alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-6426

JAMES C. MCFADDEN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

STANLEY B. BURT, JR., Lieber Correctional

Institution; CHARLES M. CONDON, Attorney

General of South Carolina,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Columbia. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.

(CA-02-83-25BC)

Submitted: May 29, 2003 Decided: June 4, 2003

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James C. McFadden, Appellant Pro Se. William Edgar Salter, III,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South

Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

James C. McFadden seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).

An appeal may not be taken to this court from the final order in a

habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of

arises out of process issued by a state court unless a circuit

justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue

for claims addressed by a district court on the merits absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). As to claims dismissed by a district

court solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability

will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1)

‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional

right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’”

Rose v. Lee, 252 F. 3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). We have independently reviewed

the record and conclude that McFadden has not made the requisite

showing. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (2003).

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNITED STATES OF AMERJCA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECUR]TY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Address of Administrative La\\, Judge Docketing Centcr:

AIJ Docketing Center

U.S. Custom House

40 South Gay Street, Room 414

Baltimore, MD 21 202 4022

Email: alidocketcente.(( uscs.mil

Phone: (410) 962-5100

Toll Free: (866) 612-7 524 [6IA-SKCG]

Fax: (410) 962-1746

Toll Free Fax: (877't 243-3453 ICGE-FILEI

COMPLAINANT:

LINITED STATES COAST GUARD

RESPONDENT: Kenneth Davon Smith, Jr DOCKET NIJMBER 202.]-OO I.]

WITHDRAWAL FROM DOCKET CG ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY NT]MBER

73 t 8It90

The Coast Guard initiated an administrative proceeding by filing a Complaint on January 11,

2023, seeking Revocation of Respondent's Merchant Mariner Credential.

On May 15, 2023, the Coast Guard filed a Notice of Withdrawal from docket. The Notice of

Withdrawal does not list a reason for the withdrawal. The Docketing Center has requested

reasons for withdrawal be set forth in withdrawal notices; however, CG-INV policy prescribes

the reason for withdrawal need not be disclosed.

This matter is removed from the docket and closed without prejudice effective this date. The

Coast Guard reserves the right to file a new Complaint in this matter.

Done and DatedMay 25, 2023 at

Baltimore. MD

/-n/r44*'W.7/fu.u4.

Lauren M. Meus

Hearing Docket Clerk

U,S. Coast Guard

By Direction of the Chief Administrative Law

Judge
# C_2021328EN.01000101.xml

| 16.8.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 328/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.8.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 328/1

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.10359 — Carsales Holdings/Goldman Sachs/Eurazeo/Open Road)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2021/C 328/01)

On 9 August 2021, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32021M10359. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32021M10359. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROSS VINKO SOKOLIC,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-70608

Agency No. A097-469-173

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

 Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 6, 2013** 

Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, IKUTA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Sokolic failed to raise to the Board of Immigration Appeals his procedural

due process argument that the Immigration Judge erred by failing to develop the

record regarding his excuses for filing his asylum application late. Because this is

FILED

FEB 08 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

the kind of alleged error that the BIA could remedy, see Tall v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d

1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2008), Sokolic’s failure to exhaust this issue deprives us of

jurisdiction to consider it. Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 676–78 (9th Cir.

2004) (applying 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)). 

The BIA and IJ’s determination that Sokolic was ineligible for withholding

of removal because he failed to establish either past persecution or a well-founded

fear of future persecution in South Africa is supported by substantial evidence,

including evidence that the assault he endured was an act of common criminal

activity, bearing no indication of racial animus. See Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d

1172, 1176–78 (9th Cir. 2004); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Accordingly, we deny

Sokolic’s petition to review the IJ’s withholding of removal determination.

DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


CHIEF
      EXECUTIVE OFFICER




I,
      Gary
      Herman, certify that:





In
      connection with the Annual Report of Digital Creative Development Corporation
      (the “Company”) on Form 10-KSB for the period ending June 30, 2008 (the
“Report”), the undersigned officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18
      U.S.C. Section 1340, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:
                October 13, 2008/s/
                Gary HermanGary
                HermanPresident
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

SARAH ANN BRIGGS,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 20 MAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 4th day of June, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVA NIA** 

IN RE: APPOINTMENT TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL RULES COMMITTEE : : : : : No. 456 CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL RULES DOCKET

**O R D E R**
**PER CURIA M:** 

AND NOW , this 1 5 th day of September , 2014 , Michael J. Machen, Esquire , Allegheny County , is hereby appointed as a member of the Criminal Procedural Rules Commi tte e for a term of three years commencing October 1, 2014.
#### In the Matter of Thomas F. Whelan, Petitioner, v Patricia B. Adduci, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, Respondent.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review an order of the New York State Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, dated July 18, 1986, which, *inter alia,*accepted the recommendation of the administrative appeals board to affirm the determination of an Administrative Law Judge, and revoked the petitioner’s driver’s license.

Adjudged that the order is confirmed, with costs.

