SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2116-18T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROLANDO MORRISON, a/k/a

ROLONDO MORRISON,

DANNY BOATWRIGHT,

and CORLANDO GRANT,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted October 7, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Sumners.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 15-04-0591.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Rasheedah Terry, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for 

respondent (Erin M. Campbell, Assistant Prosecutor, 

on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 2, 2020
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PER CURIAM

Tried by a jury, defendant Rolando Morrison was convicted1 of seconddegree aggravated assault (serious bodily injury), N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1) (count 

two); third-degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

1(b)(2) (count three); second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful 

purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count four); second-degree unlawful possession 

of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count five); and fourth-degree obstruction, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 (count six). After the verdict, he entered a guilty plea to 

second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) 

(count seven). On December 7, 2018, the trial judge merged counts two and 

three, and counts four and five, and imposed the following concurrent sentences: 

a Graves Act sentence of fifteen years subject to the No Early Release Act's

(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, eighty-five percent parole ineligibility on count 

two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(d), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); a 

Graves Act five years subject to forty-two months of parole ineligibility on 

count four, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); eighteen months on count six; and five years 

1 The jury acquitted defendant of the first count of the indictment, second-degree 

attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1, and 2C:11-3.
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subject to five years of parole ineligibility on count seven. Thus, his aggregate 

sentence was fifteen years subject to NERA. He appeals and we affirm.

Surveillance video recordings shown to the jury, taken from the outside 

of a Jersey City bar, captured an altercation that occurred August 31, 2014, at 

approximately 2:00 a.m. The victim is depicted struggling with a man wearing 

clothing similar to that worn by defendant moments later when he was arrested, 

including a dark shirt, baseball cap, white glove, and green camouflage pants. 

The white-gloved man is seen briefly turning his back away from the struggle 

and the camera, while removing an object from beneath his shirt at the 

waistband. After defendant turns back, the two men briefly exchange blows, but

defendant holds a black object, gaining the upper hand while striking the victim

repeatedly. The men, still fighting, move out of camera range for a few seconds. 

Only the victim reappears moments later; he takes a few steps and walks into 

the street towards a passing police car.

All the officers who testified at the Rule 104 hearing regarding the 

admissibility of the video film and at the trial were members of the Jersey City

Police Department. Officer Ed Redmond said that while on patrol he heard the 

sound of a shot as he passed the bar, informing dispatch immediately, and 

turning around. When shown the video, he identified his patrol car in the upper 
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corner of the screen travelling in one direction, and then returning in the other. 

He also testified during the trial, adding that the victim collapsed on the hood of 

the vehicle.

Redmond described the victim to the jury: he was in pain, and "very 

uncooperative." When the victim was turned over, Redmond saw a gunshot 

wound to his abdomen. The victim's intestines appeared to be protruding from

the wound. The victim refused to discuss the incident with the officers; none of 

the other bar patrons were willing to speak to police either.

Anthony Sharperson, the bar owner, testified at the Rule 104 hearing as 

well as at trial. On both occasions he said the exterior surveillance cameras 

were in good working order, although the time stamp was inaccurate. He also 

said that he turned the tape over to the Jersey City Police Department after the 

incident, and that the depiction of the sidewalk outside the bar was accurate. 

The judge barred defendant from cross-examining Sharperson regarding 

his alleged confrontation with the victim that evening. The judge reasoned that 

since defendant had not provided the State with notice that he would be raising 

the defense of self-defense, and the purpose of admission was unclear, it would 

have been an improper invitation to the jury to engage in sheer speculation if he 
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allowed it. Although third-party liability is mentioned by counsel in passing, 

his focus appeared to be self-defense.

Officer Eddie Fernandez headed to the bar after receiving the dispatch. 

He canvassed the area for anyone "possibly fleeing[.]" Nearby, he saw defendant 

bending over a car. By the time Fernandez left his vehicle, defendant had 

crawled underneath a car. When the officer asked defendant to stand, he stood

up and ran. The officers gave chase and arrested him. Fernandez collected a 

white and blue baseball batting-type glove from defendant. No blood was 

visible on either defendant or his clothing.

Lieutenant Keith Armstrong had been previously assigned to the 

department's "cease fire unit," which was responsible for the investigation of 

non-fatal shootings. Over his career, he had been involved in over one hundred 

such investigations, and had been trained as an officer in the use of handguns. 

