UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ) 

v. 

) DOCKET NO. CG S&R 00~0839 

) 

) 

ERICK LARONE HOSKINS, ) 

) 

Respondent. ) 

DECISION AND ORDER 

This proceeding is brought pursuant to the authority contained in 46 U.S.C. § 

7704; 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559; 46 CFRParts 5 and 16. 

Respondent is charged with having been convicted of a dangetous drug law 

violation which requires under 46 U.S.C. § 7704(b) that his Merchant Mariner Document 

be revoked. 

Respondent holds a Merchant Mariners Docmnent Number 531-80-4905 issued to 

him by the Coast Guard on December 22, 1998. It qualifies him to serve as an Oiler, 

Lifeboatman, Ordinary Seaman and Steward's Department. 

Jurisdiction is established in this matter by reason of Respondent's licensure. 46 

U.S.C. §7704(b); NTSB Order No. EM-31 (STUART); Commandant Appeal Decision, 

No. 2135 (Fossani). 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The Coast Guard filed the complaint on December 13, 2000. It alleged that 

Respondent was convicted of a dangerous drug law violation "Within the preceding ten 

years in the State of Washington. 

The Coast Guard then filed a motion for default order on March 2, 2001 

contending that Respondent had not timely answered the complaint. Respondent opposed 

the request and filed an answer. 

I rendered a decision denying that motion. Among the factors, upon which I 

relied, was the fact that the complaint was not properly served upon Respondent because 

he was not living at his mother's home (where the complaint was served), but instead was 

then incarcerated after conviction under the State of Washington's Uniform Controlled 

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Substances Act. I point this out since the allegation in this complaint is that Respondent 

was convicted of a drug related offense, i.e. the very offense for which he was 

incarcerated when service was attempted. 

Respondent's answer admitted; 

1. He holds a U.S. Coast Guard issued MMD number 531-80-4905; 

2. He was convicted of violating a drug law oHhe State of Washington within 

the preceding 10 years. 

In his answer, Respondent also asserted that his conviction occurred prior to his 

obtaining the Coast Guard license and he has completed rehabilitation, relapse 

prevention, and has been dtug fi·ee for approximately five years. 

This matter was then scheduled for hearing in Seattle, Washington on October 2, 

2001. Respondent's cmmsel withdrew and he obtained substitute counsel who then 

requested a six-week continuance that was denied. 

The hearing commenced on October 2, 2001 At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the pmiies were accorded the opportunity to file written closing m·gmnents, which was 

accepted. 

The argmnents have now been filed and this matter is ripe for decision. However, 

Coast Guard has objected to Respondent including in his closing argument an unsworn 

declaration of a witness who had not testified at the hearing. The argument is plain, the 

Coast Guard had no opportunity to confront this witness, cross-examine him and 

ascertain the veracity ofhis testimony in this declaration. In short, its inclusion in the 

closing argument is unfair. I agree, the declaration is rejected and will not be 

considered. 

FINDINGS OF FACT 

On May 15, 1998 Respondent applied for a Merchm1t Mariner's Document with 

the United States Coast Guard. His application revealed at that time he had been 

convicted in 1994 of a drug related offense. CG Exhibit 9 

While the application was pending, Respondent also disclosed a pending, yet nonadjudicated 1996 charge of violation of the State of Washington Unifom1 Controlled 

Substance Act. CG Exhibit 12. The Coast Guard's application evaluator did not consider 

this pending charge. Subsequently, Respondent was convicted of this 1996 offense and 

was sentenced on February 19, 1999. CG Exhibit 13. Respondent has served his 

sentence. During his incarceration he has taken various courses of instruction and has 

undergone emotional treatment for his former drug lifestyle. 

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The Washington State Feny System has employed Respondent, since licensure, as 

a deck hand. He returned to the System after his incarceration, and after a favorable 

conclusion of a disciplinary hearh1g where he was put on probation for six months in 

which the System managers would evaluate his performance. 

According to the System's Human Resource Captain, Respondent is performing 

his job in an outstanding manner showing up for work, and is very customer service 

oriented. The Captain expressed his opinion that Respondent is no danger to the safet-y of 

the vessel, passengers or crew. 

Respondent does have a criminal history, which he explains as his having made 

bad choices in life. But, he says he has turned his life around and has disassociated 

himself from drugs and that way of life. However, bis criminal history shows a recent 

arrest in the year 2000 for another drug related offense- Violation of Uniform Controlled 

Substances Act. At the time of the hearing there was no disposition of that charge. 

DISCUSSION 

Administrative license or document revocation proceedings have the purpose not 

to render -pt1nishment, but rather to maintrun sotmd,standards of cmiductto protect the . 

public, i.e., safety of life and property at sea. 

Proceedings to revoke a mariner's docw11ent or license for a dangerous drug 

offense conviction is mandated by 46 U.S.C. § 7704(b). 

The fact of conviction of a dangerous drug related offense in 1999 after 

Respondent had been issued a MMD is clear and admitted. See Respondent's Answer, 

and CG Exhibit 13. 

Respondent, however, attempts to rebut this fact by focusing upon a drug offense 

conviction in 1994, which he disclosed on his application for a MMD in 1998. CG 

Exhibit 9A. Unfortunately, this approach is out of focus. The Coast Guard knew of the 

earlier conviction and had the discretion to issue a MMD in spite of that conviction. See 

46 CPR § 12.02-4 [person convicted of drug offense still eligible for license or MMD 

provided person meets the exception criteria in§§ 12.02-4(c)]. 

Additionally, Respondent argues that he also disclosed his pending drug offense 

proceeding, and despite that, the Coast Guard issued him a MMD. He points out that this 

offense occurred in 1996 but had yet to be fully adjudicated. Thus, the Coast Guard was 

on notice and deliberately misled him by issuing the document. Essentially, Respondent 

asserts an equitable estoppel defense. 

The doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes a litigant from asserting a claim or 

defense, which might otherwise be available, against another party who has detrimentally 

altered their position in reliance on the other pa1iyls misrepresentation of, or failtu·e to 

Decision and Order - 3 
disclose, some material fact. 3, Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 804, p. 189 (5th ed. 

1941). See for example, United States v. Georgia Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92,96 (9th Cir. 

1970)[quoting Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960). 

Equitable estoppel has not been generally available to a party in litigation against 

the government. The theory is that government's laches or neglect of duty is no defense 

to a suit by the government to enforce a public right or protect a public interest. See, 

Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917). 

A leading case on estoppel is Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 

380, 383-388 (1947). There a farmer's application for crop insurance on re-seeded land, 

and disclosed in the application, was approved. When his re-seeded crop failed, he 

applied for insurance coverage, which was rejected citing a mle, which forbid insurance 

on re-seeded crops. The fanner sued and asserted a claim of equitable estoppel against 

the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). The Court upheld the FCIC's decision 

and rejected the equitable estoppel claim relying on a proprietary~sovereign capacity 

distinction. A private insurer may have been bound, but a government insurer was not 

because it was engaged in a sovereign or governmental function. The Court also placed 

the risk on those who deal with a govemmental official to ascertain whether the official is 

acting within the scope of his or her authority to render the advise, give ~he opinion,_or 

mal<e the decision upon which the citizen ultimately relies. The-C-ourt also concluded 

that the farmer was nevertheless bound by the contrary regulation since it was published 

in the Federal Register regardless ofwhether the farmer had actual knowledge of the 

contrary regulation. 

The Supreme Comt's decision inSchweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) is 

instmctive. Despite an erroneous opinion by a Social Security employee, about a 

person's eligibility for Social Security benefits, the Comt held that the. government 

employee's erroneous advice did not estop the Secretary of Health and Human Services 

from denying Hansen retroactive benefits. Hansen had appealed the denial and was 

awarded benefits, but also sought retroactive benefits, from the date of the 

misrepresentation. The employee, the court pointed out, was authorized to provide the 

advice given, even though it was erroneous. 

These decisions leave me with the fim1 conclusion that in order for an equitable 

estoppel defense to be successful, the govermnental employee must act beyond his or her 

authority and when doing so engage in affirmative misconduct. 

From my examination of the record here, I find no evidence of any affirmative 

misconduct, or lack of authority on the part of the Coast Guard, or its representatives 

when they took Respondent's application and evaluated it together with the information 

about the pending drug charge and related infom1ation. I hold, therefore, the Coast 

Guard is not estopped from prosecuting this administrative proceeding. In that respect, 

Respondent's defense is rejected. 

Decision and Order- 4 
Next, Respondent argues that his life changing experiences in prison have made 

him a better person and suitable for continuation of his MMD and his job at the 

Washington Fen-y System. He claims his life cht)-nge has included his complete 

disassociation with dangerous drugs, including alcohol. 

How can that be? After all, why was he charged last year with another drug 

offense? Is this some mistake? Yes, says Respondent. He claims the arresting officer 

was out to get him. He was a target. He has been unfairly singled out. See, Transcript of 

October 2, 2001 at pages 143wl57. 

Even if all of that is true, I am confronted with a harsh reality. Respondent was 

convicted in 1999 of a drug related offense one year after he obtained his MMD. Even 

though it was pending at the time of his original application inl998 he had to know, or 

should have known of the statutory revocation mandate in 46 USC § 7704(b ). Federal 

Crop Insurance Corp. v. ~Merrill, supra. [Despite representations of govemment official, 

farmer should have known of the regulation prohibiting insurance coverage for reseeded 

crop]. Respondent had to know the pending drug charge and an ultimate conviction 

would be his Trojan horse. Unfortunately, he relied upon the Ferry System's leniencies, 

which apparently lead him to believe he would not suffer an adverse licensing 

consequence fi.·om the conviction. The Washington_StateFerry System's leniency could 

nofrumul the revoc-ation mandate in 46 U.S.C. § 7704(b). 1 • 

Unlike the discretion allowed the Coast Guard in an original application for a 

license under 46 CPR§ 12.02~4, I have none under 46 U.S.C. § 7704(b)? We are not at 

the original application stage. 

SANCTION 

The statute, 46 U.S.C. § 7704(b), provides if it is shown at a hearing, that a holder 

of a merchant mariner's docun1ent within 10 years before the beginning of the 

administrative proceedings, has been convicted of violating a dangerous drug law of the 

United States or of a State, the holder's docun1ent shall be revoked. Congress left me no 

discretion. 

t 46 U.S.C. § 7704(c) provides that a licensee or document holder can avoid a revocation whete he is 

proven to be a drug user by showing he is cured. Part of Respondent's defense is that he has completely 

disassociated himselffrom the drug lifestyle and has not used drugs for five years. 'Fhis is a cure argument. 

But, Respondent has not been charged with or proven to be a drug user. His cure, while commendable, is 

irrelevant to the proof of conviction within the ten years prior to the commencement of these administrative 

proceedings. 

2 Upon original application, a person convicted of a previous dangerous drug law violation may 

nevertheless be licensed provided, after evaluation of all the relevant infommtion, the Coast Guard is 

persuaded he or she can be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of the merchant mariner's 

document for which application is made. The Coast Guard made a favorable evaluation of Respondent in 

May. 1998. See 46 CFR § 12.02~4(c)(l). 

Decision and Order - 5 
The record is clear; it has been shown that Respondent was convicted of a 

dangerous drug law ofthe State ofWashington within 10 years prior to the beginning of 

these administrative proceedings. 

Respondent's Merchant Marinel"s Document 531-80-4905 is therefore 

REVOKED. 

Respondent shall immediately turn over his document to the Seattle Coast Guard 

Marine Safety Office. 

Service of this s Decision upon you serves to notify you of your right to appeal as 

set forth in 33 CFR Subpart J, §20.1 001. (Attachment A) 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 9, 2002. 

Edvvin M. Bladen 

Administrative Law Judge 

Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that I have this day delivered foregoing Decision and Order upon 

the following parties and limited participants (or designated representatives) in this 

proceeding, at the address indicated as follows: 

MSO Puget Sound 

Attn: CWO Rice 

Telefax: 206~217~6312 

IVf.r. George Jordan 

ALJ Docketing Center 

Electronic e-mail 

Shane C. Carew 

Attorney for Responde11t 

Telefax: 206-587-2388 

ALJ Docketing Center w/activity report 

Telefax 

Dated at Seattle, WA this 9th day of January, 2002. 

Decision and Order - 6 

t~~~i#GO-{ Legal Assistant to 

Administrative Law Judge