P

Summer 2023

roceedings

of the Marine Safety & Security Council

The Coast Guard Journal of Safety & Security at Sea

Novel Uses

New Challenges

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Advances in fish farming technology and management practices significantly decreased the 

environmental footprint and increased economic performance of U.S. aquaculture in the 

last 40 years. Marine aquaculture in the United States represents an opportunity to provide 

healthy, domestic seafood; create jobs; and contribute to coastal economies. Coastal net pens, 

like these off the coast of Maine, have addressed environmental concerns about the effect on 

water quality, seafloor degradation, the sustainability of various fish feeds, and impacts to wild 

populations. 

The demand for use of the nation’s waterways is increasing with requests from the energy 

sector, space industry, aquaculture, sporting events, and recreation, among others. These 

demands are challenging the status quo and inspiring innovative responses as the Coast Guard 

works to safeguard users and marine ecosystems. NOAA photo 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PROC E E D I NG S 

Summer 2023 Vol. 80, Number 1 

Marine 

Transportation 

System Governance 

6 A Collaborative Approach |

Mitigating risk in the evolving 

marine transportation system 

by LCDR Lindsay N. Cook 

11 Charting a Course to

Cybersecurity Regulations 

and Compliance 

by Nick Parham 

15 Safety at Sea: Vessel Traffic

Service San Francisco |

Celebrating 50 years of 

Vessel Traffic Services

by Scott Humphrey 

and LCDR Alexandra Miller, P.E. 

Space and the Marine 

Transportation 

System 

20 The U.S. Coast Guard and

U.S. Space Force |Joint efforts

protect our waterways 

by U.S. Coast Guard CDR Laura 

Springer and U.S. Space Force 

MAJ Johnathan Szul 

22 Coast Guard Support to

Space Operations |A sector

commander’s roles and 

responsibilities—today and 

tomorrow 

by CDR Jillian Lamb, 

LCDR John DiNino, 

LCDR Steve Dross, 

and LT j.g. Griffin Terpstra 

30 Celestial Navigation |

The Coast Guard and DHS 

in a new era of space activities 

by Iranga Kahangama 

and Nick Reese 

33 A Changing

California Gold Coast 

by Tyrone Conner 

37 Space Cowboys | The

commercial space industry’s 

return to South Texas 

by LCDR Anthony Garofalo 

and CDR Douglas Salik 

41 From Recreational Boaters

to Astronauts | The Coast 

Guard has the responsibility—

and authority—to keep 

waterways safe 

by LCDR Tanner Stiehl 

Marine 

Transportation 

System Technology 

Revolution 

45 Digitalization | Achieving a

maritime security advantage 

by Luke Ritter 

and Mark DuPont 

50 It’s Here! |What did we learn

from the Mayflower 400’s 

Atlantic crossing? 

by LCDR Mason Wilcox 

In the winter issue of Proceedings, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Morro Bay was

incorrectly identified as the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Mackinaw on page 79.

In Water Innovation 

55 The U.S. Aquaculture

Industry |Evaluating 

navigational risk posed 

by fish farming in the

marine environment 

by Petty Officer 1st Class 

Erin Westoby 

59 Navigating the Course Ahead

with Offshore Wind 

Development |U.S. Coast

Guard prepares and responds 

by John Stone, 

Michele Desautels, 

and Daniel Dugery 

62 The Unique Waterways

of The Arctic and 

Western Alaska 

by LCDR Rven Garcia, 

LT Kaitlyn Moore, 

LT William Mason, 

and CDR John Downing 

Marine 

Transportation 

System Unity 

of Effort 

66 Harbor Safety Committees |

Community solutions 

to complex challenges 

by Greg Hitchen 

70 Eventful Days on the

San Francisco Bay |

Management of the largest 

Coast Guard marine event 

permitting program 

by LT William Harris, 

LT Anthony Solares, 

and MST1 Shannon 

Curtaz-Milian 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 75 Economies of Scale Through

Partnerships |Effectively 

managing port expansion and 

complex evolutions 

by LCDR Samuel Danus 

and CDR Baxter Smoak 

80 Building Cyber Resiliency

into Maritime Supply Chains 

by Paula de Witte, JD, Ph.D., and 

Chris Scarmardo 

84 It is Not the Same Sea |

Reconciling multiple 

waterway uses in the PACPARS 

by LCDR Sara Conrad 

89 Complex Risk Factors and

Cascading Consequences 

in the Maritime Supply 

Chain 

by Andrew Tucci, 

Dennis Egan, 

Christie Nelson, Ph.D., 

Fred Roberts, Ph.D., 

Latha Vijayagopal, 

and Ryan Whytlaw 

On Deck 

4 Assistant Commandant’s 

Perspective 

by Rear Admiral 

Wayne R. Arguin Jr. 

4 Champion’s 

Point of View 

by Kevin Kiefer 

96 Chemical of the Quarter

Understanding Methyl 

Alcohol 

by LT Luke Orr 

On the Cover: Advances 

in technology and greater 

demands for new, varied uses 

of our waterways are creating 

new challenges for those who 

work to ensure they remain 

healthy, safe, and viable for 

the future. 

Rocket photo: CRS­8 first stage 

landing courtesy of SpaceX. 

Getty images: 

Water drop by Salamatik; 

water ripple by alexx60; 

binary background by mycola; 

fish farm by Violetastock; and 

wind turbine farm by Blue Planet Studio 

Nautical Queries 

100 

99 

97 Engineering

Deck

In The News

Editorial Team 

Samantha L. Quigley 

Executive Editor 

Leslie C. Goodwin 

Graphic Designer 

Proceedings is published three times a year in 

the interest of safety at sea under the auspices 

of the Marine Safety & Security Council. 

Special permission for republication, either 

in whole or in part, except for copyrighted 

material, is not required, provided credit is 

given to Proceedings. 

The articles contained in Proceedings 

are submitted by diverse public and private interests in the maritime community 

as a means to promote maritime safety 

and security. The views expressed by the 

authors do not necessarily represent those 

of the U.S. Coast Guard or the Department of Homeland Security or represent 

official policy. 

Graphics provided by the Coast Guard and its 

licensors, unless otherwise indicated. 

Editorial Contact 

Email: HQS­DG­NMCProceedings@uscg.mil 

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ATTN: Editor, Proceedings Magazine 

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Web: www.dco.uscg.mil/proceedings 

Phone: (202) 372­2316 

Subscription Requests 

Proceedings is free of charge and published 

in April, August, and December. 

Subscriptions: 

www.dco.uscg.mil/proceedings 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Admiral Linda L. Fagan 

Commandant 

U.S. Coast Guard 

The Marine Safety 

& Security Council 

of the 

United States Coast Guard 

Rear Admiral Melissa Bert 

Judge Advocate General 

& Chief Counsel 

Chair 

Rear Admiral Megan M. Dean 

Director of Governmental 

and Public Affairs 

Member 

Rear Admiral Matthew W. Lake 

Assistant Commandant for 

Resources, Chief Financial Officer 

Member 

Rear Admiral Wayne R. Arguin 

Assistant Commandant 

for Prevention Policy 

Member 

Captain Amy M. Beach 

Director of Inspections 

and Compliance 

Member 

Mr. Jeffrey G. Lantz 

Director of Commercial 

Regulations and Standards 

Member 

Mr. Michael D. Emerson 

Director of Marine 

Transportation Systems 

Member 

Rear Admiral Jo-Ann F. Burdian 

Assistant Commandant 

for Response Policy 

Member 

Ms. Dana S. Tulis 

Director of Emergency Management 

Member 

Mr. John Luce 

Director of National Pollution 

Funds Center 

Member 

Ms. Kate Sergent 

Executive Secretary 

Assistant 

Commandant’s 

Perspective 

by rear admiral Wayne r. arguin Jr. 

Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Offering a wise view of our ever- significantly changed, but the number

evolving world, the Greek phi- of stakeholders traveling and working 

losopher Heraclitus observed on them has steadily increased. 

that, “The only constant in life is change.” From the growth of aquaculture 

First spoken almost 3,000 years ago, the and offshore renewable energy instalwords still ring true today, and the phe- lations to the advancement of autononomenal amount of change occurring mous vessels and water-based space 

within the U.S. Marine Transportation launch/recovery operations, waterways 

System (MTS) is a perfect example. uses are evolving. These uses showcase 

The area of usable waterways has not innovative methods in which people 

Champion’s 

Point of 

View 

by Kevin Kiefer 

Chief, Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy 

U.S. Coast Guard 

From small paddlecraft to ultra large uses of our waterways, and it is some of 

container vessels, our nation’s these new uses that we bring to you with 

waterways have long played host this Proceedings issue.

to people employing them for such vari- Autonomous vessels have been makous uses as travel, food, energy, and mil- ing news for a few years, but the rate 

itary defense. As time and technology at which their technology is advancing 

have advanced, so too have innovative means updates happen continually. The 

waterway uses. The past few years, espe- June 2022 transatlantic crossing of the 

cially, have seen a huge rise in the novel Mayflower Autonomous Ship 400 is one

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are harnessing water power for economically viable 

and environmentally conscious reasons; while space 

launches and recoveries highlight the multidimensional 

capabilities that only large areas of water can accommodate. 

While the demand for recreational use, passenger 

vessel travel, and offshore development on our nation’s

waterways is growing exponentially, maritime stakeholders continue to advance traditional cargo movement 

methods. This issue of Proceedings highlights some novel

waterways practices and how the MTS is accommodating them. Highlighting both technological advancements and traditional measures, the articles offer clever

insights into the incredible expansion of waterway uses 

and how the Coast Guard is encouraging collaboration 

to preserve safety and security of this vital national 

treasure. 

Disruptive innovations, by definition, create markets

where none previously existed. Whether technology to 

digitalize, model, and simulate a “Smart Port” to optimize security while lowering operational costs or installing autonomous systems to support navigation, the 

technology infusion into the MTS continues at an accelerated pace. This pace will challenge conventional norms 

as we focus efforts to preserve the efficiency, safety, and

security of our nation’s waterways. I am extremely proud 

to showcase how innovators are shaping the future of 

our waterways. 

example featured in the following pages.

Offshore renewable energy installations is another

topic that has increasingly gained attention, and with 

good reason. The last few years have seen a dramatic 

increase in wind farm construction, with the bold goal 

of powering 10 million homes with clean energy by 2030. 

Aquaculture is a newer topic but one that is quickly 

gaining attention. In addition to increasing food production and boosting economic growth, the mechanics of 

this maritime farming naturally help clean the waterways and restore habitat and at-risk species.

Perhaps the most surprising topic within a Coast 

Guard journal is a new focus on space operations. Just as 

an inland Coast Guard unit might sound like a contradiction to many people (after all, doesn’t the Coast Guard, 

by definition, guard the coast?), the Coast Guard’s new

involvement with aeronautical space flights is causing

the same confused amusement. However, a quick look 

back at astronaut Alan Shepard’s iconic 1961 splashdown 

in the Atlantic Ocean shows that the United States has 

long recognized the value of waterborne space landings. As the return to space exploration has dramatically 

increased recently, many commercial space operators are 

choosing to launch and/or recover their spacecraft in our 

nation’s waterways.

My hope for this Proceedings issue is that readers will

gain a better understanding of, and appreciation for, 

these new waterway uses, and I thank the authors for 

their time in developing these articles and the work they 

do every day to keep our waters safe and secure. 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 5 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Marine Transportation System Governance 

A Collaborative Approach 

Mitigating risk in the evolving marine transportation system 

by lCdr lindsay n. CooK 

Staff Officer 

Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy 

Waterways Policies and Activities Division 

U.S. Coast Guard 

The nation’s navigable waterways are routinely 

characterized by maritime shipping, offshore 

mineral exploration, commercial fishing, scientific research and conservation, tourism, and recreation.

While traditional uses remain dominant, the marine 

transportation system (MTS) is rapidly evolving as a platform for novel technological innovation. Space activities, 

offshore renewable energy installations, autonomous 

vessels, and aquaculture are diversifying the maritime 

landscape.

It is important to note that market demand is not 

the sole impetus for novel technologies operating in the 

MTS. Rather, novel uses reflect the objectives and priorities of the United States government and its citizens, 

and are the result of executive mandates and/or legislation. To fully appreciate the complexity of the changes 

occurring in the MTS, this article will discuss what is 

driving novel technological innovation in the maritime 

Seaman Diana Milian, of Coast Guard Station San Francisco, stands watch aboard a 25­foot response boat while maintaining a safety zone around a vessel 

carrying three 253­foot­tall cranes March 16, 2010. Two response boats from the station ensured mariners didn’t present a hazard to navigation for the vessel 

that narrowly passed under the Golden Gate and Bay Bridges. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Erik Swanson 

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The San Francisco Bay Harbor Safety Committee, in coordination with the Coast Guard and local industry partners, evaluates the region’s capability to respond 

to an emergency involving an ultra­large container vessel in San Francisco Bay on May 21, 2014. The purpose of the towing drill is to evaluate the capability 

of existing tugboats within San Francisco Bay to tow an ultra­large container ship. This was the first drill of its kind conducted in the United States. U.S. Coast 

Guard photo by Petty Officer Adam Stanton 

domain. It will also explore the managed integration 

of novel technologies via regulatory updates, regional 

interagency cooperation, and risk analysis. 

Strategic Priorities 

Enhancing American competitiveness and leadership is 

a prevailing strategic objective of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government. Since 2017, 

the president of the United States and Congress have 

outlined the importance of public and private sector 

investment in space activities, offshore renewable energy

installations, artificial intelligence, and aquaculture. The

national benefits of these industries are framed in executive orders and legislation as conduits for bolstering 

national security, reducing reliance on fossil fuels, pursing environmental justice, creating jobs, and providing 

healthy food options. 1 While each industry is distinct, 

they all share a maritime nexus and are part of the MTS. 

Coasts, lakes, rivers, canals, and ports are a component of the nation’s transportation infrastructure. 2 The 

viability and health of navigable waterways are crucial 

to the nation’s economy individually and collectively. 

According to the Association of Port Authorities, in 2018 

maritime commerce generated $5.4 trillion in economic 

activity, sustained 31 million domestic jobs, and created 

approximately $378 billion in federal, state, and local 

taxes.3 Like any system, the whole is only as good as the 

sum of its parts. 

Disruptions occurring in the MTS have cascading 

effects, including reducing the availability of goods 

and services. This is because approximately 71 percent 

of United States imports and exports, accounted for by 

tonnage, are transported by ship. 4 For example, during 

the COVID-19 pandemic, supply-chain disruptions and 

changes in consumption patterns caused unprecedented 

port congestion in multiple locations throughout the 

United States. Most notably, in late 2021, 80 container 

ships waited off the coast of Los Angeles-Long Beach,

loaded with cargo valued at $25 billion.5 The significant delays experienced by ships waiting offshore or at

anchorage to offload cargo contributed to domestic and

global equipment, material, and consumable shortages. 

Failure to monitor risk and prevent future disruptions in the MTS will be costly. For this reason, it is crucial that government entities, the maritime industry, and 

stakeholders work cooperatively to maintain the viability, accessibility, and health of navigable waterways,

especially as novel technologies and new uses emerge. 

Regulatory Perspective 

Thirty-five federal departments, agencies, and bureaus

have authorities related to the MTS. 6 As time and 

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technology progress, these federal agencies initially 

assess novel uses through the lens of existing authorities and regulations. In some circumstances, existing 

authorities and regulations may insufficiently address

novel uses because either the use or technology was 

infeasible when the authorities and regulations were 

promulgated. During this phase, regulatory agencies 

benefit from working alongside industries to further 

their understanding of novel uses and their impact to 

the MTS. With the shared goal of safe and secure operations in the maritime domain, regulatory agencies and 

industries can delineate requirements and expectations 

while alleviating unintended consequences. 

Conceptualizing new regulatory frameworks for 

novel uses cannot be accomplished by a singular regulatory agency. The interconnected nature of the MTS and 

shared authorities necessitates information sharing and 

objective identification of tangential impacts resulting

from updating or creating new regulations and policy. 

This is best accomplished through consistent interagency 

cooperation and communication. 

The U.S. Committee of Marine Transportation 

Systems (CMTS), an executive-level federal interagency 

coordinating committee established in 2005, is a robust 

forum for collaboration amongst federal agencies with a 

stake in maritime labor and operations. At this level, participating agencies collectively build corporate knowledge of the maritime domain by discussing novel uses 

and their communication with traditional users. In many

ways, the CMTS mitigates risk in the marine transportation system by keeping a pulse on the interconnected 

elements of the system and facilitating interagency discussions on trends impacting the maritime domain. It is 

also a catalyst for championing solutions to known and/ 

or forecasted challenges related to technological innovation and novel uses. Organizations such as this one 

enable unity of effort and maximize government oversight of the MTS. In many ways, the CMTS is a model 

for regional, interagency, and stakeholder collaboration. 

Local Coordination 

While federal interagency coordination has an important role in maintaining the viability and health of the 

MTS, regional industry and stakeholder coordination is 

equally crucial. Local industry representatives and stakeholders have nuanced perspectives of local waterways. 

Personnel and assets from Coast Guard Station Seattle, Port of Seattle Police Department, and Coast Guard Cutter Blue Shark enforce a 500­yard safety zone 

around Polar Pioneer, an Arctic drilling vessel, as it departs Terminal 5 in Seattle in June 2015. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Katelyn Shearer 

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Additionally, industry representatives 

and stakeholders possess knowledge of 

waterways exceeding that of local regulatory entities and have keen insight 

on how the introduction of novel uses 

will affect local maritime operations 

and marine species. Local input is key 

to mitigating risk and unplanned outcomes. 

When novel uses of the MTS are 

under development, the value of 

regional collaboration cannot be understated. Local involvement in maritime 

spatial planning and operations typically occurs via harbor safety committees or equivalent industry groups. In 

fact, the Coast Guard encourages the 

formation of harbor safety committees to facilitate local governance of 

waterways in the form of recommendations concerning port safety, security, and environmental stewardship. 7 

Participation in these committees or 

equivalent industry groups is voluntary. Membership usually includes “representatives of governmental agencies, 

maritime labor and industry organizations, environmental groups, and other 

public interest groups.”8 

Harbor safety committees are 

renowned for cultivating safe, fair, and 

equitable use of waterways amongst 

diverse maritime operations and interests and developing consensus-driven 

best practices. When novel uses are 

proposed, the harbor safety committee or equivalent industry group is the 

preferred venue for discussing novel 

uses to ensure all stakeholders have an 

opportunity to share their viewpoints.

The Coast Guard participates in harbor safety committees in an advisory 

capacity and often solicits committee 

members’ feedback on proposed operations. Very rarely does the Coast Guard 

make decisions about waterways without first conducting outreach to members of industry and stakeholders. It 

should also be noted that some regions 

do not have harbor safety committees 

but have equivalent industry and stakeholder groups, which receive the same 

professional courtesies. Throughout the 

risk management process, the Coast 

An MH­65 Dolphin helicopter from Coast Guard Air Station Atlantic City hovers above a wind turbine 

and a Coast Guard small boat during an October 14, 2020, search and rescue exercise 26 miles off the 

coast of Virginia. The exercise was to prepare for the potential need to rescue workers from the wind 

turbines. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Emily Velez 

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Guard remains engaged with harbor safety committees 

to maintain the navigability, safety, and security of port 

complexes. 

Risk Analysis 

Risk analysis is an iterative and shared process, which 

the Coast Guard and the maritime industry manage 

using organizational methodologies and best practices. 

This section focuses primarily on Coast Guard navigation safety risk assessments. 

Operations occurring in the MTS, novel or otherwise, 

are subject to Coast Guard navigation safety risk assessments. Evaluating risk in the maritime domain starts 

with clear lines of communication between the Coast 

Guard and industry. Once the Coast Guard engages the 

operator and reviews the proposed operation, a decision 

is made on what type of navigational safety risk assessment is needed. Depending on the scope and frequency 

of the operations, the assessment may be undertaken by 

the Coast Guard or the operator.

Navigation safety risk assessments for operations 

with a small footprint or one-time events are usually 

conducted by the Coast Guard. However, large or longterm projects with the potential to impact port dynamics 

and waterway usage are traditionally conducted by the 

operator. Risk assessments inform whether proposed 

operations influence public safety, the economy, and the

environment. If the risk is found to be too high, risk-mitigation strategies must be implemented to lessen the risk 

prior to operating. Otherwise, the scope of the proposed 

operation must be modified.

As the presence of space activities, offshore renewable energy installations, autonomous vessels, aquaculture, and additional novel uses expand in the MTS, 

risk analysis will become more essential. Failure to thoroughly analyze risk could severely impact the backbone 

of our economy—the transport of imports and exports. 

Disruptions to the flow of cargo within the MTS hinder

economic growth by limiting the sales of goods, which 

translates to business profits, employee wages, and tax

revenue. 

Conclusion 

The MTS is vast and becoming more dynamic as time 

and technology evolves. Its uses reflect the objectives

and priorities of the United States’ government and people. Maintaining the safety and security of the nation’s 

waterways requires the implementation of multifaceted 

risk mitigation strategies. Such strategies include updating statutes, regulations, and policies that inadequately 

address novel operations; enhancing interagency collaboration at the federal and local levels; and thoroughly 

assessing risk in the maritime domain. 

Similar to the interconnected nature of the MTS, the 

environment. 

aforementioned risk mitigation strategies are interdependent and will not successfully reduce risk if implemented in isolation. Integration of novel technologies in 

the MTS requires statutory and regulatory framework, 

interagency and stakeholder cooperation, and risk analysis. This is because jurisdictional authority provides 

agencies the legal responsibility for developing, updating, and enforcing laws and regulations. Furthermore, 

including novel uses within a department, agency, or 

bureau’s jurisdictional authority legitimizes novel operations and assures the promulgation of minimum safety 

and environmental protection standards. Collaboration 

among federal agencies with a stake in the MTS engenders a macro viewpoint of domestic maritime labor and 

operations. Meanwhile, local collaboration and risk 

assessments evaluate the risk of operating in a specific

About the author: 

LCDR Lindsay N. Cook has served in the U.S. Coast Guard for 13 years 

in many capacities; most notably in operational tours as a Prevention 

officer in the Pacific Northwest, Great Lakes, and Gulf of Mexico. 

Endnotes: 

1. Establishment of United States Space Command as a Unified Combatant 

Command. (2018). Retrieved 14 July 2022, from www.federalregister.

gov/documents/2018/12/21/2018-27953/establishment-of-united-statesspace-command-as-a-unified-combatant-command; Executive Order on 

Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space 

Resources. (2020). Retrieved 10 July 2022, from trumpwhitehouse.archives.

gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Fact-Sheet-on-EO-EncouragingInternational-Support-for-the-Recovery-and-Use-of-Space-Resources.pdf; 

Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad–The 

White House. Retrieved 17 July 2022, from www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/presidential-actions/2021/01/27/executive-order-on-tacklingthe-climate-crisis-at-home-and-abroad/; FACT SHEET: President Biden’s 

Executive Actions on Climate to Address Extreme Heat and Boost Offshore 

Wind–The White House. Retrieved 17 July 2022, from www.whitehouse.gov/

briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/07/20/fact-sheetpresident-bidensexecutive-actions-on-climate-to-address-extreme-heat-and-boost-offshorewind/; Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence. (2019). 

Retrieved 10 June 2022, from www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-02-14/

pdf/2019-02544.pdf; Promoting American Seafood Competitiveness and 

Economic Growth. (2020). Retrieved 15 July 2022, from www.govinfo.gov/

content/pkg/FR-2020-05-12/pdf/2020-10315.pdf 

2. Maritime Transportation System (MTS) | MARAD. (2021). Retrieved 

15 August 2022, from www.maritime.dot.gov/outreach/maritime-transportation-system-mts/maritime-transportation-system-mts 

3. Exports, Jobs & Economic Growth. Retrieved 2 June 2022, from www.aapaports.org/advocating/content.aspx?ItemNumber=21150 

4. Maritime Services Trade Data. Retrieved 12 June 2022, from www.trade.gov/

maritime-services-trade-data 

5. Miller, G. (2021). $25B worth of cargo stuck on 80 container ships off 

California. Retrieved 22 August 2022, from https://urldefense.proofpoint.

com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.freightwaves.com_news_22b-2Dworth2Dof-2Dcargo-2Dis-2Dnow-2Dstuck-2Don-2Dcontainer-2Dships-2Doff2Dcalifornia&d=DwIFAg&c=tnPw9yRHa20_HV5YVoVFtg&r=S2mv_pwjc 

M3Rp7dDo_2Swjq2paRVBBJl53YqG_Xuyu0&m=CgZ1tNkPm03C7PXeIwRs

1U_9af-Oss-S3tJ67wCfMzy_T5RrsaSQftNec21Ywrn2&s=UKTlQ117YtmvyE

7zd0I-PtaCY_S1ngLF5aFuYD6y6r0&e= 

6. Compendium. (2022). Retrieved 13 August 2022, from www.cmts.gov/

compendium/ 

7. Guidance for the Establishment and Development of Harbor Safety 

Committees under the Marine Transportation System Initiative. (2000). 

Retrieved 13 July 2022, from www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20

Documents/5p/5ps/NVIC/2000/n1-00.pdf 

8. Ibid 

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Charting a Course to 

Cybersecurity Regulations 

and Compliance 

by mr. niCK Parham 

Marine Transportation System Cybersecurity Coordinator 

Atlantic Area Command 

U.S. Coast Guard 

I wish to have no connection with any ship that does not sail fast; for I intend to 

go in harm’s way. —John Paul Jones to M. Le Ray de Chaumont, November 16, 1778 

When American Revolutionary War naval cap- efforts to improve upon existing regulations and clartain John Paul Jones wrote those words in a ify authorities would serve to increase the speed and letter to his ally in France, the United States power for those assets. To accomplish these changes, it 

had decided to take the fight to the British coasts. After is imperative to understand what makes the defense of 

years of defending the newly formed United States the MTS vital to the United States’ national security and 

against what was considered a superior British 

naval fleet, Jones knew that swift, powerful

ships would give him the best chance of success. He took the ships his allies provided him 

and commanded several hastily assembled 

crews to successfully target and raid British 

convoys, disrupting their ability to attack the 

United States. 

The need for swift, powerful assets to 

defend the United States and take the battle to 

our adversary remains. However, that battle is 

now being fought in the realm of cybersecurity. 

The bias towards action that fueled Jones lives 

on today in the Coast Guard’s Cyber Strategic 

Outlook, 1 “[Working with allied agencies, 

countries, and stakeholders] ... we will act to 

protect the marine transportation system from 

threats delivered in and through cyberspace 

and we will hold accountable those who would 

do our nation harm ....” 

Fighting this battle effectively to protect the

marine transportation system (MTS) is part 

of the many statutory missions for the Coast 

Guard. To enhance this particular mission, 

the Coast Guard recently updated statutes and 

regulatory policies and established specialized 

cyber protection teams to provide deployable 

capabilities for assessment and mitigation of 

cybersecurity threats to the MTS. The past two 

years have seen great advancements for the 

assets related to this mission, but legislative 

The Coast Guard has enacted policies for port facilities and vessels to strengthen 

their cybersecurity and reduce vulnerabilities. This has primarily been accomplished 

by leveraging existing domestic authorities like those established by the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act. Coast Guard photo 

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More than 275 cyber professionals from across the Defense Department, U.S. federal agencies, and allied nations participated in Cyber Flag 22 from July 20 to 

August 12, 2022. They competed against robust, dynamic opposing forces of operators from the United Kingdom and United States. U.S. Cyber Command’s 

annual exercise provides realistic “hands­on keyboard training” against malicious cyber actors to enhance readiness and interoperability among participating 

teams. U.S. Cyber Command photo 

what legislative measures can enhance the cybersecurity defending against adversarial attacks from terrorists and 

capabilities and authorities of the Coast Guard. rogue nations was focused on physical attacks, giving 

rise to the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) 

What Makes the MTS a Focus in 2004. However, it has become clear during the past 

for Cybersecurity Threats? decade that cybersecurity attacks must also be accounted 

The MTS is a vital component of the national sup- for in security regulations and planning. 

ply chain, accounting for more than 25 percent of the As the Internet of Things (IoT) continues expandUnited States’ gross domestic product and providing ing connectivity between humans and the equipment 

the means for more than 90 percent of imports to flow at shoreside facilities, as well as the ships that call upon 

into the country. Recent events have shown that a dis- them, “What would a 9-11-style cyberattack look like?” 

ruption to the flow of commerce, regardless of whether is often a discussion topic between security personnel. 

or not it was caused by a cybersecurity attack, can have Could an adversary exploit vulnerabilities to not only 

cascading impacts across regional, national, and global shut down operational technology, putting a stop to 

all facility or ship operations, but also cause physical 

destruction, pollution, or even death? As those questions are answered across the MTS, the next question 

is what can be done to prevent those types of attacks, 

or mitigate the impacts should they succeed. The Coast 

Guard has enacted policies for port facilities and vessels to strengthen their cybersecurity and reduce 

supply chains. Look no further than the M/V Ever Given 

grounding, Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, or 

COVID-19 pandemic as case studies to understand how 

vulnerable the global supply chain can be. Adversaries 

of the United States have noticed the detrimental impacts 

that supply chain disruptions can have and recognize 

that it is yet another vector to try and exploit. In the 

past, 

12 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

vulnerabilities, primarily by leveraging existing domestic authorities such as those established in the MTSA. 

Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 

01-20, and Commercial Vessel Compliance (CVC) Work 

Instruction 027 were both released in 2020. MTS stakeholders who conduct operations subject to MTSA have 

since been making adjustments required by those policies to strengthen their defenses against cybersecurity 

attacks. 

The MTS and its stakeholders have been a vital part of 

national security throughout the United States’ history. 

This fact does not change with the threat of cybersecurity 

attacks, but it requires that a new level of understanding 

and trust be built between MTS stakeholders and government agencies that work to mitigate these threats. The 

need for public-private partnership in this effort has been

recognized at the highest level through several executive 

orders and presidential policy directives during the past 

three administrations. There has been outstanding cooperation between the companies already operating under 

MTSA, but one of the challenges moving forward will 

be establishing and maintaining that cooperation with 

operators who have not been subject to MTSA regulations and policies. 

While cybersecurity concerns were present during 

the creation of the MTSA and subsequent regulations, 

the primary focus was on preventing physical terrorist 

attacks. Therefore, the applicability of MTSA was limited to facilities and ships where the consequence would 

be greatest in terms of destruction, pollution, and loss 

of life, via physical means. Many of those same terrorist organizations and rogue nations the United States 

was concerned about during the creation of MTSA have 

now included cybersecurity attacks in their arsenal to 

threaten other countries. 

What Legislative Measures Can Be Used? 

The Coast Guard’s 2021 Cyber Strategic Outlook expressed

the following goal: 

Implement a risk based regulatory, compliance and 

assessment regime, incorporating international and 

industry recognized industry cybersecurity standards, 

U.S. Cyber Command’s annual Cyber Flag exercise provides realistic “hands­on keyboard training” against malicious cyber actors to enhance readiness and 

interoperability among participating teams. During Cyber Flag 22, held from July 20 to August 12, 2022, more than 275 cyber professionals competed virtually 

from nine time zones in five countries. U.S. Cyber Command photo 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 13 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

to manage cybersecurity threat risks to maritime critical 

infrastructure and promote the lawful exchange of goods 

and services in the global marketplace. 2 

as authorized in the statutes. 4 This method of regulation has been used to accommodate the rapid change 

of technological advancement in vessel communication 

systems, engineering, and fire protection for many years.

To use this authority with respect to cybersecurity, 

the Coast Guard and MTS stakeholders would have to 

identify, and agree upon, recognized standards for measuring compliance to the statutes. The process would be 

very similar to the development of the CISA performance 

goals described above and following the intent of the 

National Security Memorandum. Given the broad range 

of operations that fall under MTSA, consideration will 

also have to be given to how these regulatory updates 

can be scaled up or down to match the cybersecurity 

maturity of the regulated entities. The continued collaborative involvement of maritime stakeholders in shaping 

these policies and regulations through active participation will be critical to meeting the needs of all MTS 

stakeholders. 

