NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM ROBERT DIXON,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.
ROBERT L e GRAND, Warden; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 15

- 16728
D.C. No. 3:13

- cv - 00586

- RCJ

- VPC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding Submitted February 14, 2017 **
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS , and FERNANDEZ , Circuit Judges. Nevada state prisoner William Robert Dixon appeals pro se from the district
court’ s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional
claims. We have juris diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo
. Toguchi v. Chung , 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004)

. We may affirm on any

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 1 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 15

- 16728

basis supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul , 547 F.3d 1055, 1058

- 59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
S ummary judgment on Dixon’s access - to

- courts claim was proper because
Dixon failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ alleged refusal to request Dixon’s legal materials from Ohio in a timely manner caused his injury

. See Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 348

- 49 (1996) (access

- to

courts claim requires actual prejudice to contemplated or existing litigation, such as inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles , 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In a § 198 3 action, the plaintiff must .

. . demonstrate that the defendant’ s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”). The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dixon’s claim alleging denial of mail because Dixon failed to raise a gen uine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted administrative remedies or whether
administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies

. . . means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doin g so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)); Williams v. Paramo , 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (a p risoner who does not exhaust administrative remedies must show that3 15

- 16728

“there is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him

. . . .”)

. We do not consider documents no t filed with the district court

. See United
States v. Elias , 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990)

. We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised in the opening brief or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on ap peal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009). All pending motions and requests are denied

. AFFIRMED.