The pa pers submitted in connec tion with thi s motion i nclude: De fenda nts’ Motion 1 for Summary

J udg ment (“D ef. Mot.”) ; Plainti ff’ s Opposition to Defenda nts’ Motion for Summary J udg ment (“Pl. Opp.”) ; Plainti ff’ s Motion for Summary J udg ment (“Pl. Mot.”); Def endants’ O pposition t o Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary J udg ment (“D ef. O pp.”); Plaintiff’s Reply to Defe ndants’ Memora

ndum in Oppositi on to Plainti ff’ s Motion for Summary J udg ment (“Pl. Rep.”) ; and Def

endants’ N otice of Supplementa l Authority (“D ef. Supp.”)
. UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

____________________________________ ) S HI RLEY TABB, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v . ) ) Ci vi l A cti on No. 06 -07 89 (P L F) DI STRI CT OF COLUMBIA and ) B REN DADO NA L D WA L KE R, ) ) De fe nd ants . ) ____________________________________)
OPI NI ON This matter is befor e the Court on the pa rties’ c ross motions for summary judgme nt. After c are ful consider ation of the pa rties’ pa pers, attached e x hibits, and the entire
rec ord in the ca se, the Court will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgme nt and will gr ant de fe nd ants ’ m oti on

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt i n p art

and de ny it i n p art . 1
I . BA CKGROUND Pla int if f S hir le y Ta bb wo rk e d f

or the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

fo r a lmo st 1 4 ye ars , mos t r e c e ntl y

a s a Pub lic Inf

or matio n Sp e c ia lis t f

or the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

Chi ld a nd F amil y Service s Ag ency

(“CF SA”). See Pl. Mot ., Plaintiff’s Statement of Mater ial Fa cts (“Pl. Fa cts”) ¶ 1; Def . Mot., Defe ndants’ Statement of Material F acts Not in Ge nuine Dispute (“ Def . Fa cts”)Def endants’ statement of fa cts asser ts that plaintiff took family medical lea

ve 2 from Mar ch 2005 throug h J uly 2005. See De f. F acts ¶ 15. D efe ndants rely entirely on plaintiff’s decla ration for this assertion, which, whe n rea d in its entirety , makes c lear that while plaintiff 2 ¶ 1. In Marc h 2005, plaintiff contac ted a public infor mation office r with the De partment of Human Servic es about de velopinga ca mpaig n to increa se aw are ness ar ound child abuse a nd
ne g le c t, r e viv ingthe B a c k to Sle e p c ampa ig n a nd oth e r C F SA p ro

je c ts. Se e De f. F a c ts ¶

6; Pl. Op p. , Pl a int if

f’ s Re sp on se to M ate ri a l F a c ts A sse rt e d b y De fe nd ants (“ Pl. Re sp .” ) ¶ 6. In July 2005, plaintiff spoke to B renda Donald Walker, the CFSA Direc tor, about her conce rns that
c hil dr e n w e re sle e pin gat th e CF SA o ff ic e bu ild ingrathe r t

ha n in e me rg e nc y

ho me s. Se e Pl. Fa cts ¶ 4; Def

. Fa cts ¶ 7. On August 15, 2005, plaintiff contac ted Susan New man, Senior Advisor for Re lig iou s A ff

a ir s f or the Exe c uti ve Of

fi c e of the Ma y or , to dis c us s th e la c k o f f os te r h ome
resour ces f

or CFSA and possible solutions. See Def . Fa cts ¶ 9; Pl. Resp. ¶ 9. Plainti ff subsequently

contac ted Deputy

Mayor Ne il Albert, who wa s responsible for CFSA perf

ormanc e,
a bo ut t he pr ob le m of

c hil dr e n s le e pin gin t

he CF SA o ff

ic e bu ild ing . Se e De f. F a c ts ¶ 10 ; Pl. Resp. ¶ 10. F inally , on September 19, 2005, pla intiff contac ted var ious media outlets to report the pr ob le m th at c hil dr e n w e re sle e pin gin t he CF SA o ff

ic e bu ild ing . Se e De f. F a c ts ¶ 11 ; Pl. Resp. ¶ 11; Pl. Fac ts ¶ 19; Def. O pp., Def endants’ Re sponse to Plaintiff’s Statement of Mater ial Fa cts Not in Genuine D ispute (“De f Resp.”) ¶ 19. Stories about the issue ra n that day or the fo llo wi ngda

y . Se e Pl. F a c ts ¶

18 ; D e f. Re sp . ¶

18 . Pl a int if

f a lso g ave a

ph oto g ra phof a c hil d sleepingat CFSA to media outlets. See Pl. Fa cts ¶ 20; Def . Resp. ¶ 20. Plaintiff took family

medical lea

ve fr om sometime in March 2005 to on or a bout May 9, 2005. See De f. F acts ¶15; Pl. Resp. ¶ 15. Plaintiff ag ain took leave from August 18, 2reque sted leave in order to c are for he r mother f rom Marc h 2005 throug h J uly 2005, her mother died bef ore the expiration of the leave period a nd plaintiff re turned to work on or about May

9, 2005. See De f. Mot., Ex . G (“ Tabb De cl.”) ¶¶ 13- 15. 3 20 05 thr ou g h Se pte mbe r 2 00 5 b e c a us e of he r d ia be te s a nd re late d h e a lthiss ue s. Se e Pl. F a c ts ¶ 1 4; D e f. Re sp . ¶

14 . Pl a int if

f w a s st ill on

a pp ro ve d le ave at th e tim e sh e c on ta c te d th e me dia about childre n sleepingin the CFSA offic e building. See Pl. Facts ¶ 24; De f. Resp. ¶ 24.

On Octobe r 3, 2005, B renda Walker issued a N otice of Summary Removal to the plaintiff, informingher that she was summarily remove d from her

position. S ee D ef. F acts ¶ 12; Pl. Mo t., Ex. 2 (“No tic e ” ). Th e No tic e inf or me d p la int if

f t hat th e ba sis fo r h e r r e mov a l w a s u se of the CF SA e ma il s y ste m f or an una uth or ize d c ampa ig n to ra ise awa re ne ss a bo ut c hil d a

bu se outside the ag ency ; failure to pe rfor m job duties in a competent and timely manner ; misrepre sentation of ag ency prac tice to the media a

nd violation of confidentiality laws; and violation of Family

Medica l L eave Policy . See Notice at 1-2. Plaintiff wa s notified of her rig ht to provide a written response to the Notice, to be r epre sented by an attorne y , and to attend a n adver sary hear ing, a fter which there would be a notice of final de cision. See Notice at 2. Plaintiff submit ted a Response to the Notice of Summary

Reversa l on October

10, 2005 and reque sted a he aring . See De f. Mot., Ex . C at 1, 5. The par ties scheduled a

hear ing f or Oc tober 27, 2005, but plaintiff did not attend. See De f. F acts ¶ 14; Pl. Resp. ¶ 14.

On April 28, 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint in this C ourt asser ting violations of her F irst Amendment rig hts, her F ifth Amendment due pr ocess r ights, the D .C. W histleblower Protection Act (“ DC-WPA”), the District of Columbia and fe dera l Family and Medic al L eave Acts, and 42 U .S.C. § 1985 for conspirac y . The Court dismissed the conspirac y claim, as we ll as th e DC -W P A cl aim again stpl ain ti ff’s superv is ors . S ee Tab b v . Di st ri ct o f C ol um bi a, 4 77 F.4

Supp. 2d 185 (D.D.C. 2007). De fenda nts now move for summar y judgme nt on all remaining
c la ims . Pl a int if

f m ov e s f or summa ry jud g me nt o n h e r F ir st A me ndme nt a nd DC -WPAc la ims
. I I . DI SCUS SI ON A. Standard of Review Summary judgme nt may

be g rante d only

if “the ple ading s, the discover y and disclosure mate rials on file, a nd any aff idavits [ or dec larations] show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any

materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c) ; see a lso Anderson v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) ; Ho lc omb v. Pow e ll, 43 3 F .3 d 8 89 , 8 95 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 6) . “ A f a c t is ‘m ate ri a l’ if

a dis pute ov e r i t might af fec t the outcome of a

suit under the g overninglaw; fa ctual disputes that ar e ‘irr eleva nt or
unnece ssary ’ do not aff

ect the summar

y judgme nt determination.” H olcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 895 (quotingAnder son v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. at 248). An issue is “g enuine” if the evide nce is such that a re asonable jury could re turn a verdic t for the non- moving pa rty . See Ande rson v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d at 895. When a motion for summary judgme nt is under consideration, “the evidenc e of the non-movant is to be believe d, and all justifiable infe renc es ar e to be dra wn in [t he non-mova

nt’s] favor.” Anderson v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. at 255. See also Mastro v. Potomac Elec tric Power Co., 447 F .3d 843, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Aka v. Was hin g ton

