UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON

INTERNATIONAL

RELIGIOUS

FREEDOM

2023 Annual Report

Firoozeh Soltan Mohammadi | Rooha Imani | Seyyed-Soroush Abbasi | Syeed-Amin Abbasi | Seyyed-Karam Abbasi | Nasim Kashani Nejad | Homayoun Khanlori 

| Nima Mahin Bakht | Sanaz Tafazoli | Shahrouz Esmaeili | Nemat Pourvali | Mehr-Ali Hemmati | Hamid Gorgin | Ghadir Rahimi | Mohammad Bahrami | Seyed 

Fereydoun Taheri | Seyed Farhad Zalnouri | Ali Nazari | Noshad Taheri | Seyed Fariborz Shah-Ebrahimi | Farzad Rahmatabadi | Amin Malekzade | Meraj Hemmati 

| Bardia Tajdini | Rashid Mohammadi | Hamid Afshari | Masoum Razavi | Naghi Rahmani | Faezeh Ranai | Seyed Foad Shah-Ebrahimi | Navid Hassanlou | Hamid 

Zandi Nejhad | Meysam Azimi | Afshin Azimi | Seyed Shahoo Shah-Ebrahimi | Seyed Ali Dakei | Kamyab Heidari | Siavash Kaliani | Kaki Saeed Almasi | Faezeh 

Abdipour | Parwa Behdad | Elaheh Mohammadi | Pooya Saraf | Leili Karami | Hami Bahadori | Shayan Gholami | Shaghayegh Bahrami | Kamyar Habibi | Badie 

Khazei | Sirous Zabihi | Armaghan Zabihi | Arash Zamani | Saman Khadem | Parisa Roohi Zadegan | Niloofar Hamedi | Aida Rasti | Amin Sharifi | Atash Shahkarami 

| Enayatollah Naeimi | Sepehr Ziaee | Payam Vali | Malihe Nazari | Joseph Shahbazian | Atollah Zafar | Fariba Ashtari | Zhila Shahriari | Elham Choubdar | Bita | Shahnaz Sabet | Reza Radmanesh | Mishak Manavipour | Behieh Manavipour | Hanan Hashemi | Haleh Shadpour | Mostafa Khosraji | Hasan Nisi | Jome Naami | Abdolsadeh Azari | Shahram Najaf-Tomaraei | Saman Ostovar | Saha Sabeti | Zahra Sedighi-Hamadani | Shafigh Eslami | Nima Shadpour | Nematollah Khoshnam | Fariba Kamalabadi | Mahvash Sabet | Afif Naeimi | Saeed Naseri | Hamid Naseri | Afsaneh Emami | Parvan Manavi | Soroush Agahi | Kianoush Salmanzadeh | Payam Shabani | Elham Salmanzadeh | Houman Homayoun Zhaveh | Mahboubeh Misaghian | Farid Alavi | Neda Shabani | Peyman Manavi | Jamileh Pakrou Haghighi | Samiyeh Gholinejad | Negar Darabi | Mohammad Chegini | Mohammad Golbaz | Sara Ahmadi | 

Gholami | Gholamreza Keyvanmanesh | Melika Qaragozlu | Soori Babaei Chegini | Hayedeh Ram | Fardin Naddafian | Zhila Sharafi Nasrabadi | Negar Ighani | 

Shaghayegh Khaneh-Zarin | Samin Ehsani | Hiwa Yazdan Mehdi Abadi | Mitra Bandi Amirabadi | Amin Zolfaghari | Morteza Mashhood Kari | Ahmad Sarparast | 

Ayub Pour Rezazadeh | Seyyed Sadrullah Fazeli Zare | Yusef Mehrdad | Sahba Farnoush | Shakila Monfared | Parizad Hamidi Shafagh | Noushin Jafari | Monireh 

Arabshahi | Saba Kord Afshari | Yasaman Ariani | Zeynab Jalalian | Farid Zirgi Moghaddam | Ataollah Melaki | Roya Melaki | Atieh Salehi | Arezou Mohammadi 

| Nasim Ghanvatian | Mehrallah Afshar | Arash Rasekhi | Maral Rasti | Mahnaz Jan Nesar | Sakineh Behjati | Hadi Rahimi | Alireza Nourmohammadi | Ameen 

Khaki | Milad Goudarzi | Abdolreza Ali Haghnejad | Ardeshir Fanaian | Mohammad Nouri | Sina Dehghan | Behnam Eskandarian | Kasra Nouri | Mostafa Abdi 

| Mohammad Sharifi Moghaddam | Saeed Soltanpour | Milad Davardan | Farhang Sahba | Anoush Rayeneh | Ali Sani | Afshin Bulbulan | Marjan Davari | Zaman 

Fadaei | Farhad Fahandezh | Abdolrahim Kouhi | Amanollah Balochi | Abbas Dehghan | Adel Naimi | Youcef Nadarkhani | Golrokh Ebrahimi Iraee | Mahsa Amini
A protester seen holding a rosary and a placard with a picture of Mahsa Amini during the demonstration. 

Protesters organized a demonstration following the death of Mahsa Amini. Mahsa fell into a coma and 

died after being arrested in Tehran by the morality police for allegedly violating the country’s hijab rules. 

Amini’s death has sparked weeks of violent protests across Iran. (Photo by Onur Dogman / SOPA Images/

Sipa USA)(Sipa via AP Images)
ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

COMMISSIONERS

Nury Turkel

Chair

Abraham Cooper

Vice Chair

David Curry

Frederick A. Davie

Sharon Kleinbaum

Mohamed Magid

Stephen Schneck

Erick Ueland

Frank Wolf

Erin D. Singshinsuk

Executive Director

APRIL 2023
PROFESSIONAL STAFF 

Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Director of Research and Policy

Roy Haskins, Director of Operations Management

Danielle Ashbahian, Chief of Public Affairs 

Keely Bakken, Supervisory Policy Analyst

Thomas Kraemer, Chief Administrative Officer

Jamie Staley, Supervisory Policy Advisor

Scott Weiner, Supervisory Policy Analyst

Kurt Werthmuller, Supervisory Policy Analyst

Susan Bishai, Policy Analyst

Mollie Blum, Researcher

Mingzhi Chen, Senior Policy Analyst 

Patrick Greenwalt, Policy Analyst 

Sema Hasan, Policy Analyst 

Veronica McCarthy, Public Affairs Associate 

Hilary Miller, Researcher 

Nora Morton, Operations Specialist 

Dylan Schexnaydre, Researcher 

Zack Udin, Research Analyst 

Madeline Vellturo, Senior Policy Analyst 

Luke Wilson, Researcher

U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714

Washington, DC 20401

(P) 202–523–3240

www.uscirf.gov
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction and Overview 1

About this Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Standards for CPC, SWL, and EPC Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

USCIRF’s 2023 CPC, SWL, and EPC Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act 5

Key Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Recommendations to the Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Recommendations to Congress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Key USCIRF Resources & Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Legal Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Key Developments in 2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Countries Recommended for Designation as 

Countries of Particular Concern (CPCs) 12

Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Burma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Cuba. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Eritrea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Nicaragua. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

North Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Pakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Syria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Tajikistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Turkmenistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Countries Recommended for the 

State Department’s Special Watch List (SWL) 48

Algeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Azerbaijan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Central African Republic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Egypt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Indonesia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Iraq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Kazakhstan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Malaysia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Sri Lanka. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Turkey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Uzbekistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Other Key Developments 71

Transnational Repression and Influence by Religious Freedom Violators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Religious Freedom Concerns in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Laws Restricting Religious Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Emerging Religious Freedom Concerns in Other Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Combating Antisemitism: Positive Developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Religious Freedom Concerns for Indigenous Peoples in Latin America. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Key USCIRF Recommendations Implemented in 2022 77

Designating the Worst Violators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Filling IRF-Related Appointments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Increasing the Use of Targeted Sanctions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Designation of Rohingya Genocide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Raising IRF Issues in Multilateral Engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Raising IRF Issues in Bilateral Engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Implementation of Executive Order 13926 – Advancing International Religious Freedom . . . . . . . . . 78

Refugee Resettlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Advocacy for Religious Prisoners of Conscience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Enforcement of China-Related Human Rights Legislation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Congressional Action Promoting Religious Freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Appendix 1 Commissioner Biographies 81

Appendix 2 Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List 83

Appendix 3 Highlights of USCIRF’s Public Activities in 2022 89
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023 1

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

I

n September 2022, Iran’s morality police arrested, beat, and mortally 

wounded Mahsa Zhina Amini because her visible hair violated the 

government’s religiously grounded headscarf law. Outraged by 

this flagrant denial of life, young women and girls led hundreds of 

thousands of fellow Iranians in peaceful protests asserting their right 

to freedom of religion or belief, risking severe punishment, permanent 

injury, and even death. Rather than respect this call to abide by its obligations under international law, the Iranian government ramped up a 

campaign of violent repression against its own people. Security forces 

shot children like Kian Pirfalak (age nine), beat and killed girls like Nika 

Shakarami (age 16), and repeatedly sexually harassed, sexually 

assaulted, and raped scores of 

peaceful protesters like Armita 

Abbasi (age 21). Iran’s government then used intimidation and 

threats to prevent victims’ families from speaking publicly and 

truthfully about this repression. 

The cover of this year’s U.S. 

Commission on International 

Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 

annual report honors the Iranian 

women and girls who have been at the forefront of the ongoing protests for greater freedom in Iran and have faced extreme and violent 

consequences for their participation. Iranian authorities’ systematic 

use of sexual and gender-based violence against them represents a 

purposeful weaponization of religious conceptions of purity, modesty, 

and gender hierarchy in an effort to shame Iranians out of peacefully 

asserting their fundamental right to religious freedom. 

The cover also honors the many other Iranians, known and 

unknown, held in prison in 2022 on account of their religious beliefs, 

activity, or identity by displaying the names of the individuals from Iran 

who are included in USCIRF’s Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims 

List. Iranian authorities’ repression of freedom of religion or belief has 

been a decades-long campaign targeting both religious minorities 

and members of the majority Shi’a Muslim community. During 2022, 

in addition to its repression of protesters, Iran’s leadership continued 

to target members of the Baha’i, Christian, Gonabadi Sufi, Zoroastrian, 

Yarsani, Sunni Muslim, Shi’a Muslim, and nonreligious communities 

with harassment, arrests, egregiously long prison sentences, multiyear internal exiles, or bans on participating in political and social 

activities. Iranian security services also targeted religious minorities 

who have fled abroad as well as activists in other countries, including 

on U.S. soil, who opposed mandatory headscarf laws and other religious freedom restrictions. Based on these systematic, egregious, 

and ongoing violations of religious freedom, in this report USCIRF is 

again recommending that Iran be designated by the U.S. Department 

of State as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC). USCIRF urges the 

administration of President Joseph R. Biden to continue to coordinate 

international action to lift the veil of impunity under which Iran’s leadership continues to operate. 

Beyond Iran, this report sounds the alarm regarding the deterioration of religious freedom conditions in a range of other countries 

and provides policy recommendations to the U.S. government to 

respond to violations occurring in these places. This year, these countries include Sri Lanka, which USCIRF is recommending for placement 

on the State Department’s Special Watch List (SWL) for the first time. 

USCIRF previously published country updates on Sri Lanka in 2021

and 2022 and found sufficient 

evidence of severe violations 

of religious freedom, such as 

discrimination against religious 

minorities in the form of targeted arrests using problematic 

legislation and appropriation of 

land and property. Similarly, 

USCIRF is recommending CPC 

designations for Cuba and Nicaragua for the first time after 

previously recommending them 

for placement on the SWL since 

2004 and 2019, respectively. In Cuba, religious freedom conditions 

in 2022 worsened considerably, with the government seeking total 

dominance over religious life in the country. Additionally, the regime in 

Nicaragua has sharply increased its persecution of the Catholic Church 

by imprisoning clergy, shuttering church-affiliated organizations, and 

prohibiting Catholic rituals.

About This Report 

Created by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, as 

amended (IRFA), USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan U.S. government advisory body, separate from the State Department, that 

monitors and reports on religious freedom abroad and makes policy 

recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress. 

USCIRF bases these recommendations on the provisions of its authorizing legislation and the standards in the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 

(ICCPR), and other international documents. USCIRF’s mandate and 

annual reports are different from, and complementary to, the mandate 

and annual reports of the State Department’s Office of International 

Religious Freedom. 

USCIRF’s 2023 Annual Report assesses religious freedom violations and progress in 28 countries during calendar year 2022 and 

makes independent recommendations for U.S. policy. The key findings, recommendations, and analysis in this report are based on a 

year’s research by USCIRF, including travel, hearings, meetings, and 

Iranian authorities’ repression of 

freedom of religion or belief has been a 

decades-long campaign targeting both 

religious minorities and members of the 

majority Shi’a Muslim community.
2 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

briefings, and are approved by a majority vote of Commissioners. 

Under the statute, each Commissioner has the option to include a 

statement with his or her own individual views.

The report’s primary focus is on two groups of countries: first, 

those that USCIRF recommends the State Department should designate as CPCs under IRFA, and second, those that USCIRF recommends 

the State Department should 

place on its SWL. The report 

also includes USCIRF’s recommendations of nonstate actors 

for designation by the State 

Department as Entities of Particular Concern (EPCs) under IRFA. 

In addition, the report analyzes 

the U.S. government’s implementation of IRFA during the 

reporting year and provides recommendations to bolster overall 

U.S. efforts to advance freedom 

of religion or belief abroad. It 

also includes a section discussing key trends and developments in 

religious freedom globally during the reporting period, including 

in countries that are not recommended for CPC or SWL status. This 

year, that section covers topics including transnational repression and 

influence by religious freedom violators, religious freedom concerns 

in Europe, laws restricting religious freedom, emerging religious freedom concerns in other countries, positive developments in combating 

antisemitism, and religious freedom concerns for indigenous peoples 

in Latin America. Finally, the report’s last section highlights key USCIRF 

recommendations that the U.S. government has implemented since 

USCIRF’s previous annual report. 

In this report, USCIRF uses the terms “religious freedom,” “freedom of religion,” and “freedom of religion or belief” interchangeably 

to refer to the broad right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion or belief—including the right to nonbelief—protected under 

international human rights law.

Standards for CPC, SWL, and 

EPC Recommendations 

IRFA defines CPCs as countries where the government engages in 

or tolerates “particularly severe” violations of religious freedom. It 

defines the State Department’s SWL for countries where the government engages in or tolerates “severe” violations of religious freedom. 

Under IRFA, particularly severe violations of religious freedom 

mean “systematic, ongoing, [and] egregious violations . . . , including violations such as—(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 

treatment or punishment; (B) prolonged detention without charges; 

(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of those persons; or (D) other flagrant denial of the 

right to life, liberty, or the security of persons.” Although the statute 

does not specifically define severe violations of religious freedom, 

in making SWL recommendations USCIRF interprets it to mean violations that meet two of the elements of IRFA’s systematic, ongoing, 

and egregious standard (i.e., that the violations are systematic and 

ongoing, systematic and egregious, or ongoing and egregious).

To meet the legal standard for designation as an EPC, a nonstate 

group must engage in particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined above, and must also be “a nonsovereign entity that 

exercises significant political power and territorial control; is outside 

the control of a sovereign government; and often employs violence 

in pursuit of its objectives.”

The Annual Report highlights the countries and entities that, in 

USCIRF’s view, merit CPC, SWL, or EPC designation; it is intended to 

focus U.S. policymakers’ attention on the worst violators of religious 

freedom globally. The fact that a 

country or nonstate group is not 

covered in this report does not 

mean it did not violate religious 

freedom during the reporting 

year. It only means that based 

on the information available to 

USCIRF, the conditions during 

that year did not, in USCIRF’s 

view, meet the high threshold—

the perpetration or toleration 

of particularly severe or severe 

violations of religious freedom—required to recommend 

the country or nonstate group for CPC, SWL, or EPC designation. In 

the case of a nonstate group, it also could mean that the group did 

not meet other statutory requirements, such as exercising significant 

political power and territorial control. 

USCIRF monitors and has concerns about religious freedom 

conditions abroad, including violations of freedom of religion or belief 

perpetrated or tolerated by governments and entities not covered 

in this report. The full range of USCIRF’s work on a wide variety of 

countries and topics can be found at www.uscirf.gov.

USCIRF’S 2023 CPC, SWL, and 

EPC Recommendations 

For 2023, based on religious freedom conditions in 2022, USCIRF 

recommends that the State Department:

■ Redesignate as CPCs the following 12 countries: Burma, China, 

Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, Nicaragua, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, 

Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan;

■ Designate as additional CPCs the following five countries: 

Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, Syria, and Vietnam; 

■ Maintain on the SWL the following two countries: Algeria and 

the Central African Republic (CAR); 

■ Include on the SWL the following nine countries: Azerbaijan, 

Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, 

and Uzbekistan; and

■ Redesignate as EPCs the following seven nonstate actors: 

al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the 

Houthis, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic State 

in West Africa Province (ISWAP also referred to as ISIS-West 

Africa), and Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).

The conditions supporting the CPC or SWL recommendation 

for each country are described in the relevant country chapters of 

this report. The conditions supporting the EPC recommendations for 

Boko Haram and ISWAP are described in the Nigeria chapter and for 

HTS in the Syria chapter. 

For al-Shabaab, the Houthis, ISGS, and JNIM, the EPC recommendations are based on the following conditions: 

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The Annual Report highlights the countries 

and entities that, in USCIRF’s view, 

merit CPC, SWL, or EPC designation; 

it is intended to focus U.S. policymakers’ 

attention on the worst violators of 

religious freedom globally.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023 3

Militant Islamist insurgency al-Shabaab continued to operate in 

parts of Somalia despite military pressure from the Somali government and its allies. The group continued to conduct attacks based 

on religion in its efforts to establish a state that will enforce a singular 

interpretation of Islamic law. In addition to targeting military and 

civilian infrastructure, al-Shabaab also targeted houses of worship. In 

July, al-Shabaab fighters bombed a mosque in Baidoa during Friday 

prayers, killing several worshipers.

In 2022, the Houthi movement, formally known as Ansar Allah, 

did not significantly expand its territorial holdings throughout Yemen 

after making marginal gains in the year prior. A truce that began 

in April expired in October despite calls for its renewal; however, 

even during the brief cessation of hostilities, the Houthis continued 

their egregious religious freedom violations. The group continued to 

undermine the rights of women and girls by imposing a mahram (male 

escort) requirement, even as broader male guardianship restrictions 

increased considerably. Jewish prisoner Libi Marhabi remained in 

Houthi detention despite multiple appeals for his release, and the tiny 

remaining Jewish community faced ongoing repression from Houthi 

leaders. Authorities persisted in systematically persecuting the Baha’i 

community by detaining and torturing members while plundering

Baha’i land, property, and assets. The Houthis harassed, detained, 

and tortured Yemeni Christians, particularly converts from Islam, and 

the group also detained more than 200 Christian foreign workers from 

Africa on false accusations. Only a few thousand Christians remained 

in the country, as many fled such persecution.

Militant Islamist insurgencies ISGS and JNIM expanded their 

reach in the Sahel, including in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Both 

ISGS and JNIM engaged in intimidation and conducted attacks based 

on religion and enforced harsh interpretations of Islamic law in their 

areas of control. Abuses continued into early 2023 when militant 

Islamist fighters attacked an Ahmadiyya mosque in Burkina Faso, 

demanding the attendees change their faith before killing the imam 

and several others.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023 5

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

Key Findings

In 2022, the administration of President Joseph R. Biden continued 

to prioritize protecting international religious freedom (IRF) and 

increasing accountability for violations. In March, the U.S. Department of State determined that the “Burmese military committed 

genocide and crimes against humanity against Rohingya” and 

imposed further sanctions against Burmese individuals and entities 

responsible for the regime’s ongoing violent crackdown. In April, 

President Biden signed into law the permanent reauthorization of 

the Global Magnitsky Human 

Rights Accountability Ac t 

(Global Magnitsky Act). USCIRF 

welcomed the permanent reauthorization, which provides 

the U.S. government with the 

authority to impose sanctions 

(i.e., issue visa bans and asset 

freezes) against foreign persons 

engaging in gross human rights 

abuses, such as severe religious 

freedom violations. 

The U.S. government 

continued to serve as the Secretariat of the International 

Religious Freedom or Belief 

Alliance (IRFBA). During 2022, 

IRFBA made multicountry statements on egregious religious freedom 

violations in Nicaragua and Nigeria, the rights of religious minority 

groups such as the Baha’i and Ahmadiyya Muslim communities to 

freely practice their faiths, and the incompatibility of blasphemy 

laws with freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression. In 

addition, the U.S. government cosponsored a United Nations Human 

Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution on freedom of religion or belief 

and supported convening a special session of the UNHRC to address 

Iran’s suppression of protesters. 

In September, President Biden maintained the heightened 

admissions cap for refugees at 125,000 for fiscal year (FY) 2023 and 

designated certain populations for priority consideration as refugees, 

including multiple groups fleeing religious persecution. This followed 

a commitment from the United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (USCIS) to increase staffing levels to more efficiently process 

refugee claims. Additionally, USCIS provided temporary protected 

status to Afghan nationals living in the United States.

In November, the State Department designated 12 countries 

as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) under the International 

Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) for engaging in or tolerating particularly 

severe violations of religious 

freedom, including for the 

first time Cuba and Nicaragua. 

USCIRF welcomed the new CPC 

designations but expressed tremendous disappointment that 

the State Department failed to 

include India and Nigeria among 

its list of CPCs. While the State 

Department reimposed existing sanctions on eight of the 12 

countries it designated as CPCs, 

it issued waivers on taking any 

action against the remaining 

four. USCIRF has long called 

on administrations to refrain 

from issuing waivers and relying exclusively on existing sanctions to hold CPCs accountable. The 

State Department placed four countries on its “Special Watch List” 

(SWL) for severe religious freedom violations, including two countries 

for the first time, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Vietnam. 

Although the State Department designated Vietnam as a CPC in 2004 

and 2005, it never previously placed Vietnam on the SWL. Finally, the 

State Department designated nine “entities of particular concern” 

(EPCs), which are nonstate actors that engage in particularly severe 

violations of religious freedom. The Wagner Group, a private Russian 

military firm, received an EPC designation for the first time in light of 

its actions in CAR.

STATE DEPARTMENT 2022 DESIGNATIONS

CPC Designations Burma, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, Nicaragua, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and 

Turkmenistan

SWL Countries Algeria, Central African Republic, Comoros, and Vietnam

EPC Designations Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Houthis, the Islamic State in Greater Sahara, the Islamic 

State in West Africa Province, Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, the Taliban, and the Wagner Group

In November, the State Department 

designated 12 countries as 

“countries of particular concern” (CPCs) 

under the International Religious Freedom Act 

(IRFA) for engaging in or 

tolerating particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom, including for the 

first time Cuba and Nicaragua.
6 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATION

■ Promptly appoint a well-qualified individual within the National Security Council 

(NSC) as Special Adviser to the President 

on IRF and provide financial resources and 

staff needed to fulfill the mandate outlined in IRFA; 

■ Strengthen advocacy on behalf of individuals persecuted on the basis of religion 

by maintaining the United States’ leadership roles in IRFBA and the International 

Contact Group on Freedom of Religion 

or Belief, participating in and supporting 

future events to advance international 

religious freedom, and continuing to implement the executive order on Advancing 

International Religious Freedom;

■ Increase the use of the Global Magnitsky 

Act and other human rights related financial and visa authorities to impose asset 

freezes and/or visa bans on individuals 

and entities for severe religious freedom 

violations, citing specific abuses, and coordinate with other countries with similar 

sanctions regimes on such targeted sanctions whenever possible;

■ Fully implement the Elie Wiesel Genocide 

and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 to 

develop policies to enhance the capacity of 

the United States to prevent and respond 

to atrocities worldwide, including those 

against religious communities; 

■ Review U.S. policy toward the four 

CPC-designated countries for which 

waivers were issued on taking any 

action—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—to make policy 

changes for meaningful consequences 

and encourage positive change;

■ Continue to strengthen the mechanisms 

of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 

(USRAP) to increase the ability to meet the 

admissions ceiling for refugees in FY 2023, 

and prioritize for resettlement survivors 

of the most egregious forms of religious 

persecution, including Iranian religious 

minorities eligible for processing under 

the Lautenberg Amendment, members 

of other severely persecuted religious or 

belief communities, and survivors of genocide or other atrocity crimes; 

■ Address longstanding flaws in the treatment of asylum seekers in Expedited 

Removal, including by enhancing the quality and oversight of the initial processing 

of noncitizens, improving detention 

conditions, and appointing a high-level 

official at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to coordinate and 

oversee reforms;

■ Allocate greater funding to programs 

that support civil society and human 

rights defenders in exile who document 

and monitor religious freedom violations in countries where civil society is 

repressed; and

■ Perform an assessment on foreign governments’ transnational repression as it relates 

to religious freedom, including analysis of 

how to improve U.S. government policy 

and U.S. collaboration with allies to prevent 

and counter transnational targeting of religious communities.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS

■ Examine U.S. policy related to IRF issues, 

including the effectiveness of CPC 

designations for mitigating religious 

freedom violations, through legislation, 

hearings, briefings, and other actions; 

and assess, during congressional delegation trips abroad, conditions for 

persons of all faiths and beliefs as well 

as nonbelievers; 

■ Advocate, as individual members of 

Congress, for IRF by sponsoring religious prisoners of conscience through 

the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission’s (TLHRC) Defending Freedoms 

Project, collaborating with the International Panel of Parliamentarians for 

Freedom of Religion or Belief, and joining the U.S. House of Representatives 

or U.S. Senate Bipartisan Task Force 

for Combating Antisemitism and caucuses such as the House IRF Caucus and 

Ahmadiyya Muslim Caucus; 

■ Reintroduce and pass the bipartisan 

Stop Helping Adversaries Manipulate 

Everything (SHAME) Act to prohibit 

any person from receiving compensation for lobbying on behalf of foreign 

adversaries, including those engaging in 

particularly severe violations of the right 

to freedom of religion or belief; and

■ Permanently reauthorize the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom to ensure Congress and the 

public continue to receive independent, 

bipartisan monitoring and analysis of 

international religious freedom issues.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Factsheet: Overview of Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution Globally

■ Factsheet: Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List

■ Issue Brief: Implications of Laws Promoting State-Favored Religions

■ Hearing: Women’s Roles in Advancing International Religious Freedom

■ Podcast: Breaking Down the State Department’s IRF Designations 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023 7

Legal Framework 

IRFA, as amended by the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2016, seeks to make religious freedom a higher priority 

in U.S. foreign policy through a range of mechanisms and tools. 

These include governmental institutions (USCIRF as an independent legislative branch agency requiring regular reauthorization, the 

ambassador at large and the State Department’s IRF Office, and a 

special adviser on the White House NSC staff); ongoing monitoring 

and annual reports on international religious freedom violations; and 

the imposition of consequences 

for the worst violators. The 

consequences set forth in IRFA 

consist of CPC designations and 

related actions, placement on 

the State Department’s SWL, 

the ability to bar entry to the 

United States of foreign officials responsible for particularly 

severe religious freedom violations, and EPC designations for 

nonstate actors. 

IRFA includes religious 

freedom as an element of U.S. 

foreign assistance, cultural 

exchange, and international 

broadcasting programs and requires training on religious freedom and 

religious persecution for State Department foreign service officers 

and U.S. immigration officials. Further, it includes provisions on U.S. 

refugee and asylum policy. It also specifically cites U.S. participation 

in multilateral organizations as an avenue for advancing religious 

freedom abroad. IRFA is centered on the right to freedom of religion or belief as recognized in international law, as articulated in the 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant 

on Civil and Political Rights, and other international instruments and 

regional agreements. 

For a more detailed description of IRFA, its legislative history, 

and its implementation, see USCIRF’s Factsheet: IRFA. 

Alongside IRFA, other laws provide tools to sanction individual 

religious freedom abusers. Some apply to specific countries, such 

as the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act (CISADA, 

P.L.111-195). More broadly, the 2016 Global Magnitsky Act allows the 

president, who has delegated these authorities to the secretaries of 

treasury and state, to deny U.S. visas to and freeze the U.S.-based 

assets of any foreigner responsible for “extrajudicial killings, torture, 

or other gross violations of internationally protected human rights” 

against someone seeking to expose illegal government activity or to 

exercise or defend internationally protected rights. Executive Order 

(E.O.) 13818, issued in December 2017 to implement and build on the 

Global Magnitsky Act, authorizes visa bans and asset freezes against 

foreign persons involved in “serious human rights abuse,” providing 

an even more expansive basis for targeted sanctions. 

In addition, Section 7031(c) of the State Department’s FY 2023 

annual appropriations (P.L. 117-328) requires the secretary of state to 

make foreign officials and their immediate family members ineligible 

for U.S. entry if there is credible evidence that such individuals have 

been involved in “a gross violation of human rights.” Unlike the visa 

ineligibility provision enacted in IRFA, visa bans under this provision 

may be announced publicly.

Key Developments in 2022

Key U.S. Government IRF Positions

Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Rashad Hussain continued implementing his mandate through public speeches 

and meetings, including with the nongovernmental organization 

(NGO) IRF Roundtable and other stakeholders. In addition, Ambassador Hussain traveled to Mauritania, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, 

the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates as well 

as Morocco, the Gambia, and Senegal to meet with government 

officials and faith communities 

to advance religious freedom. 

In March, the Senate confirmed Deborah E. Lipstadt as 

Special Envoy to Monitor and 

Combat Antisemitism and 

elevated the rank to an ambassador position for the first time. 

Since assuming her mandate, 

Ambassador Lipstadt has condemned antisemitic remarks 

delivered by a UN official; met 

with NGOs and other stakeholders; and traveled to Argentina 

and Chile, the United Kingdom, 

Belgium, France, and South 

Africa and Morocco to meet with government officials and faith leaders to combat antisemitism, anti-Muslim hatred, racism, and other 

forms of intolerance and discrimination. 

In 2022, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and 

Human Rights Uzra Zeya, who also serves concurrently as the U.S. 

Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, highlighted ongoing human 

rights violations in Xinjiang, China, and delivered remarks on protecting Tibetans’ right to freedom of religion or belief at an event on the 

sidelines of the 51st session of the UNHRC.

Lack of Designations for Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, 

and Syria 

The State Department did not designate Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, or Syria as CPCs in 2022 despite USCIRF’s recommendations 

to do so and its own reporting documenting the nature and extent 

of the religious freedom violations in those countries. USCIRF has 

recommended CPC status for Afghanistan since 2022, India since 

2020, Nigeria since 2009, and Syria since 2014, and it issued a public 

statement criticizing the State Department’s omissions. Information 

on the religious freedom violations that took place in Afghanistan, 

India, Nigeria, and Syria in 2022 can be found in the country chapters 

in this report. 

New Designations for Cuba, Nicaragua, CAR, 

and Vietnam 

The State Department elevated Cuba and Nicaragua to CPC status 

based on worsening religious freedom conditions in those countries 

and placed CAR and Vietnam on the SWL for the first time, though 

Vietnam was designated as a CPC in 2004 and 2005. USCIRF continues to conclude and recommend that Vietnam should be designated 

as a CPC, but it hopes the SWL designation will encourage the 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

The State Department did not designate 

Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, or Syria 

as CPCs in 2022 despite 

USCIRF’s recommendations to do so and 

its own reporting documenting the 

nature and extent of the religious freedom 

violations in those countries.
8 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

Vietnamese government to take concrete steps to address longstanding religious freedom concerns.

Malign Foreign Influence

In 2022, a bipartisan group of members of Congress introduced the 

SHAME Act to prohibit lobbyists from receiving compensation from 

countries designated as foreign adversaries by the U.S. Department 

of Commerce. Most of the designated countries engage in particularly severe religious freedom violations and other egregious human 

rights abuses. The SHAME Act would considerably strengthen the 

existing regulatory framework around lobbying on behalf of foreign 

governments. The current regulatory framework, governed by the 

Foreign Agent Registration Act of 1938 and the Lobbying Disclosure 

Act, does not prevent lobbyists from working on behalf of foreign 

adversaries engaging in gross violations of human rights. As such, 

foreign adversaries can legally attempt to promote their interests or 

influence U.S. government policy on human rights and international 

religious freedom issues.

Multilateral Engagement 

In 2022, the United States served the first year of a three-year term 

as a member of the UNHRC after having been elected to the body 

in October 2021. The U.S. government cosponsored a resolution on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief and also supported calling an Urgent 

Debate on human rights violations occurring in Afghanistan against 

women and girls. During the Urgent Debate, the U.S. government 

highlighted the longstanding human rights violations perpetrated 

against the Shi’a Muslim community in Afghanistan and cosponsored a resolution strongly condemning all violations occurring 

in Afghanistan. In addition, in December, the State Department 

released multicountry joint statements condemning the Taliban’s 

decisions to ban women from attending universities and working 

for NGOs. 

Following Iran’s violent crackdown on Iranians protesting 

Mahsa Zhina Amini’s death at the hands of Iran’s Morality Police 

for wearing an “improper hijab,” the U.S. government supported

convening a special session of the UNHRC on Iran’s human rights 

violations. At the special session’s conclusion, the U.S. government 

voted in favor of establishing 

a fact-finding mission to thoroughly and independently 

investigate human rights violations related to the protests. 

During 2022, the U.S. government also organized an event

on the protection of ethnic and 

religious minority groups in 

Afghanistan and an event on 

protecting the right to freedom 

of religion or belief for Tibetan 

Buddhists; joined a 47-country 

joint statement on human rights 

conditions in Xinjiang, Hong 

Kong, and Tibet; and cosponsored and supported a resolution that 

removed Iran from the UN Commission on the Status of Women. 

Individual Violators

During 2022, there were no known visa denials to any foreign officials 

for particularly severe religious freedom violations under Section 

212(a)(2)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the provision 

added by IRFA. However, the U.S. government continued its use of 

newer accountability tools to deny U.S. visas to or block the U.S.-based 

assets of foreigners for corruption or human rights abuses.

As of December, the U.S. government had sanctioned 606 foreign individuals and entities under the Global Magnitsky Act and the 

related 2017 E.O. 13818, including multiple sanctions for religious 

freedom violations. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed 

Global Magnitsky Act sanctions on Chinese public security officials 

responsible for human rights and religious freedom violations in the 

Tibetan Autonomous Region and on Iranian law enforcement authorities for violently cracking down on protesters. 

The U.S. government also used non-Global Magnitsky Act 

tools to hold violators accountable. Following the State Department designating the Burmese military’s atrocities against the 

Rohingya as genocide, the Treasury Department, under E.O. 14014, 

sanctioned Burmese military commanders, a Burmese military unit, 

and arms dealers responsible for or complicit in serious human 

rights abuses. In addition, the Treasury Department sanctioned 

Iranian officials in September, twice in October, in November, and 

in December under E.O. 13553 for their brutal crackdown against 

Iranian protesters.

Programs

IRFA envisaged the funding of religious freedom programs authorizing 

U.S. foreign assistance to promote and develop “legal protections and 

cultural respect for religious freedom.” For FY 2022, the State Department was required to make funds available for international religious 

freedom programs. During 2022, the State Department’s Bureau of 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor issued several requests for 

proposals to advance religious freedom and/or provide protection 

to religious minority groups—including in Bulgaria and Romania, 

Cuba, and Ethiopia. 

Throughout 2022, the Biden administration funded humanitarian 

aid for religious groups targeted for persecution or genocide and 

programs to promote religious freedom, tolerance, and pluralism. 

In March, the State Department 

and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

announced more than $152 million in humanitarian assistance 

for the Rohingya humanitarian 

crisis. In May, USAID announced

$808 million in humanitarian 

assistance for the Syria crisis, 

including funding to support 

safe spaces and psychosocial 

support for women and girls. In 

September, the State Department and USAID announced

$170 million in additional humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya 

humanitarian crisis and $326.7 million in humanitarian assistance to 

vulnerable populations in Afghanistan. Critically, throughout 2022, 

USAID maintained the Strategic Religious Freedom and International 

Religious Freedom Sector Council to advise and coordinate action on 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

As of December, the U.S. government 

had sanctioned 606 foreign individuals 

and entities under the Global Magnitsky Act 

and the related 2017 E.O. 13818, 

including multiple sanctions for 

religious freedom violations.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023 9

policy steps to advance USAID’s commitment to freedom of religion 

or belief.

Refugee Resettlement

Under USRAP, the president sets a ceiling for how many refugees the 

United States will accept from abroad each year; under IRFA, religious 

persecution should be considered in this determination. 

In October 2021, the Biden administration increased the annual 

refugee ceiling to 125,000 for FY 2022, which doubled FY 2021’s 

62,500-refugee ceiling. For FY 2022, the Biden administration 

designated certain populations for priority consideration as refugees—including Turkic Muslim refugees who are nationals or last 

habitual residents of China, Rohingya Muslim refugees who are nationals or last habitual residents of Burma, and Iraqi and Syrian nationals 

who are members of religious or ethnic minority groups. In addition, 

in March 2022, President Biden signed the renewal of the Lautenberg 

Amendment—a special program allowing certain persecuted religious 

minority groups to resettle in the United States. Despite these steps, 

only 25,465 refugees were admitted to the United States in FY 2022. 

USCIS has prioritized increasing staffing levels to process refugee 

claims more efficiently.

In September, the White House announced that it was maintaining the admission ceiling at 125,000 for FY 2023. The Biden 

administration also pledged to continue implementing E.O. 14013 in 

FY 2023 to rebuild and enhance USRAP and to prioritize persecuted 

religious populations for U.S. resettlement. In December, the State 

Department announced an initiative to resettle vulnerable Rohingya 

refugees as a part of USRAP. 

Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal

As authorized by IRFA, USCIRF examined the U.S. government’s treatment of asylum seekers in Expedited Removal, the process that allows 

DHS officers to quickly deport—without immigration court hearings—noncitizens who arrive at U.S. ports of entry or cross the border 

without proper documents unless they can establish a credible fear of 

persecution or torture. USCIRF has long monitored the subject, including in comprehensive reports released in 2005, 2007, 2013, and 2016

that document major problems successive administrations have not 

addressed. Specifically, USCIRF found that DHS officials often fail to 

follow required procedures to identify asylum seekers and refer them 

for credible fear determinations; that they detain asylum seekers in 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT

inappropriate, prison-like conditions; and that funding disparities and 

a lack of high-level oversight hamper the complicated, multiagency 

process. These flaws raise serious concerns that the United States is 

erroneously returning asylum seekers to countries where they could 

face persecution or torture in violation of both U.S. and international 

law—a risk that Expedited Removal has only exacerbated.

In 2021, President Biden ordered the secretary of homeland 

security to review expedited removal procedures and make recommendations for “creating a more efficient and orderly process that 

facilitates timely adjudications and adherence to standards of fairness and due process,” a step that USCIRF welcomed. Although the 

recommendations have not been made public, in March 2022, DHS 

rescinded a notice that expanded Expedited Removal procedures to 

the maximum extent permitted. With its recission, the risk of erroneously returning asylum seekers to countries where they could face 

persecution, while still real, is reduced.

Notable Congressional Efforts to Promote Religious 

Freedom Abroad

In 2022, Congress continued its own IRF promotion efforts. In April, 

Congress passed the permanent reauthorization of the Global Magnitsky Act, which USCIRF applauded. Additionally, the House Foreign 

Affairs Committee held a hearing on the crisis in Burma one year after 

the coup. The TLHRC held a hearing on discrimination and persecution against Muslims around the world and a hearing on the perilous 

state of religious freedom in Nicaragua. The Congressional-Executive 

Commission on China held hearings on China’s control of religion 

through digital authoritarianism, growing constraints on language and 

ethnic identity in China, and human rights abuses in Tibet, including 

religious rights violations. 

In addition, members of Congress advocated for the release of 

prisoners of conscience, including religious prisoners, through the 

TLHRC’s Defending Freedoms Project. Members sent the executive 

branch letters on religious freedom violations in Burma, China, India, 

Iran, Nicaragua, Nigeria, and Vietnam as well as letters advocating for 

a USRAP Priority 2 designation for religious minorities in Afghanistan 

and improvements in education for Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar. 

Members also participated in numerous USCIRF events and hearings, 

including the launch of the 2022 annual report, a hearing on U.S. 

policy and freedom of religion or belief in North Korea, a hearing on 

the crackdown on religious freedom in Nicaragua, and a hearing on 

China’s religious freedom violations.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023 11

2023 USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS

■ COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN

Afghanistan

Burma

China

Cuba

Eritrea

India

Iran

Nicaragua

Nigeria

North Korea

Pakistan

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Vietnam

■ SPECIAL WATCH LIST COUNTRIES

Algeria

Azerbaijan

Central African Republic

Egypt

Indonesia

Iraq

Kazakhstan

Malaysia

Sri Lanka

Turkey

Uzbekistan
12 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

AFGHANISTAN

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Afghanistan continued 

to deteriorate, as they have since the Taliban seized control of 

the country in August 2021. In contrast to its pledges for change 

and inclusivity upon its seizure of power, the Taliban has since ruled 

Afghanistan in a deeply repressive and intolerant manner—essentially unchanged from its previous era in power from 1996 to 2001. 

Its rigorous enforcement on all Afghans of its harsh interpretation of 

Shari’a violates the freedom of religion or belief of religious minorities; women; members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 

queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) community; and Afghans with differing interpretations of Islam, such as predominantly Shi’a Muslim 

members of the ethnic Hazara community. Taliban leaders have 

further issued a series of decrees specifying acceptable behaviors 

under their interpretation of Islam, particularly targeting women by 

restricting their freedom of movement, dress, education, participation in sports, right to work, and healthcare. The group’s Ministry for 

Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (MPVPV) enforces what 

its officials deem religiously appropriate conduct through a notoriously violent and hardline Islamist policing system that has been 

especially harsh and progressively worsening toward Afghan women. 

Despite continued promises to protect all ethnic and religious communities residing in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s de facto 

government has been unable or unwilling to provide religious 

and ethnic minorities safety and security against radical Islamist violence, particularly in the form of attacks by the Islamic 

State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) and factions of the Taliban 

itself. In April, for example, ISIS-K bombed several religious sites, 

including Sahib Khalifa Mosque, a Sufi house of worship in Kabul, 

killing almost 50 worshipers, and Mawlawi Sekandar Sufi Mosque

in Kunduz Province, killing 33 people. Much of the related violence 

has targeted Hazara villages, schools, and places of worship, such 

as a series of attacks in April against the Seh Dokan Mosque in 

Mazar-i-Sharif and twin bombings at Abdul Rahim Shahid High 

School in the Shi’a-dominated area of Kabul. That same month, 

the Taliban tortured and killed a Hazara midwife in Mazar-e-Sharif, 

amputating her legs, stabbing her, and shooting her 12 times. 

In August, an attack on a Shi’a Muslim neighborhood in Kabul 

during the holy days of Muharram left eight people dead. These 

existential threats led several members of Parliament in the United 

Kingdom, along with a group of key scholars and advocates, to 

warn in their unofficial inquiry in August of an imminent threat of 

genocide facing the Hazara community. 

The Taliban also either actively targets, discriminates against, 

or outright denies the existence of many vulnerable religious 

minorities such as Christians—who the Taliban falsely insist do 

not exist in the country—as well as Ahmadiyya Muslims, Baha’is, 

and nonbelievers. Members of these groups are unable to express 

their faiths or beliefs openly because they face dire consequences, 

including death, if discovered by the Taliban or ISIS-K. The Taliban 

reportedly assured the Sikh and Hindu communities of their safety 

shortly following the group’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021; however, several subsequent incidents of vandalism and violence led 

many to flee the country in 2021 and 2022, leaving behind fewer 

than 100 Hindus and Sikhs.

KEY FINDINGS

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Designate Afghanistan under the de facto 

rule of the Taliban as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA);

	■ Expand the existing Priority 2 (P-2) designation granting U.S. Refugee Admissions 

Program (USRAP) access for certain 

Afghan nationals and their family members to explicitly include Afghan religious 

minorities at extreme risk of religious 

persecution;

	■ Integrate protections for freedom of religion or belief into all potential dialogue 

with the Taliban; continue to clearly and 

publicly condemn ongoing and severe 

atrocities committed by the Taliban and 

ISIS-K; and emphasize to Taliban leadership the close relationship between 

religious freedom and overall security; and

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on Taliban 

officials responsible for severe violations 

of religious freedom by freezing those 

individuals’ assets and/or banning their 

entry into the United States under human 

rights related financial and visa authorities—citing specific religious freedom 

violations—and coordinate with allies to 

impose similar sanctions.

