United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-2164

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Anthony D. Lamar

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Dexter Payne, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction; Randy Straughn, 

Major, Varner Unit, ADC; James Gibson, Superintendent,/Head Warden, Varner 

Unit, ADC; Yolanda Linsy1

, Captain, Varner Unit, ADC; James Shipman, Deputy 

Warden over Security, Varner Supermax, ADC; Flora Washington, Classification 

Officer, Varner Unit, ADC

 Defendants - Appellees

Tiffany Moore, Nurse; Does, Mental Health Counselor, ADC Commissary and 

Policy Management Team

 Defendants 

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Pine Bluff

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Submitted: April 9, 2024

Filed: August 5, 2024

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1

The district court caption incorrectly identifies Yolanda Linsy as Yolanda 

Linsey. This caption has been amended to reflect the proper spelling. 
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Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Anthony Lamar, an inmate in the Arkansas Department of Corrections 

(ADC), filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging, as relevant to this appeal,

that several ADC employees (Defendants) retaliated against him for exercising his 

First Amendment rights by filing a grievance, circulating a memorandum 

encouraging other inmates to file grievances challenging a new administrative 

directive, and threatening a lawsuit. The district court granted summary judgment 

in Defendants’ favor, concluding that they had valid and non-retaliatory reasons for 

taking disciplinary actions against Lamar because he violated prison rules. The 

district court also denied Lamar’s request for an extension of time to file a summary 

judgment motion after he missed the deadline for dispositive motions. Lamar 

appeals, and, having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment but affirm its denial of Lamar’s request for an 

extension of time.

I. 

Lamar initially filed this pro se action as a class action, asserting claims on 

behalf of himself and other similarly situated ADC inmates that a new ADC 

administrative directive violated their First Amendment rights. Lamar also brought 

additional claims on his behalf only, alleging that various ADC employees retaliated 

against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. Lamar’s claims stem from 

the implementation of ADC Administrative Directive 17-23, which was enacted to 

combat the increasing use of illegal drugs within the ADC, and, as relevant here,

imposed a three-page limit for all non-privileged correspondence between ADC 

inmates and non-incarcerated individuals. This Administrative Directive went into 

effect on August 21, 2017, but the ADC notified its inmates via written notice of the 

changes to the inmate-correspondence policy prior to the effective date. At the time 
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of the enactment of Administrative Directive 17-23, Lamar was an inmate at the 

Varner Unit, an ADC facility in Grady, Arkansas. 

Lamar learned of the new Administrative Directive through the notices the 

ADC placed throughout the facility, and, once it went into effect, he filed a grievance 

challenging the policy. Separate from his challenge to the Administrative Directive, 

Lamar filed an unrelated grievance on August 6, 2017, which he asked Yolanda 

Linsy, then-Lieutenant at the Varner Unit, to sign. Lamar alleges that Linsy refused 

to sign his grievance, leading him to file a grievance against her for her refusal to 

sign. Lamar also circulated a memorandum, dated August 25, 2017, which 

encouraged all inmates to file grievances asserting that Administrative Directive 

17-23 violated the inmates’ First Amendment Rights. The memorandum, which 

used ADC letterhead that had been altered to read “Inter-Prison Communication” 

rather than Inter-Office Communication, stated, in type-written form: 

I need your help in getting this new Mail Policy, AD 17-23, done away 

with. I need for EVERYONE to file a grievance, saying AD 17-23 is 

unconstitutional. [A] violation of your First Amendment Rights under 

the Free Speech clause of the U.S. Constitution. . . . I need you all to 

file these grievances by no later than September 5, 2017 and send these 

grievances up through every level. . . . If you don’t know how to write 

a grievance, then come to me and I will write it for you to get signed. 

