[Cite as Paul v. Hannon, 2017-Ohio-1261.]

STATE OF OHIO, CARROLL COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

TERRI L. PAUL, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V. 

HARRIETT LUCINDA HANNON, ET AL., 

 DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES. 

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CASE NO. 15 CA 0908 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas of Carroll County, Ohio 

Case No. 2013CVH27582 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part 

Reversed in part 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant Attorney David E. Butz 

Attorney Matthew W. Onest 

4775 Munson St., NW/ P.O. Box 36963 

Canton, Ohio 44735-6963 

For Defendants-Appellees Attorney Karen J. Greenwell 

Attorney G. Brian Wells 

250 West Main St. Suite 1600 

Lexington KY 40507 

Attorney Eric C. Johnson 

12 W. Main Street 

Canfield, Ohio 44406 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

 

 

 Dated: March 31, 2017 
[Cite as Paul v. Hannon, 2017-Ohio-1261.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Terri Paul, appeals from a Carroll County Common 

Pleas Court judgment denying her motion for partial summary judgment and granting 

the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants-appellees, Harriet Hannon and 

the Estate of Robert Douglas Hannon. 

{¶2} This case involves the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (ODMA). Appellant is 

the owner of a 70-acre tract of land in Perry Township (the Property) and the owner 

of a one-half interest in the oil and gas interest below the Property. Appellees are the 

owners of the other one-half interest in the oil and gas below the Property. Appellant 

sought to reunite appellees’ oil and gas interest with her interest pursuant to the 

ODMA. Appellees sought to preserve their one-half interest pursuant of the ODMA. 

{¶3} On October 25, 1944, Raymond and Nellie Davis sold to R.H. Hannon a 

one-half interest in all oil and gas and other minerals except coal underlying the 

Property. The deed is referred to as the “Davis Deed.” 

{¶4} On October 30, 1944, Russell and Florence Cain sold to R.H. Hannon a 

one-half interest in all the oil and gas under a 60-acre tract of land in Perry Township, 

Carroll County. This is referred to as the “Cain Deed.” 

{¶5} On December 16, 1944, W. McClelland and Wilma Patterson 

transferred to R.H. Hannon a one-half interest in all the oil and gas under a 147-acre 

tract of land which is referred to as the “Patterson Deed.” 

{¶6} On July 31, 1989, the above three interests, those represented by the 

Davis, Cain, and Patterson Deeds, and any other mineral interests in Carroll County, 

Ohio owned by R.H. Hannon, were conveyed to R.H. Hannon’s children Lucinda 

Hannon, Doug Hannon, and Hal Hannon, in equal shares by the Estate of R.H. 

Hannon. This transfer is referred to as the “Children’s Deed.” In addition to other 

things, the Children’s Deed specifically referenced the Davis, Cain, and Patterson 

Deeds stating: 

Lands situated in Section 30, Township 12, Range 5, Perry Township, 

Carroll County, Ohio as more particularly described in an instrument 

from Russell Cain and Florence Cain dated October 30, 1944 and 
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recorded in Volume 28, Page 33, Volume 28, Page 32 and Volume 28, 

Page 39, Lease Records, Carroll County, Ohio. 

{¶7} Hal Hannon later sold all of his interest in the Children’s Deed to 

Lucinda Hannon. That transfer, dated August 14, 1989, is referred to as “Hal’s Deed.” 

Thus, at this point, Lucinda owned a two-thirds interest in the minerals conveyed by 

the Children’s Deed and Doug Hanon (now his estate) owned one third. 

{¶8} In 1989, appellant and her spouse acquired from Thelma Borland and 

Nellie Davis the surface and other interest in what is described above as the Davis 

Deed with the specific exception of the one-half interest in oil and gas and other 

minerals deeded to R.H. Hannon. This transfer from Borland and Davis to appellant 

and her spouse is called the “Paul Deed.” 

{¶9} On May 27, 2010, appellant’s spouse transferred his interest in the Paul 

Deed to appellant by quitclaim deed. This deed is referred to as the “Quitclaim Deed.” 

As a result, appellant now owns the surface lands and one-half interest in the 

minerals below the land and appellees own the other one-half interest in the minerals 

below the surface land in the Property. 

{¶10} In 2011, appellant leased her oil and gas interest in the Property to 

Chesapeake Exploration, LLC. A memorandum of the lease was recorded. 

Subsequently, appellant learned that Chesapeake would pay her only one-half of the 

proceeds because it determined that one-half of the oil and gas rights belonged to 

appellees. In April 2012, appellant took steps to try to obtain appellees’ one-half 

interest by initiating the steps set forth in the ODMA. 

{¶11} On April 20, 2012, appellant mailed to both appellees a document titled 

Notice of Intent to Declare Mineral Interest Abandoned Pursuant to R.C. 5301.56. 

{¶12} On May 25, 2012, both appellees filed a document titled Affidavit to 

Preserve Mineral Interest which stated that appellees wished to preserve their oil and 

gas interests. 

{¶13} On June 14, 2012, appellant recorded two documents both titled 

Affidavit of Fact Relating to Title to Real Estate, which state that the mineral interests 
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previously owned by appellees have been abandoned. 

{¶14} On July 24, 2012, appellant recorded two documents both titled 

Affidavit of Facts asking the County Recorder to marginally note the abandonment of 

the mineral interests of appellees pursuant to the previously filed Affidavits of 

Abandonment. 

{¶15} On November 7, 2012, December 7, 2012, and December 19, 2012, 

appellees filed Memorandums of Oil and Gas Lease reflecting the leasing of their oil 

and gas interests to Chesapeake Exploration, LLC. 

{¶16} On July 11, 2013 appellant filed a complaint against appellees and 

others seeking relief in the forms of declaratory judgment, quiet title, injunction, 

slander of title, negligence/negligence per se, and unjust enrichment. 

{¶17} Appellees filed an answer, counterclaim, and third-party complaint. In 

their counterclaim, appellees sought declaratory judgment, quiet title, and slander of 

title. The third-party claim was bifurcated and is not an issue here. 

{¶18} Appellant filed a motion for partial summary judgment on her complaint 

for declaratory relief, quiet title, injunctive relief, and slander of title. Appellant also 

sought summary judgment on all claims asserted in appellees’ counterclaim. 

Appellees also filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellees sought summary 

judgment on their counterclaim and on each of appellant’s claims against them. 

{¶19} The trial court denied appellant’s motion and granted appellees’ motion. 

The court quieted title in favor of appellees with regard to the one-half interest in the 

oil and gas underlying the Property. The court also awarded appellees nominal 

damages of $1.00 on their counterclaim for slander of title. 

{¶20} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, appellant does not 

challenge the trial court’s award of summary judgment to appellees’ regarding 

appellant’s claims for unjust enrichment, conversion, or constructive trust. 

{¶21} An appellate court reviews the granting of summary judgment de novo. 

Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 8. Thus, 

we shall apply the same test as the trial court in determining whether summary 
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judgment was proper. 

{¶22} A court may grant summary judgment only when (1) no genuine issue 

of material fact exists; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; 

and (3) the evidence can only produce a finding that is contrary to the non-moving 

party. Mercer v. Halmbacher, 9th Dist. No. 27799, 2015-Ohio-4167, ¶ 8; Civ.R. 56(C). 

The initial burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the essential elements of the case 

with evidence of the type listed in Civ.R 56(C). Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 

292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts 

to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts to show that there is a genuine 

issue of material fact. Id.; Civ.R 56(E). “Trial courts should award summary judgment 

with caution, being careful to resolve doubts and construe evidence in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Cos., 67 Ohio St.3d 344, 346, 

1993-Ohio-191, 617 N.E.2d 1129. 

{¶23} Appellant’s first assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CLASSIFIED R.C. 5305.56 AS A 

FORFEITURE STATUTE AND AS A RESULT, APPLIED AN 

IMPROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR APPELLANT’S 

ABANDONMENT EFFORTS. 

