### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 09

– 0504
Filed June 26, 20 09

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD , Complainant ,

vs.
JAMES L. WAGNER , Respondent

.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission.

Grievance Commission in disciplinary proceeding recommends suspension of respondent’s license to practice law. LICENSE
SUSPENDED.

Charles L. Harrington and David J. Grace, Des Moines , for complainant

.

James L. Wagner, Waterloo, pro se

.2

PER CURIAM
. This matter comes before the court on the report of a division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.10. The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board alleged the respondent, James L. Wagner, violated ethical r ules by neglecting client matters, prematurely taking probate fees, misrepresenting the status of an estate to the court, failing to deposit unearned fee s in his trust account, failing to promptly return unearned fees, and failing to cooperate with the B oa rd

. A division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa found Wagner violated the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers and the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended that we suspend Wagner’s license to practice law for a period of ninety days. 1

I. Standard of Review. Upon our respectful consideration of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendation of the C ommission, we find the respondent committed the alleged ethical violations and suspend his license to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for six months.

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Gottschalk , 729 N.W.2d 812, 815 (Iowa 2007). The B oard has the bur den to prove attorney misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Conrad , 723 N.W.2d 791, 792 (Iowa 2006). This burden is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but more than the preponderance standard required in the usual civil case. Once misconduct is proven, we “may

1 The Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct became effective July 1, 2005, replacing the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. Some of the conduct in this case occurred before the effective date of the new rules and some after.3 impose a lesser or greater sanction than the discipline recommended by the grievance commission.”

Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lett , 674
N.W. 2d 139, 142 (Iowa 2004) )

. The C ommission’s findings and recommendations are given respectful consideration, but we are not bound by them. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Isaacson , 750 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 2008).
II. Factual Findings
. The respondent has been an attorney for thirty

- five years and is currently practicing law in Waterloo, Iowa. The charges in this disciplinary action stem from the respondent’s r epresentation of four separate client s
. A hearing was held befo re a division of the Grievance
C ommission on February 24, 2009. The factual findings and
conclusions reached in each case will be addressed separately.
A. Bornong Estate. In January 2004, Wagner was retained to assist in the probate of the estate of Ma rga ret Bornong

. The executor of
the estate was the decedent’s sister , Helen McClain. Shortly after opening the estate, Wagner obtained a fee authorization order in the amount of $22,642. Although he had not

prepare d or file d the appropriate tax returns, o n March 3, 2004, Wagner
took $11,321 or one

- half of the authorized fee

. He took the second half of his fees on October 1, 2005 , before any final report was prepared or filed or the court costs paid. The respondent did not place t he se moneys in the client’s trust account.
Pursuant to Bornong’s will, the residuary of her estate was to be placed in trust with the income to be distributed to her nephew, Michael McClain, while he completed his Ph.D. , but for no longer than two years
after Bornong’s dea th . Thereafter, the principal and accumulated income4 was to be distributed equally to her sister’s children. Two years after her death, the decedent’s estate remained open. On October 31, 2005, Wagner filed a n interim report informing the court that the final report
and accounting was being prepared and that all assets had been
distributed . He requested that the court allow the estate to be held open until February 28, 2006 , “ to allow one of the beneficiaries to finish school
to avoid the expense of opening and administering a T rust. ” The executor, Helen McClain , died on March 2, 2006. On May 4, 2006, Michael McClain wrote to the r esponden t requesting the respondent’s assistance in locating his mother’s will and voicing

concerns that his aunt’s esta te had not been settled and that the tax obligations had not been addressed. Wagner failed to respond to this inquiry . O n May 31, 2006 , the respondent had filed an other interim report and request to keep Bornong’s es tate open . This request was signed by the respondent with out the named alternate executor’s
k nowledge or consent

. The new executor obtained new legal representation

. Upon investigation, it was d iscovered the respondent had failed to file some of
the required federal and state estate tax returns

. Moreover, t h e returns that had been prepared and/or filed were incorrect , resulting in significant penalties and interest. I t was also determined Wagner had failed to appropriately file the required fiduciary tax forms , resulting in additional penalties an d fees. Together , t hese errors resulted in penalties and interest in excess of $55,000. In addition, counsel determined Wagner had misrepresented to the court the status of beneficiary Michael
McCl ain, who had completed his education five months prior to the respondent’s initial request to hold the estate open and , further, had5 misrepresented in the second interim report that he

— Wagner

— was awaiting tax clearances. The tax returns , in fact, had not been filed. As a result of the respondent’s dilatory handling , the estate was
not closed until June 2007 , over th ree and one

- half years after Bornong’s
death

. Moreover, d espite requests from the estate , Wagner failed to refund any portion of his fees or r e compense the estate for his errors. On May 29, 2007, the executor of the estate filed a lawsuit again st Wagner, seeking damages due to Wagner’s negligence in administer ing Bornong’s estate. On January 10, 2008, Wagner confessed judgment to the executor in the sum of $66,058. On February 5, 2009, the respondent paid the judgment plus interest and costs.
The B oard asserted Wagner violated our ethical rules by (1) failing to handle the estate with reasonable diligence and promptness ; (2) failing to adequa tely communicate with his client ; (3) collecting probate fees before they were earned, contrary to Iowa Rule of Probate Procedure 7.2(4) ; 2

2 In pertinent p art, Iowa Rule of Probate Procedure 7.2(4) provides: (4) failing to deposit unearned fees into his trust account; (5) misrepresenting the status of a matter to the court; and (6) failing to promptly refund unearned fees

. See Iowa R s . Prof’l Conduct 32:1.1 ( requiring lawyer to provide competent representation); 32:1.3 ( requiring lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client); 32:1.4 (requiring lawyer to keep client reasonably informed and promptly comply with requests for information); 32:1.5(a) ( providing lawyer shall not violate any restrictions imposed by law relating to a fee);
32:1.15 (requiring lawyer to place unearned fees in client trust account);

One half of the fees for ordinary services may be paid when the federal estate tax return, if required, and Iowa inheritance tax return, if required, are prepared.

. . . The remainder of the fees may be paid when the final report is filed and the costs have been paid.6 32:1.16(d) ( requiring lawyer, upon termination, to promptly refund any unearned fee); 32:3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting lawyer from knowingly making false statement of material fact to the court); and 32: 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (holding it is misconduct for lawyer to violate a n ethical rule, engage in conduct involving misrepresentation, and engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) ; Iowa Ct. Rs. 45.1 (requiring attorney to deposit funds belonging to client in client trust account); 45.2(2) (requiring attorney to promptly deliver to the client funds that client is entitled to receive). In response, t he respondent admitted the factual allegations
contained in this count of the B oard ’s complaint. He also admitted the alleged violations. Upon our de novo review of the record, w e , like the
C ommission , conclude the facts support a finding by a convincing preponderance of the evidence the respondent committed the ethical
violations alleged by the B oard in his representation of the Bornong

estate.
B. R onald Bearbower Asbestos Claim. Between 1963 and 1966,
Ronald Bearbower was a seaman in the Navy where he was exposed to asbestos on a regular basis. In 1997, Bearbower was diagnosed with lung cancer for which he underwent treatment

. Alt hough currently in remission, he lives each day with the risk of his cancer returning. In 2003, Bearbower learned of a Texas law firm th at was
pro secuting asbestos cases resulting from exposure during military
service

. Upon his request for information, Bearbower received a questionnaire and an atto rney employment a greement form from the
Texas firm. In May 2003, Bearbower brought t he info rmation to Wagner
for his revie w. A week later, Wagner agreed to represent Bearbower in
his asbestos claim , and the parties entered into a written contract

.7 On July 11, 2003, the Texas law firm contacted Bearbower in

w riting, inquiring whether he intended to proceed with his asbestos
claim . The letter indicated a need to act expediently because more stringent filing criteria were expected after August 1

. Bearbower presented Wagner with this information. Wagner , however, advised him

not to wo rry because under Iowa law the statute of limitations would not run for two years. From August 2003 to August 2004, Bearbower called the respondent’s office every other month to see how things were progressing. The respondent never returned Bearbower’s c alls. Between January 2005 and December 2006, Bearbower called Wagner approximately twice a week to inquire as to whether a lawsuit had been filed. Wagner never returned any of these calls either. Finally, in December 2006, Bearbower obtained a new atto rney. An investigation
revealed that Wagner had failed to file any lawsuit on Bearbower’s behalf. Moreover, s ubsequent inquires led to the conclusion the statute of
limitations had run on Bearbower’s asbestos claim.
T he B oard alleged the respondent’s actions in the Bearbower
asb estos claim evidenced neglect and a failure to communicate and led to
the loss of the client’s claim

. As a result, the B oard claimed the respondent violated the Iowa Code of Professional Responsi bility for Lawyers DR 6

– 101(A), providing a lawyer shall not neglect a client’s legal

matter ; DR 7

– 101(A), providing a lawyer shall not fail to carry out a contract of employment legally entered into or prejudice or damage a client during the course of the profe ssional relationship ; DR 1

– 102(A)(1), (5), and ( 6), holding it is misconduct for a lawyer to violate an ethical rule, engage in conduct involving misrepresentation, and engage in conduct that is prejudicial t o the administration of justice; and Iowa8

Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.1, 32:1.3, 32:1.4, and 32:8.4(a) and (d). The respondent admitted the facts asserted in the B oard ’s complaint

. He also admitted the alleg ed violations. As in th e prior claim,

we conclude the facts support a finding by a con vincing preponderance of the evidence the respondent committed the eth ical violations alleged by the B oard in his repr esentation of Ronald Bearbower

. C. Dorothy Bearbower Personal Injury Claim. Dorothy Bearbower was injured in a motor vehicle accident on January 10, 2003.
She subsequently engaged the respondent to represent her in a claim again st the driver of the other vehicle , Sally Jarchow

. On January 10 , 2005, the respondent filed a claim on behalf of Dorothy and Ronald Bearbower against the Jarchows. In April 2005, the respondent was served with interrogatories and

a request for production in the matter . The Bearbowers were never
informed of these discovery requests o r contacted by the respondent with regards to the m . When discovery w as n ot forthcoming, the defendants’ attorney filed a motion to compel and a motion for sanctions. On October 5, 2005, Wagner responded that discovery would be completed by October 31, 2005. The deadline was subsequently extended until January 16, 2006. T he respondent failed , however, to ever respond to
the defendants’ discovery request . O n March 7, 2006 , the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss due to Wagner’s failure to resist the
renewed motion for sanctions and his failure to res p ond to discov ery . By this time, the two

- year statute of limitations had run on Dorothy
Bearbower ’s claim, preventing the refil ing of the action . The Bearbowers
subs equently filed a lawsuit agains t the respondent for negligent representation in this matter and in the asbes tos case.9

The B oard alleged the r espondent’s actions violated DR 6

– 101 (A),
DR 7

– 101(A) , and DR 1

– 102(A)(1), (5), and (6) of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers and Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.1, 32:1.3, 32:1.4, 32:3. 2 (requiring lawyer to make reasonable efforts to expedite client’s litigation), and 32:8.4(a) and (d). Again, the respondent admitted the facts alleged in the B oard’s complaint , which we conclude establish es by a convincing preponderance of the evidence the eth ical violations alleged by the B oard.
D. Nelsen Real Estate Transaction. In early 2008, four siblings, Steve Peterson, Ronny Fike, Joyce Davis, and Irv Peterson, through their real estate agent, Amy Wienands, entered into an agreement with
Mitchell Nelsen to sell Nelsen their parent s ’ house. Wagner was retained by the sellers to assist in this transaction. The sellers subsequently filed a complaint with the B oard , asserting W agner had failed to diligently and promptly represent the m in the transaction. Upon the B oard’s inquiry, Wagner denied the allegation stating “[he] felt that [he] timely handled
the .

. . matter based on the file and results. ”
The B oard called t wo witnesses to testif y at th e hearing. Real tor Wienands testified the seller s entered into a purchase agreement with
Nelsen on January 10, 2008

. On February 27, 20 08, the day before the scheduled closing , Wienands received the title opinion from the title
company. T he opinion raised several con cerns with the title. Wiena nds testified none of the issues were extraordinary , and she believed the sellers’ attorney, Wagner, should have be en able to resolve the issues
within a week. 3

3 The issues to be resolved involved clearing up back child support owed by one of the sellers and establishing that one of the sellers had been erroneously identified as a debtor due to a n ame similarity. T he parties , however, agreed to continue the closing for10 two weeks in order to gi ve Wagner ample time to e ffect a resolution

. A new closing date was set for March 11, 2008.
Thereafter , Wienands testified she encountered a great deal of difficulty in contacting the respondent to ascertain the stat us of the title
issues

. N umer ous and frequent calls to Wagner went unanswered. When contact was made, Wagner’s response about the status of the title opinion was that it was “almos t done” or was “ready to go out ” and then nothing would happen. During this period of time, Wienands was fi elding inquiries from both the buyer and the sellers . She relayed these inquiries to Wagner , who failed to respond

. Moreover, Wienands testified
that W agner never request ed additional time or communicate d to her
that he was having difficul ty resolving the concerns with the title

. Ultimately, the title issues were resolved , and the real estate transaction was closed on April 24, 2008 , eight weeks after it was originally scheduled t o close and six weeks after th e extension. During
this time , the buyer was asse ssed a rate lock extension fee

. According to Wienands, a rate loc k allows a buyer to “lock in” an interest rate for a

pe riod of time. Extensions on a rate lock can generally be obtained at a

cost of between $300 and $600. In this case, Wienands testified the mortgage company agreed to pay the rate lock extension fee for the buyer.
Seller Steve P eterson was also called by the B oard to testify. His
recollection of events co rresponded with Wienands ’

. Peterson testified numerous phone calls made b y him and his siblings to Wagner went
unanswered. In addition, Peterson testified that one of the title issues
involve d his back child support. Peterson testified that he resolved this
issue on March 3, 2008 , and faxed the information to Wagner’s office on that date. Peterso n also informed the B oard that , although the real11 estate transaction was completed on April 24, 2008, there was no accounting until July 8, 2008. At the hearing, Wagner did not c ross

- examin e either of the B oard’s
witnesses , and he did not put on any evidence of his own. Further more , he decline d to make any statement to the C ommission and submitted no
brief. In other words, he provided no explanation to the C ommission for
his actions. Prior to the hearing, Wagner admitted he did not res pond in a timely manner to the B oard’s letter of inquiry regarding his handling of
this matter

. Based upon the evidence presented, the C ommission concluded Wagner failed to handle this real estate matter in a timely manner and failed to sufficiently communicate with his clients. In addition, the
C ommission agreed with the B oard that these actions violated the Iowa
Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically rules 32:1 .1 , 32: 1.3 , 32:1.4 , 32:8 .1 (b) ( lawyer in a disciplinary proceeding shall not fail to respond to inq uiry from the b oard), and 32:8. 4(a)

. 4 Upon our de novo review, we agree the evidence supports a finding by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that the respondent
violated rule 32:1.3 , requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness when representing a client ; rule 32:1.4, requiring a lawyer to keep his client reasonably informed and to promptly comply with requests for information ; rule 32:8.1(b), requiring a lawyer to promptly respond to inquiries from the B oard ; and rule 32:8.4(a), providing it is misconduct for a lawyer to violate an ethical rule.

4 The Commission also found Wagner’s failure to respond to the Board’s inquiry violated rule 32:8.4(d), prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Board’s complaint does not, however, make this allegation under Count IV.12 We disagre e, however, that the B oard satisf actorily established Wagner failed to provide competent representation in this case

. “Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32 :1.1. Although Wagner’s handling of t he title issues was dilatory, there was no evidence to support a finding that Wagner did not possess the necessary legal knowledge and skill to complete the task at hand. Moreover, f rom all reports, the representation, though slow, was appropriate. The B oard presented no evide nce to support a finding of a violation of rule 32:1.1.
The B oard also alleged in its complaint that Wagner’s handling of the real estate transaction matter involved misrepresentation

. S ee Iowa
R

. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). The C ommission did not address this allegation. Upon our de novo review, we c onclude the evidence established by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that Wagner engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation

. Wienands testified that , on several occasions, Wagner advised her that the title opinion
documen ts were prepared and would be delivered that afternoon or the following morning. They never were. Repeated claims that the documents were ready and would be delivered shortly , followed by a
failure to deliver said documents , supports the conclusion the
d ocuments were , in fact, not ready and that W agner was misrepresenting this fact to the agent to the detriment of his clients

. III. Sanctions.
The C ommission recommends Wagner’s license to practice law be suspended with no possibility of reinstatement for a period of ninety days. W e may , however, impose a lesser or greater sanctio n than that13 recommended by the G rievance C ommission

. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Plumb , 766 N.W.2d 626 , 629 (Iowa 2009). “There is no standard sanction for a particular type of misconduct, and though prior cases can be instructive, we ultimately determine an appropriate sanction based on the particular circumstances of each
case.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Dis ciplinary Bd. v. Earley , 729 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Iowa 2007). In determining the appropriate s anction for attorney misconduct,

w e consider the nature and extent of the respondent’s ethical infractions, his fitness to continue practicing law, our obligation to protect the public from further harm by the respondent, the need to deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct, our desire to maintain the repu tation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Kallsen , 670 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Iowa 2003). The respondent’s ethical violations involved neglec t of several
client s’ matters

. One consideration in determining the appropriate discipline is the harm resul ting from the attorney’s neglect. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey , 761 N.W.2d 53, 61 (Iowa 2009).
I t is undisputed the respond ent’s neglect caused great harm to his
clients. W agner’s neglect of the Bornong estate resulted in the

asses sment of signific ant tax penalties and fees. Moreover, his inactions made it necessary for the estate to retain new counsel to close the estate
and to bring legal action against the respondent to recoup tho se penalties and unearned attorney fees. Wagner’s neglect of Ronald
Bearbower’s asbestos claim resulted in loss of the claim on statute

- of

limitations grounds, while his neglect of Dorothy Bearbower’s personal14 injury claim resulted in the claim’s dismis sal

. By the time the action was dismissed, the statute of limitations had run , effectively foreclosing her
claim as well. While it does not appear Wagner’s neglect of the Nelsen
real estate matter resulted in monetary loss to his client s , the sellers, it
did result in a r ate lock extension cos t to the buyer. Additionally, all of Wagner’s cli ents were harmed by stress caused by Wagner’s neglect. When attorney misconduct involves neglect, sanctions have ranged from a public reprimand to a six

- month suspension. Casey , 761 N.W.2d
at 61

. “When n eglect is compounded by other misconduct, a more severe sanction may be required.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Tompkins , 733 N.W.2d 661, 670 (Iowa 2007). “Often, the distinction between the punishment imposed depends upon the existence of multiple instances of neglect, past disciplinary problems, and other companion violations.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lesyshen , 712 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Iowa 2006)

. In this case, the B oard established the respondent comm itted
several additional ethical violations. Wagner’s premature taking of probate fees and his failure to appropriately depo sit the unearned fees
in to the client trust account constitutes a serious ethical infraction. Casey , 761 N.W.2d at 62

. In the past, w e have hel d that a deliberate conversion of client funds will warrant revocation of an attorney’s license

. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Curtis , 749 N.W.2d 694, 704 (Iowa 2008). However, where an attorney has a colorable future claim to the funds, we have imposed a lesser sanction. Casey , 761 N.W.2d at 62. At the time Wagner took the fees, he had a colorable future claim to them upon closure of the estate. Nevertheless, w hile revocation may not be required , we find Wagner’s failure to return , upon request, the unearned fees adds to the seriousness of his initial action of15 prematurely appropriating his fee. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Apland , 577 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 1998) (noting the
failure to return unearned advan ce fees constitutes a major disciplinary problem). Wagner’s misrepresentations to the court and to his clients also weigh in favor of a more serious sanction. “Misrepresentation to the court constitutes a serious breach of professional ethics, warranting a

more se vere sanction than neglect.” Gottschalk , 729 N.W.2d at 821

. “At its most basic level a court must rely, not alone on the honesty of lawyers, but also on the reliability of factual representations submitted to
the court.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Ackerman, 611 N.W.2d 473, 474 (Iowa 2000). Wagner did not fully cooperate with the B oard’s investigation in the
Nelsen matter . “We expect and demand attorneys to cooperate with disciplinary investigations.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rickabaugh , 728 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa 2007). Thus, the respondent’s failure to cooperate is another act of misconduct requiring our consideration in crafting the appropriate discipline. See Casey , 761
N.W.2d at 60.
In addition to the established ethical violations, w e consider whether any aggravating circumstances exist. Prior discipline is an aggravating factor to be considered. Id. at 62. Our record s reveal the respondent was publi cly reprimanded twice in 1999

— once for neglect
and once for m isrepresentation. We also consider any mitigating factors.
Here , Wagner failed to provide the C ommission with any reas ons in mitigation for his behavior. We, like the C ommission, conclude that because no mitigating circumstanc es by way of explanation or excuse
have be en provided, there is nothing for us to consider

.16 In fashioning the appropriate sanction , “ we look to prior similar cases while remaining cognizant of their limited usefulness due to the
variations in their facts. ” Id. We also conside r the goals of discipline:
dete rrence, protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the Bar, and the act or’s fitness to practice law. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Humphrey , 738 N.W.2d 617, 621 (Iowa 2007 ). Considering the respo ndent’s ethical violations and his prior disciplinary actions, we believe a more severe sanction than that recommended by
the C ommission is warranted. Wagner’s neglect of his clients resulted in significant harm to them. In addit ion , his other ethical violations were serious and not inconsequential to his clients , the court, or the public.
W e find a six

- month suspension is warranted. Cf. id. at 619

– 21 (neglect of and misrepresentations in six estates and premature taking of probate
fees in three estates w arranted six

- month suspension).
IV. Conclusion. Based upon Wagner’s neglect of his clients’ cases, his misrepresentations to the court and oth ers, his premature taking of probate fees and failure to deposit them in his client trust account , h is failure to pr omptly return unearned fees, his failure to promptly respond

to the B oard, and his prior disciplinary record, we believe Wagner’s
license to practice law should be suspended for a minimum of six months. Accordingly, his license is suspended indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for six months. This suspension shall apply
to all facets of the practice of law. Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(3) . The respondent shall provide all notifications required by Iowa Court Rule 35.22. Upon any application for reinstatement, Wagner shall have the burden to show he has not practiced law during the period of suspension and that he17 meets the requirement of Iowa Court Rule 35.13. Costs are taxed to Wagner pu rsuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.26 (1 ).
LICENSE SUSPENDED. This opinion shall be published.