Free-of-Charge. If you have any questions on how to get your 

grievances sent to Central Office after Warden Gibson sends you 

his . . . response, then come to me and I will take care of it. I need 

EVERYONE to go to the Law Library, get some “AFFIDAVIT” forms, 

explain on it how AD 17-23 is violating your rights to get mail from 

those on the outside world, how this Policy violates your rights . . . . I 

Will file this Lawsuit on my own and win it for us using these 

grievances and affidavits that you all send to me after you send the 

grievances through all levels and after you all get those affidavits 

notarized and sent to me. . . . I need you all’s help men. The more 

fully exhausted grievances and notarized affidavits with your name and 

ADC numbers on them that I get, the better my chances become at 

winning this Lawsuit. Getting it certified as a Class-Action Lawsuit, 

and getting this highly unconstitutional mail Policy abolished 
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permanently. . . . We’re all we got. So let’s work together to stop this 

Policy. 

At the bottom of the page, Lamar wrote in his own handwriting, “‘Peacefully United 

we stand, Divided we shall fall.’ If we don’t stand for something, then we will fall 

for anything. Let’s stand Peacefully.” The memorandum also included Lamar’s full 

name and prison identification number. Lamar made copies of the memorandum 

using the legal mail process and posted the copies in the facility’s barracks. 

On August 30, 2017, Linsy issued a written charge of a rule violation to 

Lamar. In her written report, Linsy stated that she had been assigned to investigate 

an incident involving Lamar and his use of “state property to manufacture a direct 

involvement in writing, circulating or signing a petition, letter, or similar declaration 

that poses a threat to the security of the facility.” Linsy further stated that evidence 

had been provided showing that the ADC Inter-Office Communication letterhead 

had been used and had been altered to read “Inter-Prison Communication,” and she 

charged Lamar with rule violations because the letter “was discovered to have [been] 

generated using a computer in the Library [and] encouraged the Inmate population 

to band together in order to disrupt unit operation by filing grievances against the 

mail policy AD 17-23.” The specific rule violations that Linsy alleged occurred 

were “direct involvement in writing, circulating or signing a petition, letter, or 

similar declaration that poses a threat to the security of the facility,” “[f]ailure to 

obey verbal and/or written order(s) of staff,” “[u]nauthorized use of state 

property/supplies,” and “[a]sking, coercing or offering inducement to anyone to 

violate Department policy or procedure, inmate rules and regulations, center/unit 

operating procedures.” 

On the same day that Linsy issued the written charge of a rule violation, ADC 

officials placed Lamar in isolation despite having had a previously scheduled 

classification hearing that same day, where he was promoted from a more restrictive

Class IV status to a less restrictive Class III status. He remained there for two to 

three days before officials transferred him to administrative segregation at the 

Varner Supermax Unit. Less than a week later, a classification review committee 

held a hearing and decided to keep Lamar in restrictive housing, noting his pending 
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charge of a rule violation. However, on September 11, 2017, Linsy’s disciplinary 

charges against Lamar were dismissed on procedural grounds because the charging 

document did not contain the proper information regarding the beginning and end of 

the investigation. On September 14, 2017, the classification committee held another 

hearing on Lamar’s classification. At this meeting, Lamar threatened to sue 

Defendants if they did not release him from administrative segregation because he 

believed he was being retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment rights 

and encouraging other inmates to do the same. An exchange between Lamar and 

Warden James Gibson brought the meeting to an end, and the committee thereafter 

voted to keep Lamar in restrictive housing. Lamar was released from administrative 

segregation on September 20, 2017, for the stated reason that more space was needed 

for other inmates. He then filed suit, alleging that Defendants retaliated against him 

by giving him a written charge of a rule violation and placing him in isolation and

administrative segregation because he circulated the memorandum encouraging 

other inmates to file grievances, threatened to sue ADC officials, and filed a 

grievance against Linsy.