{¶24} Appellant argues that the ODMA is properly characterized as an 

“abandonment statute.” She asserts that the trial court’s failure to properly define the 

ODMA tainted its analysis and its decision must be reversed. Appellant argues that 

the ODMA should be interpreted in favor of the owner of the surface land as their 

property rights are affected by any unused or forgotten interests. 

{¶25} In addressing this issue, the trial court observed that at common law, 

severed ownership of mineral interests could not be lost by mere nonuse, that a 

vested fee interest in real property cannot be abandoned, and that the law abhors a 

forfeiture. 
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{¶26} The trial court explained that appellees’ filing of a notice of preservation 

and a defense in this action demonstrates that they did not intend to abandon their 

mineral interest. Thus, the only way appellees could legally be divested of their 

interest was by way of a statutory forfeiture. Accordingly, the trial court characterized 

the ODMA as a forfeiture statute. The trial court was of the opinion that whether or 

not the ODMA is viewed as “abandonment” or “forfeiture,” it is contrary to common 

law and should be construed “to insure that [a] person being deprived of his or her 

property receives all of the protections the General Assembly provided in the statute.” 

Further, the trial court concluded, it is appropriate to require that appellant, as the one 

seeking to acquire appellees’ property rights, comply with all aspects of the 

requirements of the ODMA. Lastly, the trial court opined that R.C. 5301.55’s mandate 

that R.C. 5301.56 “shall be liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of 

simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a 

record chain of title * * * ” does not mean that the statute should be liberally construed 

to make it easier for surface owners to acquire the minerals of others in derogation of 

countervailing common law principles and without fully satisfying the requirements 

imposed on surface owners by R.C. 5301.56. 

{¶27} The Ohio Supreme Court recently analyzed the ODMA in Corban v. 

Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, __ Ohio St.3d __ 2016-Ohio-5796, __N.E.3d __. In 

Corban, the Ohio Supreme Court answered two certified questions regarding the 

1989 and 2006 versions of the ODMA. In answering those questions, the Ohio 

Supreme Court explained that in enacting the 1989 version, “the legislature did not 

intend title to dormant mineral interests to pass automatically and outside the record 

chain of title.” Corban at ¶ 27. The Court explained: 

The statute remedied the difficulties faced by a surface owner seeking 

to quiet title to a dormant mineral interest, an action that requires proof 

that the mineral rights holder-who may not be locatable or identifiable 

from the land records-had abandoned and relinquished that interest. At 

common law, such an action would have failed absent proof of the 
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property owner’s subjective intent. [citation omitted]. Thus, by providing 

a conclusive presumption that the mineral interest had been abandoned 

in favor of the surface owner if the holder failed to take timely action to 

preserve it, the legislature provided an effective method of terminating 

abandoned mineral rights through a quiet title action. 

Corban at ¶ 25. The Court further explained that “the conclusive presumption of 

abandonment was only an evidentiary device that applied to litigation seeking to quiet 

title to a dormant mineral interest.” Id. at ¶ 26. As of June 26, 2006, a surface holder 

seeking to claim dormant mineral rights “is required to follow the statutory notice and 

recording procedures enacted in 2006.” Id. at ¶ 31. “These procedures govern the 

manner by which mineral rights are deemed abandoned and vested in the surface 

holder.” Id. 

{¶28} Whether the ODMA is characterized as an “abandonment statute” or a 

“forfeiture statute,” the trial court correctly concluded that the resolution of this action 

depends upon what the statute itself demands. Whether a forfeiture or an 

abandonment statute, the purpose is to allow a surface owner to take steps to have 

mineral interests reunited with the surface lands, but only after the surface owner has 

taken the necessary statutory steps. The facts here amply illustrate that appellant 

sought to reunite the one-half interest in oil and gas she did not own with her surface 

land, and appellees sought to preserve their interest and block appellant’s attempt to 

reunite the severed one-half interest. 

{¶29} Regardless of its nomenclature regarding the ODMA, the trial court 

properly applied it in determining that appellees did not abandon their oil and gas 

interest underlying the Property. 

