NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0459n.06 No. 07-1945 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA , Plaintif f-Appellee , v. CU RT IS EL LISO N , also known as Chaunc ey Copeland and Curtis Smith, Defendant-

Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON A PP E A L FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

THE EA STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: KEITH , C OLE, and W HIT E, C ir c uitJudg e s. COLE, Circuit Jud ge. Curtis Elli son pleade d g uilty to one count of conspirac y to launder monetary instruments under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a) (1)( B) (i), 1956(a )(1) (B )(ii), a nd 1956(h). Following an evide ntiary

hear ing to de termine the a mount of money

Ellison laundered, the district court sente nced him to 137 months’ imprisonment. On appe al, Ellison seeks re sentenc ing, c laiming that he was entitled to a reduction in his base offense level for acc eptanc e of r esponsibility under the United States SentencingGu id e li n e s ( th e “ Gu id e li nes” or “U.S.S.G.”) a

nd that the district court e rre d in enhanc ing his sente nce f or obstruction of

justice. He a lso seeks re sentenc ing ba sed on cla ims that he did no t re c e ive the re vis e d ve rs ion of his Pr e se nte nc e I nv e sti g a tio n Re po rt (“ PSR” ) s uf

fi c ie ntl y in advanc e of his sentenc ing he aringand that the c ourt deprive d him of his right to allocute . For the following rea sons, we AF F IRM Ellison’s sentence

.No. 07-1945

United States v. Ellison

- 2 - I. BACKG ROUND Ellison was char g ed wi t h o n e count of c onspiracy to deliver mar ijuana, two counts of conspirac y

to launder monetary instruments, a nd one count of

forf eiture. H e plea ded g uilty to one count of c onspiracy

to launder mone tary

instruments. At his plea hear ing, E llison admit ted to le asing automobiles using money obt ai n ed from the sa le of illeg al drug s. I n exchang e for his guilty plea, the Go ve rnme nt a g re e d to dis mis s th e re ma ini ngc ounts a g a ins t E lli so n, and the pa rt ie s e nte re d in to a plea ag ree ment under R u l e 11 of the Fe dera l Rules of Criminal P roce dure. The ag ree ment specifie d a Guidelines r ang e of seventy to eig hty -seve n months. The Guidelines workshe et attac hed to the plea ag ree ment stated that the money -launde ring conspirac y “involv[ed] more than $70,000” (Joi nt A pp e nd ix (“ JA” ) 9 9) , a

nd bo th p art ie s a g re e d to the c a lc ulatio ns se t f or th i n th e wo rk sh e e t. After Ellison rece ived his initi al P S R, however , he filed obje ctions to its s tatements about the amount of funds he had launde red. H e pointed out that in his plea colloquy he had not a dmitted to launderingover $70,000—r ather , he mer ely s t at ed t hat he use d launder ed funds to lea se ca rs valued at over $70,000. Ellison argued that t h e $ 7 0,000 fig ure w as not the re levant figure f or purp os e s o f h is G uid e lin e s c a lc ulatio n a nd tha t he ha d a c tua lly

pa id m uc h le ss t o le ase the c a rs . Be cause Ellison challeng ed the Guide lines ca l culation set for th in the plea ag ree ment, the Gover nment moved to withdraw f rom the ag ree ment, and the district cour t gr anted the motion. Despite the G overnme nt’s withdrawa l fr o m t he plea ag ree ment, the par

ties decide d that El lis on wo uld c on tinue to pl e a d guil ty

to o ne c ount o f m on e y -l a un de ri ng , th e Go ve rnme nt w ou ld sti ll a g re e to dis mis s the oth e r ch arg e s, and the dis tr ic t court wo uld ho ld a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ngto de te rm ine the a mou

nt o f m on e y

la un de re d. At

th e hearin g , E lli so n te sti fi e d th a t he ha d o nly pa idNo. 07-1945

United States v. Ellison

- 3 - $9700 to lease c ars, but the Gove rnment conte nded that he ha d paid betwee n $30,000 and $50,000 for c ars a nd had also launde red mone y obtained fr om drug sales by using it to purcha se additional drug s, resulting in a tot al amount launder ed of more than $70,000. The district cour t ruled that, as a matter of law, the use of dr

ug proce eds to purcha se additional drug s and to promote the unlaw ful activity of selli ng drug s constitutes money -launde ring —a ruling that Ellison does not challeng e on

a pp e a l. T h e Go v ern m en t p re s en t ed t es t i m o n y fr o m t h re e m ai n wi t n es s es at t h e ev i d en t i ary h ea ri n g: Annette a nd Emory Matthews and J immy Gra y . Mr. and Mrs. Matthews, a husba nd and wife who owned a nd operated the compa

ny that lease d car s to Ellis on, testified to the amount of money Ellison had paid them. B oth Matthewses ha d criminal re cords that c alled their c redibility into question. Mr. Matthews testified that Elli son had made pay ments totaling about $31,200. Mrs. Matthews testified that she had dire ctly

rec eived pa

y ments fro m E l lison tot aling betwee n $8000 and $10,000. The $ 3 1 , 2 0 0 fi gu re m ay

i n cl u d e s o m e o r a l l o f t h e $ 8 0 0 0 t o $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 p ai d t o M rs . M at t h ew s , al t h o u gh the re cord is less than c lear on this point . Both Mr. a nd Mrs. Matthews testified a bout an occ asion when Ellison came to their offic e in the eve ning w ith severa l other men, de manded a car , and threatened to har

m them if they

ref used his reque st, stating that he w as entitled to a c ar be cause he had paid t h em $50,000 to lease ve hicles in the past. Ellison also testified at the he aring , denying havin g ma de the se state me nts to t he Matth e ws e s a

nd statin g that he ha d o nly

ma de tw o p ay

me nts to them, for a total of

$9700. I n support of its contention that Ellison launder ed money by using the proce eds of dr

ug sales to p ur c ha se mor e dr

ug s, the Go ve rnme nt p re se nte d th e te sti mony of Jimmy Gray , wh o r e g ula rl yNo. 07-1945

United States v. Ellison

The district cour

t appea rs to have misinterpr eted Gr ay ’s testimony and conc luded that 1 Dada did not acce pt the pay

ment of $20,000 fr om Ellison. ( See 1/31/07 Order at 10.) On the contra ry , Gra y testified on direc t examination: “I reme mber one occa sion [ Ellison] came over with a bagwhich wa s said to be $20,000 for D ada a nd Dada coming to pick it up.” (JA 273.) On cr oss-examination, Gray testified that he “ saw [Ellison] come ove r with a g roce ry bagfull of money . [W oodley ] t old him to s et it down on the steps and c ame ba ck [sic] and he le ft and then Dada came in and picked up the bagof money .” (JA 296.) - 4 - transporte d drug s for one of Ellison’s co-de fenda nts, Eric Woodley . Gra

y testi fi ed t h at he twice observe d Ellison come to Woodl ey ’s house to obt ain i n excess of twenty pounds of marijuana

. Ac c or din g to G ra

y , Wood le y wa s g e ne ra lly se lli ng the mari jua na fo r $11 00 pe r p ound . G ra y a lso testified that Ellison once broug ht a bagcontaining $20,000 in cash to W oodley ’s hous e as pa y ment for heroin that had been f

ronted to him by

an individual named Da da, and that Dada later c ame a nd p i c k e d u p t h e m o n e y. 1 Ba sed on the testimony

at the evide ntiary

hear ing, the co u rt d et ermined that Ellison had launder ed in ex cess of $70,000—this fig ure w as important bec ause la underingmore than $70,000 results in an addition of eig ht points t o a def endant’ s base o ff

en s e level under U.S.S.G. § 2S1 .1 (a )( 2) . Sp e c if

ic a lly , the dis tr ic t court “ c re dit [ed ] De fe nd ant’ s adm iss ion to bot h M r. and Mr s. Matthews that he paid $50,000 for a utomobiles” and conc luded that “if the Court cre dits Defenda nt with having picked up only one shi pment of 20 pounds [of marijuana], assuming it had a street va lue of $1,100 per

pound, this marijuana had a value of $22,000.” (1/31/07 Orde r, JA 150, 152). At Ellison’s init ial sentenc ing he aring , the Gover nment raised a new argument based on the court’s f indings with respect to the amount launder ed, cla iming that Ellison had committed perjury and wa s no longe r entitled to a re duction in his offense le vel for a ccept ance of re sponsibili ty , but rathe r wa s subject to a two-point incre ase for obstruction of justice. The Gover nment alleg ed thatNo. 07-1945

United States v. Ellison

- 5 - El lis on lie d a bo ut t he a mou nt h e pa id t o le a se c ars and fa lse ly de nie d e ng a g ing in d

ru g tr ans a c tio ns . Ellison’s counsel reque sted and re ceive d ad d i t ional time to submi t a re vised sentenc ing memorandum re sponding to the Gover nment’s perjury argument. Ellison submitted a memora ndum and a supple mental memora ndum responding to that argument. I n a dra ft opinion and ord er , the district court a dopted the Gove rnment’s position on

ac ce p t an ce o f r es p o n s i b i l i t y an d o b s t ru ct i o no f j u s t i ce and dete rmined that Ellison’s Guidel i n es ra n ge was 110 to 137 months. The cour t provided t h e parties with a c opy of its draft de cision at sentenc ing, w hich purporte dly surprised Ellison’s counse l, who had be en expecting to present or al argument on those issues at the sentenc ing hear ing. After hear ing E llison’s allocution and argument fr om c ouns e l, t

he c ourt se nte nc e d Elli so n to 137 mon ths ’ imp ri so nme nt. Th e fo llo wi ng da y , July 27 , 2 00 7, the dis tr ic t c ourt iss ue d it s o pin ion

and ord er s e tti ngfo rt

h th e se nte nc e . E lli so n ti me ly appea led. II. AN AL YSI S A . The di s t r ic t c o ur t di d n o t e r r in im po s in g a n e nh a nc e m e ntfo r o bs t r uc t io n o f j us tice and d enying a reduction f or acc eptance of responsibi lity 1. Obstruction of just ice Section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines, in re levant par t, instructs the district court t o i ncre ase a defe n d an t ’s offe nse leve l by two points if the defe ndant willingly attempted to obstruct the administration of justice during t he course of sentencing , and the c onduct re lated to the def endant’ s offe nse of c onviction. U.S.S.G. § 3C 1.1. Perjury is a p ro per ba sis for this enhanc ement. Se e id

. cmt. n.4(b). We re view a district court’s fa ctual dete rminations underlying a n obstruction-of-

justiceNo. 07-1945

United States v. Ellison

- 6 - enhanc ement for

clea r er ror. See U

nited States v. Goosby , 5 2 3 F

. 3 d 6 3 2 , 6 3 9 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 8 )

. We revie w de novo the district c ourt’s dete rmination that cer tain conduct c onstitut es an obstruc tion of justice, which is a mixed question of law and f act, a nd we a lso review de novo the “a ctual imposition of the e nhance ment.” Se e Un ite d S tat es v . B ag

ge tt , 342 F.3d 536, 540- 41 (6th Cir. 2003). “Perjury occur s when a witness, testify ing under oath or aff irmation, ‘g ives false testimony

c on c e rn inga

ma te ri a l matt e r wit

h the wi llf ul int e nt to pr ov ide fa lse te sti mony , r a the r t ha n a s a re su lt of confu sion, mist ake, or

faulty memory .’” See U

nited States v. Lawrence , 308 F.3d 623, 631- 32 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Dunnigan , 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)). The offe nse of pe rjury has three elements: 1) a

fal s e s t atement under oath, 2) c oncer ning a materia l matter, 3) with the willful intent to provide false test imony