Ho sp ita l Ce nte r, 15 6 F .3 d 1 28 4, 12 88 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 8) (e n b anc ); Was hin g ton Pos t Co. v. Dep’t of H ealth and H uman Service s, 865 F.2d 320, 325 (D .C. Cir. 1989). On a motion for summary

judgme nt, the Court must “eschew makingcre dibilit y

deter minations or weig hing5

the evidenc e.” Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F .3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

The non-movingparty ’s opposition, however, must consist of more than mere unsupported alleg ations or denials a nd must be supported by

aff idavits, declar ations or other competent e vidence setting f orth specif

ic fa cts showingthat there is a g enuine issue f or trial. See F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(e) (2); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The non- moving party is “requir ed to provide e vidence that would permit a re asonable jury to find” in her f

avor. L anin g ham v. U. S. N avy , 8 13 F .2 d 1 23 6, 12 42 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 7) . I f t he e vid e nc e is “ me re ly colora ble” or “not sig nificantly

probative,” summary

judgme nt may

be g rante d. Ander son v. L iberty L obby , Inc., 477 U.S. at 249-50; see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“[W] here th e r e c o r d t ak e na s a

w h o l e c o u l d

n o tl e a d a r at i o n a l tr i e r

o f f a c tt o f i n d f o r th e n o n - m o v i n gp arty, ‘t he re is n o g e nu ine iss ue fo r t ri a l.’ ” ) ( qu oti ngMatsu sh ita El e c tr ic Ind

us . Co . v . Z e nit

h Ra dio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). To de feat summary judgme nt, a plaintiff must produce more than “a scintilla of evidenc e to support [her] claims.” Fr eedma n v. MCITelec ommunications Corp., 255 F.3d 840, 845 ( D.C. Cir. 2001).
B. Plain tif f’ s F irs t A me nd

me nt C lai m Plaintiff alleg es that def

endants violated he r F irst Amendment rig hts by te rm inatin ghe r e mpl oy

me nt i n r e sp on se to h e r s tate me nts to t he me dia a bo ut c hil dr e n s le e pin gin the CFSA building. F or a public e mploy ee to make out a pr im a fa c iec a se of re ta liatio n in violation of the First Ame ndment, she must establish that (1) she w as speaking a s a citizen on a
matte r o f p ub lic c on c e rn ; ( 2) the g ov e rnme nt’ s inte re st i n e ff ic ie nt p e rf

or manc e of pu bli c service s is outweighe d by the plaintiff’s inter est as a c itiz en in commentingupon matters of6

public conce rn; (3) the plaintiff’s spee ch wa s a motivating f actor for the e mploy er’ s retaliator y action; and ( 4) the a dverse employ ment action wa s not moti vated by leg itimate, non-prete x tual g ro un ds . Se e Sand e rs v. Di str ic t of Col umb ia , 5 22 F . Su

pp . 2 d 8 3, 89 (D .D .C. 20 07 ); se e a lso Gar cetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417-22 (2006) . I t now is established, howeve r, that “when public employ ees make stateme nts pursuant to their offic ial duties, the employ ees a re not sp e akin ga s c iti zen s f

or F ir st A me ndme nt p ur

po se s, and

the Con sti tut ion

do e s n ot i ns ulate the ir
c omm un ic atio ns fr om e mpl oye r d isc ipl ine .” Ga rc e tti v. Ce ba llo s 5 47 U. S. at 42 1. In G arc e tti , the pla int if

f, a pr os e c uto r, wa s a lle g e dly re ta liate d a g a ins t f

or a me mor and

um t hat he wr ote advising his supervisor about how to proc eed in a particula r ca se. See id. B eca

use the prepa ration of the me morandum wa s part of his off icial duties, the Supreme Court de termined that the prosec utor’s spee ch wa s not protected by the Fir st Amendment. See id. at 422. As the Sup re me Court

no te d in Ga rc e tti , th e de te rm inatio n o f whe the r a pu bli c
e mpl oye e sp ok e purs ua

nt t o h is o r h e r o ff

ic ia l dutie s, rathe r t

ha n a s a c iti zen , is fr e qu e ntl y

fa c tbo un d: “ Th e pr op e r i nq

uir y is o ft e n a pr a c tic a l on e . F or

ma l jo b d e sc ri pti on s o ft e n b e ar l itt le
re se mbl anc e to t

he dutie s an e mpl oye e a c tua lly is e xpe c te d to pe rf

or m.” Ga rc e tti v. Ce ba llo s, 547 U.S. at 424-25. F urthermor e one must ca ref ully consider the forum and a udience for a

n employ ee’ s speec h in conjunction with the employ ee’ s job responsibiliti es to deter mine whether th e sp eech i s p rot ect ed b y th e Fir stAm end men t. For ex amp le, in W il li ams v. J oh ns on , 5 37 F. Supp. 2d 141, 143 (D.D.C. 2008), Judge Kollar -Kotelly discussed whe ther stateme nts made by an employ ee of

the District of Columbia wer e prote cted by the Fir st Amendment in two differ ent circ umstances. Judge Kollar-K otelly conclude d that the plaintiff’s spe ech w as not protec ted when she spoke to the Council of the District of Columbia and r aised c oncer ns about a pa

rticular7

co n tra cth el d

b y th e D i s tri ct , b ec au s e p l ai n t i ff ’s j o b d u t i es “r equ i re d

h er t o p ro v i d e h er

fi n d i n gs to senior executive per sonnel in the District g overnme nt,” and plaintiff w as expected to attend the Council meetingand to assist her supe rvisor in answe ringquestions posed by the Council. I d. at 151. B y

contra st, the plaintiff in that case had suff iciently alleg ed that she w as speaking a s a citizen, and not pursuant to her officia l duties, when she subseque ntly met privately

with a pa rt ic ula r C ounc il m e mbe r a

nd ra ise d s imi lar c on c e rn s. Se e id. at 15 2; s e e a lso F re ita gv. Aye rs , 46 8 F . 3 d 5 28 , 5 45 (9 th C ir . 2 00 6) (s tate c or re c tio ns of

fi c e r s po ke a s a

c iti zen wh e n s he wr ote to a Senator and the Inspector G ener al complainingof sexual hara ssment in her workpla ce; a n employ ee doe s not invariably “lose he r rig ht to speak as a citizen sim ply

beca use she initiated the communications while at wor k or bec ause the y

conce rned the subject matter of her employ ment”). In this case, ther e ar e g enuine f actua l disputes reg ardingplaintiff’s job responsibilities, and these fa ctual disputes ar e mater ial to resolvingwhether all of plaintiff’s state me nts we re ma de purs ua nt t o h e r o ff

ic ia l dutie s ( in whic h c a se sh e wo uld have no F ir st Amendment prote ction for the a lleg ed re taliation) or whe ther some we re ma de as a citizen. Acc ordingto plaintiff, her job duties as a public information spec ialist included inter-a g ency communications, publishing in-house ne wsletters, spea king w ith new social wor kers, a nd raising money throug h an annua l golf

tournament. See Def

. Mot., Ex . B ( “Ta

bb Dep.” ) at 56. Plaintiff states that her

job duties ge nera lly

“involved communications campaig ns as assig ned and that she
wo uld be kn ow le dg e a

ble a bo ut t he pr og ra ms a nd pr oje c ts d e sc ri be d b y

tho se c ampa ig ns .” Pl. Resp. at 2. Def

endants c hara cter ize plaintiff’s job duties more broa dly , as re quiring her to “ be kn ow le dg e a

ble a bo ut C F SA p ro g ra

m a c tiv iti e s, ini tiativ e s in the a g e nc y

and [re qu ir ing ] he r t o8

stay abre ast of sy stemic issues, problems and pr og ress in CFSA.” D ef. F acts ¶ 4 ( citing D ef. Mot., Ex . E, Shirley

Tabb’s 8/18/05 Response to 8/18/05 Admonition at 5, incorporate d by ref ere nce in Ta

bb Dec l. ¶ 49). De fenda

nts also rely

on plaintiff’s deposition at which she te s ti f ie d th at at o n e p o int s h e “ w a s r e s p o n s ib le f o r a g e n c y c o mm un ic ati o np la

n s . ” D e f M o t. , E x. D at 66. I f plaintiff wa s g ener ally responsible for

prese nting the public f

ace of the a g ency to the District of Columbia gove rnment and to the me dia, and if she expressly spoke in that capa city when she contac ted the Mayor’s Of fice and media outlets in the fa ll of 2005, then, under Gar cetti v. Ceballos, and c ases f ollowing it, these state ments likely are not protecte d. I f, howeve r, plaintiff’s duties pr imarily involved org anizing discre te public re lations events, such a s char ity g olf tournaments, she w as likely speakingas a pr ivate citizen when she spoke to the Mayor’s Of

fice and the media . The Court finds that there are g enuine issues of material fa ct as to whe the r c e rt a in s tate me nts ma de by pla int if f — name ly , h e r c omm

un ic atio ns wi th t

he De puty Mayor and subse quent contac ts with the media — wer e made pursuant to plaintiff’s job duties. The Court there fore cannot de termine a s a matter of law whe ther he r spee ch wa s protecte d by the First Amendme nt. See Gar cetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 421.

The pa rties also dispute whethe r plaintiff’s of ficial job re sponsibili ties included the leg al re quirement that plaintiff, a social worke r, re port suspecte d incidents of child abuse
. Se e D e f
. F a c ts ¶ 5 ; P l. Re s p . ¶

5
. Inh e r d e p o s it io n , p la inti f

f an s w e r e d

“ y e s ” w h e na s k e d : “ [A ]t the time y ou worke d for CF SA, did y ou believe yourself to be a mandatory repor ter? ” See D ef. Mo t., Ex. S at 24 0. Th e re c or d e vid e nc e pr e se nte d b y the pa rt ie s is su ff

ic ie ntl y un c le ar a s to leave g enuine issues of f

act that must be re solved at trial — spec ifically , whether plaintiff’s9

actua l job functions included beinga mandatory repor ter, or whether

her oblig ation to report wa s a state r equire ment that applies to all social wor kers, se parate and a

part fr om her off

icial duties. This disputed fact is mater ial beca use it has bee n held that public employ ees who have similar
re po rt ingor

dis c los ur e ob lig atio ns a s p art of the ir job re sp on sib ili tie s ty

pic a lly sp e ak p ur su ant t o their off icial duties when the y

make state ments relatingto those disclosure oblig ations. See, e.g ., Wil burn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ( District of Columbia Office of Human Rig hts Director , whose job re sponsibili ties included eliminating discriminatory prac tices in employ ment, was spea

king pur suant to her of

ficial duties whe n she made statements about
rac ial discrimination occur ringat work)
. Be cause there are g enuine issues of material fa ct as to whe ther plaintiff ha s
a sse rt e d a de pr ivatio n o f h e r c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts un de r t he F ir st A me ndme nt, the re ne c e ssa ri ly also are g enuine issues of material fa ct that must be resolve d to determine whether defe ndant Br enda Walker

is entitled to qualified immunit y . See Pear son v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816-21 (2009) (in consider ing the question of qualified immunity , a district cour t has discre tion to consider the two e lements — whethe r the fa cts alleg ed make out a violation of a c onstitut ional rig ht and whethe r that rig ht was cle arly established — in either

order).
C. M un ic ipa l Lia bil ity The District of Columbia see ks summary judgme nt on the g round that there are no g enuine issues of material fa ct as to whe ther plaintiff ha s a cla im for municipal liability under 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3. In o rd e r t o h old a mun ic ipa lity

lia ble fo r c ivi l r ig hts vio latio ns un de r 4 2 U .S. C. § 1 98 3, the mun ic ipa lity

mus t ha ve a c te d in

a c c or da nc e wi th a

“ g ov e rnme nt p oli c y

or c us tom ,10

whether made by its lawmakers or

by those whose e dicts or ac ts may fairly be said to re prese nt officia l policy .” Monell v. De p’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) ; see F eirson v. District of Columbia, 506 F.3d 1063, 1066 (D .C. Cir. 2007) (“To impose liability on the District under 42 U .S.C. § 1983, [ plaintiff] must show ‘not only a violation of [her] rights under the Constit ution or fede ral law , but also that the [Dist rict’s] custom or policy cause d the violation.’”) (c iti ngWar

re n v . D istri c t of

Col umb ia , 3 53 F .3 d 3 6, 38 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 4) ). Pr oo f o f a sin g le incident of unc onstitut ional activity is insufficient to impose liabilit y unless there is proof that there was a

policy in place that was unconstitutional. See Monell v. Dep’ t of Social Servs., 436 U. S. at 69 4. De fe nd ants c on te nd that th e Di str ic t of

Col umb a c ann ot b e he ld l ia

ble be c a us e pla int if f h a s f a ile d to de mon str ate that th e Di str ic t ha d a c us tom or po lic y of re ta liatin ga g a ins t
e mpl oye e s f

or e xer c isi ngthe ir

F ir st A me ndme nt r ights . T he Court a g re e s. Plaintiff has not alleg ed that the District of Columbi a had a

policy or pra ctice of reta liating a g ainst employ ees f or exercisingthe rig ht to free speec h under the First Amendme nt or that she suff

ere d injury

beca use of a ny such custom or policy . Nor ha s plaintiff pointed to any oth e r e mpl oye e wh o s uf

fe re d s imi lar r e ta liatio n. Th e po lic y or c us tom mus t be pe rv a siv e to support municipal liability . See Carte r v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 123- 24 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The Court f