Conclusion 

Those who know their naval history know that the ships 

received by John Paul Jones to fulfill his request were

not exactly what he had in mind when he asked his 

allies for help, but he obviously succeeded in adapting 

to what he was given. In cyberspace, the Coast Guard 

and its MTS stakeholders are still determining what is 

needed to succeed against the many active adversaries 

and, in that process, they are recognizing that models 

for success may not fit previously held ideals. In Jones’

case, the determination to use innovative ideas to defend 

his homeland against, and take the fight to, adversaries

with overwhelming capabilities was crucial to success. 

It is with that same spirit that the Coast Guard, partner 

agencies, and MTS stakeholders have entered into the 

cyberspace battle and will continue to fight to protect

one of our 

the MTS. 

nation’s most critical infrastructure sectors, 

About the author: 

Mr. Nick Parham is the Marine Transportation System (MTS) 

Cybersecurity Coordinator for the Atlantic Area command. In this 

role, he is responsible for development and execution of Coast Guard 

cybersecurity regulations and policies impacting MTS stakeholders 

operating in an area of responsibility that encompasses all inland and 

coastal commercial maritime operations east of the Rocky Mountains 

including Puerto Rico. He would like to acknowledge the faculty and 

staff of the Cyber & Innovation Policy Institute, U.S. Naval War College and his cohorts at the 2022 CIPI Summer Workshop on Maritime 

Cybersecurity, in particular U.S Navy LCDR Tyson Meadors for their 

contributions to this article. 

Endnotes: 

1. United States Coast Guard Cyber Strategic Outlook, August 2021 

2. United States Coast Guard Cyber Strategic Outlook, August 2021. Pg 28 

3. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency—www.cisa.gov/cpgs 

4. www.nist.gov/system/files/revised_circular_a-119_as_of_01-22-2016.pdf 

In order to meet this goal, the United States must 

continue to evolve cybersecurity laws and regulations. 

The speed of evolution in the cybersecurity world further complicates questions regarding legislative efforts

as solutions can quickly become outdated even with the 

most efficient government action. Recognizing this, the

administration signed a National Security Memorandum on 

Improving Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Control 

Systems on July 28, 2021. The memorandum established

a voluntary initiative intended to drive collaboration 

between the federal government and the critical infrastructure community to improve cybersecurity of control systems. The Department of Homeland Security was 

instructed to lead this effort.

In support, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 

Security Agency (CISA) published its updated CrossSector Cybersecurity Performance Goals and Objectives 

on March 21, 2023, resulting in Version 2.0. The performance goals were developed in conjunction with partners across the interagency and private sector through 

the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory 

Council. The voluntary cross-sector common baseline 

cybersecurity performance goals address information 

technology and control systems cybersecurity activities. 

They consist of foundational activities for effective risk

management andhigh-level cybersecurityrecommended 

practices. The goals and objectives are not an exhaustive 

guide to all facets of an effective cybersecurity program.

However, they provide “... clear guidance to owners and 

operators about cybersecurity practices and postures 

that the American people can trust and should expect for 

such essential services ...” to protect systems supporting 

National Critical Functions.

3 

Regarding regulations, the Coast Guard continues 

to work with its partners within the Department of 

Homeland Security and other agencies to identify how 

best to address cybersecurity requirements, with a focus 

on MTSA-regulated facilities and vessels. CISA’s crosssector performance goals will help serve as a framework 

for these efforts. For those who may be curious as to how

the Coast Guard will maintain pace with the rapidly 

changing dynamics of cybersecurity, it has previously 

overcome this challenge. The greatest example of this 

comes through its vessel inspections program, where 

personnel have been inspecting commercial ships for 

decades. While some components of ship design and 

safety never change, there are many aspects that do and 

are subject to the pace of technological advancements, 

which are often much faster than regulatory procedures.

How has the Coast Guard addressed this in the past? 

By using the ability to request incorporation by reference 

14 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Safety at Sea: Vessel Traffic 

Service San Francisco 

Celebrating 50 years of Vessel Traffic Services 

by mr. sCott humPhrey 

VTS Training Director 

Sector San Francisco 

U.S. Coast Guard 

The glow of a computer screen illuminated the face 

of a Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) San Francisco

operator on the windowless watch floor. On this

Friday afternoon in April 2022, a 564-foot container ship 

moving goods from the Port of Oakland to Seattle checked 

into the VTS offshore sector 38 nm from San Francisco

Bay. This route cut through the Greater Farallones and 

the Cordell Bank National Marine Sanctuary.

Something was wrong. The VTS operator noticed 

the vessel was no longer making forward progress. 

Querying the vessel, the operator learned that the container ship lost propulsion more than 12 nm from land 

and was drifting toward the rocky coast of Point Reyes 

National Seashore in 50-knot winds and 15-foot seas. 

In more than 300 feet of water, the vessel continued to 

drift towards Point Reyes until it was shallow enough to 

deploy its anchor, which failed to hold. After unsuccessful attempts by the ship’s crew to make engine repairs, 

the ship deployed its second anchor inside the Cordell 

Bank National Marine Sanctuary, within eight nautical 

miles of land. With 21 souls and approximately 364,000 

gallons of potential pollution on board, in addition to 

783 containers on deck, the vessel continued to drag 

anchor, drifting toward Point Reyes National Seashore.

The Captain of the Port issued an emergency broadcast for any available tug assistance. VTS operators 

diverted a tug toward the vessel, and three additional 

tugs got underway to make the 38 nm transit in arduous 

weather. Sector San Francisco established an incident 

command post and VTS operators monitored the vessel, 

keeping constant communication over the next 48 hours 

until weather conditions improved, allowing a towline to 

be passed to the vessel. The containership was eventually dead-ship towed 38 nm back to San Francisco Bay. 

While monitoring the container ship, and a large 

number of regularly scheduled marine events inside 

the Bay, the same VTS operator noticed on closed-circuit television a large plume of smoke at a port facility 

on a narrow channel. A fire had ignited at the terminal

lCdr alexandra miller, P.e. 

Chief, Waterways Management Division 

Sector San Francisco 

U.S. Coast Guard 

encompassing a cargo storage tower, silo, conveyor belt, 

and a portion of the pier. At the time the fire broke out,

a 576-foot tank vessel, a 623-foot bulk carrier, and a 

637-foot roll-on/roll-off ship were moored at the pier.

Located under the pier, but between the tank vessel and

bulk carrier, the fire posed a grave threat to the lives of

the facility workers, the crew members on the nearby 

ships, and those of the neighboring community. The VTS 

supervisor immediately contacted the San Francisco Bar 

Pilots to dispatch pilots to all three vessels and contacted 

each vessel to ensure crew safety and ask each master to 

expedite preparations to get underway. The pilots were 

able to get all three ships underway in less than 90 minutes from the initial notification; an evolution that would

normally take several hours. 

The Beginning 

In January 1970, the U.S. Coast Guard Research and 

Development Center and the San Francisco Marine 

Exchange teamed up on an experiment to determine 

the usefulness of shore-based radar in maritime traffic

safety. From a small room atop San Francisco’s Pier 45, 

Coast Guard personnel monitored vessel movements 

using state of the art radar displays and communicated 

vessel traffic information over UHF radio. The experiment, a first of its kind in the United States, was called

the Harbor Advisory Radar (HAR) Project.

On January 18, 1971, the tankers Arizona Standard and

Oregon Standard collided underneath the Golden Gate

Bridge. The Oregon Standard spilled an estimated 20,000

barrels of oil into the San Francisco Bay. The November 

1971 edition of Proceedings described the incident as “a

catastrophe in terms of ecological harm, property damage, economic loss, and harm to the small boater and to 

the public’s stake in the environment.”1 

How did such a catastrophe happen under the eyes

of the Coast Guard HAR watch team? And doesn’t such 

a catastrophe happening during a research and development project prove the experiment a failure? 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 15 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The August 11, 1971, Coast 

Guard accident report cites “two 

inherent weaknesses in the HAR 

system, both of which were contributing factors to the inability 

of the system to prevent the collision.” 2 

First, the HAR Project was voluntary for vessels. This meant it 

was optional for vessels to make 

reports to the HAR Project and 

optional for vessels to listen to the 

HAR Project radio channels. The 

accident report says the master of 

the Oregon Standard did not listen

to the HAR operating radiotelephone channel because he “did not 

observe any traffic on his radar, so

he did not think HAR’s assistance 

was necessary.” 3 The report goes 

on to say, “As a result of the master’s failure to participate, the primary purpose of the 

system was defeated.”4 In fact, the HAR watchstanders 

tried to reach the Oregon Standard to warn them of the

Arizona Standard 5. 

Second, the Coast Guard had no maritime traffic control authority in 1971. The HAR Project watchstanders 

January 1971 screenshots show the Arizona Standard and Oregon Standard radar images just before 

colliding under the Golden Gate Bridge, right, and after the collision. Coast Guard photo 

were only allowed to provide a “word picture of the 

position and general direction of movement of vessels” 

observed on radar, 6 but not any interpretative information. The Project operating manual stated, “Advice [from 

the HAR Project operator] in the sense of a recommendation for specific action to be taken by a pilot is strictly

U.S. Coast Guard watchstanders in the San Francisco Traffic Operations Center direct vessel movement in the harbor area using specially designed, highresolution radar in 1976. The VTS reduces vessel delays and the ever­present danger of marine accidents and their related loss of life and property, as well as 

potential environmental damage. Coast Guard photo 

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prohibited.”7 

As the accident report describes, 

referring to the HAR Project, these 

two systemic weaknesses were 

“due to lack of statutory authority 

for the Coast Guard to operate such 

traffic regulation systems.” 8 In the 

November 1971 edition of Proceedings,

“Collision Under the Golden Gate,” 

the author says, “had the communication or authority been present, it 

is likely that the HAR Project would 

have prevented the collision.”9 

In response to the collision, 

Congress enacted Public Law 

92-63, the Vessel Bridge-to-Bridge

Radiotelephone Act, on May 1, 1971. 10 

Congress took further action on

July 19, 1972, enacting Public Law

92-340, the Ports and Waterways

Safety Act of 1972. 11 

Among many other things, the Ports and Waterways 

Safety Act of 1972 gave the Coast Guard authority to 

establish VTS, require vessels to participate in VTS, and 

the authority to control vessel traffic. The Bridge-toBridge Radiotelephone Act required certain vessels to 

carry a marine radio and established VHF FM marine 

radiotelephone channels that applicable vessels must 

monitor and use for navigation safety communications. 

OPA 90 

Ironically, VTS San Francisco remained a voluntary service until the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). Under 

OPA 90, the Coast Guard promulgated the National VTS 

Regulations in 1994. These regulations describe certain vessels that 

must participate in all VTSs. They 

also delegate full authority to the 

VTS to manage and control vessel 

traffic .

As for the pre-OPA 90 period, 

as a voluntary service, VTS San 

Francisco always enjoyed 100 percent participation. But budget shortfalls threatened the VTS program 

and, during summer 1988, VTS New 

York and VTS New Orleans were 

already preparing to shut down. 

As evidence of strong industry support for VTS San Francisco, in June 

1988, the Marine Exchange of San 

Francisco appealed to Admiral Paul 

A. Yost, Commandant of the Coast

Guard, to keep VTS San Francisco

Bob Hastings works on the Vessel Traffic Service watch floor in 1986. Photo courtesy of Bob Hastings 

In July 1972, Vessel Traffic Service 

San Francisco became the first 

VTS in the United States. A Vessel 

Traffic Service provides active 

monitoring and navigational 

advice for vessels in particularly 

confined and busy waterways. 

Watchstanders monitor vessel traffic at the Vessel Traffic Service Operations Center in 1995. Photo 

courtesy of Scott Humphrey 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 17 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A vessel transits through the three bridges, including the Benicia ­Martinez Railroad Drawbridge, also known as the Union Paci ficRailroad Bridge. Photo by 

Michael Carlson 

a network of pipes crisscrossing the region. 

VTS not only focuses on preventing oil spills, but on 

maintaining a safe, efficient path for these petroleum

tankers to get to and from the refineries. A single blockage in the San Francisco Bay could mean a devastating 

shortage of fuel for all the region’s airports and gas stations. If tankers cannot get to the refineries, there is no

refined petroleum to put into the network pipes. When

the pipes run dry, so do the airports and the fuel depots 

that fill the tank trucks that supply the region’s gas stations. 

To keep ships moving safely and securely, the maritime community continues to champion safety through 

the San Francisco Bay Harbor Safety Committee. VTS 

often spearheads nonregulatory maritime safety and 

security solutions with the Harbor Safety Committee. 

Three examples of this are critical maneuvering areas 

(CMAs), the Ferry Traffic Routing Protocol, and the 

Benicia-Martinez Railroad Drawbridge Communications 

Protocol. 

CMAs are a Harbor Safety Committee recommendation to limit ship movements during restricted visibility. 

They also provide a template for the VTS to enforce low 

visibility traffic management measures to require vessels

to stay put. The Ferry Traffic Routing Protocol takes the

open despite budget issues. Attached to that letter was a 

check in the amount of $140,000 to help the Coast Guard 

with VTS San Francisco operating expenses. 

Today, VTS San Francisco operates with all three 

VTS mission areas—Information Services, Traffic 

Organization Services, and Navigation Assistance 

Services—outlined by the International Maritime 

Organization. Unlike the VTS San Francisco of 1972, 

where VTS operators were prohibited from giving 

advice, today, VTS San Francisco operators proactively 

respond to possible navigation errors and give mariners 

advice, warnings, or instructions. 

Keeping the Marine 

Transportation System Running 

Petroleum remains one of the most critical cargoes in 

the San Francisco Bay Region, and VTS closely monitors 

every petroleum ship movement. Almost 100 percent 

of the petroleum consumed in northern California is 

refined at one of the San Francisco Bay region refineries.

However, an area large enough for a tanker ship to tie 

up and offload jet fuel is absent from any international

airport in the San Francisco Bay region. That’s because 

the enormous volume of jet fuel needed to refill the 

planes comes directly from the local refineries through

18 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

guesswork out of high-speed ferry transits. When ferries follow the routes there is safe space between opposing ferries, and recreational boaters know where to go 

to get out of their way. The Benicia-Martinez Railroad 

Communications Protocol is a unique agreement 

between commercial mariners, Union Pacific Railroad,

Amtrak, and the Coast Guard. Its primary aim is to guarantee the drawbridge be fully open well in time for an 

approaching ship. It also helps minimize delays for passenger trains crossing the bridge. 

Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness 

as a Multimission Platform 

No other agency has the real-time maritime domain 

awareness of a VTS. In 2021, VTS oversaw approximately 153,000 Vessel Movement Reporting System 

(VMRS) users transit through the area. VTS knows the 

precise location, destination, planned route, underwater 

draft, and at least a dozen other details for every VMRS 

user vessel in its area. It also knows the status of every 

waterway, dock, and anchorage in its area, making it 

especially suited to support operations during regional 

emergencies. 

The aforementioned events of April 2022 provide 

excellent examples of this capability. The VTS operator 

catching the vessel drifting was the start of a three-day 

emergency rescue evolution for which the Captain of the 

Port established an incident command post. VTS tracked 

and managed communications between the disabled 

vessel, rescue tugs, and other nearby vessels, while a 

VTS watch team, experts with knowledge of local geography and maritime operations, worked directly with the 

ship’s captain and agent.

On the afternoon of the second day of the offshore

crisis, the VTS operation center observed black smoke 

billowing from the Port of Benicia’s petroleum coke terminal, which was on fire with three deep draft ships

moored alongside the dock. The Captain of the Port 

established a second incident command post, and VTS 

became the source for all maritime information around 

the fire scene. When emergency evacuation off all three

ships became top priority, the Port of Benicia crisis rapidly merged into what was now a pair of maritime crises 

competing for resources. 

While pilots and tugs were dispatched to Benicia, VTS 

talked to the captains of the moored ships. As the fire

blazed out of control, VTS realized the ships’ captains 

and crews might have to cut the mooring lines and move 

their ships without a pilot. In the end, San Francisco Bar 

Pilots and tugboats, with the help of firefighters as line

handlers, safely evacuated the three ships from the port. 

Normal Operations 

While not every weekend is as out of the ordinary as the 

one in April 2022, VTS San Francisco consistently safeguards the integrity of the MTS. This includes the San 

Francisco Bay region’s sailing vessels and nearly 1,000 

permitted marine events within the VTS area every year.

Sector San Francisco is also one of the busiest sectors for 

search and rescue (SAR) cases, and professional mariners aboard VTS participants are often called on as SAR 

force multipliers. 

Upon hearing a call for help over the radio, VTS San 

Francisco watchstanders quickly scan the area for VTS 

participants in the vicinity to render aid. When a fishing

vessel began taking on water offshore, VTS contacted a

vessel nearby to render assistance. This allowed the crew 

on the fishing vessel to focus on dewatering efforts in

time for Coast Guard Station Golden Gate to arrive on 

scene to tow the vessel safely back to port. 

Conclusion 

marine transportation system. 

The civilian and active-duty workforce at VTS San 

Francisco is the steady force that maintains the safety 

and integrity of the MTS in the San Francisco Bay 

Area. While not every weekend is this busy in the VTS 

Operations Center, the diligence, expertise, and responsiveness of VTS personnel averted loss of lives, catastrophic environmental damage, and extensive property 

damage while maintaining the integrity of a $70 billion 

About the authors 

Frederick Scott Humphrey has 39 years with the U.S. Coast Guard. 

More than thirty of those years are in Vessel Traffic Service operations 

and training management in the San Francisco Bay region. He holds 

an VTS certification issued by the International Association of Marine 

Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities. 

LCDR Alexandra Miller is the Chief, Waterways Management Division 

at Sector San Francisco. She earned a Master of Science in fire protection engineering from Worcester Polytechnic Institute and a Master of 

Arts in defense and strategic studies from the Naval War College. Previous assignments include CGC Thetis, Sector Jacksonville, and Coast 

Guard Headquarters Office of Design and Engineering Standards. She 

is a licensed professional engineer. 

Endnotes: 

1. Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council, November 1971, Vol. 28 No. 11 

2. Transportation Safety Board and United States Coast Guard Marine Casualty

Report, “Collision Involving the SS Arizona Standard and SS Oregon Standard 

at the Entrance to San Francisco Bay on January 18, 1971” pg. 13 

3. Ibid 

4. Ibid 

5. Ibid 

6. Ibid 

7. United States Coast Guard Harbor Advisory Radar Operating Manual 

8. National Transportation Safety Board and United States Coast Guard Marine 

Casualty Report, “Collision Involving the SS Arizona Standard and SS Oregon 

Standard at the Entrance to San Francisco Bay on January 18, 1971” pg. 19. 

9. Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council, November 1971, Vol. 28 No. 11 

10. Pub. L. 92–63, §2, August 4, 1971, 85 Stat. 164 

11. Pub. L. 92-340, July 10, 1972 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 19 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Space and the Marine Transportation System 

The U.S. Coast Guard 

and U.S. Space Force 

Joint efforts protect our waterways 

The foundational relationship between the nation’s oldest maritime service and its youngest military service begins on our common waterways. The Coast Guard and Space Force are committed 

to balancing regulatory frameworks and standards to transform maritime operations to ensure that 

both the space and maritime domains are ready for the future. 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Headquarters: Washington, D.C. 

Parent Organization: Department of Homeland Security 

Strength: 41,426 active duty personnel 

Motto: Semper Paratus, Always Ready 

For more than 230 years the Coast Guard has been 

the principal federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship. It uses the broad legal authorities granted to it as a 

law enforcement agency to safeguard America’s 95,000 

miles of shoreline, 25,000 miles of navigable channels, 

361 ports,1 and its Exclusive Economic Zone. All of these 

are key components to maintaining American jobs and 

economic competitiveness.

With a combined active duty and civilian workforce 

of more than 51,000, the service operates a fleet of 243

cutters, 201 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, and more

than 1,600 boats to maintain the safety and security of 

America’s ports. This is carried out while also serving as 

a first responder and providing humanitarian aid. These

assets are vested in two geographical areas—Atlantic 

and Pacific—nine districts and 37 sectors located at strategic ports across the country.

It has supported space operations since 1955, and has 

been working with stakeholders since the early days of 

space flight.2 Since the end of the federally operated Space

Shuttle program in 2011, there has been a tremendous 

increase in the volume of commercial space operations 

as organizations like SpaceX, Blue Origin, Boeing, and 

Sierra Space are changing the business model through 

increasingly efficient operations.

—U.S. Coast Guard CDR Laura Springer

Waterways Policies and Activities Division Chief 

Endnotes: 

1. USCG Maritime Commerce Strategic Outlook. Releasable.pdf (defense.gov).

https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002049100/-1/-1/1/USCG%20

MARITIME%20COMMERCE%20STRATEGIC%20OUTLOOK-RELEASABLE. 

PDF 

2. “Space Mission Support: Coast Guard Patrols Restricted Areas Around 

Launches, Re-Entries.” Seapower (seapowermagazine.org). https://seapowermagazine.org/space-mission-support-coast-guard-patrols-restricted-areasaround-launches-re-entries/ 

A Coast Guard Station Port Canaveral, Florida, a crew patrols the waters off

Launch Pad B in the early morning hours May 16, 2011, launch day for the 

space shuttle Endeavour. Since 1980, the Coast Guard has provided safety 

and security services to the Kennedy Space Center and Cape Canaveral Air 

Force Station. U.S. Coast Guard Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Krystyna 

Hannum 

20 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Established December 20, 2019, U.S. Space Force 

(USSF) organizes, trains, and equips space forces 

in order to protect U.S. and allied interests in space 

and to provide space capabilities to the joint force. It is the 

first new branch of the armed services in 73 years, and

was the result of widespread recognition that space is a national 

security imperative.

Space Force, organized under 

the Air Force, consists of about 

16,000 military and civilian personnel referred to as Guardians. 

This name has a long history in 

space operations, tracing back 

to the original command motto 

of Air Force Space Command in 

1983 which was “Guardians of 

the High Frontier.” Military members who had originally served 

under Air Force Space Command 

(AFSPC) were assigned to USSF 

after the Command’s redesignation as Space Force. 

Operationally, Space Force is 

responsible for acquiring military space systems, maturing 

the military doctrine for space 

U.S. Space Force 

Headquarters: The Pentagon 

Parent Organization: The U.S. Air Force 

Strength: 8,400 active duty personnel 

Motto: Semper Supra, Always Above 

power, and organizing space forces for Combatant 

Commands. 

—U.S. Space Force MAJ Johnathan Szul

Director of Operations for the 1st Range Operations Squadron 

Space Launch Delta 45 

A Falcon 9 rocket launches from LC­39A at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, Florida, January 18, 2022. 

The Starlink 4­6 mission delivered 49 satellites into orbit. U.S. Space Force photo by Joshua Conti 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 21 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Coast Guard Support 

to Space Operations 

A sector commander’s roles and 

responsibilities—today and tomorrow 

by Cdr Jillian lamb 

Response Department Head 

Sector Jacksonville 

U.S. Coast Guard 

lCdr John dinino 

Supervisor 

Marine Safety Detachment Canaveral 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Alexander Hamilton and our first Congress could

not have predicted how a small fleet of 10 cutters would eventually evolve into today’s Coast 

Guard. As our nation has changed, so too has the Coast 

Guard’s mission. This was never more evident than in 

the difficult days following September 11, 2001. Coast

Guard women and men were among the first to respond,

providing immediate assistance in the maritime evacuation of citizens; mobilizing security forces to harden 

critical infrastructure; integrating intelligence personnel 

with interagency partners; and providing onsite clean 

up expertise.

This event fundamentally changed our organization, established comprehensive regulations for ships 

and facilities, and developed a robust, risk-based maritime security approach. Amplified by the events of 9/11,

port, waterway, and coastal 

security (PWCS) policy and 

regulation matured over 

the months, years—and 

now decades—into what 

guides us today.

On June 1, 2022, the 

Commandant of the Coast 

Guard, Admiral Linda L. 

Faga n, noted i n t he 

Commandant’s Intent that:

Tomorrow looks different. So will we. We 

will be a Coast Guard that 

generates sustained readiness, resilience, and capability 

in new ways to enhance our Nation’s maritime safety, 

lCdr steve dross 

Incident Management Chief 

Sector Jacksonville 

U.S. Coast Guard 

lt J.g. griffin terPstra 

Waterways Management Chief 

Sector Jacksonville 

U.S. Coast Guard 

security, and prosperity.

Today, units across the Coast Guard are establishing 

a new paradigm for how the Coast Guard will support 

space operations, and, much like with PWCS, how field

commanders and service leadership will direct a longterm, enterprise-wide approach. 

Informed by the Past, Poised for the Future 

Port security operations existed prior to September 11, 

2001, however, globalization, advanced technology, and 

new threats required the Coast Guard to adapt. This 

same adaptability must now be applied to our space 

industry response. The Coast Guard has been supporting government and military space flight since the inception of the space program in the 1950s, and throughout 

NASA’s Space Shuttle program, which ended in 2011. 

However, the reemergence of the space race has 

brought novel technology, 

a rapid pace of change, and 

the inclusion of maritime 

elements that require the 

Coast Guard to develop 

a transparent, equitable, 

and repeatable governance 

process.

America relies on a 

robust space program to 

fuel innovation, advance 

global interests, and preserve our military superiority. To meet these growing demands, old and new spaceports regulated 

Regular access to space has been 

made possible through a rapidly 

growing space industry, supported 

by a number of federal launch ranges, 

state­owned spaceports, 

and privately­owned launch sites. 

—Federal Aviation Administration 

22 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

predominately by the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA), are increasingly impacting the marine transportation system (MTS). Since 2015, FAA licensed and permitted launch and reentry operations have more than 

quadrupled—from 14 to 64 annually. Fiscal Year 2022 

was a record year, with more than 

50 permitted launches from Cape 

Canaveral alone. The FAA had projected a total of 37 to 55 launches. 

In Sector Jacksonville alone, there 

were more than 45 launches and 

four maritime reentries. Looking 

ahead, government agencies are 

sprinting to keep pace with the 

projected, exponential growth. 

Space Operations are one of 

the few missions the Coast Guard 

performs that concurrently affects

each of the five roles the sector 

commander maintains—Captain 

of the Port, Federal On-Scene 

Coordinator, Federal Maritime 

Security Coordinator, Officer in 

Map courtesy of the Federal Aviation Administration 

Charge, Marine Inspections (OCMI), and Search and 

Rescue (SAR) Mission Coordinator. While each spaceport is unique, implications of space operations touch the 

maritime environment in nearly every district. Today, 

Coast Guard sector commanders are employing each 

Graph courtesy of the Federal Aviation Administration 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 23 
Sector Jacksonville launch graphic 

24 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of these authorities to preserve our natural resources, 

protect the maritime public, and ensure economic 

prosperity. 

Captain of the Port Responsibilities 

The fundamental role of the sector commander is to promote and enforce the safety and security of U.S. ports 

and waterways. Rocket testing, launches, and recovery 

operations taking place near the maritime community 

present a hazard to the MTS. As an organization, we 

support commerce and innovation, but we also have a 

responsibility to ensure the safety of the maritime community. Limited access areas (LAA), more commonly 

known as safety and security zones, and regulated navigation areas (RNA) are essential tools in this mission.

Due to the complexity of space operations and the 

unpredictable scheduling, waterways management 

staffs are continuously challenged to meet regulatory

requirements while still providing industry and the 

public with adequate notice of hazardous operations. 

The establishment of these areas facilitates appropriate 

maritime domain awareness, adequate broadcasts and 

communication, and on-water patrol assets to enforce 

compliance. Providing this support not only prevents 

launch cancellations, but, in the event of a non-nominal, 

or emergency scenario, protects the public, enables first

responders to perform uninterrupted operations, and 

ensures the protection of astronauts or other proprietary 

national interest equipment.

Using the Ports and Waterways Safety Authorities 

under 46 USC Chapter 700, this year District Seven and 

Sector Jacksonville established an RNA to ensure the 

safety of vessels, mariners, and navigable waters during hazardous space operations. Working with space 

partners like the United States Space Force, NASA, FAA, 

and independent space companies, the Coast Guard uses 

all information available to evaluate potential maritime 

risk. Based on this risk, the Captain of the Port activates 

a portion of the RNA based on mission specific concerns.

By activating a reduced area for a short time period, the 

effects of a launch on the MTS are drastically reduced.

Additionally, the RNA provides Coast Guard assets a 

legally enforceable area tailored specifically to the size

of the present hazard. 

Notification of the activation of LAAs and RNAs is

vital to public safety. In addition to traditional means 

of notification, such as Navigation Telex, marine safety

information broadcasts, and local notices to mariners, 

Sector Jacksonville has developed space operations 

launch advisories and leverages social media to inform 

the public. 

Confronting New Challenges 

Support of the space mission is not without its obstacles, 

A U.S. Coast Guard Station Port Canaveral boat crew enforces a safety and security zone off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, during a June 2016 rocket 

launch. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Anthony L. Soto 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 25 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

one of which is ensuring the safety of operations taking 

place outside of United States’ territorial seas. To address 

this issue, the Coast Guard establishes safety zones 

beyond territorial seas but within the exclusive economic 

zone (EEZ) as part of a two-year pilot program authorized by Congress. The program recognizes the unique 

nature of these special activities and seeks to establish 

a baseline understanding of how the Coast Guard will 

execute this authority while preserving international 

maritime norms and behaviors. Once again we are leading the way, as this historic pilot program is establishing 

maritime law precedence globally. 

Field commanders are leveraging creative thinking 

and adapting our traditional mindset to manage our 

waterways. Looking forward, however, many questions 

remain, including:

• How do you balance the economic interests and

waterways access for all stakeholders? Does one

user have greater weight or priority over another?

• Should the Coast Guard be the primary resource

for monitoring and enforcing LAAs? What

is the role of private operators? What local or

other government agency authorities could be

employed?

• What is the Coast Guard, and ultimately the

United States government’s, role in establishing

LAAs in international waters? Should the pilot

program be codified into law?

• In today’s information age, does our current

model to achieve public “notice” work? How do

we leverage technology to ensure each method of

notice is appropriate for the maritime user?

• What is the appropriate methodology and criteria

to consistently and equitably assess risk? Our

partners use the concept of aggregate risk—with

a focus on the loss of human life—should other

factors like environmental or economic risk weigh

into launch approval?

Federal On-Scene Coordinator Responsibilities 

Under Federal On-Scene Coordinator authority, hazardous materials and spill response support involves operations on the launch pad, in-flight anomalies, or materials

transport within our ports that introduce propellants 

or other hazardous materials into the environment. 

The emergence of space operations has forced incident 

Hypergolic Materials 

Hypergolic fluids are toxic liquids that react spontaneously and violently when they contact each other. 

—NASA 

management personnel to learn about new propellants, 

understand hypergolic materials, and consider the safe 

recovery and salvage of space debris and support vessels. For example, in July 2020, NASA sponsored the 

Perseverance Rover launch from Cape Canaveral which 

uses radioactive plutonium, provided by the Department 

of Energy. The existing area contingency plans, network 

of experts, and regulatory framework do not squarely fit

in the Federal On-Scene Coordinator response to space 

operations. Missions like the Perseverance require close 

interagency collaboration and communication. 

Port Canaveral Coast Guard personnel staff the 

Launch Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), along 

with federal, state, and local partners, to provide realtime notification and coordination for non-nominal situations. In the event of an incident, embedded personnel 

can rapidly preserve the safety and integrity of the MTS. 

With industry treating each launch like a research and 

development opportunity, existing regulatory frameworks quickly become out of date. The commercial space 

industry continues to explore alternative fuels and propellants, as well as unique booster recovery and offload

methods—challenging the professional expertise and 

capacity of local Coast Guard units. Several questions 

need further evaluation to effectively monitor or regulate

industry processes, procedures, and equipment within 

the maritime domain, including: 

• Should space providers be considered regulated

facilities due to the nature and amount of

hazardous materials and oil products stored

onsite and transferred?

• What are area contingency plan requirements or

provider contingency plan exercise needs?

