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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

DEPOSITORS INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

January 13, 2015 

v No. 318269 

Ingham Circuit Court 

DAHLIA LUERA-HARRIS, Personal 

Representative for the Estate of ANTHONY 

HARRIS, JOYE MICHELLE COCHRAN, 

Personal Representative for the Estate of TAYLER 

SCOTT COCHRAN, and CHRISTINE 

BOSSENBERY, Personal Representative for the 

Estate of HOLLY M. BOSSENBERY, 

LC No. 12-001330-CK 

 Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

JORDAN ROBERT HENIKA, 

 Defendant. 

Before: TALBOT, P.J., and CAVANAGH and M. J. KELLY, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 In this suit for declaratory relief concerning the coverage for a homeowner’s insurance 

policy, defendants, the Estate of Anthony Harris, the Estate of Tayler Scott Cochran, and the 

Estate of Holly M. Bossenbery (collectively the Estates), by their personal representatives, 

appeal by right the trial court’s order granting plaintiff Depositors Insurance Company’s motion 

for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). On appeal, the Estates argue the trial court 

erred when it determined that Depositors Insurance had no duty to defend its insured, defendant 

Jordan Robert Henika, against the Estates’ claims that Henika’s negligence proximately caused 

the accident that killed Harris, Cochran, and Bossenbery. Because the trial court correctly 

determined that Depositors Insurance’s policy did not apply to the claims at issue, we affirm. 

I. BASIC FACTS 

 On the night of January 29 to January 30, 2011, Henika and his roommates hosted a party 

at their East Lansing apartment. Harris, Cochran, and Bossenbery attended the party. Henika 
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and his roommates provided alcohol to the partygoers, including minor Brett Johnson. Harris, 

Cochran, and Bossenbery left with Johnson. Johnson, who was legally intoxicated, drove the 

vehicle. Johnson later lost control and the vehicle crashed broadside into a tree. Harris, 

Cochran, and Bossenbery died in the accident. The Estates later sued Johnson, Henika, and 

Henika’s roommates for wrongful death. 

 Henika’s father purchased a homeowner’s insurance policy from Depositors Insurance. 

The policy included coverage for personal liability claims: 

A. Coverage E – Personal Liability 

If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an “insured” for damages because of 

“bodily injury” or “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” or “personal 

injury” to which this coverage applies, we will: 

1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which an “insured” is 

legally liable. Damages include prejudgment interest awarded against an 

“insured”, and 

2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the suit is 

groundless, false or fraudulent. We may investigate and settle any claim or suit 

that we decide is appropriate. Our duty to settle or defend ends when the amount 

we pay for damages resulting from the “occurrence” has been exhausted by 

payment of a judgment or settlement. 

 The policy also has a motor vehicle exclusion that states that the applicable coverage 

does not apply to any “motor vehicle liability” if, “at the time and place of an ‘occurrence’” the 

motor vehicle had to have been registered. “Motor Vehicle Liability” is defined as “Liability for 

‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of the: . . . Maintenance, occupancy, operation, 

use, loading or unloading of such vehicle or craft by any person.” 

 In November 2012, Depositors Insurance sued for declaratory relief. It asked the trial 

court to declare that the policy at issue did not cover claims against Henika for proximately 

causing the accident by wrongfully serving alcohol to Johnson. As such, it asked the trial court 

to declare that Depositors Insurance had no duty to defend Henika or provide coverage to the 

extent that he might be found liable. 

 Depositors Insurance moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in May 

2013. It argued that, under the undisputed facts, Henika’s actions did not constitute an 

“accident” and, therefore, there was no “occurrence.” In the alternative, Depositors Insurance 

argued that coverage was excluded under the exclusion for “motor vehicle liability” because 

Harris, Cochran, and Bossenbery died in a motor vehicle accident. It further argued that the 

exclusions for “expected or intended injury,” the “business” exclusion, and the “controlled 

substance” exclusion also applied to the facts. 

 The trial court agreed that Henika should have reasonably foreseen that harm would 

occur when he provided alcohol to minors and, therefore, there was no “accident” and no 

“occurrence” as defined in the policy. The trial court also concluded that the “motor vehicle 
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liability” exclusion would apply even if there had been an “occurrence.” For these reasons, it 

determined that Depositors Insurance had no duty to defend or indemnify Henika and granted the 

motion for summary disposition. 

 This appeal followed. 

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 

 This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s decision on a motion for summary 

disposition. Grandberry-Lovette v Garascia, 303 Mich App 566, 572; 844 NW2d 178 (2014). 

