alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 74 (Monday, April 17, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 20505]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-9531]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 3288]


Office of Visa Services; 30-Day Notice of Proposed Information 
Collection; Supplemental Registration for Diversity Immigrant Visa 
Program, Form DSP-122

SUMMARY: The Department of State has submmitted the following 
information collection request to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) for approval in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995. Comments should be submitted to OMB within 30 days of the 
publication of this notice.
    The following summarizes the information collection proposal 
submitted to OMB:
    Type of Request: Reinstatement of Form.
    Originating Office: CA/VO/F/P.
    Title of Information Collection: Supplemental Registration for 
Diversity Immigrant Visa Program.
    Frequency: Once per applicant.
    Form Number: DSP-122.
    Respondents: Foreign Applicants.
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 90,000.
    Average Hours Per Response: .5 hours.
    Total Estimated Burden: 45,000 hours.
    Public comments are being solicited to permit the agency to:
    <bullet> Evaluate whether the proposed information collection is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency.
    <bullet> Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the 
burden of the proposed collection, including the validity of the 
methodology and assumptions used.
    <bullet> Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected.
    <bullet> Minimize the reporting burden on those who are to respond, 
including through the use of automated collection techniques or other 
forms of technology.

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Copies of the proposed information 
collection and supporting documents may be obtained from Daria Darnell, 
2401 E Street NW, Rm L-703, Tel: 202-663-1253, U.S. Department of 
State, Washington, DC 20520. Public comments and questions should be 
directed to the State Department Desk Officer, Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
Washington, DC 20530, (202) 395-5871.

    Dated: March 27, 2000.
Nancy Sambaiew,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Visa Services, Bureau of 
Consular Affairs.
[FR Doc. 00-9531 Filed 4-14-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-06-U
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 237 Engrossed in House (EH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 237

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To authorize the revocation or denial of passports and passport cards 
to individuals affiliated with foreign terrorist organizations, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``FTO Passport Revocation Act of 
2015''.

SEC. 2. REVOCATION OR DENIAL OF PASSPORTS TO INDIVIDUALS AFFILIATED 
              WITH FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

    The Act entitled ``An Act to regulate the issue and validity of 
passports, and for other purposes'', approved July 3, 1926 (22 U.S.C. 
211a et seq.), commonly known as the ``Passport Act of 1926'', is 
amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 4. AUTHORITY TO DENY OR REVOKE PASSPORT.

    ``(a) Ineligibility.--
            ``(1) Issuance.--Except as provided under subsection (b), 
        the Secretary of State may refuse to issue a passport to any 
        individual whom the Secretary has determined has aided, 
        assisted, abetted, or otherwise helped an organization the 
        Secretary has designated as a foreign terrorist organization 
        pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
        (8 U.S.C. 1189).
            ``(2) Revocation.--The Secretary of State may revoke a 
        passport previously issued to any individual described in 
        paragraph (1).
    ``(b) Report.--
            ``(1) In general.--If the Secretary of State refuses to 
        issue or revokes a passport pursuant to subsection (a), the 
        Secretary shall, not later than 30 days after such refusal or 
        revocation, submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
        House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate a report on such refusal or revocation, as the 
        case may be.
            ``(2) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) may 
        be submitted in classified or unclassified form.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives July 21, 2015.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
114th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 237

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To authorize the revocation or denial of passports and passport cards 
to individuals affiliated with foreign terrorist organizations, and for 
                            other purposes.
```
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Phillip Michael Nunez, Appellant

No. 06-21-00101-CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

Appeal from the 196th District Court of 

Hunt County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 32289CR). 

Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice 

van Cleef, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice 

Stevens participating. 

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find there was partial error in the 

judgment of the court below. Therefore, we modify the trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt 

by changing the entry under “Plea to Motion to Adjudicate” to “TRUE TO PARAGRAPH 6; 

NOT TRUE TO PARAGRAPHS 1, 5, AND 7.” As modified, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed.

We note that the appellant, Phillip Michael Nunez, has adequately indicated his inability 

to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED SEPTEMBER 16,2022

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
#### Mertens, Appellant, *v.*Wright, Respondent. Crouse, Appellant, v. Same. Dunn, Appellant, *v.*Same.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Fourth Department.*

May 2, 1890.)

No opinion. Order reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements. See opinion of Martin, J., in *McCarthey*v. *Wright, ante,*824, (decided at this term.)
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joseph Rudd, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant (1) from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Collins, J.), rendered November 10, 1983, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence, and (2), by permission, from an order of the same court (Lawrence, J.), entered November 27, 1985, denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that thé order is affirmed.

There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of guilt. Counsel’s decision not to raise an insanity defense appears to have been a matter of trial strategy, and does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel *(People v Zaborski,*59 NY2d 863, 864).

The defendant’s remaining contentions, including those raised in both *pro se*briefs, have been considered and found to be without merit. Thompson, J. P., Niehoff, Rubin and Fiber, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2

                                  CERTIFICATION


I, Timothy B. Murphy,  certify that this report on Form 10-Q fully complies with
the  requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange Act of
1934 and that  information  contained  in this report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results  of  operations  of
Investors Capital Holdings, Ltd.


Date:  February 14, 2006

/S/ TIMOTHY B. MURPHY
-----------------------------------------------
Timothy B. Murphy,
Executive Vice President,
Treasurer, Chief Financial Officer and Director
II 

Calendar No. 660 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5706 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 16, 2010 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and 

Public Works 

NOVEMBER 30, 2010 

Reported by Mrs. BOXER, without amendment 

AN ACT 

To designate the building occupied by the Government Printing Office located at 31451 East United Avenue in Pueblo, Colorado, as the ‘‘Frank Evans Government Printing 

Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION. 

4 The building occupied by the Government Printing 

5 Office located at 31451 East United Avenue in Pueblo, 

6 Colorado, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Frank 

7 Evans Government Printing Office Building’’ during the 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5706 RS

1 period in which the building is occupied by the Govern2 ment Printing Office. 

3 SEC. 2. REFERENCES. 

4 With respect to the period in which the building re5 ferred to in section 1 is occupied by the Government Print6 ing Office, any reference in a law, map, regulation, docu7 ment, record, or other paper of the United States to that 

8 building shall be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Frank 

9 Evans Government Printing Office Building’’. 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS

smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 660 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5706 

AN ACT 

To designate the building occupied by the GovernBuilding’’. ‘‘Frank Evans Government Printing Office United Avenue in Pueblo, Colorado, as the ment Printing Office located at 31451 East 

NOVEMBER 30, 2010 

Reported without amendment 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
#### In the Matter of Domanick B., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[949 NYS2d 9]

— Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Allen G. Alpert, J.), entered on or about September 7, 2011, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent upon a fact-finding determination that he committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of criminal sexual act in the first degree and sexual abuse in the third degree, and placed him with the Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 18 months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court properly permitted the six-year-old victim to give *509sworn testimony. The victim’s voir dire responses, when viewed as a whole, established that he sufficiently understood the difference between truth and falsity, the significance of an oath or promise to tell the truth, and the wrongfulness and consequences of lying (see *People v Nisoff,*36 NY2d 560, 565-566 [1975]; *People v Cordero,*257 AD2d 372 [1999], *lv denied*93 NY2d 968 [1999]).

The court’s finding was not against the weight of the evidence (see *People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the court’s determinations concerning credibility. Concur — Saxe, J.P., Catterson, Acosta, DeGrasse and Richter, JJ.
#### Michael W. MILLER, Petitioner—Appellant, v. Gene JOHNSON, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 10-7597.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 13, 2011.

Decided: April 18, 2011.

Michael W. Miller, Appellant pro se.

Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Michael W. Miller seeks to appeal the district court’s orders: (i) denying his pro se motions to the extent they sought relief from any judgment, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b); and (ii) construing his motions as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition and dismissing it as unauthorized. The district court’s orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006); *Reid v. Angelone,*369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir.2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Miller has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Additionally, we construe Miller’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a second or successive § 2254 petition. *United States v. Winestock,*340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir.2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2254 petition, a prisoner must assert claims based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review; or (2) newly discovered evidence, not previously discoverable by due diligence, that would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional *202error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2006). Miller’s claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2254 petition.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Exhibit 31.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Theodore E. Charles, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Investors Capital
     Holdings, Ltd.;
2.   Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
     statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
     make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
     statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
     this quarterly report;
3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
     information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all
     material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash
     flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
     quarterly report;
4.   The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
     establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
     in Exchange Act Rules 13(a)-15(e) and 15(d)-15(e)) for the registrant and
     we have:
     a)   designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
          material information relating to the registrant, including its
          consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
          entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly
          report is being prepared;
     b)   evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
          and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of
          this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and
     c)   presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
          effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our
          evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5.   The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on
     our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit
     committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the
     equivalent function):
     a)   all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
          controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to
          record, process, summarize and report financial data and have
          identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in
          internal controls; and
     b)   any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
          employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
          controls.

Date: November 14, 2003


By: /s/ THEODORE  E. CHARLES
----------------------------
Theodore E. Charles
Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)
#### In the Matter of the Board of Education of the Hannibal Central School District, Appellant, v Hannibal Faculty Association, Respondent.

Present — Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Boomer, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">TAM Medical Supply Corp., as Assignee of Robles, Daniel, Appellant, <br><br>against<br><br>Kemper Insurance Company, Respondent. </font></b></div><br><br><p>The Rybak Firm, PLLC (Damin J. Toell and Karina Barska of counsel), for appellant.Gullo &amp; Associates, LLP (Cristina Carollo of counsel), for respondent.</p><p>Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Sally E. Unger, J.), entered April 14, 2017. The judgment, entered pursuant to an order of that court entered November 2, 2016 denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granting defendant's cross motion to dismiss the complaint, dismissed the complaint.</p><p>ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with $25 costs. </p><p>Plaintiff Tam Medical Supply Corp. (Tam) commenced this action to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits for supplies provided to its assignor as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident on August 29, 2012. Defendant insurer (Kemper) commenced a declaratory judgment action in the Supreme Court, Bronx County, against Tam and its assignor, among others, seeking a declaration that Kemper has no obligation to pay any pending or future claims for no-fault benefits arising from an accident on August 29, 2012, and Kemper moved for summary judgment. By order dated April 11, 2016, the Supreme Court granted Kemper's motion, finding that Kemper was not obligated to pay the claims pertaining to the August 29, 2012 accident. </p><p>Thereafter, Tam moved in the Civil Court for summary judgment and Kemper cross-m<font color="FF0000">[*2]</font>oved in the Civil Court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Tam's action is barred by virtue of the Supreme Court's order which granted summary judgment to Kemper. By order entered November 2, 2016, the Civil Court denied Tam's motion and granted Kemper's cross motion. Tam appeals from a judgment which was subsequently entered dismissing the complaint. </p><p>By virtue of the findings of fact of the Supreme Court within its award granting summary judgment to Kemper, there was a conclusive determination of the merits of the claims in question (<i>see Bayer v City of New York<b></b></i>, 115 AD3d 897 [2014];<b><i></i></b> Panagiotou v Samaritan Vil., Inc., 88 AD3d 779 [2011]; <i>Methal v City of New York</i>, 50 AD3d 654 [2008]). Consequently, as Tam's action in the Civil Court is barred by the doctrine of res judicata (<i>see Bayer</i>, 115 AD3d at 899; <i>Panagiotou</i>, 88 AD3d 779; <i>Methal</i>, 50 AD3d at 656), the Civil Court properly granted defendant's cross motion and denied plaintiff's motion.</p><p>Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.</p><p>SIEGAL, J.P., PESCE and ELLIOT, JJ., concur.</p><br><br>ENTER:<br>Paul Kenny<br>Chief Clerk<br>Decision Date: August 09, 2019<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
DLD-104 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-1244

___________

IN RE: MATTHEW P. DEC,

Petitioner

____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(Related to D.C. Civ. Nos. 2:22-cv-01290, 2:23-cv-00072)

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

March 9, 2023

Before: JORDAN, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed March 20, 2023)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

In September 2022, pro se petitioner Matthew P. Dec filed a civil rights lawsuit in 

the United States Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against several 

defendants. After all but one defendant had accepted or waived service, the District 

Court entered an order on December 22, 2022 staying and administratively closing the 

matter without prejudice pending the completion of service on all defendants. Dec then 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
filed a motion on December 29, seeking to remove Butler County (the unserved party) as 

a defendant. He subsequently filed a new civil rights action in January 2023 against 

several Butler County defendants. Dec has now filed this petition for a writ of mandamus 

asking us to order the District Court to take action in his two cases. For the following 

reasons, we will deny the petition.

A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy that is available only in extraordinary 

circumstances. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 

2005). A petitioner must ordinarily have no other means to obtain the desired relief, and 

he must show a clear and indisputable right to issuance of the writ. See In re Sch. 

Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 

90, 96 (1967)). To the extent that Dec argues that the District Court has failed to act 

promptly in the 2022 case or in his recently-filed matter, he has not demonstrated a clear 

and indisputable right to relief. Although docket management is generally within the 

District Court’s discretion, see In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d 

Cir. 1982), undue delay can amount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction and thus warrant 

mandamus relief. See Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996). But there has 

been no such delay here. Case number 2:23-cv-00072 was not docketed until January 17, 

2023, while Dec’s motion in 2:22-cv-01290 has only been pending since December 29, 

2022. We are confident that the District Court will rule on these matters without undue 

delay. 

Accordingly, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.