang was actually arrested for 

publishing a story about church destructions in Zhejiang province. Using such vague definitions of “state secrets,” authorities can charge persons with criminal activity for virtually 

anything that the government does not want people to know or to discuss. 

Wei Yumei and Wei Yufen

Background: Sisters and Falun Gong practitioners. Arrested in May 2004 after they 

were found producing and distributing Falun Gong literature. Both were convicted of “using 

a cult to undermine implementation of the law” and sentenced to ten years imprisonment.

Chinese response to USCIRF: Both taken into custody “on suspicion of committing a 

crime” and sentenced to ten year terms on charges as specified above.

USCIRF Assessment: Response from the Chinese includes no new information. Fails 

to detail the justification for the government’s restriction on the manifestation of religion or 

belief, Chinese criminal law contains vague restrictions related to so-called “cults.” 
29

Tothi Tunyaz

Background: Uighur historian sentenced in 1999 to eleven years imprisonment 

on charges of inciting splittism and illegally acquiring state secrets for compiling documents used in his thesis on Chinese government policies towards ethnic minorities. In 

2001, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention ruled that the detention of Tohti 

Tunyaz was arbitrary. 

Chinese Response to USCIRF: Regarding this case and all other enquiries involving 

Uighurs, the Chinese government gave no response, continuing a policy of failure to comment on Uighur prisoners. 

USCIRF Assessment: Policies that restrict human rights in order to protect “national 

unity” or “national security” in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region exceed international 

standards and often override other protections in Chinese law. The Chinese government 

should establish a mechanism for reviewing cases of persons detained under suspicion of, 

or charged with, offenses relating to state security, disturbing social order, “splittist” activities, or organizing or participating in “illegal” gatherings or religious activities. 

North Korean Asylum-Seekers

The Commission raised with Chinese officials the status of North Koreans in China, 

who, after fleeing starvation and persecution, face harsh conditions when they cross the 

border into China. Many have been forcibly repatriated to North Korea, where they face 

severe penalties upon their return.

The Chinese government refuses to allow representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to interview North Koreans. China views North Koreans as 

“economic migrants” and therefore does not recognize them as asylum-seekers under international law. This policy, coupled with China’s active repatriation of North Koreans to their 

country of origin where they face reprisals, contravenes China’s obligations under the 1951 

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol which states that “no 

Contracting States shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to 

the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his 

race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”13

Forced return to a country where they face a risk of torture would also contravene the 

Convention against Torture to which China is a party. In addition, Chinese policy violates 

the 1995 UN-Chinese Agreement stating that “UNHCR personnel may at all times have 

unimpeded access to refugees and to the sites of UNHCR projects in order to monitor all 

phases of their implementation.”14

Chinese security forces reportedly guard the UNHCR office in Beijing and a number 

of foreign consulates in order to prevent North Koreans from entering them and seeking 

asylum. Chinese officials told the Commission that they must repatriate North Koreans 

under terms of a 1961 agreement with North Korea.15 Commissioners responded that repatriated North Koreans face harassment, mistreatment, detention, torture, and possible 

execution. Chinese officials claimed that they had no evidence of such conditions and have 

repeatedly asked North Korean officials not to mistreat those repatriated. Some officials 

suggested that the fact that North Koreans often enter and re-enter China numerous times 

was evidence that they did not face bodily harm if repatriated. 

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The Commissioners reiterated to Chinese officials that North Koreans in China should 

be considered refugees, either as persons who have a well founded fear of persecution had 

they remained in North Korea, or as persons who may not have fled persecution in the first 

place but who nonetheless are refugees because they risk persecution upon return to their 

country of origin. In addition, Commissioners offered to provide Chinese government officials with evidence that significant numbers of North Koreans face persecution because 

of their family connections, political views, or religious beliefs. The Commissioners also 

discussed the ways in which the vulnerable status of North Koreans in China encourages 

human smugglers, trafficking in women and children, and a host of other social problems. 

At least one Chinese official, Minister Li Dezhu of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, acknowledged in a meeting with the Commission the growing problems associated with North 

Korean asylum-seekers in China and expressed the need to find humane solutions to these 

and other problems occurring on the border.16 Nevertheless, Commissioners pressed Chinese officials on the need for representatives of the UNHCR to be allowed access to North 

Koreans in China and for unimpeded humanitarian assistance to the affected regions. 

Human Rights and the U.S.-China Relationship

The space for political openness, public activism, and greater civil and individual 

freedoms is narrowing in China. Over the past year, the Communist Party has tightened its 

control over religious leaders as well as journalists, intellectuals, the Internet, and non-governmental organizations. President Hu, in a speech to the Central Committee in September 

2004, warned against “hostile forces” seeking to undermine the Party by “using the banner 

of political reform to promote...parliamentary democracy, human rights, and the freedom 

of the press.” The Chinese President warned that the Soviet Union fell because of the policies of “openness and pluralism” and because of “international monopoly capital with the 

United States as its leader.”17 Chinese political leaders view pressure to guarantee individual 

and political rights as evidence of a “strategic plot to Westernize and split China.” From the 

Chinese perspective, global concerns regarding human rights are at worst subversive and at 

best peripheral to improving economic ties. 

In the past, Chinese officials have argued that slow progress on civil and political 

rights was a temporary trade-off to achieve economic modernization. Given China’s impressive economic growth, this argument can no longer be sustained. The Chinese government 

has embraced some of the benefits of the free market with dramatic results. The Chinese 

people now have greater mobility, increased property rights, and somewhat greater access 

to information than in the past. These advances have raised the aspirations of the Chinese 

people and the international community, but fulfilling these hopes will require a commitment to respect civil and political rights, in addition to economic and social rights. It will 

also require an acknowledgement that human rights are indeed universal and are currently 

not protected in Chinese law and practice, despite the Chinese government’s international 

commitments in this regard. 

Respect for human rights is also important for regional security and prosperity, both 

in China and throughout the region. Such respect is a critical element in any peaceful outcome to the Taiwan issue, successful management of Hong Kong under Beijing’s control, 

and final resolution of security concerns on the Korean peninsula. Any social or political 

crises in these areas will certainly involve Western and other actors in spheres which at 

present, China considers its exclusive national domain. 
31

Human rights concerns remain on the agenda of U.S.-China bilateral relations. In the 

past, critics of a vigorous human rights diplomacy have argued that economic liberalization 

would eventually lead to political change. This has not happened. Although China has gotten richer, economic freedom has not led to political liberalization. China’s achievements 

in the economic sphere represented a key component in Beijing’s successful bid to host the 

Olympic Games in 2008. After securing the right to host the games, Chinese officials made 

promises to create an open and free environment. The Chinese government should now 

be held to those promises. Clearly, reliance on market forces alone will not secure progress 

toward human rights and political openness. Given the chronic critical human rights problems in China, the Commission concludes that these concerns must be raised at the highest 

levels and that U.S. officials should provide a consistent, candid, and coordinated message 

about human rights, including religious freedom, in their interactions with Chinese officials. The U.S. government should therefore continue to pursue broad-ranging policy options and discussions to ensure that progress on human rights and the rule of law remain 

core components of its bilateral relationship with China. 

How the Chinese government responds to the aspirations of its own people is important 

for the future of China itself, for the flexibility and scope of future U.S.-China relations, and 

for China’s standing in the international community. The United States should continue to 

help foster political, economic, and legal reforms in China. To this end, the Commission presents the following recommendations for U.S. policy to strengthen the protection of human 

rights, in particular the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, in China.

1

 The Commission traveled to Hong Kong in January 2004, at the invitation of the Hong Kong government.

2

 Attempts by Commissioners to gain further information about this incident were rebuffed. The Commission remains concerned 

about the safety and independence of Bishop Wei and other Chinese bishops and will continue to monitor this situation closely.

3

 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2001,”China,” May 2001.

4

 “PRC: Qinghai Enhances Religious Work to Guard Against Separatist Infiltration,” Qinghai Daily, September 8, 2004 (FBIS, 11 January 

2005); Ma Pinyan, “The Implementation of the Party’s Religious Policy in Xinjiang,” Xinjiang Social Sciences, no. 1, 2005, pp. 49-55.

5

 Nailene Chou Wiest, “Religious Groups Get More Room to Move,” South China Morning Post, October 20, 2004; Wang Zuoan, 

“Establish the Idea of Managing Religious Affairs According to Law,” Chinese Religions, February 26, 2005 (FBIS 26 February 

2005).

6

 See Regulations on Religious Affairs, Article 14.

7

 See Regulations on Religious Affairs, Article 20.

8

 The only exceptions were ad hoc home meetings among family members that occurred on an irregular basis to read the Bible 

and sing hymn. The precise description of what was permitted varied and was not included in the new Regulations or otherwise 

committed to written law or other regulations.

9

 See Regulations on Religious Affairs, Articles 43, 44, 45. See also Congressional Executive Commission on China, “China’s New 

Regulations on Religious Affairs; A Paradigm Shift,” Transcript of Congressional testimony from March 14, 2005. 

10 See Regulations on Religious Affairs, Articles 41, 43, 46.

11 See Regulations on Religious Affairs, Articles 39, 43.

12 Criminal law provisions regularly used to prosecute those associated with unregistered religious activity include the Regulations 

on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations; the Law on Assembly, Procession and Demonstration, Regulations 

on Public Order Control and Punishment; the Law on Protecting State Secrets; and Chinese Criminal Code Articles 111, 277, 282, 

300, 398. See: Human Rights Watch. “Appendix II: Laws and Regulations to Crackdown on Falun Gong,” from Dangerous Minds: 

China’s Campaign Against the Falun Gong, January 2002 (http://hrw.org/reports/2002/china/China0102-09.htm). 

13 The Status of North Korean Asylum Seekers and the U.S. Government Policy Towards Them, Report issued by the U.S. Department 

of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration pursuant to section 301 of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 

(P.L. 108-333) (March 11, 2005). 

14 Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees on the Upgrading of the UNHCR Mission in the People’s Republic of China to UNHCR Branch Office in the People’s 

Republic of China (December 1, 1995), (United Nations Treaty Series Vol. 1899-1-32371).

15 1961 China-DPRK agreement entitled “Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and Social 

Order in the Border Areas.” 

16 Minister Li invited the Commission to travel to the China-North Korea border on a return visit and provide him with information 

on both humanitarian need and ongoing human rights abuses. 

17 Philip Pan, “Hu Tightens Party’s Grip on Power,” Washington Post, April 24, 2005.

CHINA: COMMISSION MAKES FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT
32

Sudan: Weak Implementation 

of the Peace Agreement 

Imperils Human Rights

Sudan is in the midst of an historic transition. 

The six-year Interim Period, which began in 2005, 

is scheduled to end with a referendum on whether 

the South will remain within a united Sudan or become an independent country. Whatever the South’s 

choice, this phase in Sudan’s political development 

will determine the future of the largest country—

in terms of land mass—in Africa and in the Arab 

world, with potential ramifications beyond Sudan’s 

borders, since Sudan is only one of several African 

countries with large Muslim and Christian populations. Peace, largely brokered by the United States, 

has created an opportunity for significant change. 

The North-South peace brought by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)1

 signed January 9, 2005 brought to an end one of Africa’s longest 

A year after the CPA’s signing, it continues to be necessary to educate the Sudanese 

in a more systematic manner 

about the terms of the agreement, including the protection 

of freedom of religion or belief. 

Sudan Policy Focus press conference on Capitol Hill with Congressman Frank Wolf and House Minority Leader 

Nancy Pelosi, and Commissioners Ricardo Ramirez and Felice Gaer
33

running conflicts, with more than two million killed and four million driven from their 

homes. The civilian victims of that conflict were overwhelmingly Christian Africans and 

the followers of traditional African religions in contrast to the Arab Muslims dominant in 

Khartoum. That peace is fragile, however, and does not extend throughout the country. 

In January 2006, a year after the signing of the peace agreement ending the NorthSouth civil war, a Commission delegation visited Khartoum, Juba, and Kadugli in Sudan 

and Nairobi and Lokichokio in Kenya to discuss the impact of recent developments on 

religious freedom conditions in Sudan. Meetings included cabinet-level members of the 

Government of National Unity, lead negotiators for both sides, the retired Kenyan general 

who had mediated the North-South peace negotiations, opposition politicians, civil society 

activists, religious leaders, and representatives of international humanitarian organizations. 

A visit to the Jebel Aulia Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp outside Khartoum provided an opportunity to hear directly from individuals displaced by the civil war.

Traveling to Sudan, the Commission found that the CPA’s arrangements for the protection of human rights are vulnerable to erosion and manipulation. There have been significant delays and shortcomings in the CPA’s implementation, raising questions regarding the 

sincerity of the commitment of the National Congress Party in the Government of National 

Unity. Moreover, the Commission found that the religious freedom and other human rights 

protections agreed to in the CPA and enshrined in Sudan’s Interim National Constitution 

have not yet resulted in significant changes in practice in government-controlled areas of 

the North. The institutions intended to protect human rights are not yet functioning, while 

an authoritarian security system remains in place, and the attitude of impunity for human 

rights abuses shows little sign of change. 

The United States has an opportunity to influence this process for the better. Sudan is 

a strategic nation where U.S. influence has already made a difference and should continue 

to do so. Unlike in Afghanistan and Iraq, Sudan’s equivalent of the Taliban and of Saddam 

Hussein’s Ba’athists have not been removed from power, but remain the major political force 

in the country, requiring close monitoring to ensure their compliance with commitments 

made to abide by international human rights standards. Moreover, the United States has a 

formal role on the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, a body established by the CPA 

to monitor its implementation. 

The Commission concludes that continued U.S. leadership, resolve, and resources 

are needed to ensure that a stable and just peace is sustained in Sudan, that institutional 

development in the South brings stability and progress to that devastated region, and that 

Sudan’s millions of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) can be assisted to return home in safety or to resettle elsewhere. The United States, through its expenditure of 

massive humanitarian relief and the investment of considerable political capital, has a huge 

stake in peace in Sudan, a country that has been a source of regional instability and a haven 

for Islamic extremists and international terrorists.

Conditions in Sudan, particularly in the North, warrant the Commission’s recommendation that Sudan continue to be designated by the Secretary of State as a “country 

of particular concern” for particularly severe violations of religious freedom. Sanctions 

should remain an essential element of U.S. human rights policy toward Sudan, but should 

not preclude U.S. support for economic and political development in the South, as well as 

educational exchanges and specific programming throughout Sudan to promote religious 

freedom by assisting those, including in the Government of National Unity, favoring greater 

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34

protection of human rights, the establishment of rule of law, and the development of truly 

accountable and democratic governmental institutions. The lifting of current U.S. sanctions 

should be conditioned on proven performance, in terms of CPA implementation, an end to 

the genocide in Darfur, and improvement in religious freedom conditions in the North. 

Problematic Implementation of the Peace Agreement 

Although Sudan’s North-South civil war (1983-2005) had many contributing causes, 

religious factors were key: 1) the effort of the Islamist government in Khartoum to extend 

sharia, or Islamic law, as well as Arabic language and culture, to the African Christians and 

the followers of traditional African religions in the South; and 2) Khartoum’s efforts to impose an extremist interpretation of Islam on all Sudanese Muslims. With neither side securing victory, the civil war ended in a set of compromises and mutual concessions, contained 

in the CPA. Among the most important of these was the agreement that sharia would not 

apply in the southern part of the country, but would continue to apply in the North, with 

special provisions for non-Muslims in Khartoum, the national capital, from being automatically subject to its punishments.

The final resolution of a number of important issues has been left to an array of commissions and administrative arrangements. The Commission delegation learned that there 

have been significant delays and shortcomings in the implementation of the CPA. These developments raise questions regarding the sincerity of the commitment of the National Congress Party leadership, who still hold the major levers of power 

in the new Government of National Unity. Northern politicians 

have a long history of broken promises in respect to the rights of 

Southern Sudanese.

The CPA’s arrangements for the protection of rights are vulnerable. Key bodies have either not yet been established, are only 

beginning to function, or have yet to prove their worth. At the 

time of the visit, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, on 

which the United States is represented, was just beginning its vital 

work. Southerners reported to the delegation that revenue-sharing was being implemented in a way that lacked transparency, 

making it difficult to determine if the South was actually receiving its agreed share of Sudan’s current oil revenues.

The delegation was told that there are four competing drafts for the functioning 

of the yet to be formed national Human Rights Commission as provided by the interim 

constitution. Not all of these drafts were in accord with international standards relating to 

the independence and mandate of such commissions.2

 The Commission delegation also 

learned that the National Constitutional Review Commission charged with ensuring the 

creation, on a proper legal basis, of the various bodies necessary to implement the CPA, 

had been dormant for most of the past year. The establishment of the Special Commission 

for the Protection of the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital had only just been 

announced.3

 Special provisions for non-Muslims appeared to amount to little more than 

promises of judicial discretion and training to make the police more culturally sensitive, 

which Christians in Khartoum believed were inadequate to protect their rights. Ominously, 

President Omar El Bashir has rejected the findings of what was supposed to be a binding 

decision by the Abyei Boundary Commission.4

Sudan’s First Vice President Salva Kiir and 

President Omar Bashir
35

There are also questions about the depth of the commitment of the Sudan People’s 

Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) to its former leader Dr. John Garang’s vision of a 

united Sudan. Moreover, the ability of the SPLM/A to hold its former Sudanese government 

adversaries to the letter, much less the spirit of the CPA, is limited by the SPLM/A’s own 

limited institutional capacities. The SPLM/A faces the triple challenge of participating in 

the Government of National Unity, of establishing the new regional government of Southern Sudan which it leads, and of transforming its armed wing from a rebel movement to 

a standing army, all without Garang’s leadership.5

 On a positive note, there was a smooth 

transition by the Government of National Unity and the SPLM/A to Dr. John Garang’s successor, Salva Kiir, as First Vice President of Sudan, President of Southern Sudan, and leader 

of the SPLM/A. 

Finally, as the Commission’s delegation learned during its visit to Juba, the SPLM/A 

must accomplish this Herculean task in one of the most impoverished and least developed 

areas of the world, a region devastated by more than 20 years of warfare and suffering from 

decades of neglect by the Northern-dominated national government in Khartoum.6 The 

South’s lack of infrastructure was underlined when the Commission delegation found itself 

in a meeting with one of the Ministers of the new Government of Southern Sudan in the 

tent city in which he was living, due to the lack of housing in the new Southern capital. 

A year after the CPA’s signing, it continues to be necessary to educate the Sudanese 

in a more systematic manner about the terms of the agreement, including the protection of 

freedom of religion or belief. For people to assert their rights, they need to know them. It is 

troubling that little effort has been made to inform the Sudanese people about the CPA or 

the Interim National Constitution. 

Although efforts are continuing to broaden participation in the Government of National Unity, significant political opposition exists to the current power-sharing arrangement, including parties that represent both of Sudan’s main Islamic sectarian movements 

and the followers of Hassan al-Turabi, who provided the ideological foundation for the former regime. To ensure that elections called for by the CPA are free and fair, the government 

will need to take considerable steps, for which external assistance and international monitoring may be necessary. If they are not taken, the protections for individual rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief, enshrined in the CPA and in the Interim National Constitution, 

may well remain just words on paper, like those in previous Sudanese constitutions.

Religious Freedom Still Limited in the North Despite Promised 

Safeguards

The Commission delegation found that in government-controlled areas of the North, the 

religious freedom and other human rights protections agreed to in the CPA and enshrined in 

Sudan’s Interim National Constitution have not yet resulted in significant changes in practice:7

■ All Sudanese in the North, and specifically in the national capital area, including 

Christians and followers of traditional African religions, are subject to sharia. 

Contrary to the understanding even of some Sudanese, the CPA and the Interim 

National Constitution’s special provision for the rights of non-Muslims in the 

national capital does not exempt Christians and followers of traditional African 

religions from sharia. Rather, it proposes to mitigate the impact of its application 

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36

by providing for alternatives to the punishments prescribed for Muslims, at the 

court’s discretion.

■ Government approval is required for the construction and use of places of worship. Although permits are regularly granted to build mosques, permission to 

build churches is routinely denied. For over 30 years, the government has denied 

permission to construct Roman Catholic churches in areas under its control. Unauthorized church construction does occur, on land registered for personal use 

rather than for public worship. There were some indications, however, of a recent 

loosening of bureaucratic restrictions on church ownership of property, e.g., the 

authorities have in three instances permitted land purchased by a church to be 

registered in the name of the church as an institution rather than in the name of 

a church official. Property registered in the name of an individual rather than an 

institution is more vulnerable to legal problems. 

■ Churches built without official permission exist at the authorities’ sufferance. 

Those constructed in squatter settlements or IDP camps have often been razed. 

Church-owned properties that are legally recognized are nevertheless vulnerable 

to seizure in a legal atmosphere in which government action is not effectively 

constrained by an independent judiciary. The most glaring example was the government seizure of a Roman Catholic recreational facility, taken not for a public 

purpose but for the use of the National Congress Party. 

■ Although not applied in recent years, the legal penalty of death for apostasy from 

Islam remains the law of the land. Converts to Christianity from Islam face societal 

pressure and harassment from the security services to the point that they typically 

cannot remain in Sudan. The law against apostasy is also of concern to Muslims; the 

last instance in which the death penalty was applied was to a Muslim reformer.8

■ The government supervises and controls most Muslim religious institutions in 

order to enhance a militant interpretation of Islam that promotes intolerance and 

undermines the rights of Muslims who adhere to other interpretations, as well as 

the rights of non-Muslims and women. 

■ Government agencies in the North continued to show a preference for Islam, 

including in education and the government-controlled media, reinforcing the 

message that Christians and non-Muslims are not equal members of society. History books reportedly ignore the Christian and other non-Muslim societies that 

existed in what is now Sudan for centuries before the Islamic conquest. In addition, Quranic verses are found throughout school texts, even in mathematics and 

geography. All law students in the North, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, must 

be competent in sharia.

■ Freedom of the press is limited, although there are some courageous independent 

voices testing those limits.

■ The activities of both indigenous and international humanitarian and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are subject to harassment and interference 

by the security services, even under the Government of National Unity.
37

Religious Freedom Conditions Have Improved in the South and in 

the Formerly Contested Areas

In the South, the Nuba Mountains, and other transitional areas formerly contested 

by government and Southern rebel forces, religious freedom conditions have significantly 

improved since the signing of the CPA. North-South peace has dramatically decreased the 

severe abuses of religious freedom and of other universal human rights that characterized 

military operations by Sudanese government forces and pro-government militias in the 

South and other areas of fighting during the civil war. Christian leaders in the major southern center of Juba reported a general lifting of the climate of fear of government security 

forces that had prevailed in the city during the war. A major Christian religious event was 

being advertised publicly during the Commission visit. On the down side, Muslims with 

whom the delegation met in Juba expressed concern about their prospects, especially in 

light of the anti-Muslim and anti-Northern violence that followed the announcement of Dr. 

John Garang’s death.

Representatives of international NGOs working in the South reported to the delegation that since the signing of the CPA, there has been a decrease, although not a total cessation, in reports of the heinous crime of abduction into slavery, a tactic employed by government-supported militias against Southerners during the North-South civil war. Khartoum 

has established a mechanism for assisting victims of abduction, 

the Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and 

Children (CEAWAC). Estimates of the number of victims vary 

enormously, but there is a general consensus that a majority of 

victims, numbering in the thousands, remain unidentified and 

that those responsible for their enslavement have not been held to 

account. CEAWAC lacks funds to return home even those whom 

it has documented as victims. The lack of action of Sudan’s legal system toward the perpetrators is inexcusable. Clearly more 

needs to be done to eliminate abduction into slavery, to prosecute 

the violators, and to ensure the rights of victims.9

Considering the poverty and lack of infrastructure in the 

South, as well as the general devastation there and in the formerly 

contested areas, peace may well be unsustainable without development and security. Community leaders told the Commission delegation 

that tangible “peace dividends” such as schools, clinics, and jobs are needed in order to provide 

alternatives to young people who only have known years of warfare. 

Insecurity also presents a major concern, whether from banditry or from continued 

attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).10 Reporting to the UN Security Council in 

December 2005, Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland declared 

that the “LRA continues to maintain bases and moves relatively freely throughout the 

region” comprising southern Sudan, northern Uganda, and neighboring portions of the 

Democratic Republic of Congo. According to Egeland, LRA attacks, including on humanitarian workers, have had a “dramatic” impact on UN humanitarian operations and have 

“severely hampered the preparation for the return of refugees” to southern Sudan.11 During 

the North-South civil war, the LRA was supplied and sheltered by the Sudanese military. In 

return, the LRA cooperated with Sudanese government forces and government-supported 

militias against the SPLM/A. More recently, as Khartoum moved to distance itself from 

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USCIRF Chair Cromartie, Foreign Minister of Sudan 

Lam Akol, and Commissioner Ramirez
2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

38

international terrorism following 9/11, such support was not only curtailed but Khartoum 

permitted Ugandan government forces to enter Sudan to pursue the LRA. Suspicions remain, however, that at least some elements in the Sudanese military or security services that 

remain in the South continue to aid the LRA.12

The Plight of Sudan’s Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: 

Greater Resources Needed

In terms of the number of civilians displaced by conflict, no country comes close to 

Sudan. There are more than 600,000 refugees and four million IDPs from the North-South 

civil war, and more than 200,000 refugees and two million IDPs from Darfur, for a total of 

seven million displaced Sudanese from a population of 40 million. In the Khartoum area 

alone, there are 255,000 IDPs residing in official camps, and an additional 1.7 million living in unofficial squatter settlements. The overwhelming majority of the nearly five million 

displaced as a result of the North-South civil war are Christians or followers of traditional 

African religions; those displaced from Darfur are Muslims who are members of tribes 

identified as African as distinct from Arab. 

Sudanese of all walks of life who met with the Commission delegation made clear 

that they want peace and are weary of the many conflicts that they have lived through since 

independence. One of the surest signs of the hunger for peace 

is that approximately 500,000 IDPs and 50,000 refugees already 

have returned to the South and transitional areas. Preparations 

are being made for still others to return home with assistance, an 

effort to which the United States is the largest contributor. Southerners living in Khartoum overwhelmingly told delegation members that they plan to return to the South, even those who had 

lived for many years in the North and had secure jobs. 

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) oversees refugee returns, and the UN Office for the Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is the coordinating agency over 

IDP returns in Sudan. Both agencies have emphasized that all 

returns of refugees and IDPs must be voluntary. This has been memorialized in recent tripartite agreements between the UNHCR, Sudan, and major host 

countries of Sudanese refugee camps. 

The international community has acknowledged that the infrastructure of Southern 

Sudan is so frail and overstretched that it can support only a relatively small number of 

returns at this time. This obstacle is compounded by serious protection concerns, as well as 

a total lack of safe transportation options from the IDP camps to the places from which the 

IDPs fled. According to UNHCR, land mines and unexploded ordinances are “omnipresent” along the feeder roads that would be used by returning refugees and IDPs. By early 

2006, the UN had expected to have had 23 way stations in place to assist spontaneous returnees en route, but had only two. As a result, while all returns must be “voluntary,” many 

individuals who wish voluntarily to return home have no way of doing so at this time.

Indeed, according to IDP community leaders with whom the Commission delegation 

met, most of Sudan’s internally displaced would like to return home without further delay. 

In spite of difficult conditions, these displaced persons would rather work to rebuild their 

Commission at IDP Camp Jebel Aulia, Khartoum
39

country than continue to be confined to IDP camps under deteriorating conditions. The 

community leaders indicated that the reason so few had returned was because they could 

not afford to pay for the dangerous, weeks-long journey home to the South or the transitional areas. On the other hand, as Walter Kalin, the Representative of the UN Secretary 

General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, recently reported, many 

IDPs in and around Khartoum are “badly or not at all informed about conditions in their 

places of origin.”

The journey itself is, indeed, very arduous. The trip begins with a 220 mile ride packed 

into a truck from Khartoum to Kosti. Once in Kosti, the IDPs must wait in the outdoors 

for up to a month to catch a barge for a journey which can take between 5 and 25 days, in 

a boat with no guardrails, sanitation, or cooking facilities. This water route is necessary 

because travel by road is not feasible, as the few passable roads in existence are laden with 

landmines. From the port, returnees must find their way home, often on foot. 

Of the nearly 4 million IDPs resulting from the North-South Civil War, 1,260,000 

were expected to return in 2005 and 2006, and UNHCR expected to repatriate 140,000 of 

the refugees by May 2006, out of a population of more than 400,000 refugees. UNHCR and 

U.S. officials now concede, however, that the actual number of returns will likely be much 

smaller. At this rate, voluntary returns will take several years. 

Moreover, once home, the returnees will likely remain without shelter, sufficient 

food, potable water, or access to schools or medical services. Many, particularly the elderly, 

women, and female-headed households, face serious security risks as well. Nor are there 

any state structures to support speedy resolution of land disputes or other conflicts. 

The numbers of potential returnees are so great and the infrastructure in the South 

so lacking that the return effort will necessarily be massive, requiring a concomitant response by the United States and other donors. Particular emphasis will need to be placed on 

developing safe and regular transportation options by river and by air while the roads are 

de-mined, as well as a general commitment among the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), OCHA, and UNHCR more closely to coordinate development efforts to 

support returns of IDPs and refugees. The resources of the Southern Sudanese churches and 

other private groups engaged in humanitarian and development assistance in the South are 

already considerably strained. Moreover, increased international attention to Darfur and to 

reconstruction in the South has meant that fewer resources, such as food and medical services, are going to the IDP camps around Khartoum and the refugee camps in neighboring 

countries such as Kenya. Those remaining camp residents are often those with the least. If 

conditions in these camps continue to deteriorate, the refugees and IDPs within them may 

feel compelled to return to an area where they will face serious dangers en route and more 

dangers upon arrival.

The Sudanese authorities, the donors, and the international community need to accelerate efforts to enhance the capacity of the South and transitional areas to absorb large 

numbers of IDPs and refugees. Otherwise, significant dangers will be faced, not only by the 

individuals who choose to return, but also to the peace process itself and to the development 

prospects for the region. Without adequate preparation, large scale influxes would likely result in additional tensions within overstretched local communities, due to competition over 

scarce resources and services. This could result in further conflict and diversions of funding 

from recovery and development to pay for emergency humanitarian assistance.13

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Darfur Threatens Sudan Peace, 

Must be Resolved within a National Context

Since 2003, Sudanese government forces and “Janjaweed” (government-backed militias from Arab tribes) have carried out a campaign of ethnic cleansing against African Muslim civilians in the western region of Darfur, similar to Khartoum’s previous tactics against 

Christians or followers of traditional African religions in the North-South conflict. The government’s culpability in the killings of an estimated 400,000 persons, the destruction of 90 

percent of Darfur’s villages, and the widespread torture, rape, and abduction of civilians is well 

documented. President Bush, the Congress, and the State Department have termed Darfur 

an instance of genocide.14i Abundant evidence demonstrates that the Sudanese government 

has directly overseen and organized Darfur’s destruction.15 UN reports have cited the government as “largely responsible” for the humanitarian disaster caused by the Darfur conflict and 

have cited the Sudanese armed forces and government-backed militias for “serious violations 

of international human rights and humanitarian law,” including the killings of civilians and 

rape and sexual violence against women.16 Despite international pressure, the perpetrators of 

these crimes, both members of the Sudanese armed forces and allied militias, have not been 

brought to account, either by the efforts of domestic or international bodies. 

According to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, there has been a marked deterioration in the situation in Darfur since September.17 With villages destroyed and lives at risk 

from further attack by government-supported Arab militiamen, many thousands of civilians remain in camps, either as IDPs in Sudan or as refugees in Chad. Despite the presence 

of African Union forces in Darfur, these traditionally self-reliant African villagers are unable to return home to raise crops and are now dependent upon international humanitarian 

assistance, with the United States and other foreign donors funding the relief effort necessitated by Khartoum’s actions. 

Recognizing the extraordinarily pressing need for U.S. and international action on 

Darfur, the Commission nonetheless concludes that more can still be done to assist the 

rest of the country. Urgent efforts to end the killing and atrocities in Darfur and to resolve 

the problems facing IDPs and refugees are needed, along with international attention and 

resources devoted to severe problems in other parts of Sudan affected by the delays and 

shortcomings in the implementation of the CPA.

Moreover, the conflict in Darfur is yet another illustration of Sudan’s broader political 

pattern of deliberate marginalization and resource-deprivation of all of Sudan’s regions with 

non-Arab or non-Muslim populations. Full implementation of the CPA, with its provisions 

for democratic elections, human rights guarantees, revenue-sharing, and state governments 

with significant powers, both North and South, hold promise for overcoming the internal tensions that have torn Sudan since independence. Although resources are admittedly 

limited, the Commission concludes that ways must be found to continue U.S. leadership. 

Engagement on both Darfur and the implementation of the CPA is critical to help the Sudanese secure the peace they overwhelmingly desire.

Commission Work on Sudan

Sudan was one of the first countries to be a focus of attention by the Commission. 

The Commission found religion to be a major factor in Sudan’s long-running North-South 

civil war because of Khartoum’s coercive policies of Arabization and Islamization. That 
41

war’s victims, over two million killed and four million driven from their homes, were overwhelmingly Christians and followers of traditional African religions. Its victims also included Muslims, particularly in the Nuba Mountains, condemned for opposing the Islamist 

regime in Khartoum.

The Commission, which has reported extensively on Sudan since the Commission’s 

inception, has repeatedly recommended that Sudan be designated a “country of particular 

concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). The Commission has frequently testified at congressional hearings, has held a full-day public hearing 

of its own on Sudan, and has issued numerous press statements drawing attention to the 

situation in Sudan. In 2000, in the midst of the North-South civil war, the Commission 

conducted a site visit to Southern Sudan.

Over the years, the Commission has made a series of recommendations regarding U.S. 

policy toward Sudan, including that the U.S. government appoint a nationally prominent 

individual to bring about a peaceful and just settlement of the war in Sudan. In September 

2001, President Bush appointed former Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace 

in Sudan, energizing the Sudan peace process. Other U.S. actions followed Commission 

recommendations, including the Administration’s decisions to give peace in Sudan a higher 

priority on its foreign policy agenda, to engage actively to move the warring parties toward 

peace, to monitor progress toward implementation of a series of partial and preliminary 

peace agreements, and to use U.S. assistance more effectively in alleviating the suffering 

of the Sudanese people and in aiding development in southern Sudan. The Commission’s 

consistent advocacy of strong U.S. pressure on the Khartoum regime, including economic 

sanctions, was also reflected in the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, signed by 

President Bush on December 23, 2004. 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

In addition to recommending that Sudan continue to be designated a CPC, the Commission urges the U.S. government to remain engaged at the highest levels in bringing about 

a just and lasting peace for all of Sudan. 

I. U.S. Diplomacy

The U.S. government should:

■ appoint a nationally prominent individual who enjoys the trust and confidence of the President and the Secretary of State and whose sole responsibility is to coordinate U.S. efforts 

toward the complete and timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 

(CPA) and the securing of a just and lasting peace for all of Sudan, including in Darfur; 

■ assign a ranking official to the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum with a mandate to advance the 

human rights aspects of CPA implementation, including coordination of U.S. engagement with the various mechanisms established by the CPA, the Interim National Constitution, and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, as well as U.S. foreign assistance 

to support these mechanisms and to promote human rights, including religious freedom, 

as recommended below; and

■ in support of the ranking official, provide more adequate U.S. Embassy and Consulate staff 

with appropriate rank, training, and language skills to strengthen reporting on human rights 

conditions and advocating for human rights protections, and require political and public affairs 

officers to travel regularly throughout Sudan to monitor and examine human rights concerns. 

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II. Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Accords

The U.S. government should:

■ report publicly every six months, through the State Department or the U.S. Embassy 

in Khartoum, on the status of implementation of the CPA and the return of IDPs and 

refugees; this reporting should include information on CPA mechanisms to protect 

human rights as well as significant obstacles to CPA implementation and the return of 

IDPs and refugees; and 

■ take a leadership role within the Assessment and Evaluation Commission to ensure the 

timely, transparent, and complete implementation of the CPA’s power-sharing, revenuesharing, and security arrangements in order to prepare the way for the agreed-upon referenda and for free and fair elections at all levels. 

III. Sanctions

The U.S. government should:

■ maintain existing U.S. sanctions on Sudan until particularly severe violations of freedom of religion or belief throughout Sudan and the genocidal atrocities in Darfur are 

ended; and

■ ensure that sanctions do not preclude U.S. support for (a) development projects in Southern Sudan, including with the participation of the government of Southern Sudan; (b) 

programming in Sudan, whether in the North, the South or elsewhere, to advance implementation of the human rights aspects of the CPA, other protections for human rights, 

the rule of law, and the development of truly accountable and democratic governmental 

institutions; and (c) educational exchanges between Sudan and the United States.

IV. U.S. Foreign Assistance

The U.S. government should:

■ ensure that USAID, the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund, and 

other providers of U.S. government assistance develop a strategy and fund specific programs to 1) promote implementation of the human rights and religious freedom provisions of the CPA, and 2) advance legal protections and respect for freedom of religion 

or belief throughout Sudan, in recognition of (a) the central role of religion as a factor 

in the civil war, and (b) the emphasis within the CPA to religious freedom concerns; the 

programs funded by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, should be expanded; 

■ adopt as specific objectives for these U.S. programs:

● improved citizen awareness of and enforcement of the legal protections for human rights 

included in the CPA, the Interim National Constitution, the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, and the international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Sudan is a party; 

● grassroots reconciliation and “peace through dialogue” among Sudanese, including building on steps USAID has already taken to promote reconciliation among Southern Sudanese, 

recognizing that participants in such programs must be transported, housed, and fed; participants should specifically include religious and other civil society leaders from Sudan’s 

diverse religious and ethnic communities; 

● greater capacity of those elements of civil society throughout Sudan (i.e. the North, the 

South, and the transitional areas) that promote religious tolerance, respect for human 
43

rights, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, to advance those goals on both the national 

and the local levels; and

● development of an independent and impartial judiciary in Southern Sudan, including through 

training of judges, prosecutors, and court administrators and support personnel, with the aim 

to ensure international standards of due process, fair trial, and non-discrimination;

■ expand the use of educational and cultural exchanges, such as the Fulbright Program, 

the International Visitors Program, and lectures by visiting American scholars and experts, in order to introduce more Sudanese to the experience of societies in which religious freedom and other human rights are protected by law; preference should be given 

to programs that bring together leaders from various religious and ethnic backgrounds 

from the North, South, and the transitional areas;

■ expand international radio broadcasting to Sudan to provide objective sources of news 

and information and to improve awareness of the CPA and its implementation, including specific programming promoting grass-roots reconciliation and respect for freedom of religion; support independent television and radio broadcasting, including in 

the South, to the same end; and 

■ promptly dispense financial assistance for humanitarian purposes, to build civil society, and to promote economic development in Southern Sudan, including in the area of 

an independent network of telecommunications.

V. Refugees and IDPs

The U.S. government should:

■ appoint a high-level “Special Representative” or “Coordinator” to Refugees and IDPs 

of Sudan to ensure that U.S. resources and influence are effectively applied to facilitate 

voluntary returns as soon as they can be done in safety and in dignity; to coordinate 

IDP and refugee returns with reconstruction efforts in Southern Sudan; and to ensure 

that those refugees who need a durable solution other than repatriation are not left to 

languish in camps; 

■ provide additional assistance—and urge other countries to follow suit—to expedite 

development efforts in the South. Although the United States has been the leading 

donor to these efforts, Congress funded Southern Sudan humanitarian and development assistance at $63 million less than the $100 million requested by the Administration. Without a significant increase in the commitment by the U.S. and other donors 

to develop the South, safe IDP and refugee returns—and the peace brought by the 

CPA—may not be sustained;

■ urge UN agencies and their NGO partners to focus urgently on practical, communitybased solutions to providing returnees with basic infrastructure and health and education services;

■ urge OCHA and UNHCR to strengthen their efforts to disseminate information to 

IDPs and refugees about return and reception conditions, including expanding “look 

and see” trips by refugees and IDPs to review conditions and report back to their camps 

so that individuals can make informed choices about returns; and urge that OCHA and 

UNHCR also track returns more closely;

■ lend and operate safer modes of transportation, including planes and river vessels, to 

facilitate spontaneous—as well as organized—voluntary refugee and IDP returns; demining efforts of roadways should continue and be intensified; 

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■ encourage OCHA to move quickly to establish the 21 remaining “way stations” on the 

return route to Southern Sudan which, according to its own plans, should have been 

in place by now;

■ work with UN agencies and NGO partners to ensure that the populations which remain 

in refugee and IDP camps continue to receive at least the same level of humanitarian assistance as before, so they are not unduly pressured into making “voluntary” returns; and

■ work with other resettlement countries, UNHCR, and its NGO partners to ensure that 

UNHCR expeditiously identifies those refugees for whom repatriation is not an appropriate or imminent solution to their displacement, including those who have suffered 

from past persecution; secure, as appropriate, timely local integration in countries of 

first asylum or resettlement to third countries for such refugees; and promptly devise a 

strategy to achieve this concurrent with efforts to repatriate refugees to Sudan.

VI. Freedom of Religion and Belief and Related Human Rights Concerns

The U.S. government should:

■ use U.S. bilateral discussions with Sudan, as well as UN mechanisms and bilateral discussions with third countries with influence in Sudan, to urge Sudan’s Government of 

National Unity to:

● allow all religious groups to conduct their activities without harassment, discrimination or 

undue interference, including activities such as publishing or importing religious literature as 

well as building, repairing, and operating houses of worship and social service programs; 

● repeal laws that punish changing one’s religion or encouraging another to do so; end official 

accusations of blasphemy, apostasy, “offending Islam,” or similar charges used to stifle public debate or restrict the right to freedom of expression; 

● dismantle the burdensome bureaucratic obstacles the government places on international 

humanitarian assistance; remove the state security services from their current role in regulating humanitarian assistance; 

● establish an independent and impartial national Human Rights Commission as called for 

in the Interim National Constitution and in accordance with the international standards for 

such bodies in terms of independence, adequate funding, a representative character, and a 

broad mandate that includes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief;

● abandon efforts to force religious organizations to register as non-governmental organizations under regulations that give government officials effective control over their activities;

● permit relations between national religious communities and their co-religionists abroad in 

accordance with universal human rights norms;

● reform the state security services to be representative of all Sudanese and ensure that all 

national institutions such as the military, law enforcement agencies, and the highest levels 

of the judiciary are representative of and equally protective of all Sudanese regardless of 

religious affiliation or belief;

● end the impunity with which members of the security forces and others acting as agents of the 

government have engaged in human rights abuses; urge the establishment of effective mechanisms for accountability for past abuses; and in the absence of such bodies, provide full cooperation with international institutions, including those mandated by the UN Security Council;

● cease messages of intolerance and discrimination against non-Muslims in the governmentcontrolled media;
45

SUDAN: WEAK IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT IMPERILS HUMAN RIGHTS

● exclude negative stereotyping in school textbooks; include in school curricula, in textbooks, 

and in teacher training the concepts of tolerance and respect for human rights, including 

freedom of religion or belief; history texts should reflect the religious and cultural diversity 

of Sudan’s past; 

● undertake a comprehensive review, in collaboration with Sudanese civil society and independent international experts, to bring Sudanese law into compliance with Sudan’s international human rights obligations; and 

● cooperate fully with international mechanisms on human rights issues, including inviting 

further visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, the Special 

Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Sudan, and by the UN Working Group on 

Arbitrary Detention.

VII. Victims of Slavery and Human Trafficking

The U.S. government should:

■ use U.S. bilateral discussions with Sudan, as well as UN mechanisms, and bilateral discussions with third countries with influence in Sudan, to urge Sudan’s Government of 

National Unity to prosecute strictly the crime of abduction into slavery, most of whose 

victims were women and children taken during the North-South civil war or in Darfur 

by government-sponsored militias; and 

■ ensure that the existing mechanisms accomplish speedy identification, voluntary return, and 

family reunification of victims as well as measures for their rehabilitation and reparation.

VIII. Darfur

The U.S. government should:

■ closely monitor compliance by the government of Sudan with UN Security Council Resolutions addressing the conflict in Darfur;

■ support a stronger international presence in Sudan sufficient to protect civilian populations and to monitor compliance with the peace accords and Security Council resolutions, including by: 

● urging the expansion of the mandate for international peacekeepers in Darfur—whether 

United Nations, African Union, or some combination of the two—explicitly to include active protection of civilians and preventative protection; 

● providing resources such as improved communications equipment, reliable vehicles and 

helicopters, and logistics assistance to enable peacekeepers to move quickly to places where 

abuses are occurring; 

● bringing in advisors on civilian protection issues in armed conflict to train and work with 

international force commanders; 

● ensuring that there is a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the 

return of refugees and the internally displaced; providing an early warning system with GPS 

(global positioning system) capability to warn camps and villages of approaching forces; 

● supporting the assignment of designated protection teams to camps for internally displaced persons; 

● supporting the active enforcement of the aerial “no fly” zone already specified in Security 

Council Resolution 1591 of March 29, 2005, which calls for the immediate cessation of “offensive military flights in and over the Darfur region”;
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● taking measures to prevent—and providing aid to those victimized by—widespread sexual 

violence and rape in Darfur, including by training advisors for the international forces in 

Darfur and by encouraging participating nations to include female troops and female police 

officers in their deployment to handle rape cases effectively; and 

● supporting a substantial increase in the number of human rights monitors from the UN 

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and in the number of international 

peacekeepers deployed in Darfur; 

■ prevail upon the government of Sudan to provide needed humanitarian access to international relief organizations;

■ continue efforts to aid the suffering civilian population of Darfur, including by seeking an 

end to killing, to ethnic cleansing and forced displacement, and to Sudanese government 

impediments to the distribution of international humanitarian assistance; assisting refugees and internally displaced persons to return home in safety; and promoting a ceasefire 

as well as a peaceful and just resolution of the grievances that underlie the crisis; and

■ urge the Sudanese authorities to cooperate with the international prosecution of those 

accused of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in connection with the events in Darfur since July 1, 2002, in accordance with Security Council 

Resolution 1593 of March 31, 2005.

1

 The CPA affirmed a series of prior agreements, including the Machakos Protocol of July 2002, which established a number of 

principles regarding freedom of religion or belief, and the Protocol on Power-Sharing of May 2004, which addresses a number of 

human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Protocol on Power-Sharing states explicitly that “The Republic of Sudan, including 

all levels of Government throughout the country, shall comply fully with its obligations under the international human rights 

treaties to which it is or becomes a party.” For the text of the CPA and the preliminary agreements it subsumed, see United States 

Institute of Peace, Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Sudan, “Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” March 16, 2005 (http://www.

usip.org/library/pa/sudan/cpa01092005/cpa_toc.html, accessed February 22, 2006). 2

 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, found 

in the Annex to Fact Sheet No. 19, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High 

Commissioner for Human Rights (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm, accessed February 14, 2006). These are commonly 

referred to as “the Paris Principles.”

3

 ReliefWeb, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Country Team in Sudan, 

“United Nations Sudan Situation Report 3 January 2006,” (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KHII6KW3AF?OpenDocument, accessed February 17, 2006).

4

 In the CPA, “the government and southern representatives agreed to the establishment of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) 

and tasked it with evaluating historical and conflicting claims to the land and demarcating a border between the groups. The final 

report of the ABC was completed in July 2005, but the Government of Sudan has yet to publicly release the document or accept its 

findings, as stipulated in the CPA. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), in contrast, supports the release of the ABC’s 

findings.” U.S. Institute of Peace, “Resolving the Boundary Dispute in Sudan’s Abyei Region,” October 2005 (http://www.usip.org/

pubs/usipeace_briefings/2005/1026_sudan.html, accessed February 17, 2006).

5

 Dr. John Garang died in a helicopter crash shortly after the Government of National Unity was formed. The timing of his death, 

just weeks after he was sworn in as First Vice President of Sudan, aroused suspicions among many Southern Sudanese, resulting in 

rioting both in Khartoum and in the South.

6

 Sudan ranks 141st on the United Nations Human Development Index of 177 countries surveyed. The index is available on-line at 

http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators.cfm?x=1&y=1&z=1.

7

 See UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Sudan, Statement by Ms. Sima Samar to the UN General Assembly, 

60th Session, October 27, 2005. “Since the formation of the Government of National Unity, the people of Sudan have seen little 

change in their everyday life – the emergency laws are still in place in Darfur and the East and are also applied in Khartoum, 

people are arbitrarily arrested or held incommunicado by security forces; torture, ill-treatment and killings of civilians continue. 

Discrimination and marginalization of groups continue and basic rights such as access to food, shelter, health and education are 

not guaranteed.” 

8

 Mahmud Muhammad Taha, a Sudanese Muslim who called for debate about the role and content of sharia, was convicted of 

apostasy and executed on January 18, 1985. Taha was the only individual executed on this charge following Sudanese President 

Jaafar Muhammad al-Nimeiri’s implementation of sharia. 

9

 For the most comprehensive and authoritative background information on the abduction and slavery issue see U.S Department of 

State, Report of the International Eminent Persons Group: Slavery, Abduction and Forced Servitude in Sudan, May 22, 2002 (http://

www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rpt/10445.htm, accessed February 22, 2006).

10 The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is a Ugandan rebel group notorious for its brutal human rights abuses, including its practice 

of kidnapping children to use as child soldiers. For a description of the religious/ideological background of the cult-like LRA see 
47

World Vision, Pawns of Politics: Children, Conflict and Peace in Northern Uganda, 2004 (http://www.worldvision.org/worldvision/

imagelib.nsf/main/pawns/$file/Pawns_Of_Politics.pdf, accessed April 6, 2006), pp. 13-15. 

11 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Statement by Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for 

Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator to UN SC Meeting 19 Dec 2005, December 19, 2005 (http://www.reliefweb.

int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SODA-6KA4FX?OpenDocument, accessed April 6, 2006).

12 For further background on the LRA and its involvement in southern Sudan see Human Rights Watch, The Impact of the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the New Government of National Unity on Southern Sudan, March 2006 (http://hrw.org/

backgrounder/africa/sudan0306/sudan0306.pdf, accessed April 6, 2006), pp. 25-26; International Crisis Group, A Strategy for 

Ending Northern Uganda’s Crisis, January 11, 2006 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/central_africa/b035_

strategy_for_ending_northern_uganda_s_crisis.pdf, accessed April 6, 2006), 4-5; Human Rights Watch, Uprooted and Forgotten: 

Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda, September 2005 (http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uganda0905/uganda0905.

pdf, accessed April 6, 2006) , pp. 11-12; International Crisis Group, Building a Comprehensive Peace Strategy for Northern Uganda, 

June 23, 2005 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/central_africa/b027_building_a_comprehensive_peace_

strategy.pdf, accessed April 6, 2006) , pp. 4-5.

13 See comments of Walter Kalin in United Nations Press Release, Much More Needs to Be Done to Ensure Protection of Internally 

Displaced of Southern Sudan, Rights Expert Says, October 14, 2005, (http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/idp/20051017sudan.htm), 

accessed February 27, 2006).

14 In the Sudan Peace Act of 2002, Congress found that the Sudanese government had committed acts of genocide during the civil 

war. By concurrent resolution in July 2004, Congress found the atrocities being committed in Darfur to constitute genocide. 

In congressional testimony delivered in September 2004, Secretary of State Powell announced that the State Department “had 

concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility—

and genocide may still be continuing.” In an open letter dated April 1, 2006 and issued on the occasion of the “Week of Prayer and 

Action for Darfur,” President Bush declared “Our Nation is appalled by the genocide in Darfur, Sudan.” See also Sue Pleming, 

Reuters, “US’s Rice says genocide continues in Darfur,” February 17, 2006; Glenn Kessler and Colum Lynch, WashingtonPost.com, 

“U.S. Calls Killings In Sudan Genocide: Khartoum and Arab Militias Are Responsible, Powell Says,” September 10, 2004 (http://

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html, accessed February 17, 2006). 

15 UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts, UN Doc. S/2006/65, January 30, 2006.

16 UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur Mission to Sudan, 

E/CN.4/2005/7/Add.2, August 6, 2005; UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Report of the 

Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, E/CN.4/2006/11, January 11, 2006; Report of the International 

Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the Secretary-General, January 25, 2005; UN News Centre, “Security Council Refers 

Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court,” March 31, 2005 (http://www.un.org/News/Press/

docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm, accessed February 17, 2006).

17 UN News Centre, “Despite forceful Security Council moves, atrocities continue in Sudan’s Darfur region – UN report,” December 

29, 2005 (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=17064&Cr=Sudan&Cr1=Darfur#, accessed February 17, 2006); Monthly 

Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, UN Doc. S/2005/825, December 23, 2005.

SUDAN: WEAK IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT IMPERILS HUMAN RIGHTS
48

“Thank You, Father Kim Il Sung” 

illustrates the need for concerted 

action to address the widespread 

denial of basic human rights in 

North Korea and to seek effective 

solutions for North Koreans seek-

ing refuge in China. This study 

also confirms that the human 

rights and humanitarian disas-

ters perpetuated by the DPRK 

government profoundly threaten 

security on the Korean peninsula. 

North Korea: Commission 

Study Provides Evidence 

of Severe Religious 

Freedom Violations

The Commission Study

The international community is growing ac-

customed to reports of government imposed excess 

and horror from the Democratic People’s Republic 

of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), including reports 

of extensive prison camps, the arbitrary detention of 

dissidents extending to three and four generations 

of their families, forced abortions, and people beat-

en down by constant suspicion, propaganda, and 

violence. Yet, concrete documentary evidence of hu-

man rights violations in North Korea is scarce, par-

ticularly testimony about violations of the freedom 
49

of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. It is only recently that interviews with former 

North Koreans are being undertaken by human rights researchers in any systematic way. 

In an attempt to address this dearth of information, the Commission undertook a 

study in 2005 to gain a more tangible understanding of conditions for human rights, particularly religious freedom, inside North Korea. The resulting report, entitled Thank You, 

Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea, was published in November 2005. The study was conducted by David Hawk, veteran human rights expert and author of the study The Hidden 

Gulag: Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps. The Commission also employed two respected 

academics, Jae Won Chun and Philo Kim, to manage the study’s progress in South Korea. 

Through in-depth interviews with North Koreans who have fled their country, the study 

allowed former North Koreans to speak openly about conditions in North Korea. It also 

offered historical and comparative analysis to help define the nature and scope of religious 

freedom abuses over the past 50 years. 

Forty former North Koreans were interviewed extensively regarding conditions of 

freedom of religion or belief in North Korea. Thank You, Father Kim Il Sung reports on the 

forceful suppression of North Korea’s once vibrant religious and intellectual life, the establishment of a quasi-religious cult of personality centered on Kim Il Sung and his son Kim 

Jong Il, and the survival of very limited religious activity in North Korea. The former North 

Koreans offer trenchant testimony on the role and character of the Kim Jong Il government 

and the extent to which it controls the thoughts and beliefs of the North Korean people. The 

thick curtain of secrecy that has shrouded the “hermit kingdom” was thus pulled back—if 

only a bit—by the testimony of former North Koreans. 

“Thank you, Father Kim Il Sung” is the first phrase North Korean parents are instructed to teach to their children. From cradle to grave, North Korean citizens are surrounded by the all-encompassing presence of the “Great Leader” and his son, the “Dear 

Leader” Kim Jong Il. The Kim dynasty is much more than an authoritarian government; 

it also holds itself out as the ultimate source of power, virtue, spiritual wisdom, and truth 

for the North Korean people. Heterodoxy and dissent are repressed, quickly and efficiently, 

with punishments meted out to successive generations of the dissident’s family. In this environment, it is hard to imagine any independent religious belief or practice surviving openly 

unless it serves the government’s larger purpose. 

Eliminate Religious Adherence: a Deliberate Policy of the North 

Korean Regime

From its inception, the brutal suppression of religious activity and rival systems of 

thought and belief was a systematic policy of the DPRK government. In the early twentieth 

century, religious life flourished in North Korea. In fact, religious organizations provided 

the key organizational links in the fight against Japanese colonialism. Thus, it is not surprising that religious groups were viewed as one of the chief political competitors of Kim 

Il Sung’s Korean Workers Party. When Kim Il Sung came to power, religious adherents and 

their families were labeled as “counter-revolutionary elements” and targeted for repression. Recalling his policies to diminish the power of religion in North Korea, Kim Il Sung 

admitted that: 

NORTH KOREA: COMMISSION STUDY PROVIDES EVIDENCE OF SEVERE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM VIOLATIONS
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We [could not] turn into a Communist society along with the religious people. 

Therefore, we purged the key leaders above the rank of deacons in Protestant 

or Catholic churches and the wicked among the rest were put on trial. The 

general religious people were...put into prison camps [and given a chance to 

reform].... We learned later that those of religion can do away with their old 

habits only after they have been killed.1

After Kim Il Sung consolidated his hold on power, North Korean officials stratified 

society on the basis of family background and perceived loyalty to the state. Religious adherents who remained in North Korea, as well as their descendents, were eventually classified on the lowest strata of this complex system of 51 social categories, receiving fewer privileges and opportunities in such areas as education and employment. An extensive report 

by Amnesty International in 2003 details evidence that persons in lower categories have, in 

some cases, been forcibly relocated to remote and desolate areas of the country and then 

systematically denied access to food aid and left to starve. Those in the lowest strata were 

deemed the “irredeemables” who gained the implacable hostility of the state and unyielding 

harassment of the security forces.2

 Thus, it is not surprising that only a few interviewees report first-hand awareness of religious activity in Kim Il Sung’s DPRK. They may remember 

a few religious structures in Pyongyang and clandestine religious activity by a small remnant of believers—but these latter recollections are mostly of suspicion, fear, and death. 

In the most unique and compelling part of the study, the persons interviewed testified 

to the total veneration of the Kim family and the institutionalization of the Juche ideology. 

Schooled as they were from birth to venerate Kim Il Sung and his son Kim Jong Il, these 

interviewees often expressed astonishment that anyone in North Korea would practice a 

belief-system challenging the reigning cult of personality. The religious cult around the 

Kims touches every individual and every province in the DPRK. Students are required to 

memorize the “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System of the 

Party,” and every North Korean is expected to attend one or more of an estimated 450,000 

“Kim Il Sung Revolutionary Research Centers” at least weekly for instruction, inspiration, 

and self-criticism.3

It is now known that every home in the country has a portrait of the “Great Leader” 

Kim Il Sung and the “Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il. Inspectors visit homes to hand out fines 

and admonishments if the portraits are not well kept. Every government building and subway car displays the two portraits, and every adult citizen wears a button of Kim Il Sung. 

Movies and propaganda constantly proclaim the blessings bestowed on them by the two 

Kims.4

 The veneration required is so complete that the former North Koreans interviewed 

for this report did not believe that religious activity was permitted because, among other 

reasons, it would be perceived as a threat to the government’s authority. 

Religious activity survives nonetheless, whether in government approved religious 

organizations operating a handful of places of worship in Pyongyang or in more clandestine 

venues. In recent years, the government has formed several “religious federations” to interface with co-religionists abroad. Three churches, two Protestant and one Catholic, were 

opened in Pyongyang between 1988 and 1992. Only a few interviewees were even aware of 

these churches, and even they believed that these churches operated as showcases for foreign visitors. However, according to South Korean religious leaders conducting exchanges 

with North Korea, these religious venues are open weekly and some genuine religious practice does take place among North Koreans at the churches. There are also reportedly three 
51

Buddhist temples and a Chondokyo shrine in Pyongyang. Although some of the interviewees had seen or were aware of Buddhist temples in North Korea, none had seen religious 

practice in these temples. 

The study provides interesting evidence that some North Koreans are testing prohibitions against religious activity. Fortune-telling, a remnant of Korean Shamanism, is re-surfacing. Several of those interviewed for this study claim that faith in the “Dear Leader” is 

not as strong as it was before the famine of the 1990s, having been shaken by the crushing 

economic and other deprivations in North Korea. The Commission’s study reveals that Kim 

Jong Il fears that cross-border contacts will puncture the hermetic seal that he has tried, 

with considerable success, to place around North Korea—the seal that preserves the Kim 

dynasty and its “divinity.” Anything that casts doubt on the beneficence or omnipotence of 

the “Dear Leader” has to be repressed. That is why there is renewed government interest in 

ensuring that North Koreans coming back from China are not “infected” either by South 

Korean democracy or any form of religious belief. As one interviewee explained after her 

encounter with North Korean border guards, the DPRK government fears that “Juche will 

be toppled by Christianity.” 

All of those interviewed left North Korea through China. They fled due to persecution, disillusionment, hunger, and severe deprivation. Refugees have flooded across the 

border with China for the past decade. Even after the famine eased a few years ago, an 

estimated 30,000 to 100,000 North Korean refugees still remain in China. Under the terms 

of an agreement with North Korea, the Chinese government considers all such refugees to 

be economic migrants who are subject to forcible repatriation. Moreover, the North Korean authorities consider migration illegal, and returnees are subject to harassment, arrest, 

imprisonment, and often torture. New laws have eased penalties for “economic crimes,” 

but there is growing evidence that North Koreans repatriated from China are interrogated to determine if they have converted to Christianity or had contact with South Korean 

Christians. If they answer affirmatively, they may face lengthy prison terms with hard labor, 

among other punishments. 

Thank You, Father Kim Il Sung illustrates the need for concerted action to address the 

widespread denial of basic human rights in North Korea and to seek effective solutions for 

North Koreans seeking refuge in China. This study also confirms that the human rights and 

humanitarian disasters perpetuated by the DPRK government profoundly threaten security 

on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, as regional powers grapple with the DPRK’s nuclear 

aspirations, human rights objectives should not be given short shrift. Negotiations to end 

nuclear proliferation should include issues such as family reunification, abductions, ruleof-law development, market reforms, needs-based food distribution, economic development and protections for religious freedom and other human rights. Pursuing both nuclear 

and human security is not mutually exclusive. In fact, examples of dual-track diplomacy 

can be found in both Soviet-American and Chinese-American relations.

North Koreans have suffered through five decades of failed social, economic, and 

political policies, as well as grave human rights abuses. The extent of the depredation is 

staggering. This study provides compelling evidence of the systematic denigration of religious life in North Korea and of ongoing abuses of the freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief. It also shows how religious freedom concerns are linked directly to the 

other human rights and security concerns that have dominated international attention. This 

study thus sheds further light on the often perplexing situation in North Korea, offers some 

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insight into the daily lives of ordinary North Koreans, and raises international awareness of 

the appalling human rights situation faced by North Koreans in the DPRK and in China. 

The Study’s Findings

For a summary of religious freedom conditions in North Korea, as well as Commission recommendations for U.S. policy, see the country chapter on Korea, People’s Democratic Republic of, in this report.

North Korean Law and Practice Restricting Freedom of Religion

■ Although the North Korean government has formally subscribed to international standards with regard to freedom of religion or belief through its accession to 

international human rights treaties, based on the information gathered for this 

report, it is evident that the DPRK government has committed—and continues 

to commit—severe human rights violations in this area.

■ Article 68 of the DPRK Constitution states that “citizens have freedom of religious beliefs.” However, despite the DPRK government’s assertion to the UN 

Human Rights Committee that there are no limitations on religious practice, Article 68 also has provisions on “drawing in foreign forces” and “harming the state 

or social order,” provisions that could lead to potentially severe limitations that 

could easily result in the arbitrary application of the constitutional provision on 

“freedom of religious beliefs.”

■ Article 67 of the DPRK Constitution provides for “freedom of speech, of the 

press, demonstration and association.” However, as is the case with “freedom 

of religious beliefs,” these freedoms are seriously—if not entirely—limited and 

circumscribed by other constitutional provisions, including that “the State shall 

adhere to the class line, strengthen the dictatorship of people’s democracy”; “the 

State shall oppose the cultural infiltration of imperialism”; and “the State shall 

eliminate the way of life inherited from the outmoded society and establish a new 

socialist way of life in every sphere.”

