****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and inthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************OREMA TAFT v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION (AC 36118)
Lavine, Prescott and Elgo, Js. Argued May 12—officially released September 8, 2015 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Tolland, Kwak, J.)
Mark M. Rembish, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).
Linda Currie-Zeffiro, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was John C. Smriga, state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).Opinion PRESCOTT, J. The petitioner, Orema Taft, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court abused its discretion by denying his petition for certification to appeal, and improperly rejected his claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in three ways: (1) failing to adequately investigate the state’s offer of
a reward and the prior testimony of witnesses at the trial of his codefendant; (2) failing to cross-examine witnesses about a witness’ recantation ofa prior statement inculpating the petitioner, and about the state’s offer of a reward; and (3) allegedly conceding during closing arguments that the petitioner was involved in the crime.1 We agree with the petitioner that his claim that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to conduct an adequate investigation and by relyingsolelyonthe opinionofanattorneyrepresenting
a codefendant regarding the significance, or lack of significance, of evidence admitted at the trial of the codefendant, raises an issue that is debatable amongst jurists of reason. Nevertheless, on the basis of the record, we concludethatthehabeascourtdidnotabuse its discretionby denyingthe petitionfor certificationto appeal with respectto this claimbecause the petitioner failedto demonstrate that adebatable issue concerning prejudice exists. As to the remainder ofthe petitioner’s claims, we also conclude that that habeas court did not abuse its discretion by denying certification to appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The following procedural history and facts, as found bythehabeas courtandas statedbyourSupreme Court in State v. Taft, 306 Conn. 749, 51 A.3d 988 (2012), are relevantto this appeal. ‘‘On September28, 2001, shortly before 3 a.m., the victim, Zoltan Kiss, was shot and killed in his car in the area of 1185 Pembroke Street in Bridgeport. Justpriortothe shooting, thevictimparked his car across from 1185 Pembroke Street, exited the vehicle, approached some individuals on the street to seek change for a $100 bill and, thereafter, approached
a gate leading to an alley next to 1185 Pembroke Street (gate). Shortly thereafter, a group of people, including the [petitioner], exited from behind the gate and followed the victim as he returned to his car. When the victim reached his car, at least one of the pursuers, Miguel Zapata, began firing a handgun at the victim. Additionally, before the gunfire, one witness heard
someone in the group say, ‘Let’s get this mother fucker.’ ’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 751–52.
Both Zapata and the petitioner were eventually arrested and charged with the victim’s murder. Zapata and the petitioner were tried separately, with Zapata’s trial occurring priorto the petitioner’s trial. ZapatawasrepresentedbyAttorneyFrankO’Reillyduringhiscriminal trial. The prosecutor for both criminal trials was C. Robert Satti, Jr. During the petitioner’s trial, the state offered the testimony of five witnesses,2 in addition to that of the police officers and detectives. ‘‘[T]wo witnesses, A and B, testified that they had seen the [petitioner] in the area behind the gate with a number of other individuals [prior to the shooting]. A and B also testified that they had seen guns behind the gate where the [petitioner] and his companions were located. Both A and B recounted that they had seen the victim park his car across the street from the gate and approach the gate. A testified that she had seen the victim interact with someone behind the gate and then begin to return to his car. Shortly thereafter, A

saw the group behind the gate chase after the victim, and A further recounted that she had seen both Zapata and the [petitioner] carrying guns as they pursued the victim to his car. B also testified that she had heard
someone say, ‘Let’s get this mother fucker’ before gunfire erupted. Both A and B then testified that they had heard shouting and gunfire, and had seen the muzzle flashes as the guns were fired at the victim. ‘‘The state then presented the testimony of another witness, C, who, at the time of the shooting lived in a third floor apartment of a nearby building. C stated that, at approximately 2 or 3 a.m., on September 28, 2001, she had heard gunfire coming from the street located in front of her apartment. When she went to investigate the noise, C saw four people—the [petitioner], Zapata, Luisa Bermudez and A—standing in front of the door of a car on the street. C further recounted that she had seen the muzzle flashes as the guns were fired at the victim, and she had heard the victim screaming. She also stated that, from her perspective, she could only see Zapata holding a gun and that, afterthe shooting stopped, the group ran from the scene.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 753–54.
In addition to the testimony ofA, B, and C, ‘‘the state presented testimony from several individuals who had had contact with the [petitioner] while the charges in the present case were pending. First, D testified that he was incarcerated in the same prison as the [petitioner], and that the [petitioner] had told him that he and Zapata had shot a ‘dude’ in a Honda seven times with a .45 caliber gun. D then recounted that the [petitioner] had told him that he and Zapata had chased afterthevictimbecausetheywantedtotakethevictim’s jewelry. Then, thestatepresentedthetestimonyof[Germaine O’Grinc],3 who testified that, during one of his court appearances in connection with a felony charge, he was in the ‘bullpen lockup’ of the courthouse with the [petitioner] and Zapata. [O’Grinc] recounted that Zapatahadtoldhimthathewasincourtbecausehe and the [petitioner] had shot a person in his car. [O’Grinc] further testified that the [petitioner] had confirmed or‘vouched for’ Zapata’s statements and had nodded in agreement while Zapata was talking to [O’Grinc].’’ (Footnote added.) Id., 755.
On September 19, 2007, following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and one count of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-54a (a). The trial court sentenced him to a total effective term of fortyfive years incarceration. At all relevant times during the criminal trial court proceedings, the petitioner was represented by Attorney Erroll Skyers.
Thepetitionerfiledadirectappealfromthejudgment of conviction, raising, among other things, a claim of ineffective assistance ofcounsel resulting from his trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine witnesses about the rewardandhisfailureto cross-examine awitness about
a prior recantation of a statement inculpating the petitioner. Id., 767–69. Our Supreme Court declined, however, to addressthe merits ofthepetitioner’sineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id., 769.
On July 8, 2010, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus, asserting that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. He amended his petition twice, with the second amended petition being filed on December 10, 2012. Following a habeas trial, the court issued its memorandum of decision on August 27, 2013, denyingthe petition in its entirety, and finding that the petitioner had failed to prove that he
was denied effective assistance of counsel under the two-prongedtest setforth inStricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). OnAugust30, 2013, thepetitionerfiledapetition for certification to appeal, which the habeas court denied on September 6, 2013. This appeal followed. Additional facts relevant to the petitioner’s appeal will be set forth as necessary. We begin by setting forth the standard of review that guides ourresolution ofthe petitioner’s appeal. ‘‘In Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 187, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), [our Supreme Court] concluded that

. . . [General Statutes] § 52-470 (b) prevents a reviewing court from hearing the merits of a habeas appeal following the denialofcertificationtoappealunlessthepetitioner establishes that the denial of certification constituted
an abuse of discretion by the habeas court. In Simms

v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 615–16, 646 A.2d 126 (1994), [our Supreme Court] incorporated the factors adopted bythe United States Supreme CourtinLozadav.Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431–32, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991), as the appropriate standard for determining whetherthe habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal. This standard requires the petitioner to demonstrate that the issues are debatable amongjurists of reason; that a court could resolve theissues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequateto deserve encouragementtoproceedfurther.

. . . Apetitionerwho establishes an abuse ofdiscretion through one ofthe factors listed above must then demonstrate that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits.

. . . In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits ofthe petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tutson v. Commissioner of Correction, 144 Conn. App. 203, 214–15, 72 A.3d 1162, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 928, 78 A.3d 145 (2013).
I
To decide if the habeas court abused its discretion by denying certification to appeal, we must look to the merits ofthe underlying claim ofineffective assistance of counsel. ‘‘[I]t is well established that [a] criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings. Strickland v. Washington, [supra, 466 U.S. 686]. This right arises under the sixth andfourteenthamendmentstotheUnitedStates constitution and article first, § 8, ofthe Connecticut constitution.

. . . As enunciated in [Strickland], this court has stated: It is axiomatic that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, 306 Conn. 664, 677–78, 51 A.3d 948 (2012).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard, ‘‘the claim must be supported by evidence establishing that (1) counsel’s representationfellbelowan objective standard ofreasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had it not been for the deficient performance.