{¶30} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶31} Appellant’s second assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT APPELLANT 
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FAILED TO COMPLY WITH R.C. 5301.56’S ABANDONMENT 

PROCEDURE. 

{¶32} R.C. 5301.56(E) provides that, before a severed mineral interest can be 

vested in the owner of the surface lands, the surface owner must do two things. First, 

the surface owner must serve notice, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to 

each holder at the last known address of the holder, of the owner’s intent to declare 

the mineral interest abandoned. The notice shall contain all of the information in R.C. 

5301.56(F). R.C. 5301.56(E)(1). 

{¶33} Second, the surface owner must file in the county recorder’s office an 

affidavit of abandonment that contains all of the information in R.C. 5301.56(G) at 

least 30 days, but not more than 60 days, after the date on which the notice is served 

or published. R.C. 5301.56(E)(2). 

{¶34} The trial court stated that appellant’s certified mail notice did not strictly 

comply with the requirement that notice be mailed to the “last known address” of the 

holder. The trial court pointed out that the notice was not mailed to the address on 

the holders’ deeds. 

{¶35} Appellant argues that she used a more current address than the one in 

appellees’ deeds for the agent of appellees and this should satisfy the statutory 

requirement of a mailing to the “last known address.” Further, appellant points to this 

court’s statement in Dodd v. Croskey, 7th Dist. No. 12 HA 6, 2013-Ohio-4257, that 

where notice is actually received failure to strictly comply with the notice requirement 

is considered to be harmless error. Id. at ¶ 59. 

{¶36} The trial court concluded that it “need not determine whether an 

incorrectly addressed notice, which did eventually reach the holder, makes the notice 

ineffective.” Likewise, we need not determine what is considered the correct address 

under the ODMA. Appellees actually received the notice. 

{¶37} R.C. 5301.56(E)(1) also provides that appellant’s notice shall contain all 

of the information specified in R.C. 5301.56(F). The pertinent part of the statute 

provides that appellant’s notice shall contain: 
- 8 - 

A description of the mineral interest to be abandoned. The description 

shall include the volume and page number of the recorded instrument 

on which the mineral interest is based. 

R.C. 5301.56(F)(3). 

{¶38} The trial court concluded that appellant’s notice was ineffective because 

it failed to properly describe the mineral interest she sought to have reunited with her 

surface lands. The trial court reasoned that the description in appellant’s notices 

included all of the interests in oil and gas or other minerals as described in the 

Children’s Deed. The Children’s Deed reflects the conveyance by the Estate of R.H. 

Hannon of any mineral interests in Carroll County owned by R.H. Hannon, including 

those reflected in the Davis, Cain, and Patterson Deeds, to his three children. The 

notices then reference the Children’s Deed. The trial court explained there was an 

erroneous reference to a “Deed of Reservation” recorded at Lease Book 71, Page 

597. This “Deed of Reservation” is Hal’s Deed (the transfer by Hal of all his interest in 

the Children’s Deed to Lucinda). The trial court concluded that since the controlling 

reference in the notice is to the Children’s Deed, which includes at least three tracts 

of which the surface owner had an interest in only one, this created an ambiguous 

and defective description. 

{¶39} Appellant complains that the trial court failed to consider the notice as a 

whole. The notice continues, after referencing the Children’s Deed, with the following 

language: 

And applying to the following described lands (“Mineral Interest”): 

Lands situated in the Section thirty (30), Township twelve (12), Range 

five (5), Township of Perry, County of Carroll, and State of Ohio, as 

more particularly described in ... Volume 28, Page 32 ... Lease 

Records, Carroll County, Ohio. 

The ellipses omit the Cain and Patterson Deeds. The Cain and Patterson oil and gas 
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interests are eliminated from the description of the mineral interest. Volume 28, Page 

32, is the Davis Deed and is the surface property which appellant owns. 