■ Those interviewed for this study claimed that there are four mutually reinforcing 

reasons for the lack of religious freedom in North Korea:

● the intensive and continuous anti-religious propaganda by the government;

● the banning of religious activity, as revealed in the fact that none of the interviewees was aware of any authorized religious activity inside North Korea;

● the severe persecution of persons caught engaging in religious activity, which most 

interviewees had either heard about or personally witnessed; and

● the fact that Juche, the official state ideology of Kim Il Sung Revolutionary Thought, 

was the only officially permitted system of thought or belief in North Korea.
53

The Institutionalization of Juche Ideology: Anti-Religious 

Propaganda and Veneration of the Kim Family

■ Article 3 of the DPRK Constitution sets out the guiding role for Juche as an official system of thought or belief. Kim Jong Il, as a precursor to his succession, 

merged the Juche ideology with the ideology of Kim Il Sung known officially as 

“Kimilsungism.” This merged ideology is presented by the state as a “monolithic” 

or “unitary” ideological system, and it is the basis for the cult of personality, pre1945 Japanese-style “emperor worship,” or semi-deification that surrounds the 

memory of North Korea’s Great Leader, Kim Il Sung. 

■ According to those interviewed, North Korean propaganda continually portrays 

religion as “opium”—the term used by virtually all of the interviewees. Television programs also regularly denigrate religion. North Koreans are exposed to 

this anti-religious propaganda in youth groups, political education sessions, and 

neighborhood or workplace study groups where attendance is mandatory. These 

sessions included indoctrination on the principles of Juche/Kimilsungism as a religious ideology to the exclusion of other religious beliefs and practices.

■ Virtually all interviewees described the life-long system of ideological propagation and indoctrination. This starts with children learning to say “Thank you 

father Kim Il Sung” when learning to talk, and continues with ongoing, mandatory adult education classes in the workplace or in shrine-like “Kim Il Sung Revolutionary Idea Institutes,” “Study Halls,” or “Research rooms. The institutions are 

described as venues for education and for veneration of the Kim family and its 

political philosophy. Interviewees describe the experience as “solemn,” “divine,” 

and “holier than the churches of South Korea.” The interviewees also reported 

that the formal “studies” are supplemented by other forms of Workers Party control and education efforts, particularly Party-led weekly, obligatory small group 

discussions, held either at work or in residential neighborhoods through which 

the population would be kept on the correct path of revolutionary thought. 

Awareness of or Participation in Religious Activities

■ Most respondents said that they had never seen or encountered any religious activity, places of worship, religious literature, or clerical officials prior to fleeing to 

China. Some were aware of former Buddhist temples or shrines in the mountains 

that were preserved as “cultural relics,” but to their knowledge there were no Buddhist monks or worship practiced at these places. A few interviewees had knowledge of religion because their parents or grandparents had been believers, and 

they remembered it from their childhood. Many more knew of religion from the 

anti-religious propaganda at school or from the North Korean state-controlled 

media. Others knew of religious activity from witnessing or hearing about the 

public executions of religious believers. 

Alternative Systems of Thought or Belief

■ The interviews revealed the widespread re-emergence in North Korea of a remnant element of Shamanism, the ancient pan-Asiatic animistic belief system: 

“fortune telling,” or the belief that one’s destiny or fate is not under one’s own 

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control (as in Juche), but lies in the stars or other natural phenomena. All the 

persons interviewed described fortune telling as an illegal activity. However, all 

said it was much too widespread for the authorities to eliminate it, and that even 

North Korean officials utilized the services of fortune tellers. Many interviewees 

associated the re-emergence of fortune telling with the onset of the famine and 

the severe deterioration in social conditions in the mid-1990s. 

■ Only a handful of persons interviewed had ever heard about the three—soon to 

be four—Christian churches that operate in Pyongyang. Nor had any interviewees heard about or encountered any of the 500 “house churches” or home worship services that the DPRK has claimed in its reports to the UN are operational 

in North Korea. With one exception, the interviewees simply did not believe that 

such activities were permitted by the authorities.

■ On the basis of the information obtained through this study, it is not possible to 

corroborate claims about the existence of a substantial underground Christian 

church in the DPRK. Fully half of the interviewees said simply “no” when asked if 

they had ever seen or encountered underground churches or non-recognized, unofficial religious activities in North Korea. Others also replied “no,” but then went 

on to describe acts of persecution against religious believers or those involved in 

presumed religious activity, such as the possession of a Bible. Only two interviewees said they were aware of an unofficial or underground church network. 

Penalties for Religious Activity

■ Two interviewees provided graphic and detailed eyewitness testimony of the summary executions of individuals accused of engaging in unauthorized religious activities. Another interviewee said that her brother was executed for involvement 

in such activities, but that she had not personally witnessed the execution. One 

additional interviewee had heard of executions of North Koreans involved in unauthorized religious activities, and as a police official had been involved in two 

separate cases resulting in the arrest of eleven individuals accused of involvement 

in such religious activities. Of the eleven arrested, two died during interrogation; 

the interviewee believed that the other nine had been executed. Others mentioned executions they had heard about but had not witnessed themselves.

■ Several interviewees described instances where possession of a Bible or other religious text was an offense punishable by imprisonment or execution. One interviewee, imprisoned following repatriation to North Korea, met a fellow prisoner 

who was imprisoned because a Bible had been found in his home. 

Religious Persecution along the North Korean-Chinese Border

■ Despite international human rights agreements that provide for the freedom to 

leave one’s country of origin, leaving North Korea without the authorization of 

the DPRK authorities is a violation of the North Korean penal code. Despite the 

UN’s contention that these North Koreans in China should be considered refugees, the Chinese police regularly apprehend large numbers of them and forcibly 

repatriate them back to the DPRK, in violation of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
55

■ Following sometimes extremely brutal interrogation by North Korean police officials, repatriated North Koreans are apparently sent in large numbers to the jipkyulso misdemeanor level provincial incarceration facilities, and to shorter-term 

small, local mobile labor detention facilities. 

■ From interviewee responses it can be determined that religion is a factor in the 

process of interrogation and meting out punishment. One interviewee reported 

that while detained following repatriation from China, six other detainees were 

sent to a prison camp for political prisoners after confessing that they were “followers of Jesus.” Another interviewee reported that he was severely beaten upon 

repatriation from China because, after repeated questioning, he admitted to 

studying in a Korean-Chinese church. 

■ Two-thirds of the interviewees had been forcibly repatriated from China. Virtually all of these interviewees report that after being asked preliminary questions 

about how they had fled to China, where they had crossed the border, and where 

they went and what they did in China, they were specifically asked (1) if they 

had attended Korean-Chinese churches, and (2) if they had had any contact with 

South Koreans in China (some of whom are representatives of religious organizations doing charitable and humanitarian work in the border area). Contact with 

Korean-Chinese believers, and, more certainly, contact with South Koreans is 

considered a political offense. Several of the interviewees described the ways they 

had been persecuted as a result of their contacts with churches in China.

Existing Religious Life in North Korea

■ By the 1960s, the King Il Sung regime had suppressed and eliminated virtually all 

public observance of religion, substituting Juche/Kimilsungism in its place. However, due to a changed international environment in the 1970s, the regime decided to allow the re-emergence of a highly circumscribed and controlled public 

religious practice. It is this revival of highly circumscribed and tightly monitored 

and controlled religious practice, organized and supervised through a series of 

religious “federations” for Buddhism, Chondokyo, and Protestant, Catholic and, 

most recently, Orthodox Christianity, that is cited by DPRK authorities to indicate that North Korea respects religious freedom.

■ Religious believers inside North Korea today generally fit into one of three general categories: 1) People who participate in the officially sanctioned religious 

federations and who are described as “old society, pre-WWII” religious adherents and their children; 2) pre-WWII religious adherents who, along with their 

children, worship clandestinely outside of the officially sanctioned system; and 

3) religious adherents who maintain religious beliefs in secret, but who acquired 

these beliefs from exposure to co-religionists in China, either by crossing the 

border themselves or through correspondence with others who cross the border 

and return. Persons in category three are not tolerated.

■ This study reveals that the two Protestant churches and one Catholic church in 

Pyongyang, while under tight control of the government, are able to conduct some 

genuine religious activities. Worshipers at these churches as of 2005 are mostly 

old society, pre-WWII Christians and their children who use this opportunity to 

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profess their faith openly and worship in the presence of other believers. These 

churches have, at least since 1995, held activities regularly, although under consistent government monitoring. Membership in, and attendance at, the churches in 

Pyongyang are controlled by the Korean Workers Party, and there is reportedly a 

lengthy waiting list.

■ South Koreans and others interviewed for this study reported on their visits to 

eight officially sanctioned “house churches” in North Korea, including five in 

Pyongyang, one in Kaesong, one in Sungchon, and one in South Hwanghae Province. Attendees at these gatherings were consistently identified as old-generation Christians and their children who gather to pray, read scriptures, and sing 

hymns, often from memory. The number of officially sanctioned house churches 

in North Korea could not be verified in the course of this study.

■ There are no Roman Catholic priests in North Korea, and the one Catholic church 

in the country has no direct relationship with the Vatican.

■ Leaders of the Chondokyo religion in South Korea state that while it is possible 

to study the religion at Kim Il Sung University, there is no freedom to propagate 

Chondokyo beliefs in North Korea. The number of Chondokyo adherents and 

“preaching rooms” could not be confirmed from the information gathered for 

this study.

■ Many of the interviewees knew of the existence of some of the more famous 

mountain-top Buddhist temples in North Korea, but surmised that these temples were maintained as “cultural heritage sites.” None had seen a temple open 

for public religious activities or for residence of Buddhist monks. The extent to 

which worship, study, and meditation is carried out at Buddhist temples could 

not be ascertained during the course of this study.

■ Despite North Korean government assertions that the state and religion are separate, religious activities in the DPRK are clearly under the auspices of governmentsponsored religious federations that could more accurately be described as emanations of the North Korean party-state. The religious activity that is allowed takes 

place under the authority and control of the corresponding religious federation. 

The religious federations are members of, and controlled by, the National United 

Front for the Unification of the Fatherland, which is in turn controlled by the Korean Workers Party, the ruling arm of the regime. Under the federation structure, 

there is no apparent mechanism, procedure, or structure for allowing belief systems 

and forms of worship that are not covered by an appropriate federation. 

■ Interaction between North Korea federation churches and churches in South Korea is used as a medium of Korean reconciliation. Religious interaction between 

North Koreans and religious adherents outside North Korea that takes place outside of the supervision of the religious federations is not permitted.

1 Goh Tae Woo, Bukhanui jonggyo jeongchaek (North Korea’s Policies on Religion), Minjokmunhwasa, 1989, pp. 79-80. 2

 Kee Hang Gu, “Bukhaniu jonggyo tanapgwa sing-ang saenghwal,” (Religious Repression and Religious Life in North Korea), in 

Hyeonsil chojeom (Reality Focus), 1990 Summer Issue, p. 111.

3

 Philo Kim, “New Religious Policy and the State of Religious Freedom in North Korea,” paper given at 5th International Conference 

on North Korean Human Rights & Refugees, February 29—March 1, 2004, Warsaw Poland. 

4

 Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty, (St. Martins Press, 2004).
IRFA and the U.S. Refugee and 

Asylum Programs

Overview of the Commission’s Work with 

Refugee, Asylum and Immigration Issues

As stated in the preamble of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA): 

The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very 

origin and existence of the United States. Many of 

our nation’s founders fled religious persecution 

abroad, cherishing in their hearts and minds the ideal of religious freedom...From its birth to this day, 

the United States has prized this legacy of religious 

freedom and honored this heritage by standing for 

religious freedom and offering refuge to those suffering religious persecution.

Working with the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and 

Homeland Security, as well as 

the U.S. Congress, the Commission had several accomplishments 

in the refugee, asylum, and immigration fields in the past year.

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58

Consistent with the language in these principles, Title VI of IRFA included several provisions related to asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants, with particular attention to those 

individuals who have fled—or committed—severe violations of religious freedom. Title VI 

also authorized the Commission to conduct a major study of the impact of a new U.S. immigration procedure established in 1996 called “expedited removal” on asylum seekers.

As part of its monitoring of the implementation of Title VI of IRFA, the Commission 

has concluded that implementation of some of the training and reporting provisions of 

Title VI has resulted in a heightened awareness of religious persecution issues among relevant decision-makers and adjudicators. Other training and operational provisions, however, remain unimplemented—nearly eight years after IRFA’s enactment. The Commission 

continues to urge the State Department and other relevant agencies to implement completely IRFA’s Title VI provisions, and welcomes remarks in November 2005 by the Chair 

and Ranking Members of the House Subcommittee on International Operations, Human 

Rights, and Africa on the need for greater congressional oversight in this area. 

Working with the U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security, as well 

as the U.S. Congress, the Commission had several accomplishments in the refugee, asylum, 

and immigration fields in the past year.

■ In February 2006, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff appointed a Senior 

Refugee and Asylum Policy Advisor, a move he indicated was in response to a key recommendation of the Commission’s report on the expedited removal process (see below).

■ Congress included a provision in the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 

(P.L. 108-333) implementing a policy recommendation of the Commission that the 

U.S. Refugee Program provide—in its annual report to Congress—descriptions of 

how access to the Program is facilitated for those who flee “countries of particular 

concern,” or CPCs, whose governments perpetrate systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom.

■ Congress renewed the Specter Amendment, adopting a Commission recommendation to promote consistent adjudications by the U.S. Refugee Program for 

members of religious minorities from Iran (P.L. 109-102).

■ The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, citing evidence provided by 

the Commission, reversed their positions in the case of Li v. Gonzales before the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, leading to the vacating of a decision by the 

Court. The Commission had expressed its concern that the original decision by the 

Fifth Circuit adopted arguments by the Department of Justice (DOJ) that contradicted 

international human rights law and undermined U.S. human rights policy, which has 

opposed China’s criminalization of unregistered religious activity.

■ Senators Joseph Lieberman and Sam Brownback introduced legislation—to be 

known as the Safe and Secure Detention and Asylum Act of 2006—to implement 

many of the recommendations of the Commission’s study on expedited removal.

■ The Commission conducted trainings on international religious freedom issues for 

U.S. government officials with roles in the asylum and refugee adjudication processes, 

including the Office of Immigration Litigation in the DOJ, the Immigration Judges and 

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) at the Executive Office for Immigration Review in the DOJ, the Refugee Corps of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
59

in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Overseas Processing Entities 

under contract with the Department of State to prepare refugee applications overseas.

Li v. Gonzales: Commission Cooperates with Department of 

Justice on Asylum Matter to Correct Inaccurate Depiction of 

Religious Freedom Issues in China 

The Commission does not intervene in individual asylum cases. However, over the 

last year, the Commission has worked with the DOJ to respond to the concerns expressed by 

the Commission in one particularly problematic case, Li v. Gonzales, before the U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Commission wrote the DOJ in this matter because the 

position argued by the DOJ was at odds with efforts to advance freedom of religion or belief 

in China by the President, the Secretary of State, and the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. 

In this case, the Fifth Circuit, deferring to arguments advanced by the DOJ, misconstrued 

religious freedom conditions in China, as well as international human rights law. The U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in August 2005 in Li v. Gonzales to uphold the order to 

remove a Chinese man who had been arrested, beaten, fired, and charged with the “crime” of 

organizing an unregistered house church in China. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit ruled that 

Mr. Li had been subject to prosecution for failing to register his church—not persecuted on the 

basis of his religious beliefs. The Fifth Circuit held, deferring to arguments advanced by the DOJ 

and adopted earlier in the case by the BIA, that China has the “sovereign right” to regulate unregistered religions, and that China’s treatment of unregistered churches is an issue for “moral 

judgment—not a legal one.” Subsequently, the Commission wrote to and met with officials at the 

DOJ to make clear that the Chinese government’s control over registered churches—and its prosecution of individuals for engaging in “unauthorized” religious activity—are clearly in violation 

of international law with regard to freedom of religion or belief.

On November 1, 2005, the Fifth Circuit vacated the decision after the DOJ, citing the 

letter written by the Commission, changed its position on removing Mr. Li to China. 

U.S. foreign policy toward China and other authoritarian regimes has been clear on 

this point: it is not permissible under international law to criminalize religious activity on 

the sole basis that such activity is “unregistered” or “unauthorized.” Section 3 of IRFA explicitly defines arbitrary religious registration requirements as a “violation of the internationally recognized right to religious freedom.” As a precedent, Li v. Gonzales would have 

undermined the international leadership of the United States in protecting asylum seekers 

and advancing the right to freedom of religion or belief in China. 

The Fifth Circuit’s order to vacate ensures that the original decision in Li v Gonzales 

cannot be cited as legal precedent to remove other asylum seekers accused of participating in 

the “crime” of unregistered religious activity. Had the decision been allowed to stand as precedent, it could have seriously limited the ability of the United States to protect religious adherents fleeing the increasing tendency in certain countries to criminalize unregistered religious 

activity, countries that include China, Belarus, Burma, Eritrea, and Vietnam, among others.

To prevent a recurrence of the Li case, the Commission has recommended enhanced 

training on freedom of religion and greater coordination between the departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security. Sections 602 and 603 of IRFA require training on religious persecution issues for immigration judges, asylum and refugee officers, and immigration officers 

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60

exercising expedited removal authority. The Li case demonstrates the desirability of extending 

such training to the BIA attorneys in the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) at the DOJ, 

as well as immigration trial attorneys at the DHS. Following the Li case, the Commission was 

invited to participate in such trainings by the BIA and OIL. The Commission urges that such 

trainings become a regular part of their training curricula, and that DHS follow suit for its immigration court attorneys. Indeed, in response to section 603 of IRFA, the DHS has already developed a training program on religious freedom issues for its asylum officer corps. This training 

should be extended to DHS trial attorneys as well.

In addition, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security have long required 

that all asylum applications be forwarded to the Office of Asylum and Country Reports in 

the Department of State. At its option (generally when it concludes that the case involves 

issues not adequately covered in its human rights reports), the Department of State replies 

with an assessment on the extent to which the claim is consistent with country conditions. 

Asylum officers and immigration judges also may request specific comments regarding individual cases or types of claims under consideration. Such consultations with the Department of State, however, have not been undertaken after the Immigration Judge or the BIA 

has reached a decision on the matter. Consultations with the Department of State on the 

depiction of country conditions by the immigration judge or the BIA prior to litigation in the 

federal courts will help ensure that the description of country conditions and the positions 

taken by DOJ on appeal are consistent with U.S. policy on matters of international human 

rights law. Such a procedure could help prevent the DOJ from spending its litigation resources on defending positions—as it did in Li—which contradict U.S. human rights policy.

The Commission continues to monitor developments in asylum case law for consistency with the principles of religious freedom and other human rights, and has raised additional concerns with the DOJ concerning more recent asylum claims from China and Iraq.

Study on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal, as Authorized by 

Section 605 of IRFA

In addition to several refugee and asylum provisions specifically related to those who fled 

religious persecution, IRFA also authorized the Commission to appoint experts to conduct a study 

to determine whether certain legislative changes to immigration, enacted in 1996, were impairing 

America’s obligation—and founding tradition—of offering refuge to those suffering persecution. 

That study, entitled Report on Asylum Seeks in Expedited Removal and released in February 2005, 

examined how the new immigration procedure—known as “expedited removal”—was affecting 

asylum seekers, regardless of whether or not the claim was based on religion, race, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 

As the Commission reported last year, the study found that expedited removal, a process 

implemented in 1997 to “expeditiously remove” certain improperly documented aliens without 

a hearing, was intended by Congress to protect the integrity of our borders while also protecting 

bona fide asylum seekers. The study, however, identified serious implementing flaws that place 

legitimate asylum seekers at risk of being returned to countries where they may face persecution. 

The study also found that bona fide asylum seekers were almost certain to be detained inappropriately by the DHS under jail-like conditions and in actual jails. In some facilities, asylum seekers 

slept alongside convicted criminals or criminal aliens awaiting deportation. Since the release of 

the study, the DHS has expanded expedited removal to cover the entire perimeter of the United 

States, yet has not corrected any of the flaws identified that place those asylum seekers at risk. 
61

While identifying these problems and urging the Departments of Justice and Homeland 

Security to take corrective measures, the study also noted that there was no individual at the 

DHS—outside of the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary—with authority to coordinate such reforms among the three agencies within the Department. These agencies, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and Citizenship and Immigration Services, 

did not report to the Secretary through a unified chain of command, and no official had the 

authority to coordinate policy across the three entities. The study urged the appointment of an 

official with authority to coordinate refugee and asylum matters across the three agencies.

When meeting with the Commission in April 2005, Secretary Chertoff indicated that 

he had already planned to establish a Policy Department at DHS with coordinating authority, and agreed to appoint a Senior Refugee and Asylum Advisor within that Department. 

In February 2006, the DHS announced the appointment. The Commission has urged that 

the Advisor act quickly to consider the findings and implement the recommendations of 

the Commission’s study. 

In January 2006, the U.S. Attorney General announced a comprehensive review of the immigration court system. Commission staff and study experts have met with the leadership of 

the review team to advise them on the concerns raised by the study on the uneven treatment of 

asylum seekers who appear before immigration judges. The Commission hopes that these initiatives are the first step toward improving the expedited removal process to ensure that it works 

as intended—namely, to secure U.S. borders without undermining the national commitment to 

protecting those who flee severe violations of religious freedom and other human rights.

While none of the recommendations of the study require legislation to be implemented, 

in April 2006, Senators Lieberman and Brownback introduced the “Safe and Secure Detention and Asylum Act of 2006,” which would implement many of the study’s recommendations 

relating to expedited removal and detention. In addition, in June 2005, the American Immigration Lawyers Association presented the Commission and its expedited removal study team 

with the Arthur C. Helton Award for the Advancement of Human Rights, in recognition of 

the accomplishments of the Commission’s study on expedited removal.

Access to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for those who have 

Fled Severe Violations of Religious Freedom

The Commission has repeatedly urged that the U.S. Refugee Program be made more 

accessible for refugee applicants who have fled severe abuses of religious freedom, particularly 

those who have fled CPCs. The Commission has been joined in this call by the Congress, 

which enacted a provision in the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 requiring that the 

President, in his annual report on proposed refugee admissions pursuant to section 207(d) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act, include information about specific measures taken to 

facilitate access to the U.S. Refugee Program for individuals from each CPC.1

 This information was included for the first time in the Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2006 

Report to Congress, which was released in August 2005. 

The Congress also renewed for fiscal year 2006 the Specter Amendment, which provides relief to religious minority refugee applicants from Iran by clarifying the adjudication 

standards specific to their claims.2

 The Commission recommends that Congress and the 

President continue to extend the Specter Amendment until the government of Iran ceases 

to engage in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom.

IRFA and the U.S. Refugee and Asylum Programs
2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

62

The United States has the largest program in the world to interview and process refugees in third countries for resettlement, with an authorized ceiling (for fiscal year 2006) of 

up to 70,000 refugee admissions. With more than 9 million refugees in the world, however, 

access to the U.S. refugee program is tightly controlled, to the extent that—for every year 

since 1991—the refugee admissions level has been undersubscribed by 5,000 refugees or 

more. Refugees overseas may not submit an application to the Refugee Program unless they 

are referred by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), or unless they belong 

to a specific group which has been deemed a “processing priority” by the Secretary of State. 

In theory, U.S. embassies may also refer cases to the refugee program for resettlement, but 

such referrals are an insignificant percentage of the overall caseload. 

Since the release of its 2005 Annual Report, the Commission has called upon the Department of State to facilitate access for certain specific groups, including Afghan Hindus 

under threat of imminent deportation from Germany, ChaldoAssyrian Christians, Mandaeans, Yazidis and other religious minorities who fled targeted violence in Iraq, and Sudanese Christians who, due to the severity of past persecution or special vulnerabilities, will 

be unlikely candidates for voluntary repatriation. The Department of State has not yet acted 

on or responded to these recommendations, and the Commission renews its call that access to the U.S. Refugee Program be facilitated for members of these groups. Other groups 

that may warrant consideration include Jehovah’s Witnesses from Eritrea who have fled to 

Sudan, as well as ethnic and religious minorities from Burma—such as Chin and Karen 

Christians and Rohingya Muslims—who have no realistic hope of imminent integration 

into countries of first asylum or safe and voluntary repatriation to Burma.

U.S. Inter-agency Disagreement Hampering Protection for Many 

Who Fled Religious Persecution

The Commission is concerned that it has become more difficult for legitimate asylum seekers who flee CPCs to gain access to the Refugee Program. Specifically, a legislative 

development in the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act (as amended in 2005 by the REAL ID Act) has 

inadvertently become a barrier for refugees and asylum seekers who have fled religious 

persecution at the hands of terrorists and terrorist regimes.3

 Essentially, an alien is now 

held inadmissible if he or she provides any in-kind or monetary assistance (i.e., “material 

support”) to any group that advocates, conspires to commit, or commits an illegal act of 

violence, even if such support is provided under duress, or is directed toward a group supported by the U.S. government. 

As an example of how this provision has affected efforts to resettle refugees fleeing 

religious persecution, in 2005, the U.S. Refugee Program launched a cooperative effort with 

UNHCR to resettle 9,500 Burmese Chin Christian refugees in Malaysia and in the Tham 

Hin Camp in Thailand. This operation, as well as the processing of a number of Vietnamese 

Montagnard refugees in Cambodia, has been suspended indefinitely because applications 

from these refugee applicants—who fled countries which have been designated by the Secretary of State as CPCs— have been held in abeyance by the DHS because the Administration has yet to make a decision on the application of the material support bar. 

The Departments of Justice, State, and Homeland Security may waive the material 

support bar under certain circumstances. After four years of placing refugee cases on indefinite hold, however, the Administration has not yet developed any policy or taken any 

action on such waivers. 
63

Individuals who have voluntarily supported foreign terrorist organizations, such 

as those designated by the Secretary of State under section 219 of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act, should certainly be excluded from the United States. However, denying 

refugees admission to the United States because they were physically forced against their 

will to assist a terrorist organization, or because they provided inconsequential support to 

organizations which oppose particularly repressive regimes, is not only undermining the 

international leadership of the United States in the field of human rights, it is endangering 

the lives of innocent refugees who have fled terror or repression.

The Commission urges the Administration and Congress to resolve this impasse 

without further delay. Bona fide refugees such as the Burmese Chin and the Montagnards 

from Vietnam should not continue to be barred from the United States if they represent no 

genuine security threat.

Problems in Implementation of Title VI of IRFA

The Commission remains concerned that the refugee, asylum, and immigration provisions of IRFA continue to be under-implemented by the Departments of State and Homeland Security. Each of these concerns is detailed below. 

Training Consular Officers in Refugee and Asylum Adjudications 

and Human Rights, Particularly Religious Freedom 

Section 602 of IRFA mandates training on the U.S. Refugee Program for consular officers. 

However, the training of State Department consular officers in the Refugee Program continues to 

fall short of the IRFA requirements in that the training concentrates on only one narrow aspect of 

the Refugee Program.4

 Although consular officers do not adjudicate refugee applications, they are 

authorized to refer individuals in need of protection to the Refugee Program. Such referrals rarely 

take place. A recent report by Professor David Martin at the University of Virginia, commissioned 

by the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, recommended that 

the Department provide new Foreign Service officers with more systematic instruction on refugee and humanitarian programs and on the specific opportunities and procedures for referrals.5

Further, the Commission’s Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal noted concern over 

evidence that it may be increasingly difficult for refugees and asylum seekers to obtain protection 

in the United States, and called for a study on the extent to which consular officers are trained in 

the Refugee Program, as is required by IRFA, and on the impact such training is having on referrals made by U.S. embassies to the Refugee Program.

IRFA Procedural Requirements Relating to the U.S. Refugee 

Admissions Program

Section 602 of IRFA also contains other requirements for the U.S. Refugee Program. 

Among these are the requirement that the State Department establish uniform procedures 

for overseas processing entities, which prepare, under contract with the Department, the 

applications of individuals seeking refugee status, as well as for personnel responsible for 

preparing refugee case files for refugee adjudications. 

Although the State Department has made progress in complying with this provision 

by developing a “Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System” (WRAPS) to promote 

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uniformity in the preparation of refugee case files, WRAPS does not provide any substantive 

guidance in two central aspects of the preparation of refugee case files: the preparation of each 

refugee applicant’s persecution story and the filing of requests for reconsideration of refugee 

applications that are denied. 

In the Commission’s 2004 Annual Report, it was noted that the State Department’s 

Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau had expressed its intention to establish a 

working group on overseas processing entities. Professor David Martin, in the paper commissioned by the Department, also recommended that such a group develop guidelines 

consistent with section 602 of IRFA.6

 The Commission reiterates its recommendation that 

the State Department’s Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau more fully implement 

the requirements set forth in this provision of IRFA.

Inadmissibility of Religious Freedom Violations

Although section 604 of IRFA holds any alien inadmissible who, as a foreign government official, was “responsible for or directly carried out...particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom,” the Commission has not seen any evidence that the Departments of State 

and Homeland Security have developed a lookout list of aliens who are inadmissible on this 

basis. This lifetime bar on admissions has only been invoked once to render an alien inadmissible. In March 2005, it was used to exclude Governor Nahendra Modi of Gujarat state in 

India for his complicity in the reportedly pre-planned riots in 2002 that resulted in the deaths 

of nearly 2,000 Muslims. The Commission had issued a statement urging such an action. 

Directly related to identifying and barring severe religious freedom violators from 

entry to the United States, section 402(b)(2) of IRFA requires that the President determine 

the specific officials responsible for violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated 

by governments of CPCs. Section 408(a)(1) requires that the identities of these officials be 

published in the Federal Register (“when applicable and to the extent practicable”). To date, 

no individual officials responsible for particularly severe religious freedom violations have 

been identified from any CPCs, despite these requirements.

The Commission urges the Departments of State and Homeland Security to implement these provisions of IRFA to identify and exclude religious freedom violators.

1

 The North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-333) SEC. 305. ANNUAL REPORTS.(b) COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR 

CONCERN.—The President shall include in each annual report on proposed refugee admission pursuant to section 207(d) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157(d)), information about specific measures taken to facilitate access to the United 

States refugee program for individuals who have fled countries of particular concern for violations of religious freedom, identified 

pursuant to section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6442(b)). The report shall include, for 

each country of particular concern, a description of access of the nationals or former habitual residents of that country to a refugee 

determination on the basis of—(1) referrals by external agencies to a refugee adjudication; (2) groups deemed to be of special 

humanitarian concern to the United States for purposes of refugee resettlement; and (3) family links to the United States. 2

 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-102).

3 See 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B) (2006), as amended by Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001 (P.L. 107-56) and Section 103 of the 

REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13).

4

 This is an important function, since individuals fleeing persecution may not submit an application for refugee status unless they 

either (1) receive such a referral from an Embassy or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or (2) fall into one of the 

narrowly defined processing priorities of “humanitarian concern” to the U.S. Refugee Program. 

5

 David A. Martin, The United States Refugee Admissions Program: Reforms for a New Era of Refugee Resettlement (July 2004), p. 72 

(http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36495.pdf).

6

 See Martin, p. 143.
65

The State Department’s Annual Report on 

International Religious Freedom

With the passage of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), Congress declared that it was the policy of the United States to stand with the victims of repression and promote respect for religious freedom by all governments and peoples. The yearly 

release by the State Department of the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 

provides an opportunity to learn more about and address some of the important challenges 

the United States faces as it pursues this important foreign policy goal.

The State Department’s Annual Report, together with the work of the Commission, 

demonstrate that religious freedom concerns cut across the many critical issues in U.S. foreign policy. From constitutional developments in Iraq, to the propagation and export of 

religious extremist ideology by Saudi Arabia, to the persistence of religious freedom abuses 

in China, to the repressive nature of the governments in potentially destabilizing countries 

such as Iran, Uzbekistan, and North Korea, to the promotion of democracy and the fight 

against extremism in the Middle East, protecting the right to freedom of religion or belief 

is indispensable to advancing American interests. It has become increasingly clear that promoting religious freedom and other human rights abroad is vital to U.S. foreign policy and 

to U.S. strategic, as well as humanitarian, interests. When it is observed, religious freedom 

is one of the keystones of stable, democratic, productive societies in which the rule of law 

and human rights are accorded value. 

Each year since its inception, the Annual Report’s role in the process of promoting religious freedom throughout the world has grown. As the only U.S. government 

The Annual Report 

continues to be an important achievement 

that consistently demonstrates the 

substantial efforts of the foreign-service officers 

in our embassies around the world, as 

well as the Ambassador at Large for 

International Religious Freedom and his staff 

at the State Department’s Office of International 

Religious Freedom. 
2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

66

publication devoted especially to religious freedom conditions worldwide, the Annual 

Report remains a unique—and crucial—reporting tool. In addition to providing a detailed description of country conditions, IRFA requires that the Annual Report fully 

describe the active steps the U.S. government is taking or has taken to promote religious freedom and to respond to religious freedom violations in all countries where 

such violations occur. 

The Annual Report continues to be an important achievement that consistently demonstrates the substantial efforts of the foreign-service officers in our embassies around the 

world, as well as the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom and his staff 

at the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom. The 2005 Annual Report was no exception.

Individual Country Reports

As in the past, many of the individual country reports in the 2005 Annual Report were excellent—thorough and accurate. However, the Commission is concerned 

about a number of informational inaccuracies and troubling conclusions in several 

important reports.

Although the achievements that have occurred in Afghanistan since the institution 

of the government of President Hamid Karzai should be recognized, the Commission continues to find that the Afghanistan country report does not adequately address the problems 

faced by individual Muslims in that country, as a result in part of the insufficient protection for freedom of religion and other human rights afforded to individual Muslims in the 

constitution passed in January 2004. These constitutional pitfalls, including the repugnancy 

clause that states that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of Islam” and 

the fact that the Supreme Court is empowered to make this determination, have negatively 

influenced other legislation also, including legislation on press freedom. The report did 

mention that the vagueness in the wording of the clause prohibiting materials “offensive to 

Islam” in the press law could lead to potential abuse, but it did not give sufficient weight to 

the significance of this problem. 

Events in the past year have demonstrated that these concerns are not merely theoretical, as several very troubling cases exemplifying the constitution’s inadequacies came 

before the courts. In one case, an editor was found guilty of blasphemy and “insulting Islam” 

for questioning discrimination against women and the use of certain harsh punishments 

under traditional Islamic law. He was eventually released, but only after apologizing to the 

court for his “crime.” In another incident, an Afghan citizen was arrested and threatened 

with execution on the charge of changing his religion. In this case, too, the court eventually 

dismissed the charges against him, citing lack of evidence and suspicions about his mental 

state, but concerns about his personal safety forced him to seek asylum abroad. In both cases, the essential problem was only side-stepped and not resolved. Clearly, despite some of 

the advances there in democratic development, it remains clear that today in Afghanistan, 

protections for human rights and democracy remain under threat from sources of religious 

extremism, even from within the Afghan government.

The report on China was quite positive about the new National Regulations on Religious Affairs implemented in March 2005, saying that they have the “potential to improve respect for religious freedom, to enhance legal protection for religious groups, and 
67

to strengthen the process of governing religious affairs according to law.” The Commission 

believes that the Regulations do include several provisions that may be important advances 

for religious freedom in China.

However, contrary to the impression left by the report, the Regulations are not the 

“paradigm shift” promised by Chinese officials. In fact, given the vague and sometimes 

contradictory language of the Regulations, the Commission believes that they do not adequately protect the human rights and security of religious adherents and are not fully consistent with international norms. For example, permission is now required for a number of 

commonplace religious activities, including holding meetings outside a place of worship, 

inviting a special speaker or teacher, printing religious material, or instituting a change 

in leadership. The Regulations also threaten criminal punishments and civil fines for “unregistered” religious activities. In fact, at the time of the Annual Report’s publication, “unregistered groups” had reported increased harassment, arrests, and detentions since the 

Regulations were implemented. From March 2005 to the time of the Report’s release, there 

had been four large scale arrests of “house church” Protestant leaders, apprehending over 

500 religious practitioners, arrests that were noted in the report. 

Second, the China report tended to focus the primary blame for religious freedom 

abuses on “local officials” in China. Although the Commission continues to recognize as a 

result of its recent visit that religious freedom conditions do vary from province to province, 

it is unmistakable that recent campaigns to “halt foreign influence,” “strike hard against religious extremism,” “stamp out evil cults,” “promote atheism,” and “eliminate the influence of 

the Dalai Lama” have all emanated directly from Beijing and are approved by top Communist Party leaders. Furthermore, Commissioners observed that local officials referred (and 

deferred) to central authorities regarding the policies they follow. Clearly, religious freedom 

abuses do not stem only—or even primarily—from local corruption or provincial officials 

misinterpreting the law. 

The Commission welcomes the inclusion of a country report on Iraq in this 

year’s Annual Report. The report offered a thorough summary of religious freedom 

conditions in Iraq and highlights areas of particular concern. However, in addressing 

religious freedom violations, the report tended to classify all abuses as stemming from 

“terrorist organizations,” a generalized term that conflates the various groups in Iraq 

that seek to impose Islamic rule with terrorist groups that support the insurgency, and 

plays down the support the former may have in Iraq, particularly within the provincial 

and municipal government structures. For example, the report failed to mention the 

deteriorating situation in Basra, where local Islamic groups—not connected to the insurgency—are imposing a strict version of Islamic law that has resulted in human rights 

violations as severe as extra-judicial killings. The report made no mention of the implications of these developments for religious freedom in Basra, its surrounding areas, 

and Iraq more generally. In addition, though the report noted that Law No. 105 of 1970 

prohibits the Baha’i faith, it failed to make clear if any efforts had been made on the part 

of the U.S. government to encourage the Iraqi government to repeal this discriminatory 

law. The report also did not mention other difficulties faced by the Baha’i community, 

including the fact that the Baha’i faith cannot currently be listed as a religion on Iraqi 

national identity cards. Finally, the report omitted mention of religiously motivated attacks targeting the Roma and Sufi Muslim communities in Iraq. 

The State Department’s Annual Report on International Religious Freedom
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The Russia report provided a wealth of information on the complex status of religious 

freedom in that country, including more attention to a wider range of religious groups. Yet, 

the report should have drawn more attention to the increasingly troubling situation faced 

by the country’s largest religious minority: Muslims. Thus, while it gave admirably detailed 

coverage of the recent legal problems of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Church of Scientology, no mention was made of a secret Supreme Court decision which outlawed 15 Muslim 

organizations for alleged ties to terrorism. This secret decision reportedly has led to the 

prosecution of several hundred Muslim individuals and groups in various parts of Russia, based on accusations that human rights groups in Russia consider unsubstantiated. In 

addition, Muslims increasingly face instances of workplace and other discrimination and 

widespread media attacks. 

The report on Saudi Arabia was more comprehensive than in previous years, highlighting the problems of the Shi’a population and non-Muslim guest workers. However, as 

in past years, the report disturbingly continued to omit any mention of the Saudi export of 

a highly intolerant and hate-filled ideology, despite the fact that this issue was mentioned 

publicly by the Ambassador at Large for Religious Freedom and other U.S. officials on several occasions during the past year. The subject was also mentioned at the press conference 

releasing the 2005 Annual Report. 

One of the most troubling country reports in the 2005 Annual Report was the 

report on Turkmenistan, which made the startling claim that “the status of Government respect for religious freedom improved during the period covered by this report.” 

Even more disturbing was that Turkmenistan was listed in the Executive Summary as 

one of the countries which had seen “significant improvements in the promotion of religious freedom.” This conclusion seemed to contradict the State Department’s recent 

human rights reports, which clearly state that the government’s human rights record 

remained “extremely poor,” and that the government continued to commit “serious 

abuses.” The claim of the 2005 Annual Report was also regarded as erroneous not 

only by the Commission but by most human rights organizations and other expert 

observers of Turkmenistan. Indeed, a number of U.S. and international human rights 

organizations issued a statement when the report was released expressing their strong 

objection to the report’s assessment of the situation in Turkmenistan and providing 

details of other inaccuracies in the Turkmenistan report.

The conclusion of the Annual Report was based largely on the Turkmen government’s 

recent registration of nine extremely small religious communities, even though their registration has not ended police harassment and tight government control of them and other 

groups. The report argued that these insignificant improvements—on paper—for these 

small groups overshadowed the worsening situation for the country’s majority religious 

group, the Muslims. The report also did not mention the growing problems for the Russian 

Orthodox Church, the country’s second largest group. Even more troubling, however, was 

that the report did not devote sufficient attention to President Niyazov’s quasi-religious, allpervasive personality cult. The report did not mention the Turkmen government’s refusal 

to respond to repeated requests by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 

Belief for an invitation to visit Turkmenistan. Moreover, at the event marking the report’s 

release, the Ambassador at Large claimed that all religious prisoners in Turkmenistan had 

been released; yet the report noted that the former Grand Mufti remains incarcerated for 

his refusal to elevate the Turkmen president’s book of “spiritual thoughts” to equal prominence with the Quran. 
69

The 2005 Annual Report claimed that the status of religious freedom had also improved in Vietnam over the course of the past year. It is true that after Vietnam was designated as a CPC in 2004, the Vietnamese government released some prominent religious 

prisoners and issued new ordinances regarding religion. It also made promises to improve 

conditions for its ethnic and religious minorities—promises that, at the time of the Report’s 

publication, however, had not yet been translated into concrete changes.

In fact, after the public announcement of a May 2005 binding agreement on religious 

freedom concerns between the United States and Vietnam, reports about restrictions and 

other abuses continued to surface, particularly against the country’s religious and ethnic 

minorities. In congressional testimony in June 2005, the Commission described evidence 

of forced renunciations of faith occurring in the northwest provinces and central highlands. Although the State Department stated that “a few” such renunciations occurred in 

the last year, the Commission submitted 21 police summons to the International Relations Committee from only one community in Vietnam. What is more, the Commission 

has reliable information on the arrests and detention of Hoa Hao and Protestant religious 

leaders and continued harassment of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), 

all in the past year. Finally, the report also stated that “almost all” the churches and meeting points closed in the Central Highland since 2001 had been reopened. Yet, at the time 

the Annual Report was published, 432 churches and meeting points reportedly remained 

closed in that region. 

Religious Persecution and the U.S. Refugee Program

Section 601 of IRFA specifically directs that the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom serve as a resource for refugee and asylum adjudicators. In that sense, the 

Annual Report plays an important role not merely in documenting religious freedom violations, but in facilitating refuge for those who are fleeing religious persecution. 

Appendix E of the 2005 report, the Overview of Refugee Policy, continued to improve, 

with more comprehensive coverage of religious persecution and the Refugee Program than 

in past years. Once again, however, the 2005 report contained little acknowledgment of the 

serious problem of intra-religious persecution, but instead focused almost exclusively on 

the persecution of religious minorities by a majority religious community. Moreover, this 

section contained no mention of significant refugee-source countries such as Afghanistan, 

Eritrea, or Iraq, where serious religious freedom problems persist. Indeed, the Secretary of 

State has designated Eritrea a CPC, and problems in Iraq—particularly with regard to the 

security of religious minority communities—are severe.

The Overview of Refugee Policy section did cite Saudi Arabia, a CPC, as well as Pakistan, which the Commission has recommended be designated a CPC, for their mistreatment of religious minorities. The Overview failed, however, to indicate how the U.S. Refugee Program has been responsive to this mistreatment.

In its Report to Congress on Refugee Admissions for FY2006, the Department of 

State provided a more complete description of the way in which it is facilitating access to 

the Refugee Program, at least for those asylum seekers who have fled CPCs. The Report to 

Congress is required to include such information under Section 304 of the North Korea 

Human Rights Act of 2004. Such information should be in the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom as well, even if not required by law. 

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The Commission does remain concerned that other refugee and asylum provisions of IRFA have been unevenly implemented. For example, Appendix D of the 

Report, “Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the International Religious 

Freedom Act,” accurately described the measures taken by the Asylum and Refugee 

Corps to train its refugee and asylum adjudicators in international religious freedom, 

as required by sections 602 and 603 of IRFA. Yet, this section made no mention of 

the training—if any—on international religious freedom undertaken by DHS Border 

Patrol agents and inspectors exercising Expedited Removal authority, even though 

such training is also required under IRFA. Nor did the report mention the efforts by 

the Department of Justice to ensure that immigration judges comply with IRFA training requirements. 

The importance of such training has been underscored by positions advanced in 

the past year by the Department of Justice and initially adopted by the Federal Court 

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Li v Gonzales. Li involved a Chinese Christian who 

claimed persecution—including arrest, detention, beatings, loss of employment, and 

forced labor—for organizing an unregistered church. An immigration judge granted the 

asylum seeker protection from removal, finding his claim to be credible and consistent 

with country conditions in China. The Department of Justice Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), on a motion from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), reversed the decision and ordered that Mr. Li be removed to China. When Mr. Li appealed 

the decision to the Fifth Circuit, the Department of Justice continued to argue that Mr. Li 

should be removed because he had been subject to prosecution for violating China’s religious registration laws—not persecution for his religious beliefs. The Fifth Circuit agreed 

with the Department of Justice. 

The Commission wrote the Department of Justice to make it clear that U.S. foreign policy has long maintained that China’s control over registered churches—and its 

prosecution of individuals like Mr. Li for engaging in “unauthorized” religious activity—are clear violations of international law with regard to freedom of religion or belief. 

The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security were receptive to the Commission’s 

concerns, and the Fifth Circuit subsequently vacated its original decision. Although immigration judges are already required by IRFA to have training on religious freedom, 

other relevant entities are not: the BIA, the trial attorneys who work for Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in DHS, as well as those who work for the Office of 

Immigration Litigation (OIL) in the Department of Justice. The BIA and OIL have recently invited the Commission to participate in training its attorneys. The Commission 

urges ICE to do the same. To ensure that they are fully informed about and sensitive to 

the ways in which individuals are in fact subjected to persecution because of religion or 

belief, all of these entities should make religious freedom a regular component of their 

training curricula, whether mandated by IRFA or not. The Commission also urges that 

the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and State better coordinate their efforts 

to ensure that legal positions on asylum which are advanced in court by these agencies 

do not set legal precedents which could undermine longstanding positions of the United 

States on international human rights.

Finally, section 602(b) of IRFA requires that all consular officers be trained in 

refugee law and policy. Although consular officers do not adjudicate refugee applications, they are authorized to refer refugee applicants to the Department of Homeland 

Security for adjudication, since the vast majority of asylum seekers are not permitted 
71

to apply to the Refugee Program without a referral from a U.S. embassy or the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Appendix C of the Annual Report, “Training at the Foreign Service Institute Related to the International Religious Freedom 

Act,” stated that consular training “includes a lecture on Immigrant Visa (sic) that 

incorporates discussion of refugee and asylum issues as they pertain to consular officers. The subject is covered in further detail in the Self-Instruction Guide (SIG) on 

immigrant visa processing.” Based on inquiries made by the Commission, however, 

it appears that the only training received by consular officers relevant to the Refugee 

Program is on the processing of immediate relative petitions filed by refugees and 

asylees. Such training does not even begin to comply with the broad requirements of 

section 602(b).1

 Consequently, the Commission is concerned that consular officers 

remain unaware of their ability to facilitate access to the resettlement program for 

asylum seekers in need of protection. Once again, the Commission urges the Department of State to comply with this training requirement, which could save the lives 

of bona fide refugees, particularly those who may have access to a U.S. consulate but 

not UNHCR.

Commission Recommendations

With regard to the State Department’s Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom, the Commission has recommended that:

■ the State Department should expand and strengthen its reporting on specific U.S. policies 

and actions to advance religious freedom;

■ the Annual Report should describe the policies that the U.S. government has adopted 

and is implementing to oppose religious freedom violations, as well as to promote religious freedom, on a worldwide, regional, and individual country basis, including policies 

regarding foreign aid, public diplomacy, multilateral organizations, and international financial institutions;

■ the Annual Report should specify, for each foreign country in which religious freedom 

violations occur: the U.S. government’s objectives to advance religious freedom; U.S. policies that have been adopted and are being implemented to advance religious freedom; the 

religious freedom concerns that the U.S. government has raised with the foreign government, and the response of that government, including any specific actions taken; and the 

results, or lack thereof, of the actions taken by the U.S. government;

■ the State Department should describe in the Annual Report the specific actions taken 

pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act in response to the designation of 

a country as a “country of particular concern” (CPC) or in response to a finding that a 

foreign government has engaged in or tolerated a violation of religious freedom;

■ where appropriate, activities designed to promote rule of law, effective law enforcement, 

and accountability for religious freedom and related human rights violations should be a 

significant component of U.S. efforts to promote religious freedom, and they should be 

described in the Annual Report; and

■ the Annual Report should describe in detail what measures have been taken to facilitate 

access to the U.S. Refugee Program for individuals fleeing from countries where religious 

freedom violations occur, including from countries designated as CPCs.

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lxii Section 602(b) of IRFA holds that “(t)he Secretary of State shall provide sessions on refugee law and adjudications and on religious 

persecution to each individual seeking a commission as a United States consular officer....”
Countries of Particular Concern 

and the Commission Watch List

In passing the 1998 International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), Congress not only recognized the global importance of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief, but also made the promotion of this critical freedom 

a matter of U.S. law. This action ensured that advancing international religious freedom became an integral part of the 

U.S. government’s foreign policy agenda. IRFA established 

a number of interrelated mechanisms to pursue this goal. 

These include: an Office of International Religious Freedom 

in the Department of State headed by an Ambassador-atLarge for International Religious Freedom; an annual report 

by the State Department on the conditions of religious freedom in each foreign country and U.S. actions to promote religious freedom; and the establishment of the United States 

Commission on International Religious Freedom. 

The Commission was created by Congress through 

IRFA expressly to advocate a prominent place within U.S. 

foreign policy for the promotion of religious freedom 

and other freedoms throughout the world. The Commission was mandated both to monitor the status of freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion or belief globally and 

to make recommendations to the President, the Secretary 

One of the Commission’s chief 

responsibilities in the process of 

promoting religious freedom as 

required by IRFA is to draw the 

U.S. government’s attention to 

those countries whose governments have engaged in or tolerated systematic and egregious 

violations of religious freedom 

and recommend that they be designated as CPCs. The designation 

of CPCs not only puts a spotlight 

on those countries where the 

most severe violations take place, 

but also lays the groundwork 

for important decisions in U.S. 

relations with these countries. 

USCIRF Commissioners Elizabeth Prodromou, Charles Chaput, Preeta Bansal, Richard Land, Nina Shea and Chair Michael Cromartie (at 

podium) present the USCIRF Annual Report at a press conference, May 2006

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2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

74

of State, and Congress on ways the U.S. government can further the protection and promotion of this freedom and related human rights in its relations with other countries. 

Under IRFA, the President is required to single out and explicitly name those countries that are the most egregious violators of religious freedom, and the Act contains a formal mechanism for doing so. Section 402(b)(1) of IRFA specifically directs the President at 

least annually to designate each country in which the government has engaged in or tolerated “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” as “a country of particular concern” or CPC. Particularly severe violations of religious freedom are defined as those that 

are “systematic, ongoing, and egregious.”1

 In defining violations of religious freedom, IRFA 

directly refers to the “internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and religious 

belief and practice” as laid out in such international instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.2

Countries of Particular Concern: Commission Recommendations

One of the Commission’s chief responsibilities in the process of promoting religious 

freedom as required by IRFA is to draw the U.S. government’s attention to those countries 

whose governments have engaged in or tolerated systematic and egregious violations of religious freedom and recommend that they be designated as CPCs. The designation of CPCs 

not only puts a spotlight on those countries where the most severe violations take place, but 

also lays the groundwork for important decisions in U.S. relations with these countries. 

As required by IRFA, the Commission has assessed the facts and circumstances regarding violations of religious freedom around the world. As a result of this review process, 

and in furtherance of the Commission’s statutory responsibility, the Commission wrote 

to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in May 2006 recommending that she designate as 

CPCs the following 11 countries: Burma, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North 

Korea), Eritrea, Iran, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 

Countries Named as 

CPCs by the Department 

of State

Countries Recommended 

for CPC Designation 

by the Commission

Countries on the 

Commission’s 

Watch List

Burma

China

Eritrea

Iran

North Korea

Saudi Arabia

Sudan

Vietnam

Burma

China

Eritrea

Iran

North Korea

Saudi Arabia

Sudan

Vietnam

Pakistan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Afghanistan

Bangladesh

Belarus

Cuba

Egypt

Indonesia

Nigeria
75

Re-Designation of Severe Religious Freedom Violators

In September 2005, Secretary Rice re-designated Saudi Arabia, China, North Korea, Sudan, Iran, Vietnam, Eritrea, and Burma as CPCs. The Commission concluded that 

there have been no changes substantial enough to warrant the removal of these eight countries from the list of CPC designations. 

■ Despite the Department’s contention in its 2005 religious freedom report that there 

were some slight improvements in Saudi government efforts to foster religious tolerance in Saudi society, the report again concluded that freedom of religion “does 

not exist” in Saudi Arabia. The Commission also finds that there is no religious 

freedom in Saudi Arabia. The government of Saudi Arabia persists in banning 

all forms of public religious expression other than that of the government’s own 

interpretation of one school of Sunni Islam and forcefully represses private religious practice. The government also continues to be involved in financing activities throughout the world that support extreme religious intolerance, hatred, and, 

in some cases, violence toward non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. 

■ In China, where the Commission made its first official visit last year, the government 

continues to be responsible for pervasive and severe violations of religious freedom 

and related human rights. Every religious community in China is subject to serious restrictions, state control, and repression. The most severe religious freedom abuses are 

directed against Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslims, Roman Catholics, house church 

and unregistered Protestants, and spiritual groups such as the Falun Gong—abuses involving imprisonment, torture, and other forms of ill treatment. Though the Chinese 

government issued a new Ordinance on Religion in March 2005, its provisions, in fact, 

restrict rather than protect religious freedom, offering Party leaders more extensive 

control over all religious groups and their activities. Prominent religious leaders and 

others continue to be confined, imprisoned, tortured, “disappeared,” and subjected 

to other forms of ill treatment on account of their religion or belief. What is more, 

the Chinese government, in its treatment of refugees from North Korea, continues to 

disregard its international obligations to protect those who face persecution on their 

return. For more information on all of these concerns, see the chapter on the Commission’s visit to China in this report. 

■ There are virtually no personal freedoms in North Korea and no protections for 

universal human rights. In pursuit of absolute control of all facets of life, the government under dictator Kim Jong Il has created an environment of fear in which 

dissent of any kind is not tolerated. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 

or belief does not exist, as the government severely represses public and private religious activities and maintains a policy of tight control over government-sanctioned 

religious practice. As confirmed by the Commission’s important new study based 

on interviews with North Korean refugees, religious belief of any kind is viewed by 

the government as a potential competitor to the forcefully propagated cult of personality centered on Kim Jong Il, and his late father, Kim Il Sung. In the past several 

years, North Korean government officials have arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and 

sometimes executed those discovered engaging in clandestine religious activity. 

■ In Sudan, which the Commission visited earlier this year, an authoritarian government that has pursued coercive policies of Arabization and Islamization resulting in 

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genocide severely restricts the religious freedom and other universal human rights 

of an ethnically and religiously diverse population. Sudanese security forces, and 

the senior officials responsible for their actions, have not been held to account for 

the human rights abuses committed during Sudan’s North-South Civil War, most 

of whose victims were Christians or followers of traditional African religions. With 

the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, religious freedom conditions have improved in southern and central Sudan. However, 

during its trip to Sudan, the Commission found that peace in Sudan is very fragile 

and that there are serious problems with implementing the CPA, including its arrangements for the protection of human rights. The CPA has not yet resulted in 

significant changes in practice in government-controlled areas of the North, where 

government agencies continue to harass and discriminate against Christians, other 

non-Muslims, and Muslims who dissent from the government’s views. In prisons 

and vagrant camps, non-Muslims are pressured to convert to Islam. Apostasy is 

legally punishable by death. Permission to build churches is routinely denied. The 

government’s actions with regard to the continuing genocide in Darfur, as well as 

its failure to cooperate with the Security Council-mandated investigation by the 

International Criminal Court of alleged war crimes, impugns the commitment of 

Sudanese leaders to support human rights guarantees. What is more, at least some 

elements in the Sudanese military or security services that remain in the South may 

be aiding the Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugandan rebel group notorious for its brutal human rights abuses and known to have received safe haven and other support 

from Khartoum in the past.

■ The government of Iran engages in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, including prolonged detention, torture, and executions. Over the past year, the Iranian government’s poor religious freedom record 

deteriorated, especially for religious minorities and for Baha’is and Jews in particular. All minority groups faced intensified harassment, detention, arrests, and 

imprisonment. A consistent stream of virulent and inflammatory statements by 

political and religious leaders and an increase in harassment and, in some cases, 

imprisonment of, and physical attacks against, members of such groups indicate 

a renewal of a level of oppression not seen since the years after the 1979 revolution. President Ahmadinejad’s repeated threats to destroy Israel and denials of 

the Holocaust have intensified fears among Iran’s Jewish community. Dissidents 

and political reformers continue to be imprisoned on criminal charges of blasphemy and criticizing the nature of the Islamic regime. 

■ The government of Vietnam continues to harass, detain, imprison, and discriminate 

against leaders and practitioners of all religious communities. In response to its designation as a CPC, the Vietnamese government has released a number of prominent 

religious prisoners, re-opened some churches in the Central Highlands, officially outlawed forced renunciations of faith, and issued new guidelines to help speed the process of registration of religious congregations. Nevertheless, serious abuses of religious 

freedom continue to occur, particularly against Montagnard and Hmong Protestants, 

Vietnamese Mennonites, followers of Hoa Hao Buddhism, and leaders of the Unified 

Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV). In addition, reports of forced renunciation of 

faith continue to emerge, the number of religious venues re-opened is low relative to 

the number that were closed, and new detentions continue to occur.
77

■ Religious freedom conditions deteriorated in the past year in Eritrea, where the 

government continues to engage in systematic and egregious religious freedom 

violations. These violations include: a prolonged ban on public activities by all religious groups that are not officially recognized; closure of places of worship; inordinate delays in acting on registration applications by religious groups; disruption of private religious and even social gatherings of members of unregistered 

groups; arbitrary arrests and detention without charge of their members; and 

the mistreatment or torture of religious detainees, sometimes resulting in death. 

Hundreds of members of unregistered churches are believed to be detained at 

any given time, typically without charges, even for extended periods.

■ Serious human rights abuses perpetuated by the military regime in Burma continue to be widespread, including systematic and egregious violations of religious freedom. According to the State Department, the Burmese government’s 

extremely poor human rights record deteriorated in the past year, with increasing 

hostility directed at ethnic minorities, democracy activists, and international humanitarian agencies. The military junta uses a pervasive internal security apparatus to monitor the activities of all religious organizations. The government imposes restrictions on certain religious practices, controls and censors all religious 

publications, has supported, allowed, or instigated violence against religious minorities, and, in some areas of the country, has forcefully promoted Buddhism 

over other religions. Ethnic minority Christians and Muslims have encountered 

severe difficulties in recent years. 

Responding to the CPC Designation

The process of CPC designation as outlined under IRFA, and the implementation of 

meaningful policies in response to such designations, should be considered among the most 

serious actions taken by the U.S. government in its human rights policy. Under IRFA, however, 

the simple designation by the U.S. government of a severe violator of religious freedom as a 

CPC is not by itself sufficient action. CPC designation carries an obligation that one or more 

of certain actions specified in Section 405 of IRFA be taken, unless the Secretary of State, as the 

President’s designee, determines that pre-existing sanctions are adequate or otherwise waives 

the requirement.3

 If a CPC designee is already subject to ongoing, multiple, broad-based sanctions “imposed in significant part in response to human rights abuses,” then one or more of 

these pre-existing sanctions can be designated as meeting the requirements of IRFA.4

The CPC designation is a flexible diplomatic tool. It provides the Secretary of State 

with a range of specific options to take to address serious violations of religious freedom. 

It does not automatically entail sanctions, but requires that the Secretary of State enter into 

direct consultations with a country to find ways to improve the situation. To avoid more 

punitive actions, one policy response under IRFA is for the CPC country to enter into a 

binding agreement with the United States that spells out specific actions the government 

will take to end the violations that gave rise to the designation.

When used properly, the CPC designation:

■ sends the clear signal that U.S. interests include concern for human rights; 

■ starts a dialogue where specific benchmarks on progress are agreed upon in order to avoid economic sanctions;

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■ allows the Secretary of State in an incremental fashion to employ or use the threat 

of punitive actions to address egregious abuses of religious freedom; and 

■ allows the Secretary of State to waive any specific actions if progress is being 

made toward addressing serious violations of freedom of religion or belief.

Until 2004, the Secretary of State had continually named as CPCs Burma, China, 

Iran, North Korea (beginning in 2001), and Sudan, countries that had been, and continue to 

be, subject to multiple sanctions that predate the CPC designation. Until September 2005, 

the only official action taken by the U.S. government with respect to the CPCs had been to 

invoke those already existing sanctions, rather than to take additional measures pursuant to 

IRFA. Until that time, as permitted by Section 402 (c)(5) of IRFA, the Secretary had determined that the following pre-existing sanctions satisfied the IRFA requirements:

Last year, the State Department announced its decisions on three serious religious freedom 

violators, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Eritrea, in fulfillment of statutory obligations outlined in 

IRFA. In September 2005, Secretary Rice announced the denial of commercial export to Eritrea of 

defense articles and services covered by the Arms Control Export Act, with some items exempted. 

This was the first unique presidential action to be undertaken under IRFA as a result of CPC designation. The Commission commended this action and has recommended subsequent actions that 

the Administration should take, in accordance with IRFA, in response to that designation. 

Nevertheless, the U.S. government’s continued general reliance on pre-existing sanctions 

has provided little incentive for the other CPC governments to reduce or end egregious violations 

of religious freedom. While the reliance on pre-existing sanctions may be technically correct under the statute, it is unacceptable as a matter of policy. The designation of an egregious religious 

freedom violator as a CPC, followed by the implementation of a clear and directed policy response, is an essential tool to promote religious freedom, and one explicitly required by IRFA. The 

failure to take additional action under IRFA suggests that nothing further can, or will, be done by 

the U.S. government with respect to those countries that commit severe violations of freedom of 

religion or belief. This is the case with the five countries listed above.

Vietnam: May 2005 Agreement Only a First Step

In February 2005, in accordance with its statutory obligations, the Commission wrote 

to Secretary Rice and recommended the following actions by the U.S. government in response to the designation of Vietnam as a CPC. In doing so, the Commission emphasized 

that the recommended actions were only initial steps that should be taken, in concert with 

Burma 22 CFR 126.1: prohibition on exports or other transfers of defense articles and 

defense services pursuant to §§ 2, 38 and 42 of the Arms Export Control Act.

China Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, P.L. 101-246: restriction of exports of crime control and detection instruments and equipment.

Iran Arms Export Control Act, §40: restrictions on United States security assistance.

North Korea Trade Act of 1974, §§402 and 409 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment): restrictions on normal trade relations and other trade benefits.

Sudan

International Financial Institutions Act, §1621: use of the voice and vote of 

the United States to oppose any loan or other use of the funds of the International Financial Institutions to or for Sudan.
79

diplomatic efforts at all levels, to urge the government of Vietnam to abide by its international human rights commitments and cease severe violations of freedom of religion or 

belief. The Commission also recognized that IRFA authorizes more stringent actions that 

could be taken should severe violations continue.

1) The U.S. government should identify those Vietnamese agencies and officials 

who are responsible for particularly severe violations of religious freedom 

and vigorously enforce section 604 of IRFA with respect to Vietnam, rendering inadmissible for entry into the United States any Vietnamese government 

official who was responsible for, or directly carried out, such violations.

2) The U.S. government should dedicate no less than $1 million for FY 2005 

and FY 2006, if discretionary funds are allocated to Vietnam above its annual earmark, to programs that will directly promote freedom of religion 

and belief and related human rights in Vietnam.