The petitioner was stopped by the New York State Police in the early morning hours of January 25, 1986, on the Southern State Parkway for speeding. The police officers observed that his eyes were bloodshot and that he had the odor of alcohol on his breath. He was arrested for driving while intoxicated.

Back at the precinct 25 minutes after the arrest, the petitioner refused to submit to a chemical test to determine the amount of alcohol in his blood after he was warned that his refusal would result in the immediate revocation of his driver’s license. At his arraignment, the arresting officer’s written report of refusal of the chemical test was presented to the court, which set the matter down for a revocation hearing four days later.

At the revocation hearing, neither party appeared. The Administrative Law Judge determined, based upon the written report of the petitioner’s refusal to submit to a chemical test, that the arrest of the petitioner had been lawful, and that the petitioner had refused to submit to the test after having been given sufficient warning that his refusal would result in the revocation of his license. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge revoked the petitioner’s license in accordance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 and 15 NYCRR part 139.

Upon administrative appeal, the revocation was affirmed by the New York State Commissioner of Motor Vehicles upon the recommendation of the administrative appeals board. It was determined that the Administrative Law Judge’s reliance *274upon the written report of the petitioner’s refusal provided substantial evidence to support the revocation.

We agree. The written report of the petitioner’s refusal provided proof of such quality and quantity that it could have persuaded a detached fact finder that the petitioner had refused to submit to the chemical test after having been given adequate warning of the effect of his refusal *(see, 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v State Div. of Human Rights,*45 NY2d 176, 181). Moreover, the quantum of the evidence before the Administrative Law Judge was substantial since his finding of revocation was supported by the kind of proof that responsible persons rely upon in their serious affairs *(see, People ex rel. Vega v Smith,*66 NY2d 130; *National Labor Relations Bd. v Remington Rand,*94 F2d 862, *cert denied*304 US 576, *reh denied sub nom. Remington Rand v United States,*304 US 590).

We find that the petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Charles R. Waldron, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Learning Tree International, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 30, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of the operations of Learning Tree International, Inc.



Date:    August 29, 2007

By:

/s/ CHARLES R. WALDRONName:

Charles R. WaldronTitle:

Chief Financial Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company
and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Bulmer, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Samenga, J.), rendered April 27, 1984, convicting him of murder in the second degree (three counts), robbery in the first degree, and attempted rape in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress his confession.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Our examination of the record satisfies us that there was sufficient attenuation between the original illegal seizure of the defendant and his subsequent confession to warrant denial of his motion to suppress his confession.

The defendant’s other allegations of error are insufficient to warrant reversal. Mollen, P. J., Lazer, Thompson and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
#### Raymond J. Skeet et al., Respondents, v Husayn A. Rashid et al., Appellants.

Memorandum: Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint is governed by CPLR 3216 (e), which requires plaintiffs to show a justifiable excuse for failing to file a note of issue subsequent to service upon them of a 90-day demand, and a meritorious cause of action. Plaintiffs failed to meet either of these requirements and it was an abuse of discretion for Special Term to deny the motion *(MacLeod v Nolte,*106 AD2d 860, 861). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Gossel, J. —dismiss complaint.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Green, Pine, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 13

- 00190

- CR

Christopher James Hensley

v.

The State of Texas §

§

§

§

§ From the 355th District Court

o f H ood County (CR12277 )

May 15, 2014

P er C uriam

(nfp)



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was error in part of the trial court’s judgment. We reverse the trial court’s

judgment, render a judgment of misdemeanor theft, and remand this case to the

trial cou rt for a new punishment trial

.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

PER CURIAM
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v *352Juan Mendez, Appellant.

by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hayes, J.), rendered December 3, 1985, convicting him of sexual abuse in the first degree (five counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reducing the conviction of sexual abuse in the first degree on the count of the indictment relating to the first incident alleged to sexual abuse in the third degree, and vacating the sentence imposed on that count; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed and the case is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for sentencing on that count; the facts have been considered and are determined to have been established.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and drawing every reasonable inference therefrom *(see, People v Shapiro,*117 AD2d 688, *lv denied*67 NY2d 950), we conclude that forcible compulsion with respect to the first incident alleged in the indictment was not proven. The sole testimony with respect to that count was that the defendant placed his fingers in the victim’s vagina as she was sleeping and removed his fingers when she awoke and pushed his hand away. That event then ended. Under the then relevant definition of forcible compulsion, there was no proof that the act was committed by use of "physical force or a threat, express or implied, which force or threat place[d the complainant] in fear of immediate death or serious physical injury to * * * herself or another person” *(see,*Penal Law former § 130.00 [8]; L 1982, ch 560).

With regard to this first incident, there is an insufficient basis for an inference of forcible compulsion from the four later incidents of forcible sexual contact for which the defendant was charged and properly convicted or from the fact that the victim may have known that the defendant owned guns.

The court properly admitted expert testimony of the child abuse accommodation syndrome *(see, People v Keindl,*68 NY2d 410, *rearg denied*69 NY2d 823). The testimony neither bolstered the complainant’s testimony nor usurped the jury’s fact-finding responsibility *(see, People v Parks,*41 NY2d 36; *People v Benjamin R.,*103 AD2d 663).

We have considered the defendant’s remaining contention and find it to be unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit. Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 14

- 00414

- CV

A. E. and J. L., Appellant s

v.
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE 274TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY, NO. C2012

- 1407C, THE HONORABLE GARY L . STEEL, JUDGE PRESI DING

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

Appellant J. L. filed his notice of appeal on July 1, 2014 . The appellant = s brief

was due August 20, 2014

. On August 26, 2014 , counsel for appellant filed a motion for

extension of time to file appellant’s brief.

Amendments to the rules of judicial administration a ccelerate the final disposition

of appeals from suits for termination of parental rights. See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a)
(providing 180 days fo r court’s final disposition). The accelerated sched ule constrains this
Court’s leeway in granting extensions. In this instance, we will grant the motion and order

counsel to file appellant = s brief no later than September 2, 2014 . If the brief is not filed by that
date, counsel may be required to show cau se why she should not be held in contempt of court.

It is ordered on August 27, 2014

.

Before Justices Puryear, Pemberton and Field
**Exhibit**** 23.3**

 

**Consentof Independent Petroleum Engineers**

 

MHA Petroleum Consultants, Inc.does hereby consent to the use of its reports relating to the proved oil andgas reserves of GeoPetro Resources Company and to the reference to the firm asan expert in the Form 10K Annual Report being filed by GeoPetro ResourcesCompany.

 
| /s/ LESLIE S.  O’CONNOR |   |
|-----------------------------------|--------|

 

MHA Petroleum Consultants, Inc.Leslie S. O’ConnorVice President

 

Denver, COMarch 31, 2008

 

----
#### FOGASSI v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.

(City Court of New York, General Term.

October 30, 1896.)

Action by Marie Fogassi against New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company.

A. Green, for appellant.

R. Gampora, for respondent.

No opinion. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
#### ROUSE v. GOODMAN.

(City Court of New York, General Term.

April 23, 1894.)

Supplementary Proceedings—Removal of Referee.

Where the judgment debtor appears at the examination before the referee, he waives the objection that the referee and plaintiff’s attorney occupied the same office.

Appeal from special term.

*525Action by Callman Rouse against Aaron Goodman. From an ■order denying a motion to remove a referee in supplementary proceedings, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before NEWBURGER, McCARTHY, and CONLAN, JJ.

Abraham Levy, for appellant.

William A. Gans, for respondent.

McCARTHY, J.

This is an appeal by the defendant judgment ■debtor from an order denying a motion to remove a referee in supplementary proceedings, on the ground that that referee has his ■office in the same office with the plaintiff’s attorney. On the hearing of the motion, this was disputed, and it was also asserted and sworn to that the judgment debtor appeared at the examination, and waived this objection. This is also certified to by the referee. On these facts the justice at special term, in the exercise of his •sound discretion, denied the motion to remove. The facts are sufficient to justify this determination, and, there being no abuse of •discretion, order must be affirmed with costs. All concur.
#### Douglas Perfido, Sr., et al., Respondents, v Robert J. Messina, Jr., Defendant, and Antoinette Messina, Appellant.

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful death, the defendant Antoinette Messina appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ramirez, J.), dated July 9, 1985, as denied her motion for a protective order vacating the plaintiffs’ notice for discovery and inspection.

Ordered that the order is modified, by adding a provision thereto granting the motion to the extent that as to the experts’ reports referred to in item No. 3 of the plaintiffs’ notice for discovery and inspection, the appellant need only reveal the facts observed by the experts and contained in such reports with the opinions contained therein deleted. As so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. The appellant’s time to comply with the plaintiffs’ notice for discovery and inspection is extended until 20 days after service upon her of a copy of this decision and order, with notice of entry.

The appellant argues that the information sought in the plaintiffs’ notice for discovery and inspection is material prepared for litigation and is therefore immune from disclosure. We find that this conclusory and unsubstantiated assertion by appellant’s counsel is insufficient to sustain her burden of demonstrating that the items were indeed prepared solely for the purpose of litigation *(see, Carden v Allstate Ins. Co.,*105 AD2d 1048; *Du Four v Blaw-Knox Corp.,*89 AD2d 900; *Hunt v Joseph,*67 AD2d 697).

In any event, since the subject premises have been destroyed, the plaintiffs’ inability to duplicate the material would overcome the privilege as undue hardship would result if the material in the appellant’s possession were withheld *(see,*CPLR 3101 [d]). However, with regard to the experts’ reports, the disclosure shall be limited to the factual data and test results and shall not include the opinions of experts *(see, Stevens v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth.,*117 AD2d 733; *Castro v Alden Leeds, Inc.,*116 AD2d 549). Bracken, J. P., Kunzeman, Kooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.
No. 75-6497.

#### Hero *v.*United States.

C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JULIO CEASAR SEGURA JR.,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 335 MAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 28th day of November, 2023, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.