The U.S. Congress should: 

	■ Create by law a P-2 designation for members of religious groups at extreme risk of 

persecution by the Taliban.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Country Update: Religious Freedom in Afghanistan

■ Hearing: Religious Freedom in Afghanistan: One Year since the Taliban Takeover

■ Podcast: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in South Asia

■ Factsheet: Overview of Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution Globally
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 13

AFGHANISTAN

Background

Afghanistan is home to a diverse array of ethnic groups, including 

Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Balochs. Historically, 

the nation was religiously diverse, but the vast majority of non-Muslims 

fled after the Taliban seized control in 1996, and many of those who 

remained subsequently fled the country following the U.S. withdrawal 

in August 2021. The country’s current population of over 38 million is 

approximately 99.7 percent Muslim (84.7–89.7 percent Sunni and 10–15 

percent Shi’a, including Ismailis and Ahmadis), with the few remaining 

non-Muslims (Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is, Christians, Buddhists, Zoroastrians, and others) comprising the remaining 0.3 percent. Statistics for 

smaller groups are difficult to substantiate as most members are now 

reportedly in hiding; however, estimates for the Ahmadiyya Muslim 

community range from 450 to 2,500, and as many as 10,000 to 12,000 

Christians likely lived in Afghanistan at the beginning of the year. The 

country’s reported last remaining Jew, Zebulon Simentov, left in 2021.

Policing Society and Restricting Women

The Taliban has placed many other restrictions on Afghan society 

based on the regime’s interpretation of religious law, such as the banning of music. In January 2022, a video emerged from Paktia Province 

in which Taliban members humiliated two local musicians and burned 

their instruments. As a result of such incidents—including several 

executions and attacks since August 2021—many artists, entertainers, 

and musicians have fled Afghanistan, while those remaining hide their 

trade in fear; the Artistic Freedom Initiative reports that around 3,000 

performers have requested help to leave.

However, the Taliban has focused its most disastrous, sweeping, 

and repressive policies against the country’s women in an effort to 

implement its vision of religious law that excludes Afghan women 

from all opportunities and aspects of public life. In May, the MPVPV 

issued a decree stating that women in Afghanistan must cover their 

faces in public, ideally wearing a burqa, and warned women not to 

wear colorful clothing, high-heeled shoes, perfume, or anything ostensibly meant to attract the opposite sex. Secondary schools for girls 

remained closed throughout 2022, contingent on plans for the Taliban 

to set Islamic and cultural conditions for female students aged 12 

and older, according to statements from the group. Furthermore, 

the de facto government announced in December a complete ban 

on women attending universities, prompting a series of protests 

across the country by male and female students as well as widespread 

international condemnation, including from the United Nations (UN) 

Security Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and many 

Muslim-majority countries. Days later, the Taliban demonstrated its 

recalcitrance by announcing yet another ban—this time on women’s 

employment with local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—leading to similar international outrage and the 

suspension of activities by a number of organizations. The UN joined in 

temporarily closing some of its aid programs in Afghanistan, warning 

of “life-threatening consequences” from the Taliban’s actions.

Key U.S. Policy 

While the United States has not recognized the Taliban regime as the 

official government of Afghanistan, a U.S. government delegation

met with Taliban representatives in Qatar in June, underscoring U.S. 

commitment to the Afghan people in the wake of the deadly earthquakes that hit eastern Afghanistan earlier that month. U.S. officials 

emphasized the importance of the Taliban fulfilling its public commitments, including protecting the rights of all Afghans. The officials 

also expressed concern regarding the ongoing presence of al-Qaeda, 

ISIS-K, and other terrorist organizations in Afghanistan that continue to target religious minorities and those with differing beliefs. In 

August, U.S. drone strikes killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri 

in Kabul, and the U.S. Department of State accused the Taliban of 

grossly violating the 2020 Doha Declaration. 

Refugee resettlement remains one of the most crucial but challenging U.S. policy issues regarding Afghanistan. At present, only 

Afghan nationals who meet a highly limited set of conditions, such as 

working directly for U.S. authorities or U.S.-funded programs or for 

NGOs or media outlets based in the United States, have priority status

for resettlement. Efforts to extend the program to other communities 

and individuals at particular risk since the Taliban’s return to power 

have largely stalled. As of the end of 2022, and despite recognition 

from Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and some members of Congress regarding the horrendous conditions that religious minorities 

and other especially vulnerable populations face in Afghanistan, no 

specific legislation or policy initiative has yet emerged that would 

extend the crucial P-2 designation to those communities. Many such 

vulnerable families are reportedly among the thousands of displaced 

Afghans who by the end of 2022 still remained in limbo at the Emirates Humanitarian Centre in Abu Dhabi, awaiting U.S. processing in 

cooperation with United Arab Emirates authorities.

On November 30, the State Department redesignated the 

Taliban as an “entity of particular concern,” or EPC, under IRFA for 

engaging in particularly severe violations of religious freedom. However, the State Department did not designate Afghanistan as a CPC, 

likely due to its nonrecognition of the Taliban as the de facto governing authority; it also did not designate ISIS-K as an EPC due to the 

group’s lack of territorial control—its horrific campaign of violence 

against Afghan religious minorities notwithstanding.
14 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

BURMA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Burma continued to 

decline significantly. Since staging a military coup in February 

2021, the country’s junta—the Tatmadaw—has ruled through 

the State Administration Council (SAC) under the leadership of 

General Min Aung Hlaing. The SAC maintains full control of only 

an estimated 17 percent of the country’s total territory, and in 

that limited space it has significantly cracked down on all dissent 

and freedoms. 

Throughout the year, the SAC continued to link its legitimacy 

to the sponsorship of Burma’s Buddhist majority. In August, Major 

General Zaw Min Tun promised that any verbal, written, or online 

post insulting Buddhism would be punished according to the law. 

In July, General Hlaing joined two Buddhist monks in consecrating 

a replica of Shwezigon Pagoda in Moscow, Russia. In March, it was 

reported that since the time of the coup, the junta had destroyed, 

raided, and looted at least 30 Buddhist monasteries in Sagaing 

Region and 20 more in Magwe Region. The SAC’s sponsorship 

is limited to those Buddhist communities that support the junta.

The government violently targeted houses of worship belonging to religious minorities throughout the year, with evidence 

suggesting the SAC is using the same tactics against these communities that its forces have deployed against Muslim-majority 

Rohingyas since 2017. From the time of the 2021 coup through 

December 2022, government forces damaged or destroyed at 

least nine Catholic churches in Kloikaw Diocese in Kayah State and 

severely affected at least 16 out of 38 Catholic parishes. Government forces have also burned villages of religious minorities and 

even members of the Buddhist majority, destroying homes and 

houses of worship and schools in the process. The conflict displaced 

over 1.1 million people during that same timeframe, bringing the 

total of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Burma to 1.4 million. 

This number includes 121,000 from religious minority communities 

as well as from majority Buddhist groups within Kachin and Shan 

states. The SAC has deliberately blocked the delivery of humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations.

The increasing conflict between the SAC and the various ethnic armies, as well as forces aligned with the opposition National 

Unity Government (NUG), have caused the conflict to spread to 

approximately 83 percent of Burma’s territory. Growing evidence

reveals that neither the SAC nor the NUG have the ability to control many of the territories within Burma, including the regions 

in Rakhine State that are or were formerly home to the Rohingya 

community. Instead, the ethnoreligious militia known as the Arakan 

Army (AA) has become the dominant political force in that region, 

lessening the influence of both the SAC and the NUG in Rakhine 

State. Some members of the Rohingya community who spoke 

with USCIRF reported that in addition to the Tatmadaw and other 

Burmese authorities who drove them out of Rakhine State, the 

AA has also targeted members of their community. The AA has 

yet to reverse its past opposition to the presence of the Rohingya 

community in Rakhine.

International efforts to hold the Burmese authorities and the 

Tatmadaw legally accountable for atrocities they committed against 

the Rohingya community continued throughout 2022. Related 

cases were ongoing at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the 

International Criminal Court (ICC), and in Argentina under the principle of Universal Jurisdiction. In July, the ICJ dismissed the SAC’s 

objections to the case, allowing it to proceed. 

KEY FINDINGS

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Redesignate Burma as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA);

	■ Engage with the prodemocracy Burmese 

opposition, including the NUG, as well as 

ethnic armed organizations as outlined 

in the Burma Unified through Rigorous 

Military Accountability Act of 2022, and 

prioritize religious freedom—including justice, voluntary repatriation, and restored 

citizenship for the Rohingya community—

as a prerequisite for recognition and/or 

ongoing and substantial engagement;

	■ Work with Bangladeshi authorities and 

the international community to assist the 

Rohingya community with immediate 

needs while waiting for eventual voluntary repatriation, including identifying 

solutions to fully scale up livelihood and 

skills training programs for adults and 

youths and providing access to the 

Burmese curriculum to ensure a quality 

education for all children within Cox’s 

Bazar; and

	■ Expand options for Rohingya refugees 

to resettle in the United States—with 

an emphasis on especially vulnerable 

members of that community—and encourage like-minded partner countries to do 

the same. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES 

■ Factsheet: Pursuing Justice and Accountability: Next Steps for Rohingya Community of Burma

■ Policy Update: Burma 

■ Podcast: Rohingya Genocide Determination and Accountability

■ Commission Delegation Visit: Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, in November 2022
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 15

BURMA

Background

Burma’s population consists of Buddhists (87.9 percent), Christians (6.2 

percent), Muslims (4.3 percent), Animists (0.8 percent), and Hindus 

(0.5 percent). Although the 2008 constitution treats Buddhism as the 

de facto state religion while recognizing Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, 

and Animism, non-Buddhist religious and ethnic minorities have faced 

longstanding persecution. In 2015, Burma passed race and religion 

laws with the support of hardline Buddhist nationalist groups such as 

the Ma Ba Tha. These laws regulate religious conversion, marriage, 

and births; they also restrict the religious freedom of non-Buddhists, 

particularly Muslims.

In 2022, the SAC continued to perpetrate mass human rights 

violations within Burma. The SAC has received support from Russia 

and China, although there are indications China’s past support for 

the Tatmadaw had waned by late 2022. In July, the SAC ordered the 

execution of four prodemocracy activists, and in August, General 

Hlaing extended the state of emergency by six months, citing ongoing 

efforts to combat the opposition, whom he referred to as “terrorists.” 

In December, an SAC court found former State Counsellor Aung San 

Suu Kyi guilty of corruption, sentencing her to 33 years in prison. 

Rohingya and Other Refugees

Muslim-majority Rohingya have borne the brunt of religious freedom 

violations by Burmese authorities and ethnic armies, and the corresponding violence has externally displaced most of that community. 

Of the reported 600,000 Rohingya who remain within Burma, at least 

100,000 are likely in IDP camps. Sea crossings remained a persistent 

challenge, as an estimated 1,920 people, mostly Rohingya, fled Burma 

by sea between January and November; of those, a total of 119 were 

reported dead or missing. Rohingya and other contacts inside Burma 

generally indicate that the government heavily restricts their freedom 

of movement, further noting that some Rohingya received university 

admissions in 2022 but still faced persistent discrimination. 

In November, USCIRF traveled to Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, to 

assess the conditions of the approximately one million Rohingya who 

reside in the refugee camps established in 2017. The majority of refugees to whom USCIRF spoke confirmed a desire to repatriate to 

Burma. USCIRF learned that the Bangladesh government had approved

recent initiatives to provide a Burmese curriculum to children within the 

Rohingya refugee community as well as livelihood and skills training 

for youths and adults. Multiple groups working with those refugees 

consistently communicated that Bangladesh and the international 

community need to urgently scale up such initiatives while seeking 

creative solutions to funding shortfalls. In 2022, Bangladesh only permitted humanitarian funds for Rohingya refugee programs, insisting 

that development and other forms of funding would both imply and 

establish permanence for the refugees’ presence in Cox’s Bazar. 

In November, USCIRF met in Malaysia with refugees of several Burmese diaspora communities, all having fled persecution in 

their homeland; they represented various Christian groups primarily 

from Chin State, including the Zomi people. They indicated some 

in their communities had attempted to return to Burma during the 

quasi-democratic period that ended with the 2021 coup, but subsequent violence forced them to flee again. These refugees’ lack of 

formal status in Malaysia has prevented them from accessing healthcare and other essential services in addition to preventing children 

from attending schools and adults from accessing stable employment 

opportunities. 

Regional Efforts at Accountability 

In April 2021, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

and SAC leader General Hlaing met and agreed to a Five-Point 

Consensus to restore peace to Burma. In 2022, General Hlaing 

completely disregarded that plan. His government restricted access 

by ASEAN’s Special Envoy to all parties involved in the conflict, 

including ethnic and religious groups and detained elected leaders. 

In November, following the 40th and 41st ASEAN Summits, ASEAN 

leaders reaffirmed Burma’s place in their ranks and called on the 

military to comply with the consensus. 

Key U.S. Policy

The United States continued to impose sanctions on the SAC, the 

Burmese military, and other Burmese authorities throughout 2022, 

including targeting the regime’s military aircraft suppliers. President 

Joseph R. Biden gave a speech in February denouncing the military 

junta and marking the coup anniversary. In March, Secretary of State 

Antony J. Blinken announced that the United States had determined 

that the atrocities the Burmese authorities and the Tatmadaw committed against the Rohingya in August 2017 constituted genocide. In 

July, at the ASEAN summit in Bangkok, Thailand, Secretary Blinken 

urged China and ASEAN members to escalate pressure on Burma’s 

rulers to return to democracy and to hold them accountable to the 

Five-Point Consensus.

Since 2017 to the end of the reporting period, U.S. contributions to the Rohingya Refugee Crisis reached approximately $1.9 

billion, making the United States the largest single donor in support 

of humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees inside and outside 

Burma. In September, the United States announced more than $170 

million in additional humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees, 

and in December it announced a resettlement program for vulnerable members of that community in collaboration with Bangladesh 

and the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees. Also 

in December, President Biden signed into law the Burma Unified 

through Rigorous Military Accountability Act as part of the 2023 

National Defense Authorization Act, which updated how the U.S. 

government can engage with ethnic armed organizations and prodemocracy forces.

In December, the United States supported UN Security Council 

Resolution 2669 denouncing the Tatmadaw’s human rights violations 

since the coup—the first such resolution on Burma to pass since its 

independence in 1948. On November 30, the U.S. Department of 

State redesignated Burma as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed as the 

relevant presidential action existing ongoing restrictions referenced 

in 22 CFR 126.1.
16 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

CHINA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in China further deteriorated. The government continued to vigorously implement 

its “sinicization of religion” policy and demand that religious 

groups support the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule and 

ideology. The CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), 

the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), and statecontrolled religious organizations are integral in implementing

this coercive policy. Although China officially recognizes Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism, groups 

with perceived foreign connections—such as Uyghurs and other 

Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, underground Catholics, and house 

church Protestants—are especially vulnerable to persecution. 

The Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services took effect in March, banning religious content 

on the internet and further constricting the narrow space for religious groups. The Chinese government and state-owned entities 

such as Hikvision—accused of complicity in abuses in the Uyghur 

region, known as Xinjiang—hired former U.S. officials and former 

members of Congress to lobby on their behalf, undermining religious freedom and related human rights in China. 

During the year, Chinese authorities continued their repressive 

sinicization of Islam and forced assimilation policy in Xinjiang that 

attempts to eradicate Uyghurs’ and other Turkic Muslims’ distinct 

ethnoreligious identities. In May, a report based on leaked internal 

police files from two Xinjiang counties confirmed the existence 

and brutality of concentration camps where Uyghurs have been 

detained. The report held high-level CCP and government officials, 

including CCP leader Xi Jinping, responsible. New reports noted 

a policy shift from detaining Uyghurs in camps to sending them to 

prisons. Forced labor, political indoctrination, mass surveillance, 

an intrusive homestay program that embeds officials in Uyghur 

households, and forced interfaith marriages also continued. 

Government control and suppression of Tibetan Buddhism 

intensified. Authorities restricted Tibetans’ access to religious 

sites, banned religious gatherings, destroyed sites and symbols of 

religious significance, and subjected Tibetan monks and nuns to 

political indoctrination, including at “reeducation centers.” Authorities reportedly tortured Tibetan monks in prison, including Rinchen 

Tsultrim and Sherab Gyatso, who suffer from poor health, and they 

detained Tibetans for religious activities honoring the Dalai Lama 

or possessing his portraits. The Chinese government repeatedly 

stated its intent to interfere in the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, claiming it has the ultimate authority to appoint his successor. In 2022, at 

least three Tibetans self-immolated, protesting the government’s 

policies in Tibet. Moreover, authorities reportedly conducted mass 

DNA collection in Tibet, likely to strengthen surveillance and control there. 

Despite renewal in October of the Vatican-China agreement 

on bishop appointments, in December the Vatican protested the 

government’s installation of a bishop without its approval. Across 

China, authorities detained or otherwise forcibly disappeared

Catholic priests and bishops—including Bishop Joseph Zhang 

Weizhu and Bishop Augustine Cui Tai—who refused to join the 

state-controlled Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association.

Persecution of Protestant house church Christians also 

intensified in 2022. The government carried out a nationwide 

crackdown on house churches by harassing, detaining, physically abusing, and sentencing Protestants who refused to join 

the state-controlled Three-Self Patriotic Movement. Authorities targeted Reformed house church Christians, including Elder 

Zhang Chunlei of Ren’ai Reformed Church and Pastor An Yankui

of Taiyuan Zion Reformed Church. Reports also emerged of harsh 

persecution of ethnic minority Protestants, such as Lisu and Nu

Protestants in Yunan Province and Kyrgyz Protestants in Xinjiang 

reeducation camps.

The government continued its persecution of Falun Gong 

and the Church of Almighty God (CAG), often using “anti-cult” 

provisions under Article 300 of China’s Criminal Law. In 2022, Falun 

Gong sources documented 7,331 cases of harassment and arrest, 

633 prison sentences, and 172 deaths because of persecution. 

Reports also documented detention, imprisonment, and torture

of CAG members, some of whom reportedly died due to abuses.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Redesignate China as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA); 

	■ Adopt a whole-of-government approach 

by elevating and integrating religious freedom as a key strategic objective in U.S. 

foreign policy toward China and by raising 

religious freedom concerns in all bilateral 

dialogues and engagement; 

	■ Continue imposing sanctions to target 

Chinese officials and entities responsible 

for severe religious freedom violations, 

especially within the CCP’s UFWD, SARA, 

and the public security and state security 

apparatus; and

	■ Work with like-minded countries in international fora, including the United Nations 

Human Rights Council (UNHRC), to collectively hold the Chinese government 

accountable for severe religious freedom 

violations, including by creating a UN 

Commission of Inquiry to investigate and 

identify perpetrators of ongoing genocide 

and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang 

and document other severe human rights 

abuses throughout China.

The U.S. Congress should: 

	■ Support legislation to counter the CCP’s 

malign influence in the United States, 

particularly its lobbying efforts that 

undermine religious freedom and related 

human rights.
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 17

CHINA

Background

China is officially an atheist state. Of its estimated 1.4 billion people, 

approximately 18 percent are Buddhist, including Tibetan Buddhists; 

five percent are Christian; and two percent are Muslim. Other significant religious traditions include Taoism, Falun Gong, and folk 

religion practices. 

The CCP has long repressed religious freedom and in recent 

years has become increasingly hostile toward religion, implementing 

campaigns to “sinicize” Islam, Tibetan Buddhism, and Christianity to 

remove alleged “foreign influences.” These policies require religious 

groups to support the CCP, including by altering their religious teachings to conform to CCP ideology and policy. Both registered and 

unregistered religious groups that run afoul of the CCP face harassment, detention, arrest, imprisonment, and other abuses. 

Accountability for International Crimes 

against Uyghurs

In August, the UNHRC’s special rapporteur on contemporary forms of 

slavery, concluded that forced labor of Uyghurs and other minorities 

in Xinjiang “may amount to enslavement as a crime against humanity.” That same month, then UN High Commissioner for Human 

Rights Michelle Bachelet found that human rights abuses in Xinjiang, including arbitrary and discriminatory detention of Uyghurs and 

other predominantly Muslim groups, “may constitute international 

crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.” In October, the UNHRC 

rejected a motion led by Western member states to hold a debate on 

China’s human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other Muslims in 

Xinjiang. UNHRC member states voting against the motion included

Muslim-majority countries, such as Qatar, Indonesia, the United Arab 

Emirates, and Pakistan. 

In June, the European Parliament adopted a resolution 

condemning China’s oppression of Uyghurs, including “mass deportation, political indoctrination, family separation, restrictions on 

religious freedom, cultural destruction and the extensive use of 

surveillance.” The resolution further stated that the “birth prevention 

measures and the separation of Uyghur children from their families 

amount to crimes against humanity and represent a serious risk 

of genocide.” In a December resolution, the European Parliament 

reiterated its recognition of China’s abuses against Uyghurs as constituting crimes against humanity and representing a serious risk of 

genocide. The Parliament urged European Union (EU) member states 

to “consider prosecuting Chinese officials deemed responsible for 

crimes against humanity, on the basis of the principle of universal 

jurisdiction” and called for “additional EU sanctions targeting Chinese officials and entities responsible for crimes against humanity.” 

Religious Freedom in Hong Kong 

In May, Hong Kong authorities arrested 90-year-old Cardinal Joseph 

Zen Ze-kiun, bishop emeritus of Hong Kong, accusing him of “colluding with foreign forces” under Hong Kong’s National Security 

Law (NSL). Despite his release on bail, his situation remained precarious. Democracy activist and religious freedom advocate Jimmy Lai, 

another high-profile Catholic figure, pled not guilty to NSL charges 

in August and court authorities postponed his trial in December. He 

is currently serving prison terms on other charges related to his political activism. If convicted, both Zen and Lai could face the maximum 

penalty of life imprisonment. In the U.S. Department of State’s March 

2022 Hong Kong Policy Act Report, religious groups stated concern 

about the Chinese government’s potential “targeting of civil society 

organizations or individuals affiliated with religious groups that were 

active in the 2019 pro-democracy movement.” 

Key U.S. Policy

In March, the State Department announced visa sanctions on Chinese 

officials deemed responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses 

in China and abroad that targeted religious and spiritual practitioners 

and members of ethnic minority groups, including transnational 

repression to silence Uyghur American activists. That same month, 

the U.S. Department of Justice arrested and charged Wang Shujun 

for engaging in transnational repression activities on behalf of China’s 

Ministry of State Security (MSS). Wang’s victims included Uyghur and 

Tibetan activists in the United States and abroad. In May, the Justice 

Department indicted Wang and four MSS agents on espionage and 

transnational repression charges. 

On November 30, the State Department redesignated China 

as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed existing restrictions on exports 

of crime control or detection instruments or equipment to China. In 

December, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed financial 

sanctions on Wu Yingjie, party secretary of Tibet Autonomous Region 

(TAR), and Zhang Hongbo, TAR Public Security Bureau director, for 

human rights abuses in Tibet, pursuant to Executive Order 13818. 

In addition, the State Department imposed visa sanctions on Zhang 

and Tang Yong, former deputy director of Chongqing city, for human 

rights and religious freedom violations in Tibet and against Falun 

Gong practitioners, respectively. 

The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) took effect in 

June, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection began implementing it 

by prohibiting imports from Xinjiang. In August, the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security published its initial consolidated UFLPA Entity 

List, subjecting named Chinese entities to “rebuttable presumptions” 

in accordance with the UFLPA. In December, the U.S. Department of 

Commerce added Tianjin Tiandi Weiye Technologies to its Entity List 

for complicity in human rights violations against Uyghurs and other 

Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. 

In December, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the 

Uyghur Policy Act of 2021 (H.R.4785) to address human rights issues 

in Xinjiang. Members of Congress introduced bills in 2022 to counter 

foreign lobbying on behalf of countries like China, including the PAID 

OFF Act of 2022 (S.4901), the SHAME Act (H.R.9140), and the Disclosing Foreign Influence in Lobbying Act (S.4254).

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES 

■ Factsheet: State-Controlled Religion and Religious Freedom Violations in China 

■ Hearing: China’s Religious Freedom Violations: Domestic Repression and Malign Influence Abroad

■ Podcast: The Plight of Christians in China
18 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

Additional view statement on China by 

Commissioners Abraham Cooper, David Curry, 

Frederick A. Davie, Sharon Kleinbaum, Mohamed 

Magid, Stephen Schneck, Nury Turkel, Eric Ueland, 

and Frank Wolf

At the height of Cold War hostilities in 1980, it would have been unthinkable for any reputable firm to take on the Soviet Union as a client.

And yet today, untold profits are being raked in by lobbyists 

willing to whitewash the record and aims of the Chinese Communist 

Party (CCP) and government.

It’s time to make this activity illegal.

As the Commission’s report documents, the Chinese Government 

is an equal opportunity persecutor of people of faith—Christians, 

Tibetan Buddhists, Uyghur Muslims, and Falun Gong practitioners.

In Xinjiang, the CCP is committing genocide, operating a network 

of mass internment camps and prisons and systematically separating 

Uyghur children from their parents.

Any notion of Hong Kong’s autonomy is fantasy. A once vibrant, 

open society has been transformed with shocking speed. The ruthless crackdown on dissent found 90-year-old Catholic Cardinal Zen 

in its crosshairs.

In every corner of the globe the Chinese government actively 

works to subvert U.S. interests.

FBI Director Christopher Wray said, “the counterintelligence and 

economic espionage efforts emanating from the government of China 

and the Chinese Communist Party are a grave threat to the economic 

well-being and democratic values of the United States.” 

The Chinese government oversees the most advanced surveillance state in human history and actively exports these technologies 

to other repressive regimes worldwide.

As USCIRF recommends in this report, we urge the Biden Administration and Congress to ban lobbying groups and law firms from 

representing the Chinese government and its interests.
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 19

CHINA
20 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

CUBA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Cuba worsened. Throughout the year, the Cuban government tightly controlled religious activity through surveillance, harassment of religious leaders and 

laypeople, forced exile, fines, and ill treatment of religious prisoners 

of conscience. Religious leaders and groups that are unregistered 

or conducted unsanctioned religious activity—as well as journalistic reporting on religious freedom conditions—faced relentless 

oppression from the Office of Religious Affairs (ORA) and state 

security forces. 

The Cuban government regularly targeted members of religious communities who refused to abide by strict regulations 

set out by the ORA. Authorities subjected pastors to detention, 

interrogation, threats of prison sentences on false charges, and 

confiscation of property. In February, authorities detained Reverend Yordanys Díaz Arteaga, the president of the Christian 

Reformed Church of Cuba, after an extensive search of his home 

and the confiscation of technology belonging to his church. He 

was later interrogated and threatened with criminal charges at 

an unknown location and held incommunicado under effective 

house arrest. Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) reported 

that Reverend Díaz became a target of the government after his 

denomination withdrew from the regime-aligned Cuban Council 

of Churches. He reportedly arrived in the United States in August. 

In April, evangelical couple Pastors Mario Jorge Travieso and 

Velmis Adriana Medina Mariño planned an April 29–30 prayer 

event called “Breaking the Chains” to focus on the wives and 

mothers of political prisoners. The regime made repeated threats

to Pastors Travieso and Medina and several members of their 

church who planned to participate. Authorities arbitrarily detained 

the pastors, interrogated them for six hours, and threatened them 

with imprisonment. The organizers canceled the event due to the 

regime’s various threats. 

USCIRF received reports indicating that Cuban authorities 

detained and interrogated citizens who traveled or planned to 

travel to the United States in 2022, including Catholic layman Dagoberto Valdés and his son Javier Valdés Delgado as well as Mildrey 

Betancourt Rodríguez, a member of the Alliance of Non-Registered 

Churches. Similarly, in October the Office of the Directorate of 

Identification, Immigration, and Foreigners of Cuba arbitrarily 

barred Imam Abu Duyanah, imam of the Cuban Association for 

the Dissemination of Islam, from traveling to Mecca for “reasons 

of public interest” without any specifications.

Additionally, threats and persecution by the government 

caused several religious leaders to leave Cuba in 2022. In March, 

Pastor Enrique de Jesús Fundora Pérez of the Apostolic Movement fled the country to seek asylum in Switzerland after state 

security officials threatened him with up to 30 years in prison for 

“sedition” and “incitement to commit a crime.” He drew the ire 

of authorities when he gave monetary and spiritual aid to families 

of political prisoners from the July 11, 2021 (J11) protests. Pastor 

Alain Toledano, a prominent Cuban religious leader of the unregistered Emmanuel Church of the Apostolic Ministry, has experienced

severe harassment from the Cuban government for over 20 years. In 

June, Cuban state security presented Toledano with an ultimatum: 

leave the country within 30 days or face imprisonment. The United 

States granted him and his family emergency parole in July. In September, Father David Pantaleon, head of Cuba’s Jesuit Order and 

president of the Conference of Religious Men and Women in Cuba, 

had to leave the country after the government refused to renew 

his residence permit. During an interview in his native Dominican 

Republic, Father Pantaleon reported that the ORA cited his support 

for political prisoners and the Jesuits’ critical position toward the 

regime as the main reasons for his expulsion.

The Cuban government continued to target independent 

journalists who report on religious freedom by threatening criminal 

charges and fines, often under Decree Law 370, and imposing travel 

restrictions. Cuban authorities twice interrogated and fined young 

Catholic layman and journalist Adrián Martínez Cádiz this year. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Redesignate Cuba as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA); 

	■ Encourage Cuban authorities to extend an 

official invitation for unrestricted visits by 

USCIRF, the U.S. Ambassador at Large for 

International Religious Freedom, and the 

United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur 

on freedom of religion or belief; and

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on Cuban 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom—including Caridad Diego, head 

of the ORA—by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Raise human rights and democracy concerns in Cuba and highlight the situation 

facing religious leaders and organizations 

persecuted by the Cuban government, 

among others.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES 

■ Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Cuba

■ Report: Constitutional Reform and Religious Freedom in Cuba

■ Event: Constitutional Reform and Religious Freedom in Cuba
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 21

CUBA

Background

While there are no independent sources on Cuba’s religious demographics, a reported 60–70 percent of Cuba’s estimated population 

of 11.1 million self-identify as Catholic. Approximately 25–30 percent identify as unaffiliated or another religion, such as Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, Methodists, Seventh-day Adventists, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Buddhists, Muslims, Jews, Quakers, Moravians, 

and members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. An 

estimated 70 percent of Cubans engage in one or more practices 

associated with Santería, a syncretic religion born out of the Yoruba 

tradition mixed with elements of Catholicism.

Cuba is a one-party system under the ruling Cuban Communist 

Party, with no independent judiciary. The state regulates and controls 

religious institutions through the ORA of the Central Committee of the 

Cuban Communist Party. The Law of Associations requires religious 

organizations to apply to the Ministry of Justice, where the ORA is 

housed, for registration. However, the Ministry of Justice continues 

to deny registration for religious groups and leaves long-standing 

requests for registration unanswered. Unregistered religious groups 

are particularly vulnerable, as membership or association with an 

unregistered religious group is a crime. The ORA exercises direct 

and arbitrary control over the affairs of registered religious organizations, requiring permission for virtually any activity other than regular 

worship services.

The Ladies in White

The Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco) is an organization of wives and 

relatives of dissidents imprisoned in 2003. Cuban authorities actively 

surveil and violently detain members of the Ladies in White and prevent them from attending religious services on Sundays. 

The Cuban regime has aggressively targeted the leader of the 

movement, Berta Soler. In January, Soler and her husband Ángel Moya 

announced a campaign seeking the release of all political prisoners 

from the J11 protests. Subsequently, authorities subjected Soler 

and Moya to repeated arbitrary detentions. These detentions often 

included interrogations at police stations and fines. Such offenses 

occurred on 15 consecutive Sundays between January and May. In 

September, Soler detailed that government agents parked a large 

container in front of her house, reportedly to obscure when authorities 

arrest her or her husband when they leave their home. 

In September, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 

issued follow-up precautionary measures to its 2013 decision in favor 

of the Ladies in White, appealing to the Cuban government to maintain “necessary measures to protect the rights to life and personal 

integrity of the members of the Ladies in White.” The decision also 

documents numerous cases of harassment, detentions, and fines up 

to September 2022.

Religious Prisoners of Conscience

Several religious leaders and laypeople remained in prison at the end 

of 2022 for their participation in the J11 protests. Select cases are 

included in USCIRF’s Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) Victims List, 

including Christian pastors and Santería practitioners. 

Pastor Lorenzo Rosales Fajardo of the Monte de Sion Independent 

Church participated in the J11 protests and was detained that day. The 

government claims that Pastor Rosales Fajardo was involved in perpetrating a violent attack during the protest, despite evidence to the 

contrary. The Cuban government tried him in December 2021 on charges 

of “disrespect,” “assault,” “criminal incitement,” and “public disorder” 

and sought to impose a 10-year sentence. Pastor Rosales Fajardo was 

sentenced to eight years in prison in April, but the government reduced 

his sentence to seven years in May. In June, a court upheld his revised 

sentence. According to CSW, only the prosecution was allowed to provide evidence, which included testimony from at least 12 policemen.

President of the unregistered Free Yoruba Association of Cuba 

(Asociación de Yorubas Libres de Cuba, or “Free Yorubas”) Donaida 

Pérez Paseiro and her husband, the community’s vice president Loreto 

Hernández García, were charged with “public disorder,” “disobedience,” “spreading the epidemic,” and “incitement” and eventually 

sentenced to eight years in prison. Pérez Paseiro experienced multiple 

medical emergencies while in prison and authorities reportedly tried 

to force her to renounce her faith. Hernández García reportedly suffers from several health conditions, including asthma, hypertension, 

diabetes, and other cardiac issues. Prison authorities also reportedly 

tried to force him to renounce his faith. In May, Radio Televisión Martí 

reported that Hernández García’s health has severely deteriorated in 

prison, as authorities fail to provide him food that takes into consideration his diabetes. He received medical treatment in a hospital, but 

state security forced him back into prison in June.

Key U.S. Policy

The U.S. government continued to place robust sanctions on Cuban 

officials. In January, the U.S. Department of State imposed visa restrictions on eight officials “implicated in attempts to silence the voices of 

the Cuban people through repression, unjust detentions, and harsh 

prison sentences” of J11 protesters. Further rounds of visa restrictions came in June and July when the State Department imposed 

restrictions on an additional 33 individuals for “unfair trials and unjust 

sentencing and imprisonment” of J11 protesters, plus media and 

communications officials who “formulate and implement policies that 

restrict Cubans’ ability to freely access and share information and who 

engage in the spread of disinformation.” 

In September, the U.S. Embassy in Havana announced the 

resumption of immigrant visa processing and consular services for 

the first time since 2017. 

On November 30, the State Department for the first time designated Cuba as a CPC under IRFA and imposed as the relevant 

president action the existing ongoing restrictions referenced in 31 

CFR 515.201 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), pursuant to section 402(c)

(5) of the Act. Cuba previously had been on the State Department’s 

Special Watch List since 2019.
22 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

ERITREA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Eritrea remained 

extremely poor. The government did not register any new religious organizations, and individuals practicing faiths other than 

the four officially recognized by the government faced intimidation and prosecution by Eritrean authorities. Members of officially 

recognized religions also faced restrictions and government 

backlash for practicing their faith. Dozens of religious prisoners 

of conscience remain imprisoned in decrepit, unsanitary, and 

inhumane conditions.

Eritrean authorities continued to detain dozens of people 

imprisoned for their religious belief or practice. The government 

detained 20 Jehovah’s Witnesses for conscientious objection to 

military service and other expressions of their faith. 

In February, Patriarch Abune Antonios, the former leader 

of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, died at age 94 after spending 

a decade and a half under house arrest because of his religious 

beliefs, his calls for the release of political prisoners, and his resistance to government pressure to excommunicate members of 

the church. 

In October, security forces detained three Catholic leaders

for two months for raising Eritrea’s human rights violations in their 

sermons. Prison conditions are abysmal, with detainees living in 

squalor and subject to violence and intimidation.

Eritrean forces have also continued to engage militarily in the 

Tigray region of neighboring Ethiopia, where ethnically affiliated 

rebel fighters seek respect for autonomous local governance. In 

past years, Eritrean troops operating in support of the Ethiopian 

government in the region have attacked religious sites and triggered

community-based religious violence in some areas. Reports suggest 

that in 2022, Eritrean forces in Ethiopia continued to commit human 

rights abuses and undermine the peace process, exacerbating the 

likelihood that instability could yield additional religious freedom 

violations in Ethiopia. 

The Tigrayan crisis has also impacted Eritrean refugees living in 

Ethiopia, some of whom fled Eritrea’s repressive religious and human 

rights policies. Violence from both sides in the conflict has destabilized 

the Tigray region, causing some Eritrean refugees to flee back across 

the border to their country of origin or face violence and abuses.

KEY FINDINGS

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Redesignate Eritrea as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA); 

	■ Maintain the existing, ongoing arms 

embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a) 

of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations as the presidential action imposed 

as a consequence of the CPC designation to encourage religious freedom 

improvements;

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on Eritrean 

government agencies and officials 

responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry 

into the United States under human rights 

related financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; 

	■ Engage with the Eritrean government to 

end religious persecution of unregistered 

religious communities, grant full citizenship rights to Jehovah’s Witnesses, and 

release the remaining detainees held on 

account of their religious activities; and 

	■ Coordinate an initiative through the 

International Religious Freedom or 

Belief Alliance (IRFBA) to encourage the 

Eritrean government to extend an official 

invitation for unrestricted visits by the 

United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur 

on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, 

the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of 

religion or belief, the UN Working Group 

on Arbitrary Detention, and the International Red Cross. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

	■ Highlight religious freedom issues in 

Eritrea through legislation, hearings and 

briefings, and a congressional delegation trip to Eritrea to engage with Eritrean 

officials to encourage them to advance 

human rights and religious freedom. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Factsheet: Religious Freedom Concerns in the Horn of Africa

■ Factsheet: Overview of Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution Globally 

■ Press Statement: USCIRF Mourns the Passing of Patriarch Abune Antonios
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 23

ERITRE

Background A

Following military conflict with and secession from neighboring Ethiopia, Eritrea gained independence in 1993. With a population of just 

over six million people, Eritrea’s religious demography is difficult to 

assess. The government recognizes three Christian denominations—

Eritrean Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant—estimated to comprise 

between 49 and 63 percent of the population. It also recognizes Islam, 

estimated to comprise between 37 and 49 percent of the population. 

Minority communities adhere to the Baha’i, Jewish, and traditional 

animist faiths.

The Eritrean constitution protects citizens’ rights to freedom of 

religion or belief. The law and constitution prohibit religious discrimination and provide for freedom of thought, conscience, and belief 

and the freedom to practice any religion and to change one’s religion. 

However, the government regularly violates these rights in practice. 

Proclamation No. 73 of 1995 permits the government to exert full 

control over religious activities in the country. The government of 

Eritrea requires all religious groups to apply for registration, with 

only the four approved communities allowed to operate since 2002. 

Applications from other faith communities have been denied for 

being “defective,” according to the Office of Religious Affairs. Without formal registration, faith groups’ rights are denied and they are 

prohibited from building or owning houses of worship or engaging in 

religious practices such as praying in groups.

Eritrean authorities signed the Joint Declaration of Peace and 

Friendship with neighboring Ethiopia in July 2018. The accord ended 

over two decades of war between the two countries. Following the 

peace treaty, President Isaias Afwerki delivered a much anticipated 

speech on Independence Day, saying “the beginning of a new era” had 

come to Eritrea. Historically, Eritrea justified its oppression of political 

and civil rights by citing security concerns related to the ongoing war 

with Ethiopia. Many observers anticipated that the President’s commitment would translate into advancements for human rights, including 

religious freedom. However, nearly five years after the agreement, over 

a thousand political prisoners, including many imprisoned for exercising 

their freedom of religion or belief, remain behind bars.

Religious Prisoners of Conscience

In February 2022, Patriarch Abune Antonios, the former leader of the 

Eritrean Orthodox Church, died at age 94 after spending a decade 

and a half under house arrest because of his religious beliefs and 

advocacy. Patriarch Antonios had been imprisoned for over a decade 

after condemning government interference in church affairs and 

calling for the release of imprisoned Christians. In 2006, Eritrean 

authorities removed him from his position as the ordained head of 

the Eritrean Orthodox Church and placed him under house arrest. A 

year later, he was forcibly disappeared from his residence and taken 

to an undisclosed location. He was reportedly denied proper medical 

care throughout his custody.

In October, security forces detained Catholic leaders Bishop 

Fikremariam Hagos Tsalim, Father Mihretab Stefanos, and Friar Abbot 

Abraham at the airport in Asmara as they returned from traveling in 

Europe. The government did not publicize charges against Tsalim and 

his colleagues, but sources from the ground report that they were 

targeted for publicly highlighting human rights violations in Eritrea 

in their homilies. Authorities held them in detention for two months 

before releasing them on December 29.

The Eritrean government continued to imprison 20 Jehovah’s 

Witnesses: 14 men and six women. These religious prisoners include 

an 80-year-old man and two men who have been in prison for more 

than 17 years without formal charges against them. Eritrean officials 

reportedly refused to meet with representatives of the Jehovah’s 

Witness community to discuss these violations.

Conditions for religious prisoners of conscience in Eritrea are 

particularly poor. First-hand accounts describe physical abuse, sexual 

violence, and torture as normal and ongoing practices. Prisoners are 

often denied medical treatment, and many have died in prison due to 

severe human rights abuses. Many prisons reportedly use metal shipping containers to hold large numbers of people. In prison, praying 

aloud, singing, preaching, and possessing religious books are banned. 

Arrested individuals have reported being asked to sign documents 

certifying that they renounce their faith or that they join or return to 

the Eritrean Orthodox Church; if they do not, they face transfer to 

worse conditions.

Cross-Border Military Activity

In 2022, Eritrean forces continued to engage militarily in neighboring 

northern Ethiopia, where their activities have historically included 

attacks on religious infrastructure. This conflict has also aggravated 

religious freedom challenges in Eritrea itself. The Eritrean government 

has reportedly increased conscription to meet the demand for military 

support in Tigray, raising the risk of prosecution against conscientious 

objectors. Eritrean refugees who fled to Ethiopia to avoid restrictive 

Eritrean government policies, including religious restrictions, have 

been detained and forcibly returned to Eritrea in the context of the 

Tigray conflict. Targeted violence by the Tigray People’s Liberation 

Front has also impacted Eritrean refugees, likely including those fleeing religious persecution.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States has extremely limited diplomatic relations with 

Eritrea. Diplomats continued to raise issues of human rights and religious freedom in official conversations with representatives from the 

Eritrean government. Due to religious freedom violations and other 

human rights abuses, the Joseph R. Biden administration declined 

to invite Eritrean government leaders to the high-profile U.S.-Africa 

Leaders Summit held in December in Washington, DC. 

On November 30, the U.S. Department of State redesignated 

Eritrea as a CPC for engaging in and tolerating particularly severe 

violations of international religious freedom. In 2022, the United 

States renewed sanctions imposed in 2021 under Executive Order 

(E.O.) 13818 (which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky 

Human Rights Accountability Act) and E.O. 14046 (Imposing Sanctions 

on Certain Persons with Respect to the Humanitarian and Human 

Rights Crisis in Ethiopia) against Eritrean entities and individuals perpetuating the crisis in Ethiopia.
24 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

INDIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in India continued to worsen. 

Throughout the year, the Indian government at the national, 

state, and local levels promoted and enforced religiously discriminatory policies, including laws targeting religious conversion, 

interfaith relationships, the wearing of hijabs, and cow slaughter, 

which negatively impact Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Dalits, and 

Adivasis (indigenous peoples and scheduled tribes). The national 

government also continued to suppress critical voices—particularly 

religious minorities and those advocating on their behalf—including through surveillance, harassment, demolition of property, and 

detention under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) and 

by targeting nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) under the 

Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA). 

