### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00723- CR NO. 03-04-00157- CR

Jo e Lawr e nc e Lut z , A ppe lla nt

& Jo se ph A lfr e d Ro m e , J r ., App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 331ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NOS . 30201 67 & 30208 73, H ONO RAB LE BO B PERK INS, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N
I n 1982, appellant Joe L awrence Lutz was convicted of a g g ravated ra pe in Tay lor County . I n 1983, appellant J oseph Alfred R ome, J r., wa s convicted of ag g ravated sexual abuse of a chil d i n De nton County . I n 2002, Lutz and Rom e we re indicte d in Travis County for violating
re qu ir e me nts of

the Tex a s Se x Of

fe nd e r R e g istra

tio n Pr og ra

m. A ft e r t

he ir pr e tr ia l mo tio ns to dis mis s w e re ov e rr

ule d, Lutz a

nd Rom e e nte re d b arg a ine d p le a s o f guil ty and we re se nte nc e d to prison terms of six and three y ear s, respe ctively . These c ompanion appea ls raise the que stion of wh e the r L

utz’ s c on vic tio n for a g g ra vate d ra pe and Rom e ’s c on vic tio n f or a g g ra vate d s e xua l a

bu seCha

pte r 62 of the c od e of c ri min a l pr oc e dure , the Te xas Se x Of fe nd e r R e g istra

tio n Pr og ra

m, 1 was reena cted and amende d eff ective Septe mber 1, 2005. See Ac t of May 8, 20 05 , 7 9th

L e g ., R.S. c h. 10 08 , § 1. 01 , 20 05 Te x. Ge n. L aws 33 85 . N on e of the a me ndme nts are pe rt ine nt t o th e se a pp e a ls. We wi ll c ite the c ur re nt s ta tut e s and , in

pa re nth e se s, no te the c or

re sp on din g fo rm e r a

rt ic le numbe rs . 2 of a c hil d are re po rt a

ble c on vic tio ns su

bje c tin g the m to the re qu ir e me nts of the re g istra

tio n p ro g ra

m. A sec ond question is whether the convictions wer e for sexually violent offense s as def

ined by the prog ram. We answe r “y es” to both questions and a ffirm the c onvictions for fa iling to re g ister.

Th e se x off

e nd e r r e g istra

tio n p ro g ra

m r e qu ir e s a

pe rson hav inga

re po rt a ble conviction to r eg ister with his local law e nforc ement author ity , periodica lly verify his reg istration, and rep ort any

chang e of a ddress. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. arts. 62.051(a ), (d) , 62.055(a) (West Supp. 2005) (former ly arts. 6 2 .02(a) , (d), 62.04( a))
. The ter m of the off

ender ’s obligation 1 to reg ister and report, the f reque ncy with which he must do so, and the punishment for a violation of the re g istration prog ram a re determined in par

t by whether the offe nder’ s repor

table convic tion was for a sexually

violent offense
. S

e e id
. art s. 62 .0 58 (a ), 62 .1 01 (a ), 62 .1 02 (b ) ( fo rm e rl y a rt s. 62.06(a) , 62.10(b), 62.12( a)) . A re portable c onviction is defined as a conviction for one of seve ral
enumer ated of

fense s. Se e id . art. 62.001(5) (for merly art. 62.01(5) ). Ther e is a similar list of sexually violent offense s. Se e id . a rt . 6 2. 00 1( 6) (f

or me rl y art . 6 2. 01 (6 ))
. Nei the r l ist e xpre ssl y includes either

ag g ravated ra

pe or a g g ravated sexual abuse of a child. When interpretinga statute, we seek to e ffe ctuate the collec tive intent or purpose of the leg islature. Bo

y k in v . S tat e , 818 S.W .2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Ordinar ily , we do this by g iving e ffe ct t o t h e plain meaning of the statute’s text. Id . We may consider e x tratextual fac tors only

if the s tatute i s ambig uous or if the plain languag e of the statute would lead to a bsurd3

results the l eg islature could not possibly have intende d. Id
. I f a statut e is su bje c t to tw o r e a so na

ble interpre tations, we may

consider the conseque nces o f t h e alter native interpr etations in deciding which to adopt. Mu no z v . S tat e , 851 S.W .2d 238, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Lutz and Rom e ar g ue that the rele vant statutes are unambig uous: a g g ravated rape and ag g ravated sexual abuse of a child are plainly

not named as rep o rt able, se x ually violent offense s subject to the sex offende r re g istration prog ram. The State responds that the definitions in question should be rea d to include the statutory prede cess o rs o f t he enume rate d offe nses, all of whic h are
curr ent pena l code of

fense s. Under the State’s proposed rea ding of the statute, L

utz and Rom e have repor table convic tions for sexually violent offense s beca

use ag g ravated ra

pe and ag g ravated sexual abuse of a child ar e statutory

prede cessor s of ag g ravat ed s exual assault, which is de fi ne d a s a repor table convic tion and a sexually violent offe nse. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.001( 5)(A) , (6)( A) (f ormerly art. 62.01(5) (A), ( 6)(A) ). Anticipating the S tate’s arg ument, Lutz and Rom e dra w our attention to the statutes providing for civil c ommitm ent of sexually violent predators. See T e x. Hea lth & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.150 (W est 2003 & Supp. 2005). The re, the definition of sexually violent offense includes not only curr ent statutory offe nses but also “a n offe nse under

prior state law that contains eleme nts substantially simil ar to the e lements” of the listed s t atut es. Id
. § 841.002(8)( F) (West Supp. 2005). L utz and Rom e ar g ue that if the le gi s l at u re h ad int ended persons c onvicted under prior st atutes t o be included within the s cope of the sex offende r re g istration prog ram, the pr og ram’s de finitions would have a similar provision.

Although a

rticl e 6 2
. 0 0 1 d o es n o tex p re s s l y i n co rp o ra t e c o n v i ct i o n s for offense s under prior s tate la

w s , it d o e s s tate th a t a r e p o rta b le c o n v ic ti o n me an s “ a c o n v ic ti o n u n d e r the laws of4

another state, fe dera l law, the laws of a for eig n country , or the Uniform Code of Mi litary J ustice for an off ense c ontaining e lements that are substantially simil ar to th e ele ments” of a n enumer ated offe nse. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 62.001(5) (J) (f o rmerly art. 62.01(5) (J)). Sim ilarly , an offe nse “under the laws of another state, federa l law, the laws of a fore ign c ountry , or the Unifor m Code of Military

J ustice” is a se x uall y v i o lent offe nse “if the offe nse conta ins elements that ar e
s u b s ta n ti a ll y s im il ar to th e e le me n ts ” o f an e nu me r a te d s e xu a ll y v io le n t o f f ense. Id . ar

t. 62.001(6)( E) (f

ormerly art. 62.01(6) (E))
. Under the rea ding of the statutes a dvocate d by Lutz and Rome, a per son with a convict i on in another jurisdiction for an off ense substantially

simil ar to a

n offe nse enume rate d in article 62.011( 5) or ( 6 ) wo u l d b e subj ect to the r equire ments of the sex offe n d er re gi s t ra tion prog ram, but a pe rson with a Te x as convic tion for a substantially simil ar, or
e ve n id e nti c a l, o ff

e ns e that ha s si nc e be e n r e name d w ou ld n ot b e su bje c t to the pr og ra

m. I n 1983, the ra

pe and sex u al ab use off

enses pr eviously

found in cha

pter 21 of the pe na l c od e we re c on so lid a te d, re name d s e xua l a ssa ult and a g g ra vate d s e xua l ass a

ult , an d move d to ch ap t er 2 2
. See Act of Ma y 29, 1983, 68th L eg ., R.S., ch. 977, §§ 3 & 12, 1983 Te x . Gen. L aws 53 11 , 5 31 2- 15 , 5 32 1. I n 1 99 7, the le g isl a ture ex pan ded the se x off e nd e r r e g istra

tio n p ro g ra

m to i n clude pe rsons having repor table convic tions occurr ing on or afte r September

1, 1970. See T e x. Code Crim. Proc
. Ann. ar

t. 62.002(a) ( former ly

art. 62.11(a )). Unde r L

utz’s and Rome’s rea ding of the statutes, per sons who committed sex ual assaults prior to 1983 a re exempt fr om this ex pansion of the prog ram be cause the offe nses wer e then c alled ra pe or se x ual abuse
. The statutory

construction issue befor e us is a nalog ous to those raised in two r ece nt court of criminal appea ls opinions. I n Gr iff ith v . S tat e , 116 S.W .3d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), the5

c ourt c on str ue d p e na l c od e se c tio n 1 2. 42 (c )( 2) , w hic h c re a te s a n e nh anc e d p un ish me nt f or c e rt a in repe at sex offende rs. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.42(c) (2) (West Supp. 2005). Under the statute, a per son convicted of

a sex offense l i s t ed in section 12.42(c) (2)( A) shall be punishe d by life imprisonment if he has previously been convicted for a sex offe nse listed in section 12.42(c) (2)( B)
. Following his conviction for a section 12.42(c) (2)( A) offense, Griffith wa s sentence d to life on the basis of his previous convic tions for rape and ag g ravated ra pe. Gr iff ith , 1 16 S.W. 3d

a t 78 4. Gr if

fi th urg ed that t his was unlawf ul beca use neither

rape nor ag g ravated ra

pe is listed as an e nhancing offe nse in section 12.42(c )(2) (B ). Id
.

The c ourt of cr iminal appeals re sponded to this arg ument by pointing out that ra

pe and ag g rava

ted ra pe ar e statutory

prede cessor s to the o ff

en s es of sexual assault and ag g ravated sexual assault, which ar e enha ncing offe nses under

section 12.42(c )(2) (B ). Id . at 787; Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 12.42(c )(2) (B )(ii). The court a lso noted that convi ct i o n s “u nder the laws of a nother state c on ta ini nge le me nts tha t are su bs tanti a lly

sim ila r t o” the of

fe ns e s e nume rate d in section 12.42(c )(2) (B ) ar e also e nhancingoffe nses. Gr iff ith , 116 S.W .3d at 786; Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 12.42(c)(2)( B) (v). The court held t hat i t was absurd to conclude that a sex offende r with a previous conviction in a

nother state for an offe nse substantially simil ar to sex ual assault would be
su bje c t to e nh anc e d punis hme nt, bu t a se x o ff e nd e r wi th a pr e vio us ra

pe c on vic tio n in T e xas w ou ld avoid enhanc ed punishment simply beca use he committed his e arlier crime at a time when it was not called se x ual assault. Gr iff ith , 1 16 S.W. 3d

a t 78 6. Th e c ourt

he ld that se c tio n 1 2. 42 (c )( 2) (B ) s ho uld be re ad to include the statutory prede cessor s to the enumera ted offe nses. Id . at 788.6 The issue in Ex

pa rteErv in , N o . A P- 7 4 , 9 8 5 , 2 0 0 5 T e x. Cr im
. A p p . L E X I S 5 1 8 ( T e x. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2005), wa s the proper interpre tation of the g overnme nt code pr ovision deny ing
mand a to ry

su pe rv isi on to i nmate s w ithpr e vio us c on vic tio ns fo r c e rt a in e nume rate d o ff e ns e s, including se x ual assault. Te x . Gov’t Code Ann. § 508.149( a) (W es t 2 0 0 4 ). Ervin was denied mandatory

supervision bec ause he had a previous convic tion for sexual abuse of a child. Erv in , at *2. He c halleng ed this denial on the g round that sexual abuse of a child is not a disqualify ing offe nse under

section 508.149(a ). Id . The c ourt of cr iminal a ppeals conclude d that the leg islature
c ou ld n ot h a ve re a so na

bly int e nd e d to de ny mand a tor y su pe rv isi on fo r inm a te s wi th se xua l a ssa ult convictions but allow mandatory supervision for inmates convicted under pre dece ssor statutes. Id. , at *7. T he cour

t held that section 508.149(a ) should be re ad to include the statutory prede cessor s to the enumer ated of

fense s and that Ervin wa s ineligible f or mandatory

supervision. Id . at *8. I n light of the opinions in Gr iff ith and Erv in , and considering the purposes of the sex of fe nd e r reg istratio n p ro g ra m, w e c on c lud e tha

t th e re is n o r a tio na l ba sis fo r e xemp tin g fr om i ts
c ov e ra g e a

pe rs on wh o c omm itt e d a se x o ff

e ns e su bs tanti a lly sim ila

r to on e de sig nate d a s r e po rt a ble solely b ec au s e t h e o ffense wa s committed in Tex as and ha d a diffe rent name at the time it was committed. We therefor e ag ree with the State that article 62.001(5) and (6) should be rea d to include the statut or

y pr e de c e sso rs of

the e nume rate d o ff

e ns e s. Two other c ourts of ap p e a ls h a v e c o n c lu d e d

th a t t h e sex offender

reg istration prog ram applies t o persons convicted of prede cessor offe nses. I n Tur ne r v . S tat e , 101 S.W .3d 750, 758-59 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2003, pet
. re f’ d ), the c ourt held that sodomy under f ormer pe nal code a rticle 524 wa s a sexually

violent offense . I n Re

y e s v . Stat e , 1 1 9 S. W. 3 d

8 4 4 , 8 4 7
- 4 8 ( T e x.7

Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 03 , n o p e t.) , th e c ourt he ld t hat a c on vic tio n f

or ra pe of a chi ld w a s a repor table convic tion. Lutz and Rom e also a

rg ue that the punishmen t p rovi sions of the sex offender
re g istratio n p ro g ra

m are un c on sti tut ion a lly va g ue . Th is co nte nti on wa s not ma de in t he tr ia l c ourt
. Even c onstitut ional issues may be wa ived by

failing to raise t h em at t rial. Br igg s v . S tat e , 789 S.W .2d 918, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We a lso note that this c ontention was ra ised and re jected in Rey es . Id . at 844.

We hold t h a t L u tz ’ s 1 9 8 2 c o nv ic tion f

or ag g ravated ra

pe and Rome’ s 1983 conviction for a g g ravated sexual abuse of a child wer e re portable c onvictions for sexually violent offense s and
overr ule their points of er

ror to the c on t ra ry . T h e judg ments of conviction for violating the se x offe nder r eg istration prog ram a re a ffirme d.

__________________________________________

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: January

19, 2006 Pub lis h