inds that the one incident of a lleg ed re taliation ag ainst plaintiff does not qualify as per vasive. Plaintiff also argues that bec ause de fenda nt Bre nda Walker w as a f inal policy maker for the D istrict of Columbia, her dec ision to fire plaintiff supports a f inding of municipal liability . For

this argument, she re lies on Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 48 0 ( 19 86 ) (plu

ra lity op ini on ) ( “ [I ]t is p la in t

hat munic ipa l li a

bil ity may be imp os e d f

or a sin g leAs CFSA Dire ctor, Ms. Walker ha d the authority to terminate pe rsonnel. See 3 D.C. Code § 4-1303.03(a -1)( 8). 11 decision by

municipal policy

maker s under a

ppropriate circ umstances.” ). The instant c ase, howeve r, is not gove rned by Pembaur. While Ms. W alker had the a uthority to discharg e her subordinates, whic h authority she exercise d ag ainst plaintiff, she did not have the authority to set employ ment policy

for the D istrict of Columbia — a distinction t hat is signific ant in considering the qu e sti on

of mun ic ipa l li a

bil ity
. As Judg e Ob e rd or fe r h a s h e ld, a mun ic ipa lity

is n ot “ lia

ble 3 under § 1983 when the of ficials re sponsible for the a lleg ed constitutional deprivation . . . po sse sse d o nly

the a uth or ity to m ake e mpl oy

me nt decisions (i.e. tra

nsfer ringor terminatingan ag ency employ ee) , not

the a uth or ity to s e t e mpl oy

me nt policyfor the City .” F ox v. District of Col umb ia , 9 90 F . Su

pp . 1 3, 20 (D .D .C. 19 97 ) ( c iti ngCity of St. L ou is v . Pr a

pr op tni k, 48 5 U .S. 112, 128-30 (plura lity

opinion); 145-47 (B renna n, J ., concur

ring )) ( emphasis in orig inal); see also Pembauer

v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. at 484 n.12 (“[F]or example, the County Sheriff
may have dis c re tio n to hir e and fi re e mpl oye e s w ith out a lso be ingthe c ounty of fi c ia l r e sp on sib le for e stablishing county

employ ment policy . I f this were the ca se, the Sherif f' s decisions respe ctingemploy

ment would not give rise to municipal liability .”). Nothing in Ms. Walkers’ job duties as identified in the District of Columbia Code, see D .C. Code §§ 4-1303.03(a) , (a- 1), or in the e vidence proff ere d by plaintiff supports a finding that Ms. Walker was a

final dec ision-maker w ith respec t to employ ment policy

for the D istrict. The Court there fore will gr ant judg ment for the D istrict of Columbia on this claim.The pa rties dispute whethe r plaintiff wa s fired on the date the notice of summary 4 remova l was issued, bef

ore he r opportunity

for a hear ing, or

on the date that the hear ing of fice r issued a notice of

final dec ision, after he r opportunity for a hear ing. T he notice of

summary remova l indicates that it is the first step in a multi-step proce ss before a “notice of final de cision” iss ue s, imp lyingthat e mpl oy me nt t e rm inatio n is no t f

ina l until the e mpl oye e ha s a n o pp or tun ity fo r a he ari ng . Se e No tic e at 2. Pla int if f d oe s n ot p ro vid e a de qu ate fa c ts o r l aw t o c ha lle ng e thi s conclusion. Although pla intiff argues that the Notice did not inform her with suffic ient

5 specific ity

of the ba ses for he r re moval, she could have discove red this additional detail had she followed the pr ocedur e identified in the N otice. See N otice at 2 ( stating that “[y ou] have the rig ht to review a

ny materia l upon which this proposed ac tion is based . . .” and pr oviding the name and c on ta c t in fo rm atio n f

or the he ari ngof

fi c e r) . T he le tte r s e rv e d to pr ov ide a de qu ate notice of the g ener al re asons for he r dismissal. See Reeve Aleutian Airw ay s, Inc. v. United States, 982 F.2d 594, 600 (D .C. Cir. 1993) (no proce dural due proce ss violation where notice was “ adequate to avoid serious risk of e rrone ous deprivation” a nd provided “ the name of a person in author ity

for [plaintiff] to contact to seek a ny additional specific ation [pl aintiff] thought nece ssary .”) 12 D. Proc e du ra l D ueProc ess C lai m Assuming that plaintiff ha d a prope rty interest in her

employ ment, a point
un c on te ste d b y

the pa rt ie s, se e B oa

rd of Re g e nts v. Roth, 40 8 U .S. 56 4, 57 7 ( 19 72 ), the iss ue is wh e the r p la int if

f r e c e ive d a de qu ate pr oc e ss b e fo re sh e wa s f ina lly te rm inate d f

ro m e mpl oy

me nt. 4 The notice of summary

remova l notified plaintiff of the District’ s asserte d rea sons for terminatingher e mploy

ment — namely , use of the CF SA email sy stem for a n unauthorized campa ign to r aise a

war eness a

bout child abuse; fa ilure to perf orm job duties in a competent a nd tim e ly mann e r; mis re pr e se ntatio n o f a g e nc y pr a c tic e to t

he me dia and vio latio n o f c on fi de nti a lity laws; and violation of F amily Medica l L eave . See Notice at 1-2. The notice also informed 5 pla int if f t hat un de r D istri c t of

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re g ulatio ns sh e ha d th e ri g ht t o r e sp on d in wr iti ngand

to pa rt ic ipate in a

n a dv e rs ari a l he ari ng . Se e id. Th e Court c on c lud e s th at th is p ro c e ss w a s a de qu ate under the Due Proc ess Clause. See Cleve land B oard of Education v. L oudermill, 470 U.S. 532,13

54 6 ( 19 85 ) ( “ Th e e sse nti a l r e qu ir e me nts of du e pr oc e ss . . . are no tic e and an o pp or tun ity to respond.” ). Plaintiff submit ted a wr itten response c ontesting the char g es in the Notice , but she did not appear

on the date sc heduled f

or her hear ing be cause she did not think she would be
su c c e ssf ul a nd ins te a d d e c ide d to “ purs ue it thr ou g h th e c ourt s. ” Se e Pl. Op p. ¶ 1 4; D e f. Mo t, Ex. K (“ Ta bb De p. pt. 2” ) at 19 7- 98 . Pl a int if f c on te nd s th at th e pr oc e ss w a s a “ sh am,” but th is
asser tion is notsupported by

the re cord e vidence . See Pl. Opp. at 19; Pl. Mot ., Ex . 6 (“Char les Dep.” ); see a lso L epre v. DOL , Emple. Comp. Appeals B d., 275 F.3d 59, 71 ( D.C. Cir. 2001) (“ba ld assertions” that pr ocee dings w ere a “sha m” do not support conclusion that proc edura l due proce ss rig hts were violated). More importantly , plaintiff’s belief that the hea

ringwould be futil e , whe the r w e ll- fo un de d o r n ot, do e s n ot e xcu se he r f a ilure to t ake a dv anta g e of the pr oc e ss aff orded he r. The Court will g rant judg ment in favor of the def endants on plaintiff’ s proce dural due proc ess claim.
E. D. C. W his tle blo we r Pro te c tio n A c t Cla im Both plaintiff a

nd the District of Columbia move for summar y judgme nt on pla int if f’ s c la im und e r t

he D. C. Wh ist le blo we r P ro te c tio n A c t. T he DC -WPApr oh ibi ts c e rt a in employ ment actions and othe r re taliatory behavior as a r esult of an e mploy ee’ s protecte d disclosure. See D.C. Code § 1-615.52 - 615.53. In order to establish a pr im a fa c iecase under the DC-WPA, plaintiff must allege fac ts establishing that she ma de a pr otected disc losure, that her supe rvisor re taliated or took or thr eate ned to take a prohibited personne l action ag ainst her, and that her

protec ted disclosure w as a c ontributing fa ctor to the re taliation or prohibited14

personne l action. See Cra wford v. D istrict of Columbia, 891 A.2d 216, 218-19 (D.C. 2006). I t is undisput ed that the District of Columbi a ter

minated plaintiff — a pr ohibited personne l action within the meaningof the DC-WPA. See D.C. Code § 1-615.52. De fenda nt contends, howe ver, that plaintiff did not make a “ protec ted disclosure” beca use the fa ct that children w ere sleepingin the CFSA offic e wa s well known. See D ef. Mot. at 18- 20. Under the statut e , p ro te c te d d isc los ur e me ans :

[A] ny disclosure of inf

ormation, not specific ally prohibited by statute, by

an employ ee to a

supervisor or

a public body

that the e mpl oye e re a so na

bly be lie ve s e vid e nc e s: (A ) G ro ss m ism ana g e me nt; (B ) G ro ss m isu se or

wa ste of pu bli c re so ur c e s o r f

un ds ; (C) Abuse of

authority in connec tion with the administ ration of a pu bli c pr og ra

m or the e xec uti on

of a pu bli c c on tr a c t; (D) Aviolation of a fe dera l, state, or loca l law, rule, or regulation, or of a term of a contra ct betwe en the District g overnme nt and a District g overnme nt contrac tor which is not of a me rely technica l or minimal nature; or (E) Asubstantial and spec ific dang er to the public he alth and s a f e ty. D.C. Code § 1-615.52.

In support of its positi on, defe ndant re lies on Wi lburn v. District of Columbia, 95 7 A .2 d 9 21 , 9 25 -2 6 ( D. C. 2 00 8) , in wh ic h th e Di stric t of

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Court of Ap pe a ls
c on sid e re d th e po ssi bil ity that if a pla int if f’ s st ate me nts we re a lr e a dy br oa dly kn own th e y

c ou ld not be protec ted disclosures, a lthough it ruled a g ainst the plaintiff on other grounds. Def endant relies on plaintiff’ s statement that “the f act that c hildren ar e slee ping in [the CFSA] buil ding15

[wa s] a we ll k no wn fa c t. E ve ryon e in t

he a g e nc y [kne w] it , a s w e ll c omm

un ity [sic ].” De f. Mo t.
at 19 (c iti ngTa

bb De c l. at ¶

36 , in c or po ratin gby

re fe re nc e Shi rl e y

Ta bb ’s 8/1 8/0 5 Re sp on se to 8/18/05 Admoniti on at 4, attac hed at De f. Mot., Ex . E.). De fenda nt maintains that her disclosures ther efor e we re not prote cted; they wer e alr eady

widely known. The Court is not persua ded that this evidenc e is ade quate to support a f inding that ther e ar e no g enuine issues of materia l fac t as to whether the content of

plaintiff’s stateme nts was well known in the community . The stateme nt itself was not under oa th, and appe ars likely

to have be en hy

perbole
. In a subseque nt deposition, plainti ff state d: “[I ]t ’s har d to say who all knew be cause people who
wer e comingin, a social wor ker c oming in ea

rly in the morning or workinglate at night . . . they would see the kids down there.” See De f. Mot., Ex . Iat 176; see a lso Pl . Resp. ¶ 8.

The Court conc ludes that there are g enuine issues of material fa ct as to whe ther plaintiff’s stateme nts about children slee ping in the CF SA Office wer e prote cted disclosure s. For that rea son, it will deny

both motions for summary judgme nt on this claim. F. Family and Me dical Leave A ct The District of Columbia asse rts that it is entit led to summary judgme nt on pla int if f’ s c la im und e r b oth

the Di str ic t of

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and fe de ra l F amil y

and Me dic a l L e ave Ac ts, D.C. Code §§ 32-503 et seq., a nd 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. Def endant a sserts that plaintiff has failed to provide evidenc e that she w as entitled to fede ral fa mily medical lea

ve on the date of he r
remova l or on the date of her termination. I t further

asser ts that plaintiff was not re taliated ag ainst for takingleave . The Court finds that there are g enuine issues of material fa ct as to how much family

medical lea

ve plaintiff took in 2005, and whe ther she w as takingfede rally protec ted16

leave on the date of

her r emoval. The Court further finds that beca

use the notice of summary
re mov a l in c lud e d a

bu se of fa mil y me dic a l le ave a s a

ba sis fo r p la int if

f’ s r e mov a l, a

nd be c a us e defe ndant has not prof

fer ed any evidenc e of a

CFSA policy

reg ardingabuse of

family medical le ave , th e re are g e nu ine iss ue s o f m ate ri a l f a c t r e latin gto whe the r d e fe nd ant r e ta liate d a g a ins t plaintiff for taking pr otected le ave.
I I I . CONCLUSI ON

For the fore g oing r easons, the Court will g rant de fenda nts’ motion for summary jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to pla int if f’ s c la im f

or mun ic ipa l li a

bil ity a g a ins t th e Di str ic t of

Col umb ia and with re spect to plaintiff’s pr ocedur al due pr ocess c laim ag ainst both defenda nts. The Court wi ll d e ny de fe nd ants ’ m oti on

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to the F ir st A me ndme nt c la ims
a g a i n s tb o thd e f

e n d an t s , an d

th e D
. C
. W h i s t l e b l o w e r

P r o t e c t i o nA c tc l a i m s an d th e F M LA claims ag ainst the District of Columbia. The Court will deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgme nt in its entirety
.

An Orde r consistent with this Opinion will be issued this same day
. _/s/_______________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: Mar ch 19, 2009