### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00608- CV

Ca th r e n K e nne dy, App e lla nt

v. Texas Depart m ent of Pr otec tive and Regulatory Servic es, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN302604 , HO NORAB LE CHARLES F . CAMP B ELL, JR., JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Cathre n Kenne dy retire d as an employ ee of appe llee Te x as De partment of Protective a

nd Reg ulatory

Service s (the De partment) a nd applied to be r ehire d to he r position. The Depa rtment instead hired one of Kenne dy ’s co-worker s. Kenne dy is Caucasian, w hile the co- worke r is Hispanic. Kenne dy

filed a national orig in d i s cr i m i n at ion claim with the fede ral Equa l Employ ment Opportunity Commi ssion (EEOC). There afte r, Ke nnedy applied for

another position wi th t he De pa rtment ; sh e di d n ot r e c e ive an in te rv ie w a nd wa s n ot h ir e d. She the n f ile d s uit in d i s t ri ct court, c laiming national orig in discrimination and reta liation. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. §§ 21.051, .055 (West 1996)
. The district c ourt g rante d traditional summary judgm en t o n the2

natio na l or ig in d iscriminatio n c la im a nd no -e vid e nc e summa

ry jud g me nt o n th e re ta liatio n c la im, both in favor of

the Depa rtment. We will affirm the judg ment of the district cour t.
BACK GR OUND Kenne dy worke d for the Depa

rtment for ove r twenty -eig ht y ear s. During that time, she had be en a lice nsing r epre sentative a nd a licensingsupervisor, she had monito red residential fac iliti es and c hild placement a g encie s, and she had been a prog ram specialist in the Depa rtment’s l i c e n s i n g d i v i s i o n . O nM ay 3 1 , 2 0 0 2 , s h e r e t i r e d

f r o m h e r p o s i t i o na s a “ F u n c t i o n a l A n a l y s tIII ” (“Pos it io n I ” ) , a p o s it io n s h e h a d h e ld f o r n in e mo n th s th a t d e a lt w it h th e D e p artm e n t’ s new automated doc umentation sy stem. The De partment then posted Posi tion I , and, on June 14, Kennedy
a pp lie d to be re hir e d to it. Ac c or din g t o Ken ne dy ’s ple a din g s, the De pa rtme nt, lik e oth e r s tate
a g e nc ie s at th e tim e , p e rm itt e d c e rt a in e mpl oy e e s to re tir e , the n r e hir e d th e m a ft e r w a iti ngthi rt y day s, enabling the employ ees to obtain c erta in pension benef its. After her re t i re m ent, Kenne dy
vo lun tari ly

c on tin ue d w or kin g a t he r p os iti on

on an unp a id b a sis duri ngthe e ns uin g thi rt y da y s. The Department chose five applicants to interview for P osition I , including K ennedy and Yolanda

Her nandez. Acc ording to Kennedy , she wa s initi ally interviewe d on J une 5 or 6 by one Depa rtment employ ee, Scott Silverthorne. H oweve r, she wa s later notified that th e De partment neede d to conduct an o t her inter view bec ause the interview w ith Si lverthorne had occ urre d befor e the Depa rtment had posted Position I and bef ore K ennedy

had applied f

or it. The De partment c reated a pa nel of four employ ees to conduct interviews, and two of those employ ees, Keith Elliot and Pat Smith, inter viewed Kenne dy
. Both Ke nnedy and He rnande z h adi n i t i al l y

qu al i fi ed fo r i n t erv i ew s b as edo nb ac k gro u n d an d qu al i fi ca t i o n s
— edu ca t i o n , t ra i n i n g,T h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t i n d ic a te w h ic h p an e l m e mb e r s in te r v ie w e d H e r n an d e z. 1 The memora

ndum was sent to the De partment’s de puty director of leg al servic es, the 2 Depa rtment’s human re source s attorney , and F rank Pea rce, the De partment’s dire ctor of huma n re so ur c e s. 3 and pre vious work e x perie nce. T he intervie w notes indicate that the interview ers f elt that Her

nandez perf ormed we ll during he r interview. H oweve r, they rate d Kenne dy ’s interviewperf ormanc e as “poor” and re marke d that she appe are d unprepa red. The rec ord contains minimal notes taken by the i n t e r v i e w e r s . T h e D e p art m e n tu l t i m a t e l y h i r e d H e r n an d e z o v e r

K e n n e dy f o r P o s i t i o nI. 1 On August 27, Kenned y

filed a national orig in discrimination complaint with the EEOC conc erningthe Depa rtment’s hiring decision for Posit ion I
. On August 30, the EEOC not ified the Depa rtment of Ke nnedy ’s complaint and sugges t ed mediation. Pedro L opez, an employ ee relations specialist with the Depar tment, draf

ted an inter

nal memora

ndum conce rning the complaint
on S ep t em b er 23, sug g esting that the Depa rtment reje ct mediation. On September 26, the 2 Depa rtment’s di rec tor of hum an resource s, Fr ank P ear ce, r esponded by letter to the EEO C, denying Kenne dy ’s alleg ations.