{¶40} Appellant’s notice, although somewhat confusing, given all of the facts 

and reading the entire notice, substantially met the requirements of the statute and 

put appellees on notice of the mineral interest against which appellant intended to file 

an Affidavit of Abandonment. Therefore, it seems, on this narrow issue the trial court 

reached the wrong conclusion. This, however, does not end the discussion of 

appellant’s second assignment of error. 

{¶41} After notice, if the holder of the mineral interest wants to preserve their 

interest, they must file a claim to preserve. If a claim to preserve is not filed, the 

surface owner then must file in the office of the county recorder, at least 30 but not 

later than 60 days after notice is served, an affidavit of abandonment which contains 

all of the information in R.C. 5301.56(G). R.C. 5301.56(G) states that the affidavit of 

abandonment shall contain the following: 

(1) A statement that the person filing the affidavit is the owner of the 

surface of the lands subject to the interest; 

(2) The volume and page number of the recorded instrument on which 

the mineral interest is based; 

(3) A statement that the mineral interest has been abandoned * * *; 

(4) A recitation of the facts constituting the abandonment; 

(5) A statement that notice was served on each holder * * * 

R.C. 5301.56(G). 

{¶42} The parties dispute only whether appellant complied with subpart two. 

The trial court, as with the notice, concluded that the affidavit purported that the 

surface owner will acquire all of the mineral interests described in the Children’s 

Deed and Hal’s Deed, which includes oil and gas under surface land not owned by 

appellant. 

{¶43} One aspect of appellant’s affidavits that is different from the notice is 
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that the affidavits describe the mineral interest as follows: 

All as more particularly set forth in the Mineral Deed recorded in the 

Carroll County Recorder’s Office at Lease Book Volume 71, Page 438 

and also by the Mineral Deed recorded in the Carroll County Recorder’s 

Office at Lease Book Volume 71, Page 597 (the aforesaid reserved 

interest excluding coal is referred to as “Mineral Interest”). 

The filings reference the Children’s Deed and Hal’s Deed which include at least two 

parcels in which appellant has no interest. And the affidavit does not include the 

language which was included in the notice given to appellees describing the “Mineral 

Interest” using ellipses in place of the Cain and Patterson Deeds and using only the 

volume and page number of the Davis Deed, which is the correct mineral interest 

over which she owns the surface. Thus, the affidavits of abandonment include all of 

the mineral interests conveyed by the Estate of R.H. Hannon to his children, including 

the oil and gas interests in the Cain and Patterson Deeds, to which appellant admits 

she has no claim. 

{¶44} Appellant argues that her affidavits of abandonment did not need to 

include a description of the mineral interest which she seeks to reunite with her 

surface lands. Instead, she argues, the affidavits needed only include the volume and 

page number of the instrument on which the mineral interest is based. Appellant 

argues the above quoted volumes and page numbers satisfy this requirement as they 

reference the two deeds (the Children’s Deed and Hal’s Deed) on which appellees’ 

mineral interest is based. 

{¶45} Next, appellant’s two July Affidavits of Facts are apparently appellant’s 

attempt to comply with R.C. 5301.56(H)(2)’s direction to cause the county recorder 

“to memorialize the record on which the severed mineral interest is based” with 

specific statutory language indicating that the mineral interest is abandoned. R.C. 

5301.56(H)(2). Similarly, these documents reference only the Children’s Deed and 

Hal’s Deed. The affidavits ask that the Children’s Deed and Hal’s Deed be noted with 
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the following language: “This mineral interest abandoned pursuant to Affidavit of 

Abandonment recorded in Book 83, Page 3977.” 

{¶46} The trial court concluded that this notation on the Children’s Deed and 

Hal’s Deed would indicate that the mineral interests in the Cain and Patterson Deeds, 

and any other interests owned by the Estate of R.H. Hannon, have been statutorily 

abandoned. This suggests that other interests owned by appellees, which are not 

below the surface land owned by appellant, were also abandoned. But the notation 

would also include the oil and gas interest at issue here. Thus, the trial court should 

have found that appellant substantially complied with R.C. 5301.56’s abandonment 

provisions. But as will be seen in appellant’s next assignment of error, because 

appellees preserved their oil and gas interest, this assignment of error does not 

present a reversible error. 

