alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 12.1


I, Arnon Toussia-Cohen, certify that:

 1. I have reviewed this amendment to annual report on Form 20-F of Radcom Ltd.;
    and

 2. Based on my knowledge, this amendment to report does not contain any untrue
    statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
    make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
    statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
    this annual report.

Date: May 13, 2004

/s/ Arnon Toussia-Cohen

Arnon Toussia-Cohen
Chief Executive Officer
**Exhibit 10.60**

**Summary of Loan Agreement by and between Shenzhen BAK Battery Co., Ltd. and Shenzhen Eastern Branch, Agricultural Bank of China dated September 27, 2006.**

| **Summary of the main articles**    |
|-------------------------------------|
| •                              | Contract   number: No. 81101200600001651 |
| •                              | Loan Principal:   RMB 20 million; |
| •                              | Loan term: six   months starting from the date loan is actually provided to the Company. |
| •                              | Interest   rate: fixed rate of 5.58%; |
|                                | • | Penalty   interest rate for delayed repayment: 5.58% plus 50% *5.58%; |
|                                | • | Penalty   interest rate for embezzlement of loan proceeds: 5.58% * 2; |
| •                              | Purpose of   the loan is to provide working capital for the Company; |
| •                              | Advanced   repayment of loan needs to be approved by the Lender; |
| •                              | Breach of   contract penalties: suspension of loan not yet provided, demand prepayment of   loan principal and interest before maturity; imposition of punitive interest;   compensation for the Lender’s expenses incurred due to the Company’s breach   of contract such as lawyer’s fee, travel cost in case of litigation, etc. |
| **Summary of the articles omitted** |
| •                              | Types of the   loan |
| •                              | Clearing of   the loan interest |
| •                              | Conditions   precedent to the drawing of the loan |
| •                              | Rights and   obligations of the Borrower |
| •                              | Rights and   obligations of the Lender |
| •                              | Guarantee of   the loan |
| •                              | Dispute   settlement |
| •                              | Miscellaneous |
| •                              | Validity |
| •                              | Notes |
#### CHICAGO, BURLINGTON AND QUINCY RAILWAY COMPANY *v.*GRAY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA.

No. 876.

Submitted March 11, 1889. —

Decided March 18, 1889.

Since the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, c. 373, took effect, no appeal or writ of error lies to this court from a decision of a Circuit Court remanding a cause to a state court which had been removed from it, although the order remanding it was made before that act took effect.

Motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

*397
      *Mr. John F. Lacey*for the motion.

There is only one point involved in this motion. The plaintiff in error caused the removal of the cause from the District Court of Iowa to the United States Circuit Court.

The defendant in error moved to remand the cause to the state court. This motion was submitted before Justice Miller and Judge Lorr and the motion sustained. The cause was removed and also remanded prior to the act of March 3d, 1887, but the writ of error wTas not ’ sued out until after the passage of that act. It follows that when the right to sue out a’ writ of error in a cause that had been remanded was cut off by the statute, there being no reservation in relation to any past orders the jurisdiction was cut off, and so writ of error will not lie.

No one opposing.

Pee curiam

: This case is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

*Dismissed.*
#### BOOTH v. SMITH et al.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.

June 18, 1894.)

Receivers—Appointment—Partnership.

In an action by the surviving partner against the representatives of the deceased partner for an accounting, a receiver of the firm property *791will not be appointed on plaintiff’s application, where defendants have not interfered with plaintiff in closing up the firm affairs, but have expressed their confidence in him and their willingness to allow him all his rights as surviving partner, and there is no suggestion that the property will be removed, or in any way endangered.

Appeal from special term, Dutchess county.

Action by Oliver H. Booth against Hannibal Smith and Mary A. Huntington, as administrators of James Vassar Harbotüe, deceased, for an accounting. From an order appointing plaintiff receiver of the property of the firm of M. Vassar & Co., composed of plaintiff, defendants’ intestate, and others, defendants appeal.

Reversed.

Argued before BROWN, P. J., and DYKMAN and CULLEN, JJ.

Smith & Smith, for appellants.

Frank B. Lown, for respondent.

