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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50484

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KAREN FULLBRIGHT,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: September 17, 2024

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Patrick J. Miller, District Judge. 

Order for restitution, affirmed. 

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Amy J. Lavin, Deputy Attorney General, 

Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

TRIBE, Judge 

Karen Fullbright appeals from an order for restitution. Fullbright asserts the district court 

abused its discretion by ordering $1,400 in restitution. We affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Following a trial, Fullbright was convicted of two counts of felony grand theft for taking 

and using K.N.’s (Fullbright’s ex-husband) Wells Fargo debit card to withdraw $1,400 from the 

Wells Fargo account. The district court sentenced Fullbright to a unified sentence of eight years, 

with two years determinate, but suspended the sentence and placed her on probation. Fullbright 
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appealed. This Court affirmed Fullbright’s judgment of conviction and sentence in an unpublished 

opinion.

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While the appeal was pending, the State moved for a restitution order. At the conclusion 

of the restitution hearing, the district court found that the State presented sufficient evidence that 

Fullbright withdrew $1,400 in cash from K.N.’s Wells Fargo account and that those funds were 

never returned nor were the transactions canceled. The district court also found that Wells Fargo 

was the victim pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304(1)(e)(i), as it dispersed the cash to Fullbright.

The district court rejected Fullbright’s argument that she did not have the ability to pay the 

restitution. The district court issued a final restitution order in the amount of $1,400. Fullbright 

timely appeals from the district court’s restitution order.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 

conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the 

issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently 

with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision 

by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

 III.

ANALYSIS

A. Wells Fargo is a Victim

Fullbright argues that the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal 

standards because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Wells Fargo qualified as a 

victim under I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e). Fullbright contends that there is no evidence to support the 

finding that she took Wells Fargo’s money and that the evidence showed that K.N., not Wells 

Fargo, was the directly injured victim. Fullbright argues that Wells Fargo did not qualify as a 

direct victim under I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i) because it did not suffer an “economic loss as a result”

of Fullbright’s criminal conduct. The State argues that the district court properly determined that 

Wells Fargo qualified as a victim. We agree that Wells Fargo is a victim.

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See State v. Fullbright, Docket No. 50080 (Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2023). 
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For purposes of the restitution statute, the term “victim” means, in relevant part: “a person 

or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.” 

I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i). At the restitution hearing, the State presented a letter from Wells Fargo 

containing a list of transactions made with K.N.’s debit card, including two withdrawals of $700 

made by Fullbright directly from Wells Fargo. Fullbright argues that Wells Fargo’s claim letter 

does not indicate that Wells Fargo gave its own money to Fullbright. Rather, the letter indicates 

only that K.N. filed a claim for two cash withdrawals for $700 and that Wells Fargo was requesting 

that amount in restitution. 

The district court determined that Wells Fargo qualified as a victim under I.C. § 19-

5304(1)(e)(i) because “Wells Fargo dispersed cash to [Fullbright] twice through an ATM in the 

amount of $700 each for a total of $1,400.” It also found that Wells Fargo “suffered the loss” 

when Fullbright made the two $700 ATM withdrawals. These amounts are confirmed by the letter 

from Wells Fargo that indicated that it had suffered an economic loss and was requesting restitution 

for that loss. The district court found that there was substantial evidence in the record to support 

the finding that the money withdrawn by Fullbright could not have been canceled like a fraudulent 

credit card charge, making restitution necessary because it was withdrawn as cash and Wells Fargo 

never sought reimbursement of the cash from K.N., making Wells Fargo a victim. 

Fullbright also argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence that Wells Fargo 

was a “victim” under I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iv) and that the record is “devoid” of any evidence to 

show Wells Fargo suffered economic loss because it “made payments” to the victim “pursuant to 

a contract.” State v. Cheeney, 144 Idaho 294, 299, 160 P.3d 451, 456 (Ct. App. 2007). Fullbright 

argues that the State offered no testimony from K.N. or a Wells Fargo employee on whether Wells 

Fargo reimbursed K.N. for the two cash withdrawals pursuant to a contract. The State argues that 

Cheeney is not controlling in this case because I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iv) has been amended since 

Cheeney to include a second option besides a contractual relationship. The statute was amended 

in 2008 and reads:

A person or entity who suffers economic loss because such person or entity has 

made payments to or on behalf of a directly injured victim pursuant to a contract 

including, but not limited to, an insurance contract, or payments to or on behalf of 

a directly injured victim to pay or settle a claim or claims against such person or 

entity in tort or pursuant to statute and arising from the crime.
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I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iv) (emphasis added). In reviewing the record, it is not clear that the district 

court based its decision, in part, on I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(iv). However, because the district court 

concluded that Wells Fargo was a victim under I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i), it is unnecessary to 

determine whether the district court erred in finding that Wells Fargo was a victim pursuant to I.C. 

§ 19-5304(1)(e)(iv). For the reasons stated above, Fullbright did not meet her burden in showing 

the district court abused its discretion in finding Wells Fargo was a victim. 

B. Ability to Pay

Fullbright next claims that the district court did not “exercise reason” by ordering 

restitution because “it should have given more weight to her inability to pay.” In support of her 

claim, Fullbright points to her testimony that she was unable to work due to a back injury, her sole 

sources of income were social security and food stamps, and she also had significant debt and bills. 

The State responds that the restitution award was proper because the district court recognized the 

distinction between immediate and foreseeable ability to pay and the “district court correctly 

weighed all [the] factors before issuing its restitution order.”

The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the discretion of a 

trial court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-5304(7) and by the policy 

favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer economic loss. State v. Torrez, 156 Idaho 

118, 119, 320 P.3d 1277, 1278 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543, 768 P.2d 804, 

806 (Ct. App. 1989). Although a court should consider the needs and earning ability of the 

defendant, the immediate inability to pay restitution is not, in and of itself, a reason to deny a 

restitution request. I.C. § 19-5304(7); see also State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708, 

710 (Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that inability to pay neither precludes nor limits a restitution award 

but is only one factor to consider when making a discretionary restitution determination). Unless 

the trial court determines that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable, it shall 

order a defendant found guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to 

make restitution to the victim. I.C. § 19-5304(2).

The record reflects that the district court considered that Fullbright might not have “the 

immediate ability to pay” and perhaps “has the immediate inability to pay,” considered the factors 

set forth in I.C. § 19-5304(7) and determined that Fullbright’s “immediate inability to pay 

restitution” was not a reason to not order restitution. Fullbright testified at the restitution hearing 
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that she had a back injury that limited her ability to work and might require surgery, the district 

court found that there was “no evidence that the injury is other than temporary.” Additionally, the 

district court found that Fullbright was “able-bodied and employable” and would be able to pay 

the $1,400 restitution “even if it has to be paid over time.” It is in the district court’s discretion to 

determine how much weight to place on Fullbright’s ability to pay the restitution, and the 

foreseeable ability to pay is not the only factor that a court can rely on to make an order of 

restitution. “The exercise of discretion must encompass consideration of the amount of economic 

loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources, needs and earning 

ability of the defendant, and other factors deemed appropriate by the court.” State v. Hamilton, 

129 Idaho 938, 942, 935 P.2d 201, 205 (Ct. App. 1997). Because the district court correctly 

perceived the decision to order restitution as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of that 

discretion in accordance with the applicable legal standards and reached its determination through 

an exercise of reason, Fullbright has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Fullbright has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s restitution order. 

Accordingly, the district court’s restitution award of $1,400 to Wells Fargo is affirmed. 

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.