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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Parentage of 

O.S. & K.S.,

Minor Children.

JENNIFER HINES,

 Respondent,

v.

KENNETH STEVENS,

Appellant.

No. 81394-3-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MANN, C.J. — Kenneth Stevens appeals a final parenting plan entered in 

2019, challenging restrictions on his residential time with his two children. 

Because the trial court acted within its authority to impose restrictions under 

RCW 26.09.191 and substantial evidence supports the court’s findings, we 

affirm.

I.

Kenneth Stevens and Jennifer Hines have two children together, K.S. and 

O.S.1 Stevens and Hines ended their relationship in 2012 and Hines 

 1 Hines has changed her last name to Sandrini. We refer to Hines by her former last

name to be consistent with the record and pleadings below.
No. 81394-3-I/2

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subsequently married Benjamin Sandrini. Since the parties separated, K.S. and 

O.S. have primarily lived with Hines, Sandrini, and Hines’s two older children 

from a prior relationship, T. and Z. 

Although Hines and Sandrini had a turbulent relationship, they were 

initially able to parent their children together without court involvement. Conflict 

between the parties escalated in 2013 after Hines attempted to obtain a 

protection order and Stevens withheld the children from Hines for a period of 

time. Hines obtained a court order directing Stevens to release the children to 

her and ordering the children to reside with her. Hines served the order on 

Stevens, but as Stevens admits, he initially refused to comply. 

Between July and October 2013, both Hines and Stevens filed multiple 

proposed parenting plans. Both sought sole decision-making authority, 

requested that the children reside with them the majority of the time, and sought 

restrictions under RCW 26.09.191 as to the other parent. 

On November 20, 2013, the court entered a temporary parenting plan. 

The plan provided for the children to reside primarily with Hines and to have 

residential time with Stevens from Friday to Sunday twice per month. The court 

ordered both parents to complete a parenting seminar. The court ordered 

Stevens to refrain from withholding the children at the end of his visits or 

accessing Hines’s home, and provided for Hines’s address to remain 

confidential. 

Hines’ and Stevens’s contentious relationship continued after entry of the 

temporary parenting plan. They had numerous conflicts surrounding the 
No. 81394-3-I/3

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children’s healthcare, education, the environments of both households, and other 

issues. Nearly five years after the entry of the temporary parenting plan, Stevens 

filed a petition to change the parenting plan. Stevens claimed that Hines and 

Sandrini were growing marijuana and driving while impaired. 

A trial took place over the course of three days in February 2019. 

Although he initially retained an attorney, Stevens appeared pro se at trial. At the 

time of trial, K.S. and O.S. were aged 7 and 10, respectively. The court 

considered the testimony of Hines, Stevens, Sandrini, Hines’s mother, and 

Hines’s oldest child, as well as 25 exhibits. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered final orders, including 

findings and conclusions and a final parenting plan. The trial court imposed

restrictions on Stevens under RCW 26.09.191(2)(a), (b), and (c), concluding that 

he “substantially refused to perform his parenting duties,” engaged in “repeated 

emotional abuse,” and has a “history of domestic violence.” The court also found 

that discretionary restrictions were warranted under RCW 26.09.191(3). The 

parenting plan gives sole decision-making authority to Hines with respect to 

nonemergency medical issues and education. Consistent with the temporary 

plan in place since 2013, the 2019 final parenting plan provides for the children to 

reside primarily with Hines. The court again allowed Stevens to have twice 

monthly overnight visits with the children, but ordered the visits to be supervised 

by Stevens’s parents or another mutually-agreed upon party. The court did not 

order constant monitoring, but required the supervising parties to be available to 

the children at all times. The court ordered Stevens to complete two parenting 
No. 81394-3-I/4

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classes, to obtain a psychological evaluation with a parenting component, and to 

comply with any treatment recommendations made as a part of that evaluation. 

The plan provides for the possibility of expanding Stevens’s residential time or 

lifting the supervision requirement upon his completion of these requirements. 

The court awarded attorney fees of approximately $8,500 to Hines. Stevens 

appeals. 

II.

A trial court has broad discretion in fashioning a parenting plan. In re 

Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012). We review a trial 

court’s parenting plan for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Black, 188 

Wn.2d 114, 127, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017). “A court’s decision is manifestly 

unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and 

the applicable legal standard; . . . it is based on untenable reasons if it is based 

on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct 

standard.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).

The trial court’s findings of fact are verities on appeal if they are supported 

by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 

P.3d 644 (2014). Evidence is “substantial” when it is sufficient to persuade a fairminded person of the truth of the matter asserted. Black, 188 Wn.2d at 127. We 

do not review the trial court’s credibility determinations or weigh evidence, even if 

we may disagree with the trial court. Black, 188 Wn.2d at 127. And we are 

extremely reluctant to disturb child placement decisions “[b]ecause the trial court 
No. 81394-3-I/5

5

hears evidence firsthand and has a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.” 

In re Parenting & Support of C.T., 193 Wn. App. 427, 442, 378 P.3d 183 (2016).

RCW 26.09.191 governs the court’s authority to impose restrictions on a 

parent’s residential time and decision-making. The court is required to limit 

residential time and decision-making authority if it finds that a parent has 

engaged in willful abandonment or substantial refusal to perform parenting 

functions, abuse of a child, or a “history of acts of domestic violence.” RCW 

26.09.191(1), (2)(a). The court is permitted, but not required, to limit provisions 

of the parenting plan if it finds that certain other circumstances exist, including a 

parent’s neglect or substantial nonperformance of parenting functions; long-term 

impairment which interferes with performance of parenting functions; abusive use 

of conflict; or withholding one parent’s access to the child for a protracted period 

of time without good cause. See RCW 26.09.191(3)(a),(b),(e),(f). 

Stevens challenges the court’s imposition of restrictions on his residential 

time under RCW 26.09.191.2 He primarily asserts that the court erred in 

weighing the evidence. He claims the court gave too much credence to some 

evidence—including “old unfounded allegations” of abuse and a brief bout of 

depression—and failed to adequately appreciate the importance of other 

factors—including the benefit of his involvement in his children’s lives. 

Stevens’s argument fails chiefly because, as explained, the appellate 

court does not reweigh the evidence or revisit the trial court’s credibility 

 2 Stevens does not assign error to or otherwise challenge the court’s order giving Hines 

sole decision–making authority regarding healthcare and education.
No. 81394-3-I/6

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determinations. See Black, 188 Wn.2d at 127. In addition, Stevens’s claims are 

premised on significant mischaracterizations of the record. Most notably, 

Stevens repeatedly asserts that the court abused its discretion by failing to 

consider that Hines lost custody of the children and he was previously awarded 

“primary custody.” No evidence in the record supports these claims. The 

residential schedule that has been in place since 2013 has not changed. Since 

that time, Stevens has residential time with the children two weekends every 

month and the children otherwise reside with Hines. 

 The court made numerous findings to support the imposition of parental 

restrictions:

1. Based on a preponderance of the evidence that under RCW 

26.09.191(1) and RCW 26.09.191(2)(a), Mr. Stevens engaged in a 

history of domestic violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010(3). 

There was credible evidence presented of physical harm, bodily 

injury, and the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily 

injury, or assault.

2. The evidence and testimony provided regarding injuries to the 

child [Z.] (the mother's biological child) by Mr. Stevens, was 

interpreted differently by the Court than how Mr. Stevens 

interpreted the testimony and evidence. Specifically the Court finds 

that the testimony was that Mr. Stevens picked up [Z.] by the collar, 

not the neck, which would not necessarily inflict noticeable injuries.

3. The testimony of Taylor Hines was credible.

4. Mr. Stevens’ involvement or conduct may have an adverse effect 

on the children's best interest, based on his neglect or substantial 

non-performance of parenting functions. Specifically Mr. Stevens’

lack of involvement in the children’s medical appointments and 

effectively terminating Olivia’s counseling with a counselor with 

whom she had developed a therapeutic relationship with for no 

valid reason. Additionally, the Court finds that Mr. Stevens has 

failed to be involved in the children's education, without a valid 

reason as to why.
No. 81394-3-I/7

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5. Mr. Stevens has a long-term emotional or physical impairment 

which interferes with his performance of parental functions as 

defined in RCW 26.09.004. Specifically due to the fact that Mr. 

Stevens testified to being in a blackout state for several weeks, 

although the exact time frame is unclear, during which point he had 

no contact with the children and that he was in a mental state which 

resulted in a legal finding of at least two criminal cases dismissed 

for diminished capacity. Based on the evidence, the Court does 

have concern for Mr. Stevens’ mental well-being.

6. Mr. Stevens has engaged in abusive use of conflict. Specifically 

due to the fact that he raises his voice and discusses topics in the 

children’s presence which are inappropriate for that audience. 

Additionally, Mr. Stevens uses the court system and all of its 

trappings, including parties having to get attorneys and pay 

attorney fees, to solve problems that could otherwise be solved.

7. Mr. Stevens withheld from the other parent access to the children 

for a protracted period of time without good cause, specifically 

where Ms. Hines had to get a court order to get the children back. 

. . . .

11. Mr. Stevens’ was less credible than other witnesses, largely 

due to his testimony during cross examination.

Stevens does not challenge any of the court’s findings. He focuses on the 

court’s imposition of supervised visitation based on the finding of a history of acts 

of domestic violence under RCW 26.09.191(2)(a)(iii). But he fails to 

acknowledge or address the court’s multiple alternative bases for imposing 

limitations under RCW 29.09.191 or assign error to the factual findings 

supporting those bases. 

Even disregarding the court’s alternative and unchallenged grounds for

restricting Stevens’s residential time, there is sufficient evidence in the record of 

“a history of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010(3).” 

“Domestic violence,” as defined by RCW 26.50.010(3)(a), includes “[p]hysical 
No. 81394-3-I/8

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harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, 

bodily injury or assault, between family or household members.” 

Although Stevens largely fails to discuss the evidence, he claims that the 

only allegations of abuse were “of the type that are on the lowest possible level of 

the spectrum of what would be considered domestic violence.” And he maintains 

that, apart from allegations of yelling, there was evidence of only two minor

incidents. He points to one time where he broke a door, but explains that he did 

so only because Hines was attempting to sabotage him by causing him to be late 

for work. Stevens claims on another occasion, he was forced to intervene to 

prevent Hines’s son, Z., from assaulting two-year-old K.S. Stevens argues that 

as in In re Marriage of Watson, 132 Wn. App. 222, 130 P.3d 915 (2006), the 

court abused its discretion by imposing restrictions based on “mere unproven 

allegations.” 

But again, under the substantial evidence standard, we do not “substitute 

our judgment for the trial court’s, weigh the evidence, or adjudge witness 

credibility.” See In re Marriage of Wilson, 165 Wn. App. 333, 340, 267 P.3d 485 

(2011). And Stevens fails to address the trial court’s finding that he was “less 

credible,” whereas the court found that the evidence of domestic violence was 

“credible” and that Hines’s daughter, T., testified credibly. 

T.’s version of the incident involving Z. contradicts Stevens’s claim that he 

was merely protecting K.S. According to T., Stevens was angry at her brother for 

taking a toy away from one of the younger children. He yelled at Z. “in his face,” 

while holding him up against the wall by his shirt collar. 
No. 81394-3-I/9

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The record includes other evidence of “assault,” and several incidents that 

revealed an “infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault.” 

Hines testified that there were “[m]ultiple, multiple times” when Stevens was 

violent or threatened her, causing her to fear for her safety or for the safety of the 

children. Although the statute does not include a temporal requirement for the 

acts of domestic violence, the record establishes that Stevens’s pattern of 

aggressive conduct continued up until the time of trial.

For instance, Hines described an incident when she was pregnant and,

because Stevens was yelling and unable to calm down, she locked him out of the 

house. When she opened the door to talk, he continued to yell in her face, 

restrained her by grabbing her hands, and pulled her outside the house, 

scratching her and ripping her shirt in the process. Neighbors called the police. 

Hines described other incidents when Stevens broke her phone after she called 

911, broke through a locked door, and broke into her home when he was out of 

control and she tried to physically distance herself. Hines testified about a time 

after the couple separated, when they planned to take the children to the ocean 

together. Stevens was not ready when Hines arrived and he emerged from the 

house in a rage and tried to pull one of the children out of the car. After Hines 

left, Stevens called and threatened to kill her if she failed to return with the 

children. 

Hines testified that Sandrini almost always accompanies her to exchange 

the children because she remains afraid of Stevens. Hines testified about recent 

interactions, including a telephone call with the children when they were in 
No. 81394-3-I/10

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Stevens’s care. After the call was disconnected and Hines reinitiated the call, 

she heard Stevens yelling at the children, “[s]he hung up on you” and “[y]our 

mom is a liar.” Hines testified that during the most recent exchange of the 

children, Stevens called the police while the children were in the car. Then, he 

put his face though her open car window and yelled menacingly at her while she 

was unable to drive away as the children were not secured in their seats. 

The record contains substantial evidence of assault and the infliction of 

fear of imminent physical harm. This evidence supports the trial court's finding of 

a history of domestic violence. In turn, this finding supports the court's imposition 

of mandatory restrictions on residential time under RCW 26.09.191(2).

Without further elaboration or citation to relevant authority, Stevens argues

that the court infringed on his parental rights in violation of due process by 

imposing RCW 26.09.191 restrictions without a showing of necessity. He also 

contends that the restrictions imposed are not reasonably calculated to address 

the identified harm because supervised visitation will not mitigate his conflict with 

Hines. See RCW 26.09.191(2)(m)(i) (restrictions imposed under RCW 

26.09.191(2)(a) or (b) “shall be reasonably calculated to protect the child from

physical, sexual, or emotional abuse or harm that could result if the child has

contact with the parent”); Chandola, 180 Wn.2d at 655.

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes a 

substantive component that “provides heightened protection against government 

interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Washington v. 

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997). The 
No. 81394-3-I/11

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United States Supreme Court has recognized that perhaps the oldest of these 

fundamental liberty interests is the interest of parents in the care, custody, and 

control of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 

147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000).

But a parent’s rights may be subject to limitation in order to protect a child. 

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 

(1972). RCW 26.09.191(2) and (3) reflects the legislature’s recognition of this 

fact. RCW 26.09.191 provides that a trial court may preclude a parent’s 

residential time altogether if certain factors exist. See In re Marriage of 

Underwood, 181 Wn. App. 608, 611, 326 P.3d 793 (2014).

Here, the court relied on several statutory factors under RCW 

26.09.191(2) and (3) in imposing supervised visitation. Stevens participated in 

the trial and was aware of the possibility that the court would impose parental 

restrictions. Stevens does not argue that the trial court lacked authority to place 

limits on residential time, does not challenge the constitutionality of RCW 

26.09.191 on its face, or question the constitutional validity of the statute as 

applied to him. Stevens presents no reasoned argument to support his assertion 

of a violation of his constitutional rights.

 Moreover, the statute does not require a specific finding with regard to 

the necessity of supervised contact. Upon a finding of neglect, abuse, or a 

history of domestic violence under RCW 26.09.191(2), parental restrictions are 

mandatory and the statute expressly provides that those restrictions may include 

supervised contact. RCW 26.09.191(2)(m)(i). In this case, supervised contact 
No. 81394-3-I/12

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does, in fact, minimize opportunities for Stevens to engage in conflict with Hines, 

shelters the children from the effects of that conflict, and ensures a safe 

environment for the children during Stevens’s residential time. The limitations 

are reasonably calculated to prevent harm to K.S. and O.S.

3 

Stevens next argues that the court abused its discretion by not allowing 

him to object to the exhibits that Hines submitted pursuant to ER 904. ER 904 

provides that certain documents “shall be deemed admissible” if properly 

proposed as exhibits unless the opposing party objects within 14 days. ER 

904(a), (c). He complains that his counsel withdrew from the case without 

objecting, and he did not know about the exhibits until trial. The record indicates 

that Hines provided the exhibits three weeks before Stevens’s counsel withdrew. 

Stevens was not deprived of an opportunity to object. He has not designated any 

exhibits on appeal and does not provide the basis for objection as to any 

particular exhibit.

Stevens also asserts cumulative error and judicial bias. But Stevens 

demonstrates no error, much less cumulative error. And he cites no authority 

applying the cumulative error doctrine in a civil case. See DeHeer v. Seattle 

Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962). Stevens claims that 

the trial court demonstrated bias against him and urges this court to remand to a 

 3 In his reply brief, Stevens suggests that the trial court committed reversible error by 

failing to expressly find that his conduct caused harm to the children. Because Stevens failed to 

properly brief this argument in a manner permitting Hines to respond, we need not consider it. 

See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (“an 

issue raised and argued for the first time in a reply brief is too late to warrant consideration.”).
No. 81394-3-I/13

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different judge “to preserve the appearance of fairness.” Because we affirm, we 

do not address the issue.

Finally, Hines requests attorney fees and costs under RAP 18.9 and RCW 

4.84.185. RAP 18.9 authorizes an award of attorney fees if an appeal is 

frivolous. An appeal is frivolous where “it presents no debatable issues and is so 

devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal.” Carrillo v. City 

of Ocean Shores, 122 Wn. App. 592, 619, 94 P.3d 961 (2004). We consider the 

record as a whole in determining whether an appeal is frivolous. In re Marriage 

of Tomsovic, 118 Wn. App. 96, 110, 74 P.3d 692 (2003). The fact that an appeal 

is ultimately unsuccessful is not dispositive of whether it is frivolous, and we 

resolve doubts in favor of the appellant. Tomsovic, 118 Wn. App. at 110.

Under these standards, we conclude that Stevens’s appeal is frivolous. 

The record confirms that there are no debatable issues of fact or law and the 

appeal is so totally devoid of merit there is no reasonable possibility for reversal. 

Stevens primarily sought review based on arguments seeking to reweigh the 

evidence and ignoring the trial court’s critical credibility findings. He failed to 

provide a “fair statement of the facts and procedure relevant to the issues 

presented for review,” see RAP 10.3(a)(5), misleadingly represented the record,

and presented his arguments in a manner that inhibited appellate review. For 

these reasons, subject to her compliance with RAP 18.1(d), we grant Hines’s

request for reasonable attorney fees.

Affirmed.
No. 81394-3-I/14

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WE CONCUR: