### FI LED U.S . COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CI RCUIT Apri l 2, 2004 THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

* Honorable Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. [P UBLI SH]

IN THE UNIT ED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELE VEN TH C IRCU IT

________________________ No. 03-11056

________________________ D. C. Docket N o. 02-01334-CV -CAP -1 PRISC ILLA HILL , on behalf of herself and all others simila rly situ ated, Plain tiff-A ppe llee,
versus BE LL SO UT H T EL EC OM M UN ICA TIO NS , IN C., De fend ant-A ppe llant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States Distri ct Court for th e N orth ern D istrict o f G eorg ia

_________________________ (April 2, 2004) Before ED MO ND SON , Chief Judge, BIRCH and F ARR IS * , Circuit Judges. BIR CH , Circ uit Ju dge :2

Th is app eal inv olve s the in terpla y betw een th e Fe dera l Co mm unic ation s A ct, 47 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2000), which requires tel ecommunications servic e provider s to fi le t arif

fs with t he FederalCommunicati ons Commissi on, and t he federa l “f

ile d rate doctrine,” whic h prohibi ts cus tomers f rom direc tly

chall enging those fil ed tarif

fs in state or federalcourt. Plaintiff-a ppellee, Priscil la Hill ( “Hill”) , bro ugh t six sta te-law claim s cha lleng ing d efen dan t-app ellant's , BellS outh Telecommunications, Inc. (“BellSouth”), alleged prac tice of mis leading cust omers about t he fil ed tariffs it c harged t o customer s. The di stri ct cour t dis missed f

our of Hil l' s cl ai ms as barred

by t he f il ed r at e doc tr ineon the gr ound t hat tho se c la ims direc tly cha lleng ed B ellSo uth's filed ta riff. T he sp ecific q uestio n pr esen ted in this appeal is whether Hill 's two remaining st ate-l aw claims also should have been dism issed und er the filed r ate do ctrine ––o n the theo ry tha t they, to o, dir ectly atta cke d Bel lSouth' s fi le d ta ri ff. Afte r re vie w, we c onclude t hat the se t wo cl ai ms should have been si milarly di smisse d. Accordi ngly, we REV ERSE the judgment of th e distr ict cou rt. I. BACKGRO UND BellSouth, as a t elecommunications se rvices provider, is subject to federal regulation unde r the Fede ral Communications Act (“FCA”), 47 U.S. C. § 201 et seq. The FC A requires carrier s such as BellSouth to fi le with the Federal1 Effective 1 April 2003, however, the FCC decided tha t telecommunications service provider s such as B ellSouth ma

y no longer recoup a n amount in

excess of their contributions to the USF from their customers. In re Fed.- State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv. , FCC 02-329, 2002 WL 31778732, at *24978 (Dec. 13, 2002). 3 Co mm unic ation s Co mm ission (“FC C”) , and mak e pu blicly a vailab le, certa in schedul es, or

“ta riff s,” e xplai ning al l of t

he charge s, pra cti ces, and regul ati ons affecting them. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a). The FC A also requires Bell South and other telec ommun icati ons services provider s to contribute a percenta ge of their re venues to a “U nive rsal S ervic e Fu nd” (“U SF ”), 47 U.S .C. § 254 (d), w hich is des igne d to pro vide affo rdab le teleco mm unic ation s serv ices to rura l and low -inco me a reas, id. § 254(b)(3). BellSouth's re quired contribut ion to the USF is list ed in the ta riffs BellS outh filed w ith the FC C. In re Fed. -Stat e Joint Bd. on Universa l Serv. , FCC 97- 157 , 199 7 W L 2 363 83, a t *90 56, 9 145 (M ay 8, 1 997 ). Under FC C regulations i n place at t he time Hill f

iled her Firs t Amended Complaint , Bell South was permit ted t o recoup i ts re quired USF contribution f rom its customers, eit

her through the rate s it charged or as a separat e itemiz ed charge. 1 In re Fed. -Stat e Joint