This Court also reviews de novo the proper interpretation of an insurance agreement. Henderson 

v State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 460 Mich 348, 353; 596 NW2d 190 (1999). 

B. ANALYSIS 

 “[I]nsurance policies are subject to the same contract construction principles that apply to 

any other species of contract.” Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 461; 703 NW2d 23 

(2005). An unambiguous insurance policy must be enforced as written. Id. at 468. If there are 

two reasonable interpretations of a contract, factual development is necessary and summary 

disposition is inappropriate. Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 722; 565 NW2d 

401 (1997). However, awkward wording or a clumsy arrangement of words will not make a 

contract ambiguous if, despite the awkward language, the contract “admits of but one 

interpretation.” Id. And mere disagreement about the meaning of a provision does not, by itself, 

render it ambiguous. Harbor Park Market, Inc v Gronda, 277 Mich App 126, 133 n 3; 743 

NW2d 585 (2007). 

 The threshold question in this case concerns whether there was an occurrence sufficient 

to trigger coverage. “Occurrence” is defined in the policy to mean “an accident,” which results 

in bodily injury or property damage. The term “accident” is not defined in the policy. When 

such is the case, our Supreme Court has held that the term “accident” must be construed 

according to its ordinary meaning. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105, 113-114; 

595 NW2d 832 (1999). The ordinary understanding of the term “accident” is “an undesigned 

contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, 

unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected.” Id. (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The definition must also be “framed from the standpoint of the insured, not the 

injured party.” Id. at 114. Because “an insured need not act unintentionally in order for the act 

to constitute an accident,” it is important to “distinguish between intentional acts that can be 

classified as ‘accidents’ and those that cannot.” Id. at 115 (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). If the harm was either “intended by the insured or reasonably should have been 

expected because of the direct risk of harm intentionally created by the insured’s actions,” the 

intentional act cannot be classified an accident. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The 

intentional act at issue in the present case is Henika’s provision of alcohol to minors and the 

resulting harm is the car crash. 

 This Court examined a similarly worded contract in a case where the alleged conduct 

was, as here, the intentional provision of alcohol to minors. Allstate Ins Co v Morton, 254 Mich 
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App 418; 657 NW2d 181 (2002). In Morton, the plaintiff alleged that the insured provided 

alcohol to minors at a party and that the plaintiff’s minor was given so much alcohol that she 

passed out. After she passed out, another minor, who had also received alcohol from the insured, 

sexually assaulted the plaintiff’s minor. Id. at 419-420. This Court held that the provision of 

alcohol to the minors did not constitute an accident within the meaning of the insurance policy 

“because [the insured] reasonably should have expected that giving minors enough alcohol to 

allow them to pass out would result in harm.” Id. at 422. It did not matter, the Court stated, that 

the specific harm that occurred was another minor’s intentional rape instead of alcohol 

poisoning. Id. at 422-423. 

 The rationale stated in Morton controls the outcome in the present case. In both cases the 

actual harm was not caused by the provision of the alcohol, but through acts by a minor who 

consumed the alcohol. And as in Morton, it does not matter if the actual harm was inflicted by a 

third party (Johnson) so long as the insured (Henika) should have reasonably expected that harm 

would occur. Id. at 422. Similarly, it does not matter that the harm that did occur exceeded the 

harm that the insured actually expected. See Masters, 460 Mich at 116-117. 

 It also does not matter that Henika did not give the minors enough alcohol to cause them 

to pass out, because the resulting harm was not the kind of harm that is caused by passing out. In 

Morton, giving the plaintiff’s daughter enough alcohol to pass out made the girl vulnerable to a 

physical assault. In the case at hand, the resulting harm was the negligent operation of a vehicle. 

Therefore, Depositors Insurance only had to show that Henika provided enough alcohol to the 

minors for him to reasonably foresee that it might impair their ability to drive. Even if Henika 

did not provide the minors with enough alcohol to pass out, he provided them with enough 

alcohol to create a situation where it was foreseeable that a minor who had consumed alcohol 

would operate a vehicle in a negligent manner. 

 Because Henika’s actions created a direct risk of harm that was reasonably foreseeable, 

the result at issue here—a vehicular crash—cannot be said to be accidental; accordingly, there 

was no occurrence within the meaning of the insurance policy. Masters, 460 Mich at 115-116. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 The trial court did not err when it determined that there was no occurrence, as that term 

has been defined under the policy. Accordingly, Depositors Insurance had no duty to provide a 

defense or coverage to Henika. And the trial court properly granted Depositors Insurance the 

requested relief on summary disposition. Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive, we 

decline to address the remaining arguments made on appeal. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael J. Talbot 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly