[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 17-13209

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00351-WSD-JSA-4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ADAM SMITH, 

a.k.a. Scrap, 

a.k.a. Scrappy, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(May 16, 2018)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Adam Smith pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute methamphetamine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(b)(1)(C), (D) & 846. The district court imposed a sentence of 107 months’ 

imprisonment, which fell within the advisory guideline range of 100–125 months. 

The district court further ordered that 40 months of Mr. Smith’s sentence would be 

served concurrently with his imprisonment on state charges. Mr. Smith now 

appeals the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. After careful review, we 

affirm.

I

We ordinarily review the procedural reasonableness of a sentence for abuse 

of discretion. See United State v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1194 (11th Cir. 

2011). In this case, however, Mr. Smith made only a general objection to the 

“imposition of sentence just to preserve any rights.” This failed to indicate an 

objection to the procedural reasonableness of the sentence. See United States v. 

Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2006) (“When the statement is not clear 

enough to inform the district court of the legal basis for the objection, we have held 

that the objection is not properly preserved.”). Therefore, we review only for plain 

error. See United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). We 

may correct a plain error only when (1) an error has occurred, (2) the error was 

plain, (3) the error affected substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affected 

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the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United 

States v. Gonzalez, 834 F.3d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 2016). 

II

A district court commits procedural error when it “fail[s] to calculate (or 

improperly calculate[es]) the Guidelines range, treat[s] the Guidelines as 

mandatory, fail[s] to consider the § 3553(a) factors, select[s] a sentence based on 

clearly erroneous facts, or fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall 

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Mr. Smith argues that the district court 

committed procedural error by failing to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). Our review reveals no error, much less plain error. 

When explaining its reasons for imposing sentence, we require that “the 

sentencing judge [ ] set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has 

considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own 

legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1263 

(11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007))

(alteration adopted). Mr. Smith seems to contend that the district court was 

required to explicitly state each of the § 3553(a) factors. We have not required that 

the district court discuss each factor, so long as the district court sets forth a 

sufficient explanation for a particular sentence. See McGarity, 669 F.3d at 1263. 

The district court met this standard. 

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After hearing arguments from Mr. Smith and the government and listening 

to Mr. Smith’s allocution, the district court discussed the advisory guideline range 

and the § 3553(a) factors. For example, the district court acknowledged the need 

to deter criminal conduct, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), by stating that if Mr. 

Smith was not punished, it would encourage other inmates to introduce contraband 

into prison. Likewise, the district court commented on the safety risks associated 

with selling drugs inside prisons, reflecting consideration of both the nature of the 

offense and its seriousness. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1) & (a)(2)(A). It is also 

clear that the district court considered Mr. Smith’s personal characteristics—

commenting both on Mr. Smith’s acceptance of responsibility and his attitude at 

the proceeding, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)—and the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentence disparities, by considering Mr. Smith’s sentence in comparison to those of 

his co-defendants, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The district court explicitly 

weighed these factors and explained that they called for a sentence somewhere in 

the middle of the advisory guideline range. And, after completing that discussion, 

the district court stated that it had “applied all the [§] 3553(a) factors and 

[considered] what would be fair and reasonable in [Mr. Smith’s] case.” Taken 

together, this is a sufficient explanation for Mr. Smith’s 107-month sentence. See 

McGarity, 669 F.3d at 1263 (“The district court’s acknowledgment that it 

considered the defendants’ arguments at sentencing and that it considered the 

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factors set forth in § 3553(a) alone is sufficient explanation for a particular 

sentence.”). 

III

Because Mr. Smith has failed to show that the district court committed 

procedural error, we affirm his sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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