Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2338 | April 18, 2019 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jennifer L. Koethe

Navarre, Florida

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Samuel J. Dayton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Darrell Davis,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 18, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2338

Appeal from the LaPorte Superior 

Court

The Honorable Michael S. 

Bergerson, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

46D01-1609-F3-884

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2338 | April 18, 2019 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary

[1] One evening in August of 2016, then-sixteen-year-old Darrell Davis went into 

the bedroom of his then-eleven-year-old cousin, restrained her, and forced her 

to fellate him. Davis subsequently pled guilty to Level 3 felony child molesting. 

At sentencing, Davis requested that the trial court withhold judgment and 

transfer the matter to the juvenile court pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-30-

1-4(c). Davis appeals the denial of this request. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] One evening in August of 2016, Davis entered the bedroom of then-eleven-yearold L.F., confined her with his arms and legs, and forced her to fellate him until 

he ejaculated. L.F. subsequently reported Davis’s actions to her mother who 

notified the police. 

[3] On September 29, 2016, the State charged Davis with Level 3 felony rape. On 

May 3, 2018, the State amended the charging information to include a charge of 

Level 3 felony child molesting. That same day, Davis agreed to plead guilty to 

the Level 3 felony child molesting charge. In exchange for Davis’s guilty plea, 

the State agreed to dismiss the Level 3 felony rape charge and the parties agreed 

that the trial court “shall consider withholding the judgment, and transferring 

the matter for adjudication and disposition in the juvenile court, based on the 

standard set forth in [Indiana Code section] 31-30-1-4(c).” Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II p. 135.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2338 | April 18, 2019 Page 3 of 6

[4] The trial court conducted a hearing on August 30, 2018, during which the State 

called juvenile probation officer Thomas LaShawn O’Neil. O’Neil had 

previously served as Davis’s juvenile probation officer in another matter. With 

regard to his prior contacts with Davis, O’Neil testified that in August of 2012, 

Davis was alleged to be delinquent for committing what would have been 

battery and sexual battery if committed by an adult. Davis was placed on a 

nine-month informal adjustment during which he participated in individual and 

family counseling and completed an anger replacement training program. With 

regard to the instant matter, O’Neil testified that because the juvenile system’s 

treatment and placement options are limited for individuals like Davis who are 

adjudicated to be delinquent after turning eighteen, “accountability would be an 

issue if [Davis’s case] would be transferred to the juvenile division.” Tr. p. 11. 

Given the accountability issues, O’Neil testified that the juvenile probation 

department would not recommend transferring the matter to the juvenile court.

[5] In denying Davis’s request for the trial court to withhold judgment and transfer 

the matter to the juvenile court, the trial court stated:

The Court has considered the information that’s been provided in 

the Presentence Investigation Report, as well as the evaluations. 

And as required by Indiana Code 31-30-1-4(c), the Court has 

considered withholding judgment and transferring this matter for

adjudication and disposition to the juvenile court based on the 

standards set forth in the previously indicated statute. However, 

the Court’s gonna deny that transfer.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2338 | April 18, 2019 Page 4 of 6

Tr. p. 16. The trial court retained jurisdiction, accepted Davis’s plea and 

sentenced him to a term of ten years, with eight years executed in the 

Department of Correction and two years suspended to probation. 

Discussion and Decision

[6] Davis contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request 

for the trial court to withhold judgment and transfer the matter to the juvenile 

court. We disagree. Indiana Code section 31-30-1-4 provides, in relevant part, 

as follows: 

(a) The juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over an 

individual for an alleged violation of:

****

(4) IC 35-42-4-1 (rape);

 

if the individual was at least sixteen (16) years of age but less than 

eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the alleged violation.

** **

(c) If:

(1) an individual described in subsection (a) is 

charged with one (1) or more offenses listed in 

subsection (a);

(2) all the charges under subsection (a)(1) through 

(a)(9) resulted in an acquittal or were dismissed; and

(3) the individual pleads guilty to or is convicted of 

any offense other than an offense listed in subsection 

(a)(1) through (a)(9);

the court having adult criminal jurisdiction may withhold 

judgment and transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court for 

adjudication and disposition. In determining whether to transfer 

jurisdiction to the juvenile court for adjudication and disposition, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2338 | April 18, 2019 Page 5 of 6

the court having adult criminal jurisdiction shall consider 

whether there are appropriate services available in the juvenile 

justice system, whether the child is amenable to rehabilitation 

under the juvenile justice system, and whether it is in the best 

interests of the safety and welfare of the community that the child 

be transferred to juvenile court. All orders concerning release 

conditions remain in effect until a juvenile court detention 

hearing, which must be held not later than forty-eight (48) hours, 

excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after the order 

of transfer of jurisdiction.

(Emphasis added). The plain language of the statute indicates that the trial 

court may withhold judgment and transfer the matter to the juvenile court, not 

that the trial court must do so. 

The term “may” in a statute ordinarily implies a permissive 

condition and a grant of discretion. It logically follows that a 

trial court’s ruling on a reverse transfer request would be 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion 

occurs when a trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic 

and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court 

misinterprets the law. 

Tibbs v. State, 86 N.E.3d 401, 404–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (internal quotations 

omitted), trans. denied. 

[7] Davis committed a serious offense when he forced his then-eleven-year-old 

cousin to fellate him. Davis committed this offense after having previously 

been subjected to an informal adjustment for allegedly committing what would

have been sexual battery if committed by an adult, suggesting that the prior 

attempts to rehabilitate Davis and reform his sexually aggressive behavior were 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2338 | April 18, 2019 Page 6 of 6

unsuccessful. Further, while Davis correctly notes that the Indiana Risk 

Assessment System Community Supervision Tool found him to be a low risk to 

reoffend, the psychosexual assessment completed in connection to the case 

“indicates that he is in the medium to high range to be reconvicted for a sexual 

offense.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 8. In light of these facts coupled with the 

fact that the juvenile probation department “would not be in agreement with 

transferring [Davis’s case] back to” the juvenile court, tr. p. 12, Davis has failed 

to convince us that either (1) the trial court’s denial of his request to withhold 

judgment and transfer the matter to the trial court is clearly against the logic 

and effect of the facts and circumstances of this case or (2) the trial court 

misinterpreted the law. As such, we conclude that the trial court acted within 

its discretion in denying Davis’s request.

[8] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.