• How do the regulatory requirements for a federal

range differ from a commercial range?

• Should the National Response Center receive

notifications of space activities within the EEZ?

• As we move towards long-range missions to

Mars, how do we adequately leverage nuclear

energy without increasing environmental or

security threats? What is the Coast Guard’s role?

• Are regulated timelines or contracts with oil

spill removal organizations (OSRO) necessary

to expedite response to maritime environmental

threats?

Federal Maritime Security 

Coordinator Responsibilities 

For the Coast Guard, space operations predominately 

center around preserving the safety of our MTS. 

However, through the role of Federal Maritime Security 

Coordinator, the Coast Guard must also ensure the security of our ports, waterways, and coastal communities. 

Against a backdrop of global strategic competition and 

26 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

conflict, the resurgence of the U.S. space program has earned national-level interest from 

senior government officials and patriotic citizens who recognize the symbolic nature of U.S. 

leadership within the industry.

Sector commanders use security zones to 

protect federal property, investments in technology, and our national security assets, like astronauts and launch vehicles. In Port Canaveral, the 

center of the space industry is near a concentration of assets including the world’s second largest cruise ship port and a strategic naval port. 

It’s also home to a growing energy industry that 

provides LNG bunkering capability to U.S. and 

foreign shipping, as well as jet fuel for Orlando 

International Airport. This dynamic port complex requires strong partnerships within the 

maritime community. Routine collaboration 

between all interested parties, to include law 

enforcement, security officers, intelligence agencies, and stakeholders, enables the Coast Guard 

to evaluate vulnerabilities, mitigate risk, and 

evaluate threats. As the number and variety 

of spaceport users continues to grow, coupled 

with the expected growth in launch frequency, 

it is critical that field commanders leverage their

Federal Maritime Security Coordinator authorities and exercise their responsibilities within the 

MTS. Moving forward, some topics field commanders are examining include: 

• Space support vessels (SSV) and

maritime facilities at which they moor

are not always subject to security

requirements. Although these vessels

and facilities are complying with similar

security requirements they are not

mandated. What are the future security

requirements for SSVs?

• What is the best practice for integrating

commercial and government space providers into

Area Maritime Security Plans?

• Should Coast Guard waterways and port

security risk assessment tools, such Maritime

Security Risk Analysis Model, Risk-Based

Maritime Security and Response Operations, and

Fairings are reusable shells that 

improve aerodynamics and protect 

the payload against the impacts of 

launching through the atmosphere. 

A SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket carrying the company’s Crew Dragon spacecraft is launched 

on NASA’s SpaceX Crew­4 mission to the International Space Station on April 27, 2022, at 

NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida. NASA photo by Aubrey Gemignani 

Navigation Safety Risk Assessment be updated 

across the Coast Guard to incorporate space 

operations? 

• Should spaceports be reviewed for designation as

maritime critical infrastructure?

• Private or adversarial unmanned aerial systems

are vulnerabilities within the port complex. What

are the potential threats, and who is the lead

agency to spaceports with maritime equities?

Officer in Charge, Marine 

Inspection Responsibilities 

Under OCMI authority, the Coast Guard’s marine 

inspectors and investigators provide oversight of a maritime space fleet. That fleet includes remotely operated

Summer 2023 Proceedings 27 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Orion spacecraft, for the Artemis I mission, waits for launch on the pad at Kennedy Space Center’s Launch Complex 39B in Cape Canaveral, Florida, on 

August 22, 2022. Artemis I will provide a foundation for human deep space exploration. NASA photo by Ben Smegelsky 

dynamic positioning rocket recovery vessels, or drone A typical industrial vessel averages three in-person 

ships; vessels designed to recover rocket fairings; ves- inspections by Coast Guard Marine inspectors each year. 

sels used to support human flight recovery, vessels with However, due to the novel technology and rapid change 

command-and-control functionality, and vessels to sup- for space support vessels, more than 30 in-person inspecport fixed sea launch and recovery operations. These U.S. tions a year is not out of the ordinary for space indusflag vessels, installed with the latest technology to sup- try vessels. This significantly increases resource burden

port hazardous equipment and operations, are inspected on units that are already charged with overseeing and 

and certificated by the Coast Guard. inspecting vessels not meeting a typical regulatory comHowever, many of the space support vessels are spe- pliance regime. 

cially modified for their particular space operations, New companies seeking high volumes of launches at 

and thus, do not fit into existing regulation and policy. low costs are working towards at-sea recovery of their 

Additionally, due to the nature of the commercial space most expensive assets. In a few years, the number of vesindustry’s need to continuously innovate and evolve, sels actively engaged in supporting space activities will 

their vessels do the same, which requires a constant cycle nearly double and the Coast Guard will need to idenof engineering plan review, modification oversight, and tify streamlined paths towards regulatory compliance, 

final verification. Coast Guard marine inspectors are versus individual approvals, in order to meet industry 

thus required to work closely with offices at the district demand. In addition, the commercial space industry will 

likely continue to modify vessels with remote and autonomous capabilities of increasing sophistication to support their operations. These capabilities are not merely 

designed to increase efficiencies or reduce manning. 

and headquarters levels and with industry to appropriately advise the OCMI on regulatory waivers, equivalencies, design basis approvals and, occasionally, detentions 

when the risks to safety and security are too high. 

28 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

There is a specific need due to operations which are 

inherently hazardous to human life. These vessels, both 

current and future, present unique challenges for the 

Coast Guard programs and field commanders responsible for overseeing their design, engineering, construction, and operation. What was once thought impossible, 

recovering intact rocket boosters and fairings at sea, is 

now an everyday occurrence and it raises some important questions, to include:

• What are the Jones Act implications for space

equipment launched from land into the maritime

domain and what is the future for companies

operating assets supporting at-sea commercial

launch and/or recovery?

• As remote and autonomous technologies continue

to propagate into SSVs due to the inherent

hazards to human life, how will the technology

be accepted and allowed in operations?

• With the expected exponential growth in SSVs,

which do not cleanly fit into standard regulatory

subchapters, what is the best path to implement

reasonable compliance standards to meet the

needs of today and tomorrow?

• With the advanced power, remote, and

autonomous technologies being used, how is 

the Coast Guard training and retaining marine 

inspectors to serve in this rapidly expanding 

field?

Search and Rescue Mission 

Coordinator Responsibilities 

No SAR case is the same, and the Coast Guard leads 

the way in planning, coordinating, and executing SAR. 

Across the Coast Guard, units are providing support for 

crewed space launch/recovery operations and for potential space vehicle anomalies. 

Beginning with the shuttle missions, the Department 

of Defense (DoD) has historically taken the lead on global 

SAR for government sponsored astronauts. However, 

current launch and recovery operations are more complicated and reflect public-private partnerships or even

private astronauts. Contractually, a private space company may be required to recover NASA-sponsored 

astronauts safely from the water in a planned reentry, 

without the real-time command-and-control or ready 

resource support of the DoD. For example, NASA commercial crew missions with SpaceX between 2020 and 

2022 had DoD support ready for global SAR response 

U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Maria Bray gets positioned to support a SpaceX rocket launch, May 30, 2020, in Cape Canaveral, Florida. Coast Guard units and crews 

enforced safety and security zones in order to protect the public, vessels, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class 

Vincent Moreno 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 29 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

at launch. The same DoD 

resources were not actively 

standing by for the planned 

maritime reentry to one of 

seven pre-determined locations across Districts 7 and 8. 

Further, the Inspiration-4 

and Axiom-1 missions were 

all-civilian crewed missions 

to low earth orbit and the 

International Space Station, 

respectively. These dynamic, 

inaugural missions, required 

field commanders to identify

policy gaps, determine appropriate SAR resource response 

posture, and create new pathways for communications 

with current and past partners. As new space companies 

emerge with unique operating plans, including various 

capsules—even air balloons 

soaring to low earth orbit and 

landing on the water—early 

communication with the providers is necessary to ensure SAR mission coordinators 

and rescue coordination centers are prepared to respond. 

Despite great strides ahead, some critical questions 

remain, including:

• What is the Coast Guard’s role in private

astronaut recovery?

• Is there a role for commercial space SAR

companies? If so, should it be regulated or be

subject to government oversight? Is it the next

generation of maritime SAR assistance policy?

• Given the potential hypergolic threats to capsule

recovery and space related SAR, should there

be structured training, exercises, or safety

programs?

• Space recovery could happen in any district

or sector; is a National Quick Response Card

necessary? Should space vehicles be included in

SAR operations?

• As the model for international SAR, is there a

role for the Coast Guard in global recovery policy

development?

Marine Safety Detachment Port Canaveral staff attend a Space Support Vessel (SSV) in Port Canaveral. Detachment 

inspections personnel average 30 annual visits to SSVs versus 3 visits to traditional Coast Guard inspected vessels. 

Coast Guard photo 

a repeatable, equitable, and transparent approach to the 

emerging space mission. The development of any new 

program requires organizational mission prioritization, including acceptable risk, projected investment in 

resources and budget, and commitment of intellectual 

capital on policy development. Today, sector commanders are leveraging broad authorities to apply common 

sense regulatory oversight amidst novel technology, 

rapid change, and the growth of the maritime space 

industry. Anticipating change is essential to adequately 

applying current resources and making tough decisions in the future. The breakneck development of the 

space industry makes sustaining the current operational 

tempo and regulatory approach a top challenge for sector, district, area and headquarters. As we look forward, 

the next decade of Coast Guard support to space operations is certain to look different from today’s.

About the author: 

This article is a collaboration between CDR Jillian Lamb, LCDR John 

DiNino, LCDR Steve Dross, and LT j.g. Griffin Terpstra. Sector Jacksonville and Marine Safety Detachment Port Canaveral work across all 

departments and divisions to successfully execute the space mission, 

Operation Solar Guardian. Together, Sector personnel are establishing 

relationships throughout the Coast Guard to build the requisite space 

expertise and to support District, Area, and Headquarters personnel 

with this evolving mission. 

References: 

United States Space Priorities Framework. December 2021. 

Looking to the Future 

The Coast Guard workforce is highly adaptive and possesses a penchant for leveraging on-scene initiative to 

get the job done. Just like field commanders did following the terrorist attacks of September 11, today’s workforce is functioning across districts and sectors to create 

30 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Celestial Navigation 

The Coast Guard and DHS in a new era of space activities 

by iranga Kahangama 

Assistant Secretary for Cyber, Infrastructure, 

Risk, and Resilience 

Department of Homeland Security 

Department of Homeland Security and the Coast 

Guard are not often mentioned in conversations 

about space, but this large ecosystem demands 

champions for cybersecurity, resilience, and contingency 

planning. Today, data from space assets and innovations 

resulting from space activities permeate our homeland 

and play vital roles in our security. Those innovations 

come with the responsibility to defend and protect these 

assets as they grow in number and complexity.

While today’s space environment features a growing 

commercial space industry and an increase in deployed 

warfighting capabilities, the Coast Guard’s space mission

is not a new one. It’s rich history in supporting space 

activities will help it sail into the future and remain on 

the leading edge of protecting our homeland and maritime commerce. 

The Coast Guard has a history of supporting 

American space activities dating back to the earliest 

days of U.S. space exploration. In March 1965, the U.S. 

Coast Guard Cutter Vigilant left its homeport in New

Bedford, Massachusetts, to join 19 other ships assembled for the March 23, 1965, launch of 

Gemini 3. In the first Gemini mission

with two astronauts, Gus Grissom 

and John Young would launch from 

Cape Canaveral, Florida, to spend 

two weeks in orbit. The astronauts 

performed docking and rendezvous 

maneuvers between the command 

module and the lunar lander that 

proved central to the American space 

program and its eventual mission to 

the moon. 

Today, the evolution of space activities in the United States includes a 

strong commercial space sector and a 

significant increase of on-orbit assets.

The Coast Guard’s modern mission 

includes the use of robust and resilient space-based data, and new capabilities are coming online constantly. 

This continued innovation is driving 

niCK reese 

Deputy Director for Emerging Technology Policy 

Department of Homeland Security 

economic opportunities and has implications for homeland security. As new systems come online, the potential 

for our adversaries to target those assets and compromise our mission readiness is undeniable. 

In December 2020, more than 55 years since Vigilant 

set sail for the Gemini 3 recovery mission, the White

House released a new National Space Policy making 

it clear that space is a contested warfighting domain.

It is no secret that some nation states seek primacy in 

space, and test antisatellite capabilities to exert influence.

Following Vice President Kamala Harris’ remarks on 

April 18, 2022, the United States introduced a proposal to

the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 

2022, to create a binding resolution banning the conduct 

of destructive, direct ascent antisatellite missile testing. These dangerous tests create on-orbit debris from 

a ground-based missile system which poses the most 

significant threat to our satellite assets and our low-earth

orbit human space activity. The United States has already 

committed to not undertaking these dangerous tests 

and we hope to make this the norm internationally. Our 

Coast Guard Cutter Vigilant (WMEC­617) was commissioned in October 1964, and homeported in New 

Bedford, Massachusetts. In 1990, the cutter moved to its new homeport at Port Canaveral, Florida. 

Coast Guard photo 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 31 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket, with the Dragon spacecraft onboard, launches from Launch Complex 39A at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, 

Florida, on June 3, 2017. Dragon carried almost 6,000 pounds of science research, crew supplies, and hardware to the International Space Station in support of 

the Expedition 52 and 53 crew members. This was the 100th launch, and the sixth SpaceX launch, from this pad. NASA photo by Bill Ingalls 

adversaries, however, have made no such commitment. 

Likewise, our adversaries make no commitment to 

with commercial space companies of all sizes to discuss

challenges, share information, and offer cybersecurity

resources. DHS also has excellent relationships with all 

16 critical infrastructure sectors, as well as state, local, 

tribal, and territorial government partners, many of 

whom rely on space-based data for their operations. 

Those relationships facilitate engagement and information sharing on cybersecurity and resilience, since the 

threat or vulnerability presented by use of space-based 

data may not be immediately apparent to the user. 

Attacks in Space, Impacts in the Homeland 

As demonstrated with the hacking of the U.S. company 

Viasat, space systems are under threat from adversarial 

nations. By providing inaccurate data to operational 

Critical Infrastructure Sectors 

The critical infrastructure sectors include: 

• Chemical

• Commercial Facilities

• Communications

• Critical Manufacturing

• Dams

• Defense Industrial Base

• Emergency Services

• Energy

• Financial Services

• Food and Agriculture

• Government Facilities

• Healthcare and Public Health

• Information Technology

• Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste

• Transportation Systems

• Water and Wastewater

confine their cyber activities to passive espionage against

government targets. Instead, they are establishing a persistent presence across our critical infrastructure and 

finding novel ways to attack orbital and ground assets

with the potential for physical effects. Per the National

Space Policy, attack on our space assets will be met with 

a response and such a conflict could easily bleed over

into the homeland and Coast Guard’s mission. 

In December 2020, the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) undertook an effort to produce the first

DHS Space Policy update since 2011. The policy clarifies

DHS’ role in American space activities and communicates our priorities to DHS operational components, like 

the Coast Guard, so they can align their mission to meet 

these priorities.

In 2020, the White House released Space Policy 

Directive-5 providing cybersecurity principles for space 

assets that helped guide DHS’ approach to cybersecurity 

for space. With new and novel cyberattack methods 

and techniques, and geopolitical events necessitating a 

new vision for DHS’ role in American space activities, 

cybersecurity for space assets is a priority at the highest 

levels of government. 

Talking and Listening to Industry 

Currently, DHS has some of the most robust space industry relationships in the government and continues to 

promote cyber and supply chain security for the space 

industry. As such, it will take a leading role in promoting 

cybersecurity for space-based and ground assets. 

In response to the recognition that space assets 

cross into many critical infrastructure sectors, in 2021 

the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 

(CISA) formed a Space Cross-Sector Working Group. 

This working group serves as a venue for DHS to 

engage 

32 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

units or completely denying access, a 

cybersecurity breach of an on-orbit or 

ground asset could result in significant

mission impact. While physical effects

or data theft are common outcomes of 

a cyberattack, a more nuanced threat 

comes from a threat actor’s ability to 

send corrupt data to a device or to 

slow down the speed of communications. This threat is particularly acute 

in space cyberattacks, necessitating 

cybersecurity as a central requirement 

for the procurement and use of space 

systems.

Cybersecurity of space systems is 

not confined to defensive measures and

cybersecurity practices, but includes 

the security of supply chains, important research and development material, and procurement requirements that 

prioritize security by design. Consistent 

with the core of our space policy, DHS is 

leading the promotion of cybersecurity 

measures across the spectrum.

Our adversaries will continue to 

seek ways to disrupt our space assets, 

which is why the DHS Space Policy also 

prioritizes resilience. Resilience means 

different things to different missions, 

but a denied or degraded space environment will impact most of our mission areas and the 

homeland depends on our ability to continue through 

outages without an impact to our success. Imagining 

how our operational units would function without GPS 

or other space data is important to mission planning 

and capabilities development. Training our operators to 

recognize disruptions and be resilient is central to our 

national security. 

Conclusion 

Future conflict in space will not be confined to outer

space and will almost certainly have implications for, 

and effects on, the homeland. Adversaries’ attacks on

our critical infrastructure or outposts are not out of the 

question and having contingencies in place is critical to 

our support of space activities. As a military force, the 

Coast Guard has an advantage since its mission covers 

multiple domains. However, space is a new and important domain, and must be integrated into the service’s 

planning efforts. Some nations are less concerned with

international norms than their national goals, something 

they have demonstrated through their willingness to 

endanger space assets through destructive missile tests.

Escalations happen in every conflict. The homeland

Astronauts Jerry L. Ross (left) and James H. Newman, both mission specialists, work together on 

the last of three space walks of the STS­88 mission in December 1998. One of the solar panels of the 

Russian­built Zarya module is visible in the background. Photo courtesy of NASA 

and our maritime commerce are attractive targets. Space 

is a new vector for attack and DHS’ role in mission planning gives it an advantage to plan for responses or escalations. 

What was once the exclusive domain of a few U.S. government agencies and a handful of defense contractors is 

now a broad and exciting ecosystem driving innovation 

and opportunity, but also national risk. So, though DHS 

and the Coast Guard are not often mentioned in conversations about space, protecting our on-orbit assets and 

the intellectual property that fuels further innovation 

is central to the 

ort.

homeland security mission. This is an 

all-hands eff

About the authors: 

Iranga Kahangama is the assistant secretary for Cyber, Infrastructure, 

Risk, and Resilience at Department of Homeland Security. Prior to joining DHS, he served on the National Security Council as director for 

Cyber Incident Response. He earned a master of public policy from the 

Harvard Kennedy School of Government. 

Nick Reese is the deputy director for Emerging Technology Policy in 

the Office of Cyber, Infrastructure, Risk, and Resilience Policy at the 

Department of Homeland Security. Prior to joining DHS, he served in 

various operational roles in the U.S. intelligence community and in the 

U.S. Navy. 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 33 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A Changing 

California Gold Coast 

by tyrone Conner 

Deputy Chief, Waterways Management 

District Eleven 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Join the Coast Guard 

to play on the high seas, save lives, 

and bust drug-runners ! 

I

n the 1990’s, this was a slogan that recruiters used to 

appeal to new Coast Guard recruits. As the mission 

of today’s Coast Guard grows and evolves, so must 

our vision and message. While law enforcement and 

search and rescue missions remain the Coast Guard’s 

core roles, we must expand our missions to address the 

growing demands of industry. Innovations, including 

space operations in the maritime domain, are changing 

Coast Guard operations. Further, advancing spatial data 

analysis and modernizing communications tactics are 

improving data and information sharing. 

A Rapidly Evolving Maritime Domain 

The marine transportation system (MTS) has witnessed 

tremendous growth and innovation in recent years. The 

interest in using the nation’s waterways to test technological innovations is outpacing current federal and state 

policy related to shared waterway use and marine planning. This rapid pace challenges marine planners’ 

efforts to establish waterway safety for all users.

The Coast Guard continues to see tremendous 

growth in multiple commercial industries that 

are already competing for viable waterway space. 

These industries include: 

• aquafarms

• floating and fixed offshore wind platforms

• shipping

• sanctuary expansions

• marine life protection programs

• wave energy development

• power storage facilities

• Department of Defense operations

• fishing

• commercial space

• recreational boating

• other historic marine uses

Operations off the California Gold Coast 

Historically the California coast has been home to 

traditional waterway uses like fishing, cargo transportation, Department of Defense operations, and recreational activities. Technical advances have increased 

the demand for the use of these same waters, migrating the prowess of Silicon Valley’s technical expertise 

in engineering, programming, and entrepreneurship 

starts from the hills of northern California to the blue 

waters of the Pacific Ocean to shape the United States’

burgeoning commercial space operations. The California 

coast stands in a new era of waterways growth and innovation. Some of the major space companies we know 

today had their first success in California’s Silicon Valley

industry. Even NASA’s Ames Research facility is located 

in Silicon Valley. 

Coast Guard Support for Space Operations 

The Coast Guard has supported government-sponsored 

space programs since the first rocket launch from Cape

Canaveral, Florida, in 1950 and continued in 1978 with 

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, space operations. Now, we have a new group of commercial space 

Recreational boaters are seen in close proximity to the SpaceX GO Navigator 

recovery vessel, August 2, 2020. The SpaceX Dragon capsule performed a successful 

splashdown, returning two astronauts safely to Earth. Coast Guard photo 

34 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

entrepreneurs requiring novel protocols. 

Coast Guard District Eleven in Alameda, California, 

has seen significant growth in commercial space operations off the coast of California since 2016. SpaceX has

become a key player in the commercial space industry, while dozens of other companies are exponentially 

pushing the technological boundaries of commercial 

space operations. Companies including SpaceX, Virgin 

Orbit, FireFly, and StratoLaunch have applied for licensing from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and 

have planned or conducted operations from Vandenberg 

Space Force Base and Mojave Air and Space Port. 

Some of these commercial operators have proposed 

launch operations from shore launch pads, while other 

companies have submitted plans to launch rockets at 

30,000 feet from a large fixed-wing aircraft. Coast Guard

District Seventeen is working with a commercial company, SpinLaunch, that is prototyping to launch 200 kilogram class satellites from a kinetic launching system in 

Alaska. 

Kinetic launching uses stored kinetic 

energy from a rotary wheel drive 

powered by electricity to launch an 

object to the desired path and location. 

—SpinLaunch 

Commercial companies are pressing process improvements to increase the pace of operations and streamline 

the reusability of space components. New trends with 

offshore launch facilities, 100 percent recoverable and

reusable rocket segments, and increased operations will 

be parts of the new normal for future space programs. 

The Coast Guard is tracking space program updates and 

working with federal regulators to ensure the MTS is 

part of the calculation of future needs.

Why does the Coast Guard care about commercial 

rocket launches? It is the authorized regulatory authority serving the maritime community in all federal navigable waters out to the Exclusive Economic Zone and 

works with regulations outlined in the Code of Federal 

Regulation, Titles 33 and 46. Most of these regulations 

have been developed due to catastrophic failures and 

loss of life incidents, but all regulations are developed to 

protect public health and safety from potential conflicts.

Coast Guard Waterways Management 

and Space Operations 

Local Coast Guard waterways management divisions 

take great pride and responsibility in supporting 

The Sentinel­6 Michael Freilich satellite launches from Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, California, on November 21, 2020. The Sentinel­6 is the first of two 

identical satellites to head into Earth orbit to continue sea level observations 

for at least the next decade. The second satellite is scheduled to launch in 

2025. U.S. Space Force photo by Michael Stonecypher 

emerging commercial space operations and the FAA 

space program. Coast Guard members have familiarized 

current and potential commercial space operators with 

the intricacies of the MTS environment. Coast Guard 

areas and district waterways management offices also

evaluate data on each launch and reentry to assess the 

risks associated with space launch trajectories, first-stage

rocket reentries, and capsule splash-down zones. Data 

collected relates directly to variables of time, speed, path, 

location, current vessel traffic patterns, and charted vessel routing measures. 

Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) vessel tracking data is one of many critical resources used in waterways management and ocean planning. AIS data allows 

the Coast Guard to visualize where vessels have operated 

and predicts where they will likely continue to operate 

in the future. This data associated with all vessels can 

be displayed as a ratio of transits calculated into densities based on efforts per area, or enumerated to show the

number of transits and unique vessels transiting specific

regions. 

Coast Guard District Eleven uses various data 

sources and techniques to visualize potential conflicts

with commercial and government-sponsored launches. 

Geographic Information System’s applications are used 

to display hazard zones associated with the launch, 

maritime vessel densities, and other areas of interest. 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 35 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Overlapping regions between the different data layers

are noted, and mitigating measures are taken if necessary. This level of research is critical in evaluating the 

risk associated with federal government and commercial 

space changes due to modifications of flight paths, reentry zones, and last-minute schedule changes. 

The Coast Guard continues to grow these technical 

skillsets in their civilians and junior officers to support

the growing need for spatial planning in the marine 

environment. 

In the last few years, the maritime safety program has 

expanded legal authority to support the risk mitigation 

strategy associated with first-stage rocket reentry plans,

as well as space debris impact trajectory with limited 

access area authority, by delegating district commanders the authority to establish a temporary final rule for

safety zones. 

District commanders now have additional procedures 

for establishing restrictions for federal and commercial 

space programs. These procedures provide details for 

the limited timeframe needed outside of 12 nautical 

miles and restrict interference on critical phases of space 

recovery operations. This extended authority is delegated 

from Section 8343, Safety of Special Activities, Division 

G – Elijah E. Cummings Coast Guard Authorization Act 

of 2020, William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021. Congress established a trial period for extending this authority for specific offshore programs, and affords the Coast Guard

the tools to implement new policies by establishing 

additional safety measures in high-risk maritime space 

evolutions. 

The Coast Guard continues to evaluate the offshore

programs’ scope and need, only using these tools when 

extenuating circumstances are necessary to keep vessels at a safe distance from splash down and first-stage

reentry recovery efforts on the high seas. The programs

are relatively new from a policy perspective and have 

not been used for a space mission. But, the programs 

provide options for current and future space operations. 

Coast Guard districts continue coordinating with federal 

partners and commercial agencies to assess risks and 

potential protocols to support safe navigation.

The greatest fears consuming Coast Guard waterways managers are scenarios involving major failures of 

safety procedures, causing a catastrophic impact with a 

vessel carrying passengers, or a vessel loaded with products that could pollute and harm the sensitive environmental ecosystems. 

The space program is one industry that has major 

risks associated with scheduled operations. However, 

it has a proven track record of well-rehearsed programs 

and procedures that mitigate risk and provide safety 

protocols to cancel or divert launch and reentry anomalies. Multiple safety systems and procedures are built 

into the program to control rocket functions and abort 

the mission by detonation or diverting the rocket. But, 

with any failed launch or reentry, there remains risk of 

fallout from chemicals, fuels, mechanical components, 

and structural pieces. 

The space industry calculates the risk associated with 

vessel traffic to plan a trajectory that minimizes the risk

associated with the flight path. Two examples of failed

launches, and the risks associated, occurred May 26, 

2020, and September 2, 2021. The first occurred when

Virgin Orbit conducted its first rocket test by launching a

The Sentinel­6 Michael Freilich satellite launches November 21, 2020, from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. U.S. Space Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Brittany 

E. N. Murphy 

36 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lonestar, a technology demonstrator designed to provide space­based situational awareness directly into the hands of the tactical warfighter, lifts off July 1, 

2022, from Mojave Air and Space Port as a payload aboard Virgin Orbit’s LauncherOne two­stage orbital air­launch vehicle. LauncherOne was attached to a 

pylon on the aircraft’s left wing before being launched over the Pacific Ocean from the Boeing 747­400 carrier aircraft, named Cosmic Girl. The launch was 

made available by the Department of Defense Space Test Program. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command photo 

two-stage rocket from the underwing of a Boeing 747-400 

aircraft. The rocket failed within seconds of release and 

after first-stage ignition, though there was no impact to

any vessels below the incident. 

The second involved Firefly Aerospace’s attempted

launch from Vandenberg Space Force base. Just after liftoff the rocket experienced an anomaly and the launch

was aborted to detonate in midflight. There was no risk

to residential neighborhoods or the maritime community during the attempt. With every rocket launch, there 

are inherent risks to vessels transiting internationally 

and traffic near the warning area. This risk is aggravated

by the distance they can travel in a short period of time 

and the size of the warning area. 

Meeting the Needs of the Marine Environment 

Communication is key to improving the maritime community’s awareness and developing processes to provide 

maximum distribution of information to all waterway 

users. The Coast Guard continues to evolve to meet these 

needs with software, tools, vessels, equipment, and communication networks. 

The Coast Guard has multiple resources to provide 

notification to mariners via the Local Notice to Mariners,

Broadcast Notice to Mariners, Navigation Telex, 

SafetyNET, social media, and local harbor masters. These 

services and notifications allow for maximum distribution via required equipment on board a vessel. 

Conclusion 

As new systems emerge, accessibility and pricing of 

equipment improve, and social media platforms continue to be prominent sources of information. The Coast 

Guard must meet the new trends and add these platforms to increase awareness and achieve improved situational awareness of all waterway users. The Coast Guard 

must continue to evaluate each space launch, reentry, 

and recovery process and provide continuous improvement protocols to meet the expectations and needs of our 

maritime community. 

About the author: 

Tyrone Conner, MBA, retired from the Coast Guard after 23 years of 

active duty as an aviation maintenance technician, command duty officer, marine inspector, and waterways manager. He started as the deputy 

chief of Waterways Management in 2016, and has developed and implemented the first commercial space maritime communication standards. 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 37 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Space Cowboys 

The commercial space industry’s return to South Texas 

by lCdr anthony garofalo 

Chief, Waterways Management Division 

Sector Corpus Christi 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Located just a few miles south of NASA’s Johnson 

Space Center in Houston, the commercial space 

industry got its start in a seemingly improbable 

place along the South Texas coast. In 1982, Matagorda 

Island became the first licensed private commercial 

spaceport when Space Services Inc. (SSI) spectacularly 

launched the Conestoga 1 rocket. 1 

Catering to the private sector, SSI was positioning 

itself to provide a low-budget solution to deliver commercial satellites to space. 2 While this endeavor never 

came to full fruition, it paved the way for future growth 

in the industry. At the time, President Ronald Reagan 

acknowledged the achievement in a letter to SSI which 

stated, “In blazing a new trail through the skies, you 

have shown the potential of private enterprise to perform even the most sophisticated technical feats.”3 

Starting in the 1980s and continuing today, the 

CDR Douglas Salik 

Chief, Prevention Department 

Sector Corpus Christi 

U.S. Coast Guard 

government has supported the development of the commercial space industry. The push to commercialize a 

once government-controlled process added a novel element to the waterways with commercial space operators 

and traditional maritime users sharing them in ways 

never before envisioned. 

The Spaceport That Never Was 

During the development of NASA’s space shuttle program, Matagorda Island was a finalist in the launch site

selection. The Space Shuttle Launch and Recovery Site

Review Board considered mission capability, abort planning, logistics planning, weather and climate, air and 

water quality, and the potential impacts of noise/sonic 

boom in determining a suitable site for the next NASA 

program. 4 Due to its favorable geographic location for 

launch trajectories and relatively low population density, 

Example of potential commercial range in the Gulf of Mexico. Coast Guard map by LCDR Anthony Garofalo 

38 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Coast Guard Cutter Cypress assists in a 2018 NASA test of the Orion capsule. Photo courtesy of NASA 

Matagorda Island in the Gulf of Mexico was ideally situated to provide a single launch site. However, the initial investment costs were a barrier to using Matagorda 

Island as a spaceport. Ultimately, Kennedy Space Center 

and Vandenberg Air Force Base were selected as the 

future space shuttle program launch sites. Consequently, 

a governmental range was never established in the Texas 

region.5 

For many of the same reasons mentioned above, the 

South Texas coast remained a viable starting point for 

space exploration. SSI, recognizing the area’s potential, 

selected the same location for the Conestoga 1 launch.

After the successful launch, rocket engines on Matagorda 

Island went silent. Although the regulatory landscape 

has changed since the 1980s, the South Texas coast continues to attract companies to the region. 