In May 2005, the State Department announced it had reached a binding agreement 

with the government of Vietnam, in accordance with IRFA, on steps that would be taken to 

improve religious freedom. The Department also said that the U.S. government would consider taking Vietnam off the CPC list if certain conditions are met. It is the Commission’s view 

that, as of the time this report went to print, Vietnam’s record on fulfilling this agreement has 

been mixed at best. As noted above, there has clearly not yet been enough tangible progress on 

religious freedom concerns in Vietnam to warrant removal of the CPC designation.

Saudi Arabia: the Need to Take Action

In its February 2005 letter to Secretary Rice, the Commission recommended the following actions by the U.S. government in response to the designation of Saudi Arabia as a 

CPC. As in the case of Vietnam, the Commission emphasized that the following recommended actions were only initial steps that should be taken, in concert with diplomatic 

efforts at all levels, to urge the government of Saudi Arabia to abide by its international 

human rights commitments and cease severe violations of freedom of religion or belief. 

The Commission also recognized that IRFA authorizes more stringent actions that could be 

taken should severe violations continue.

1) The U.S. government should identify those Saudi agencies and officials thereof who are responsible for particularly severe violations of religious freedom 

and vigorously enforce section 604 of IRFA with respect to Saudi Arabia, rendering inadmissible for entry into the United States any Saudi government 

official who was responsible for or directly carried out such violations. 

2) The U.S. government should issue a proclamation, under the President’s authority pursuant to section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

(8 USC 1182(f)), to bar those Saudi government officials from entering the 

United States who have been responsible for propagating globally an ideology that explicitly promotes hate, intolerance, and human rights violations. 

3) The U.S. government should issue a demarche urging the government of 

Saudi Arabia to cease funding or other support for written materials or 

other activities that explicitly promote hate, intolerance, and human rights 

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violations, including the distribution of such materials in the United States 

and elsewhere outside of Saudi Arabia.

4) The U.S. government should order the heads of appropriate U.S. agencies, 

pursuant to section 405(a)(13) of IRFA, not to issue any specific licenses and 

not to grant any other specific authority for the export of any item on the 

U.S. Commerce Control List of dual-use items [Export Administration Regulations under part 774 of title 15] to any agency or instrumentality of the 

government of Saudi Arabia that is responsible for committing particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom. In FY 2004, the Commerce Department approved approximately $67 million worth of such articles for Saudi 

Arabia, including, for example, thumbcuffs, leg irons, shackles, and other 

items that could be used to perpetrate human rights violations.

In September 2005, one year after the designation of Saudi Arabia, Secretary Rice approved a temporary 180-day waiver of further action, as a consequence of CPC designation, 

to allow for continued diplomatic discussions with the Saudi government and “to further 

the purposes of the International Religious Freedom Act.” The waiver expired in late March 

2006. As of the time this report went to print, no action with regard to Saudi Arabia had 

been announced by the U.S. government. Given the extent of religious freedom violations 

in Saudi Arabia, the Commission urged the Secretary to consult with Congress and other 

parts of the U.S. government, including the Commission, during its discussions with the 

Saudis, and to make any agreement reached with the Saudi government public in the interest of the accountability that results from transparency. Since religious freedom conditions 

in Saudi Arabia have not substantially improved in the last year, the U.S. government must 

not hesitate in taking aggressive action as suggested above which meets the requirements 

of IRFA to demonstrate that it will not disregard the persistent and egregious religious freedom violations committed by the Saudi government.

Countries that Should be Added to the CPC List

In addition to the eight countries previously designated by Secretary Rice as CPCs, 

the Commission continues to find that the governments of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 

and Pakistan have engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom, and recommends that they be designated as CPCs this year. 

■ The overall situation for human rights in Uzbekistan deteriorated in the past 

year, particularly after the events in Andijon last May, when government troops 

fired on a crowd of demonstrators, killing hundreds. In addition to a restrictive 

law on religion that severely limits the ability of religious communities to function in Uzbekistan, the Uzbek government continues to exercise a high degree 

of control over the manner in which the Islamic faith is practiced. Government 

authorities also continue to crack down harshly on Muslim individuals, groups, 

and mosques that do not conform to government-prescribed practices or that 

the government claims are associated with extremist political groups. This has 

resulted in the imprisonment of thousands of persons in recent years, most of 

whom are denied the right to due process, and there are credible reports that 

many of those arrested continue to be tortured or beaten in detention. Though 

security threats do exist in Uzbekistan, including from members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and other groups that claim a religious linkage, these threats do not excuse 
81

or justify the scope and harshness of the government’s ill treatment of religious 

believers. The Commission’s CPC recommendation for Uzbekistan should not in 

any way be construed as an exculpatory defense of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist 

and highly intolerant organization that promotes hatred of moderate Muslims, 

the West, Jews, and others. 

■ President Saparmurat Niyazov’s monopoly of power and absolute control over 

Turkmen society render any independent religious activity impossible in Turkmenistan. The president is also imposing an increasingly oppressive personality cult, now effectively a state-imposed religion, that impinges on all aspects of 

public life in the country. Even the majority Muslim community faces repression; in July 2005, Niyazov ordered the publication of a list of religious rituals 

common to all Turkmens. It is reported that secret police attend mosques to 

identify Muslims who perform religious rites in a way that differs from this 

officially prescribed Turkmen practice. In the past two years, the government 

has made small, purportedly positive legal adjustments to the laws that restrict 

religious practice; however, these changes have done little or nothing to alter 

the overall repressive situation. The decree on registration cited in the 2005 

International Religious Freedom Report as evidence of “improvement” in fact 

resulted in the registration of only nine small groups and even they report continued difficulties. Credible reports indicate that registration is becoming a 

method of more pervasive state control over religious communities. The Commission regrets that a few insignificant developments in Turkmenistan that in 

no way change the fundamental absence of any freedom, including religious 

freedom, enable that country to evade the State Department’s designation as a 

CPC which it so unequivocally deserves.

■ Sectarian and religiously motivated violence persists in Pakistan, particularly 

against Shi’as, Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians, and the government’s response 

to this problem, though improved, continues to be insufficient and not fully effective. In addition, a number of the country’s laws, including legislation restricting the Ahmadi community and laws against blasphemy, frequently result in imprisonment on account of religion or belief and/or vigilante violence against the 

accused. These religious freedom concerns persist amid the wider problem of the 

lack of democracy in Pakistan, an obstacle the current government has done little 

to address. The absence of any meaningful democratic reform has been exacerbated by the current government’s political alliance with militant religious parties, which has served to strengthen these groups and give them influence in the 

country’s affairs disproportionate to their support among the Pakistani people. 

Given the importance of Pakistan in the U.S. government’s efforts against terrorism, the failure of the Pakistani government to implement genuine religious 

freedom reforms is a cause for serious concern.

Countries Requiring Close Monitoring: the Commission’s Watch List

In addition to its CPC recommendations, the Commission has established a Watch 

List of countries where conditions do not rise to the statutory level requiring CPC designation but which require close monitoring due to the nature and extent of violations of religious 

freedom engaged in or tolerated by the governments. Afghanistan, where the former Taliban 

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82

regime was once designated under IRFA as a particularly severe violator, has been added to 

the Commission’s Watch List this year, joining Bangladesh, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, and Nigeria. The Commission is concerned about the serious abuses in these countries, 

and that the governments have either not halted repression and/or violence against persons 

amounting to severe violations of freedom of religion, or failed to punish those responsible 

for perpetrating those acts. The Commission urges the Department of State to pay particular 

attention to the poor situation for religious freedom in these countries.

Though improved since the fall of the Taliban regime, conditions for freedom of religion 

or belief in Afghanistan became increasingly problematic in the past year. Flaws in the country’s 

new constitution, which does not contain clear protections of the right to freedom of religion or 

belief for individual Afghan citizens, resulted in a growing number of criminal prosecutions and 

other official actions against individuals for exercising their rights. The defects in the constitution 

are compounded by the current role and power of the country’s Supreme Court, which continues 

to be headed by a Chief Justice who disavowed to the Commission his support for core international human rights standards. As a consequence of his actions, a sitting Minister in the interim 

Afghan government was forced to resign after being charged with blasphemy for questioning 

the role of Islamic law in Afghanistan, journalists have been jailed on charges of offending Islam, 

and during the October 2004 presidential elections, a presidential candidate was threatened with 

disqualification for purported “anti-Islamic remarks” on women’s rights and family law. In addition, the failure or inability of the Afghan government to exercise authority over much of the 

country outside Kabul contributes to a progressively deteriorating situation for religious freedom 

and other human rights in many of the provinces. These developments indicate that religious 

extremism—even in official circles—is an increasing threat to democratic consolidation in Afghanistan. In light of the very real dangers to the U.S. goal of instituting democracy and human 

rights protections in Afghanistan, the Commission has decided to place the country on its Watch 

List. The Commission will carefully monitor the situation in Afghanistan, in whose political development the United States should remain closely engaged. 

In Bangladesh, where the Commission traveled in March 2006, there is concern that democratic institutions and constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion continue to be threatened by the growth of religious extremism amidst the country’s chronic political strife. Islamic 

militants have been implicated in violent attacks on politicians, members of religious minorities, 

particularly Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians, authors who promote different interpretations of 

Islam, and non-governmental institutions promoting the empowerment of women and human 

rights. There is also concern that the next national elections in 2007 might result in the kind of 

violence seen following the 2001 elections, when Hindus were particularly targeted for attacks. 

Although the perpetrators of these crimes have largely gone unpunished, the Commission notes 

that the government’s efforts to combat extremist violence have had some notable successes in the 

past year, including the arrests of two militant leaders, Siddiqul Islam, better known as “Bangla 

Bhai,” and Sheikh Abdur Rahman. 

In Belarus, violence after the March 2006 presidential elections has resulted in a deteriorating situation for all human rights. The highly authoritarian government persists in 

enforcing the harsh 2002 law on religion, resulting in calculated and serious regulatory 

obstacles and bureaucratic and legal restrictions on the activities of many religious communities. In the past year, the Belarusian authorities appeared to be adopting even tougher 

sanctions against religious leaders and others who take part in unregistered religious activity. Moreover, the government refuses to acknowledge anti-Semitism and does not prosecute those responsible for vandalism against Jewish memorials, cemeteries or other prop-
83

erty. Anti-Semitic literature continues to be sold in government buildings, in stores, and at 

events directly and indirectly connected with the Belarusian Orthodox Church. 

Religious belief and practice continue to be tightly controlled in Cuba, where the government rarely permits the construction of new places of worship. A new law on religion, 

adopted last year and meant to “legalize” certain religious activity, actually reinforces the 

government’s efforts to maintain control over religious practice. Reports indicate that at least 

three Protestant house churches have been closed, confiscated, and/or demolished since the 

new law went into effect. In the past year, both registered and unregistered religious groups 

continued to experience varying degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. 

The Commission traveled to Egypt in 2004 and found that discrimination, intolerance, and other human rights violations affect a broad spectrum of religious groups in 

that country. Serious violations affect Coptic Orthodox Christians, Jews, and Baha’is, as 

well as members of minority Muslim communities. The Egyptian government has adopted some measures in recent years to acknowledge certain aspects of the religious pluralism in Egyptian society; however, more can and should be done by the government to 

protect the right to religious freedom, to punish those responsible for a rise in religiously 

motivated violence over the past year, and to combat widespread and virulent anti-Semitism and other intolerance in the media and in the education system. Just last month, 

three Coptic Christian churches were attacked by a Muslim man, resulting in the death of 

one Christian and the wounding of approximately a dozen others. Three days of rioting 

followed the attacks, leaving one Muslim killed and almost 40 injured. 

In Indonesia, though the situation has continued to improve since 2002, the Commission remains concerned about ongoing sectarian violence and the Indonesian government’s inability or unwillingness to hold those responsible to account; the forcible closures 

of worship buildings belonging to religious minorities; and the growing political power 

and influence of religious extremists, who harass and sometimes instigate violence against 

moderate Muslim leaders and members of religious minorities. In the past year, a Hindu 

temple was bombed in Central Sulawesi and mobs attacked an Ahmadiyah compound in 

West Java several times. 

Despite some improvement in the past year, including more decisive government 

action to quell sectarian violence and address the activities of Islamic extremist groups, the 

response of the government of Nigeria to persistent religious freedom concerns continues 

to be inadequate. This is particularly the case with regard to an ongoing series of violent 

communal conflicts along religious lines; the controversy over the expansion of sharia (Islamic law) into the criminal codes of several northern Nigerian states; and discrimination 

against minority communities of Christians and Muslims. 

Summaries of conditions in all of the countries discussed in this chapter, as well as the 

Commission’s policy recommendations, can be found in the country chapters of this report. 

1

 IRFA § 402 (b)(1)(A).

2

 IRFA § 3(13).

3

 The authority to make these decisions has been delegated by the President to the Secretary of State.

4

 IRFA § 402(c)(5). 

Countries of Particular Concern and the Commission Watch List
84

Eritrea

The government of Eritrea continues to engage in systematic and egregious violations 

of religious freedom. Current violations include a prolonged ban on public religious 

activities by all religious groups that are not officially recognized, closure by the 

authorities of the places of worship of these religious groups, inordinate delays in acting on 

registration applications by religious groups, disruption of private religious and even social gatherings of members of unregistered groups, arbitrary arrests and detention without 

charge of their members, and the mistreatment or torture of religious detainees, sometimes 

resulting in death. In February 2004, the Commission recommended that the State Department designate Eritrea a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, which the State Department did in September 2004. Secretary of State Rice in September 2005 announced the 

denial of commercial export to Eritrea of defense articles and services covered by the Arms 

Control Export Act, with some items exempted, the first unique presidential action to be 

undertaken under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) in response to 

CPC designation. The Commission recommends that Eritrea remain a CPC.

The Eritrean government officially recognizes the Orthodox Church of Eritrea (Coptic Orthodox), Sunni Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Church of 

Eritrea, a Lutheran-affiliated denomination that provides an umbrella for some other small 

Protestant groups. Although there is no state religion, the government has close ties to the 

Orthodox Church, the largest and oldest of Eritrea’s Christian communities, and is suspicious of newer groups—in particular, Protestant Evangelical, Pentecostal, and other Christian denominations not traditional to Eritrea. 

Although relations among the four government-recognized religious communities 

are generally good, leaders of the established groups, in particular the Orthodox Church, 

have expressed concerns about the growth of newer, more activist religious groups. 

Government officials have criticized non-traditional Christian groups for engaging in 

aggressive evangelism that is allegedly alien to Eritrea’s cultural traditions and socially 

divisive. Government officials have also pointed to foreign or foreign-inspired Muslim 

fundamentalists, including Wahhabis and the Muslim Brotherhood, as seeking to radicalize Eritrea’s traditional, popular Islam and thus to create tensions in a society that is 

roughly half Christian and half Muslim. Government concerns regarding foreign backing 

for religious groups have resulted in strict controls both on humanitarian activities by international faith-based organizations and on foreign funding going to indigenous groups 

for religious or charitable activities. 

Jehovah’s Witnesses were the first religious group to experience official persecution. 

For over a decade, the government of Eritrea has denied a range of government services 

▲ Eritrea

▲ Nigeria

Africa
and civil and political rights to members of this small community. Many of Eritrea’s Jehovah’s Witnesses refused on 

religious grounds to participate in the 1993 referendum 

on independence or to accept the national military service 

required of all citizens, both male and female. The government chose to interpret these actions by Jehovah’s Witnesses 

as a rejection of Eritrean citizenship. In accordance with a 

Presidential decree issued October 1994, Jehovah’s Witnesses have been barred from obtaining government jobs, 

business licenses, and government-issued identity and travel 

documents. Lack of Eritrean identity cards effectively denies 

Jehovah’s Witnesses a range of government services, including legal recognition of marriages and land purchases. Jehovah’s Witnesses who have refused to serve in the military 

have been imprisoned without trial, some for over a decade. 

These government actions, which continued in the past year, 

are customarily taken without due process of law or any administrative appeal. Moreover, the requirement of a military 

training component for secondary school graduation effectively denies educational and employment opportunities to 

young Jehovah’s Witnesses, encouraging many to flee their 

homeland. Some children of Jehovah’s Witnesses have been 

expelled from school because of their refusal to salute the 

flag or to pay for membership in the officially sanctioned national organization for youth and students. 

Some of the government’s concerns regarding religious 

activities are linked to real or perceived security threats, and 

government spokespersons have cited Pentecostals, along 

with Muslim extremists, as a threat to national security. Islamic militants, operating out of Sudan, have engaged in a 

low-level insurgency against the government, occasionally 

employing terrorism as a tactic in their campaign to establish an Islamic state. However, human rights organizations 

report that it is likely that many of the Muslim suspects detained without charge by the security forces are being held 

primarily for their views, including their criticism of alleged 

anti-Muslim discrimination or their opposition to the government-recognized leadership of the Muslim community, 

rather than for supporting or engaging in violence. None of 

the suspect Christian groups is known to have engaged in or 

to have advocated violence. 

In 2002, the government imposed a registration requirement on religious groups requiring each group applying for approval to provide detailed financial and membership information, as well as background on its presence in 

Eritrea. Affected groups included Protestant Evangelical and 

Pentecostal Christian denominations, as well as the Baha’is. 

COUNTRY REPORTS: AFRICA

As part of the campaign against the 

religious activities of those persons 

not belonging to officially recognized 

religious denominations, Eritrean 

security forces have disrupted private worship, conducted mass arrests 

of participants at religious weddings, 

prayer meetings, and other gatherings, and detained those arrested 

without charge for indefinite periods of time. Hundreds of members 

of unregistered churches and suspect 

Muslims are believed to be detained 

at any given time, typically without 

charges, even for extended periods.

85
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86

Some of these groups have operated in Eritrea for several decades. Exempted from the new 

requirements for registration were the four “sanctioned” faiths. Jehovah’s Witnesses were 

not among the groups offered the opportunity to register. By stipulating that there could 

be no public religious activities pending registration, the decree effectively closed places of 

worship and prohibited public religious activities, including worship services, of all other 

religious communities in Eritrea. To date, no other religious groups have gained government registration, even though some groups submitted applications over three years ago. 

As a result of the registration requirement and of the government’s inaction on registration 

applications, all of Eritrea’s religious communities except the four government-sanctioned 

religious groups lack a legal basis on which to practice their faiths publicly. 

As part of the campaign against the religious activities of those persons not belonging 

to officially recognized religious denominations, Eritrean security forces have disrupted private worship, conducted mass arrests of participants at religious weddings, prayer meetings, 

and other gatherings, and detained those arrested without charge for indefinite periods of 

time. Hundreds of members of unregistered churches and suspect Muslims are believed to 

be detained at any given time, typically without charges, even for extended periods. Among 

those detained have been elderly individuals and persons in poor health. Following Eritrea’s 

designation as a CPC, the government’s religious crackdown intensified, with a series of 

arrests and detentions of clergy and hundreds of others. There are credible reports that the 

security forces have used coercion on detainees to secure repudiation of their faith. Some 

religious detainees have reportedly been beaten, tortured, confined in crowded conditions, 

or otherwise subjected to harsh conditions resulting in death. 

Government violations of religious freedom are alleged to be particularly severe in the 

armed forces. During the war with Ethiopia, many Eritrean soldiers accepted various forms 

of Protestantism, reportedly alarming government officials and leading to the banning of 

prayer meetings among armed forces members. Attendance at such meetings is punishable 

by imprisonment. Moreover, armed forces members and national service inductees reportedly face severe punishment for possession of religious literature, including Bibles. 

During the past year, even the Orthodox Church was not spared official government 

interference in internal church affairs. Security forces acted against reformist elements in 

the Orthodox Church, arresting religious activists and preventing their meetings. The government of Eritrea has also reportedly moved to tighten its grip on the highest levels of the 

Church. In August 2005, the Church’s Synod, allegedly acting on the government’s behest, 

stripped the Orthodox Patriarch of much of his authority, with his administrative duties 

being assumed by a government-appointed layperson. In January 2006, the Synod moved 

to depose the Patriarch. In a letter dated January 15, 2006, the Patriarch denounced the 

Synod’s actions as illegal under canon law and announced the excommunication of the 

government-appointed administrator. 

The Commission has met on a number of occasions with State Department personnel, Eritrean diplomats, religious community representatives, and others concerned with 

religious freedom in Eritrea. In October 2004, the Commission sent a staff delegation to 

Eritrea to study religious freedom conditions first hand. During a six-day visit, the delegation discussed the religious freedom situation with senior Eritrean government officials, 

leaders of the four major faiths sanctioned by the Eritrean government, as well as with 

unregistered religious groups, representatives of non-governmental organizations, United 

Nations personnel, and members of the U.S. and foreign diplomatic communities. In a 
87

January 2005 letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the Commission commended 

the Administration for Eritrea’s designation as a CPC and recommended subsequent actions that the Administration should take, in accordance with IRFA, in response to that 

designation. The Commission welcomed the Secretary’s announcement in September 2005 

that Eritrea would be subject to the first-ever presidential action under IRFA specifically 

taken in response to CPC designation.

Commission Recommendations

As a consequence of the designation of Eritrea as a CPC, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should:

■ maintain the denial of commercial export to Eritrea of defense articles and services covered by the Arms Control Export Act, with some items exempted, as announced by the 

Secretary of State in September 2005;

■ engage in vigorous advocacy of religious freedom and other universal human rights at 

all levels of involvement with the government of Eritrea and draw international attention to religious freedom abuses there, including in multilateral fora such as the United 

Nations; and

■ review development assistance to Eritrea with the aim of redirecting such assistance to programs that contribute directly to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; increases 

in other forms of development assistance should depend on measurable improvements 

in religious freedom. On December 31, 2005, USAID closed its offices and ended most 

assistance programs in Eritrea, with the exception of certain humanitarian activities. The 

Commission believes that any resumption of U.S. development assistance should entail a 

thorough review as described. 

With regard to religious freedom conditions in Eritrea, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should:

■ urge the government of Eritrea to undertake the following actions to improve respect for 

religious freedom in that country by:

● implementation of the Constitution’s existing guarantees of freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion, including the freedom to practice any religion and to manifest such practice;

● institution of a registration process for religious groups that is transparent, non-discriminatory, not overly burdensome, and otherwise in accordance with international standards; 

● prompt registration of those religious groups that comply with the requirements issued in 

2002; religious groups should not be required to provide identifying information on individual members;

● official, public action by Eritrean authorities to permit religious groups to resume their 

public religious activities pending registration, including reopening of places of worship 

closed by the ban in 2002;

● issuance of a public order to the security forces reminding them that religious practice is 

not to be interfered with except in those circumstances permitted by international law;

● release of detainees held solely on account of their peaceful religious activities; and 

● increased engagement by the Eritrean authorities with the international community regarding respect for freedom of religion or belief, including by making an official invitation 

COUNTRY REPORTS: AFRICA
2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

88

for visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and by the UN 

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.

■ encourage unofficial dialogue with Eritreans on religious freedom issues, specifically by:

● the promotion of a visit to Eritrea by U.S. leaders concerned with freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief in order to meet with Eritrean authorities and other opinionmakers and to facilitate dialogue among all of Eritrea’s religious communities;

● the expanded use of educational and cultural exchanges, such as the Fulbright Program, the 

International Visitor Program, and lectures by visiting American scholars and experts, in 

order to introduce more Eritreans to the workings and benefits of societies in which religious freedom and other human rights are respected; and

● support for a conference that would bring together international experts, government officials, and representatives of international organizations, religious communities, and civil 

society to discuss international human rights standards and best practices related to a) the 

registration of religious organizations and b) conscientious objection to military service; 

■ seek the cooperation of other countries in promoting greater understanding by Eritreans 

of international standards regarding freedom of religion or belief; 

■ intensify international efforts to resolve the current impasse between Eritrea and Ethiopia regarding implementation of the boundary demarcation as determined by the “final 

and binding” decision of the International Boundary Commission established following 

the 1998-2000 war; and

■ support, and offer to provide funding for, the creation of an independent human rights 

commission in Eritrea, in line with the Paris Principles1 for such organizations, including 

independence, adequate funding, a representative character, and a broad mandate that 

includes freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief

1

 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, found 

in the Annex to Fact Sheet No. 19, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Office of the High 

Commissioner for Human Rights (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.htm, accessed January 31, 2005).
Nigeria

The response of the government of Nigeria to persistent 

religious freedom concerns in that country continues 

to be inadequate. These concerns include an ongoing 

series of violent communal conflicts along religious lines; 

the controversy over the expansion of sharia (Islamic law) 

into the criminal codes of several northern Nigerian states; 

and discrimination against minority communities of Christians and Muslims. In addition, there are reports of foreign 

sources of funding and support for Islamic extremist activities in northern Nigeria, activities that threaten to fracture 

the already fragile relations between the two main religious 

groups. However, in the past year, Nigerian security forces 

have responded more quickly to quell sectarian violence and 

have taken steps to address the activities of Islamic extremist 

groups. Because of these persistent concerns, the Commission continues to place Nigeria on its Watch List.

Over the last year, Nigeria continued to experience 

incidents of violent communal conflict along religious and 

ethnic lines, which are often intertwined. The popular movement in 12 northern Nigerian states to expand the legal 

application of sharia to criminal matters has continued to 

spark communal violence and is an ongoing source of volatility and tension between Muslims and Christians at both 

the national and local levels. Serious outbreaks of MuslimChristian violence in the last few years threaten to divide 

further the populace along religious lines and to undermine 

the democratic transition and the foundations of freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief in Nigeria. Social, 

economic, and political conditions have not improved in the 

country, fostering a climate of even greater tension among 

ethnic and religious communities. 

Since President Olusegun Obasanjo came to power 

through popular elections in 1999, more than 10,000 Nigerians have been killed in sectarian and communal attacks and 

reprisals between Muslims and Christians. The most serious 

of these clashes have occurred in Kaduna state (February 

and May 2000 and November 2002); Jos, Plateau state (September 2001); Kano state and Yelwa, Plateau state (FebruaryMay 2004); and most recently, in northern and southeastern 

Nigeria, in the wake of the controversy over depictions of the 

Prophet Muhammad in the Danish press (February 2006). 

COUNTRY REPORTS: AFRICA

Since President Olusegun Obasanjo 

came to power through popular elections in 1999, more than 10,000 

Nigerians have been killed in sectarian and communal attacks and 

reprisals between Muslims and 

Christians. Ethnic and religious 

violence continued throughout the 

past year. Hundreds of people were 

killed, and dozens of churches and 

mosques destroyed, in communal violence in several towns and villages 

in southeastern Nigeria, the Middle 

Belt region, and northern Nigeria. 

89

1 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for 

Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, found in the Annex to Fact Sheet No. 19, 

National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Office of the 

High Commissioner for Human Rights (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs19.

htm, accessed January 31, 2005).
2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

90

Ethnic and religious violence continued throughout the past year. Hundreds of people were killed, and dozens of churches and mosques destroyed, in communal violence in 

several towns and villages in southeastern Nigeria, the Middle Belt region, and northern 

Nigeria. In April and May 2005, at least 17 people were killed in the central state of Benue as 

a result of sectarian violence and reprisals between Muslims and Christians. From February 

to May 2005, in the northern state of Sokoto, at least seven people were killed and dozens 

injured in fighting between groups of Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. Shi’as claimed their public 

commemoration of Ashura was attacked in an attempt to stop their procession. 

In February 2006, at least 120 Muslims and Christians were killed in four days of 

sectarian violence across Nigeria, particularly in the cities of Onitsha, Maiduguri, Katsina, 

and Bauchi, after protests over caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad fueled underlying 

religious and ethnic tensions. The reports of human rights groups and others indicate that 

both Muslim and Christian groups initiated attacks on the other and responded with reprisal attacks. Unlike in the past, the Nigerian government eventually raised the security alert 

level and directed law enforcement agents to deal decisively with eruptions of violence in 

any part of the country. At least 400 people have since been arrested. In early March, the 

Nigerian Information Minister stated publicly that there are continuing efforts by some 

individuals, groups, and organizations to instigate “further violence and mayhem” in many 

northern and southern states and that those “already arrested for their roles in the violence 

will be fully prosecuted.” 

President Obasanjo has been criticized both inside and outside Nigeria for not responding more decisively to religious violence and the communal tensions brought about 

by the sharia controversy. He has primarily played a mediating role, stressing political negotiations rather than ordering the government to intervene to stop or prevent further 

violence. Moreover, many Christians and Muslims have been identified as perpetrators of 

violence over the years, but very few, if any, have been prosecuted or brought to justice. In 

fact, security and police forces have sometimes been accused of using excessive force, including extrajudicial killings, to curb communal violence. In an unprecedented admission, 

in August 2005, President Obasanjo stated publicly that the Nigerian police force had been 

guilty of torture and extrajudicial killings in numerous instances, and vowed to enforce 

adherence by police to international human rights standards. After her visit to Nigeria in 

February-March 2005, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief stated 

that the Nigerian government should ensure that investigations of communal and sectarian violence are thorough, including through the identification and prosecution of the alleged perpetrators. In addition, the Nigerian government “should take very firm positions 

whenever religion is at the origin of human rights violations, regardless of which religious 

community is concerned.”

Since October 1999, 12 northern Nigerian states have extended or announced plans 

to expand the application of sharia in the state’s criminal law. Although the particulars 

vary from state to state, each has adopted, or reportedly plans to adopt, a sharia-based penal code and provisions to extend the jurisdiction of sharia courts beyond personal status 

matters to include sharia crimes and punishments for Muslims only. Punishments include 

amputation, flogging, or death by stoning, oftentimes after trials that fall short of basic 

international legal standards. Defendants have limited rights of appeal and sometimes no 

legal representation. Women have faced particular discrimination under sharia, especially 

in adultery cases where pregnancy alone has been used as adequate evidence of guilt, and 

allegations of rape and sexual violence are rarely investigated by judges. Some states have 
91

instituted or tolerated, as a result of these imposed codes, discriminatory practices disadvantaging women in education, health care, and public transportation. For example, in July 

2005, the state government in Kano banned women from riding in the same buses as men 

and from riding behind men on motorcycles. Moreover, a few northern Nigerian states 

—Kano, Zamfara, and Katsina—have sanctioned quasi-official Hisbah (religious police) to 

enforce sharia violations. 

There have been several cases in which sharia courts have handed down sentences 

of death by stoning to Muslims for various offenses. In 2003, several such cases were overturned and thrown out on appeal; stoning sentences remain in several other cases pending 

appeal. No stoning punishments have been carried out as of the time of this report. Nevertheless, sentences involving amputation and flogging have been carried out in recent years. 

Although no amputations have taken place in the past year, several cases of this kind are in 

the process of appeal, or awaiting sentencing. There are pending amputation and/or stoning 

sentences in Jigawa, Bauchi, Niger, Kano, and Zamfara states. 

Sharia punishments such as death by stoning and amputation have been topics of a 

national debate in recent years on whether these punishments constitute torture, or inhumane or degrading treatment under the Nigerian Constitution. The UN Committee Against 

Torture, as well as the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, have stated that stoning and amputation do constitute inhuman or degrading treatment under international human rights 

standards and treaties. On this issue, the UN Special Rapporteur stated that the Nigerian 

government should ensure that practices and codes of all states are in compliance with international human rights conventions and it should conduct an “assessment of all the laws 

in force and analyze their compatibility with international human rights law.”

In addition to the sharia controversy and the violence it has incited, Nigeria is plagued 

by a number of other serious problems regarding freedom of religion or belief. Christians in 

the northern states complain of what they view as discrimination at the hands of Muslimcontrolled governments and describe their communities as having the status of “secondclass citizens.” Most complaints predate the recent initiatives regarding sharia, and include 

allegations of official discrimination in the denial of applications to build or repair religious 

institutions, access to education and state-run media, representation in government bodies, and government employment. In August 2005, there were reports of the forcible closure by local police and the Hisbah of 15 churches in Kano state. Muslim communities in 

southeastern Nigeria, where Muslims are a small fraction of the population, echo some of 

the complaints of minority Christian communities in northern Nigeria. Southern Muslim 

leaders report official or officially sanctioned discrimination in the media, education, and 

representation in government institutions. Although proselytizing is permitted by the Constitution, several northern states continue to ban some public religious activities to address 

public safety and security concerns. 

Over the past few years, there have been an increasing number of small, vocal Muslim groups in northern Nigerian that advocate strict application of sharia, and which, some 

argue, are helping create a haven for radical Islamic militants from outside Nigeria. Though 

not organized as a nationwide movement, some of these groups advocate a more forcible 

Islamization of all of Nigerian society, regardless of religious affiliation. In late 2003 and 

early 2004, a wave of extremist activities, including attacks on police stations and churches, 

resulted in at least 18 deaths in Yobe state in northeastern Nigeria. A group of about 200 

young militants killed two policemen and seized guns and ammunition. Police responded 

COUNTRY REPORTS: AFRICA
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92

by killing dozens of militants. A UN press report stated that a Sudanese man was arrested 

for spearheading the insurrection and that the Islamic foundation he headed, which builds 

new mosques in Nigeria, was funded by Saudi nationals. The man who heads the militant 

group reportedly fled to Saudi Arabia. Similar militant activity, resulting in more than a 

dozen deaths and kidnappings of Christians, continued in late 2004 in Borno and Jigawa 

states. In a positive development, in the past year, Nigerian security forces have dealt more 

decisively with Islamic extremist groups, resulting in a decrease in the number of incidents 

related to these groups’ activities.

Several observers inside and outside Nigeria have reported that financial support 

from Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan has been used to build mosques and Islamic religious 

schools in northern Nigeria. Some have suggested that the strict interpretation of Islam being preached in these mosques and religious schools is not a form of Islam that is traditional 

to Nigeria. Also, there are reports that an increasing number of Nigerian Islamic scholars 

and clerics are being trained in Saudi Arabia and have brought back with them a politicoreligious ideology that explicitly promotes hatred of, and violence against, non-Muslims.

The Commission has traveled twice to Nigeria, most recently in August 2003. In August 2004, the Commission issued a Policy Focus on Nigeria, which included recommendations for the U.S. government in relation to communal and sectarian violence, the expansion of sharia law in the north, discrimination against religious minorities, and increasing 

Islamic extremist activity. In addition, throughout the past year, Commission staff met with 

members of non-governmental organizations representing various religious communities 

in Nigeria, as well as human rights organizations, academics, and other Nigeria experts.

Commission Recommendations

With regard to Nigeria, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should:

■ urge the Nigerian government to address the sharia controversy, oppose religious extremism, and hold accountable perpetrators of religious violence by:

● ensuring that sharia criminal codes do not apply to non-Muslims or to individual Muslims 

who do not wish to go before sharia courts, and preventing law enforcement activities in 

northern states by any quasi-official or private corps of sharia enforcers;

● ensuring that sharia codes, where applied, do not result in violations of international human 

rights standards with regard to freedom of religion or belief, due process of law, equal treatment before the law, freedom of expression, and discriminatory practices against women;

● taking effective steps to prevent and contain acts of sectarian and communal violence, prevent reprisal attacks, and bring those responsible for such violence to justice;

● ceasing immediately any official support for the so-called “religious police,” or Hisbah, and 

ensuring that state governments make greater efforts to halt the activities of these vigilante 

groups, including prosecuting those found to have taken the law into their own hands;

■ expand U.S. presence and outreach efforts, primarily in northern Nigeria by:

● opening a consulate or other official presence in Kano, or elsewhere in the north;

● providing adequate Embassy and Consulate staff with appropriate local language skills, and 

require political and public affairs officers to regularly travel throughout Nigeria;
93

COUNTRY REPORTS: AFRICA

● increasing the capacity of the Hausa Service of the Voice of America to report fair and balanced views on communal conflict and human rights;

● expand in northern Nigeria the American Corners program; and

● sponsor several exchange programs each year on the topics of freedom of religion or belief, 

religious tolerance, and Islamic law and human rights, targeting religious leaders, human 

rights advocates, government officials, and northern Nigerians;

■ expand U.S. support for communal conflict prevention and mitigation, through U.S. foreign assistance programs or otherwise, by identifying and supporting:

● Nigerian non-governmental organizations working on communal conflict prevention and 

mitigation, emphasizing capacity-building at the local level;

● human rights defenders, including legal aid groups that defend the constitutional and internationally recognized rights of individuals, especially women, impacted by sharia-based 

criminal codes;

● human rights defenders responding to credible allegations of religious discrimination in 

any part of Nigeria;

● funds for the expansion of training for the Nigerian federal police in human rights protection;

● programs and institutions, particularly where communal violence has occurred, that promote objective, unbiased, and non-inflammatory reporting, consistent with the right to 

freedom of expression; and

● the expansion of Nigeria’s Inter-Religious Council, formed to promote dialogue between 

Christians and Muslims, and replicate the Council at the state and local levels; and

■ support and adequately fund the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, a regional 

U.S. security partnership, succeeding the previous Pan-Sahel Initiative and comprised of 

African and Maghreb countries, including Nigeria, which helps to identify, publicize, and 

counter foreign sources of terrorism and religious extremism. 
94

Burma

S

erious human rights abuses perpetuated by Burma’s military regime continue to be 

widespread, including systematic and egregious violations of religious freedom. According to the State Department’s 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 

the Burmese government’s extremely poor human rights record deteriorated in the past 

year, with increasing hostility directed at ethnic minorities, democracy activists, and international humanitarian agencies. Since its inception, the Commission has recommended 

that Burma be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. The State Department 

has followed this recommendation and consistently named Burma a CPC.

The military junta that governs Burma, the State Peace and Development Council 

(SPDC), monitors the activities of all religious organizations through a pervasive internal security apparatus. In the past year, the SPDC moved the country into a position of 

further isolation by transferring the capital from Rangoon to a remote provincial city of 

Pyimma, telling diplomats that they could reach the new government capital only by fax. 

The government imposes restrictions on certain religious practices, controls and censors 

all religious publications, has supported, allowed, or instigated violence against religious 

minorities, and, in some areas of the country, has forcefully promoted Buddhism over 

other religions. Ethnic minority Christians and Muslims have encountered the most difficulties in recent years. 

The SPDC remains locked in a decades-long conflict with the pro-democracy opposition in the cities and armed groups of ethnic minorities in the countryside. The 

military junta continues to be suspicious of all organized, independent religious activity, in part because some clergy and followers of Buddhism and members of minority 

religions are politically active in opposition to the regime. This includes persons from 

among the ethnic minorities, for whom religion is often a defining feature. There have 

been some attempts in recent years to reach peace accords with armed militias and produce a “Seven-Step Roadmap to Democracy,” but these efforts have not produced an 

improvement in the overall conditions for human rights, including religious freedom, 

in Burma. In fact, renewed attacks on ethnic villages have resulted in additional human 

rights abuses, including killings, rapes, forced labor, communal violence, displaced persons, and forced renunciations of faith. Because opposition political parties have been 

excluded from the roadmap process, religious leaders suspected of supporting the National League for Democracy (NLD) or those critical of SPDC policies have been harassed, arrested, and detained. 

Members of minority religious groups, especially Muslims and Christians, face serious abuses of religious freedom and other human rights by the military that continued in 

East Asia

▲ Burma

▲ China

▲ Indonesia

▲ Korea, 

People’s 

Democratic 

Republic of

▲ Laos

▲ Vietnam
the past year. In some localities, military commanders have 

forcibly conscripted members of ethnic and religious minorities for forced labor. Those who refuse conscription are 

threatened with criminal prosecution or fined. Those who do 

not carry out their tasks have been shot or beaten to death. 

Christians and Muslims have been forced to engage in the 

destruction of mosques, churches, and graveyards and serve 

as military porters. They reportedly have also been forced 

to “donate” labor to build and maintain Buddhist pagodas 

and monasteries. In January 2006, military forces destroyed 

a fifty foot cross on a hillside in Chin State and forced Christians to erect Buddhist shrines in its place. 

Tensions between the Buddhist and Muslim communities has resulted in outbreaks of violence over the past 

several years, some of it instigated by Burmese security 

forces against ethnic minority Muslims. In 2003, Buddhists 

attacked shops, restaurants, and homes owned by Muslims 

in Irrawaddy Division. In 2004, at least seven Muslims were 

killed and two mosques destroyed in Mandalay. In January 

2005, two Muslims were killed and one Buddhist monk severely injured in communal violence in Rakhine (formerly 

known as Arakan) state. Police and soldiers reportedly stood 

by and did not halt the violence against Muslims until Muslims started to fight back. 

In addition to violence, overt discrimination against 

Muslims, particularly ethnic Rohingya Muslims, is widespread and severe. The government has denied citizenship 

to Rohingya Muslims on the grounds that their ancestors 

allegedly did not reside in the country prior to British colonial rule. Without citizenship, Rohingya face restrictions 

on their freedom of movement. They also may not be able 

to own property legally or reside in certain townships or attend state-run schools beyond the primary level. Since 1988, 

the government has permitted only three marriages per 

year per village in the predominantly Muslim parts of Rakhine. Enforcement of this policy widened in the past year. 

In June 2004, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 

expressed concern over the situation among Rohingya children, particularly with regard to the denial of their right to 

food, health care, and education, as well as to their ability to 

survive, develop, and enjoy their own culture and be protected from discrimination. 

Muslims reported difficulties in constructing new 

mosques or re-building those previously destroyed. In 2002, 

authorities in Rakhine state destroyed 13 mosques, halting 

only in response to international pressure. Local authorities 

reportedly replaced the mosques with government owned 

COUNTRY REPORTS: EAST ASIA

Members of minority religious 

groups, especially Muslims and 

Christians, face serious abuses of 

religious freedom and other human 

rights by the military that continued 

in the past year. In some localities, 

military commanders have forcibly 

conscripted members of ethnic and 

religious minorities for forced labor. 

Those who refuse conscription are 

threatened with criminal prosecution 

or fined. Those who do not carry out 

their tasks have been shot or beaten to 

death. Christians and Muslims have 

been forced to engage in the destruction of mosques, churches, and graveyards and serve as military porters. 

95
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96

buildings and Buddhist temples and have refused to issue the necessary permission for 

mosque construction on other sites. In July 2005, authorities forced the closure of a Muslim 

school on the grounds that its teachers had tried to convert children to Islam by offering 

private courses. Additionally, in Rangoon, eight Muslims were arrested for holding prayers 

at the home of a local imam. They remain detained, pending trial. Authorities also forbid 

ceremonies for Eid al-Adha in Rangoon. 

Christian groups continue regularly to experience difficulties in obtaining permission to build new churches, as well as to hold public ceremonies and festivals and import 

religious literature. Authorities have reportedly denied permission for the construction of 

new churches since 1997 in certain parts of Chin state. Similar restrictions are reportedly 

imposed in the capital of Kachin state and among Protestants in Karen state. In Rangoon 

in 2001-2002, authorities closed more than 80 Protestant house churches because they did 

not have proper authorization to hold religious meetings. Few of these churches have since 

been reopened. Additional reports of church closings in Rangoon have been received within the last year. 

Among the Chin and Naga ethnic minorities, there are credible reports that government and military authorities made active efforts to convert Christians to Buddhism. The 

State Department’s 2004 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom reported that 

under the guise of offering free education, local officials have separated children from their 

parents, with the children instructed to convert to Buddhism without their parents’ knowledge or consent. However, Christian groups reported that these measures decreased in the 

past year. In Chin state, there are continued reports that government authorities offered 

financial and career incentives to ethnic Burman Buddhist soldiers to marry Chin Christian 

women. Among Naga Christians, refugees leaving Burma report that members of the army, 

together with Buddhist monks, closed churches in local villages and attempted to force adherents to convert to Buddhism. 

In addition to building permits, the government of Burma continues to discriminate 

against members of minority religious groups in education, publishing, and access to public 

sector services and jobs. In public schools nationwide, all students are required to recite a 

daily Buddhist prayer. While some Muslim students are permitted to leave the room during 

this time, some schools require non-Buddhist students to recite the prayer. 

The SPDC shows public preference for Theravada Buddhism; however, even the 

majority Buddhist religion is not immune from government repression. According to 

the State Department’s 2005 human rights report, members of the Buddhist “sangha” are 

subject to a strict code of conduct that is reportedly enforced through criminal penalties. Monks are not allowed to preach political sermons or make public views critical of 

SPDC policies. Military commanders retain jurisdiction to try Buddhist monks in military court for “activities inconsistent with and detrimental to Buddhism.” Over the past 

several years, monks and nuns have been defrocked or imprisoned, and an estimated 300 

monks and novices remain incarcerated. 

The government also prohibits all monks from being members of a political party. 

Since the 1990s, some Buddhist monks have been active in the pro-democracy movement, 

resulting in the imprisonment of more than 100 Buddhist monks for advocating democracy 

and encouraging dialogue between the government and pro-democracy forces. The number of Buddhist clergy in prison for supposed political activity has risen since May 2003, 

when the Burmese government organized an attack on the motorcade of Aung San Suu Kyi 
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and placed her in “protective custody.” Travel restrictions, including an overnight curfew, 

remain in effect at several monasteries. 

In March 2005, Senator Gordon Smith introduced S. Res. 91, a resolution to urge the 

European Union (EU) to maintain its arms embargo on China. The resolution cited Commission findings on the role of the Burmese military in perpetuating religious and ethnic 

conflict in that country, in which China has played a role as a key supplier of weapons materials. The resolution, using language suggested by the Commission, also recommended 

greater cooperation between the EU and the United States to bring “a permanent and verifiable end to the ongoing proliferation by state and non-state owned entities and individuals 

of the People’s Republic of China of munitions materials, and military equipment and trade 

in such items involving countries, such as Burma and Sudan, whose armies have played 

a role in the perpetration of violations of human rights and of humanitarian law against 

members of ethnic and religious minorities.”

In 2005, Commission staff met with exiled Burmese ethnic and religious leaders, including Buddhists, Christians, and Muslims, and with members of congressional and international delegations that visited Burma. 

Commission Recommendations

In addition to recommending that Burma be designated as a CPC, the Commission 

has recommended that the U.S. Government should urge the government of Burma to:

■ halt the arrest and detention of persons solely on the basis of religion or belief and immediately 

and unconditionally release any person who has been detained for the peaceful exercise of the 

right to religious freedom, including an estimated 300 Buddhist monks and novices;

■ publicly and officially order security forces to end violations of religious freedom, including compulsory contributions by non-Buddhists to the construction of pagodas, the 

closure of churches and mosques, the destruction of religious shrines and symbols, the 

instigation of communal violence against Muslims, the forcible promotion of Buddhism 

among ethnic minorities, and forced renunciation of belief;

■ end policies of forced eviction from, followed by the confiscation and destruction of, 

Muslim and Christian properties, including mosques, churches, religious meetings 

points, schools and cultural centers;

■ end policies that discriminate on the basis of religion in land use, education, allocation 

of land, job promotion, marriage, access to government services, citizenship, freedom of 

movement, and marriage, and invite international technical assistance to help draft laws 

that conform to international legal standards on these matters;

■ end the use of forced labor and the use of children and members of religious minorities as 

porters or military labor, and actively enforce its own Order 1/99 (May 1999) and Order 

Supplementing 1/99 (November 2000), which instruct SPDC officials and military commanders to refrain from employing forced labor of civilians, except in emergencies;

■ accept the recommendations of UN General Assembly Resolution A/C.3/60/L.53 on the 

Situation of Human Rights in Burma, adopted by the General Assembly in November 

2005, which includes the granting of unimpeded access to both the UN Special Rapporteur on Burma and the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy on Burma;

■ allow unrestricted access of independent human rights monitors and humanitarian aid 

organizations to all parts of Burma;
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■ ratify core international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights; and

■ immediately and unconditionally release National League for Democracy Chairman 

Aung San Suu Kyi and engage in meaningful dialogue with the democratic opposition 

leading to a peaceful transition to civilian rule.
China

The Chinese government continues to engage in systematic and egregious violations of freedom of religion or belief. Although the number of professed religious adherents has expanded in recent years, conditions 

for religious freedom have nevertheless remained poor. 

Moreover, ongoing efforts to implement certain legislative 

and economic reforms have not rectified the fundamental 

failures in the legal system that perpetuate religious freedom 

abuses. Chinese government officials continue to control, 

monitor, and restrain the activities of all religious communities, including Uighur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, various spiritual movements such as the Falun Gong, “underground” Roman Catholics, and “house church” Protestants. 

Prominent religious leaders and laypersons alike continue 

to be confined, tortured, “disappeared,” imprisoned, and/or 

subjected to other forms of ill treatment on account of their 

religion or belief. Since 1999, the Commission has recommended that China be designated as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC. The State Department has followed the 

Commission’s recommendations and named China a CPC. 

In August 2005, a Commission delegation made an 

unprecedented two-week visit to China to engage senior 

government officials on Chinese policies and practices relating to religious freedom. The trip followed three years of 

diplomatic effort by the U.S. government. During the visit, 

the delegation traveled to the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, 

Chengdu, Urumqi, Kashgar, and Lhasa. The Commission 

delegation raised questions about Chinese law and international human rights norms, the control and management 

of religious affairs, new regulations on “cults” and religious 

affairs, the situations in Xinjiang and Tibet, religious education of minors, Chinese policy toward unregistered religious communities, and other matters relating to freedom of 

religion or belief, as well as the condition of North Korean 

asylum-seekers in China. The Commission also raised specific cases of concern with law enforcement officials. For a 

full discussion of this visit, see the chapter entitled, “China: 

Commission Makes First Official Visit” in this report. 

In March 2005, the Chinese government promulgated 

the National Regulations on Religious Affairs, which replaced 

previous regulations issued in 1994. Though Chinese leaders 

heralded the regulations as “a significant step forward in the 

protection of religious freedom,” the bulk of the regulations in 

fact codify provisions previously scattered through several sets 

of laws, ordinances, and regulations. Provisions in the 2005 

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Chinese government officials continue to control, monitor, and restrain 

the activities of all religious communities, including Uighur Muslims, 

Tibetan Buddhists, various spiritual 

movements such as the Falun Gong, 

“underground” Roman Catholics, 

and “house church” Protestants. 

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regulations specify conditions with which registered religious organizations must comply in 

order to gain permission to provide social services in local communities, accept donations 

from overseas, and host inter-provincial religious meetings. Several of the protections laid out 

in the new regulations, such as the protection of “normal” religious activities, safeguards of 

religious properties, and democratic election for management committees of religious venues, 

have been part of Chinese law for several years. Yet, these provisions in the past have failed 

adequately to protect religious organizations from harassment, intimidation, and interference 

from state authorities. 

After studying the matter, consulting with experts, and discussing the issue in China, 

the Commission concludes that the new regulations were issued in large measure to regularize the management of religious affairs, thus offering Party leaders more extensive control over all religious groups and their activities. Under the new rules, success with regard 

to implementation is measured according to the number and proportion of unregistered religious organizations and sites that local officials can succeed in bringing into the structure 

of officially registered religious groups. Any religious activity outside this official structure 

is illegal and subject to restriction. Local Religious Affairs Bureaus (RAB) pressure unregistered groups to become registered or to merge with existing registered groups. Groups that 

persistently resist pressure to register have been shut down and their leaders detained or 

fined, and in some cases, made to face criminal prosecution. 

In practice, the process for registration requires religious 

groups to affiliate with one of the seven government-sanctioned 

“patriotic religious organizations.” Some groups have resisted such 

an affiliation due to requirements that they 1) provide the government with the names and contact information of their congregants; 

2) receive approval from the relevant patriotic religious organization on leadership decisions; and 3) inform that organization about 

religious activities and programs. Some religious leaders also report that the patriotic religious organizations sometimes interfere 

in doctrinal decisions and require them to refrain from teaching 

on certain subjects or presiding over certain religious rituals. Officials from China’s State Administration on Religious Affairs have 

remarked that while religious organizations and religious venues 

are required to register, registration is not necessary for small groups of families and 

friends meeting to worship in private homes. During its visit to China in August 2005, the 

Commission received varying answers from numerous officials regarding the definitions 

of what would constitute “small groups of families and friends.” Some officials stated that 

only larger groups and groups that meet on a regular, permanent basis would be required 

to register; however the criteria continues to be vague, and individuals have still been 

detained because of worship ceremonies conducted in unofficial settings. 

Within the last two years, Chinese leaders have continued a campaign to root out 

what they view as “foreign infiltration,” a campaign that has, in some cases, targeted religious organizations that attempt to maintain affiliation with co-religionists abroad, although such contact is specifically affirmed in the UN Declaration on the Elimination of 

Intolerance. The campaign originates from Politburo level leadership and has been carried 

out more intensively in areas with a greater presence of unregistered religious activity and 

in certain ethnic minority areas, such as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the 

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). In fall 2005, reports indicated that Chinese 

Commission meets with Chinese Vice Premier 

Hui Liangyu
101

officials considered the case against Protestant house church Pastor Cai Zhuohua, discussed further below, an important part of the campaign to root out “foreign infiltration.” 

In the largely Muslim XUAR, freedom of religion or belief continues to be severely 

curtailed by the government, which often conflates peaceful Uighur political opposition 

with violent separatist activities, extremism, and/or terrorism. The already poor situation 

deteriorated further in the past year, as a campaign against “terrorism, separatism and religious extremism,” perpetuated through orders originating from China’s Politburo, targeted 

politically, socially and religiously active members of Uighur society. Since September 11, 

2001, the government has used concerns about international terrorism as a pretext to monitor and control Muslim religious activities. Uighur Muslim clerics and students have been 

detained for various “illegal” religious activities, “illegal religious centers” have been closed, 

and police continue to confiscate large quantities of “illegal religious publications.” Some 

religious leaders and activists who attempt to publicize these and other abuses have received 

prolonged prison terms, or even death sentences, on charges of “separatism” and “endangering social order.” All imams in Xinjiang are required to undergo annual political training 

seminars to retain their licenses, and local security forces maintain a dossier on them to 

make sure they meet political requirements.

In response to concerted and persistent pressure from the U.S. and European Union 

governments, Chinese authorities released Uighur businesswoman Rebiya Kadeer in March 

2005. Kadeer was arrested in 1999 for trying to deliver a letter to a visiting staff delegation from the U.S. Congressional Research Service. The letter was critical of the Chinese 

government’s policies in Xinjiang, including its suppression of Islam. Since Ms. Kadeer’s 

exile, her family members in Urumqi have been harassed and placed under surveillance. 

Two of her business associates were taken into custody in June 2005. The authorities have 

charged the two with tax evasion but have presented no evidence that any crime was committed. In August 2005, Wang Lequan, Chairman of the XUAR and Member of the Chinese 

Politburo, accused Ms. Kadeer of meeting with terrorist organizations in a plot to sabotage 

the upcoming celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the XUAR.

During the Commission’s visit to China in August 2005, religious affairs officials in 

Xinjiang confirmed to Commissioners the existence of a policy that forbids minors from 

participating in any religious activity before completing nine years of compulsory education. During that same month, human rights groups reported that Aminan Momixi, a 

woman in a rural area of Xinjiang, was arrested and detained for holding religious classes 

for 37 students in her home. Throughout Xinjiang, teachers, professors, university students, 

and other government employees are prohibited from engaging in religious activities, such 

as reciting daily prayers, distributing religious materials, and observing Ramadan, as well as 

wearing head coverings, and are reportedly subject to fines if they attempt to do so.

The Chinese government retains tight control over religious activity and places of 

worship in the TAR. The religious activities of monks and nuns are highly controlled, monasteries are administrated by government-approved management committees, and the 

Communist Party insists in approving the selection and training of reincarnate lamas. The 

Chinese government acknowledges that more than 100 Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns 

are being held in prison. Tibetan human rights groups claim that these prisoners are subject to torture and other ill-treatment. There have been some high-profile early releases or 

reduced sentences of Tibetan Buddhists in the past several years. In February 2004, authorities released Phuntsog Nyidron, a nun who had been held in Drapchi Prison since 1989. 

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Phuntsog Nyidron remained under constant surveillance and her freedom of association 

was extremely limited until she was permitted to leave Tibet for the United States in March 

2006. Nevertheless, neither recent prisoner releases nor renewed contact between China 

and the Dalai Lama’s representatives have brought any significant changes to the government’s overall policy of strict control over religion in Tibet. 

The Chinese government continues to deny repeated international requests for access 

to the 17-year old boy whom the Dalai Lama designated as the 11th Panchen Lama. Government officials have stated that he is being “held for his own safety,” while also claiming that 

another boy, one of their choosing, is the “true” Panchen Lama. In January 2003, Tenzin Delek 

Rinpoche was arrested on charges related to a 2002 bombing incident and later sentenced to 

death. U.S. officials were promised that the evidence used to convict Tenzin Delek would be 

reviewed by the Supreme People’s Court. After more than two years, the case has never been 

reviewed, though Tenzin Delek’s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in January 2005. Additionally, Pawo Rimpoche, a reincarnate lama recognized by the Karmapa Lama 

in 1994, remains under strict surveillance and is not permitted to leave his monastery. 

Reports indicate that official campaigns to promote “patriotic education” in Tibet, 

and especially in Lhasa, have intensified in the past year. In July 2005, 18 monks were expelled from Sera Monastery in Lhasa for refusing to participate in “patriotic education” 

sessions. Additionally, 40 nuns were expelled from Gyarak Nunnery in October for similar 

reasons. In November, five monks from Drepung Monastery in Lhasa were arrested and 

detained after they, along with several other monks, refused to renounce their loyalty to the 

Dalai Lama. During the Commission’s visit to Lhasa, Tibetan officials in charge of religious 

affairs and of public security informed the Commission that although it is not illegal for 

citizens to possess pictures of the Dalai Lama, it is illegal to distribute them or to display 

them, since that could be interpreted as incitement to separatist activities. In January 2006, 

authorities in Shigatse Prefecture reportedly arrested Phuntsog Tsering, the chant master 

of Magar Dhargyeling Monastery, on charges of possessing a portrait of the Dalai Lama. 

In April 2005, the Tibet Information Network reported raids in a Tibetan border town in 

which officials reportedly entered the homes of Tibetan residents and confiscated pictures 

and books that contained speeches of the Dalai Lama. 

Beginning with the banning of Falun Gong in 1999, the Chinese government has 

conducted a campaign against what it calls “evil cults” and “heretical sects.” Tens of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners have been sent to labor camps without trial or sent to 

mental health institutions for re-education due to their affiliation with an “evil cult.” Falun Gong practitioners claim that between 1,000 to 2,000 practitioners have been killed as 

a result of police brutality. Given the lack of judicial transparency, the number and treatment of Falun Gong practitioners in confinement is difficult to confirm. Nevertheless, 

there is substantial evidence from foreign diplomats, international human rights groups, 

and human rights activists in Hong Kong that the crackdowns on the Falun Gong continue to be widespread and violent. During the Commission’s August 2005 visit, several 

high level Chinese government officials reiterated official support for these crackdowns 

and defended labeling Falun Gong an “evil cult.” In the past year, a growing number of 

reports have surfaced regarding the re-arrest of Falun Gong practitioners who have been 

released after completing terms of imprisonment originating from the original crackdown in 1999 and 2000. In addition, the Chinese government has reportedly continued 

to pressure foreign businesses in China to sign statements denouncing the Falun Gong 

and to refuse to employ the group’s followers.
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The campaign against “evil cults” has, in recent years, expanded beyond the Falun 

Gong and similar groups to those religious communities that have refused to register and 

become part of the system of officially-sanctioned religious organizations. This campaign 

has targeted leaders and members of newer, as well as long-established, Protestant and Catholic groups which, for various reasons, have not registered with the government. Religious 

leaders have been imprisoned and followers detained and fined for “cultist activity.” Many of 

the congregants of the unregistered South China Church, including its pastor, remain in jail 

facing serious charges and are allegedly subject to torture and other ill treatment in prison. 

In August 2005, about 40 members of the South China Church were reportedly detained in 

Hubei when they met to receive religious training from expatriate co-religionists. In March 

2006, 17 leaders of the Three Grades of Servant Church, which the government has labeled 

an “evil cult,” were tried on charges of murder and fraud after authorities accused them of 

killing members of the Eastern Lightening Sect. Lawyers in that case claim that confessions 

from the 17 men were coerced through torture. 

The Chinese government also continues its repression of the unregistered Roman 

Catholic Church in China, which maintains its allegiance to the Vatican. There are at least 

40 Catholic bishops or priests under arrest, imprisoned, or detained, including 74-year old 

Bishop Su Zhimin, who has been in prison, in detention, under house arrest, or under 

strict surveillance since the 1970s. Bishop Su’s Auxiliary Bishop, An Shuxin, has not been 

seen since he was detained in 1996, although Bishop Jin of Shanghai reported to 

the Commission in August 2005 that he had been permitted to visit Bishop An 

in Hebei in 2001. In August 2004, Bishop Gao Kexian died of unknown causes in 

a prison where he had been since 1997. In March 2005, Bishop Zhao Zhendong 

of Hebei was detained along with two other priests. Their current whereabouts 

remain unknown. Clergy in Hebei, Fujian, and Shaanxi provinces were harassed, 

detained, and arrested during the past year. In November 2005, authorities in Hebei arrested six priests who serve with underground Bishop Jia Zhiguo, who himself remains under house arrest. Also in November, at least 16 nuns were beaten 

in Shaanxi province in attempts to prevent the demolition of a Catholic school. 

One of the nuns was paralyzed in the incident. In December, police reported that 

11 people had been arrested and charged in the beatings, although the nuns claim 

that at least 40 persons were involved. 

Despite tensions in some parts of the country, an ongoing effort continues for 

reconciliation between registered and unregistered communities of Catholics. In 

late 2005, at ordination ceremonies for two auxiliary bishops, one in Shanghai and 

one in Xian, the candidates publicly stated their allegiance to Rome during the ceremony with no reported repercussions from the government. The Vatican claims that 

Pope Benedict had played a role in the appointment of these two bishops, although 

the Chinese government refuses publicly to acknowledge such a role. In October 2005, three 

Chinese bishops were denied permission from the Chinese government to attend a Vatican 

Synod in Rome. 

Conditions for unregistered Protestant groups in China remained poor during the last 

year. According to the State Department, in some regions of China, members of Protestant 

house church groups that refuse to affiliate with the national patriotic religious association 

on either theological or political grounds, are subject to intimidation, extortion, harassment, detention, and the closing of their churches. In the last year, the Chinese government 

continued to carry out large-scale raids on several meetings of house church pastors in 

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USCIRF Chair Michael Cromartie 

with Tibetan Nun Phuntsog 

Nyidron at Washington event 

welcoming her to freedom.

Photo: Diane Daly
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various parts of the country. In January 2006, a well-established house church that has been 

meeting for several years in Beijing was raided by police. Authorities reportedly cited the 

March 2005 Regulations on Religious Affairs and declared the venue an “illegal religious 

gathering.” In addition, in the past year, dozens of pastors were arrested, detained, and, 

in some cases, released in Hebei, Hubei, Henan, Xinjiang, and Anhui provinces. At least 

15 pastors remain in custody from this series of mass arrests. In March 2006, a registered 

church in Henan was reportedly raided and three of its leaders taken into custody because 

it was conducting activities outside the framework of an official agreement with the Three 

Self Patriotic Movement of Protestant Churches, considered the sole body through which 

Protestant congregations may worship and engage in religious activities. However, in some 

parts of the country, unregistered house churches with hundreds of members meet openly, 

with the full knowledge of local authorities. For example, in Yanbian Korean Autonomous 

Prefecture, Protestant leaders report that unregistered house churches are able to maintain 

their activities without interference from authorities. 

In September 2005, house church historian Zhang Yinan was released from a reeducation-through-labor facility in Henan Province after completing his two year sentence. In 

the past year, Xu Yonghai and Zhang Shengqi, house church activists who had been sentenced to prison in August 2004 for sending materials on the persecution of Christians in 

China to organizations in the United States, were both released. However, their colleague, 

Liu Fenggang, who was also arrested at that time, reportedly continues to be ill treated inside the prison. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has examined the cases of 

Zhang Yinan and Liu Fenggang and has determined that both cases were arbitrary detentions. In November 2005, House Church pastor Cai Zhuohua received a three year sentence 

on charges of “illegal business” after authorities confiscated over 200,000 copies of the Bible 

and other religious books from his storage facility in Beijing. Three of Cai’s relatives received lesser sentences in this case. In September 2005, Tong Qimiao was reportedly beaten 

at a public security substation in Kashgar, Xinjiang while police interrogated him regarding the activities of house churches in the region. In June 2004, a local Chinese newspaper 

reported that a woman, Jiang Zongxiu, detained in Guizhou for distributing Bibles, died in 

police custody and that her body showed signs of torture. 

