UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1896

GARY HARE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, LLC, a/k/a Comcast,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, District Judge. 

(1:12-cv-01830-GLR)

Submitted: March 26, 2014 Decided: April 1, 2014

Before GREGORY and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark T. Mixter, THE LAW OFFICES OF MARK T. MIXTER, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Michelle M. McGeogh, Timothy F. 

McCormack, BALLARD SPAHR LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Gary Hare appeals from the district court’s orders 

denying his motion to compel discovery, denying his motion to 

strike Comcast Cable Communications Management’s (“Comcast”) 

opposition to the motion to compel, granting attorneys’ fees to 

Comcast related to the motions, and granting Comcast’s motion 

for summary judgment. Hare alleges that Comcast terminated his 

employment on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e 

to 2000e-17 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). Finding no error in 

district court’s rulings, we affirm.

I.

First, Hare challenges the district court’s order 

denying his motion to compel discovery and to extend the 

discovery deadline. He argues that the testimony he sought was 

crucial to his case and that he should not be penalized for 

seeking to conduct discovery by consent rather than court order.

District courts are afforded substantial discretion in 

managing discovery, and we review a discovery ruling for an 

abuse of that discretion. United States ex rel. Becker v. 

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 

2002). Here, after a lengthy hearing, the district court denied

Hare’s motion to compel, finding that Hare’s failure to depose a 

key witness before the discovery deadline was attributable to 
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the lack of timely efforts by his own counsel. The court

further found an extension of the discovery deadline was not 

warranted because Hare had had several months to secure 

discovery, and he failed to seek an extension before discovery 

closed. These findings find ample support in the record and 

were accordingly well within the lower court’s discretion.

II.

Hare next argues that the district court erred by 

denying his motion to strike Comcast’s opposition to his motion 

to compel. He contends that certain allegations in the 

opposition were not supported by the record and were unrelated 

to the motion to compel. Again our review is for abuse of 

discretion, see United States v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379 (5th 

Cir. 2012), and we find no such abuse in the district court’s

denial of the motion to strike.

III.

Next, Hare challenges the district court’s decision to 

award attorneys’ fees and costs for Comcast’s defense of the 

motions to compel and to strike, arguing that the motions were 

substantially justified. Rule 37(a)(5)(B) provides for an award 

of expenses if a motion to compel discovery is denied, unless 

“the motion was substantially justified or other circumstances 

make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B). 

A motion is substantially justified if “a reasonable person 
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could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in 

law and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565-66 n.2 

(1988).

Hare’s motions contained substantial 

misrepresentations that went to the heart of his requests to 

compel and extend discovery and to strike Comcast’s 

opposition. The motions rested on the false and unreasonable

assertion that Hare’s counsel had been denied the opportunity to 

conduct the deposition through no fault of his own. We 

therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in awarding Comcast its reasonable costs in defending 

the intertwined motions to compel and to strike. See Hoyle v. 

Freightliners, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 329 (4th Cir. 2011) (standard 

of review). In addition, the fee calculations were well 

supported by Comcast’s affidavit and detailed hours log, and the 

district court did not err in declining to consider Hare’s 

untimely opposition.

IV.

Finally, Hare challenges the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to Comcast on the Title VII claim. We review 

de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing 

the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 

F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2013). We agree with the district court 
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that Hare failed to demonstrate by direct or circumstantial 

evidence that race was a motivating factor in his termination. 

Nor does the record support Hare’s argument that he was 

performing his job in a satisfactory manner at the time of his 

termination. See Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 

208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007).

Finally, we are unpersuaded by Hare’s argument that 

summary judgment was premature because additional discovery 

remained to be completed. As discussed above, Hare had ample 

time to complete discovery within the deadline established by a 

scheduling order, and the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by refusing to extend the time allotted.

V.

Accordingly, we affirm the disputed orders and the 

entry of summary judgment for Comcast. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the material before this court and argument will 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED