United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 19, 2019*

Decided February 25, 2019 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 18-1412 

ROBERT OLLIE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MICHAEL P. ATCHISON, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 15-CV-1313-SMY-RJD 

Staci M. Yandle, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Robert Ollie, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, 

challenges the entry of summary judgment in his lawsuit asserting that prison officials 

denied him access to congregative religious services in violation of the First 

Amendment. Because Ollie is not entitled to any form of relief, we affirm the judgment. 

 

*

 We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2) (C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 18-1412 Page 2 

We recount the facts in the record, construed in Ollie’s favor. Kemp v. Liebel, 

877 F.3d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 2017). While at Menard Correctional Center between 2010 

and 2014, Ollie twice was found guilty of assaulting staff and disciplined with time in 

segregation. In segregation he was not allowed to attend congregative worship services. 

In early 2014 Ollie was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center, where he remained 

in segregation and was again prohibited from attending congregative services. And in 

early 2015, he was transferred to Stateville Correctional Center, where he was removed 

from segregation. At Stateville Ollie was enrolled in the “Staff Assaulter/Weapons 

Violator Program,” which entails some restrictions on movement, including a 

prohibition on attending congregative worship services. He since has been transferred 

to Hill Correctional Center, where he has resumed attending weekly services. 

Ollie then sued six Department of Corrections officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

asserting that their ban on his attending congregative services violated his First 

Amendment right to free exercise of his religion. (He also asserted that the officials 

transferred him in retaliation for grievances he had filed, but he abandoned that claim 

in the district court, so we say nothing more about it.) 

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district judge 

denied Ollie’s motion and granted the defendants’. The judge analyzed Ollie’s First 

Amendment claim under the test set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), and 

concluded that the defendants had shown a legitimate penological interest for the 

prison rule that bars inmates who have been placed in segregation or designated as a 

“staff assaulter” from attending congregative activities. The judge referred, specifically, 

to security and safety concerns relating to those inmates who have been prone to violent 

or adverse behavior. Ollie also had alternative means of exercising his religious beliefs, 

the judge pointed out, in the form of reading his bible and receiving religious 

counseling (i.e., visits from the prison chaplain or religious volunteers). 

On appeal Ollie challenges the summary-judgment ruling on the ground that the 

judge inappropriately resolved a factual dispute in the defendants’ favor when she 

determined that the ban on attending congregative services served a legitimate 

penological interest. He asserts, first, that he introduced evidence that inmates with the 

“staff assaulter” designation were able to access other nonworship communal spaces 

and, second, that the defendants introduced no evidence that inmates with the 

designation created safety or security issues. 
No. 18-1412 Page 3 

Ollie cannot obtain the relief he seeks. First, he may not maintain a damages 

action under § 1983 against state officials in their official capacity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of 

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). To the extent Ollie sued the defendants in their 

individual capacities, the Prison Litigation Reform Act bars him from compensatory 

damages because—as he made clear in his deposition testimony—he suffered no 

“physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1007–08 (7th Cir. 

2016). 

Although § 1997e(e) does not bar Ollie’s request for punitive damages and a 

declaratory judgment, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2011), neither 

remedy offers him relief. To receive punitive damages, he would have to show that the 

defendants’ conduct was motivated by “evil motive or intent” or “reckless or callous 

indifference.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). The defendants’ deposition 

testimony, however, reflects the contrary—that they were aware and respectful of 

inmates’ First Amendment rights and of the alternative forms of religious exercise that 

prison policies provided for inmates who were not allowed to participate in 

congregative worship. And a declaratory judgment is appropriate “only when the 

court’s ruling would have an impact on the parties.” Cornucopia Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Agric., 560 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2009). But here Ollie has been released from all 

restrictions on attendance at congregative services, and he even testified at his 

deposition that he attends services every week. For similar reasons, he is not eligible for 

prospective relief, especially because the likelihood of his returning to segregation is 

merely conjectural. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); Simic v. City of 

Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2017). 

Lastly, while it is true that § 1997e(e) permits nominal damages, Ollie did not 

request this relief in his amended complaint (filed while represented by counsel), and 

therefore it was never before the district court. Nor, for that matter, does he mention 

such relief in his brief on appeal. Cf. Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 943 (7th Cir. 2003). 

AFFIRMED