1

The Honorable Donald D. Alsop, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota, presiding.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 01-1616

___________

Larry D. Miell, on behalf of himself *

and all others similarly situated, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

Greyhound Lines, Inc., *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendant-Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: November 16, 2001

Filed: December 3, 2001

___________

Before LOKEN, LAY, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Larry D. Miell, as representative of a class of similarly situated

persons, seeks damages from defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc., alleging Greyhound

breached its employment contracts when it decided in May 1990 to pay its drivers on

an hourly basis rather than per mile. The district court1

 dismissed Miell’s case. It

ruled Miell was barred from proceeding by order of the United States Bankruptcy
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Court for the Southern District of Texas enjoining him from pursuing his claims in

any forum other than the bankruptcy court. We agree with the district court’s analysis

and affirm.

On June 4, 1990, Greyhound filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 relief.

On October 10, 1991, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District

of Texas entered an order confirming Greyhound’s Third Amended Plan of

Reorganization. The order discharged Greyhound from any debt arising before the

confirmation date and enjoined all parties from taking any further judicial action for

such claims outside the plan. The court specifically reserved jurisdiction over such

claims. Miell never filed proof of claim under the plan.

On March 21, 1994, Miell filed a class action complaint in Minnesota state

court asserting state law claims arising from Greyhound’s alleged breach of contract.

This suit alleged damages accruing prior to the October 1991 confirmation order.

Greyhound moved in the Texas bankruptcy court to enforce the plan and confirmation

order. Subsequently, Miell voluntarily dismissed his action.

On January 27, 1995, Miell filed a second class action suit in Minnesota state

court, without leave of the bankruptcy court. The asserted grounds for liability were

the same, but Miell only sought damages postdating the October 1991 confirmation

order. Greyhound removed the case to Minnesota district court on diversity grounds

and moved a second time in the Texas bankruptcy court to enforce the plan and

confirmation order. The bankruptcy court ruled it had subject matter jurisdiction. It

enforced the confirmation order and enjoined Miell from proceeding with his second

complaint in any court other than the bankruptcy court.

Miell did not timely appeal that decision, and the bankruptcy court’s order

became final on October 10, 1995.
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On February 28, 1997, Miell returned to the Texas bankruptcy court and filed

a motion for relief from the confirmation order. Miell asserted he could not afford

to litigate his claims in a foreign forum. The bankruptcy court denied relief after a

hearing, chastising Miell for continuing to seek to avoid the bankruptcy plan.

On August 28, 1997, Miell timely appealed that order to the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court also held Miell’s

claims had been discharged under the reorganization plan. It affirmed the bankruptcy

court’s order.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on identical

grounds. 

On December 20, 2000, without leave of the bankruptcy court, Miell filed a

motion to reopen the Minnesota federal court litigation “for the limited purpose” of

having the federal district court remand the case to Minnesota state court. The district

court denied Miell’s motion on February 5, 2001. The court noted the bankruptcy

court had subject matter jurisdiction over the second complaint and had ruled Miell’s

claims barred by the reorganization plan. It had enjoined Miell’s pursuit of those

claims in any and all courts. The court ruled Miell was barred from reopening the suit

in Minnesota and denied Miell’s motion. Now Miell appeals to this court, again

claiming a right to recover on his contract claims.

Discussion

Greyhound argues that the bankruptcy court’s order is clear and Miell cannot

collaterally attack that order. We agree. The bankruptcy court’s order clearly enjoins

Miell from pursuing his claims in Minnesota or any other forum other than the

bankruptcy court itself. See Memorandum Opinion (September 28, 1995) (“It is

further ORDERED that Miell shall remedy all prior violations of the Confirmation
2

Miell also argues the bankruptcy court’s order has no effect because that court

lacked jurisdiction. That argument is unavailing. The parties litigated the

jurisdictional issue before the bankruptcy court, which found it had jurisdiction. This

finding was affirmed by the Texas district court and the Fifth Circuit. This final

judgment also is not subject to collateral attack. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.

Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982) (“A party that has

had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject-matter jurisdiction may not,

however, reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse judgment. It has

long been the rule that principles of res judicata apply to jurisdictional

determinations–both subject matter and personal.”).

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We also agree with the merits of the prior decisions addressing Miell’s claims.

The reorganization plan clearly discharged Miell’s claims. Although Miell currently

seeks damages “accruing” after the confirmation order, the claims are based on an

employment contract and a change in compensation policy arising prior to

Greyhound’s bankruptcy action. Thus, his claims were discharged. See Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 3003(c)(2).

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Injunction, including but not limited to immediately dismissing the [second

complaint] with prejudice to refiling same in any court other than this Court in the

Chapter 11 cases captioned above.”). This order has res judicata effect. The same

parties litigated the same issues in the same cause of action before three separate

courts before bringing the instant case. On two separate occasions the Texas

bankruptcy court held that Miell’s claims were discharged by the 1991 bankruptcy

and enjoined Miell from pursuing his claims in other forums pursuant to the

confirmation injunction.2

 Both of these orders are final; Miell failed to appeal the

first, and the second has been affirmed by the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit. Thus, Miell is barred from pursuing

his claims. See Murphy v. Jones, 877 F.2d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating res

judicata requirements).3

Miell responds by arguing that the foregoing analysis is beyond the proper

scope of our review. He asserts the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction;
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it lacked federal question jurisdiction because he presents only state law questions

and lacked diversity jurisdiction because he does not meet the amount in controversy

requirement. Thus, he asserts all this court can do is reverse the district court and

order it to remand the case to Minnesota state court. 

This argument is of no avail to Miell because of the procedural posture of the

case. Miell seeks to reopen a case that has been enjoined by final order of a

competent court with jurisdiction. In this unusual circumstance, considering the

issues necessary to decide whether to reopen the case was a necessary first step. The

district court properly considered those issues before considering the issue of remand.

Because that analysis leads to the inevitable conclusion that Miell is barred from

proceeding, the district court did not have to reach the remand issue and properly

denied the motion to reopen. The district court is AFFIRMED. 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.