In November 2005, the Commission held a press conference with Members of Congress to release the Commission’s findings and recommendations resulting from its August 2005 visit to China. In addition to its visit in August 2005 and its earlier visit to Hong 

Kong in January 2004, the Commission has carried out a number of activities on China. 

In November 2005, several Members of Congress released a letter urging the Chinese 

government to issue all necessary documents and facilitate procedures for the travel to 

the United States of Tibetan nun and former political prisoner Phuntsog Nyidron, with 

whom the Commission met in Lhasa in August. At that time, the Commission pressed 

the Chinese government to allow her to travel abroad to seek medical attention. The 

Commission was the first group to be allowed to see Phuntsog Nyidron following the UN 

Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in February 2004. In April 2006, Commission 

Chair Michael Cromartie offered remarks at a reception held by the International Campaign for Tibet to welcome Phuntsog Nyidron to the United States following her arrival 

in Washington in March. 

In October 2005, the Commission wrote a letter to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales expressing its concern over the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit in the case Li v. Gonzales, which involved an asylum claim by a Chinese Christian 
105

who organized an unregistered house church in China. The Commission remained active in correspondence with the Justice Department regarding this case until the court’s 

decision was vacated in November. Detailed information about the Commission’s actions 

on the Li case can be found in the chapter on “IRFA and the U.S. Refugee and Asylum 

Programs” in this report.

S. Res. 91, introduced in March 2005 and passed by unanimous consent in the Senate, contains Commission findings that the People’s Republic of China remains a primary 

supplier of weapons to countries such as Burma and Sudan, where the military has played a 

key role in the suppression of religious and ethnic minorities.

In April 2006, the House passed H. Con. Res. 365, which urges the Chinese government to lift restrictions on and end harassment of Chinese lawyers defending individuals 

whose freedom of religion or belief has been violated, as well as human rights activists. The 

Resolution includes several of the Commission’s recommendations for improving religious 

freedom and expanding the rule of law in China. 

Commission Recommendations

In addition to recommending that China be designated a CPC, the Commission offers the following recommendations concerning U.S. policy toward China.

I. Ending Human Rights Abuses in China

The U.S. government should urge the Chinese government to end severe violations 

of religious freedom and other human rights. To this end, the U.S. government should urge 

the Chinese government to:

■ end its current crackdown on religious and spiritual groups throughout China, including 

harassment, surveillance, arrest, and detention of persons on account of their manifestation of religion or belief; the detention, torture, and ill-treatment of persons in prisons, 

labor camps, psychiatric facilities, and other places of confinement; and the coercion of 

individuals to renounce or condemn any religion or belief; 

■ release all those imprisoned or detained on account of their manifestation of religious 

belief in contravention of international human rights standards; and

■ establish a mechanism for reviewing cases of persons detained under suspicion of, or 

charged with, offenses relating to state security, disturbing social order, “counterrevolutionary” or “splittist” activities, or organizing or participating in “illegal” gatherings or 

religious activities. This mechanism should also review cases of detained or imprisoned 

religious leaders, many of whom have been charged with specious criminal offenses.

In addition, the U.S. government should: 

■ raise publicly concerns about Chinese human rights abuses in multilateral fora, including 

at appropriate UN bodies or other international and multi-national fora, and ensure that 

preparations for such actions be made at appropriately high levels; and

■ fully implement the March 2005 bilateral agreement between the Chinese Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Department of State. To this end, the U.S. government should 

urge the Chinese government to:

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● issue a national decree guaranteeing the right of minors to manifest their religion or belief 

and the liberty of parents to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in 

conformity with their own convictions;

● undertake measures to ensure that this decree is implemented fully and fairly in all regions 

of the country and among members of all religious groups;

● provide a clear definition of “religious gatherings at home,” including the circumstances 

under which such gatherings are required to register as religious venues; and

● determine dates for a visit to China by the new UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, in accordance with the terms of reference required by the Special Rapporteur.

II. Building on Existing Efforts to Improve the Rule of Law in China

The U.S. government should make the promotion of the rule of law a greater priority 

of U.S. human rights diplomacy in China. To this end, the U.S. government should continue 

to urge the Chinese government to: 

■ ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 

which China signed in 1998;

■ amend or repeal Article 306 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which has been used against 

attorneys who have vigorously defended the rights of their clients; 

■ amend or repeal Article 111 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which labels as “state secrets” any published information deemed embarrassing to the government, and raise the 

issue of China’s use of “state security” as a rationale for suppressing dissent in bilateral 

and multilateral discussion; 

■ investigate allegations of abuses of power by law enforcement officials and the use of torture to extract confessions in criminal cases, including the cases raised by the Commission 

with the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, report publicly on the 

results of the investigations, and punish those found responsible for such abuses; and

■ end the use of government filters on web sites and e-mail and remove official restrictions 

on Internet message boards and text messaging, including blockage of access to certain 

web sites related to religion, belief, or human rights; revise the September 2000 State 

Council regulations on Internet Content Providers (ICP) and offer ICPs clear and consistent guidelines for web site content and usage to ensure that Chinese law and practice in 

this area conform to international standards on the freedoms of opinion and expression.

In addition, the U.S. government should:

■ appoint a new Counselor for Human Rights and the Rule of Law at the U.S. Embassy in 

Beijing and ensure that U.S. funded programs advance the priorities of U.S. human rights 

diplomacy, including the promotion of religious freedom, with China; and

■ vigorously promote international human rights norms in legal reform and religious affairs by supporting:

● programs with U.S. human rights experts and Chinese government officials, academics, representatives of religious communities, and non-governmental organizations on international standards relating to the right of freedom of religion or belief, and the importance and benefits of 

upholding human rights, including freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief;

● programs with international human rights experts and Chinese scholars, judges, attorneys, 

and government officials on reforms to the Chinese criminal justice system, including 
107

planned changes in the criminal procedure code, the role of defense lawyers, and international norms on criminal justice standards; and

● consultations between international human rights experts and Chinese officials and others on 

the compatibility of Chinese laws, regulations, and practices with ICCPR standards on freedom of religion or belief. These consultations should occur within the 2006 calendar year.

The U.S. Congress should authorize the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund to initiate new human rights and rule of law programs on freedom of religion or belief, targeting both religious and ethnic minorities in consultation with the Commission and with the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom.

III. Strengthening International Coordination for Technical Assistance Programs

The U.S. government should:

■ encourage international coordination of internationally funded technical assistance 

programs in China to ensure that programs advance 1) Chinese compliance with its 

international human rights commitments, and 2) the objectives of the bilateral and 

multilateral human rights initiatives with China.

IV. Expanding U.S. Outreach and Public Diplomacy in Tibet and Xinjiang

The U.S. government should:

■ urge the Chinese government to allow a U.S. government presence, such as consulates in 

Lhasa, Tibet and Urumqi, Xinjiang, which would be able to monitor religious freedom 

and other human rights conditions; and

■ strengthen its efforts to highlight conditions faced by Uighur Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists by:

● addressing religious freedom and other human rights concerns in bilateral discussions;

● increasing the number of educational opportunities in the United States that are available to 

religious and other leaders from these regions, in order to enhance their understanding of 

religious freedom and other human rights according to international standards;

● creating legal clinics to assist those in areas of high concentrations of Uighur Muslim and 

Tibetan Buddhist populations to enforce their human rights under the Chinese Constitution and international law, building on existing programs that serve other ethnic minority 

areas in China;

● expanding ongoing assistance to civil society programs that promote Tibetan culture, language, and social welfare and developing similar programs for Uighurs; 

● increasing the number and frequency of broadcasts in the Tibetan and Uighur languages by 

the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia; and

● using official U.S. delegations traveling in the region and other means to disseminate among 

local populations documents on international human rights standards in local languages.

V. Enhancing the U.S.–China Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue 

The U.S. government should:

■ ensure that congressional oversight of U.S.-China Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue is 

maintained by requiring the State Department to submit an annual public report to the 

appropriate congressional committees detailing issues discussed at the previous year’s 

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U.S.-China human rights dialogue and describing progress made toward a series of 

“benchmarks” specified by Congress.

VI. Addressing the Conditions of North Koreans in China

The U.S. government should:

■ continue to urge the Chinese government to protect North Koreans in China by: 

● upholding its international obligations to protect asylum seekers by (1) working with the 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to establish a mechanism to 

confer at least temporary asylum on those seeking such protection; (2) providing the UNHCR with unrestricted access to interview North Korean nationals in China; and (3) ensuring that any migrants who are being returned pursuant to any bilateral agreement are not 

potential asylum seekers refouled in violation of China’s obligations under the 1951 Refugee 

Convention and its 1967 Protocol;

● granting legal residence to the North Korean spouses of Chinese citizens and their children; and

● allowing international humanitarian organizations greater access to North Koreans in China to address growing social problems experienced by this vulnerable population, including 

child and sexual trafficking and forced labor;

■ place a higher priority on working with China and other countries in the region to provide 

safe haven, secure transit, and clear resettlement procedures for North Koreans; and

■ ensure that the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security work 

with China, South Korea, and other countries in the region to resolve quickly the remaining technical and legal issues surrounding the resettlement of North Koreans in the 

United States and other countries.
Indonesia

I

ndonesia’s transition to democracy since the end of military rule in 1998 is a notable achievement. The majority of Indonesians have embraced democracy, religious 

tolerance, and religious pluralism. In addition, a vibrant 

civil society has initiated public discussions on the nature 

of democracy, the separation of religion and state, women’s 

rights, and human rights more generally. These developments have contributed to a gradual improvement in conditions for human rights, including religious freedom, over 

the past few years. Nevertheless, the Commission remains 

concerned about ongoing communal violence, the forcible 

closures of places of worship belonging to religious minorities, the growing political power and influence of religious 

extremists, and the lack of civilian control over the military. 

Religiously motivated violence in Central Sulawesi, the Malukus, Papua, and parts of West Java continued in the past 

year, including murders, bombings, and mob violence. In 

some of these regions, militant Islamist groups appear to 

operate with relative impunity. Moderate Muslim leaders 

and members of religious minorities face pressure, intimidation, or sometimes violence from protestors organized by 

extremist groups, government officials, or members of the 

police and military. In addition, the government continues 

to restrict the construction and expansion of places of worship. Because of these persistent concerns, the Commission 

continues to place Indonesia on its Watch List.

Islam in Indonesia is known historically for its tolerance and its assimilation of a variety of indigenous cultural 

traditions. With the end of authoritarian rule, there has been 

a revival of Islamic awareness and piety, once repressed by the 

government. The wearing of Islamic dress has re-emerged as 

an outward sign of devotion; the number of Islamic banks, 

businesses, and magazines is growing; and Islamic-themed 

art and fiction are becoming more popular. The role of Islam 

in politics and society, as well as the growth of terrorism, are 

discussed widely on television and radio and in numerous 

public fora, including during the last presidential debates. 

At the same time, there are also concerns that more extremist strains of Islam are finding converts, gaining political 

strength in some local areas, and stoking communal violence and terrorism. 

Religious extremist groups in Indonesia continue to be 

responsible for harassment, intimidation, and acts of violence. 

Members of these groups intimidate judges and local officials 

and vandalize and destroy buildings belonging to religious 

COUNTRY REPORTS: EAST ASIA

The Commission remains concerned about ongoing communal 

violence, the forcible closures of 

places of worship belonging to religious minorities, the growing political power and influence of religious extremists, and the lack of 

civilian control over the military. 

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minorities, including Christian churches, Hindu temples, and Ahmadiyah mosques and religious centers. In September 2005, the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) organized protests and 

intimidated lawyers and judges during the trial of three Christian women who were being 

tried for allegedly “proselytizing” to Muslim children. Through the intimidation of government officials and the instigation of mob violence, the FPI and another group, the “Alliance 

for Anti-Apostates,” effectively closed at least 50 Protestant churches in West Java during 2005, 

a significant increase from the previous year; churches were burned or destroyed by mobs or 

closed by government officials after intense community pressure. In some cases, police did 

little to stop the violence and on occasion, even participated in it. In January 2005, six Hindu 

temples in Bali were vandalized. In March 2006, a Hindu temple was bombed in Central 

Sulawesi. Twice in July 2005, mobs attacked the Ahmadiyah compound in Bogor, West Java. 

Despite the presence of security forces, several buildings were burned. No assailants were 

arrested in these attacks. In September 2005, mobs attacked Ahmadiyah mosques and other 

property in Cianjur, West Java. Police did arrest 45 suspects in that attack and are pursuing 

prosecution against 12 of those arrested. However, as a purported protective measure, local 

government officials banned all Ahmadiyah activities in Cianjur. In March 2006, there were 

reports that mobs attacked the homes and private property of Ahmadiyah members in Prapan 

and Ketapang, Lombok. At least 132 people were expelled from their homes. In addition to 

violence against members of and property belonging to religious minorities, extremist groups 

also harass and close down nightclubs, bars, and cafes.

Attacks on Ahmadiyah religious communities followed the issuing of 

a fatwa in July 2005 by the Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI) condemning 

Ahmadiyahs as “deviants” from Islam. In addition to the Ahmadiyah fatwa, 

the MUI issued religious edicts banning interfaith prayer, marriage, and inheritance, as well as the notions of pluralism, liberalism, and secularism. 

According to Indonesian human rights groups, the MUI fatwas undermined 

public support for projects of interfaith dialogue and public discussions on 

the compatibility of Islam, democracy, and human rights. Intellectuals, 

scholars, and activists engaging in these activities have been intimidated and 

their lives and property threatened. Though the MUI is not a government 

entity and its fatwas do not carry the force of law, the Indonesian government has not publicly addressed the MUI edicts or distanced itself from 

their content. However, the Indonesian government has consistently refused 

calls for an outright ban on the Ahmadiyah religion and publicly supports 

constitutional guarantees to freedom of religion for that community. 

The Indonesian government continues to restrict the construction and expansion of 

houses of worship. In the past, Joint Ministerial Decree 1/1969 (“Regulation on Building Houses of Worship) required “community approval” for the expansion of existing or the building of 

new religious venues. In areas where Christians, Hindus, or Muslims were the minority, new 

building permits were often difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. In addition, in some places, 

extremists pressured local government officials to revoke permits of longstanding places of 

worship and destroyed those operating without permits. In response to public criticism, the 

Ministry of Religious Affairs issued a new Decree (Joint Ministerial Decree 1/2006), which 

appears to impose new restrictions and make it even more difficult to obtain a permit. In 

replacing the vague “community approval” standard, the new decree requires religious groups 

with 90 or more members to circulate a petition and get 60 local residents to support the 

building or expansion of their religious venue. The petition then has to gain majority approval 

Temple in Bali
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from both district and provincial panels of religious leaders. The membership of the panels 

will be chosen proportionally by the number of religious adherents in the region. 

Protestant and Buddhist leaders oppose the measure because many of their religious 

venues have fewer than 90 members. Other religious leaders believe that extremist groups 

will intimidate anyone who signs his or her name to a public petition. In addition, critics 

of the new decree argue that the proportional membership of the district and provincial 

panels does not protect the rights of religious minorities and opens the permit process 

to corruption. Muslim leaders are divided about the new decree’s impact. Hazim Muzadi, 

head of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, declared that 

the new decree was “more restrictive” than the previous one. However, the Chairman of the 

National Assembly, Hidayat Nur Wahid, pointed out that “restrictive regulation...is needed 

to avoid sectarian conflicts among religious communities.” The Commission will continue 

to monitor the implementation of the new decree in the coming year. 

Although the annual number of dead and injured continues to decrease, communal 

violence in Central Sulawesi and the Malukus continued in the last year, threatening to reignite Christian-Muslim conflict that claimed thousands of lives between 1999 and 2001. 

At least 13 people were killed and 80 injured in the Malukus last year in separate attacks 

on a marketplace, a crowded bus, and a police station. In March 2005, a hand grenade 

exploded in a Muslim neighborhood in Ambon. In retaliation, Muslim residents attacked 

a bus carrying Christians. In August 2005, a bomb exploded in an Ambon market, injuring bystanders and destroying property. Police wounded two suspects in this bombing. In 

Central Sulawesi, at least 37 people were killed and 104 injured in communal violence in 

the past year. In May 2005, two bombs exploded in a central market in the predominately 

Christian town of Tentena, killing 24 people. In October and November 2005, eight Christian girls and one Muslim girl who was mistaken for a Christian from Poso were killed in 

three separate attacks. Three of the girls were beheaded. In January 2006, a bomb exploded 

at a “pork butcher” in the city of Palu, killing several customers. Local religious leaders condemned the attacks as the work of “outside extremists” and expressed continued support for 

expanded security and reconciliation efforts.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono publicly condemned the violence in Central 

Sulawesi and sent police investigators from Jakarta to coordinate investigations. However, 

no arrests have been made in any of the cases of communal violence that occurred in the 

past year. Some local leaders in Central Sulawesi laud recent efforts by local police to investigate, arrest, and prosecute those involved in past violence. At the same time, they are 

critical of security forces for not taking more effective measures to prevent the violence. 

Extremist groups, including members of Mujahadin Kompak (MK), a militant offshoot 

of Jemaah Islamiyah, are known to operate in Central and South Sulawesi. These militant 

groups were frequently responsible for attacks on religious minorities and for instigating 

mob actions to restrict religious activities. It is widely believed that concerted government 

efforts to reduce the activities and influence of militant groups would do much to improve 

religious freedom conditions in Indonesia. 

The Indonesian government has made some progress holding accountable those 

responsible for past communal violence in Central Sulawesi and the Malukus. Suspects in 

the May 2005 Tentena bombing and the shooting of a local minister have been detained, 

though no arrests have been made in these cases. According to the State Department, 

Central Sulawesi government officials have called for the investigation of members of 

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the security forces involved in religious violence during the 1999-2001 period and have 

named a senior police officer as a suspect in a 2004 church bombing. There remain concerns, however, about judicial independence and the disparate sentences given Muslim 

and Christian defendants in cases of past religious violence. Such disparities continue to 

fuel grievances that exacerbate religious tensions. 

Human rights organizations have been critical of the role played by the Indonesian 

armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) in regional conflicts throughout Indonesia. The TNI operates independently of civilian political control and only 30 percent of 

its revenue is allocated by the National Assembly, the Indonesian legislature; the other 70 

percent comes from the TNI’s private business investments and other ventures. The TNI 

held expansive political and economic power during the former Suharto regime, though 

they have recently relinquished their reserved seats in the National Assembly. President 

Yudhoyono has cautioned that a move to assert civilian control of the TNI too quickly 

could have negative consequences for democratic stability in Indonesia. Nevertheless, 

reigning in the TNI’s power and holding its senior officers accountable for human rights 

violations is a critical element of addressing ongoing sectarian violence and other human 

rights problems in Indonesia. 

The State Department’s 2005 human rights report states that in the past year, the 

TNI continued to prosecute junior officers and enlisted men for human rights violations. 

However, senior officers are rarely held accountable for abuses against civilians, including 

extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, beatings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, 

and drastic limits on freedom of movement and association. For example, senior officers 

escaped with small sentences, most of which were overturned on appeal, for the atrocities 

committed in 1999 in what is now independent East Timor. 

Some of the very officers indicted for human rights abuses in East Timor, including 

Timbul Silaen and Eurico Guterres, now hold similar positions of authority in the eastern 

region of Papua. Papua’s population has swelled in recent years, due to large flows of economic migrants and other civilians fleeing conflict elsewhere in Indonesia. Indigenous Papuans are predominantly rural and Christian, while the migrant groups are predominantly 

urban and Muslim, creating a volatile mix similar to that found in Central Sulawesi and the 

Malukus at the time those violent sectarian conflicts erupted. The presence of Silaen and 

Guterres in the area has raised fears that additional sectarian conflict and human rights 

abuses will occur in Papua. 

Last year, the United States restored military-to-military relations with the TNI, 

which had been suspended because of the TNI’s role in perpetuating violence in East Timor 

during 1999 and allegations of its involvement in the killing of two American teachers in 

Papua in 2002. In November 2005, the United States started a small International Military 

Education Training (IMET) program and a Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program in 

order to boost the TNI’s counter-terrorist capabilities. In the past, the Commission recommended that any renewed military assistance give priority to reform of the Indonesian military, including human rights training and technical assistance for legal tribunals and other 

mechanisms to hold military officers accountable for human rights abuses. It is too soon to 

evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. military assistance on these priorities. The Commission 

will continue to monitor U.S. military assistance to Indonesia and its relation to the general 

situation for human rights, including religious freedom, in that country. 
113

In August 2005, the Indonesian government concluded a comprehensive peace 

agreement with the insurgent group Free Aceh Movement (GAM). The agreement ended 

a thirty year conflict that had resulted in significant human rights abuses. As of this writing, the agreement remains in place and there is optimism that a lasting peace is possible 

in Aceh. However, the peace agreement does not overturn Aceh’s special autonomy status, which allowed the province to establish and implement sharia law. In 2001, sharia 

police, locally know as Wilayatul Hisbah, were set up to enforce religious norms. Initially, 

these “police” were often confined to mosques and other religious institutions. Since the 

peace agreement was signed, however, sharia police have become more visible. There 

are reports of sharia police issuing fines and meting out other punishments to Muslims 

found gambling or consuming alcohol, unmarried couples found engaging in “immoral” behavior, or women found without headscarves. Public caning punishments are now 

commonplace in some towns, particularly for gambling. Non-Muslims are exempt from 

sharia provisions in Aceh. 

A vocal and influential minority of Indonesians continues to call for implementation of sharia law throughout Indonesia. An August 2002 proposal to implement sharia at 

the national level was withdrawn from consideration by the National Assembly because 

it did not have sufficient support to pass and was opposed by the country’s two largest Muslim organizations. Efforts to revive the legislation continue and could reemerge 

during the current National Assembly session. In addition, there are efforts to enforce 

Islamic law at the municipal and regional levels. In South Sulawesi, Madura, and Padang, 

West Sumatra, local authorities required women to wear headscarves and men to follow traditional Islamic rituals on Fridays. Similar practices were already put in place in 

parts of West Java, including Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, and Garut. In August 2005, a court in 

Surabaya issued a two-year sentence to a man who offered a public prayer in Indonesian 

instead of Arabic, after religious leaders argued that the prayer insulted Islam. Municipal 

governments in Kendari, Medan, and Palembang closed discos, massage parlors, bars, 

and karaoke establishments during Ramadan. Non-Muslims were exempt from the new 

laws. Muslim women’s groups, however, expressed fear of reprisals if women in these areas chose not to comply with the laws. 

In June 2003, the National Assembly passed an education bill, which, if enforced, 

would require both public and private schools to provide religious instruction to their students. In the last year, the government had still not implemented the most controversial 

provisions of the law. 

The Indonesian government continues to encourage inter-religious tolerance and cooperation. Some Indonesian government officials pursued ongoing work with local Muslim and Christian community leaders to diffuse tensions in conflict areas. There are also a 

growing number of inter-religious non-governmental organizations initiating discussions 

on pluralism, democracy, religious tolerance, and human rights. 

U.S. government assistance currently supports programs in conflict resolution, multireligious dialogue and tolerance, pluralism, and education, programs that are in line with 

previous recommendations by the Commission. 

The Commission regularly meets with Indonesian political leaders, human rights activists and defenders, journalists, and religious leaders, including representatives of Muslim, Christian, and Hindu communities from the regions of Aceh, Papua, Sulawesi, Java, 

Bali, and the Malukus. 

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Commission Recommendations

 The Commissions recommends that the U.S. government should urge the government of Indonesia to: 

■ disarm fully and disband all outside militia forces in Sulawesi, the Malukus, and Papua, 

such as Laskar Jundullah, Mujahidin Kompak, and Laskar Merah Putih;

■ continue efforts to bring those who participated in or are responsible for sectarian and 

ethnic violence in Central Sulawesi, Malukus, and Papua to justice, by providing fair and 

transparent trials;

■ provide protection for religious venues, as well as restitution to religious communities 

whose venues are destroyed or closed due to mob violence or protest, and ensure that 

those responsible for such acts are prosecuted; 

■ address the July 2005 Indonesian Ulamas Council (MUI) fatwas prohibiting interfaith 

prayer, interfaith marriage, interfaith inheritance, religious pluralism, liberalism, and 

secularism, as well as the decisions violating the rights of the Ahmadiyah community, as 

contradicting the ideals of religious freedom and tolerance found in Indonesia’s Constitution, and condemn publicly the communal violence and harassment that followed the issuance of the fatwas targeting moderate Muslim organizations, such as the Liberal Islam 

Network (JIL), as well as Ahmadiyah mosques and religious centers;

■ amend the Joint-Ministerial Decree No. 1/2006, (Regulation on Building Houses of Worship) in such a way that it is consistent with the Indonesian constitution’s protection of 

religious freedom and removes restrictive barriers on building and re-furbishing places 

of worship for all religious groups in Indonesia; and

■ transfer or remove from Papua security, police, and militia personnel who were indicted 

for activities related to serious human rights abuses and war crimes by the UN’s Serious 

Crimes Investigation Unit (SCIU) and the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for East Timor 

in Jakarta.

In addition, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should:

■ commend the government of Indonesia for its efforts to curb terrorism, establish peace 

in Aceh, and promote inter-religious understanding, conflict mitigation, and a vibrant 

discussion among members of civil society on the role of Islam in supporting human 

rights, democracy, and pluralism; 

■ consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States (2006), continue to 

expand U.S.-Indonesian cooperation in economic development, democracy, education, 

good governance, pluralism, and rule of law programs by: 

● supporting Indonesia’s evolving legal and human rights reform agenda by providing training, capacity building, and targeted exchanges with Indonesian government agencies, legal 

and judicial institutions and legal and human rights-focused civil society organizations, including the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), the Supreme Court, and 

the Directorate General of Human Rights in the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights;

● establishing exchange programs that bring Indonesian scholars, judges, lawyers, and activists to the United States to initiate discussions with governmental, academic, and nongovernmental experts on human rights, including religious freedom, rule of law, and the 

relationship between religion and the state;
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● monitoring the implementation of sharia law in Aceh and other parts of Indonesia to determine if individual rights and freedoms, including religious freedom, are being guaranteed 

for all citizens and making sure that U.S. humanitarian and foreign assistance programs do 

not support sharia police or courts in Aceh or other municipalities in Indonesia;

● monitoring and publicly reporting on the impact of U.S.-funded humanitarian relief and 

post-conflict development programs on the promotion of religious freedom and other human rights, monitoring that should include, for example, a report to the appropriate congressional committees;

● establishing programs that promote training and capacity-building for Indonesian human 

rights-focused civil society organizations involved in conflict resolution, inter-religious dialogue, reconciliation, public interest law, and economic and social development in areas of 

communal and sectarian conflict; 

● prioritizing support for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights-focused civil society organizations pursuing programs on inter-religious economic development, conflict prevention and social cohesion, and the resettlement of internally displaced 

persons in potential flashpoint areas such as Central Sulawesi, the Malukus, Papua, or parts 

of West Java;

● expanding U.S. government support for the promotion of religious pluralism in Indonesia 

by supporting seminars and conferences, international exchanges, intra-religious dialogue, 

and new radio, television, and publishing activities of interfaith and private organizations 

that promote respect for religious freedom and human rights; and

● expanding support for media, dialogue, and publishing ventures of Indonesian organizations seeking to promote intra-Muslim dialogue on the compatibility of Islam and human 

rights, democracy, and pluralism, including the translation of books by prominent Indonesian scholars into, as appropriate, Arabic, Urdu, Persian, Turkish, and English; and

■ ensure that any ties with the Indonesian military and police should include, as priorities:

● reform of the Indonesian military, including 1) transfer to civilian control, 2) training in 

international human rights standards, and 3) technical assistance in military law and tribunals; and

● dedicated funds for training Indonesian police in counter-terrorism techniques and protecting human rights in areas of sectarian conflict, including fellowships to the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, Thailand and participation in UN 

Police training programs (UNPOL).
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Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of

By all accounts, there are virtually no personal freedoms in the Democratic People’s 

Republic of North Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and no protection for universal 

human rights. In pursuit of absolute control of all facets of politics, society, and the 

flow of information, the government headed by Kim Jong Il has created an environment 

of fear in which dissent of any kind is not tolerated. Freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief does not exist, as the government severely represses public and private 

religious activities and maintains a policy of tight control over government-sanctioned religious practice. Religious belief of any kind is viewed by the government as a potential 

competitor to the officially propagated cult of personality centered on Kim Jong Il, and 

his late father, Kim Il Sung. In the past several years, North Korean government officials 

have arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and sometimes executed those discovered engaging in 

clandestine religious activity. There is no evidence that religious freedom conditions have 

improved in the past year. The Commission continues to recommend that North Korea be 

designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, which the State Department has done 

since 2001. 

Because of the North Korean government’s extremely tight control over all information entering and leaving the country, detailed data about religious freedom conditions is 

difficult to obtain. In 2005, the Commission authorized researchers to interview 40 North 

Korean refugees living in South Korea. The resulting study, authored by David Hawk and 

entitled Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom 

of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea, shows how successive North Korean 

governments suppressed the country’s once vibrant religious and intellectual life and put in 

its place a quasi-religious cult of personality surrounding the Kim family. The report also 

describes the survival of very limited religious activity in North Korea. More information 

about the study and its findings can be found in the chapter entitled “North Korea: Commission Study Provides Evidence of Severe Religious Freedom Violations” in this report. 

The government has allowed Buddhist, Chondokyist (referring to Chondokyo, or 

“Eastern Learning,” a syncretic belief largely based on Confucianism but which also incorporates elements of Taoism, Shamanism, Buddhism and Catholicism), and Christian 

“religious federations” to operate in Pyongyang to project a presence of religious observance to outsiders. However, these federations are often led by political operatives whose 

goal is to implement the government’s policy of control over religious activity, as well as to 

gain foreign humanitarian assistance and maintain religious sites as cultural centers. For 

example, the official Korean Buddhist and Christian Federations restrict religious activities at monasteries, temples, and churches in North Korea. The federations also operate 

churches, temples, and shrines in North Korea. One Catholic and two Protestant churches, built between 1988 and 1992, operate in Pyongyang. Services have been held in these 

churches since the mid-1990s in response to the growing presence of foreign aid workers in 

Pyongyang. Access to these church services is tightly controlled and monitored, and most 

North Korean refugees report that they exist as showpieces for foreign visitors. Nevertheless, in addition to foreign visitors, those permitted to participate in services include some 

North Korean citizens who were known to practice prior to the Korean War. The absence 

of a priest for Roman Catholics means that Mass cannot be celebrated and most sacraments 

cannot be performed. According to South Korean pastors operating exchanges with the Korean Christian Federation, although some fraction of North Koreans who attend services at 
By all accounts, there are virtually 

no personal freedoms in the Democratic People’s Republic of North 

Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and 

no protection for universal human 

rights. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief does 

not exist, as the government severely represses public and private 

religious activities and maintains a 

policy of tight control over government-sanctioned religious practice.

the churches in Pyongyang are genuine in their faith, more 

people reportedly attend services to monitor and report to 

the government on church activities. 

A Russian Orthodox Church under construction since 

2003 remains unfinished. Two North Koreans are reportedly 

receiving Orthodox theological training in Moscow. There 

are also reportedly three Buddhist temples and a Chondokyist shrine in Pyongyang. Government officials have 

claimed that Buddhist temples are cultural relics that need 

to be preserved. There is a department of religion at Kim Il 

Sung University; however, graduates and faculty are said to 

be involved in training security forces to identify repatriated 

refugees who may have become Christian adherents during 

their time in China. 

The North Korean government reports that some 

500 house churches operate in North Korea with government approval. Until recently, it was not possible to verify 

who attended these house services and whether they existed 

outside of Pyongyang. Reports, including the Commission’s 

study, are emerging that indicate that house church participants are largely made up of individuals whose families were 

Christians before the Korean War and that some do in fact 

operate outside of Pyongyang. It is impossible to ascertain 

the number of operating house churches or the extent of 

their activities and membership, as visiting religious leaders 

and scholars are repeatedly denied access to such gatherings 

in rural areas. The Commission has received credible reports 

that underground religious activity is growing, despite pervasive suppression by North Korea’s all-encompassing security apparatus, although there is no reliable estimate of the 

number of religious believers practicing underground. 

Anyone discovered taking part in such unauthorized 

religious activity, which includes carrying religious literature in public, distributing religious literature, or engaging 

in public religious expression and persuasion, is subject to 

severe punishment, such as long term imprisonment in labor camps, torture, and possible execution. There continue 

to be reports of torture and execution of religious believers, 

including a January 2005 report of the execution of six religious leaders. Although the practice of imprisoning religious 

believers is apparently widespread, the State Department has 

been unable to document the number of religious detainees 

or prisoners. According to press reports, an estimated 6,000 

Christians are incarcerated in “Prison No. 15” located in the 

northern part of the country. According to testimony heard 

at the Commission’s January 2002 hearing, prisoners held 

on the basis of their religious beliefs are treated worse than 

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other inmates. For example, religious prisoners are reportedly given the most dangerous 

tasks while in prison. In addition, they are subject to constant abuse from prison officials 

in an effort to force them to renounce their faith. When they refuse, they are often beaten 

and sometimes tortured to death. North Korean refugees and refugee assistance organizations report a growing number of Christian adherents in the prison system due to a spread 

of Christianity from cross-border proselytizing of South Korean and Chinese missionaries 

in the border area. 

The North Korean government forcefully propagates an ideology known as “Juche” 

or “KimIlSungism” centered on the personality cult surrounding Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong 

Il. Pictures of the “Great Leader” (Kim Il Sung) and the “Dear Leader” (Kim Jong Il) hang 

on the walls of every house, schoolroom, and workplace. The only exception is the churches 

of Pyongyang, where crosses hang in their place. Under threat of fines and other penalties, 

North Koreans are required properly to maintain and display the portraits of their leaders. 

Every North Korean wears a lapel pin of the Great Leader. Schools are required to study 

and memorize the “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System of 

the Party.” North Korean refugees report that each village contains a “Kim Il Sung Research 

Center” where they are required to attend weekly meetings. One scholar estimated that 

there may be as many as 450,000 such centers, including one in the infamous Yodok prison 

camp. Meetings include watching inspirational films on the Dear Leader’s life, indoctrination sessions on the principles of Juche, and public self-criticism sessions. 

North Korean officials have stratified society on the basis of family background and 

perceived loyalty to the regime into 51 specific categories. Religious adherents are by definition relegated to a lower category, receiving fewer privileges and opportunities, such as 

education and employment, than others. An extensive report by Amnesty International in 

2003 details evidence that persons in lower categories have, in some cases, been forcibly 

relocated to remote and desolate areas of the country and then systematically denied access 

to food aid and therefore left to starve. 

As a result of the prolonged famine and the highly oppressive nature of the regime, 

an estimated 300,000 refugees have fled North Korea to China over the past eight years. 

With the easing of famine conditions, an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 remain in China 

today. China, according to an agreement with North Korea, considers all the refugees to 

be economic migrants who are subject to forcible repatriation. According to North Korean 

law, leaving the country is tantamount to treason and all returnees are subject to arrest 

and imprisonment, often accompanied by torture. According to refugee testimony, those 

determined to have migrated to avoid famine conditions are often released after a short 

period of detention. Anyone suspected of having contact with either South Korean humanitarian or religious organizations is reportedly extensively interrogated. Security forces 

try to determine if those repatriated have become adherents of Christianity or otherwise 

“contaminated” by their contact with South Koreans. Reports from those repatriated claim 

that security forces use torture during interrogation and anyone deemed to have had such 

contact is subject to a long prison term with heavy labor.

In November 2004, the North Korea Human Rights Act was signed into law. The 

legislation cites Commission findings and includes provisions reflecting several Commission recommendations, including the appointment of a Special Envoy on Human Rights 

in North Korea. In August 2005, President Bush appointed Jay Lefkowitz to this position. 

Commissioners met with Ambassador Lefkowitz in November 2005 to present the recently 

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released study and to discuss Commission policy recommendations on religious freedom 

and human rights issues in North Korea. 

In July 2005, Commission Vice Chair Nina Shea and Commissioner Richard Land 

spoke on a panel titled “Interfaith Action Panel on Human Rights in North Korea,” as part 

of a larger conference on human rights and religious freedom in North Korea. 

In November 2005, the Commission released its study Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: 

Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in 

North Korea at a press conference with several Members of Congress. Commissioners and 

staff also briefed relevant policy makers at the National Security Council, the State Department, and in both Houses of Congress about the findings of the study. In March 2005, Commissioners Michael Cromartie and Felice D. Gaer presented the study’s preliminary conclusions at the 61st Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights. The U.S. Ambassador 

hosted a meeting with country representatives who had voted against or abstained from 

previous motions regarding North Korea. In Geneva, Commissioners also met with the 

UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea and the acting UN High Commissioner for Refugees to discuss preliminary findings on the situation of North Korea. 

In anticipation of the release of the study, Commissioners again met with the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea in October 2005 in New York to discuss the 

study’s final findings and recommendations.

In November 2005, Commissioners met with the representative of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights in Beijing to discuss the situation of North Korean refugees in 

China. Commissioners also inquired about North Korean refugees and voiced concern for 

their situation in meetings with several Chinese officials during the Commission’s visit to 

China in August 2005. 

In March 2006, the Commission hosted, together with the American Enterprise Institute, a panel presentation entitled “Religious Freedom in North Korea: Update and Options,” at which David Hawk, lead researcher of the Commission’s study on North Korea, 

gave a presentation on the findings of the study, with commentary from other panelists. 

Commission Chair Michael Cromartie presented opening remarks and Jay Lefkowitz, the 

Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea, gave a keynote address at the event.

Commission Recommendations

 In addition to recommending that North Korea continue to be designated a CPC, the 

Commission recommends that the U.S. government should:

■ use all diplomatic means to urge the North Korean government to undertake the following measures that would help bring the DPRK into compliance with its international legal 

obligations with respect to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief:

● end the severe human rights violations, including imprisonment and execution on account 

of religion or belief, against individuals not affiliated with the state-sponsored religious federations or those North Koreans having contact with foreign religious groups in China;

● release prisoners from administrative detention in kwan-li-so political penal labor colonies, 

such as those reported to be in certain villages in the “total control zone” at Camp No. 15 

(“Yodok”), as well as those who remain detained in other facilities for exercising their right 

to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief and rehabilitate remaining religious adherents held in lifetime detention;

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● end the coercive enforcement of the official ideology, Juche/Kimilsungism, that results in 

discrimination and other human rights violations against adherents of other religions or 

belief systems; 

● enable adherents of systems of thought and belief not covered by the existing federations, 

such as Confucianism, Shamanism, and other indigenous Korean belief systems, to practice their religion or belief without government interference and to form organizations 

for that purpose;

● implement the existing Constitutional provision allowing for the construction of places of 

worship outside the capital city of Pyongyang, including for religious groups who are not affiliated with the state-sponsored federations or for which there is no applicable federation;

● end prohibitions and punishments for importing religious literature from abroad;

● allow individuals and religious groups to engage in public expression of their religion or 

belief and to inform others of their belief systems; 

● allow religious groups to operate religious education programs for young persons and adults; 

● allow clergy or religious leaders to travel abroad for higher education and/or training, and 

allow the residence of foreign clergy where there are shortages; and

● distribute widely Korean language translations of and other information on the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights and the international human rights treaties to which North 

Korea is a party;

■ work with regional and European allies to fashion a comprehensive plan for security 

concerns on the Korean peninsula—modeled after the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—as suggested by the Commission 

and in Sec. 106 of the North Korean Human Rights Act and

● consider, with this model, expanding the Six-Party talks on nuclear security to include 

separate discussions on issues related to human rights and human security, using ongoing 

security negotiations to press North Korea for improvements in areas of mutual concern, 

including monitoring of humanitarian aid, resettlement of refugees, family reunifications, 

abductions, and other pressing human rights issues, including religious freedom;

■ ensure that the Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea, appointed by President 

Bush in accord with the Envoy’s mandate in the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004, 

retains full authority to move forward on assistance to North Korean refugees, new human rights and democracy programming, and expanded public diplomacy programs;

■ urge the Chinese government to uphold its international obligations to protect asylum 

seekers, by (1) working with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to 

establish a mechanism to confer at least temporary asylum on those seeking such protection; (2) providing the UNHCR with unrestricted access to interview North Korean nationals in China; and (3) ensuring that any migrants who are being returned pursuant to 

any bilateral agreement are not potential asylum seekers refouled in violation of China’s 

obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol;

■ in bilateral relations with China, Russia, Mongolia, and other countries in the region, 

place a higher priority on working to provide safe haven, secure transit, and clear resettlement procedures for North Koreans;

■ promote further cooperation among the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and regional allies, including South Korea, to resolve quickly the remaining 
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technical or legal issues surrounding the resettlement of North Koreans in the United 

States and other countries;

■ urge the Chinese government to allow international humanitarian organizations greater 

access to North Koreans in China, to address growing social problems experienced by 

this vulnerable population; 

■ encourage nations with diplomatic relations with North Korea to include religious freedom and other human rights in their talks with North Korea, and to urge the North Korean government to invite UN Special Rapporteurs and other appropriate UN bodies to 

assess the human rights and humanitarian situation, to monitor the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to recommend reforms and technical assistance programs; 

■ continue to use appropriate international fora to condemn egregious human rights abuses in North Korea and seek protections and redress for victims, including by co-sponsoring and working for passage of a resolution on North Korean human rights practices at 

appropriate UN bodies; and

■ expand radio, television, Internet, and print information available to the North Korean 

people through:

● the expansion of appropriations to the Broadcasting Board of Governors earmarked to allow Radio Free Asia and Voice of America to increase shortwave and medium-wave broadcasting to North Korea to provide a total of 12 original hours of daily broadcasting; and 

● the funding of programs through the National Endowment for Democracy and the Department of State Human Rights and Democracy Fund that disseminate information on 

human rights, including religious freedom, inside North Korea in the form of written and 

electronic materials, DVDs and digital programming.

In addition, Congress should fund a regional task force involving prominent political, academic, religious, and other non-governmental experts from Asia and the United 

States to raise the public profile of North Korea’s human rights and human security concerns and to make recommendations to regional governments for establishing a permanent 

framework that addresses both human rights and other outstanding security and economic 

concerns on the Korean Peninsula. Congress should also: (a) continue to appropriate funds 

authorized in the North Korea Human Rights Act for public diplomacy, refugee assistance, 

and democratization programs; (b) establish a congressional caucus to focus specifically 

on North Korean human rights and refugees and to explore new ideas for establishing an 

“Helsinki Option” for security talks on the Korean Peninsula; and (c) urge congressional 

delegations that visit North Korea to seek access for international monitors to North Korean prisons as promised by Vice-Premier Gew Yan-un to a visiting Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee delegation in 2004. 

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Laos

The Commission removed Laos from its Watch List in 2005. In taking this action, the 

Commission cited the fact that positive steps had been taken by the Lao government 

to address the religious freedom concerns expressed by the Commission and the 

international community. For example, over the past two years, the government of Laos has 

released all but two of its religious prisoners, re-opened most of its closed churches, and issued a public condemnation of forced renunciation of faith. In addition, there were reports 

that government authorities had taken active steps to address the concerns of Lao religious 

minorities, intercede with provincial officials when religious leaders were detained, and 

promote interfaith cooperation. 

In view of the Lao government’s continued poor overall human rights record, there remains a possibility that past religious freedom abuses could reemerge. The Commission therefore maintains its scrutiny of the actions of the Lao government with regard to religious freedom 

to determine whether developments continue to move in a positive direction or if a return to the 

Watch List is warranted. Although religious freedom conditions are better now than in the past, 

the Commission is concerned that progress has stalled over the past year. In addition, the Lao 

government appears unable or unwilling to curtail the actions of some provincial authorities 

who continue to restrict the religious practices of ethnic and religious minorities. 

Since the end of 2002, religious groups, particularly in the largest cities and districts 

of Laos, report steadily improving religious freedom conditions, including a more constructive relationship with the Lao government. The government remains wary of religious 

traditions other than Theravada Buddhism, particularly the various forms of Protestantism found among some ethnic minority groups. However, there are encouraging reports 

that the Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC), the agency that oversees religious 

policy and regulates religious activities, has sought to promote reconciliation and tolerance 

among religious groups and has intervened with provincial officials in cases where minority 

religious practitioners have been harassed, threatened, or detained. In the past, the LFNC 

was reluctant to intervene in local disputes, due to the significant measure of power given 

provincial governors in the Lao system of government. The LFNC continues to cooperate 

with the U.S. Embassy in Laos in organizing, participating in, and conducting seminars on 

human rights, including religious freedom. 

In most parts of the country, adherents from all religious communities are allowed to 

practice their religion with few restrictions. There continue to be reports, however, that provincial and local officials harass individuals, confiscate property, and, on occasion, detain persons 

for participating in religious activities. In the past year, these problems were concentrated in 

parts of Savannakhet, Luang Prabang, and Bokeo provinces, where 35 Christians were briefly 

detained, a pattern similar to that of the previous year. Persons were reportedly arrested in 

order to halt the importation of Bibles, worship activities, and the building of churches. 

The small Catholic communities in Luang Prabang, Sayaboury, and Bokeo provinces 

were allowed to meet in homes, though no priests were available in these areas. The Lao government did grant permission for a Catholic community in Sayaboury province to construct a 

new church. In addition, the bishop of Vientiane announced the ordination of the country’s first 

new priest in 30 years. The ordination, however, has been postponed by the Lao government. 

Followers of the Baha’i faith continued to face restrictions from local authorities in Savannakhet 

province, though they were able to meet in urban areas. 
Between 1999 and 2002, the State Department reported that campaigns of coerced renunciation of faith occurred 

in nearly every Lao province. These reports have diminished 

significantly in the past several years. Moreover, there have 

been no recent reports of incidents where security forces required the ritualistic drinking of animal blood mixed with 

alcohol, which was the primary method used in past renunciation campaigns. However, in the past year, authorities in 

Savannakhet Province, detained 24 ethnic Brou Christians 

and held them for several weeks until most members of the 

group agreed to cease their religious activities. There are also 

reports that provincial officials threaten to withhold government identification cards and household registers and deny 

government services or benefits to those who do not give up 

their religious beliefs.

According to the State Department, between 1999 and 

2001 local authorities closed approximately 20 of Vientiane 

province’s 60 Protestant churches, primarily those in Hin 

Hoep, Feuang, and Vang Vieng districts, and approximately 

65 Protestant churches in Savannakhet and Luang Prabang 

provinces. Many of these churches were allowed to reopen in 

the past eighteen months, especially in Vientiane and Luang 

Prabang provinces. Six of Savannakhet’s 40 churches remain 

closed, though recently, officials in Kengkok returned property seized in 1999 to a small Protestant congregation. In the 

past year, disputes in Bokeo province between officials and 

ethnic Protestants led to the burning of a local church. 

Another ongoing concern is the potential for abuses 

through the implementation of Decree 92, the Lao government’s 

2002 decree on religious activities. During its visit to Laos in 

February 2002, the Commission was assured that passage of the 

decree would improve religious freedom in Laos by legalizing 

religious activities, protecting the religious practices of ethnic 

minorities, and providing guidelines to local and provincial 

officials to ensure that abuses by those officials would cease. 

Nevertheless, the decree provides government officials with a 

potential legal basis for control of, and interference in, religious 

activities. Many religious activities can be conducted only with 

government approval, and the decree contains a prohibition on 

activities that create “social division,” or “chaos,” reiterating parts 

of the Lao’s criminal code, including Article 66, used in the past 

by government officials to arrest and detain arbitrarily ethnic 

minority Christians. Thus, Decree 92 and several provisions of 

the criminal code could be used to restrict and suppress religious activities, rather than protect and promote the freedom 

of religion or belief. However, there are credible reports that the 

government is using the Decree to facilitate religious practice in 

COUNTRY REPORTS: EAST ASIA

In view of the Lao government’s continued poor overall human rights record, there remains a possibility that 

past religious freedom abuses could 

reemerge. The Commission therefore 

maintains its scrutiny of the actions 

of the Lao government with regard 

to religious freedom to determine 

whether developments continue to 

move in a positive direction or if a return to the Watch List is warranted. 

123
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some areas and to promote cooperation among religious communities. At the same time, in the 

past year, religious groups report that the government has not given them permission to import, 

print, and distribute non-Buddhist religious materials. The Commission will continue to monitor how the decree is implemented and whether the central government has made progress in 

controlling the alleged abusive acts of local officials. 

In the past year, the Commission and its staff have met with Lao government officials 

and religious leaders, domestic and international human rights activists, academics and 

other experts on Laos. The Commission has traveled to Laos and issued a report on its findings in February 2003. 

In 2003, Resolution 402 was introduced in the House, stating the sense of Congress 

that the U.S. government should work to implement the Commission’s recommendations 

on Laos. Commission findings and accompanying recommendations were also cited in several letters from Members of Congress to the Administration regarding human rights in 

Laos in 2004.

Commission Recommendations

With regard to Laos, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should: 

■ make clear to the government of Laos that continued improvements in the protection 

of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief is essential to further improvements and in expansion of U.S.-Laos relations, and urge Lao officials to:

● ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and invite the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and other relevant UN mechanisms to visit the country; 

● halt any harassment and detention of persons on account of their religion by local government 

officials and hold any such officials responsible for violations of the religious freedom of Lao 

citizens, particularly in such provinces as Savannakhet, Attapeu, Luang Prabang, and Bokeo;

● criminalize forced renunciations of faith by passing a law in the National Assembly providing for specific penalties for those who carry out such practices;

● repeal or amend Article 66 of the Lao Criminal Code so that it cannot be used to arrest or 

detain individuals for engaging in religious activities that are protected by the Lao Constitution and under international law;

● amend those elements of Decree 92 on religious activities that are inconsistent with international human rights law; 

● respect and fully implement the freedom of individuals and organizations to engage in social, 

humanitarian, and charitable activities, free from undue government interference; and

● provide access to all parts of Laos by foreign diplomats, humanitarian organizations, and 

international human rights and religious organizations, in particular, to Savannakhet, Attapeu, and Saisomboune Special Zone; 

■ establish measurable goals and benchmarks, in addition to those listed above, for further human rights progress in Laos as a guide for diplomatic engagement between Laos and the United 

States or for initiating a formal human rights dialogue with the government of Laos, addressing 

such human rights issues as ethnic and religious discrimination, torture and other forms of illtreatment in prisons, unlawful arrest and detention, the absence of due process, and practical 

steps to ensure the right to freedom of expression, association, and assembly; 
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■ expand Lao language broadcasts on Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) 

while ensuring that the content of the Lao language broadcasts on VOA and RFA adequately includes information about the importance of human rights, including religious 

freedom, within Laos; and

■ initiate and expand technical assistance and human rights programs that support the 

goals of protecting and promoting religious freedom, including: 

● rule of law programs that provide assistance in amending, drafting, and implementing laws 

and regulations; 

● human rights and religious freedom training programs for specific sectors of Lao society, 

including government officials, religious leaders, academics, police, and representatives of 

international non-governmental organizations; 

● educational initiatives to combat intolerance of religious and ethnic minorities and to promote human rights education; and 

● the expansion of the number and funding of educational, academic, government, and private exchange programs with Laos that will bring a wide cross-section of Lao society to the United States.
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Vietnam

The government of Vietnam continues to commit systematic and egregious violations 

of freedom of religion or belief. Vietnam’s human rights record remains poor, and 

the freedoms of speech, assembly, and association also continue to be restricted. 

The government targets popular religious leaders, intellectuals, free speech and democracy advocates, and members of ethnic minority groups for harassment and arrest. Despite 

some positive developments in the area of religious freedom in the past year in response 

to Vietnam’s designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, serious abuses of 

religious freedom continued to occur. The government remains highly suspicious of Montagnard and Hmong Protestants, Vietnamese Mennonites, followers of Hoa Hao Buddhism, 

and leaders of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), and these individuals in 

particular continue to face difficulties. Following the Commission’s recommendation, the 

State Department has designated Vietnam as a CPC since 2004. In the past year, there has 

not yet been enough tangible progress on religious freedom concerns in Vietnam to warrant removal of the CPC designation and the Commission continues to recommend that 

the country be designated a CPC.

In May 2005, the State Department announced it had reached an agreement with 

Vietnam on benchmarks to demonstrate an improvement in religious freedom conditions. Under the agreement, the Vietnamese government committed to: 1) implement 

fully the new legislation on religious freedom and render previous contradictory regulations obsolete; 2) instruct local authorities strictly and completely to adhere to the new 

legislation and ensure compliance; 3) facilitate the process by which religious congregations are able to open houses of worship; and 4) give special consideration to prisoners 

and cases of concern raised by the United States during the granting of prisoner amnesties. The U.S. government agreed to consider taking Vietnam off the CPC list if these 

conditions are met.

Vietnam’s record on fulfilling this agreement is mixed. In the past two years, the Vietnamese government has released a number of prominent religious prisoners, re-opened 

some churches in the Central Highlands, officially outlawed forced renunciations of faith, 

and issued new guidelines to help speed the process of registration of religious congregations. Reports of forced renunciation of faith continue to emerge, particularly among ethnic 

minority Protestants and monks and nuns associated with UBCV, though there are fewer 

than in the past. Several hundred religious venues have been allowed to re-open, but this 

is a fraction of the over 1,250 sites closed in the Central Highlands after 2001. Religious 

prisoners have been amnestied, but new detentions continue to occur and vague “national 

security” and “national solidarity” provisions in the penal code have at times superseded 

new laws providing for religious freedom. Moreover, Vietnamese citizens have no legal recourse to challenge human rights abuses by government officials. 

In the last year, Vietnam released several high-profile religious prisoners, including UBCV, Mennonite, Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Protestant leaders. Pastor Nguyen Hong 

Quang was amnestied in September 2005; the five other Mennonite leaders arrested with 

him have also been released. Baptist pastor Than Van Truong was released from a psychiatric hospital where he had been held for two years after having been diagnosed as 

“delusional” for giving Bibles to government officials. However, other religious prisoners 

remain in detention or continue to be subject to government surveillance. Fr. Nguyen Van 
Ly, who was arrested after submitting testimony to a 2001 

Commission hearing on Vietnam, was released from prison in 2004. While the Commission welcomed the release of 

Fr. Ly, there are reports that he remains under some form 

of administrative detention. Two prominent prisoners released with Fr. Ly, democracy activist Dr. Nguyen Dan Que 

and UBCV monk Thich Thien Mien, are reportedly also 

under constant police surveillance.

Vietnamese security forces continue to detain, arrest, 

and imprison adherents from a several religious communities. The State Department estimated in 2005 that there 

were six religious prisoners and fifteen other individuals 

being held in some form of administrative detention on account of their religious beliefs. The number is likely to be 

higher. For example, in June 2005, security officials arrested 

eight Hoa Hao followers who protested government control of the Hoa Hao religion. In September 2005, Hoa Hao 

monk Vo Van Thanh Liem was arrested and given a nine 

year prison term for “opposing public authorities.” He and 

another monk, Bui Thien Hue submitted written statements 

to a congressional hearing entitled “Human Rights in Vietnam.” Bui Thien Hue is reportedly being held under some 

form of house arrest. At least three Catholic priests from the 

Congregation of Mother Co-Redemptrix remain in prison 

for distributing religious books without permission; they 

were charged with security-related offenses and sentenced 

to 20 years. One of the three, Fr. Pham Minh Tri, has reportedly developed severe dementia while in prison, but has not 

been granted humanitarian parole. 

Tensions between residents and security officials have 

been heightened in the Central Highlands after demonstrations in 2001 and 2004 for religious freedom and land rights. 

During the 2004 Easter demonstrations, an estimated 45,000 

people gathered for protests in Gai Lai, Dak Lak, and Dak 

Nong provinces. Numerous eyewitnesses report that the 

peaceful demonstrations were disrupted by attacks on protestors by security forces and hired proxies. There are credible reports of severe violence occurring in Dak Lak province, 

including the deaths of at least ten demonstrators. Since the 

demonstrations, Vietnamese officials have sought to imprison those believed to have organized the protests, as well as 

others who took part. Montagnard villages and communes 

have been under tight control by the Vietnamese military 

and few international observers have been allowed access to 

the region. As a result of the demonstrations, some ethnic 

minority Protestants are being held in the Central Highlands 

under vague “national security” and “national solidarity” 

The government targets popular 

religious leaders, intellectuals, free 

speech and democracy advocates, 

and members of ethnic minority groups for harassment and arrest. In the past year, there has not 

yet been enough tangible progress 

on religious freedom concerns in 

Vietnam to warrant removal of the 

CPC designation and the Commission continues to recommend that 

the country be designated a CPC.

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provisions of the legal code. Because of the lack of transparency in the Vietnamese legal 

system and the high level of security in the Central Highlands, it remains difficult to determine the exact number of Montagnard Protestants imprisoned for taking part in peaceful 

demonstrations against religious freedom restrictions and those imprisoned for allegedly 

taking part in violence that occurred during the protests. In the last year, 15 Montagnards 

were sentenced for taking part in the 2004 Easter demonstrations. An estimated 76 Montagnards remain in prison for taking part in similar demonstrations in 2001.

Significant pressure remains on leaders of the UBCV, despite Prime Minister Pham 

Van Khai’s March 2002 promise that arrests and harassment would end. UBCV leaders 

Thich Quang Do and Thich Huyen Quang are still restricted in their contacts and movement, though Western diplomats have been able to meet with them in 

the past year. At least 13 other senior UBCV monks remain under some 

form of administration probation or actual “pagoda arrest.” Charges issued in October 2004 against UBCV leaders for “possessing state secrets” have not been rescinded. In February 2006, Thich Quang Do was 

detained after trying to board a train to visit Thich Huyen Quang. He 

was released after a few hours, but was not allowed to travel. There are 

reports that police routinely detain and interrogate monks and nuns 

suspected of organizing “provincial committees” of the UBCV in Quang 

Nam-Danang, Thua Thien-Hue, and Binh Dinh provinces. In August and 

September 2005, monks were detained in these provinces and ordered 

to withdraw their names from the committees and cease all connections 

with the UBCV. In December 2005, reports emerged that UBCV nun 

Thich Nu Thong Man was subject to a “denunciation campaign” and 

expulsion order by provincial authorities in Khanh Hoa province. Police 

threatened local villagers with the loss of jobs and government services 

unless they publicly denounced the nun and asked provincial authorities to have her expelled from the local monastery. 

In February 2005, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai issued “Instructions on Protestantism,” which purport to allow Protestant “house churches” in the Central Highlands and 

northwest provinces to operate legally if they renounce connections to groups that Hanoi 

has accused of organizing anti-government protests. The new instructions also prohibit 

forced renunciation of faith efforts by government officials, but do not specify criminal 

penalties for those who carry out these practices. Despite the new instructions, incidents 

of forced renunciation of faith continue to be reported, particularly among ethnic minority 

Protestants. Religious followers are detained, threatened, and beaten to pressure them to 

recant their faith or cease their religious activities. 

In March and June 2005, police and local officials detained up to 17 ethnic Hre Protestants in Quang Ngai province. Because community members refused to cease their religious activities, homes and rice fields were burned and land confiscated. In February and 

March 2005, police in Gai Lai province reportedly detained minority Protestants from several villages in an attempt to force them to join the government-approved religious organization. Police asked those detained whether they would remain “political” or whether they 

would follow the “Christianity of [Prime Minister] Phan Van Khai.” Those who refused to 

cease their religious activity were beaten. Others were pressured to sign pledges agreeing 

to “abandon Christianity and politics.” In May 2005, police in Dien Bien province issued at 

least 21 “re-education” summons to local Hmong Protestants. During the sessions, religious 

USCIRF Chair Michael Cromartie 

testifying about Vietnam before the House 

Subcommittee on Africa, Human Rights, and 

International Organizations
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believers were threatened with beatings, loss of government services, or fines if they did not 

give up their religious beliefs. In Ninh Thuan province in June 2005, police briefly detained 

for interrogation two leaders and six members of a local Protestant congregation. Several 

months later, local officials held a public ceremony and threatened the Protestant congregation with the loss of government services if they did not renounce their faith. In Ha Giang 

province in November 2005, police forced an ethnic minority Protestant pastor to sign a 

pledge to renounce his faith and cease religious activities after his congregation sought to 

register legally with the government approved organization.

After the 2001 demonstrations for land rights and religious freedom, local authorities 

closed an estimated 1,250 churches and meeting points in the Central Highlands. According to reports from religious communities in Gai Lai province, provincial authorities have 

legally registered and re-opened 29 Protestant churches and have allowed another 170 to 

function pending registration decisions. There are reports that officials in Dak Nong and 

Bien Phuoc provinces are considering following the example set by Gai Lai authorities. In 

Dak Lak, most of the estimated 450 churches and meeting points in Dak Lak province remain closed and none have been legally recognized.

In the past year, restrictions on some legally recognized religious activity appears to 

have eased, particularly among Buddhists and Catholics. In January 2006, a special envoy 

from Rome made the first visit by a senior official from the Vatican since 1954 and presided 

over the ordination of 57 priests at a ceremony in Hanoi. In addition, a new Archbishop 

was named for Ho Chi Minh City in 2005 and an agreement was reached on the creation 

of a new bishopric. Though relations between Vietnam and the Vatican appear to have 

improved in recent years, the government continues to require prospective seminarians to 

obtain government permission before entering the seminary and receiving ordination and 

maintains de facto veto power over Roman Catholic ordinations and appointments. Most 

Church property seized in 1975 also remains in government hands.

In the past two years, the Vietnamese government has updated laws and regulations governing religious activity. In November 2004, the government of Vietnam issued 

a long-awaited Ordinance on Religious Beliefs and Religious Organizations. The Ordinance affirms the right to freedom of religion or belief in the first clause, but the remaining provisions provide an extensive list of religious activities requiring government 

permission. The Ordinance continues to ban religious activities outside of officially recognized religious organizations, as well as any religious activity that threatens the vaguely 

defined notions of national venues, national unity, and public order. The Ordinance does 

standardize religious management practices, setting forth national rules for groups seeking legal recognition. The Ordinance also seems to allow religious groups with at least a 

30 year history in Vietnam to register independently of already approved religious organizations. Nevertheless, by requiring that the government sanction the organization 

and activities of all religious groups, the Ordinance extends the control of government 

officials over religious practice in Vietnam. 

To facilitate the Ordinance’s implementation, the Vietnamese government issued Decree 22 in March 2005. The decree establishes specific requirements for government approval 

of all religious groups, venues, seminaries, conferences, donations, festivals, ceremonies, and 

the selection and training of religious leaders. Like the Ordinance, the Decree affirms the right 

of Vietnamese citizens to freedom of religion or belief, but there are also prohibitions on any 

religious activities that “undermine peace, independence and national unity; incite violence 

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or wage war; disseminate information against prevailing State law and policies; sow division 

among the people, ethnic groups, and religions; cause public disorder; do harm to other people’s lives, health, dignity, honor, and property; hinder people from exercising their public 

obligations; and spread superstitious practices and commit acts to breach the law.” These limitations appear to go far beyond those permitted under international human rights law, as they 

are broad, vague, and have been used in the past by the Vietnamese authorities to justify the 

imprisonment of religious leaders and other serious human rights abuses.

The primary benefit of Decree 22 appears to be streamlining the process of registration and obtaining permits. Deadlines for an official response are outlined in the decree 

and, in some cases, religious groups can expect a written explanation of why their application was denied. In the past year, the province of Gai Lai has granted legal recognition to 

a number of churches and meeting points and allowed them to affiliate with the Southern 

Evangelical Church of Vietnam. In addition, three Protestant churches in Ho Chi Minh 

City, one Baptist, one Mennonite, and one Seventh-Day Adventist, were granted legal recognition in the past year. However, recognition was not granted to other venues affiliated 

with these denominations, either in Ho Chi Minh City or in other places in Vietnam. There 

are several groups seeking legal recognition whose applications are pending, including the 

Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Assembly of God, and Danang-based Christian Mission Church. 

Legal recognition has been denied, however, to some Protestant, UBCV Buddhist, and Hoa 

Hao religious bodies. Hmong Protestants in the northwest provinces have encountered the 

most problems in seeking legal recognition, as Vietnamese authorities have refused to acknowledge the legal existence of a reported 1,110 Protestant churches in the region. Approximately 200 Hmong churches have applied for registration under the new law, but they 

have encountered numerous obstacles, including some overt harassment. 

The new Ordinance on Religion and its implementing mechanism Decree 22 are 

improvements over past laws governing religious activity, but deficiencies remain. At this 

time, the Vietnamese government continues to use registration and the process of recognition as a way to monitor religious organizations and to restrict their activities. It remains to 

be seen whether the new laws governing religion will facilitate or further restrict freedom 

of religion or belief in Vietnam. 

Commissioners and staff have traveled to Vietnam and met with Vietnamese government officials and religious leaders. In addition, the Commission has met with officials in 

the U.S. Administration, Members of Congress, the Acting UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees (UNHCR), and congressional staff about current U.S. policy toward Vietnam and 

the Commission’s policy recommendations. 

In June 2005, Commission Vice-Chair Nina Shea testified before the House International Relations Committee hearing entitled “Human Rights in Vietnam.” Shea discussed 

Vietnam’s record on religious freedom and related human rights, the provisions of the May 

5, 2005 agreement on religious freedom, as well as the Commission’s recommendations for 

U.S. policy. In July 2005, Commission Chair Michael Cromartie testified at a joint Congressional Caucus on Vietnam and Congressional Human Rights Caucus hearing on Vietnam 

entitled, “The Ongoing Religious Freedom Violations in Vietnam.” In March 2006, Commission Chair Cromartie testified on religious freedom problems and progress in the past 

year at a hearing of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Human 

Rights, and International Organizations entitled “The Human Rights Dialogue with Vietnam: Is Vietnam Making Significant Progress?” 
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The Commission also issued statements after the release of Fr. Nguyen Van Ly and 

members of his family, the issuing of the Prime Minister’s “Instructions on Protestantism,” and the State Department’s announcement of the May 5, 2005 agreement on religious freedom, all of which can be found on the Commission’s Website. 

Commission Recommendations

Following the designation of Vietnam as a CPC, the Commission has recommended 

that the U.S. government should:

■ identify those Vietnamese agencies and officials who are responsible for particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom, and vigorously enforce section 604 of IRFA with 

respect to Vietnam, rendering inadmissible for entry into the United States any Vietnamese government official who was responsible for or directly carried out such violations; and 

■ re-prioritize human rights programming and technical assistance in Vietnam by 

dedicating no less than $1 million for FY 2006 and FY 2007, if discretionary funds 

are allocated to Vietnam above its annual earmark, to new or existing programs 

that will directly promote freedom of religion and belief and related human rights 

in Vietnam.

With regard to religious freedom conditions in Vietnam, in addition to recommending that Vietnam be designated a CPC, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. 

government should:

■ make clear to the government of Vietnam that ending violations of religious freedom is 

essential to the continued expansion of U.S.-Vietnam relations, urging the Vietnamese 

government to:

● establish a non-discriminatory legal framework for religious groups to engage in peaceful 

religious activities protected by international law without requiring groups to affiliate with 

officially registered religious organizations; for example: 

● allow the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam to register and operate independently of the official Buddhist organization, the Vietnam Buddhist Sangha; 

● allow leaders chosen by all Hoa Hao adherents to participate in the Executive Board 

of the Hoa Hao Administrative Council or allow a separate Hoa Hao organization 

to organize and register as the Hoa Hao Central Buddhist Church with the same 

privileges as the Administrative Council;

● allow Presbyterian, Assembly of God, Baptist, Mennonite, Jehovah’s Witness, 

and any other Christian denominations that do not wish to join either the 

Southern Evangelical Church or the Northern Evangelical Church of Vietnam, to register independently; and

● allow Cao Dai leaders opposed to the Cao Dai Management Council to form and 

register a separate Cao Dai organization with management over its own affairs; 

● establish a legal framework that allows for religious groups to engage in humanitarian, 

medical, educational, and charitable work; 

● amend the 2004 Ordinance on Religious Beliefs and Religious Organizations and Decree 

22, and other domestic legislation that may restrict the exercise of religious freedom, so that 
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they conform to international standards for protecting the freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief;

● enforce the provisions in the Prime Minister’s “Instructions on Protestantism” that outlaw 

forced renunciations of faith, and establish in the Vietnamese Criminal Code specific penalties for anyone who carries out such practices; 

● repeal Decree 31/CP of the Vietnamese Criminal Code which empowers local Security Police to detain citizens for up to two years without trial, as this decree is routinely invoked to 

detain religious followers and members of non-recognized religious denominations; 

● set up a national commission of religious groups, government officials, and independent, 

non-governmental observers to find equitable solutions on returning confiscated properties to religious groups; 

● release or commute the sentences of all those imprisoned or detained on account of their 

peaceful manifestation of religion or belief, including, among others, UBCV Patriarch 

Thich Huyen Quang, Thich Quang Do and 13 UBCV leaders detained since the 2003 

crackdown, members of ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands and northwest provinces, the remaining Mennonites arrested in July 2004, and the ten Hoa Hao followers 

arrested in July 2005, using the list compiled by the State Department pursuant to Section 

108 of IRFA;

● re-open all of the churches, meeting points, and home worship sites closed during 2001 in 

the Central Highlands and northwest provinces;

● investigate and publicly report on the beating deaths of Hmong Protestant leaders Mua Bua 

Senh and Vang Seo Giao, and prosecute anyone found responsible for these deaths; and

● continue to allow representatives of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNCHR) and 

other appropriate international organizations access to the Central Highlands in order to 

monitor voluntarily repatriated Montagards consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on January 25, 2005 between the UNHCR, Cambodia, and Vietnam 

and provide unhindered access for diplomats, journalists, and non-governmental organizations to members of all religious communities in Vietnam, particularly those in the Central 

Highlands and the northwestern provinces; 

■ expand existing programs and initiate new programs of public diplomacy for Vietnam, including, 

● expanding funding for additional Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) programming for Vietnam and to overcome the jamming of VOA and RFA broadcasts; 

● targeting some of the Fulbright Program grants to individuals and scholars whose work 

promotes understanding of religious freedom and related human rights;

● requiring the Vietnam Educational Foundation, which offers scholarships to Vietnamese 

high school age students to attend college in the United States, to give preferences to youth 

from ethnic minority group areas (Montagnard and Hmong), from minority religious communities (Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholic, Protestant, Cham Islamic, and Kmer Buddhist), or 

former novice monks associated with the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam; 

● providing grants to educational non-governmental organizations to bring Vietnamese high 

school students to the United States for one year of study; and

● creating new exchange programs between the Vietnamese National Assembly and its staff 

and the U.S. Congress; and

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■ continue to expand its economic development, democracy, education, good governance, 

and rule of law programs in Vietnam by: 

● working with interested nations and international donors to create and capitalize a “Montagnard Development Fund” fund for ethnic and religious minorities that targets business 

creation, micro-enterprise development loans, and grants to improve agricultural, educational, health, and technical training, a fund that would prioritize areas with both rural 

poverty and significant human rights problems; and

● expanding existing rule of law programs to include regular exchanges between international experts on religion and law and appropriate representatives from the Vietnamese 

government, academia, and religious communities to discuss the impact of Vietnam’s laws 

and decrees on religious freedom and other human rights, to train public security forces on 

these issues, and to discuss ways to incorporate international standards of human rights in 

Vietnamese laws and regulations.

In addition, the U.S. Congress should appropriate additional funds for the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund for new technical assistance and religious 

freedom programming. Funding should be commensurate to new and ongoing programs 

for Vietnamese workers, women, and rule of law training.

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OSCE

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) specifically cites U.S. participation in multilateral organizations as a way to advance respect for freedom of 

religion or belief, which is enshrined in numerous international human rights declarations and conventions. The 55 participating States of the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), i.e., all of Europe and the former Soviet republics along 

with the United States and Canada, committed themselves to uphold extensive standards 

to protect freedom of religion or belief and to combat discrimination, xenophobia, intolerance, and anti-Semitism. In point of fact, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief is singled out in the OSCE founding document, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. After 

the fall of the Soviet Union, the OSCE has continued to be an important forum in which 

participating States have been held accountable for their human rights commitments. 

Moreover, uniquely for an international organization, the OSCE since its inception has 

involved non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as partners in its review of members’ 

human rights practices. 

In recent years, however, some participating states have sought to curtail the organization’s human rights activities. In 2004, delegations from nine countries, led by Russia 

along with eight other former Soviet states—Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan—issued a written statement demanding 

that the OSCE give more weight to security matters.1

 Russia, in particular, has protested 

frequently in recent years that the OSCE focuses too much of its criticisms on the countries of the former USSR, while downplaying human rights problems in the West.2

 Russia 

withheld its needed approval for the OSCE’s 2005 budget, which must be agreed to by the 

consensus of all participating States, thereby delaying its implementation and putting in 

jeopardy many of the organization’s human rights activities. The OSCE’s human rights 

activities are particularly important at a time when the governments of Russia and many 

other countries of the former USSR are demonstrating an increasing lack of commitment 

to their human rights obligations, which include efforts to combat racism, xenophobia, 

and various other forms of intolerance and discrimination. 

1 In July 2004, the institution itself came under more pointed attack when these countries accused the OSCE of failing to respect 

their sovereignty. Having been criticized—in some cases, repeatedly—by OSCE election monitors for holding elections that failed 

to meet democratic standards, the nine countries accused the OSCE of interfering in their internal affairs.

2 Yet, on the invitation of the United States, the OSCE deployed an Election Observation Mission for the U.S. November 2004 

presidential elections.

▲ OSCE

▲ Belarus

▲ Georgia

▲ Russia

▲ Turkmenistan

▲ Uzbekistan

Europe and

Eurasia
Background on Racism, Xenophobia, 

Discrimination, and Intolerance

In recent years, there has been a dramatic rise in incidents of racism, xenophobia, discrimination, and intolerance toward Muslims, Jews, Christians, and members of 

other religious and ethnic minorities in the OSCE region. 

Anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic views and actions also continue 

to be a problem in many OSCE participating states. Frequently, officials fail to hold the perpetrators of anti-Semitic 

attacks to account. Reportedly, many of the recent anti-Semitic incidents in Western Europe have been committed 

by angry and marginalized young North African Muslim 

immigrants. “Skinhead” gangs are another source of hatefilled rhetoric and violence in all too many countries in the 

OSCE region. These gangs target various ethnic and religious minorities, including Jews and Muslims, with violence 

that includes acts of vandalism against religious and other 

property, and seek to inflame public opinion against these 

groups. Although such violence is often well documented, 

officials rarely investigate and prosecute these acts as hate 

crimes. Instead, they often trivialize such violence by treating it as “hooliganism.” Extremist rhetoric emanating from 

some circles that goes uncontested by political and societal 

leaders has also promoted an environment of intolerance 

toward members of various ethnic and religious minorities. 

Anti-Zionism and vilification of Israel can also mask antiSemitism. When burnings, beatings, and other acts of violence are directed at a particular group because of who they 

are and what they believe, such acts should not be viewed 

merely as police problems, but as human rights violations 

that require an unequivocal response. 

The OSCE Response 

The OSCE has set up several new mechanisms to address intolerance and related human rights issues, as mandated by the 2003 OSCE Ministerial Meeting. The OSCE 

has convened a series of high-level meetings to address 

anti-Semitism and other tolerance-related issues. As the 

Commission recommended, in late 2004 the OSCE Chairman-in-Office appointed three Personal Representatives to 

promote tolerance. The OSCE became the first international organization to name a prominent appointee specifically 

to examine anti-Semitism. Similarly, there is a personal 

representative monitoring intolerance toward Muslims, 

and a third who tracks other forms of intolerance, including xenophobia, racism, Christianophobia, and intolerance 

against members of other religions. Finally, a new Tolerance 

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In recent years, there has been a 

dramatic rise in incidents of racism, xenophobia, discrimination, 

and intolerance toward Muslims, Jews, Christians, and members of other religious and ethnic 

minorities in the OSCE region. 

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136

Unit within the OSCE’s Office of Human Rights and Democratic Institutions (ODIHR) 

was set up, also in late 2004, to monitor and encourage compliance with OSCE commitments to combat xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia, and to promote freedom 

of religion or belief. 

OSCE Meetings on Tolerance and Related Topics

The annual OSCE Ministerial Meeting in 2003 mandated a major international conference to address anti-Semitism in the 55 states of the OSCE region. The Berlin Conference on Anti-Semitism in April 2004 was attended by 600 officials from 55 nations and by 

hundreds of NGOs. The conference recommended specific steps to fight anti-Semitism, 

including collection of, and regular reporting on, hate crimes data; bolstering national laws; 

promoting educational programs, and combating hate crimes fueled by racist propaganda 

in the media and on the Internet. Led by the then-U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, Stephan 

M. Minikes, the participating States authorized the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to appoint 

three special representatives to coordinate and highlight OSCE activities in this field. In addition to the Berlin Conference, the OSCE has held several other high-level and expert-level 

meetings on tolerance-related issues, including the Conference on Tolerance and the Fight 

against Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination (Brussels, September 2004); the Human 

Dimension Seminar on Migration and Integration (Warsaw, May 2005); the OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism and on Other Forms of Intolerance (Cordoba, June 2005); and the 

Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism (Vienna, July 2005). At the time of this writing, the OSCE had not publicized any 

official decisions on meetings in 2006 specifically related to tolerance topics.

These conferences have raised awareness among the governments of the OSCE participating States, NGOs, and the public regarding anti-Semitism, discrimination against 

Muslims, and other tolerance-related issues in the OSCE region. The challenge for the 

OSCE and its 55 members is to act on the ideas that have emerged from these conferences 

and translate them into activities and programs that will combat these forms of intolerance 

in OSCE participating States. 

OSCE Personal Representatives 

In December 2004, the 55 OSCE participating States authorized the then-Chairmanin-Office, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy, to name three Personal Representatives to promote tolerance. Anastasia Crickley of Ireland, Chairperson of the European 

Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, was appointed as the Personal Representative on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination, also focusing on Intolerance 

and Discrimination against Christians and Members of Other Religions; Gert Weisskirchen, 

German Parliamentarian and Professor of Higher Education, was named the Personal Representative on Combating Anti-Semitism; and Omur Orhun, former Turkish Ambassador 

to the OSCE, was appointed the Chairman-in-Office’s Personal Representative on Combating Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims. These appointments have been reconfirmed and will extend at least through 2007. The mandates of these Representatives 

include the promotion of better coordination of the implementation of decisions by the 

OSCE Ministerial and Permanent Councils on Tolerance and Non-discrimination as well 

as cooperation between the Chairman-in-Office and the ODIHR. 
137

The mandates of the three Personal Representatives address separate but interrelated 

issues that call for distinct, yet coordinated, responses. Since the persons selected by the 

OSCE Chairman-in-Office for these honorary and part-time positions come from a variety 

of backgrounds, they may take different approaches to these important issues. Therefore, it 

is essential that the Personal Representatives more effectively coordinate with the various 

relevant OSCE institutions and among themselves in order to fulfill their mandates adequately. Indeed, the Commission is concerned that the work of the Representatives has 

been hampered by the lack of coordination of their complex and rather vague mandates, 

inadequate funding for staff and travel expenses, and other demands on their time and attention. The Commission also believes that the activities of the Personal Representatives 

should be given more prominence in the work of the OSCE. 

In addition to playing an active role at relevant OSCE meetings, country visits have 

played a key role in the work of the Personal Representatives and in their reports to the 

OSCE Permanent Council. They have all visited the United States; Orhun held meetings 

in Turkey and made visits to the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France; Crickley also met 

with the UN in Geneva and paid a visit to Great Britain; and Weisskirchen has held meetings in Germany and has visited Russia. The Commission believes that the participating 

States should invite the Personal Representatives to their countries and enable them to meet 

with relevant government officials and, without interference, to meet with NGOs, and with 

community and religious leaders, and activists. 

The Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 

Tolerance Unit

One of the major institutional responses of the OSCE to growing concerns regarding religious intolerance was to set up a new Tolerance Unit in late 2004 within the 

ODIHR. The mandate of the Tolerance Unit includes OSCE efforts to promote tolerance 

and to combat intolerance and xenophobia, as well as to advance freedom of religion or 

belief. The United States has been a strong advocate for the establishment of the unit and 

for sufficient funding for its activities. The Tolerance Unit staff includes specialists on the 

issues of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, xenophobia, and racism, as well as on freedom of 

religion or belief. These specialists monitor and conduct research, write reports, conduct 

programs, and serve as backups to the three Personal Representatives and the ODIHR 

Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief. The Tolerance Unit was 

charged with setting up a database of information, as well as working on projects on such 

issues as data collection for hate crimes legislation, police training on hate crimes, and 

Holocaust education in specific countries. 

Thus far, many of the Tolerance Unit’s activities have centered on ambitious projects 

for gathering and publicizing information. The Unit’s web site, slated to be operational in 

2006, is supposed to provide access to information from OSCE participating states, NGOs, 

and inter-governmental organizations on international standards and instruments, plus 

Legislationline, ODIHR’s online database, and the Human Rights Information and Documentation Systems International index to 2,000 NGO web sites. Although the Tolerance 

Unit has developed a “Website Guide to Tolerance Education” and a curriculum unit on 

“Holocaust Education and Anti-Semitism,” the web site has not yet defined “tolerance” or 

“tolerance education” and does not include key documents and treaties, or relevant web 

links. The Tolerance Unit has issued several useful publications on combating intolerance, 

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including “Combating Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region: An Overview of Statistics, Legislation, and National Initiatives” and “Education on the Holocaust and on Anti-Semitism: 

An Overview and Analysis of Educational Approaches.” To date, however, the Tolerance 

Unit has focused little attention to specific countries where conditions are problematic. 

For example, few materials of the Tolerance Unit are available in the Russian language. 

Access to such information would make a significant contribution, in light of the rising 

levels of xenophobia, racism, and various forms of intolerance in Russia and other former 

Soviet countries. 

Given the small staff and limited funding of the Tolerance Unit, however, it is open 

to question whether these many and complex projects make the most effective use of OSCE 

resources. To date, ODIHR’s Tolerance Unit has emphasized activities with external organizations. To be more effective, the Unit should emphasize work with the 17 OSCE field 

presences and other OSCE institutions doing projects on the ground in participating States, 

thereby enabling the OSCE to identify and more directly address these problems. In 2005, 

the Tolerance Unit conducted pilot projects in Spain and Hungary to train police on hate 

crimes, but ODIHR has not yet taken up offers from several participating States to contribute expertise for such programs. If such offers were accepted, ODIHR core budget funding 

would be freed for other projects. 

As mentioned above, part of the Tolerance Unit’s mandate is to address freedom of 

religion or belief. Responsibility for the issue of religious freedom was removed from the 

ODIHR’s Human Rights Unit when the issue was assigned to the Tolerance Unit in late 

2004. The Commission is concerned that because of this bureaucratic reassignment, freedom of religion or belief will be relegated as a corollary to tolerance work and will no longer 

be addressed by the ODIHR’s human rights programs. Only one staff person in the Tolerance Unit is specifically assigned to the issue of freedom of religion or belief, and that person is also assigned to work with NGOs. In 2006, the ODIHR plans to hold workshops on 

freedom of religion issues with NGOs, religious communities, and government officials in 

Central Asia, the Caucasus, and South-Eastern Europe.

Other OSCE Venues for Addressing Freedom of Religion 

or Belief Issues

Freedom of religion or belief is set forth as one of the basic human rights principles 

in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and since then has been addressed in various ways by 

the OSCE: through the periodic OSCE and later ODIHR conferences to review implementation of human rights commitments by the 55 participating States; during several 

conferences which specifically addressed these issues, such as the Supplementary Human 

Dimension Meeting on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism, held in Vienna 

in July 2005; in the structure of the ODIHR, where, until the Tolerance Unit was set up, 

freedom of religion or belief was part of the Human Rights Unit portfolio; through the 17 

OSCE field presences, where freedom of religion or belief can also be the subject of monitoring, reports, and related activities; and through the inclusion of the views of relevant 

international, regional, and non-governmental human rights organizations in connection with each of the other venues described above. 

Under the auspices of the ODIHR, the OSCE also hosts annual conferences, traditionally held in Warsaw in October, to review implementation by the 55 OSCE participating 

States of their OSCE human rights commitments, including freedom of religion or belief. 
139

Known as the Conferences on the Human Dimension (Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, or HDim), these ten-day meetings bring together diplomats, representatives of 

other international organizations, and, reportedly, the largest number of NGOs for a general 

European human rights conference. These conferences have been criticized by some government representatives for being too lengthy, for not attracting enough press and public attention, and increasingly, for the failure of participating States to respond—either in words or in 

deeds—to criticism of their human rights records voiced at the HDim.

The ODIHR Advisory Panel of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief was re-organized in 2004 and expanded to a total of 58 persons nominated by countries from throughout the OSCE region, including an Advisory Council of 15 members. The Panel functions 

primarily as a consultative body for the governments of participating States considering 

new or amended legislation affecting freedom of religion, as well as for expert opinions on 

individual cases. The Panel reviews both proposed and enacted legislation under guidelines 

developed by the ODIHR and the Council of Europe Venice Commission, guidelines that 

are based on international conventions and on OSCE commitments. The Panel then issues 

recommendations to the participating States on bringing such legislation into conformance 

with international human rights standards. 

At present, the Panel is advising the governments of Macedonia, Romania, and 

Serbia on legislation. Panel recommendations on relevant legislation were also taken into 

consideration by the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Bulgaria. In the case of 

Uzbekistan, the government has not responded to the Panel’s recommendations for revisions of its religion laws. In two recent examples of expert opinions on individual cases, 

the Panel determined that the situation of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Moscow is illustrative of 

problems in other post-Soviet countries, where registration requirements are being used 

to control religious groups. The Panel also criticized the 18-month detention of Bishop 

Jovan in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for alleged incitement of religious 

and ethnic hatred as incompatible with OSCE freedom of religion commitments. (Bishop 

Jovan has since been released from imprisonment.) The Commission believes that the 

activities of the Panel should be more transparent, in particular with respect to governments that ignore its recommendations. 

Commission Activities 

Since 2001, the Commission has participated with, often as members of, U.S. delegations to OSCE meetings and has made extensive recommendations relating to the work of 

the OSCE on protecting freedom of religion or belief and on combating intolerance and 

anti-Semitism in the OSCE region. In 2003, Commissioners participated with the U.S. delegations to the OSCE’s first-ever special meeting on anti-Semitism in June; a special meeting 

on freedom of religion or belief in July; and the OSCE’s annual human rights conference, 

the HDim, in October. Commission Vice Chair Felice D. Gaer made public statements on 

behalf of the Commission at each of these meetings. 

In July 2004, the Commission recommended that the U.S. government should advocate an active role for NGOs in monitoring religious intolerance. In September 2004, at 

the OSCE Conference on Tolerance and the Fight against Racism, Xenophobia, and Discrimination (Brussels), Commission Vice Chair Gaer stressed the importance of freedom 

of religion or belief in the OSCE region. At the October 2004 OSCE HDim, the Commission publicized information on the status of freedom of religion or belief in various OSCE 

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States, including Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 

The Commission’s concerns about religious freedom were included in the concluding 

intervention by the U.S. delegation to the HDim meeting. At the HDim, the Commission 

also met with delegations from Belgium and Russia, as well as with various NGOs from 

the OSCE region. 

At the OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism and Other Forms of Intolerance, held 

in Cordoba in June 2005, Commissioner Nina Shea spoke at the OSCE Panel of Experts 

Workshop on Promoting Tolerance and Ensuring Freedom of Religion and Belief on highly restrictive registration laws in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Belarus. Invited to serve 

as advisers to the U.S. delegation to the Cordoba meeting, Commission Chair Michael 

Cromartie and Vice Chair Shea met with a wide variety of diplomats and NGO representatives. Commissioner Archbishop Charles Chaput served in his private capacity as a member of the U.S. official delegation to the 2005 Cordoba meeting.

During the September 2005 OSCE Human Dimension conference in Warsaw, Commission Vice Chair Gaer served as a member of the U.S. delegation and made a plenary 

statement on the problems faced by ethnic minorities, including the scourge of anti-Semitism. She also held meetings with each of the three OSCE Personal Representatives, as 

well as with numerous delegations and NGO representatives. The Commission also took 

part in a roundtable on intolerance and discrimination against Muslims and discussed how 

the Commission has addressed this problem, including in OSCE States such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the Russian Federation, as well as with regard to the headscarf ban in 

French schools. 

The Commission was one of the first official bodies to speak out against the rise 

in anti-Semitic violence in Europe; it has also addressed anti-Semitism and related 

issues in countries such as Belarus, Belgium, Egypt, Iran, France, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. The U.S. Congress introduced and unanimously passed 

resolutions in the Senate and the House on the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe. The 

Senate version cited the Commission’s findings and urged the Commission to continue documenting the issue.

The Commission has recommended that the U.S. government work with the OSCE 

and the U.S. delegation to ensure that separate attention is paid to anti-Semitism in the 

region and successfully advocated for the OSCE’s first special meeting on anti-Semitism, 

held in Berlin in April 2004. During preparations for that meeting, Commission Vice 

Chair Gaer stressed that acts of anti-Semitism must be seen not as hooliganism, but as a 

human rights abuse that States should combat by robust implementation of their international human rights commitments. Participating with the U.S. delegation at the Berlin 

meeting, Gaer discussed anti-Semitism in the OSCE region and met with a wide variety 

of delegations and NGOs. During the Berlin conference on anti-Semitism, the Commission called the attention of the U.S. delegation to the key role played by NGOs in monitoring anti-Semitism, intolerance, and discrimination, and this language was included 

in the delegation’s concluding speech. The resulting OSCE “Berlin Declaration” on antiSemitism has served as a precedent for the UN in organizing its own public event on 

combating anti-Semitism. 
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Commission Recommendations

With regard to the institution of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE), the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should:

■ express continued strong support for the OSCE in the face of attacks led by the Russian 

government on the OSCE, particularly on its human rights activities carried out by the 

Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); and 

■ authorize and appropriate additional funds to existing U.S. contributions to the OSCE 

for the purpose of expanding programs that combat anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and discrimination against Muslims, Christians, and members of other religions, and of developing ways to advance freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief.

With regard to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief and the promotion of tolerance, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government urge that 

OSCE participating States undertake the following steps:

● ensure that they are complying with their commitments to combat discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism, as detailed in the 1990 Copenhagen Document on the Human 

Dimension, including adopting laws against incitement to violence and ensuring effective 

remedies for acts of discrimination;

● engage in a regular public review of compliance with OSCE commitments on freedom of 

religion or belief, on racial and religious discrimination, and on anti-Semitism, including 

by facilitating a more active role by NGOs as part of that process; 

● commit to condemn promptly, publicly, and specifically hate crimes and to investigate and 

prosecute their perpetrators; 

● take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish acts of anti-Semitism, such as publicly to 

condemn specific anti-Semitic acts, to pursue and prosecute the perpetrators of attacks on 

Jews and their communal property, and, while vigorously protecting freedom of expression, 

to counteract anti-Semitic rhetoric and organized anti-Semitic activities;

● condemn in a public fashion, while vigorously protecting freedom of expression, attacks 

targeting Muslims and pursue and prosecute the perpetrators of such attacks; 

● ensure that efforts to combat terrorism not be used as an unrestrained justification to restrict 

the human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, of members of religious minorities; 

● bring national legislation and practice, as well as local laws, into conformity with international human rights standards and OSCE commitments by: permitting all religious groups 

to organize and conduct their activities without undue interference; discontinuing excessive regulation of the free practice of religion, including registration or recognition requirements that effectively prevent members of religious communities from exercising their 

freedom to manifest religion or belief; and permitting limitations on the right to freedom 

of religion or belief only as provided by law and consistent with participating States’ obligations under international law; 

● monitor the actions of regional and local officials who violate the right to freedom of religion or belief and provide effective remedies for any such violations; and

● establish mechanisms to review the cases of persons detained under suspicion of, or charged 

with, religious, political, or security offenses and to release those who have been imprisoned 

solely because of their religious beliefs or practices, as well as any others who have been 

unjustly detained or sentenced.
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With regard to freedom of religion or belief and the promotion of tolerance, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government urge the OSCE to:

■ take concrete action within the OSCE to ensure that all participating states are living up 

to their commitments to combat discrimination and intolerance, in particular to combat anti-Semitism, as detailed in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, action which should 

include adopting laws to protect against incitement to violence based on discrimination, 

including anti-Semitism, and providing the individual with effective remedies to initiate 

complaints against acts of discrimination;

■ undertake a public review of compliance by participating States within the OSCE on 

a regular basis of their commitments to combat discrimination, xenophobia, and antiSemitism; 

■ provide the ODIHR the necessary mandate and adequate resources to hire experienced 

staff at the working level to monitor compliance with OSCE obligations on freedom of 

religion or belief and to combat discrimination, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism; 

■ ensure reappointment of the three Chairman-in-Office Personal Representatives on tolerance issues;

■ provide funding for each of the three OSCE Personal Representatives on Tolerance for an 

annual budget allocation for travel and other program purposes;

■ provide funding for added staff to deal with freedom of religion or belief, working within 

the ODIHR Human Rights Unit; 

■ provide funding for the OSCE Field Presences and the ODIHR to hold public roundtables 

with local government officials, NGOs, and community leaders to discuss the concept, 

definition, and implementation of hate crimes and hate crimes legislation;

■ ensure that the ODIHR Tolerance Unit staff should take part in ODIHR training of Field 

Presences and other OSCE staff; 

■ provide funding for the translation of additional ODIHR Tolerance Unit reports into 

OSCE languages, particularly Russian, and for one ODIHR Tolerance Unit staffer with 

Russian-language capability; 

■ consider holding the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) in September and October in several areas in the OSCE region, preferably in areas with major 

OSCE Field Presences;

■ consider reorganization of the HDIM conference into thematically-linked issues: Rule of 

Law (Elections; Judiciary; Penal System); Fundamental Freedoms (Religion, Expression/

Media, Assembly/Association, Movement); Tolerance and Non-Discrimination (Gender 

and Minorities—Religious, Ethnic, Economic); and

■ convene expert conferences on anti-Semitism and freedom of religion or belief, as well as 

other tolerance issues, during 2006 and 2007.
Belarus 

Belarus has a highly authoritarian government, with almost all political power concentrated in the hands of 

President Aleksandr Lukashenko and his small circle 

of advisors. The Lukashenko regime has been widely accused 

of serious human rights abuses, including involvement in 

the “disappearances” of several key opposition figures, the 

imprisonment of political opponents and journalists, and 

strict media controls. Human rights conditions deteriorated 

further after the March 2006 presidential elections, which 

observers deemed to be fraudulent. The government of Belarus also continues to commit serious violations of the right 

of its citizens to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. Religious freedom conditions, which had already declined as a result of the strict law on religion passed 

in October 2002, deteriorated further in the past year. The 

Commission continues to place Belarus on its Watch List, 

and will maintain scrutiny throughout the year to determine 

whether the government’s record rises to a level warranting 

designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC.

According to the State Department’s 2005 Country 

Reports on Human Rights Practices, the human rights record of the government of Belarus “remained very poor and 

worsened in some areas, with the government continuing to 

commit numerous serious abuses.” The Belarusian authorities stepped up their campaign against all independent actors, including independent media outlets, trade unions, 

advocates of ethnic minority rights, and non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs). In December 2005, the Belarusian 

government amended its laws further to restrict freedom of 

speech, press, and assembly by passing a series of amendments that make it a crime, with punishments of up to three 

years in prison, to provide “false” information about the political, economic, social, military, or international situation 

of the country to a foreigner; to give out information on government agencies or the rights of citizens; to participate in 

the activities of unregistered NGOs; to participate in public 

demonstrations; to instruct people on demonstrating publicly; to finance public demonstrations; or to solicit foreign 

countries or international organizations in order to “act to 

the detriment” of Belarus.

The legislation on religion passed in October 2002 led 

to serious restrictions on religious freedom in Belarus. The 

law codifies the activities of the official Committee of Religious and Nationality Affairs of the Council of Ministers 

(CRNA) and sets up severe regulatory obstacles and major 

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Human rights conditions deteriorated further after the March 

2006 presidential elections, which 

observers deemed to be fraudulent. Religious freedom conditions, which had already declined 

as a result of the strict law on religion passed in October 2002, deteriorated further in the past year. 

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bureaucratic and legal restrictions on the activities of many religious communities. Essentially, the 2002 religion law prohibits all religious activity by unregistered groups; religious 

communities with fewer than 20 members; foreign citizens from leading religious activities; and religious activity in private homes, with the exception of small, occasional prayer 

meetings. The law set up a three-tiered system of registration, and particularly restricts 

the activities of groups on the lowest tier. The law also mandated that all existing religious 

communities in Belarus re-register with the CRNA by November 2004. Most previously 

registered groups were re-registered, but the law was viewed as a strengthening of the government’s opportunities to deny registration to disfavored groups.

Some religious groups have been consistently denied registration. One frequent basis for re-registration denials has been failure to provide a valid legal address; another is a 

failure to limit activities to a required location. In the past year, two evangelical Protestant 

churches in and near Minsk were denied registration due to the absence of a “legal address.” 

In the past year, a Jewish group and a Calvinist congregation in Minsk had difficulty obtaining valid legal addresses, thereby preventing them even from applying for registration. Five 

autonomous Baptist congregations in the Brest region still await a response to their re-registration request because they refuse to restrict their activity to a particular location. In many 

cases, officials do not provide any reason for the denial of re-registration requests. 

Official government attempts to control and restrict religious groups are frequently 

blatant. A January 2005 report by the top religious affairs official in the Brest region which 

was leaked to persons outside the government reportedly called for more prosecutions of 

local unregistered Baptist congregations by the end of the year. A November 2005 report 

called on Brest regional officials to break up more worship services and harass, fine, and 

control religious activity. That same report points to specific failures of local officials, including their failure to return the property of an alternative Orthodox community to the 

Moscow Patriarchate and to halt Greek Catholic, Jehovah’s Witness, Adventist, and Pentecostal activities in the region. 

While re-registered religious organizations, including Muslims, Lutherans, and 

Baha’is, have held worship services at residential addresses without prosecution, the Administrative Violations Code (Article 167) and the 2002 religion law forbid religious meetings in private homes and religious activity outside designated houses of worship without 

advance approval from state authorities. A first offense is punishable by a warning, a fine of 

between 20 and 150 times the minimum monthly wage, or three to 15 days’ imprisonment. 

A second violation within one year is punishable by a fine of between 150 and 300 times the 

minimum monthly wage or ten to 15 days’ imprisonment. In 2005, several religious communities were fined or warned by courts for holding private worship services, including the 

Minsk Krishna Consciousness Society, which faces prosecution; the Christ’s Covenant Reformed Baptist Church, which received a warning from a Minsk court; and the Full Gospel 

Light to the World, which was warned that it would be shut down. 

The Belarusian authorities appear to be adopting tougher sanctions against church 

leaders and parishioners who take part in unregistered religious activity. In March 2006, the 

pastor of the Minsk-based Christ’s Covenant Reformed Baptist Church received a ten-day 

prison term for conducting religious worship in his home, the first time in 20 years that a 

religious leader was sentenced to imprisonment. The church’s re-registration request had 

previously been denied. In January 2006, police visited a residence during a worship service of a registered Minsk-based Pentecostal congregation and drew up a protocol against 
145

the bishop for alleged violations of the public demonstrations law, which requires advance 

official permission for all public events. This is despite the fact that the congregation is registered to hold worship services in that building. In November 2005, a member of the Brest 

congregation of the unregistered Council of Churches Baptists was fined for unregistered 

religious activity. 

Various other laws, regulations, and directives also restrict the activities of registered 

religious communities. For example, groups are not allowed to function outside their geographic area of registration. The pastor of an Evangelical Protestant church in the Grodno 

region reportedly received a call from a local official warning him not to allow pastors from 

other regions to speak at his church. If a registered religious community does not qualify as a 

“central association,” as in the case of the Greek Catholic Church, it cannot own media outlets 

or invite people from outside Belarus to work with the community. The Society for Krishna 

Consciousness also does not qualify as a central association and therefore cannot rent a hall 

or produce a publication with a print run of over 300. Belarusian law requires monasteries to 

have a minimum of ten participants; yet, only seven Roman Catholic convents and none of 

the Catholic Church’s five or six monasteries meet that arbitrary criterion. 

Since coming to power in 1994, President Lukashenko has openly favored the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC), an Exarchate of the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox 

Church, resulting in a privileged position for the BOC in relation to other religious communities. This relationship was codified in June 2003, when the Belarus government and the 

BOC signed a concordat setting out the Church’s influence in government affairs and other 

facets of public life. Relations between the BOC and the Belarus government have created 

difficulties for many religious minorities, which have sometimes been denied registration 

or permission to rent or build a place of worship by regional authorities who have been influenced by local Orthodox leaders. Several “independent” Orthodox churches that do not 

accept the authority of the Orthodox Patriarch in Moscow have been denied registration, 

including the Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the True Orthodox Church, a branch 

of the Orthodox Church that rejected the compromise with the Soviet government made 

by the Russian Orthodox Church in the 1920s. In March 2004, the Belarusian government 

granted the BOC the exclusive right to use the word “Orthodox” in its title. The state-media 

sometimes attacks minority religious groups; in some cases, the property of these groups 

has been vandalized, though it cannot be established for certain if there is a direct correlation between these events.

The government refuses to acknowledge anti-Semitism and does not prosecute those 

responsible for vandalism against Jewish memorials, cemeteries, or other property. A Jewish cemetery, reportedly located a few meters from a police station in the Brest region, was 

vandalized in May 2005. No arrests have been reported. In January 2006, President Lukashenko reportedly awarded a medal for “spiritual development” to the editor of his presidential administration’s newsletter, a person who has argued that the notorious anti-Semitic 

forgery “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” is a genuine document. Anti-Semitic literature 

continues to be sold in government buildings, in stores, and at events directly and indirectly 

connected with the BOC. In addition, because the 2002 religion law states that religious organizations do not have priority in reclaiming property if a former worship building is now 

used for culture or sport, only nine of 92 historic synagogues in Belarus have been returned 

to the Jewish community since the country’s independence in 1991. Reportedly, in January 

2006, some 30 neo-Nazis held a march in the city of Grodno and several bystanders were 

beaten; city police deny any knowledge of the incident.

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In contrast to the harsh measures described above, President Lukashenko signed a 

new law in late 2005 that exempted from tax the land and property of many religious organizations. The list of eligible religious organizations includes those denied re-registration 

but not yet liquidated by court order, such as the Minsk-based New Life Church and the 

Minsk Society for Krishna Consciousness. However, the recently liquidated Minsk-based 

Belarusian Evangelical Church and Belarusian Evangelical Reformed Union are reportedly 

not included.

The Commission has traveled to Belarus and met with officials for the State Committee on Religious and Nationalities Affairs as well as with representatives of various 

religious and human rights groups. The Commission pressed for passage of the Belarus 

Democracy Act, which was passed by Congress in October 2004. Commission staff has 

met with independent human rights activists from Belarus, including the author of the 

“White Book,” an extensive report on religious persecution in that country. The Commission released a report on Belarus in May 2003 with findings and recommendations for 

U.S. policy. In 2004 and 2005, the Commission took part in meetings of the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe, presenting information on freedom of religion 

in Belarus and meeting with Belarusian officials. In March 2005, the Commission met 

with delegation heads from the United States and European Union countries at the 61st 

session of the UN Commission on Human Rights and presented information about violations of religious freedom in Belarus. 

Commission Recommendations

With regard to Belarus, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should:

■ raise the deteriorating human rights situation in Belarus at the next meeting of the G8 

countries in St. Petersburg, Russia in July 2006 and urge all of the members of the G8, 

including Russia, to press the government of Belarus to institute democratic reforms with 

respect to human rights, including religious freedom, in that country;

■ institute fully the measures set forth in the October 2004 Belarus Democracy Act, which 

expresses the Sense of Congress that sanctions be applied against the government of 

Belarus until the President “determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional 

committees that the government of Belarus has made significant progress” in meeting 

human rights conditions designated in the bill, including: the release of individuals who 

have been jailed on account of their political beliefs; the withdrawal of politically motivated charges against opposition figures; a full accounting of the “disappearances” of 

noted opposition leaders and journalists; and the cessation of all forms of harassment of 

independent media, non-governmental organizations, opposition groups, and religious 

organizations; specific sanctions would include: the denial of entry into the United States 

to high-ranking Belarusian officials, and the prohibition of strategic exports and U.S. 

government financing to the Belarusian government, except for humanitarian goods and 

agricultural or medical products;

■ coordinate with the European Union on the application of financial sanctions and visa 

bans on high-ranking Belarusian officials, particularly those who are directly responsible 

for or who have carried out the government’s abuses of religious freedom;

■ undertake efforts to prevent Belarus from gaining membership in the new UN Human 

Rights Council;
147

■ use every measure of public and private diplomacy to advance the protection of human 

rights, including religious freedom, in Belarus, including enhanced monitoring and public 

reporting by the U.S. Department of State and the appropriate international organizations;

■ urge the Belarus government to take immediate steps to end repression, including: 

● repealing the highly repressive religion law; 

● ending the practice of denying registration to religious groups and then erecting obstacles 

to religious practice because of that unregistered status; 

● providing the right to conduct religious education and distribute religious material; 

● halting government attacks on the persons and property of minority religious groups; 

● ensuring a greater effort on the part of government officials to find and hold to account perpetrators of attacks on the persons and property of members of religious minorities; and 

● providing free access by domestic and international human rights groups and others to sites 

of religious violence or destruction of places of worship; 

■ ensure that the activities to promote democracy authorized by the Belarus Democracy 

Act include the right to freedom of religion or belief and religious tolerance;

■ urge the Belarus government to issue invitations to the UN Special Rapporteur on the 

Situation of Human Rights in Belarus; the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other 

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Special Rapporteur on the 

Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Expression; the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders; the Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, as well as the Working Group on Enforced 

and Involuntary Disappearances; 

■ urge the Belarus government to ensure that no religious community is given a status 

that may result in or be used to justify impairment of the rights of members of other 

religious groups; 

■ urge the Belarus government to publicly condemn, investigate, and prosecute criminal 

acts against Jews and the Jewish community, as well as members of other ethnic and 

religious communities;

■ continue to support, publicly and privately, persons and groups engaged in the struggle 

against repression in Belarus, including the group of religious and opposition activists 

who make up the Freedom of Religion Initiative that published the “White Book”;

■ organize roundtables inside Belarus between members of registered and unregistered religious communities and international experts on freedom of religion; and

■ increase international travel opportunities, particularly for international conferences, for 

Belarusian civil society leaders, including representatives of human rights groups and 

religious leaders, and others who defend freedom of religion in that country. 

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Georgia

Georgia’s former government under President Eduard Shevardnadze exhibited a 

slow and inadequate response to three years of vigilante violence against members 

of some of the country’s religious minorities. However, under the new government 

of President Mikheil Saakashvili, the number of reported incidents of violence against minority religious communities markedly decreased in 2004. Moreover, in January 2005, two 

of the leaders of this vigilante violence were sentenced to prison for their involvement in the 

attacks. In the past year, President Saakashvili, the National Security Council Secretary, and 

the Government Ombudsman have all advocated religious freedom and spoken out in support of minority religious groups. In late 2004, Georgian officials permitted the Jehovah’s 

Witnesses Watchtower Bible and Tract Society to operate legally in the country for the first 

time. Under a new registration process established by parliament in April 2005, two religious communities were approved for registration as non-commercial organizations. While 

the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) remains the only religious group with formal legal 

status as a religious organization and other religious freedom issues remain unresolved in 

Georgia, significant improvement in religious freedom conditions led the Commission to 

remove Georgia from its Watch List in 2004.

Georgia’s 1995 Constitution mandates the separation of church and state, guarantees 

religious freedom, and forbids “persecution of an individual for his thoughts, beliefs or 

religion.” In practice, however, violations of religious freedom have occurred, especially 

at the regional level, where local officials have restricted the rights of members of mainly 

non-traditional religious minorities, who in past years were subjected to societal violence. 

However, according to the State Department, increased investigations and prosecutions of 

the perpetrators led to further improvements in the status of religious freedom in 2005.

The precipitous drop in the number of violent attacks on religious minorities and the 

sentencing of the ringleaders of the violence represent improvements for religious freedom 

in Georgia. Under the Shevardnadze government, minority religious groups in Georgia, 

including Baptists, Roman Catholics, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and members of 

Orthodox churches that do not accept the primacy of the GOC Patriarchate, were subjected 

to more than 100 violent vigilante attacks. Jehovah’s Witnesses, as well as members of independent Orthodox churches, were particularly targeted. Local police were implicated in 

these attacks, as they often refused to intervene to protect the victims. What began in 1999 

as a series of isolated attacks in the capital of Tbilisi escalated by 2002 into a nation-wide 

scourge of widely publicized mob assaults against members of religious minorities. 

The main instigators of these attacks were the defrocked GOC priest Basil Mkalavishvili and director of the Orthodox “Jvari” Union, Paata Bluashvili, the latter of whom was 

reportedly supported by some in the GOC hierarchy. After years of government delays and 

inaction, in November 2003, only days after the Shevardnadze government fell, a court in 

Rustavi sentenced Bluashvili and four associates to suspended prison terms, ranging from 

two to four years, for their role in spearheading the violence in two attacks against Jehovah’s 

Witnesses. Mkalavishvili has also been convicted on criminal charges, though only after 

somewhat drawn-out legal proceedings. Mkalavishvili and an associate were sentenced in 

January 2005; Mkalavishvili received a six-year term and his associate a four-year term. 

Their lawyers reportedly plan to appeal the sentences. 
Despite improvements, some religious freedom concerns remain. Although the primary leaders of the violent 

attacks against members of religious minorities have been 

convicted, many other of the people accused of participating 

in this violence—including local police officials—have not 

been held to account by the Georgian authorities, reportedly 

due to fears of offending the GOC hierarchy. Moreover, Orthodox communities other than the GOC and some other 

minority Christian denominations periodically encounter 

difficulties from local officials and the GOC in building places of worship or displaying their literature in bookstores. 

There are a number of concerns involving the status 

of the GOC, to which 65 percent of the country’s population 

claim adherence. Article 9 of the Constitution recognizes the 

“special importance of the GOC in Georgian history.” In October 2002, the Georgian government signed an agreement, 

or concordat, with the GOC, granting the Church some approval authority over state school textbooks, the construction of religious buildings, and the publication of religious 

literature by other religious groups. Although the agreement 

was reaffirmed in January 2005, a new law passed in April 

2005 provided for the separation of state schools and religious teaching and narrowed the application of the concordat, such as limiting teaching by the GOC to after-school 

hours and eliminating school and teacher involvement. 

In recent years, Assyrian Chaldean Catholics, Lutherans, Muslims, Old Believers, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Roman Catholics have stated that the GOC Patriarchate has 

often acted to prevent them from acquiring, building, or reclaiming places of worship. The Patriarchate has also reportedly denied permission for Pentecostals, the Salvation Army, 

and the True Orthodox Church to print some religious literature in Georgia, although Assyrian Chaldean Catholics, 

Baptists, Roman Catholics, and Yezidis (an ancient religion 

with a majority of ethnic Kurdish adherents) have not reported difficulties in this regard. An affiliate organization 

of the Jehovah’s Witnesses has been allowed to register as a 

civic association, which should ease problems with regard to 

the import of religious literature. 

In April 2005, a new law was passed allowing religious 

communities to register as non-commercial organizations. 

As a result, both the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 

Saints (Mormons) and the Seventh Day Adventists were approved for registration. While this remedy generally is considered a more or less satisfactory way to grant legal personality to religious groups, Roman Catholic and Armenian 

Apostolic churches reportedly are trying to devise a different 

In the past year, President Saakashvili, the National Security Council Secretary, and the Government 

Ombudsman have all advocated 

religious freedom and spoken out in 

support of minority religious groups. 

149

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arrangement with the government. They, along with Muslims, oppose registering as noncommercial organizations, preferring to register only as public religious bodies. This would 

give them the same status as that of the GOC, the only religious community in the country that enjoys such a distinction and one that it gained as a result of its 2002 concordat 

with the Georgian government. The leaders of many other religious minority groups are 

also still seeking recognized legal status, a prerequisite for the community collectively to 

own property or organize most religious activities. However, the absence of formal legal 

status generally has not prevented most religious communities from functioning through 

affiliated registered non-governmental organizations. According to the State Department, 

in December 2005, the government’s human rights ombudsman issued a report calling for 

equal recognition under the law for all religions, a suggestion to which some Members of 

Parliament reportedly objected. 

Despite general tolerance toward minority religious communities viewed as traditional to Georgia, opinion polls and the Georgian media reflect significant societal intolerance towards Protestants and other religions relatively new to Georgia. Public opinion polls 

continue to show that a majority of Georgians view minority or new religious groups as a 

threat to the GOC and national cultural values, and that violence against and the prohibition of such groups would be acceptable, according to the State Department’s 2005 human 

rights report. Some GOC representatives have argued that foreign Christian missionaries 

should confine their activities to regions of Georgia where Muslims are the majority of the 

population. The government ombudsman has also reported hostility towards non-Orthodox religious communities, including reports that children in state orphanages are sometimes baptized by GOC clergy without their parents’ permission (it is not uncommon in 

many countries of the former Soviet Union for poorer parents to place their children in 

orphanages on a temporary basis).

Commission Recommendations

With regard to Georgia, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should: 

■ encourage the Georgian government to continue to investigate and prosecute those individuals, including local officials, who are alleged to have been complicit or engaged in 

violence against members of religious minority communities; 

■ encourage the Georgian government to establish a mechanism to enable religious communities to gain legal personality as public religious bodies under Georgian law, consistent with international human rights standards; and

■ direct funding to initiate programs in Georgia for journalists, religious leaders, and members of non-governmental organizations to promote religious tolerance and provide education on international standards on freedom of religion or belief. 
The Russian Federation

S

ince the Commission expressed strong concern in its 

May 2003 report that the Russian government was 

retreating from democratic reform and endangering 

significant gains on human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, it has become increasingly clear that this is 

a deliberate policy of the Russian government. Curtailments 

of media freedom and of the role of political parties, the 

placement of tighter restrictions on religious communities, 

non-governmental organizations, and other aspects of civil 

society, and the harassment of human rights organizations, 

as well as legal restrictions on freedom of assembly, constraints on the use of popular referenda, and President Vladimir Putin’s decision to end the popular election of regional 

governors, have all revealed that progress toward democracy 

is being halted, if not reversed. The deterioration in conditions for religious freedom and other human rights appears 

to be a direct consequence of the increasingly authoritarian 

nature of the Russian government and the growing influence 

of chauvinistic groups in Russian society, which seem to be 

tolerated by the government. The country’s progress toward 

the rule of law and protection of religious freedom and other 

human rights is now in peril.

Despite the setbacks in the past year, it can still be said 

that the practice of religion in Russia today, particularly for 

the individual, is freer than during the Soviet period, when 

atheism was the strictly enforced state policy and religious 

expression was harshly repressed. Nevertheless, advancements in religious freedom protections that emerged in the 

period immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union are now 

in danger of being reversed. A January 2006 law regulating 

non-commercial organizations allows Russian government 

officials to attend meetings of any registered religious community and provides for increased controls on foreign donations, which will likely hamper the charitable and other 

activities of religious groups. Although the number of violent incidents has not increased, there has been a noticeable 

rise in the number of anti-Semitic sentiments expressed in 

official government circles as well as the media. In addition, 

there has been a significant increase in allegations of official 

discrimination against, as well as harassment, detention and 

imprisonment of, members of the country’s numerous Muslim communities, incidents in which religious identification 

is believed to play a growing role. 

In 1997, Russia passed a new law on religion. Requiring registration at both federal and local levels, the law creates 

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The deterioration in conditions for 

religious freedom and other human 

rights appears to be a direct consequence of the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Russian government and the growing influence 

of chauvinistic groups in Russian 

society, which seem to be tolerated 

by the government. The country’s 

progress toward the rule of law and 

protection of religious freedom and 

other human rights is now in peril.

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difficulties for previously unregistered as well as new religious groups. Religious groups that 

have taken their cases to court to overturn denials of registration have often been successful; 

however, administrative authorities have sometimes proved unwilling to implement court 

decisions. In addition, Russian authorities have denied registration to certain religious communities based on the allegedly insufficient time they have existed, despite a 2002 Russian 

Constitutional Court decision that an active religious organization registered before the 1997 

law could not be deprived of legal status for failing to re-register. According to the State Department, a January 2006 amendment to the law requires that all registered local religious 

organizations notify the Federal Registration Service (FRS) within 36 hours of any change in 

its leadership or legal address. If a local organization twice fails to meet this requirement, the 

FRS may file suit with a court to have it dissolved.

At the federal level, the vast majority of religious organizations have been registered 

under a liberal interpretation of the 1997 law by federal officials and the Russian Constitutional Court. There have been several noticeable exceptions. The March 2004 Moscow 

court decision banning the Jehovah’s Witnesses in that city, upheld on appeal, marked the 

first time that a national religious organization in Russia had a local branch banned under 

the 1997 law, even though 135,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses practice their faith in registered 

communities in many other parts of Russia. The Salvation Army has not been re-registered, despite a Constitutional Court ruling that overturned the government’s decision not 

to register the organization in Moscow. Local officials sometimes either refused outright to 

register groups or created prohibitive obstacles to registration; a lack of specific guidelines 

to accompany the 1997 law and the shortage of knowledgeable local officials contributed to 

the problem. In the past year, there were a number of reports that the Procurator General 

encouraged local prosecutors to challenge the registration of some religious groups deemed 

“non-traditional” to Russia. In addition, some Muslim clerics have reported that it has become more difficult to register new Muslim communities. For example, registration has 

been arbitrarily denied to 39 of the Stavropol region’s 47 mosques.

A number of minority religious groups continue to report difficulties in obtaining 

permission to build houses of worship, since local government officials often create barriers. Roman Catholics, Protestants, Old Believers, Molokans (an ancient Orthodox sect), 

and Muslims have reported problems in acquiring land for new buildings, as have other 

alternative Orthodox communities. Religious groups seen as non-traditional to Russia face 

particular difficulties. For example, in November 2005, Moscow authorities overturned 

their decision to allot land for the building of a Hare Krishna temple and in 2006 the community lost its appeal of that decision. In other cases, local authorities have been responsive 

to the needs of a religious community. For example, following protests in June 2005, the 

Moscow Department for Building Policy reportedly ordered that land be found for the 

Emmanuel Pentecostal Church to build a center. For Muslims, the situation is mixed. In 

majority Muslim areas, the local government often funds the building of new mosques; in 

Tatarstan, the local government has funded the building of 1,000 new mosques and several 

dozen Islamic schools. In areas where the Muslim population is new or in the minority, 

however, the community may face difficulties in building or operating places of worship. In 

October 2005, in the city of Nalchik, capital of Karbardino-Balkariya in the north Caucasus, 

the regional governor closed six of the seven mosques in that city and allowed the remaining mosque to open for only a few hours a week. In the regional capital of Astrakhan, local 

authorities have ordered the demolition of a mosque they initially helped fund. The case is 

apparently going to the Supreme Court. 
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The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which has played a special role in Russian 

history and culture, enjoys a favored status among many Russian government officials, a 

situation that sometimes results in restrictions on other religious communities. The ROC 

receives the overwhelming majority of various forms of state support, including subsidies 

for the construction of churches, although other religious communities also sometimes 

benefit. The ROC also has agreements with a number of government ministries on guidelines for public education, religious training for military personnel, and law enforcement 

decisions. Early in 2006, a bill was introduced to allow only clergy from the ROC to serve as 

official military chaplains. Members of registered Protestant communities in distant areas 

claim that they do have some access to military personnel that varies by region; however, the authorities generally 

prohibit Muslim services at military facilities. 

ROC officials sometimes use their influence with 

regional authorities to restrict the activities of other religious groups. There are frequent reports, particularly on 

the local level, that minority religious communities must 

secure permission from the ROC before being allowed to 

build, buy, or rent a house of worship and that local authorities sometimes deny registration to minority groups 

at the behest of local ROC officials. In July 2005, reportedly 

in response to pressure from officials of the local ROC, the 

Sverdlovsk Regional Railway canceled a three-day congress 

of 5,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses, due to be held in a railwayadministered stadium. 

Due to their perceived links to the decade-long conflict in Chechnya and acts of terrorism worldwide, Muslims throughout Russia in 2005 increasingly became the targets of widespread discrimination, media attacks, and occasional 

acts of violence. In many of these incidents, there is growing concern among human rights 

organizations in Russia that religion has been a major factor. In February 2003, the Russian 

Supreme Court reportedly met in secret and banned 15 Muslim groups because of their alleged ties to international terrorism. The evidence on which the Court made this decision 

has never been made public, but police, prosecutors, and courts reportedly have used the 

decision to arrest and imprison individuals from among Russia’s estimated 20 million Muslims. Persons suspected by local police of involvement in alleged Islamic extremism have 

reportedly been subjected to torture and ill-treatment in pre-trial detention, prisons, and 

labor camps. There are as many as 200 cases of the imprisonment of Muslims on what are 

apparently fabricated criminal charges of possession of weapons and drugs. 

After the 2004 hostage-taking in Beslan, police actions against Muslims in the 

North Caucasus intensified. The Russian human rights group Memorial described most 

cases against Muslims in that region as “trumped-up.” Nine female Muslim students at the 

Kabardino-Balkariya State University reportedly were detained in June 2005 and interrogated for wearing the hijab and engaging in group study of the Quran. Mosque closings in 

Nalchik in October 2005 resulted in violence in which some 300 attackers targeted military 

garrisons and police stations, leaving 34 police and armed forces members dead. Following 

this incident, police harassment of Muslim clerics and torture of alleged militants reportedly increased. According to the State Department, the head of the Islamic Research Institute in Nalchik, who sought to promote dialogue between the authorities and Muslims, is 

USCIRF Russia roundtable at Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace in Washington

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reported to have disappeared in November 2005, after interrogation by the Federal Security 

Service. The Russian government continues to refuse to make a serious effort to address 

reports of chronic human rights abuses in Chechnya, reportedly carried out by the Russian 

military, Chechen government forces, and Chechen rebel fighters. Despite entreaties from 

the U.S. State Department, Russian authorities have not sought negotiations to find a political solution to the decade-long war in Chechnya.

Many in Russia’s Jewish community state that despite some continued problems, conditions for the country’s Jews have generally improved, because, unlike in the Soviet period, 

the state no longer acts as an official sponsor of anti-Semitism. In 2005, construction began 

on a Jewish community building complex on land donated by the city of Moscow, which 

will include a school, a hospital, and a new museum of Russian Jewry, the Holocaust, and 

religious tolerance. 

Nevertheless, anti-Semitic acts, including public pronouncements as well as vandalism and physical attacks, continue, particularly in Russia’s western regions. In January 2005, 

20 members of the Russian State Duma (Parliament) called on the Procurator General to 

ban all Jewish organizations in Russia, alleging that Jewish texts teach incitement of religious and ethnic hatred. Though the letter was later officially withdrawn, none of the signers have expressed regret for the views it expressed. In April 2005, another letter, expressing 

similarly virulent anti-Semitic views, was signed by 5,000 people, including many wellknown Russian public figures and ROC officials. Both letters were publicly condemned by 

the Russian Foreign Ministry. However, a Moscow district prosecutor opened an investigation into the Jewish organization that published the translation of the letters, as well as into 

charges brought by Jewish and human rights organizations that the letters themselves, in 

promoting hatred of Jews, violated federal laws against ethnic incitement. These investigations were later closed with no charges being brought. In September 2005, Moscow airport 

border guards denied reentry to the rabbi of the Moscow Choral Synagogue. A Swiss citizen, he has lived in Moscow since 1989 and his family resides there. His visa status has since 

been resolved, after a delay of several months. 

Casual anti-Semitic statements are reportedly so numerous in society that law enforcement bodies do not pay attention to them. While official investigations into anti-Semitic activity by individuals have increased, official efforts to combat chauvinist and antiSemitic groups decreased in 2005. There was a significant exception in May 2005, when a 

Novgorod city court ruled that three distributors of an anti-Semitic bulletin constituted 

an “extremist community,” as defined in criminal code Article 2821. All three defendants 

received conditional sentences, but were banned from distribution of mass media; one was 

also banned from journalism. 

Anti-Semitic attacks and vandalism often go unpunished, except for high-profile incidents, such as an attack in January 2005 in Moscow on two rabbis who are U.S. citizens. 

The two attackers in that case were sentenced to four years and eighteen months in prison, 

respectively, but the court failed to find that they were motivated by hatred. In March 2006, 

a Moscow court sentenced a 21-year-old defendant to 13 years in prison for the stabbing of 

eight men in a prominent Moscow synagogue, but found him not guilty of inciting racial 

hatred. The perpetrator had reportedly been reading anti-Semitic literature before committing the act. The number of reported incidents of vandalism of Jewish cultural and religious 

sites in 2005 was estimated to be similar to that in 2004. Anti-Semitic graffiti and property 

damage were reported in Moscow, Petrozavodsk, Samara, Taganrog, Vladimir, and Nizhny 
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Novgorod. Vandalism of Jewish cemeteries or of Jewish graves was reported in Moscow, 

Kazan, Tver, Tambov, Pskov Oblast, St. Petersburg, and near Izhevsk. 

There continue to be official efforts to portray “foreign sects,” mostly Evangelical 

Protestants, as alien to Russian culture and society. Officials do little to counter libelous 

media attacks or discrimination. Security services treat the leadership of some minority 

religious groups, particularly Muslims and adherents of newer religions, as security threats. 

Many officials in the legislative branch and in law enforcement speak of the need to protect 

the “spiritual security” of the country by discouraging the growth of “sects” and “cults,” usually understood to include Protestant and newer religious movements. In one case, a local 

official reportedly warned that non-traditional religions are used by foreign organizations 

to undermine the country’s security, grouping together Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the 

True Orthodox Church, and the New Apostle Church with such groups as Aum Shinrikyo, 

the Japanese group notorious for the subway gas attack in Tokyo, and Satanists. Evangelical 

Protestants also continued to be subject to societal violence in the past year, as churches 

and prayer houses were vandalized in several regions. The Slavic Law Center reported that 

a Baptist Church in Chelyabinsk Oblast was firebombed in April 2005. The Jehovah’s Witnesses reported two incidents in March 2006, when members were assaulted, leaving one 

with a concussion. 

There are continued reports of difficulties for foreign religious workers in entering 

Russia, either to work or to visit. Catholic authorities reported a decrease in visa problems 

for Catholic priests in 2005, though foreign Catholic priests in the Pacific region remain 

unable to invite others to assist them. None of the seven foreign Catholic clergy barred 

by authorities from entering Russia in 2001 and 2002 has since been allowed to return to 

the country. The Russian authorities have not resolved a pending visa request by the Dalai 

Lama to visit the Republic of Tuva, although the Tibetan Buddhist leader was finally allowed to visit the traditionally Buddhist region of Kalmykia in late 2004. In the past year, 

the government denied entry to high-ranking British and Danish Salvation Army officials 

who sought to attend a church congress, reportedly on the grounds that it was not “in the 

interests of state security.” 

In February 2005, the Commission held a joint briefing with the Kennan Institute for 

Advanced Russian Studies on “Russia: Religious Communities, Extremist Movements and 

the State” chaired by Commissioner Felice D. Gaer, at which findings were presented by 

experts on the current status of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities, as well as on 

increased acts of ethnic and religious extremism. Also in February, the Commission issued 

a press statement calling on President Bush to raise with President Putin the state of freedom of religion or belief in Russia at their then-upcoming meeting. In April 2005, the Commission held a briefing with Oleg Mironov, the former Human Rights Ombudsman of the 

Russian Federation, and Mufti Ismagil Shangareev, director of the Islamic Human Rights 

Defense Center in Russia. Also in that month, a briefing by Lyudmila Alekseeva, head of the 

Moscow Helsinki Group on religious freedom and other human rights concerns in Russia, 

took place at Commission offices. In May 2005, the Commission co-sponsored a presentation at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on religious extremism in Russia by Aleksandr 

Verkhovsky, director of the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis in Moscow. 

In February 2006, Commissioner Elizabeth Prodromou traveled to Moscow to make 

a presentation on “Human Rights and Tolerance in Today’s Russia: an International View” 

at a conference in Moscow organized by the Russian Presidential Administration Training 

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Academy for state officials. The conference brought together scores of national, regional, 

and local government officials responsible for the regulation of religious affairs in Russia. 

The Commission also made a similar presentation at a conference on religion in Russia at 

the Moscow Humanities University. During the visit, Commissioner Prodromou met with 

several representatives of human rights and other civil society organizations, as well as academic experts, concerned with freedom of religion and growing intolerance in Russia.

Also in February 2006, the Commission convened a public roundtable discussion at 

the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace entitled “Assessing U.S. Human Rights 

Policy Towards Russia.” The panelists at the roundtable reviewed how the U.S. government 

should be responding to the rollback in human rights, including religious freedom, in Russia and increasing Russian nationalism. 

The Commission has advocated continued inclusion of the “Smith Amendment” in 

the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. The Smith Amendment conditions foreign assistance to the Russian government if the President certifies that the Russian government 

has not implemented any statute, executive order, or regulation that discriminates against 

religious groups or religious communities, in violation of international norms on human 

rights and religious freedoms to which the Russian Federation is a party. Congress included 

this provision in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005. 

Commission Recommendations

With regard to Russia, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should:

■ urge the Russian government to ensure that any special role for the Orthodox Church or 

any other religious community does not result in violations of the rights of, or discrimination against, members of other religious groups;

■ ensure that the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Chechnya remains a key issue in 

its bilateral relations with Russia and urge the Russian government to end, and prosecute 

acts of, torture, arbitrary detention, rape, and other abuses by members of the military 

in Chechnya; 

■ urge the Russian government to accept a site visit to Chechnya from the UN Special Rapporteurs on Torture, Extrajudicial Executions, and Violence Against Women;

■ raise religious freedom and other human rights violations in multilateral fora, including 

the OSCE and the UN, and continue, on a bilateral basis, to encourage the government 

of Russia to agree to the request of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief to visit Russia;

■ use every possible means to engage and support the genuine democrats in the Russian 

government at the federal and local levels, and ensure that U.S. aid programs are not being used to support the activities in Russia of authoritarian-minded officials; 

■ make clear its concern to the Russian government that hostile rhetoric against Muslims 

and the Islamic faith is fueling an atmosphere in which perpetrators believe they can attack Muslim or members of other religious and ethnic minorities with impunity;

■ make clear its concern to the Russian government that efforts to combat terrorism should 

not be used as an unrestrained justification to restrict the rights, including religious freedom, of members of Russia’s religious minorities;

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■ urge the Russian government to take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish acts 

of anti-Semitism, including to condemn anti-Semitic acts, to investigate and prosecute 

the perpetrators of violent incidents of anti-Semitism, and, while vigorously protecting 

freedom of expression, to counteract anti-Semitic rhetoric and other organized antiSemitic activities;

■ continue to press the Russian government to ensure that religious communities are not 

broadly and indiscriminately labeled as threats to Russia’s national security;

■ continue to urge the Russian government to cease interference in the internal affairs of 

religious communities, such as denials of visas and work permits to religious workers and 

attempted interference in the elections of religious bodies; 

■ urge the government of Russia to monitor the actions of regional and local officials who 

interfere with the right to freedom of religion or belief, take steps to bring local laws and 

regulations on religious activities into conformity with the Russian Constitution and international human rights standards, and bring those who commit crimes to justice;

■ continue to monitor official restrictions on the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including the implementation of the recently enacted law on NGOs, and 

to oppose such restrictions that constitute violations of international norms; 

■ advance human rights, including religious freedom, in Russia by continuing to provide 

assistance, as appropriate, to NGOs, public interest groups, journalists, and academic 

institutions, and by expanding programs aimed at encouraging religious tolerance and 

supporting international standards on freedom of religion and other human rights; 

■ include the promotion of freedom of religion or belief as a category for U.S. Embassy 

small grants proposals; and

■ consider providing funds to non-governmental programs on international and Russian 

legal commitments to protect freedom of religion or belief as well as promote tolerance. 

Such programs should include training of religious affairs officials, court officials, and 

lawyers; media monitoring; journalism training; and conferences of academic specialists, 

representatives of civil society and religious communities and government officials. 

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Turkmenistan 

Turkmenistan is among the most repressive states in the world today and engages in 

systematic and egregious violations of freedom of religion or belief. The all-pervasive 

authoritarian rule and escalating “personality cult” of President Saparmurat Niyazov 

effectively prevent any opposition or independent religious activity within the country. The 

country’s poor human rights situation further deteriorated after November 2002, when, in 

response to a reported assassination attempt, Niyazov ordered the arrest of hundreds allegedly linked to that attempt, sentencing many to long prison terms and sending others to 

psychiatric hospitals. In the past two years, the government has made small, purportedly 

positive legal adjustments to the laws that restrict religious practice; however, these changes 

have done little or nothing to alter the overall repressive situation. The Commission continues to recommend that the Secretary of State designate Turkmenistan a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. Although religious freedom continues to be severely proscribed 

in Turkmenistan and there is scant evidence that the situation has improved in the past year, 

the Secretary of State has not named Turkmenistan a CPC. 

President Niyazov’s personality cult is increasingly becoming comparable to a stateimposed religion. This aspect of his rule is bolstered by the forceful official promotion of 

a book containing the president’s own “spiritual thoughts,” known as Rukhnama. Students 

are reportedly required to study the Rukhnama at all public schools and institutes of higher 

learning. Moreover, according to the State Department, observers have stated that the president uses his teachings “in part to supersede other established religious codes, as well as historical and cultural texts, and thereby influence citizens’ religious and cultural behavior.” 

A July 2002 law enjoins parents and guardians “to bring [children] up in spirit of 

...the unshakeable spiritual values embodied in the holy Rukhnama.” Credible reports indicate that mullahs in Turkmenistan were told in late 2005 to stop reading the Quran in 

mosques and restrict themselves to the Rukhnama. In March 2006, Niyazov announced on 

Turkmen state television that anyone reading Rukhnama three times “would be assured a 

place in heaven.” According to reports, the study of the Rukhnama has even replaced some 

subjects in the school curricula. The president’s books must be displayed in mosques and 

churches alongside the Quran and the Bible. Rukhnama quotations have also been carved 

alongside Quran citations in the country’s largest mosque. Turkmenistan’s former chief 

mufti, Nazrullah ibn Ibadullah, who opposed this requirement, was sentenced in a closed 

trial in March 2004 to 22 years in prison, reportedly for treason due to his alleged link to 

the alleged assassination attempt. The former chief mufti remains in prison, where, reports 

indicate, he is maltreated by prison guards. During a December 2005 police raid of a registered Baptist church in the town of Deynau, ethnic Turkmen congregants were released 

from detention only after they signed a statement promising to read the Rukhnama rather 

than the New Testament. 

Since independence in 1991, religious groups have been required to register with the 

government in order to engage in religious activities. The 1997 version of the country’s religion law effectively banned all religious groups except the state-controlled Sunni Muslim 

Board and the Russian Orthodox Church, though religious instruction even for these two 

communities is severely limited. Niyazov enforces his own interpretation of Islam as part of 

his version of Turkmen identity. Imams have been instructed by the government to repeat an 

oath of loyalty to the “fatherland” and to the President after each daily prayer. In March 2004, 
Niyazov proclaimed that no new mosques should be built and 

some seven mosques are reported to have been destroyed in 

that year. In July 2005, Niyazov reportedly told his cabinet that 

Turkmen Muslims had their own way of praying and ordered 

the publication of a list of religious rituals common to all 

Turkmens. Reportedly, secret police attend mosques to identify Muslims who perform religious rites in a way that differs 

from this officially prescribed Turkmen practice. Since August 

2005, according to the exiled Turkmenistan Helsinki Foundation, the secret police have increased the monitoring of young 

men who regularly visit mosques in the country’s Ahal region 

by ordering imams to hang a list of mosque attendees above 

the doors to their mosques; now, only those whose names are 

on the lists are allowed to visit those mosques. The Turkmen 

authorities continue to limit the numbers of Muslims permitted to perform the haj; in 2006, only 188 of the country’s official quota of 4,500 were allowed to go to Mecca. In the past 

year, the Turkmen State University Theological Faculty was 

dissolved and absorbed into another department, leaving only 

one institution of Islamic education open, with the government controlling the curriculum of that institution. As far 

back 2000, Niyazov reportedly ordered Muslims to renounce 

the hadiths, sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad 

that do not appear in the Quran. 

The Russian Orthodox community has also been affected by the repressive policies of Niyazov, who has banned 

residents of Turkmenistan from receiving Russian publications by mail, including the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. All Russian Orthodox parishes were re-registered by November 2005. However, Turkmen authorities refuse to allow 

the Russian Orthodox community to build a new cathedral 

in the capital of Ashgabat, though Niyazov allocated land for 

that purpose ten years ago. In addition, the Turkmen government continues to attempt to isolate local parishes from 

the wider Russian Orthodox Church, in part by pressuring 

the local Church to take the Turkmen parishes from the jurisdiction of the Central Asian diocese in Uzbekistan and 

put them directly under the Patriarch of Moscow, who in 

July 2005 rejected this proposal. 

A new law on religion in 2003 resulted in a further decline in religious freedom conditions. The new law codified 

the Turkmen government’s already highly repressive policies 

even further, effectively banning most religious activity, and 

established criminal penalties for those found guilty of participating in “illegal” religious activity. The law also requires 

religious groups to coordinate with the Turkmen government any contacts with co-religionists abroad. In response 

The Commission continues to recommend that the Secretary of State 

designate Turkmenistan a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC. Although religious freedom continues 

to be severely proscribed in Turkmenistan and there is scant evidence 

that the situation has improved in 

the past year, the Secretary of State 

has not named Turkmenistan a CPC. 

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to international pressure, Niyazov issued a decree in March 2004 stating that religious 

communities may register “in the prescribed manner,” and will no longer have to meet 

the requirement of 500 members in order to do so. However, the decree only amended the 

numerical requirements for registration and not the penalties for violating it. In May 2004, 

President Niyazov issued several decrees decriminalizing unregistered religious activities 

and easing other requirements for registration, resulting in the registration of nine small 

groups, in addition to the majority Sunni Muslims and the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, Turkmen officials have stated that “eased” registration requirements do not mean 

that religious communities may gather in private homes or that religious adherents will no 

longer be required to request official permission before holding worship services. In fact, 

some reports indicate that registration is actually being used as a method of more effective 

state control over religious communities, as it affords officials the right to know what occurs at every meeting of a religious group. Church members who refuse to provide details 

about religious gatherings risk having their communities charged with being in violation of 

registration requirements.

In addition, police continued to interfere in the activities of registered and unregistered religious communities in the past year. Security officials regularly break up religious 

meetings in private homes, search homes without warrants, confiscate religious literature, 

and detain and threaten congregants with criminal prosecution and deportation. Family 

members of detained religious leaders have been subjected to harassment and internal exile. 

In March 2005, Baptist communities were raided in the towns of Turkmenabad and Mary 

and Pentecostals in Turkmenbashi. In August, “anti-terrorist” police raided a Baptist worship service in Dashoguz, questioning church members, confiscating Turkmen-language 

Bibles, and claiming that the church’s national registration in Ashgabat was not valid in 

other towns. In the past year, Baptists, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Seventh-day 

Adventists reported disrupted meetings, detainments (including of children), and administrative fines. Jehovah’s Witnesses reportedly experienced eight incidents of harassment or 

short-term detention during a three-month period in the last year. One Jehovah’s Witness 

was confined to a psychiatric hospital for refusing military conscription in November 2005. 

He was released in February 2006. In July 2005, police raided a home in Turkmenabad where 

a group of unregistered Baptists had gathered; police reportedly beat the host with her own 

Bible and threatened to hang her. An adherent of Hare Krishna received a seven-year jail 

sentence on unknown charges; in February 2006 her appeal to overturn that sentence was 

denied. In addition, members of some religious minority groups, particularly Protestants, 

Hare Krishnas and Jehovah’s Witnesses, continue to face official pressure to renounce their 

faith publicly, and are forced to swear an oath on the Rukhnama. 

No religious literature is printed in Turkmenistan and the import of religious materials is essentially impossible. In addition, known religious adherents are sometimes banned 

from travel. In 2005, two Protestants were denied permission to leave Turkmenistan after 

they told border guards they wanted to study the Bible, and a Hare Krishna follower who 

had planned to visit a temple in Russia was also prevented from traveling. In recent years, 

the Turkmen government has refused entry visas to three or four priests who are Russian 

citizens, while church delegations to Turkmenistan from Tashkent and Moscow have been 

forced by Turkmen officials to reduce their numbers. Muslims are not allowed to travel 

abroad for religious education; however, Russian Orthodox men from Turkmenistan are 

allowed to study for the priesthood at the Tashkent seminary.
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For several years, the Commission has raised public concerns about the status of 

religious freedom in Turkmenistan at meetings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Commission has met with the U.S. Ambassador to Turkmenistan to 

discuss bilateral relations, the status of religious freedom and other human rights, and steps 

the United States might take to ameliorate the situation. As recommended by the Commission, the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) passed resolutions condemning 

Turkmenistan for repression of religious and political rights in 2004. In March 2005, the 

Commission met with delegation heads from the United States and European Union (EU) 

countries at the 61st session of the UNCHR session and presented information about violations of religious freedom in Turkmenistan, questioning the decision of the United States 

and the EU not to introduce a resolution on Turkmenistan at the 2005 UNCHR. 

In May 2004, the Commission organized two public briefings on “Religious Freedom in 

Turkmenistan: the U.S. Response to One of the World’s Worst Religious Freedom Violators,” 

with the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Radio Free Europe/Radio 

Liberty. The Commission also released a public statement in response to the Turkmen Ministry of Justice’s declaration that unregistered religious activity continues to be illegal, noting 

that “CPC designation would likely lead to significant improvements for the religious communities in Turkmenistan who have been ignored by the outside world for too long.” In July 

2005, the Commission held a public briefing with the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, on “U.S. Strategic Dilemmas in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.” The briefing discussed 

the human rights situation in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the nature of local extremist and 

terrorist threats, and U.S. and other strategic interests in the region. 

Commission Recommendations

In addition to continuing to recommend that Turkmenistan be designated a CPC, the 

Commission has further recommended that the U.S. government should:

■ suspend all non-humanitarian assistance to the government of Turkmenistan, with the 

exception of programs that serve identifiable U.S. national security interests in connection with the current campaign against terrorism. This recommendation does not apply 

to U.S. assistance to appropriate non-governmental organizations, private persons, or 

cultural or educational exchanges;

■ scrutinize all aspects of any assistance programs in Turkmenistan to ensure that these programs do not facilitate Turkmen government policies or practices that result in religious 

freedom violations. The United States should also examine its programs in Turkmenistan 

to determine if opportunities exist within those programs to promote the development of 

genuine respect for human rights, including religious freedom, in that country;

■ support efforts to facilitate Turkmenistan’s sale of natural gas on world markets, including 

support for the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, only if the Turkmen government takes definitive steps to improve substantially conditions for religious freedom in Turkmenistan;

■ identify specific steps that the government of Turkmenistan could take in order to have 

its currently suspended assistance reinstated and to avoid triggering further restrictions 

on assistance programs, steps which should include, but not be limited to (1) the lifting 

of oppressive legal requirements on religious groups and allowing all such groups to organize and operate freely; (2) the end to harassment and deportation of religious leaders; 

and (3) the halting of unjust arrest, detention, imprisonment, torture, and residential and 

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workplace intimidation of religious leaders and their adherents, including releasing those 

currently in detention or imprisoned;

■ press the government of Turkmenistan: (a) to release immediately and unconditionally 

any persons who have been detained solely because of their religious beliefs, practices, or 

choice of religious association; (b) to ensure that all people in Turkmenistan are able to 

exercise their right to religious freedom without threat of harassment, detention, imprisonment, or torture; and (c) to permit all religious groups to organize and worship freely;

■ continue to support discussions in Turkmenistan among representatives of Turkmenistan’s religious communities, religious affairs officials, and experts on international 

norms on religious freedom, possibly in conjunction with the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);

■ support efforts to counteract the Turkmen government’s blockade on information into 

the country and its rollback of general education by increasing radio, Internet, and other 

broadcasting of objective news and information on issues relevant to Turkmenistan, including educational topics, human rights, freedom of religion, and religious tolerance;

■ increase exchange programs for Turkmen citizens, including civil society leaders, students, and others concerned with human rights; 

■ suspend state visits between the United States and Turkmenistan until such time as religious freedom conditions in the country have improved significantly; and

■ encourage scrutiny of religious freedom violations in Turkmenistan in appropriate international fora such as the OSCE and other multilateral venues and also raise the issue of 

religious freedom violations in Turkmenistan at those UN bodies that consider human 

rights questions. 

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Uzbekistan

S

ince Uzbekistan gained independence in 1992, fundamental human rights, including freedom of religion or 

belief, have been under assault. A restrictive law on religion severely limits the ability of religious communities to 

function in Uzbekistan, facilitating the Uzbek government’s 

exercise of a high degree of control over religious communities, as well as the approved manner in which the Islamic religion is practiced. In the past year, Uzbek authorities 

continued to crack down harshly on Muslim individuals, 

groups, and mosques that do not conform to governmentprescribed practices or that the government claims are associated with extremist political programs. This has resulted 

in the imprisonment of thousands of persons in recent years, 

many of whom are denied the right to due process, and there 

are credible reports that many of those arrested continue to 

be tortured or beaten in detention. Though security threats 

do exist in Uzbekistan, including from members of Hizb utTahrir and other groups that claim a religious linkage, these 

threats do not excuse or justify the scope and harshness of the 

government’s ill treatment of religious believers. The Commission continues to recommend to the Secretary of State 

that Uzbekistan be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. However, the Commission’s CPC recommendation for Uzbekistan should not in any way be construed as 

an exculpatory defense of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist and 

highly intolerant organization that promotes hatred of the 

West, moderate Muslims, Jews, and others. 

Despite the constitutional separation of religion and 

state, the Uzbek government strictly regulates Islamic institutions and practice through the officially sanctioned Muslim 

Spiritual Board. The Uzbek government has also closed down 

approximately 3,000 of the 5,000 mosques that were open in 

1998. In the Ferghana Valley, viewed as the country’s most 

actively religious region, the state has confiscated a number 

of mosques and used them as warehouses or for other state 

purposes; in the Kashkadarya region, state officials allow 

certain mosques to be open only for major religious holidays. In early 2006, the Uzbek government reportedly issued 

an order requiring imams in the city of Namangan in the 

Ferghana Valley not to allow men wearing traditional white 

prayer caps into mosques. 

Over the past decade and particularly since 1999, the 

Uzbek government has arrested and imprisoned, with sentences of up to 20 years, thousands of Muslims who reject the 

state’s control over religious practice or who the government 

In the past year, Uzbek authorities 

continued to crack down harshly 

on Muslim individuals, groups, 

and mosques that do not conform 

to government-prescribed practices 

or that the government claims are 

associated with extremist political 

programs. This has resulted in the 

imprisonment of thousands of persons in recent years, many of whom 

are denied the right to due process, 

and there are credible reports that 

many of those arrested continue to 

be tortured or beaten in detention. 

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claims are associated with extremist groups. Although it is difficult to estimate the exact 

number of such prisoners, in 2004 there were estimated to be as many as 5,500, including 

those sent to psychiatric hospitals. In 2005, the State Department reported that that number 

remained the same or increased. Piety alone may result in arrest. Human rights organizations report that many of those in detention were arrested on false drug charges or for possession of literature of a banned organization. Once arrested, they often are denied access 

to a lawyer or are held incommunicado for weeks or months. Many of those imprisoned or 

detained for charges related to religion are treated particularly harshly; 

prisoners who pray or observe Muslim religious festivals are by many 

accounts subjected to further harassment, beatings, and other torture, in 

efforts to force them to renounce their religious or political views. 

The use of torture continues to be widespread in Uzbekistan, despite promises from the government to halt the practice. The UN Special 

Rapporteur on Torture, in his February 2003 report on Uzbekistan, concluded that “torture or similar ill-treatment is systematic” and that the 

“pervasive and persistent nature of torture throughout the investigative 

process cannot be denied.” Even after the publication of the Rapporteur’s 

report, reliance on the use of torture in detention did not significantly decrease. According to the State Department, “police, prison officials, and 

the [security services] allegedly used suffocation, electric shock, deprivation of food and water, and sexual abuse, with beating the most commonly reported method of abuse [and] torture.” Convictions in the cases 

described above are based almost entirely on confessions, which, according to the State Department and many human rights organizations, are 

frequently gained through the use of torture.

The government of Uzbekistan does face threats to its security from certain groups that 

claim religious links, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has used violence 

but whose membership reportedly declined after U.S. military action in Afghanistan in late 

2001 killed its leaders. Uzbekistan continues to be subject to violent attacks; there were several 

incidents in 2004, although the motivation of those involved is difficult to determine. 

In the city of Andijon in May 2005, after a series of daily peaceful protests in support 

of 23 businessmen on trial for alleged ties to Islamic extremism, a group turned violent: it 

seized weapons from a police garrison, stormed the prison holding the businessmen, released 

the defendants, and attacked other sites in the city. On May 13, several thousand mostly unarmed civilians gathered on the central square; armed forces fired indiscriminately and without warning into the crowd. Estimated fatalities range from an official total of 187 to over 

700 according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); some 

reports of non-governmental organizations say as many as 1,000 men, women, and children 

were killed. The Uzbek government has rejected repeated calls from the United States, the 

European Union, the OSCE, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for an independent international investigation into these events. In the aftermath, Uzbek authorities have 

reportedly jailed hundreds of local residents, human rights activists, and journalists.

Hizb ut-Tahrir, banned in most Muslim countries, purports not to engage in violence 

but is intolerant of other religions and has in some circumstances sanctioned violence. The 

group calls for a worldwide caliphate to replace existing governments and the imposition 

of an extremist interpretation of Islamic law. Although it does not specify the methods it 

Samarkand, Uzbekistan
165

would use to attain those goals, it does, according to the State Department, reserve the 

“possibility that its own members might resort to violence.” In addition, the State Department reports that Hizb ut-Tahrir material includes “strong anti-Semitic and anti-Western 

rhetoric.” Alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir make up most of the thousands in prison; in 

most cases, however, Uzbek authorities have failed to present evidence that these persons 

have committed violence. Many of those arrested and imprisoned are not affiliated with 

Hizb ut-Tahrir but are wrongfully accused of membership or association, sometimes due to 

alleged—or planted—possession of the group’s literature at the time of arrest. 

“Wahhabi” is a term that generally is used to refer to followers of a highly restrictive interpretation of Sunni Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. In Uzbekistan, “Wahhabi” is a 

catchphrase used to refer to genuine extremists, Muslim individuals and groups that oppose 

the Karimov regime, and those who wish to practice Islam independently of government 

strictures. For the Uzbek authorities, all these groups and individuals are equally suspect 

and subject to government repression. Such groups include Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Tabligh, a Muslim missionary movement which originated in South Asia in 1920, and Akromiya, a group 

based on the 1992 writings of an imprisoned Uzbek mathematics teacher, Akram Yuldashev, which reportedly espouses charitable work and a return to Islamic moral principles. In 

2004, there were several trials of alleged Tabligh members in the Ferghana Valley, including 

one in October 2004 at which the two defendants received comparably “light” six-month 

terms, reportedly because the Commission had visited the courthouse the previous day. 

Although observers contend that Akromiya does not promote extremism, several persons 

were convicted in 2005 of religious extremism for alleged affiliation with that group. The 23 

local businessmen on trial in Andijon in May 2005 were also charged with membership in 

Akromiya. In July, a Tashkent court convicted three alleged Akromiya members on charges 

of taking part in a religious extremist group, conspiracy to overthrow the constitutional 

order, and establishing a criminal group. Defendants received prison sentences of up to 16 

years, and convictions in the case were reportedly based on confessions, which often are the 

result of torture. In March 2006, an anti-terrorist unit reportedly arrested a Muslim man in 

Tashkent as an alleged “Wahhabi,” although a police search of his house found no evidence 

of this or any other charge. 

The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations passed in May 1998 

severely restricts the exercise of religious freedom. Through a series of regulations that are 

often arbitrarily applied, the law imposes onerous hurdles for the registration of religious 

groups; criminalizes unregistered religious activity; bans the production and distribution of 

unofficial religious publications; prohibits minors from participating in religious organizations; prohibits private teaching of religious principles; and forbids the wearing of religious 

clothing in public by anyone other than clerics. According to the State Department, in the 

past year, local authorities continued to block the registration or re-registration of numerous Protestant Christian congregations in the country, including in Tashkent, Samarkand, 

Guliston, Gazalkent, Andijon, and Nukus. A Pentecostal Church in Chirchiq was denied 

registration and the city of Nukus’ only registered Protestant church lost its registration in 

the past year. Of the country’s 11 Jehovah’s Witness congregations, only those in Chirchiq 

and Ferghana have been registered. For several years, the non-denominational International 

Church of Tashkent has been denied registration, partly because it cannot meet the registration minimum of 100 Uzbek citizens. In 2004, a Jewish organization in Tashkent was denied 

registration; Uzbek officials reportedly told the group that because a Jewish organization 

already exists in Tashkent, the Jewish community does not need another. 

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As with Muslims, members of Protestant and other minority religious groups have 

been arrested, sometimes on spurious drug or other charges. Several Christian leaders 

have reportedly been detained in psychiatric hospitals, severely beaten, and/or sentenced 

to labor camps and continue to have their churches raided, services interrupted, Bibles 

confiscated, and the names of adherents recorded by Uzbek officials. There are frequent 

reports that officials accuse them of being members of alleged extremist organizations. In 

this atmosphere, some Christian groups in various parts of Uzbekistan have been forced to 

operate underground. The situation of Protestants is particularly difficult in Karakalpakistan, an autonomous republic in the country’s northwest, where it is almost impossible for 

churches to be registered. In March 2006, police raided a gathering of 40 Protestants in a 

private home in the village of Kum Kurgan, in the Surkhandarya region of southern Uzbekistan. All 40 participants were interrogated for 18 days. In February 2006, in the town of 

Syr-Darya, officials invaded a private home where nine Pentecostals were meeting. The officials confiscated the group’s religious literature, forced them to write statements, and later 

levied fines against them. In March 2005, over 200 members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses were 

detained for up to one day in police raids in Tashkent, Kogon, Bukhara, Samarkand, Navoi, 

and Bekobod; 120 were questioned in the town of Angren. In the past year, a judge ordered 

the brief detention of two Jehovah’s Witnesses and the imposition of fines on another nine 

for alleged administrative infractions. The authorities also continue to exert pressure on the 

Hare Krishna community in Karakalpakistan. 

In December 2005, the government modified the country’s criminal and administrative codes to introduce much heavier fines for repeated violations of rules on religious 

meetings, processions, and other religious ceremonies, as well as of the law on religious 

organizations. As a result, official inspections and police monitoring of places of worship 

has intensified. In addition, there are persistent reports of societal discrimination against 

ethnic Uzbeks who convert to Christianity. In April 2005, authorities did not respond to 

the complaint of a Christian convert who had been beaten by local villagers near the city of 

Nukus and told to “return to Islam” or leave the village. An ethnic Uzbek Pentecostal pastor 

in Andijon reportedly was attacked in late 2005 and reviled as a “traitor to the faith.” Another Pentecostal pastor in Andijon reported that he and other local Protestants are under 

police surveillance and that he has often been threatened with arrest if he does not close his 

unregistered church. 

In the past year, the Uzbek government stepped up efforts to isolate the people of 

Uzbekistan from the international human rights community and the outside world. In August 2005, the Uzbek government detained and then officially deported the representative 

of Forum 18, a non-governmental organization that reports on religious freedom violations. Censorship and confiscation of mail and religious literature has also increased. In 

another move, the Uzbek government in March 2006 ordered the UN High Commissioner 

for Refugees, in Uzbekistan since 1993, to close its office within one month despite some 

2,000 refugees from Afghanistan in the country. 

In October 2004, the Commission traveled to Uzbekistan and met with senior officials of the Foreign, Internal Affairs, and Justice Ministries, the Presidential Administration, the Committee on Religious Affairs, and the Parliamentary Ombudsman’s office. 

The delegation also met with Islamic, Jewish, and Christian communities and other religious groups, Uzbek human rights activists and lawyers, alleged victims of repression 

and their families, Western non-governmental organizations active in Uzbekistan, and 

U.S. Embassy personnel. 
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Throughout the past year, the Commission staff has held meetings with numerous 

delegations of Uzbek religious leaders, as well as with human rights groups and academics. In May 2005, Commission Chair Michael Cromartie testified at a hearing of the U.S. 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe entitled “Unrest in Uzbekistan: Crisis 

and Prospects.” At a June 2005 Carnegie Endowment roundtable on Andijon, the Commission released its Policy Focus report, which includes numerous policy recommendations. 

In July, the Commission held a public briefing on “U.S. Strategic Dilemmas in Uzbekistan 

and Turkmenistan” with the Center for Strategic and International Studies discussing the 

human rights situation and U.S. policy in both countries. 

Language reflecting a Commission recommendation on Uzbekistan was included in 

the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005. The Congress conditioned funds to Uzbekistan on its “making substantial and continuing progress in meeting its commitments under 

the ‘Declaration of Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework Between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the United States of America,’” such as respect for human rights, including religious freedom. In addition, the Commission’s recommendation to re-open the 

Voice of America’s Uzbek Service was taken up in June 2005. 

Commission Recommendations

 In addition to recommending that Uzbekistan be named a CPC, the Commission 

makes the following recommendations for U.S. policy. 

I. The U.S. government should ensure that it speaks in a unified voice in its relations 

with the Uzbek government. To that end, the U.S. government should:

■ ensure that U.S. statements and actions are coordinated across agencies to ensure that 

U.S. concerns about human rights conditions in Uzbekistan are reflected in all dealings 

with the Uzbek government; 

■ following the European Union’s October 2005 decision, reduce aid and arms sales to Uzbekistan and ban visits by high-level Uzbek officials in response to the Uzbek government’s refusal to allow an independent investigation into the violence in the eastern city 

of Andijon in May 2005; 

■ ensure that U.S. assistance to the Uzbek government, with the exception of assistance to 

improve humanitarian conditions and advance human rights, be made contingent upon 

establishing and implementing a specific timetable for the government to take concrete 

steps to improve conditions of freedom of religion or belief and observe international 

human rights standards, steps which should include:

● ending reliance on convictions based solely on confessions, a practice that often is linked to 

ill treatment of prisoners, and implementing the recommendations of the UN Committee 

Against Torture (June 2002) and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (February 2003);

● halting the detention and imprisonment of persons on account of their religious beliefs 

and practices;

● establishing a mechanism to review the cases of persons previously detained under suspicion 

of or charged with religious, political, or security offenses, including Criminal Code Articles 

159 (criminalizing “anti-state activity”) and 216 (criminalizing membership in a “forbidden 

religious organization”); releasing those who have been imprisoned solely because of their religious beliefs or practices as well as any others who have been unjustly detained or sentenced; 
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and making public a list of specific and detailed information about individuals who are currently detained under these articles or imprisoned following conviction;

● implementing the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe (OSCE) Panel of Experts on Religion or Belief to revise the 1998 law on Freedom 

of Conscience and Religious Organizations and bring it into accordance with international standards;

● registering religious groups that have sought to comply with the legal requirements; and 

● ensuring that every prisoner has access to his or her family, human rights monitors, adequate medical care, and a lawyer, as specified in international human rights instruments, 

and allowing prisoners to practice their religion while in detention to the fullest extent 

compatible with the specific nature of their detention;

■ ensure that U.S. security and other forms of assistance are scrutinized to make certain 

that this assistance does not go to Uzbek government agencies, such as certain branches 

of the Interior and Justice Ministries, which have been responsible for particularly severe 

violations of religious freedom as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act of 

1998 (IRFA);

■ use appropriate avenues of public diplomacy to explain to the people of Uzbekistan why 

religious freedom is an important element of U.S. foreign policy, as well as specific concerns about violations of religious freedom in their country; and

■ establish “American corner” reading rooms in various regions of Uzbekistan, including 

in the capital Tashkent, which should include materials on democracy, civic education, 

human rights, the role of religion in society, and other relevant topics.

II. The U.S. government should encourage greater international scrutiny of Uzbekistan’s 

human rights record. To that end, the U.S. government should:

■ encourage scrutiny of Uzbek human rights concerns in appropriate international fora 

such as the OSCE and other multilateral venues and facilitate the participation of Uzbek 

human rights defenders in multilateral human rights mechanisms; and

■ urge the Uzbek government to agree to a visit by UN Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief and the Independence of the Judiciary and provide the full and necessary conditions for such a visit.

III. The U.S. government should support Uzbek human rights defenders and religious 

freedom initiatives. To that end, the U.S. government should:

■ respond publicly and privately to the recent expulsions of U.S. non-governmental organizations and the numerous new restrictions placed on their activities; unless these 

restrictions are rescinded, the U.S. government should make clear that there will be 

serious consequences in the U.S.-Uzbek bilateral relationship, including a ban on highlevel meetings; 

■ continue careful monitoring of the status of individuals who are arrested for alleged religious, political, and security offenses and continue efforts to improve the situation of 

Uzbek human rights defenders, including by pressing for the registration of human rights 

groups and religious communities;

■ support efforts to counteract the Uzbek government’s blockade on information into 

the country by increasing radio, Internet, and other broadcasting of objective news and 
169

information on issues relevant to Uzbekistan, including education, human rights, freedom of religion, and religious tolerance;

■ increase foreign travel opportunities for civil society activists, religious leaders, and others concerned with religious freedom to permit them to take part in relevant international conferences;

■ continue to develop assistance programs for Uzbekistan designed to encourage the creation of institutions of civil society that protect human rights and promote religious freedom, programs that could include training in human rights, the rule of law, and crime investigation for police and other law enforcement officials; since such programs have been 

attempted in the past with little effect, they should be carefully structured to accomplish, 

and carefully monitored and conditioned upon fulfillment of these specific goals: 

● expanding legal assistance programs for Uzbek relatives of detainees, which have sometimes led to the release of detainees;

● expanding “train-the-trainer” legal assistance programs for representatives of religious 

communities to act as legal advisers in the registration process;

● specifying freedom of religion as a grants category and area of activity in the Democracy 

and Conflict Mitigation program of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the 

Democracy Commission Small Grants program administered by the U.S. Embassy; and

● encouraging national and local public roundtables between Uzbek officials and representatives of Uzbek civil society on freedom of religion; and

■ increase opportunities in its exchange programs for Uzbek human rights advocates and 

religious figures, and more specifically:

● expand exchange programs for Uzbek religious leaders to include representatives from all 

religious communities; 

● expand exchange programs for Uzbek human rights defenders, including participation in 

relevant international conferences and opportunities to interact with Uzbek officials; and

● ensure that the U.S. Embassy vigorously protests cases when an Uzbek participant in an 

exchange program encounters difficulties with the Uzbek authorities upon return to Uzbekistan, and if such difficulties continue, inform the Uzbek authorities that there will be 

negative consequences in other areas of U.S.-Uzbek bilateral relations, including a ban on 

high-level meetings. 

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Egypt

Serious problems of discrimination, intolerance, and other human rights violations 

against members of religious minorities, as well as non-conforming Muslims, remain widespread in Egypt. In the past year, the Egyptian government has adopted several measures to 

acknowledge the religious pluralism of Egypt’s society, including increased efforts in promoting interfaith activity and the issuance of a presidential decree that, if genuinely implemented, would improve the procedures required for building new and maintaining existing 

houses of worship. Yet, the government has not taken adequate steps to halt repression of and 

discrimination against religious believers, including the indigenous Coptic Orthodox Christians, or, in many cases, to punish those responsible for violence or other severe violations of 

religious freedom. Despite a recent positive court ruling, the government has also not taken 

steps to provide identity cards and other important documents to members of the Egyptian 

Baha’i community or to combat widespread and virulent anti-Semitism in the governmentcontrolled media. Egypt remains on the Commission’s Watch List, and the Commission continues to monitor the actions of the government of Egypt to see if the situation rises to a level 

that warrants designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

Egypt has a poor overall human rights record that includes repressive practices which 

seriously violate freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. The government 

maintains tight control over all Muslim religious institutions, including mosques and religious endowments, which are encouraged to promote an officially sanctioned interpretation of Islam. According to Egyptian officials, the government regulates these Muslim institutions and activities as a necessary precaution against religious extremism and terrorism. 

The state appoints and pays the salaries of all Sunni Muslim imams; all mosques must be 

licensed by the government; and sermons are monitored by the government. 

Human rights organizations inside the country are seriously concerned that Islamic 

extremism is advancing in Egypt with detrimental effects on the prospects for democratic 

reform, religious tolerance, and the rights of women and girls and members of religious 

minorities. Some believe that the government is not acting to its fullest ability to counteract 

this problem, especially in the areas of public education and the media, where the extremist 

influence is growing.

There is continued prosecution in state security courts and imprisonment for those 

accused of “unorthodox” Islamic religious beliefs or practices that insult the three “heavenly 

religions”: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Article 98(f) of the Penal Code, which prohibits 

citizens from “ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or inciting sectarian strife,” continues to be applied to prosecute alleged acts by purportedly “unorthodox” Muslims. These 

include Muslims groups, such as the Koranites—a group that does not accept as authentic 

▲ Egypt

▲ Iran

▲ Saudi Arabia

Middle East
hadith, oral traditions of the life of the Prophet Muhammad, 

or Sunna, accounts of the way the Prophet Muhammad lived 

his life—who are accused of practicing beliefs deemed to 

deviate from Islamic law. In December 2003, state security 

services arrested and imprisoned 20 Shi’a Muslims without 

charge and subsequently interrogated them concerning their 

religious beliefs; they were reportedly also physically abused. 

All were released by June 2005. In December 2004, 13 “unorthodox” Muslims were referred to trial by a State Emergency Court on charges of “insulting heavenly religions”; 

their status remains unknown.

The Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981 

and was renewed for another three years in February 2003, 

restricts many human rights, including freedom of religion 

or belief. The Law must be extended by May 2006 or it will expire. Under this Law, the security forces continue to mistreat 

and torture prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, 

hold detainees in prolonged pretrial detention, and occasionally engage in mass arrests. Thousands of persons have been 

detained without charge on suspicion of illegal terrorist or 

political activity; others are serving sentences after being convicted on similar charges. Egyptian and international human 

rights groups have asserted that the primary purpose of the 

state emergency and military courts is to punish political activism and dissent, even when that dissent is peaceful. These 

courts are also used to detain and try individuals deemed by 

the state to have “unorthodox” or “deviant” Islamic or other 

religious beliefs or practices. In 2005, Egypt’s National Human Rights Commission formally called for the Law to be 

lifted and during his presidential campaign, President Hosni 

Mubarak pledged to rescind the Law.

Members of Egypt’s non-Muslim religious minorities, 

particularly Christians, Jews, and Baha’is, report discrimination, interference, harassment, and surveillance by the 

Egyptian state security services. Although neither the Constitution nor the Penal Code prohibits proselytizing or conversion, the State Department has observed that the Egyptian 

government uses the Penal Code to discourage proselytizing 

by non-Muslims. Article 98(f) of the Code is used frequently 

to prosecute alleged acts of proselytism by non-Muslims.

Coptic Orthodox and other Christian denominations 

face increasing problems with societal intolerance and violence by Muslim extremists and Egyptian authorities have 

been accused of being lax in protecting the lives and property 

of these groups. In October 2005, thousands of Muslim demonstrators took to the streets in Alexandria, reportedly angry 

over a play that was performed two years before in a Coptic 

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Coptic Orthodox and other Christian denominations face increasing 

problems with societal intolerance 

and violence by Muslim extremists 

and Egyptian authorities have been 

accused of being lax in protecting the 

lives and property of these groups.

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church and recently distributed among church members on DVD. Some Muslims claimed 

that the play was anti-Islamic. Three Muslims were killed, a Christian nun was wounded, 

and dozens were injured, in what officials called the worst case of sectarian violence to strike 

Egypt since the Al-Kosheh incident in 2000. In February 2006, a criminal court in Alexandria sentenced a man to three years in prison for physically attacking the nun. 

In January 2006, 14 people were injured, including two policemen, when clashes 

broke out between Muslims and Coptic Orthodox Christians near the southern Egyptian 

city of Luxor. One Coptic Orthodox Christian man died from injuries associated with 

the violence. The violence began when Muslims torched a house that Coptic Christians 

were using as a makeshift church. Police arrested ten youths for setting fire to the house, 

as well as the owners of the house for using it as a church without permission. As of this 

writing, the case was ongoing. In February 2006, in the village of Al-Ayat south of Cairo, 

five Muslims and three Christians were injured in clashes as a result of extremist attacks 

on a local Christian meeting place; the violence broke out in response to the rumor that 

the local Christian community was planning to convert the meeting place into a church. 

In April 2006, three Coptic Christian churches in Alexandria were attacked by a Muslim 

man, resulting in the death of one Christian and the wounding of approximately a dozen 

others. Three days of rioting followed the attacks, leaving one Muslim killed and almost 

40 injured. According to the Interior Ministry, the man who attacked the churches was 

caught and is being held; he is believed to be “mentally unstable.” At least 100 persons 

have been detained in response to these events, some for questioning and others on suspicion of incitement to riot and rioting. 

Egyptian government officials have confirmed that in June 2004, the Court of Cassation upheld the acquittal of 94 of 96 suspects who were charged with various offenses in 

connection with the killing of 21 Christians in Al-Kosheh in late 1999 and early 2000. The 

decision has left public prosecutors and Christian advocates with no further legal options 

within the Egyptian legal system. Some Egyptian human rights advocates believe that the 

only recourse is to urge Egyptian authorities to investigate claims of police negligence and 

inadequate prosecution of those involved in the violence. 

In addition to violence, Christians face official and societal discrimination. Although Egyptian government officials claim that there is no law or policy that prevents 

Christians from holding senior positions, the Coptic Orthodox Christian community 

faces de facto discrimination in appointments to high-level government posts. For all 

Christian groups, government permission must still be sought to build or repair a church, 

and the approval process for church construction is time consuming and inflexible. Although President Mubarak reportedly has approved applications for new construction 

and, under new regulations, provincial governors now have the authority to approve applications for church repair, many such applications are languishing in the system. At 

least 100 applications to build new churches have been submitted to President Mubarak 

for approval; though most of these applications were submitted over five years ago, none 

have received a response. Even some permits that have been approved cannot be acted 

upon because of interference by the state security services, at both the local and national 

levels. On a potentially positive note, in December 2005, President Mubarak issued decree 291 to alleviate the procedures required for renovating, building, and rebuilding 

existing churches. Reportedly, governors now must make a decision to reject or approve 

an application within 30 days of its submission. However, it is still too early to determine 

if the decree will yield any positive results.
173

Known converts from Islam to Christianity generally receive attention from the 

state security services, and converts have been arrested for attempting to change their 

religious affiliation on identity documents. Most conversions are reportedly done quietly 

and privately. Egyptian government officials have stated that no law prevents conversion, 

but some individuals have been arrested for falsifying documents. In some instances, 

converts, who fear government harassment if they officially register their change in religion from Islam to Christianity, have reportedly altered their own identification cards 

and other official documents to reflect their new religious affiliation. A court decision 

in 2004 affirmed that the state could not prevent a woman from 

changing the religion on her identity card from Muslim to Christian. According to the State Department, it is not clear if this decision will set a precedent for future cases involving conversion of 

individuals from Islam to Christianity. 

Baha’is also face repression and violations of their rights. 

All Baha’i institutions and community activities have been banned 

since 1960 by a presidential decree. As a result, Baha’is are unable to 

meet and engage in communal religious activities. Over the years, 

Baha’is have been arrested and imprisoned because of their religious beliefs, often on charges of insulting Islam. Almost all Baha’i 

community members are known to the state security services, and 

many are regularly subject to surveillance and other forms of harassment. Al-Azhar’s Islamic Research Center has issued fatwas

(religious edicts) in recent years urging the continued ban on the 

Baha’i community and condemning Baha’is as apostates. There has 

reportedly also been increased intolerance of Baha’is in both the independent and government-controlled media in recent years. 

The Egyptian government’s requirement that religious affiliation be included on national identity cards particularly affects the Baha’i community. Because “Muslim, Jew, or 

Christian” are the only allowable choices, Baha’is are effectively prevented from obtaining 

the cards, which are necessary to engage in many basic transactions, such as opening a 

bank account, buying a car, or obtaining a driver’s license. Moreover, the Egyptian government has recently made it illegal to be in public without an identity card. Because the Baha’i 

faith is banned, the community also has difficulty obtaining or renewing passports, birth 

certificates, and death certificates. Egyptian government officials have stated that the rights 

of Baha’is are not protected under the Constitution, since, in accordance with Islamic principles, protection applies only to adherents of the three “heavenly religions.” In a positive 

development, in April 2006, an Egyptian administrative court ruled that Egyptian Baha’is 

have the right to have their religion recognized in official documents. This ruling, in effect, 

forces the Interior Ministry to issue a national identity card for any citizen who identifies 

him or herself as a Baha’i. However, as with Decree 291, it remains too early to determine if 

the ruling will be effectively implemented.

Material vilifying Jews—with historical and new anti-Semitic stereotypes—appears regularly in the state-controlled and semi-official media. This material includes 

Holocaust denial, anti-Semitic cartoons, and television programming, such as a 24-part 

series based on the notorious anti-Semitic “Protocols of the Elders of Zion.” Egyptian 

authorities have not taken adequate steps to combat anti-Semitism in the media. Human 

rights groups also cite persistent, virulent anti-Semitism in the education system, which 

USCIRF briefing with Saad Ibrahim at the Woodrow 

Wilson Center

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is increasingly under the influence of Islamic extremists, a development that the Egyptian 

government has not adequately addressed. The small Jewish community maintains and 

owns its property and performs required maintenance through private donations without 

excessive interference from local authorities. However, state security services continue to 

regulate and approve those permitted to make repairs, which, in some cases, has created 

problems and delays. 

After several years of close surveillance, authorities reportedly have increased repressive measures against the small community of Jehovah’s Witnesses, who are not recognized 

by the Egyptian government. In the past year, Jehovah’s Witnesses have reported harassment and abuse by government officials. 

The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist political groups, which believe in or seek 

to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on their interpretation of Islamic law, are considered illegal organizations by the Egyptian government under a law prohibiting political 

parties based on religion. Despite these restrictions, the Muslim Brotherhood has become 

more visible in Egypt’s political landscape. In fact, more than 100 members of the Muslim 

Brotherhood ran as independent candidates in the December 2005 parliamentary elections 

and won 88 seats, up significantly from their previous 15. The Muslim Brotherhood and 

other Islamist political groups have used violence in the past to achieve their aims, including the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 and attacks on foreign tourists. 

Some of these groups continue to advocate violence. Egyptian security forces continue to 

arrest hundreds of Islamists every year, and some are subject to torture and/or prolonged 

detention without charge. According to Egyptian and international human rights groups, 

there are 12,000-15,000 political detainees, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood 

and other Islamist political groups, in administrative detention at any given time whose 

cases are not being addressed. Groups that closely monitor the detention of such individuals claim that the vast majority of these prisoners are in prison as a result of their political 

beliefs or activities, and not on the basis of religion. 

In July 2004, a Commission delegation traveled to Egypt. While there, the delegation met with senior government officials, religious leaders, human rights groups, scholars, 

educators, legal specialists, and others active in civil society. In June 2005, the Commission 

released a Policy Focus report brief on Egypt at an event held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington. The Policy Focus on Egypt provides details about the Commission’s visit 

to Egypt and presents new recommendations for U.S. policy.

In May 2005, the Commission issued a statement urging President Bush to press 

the government of Egypt for democratic reforms. The statement coincided with the visit 

of Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif to the United States. In July 2005, Commission 

Vice Chair Felice Gaer testified before a Members Briefing of the Congressional Human 

Rights Caucus entitled, “The Human Rights Situation in Egypt: An Overview.” In November 2005, Commissioner Elizabeth Prodromou testified before the Congressional Human 

Rights Caucus at a hearing entitled “Religious Freedom in Egypt.” 

In July 2005, House Resolution 413 was introduced, expressing the concern of the 

House of Representatives that the amount of U.S. foreign assistance provided to Egypt over 

the past 25 years has grown without any meaningful political reforms by the government of 

Egypt. The resolution contains a significant number of the Commission’s recommendations 

with regard to Egypt. 
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Throughout the past year, the Commission and its staff met with Egyptian government 

officials, members of non-governmental organizations representing various religious communities in Egypt, as well as civil society and human rights groups, and other Egypt experts. 

Commission Recommendations

With regard to Egypt, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should 

urge the Egyptian government to:

■ remove de facto responsibility for religious affairs from the state security services with the 

exception of cases involving violence or the advocacy of violence;

■ repeal the state of emergency, in existence since 1981, in order to allow for the full consolidation of the rule of law in Egypt;

■ implement procedures which would ensure that all places of worship are subject to the 

same transparent, non-discriminatory, and efficient regulations regarding construction 

and maintenance;

■ allow full access to the constitutional and international guarantees of the rule of law and 

due process for those individuals charged with violating Section 98(f) of the Penal Code, 

which “prohibits citizens from ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or inciting sectarian strife,” instead of having those cases heard by the State Security Courts;

■ exclude from all educational textbooks any language or images that promote enmity, intolerance, hatred, or violence toward any group of persons based on faith, gender, ethnicity, or nationality, and include in school curricula, in school textbooks, and in teacher 

training the concepts of tolerance and respect for human rights, including religious freedom, ensuring that textbooks meet the standards for education set out in the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights;

■ cease all messages of hatred and intolerance, particularly toward Jews and Baha’is, in the 

government-controlled media and take active measures to promote understanding and 

respect for members of these and other minority religious communities; 

■ take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish acts of anti-Semitism, including condemnation of anti-Semitic acts, and, while vigorously protecting freedom of expression, 

counteract anti-Semitic rhetoric and other organized anti-Semitic activities;

■ ensure that every Egyptian is protected against discrimination in social, labor, and other 

rights by modifying the national identity card either (a) to omit mention of religious 

affiliation from identity documents, or (b) to make optional any mention of religious affiliation on identity documents, since currently, individuals must identify themselves as 

adherents of one of the three recognized faiths: Islam, Christianity, or Judaism;

■ more actively investigate religious based violence against Egyptian citizens, particularly 

Coptic Christians, prosecute perpetrators responsible for the violence, and ensure compensation for victims;

■ investigate claims of police negligence and inadequate prosecution of those involved in 

the Al-Kosheh case;

■ request the National Council for Human Rights to investigate allegations of discrimination against Coptic Orthodox Christians as a human rights issue and to publish their 

findings and recommendations;

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■ repeal a 1960 presidential decree banning the Baha’i community from practicing their 

faith; and

■ implement the 2002 recommendations of the UN Committee Against Torture. 

In addition, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should: 

■ negotiate an agreement with the Egyptian government to establish a timetable and specific steps to be taken to make progress on political and legal reforms, including the 

steps described in the recommendations above; if deadlines are met in a timely manner, 

the U.S. government should consider, within the boundaries of its overall aid to Egypt, 

providing economic assistance to areas where significant progress has been made, but if 

deadlines are not met, the U.S. government should re-consider the dimension and direction of its economic assistance;

■ offer direct support for human rights and other civil society non-governmental organizations (NGOs) without prior approval by the Egyptian government;

■ urge the Egyptian government to ensure that NGOs engaged in human rights work can 

pursue their activities without undue government interference, and monitor and report 

to what extent this is accomplished;

■ expand support of initiatives to advance human rights, promote religious tolerance, and 

foster civic education among all Egyptians, including support for:

■ civic education and public awareness programs that reflect the multi-confessional nature of Egyptian society and the diversity of Egypt’s religious past;

■ efforts by Egyptian and international NGOs to review Egyptian educational 

curricula and textbooks for messages of hatred, intolerance, and the advocacy of violence, and to monitor equal access to education by girls and boys 

regardless of religion or belief; and

■ preservation of Egyptian Jewish properties and antiquities in a publicly accessible site, such as in a museum, so that all Egyptians can better understand 

past and present Jewish contributions to their history and culture; and 

■ as mandated by section 104 of IRFA, train Foreign Service Officers at Embassy Cairo 

about universal human rights, especially the right to freedom of religion or belief, the history, experiences, and contributions of different religions to Egyptian history, and ways to 

identify and respond to discriminatory and other abridgements of the rights of persons 

belonging to these communities.

In the context of the annual congressional appropriation for U.S. assistance to Egypt, 

Congress should require the State Department to report to it annually on the extent to 

which the government of Egypt has made progress on the issues described in this chapter, 

as well as on the progress of the U.S. government on offering funding directly to Egyptian 

NGOs without prior Egyptian government approval. 
Iran

The government of Iran engages in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, including prolonged detention, torture, and executions 

based primarily or entirely upon the religion of the accused. 

Over the past year, the Iranian government’s poor religious 

freedom record deteriorated, especially for religious minorities and Baha’is in particular; all minority groups faced intensified harassment, detention, arrests, and imprisonment. 

Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, significant numbers from 

religious minority communities have fled Iran for fear of 

persecution. Dissident Muslims also continue to be subject 

to abuse. Since 1999, the State Department has designated 

Iran as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. The Commission continues to recommend that Iran remain a CPC. 

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran proclaims Islam, particularly the doctrine of the Twelver (Shi’a) 

Jaafari School, to be the official religion of the country. It 

stipulates that all laws and regulations, including the Constitution itself, be based on Islamic criteria. The Head of State, 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution and has direct control over the armed forces, 

the internal security forces, and the judiciary. The Council 

of Guardians, half of whose members are appointed by the 

Supreme Leader, reviews all legislation passed by the Majlis (parliament) for adherence to Islamic and constitutional 

principles. The Constitution grants the Council of Guardians 

the power to screen and disqualify candidates for elective 

offices based on an ill-defined set of requirements, including candidates’ ideological and religious beliefs. In February 

2004, elections were held for the 290-seat Parliament in Iran. 

In a move to diminish pro-reformist re-election chances, 

the Guardian Council disqualified approximately one-third 

of the 8,200 submissions for candidacy, including those of 

more than 80 reformists holding Majlis seats, effectively limiting the democratic alternatives available to Iranian voters. 

In June 2005, the mayor of Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 

known to be supportive of hardliners in the regime, won the 

presidential elections and assumed power in August.

In recent years, hundreds of prominent Muslim activists and dissidents from among the Shi’a majority advocating 

political reform have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms 

by the Revolutionary Court, ostensibly on charges of seeking 

to overthrow the Islamic system in Iran; others have been arrested and detained for alleged blasphemy and criticizing the 

nature of the Islamic regime. Reformists and journalists are 

Since August 2005, the Iranian government has intensified its campaign against non-Muslim religious 

minorities. A consistent stream of 

virulent and inflammatory statements by political and religious leaders and an increase in harassment 

and imprisonment of, and physical 

attacks against, these groups indicate a renewal of the kind of oppression seen in previous years. 

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regularly tried under current press laws and the Penal Code on charges of “insulting Islam,” 

criticizing the Islamic Republic, and publishing materials that deviate from Islamic standards. Prominent Iranian journalist Akbar Ganji was finally released from prison in March 

2006 after serving a six-year prison sentence on reportedly spurious charges of “harming 

national security” and “spreading propaganda” against the Islamic Republic. Ganji was arrested and convicted as a result of attending a human rights conference in Germany in 2000 

where he publicly expressed views critical of the Iranian regime. Following a visit to Iran, 

the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression concluded 

in early 2004 that such charges brought by Iranian courts “lack any objective criteria” and 

are open to “subjective and arbitrary interpretation by judges implementing them.” A number of senior Shi’a religious leaders who have opposed various religious and/or political 

tenets and practices of the Iranian government have also been targets of state repression, 

including house arrest, detention without charge, trial without due process, torture, and 

other forms of ill treatment. 

Muslim minorities continue to face repression. Iranian Sunni leaders have reported 

widespread abuses and restrictions on their religious practice, including detentions and torture of Sunni clerics as well as bans on Sunni teachings in public schools and Sunni religious 

literature, even in predominantly Sunni areas. Sufi and Sunni Muslim leaders are regularly 

intimidated and harassed by intelligence and security services and report widespread official 

discrimination. The Sunni community still has not been able to build a mosque in Tehran. 

In February 2006, Iranian authorities destroyed a Sufi house of worship in the northwestern 

city of Qom and arrested approximately 1,000 Sufis after clashes with security forces. Most 

were released within hours or days, although dozens reportedly suffered serious injuries.

The Constitution of Iran formally recognizes Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians as 

protected religious minorities who may worship freely and have autonomy over their own 

matters of personal status (e.g. marriage, divorce, and inheritance). Nevertheless, the primacy of Islam and Islamic laws and institutions adversely affects the rights and status of 

non-Muslims. Members of these groups are subject to legal and other forms of discrimination, particularly in education, government jobs and services, and the armed services. 

Non-Muslims may not engage in public religious expression 

and persuasion among Muslims; some also face restrictions on 

publishing religious material in Persian. 

Since August 2005, the Iranian government has intensified its campaign against non-Muslim religious minorities. 

A consistent stream of virulent and inflammatory statements 

by political and religious leaders and an increase in harassment and imprisonment of, and physical attacks against, these 

groups indicate a renewal of the kind of oppression seen in 

previous years. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the Guardian Council, has publicly attacked non-Muslims and referred 

to them as “sinful animals” and “corrupt.” In November 2005, after publicly criticizing Ayatollah Jannati’s remarks, the lone Zoroastrian member of the Iranian 

parliament was charged with the “dissemination of false information, slander and insult” 

by Iranian authorities, though as of this writing, the case has not gone to trial. In March 

2006, the UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion or Belief confirmed that religious 

freedom conditions are worsening for all religious minorities in Iran. 

USCIRF roundtable on Iran
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The Baha’i community has generally been subject to particularly severe religious 

freedom violations in Iran. Baha’is, who number approximately 300,000 to 350,000, are 

often viewed as “heretics” by Iranian authorities, and may face repression on the grounds 

of apostasy. Since 1979, Iranian government authorities have killed more than 200 Baha’i 

leaders in Iran, and more than 10,000 have been dismissed from government and university 

jobs. Baha’is may not establish houses of worship, schools, or any independent religious associations in Iran. In addition, Baha’is are denied government jobs and pensions as well as 

the right to inherit property, and their marriages and divorces are not recognized. Baha’i 

cemeteries, holy places, and community properties are often seized and some have been 

destroyed. Members of the Baha’i faith are not allowed to attend university.

Over the past two years, Baha’is in Iran have faced increasingly harsh treatment. Baha’i 

property has been confiscated or destroyed and dozens of Baha’is have been harassed, interrogated, detained, imprisoned, or physically attacked. In January 2005, the personal property of several Baha’is in Yazd was confiscated and destroyed and in February 2005, a Baha’i 

cemetery in Yazd was razed. In the past year, dozens of Baha’is were arrested, detained, 

interrogated and subsequently released after, in some cases, weeks or months in detention. 

Charges typically ranged from “causing anxiety in the minds of the public and of officials” 

to “spreading propaganda against the regime.” As of this writing, there are more than 60 

Baha’is awaiting trial on account of their religious beliefs. In December 2005, Zabihullah 

Mahrami, a Baha’i who had been jailed for more than 10 years on charges of apostasy, died 

in prison under mysterious circumstances. Over the last several months, a series of articles 

in the government-controlled newspaper Kayhan, whose managing editor is appointed by 

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, have vilified and demonized the Baha’i faith and its 

community in Iran. In December 2005, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Iran’s poor human rights record, including its continued human rights abuses 

targeting religious minorities and its “escalation” of violations against the Baha’i community. In March 2006, the UN Special Rapporteur exposed a confidential October 2005 letter 

from the Iranian Chairman of the Command Headquarters of the Armed Forces to several 

Iranian government agencies directing these entities to collect information on all members 

of the Baha’i community in Iran and to monitor their activities.

Christians in Iran continue to be subject to harassment, arrests, close surveillance, 

and imprisonment; many are reported to have fled the country. In the past 15 years, numerous Evangelical Christians reportedly have been killed at the hands of government authorities and more than a dozen are reported missing or “disappeared.” According to a 2001 

report of the UN Special Representative on Iran, some are said to have been convicted of 

apostasy. Over the past two years in particular, there have been several incidents in which 

Iranian authorities raided church services, detained worshippers and church leaders, and 

harassed or threatened church members. As a result of one of these raids, an evangelical 

pastor, Hamid Pourmand, remains in prison on charges of apostasy even after being acquitted in November 2005 by an Islamic court. Pourmand has been serving the balance 

of a three-year sentence handed down by a separate military court in February 2005. Also 

in November, Ghorban Tourani, a Turkmen Christian pastor who converted from Islam 

in the mid-1990s and reportedly has received numerous death threats over the years, was 

abducted and killed by unknown assailants. President Ahmadinejad reportedly has called 

for an end to the development of Christianity in Iran. During the past year, even the small, 

unrecognized Mandaean religious community is reportedly facing intensifying harassment 

and repression by authorities. 

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Official policies promoting anti-Semitism are on the rise in Iran, though members of 

the Jewish community have always been singled out on the basis of “ties to Israel,” whether 

real or perceived. President Ahmadinejad and other top political and clerical leaders have 

made public remarks in the past year denying the existence of the Holocaust and stating 

that Israel should be “wiped off the map.” Anti-Semitic tracts have also increased in the 

government-controlled media. In February 2006, the leader of Iran’s Jewish community, 

Haroun Yashayaei, sent an unprecedented public letter to President Ahmadinejad expressing serious concern about the President’s repeated Holocaust denial statements and the 

extent to which these statements have intensified fears among Iran’s 30,000-member Jewish 

community. Official government discrimination against Jews continues to be pervasive. According to the State Department, despite minimal restriction on Jewish religious practice, 

education of Jewish children has become increasingly difficult in recent years, and distribution of Hebrew religious texts is strongly discouraged.

The government’s monopoly on and enforcement of the official interpretation of Islam negatively affect the human rights of women in Iran, including their right to freedoms 

of movement, association, thought, conscience, and religion, and freedom from coercion 

in matters of religion or belief. The Iranian justice system does not grant women the same 

legal status as men; for example, testimony by a man is equivalent to the testimony of two 

women. Provisions of both the Civil and Penal Codes, in particular those sections dealing 

with family and property law, discriminate against women. 

Throughout the past year, Commission staff met with members of non-governmental 

organizations representing various religious communities in Iran, as well as human rights 

groups and other Iran experts and policy makers. In May 2005, the Commission held an 

on-the-record briefing, “Iran, Conditions for Human Rights Deteriorating,” featuring the 

co-founders of the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, a non-partisan organization 

that seeks to remedy a deficit in the systematic, objective, and analytical documentation of 

human rights violations committed in Iran since the 1979 revolution. In February 2006, the 

Commission issued a statement documenting recent religious freedom abuses by Iranian 

authorities and expressing concern about the worsening treatment of religious minorities 

in Iran.