O nO c to b e r

4 , K e n n e dy

le ar n e d th a t a n o th e r f u n c ti o n a l a

n a ly s t p o s it io n(“Position I I ”) ha d become open; she submitted her a pplication that day
. On October 9, she conf

irmed that the Depa rtment’s human re sourc es depar tment had re ceive d the application. Kennedy was ne ver interviewe d for Position I I . On Octobe r 23, Ke nnedy lear ned that the Depa

rtment had filled Position I Iwith another pe rson and without interview ing he r.She also broug ht this claim under sec tion 106.001(a) of the civil prac tices and r emedies 3 code, but that c laim was dismissed on a plea to the jur isdiction. W e will detail the re levant summary -judg ment evidenc e whe n we discuss Ke nnedy ’s 4 a pp e llate iss ue s. 4

Kenne dy filed suit ag ainst the Depa rtment on J uly

24, 2 0 0 3 . She first alleg ed national orig in disc rimination f

or the Depa

rtment’s hiring of Her

nandez over he r for

Posit ion I
. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 21.051
. Second, she c laimed the De partment e ng ag ed in unlawf ul retaliation whe n 3 it did not i nterviewor hire he r for Posit ion I I
. Se eid . § 21.055. I n response , the Depa rtment filed a t ra d i t i o n al m o t i o nfo r s u m m ary j u d gm en tfo r t h e n at i o n al o ri gi n d i s cr i m i n at i o n cl ai m , cl ai m i n g a leg itimate non-discriminatory rea son for it s selec tion of He rnande z and lack of c ausation. See T e x. R. Civ. P . 166a(c ). At the same time, it moved for no-evide nce summary judgme nt f or the re taliation claim, asser

ting that Kenne dy had no evidenc e that dec isionmakers in the De partment we re a war e of her EEOC cha

rg e of discr imination. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(i). The district c ourt g rante d the Depa rtment’s motions. This appea l followed. 4
DI SCU SSIO N Kenne dy b ri ng s two issues on appea l, arguing that the trial court e rre d in gr anting both motions for summary judgme nt. We will address ea ch issue in turn.
Na ti ona l or igi n dis c r im ina ti on c lai m

I n her f irst issue, Kennedy

argues that the district court e rre d in gr anting traditional
summa ry jud g me nt a g a ins t he r o n h e r n a tio na l or ig in d isc ri min a tio n c la im. I n p art ic ula r, sh e c la ims5

she “w as the only

candidate qualified f

or” Position I . She adds t h at the Depa rtment awa

rded Posit ion I to Her

nandez bec ause, K ennedy alleg es, He rnande z had threate ned to sue the D epar tment in the past for national orig in discrimination.

Be cause the proprie t y o f a summary judgme nt is a question of law, we revie w the district c ourt ’s d ecision de novo
. Va le nc e Op e ra tin g Co . v . D or se tt , 1 6 4 S. W. 3 d

6 5 6 , 6 6 1 ( T e x. 2005). The sta

ndards f or re viewing traditional summary judgm en t s are well established: (1) the
mov ant h a s th e burd e n o f s ho wi ngtha t no g e nu ine i ss ue o f m a te ri a l f a c t e xists and

e nti tle me nt t o judgme nt as a matter of law; (2) in de ciding whether there is a disputed materia l fac t issue prec luding
sum m ar y j udg ment, evidenc e fa vorable to the nonmovant will be taken a s true; and ( 3) eve ry
r e a s o n a b le in f e r e n c e mu s t b e in d

u lg e d , an d an y d o u

b ts r e s o lv e d , in f

a v o r o f th e n o n mo v an t. T e x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); M.D. Ande rson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. W illri ch , 28 S.W .3d 22, 24 (Tex. 2000) (c i t i n g Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgm t. Co. , 690 S.W .2d 546, 548-49 (Te x . 1985)). We affir m if summary jud g me nt i s wa

rr ante d on any g ro un d a sse rt e d in the tr ia l c ourt
. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); J oev . Two Thi rty Nin e J oin t V e ntu re , 145 S.W .3d 150, 157 (Tex. 2004). A d ef en d an t , when moving for
summa ry jud g me nt, ne e d dis pr ov e on ly on e e sse nti a l e le me nt of the op po ne nt’ s c a us e of a c tio n to pr e va il. IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of Desoto, Tex., Inc . v. Mason , 1 4 3 S. W. 3 d 7 9 4 , 7 9 8 ( T e x. 2004). Howeve r, the defe ndant must support its motion with proper summar y -judg ment evidenc e. Tex. R. C iv. P. 166a(c) . Only if the def endant mee ts its burden does the burde n shift to the plaintiff, as the nonmovant, to establish the e x istence of a genuine issue of m ater ial fac t. Elliott -W illiams Co. v. Diaz , 9 S.W .3d 801, 803 (Tex. 1999).6 On e of the purp os e s of the Te xas Com mis sio n on Human Ri g hts Ac t ( TCH RA ) i s to

“ pr ov ide fo r t

he e xec uti on

of the po lic ie s o f T itl e VI Iof the Civil Rig hts Ac t of

19 64 and

its
su bs e qu e nt am e ndme nts .” Te x. L a b. Cod e Ann. § 21. 00 1( 1) (We st 1 99 6) ; se e id . §§ 21.001-.306 (West 1996 & Supp. 2004-05). T here fore , analog ous fede ral statutes a nd the ca ses interpre ting them g uide our re ading of the TCHRA. Quantum Chem. Cor p . v. Toennies , 4 7 S. W. 3 d 4 7 3 , 4 7 6 ( T e x. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g NM

E H os ps ., In c . v . R e nn e ls , 994 S.W .2d 142, 144 (Tex. 1999)). F e de ra l c ourt s r e c og nize tw o ty pe s o f T itl e VI Ie mpl oy

me nt d is cri mi natio n c a se s,
ea ch requiringdiffer ent eleme nts of proof. Id
. O n e t y p e o f c a s e i s t h e “ m i xe d

- m o t i v e ” c a se , in which the p l aint iff has dire ct evidenc e that discriminatory animus fac tored into the employ ment decision. Id . T his dir e c t e vid e nc e sh if ts the burd e n of pr oo f to the e mpl oy e r to sh owthat le g iti mate
rea sons would have led to the same decision reg ardle ss of any discriminatory

motives. Id . (citing Price W aterhouse v. H

opkins , 490 U.S. 228, 2 4 4 -4 5 (1989), a nd Starceski v . W

estinghouse Elec

. Corp. , 54 F.3d 1089, 1095- 99 (3rd Cir. 1995))
.