Where Is the Space Industry 

on the South Texas Coast Today? 

The South Texas coast is experiencing a resurgence of 

commercial space activity a few miles south of Matagorda 

Island, in Boca Chica, Texas. SpaceX continues to rapidly 

develop its research and development facility as it continues to test and launch its Starship/Super Heavy rockets. 

With Mars in its crosshairs, the company is positioned to 

launch the largest rocket in our nation’s history. 6 Similar 

to the Matagorda Island launch site, the Boca Chica site 

sits adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico and provides comparable appeal for rocket launches.

Situated just a few miles south of the Brownsville 

Ship Channel, rockets and marine vessels once again 

share our waterways on the Texas coast. While not a 

novel endeavor, it does introduce new waterway complexities yet to be experienced in most other parts of 

the country. Additionally, the regulatory scheme has 

matured through the creation of the office of Commercial

Space Transportation (CST) under the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) and establishment of specific commercial space transportation regulations, most notably 

range management. 

U.S. Government Ranges and Commercial Ranges 

In the late 1940s and 1950s two primary government 

ranges were established on the east and west coasts. 

These ranges supported Air Force testing and the future 

NASA space programs. Over the years, the ranges have 

grown in size and support much of the current space 

industry.7 The commercial space industry has benefited

greatly from use of government ranges through use of 

similar government resources and authorities within 

these established regions. 

The government’s commitment to the commercialization of launch vehicles was highlighted in a 1983 White 

House directive, which included support through use 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 39 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

when it is activated for a launch or testing. 

Unlike the eastern and western government ranges, 

Coast Guard on-water asset support is limited in South 

Texas, as resources and staffing are allocated for statutory missions. Duration, location, and shortage of other 

government resources and authorities create a challenge 

for government support of commercial ranges. This 

model differs from the one developed under the NASA

umbrella during the space program’s birth in the 1950s in 

that the government no longer supports just governmental launches. Now it must delineate between supporting 

governmental, private, and commercial launches.

A new approach to commercial ranges, one that allows 

vessels and rockets to comingle over the high seas, is 

necessary to provide public safety. The model may differ

slightly from that of the traditional national ranges, but it 

does provide an equivalent level of safety, an assurance 

supported through FAA regulations. Commercial space 

operators conduct a thorough operational risk analysis 

and tie in real time data to assess the range. Education 

and maritime understanding of the hazards are key factors in facilitating a cooperative environment between 

marine and space. As the commercial space industry 

demonstrates success and decreases operational risk, 

Coast Guard supports egress training for the Apollo 9 crew. Photo courtesy 

of NASA 

of national ranges, facilities, equipment, tooling, and 

services on a reimbursable basis.

8 Use of these ranges 

requires the commercial space industry to follow all 

rules and regulations governing the ranges. Today, the 

U.S. Coast Guard continues to support space launches in 

the eastern and western ranges under agreements with 

U.S. Space Force. 

Commercial ranges however, are regulated by the 

CST and entirely monitored and managed by commercial entities. Commercial space operators perform the 

function of range monitoring through deployment of 

commercial technology. While not prescriptive in regulations, operators depend on inputs from shipboard automatic identification systems, radar, visual observations,

and other maritime technologies. The ultimate goal of 

monitoring is to detect vessel intrusions on the launch 

range. 

Range management is a multifaceted approach aimed 

at reducing incursions into the area. Commercial space 

operators are governed by set risk tolerances established 

by the FAA, which, in the end, influences the ability to

launch. On the waterways, vessel type and density, number of persons on board, and location are main drivers 

in calculating risk scores for a particular launch. Real 

time risk calculations determine go/no-go decisions for 

launches. 

To a large degree, commercial space operators must 

rely on industry and public partnerships to achieve 

shared use of our waterways. This includes coordinating 

with local port harbor masters; marine industry stakeholders; vessel operators; state, county, and local officials; and the recreational boating public before planned 

launches. The Coast Guard aids in facilitating these discussions through established harbor safety committees 

or with other stakeholders who have knowledge of the 

waterway. Early, effective outreach can reduce intrusion

into the range and decreases overall risk.

Commercial space operators employ a host of other 

methods to manage the range. On the landside, they can 

partner with the county for local road and beach closures 

to safeguard the public. Additionally, local law enforcement and contracted third-party resources can be used 

to inform the public of the hazard area during launches. 

The Way Ahead 

As part of the FAA licensing process, commercial space 

operators enter into agreements with the Coast Guard to 

publish Notice to Mariners alerts. These alert the marine 

community of the hazardous area boundaries and scheduled launch windows. Captains of the Port disseminate 

the information through marine safety information 

bulletins, VHF radio broadcasts to mariners, or other 

appropriate means. The notices provide the maritime 

community information necessary to avoid the range 

40 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Boca Chica, Texas, launch site developed rapidly, with SpaceX using the facility it dubbed “Starbase” to develop its Mars­bound Starship rocket. Photo 

courtesy of RGV Aerial Photography 

range areas will ultimately shrink allowing for less interference to the maritime transportation system and space 

operations. 

Conclusion 

The commercial space industry is moving down divergent paths; one supported by established government 

assets and another governed by partnerships with traditional waterway users. Both are viable solutions, but 

require different tactics and techniques. Development

of commercial ranges will require increased planning 

and partnerships between the marine community and 

commercial space operators. 

Shared usage of our waterways is a balance between 

industries and the general public. The oceans are shared 

resources that make possible a host of recreational activities, the movement of goods, research, marine resources 

cultivation, and space exploration. No one activity in 

the waterway takes precedence, thus the relationships 

fostered between all stakeholders are key for continued 

safe and secure waterways. 

About the author: 

LCDR Anthony Garofalo serves as the chief of Waterways Management 

at Coast Guard Sector Corpus Christi. He previously served as a division chief in the Office of Design and Engineering Standards where he 

oversaw development of national regulations and represented U.S. interests at the International Maritime Organization and other standards 

organizations. 

CDR Douglas Salik serves as the Prevention Department head at Coast 

Guard Sector Corpus Christi. He has 20 years of Coast Guard experience across the nation and globe. Previously, he served as the chief of 

Waterways Management and as a Marine Safety Detachment supervisor where he managed shared waterway conflicts among stakeholders. 

Endnotes: 

1. Pioneering the Commercial Space Frontier, Space Services Inc., www.spaceservicesinc.com/company-heritage 

2. Mr. Hannah’s Rocket, Texas Monthly, November 1982, www.texasmonthly. 

com/news-politics/mr-hannahs-rocket/ 

3. White House Letter to Mr. Hannah from President Reagan, dated 

September 27, 1982, https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/

viewer/docN576F84D9A67A1f9e5f3f1e9470abab204c9e4f4bde6539b1cab2325e2c787467b86aa6ddf02c 

4. Space Shuttle Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979: Hearings before the 

Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives, https://books.

google.com/books?id=9B_RAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=

gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q=Matagorda&f=false 

5. Ibid 

6. SpaceX Starship Super Heavy Project at the Boca Chica Launch Site, Federal 

Aviation Administration, https://www.faa.gov/space/stakeholder_engagement/spacex_starship 

7. What is a “Range,” NASA, www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/home/eastern_range.html#:~:text=A%20range%20is%20an%20area,fired%20for%20

testing%20and%20tracking. 

8. Expendable Launch Vehicles, Announcement of United States Government 

Support for Commercial Operations by the Private Sector dated May 16, 

1983, Administration of President Reagan, www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/

speech/announcement-united-states-government-support-private-sectorcommercial-operations 

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From Recreational Boaters 

to Astronauts 

The Coast Guard has the responsibility— 

and authority—to keep waterways safe 

by lCdr tanner stiehl 

Chief, Prevention Law Branch 

Seventh District 

U.S. Coast Guard 

On January 1, 2021, the United States Senate passed 

the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense 

Authorization Act of 2021. 1 Hundreds of pages in

length and covering a wide range of topics, it included a 

particular provision regarding the creation of a two-year 

pilot program for safety zones in the Exclusive Economic 

Zone (EEZ). 2 While that provision may have seemed 

short and simple, it spurred a necessary conversation 

about the Coast Guard’s authorities in the EEZ. 

In the months and years since the passage of that bill, 

the Coast Guard has taken significant steps to define

what those authorities are from a domestic and international perspective. Before digging too deeply into the 

actions the Coast Guard has taken, it is important to discuss the text of the bill itself and why these authorities 

were needed in the first place.

In the bill, Congress directed the Coast Guard to 

“establish safety zones to address special activities” in 

the EEZ. 3 These special activities include, “space activities, including launch and reentry ... .” This directive 

has far-reaching ramifications that 

involve significant U.S. and internaCrew Dragon Demo-2 mission, which splashed down 

in the Gulf of Mexico on August 2, 2020. 5 In that widely 

publicized event, many boaters crowded around the capsule during the recovery operation. 6 

Although there were no resulting casualties, it 

exposed some potential weaknesses in the government’s legal and regulatory framework. Currently, 

NASA has a contract with SpaceX to send its astronauts 

to the International Space Station until 2030. 7 The specific reentry sites that NASA and SpaceX have provided

to the Coast Guard for these types of missions are all 

within the EEZ. 8 Therefore, these weaknesses must be 

addressed for splash-down operations to continue.

Historically, the Coast Guard has used safety and 

security zones to deter spectators, onlookers, or potential nefarious adversaries from getting too close to vessels, facilities, and other targets. This not only includes 

navigable waterways, but also space launch and recovery 

operations. Safety zones are described as, “water area, 

shore area, or water and shore area to which, for safety or 

SpaceX’s recovery ship, Go Searcher, prepares to retrieve the company’s Crew Dragon from the Atlantic 

Ocean, about 200 miles off the Florida coast, March 8, 2019. SpaceX’s inaugural flight with NASA’s 

Commercial Crew Program, known as Demo­1, is the first flight test of a space system designed for 

humans and built and operated by a commercial company through a public­private partnership. NASA 

photo by Cory Huston 

tional law. However, from an operational perspective, this language is 

necessary to ensure the safety of 

launch and reentry operations for 

NASA and other SpaceX missions, at 

least in the present and immediate 

future.

4 

While space launch and reentry 

operations have been a recurring 

concern for decades—the Coast 

Guard has recovered U.S. space 

objects since 1955—there had not 

been a specific need for safety zones

in the EEZ in recent memory. This 

all changed with the recovery of the 

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environmental purposes, access is limited to authorized 

persons, vehicles, or vessels.”9 They may be stationary or 

encompass a moving vessel. 10 Largely the same, security 

zones are prescribed for different purposes. For example,

a safety zone might be used to keep spectators from getting too close to a fireworks display, while a security

zone might be used to prevent nefarious actors from getting too close to a high interest vessel or person. 11 

While these zones are great tools, domestic and 

international law has limited their establishment to the 

waters of the territorial seas, 12 meaning they can only be 

established within 12 miles of shore. 13,14 That presented a 

problem with recovery operations like that of the Demo-2 

because the recovery site was outside that boundary line. 

Luckily, Congress was quick to act. Within months 

of the Demo-2 recovery, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry 

National Defense Authorization Act of 2021 was passed,

and the Coast Guard was granted authority to begin the 

aforementioned pilot program, and test out its newly 

granted authorities. However, the statutory language, 

domestic precedent, and established international law 

left significant room for interpretation. If the Coast 

Guard moved forward with these zones, what other 

equities could be implicated? 

Ultimately, the relevant Coast Guard entities met in 

September 2021 for the inaugural Coast Guard Judge 

Advocate General Space Conclave, a meeting covering a 

wide array of legal and space-related issues, where this 

was a featured topic of conversation. Within a few weeks 

of that meeting, consensus was reached that the Coast 

Guard had the authority to enforce these safety zones on 

U.S. vessels in the EEZ, but not on foreign vessels. The 

Coast Guard could, however, still warn foreign vessels to 

stay away from the planned recovery sites during recovery operations. With this knowledge in mind, staff at the

Seventh and Eighth Coast Guard Districts and the Office

of Regulations and Administrative Law (CG-LRA) were 

on a tight deadline to publish a safety zone regulation. 

The Crew-3 mission launched on November 11, 2021, and 

was expected to re-enter in April 2022. 15 

While the Coast Guard publishes hundreds of safety 

and security zone regulations in the Federal Register 

every year, this one was different. Not only would the

zones be very large, but they would be in the EEZ, and 

the Coast Guard may not know which landing site would 

be used until a few days before the recovery operation. 

All of those considerations, in addition to the previously 

discussed issues, meant this would be a highly novel 

rulemaking. 

Over the course of the next few months, Seventh 

District and CG-LRA considered several drafts. Both 

parties knew it was critical to balance the Coast Guard’s 

operational constraints with the safety concerns of 

NASA and SpaceX. However, they also needed to 

consider the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the 

Paperwork Reduction Act, and other relevant laws that 

are implicated in the Coast Guard rulemaking process. 

In its initial iteration, the Coast Guard determined the 

best course of action was to publish a Temporary Final 

Rule (TFR) without notice and comment, so there would 

be a safety zone in place for the Crew-3 and Axiom-1 

mission recoveries. 16 Based on the authorities held by 

the district commanders, two rules were published; one 

for the Seventh District and one for the Eighth District. 

These rules created seven safety zones that encompassed 

NASA and SpaceX pre-approved recovery sites. They 

were published in late April and early May 2022, and 

were in effect until May 15, 2022. 17,18 

Naming Space Missions 

NASA and SpaceX name their missions after the program 

and the number of the mission. For instance, the moon 

landing was the 11th mission of the Apollo program, 

so it was called Apollo­11. This naming convention 

is still used today. All of the missions discussed here 

employed the SpaceX Dragon capsule, but they are 

part of different programs. For the purposes of the 

missions discussed here, the Demo program was to 

demonstrate SpaceX was capable of safely taking crew 

to the International Space Station, the Crew missions 

are part of the Commercial Crew Program, the CRS 

missions are part of the Commercial Resupply Services 

Program, and the Ax missions are contracted by the 

commercial space operator Axiom. —NASA 

After the recovery of the Axiom-1 capsule, the Coast 

Guard had some time to contemplate its next move. The 

CRS-25 mission was expected to splash down sometime in late summer. 19 Additionally, Crew-4 launched 

in the same period as the previous TFR, but recovery 

was not expected until fall 2022. 20 The Coast Guard 

needed to leverage the lessons learned from the previous rulemaking and ensure there were still safety zones 

in place for these recovery missions. A second Space 

Conclave was convened in May 2022 to help iron out the 

details. 

The Coast Guard published a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM), which allowed it to meet its obligations under the APA and receive feedback from the public on the original rule. The Coast Guard also proposed 

for the rule to last for a much longer period, so it significantly narrowed the scope of the safety zones. Under the 

initial rule, all five landing sites were considered safety

zones for the entire period the regulation was in effect. 21 

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After three days orbiting Earth aboard SpaceX’s Dragon spacecraft, Inspiration4’s all­civilian crew splashed down in the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Kennedy 

Space Center, Florida. As they returned to Earth, their Crew Dragon capsule’s descent was slowed by four parachutes before splashing down in the Atlantic 

Ocean off the coast of Florida. Photo courtesy of SpaceX 

The NPRM proposed that, in the second 

rule, the zones would only be activated in 

the days prior to the recovery mission, and 

they would cease to exist when the Dragon 

Capsule was safely recovered. 22 

During that comment period, the Coast 

Guard received a single public comment, 

endorsing the rule as proposed in the 

NPRM. With that in mind, a new temporary final rule was published on August 4,

2022, without changes to the NPRM. 23 

The Seventh District started the 

rulemaking process for the third time in 

fall 2022. There were several comments 

on the second NPRM that were adjudicated, and the new temporary final rule

was published in late December 2022. 24 

The new rule came into effect on January Ocean, about 200 miles off the Florida coast, on March 8, 2019, after returning from the 

1, 2023, and will remain in effect until the International Space Station on the Demo­1 mission. The uncrewed spacecraft docked to the 

pilot program ends in February 2024. In orbiting laboratory on March 3, following a March 2 liftoff aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket 

from NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Crew Dragon made 18 orbits of Earth before addition to the offshore safety zones for successfully attaching to the space station. The spacecraft splashed down in the Atlantic on 

recovery of the Dragon Capsules, the March 8. NASA photo by Cory Huston 

SpaceX’s Crew Dragon is carried by the company’s recovery ship, Go Searcher, in the Atlantic 

44 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SpaceX’s Crew Dragon Endeavour, which transported Crew­2 to the International Space Station for a six­month orbit is seen in early November 2021, after the 

crew’s splash landing in the Atlantic off the coast of Florida. Photo courtesy of SpaceX 

Coast Guard used this authority in the late summer 

and fall 2022 to create a safety zone for the launch of 

the Artemis-1 moon rocket. This zone extended from 12 

to 30 miles from shore, and was adjacent to the existing 

regulated navigation area that the Coast Guard uses for 

all rocket launches in Cape Canaveral. 

At this point the pilot program is expected to conclude in the winter 2024. At that time, Coast Guard 

Headquarters will evaluate the utility and effectiveness

of these provisions in a congressional report, and a determination will be made if this new law achieved its goals. 

If the determination is positive, Congress may decide to 

permanently codify this authority, or make modifications to its scope and continue the evaluation process. In 

the meantime, the Coast Guard continues to streamline 

and clarify these processes with the goal of ensuring 

the safety of the waterway for all users, whether they be 

boaters or astronauts. 

About the author 

LCDR Tanner Stiehl spent seven years as a prevention officer at Sector 

New Orleans, Sector New York, and Marine Safety Detachment American Samoa. He then attended the University of Miami, earning his JD 

and LLM in Maritime Law. He currently serves as a judge advocate in 

the Seventh District legal office. 

Endnotes: 

1. Phillip Ewing, Congress Overturns Trump Veto On Defense Bill After Political 

Detour (2021), www.npr.org/2021/01/01/952450018/congress-overturnstrump-veto-on-defense-bill-after-political-detour 

2. Ibid 

3. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2021, PL 116-283, January 1, 2021, 134 Stat 3388 

4. 87 FR 35697 

5. Returning Human Spaceflight To The United States, www.spacex.com/

launches/return-human-spaceflight-america-08-02-2020/ 

6. Edward Lundquist, “Space Mission Support: Coast Guard Patrols Restricted 

Areas Around Launches, Re-Entries,” Seapower Magazine. https://seapowermagazine.org/space-mission-support-coast-guard-patrols-restricted-areasaround-launches-re-entries/ 

7. Sean Potter, NASA Awards SpaceX More Crew Flights to Space Station, www. 

nasa.gov/feature/nasa-awards-spacex-more-crew-flights-to-space-station. 

8. 87 FR 35697 

9. 33 C.F.R. § 165.20 

10. Ibid 

11. 33 C.F.R. § 165.30 

12. 33 C.F.R. § 165.9 

13. Ibid 

14. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 3, December 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 

15. CREW-3 MISSION. www.spacex.com/launches/crew-3/ 

16. 87 FR 23441 

17. Ibid 

18. 87 FR 26273 

19. CRS-25 Mission, www.spacex.com/launches/crs-25/ 

20. CREW-4 Mission, www.spacex.com/launches/crew-4/ 

21. 87 FR 23441 

22. 87 FR 35697 

23. 87 FR 47626 

24. 87 FR 78864 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 45 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Marine Transportation System Technology Revolution 

Digitalization 

Achieving a maritime security advantage 

by luKe ritter 

Senior Vice President, Maritime 

ARES Security Corporation 

The term “smart port,” a label with many definitions that can be used to describe a variety of 

different maritime initiatives, is appearing regumarK duPont 

Executive Director 

National Maritime Law Enforcement Academy 

some catching up to do, as stated in a report published 

by Deloitte titled Smart Port—Point of View. 4 

Seaports are playing catch-up with the large transport 

& logistics players when it comes to developing insight 

driven solutions and IoT applications.... Even though 

some ports today are starting to come to terms with the 

importance and need for digitalization and IoT, there is 

still a long road ahead to get to relatively mature smart 

port concepts.

This comment is echoed in the Port Technology article,

“Although the maritime industry is often criticized for 

being too conservative and resistant to change, there are 

digital technologies, systems and solutions emerging in 

the maritime that will alter this perception.” 

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a term 

used to describe devices, other than 

computers and smart phones, 

that connect to the internet. 

Digitalization: The Importance and the First Steps 

In the United States, port security can digitalize to 

achieve a higher level of security competency, preparedness, and resilience. By driving maritime critical infrastructure into the digital age, maritime security leaders 

have an opportunity to facilitate change that can achieve 

multiple advantages, including:

• increased productivity

• lower operational costs

• enhanced decision making

• improved information security

• process automation

• increased agility and mobility

Creating a digital twin is one of the first and most

fundamental investments a port can make in pursuing a 

digital security advantage. By creating a digital twin, port 

security professionals establish a virtual representation 

larly in trade journals and other industry news. One of 

the most compelling examples of putting “smart” into 

the maritime domain has to do with going digital, and 

digitalization has the potential to provide any port enterprise with a maritime security advantage.

For the purposes of this discussion, we will use a definition that supports security management and anchors 

any approach to becoming more secure and resilient. 

Published in a 2021 Port Technology1 article, a smart port

was defined as one “that uses automation and innovative technologies including artificial intelligence (AI),

big data, Internet of Things (IoT) ... to improve its performance.” Those last four words are important, and are 

what sophisticated, mature enterprises tend to pursue—

continual, incremental improvement. 

Opportunities to improve performance, in maritime 

security, exist through the application of digitalization, 

modeling, and simulation. Digitization, “the process 

of converting information into a digital, or computerreadable, format.”2 is a fundamental pre-requisite—a 

building block—for establishing a technology baseline 

that supports and fosters innovation. 

Digitalizing security functions follows as the next 

logical step up from digitization, and is defined by 

research and advisory firm Gartner as “the use of digital technologies to change a business model and provide 

new revenue and value-producing opportunities; it is the 

process of moving to a digital business.”

3 To simplify, 

owners of maritime critical infrastructure that digitalize 

their enterprise create an opportunity to use advanced 

technology in a way that optimizes security requirements, while lowering specific operational costs.

The return on investment associated with becoming a smart port is compelling. Security threats in the 

maritime domain are persistent, and pervasive, and 

geopolitical issues are creating new security challenges 

for ports around the world. There is no better time than 

the present to digitalize to achieve a maritime security 

advantage. But as an industry, the maritime sector has 

46 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of the port. This three-dimensional model shows the terrain features and major 

physical elements, including 

structures, capital equipment, 

and other objects, like critical 

infrastructure that are being 

protected. The twin then 

serves as a digital foundation 

for security improvement by 

allowing for accurate modeling of different security scenarios. 

Dig ital t w i n models 

for security can be incredibly accurate, and ultimately 

include details about a site’s 

guard force; security concept 

of operations (CONOPS); and 

installed security technology—cameras, radar, perimeter structures, and barriers. 

Once a site’s security posture 

is accurately modeled, maritime security professionals 

can use software to identify, 

monitor, analyze, and optimize both operational and 

security requirements. Digital 

decision support tools can 

be used to support various 

requirements such as vulnerability assessments, training, 

and exercises that directly 

impact maritime security preparedness, readiness, responsiveness, and resiliency. 

Security Cost Savings 

The process of addressing complex security questions 

can be facilitated using digital decision support tools. In 

the hands of a qualified subject matter expert, security

software can be a force multiplier and rapidly process 

comprehensive answers to complex security questions. 

Advanced algorithms and digital security libraries can 

be applied to compliance-related tasks like the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act of 2002 Facility Security 

Assessments. Digital tools can make future assessments 

and related security analyses more efficient by eliminating the need to re-baseline with each iteration. Digital 

twins are typically refreshed annually meaning vulnerability assessments do not need to start with a site survey. Additionally, maritime security teams can use their 

digital twin to continually perform rapid cost/benefit

Tryaging | iStock/Getty Images 

Digital Tools and Security 

Digital tools provide security teams with a way to easily 

and cost­effectively address important questions that 

can have a significant impact on overall security effectiveness. Questions like: 

• Are there any gaps in coverage that could

impact security readiness?

• How will the current security strategy work

against different threats?

• What improvements can be made to optimize

security posture?

• What are the costs versus the benefits of

various security solutions?

Summer 2023 Proceedings 47 
analyses to thoroughly analyze new threats or proposed 

security design changes. This results in reduced costs for 

future security analyses and assessments.

A digital twin can also be used to facilitate virtual 

security exercises, thereby removing the guesswork and 

wildcards associated with traditional exercises while 

providing a realistic training opportunity in a virtual 

environment. Users can be prompted to make decisions 

based on computer-generated analysis, and then view 

and evaluate the outcome of those decisions in real 

time. Additionally, recordings and files can be archived

and reused, as desired. Expenses associated with a traditional physical exercise—travel, lodging, labor, and 

logistics—are reduced or eliminated.

Security software that uses simulations to evaluate 

security vulnerabilities is available to the industry, and 

its algorithms and digital libraries of security characteristics can reliably determine various potential vulnerabilities in any maritime facility with a digital twin. 

These tools provide security professionals with a complete understanding of their existing security posture, 

the predicted success of threat mitigation strategies, and 

options to optimize the security solution for both effectiveness and costs. 

Security Efficiency/Effectiveness 

Analysis parameters can be easily changed within digital models to address a wide range of security system 

configurations, threats profiles, and risk elements. Once

the vulnerabilities and pathways have been identified

and analyzed, users can adjust, test, and evaluate various notional security solutions—sensors, systems, and 

procedures—by testing their effectiveness using software. An unlimited number of iterations can be considered using this process, at a very low cost. Output from 

these digital tools provides port security experts with a 

detailed analysis of security effectiveness and thorough

cost/benefit analysis.

Using a quantitative approach to maritime secu-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

sensor additions and perimeter detection systems, can be 

digitally evaluated before a commitment is made to procure. And finally, digital tools can be used to cost-effectively evaluate plans for future capital improvements, 

changes in threat or regulatory requirements, and new 

or modified design basis threats.

Return on Investment 

Vulnerability assessments provide the foundation for 

the effective implementation of maritime security measures at ports and port facilities. Every one of America’s 

more than 300 ports have different security infrastructure and risk profiles. Vulnerability assessments can be

both expensive and subjective, based on how they are 

performed. Using a digital twin, and applying software 

tools, can reduce cost, eliminate variability in analysis 

and output, and optimize results.

Digital security tools enable experts to visualize, 

quantify, assess, and optimize the security posture at a 

designated site. Digitalizing maritime security processes 

delivers accurate, measurable, and repeatable results to 

optimize the physical security analysis process. Potential 

benefits derived from using digital security tools include:

• quantifiable, systematic, automated process to

evaluate facility security posture

• data-driven input regarding security risks,

rity management also offers operators a cost-effective

means to continually assess risks and optimize security effectiveness. Rather than assessing facility security

requirements once every 3 to 5 years, digital solutions 

can analyze continually, and on a case-by-case basis, as 

security upgrades are made and threat profiles change,

and at no additional cost. 

Savings through cost-reduction examples like those 

shown above represent “hard savings,” and are often the 

easiest to identify. Using digital tools can also result in 

savings and improved effectiveness in less obvious ways.

Digital security simulations can be used to evaluate a 

security CONOPS and can lead to operational changes 

that highlight areas where costs can be reduced, such as 

headcount. Additionally, planned security upgrades, 

like 

48 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

expenditures, and benefits

• evaluations of security designs permutations to

verify desired performance outcomes

• ability to evaluate alternative security detection

and deterrence strategies/technologies

• virtual testing and validation of vulnerabilities

and changes to security plans and procedures

• processing of thousands of threat scenarios and

responses to determine security effectiveness

• identification of security cost savings through

quantified risk assessments and cost benefit

analysis

All Hands on Deck 

Effective maritime security requires attention to a 

unique set of capabilities and often demands expertise 

in an array of specific disciplines from law enforcement

to infrastructure protection to security technology. 

Sensitivity to the nuanced nature of the individual missions, capabilities, and cultures of many federal, state, 

and local law enforcement agencies can be critical. The 

ability to build bridges among maritime security stakeholders, and to remain current in relevant best practices—public, private, domestic, and international—is 

a critical component of an effective maritime security

solution. 

bestdesigns | iStock/Getty Images 

Finally, reliable analysis of emerging issues and 

industry trends, and the ability to adapt and respond 

rapidly to complex challenges to business continuity, 

are the characteristics differentiating maritime organizations with successful security solutions from the rest of 

the marketplace. Security leaders need as many tools at 

their fingertips as possible to manage this complex environment, and digital security solutions are exceptional 

tools. Digital twins, and associated digital tools, are critical components in a comprehensive security strategy.

Whether one is charged with managing the security 

of a small facility, with a limited security profile, or a

large enterprise that must address complex hazards, 

digital tools help protect critical infrastructure from 

threats that suspend operations, interrupt business, and 

compromise the well-being of personnel. Smart ports 

put software to work to evaluate “what if” scenarios and 

assess security options in a virtual environment to prioritize future investments and operational procedures. 

Knowledge is Power 

Ex Scientia Tridens. From Knowledge, Seapower.

The U.S. Naval Academy motto, reminds us that 

knowledge and information can, and should be, at the 

root of our security initiatives. The National Maritime 

Law Enforcement Academy’s motto, Per Scientiam Vires,

Summer 2023 Proceedings 49 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

or Strength Through Knowledge, conveys the same message. These are certainly true in the case of maritime 

security, as well. 

Mitigating natural and man-made threats in the 

maritime domain using digital solutions is becoming 

increasingly more important. These tools put the power 

of data-driven optimization, and knowledge, in the 

hands of maritime security leaders.

Asking “Why?” can be an essential first step in the

pursuit of security excellence. By focusing on an end 

result that is designed to create both operational and 

security benefits, end users can do more than simply

check boxes toward compliance. The power of machine 

learning and artificial intelligence offers the maritime

security industry an opportunity to gauge the effectiveness of its overall security or response plans, as well as 

the individual systems, staff, and procedures. A knowledge-based approach to security management is critically important to ensure that security information does 

not become just another cumbersome stockpile of data. 

The maritime industry continues rapidly evolving, and connectivity is a key component of success in 

security operations, threat intelligence, and incident 

response. Driving operational efficiencies and lowering

costs, while maintaining or improving security effectiveness, is a realistic goal—particularly when digital tools 

are employed.

The most important part of any organization is its 

people. And as the world around us has demonstrated, 

today’s workforce is dynamic. As retention, recruitment, 

retirement, and diversity challenges continue, it is more 

critical than ever to adapt to preferred learning styles. 

Adult-learning research tells us that providing ondemand, readily accessible training through a learning 

management system is critical to achieving an organization’s goals. Digital training tools can ensure that maritime security professionals will have what they need, 

when and where they need it. Digital tools also allow for 

opportunities to optimize training by creating a more 

accessible, affordable, and adaptable training environment that maximizes the people part of the equation. 

Conclusion 

So, what is the ‘secret sauce’ with regard to achieving 

a maritime security advantage? It includes, but is not 

limited to: 

• investing in a digital twin to serve as the baseline

for digital growth

• applying digital decision support tools, and

quantitative analysis, to enhance security

readiness

• employing software solutions to essential security

tasks, including vulnerability assessments and

exercises

Fundamental Aspects 

of Maritime Security 

Connectivity 

There are some fundamental aspects of connectivity 

that apply to maritime security: 

• connectivity enhances readiness and resiliency

• access to information enhances opportunities

to succeed

• remaining current with events, threats, and

dynamic changes in the maritime environment

is an essential element of a comprehensive

security strategy

It is hard to argue with the reasoning that a more 

secure and resilient port is a more valuable one. 

Mitigating risks and optimizing security posture creates value. Digitalization represents a clear path toward 

reduced cost, optimized security, and the ability to 

continually verify and validate that proposed security

investments have been optimized to achieve the desired 

results. Using data analytics to support risk-informed, 

cost-effective, and quantifiable improvements in security will become the hallmarks of a smart port. Databased decision making has always driven continual, 

incremental improvement, and security initiatives are 

no exception. 

America’s ports can get “smarter,” in how they conduct security operations, train their people, do vulnerability assessments, and conduct exercises through 

digitalization and the application of machine learning. 

It is time to consider pursuing digital initiatives that 

impact the fence line, as well as the bottom line. 

About the authors: 

Luke Ritter is senior vice president for maritime solutions at ARES 

Security Corporation. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, a 

former surface warfare officer, and the co-author of Securing Global

Transportation Networks (McGrawHill). 

Mark DuPont (USCG ret) is the executive director of the National 

Maritime Law Enforcement Academy (NMLEA), and formerly Florida 

FWC’s chief intelligence and domestic security officer. NMLEA hosts 

the Maritime Security Digitalization & Accreditation Program. 

Endnotes: 

1. www.porttechnology.org/news/what-is-a-smart-port/ 

2. Collins Dictionary. (n.d.). Definition of ‘digitize’. Retrieved December 15, 

2021, from www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/digitize 

3. www.gartner.com/en/information-technology/glossary/digitalization#:

~:text=Digitalization%20is%20the%20use%20of,Scale%20and%20Lead%20

Digital%20Initiatives 

4. https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents/energyresources/deloitte-nl-er-port-services-smart-ports.pdf 

50 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

It’s Here! 

What did we learn from the 

Mayflower 400’s Atlantic crossing? 

by lCdr mason WilCox 

Chief, Inspections and Investigations 

First District 

U.S. Coast Guard 

On June 30, 2022, the Mayflower 400 (MAS400) 1 shipping have been based on crewed ships. 2 So, when 

arrived in Plymouth, Massachusetts, after taking action to avoid impending collisions, vessel 

departing Plymouth, England, 

in the early morning hours of April 27, 

2022. With the exception of two detours 

and assistance into port, she crossed fully 

autonomously.

This is the first time there has been 

an arrival of an autonomous vessel to the 

United States. We must leverage the lessons learned to develop policy and guide 

regulatory change to embrace this new 

technology. 

During her 64-day transit across the 

Atlantic, the team at Promoting Marine 

Research and Exploration (ProMare) closely 

watched all of the decisions MAS400 

made from its command center. Though it 

trusted the technology, MAS400 had yet to

complete such a long transit and the team 

wanted to ensure it had minimized all the 

risks associated with such a long voyage. 

The ProMare team knew the Atlantic 

transit would be a very risky operation, 

but also an opportunity to advance the 

industry. The last thing ProMare wanted 

was a bad outcome from the MAS400 

transit—collision, pollution, sinking, etc. 

Autonomous vessels do not comply with 

Rule 5 of the International Regulations for 

Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), 

which requires lookouts, among other 

rules. This highlights a significant gap 

between human-controlled vessels and the 

MAS400. Therefore, the consequences of a

collision could catastrophically impact the 

reputation of this new technology, delaying its implementation.

COLREGs were developed prior to 

computer technology, thus the legalities of 

Standing atop the Mayflower 400 after its arrival to Plymouth, Massachusetts, in June 2022, Coast 

Guard LCDR Mason Wilcox presents owner, Brett Phaneuf, with a copy of Proceedings’ Spring 

2022 issue highlighting the autonomous vessel. Photo courtesy of Laura Wilcox 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 51 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

operators have been able to deviate from the rules of 

the road. However, computers operate in a robotic manner and are designed to strictly adhere to their programming. 3 This significant difference in the capability

to follow the COLREGs was evident in the MAS400 

transit. 

Generally, when the MAS400 was in a crossing situation with one other vessel, she was able to make the 

proper decision to avoid collision. The issue became 

more complex when there were several vessels in a 

crossing situation. Most notably, she lacked the ability 

to effectively communicate with another vessel. When

there are inherent conflicts in the application of the rules

for multiple ships, the complexity of the situation became 

problematic for MAS400’s computer as the COLREGs are

a set of ship-to-ship rules. 

One of MAS400’s standing orders was to maintain

a 10-mile Closest Point of Approach (CPA). On her first

encounter out of the United Kingdom, MAS400 quickly

had an encounter with two tankers ahead and one tanker 

at her starboard quarter. The larger ships were cruising 

at 15 knots while MAS400 was cruising at 6 knots. The

three ships were to pass the MAS400, respectively, across

her port bow, starboard bow, and overtake her on her 

starboard side. 

The MAS400 recommendation was to turn to starboard to avoid the two head-on oil tankers. However, 

this altering of course to avoid collision would have 

compromised the tanker on her starboard quarter. 

The MAS400’s presence caused the ships to act differently, and this could have led to negative consequences. 

Because of the complexity of the situation, ProMare’s 

watchstander took over, maintaining speed and course, 

ensuring a safe encounter. 

Similarly, after leaving the Azores following an elecmulti-ship situations reliably and in a predictable manner. Decision-making is a rapidly changing process and 

autonomous ships must be able to anticipate the influence of other vessels’ actions. When one vessel assumes 

the right of way, requiring another vessel to maneuver 

to avoid collision, it causes a domino effect on all other

vessels in that vicinity.

Imagine two autonomous vessels on track for a headon collision. In consultation with a ProMare engineer, it 

was concluded that the vessels would have a challenge 

responding to such a constricted space where each ship 

is relying on hydrodynamic interaction with the other 

vessel to safely navigate. There is a tendency to move far 

away from the other vessel to avoid collision, but this 

may result in the MAS400 running aground or alliding

with a sea wall. This is where human skill overtakes a 

computer’s ability to “judge” what is going on. 

What is Needed to Succeed 

Globally, regulations are still catching up to innovation, 

and we need to consider a change to the COLREGs to 

incorporate autonomous vessels. The Coast Guard needs 

to continue taking a proactive approach with evaluating 

risks and developing policies and regulations that will 

provide a safe, secure governance framework for autonomous vessels. 

Specifically, there should be a standard of digital 

communication requiring autonomous vessels to communicate with each other in route-planning to avoid collision. For now, we must make assumptions about the 

other ship’s intent based on our belief that the other ship 

also intends to follow the COLREGs. 

There is a need for voice-over-satellite and the ability 

to communicate intent, though it may not be the optimal solution due to latency. Natural language processing 

for discreet VHF communications at sea—intership—is 

very challenging and nowhere near ready for deployment, so we must accept the latency of VHF to satellite 

communications while striving to predict and resolve 

potential issues. Additionally, there is a need for a standard protocol for communicating intent. 

How can we measure this risk in such a complex 

situation? The MAS400 minimized this risk by using

four redundant computers to run the necessary operating programs in order to safely function. If a piece of 

software or hardware failed during the transit, another 

computer could run the operating program instantly and 

take control. 

Unfortunately, one cannot plan for every situation, 

but ProMare found ways to reduce risk with MAS400 by

incorporating watertight compartments, adding “deadman” switches for external safety shutdowns, and ensuring a neutral/midship reset during a power outage. 

Right now, we must continue to verify that the 

trical repair, MAS400 encountered another crossing

situation that was made more complex due to sea state 

and maneuverability issues. MAS400 was on a course of

270 degrees with a container ship 20 miles to the southwest. MAS400 was content to maintain course and speed

as the stand-on vessel with an expected 10-mile CPA. 

However, due to sea state and maneuverability concerns, 

the ProMare watchstander was concerned the other 

ship may not have considered MAS400 and overrode

the decision, slowed down, and turned to port. At the 

same moment, the other ship, having seen MAS400, had

changed course 10 degrees to starboard to open the CPA. 

The watchstander changed back to 270 degrees, and the 

vessels never came within 10 miles of each other. 

Lessons from Complex Encounters 

Route planning algorithms must be sophisticated 

enough to anticipate the assumptions of other vessels. 

Autonomous ships must be able to navigate complex 

52 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Mayflower 400 (foreground) is anchored next to the Mayflower II, a replica of the 17th century original, in Plymouth, Massachusetts. Photo courtesy of 

LCDR Mason Wilcox 

autonomous community is reducing and addressing 

risks to the marine transportation system. This is new, 

intrusive technology that will, in a best-case scenario, 

be viewed with cautious skepticism or, at worst, hostile rejection. We must work together to develop the 

trust necessary to advance its use by understanding it 

is a balancing act between risk, safety, and innovation. 

Industry’s reputation is on the line and they are the last 

ones that want to see this fail. The key to the success of 

this industry is information sharing to allow everyone to 

learn from mistakes and develop a safer operation. 

Conclusion 

MAS400’s future is exciting and the opportunities to

learn from her operations are endless. There are plans to 

conduct offshore oceanographic studies while simultaneously learning from her computers’ decision-making 

process to act accordingly with the COLREGs. The Coast 

Guard will continue to see increased use of this type 

of technology and we will need to continue to assess 

risks and develop suitable mitigating strategies for safe 

operation and then incorporate lessons leaned into the 

development of future policies and regulations. 

About the author: 

LCDR Mason Wilcox has served in the U.S. Coast Guard for 18 years. 

Since direct commission into the Maritime Academy Graduate (MARGRAD) program in 2005 from Massachusetts Maritime Academy, he 

has spent his career as a marine inspector and investigator. 

Endnotes: 

1. The Mayflower 400, a 50-foot-long diesel electric trimaran, is capable of 

speeds of up to 10 knots and is navigated by onboard artificial intelligence 

with information from six cameras and 50 sensors. In addition to its lithium 

ion batteries, it has a diesel powered generator to provide electricity when 

solar energy is not available to the 20 KW electric propulsion motor. https:// 

mas400.com/ 

2. The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea were adopted 

as a convention of the International Maritime Organization on 20 October 

1972 and entered into force on 15 July 1977 

3. Isaac Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics —1. A robot may not injure a human 

being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. 2. A robot 

must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders 

would conflict with the First Law. 3. A robot must protect its own existence 

as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws 

Asimov, Isaac (1950). I, Robot 

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In Water Innovation 

The U.S. Aquaculture Industry 

Evaluating navigational risk posed by 

fish farming in the marine environment 

by Petty offiCer 1st Class erin Westoby 

Waterways Management Division 

Sector Northern New England 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Have you ever feasted on seafood and wondered where it 

came from? It is highly likely 

A vessel transfers feed into Atlantic Salmon fish net pens using a high­tech, automatic feeding 

system off Black Island, Maine. Photo courtesy of Maine Aquaculture Association 

A member of the Underwater Photo Team assigned to Fleet Combat Camera Pacific, ascends to the 

surface after conducting photography training near kelp beds on the seafloor off the coast of San 

Diego. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Nicholas S. Tenorio 

your dinner was sourced from marine 

aquaculture, more commonly known 

as a fish farm. The term aquaculture is

defined as the farming of aquatic species

like fish, shellfish, and plants in a controlled or selected environment. In the 

United States, marine aquaculture primarily produces oysters, clams, mussels, 

shrimp, and salmon, in addition to other 

marine fish products.

The aquaculture industry is a crucial 

resource needed to meet the increasing 

global demand for seafood. The United 

States imports between 70 and 85 percent of the seafood consumed domestically, half of which is sourced from 

aquaculture.

1 Not only is aquaculture a 

necessary form of food production in the 

world, it also supports commercial and 

recreational fisheries and aids in the restoration of various species and marine 

habitats. The United States works hard 

to support the growth of this novel technology while ensuring operations meet 

wide-ranging compliance standards. 

Aquaculture Gear 

Aquaculture uses two main methods to 

farm a variety of organisms—natural 

environment or onshore tanks. Species 

farmed in a natural environment, like 

the navigable waters of the United States, 

require a range of regulatory oversight 

from multiple federal and state agencies, and can use an assortment of gear. 

What kind of gear and how it is 

deployed 

54 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Graphic courtesy of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

depends on the species being farmed and can include: 

• mussel longlines

• mussel rafts

• floating shellfish bags

• floating/sinking oyster cages

• bottom culture for oysters, mussels, and clams

• open net pens for finfish

• suspended kelp lines

With an extensive variability of gear types situated

throughout the maritime community, the concern aquaculture poses for mariners and safe navigation is understandable. To address these concerns, in 2020 the U.S. 

Coast Guard established new procedures for its workforce to assess and mitigate risks posed by novel uses of 

the marine environment and the Marine Transportation 

System. The development and location of aquaculture 

in the marine environment has become a keen point of 

interest for the Coast Guard in the last two years. New 

procedures are constantly evolving in order to keep up 

with the increasing demands of aquaculture applications, and these innovations require safety and risk 

assessments. 

Developing New Processes 

Following the release of the policy letter, Evaluation of 

Risk Posed by Novel Uses of the Marine Environment, Coast

Guard units throughout the nation were tasked with 

developing programs aimed at tracking and assessing 

risks associated with aquaculture sites. 2 The program 

must facilitate operations specific to a unit’s area of 

responsibility (AOR), to account for differing aquaculture operations depending upon the region, waters, and 

species cultivated there. 

Data obtained from the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture, state agencies, and industry groups found 

the Atlantic region accounts for 40 percent of the nation’s 

aquaculture, followed by the Pacific region with 38 percent, and the Gulf of Mexico at 22 percent. 3 Coast Guard 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 55 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

units in these regions will have the most exposure to, 

and experience with, aquaculture, therefore establishing 

best practices to meet the objectives of the Coast Guard’s 

navigation safety risk assessment guidelines.

It is important for the Coast Guard to identify who 

the marine aquaculture licensing and permitting agencies are in their AOR and establish direct lines of communication and working relationships with these state 

and federal counterparts. Agency involvement and the 

regulatory process will differ among states. For example,

in Maine, the Maine Department of Marine Resources 

(MEDMR) receives and processes aquaculture applications and determines whether an applicant will receive 

a license or lease. Applicants must also apply for a federal permit through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) to operate gear within the United States’ navigable waters.

Conversely, New Hampshire directs all aquaculture applications through the New Hampshire Fish 

and Game Department, and licensing durations differ

greatly from those issued in Maine. Most marine aquaculture in the United States takes place in coastal state 

waters. If an applicant wishes to establish an offshore

aquaculture operation in federal waters, the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and USACE will 

all be involved in the permitting process. 4 

Once a Coast Guard office identifies the aquaculture

application process in its AOR, they can activate their 

unit-specific program and use software like ArcGIS Pro

to formulate vessel traffic data to conduct a navigational

risk assessment. Additional resources may be used to 

to approve or disapprove an application. Its role is to 

provide the permitting agency with an assessment of 

potential impacts to safe navigation if a proposed project 

is approved. Through a Coast Guard business letter, the 

Captain of the Port (COTP) can document recommendations to the permitting agency that certain conditions be 

implemented or risk mitigation factors considered before

a permit is issued. 

In addition to having no approval authority, the 

Coast Guard may be time-constrained to review aquaculture applications. Often, one unit will be responsible 

for reviewing permits for multiple state governments. 

Navigation Safety 

Risk Assessment 

A navigation safety risk assessment is a tool the Captain 

of the Port (COTP) uses when preparing input for the 

permitting agency regarding port or waterway safety 

issues associated with a structure or work project 

located on or near the navigable waters of the United 

States. The assessment helps the COTP identify potential navigation risks and determine if a more extensive 

analysis is necessary, or what recommendations to 

provide to the permitting agency. 

—Waterways Management (WWM): Navigation Safety Risk 

Assessments Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP). 

CGTTP 3­71.7, August 2015 

A crew from Bangs Island Mussel Farm harvests kelp in Casco Bay near Portland, Maine. Bangs Island 

has been growing mussels and kelp for more than 10 years. Photo courtesy of Maine Aquaculture 

Association 

populate data and aid in the assessments. Coast Guard Sector Northern 

New England in Portland, Maine, has 

found the Northeast Ocean Data Portal, 

used to illustrate traffic patterns in its

AOR, to be a great resource in conducting risk assessments. Along with evaluating the traffic density in an area, the

Coast Guard also notes the proximity 

of the proposed project to federal aids 

to navigation and any potential impact 

it may have on the service’s ability 

to maintain them. Once a risk level is 

determined for each assessment, the 

Coast Guard will document the review. 

Coast Guard Limitations 

If a proposed site is determined to be a 

high risk to safe navigation, the Coast 

Guard will work with the permitting 

agency to mitigate or remove the risk. 

The Coast Guard has no official authority

56 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Some states, like Maine, have a variety of different applications that can

be categorized as either a standard 

lease, experimental lease, or limitedpurpose aquaculture (LPA) license. 

A standard lease can include a farming site of up to 100 acres for a term 

of up to 20 years; whereas experimental leases allow for applicants to 

apply for a maximum of 4 acres for a 

duration of up to 3 years. Both types 

of leases require an extensive review 

from MEDMR, which provides the 

Coast Guard more time and flexibility to complete risk assessments. 

On the other hand, LPA licenses are 

one-year licenses that cover an area 

of no more than 400 square feet and do not require an 

extensive MEDMR review. MEDMR streamlines the LPA 

permitting process with the intent of allowing shellfish

growers the ability to sample different site locations prior

to applying for a longer standard or experimental lease. 

This short turn-around, combined with other mission-critical responsibilities, has limited the Coast 

Guard’s ability to conduct risk assessments for all 

LPAs in the state of Maine. In 2021 alone, a total of 179 

new LPAs were issued in addition to the 804 existing 

licenses. 5 In order to circumvent this gap in oversight, 

Sector Northern New England requested that MEDMR 

inquire about Coast Guard risk assessments on LPAs 

only concerning navigation safety. 

Conclusion 

Aquaculture is a growing industry, and the Coast Guard’s 

involvement in support of these projects has just begun. 

The majority of aquaculture sites in the United States 

are located in state waters, where species and gear are 

more protected from the harsh weather conditions often 

found offshore. As the industry expands, competition

for space may push more operations offshore and into

federal waters where projects impact additional waterway users.

open for innovation. 

Only time will tell what the future holds for marine 

aquaculture, but the Coast Guard’s steadfast dedication 

to the safety of navigation for our maritime community 

will remain certain. The Coast Guard is committed to 

ensuring that the marine transportation system remains 

About the author: 

Petty Officer 1st Class Erin Westoby has served in the Coast Guard 

for 11 years, completing operational assignments in search and rescue, 

inspections, and pollution response. She currently serves in Coast Guard 

Sector Northern New England’s waterways management division as the 

aquaculture program coordinator. 

Islesboro, Maine, is home to this farm of mussels rafts that are owned and operated by Marshall Cove 

Mussels. Photo courtesy of Maine Aquaculture Association 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Norfolk District Oyster Reef Team hosts 

Norfolk Christian Schools’ fifth­grade students to assist with the oyster 

restoration on the Elizabeth River near Fort Norfolk, Virginia, in November 

2018. The monthly field trip to the reef offers a lesson in science, technology, 

engineering, and math while helping bolster the struggling oyster 

population in the area. Army photo by Andria Allmond 

Endnotes: 

1. www.fishwatch.gov/aquaculture 

2. WWM 01-20 Policy Letter Evaluation of Risk Posed by Novel Uses of the Marine 

Environment 

3. NOAA “2020 Fisheries of the United States” https://media.fisheries.noaa. 

gov/2022-05/Fisheries-of-the-United-States-2020-Report-FINAL.pdf 

4. NOAA Guide to Permitting Marine Aquaculture in the United States (2022) 

5. Maine Aquaculture Harvest, Lease, and License (LPA) Data. www.maine. 

gov/dmr/aquaculture/data/index.html 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 57 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Navigating the Course Ahead 

with Offshore Wind Development 

U.S. Coast Guard prepares and responds 

by mr. John stone 

Program Analyst 

Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy 

U.S. Coast Guard 

miChele desautels 

Waterways Management Specialist 

First Coast Guard District 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Offshore wind has been active in U.S waters 

for over 15 years, beginning with the nowdefunct Cape Wind project off of Cape Cod, 

Massachusetts. The First and Fifth Coast Guard Districts 

daniel dugery 

Port Security Specialist 

First Coast Guard District 

U.S. Coast Guard 

(NVIC 01-19) on August 1, 2019, to explain the Coast 

Guard’s roles and responsibilities with respect to Offshore

Renewable Energy Installation (OREI) development. The 

NVIC is intended to assist the Coast Guard in providing 

BOEM with input on how an installation may impact 

safe navigation for all waterway users and the Coast 

Guard’s ability to execute its missions. Additionally, it 

provides members of industry, port safety and security 

stakeholders, and the public with information on the 

Coast Guard’s roles and responsibilities in the OREI 

application process.

As projects are permitted, sector and district staffs

become involved with vessel inspections, incident investigations, and other waterways management activities 

during construction and operation of the wind farm. 

The Coast Guard will review any proposed changes to 

its area of operations from offshore wind development

and evaluate how these changes will affect standard 

Established Offshore Wind 

Projects on the East Coast 

• In 2016, the Block Island Wind Farm came online

in state waters off the coast of Rhode Island with

five 6 MW turbines.

• In 2020, the Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind

demonstration project came online in federal

waters with two 12 MW turbines. For example, the

Bengis case involving a network

are at the forefront of offshore wind development in the

United States where, especially in the Northeast, there 

are several key drivers to offshore wind development.

The primary driver is the demand for electricity, which is 

highest along coastal states. Other drivers include some 

of the highest offshore wind speeds in proximity to states

with the highest demands for increased energy supply, 

and the Biden Administration’s goal of 30 GW nationwide by 2030.

As of August 2022, there were 27 active leases in 

various stages of development in federal waters on the 

Atlantic and several auctions expected on the West coast, 

Gulf of Mexico, and Gulf of Maine in the next few years. 

Vineyard Wind and South Fork Wind, in the First District 

area of responsibility, were the first projects permitted to

begin construction, which started in 2022. All of these 

projects will result in the construction of hundreds of 

turbines and installation of miles of submarine cables. 

Under the National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA), the Coast Guard serves as a cooperating agency 

to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), 

the lead federal agency responsible for issuing offshore

wind farm permits beyond 3 NM in federal waters. 

While the Coast Guard does not have the authority to 

approve, disapprove, permit, or authorize an offshore

wind permit application, ensuring safe navigation and 

efficiency of the marine transportation systems are top

priorities.

The director of the marine transportation systems 

issued a Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 

58 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Commercial Wind Leasing Off Rhode Island and Massachusetts 

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 

operating procedures and missions. Based on the findings of this review, operational commanders will make 

necessary updates to guidance as required to mitigate 

any potential impact to the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory 

missions. Eventually, units of all types and geographies 

will be involved in response activities, like search and 

rescue (SAR) and oil spill. 

Port Infrastructure 

With the increase in offshore construction comes an 

increase in shoreside facilities to support these activities. 

These facilities support crew boats transporting workers 

to and from construction sites, survey boats, wind farm 

component construction, and assembly yards. Many of 

these facilities are located at existing commercial waterfronts, some of which have been repurposed as part of 

wind farm construction support. In many instances, 

there are coastal and river locations that have not had 

significant commercial traffic in some time, and this 

increased traffic density may cause conflict with local

marine traffic.

Wind turbine farms such as the one above 

bring renewable energy to many. Blue 

Planet Studio| Getty Images 

With shoreside support facilities coming online over 

the coming years, determining whether they come under 

the Maritime Transportation Security Act is important 

to ensuring the safety and security of the port. One of 

the requirements is the development of a facility security plan required under the Maritime Transportation 

Security Act. Each sector’s prevention department will 

work with these facilities to ensure they are following 

all applicable regulations.

For the Coast Guard, new shoreside facilities pose 

several challenges, from increased vessel traffic to a 

project running across several Coast Guard sectors and 

districts. Coordination with marine construction organizations working on these wind farm sites, as well as 

cooperation with the maritime community in each sector 

through outreach and information sharing, is paramount 

to ensuring these communities can adapt to changing 

port operations. Working with entities such as area maritime security committees and various maritime groups, 

will set the groundwork for better cooperation between 

all involved in this complicated work. 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 59 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Block Island Wind Farm, just a few miles off the coast of Rhode Island, was the first commercial offshore wind farm in the United States. Construction started 

in late 2015 and has paved the way for numerous additional projects nationwide. diane39 | iStock /Getty Images Plus 

Marking and Lighting 

While many mariners will navigate around wind farms, 

others may choose to transit through them. This presents 

some unique challenges with marking and lighting. Not 

only must these structures be well-marked to provide 

mariners ample time to avoid them, each turbine needs 

to provide orientation within the farm. In essence, the 

Coast Guard needs to balance the need to mark farms 

as one single obstruction with turning the individual 

turbines into individual aids to navigation.

Although the United States’ offshore wind development is just beginning, the Coast Guard has assisted with 

marking and lighting guidelines for several years through 

its participation in the International Association of Marine 

Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA). 

IALA published a guideline for The Marking of Offshore 

Man-Made Structures (G1162) on December 17, 2021.

Recognizing the growing development of offshore

windfarms worldwide, IALA seeks to provide consistency between all nations to ensure mariners are able 

to determine the outer perimeter of a windfarm. The 

guideline provides the mariner the ability to distinguish 

not only which structures are on the perimeter, but 

also which structures mark a corner by differentiating

between what IALA calls Significant and Intermediate

Peripheral Structures (SPS/IPS). This allows mariners a 

means to safely navigate around the windfarm.

While the guideline provides additional lighting and 

marking recommendations for the interior structures, 

the Coast Guard is standardizing these recommendations to provide mariners a safe way to determine their 

vessel’s location within the farm and ultimately navigate through, if desired. As described in NVIC 01-19, the 

consistent spacing and a standard grid pattern with two 

lines of orientation provides an organized way to label 

each individual turbine. Large areas with multiple adjacent farms, like the Massachusetts/Rhode Island Wind 

Energy Area, will be marked as one single farm, allowing mariners a clear position identification throughout

the area. 

In addition to traditional marking and lighting, 

radar and electronic chart clutter versus if AIS ATON 

were to be broadcast continuously. IPS and interior turbines would only broadcast to alert the mariner of any 

ATON discrepancies. These ATON could also be used 

to alert mariners of any emergencies in the area, such 

as SAR cases. By leveraging AIS technology, the Coast 

Guard could supplement its Broadcast Notice to Mariners 

procedures by sending a message to a wind farm’s command center for broadcast throughout the AIS transmitters located across the farm. This judicious use of AIS 

may ultimately provide the Coast Guard and developer 

a force multiplier to broadcast marine information and 

ensure navigation safety throughout a wind farm. 

Conclusion 

In order to meet the demand of the additional users that 

offshore wind development brings, the Coast Guard’s

role in marine planning is important, and our work with 

BOEM and offshore wind developers is critical to the

success of this program. The offshore energy industry

continues to evolve, and floating wind turbines and 

other types of offshore renewable energy development

will bring new concerns. As the development of offshore renewable energy installations advances, the Coast 

Guard will continue to coordinate a collaborative effort

focused on safe navigation and harmonious waterway 

use by multiple maritime stakeholders. By looking forward to balance the potential impacts of proposed offshore energy projects with navigation safety, traditional 

uses of the waterway, and port infrastructure, the Coast 

Guard can better position 

maritime communities. 

itself to continue serving the 

About the authors: 

Mr. John Stone is a program analyst with the Office of Waterways and 

Ocean Policy at Coast Guard Headquarters. He specializes in marine 

planning, navigation safety regulations, and aids to navigation. Prior to 

this, he served on active duty in the Coast Guard for more than 23 years 

as a career afloat officer. 

Ms. Michele Desautels has worked on maritime energy projects in the 

First Coast Guard District’s Prevention Division for 10 years. Prior to 

that, she worked at the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the 

U.S. Department of Energy Office of Renewable Energy in the Wind 

Program. 

Mr. Daniel Dugery has worked for the First Coast Guard District over 

the last 4 years as a port security specialist. He has more than 40 years 

combined active duty and civilian service with experience in marine construction, marine safety, and environmental response. 

Reference: 

Dr. John Smith, Search and Rescue: A Study of North American SAR Response, 

Random House, 2003, p. 5 

automatic identification system (AIS) aids to navigation

(ATON) will be leveraged. These will not only assist 

mariners with their location, but also provide additional 

information in the unlikely event the marking and lighting on specific turbines are inconsistent. The intent is to

provide each individual wind turbine with the capability to broadcast, while only continuously broadcasting

on the SPS turbines. This strategy will reduce potential 

60 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Unique Waterways of 

The Arctic and Western Alaska 

by lCdr rven garCia 

Chief of Inspections Division 

Sector Anchorage 

U.S. Coast Guard 

lt Kaitlyn moore 

Investigations Division Chief 

Sector Anchorage 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Arctic waterways are some of the most unique 

waterways in the United States. While many take 

the efficiency of modern transportation systems

for granted, rarely thinking about how supply chains 

affect their lives, Alaska’s citizens are well aware of how

crucial the ports and waterways are to their survival. 

The harsh Arctic weather can impact delivery schedules, 

making the efficient use and management of resources

mandatory. 

Maritime Cargo 

Intermodal transportation is essential to moving Alaska’s 

imported and exported goods, which keep the state and 

local economies thriving. Alaska’s top exports include 

seafood, mineral ores, crude oil, and wood, and the top 

imports are refined oil/fuels; electrical and industrial

machinery; and iron, steel, and manufactured products. The Port of Alaska, located 

in Anchorage, is the state’s primary cargo 

handling facility. Half of the cargo received 

at the port is redistributed throughout 

the state to sustain its residents, native 

corporations, and native tribes in remote 

regions. To put into perspective how dispersed the population is, only 78 percent of 

the population lives in regions connected 

by traditional road or rail systems. 

In 2022, the U.S. Department of 

Transportation’s Maritime Administration 

awarded the city of Seward and the Alaska 

Railroad Corporation nearly $20 million 

for improvements to the Port of Seward’s 

freight dock, rail corridor, and cruise ship 

terminal. The expansion of the port’s infrastructure will absorb the Port of Alaska’s 

overflow of vessel traffic and create an 

lt William mason 

Waterways Management Division Chief 

Sector Anchorage 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Cdr John doWning 

Prevention Department Head 

Sector Anchorage 

U.S. Coast Guard 

alternate port in western Alaska to ensure continuity 

of cargos when disaster strikes. With a highway system 

that doesn’t reach every community and other modes 

of transport that are often impacted by unpredictable 

weather for success, the state’s transportation system

highlights the importance of a resilient, dynamic supply 

chain. 

Geographical Challenges 

Unforgiving geographical features across the state limit 

the use of highway and rail systems, making commercial 

aircraft and vessels the only modes of transportation for 

cargo. Seasonal weather disparities across the state pose 

major challenges to the delivery of cargo due to operational limitations for both aircraft and vessels. Extremely 

low temperatures require aircraft and vessels to be fitted

A landing craft prepares to load cargo in Nome, Alaska, 142 miles south of the Arctic Circle. Coast 

Guard photo by LT William Mason 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 61 
At approximately 2,400 miles north to south 

and nearly 1,000 miles east to west, Alaska is equal 

in size to a significant portion of the contiguous 

United States, posing significant logistical challenges 

for the Coast Guard’s District 17. Coast Guard map Bottom left:

Bulk fuel facilities, like this one in Wales, Alaska, 64 miles north of 

the Arctic Circle, must be inspected regularly. Coast Guard photo 

by LT William Mason Bottom right: Two hundred and twenty miles 

north of the Arctic Circle, Crowley Fuels Alaska vessels discharge fuel 

to Utqiagvik, Alaska, using a specialized mile­long transfer hose. Photo 

courtesy of Scott Wilson, Crowley Fuels Alaska 

62 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

with additional equipment to prevent operational systems from freezing. When an aircraft is unavailable, 

delivering cargo by vessel is the only option, and that 

comes with its own set of challenges when operating in 

Alaska. 

During the summer, if weather cooperates, there is 

an approximate three-month operating season on the 

North Slope and in the interior of the state. During this 

time-frame, Alaskan communities depend on commercial vessel operators to maintain schedules for delivery 

of essentials that will help them survive the long, harsh 

winters. 