 

Defendants moved for summary judgment on Lamar’s claims, after which 

Lamar filed a motion for an extension of time to respond to Defendants’ motion and 

to file his own motion for summary judgment. A magistrate judge granted the 

motion insofar as it sought an extension to respond to Defendants’ motion but denied 

it as to Lamar’s request for an extension of time to file his own summary judgment 

motion, stating that the deadline for dispositive motions had passed and that Lamar 

failed to show good cause for extending the deadline. The magistrate judge rejected 

Lamar’s argument that he needed an extension of time to file his own motion because 

Defendants had intentionally withheld a copy of his deposition transcript, noting that 

Defendants were not obligated to provide him with a copy before filing their 

summary judgment motion and that Lamar could have filed his own motion for 

summary judgment relying on a sworn affidavit instead of his deposition testimony. 

Finally, the magistrate judge noted that it had already granted the parties an 

extension of time to file dispositive motions and, in granting that extension, stressed

that further extensions of time were unlikely to be granted given that the case was 
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nearly three years old at that point and dispositive motions had yet to be filed. Lamar 

appealed this ruling to the district court, which concluded that the magistrate judge’s 

decision was not clearly erroneous or contrary to the law. 

Lamar filed a response to Defendants’ motion, stating that he was no longer 

pursuing his constitutional challenge to the policy and his retaliation claim against 

one defendant, Randy Straughn. However, Lamar continued to pursue retaliation 

claims against the remaining Defendants. Specifically, Lamar continued to pursue 

his claim against Linsy that she retaliated against him for filing a grievance against 

her by issuing him a written charge of a rule violation related to the circulation of 

the memorandum and his claim that Defendants retaliated against him for circulating 

the memorandum and threatening to sue Defendants by putting him in or keeping 

him in isolation or administrative segregation. 

The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation recommending that 

the district court grant Defendants’ summary judgment motion. The report and 

recommendation first determined that Linsy was entitled to summary judgment on 

Lamar’s retaliation claim against her, concluding that the record contained evidence 

that Lamar had committed a rules violation by circulating the memorandum 

encouraging other inmates to file grievances about the new administrative directive 

and by using state property to create the memorandum, relying on statements Lamar 

made during his deposition in relation to this action. Because there was evidence of 

a rule violation, the magistrate judge determined that Lamar could not show that 

Linsy retaliated against him, relying on case law dictating that a written charge of a 

rule violation cannot be retaliatory if it is issued for violation of prison rules and that 

a defendant can prevail on a retaliation claim by showing “some evidence” of a 

violation of a prison rule. The magistrate judge similarly recommended that 

Defendants be granted summary judgment on Lamar’s retaliation claim stemming 

from ADC officials’ decision to place him in isolation or administrative segregation. 

The magistrate judge concluded that because Lamar’s circulation of the 

memorandum was a violation of prison rules, it was not protected activity, and, even 

though Lamar’s written charge of a rule violation was dismissed on procedural 
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grounds, Defendants did not retaliate against him by keeping him in administrative 

segregation after its dismissal because “it is undisputed that [Lamar] was guilty of 

violating prison rules as charged.” The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s 

recommended disposition in full and without additional comment, entering summary 

judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Lamar’s claims with prejudice. 

Lamar now appeals, asserting that the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment to Defendants and in denying him an extension of time to file his own 

summary judgment motion. 

II. 

 Lamar first asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 

to Defendants on his retaliation claims, arguing that the district court erroneously 

relied on a written charge of a rule violation that was dismissed on procedural 

grounds and testimony from Lamar’s deposition—taken four years after the 

incidents relevant to this case—to conclude that there was “some evidence” that 

Lamar violated prison rules.

2

 “‘We review de novo a district court’s grant of 

summary judgment.’ Summary judgment is proper only if ‘there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact’ and ‘the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.’” Avenoso v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 19 F.4th 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 

2021) (citation omitted).

“‘The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech.”’

Thus, ‘as “a general matter,”’ the First Amendment ‘prohibits government officials 

from subjecting individuals to “retaliatory actions” after the fact for having engaged 

2

Defendants assert that we need not reach the merits of Lamar’s appeal, 

arguing that “this Court ‘cannot tell whether the district court erred in a ruling’ 

because Lamar did not ‘direct [the Court] to a place in the record’ where the alleged 

error can be found.” Given that we liberally construe pro se filings, see Stone v. 

Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004), and that Lamar clearly stated the basis for 

his argument that the district court erred, we reject Defendants’ contention that, 

because Lamar did not include specific record citations, we should not address the 

merits of his appeal.
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in protected speech.’” Aldridge v. City of St. Louis, 75 F.4th 895, 898 (8th Cir. 

2023) (citations omitted). A plaintiff alleging a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation 

claim must show: “(1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the 

government official took adverse action against him that would chill a person of 

ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity; and (3) that the adverse action was 

motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.” Santiago v. Blair, 

707 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2013). 

The parties do not dispute that Lamar engaged in protected conduct by filing 

a grievance and threatening to sue Defendants. See Spencer v. Jackson Cnty., 738 

F.3d 907, 913 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Filing a prison grievance has long been ‘protected 

First Amendment activity’. . . .”); Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152, 1155-56 

(8th Cir. 2009) (“The filing of a prison grievance, like the filing of an inmate lawsuit, 

is protected First Amendment activity.” (citation omitted)); Entler v. Gregoire, 872 

F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2017) (“‘[T]he applicability of the constitutional right to 

redress of grievances does not hinge on the label the prison places on a particular 

complaint,’ and embraces threats to sue.” (citation omitted)). We also conclude that

Lamar’s circulation of the memorandum encouraging inmates to file grievances is 

protected conduct. This Court has permitted a prison to suppress petitions or 

otherwise limit an inmate’s efforts to encourage other inmates to use the prison 

grievance process, but only where the activity created a security concern for the 

prison facility, implicitly recognizing that, without a security concern, this activity 

is protected conduct. See Nickens v. White, 622 F.2d 967, 970-71 (8th Cir. 1980) 

(holding that prison’s suppression of prisoners’ group petition was justified based 

on reasonable security concerns “despite the evident restriction of appellant’s right 

to freedom of expression”); Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936, 941 (8th Cir. 1999) 

(citing Nickens for proposition that there is no constitutional right to incite other 

inmates to file grievances but acknowledging that restrictions on such conduct are 

based on reasonable security concerns). Here, construing the facts in the light most 

favorable to Lamar, as we must, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that 

Lamar’s circulation of the memorandum created a security concern; the only 

evidence suggesting that a security concern existed was Linsy’s characterization of 
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the memorandum in the written charge of a rule violation as “encourag[ing] the 

Inmate population to band together in order to disrupt unit operation.” In contrast, 

the language of the memorandum urging the inmates to “peacefully” band together 

to challenge the administrative directive suggests that Lamar did not intend to disrupt 

the unit’s operation. Without further record evidence demonstrating a threat to 

prison security, on the record before us, we conclude that Lamar’s circulation of the 

petition falls within the ambit of conduct protected by the First Amendment. 

Lamar has likewise shown that he suffered an adverse action in the form of a 

written charge of a rule violation and being placed in isolation or administrative 

segregation because a reasonable jury could conclude that being placed in segregated 

housing or being subject to additional disciplinary actions would “chill a person of 

ordinary firmness” from engaging in the First Amendment conduct Lamar engaged 

in. Santiago, 707 F.3d at 991; see also Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 450 (8th 

Cir. 2010) (finding an adverse action where plaintiff detainee was placed in isolation 

without access to mail, family, recreation, and phone calls). 

Turning to the final element, whether the adverse action was motivated at least 

in part by Lamar’s protected conduct, the record shows that Lamar received a written 

charge of a rule violation specifically related to his circulation of the memorandum, 

that he was placed in isolation the same day as his classification hearing, at which it 

was recommended that he be placed in a lower classification, that he was kept in 

administrative segregation after his written charge was dismissed on procedural 

grounds, and that there is a close temporal proximity between Lamar’s protected 

conduct and the complained-of adverse actions. When construing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to Lamar, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants 

were at least partially motivated by Lamar’s protected conduct in taking the adverse 

actions against him.

