The short title of the Te x as Commissi on on Human Rig hts Act was omitted wh en it was 1 rec odified at c hapter

21 of the Te x as L abor Code. H oweve r, for the s ake of simplicity , we will re fer to c ha pte r 2 1 o f t

he la bo r c od e a s th e Te xas C omm iss ion on Human Ri g hts Ac t. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 06 -00 437 -CV

M ay nar d Tuc ke r , A ppe lla nt

v. The Austin Am eric an-Statesm an and The Austin Human Rights Com m ission , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-05- 0032 33 , HO NORAB LE SCO TT H. JENK INS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt M ay na rd Tu c ke r s ue d the Au sti n A me ri c an- State sma n a nd the Au sti n Human Rig hts Com mis sio n un de r the Te xas Com mis sio n on Huma n Rig hts Ac t, alleg ing a g e and

1
rac e discrimination in connec tion with his termination by the Statesman and the Com m ission’s investigation into hi s termination. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. §§ 21.001-.556 (West 2006). Tuc ker also alleg ed that the Statesman defa med his c hara cter

by providing false a

nd misleading information in its re sponse to the Commi ssion’s inve stigation. The Commi ssion f iled a plea to the jurisdiction
asser ting e x clusive fe dera l-court jurisdiction a nd sovere ign immunit y as jurisdictional bars, which the trial cour

t gr anted. The Statesman filed a motion to dismiss the discrimination claims o n the g ro un d s o f r e s j u d i c a t a , w h i c h t h e t r i a l c o u rt a l s o g r an t e d
. T h e S t a t e s m an s p e c i a l l y e xc e p t e d toTucke r does not appe al the trial court’s dismi ssal of hi s discrimination claims ag ainst the 2 Statesman. 2 Tucke r’s amended de famation claim, stating that the c laim is not vi able unde r statutory and common law, and filed a motion to dismiss
. After allowing Tucke r the opportunity to amend his claim, the trial court sustained the specia l exceptions and dismis sed the amended de fama tion claim. I nth is a p p e a l, T u c k e r

c o n te n d s th a t t

h e d is tr ic t c o u rt e r

r e d in g r an ti n g the Commi ssion’s plea to the jurisdiction on the discrimination claims and in dismissing hi s defamation
c la im. We affir

m the d i s trict court’ s order g rantingthe Commiss ion’s plea to the jurisdiction on 2 the dis c ri min a tio n c la ims and the or de r d ism iss ingTu c ke r’ s d e fa matio n c la im.

BACK GR OUND Tu c ke r, a 47 -ye ar- old Af

ri c an- Am e ri c an mal e , wa s emp loye d b y the State sma

n a s a loader from Marc h 26, 1997 to Aug ust 14, 2003. Tucker was initially

suspended by

the Statesman afte r an a rgument with a cowor

ker on Aug ust 2, 2003, and this suspension was followe d by Tucke r’s termination on August 14, 2003. The Statesman conte nds that Tucke r was ter minated as a

result of his conduct duringthe ar g ument. Tucke r conte nds that manag ers Ke vin Ba ird and R obert Mele ndez used the a rgument as a pr etext for his suspension and termination. The fa cts of the August 2, 2003 incident are larg ely undisputed. Tucker

was wor king as a loa der on the loading docks while another S tatesman employ ee, J ohn Gonzales, was wor king as a f orklift operator. For

klift operator s are authorized by Statesman policy

to d i re ct t h e work of loader s. Tucke r and Gonzales beca me eng ag ed in a he ated a

rgument afte r Gonzales dire cted Tuc ker to h e lp t wo oth e r wo rk e rs . D ur ingthi s argume nt, Tu c ke r k no c ke d G on zal e s’ s b a se ba ll c a p o ff hisTucke r broug ht his first suit unde r the Ag e Discrimination in E mploy ment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 3 §§ 621-634 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006) , and Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 20 00 e to 2 00 0e -1 7 ( Wes t 20 03 & Sup p. 20 05 ). Em plo y me nt dis c ri min a tio n cla ims un de r t he se fe de ra l st a tut e s ar e ana log ou s to c la ims ma de un de r t he Te xas C omm iss ion

on Human Ri g hts Ac t. See E vans v. City of Houston , 246 F.3d 344, 349 ( 5th Cir. 2001).

3 he a d; G on zal e s r e sp on de d w ithra c ia l e pit he ts. Go nza le s the n we nt to Ni g ht Of fi c e Ma na g e r K e vin Ba ird’s office to repor

t the i ncident, and Tucke r followed. Ba ird direc ted Tucke r to clock out a nd leave the pre mises. Tucker was suspende d for two we eks and ultimately terminated. After T u ck er was ter

minated, he f

iled an administrative c omplaint with the Commi ssion, al l egi n g em p l oy ment discrimination based on a g e and r ace . I n response to the Commi ssion’s investigation, the Statesman submitt ed documentation to establish that Tucke r had a history of ag g ressive be havior, late ness, violating va cation and call-in policy , and leaving the work
are a without permission. Tucke r contends that this documentation consisted of “fa lse and fic titious alleg ations” and that the Statesman defa med his char acte r by

providing this infor m ati on to the Commi ssion. Upon completing its investi g ation, the Commiss ion issued a dec ision in favor of the Statesman.

Be fore filing the p r e s e nt case , Tucke r broug ht suit i n state cour t ag ainst the Statesman and the Commi ssion charg ing a g e and r ace discrimination under fe dera l law based on the same set 3 of fa cts prese nted her e. The orig inal suit did not include a de famation claim. The Statesman and the C o mm is s io n r e mo v e d th e o r ig in a l c a s e to f e d e r a l d is tr ic t c o u rt. T h e f e d e r a l c o u rt g r anted the Commi ssion’s motion to dismi ss for fa ilure to state a c laim on November 7, 2005, and g rante d the Statesman’s motion for summary judgme nt on March 9, 2006.4 STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW P lea to the Jurisdiction

A plea to the jur isdiction is a dil atory plea that seeks dism issal of a case for lac k of subject-matter

jurisdiction. Harris County v. Syke s , 136 S.W .3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004). The plaintiff has the burde n of alleg ing f acts to af fi rm at i vely

demonstrate that the trial court ha s jurisdiction. Texas De p’t of Parks &W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)
. Whether this burden has bee n met and whe ther undisputed evidenc e of jurisdictional fa cts establishes a tr ial court’s jurisdiction are questions of l aw reviewe d de novo. Id. I n perf orming this re view, an a

ppellate c ourt does not look to the merits of the ca se but consider s only the pl eading s and evide nce r eleva nt to the jurisdictional inquiry
. Cou nty of C am e ro n v . B ro wn , 80 S.W .3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). I f the pleading s aff

irmatively neg ate the exis tence of jurisdiction, a plea to the jurisdiction may be g rante d without allowing the pla intiff an opportunity to amend. Id. Spe c ialExc e pt ion s

We r e v ie w th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s r u li n g o ns p e c ia l e xc e p ti o n s an d it s d is mi s s a l u

n d e r an abuse- of-discr etion standard. Muec ke v. Hallstead , 2 5 S. W.3 d 2 21 , 2 24 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 2000, no pet.). Spec ial exceptions may be used to de termi n e wh et her the plaintiff has plea ded a
cause of action permitted by law. Sa n B e nito B an k

& Tru st C

o. v . La nd air Tra v e ls , 31 S.W .3d 312, 31 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 20 00 , n o p e t.) . Wh e n a tr ia l c ourt

su sta ins sp e c ia l e xce ption s, it must give the pleade r an o p p ortunity to amend, but the ca se may be dismissed if the amende d pleadingfails to state a c ause of action. Friesenhahn v . Ryan , 960 S.W .2d 6 5 6 , 6 5 8 (T ex . 1998). Dismissal with prejudice is proper if a plea ding de fec t cannot be cure d by amendment. Te

x as -O hio5

Gas, Inc. v . Mec om , 2 8 S. W.3 d 129 , 141 n. 16 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 00 , no pe t.) . The a

pp e llate court re views such a

ruling de novo, takingall alleg ations, fac ts, a nd infere nces in the pleading s as true a n d v i ewingthem in a light most favor able to the plea der. San Benito Bank & Tru st , 31 S.W .3d at 317. DI SCU SSIO N

Be fore rea chingthe merits of this appea l, we must consider the Statesman’s motion to strike improper r ecor d supplementati o n . W h i l e pro se litigants must comply with the law and rules of pr ocedur e, pro se pleading s and briefs are to be liberally construed. Shull v. United Parce l Serv. , 4 S.W .3d 46, 53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) . On Fe bruar y 21, 2007, Tucke r filed a “ 2nd Supplemental Ap p ea l ” wi th this C ourt, consisting of copies of doc uments that were
a lr e a dy inc lud e d in

the c le rk ’s re c or d a

nd /or the fi rs t and

/or se c on d s up plem ent al cler k’ s r e c or ds , as well as certain documents that are not included in the record. I n light of the fac t that items 1-3, 5-8, and 13, a s well as the pa g es of item 16 bear ing Bates stamps A A 50117, AA 50120, AA 50121, AA50 13 0, and

AA50 13 3 o f t

his fi lin g c an b e fo un d in the re c or d a

nd are a lre a dy

be ingpr op e rl y
c on sid e re d o n a

pp e a l, we ov e rr

ule the State sma

n’ s mo tio n to str ike tho se ite ms. I n a dd iti on , it e ms 14 and 15 are summaries of U.S. Supreme Court case s, Cur tis Pu bli sh ing Co. v . B utt

s , 388 U.S. 130 (1967), a nd Gertz v. Robe rt W

elch I nc. , 418 U.S. 323 (1974), respe ctively , that wer e previously cited by Tucke r in his moti o n t o am en d the def amation claim. B eca

use these c ases we re c ited in a document conta ined i n the record and there fore have been reviewe d by this Court i ndepende ntly of Tuck er ’s “2 nd Supplemental Appea l,” we ove rrule the Statesman’s motion to strike items 14 and 15 . We wi ll v ie w the a llo we d it e ms as a su pp le me nta l app e nd ix to T uc ke r’ s b ri e f u nd e r T e xas R

uleThese items a re de scribed in the inde x to the “2nd S upplemental Appeal” a s follows: (I tem 4 4) “Plaintiff e vidence [si c], a letter f rom the office of cour

t administration, a letter in re fer ence to the Honora ble J udg e De rwood’s time of se rvice on the benc h,” (Item 9) “Pl aintiffs evide nce [sic], a letter of written warning from the plaintiffs [si c] former employ er the Austin America n Statesman fr o m M r. Robert Melende z,” ( I tem 10) “L etter from Mr. Melende z, this letter in r eg ards to a discounted write- up,” (Item 11) “Plaintiffs evidenc e [si c] a nd aff idavit by the plaintiff,” (I tem 12) “A w ar n in g s tate me n t w r itte n b y Ro b e rt A g u le r a d a te d D e c e mb e r 1 8 th , 2 0 0 2 , ” an d ( I tem 16) “Plaintiff evidenc e [sic] , Fa lse write ups by Dar yl McFa rlin, Robert Melende z, 1-22 pag es.” 6 of Appe llate Proce dure 38.7. H owev er , items 4, 9-12, and the r emainder of item 16 of Tucke r’s

4

“ 2n d Sup ple me nta l App e a l” c on sis t of do c ume nts that w e re no t in c lud e d in the re c or d. An

a pp e llate court is bound to de termine the ca se on the re cord a s filed and c annot look outside the trial cour t’s
rec ord t o discover r eleva

nt fac ts. Se e Qu or um In t’ l v . Ta rra nt A pp ra isa l D ist
. , 114 S.W .3d 568, 572 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 2003, pet. denied)
. Be cause materia ls not included in the rec ord may not be prope rly

considere d on appea l, we will str i k e i t em s 4, 9-12, and those por tions of item 16 not noted above.

Di s cr i mi n a ti o n Cl a i ms

I n his first issue, Tucker

argues that the t

r ia l c ourt err ed by

g rantingthe Commiss ion’s ple a to the jur isd ic tio n. Th e Com mis sio n’ s ple a to the jur isd ic tio n c on te nd e d th a t T uc ke r f a ile d to
make a c la im und e r t

he statut e ple a de d to ov e rc ome the Com mis sio n’ s so ve re ig n immun ity
. As a g overnme ntal unit, the Comm ission enjoy s sovere ign immunity from suit unless the pl ai n tiff establishes that immunity was specific ally waived by statute. See Tex as Dep’t of Transp. v. Jone s , 8 S.W .3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). Tucke r charg ed the Commi ssion with rac e and ag e discrimination
u n d er t h e T ex as C o m m i s s i o no nHu m an R i gh t s Ac t , wh i ch p ro v i d es a l i m i t edwa i v er o f s o v er ei gn immun ity by inc lud ingc ounti e s, mun ic ipa lit ie s, state a g e nc ie s, and state ins trum ent ali tie s in itsBe cause we have dete rmined that the trial c ourt lacke d subject-matter ju risdiction on the 5 g rounds of sover eig n immunit y , we will not addre s s the Commis sion’s alternative plea to the jurisdiction on the gr ounds of exclusive fede ral jurisdiction. 7 de fi nit ion of “ e mpl oy e r. ” Te x. L a

b. Cod e Ann. § 2 1. 00 2( 8) ; s ee Dallas/Fort W orth Int’l Airport Bd.

v . F un de rb ur k, 188 S.W .3d 233, 235 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2006, pet. g rante d, judgm’ t vacated w.r.m.). However , “[f]or a suit to proceed a g ainst a g overnme ntal unit under a statute pe rmitting such suit, the court must fir st look to the ter ms of the Act to dete rmine the scope of its waiver and then ‘c onsider the pa

rticular f acts of the case . . . to de termine whether it comes within that scope.’” Texas De p’t of Criminal

Justice v . Cooke , 149 S.W .3d 700, 704 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (q u o t i n g Texas De

p’t of Criminal

Justice v . Miller , 51 S.W .3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001)). I n order to bring suit under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, a plaintiff
mus t sh ow“ that so me so rt of e mpl oy me nt r e latio ns hip e xi st s” be tw e e n th e pla int if f a nd the pa rt y sued. NM

E H os ps ., Inc. v. Re nn e ls , 994 S.W .2d 142, 147 (Tex. 1999). Tucke r’s discr imination claims rely

solely on his employ

ment relationship with the Statesman. He did not plead that he has
ever had an e mploy

ment relationship wit h the Commiss ion, nor d i d he bringsuit ag ainst the Commi ssion in it s capa city as an e mploy er. A s a re sult, Tucker f ailed to establish that the Com mi ss ion w a ive d it s so ve re ig n immun ity un de r t he Te xas C omm iss ion

on Human Ri g hts Ac t. The trial c ourt’s orde r gra nting the Commission’s plea to the jurisdiction was prope r. I n g ranting 5

a plea to the jurisdiction ba sed on sovere ign immunit y , dismiss al with pr ejudice is prope r whe n there is nothing the plaintiff c ould have include d in his petition that would have c onfer red jurisdiction on the trial cour

t. Lib e rty

Mu t. I ns . Co. v . S

ha rp , 8 74 S.W. 2d

73 6, 73 9- 40 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 1994, writ denied) . As a re sult, we overr ule Tucke r’s fir st issue.8

De f a mat i o n Cl a i m

I n his second issue, Tuc ker a rgues t hat the trial c ourt err ed in sustaining the State sma n’ s sp e c ia l e xcep ti on s to hi s ame nd e d d e fa matio n c la im a

nd dis mis sin g the c la im w ith prejudice . Tucke r’s de famation claim a g ainst the Statesman stated that information submitt ed to the Commi ssion during its investig ation included “f alse a nd fi ct i t ious alleg ations.” The Statesma n specia lly excepted to the def

amation claim, stating that the claim is not viable under the labor c ode
or Te xas c omm on

law. Th e tr ia l c ourt

g a ve Tu c ker an op po rt

un ity to a me nd his c la im. I n h is amende d defa

mation claim, Tucker st ated that the S tatesman defamed his char acte r by submitt ing “fa lse and malicious letter s” to the Commissi on in relation to the investig ation. The trial c ourt sustained the Statesman’s spe cial exceptions and dismissed the claim with pre judice. The labor code provides t hat an “ora l or written state ment made to a c ommissi oner
or an employ ee of the commission” in connec tion with a char g e of e mploy ment discrimination “may not be the basis for

an ac tion for def

amation of c hara cter .” Te x . L ab. Code A n n . § 21.007. Howeve r, sec tion 21.0015 states that a “r ef er en ce in this cha

pter to the ‘c ommissi on’ mea ns the Texas Workfor ce Commi ssion c ivil rig hts division.” Id . § 21 .0 01 5. Whil e the Au sti n H uma n Ri g hts Commi ssion is a “local c ommissi on” as define d by subsection 21.002(11) of the labor c ode and w as
cre ated to promote t he purposes of t he Tex as C ommissi on on Human R ights Act, the languag e of section 21.007 does not spec ifically extend a privileg e to statements mad e t o s u ch local commissions. However , we will affirm the tria l court’s orde r sustaining the Statesman’s spec ial
e xce pti on s b e c a

us e the inf

or matio n s ub mitte d b y

the State sma

n to the Com mis sio n is su bje c t to judicial immunit y

under Te x as common law.9 Ora l and written c ommunications made in the due course of a judicial proc eedingare ab s o l u t el y

p ri v i l ege d , an d t h i s i m m u n i t y ex t en d s t o “s t at em en t s m ad e i nqu as i -j u d i ci al p ro ce ed i n gs b ef o re g overnme ntal executive offic ers, boa rds, and c ommissi ons which exercise quasi-judicial power s.” W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Lane , 31 S. W.3 d 2 82 , 2 90 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 20 00 , p e t. de nie d) . F a c tor s th a t ha

ve be e n id e nti fi e d a s in dic a tiv e that a g ov e rnme nta l c omm iss ion ha s q ua sijudicial power s include the powe r to exercise judg ment and discre tion, the power to h ea r and deter mine fac ts, the power to make binding orders and judgme nts, the power to affe ct the per sonal
or pr op e rt y ri g hts of pr ivate pe rs on s, the po we r t o c omp e l th e a tte nd anc e of wi tne sse s, the po we r t o examine witnesses and hear the l itigation of issues in a hearing , and the power to enforc e dec isions or i mpose pena lties. City of Austi n v. Ev ans , 794 S.W .2d 78, 83 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ). A g ov e rnme nta l bo dy

ne e d n ot e xhibi t a ll o f t

he po we rs lis te d a

bo ve to b e inv e ste d with qu a sijudicial authority
. Id. Th e Com mis sio n is a uth or ized und e r s e c tio n 2 1. 15 4 o f t he la bo r c od e to
rec eive, investig ate, c onciliate, and r ule on complaints of employ ment discrimination, to c ompel the prod u c ti o n o f e v id e n c e , an d to c o mp e l th e a tt e n d an c e o f w it n e s s e s f o r e xami n a ti o n u n der oa th. There fore, the Commiss ion is a g overnme ntal body exercising quasi-judicial powe rs, and the information submitted by the S tatesman in the course of the C ommissi on’s i nvestig ation is protected by jud ic ia l im mun ity

fr om a c ha rg e of de fa matio n. B e c a

us e Tu c ke r d oe s n ot s tate a via ble c la im, th e tr ia l c o u rt d id n o t e r r in s u s ta in in g th e St a te s ma n ’ s s p e c ia l e xc e p ti o n s . D ismissal of the defa mation claim with prej udice wa s proper beca use this defe ct ca

nnot be cur ed by

further amendment. See Tex as-Ohio Gas , 28 S.W .3d at 141 n.16.

Tucke r conte nds that the trial judg e erred by denying his re quest for f

indings of f

act in relation to the hear ing on the Statesman’s specia l e x ceptions and motion to dism iss. Findings of10

fac t “have no purpose a

nd should not be reque sted, made, or considere d on ap p ea l ” in i nstance s wher e judgme nt must be r ender ed as a matter of la

w, such a s a dismissal based on the plea dings or specia l exceptions. IK

B I nd us . ( Nige ria ) Ltd . v . Pro -L ineCor

p ., 938 S.W .2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1997). Th e tr ia l ju dg e did

no t e rr by fa ili ngto f

ile fi nd ing s o f f

a c t becau se th e tr ia l c ourt wa s f a c e d w ith pure ly le g a l is su e s and

jud g me nt w a s r e nd e re d a s a matter of law. We ov e rr ule Tucke r’s sec ond issue. CO NC LU SION

Be cause Tucke r fa iled to mak e a cl ai m under the statute pleade d to overc ome the Commi ssion’s sovereig n immunit y , we affirm the district court’s order gr anting the Commiss ion’s plea to the jurisdiction.

B e c a us e Tu c ke r’ s def

amatio n cla im is not v ia

ble un de r c omm on

law a nd inc ur a ble by further amendm en t , we aff

irm the district court’s or der sustainingthe Statesman’s spec ial
e xce pti on s and

dis mis sin g the de fa

matio n c la im.

_______________________________

Diane H enson, Jus tice
Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: Apr il 26, 2007