2020 IL App (1st) 192626-U 

FIFTH DIVISION

Order filed: March 6, 2020 

No. 1-19-2626 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

DAVID EVANS III,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

THOMAS J. DART, in His Official Capacity as Sheriff 

of Cook County; and COOK COUNTY, as a Unit of 

Local Government and as Indemnitor, 

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the 

Circuit Court of 

Cook County 

No. 19 CH 02813 

 

 

 

Honorable 

Sophia Hall, 

Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THOMAS J. DART, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S MERIT BOARD; 

JAMES P. NALLY, Board Chairman; BYRON 

BRAZIER, Board Vice-Chairman; JOHN 

DALICANDRO, Board Secretary; KIM R. WIDUP, 

Board Member; VINCENT T. WINTERS, Board 

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Appeal from the 

Circuit Court of 

Cook County 

No. 19 CH 04416 
No. 1-19-2626 

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Member; PATRICK M. BRADY, Board Member; 

JUAN L. BALTIERRES, Board Member; GRAY 

MATEI-HARRIS, Board Member; and DAVID 

EVANS, III,

Defendants. 

(David Evans, III, Defendant-Appellant; Cook County 

Sheriff’s Merit Board, James P. Nally, Byron Brazier, 

John Dalicandro, Kim R. Widup, Vincent T. Winters, 

Patrick M. Brady, Juan L. Baltierres, and Gray MateiHarris, Defendants-Appellees.)

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Honorable 

Sophia Hall, 

Judge, Presiding.

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Rochford and Delort concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm the order of the circuit court granting the defendants’ motion to stay the 

present litigation pending resolution of an appeal in the supreme court from a 

decision in a separate action between the same parties.

¶ 2 The plaintiff, David Evans III, brings this interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017), challenging the circuit court’s order granting a motion, 

filed by the defendants, Thomas J. Dart (the Sheriff), Cook County, and the Cook County Sheriff’s 

Merit Board (the Board), to stay the present litigation, pending resolution of an appeal in the 

supreme court between the same parties and raising one common claim. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm. 

¶ 3 The following factual recitation necessary to the resolution of this appeal is adduced from 

the pleadings, orders, motions, and supporting documents of record. On June 13, 2005, the plaintiff

was appointed as a Correctional Officer with the Cook County Sheriff’s Department. On February 

21, 2017, the Sheriff suspended the plaintiff and, the next day, filed a complaint against him with 

the Board, seeking his termination for alleged use of improper force with a detainee. 
No. 1-19-2626 

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¶ 4 The Sheriff also charged six other officers (who are not parties to this case) with 

misconduct. On February 26, 2018, before the Board heard the charges against the plaintiff and 

the other officers, they filed a complaint in the circuit court against the defendants1 (Goral v. Dart, 

No. 2017 CH 15546) seeking, inter alia, to enjoin the Board from taking any action in their 

disciplinary cases; seeking declarations of their entitlement to back pay; and challenging the 

composition of the Board, including the appointments of certain members to the Board. On July 

26, 2018, the circuit court dismissed the complaint in Goral v. Dart, finding that the officers failed 

to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit.

¶ 5 On August 1, 2018, during the pendency of the proceedings before the Board, the plaintiff 

and the other officers filed their notice of appeal from the circuit court’s decision in Goral v. Dart. 

In that appeal, the plaintiff and the other officers challenged, inter alia, the authority of the Board 

to act based on its compositional defects and raised the question of their entitlement to back pay. 

Goral v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 181646.

¶ 6 On March 1, 2019, the Board determined that the plaintiff had not engaged in any 

misconduct and reinstated him effective February 21, 2017. On March 5, 2019, the Sheriff sought 

administrative review of the Board’s decision. Dart v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, No. 

2019 CH 04416 (Cir. Ct. Cook County). On that same day, the plaintiff filed the instant mandamus

action against the defendants, seeking back pay he maintains is owed to him from February 21, 

2017, the date the Board determined he was effectively reinstated. Goral v. Dart, No. 2019 CH 

02813 (Cir. Ct. Cook County). The matters were consolidated and are proceeding under the caption 

of the plaintiff’s mandamus action. 

¶ 7 On July 10, 2019, this court issued its decision in Goral v. Dart, reversing the circuit court 

1 The defendants in the Goral proceedings are the same defendants in the present case. 
No. 1-19-2626 

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in part and remanding the matter to the circuit court with instructions to consider the issue of back 

pay. Goral v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 181646, ¶ 114. This court held, inter alia, that the issue of

back pay is “included within [the authority to act] exception to the exhaustion requirement,” (Id.

¶ 47), that the question of whether the Goral plaintiffs (including the plaintiff in this action) are 

entitled to back pay is a purely legal question and is not dependent upon the outcome of the 

administrative hearing before the Board, and that the issue of back pay can be raised in the circuit 

court without first exhausting administrative remedies before the Board. Id. ¶¶ 52-53. 

¶ 8 On July 22, 2019, the defendants filed a petition, in the supreme court, for leave to appeal 

the Goral decision. On September 25, 2019, the supreme court granted the petition. Goral v. Dart, 

2020 IL 125085. The defendants’ opening brief before the supreme court addresses the issue of 

back pay, arguing that the issue of back pay is a disputed question of fact that should be resolved 

by the Board and not the circuit court. 

¶ 9 On October 18, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to stay the present litigation, pending 

the supreme court’s decision in Goral. On November 27, 2019, the circuit court granted the 

defendants’ motion to stay. This appeal followed. 

¶ 10 The sole question before us is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in granting the 

defendants’ motion to stay the current action pending resolution of the Goral appeal in the supreme 

court. A circuit court’s authority to stay proceedings arises from its power to control the disposition 

of its cases. J.S.A. v. M.H., 384 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1005 (2008). The factors a circuit court considers 

when deciding whether to issue a stay include: the prevention of multiplicity, vexation, and 

harassment; the orderly administration of justice; judicial economy; and the res judicata effect of 

a claim. Id. 

¶ 11 In determining whether to stay the latter of two suits, the subject matter between the two 
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proceedings need not be identical, such that the resolution of the earlier action “is potentially 

dispositive; it is necessary only that the two proceedings share a ‘significant’ issue.” Khan v. BDO 

Seidman, LLP, 2012 IL App (4th) 120359, ¶ 74. In other words, the test is whether the reviewing 

court’s decision in the earlier proceeding would be significant to, or have an effect on, the latter

proceeding between the parties, and not whether it would be completely dispositive of the latter

proceeding. Id. ¶ 78. The decision to grant or deny a motion to stay will not be overturned on 

appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Estate of Bass v. Katten, 375 Ill. App. 3d 62, 67 (2007). Our 

function is not to determine if we agree with the circuit court’s resolution of the matter, but rather, 

to determine if the circuit court acted arbitrarily, exceeded the bounds of reason, or ignored 

recognized principles of law. Aventine Renewable Energy, Inc. v. JP Morgan Securities, Inc., 406 

Ill. App. 3d 757, 760 (2010). 

¶ 12 Based on our review of the record, there is no question that the present case and the Goral

case pending before the supreme court have a “significant issue” in common—that issue being the 

question of whether the Board or the circuit court should first resolve the issue of back pay. In 

each stage of the Goral litigation the question of back pay surfaced. The plaintiff in the instant 

matter maintains that, regardless of the outcome of the Goral proceedings, he is entitled to back

pay and, therefore, the stay was in error. However, the relief that the plaintiff seeks is intertwined 

with questions that are before the supreme court—whether he must exhaust his administrative 

remedies before seeking back pay. 

¶ 13 The supreme court’s decision in Goral will control the next steps regarding the back pay 

issue that is central to the instant matter. Allowing these two cases to proceed separately is not 

only duplicative, but it is also contrary to the orderly administration of justice. Further, allowing 

the present case to proceed before the conclusion of Goral does nothing to contribute to the cause 
No. 1-19-2626 

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of judicial economy. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s decision to 

stay the proceeding. 

¶ 14 We note that the plaintiff’s argument that the circuit court provided no reasoning for its

decision to stay the current proceeding is unavailing. We review the judgment of the circuit court, 

not its reasoning, and we may affirm the judgment on any grounds supported by the record, 

regardless of whether the circuit court relied on those grounds, and regardless of whether the circuit 

court’s reasoning was sound. City of Chicago v. Holland, 206 Ill. 2d 480, 492 (2003). Accordingly, 

we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the defendants’ motion to 

stay the present case during the pendency of the Goral case before the supreme court. 

¶ 15 Affirmed.