DYKMAN, J.

This is an appeal from an order appointing a receiver of the partnership property of M. Vassar & Co. The plaintiff is the surviving member of that firm, and this action is brought to procure an accounting' between him and the personal representatives of a deceased copartner in respect to the dealings of the firm, and the complaint contains a prayer for the appointment of a receiver. The complaint contains no allegation showing any especial necessity for a receiver, and the appointment was opposed by the defendants, who are the personal representatives of the deceased co-partner of the plaintiff. The plaintiff presented a claim to the defendants against the estate of their intestate, of about $9,000, which they rejected, and offered to refer under the statute. The plaintiff did not accept the offer, but commenced this action. The defendants have not interfered with the plaintiff in closing up the affairs of the copartnership as surviving partner, and all the books of account and property of the firm are in his possession. The defendants declare their confidence in the plaintiff, and their willingness to allow him to exercise all the rights with which he is clothed by law as surviving partner. There is no suggestion that the property will be removed, or that it will be endangered in any way. It is in the undisputed possession of the plaintiff, with the approbation of all parties interested. Under these circumstances, we can perceive no possible necessity for the appointment of a receiver, and the order should be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements. AH concur.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### September 9, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r 

### 136410 Marilyn Kell y Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, 

### PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, J ustices 

### Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 136410 COA: 283693 Berrien CC: 2007-405773-FH BILLY RAY WRENFROW, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 26, 2008 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

d0828 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 9, 2008

Clerk
Listen

# Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 2022

November 14, 2022

Report

-  All Reports 
-  Annual Statutory Enforcement 
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#### NATIONAL PAC. OIL CO. v. UNITED STATES. MIDLAND OILFIELDS CO., Limited, v. SAME.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

February 8, 1916.)

Nos. 2656-2659.

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the Southern District of California.

A. L. Weil, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellants.

E. J. Justice, Sp. Asst. U. S. Atty. Gen., of San Francisco, Cal.,, and Albert Schoonover, U. S. Atty., of Los Angeles, Cal.

On motion made on behalf of counsel for the appellant to dismiss the appeal in each of said causes, without prejudice — ordered, motion granted and appeal in each of said causes dismissed, without prejudice.
(7 Misc. Rep. 502.)

#### In re WARING et al.

(Surrogate’s Court, Westchester County.

March, 1894.)

Executors and Administrators—Executions.

Where a decree for the payment of money is rendered against executors on an accounting, execution cannot issue against the property of testator, but must run against the property of the executors.

Proceeding by Ann M. Paddock and Phebe B. Rockwell to.compel an accounting by Oscar Waring and Wilbur F. Washburn, as executors of Jarvis A. Waring, deceased. A decree was made, directing payment of $6,802.55 to each petitioner, and executions were issued thereon against the property of Jarvis A. Waring, deceased.

F. X. Donoghue, for the motion.

James M. Hunt, opposed.

COFFIN, S.

The executions are clearly void, and should be set aside. They should have run against the property of Oscar Waring and Wilbur F. Washburn, and not against the property of the estate. Section 2554 of the Code permits execution to be issued against the property of the party directed to make the payment The next section authorizes, in a proper case, the surrogate to punish the party for contempt, for not making the payment as decreed. That, of course, would be a proceeding against his own person. In Peyser v. Wendt, 2 Dem. Sur. 221, the surrogate of New York took the view that the execution was properly issued against the property of the executor, and cited authorities on the subject. The court of appeals has held the same in Power v. Speckman, 126 N. Y. 354-359, 27 N. E. 474. See form of execution *394in Redf. Pr. (5th Ed.) 1009, substituting, however, the letters “Y. *Z”*for “A. B.,” in last clause. The executions must therefore be set aside, and all proceedings under them, consequently, fall. Motion granted.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v *240David Wadley, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Owens, J.), rendered April 30, 1985, convicting him of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

According to the evidence adduced on behalf of the People, Jose Torres, a student at Thomas Jefferson High School in Brooklyn, was accosted at 1:30 p.m. by the defendant and two other males whom he had moments before observed standing in the hallway. Torres was grabbed from behind by the neck but upon turning his head, Torres observed the defendant holding a knife to his throat. The defendant then repeatedly punched Torres in the face and took property from him, including money and a mask Torres had made in art class. As Torres fled, he turned and saw the defendant placing the mask over his face.