The Indian government invoked the UAPA and the Sedition Act 

throughout the year to target freedom of religion and expression, 

creating an increasing climate of intimidation and fear. Authorities 

surveilled, harassed, detained, and prosecuted a number of journalists, lawyers, rights activists, and religious minorities advocating 

for religious freedom. Hundreds of cases remained pending against 

individuals for involvement in the 2019 peaceful protests against 

the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), which provides a pathway 

to citizenship strictly for non-Muslims from Pakistan, Afghanistan, 

and Bangladesh. As of 2022, only 92 of more than 700 cases had 

reached trial, and many of those arrested under the UAPA continued 

to languish in jail. During India’s fourth Universal Periodic Review

(UPR), United Nations (UN) member states emphasized protections 

for religious minorities and expressed concern over the broad application of India’s “anti-terror” laws. Additional official efforts, such as 

the National Register of Citizens (NRC) process in Assam, also aimed 

to identify “undocumented” Bengali-speaking Muslims. 

The continued enforcement of discriminatory laws facilitated 

a culture of impunity for widespread campaigns of threats and 

violence by mobs and vigilante groups. In March, for example, 

Karnataka’s state government issued a hijab ban in public schools. 

Despite widespread protests and instances of violence, state high 

court judges upheld the ban, agreeing with the government’s argument that the hijab is not essential to practicing Islam. India’s state 

governments also continued to pass and enforce anti-conversion 

laws, currently existing in 12 states, including legislation in multiple 

states aimed to prohibit and criminalize interfaith marriages. Public 

notice requirements for interfaith marriages imposed in 10 states 

have, at times, resulted in violent reprisals against couples. The 

ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) committed to enforcing harsher 

penalties for interfaith marriages in its 2022 election manifesto for 

Uttar Pradesh. 

Violent attacks were also perpetrated across India under the 

justification of protecting cows from slaughter or transport, which 

is illegal in 18 states. Examples of violence against Christians, Muslims, and Dalits around suspicions of cow smuggling were reported 

in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Delhi. In August, BJP member Gyan Dev 

Ahuja was recorded publicly calling for his listeners to “kill anyone 

involved in cow slaughter.”

Throughout the year, destruction of property—including 

places of worship in predominantly Muslim and Christian neighborhoods—continued. In June, local authorities demolished the 

homes of three Muslim families in Uttar Pradesh following protests 

against derogatory language used by members of the BJP. Hindu 

nationalists bulldozed a Catholic center near Mangalore in February and attacked, looted, and destroyed the homes of hundreds 

of Christians in December for their refusal to convert to Hinduism. In addition, at least four madrasas (Islamic seminaries) were 

demolished following a statement in May from the Chief Minister 

of Assam that madrasas should be eliminated. 

Social media platforms continued to facilitate widespread 

disinformation, hate speech, and incitement of violence toward religious minorities. In February, Twitter removed a caricature shared 

by the verified account of Gujarat BJP depicting Muslim men hung 

by a noose.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Designate India as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of 

religious freedom, as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

	■ Advance human rights for all religious 

communities in India and promote religious freedom, dignity, and interfaith 

dialogue through bilateral engagement 

and in multilateral forums; 

	■ Condemn ongoing religious freedom 

violations and support religious organizations and human rights groups 

targeted for their advocacy of religious 

freedom; and

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on Indian government agencies and officials responsible 

for severe violations of religious freedom 

by freezing those individuals’ assets and/

or barring their entry into the United 

States under human rights related financial and visa authorities, citing specific 

religious freedom violations.

The U.S. Congress should: 

	■ Raise religious freedom issues in the 

U.S.-India bilateral relationship and highlight concerns through hearings, briefings, 

letters, and congressional delegations.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in India

■ Issue Update: India’s State-Level Anti-Conversion Laws 

■ Podcast: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in South Asia

■ Podcast: Anti-Conversion Laws and Growing Intolerance in India
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 25

INDIA

Background

India is the world’s most populous democracy, with an estimated 1.4 

billion people, 79.8 percent of whom are Hindu, 14.2 percent Muslim, 

2.3 percent Christian, and 1.7 percent Sikh. Smaller religious groups 

include Buddhists, Jains, Baha’is, Jews, Zoroastrians (Parsis), and 

nonreligious persons. India’s constitution establishes the nation as 

a secular, democratic republic, and Article 25 grants all individuals 

freedom of conscience, including the right to practice, profess, and 

propagate religion. Despite these secular principles, since 2014, the 

Indian government—led by the BJP—has facilitated and supported 

national and state-level policies that undermine religious freedom 

for minority groups. 

Anti-Conversion Laws

At the end of the reporting period, 12 of India’s 28 states had legislation that criminalized religious conversion in various circumstances 

(Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal 

Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradesh). These laws are not limited to 

instances of coercion, and they contain broad and vague language that 

can be used to target voluntary religious conversions. Common features of these laws include prohibitions on conversions, requirements 

to notify the government of one’s intent to convert, and burden-shifting provisions that presume an accused individual is guilty. 

These laws carry penalties of hefty fines and imprisonment 

and disproportionately target Christians and Muslims. Increasingly, 

anti-conversion laws are used to prevent interfaith marriages or relationships, including so-called “Love Jihads,” a derogatory term that 

targets Muslims and refers to conversions occurring in the context of 

interfaith marriages. Under the Special Marriage Act, interfaith marriages require a 30-day notice period, allowing individuals to object 

to the marriage. In April, the state of Haryana enacted its Prevention 

of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act prohibiting conversion “by 

marriage or through marriage.” Authorities, including police, at times 

assist Hindu vigilante groups to “enforce” these anti-conversion laws.

Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) and 

National Register of Citizens (NRC)

Since the CAA’s introduction in 2019, over 200 petitions have been 

filed against the religiously discriminatory act. The CAA, combined 

with the NRC, is perceived as an attempt to disenfranchise Muslims of 

Indian citizenship. The CAA aims to provide citizenship to non-Muslim 

migrants (Sikhs, Hindus, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, and Parsis) from 

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. While the act’s purported 

intention is to aid persecuted religious minorities, it does not include 

vulnerable communities such as Rohingya Muslims, Ahmadiyya Muslims, Hazara Shi’a Muslims, or Baha’is. Since its enactment, journalists, 

activists, and students have been arrested and detained for their 

participation in widespread protests against the law. 

The NRC is unique to the state of Assam, and since its publication 

in 2019 it aims to distinguish Indian citizens from “undocumented 

migrants.” Those deemed “foreign” under the NRC include Assam’s 

Bengali-speaking Muslims, who have also been arrested under the 

UAPA in some instances. As many as 700,000 Muslim residents in 

Assam are estimated to be at risk of having their citizenship revoked.

Attacks on Religious Minorities

In 2022, there were numerous attacks against religious minorities and 

their places of worship. Demolitions of mosques in Muslim communities led to arrests and violent clashes. In May, the Home Minister of 

Madhya Pradesh ordered the demolition of homes in predominantly 

Muslim neighborhoods. While the Indian Supreme Court stated that 

demolitions “cannot be retaliatory,” the practice has continued. 

Mob attacks against religious minorities and members of 

scheduled tribes further demonstrate how vigilantes and Hindu 

nationalists act with impunity. In January, a Hindu nationalist group 

allegedly beat a Muslim man for traveling with a Hindu woman in 

Mangalore. In March, a Hindu nationalist group attacked a Christian 

youth leader in Karnataka for sharing about Christianity outside a 

college. Social media and news channels served as a platform for 

Hindu nationalist groups to stoke tensions and encourage violence 

toward minority groups. 

Sexual Violence and Harassment of 

Religious Minorities 

Muslim women continued to face discrimination and harassment, both 

at the local and state levels. In January, GitHub shut down an Indian 

website that published the names of—and purported to “auction 

off”—Muslim women who had publicly opposed Hindu nationalism 

and the government’s treatment of religious minorities. That same 

month, students across India protested against policies that would 

require female students to remove their head scarves or stay home 

from school. These demonstrations were met with rival protests by 

Hindu nationalists. In February, sectarian violence erupted between 

those supporting the right to wear the hijab and Hindu students 

wearing saffron robes. Subsequently, in Karnataka the BJP banned any 

religious garb in public schools. In October, the government released

11 men who, as part of a Hindu nationalist mob, were convicted for the 

gang rape of Bilkis Bano, a pregnant Muslim woman, and for attacking her family during the 2002 violence in Gujarat. In Uttar Pradesh, 

reports of sexual assault and attacks against Dalits also continued.

Key U.S. Policy 

In 2022, the Joseph R. Biden administration again failed to designate 

India as a CPC for engaging in particularly severe religious freedom 

violations. The United States and India continued to maintain strong 

bilateral ties around economic trade and technology. Trade reached 

$120 billion in 2022, making the United States India’s largest trading 

partner. President Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi interacted 

on multiple occasions, including the G20 and G7 Summits and the 

Quad Leaders Summit. In July, U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha J. Power traveled to India to discuss 

challenges of food insecurity, climate change, and the COVID-19 

pandemic. In September, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely S. Ratner cochaired the sixth U.S.-India 2+2 

Intersessional Dialogues in New Delhi. 
26 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

IRAN

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Iran sharply deteriorated. 

Following the death of Mahsa Zhina Amini after her arrest and 

torture by police for wearing an “improper hijab,” Iran repressed 

nationwide protests with lethal force, detained and killed children, 

sexually assaulted and raped detained protesters, and engaged in 

other gross violations of human rights, including executions of protesters without due process. Scores of protesters received charges

grounded in Islamic religious concepts that in Iran carry the death 

penalty, raising serious concerns of mass executions. Iran’s government also escalated its repression of Baha’is, restricting access to 

religious sites, issuing legal rulings supporting confiscation of Baha’i 

properties, denying Baha’is entrance to universities, and conducting 

systematic arrests. Security forces arrested 30 Yarsanis in Khermanshah and sentenced two Yarsanis, including a community leader, to 

prison terms for “propaganda against the state.” Iranian security 

forces destroyed a Sunni mosque in Zahedan and threatened Sunni 

clerics who condemned the killing of at least 96 protesters following 

Friday prayers on September 30. Prison officials at Bander Abbas 

prison tortured Sunni cleric Musa Rahimi to death following his arrest 

for holding prayers on the date designated by Saudi Arabia instead 

of Iran’s religious establishment. The Tehran Revolutionary Court 

sentenced an Iranian Christian to a 10-year prison sentence, and 

he and two other Christians also received a 10-year “deprivation 

of social rights” upon their release for their membership in a house 

church. Several other Christians faced sentencing and prison time on 

similar charges. In January, Ministry of Intelligence officials in Dezful 

summoned eight Christians and pressured them to abandon their 

faith. Several members of Iran’s Gonabadi Sufi community remained 

under alleged arbitrary detention, including in solitary confinement. 

Iran also continued to persecute nontheists and members of spiritualist movements. In August, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 

(IRGC) arrested eight followers of Erfan-e Halgheh. Iran’s leadership 

also spread explicitly antisemitic messages over traditional and social 

media. It continued targeting Iranian religious minorities abroad, in 

one case, forcibly repatriating dissidents.

In 2022, women and girls continued to face religious freedom 

repression in Iran. Religiously grounded laws in Iran continued to 

allow impunity for men who murdered women for violating “family 

honor.” Security forces arrested and deployed egregious violence 

against women and girls who peacefully protested the increased 

enforcement of mandatory headscarf laws. Golrokh Iraee, a women’s rights activist who previously served prison time for writing an 

unpublished short story criticizing the stoning of adulterers, was 

arrested in September and moved in November from Qarchak 

to Evin Prison. Iran also targeted and actively executed lesbian, 

gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) Iranians 

on religious grounds, including those outside the country. Prison 

officials hanged two gay men on sodomy charges in January and 

two other gay men in July. In August, a court in Urmia issued death 

sentences against two LGBTQI+ activists for “corruption on Earth.” 

KEY FINDINGS

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Redesignate Iran as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of 

religious freedom, as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on Iranian 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; 

	■ Issue clarifications of general and specific sanctions licenses, expedite the 

processing of general license applications, 

and continue issuing new general licenses 

that facilitate financial and technological 

support for Iranians asserting their freedom of religion or belief through peaceful 

demonstrations and labor strikes; and

	■ Work with members of the International 

Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance and 

other international associations to support 

the United Nations (UN) Fact Finding Mission to Iran and support a Security Council 

referral of the situation in Iran to the International Criminal Court for crimes against 

humanity against those asserting freedom 

of religion or belief.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Reauthorize and exercise oversight to 

ensure implementation of the Lautenberg Amendment, which aids persecuted 

Iranian religious minorities seeking refugee status in the United States, and urge 

the Biden administration to expand the 

program’s capacity to process, vet, and 

resettle Iranian religious minorities.

	■ Convey, through legislation, press statements, and media messaging, bipartisan 

support for Iranian protesters’ calls for 

greater religious freedom in Iran.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Country Update: Religious Freedom in Iran in 2022

■ Special Report: Religious Propaganda in Iran

■ Podcast: The Nexus of Religious Freedom and Women’s Rights in Iran

■ Podcast: Religious Prisoners of Conscience in Iran
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 27

IRAN

Background

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a theocratic, authoritarian state with 

restricted political participation. Ninety to 95 percent of the population are Shi’a Muslim, while Sunni Muslims account for 5–10 percent. 

Approximately 0.3 percent ascribe to other religions, including the 

Baha’i faith, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Judaism. While the Jaafari 

school of Shi’a Islam is the official religion, the constitution extends full 

respect to the five major Sunni schools. It also recognizes Christians, 

Jews, and Zoroastrians as protected minorities. Five of the parliament’s 

290 seats are reserved for religious minorities—two for Armenian 

Christians and one each for Assyrian/Chaldean Christians, Jews, and 

Zoroastrians. There are two Hindu temples, and Buddhism has historical influences. Iran is home to several other religious groups that face 

persecution, including Mandeans, Yarsanis, nonbelievers, and spiritual 

movements, such as Erfan-e Halgheh. 

Religious Minorities

In 2022, Iran’s government escalated its persecution of Baha’is, conducting nationwide arrests and spreading propaganda against the 

group. In February, Judge Mohammadghasem Ain al-Kamali of Branch 

1 of the Semnan Revolutionary Court ruled that the Execution of Imam 

Khomeini’s Order (EIKO) could legally confiscate the property of 

Baha’is following false allegations against a Baha’i man in the province. 

Branch 54 of the Tehran Appeals Court upheld the decision in August 

following the destruction of six Baha’i houses in Rooshankooh. In July, 

Iran rearrested three members of the now disbanded Friends of Iran 

(Yaran Iran) who previously spent a decade in prison. In late August, 

Ministry of Intelligence officials arrested 14 Baha’is during a religious 

study in Ghaemshahr. Throughout the fall and winter of 2022, Iran 

continued its systematic campaign of Baha’i arrests.

Iran’s government also continued using antisemitic rhetoric to 

incite intolerance against Jews. In April, an IRGC-affiliated think tank 

declared there was no “real antisemitism” in Nazi Germany. Ayatollah 

Ali Khamenei regularly uses antisemitic tropes such as Jewish financial 

domination and deliberately conflates Judaism and Israeli government 

policy in his tweets. U.S. Department of State Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism Deborah E. Lipstadt has condemned 

repeatedly this “vile antisemitic rhetoric.”

The government also targeted Christian Iranians, particularly 

converts from Islam. In February, the Tehran Court of Appeal ordered 

a review of the sentences of nine Christians on the grounds that 

membership in a house church did not constitute a threat to national 

security, leading to their acquittal. However, the lower courts continued sentencing Christians on national security grounds. Pastor 

Youcef Nadarkhani, who is serving a six-year sentence for leading a 

400-member house church, was allowed a five-day furlough for Easter 

but returned to Evin Prison shortly thereafter. In May, the Civil Court 

of Bandar Anzali levied a fine of $185 (six million tomans) on Christian 

convert Rahmat Rostimipour for violating Article 500 of Iran’s penal 

code prohibiting education “contrary to Islam.” In August, Iran’s 

Supreme Court declined to review the 10-year prison sentence against 

house church leader Anooshavan Avedian. That same month, house 

church leader Josef Shahbazian began a 10-year sentence at Evin 

Prison following a June 2020 raid on a private home in which security 

forces arrested 30 Christians. In October, however, two Christian 

prisoners, Nasser Navard Goltapeh and Fariba Dalir, were released 

from Evin Prison. Following the outbreak of mass protests, the Ministry of Intelligence reportedly pressured Armenian Christian churches 

and church leaders to issue statements supporting the government.

Sunni Muslim Iranians faced repression in 2022 as security 

forces targeted communities in the geographic and social periphery 

in response to protests. Cleric Musa Rahimi reportedly died under 

torture in a prison in Bandar Abbas following his arrest for announcing 

the start of Eid al-Fitr in alignment with the Saudi date rather than the 

Iranian date. In September, security forces in Zahedan shot at least 

96 people leaving the Makki Grand Mosque to attend protests. In 

November, security forces opened fire on worshipers at the mosque. 

Both the IRGC and a Shi’a religious official linked to Ayatollah Khamenei condemned Sunni clerics for comments supporting protesters and 

criticizing the government. Iran’s most prominent Sunni cleric, Molavi 

Abdolhamid, continued to express his support for protesters.

Iran also continued its mistreatment of Gonabadi Sufis in 2022. 

Three Gonabadi Sufis at Great Tehran Prison were denied access to 

visitors in April. In August, Gonabadi Sufi journalist Kasra Nouri was 

moved from Adel Abad Prison in Shiraz to a local Ministry of Intelligence office. During protests in December, security forces arrested 

Gonabadi Sufi Mohsen Afrouz.

Key U.S. Policy

The Joseph R. Biden administration has supported protesters in Iran 

calling for greater religious freedom. In remarks at the UN General 

Assembly, President Biden lauded “the brave women of Iran who right 

now are demonstrating to secure their basic rights.” In November, the 

United States voted in favor of establishing a UN fact-finding mission 

on Iran at the UN Human Rights Council. That same month, Vice President Kamala D. Harris stated that the United States would “work with 

our partners to remove Iran from the UN Commission on the Status of 

Women.” In December, the United States voted in favor of the resolution—which it cosponsored—to remove Iran from the commission. 

The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the State Department 

continued to impose targeted sanctions on Iranian officials for violating religious freedom in 2022, including leaders in Iran’s IRGC and 

Basij militias. In September, the Treasury issued General License D-2, 

which facilitates outside technological support to Iranians protesting 

for greater religious freedom and other rights.

On November 30, the State Department redesignated Iran as a 

CPC under IRFA and, as the relevant presidential action, imposed travel 

restrictions on Iranian officials complicit in religious freedom violations.
28 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

NICARAGUA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Nicaragua worsened considerably. The government of Nicaragua, under President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo, escalated its campaign 

of harassment and severe persecution against the Catholic Church 

by targeting clergy, eliminating Church-affiliated organizations, and 

placing restrictions on religious observances. Violations of religious 

freedom that occurred in previous years—such as hate speech 

against the Catholic Church and denial of entry into the country 

for clergy—continued in 2022 as well.

The Nicaraguan government heightened its crackdown 

against members of the clergy. Despite the high level of persecution against Catholic leaders since protests in 2018, 2022 was 

the first year in which the government imprisoned members of the 

clergy. Father Manuel Salvador García was sentenced in June to two 

years in prison for threatening a crowd with a weapon, and later he 

was sentenced to another two years and eight months for allegedly 

assaulting a parishioner. José Leonardo Urbina was sentenced to 

30 years in prison for abuse of a minor; his secret trial lasted only 

two days and lacked due process. Additionally, the government 

made several high-profile moves against Rolando Álvarez, Catholic 

bishop of the Diocese of Matagalpa and Estelí. Following multiple 

instances of harassment in spring and summer, in August police 

conducted an early-morning raid on Bishop Álvarez’s church in 

Matagalpa, detained him, and put him under house arrest in Managua. Additional priests detained in 2022 include Óscar Benavidez in 

August and Enrique Martínez Gamboa in October. The government 

also engaged in hate speech against clergy and expelled priests or 

prevented them from returning to the country.

Within the context of a widespread crackdown on civil 

society organizations critical of the government, the Ortega 

regime has also pressured the Catholic Church by hindering or 

preventing Church-affiliated organizations and services from 

operating. In 2022, the regime shut down over 3,000 nongovernmental organizations, often citing legislation such as the 

“foreign agents” law or Law No. 977, Law against Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism and Financing of the Proliferation 

of Arms, to justify its consolidation of control over civil society. 

The National Assembly ordered the revocation of the legal status of a Catholic university and several Catholic educational and 

charitable projects in the city of Estelí and later approved a law 

that would strengthen its control over educational institutions 

and strip funding from the Jesuit-run school Universidad Centroamericana (Central American University). 

In May, the Nicaraguan Institute of Telecommunications and 

Postal Services (TELCOR) ordered the removal of the Episcopal 

Conference of Nicaragua’s Canal Católico (Catholic Channel). In 

its place the regime began airing Nicarao TV, widely perceived

as a propaganda network. TELCOR also ordered the closure of 

at least eight radio stations operated by the Catholic Church. 

In August, police in Sébaco forcibly entered the chapel where 

Radio Católica operated. They seized broadcast equipment and 

forced the church’s priest to take refuge in the parish house for 

several days. 

In June, the government canceled the legal status of Missionaries of Charity—an order established by Mother Teresa—for 

allegedly failing to declare the origins of its funding in line with 

Law No. 977. Missionaries of Charity had operated in Nicaragua 

since 1988, running a “children’s nursery, a home for abused and 

abandoned girls and a nursing home.” The government also forced 

the nuns in the order to leave the country.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Redesignate Nicaragua as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging 

in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on Nicaraguan government agencies and officials 

responsible for violence and other punitive actions against houses of worship, 

religious leaders, and organizations by 

freezing those individuals’ assets and/or 

barring their entry into the United States 

under human rights related financial and 

visa authorities, citing specific religious 

freedom violations;

	■ Press the Nicaraguan government to 

unconditionally release religious prisoners of conscience, commit to due process 

for religious detainees, and permit access 

to Bibles and religious consultations for all 

political prisoners; and

	■ Exercise increased scrutiny of any loan or 

financial or technical assistance provided 

by international financial institutions for 

projects in Nicaragua, pursuant to the 

Reinforcing Nicaragua’s Adherence to 

Conditions for Electoral Reform Act of 

2021 (RENACER Act).

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Hold public hearings to amplify congressional concerns over religious prisoners 

of conscience in Nicaragua and work 

with like-minded parliamentarians in 

other countries to advocate for their 

release and the release of other prisoners 

of conscience.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Country Update: Religious Freedom in Nicaragua in 2022

■ Hearing: Crackdown on Religious Freedom in Nicaragua

■ Podcast: Nicaragua’s Assault on Religious Freedom

■ Podcast: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in Nicaragua
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 29

NICARAGUA

Background

President Ortega is the head of state and government of Nicaragua. 

He and his party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, exercise 

authoritarian control over the government and electoral process. 

Roman Catholics account for about 50 percent of Nicaragua’s population; Evangelical Christians account for 33.2 percent; followers of 

unspecified religions account for 13.2 percent; Jews, Muslims, and 

others account for 2.9 percent; and 0.7 percent do not adhere to 

any religion. 

Nicaragua is embroiled in a social and political crisis that started 

after the government’s repression of peaceful protests in April 2018. 

The Ortega administration began targeting the Catholic Church after 

it aided demonstrators and individual clergy voiced opposition to the 

government’s human rights abuses. Since 2018, government actors 

and pro-Ortega groups have routinely intimidated and harassed 

worshipers; vandalized churches; and targeted clergy with defamatory accusations, arbitrary arrests, death threats, deportations, and 

violent attacks. 

Persecution of Bishop Rolando Álvarez 

The Nicaraguan government’s persecution against Bishop Álvarez is 

illustrative of its crackdown on members of the clergy. Álvarez was a 

mediator in the national dialogue in 2018 and was critical of the government’s human rights record. In May, police placed Álvarez under 

24-hour surveillance. As a result, Álvarez took refuge in a church in 

Managua—which the police then surrounded—and began a hunger 

strike to protest his treatment. Police allowed the bishop to return to 

his own diocese in Matagalpa but escorted his vehicle for the two-hour 

journey. On August 5, the national police announced an investigation into Bishop Álvarez. He was under de facto house arrest at his 

Matagalpa church residence for two weeks until police conducted an 

early-morning raid on the church, detained the bishop, and put him 

under house arrest in Managua. He was charged with “conspiracy,” 

“spreading false news,” and “damaging the Nicaraguan government 

and society.” Vice President Murillo justified the bishop’s arrest by 

arguing that it served to “guard the peace, security, and tranquility 

of Nicaraguan families.” In February 2023, a court sentenced Bishop 

Álvarez to 26 years in prison and also announced that “he would be 

fined and stripped of his Nicaraguan citizenship.” 

Authorities detained seven other men at the same time as Bishop 

Álvarez’s arrest, including three priests, one deacon, two seminarians, 

and one layman. In February 2023, the regime sentenced the men to 

10 years in prison for "conspiracy to undermine national integrity" 

and "for spreading false news.” Days later, the regime released the 

seven men and exiled them to the United States along with over 200 

other political prisoners.

Harassment of Clergy

The government continued to use similar tactics as in previous years 

to incite fear in the Catholic community. It again expelled priests and 

prevented them from returning to the country after traveling abroad, 

without any official explanation. Monsignor Waldemar Sommertag 

served as the papal nuncio in Managua starting in 2018. In March 

2022, the Nicaraguan government abruptly withdrew his credentials 

and forced him to leave the country. In September, the Directorate 

General of Immigration and Nationality notified Father Juan de Dios 

García via email that he was banned from returning after he visited 

family in the United States. A short while later, the regime denied

entry to Father Guillermo Blandón after he traveled to Israel with a 

stopover in the United States. 

Shortly after Pope Francis acknowledged dialogue between the 

Vatican and the Nicaraguan government, President Ortega—during 

a televised speech—called the Church a “perfect dictatorship” and 

renewed his old accusations of clergy as “killers” and “coup plotters.” 

In December, he also accused clergy of “calling for bloodshed” during 

the 2018 protests. 

Prohibition of Religious Rituals 

The regime continued to arbitrarily ban Catholic processions in several 

cities. In August, the police prohibited a procession in Managua for 

“reasons of internal security.” In lieu of the procession, parishioners 

gathered peacefully under heavy police presence for Mass at the 

cathedral. Similar prohibitions occurred at least four times in September, twice in October, and twice in November. 

Key U.S. Policy

The U.S. government continued to enact robust sanctions against 

Nicaraguan organizations and officials. The RENACER Act expanded 

the Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors list to include Nicaragua. In 

March, the U.S. Department of State added nine Nicaraguan officials 

to the list for “undermining the democratic processes or institutions of 

Nicaragua” during the 2021 sham election, making those individuals 

ineligible for visas and admission to the United States. Further rounds 

of visa restrictions came in June and July when the State Department 

imposed restrictions on an additional 116 individuals for undermining 

democracy, including judges, prosecutors, National Assembly members, and Interior Ministry officials.

In June, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign 

Assets Control sanctioned the state-owned mining company Empresa 

Nicaraguense de Minas and one official in the government pursuant 

to Executive Order 13851. In October, the Joseph R. Biden administration announced another slate of sanctions against individuals and 

entities in Nicaragua “to hold the Ortega-Murillo regime accountable 

for its escalating human rights violations, continued dismantling of 

democratic institutions,” and attacks on civil society. These measures 

put pressure on Nicaragua’s gold sector, allow for future trade restrictions, and impose visa restrictions on more than 500 individuals “who 

work for the Nicaraguan government or formulate, implement, or 

benefit from policies or actions that undermine or injure democratic 

institutions.”

On November 30, the State Department for the first time designated Nicaragua as a CPC under IRFA and imposed as the relevant 

president action the existing ongoing restrictions referenced in section 5 of the Nicaragua Investment Conditionality Act of 2018 (the 

NICA Act). Nicaragua previously had been on the State Department’s 

Special Watch List since 2019.
30 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

NIGERIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Nigeria remained poor, 

with both state and nonstate actors committing particularly 

severe violations of religious freedom. While some officials 

worked to address drivers of religious freedom violations, others 

actively infringed on the religious freedom rights of Nigerians, 

including by enforcing blasphemy laws. Criminal activity and violent 

armed group incidents impacting religious freedom worsened.

A Shari’a court sentenced Sheikh Abduljabar Kabara to death

for blasphemy. Judicial authorities sentenced humanist leader 

Mubarak Bala to 24 years in prison for blasphemy and other 

charges. A high court ruled that blasphemy laws in Shari’a penal 

codes are constitutional and remanded the blasphemy case against 

Yahaya Sharif Aminu back to Shari’a courts for retrial. In September, 

armed officers conducted a surprise raid on the residence of the 

presiding judge of the Kano Court of Appeal, who was the only 

judge who dissented the ruling. Kabara, Bala, and Sharif Aminu 

remained incarcerated at year’s end, along with several other individuals accused of blasphemy. Meanwhile, religious police arrested 

19 people accused of organizing a wedding ceremony for two individuals of the same sex in Kano State, where Muslims convicted of 

lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) 

activity face execution or public flogging under Shari’a legal codes. 

Mob violence in Zamfara killed Christian university student 

Deborah Yakubu due to blasphemy accusations. Officials in Bauchi 

State arrested Christian healthcare worker Rhoda Jatau for blasphemy for comments she shared on social media in the aftermath 

of the violence. Authorities only brought minor charges against two 

of the instigators of violence against Yakubu and no charges against 

the instigators of violence against Jatau.

Rampant violence and atrocities across Nigeria continued 

to impact freedom of religion or belief, including militant Islamist 

violence; some forms of identity-based violence; mob violence; 

and criminal, political, and vigilante violence impacting worship. 

The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) claimed several 

attacks against Christian communities, including allegedly killing 

40 people in an attack on a Catholic Church in Ondo State during 

Pentecost Sunday services and bombing a market in Borno State 

that sold alcohol. 

In many of the country’s complex violent crises, armed actors 

targeted worshipers and religious leaders. Attacks targeted 

churches and mosques in Kaduna State, mosques in Zamfara and 

Katsina states, and several Christian leaders in other parts of the 

country. Tensions at the intersection of ethnicity, religion, and geographic heritage yielded atrocities in several regions, including in 

Plateau, Benue, and Anambra states. 

Federal authorities accelerated efforts to address violence 

impacting religious freedom, including by institutionalizing harsher 

punishments against perpetrators, improving military efforts to 

neutralize Islamist fighters in the north, and strengthening efforts to 

investigate and arrest perpetrators of the most egregious attacks. 

The effectiveness of these efforts remained in question, while 

in some regions state and local officials failed to fully prosecute 

individuals who incited mob violence against alleged blasphemers. 

Security and judicial sector reform aimed at deterring and 

providing redress for religious violence remained stagnant, with 

such efforts largely absent from or peripheral to leading politicians’ 

policy priorities. The government’s human rights record continued 

to be poor, with reports emerging of a decades-long forced abortion campaign facilitated by the Nigerian military against rescued 

abductees of Boko Haram. 

Despite continued religious freedom challenges in the country, in November the U.S. Department of State failed to designate 

Nigeria as a country of particularly concern (CPC) for engaging in 

particularly severe violations of religious freedom.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Designate Nigeria as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by 

the International Religious Freedom Act 

(IRFA), and redesignate Boko Haram and 

ISWAP as “entities of particular concern,” 

or EPCs, for engaging in systematic, 

ongoing, and egregious violations of 

religious freedom, as defined by IRFA;

	■ Appoint a Special Envoy for Nigeria and 

the Lake Chad Basin to maximize U.S. 

diplomatic efforts to address religious 

freedom violations and atrocity risk in 

Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin; and

	■ Diplomatically, financially, and administratively support Nigerian civil society 

organizations to coordinate a national 

dialogue on implementing United 

Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) 

Resolution 16/18 and to promote religious freedom and tolerance while 

safeguarding freedom of expression.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Revitalize the bipartisan Nigeria caucus 

to place due focus on security, atrocity 

risk, human rights, and religious freedom 

challenges in Nigeria; and

	■ Request that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigate the 

effectiveness of U.S. assistance to Nigeria 

in achieving religious freedom objectives 

in the country.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Hearing: Religious Freedom, Violence, and U.S. Policy in Nigeria

■ Policy Update: Violence and Religious Freedom in Nigeria

■ Policy Update: Blasphemy Laws in Nigeria

■ Commission Delegation Visit: Abuja in June 2022

■ Podcast: Religious Freedom Takeaways on the Ground in Nigeria
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 31

NIGERIA

Background

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with an estimated 

219 million people. Among these, 53.5 percent identify as Muslim; 

45.9 percent identify as Christian; and 0.6 percent identify with other 

religious or nonreligious beliefs, including atheism, African traditional 

religions, the Baha’i faith, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Judaism. Nigeria’s 

1999 Constitution protects freedom of religion or belief and prohibits 

the state from establishing a state religion. The Nigerian Criminal 

Code includes a penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment for blasphemy. Twelve northern states use Islamic Shari’a criminal and family 

codes alongside civil and customary laws. These Shari’a codes prohibit 

blasphemy and other offenses based on Islamic law as interpreted by 

each state’s High Court. 

Blasphemy Cases

In December, a Shari’a court sentenced Sheikh Abduljabbar Kabara to 

death by hanging for offending the Prophet in his preaching. In April, 

a court in Kano State sentenced humanist leader Mubarak Bala to 24 

years in prison for blasphemy after he pled guilty against the advice 

of his lawyers and seemingly against his own convictions. In August, 

a high court in Kano ruled that blasphemy laws in Shari’a penal codes 

are constitutional and remanded the blasphemy case against Tijaniyya 

Muslim Yahaya Sharif Aminu back to Shari’a courts for retrial. 

In May, a mob in Zamfara State stoned Christian student Deborah 

Yakubu to death and burned her body because they perceived remarks 

she made in a WhatsApp thread as insulting to Islam. In June, a mob in 

Abuja stoned and burned Muslim Ahmad Usman to death for alleged 

blasphemy, although investigations implicated organized criminal 

activity as likely playing a major role in the incident. 

Some government officials made public statements condemning 

mob violence against alleged blasphemers and issued temporary 

curfews to quell rising threats to public safety. However, authorities 

limited charges against two alleged perpetrators of violence that 

killed Yakubu to bailable offenses. When a mob in Bauchi State mobilized to retaliate against Christian healthcare worker Rhoda Jatau for 

making comments they considered blasphemous in the aftermath of 

Yakubu’s murder, authorities arrested Jatau on charges of blasphemy 

instead of arresting those who incited violence against her.

Violence Impacting Religious Freedom

Rampant violence and atrocities across Nigeria continued to impact 

freedom of religion or belief for many Nigerians. During a rampage 

across several villages in February, ISWAP burned at least one church. 

In April, ISWAP bombed a bar in Taraba State in an attempt to target 

“infidel Christians,” killing three and injuring 19. Investigations allege 

that ISWAP killed at least 40 people in a June attack on Pentecost 

Sunday targeting a Catholic Church in Owo, Ondo State. In October, 

ISWAP attacked a church in Kogi State, killing two people and injuring 

several others. Boko Haram also continued to commit violations in its 

campaign to install undemocratic Islamic rule, with 100 of the schoolgirls they abducted in Chibok in 2014 still missing.

Complex violent crises across the country involving dynamic 

alliances of insurgent, criminal, and vigilante actors also impacted 

freedom of worship for both Muslims and Christians. In Kaduna State 

in March, alleged bandits reportedly abducted 14 worshipers from 

a mosque during Isha prayers. In June, two simultaneous attacks on 

churches in Kaduna State reportedly killed eight people and resulted 

in 38 abductions. In July, armed actors abducted two priests in Kaduna 

State, resulting in the death of one. In September, gunmen kidnapped 

dozens of worshipers from Friday prayers in Zamfara State, and later 

that month armed assailants killed 15 people during an attack on 

a mosque. In December, gunmen abducted 19 worshipers from a 

mosque in Katsina State.

In Plateau State in March 2022, tensions triggered by an attack 

on a convoy of Muslim worshipers in August 2021 reignited, resulting 

in fatalities from both Muslim and Christian communities. In May, 

armed assailants killed a pregnant Muslim Hausa woman and her four 

children, with local analysis concluding that discrimination likely played 

a key role in the attack. 

In January, the Nigerian government issued a policy considering 

all activities by or in support of “bandits” and “gunmen” as prosecutable under the Terrorism Prevention Act (2013). In April, the Nigerian 

Congress made kidnapping punishable by death and criminalized 

ransom payments in an attempt to curb growing abduction rackets 

that have impacted religious leaders and worshipers. Authorities 

also made several prominent arrests, including five individuals for 

conducting the Pentecost church attack in Owo.

Despite these efforts, ISWAP expanded its territorial reach and 

conducted several sophisticated attacks in 2022. While the Nigerian 

government often projects an overly optimistic picture of its capacity 

and readiness to combat violent actors, sources from the ground 

allege that chronic institutional challenges plague the effectiveness 

of Nigeria’s security and judicial systems. 

Key U.S. Policy

In 2022, the Joseph R. Biden administration again failed to designate 

Nigeria as a CPC for engaging in particularly severe religious freedom 

violations, having removed it from the CPC list the previous year. In 

April, the U.S. Congress approved the release of a nearly $1 billion 

weapons sale to Nigeria that was paused due to human rights concerns, garnering criticism from human rights organizations. The U.S. 

Embassy in Nigeria held several trainings with Nigerian security forces 

to improve civilian protection in military operations. The U.S. government continued to support peacebuilding programs and efforts 

to promote interfaith dialogue and harmony. The U.S. Embassy also 

demonstrated commitment to protect Nigeria’s religious and cultural 

heritage, including by funding a project to protect the Busanyin Shrine 

in the Osun Osogbo Sacred Grove.
32 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

NORTH KOREA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in North Korea remained 

among the worst in the world. North Korea’s ruling ideology, 

known as Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism, forbids competing ideologies—including religious ones—and treats religion as an existential 

threat. The country’s most fundamental legal document, known as 

the Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Leadership 

System, requires absolute loyalty and obedience to the teachings 

of North Korean leaders. The Ten Principles contradict the rights 

and freedoms enshrined in international law and in the country’s 

own constitution, which nominally grants religious freedom. The 

ruling Workers’ Party of Korea actively enforces the Ten Principles 

at all levels of government and across society, monitors and controls religious belief and activities, and systematically denies North 

Korean citizens the right to religious freedom. 

North Korea’s discriminatory songbun system classifies 

citizens based on their perceived loyalty to the state. Religious practitioners belong to the “hostile” class and are considered enemies 

of the state, deserving “discrimination, punishment, isolation, and 

even execution.” The government attempts to provide an illusion 

of religious freedom to the outside world through state-controlled 

religious sites and organizations, which include the Korean Buddhist 

Federation, the Korean Christian Federation, and the Korean Catholic Association. In reality, religious freedom remains nonexistent 

as authorities actively and systematically target and persecute

religious groups and adherents, including Christians, practitioners 

of shamanism, and others. 

Protestant Christians remain especially vulnerable to persecution. According to a 2022 report by the War Crimes Committee 

of the International Bar Association and the Committee for Human 

Rights in North Korea, human rights abuses—including religious 

freedom abuses—in North Korean detention centers amount to 

crimes against humanity. Christians make up a disproportionate 

number of detainees in these detention centers. Authorities consider the practice of their faith a political crime and levy particularly 

harsh punishments on prisoners from that community, including 

severe torture and killing. For example, a former detainee at the 

Onsong labor detention center estimated that between 50 and 60 

percent of the facility’s population are Christian or have had contact with Christianity. The Ministry of State Security, North Korea’s 

secret police agency, is the principal perpetrator responsible for 

the persecution of Christians. 

Furthermore, North Korean law bans shamanistic practices 

as “superstitious acts.” The Ministry of People’s Security, North 

Korea’s police agency, is primarily responsible for abuses against 

practitioners of shamanism. Information on religious freedom conditions for practitioners of other major religious traditions in North 

Korea—such as Buddhism, Catholicism, and Chondoism—remains 

severely limited. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Redesignate North Korea as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging 

in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

	■ Integrate security and human rights as 

complementary objectives in broader U.S. 

policy toward—and in bilateral negotiations with—North Korea; and

	■ Impose targeted and broad sanctions—

including coordinated, multilateral 

sanctions with international partners—as 

appropriate for religious freedom violations in North Korea and consider lifting 

certain sanctions in return for concrete 

progress in religious freedom and related 

human rights. 

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Reauthorize the North Korean Human 

Rights Act and swiftly confirm the nominee for Special Envoy for North Korean 

Human Rights Issues. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Special Report: Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and the Right to Freedom of Religion, Thought, and Conscience in North Korea 

■ Hearing: U.S. Policy and Freedom of Religion or Belief in North Korea 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 33

NORTH KOREA

Background

Information about religious demographics and religious freedom 

conditions in North Korea is difficult to confirm and often outdated. 

Historically, North Koreans followed Buddhism and an indigenous 

syncretic religious movement known as Chondoism (Religion of the 

Heavenly Way). The country was also home to a sizeable Christian 

community before the Korean War (1950–1953), with Pyongyang 

known as the “Jerusalem of the East,” but successive crackdowns have 

shrunk the Christian population to an estimated two percent of the 

total population. Shamanism and traditional folk religion practices, 

such as fortunetelling, are also prevalent.

North Korean Defectors and Refugees

Defectors and refugees from North Korea are primary sources of 

information about religious freedom conditions in the country. In 

recent years, however, the number of North Koreans arriving in 

South Korea has decreased significantly due to tightened security 

along borders between China and North Korea as well as between 

China and Southeast Asian countries; the COVID-19 pandemic has 

contributed to a further decrease. According to the South Korean 

Ministry of Unification, only 67 North Koreans defected to South 

Korea in 2022—one of the lowest numbers in over 20 years. The 

Chinese government views all North Korean refugees as illegal economic migrants and repatriates them if discovered, without regard to 

their risk of persecution upon return, in violation of its international 

obligations. North Korean refugees who have contact with Christian 

missionaries and nongovernmental organization workers in China 

face severe punishment when repatriated to North Korea. Chinese 

authorities have expelled hundreds of South Korean missionaries 

since 2017, many of whom played an instrumental role in helping 

North Korean refugees escape. 

International Accountability in the 

United Nations (UN)

In March, Tomás Ojea Quintana, then Special Rapporteur on the 

situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea, submitted a report to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 

raising concerns about North Korea’s deprivation of its people’s fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression, religion, 

and thought. It recommended that North Korea “review the Law on 

the Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture, and promote 

and protect freedom of expression, access to information and freedom of religion, including for young people.” In August, the UNHRC 

appointed Elizabeth Salmón of Peru as the incoming Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea.

In April, the UNHRC adopted a resolution condemning “[longstanding] and ongoing systematic, widespread and gross human 

rights violations and other human rights abuses committed” in North 

Korea. It expressed grave concerns over North Korea’s persecution 

of individuals on religious and other grounds; denial of the right to 

freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including the right to 

adopt a religion or belief; and discrimination based on the songbun 

system. The UNHRC also called on the North Korean government 

to ensure the right to thought, conscience, and religion or belief. In 

December, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution expressing 

concerns over North Korea’s dire human rights conditions and calling 

for international efforts to improve them. 

Key U.S. Policy

There was little to no change in U.S.-North Korea relations in 2022. 

Officials with the administration of President Joseph R. Biden 

repeated the U.S. commitment to diplomacy and dialogue with North 

Korea, without preconditions, to which the North Korean government 

offered no positive response. During President Biden’s visit with South 

Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in May, the two leaders issued a 

joint statement that expressed grave concern over the human rights 

situation in North Korea. In December, U.S. Secretary of State Antony 

J. Blinken, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin, and their Australian counterparts issued a joint statement during the U.S.-Australia 

Ministerial Consultations that called on North Korea to engage in 

denuclearization dialogue, while expressing grave concern over severe 

human rights violations in that country. 

On November 30, the U.S. Department of State redesignated 

North Korea as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed as the relevant 

presidential action the existing, ongoing restrictions to which the 

country is already subject under Sections 402 and 409 of the Trade 

Act of 1974. That same month, pursuant to Executive Order 13687, the 

U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned North Korea’s Ministry of 

State Security Border Guard General Bureau (BGGB) for its complicity 

in human rights abuses along that country’s borders with China and 

Russia. On January 23, 2023, shortly after the reporting period, President Biden nominated Julie Turner for the position of Special Envoy 

on North Korean Human Rights Issues.