In mid-September, once ice begins to form and winter 

weather begins to encroach, there is inherent risk to transiting through the Arctic Ocean, as well as through the 

state’s rivers and bays. Any error—even a loaded barge 

becoming beset in ice—can result in threats to safety, 

property, and the environment, meaning essentials can 

go undelivered. Without essentials like petroleum products used for power generation and heating, as well as 

fuel for boats, airplanes, ATVs, and snowmobiles, communities are unable to refuel alternate means of transportation used for subsistence hunting and fishing. If

these deliveries are missed, it can be devastating, as the 

community may not receive another shipment for an 

entire year unless they rely on air support. While relying 

on expensive commercial air service for essential goods 

like food and fuel makes life in the Arctic possible, even 

aircraft are limited by weather. 

Residents also rely on these deliveries 

for construction materials and 

prefabricated buildings for use as 

schools, housing, and other dwellings. 

Maritime Transportation 

Weather is not the only challenge in Alaska. Once vessels 

reach their intended waterway, they are sure to encounter uncharted and unmarked channels, daily changes in 

water depth, and constantly shifting bottom contours. In 

particular, the water depth changes throughout the year 

due to melting snow, ice, glacial sediment, and summer 

rainfall. 

As towing vessels make their way up the rivers, they 

deploy a small skiff ahead of them to manually sound

and chart a navigational route. This data becomes proprietary to each company, therefore special automatic 

identification systems waivers are granted to prevent

competitors from copying these uncharted routes.

In order to operate in shallow, Alaskan waterways, 

LT William Mason oversees repairs to a vessel’s damaged rudder on the 

frozen Chena River in Fairbanks, Alaska, where—about 120 miles South of 

the Arctic Circle—the air temperature was approximately minus 40 degrees 

Fahrenheit. Coast Guard photo by LT William Mason 

towing vessels and barges navigating the inland rivers 

of Alaska are specifically designed with towing vessels restricted by length and only able to push a maximum of two barges. Moreover, in an effort to maximize

deliveries, barges “of less than 1,500 gross tons carrying refined petroleum product in bulk as cargo in or

adjacent to waters of the Bering Sea, Chukchi Sea, and 

Arctic Ocean ...” (46 USC 3703), are exempt from the federal double hull regulations. These single-hulled vessels 

create environmental and operational safety concerns for 

villages and responders.

Most fuel deliveries are dependent on the tide, therefore, it is normal for operators to intentionally ground 

their barges while transferring fuel and remain aground 

until the next tide cycle. Maintaining the integrity of 

the vessel’s hull is of the upmost importance, and towing vessels and barges needing repair or dry-docking 

service in the Arctic or western Alaska only have two 

options. The first uses the tidal difference to ground the

vessel on high tide and complete the work on low tide. 

The second, and increasingly popular, option uses specially designed airbags to roll the vessel out of the water 

and onto land using tractors and ground anchors. Once 

on dry ground, the airbags are deflated, and the vessel

is lowered onto blocks. 

Damage requiring parts and labor, which are usually 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 63 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

not readily available, to correct these issues is often 

identified during the dry docking of vessels. This often

requires that the materials, skilled labor, Coast Guard 

inspectors, and class surveyors to be flown in via chartered air service. To adequately complete repairs to 

specially designed vessels, skilled welders and marine 

inspectors/surveyors must be extremely knowledgeable 

about steel repair on single-hull barges that are also carrying freight on deck. Any error or misstep could result 

in additional environmental risks and financial costs.

The Coast Guard works closely with industry to effectively mitigate hazards and ensure regulatory compliance, while simultaneously facilitating commerce and 

modern life within the Arctic and Western Alaska. 

Bulk Fuel Facilities 

The vast majority of western Alaska’s 386 bulk fuel facilities are isolated, without any physical connection to other 

communities. This means that fuel and supply deliveries 

are only possible by sea or air. These bulk fuel facilities are critical to sustaining modern living conditions 

throughout Alaska and the Arctic regions. They primarily fuel machinery that contributes to survival, like diesel furnaces in locations where temperatures frequently 

dip below minus 50 degrees Fahrenheit in the winter 

months. Annual planning is crucial to avoid emergent 

needs when sea ice prevents fuel delivery, requiring 

costly alternatives. In emergency situations, where transporting fuel via barge is not possible, airplane tankers 

are used, pushing fuel costs to nearly $20 per gallon. 

These remote communities often have populations 

of less than 1,000 people, yet many have three regulated 

bulk fuel facilities. In contrast, regulated bulk facilities 

in the continental United States may have 1,000 people 

employed within a single facility and occupy more land 

than one of Alaska’s remote communities. 

The drastic differences do not stop there. Most U.S.

all facilities in a community receiving shipments at the 

same time and from the same barge. 

The logistics and exorbitant costs do not just apply to 

the delivery of the fuel to the community facilities. The 

Coast Guard is tasked with providing regulatory oversight of these facilities, encountering difficult logistics

and high costs to inspect these remote facilities. Current 

transportation to examine vessels and facilities requires 

the use of commercial airlines, Alaska National Guard, 

U.S. Air Force Civil Air Patrol, and Alaska State Troopers’ 

aircraft with members deployed throughout Alaska for 

weeks at a time. Typically, this transportation only gets 

the team to a gravel runway. The final travel to each facility must be completed on ATVs, snowmobiles, or foot. 

Conclusion 

Effective waterways management is critical to the survival of Alaskan communities. Without balanced maritime governance, many communities would fall short 

of required resources, suffer tremendous economic 

impacts, or experience a catastrophe affecting their traditional methods of subsistence hunting and fishing for

generations. As climate change opens the Arctic to more 

commerce, the Coast Guard’s footprint needs to grow 

with additional focus on the marine safety mission. This 

includes waterways management with an emphasis on 

vessel and facility inspections.

Coast Guard District 17 and Sector Anchorage are 

managing innovative logistical solutions to ensure personnel can reach even the smallest communities of the 

Final Frontier to guarantee environmental safety 

preserve life in the harsh Arctic environment. 

and 

About the authors: 

CDR John Downing currently serves as the chief of Prevention at Sector Anchorage, Alaska, where he oversees all marine inspections, marine 

casualty investigations, and waterways management in western Alaska 

and the U.S. Arctic. He attended the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, 

has a master’s degree in organizational leadership and a master’s in 

marine affairs. 

LCDR Rven Garcia serves as the chief of the Inspections Division at 

Coast Guard Sector Anchorage, Alaska. His previous tours include 

PACAREA Prevention, Sector Anchorage as the senior investigating officer, supervisor of Marine Safety Detachment American Samoa, Marine 

Safety Unit Portland, Oregon, and Coast Guard Cutter Morgenthau. 

He is a graduate of California Maritime Academy. 

LT Kaitlyn Moore is the chief of Investigations Division at Sector 

Anchorage, Alaska. Her previous tours include serving as an investigator at Sector Los Angeles-Long Beach and as an inspector at Marine 

Safety Unit Houma, Louisiana. She is a graduate of the Merchant 

Marine Academy and, prior to joining the Coast Guard, she worked as 

an engineer on harbor tugs. 

LT William Mason is the chief of Waterways Management Division at 

Sector Anchorage, Alaska. His previous tours include Sector Anchorage as the assistant chief of Inspections, Sector Mobile, Alabama, as an 

inspector, Station Tybee, and Coast Guard Cutter Saginaw. Prior to joining the Coast Guard, he was a tankerman for a towing vessel company. 

fuel facilities are owned by major petroleum companies, 

but in Alaska they are owned by public schools, general 

grocery and hardware stores, and tribal entities. Alaskan 

facilities are often managed by school principals, “gas 

station” clerks, city mayors, and part-time employees, 

who often manage two facilities at once. Federal regulations do not differentiate between these small remote

communities and major petroleum companies; both are 

expected to comply with the same set of regulations, 

requiring training and incorporating costs not easily met 

by small communities. 

Challenges and Solutions 

Transferring life-sustaining critical fuel supplies and 

the regulatory oversight from several government agencies is a delicate balance. The communities’ fuel facilities 

typically only transfer fuel once or twice annually, with 

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Marine Transportation System Unity of Effort 

Harbor Safety Committees 

Community solutions to complex challenges 

by greg hitChen 

Director 

Vessel Traffic Service New York 

U.S. Coast Guard 

I

n April 2000, Assistant Commandant for Marine 

Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection Rear 

Admiral Robert C. North, provided guidelines to 

formally establish harbor safety committees throughout the United States. Already established in key ports, 

the Coast Guard acknowledged these committees were 

very effective venues for meeting challenges and providing opportunities to enhance the safety of the Marine 

Transportation System through local coordination. 1 

Prior to the identification of these committees as ideal

venues for developing commuthe southern tip of Manhattan. Almost all of this traffic

navigates the Kill Van Kull waterway nestled between 

Bayonne, New Jersey, and New York’s Staten Island. 

Roughly 800 feet wide, this channel, sometimes referred 

to as the Suez of the West, has several bends and ends 

in a sharp turn into one of the world’s busiest container 

ports. Close management and coordination is crucial to 

ensuring it stays open for business.

New York regularly receives the largest container 

ships to call on the East Coast. These ships, measuring 

nity solutions to complex chal- Kill Van Kull and Northern Part of Arthur Kill 

lenges in crowded waterways, 

the Port of New York and New 

Jersey already had a wellestablished Harbor Safety, 

Navigation, and Operations 

Committee. For decades, the 

unique, complex nature of 

the port dictated a high level 

of stakeholder coordination, 

driving the New York/New 

Jersey committee to continually influence improvements to

both the safety and efficiency

of the East Coast’s largest 

seaport. 

The Port of New York 

and New Jersey 

New York Harbor surrounds 

one of the United States’ densest population centers. Some 

of the world’s most iconic 

destinations—the Statue of 

Liberty and United Nations 

among them—are located on 

the city’s busiest waterways. 

Global trade supplying onethird of the country’s population transits within 4 miles of Map courtesy of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 65 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

upward of 1,200 feet in length, have complex navigational needs to ensure safe navigation of the harbor. 

Adding further complexity to the navigation, container 

ships must share the Kill Van Kull with tankers providing the full spectrum of petroleum products to the 

entire Northeast United States. Arriving via tanker and 

departing via tug and barge, the port transfers the largest amount of refined petroleum of any seaport in the

United States. 

Each month, roughly 4,500 tugs and barges transit 

throughout the port, with many transiting between 

Manhattan and Brooklyn, through the heart of New 

York City, via the East River, infamous for its strong currents. Most carry petroleum products, while others carry 

building materials to areas not easily reachable by road 

or the bulk of the city’s trash and other waste streams to 

final disposal sites.

As with many other ports, the Port of New York and 

New Jersey is constantly changing. The size of commercial ships calling on the port has dramatically increased 

as the harbor has been deepened and key bridges have 

been raised. These ships transported 8.9 million TEUs of 

container cargo in 2021 alone. 2 Most New Yorkers live on 

an island, and commuting by boat has exploded in popularity over recent years, topping more than 1 million 

transits per year throughout the harbor. Furthermore, 

more area residents have been drawn to recreational 

use of “blue space” as the harbor gets cleaner and green 

space gets more crowded. Portions of the harbor that 

have been exclusively commercial for hundreds of years 

are now occupied by sailboats, jet skis, kayaks, and paddle boards. The region has also become a popular cruise 

destination with some of the world’s largest cruise ships 

operating out of the port.

As might be imagined, 

the number of stakeholders 

with interest in management 

of the port is impressive. Two 

states and one, rather large, 

municipality have overlapping jurisdictions throughout the harbor. Although the 

Port Authority of New York 

and New Jersey provides 

oversight of the region’s container terminals, there is no 

specific management body 

for the numerous petroleum 

facilities in the region. Four 

separate pilot organizations 

conn ships entering the port 

dependent on route and type 

private companies manage commuter ferry operations 

throughout the region.

The consequences of failing to manage the safety and 

efficiency of the Marine Transportation System in the port

are huge. Within 48 hours after the Captain of the Port 

restricted commercial maritime traffic after the events of

9/11 and Super Storm Sandy, supply chain shortfalls rippled throughout the Northeast United States. Even routine port-wide activities, such as the annual convening of 

the United Nations and Fleet Week have to be carefully 

planned to minimize impact on daily commerce. These 

consequences highlight the need to promote waterway 

efficiency as well as safety, since critical supply chains

are dependent on the timely arrival of cargo to the port.

All of this complexity drives a critical need for close 

and continuous coordination between stakeholders on 

the water and shoreside. The Harbor Safety, Navigation, 

and Operations Committee, fondly known as Harbor 

Ops, successfully meets this need. 

The Harbor Ops Committee 

The port’s Harbor Ops Committee is not a Coast Guardrun committee. The Coast Guard, as well as other government agencies, serve solely in an advisory capacity 

to the voting members of the committee. This structure, 

in which committee governance is reserved for nongovernmental stakeholders, provides greater flexibility for

the community to freely discuss issues, provide advice 

to decision-makers, and nimbly develop navigational 

safety guidelines.

Due to the size and complexity of the port, the full 

committee has open membership, allowing any interested individual to attend and participate in bimonthly 

meetings. As a result, the full committee meetings are 

of vessel. A wide variety of Three dredges work simultaneously to deepen the Kill Van Kull, part of the New York and New Jersey Harbor. 

municipal organizations and Coast Guard photo 

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primarily reserved for the presentation of agenda items first

vetted through the executive 

steering committee to best 

allocate time and gather stakeholder feedback in a general 

venue. Consequently, most business is conducted via side conversations outside of the formal 

meeting.

The Executive Steering Committee meeting is robust in size, 

with more than 25 individuals 

representing either user communities or government entities. In addition to the more 

traditional commercial users of 

the harbor, the committee has 

representatives from the sail/ 

power recreational community, 

kayak/paddleboard users, and 

marine event organizers. The 

committee meets monthly and 

very effectively serves as a forum for open dialog. It also

routinely provides direct advice on emerging issues and 

refers larger challenges for presentation to the full committee for greater feedback.

Given the enormous scope of challenges and opportunities in the port, Harbor Ops has also formed a number of standing and ad-hoc subcommittees to provide 

greater focus on pressing issues. Some groups, like the 

Passenger Vessel Subcommittee and Deep Draft Vessel 

Working Group, are centered on industry segments. 

Others are centered on specific challenges, including

the Harbor Education Subcommittee, formed to increase 

navigational safety for recreational users new to the 

harbor; and the Energy Subcommittee which provides 

advice on emerging alternative energy projects that 

impact waterways users. These subcommittees meet as 

needed and provide feedback to the Executive Steering 

and full committees on their efforts.

Harbor Ops has many benefits to the Coast Guard

and, more importantly, the Port as a whole. The committee has been crucial as “one stop shopping” for numerous entities seeking to conduct a wide number of varied 

activities through the harbor. With the recent explosion 

of activity surrounding offshore wind energy sites in

New York Bight, Harbor Ops has been crucial as a venue 

for energy developers to get advice from all maritime 

users regarding activities that impact the port. Likewise, 

Harbor Ops served as a key advisor to the Coast Guard 

with the completion of The Northern New York Bight Port 

Access Route Study.

Harbor Ops successfully developed and updated a 

Part of the annual New York Jet Ski Invasion, an event that began in 2017, hundreds of jet skis take to New York’s 

waterways. Beginning on the East River at Long Island City, they travel around the tip of Manhattan and up the 

Hudson River toward the George Washington Bridge. Coast Guard photo 

comprehensive set of navigational guidelines ensuring 

safe transit and on-time arrivals of ultra large container 

ships and other vessels that require greater oversight. 

Although not regulatory in nature, these guidelines 

provide a framework for the Coast Guard, particularly 

the Vessel Traffic Service, to monitor riskier transits and

implement operational controls on a vessel-specific basis.

Furthermore, since these guidelines are not regulatory in 

nature, they are easily adjusted to account for the constantly-evolving nature of traffic in the Port.

Successes 

Harbor Ops has ensured the success of the port throughout the years, particularly as it expanded to meet the 

evolution of increased global trade being carried on 

ever larger ships. The committee provided crucial 

Northern New York Bight Port 

Access Route Study 

The Northern New York Bight Port Access Route Study 

was a Coast Guard­led effort. It was conducted to evaluate the adequacy of existing vessel routing measures 

in the approaches to the Port of New York and New 

Jersey, improve navigational safety in response to 

factors like planned offshore energy development, 

and improvements to port capabilities. 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 67 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

advice during the decadelong deepening of the Harbor 

so it could accommodate the 

next generation of container 

ships. Harbor Ops developed 

crucial guidelines for the 

Vessel Traffic Service to manage the closure of half of the 

already narrow Kill Van Kull 

as dredging and blasting was 

completed as part of the deepening. Additionally, the committee provided guidelines 

for the safe transit of the first

new ultra large container vessels to arrive in the port, and 

continues to regularly revise 

them in response to feedback 

from the pilots on the ships. 

This has maintained safety 

while also improving the efficiency of vessel transits.

A containership passes under the Bayonne Bridge which spans the Kill Van Kull connecting Bayonne, New Jersey, 

with New York City’s Staten Island. Photo by Ultima_Gaina | iStock/Getty Images 

continues to develop at a rapid pace. Although many of 

these projects are sited well outside the port, construction and maintenance activity will change the dynamics of port operations for years to come. In particular, 

much of this construction activity will take place in the 

Upper Hudson River and has, in large part, contributed 

to the creation of a distinct Hudson River Harbor Ops 

Committee. 

It does not end with offshore wind. Container traffic increased by 18 percent over the past year and is 

projected to continue to grow. 3 As roads become more 

congested, the harbor is increasingly viewed as the best 

option for last-mile delivery of various goods. Finally, as 

sea levels rise, coastal resiliency projects will potentially 

result in major changes to the waterfront in all areas of 

the port.

This story can be repeated in a wide variety of forms 

in every port in the country. Harbor safety committees 

have been, and will continue to be, essential to providing 

community solutions to meet these challenges. 

About the author: 

Greg Hitchen has served the Coast Guard in uniform and as a civilian 

for 35 years. Prior to retiring from active duty and becoming New York’s 

Vessel Traffic Service director, he served as deputy commander of Sector 

New York. He is also a career cutterman, serving 10 years on five ships. 

Endnotes: 

1. United States Coast Guard. Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 

1-00. 25 April 2000,. 

2. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. www.panynj.gov/port/en/ourport/facts-and-figures.html. Facts and Figures. 

3. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. www.panynj.gov/port/en/ourport/facts-and-figures.html. 

The committee also nimbly responded to the impressive growth of recreational activity in the harbor by 

establishing recreational community representation on 

the Executive Steering Committee and using its views to 

develop innovative outreach to recreational waterways 

users. This outreach included Operation Clear Channel, 

a comprehensive program to educate recreational users 

of the risks of operating in and around shipping channels. Harbor Ops also hosted an annual Captains and 

Paddlers Day, during which commuter ferry captains 

and kayakers could exchange ideas on safety, and actually operate from each other’s craft.

Finally, Harbor Ops was a tailor-made Maritime 

Transportation System Recovery Team for major emergencies, notably 9/11 and Super Storm Sandy. The existing coordination between all stakeholders was crucial 

to the region’s rapid recovery, and the Harbor Ops Team 

ensured the quick reopening of the port and resumption of critical commerce after both events. During 

9/11, Harbor Ops provided essential advice to the Coast 

Guard as it rapidly established security protocols to get 

traffic moving through the port. The working relationships developed through the committee ensured the 

unqualified success of the 9/11 boat lift of thousands of

people from downtown Manhattan, the largest maritime 

evacuation in Coast Guard history. 

What is on the Horizon 

But the work is never done. 

The committee continues to advise the Coast Guard 

and other decision-makers on a host of changes throughout the port. Offshore wind and other alternative energy

68 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Eventful Days on the 

San Francisco Bay 

Management of the largest Coast Guard 

marine event permitting program 

by lt William harris 

Prevention Officer 

Waterways Management Division 

Sector San Francisco 

U.S. Coast Guard 

lt anthony solares 

Waterways Safety Branch Chief 

Waterways Management Division 

Sector San Francisco 

U.S. Coast Guard 

As the sun rises over Oakland Hills, California, a 

westerly wind propels a sailboat along the San 

Francisco city front near Crissy Field, a public 

recreation area. Ahead of the sailboat is a large collection of vessels—recreational motorboats and sailboats, 

police and Coast Guard vessels, ferries with sightseeing 

passengers and, at the center of it, a group of high-speed 

sailing vessels that appear to be racing.

As one of the most active and iconic waterways 

in the country, a sight like this is not all that uncommon in the waters of San Francisco. Marine events, in 

the tens of thousands, occur annually on the waterways across the country and require the efforts and 

coordination of Coast Guard 

Waterways Management representatives. Coast Guard 

Waterways Management, part 

of the Coast Guard Maritime 

Prevention Program, works to 

prevent personnel casualties 

and property losses, minimize security risks, and protect the marine environment. 

A marine event is an 

“organized on-water event of 

limited duration conducted 

according to a prearranged 

schedule, and which presents 

an extra or unusual hazard to 

the safety of life that cannot 

mst1 shannon Curtaz-milian 

Marine Events Coordinator 

Waterways Management Division 

Sector San Francisco 

U.S. Coast Guard 

be protected against by the existing Navigation Rules.”1 

This extra or unusual hazard may be a large collection 

of vessels associated with regattas or marine parades or 

could be a large group of swimmers racing in a highly 

trafficked area. Some marine events are more complex

than others and may take up a larger footprint in the 

waterway, requiring close coordination with event sponsors and other external stakeholders. Examples of these 

types of events within the Sector San Francisco area of 

responsibility include Sail Grand Prix high-speed race, 

Blessing of the Fleet/Opening Day on the San Francisco 

Bay, and the Escape from Alcatraz swim. Another recurring on-water event requiring high level coordination is 

A crowded field of competitors compete during the 2022 Sail Grand Prix race in San Francisco. Photo courtesy of 

Michael Carlson | Michael R. Photography 

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the San Francisco Fleet Week parade of ships. Each event 

type presents unique challenges to be addressed. 

There are several ways the Coast Guard is notified

of a potential marine event. A few of those come from 

alerts by local partner agencies or departments, social 

media, or event sponsors who reach out to the Coast 

Guard directly. Sponsors complete an Application for 

Marine Event form that allows a Coast Guard Waterways 

Management office the opportunity to gather a substantial amount of information and make a permit determination. The determination of whether an event requires 

a Marine Event Permit comes from local district policy 

that establishes guidance for evaluating an application. 2 

The Sector San Francisco Waterways Management office

developed a form to gather information that addresses 

common concerns specific to the San Francisco Bay Area.

After all pertinent information is 

collected, the Coast Guard analyzes 

event participation requirements, 

safety and communication plans, 

routes of travel, and possible traffic 

conflicts or overlap with other marine

events. Once any concerns identified in the review process have been

addressed or mitigated, the Captain 

of the Port (COTP) may issue a Marine 

Event Permit. It should be noted that 

not all applications meet the threshold 

to be permitted. In those instances, 

an event can proceed as organized, 

provided participants follow established navigation rules. For permitted 

events, safety measures are inserted 

when appropriate during the review 

process. For larger events, public notification is made to allow for overall

awareness. 

Within an issued permit, the event is outlined and 

conditions and expectations are documented. These conditions could include the obligation to report an incident 

with a marine mammal, coordination with local police, 

or designated check-ins with Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)

San Francisco. Annually, Sector San Francisco reviews 

more than 1,000 Marine Event Permit applications, 

Responsible for coordinating over 

153,000 vessel transits annually 

within the Bay Area, the VTS maintains 

predictability and good order through 

vessel movement coordination. 

making this office’s programs one of the busiest in the

Coast Guard. 

All permits are approved by the Captain of the Port 

San Francisco, or delegated to the prevention department 

head at Sector San Francisco. Permitted marine events 

inherently have an “extra or unusual” hazard associated 

and the complexity of an event may increase the level of 

risk which may in turn elevate the final review authority.

For example, the final review of an offshore event is

completed by the COTP. This level of review has been 

standard following a high profile marine casualty that

occurred more than a decade ago. In April 2012, the sailing vessel Low Speed Chase participated in a permitted

event around the Farallon Islands and capsized, primarily due to heavy weather. Five of the eight crew members perished and the San Francisco COTP ordered a 

Coast Guard graphic 

Coast Guard graphic 

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Coast Guard Cutter Hawksbill provides a watchful eye while teams New Zealand and Australia vie for the lead during the 2022 Sail Grand Prix race in San 

Francisco. Photo courtesy of Michael Carlson| Michael R. Photography 

temporary halt to offshore races, prompting the review

of the marine event permitting process. 3 Current policy 

stems from this incident, where all off-shore marine 

events are reviewed and signed by the COTP.

Overall, the goal of the permit application review process is to provide for the safety of event participants and 

non-participants alike. Additionally, the permit review 

process seeks to protect the associated marine environment. Outside of the marine event permit process review, 

there are several administrative measures available to 

limit non-event participant access. For example, notification to the public through marine broadcasts can deconflict vessel traffic and the regulation writing process

can provide means to limit access. 

Preparing for Significant Marine Events 

On top of the hundreds of races and swims sponsored by 

local organizations, there are several significantly more

complex annual events. Events of this nature may have 

hundreds of participants, thousands of on-water spectators, and a national profile that brings unique challenges

and attention to the area. These events provide examples 

of some of the considerations that go into the application review, and the additional administrative measures 

taken, to ensure the safety of these larger scale events. 

Fleet Week 

San Francisco Fleet Week consists of two separate onwater events—the Parade of Ships, and the Blue Angels 

airshow. During these events, access is restricted to 

the specified locations listed in the Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR). This particular event, and similar 

large-scale events listed in the CFR, limit access through 

the use of control measures established through regulation writing. A published Notice of Enforcement for the 

established regulation serves as notification to the public. A typical control measure associated with a recurring 

marine event is a Special Local Regulation (SLR), which 

generally establishes traffic lanes, restricts access to 

areas, or provides requirements for participating vessels.

SLRs are one means of mitigating hazards that may 

result from a congregation of vessels around a regatta 

or vessel parade. The regulation for Fleet Week creates a 

designated path for vessels participating in the Parade of 

Ships to follow without interference, mitigating the risks 

of collisions and other accidents on the parade route. The 

second part of the regulation designates the “air show 

box,” where the Blue Angels flight demonstration team

performs a low-altitude pass over the San Francisco Bay. 

By requiring that no vessels enter the box without permission, and having on-water enforcement with vessels 

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on the outer edge, this regulation mitigates hazards from 

a potential aerial accident and has resources on-scene to 

quickly respond if the need arises. 4 

SLRs can be permanently established in the CFR, or 

temporarily written to serve a one-time event. It is not 

uncommon for an event to occur for multiple years as a 

one-time event before the event sponsor finally decides

to go through the process to permanently establish the 

event in the CFR. This delayed approach to permanent 

listing can actually allow for a more polished event, 

since any unsettled event details would be worked out 

by going through the process multiple times. 

Sail Grand Prix 

The Sail Grand Prix organization sponsors high-speed 

sailing catamaran races around the world with San 

Francisco Bay serving as the final location in the yearlong circuit. A review of the event permit application 

identified the high speeds at which the vessels operate

to be an extra or unusual hazard. Additionally, the sponsors proposed a race course located along the city waterfront, which encompassed the eastbound San Francisco 

Bay traffic lane with normally high vessel traffic, including passenger ferry operations. 

To address these items, a Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking was drafted, which allowed the public to 

make comments on any concerns associated with the 

event. Comments from the public generally focus on 

navigability or environmental concerns. Sail Grand Prix 

also had opportunity to present to local stakeholders at 

the Harbor Safety Committee of the San Francisco Bay 

Region for additional comments. After considering all 

comments, the SLR was established to create both the 

race course box and designated spectator areas. All environmental safety plans must be adhered to throughout 

an event. This was made evident in 2022 when a whale 

in the course prompted use of the marine mammal protection plan. 

Incorporating lessons learned from previous iterations of this event, spectator zones were established to 

prevent congestion and congregation of vessels along the 

waterfront. With these efforts, the event concluded safely

and the sponsors plan to return to the San Francisco Bay 

in the future, which may prompt the establishment of a 

permanent regulation to support continual safe event 

operations. 

The Escape from Alcatraz Swim

The Escape from Alcatraz Swim, consisting of 1,850 athletes braving the cold temperatures and strong currents 

in the vicinity of “The Rock,” is another iconic Bay Area 

event. A swim of this size requires careful consideration 

during the review of both the Marine Event Permit application and additional information collected through 

sponsor meetings.

For swims of any size, particular attention is given 

to the ratio of swimmers to safety vessels. During the 

review process for this event, or similar events, such as a 

Sail Grand Prix teams race past “The Rock,” Alcatraz Island, during the 2022 Sail Grand Prix race in San Francisco. Photo courtesy of Michael Carlson | Michael R. 

Photography 

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triathlon, athlete safety is the highest concern. 

To address this, the Waterways Management 

Office office reviews the event safety plan and

focuses on accounting for all swimmers and 

distressed swimmer recovery plans. Marine 

event sponsors are expected to contact the 

Command Center immediately if there are 

any reports of injury beyond first aid or less

than 100 percent accountability for participating members. This expectation is a stipulation 

of an issued Marine Event Permit and contributes to safe recovery and quick response to 

unaccounted for or injured participants. The 

Coast Guard also partners closely with local 

law enforcement marine units for event safety 

coordination. They assist with communication 

of local emergency medical requirements and 

provide us with local area expertise for different events. 

Partnerships and Coordination 

Sector San Francisco cannot act alone and uses 

well-established internal and external partnerships to accomplish its goals and keep the 

events on the Bay running smoothly. For events requiring on-scene Coast Guard oversight, such as enforcement 

of special local regulations, boat crews or a Coast Guard 

cutter may serve as the on-scene assets. These assets 

provide ready search and rescue platforms in case of an 

emergency while also preventing non-event participants 

from impeding the events.

Vessel Traffic Service San Francisco is another actively

involved internal partner. VTS is an around-the-clock 

watch of professional civilian and active duty military 

personnel who manage the transits of deep draft vessels, 

a multitude of ferry routes, and maintain awareness of 

marine events. They keep the Bay safe through vessel 

traffic monitoring and dissemination of information to

waterway users. Using radar displays, multiple camera 

installations, and radio communication with vessels, the 

VTS acts as a preventative watch for more than 6,590 

square miles of the San Francisco Bay and the Delta 

region.

Rounding out the list of partnerships is the “Neptune 

Coalition,” which consists of local, state, and regional law 

enforcement agencies with maritime assets. During Fleet 

Week and Sail Grand Prix, Sector San Francisco coordinates with the Neptune Coalition to ensure enforcement of the SLRs and safety coverage of the events. 

Additionally, for other non-major marine events, these 

organizations may be asked to provide on-scene support. 

Conclusion 

Holding a marine event may start with the submission of 

Team USA surges ahead as a safety boat looks on during the 2022 Sail Grand Prix race in San 

Francisco. Photo courtesy of Michael Carlson | Michael R. Photography 

an application, but it encompasses so much more. Without 

the efforts and coordination of the Coast Guard, VTS,

local partners, event sponsors, and average waterway 

users, these types of exceptional events could not occur 

in a way that keeps the Bay safe for all who enjoy it. 

About the authors: 

LT William Harris is a prevention officer in the Waterways Management Division at Sector San Francisco. Prior to this assignment, he 

served as an apprentice marine inspector at Sector New Orleans. 

LT Harris entered the Coast Guard through the Direct Commission 

Officer program. 

LT Anthony Solares is a prevention officer in the Waterways Management Division at Sector San Francisco and serves as the Waterways 

Safety Branch chief. His previous assignments include Marine Safety 

Detachment Dutch Harbor, Alaska; Marine Safety Unit Portland, Oregon; and Sector Miami. He entered the Coast Guard through Officer 

Candidate School. 

MST1 Shannon Curtaz-Milian is the marine events coordinator for the 

Waterways Management Division at Sector San Francisco. She has previously been stationed at Sectors New York and Miami, and on the Coast 

Guard Cutter Healy. She holds a bachelor’s in environmental and liberal 

studies from California State University, Sacramento. 

Endnotes: 

1. U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant Instruction Manual 16751.3, Permitting of 

Regattas & Marine Parades, March 19, 2003, p. 1-4&1-5 

2. U.S. Coast Guard, District 11 Instruction Manual 3120.1, Standard Operating 

Procedures, February 14, 2011, p. 7.1–63 

3. Sally Lindsay Honey, Jim Corenman, et al, US Sailing Independent Review Panel 

Inquiry into the Low Speed Chase Capsize during the Full Crew Farallones Race on 

14 April 2012, US Sailing, July 31, 2012, p. 4 

4. Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations Section 100.1105, San Francisco Bay Navy 

Fleetweek Parade of Ships and Blue Angels Demonstration, July 27, 2015 

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Economies of Scale 

Through Partnerships 

Effectively managing port expansion 

and complex evolutions 

by lCdr samuel danus Cdr baxter smoaK 

Waterways Management Division Chief Prevention Department Head 

Sector Maryland-National Capital Region Sector Maryland-National Capital Region 

U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Coast Guard 

The demand for waterway and port capacity 

continues to increase across the entire Marine 

Transportation System (MTS). Larger ships, shift1985 to 1995 after working as a maritime reporter for the 

Baltimore Sun. 3 During her time in office, Representative

Bentley was a strong advocate for protectionist trade 

policies in support of U.S. manufacturing and the U.S. 

Merchant Marine fleet. 4 

Coincidentally, the Port of Baltimore Harbor Safety 

and Coordination Committee also formed in the late 

1980s when federally maintained navigation channels 

and aids to navigation systems were being improved to 

accommodate larger cargo vessels. Today, this vibrant 

HSC continues to play an essential role in ensuring 

safety and coordination in a continually growing port.

In the midst of a global pandemic, the Port of Baltimore 

positioned itself to become the largest e-commerce port 

and one of the busiest shipping ports in the nation. 5 In 

2021, auto trade through the port increased by 13 percent, paper products by 73 percent, roll on/roll off farm

and construction machinery rose 30 percent, and general 

cargo was up 9 percent. 6 

Complex and High Flying 

Throughout 2020 and 2021, the HSC spurred coordination among stakeholders to facilitate sustained and safe 

maritime commerce during the complex Baltimore Gas 

and Electric (BGE) Key Crossing Reliability Initiative.

This two-year project, adjacent to the Francis Scott Key 

Bridge, began with driving approximately 120 steel piles, 

erecting eight monopole towers, and constructing waterlevel collision protection structures. The conclusion 

included two miles of high voltage power lines installed 

across the entire width of the Patapsco River, a vital shipping channel.7 

BGE engaged with the Port of Baltimore HSC on a 

regular basis, providing port stakeholders with briefings on the project’s status and collaborating to minimize any waterway impacts. This was critical to the port 

community’s understanding of the project’s importance 

ing trade patterns, and novel uses of our nation’s waterways are exciting, but present new risks that must be 

mitigated. From offshore wind development and autonomous vessels to ultra-large container ships, port expansion, expanded use, and increased waterway congestion, 

this growth, along with advancements in technology, 

presents unique challenges that need to be managed to 

safeguard our vital MTS.

To effectively reduce new risk profiles and address

evolving complexities, coordination and cooperation 

among MTS stakeholders is more essential now than 

ever. A well-connected and robust port coordinating 

body, commonly known as a harbor safety committee 

(HSC), provides the mechanism to tackle risk and facilitate complex port evolutions to prevent major disruptions. HSCs are defined by U.S. Coast Guard Navigation

and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 01-00.

1 

Furthermore, when port disruptions do occur, a 

resilient HSC provides an existing network for critical 

incident communication, crisis management, and stakeholder engagement to buy down risk within the complex. 

In 2021 and 2022, the Port of Baltimore and its approach 

channels faced several complex events where partnerships within the local HSC paid dividends in safety, 

quality communications, and effective port management

to control risk and manage multifaceted port evolutions. 

The Port of Baltimore 

Established, Historic, and Growing

June 2006 marked the Port of Baltimore’s 300th anniversary. At this milestone, the Maryland governor renamed 

the state’s public terminals the Helen Delich Bentley Port 

of Baltimore.

2 The name honors the six-term U.S. representative who represented suburban Baltimore from 

74 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

to maintaining a reliable electric grid by replacing the 

existing, aging high voltage transmission lines running 

under the Patapsco River and Fort McHenry Channel. 

Furthermore, it established a network of contacts 

between key stakeholders. In fall 2021, the U.S. Coast 

Guard, Association of Maryland Pilots, local vessel operators, Maryland Port Administration, and other regulators engaged to manage the sequential activities required 

to safely install conductors across the waterway. 

This tricky operation required numerous waterway 

closure and safety zones in order for the work to be performed safely. Overall, more than 100 hours of waterway 

closures were needed over a three-month period to complete this high-risk work. 8,9 

In addition to managing deep draft arrivals and 

departures around the waterway closures, a mechanism 

was established to immediately and directly inform key 

waterway users of any changes to the schedule due to 

weather or mechanical issues. Following a break of a 

synthetic line during a scheduled waterway closure, the 

Port of Baltimore HSC, BGE, and a contractor developed 

port guidance for draft-restricted vessels to use when 

planning departures and arrivals around the closures.

The port guidance mitigated the potential of a deep 

draft vessel grounding or fouling its main propulsion in 

the event of a line break. This coordination was critical 

because once vessels begin transiting along Baltimore 

Harbor and its approaches, there is nowhere for them 

to stop or turn around in the event of an obstruction or 

dropped wire, which could take hours to recover. 

Although the waterway closures were established to 

prevent an immediate danger to commercial and recreational traffic, the port guidance helped further optimize voyage planning for commercial vessels during 

Top: A helicopter prepares to land on a temporary 

landing area in the vicinity of the Baltimore Gas 

and Electric (BGE) Key Crossing Reliability Initiative 

project. Spanning the Patapsco River, the Francis 

Scott Key Bridge and the Fort McHenry Channel 

are seen in the background. Photo courtesy of 

Burns McDonnell Middle: A crane sets the top 

of a monopole on Tower 4 along the Baltimore 

Gas and Electric Key Crossing Reliability Initiative 

project. Photo courtesy of Burns McDonnell Left: 

A helicopter pulls rope across Patapsco River and 

Fort McHenry Channel for the Baltimore Gas and 

Electric Key Crossing Reliability Initiative project. 

Photo courtesy of Burns McDonnell 

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the scheduled port waterway closures. It also prevented 

a major incident from any unforeseen delay in line pulling operations. This complex evolution, with more than 

70 channel closures, was successfully completed with 

minimal disruption to port operations only because of 

the close coordination between the HSC and all stakeholders. 

Under Bridges and Through Narrow Channels 

In September 2021, and during the BGE Key Crossing 

Project, Port of Baltimore stakeholders also coordinated 

for the arrival of a heavy lift ship laden with four postPanamax container cranes to the Seagirt Terminal. These 

cranes were an important element to Ports America 

Chesapeake’s $166 million Port Expansion Project, which 

would allow the port to accommodate two ultra-large 

container ships simultaneously. 10 

In order for the cranes to transit underneath three 

critical highway bridges, their booms were lowered at 

the Annapolis Anchorage, providing less than 6 feet 

of vertical clearance. Lowering the cranes at anchor 

introduced additional complexity. The lowered cranes 

essentially increased the breadth of the vessel, making 

its supersized cargo approximately 490 feet wide for a 

transit in 800-foot-wide channels. Due to this increased 

breadth, it would not be safe for two-way traffic to occur

along the channel during this phase of transit if a meeting situation occurred with other deep draft vessels. To 

mitigate this risk, a moving safety zone was established 

through the rulemaking process to include a comment 

period for public input. Engagement through the HSC 

several months before the cranes’ anticipated arrival 

was critically important toward keeping waterway users 

apprised of the timing and allowing for proper voyage 

planning to ensure safety and mitigate any harmful 

impact to commerce. This information flow and quality communications proved extremely important among 

HSC stakeholders and contributed to the successful, and 

highly visible, evolution.

In addition, outreach was required beyond the 

maritime community, including coordination with the 

Maryland Transportation Authority, to halt vehicular 

traffic across the three bridges during off-peak hours;

a necessity to prevent accidents by distracted drivers. Furthermore, the cranes were delivered when the 

BGE Key Crossing Project power line transmission was 

Crewmembers from Coast Guard Station Annapolis, Maryland, provide and escort for the delivery of four new neo­Panamax cranes to the Port of Baltimore 

in September 2021. Coast Guard crews provided security zones throughout the transit into the port’s Seagirt Marine Terminal. Coast Guard photo by Petty 

Officer 1st Class Tara Molle­Carr 

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Transporting these neo­Panamax container cranes to Maryland’s Port of Baltimore meant transiting under the William Preston Lane, Jr. Memorial Chesapeake 

Bay Bridge, an endeavor requiring significant cooperation among multiple partner agencies. Photo courtesy of Maryland Port Administration/Bill McAllen 

beginning. The great coordination among the HSC, 

Maryland Transportation Authority, BGE project team, 

and public ensured that there would be no negative 

impact or unsafe situation to either evolution. 

Hard Aground and Channel Management 

On the evening of March 13, 2022, the Ever Forward, laden

with 4,965 containers and 600,000 gallons of mixed fuels, 

ran hard aground outside the Craighill Channel, a critical artery to the Port of Baltimore. 11 The relationships 

forged among Committee members and the greater port 

community proved essential to rapidly resuming commercial traffic and maintaining maritime commerce over

the 36-day event, which set the standard for environmental and MTS disaster responses. Galvanizing teamwork across our federal and state partner agencies, as 

well as leveraging port and industry stakeholders, the 

vessel was safely refloated without pollution or injury,

while largely mitigating adverse impacts to the MTS.

Although the grounded vessel did not directly 

impact the channel, its proximity required intense stakeholder engagement and coordination. The salvage operation necessitated a unified approach to coordinate the

required safety zones and management of commercial 

traffic. It involved the dredging of 206,280 cubic yards

of material, safe removal of 505 shipping containers at 

sea, as well as complex push-pull operations to free the 

vessel without compromise to the environment or MTS. 

These critical operational phases impacted the channel 

and, at times, required waterway closures. Furthermore, 

the risks involved with salvage operations—pollution 

and vessel stability concerns—could have negatively 

impacted the 50-foot-deep access to a major U.S. port 

during a time when there were already supply chain 

issues. 

Once again, longstanding port partnerships yielded 

great communication and mitigated risk, while ensuring there were no “blind spots” in the response. Salvage 

operations were highly dependent on weather, daylight, 

equipment, and tidal cycles. Sharing these intricacies 

with port partners and stakeholders via the HSC network facilitated communications and understanding.

Only permitting one-way traffic in the vicinity of the

Ever Forward for the duration of the response was a key

decision. During critical phases of the salvage operation, full channel closures were imposed. All key stakeholders were notified via routine briefs, detailed marine

safety information bulletins, and broadcast notices to 

mariners. The unified command was intentional in providing enough advance notice to facilitate planning and 

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minimize impacts to traffic and

commercial port operations. 

Conclusion 

Certainly, the Port of Baltimore 

is not unique in the diversity of the challenges it faces. 

Modernizing infrastructure, 

port expansion, larger ships, 

and increasing congestion on 

our waterways; all port complexes face new challenges and 

evolving risks that will continue to require exceptional 

coordination among MTS 

stakeholders. 

In 1999, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) 

report to Congress on the MTS 

envisioned a desired end state 

in 2020. Improved coordination 

among stakeholders was cited 

as a key element in achieving 

Containers are lightered off the grounded Ever Forward. Coast Guard photo 

the current head of the Prevention Department at Sector MarylandNational Capital Region, CDR Smoak is responsible for all marine safety 

missions across the navigable waters of Maryland and the District of 

Columbia. 

Endnotes: 

1. U.S. Coast Guard Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 01-00, 

“Guidance for the Establishment and Development of Harbor Safety 

Committees Under the Marine Transportation System (MTS) Initiative, 

25 April 2000 

2. Maryland State Archives. “Maryland at a Glance, Waterways; Port of 

Baltimore,” https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/01glance/html/

port.html, 05 May 2022 

3. United States House of Representatives. “BENTLEY, Helen Delich,” https:// 

history.house.gov/People/Detail/9284, 11 August 2022 

4. Dresser, Michael (August 6, 2016). “Helen Delich Bentley, congresswoman 

who was a staunch advocate of the port of Baltimore, dies”. The Baltimore Sun. 

Retrieved August 6, 2016 

5. Maryland Governor Office. “FACT SHEET: Port of Baltimore Is Booming, 

Leading Response to Supply Chain Crisis.” https://governor.maryland.

gov/2021/11/10/fact-sheet-port-of-baltimore-is-booming-leading-responseto-supply-chain-crisis/ 

6. Maryland Governor Office. “FACT SHEET: Port of Baltimore Is Booming, 

Leading Response to Supply Chain Crisis.” https://governor.maryland.

gov/2021/11/10/fact-sheet-port-of-baltimore-is-booming-leading-responseto-supply-chain-crisis/ 

7. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Public Notice 19-27. BGE Key Crossing 

Reliability Initiative / 230 kV Overhead Transmission Line. 28 May 2019. 

8. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Docket Number USCG-2021-0327. Safety 

Zone; Patapsco River, Baltimore, MD. 86 FR 31999. 16 June 2021 

9. Temporary Final Rule. Docket Number USCG-2021-0870. Safety Zone; 

Patapsco River, Baltimore, MD. 86 FR 67651. 29 November 2021 

10. Maryland Port Administration Press Release. “Port of Baltimore Welcomes 

Four Additional Gigantic Cranes to Service Container Ships,” 09 Sep 2021, 

https://mpa.maryland.gov/Press%20Releases/090921.pdf 

11. “Long Salvage Operation Expected for Grounded Boxship Ever Forward,” 

The Maritime Executive. 16 March 2022. https://maritime-executive.com/article/long-salvage-operation-expected-for-grounded-boxship-ever-forward 

12. U.S. Department of Transportation, “An Assessment of the U.S. Marine 

Transportation System: A Report to Congress,” September 1999 

13. U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation System, “An Assessment of the 

U.S. Marine Transportation System: Report to Congress,” 28 March 2022 

this vision.

12 This report is a key reference in the Coast 

Guard’s NVIC 01-00, which provided guidance to HSCs 

for addressing MTS issues at a local level. It provided a 

great playbook for port partners within HSCs to implement those recommendations from the 1999 DOT report 

to optimize the MTS.

In March 2022, the U.S. Committee on the Marine 

Transportation System, provided an updated report to 

Congress that reassessed the MTS. 13 This report discusses emerging trends and concerns within the MTS, 

to include offshore wind energy development, growing

ship sizes, and cybersecurity. With NVIC 01-00 being 

predicated on the 1999 report, it would be quite timely to 

gather best practices across all HSCs in order to update 

existing guidance. The findings of this updated report

could be implemented to help guide MTS stakeholders in 

addressing these complex challenges across our nation’s 

MTS. Let us envision the desired state of the MTS in 2040, 

today. 

About the authors: 

LCDR Samuel Danus has served in the U.S. Coast Guard for 15 years. 

As the Waterways Management Division chief at Sector MarylandNational Capital Region, he is responsible for overseeing aids to navigation and marine event permitting mission areas, while also preventing 

waterway impacts. In addition, he oversees the inspection of U.S. Coast 

Guard regulated waterfront facilities and containers. 

CDR Baxter Smoak has served for 18 years with assignments on the 

east, west and Gulf coasts, as well as the Great Lakes. He is a seasoned 

marine safety professional with afloat and ashore experience, as well as 

a robust background and qualifications in vessel and facility inspections, 

waterways management, marine investigations, and enforcement. As 

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Building Cyber Resiliency 

into Maritime Supply Chains 

by Paula de Witte, Jd, Ph.d. 

Professor of Practice 

Department of Computer Science and Engineering 

Texas A&M University Galveston 

Disruptive events may arise from many sources, 

including natural, such as hurricanes; intentional, such as accidents, cyberattacks, or 

transportation failures; pandemics; and geopolitical 

instability. A salient lesson learned from the disruptions 

arising from the COVID-19 pandemic was the fragility of 

our maritime supply chains.

This lesson provided an opportunity to examine the 

impacts on the maritime supply chain. In response to this 

“opportunity,” the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) funded a project to review and develop principles 

and best practices for cyber resiliency in maritime supply chains. The project was conducted through the DHS 

Center of Excellence based at Texas A&M University, 

the “Cross Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain 

Defense.” 

The research from this project resulted in a guidebook on principles and best practices for resiliency—the ability 

to maintain expected outcomes 

despite disruptive events—in 

maritime supply chains. 

Background 

As one of 16 DHS-defined critical

infrastructure sectors, the transportation system sector is unique. 

Most other sectors, like energy, 

chemical, critical manufacturing, and the defense industrial 

base are highly dependent on 

the resiliency of transportation 

systems for delivering necessary 

products, supplies, parts, and 

feedstock. These sectors, defined

for protecting cyber assets, have 

given rise to the concept of resiliency, which is the concept that all 

assets and systems—physical and 

virtual—in both the operational 

technology (OT) and information 

Chris sCarmardo 

Program Manager 

Cross Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense 

Department of Homeland Security 

technology (IT) environments remain operational during 

and after a disrupting event.

A key component of the transportation system is 

the maritime supply chain. This supply chain captures 

the flow and movement of goods and cargo using vessels, ports, and terminals and excludes the end points 

where the goods and cargo are transferred to or from 

intermodal transportation, like truck and rail. COVID-19 

disrupted the maritime supply chain with myriad consequences to both the international and United States’ 

economy. As stated in the DHS Resilience Framework 

document, the pandemic had a “debilitating impact on 

security, national economic security, and national [and] 

public health or safety.” 

While resiliency is currently associated with 

cyberattacks—maintaining power while the grid is 

attacked—similar response and recovery concepts are 

As the world becomes more connected, the supply chain becomes more vulnerable to cyberattacks, 

which can threaten our national security. When one aspect of the supply chain is compromised by a 

disrupting event, it cascades throughout the supply chain causing further disruptions. ake1150sb with NASA 

images | iStock /Getty Images Plus 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 79 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

used in maintaining or restoring operations in America’s 

ports after hurricanes. This project investigated whether 

resiliency concepts developed for cyberattacks and hurricanes can be used to generalize resiliency in the supply chain regardless of the initial cause(s). If so, these 

generalized principles and best practices could result in 

improving maritime supply chain design and execution 

and provide a common basis for response and recovery 

that would protect America’s maritime environment. 

Our conjecture is that recovery and response operations from a disruptive event, regardless of its cause— 

cyberattack, hurricane, global pandemic—have much 

in common. For example, hurricanes and the COVID-19 

pandemic disrupted the food supply chain. While the 

ways it was disrupted were different, the consequences

were the same. Directly, food in homes that hurricanes 

have damaged or flooded is to be thrown away because

of contamination that causes it to be considered unsafe 

to eat. Indirectly, hurricanes affect the food producers. The latest hurricane, Ian, destroyed a key crop of 

Florida citrus causing consumer prices to rise as the supply decreased when orchards were flooded or damaged

by wind. 1 

Similarly, COVID-19 caused a disruption in the processing or transportation of food due to closures or 

worker shortages that resulted in a disruption getting2 

food from the producers to consumers given the limited 

shelf life. 3,4,5 Similarly, cyberattacks could result in disrupting operations at food processors, the transportation 

network, or the food deliverers. All three produce the 

same consequences because disrupted operations result 

in bottlenecks, shortages, and competition for resources. 

Resiliency 

To better understand resiliency as a mechanism to 

effectively manage the supply chain, a new review of

the concept is required. Resiliency allows supply chain 

stakeholders to better manage unforeseen and unpredictable events that influence productivity, performance,

and routine and non-routine business operations. 6 If the 

model and resiliency are properly executed, we would 

expect actions to be less reactive and more proactive, 

as well as more predictive. Hence, concepts of building 

resiliency into entities are necessary to promote supply chain success, economic prosperity, and national 

security.

Optimally, systems are resilient from their initial 

design, however, they must be continually adapted to 

achieve resiliency. Further, given the dynamic nature of 

innovative technologies implemented with legacy systems and the maritime transportation environment, the 

goal of resiliency is a moving target. As such, there must 

The maritime supply chain is a key component of the transportation system. It captures the flow and movement of goods and cargo using vessels, ports, 

and terminals, but it excludes the end points where the goods and cargo are transferred to or from intermodal transportation, like truck like truck and rail. 

pigphoto| iStock/Getty Images Plus 

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Disruptions to the supply chain differ in their causes and provenance, but they result in common consequences, including increased prices, unacceptable 

delays, bottlenecks, and compromised operations that create cascading results for both maritime and intermodal transportation systems. MAGNIFIER | iStock / 

Getty Images Plus 

be a continuous focus on the principles and best practices associated with building resiliency into the supply 

chain. 

Viewpoint 

Guidebook: Principles and Best Practices for Supply Chain 

Resiliency approaches the topic from the viewpoint of

the Coast Guard as vessel traffic managers. There are

several recognized supply chain disruptors, though 

this project recognizes only those within the purview 

of the Coast Guard. For example, the Coast Guard does 

not have authority over detecting counterfeit goods or 

control over the actual sourcing, production, or product 

tampering that may occur during manufacturing.

The Coast Guard’s role begins when goods and cargo 

transit from international waters into those ocean or 

inland waterways controlled by the United States and 

ends when the goods and cargo exit waterways and enter 

intermodal transportation. Hence, our project focuses 

on the data provided by the information flow governing supply chains to better manage the physical movement of vessels that are within the purview of the Coast 

Guard. Although the Coast Guard is a key stakeholder in 

this project, the results are also useful to the commercial 

shipping industry, which directly controls the goods and 

cargo in the supply chain. As such, we are requesting 

a review of the research results from industry sources 

after the Coast Guard and DHS complete theirs. 

Project Innovations 

The innovations in this project include the development of a supply chain maturity model and associated 

metrics. Previous, similar models were from the viewpoint of those who have custody and control of the goods 

and cargo in the supply chain—commercial shipping. 

Further, their profitability depends on the efficient movement of these goods and cargo, so their decisions may be 

optimized for the respective entity and not over a larger 

group of entities. Because supply chains are so complex, 

the dependencies between factors affecting them are also

more complicated.

When one aspect of the supply chain is compromised 

by a disrupting event, it cascades throughout the supply 

chain causing further disruptions. For example, when 

the Ever Given obstructed the Suez Canal in 2021, there

were 150 ships queued behind it. Many had contractual 

issues for delivery of goods. Others may have had cargo 

that would expire if not delivered on time. Each of these 

disruptions can cascade into additional disruptions for 

their respective entities, and also affect the security and

economy of impacted countries because disruptions 

make it difficult for countries to maintain a stable workforce or maintain ready military forces. 7,8,9 Ships could 

forego the Suez Canal and travel around the African continent, a longer voyage with added risks, like increased 

costs and piracy. 

Typically, supply chain factors are modeled using a 

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type of complex mathematical analysis involving data 

networks, relationships between the different components of a supply chain, and figuring out the probabilities

of certain events, to determine the unintended consequences; for example, interrelated factors such as availability of critical supplies or equipment, labor shortages, 

and closures of ports. The dependencies would have an 

economic impact on the supply chain, and the responsibility, responsiveness, and overall interaction of the 

Coast Guard can be of major importance for mitigating 

the consequences of the supply chain downfall caused 

by disrupting events. 

The innovation in this project is developing the maturity model to be more holistic, including complex supply chain dependencies and expanding viewpoints to 

include vessel traffic managers without physical control

of the goods and cargo within the supply chain. The second innovation is metrics, which are near-real-time measurable factors used to better manage vessel traffic. The

understanding of these metrics—their capture, storage, 

and further data analysis—can identify industry best 

practices to increase the maturity level in the organization’s model. 

Conclusion 

Supply chain disrupters may be natural, fabricated, or 

caused by other factors, like pandemics or geopolitical 

instability. The most recent supply chain disruptions 

caused severe consequences to United States’ economic 10,11 and national security. 12 Many of these threats 

to national security came from increased numbers of 

cyberattacks that took advantage of the disruptions 

in the workforce caused by the pandemic. 13,14 It highlighted the fragility of supply chains and dependence of 

the United States on foreign materials and supplies; for 

example the inability to obtain critical supplies such as 

N95 masks and computer chips. These disrupting events 

differ in their causes and provenance, but they result

in common consequences, including increased prices, 

unacceptable delays, bottlenecks, and compromised 

operations that create cascading results for both maritime and intermodal transportation systems. 

This project examined these disrupting events, 

their impacts, and the risks they pose to the marine 

For more information 

Guidebook: Principles and Best Practices 

for Supply Chain Resiliency can be viewed 

at https://cbts.tamu.edu/files/2022/08/ 

Guidebook-Principles-and-Best-Practicesfor-Supply-Chain-Resiliency.pdf 

transportation system, to design a set of resiliency principles and best practices for maritime supply chains 

from the Coast Guard’s viewpoint of vessel management. Beyond the initial use of these best practices and 

guidelines for DHS and the Coast Guard, there has 

been considerable interest from members of Texas A&M 

University-Galveston’s network of industry board advisors as these findings should be useful to those involved

in commercial shipping.

It is without question that commercial shipping has a 

different mission than the Coast Guard. However, each

entity will benefit if the principles and best practices are

integrated and transparent, giving 

into the other. 

each entity insight 

Editor’s note: All publications produced because of this funding which 

are submitted for publication in any magazine, journal, or trade 

paper shall carry the following acknowledgement and disclaimer: 

This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award 

Number 18STCBT00001-03-00. 

The views and conclusions contained in this document are those 

of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 

About the authors: 

Paula S. deWitte, J.D., Ph.D., P.E., is a professor of practice in the Computer Science and Engineering Department at Texas A&M University, 

College Station, and an adjunct professor of law at the Texas A&M University Law School, Fort Worth. A licensed attorney in Texas, and a registered patent attorney, she holds a bachelor’s and master’s from Purdue 

University, earned her Ph.D. in computer science from Texas A&M University, and a law degree from St. Mary’s University. 

Mr. Chris Scarmardo is the program manager for the Cross Border 

Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense, with a strong background 

in business administration, and financial and program management. 

He has been with two separate DHS Centers of Excellence, developing, 

managing, and monitoring high-quality and high-value research and 

development. 

Endnotes: 

1. www.cnn.com/2022/09/28/business/hurricane-ian-food-prices) 

2. www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/food-supply-chains-andcovid-19-impacts-and-policy-lessons-71b57aea/) 

3. https://academic.oup.com/fqs/article/4/4/167/5896496 

4. https://www2.deloitte.com/ch/en/pages/consumer-business/articles/

covid19-has-broken-the-global-food-supply-chain.html 

5. https://academic.oup.com/fqs/article/4/4/167/5896496 

6. https://doi.org/10.1111/jbl.12202 

7. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41284-021-00314-1, 

8. www.american.edu/sis/news/20200521-the-impact-of-covid-19-on-nationaland-global-security.cfm 

9. www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19 

10. www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Chapter-3-new.pdf 

11. www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/03/initial-impact-covid-19-on-unitedstates-economy-more-widespread-than-on-mortality.html 

12. https://tnsr.org/2022/02/disease-outbreak-and-national-security-drawinglessons-from-the-covid-19-crisis-to-improve-emergency-response/ 

13. www.cisa.gov/publication/confronting-heightened-cybersecurity-threatsamid-covid-19 

14. https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/risk/cyber-strategic-risk/

articles/covid-19-the-impact-of-cyber-on-critical-infrastructure-in-the-nextnormal.html 

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It is Not the Same Sea 

Reconciling multiple waterway uses in the PAC­PARS 

by lCdr sara Conrad 

Port and Facilities Activities Section Chief 

Pacific Area 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Ernest Hemingway spent significant time from the

summer of 1942 to 1943 in his 38-foot fishing boat,

Pilar, patrolling the northern coast of Cuba for

German U-boats. It was an operation conducted with 

the U.S. military under the guise of catching fish. 1 His

romantic love of fishing and the sea were often espoused

in his works. To Hemingway, the Gulf Stream, specifically, was a place of adventure. 

In the first place the Gulf Stream and the other great 

ocean currents are the last wild country there is left. 

Once you are out of sight of land and of the other boats 

you are more alone than you can ever be hunting and 

the sea is the same as it has been since before men ever 

went on it in boats. 2 

While the sea remains largely unused, large swaths 

of it are being taken up by more than adventure seekers 

and fishers. The commercial transit industry is building

larger vessels with changing handling characteristics, 

automation, and crewing requirements. Marine sanctuaries are expanding to safeguard more living marine 

resources and their ecosystems, which have always 

inhabited the waters and need continued stewardship and protection. Tribes are acting to protect sacred 

sites. Military practice ranges are operating to ensure 

national security readiness. Alternative energy sources 

are expanding renewable, clean energy technologies. 

Most recently, space operations are carving out temporary hazard areas for launch or reentry of space vehicles.

Seeing the need to reconcile the sometimes overlapping physical requirements of all these interests 

and stakeholders prompted Coast Guard Pacific Area

Districts 11 and 13 to conduct a Pacific Coast Port Access

Route Study (PAC-PARS). 

The study involved an indepth vessel traffic analysis

combined with public outreach, comments, and contributions to evaluate the 

unimpeded paths for vessels proceeding to or from ports 

along the western United States, while also accommodating other waterway uses. 

What is the PARS Process? 

The Ports and Waterways Safety Authorities in 46 USC 

Chapter 700 requires the Coast Guard to conduct a Port 

Access Route Study before establishing or modifying any 

fairway or traffic separation scheme. 3 Two overarching

components informed the study—public contributions 

and the vessel traffic analysis. Using data from both 

inputs, the Coast Guard PAC-PARS team developed recommendations to establish shipping fairways for vessels 

transiting along the coasts of California, Oregon, and 

Washington. Once the recommendations were formed, 

the Coast Guard released the draft study to the Federal 

Register for public comment. 4 This non-mandatory step

allowed additional transparency to inform stakeholders 

on how the data were collected and analyzed and how the

public comments were adjudicated. It also requested final

input and recommendations. Once those additional comments are considered, the Notice of Study Results will be 

released to the Federal Register and sent to Headquarters 

to validate the recommendations and initiate the next 

steps, including the federal rulemaking process. 5 

Public Engagement and Collaboration 

The PAC-PARS started in July 2021 by seeking a 180-day 

public comment period on a Notice of Study posted in 

the Federal Register. 6 This initial announcement notified

the public of the study, giving them the opportunity to 

contribute, and also ensured the entire process remained 

transparent to all stakeholders, allowing any interested parties to provide 

input. During the comment period, Districts 11 

and 13, in collaboration 

The study involved an in­depth vessel 

traffic analysis combined with public 

outreach, comments, and contributions 

to evaluate the need for new or 

modified vessel routes. 

need for new or modified with sectors and other local 

vessel routes. These routes units, conducted extensive 

would ensure the safety of outreach efforts. For the 

navigation by providing study to be a successful 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 83 
 

 

This map represents the proposed fairways published as part of the draft study but may not reflect the final study recommendations. Basemap: Esri, GEBCO, 

DeLorme, NaturalVue. Overlays: USCG, NOAA, BOEM. 

84 Proceedings Summer 2023
Basemap: Esri, HERE, Garmin, FAO, NOAA, USGS, EPA. Overlays: USCG. 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 85 
This map does not re flect the final study recommendations. Basemap: Esri, HERE, Garmin, FAO, NOAA, USGS, EPA. Overlays: USCG. 

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and accurate reflection of all the waterway needs, they

wanted to ensure significant collaboration from a broad

range of waterway users. 

As the data analysis began, concurrent with outreach 

efforts, District 11 realized it wanted more granularity on

public concerns regarding certain areas where conflicting

waterways uses were likely. Specifically, the District sought

public input regarding the two California Wind Energy 

areas, the Navy’s Pacific Missile Range, and the approaches

to San Francisco Bay. It released a Notice of Inquiry in the 

Federal Register with an additional 28 questions regarding those areas to expand the Coast Guard’s dialog with 

the maritime community. 7 All comments received for 

both notices were considered in the drafted PARS recommendations and adjudicated as part of the study. 