At the scene promptly after the incident, he found two baseball caps up against 

the building, and a spent shell casing on the ground. Defense counsel objected 

to Armstrong explaining the meaning of "shell casing" because he had not been 

qualified as an expert. The judge overruled the objection, stating without 

comment from counsel, that the fact the victim was shot was undisputed. 

Armstrong proceeded to describe the separation process that occurs when a 
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bullet is fired, and the ejection of the empty shell casing. The jury was shown 

a photograph of the casing on the ground in front of the bar.

The State also moved into evidence four photographs of the victim's face, 

which are included in the appendix on appeal. They depict the victim lying in a 

hospital bed, his eyes swollen shut. Also moved into evidence were defendant's 

blue and white sneakers, and the clothes he was wearing when arrested. 

Additionally, the State presented the jury with enlarged still photographs taken 

from the video depicting the item defendant was holding. 

The State presented Allison Lane, a scientist from the State Police 

Laboratory, who explained the forensic examination of the clothing, glove, and 

a cap submitted for testing, actually performed by an employee who had retired. 

Lane was qualified as an expert, stating she was not only familiar with the 

procedures employed during testing, but also with the retired scientist's 

examination, and independently reviewed her findings. The procedures used in 

her testing "were in line with . . . protocols in the laboratory." The items were 

then forwarded to the DNA lab because a stain on the glove was presumptive 

for blood, and skin cells were found inside the hat that might generate a DNA 

match. When tested, the clothing items traced back to defendant.
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At the close of the State's case, defense counsel moved for dismissal

pursuant to State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967). The judge denied the motion,

concluding that despite the unusual nature of the State's proofs, entirely 

circumstantial evidence due to the non-cooperative victim and eyewitnesses, a 

reasonable jury could nonetheless convict when all inferences were drawn in 

favor of the State. Those proofs included the surveillance video, and the hat 

bearing defendant's DNA. 

Defendant draws our attention to the following alleged errors:

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT’S EXCLUSION OF 

DEFENDANT’S THIRD-PARTY DEFENSE 

VIOLATED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.

POINT II. THE ADMISSION OF IMPROPER 

EXPERT TESTIMONY FROM LAW 

ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS REDMOND AND 

ARMSTRONG DENIED THE DEFENDANT OF HIS 

RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.

A. Redmond’s Determination That Irwin

Sustained a Gunshot Wound Related To

Matters That Were Beyond The Ken Of An

Average Juror (Not raised below).

B. Armstrong’s Testimony About The

Components Of A Bullet, The Trajectory

Of A Projectile And The Landing Spot

For A Spent Shell Casing Went Beyond

The Ken Of An Average Juror.
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POINT III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 

WHEN IT ADMITTED THE COMPLEX FINDINGS 

OF ANNETTE ESTELLO, A NON-TESTIFYING 

EXPERT. 

POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION WHEN IT ADMITTED THE 

CHERRY’S LOUNGE VIDEOTAPE INTO 

EVIDENCE AS THE STATE FAILED TO 

PROPERLY AUTHENTICATE THE VIDEOTAPE.

POINT V. THE ADMISSION OF CUMULATIVE 

AND UNDULY PREJUDICIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF 

THE ALLEGED VICTIM DENIED THE 

DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 

(Not raised below).

POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 

ENTERED A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL OR 

GRANTED DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A NEW 

[TRIAL] BECAUSE NO REASONABLE JURY 

COULD HAVE FOUND DEFENDANT GUILTY 

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

POINT VII. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 

PROVIDE A CHARGE PURSUANT TO STATE V. 

CLAWANS, 38 N.J. 162 (1962) REGARDING THE 

STATE'S FAILURE TO PRODUCE THE VICTIM AS 

A WITNESS (Not raised below).

POINT VIII. THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO 

INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT IT MUST FIND 

DEFENDANT NOT GUILTY IF THE STATE 

FAILED TO PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE 

SECOND-DEGREE POSSESSION OF A WEAPON 

FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE CONSTITUTES 

REVERSIBLE ERROR (Not raised below).
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POINT IX. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION WHEN IT SENTENCED 

DEFENDANT TO AN AGGREGATE TERM OF 

FIFTEEN YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT BECAUSE 

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FIND 

MITIGATING FACTORS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY 

THE RECORD.

