UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

JOHN T. BOOKER, JR., a/k/a Muhammad 

Abdullah Hassan, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 17-3167 

(D.C. No. 5:15-CR-40030-CM-1) 

(D. Kan.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before BRISCOE, HOLMES, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

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After accepting a plea agreement that included a waiver of his right to appeal, 

John T. Booker, Jr., pleaded guilty to attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction 

and attempted destruction of government property by fire or explosion. He was 

sentenced to concurrent 360- and 240-month terms of imprisonment followed by a 

lifetime term of supervised release. Despite the waiver, Booker filed an appeal 

challenging some of the conditions of his supervised release. The government has 

moved to enforce the appeal waiver. See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1328 

 *

 This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 

10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law 

of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

November 28, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

(10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). We grant the motion to enforce and dismiss 

the appeal. 

The sentencing court adopted the recommendations in the presentence report 

and imposed the following special conditions of supervision: 

[Booker] must not participate in any anti-government or tax protesting 

activities, or associate with individuals who are known members of 

these groups, or possess any literature advocating or supporting these 

groups during the term of supervision. 

. . . . 

[Booker] must not possess, view, access, or otherwise use material that 

reflects extremist or terroristic views or as deemed to be inappropriate 

by the U.S. Probation Office. 

R., Vol. 2 at 41-42, ¶¶ 131, 134. We need not reach the merits of Booker’s 

contentions that these conditions are impermissible, however, because he waived his 

right to appeal his sentence, including the special conditions above, under the express 

terms of the plea agreement. 

To evaluate a motion to enforce a waiver, we consider “(1) whether the 

disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether 

the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether 

enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 

1325. “[P]lea agreements are governed by contract principles.” United States v. 

Cooper, 498 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 2007). 

Nothing in the agreement supports Booker’s contention that his appeal is 

outside the scope of the waiver simply because he seeks to challenge his sentence on 
3 

constitutional grounds. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Booker “knowingly 

and voluntarily waive[d] any right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in 

connection with . . . the components of the sentence . . . including the length and 

conditions of supervised release . . . .” R., Vol. 1 at 66. Because he did not retain the 

right to appeal the conditions of supervised release, Booker’s waiver of his right to 

appeal his sentence extends to the special conditions of his supervised release, and 

the first Hahn requirement is met. See United States v. Sandoval, 477 F.3d 1204, 

1207 (10th Cir. 2007). 

Booker makes no assertion that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary—

Hahn’s second requirement. Our independent review of the record persuades us 

there is no basis for concluding that he did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to the 

waiver. 

Nor are we persuaded that enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage 

of justice under Hahn’s third requirement. We have held that a miscarriage of justice 

under Hahn occurs in only four narrow circumstances, and Booker has not 

established that any of them apply such that the waiver itself was unlawful. See 

Sandoval, 477 F.3d at 1208 (“Our inquiry is not whether the sentence is unlawful, but 

whether the waiver itself is unlawful because of some procedural error or because no 

waiver is possible.”). Booker’s citations to cases where the sentencing court 

exceeded its statutory authority in sentencing a defendant are unavailing because that 

scenario did not occur here. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 483 F.3d 707, 710 

(10th Cir. 2007) (concluding waiver did not encompass right to appeal unlawful 
4 

restitution order); United States v. Gordon, 480 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007) 

(same). Nor does Booker challenge the validity of his plea or waiver due to 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Cf. United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 

1191 (10th Cir. 2001). 

Accordingly, we grant the motion to enforce and dismiss this appeal. 

Entered for the Court 

Per Curiam