Commission Recommendations

In addition to recommending that Iran continue to be designated a CPC, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should:

■ at the highest levels, vigorously speak out publicly about the deteriorating conditions for 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief in Iran, including drawing attention to specific cases where severe violations have occurred;

■ ensure that new funding budgeted to promote democracy and human rights in Iran includes support for effective initiatives promoting freedom of religion or belief, as well as 

ways to promote rule of law programs that specifically seek to protect religious minorities 

in Iran; 

■ increase funding for U.S. public diplomacy entities, such as Voice of America and Radio 

Farda, and develop new programming solely focusing on the situation of human rights—

including the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief—in Iran;
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■ advocate for creation of a UN Special Rapporteur to investigate and report publicly on 

the human rights situation, including freedom of religion or belief, in Iran at the first 

session of the newly established UN Human Rights Council and, as appropriate, the UN 

General Assembly’s Third Committee;

■ call on the UN Human Rights Council to monitor carefully and demand compliance with 

the implementation of recommendations of the representatives of those special mechanisms that have already visited Iran, particularly those of the UN Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief (1995), the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (2003), 

and the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression (2003); and

■ encourage the UN Human Rights Council to continue to use its procedures to maintain 

oversight of conditions for freedom of religion or belief in Iran, including continued visits 

and reporting by relevant UNCHR rapporteurs and working groups.

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Saudi Arabia

The government of Saudi Arabia engages in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief. Despite the State Department’s 

contention in its 2005 International Religious Freedom Report that there were, in fact, 

slight improvements in Saudi government efforts to foster religious tolerance in Saudi society, the report again concluded that freedom of religion “does not exist” in Saudi Arabia. 

Since its inception, the Commission has recommended that Saudi Arabia be designated a 

“country of particular concern,” or CPC. In September 2004, the State Department for the 

first time followed the Commission’s recommendation and designated Saudi Arabia a CPC. 

In September 2005, Secretary of State Rice approved a temporary 180-day waiver of further 

action, as a consequence of CPC designation, to allow for continued diplomatic discussions 

with the Saudi government and “to further the purposes of the International Religious Freedom Act.” The waiver expired in late March 2006. 

The repressive Saudi government continues to engage in an array of severe violations 

of human rights as part of its repression of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief. Abuses include: torture and cruel and degrading treatment or punishment imposed 

by judicial and administrative authorities; prolonged detention without charges and often 

incommunicado; and blatant denials of the right to liberty and security of the person, including coercive measures aimed at women and the broad jurisdiction of the mutawaa 

(religious police), whose powers are vaguely defined and exercised in ways that violate the 

religious freedom of others. 

The government of Saudi Arabia continues to enforce vigorously its ban on all 

forms of public religious expression other than the government’s interpretation and enforcement of the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam. This policy violates the rights of the large 

communities of non-Muslims and Muslims from a variety of doctrinal schools of Islam 

who reside in Saudi Arabia, including Shi’as, who make up 8-10 percent of the population. 

The government tightly controls even the restricted religious activity it permits—through 

limits on the building of mosques, the appointment of imams, the regulation of sermons 

and public celebrations, and the content of religious education in public schools—and 

suppresses the religious views of Saudi and non-Saudi Muslims who do not conform to 

official positions. 

Members of the Shi’a and other non-Sunni communities, as well as non-conforming Sunnis, are subject to government restrictions on public religious practices and official discrimination in numerous areas, particularly in government employment. In past 

years, prominent Shi’a clerics and religious scholars were arrested and detained without 

charge for their religious views; some were reportedly beaten or otherwise ill-treated. 

Reports indicate that some of these Shi’a clerics have been released, but the current status 

of a number of others remains unknown. Between 2002-2004, several imams, both Sunni 

and Shi’a, who spoke out in opposition to government policies or against the official government interpretation of Islam, were harassed, arrested, and detained. On a positive 

note, in February 2006, thousands of members of the Shi’a community in Qatif, in the 

Eastern Province, made their largest public appearance in observance of Ashura without 

government interference.

Spurious charges of “sorcery” and “witchcraft” continue to be used by the Saudi authorities against non-conforming Muslims. Several individuals remain in prison on these 
charges. In 2000, in the Najran region, after the mutawaa

raided an Ismaili mosque for practicing “sorcery,” approximately 100 Ismailis, including clerics, were arrested. Many 

were released after serving reduced sentences, but dozens 

remain in prison and reports indicate that some are occasionally subject to flogging. Members of the Sufi community continue to be harassed, arrested, and detained because 

of their non-conforming religious views; some are held 

for hours but others are detained for days. In September 

2003, the mutawaa arrested 16 foreign workers for allegedly practicing Sufism; their status remains unknown. In 

June 2005, Saudi authorities shut down a weekly gathering 

held by a Sufi leader who adheres to the Shafi’i school of 

Islamic jurisprudence. 

Criminal charges of apostasy, blasphemy, and criticizing the nature of the regime are used by the Saudi government to suppress discussion and debate and silence dissidents. Promoters of political and human rights reforms, as 

well as those seeking to debate the appropriate role of religion 

in relation to the state, its laws, and society, are typically the 

target of such charges. For example, in April 2006, a Saudi 

journalist was arrested and detained by Saudi authorities for 

almost two weeks for “denigrating Islamic beliefs” and criticizing the Saudi government’s strict interpretations of Islam. 

In November 2005, a Saudi high school teacher, accused for 

discussing topics such as the Bible, Judaism, and the causes 

of terrorism, was tried on charges of blasphemy and insulting Islam and sentenced to three years in prison and 750 

lashes. Although he was pardoned by King Abdullah in December 2005, he nevertheless lost his job and suffered other 

repercussions. In a positive development, in August 2005, 

King Abdullah pardoned three human rights reformers who 

had been imprisoned since March 2004 on charges of “sowing dissent and disobeying the ruler.” 

Restrictions on public religious practice, for both Saudis and non-Saudis, are enforced in large part by the mutawaa, official enforcers of religious behavior that fall under 

the direction of the Ministry of Interior. The mutawaa conduct raids on worship services, including in private homes. 

They have also harassed, detained, whipped, beaten, and 

otherwise meted out extrajudicial punishments to individuals deemed to have strayed from “appropriate” dress and/or 

behavior, including any outward displays of religiosity, such 

as wearing Muslim religious symbols not sanctioned by the 

government. In November 2004, a press report identified a 

former member of the mutawaa as the leader of an attack 

on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah that resulted in the deaths of 

Criminal charges of apostasy, blasphemy, and criticizing the nature 

of the regime are used by the Saudi 

government to suppress discussion and debate and silence dissidents. Promoters of political and 

human rights reforms, as well as 

those seeking to debate the appropriate role of religion in relation to 

the state, its laws, and society, are 

typically the target of such charges. 

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five people. In recent years, the Saudi government has stated publicly that it has fired and/or 

disciplined members of the mutawaa for abuses of power, although reports of abuse persist. 

Equally troubling, many of the human rights abuses committed by the mutawaa are within 

the scope of their authority. 

Although the government has publicly taken the position—reiterated again in 

early 2006—that it permits non-Muslims to worship in private, the guidelines as to what 

constitutes “private” worship are vague. Surveillance by the mutawaa and Saudi security services of private non-Muslim religious activity continues unabated. Many persons 

worshipping privately continue to be harassed, arrested, imprisoned, tortured, deported, 

and generally forced to go to great lengths to conceal religious activity from the authorities. Even diplomatic personnel from Western countries report difficulties in their religious practices. Foreign guest workers without diplomatic standing, and with little or no 

access to private religious services conducted at diplomatic facilities, face even greater 

difficulties. Moreover, the Saudi government does not allow clergy to enter the country 

for the purpose of performing private religious services for foreigners legally residing in 

Saudi Arabia.

There is a continuing pattern of punishment and abuse of non-Muslim foreigners for 

private religious practice in Saudi Arabia. In September 2004, seven Filipino Christian leaders were arrested and detained when the mutawaa raided a religious service. All were released within one month, but the mutawaa reportedly pressured their employers to deport 

them, resulting in six deportations by late 2005. In March 2005, a Hindu temple constructed 

near Riyadh was destroyed by the mutawaa, and three guest workers worshiping at the site 

were subsequently deported. Also in March 2005, the mutawaa arrested an Indian Christian and confiscated religious materials in his possession; he was released in July 2005 after 

four months of detention. In April 2005, the mutawaa raided a Filipino Christian private 

service in Riyadh and confiscated religious materials such as Bibles and Christian symbols. 

Also in April 2005, at least 40 Pakistani, three Ethiopian, and two Eritrean Christians were 

arrested in Riyadh during a raid on separate private religious services. All of the Pakistani 

Christians were released within days and all five of the African Christians were released 

after a month in detention. In May 2005, at least eight Indian Protestant leaders were arrested, interrogated, and subsequently released for reportedly being on a list, obtained by 

the mutawaa, of Christian leaders in the country. Throughout the spring of 2005, dozens of 

Christian guest workers were detained, some for several days and others for several months, 

for holding religious worship services in private homes. Several of those who were released 

have been deported and others fear criminal charges and possible deportation. In April 

2006, an Indian Catholic priest, who was visiting Saudi Arabia, was deported after being 

detained for four days in Riyadh for conducting a private religious service.

The government’s monopoly on the interpretation of Islam and other violations 

of freedom of religion adversely affect the human rights of women in Saudi Arabia, including freedom of speech, movement, association, and religion, freedom from coercion, 

access to education, and full equality before the law. For example, women must adhere 

to a strict dress code when appearing in public and can only be admitted to a hospital 

for medical treatment with the consent of a male relative. Women need to receive written permission from a male relative to travel inside or outside the country and are not 

permitted to drive motor vehicles. Religiously based directives limit women’s right to 

choose employment by prohibiting them from studying for certain professions such as 
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engineering, journalism, and architecture. In addition, the Saudi justice system does not 

grant women the same legal status as men.

In March 2006, the Saudi Embassy in Washington published a report summarizing 

efforts by the Saudi government to revise the state curriculum and a number of school 

textbooks to exclude language promoting religious intolerance. Nevertheless, non-governmental organizations from outside Saudi Arabia continue to report the presence of highly 

intolerant and discriminatory language, particularly against Jews, Christians, and Shi’a 

Muslims, in these educational materials. Moreover, in the past year, there were frequent 

reports of virulently anti-Semitic and anti-Christian sentiments expressed in the official 

media and in sermons delivered by clerics who are under the authority of the Ministry of 

Islamic Affairs. In some cases, the State Department reported, clerics prayed for the death 

of Jews and Christians. 

In March 2004, the Saudi government approved the formation of a National Human Rights Association, the country’s first purportedly independent human rights body, 

comprised of 40 members and chaired by a member of the Consultative Council, a 150 

member advisory body appointed by then-Saudi King Fahd. In September 2005, the 

Council of Ministers, chaired by King Abdullah, approved the establishment of a government-appointed, 25 member Human Rights Commission. The following month, King 

Abdullah appointed, with the rank of minister, Turki bin Khaled al-Sudairi, a former 

state minister and Cabinet member, as chairman of the Commission. The Human Rights 

Commission is mandated to “protect human rights and create awareness about them...in 

keeping with the provisions of Islamic law.” It is not yet possible to determine if either 

human rights body will prove to be a positive mechanism for addressing human rights 

concerns in Saudi Arabia.

Throughout the past year, senior Saudi government officials, including the Crown 

Prince and the Grand Mufti, made statements with the reported aim of improving the climate of tolerance toward other religions; both also continued publicly to call for moderation. In a public interview in October 2005, King Abdullah reiterated that non-Muslims are 

free to practice their faith privately but that public worship by non-Muslims is not permitted. He also said that to allow any non-Muslim places of worship to be built in Saudi Arabia 

“would be like asking the Vatican to build a mosque inside of it.” 

In addition to the Saudi government’s violations of religious freedom within its own 

borders, evidence has mounted that funding originating in Saudi Arabia has been used to 

finance globally religious schools and other activities that support religious intolerance, 

and, in some cases, violence toward non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. The Saudi government itself has been implicated in promoting and exporting views associated with certain Islamic militant and extremist organizations in several parts of the world, and a number of reports have identified members of extremist and militant groups that have been 

trained as clerics in Saudi Arabia. These reports point to a role for the Saudi government in 

propagating worldwide an ideology that is incompatible with universal norms of the right 

to freedom of religion or belief. 

The Saudi government funds mosques, university chairs, Islamic study centers, and 

religious schools known as madrassas all over the world. During Afghanistan’s war against 

the former Soviet Union, Saudi-funded madrassas were established in Pakistan that were 

concerned less with scholarship than implementing an extremist agenda glorifying violence. These madrassas provided ideological training for some of those who went to fight 

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in Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan—and some of these schools still do. The peaceful 

propagation of religious beliefs, including Islam, is a human right. However, there is legitimate concern when a government may be propagating an ideology that promotes hatred 

and violence against both Muslims and non-Muslims. 

The form of Islam allegedly preached by some Saudi clerics and the violence incited 

and perpetrated by certain radicals continues to warrant further investigation by the U.S. 

government. The Commission has urged the U.S. government to address publicly concerns 

arising from the propagation of religious hatred and intolerance from Saudi Arabia. The 

Commission has published reports and held public hearings over the past several years 

regarding this issue, and issued a number of recommendations for U.S. policy. The Commission welcomed the public statements made in the past year by the Ambassador-at-Large 

for International Religious Freedom, John V. Hanford III, and the State Department Deputy 

Spokesman Adam Ereli, raising concerns about the role of the Saudi government in the 

promotion of religious intolerance and extremism. 

In 2004, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked by the Government Affairs Committees of the House and Senate to undertake a comprehensive review 

of U.S. oversight of Saudi support for an ideology promoting violence and religious intolerance globally. The study was inspired by the Commission’s 2003 recommendation that 

Congress initiate a review of Saudi Arabia’s global exportation of religious hatred and 

intolerance. The unclassified portion of the report was released in September 2005; the 

classified portion of the report is available but has not been officially released. The public 

GAO report concludes that while Saudi Arabia claims to have made reforms, and in some 

case has done so, “U.S. agencies do not know the extent of the Saudi government’s efforts 

to limit the activities of Saudi sources that have allegedly propagated Islamic extremism 

outside of Saudi Arabia.” Moreover, the report states that, “as of July 2005, agency officials 

did not know if the government of Saudi Arabia had taken steps to ensure that Saudifunded curricula or religious activities in other countries do not propagate extremism.” 

It should be noted that the GAO’s public report also states that very few U.S. government 

agencies actually responded to the GAO’s inquiries, and none of the U.S. government’s 

intelligence agencies are cited in the report. Thus, the study should be seen as a first step 

in a continuing investigation.

Throughout the past year, the Commission has spoken out numerous times about 

religious freedom concerns in Saudi Arabia. After the State Department failed to act for 

several months in accordance with the requirements of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) in response to the designation of Saudi Arabia as a CPC, the Commission released a statement in April 2005 expressing concern about this inaction. In May 

2005, a Commission op-ed was published in the Dallas Morning News on this and other 

concerns about Saudi Arabia. 

In September 2005, one year after the designation of Saudi Arabia, Secretary Rice 

approved a temporary 180-day waiver of further action, as a consequence of CPC designation, to allow for continued diplomatic discussions with the Saudi government and “to 

further the purposes of the International Religious Freedom Act.” Later that month, the 

Commission stated publicly that the U.S. government should use the 180-day extension 

directly to engage the Saudi government to achieve demonstrable progress by the end of 

that period of time. The waiver expired in late March 2006. As of the time this report went 

to print, no action with regard to Saudi Arabia had been announced by the U.S. govern-
187

ment. Given the extent of religious freedom violations in Saudi Arabia, the Commission 

urged Secretary Rice in its May 2006 letter to consult with Congress and other parts of 

the U.S. government, including the Commission, during its discussions with the Saudis, 

and to make any agreement reached with the Saudi government public in the interest of 

the accountability that results from transparency. Since religious freedom conditions in 

Saudi Arabia have not substantially improved in the last year, the Commission also told 

Secretary Rice that the U.S. government must not hesitate in taking aggressive action 

as suggested below which meets the requirements of IRFA to demonstrate that it will 

not disregard the persistent and egregious religious freedom violations committed by the 

Saudi government.

Throughout 2005, the Commission continued to meet with representatives of a 

variety of human rights and other non-governmental organizations, academics, and 

other experts on Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the Commission influenced a number of 

legislative initiatives, including the Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2005, which is 

still pending and which contains Commission recommendations with regard to prohibitions on the issuance of any specific licenses and not granting any other specific 

authority for the export to Saudi Arabia of any item on the U.S. Commerce Control List 

of dual-use items. 

Commission Recommendations

As a consequence of the designation of Saudi Arabia as a CPC, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should:

■ identify those Saudi agencies and officials thereof who are responsible for particularly severe violations of religious freedom and vigorously enforce section 604 of 

IRFA with respect to Saudi Arabia, rendering inadmissible for entry into the United 

States any Saudi government official who was responsible for or directly carried out 

such violations;

■ issue a proclamation, under the President’s authority pursuant to section 212(f) 

of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USC 1182(f)), to bar those Saudi government officials from entering the United States who have been responsible for 

propagating globally an ideology that explicitly promotes hate, intolerance, and 

human rights violations;

■ issue a demarche urging the government of Saudi Arabia to cease funding or other support for written materials or other activities that explicitly promote hate, intolerance, and 

human rights violations, including the distribution of such materials in the United States 

and elsewhere outside of Saudi Arabia; and

■ order the heads of appropriate U.S. agencies, pursuant to section 405(a)(13) of IRFA, 

not to issue any specific licenses and not to grant any other specific authority for the 

export of any item on the U.S. Commerce Control List of dual-use items [Export Administration Regulations under part 774 of title 15] to any agency or instrumentality of 

the government of Saudi Arabia that is responsible for committing particularly severe 

violations of religious freedom. In FY 2004, the Commerce Department approved approximately $67 million worth of articles for Saudi Arabia, including, for example, such 

items as thumbcuffs, leg irons, shackles, and other items that could be used to perpetrate human rights violations. 

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With regard to religious freedom conditions in Saudi Arabia, the Commission has 

recommended that the U.S. government should:

■ press for immediate improvements in respect for religious freedom, including: (1) establishing genuine safeguards for the freedom to worship privately, (2) entrusting law 

enforcement to professionals in law enforcement agencies subject to judicial review and 

dissolving the mutawaa, (3) permitting non-Wahhabi places of worship in certain areas 

and allowing clergy to enter the country, (4) reviewing cases and releasing those who 

have been detained or imprisoned on account of their religious belief or practices, (5) 

permitting independent non-governmental organizations to advance human rights, (6) 

ending state prosecution of individuals charged with apostasy, blasphemy, sorcery, and 

criticism of the government, (7) ceasing messages of hatred, intolerance, or incitement 

to violence against Muslims and members of non-Muslim religious groups in the educational curricula and textbooks, as well as in government-controlled mosques and media, 

(8) inviting the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to conduct a 

fact-finding mission, and (9) ratifying international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and cooperating with UN 

human rights mechanisms; and

■ use its leverage to encourage implementation of numerous Saudi government statements to ensure that the Saudi government carries out political, educational, and 

judicial reforms in the Kingdom by: (1) raising concerns about human rights, including religious freedom, both publicly and privately in the U.S. anti-terrorism dialogue 

with the Saudi government, (2) ensuring that the U.S.-Saudi Strategic Dialogue, initiated in 2005, includes discussions on freedom of religion or belief, and (3) expanding 

human rights assistance, public diplomacy and other programs and initiatives—such 

as the Middle East Partnership Initiative—to include components specifically for 

Saudi Arabia. 

With regard to the exportation of religious intolerance from Saudi Arabia, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should:

■ continue efforts, along with those of the Congress, to determine whether and how—and 

the extent to which—the Saudi government, individual members of the royal family, or 

Saudi-funded individuals or institutions are directly or indirectly propagating globally, 

including in the United States, a religious ideology that explicitly promotes hate, intolerance, human rights violations, and, in some cases, violence, toward members of other 

religious groups, both Muslim and non-Muslim; 

■ request the Saudi government to provide an accounting of what kinds of Saudi support have been and continue to be provided to which religious schools, mosques, 

centers of learning, and other religious organizations globally, including in the United States;

■ urge the Saudi government to stop funding religious activities abroad until it knows the 

content of the teachings and is satisfied that such activities do not promote hatred, intolerance, or other human rights violations;

■ urge the Saudi government to monitor, regulate, and report publicly about the activities 

of Saudi charitable organizations based outside Saudi Arabia in countries throughout the 

world; and 

■ urge the Saudi government to: a) cease granting diplomatic status to Islamic clerics 

and educators teaching outside Saudi Arabia; and b) close down any Islamic affairs 
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sections in Saudi embassies throughout the world that have been responsible for 

propagating intolerance. 

The Commission urges the U.S. Congress to hold biannual hearings at which the State 

Department reports on what issues have been raised with the Saudi government regarding 

violations of religious freedom and what actions have been taken by the United States in 

light of the Saudi government’s response.
190

Afghanistan

Though improved since the fall of the Taliban regime, conditions for freedom of religion or belief in Afghanistan became increasingly problematic in the past year. 

Flaws in the country’s new constitution, which does not contain clear protections for 

the right to freedom of religion or belief for individual Afghan citizens, failed to prevent a 

growing number of criminal court cases that were in violation of the rights of the accused. 

The defects in the constitution are compounded by the current role and power of the country’s Supreme Court, which continues to be headed by a man who has shown little regard 

for international human rights standards. In addition, the failure or inability of the Afghan 

government to exercise authority over much of the country outside Kabul contributes to a 

progressively deteriorating situation for religious freedom and other human rights in many 

of the provinces. These developments indicate that religious extremism—even in official 

circles—is an increasingly viable threat in Afghanistan. In light of the very real dangers to 

the declared U.S. goal of instituting democracy and human rights protections in Afghanistan, the Commission has decided to place the country on its Watch List. The Commission 

will carefully monitor the situation in Afghanistan, in whose development the United States 

should continue to play a crucial role. 

In January 2004, Afghanistan adopted a new constitution. The constitution contains 

an explicit recognition of equality between men and women and a reference to Afghanistan’s commitment to abide by its international human rights obligations. However, though 

the Constitution provides for the freedom of non-Muslim groups to exercise their various 

faiths, it does not contain explicit protections for the right to freedom of religion or belief 

that would extend to every individual, particularly to individual Muslims, the overwhelming majority of Afghanistan’s population. Other fundamental rights, such as the right to 

life and free expression, can be superseded by ordinary legislation. This omission is compounded by a repugnancy clause that states that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and 

provisions of the sacred religion of Islam,” as well as by provisions for a judicial system empowered to enforce the repugnancy clause and apply Hanafi jurisprudence to cases where 

there is no other applicable law.

The absence of a guarantee of the individual right to religious freedom and the inclusion of a judicial system instructed to enforce Islamic principles and Islamic law mean that 

the new constitution does not fully protect individual Afghan citizens who dissent from 

state-imposed orthodoxy against unjust accusations of religious “crimes” such as apostasy 

and blasphemy. There are also fewer protections for Afghans to debate the role and content 

of religion in law and society, to advocate the rights of women and members of religious 

minorities, and to question interpretations of Islamic precepts without fear of retribution. 

▲ Afghanistan

▲ Bangladesh

▲ India

▲ Pakistan

▲ Sri Lanka

South Asia
There is concern that these constitutional deficiencies could 

permit a harsh, unfair, or even abusive interpretation of religious orthodoxy to be officially imposed, violating numerous human rights of the individual by stifling dissent within 

the Afghan population. 

These concerns are not merely theoretical, as in the 

past year, several very troubling cases exemplifying the constitution’s inadequacies came before the courts. In October 

2005, Afghan journalist and editor Ali Mohaqiq Nasab was 

imprisoned after being found guilty of charges of blasphemy 

and “insulting Islam.” The purported “crime” of Nasab, editor 

of the journal Haqooq-i-Zan (Women’s Rights), was to question discrimination against women and the use of certain 

harsh punishments under traditional Islamic law, including 

amputation and public stoning. Although Nasab, who is also 

an Islamic scholar, was initially sentenced to two years of 

hard labor, the prosecutor in the case reportedly intended 

to seek the death penalty against him. In December, Nasab’s 

term was reduced to a six-month suspended sentence, but 

only after he apologized to the court. In March 2006, Abdur Rahman, an Afghan citizen, was arrested and threatened 

with execution on the charge of changing his religion. His 

offense, according to a public prosecutor in Afghanistan, 

was “rejecting Islam.” Under Afghanistan’s sharia law, Rahman was to face the death penalty if found guilty of apostasy. 

The prosecutor in the case called Rahman “a microbe [who] 

should be cut off and removed from the rest of Muslim society and should be killed.” The judge overseeing the trial publicly affirmed that if Rahman did not return to Islam, “the 

punishment will be enforced on him, and the punishment is 

death.” Within a few weeks, in the face of a massive international outcry about the case, the court dismissed the charges 

against him, citing lack of evidence and suspicions about his 

mental state, but concerns about his personal safety forced 

him to seek asylum abroad.

Both of these cases, involving Muslim individuals exercising their internationally guaranteed rights, indicate that 

the inadequate guarantees for individual human rights in the 

constitution represent a significant problem for Afghanistan’s 

development as a democratic, rule of law based state where 

fundamental human rights are protected. The constitutional 

concerns are intensified by the fact that the task of interpreting many of these provisions has been left to the Supreme 

Court, currently headed by Chief Justice Fazl Hadi Shinwari, 

who has shown little tolerance for those who disagree with 

his hard-line interpretation of Islam. In August 2003, Chief 

Justice Shinwari told a visiting Commission delegation that 

COUNTRY REPORTS: SOUTH ASIA

In October 2005, Afghan journalist and editor Ali Mohaqiq Nasab 

was imprisoned after being found 

guilty of charges of blasphemy and 

“insulting Islam.” The purported “crime” of Nasab, editor of the 

journal Haqooq-i-Zan (Women’s 

Rights), was to question discrimination against women and the use 

of certain harsh punishments under traditional Islamic law, including amputation and public stoning. 

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192

he rejects three crucial freedoms—those of expression, religion, and equal rights for men 

and women—all of which are protected under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

As a consequence of his actions, a sitting Minister in the interim Afghan government was 

forced to resign after she was charged with blasphemy for questioning the role of Islamic 

law in Afghanistan, journalists have been jailed on charges of offending Islam, and during 

the October 2004 presidential elections, a presidential candidate was threatened with disqualification for purported “anti-Islamic remarks” on women’s rights and family law. These 

incidents suggest that despite the gains since 2002 and the adoption of a new constitution, religious freedom and other human rights, along with democracy itself, remain under 

threat from extremism.

These constitutional pitfalls have been extended to 

other legislation also. In 2002, Afghanistan adopted a new 

press law that contains a sanction against publication of 

“matters contrary to the principles of Islam or offensive 

to other religions and sects.” According to the State Department, the vagueness in the definition of what constitutes offensive material allows for the potential abuse of 

this clause with the aim of limiting freedom of the press 

and intimidating journalists. Indeed, incidents of this 

sort of abuse have already occurred, as when Chief Justice 

Shinwari in November 2004 successfully appealed to the 

Afghan government to have cable television taken off the 

air because of its “immoral” programs that insult religion. 

Earlier in that year, the Chief Justice had also protested 

the presence of female singers on radio and television and 

attempted to have the practice halted, though in this effort he was ultimately not successful. In January 2006, the Afghan Minister of Information, 

Culture, and Tourism declared that though Afghan law allows citizens access to a free press, 

limitations exist that are “not imposed by the government but are in line with Islamic and 

national principles.” That same month, cable television was shut down in Balkh province 

for broadcasting films and music that were “against Islam and Afghan culture.” In February 2006, the Afghan government, through a special media commission, imposed a fine on 

Afghan TV, one of four private stations in Kabul, for broadcasting “un-Islamic materials.”

Due to continued security problems, the government of President Karzai does not 

exercise full control over the country. As a result, the situation for religious freedom and 

other human rights is increasingly both precarious and problematic in some parts of the 

country. Taliban remnants remain active in various regions and continue to pose a threat to 

the stability of the government. Many of the human rights abuses practiced by the Taliban 

reportedly persist today under the rule of the regional warlords, who continue to operate 

in regions that are effectively outside of central government control. These abuses include 

political killings, torture, coercion to enforce social and religious conformity, and abuses 

against women and girls, sometimes with the active support of the local courts and police. 

These substantial security threats, which have increased in the past year, present a persistent 

danger to the establishment of democracy and the rule of law throughout Afghanistan. 

Despite these concerns, religious freedom conditions continue to be better than under the rule of the Taliban. For example, the active persecution of Afghanistan’s Shi’a minority (approximately 15 percent of the population) that was perpetrated by the Taliban 

Afghan women in Kabul
193

has ended, and Shi’as are once again able to perform their traditional processions and to 

participate in public life. In January 2005, President Karzai appointed a Shi’a scholar to the 

country’s Supreme Court, the first Shi’a scholar ever to be appointed to that body. The situation of Afghanistan’s religious minorities, which include small communities of Hindus and 

Sikhs, has also improved since the fall of the Taliban, as there is no longer any official discrimination, though societal violence against both groups, particularly in the areas outside 

of government control, continues to be a concern. In November 2005, a Hindu aid worker 

from India was beheaded after being abducted by Taliban forces. Although there are no 

churches, expatriate Christians are reportedly able to meet for informal worship services in 

Kabul and one or two other major centers. However, some religious advocacy organizations 

are reporting instances of societal intolerance of and violence against persons who have 

converted to Christianity. 

In the past year, the Commission spoke out several times about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. In October 2005, the Commission issued a statement condemning 

the arrest and trial of Ali Mohaqiq Nasab on charges of blasphemy and “insulting Islam.” 

In December, the Commission wrote to the State Department asking that it urgently communicate with the German government to prevent the imminent involuntary deportation 

of thousands of particularly vulnerable asylum seekers from Germany to Afghanistan, including Hindu refugees who face the threat of violence upon return to Afghanistan. In 

March 2006, the Commission wrote to President Bush expressing its concern about the trial 

and threatened execution of Abdur Rahman on charges of apostasy. In April, Commission 

Vice-Chair Felice D. Gaer testified before a Congressional Human Rights Caucus Members’ 

Briefing on “Anti-Conversion Laws and Religious Freedom in South Asia and the Middle 

East: The Case of Abdul Rahman.” In her testimony, Commissioner Gaer described the 

weak state of human rights protections in Afghanistan today, and cautioned that freedom 

and democracy are still in peril in that country. 

During the period that the constitution was being drafted, the Commission met with 

numerous high-ranking U.S. government officials to articulate the importance of institutionalizing human rights guarantees in the document that adequately protect the rights 

of each individual. The Commission also briefed Members of Congress and relevant committee staff on its policy findings and recommendations. In January 2003, the Commission 

held an international forum, “Reconstructing Afghanistan: Freedom in Crisis?” in cooperation with George Washington University Law School, which brought together key Afghan 

leaders, U.S. policymakers, and other experts to discuss ways of integrating adequate human rights protections into current judicial and legal reform processes. The Commission 

also raised the issue of religious freedom in numerous public statements, as well as in two 

separate opinion-editorial articles, in The Washington Post and The New York Times, authored by Commissioners Michael K. Young, Felice D. Gaer, and Preeta D. Bansal. In late 

2003, the Commission was cited on this issue in over a dozen editorials in major newspapers worldwide. 

In August 2003, a Commission delegation visited Afghanistan for an intensive series 

of discussions with senior officials of the Transitional Administration, U.S. officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations and of Afghan civil society, former President 

Burhanuddin Rabbani, religious leaders, and members of the diplomatic community, including the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In September 

2004, the Commission issued a press release denouncing the Supreme Court Chief Justice’s 

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194

attempt to stifle freedom and electoral democracy by calling for the disqualification of a 

candidate who made comments of which Chief Justice Shinwari did not approve.

The U.S. government should provide the leadership, sound policy, and resources 

needed to secure freedom for all in Afghanistan, which regrettably appears to be reverting more and mores to Taliban-like practices. The U.S. government should therefore step 

up its leadership and engagement in Afghanistan to preserve and consolidate the Afghan 

people’s gains in the protection of human rights, since the United States has been so directly 

involved in the country’s political reconstruction. Failure will leave Afghanistan not only 

less free but also more unstable, thereby contributing to regional insecurity and potentially 

serving again as a future haven for global terrorism that threatens U.S. interests. 

Commission Recommendations

With regard to Afghanistan, the Commission has also recommended that the U.S. 

government should:

■ vigorously support respect for the right of every individual to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief in post-Taliban Afghanistan, and be prepared to make great 

efforts to ensure protection of fundamental human rights, including freedom of conscience and the equal rights of women, as outlined in international human rights instruments to which Afghanistan is a party; 

■ use its influence to protect freedom of expression against charges that may be used to 

stifle debate, such as blasphemy, “offending Islam,” apostasy, or similar offenses, including expression on sensitive subjects such as the role of religion in society and the rights of 

women and members of minority groups; 

■ act to bolster the position of those reformers who respect, and advocate respect for, human rights, since those persons in Afghan society who would promote respect for internationally recognized human rights are currently on the defensive, even threatened, 

and these people need U.S. support to counter the influence of those with an Islamic 

extremist agenda; 

■ amplify the voices of political reformers and human rights defenders by, among other 

things, encouraging President Karzai to appoint independent human rights defenders to 

the country’s independent national human rights commission; 

■ ensure that its programs, administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development, to help develop primary and secondary education, including through the printing 

of textbooks, and to provide civic education, incorporate, as part of the content, education on international standards with regard to human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, and religious tolerance;

■ strengthen efforts to reform the judicial system, including through helping to develop 

sorely needed infrastructure and through strongly supporting the reconstruction in Afghanistan of a judicial sector operating under the rule of law and upholding civil law and 

international standards of human rights, and work to ensure that all judges and prosecutors are trained in civil law and international human rights standards, women are 

recruited into the judiciary at all levels, and all Afghans have equal access to the courts;

■ encourage President Karzai to appoint judges who understand—and who will uphold—

international human rights standards, and to replace those judges trained only in religious law;

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195

■ assist legal experts to visit Afghanistan, engage their Afghan counterparts, and provide 

information to the Afghan public on the universality of human rights and the compatibility of Islam and universal human rights, including freedom of religion and belief, and 

expand existing programs to bring Afghans to this country to see how Islam and other 

faiths may be practiced in a free society; 

■ make greater efforts to improve security outside Kabul in order for Afghanistan’s political 

reconstruction to succeed, because without adequate security, the warlords will continue 

to hold sway over much of the country, undermining the rule of law and Afghanistan’s 

nascent democratic institutions; and

■ direct measurable, concrete support and benefits, including the improved, countrywide security referred to above, to the Afghan people, which will, in turn, enable the 

Karzai government and other moderates to make the hard choices necessary to oppose 

religious extremism.

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Bangladesh 

During the past year, Bangladesh has seen an escalation both in violence attributed 

to Islamic militants and in countermeasures undertaken by the government of 

Bangladesh. In February-March 2006, the Commission visited Bangladesh, where 

it examined reports that the targets of militant attacks have included Bangladesh’s judicial 

system, individuals who oppose extremist interpretations of Islam or who have espoused 

controversial views on religious subjects, members of religious minorities, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Although Bangladesh is a functioning democracy, religious 

extremism and chronic political violence continue to undermine the institutions that protect religious freedom and to silence the country’s voices of religious tolerance and moderation. Left unchecked, current trends toward greater intolerance and religiously-motivated 

violence, particularly toward Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians, could have an increasingly 

negative impact on all Bangladeshis. The Commission continues to place Bangladesh on its 

Watch List. 

Since 1991, notwithstanding relatively difficult economic conditions, Bangladesh has 

had a representative government, regular changes of power through free elections, a judiciary that sometimes rules against those in authority, a lively press often critical of government policies, active participation of women in the workplace, and a functioning civil 

society with active human rights groups, women’s organizations, and numerous NGOs. The 

democratically-elected governments that have held office since 1991 have, however, left untouched and in some cases furthered the more strident Islamic elements introduced in the 

constitution by previous military regimes. 

Following independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh was established as a secular state in which national identity was based on Bengali language and culture, rather than on 

the Islamic religion, as in Pakistan. The constitution contains strongly worded guarantees of 

freedom of religious belief and practice, as well as equal treatment by the government for citizens regardless of religious affiliation. Subsequent military regimes amended the constitution, 

however, to introduce Islamic elements, including the affirmation that “absolute trust and 

faith in Allah” is to “be the basis for all actions” by the government. Although not judicially 

enforceable, this change in the constitution has been cited by minority rights advocates as 

diminishing the status of non-Muslims as equal members of Bangladeshi society. Islam was 

made Bangladesh’s state religion in 1988 under the military dictatorship of H.M. Ershad.

Aided by the expansion of Islamic schools (madrassas), charities, and other social 

welfare institutions, some receiving foreign funding, Islamic activists have gained in political, economic, and social influence in Bangladesh in recent years. Explicitly Islamic parties, including Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, helped the center-right Bangladesh Nationalist 

Party (BNP) win the last national election in October 2001 and have allegedly used their 

positions in the current BNP-led government to favor Islamic organizations and to deny 

funding to or otherwise disadvantage groups viewed as opposing an Islamist political and 

social agenda. Although many of those who call for a more Islamist Bangladesh have been 

engaged in peaceful political and social activities, others, drawing inspiration from extremist movements elsewhere in the Islamic world have adopted a jihadist ideology of violent 

struggle against perceived opponents of Islam. 

The most serious episode of anti-minority violence followed the October 2001 

elections. At that time, there were numerous reports of killings, sexual assaults, illegal 
land-seizures, arson, extortion, and intimidation of religious minority group members, particularly Hindus, perceived as favoring the BNP’s main rival, the Awami League. 

Minority group representatives and human rights groups 

ascribed these attacks to religious extremists or to partisans 

of the BNP and its Islamist allies. The continued lack of 

accountability for the violence in 2001 raises serious concerns about an atmosphere of impunity for such crimes, 

as well as the possibility of a renewal of violence against 

Hindus and members of other religious minorities in the 

next general election, expected in early 2007. Some human 

rights activists and minority advocates also have voiced serious concerns that manipulation of the voting rolls to specifically exclude or burden persons with names associated 

with religious minority communities, coupled with active 

voter intimidation, may keep religious minorities from exercising their right to vote.

Although reports of anti-minority violence have 

dropped off sharply since the 2001 election, Hindus, Christians, and representatives of other minority religious communities continue to express concerns regarding the safety 

of their coreligionists, citing the growth in Islamic radicalism and instances of violence, including fatalities, in which 

the victims’ religious affiliation or activities may have been 

factors. In June 2005, there were arson or bombing attacks 

against Ahmadi mosques in three locations. In July 2005, two 

Bangladeshis working for a Christian NGO were murdered, 

allegedly because of showing a film on the life of Jesus. As of 

this writing, there have been no charges brought in this case 

or in the murder in September 2004 of a locally prominent 

Christian convert from Islam. The Commission was told 

on its visit to Bangladesh that because of the atmosphere of 

uncertainty and fear under which religious minorities must 

live, Hindus have left Bangladesh in large numbers in the 

past three decades.

Bangladesh’s high levels of political violence and instability have also provided opportunities for religious and 

other extremists to expand their influence. Due to a weak 

legal system and corrupt law enforcement, gangs employed 

by politicians engage in criminal activities with relative impunity. Armed groups of Islamist vigilantes and leftist guerrillas terrorize remote rural areas. Authors, journalists, and 

academics expressing opinions allegedly offensive to certain 

interpretations of Islam are subject to violent, sometimes 

fatal, attacks. Extremists oppose NGOs that promote the 

COUNTRY REPORTS: SOUTH ASIA

Although Bangladesh is a functioning democracy, religious extremism 

and chronic political violence continue to undermine the institutions 

that protect religious freedom and 

to silence the country’s voices of religious tolerance and moderation. Left 

unchecked, current trends toward 

greater intolerance and religiouslymotivated violence, particularly toward Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians, could have an increasingly 

negative impact on all Bangladeshis. 

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198

economic betterment of women and protection for women’s rights. Some such organizations have been bombed, presumably by these extremists.

Although Bangladesh has the unusual distinction of having both its major parties, the 

BNP and the Awami League, led by women, both of whom have served as Prime Minister, 

religious extremism, mostly among Muslims, victimizes Bangladeshi women of all faiths. 

Some Muslim clerics, especially in rural areas, have sanctioned vigilante punishments 

against women for alleged moral transgressions. Rape is reportedly a common form of 

anti-minority violence. The government often fails to punish the perpetrators of these acts 

against women, as the law enforcement and the judicial systems, especially at the local level, 

are vulnerable to corruption, intimidation, and political interference. Some women’s activists have accused the current government of backsliding on the strong stance on women’s 

rights set forth in the 1997 version of the National Policy for the Advancement of Women. 

Politically-motivated bombings, assassinations, and other terrorist acts, often ascribed to Islamic militants, have exacerbated partisan tensions and increased the vulnerability of minority communities. In August 2004 and January 2005, such attacks resulted 

in the deaths of prominent opposition political figures. In February 2005, the government 

banned two Islamic militant groups implicated in a series of bomb attacks on NGOs. Islamic militants have been blamed for a coordinated wave of almost simultaneous bomb attacks, numbering in the hundreds, carried out in all but one of Bangladesh’s 64 districts on 

August 17, 2005. Militants were also implicated in a series of bomb attacks on the judicial 

system in October-November 2005. The bomb attacks were accompanied by calls by the 

militants for the substitution of sharia, or Islamic law, for Bangladesh’s current system of 

secular jurisprudence and by threats against courts and judges for not applying sharia. The 

government responded with a campaign of arrests of militants suspected of involvement in 

the bombings and in other violence incidents. In March 2006, 21 suspected militants were 

sentenced to death for the August 17 bombings. In a separate case, it was announced on the 

same day that a suspect was sentenced to death for killing a Hindu judge (one of the very 

few Hindu judges in Bangladeshi society), in an October 2005 bombing. Reputed senior 

militant leaders are among those arrested, including Siddiqul Islam, better known as “Bangla Bhai,” and Sheikh Abdur Rahman. 

In addition to these security measures, the government has spoken out against the 

militants. To a national conference of imams in November 2005, Prime Minister Khaleda 

Zia denounced those who were “trying to establish a reign of terror and turmoil” in the 

name of Islam. At a national conference on “interfaith harmony” in February 2006, the 

Prime Minister declared her government to be “dead against the practice of any discrimination on the basis of religious identity.” Similarly, the Religious Affairs Ministry arranged 

public activities against Islamic militancy in conjunction with the 35th anniversary of Bangladesh’s independence on March 26, 2006. 

Despite constitutional protections, non-Muslims in Bangladesh face societal discrimination and are disadvantaged in access to government jobs, public services, and 

the legal system. They are also underrepresented in elected political offices, including the 

national parliament. Minority group advocates claim that religion plays a role in property 

and land disputes, pointing to expropriations of Hindu property since the Pakistan era 

and the gradual displacement of non-Muslim tribal populations by Bengali Muslims in 

the Chittagong Hill Tracts and other traditionally tribal areas. Such disputes occasionally 

result in violence.
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Supreme Court, Dhaka, Bangladesh

Islamic extremists in Bangladesh have engaged in a public campaign against the Ahmadi community, which is viewed as heretical by many Muslims. The Ahmadis, also referred to as Ahmadiyya, are a relatively small group in Bangladesh, estimated at 100,000 

persons in a population of over 140 million. Anti-Ahmadi demonstrators have called on 

the government of Bangladesh to declare Ahmadis to be “non-Muslims,” as has been done 

in Pakistan, and as has been used in Pakistan to justify a range of legal 

limitations on the Ahmadi community and individual Ahmadis. The 

demonstrators have also called for curbs on Ahmadi missionary outreach to the broader Muslim community. Although the government of 

Bangladesh has thus far refused to declare Ahmadis to be non-Muslims, in January 2004, it bent to militant pressure and banned the publication and distribution of Ahmadi religious literature. Police seized 

Ahmadi publications on a few occasions. The ban was stayed by the 

courts in December 2004, with further legal action still pending. Although the ban is not currently being enforced, it has not been withdrawn by the government. 

Anti-Ahmadi activists have been organized under the banner 

of a group known as the International Khatme Nabuwat Movement 

Bangladesh. (“Khatme Nabuwat” is an Arabic phrase meaning “finality 

of the Prophethood” of Mohammed.) There is reportedly a significant 

overlap of membership between this organization and Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamic political parties. Anti-Ahmadi activists object 

to Ahmadi houses of worship being called “mosques” and on a number of occasions have organized mass demonstrations against Ahmadi 

mosques, have attempted to occupy the sites, and have forcibly replaced signs identifying 

Ahmadi places of worship as mosques, sometimes with the assistance of the police. In some 

instances, the anti-Ahmadi agitation has been accompanied by mob violence in which Ahmadi homes have been destroyed and Ahmadi converts held against their will and pressured to recant. Although the campaign against the Ahmadis has continued, the violence 

has diminished in recent months due to improved and more vigorous police protection for 

the Ahmadis. 

The Commission visited Bangladesh February 26-March 2, 2006 at the invitation of 

the government of Bangladesh. The Commission delegation met with a broad range of individuals, including government officials, political leaders, human rights monitors, journalists, women’s rights advocates, Muslim religious leaders, leading members of Ahmadi, 

Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian communities, and civil society representatives. The government of Bangladesh cooperated with the visit and received the delegation at a high level, 

including individual meetings with four members of the Cabinet: the Foreign Minister; 

the Minister for Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs; the Minister of Education; and the 

Minister of Industries, the last mentioned being the head of Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. 

The delegation also met with the Minister of State for Religious Affairs and with the Secretary for Home Affairs, whose responsibilities include law enforcement. 

The Commission has met on a number of occasions with human rights monitors, 

representatives of religious communities, Bangladeshi diplomats, and others to discuss religious freedom in Bangladesh. In April 2004, the Commission, together with Congressman Joseph Crowley, a member of the House Committee on International Relations, held 

a public hearing at the City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law at Queens 

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College in Flushing, New York, on “Bangladesh: Protecting the Human Rights of Thought, 

Conscience, and Religion.” 

Commission Recommendations

With regard to Bangladesh, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government 

should urge the government of Bangladesh to:

■ uphold Bangladesh’s international obligations and constitutional guarantees of freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, as well as of equal treatment for all citizens 

regardless of religious affiliation or belief;

■ prosecute to the fullest extent of the law perpetrators of violent acts against members 

of minority religious communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) promoting 

women’s rights, and all those who oppose religious extremism; 

■ cancel its January 2004 order banning publications by the Ahmadi religious community, 

continue to reject extremist demands to declare Ahmadis to be non-Muslims, and protect 

the places of worship, persons, and property of members of this religious community on 

an equal basis with all Bangladeshi citizens; 

■ ensure that the voting rights of all Bangladeshis are safeguarded in the next national elections, that those elections are free and fair, that they are conducted with voting rolls that 

do not discriminate on the basis of perceived religious affiliation or ethnic background, 

and that the elections are not marred by violence, particularly violence targeting members of religious minority communities; permit international and domestic monitoring 

of the entire electoral process, including preparation of the voting rolls; 

■ ensure that decisions on public employment in national institutions such as the civil service, the military, law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary, including at the highest levels, do not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation, belief, or ethnic background; 

■ ensure that publicly-funded support for domestic faith-based charitable, humanitarian, 

developmental, or educational activities be on a non-discriminatory basis; 

■ permit NGOs to conduct legitimate humanitarian and developmental activities without 

harassment, undue interference, or discrimination; protect NGOs from extremist violence and vigorously prosecute and punish the perpetrators of such violence; 

■ strengthen efforts to protect women from vigilante or anti-minority violence; combat 

claims of religious sanction or justification for violence against women; vigorously prosecute the perpetrators of such violence; and 

■ undertake a comprehensive review, in collaboration with civil society and independent 

international experts, to bring domestic legislation and government regulations affecting 

women’s rights into compliance with international standards and Bangladesh’s international human rights obligations.
India

The positive developments in India affecting freedom 

of religion or belief that began in 2004, when parliamentary elections resulted in installation of a coalition government led by the Congress Party, continued in the 

past year. Under the previous leadership of the Bharatiya 

Janata Party, or BJP, the Commission found the Indian government’s response to increasing violence against religious 

minorities in the state of Gujarat and elsewhere to be inadequate. In addition, several senior BJP government leaders 

had publicly allied themselves with, or refused to disassociate themselves from, extremist organizations that were implicated in that religious violence. In response, in 2002-2004, 

the Commission recommended that India be designated a 

“country of particular concern,” or CPC. As a result of the 

changes that took place in India after the 2004 elections, the 

Commission in 2005 no longer recommended that India be 

designated a CPC. 

Unlike many of the other countries that draw Commission attention, India has a democratically elected government, is governed generally by the rule of law, and has a 

tradition of secular governance that dates back to the country’s independence. India has a judiciary that is independent, 

albeit slow-moving and frequently unresponsive, that can 

work to hold the perpetrators of religious violence responsible; contains a vibrant civil society with many vigorous, 

independent non-governmental human rights organizations 

that have investigated and published extensive reports on 

the rise of religiously motivated violence; and is home to a 

free press that has widely reported on and strongly criticized 

the situation on the ground in India and the growing threats 

in the past decade to a religiously plural society.

Despite these democratic traditions, religious minorities in India have been the victims of violent attacks, including killings, in what is called “communal violence.” In the 

late 1990s, there was a marked increase in violent attacks 

against members of religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians, throughout India, including killings, 

torture, rape, and destruction of property. Those responsible 

for communal violence were rarely held responsible for their 

actions. The increase in violence against religious minorities coincided with the rise in political influence of groups 

associated with the Sangh Parivar, a collection of organizations that view non-Hindus as foreign to India and aggressively press for governmental policies to promote a Hindu 

nationalist agenda. The ascent to power in 1998 of the Sangh 

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The positive developments in India affecting freedom of religion 

or belief that began in 2004, when 

parliamentary elections resulted in installation of a coalition 

government led by the Congress 

Party, continued in the past year. 

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Parivar’s political wing, the BJP, helped to foster a climate in which violence against religious minorities was not systematically punished. Although it was not directly responsible 

for instigating the violence against religious minorities, the BJP-led national government 

clearly did not do all in its power to pursue the perpetrators of the attacks and to counteract 

the prevailing climate of hostility against these minority groups, especially at the state and 

local levels. 

Of particular concern to the Commission were the February 2002 events in the state 

of Gujarat, when, after a fire on a train resulted in the death of 58 Hindus, hundreds of 

Muslims were killed across Gujarat by Hindu mobs. In addition, hundreds of mosques 

and Muslim-owned businesses and other kinds of infrastructure were looted or destroyed. 

More than 100,000 people fled their homes and, in the end, as many as 2,000 Muslims were 

killed. India’s National Human Rights Commission, an official body, found evidence of premeditation in the killings by members of extremist groups espousing Hindu nationalism, 

complicity by Gujarat state government officials, and police inaction in the midst of attacks 

on Muslims. Christians were also victims in Gujarat, and many churches were destroyed. 

In the months following the violence, the BJP-led state government in Gujarat headed 

by State Minister Narendra Modi was widely accused of being reluctant to bring the perpetrators of the killings of Muslims to justice. Few persons had been arrested and held to 

account for the deaths. In response to the failures of the Gujarat government, India’s Supreme Court declared in October 2003 that it had “no faith left” in the state’s handling of 

the investigations and instructed the Gujarat state government to appoint new prosecutors 

to examine the religious violence of 2002. In April 2004, in what was described as an indictment of the Gujarat government, the Supreme Court overturned the controversial acquittal 

of the 21 accused in a particular case and ordered a new trial of those indicted. In August 

2004, the Supreme Court ordered the Gujarat government to reopen its investigation of the 

2002 violence, criticizing the local police officials for poor investigative practices and follow-up. The Court set up an inquiry committee to reexamine 2,000 cases; as a result, it was 

announced in February 2006 that the Gujarati police would reopen nearly 1,600 cases and 

take action against 41 police officials for their alleged role in the Gujarat violence. In addition, Gujarati police have announced that they will pursue more than 600 others accused in 

these reopened cases.

In addition to the steps taken by the Supreme Court, the government continued its 

efforts to redress a number of aspects of the Hindu nationalist agenda of the previous government. After a government-appointed committee of historians was tasked in June 2004 

with removing the “distortions and communally biased portions” of the new textbooks, the 

latter were replaced in 2005 with revised editions. In addition, the government has continued to act decisively to prevent communal violence in situations where it has erupted in 

the past. In July 2005, six Muslim militants attacked a religious site in Ayodhya, in the state 

of Uttar Pradesh, where in 1992 Hindu extremists destroyed the sixteenth century Babri 

mosque, resulting in nationwide riots that left up to 3,000 dead, mostly Muslims. There 

were protests organized by the BJP in response to the July attack, but police dispersed the 

crowds and no violence ensued. In February 2006, a mass rally of Hindu nationalists was 

held in the Dangs district of Gujarat calling on members of the indigenous “tribal” people 

to “reconvert” to Hinduism. In the weeks leading up to the event, the Hindu groups issued 

a number of highly inflammatory statements, particularly against Christians, and violence 

against local Christian communities was feared, as has happened in the past. However, the 

military was sent into the area to maintain peace; riot police were reportedly posted outside 
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churches and temples and no violence occurred. In March 2006, after bombs exploded in 

the Hindu holy city of Varanasi killing 20 persons, allegedly instigated by Islamist groups, 

authorities reportedly acted swiftly to prevent retaliation against Muslims. Prime Minister 

Manmohan Singh appealed for calm, and soldiers and police were deployed at holy sites 

across the country. 

Despite the improved situation, concerns about religious freedom in India remain. Attacks on Christian churches and individuals, largely perpetrated by individuals associated 

with extremist Hindu nationalist groups, continue to occur, and perpetrators are rarely held 

to account by the state legal apparatus. For example, in February 2006 alone, a mob attacked 

a Catholic school in Maharashtra state, destroying some of the church’s contents; extremists 

incited Hindu residents in a town in Orissa state to attack the Christian residents, injuring 10, 

with two requiring hospitalization; and three separate attacks on Christians occurred in the 

state of Madhya Pradesh in a period of four days, resulting in several persons requiring hospitalization. In one instance, a mob threw stones at the site of a Christian gathering and attacked 

some of the participants with sticks and rods. In the first case noted above, police arrested 

18 of the attackers and subsequently provided protection for the school; in the second case, 

the police made no attempt to arrest the accused. Similar attacks occur, sometimes in greater 

numbers, every month, particularly in states where the BJP heads the state government, including in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Chhatisgarh, and Jharkhand. 

The state of Rajasthan was the scene of particularly serious attacks on Christian individuals and institutions carried out by members of Hindu nationalist groups in the first 

months of 2006. In March, the head of a Christian organization that runs a number of educational and charitable institutions was arrested on charges of “hurting religious sentiments” 

and “insulting the religious beliefs of a community” because of a book that was on sale in 

one of his establishments. The man and his father had reportedly received death threats the 

previous January. In addition, the BJP-led Rajasthan government froze the group’s financial 

accounts and revoked its licenses to operate its institutions, which include a hospital, an 

orphanage, and a number of schools. An Indian parliamentary delegation visited Rajasthan 

and reported that the attacks on Christians had been “unprovoked.” The delegation also 

reported that “Sangh Parivar elements are using the controversial book as a convenient tool 

to carry out a systematic campaign against the minority groups.”

Several of the BJP-led states, including Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Chhatisgarh, as 

well as Arunchal Pradesh, still have laws against “forced” or “induced” religious conversions, 

which require government officials to assess the legality of conversions and provide for fines 

and imprisonment for anyone who uses force, fraud, or “inducement” to convert another. 

However, reports of persons having been arrested, still less prosecuted, under these laws are 

not common. Significantly, the government of Tamil Nadu rescinded its law against forced 

conversions after the May 2004 elections. In addition, social science textbooks published 

in the state of Gujarat in June 2005 reportedly contained language minimizing Hitler’s role 

in the Holocaust (Hitler is a respected figure among some extreme Hindu nationalists) and 

belittling religious minorities. The national government minister responsible for education 

was harshly critical of the textbooks, but because education is a subject regulated by the 

states, the central government was reportedly unable to act on the matter.

Throughout the past year, Commission staff conducted personal interviews with 

members of non-governmental organizations representing various religious communities in India, as well as human rights organizations, academics, and other India experts. In 

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March 2005, the Commission issued a statement encouraging the Department of State to 

prevent the planned visit to the United States of Gujarat State Minister Narendra Modi, citing evidence presented by India’s NHRC and numerous domestic and international human 

rights investigators of the complicity of Gujarat state officials, led by State Minister Modi, in 

the February 2002 mob attacks on Muslims.

Commission Recommendations

With regard to India, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should: 

■ press the government of India to make more vigorous and effective efforts to halt the violent attacks against religious minorities that continue to occur with troubling regularity 

in India and to hold state governments accountable for the violence and other unlawful 

acts that occur in their states; and

■ urge the Indian government to continue its policies aimed at returning the country to its 

tradition of religious tolerance, including by:

● continuing to pursue the perpetrators of the killings in Gujarat and hold them to account; and

● taking steps to prevent and punish communal violence, including by following through on 

a pledge made in 2004 to enact a law criminalizing inter-religious violence.
Pakistan

S

ectarian and religiously motivated violence persists 

in Pakistan, and the government’s response to this 

problem, though improved, continues to be insufficient and not fully effective. In addition, a number of the 

country’s laws, including legislation restricting the Ahmadi 

community and laws against blasphemy, frequently result 

in imprisonment on account of religion or belief and/or 

vigilante violence against the accused. These religious freedom concerns persist amid the wider problem of the lack 

of democracy in Pakistan, an obstacle the current government has done little to address. The absence of any meaningful democratic reform has been exacerbated by the current 

government’s political alliance with militant religious parties, which has served to strengthen these groups and give 

them influence in the country’s affairs disproportionate to 

their support among the Pakistani people. In light of these 

persistent, serious concerns, the Commission continues to 

recommend that Pakistan be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. To date, the State Department has 

not designated Pakistan a CPC.

Successive governments have severely violated religious freedom in Pakistan. Discriminatory legislation, promulgated in previous decades and persistently enforced, has 

fostered an atmosphere of religious intolerance and eroded 

the social and legal status of members of religious minorities. Government officials do not provide adequate protections from societal violence to members of the religious minority communities, including Shi’as, Ahmadis, Hindus, and 

Christians. With some exceptions, perpetrators of attacks on 

minorities are seldom brought to justice. In other instances, 

the government of Pakistan directly encourages religious intolerance. In March 2006, it was reported that, in an attempt 

to persuade people in the regions bordering on Afghanistan not to support Islamist militants, the Pakistani military 

dropped leaflets claiming that those militants were fighting 

against Pakistan “in connivance with Jews and Hindus.”

Many religious schools, or madrassas, in Pakistan 

provide ongoing ideological training and motivation to 

those who take part in violence targeting religious minorities in Pakistan and abroad. In mid-2005, the government 

of Pakistan renewed its effort to require all madrassas to 

register with the government; in addition, madrassas were 

ordered to expel all foreign students. By year’s end, and despite considerable outcry from some militant groups, most 

of the religious schools had registered. It remains unclear, 

COUNTRY REPORTS: SOUTH ASIA

Despite President Musharraf’s repeated calls for religious moderation 

and tolerance, religiously motivated violence, much of it committed 

against Shi’a Muslims by Sunni militants, remains chronic in Pakistan. 

Ahmadis, Christians, and Hindus 

have also been targeted by Sunni extremist groups and mob violence. To 

its credit, the government has made 

some attempts to respond to these 

attacks; however, despite these efforts, religiously motivated violence 

continues to be a serious problem. 

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USCIRF Pakistan hearing

however, whether these belated efforts to curb extremism through reform of the country’s 

Islamic religious schools will prove effective. Moreover, these efforts do not adequately 

address the much wider problem of religious extremism in Pakistan and the continued 

strength of militant groups. 

Despite President Musharraf ’s repeated calls for religious moderation and tolerance, 

religiously motivated violence, much of it committed against Shi’a Muslims by Sunni militants, remains chronic in Pakistan. Ahmadis, Christians, and Hindus have also been targeted by Sunni extremist groups and mob violence. To its credit, the government has made 

some attempts to respond to these attacks; however, despite these efforts, religiously motivated violence continues to be a serious problem. Sunni Muslims are also victims of reprisal 

attacks, sometimes carried out by Shi’a militant groups. In February 2006, two consecutive 

bombings of a procession of Shi’a Muslims in the town of Hangu in the North West Frontier 

Province killed at least 43 people, sparking days of Sunni-Shi’a sectarian violence in the city. 

The central government condemned the blasts and a formal inquiry into the attack was begun the following week. In October 2005, at least eight Ahmadis were killed when gunmen 

opened fire on a group of Ahmadi worshippers as they assembled for prayers. 

In the past year, the minority Christian community also continued to be subject to 

extremist and mob violence. In November 2005, a mob of over 1,500 persons, incited by 

local Muslim clerics on the basis of a false accusation of blasphemy against a local Christian 

man, set fire to and destroyed several churches, schools, and homes of Christian families in 

the town of Sangla Hill, in the province of Punjab. Political leaders condemned the violence 

and perpetrators were arrested and reportedly will be brought to trial. In January 2006, the 

blasphemy charge was dropped. In February 2006, in the furor that erupted in Pakistan 

after the publication of highly controversial cartoons in the Danish press, mobs threatened 

Christian communities in a number of areas in Pakistan. In the town of Sukkur, in Sindh 

province, a crowd of Muslims burned down two churches, an attack that was triggered in 

part by rumors that a Christian man committed blasphemy. Provincial authorities ordered 

an investigation into the incident and reportedly a number of people have been arrested.

Ahmadis, who number between 3 and 4 million in Pakistan, are prevented by law from 

engaging in the full practice of their faith. Pakistan’s constitution declares members of the Ahmadi religious community to be “non-Muslims,” despite their insistence to the contrary. Barred 

by law from “posing” as Muslims, Ahmadis may not call their places of 

worship “mosques,” worship in non-Ahmadi mosques or public prayer 

rooms which are otherwise open to all Muslims, perform the Muslim 

call to prayer, use the traditional Islamic greeting in public, publicly 

quote from the Quran, or display the basic affirmation of the Muslim 

faith. It is also illegal for Ahmadis to preach in public, to seek converts, 

or to produce, publish, and disseminate their religious materials. In August 2005, Pakistani authorities banned 16 Ahmadi-run publications in 

the Punjab province. Ahmadis have been arrested—two persons were 

arrested as a result of the previously mentioned action in the Punjab—

and imprisoned for terms of up to three years for all of the above acts, 

and they are reportedly subject to ill treatment from prison authorities and fellow prisoners. 

Because they are required to register to vote as non-Muslims, a policy that was reaffirmed by 

Pakistani government officials in February 2004, Ahmadis who refuse to disavow their claim 

to being Muslims are effectively disenfranchised. The one potentially positive development, the 

December 2004 abolition of the religion column in Pakistani passports, which, among other 
207

advances, enabled Ahmadis to participate in the hajj, was derailed in March 2005, when members of a government ministerial committee restored the column, reportedly in response to 

pressure from militant religious parties. There is no indication that the current government 

intends to institute any reforms to the anti-Ahmadi laws.

Prescribed criminal penalties for blasphemy include death for whoever “defiles the sacred 

name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad” and life imprisonment for whoever “willfully defiles, 

damages, or desecrates a copy of the holy Quran.” Blasphemy allegations, which are often false, 

result in the lengthy detention of, and sometimes violence against, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and members of other religious minorities, as well as Muslims on account of their religious 

beliefs. The negative impact of the blasphemy laws is further compounded by the lack of due 

process involved in these proceedings. In addition, during blasphemy trials, Islamic militants 

often pack the courtroom and make public threats about the consequences of an acquittal. Such 

threats have proven credible, since the threats have sometimes been followed by violence. Although no one has yet been executed by the state under the blasphemy laws, some persons have 

been sentenced to death. Several accused under the blasphemy laws have been attacked, even 

killed, by vigilantes, including while in police custody; those who escape official punishment or 

vigilante attack are sometimes forced to flee the country. Already noted above are the incidents 

of serious mob violence against Christian institutions that occurred as a result of spurious blasphemy accusations against two Christian individuals. In September 2005, a Hindu couple was 

arrested in the North West Frontier Province for allegedly desecrating the Quran; a mob also 

vandalized their home. In the past year, it was reported that lawyers who defend individuals accused of blasphemy are also frequently the subject of death threats.