POINT X. THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED 

FOR RESENTENCING TO ENABLE THE COURT 

TO PROVIDE A STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR 

ITS DECISION TO APPLY THE MANDATORY 

GRAVES ACT EXTENDED TERM TO 

DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION FOR SECONDDEGREE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. 

I.

Defendant's first point is that the judge's refusal to allow him to question 

Sharperson regarding the bar owner's own confrontation with the victim violated 

his right to a fair trial. It is undisputed that "a defendant is entitled to prove his 

innocence by showing that someone else committed the crime." State v. 

Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 297 (1988). Similarly, the statutory defense of selfdefense, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4, can be raised even if the interaction between 

defendant and the victim commenced as mutual combat. State v. Gentry, 439 

N.J. Super. 57, 69-71 (App. Div. 2015). In this case, it appeared that defense 

counsel was arguing that the victim had "threatened a number of people" and 

that thus someone else could have shot him, or defendant could have acted in
10 A-2116-18T1

self-defense. But, as the judge pointed out, just because the victim may have 

been prohibited from going back into the bar, and was aggressive that evening, 

does not connect the shooting with any particular confrontation other than the 

one defendant had with the victim. The video shown to the jury clearly depicted

interactions between the victim and a person dressed in clothing similar to that 

worn by defendant, seconds before the victim collapsed onto the hood of the 

passing police car. The judge opined that to have allowed the testimony would 

have merely encouraged the jury to speculate. Thus, he denied the crossexamination. 

The video makes clear that although anything is possible, the likelihood

that a third person shot the victim, simultaneously with his continuing 

confrontation off-screen with the defendant, is nothing more than unfounded 

speculation. As the court said in Koedatich, some evidence has to be proffered 

linking a third party and the victim, or a third party and the crime. 112 N.J. at 

300. There must be "some thread" that would enable a reasonable jury to view 

that third-party confrontation as having relevance to the shooting. See ibid. The

evidence must rationally tend "to engender a reasonable doubt with respect to 

an essential feature of the State's case." State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 345 (1996)

(quotations omitted). 
11 A-2116-18T1

No such evidence would be developed through the line of questioning. At

trial, though not on appeal, counsel suggested self-defense as the theory that 

warranted cross-examination of the bar owner. Even if it had been clearly 

argued, nothing on the video depicting the struggle between the unarmed victim 

and an armed defendant justified his use of force, as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:3-

4. Nothing in the video or the State's proofs suggested third-party guilt. The

argument lacks merit. 

II.

Plain error is "error possessing a clear capacity to bring about an unjust 

result and which substantially prejudiced the defendant's fundamental right to 

have the jury fairly evaluate the merits of his [or her] defense." State v. 

Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 576-77 (1999) (quoting State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 

427, 444 (1989)). "[A]ny finding of plain error depends on an evaluation of the 

overall strength of the State's case." State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 

(2006). The unjust result must be "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to 

whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." 

State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971). Harmless errors should be disregarded 

by the court, even where the trial court is found to have abused its discretion in 

admitting evidence and failed to properly instruct the jury. See State v. Prall, 
12 A-2116-18T1

231 N.J. 567, 581, 587-88 (2018); R. 2:10-2 ("Any error or omission shall be 

disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been 

clearly capable of producing an unjust result . . . ."). 

At trial, defendant did not object to the admission of Redmond's testimony 

that the victim sustained a gunshot wound in the absence of medical evidence. 

On appeal, defendant objects that the "diagnosis" required it. 

The argument fails because pursuant to N.J.R.E. 701, a witness may state

his opinion so long as it is rationally based on his perceptions, and will assist 

the jury in determining a fact at issue. The admissibility of opinion evidence 

rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 

187, 197 (1989). 

It bears repeating that the fact defendant was shot was not in dispute. 

Defendant was silent when the judge ruled on Armstrong's proposed testimony 

about the shell casing and observed that the occurrence of the shooting was not 

in dispute. The doctrine of invited error is therefore applicable. Under that 

doctrine, we do not review a claim of error when a party's statements or conduct 

were relied upon by the trial judge in reaching a decision later appealed. See

Brett v. Great American Recreation, 144 N.J. 479, 503 (1996). The judge relied 
13 A-2116-18T1

on defendant's silence in making his evidentiary ruling as to Armstrong—but it 

applies to Redmond's testimony as well.