I n the sec ond ty

pe of c ase—the “pretext ” ca se—there is no direct evide nce of discriminatory

animus but the plaintiff attemp t s to show that the employ er’ s stated re ason for the adver se ac tion was a mer e pre text for discr imination. Id
. (c i t i n g Texas De p’t of Cmt

y. A f f a i rs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981), and McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1 97 3) ). I n th is ty

pe of ca se, di scr imi natio n c an b e sh ow n in dir e c tly by fo llo wi ngthe “ pr e te xt” method of proof

set out in McD onnell Douglas Corp. , 411 U.S. at 802-05. Mo on e yv . A ra mc o S

e rv s. Co. , 5 4 F. 3d 12 07 , 121 6- 17 & n. 11 (5 th Cir . 199 5)
. I n g e ne ra l, t he c omp la ina

nt m us t f ir st e sta bli sh
a prima facie case of discrimination. McD onnell Douglas , 4 11 U. S. at 80 2. Al tho ug h th e pr e c iseT h e facts nec essar ily will vary in pretext cases, a

nd the spec ifications of the pr im a fa c ie 5 proof r equire d from the plaintiff w ill also vary in response to diff

eringfac tual situations. Mc Do nn e ll Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973). I n its motion for summary judgme nt, the Depa rtment did not attack Ke nnedy ’s ability to make out a pr im a fa c ie case . “Establishment of the prima facie case in effe ct cr eate s a presumption that the employ er 6 unlawfully

discriminated ag ainst the employ ee.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine , 45 0 U .S. 248, 254 (1981). 7 elements of this showing will vary depending o n the alleg ations, id . at 802 n.13, the plaintiff’s 5 burden at this st ag e of the case “i s n ot onerous.” Burdine , 450 U.S. at 253. The burde n of g oing forwa rd then shifts to the employ er to “ articulate some leg itimate, nondisc riminatory rea son for the employ ee’ s reje ct i o n . ” McD onnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802. The off er of a leg itimate rea son
e lim inate s th e pres umpti on of dis c ri min a tio n c re a te d b y the pla int if

f’ s prima facie s h o wi n g. 6 Burdine , 450 U.S. at 254. The burde n then shifts back to the c omplainant to show that the employ er’ s stated reason was a pre text for discr imination. McD onnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 805-07; Burdine , 450 U.S. at 256. “ The plaintiff c an usually provide suff

icient evidenc e of discr iminatory intent by showing that the employ er’ s proffe red r eason f or the a dverse action is false .” Quantum Chem. Co. , 47 S.W .3d at 4 7 6 (c i ting Re e v es v . S an de rso n P lum bin g P ro ds

. , Inc. , 530 U.S. 133 (2000))
. The Te x as Su p r e me Co u

r t h as explained that, when the employ er move s for summary judgme nt under Rule 166a(c), the employ er has the summary -judg ment burden to prove as a matter of law a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son for the employ ment action. See M

.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tum or In st. , 28 S.W .3d at 24. Once the employ er est ablishes a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory8

rea son, the burden the n shifts to the employ ee ( or, in this case, the applicant) , as i n other tra ditional summary -judg ment case s, t o ra ise a fa ct issue that the employ er’ s rea sons were a pre text for discrimination. Id . The e mploy ee c an mee t this burden by prese nting e vidence raising a fac t issue or by showing that the employ er’ s summary -judg ment evidenc e fails to prove as a matter of law that the proff ere d rea son was not a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory one. Id
. I n this case, the D epar

tment moved for tra ditional summ ary judgme nt a nd thus had the burden to establish as a matter of law that it had a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son for not hiring Kenne dy

for Position I
. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c); M. D. An de rso n H os p. & Tum or

In st. , 28 S
. W
. 3 d at 24. I n support of its motion for summary judgme nt, the Depa

rtment offe red a

n aff idavit from Ell iot, in which he asser ted t hat no “employ ee of [the Depar tment] told me that the pa ne l sh ou ld f

a vo r a ny pe rs on duri ng the int e rv ie w pr oc e ss” and that he “d id n ot h e ar a nyon e dis c us s any candidate’s national or igin a s a re levant fa ctor in scor ing or in the final dec ision.” I n addition, he stated that no member of Depa rtment manag ement direc ted him to choose a H ispanic per son or to choose He rnande z, that Hernande z’s perfor mance in t h e interview “ far exceede d” Ke nnedy ’s pe rf or manc e , a nd th at th e do c ume nts me mor ia lizin g the c and idate s’ e va luatio ns re fl e c te d h is judgme nt of their qualific ations. An aff idavit from Smith echoes these a ssertions. Al so included in the summary -judg ment rec ord wa s an applicant “matrix”—a cha rt in which the qua lifications of
eac h of the five finalists were org anized in a way to fac ilitate compar ison. This char t indicates the Depa rtment’s asse ssment that Herna ndez an d Kennedy

wer e similarly

qualified in terms of education, training, a

nd experience and that, whi le K e nn e d y ’s work history

with the Depa

rtment may have w eig hed in her

favor , the Depa

rtment clea

rly indicated on the matrix that it judge d Her nandez’sI n her br ief a nd at ora l argument, Kenne dy contende d that the Depa rtment failed to meet 7 its summa

ry -j ud g me nt b ur de n b ecaus e it “c oo ke d th e bo ok s” in d oc ume ntatio n r e fl e c tin g that it e v a l u a t e d H e r n an d e z m o r e f

a v o r a b l y t h anK e n n e dy. N o e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d s u p p o rt s t h i s t h e o r

y. Rather, to adopt Ke nnedy ’s theory , we would b e re q u ired to ac cept Ke nnedy ’s asser tions that she was more qualified than H erna ndez and then infe r, because the rec ord re flec ts that the Depa rtment believed dif

fer ently , that it had manipulated its documentation to support its actions. 9 interv i ew p erf

ormanc e to fa

r excee d Kenne dy ’s. We find that this evidence satisfied the 7 Depa rtment’s burden to e stablish a s a matter of law a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son for not hiring Kenne dy

for Posit ion I
. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); M. D. An de rso n H os p. & Tum or

In st. , 28 S.W .3d at 24.

Thus, we must now turn to Kenne dy ’s burde n to raise a fac t issue that the Depa rtment’s leg itimate nondiscriminatory rea sons were a pre text for discr imination. See M .D. An de rso n Hosp. & Tum or In st. , 28 S.W .3d at 24. To ra ise a fa ct issue, Kenne dy submitt ed her deposition testimony

conce rning a conver sation she had with H erna ndez at a Luby ’s re staurant a fter Her nandez had been passed over for a previous promotion opportunity . Kenne dy testified that, at that time, Her

nandez complained that Hispanics were underre prese nted i n Depa rtment manag ement and that “the next t ime she was passed over, there was g oing to be a lawsuit.” Kenne dy assumed that Her nandez must have made simil ar state ments to other Depa rtment employ ees. K ennedy further te sti fi e d th a t sh e ha d e xpe c te d to be re hir e d to Pos iti on Ibe c a us e of “ the fact th a t I

wa s th e on ly qualified person f

or the job” a

nd that her “ assumption” was that He rnande z was hired bec ause of the threat of litigation.

Kenne dy also submitted deposition t estimony fr om Smi th, clarify

ing K ennedy ’s interview answer s as re corde d by Smit h in her notes. F or example, the sec ond interview que stion1 0

asked, “ Desc ribe y our experienc e with computer s, software and automation sy stems.” Interview notes i n t h e re cord indicate that Kenne dy ’s re sponse was that she had “ seen be hind the scene s things.” Smit h was a sked duringher d ep o s i t ion about that question, “[I ]sn’t i t true that she emphasized her a ctual hands- on experience with computer, soft wa re and automation sy stems by saying, ‘ I ’ve se en behind the sc enes thing s in this area? ’” S m i t h responded, “Appe ars to be what sh e sa id, y e s. ” Whe n c on sid e ri ngano the r q ue sti on a bo ut wo rk ing on mul tip le pr oje c ts at the same time, Smi th n o t ed t h at Kennedy failed to identify

any details conc erningsuch work. Smith then looke d a t n o te s w r itte n b y an o th e r in te r v ie w e r f r o m H e r n an d e z’ s in te r

v ie w , w h ic h Sm it

h d id not
a tte nd . Sh e ob se rv e d that tho se no te s did no t ind ic a te wh a t de ta ils He rn and e z pr ov ide d in re sp on se to the same que stion. Further , Kenne dy provided testimony

from seve ral De par

tm e nt e mploy ees that H e r n an d e z h a d

d i f f i c u l ty p e r f

o r m i n g t h e j o b d

u t i e s f o r P o s i t i o n I a f

t e r s h e w a s h i r e d
. F i n a l l y, Kenne dy provided documentation that Her nandez had complained in the past about job eva luations draf ted conc erningher pe rfor

mance for pr evious positions; Her nandez had f

elt th a t t h o s e eva luations
wer e par tially unfair. To summarize, Ke nnedy

attempted to pre sent summary-judgment evidenc e supporting three propositions—that Her nandez was awa

rded Posi tion I beca

use she told Kenne dy

she mig ht sue the Depa rtment if passed ove r for

the next open supervisory position; that the Depa

rtment may

have been mistake n in its assessment of Her nandez’s ca

pabilities; and that Kenne dy believed that she was the only qualified a

pplicant. We will a ddress eac h in tur n to de termine whe ther Ke nnedy met her b u r d e nto r a i s e a

f a c t i s s u e th a t t

h e D e p artm e n t’ s le g it im a te n o n d is c r im in a to r y r e a s o n s w e r e a

p r e te xt for discr imination.1 1 Reg ardingKenne dy ’s assumption that Herna ndez w as aw arde d Posit ion Ibeca use of the comments she made to Kennedy , Kenne dy p rovided no e vidence that Her nandez eve r communicated a

ny such threat to Depar

tm e nt m a n a g ement or that any

decisionmake r wa s ever

awa re of He rnande z’s threats. For workplace co mments to constitut e leg ally sufficie nt evidence of dis c ri min a tio n, tho se c omm e nts mus t be (1 ) r e late d to pla int if f’ s pr ote c te d c la ss, (2 ) p ro xima te in time to the adve rs e em p l o y ment decision, (3) made by an individual with authority over the employ ment decision at issue, a

nd (4) r elated to the e mploy ment decision at issue. See Krystek v. Un iv e rsi ty

of S . M iss
. , 164 F .3 d 251 , 256 (5 th C ir . 1 99 9) ; El gagh il v . Tarra nt C

ou nty J un ior Col l. , 45 S.W .3d 133, 140 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2000, pet. denied). Stray rema rks made in the
wo rk pla c e by no n- de cis io nm a ke rs , w ith ou t mo re , a re no t e vid e nc e of

the e mpl oy e r’ s in te nt t o discriminate. See Nichols v

. Loral Vought Sys. Cor p. , 81 F. 3d 38 , 41- 42 (5 th C ir . 1 99 6) ; El gagh il , 45 S.W .3d at 140. Assuming for summary -judg ment revie w that Her nandez actua lly m ad e t he alleg ed comments to K ennedy , the re cord doe s not establish that any person with author ity

over the
e mpl oy me nt d e c isi on

ma de any

c omm e nt a

bo ut a ny a pp lic ant’ s n a tio nal ori gin to K e nn e dy , to Her nandez, or to a n y o n e el s e. I n addition, Herna ndez was not a de cisionmaker; she made he r comments to a co- worke r out side the off ice; and the comment was not c onnecte d to any particula r employ ment decision. Her

nandez’s comment is a stra y rema rk that ca nnot constitute discrimination
as a matter of law
. See Kryste k , 164 F.3d at 256.