In March, Representative Young Kim (R-CA) and Representative 

Ami Bera (D-CA) introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives a bipartisan bill to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act (H.R.7332), 

but the House took no further action on the measure. In May, Senator 

Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) introduced the Senate 

version of the bill (S.4216), which the Senate passed in December. As 

the law expired at the end of fiscal year 2022 and was not reauthorized 

by the conclusion of the 117th Congress (January 2021–January 2023), 

members of the House and Senate are likely to reintroduce new versions. 
34 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

PAKISTAN

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, Pakistan’s religious freedom conditions continued to 

deteriorate. Religious minorities were subject to frequent attacks 

and threats, including accusations of blasphemy, targeted killings, lynchings, mob violence, forced conversions, sexual violence 

against women and girls, and desecration of houses of worship 

and cemeteries. Members of the Shi’a Muslim, Ahmadiyya Muslim, 

Christian, Hindu, and Sikh communities faced the continued threat 

of persecution via harsh and discriminatory legislation, such as 

anti-Ahmadiyya and blasphemy laws, as well as increasingly aggressive societal discrimination amid a rise in radical Islamist influence. 

These laws have enabled and encouraged radical Islamists to operate with impunity, openly targeting religious minorities or those 

with differing beliefs, including nonbelievers.

The new government under Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, 

which took office in April, weaponized the country’s blasphemy 

laws against former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his cabinet 

members. Religious minorities, however, were especially vulnerable to prosecution or violence based on blasphemy allegations 

in a society that has grown increasingly intolerant of religious 

diversity. Blasphemy cases remained a substantial threat to religious freedom, as did the sort of mob violence that has long 

accompanied such accusations. In February, a court sentenced 

Notan Lal—the owner and principal of a private school in Ghotki, 

Sindh—to life in prison under Article 295(c) of the Pakistani Penal 

Code (PPC) after a student accused him of insulting the Prophet 

three years prior. His appeal remains pending despite pleas of 

innocence. That same month, an angry mob in Punjab Province 

stoned to death Muhammad Mushtaq, a mentally ill man accused 

of burning the Qur’an; a mob of some 300 people then hanged 

his body from a tree. 

Societal violence and targeted killings also continued to 

plague the country’s religious minorities. In January, unknown 

gunmen killed a Christian priest and wounded another as they 

drove home from Sunday Mass in Peshawar. In May, unidentified 

assailants gunned down two Sikh businessmen in Peshawar, and a 

seminary student stabbed to death an Ahmadiyya man in Okara 

District, Punjab Province. The victim’s family members accused

the chief cleric of the seminary of provoking the student to commit murder by delivering sermons calling for violence against the 

Ahmadiyya community. From January to July alone, that community 

reported the desecration of over 170 graves and at least two houses 

of worship, often with the assistance of authorities. In July in Punjab 

Province, 53 Ahmadiyya graves were desecrated in Gujranwala 

District under the supervision of the police, while security forces 

arrested several Ahmadis for conducting Islamic ritual slaughter 

in celebration of the Eid al-Adha holiday and thereby “posing as 

Muslims.” In June, a group of armed men desecrated a Hindu temple in Karachi after two spokespersons for India’s ruling Bharatiya 

Janata Party (BJP) reportedly made insulting statements about 

the Prophet Muhammad; Pakistan’s government vowed to hold 

the perpetrators accountable, although it had made no arrests by 

the end of 2022. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Redesignate Pakistan as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing 

the administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result of 

the designation;

	■ Enter into a binding agreement, under 

Section 405(c) of IRFA, with the Pakistani 

government to encourage substantial 

steps to address religious freedom violations with benchmarks, including but not 

limited to: 

■ Release blasphemy prisoners and other 

individuals imprisoned for their religion 

or beliefs;

■ Repeal blasphemy and anti-Ahmadiyya 

laws; until such repeal, enact reforms 

to make blasphemy a bailable offense, 

require evidence by accusers, ensure 

proper investigation by senior police 

officials, allow authorities to dismiss 

unfounded accusations, and enforce 

existing Penal Code articles criminalizing perjury and false accusations; 

■ Remove requirements for self-identification of religion on identity documents;

■ Address radical Islamist rhetoric, which 

often precedes attacks on minorities, 

while protecting freedom of expression;

■ Hold accountable individuals who incite 

or participate in vigilante violence, targeted killings, forced conversions, and 

other religiously based crimes; and

■ Reform educational textbooks, curricula, 

and teacher training materials to ensure 

content is inclusive of and not discriminatory toward religious minorities.

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on Pakistani 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Incorporate religious freedom concerns 

into its larger oversight of the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship through hearings, 

letters, and congressional delegations and 

advocate for the release of religious prisoners of conscience in Pakistan, including 

Junaid Hafeez, Asif Pervaiz, Notan Lal, 

Zafar Bhatti, and Aneeqa Ateeq. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Country Update: Religious Freedom in Pakistan in 2022

■ Podcast: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in South Asia
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 35

PAKISTAN

Background

Pakistan’s population is an estimated 96.5 percent Muslim (85–90 

percent Sunni, 10–15 percent Shi’a, and 0.2 percent Ahmadi) with 

smaller populations of Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Baha’is, 

and Zoroastrians comprising the remaining 3.5 percent. Pakistan was 

established as an Islamic Republic in 1956, granting special status to 

Islam; the constitution establishes Islam as the state religion, defines 

the country’s purpose “wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order 

their lives . . . in accordance with the teachings and requirements of 

Islam,” and allows only Muslims to serve as president and prime minister. Pakistan’s constitution nominally protects religious freedom by 

prohibiting faith-based discrimination and guaranteeing the right to 

religious practices and education while reserving 10 seats for religious 

minorities in the National Assembly, four in the Senate, and 23 in four 

provincial assemblies. However, a 1974 constitutional amendment 

declares Ahmadis non-Muslims, excluding them from representation. 

In addition, Pakistan maintains several laws, including criminal blasphemy and anti-Ahmadiyya laws, that further restrict the freedom of 

religion or belief.

Blasphemy and Anti-Ahmadiyya Laws

Sections 295 and 298 of the PPC criminalize acts and speech insulting 

religion or defiling the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad, places of 

worship, or religious symbols. These vague provisions are frequently 

abused to levy false accusations against Shi’a Muslims, Ahmadiyya 

Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and others who do not adhere 

to the majority Sunni interpretation of Islam. Those accused of blasphemy face violence, imprisonment with limited opportunity for 

bail, and even the death sentence, although no blasphemy convict 

has been executed by the state in Pakistan. In January 2023—after 

the reporting period—the National Assembly passed a draft law 

that would increase the penalties for certain blasphemy cases to life 

imprisonment while eliminating their eligibility for bail. 

Articles 298(b) and 298(c) of the PPC prohibit Ahmadis from 

self-identifying as Muslim, forcing them to sign a declaration swearing 

they are non-Muslim to obtain basic civil rights, such as the right to 

vote or receive national identification cards. Ahmadiyya Muslims are 

prohibited from citing the Qur’an or Hadith; displaying Qur’anic text 

on gravestones, houses of worship, or elsewhere; sharing their faith; 

or calling their places of worship “mosques.” 

Sexual Violence and Forced Conversion of Women 

and Girls

Abductions, forced conversion to Islam, rape, and forced marriage—frequently allowed with impunity—remain imminent threats 

for religious minority women and children, particularly Christians, 

Hindus, and Sikhs. In January, neighbors abducted, forcibly converted 

to Islam, and married Mahnoor Ashraf, a 14-year-old Christian girl in 

Lahore, to a 45-year-old Muslim man. In March, in Sindh Province, a 

man attempting to abduct and forcibly marry 18-year-old Hindu Pooja 

Kumari shot and killed her when she resisted. In April, 12-year-old 

Christian Zarvia Pervaiz was abducted, forced to convert to Islam, and 

married to a 40-year-old man; a Lahore judge dismissed her parents’ 

case in August, claiming that she had converted and married “of her 

own free will” despite her status as a minor. 

In October, concerns over such abuses prompted several United 

Nations special rapporteurs, including those on freedom of religion 

or belief and on violence against women and girls, to express their 

concern to the government of Pakistan. That communication provided 

a series of individual examples, which it referred to as “indicative of 

a wider phenomenon throughout the country,” and it warned of the 

reported “inaction and complicity of security forces and the judiciary 

in the face of these abuses.”

Radical Islamism: Armed Groups and 

Political Influence

Radical Islamist influence continued to worsen in 2022, including 

through armed groups, political factions, and individuals, many of 

whom used rhetoric, disinformation, or direct violence targeting 

religious minorities. Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) gained popularity, using blasphemy laws as rallying points. In March, the Islamic 

State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) killed over 60 in a deadly attack on a Shi’a 

mosque, marking yet another instance of extremist violence against 

religious minorities. 

Key U.S. Policy

The United States has long considered Pakistan’s stability and security a foreign policy priority, making it one of the largest recipients 

of U.S. foreign aid—more than $32 billion over the last two decades. 

It increased that level of aid in 2022, largely due to the devastating 

floods that covered vast swaths of Pakistani territory from June to 

August, killing over 1,700 and destroying around 2.3 million homes. By 

the start of 2023, the U.S. government had provided over $98 million 

in humanitarian assistance in response to that crisis, largely through 

the U.S. Agency for International Development. This assistance came 

in addition to U.S. support in 2022 for Pakistani efforts to combat the 

COVID-19 epidemic, including pledging and partially implementing 

the donation of an additional 77 million vaccine doses. In October, the 

United States hosted a visit from Pakistan’s outgoing Chief of Army 

Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, just weeks after announcing plans 

to move forward with a $450 million deal to support the Pakistani Air 

Force’s F-16 program. Reports suggest that these dynamics may point 

to improvement in bilateral relations, long complicated by the two 

countries’ starkly differing agendas and interests vis-à-vis Pakistan’s 

neighbors in Afghanistan, India, and China.

On November 30, the U.S. Department of State redesignated 

Pakistan as a CPC under IRFA. However, as in prior years, the State 

Department issued a national interest waiver that absolved Pakistan of 

liability to sanctions or other significant penalties that would otherwise 

accompany that designation.
36 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

RUSSIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in the Russian Federation continued to decline. Authorities increasingly prosecuted members of religious minority communities using a range of 

legal mechanisms, including a 1996 religion law; laws on terrorism, 

extremism, and “undesirable organizations”; provisions criminalizing blasphemy; and others. These vague laws continued to give 

authorities broad powers to outlaw religious groups, prosecute 

individuals based on their religious speech or religious activities, 

and ban religious literature deemed “extremist.” The government 

also continued to fine Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, Old Believers, and others for illegal missionary activities and other violations 

of various restrictions.

Russian authorities frequently relied on the country’s extremism statutes to punish individuals for participating in so-called 

“extremist” organizations—without adequately defining “extremism.” In 2022, the government detained, imprisoned, and fined 

adherents of Muslim theologian Said Nursi, members of the Muslim 

group Tablighi Jamaat, and Jehovah’s Witnesses on such charges. 

Since the Supreme Court declared Jehovah’s Witnesses “extremist” in 2017, authorities have subjected the group to 1,874 home 

searches, with 201 occurring in 2022. In June, the European Court 

of Human Rights concluded that Russia had violated Jehovah’s 

Witnesses’ rights and ordered the government to pay pecuniary 

damages. By the end of the year, more than 100 Jehovah’s Witnesses remained in Russian custody. 

Officials continued to detain and sentence Muslims on 

unsubstantiated terrorism and sedition charges for their real 

or alleged affiliation with Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), an Islamist group 

that Russia has designated a terrorist organization. International 

human rights organization Memorial reported in December that 

at least 328 people were in prison or faced prosecution or investigation for such alleged affiliations, of whom 108 had received 

prison sentences between 10–15 years and 105 had received 

sentences of 15 years or more. In Russian-occupied Crimea, 

occupation authorities have regularly imprisoned predominantly 

Muslim Crimean Tatars who oppose the Russian occupation, 

charging them in connection with their Muslim identity and religious activities.

In February, Russian military forces launched a full-scale and 

unjustified invasion of Ukraine with the purported goal of the 

“demilitarization and denazification” of the country. This “denazification” rhetoric often resulted in antisemitic Russian propaganda 

and remarks from government officials, including Foreign Minister 

Sergey Lavrov. As part of its war propaganda, the Russian government also pointed to the alleged flourishing of “satanism” and 

other religious movements—so-called “cults”—in Ukraine, with one 

official calling for the “desatanization of Ukraine.” Dissidents within 

Russia voicing opposition to the war on religious grounds faced

fines and detention for allegedly discrediting and disseminating 

false information about the Russian army. Religious leaders who 

refused to voice support for the invasion, such as the chief rabbi of 

Moscow, were forced to flee Russia.

Ukrainian religious communities living in areas invaded by 

Russia experienced gross religious freedom violations perpetrated 

by Russian forces. Several reports document Russian military personnel threatening, detaining, disappearing, and torturing religious 

figures in order to exert control and influence over local populations. In the first six months of the war, at least 20 religious figures 

were reported killed and another 15 kidnapped. Russian artillery 

and gunfire regularly destroyed and damaged Ukrainian places 

of worship and other religious facilities. By December, the United 

Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) had verified damage to at least 102 religious sites, with other 

organizations reporting damage to more than 300.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Redesignate Russia as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on Russian 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and

	■ Allocate greater funding to programs 

supporting: 

■ Russian civil society, including Russian 

civil society actors in exile, that monitors 

and documents human rights and religious freedom violations in Russia; and

■ Independent media that counters Russian disinformation and antisemitism 

and reports uncensored information 

about events inside Russia, including 

those related to religious freedom. 

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Engage with repressed religious communities in Russia and occupied Ukraine and 

raise ongoing religious freedom issues 

through hearings, meetings, letters, congressional delegation trips abroad, and 

other actions for community representatives to inform the U.S. government and/

or public of existing conditions.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Backgrounder: Religious Freedom in Russia and Regions under Russian Occupation

■ Podcast: Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The Religious Regulation Framework

■ Press Statement: USCIRF Welcomes European Court Judgment against Russia on Jehovah’s Witnesses 

■ Podcast: Russia’s Religious Freedom Violations in Ukraine

■ Press Statement: USCIRF Welcomes Release of Religious Prisoner of Conscience Dennis Christensen
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 37

RUSSIA

Background

According to a 2020 poll, 63 percent of Russia’s population identify 

as Orthodox Christian, seven percent as Muslim, and 26 percent 

as having no religious faith. Less than one percent belong to other 

various communities, including Protestants, Catholics, Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, Buddhists, Jews, Hindus, Baha’is, Falun Gong practitioners, 

Scientologists, and followers of indigenous religions. Russian law 

considers Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism as “traditional” 

religions and grants special recognition and privileges to the Russian 

Orthodox Church.

In 2022, Russia enacted legislation that threatened to further 

curtail religious freedom by expanding already broad, vague terms 

such as “extremism,” “propaganda,” and “foreign influence.” In July, 

President Vladimir Putin signed amendments to the country’s extremism law that created a database of “extremist materials” and a unified 

register of individuals involved in “extremist” or “terrorist” activities. 

In December, a new version of the country’s foreign agents law went 

into effect permitting authorities to label individuals considered to 

be under “foreign influence” as agents of another country. That same 

month, Putin signed into law a bill punishing anyone who promotes 

“LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender] propaganda” and another 

bill banning rallies and demonstrations in proximity to certain places, 

including churches and religious sites. Russia’s widening crackdown 

on civil society following its invasion of Ukraine led the United Nations 

Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to adopt a resolution in October 

appointing a special rapporteur to monitor human rights in Russia.

“Extremism” and “Nontraditional” 

Religious Groups

In 2022, Russian authorities sentenced more than 40 Jehovah’s Witnesses to prison time for peaceful religious activities portrayed as 

“extremist.” In September, a court in Gukovo sentenced four Jehovah’s Witnesses to seven years in prison and another two Jehovah’s 

Witnesses to six and a half years for praying and singing hymns. All 

six had been in pretrial detention since August 2020. In November, a 

court fined Jehovah’s Witness Igor Gusev $9,921 (600,000 rubles) for 

discussing the Bible. In October, a court in occupied Crimea sentenced 

three Jehovah’s Witnesses to six years in prison for holding religious 

services. In May, Dennis Christensen was released from prison and 

deported to Denmark after completing his six-year sentence.

In August, six Muslims accused of teaching and discussing the 

works of Said Nursi had their first hearing in Moscow. They were 

initially detained in October 2021 and charged with extremism. 

Authorities opened cases or started trials against several other Muslims in Dagestan and Tatarstan on similar Nursi-related allegations. 

In March, an appeals court in Omsk sentenced one Tablighi Jamaat 

member to two years in prison and another two to suspended sentences for giving sermons and spreading Tablighi Jamaat teachings.

Muslims Accused of Terrorism

Muslims accused of involvement in HT face decades in prison, despite 

no evidence of defendants advocating for or participating in violence. 

In November, a military court sentenced four Muslims from Kazan to 

between 11 and 18 years in prison reportedly related to their talking 

about religion and holding meetings, holidays, and tea parties after 

Friday prayers. In Crimea, Russian authorities often use terrorism 

allegations connected to religious identity to suppress predominantly 

Muslim Crimean Tatar civil activists opposed to their rule. In March, 

a military court in Rostov-on-Don sentenced five Crimean Tatars to 

between 15 and 19 years in prison for alleged HT activities. More than 

a dozen other activists originally arrested alongside the five in March 

2019 were also sentenced in 2022 to prison terms ranging from 12 to 

15 years. In July, three lawyers known for defending Crimean Tatars 

were disbarred in retaliation for their work. Imprisoned Crimean Tatars 

reported medical neglect, being served food violating their religious 

dietary requirements, and inhumane living conditions, including rat-infested cells and a lack of access to beds, clean water, and sanitary 

toilet facilities.

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

In October, a UNHRC commission determined that Russia had committed war crimes in Ukraine, including summary executions, torture, 

and rape. Religious communities in Ukraine experienced these and 

other human rights violations, with Russian forces targeting religious 

leaders, religious buildings, and other sites of religious or spiritual 

importance. In March, Russian soldiers in Kherson reportedly beat, 

strangled, and sexually assaulted an Orthodox Church of Ukraine 

priest until he agreed to cooperate with them. In November, Russian 

forces reportedly abducted, tortured, and killed an Evangelical deacon and his son. In June, Russian artillery struck the Svyatohirsk Lavra 

monastery complex in the region of Donetsk, killing two monks and a 

nun. That same month, Russian forces reportedly destroyed a mosque 

while assaulting Severodonetsk, killing 20 people seeking shelter in it.

Key U.S. Policy

U.S.-Russian relations nosedived as the United States rallied the international community against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. The 

United States imposed several rounds of sanctions targeting Russia’s 

financial, defense, shipping, and technology sectors as well as Russian government and military officials involved in the war and human 

rights violations in Ukraine, including President Putin. In September, 

the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned individuals operating 

as Russia’s occupation authorities in Crimea for specifically targeting 

religious and ethnic minorities. Following U.S. measures, Russia sanctioned and barred entry to several U.S. government officials, including 

USCIRF Commissioners. In April, President Joseph R. Biden signed 

into law legislation suspending trade relations with Russia and banning 

the importation of Russian oil. On November 30, the U.S. Department 

of State redesignated Russia as a CPC under IRFA and reimposed as 

the relevant presidential action existing ongoing sanctions issued 

for individuals identified pursuant to the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act 

of 2012 and the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, 

and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014, as amended.
38 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

SAUDI ARABIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I In 2022, religious freedom conditions in Saudi Arabia remained 

poor despite some nominal improvements. The Saudi government continued to systematically deny non-Muslims the ability 

to build houses of worship or worship in public. According to the 

1992 Saudi Basic Law of Governance, the constitution is the Qur’an 

and the sunna (traditions of the Prophet). The judicial system is 

largely governed by a Saudi interpretation of Shari’a as informed by 

Hanbali jurisprudence. Apostasy (including conversion away from 

Islam) and blasphemy are both crimes carrying the potential for a 

death sentence, though blasphemy is more often punished through 

prison sentences, fines, and lashings, and no executions on either 

charge have taken place in recent years.

Power in Saudi Arabia is highly centralized within the Al Saud 

ruling family. The ruling monarch, King Salman bin Abdel Aziz Al 

Saud, holds the title “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.” In 

September, King Salman bin Abdelaziz appointed his son Crown 

Prince Mohammed bin Salman as prime minister, further centralizing the family’s power. Crown Prince Mohammed has systematically 

cracked down on both religious and political dissent despite 

overseeing economic reforms associated with Saudi Vision 2030. 

Saudi law is largely uncodified, but in 2022 the government made 

progress toward digital procedures for the law of evidence and a 

written penal code, both of which could reduce the risk of arbitrary 

and inconsistent sentencing of religious dissidents and enhance 

accountability within the Saudi judicial system.

Shi’a Muslims also faced ongoing discrimination in housing, 

employment, and the judiciary, and they remained without access 

to senior positions in the government and military. The government 

continued to prosecute, jail, sentence, and execute Shi’a Muslims 

involved in protests in 2011 against discrimination on the basis of 

their religious identity. While some were released in 2022, many of 

those charged and sentenced were minors when they are alleged 

to have committed their crimes. In March, Saudi Arabia carried 

out its largest known mass execution, killing 81 people, including 

41 Shi’a Muslims who participated in the 2011 protests. The head 

of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of 

Vice commented on the executions, saying that “one of the most 

legitimate actions is to preserve religion . . . and one of the ways to 

achieve that is to eliminate violators and eradicate them.” 

The Saudi leadership’s continued centralization of governance 

has sidelined the country’s religious establishment but has not eliminated state-imposed religious interpretations that restrict freedom 

of religion or belief. The government took steps to increase its 

control of the judiciary by arresting sitting judges and appointing 

new ones, potentially impacting ongoing legal cases against religious minorities and dissenters. Beginning in the summer of 2022, 

Saudi courts began issuing egregiously long prison sentences 

against dissidents—including religious dissidents—who peacefully 

expressed their beliefs. Several detained prisoners of conscience 

had their sentences extended arbitrarily and for excessively long 

lengths of time. In April, the Saudi government made preparations 

to deport four Uyghur Muslims to China but delayed the deportation following international pressure.

Saudi women have benefited from recent legal reforms but 

continue to face restrictions on their religious freedom. The March 

2022 Saudi Personal Status Law standardizes in writing laws that were 

previously subject to the discretion of Saudi officials and ensures certain protections for women’s consent to marriage. At the same time, 

it codifies systematic religious freedom restrictions affecting women, 

including the male guardianship system and a legal prohibition on 

Muslim women marrying non-Muslim men. Saudi women who have 

protested the guardianship system began receiving appallingly long 

prison sentences in 2022. In August, the Saudi Specialized Criminal 

Court (SCC) sentenced Salma al-Shehab to 34 years in prison and 

an additional 34-year travel ban over her tweets supporting women 

activists advocating for guardianship system reform. 

The Saudi government also continued to restrict the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) 

community's freedom of religion or belief. Same-sex relations are 

punishable by death based on the government’s interpretation of 

religion, though the government has not executed anyone on these 

grounds in recent years.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Redesignate Saudi Arabia as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing 

the administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result of 

the designation; and

	■ Explore legal options for penalizing 

U.S. companies complicit in the Saudi 

government’s religious freedom violations, including those enabling the 

electronic surveillance of the cellular 

phones, emails, social media accounts, 

and private messages of religious minorities and religious dissidents.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Hold public hearings to amplify congressional concerns over religious freedom 

violations in Saudi Arabia, including the 

prolonged detention of religious prisoners 

of conscience, and work with like-minded 

parliamentarians in other countries to 

advocate for them and other prisoners of 

conscience to be released; and

	■ Convey publicly to the administration 

bipartisan concern over religious freedom 

violations in Saudi Arabia.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Saudi Arabia
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 39

SAUDI ARABIA

Background

Out of 34 million Saudis, 85–90 percent are Sunni Muslim and 10–15 

percent are Shi’a Muslim. The United Nations (UN) estimates that 38 

percent of the population are expatriates, including at least two million 

Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, practitioners of folk religions, and 

the unaffiliated. Non-Muslim citizens gather for religious purposes in 

private and often hide their identity to avoid harsh social and official 

consequences. The government has also been increasingly tolerant 

of practices with non-Muslim religious origins like yoga, Halloween 

costumes, and Christmas decorations.

Muslim Dissidents

In 2022, the Saudi government released two Shi’a Muslims whose death 

sentences were converted to life sentences in 2021. Authorities released 

Dawood al-Marhoon in February and Murtaja Qureiris in June, both of 

whom were minors when they are alleged to have committed crimes. 

However, in July the SCC sentenced Jalal al-Labbad to death for his participation in 2011 protests despite being a minor at the time. In August, 

the court also upheld a death sentence against Abdullah al-Derazi, who 

was a minor when he is alleged to have committed his crimes.

Saudi Arabia also continued to persecute dissident Sunni religious leaders and their families. Malik al-Dowaish, son of imprisoned 

Sunni religious scholar Suleiman al-Dowaish, was arrested in July 

after calling for his father’s release. In February, the Court of Appeal 

upheld a two-year prison sentence against Malik’s brother Abdulrahman. Malik and his other brother Abdulwahhab (arrested in August 

2021) were released in September, but Malik was rearrested later that 

month. Suleiman al-Dowaish was arrested in 2016 following tweets 

about a religious sermon he gave in Mecca. Sheikh Salman al-Ouda, 

arrested in 2017 over his religious beliefs, continues to be detained 

despite reports in 2021 of his deteriorating health. There are similar 

health concerns for Mohammad Hassan al-Habib, arrested in July 2016 

over the content of his sermons. In October, the SCC again postponed 

a court hearing for religious scholar Hassan Farhan al-Maliki, arrested 

in 2017 and charged with calling into question the fundamentals of 

Islam, among other charges.

Non-Muslim Religious Minorities

Saudi textbooks reflect some improvement regarding the portrayal 

of non-Muslims, but they still teach that Jewish and Christian holy 

books were “corrupted” and “distorted” in their interpretation and 

compare Jews to “donkeys carrying books.” During a sermon at the 

Grand Mosque in Mecca in July, Imam Saleh bin al-Humaid called for 

bringing “annihilation upon the plundering and occupying Jews.” 

During the Muslim World League’s Forum on Common Values 

among Religious Followers, held in May, non-Saudi leaders from the 

Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities came to 

Saudi Arabia to discuss religious issues, though not issues related to 

religious freedom in Saudi Arabia itself. 

Women and LGBTQI+ People and 

Religious Freedom

In September, the Public Prosecution and the governor of the Asir 

region opened an investigation into a violent August raid by security 

forces on a “social education house” (Dar al-Reaya) for women and girls 

in Khamis Mushait. Women and girls can be sent to social education 

houses for religiously grounded violations, including disobedience 

(‘uquq) and running away (taghayyub) from a male guardian’s home. 

During the raid, reportedly in response to protests over the mistreatment of residents at the facility, Saudi security officials assaulted women 

and girls living at the facility, whipped them with belts and sticks, and 

dragged them by their hair. During the year, the government continued 

to detain activists who protested the guardianship system and those 

who expressed support for them on social media.

Saudi Arabia has jailed members of the LGBTQI+ community on 

religious grounds and has arrested LGBTQI+ social media influencers on the basis that their content could “negatively impact public 

morality.” Saudi textbooks, while reflecting considerable improvement in other areas, continue to use religion as a basis to claim that 

fluid gender identity is “among the greatest of sins” that “make one 

deserving of a curse” and that dressing in the manner of a different 

gender will be “cursed with expulsion and banishment from the mercy 

of Allah Almighty.”

Key U.S. Policy

The Joseph R. Biden administration has expressed concern over 

religious freedom conditions in Saudi Arabia but has imposed limited 

tangible consequences in light of security and economic interests 

exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In April, President 

Biden nominated Michael Ratney as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 

but Ratney was not confirmed by the end of the reporting period. 

He was renominated in January 2023. In July, President Biden visited 

Saudi Arabia and met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, 

where he “underscored” human rights concerns.

U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism Deborah E. Lipstadt made her first official overseas trip to Saudi Arabia 

in July to discuss antisemitism with Saudi officials. She indicated an 

openness to hosting a discussion on “Judeo-Arabic issues” in Saudi 

Arabia in the future.

On November 30, the U.S. Department of State redesignated Saudi 

Arabia as a CPC under IRFA but reimposed the longstanding waiver on 

taking any presidential action as a consequence of the designation. 
40 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

SYRIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Syria remained poor 

amidst the ongoing civil war and continuing political fragmentation, humanitarian crises, and contested governance. The 

government of President Bashar al-Assad—which controlled 

two-thirds of Syria’s territory— committed egregious human 

rights abuses such as arbitrary detention and torture, enforced 

disappearance and, with its allies, civilian-targeted fatal attacks

in opposition- and rebel-held regions. While President Assad 

appeared in March at a Christian ecclesiastical conference in 

Damascus, the government’s treatment of other groups such as 

Druze challenged its claims of protecting religious minorities. In July 

and December, state security and government-affiliated militias 

responded with lethal force to Druze communities’ anti-regime protests. The government angered its Alawi Muslim base by releasing 

hundreds of detained Sunni Muslims—whom it has long deemed 

militants—during the holy season of Ramadan. Yet, the regime 

kept at least 136,000 people in arbitrary detention and continued 

to capitalize on the conflict-fueled sectarianism it helped establish, 

appropriating Sunni Muslims’ religious authority and stoking Alawis’ 

fear of Sunnis gaining power. 

Nonstate actors, such as Turkish-supported armed opposition 

groups (TSOs) in the north-central region and former al-Qaeda 

affiliate and U.S.-designated terrorist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham

(HTS) in Idlib in the northwest, perpetrated many violations against 

religious minorities. Emboldened by Turkey’s support and intensifying military action in northern Syria, TSOs continued to target 

religious minorities, especially Yazidis, for rape, assassination, 

kidnapping for ransom, confiscation of property, and desecration 

of cemeteries and places of worship. In June, TSOs desecrated

Yazidi graves, and in December, on a Yazidi holy day, the Faylaq 

al-Sham faction vandalized a cemetery near Afrin. Despite HTS’s 

robust campaign to distance itself from its past massacres and 

other crimes against religious minorities, the group’s governance

in the northwest advanced a Salafi-Jihadist ideology disenfranchising Christians and Druze. HTS continued to expropriate property, 

restrict religious rituals, arrest and detain religious minorities and 

nonconforming Sunni Muslims, and impose religiously justified 

dress codes on women. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 

a longstanding perpetrator of mass atrocities against Syria’s religious minorities, did not regain territory. However, it asserted 

its presence via a major prison break in Hasaka in January and 

numerous attacks on civilians and the U.S.-allied Syrian Democratic 

Forces (SDF). Its morality police (Hisba) used religion to justify 

killing people accused of prostitution and witchcraft in Deir al-Zor 

and to extort zakat, or religious alms, from local populations. 

Turkey, Iran, and Russia contributed to the devastation and displacement of endangered religious minority communities in Syria 

via direct military actions such as airstrikes, drones, and bombings. 

In November, Turkey conducted airstrikes in northern Syria and 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdog ̆an amplified longstanding 

threats to escalate land operations there, ostensibly in retaliation 

for a November 13 bombing in Istanbul that Turkey attributed to 

Syrian-based Kurdish terrorists. The U.S. Department of State 

acknowledged Turkey’s concerns about terrorism but stressed the 

need for de-escalation. The Autonomous Administration of North 

and East Syria (AANES) and its SDF militia—which have helped 

stabilize religious freedom conditions in parts of northern Syria—

expressed concern that Turkey’s threatened military encroachment 

would prevent the SDF’s ability to secure the region against the 

threat of ISIS insurgency and the TSOs that have laid waste to religious minority communities. Already displaced within and outside 

Syria, and vulnerable on the basis of their religious identity, minorities in rebel-held areas face precarious conditions subject to ruin 

from any additional crisis, such as the massive 2023 earthquakes.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Designate Syria as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC, for engaging in and tolerating systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom Act 

(IRFA), and redesignate HTS as an “entity 

of particular concern,” or EPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by IRFA; 

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on additional 

Syrian government agencies and officials, 

HTS principals, and the leadership of 

TSOs responsible for severe violations of 

religious freedom by freezing those individuals’ assets and/or barring their entry 

into the United States under human rights 

related financial and visa authorities, citing 

specific religious freedom violations; and

	■ Support religious freedom in north and 

east Syria by: 1) fully implementing General 

License No. 22 in areas the AANES governs; 

2) encouraging inclusion of the AANES in 

any U.S.-backed political solution for Syria, 

pursuant to United Nations (UN) Resolution 2254, including Geneva-based talks to 

resolve the conflict “as the basis for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition;” 

and 3) assisting the efforts of local partners 

to ascertain the whereabouts of kidnapped 

and missing Yazidi women and girls.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Raise the profile of Syria’s vulnerable 

religious minority communities through 

hearings, meetings, letters, congressional 

delegation trips abroad, or other actions.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Hearing: Freedom of Religion or Belief in Syria 

■ Press Statement: USCIRF Welcomes the U.S. Government’s Issuance of a General License Including Northeast Syria

■ Podcast: The Suffocating Hold of HTS on Northwest Syria

■ Factsheet: Religious Freedom in Syria under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 41

SYRIA

Background

Article 3 of Syria’s constitution states that the president must be 

Muslim and that Islamic jurisprudence is a major source of legislation. 

The same article calls for the government to respect all religions, to 

protect the personal status of religious communities, and to ensure 

the freedom to practice religious “rituals that do not prejudice public order.” The government continued to ban Jehovah’s Witnesses, 

restrict proselytization, and prohibit the conversion of Muslims to 

other religions.

The demography of Syria reflects over 11 years of war resulting in 

mass casualties and displacement. Over 87 percent of the almost 21.5 

million-person population is Muslim, with 74 percent Sunni Muslims 

and the remaining 13 percent Shi’a, Alawi, and Ismaili Muslims. Christians—including Syriac-Assyrians, Maronites, Armenians, and other 

groups—constitute between two and 10 percent of the population, 

with some humanitarian organizations reporting that war-related displacement and migration has diminished Christian numbers from 1.5 

million before 2011 to only 300,000 in 2022. Druze comprise approximately three percent, the Jewish community is now essentially gone, 

and estimates for Yazidis are obscured by the Syrian government 

inaccurately classifying them as Muslims.

The war—triggered in 2011 by the government’s repression of 

peaceful protests—has narrowed in territorial scope. Major areas of 

ongoing conflict include the northern swath encompassing the border 

with Turkey, Idlib Governorate in the west, the Jazira region in the east, 

and three Turkish “cantons” including Afrin and those formed by the 

Euphrates Shield and Peace Spring military operations. 

Religious Minorities’ Concerns 

Throughout the war, Druze communities have avoided countering the 

Assad regime’s portrayal of itself as the protector of religious minorities from militant jihadist groups. However, in July and December, 

Druze-majority villages in the southern province of Suweida staged 

large protests expressing long-simmering resentment against the 

Assad regime, resulting in a government crackdown and fatal clashes 

with Syrian security forces and affiliated militias. Non-regime-held 

regions such as Idlib have proven even more inhospitable to Druze. 

At least 53 kidnapping cases in Druze-majority villages of Idlib Governorate took place between January and August 2022: 23 by HTS, 

16 by ISIS, and 14 by other Islamist organizations. Druze in Idlib have 

expressed concern that despite HTS’s public overtures to them, the 

militant group cannot or will not bring to justice foreign-origin Islamist 

fighters who target the Druze for violence, as in the case of the murder 

of an elderly couple in August. 

Christians experienced political disenfranchisement as well 

as violent attacks. In July, an explosion destroyed a Greek Orthodox church during its inauguration in the Hama Governorate, which 

HTS partially controls. Christian communities in some parts of Idlib 

approached extinction due to displacement and flight from TSO and 

HTS harassment and attacks. Those who remain in other villages face 

HTS and other militant groups’ restrictions on their rituals and houses 

of worship, appropriation of land and other property, kidnappings, 

and murder. 

While the international community took steps toward accountability for Syrian ISIS members who participated in the Yazidi genocide 

that began in 2014, Yazidis within Syria remain subject to legal discrimination across multiple regions’ frameworks of governance, and 

militant jihadist groups target them for forced conversion, rape and 

other sexual violence, and murder. The SDF continues to rescue genocide survivors still enslaved within ISIS fighter cells, but in 2022, at least 

2,763 Yazidi women and girls kidnapped from Iraq were still missing, 

many potentially hidden within northeast Syrian camps detaining ISIS 

fighters and their families.

Religious Freedom Conditions in the 

North and East 

Areas governed by the AANES remained more conducive to religious 

freedom than government or rebel-held regions. The Kurdish-initiated, ethnically diverse, and multi-confessional administration 

continued to support pluralistic initiatives. In January, the AANES 

hosted the International Conference on Mesopotamian Religions 

and Beliefs, featuring representatives from a variety of religious and 

political institutions across the Middle East and North Africa and from 

numerous faiths and ethnic backgrounds. Some Sunni Muslim Arab 

and Christian residents objected to the AANES’s educational reforms, 

such as bans in October on niqabs in school settings and on Assyrian 

schools’ use of the Syrian government’s curriculum over that of the 

AANES. Overall, however, the AANES’s stabilization of the region 

for religious minorities contrasted favorably with the violence and 

displacement advanced by TSOs and the Turkish military. 

Key U.S. Policy

U.S.-Syria relations have been strained for several decades, and since 

1979, the United States has named Syria on its list of state sponsors 

of terrorism. Over the course of the present civil war, the United 

States has introduced several sanctions on Syria and related individual 

actors, pursuant to the Caesar Civilian Protection Act of 2019 and 

various executive orders. In May, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 

announced the release of a general license authorizing wider forms 

of private economic activity in certain non-regime-held areas, including—and as recommended by USCIRF since 2021—those within the 

AANES, a region uniquely supportive of religious freedom. 

In May and September, the State Department announced $808 

million and $756 million, respectively, in additional humanitarian 

assistance to Syria, making the United States the largest humanitarian 

donor since the beginning of the conflict.
42 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

TAJIKISTAN

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I In 2022, religious freedom conditions in Tajikistan remained dire. 

The Tajik government continued to severely repress the country’s 

Muslim majority. Children under the age of 18 are barred from 

visiting mosques and all other public religious activities except for 

funerals. Private religious education is banned, and children are 

only allowed to receive religious instruction from their parents 

at home. Since 2014, the government has appointed all imams, 

required them to wear state-issued religious garments, and strictly 

dictated their sermons. People under the age of 35 are not allowed 

to perform the Hajj.

The government enforced restrictions on how Muslims mourn 

the dead, including a ban on wearing black clothes. In June, police 

stopped a woman wearing a black dress to mourn the death of her 

son and detained her for seven hours at a police station, where she 

was beaten to the point of unconsciousness. After her family saw 

her injuries and complained to the police, they were threatened 

with 15 days of jail time. In addition, police sometimes harassed 

individuals wearing hijabs or beards as a symbol of Islamic piety and 

blocked them from entering government buildings.

In 2022, the Tajik government implemented new methods of 

persecution specifically aimed at the country’s minority Ismaili Shi’a 

Muslim population, including the imprisonment of a prominent 

religious leader, closure of a religious school and other community 

activities, and shuttering of religious bookstores that sold Ismaili 

literature and other materials. 

In Tajikistan, the government punished alleged extremism and 

terrorism without requiring acts that involved violence or incitement of imminent violence. Charges are often arbitrarily issued 

against religious individuals and their trials lacked due process 

and procedural safeguards. The Tajik government continued to 

imprison multiple individuals on lengthy prison sentences for peacefully expressing their faith, including those who veered from the 

state-scripted sermons, preached without an official appointment 

by the government, provided religious education, or attempted to 

share their faith publicly. In August, Ismaili Muslim cleric Muzaffar 

Davlatmirov was sentenced to five years in prison on “extremism” 

charges after officiating funeral services for protesters killed by 

the government. The Tajik government continued to target anyone with ties to the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), 

a moderate Islamic political party banned in Tajikistan since 2015, 

including through the use of transnational repression and requests 

for extradition from other countries. One of the founders of the 

IRPT, 80-year-old Zubaydullo Rozik, was placed in special punishment cells twice over the past year for teaching religion to other 

prisoners, which is illegal in Tajik prisons.

The government continued to require the registration of 

all religious communities. Unregistered religious communities 

cannot legally convene religious meetings or assemblies, own 

or use property for religious purposes, produce or import religious literature, receive donations, carry out charitable work, 

or invite foreign persons to participate in religious activities. In 

May, government officials told Protestant Christian leaders that 

the government would not register any new churches. Like the 

restrictions placed on Muslims, children of Christian families 

cannot attend church or other related activities such as religious 

camps. In August, the government demanded that all non-Muslim 

communities fill out questionnaires detailing information about 

the community’s employees and their families and any financial 

contributions the community receives. In September, the United 

Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRCtee) determined that 

Tajikistan’s refusal to register Jehovah’s Witnesses violated Articles 18(1) and 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, which guarantee protections for the right to 

freedom of religion or belief. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Redesignate Tajikistan as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging 

in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing 

the administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result of 

the designation;

	■ Condition U.S. security assistance to the 

Tajik government on 1) reform of the 

2009 religion law and the improvement 

of conditions for freedom of religion or 

belief, and 2) mandated religious freedom training for Tajik officials, including 

education about the benefits of religious 

freedom for countering and preventing 

violent extremism;

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on Tajik 

government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious 

freedom by freezing those individuals’ 

assets and/or barring their entry into the 

United States under human rights related 

financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and

	■ Press the Tajik government at the highest levels to identify and immediately 

release individuals imprisoned in Tajikistan for their peaceful religious activities 

or religious affiliations; account for the 

whereabouts of all prisoners of conscience, including those imprisoned on 

religious grounds; and allow international observers to monitor conditions 

in Tajik prisons.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Country Update: Religious Freedom in Tajikistan

■ Press Statement: USCIRF Vice Chair Nury Turkel Calls on Tajikistan to Release Shamil Khakimov 

■ Podcast: The Persecution of Muslims in Tajikistan
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 43

TAJIKI

Background

STAN

President Emomali Rahmon has ruled Tajikistan since 1992, centering 

power in the hands of his family. Tajikistan faced multiple crises in 

2022, including increased economic hardship due to Russia’s invasion 

of Ukraine, ongoing security challenges from Islamic State-Khorasan 

Province (ISIS-K) in neighboring Afghanistan, increased drug trafficking

along the Tajik-Afghan border, and the continuation of the Tajik-Kyrgyz 

border conflict throughout the year. 

The country’s population is predominantly Muslim, with around 

86 percent adhering to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam and approximately four percent identifying as Ismaili Shi’a, a group that primarily 

resides in the mountainous eastern part of the country known as the 

Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO). The largest Christian 

group is Russian Orthodox, but other Christian communities include 

Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Jews, Baha’is, 

and Zoroastrians also make up small communities.

UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders Mary Lawlor conducted a two-week-long official visit to Tajikistan 

in November and December but was denied access to the GBAO. 

Lawlor concluded that the situation for human rights defenders, 

including those working on behalf of religious freedom, is deteriorating as they face “harassment, threats, criminalization, closed unfair 

trials, and imprisonment.”

Legal Framework for Controlling Religion

Tajikistan’s legal environment for freedom of religion or belief sharply 

declined after the adoption of several highly restrictive laws beginning in 2009. Its Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Unions

requires religious organizations to complete burdensome registration 

applications to operate legally. Applicants must secure an attestation 

from local government officials confirming that at least 10 persons 

over 18 years old in their locality are members. Applicants must 

then submit detailed information to the government’s Committee 

on Religion, Regulation of Traditions, Celebrations, and Ceremonies, including the organization’s planned activities, founders and 

structure, and basic tenets and attitudes toward education, family, 

marriage, and health. The government exercises broad discretion to 

deny applications and strip religious organizations of their registration. 

The administrative and penal codes provide for large fines and prison 

terms for religion-related charges such as organizing or participating 

in “unapproved” religious meetings.

Tajikistan maintains additional legal barriers severely curtailing the right to freedom of religion or belief. The Law on Parental 

Responsibility bans minors from any organized religious activities 

except funerals. The Law on Military Duty and Service provides for 

mandatory military service with no exemption for conscientious 

objectors. Conscripts must either serve two years in the armed 

services or pay a substantial fine and take a month-long course in 

military preparedness.

The GBAO and Repression of Ismaili Shi’as

In 2022, the Tajik government increasingly repressed the country’s 

Ismaili Shi’a population, who are primarily ethnic Pamiris located in 

the GBAO. Authorities cracked down on civil society in the GBAO 

following protests in mid-May over the government’s decision 

not to investigate the death of an activist in police custody. The 

government arrested over 200 people, imprisoned Pamiri journalists and repatriated them from Russia, and began country-wide 

suppression of Pamiris that included repression of their freedom 

of religion or belief. 

In May in the capital Dushanbe, authorities began pressuring 

staff at the Ismaili tariqa (school), officially registered with the government since 2012, to cease all religious and secular educational 

activities. In September, the government forcibly closed the school 

along with all the bookstores in Dushanbe selling religious literature. 

Islamic religious studies are now only taught in one school that remains 

open in the capital. In addition, authorities shut down development 

projects funded and created by the Ismaili religious leader, Europebased Aga Khan, including schools, summer camps for children, 

banks, and telecommunications. 

Religious Prisoners of Conscience

In August, Ismaili Muslim cleric Muzaffar Davlatmirov received a 

five-year prison sentence on “extremism” charges. Following the 

government’s violent crackdown in the GBAO, Davlatmirov gave 

sermons calling on people to remain peaceful but also criticized the 

authorities’ use of force. After authorities killed three local informal 

leaders in the May protests, Davlatmirov led their religious services 

and gave janaza (funeral) prayers. The secret police arrested him on 

July 26 and sentenced him in private court proceedings only eight 

days later.

Since February 2019, Jehovah’s Witness Shamil Khakimov has 

been in prison for “inciting religious hatred.” Tajik authorities targeted 

the nonviolent 71-year-old for sharing his faith in public and have 

denied him access to adequate medical care. In November 2022, 

the Khujand City Court rejected Khakimov’s request for transfer to 

a specialized hospital to treat signs of gangrene in his legs and poor 

eyesight, again disregarding UNHRCtee requests for Khakimov to 

receive proper medical treatment.

Key U.S. Policy

In February, the United States and Tajikistan celebrated 30 years of 

diplomatic relations. Since recognizing Tajikistan’s independence in 

1991, the U.S. government has provided over $1.8 billion in assistance 

to promote economic development, education, and health as well as 

regional security, including joint military exercises and $330 million in 

security assistance to combat terrorism and narco-trafficking. The U.S. 

government has pledged an additional $60 million in security assistance over the next two years. In May, Assistant Secretary of State for 

South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu visited Tajikistan to discuss 

bilateral cooperation on economic and security issues.

On November 30, the U.S. Department of State redesignated 

Tajikistan as a CPC under IRFA, although it also maintained a waiver 

on imposing any related sanctions on the country “as required in the 

important national interest of the United States.” It has designated 

Tajikistan as a CPC each year since 2016.
44 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

TURKMENISTAN

KEY FINDINGS

I

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Turkmenistan remained 

poor. The government controls all aspects of religious life and 

expression, dictating and surveilling religious practice and 

punishing nonconformity through administrative harassment, 

imprisonment, and torture. 

The government of Turkmenistan is an extremely authoritarian 

regime with an abysmal record on human rights and freedom of the 

press. As a result, the country is largely closed off from the rest of 

the world, making it difficult for accurate information to flow into 

or out of its borders. The government’s tight hold on society and 

information also makes it difficult to document the full scope of 

the ongoing religious freedom violations, which are certainly more 

extensive than the limited number of reports indicate. In addition to 

the closed-off nature of the country, those who can get information 

out often do so at great risk to their lives and liberty. Turkmenistan’s 

diaspora community and citizens in exile are often unwilling to share 

information about the government’s religious freedom violations 

for fear of retaliation against them or their families. Nevertheless, 

the available information continues to present a bleak picture. 

During the year, the government continued to treat all independent religious activity with suspicion, maintaining a large 

surveillance apparatus that monitors believers at home and abroad. 

Turkmen law requires religious groups to register under intrusive 

criteria, strictly controls registered groups’ activities, and punishes 

religious activities by unregistered groups, which are banned. 

Persons accused of criminal religious offenses are often tried 

in closed-regime courts where sentences remain secret. Prisoners 

of conscience are often disappeared in the state’s prison system 

and presumed to be held without contact with the outside world. 

The authorities hold many religious prisoners at the notorious 

Ovadan-Depe Prison, located in the remote desert 50 miles north 

of the capital city of Ashgabat. Ovadan-Depe was built to house 

high-level political dissidents and enemies of the state, and its 

prisoners routinely die from harsh conditions that include torture 

and starvation. In October, five Muslims who are serving 12-year 

prison sentences for meeting to study the writings of Turkish 

Muslim theologian Said Nursi were transferred to a strict-regime 

labor camp.

Turkmenistan maintains its compulsory two-year military service requirement, described as a “sacred duty” in Turkmenistan’s 

constitution, and does not offer alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors. As USCIRF’s past reporting shows, Jehovah’s 

Witnesses have been imprisoned under Turkmenistan’s criminal 

code for conscientious objection. Although all those imprisoned 

were granted amnesty in 2021, the government conscription office 

continued to summon Jehovah’s Witnesses for compulsory military service in 2022. In March, the United Nations Human Rights 

Committee found that Turkmenistan violated Articles 9(1) and 

18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by 

imprisoning a Jehovah’s Witness for his conscientious objection to 

compulsory military service.

Online activity remained limited by blocked internet access 

and extremely slow network speeds. In January, then President 

Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow instructed the head of the Ministry 

for State Security to further increase state control of the internet and 

restrict public access to internet sources that “threaten the constitutional order.” In March, then President Berdimuhamedow ostensibly 

handed government leadership over to his son Serdar in managed 

“elections” while giving himself the position of speaker of the Senate. This transition did not bring any improvements in conditions for 

human rights and individual freedoms; if anything, they worsened. 

Throughout the year, Gurbanguly remained active in government 

leadership, and in January 2023 he was appointed “national leader,” 

making clear he still controlled the Turkmen government.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Redesignate Turkmenistan as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious 

violations of religious freedom, as defined 

by the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA), and lift the waiver releasing 

the administration from taking otherwise 

legislatively mandated action as a result of 

the designation;

	■ Take presidential action to limit security 

assistance to Turkmenistan under IRFA 

Section 405(a)(22) to hold the government of Turkmenistan accountable for its 

particularly severe violations of religious 

freedom;

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on Turkmenistan government agencies and 

officials responsible for severe violations 

of religious freedom by freezing those 

individuals’ assets and/or barring their 

entry into the United States under human 

rights related financial and visa authorities, citing specific religious freedom 

violations; and

	■ Urge the government of Turkmenistan to 

provide an acceptable civilian alternative 

to military service. 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Podcast: Turkmenistan’s Tight Grip on Religious Freedom
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 45

TURKMENISTAN

Background

Turkmenistan is a highly repressive country ruled since 2007 by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, who enforces a cult of personality that 

proliferates his image in golden monuments and fawning official 

coverage. During 2022, the year his son Serdar nominally took over 

as the country’s president, space for civil society continued to shrink, 

most directly affecting women and internet users. Women were 

banned from sitting in the front seat of cars and were required to 

adhere to strict dress codes, though enforcement did weaken during 

the year. Internet access and government censorship of information 

continued to worsen with the government’s increased curtailing of 

VPNs and incredibly slow broadband, earning Turkmenistan’s mobile 

and fixed broadband speeds a ranking of 177th out of 179 countries 

as of January 2023. 

Turkmenistan holds the fourth-largest natural gas reserves in the 

world, which is vital to its geopolitical relations with Russia, China, Iran, 

and potentially Europe. Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, 

European Union countries have sought new sources of natural gas to 

decrease their dependence on Russia, including from Turkmenistan.

The majority of the population is Sunni Muslim, at 89 percent, 

while approximately nine percent of the population is Eastern Orthodox, typically Russian Orthodox or Armenian Apostolic. There are 

small communities of Shi’a Muslims, Roman Catholics, Protestant 

Christians, and Baha’is. 

Legal Framework for Controlling Religious Activity

Although Turkmenistan’s 2016 religion law asserts that the country is a 

secular state with religious freedom, it requires all religious activity to 

be registered with the state under intrusive criteria, mandates that the 

government be informed of all foreign financial support, bans private 

religious education and worship, and prohibits the public wearing 

of religious garb except by clerics. The State Commission on Religious Organizations and Expert Evaluation of Religious Information 

Resources (SCROEERIR) oversees all religious activity, including registrations, the appointment of religious leaders, the building of houses 

of worship, and the import and publication of religious literature. 

Registration of Religious Organizations 

Turkmen law requires all religious organizations to register with the 

Ministry of Justice (MOJ) by sending applications to SCROEERIR to 

operate legally. The process is burdensome and designed to allow 

for significant government interference in the functioning of religious organizations. The MOJ will register an organization only if 

SCROEERIR has endorsed the application and the organization’s goals 

or activities do not “contradict Turkmenistan’s constitution,” giving 

the government latitude to arbitrarily deny registration applications. 

SCROEERIR must approve all individuals appointed as leaders of religious organizations, each of whom under law must have “appropriate 

religious education.” In addition, the process requires religious organizations to provide detailed information about founding members, 

including names, addresses, and birth dates. Recognized communities 

must reregister every three years.

Even if successfully registered, religious organizations enjoy little 

legal protection. If a court finds that a religious organization is violating Turkmenistan’s constitution, it may suspend the group’s activities. 

The law further provides that MOJ officials may attend any religious 

event held by a registered organization and question its leaders about 

the organization’s activities. Registered organizations may import 

religious literature only with SCROEERIR approval. 

Unregistered religious organizations are forbidden from conducting religious activities, producing or disseminating religious 

materials, proselytizing, and gathering for religious services, even in 

private residences. Reports indicate that registering churches is very 

difficult and that Turkmenistan’s Christian minority has been largely 

driven underground. Although not technically banned, Jehovah’s 

Witnesses have not been granted registration and are therefore 

unable to operate legally. Religious activity is forbidden in prisons 

and in the military.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States engaged with the government of Turkmenistan 

on a variety of issues such as border and regional security programs, 

efforts to mitigate climate change, trade, and educational and cultural 

exchanges; U.S. foreign assistance served to reinforce these objectives. Turkmenistan also enjoys most-favored-nation trading status. 

In September, the commander of the Montana National Guard 

traveled to Turkmenistan for talks on reviving the state partnership 

program facilitating collaborative military trainings between the 

United States and Turkmenistan. In November, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu traveled

to Turkmenistan to discuss cooperation on a wide range of bilateral 

and regional issues.

On November 30, the U.S. Department of State redesignated 

Turkmenistan as a CPC under IRFA but kept in place a waiver of 

the sanctions that should accompany the designation based on the 

“important national interest of the United States,” as it has done since 

2014. The waiver effectively neutralizes the consequences of Turkmenistan’s CPC designation, removes any incentive for the government to 

reform its brutal policies, and lends credence to the regime’s claims 

that security concerns warrant its harsh repression of religious freedom.
46 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

VIETNAM

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Vietnam worsened. 

Authorities intensified their control and persecution of religious 

groups—especially unregistered, independent communities, 

including Montagnard and Hmong Protestants, Cao Dai followers, 

Hoa Hao Buddhists, and Unified Buddhists, as well as other unrecognized movements such as Duong Van Minh and Falun Gong. 

Even members of state-controlled religious groups experienced 

persecution. During the year, authorities harassed and persecuted 

some independent groups, particularly Montagnard Protestants 

and Cao Dai, for observing International Human Rights Day and 

International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence 

Based on Religion or Belief. The 2018 Law on Belief and Religion 

(LBR) remained restrictive, and groups encountered challenges with 

registration due to the law’s uneven and inconsistent application 

throughout the country, contravening international standards. In 

June, the government introduced two repressive draft decrees to 

implement the LBR, which, if passed, could further restrict religious 

freedom in Vietnam. 

USCIRF received many reports of local authorities harassing 

members of unregistered Montagnard Protestant groups, disrupting and banning their peaceful religious activities, interrogating 

and threatening them with imprisonment, imposing heavy fines, 

and coercing them to denounce and leave their denominations and 

instead join state-controlled Protestant organizations. During the 

year, some unregistered Montagnard Protestant churches in Cu 

Mgar district of Dak Lak Province requested guidance from their 

commune governments on lawfully conducting religious activities; 

they also requested the implementation of Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which 

Vietnam is a party. In response, authorities detained, interrogated, 

fined, and threatened the Montagnards with imprisonment. 

There was a significant increase in the number of reported 

incidents of local authorities coercing Hmong Christian converts 

to publicly renounce their faith, including some who attended 

state-controlled Protestant churches. Those who refused to 

comply faced threats and physical assaults, hefty fines, dispossession of properties that threaten their livelihood, denial of 

important identification documents and birth certificates that 

render them effectively stateless, and banishment from families 

and local Hmong communities. 

Meanwhile, harassment of Catholic communities also 

increased. In February, officials from Vu Ban, Hoa Binh Province, 

disrupted a Mass celebrated by Archbishop Joseph Vu Van Thien of 

Hanoi and other priests. The Hanoi Archdiocese delivered a formal 

letter of complaint to the provincial government, protesting the 

local authorities’ frequent harassment and urging them to respect 

the religious freedom of Catholics in that province. Additionally, 

land disputes between Catholics and local governments persisted. 

Working with state-controlled Cao Dai groups, local authorities disrupted and banned home-based independent Cao Dai 

religious activities and observance of important rituals, demanding that adherents obtain approval for such activities and join the 

state-controlled organization. Authorities in An Giang and Dong 

Thap provinces similarly prevented or disrupted home-based religious activities of independent Hoa Hao Buddhists. 

Authorities harassed members of the independent Unified 

Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV). In December, local authorities in Ngoc Hoi district, Kon Tum Province, destroyed a UBCV 

pagoda, reportedly in retaliation against its abbot’s refusal to join 

the state-controlled Buddhist church. Moreover, local authorities 

threatened to demolish a religious hall built by Khmer-Krom Theravada Buddhists in Loan My Village, Vinh Long Province. 

Authorities also continued persecution of other religious 

movements—including Doung Van Minh, Falun Gong, Ha Mon, 

the Jesus Church, Peng Lei Buddhists, the World Mission Society 

Church of God, and Yiguandao—characterizing many of them as 

“false” or “evil” religions and vowing to eradicate them. In May, 

the Hanoi Government Committee for Religious Affairs stated that 

such groups are ineligible for registering religious activities with 

the government. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Designate Vietnam as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for engaging in 

systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by 

the International Religious Freedom Act 

(IRFA), and enter into a new binding agreement with the government to address 

worsening religious freedom conditions; 

	■ Engage with the Vietnamese government 

and relevant academic and civil society 

stakeholders to encourage amendments 

to the 2018 LBR and the two 2022 draft 

implementing decrees to conform to international standards, including by making 

registration simpler and optional; 

	■ Hold Vietnam accountable for religious 

freedom violations as a member of the 

United Nations Human Rights Council 

(UNHRC) and press Vietnam to allow 

relevant United Nations (UN) Special 

Procedures unfettered access to the country to monitor and investigate religious 

freedom and other human rights violations; and

	■ Direct the U.S. Mission in Vietnam to highlight and monitor the conditions of religious 

prisoners of conscience and to advocate for 

their wellbeing in prison and release. 

The U.S. Congress should: 

	■ Support legislative efforts to improve religious freedom in Vietnam, including by 

reintroducing the Vietnam Human Rights 

Act (H.R.3001). 

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Country Update: Religious Freedom in Vietnam in 2021

■ Factsheet: Overview of Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution Globally
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) 47

VIETNA

M

Background

Vietnam is a religiously diverse country with related demographics 

varying greatly across research studies and reports. Religious traditions with a significant presence in the country include Buddhism, 

Hoa Hao Buddhism, Cao Dai, Catholicism, and Protestantism. As of 

December, the government had officially recognized a total of 16 religions and 43 religious organizations. Many groups, however, refused 

to register for fear of persecution or concern over their independence, 

which has led state-controlled and independent religious groups to 

compete for representation.

Vietnam’s constitution states that citizens “can follow any religion 

or follow none” and that “all religions are equal before the law.” The 

constitution also mandates respect and protection for freedom of 

belief and religion. However, it allows authorities to restrict human 

rights, including religious freedom, for reasons of “national defense, 

national security, social order and security, social morality, and community well-being.” Vietnam’s 2018 LBR contains similar provisions 

permitting restrictions on the right to religious freedom. 

Legal and Policy Developments

In June, the government introduced two draft decrees to implement the LBR, one of which would replace the current implementing 

Decree 162/2017/ND-CP and increase control and suppression of 

registered religious activities. In addition, the punishment decree 

would impose harsh administrative punishments—including heavy 

fines, suspension of religious activities, and forced dissolution of 

religious organizations—on groups for vaguely and broadly defined 

“violations.” The Vietnamese Communist Party’s Vietnam Fatherland 

Front and the Government Committee for Religious Affairs (GCRA) 

organized consultation sessions and conferences on the draft decrees. 

Experts warned that if passed in their current form, the two decrees 

could further restrict religious freedom in Vietnam. 

Religious Prisoners of Conscience and 

Prison Conditions

Conditions for religious prisoners of conscience remained dire in 2022. 

For example, renowned religious freedom advocate and Hoa Hao 

Buddhist Nguyen Bac Truyen remained in prison, serving an 11-year 

sentence while suffering from heart, liver, and other health conditions. 

Authorities transferred him to Gia Trung prison in Gia Lai Province, 

where he was reportedly subjected to forced labor. Phan Van Thu, 

founder of the An Dan Dai Dao Buddhist group, died while serving 

a life sentence in prison after reportedly succumbing to an unspecified medical issue in November. In May, court authorities in Dak Lak 

Province sentenced Montagnard Protestant Y Wo Nie to four years’ 

imprisonment for reporting religious persecution to international 

organizations. Furthermore, despite the government’s announcement 

in April that it would deliver religious books to 54 prisons, former 

prisoners reported that access to religious scriptures—especially 

those in ethnic minority languages—remained severely lacking. They 

also reported poor prison conditions and that prison authorities often 

banned religious practices such as public or group prayers.

International Accountability

In October, Vietnam was elected to a three-year term (2023–2025) as 

a member on the UNHRC, despite widespread and deep concerns 

over the country’s human rights record. The Unrepresented Nations 

and Peoples Organization expressed concern over Vietnam’s UNHRC 

candidacy due to the country’s systematic violation of the rights of 

its citizens—particularly indigenous peoples—including its religious 

freedom violations through enforcement of the LBR. Four prominent 

international human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch and 

Amnesty International, voiced concerns about the country’s human 

rights situation and called on the government to “ensure compliance 

with obligations under the ICCPR and other international human rights 

law” in accordance with its pledges. They also called on Vietnam to 

invite all UN special procedures and allow them “full and unfettered 

access to the country” to monitor human rights situations. Also in 

October, following that UNHRC election, six UNHRC special rapporteurs, including the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or 

belief and the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, 

sent a Joint Allegation Letter (JAL) to the Vietnamese government 

concerning its human rights violations. The JAL raised specific concerns over the LBR’s restrictions on religious freedom that affected 

independent, unregistered religious groups, including Khmer-Krom 

Theravada Buddhists. 

Key U.S. Policy

In 2022, officials with the administration of President Joseph R. 

Biden, including Secretary of the State Antony J. Blinken and Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman, raised Vietnam’s human 

rights issues and its international human rights obligations with their 

Vietnamese counterparts. Marking the International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion or Belief 

on August 22, the U.S. Embassy and six other Western embassies in 

Vietnam issued a joint statement condemning “continuing acts of 

violence targeting individuals, including those belonging to religious 

minorities, on the basis of religion or belief.” The 26th U.S.-Vietnam 

Human Rights Dialogue convened in Hanoi in November, during 

which U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Rashad Hussain raised religious freedom concerns. In May, 

Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), Representative Chris Smith 

(R-NJ), and other members of the House of Representatives sent a 

letter to President Biden, urging him to raise religious freedom and 

other human rights concerns with Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham 

Minh Chinh during the U.S.-Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) Summit. 

On November 30, the U.S. Department of State placed Vietnam 

on its Special Watch List for severe violations of religious freedom. 

While USCIRF has recommended Vietnam’s designation as a CPC 

every year since 2002—finding that despite some notable areas of 

improvement, “systematic, ongoing, and egregious” violations of 

religious freedom within the meaning of IRFA persist—the State 

Department had previously designated it as a CPC only in 2004 

and 2005.
48 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

ALGERIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Algeria remained poor. 

Since beginning its campaign to forcibly close Evangelical 

churches in 2017, the Algerian government has failed to show 

meaningful commitment to improving religious freedom conditions over the last five years. Government authorities continued 

to forcibly close churches and prosecute members of Muslim and 

non-Muslim minority communities on charges of blasphemy, proselytization, and unauthorized worship. The Algerian government also 

continued to deny several religious minority groups the registration 

required to worship collectively, including the Evangelical Protestant Association (EPA) and the Ahmadiyya Muslim community. 

Algerian law regulates the manifestation of religion or belief 

through several legal mechanisms, including the Algerian Penal 

Code and Ordinance 06-03 on the regulation of non-Muslim organizations. Some of these provisions, including laws penalizing 

blasphemy, proselytization, and unregistered religious activity—all 

subject to imprisonment and fines—are inconsistent with international legal protections for religious freedom. 

In 2022, the wali (governor) of Tizi Ouzou commenced proceedings to close at least four churches in that province, bringing 

the total number of EPA churches closed by the government to 21. 

Civil society members report that the government has encouraged 

individual churches to register outside of the EPA umbrella in an 

attempt to fracture the growing community. 

Authorities arrested the EPA’s top leader, Pastor Salaheddine 

Chalah, in November 2021 following the U.S. government’s decision 

to add Algeria to its Special Watch List for engaging in severe religious freedom violations. Other EPA leaders reportedly experienced 

harassment at the same time, including surveillance and property 

searches by government officials. In March, a court in Tizi Ouzou 

convicted Chalah of “practicing worship without the prior (approval) 

of the National Commission for non-Muslim worship” and “calling 

through social media for the disobedience of laws by a clergyman,” 

sentencing him to 18 months in prison and a fine of $1,400 (200,00 

dinars). The government charged Chalah as a “clergyman” while at 

the same time refusing to register the EPA as a religious organization, reflecting a biased government double standard specifically 

against the EPA.

Authorities sentenced Mohamed Derrab, a Christian convert, to 

18 months in prison for proselytization while continuing to prosecute 

Pastor Hamid Boussadi on charges of proselytization and holding 

worship without permission. In September, the Algerian government requested that Caritas, a nongovernmental development 

organization affiliated with the Catholic Church, cease operating in 

the country, reportedly due to its purported foreign influences. In a 

context where the government has a history of undermining religious 

freedom and then justifying it as protecting against foreign influence, 

this development raises red flags for the future.

Several Muslims remain detained on charges of blasphemy, 

including political opposition members Yacine Mebarki and Walid 

Kechida and scholar Dr. Said Djabelkhir. According to local media 

reports, at least one additional unnamed Muslim individual faced 

blasphemy charges in 2022. In June, a tribunal in Bejaia charged 

18 Ahmadiyya Muslims with blasphemy and unauthorized group 

participation, detaining three members of the group. The judge 

ordered the immediate detention of three members and released 

the others pending further investigation. In December, Abdul Ghani 

became the sixth Ahmadiyya Muslim to be sentenced to a multiyear 

prison sentence, with the judge accusing the Ahmadiyya Muslim 

community of being a “threat to national security” and a threat to 

Algeria’s traditional Maliki school of thought. Advocates estimate 

that over 100 Ahmadis are facing prosecution, most of them for 

“unauthorized worship” in the context of the religious group’s 

unregistered status.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Maintain Algeria on the Special Watch List 

for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

	■ Enter into an agreement with the Algerian 

government and provide associated financial and technical support to obligate the 

Algerian government to take substantial 

steps to address violations of religious 

freedom, including but not limited to:

	■ Decriminalizing blasphemy and 

proselytization and releasing those 

detained on charges of blasphemy and 

proselytization;

	■ Registering the EPA and the Ahmadiyya 

community as non-Muslim and Muslim 

religious organizations, respectively;

	■ Reopening closed and sealed churches 

and working in good faith with EPA 

members to address remaining health 

and safety code violations; and

	■ Direct U.S. Embassy officials to attend and 

observe court proceedings on blasphemy 

charges or cases related to houses of worship to emphasize the U.S. government’s 

concerns about such cases.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Continue to raise the implementation of 

blasphemy laws and closure of houses 

of worship with the U.S. Department of 

State and relevant Algerian counterparts 

to ensure religious freedom concerns are 

incorporated into the U.S.-Algeria bilateral 

relationship.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Factsheet: Law and Religion in Algeria

■ Podcast: The State of Religious Freedom in Algeria
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 49

ALGERI

Background

A

Algeria is home to nearly 43 million people, 99 percent of whom 

are estimated to be Sunni Muslim. The remaining one percent of 

the population comprises Jews, nonbelievers, Muslim minorities 

(including Ahmadiyya and Shi’a Muslims), and Christians (including 

Roman Catholics, Seventh-day Adventists, Methodists, Evangelicals, 

Lutherans, the Reformed Church, and Egyptian Coptic Christians). 

Algeria’s constitution establishes Islam as the official state religion.

Algeria has a long history of repression and persecution of religious minorities, including against Jews, people who practice the 

Baha’i faith, Protestant Christians, and Ahmadiyya Muslims. Despite 

Algeria’s constitution affording all Algerians the right to freedom of 

opinion and worship, the Algerian government limits the free expression and practice of belief through the enforcement of laws that favor 

a particular interpretation of Islam and restrict religious activities. 

Algeria’s penal and information codes criminalize blasphemy, with 

punishments including imprisonment for up to five years and fines. 

Algeria’s Criminal Code also censors publications by prohibiting content that is “contrary to Islamic morals.” 

Through Ordinance 06-03, passed in 2006, the Algerian government requires all non-Muslim organizations to register with the 

Minister for Non-Muslim Affairs in order to conduct activities and 

establish places of worship. The process for registration has been 

opaque and poorly implemented, creating legal uncertainty for some 

non-Muslim religious communities, which the government exploits 

to repress and prosecute religious minorities. Ordinance 06-03 also 

criminalizes proselytization by non-Muslims, with punishments of up to 

five years in prison and a maximum fine of $8,347 (one million dinars).

Restrictions on Christians

Authorities convicted the EPA’s top leader, Pastor Salaheddine Chalah, 

and three other parishioners of “practicing worship without the prior 

opinion (or approval) of the National Commission for non-Muslim Worship.” The three parishioners were sentenced to six months in prison, 

while Pastor Chalah, who was also convicted of “calling through social 

media for the disobedience of laws by a clergyman,” was sentenced 

to 18 months in prison. Other EPA leaders reported increased harassment in late 2021 and early 2022.

A court in Tizi Ouzou sentenced Christian convert Mohamed 

Derrab to 18 months in prison for “shaking the faith of a Muslim.” 

Derrab was preaching and distributing Bibles outside of his church in 

Tizi Ouzou following its closure by authorities. The government also 

continued to prosecute Pastor Hamid Boussadi for holding unauthorized worship services and proselytizing.

Restrictions on Muslims 

Several Muslims remain detained on charges of blasphemy, including 

political opposition members Yacine Mebarki and Walid Kechida

and scholar Dr. Said Djabelkhir. Authorities arrested Mebarki in 2020 

for “inciting atheism” and “offending Islam” after finding a ripped 

Qur’an in his home. In 2021, authorities sentenced opposition activist 

Kechida to three years in prison with charges including “offending the 

precepts” of Islam in internet memes. In 2021, authorities arrested 

scholar and Sufism expert Djabelkhir and charged him with blasphemy 

after a fellow academic filed a complaint about his writings on various 

Islamic rituals. Local media reports indicate that at least one unnamed 

Muslim individual has been arrested on charges of blasphemy in 2022.|

On June 6, 2022, the First Instance Tribunal in Bejaia charged 18 

Ahmadiyya Muslims with “participation in an unauthorized group” 

and “denigrating Islam” under Article 46 of the Law on Associations 

and Article 144 of the Algerian Penal Code, respectively. The judge 

ordered the immediate detention of three members and released 

the others pending further investigation. Advocates estimate that 

over 100 Ahmadis are facing prosecution, mostly for “unauthorized 

worship” in the context of their unregistered status.

Targeting Religious Actors Perceived as Foreign

The Algerian government has historically targeted religious leaders 

and communities it views as foreign, sometimes threatening religious 

freedom rights in the process. Officials prosecute individuals associated with “foreign movements” with blasphemy charges to override 

a lack of evidence or extend prison sentences. 

On December 26, an Algerian court sentenced Ahmadiyya Muslim Abdul Ghani to three years in prison and a fine of $1,500 (200,000 

dinars). In his verdict, the judge accused the Ahmadiyya Muslim community of being a “threat to national security,” an entity “working for 

foreign interests,” and a threat to Algeria’s traditional Maliki school 

of thought.

In 2022, the Algerian government requested that Caritas, a nongovernmental development organization affiliated with the Catholic 

Church, cease operating in the country. Analysts posit that Caritas’ 

supposed foreign ties influenced the government’s decision. While 

members of the Catholic community still worship and practice their 

religion in Algeria, some religious minorities expressed concern that 

the government’s targeting of Caritas may precede further restrictions 

against religious minorities viewed as outsiders.

Key U.S. Policy

On November 30, the State Department maintained Algeria on its 

Special Watch List for severe violations of religious freedom. Several 

high-profile U.S. officials visited Algeria in 2022, including Secretary of 

State Antony J. Blinken, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman, 

and an interagency delegation that included officials from the State 

Department, Department of Defense, and National Security Council. 

Topics for discussion included human rights and religious freedom 

concerns as well as stabilization and development assistance.

The United States is one of Algeria’s top trading partners, and 

professional exchanges play a valuable role in strengthening the 

U.S.-Algeria law enforcement and security partnership at both the 

senior and working levels. The Middle East Partnership Initiative has 

supported the work of Algeria’s civil society through programming 

that provides training to journalists, businesspeople, female entrepreneurs and parliamentarians, legal professionals, and the heads of 

leading nongovernmental organizations.
50 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

AZERBAIJAN

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Azerbaijan trended negatively. The government continued to exert significant control over all religious practice, primarily through enforcement of the 

country’s law On Freedom of Religious Beliefs (religion law). The 

religion law requires religious communities to register to legally 

engage in religious activity, requires state review and approval 

of religious literature and related materials, and places numerous 

other limitations on freedom of religion or belief. In March, President Ilham Aliyev signed into law amendments to the religion law 

that reassigned the power to appoint imams from the nominally 

independent Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) to the official State 

Committee for Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA), further 

entrenching state control over the practice of Islam. In May, the 

SCWRA fired Shi’a imam Mirseymur Aliyev after he reportedly held 

Ramadan prayers on a different day than mandated by the state. 

That same month, the CMB announced the imposition of an age 

restriction that barred citizens over the age of 65 from performing 

the Hajj. Authorities also raided, seized religious literature from, and 

fined about 20 Muslims across the country who met for worship in 

private homes or held religious events with children. 

While religious minorities have generally noted positive 

strides for religious freedom in Baku, others have shared that 

local authorities outside of the capital have surveilled Christians. 

During the year, the government failed yet again to register any 

non-Muslim religious communities, leaving some communities 

of Protestant Christians and Jehovah’s Witnesses without registration and therefore unable to operate legally. Meanwhile, the 

SCWRA disclosed registering approximately 22 Muslim communities. Officials continued to reject requests for a civilian alternative 

to mandatory military service despite the allowance of such an 

option in the constitution. In a reversal of recent practice, Azerbaijan resumed detaining Jehovah’s Witnesses who sought to 

conscientiously object. In July, conscription authorities detained 

Royal Karimov and held him for more than three months. In September, a local court sentenced Seymur Mammadov to nine 

months in prison for his refusal to serve in the military before 

converting that punishment in December to a one-year suspended sentence. 

Azerbaijani nongovernmental organizations tracking political 

prisoners in the country documented as many as 19 individuals 

imprisoned at the end of the year for their religious activism, the 

majority of whom are members of the Muslim Unity Movement 

(MUM). Throughout the year, law enforcement regularly detained 

additional members of the MUM, which the group characterized 

as a “provocation and pressure against the movement.” In June, 

MUM member Elgiz Mammadov alleged that he was raped while 

in police custody. In a positive development, a court granted early 

release to Muslim theologian Elshan Mustafaoglu, who had served 

seven and a half years of his 10-year prison sentence.

International bodies and other organizations continued to 

question the Azerbaijani government’s willingness to protect and 

preserve religious and cultural heritage sites in Nagorno-Karabakh 

and neighboring territories under Azerbaijani control. In February, 

then Minister of Culture Anar Karimov announced the creation of 

a working group to remove Armenian Apostolic inscriptions from 

churches that he characterized as “fictitious.” The government 

seemingly backpedaled on the plan following international outcry, 

and in March the European Parliament condemned “Azerbaijan’s 

continued policy of erasing and denying the Armenian cultural 

heritage in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.” During the reporting 

period, Caucasus Heritage Watch, a research initiative supported 

by Cornell University, documented through satellite imagery the 

destruction of St. Sargis Church. In past years, Azerbaijan has 

claimed that Armenian forces also damaged religious sites. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Include Azerbaijan on the Special Watch 

List for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

	■ Work with the government of Azerbaijan 

to revise the 2009 religion law, as most 

recently amended in 2022, to comply with 

international human rights standards and 

to bring it into conformity with recommendations made in 2012 by the Council 

of Europe’s Venice Commission and the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe;

	■ Assist the Azerbaijani government, in collaboration with international partners, to 

develop an alternative civilian service and 

permit conscientious objection in line with 

its constitution and pursuant to its commitment made to the Council of Europe 

and obligations under international human 

rights law; and

	■ Allocate funding to the U.S. Agency 

for International Development and 

U.S. Embassy in Baku to restore, preserve, and protect places of worship 

and other religious or cultural sites in 

Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding 

territories.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Raise concerns, through public hearings 

and other actions, about Azerbaijan’s 

religious freedom and broader human 

rights abuses, including treatment of 

the MUM, directly with the Azerbaijani 

Embassy and other government officials 

and advocate for the release of all prisoners of conscience.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Special Report: Tolerance, Religious Freedom, and Authoritarianism

■ Podcast: Differences between Religious Tolerance and Religious Freedom
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 51

AZERBAIJAN

Background

The U.S. government estimates the population of Azerbaijan at more 

than 10.3 million people, of whom approximately 96 percent identify 

as Muslim. According to Azerbaijani government statistics, as many 

as 65 percent of Muslims identify as Shi’a, while the remaining 35 

percent identify as Sunni. The remaining four percent of the population comprises atheists, Armenian Apostolics, Baha’is, Catholics, 

Georgian Orthodox, members of the International Society for Krishna 

Consciousness, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Molokans, Protestants, 

and Russian Orthodox. The constitution defines the state as secular 

and mandates the separation of religion and state. Despite these provisions, however, the government is actively involved in the regulation 

and management of virtually all religious activities. In general, the 

government remained concerned about the potential for “religious 

strife” in the country and undertook efforts to continue to limit independent religious activism and activities in 2022. 

Legislating Increased Control of Muslims

At the beginning of the year, Azerbaijan’s parliament introduced a 

proposal to amend the country’s religion law and reduce the role of 

the CMB, an entity that has historically overseen the practice of Islam 

in the country. The government formally adopted the amendments 

in March, which removed the ability of the CMB to appoint imams to 

mosques and shrines and assigned that authority instead to an official state body, the SCWRA. A member of parliament explained the 

change as a measure to ensure that imams have a “pro-state position,” 

although other politicians objected to the move on the grounds that 

it violated the constitution. Similarly, the government eliminated the 

right of the CMB to register mosques and permitted state oversight 

of donations to religious associations.

Retaliation for Conscientious Objection

Although the constitution provides for an alternative to mandatory 

military service, the government did not offer one in practice and 

retaliated against conscientious objectors who requested an alternative civilian service due to their religious beliefs. In July, authorities 

detained Jehovah’s Witness Royal Karimov after he disclosed his 

conscientious objection; they held him against his will at a local military 

unit for more than three months before releasing him in November. 

In September, the Goranboy District Court sentenced Jehovah’s 

Witness Seymur Mammadov to nine months in prison for his conscientious objection. Following Mammadov’s appeal of the verdict, the 

court ruled to suspend his sentence and subsequently released him 

in mid-December. According to Mammadov, he was not permitted 

to have a Bible while in prison. Other Jehovah’s Witnesses remained 

subject to travel restrictions due to their conscientious objection.

Detention of MUM Members

The government increasingly cracked down on the MUM, a Shi’a 

Muslim group that has criticized the state’s control of religion. In May, 

a court sentenced MUM member Razi Humbatov to six years in prison 

on drug trafficking charges that the group asserted were fabricated 

to punish him for his public criticism of authorities. During the course 

of Humbatov’s trial, police detained five additional MUM members 

who came to the courthouse to protest, some of whom received 30 

days of administrative detention and claimed that the police beat and 

tortured them. In June, police detained MUM member Fariz Aliyev 

after he protested in support of MUM leader Taleh Bagirzade and 

other religious prisoners. Throughout the year, police also detained 

MUM members Elshan Abbasov, Shahin Gadirov, Nejat Aliyev, Samir 

Babayev, and Mirtofiq Huseynov on alleged drug-related charges. In 

two separate instances in June and November, Bagirzade and other 

imprisoned MUM members participated in a hunger strike to protest 

ongoing and regular police abuse, including allegations of torture 

and religious insults.

Key U.S. Policy

In 2022, the United States and Azerbaijan marked 30 years of diplomatic relations that have largely prioritized cooperation on European 

energy security, bilateral trade and investment, and efforts to combat 

terrorism and transnational threats. The U.S. government regularly 

engaged with Azerbaijani counterparts to underscore the importance 

of ongoing peace negotiations with Armenia and to urge an end to 

military hostilities. In June, Assistant Secretary of State for European 

and Eurasian Affairs Karen Donfried traveled to Azerbaijan, where 

she highlighted U.S. support for fundamental freedoms and met with 

Azerbaijani civil society.

The U.S. Department of State continued to raise religious freedom concerns directly with Azerbaijani officials. In May, Ambassador 

at Large for International Religious Freedom Rashad Hussain met with 

then Minister of Culture Anar Karimov and discussed “best practices 

for preserving the country’s beautifully diverse religious and cultural 

heritage.” In June, Deputy Chief of Mission Michael Dickerson met 

with officials from the SCWRA. In November and December, the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee respectively held hearings on U.S. policy in the Caucasus that 

involved significant discussion of Azerbaijan.

On December 9, the State Department designated Kerim Heydar Alimardanov, an official in the Main Department for Combating 

Organized Crime in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, pursuant to Section 7031(c) for “his involvement in a gross violation of human rights, 

namely torture of detainees in 2015 and 2016.” Alimardanov was 

reportedly involved in the 2015 Nardaran case that led to the arrest, 

alleged torture, and sentencing to prison of many MUM members.
52 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

KEY FINDINGS

I In 2022, religious freedom conditions in the Central African 

Republic (CAR) remained poor. Armed group violence, which 

resumed in early 2020 after a brief respite, led to the politicization of religious identity in several localities and resulted in 

violence based on religious or ethnoreligious affiliation. Previous 

years’ trends of state-backed fighters targeting Muslim civilians 

with violence, torture, and extrajudicial detention continued. In 

at least one instance, fighters defending Muslim communities 

targeted Christian civilians in retaliation for state-backed abuses 

against Muslims.

The CAR government continued to collaborate with nonstate 

armed actors, including the Wagner Group—a military contractor 

with ties to the Russian government—and local vigilante fighters, 

despite trends of these actors targeting religious minorities and 

committing human rights abuses. Furthermore, the CAR government made efforts to shield these partners from accountability for 

abuses, inhibiting multilateral efforts to investigate allegations of 

religious targeting and human rights violations. 

From September 2021 to February 2022, national defense 

forces and other security personnel recruited approximately 600 

fighters from local vigilante groups in Basse-Kotto and Ouaka 

Prefectures to fight against rebel groups. Elements from the 

former Christian and animist-affiliated anti-balaka armed groups 

committed abuses, mainly against Muslim communities. In May, 

national defense forces arrested and tortured three Fulani Muslim 

youths in Bokolobo, Ouaka Prefecture, killing one of them. The 

Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (Union for Peace in Central 

African Republic), a local rebel group in the area, vowed retaliation

and subsequently attacked a national defense forces checkpoint 

in Bokolobo, Ouaka Prefecture, killing two soldiers, six anti-balaka 

combatants, and five civilians from the Christian community. On 

the following day in the same area, presumed national defense 

forces and anti-balaka combatants carried out a reprisal attack on 

a Muslim community, killing nine civilians.

Muslim Central Africans also continue to face discrimination 

and displacement. Government authorities charge Muslims higher 

fees and fines than non-Muslims for the same services or penalties. 

Analysts familiar with the situation on the ground assess that Muslims are disproportionately represented among CAR’s displaced 

population and have struggled to return safely to their areas of 

origin due to continued intimidation and lack of support.

The Special Criminal Court (SCC) tried its first cases against 

armed group leaders responsible for crimes against humanity, 

war crimes, and severe violence and made several other prominent arrests. However, executive authorities continued trends of 

undermining justice mechanisms and constitutional power in 2022. 

President Faustin-Archange Touadera forcibly removed the Constitutional Court's presiding judge, who had spoken out against the 

illegality of Touadera's efforts to change the constitution to allow 

himself to run for a third presidential term.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Maintain CAR on the Special Watch List for 

engaging in or tolerating severe violations 

of religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

	■ Provide financial, administrative, and 

diplomatic support to the SCC and other 

investigations into ethnoreligious targeting and other human rights abuses 

by state actors or state-backed foreign 

fighters in CAR, and urge the CAR government to cease all obstructions to such 

investigations; 

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on CAR government agencies and officials and other 

relevant foreign actors responsible for 

severe violations of religious freedom by 

freezing those individuals’ assets and/or 

barring their entry into the United States 

under human rights related financial and 

visa authorities, citing specific religious 

freedom violations; and

	■ Continue to allocate funding for humanitarian assistance, including for refugees, 

internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 

returnees as well as funding programs to 

rebuild mosques destroyed during the 

civil conflict.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Factsheet: Religious Freedom Concerns in Central Africa

■ Podcast: Religious Freedom Backslides in Central African Republic
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 53

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Background

CAR’s constitution provides for freedom of religion or belief and equal 

protection under the law, regardless of religion. Approximately 89 

percent of CAR’s population identify as Christian, nine percent identify 

as Muslim, one percent practice folk religions, and one percent are 

religiously unaffiliated. 

In 2012, predominantly Muslim militias in CAR’s north mobilized 

and marched on the capital in response to longstanding grievances 

with the government’s marginalization of and discrimination against 

Muslim minorities. In response, militias from predominantly Christian 

and folk religion-practicing communities mobilized for self-protection 

and began retaliating against Muslim civilian communities. This triggered more than half a decade of political and ethnoreligious violence, 

including attacks on individuals based on their religious identity and 

deliberate attacks on houses of worship and religious enclaves in 

cities across CAR. Muslim communities bore the brunt of the conflict, 

with violence displacing an estimated 80 percent of CAR’s Muslim 

population in the first two years. 

In 2019 and 2020, instances of religious violence decreased 

following a political agreement and increased CAR government 

cooperation with the Wagner Group. However, following contested 

elections at the end of 2020 and the remobilization of a united rebel 

militia, state-sponsored abuses against Muslims have been on the rise.

Politicization of Religion by Armed Actors

In several regions of CAR, ethnicity and religion are so strongly linked 

that violence based on ethnoreligious identity poses a risk to religious 

freedom. Since the resumption of fighting in December 2020, the 

United Nations (UN) secretary general has found that targeted arrests 

of alleged rebel collaborators “disproportionately affected religious 

and ethnic minorities.” A joint human rights investigation reported a 

notable “increase in targeted attacks against the civilian population, 

especially Muslims” and found that CAR authorities used a state 

of emergency to commit abuses that “specifically targeted certain 

communities (Muslims and Peuhl).”

The CAR government has also tolerated religious freedom violations by both foreign and domestic proxy fighters it enlists to help 

achieve military objectives. In Ouaka prefecture, the CAR government recruited fighters from former Christian- and animist-affiliated 

anti-balaka militias that reportedly targeted Muslim communities 

on the basis of religion in their campaign to eliminate rebel militias. 

These vigilante fighters also carried out a reprisal attack on a Muslim 

community in Bokolobo after rebel fighters in the area attacked their 

checkpoint in May.

Relying on foreign and proxy fighters complicates the CAR government’s involvement in the violations they commit, but it does not 

absolve the government of complicity or responsibility. CAR authorities have acted to protect both Wagner and anti-balaka elements 

operating on the government’s behalf from accountability for religious 

violence and human rights abuses.

Justice Progress and Setbacks

Strong justice mechanisms are crucial to achieving justice for victims of 

religious violence in CAR and deterring future violations. In particular, 

the SCC, a hybrid court established to investigate and prosecute serious international crimes committed since 2003, began hearing cases 

in 2022. Its first case resulted in the conviction of three members of 

rebel militia 3R for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and severe 

violence against civilians. The SCC also arrested two former Central 

African Armed Forces members and one ex-Séléka militia general in 

2022 on charges of crimes against humanity.

Yet, SCC trials and other justice efforts have been under threat 

from other parts of the CAR government. Last year, national security 

forces prevented the SCC from accessing former armed group leader 

Hassan Bouba Ali for his scheduled appearance and released him in 

contravention of the SCC’s warrant. In 2022, the CAR government 

obstructed UN efforts to investigate religious targeting and other 

human rights abuses.

President Touadera also sought in 2022 to undermine other 

government institutions and the constitution. In May, Touadera proposed reforms to eliminate term limits, and in August he established 

a commission to revise the constitution. When the independent 

Constitutional Court declared those efforts unconstitutional and 

annulled the commission, Touadera requested the Constitutional 

Court’s head jurist, Daniele Darlan, to retire, which she refused to 

do. Touadera then forcibly dismissed Darlan by decree, which many 

considered unconstitutional, and appointed Jean Pierre Waboé as 

the new head of the Constitutional Court.

Given that security forces under executive control in CAR have 

shown bias against religious minorities, the independence of judicial 

institutions is critical to ensuring accountability for abuses by government actors. Recent government efforts undermine the constitution 

and erode the independence of the judiciary, threatening mechanisms 

designed to provide justice for human rights abuses and religious 

freedom violations.

Key U.S. Policy

In 2022, the United States pledged $48 million in emergency humanitarian assistance to CAR in addition to the $140 million already 

allocated. The U.S. government remains a main source of financial 

support to the SCC.

In October, the spokesperson for the U.S. Embassy in Bangui, 

CAR, publicly expressed concern regarding political developments in 

the country after Touadera’s administration removed the president of 

the Constitutional Court. A delegation from CAR attended the Joseph 

R. Biden administration’s U.S-Africa Leaders Summit in December.

On November 30, recognizing escalating state abuses against 

Muslim communities in CAR, the U.S. Department of State placed CAR 

on its Special Watchlist for the first time for engaging in or tolerating 

severe violations of religious freedom. The U.S. government also 

designated the Wagner Group, a military contractor closely linked 

with the Russian government, as an Entity of Particular Concern for 

engaging in particularly severe religious freedom violations in CAR in 

2021, including attacks on mosques and disappearing Muslim leaders. 
54 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

EGYPT

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Egypt generally trended 

consistent with 2021. The government continued to make overtures toward religious minority communities and to promote 

religious tolerance. For example, under President Abdel Fattah 

El-Sisi, the government appointed the first-ever Christian judge 

to the Supreme Constitutional Court in February. Egypt also continued its cultural heritage preservation program, announcing 

the restoration of more historic synagogues. In May, authorities 

convicted and sentenced the “extremist Islamist” murderer of a 

Coptic Orthodox priest. The government also continued reviewing 

and approving Christians’ applications to register their worship 

sites as churches. 

However, restrictions on new church construction and the slow 

pace of approvals for the backlog of legalization applications filed 

since the Church Construction Law of 2016 have forced many congregations to assemble in structurally unsafe buildings not intended 

for communal worship. In August, the government attributed a 

series of deadly fires at several Coptic Orthodox churches to faulty 

electrical setups and other structural deficiencies, which human 

rights organizations identified as a result of systemic discrimination 

against Copts. Rights organizations have also noted that the 2016 

legislation is inherently discriminatory in continuing to subject 

churches to requirements and approval processes that do not apply 

to Sunni mosques. The 2016 law also offers no legalization process 

for the houses of worship of Ahmadiyya Muslims, Baha’is, Shi’a Muslims, and other religious groups. In addition, even after successfully 

registering, some churches continued to face threats. In June, the 

government’s approval of the license for Luxor’s Archangel Michael 

Church prompted some Islamist residents of that and other villages 

to riot and set fire to Copts’ personal property. 

State security and prosecutors continued to invoke the 

blasphemy statute and other laws to arrest, detain, convict, and 

sentence Egyptians from a diverse range of religious backgrounds. 

Reports of individual violent assaults against Copts increased, with 

several attacks unfolding in April during the seasons of Christian 

Easter and Muslim Ramadan. This included crimes such as the fatal 

stabbing of Father Arsanios Wadid and the deadly shooting of 

Rani Ra’fat by six men, one of whom posted social media videos 

confirming a militant Islamist motivation for the murder. In July, 

another assailant stabbed the father and son owners of a shop in 

Giza that sold alcohol—a practice associated with non-Muslims. 

Coptic women suffered both anti-Christian and female-targeted 

abuse, such as the suspected kidnapping and potential forced 

conversion to Islam of Mariam Waheeb and a male pharmacist’s 

physical assault of Naveen Sobhi for appearing in non-Islamic dress 

during the Muslim holy days of Ramadan. The latter case is notable 

for the police’s pressuring of the victim to agree to adjudication by 

a local, nonjudicial “reconciliation” session, which doubly victimizes

Copts and other minorities by forcing them to reconcile with their 

attacker, commonly resulting in lenient punishments for assailants. 

In February, Egypt’s child-fostering laws and practices attracted 

scrutiny when authorities removed a four-year-old boy from his 

Coptic Orthodox adoptive family and placed him in an orphanage 

upon discovering his origins as an unidentified infant that a priest 

had found in the local church. Although prosecutors reportedly 

invoked laws presuming the Muslim identity of unknown children, in 

December, Egypt’s National Council for Human Rights asserted the 

illegality of the child’s transfer to the orphanage, urging the government to return him to his would-be adoptive parents. Personal 

status laws regulating family matters such as marriage, divorce, and 

inheritance also disproportionately burden religious minorities, 

especially women. In December, President El-Sisi encouraged “all 

segments of society” to participate in dialogue surrounding draft 

amendments to these laws. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Include Egypt on the Special Watch List 

for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

	■ Conduct a comprehensive review of all U.S. 

assistance to Egypt and continue to withhold a portion of Foreign Military Financing 

(FMF) for specified international religious 

freedom violations along with broader 

human rights concerns; and

	■ Incorporate religious freedom concerns 

into U.S.-Egypt bilateral engagement by 

encouraging Egypt to: 1) ensure equal 

protection of all religious communities, 

including through phasing out customary 

reconciliation councils to resolve incidents 

of violence against religious minorities and 

proposing universal “houses of worship” 

legislation that treats identically the construction, repair, and registration of houses 

of worship of all religions; 2) repeal Article 

98(f) of the Criminal Code, which penalizes 

“ridiculing or insulting a heavenly religion 

or a sect following it,” and until that is 

accomplished limit the conditions under 

which the law is applied and allow charged 

individuals to post bail; and 3) lift all travel 

bans and asset freezes on released religious prisoners of conscience and establish 

independent oversight and appeals mechanisms for travel bans.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Raise religious freedom issues through 

hearings, meetings, letters, congressional 

delegation trips abroad, or other actions.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Special Report: Assessing Religious Freedom in Egyptian Curriculum Reform

■ Event: Assessing Religious Freedom in Egyptian Curriculum Reform

■ Press Statement: USCIRF Welcomes Egypt’s Release of Coptic Activist Ramy Kamel

■ Press Statement: USCIRF Commends Release of Egyptian Religious Prisoner Reda Abdel Rahman
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 55

EGYPT

Background

Article 2 of Egypt’s constitution identifies Islam as the state religion 

and the “principles of Shari’a” as the primary source of legislation. 

Article 64 provides for “absolute” freedom of belief, although only 

adherents of “heavenly religions” (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism) 

may practice their religion publicly and build places of worship. Bans 

from 1960 remain in effect on Jehovah’s Witnesses and Baha’is.

Egypt’s population is approximately 107.7 million, an estimated 

90 percent of whom are Sunni Muslims. Non-Sunni Muslims such as 

Shi’a comprise less than one percent. At an estimated 10 percent 

or more, Egypt’s indigenous Copts constitute the largest Christian minority in the Middle East and North Africa. Christian leaders 

estimate over 90 percent of Copts belong to the traditional Coptic 

Orthodox Church, with Coptic Catholics, Coptic Evangelical Protestants, and other small denominations comprising the remainder. There 

are reportedly up to 2,000 Baha’is, approximately 1,500 Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, and fewer than 10 Jews in Egypt.

State Targeting of Religious Identity, 

Expression, and Activism 

The Egyptian criminal justice system remained the locus of systematic 

and ongoing religious freedom violations. In January and February, 

authorities released from long-term detention religious prisoners of 

conscience Ramy Kamel, a Copt, and Reda Abdel Rahman, a Qur’anist 

Muslim. Both Abdel Rahman and Patrick Zaki—a Coptic human rights 

researcher released at the end of 2021—remain under travel bans. 

Throughout 2022, Zaki also endured numerous adjournments of his 

trial for the charge of “spreading false news” via the publication of 

an online testimonial discussing anti-Coptic discrimination. In June, 

Al-Mataria prosecutors wielded the same charge to detain Coptic 

attorney Hani Farouk Gibran—later releasing him—for posting messages on social media such as, “No to attacks on churches in Egypt, 

burning homes and kidnapping girls.” 

Egypt continues to enforce Law 98(f) of Egypt’s Penal Code, 

a blasphemy statute that bans “insulting the heavenly religions.” 

In September, an appeals court in Cairo upheld a five-year prison 

sentence against Marco Girgis, a Copt, on charges including breach 

of 98(f) and “exploiting religion in promoting extremist ideas, contempt of Islam, and transgression of the values of the Egyptian 

family” for allegedly sharing sexually explicit digital material. In 

June, United Nations human rights experts expressed concern 

over the detention and potential deportation of Abdulbaqi Saeed 

Abdo, a Yemeni asylum seeker and convert to Christianity accused 

of “contempt of Islam.”

Egyptians of Sunni Muslim backgrounds also faced government 

harassment and detention. In February, the Court of Cassation rejected 

the appeal of imprisoned blogger Anas Hassan, arrested in 2019 for 

administering an “Egyptian Atheists” page on Facebook and charged 

with violation of 98(f) and information technology laws. Also that month, 

the public prosecutor stated it would order “investigative measures” 

against journalist and television presenter Ibrahim Issa for his public 

statements questioning a miracle connected to the Prophet Muhammad. In August, the Heliopolis Misdemeanors Court announced the 

trial of another television personality, Islamic preacher and Al-Azhar 

instructor Mabrouk Attia, for on-air jokes about Jesus Christ following 

a lawyer’s filing of a criminal complaint that the statements showed 

contempt for both Christianity and Islam. 

Authorities also arrested or detained individuals related to mob 

protests and attacks on Christian churches; however, several such 

detainees were members of targeted church communities. In January, 

security officials arrested nine Copts for online videos showcasing their 

peaceful protest of the government’s failure to permit the rebuilding 

of the fire-ravaged St. Joseph and Abu Seifein Church in Samalout. 

Charges included “participating in a demonstration threatening public 

safety and committing a terrorist act.” They were released in April, 

the same month the government relaunched its Presidential Pardon 

Committee, possibly in advance of the 27th Conference of the Parties, 

or COP27 climate summit, which Egypt hosted in November. 

Educational Curriculum Reforms 

The government of Egypt implemented some religious tolerance 

reforms to the national primary and secondary school educational 

curricula consistent with its 2021 National Human Rights Strategy. 

However, a USCIRF assessment found that despite slight improvements, religionization of the curriculum remained endemic. Subjects 

such as Arabic Language and Social Studies advanced government-endorsed versions of Sunni Islam while underrepresenting, excluding, 

or negatively characterizing—for example, using antisemitic rhetoric 

toward—religious minorities such as non-Sunni Muslims, Christians, 

and Jews. 

Key U.S. Policy

The U.S.-Egypt strategic partnership assumed an even higher profile 

throughout the year in advance of the COP27. Despite Egypt’s robust 

efforts to rehabilitate international perceptions of the country’s human 

rights violations, the administration of President Joseph R. Biden and 

the U.S. Congress took measures to communicate concerns over 

Egypt’s human rights record. As in 2021, Congress conditioned up to 

$300 million of the $1.3 billion annual FMF aid package to Egypt on 

human rights improvements. However, in September, the administration chose to withhold only $130 million. In approving the other $170 

million, the United States noted part of the grant was due to President 

El-Sisi’s release of 500 political prisoners out of the total of more than 

60,000 in detention. The withheld aid accounted for 10 percent of the 

United States’ total annual allocation to Egypt.
56 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

INDONESIA

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, Indonesia’s religious freedom conditions remained poor, 

as in the prior year. The country maintains several regulations 

that either constitute blasphemy laws or effectively function as 

such: Presidential Decree No. 1/PNPS/1965, Criminal Code Article 

156(a), and Law No. 11/2008 on Electronic Information and Transaction (known as the ITE law) Articles 27(3) and 28(2). Indonesia 

also maintains a 2006 joint regulation on houses of worship that 

local authorities often exploit to hinder religious communities’ 

right to build and maintain houses of worship. Minority religious 

leaders throughout Indonesia report that this regulation enables 

corruption, emboldening local Islamic religious leaders and/or 

political officials to coerce bribes from religious communities to 

obtain permission to proceed with construction. In addition, minorities’ houses of worship—especially for groups that are officially 

unrecognized—are especially vulnerable to attacks and lack the 

protections afforded to majority-affiliated religious sites in law or 

in practice. For example, in early January, Pontianak District Court 

sentenced 21 men to only four and a half months in prison for ransacking and burning an Ahmadiyya mosque in West Kalimantan the 

prior year but released them a mere 16 days later.

Indonesia recognizes six official religions, excluding the less 

than 0.5 percent of the population who practice traditional or 

indigenous faiths, including forms of animism or syncretic versions of religions. In 2016, followers of traditional faiths appealed 

to the Constitutional Court against the 2013 Civil Administrative 

Law, which codified discriminatory regulations such as forcing 

members of indigenous groups to leave the religion section 

of their national identification cards blank. Despite the Constitutional Court ruling in favor of traditional faith communities, 

members still reported discrimination in accessing public services 

such as education. 

In December, the Indonesian Parliament passed a new criminal 

code that reinforces the criminalization of blasphemy, further undermining religious freedom. Article 300 broadens the sorts of acts, 

speech, or outcomes to which the blasphemy prohibition applies and 

expands enforcement to include fines and up to three years in prison. 

Article 302 criminalizes “inciting” someone to leave their faith—an 

offense that carries a punishment of up to two years’ imprisonment. 

The law replaced the Dutch colonial-era code and will gradually take 

effect over a period of up to three years. This legal development 

coincided with a general backsliding of democratic norms as well as 

growing political and societal influence from conservative Islamist 

organizations, such as the quasi-governmental Indonesia Ulema 

Council (MUI), that seek to impose their religious interpretations 

on others. The MUI responded to public criticism of provisions in 

the then draft criminal code that incorporated the MUI’s preferred 

religious views on issues of sexual morality by insisting that all six of 

Indonesia’s officially recognized religions condemn the lesbian, gay, 

bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) community and 

therefore the government should not protect its members.

The enshrinement of a particular interpretation of Islam into 

Indonesian law that is binding on all people regardless of their 

religious beliefs coincides with the government’s increased level

of international cooperation to combat religiously based violent 

extremism, which remained a persistent concern. The country’s 

counterterrorism force, known as Densus 88, continued to pursue radical Islamist groups believed responsible for killing several 

Christian farmers in Sulawesi the prior year. In September, Densus 

88 pursued and killed a group of radical Islamist militants in that 

area, and in December, the National Police arrested 24 suspected 

terrorists in connection with a suicide bombing that targeted a 

police precinct in Astanaanyar, West Java.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Include Indonesia on the Special Watch List 

for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

	■ Work with the Indonesian government to:

	■ Amend the criminal code to comply with 

international human rights standards, 

including relating to the freedom of religion or belief; 

	■ Repeal or amend the existing blasphemy 

laws, including Indonesia’s ITE law;

	■ Release all individuals currently detained 

or imprisoned on blasphemy charges;

	■ Repeal or revise the 2006 Joint Regulation on houses of worship. 

	■ Incorporate training on international 

religious freedom standards into the bilateral partnership on combating violent 

extremism, including the U.S. Agency for 

International Development’s (USAID) funded 

programs such as the Harmoni and MAJu 

projects, and all education initiatives to 

which the U.S. government contributes; and

	■ Urge the Indonesian government, as chair 

of the Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations (ASEAN) and its Intergovernmental 

Commission on Human Rights, to publicly 

advocate for religious freedom, pluralism, 

and inclusion throughout the region.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Raise Indonesia’s ongoing religious 

freedom challenges through hearings, 

meetings, letters, congressional delegation 

trips abroad, and other actions.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Factsheet: Blasphemy and Related Laws in ASEAN Member Countries 

■ Podcast: The Legacy of Blasphemy Laws in Southeast Asia
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 57

INDONESIA

Background

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country. Muslims comprise 87.2 percent of the country’s 267 million citizens, with 

around 99 percent identifying as Sunni and less than one percent and 

0.2 percent identifying as Shi’a or Ahmadiyya Muslim, respectively. 

Protestant Christians comprise seven percent of the population, Roman 

Catholics 2.9 percent, and Hindus 1.7 percent; 0.9 percent identify with 

other minority religions such as Buddhism or Confucianism.

In light of this diversity, Indonesia has a long tradition of religious 

pluralism. Article 29 of its constitution “guarantees the independence 

of each resident to embrace religion and worship according to their 

respective religions and beliefs.” The government has long promoted 

Pancasila, an ideology that comprises five principles: monotheism, 

civilized humanity, national unity, deliberative democracy, and social 

justice. However, its promotion of this ideology extends only to those 

religious groups that leaders of the officially recognized religions 

determine as legitimate. In addition, the government requires all 

citizens to list their religious affiliation on their identification cards—a 

practice that has forced nonreligious persons and members of unrecognized religious minorities to misrepresent their faith or leave the 

field blank. This omission can impact access to licenses, permits, 

education, and employment. 

In addition to hosting the G20 meeting in November, Indonesia 

also hosted the G20 Religion Forum, which brought together religious 

and government leaders to discuss interfaith initiatives and strategies 

to confront extremism. That same month, Indonesia launched a joint 

campaign with India—a country that USCIRF recommends as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC—to promote moderate Islam. In 

January 2023, just after the reporting period, Indonesia assumed the 

chairmanship of the regional ASEAN, placing it in a potential position 

to guide the bloc’s response to human rights challenges relevant to 

religious freedom, such as the ongoing conflict in Burma. 

Criminal Code Process

According to human rights activists, the government provided minimal, if any, opportunity for civil society and religious minorities to 

engage with the criminal code revision process since the new draft 

code was first introduced in 2019. In contrast, officials reportedly 

consulted with conservative Islamic groups during that process in 

coordination with the MUI. However, religious freedom advocates 

have expressed tentative hope that the new code’s gradual implementation may afford civil society and the judicial system space to 

review and modify its provisions. 

Limited Central Government Authority 

Many of Indonesia’s religious freedom violations against religious 

minorities are perpetrated by local governing authorities, far outside 

the control of Indonesia’s central government. In March, the mayor of 

a city within greater Jakarta publicly opposed a Ministry of Religious 

Affairs regulation on the volume level of the azan, or Muslim call to 

prayer, which Muslim and non-Muslim neighbors and officials cannot 

publicly criticize without risk of blasphemy allegations. In July, reports 

circulated of public and private schools forcing girls to wear the hijab, 

illustrating the central government’s limited success in preventing 

local schools from implementing such measures. Furthermore, in 

some areas where central or provincial government authorities have 

delegated social and education services to quasi-governmental and 

nongovernmental organizations, violent Islamist groups have set 

up schools to reportedly radicalize children. Such groups also run 

boarding schools and coordinate through social media to raise funds 

for violent Islamist activities. 

Expansion of Provincial Religious Laws 

In July, the Indonesian government formally declared that the customs 

of the Minangkbakau people, who comprise the ethnic majority of 

West Sumatra, are based on the philosophical values of the Qur’an. 

Provincial leaders requested this legal decision to legitimize their further development of local laws based on Shari’a (Syariah). The central 

government currently exempts the autonomous province of Aceh 

from national laws and permits it to implement its own legal system, 

which is based on a rigid interpretation of Syariah and is enforced 

through a religious police force. Enforcement mandates women to 

wear hijabs and bans them from straddling motorcycles, among other 

restrictions, regardless of their faith or personal choice. Violators of 

these religiously based laws are often subjected to corporal punishment, and neither Muslims nor non-Muslims are able to opt out of this 

official interpretation.

Key U.S. Policy 

Throughout 2022, the USAID-funded Harmoni program continued 

to support the Ministry of Social Affairs and local organizations by 

strengthening Inter-Religious Harmony Forums; countering violent 

extremist narratives through community, university, and school-based 

campaigns; and rehabilitating women and children returning from 

conflict zones in the Middle East and the Philippines. The United 

States also maintained bilateral exchange programs such as the International Visitor Leadership Program to host Indonesian leaders in the 

United States. 

In February, the United States marked one year since the administration of President Joseph R. Biden released its Indo-Pacific Strategy. 

As part of this strategy, the United States launched the Indonesia 

Millennium Challenge Corporation, which dedicated $698 million to 

support infrastructure and development goals as well as initiatives for 

clean energy. The United States also allocated resources for a 30 percent increase in educational advising centers in Indonesia, although 

these programs did not include discussion of religious freedom or 

broader human rights. In November, rhetoric from the MUI and other 

religious organizations against the LGBTQI+ community prompted the 

Indonesian government to cancel a visit from the U.S. Special Envoy 

to Advance the Human Rights of LGBTQI+ Persons.
58 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

IRAQ

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Iraq continued to 

deteriorate as a result of the Iraqi Federal Government’s (IFG) 

intensifying political factionalism and resulting administrative 

paralysis. The government’s instability fueled intra-Shi’a Muslim

and Sunni Muslim-disenfranchising sectarianism and stalled progress on initiatives that would help advance freedom of religion 

or belief, including addressing the pressing concerns of Iraq’s 

diverse religious minorities. The year-long government deadlock 

arose from the October 2021 elections, which cemented divisions 

among followers of Shi’a Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, rival Shi’a 

factions aligned with Iran, and Sunni Muslims of both Arab and 

Kurdish backgrounds. Following al-Sadr’s unexpected resignation 

from Parliament and Sadrists’ protests in Baghdad in the summer, 

their Iran-backed Shi’a opponents moved forward with a new 

government in October. 

Late in December, the new administration formally recognized 

for the first time in 47 years Yazidis’ ownership of their residential 

properties in the Sinjar district in northern Iraq. However, the year 

of political stasis exacerbated the government’s neglect of other 

initiatives that would benefit vulnerable religious minorities. The 

government did not adequately implement the Yazidi Survivors Law 

(YSL), which Parliament passed in 2021 to provide reparations for 

Yazidi, Christian, Turkmen, and Shabak victims of the Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Likewise, the IFG and the semi-autonomous 

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—which each lay claim to Sinjar—failed to substantially carry out the provisions of the 2020 United 

Nations (UN)-brokered Sinjar Agreement intended to stabilize the 

area and enable the return of Yazidis displaced by ISIS’s genocide. 

The IFG did not bring under control the Popular Mobilization 

Units (PMU or PMF) or al-Hashd al-Shaabi, a government-affiliated 

umbrella organization of largely Shi’a Muslim, pro-Iran militias. These 

groups used checkpoint interrogations and detentions, enforced 

disappearance, extortion, and physical violence and targeted Sunni 

Muslims and other religious minorities, including Christians and 

Yazidis. On the outskirts of Mosul and in the Nineveh Plains—areas 

with numerous indigenous religious minorities and subject to the 

IFG’s and KRG’s jurisdictional disputes—the PMF’s aggressive use 

of checkpoints, seizure of Christians’ land and businesses, and other 

targeted harassment deterred displaced Christians’ return to the 

area and fueled further emigration. Iraqi military forces also targeted 

religious minorities, as in a May operation against Yazidi fighters, 

which displaced at least 3,000 Yazidi civilians—already traumatized 

by recent displacement and by recurrent Turkish airstrikes—in their 

“largest exodus” since the 2014 genocide.

For its part, the KRG continued to promote religious coexistence and its status as a refuge for over two million religiously 

diverse Iraqis and Syrians displaced to the Kurdistan Region of 

Iraq (KRI) by years of conflict and the threat of ISIS. In October, the 

KRG, along with religious minority stakeholders, participated in 

a series of UN workshops analyzing the KRG’s laws, mechanisms, 

policies, and programs with the goal of strengthening its protection of minority groups’ rights. However, some Christian groups 

indigenous to the Nineveh Plains raised concerns over the KRG’s 

failure to resolve longstanding grievances such as lack of KRG funding and other support for Assyrian-run schools; discrimination in 

employment and municipal services; and unresolved KRG-tolerated 

or -initiated misappropriation of Christians’ land, businesses, and 

other property. Christian residents have cited their lack of security

and threats from ISIS, the PMF/PMU, and the KRG as the main drivers of emigration from the area, bringing their ancient communities 

almost to the point of extinction. Similarly, Yazidi genocide survivors 

feared returning to their Sinjar homeland—caught in the stranglehold of vying militias—and remained in displacement camps within 

the KRI prone to fire and other hazards.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Include Iraq on the Special Watch List for 

engaging in or tolerating severe violations 

of religious freedom pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA); 

	■ Use diplomatic channels and multilateral 

engagement to encourage the IFG and the 

KRG to expedite processing the return of 

kidnapped and displaced Yazidi genocide 

survivors and assist them in reintegrating 

into Iraqi society; to resolve conflicts over 

disputed areas per Article 140 of the Iraqi 

constitution, while including all religious 

and ethnic minorities in the process; and 

to comprehensively implement the Sinjar 

Agreement with full inclusion of the Yazidi 

community in particular; 

	■ Impose targeted sanctions on additional 

PMF leaders responsible for severe violations of religious freedom by freezing 

those individuals’ assets and/or barring 

their entry into the United States under 

human rights related financial and visa 

authorities, citing specific religious freedom violations; and 

	■ Continue to assist Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities in rebuilding communities 

devastated by ISIS and in advocating for 

their own interests, including opening a 

broad discussion on holding fair and free 

elections to select their own local leaders as 

well as representatives to the IFG and KRG. 

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Incorporate religious freedom concerns 

into its larger oversight of the U.S.-Iraq 

bilateral relationship through hearings, letters, and congressional delegations and by 

appropriating funding for development programming to strengthen religious freedom.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Press Release: USCIRF Commemorates the Eighth Anniversary of the Yazidi Genocide

■ Factsheet: Religious Freedom amid Iraq’s Political Crisis

■ Podcast: Recovering from Genocide: The Yazidis’ Return to Sinjar

■ Podcast: Iraq's Beleaguered Religious Minority Communities
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 59

IRAQ

Background

Iraq’s population is approximately 95–98 percent Muslim, with 61–64 

percent Shi’a and 29–34 percent Sunni. Christians—consisting of 

Catholic, Orthodox and Assyrian Church of the East, Protestant Evangelical, and others—comprise approximately one percent, although 

accurate figures are obscured by frequent displacement both within 

and beyond Iraq’s borders. 

Iraq is unique as a Shi’a-majority Arab state. It has ties to both 

the Sunni-majority Arabic-speaking world and Iran, a non-Arab Shi’a 

country. Iraq is also home to numerous ethnic and religious minorities 

such as Kurds, Yazidis, Sabean Mandaeans, Kaka’is, Shabaks, and 

Turkmen as well as members of Assyrian, Chaldean, Syriac, Armenian, 

and other Christian churches. In 2022, at least 2,763 Yazidi women and 

girls kidnapped from Sinjar by ISIS were still missing, many potentially 

hidden within northeast Syrian camps detaining ISIS fighters and 

their families. Yazidi Iraqis welcomed the international community’s 

additional steps toward accountability and justice, such as a German 

court’s judgment in July convicting a repatriated German ISIS member 

of genocide. 

Article 2 of the federal constitution establishes Islam as the official religion and affirms “the full religious rights of freedom of belief 

and religious practice to all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis and 

Mandean Sabaeans.” However, the penal code contains blasphemy 

statutes, and since 2016, the Law of United National Identity requires 

non-Muslim minors to convert to Islam if one of their parents becomes 

Muslim, as in the ongoing legal case of an Assyrian child. 

In the years since the 2003 collapse of Saddam Hussein’s 

regime, sectarianism has flourished, with political power in the IFG 

distributed along religious lines among dominant Shi’a political 

parties, a Kurdish president, an Arab Shi’a prime minister, and an 

Arab Sunni president of Parliament. 

Other Religious Freedom Issues in the IFG and KRG

Within weeks of the new administration’s emergence in October, 

IFG agencies issued eviction notices to Christians in a displacement 

settlement in Baghdad’s Zayouna district, leaving the families—many 

of whom ISIS had displaced from their Nineveh homelands in 2014—

facing homelessness during winter. The evictions were completed in 

February 2023. 

Community members from other religious minorities, including 

Sabaean Mandaeans, Shabaks, and Kaka’is, have communicated their 

intentions to lobby international bodies for minority protections and 

the new IFG administration for constitutional and other legal safeguards for religious and ethnic minorities. These activists note that, 

for example, Article 125 of the federal constitution sets forth “administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights” for minorities but 

lacks mechanisms of enforcement. 

Political representation remained an important concern for religious minorities, with communities pointing out flaws in both the IFG’s 

and KRG’s quota systems for elected representatives from minority 

religious backgrounds. Some minority advocates suggested both 

the IFG and KRG amend their existing quotas to ensure minority 

representation is effective and meaningful rather than symbolic and 

vulnerable to dominant religious groups’ political appropriation 

of minorities’ seats. In February, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court 

further limited the political representation of Yazidis, Shabaks, and 

Feyli Kurds, forcing those minorities to campaign within the already 

severely circumscribed Christian and Mandaean components. In 

March, archaeologists criticized both IFG and KRG leaders’ ongoing 

sectarianizing of cultural heritage sites, finding it amounts to cultural 

heritage predation. In the IFG, confessional political and religious 

groups leveraged the ethnic and religious political quota system, the 

Iraqi Constitution of 2005, and a collection of later laws, including 

religion-specific endowments, to misappropriate and alter the character of religious heritage sites. Meanwhile, the KRG’s “land grabs” 

of indigenous Christians’ villages and sites constituted a form of 

targeted demographic change, prompting continued displacement 

and migration. 

In May, the Iraqi Parliament passed a Sadr-proposed law criminalizing Iraqis’ and foreigners’ ostensible attempts to normalize relations 

with Israel. The law did not address Judaism and set forth exceptions 

for Iraqis’ “religious visits” to Israel as preapproved by the Ministry 

of the Interior. However, it not only potentially “promot[ed] an environment of antisemitism” but also reflected Iraq’s rampant political 

sectarianism, with Shi’a parliamentary blocs advancing the legislation 

in part to distance themselves from Sunni Kurds’ and Arabs’ perceived 

receptivity to normalizing ties with Israel.

Key U.S. Policy 

The administration of President Joseph R. Biden continued to prioritize Iraq’s stabilization and economic development in U.S. relations 

with both the IFG and KRG. 

In July, the United States condemned an attack on a resort in 

Duhok that killed at least eight civilians. The IFG attributed the strike 

to Turkey, which frequently carries out airstrikes in northern Iraq in 

ostensible pursuit of members of the terrorist-designated Kurdistan 

Workers’ Party (PKK). The strikes have contributed to the abandonment of nearby Christian villages, threatened already traumatized 

Yazidis in Duhok’s displacement camps, and inhibited Yazidis’ return 

to Sinjar. The United States maintained its “strong support for Iraq’s 

sovereignty and its security, stability, and prosperity, including that 

of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.” 

The United States Agency for International Development 

asserted its commitment to providing financial assistance to help 

enable the approximately 1.67 million displaced Iraqis’ return to their 

homes. In November, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Alina L. Romanowski 

redeclared a disaster in Iraq for fiscal year 2023 “due to the ongoing 

complex emergency and humanitarian crisis.”
60 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

KAZAKHSTAN

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Kazakhstan remained relatively the same as last year as the government failed to introduce meaningful reform and continued to restrict religious activity. 

In January, new amendments to the country’s expansive religion 

law came into force that did not include substantive reforms and 

preserved many provisions that systematically violate freedom of 

religion or belief. Throughout the year, the government continued 

to prohibit unregistered religious activity, require state approval 

for religious literature, and restrict missionary activity, among other 

undue limitations. 

The government continued to suppress groups and individuals it perceived as following “nontraditional” religions, along with 

Sunni Muslims who do not subscribe to the state’s interpretation 

of Islam. By the end of the year, at least 10 Muslim men were still 

imprisoned on charges related to their online religious activity, 

including discussing their beliefs and sharing religious content. 

Those in prison include five men sentenced due to their participation in a WhatsApp conversation on Islam in 2019, despite a 

2021 United Nations (UN) Working Group opinion that called for 

their release. In March, an Atyrau court found Sarsen Netekov 

and Nurlan Atalykov guilty of belonging to the Tablighi Jamaat 

movement, sentencing both men to a year of restricted freedom 

and blocking their bank accounts. In July, authorities imprisoned 

Anatoli Zernichenko for posting excerpts from religious texts on 

his private Instagram page.

Kazakhstan also maintained an official ban on women and 

girls wearing a hijab in public schools in the face of continued calls 

by activists and parents to rescind the ban. In October, an Almaty 

school barred a Muslim schoolgirl who wears a hijab from attending 

class for a month, stating that religious garb did not comply with 

uniform regulations issued by the Ministry of Education. In addition, 

Ahmadiyya Muslims remained unregistered as a religious association due to official discrimination. As in years past, authorities 

issued over 140 administrative fines for religious offenses throughout 2022, primarily targeting Muslims. 

Non-Muslim religious minorities, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses 

and Protestant Christians, also encountered restrictions on religious 

activities, including raids on unauthorized meetings, negative publicity from state-sponsored groups, and forced official apologies 

for missionary activities. In a positive development, the official 

Financial Monitoring Agency removed several Jehovah’s Witness 

associations and members of the Church of Scientology from a 

secret list of “high-risk” entities that prevented them from accessing 

banking services for the past few years. It remains unclear how many 

other organizations and individuals may be included on this list, as 

Protestant churches have reportedly experienced similar issues. 

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Include Kazakhstan on the Special Watch 

List for engaging in or tolerating severe 

violations of religious freedom pursuant 

to the International Religious Freedom 

Act (IRFA);

	■ Continue to engage with the government 

of Kazakhstan to revise the 2011 religion 

law, as amended in 2021, and other relevant legislation to comply with international 

human rights standards, including repealing or amending registration requirements, 

ending all expert mandatory review of religious materials, and removing or reducing 

administrative fines for religious activities; 

	■ Provide training to law enforcement and 

local officials in line with international 

human rights standards through programs 

such as the Workshop on Inclusive Governance to protect religious freedom; and

	■ Call for Kazakhstan to release all those 

imprisoned due to their religious activities 

or beliefs immediately, permit all incarcerated individuals to practice their religion, 

and investigate and cease all torture. 

 The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Advocate for religious freedom reform 

and other measures aimed at improving 

the human rights landscape in Kazakhstan 

through the Congressional U.S.-Kazakhstan Caucus.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Issue Update: Kazakhstan’s Religion Law Amendments

■ Podcast: Religious Prisoners of Conscience in Kazakhstan

■ Special Report: Tolerance, Religious Freedom, and Authoritarianism
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 61

KAZAKHSTAN

Background

According to a 2021 census, Kazakhstan is home to more than 19 

million people, with 69.3 percent of Kazakh citizens identifying as 

Muslim. Most Muslims in Kazakhstan are Sunni, although other sects 

of Islam—such as Shafi’i Sunni, Shi’a, Sufi, and Ahmadiyya groups—are 

also represented. Christians comprise 17.2 percent of the population 

and are mostly Russian Orthodox. Other Christian denominations 

include Catholics, Protestants, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, among 

others. Eleven percent of Kazakhs did not indicate any religious affiliation, and two percent of Kazakhs are atheist. Additional religious 

groups represent about 0.2 percent of the population and include 

Jews, Buddhists, members of the International Society of Krishna 

Consciousness, Baha’is, Scientologists, and others. 

The state gives preferential treatment to the Hanafi school of 

Sunni Islam and Russian Orthodoxy, recognizing the “historical role” 

of both in the country and placing them in the unofficial category of 

“traditional” religions. The government heavily regulates religious 

groups it considers “threatening,” including Muslim groups, Evangelical Christians, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, in an ostensible effort to 

combat extremism. 

Religion Law Amendments

In December 2021, Kazakhstan passed amendments to its 2011 law, 

On Religious Activities and Religious Associations, which came into 

force in early January. After soliciting recommendations to improve 

religious freedom in the context of meetings carried out through 

the U.S.-Kazakhstan Religious Freedom Working Group, Kazakhstan 

adopted amendments touted as liberalizing but that included little 

notable reform. While the amendments included switching from a 

permission-based system to a “notification-based” system for religious groups seeking to hold events outside their registered place of 

worship, it changed little in practice. Religious groups are still effectively required to seek permission from local authorities and provide 

in-depth details about the nature of their event. 

Authorities have applied the “notification” amendment to the 

regularly scheduled meetings of groups that rent their religious facilities. Authorities mostly enforced the amendment for larger meetings 

and events, such as when police disrupted the annual commemoration 

of Jesus Christ’s death, a widely observed occasion, in three Jehovah’s Witness communities across Kostanay region. Yet, in Aqmola 

region, police also disrupted a typical, smaller meeting of Jehovah’s 

Witnesses. In all cases, authorities stated that no one submitted the 

required notification for the event. 

Targeting of Muslims

The state often targets Sunni Muslims who practice Islam independently from the state, particularly for the distribution of religious 

materials and online religious activities. Officials often use questionable or false claims of “extremism” or terrorism charges to detain, 

arrest, and imprison Muslims. In particular, Kazakhstan continued 

to target individuals affiliated with the Tablighi Jamaat movement 

and other Muslim groups on its list of prohibited foreign organizations deemed extremist. Released prisoners have faced continued 

punishments and endure long bans on religious, social, and financial 

activities. Of the 10 individuals known to be imprisoned on such 

charges, all identify as Sunni Muslim. Despite the UN Working Group 

on Arbitrary Detention’s 2021 opinion that called for the release of 

eight individuals jailed in 2019 for participating in a WhatsApp discussion about Islam, five of the men remained imprisoned at the end of 

2022. In February, the Kyzylorda Regional Court rejected a petition 

for early release submitted by one of those men, Bolatbek Nurgaliyev, 

claiming he violated prison rules when he prayed in his free time. 

In June, a local court sentenced Sunni Muslim Anatoli Zernichenko 

to seven years in prison on charges under Penal Code Article 256 for the 

“propaganda of terrorism or public calls to commit terrorism” after he 

posted religious content on social media. The court ordered that he pay 

a fine equivalent to six months’ average local wages. The state relied 

on “expert” theological analysis to support the final verdict. In another 

case, reports claimed prison officials tortured religious prisoner Dadash 

Mazhenov, beating him and allegedly breaking his jaw. 

Attitude toward China’s Ongoing Genocide

Kazakhstan continued to hold an at-times ambiguous position with 

respect to neighboring China’s ongoing genocide of Uyghurs and 

other ethnic Turkic Muslims. In an October session of the UN Human 

Rights Council, Kazakhstan voted against a motion to discuss human 

rights abuses against Uyghurs and Muslims in Xinjiang. Notably, the 

police continued to disrupt individuals protesting the detention of 

Uyghur and ethnic Kazakh family members in China. In mid-September, just prior to a state visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping, Kazakh 

authorities in Almaty region detained several protesters who regularly 

advocated for the Chinese government to release their relatives. 

Authorities charged those detained with violating the legal procedures for holding peaceful assemblies. 

Key U.S. Policy

In 2022, while the United States and Kazakhstan collaborated on key 

issues regarding security, development, and human rights, engagement on religious freedom matters was less of a focus. The U.S. 

government continued to provide economic assistance through the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to strengthen 

Kazakhstan’s capacity for governance in key areas, including the 

legal enabling environment, the energy sector, and the health sector. In May, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian 

Affairs Donald Lu traveled to Kazakhstan to meet with government 

officials and civil society and discuss President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s reform agenda, human rights, and women’s empowerment. In 

response to the government of Kazakhstan’s violent management of 

protests in January 2022, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

called for an international investigation into the state-sponsored violence and a review of U.S. security assistance to the country in light 

of Kazakhstan’s human rights abuses. In November, U.S. Department 

of State Spokesperson Ned Price noted that Kazakhstan’s November 

presidential election lacked meaningful political competition; he also 

expressed U.S. government support for President Tokayev’s proposed 

reforms, including protection of human rights. In December, both 

sides came together for the U.S.-Kazakhstan Enhanced Strategic Partnership Dialogue, where officials discussed human rights conditions in 

Kazakhstan. Public reporting did not indicate whether representatives 

discussed religious freedom issues. 
62 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

MALAYSIA

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

KEY FINDINGS

I

n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Malaysia remained the 

same as in 2021. Article 160 of the constitution links Malay ethnicity with Islam, infringing on ethnic Malays’ ability to choose 

their own religion. The government requires all citizens to obtain a 

religious identification card known as MyKad through the Ministry 

of Home Affairs (MOHA), which lists whether they are Muslims. 

Federal and state governments compel all citizens designated 

as Muslims to adhere to a strict, state-approved interpretation of 

Sunni Islam according to Shafi’i jurisprudence. This system essentially prevents Malaysians who are officially labeled as Muslims 

from changing their religion, with only a few exceptions in recent 

years involving lengthy court processes. Although the National 

Registration Department—under MOHA’s jurisdiction and responsible for MyKad—is not affiliated with any religious office, it must 

obtain approval from Islamic affairs departments at the state and/

or national level to change a registered Muslim’s designation.

Malaysia’s Penal Code Sections 298 and 298A criminalize 

blasphemy, and government authorities use Section 233 of the 

Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998 (CMA) in effect as 

a blasphemy law as well. At least five states criminalize apostasy 

with fines, imprisonment, or detention in a “rehabilitation” center. 

Politicians have consistently supported these restrictions, including 

during 2022. In January, Ahmad Marzuk Shaary, deputy minister in 

the prime minister’s Department of Religious Affairs, confirmed the 

intent of the federal Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM) 

to continue monitoring online posts for blasphemy. In July, the 

Federal Territories Islamic Religious Department detained Siti 

Nuramira Abdullah under Article 298 for allegedly insulting Islam by 

removing religious attire at the Crackhouse Comedy Club in Kuala 

Lumpur. One of the club’s founders, Rizal Van Geyzel, was arrested 

under Section 4(1) of the Sedition Act and Section 233 of the CMA. 

Malaysia maintains a dual legal system that devolves the maintenance and regulation of Shari’a (known domestically as Syariah) to 

individual state or federal departments. State-led religious departments coordinate with the security services to control and enforce 

the affairs of Muslims to varying degrees depending on the state, 

creating restrictions on religious freedom for both Muslim and 

non-Muslim residents. For example, in early December, Terengganu’s state government passed amendments to its Syariah Code 

which, among other restrictions, placed new regulations on attire 

for men and women and criminalized pregnancy out of wedlock. 

Islamic affairs departments and some politicians justified using 

Syariah Codes to restrict human rights and individual freedoms as 

an effort to “protect the well-being” of Muslims. 

The phenomenon of unilateral conversions—when a parent converts to Islam and then converts their child, often in an 

apparent attempt to win custody following a divorce—remains 

a persistent issue in Malaysia. Children of these conversions who 

do not identify as Muslim are forced to endure lengthy legal proceedings to change their designated religion to coincide with their 

beliefs. In February, Loh Siew Hong regained custody of her three 

children, who had been unilaterally converted by their father. In 

April, a High Court decision finally allowed an unidentified woman 

to change her religion, concluding an eight-year legal struggle 

to overturn her unilateral conversion by her father when she was 

four years old. 