. . . Because both prongs ofStrickland must be demonstrated for the petitioner to prevail, failure to prove either prong is fatal to an ineffective assistance claim.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Commissioner of Correction, 152 Conn. App. 601, 608, 99 A.3d 1200, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 950, 103 A.3d 979 (2014).
A
The petitioner first claims that the habeas court improperly denied his claim ofineffective assistance of counselbecause Skyers failedto adequatelyinvestigate the facts ofhis case. Specifically, the petitioner asserts that Skyers failed to investigate or discover (1) the state’s offer ofareward; (2) the testimony ofwitnesses at Zapata’s trial concerning the reward offered by thestate; and (3) O’Grinc’s testimony at Zapata’s trial, during which O’Grinc recanted a statement inculpating the petitionerthat he previouslymade to the police. Underlying all three assertions is the petitioner’s predicate claim that it is deficient performance for an attorney to rely solely on the representations ofa codefendant’s counselto decidethe scope ofanappropriate investigation into his client’s case. The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. Prior to the petitioner’s arrest, due to the stalled nature of the investigation of the victim’s murder, the governor signed an offer of a $50,000 reward for information leading to the ‘‘arrest and conviction’’ of the guilty parties. A, B, and C knew about the reward and each received a portion of the reward money after the petitioner’s conviction. All three witnesses testified at Zapata’s trial, which occurred prior to the petitioner’s trial, and O’Reilly cross-examined all three witnesses aboutthe reward. O’Reillyalso cross-examined O’Grinc aboutastatementinculpatingthepetitionerandZapata, which O’Grinc had previously made to the police. On cross-examination, at Zapata’s trial, O’Grinc recanted his prior statement inculpating the petitioner. State v. Zapata, 119 Conn. App. 660, 667–68, 989 A.2d 626, cert. denied, 296 Conn. 906, 992 A.2d 1136 (2010).
Inpreparationforthepetitioner’strial, Skyers didnot attend Zapata’s trial. Instead, Skyers spoke to O’Reilly aboutwhathadoccurredatZapata’strialand discussed with him who the important witnesses were. Relying
on O’Reilly’s representations, Skyers did not order all ofthe transcripts from Zapata’s trial, including anyportion ofO’Grinc’stestimony. Skyers didrequestandread the trial transcripts of the testimony of A, B, and C. At the petitioner’s criminal trial, Skyers did not crossexamine any ofthe witnesses aboutthe reward and did not confront O’Grinc about his recantation. O’Grinc testified against the petitioner in accordance with his prior statement inculpating the petitioner by stating that while in lockup with the petitioner and Zapata, Zapata admitted to his and the petitioner’s involvement in the murder, and the petitioner nodded in agreement.
The habeas court found that Skyers ‘‘was aware of and investigated the reward. He spoke with [O’Reilly] and reviewed relevant portions of the codefendant’s criminal trial transcripts. After these efforts, [Skyers] made an informed tactical decision to not pursue a line of questioning that had already proved to be unfruitful in [Zapata’s] trial.’’ The habeas court, however, did not makeaspecificfindingregardingpreciselywhenSkyers became aware of the reward.4 Inadequate pretrial investigation can amount to deficient performance, satisfying prong one ofStrickland, as ‘‘[c]onstitutionally adequate assistance of counsel includes competent pretrial investigation.’’ Siemon v. Stoughton, 184 Conn. 547, 554, 440 A.2d 210 (1981).Althoughwe acknowledge that ‘‘counselneed nottrack down each and every lead or personally investigate every evidentiary possibility before choosing a defense and developing it’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 306 Conn. 683; ‘‘[e]ffective assistance of counsel imposes
an obligation [on] the attorney to investigate all surrounding circumstances of the case and to explore all
avenues that may potentially lead to facts relevant to the defense of the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 680. ‘‘Inotherwords, counselhas adutyto makereasonableinvestigationsortomakeareasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
If counsel makes strategic decisions after thorough investigation, those decisions ‘‘are virtually unchallengeable

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.. In particular, ‘‘our habeas corpus jurisprudence reveals several scenarios in which courts will not second-guess defense counsel’s decision not to investigate
or call certain witnesses or to investigate potential defenses, such as when: (1) counsel learns of the substance of the witness’ testimony and determines that calling that witness is unnecessary orpotentially harmful to the case; (2) the defendant provides some information, but omits any reference to a specific individual who is later determined to have exculpatory evidence such that counsel could not reasonably have been expected to have discovered that witness without having received further information from his client; or (3) the petitioner fails to present, at the habeas hearing, evidence or the testimony of witnesses that he argues counsel reasonably should have discovered during the pretrialinvestigation.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Id., 681–82;

see e.g., Norton v. Commissioner of Correction, 132 Conn. App. 850, 859, 33 A.3d 819 (2012) (‘‘[T]he petitioner has not presented us with any beneficial testimony from these witnesses that would demonstrate how they would have assisted in his case had trial counsel interviewed them. He makes onlythe bare allegation,’’whichisnotsufficienttoshowprejudice.), cert. denied, 303 Conn. 936, 36 A.3d 695 (2012).
Not every failure to investigate, however, can be dismissed as trial strategy. Here, the petitioner’s claim of inadequate investigation is premised on the underlying assertion that Skyers relied solely on the representations of O’Reilly when investigating what occurred at Zapata’strial and decidingwhat evidence from Zapata’s trial was important to the petitioner’s case. We agree for the following reasons that, under the circumstances ofthis case, Skyer’s sole reliance on the representationsandopinionsofO’Reillyregardingwhat evidence from Zapata’s trial would be important forthe defense of the petitioner raises a meritorious claim of deficient performance.5 First, O’Reilly would not havebeen privy to privileged conversations between Skyers andthepetitioner. Knowledgeofthosecommunications would be significant in order to analyze the relative importance ofthe evidence and testimonypresented at Zapata’s trial. Moreover, O’Reilly had no duty ofloyalty to the petitioner to exercise care and appropriate professional judgment in assessing the importance to the petitioner of the evidence in Zapata’s trial. Indeed, in these circumstances, itmaywellbethatbecause Zapata already had been convicted at his trial, Zapata might have had personal interests that significantly diverged from the interests of the petitioner. Simply put, the petitioner is entitled to counsel who has not abdicated to another his or her duty to make an informed and independent assessment ofthe importance ofevidence to the client’s case.6
Our conclusion is supported by Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002). In Rios, the United States Court ofAppeals forthe Ninth Circuit heldthatthe trial attorneyfailedtoadequatelyinvestigatethe defendant’s

case because he relied solely on the investigation reports and trial materials prepared by the attorney for thecodefendant.7Id., 807. Thetrialattorneyreliedsolely
on the investigative efforts of the codefendant’s attorney in locating and interviewing the witnesses; he personally interviewed only one of the fifteen witnesses. Id., 806. In reversing the District Court’s conclusion thattheinvestigationwasconstitutionallyadequate, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it is ‘‘unreasonable for [an attorney] to rely solely on the investigation performed for a co-defendant, because the co-defendant’s interests in the case might well conflict with [the defendant’s] own. [The codefendant’s attorney] testified, for example, that he
was looking for information to exculpate [the codefendant], not [the defendant].’’ Id., 808. In other words, relianceontheinvestigationofacodefendant’sattorney is not a substitute for proper investigation. Thus, in Rios, itwas deficientperformance forthe trial attorney not to conduct further investigation before deciding to ‘‘abandon a potentially meritorious defense

. . . .’’ Id.
In arelated context, federal appeals courts have also concluded that it is deficient performance for a defendant’s counselto relysolelyon aprosecutor’s investigation into the facts. For example, inAlcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 891–92 (9th Cir. 2003), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there is deficient performance iftrial counsel relies solely on the investigation of the prosecution, stating that ‘‘trial counsel’s reliance on the prosecution’s investigation is
no more reasonable than the reliance on a co-defendant’s investigation in Rios.’’ The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit similarly has held that it is deficient performance for trial counsel to rely solely on the prosecutor’s investigations, as trial counsel ‘‘couldnothave made aninformedtactical decision’’to refrain from calling a medical expert witness. Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1387–88 (11th Cir. 1998) (‘‘[I]t appears from the record that counsel preferred simply to rely on the prosecutor’s references to the lack of physical evidence as the sole source of information on the subject.

. . . Having conducted no investigationintothe significance ofthe lackofmedical evidence that [the victim] had been sexually abused, however, [the defendant’s] counsel could not have made an informed tactical decision

. . . . In these circumstances, we cannot say that counsel’s decision not
even to contact the physicians as part of his pre-trial investigation was professionally reasonable.’’ [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]). Although there are no Connecticut cases on point, the decisions of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits are instructive in defining what it means for an attorney to conduct an investigation so as to be able to make an informed strategic decision.8 Reliance solely on a codefendant’s attorney is not enough.9
For similar reasons, courts have held, or at least intimated, that counsel also has a duty to request and review the trial transcripts from a codefendant’s separate trial that occurred prior to the defendant’s trial.10 Both the United States Courts of Appeal for the Fifth andthe Eighth Circuitshaveheldthatdefense counsel’s failureto reviewthe codefendant’strialtranscripts constitutes deficient performance. See Owens v. Dormire, 198 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 1999) (‘‘[w]e concede that trial counsel’s failure to read aco-defendant’s trialtranscripts may constitute deficient performance under Strickland’’), cert. denied, 530U.S. 1265, 120 S. Ct. 2725, 147 L. Ed. 2d 988 (2000); Westley v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 714, 721 (5thCir. 1996) (‘‘We arepersuadedthatcounsel
was deficient in not at least reviewing the transcripts of[the codefendant’s] trial. Areasonable counselwould have reviewed the testimony of [a witness from the codefendant’s trial]

. . . who would eventually testify against [counsel’s] client.’’), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1094, 117 S. Ct. 773, 136 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1997). Specifically, the Fifth Circuit has heldthatitis constitutionally deficient performance not to order and review the testimony of
a witness from the codefendant’s trial if that witness willlatertestifyatthepetitioner’s criminaltrial. Westley

v. Johnson, supra, 721.
We do not mean to suggest that defense counsel’s failure to read the entire transcript of the trial of a codefendant will always constitute deficient performance.11 In this case, however, Skyers’ decision as to the need or importance of conducting that review or additional investigation was based solely upon O’Reilly’s representations and judgment, which, for the reasons we have stated, should not have been relied upon
as the sole basis on which to make that decision. This is particularly true considering the fact that Skyers didnot order or review any of O’Grinc’s testimony from Zapata’s trial, even though Skyers knew that O’Grinc would also testify against the petitioner at the petitioner’s trial. Accordingly, we conclude thatthe petitioner’s claim regarding Skyers’ deficient performance as it relates to his allegedly inadequate investigation of the petitioner’s case is debatable amongstjurists ofreason. B Having concluded thatthe petitionerraised ameritorious claim that Skyers’ investigation ofthe petitioner’s

case was constitutionally inadequate, we turn to the question of whether the petitioner was prejudiced by this potentially deficient performance. We conclude that the court properly found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice by any lack of a proper investigation, and, thus, it did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition for certification to appeal as to this claim.
To prove prejudice, a petitioner ‘‘must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’’ Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 694. ‘‘In a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner’s burden of proving that a fundamental unfairness had been done is not met by speculation

. . . but by demonstrable realities.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 585, 599, 940 A.2d 789 (2008). To meet this standard, the petitioner must offer evidence of what benefit the additional investigation—reading the entire transcript of the codefendant’s trial—would have provided and how that would have changed thejury’s verdict. See Nguyen v. Archuleta, 369 Fed. Appx. 889, 894 (10th Cir. 2010) (‘‘[the petitioner] does not indicate that there actually were inconsistent statements given or that his counsel could have impeached the witnesses whotestifiedathistrial [ifhehadreadthetranscript]’’); United States v. Dung Vu, 215 Fed. Appx. 9, 12 (1st Cir.) (requiring petitioner to both identify beneficial sections of transcript not reviewed and to show that additional benefit provided by transcript is more than minor), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 828, 128 S. Ct. 45, 169 L. Ed. 2d 42 (2007); Westley v. Johnson, supra, 83 F.3d 721–22 (finding no prejudice because there was only proof of minimal additional benefit from full use of transcript). As discussed previously in this opinion, to prove that the habeas court abused its discretion by denying certification to appeal this claim, the burden is
onthe petitionerto establishthatit is at least debatable among jurists of reason that prejudice exists.
The petitioner offered no evidence atthe habeas trial
as to what Skyers would have discovered ifhe had read the entire transcript ofZapata’s trial. The petitioner didnotprovidethehabeascourtwiththosetrialtranscripts. Furthermore, the petitioner also did not offer evidence regarding how O’Grinc or A, B and C would have testifiediftheyhadbeen cross-examined aboutthe recantationorreward, respectively. Accordingly, weagreewith the habeas court’s conclusion that the petitioner was not prejudiced by the deficiencies in Skyer’s investigation.
In addition, even if the petitioner had offered the witnesses’ testimony or the Zapata transcripts as evidence, he did not establish how this evidence would tend to demonstrate that Skyers would have changed his defense strategy and chosen to cross-examine the witnesses about the reward and recantation. Indeed, the habeas court found that if the witnesses had been cross-examined about the reward, Satti would have been able to rehabilitate them on redirect examination with evidence damaging to the petitioner: ‘‘Furtherbuttressing [Skyers’] tactical decisionwas the veryreasonable concern of opening the door to additional [and harmful rehabilitation] questioning,’’ namely, that A, B, and C would have testified to having other motives for testifying at the criminal trial other than the reward— C was motivated to testify by almost being killed in the past for being thought as a snitch in the present case; B was motivated to testify by fear as Zapata had tried to murder her in the courtroom during Zapata’s trial; and A was motivated to testify by being arrested and forced to testify pursuant to a capias warrant. As for O’Grinc, Satti would have shown that the petitioner, Zapata, and O’Grinc had a prior history, including alleged participation in the same drug operation and a familial relationship between Zapata and O’Grinc. The habeas court found Satti and Skyers’ testimony at the habeas trial credible as to the rehabilitation evidence being more harmful than the cross-examinations being beneficial.
We agree with the habeas court’s conclusion that the petitioner failed to established that he was prejudiced by Skyers’ deficient performance, as he did not offered any evidence of how the result of his trial would have been different if Skyers had reviewed the Zapata trial transcript in its entirety and had cross-examined the witnessesabouttherewardandrecantation. SeeStricklandv. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 694. The petitioner has failed to prove how any additional information, if it did exist, about the reward or recantation would have altered Skyers’ defense strategy or impeachment strategy. Thepetitionerhasprovidednotestimonyfrom the witnesses asto whattheywouldhave said on crossexamination about the reward or the recantation. In sum, the petitioner has offered no evidence proving that a different cross-examination of O’Grinc or A, B, and C would have altered the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, thepetitionerhasfailedto establishthatthe issue of prejudice is debatable among jurists of reason, thatacourtcouldresolvetheissueinadifferent manner, orthatthe issue is adequateto deserve encouragement to proceed further. We, therefore, conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition for certification to appeal as to this claim.
II
The petitioner next claims that the habeas court improperly denied his claim that Skyers’ failure to adequately cross-examine witnesses at the petitioner’s criminal trial amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. In support of this claim, the petitioner makes two arguments. First, the petitioner claims that Skyers shouldhaveimpeachedO’Grincabouthispriorrecantation. Second, the petitioner claims that Skyers should have impeached A, B, and C about their potential bias stemming from the reward offer. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, contends that Skyers made informedtactical decisions, which deserve deference, that these lines of impeachment would not be fertile. We agree with the respondent and, therefore, conclude thatthe habeas court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition for certification to appeal
as to this claim.
A claim of deficient cross-examination is a claim against an attorney’s strategic and tactical decisions, and ‘‘[this] court will not, in hindsight, second-guess counsel’s trial strategy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Velasco v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 119 Conn. App. 164, 172, 987 A.2d 1031, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 901, 994 A.2d 1289 (2010). Accordingly, when challenging a trial attorney’s line of impeachment on cross-examination of a witness, the petitioner must ‘‘overcome the presumption that trial counsel’s crossexamination of [the witness] represented a sound trial strategy.’’ Antonio A. v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 148 Conn. App. 825, 832, 87 A.3d 600, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 901, 91 A.3d 907 (2014). Once an attorney makes
an informed, strategic decision regarding howto crossexamine a witness, that decision is ‘‘virtually unchallengeable.’’ Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 690. ‘‘As a general rule, a habeas petitioner will be able to demonstrate that trial counsel’s decisions were objectively unreasonable only if there [was] no