As fo r K e nn e dy ’s e vid e nc e re g ard ing He rn and e z’s c a pa bil iti e s, the e vid e nc e a t mo st could s ug g est that the Department m ay have misj udg ed He rnande z’s abiliti es. B ut even incor rec t beliefs c oncer

ning a n employ ee’ s perf

ormanc e o r qualifications constitut e leg itimate,1 2

non-discriminatory

rea sons. See Little v. Re

public Refining Co. , 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991). I nc or re c t be lie fs do no t e sta

bli sh dis c ri min a tor

y int e nt, e ve n f

or the purp os e s o f s umm ary jud g me nt, beca use we do not try

in court the va lidity

of g ood faith belief

s as to an employ ee’ s competenc e. See id . Rather, motive is the issue. Se e id
. (c i t i n g De Anda v . St. Joseph Hosp. , 671 F.2d 850, 854 n.6 (5th Cir.1982)). The Department’ s mistaken judgme nt, if any , does not g ive rise to a f act que stion about the De partment’s motive.

Finally , Kenne dy

argu es t hat, base d on her c omparison of the e mploy ment applications and inter

view notes, she was the only qualified applicant. To defe at summary judgme nt on this claim, K ennedy was re quired to demonstrate that she wa s “cle arly better qua lified” than the ot he r a pp lic ants
. See M

anning v. Chevron Chem . Co. , 3 3 2 F
. 3 d 8 7 4 , 8 8 2 ( 5 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 3 )
. B eing “mer ely qualified” or “a s qualified” is not suffic ient. See , e.g. , Equal Opportunity Employme nt Com m’n v . Lo uis ian a O

ffi c e of C mt y . S e rv s. , 47 F.3d 1438, 1444 ( 5th Cir. 1995); Odom v. F rank , 3 F.3d 839, 845- 46 (5th Cir. 1993); W alther v. Lone Star Gas Co. , 952 F.2d 119, 123 ( 5th Cir. 1992); Thornbrough v. Columbus &Gree nville R. R. Co. , 7 60 F .2 d 6 33 , 6 47 (5 th C ir . 1 98 5) . T he “ c le arl y better qua lified” standa

rd, rather, is a ve ry h i gh b u rd en that require d Kenne dy to show that “no
rea sonable pe rson . . . could have chosen the ca n d i d ate selected ove r [her].” See Ce lestine v. Petroleos de Ve nezuella SA , 266 F.3d 343, 357 ( 5th Cir. 2001). To survive summary judgme nt, the unfairne ss of the employ er’ s decision m ust be so appar ent as to jump off the rec ord and “slap [the court] in the fac e.” See O dom , 3 F.3d at 847. Evidence that one applica nt is better qualified tha

n another m u s t be more tha n mere ly subjective a

nd speculative. Se e Nic ho ls v . Lo ra l V ou gh t Sy s. Corp. , 8 1 F .3 d 3 8, 42 (5 th C ir . 1 99 6) ; Molnar v. Ebasco Constr uctors, Inc. , 9 86 F .2 d 1 15 , 1 19 (5 th1 3

Cir. 1993); Elliott

v. Group Med. & Surgical Serv. , 714 F.2d 556, 564 ( 5th Cir.1983), cert. de nied , 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).

We have thoroug hl y re v i ewe d the re cord a nd cannot de termine that Ke nnedy was clea rly better qua lified for the position than Hernande z appea red to be whe n the Depa

rtment made the hiring decision. Ther e we re ma ny simil arities betwe en the two applicants; the most significa nt documented dif

fer ence s were Her

nandez’s per for m an ce during the interviewand Ke nnedy ’s previous nine- month ex perie nce in Position I . Given that we are “ reluc tant to substit ute our view s for those of

the individuals ch arg ed with the eva luation duty by virtue of their

own y ear s of
e xpe ri e nc e and

e xpe rt ise in the fi e ld in que sti on ,” we fi nd that Ke nn e dy ’s e vid e nc e do e s n ot r a ise a fa ct question on prete x t based on he r compa rison of qualifications. See O dom , 3 F.3d at 847. We have f

ound that the Depa

rtment met its initial burden to e stablish as a matter of law a le g iti mate , n on dis c ri min a tor y re a so n f or no t h ir ing Ke nn e dy

fo r P os iti on

I . We have a lso found that Ke nnedy

failed to meet her burden to show that a fa ct issue exist s conce rning whether the Depa rtment’s reasons wer e a pr etext for discrimination. McD onnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 805-07; Burdine , 450 U.S. at 256. There fore , the district c ourt did not err in g rantingsummary judgme nt for the Dep art me nt o n K e nn e dy ’s natio na l or ig in d isc ri min a tio n c la im. We o ve rr ule Ke nn e dy ’s fi rs t issue.
Re ta lia ti on c lai m

I n her se cond issue, Ke nnedy argues that the district cour t er re d in gr anting noevidenc e summary

judgme nt in favor of t he Department on her retaliation claim. Kenne dy pleade dSee also H iggs v
. Trammell Crow Co. , No. 05-04-00547- CV, 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 1058, 8 a t *5 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s F e b. 10 , 2 00 5, no pe t.) ; Ib e zim v . Te x . D e p’ t of He alt h , No. 03-03-00308- CV, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 6252, at *20 (Tex. App.—Austin J uly 15, 2004, no pet.). 1 4 that the Depa

rtment’s re fusal to hire her for Posit ion I I constituted unlawful reta liation for filing an EEOC claim re g arding

Posit ion I
. An em p l oy er c ommits an unlawf ul employ

ment prac tice if it reta liates or discriminates ag ainst a per son who files a c omplaint. Tex
. L ab
. C o d e Ann. § 21.055(3). To
s u c c e s s f u l l y a s s e rta

c l a i m o f

r e t a l i a t i o n d i s c h ar g e , t h e p l a i n t i f f m u s tf i r s te s t a b l i s h , b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, a prima facie case of di scrimination, which, when established, g ives rise to a pr esumption that the employ er unlawfully discriminated ag ainst the employ ee. Grave s v. Komet , 982 S.W .2d 551, 554 (Tex. App.—San Antoni o 1998, no pet.). A pla intiff proves a prima fac ie case of re taliation by showing (1) that she eng ag ed in a pr otected a ctivity , (2) that the e mploy er took an adverse employ

ment action aga inst her, and (3) a causa l connec tion betwee n the protec ted activi t y and the a dverse employ

ment action. Id. ; Maybe rry v. Tex as Dep’t of Agric. , 948 S.W .2d 31 2, 31 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —Aus tin 19 97 , w ri t de nie d) ; see Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n , 10 F.3d 292, 29 8 ( 5th

Cir . 1 99 4) . T o me e t he r b ur de n r e g ard ing the c a us a tio n e le me nt, a

pla int if f m us t produce evidenc e that the decisionmake r responsible for the adver se employ ment action knew

of the plaintiff’s prote cted a ctivity and wa s motivated by

it. Se e Ma rsa

gli a v . U niv e rsi ty of T

e x ., El Pa so , 22 S.W. 3d 1, 5 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 99 , p e t. d e nie d) ; cf. Romo , 48 S.W .3d at 273 n.2 (whe n filing tr a dit ion a l mo tio n f

or summ a r y j u d g m e nt, e mpl oy e r p re se nte d n o e vid e nc e that de c isi on to t e rm inate was made by

persons with n o k nowledg e of e mploy ee’ s protecte d activity ). I f the plaintiff c an 8 establish a prima fac ie case of re taliation, the burden shifts to the employ er to re but the presumptionI n its appellate brie fing , the Depa rtment argues that, in addition to targ eting the ca usation 9 e le me nt o f K e nn e dy ’s pr im a fa c ie case , it is also cha lleng ing K ennedy ’s ability to “over come [the Depa rtment’s] legitimate non- discriminatory rea son, i.e., the hiring supervisor did not re ceive [Ke nn e dy ’s ] app li c a tio n p ri or to m a kin g a

hir ingde c isi on .” Ho we ve r, un lik e the c a se wi th Ke nn e dy ’s natio na l or ig in d isc ri min a tio n c la im, the De pa rtme nt did no t se e k s umm ary jud g me nt t o establish that it had proff

ere d a leg itimate non-discriminatory rea son for its ref

usal to hire Ke nnedy in P os iti on I I
. Un le ss and un til the De pa rtme nt me e ts thi s bu

rd e n, the re is no thi ng fo r K e nn e dy to “over come” on summary

judgme nt except her initial burden to esta blish her prima facie case . 1 5 by se tti ng fo rt

h thr ou g h admis sib le e vid e nc e a le g iti mate no n- dis c ri min a tor y re a so n f or the a dv e rs e employ ment action. Texas Dept. of Comm

. Affairs v. Burdine , 4 50 U. S. 2 48 , 2 54 (1 98 1) ; Mc Do nn e ll Do u glas , 4 1 1 U
. S. a t 8 0 2
. I f th e d e f e n d an t p r o f

f e r s a le g it im a te n o n - d is c r im in a to r y r e a s o n , the burden shi f

ts b a c k to th e p la in ti f

f to p r o v e th a t t

h e p u r p o rte d n o n d is c r im in a to r

y r e a s o nis a

mere prete x t for re taliation. McD onnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802. The plaintiff c arr ies this burden whe n she either direc tly persua des the fa ct-finde r that “a discriminatory

rea son more likely

motivated the employ er or

indirectly by showing that the proffere d rea son is unworthy of cr edenc e.” Burdine , 450 U. S. at 25 6. Th e ult imate burd e n o f p e rs ua din g the fa c t- fi nder th at th e empl oy e r e ng a g e d in intentionally

discriminatory

conduct r emains at a ll tim es with the plaintiff. Id . at 253. The De partment moved f or “no e vidence ” sum m ar y j u dg ment on the ca usation elemen t o f Ke nnedy ’s re taliation claim. I t asserte d that there was no e vidence that Smit h, the Posit ion I Idecisionmake r, kneweither of Kenne dy ’s EEOC cla im or that Kenne dy had applied f

or Posit ion I I at the time Smith inter viewed candidates and filled that position. The De partment a dded that there was no e vidence that Kenne dy ’s “a pplication was d e li b e r a

te ly withheld from conside ration be c a us e of he r p ri or

c omp la int

of dis c ri min a tio n. ” We c on str ue the Dep artme nt’ s mo tio n to
c ha lle ng e Ke nn e dy ’s pr im a fa c ie case . 91 6 A par ty may move for summary judgme nt unde r Rule 166a(i) on the g round that there is n o e vid e nc e of

on e or mor e e sse nti a l e le me nts of a cla im or defe ns e on wh ic h a n a dv e rs e pa

rt y
wo uld have the burd e n o f p ro of a t tr ia l. T e x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (i ); W estern Inv s., Inc. v. Ure na , 162 S.W .3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005). Unless the nonmova nt produce s summary -judg ment evidenc e ra ising
a g e nu in e is s u e o f

mate r ia l f

a c t on th e c h a ll e n g e d

e le me n ts , th e c o u rt m

u s t g r an t t h e mo ti o n . T e x. R. Civ
. P. 1 66 a (i ) & c mt. ; Urena , 162 S.W .3d at 550. I n revie wing a no-e vidence claim, we vie w the evidenc e in a lig ht that tends to support the finding of the disputed fac t and dis reg ard a ll evidence and infe renc es to the contra ry . Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v . Goodman , 8 0 S. W. 3 d 5 7 3 , 5 7 7 ( T e x. 2002). I f more tha

n a scintilla of evide nce e x ists, it is leg ally sufficie nt. Goodman , 80 S.W .3d at 577. Evidence is more than a scintilla w hen it “ rises to the leve l that would enable r easona ble and fair- minded people to diffe r in their conc lusions.” Merre ll Dow Pharm., Inc. v . Havne r , 953 S.W .2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). When evidenc e offere d to prove a vital fac t is so weak as to do no more than
c re a te a me re surm ise or su sp ic ion of its e xiste nc e , it is no mor e tha n a sc int ill a and , in l e g a l e ff e c t, is no evidence
. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). As with a tra ditional
s u m m ar y -j u d gm en tm o t i o n , we m u s tco n s t ru e t h e e v i d en ce i nfa v o r o f t h e n o n m o v an tan d i n d u l ge
ever y rea sonable infe renc e and r esolve a ny doubts in the nonmovant’s favor
. J ac k so n v . F ie sta Ma rt , 979 S.W .2d 68, 70 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.).

Bo th p arti e s r e f

e r e n c e tw o a f

f id a v it s a tt a c h e d

to th e D e p artm e n t’ s n o - e v id ence mot ion , th a t of

Smith a nd L ind say Ho rn e , a sta ff e r in the De pa

rtme nt’ s human r e so ur c e s d e pa rtme nt. See B inur v. Jac obo , 135 S.W .3d 646, 651 (Tex. 2004). Smit h’s af fidavit rec ounts that she posted1 7

Posit ion I I , “re ceive d the first packe t of applications and be g an intervie wing candidates on Octobe r 9, 2002,” and ma de a se lection without ever rec eiving Kenne dy ’s application or even know ing that Ke n n ed y h ad ap p l i ed fo r t h e p o s i t i o n . S m i t h ad d ed , “I d i d n o t h av e a n y i n fo rm at i o no r k n o wl ed ge
conce rning any

equ al opportunity

complaint or any

other c omplaint made by Cathren Ke nnedy during the time Iwas re viewing applications, choosing persons to be inter viewed, a nd selec ting the final ca ndidate.” I

n sum, Sm ith avers that when she interviewe d and hire d for Position I I , she wa s
unawa re e ither that Ke nnedy

had applied f

or this job or t hat Kennedy had filed a complaint reg arding P o s i t i o nI. I n her a ffidavit, Hor ne explained the conte x t in which she proce ssed and for war ded applications for

Smit h’s re view, the Depar tment’s internal procedur es for scre ening and fill ing a n “open until filled” position:

• Upon re ceipt, applic at ions are log g ed into a De partment database (the “ EEO databa se”) by

a staff er, a nd place d in a file for

scre ening
.

• Applications are then scre ened a ccor ding to the qua lifi ca t i ons outlined on the job posting. T h ose that mee t qualifications ar e “f orwa rded” to the hiring supervisor; those that do not ar e desig nated “ DNM” ( Does No t M ee t) and a re not forwa rded.

• Appl i cations fr om curre nt employ ees that meet qualifications are de signated “Mee ts-Current.”

• A p p l i c a t i o n s ar e “ f

o r w ar d e d ” t o t h e r e l e v an th i r i n g s u p e r v i s o r e v e r y F r i d ay.

• The hiringsupervisor ha s the choice of havingthe applications “forw arded” either by mail or by

being made available f

or the super

visor to pick up.

• This proce ss continues until a selection is made.1 8

Horne explained that, in the c ase of the Posit ion I I posting, Smit h, the hiring supervisor, r equeste d tha t a p p li c a ti o n s b e s c r e e n e d b a s e d o n mi n im u m qu a li f ic a ti o n s an d le f

t f o r p ic k u p in the Human Resource s depar

tment. Horne r ecounte d that four a pplications made available f or Smith t o pick up on Fr iday , September 27, 2003, a nd twenty -three wer e re ady on October 4. Scree ning of the Octobe r 4 b a t c h o f

t w e n t y- t h r e e ap p l i c a t i o n s w a s n o tc o mp l e t e d u n t i l a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2 p . m . t h a td ay. Meanw hile, around noon on O ctober 4, Kenne dy

had fax ed her

application to the De partment’s “Hiringand Selec tion” fax line. Horne e x plained that “the application neede d to be log g ed in the EEO d at ab ase and forw arde d to the posting folde r. With t he volume of a pplications that are
rec eived, the a

pplication would not have been fo rw ar d ed by 2:00 and was sc ree ned the f ollowing F ri da y .” L a te r, Ho rn e e xpla ine d, Ke nn e dy ’s a pp lic a tio n wa s in

fa c t sc re e ne d, de sig nate d “ Me e tsCur re nt, ” and fo rw ard e d w ith a batc h of fo ur te e n othe r ap pli c a tio ns on F ri da y , O c tob e r 1 1. Th e se applications we re ne ver pic ked up by Smit h who, ac cordingto her a ffidavit, had a lrea dy decide d on a hire
. To s u r

v iv e s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t, K e n n e dy h a d th e b u r d e n to r a is e a f a c t issue that Smit h (and/or some other decisionmake r) took the adver se action of r efusingto interview a nd hire Ke n n ed y wi t h kn o wl ed ge o f K en n ed y ’s co mp l ai n t
. T o ra i s e afa ct i s s u e t h at S m i t h h adkn o wl ed ge of Ke nnedy ’s complaint, Kenne dy points to corresponde nce a nd communications amongthe Depa rtment’s mana g eria l staff c oncer ning the complaint, some of which ref err ed to S mith as one of the pane l interviewe rs for Position I
.