Throughout 2022, the government of Malaysia continued to 

withhold the 2019 Special Taskforce’s report examining cases of 

enforced disappearances, including Pastor Raymond Koh, Amri 

Che Mat, and others. Malaysian security forces and religious affairs 

departments likely targeted these individuals, at least in part, for 

their religious identity and practices.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Include Malaysia on the Special Watch List 

for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

	■ Raise at every opportunity with the Malaysian government that it should:

	■ Ratify international treaties on human 

rights that directly or indirectly impact 

religious freedom, including the Convention on the Elimination of All 

Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 

International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights;

	■ Ratify the 1951 Covenant on Refugees 

and/or develop a law to regulate the 

Malaysian government’s response and 

obligations to refugees and asylum seekers, many of whom have fled religious 

persecution in their home countries;

	■ Release the Special Taskforce’s report 

investigating cases of enforced disappearances; and

	■ Prioritize raising religious freedom concerns in all bilateral engagement with 

Malaysia, including through a visit by the 

Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom with official counterparts 

and religious leaders in Malaysia.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Raise Malaysia’s ongoing religious freedom concerns in all bilateral engagement, 

hearings, meetings, letters, congressional 

delegation trips abroad, and other actions.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Commission Delegation Visit: Kuala Lumpur in November 2022

■ Podcast: The Impact of Malaysia’s Dual Legal System on Religious Freedom 

■ Factsheet: Blasphemy and Related Laws in ASEAN Member Countries 
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 63

MALAYSIA

Background

Malaysia is a highly pluralistic society. Around 61.3 percent of the 

population identify as Muslim, the vast majority of whom adhere to 

state-sponsored Sunni Islam. Buddhists comprise 19.8 percent; 9.2 

percent are Christian; 6.3 percent are Hindu; 1.3 percent practice 

Confucianism, Taoism, and other traditional Chinese religions; and 

about 0.8 percent identify with no religion. Although Malaysia was 

founded as a secular state, Article 3 of the 1957 Constitution places 

Islam—interpreted as Sunni Islam—as the federation’s official religion. Article 11(4) provides that state and federal law “may control 

or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or beliefs among 

persons professing the religion of Islam.” 

Rising Islamism and Its Mainstreaming 

throughout Malaysia

In 2022, Malaysia’s Malay-majority population, other Muslim communities, and both federal and state institutions continued to 

experience increased Islamization. Despite a constitutional ban on 

hudud (corporal punishments), several states, including Kelantan, 

Kedah, and Terengganu, have incorporated them into their legal 

system to be implemented if the federal ban is removed. Then Prime 

Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob’s administration worked to elevate 

the position of tahfiz institutions—religious schools that are not 

obliged to provide formal, nonreligious education alongside their 

instruction—through legislation to standardize their curriculum and 

regulations. Around 1,200 such schools exist throughout the country 

and have played a role in introducing Malay students to Islamist 

ideology, heightening the influence of fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, and increasing the risk for radical Islamist groups to 

establish a presence.

The increased role of Islamist rhetoric and ideology was also 

present in the Islamic Party’s (PAS) political calls for the strengthening of Syariah and religiously based laws throughout Malaysia. PAS’s 

coalition earned second place during the 2022 general elections 

(GE15) in November. In its outreach, PAS utilized social media platforms such as TikTok to spread hateful and inflammatory messages 

against non-Muslims to motivate its electoral base. Malaysia’s Islamist 

populist parties have used social media to stoke religious and populist sentiment against what they characterize as plots to Christianize 

the country or take rights and privileges away from Muslim Malay 

communities. GE15 witnessed the collapse of support among ethnic 

Malays for the traditional United Malay National Organization and a 

realignment of most of this demographic behind PAS. During the elections, multiple political actors exploited ethnic and religious concerns 

in their efforts to mobilize Malay Muslim and other Muslim Bumiputra 

voters. In November, King Al-Sultan Abdullah called upon longtime 

opposition figure Anwar Ibrahim to form a national unity government 

with some ideologically and geographically disparate parties. 

Dual Legal System and State Control of Muslims

Malaysia’s federal and state governments use the country’s dual 

legal system to regulate and control the Muslim population. This 

system emerged in the 1990s and coincided with a rapid bureaucratization of religion. States where PAS controls the government require 

individuals to live their lives in accordance with a rigid interpretation 

of Islam, regardless of their religious belief. They enforce clothing 

restrictions for men and women and prohibit indigenous practices, 

such as dancing, and other clothing deemed haram (forbidden).

Malaysia’s state-level Syariah systems also place undue burden 

on Muslim members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, 

and intersex (LGBTQI+) community. In several states, religiously based 

laws criminalize sexual relations for LGBTQI+ people and permit 

caning and imprisonment as punishment. In October, JAKIM officers 

joined the police in raiding a Halloween-themed party in Kuala Lumpur 

for the local LGBTQI+ community, detaining only those whose MyKad 

cards identified them as Muslims. LGBTQI+ community members in 

other parts of the country reported similar incidents in 2022, indicating 

that local authorities have repeatedly attempted to disrupt LGBTQI+ 

events under the pretext of preventing Muslims from attending. Furthermore, the JAKIM, in coordination with its state-level counterparts, 

continued to organize mukhayyams (conversion therapy camps) to 

target and compel Muslim members of the LGBTQI+ community to 

undergo “rehabilitation.” The government reported that it had subjected at least 1,733 LGBTQI+ people to these programs in 2021, but 

it has not released numbers for 2022. 

Refugees and Asylum Seekers

Malaysia hosts significant numbers of refugees and asylum seekers 

fleeing violations of religious freedom, such as religious minorities 

from Burma, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Since Malaysia is not party 

to the 1951 Covenant on Refugees, it effectively leaves those fleeing 

religious persecution and in search of refugee status in a grey legal 

area, void of protection.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States is Malaysia’s third-largest trading partner, and the 

two countries maintain strong bilateral ties. In March, U.S. Secretary 

of State Antony J. Blinken spoke with then Foreign Minister Saifuddin 

Abdullah via phone to strengthen bilateral relations. The United 

States maintains a deep, institutionalized, bilateral military relationship with Malaysia and regularly engages in joint military exercises. 

The two countries continued to partner on counterterrorism efforts 

through information sharing, capacity-building programs for law 

enforcement and judicial authorities, and assistance to improve 

immigration security and border controls. The United States also 

works with Malaysia through regional organizations such as the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, neither 

religious freedom nor broader human rights issues have played a 

substantial, visible role in such engagement.

Through both the International Visiting Leadership Program 

and the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the United States 

hosts leaders from Malaysia in programs that often include religious 

freedom issues. The United States is actively engaged with civil society in Malaysia to promote tolerance and counter violent extremism. 

In August, then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy 

Pelosi (D-CA) visited Kuala Lumpur, accompanied by a congressional 

delegation, where she praised Malaysia for its “leadership in ASEAN 

on repudiating Burma for its deadly crackdown on dissent.”
64 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

SRI LANKA

KEY FINDINGS

I In 2022, religious freedom conditions in Sri Lanka continued 

on a worrying trajectory. The Sri Lankan government targeted 

the rights of religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Hindus, by using problematic legislation, engaging in discrimination 

against them, and instigating land disputes intended to expropriate their property. Authorities harassed and imprisoned religious 

actors associated with the protest movement in 2022 (Aragalaya, 

or “Struggle” in Sinhala) and intimidated members of minority 

religious communities. Muslims who posted supportive messages 

for protesters on social media were identified, questioned, and 

arrested under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights (ICCPR) Act. During the year, Sri Lanka faced an economic 

and political crisis resulting in a lack of basic necessities. The 

Aragalaya called for accountability for corruption and economic 

mismanagement, leading to the resignation of then President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in May and the election of former Prime Minister 

Ranil Wickremesinghe as president in July.

The 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) gives Sri Lankan 

authorities broad powers to search, arrest, and detain individuals. 

Nearly 300 Muslim men and women remained in detention without 

charges in connection to the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings (a series 

of coordinated “bomb blasts that ripped through churches and 

luxury hotels” that killed over 200 people) based on a combination

of the PTA, the ICCPR Act, and/or the penal code. The PTA and 

the ICCPR Act (designed to incorporate the international treaty 

into domestic law) often are used to restrict freedom of expression 

among minority groups. Authorities also utilized the PTA to crack 

down on Aragalaya protesters. In August, police dispersed a protest using tear gas and water cannons and arrested three students, 

including Galwewa Siridhamma Thero, a Buddhist monk and organizer of the Inter University Bhikku (Monks’) Federation. President 

Wickremesinghe signed an order that the three men could be held 

for 90 days without evidence or the opportunity to seek bail. The 

United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders 

expressed support for the three men. The government released

Siridhamma Thero on bail in December. 

The government published proposed amendments to the 

PTA in January, but experts assessed that the amendments did 

not go far enough in addressing the worst aspects of the act. In 

September, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) published a 

report on the human rights situation in Sri Lanka. Nada Al-Nashif, 

then UN Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights, urged the 

government to repeal the PTA and draft a new counterterrorism 

law in its place. 

The Sri Lankan government discriminated against Muslims and 

targeted the practice of Islam. In August, the Ministry of Defense 

announced the addition of several Tamil and Muslim groups and 

individuals to a list of designated persons accused of “terrorism 

related activities” and/or “funding for terrorism” under the country’s UN Regulations No. 1 of 2012. The list included a single mother 

of two who subsequently lost her job, a business owner who sits on 

a local-level peace commission, and Muslim poet Ahnaf Jazeem. 

Organizations included on these kinds of lists often have their 

assets and bank accounts frozen. Inclusion on such lists is used to 

intimidate different communities and disproportionately targets 

religious minorities. The government also closely monitored the 

affairs and finances of Muslim organizations, particularly those 

that receive foreign donations. Such surveillance impacts Muslim 

organizations dedicated to the alms-giving pillar of Islam, known 

as zakat; for example, groups wishing to donate money to the 

families of PTA/ICCPR Act detainees must inform the Terrorism 

Investigation Division to do so.

The Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense previously decreed that 

all imported Islamic books are subject to review and will only be 

released following approval from the ministry to protect against 

“terrorism.” Reports indicate that this practice is ongoing and 

affects all reading material with Arabic script, Qur’anic translations, and material related to Islamic education. The Ministry of 

Education recalled Islamic textbooks for several grades after the 

discredited Presidential Task Force for “One Country, One Law” 

raised concerns over unspecified “objectionable words” and 

claimed “they might contain ideas of extremist ideology.”

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Include Sri Lanka on the Special Watch List 

for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

	■ Direct U.S. Embassy officials to urge 

the Sri Lankan government to repeal or 

significantly reform the PTA and other laws 

that disproportionately affect religious and 

ethnic minorities; and

	■ Advocate for the full implementation of 

UNHRC Resolution 51/1 to promote reconciliation, accountability, and religious 

freedom and other related human rights 

in Sri Lanka.

The U.S. Congress should: 

	■ Hold public hearings highlighting religious 

freedom conditions in Sri Lanka and U.S. 

policy toward Sri Lanka.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Sri Lanka

■ Podcast: Troubling Signs for Religious Freedom in Sri Lanka
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 65

SRI LA

Background

NKA

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is a presidential 

republic with a unicameral parliament. President Wickremesinghe 

serves as chief of state and head of government, having previously 

served as prime minister for five separate terms between 1993 and 

2020. Under Article 9 of the Sri Lankan constitution, Buddhism is 

afforded special status. The state is directed to “protect and foster” 

Buddhism, which holds the “foremost place” within the country. 

The constitution also guarantees the freedom of religion or belief 

in subsequent articles. 

Sri Lanka is both religiously and ethnically diverse. Buddhists 

account for about 70 percent of the population, followed by Hindus 

at 12.6 percent, Muslims (mostly Sunni) at 9.7 percent, Roman Catholics at 6.1 percent, other Christians at 1.3 percent, and adherents 

of “other” religions at about 0.05 percent. Most Sri Lankans are Sinhalese, a majority of whom are Buddhist. The second-largest ethnic 

group, Sri Lankan Tamils, are mostly Hindu with a significant Christian 

minority. Members of the next-smallest ethnic group are traditionally 

called Sri Lankan Moors, who are mostly Muslim and eschew formal 

ethnic classification. Also included are Indian Tamils and a small number of other ethnicities. 

Land Disputes

The Ministry of Defense heads the Task Force for Archaeological 

Heritage Management in the Eastern Province and works in collaboration with the Archaeological Department, security agencies, and 

Buddhist clergies to “identify archaeological monuments and facilitate the repair or construction of Buddhist sites.” In some cases, this 

collaboration has led to the expropriation of Hindu and Muslim sites 

where there were formerly no Buddhist populations, leading to fears 

that the program is transforming the region’s demographic landscape. 

The National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka (NCEASL) 

documented several incidents involving the appropriation of Hindu 

temples between January and August, ranging from the removal 

of Hindu flags at a temple by unknown persons to erecting statues 

of Buddha on Hindu temple sites. In June, Buddhist monks and the 

Sri Lankan Army attempted to dedicate a new Buddhist shrine in 

Mullaitivu despite a 2018 court order prohibiting any new building 

in the area. The same court ordered the removal of new structures 

in July. Government authorities filed a motion asking for the court to 

reconsider the order, arguing that the new structure was meant to 

preserve archaeological materials and that demolishing the building 

would create interreligious tensions. That same day, a judge revised 

the previous order, specifying that the building could remain but that 

no further construction could take place. 

Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act

The Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (MMDA) governs marriage, 

divorce, and other family law matters for all Muslim Sri Lankans and 

is based on Shari’a law, Islamic legal practice, and local customs. The 

MMDA established a tax-funded Muslim judge (Quazi) court system, 

including a Board of Quazis and an Advisory Board. Muslim couples 

can only marry under the MMDA. 

Observers argue that the MMDA is discriminatory toward Muslim 

women and is in violation of domestic and international human rights 

law, as it does not provide them with the same rights and protections 

afforded to women in other religious communities in Sri Lanka. The 

MMDA does not require a woman’s consent before the registration 

of a marriage, allows for unilateral divorce by the husband without 

giving the same right to the wife, presents bureaucratic hurdles to 

women seeking divorce that are not required for men, and allows the 

arbitrary provision for wife and child maintenance by a Quazi, among 

other problematic practices. Additionally, the MMDA lacks a minimum 

age for marriage, providing Quazis the ability to permit marriage of a 

girl younger than 12 years old, despite common law requiring an age 

minimum of 18 years old. 

Harassment of Religious Actors 

Participating in the Aragalaya

Catholic priest Father Amila Jeewantha Peiris was heavily involved 

in the protests in Galle Face. In July, a court imposed a travel ban on 

him for alleged participation in “unlawful assembly and damage to 

public property” during a protest in June. Later in July, police raided 

Father Peiris’s church in the southern city of Balangoda, seeking his 

arrest. Authorities claimed he was liable for “being part of an unlawful 

assembly, obstructing public employees from performing duties, criminal assault and causing hurt.” Father Peiris later filed a fundamental 

rights petition with the Supreme Court to prevent his arrest, but he 

eventually surrendered to the court and posted bail.

Key U.S. Policy

The United States is Sri Lanka’s largest export market, accounting for 

almost 25 percent of Sri Lankan exports. U.S. policy toward Sri Lanka 

has historically focused on “supporting Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions, encouraging economic development, and promoting human 

rights.” In December, the U.S. Department of State announced nearly 

$240 million in new U.S. government assistance to support Sri Lanka 

during its acute economic crisis.

In May, the State Department twice condemned violence against 

Aragalaya protesters and expressed concern about state of emergency declarations, which “can be used to curb dissent.” In a June 

call with then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, U.S. Secretary of 

State Antony J. Blinken affirmed “the United States’ commitment to 

the Sri Lankan people during this challenging time and the importance 

of supporting reforms that address the concerns of all Sri Lankans, 

including on democratic governance and human rights.” U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka Julie J. Chung condemned the use of the PTA 

against Sri Lankans expressing their views.
66 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

TURKEY

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Turkey remained fairly consistent overall but did see some slight improvements. In June, the government finally released long-awaited regulations for religious 

minority foundations’ board member elections. The government’s 

failure to provide these regulations had prevented religious minority 

communities from electing foundation leadership for the last nine 

years. While the issuance of the regulations represented a positive 

development for the ability of some groups to operate, some critics panned the procedure as another means to “perpetuate state 

control” over non-Muslim communities. Although an April decision 

by the Constitutional Court ruled that schools’ refusal to exempt 

children from mandatory religious classes violated freedom of religion or belief, the government took no apparent action to remedy 

the situation. On the contrary, schools reportedly pushed Kurdish 

students who wanted to enroll in Kurdish language courses to take 

religious classes instead. During the year, the government also took 

no steps to grant legal personality to religious communities, permit 

conscientious objection to mandatory military service, or reopen 

the Theological School of Halki or any other seminary.

The Turkish government continued to discriminate against 

Alevis and refuse to recognize their places of worship, known as 

cemevis. In February, Alevis protested the government’s discriminatory policy of charging utility fees for their places of worship 

and not others, like mosques. That same month, President Recep 

Tayyip Erdog ̆ an announced that the government would reduce the 

fees by classifying cemevis as residences rather than commercial 

establishments, but notably it did not categorize them as places of 

worship. In October, President Erdog ̆ an announced the creation 

of a state-run “Alevi-Bektas ̧i Culture and Cemevi Directorate” to 

allegedly address the community’s issues; however, many Alevis 

criticized the move as a means to subject Alevism to government 

authority and promote their assimilation to Sunni Islam. Alevis also 

continued to experience targeted violence throughout the year. In 

July, coinciding with the beginning of the holy month of Muharrem, 

several individuals conducted a string of attacks on Alevi places of 

worship and associations, with one assailant reportedly stabbing a 

woman who had to be hospitalized. Days later, two men physically 

assaulted Selami Sarıtas ̧, the leader of an Istanbul cemevi. 

Other religious communities, including Christians and Jews, 

also experienced instances of societal violence, intimidation, 

and the destruction or vandalization of their religious sites over 

the course of the year. In June, several persons attacked a Syriac 

family related to an alleged land dispute while the family hosted 

Syriac clergy members in their house. In July, vandals destroyed 36 

headstones in the Jewish Hasköy cemetery in Istanbul. Remnants 

of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—which maintained

a presence in Turkey—continued to pose a threat to religious 

minorities. Alleged ISIS members reportedly planned to carry out

attacks on Alevis and an Ankara cemevi, and after the reporting 

period, additional plots to attack churches and synagogues also 

came to light. 

The Turkish government continued to criminalize blasphemy or 

“insulting religious values” under Article 216(3) of the Penal Code, 

frequently levying such charges to crack down on criticism of the government and expression perceived as offensive to Islam. Throughout 

the year, numerous individuals and entities faced prosecution or 

investigation on criminal blasphemy charges, including Turkish pop 

singer Sezen Aksu and Swedish music streaming service Spotify.

KEY FINDINGS

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Include Turkey on the Special Watch List 

for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

	■ Raise in all meetings with Turkish government officials and press at the highest levels 

for the reopening of the Theological School 

of Halki (Halki Seminary) and for full compliance with European Court of Human Rights 

rulings on freedom of religion or belief; and

	■ Track and comprehensively document in 

the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report religious 

communities’ efforts to open, regain, renovate, and protect places of worship and 

other religious sites of spiritual, cultural, or 

historical importance; include information 

on the vandalization, damage, and destruction of such sites; and work with the Turkish 

government to ensure their protection.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Incorporate consideration of Turkey’s treatment of religious minorities and broader 

human rights issues into its continued 

evaluation of the U.S.-Turkey bilateral 

relationship, including in the context of 

proposed legislation.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Staff Visit: Istanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakır, and Mardin in March 2022

■ Issue Update: Blasphemy Charges in Turkey

■ Podcast: Conditions for Religious and Nonbelief Communities in Turkey

■ Podcast: The Alevi Struggle for Rights in Turkey
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 67

TURKEY

Background

The U.S. government estimates the population of Turkey at just over 

83 million. The Turkish government has claimed that 99 percent of the 

population is Muslim, with 78 percent reportedly identifying as Hanafi 

Sunni. Between 10 million and 25 million people identify as Alevi, the 

country’s largest religious minority, and there is also a small population 

of Shi’a Muslims. An estimated 0.2 percent of the population comprises 

atheists, Armenian Apostolics, Baha’is, Bulgarian Orthodox, Chaldean 

Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, Protestants, 

Roman Catholics, Russian Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, 

Yazidis, and others.

The constitution defines Turkey as a secular (laik) state and provides for the freedom of conscience, religious belief, and conviction. 

Despite these provisions, the government maintained an active role in 

religious affairs, directly overseeing the practice of Islam through the 

official Directorate of Religious Affairs, or Diyanet, and managing the 

affairs of other religious communities through the General Directorate 

of Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüg ̆ ü).

The overall situation for human rights in Turkey continued to 

decline amid the government’s ongoing targeting of political opponents, censorship of media, and alleged use of torture. The downward 

trajectory of recent years led Human Rights Watch to assert that “the 

authoritarian and highly centralized presidential government of Recep 

Tayyip Erdog ̆ an has set back Turkey’s human rights record by decades.” 

In June, the European Parliament adopted a report that reiterated serious human rights concerns and called on Turkey to address persistent 

religious freedom issues such as: lack of legal personality for religious 

communities, compulsory religious education, failure to recognize 

Alevis and their places of worship, restrictions on the training and 

succession of clergy, and the continued closure of Halki Seminary. 

According to reports, Turkey also rejected the citizenship applications 

of some Uyghurs due to purported “national security” and “public 

order” risks. 

Foundation Elections and 

Other Discriminatory Policies

The government has regularly inserted itself in the internal affairs 

of religious communities, interfered in leadership elections, and 

prevented religious minorities from opening places of worship 

and training facilities for religious leaders. For the last nine years, 

the many religious minority communities that manage their affairs 

through foundations have been unable to elect new leadership due 

to the government’s refusal to issue regulations for those elections. 

Finally, in June, the government published those regulations but 

included a new residency requirement for candidates competing in 

parts of Istanbul, generating concerns that it would limit participation. 

Armenian Patriarch Sahak Mas ̧alyan stated that the patriarchate did 

not know why religious communities had to wait so long to hold elections, and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew criticized the extended 

delay as a “great injustice” and expressed his disappointment that 

the state did not heed the communities’ appeals on various elements 

of the regulations.

In June, a citizen won a lawsuit to have information included 

on his national identification card to reflect Tengrism as his religion 

instead of Islam, after the Ministry of Interior reportedly denied his 

initial request.

Charges of Blasphemy

Turkish authorities continued to rely on blasphemy charges to penalize individuals considered critical of the government or perceived 

to have “insulted” Islam. In January, a group lodged a complaint 

against pop singer Sezen Aksu on such charges after she posted a 

clip of a five-year-old song to YouTube in which she referred to the 

religious figures of Adam and Eve as “ignorant.” In a thinly veiled 

reference to Aksu, President Erdog ̆ an threatened to “tear out those 

tongues,” while the Diyanet warned citizens “to be extremely sensitive and careful in every sentence, statement and approach made 

about the distinguished, leading, and exemplary figures of Islam.” 

In August, the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office announced 

an investigation into Spotify after complaints emerged that users 

had created “insulting” playlist names such as “God’s Ringtone,” 

“Songs God listened to while exiling Adam from paradise,” and 

“Eve didn’t hear when God announced the forbidden fruit [because 

she was] listening to this playlist,” among others. In September, 

authorities began an investigation against a scholar and atheist who 

called certain religious figures “fairy tales.” Yet another individual 

was indicted on incitement charges after he posted a photo during 

the holy month of Ramadan of himself and others drinking alcohol 

captioned with the phrase “may the lord accept.”

Key U.S. Policy

The United States and Turkey continued to cooperate closely on 

matters related to security and economic relations. With the launch of 

Russia’s full-scale invasion and war against Ukraine, the U.S. government increasingly engaged with the Turkish government—which has 

attempted to position itself as a potential mediator to the conflict—

on efforts to assist Ukraine. In April, the United States and Turkey 

launched the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism, which convened three 

times throughout the year to review aspects of the bilateral relationship such as trade, defense cooperation, and counterterrorism. During 

the year, the State Department condemned Turkey’s unjust convictions and sentencing of philanthropist Osman Kavala and Istanbul 

Mayor Ekrem  ̇Imamog ̆ lu.

The U.S. government continued to raise religious freedom concerns in Turkey. In September, Ambassador at Large for International 

Religious Freedom Rashad Hussain traveled to Turkey, where he met 

with Turkish officials including the Spokesperson and Chief Advisor 

to the President  ̇Ibrahim Kalın and President of Religious Affairs Ali 

Erbas ̧. Public messaging, however, indicated a greater focus on refugees and individuals fleeing religious persecution in other countries 

than on Turkey’s own religious freedom violations. U.S. Ambassador 

to Turkey Jeffry L. Flake also met with representatives of various 

religious communities.
68 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

UZBEKISTAN

KEY FINDINGS

I n 2022, religious freedom conditions in Uzbekistan trended slightly 

positively in a few areas, although most concerns related to the 

fundamental protection of this right remained. The government 

continued to severely restrict freedom of religion or belief through 

its 1998 law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, 

as amended in 2021, which requires religious groups to obtain registration to engage in religious activity and prohibits unregistered 

religious activity, the private teaching of religion, missionary activity, 

and proselytism, in addition to other undue restrictions. Although the 

government allowed the opening of some new mosques and registered a handful of religious minority communities—including three 

Protestant Christian churches and one Shi’a Muslim mosque—the 

registration process remained a burdensome and insurmountable 

challenge to other religious minority communities. Local governments and mahallas (local neighborhood committees) still arbitrarily 

blocked some registration applications submitted by Jehovah’s 

Witnesses and Protestant Christians.

While the government continued to issue sporadic pardons 

that resulted in the release of some individuals convicted in connection with their peaceful religious activities, more than 2,000 

Muslims remained imprisoned on various charges of “extremism” 

and other related offenses. Throughout the year, authorities continued to detain, arrest, imprison, and ill-treat Muslims for distributing 

unauthorized or illegal religious materials, criticizing state-approved 

imams, holding prayers in unsanctioned areas, and leading informal 

classes on Islam without government permission. Law enforcement authorities conducted raids against and detained alleged 

members of the Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir for meeting to discuss 

religious texts or sharing such texts online. In July, a local court in 

Bukhara sentenced Muslim Bobirjon Tukhtamurodov, who studied 

the works of Muslim theologian Said Nursi, to more than five years 

in prison for allegedly recruiting youth to the so-called “Nurchilar” group. In another case, Muslim blogger Fazilhoja Arifhojaev 

received a seven-and-a-half-year prison sentence in January after 

he reshared a Facebook post that stated that Muslims should not 

congratulate non-Muslims on their religious holidays. According to 

Human Rights Watch, Arifhojaev’s lawyer said that his client experienced ill-treatment and torture while in police custody. USCIRF 

received reports throughout the year that Uzbekistan pursued 

individuals who had fled abroad on religiously motivated charges 

and requested their extradition. In an apparent effort to suppress 

information, Uzbekistan’s State Security Service (Davlat Xavfsizlik 

Xizmati) also intimidated human rights activists documenting the 

country’s ongoing religious freedom violations—including during 

USCIRF’s commissioner delegation visit—and reportedly warned 

journalists against reporting on such issues. 

Authorities sought to limit some elements of Islam and Islamic 

practice unofficially considered inappropriate. For instance, in May 

police in two districts of Tashkent rounded up at least 10 men and 

threatened them with arrest if they refused to have their beards 

shaved, drawing criticism from the U.S. ambassador to Uzbekistan. 

Similarly, officials have harassed women and girls who wear the 

hijab and maintained that only a “light-colored national headscarf” 

may be worn in schools. Despite a public announcement made in 

recent years that children can attend mosques, in April security 

officials in the exclave of So’x (or Sokh) reportedly raided and drove 

out children from the Hazrati Ali mosque during the holy month of 

Ramadan. Authorities allegedly dissuaded or hindered attempts by 

Muslims to reopen previously closed places of worship, such as the 

Abu Zar mosque and the Nazira Bibi Xonim mosque in Tashkent, 

and required Muslims interested in performing the Hajj or Umra 

pilgrimages to apply to their mahalla.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

	■ Include Uzbekistan on the Special Watch 

List for engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom pursuant to the 

International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA);

	■ Work with the government of Uzbekistan to revise the 1998 religion law, as 

amended in 2021, and other relevant legislation to comply with international human 

rights standards, including by removing 

registration requirements on religious 

communities, permitting the possession 

and distribution of religious literature, and 

permitting the sharing of religious beliefs; 

	■ Press at the highest levels for the immediate release of individuals imprisoned 

for their peaceful religious activities or 

religious affiliations, and press the government of Uzbekistan to treat prisoners 

humanely and allow for independent prison 

monitoring; and

	■ Allocate funding for the U.S. Agency 

for International Development and U.S. 

Embassy in Tashkent to provide litigation 

support to individuals and religious communities prosecuted in connection with 

their peaceful religious activities.

The U.S. Congress should:

	■ Advocate on behalf of individuals imprisoned for their peaceful religious activities 

or religious affiliations through letters, 

floor speeches, hearings, delegations, 

and other engagements with or about 

Uzbekistan.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Commission Delegation Visit: Tashkent and Bukhara in April 2022

■ Country Update: Uzbekistan: Space for Reform

■ Podcast: Uzbekistan: Gaps in Principles and Practice
USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST 69

UZBEKI

Background

STAN

The government of Uzbekistan estimates the country’s population 

at nearly 35 million people. Varying estimates assess that between 

88 and 96 percent of people identify as Sunni Muslim; one percent 

identify as Shi’a Muslim; 2.2 percent identify as Russian Orthodox; and 

1.6 percent identify as atheist, Baha’i, Buddhist, Catholic, Jehovah’s 

Witness, Jewish, Protestant, or a member of the International Society 

of Krishna Consciousness. 

Uzbekistan’s reform agenda related to religious freedom slowed 

in 2022 relative to previous years, although the government introduced additional legislative and other policy changes that alternately 

represented positive and negative developments for freedom of 

religion or belief. At the beginning of the year, Uzbekistan signaled 

its intent to abolish administrative fines for wearing religious attire 

in public after formally dropping the ban previously included in the 

country’s religion law. Meanwhile, in June the government adopted a 

new law on advertising that prohibits “disrespect for traditional symbols of the country,” including religious symbols. In the foreign policy 

sphere, in October Uzbekistan voted against the United Nations 

Human Rights Council holding a debate on China’s human rights 

abuses perpetrated against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities 

in Xinjiang.

Fines, Detention, and Arrest of Muslims

Uzbekistan continued to repress Muslims whose independent religious 

practice violated the country’s religious regulations and whose actions 

the government equated with “extremism” or “religious fundamentalism.” For example, in several instances courts handed down fines to 

Muslims who held or permitted prayers in unauthorized locations such 

as businesses. In January, law enforcement raided the business of Farhod Rahmonov because he allowed his employees to pray at their place 

of work. The next month, a local Tashkent court fined him the equivalent 

of $1,982 (21,600,000 So’m). In March, a court jailed Nosir Numanov for 

15 days after he performed Friday prayers in a teahouse with a group of 

friends. The court also fined the teahouse owner approximately $2,473 

(27,000,000 So’m). 

Likewise, authorities routinely cracked down on Muslims for 

illegal possession or distribution of religious texts. According to nongovernmental organization Forum 18, in January and February police 

arrested as many as 24 men for keeping “extremist” religious content 

on their phones. In April, a judge sentenced Hasan Abdirahimov to 

four years in prison for “liking” and sharing religious materials online; 

he was already serving a previous sentence for listening to banned 

sermons. In May, Oybek Hamidov received five years in prison after he 

shared an audio file of a sermon. That same month, a court sentenced

Alimardon Sultonov to seven years in a labor camp on numerous 

charges, including storage of materials with “religious extremism,” 

despite claims he had experienced torture. His family has asserted he 

was arrested due to his criticism of state-appointed imams, among 

other public figures.

Women are also targeted, often in connection with their collective religious activity. Following a raid in the beginning of the 

year, police accused four women of teaching Islam without official 

permission and fined each around $124 (1,350,000 So’m). In January, officials detained another 12 women—who had gathered in a 

private home for religious readings—on charges of Hizb ut-Tahrir 

membership. 

Persistent Obstacles for Religious Minorities

Despite the passage of a revised religion law with a supposedly 

streamlined registration process in July 2021, few non-Muslim religious communities have managed to obtain the legally required 

registration. Only two Pentecostal churches and one Evangelical 

church received registration in June and September 2022, respectively, since the adoption of those amendments. Numerous religious 

communities that have sought registration in recent years remained 

unregistered by year’s end.

Various communities reported to USCIRF that they were often 

required to inform the government of their activities, that they limited some practices in light of the continued bans on proselytism 

and missionary activity, and that some still could not import religious 

literature. In a few instances, police subjected Jehovah’s Witnesses to 

interrogation, seized their possessions, threatened them with fines for 

sharing their beliefs, and in one case searched an individual’s private 

home. Forum 18 reported that in early 2022, the Ministry of Internal 

Affairs ordered non-Muslim religious communities to install surveillance cameras in their places of worship, causing some members to 

cease attending services amid fears of possible retaliation.

Key U.S. Policy

As in recent years, the United States and Uzbekistan took steps to 

build closer relations in 2022, an effort exemplified by the number 

of high-level visits paid by both countries to the other throughout 

the year. For example, Assistant Secretary of State for South and 

Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu traveled to Tashkent twice, in May 

and November, to “advance our support for . . . freedom of religion 

or belief,” among other priorities. In August, a congressional delegation that included Representative Trent Kelly (R-MS), cochair of 

the Uzbekistan Caucus, and Representative Darin LaHood (R-IL) also 

visited to discuss bilateral relations.

The U.S. government continued to prioritize religious freedom 

concerns in the country at all levels of engagement. In December, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met with Foreign Minister Vladimir 

Norov on the occasion of the two countries’ annual Strategic Partnership Dialogue, where Secretary Blinken highlighted his appreciation 

for “the work being done on reforms, including on religious freedom.” 

Similarly, visiting delegations from Uzbekistan regularly interacted 

with the U.S. Department of State’s Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Rashad Hussain and Under Secretary for 

Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya to discuss 

freedom of religion or belief. Then U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan 

Daniel N. Rosenblum frequently raised religious freedom issues in his 

meetings and other public fora.

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023 71

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

This section highlights some important developments and trends 

that impacted religious freedom conditions around the world 

in 2022, particularly—but not only—in countries and regions 

not covered elsewhere in this report.

Transnational Repression and Influence 

by Religious Freedom Violators

While abuser governments perpetrate most religious freedom violations within their own countries, several authoritarian governments 

often and insidiously seek to extend their religious repression beyond 

their borders. 

The Chinese government continued its transnational repression 

campaigns throughout 2022, targeting ethnic and religious minorities, human rights activists, and others living in diaspora. It used 

its economic and geopolitical 

influence to pressure foreign 

countries, including majority-Muslim countries such as 

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United 

Arab Emirates, and Kazakhstan 

to repatriate Uyghurs, Kazakhs, 

and others—sometimes through 

the use of Interpol Red Notices. 

The Chinese government also 

harassed and intimidated victims by threatening their family 

members in China and by sending or recruiting undercover 

agents to conduct transnational 

repression activities abroad on its behalf, including in the United 

States. Reports emerged during the year revealing that China operates more than 100 overseas “police service stations” in at least 53 

countries, including one in New York City—causing concerns about 

their use to harass and intimidate ethnic minorities and dissidents 

abroad, including Uyghurs and Tibetans. In Thailand, approximately 60 

members of the Protestant Shenzhen Holy Reformed Church, over 50 

Uyghurs, and an ethnic Mongolian activist have experienced ongoing 

harassment and intimidation by Chinese officials operating in that 

country and remained in fear of repatriation to China.

Iran’s government continued to pursue religious minorities and 

those challenging the legal imposition of its religious interpretations 

on Iranians without their consent. In Germany, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has overseen shooting and arson attacks on 

synagogues. Religious minorities from Iran who fled to Turkey and 

Europe faced threats and harassment from the IRGC on the basis of 

their faith. Iranians seeking asylum in Turkey from religiously grounded 

laws in their home country faced an ongoing threat of deportation and 

severe consequences. In some cases, Iran’s repression of individuals 

who oppose its religiously grounded laws occurred on U.S. soil; in early 

2023, just after the reporting period, the U.S. Department of Justice 

announced details of an Iranian government conspiracy to kidnap 

and return to Iran a Brooklyn-based Iranian American woman whose 

activism opposes mandatory hijab laws and other religious restrictions 

by Iran’s government. 

Regarding other countries, Saudi Arabia also engaged in transnational repression, including the monitoring of religious dissidents. 

In August, a U.S. court convicted a former employee of Twitter after 

he “took bribes in exchange for accessing, monitoring, and conveying 

the private information of Twitter users to officials of the Kingdom 

of Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Royal family.” That case highlights 

the country’s ongoing efforts to monitor and suppress social media 

activity both inside and outside of its borders. Saudi authorities have 

arrested scores of religious dissidents for their Twitter posts, sentencing some to decades of 

imprisonment—including Salma 

al-Shehab, a Saudi student in the 

United Kingdom (UK) whom a 

Saudi court sentenced to an 

astonishing 34 years in prison 

for implying support for political dissidents on social media. 

Meanwhile, Forum 18 reported 

that in October, Russian law 

enforcement threatened to submit Interpol Red Notices to seek 

the extradition of two individuals targeted for their religious 

belief or activity. Throughout 

the year, USCIRF also received reports that government officials in 

Uzbekistan continued to pursue or seek the extradition of Muslim 

individuals who had fled abroad—typically to countries in Europe—to 

avoid prosecution on various religiously motivated charges, such as 

illegal possession or distribution of unauthorized religious materials.

Religious Freedom Concerns in Europe

In 2022, religious communities throughout Europe continued to face 

restrictions on certain religious practices and discrimination on the 

basis of their faith. As in years past, Muslims and Jews navigated 

discriminatory policies and societal intolerance that increasingly 

threatened their way of life, compelling some individuals to emigrate. 

Christian communities similarly faced rising prejudices.

Some European countries maintained restrictions on wearing 

religious garb—an issue that impacts Jews, Sikhs, and other religious 

groups but most blatantly targets Muslim women and encourages 

societal discrimination against them. In January, the French Senate 

approved an amendment to ban head coverings in sporting events, 

While abuser governments perpetrate 

most religious freedom violations within 

their own countries, several authoritarian 

governments often and insidiously 

seek to extend their religious repression 

beyond their borders.
72 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

although the National Assembly had not moved to enact the ban by 

the end of the year. In March, the Court of Cassation—France’s highest court—upheld a ban set by the Bar Council in Lille that prohibited 

the wearing of religious symbols in courtrooms, including head coverings. In May, the town council of the French city of Grenoble voted 

to permit women to wear a “burkini,” but France’s top administrative 

court ruled against that decision. In August, a body of the ruling 

political party in Denmark proposed a ban on hijabs for elementary 

school girls. In October, the Swiss government introduced a draft law 

to ban face coverings and fine violators up to approximately $1,100 

(1,000 Swiss francs). The European Court of Justice ruled in October 

that prohibitions on religious symbols in the workplace is not discriminatory if those restrictions are applied equally. Jews also experienced 

discrimination in manifesting their religion through their clothing; for 

example, in March, a bus driver in Sweden refused to allow a Jewish 

man to board because he was wearing an unspecified “Jewish symbol” 

on his clothes. 

European countries continued to debate the issue of ritual 

slaughter. State regulations requiring the stunning of animals before 

slaughter, with no religious exemptions, force Jews and Muslims to 

abandon important religious practices and send them an exclusionary 

message. In March, Greece dropped an amendment that, if passed, 

would have allowed ritual slaughter of animals without pre-stunning. 

In the Belgian region of Brussels-Capital, the Federal Parliament of 

Belgium rejected a bill that would require pre-stunning of animals. A 

public petition to the government of the UK calling for a ban on ritual 

slaughter without pre-stunning ultimately did not garner enough votes 

for consideration by the British Parliament. 

As part of stated efforts to counter “extremism,” governments 

continued to single out Muslim communities for suspicion and place 

undue restrictions on mosques and affiliated spaces. In February 2023, 

just after the reporting period, 

French President Emmanuel 

Macron announced that France 

had conducted nearly 28,000 

investigations since 2019 to 

combat “political Islamism.” As 

a result, the government temporarily or permanently closed 

906 establishments, including 

mosques, Qur’anic schools, 

businesses, and civil society 

organizations, and seized over 

$57.5 million (54 million euros). 

Reports of physical attacks against individuals on the basis of 

religion persisted throughout the year. For example, in January, individuals assaulted two Orthodox Jews in the UK and in September 

verbally harassed and physically attacked Jews on public transportation in Germany. In August, a man in France murdered his neighbor, 

Eyal Haddad, confessing to police that he did so because the victim 

was Jewish. During another incident in France, police officers physically assaulted two Muslim women in May and attempted to forcibly 

remove one’s hijab.

The vandalism of places of worship, holy sites, and other places 

of religious significance remained a threat to religious freedom in 

Europe throughout the year. Vandals desecrated Jewish cemeteries in 

Greece, Germany, and Hungary, among other places. On Yom Kippur, 

an unidentified individual broke a window during religious services 

at a synagogue in Hanover, Germany; mere weeks later, German 

authorities found bullet holes at a synagogue in Essen. Additionally, 

vandals targeted synagogues in other countries, including Spain and 

Italy, and desecrated Holocaust memorials in Lithuania and Greece. 

As in previous years, individuals also targeted Muslim cemeteries 

throughout Europe, including in Germany and Sweden. Unknown 

individuals threw stones at a mosque in Sweden in September and 

set fire to a mosque in the Netherlands in August. 

Vandalism and restrictive policies also targeted or impacted 

Christian communities. According to local clergy, arsonists likely set 

fire to a church in Rautjarvi, Finland, during December Christmas 

services, while in Paris, France, a suspicious fire seriously damaged a 

Russian Orthodox Church on Easter Sunday. In addition, three Austrian churches were the targets of vandalism in the span of two weeks. 

In December, UK authorities arrested a woman for silently praying 

outside of an abortion clinic and charged her with violating a legal 

“buffer zone,” which bans protests around abortion clinics in certain 

UK localities.

Laws Restricting Religious Freedom

In 2022, governments in various parts of the world maintained laws 

based on religion that may result in violations of international standards regarding freedom of religion or belief. As USCIRF delineated 

in an issue brief in November, such governments repress religious 

freedom through laws and policies that coerce compliance with a 

particular religious interpretation, typically one that aligns with an 

official or state-favored religion. These sorts of laws can lead to severe 

violations of freedom of religion or belief and other human rights, 

including discrimination on the basis of religion against individuals and 

communities who do not adhere to the state’s interpretation. Targets 

of such discrimination include religious minorities, dissenters within 

the majority faith, nonreligious 

persons, women, and members 

of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 

transgender, queer, and intersex 

(LGBTQI+) community. USCIRF’s 

report found that although 

there is no inevitable contradiction between religious freedom 

and a country’s adoption of an 

official or favored religion, most 

governments within this category also maintained laws or 

policies on the basis of religion 

that led to discrimination or repression. Far fewer countries—less than 

a third—named an official or favored religion and yet maintained no 

discriminatory laws or policies based on that religion.

Blasphemy laws remained one of the most pervasive and corrosive ways that governments—in a variety of religious, cultural, and 

political contexts—employed laws in 2022 to enforce a particular 

interpretation of an official or favored religion or to protect such a 

religion. Such laws violate freedom of religion or belief, including the 

right to express a full range of thoughts and beliefs that others might 

find blasphemous; they also violate freedom of expression and promote intolerance and discrimination against minorities. 

As described in their respective chapters, a number of the countries USCIRF recommends for Country of Particular Concern or Special 

Watch List designation in this report maintain and enforce blasphemy 

laws, leading to related prosecutions and, in some cases, to societal 

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

As part of stated efforts to 

counter “extremism,” governments 

continued to single out Muslim communities 

for suspicion and place undue restrictions on 

mosques and affiliated spaces.
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023 73

violence such as mob attacks. However, blasphemy cases continued 

to emerge in other countries as well. For example, in August, cybersecurity specialists with Bahrain’s Office of the Public Prosecutor 

questioned and eventually recommended charges against three 

members of the Tajdeed Society, a Shi’a Muslim cultural organization, 

for YouTube videos in which they reportedly questioned elements 

of traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Those individuals subsequently 

stood trial on blasphemy-related charges beginning in February 2023, 

after the reporting period. In November, authorities in Mali issued a 

warrant to arrest a Kamite preacher on charges of blasphemy after 

he released a video that contained content that many considered 

insulting to Islam. Officials arrested six of the preacher’s followers for 

complicity when they refused to tell them where the man was hiding.

Sixteen European countries also maintained blasphemy laws—

and in some cases enforced or sought to reinforce them in 2022. For 

example, in August, an Italian man who cursed in public received a 

fine of over $200 (200 euros) for violating Article 724 of the Criminal 

Code, which penalizes blasphemy. In October, a Polish political party, 

United Poland, submitted a proposal to parliament that would further 

expand the country’s existing blasphemy law by dropping a requirement that an individual actually take religious offense from another’s 

actions. These actions stood in marked contrast to efforts elsewhere 

in Europe in recent years to repeal or nullify such laws, such as Norway 

(2015), Denmark (2017), Greece (2019), the Republic of Ireland (2020), 

and Scotland (2021).

In addition to these lingering blasphemy laws in Europe, vague 

and overbroad hate speech laws also remained a parallel legal challenge to religious freedom. Such laws criminalize speech that does 

not amount to incitement to violence, denying the integral right of 

individuals to peacefully and 

publicly share and express their 

religious beliefs—including 

beliefs that others in society may 

find offensive or controversial. 

For example, Finnish prosecutors charged MP Päivi Räsänen 

and Evangelical Lutheran Bishop 

Juhana Pohjola with hate speech 

in 2021 for expressing religious 

beliefs concerning LGBTQ+ 

issues. Although a court dismissed all charges against them in March 

2022, the Finnish prosecutor appealed the ruling in May and the Court 

of Appeals subsequently delayed a new hearing to August 2023.

USCIRF highlighted several regional and country-specific contexts in which blasphemy cases remained especially concerning in 

2022. For example, USCIRF’s October issue update on related laws 

in Southeast Asia found that blasphemy allegations and convictions 

continued to represent serious, ongoing religious freedom abuse in 

Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia, while Brunei’s Shari’a-based 

Penal Code also enshrined restrictive and punitive blasphemy laws. 

At the same time, the Buddhist-majority countries of Burma and 

Thailand maintained their own versions of blasphemy laws as part 

of their authoritarian arsenals. USCIRF’s December issue update on 

blasphemy charges in Turkey delineated the ways in which the Turkish 

government uses Article 216(3) of its Penal Code to restrict freedom 

of religion or belief and freedom of expression. Its use of blasphemy 

charges is generally politically motivated and has served as a tool to 

silence dissenting or simply different voices. USCIRF’s most recent 

policy update on blasphemy laws in Nigeria, released in October, 

demonstrates the ways in which the increasing enforcement of these 

laws as enshrined in criminal and Shari’a codes poses a significant risk 

to religious freedom for Nigerians—especially religious minorities 

and those who espouse unpopular or dissenting religious beliefs, 

worldviews, or interpretations.

Emerging Religious Freedom Concerns 

in Other Countries 

In Belarus, religious freedom conditions continued to trend negatively in 2022 as the government persisted in exerting control over all 

aspects of society following the country’s fraudulent 2020 election 

that kept President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in power. Authorities 

reportedly fined, detained, and sentenced at least 20 Christian religious leaders for perceived political activities and forced several to 

flee the country. In January, amendments to the Criminal Code took 

effect, recriminalizing with fines or up to two years’ imprisonment individual activities in unregistered or forcibly dissolved nongovernmental 

organizations, including religious organizations. In March, police 

briefly detained four mothers of Belarusian soldiers for attending 

prayers for peace at the Orthodox Holy Spirit Cathedral in Minsk. In 

September, the government closed the Roman Catholic Church of 

Saints Simon and Helena (Red Church) in Minsk—a symbol of political 

opposition to the Lukashenka regime during the 2020 protests—after 

a mysterious fire broke out, and officials gave no timetable for the 

repairs they claimed to be making. 

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, 

Ukrainian authorities increasingly scrutinized the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC)—which is historically and ecclesiastically linked 

to the Moscow Patriarchate—

despite the UOC declaring in 

May its “full independence and 

autonomy.” The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) searched

hundreds of UOC churches 

and other religious facilities 

and opened criminal proceedings against dozens of UOC 

clergy for collaborating with 

Russian authorities, spreading 

pro-Russian propaganda, or justifying Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In 

November, a group of Ukrainian parliamentarians proposed a bill that, 

if passed into law, would ban the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and 

religious organizations subordinate to the ROC, cancel property contracts with ROC-aligned religious organizations, and regulate the use 

of the term “Orthodox” by religious groups. In December, President 

Volodymyr Zelenskyy ordered his Cabinet of Ministers to also submit 

a bill to parliament that would make it “impossible for religious organizations affiliated with centers of influence in the Russian Federation 

to operate in Ukraine.” While the Ukrainian parliament had not passed 

any such legislation banning religious groups by the end of 2022, its 

potential to still do so remained a serious concern.

In Qatar, the increasingly concerning trend of official discrimination against the country’s small Baha’i community continued. 

For example, the government has not renewed residency visas for 

many Baha’is, despite their having lived peacefully in the country for 

decades, while plans for a new Baha’i cemetery remained in hiatus. In 

May, the Court of Cassation upheld the 2021 conviction of Remy Rouhani, chair of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Qatar, 

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Sixteen European countries also maintained 

blasphemy laws—and in some cases 

enforced or sought to reinforce them in 2022
74 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

on vague charges of financial crimes over his handling of money for 

that community. In March, the Baha’i International Community raised 

concerns that Qatar’s Baha’i community is “at risk of being eradicated 

from the country” should these trends persist long term.

The Islamic State continued to pose a threat to freedom of 

religion or belief, gaining strength, territory, and fighters in several 

contexts. In addition to threats from the group discussed in the relevant country chapters—including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, , and 

Turkey—affiliates in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo 

(DRC), and others continued to conduct attacks, harm civilians, and 

enforce harsh interpretations of Islamic law in their campaigns to 

establish governance based on their religious beliefs. For example, 

the Islamic State-affiliated Allied Defense Forces (ADF) reportedly 

continued to enforce a strict interpretation of Islamic law and commit 

egregious violations of freedom of religion or belief, including forced 

prayer, conversion, and marriage.

In addition to violent threats from Islamic State affiliates, armed 

groups in the DRC directly placed religious communities in their line 

of fire, including targeting houses of worship. An attack in March 

by the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO) on a 

church compound in Ituri Province killed 18 civilians seeking refuge 

there. Rwandan-backed armed group M23 also attacked worshipers 

at an Adventist church in the context of a wider massacre that killed 

an estimated 270 people in December in Kishishe. 

In Ethiopia, armed actors targeted religious infrastructure in the 

context of the ongoing civil conflict in the Tigray and Oromia regions, 

impacting worship for several faith communities. In Oromia, Ethiopian security forces attacked practitioners of an indigenous religion 

conducting a sacred prayer ceremony and abducted, tortured, and 

executed several spiritual leaders and other worshipers. Instability and 

impunity for violence in Ethiopia 

have also aggravated religious 

tensions in some regions and 

led to nonstate armed actors 

attacking houses of worship and 

religious communities. In April, 

alleged anti-Muslim extremists 

attacked the funeral of a Muslim elder in the northern city of 

Gondar and killed 20 members 

of that community. In November, an unidentified armed 

group killed at least 15 worshipers in a drone attack on an Evangelical Christian church in Oromia, 

following similar attacks on nearby sites earlier that month.

Meanwhile, religious freedom conditions in various parts of 

South Asia continued to exhibit substantial challenges throughout the 

year. In Bangladesh, the Armed Police Battalion extorted, harassed, 

and arbitrarily arrested Rohingya refugees, while government officials 

imposed new restrictions making it more difficult for these refugees 

to secure livelihood and for their children to receive education. Elsewhere in the country, perpetrators also reportedly vandalized several 

Hindu temples in a series of incidents in October and December, 

echoing deadly anti-Hindu riots that targeted temples and worshipers 

one year prior. Meanwhile, in July, a High Court in Nepal affirmed the 

conviction of a pastor for illegal proselytization—despite the dropping 

of all charges against him one month prior—but revised his sentence 

from two years’ imprisonment to one year and reportedly released 

him on bail in January 2023, pending appeal.

Combating Antisemitism: Positive Developments

While antisemitism continued to present an alarming resurgence in 

various parts of the world in 2022, a number of countries in Europe, 

Latin America, the Middle East, and North Africa launched or continued substantive and ongoing initiatives to combat this trend. 

The European Commission published a strategy in 2021 on 

combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life in Europe, which—

among other items—called for all European Union (EU) member 

states to develop their own national strategies on combating 

antisemitism. In 2022, Denmark and Germany joined the list of EU 

member states to announce their individual strategies, followed by 

France, Spain, and Sweden in early 2023, shortly after the reporting 

period. However, Finland was the only additional EU member state 

to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance working 

definition of antisemitism and its examples in 2022. Outside of the 

EU, Bosnia also newly agreed to adopt the definition, and Croatia

followed suit in early 2023, just months after it created and filled the 

role of Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Croatia for Holocaust 

Issues and Combating Antisemitism in September. In another first, 

Sweden appointed its first Special Investigator responsible for outlining the status of the Jewish community in Sweden and proposing 

a national strategy on supporting Jewish life. 

In April, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) partnered with the Latin American 

Jewish Congress to organize a workshop for policymakers from 

Latin America and the Caribbean to promote education to address 

antisemitism, which 60 policymakers from 14 countries attended. 

In July, Israel’s Holocaust memorial center Yad Vashem launched 

a collaborative effort with the Organization of American States 

Commissioner to Monitor 

and Combat Anti-Semitism to 

translate educational materials 

about the Holocaust into Spanish. Yad Vashem officials also 

announced a similar agreement 

that month with Argentina’s Ministry of Education to 

promote Holocaust-related 

educational and commemorative activities in that country. 

I n t h e A r a b i a n G u l f 

region, some governments 

moved forward with recent 

initiatives to promote Jewish life, implement school curricula that 

positively show Jews as entwined in the national and cultural fabric, and spread Holocaust awareness. In January, the United Arab 

Emirates hosted its first official International Holocaust Remembrance Day commemoration at the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic 

Academy in Abu Dhabi, under Ministry of Culture and Education 

sponsorship. In November, the privately run Crossroads of Civilizations Museum in Dubai held the country’s first-ever Kristallnacht 

commemoration, hosting a Holocaust survivor for the event who 

also subsequently appeared at a local school to share about her 

experiences. Bahrain’s Hammad Global Center for Peaceful Coexistence also cohosted a Holocaust remembrance event in January 

in which Israeli President Isaac Herzog and former Ashkenazi Chief 

Rabbi Yisrael Meir Lau participated.

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

 Indigenous peoples in Latin America 

have long faced a series of 

collective and individual threats to the 

full enjoyment of their religious freedom 

and related rights . . .
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023 75

Religious Freedom Concerns for 

Indigenous Peoples in Latin America

Indigenous peoples in Latin America have long faced a series of collective and individual threats to the full enjoyment of their religious 

freedom and related rights: lack of recognition of ancestral land 

ownership, state absence and organized crime, extraction of natural 

resources by legal and illegal companies, breakdown of the social 

fabric, and dispossession of land by appropriation. Although not all 

these areas of concern unambiguously connect to religious freedom 

from a Western perspective, the holistic nature of most indigenous 

worldviews in the region means that indigenous groups often indeed 

perceive and experience them as religious freedom violations. For 

example, in Nicaragua, the government canceled the legal status of 

a number of indigenous nongovernmental organizations in March, 

including the Center for Justice and Human Rights of the Atlantic 

Coast of Nicaragua, which focuses on environmental development 

and defending the customs and sacred territories of the country’s 

native communities. Additionally, in July—in a case that illustrates 

OTHER KEY DEVELOPMENTS

issues that other indigenous communities also face—illegal miners in Peru attacked leaders of the Sua Panki, Tufino, Wawain, and 

Mamayaque communities in the Department of Amazonas. This sort of 

harassment and violence forces the displacement of these traditional 

communities and serves to break their social fabrics. 

Religious freedom concerns also impact indigenous individuals 

across Latin America through several other key issues: conversion, 

contributions to patronal feasts, construction of places of worship, 

proselytism and religious education, and renunciation of ancestral 

practices and expulsion from communal property. Indigenous community leaders themselves have often perpetrated related violations, 

although organized crime as well as revolutionaries and paramilitary 

groups have also contributed to these challenges. Researchers at the 

Observatory of Religious Freedom in Latin America documented 497 

such incidents in 2022 in Chile, Mexico, and Colombia; in one such 

incident, authorities of San Juan Mazatlán in Mexico detained 15 

indigenous individuals from six different families from an evangelical 

Christian community for not contributing to local Catholic festivities. 

USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023 77

KEY USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS 

IMPLEMENTED

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), as 

amended, mandates USCIRF to make independent policy 

recommendations to the president, secretary of state, and 

Congress. The recommendations are based on USCIRF’s research on 

religious freedom conditions abroad and assessment of U.S. policy. In 

addition, USCIRF’s mandate includes tracking the U.S. government’s 

implementation of USCIRF’s recommendations and reviewing, to the 

extent practicable, the effectiveness of such implemented recommendations in advancing religious freedom internationally. While notable 

U.S. government actions pursuant to USCIRF’s recommendations 

are detailed throughout this report, this section highlights the key 

USCIRF recommendations implemented during 2022 and early 2023, 

including several longstanding recommendations. The list, which is not 

exhaustive, is meant to showcase the effectiveness of U.S. government 

actions resulting from the implementation of USCIRF’s recommendations. Unless otherwise noted, the recommendations highlighted here 

were included in USCIRF’s 2022 Annual Report.

Designating the Worst Violators

■ On November 30, 2022, the U.S. Department of State designated 

12 countries as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) under 

IRFA. USCIRF recommended that the State Department designate 

10 of the 12 countries as CPCs. The two countries that USCIRF 

did not recommend for CPC status but that the State Department designated as such—Cuba and Nicaragua, which USCIRF 

had recommended for the State Department’s Special Watch List 

(SWL)—experienced severe deteriorations in religious freedom 

conditions after USCIRF issued its 2022 Annual Report. 

■ Alongside the CPC designations, the State Department placed four 

countries on its SWL under IRFA. USCIRF recommended two of 

these countries—Algeria and the Central African Republic (CAR)—

for such placement. CAR was added to the SWL for the first time.

■ At the same time, the State Department also designated nine 

nonstate actors as “entities of particular concern,” seven of which 

USCIRF recommended for such designation. 

Filling IRF-Related Appointments

■ USCIRF recommended that the Joseph R. Biden administration fill 

and maintain the position of Special Envoy for North Korean Human 

Rights Issues. In January 2023, after the reporting period, the Biden 

administration nominated Julie Turner to serve as Special Envoy 

with the rank of Ambassador.

Increasing the Use of Targeted Sanctions

■ USCIRF has consistently called on the U.S. government to increase 

the use of human rights related financial and visa authorities to 

impose asset freezes and/or visa bans on individuals and entities for severe religious freedom violations, citing specific abuses. 

Over the course of 2022, the U.S. government issued sanctions 

under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 

(Global Magnitsky Act) and other authorities against individuals 

and entities specifically for religious freedom abuses. Significant 

sanctions issued during the year for religious freedom abuses are 

listed below.

■ In September, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned 

“judges” serving in Russian-occupied Crimea who imposed harsh 

sentences on members of religious minority groups for exercising 

their religious freedoms. 

■ In September, twice in October, in November, and twice in 

December, the Treasury Department sanctioned Iranian officials 

for their brutal crackdown on demonstrators protesting Mahsa 

Zhina Amini’s death in police custody. Prior to her death, Iran’s 

“Morality Police” arrested and tortured Amini for wearing an 

“improper hijab.”

■ In October, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken announced 

the imposition of visa restrictions against current and former 

Taliban officials responsible for violence against women and 

restrictive policies based on the group’s interpretation of religion, 

such as barring girls from attending secondary school. 

■ In December, the Treasury Department sanctioned Chinese public security officials responsible for human rights and religious 

freedom violations in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. 

■ In December, the Treasury Department sanctioned North Korea’s 

Ministry of State Security Border Guard General Bureau for 

human rights violations, including forced labor and torture. 

Designation of Rohingya Genocide

■ In March 2022, the State Department determined that the atrocities committed by the Burmese military, known as the Tatmadaw, 

against the Rohingya constitute genocide and crimes against 

humanity, an action that USCIRF had been recommending since 

2019. Four days after the determination, the Treasury Department 

sanctioned Burmese military units, commanders, and arms dealers. 

USCIRF has highlighted the importance of a genocide determination to the Rohingya community and how to hold perpetrators of 

mass atrocities accountable.
78 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

Raising IRF Issues in Multilateral Engagement

■ USCIRF recommended that the Biden administration maintain the 

United States’ leadership role in the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA). In 2022, the United States continued 

to serve as the Secretariat for IRFBA. During the year, IRFBA made 

multicountry statements on egregious religious freedom violations 

in Nicaragua and Nigeria, the rights of religious minority groups 

such as the Baha’i and Ahmadiyya Muslim communities to practice 

their faith freely, and the incompatibility of blasphemy laws with 

freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression. 

■ USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government prioritize freedom 

of religion or belief in the United States’ renewed engagement with 

the United Nations (UN) human rights system, including at the UN 

Human Rights Council (UNHRC). In 2022, the United States served 

the first year of a three-year term as a member of the UNHRC. 

During the year, the U.S. government cosponsored a resolution on 

Freedom of Religion or Belief, supported calling an urgent debate 

about ongoing human rights violations against women and girls 

in Afghanistan, and supported convening a special session and 

establishing a fact-finding mission on Iran’s human rights violations 

following Mahsa Zhina Amini’s death in police custody. In addition, 

the U.S. government supported a resolution that removed Iran from 

the UN Commission on the Status of Women, organized events 

on protecting ethnic and religious minority groups in Afghanistan 

and protecting the right to freedom of religion or belief for Tibetan 

Buddhists, and joined a 47-country joint statement on human rights 

conditions in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet. 

■ USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government collaborate with 

and encourage multilateral organizations, such as the Organization 

of American States (OAS), to monitor and investigate religious 

freedom violations that occur in Nicaragua. In August, the OAS 

adopted a resolution strongly condemning the harassment of and 

arbitrary restrictions placed on religious organizations in Nicaragua. 

■ USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government increase engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

to stem ongoing religious freedom violations and promote 

accountability in Burma. In May, the U.S. government hosted a 

U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit and released a joint statement calling 

for an immediate cessation of violence in Burma. In November, 

President Biden attended the 10th Annual U.S.-ASEAN Summit in 

Cambodia and elevated U.S.-ASEAN relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. 

Raising IRF Issues in Bilateral Engagement

■ USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government urge relevant 

Algerian government officials to deliver clear and timely responses 

to registration requests by non-Muslim organizations as required 

by Ordinance 06-03. In 2022, U.S. government officials, including 

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman, raised issues 

surrounding religious organization registration with Algerian government officials and other relevant stakeholders. 

■ USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government prioritize travel to 

Turkey for officials at the highest levels of the Office of International 

Religious Freedom to meet with Turkish counterparts and raise 

issues related to freedom of religion or belief and antisemitism. In 

September, U.S. Ambassador at Large for International Religious 

Freedom Rashad Hussain traveled to Turkey to meet with Turkish 

government officials, civil society groups, and religious communities on religious freedom related issues. 

■ USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government, in its engagements with Turkish government officials, press for the reopening 

of the Theological School of Halki. In 2022, Office of International 

Religious Freedom staff visited the Theological School of Halki and 

urged Turkey to allow the seminary to reopen.

■ USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government conduct a comprehensive review of all U.S. assistance to Egypt and continue to 

withhold a portion of Foreign Military Financing for specified international religious freedom violations. Congress conditioned up to 

$300 million of the $1.3 billion annual Foreign Military Financing aid 

package to Egypt on human rights improvements. In September, 

the administration chose to withhold $130 million. 

■ USCIRF recommended that Congress incorporate religious freedom concerns into its larger oversight of the U.S.-Iraq bilateral 

relationship through hearings, letters, and congressional delegations. In November, House Veterans Affairs Committee members 

traveled to Iraq and raised religious freedom issues.

■ USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government grant a waiver of 

sanctions in the areas governed by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. In May, the U.S. government issued a 

general license authorizing wider forms of private economic activity 

in areas of northeast and northwest Syria outside the control of 

President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

■ USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government continue to allocate funding for humanitarian assistance, including for refugees, 

internally displaced persons, and returnees in CAR. In 2022, the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) maintained its 

support for CAR, including through health and nutrition assistance 

as well as water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance; protection 

programs for CAR’s most vulnerable populations; and shelter and 

settlement support. 

■ USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government provide financial, 

administrative, and diplomatic support to CAR’s Special Criminal 

Court (SCC), including urging the CAR government to cease all 

obstructions to such investigations. In 2022, the U.S. government 

continued to support the SCC, including through statements recognizing the body’s accomplishments. 

Implementation of Executive Order 13926 - 

Advancing International Religious Freedom

■ USCIRF has called on the Biden administration to continue to implement the executive order on Advancing International Religious 

Freedom, signed by then President Donald J. Trump in June 2020. 

The executive order included several of USCIRF’s longstanding 

recommendations related to the prioritization of religious freedom in U.S. foreign policy. This included increasing related foreign 

assistance and developing an overall strategy for promoting religious freedom abroad and country-specific action plans. In 2022, 

the Biden administration implemented the executive order in the 

following ways:

■ The State Department continued to pursue country-specific action plans, again dedicated $50 million to IRF-related 

KEY USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTED IN 2022
USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023 79

programming, and continued to provide training on IRF issues 

to foreign service officers.

■ USAID continued to advance religious freedom within its priorities and programming, including through activities to address 

the needs of vulnerable religious minority communities in various 

parts of the world as well as organizational initiatives such as 

the IRF Sector Council to foster agency-wide coordination and 

cooperation. 

Refugee Resettlement

■ USCIRF has consistently recommended that the U.S. government 

maintain a robust refugee resettlement program and that victims 

of the most severe religious persecution be prioritized. In September 2022, the Biden administration maintained the annual refugee 

ceiling at 125,000 for FY 2023. 

■ USCIRF recommended that Congress reauthorize the Lautenberg 

Amendment to aid persecuted Iranian religious minorities seeking refugee status in the United States. In March, the Lautenberg 

Amendment was reauthorized. 

Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal

■ USCIRF has repeatedly recommended that successive administrations address the longstanding flaws in the treatment of asylum 

seekers in expedited removal that USCIRF has identified in reports 

issued in 2005, 2007, 2013, and 2016.

■ In March 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a new rule that 

authorizes asylum officers from the United States Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (USCIS) to consider the asylum applications 

of individuals subject to expedited removal who assert a fear of 

persecution or torture and pass the required credible fear screening, as USCIRF had recommended. Prior to the new rule, USCIS 

asylum officers could only conduct an initial screening to evaluate 

whether an applicant’s fear of persecution or torture was credible. 

If the asylum officers found the fear credible, then the application 

would be referred to an immigration judge for consideration. 

Advocacy for Religious Prisoners of Conscience

■ USCIRF has recommended that U.S. government officials and members of Congress press foreign governments for the release of 

religious prisoners of conscience (RPOCs). Pursuant to this recommendation, U.S. officials actively engaged on RPOC cases around 

the world.

■ The State Department strongly condemned the Burmese government’s arrest and detention of Reverend Hkalam Samson 

and called for his release. Reverend Samson has been one of 

Burma’s most respected religious leaders and a prominent voice 

for peace. 

■ The State Department marked the 33rd birthday of Gedhun 

Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama, who has been missing 

since the Chinese government abducted him as a six-year-old 

child, and urged the Chinese government to account for his 

whereabouts and wellbeing.

■ The State Department condemned the Russian government’s 

imprisonment of Jehovah’s Witnesses for holding religious 

meetings.

■ The U.S. Mission in Vietnam advocated for access to religious 

materials and clergy for persons who were incarcerated.

■ Members of Congress advocated for the release of RPOCs, 

including by adopting RPOCs through the Tom Lantos Human 

Rights Commission’s (TLHRC) Defending Freedoms Project and 

speeches on the Senate floor.

Enforcement of China-Related 

Human Rights Legislation

■ USCIRF recommended that the U.S. government enforce China-related human rights legislation to ensure that U.S. companies do 

not contribute to religious freedom violations in China. In June, 

the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) went into effect

and U.S. Customs and Border Protection began implementation

of the law by prohibiting imports from Xinjiang. In August, DHS 

published its UFLPA entities list identifying foreign companies 

involved in human rights violations in Xinjiang. Foreign companies 

appearing on the entities list are presumed to produce products 

wholly or in part with forced labor, and as such their products 

are prohibited entry at U.S. ports of entry. In December, the U.S. 

Department of Commerce added Tianjin Tiandi Weiye Technologies to its entities list for the company’s human rights violations 

in China, including against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other members 

of Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang. As such, the company will 

be subject to import restrictions. 

Congressional Action Promoting 

Religious Freedom

■ USCIRF recommended that Congress highlight international religious freedom issues through legislation, hearings, briefings, and 

other actions. 

■ In April, Congress passed and the president signed into law the 

permanent reauthorization of the Global Magnitsky Act. 

■ In December, Congress passed and the president signed into 

law the Burma Act. 

■ In 2022, Congress held several hearings on international religious 

freedom issues. Those hearings include a House Foreign Affairs 

Committee hearing on the Burma crisis one year after the coup, 

TLHRC hearings on discrimination against Muslims worldwide

and the perilous state of religious freedom in Nicaragua, and 

Congressional Executive Commission on China hearings on China’s control of religion through digital authoritarianism, growing 

constraints on language and ethnic identity in China, and human 

rights abuses in Tibet. 

KEY USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTED IN 2022

APPENDIX 1 81

APPENDIX 1 COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES

Nury Turkel, Chair

REAPPOINTED BY 

Hon. Nancy Pelosi (D), then Speaker of 

the U.S. House of Representatives, for a 

term expiring in May 2024. Lawyer, author, 

human rights advocate, Senior Fellow at 

the Hudson Institute, and member of the 

Council on Foreign Relations.

Abraham Cooper, Vice Chair

APPOINTED BY 

Hon. Mitch McConnell (R), Senate Minority 

Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024. 

Associate Dean and Director of Global Social 

Action for the Simon Wiesenthal Center, a 

leading Jewish human rights organization.

David Curry, Commissioner

APPOINTED BY 

Hon. Kevin McCarthy (R), then House Minority 

Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024. President and CEO of Global Christian Relief, 

an international ministry that advocates on 

behalf of those who are persecuted for their 

Christian faith.

Frederick A. Davie, Commissioner

REAPPOINTED BY 

Hon. Charles Schumer (D), Senate Majority Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024. 

Senior Strategic Advisor at the Union Theological Seminary in New York City and Senior 

Advisor on Racial Equity at Interfaith America. 

Sharon Kleinbaum, Commissioner

APPOINTED BY

President Joseph R. Biden (D) for a term 

expiring in May 2023. Spiritual leader of Congregation Beit Simchat Torah in New York 

City and Commissioner on New York City's 

Commission on Human Rights.

Mohamed Magid, Commissioner

APPOINTED BY 

President Joseph R. Biden (D) for a term 

expiring in May 2024. Executive Religious 

Director and Imam of All Dulles Area Muslim 

Society Center, Chairman of International 

Interfaith Peace Corps, member of the Muslim Jewish Council, Co-President of Religions 

for Peace, and Co-Founder of the Multi-faith 

Neighbors Network.

Stephen Schneck, Commissioner

APPOINTED BY 

President Joseph R. Biden (D) for a term expiring in May 2024. Political philosopher and 

retired professor from The Catholic University of America. Catholic advocate for social 

justice and serves on the governing boards 

of Catholic Climate Covenant and Catholic 

Mobilizing Network.

Eric Ueland, Commissioner

APPOINTED BY 

Hon. Mitch McConnell (R), Senate Minority 

Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024. 

Visiting Fellow at the Heritage Institute 

with history of service in the United States 

Congress, the executive branch, and the 

private sector.

Frank Wolf, Commissioner

APPOINTED BY 

Hon. Kevin McCarthy (R), then House Minority 

Leader, for a term expiring in May 2024. 

Retired U.S. Member of Congress, Founder 

and former Co-Chairman of the Tom Lantos 

Human Rights Commission.

APPENDIX 2 83

APPENDIX 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION 

OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

Introduction

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), as amended 

by the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2016, 

requires USCIRF to:

make publicly available, to the extent practicable . . . lists of 

persons it determines are imprisoned or detained, have disappeared, been placed under house arrest, been tortured, 

or subjected to forced renunciation of faith for their religious 

activity or religious freedom advocacy by the government 

of a foreign country that the Commission recommends for 

designation as a country of particular concern [CPC] . . . or 

by a nonstate actor that the Commission recommends for 

designation as an entity of particular concern [EPC].

USCIRF developed the Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) 

Victims List—an online public database—to implement this provision 

for countries USCIRF recommends for Country of Particular Concern 

(CPC) or Special Watch List (SWL) status. The list also includes such 

victims located in the de facto territories of nonstate actors that 

USCIRF recommends for Entity of Particular Concern (EPC) status, 

according to the same criteria.

Due to limited resources, USCIRF is unable to identify and document 

all victims that meet the statutory requirement to be included on the FoRB 

Victims List and generally relies on receiving submissions from outside 

individuals and organizations. As such, the information contained in the 

database does not reflect country, regional, or global trends. Furthermore, percentages highlighted in this section should not be used for 

extrapolation purposes nor interpreted as a particular group experiencing 

greater violations than another or a particular country committing violations at a greater rate than others. To support this project, USCIRF invites 

those with credible information on victims to submit information using the 

Victims List Intake Form. Additional information about the FoRB Victims 

List can be found in USCIRF’s FoRB Victims List Factsheet.

Perpetrators

By the end of 2022, the FoRB Victims List included nearly 2,000 individuals 

targeted by 26 different countries and entities. More than 1,400 victims 

remain in some form of custody, while more than 300 have been released. 

The detention status of approximately 200 cases remains unknown, and 

six individuals are listed as deceased after dying in state custody. The 

following table provides a breakdown of the data by country.

Perpetrator Not 

Released

Released Died in 

Custody

Unknown Total

Algeria 5 5

Azerbaijan 6 3 2 11

Burma 4 4

China 578 29 146 753

Cuba 8 1 2 11

Egypt 2 12 1 15

Eritrea 25 24 1 50

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) 2 2

Houthis 1 1 2

India 44 10 1 55

Indonesia 6 1 7

Iran 167 119 1 7 294

Iraq 2 2

Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) 1 1

Kazakhstan 11 3 1 15

Malaysia 4 4

Nicaragua 9 9

Nigeria 6 3 9
84 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

APPENDIX 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

Perpetrator Not 

Released

Released Died in 

Custody

Unknown Total

North Korea 1 8 9

Pakistan 61 21 1 83

Russia 318 50 1 369

Saudi Arabia 38 6 44

Tajikistan 9 3 12

Turkmenistan 6 21 27

Uzbekistan 52 30 82

Vietnam 59 6 2 10 77

Total 1,418 339 6 189 1,952

Based on the information maintained in the database, the following chart reflects the percentage of individuals imprisoned by country. 

Among the violators, China imprisoned the most FoRB victims, followed by Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, India, Eritrea, and Saudi 

Arabia. Victims from all other countries and entities individually constituted one percent or less than one percent of the victims in the database.

VICTIMS BY PERPETRATOR
APPENDIX 2 85

APPENDIX 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

Religions and Beliefs

The FoRB Victims List contains individuals with a wide variety of beliefs 

and religions, as reflected in the following table.

Religion or Belief Number of Victims 

Documented

Adivasi 1

Baha’i 129

Bon 1

Buddhist - Hoa Hao 6

Buddhist - Theravada 3

Buddhist - Tibetan 73

Buddhist - Unspecified/Other 28

Christian - Catholic 40

Christian - Church of Almighty 

God

236

Christian - Jehovah’s Witness 227

Christian - Orthodox 14

Christian - Protestant 113

Christian - Unspecified/Other 62

Duong Van Minh 4

ECKist (Eckankar) 1

Erfan-e Halgheh Practitioner 2

Falun Gong 208

Hindu 11

Humanist 1

Jewish 1

Muslim - Ahmadiyya 22

Muslim – Qur’anist 1

Muslim - Shi’a 37

Muslim - Sufi 61

Muslim - Sunni 300

Muslim - Unspecified/Other 264

Santería 5

Scientologist 1

Shaman 1

Sikh 1

Yarsani 37

Unknown/Unspecified 61

Total 1,952
86 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

APPENDIX 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

VICTIMS BY RELIGION OR BELIEF

The following chart provides a percentage for the individuals, based on their religion or belief, maintained in the database.
APPENDIX 2 87

APPENDIX 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

Nature of Charges

Individuals included on the FoRB Victims List face a range of charges in 

several different legal contexts. USCIRF created groupings for similar 

charges to identify how foreign governments and entities justify the 

incarceration of the individuals included on the FoRB Victims List. 

USCIRF’s categories are not mutually exclusive, and individuals are 

often included in more than one category based on varying charges 

brought against them. While USCIRF excludes from the FoRB Victims 

List individuals known to have committed or promoted violence, many 

individuals on the list face unsubstantiated accusations of violent 

crimes by the foreign government. 

USCIRF is in the process of identifying charges for more than a 

quarter of the victims. Dozens of victims are not facing any charges, 

yet they remain imprisoned or have been subjected to other violations 

included on the FoRB Victims List that do not involve legal charges, 

such as enforced disappearance or forced renunciation of faith.

Nature of Charges 

Categories

Number of 

Individuals 

Charged

Percentage 

of 

Individuals 

Charged

Aid & Abetment 14 1%

Apostasy 4 < 1%

Arms Trafficking & Illicit Use 

of Weapons 

32 2%

Assault & Battery 9 < 1%

Banned Organization 473 24%

Blasphemy 100 5%

Breach of Privacy & Disclosure 2 < 1%

Conversion 29 1%

Crimes Involving Minors 4 < 1%

Criminal Premeditation & 

Conspiracy 

26 1%

Cult 309 16%

Defamation 2 < 1%

Drug Trafficking & Illicit Drug Use 9 < 1%

Embezzlement & Fraud 9 < 1%

Environmental Crimes 1 < 1%

Extremism 257 13%

Fabricating & 

Destroying Evidence

5 < 1%

Filing a False Police Report 3 < 1%

Forgery 7 < 1%

Harboring a Fugitive 5 < 1%

Hate Speech 108 6%

Illegal Assembly 118 6%

Illegal Business Activity 5 < 1%

Illegal Migration & 

Entry/Exit of Country

6 < 1%

Nature of Charges 

Categories

Number of 

Individuals 

Charged

Percentage 

of 

Individuals 

Charged

Illicit Financing 52 3%

Immorality 9 < 1%

Incitement to Commit Crime 

& Violence

43 2%

Insulting Public Officials 

& Institutions

9 < 1%

Leaking State Secrets 4 < 1%

Mercenarism 2 < 1%

Miscellaneous Religious Crimes 14 1%

Murder & Attempted Murder 27 1%

Negligence 1 < 1%

No Charges/Not Applicable 65 3%

Public Disorder 91 5%

Refusing & Absconding 

Military Service

23 1%

Separatism 28 1%

Spreading Propaganda & 

False or Misleading Ideas, 

Information, or Materials

165 8%

Subversion 76 4%

Terrorism 270 14%

Theft & Robbery 3 < 1%

Threat 2 < 1%

Treason & Sedition 197 10%

Unlawful Disobedience 49 3%

Violating Prison Rules 11 1%

Unknown 559 29%
88 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

APPENDIX 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF VICTIMS LIST

TOP TEN MOST COMMON CHARGES

The following chart hightlights the top 10 most common types of charges for individuals on the FoRB Victims List.
APPENDIX 3 89

APPENDIX 3 HIGHLIGHTS OF 

USCIRF’S PUBLIC ACTIVITIES IN 2022

In addition to releasing an Annual Report by May 1 of each year, 

USCIRF produces research and additional information related to 

international religious freedom throughout the year. This Appendix 

highlights USCIRF’s events and other materials from calendar year 

2022. USCIRF’s 2022 press releases and statements and op-eds are 

available on USCIRF’s website at www.uscirf.gov. USCIRF’s 2022 

Tweets can be found here. 

Hearings:

■ February 2022: Anti-Muslim Policies and Bias in Europe

■ March 2022: Women’s Roles in Advancing International 

Religious Freedom

■ May 2022: Freedom of Religion or Belief in Syria

■ August 2022: Religious Freedom in Afghanistan: One Year 

since the Taliban Takeover

■ September 2022: Religious Freedom, Violence, and U.S. Policy 

in Nigeria

■ October 2022: U.S. Policy and Freedom of Religion or Belief in 

North Korea

■ November 2022: Crackdown on Religious Freedom in Nicaragua

■ December 2022: China’s Religious Freedom Violations: 

Domestic Repression and Malign Influence Abroad

Events:

■ February 2022: Global Compact on Refugees

■ March 2022: The Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine 

and the State of International Religious Freedom (Congressional Briefing)

■ April 2022: 2022 Annual Report: Key Findings and 

Recommendations

■ June 27, 2022: An Unflinching Voice: USCIRF’s Impact on International Religious Freedom (Congressional Briefing)

■ August 2022: Constitutional Reform and Religious Freedom in 

Cuba

■ September 2022: Assessing Religious Freedom in Egyptian 

Curriculum Reform

■ November 2022: Iranian Government Propaganda against 

Religious Minorities

Publications:

■ January 2022: Religious Freedom in Tajikistan in 2021

(Country Update)

■ February 2022: Religious Freedom in Vietnam in 2021

(Country Update) 

■ March 2022: Religious Freedom in Iraq in 2021

(Country Update)

■ March 2022: Religious Freedom in Russia and Regions under 

Russian Occupation (Backgrounder)

■ April 2022: 2022 Annual Report

■ May 2022: Overview of Refugees Fleeing Religious Persecution 

Globally (Factsheet)

■ May 2022: Pursuing Justice and Accountability: Next Steps for 

the Rohingya Community of Burma (Factsheet)

■ June 2022: Increasing Religious Freedom Restrictions on 

Baha’is in Qatar (Factsheet)

■ July 2022: Constitutional Reform and Religious Freedom in 

Cuba (Special Report)

■ July 2022: Religious Freedom in Iran in 2022 (Country Update)

■ July 2022: Religious Propaganda in Iran (Special Report)

■ July 2022: Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and the Right to 

Freedom of Religion, Thought, and Conscience in North Korea

(Special Report)

■ August 2022: Religious Freedom in Pakistan in 2022

(Country Update)

■ August 2022: Religious Freedom in Nicaragua in 2022

(Country Update)

■ August 2022: Religious Freedom in Afghanistan

(Country Update)

■ August 2022: Assessing Religious Freedom in Egyptian 

Curriculum Reform (Special Report)

■ September 2022: Uzbekistan: Space for Reform

(Country Update)

■ September 2022: Violence and Religious Freedom in Nigeria

(Policy Update)

■ October 2022: Blasphemy and Related Laws in ASEAN 

Member Countries (Issue Update)

■ October 2022: Blasphemy Laws in Nigeria (Policy Update)

■ November 2022: Law and Religion in Algeria (Factsheet)

■ November 2022: Implications of Laws Promoting StateFavored Religions (Issue Brief)
90 USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2023

APPENDIX 3 HIGHLIGHTS OF USCIRF'S PUBLIC ACTIVITIES IN 2022

	■ November 2022: Religious Freedom Conditions in India 

(Country Update)

	■ November 2022: Religious Freedom Conditions in Sri Lanka

(Country Update)

	■ November 2022: Religious Freedom in Syria under Hay’at 

Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (Factsheet)

	■ December 2022: Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) Victims 

List (Factsheet)

	■ December 2022: Blasphemy Charges in Turkey (Issue Update)

	■ December 2022: Tolerance, Religious Freedom, and 

Authoritarianism (Special Report)

	■ December 2022: Religious Freedom in Burma (Policy Update)

	■ December 2022: Religious Freedom Conditions in Cuba 

(Country Update)

	■ December 2022: Kazakhstan’s Religion Law Amendments

(Issue Update)

	■ December 2022: Religious Freedom Conditions in Saudi Arabia

(Country Update)

	■ December 2022: State-Controlled Religion and Religious 

Freedom Violations in China (Factsheet)

Spotlight Podcast Episodes:

	■ January 2022: Worrying Trends for Religious Freedom in 

Central and Eastern Africa

	■ January 2022: Christians in Extreme Danger in Afghanistan

	■ February 2022: Nicaragua’s Assault on Religious Freedom

	■ February 2022: The Grim Backdrop to the Beijing Olympics

	■ February 2022: Iraq’s Beleaguered Religious Minority 

Communities

	■ March 2022: Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Part 1: 

“Denazification” Narrative

	■ March 2022: Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Part 2: 

The Religious Regulation Framework

	■ March 2022: The Status of Religious Freedom for the Baha’i 

Community

	■ April 2022: Rohingya Genocide Determination and 

Accountability 

	■ April 2022: Nontheists Facing Challenges to Freedom of Belief

	■ April 2022: Persecuted Christians around the World

	■ April 2022: USCIRF Releases 2022 Annual Report with 

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

	■ May 2022: Anti-Conversion Laws and Growing Intolerance in India

	■ May 2022: Content Moderation Online and Its Impact on 

Religious Freedom

	■ May 2022: Treatment of Asylum Seekers in the Expedited 

Removal Process

	■ June 2022: Uzbekistan: Gaps in Principles and Practice

	■ June 2022: Religious Prisoners of Conscience in Iran

	■ June 2022: Religious Freedom Backslides in Central African 

Republic

	■ June 2022: Preview of the IRF Summit 2022

	■ July 2022: Preview of the 2022 International Ministerial Conference on Freedom of Religion or Belief

	■ July 2022: Conditions for Religious and Nonbelief Communities in Turkey

	■ July 2022: Religious Freedom Takeaways on the Ground in 

Nigeria

	■ July 2022: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions in 

South Asia

	■ July 2022: U.S. Policy Advances for International Religious 

Freedom over the Past Year

	■ August 2022: Russia’s Religious Freedom Violations in Ukraine

	■ August 2022: The Impact of Malaysia’s Dual Legal System on 

Religious Freedom

	■ August 2022: Troubling Signs for Religious Freedom in Sri Lanka

	■ August 2022: The 5th Anniversary of the Rohingya Genocide

	■ September 2022: The Plight of Christians in China

	■ September 2022: Deteriorating Religious Freedom Conditions 

in Nicaragua

	■ September 2022: Religious Prisoners of Conscience in 

Kazakhstan

	■ September 2022: Turkmenistan’s Tight Grip on Religious 

Freedom

	■ October 2022: The Nexus of Religious Freedom & Women’s 

Rights in Iran

	■ October 2022: Russia’s Persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses

	■ October 2022: The Legacy of Blasphemy Laws in Southeast Asia

	■ October 2022: Civil Society’s Important Role in Promoting 

Freedom of Religion or Belief

	■ November 2022: Recovering from Genocide: The Yazidis’ 

Return to Sinjar

	■ November 2022: The Persecution of Muslims in Tajikistan

	■ November 2022: The Suffocating Hold of HTS on 

Northwest Syria

	■ November 2022: The Alevi Struggle for Rights in Turkey

	■ December 2022: Preview of IRF Summit 2023

	■ December 2022: Reflecting on USCIRF’s Visit to Cox’s Bazar

	■ December 2022: Breaking Down the State Department’s 

IRF Designations

2023 USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONS

■ COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN ■

Afghanistan

Burma

China

Cuba

Eritrea

India

Iran

Nicaragua

Nigeria

North Korea

Pakistan

Russia

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Vietnam

■ SPECIAL WATCH LIST COUNTRIES ■

Algeria

Azerbaijan

Central African Republic

Egypt

Indonesia

Iraq

Kazakhstan

Malaysia

Sri Lanka

Turkey

Uzbekistan

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714

Washington, DC 20401

Telephone: (202) 523–3240

www.uscirf.gov