Bd. on Universa l Serv. , FCC 02-32 9, 2002 W L 317787 32, at *24959 (Dec. 13, 2002). Bel lSouth chos e to i mpose a separate ite mized charge of $0.53 indicate d on each customer's monthly bi ll as t he “Federal UniversalService Ch arge ” (“F US C”) . R1 -2, E x. A at 2. L ike B ellSo uth's requ ired c ontr ibutio n to the USF, the dollar amount of the FUSC levied on BellSouth cust omers was4

inclu ded and exp lained in the tariffs that B ellSo uth f iled w ith the FC C. Id. at 2,
unn um bere d 9. Hill f ile d a complaint in t

he Stat e Court of Ful ton County, Georgia, rais ing various state-la

w claims r egardi ng BellSout h's r ecoupment, through t he FUSC, of
an amount

in e xce ss o f i ts requir ed c ontri but ionto t he USF. She a ll ege d si x cl ai ms base d on (1) th e G eorg ia U nfair Tra de P ractice s A ct, O .C.G .A. § 10- 1-3 90, et seq. ; (2) f raud and neg ligen t misr epre senta tion; ( 3) co nve rsion ; (4) u njus t enric hm ent; (5) breach of duty of good fait h and fair dealing; and (6) breach of contract
acco mp anied by a f

raud ulen t act. As for damages, the district court construed Hill' s complaint as r equest ing purely monetar y rel ief––namely, “rec overy of BellSouth's undiscl osed charges in excess of its cont ributions to the fund.” Hill v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. , 244 F.S upp .2d 1 323 , 132 5 (N .D. G a. 20 03)
. BellSouth removed the acti on to the Distri ct Court for the Northern Distri ct of Georgia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, on the ground that Hill' s stat elaw causes of acti on raised federalquestions because t hey either

(1) were completely pre empted by the FCA o r (2) raise d substantia l questi ons of federal law. Base d on its asser

tion t hat fe deraljuri sdiction exi sted, BellSout h also f ile d a
mo tion to dism iss H ill's claim s as b arre d un der th e fed eral file d rate doc trine. H ill,2 These two re maini ng clai ms con testi ng Bell Sout h's FUS F charge e ssent iall y challen ge

BellSouth's (1) characterization of the FUSF as a federal fee a nd (2) lack of full disclosure that customers are charged a

n amount in excess of BellSouth's required contribution to the USF. Appellee's Br. at 19. 5 on the ot her hand, fil ed a moti on to remand t he case to it s state cour

t of ori gin on the g rou nd th at no ne o f her claim s gav e rise to fede ral su bject m atter ju risdic tion. The dist rict court a greed wit

h BellSout

h that Hill' s cla ims base d on conversi on, unjus t enri chment, breach of duty of good f

ait h and fai r deal ing, a

nd breach of

contra ct ac companied by a fraudul ent ac t gave rise to federa l question juri sdiction beca

use the y were comple tely preempt ed by the FCA. After finding federa l jurisdi cti on for the se cl aims (a nd, the reby, impli edly de nying Hil l' s motion to rem and these fou r claim s), the distric t cou rt gra nted BellS outh 's mo tion to dism iss the m p ursu ant to the file d rate doc trine. Hill , 244 F.S upp .2d a t 133 0. H ill did n ot ap peal th e dism issal o f thes e fou r claim s. The dist rict court di sagree d, however, that Hill' s two remai ning claims––violation of

the Georgi a Unfair Tra de Pract ices Act and fra ud and negli gent mis repres entation 2 ––also gave ris e to fe deralquesti on juri sdiction because it c oncluded t

hat t hese t wo claims were not comple tely preempt ed by the FC A. Id. The dist

rict court t hen decl ined t o exerci se suppl ementaljuri sdiction
ove r thes e claim s and , there fore , gran ted H ill's mo tion to rem and them to the ir state court of origin (thereb y impliedly denying B ellSouth's motion to d ismiss these6

claim s). Id. at 1330-31. BellSouth now appeals the dist rict c ourt's implied denial of its m otion to dis miss these two claim s. II. AN AL YS IS Before we may proc eed to t he merit s, we must f