The re cord r efle cts that Kenne dy filed her national origin discrimination complaint with t h e E E OC o n Aug ust 27. On Aug ust 30, the EEOC notified the De partment of K ennedy ’sKe nn e dy te sti fi e d th a t sh e inf

or me d Jud y Lutz, a De pa rtme nt e mpl oy e e , o f h e r i nte nt t o 10 fi le a c omp la int

wi th t he EE OC . T he re c or d c on ta ins no e vid e nc e c on c e rn ingLutz’ s po sit ion wi th the Depa rtment or that Lutz either had any role in the hiringdecision for Posit ion I Ior communicated knowledg e of the complaint to Smi th or any other pe rson. Kenne dy also appe ars to ar g ue that it is en o u gh for “the Depa rtment” to have had 11 knowledg e of he r complaint. I t is not. See H iggs , 20 05 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 10 58 , at *5 ; Ib e zim , 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 6252, at *20. 1 9 complaint and sug g ested mediation. By S ep t em b er 24, se vera l members of the Depa rtment’s manag eria l sta ff wer e awa re of the complaint—the Depa rtment’s direc tor of human re source s, Fra nk Pearc e, Pedro L opez in the Depar tment’ s e mp lo ye e r e la

ti o n s o f f ice, the D epar

tment’s deputy

direc tor of leg al servic es, and the Depa rtment’s human re source s attorney —as evide nced by

the circ ulation
no te s o n L op e z’s me mor and um r e c omm e nd ingtha

t th e De pa

rtme nt m e diate the c omp la int
. 10 Ho we ve r, Ke nn e dy

po int s to no e vid e nc e fr om whic h it c ou ld b e inf

e rr e d th a t Smi th actua lly rec eived a

ny such cor responde nce or

communications. The c lose s t ev i d ence Kenne dy pr od uc e s is he r o wn

de po sit ion

te sti mony

that sh e “ a ssume [d]” Smith k ne w o f t he c omp la int

b e c a us e
o f t h e s m a l l nu mb e r

o f e mp l o y e e s i n v o l v e d

i nt h e w o r

k i n v o l v i n g b o t h P o s i t i o n I a n d P o s i t i o nII. Kenne dy has not produce d more than a scintilla of evidenc e to support that infer ence , and we cannot simply impute the knowledg e of “ the Depa rtment” to Smith. Se e Ma rsa gli a , 22 S.W .3d at 5. 11 Additionally , Kenne dy has failed to raise a fact issue that Smit h ever rec eived or

was
awa re of Kenne dy ’s Positi on I Iapplication. Ke nnedy attempts to r ely on an email sent by Horne at 2 p.m. on Frida

y , October

4 stating, “ Applications for your job posting are r eady for pick up at the HR front.” Smith read this ema il at 4:08 p.m . that afte rnoon. Ke nnedy would have us infe r fr om this email that Sm ith picked up and revie wed Kenne dy ’s application befor e commenc ing inter views during the following wee k. Howeve r, proof that Smit h might have picked up some a pp lic a tio ns inF or the same re a so n, we dis a g re e wi th K e nnedy ’s ass ert ion that H or ne ’s a ff ida vit is 12 inconsistent with her ema il and prese nts a fac t issue.

Kenne dy also urg es us to drawinfere nces f rom the orde r of doc uments produce d by the Depa rtment in discovery . After a copy of Horne ’s email, “[t] he appellant’ s application follows on the ve ry ne xt pa g e of do c ume nts pr od uc e d by a pp e lle e .” To Ke nn e dy , “[t]hi s a rr ang e me nt s tr on g ly sug g ests that Pat Smi th got the a ppellant’s application on October 4, 2002.” We disag ree that we can dr aw su ch an infere nce me rely from the or der in whic h these doc uments are arr ang ed in the Depa rtment’s docume nt production. 2 0 response to Horne’ s email does not support an infe renc e that Ke nn ed y ’s application was among them. I ndeed, the Depa

rtment prese nted undi sputed evidenc e that Ke nnedy ’s application was not proce ssed and made available to Smi th until t he followingwee k. 12

There is no evidence that any decisionmake r other tha

n Smit h was involved in t he interviewingand hiring o f P o s i t ion I I . Horne admitted to “limited knowledg e” of Kenne dy ’s complaint at the time she was proce ssing the a pplications, but Kennedy

produce d no evidenc e that Ho rn e wa s a

de c isi on make r r e g ard ingwh e the r o r whe n a pp lic a tio ns sh ou ld b e fo rw ard e d to Smith
o r t h a tH o r n e w i t h h e l d K e n n e dy’ s a

p p l i c a t i o n a tt h e d i r e c t i o no f an y d e c i s i o n m a k e r . T o t h e c o n t r ar y, Ho rn e ’s un c on tr ov e rt e d te sti mony is that sh e wi thh e ld K e nn e dy ’s a pp lic a tio n on Oc tob e r 4 so le ly beca use of log istical problems cre ated by the volume of applications and the Depa rtment’s scr eening pr oc e dure s. See Maarouf v. W alker Mfg. Co. , 210 F.3d 750, 755 ( 7th Cir. 2000). I n fac t, the rec ord shows that Horne later pr ocesse d Kenne dy ’s application with a “Me ets–Current” desig nation, in a
ma nn e r c o n s i s t e n tw i t h t h e D e p art m e n t ’ s n o r m a l s c r e e n i n g p r o c e d

u r e s , an d m a d e i ta v a i l a

b l e to Smit h. By

this ti me, it is undisput ed that Smith had alrea dy decide d on a hire for Position I I
. The district cour

t did not err in gr anting no-evide nce summar y judgme nt in favor of the Depa rtment on Kenne dy ’s re taliation claim. We overrule Kenne dy ’s sec ond issue.2 1 CO NC LU SION W e h av e over

ruled Ke nnedy ’s two issues. We aff irm the district court’s g rant of
summa ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f t he De pa rtme nt o n K e nn e dy ’s natio na l or ig in d isc ri min a tio n c la im and her reta liation claim.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: De cembe r 22, 2005