2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

2-8-2010

USA v. Gary Haile

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-1433

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 09-1433

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

GARY HAILE,

 Appellant

 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

(D.C. Crim. No. 08-cr-00117-001)

District Judge: Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.

 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 12, 2010

 

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: February 8, 2010)

 

OPINION

 

BARRY, Circuit Judge

Appellant Gary Haile argues that the District Court erred by improperly delegating

authority to the probation officer to decide whether or not Haile should receive a mental
 The judgment had been amended to correct a clerical error. (App. at 50.) 1

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health evaluation and treatment as a condition of supervised release. Because the Court

was clear that it would make the ultimate decision as to whether a mental health

evaluation and treatment would be necessary, we will affirm.

BACKGROUND

Haile pled guilty to a one-count information charging him with Hobbs Act

robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-52. At his sentencing hearing on January 14, 2009, the

District Court imposed a sentence of 168 months’ imprisonment, as well as a three-year

term of supervised release. (App. at 39-40.) This appeal challenges the following

statement of the Court made while imposing conditions of supervised release: 

At the direction of your probation officer, you shall undergo a mental health

evaluation and follow the recommendations of that evaluation; including

participation in anger management or cognitive therapy. Now, there’s a

new case that says that probation officers are not to be charged in essence

with that responsibility. It’s a non-precedential case. I’m not sure what that

means. I want the record to reflect that the judge will personally supervise

the need for that mental health evaluation and any cognitive therapy

imposed.” 

(Id. at 41.) Haile did not object at sentencing to this statement or to any of the conditions

of supervised release. The amended judgment issued on February 11, 2009 included a 1

requirement that “Defendant shall undergo a mental health evaluation and follow the

recommendations of the evaluation, including participation in anger management or

cognitive behavioral therapy.” (Id. at 53.) 
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Haile appealed. He argues that “the District Court improperly delegated judicial

authority to the probation officer.” (Appellant’s Br. at 3.) He “seeks a remand with

directions to vacate the mental health condition.” (Id.)

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have

appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The parties agree that our review is

for plain error. United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 143 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007); United

States v. Warren, 186 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION 

Not surprisingly, the parties offer different interpretations of the challenged

statement of the District Court. On the one hand, Haile argues that the Court delegated the

decision about whether he should receive a mental health evaluation and treatment; on the

other hand, the government insists that the Court was clear in its instruction that Haile

“was required to undergo a mental health evaluation and treatment.” (Appellee’s Br. at

10.) 

In United States v. Pruden, we labored to strike the appropriate balance between

two competing imperatives: namely, the “most important limitation . . . that a probation

officer may not decide the nature or extent of the punishment imposed upon a

probationer” and the reality that “courts cannot be expected to map out every detail of a

defendant’s supervised release.” 398 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2005). To achieve this
 Our decision in Heckman is instructive. There, the district court stated: “The 2

defendant shall participate in a mental health program for evaluation and/or treatment as

directed by the United States Probation Office. The defendant shall remain in treatment

until satisfactorily discharged and with the approval of the United States Probation

Office.” 2010 WL 59185, at *7. We found that this was not an improper delegation

because the second sentence – instructing that Heckman “shall remain in treatment . . .” –

cleared up any ambiguity caused by the sentence that preceded it and “naturally read as

requiring mandatory treatment and thus limiting the Probation Office’s discretion.” Id. at

*8. 

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balance, we adopted the following standard, which we recently reaffirmed in United

States v. Heckman, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 59185, at *7 (3d Cir. 2010):

If [the defendant] is required to participate in a mental health intervention

only if directed to do so by his probation officer, then this special condition

constitutes an impermissible delegation of judicial authority to the probation

officer. On the other hand, if the District Court was intending nothing more

than to delegate to the probation officer the details with respect to the

selection and schedule of the program, such delegation was proper.

Pruden, 398 F.3d at 250 (quoting United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir.

2001)). 

It would be wrong to characterize the District Court’s statement as requiring Haile

to participate in a mental health evaluation and subsequent treatment only if the Probation

Office determined it was necessary. In stating that it would “supervise the need for it,”

the Court made clear that it retained control over the decision. App. at 41; see Heckman,

2010 WL 59185, at *8. Moreover, the language of the judgment order gives no discretion

to the Probation Office, as it unequivocally states that “the defendant shall undergo a

mental health evaluation and follow the recommendations of the evaluation.” (App. at 2
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53.) 

Thus, because the Court’s oral and written instructions demonstrate that it retained

authority over the need for an evaluation and treatment, it did not commit error, much less

plain error, in imposing the special condition of supervised release at issue in this appeal. 

See Heckman, 2010 WL 59185, at *8 (finding permissible delegation where

“[p]articipation in the mental health treatment program itself is mandatory, and only the

details are to be set by the Probation Office”).

CONCLUSION

The judgment of sentence will be affirmed.