The defendant, not then a student at the high school, took the stand and denied he was a participant in the incident. He testified that he was on school grounds on the dáte of the incident in order to pick up his diploma, that he left the school grounds at 1:25 p.m. and that he went home to briefly celebrate with his mother. Although he was not expected at and did not "punch in” for work until 4:00 p.m., the defendant, without corroboration, testified that he arrived at his place of employment at 1:30 p.m., where he spoke for the next three hours with his girlfriend, and a coemployee. A security guard at the high school, who acknowledged that he considered the defendant a friend, testified that the defendant exited the school building at 1:15 p.m.

We note that the issue of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be afforded any inconsistency in their testimony is primarily within the province of the trier of fact *(see, People v Di Girolamo,*108 AD2d 755, *lv denied*64 NY2d 1133). Upon the exercise of our factual review power we are satisfied that the evidence adduced at the trial established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

We have examined the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Mangano, J. P., Niehoff, Spatt and Harwood, JJ., concur.
#### James J. O’Leary, Respondent-Appellant, v Raymond LeChase, Inc., Appellant-Respondent. (And a Third-Party Action.)

(Appeal No. 1.)

— Judgment unanimously reversed, on *992the law, without costs, and new trial granted. Memorandum: Under the circumstances of this case, we deem a new trial to be necessary. In this action by plaintiff worker arising from a construction site accident, the court failed to instruct the jurors concerning the nondelegable duty imposed upon a general contractor pursuant to Labor Law §241 (6). As the general contractor, LeChase had a nondelegable duty to provide a safe workplace in accordance with the statutory requirements irrespective of its control of supervision of the construction site *(Allen v Cloutier Constr. Corp.,*44 NY2d 290, 300). The jury could well have inferred from the court’s instructions that breach of a regulation promulgated pursuant to statute (Labor Law § 241 [6]) was tantamount to a violation of the statute. Although the duty imposed by Labor Law § 241 (6) is nondelegable, breach of a regulation promulgated under that statute is only some evidence of negligence, and instructing a jury that breach of a regulation promulgated under Labor Law § 241 (6) creates liability constitutes error *(Long v Forest-Fehlhaber,*55 NY2d 154; *Allen v Cloutier Constr. Corp., supra).*The court further complicated matters by charging that a breach of that statutory duty will make both the general contractor and plaintiff’s employer liable to the plaintiff. (Appeals from judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Provenzano, J. — indemnification, Labor Law § 241 [6].) Present — Callahan, J. P., Boomer, Green, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-60152

Summary Calendar

 

DONALD WAYNE WILLIS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; 

MIKE MOORE, Attorney General,

State of Mississippi,

Respondents-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi 

USDC No. 2:97-CV-292-P-G

--------------------

December 3, 1999

Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Donald Wayne Willis (Mississippi prisoner # 40317-A) was

granted a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the

district court’s dismissal of his habeas corpus petition as timebarred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s statute of limitations. Both

parties were ordered to brief the limitations issue; however,

Willis has not done so.

 “Although [this court] liberally construe[s] the briefs of

pro se appellants, [this court] also require[s] that arguments 
No. 98-60152

-2-

must be briefed to be preserved.” Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d

222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993)(internal quotation and citation

omitted). Willis has neither briefed nor identified any error in

the dismissal of his petition as time-barred. Accordingly, the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2574 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2574

To amend the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 to stop a scheduled increase 
 in the minimum wage applicable to American Samoa and to provide that 
 any future increases in such minimum wage shall be determined by the 
                     government of American Samoa.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 26, 2015

Mrs. Radewagen introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 to stop a scheduled increase 
 in the minimum wage applicable to American Samoa and to provide that 
 any future increases in such minimum wage shall be determined by the 
                     government of American Samoa.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MINIMUM WAGE APPLICABLE TO AMERICAN SAMOA.