. See D unnigan , 507 U.S. at 94. A sentenc ing c ourt imposing an obstruc tion-of-just i ce enhanc ement base d on its determination that a def endant committed perjury

must make specif

ic finding s on the rec ord to aid the a ppellate c ourt in review ing that decision. Lawrence , 308 F.3d at 632. “The [district] cour t m u s t: 1) identify those particula

r po rt ion s o f d e fe nd ant’ s te sti mony that it c on sid e rs to b e pe rj ur iou s; a nd 2) e ith e r m a ke a

sp e c if ic finding for e ach e lement of pe rjury o r, at least, make a finding that encompa sses all of the f actua l predic ates for

a finding of per

jury .” Id

. The dist rict court followed the re quired proc edure in its opi nion and orde r and spe cified two ins tanc e s o f p e rj ur

y to s up p o r t i t s o b s t r u c tio n- of -j us tic e e nh anc e me nt: 1) El lis on ’s de nia l th a t he pa id

mor e tha n $ 97 00 to l e a se c ars , an d 2) his de nia l tha t he wa s invo lve d with dr ug sa le s. Th e c ourt

a lso made a specific finding that eac h element of perjury was pre sent with respe ct to both inst ance s. The court de termined that Ellison’s denials we re lies be cause both alleg ations were supported byNo. 07-1945

United States v. Ellison

- 7 - “De fenda nt’s own plea c olloquy ” and “ evidenc e fr o m Go v ernment’s witnesses whom the Court found more c redible tha

n Mr. El lison.” (JA 65-66.) Whil e we take e x ception to one a spect of the d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s r e a s o n i n g , i t s u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o nw a s s o un d b e c a u s e E l l i s o n ’ s t e s t i m o n y w a s d i r e c t l y,

ma te r ia ll y

c o n tr a d ic te d

b y G o v e r n me n t w it

n e s s e s w h o m t

h e c o u rt r e a s o n a

b ly f o u n d to b e mo re

cre dible than Ellison. At his plea hea

ring , El l i s o n m er ely

stated that the c ars he lease d wer e wor th over $7 0, 00 0—

no on e a sk e d h im h ow muc h he pa id to le a se the m. Th e re fo re , it c ann ot b e sa id t

hat hi s later c laim that he paid only $9700 to lease c ars wa s i n co n s i s t ent with his plea colloquy , and the basis for the district court’s conclusion that Ellison’s statements at his plea he aringsupport a finding of per jury is unclear . Nor did Ellison state at his plea he aringthat h e h ad en gage d in any drug transac tions. The only potential inconsistency betwee n his ple a colloquy and his later te stimony

at the e vid e nti ary

he ari ngre la te d to wh e the r E lli so n ma de le a se pa y me nts in h is ow n n a me to o bta in

ca rs for other individuals (drugdeale rs) who w ished to remain a nony mous. At the plea he aring, El lis on state d th a t he “ le a se d v e hic le s f ro m a c ar b ro ke r f

or va ri ou s oth e r pe op le ,” and in r e sp on se to a question from the pr osecutor, he ag ree d that “the c ars [were not] lease d in the n am es of the ind ivi du a ls w ho pr ov ide d [him ] t he dr ug pr oc e e ds ,” and

that th e “ purp os e of

that w a s so that th os e individuals’ identities would not be associate d with the car s.” (JA 209-10.) While this admis sion sug g ests that Ellison mus t have made numerous pay ments, rather

than just the two to which he late r admitted, the district court ne ver a rticulated this re asoning . I n addition, it is possible that Ellison’s statements about prote cting identities related not to his own ef forts, but to the Matthewses’ dubious

arr ang ement of le asing car s from dea lerships under o n e n ame and then leasingthem to otherNo. 07-1945

United States v. Ellison

- 8 - individuals for ca sh—an ar rang ement intended to hide the identities of ce rtain people involved, as

ex p l ai n edat t h e e v i d en t i ary h ea ri n g. Even if the district c ourt did not have a rea soned basis f

o r s t ating that disparities betwe en Ellison’s plea hea

ring testimony

and evide ntiary

hear ing te stimony

support a finding of per

jury , the dis tr ic t c ourt

is c or re c t th a t th e te sti mony of

Em or y Matth e ws (w ithre sp e c t to the le a sin g of the c a rs )

an d Gr ay (w i t h re s p ec tt o dru gs ) c l ea rl y co n t ra d i ct edE l l i s o n ’s t es t i m o n y . At t h e e v i d en t i ary h ea ri n g, Ellison repeatedly

denied de aling drug s with or throug h his c o-conspirators, admitting only that he had been aware that his co-de fenda nts, whom he described as friends, were drug deale rs. Howe ver, Gra y testified that Ellison wa s persona lly involved in multiple drug transac tions: he saw E l l ison bring a bagof ca sh to Woodley ’s house, which Woodley said was a $20,000 pay ment to Dada f

or heroin, a nd he sawEllison come to Woodl ey ’s house with the purpose of picking u p m o re than twenty pounds of marijuana on two occa sions. Whil e Gray ’s t estimony was not particularly strong

e vid e nc e —G ra

y wa s a c ri min a l w ho did

no t kn owEl lis on

we ll, ha d n e ve r s e e n h im a c tua lly se ll dr u g s , an d d i d n o t kn o w w h a t t yp e o f p aym e n tar r an g e m e n te x i s t e d

b e t w e e nE l l i s o nan d

W o o d l e y, if any —it provided the district court with a r easona ble fa ctual basis for

concludingthat Ellison was lyinga bo ut n e ve r e ng a g ingin dr ug tr ans a c tio ns . We mus t a ff or d th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c re dib ili ty deter minations gre at def

ere nce, an d if two permissible views of the evidenc e exist, t he district court’s decision as to which is corr ect is not clea r er ror. Se e Un ite d S

tat es v . J e ro ss , 521 F.3d 562, 57 0 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 8) ; United States v. Maliszewski , 161 F.3d 992, 1020 (6th Cir. 1998) (desc ribing the district court’s c redibility finding s, in the context of an obstruction-of -justice enha

nceme nt for perjury , as “ba sically

unassailable” ). Thus, we c onclude that the district c ourt’s dete rmination thatNo. 07-1945

United States v. Ellison

We note that even if

Ellison were only

deeme d to have launde red $31,200 by leasing 2 car s, Gray ’s testimony

still bring s him well over the $70,000 thre shold. For e x ample, if e ach pick-up of mor e than twe nty pounds of marijuana

implied a purcha se of $22,000—a calc ulation by the district court that Ellison has not challeng ed—then the two pic k-ups take E llison over the threshold eve n without considering the bagof $20,000 in ca sh. - 9 - Ellison li ed about e ng ag ing in dr ug transac tions was not clear ly err oneous, and we aff

irm the district court’s obstruc tion-of-justice e nhance ment on this basis. I nad d i t i o n , t h e di s t ri ct co u rt fo u n d t h at E l l i s o n p er j u re d h i m s el f b y

“c o n t i n u o u s l y

d en [ y i n g]

e ve r . . . pa

y ingin e xce ss o f $9 ,7 00 .0 0 fo r le a se d c ars .” (JA 66 .) Th e dis tr ic t c ourt no te d th a t bo th of the Matthew ses testified that Ellison came to their business and told them that he had pa id them $5 0, 00 0 a nd wa s e nti tle d to a c ar, and the c ourt c on c lud e d that El lis on ha d, in f a c t, p a id t his a mou nt. Th is co nc lus ion

is r a the r w e a k, g ive n th a t th e Matth e ws e s, wh o w ou ld b e st k no w the a mou

nt p a id to them, testified at the evide ntiary hear ing that Ellison onl y paid $31,200. None t h eless, Emory Matth e ws did

c le arl y te sti fy that E lli so n p a id $ 31 ,2 00 fo r c ars , a nd e ve n if El lis on did

no t a c tua lly pay the $50,000 he c laimed to have pa id when demanding a ca r fr om the Matthewses, his stateme nt

su p p o rts th e c o n c lu s io n th a t h e p a id mu c h mo r e th an th e $ 9 7 0 0 h e c la im e d a t the evidentiary hear ing. There fore , the judg e’s ultimate conc lusion that Elli son materially understate d the amount

o f m o n ey he paid is supported by

the re cord, a

nd this finding is also an a cce ptable basis for the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s imp os iti on of the se nte nc inge nh anc e me nt. 2 Ellison arg ues that he did not c ommit per jury but was simply

confuse d by

the fa ct that he wa s be ingqu e sti on e d a

bo ut d ru g tr ans a c tio ns a t a

he ari ngthat he e xpe c te d w ou ld d e a l so le ly wi th pay ments for c ars. He points out t hat inacc urate testimony resulting fro m co nfusion, mistake, or faulty memory does not nece ssarily ref lect a willful attempt to obstruct justice. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1No. 07-1945

United States v. Ellison

- 10 - c mt. n. 2. No ne the le ss, the qu e sti on of wh e the r o ne ha s e ng a g e d in lar g e -s c a le dr ugsa le s is no t a complica t ed one, a

nd Ellison does not ex plain how conf usion or a fa

ulty memory , rathe r than a willful intent to deceive, c ould be re sponsible f or his denial of dr

ug -dea ling. Nor

does Ellison offer any rea son to believe that the dispar it y b et we en $9700 and $31,200—a differ ence of more tha

n 300%—could be explained by mere confusion, mistake, or f aulty memory . Th e oth e r e le me nts of

pe rj ur y we re a lso me t. El lis on ’s fa lse state me nts we re ma te ri a l to his sentenc ing be cause the per jured testimony , if believed, would have taken Ell ison’s conduct be low the $70,000 threshol d , s i gnificantly reduc ing his Guide lines score

. See, e .g. , United States v. Boothes , No. 99-5224, 2000 U.S. App. L E XIS 22737, at *8-9, *15 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2000) (upholding finding that testimony was mate rial whe re, if be lieved, testimony would have a llowed defe ndant to avoid a se ntencingenha n ce m en t ). The district c ourt also re asonably found that Ellison’s provision of false testimony was will ful and int entional, bot h with respe ct to his denial of purc ha sin g dr

ug s and his g ro ss u

nd e rs ta te me nt of th e amount o f m on e y he pa id t he Matth e ws e s. There fore , we a ffirm the district c ourt’s enha nceme nt for obstruction of justice. 2. Ac c e

pta nc e of r esp on sib ili ty Section 3E1.1(a) of the Guidelines states: “I f the defe ndant clea rly demonstrates a cce ptance of re sponsibili ty

for his off

ense, de cre ase the offe nse leve l by 2 levels

. ” U.S .S.G. § 3E1.1(a)

. Subsection (b) provide s for a n ad d i t i onal one- level dec rea se upon motion of the g overnme nt. U. S.S. G. § 3 E1 .1 (b ). An app li catio n n ote to t he se c tio n in dic a te s th a t “ a de fe nd ant w ho fa lse ly denies . . . re levant conduc t that the court de termines to be true has ac ted in a manne r inconsistent with acc eptanc e of r esponsibility .” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt n.1(a) . Fur thermore , a prope r finding ofNo. 07-1945

United States v. Ellison

- 11 - obstruction of justice “or dinarily indicates that the defe ndant has not ac cepte d responsibility .” Id

