[Cite as State v. Rupert , 2022-Ohio-329.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )

STATE OF OHIO Appellee

v. KAITLIN RUPERT Appellant C.A. No. 21CA0032-M

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO CASE No. 21CR0141

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: February 7, 2022

HENSAL, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Kaitlin Rupert appeals from the judgment of the Medina County C ourt of

Common Pleas. This Court affirms.

I. {¶2} A grand jury indicted Ms. Rupert on two counts of endangering c hildren and one count of tampering with eviden ce. Ms. Rupert initially pleaded not guilty. The trial court later held a change of plea hearing vi a videoconference wherein the S tate agreed to dismiss the tampering-with-evidence count a nd one count of endangering chil dren. In return, Ms. Rupert agreed to plead guilty to one count of endangering children und er Revised Code Section 2919.22(B)(1), (E)(2)(d), a second-degree felony. {¶3} The trial court engaged in a Criminal Rule 11(C)(2) plea colloq uy with Ms. Rupert. It advised her, in part , that the maximum sentence she could receive for the charged offense was an indefinite prison term between eight to twelve y ears. After the colloquy, Ms.2

Rupert pleaded guilty, and the trial court accepted her plea. At the conclusion of that hearing,

the trial court set th e matter for sentenc ing at a later date. {¶4} At the sentencing hearing, Ms. R upert’s counsel acknowledged th at a seconddegree felony carries a presumption in favor of a prison senten ce, but argued that Ms. Rupert should be sentenced to probation. The trial court then recited some of the facts surr ounding the charged offense, and determined that a prison sentence was appr opriate. It sentenced her to an indefinite prison term of a minimum of six years and a maximum of not more than nine years. Ms. Rupert now appeals, raising t wo assignments of error for th is Court’s review.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I APPELLANT DID NOT ENTER HER GUILTY PLEA KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, OR VOLUNTARILY BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INFORM HER OF THE MAXIMUM PENALTIES AS REQUIRED BY CRIM.R. 11(C)(2)(A). {¶5} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Rupert argues that she di d not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily plead guilty because the trial co urt failed to advise her that the penalty for the charged offense includes a presumption in favor of a prison term. As a result, she argues, the trial court did not a dvise her of the maximum penal ty as required under Criminal Rule 11(C)(2)(a). {¶6} As previously noted, Ms. Rupert pleaded guilty to endangering c hildren under Section 2919.22(B)(1), (E)(2)(d), a second-degree felony for wh ich a presumption in favor of a prison term applies. Secti on 2929.13(D)(1). Among other advis ements during the plea colloquy, the trial court advised Ms. Rupert that the maximum sentence sh e could receive was an indefinite prison term between eight and tw elve years. It did not inform her that there was a presumption in favor of a prison term.3

{¶7} Ms. Rupert’s argument requires th is Court to conclude that fail ing to advise a defendant that the charged offense carries a presumption in fav or of a prison term is akin to failing to advise a defendant of the maximum penalty for that o ffense. She has pointed this Court to no authority that has reached that conclusion. Instea d, courts have reached the opposite conclusion, rejecting the same argument Ms. Rupert has raised o n appeal. See, e.g. , State v. Raymond , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99177, 2013-Ohio-3144, ¶ 7-10 (analyzi ng Rule 11(C)(2)(a) and rejecting the defendant’s argument that the trial court fai led to inform him of the maximum penalty for his offense because it did not inform him of the pr esumption in favor of a prison term); State v. Stevenson , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106128, 2018-Ohio-2645, ¶ 2 (same); State v.

Gales , 2d Dist. Greene No. 97-CA-114, 1998 WL 698363, *4 (Oct. 9, 19 98) (“We conclude that a trial judge is not required, when accepting a guilty plea, to inform a defendant of the statutory presumption in favor of incarceration for first -and second-deg ree felonies, and to ascertain that

the defendant understands that statutory presumption.”). Ms. R upert has not met her burden of establishing error on appeal. State v. Mastice , 9th Dist. Wayne No. 06CA0050, 2007-Ohio-4107, ¶ 7 (“An appellant has the burde n of demonstrating error on app eal.”). Accordingly, her first assignment of error is overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING AN INDEFINITE PRISON SENTENCE UPON APPELLANT WHICH IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. {¶8} In her second assignment of error, Ms. Rupert asserts that the trial court erred by imposing an indefinite prison sentence because such sentences a re unconstitutional. She asserts

that her trial counsel did not object on the basis of the Reaga n Tokes Law, and that she is raising this issue on appeal to preserve h er rights for any future reme dies and/or litigation. She also asserts that the issues regarding her sentence are presently be fore the Ohio Supreme Court in4

State v. Maddox , No. 2020-1266, as well as 11 othe r cases, and that she incorp orates the arguments made by the defendants in those cases into her merit brief. {¶9} We decline to address the mer its of Ms. Rupert’s second assignm ent of error because she has failed to prope rly develop an argument in suppo rt of her position. Appellate Rule 16(A) requires an appellant ’s brief to include “[a]n argum ent containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presente d for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” Ms. R upert’s second assignment of err or does not satisfy this rule. Instead, her merit brief contains general references to the con stitution, the Reagan Tokes Law, and to other cases presently before the Ohio Supreme Court. Wi thout offering any analysis, she then attempts to incorporate the arguments made by the defendan ts in those cases into her merit brief. Ms. Rupert, however, has the burden of establishing err or on appeal, and cannot simply incorporate arguments from othe r cases into her merit brief. See Mastice at ¶ 7 (“An appellant has the burden of demonstrating error on appeal.”); In re T.D. , 9th Dist. Wayne No. 16AP0035, 2018-Ohio-204, ¶ 14 (“Parties * * * cannot simply incorporate a rguments by reference to other documents.”). Because Ms. Rupert has not properly developed an argument in support on her second assignment of error, we decline to address it. Accordin gly, Ms. Rupert’s second assignment of error is overruled.

III. {¶10} Ms. Rupert’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment o f the Medina County Court of Common P leas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.5

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Medina, State o f Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the pa rties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket , pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT

TEODOSIO, J. CALLAHAN, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES: THOMAS REIN, Attorney a t Law, for Appellant. S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLU ICCI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.