Data Analysis 

The data analysis was an enormous task conducted by 

the Coast Guard Navigation Center (NAVCEN) and 

District 11. NAVCEN’s vessel traffic analysis was based

on Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) transponder

data for 10 port entrances along the West Coast. The 

District completed a similar analysis for offshore vessel

traffic which included data for both Districts 11 and 13.

The offshore analysis considered a number of data points

including, but not limited to:

• vessels (calendar years 2017–2021)

• vessel density (calendar years 2017–2021)

• type of vessel

• seasonal routing changes

• industry agreements

• recommended routes

• changes in traffic patterns since 2012

• marine sanctuaries

• whale location data

• environmental data

• fishing industry data

• marine incidents

• casualties

The years 2012, 2015, and 2017 through 2021 were

selected to determine both the average vessel activity 

over the last five years as well as long-term traffic pattern

trends over the last decade. This was done to showcase 

changes given various AIS carriage requirements and 

environmental regulation shifts. The data was used to 

create track-lines, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of individual transits from baseline to outside the 

exclusive economic zone. This data could then be broken 

down into components for individual study, like those 

noted above, or further processed for many other statistical analyses. 

Using geographic information system software, the 

District 11 Waterways staff overlaid the vessel traffic data

with other significant ocean uses and obstructions that

included: 

• Bureau of Ocean Energy Management

wind energy areas

• National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA) national marine sanctuaries

• marine life statistics

• NOAA fishing vessel data

• space industry marine activities

• military practice ranges

The resulting maps offered details for a comprehensive understanding of vessel traffic patterns and 

projected conflicts with existing and emerging uses of

Pacific Coast waters. These statistical analyses were critical to developing marine spatial planning with the least 

disruptive solution that met all avoidance needs. 

The 90 Percent Solution Fits 100 Percent 

In many projects, 90 percent would not necessarily be 

a respectable metric to measure success. For the PACPARS project, where wide-ranging needs and concerns 

of waterway uses and stakeholders were considered, the 

team aimed to accommodate all reasonable waterways 

uses to the extent practical while providing for safety of 

navigation along the Pacific Coast. Finding this solution

inevitably resulted in some sharing and concessions, but 

Districts 11 and 13 found ways to ensure each conflicting

space usage worked to protect the safe navigation of vessels without encroaching on other uses. 

Conclusion 

The waterways are national priorities due to their energy 

resources, sacred sites, critical supply chain role, particularly pertaining to food security, importance to national 

defense, and opportunity for exploration and adventure. 

The ultimate goal of the PARS process was to maintain 

those priorities while allowing emergent technologies 

to flourish and to provide an unobstructed space for 

vessels’ safe navigation. Balancing overlapping waterways’ uses is critical to the strategic needs of the United 

States and its citizens. As the uses for the sea continue to 

change, those strategic needs will as well. 

About the author: 

LCDR Sara Conrad has served in the U.S. Coast Guard for 14 years, 

serving in many capacities, most recently as the Pacific Area project 

manager for the PAC-PARS. She has received three Coast Guard Commendation Medals, two Achievement Medals, and three Meritorious 

Unit Commendations. 

Endnotes: 

1. Terry Mort, The Hemingway Patrols: Ernest Hemingway and His Hunt for U-Boats,

Scribner, 2010, p. 15. 

2. Terry Mort, The Hemingway Patrols: Ernest Hemingway and His Hunt for U-Boats,

Scribner, 2010, p. 61. 

3. Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA)(P.L. 95-474, 33 U.S.C. 1223(c)) 

4. 87 FR 52587 

5. Regulations.gov; USCG-2021-0345 

6. 86 FR 40791 

7. 87 FR 10757 

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Complex Risk Factors 

and Cascading Consequences 

in the Maritime Supply Chain 

by andreW tuCCi 

Consultant and CAPT, USCG (ret) 

Tempest Marine, LLC 

dennis egan 

Research Professor 

Rutgers University 

Christie nelson, Ph.d. 

Assistant Research Professor 

Rutgers University 

The research presented in this paper was funded by the Center for Accelerating Operational Efficiency under grant no. 17STQAC000001 from the 

U.S Department of Homeland Security. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or 

implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 

Diverse and complex, the global maritime supply chain is by far the largest single component of global trade. Most operational planning and 

fred roberts, Ph.d. 

Distinguished Professor and Director of CCICADA Center 

Rutgers University 

latha viJayagoPal 

Graduate Student 

Rutgers University 

ryan WhytlaW 

Consultant 

Rutgers University 

of the organizations that show up for local harbor safety 

and area maritime security committee meetings. 

In this article, MTS and the term “maritime supply 

chain” are not interchangeable. The latter includes the 

MTS and extends to other players, including overseas 

shipping, upland warehousing, long haul rail and truck 

lines, and endpoints such as retailers and manufacturers. These additional players are equally important to 

enabling the maritime supply chain to serve the broader 

economy.

The most serious consequences of marine supply 

chain issues may fall on entities not represented in traditional MTS discussions. Accordingly, our research is 

focused on understanding “cascading consequences” to 

all of these components of maritime trade. 

Background and Purpose 

Since 2020, a diverse collection of disruptions has unexpectedly impacted maritime supply chains, as well as 

non-traditional stakeholders. The COVID-19 pandemic 

was, and remains, a significant driver in these disruptions. Still, other events, including the blockage of the 

Suez Canal, cyberattacks, changing trade patterns, and 

the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have impacted maritime supply chains. When multiple disruptions coincide, 

or a new disruption occurs when another one is already 

underway, the risks and impacts can be significantly

harder to understand and quantify.

Consumers, manufacturers, MTS-related organizations, and government officials have all been impacted

by these events, often in unanticipated ways. These 

cascading consequences continue to flow through our

academic research has focused on single disruptions 

such as oil spills, hurricanes, or security threats to this 

system, especially at the port level. While maritime trade 

has proven resilient, challenges over the past few years 

have revealed that, when multiple disruptions coincide, 

maritime supply chains can be unexpectedly strained 

leading to cascading consequences.

A greater understanding of how these various disruptions interact can improve risk analysis, resilience, 

and stakeholder engagement. Quantifying the economic 

impact can improve modeling and demonstrate the 

value of reliable maritime supply chains. This research 

can also help prepare for a future where climate change, 

digital transformation, emerging technology, workforce 

demographics, and new trading patterns all present 

dynamic maritime supply chain risks. 

The MTS and Maritime Supply Chains 

The Marine Transportation System (MTS) is composed of 

port and vessel operators, agencies, seafarers, stevedores, 

and service providers that see marine transportation as 

central to their purpose and responsibility. A somewhat 

U.S.-centric term, in plain language, the MTS is made

up

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As automation increases, so does the potential for cyber related disruptions. Adi Goldstein | Unsplash 

economy and society. We seek to understand how these equipment. But, this type of scenario also has its advanvarious disruptions interact; how one type can magnify tages in that the similarity of the events may make it 

the impact of another; and where hidden or dispropor- relatively easy to prioritize needs and sequence the use 

tionate consequences may occur. Improved modeling of of specific resources.

these complexities can help us prepare for future events. Another way a complex disruption can play out is if 

In a project that is a joint effort, we are exploring com- different resources must be brought to bear against difplex, multivector disruptions to the MTS. The research ferent aspects of the situation. It might seem counterinincludes an extension of Center for Risk and Economic tuitive that this could make things worse since there is 

Analysis of Threats and Emergencies’ Economic reduced competition for individual resources. However, 

Consequence Analysis Tool, or E-CAT, which has suc- coordinating the response and resuming normal marine 

cessfully addressed the economic consequences of sup- supply chain activity could be challenging if different

ply chain issues. 

Types of Disruptions 

Complex Disruptions: 

What Makes Them So Complicated? 

All disruptions require some combination of capabilities, authorities, and skills 

to respond effectively. Resource limitations can aggravate responses if similar 

resources are needed to address multiple 

components of complex disruptions. For 

example, a vessel grounding and oil spill 

might both require work boats and crews 

to stabilize the vessel and deploy pollution 

There are countless examples of maritime disruptions, and even more ways to 

organize them. At the risk of oversimplification, this table provides a short list 

of the many types of disruptions that maritime supply chains may experience 

and should be read vertically. 

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agencies and private sector organizations, each with 

their own priorities and cultures, must still coordinate 

actions. 

For instance, imagine a vessel collision in a channel 

combined with a GPS/Automatic Identification System

disruption. The collision requires tug boats, traditional 

marine casualty investigators, and salvage experts. The 

GPS disruption requires technical experts skilled in electronics, satellite, and radio transmissions. Coordination 

between the groups and communication to supply chain 

stakeholders about how and when the situation will be 

resolved will be challenging. If there is any suggestion 

that the GPS disruption was a deliberate event, and that 

it contributed to the vessel collision, then a third, law 

enforcement-focused, set of players will be involved. 

Consider the above scenario from the perspective of a 

shipper, freight forwarder, pilot, or other maritime supply chain player. A blocked channel alone is unfortunate, but precision GPS might enable the use of alternate 

routes. Alternatively, GPS disruptions are a concern, but 

as long as ships can use established channels, marine 

traffic should continue at an acceptable, if not ideal, rate.

However, when combined, commerce is seriously hampered. The GPS disruption might also affect terminal

Maritime Supply Chain 

Study Partners 

Study partners include three Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) university centers of 

excellence: 

• the Command, Control, and

Interoperability Center for Advanced Data

Analysis (CCICADA) 1 at Rutgers University,

• the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis

of Threats and Emergencies (CREATE) 2 at

the University of Southern California,

• and the Center for Accelerating

Operational Efficiency 3 at Arizona State

University.

Endnotes: 

1. https://ccicada.org/ 

2. https://create.usc.edu/ 

3. https://caoe.asu.edu/ 

Ports are congested areas. Small disruptions can quickly have ripple effects. Lazy_Bear | Getty Images 

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operations, further increasing the complexity of the 

event and its impact on maritime supply chains.

Furthermore, disruptions that are new, novel, or reliant upon skills, capabilities, and resources from outside 

the MTS community can also comprise complex supply 

chain issues. This is especially true if outside experts do 

not prioritize the maritime supply chain.

The novel coronavirus is an example where seafarers and port workers had no special skills or training 

to respond to the virus and public health experts had 

no understanding of maritime work environments. 

Therefore, the priorities were not aligned. 

A similar situation could arise from widespread 

power outages impacting ports and other maritime 

supply chain players. The power generation and transmission organizations will be responding from different locations than the Coast Guard and potentially 

with different priorities. Meanwhile, freight forwarders

and other logistics providers will struggle to track and 

reroute cargo while on emergency power. A power outage, combined with some other disruption, could certainly lead to significant cascading consequences.

How Do Maritime Supply Chains Work? 

Despite these scenarios, maritime supply chains do work.

Countless individual workers and businesses innovate, 

improvise, and overcome obstacles, working independently and on a business-to-business level. Government 

agencies find ways to use their authority and capabilities to allow a company to efficiently resume business.

The hard work of all of these individuals has meant that, 

while the consequences of recent disruptions have been 

significant, they have been economic and transitory, not

societal and persistent. 

To help understand the impact of disruptions, the 

table on this page provides a highly simplified diagram

of critical supply chain elements. If any of these elements 

is negatively impacted, the system is resilient enough to 

recover with minimal costs and impacts—if the disruption is small. When the severity, duration, geographic 

scale, or other factors are sufficiently large, cascading

impacts occur. 

In our model, people are the founda- Critical Supply Chain Elements tion of all maritime supply chain activity. Despite automation, computers, and 

other technology, we rely on skilled workers at every step. This is what has made 

COVID-19 so disruptive. COVID-19 did no 

physical or cyber damage, but its impact 

on people slowed every link in the supply 

chain. 

The various non-human components 

are subject to damage and destruction, 

and MTS members, like other businesses, 

need to minimize costs, including replacement costs, 

which does not necessarily promote resilience. For example, gantry cranes at container terminals are vital for 

cargo operations, but no facility can afford to have an

extra $35 million gantry crane sitting idle on standby just 

in case a working crane becomes damaged. 

At the retail and manufacturing levels, the widely 

adopted “just in time” inventory system meant that 

businesses had little ability to absorb supply chain disruptions. While there is a great deal of discussion in 

the business community about revising this approach, 

the economic incentives for a lean inventory will likely 

prevail. 

While economic incentives do not necessarily promote resilience, in some cases they may even aggravate 

disruptions. Such is the case when ocean carriers find it

more profitable to leave empty containers in port, rather

than wait for them to be filled and loaded back on ships.

In other cases, the economic consequences of a disruption may be primarily borne by manufacturers and 

retailers, rather than by the maritime and port entities. 

Finally, government agencies, classification societies,

insurance companies, and similar organizations provide independent, expert risk oversight and governance 

functions. Their capacity is limited, and disruptions may 

push risk tolerances to uncomfortable levels.

The MTS is continuously evolving, however, and it 

is important to plan for its future. Will investment in 

systems allowing vessels to use new types of fuels lead 

to new infrastructure requirements and vulnerabilities? 

Will increasing automation lead to problems in the case 

of power outages? Will autonomous and semi-autonomous vessels on the water and trucks in the ports lead to 

new kinds of complex disruptions? We need to develop 

ways to address these kinds of questions. 

Development of Complex Disruption Scenarios 

The first phase of our research was to interview a variety of transportation experts on their experiences with 

disruptions. While all of the researchers have had some 

experience in this field, listening to these experts explain

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how the systems work, how they sometimes fail, and 

“what keeps them up at night,” was fascinating. Our 

initial round of interviews included port authorities, vessel operators, dry cargo and energy terminal representatives, Coast Guard personnel, academics, and even a 

representative from the air forwarders industry, for an 

outside perspective on supply chains. 

These experts helped us identify plausible and potentially useful scenarios to examine in more detail—a key 

element of our research. It soon became apparent that 

disruptions do not happen in a vacuum or against a 

backdrop of “ideal” supply chain activity. Accordingly, 

we are including pre-existing conditions and other considerations in our test cases. 

In our first scenario, a fire on a container ship leads

to a blockage of the Kill van Kull Federal Channel. The 

account below is an abbreviated version of the scenario 

we are developing with the cooperation of Coast Guard 

Sector New York and the Port of New York and New 

Jersey, which is planning an exercise along these lines.

Background Condition: A surge in port activity

coincides with a shortage of trucks and some road 

and bridge repairs. The result is long lines at container terminals and greater than normal congestion. 

These conditions add cost but don’t otherwise affect

port activity. 

Initial Disruption: A fire breaks out in the cargo

hold of a container vessel as it approaches a terminal 

in the Kill van Kull in New York Harbor. There are no 

deaths, but the intense heat and smoke, and concerns 

about a possible capsize, make moving the vessel 

risky. The channel is blocked for a week. Overhaul, 

salvage, and cargo transfer take an additional week, 

with much of the cargo and other vessels diverted to 

other nearby terminals.

Secondary Disruption: A cyberattack corrupts

the data and stops operations at two terminals for 

three days. Other terminals slow their cargo operations by 50 percent for two days, while both internal IT 

personnel and law enforcement agencies check data 

integrity. The combination of a suspicious fire and

a cyber attack suggests that a coordinated, sophisticated attack on the port is in progress. The Coast 

Guard sets Maritime Security Level 2. This further 

slows the movement of cargo and vessels through the 

port area.

Additional considerations: The source of the

fire might have been illegal or improperly stored 

Delayed or diverted cargo can have serious impact on businesses far from port areas. liorpt | Getty Images 

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Small, novel threats—like a lithium ion battery fire—can have big impacts. Photo courtesy of Tavo Romann 

hazardous materials or sabotage. Uncertainty about 

what is in any given, and now fire-damaged, container, compounded by data integrity questions, will 

complicate the response. Large amounts of heavy 

black smoke in the middle of a densely populated 

area raises public health concerns in two states, 

including for ferry passengers. Various cargo owners 

may decide to sue each other or the vessel owner, further slowing cargo and vessel disposition. Longshore 

workers may refuse to work until air monitoring 

deems it safe. 

Questions We Would Like to Answer 

While this scenario poses a host of emergency response 

challenges, our research is focused on understanding 

and quantifying the supply chain impacts. How many 

vessels and how much cargo would this event affect?

Would vessels and cargo divert to other ports? After the 

channel is clear, how long would it take for normal trade 

to recover, and would that happen in steps or all at once? 

Who outside the port area would be affected, and by

how much? What actions would promote a fast economic 

recovery? 

With the help of Sector Los Angles/Long Beach, 

The Kill Van Kull Federal Channel, 

a tidal strait between Staten Island, 

New York City, and Bayonne, 

New Jersey, is one of the most 

heavily travelled waterways in the 

Port of New York and New Jersey. 

The vast majority of containerized 

cargo bound for the port passes 

through the Kill Van Kull. 

the LA Port Authority, and security leads at the Port of 

Long Beach, we are developing a West Coast scenario 

involving a wildfire-caused power loss combined with

more conventional port disruptions. As in New York, an 

already planned exercise provides the perfect opportunity to examine the cascading impacts of these scenarios. 

We are grateful to Coast Guard and port authority personnel for finding ways to dovetail their preparedness

Summer 2023 Proceedings 93 
 

 

 

The majority of all containerized cargo destined for the 

Port of New York and New Jersey traverses the Kill Van Kull 

Federal Channel. Photo courtesy of Jim.henderson 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

work with our research, as we are confident it will benefit

all parties. 

The goal of the research is to develop a model, useable 

by various stakeholders, to better understand multiple 

risks to maritime supply chains, including the likely economic consequences of such events. 

Ukraine 

A few short months after our initial research was 

approved, Russia invaded Ukraine. We quickly expanded 

the scope of our work to track the maritime disruptions of the invasion, and DHS has approved continued 

research on that topic. 

While the direct impacts to the U.S. MTS have been 

small, there have been substantial impacts to other 

maritime stakeholders, from stranded seafarers to the 

superyachts of oligarchs. Energy, food, and commodity 

trading have been impacted, and smuggling and sanctions-evading activity have accelerated. 

While much of the focus has been on food and energy 

trade, we are completing a study that describes the conflict’s impact on grains and certain metals, including

nickel, palladium, titanium, aluminum, copper, and uranium. Russia is an important source of these materials, 

and trade restrictions have led to skyrocketing commodity prices. This has various cascading impacts, including 

on European automotive production lines, and on the 

production of semiconductors and catalytic converters 

in the United States. 

We will provide a much more detailed accounting of 

this significant disruption in the future. For now, we note

that the war has weakened governance, shifted trade 

patterns and partners, strained ports, upended markets, 

and threatened the lives and livelihoods of people well 

beyond the combat areas. 

Initial Observations 

While our work is in no way complete, we have learned 

a tremendous amount from the various professional 

How You Can Help 

If you have opinions, observations, or recommendations related to “complex disruptions” and how the industry can improve its 

resilience, please contact Dr. Fred Roberts, 

director of the Command, Control, and 

Interoperability Center for Advanced Data 

Analysis, at froberts@dimacs.rutgers.edu. 

We’d love to talk with you! 

experts we have interviewed, as well as from ongoing 

reviews of industry publications, government data, and 

other sources. A few of those observations include: 

• Cybersecurity remains a concern, and even the

perception that data integrity may be in doubt

could impact supply chain activity.

• Improperly labeled or packaged hazardous

materials, including flammable items such as

lithium ion batteries, is a growing concern.

• With much of the maritime community’s focus on

COVID-19 and technology issues in recent years,

the ability of port communities to implement and

sustain meaningful security requirements (e.g.,

maritime security) is uncertain.

• Maritime supply chain challenges caused many

businesses to shift from a “just in time” to a

“just in case” approach to their inventory and

supply chain management practices. As supply

chains stabilize, it is unclear if organizations will

continue this practice or return to their former,

cost-minimizing approach.

About the authors: 

Andrew Tucci is a retired U.S. Coast Guard captain with over 30 years 

of experience working with the marine industry in security, safety, and 

environmental risk management. 

Dennis Egan is a research professor at Rutgers University and assistant director of the Command, Control and Interoperability Center for 

Advanced Data Analysis (CCICADA). His research includes cyber security and complex disruptions to the marine transportation system. Mr. 

Egan represents CCICADA on the Port of New York and New Jersey 

Area Maritime Security Committee. 

Christie Nelson, Ph.D., is an assistant research professor for the Command, Control and Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis 

Center and the Professional Science Masters Program. She has done 

various maritime projects for the U.S. Coast Guard, security related 

projects, and more, and is the director of the Rutgers MBS Externship 

Exchange Program. 

Fred Roberts, Ph.D., is distinguished professor of mathematics at Rutgers 

University and director of the Command, Control and Interoperability 

Center for Advanced Data Analysis, a U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security university center of excellence. He has done extensive research 

on cyber and physical disruptions to the marine transportation system, 

much of it in collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Latha Vijayagopal is a graduate student of the Rutgers MBS program 

and parttime research assistant at the Command, Control and Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis. She previously worked 

17 years for a Fortune 500 company that builds enterprise management 

software, in their research and development and technology offices. 

Ryan Whytlaw, holds a Master of Public Policy and is an emergency 

planner with 20 years of experience in the fields of emergency management, security and transportation. He originally joined Rutgers in 2009 

and currently supports the Command, Control and Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis as a consultant. His experience as a 

researcher includes supporting emergency management and evacuation 

planning, entertainment venue and stadium security, and transportation systems disaster resiliency. 

Summer 2023 Proceedings 95 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chemical of the Quarter 

Understanding Methyl Alcohol 

by lt luKe orr 

Tank Vessel and Offshore Division 

U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Center 

piping and ventilation systems for carriage of methyl alcohol. Typically, the restrictions placed on toxic cargo also 

include preventing it from being stored next to fuel tanks, 

though methyl alcohol is exempt from this rule. 

What is the Coast Guard doing about it? 

system. 

There is no current regulation regarding methyl alcohol as 

a safe alternative fuel for U.S. vessels, meaning the Office

of Design and Engineering Standards approves the use of 

methyl alcohol for this purpose on a case-by-case basis. 

The office is also responsible for developing and maintaining cargo regulations. The Marine Safety Center, however, 

ensures that vessel plans comply with regulations ensuring 

toxic and hazardous cargos are transported in a safe manner and provides a Cargo Authority Attachment (CAA) to 

marine inspectors in the field. Marine inspectors verify the

vessel is within compliance and, if they are, the inspectors 

will issue the Certificate of Inspection and the CAA endorsing the cargo list. Through this team effort, the Coast Guard

enforces the regulations for both fuel usage and the shipment of hazardous and toxic cargos, enabling safe carriage 

of methyl alcohol on our nation’s marine transportation 

About the author: 

LT Luke Orr works in the Tank Vessel and Offshore Division at the U.S. 

Coast Guard Marine Safety Center. He graduated from the Coast Guard 

Academy in 2018 with a B.S. in mechanical engineering, and the University of Washington in 2022 with an M.S. in chemical engineering. He 

was previously stationed onboard CGC Vigilant as a student engineer. 

References: 

PubChem, U.S. National Library of Medicine. https://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih. 

gov/compound/methanol 

International Maritime Organization. MSC.1/Circ.1621 Interim Guidelines for 

the Safety of Ships Using Methyl/Ethyl Alcohol as Fuel (2020) 

International Maritime Organization. “Methanol as Marine Fuel: Environmental 

Benefits, Technology Readiness, and Economic Feasibility” (2016) 

What is it? 

Methyl alcohol (CH3OH), more commonly known as 

methanol (MeOH), is an organic compound and the 

simplest of all alcohols. Unlike ethanol, the alcohol 

found in adult beverages, two ounces of methyl alcohol is considered a lethal dose. It is toxic if ingested, 

inhaled, or when it comes into contact with skin or eyes. 

In addition, methanol is highly flammable in both the

liquid and vapor state. 

The United States produces more than 5.7 million 

metric tons of methyl alcohol, a process that involves 

reforming natural gas with steam then distilling the 

mixture, annually. Methanol is used as a precursor in 

chemical production for products such as paints, medicine, and adhesives. It is used as an antifreeze in fuels 

and a solvent in laboratories. 

Why should I care? 

With the increased desire to use alternative fuels that 

reduce or eliminate greenhouse gases, the International 

Maritime Organization (IMO) approved methyl alcohol 

as an alternative maritime fuel in 2020. Ship builders 

have started designing vessels that not only transport 

methyl alcohol, but also use it as a fuel, which can significantly reduce the amount of greenhouse gas emissions compared to conventional fuels. 

Even with known toxic traits, it was not until the 2021 

publication of the International Code for the Construction 

and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals 

in Bulk, published by the IMO, that methyl alcohol was 

categorized as a safety hazard. Prior to the updated code, 

it was categorized only as a pollution hazard. This new 

update also recognizes methyl alcohol vapor as toxic and 

not just flammable as it was previously categorized. One of

the newest requirements is that vessels must have 

separate 

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Nautical

Engineering

Queries

Nautical 

Engineering

Queries 

Questions 

Prepared by NMC Engineering

Examination Team 

1. How is a wattmeter electrically connected in a circuit?

A. In Series

B. In Parallel

C. In Series – parallel

D. Inductively

2. The seal piping obtains liquid from the discharge side of the pump and directs the liquid to the . 

A. packing gland

B. wearing ring

C. vacuum seal

D. lantern ring

3. When a vessel is inclined due to an external force, such as the action of seas, in which no cargo shifts, the

tendency of the vessel to return to its original position is caused by the shift in .

A. center of buoyancy

B. center of gravity

C. center of flotation

D. metacentric radius

4. Accumulation tests are conducted in order to determine the . 

A. steam generating capacity of an individual boiler

B. steam relieving capacity of safety valves

C. maximum combined oil consumption of all oil burners installed on a single boiler

D. maximum combined steam generating capacity for all propulsion boilers of a single plant

Summer 2023 Proceedings 97 
 

 

 

 

AEngineering 

nswers

1. A. In Series Incorrect 

B. In Parallel Incorrect 

C. In Series – parallel Correct Answer. The wattmeter, is an instrument with both a current and

a voltage or potential element. The current element is connected in series 

and the potential element in parallel with the circuit in which the power is 

being measured. 

D. Inductively Incorrect 

Reference: Electric Circuits and Machines, 5th Ed., Lister, page 38, and fig 2-15 

2. A. packing gland Incorrect 

B. wearing ring Incorrect 

C. vacuum seal Incorrect 

D. lantern ring Correct Answer. Clear water under pressure should be piped to the seal

cages (lantern ring). In the event that no water is readily available, it may be 

possible to run a line from the discharge of the pump(s). 

Reference: Centrifugal Pump Clinic, 2nd Ed., Karassik, page 475 

3. A. center of buoyancy Correct Answer. When a vessel is inclined, the center of buoyancy will

move since it is the center of volume of the immersed portion of the vessel, 

and a wedge of buoyancy has been transferred. It is this movement of B 

which results in a tendency of the vessel to return to its original position. 

B. center of gravity Incorrect 

C. center of flotation Incorrect 

D. metacentric radius Incorrect 

Reference: Stability and Trim for the Ship’s Officer, 3rd Ed., George, page 7 

4. A. steam generating capacity Incorrect 

of an individual boiler 

B. steam relieving capacity Correct Answer. An accumulation test is conducted in the presence of a

of safety valves USCG Inspector to determine that the boiler’s safety valves have a sufficient

capacity to relieve the steam from the boiler. 

C. maximum combined Incorrect 

oil consumption of all oil burners

installed on a single boiler

D. maximum combined Incorrect 

steam generating capacity

for all propulsion boilers

of a single plant

Reference: Fundamentals of Steam Generators as applied to Marine Propulsion Power Plants, MEBA Dist. 2, Page 58, 303, 304 

98 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

Nautical

Deck

Queries

Nautical Questions 

Deck 

Queries Prepared by NMC Engineering

Examination Team 

1. BOTH INTERNATIONAL & INLAND: In complying with the Rules, of what must the mariner take due

regard?

A. Radar information about nearby vessels

B. The occupation of the other vessel, if known

C. Limited backing power of his vessel

D. All of the above

2. A passenger vessel in river service which operates in fresh water at least 6 out of every 12 months since the last

dry dock examination must be dry-docked at intervals not to exceed which time frame?

A. 12 months

B. 24 months

C. 48 months

D. 60 months

3. Which statement concerning satellite EPIRBs is TRUE?

A. The coded signal identifies the nature of the distress situation.

B. Once activated, these EPIRBs continuously send up a signal for use in identifying the vessel and for determining

the position of the beacon.

C. The coded signal only identifies the vessel’s name and port of registry.

D. If the GMDSS Radio Operator does not program the EPIRB, it will transmit default information such as the

follow-on communications frequency and mode.

4. You are on a course 201°T. To check the speed of your vessel, you should observe a celestial body on which

bearing?

A. 090°

B. 180°

C. 111°

D. 201°

Summer 2023 Proceedings 99 
 

 

 

 

 

 

ADeck 

nswers 

1. A. Radar information about Incorrect 

nearby vessels 

B. The occupation of the other vessel, Incorrect 

if known

C. Limited backing power of his vessel Incorrect 

D. All of the above Correct answer. “In construing and complying with these Rules, due regard 

shall be had to all dangers of navigation and collision and to any special 

circumstances, including the limitations of the vessels involved, which may 

make a departure from these Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger.” 

Reference: Int’l./Inland Navigation Rule 2(b)

2. A. 12 months Incorrect 

B. 24 months Incorrect 

C. 48 months Incorrect 

D. 60 months Correct answer. “Vessels that operate in fresh water at least six months 

in every 12-month period since the last drydock examination must undergo 

drydock and internal structural examinations at intervals not to exceed five 

years.” 

Reference: 46CFR71.50-3(b)(3)

3. A. The coded signal identifies Incorrect 

the nature of the distress situation 

B. Once activated, these EPIRBs Correct answer. “An important feature of 406MHz emergency beacons is the 

continuously send up a signal addition of a digitally encoded message, which provides such information as the 

for use in identifying the vessel country of origin and the identification of the vessel in distress, and position 

and for determining the position data from onboard navigation equipment.” 

of the beacon

C. The coded signal only identifies the Incorrect

vessel’s name and port of registry

D. If the GMDSS Radio Operator Incorrect 

does not program the EPIRB, it will

transmit default information such

as the follow-on communications

frequency and mode

Reference: Marine Radionavigation and Communications, Monroe and Bushy, pages 148–149 

4. A. 090° Incorrect 

B. 180° Incorrect 

C. 111° Incorrect 

D. 201° Correct answer. “Observations made directly on the beam are helpful in 

determining whether the ship is on the track line, while observations obtained 

dead ahead or astern show how far she has advanced.” 

Reference: Dutton’s Nautical Navigation, Cutler, 15th ed., page 349 

100 Proceedings Summer 2023
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-

In the News: Orcas Greet Polar Star in Antarctic 

Orcas spy hop in the broken ice behind the 

Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star as it conducts ice 

breaking operations in the Southern Ocean, 

on January 1, 2023, as part of Operation Deep 

Freeze 2023. Operation Deep Freeze is one of 

many U.S. military operations in the Indo Pacific 

region that promotes security and stability 

across the region. Inset: Fireman Kenadi Kane, 

a member of the auxiliary engineering division 

on Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star, watches orcas 

swim near the cutter. Coast Guard photos by 

Petty Officer 3rd Class Aiden Cooney 
 

 

 

 

 

 

PRSRT STD 

POSTAGE & FEES PAID 

U.S. COAST GUARD 

PERMIT NO.G-157 

COMMANDANT (CG-5PS-D) 

ATTN: PROCEEDINGS 

US COAST GUARD STOP 7509 

2703 MARTIN LUTHER KING JR AVE SE 

WASHINGTON, DC 20593-7509 

Official Business 

Penalty for Private Use, $300 

Coast Guardsmen enforce a safety zone around wild horses as they cross the Assateague 

Channel separating Virginia’s Assateague and Chincoteague islands during the 83rd Annual 

Pony Swim in 2008. Events like the pony swim, New York’s Fleet Week, America’s Cup 

sailing race on San Francisco Bay, and space launch and recovery operations are just a few 

of the novel uses of the nation’s waterways that require Coast Guard presence. Coast Guard 

photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Mark Jones