{¶47} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and 

is overruled. 

{¶48} Appellant’s third assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT APPELLEES 

PROPERLY PRESERVED THEIR SEVERED MINERAL INTEREST 

WHEN APPELLEES FILED CLAIMS TO PRESERVE WHICH THE 

TRIAL COURT ACKNOWLEDGED “CLEARLY DID NOT MEET ALL 

OF” R.C. 5301.56’S REQUIREMENTS. 

{¶49} Appellant argues that appellees’ attempt to preserve their mineral 

interests must strictly comply with the statutory requirements and, even if strict 

compliance is not necessary, appellees’ attempt to preserve their interests did not 

substantially comply with the statutory requirements. 

{¶50} If the holder of a mineral interest has received notice pursuant R.C. 

5301.56(E), the holder, within 60 days of the date on which notice is served, must file 

in the office of the county recorder either a claim to preserve the mineral interest in 

accordance with R.C. 5301.56(C) or an affidavit identifying one of the saving events 
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in R.C. 5301.56(B)(3). Appellees do not assert that any of the saving events 

occurred. Instead, appellees argue, and the trial court agreed, that they filed a claim 

to preserve pursuant to R.C. 5301.56(C) and have thus preserved their oil and gas 

interests. That provision states that a claim to preserve may be filed and recorded by 

the holder. The claim to preserve shall consist of a notice that does all of the 

following: 

(a) States the nature of the mineral interest claimed and any recording 

information upon which the claim is based; 

(b) Otherwise complies with section 5301.52 of the Revised Code; 

(c) States that the holder does not intend to abandon, but instead to 

preserve, the holder’s rights in the mineral interest. 

R.C. 5301.56(C)(1). A claim that is properly filed and recorded, pursuant to R.C. 

5301.56(C), “preserves the rights of all holders of a mineral interest in the same 

lands.” R.C. 5301.56(C)(2). 

{¶51} R.C. 5301.52 explains what the notice must contain to be effective and 

entitled to recording. According to R.C. 5301.52, to be effective, the notice shall 

satisfy the following requirements: (1) be in the form of an affidavit; (2) state the 

nature of the claim and the names and addresses of the persons benefitting from the 

notice; (3) contain an accurate and full description of the land in particular terms, 

except that if the claim is founded upon a recorded instrument the description may be 

the same as in the recorded instrument; (4) state the name of each record owner 

affected by the notice together with the recording information of the instrument by 

which each record owner acquired title; and (5) be made by a person with knowledge 

or competent to testify in court. 

{¶52} Appellees each filed with the county recorder an affidavit titled “Affidavit 

to Preserve Mineral Interest” which stated: 

I am the owner of the following described mineral interest: 
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Being all those lands situated in Section 30, Township 12, Range 5, 

Perry Township, Carroll County, Ohio as more particularly described in 

an instrument from Russell Cain and Florence Cain dated October 30, 

1944 and recorded in Volume 28, Page 33, Volume 28, Page 32 and 

Volume 28, Page 39, Lease records, Carroll County, Ohio. 

I hereby declare that I intend to preserve all my right, title and interest in 

the above described minerals. 

This language is from the Children’s Deed and references the Davis, Cain, and 

Patterson Deeds by volume and page number. Each affidavit begins with an 

identification of the state and county in which each affiant currently resides. 

{¶53} The trial court held that, although appellees’ notices did not meet all of 

the requirements imposed by the ODMA, they served the purposes intended by the 

ODMA for such claims, which was to provide a record of the mineral owner’s 

intention to retain their minerals. Thus, the trial court concluded that appellees’ notice 

preserved their oil and gas rights pursuant to the ODMA. The trial court cited 

Cleveland Co-Op Stove, Co. v. Cleveland & P. Ry., 44 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 260, 34 C.D. 

236 (1912) for the rule that descriptions by reference to prior recorded deeds have 

been held to be sufficient under Ohio law. Thus, the trial court reasoned, appellees’ 

reference in their affidavits to the Cain, Davis, and Patterson Deeds adequately 

described the property affected and the mineral interest conveyed. Thus, the trial 

court concluded that appellees sufficiently complied with the requirements of R.C. 

5301.56(C) to preserve their interests. 

{¶54} Appellant argues that appellees failed to notify appellant of the filing of 

their claims to preserve as required by R.C. 5301.56(H) and also failed to comply 

with five of the requirements in R.C. 5301.56(C), which by reference includes the 

requirements set forth in R.C. 5301.52. 

{¶55} Appellant asserts that appellees failed to identify the affected surface 

owner and the surface owner’s recording information. Appellant argues that this is 

required by R.C. 5301.52(A)(4) which provides that the notice shall: 
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State the name of each record owner of the land affected by the notice, 

at the time of its recording, together with the recording information of 

the instrument by which each record owner acquired title to the land. 

{¶56} The trial court concluded that this was effectively accomplished by the 

holder’s affidavit quoted above because “the referenced deeds also identify the 

owner of the surface at the time of severance which allows the identification of the 

current affected surface owner and the surface owner’s recording information.” We 

agree with the trial court. Appellant is the only surface owner here. The purpose of 

the affidavit requirements is to give notice to the surface owner or owners of the 

preservation claim. Appellant was clearly notified in this case. 

{¶57} Next, appellant argues that appellees failed to identify the instrument 

through which they acquired their mineral interest. Appellant further asserts that 

appellees’ affidavits fail to meet the statutory requirements because they simply 

indicate an interest to preserve a mineral interest in the described property and fail to 

state that the interest is a one-half interest and not a one hundred percent interest. 

Appellant asserts that this is required by R.C. 5301.56(C)(1)(a), which provides that a 

claim to preserve shall consist of a notice that states the nature of the mineral interest 

claimed and any recording information upon which the claim is based. 

{¶58} The trial court concluded that the above quoted affidavit satisfies this 

requirement because, by referencing the Davis, Cain, and Patterson Deeds, the 

affidavits described the property affected and the mineral interest conveyed and were 

the source of the mineral interest to be preserved. Appellant seems to complain that 

appellees’ affidavits need to include a reference to where the Children’s Deed is 

recorded, i.e., Volume 71, Page 438, as well as Hal’s Deed, Lease Book 71, Page 

597. 

{¶59} Each of appellees’ affidavits are titled as a notice to preserve a mineral 

interest and each clearly indicate a desire to preserve the mineral interests conveyed 

in the Davis Deed, as well as the Cain and Patterson Deeds. Thus, the trial court 

correctly found compliance here. 
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{¶60} Appellant also complains that appellees failed to comply with that part 

of R.C. 5301.52(A)(2) which requires that the notices shall state the names and 

addresses for whose benefit the notice is being filed. 

{¶61} Appellees’ affidavits set forth the state and county in which appellees 

reside, but do not include a street address. The trial court concluded that this was 

sufficient as it made them easily locatable by anyone who wanted to do so. Clearly, 

in this case, this notice was sufficient because appellant was easily able to locate 

appellees. 

{¶62} Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶63} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT APPELLANT 

SLANDERED APPELLEES’ TITLE TO THE SEVERED MINERAL 

INTEREST AT ISSUE BECAUSE APPELLANT HAD NO NOTICE 

THAT APPELLEES HAD FILED THEIR DEFECTIVE CLAIMS TO 

PRESERVE PRIOR TO COMPLETING R.C. 5301.56’S 

ABANDONMENT PROCEDURE. 

{¶64} In their counterclaim, appellees alleged that Exhibits K and L to 

appellant’s complaint contain false statements about the ownership of oil and gas 

rights below the premises. Exhibits K and L both are titled Affidavit of Fact Relating to 

Title to Real Estate. Those affidavits represent that the mineral interests at issue here 

have been abandoned. Appellees complained appellant filed these affidavits after 

they recorded their intent to preserve their mineral interests. They asserted they 

suffered actual and special damages as they were unable to lease or transfer their oil 

and gas interests. 