Even if the doctrine of invited error did not apply, plain error did not occur 

when the police officer described what he saw. He saw an injury in the victim's 

abdomen, from which the victim's intestines appeared to be protruding. 

Although certainly, such wounds can result from causes other than a gunshot, it 

was reasonable for the officer to have testified, without objection, to the 

sequence of events. As he was driving by the bar, he heard a gunshot, and when 

he returned to the scene, he immediately located an injured person. His 

observation in the context of what he heard, and his training and experience 

caused him to conclude that the injury was a gunshot. Thus, this argument has 

no merit. Even if error, the error was harmless.

Defendant also objects to Armstrong's testimony explaining how a bullet 

separates once shot out of a gun, causing the empty casing to fall to the ground. 

The officer had worked with the Jersey City Police Department for twenty-four 

years and was assigned over his career to the street crimes unit, the gang task 

force, and the "cease fire" unit. He had participated in over one hundred 

investigations and received training in handguns. The officer could have been 

formally qualified as an expert, able to testify regarding the relatively innocuous 
14 A-2116-18T1

information that a spent shell casing lands on the ground. The judge limited the 

officer's testimony to that point. The nature of this testimony was within the 

sphere of common knowledge of those familiar with guns. 

In similar situations, the New Jersey Supreme Court has permitted lay

opinion testimony, such as that of both Redmond and Armstrong, given their 

employment, experience, and observations. See State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 

459 (2011). Examples of similar scenarios found in McLean are testimony 

regarding whether a neighborhood is a high-crime area, an officer's observations 

of an accident scene, including skid marks, and an officer's interpretation of

street slang. Id. at 458-59. The admission of Redmond and Armstrong's 

testimony did not deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial. It was nothing 

more than lay opinion evidence.

III.

Defendant also contends that the court should not have admitted the 

testimony of the State Police laboratory serology unit scientist's discussion of 

the testing conducted by a retired employee. This argument lacks merit because 

the scientist, consistent with current caselaw, did not passively repeat the 

contents of the report. She stated that she was familiar with the testing protocols

the retired employee followed and had independently reviewed the retired 
15 A-2116-18T1

employee's findings. Thus, her testimony that the glove tested positive

presumptive for the presence of blood, and the hat contained "potential skin

cells[,]" was proper. The items were sent on for further analysis. 

The requirements of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004),

were satisfied. As in State v. Michaels, 219 N.J. 1, 45-46 (2014), the scientist

independently verified the report protocols, forming independent conclusions 

about the results. This argument also lacks merit.

IV.

Videotapes are treated similarly to a writing under N.J.R.E. 801(e) and 

therefore must be authenticated before admission. See State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 

4, 17 (1994). The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 

precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding 

that the matter is what its proponent claims. N.J.R.E. 901. In order to establish 

the foundation for admission, no hyper technical steps must be followed—

rather, the testimony must establish the accuracy and correctness of the film. 

Wilson, 135 N.J. at 14. And as is the case with all evidence, admission of a 

video is subject to abuse of discretion review. See State v. Brown, 463 N.J. 

Super. 33, 51 (App. Div. 2020).
16 A-2116-18T1

In this case, the judge's admission of the videotape and his decision at the 

close of the Rule 104 hearing were not an abuse of discretion. Sharperson's and 

Redmond's testimony regarding the video sufficed to authenticate it. The 

suggestion that because no chain of evidence was proffered, or that because

Sharperson could have manipulated the tape in some fashion, it should not have 

been admitted, is speculative. The time stamp discrepancy was explored by 

defense counsel; it was the only issue with the video. Accordingly, the judge 

did not abuse his discretion by admitting it.

V.

Defendant argues that either his Rule 3:18-2 motion for acquittal, or his 

motion for a new trial, should have been granted. Because no actual shooting is 

depicted on the video, the victim refused to cooperate, no eyewitness spoke with 

police, and defendant claims the video is allegedly insufficient to establish 

defendant's possession of a gun, even drawing all inferences in favor of the State, 

no reasonable jury could have convicted defendant. 

After conviction, defendant further claims, given that all proofs were 

circumstantial, the interests of justice required dismissal of the charges. That 

the judge commented that he could not have found the object seen in defendant's 
17 A-2116-18T1

hand was a gun did not mean a reasonable jury could not reach a contrary 

conclusion. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence for them to convict. 

Defendant was seen on the video, holding a black object, apparently pistol 

whipping the victim, and was arrested moments later in the same clothes. A 

gunshot was heard, admittedly off camera, while the two men struggled. When 

police arrived moments later, the victim had a gunshot wound to his abdomen. 

A spent shell casing was found at the scene, corroborating that a shot was fired. 

Defendant was located hiding under a nearby car, and when told by police to 

walk toward them, he took off running. 

The trial court is bound pursuant to rule, to give the benefit of all favorable

inferences to the State. Viewing the circumstantial evidence in this case in that 

light, it is clear that a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charges beyond any 

reasonable doubt. See Rule 3:18-1; State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967). 

A motion for a new trial is granted pursuant to Rule 3:20-1 where 

"required in the interest of justice." These motions are addressed to the 

discretion of the trial judge and are not reversed unless a clear abuse of that 

discretion has been established. State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119, 137 (App. 

Div. 2000). We merely determine whether the court could have made its 

decision on sufficient credible evidence present in the record. That certainly 
18 A-2116-18T1

appears to be the case here. Enlarged stills were presented to the jury taken from 

the video showing an object in defendant's hand. From these photographs, a 

reasonable juror could readily conclude defendant was holding a gun. At trial 

at least, no one was contesting that the victim had been shot. No manifest denial 

of justice occurred; the judge's decision was reached on sufficient credible 

evidence present in the record. 

VI.

Defendant also contends that the judge should have found mitigating 

factor seven, lack of criminal record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). The judge did not

err in his findings of aggravating and mitigating factors. As indicated in the 

presentence report, in addition to having an extensive juvenile history, this

thirty-eight-year-old defendant in 2018 had been previously convicted of eight 

indictable offenses, including federal offenses, and five disorderly persons 

matters. In 2004, defendant was sentenced for a federal offense involving the 

unlawful transport of firearms to 110 months imprisonment. Thus, to say he 

was offense-free is not within the intent of the statute. If he was in federal 

custody, the fact he was law-abiding during that time does not support mitigating 

factor seven. He was charged in 2011 with attempted murder and related 

offenses that mirror these charges.
19 A-2116-18T1

VII.

Defendant makes a series of arguments that do not warrant discussion in 

a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We touch upon them briefly.

Defendant asserts that the admission of the four photographs of the 

victim's face denied him his right to a fair trial because they were too prejudicial. 

Those photographs are included in the appendix. They simply depict the 

victim's face, his eyes swollen shut. They would not inflame the passions of a 

jury. Their admission did not prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial.

Defendant's argument that the judge should have given the State v. 

Clawans, 38 N.J. 162 (1962), charge also lacks merit. A fundamental 

requirement for Clawans is that the victim be unavailable to the defendant. The 

victim was equally available to both parties, making the Clawans inference 

unavailable. Id. at 171.

Defendant also contends that the judge erroneously instructed the jury.

The State provided a copy of a CD, however, created from the courtroom 

recording to refute the misstatement in the transcript. The judge, tracking the 

model jury charge, actually said that if the State failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt any elements of the offense, the jury must find defendant not 

guilty. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Possession of a Firearm With a
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Purpose to Use It Unlawfully Against the Person or Property of Another 

(N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a))" (rev. Oct. 22, 2018).2 

Finally, defendant argues that the matter should be remanded for 

resentencing so that the court could provide a statement of reasons regarding his

decision to apply the Graves Act extended term to defendant's conviction for 

second-degree aggravated assault. We disagree that the judge did not do so; the 

judge gave a detailed and thorough exposition as to his imposition of sentence 

overall, including the mandatory Graves Act term.

Affirmed.

2

 The court gave Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Possession of a Firearm With 

a Purpose to Use It Unlawfully Against the Person or Property of Another 

(N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a))" (2003), which was revised on October 22, 2018 after 

defendant's trial. The 2018 revision did not, however, alter the content of the 

portion of the jury charge disputed by defendant.