. cmt. n.4. We review

the d i s t ri ct court’s de cision to awar d or deny a re duction for a cce ptance of responsibility

for c lear err or. See U

nited States v. Angel , 355 F.3d 462, 476 (6th Cir. 2004). For the

re a so ns state d in

the pr e c e din g se c tio n, we c on c lud e that th e di st ri ct cou rt did no t c le arl y

e rr in deter mining that Ellison com mitted perjury such that he w as not entitled to a re duction for

a c c e p t an c e o f

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y. B. Elli so n was no t p r e ju dic e d by t he lat e pr ov isi on o f the am e nde d P SR Ellison appear ed for

his second sente ncing hear ing on July 26, 2007, and ten to fifte en minu t es b efor e the he aringbeg an he r ece ived a r evised PSR that had been updated from the pr ior version to re flec t the probation depa rtment’s new p o s i t i ons on acc eptanc e of r esponsibility and obstruction of justice (a s well as the f act that the Rule 11 a g ree ment had been withdrawn) . Ellison had previously rec eived an initial PSR dated September 20, 2006, which was amende d on October 23, 2006 and November 13, 2006. Ellison does not contend that he did not rec eive the October and No ve mbe r a

me ndme nts . T he re wa s n o d if feren ce b e tw e e n th e No ve mbe r 2 00 6 PSR and the July 2007 PSRother than the chang es with respe ct to a cce ptance of responsibility , obstruction of justice, and the withdra

wal of the plea a g ree ment. Ellison claims that his last-minute rec eipt of the PSR viol ated Rule 32(e ) of the F eder al Rules of Cr imi na l Pr oc edure , w hic h r e qu ir e s th e re sp on sib le pr ob a tio n o ff ic e r t o p ro vid e the PSR to a ll parties “ at least 35 da

y s befor e sente ncing unless the def endant wa ives this mini mum period.” F ed. R. C ri m. P . 3 2( e ). El lis on did no t obje c t to the tim e lin e ss of the pr ov isi on of the a me nd e d PSR , s o

we r eview the issue for plain e rror . Among the showing s Ellison m ust make to establish plain err orNo. 07-1945

United States v. Ellison

- 12 - is that th e e rr or

a ff e c te d h is sub sta

nti a l rig hts and “ se ri ou sly a ff e c te d th e fa ir

ne ss, int e g ri ty , o r p ub lic reputation of the judicial proce eding s.” United States v. Gardiner , 463 F.3d 445, 459 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (quotation m ar k s o mitted). Ellison cannot make this showing beca use he c lear ly

suffe red no prejudice as a r esult of the timing of his rece ipt of the amende d PSR . The only preju d ice Ellison alleg es is the i nability to “file additional written obj ections t o the conteste d chang es in the sentenc ing g uidelines, that being the deletion of the acc eptanc e of responsibility points and the addition of the ob str uc tio n o f j us tic e po int s. ” (E lli son Br. 2 4. ) H ow e ve r, El lis on ha d lo ngbe e n a

wa re of the se proposed c hang es, had requeste d and re ceive d additional time to brief these very issues, and had submitt ed two memora

nda ar g uing a g ainst the positions adopted in the revised PSR. Theref ore, Ellison is not entitled to resentenc ing ba sed upon the timing of his rece ipt of the amende d PSR

. C. Elli son’s right to allocute was n ot violated The district judge invited Ellison t o allocute, whic h Ellison did wit hout limi tation. Ellison’s

rea l com p laint is that the district court made its dec ision on the acc eptanc e-of -re sponsibili ty

and obstruc ti o n - of-justice issues ba sed on the pa rties’ wr itten submiss ions without first allowing counse l to provide ora l argument on those issues. We reviewde novo an a lleg ation of a de nial of the rig ht of allocution. Se e Un ite d S tat es v . W olf e , 71 F.3d 611, 614 ( 6th Cir. 1995). Here , the district court did not err , as “neither the rig ht to allocution in F ed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)( 3)(B )& (C), nor the pr ocedur es for de aling with controver ted matters in F ed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) indicate[s] that a judg e may not state his ruling on objections raise d to the PSR , or to othe r sentenc ing matters, bef ore the defe ndant or his counsel is g iven a c hance to speak.” Id. a t 61 4- 15 . T he re fo re , th is c la im i s w ith ou t me ri t.No. 07-1945

United States v. Ellison

- 13 - III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM Ellison’s sentence

.