Pakistan’s Hudood Ordinances, Islamic decrees introduced in 1979 and enforced 

alongside the country’s secular legal system, provide for harsh punishments, such as amputation and death by stoning, for violations of Islamic law. Rape victims run a high risk 

of being charged with adultery, for which death by stoning remains a possible sentence. In 

October 2003, the National Commission on the Status of Women in Pakistan issued a report on the Hudood Ordinances that stated that as many as 88 percent of women prisoners, 

many of them rape victims, are serving time in prison for violating these decrees, which 

make extramarital sex a crime and adultery a criminal offense. The Hudood laws apply to 

Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The UN Committee Against Torture, as well as the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Torture, have stated that stoning and amputation do constitute acts 

in breach of the obligation to prevent torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 

or punishment under international human rights standards and treaties. Although these 

extreme corporal punishments have not been carried out in practice due to high evidentiary standards, lesser punishments such as jail terms or fines have been imposed. 

The Commission’s May 2001 report on Pakistan played a key role in highlighting to 

U.S. and Pakistani government officials the undemocratic nature of the Pakistani separate 

electorate system for religious minorities. In January 2002, the Pakistani government abolished the system of separate electorates.

In June 2005, the Commission held a public hearing entitled, “The United States 

and Pakistan: Navigating a Complex Relationship,” during which testimony was given 

on U.S. policy toward Pakistan with regard to the serious religious freedom and other 

human rights problems in Pakistan. In July, the Commission issued a press statement expressing serious concern about legislation, the so-called “Hasba bill,” passed that month 

by the provincial assembly in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province that proposed the 

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creation of a “watchdog” position to monitor the observance of “Islamic values” in public 

places. The bill would have enabled a person, called the mohtasib, to enforce one interpretation of religious requirements on such activities as participation in Friday prayers, doing 

business on Fridays, and the appearance of unrelated men and women in public. There 

were concerns that the bill would also have imposed Taliban-like restrictions on women’s 

movement and dress. The subject of outcry in other parts of Pakistan and abroad, the law 

was later declared to be unconstitutional by Pakistan’s Supreme Court.

Throughout 2005, the Commission continued to meet with representatives of the 

various religious communities in Pakistan, including Muslims, Ahmadis, Christians, and 

Hindus, as well as with human rights organizations, academics, and other experts. The 

Commission also met with representatives of the Pakistani government.

Commission Recommendations

In addition to recommending that Pakistan be designated a CPC, the Commission 

has recommended that the U.S. government should: 

■ urge the government of Pakistan to make more serious efforts to combat Islamic extremism in that country, noting especially the current government’s political alliance with Islamist political parties, which affords an inordinate amount of influence to these groups, 

and which, in turn, has a strong negative impact on religious freedom in Pakistan; 

■ urge the government of Pakistan to decriminalize blasphemy and until such a time as 

that is possible, to implement procedural changes to the blasphemy laws that will reduce 

and ultimately eliminate their abuse; and ensure that those who are accused of blasphemy 

and people who defend them are given adequate protection, including by following up 

on death threats and other actions against them carried out by militants, and that full due 

process is followed; 

■ urge the government of Pakistan to take more effective steps to prevent sectarian violence and punish its perpetrators, including by making greater efforts to disarm militant 

groups and any religious schools that provide weapons training; 

■ urge the government of Pakistan to rescind the laws targeting Ahmadis, which effectively 

criminalize the public practice of their faith and violate their right to freedom of religion 

guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 

■ urge the government of Pakistan to sign and ratify the International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights; 

■ expand U.S. government contacts beyond the Pakistani government to include a more 

open and public dialogue with a variety of representatives of civil society in Pakistan, 

including groups and political parties that may be critical of the current government;

■ give greater attention and assistance to institutions in Pakistan that are crucial to its democratic development, including and especially the judiciary and the police, which are 

reported to be especially corrupt, ineffective, and lacking accountability, thereby contributing to violations of human rights, including religious freedom, in Pakistan; and 

■ in administering its education assistance to Pakistan, focus more specifically on promoting reform in the state schools, where the State Department reports that textbooks 

regularly include derogatory statements about religious minorities, particularly Jews and 

Hindus, and religious intolerance is presented as acceptable.
Sri Lanka

I

n the past two years, the Commission turned its attention to Sri Lanka in the face of two 

primary concerns: an increasing number of attacks targeting members of religious minorities and churches; and proposed legislation on religious conversion that, if enacted, 

would have violated international law norms and resulted in mandated abuses of freedom of 

thought, conscience, and religion or belief in Sri Lanka. In February 2006, the Commission 

visited Sri Lanka to seek information about reports of growing religious intolerance. The delegation met with Sri Lankan government officials, Members of Parliament, representatives of 

political parties, human rights organizations and other non-governmental groups, and representatives of the Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, and Muslim communities. The Commission 

notes that the proposed legislation on religious conversions has been deferred at the present 

time. Nevertheless, the Commission will continue to monitor the situation in Sri Lanka and 

report on any further attempts to restrict freedom of religion in that country.

Unlike many of the other countries that draw Commission attention, Sri Lanka is, despite years of civil war, a functioning democracy. The constitution of Sri Lanka forthrightly 

guarantees that “Every person is entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.” It also states that “The 

Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be 

the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all religions the 

rights granted” by other articles in the constitution.

There have been an increasing number of violent attacks on churches, ministers, and 

other Christian individuals in the past few years reportedly carried out by members of, or 

persons affiliated with, extremist groups espousing Buddhist nationalism. There are reports 

that in the rural areas churches and individual Christians have been physically assaulted by 

one or more persons or by large groups, particularly for alleged attempts to convert Buddhists to Christianity. The churches are sometimes desecrated and/or burned to the ground. 

Over the past five years, there are reports that approximately 200 attacks have been carried 

out against churches and/or individuals; during the same period, 200 others reportedly 

have received verbal threats. The violence has mainly affected Evangelical churches, but 

other Protestant and Roman Catholic institutions have also been targeted. Although few 

deaths have resulted, dozens of Christian individuals have been injured enough to require 

hospitalization. The violence was reportedly particularly severe in 2003, in response to Buddhist anger and suspicions of foul play over the death in Russia of an esteemed Sri Lankan 

Buddhist monk who in fact died of natural causes. 

Though diminished in number this past year, the attacks have continued. The police sometimes respond quickly to the attacks and on occasion provide extra security for 

churches. Other sources suggest that these actions are pro forma and not effective. For 

example, in January 2006, a mob of about 500 people demonstrated outside a church in 

Bolaththa, just north of Colombo, demanding that the church service cease. Some from 

the mob returned the next day and stoned the house belonging to the pastor, breaking 

several windows. The police were called and when they arrived, rather than arresting 

the perpetrators, they took the pastor to the police station for “discussions”—reportedly 

not an uncommon police response. In February 2006, the pastor of the Dutch Reformed 

Church in the town of Galle, on the country’s southwest coast, reportedly received several 

death threats. There is an as yet unresolved court case against the perpetrator. Reports 

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indicate that even if local authorities have made some effort to hold the perpetrators of 

these attacks to account, these efforts have not been successful in halting the problem. 

The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, who traveled to Sri Lanka 

in May 2005, concluded in her report that, with regard to acts of religious violence or intolerance by non-state actors, the Sri Lankan government’s obligation to promptly investigate and prosecute all perpetrators has not “been satisfactorily fulfilled.” This problem 

is compounded by the fact that due to wider, more chronic deficiencies in the judicial 

system in Sri Lanka, including corruption, a lack of police training, and inadequate infrastructure, arresting perpetrators and moving them through the criminal court system is 

a serious problem, regardless of the crime involved.

In 2004, two draft laws purporting to restrict religious conversion and the act of attempting to convert another person were circulated in Sri Lanka. The first was a private 

member’s bill drafted by the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) party comprised of nationalistminded Buddhist monks, targeting “forced” conversions; the second was a bill proposed by 

the government, a much stricter bill that essentially prohibited any and all attempts to convert another person—even 

inadvertently. In July 2004, the government’s bill was sent 

to committee for re-drafting. The JHU bill was tabled that 

same month and sent for analysis on its constitutionality to 

the Supreme Court, where over 20 challenging petitions had 

been filed. In August 2004, Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court ruled 

that certain clauses of the JHU bill violated several articles of 

the constitution. As a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling, 

in order for it now to become law, the bill in its entire form 

would require a two-thirds majority in the parliament and 

the approval of the people of Sri Lanka in a referendum. 

In March 2005, the JHU again introduced legislation 

on conversions. Called “Bill on the Prohibition of Forcible 

Conversions,” the legislation was the same as that tabled the 

previous year, including the provisions of that bill that had been found unconstitutional 

by the Supreme Court. This bill against religious conversions would have: (1) provided for 

prison terms of up to five years for anyone who attempted to convert a person from one 

religion to another by “the use of force or by allurement or by any fraudulent means,” with 

the terms “fraud” and “allurement” vaguely defined such that many charitable activities 

could be included; (2) established reporting requirements for any person who adopts a new 

religion as well as for any person who takes part “directly or indirectly” in the conversion 

of another person, requiring individuals to inform government authorities of their action 

or face the threat of jail time and fines upon conviction; and (3) provided an opportunity 

for “any interested person” having “reason to believe” a violation of the act to bring cases 

in the public interest. According to the UN Special Rapporteur, the proposed law was not 

“an appropriate response to the religious tensions and is not compatible with international 

human rights laws.” 

The JHU bill was sent to a parliamentary Standing Committee for discussion. After 

elections in November 2005, newly-elected President Mohinda Rajapaksa prorogued parliament, thereby annulling all bills going through any stage of the process of being enacted 

by parliament, including the JHU’s bill on religious conversion. 

Commission meets with members of the Jathika Hela Urumaya 

(JHU) Party in Sri Lanka
211

In September 2005, the JHU put forward a proposed amendment to the constitution 

that would make Buddhism the official religion of Sri Lanka. Article 9.1 of the proposed 

amendment stated that “The Official Religion of the Republic is Buddhism. Other forms of 

religions and worship may be practiced in peace and harmony with Buddha Sasana.” The 

establishment of one religious community as a country’s official religion is permitted under 

international standards for freedom of religion or belief, and thus is not, in and of itself, problematic. However, two other articles in the proposed amendment were particularly troubling. 

Article 9.4 required that the inhabitants of Sri Lanka “professing Buddhism are bound to bring 

up their children in the same”; Article 9.5 stated that it is prohibited to convert “a Buddhist 

into other forms of worship or to spread other forms of worship among the Buddhists.” Both 

of these proposed articles, if enacted, would be in clear violation of international standards 

with regard to freedom of religion or belief. The proposed amendment was later found by the 

Sri Lankan Supreme Court to be “inconsistent” with the national constitution.

In the past few years, there have been reports, particularly in the period immediately 

after the December 2004 “tsunami” disaster, of some groups and individuals engaging in efforts to encourage people to convert—reportedly amounting to “unethical” practices—that 

are said to have led to increased tensions among religious communities in Sri Lanka. Some 

in Sri Lanka suggest that the anti-conversion legislation came about in response to these 

reports. These allegations have included, for example, the offering of money, employment, 

access to education or health care, or some other material good as an incentive to convert or 

join a particular church, taking advantage chiefly of the poorest people among Sri Lanka’s 

population. Though there have been allegations, concrete evidence of any such practices 

has not been found. However, some involved in evangelizing activities have also been accused of denigrating Sri Lanka’s other religious communities by referring to those religions 

as evil, pagan, or unworthy of consideration, and thereby sowing contention and even violence among religious groups. 

Religious communities in Sri Lanka must register either as a corporation, which 

enables them to be treated as a corporate entity in financial and real estate transactions, 

or as a charitable organization, which entitles them to some tax exemptions. In 2003, 

the Sri Lankan Supreme Court denied the incorporation petition of a Roman Catholic 

group, the Teaching Sisters of the Holy Cross of the Third Order of Saint Francis, claiming that incorporation is impermissible if the group is engaging in proselytization and 

providing material benefit. The group took their petition to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), a treaty body, which in November 2005 decided in the group’s favor. The 

HRC found that articles 18 and 26 (non-discrimination) of the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights had been violated. It stated that the grounds advanced by 

the Supreme Court and the government of Sri Lanka in support of the restrictions were 

insufficient to demonstrate that these restrictions were necessary to further one or more 

of the limitations on rights permitted by the Covenant.

In addition to the February 2006 visit to Sri Lanka, the Commission issued a statement in July 2005 expressing concern about growing religious intolerance in Sri Lanka, particularly the ongoing violence against religious minorities and the proposed bill 

addressing forced religious conversions. In September 2005, the Commission issued a 

statement about the proposed amendment to the constitution, expressing concern about 

articles in the amendment discussed above that would have violated the internationally 

guaranteed rights primarily of members of the majority Buddhist community as well as 

minority religious groups. 

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Cuba 

Religious belief and practice continue to be tightly controlled in Cuba. Religious freedom conditions have been affected in part by the ongoing government crackdown on 

democracy and free speech activists, resulting in a generally deteriorating situation 

for human rights. In the past year, a new law on religion meant to “legalize” house churches 

has also affected religious freedom and reinforced the government’s efforts to increase its 

control over religious practice. The Commission continues to place Cuba on its Watch List, 

and will monitor conditions of freedom of religion or belief in Cuba to determine if they 

rise to a level warranting designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

Cuba remains a hard-line authoritarian state, with a human rights record that, after 

deteriorating significantly in 2003, continued to be poor through 2005. Since seizing power 

in 1959, President Fidel Castro has maintained strong, centralized control of all facets of life 

in Cuba. While parliamentary, judicial, and executive institutions exist in name, all are under 

his control, and there is no legal or political avenue of dissent. Individuals who engage in dissent are harassed, jailed, and mistreated in prison. In February 2003, the Cuban government 

initiated an extensive crackdown on democracy activists, including those supporting the Varela Project and the Christian Liberation Movement. The Varela Project was a referendum 

calling for economic and political reforms submitted to the Cuban government in 2002 and 

2003. Although allowed under the constitution, the petition resulted in a serious government 

crackdown on human rights activists, journalists, leaders of independent labor unions, and 

political opponents, many of whom were arrested and convicted on charges of violating national security and aiding a foreign power. Seventy-five human rights activists were arrested 

and sentenced in 2003; about 60 of the 75 were still in prison at the end of 2005. The crackdowns have continued, and several more human rights activists have been imprisoned in the 

past two years. In response to the Varela Project, the Cuban National Assembly unanimously 

passed an amendment making socialism the irrevocable basis of the constitution. 

Since Castro came to power, the communist government has sought to suppress religious belief and practice because it was “counterrevolutionary.” During the early years of the 

Castro regime, government and Communist Party officials forced priests, pastors, and other 

religious leaders into labor camps or exile and systematically discriminated against those who 

openly professed religious belief by excluding them from certain jobs or educational opportunities. In the past decade, however, the state instituted a limited rapprochement with religious 

believers, and it seemed as though conditions might improve. For example, the government 

abandoned its official policy of atheism in the early 1990s. Castro welcomed a visit from Pope 

John Paul II in 1998 and visited Havana’s Jewish Community Center for its Hanukah celebration that same year. In 2000, religious holidays were reinstated and members of Cuba’s Jewish 

▲ Cuba

Western

Hemisphere
community were allowed to emigrate to Israel. The Pope’s visit, in particular, sparked great hopes within the religious communities in Cuba, as well as among democracy activists, who 

viewed these steps as a softening of past government policies. 

Yet, despite optimism that religious freedom conditions would improve, violations have continued, as has the 

government’s strong degree of control and generally hostile 

attitude toward religion. Although the Cuban government 

seeks to project the image that the right to religious freedom 

is respected, in fact, government authorities continue to view 

the influence of religion as a threat to the ideology of Castro’s 

revolution. In early 2001, the Communist Party in Havana 

prepared a report that criticized inroads made by churches, 

particularly the Roman Catholic Church, into Cuban society, and asserted that the social work of the churches violated 

the law. Communist Party officials reportedly apologized to 

the Catholic Church hierarchy after the report was leaked. 

Nevertheless, Havana’s Catholic Cardinal gave an interview 

in 2003 in which he asserted that “restrictions on religious 

freedom are returning” in Cuba, and that they represent a 

“return to the ideology of repression.” After visiting Cuba 

in spring 2004, a British religious advocacy organization reported a marked shift in government propaganda towards 

a communist orthodoxy, including an assault on religious 

freedom and related human rights. The U.S. Conference of 

Catholic Bishops reported that despite international pressure and the Pope’s visit, human rights and religious freedom 

conditions appeared to worsen in the past year. 

The government’s main interaction with, and control of, 

religious denominations is through the Office of Religious Affairs of the Cuban Communist Party. The Cuban government 

also requires churches and other religious groups to register 

with the relevant provincial office of the Registry of Associations 

within the Ministry of Justice. According to the State Department, the Cuban government is most tolerant of religious groups 

that maintain “close relations” with the state or those who “often 

supported government policies.” Currently, there are approximately 50 state-recognized religious groups, primarily Christian denominations, half of which are members of the government-recognized Cuban Council of Churches. Reportedly, the 

government in recent years has not granted recognition to any 

relatively new denominations, although it has tolerated the presence of some new groups, such as the Baha’is and the Church of 

Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, though they are not officially 

registered. Conditions for Jehovah’s Witnesses have improved 

substantially since 2004; however, there were sporadic reports of 

harassment and discrimination by local Communist Party and 

COUNTRY REPORTS: WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Although the Cuban government 

seeks to project the image that the 

right to religious freedom is respected, in fact, government authorities continue to view the influence of religion as a threat to 

the ideology of Castro’s revolution. 

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government officials. For example, in 2005, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses reported being 

denied employment in a government-run factory due to her religious beliefs. Nevertheless, such 

reports continued to decline in number. 

In recent years, the Cuban government has rarely permitted the construction of new 

places of worship, forcing religious groups that are not recognized, or those without adequate space, to meet in private homes or other similar accommodations, commonly known 

as “house churches.” Permission for such meetings is frequently denied to those outside 

the recognized religious faiths and to those the government deems to be “an independent 

religious movement” (i.e. not recognized or hostile to government policies). If a complaint 

is made against a house church meeting, it can be broken up and the attendees imprisoned. 

The Cuban government did permit the opening of Russian Orthodox and Greek Orthodox 

Churches in 2004, which the official media declared to be evidence of the Cuban government’s religious tolerance.

A new law went into effect in September 2005 requiring all house churches to register in order to legalize previously unauthorized groups. Put into effect as Directive 43 and 

Resolution 46, the new law has increased concerns primarily amongst Protestant religious 

groups, many of which hold unauthorized religious meetings in private homes several times 

per week. Once authorization is formally refused, the members of the house church are not 

permitted to meet at the same house. Reportedly, at least three Protestant house churches 

have been closed, confiscated, and/or demolished since the new law went into effect. However, there is no evidence that the new legislation has resulted in a wider crackdown on 

house churches thus far. In order to legalize a house church, the new law requires that there 

may be no more than three meetings at the house per week; the house church cannot be 

within two kilometers of another house church of the same denomination; and detailed information on the number of members, when services will be held, and the names and ages 

of the inhabitants of the house must be provided. The new requirements also prohibit the 

participation of non-Cubans without government permission and foreigners are prohibited 

altogether in the mountainous regions. 

In the past year, both registered and unregistered religious groups continued to experience varying degrees of 

official interference, harassment, and repression. The State 

Department reports that Cuban Interior Ministry officials 

regularly engage in efforts to control and monitor the country’s religious institutions, including through surveillance, 

infiltration, and harassment of religious clerics and laypersons. Protestant house churches continued to be harassed 

and evangelical denominations reported evictions from 

houses used for worship (most of which were unauthorized 

and thus illegal). In March 2006, an evangelical pastor was 

jailed, allegedly for aiding emigrants who sought to leave the 

country illegally. However, sources inside the country contend he was targeted for openly challenging the government 

on religious freedom issues. In many churches, officials reportedly continue to monitor sermons and sit behind the wives of political prisoners in 

order to intimidate them. The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops reports that monitoring 

of church services and harassment of parishioners has continued in the last year. In January 

2004, a Ministry of Interior official revealed in an interview that government infiltration of 

Cathedral in Havana
215

civil and religious organizations is widespread. Afro-Caribbean religious groups are reportedly more heavily targeted than political opposition organizations because some estimates 

indicate that 70 percent of the population engages in at least some religious practices associated with these groups, presenting a more grassroots threat to the government. According 

to the State Department, in the past year, independent Santeria priests have been threatened 

and pressured to assimilate into the government-sanctioned Yoruba Cultural Association. 

Other means by which the government restricts religious practice include: enforcement of a regulation that prevents any Cuban or joint enterprise, except those with specific 

authorization, from selling computers, facsimile machines, photocopiers, or other equipment to any church other than at the official—i.e. exorbitant—retail prices; an almost total 

state monopoly on printing presses; a prohibition on private religious schools; limitations 

on the entry of foreign religious workers; denial of Internet access to religious organizations; restrictions on making repairs to church buildings; and the denial of religious literature such as Bibles to persons in prison. Additionally, there is a requirement that religious 

groups receive permission from local Communist Party officials before being allowed to 

hold processions or events outside of religious buildings. Refusal of such permission is 

often based on the decision of individual government officials rather than the law. In 2005, 

the Catholic Church decided to stop seeking permits for religious processions in some 

areas and one Catholic publication ceased printing, reportedly under government pressure. Cuban authorities also continue to deny or revoke visa authorization for religious 

workers whose activities are deemed too visible or whose opinions are viewed as contrary 

to government policy. 

Commission Recommendations

With regard to Cuba, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government should:

■ continue to raise religious freedom and other human rights violations in multilateral 

fora, including the Organization of American States and the UN, and encourage the government of Cuba to respond to and initiate a dialogue with the UN Special Representative of the High Commissioner on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in 

Cuba; and 

■ use all diplomatic means to urge the Cuban government to undertake the following measures that would help bring Cuba into compliance with its international legal obligations 

with respect to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief:

● order, publicly and officially, the state security agencies to end the instigation of mob violence against religious persons and other human rights activists, including those recently 

released from prison; the mistreatment of indigenous religious communities; and the harassment of the spouses of imprisoned human rights activists during religious services;

● revise government Directive 43 and Resolution 46 restricting religious services in homes or 

other personal property, as well as other national laws and regulations on religious activities, to bring them into conformance with international standards on freedom of religion 

or belief; 

● cease interference in the internal affairs of religious communities, such as denials of visas 

to religious workers, limitations on freedom of movement of religious workers, infiltration 

and intimidation of religious communities, arbitrary prevention of religious ceremonies 

and processions, and attempted interference in the elections in religious bodies; and

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● take immediate steps to end restrictions on religious activities protected by international 

treaties and covenants including: 

■ ending the practice of arbitrarily denying registration to religious groups, as 

well as detaining or harassing members of religious groups and interfering 

with religious activities because of that unregistered status; 

■ issuing permits for construction of new places of worship; 

■ ending the practice of evictions and requisition of personal property of 

religious individuals or communities without due process, restitution, 

or provision of alternative accommodation; 

■ providing the right to conduct religious education and distribute religious materials; and 

■ lifting restrictions on humanitarian, medical, charitable, or social service 

work provided by religious communities and protecting such activities in 

Cuban law.
217

Appendix 1

Biographies of Members of the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom

Michael Cromartie, Chair

Michael Cromartie is the Chair of the 

Commission. He is Vice President of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, 

D.C., where he directs the Evangelicals in 

Civic Life program and the Media and Religion program. He is also a Senior Advisor to 

The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 

in Washington. The Ethics and Public Policy 

Center was established in 1976 to clarify and 

reinforce the bond between the Judeo-Christian moral tradition and domestic and foreign policy issues. 

Mr. Cromartie has contributed book 

reviews and articles to First Things, Books 

and Culture, The Washington Times, The Reformed Journal, Insight, Christianity Today, 

Stewardship Journal, and World. He is the 

editor of 14 books on religion and politics 

including, most recently, “Religion, Culture, 

and International Conflict: A Conversation,” “Religion and Politics in America: A Conversation,” “A Public Faith: Evangelicals and Civic Engagement,” “A Preserving Grace: Protestants, Catholics, and Natural Law,” “Caesar’s Coin Revisited: Christians and the Limits 

of Government,” “Creation at Risk: Religion, Science, and Environmentalism,” “The Nine 

Lives of Population Control,” “Disciples and Democracy: Religious Conservatives and the 

Future of American Politics,” “Might and Right After the Cold War,” “No Longer Exiles: The 

Religious Right in American Politics,” “Piety and Politics: Evangelicals and Fundamentalists 

Confront the World,” “Peace Betrayed: Essays on Pacifism and Politics,” and “Evangelicals 

and Foreign Policy.” 

He is the host of Radio America’s weekly show “Faith and Life,” an adjunct professor 

at Reformed Theological Seminary, an advisory editor at Christianity Today, on the Board 

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of Directors of Mars Hill Audio, and was an advisor to the PBS documentary series “With 

God on Our Side: The Rise of the Christian Right in America.” 

Frequently asked to explicate the dynamics between religious faith and political convictions, Mr. Cromartie has been interviewed on numerous radio and television programs, 

including National Public Radio, CNN, ABC News, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, MSNBC, PBS and quoted frequently in the Washington Post, New York Times, The New Republic, 

Christianity Today, Time, the National Catholic Reporter and U.S. News and World Report. 

He holds an M.A. in Justice from The American University and a B.A. from Covenant College in Georgia. He is married to Jennifer Seel Cromartie and they have three children, 

Ethan, Eric, and Heather.

Commissioner Cromartie was appointed by President George W. Bush.

Felice D. Gaer, Vice Chair

Felice D. Gaer has served on the Commission 

since 2001. She is currently a Vice Chair of the Commission. She was Chair from June 2002 to June 2003, 

Vice Chair 2004 to the present, and a member of the 

Commission’s Executive Committee from September 

2001 to June 2002. 

Ms. Gaer, a human rights specialist, is Director 

of the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement 

of Human Rights of the American Jewish Committee. 

The Institute, founded in 1971, works creatively to 

enrich thinking, discourse, and action for the protection of international human rights for all. 

She is Vice President of the Committee Against 

Torture (CAT), a United Nations human rights treaty 

body composed of 10 individuals elected as independent experts. The Committee reviews reports by governments on their compliance with the Convention Against Torture, a treaty ratified by 

over 130 countries, and considers individual communications about alleged violations of 

the Convention. Nominated by the United States, elected in 1999, and again in 2003, she is 

the first American to serve on the Committee. Ms. Gaer is the CAT’s Special Rapporteur on 

Follow Up to country reports on compliance with the convention. 

Ms. Gaer was appointed as a public member of nine U.S. delegations to UN human 

rights negotiations between 1993 and 1999, including the UN Commission on Human 

Rights, the World Conference on Women, and the World Conference on Human Rights. 

Ms. Gaer was cited as “the American Jewish international human rights expert” in 

the November 2002 and November 2003 lists of the “Forward Fifty,” in which The Forward

newspaper’s editorial board commended her for addressing major human rights issues 

“long before they bubble to the surface” and remarked that “during the last 20 years, no 

communal official has accumulated such a wealth of experience and contacts with activists, 

governments, and the United Nations in the field of human rights.” 
219

She is also Vice President of the International League for Human Rights and a member of the Board of Directors of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation and the Eleanor Roosevelt 

Center at Valkill. She is a member of the Advisory Committee of Human Rights Watch’s 

Europe and Central Asia division and a member of the Human Rights Executive Directors 

Leadership Group. Ms. Gaer is a frequent author on international human rights topics, including reforming the United Nations, advancing the human rights of women, the role of 

non-governmental organizations, and related topics. 

In 1995, she was awarded the Alumnae Achievement Award from Wellesley College, 

from which she received an A.B. (with honors). She also received advanced degrees from 

Columbia University in political science (Masters of Philosophy; Master of Arts) and a Certificate from the Russian Institute. 

Commissioner Gaer was appointed by House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA).

Nina Shea, Vice Chair

Since 1999, Nina Shea has served as a Commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom and, in 2003 and 2004, she was elected 

a Vice Chair of the Commission. 

Ms. Shea has been an international human 

rights lawyer for 25 years, and for 20 years she has focused specifically on the issue of religious freedom in 

American foreign policy as the director of the Center 

for Religious Freedom, a division of Freedom House, 

America’s oldest human rights group.

She is a co-author of a newly-released book on 

governance by extreme sharia, Radical Islam’s Rules

(Rowman & Littlefield) and the author of a widely acclaimed book on anti-Christian persecution 

around the world entitled In the Lion’s Den (Broadman & Holman Publishers). In 2005, she edited a 

path-breaking report on publications by the government of Saudi Arabia promoting an 

ideology of hate in America. Ms. Shea has been one of the activists at the forefront of a 

movement to make religious freedom abroad a U.S. foreign policy priority. It was a conference that Ms. Shea organized under Freedom House auspices in January 1996 that brought 

100 top Christian leaders together for the first time to address the issue of worldwide antiChristian persecution. This marked the beginning of an interfaith coalition she has played 

a key leadership role in that has turned into a nationwide movement to advance religious 

freedom worldwide. In a profile of her, Newsweek magazine credited her with “making 

Christian persecution Washington’s hottest cause.” The Far Eastern Economic Review cited 

Nina Shea as one of the “leading voices in the fight to put religious persecution at the center of U.S.-China relations.”

Ms. Shea has organized and sponsored numerous fact-finding missions to Iraq, Sudan, Nigeria, China, Egypt and elsewhere and has testified before Congress on these and 

other governments. She has written and contributed to articles in The New York Times, 

Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, National Review, The Weekly Standard, The New 

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Republic and numerous other publications. She has been a guest on hundreds of talk shows 

on Christian radio and has appeared on Fox, CBS, ABC and PBS news programs, as well as 

numerous religious broadcasts.

In 2001, Ms. Shea was appointed by President Bush to serve on the U.S. delegation to 

the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. During the Clinton Administration, she 

had also served on the Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad to the U.S. Secretary of State and for one year as a U.S. delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights.

She graduated from Smith College and American University Law School and has an 

honorary degree from Alvernia Franciscan College in Reading, PA. She is a dame of the 

Knights of Malta.

Commissioner Shea was appointed by Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-IL).

Preeta D. Bansal

Preeta D. Bansal is a partner at Skadden, Arps, 

Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP in New York City, where 

she concentrates on appellate litigation and complex 

legal issues as well as First Amendment and technology-related matters. She has represented leading Wall 

Street financial institutions and international corporations in significant appellate matters raising novel 

issues of broad legal and practical impact. 

Ms. Bansal served as the Solicitor General of 

the State of New York during New York Attorney 

General Eliot Spitzer’s first term. As Solicitor General, 

Ms. Bansal argued cases in the United States Supreme 

Court, the en banc Second Circuit, and the New York 

State Court of Appeals on behalf of the State of New 

York. She directly supervised 45 lawyers in the Solicitor General’s Office who filed 40 to 50 appellate briefs 

each week, and she helped oversee and coordinate the 

significant legal positions of the 600 lawyers as well as the amicus strategy of the Attorney 

General’s Office. She initiated organizational and managerial reforms to improve the quality, efficiency, accountability and transparency of the Solicitor General’s office. During her 

tenure, the New York Attorney General’s Office and she received the “Best United States 

Supreme Court Brief ” award from the National Association of Attorneys General in 1999 

for the first time and then again in each subsequent year of her leadership.

Ms. Bansal is a magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Harvard-Radcliffe College and a magna cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School, where she was Supervising 

Editor of the Harvard Law Review. She was a law clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens of the 

U.S. Supreme Court and to then-Chief Judge James L. Oakes of the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit. She served in the Clinton Administration from 1993-1996, as a 

Special Counsel in the White House and as a Counselor in the U.S. Justice Department. She 

has taught constitutional law and First Amendment law, and was a Visiting Fellow at the 

Institute of Politics at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. 
221

The New York Times profiled Ms. Bansal and called her a “legal superstar.” The New 

York Law Journal referred to her as “one of the most gifted lawyers of her generation, who 

combines a brilliant analytical mind with solid, mature judgment.” She has appeared as a 

commentator on legal issues and U.S. Supreme Court matters on CNN, CSPAN, and PBS 

news programs, and has authored and co-authored scholarly articles published in the Harvard Law Review, Yale Law Journal, the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, and the Villanova Law Review. She has published op-eds in the New York 

Times, Washington Post, and Dallas Morning News. 

Currently, in addition to her private law practice and service on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, she is a Commissioner on New York City Mayor 

Bloomberg’s bipartisan Election Modernization Task Force; a Trustee of the national Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; an Advisory Board Member of the Clinton 

Global Initiative; and a Board Member of the New York City Bar Justice Center. She cochairs the Appellate Committee of the Commercial and Federal Litigation of the New York 

State Bar Association, and also chairs a special statewide Task Force on State Court Appeals 

designed to improve the quality of appellate justice in New York State.

Commissioner Bansal was appointed by former Senate Minority Leader Thomas 

Daschle (D-SD) and served as Chair of the Commission in 2004-2005.

The Most Reverend Charles J. Chaput

The Most Reverend Charles J. Chaput, Archbishop of Denver, was born September 26, 1944, in 

Concordia, Kansas, the son of Joseph and Marian 

DeMarais Chaput. He attended Our Lady of Perpetual Help Grade School in Concordia and St. Francis 

Seminary High School in Victoria, Kansas. He joined 

the Order of Friars Minor Capuchin, St. Augustine 

Province, in 1965.

After earning a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy from St. Fidelis College Seminary in Herman, 

Pennsylvania, in 1967, Archbishop Chaput completed Studies in Psychology at Catholic University 

in Washington, D.C., in 1969. He earned a Master of 

Arts in Religious Education from Capuchin College 

in Washington, D.C., in 1970 and was ordained to the priesthood on August 29, 1970.

Archbishop Chaput received a Master of Arts in Theology from the University of San 

Francisco in 1971. He served as an instructor in theology and spiritual director at St. Fidelis 

from 1971-1974 and as executive secretary and director of communications for the Capuchin Province of St. Augustine in Pittsburgh from 1974-1977.

In 1977, Archbishop Chaput became pastor of Holy Cross Parish in Thornton, Colorado, and vicar provincial for the Capuchin Province of Mid-America. He was named secretary and treasurer for the province in 1980, and he became chief executive officer and 

provincial minister three years later.

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Archbishop Chaput was ordained Bishop of Rapid City, South Dakota, on July 26, 

1988. Pope John Paul II appointed him Archbishop of Denver on February 18, 1997.

Archbishop Chaput was appointed by President George W. Bush.

Dr. Khaled M. Abou El Fadl

Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl has been described as 

the most important and influential Islamic thinker in 

the modern age. He is currently a Full Professor of 

Law at the UCLA School of Law. He was also a Visiting Professor at Yale Law School, where he taught 

National Security law, Islamic law and Immigration 

law. Dr. Abou El Fadl holds degrees from Yale University, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and 

Princeton University. An Islamic jurist and scholar, 

Sheikh Abou El Fadl received formal training in Islamic jurisprudence in Egypt and Kuwait. 

A world-renowned expert in Islamic law and 

an American lawyer, Dr. Abou El Fadl is a strong proponent of human rights and is on the Board of Directors of Human Rights Watch. He regularly serves 

as an expert in a wide variety of cases ranging from human rights and political asylum to 

international and commercial law.

Dr. Abou El Fadl is a prolific author and prominent public intellectual on Islamic 

law and Islam and is most noted for his scholarly approach to Islam from a moral point of 

view. He writes extensively on universal themes of morality and humanity, and the notion 

of beauty as a moral value. Dr. Abou El Fadl is a staunch advocate and defender of women’s 

rights, and focuses much of his written attention on issues related to women. As the most 

critical and powerful voice against puritan and Wahhabi Islam today, he regularly appears 

on national and international television and radio, and is published and cited extensively in 

all media venues. His most recent works focus on issues of authority, terrorism, tolerance, 

Islam, and Islamic law. His newest book, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, was published in 2005 by HarperSanFrancisco.

Other books by Dr. Abou El Fadl include: Conference of the Books: The Search for Beauty in Islam (University Press of America/Rowman and Littlefield, 2001); And God Knows 

the Soldiers: The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourses (UPA/Rowman and 

Littlefield, 2001); Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women (Oneworld 

Press, Oxford, 2001); Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 

2001); The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Beacon Press, 2002); and Islam and the Challenge of 

Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2004). Other forthcoming books include: Reasoning with God: Rationality and Thought in Islam (Oneworld Press, Oxford) and Jihad in Islam

(Cambridge University Press).

Commissioner Abou El Fadl was appointed by President George W. Bush.
223

Dr. Richard D. Land

Dr. Richard D. Land has served as president of the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission since 1988. 

During his tenure as spokesman on Capitol 

Hill for the largest Protestant denomination in 

the country, Dr. Land has represented Southern Baptists’ interests in Congress, before U.S. 

Presidents, and in the major media.

In February, 2005, Dr. Land was featured 

in Time magazine as one of “The Twenty-five 

Most Influential Evangelicals in America.” In 

May 2004, Land was recognized by the National Journal as one of the 10 top church-state 

experts “politicians will call on when they get 

serious about addressing an important public 

policy issue.” 

He is the host of two nationally syndicated radio programs, For Faith & Family and For Faith & Family’s Insight. The For Faith & 

Family Broadcast Ministry is heard by more than 1.5 million listeners each week on over 600 

radio stations across the country and throughout the world on the Internet. Richard Land 

Live! is Land’s latest radio initiative and it is syndicated on the Salem Radio Network. Most 

recently, he has authored Imagine! A God-Blessed America, and Real Homeland Security: The 

America God Will Bless (Broadman & Holman Publishers), and is also Executive Editor of 

Faith & Family Values, a national magazine. 

Commissioner Land was appointed by Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN).

Dr. Elizabeth H. Prodromou

Elizabeth H. Prodromou is Asst. Professor in the 

Department of International Relations at Boston University, where she is also the Associate Director of the Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs. Dr. Prodromou holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute 

of Technology. Dr. Prodromou’s publications include 

“Negotiating Pluralism and Specifying Modernity in 

Greece: Reading Church-State Relations in the Christodoulos Period” (Social Compass: 2005); “Religious Pluralism in 21st-Century America: Problematizing the 

Implications for Orthodox Christianity” (Journal of the 

American Academy of Religion: 2004); “Christianity and 

Democracy: the Ambivalent Orthodox” (Journal of Democracy: 2004); “God Is Not Neutral: Religion and US 

Foreign Policy After 9/11” (Orbis: 2004); “Reintegrating 

Cyprus: the Need for a New Approach (Survival: 1998); “The Perception Paradox of PostCold War Security in Greece” (The Greek Paradox, Promise vs. Performance, G. Allison & K. 

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Nicolaidis, eds.: 1997); “Paradigms, Power and Identity: Rediscovering Religion and Regionalizing Europe” (European Journal of Political Research: 1996). She is currently working on a 

book on “Orthodox Christianity in American Public Life: The Challenges and Opportunities 

of Religious Pluralism in the 21st Century.” 

A regional expert on Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, Dr. Prodromou has been an invited policy consultant in the U.S. and Europe, and has received academic 

awards and grants from Harvard University, New York University, and Princeton University. 

Dr. Prodromou holds a Ph.D. and an M.S. in political science from the Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology (MIT), as well as an M.A.L.D. from The Fletcher School of Law and 

Diplomacy and a B.A. in International Relations and History from Tufts University. She is 

married and has a daughter.

Commissioner Prodromou was appointed by House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA).

The Most Reverend Bishop Ricardo 

Ramírez, C.S.B.

The Most Reverend Ricardo Ramírez, C.S.B., 

is currently Bishop of Las Cruces, New Mexico. He 

was ordained to the priesthood in 1966. Bishop 

Ramírez was named Titular Bishop of Vatarba and 

Auxiliary Bishop of San Antonio in 1981. In 1982 he 

became the first Bishop of the Diocese of Las Cruces, 

New Mexico. He holds a B.A. from the University of 

St. Thomas, in Houston, Texas, an M.A. from the 

University of Detroit, Michigan, a Doctor of Laws 

honoris causa from Neumann College, Wichita, 

Kansas, a Doctor of Divinity honoris causa from the 

University of St. Michael’s College, Toronto, Canada, and a Doctor of Humane Letters honoris causa

from Siena Heights University, Adrian, Michigan. 

Bishop Ramírez attended St. Basil’s Seminary in Toronto, Canada, Seminario Conciliar in 

Mexico City, Mexico, and the East Asian Pastoral Institute in Manila, Philippines.

Bishop Ramírez currently serves as a Member of the New Mexico Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; the Catholic Church Extension Society 

Board; Episcopal Advisor of the Institute for Hispanic Liturgy; Episcopal Moderator of the 

Asociación Nacional de Sacerdotes Hispanos (ANSH); Member of the U.S. Conference of 

Catholic Bishops’ (USCCB) International Policy Committee; USCCB Committee on the 

Liturgy; Member of the Committee on the Catholic Common Ground Initiative; and Consultant of the USCCB Committee on Hispanic Affairs. He has also served as a member of 

the U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad; chairman 

of the USCCB’s Catholic Campaign for Human Development; and chairman of the USCCB 

Committee for the Church in Latin America. He served as administrative secretary for the 

Comisión para el Estudio de la Historia la Iglesia en Latinoamérica (Commission for the 

Study of the History of the Church in Latin America). Bishop Ramírez was also elected as 

delegate for the United States at the 1997 Vatican Synod for America.

Bishop Ramirez was appointed by former Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD).
225

Ambassador John V. Hanford III

Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom

In May 2002, John V. Hanford III was sworn in 

as the second U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom. This position, created by the 

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), is 

charged with promoting religious freedom worldwide, 

promoting reconciliation in those areas where conflict 

has been implemented along religious lines, and making 

sure that this issue is woven into the fabric of U.S. foreign policy. Ambassador Hanford serves as an Ex-Officio member of the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom.

Ambassador Hanford, originally from Salisbury, 

North Carolina, attended the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill on a John Motley 

Morehead Scholarship (BA in Economics) and holds a Master of Divinity degree from the 

Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary in South Hamilton, Massachusetts.

For the past 15 years, Ambassador Hanford has served as an expert on international 

religious freedom while working as a Congressional Fellow on the staff of Senator Richard 

Lugar (R-Indiana). During that time, he worked at the forefront of efforts to mobilize strong 

and compassionate intervention through U.S. governmental channels on behalf of persons 

persecuted for their religious beliefs. Ambassador Hanford and Senator Lugar have led numerous efforts in Congress to address some of the world’s most severe problems of religious 

persecution. Their initiatives have rallied Senators, Members of Congress, Presidents, and 

Secretaries of State in successful interventions to halt execution orders, secure the cessation 

of torture or harassment on religious grounds, gain the release of religious prisoners, or oppose the policies of governments which repress religious freedom.

In 1998, Ambassador Hanford spearheaded a bipartisan congressional effort to develop a strong and responsible U.S. policy on international religious freedom. Ambassador Hanford organized and led the group of offices that co-authored the IRFA. He worked 

closely with the IRFA’s chief sponsor, Senator Don Nickles, and his staff in guiding IRFA 

through the legislative process to a unanimous (98-0) Senate vote and a unanimous voice 

vote in the House of Representatives. IRFA ensures U.S. vigilance and an ongoing process 

of effective action in addressing religious persecution overseas. IRFA is regarded as one of 

Congress’s most significant legislative achievements in human rights. Since the passage of 

IRFA, the U.S. government’s attention to problems of religious persecution has increased 

significantly. On this and other projects, Ambassador Hanford has worked closely with a 

broad spectrum of human rights and religious organizations at home and abroad.

Prior to his work in the Senate, Ambassador Hanford served in pastoral ministry on 

the staff of West Hopewell Presbyterian Church in Hopewell, Virginia. Hanford is married 

to Laura Bryant Hanford.

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Joseph R. Crapa, Executive Director

Joseph R. Crapa, the Commission’s Executive Director, joined the Commission in November 2002. Prior to coming to the Commission, Mr. 

Crapa served as Chief of Staff to Senator Charles 

E. Schumer, the senior Senator from New York. 

Before that, Mr. Crapa spent four years as an official in the Executive Branch from 1997-2001, 

where he was nominated by President Clinton 

and confirmed by the Senate to serve as an Assistant Administrator at the U.S. Agency for International Development. He also held the prior positions of Assistant Secretary at the Department 

of Agriculture and Associate Administrator at 

the Environmental Protection Agency where his 

portfolio included Congressional Relations and 

Public Affairs.

Mr. Crapa has extensive experience dealing with foreign and domestic policy issues. 

For ten years he served as Chief of Staff to Rep. David Obey (D-WI), the Chairman and currently Ranking Member of the House Appropriations Committee, and also as counsel to the 

House Appropriations Committee. He was an Adjunct Professor of Government at Georgetown University (1990-1995) and was chosen as a Stennis Fellow of Congress (1995-1997) 

and continues as a Senior Fellow and Mentor. He also is a Lecturer for the Washington Campus, a consortium of universities where he lectures on Congress and the policy process.

Mr. Crapa graduated from Cathedral College Preparatory Seminary, received a B.A. 

from St. John’s University, went on to earn his M.A. from Duke University, and his Ph.D. at 

the University of Arizona where he was a National Defense Teaching Fellow.
227

Appendix 2

The International Religious Freedom Act of 19981

Selected Provisions

Section 3. Definitions (22 U.S.C. § 6402)

(11) PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term 

“particularly severe violations of religious freedom’’ means systematic, ongoing, egregious 

violations of religious freedom, including violations such as—

(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;

(B) prolonged detention without charges;

(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of those 

persons; or

(D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons. 

(13) VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term ``violations of religious freedom’’ means violations of the internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and 

religious belief and practice, as set forth in the international instruments referred to in section 2(a)(2) and as described in section 2(a)(3), including violations such as—

(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for—

(i) assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, including arbitrary registration requirements;

(ii) speaking freely about one’s religious beliefs;

(iii) changing one’s religious beliefs and affiliation;

(iv) possession and distribution of religious literature, including Bibles; or

(v) raising one’s children in the religious teachings and practices of one’s choice; or

(B) any of the following acts if committed on account of an individual’s religious belief or 

practice: detention, interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, 

forced mass resettlement, imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, enslavement, murder, and execution. 

APPENDIX 2

1 P.L. 105-292, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 6401, et seq. The full text of IRFA can be found on the Commission’s Web site, www.uscirf.gov.
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Section 402. Presidential Actions in Response to Particularly 

Severe Violations of Religious Freedom (22 U.S.C. § 6442)

(b) DESIGNATIONS OF COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—

(1) ANNUAL REVIEW.—

(A) IN GENERAL.— Not later than September 1 of each year, the President2

 shall review 

the status of religious freedom in each foreign country to determine whether the government of that country has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious 

freedom in that country during the preceding 12 months or since the date of the last review 

of that country under this subparagraph, whichever period is longer. The President shall 

designate each country the government of which has engaged in or tolerated violations described in this subparagraph as a country of particular concern for religious freedom. 

Section 405. Description of Presidential Actions (22 U.S.C. § 6445)

[With respect to each country named a “country of particular concern” (CPC), the President shall, according to section 402(c)(1)(a) and, in general, following an attempt to carry 

out consultations with the foreign government in question, carry out one or more of the 

actions described in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a), as determined by the 

President. The President may substitute a commensurate action. IRFA § 405(b).] 

405(a)(9) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States development assistance in accordance with section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

405(a)(10) Directing the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or the Trade and Development Agency not to approve the issuance 

of any (or a specified number of ) guarantees, insurance, extensions of credit, or participations in the extension of credit with respect to the specific government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under 

section 401 or 402;

405(a)(11) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security assistance in 

accordance with section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;

405(a)(12) Consistent with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act of 

1977, directing the United States executive directors of international financial institutions 

to oppose and vote against loans primarily benefiting the specific foreign government, 

agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible 

for violations under section 401 or 402;

405(a)(13) Ordering the heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to issue any (or 

a specified number of ) specific licenses, and not to grant any other specific authority (or a 

specified number of authorities), to export any goods or technology to the specific foreign 

government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be 

responsible for violations under section 401 or 402, under—

(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979;

(B) the Arms Export Control Act;

2

 The authority to make decisions and take actions under IRFA has been delegated by the President to the Secretary of State.
229

(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or

(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services;

405(a)(14) Prohibiting any United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period to the specific foreign 

government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be 

responsible for violations under section 401 or 402; and/or

405(a)(15) Prohibiting the United States Government from procuring, or entering into any 

contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the foreign government, entities, or officials found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under 

section 401 or 402.

[In lieu of carrying out action as described above, the President may conclude a binding 

agreement with the respective foreign government that obligates such government to cease, 

or take substantial steps to address and phase out, the act, policy, or practice constituting 

the violation of religious freedom. IRFA § 402(c)(2). Moreover, “[a]t the time the President 

determines a country to be a country of particular concern, if that country is already subject 

to multiple, broad-based sanctions imposed in significant part in response to human rights 

abuses, and such sanctions are ongoing, the President may determine that one or more of 

these sanctions also satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” IRFA § 402(c)(5).]

Section 407. Presidential Waiver. (22 U.S.C. § 6447)

(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the President may waive the application of any of 

the actions described in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a) (or commensurate 

action in substitution thereto) with respect to a country, if the President determines and so 

reports to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(1) the respective foreign government has ceased the violations giving rise to the Presidential action;

(2) the exercise of such waiver authority would further the purposes of this Act; or

(3) the important national interest of the United States requires the exercise of such 

waiver authority.

(b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than the date of the exercise of a waiver under 

subsection (a), the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the 

waiver or the intention to exercise the waiver, together with a detailed justification thereof.

APPENDIX 2
230

Appendix 3 

International Human Rights Standards: Selected Provisions on 

Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion or Belief

This document sets forth the relevant provisions of international instruments, as well as 

further information concerning international standards concerning the protection of freedom 

of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. 

A. Everyone Has The Right To Freedom Of Thought, Conscience, 

And Religion

■ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR), Art. 18:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 

includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 

community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 

teaching, practice, worship and observance.

■ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), Art. 18:

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 

right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 

freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, 

to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 

2. No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to have or to 

adopt a religion or belief of his choice.

3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 

health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty 

of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral 

education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

■ In general, according to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), The treaty 

body that reviews compliance with the ICCPR, Article 18 of the ICCPR protects:
231

theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms “belief ” and “religion” are to be broadly construed. Article 

18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs 

with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate 

against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are newly 

established, or represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility on 

the part of a predominant religious community.

—Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22

■ European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 

Freedoms 1950 (ECHR), Art. 9: 

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 

includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 

community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 

worship, teaching, practice and observance.

■ Helsinki Final Act 1975, Principle VII: 

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of though, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

■ UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief 1981 (UN 1981 Dec.), Art. 1: 

(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 

right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and 

freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or belief in 

worship, observance, practice and teaching. (2) No one shall be subject to coercion 

which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice. (3) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are 

prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals 

or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

Components of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or 

belief include:

1. Freedom to Change One’s Religion or Belief

[UDHR, Art. 18, ECHR, Art. 9(1), OSCE Copenhagen Document, Art. 9(4)]

2. Freedom to Have or to Adopt a Religion or Belief of One’s Choice

[ICCPR Art. 18(1)]

● Necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to 

replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as 

well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief; 

● No limitations permitted on this freedom; and

● No individual shall be compelled to reveal his or her thoughts or adherence to a 

religion or belief.

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (paras. 3, 5)

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3. Freedom From Coercion Which Would Impair an Individual’s Freedom to 

Have or To Adopt a Religion or Belief of His or Her Choice

[ICCPR, Art. 18(2) and UN 1981 Dec. Art. 1(2)]

● No limitations are permitted on this freedom.

● The same protection is enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature.

● Examples of impermissible coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a 

religion or belief include:

(a) The use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers 

or non-believers to adhere to specific beliefs and congregations, to recant 

their religion or belief, or to convert; and

(b) Policies or practices having the same intention or effect, such as, for example, those restricting political rights protected under article 25 of the ICCPR or access to education, medical care or employment

–Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment No. 22 (para. 5)

4. Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief in Worship, Observance, Practice, 

and Teaching 

[UDHR, Art. 18, ICCPR, Art. 18(1), UN 1981 Dec., Art. 1, OSCE Vienna Document, 

Art. 16(d)]

● This freedom may be exercised in public or in private, individually or in community with others.

● This freedom, at a minimum, encompasses the following freedoms:

(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to 

establish and maintain, including the building of places of worship, freely 

accessible places for these purposes;

(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions, and seminaries or religious schools;

(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles 

and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief, including 

the use of ritual formulae and objects, the display of symbols, observance of 

dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive clothing or head coverings, 

participation in rituals associated with certain stages of life, and the use of a 

particular language customarily spoken by a group;

(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;

(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;

(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from 

individuals and institutions;

(g) To organize, train, appoint, elect, designate by succession, or replace appropriate leaders, priests and teachers called for by the requirements and 

standards of any religion or belief; 
233

(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or belief; and

(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and 

communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels. 1

5. Permissible Limitations on the Freedom to Manifest Religion or Belief

[ICCPR, Art. 18(3) and UN 1981 Dec., Art. 1(3)]

Freedom to manifest religion or belief may be subject to only such limitations as are 

prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals 

or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 

● No derogation2 may be made from freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 

even during “time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.” (ICCPR, Art. 4(2) and UDHR, Arts. 29 & 30) 

● Limitations must be established by law and must not be applied in a manner that 

would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18. 

● Paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: limitations are not allowed on 

grounds not specified there, even if they would be allowed as limitations to other 

rights protected in the Covenant (for example, a limitation based on national security is impermissible). 

● Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed 

and must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they 

are predicated. 

● Limitations may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner. 

● Limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single 

tradition or religion.

● Persons already subject to certain legitimate constraints, such as prisoners, continue to enjoy their rights to manifest their religion or belief to the fullest extent 

compatible with the specific nature of the constraint. 

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 8)

● Nothing in the UDHR shall be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth therein. 

—UDHR Art. 30

APPENDIX 3

1

 See Para. 4, UN HRC General Comment No. 22; Art. 6, UN 1981 Dec.; Art. 16(h-j), Vienna Document.

2 Derogation of rights is different than a limitation. Under the ICCPR, a state can, in a case of war or serious public emergency, take 

measures that limit the applicability of certain rights for the period of the emergency. Such measures could go well beyond the 

scope of limitations to rights that are permissible at any other time.
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B. Persons Belonging to Religious Minorities Shall Not Be Denied 

The Right, In Community with Other Members of Their Group, to 

Profess and Practice Their Own Religion 

[ICCPR, Art. 27, OSCE Vienna Document Art. 19, OSCE Copenhagen Document, 

and UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or 

Linguistic Minorities, Arts. 1-2 and 4]

● In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 

other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice 

their own religion, or to use their own language

—ICCPR, Article 27

● States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and 

linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, shall encourage 

conditions for the promotion of that identity, and shall adopt appropriate legislative 

and other measures to achieve those ends.

—UN Declaration on the Rights of Minorities

● The State “will protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities on their territory. They 

will respect the free exercise of rights by persons belonging to such minorities and 

ensure their full equality with others.”

—OSCE Vienna Document

C. Everyone Has The Right To Equal And Effective Protection 

Against Discrimination On The Basis Of Religion Or Belief

[ICCPR, Arts. 2(1) and 26, OSCE Vienna Document, Art. 16(a), and OSCE Copenhagen Document, Art. 40(1-2)] 

This right includes the following components:

1. States Undertake to Respect and to Ensure for All Individuals Within its Territory and Subject to its Jurisdiction the Rights Recognized in the ICCPR Without 

Distinction of Any Kind, Including Religion

[ICCPR Art. 2(1)] 

2. All Persons Are Equal Before the Law and Are Entitled Without Any Discrimination to the Equal Protection of the Law.

[ICCPR, Art. 26]

3. The Law Shall Prohibit Any Discrimination and Guarantee to All Persons 

Equal and Effective Protection Against Discrimination on Any Ground, Including Religion.

[ICCPR, Art. 26]

● The application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in article 26 of 

the ICCPR is not limited to those rights which are provided for in the Covenant, 
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and extends to prohibit discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and 

protected by public authorities; 

● The term “discrimination” as used in the ICCPR should be understood to imply 

any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground 

such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 

social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of 

nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an 

equal footing, of all rights and freedoms;

● The enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing, however, does not mean 

identical treatment in every instance;

● The principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate 

discrimination prohibited by the ICCPR; and

● Not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria 

for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a 

purpose which is legitimate under the ICCPR.

—HRC General Comment No. 18 (paras. 7, 8, 10, 12, 13)

4. Protection Against Discrimination by Any State, Institution, Group of Persons 

or Person on the Grounds of Religion or Other Belief 

[UN 1981 Dec., Arts. 2(1) and 4]

● States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the 

grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human 

rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social 

and cultural life.

● States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any such discrimination.

● States shall take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds of 

religion or other beliefs in this matter.

—UN 1981 Dec., Arts. 4(1) and 4(2)

● Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and 

to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It 

shall promote understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations, racial 

or religious groups ....

—UDHR Art. 26(2)

● State parties will “foster a climate of mutual tolerance and respect between believers 

of different communities as well as between believers and non-believers.”

—OSCE Vienna Document, principle 16b

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D. States Shall Prohibit by Law Any Advocacy of National, Racial 

or Religious Hatred That Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, 

Hostility or Violence

[ICCPR, Art. 20]

● No manifestation of religion or belief may amount to propaganda for war or advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination; hostility or violence... [and] States parties are under the obligation to enact 

laws to prohibit such acts.

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 7) 

● State parties should take the measures necessary to fulfill the obligations contained 

in article 20 of the ICCPR, and should themselves refrain from any such propaganda or advocacy.

—HRC General Comment No. 11 (para. 2)

● Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United 

States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the 

Constitution and laws of the United States.

—United States reservation to ICCPR Art. 20

● States will take effective measures, including the adoption of laws, to provide protection against any acts that constitute incitement to violence against persons or 

groups based on national, racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, hostility or hatred, including anti-Semitism.

—OSCE Copenhagen Document

● States commit themselves to take appropriate and proportionate measures to protect persons or groups who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, 

hostility or violence as a result of their racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious 

identity, and to protect their property;

—OSCE Copenhagen Document

E. The Rights of Parents in Relation to Freedom of Religion or Belief

[ICCPR Art. 18(4), OSCE Vienna Document Art. 16(f) and 16(g)]

● State Parties undertake to respect the liberty of parents and legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their 

own convictions.

—ICCPR Article 18(4)

● The liberty of parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted.

● Public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and 

ethics is permitted if it is given in a neutral and objective way.

● Public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with ICCPR Art. 18 (4) unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians.
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—HRC General Comment No. 22 (paras. 6 & 8)

● Parents or legal guardians have the right to organize family life in accordance with 

their religion or belief and bearing in mind the moral education in which they believe the child should be brought up.

● Every child shall enjoy the right to have access to education in the matter of religion 

or belief in accordance with the wishes of his parents or legal guardians, and shall not 

be compelled to receive teaching on religion or belief against the wishes of his parents 

or legal guardians, the best interests of the child being the guiding principle.

● The child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of 

religion or belief.

● In the case of a child who is not under the care either of his parents or of legal 

guardians, due account shall be taken of their expressed wishes or of any other 

proof of their wishes in the matter of religion or belief, the best interests of the child 

being the guiding principle. 

● Practices of a religion or belief in which a child is brought up must not be injurious to his physical or mental health or to his full development, taking into account 

article 1(3) of the present Declaration.

—UN 1981 Dec., art. 5

F. Further Elaboration on Selected Topics

1. Obligation to Ensure Rights/Provide Remedies for Violations

[ICCPR Arts. 2(2) and 2(3), UDHR Art. 8, UN 1981 Dec. Art. 7]

The ICCPR requires State parties to adopt such laws or other measures as may be 

necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant. This obligation includes ensuring:

● effective remedies for any person whose rights or freedoms are violated;

● that such remedies are determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities; and

● that such remedies are enforced when granted.

2. Relationship Between Religion and the State

● The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or established as official or 

traditional, or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, shall not 

result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the ICCPR, 

nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers. 

● In particular, measures restricting eligibility for government service to members 

of the predominant religion, or giving economic privileges to them, or imposing 

special restrictions on the practice of other faiths are not in accordance with the 

prohibition of discrimination based on religion or belief and the guarantee of equal 

protection under ICCPR article 26.

● If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes, proclamations 

of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not result in any impairment of 

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the freedoms under article 18 or any other rights recognized under the ICCPR nor 

in any discrimination against persons who do not accept the official ideology or who 

oppose it. 

—HRC General Comment No. 22 (para. 9)

● State parties are required to grant communities of believers, practicing or prepared 

to practice their faith within constitutional boundaries, “recognition of the status 

provided for them in their respective countries.”

—OSCE Vienna Document

3. Women’s Equal Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief

● The principle of non-discrimination is so basic that each State party is obligated to 

ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of the rights set forth 

in the ICCPR.

—HRC General Comment No. 18 (para. 2)

● Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply 

embedded in tradition, history and culture, including religious attitudes. The subordinate role of women in some countries is illustrated by the high incidence of 

prenatal sex selection and abortion of female fetuses. States parties should ensure 

that traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not used to justify violations of women’s right to equality before the law and to equal enjoyment of all 

ICCPR rights.

● State parties should report and provide data on a number of issues related to religion and women’s rights, including:

● pregnancy- and childbirth-related deaths of women, as well as gender-disaggregated data on infant mortality rates; 

● information on the extent of any practice of genital mutilation, and on measures to 

eliminate it; 

● measures to protect women from practices that violate their right to life, such as 

female infanticide, the burning of widows and dowry killings; 

● regulation of clothing to be worn by women in public; and

● whether women may give evidence as witnesses on the same terms as men; whether 

measures are taken to ensure women equal access to legal aid, in particular in family matters; and whether certain categories of women are denied the enjoyment of 

the presumption of innocence.

● Freedoms protected by article 18 must not be subject to restrictions other than 

those authorized by the ICCPR and must not be constrained by, inter alia, rules 

requiring permission from third parties, or by interference from fathers, husbands, 

brothers or others. Article 18 may not be relied upon to justify discrimination 

against women by reference to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;

● The commission of so-called “honor crimes” which remain unpunished constitutes 

a serious violation of the ICCPR and laws which impose more severe penalties on 

women than on men for adultery or other offences also violate the requirement of 

equal treatment.
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—HRC General Comment No. 28 (paras. 5, 10, 11, 13, 18, 21, 31)

● Certain religious practices have an adverse effect on women’s rights. These practices include :

● cultural stereotypes, including preference for male children, religious extremism, 

and regulation of women’s clothing;

● discrimination in medical well-being, including genital mutilation, traditional 

childbirth practices, and dietary restrictions;

● discrimination resulting from the condition of women within the family, including 

practices related to marriage and divorce (e.g.: polygamy, family planning, division 

of responsibilities);

● discrimination related to transmission of nationality;

● discrimination related to inheritance and independent management of finances;

● discrimination related to right to life, including infanticide, cruel treatment of widows, and honor crimes, 

● attacks on dignity, including sexual abuse;

● social ostracism, including denial of the right to education, and denial of access to 

professional fields such as politics and religion; and

● aggravated discrimination against women who also are members of a minority community.

To ensure that freedom of religion does not undermine the rights of women, it is essential that this freedom not be understood as a right of indifference with respect to 

the status of women. 

—UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Study on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Status of Women with Regard to Religion and Traditions (Amor Report) 3

3

 Commission staff translation.

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