. . . tactical justification for the course taken.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.)Lynnv.Bliden, 443 F.3d238, 247 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1257, 127 S. Ct. 1383, 167 L. Ed. 2d 168 (2007).
As the habeas court made no findings as to if Skyers knew about the recantation when O’Grinc testified at the petitioner’s trial, and the petitioner did not seek an articulation from the habeas court, we assume for the purposes of this claim that Skyers knew about the recantation at the time that O’Grinc testified at thepetitioner’s trial. Assuming that Skyers knew of the recantation, Skyer offered a strategic, plausible reason for not utilizing that line ofimpeachment. On the basis of Skyers’ testimony and other evidence, the habeas courtfoundthatitwas astrategic decisionnotto crossexamine O’Grinc about the recantation; had Skyers cross-examined O’Grinc about the recantation, Satti would have been able to introduce harmful rehabilitation evidence, negating the benefit of the cross-examination. Thus, we must defer, as the habeas court did, to Skyers’ informed, strategic decision.
We similarly must defer to Skyers’ strategic decision not to cross-examine A, B, and C aboutthe state’s offer ofa reward. The habeas court made no findings offact
as to when Skyers became aware of the reward, and the record is ambiguous. In light of this ambiguity, we
assume forthe purposes ofthis claimthat Skyers knew oftherewardatthepetitioner’sprobable causehearing, when he first could have cross-examined C about the reward. The habeas court found that the testimony of Satti and Skyers was credible that the rehabilitation evidence was more harmful than the potential benefit of the cross-examinations. Thus, Skyers made an informed, strategic decision not to cross-examine the witnesses about the reward.12 Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate thatthis claiminvolvesissuesthatare debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues inadifferentmanner, orthatthequestions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. 616. We, therefore, conclude thatthe habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal
as to this claim.
III Lastly, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperlydeniedhispetitionforcertificationtoappeal with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on Skyers’ closing argument. We agree withthe respondentthatthe habeas courtdidnotabuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal this claim.
The following additional facts are relevant to this claim. At the petitioner’s criminal trial, in his closing, Skyers statedthat ‘‘[i]tis notunreasonable thatifsomething drastic occurs where you’re not intimately involved, but you know the persons who are involved, and they run, you run, too.’’ The petitioner objects to the use ofthephrase ‘‘intimatelyinvolved,’’ arguingthat it concedes the petitioner’s involvement in the crime. At the habeas trial, Skyers explained that by using the phrase ‘‘intimatelyinvolved,’’ he did not intendto imply that the petitioner was involved in criminal activity; rather, he meant that ‘‘aperson can be aware ofpeoplearound them that are doing something, and when he
sees those persons run, and he knows who they are, then he runs as well. Without being involved in anything.’’
We previously rejected a similar claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in Haywood v. Commissioner of Correction, 153 Conn. App. 651, 105 A.3d 238, cert. denied, 315Conn. 908, 105A.3d235 (2014). InHaywood, the petitioner alleged that trial counsel’s closing argument amountedto deficientperformance under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel had conceded that an attempted armed robbery had occurred. Id., 659. Although the petitioner claimed that this statement conceded his guilt, we concluded that it was consistent with counsel’s defense strategy of showing that the petitioner, although present, was not
a participant in the attempted robbery. Id., 659–60.
The same reasoning applies in the present case. The habeas court found Skyers’ testimony credible and that Skyers’ statement in closing argument was in line with his defense strategy, which included establishing that the petitioner was present at the scene of the crime, but that he did not participate in it. We agree with the habeas court that Skyers’ closing argument did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Thus, Skyers made an informed, strategic decision, and we must defer to it. Accordingly, thepetitionerhasfailedto establishthat the issue of whether Skyers’ closing argument constituted deficientperformance underprong one ofStricklandis debatable amongstjurists ofreason, that acourt could resolve the issue in a different manner, or that the question raised is adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. We, therefore, conclude that the petitionerhas failedto demonstrate thatthe habeas court abused its discretion by denying the petition for certification to appeal as to this claim.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 In appellate his brief, the petitioner set forth his claims in a different order; however, for the sake of clarity and efficiency, we have reordered the claims and arguments.
2 The criminal court sealed the names of the witnesses, and, thus, they

arereferredtobyinitialinthisopinion.Statev. Taft, supra, 306Conn. 753n.7.

3 O’Grinc’s name is no longer sealed, but it was at the time of the direct appeal.

4 At the habeas trial, Skyers could not recollect if he knew about the reward at the probable cause hearing. The habeas court made no specific finding regarding whether Skyers knew, at the time ofthe petitioner’s criminal trial, that O’Grinc had recanted his statement to the police.

5 Although Skyers testified regarding his usual practices in investigating

a criminal case involving one of his clients, he did not state whether his investigation of this case was consistent with his general practices.

6 Our decision by no means should be interpreted to prohibit defense counselfromspeakingwithacodefendant’s counselaboutthe codefendant’s

case and from relying, in part, on the information provided by the codefendant’s counsel. Discussing how the codefendant’s case was tried, potential issues with the defense strategy, and the strengths and weaknesses of thestate’s case are useful pieces of information that can inform and shape defense counsel’s own defense strategy. Furthermore, there may be cases in which defense counsel’s reliance on the assessments of a codefendant’s counsel concerning the codefendant’s case is reasonable if that reliance is confirmed by the well-informed, independentjudgment of defense counsel. Sole reliance, however, onthe representations ofthe codefendant’s counsel, where no independent judgment has been exercised, is unreasonable, and may well be deficient performance.

7 The codefendant’s attorneygave the trial attorney ‘‘alist ofhis witnesses shortly before trial along with abriefsynopsis ofeach witness’s testimony.’’ Rios v. Rocha, supra, 299 F.3d 807.

8 Two Connecticut cases have discussed, but not decided, whether it is deficientperformance for defense counsel to rely solely on the investigative efforts of a prosecutor. In Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 581, 941 A.2d 248, 265 (2008), our Supreme Court held that trial counsel’s reliance on the results of DNA testing performed by the state did not prejudice the petitioner because there was no evidence to establish that additional, independent DNA testing would have provided exculpatory evidence. In Davis v. Commissioner of Correction, 147 Conn. App. 343, 351, 81 A.3d 1226 (2013), cert. granted on other grounds, 311 Conn. 921, 86 A.3d 467 (2014), the petitioner argued that ‘‘counsel’s failure to investigate his

case beyond a review of the documentation provided by the prosecution constituted a complete denial ofrepresentation.’’ The court appears to have rejected this claim solely on prejudice grounds, concluding that the lack of

an investigation did not constitute a structural violation of the petitioner’s rightto effective assistance ofcounselthatobviatedthe needfordemonstrating any particular prejudice. Id., 353.

9 Our conclusion in the present case does not conflict with the court’s conclusion in Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 306 Conn. 681–82, that an attorney’s investigation is not constitutionally deficient with respect to a potential witness’ prior testimony, when the attorney knows the substance ofthat testimony and decides that it is unhelpful or harmful. To know the substance of potential testimony, an attorney must rely on a reliable source of information, like the defendant, and must actually be

aware of the substance of the testimony. See Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 62, 79–80, 967 A.2d 41 (2009) (counsel’s decision not to investigate further reasonable when defendant told him that witness would not cooperate, witness’ attorney said that witness would not cooperate, and after he read police report stating that witness was not eyewitness to crime). ‘‘Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the [petitioner] and on information supplied by the [petitioner]. In particular, what investigat[ory] decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information. For example, when the facts that support a certain potential line of defense are generally known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for further investigation maybe considerably diminishedoreliminatedaltogether. Andwhenadefendanthas given counsel reasonto believe thatpursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.’’ Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 690–91.

10 Some federal courts of appeal have concluded that it is not necessary to decide whether the failure to read the transcripts from a codefendant’s trial is deficient performance, instead deciding those cases on the prejudice prong ofStrickland

. SeeNguyenv.Archuleta, 369 Fed. Appx. 889, 894 (10th Cir. 2010); UnitedStatesv. Dung Vu, 215 Fed. Appx. 9, 12 (1st Cir.) (deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claim on basis of lack of prejudice when trial attorney did notrequesttranscripts ofcodefendant’strial), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 828, 128 S. Ct. 45, 169 L. Ed. 2d 42 (2007).

11 Theremaybe caseswhereitisnotnecessarytoreadthe entiretranscript ofthe trial ofthe codefendant. Forinstance, codefendants’ allegedparticipation in a crime may be distinct enough from each other to obviate the need to review the codefendant’s entire trial transcript. Therefore, defense counsel’s failure to order and review the transcript of the codefendant’s trial is not per se deficient performance. The scope of counsel’s obligation to investigate must be addressed on a case-by-case basis, and we do not intend to suggest a blanket rule for all occasions.

12 The petitioner argues that failure to cross-examine about a reward

can never be ‘‘sound trial strategy’’ pursuant to the holding in Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462F.3d 1099, 1110–14 (9thCir. 2006). ThepetitionermisinterpretsReynoso, which merely held that under no trial strategy offered by the respondent in that case could the decision not to cross-examine about the reward be ‘‘sound,’’ as the trial attorney did not make an informed decision and cross-examining about the reward would not have been harmful to the defense strategy or to the petitioner. Id. Those facts distinguish the present

case from Reynoso

.