Citations and pincites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint

of:

RICKY DESHAWN KING,

Petitioner,

No. 78994-5-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LEACH, J. — Ricky DeShawn King filed a personal restraint petition to 

challenge three conditions of community custody imposed by the trial court after 

his conviction for first degree child molestation. Because the trial court did not 

have statutory authority to impose one condition, did not make required findings to 

support restrictions on King’s contact with his children while under community 

supervision, and an intervening Supreme Court decision clarified the requirements 

for the third condition, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

BACKGROUND

In December 2014, Ricky DeShawn King pleaded guilty to first degree child 

molestation for molesting his young stepdaughter who lived with King and the 

victim’s mother and their four younger children. He also agreed with the State’s 

recommendation for a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) in lieu 

of a standard range indeterminate prison sentence. He agreed to various 

community custody conditions, including abstaining from alcohol, staying out of 
No. 78994-5-I/2

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parks, playgrounds, schools and other places where minors congregate, and to 

have no unsupervised contact with any minors without prior approval.

In February 2016 and April 2016, the Department of Corrections filed 

notices of violations of King’s community custody conditions. The violations 

included King failing to attend treatment; being seen with a young girl after leaving 

a court hearing; regularly contacting the victim’s mother and their children; drinking 

alcohol; and being at the home where his children and the victim live. The 

sentencing court then revoked King’s SSOSA and imposed the original sentence 

of 96 months to life including all original community custody conditions. This court 

affirmed the SSOSA revocation on direct appeal.1 King then filed a personal 

restraint petition on September 24, 2018. 

ANALYSIS

King challenges three conditions imposed as part of his judgment and 

sentence, prohibiting unsupervised contact with minor children, prohibiting use of 

alcohol, and prohibiting him from entering “parks/playgrounds/schools and/or any 

places where minors congregate.” Each of these conditions is related to the crime 

King committed. 

Appellate courts review the imposition of crime related prohibitions for 

abuse of discretion.2 A trial court abuses its discretion if it makes a manifestly 

unreasonable decision or exercises its discretion on untenable grounds or for 

 1 State v. King, No. 75306-1-I, slip op. (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2017)

(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/753061.pdf.

2 State v. Williams, 157 Wn. App. 689, 691, 239 P.3d 600 (2010).
No. 78994-5-I/3

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untenable reasons.3 We review the factual basis for crime related conditions for 

substantial evidence.4 A court does not abuse its discretion if a reasonable 

relationship between the crime of conviction and the community custody condition 

exists.5

Contact with Biological Children

King challenges a condition which states he shall, “Have no direct and/or 

indirect contact with minors without the supervision of a responsible adult who has 

knowledge of this conviction and the defendant's status as a registered sex 

offender without prior approval of the court, CCO, and treatment provider, and the 

informed consent of the minor's parent or guardian.” He claims “the condition of 

community custody restricting contact with minors violates his constitutional right 

to parent.” We address this challenge as applied in two situations, when King is 

under community supervision and when King is incarcerated in the custody of the 

Department of Corrections. 

Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children without State 

interference.6 But, parental rights are not absolute and may be subject to 

reasonable regulation.7 Sentencing courts can restrict fundamental parenting 

rights with a criminal sentence condition if the condition is reasonably necessary 

 3 State v. Rodriguez, 163 Wn. App. 215, 224, 259 P.3d 1145 (2011). 4 State v. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 644, 656, 364 P.3d 830 (2015)

5 Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 659.

6 In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wn.2d 1, 15, 969 P.2d 21 (1998) aff'd sub 

nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000); 

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923).

7 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 

645 (1944).
No. 78994-5-I/4

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to further the State's compelling interest in preventing harm and protecting 

children.8 Conversely, courts will vacate contact prohibition conditions that are not 

sufficiently related to the harm they seek to prevent, such as protecting a child.9 

“Such conditions must be ‘sensitively imposed’ so that they are reasonably 

necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the State and public order.”10 A 

no-contact order must be drawn narrowly to serve the interests of protecting the 

child.11

The State agrees with King the trial court should have entered findings to 

justify any limitations on his contact with King’s biological children during 

community custody. It also agrees with King the trial court should specifically 

address the parameters and scope of community custody limitations regarding his 

biological children as separate from prohibitions on contacting minors in general. 

We accept the State’s concession on these points. We are confident that on 

remand the trial court will also resolve King’s concerns about the ambiguity of the 

current condition. Any further appellate review of limitations on King’s contact with 

his biological children while on community custody is premature and must await 

the trial court’s entry of findings and revision of any condition it narrowly tailors to 

protect the children.

King also complains the Department of Corrections (DOC) is prohibiting 

visitation with his children while he is in total confinement. This Court cannot 

 8 State v. Corbett, 158 Wn. App. 576, 598, 242 P.3d 52 (2010).

9 State v. Letourneau, 100 Wn. App. 424, 438, 997 P.2d 436 (2000).

10 In re Rainey, 168 Wn.2d 367, 374, 229 P.3d 686 (2010). 11 Rainey, 168 Wn.2d at 378.
No. 78994-5-I/5

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address this complaint in this case. The DOC is not a party here. And, the

complaint does not involve an issue of community custody. Neither the federal nor 

our state constitution creates a protected liberty interest in visitation between an 

inmate and his children while in a DOC facility.12 The superior court does not have 

personal jurisdiction over the DOC on issues of visitation while in a DOC facility.13

As the State correctly notes in its briefing, the trial court could suggest visitation if 

it believed it to be appropriate, but that suggestion would not be binding on the 

DOC. The DOC has its own rules and directives for controlling visits. Any issues 

King has with the DOC’s visitation decisions while he is in prison must be pursued 

through the appropriate administrative process or other litigation.

Alcohol Consumption Condition 

King asserts the trial court exceeded its authority by imposing the 

community condition prohibiting him to “not use or consume alcohol.” The State 

concedes this case should be remanded to amend the condition to strike the words 

“use or.” 

Former RCW 9.94A.703(3)(e) authorized the court to impose a condition 

that prohibits offenders from consuming alcohol regardless of whether alcohol 

contributed to the offense.14 This court has previously held that former 

RCW 9.94A.703(3)(e) authorizes conditions that refer to “consuming alcohol” but 

not using alcohol.15 So, we accept the State’s concession and remand to the trial 

 12 Matter of Gossett, 7 Wn. App. 2d 610, 623-24, 435 P.3d 314 (2019).

13 Gossett, 7 Wn. App. 2d at 625.

14 State v. Norris, 1 Wn. App.2d 87, 99-100, 404 P.3d 83 (2017) rev’d on 

other grounds, State v. Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d 671, 425 P.3d 847 (2018)). 

15 Norris, 1 Wn. App.2d at 100. 
No. 78994-5-I/6

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court to strike the words “use or” from the challenged condition prohibiting alcohol 

use or consumption. 

Frequenting Areas where Minor Children Congregate

King next claims the community custody condition prohibiting him from 

frequenting areas where minor children are known to congregate is 

unconstitutionally vague. 

Due process, guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution, requires 

that legal standards like community custody conditions not be vague.16 The 

rationale for this rule equally applies to community custody conditions.

To avoid vagueness, the condition must (1) provide ordinary people fair 

warning of proscribed conduct, and (2) have standards that are definite enough to 

protect against arbitrary enforcement.17 A sentencing condition is 

unconstitutionally vague if it fails to do either.18 But, a sentencing condition is not 

unconstitutionally vague merely because a person cannot predict with complete 

certainty the exact point at which the actions would be classified as prohibited 

conduct.19

The community custody condition King challenges as unconstitutionally 

vague orders King to “not enter any parks/playgrounds/schools and/or any places 

where minors congregate.” He claims this condition is not sufficiently definite to 

 16 Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 652-53

17 Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 652-53. 

18 Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 653.

19 Irwin, 191 Wn. App. at 653. 
No. 78994-5-I/7

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apprise him of prohibited conduct and allows for the arbitrary enforcement by his 

community corrections officer. 

In September 2019, our supreme court held that a community custody 

condition that, “The defendant...shall not loiter in nor frequent places where 

children congregate such as parks, video arcades, campgrounds, and shopping 

malls,” was not unconstitutionally vague and satisfied due process.20 The 

Supreme Court held that a nonexclusive list of examples cured any vagueness in 

the phrase “where children congregate.”21

The State suggests that we should remand to the trial court to rewrite the 

challenged condition to read, “Do not enter any places where minors congregate, 

such as parks, playgrounds, and schools” to comport with Wallmuller. We agree.

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not have statutory authority to impose a condition about 

using alcohol and did not make required findings to support restrictions on King’s 

contact with his children while under community supervision. And, an intervening 

Supreme Court decision clarified the requirements for the condition restricting 

access to places where minors congregate. So, we remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

WE CONCUR:

 20 State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d 234, 237, 245, 449 P.3d 619, 620 (2019).

21 Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at 244-45.