We note, however, that while “‘[a] prisoner has a cause of action when the 

prisoner alleges that prison officials filed disciplinary charges based upon false 

allegations against the prisoner in retaliation for the prisoner’s participation in 
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grievances against prison officials’ . . . ‘claims of retaliation fail if the alleged 

retaliatory conduct violations were issued for the actual violation of a prison rule.’” 

Santiago, 707 F.3d at 993 (citations omitted). Further, Defendants “may 

successfully defend a retaliatory discipline claim by showing ‘some evidence’ [that 

Lamar] actually committed a rule violation.” Id. (citation omitted). To demonstrate 

“some evidence” of a rule violation, Defendants may rely on “a report from a 

correctional officer, even if disputed by [Lamar] and supported by no other 

evidence . . . if the violation is found by an impartial decision maker.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

Here, it is undisputed that Linsy issued a written charge of a rule violation to 

Lamar based on his circulation of the memorandum. However, as Lamar notes, that 

written charge was undisputedly dismissed on procedural grounds; because no 

impartial decision-maker reviewed the violation, it cannot serve as “some evidence” 

of a violation of a prison rule. The district court thus erred in relying on the written 

charge as evidence of Lamar’s violation of prison rules. So too did the district court 

err in relying on Lamar’s admissions during his deposition, four years after the 

incident, that he violated prison rules by circulating the memorandum. Lamar’s 

opinions, given years later, are irrelevant to the question of whether Linsy issued the 

written charge for a violation of a prison rule because they were not known to Linsy 

at the time of the charge. Therefore, they cannot have formed any part of her 

motivation in issuing the charge. Because there is no other record evidence to satisfy

the “some evidence” standard, the district court erred in granting summary judgment 

to Defendants on this basis. 

III. 

 Lamar also asserts that the magistrate judge erred when it denied his motion 

for an extension of time to file a motion for summary judgment. Lamar argues that 

Defendants’ attorneys deliberately withheld the transcript of his deposition—which 

he needed to be able to properly prepare a summary judgment motion—until the 

deadline passed. We review the denial of a motion to extend the time for filing a
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dispositive motion for an abuse of discretion. See Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 

850 (8th Cir. 2018). The magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in denying 

Lamar an extension of time, particularly given that it was the second extension 

Lamar requested and the district court, in granting the original extension to both 

parties, expressly stated that future extensions were unlikely due to the age of the 

case. In denying Lamar’s request for a second extension of time, the magistrate 

judge stated:

The deadline for filing motions for summary judgment has expired, and 

Plaintiff fails to make a showing of good cause for extending it at this 

point. The fact that he didn’t receive a copy of his deposition transcript 

until September 18, 2021 fails to explain why he didn’t file a motion for 

summary judgment or seek an extension of time to do so earlier. First, 

Defendants were not obligated to provide him with a copy of his 

deposition transcript until they attached it to the summary judgment 

motion filed on September 16, 2021. Second, Plaintiff did not need his 

deposition transcript to file a motion for summary judgment because he 

could have included a sworn affidavit in support of the motion. Third, 

the Court has repeatedly stressed that due to the age of this case, it was 

unlikely that any further extensions would be granted. See Text Orders 

94, 97. For all of these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to 

allow him a sixty-day extension to file a motion for summary judgment.

Lamar does not challenge any of the reasons given by the magistrate judge; he 

merely disagrees with the reasoned decision to deny him an extension of time. On 

this record, we find no abuse of discretion in that decision. See Grandson v. Univ. 

of Minn., 272 F.3d 568, 574 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the district court acted 

“well within its discretion” in denying motion for an extension of time to file 

dispositive motions because plaintiffs “had ‘no credible excuse’” for not filing the 

motion before the deadline or seeking an extension of time before the deadline lapsed 

(citation omitted)). 
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IV. 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment but affirm the denial of Lamar’s motion for an extension of time to file a 

summary judgment motion. We also grant Lamar’s motion to file a supplemental 

brief and addendum. 

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