{¶65} Appellant now argues that the trial court finding that appellees were 

entitled to summary judgment on their counterclaim for slander of title because there 

was no evidence of malice, there was no evidence that appellees were damaged by 
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appellant’s filings, and, since the counterclaims were limited to the abandonment 

affidavit, the claim is time-barred. 

{¶66} To prevail on a slander of title claim, one must prove the publication of 

a slanderous statement which disparages one’s title; that the statement was false; 

that the statement was made with malice or reckless disregard of its falsity; and that 

the statement caused actual or special damages. Cupside Properties, LTD., v. Earl 

Mechanical Services, Inc., 6th Dist. No. L-14-1253, 2015-Ohio-5019, ¶ 37, citing 

Green v. Lemarr, 139 Ohio App.3d 414, 430-431, 744 N.E.2d 212 (2d Dist.2000). 

{¶67} The trial court determined that appellant recorded a defective 

instrument that purported to abandon interests owned by appellees on properties in 

which appellant had no interest, i.e., all of the mineral interests conveyed by the 

Children’s and Hal’s Deeds. This, the trial court concluded, deprived appellees of 

royalties due for oil and gas from their mineral interests. The trial court awarded each 

appellee one dollar as nominal damages. 

{¶68} The trial court did not identify any evidence which might support a 

conclusion that the actions of appellant were malicious or reckless. Instead, the trial 

court relied upon its conclusion that appellant recorded defective documents that 

purported to abandon mineral interests owned by appellees, including mineral 

interests in properties over which appellant did not own the surface lands. This 

caused, according to the trial court, the property records of Carroll County to 

incorrectly reflect that all of appellees’ mineral interests conveyed by the Children’s 

and Hal’s Deeds had been forfeited. More is needed to prove that appellant’s actions 

were malicious or reckless. 

{¶69} A failed attempt to meet the requirements of the ODMA alone does not 

establish that the failed attempt was malicious or reckless. Each party here believed 

the other failed to meet the statutory requirements. For this reason, the trial court 

erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on their slander of title 

claim. 

{¶70} Accordingly, appellant’s fourth assignment of error has merit and is 
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sustained. 

{¶71} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT APPELLEE, 

HARRIET LUCINDA HANNON, DID NOT SLANDER APPELLANT’S 

TITLE TO HER MINERAL RIGHTS WHEN APPELLEE, HARRIET 

LUCINDA HANNON, RECORDED A MEMORANDUM OF OIL AND 

GAS LEASE BASED UPON LEGALLY DEFECTIVE TITLE 

DOCUMENTS. 

{¶72} Appellant argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in 

favor of Appellee-Harriet on her slander of title claim. 

{¶73} This assignment of error is contingent upon a finding that appellant 

successfully reunited the oil and gas rights previously held by appellees to her 

surface land and appellees failed to preserve their interests. Since we have 

concluded that appellees preserved their interest, the trial court’s grant of summary 

judgment on appellant’s slander of title claim is correct. 

{¶74} Accordingly, appellant’s fifth assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶75} Appellant’s sixth assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD APPELLEE, HARRIET 

HANNON, DID NOT OWE APPELLANT A DUTY OF REASONABLE 

CARE WHEN RECORDING DOCUMENTS WHICH BURDENED 

APPELLANT’S TITLE TO HER REAL PROPERTY AND ITS MINERAL 

RIGHTS. 

{¶76} Appellant argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in 

favor of Appellee-Harriet on her negligence claim. 

{¶77} This assignment of error is also contingent upon a finding that appellant 

successfully reunited the oil and gas rights previously held by appellees to her 
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surface land and appellees failed to preserve their interests. Since we have 

concluded that appellees preserved their interest, the trial court’s grant of summary 

judgment on appellant’s negligence claim is correct. 

{¶78} Accordingly, appellant’s sixth assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶79} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby 

reversed only as to its grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees on their 

slander of title claim. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. 

Waite, J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, J., concurs.