UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4325

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

QUINCY WILLIAMS, a/k/a Bandana,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District 

Judge. (1:09-cr-00288-WDQ-19)

Submitted: September 12, 2011 Decided: September 27, 2011

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

G. Godwin Oyewole, McLean, Virginia, for Appellant. Jonathan 

Biran, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, 

for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Quincy Williams pled guilty pursuant to a plea 

agreement to conspiracy to participate in a racketeering 

enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006), and was 

sentenced to 121 months in prison. Counsel has filed an appeal

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In the 

Anders brief, counsel states that there are no meritorious 

grounds for appeal, but nonetheless asks this court to conduct 

an Anders review. Counsel has also moved for permission to 

withdraw from further representation of Williams. Williams has 

not filed a pro se supplemental brief, despite receiving notice 

of his right to do so. The Government moves to dismiss the 

appeal, in part, based on the appellate waiver in Williams’ plea 

agreement. We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw, dismiss the 

appeal in part, and affirm in part.

A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that 

waiver is knowing and intelligent. See United States v. 

Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). Our independent 

review of the record supports the conclusion that Williams

voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to appeal any 

sentence within or below an advisory Guidelines range resulting 

from an adjusted base offense level of thirty-one. Thus, we 

conclude that the waiver is valid and enforceable.
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However, even a valid waiver does not waive all 

appellate claims. Specifically, a valid appeal waiver does not 

preclude a challenge to a sentence on the ground that it exceeds 

the statutory maximum or is based on a constitutionally 

impermissible factor such as race, arises from the denial of a 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance 

of counsel, or relates to claims concerning a violation of the 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel in proceedings following the 

guilty plea. See United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 

(4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Craig, 985 F.2d 175, 178 (4th 

Cir. 1993). Moreover, the appellate waiver in Williams’ plea 

agreement did not waive any claims Williams may have pertaining 

to his conviction or to a sentence calculated based on an 

adjusted base offense level greater than thirty-one. Williams 

raises no claims that fall outside the scope of his appellate 

waiver and does not oppose the Government’s motion. Thus, we 

grant the Government's motion to dismiss in part. 

Although we are charged under Anders with reviewing 

the record for unwaived error, we have reviewed the record in 

this case and have found no unwaived and meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore deny counsel’s motion to withdraw, dismiss 

the appeal in part and affirm in part. This court requires that 

counsel inform Williams, in writing, of his right to petition 

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If 
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Williams requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move 

this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s 

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Williams. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART;

AFFIRMED IN PART