irst address whether we have appropri ate j urisdi cti on to hear the appe al. We conclude (a) that we have app rop riate ap pellate jurisd iction and (b) th at Be llSo uth's mo tion to dism iss H ill's
rem ainin g tw o state -law claim s sho uld h ave b een g rante d. A. Appellate Juri sdiction Hill argues t

hat our juris dicti on to consider BellSouth' s appeal was limited for tw o rea son s. Fir st, she con tend s that “[ s]ince BellS outh 's N otice o f A ppe al did not expre ssly

address the orde r of remand, only t hat portion of t

he order de nying their moti on to dismiss the r emanded claims is before this court .” Appellee' s Br. at 8. Second, she argue s that , under Fede ral Rul e of Civi l Procedur e 54(b), the distric t cou rt's or der w as no t a fina l decis ion u nde r 28 U.S .C. § 129 1 be caus e it did not d ispo se of

all the c laims in H ill's mu lti-cou nt actio n. W e add ress e ach o f H ill's misp laced con cern s in tu rn. 1. B ellSo uth's No tice of Ap peal BellSout h's Noti ce of Appealstates it s int enti on to appea l “f rom the portion of th e [D istrict] C our t's ord er . . . de nyin g D efen dan t's M otion to D ismis s Pla intiff's3 In Bonner v. City of Pricha rd , 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit a dopted as binding p

recede nt all Fif th Circuit d

ecisions handed d own prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. 7 claims for viol ati on of the Georgi a Unfair Tra de Pract ices Act and for f raud and negligent misr epresentation in thei r entire ty.” R1-14 at 1. While it is true that “[t] he general rule in this c ircuit is that an appellat e court has juri sdicti on to review only those judgments, orders or portions t hereof which are specifi ed in an appellant 's noti ce of appeal, ” Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc. , 825 F.2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987), this circuit al so embraces “a poli cy of liber al constructi on of notices of appeal ” when (1) unno ticed cl aims or issues a re inext rica bly i ntert wined with noticed one s and (2) t he advers e part

y is not preju diced , C.A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp. , 649 F.2d 1049, 1056 (5th Cir. 1981). 3 In th is case , the d istrict co urt's im plied den ial of B ellSo uth's mo tion to dismiss Hill's two rem aining claims and its grant of H ill' s motion to rem and those claim s are in extric ably in tertw ined : the d istrict co urt im plied ly den ied B ellSo uth's motion t o dismis s Hill 's s tat e-la w claims be cause it expre ssly grante d Hill' s motion to remand t

hose cl aims. Since t

hese i ssues a

re so i nterr elated, Hil l is not preju diced by o ur co nsid eratio n of the d istrict co urt's g rant o f her mo tion to
rem and beca use th e pro priety of th e distr ict cou rt's de cision to rem and and its8

impli ed deci sion t o deny Bell South's motion t o dismis s requi re consi derat ion of t he
sam e lega l issue : wh ether fede ral qu estion jurisd iction sho uld h ave a ttache d to Hill's two rem ainin g claim s. 2. The finali ty of the di stric t court' s order Under Rule 54(b) of

the Feder al Rule s of Civi l Procedur e, “ in actions involving multiple cl aims for reli ef . . . an orde r that

final ly di sposes of

one or more but fe wer than al l of t he cla ims for r eli ef ass erte d . . . does not terminate the acti on in thedist

rict court” and is not

appeal able a s a fi nal orde r pursuant to 28 U.S .C. § 129 1. Huck eby v. Frozen Food Express , 555 F.2d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 197 7). A lthou gh th e distr ict cou rt allow ed tw o of Hill's claim s to p roce ed in state court, these two claims were “t erminate[d]” for purpose s of furt her action by t

he dist rict court, thereby making t he dist rict court' s order one that

is final and app ealab le in th is cou rt. Engelhardt v. Paul Reve re Life Ins. Co. , 139 F.3d 1346, 1350-51 (11th Ci r. 1998) ( concluding that the dec isi on of a dis tri ct cour t to r emand state-la w c laims base d on a den ial of s upp leme ntal ju risdic tion u nde r 28 U.S .C. § 136 7(c) (3) is app ealab le). B. The M erits of BellSouth's Appeal Because we have juri sdiction to he ar Bell South's appeal , we now turn to a discus sion of t

he merit s of it s appeal . In t his di scussi on, we will(1) st ate t he9

pro per s tand ard o f rev iew , (2) d iscus s fed eral q uestio n jur isdictio n an d B ellSo uth's argumen t for why it shou ld have attached to H ill' s two rem aining state-law claims, and (3) d iscus s the f

iled ra te do ctrine and wh y w e agr ee w ith B ellSo uth th at this doc trine b ars H ill's req ueste d relie f in th is case
. 1. Standard of Review The di st ri ct co urti mpl i ed l y d en i edBe l l Sout h' s m ot i ont o d i sm i ss Hi l l ' s t wo remaining state-law clai ms and declined to exerci se supplemental j urisdiction over them based on its det ermination t hat those t

wo claims did not give ris e to federal sub ject m atter ju risdic tion. “[ T]h e sub ject m atter ju risdic tion o f the d istrict co urt is a l eg alqu es t i ont hatwe r ev i ew de novo .” Fogad e v. EN B Rev ocable Tru st , 263 F.3d 1274, 1285 (11th C ir. 2001) (ci tati on omitted). While usual ly “[w]e re view the di stri ct cour

t' s deci sion not

to exer cise supplemental j urisdi cti on for abuse of discr eti on. . . . , [ t]o t

he exte nt that thecourt' s deci sion was bas ed on conclusions of law, we re view the legal conc lusions de novo .” Engelhardt , 139 F.3d at 1351 n.4. 2. Federa l Subjec t Matte r Juri sdiction Any claim that w as originally filed in state court may be remov ed by a defendant to federalcourt if t he case could have been fil ed in federalcourt origi nally. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Where, as he re, t here i s no diver sit

y of citizen ship , the d efen dan t mu st sho w th at fed eral q uestio n jur isdictio n is p resen t.10

Id. § 14 41( b). F eder al cou rts ha ve fe dera l que stion jurisd iction ove r “all civ il acti ons ari sing under

the Constitution, l aws, or t reat ies of the Unit ed Stat es.” 28 U.S .C. § 133 1. W heth er a c laim “a rises u nde r” a f eder al law “is gen erally determined by the well -pleaded complaint rule, which provides t

hat federal juri sdiction exi sts only when a feder al ques tion i s prese nted on t he face of the plainti ff's properly pleaded complaint .” Smith v. GTE Corp. , 236 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11th Cir . 2001) (c itation omi tte d). Thus, “the plai ntif f is t he maste r of the complaint, f

ree to avoid feder al juri sdicti on by pleading only state cla ims even where a federal cla im is als o availabl e.” Marcus v. AT&T Corp. , 138 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 1998). However, i f “t he plaintif

f's right to rel ief ne cessa

rily depends on resolution of

a subst anti al ques tion of federa l la

w,” feder al ques tion j urisdi cti on may nev erthe less atta ch to the sta te-law claim
. Sm ith , 236 F.3 d at 1 310
. BellS outh has a rgu ed, b oth b efor e the d istrict co urt an d on app eal, tha t Hill's remaining two claims––based on t he Georgia Unfair Trade Prac tic es Act and f raud and negli gent mis repres entation––shoul d create feder al ques tion j urisdi cti on beca use th ey rais e sub stantia l que stion s of feder al law . Sp ecifica lly, Be llSo uth argu es tha t reso lution of th ese tw o claim s imp licates th e filed rate d octrin e, a judg e-m ade c reatio n of fede ral law . Th e distr ict cou rt did not c ons ider th is11

argument, and Bell South now urges us t o do so on appeal . Accordi ngly, we now
con sider the file d rate doc trine. 3. The Fil ed Rate Doct rine W e con clud e that feder al qu estion jurisd iction sho uld h ave a ttache d to H ill's two rem ainin g state -law caus es of action beca use th ey im plicate d the filed r ate doc trine. A lthou gh o ur d ecisio n is n ot co mp elled b y bin ding , on- poin t prec eden t, we reach our c onclusi on based on a c onsider ati on of persua sive a uthori ty and t

he two broader principles unde rlying the doct rine: nondiscrimination and nonjustici abili ty. We begin with a general di scussion of the fi led rate doctrine, then di scuss r elated case s from two si ster circ uits , and conc lude by di scussing the t wo p rinc i pl es un de rlying t he do ct rine an d h ow t

he y are i mpl i cat edbyHi l l ' s t wo
rem ainin g claim s.

a. Th e D octrin e G ener ally The filed rate doctrine (also kn own as the “filed tariff doctrine”) “forbids a regu lated e ntity to char ge ra tes fo r its ser vices othe r than thos e pro perly filed w ith the appropriat e federal r egulatory aut hority. ” Ar kan sas L ouis iana G as C o. v. H all , 453 U.S. 571, 577, 101 S. Ct. 2925, 2930 (1981) . As it appli es in t

he telec ommun icati ons industry, t he filed rate doctrine dictat es that t he rates a c arrier12

ch ar ge s i t s c us t ome rs , on ce fi l edwi t h andap pr ov edbyt he FCC , be co me “ t he l aw” and exclu sively gov ern th e righ ts and liabilities of th e car rier to the cu stom er: Not only is a carri er forbidden from charging rates other than as se t out in its fi led t arif

f, but customer s are a lso cha

rged with notice of

the terms a nd rate s set

out in t hat fi led t arif

f and may not

bring an a cti on agains t a ca

rrie r that would inval idat e, alter or add to t he ter ms of the filed t ariff. Evanns v. AT&T Corp. , 229 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2000) (internalfootnotes
om itted). Therefore , caus es of ac tion in which the pl aintiff atte mpts to c hall enge the term s of a filed ta riff ar e bar red b y the f iled ra te do ctrine
. See, e.g. , id. at 840; Marcus , 138 F.3d at 58-59. A more difficult question is present ed, however, when the plai ntiff' s clai ms––at least on their face––do not attempt to chal lenge a fil ed rate and thus do not appear to implicat e the parti es' ri ghts and liabi lities under that rate. Hill, for exampl e, argues that her r emaini ng claims do not dir ectly chal lenge BellSouth's filed FU SF, bu t instead challenge BellSouth's repres entation of the FUS F to its customers. We begin by examining related prece dents from two other circu its. b. Related Cases Two of our sist er ci rcuit s have cons idere d the ef fect of the f ile d rate doctrine on claims simil ar to Hil l' s, and bot h found the c lai ms to be bar red under t

he13

doctrine. In Marcus , app ellants , in claim s sim ilar to H ill's, alleg ed th at A T& T's adv ertisin g an d billin g pr actices we re fa lse an d m islead ing b ecau se the carr ier did not discloseits prac tice of “rounding-up” the length of cust omer's long-dist ance calls to the n ext fu ll min ute. 1 38 F .3d a t 51. T he S econ d C ircuit, h ow ever , held that fra ud or misrepresentation clai ms are barred by the fi led rate doctrine because , when monetary damages are requested, suc h claims have the effec t of cha lle nging the file d rate
. Id. at 60 -63
. The Ninth Circ uit in Evanns face d sim ilar claim s to th ose p resen ted in Marcus and those presented by Hillin thi s appeal . 229 F.3d at 840-41. Evanns ch al l en ge d AT &T' s c ol l ec t i onof i t s US F pa ss -t

hr ou gh fe e a s unl awf

ulont he t wo gro und s that ( 1) A T& T sh ould hav e disc losed to its cu stom ers th at the U SF is, in fact, a pass-through charge and (2) the USF pass-through is not a charge requi red by th e go vern men t to be paid by co nsu mer s. Id. Beca use AT&T had fi le d it s USF tarif f with the FCC, the Ninth Circuit concluded that any cl aim that AT&T had an obligation to Evan ns “ beyond tho se set out i n the fil ed tarif fs, i. e., t hat [AT& T] had a duty to disclose the fa ct that th e U SF asses sme nt w as a p ass-th rou gh c harg e, is . . . barred by the f

iled-rate doctrine.” Id. (em pha sis in o rigin al). “T he file d rate doc trine b ars an y claim , wh ether cou ched in term s of feder al orstate law, atta cking14

the def endants ' col lection of t

he USF assessment

in compli ance wit

h the t erms of the fil ed tarif

fs.” Id. (em pha sis in o rigin al). c. The Two Principles Underlying t he Doctri ne Both the Marcus and Evans courts reli ed on the t wo principl es underlying the fi led rate doct

rine: (1) nondis crimi nati on––“preve nting c arri ers fr om engaging in pri ce dis crimi nati on as bet ween ratepayers ” and (2) nonjustici abil ity

––“pres erving t

he exclusive role of f

ederalagenci es in a

pproving rate s for t elec ommunicati ons servi ces t hat ar e 'r easonabl e' bykeeping c ourts out of the rate -making process . . . , a functi on that the fe deral regulatory agencie s are more competent to perform.” Marcus , 13 8 F. 3dat 58
. Ba se d o n the se t wo principles, “the doctrine is a pplie d stri ctly to pre vent a pl aintiff f rom bringi ng a cause of acti on even in t

he face of appare nt ine quiti es whenever e ithe r the
non discr imin ation stran d or the n onju sticiab ility stran d un derly ing th e do ctrine is implicat ed by the cause of action the plaintiff se eks to pursue.” Id. a t59
. We add ress e ach p rincip le and its effe ct on Hill's claim s in tu rn.

1. Nondiscrimination Th e pu rpo se of

the n ond iscrim inatio n pr incip le un derly ing th e filed rate doct ri ne i s t o ens ure that a llte le commun ic at ion s cu st omer s ar e ch arg ed t he s ame rate fo r their serv ice–– the ra te filed with and app rov ed b y the F CC . Th e filed rate15

doctrine prevent s carriers from negoti ati ng a lower rate wit h some cust omers and then char ging othe rs the rate file d w ith the FC C. AT &T Co . v. C ent. O ffice T el., Inc. , 524 U.S. 214, 223, 118 S. Ct. 1956, 1963 (1998). The nondiscrimination prin ciple e xpla ins w hy th e filed rate d octrin e bar s any challe nge that, “if successful, would have the effect of changing the f iled t ariff. ” Brown v. MCI Worldcom N etwork Servs., Inc. , 277 F.3 d 11 66, 1 170 (9th Cir. 2 002 ). Ev en if such a cha lleng e do es no t, in the ory, a ttack th e filed rate, an aw ard o f dam ages to the cu stom er-p laintiff

wo uld, e ffec tively, c han ge th e rate p aid b y the c usto mer to
one belo w th e filed rate p aid b y oth er cu stom ers. See, e.g. , Marcus , 138 F.3d at 60 (“Pla intiffs wh o w ere a ble to pro ve th eir claim s and reco ver d ama ges w ould ef fe ctiv ely r ec ei ve a d is co untedratefo r p hon e s ervi ce ove r o th er AT&T custo mer s.”). In thi s case , Hill 's t

wo remaining s tat e-la

w causes of a cti on impli cate the
non discr imin ation prin ciple b ecau se, in e ffec t, she “s eeks reco very of B ellSo uth's undisclosed charges in excess of it s contributi ons to the [USF].” Hill , 244 F.Supp.2d at

1325. Such compensatory damages “would have the e ffect of retro active ly red ucin g” H ill's rate f or tele com mu nicatio ns se rvice , and BellS outh “wo uld, in essen ce, be forc ed to refu nd to [H ill] the am oun t allege dly overcharged.” Taffet

v. Souther

n Co. , 967 F.2d 1483, 1491 (11th C ir. 1992) (en16

ban c). L ike all o ther B ellSo uth c usto mer s, H ill is pre sum ed to hav e no tice, via BellS outh 's filed tariffs , of th e bas is for BellS outh 's FU SC
. Evanns , 229 F.3d at 841. And to permi t her to recover on her cl aims t

hat Bel lSouth had a

n obligation to dis close to it s cust omers–– beyond the discl osures alrea dy made in its fi led tariffs ––th at the F US C B ellSo uth le vied reco upe d an amo unt in exce ss of its required contribution to the USF w ould be to all ow her “to receive a di scounted rate for phone servi ce over other [Bell South] customers.” See, e.g. , Marcus , 138 F.3 d at 6 0; Evanns , 229 F.3 d at 8 41. 2. N onju sticiab ility Th e pu rpo se of

the n onju sticiab ility prin ciple u nde rlying the file d rate doctrine is to preser

ve the FCC's primary

juri sdiction over de termi nati ons rega rdin g the reaso nab lenes s of r ates ch arge d by regu lated c arrier s. Arkansas Louisiana Gas , 453 U.S . at 57 7-7 8, 10 1 S . Ct. at 2 930 . Th is prin ciple “p reve nts more than judicia l rate -setting; it precludes any j udicialaction which undermines agency rate- making authority. ” Marcus , 138 F.3 d at 6 1. Th us, ev en if a claim does not direct ly attack the fil ed rate, an award of damages to the customer that
wo uld, in effe ct, resu lt in a ju dicial d eterm inatio n of the re ason ablen ess o f that r ate is pro hibite d un der th e filed rate d octrin e.17

In thi s case , Hill 's t

wo remaining s tat e-la

w causes of a cti on impli cate the
nonjusticia bility p rincip le bec ause she s eeks only mo netar y dam ages as relie f. Hill , 244 F.S upp .2d a t 132 5. W ere w e to aw ard H ill the re lief sh e seek s, w e w ould be retroactively det ermining that t he FUS C originally

levied by Bell South, that was filed w ith an d ap pro ved by th e FC C, w as un reaso nab le. Th e fac t that H ill cha ll enge s Bel lSouth' s repre sentati on of theFUSC––rathe r than t he FUSC its elf––doe s not alter our analy sis: “[a] regulated entity 's a lle ged fraud doe s not create a right to a r easonable rat e that exi sts independently of agency acti on.” Taffet , 967 F.2 d at 1 494 -95
. Thus, Hill 's r emaini ng two claims are al so barre d by the n onju sticiab ility prin ciple u nde rlying the file d rate doc trine. W e ther efor e ho ld tha t Hill's two rem ainin g claim s imp licate th e filed rate do ct rine be ca us e s he se ek s p ur ely m on et ar y d am ag es as re l i ef

. Thu s, t he se t wo claims rais e subst anti al ques tions of feder al l aw, and fede ral que sti on juri sdiction should have attac hed. For that reas on, the dist rict c ourt erred when it denied BellS outh 's mo tion to dism iss the se claim s and instea d rem and ed th em to their state co urt o f orig in. II I. CONCLUSI ON Because we find that the di stric t court err ed by refusing to al low federal qu es t i onj ur i sd i cti onfo r Hi l l ' s t wo r em aini ng st at e- l aw c au se s o f a cti on , we18

RE VE RS E th e jud gm ent o f the d istrict co urt d enyin g B ellSo uth's mo tion to dismis s thes e two cla ims. Accordingly , we REMA ND this case with ins tructions to gr ant B ellSo uth's mo tion to dism iss the se claim s as b arre d un der th e filed rate doc trine.19

EDM OND SON , Chief

Judge, di ssenting: I would affirm the di stri ct cour t’s decis ion to r emand to state c ourt t he remaining claims. I t

hink toda

y’s c ourt extends the judge-made fil ed-rate doctrine too far : Congress inte nded not t o remove from t he states t

he power to pre vent decept ive t

rade pra cti ces al ong the l ines a lle ged by Hillin her c lai ms for viol ati on of the Georgi a Unfair Tra de Pract ices Act and for f raud and negl igent misr epre senta tion. Cf. AT& T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc. , 118 S.Ct. 1956, 1966-67 (19 98) (Re hnq uist, C . J. con curr ing) (statin g, “T he file d rate doc trine’s pur pos e is to ensur e that

the fi led rates a

re the exclus ive source of t he ter ms and conditions by which the c ommon carrie r provide s to i ts cus tomers t he servi ces cove red by t he tarif f. It does not

serve as a shi eld against all ac tions based i n state l aw.”).