    Section 8103(b)(2) of the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 (29 U.S.C. 
206(b)(2) note) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (A)--
                    (A) by striking ``on the date of enactment of this 
                Act'' and inserting ``May 1, 2015''; and
                    (B) by inserting ``and'' after the semicolon; and
            (2) by striking subparagraphs (B) and (C) and inserting the 
        following:
                    ``(B) increased thereafter by such amount and at 
                such time as determined by the government of American 
                Samoa.''.
                                 <all>
```
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2512 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2512

   To amend title 5, United States Code, to make clear that Federal 
   employees who receive back pay for a period during which they are 
   furloughed due to a lapse in appropriations may not also receive 
             unemployment compensation for the same period.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 21, 2015

Mr. Brady of Texas introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                    the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title 5, United States Code, to make clear that Federal 
   employees who receive back pay for a period during which they are 
   furloughed due to a lapse in appropriations may not also receive 
             unemployment compensation for the same period.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Furloughed Federal Employee Double 
Dip Elimination Act''.

SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION.

    (a) In General.--Section 8508 of title 5, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) by inserting ``(a)'' before the first sentence; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(b) The rules and regulations shall include provisions to ensure 
that, in the case of a Federal employee who receives back pay for a 
period during which such employee was furloughed due to a lapse in 
appropriations--
            ``(1) such back pay shall be treated in the same way as 
        Federal wages attributable to such employee; and
            ``(2) the period to which such back pay relates shall be 
        treated in the same way as a period of Federal service 
        attributable to such employee.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall be 
effective as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
# User's Guide

# Project_Summary

# Daily Summary

# day1

&P	

# day2

# day3

# day4

# day5

# day6

# day7

# day8

# day9

# day10

# day11

# day12

# day13

SPII Sensitivity

# day14

# day15

# day16

# day17

# day18

# day19

# day20

# day21

# day22

# day23

# day24

# day25

# day26

# day27

# day28

# day29

# day30

# day31

# rate

#  blank day

# Module1
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2131 Reported in House (RH)]

                                                  House Calendar No. 38
114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2131

                          [Report No. 114-137]

To designate the Federal building and United States courthouse located 
at 83 Meeting Street in Charleston, South Carolina, as the ``J. Waties 
                       Waring Judicial Center''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 30, 2015

 Mr. Clyburn (for himself, Mr. Sanford, Mr. Wilson of South Carolina, 
Mr. Duncan of South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy, Mr. Mulvaney, and Mr. Rice of 
 South Carolina) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
           the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

                              June 4, 2015

        Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To designate the Federal building and United States courthouse located 
at 83 Meeting Street in Charleston, South Carolina, as the ``J. Waties 
                       Waring Judicial Center''.

 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. J. WATIES WARING FEDERAL BUILDING AND UNITED STATES 
              COURTHOUSE.

    (a) Designation.--The Federal building and United States courthouse 
located at 83 Meeting Street in Charleston, South Carolina, shall be 
known and designated as the ``J. Waties Waring Judicial Center''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the Federal building and 
United States courthouse referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed 
to be a reference to the ``J. Waties Waring Judicial Center''.
                                                  House Calendar No. 38

114th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 2131

                          [Report No. 114-137]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

To designate the Federal building and United States courthouse located 
at 83 Meeting Street in Charleston, South Carolina, as the ``J. Waties 
                       Waring Judicial Center''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                              June 4, 2015

        Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed
```
#### SHELDON v. HEATON.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department.

May 26, 1894.)

Appeal from special term, Clinton county.

Action by John J. Sheldon against Rufus Heaton. From an order striking out of defendant’s answer the denial, defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Argued before MAYHAM, P. J., and PUTNAM and HERRICK, JJ.

J. B. Stearns (G. H. Beckwith, of counsel), for appellant.

Wilmer H. Dunn, for respondent.

MAYHAM, P. J.

The same question raised in this appeal was raised and disposed of in an appeal between the same parties, standing No. 13 on this calendar. 29 N. Y. Supp. 275. No opinion is required on this appeal. The order of the special term is reversed, with $10 costs and printing disbursements, and $10 costs of special term, to the defendant. All concur.