In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-24-00099-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 360th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 360-729460-23

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel

IN THE INTEREST OF S.D., A CHILD
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an ultra-accelerated appeal1 in which Appellant M.D. (Father) appeals

the termination of his parental rights to his daughter, S.D.,

2 following a bench trial.

Father’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief averring that after 

diligently reviewing the record, he believes that the appeal is frivolous because even 

though the evidence is allegedly factually insufficient to support termination under 

Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), the record contains sufficient evidence to 

support termination under Subsections (E) and (N).

3 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (reasoning that Anders procedures apply in 

noncriminal appeals when appointment of counsel is mandated by statute). Although 

the brief requests modification of the termination order to delete the trial court’s 

Subsection (D) finding, it nevertheless meets the requirements of Anders by presenting 

a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable 

1

See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a) (requiring appellate court to dispose of appeal

from a judgment terminating parental rights, so far as reasonably possible, within 180 

days after notice of appeal is filed).

2

See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2) (requiring court to use an alias to refer to a minor

in an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights); see also Tex. R. App. P. 

9.8(a) (defining “alias” to include “one or more of a person’s initials or a fictitious 

name”). 

3

See In re E.P.C., 381 S.W.3d 670, 684 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no 

pet.) (explaining that a finding of only one Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)

termination ground—along with a best-interest finding—is sufficient to support a

judgment terminating a parent’s rights).
3

grounds for reversal to be advanced on appeal. See Mitchell v. State, 653 S.W.3d 295, 

297 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.) (“[A]ppellate courts are authorized to 

reform judgments and affirm as modified in Anders cases involving non-reversible 

error.”); cf. R.J.O. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-13-00478-CV, 

2013 WL 6060778, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) 

(reforming trial court’s final decree to remove a statutory termination ground and 

affirming judgment, as modified, in Anders case). Father did not file a response despite

being given the opportunity to do so. The Department filed a letter brief stating that 

although it generally agreed with the Anders brief, it opposed Father’s counsel’s request 

to modify the termination order by deleting the Subsection (D) finding.

As the reviewing appellate court, we must independently examine the record to 

decide whether an attorney is correct in determining that the appeal is frivolous. See

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 

618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). Having carefully reviewed the record 

and the Anders brief, we agree that Father’s appeal is frivolous. We find nothing in

the record that might arguably warrant reversal of the trial court’s termination order.

See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

Further, we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to support 

termination under Subsection (D) and therefore deny Father’s counsel’s request to 

modify the trial court’s order. Subsection (D) provides that a trial court may order 

parental rights terminated if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent 
4

has “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or 

surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Tex. 

Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). As used in the statute, “‘endanger’ means to 

expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.” Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 

531, 533 (Tex. 1987). Endangerment under Subsection (D) arises from the child’s 

environment, but a parent’s conduct can contribute to an endangering environment.

In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); see J.G. v. 

Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 592 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no 

pet.). “A single act or omission can support termination under [S]ubsection (D) . . . .” 

J.G., 592 S.W.3d at 524. Evidence of the following can support the conclusion that a 

child’s surroundings endanger her physical or emotional well-being for purposes of 

Subsection (D): a parent’s drug use,4 a parent’s allowing a child to be around another

person—including another parent—who is using drugs or participating in unlawful

conduct,

5 a parent’s knowledge of the other parent’s drug use during pregnancy and 

4

See E.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00469-CV, 2022 WL 

17970222, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

5

See In re B.U., 02-23-00150-CV, 2023 WL 5967604, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth Sept. 14, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[A] parent’s choice to continue

relationships with people who abuse illegal drugs may constitute evidence of 

endangerment [under Subsection (D)].” (citing In re K.W., No. 09-19-00442-CV, 2020 

WL 1755985, at *8 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 9, 2020, pet. denied))); In re M.R.J.M., 

280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (op. on reh’g)

(“Inappropriate, abusive, or unlawful conduct by persons who live in the child’s home 

or with whom the child is compelled to associate on a regular basis in his home is a 

part of the ‘conditions or surroundings’ of the child’s home under [Subsection (D)].”). 
5

corresponding failure to attempt to protect the unborn child from the effects of that 

drug use,

6 a parent’s imprisonment or intentional activity that exposes the parent to 

potential incarceration,7 or a parent’s mental instability or untreated mental illness.8

Here, the record reflects that

• S.D. tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana when she was 

born, and S.D.’s mother (Mother) admitted to using methamphetamine and 

amphetamines during her pregnancy.

• Rayshon Jones, the permanency specialist assigned to S.D.’s case, testified 

that she believed that Father and Mother were a couple and lived together 

prior to S.D.’s removal. 

• Although Father denied having lived with Mother, he testified that he had 

“spent nights with her” and that he had learned that Mother was pregnant 

when she was about six or seven months along. 

• Father and his sister told Jones that they knew that Mother was not going to 

stop using drugs. 

• Father has a lengthy criminal history, including four convictions for 

possessing methamphetamine; has been in and out of prison; and was 

incarcerated at the time of trial.

6

See In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 749–50 (Tex. 2022).

7

See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; D.N. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 

03-15-00658-CV, 2016 WL 1407808, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 8, 2016, no pet.) 

(mem. op.).

8

See T.A.W. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-20-00364-CV, 2021 

WL 81866, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 8, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (mental 

instability); In re L.L.F., No. 02-11-00485-CV, 2012 WL 2923291, at *15 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth July 19, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (untreated mental illness); In re J.I.T.P., 

99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (noncompliance 

with mental health medication).
6

• Although Father denied having a drug problem, he acknowledged that he 

had multiple “drug charges” and could have been considered to have had a 

drug problem in the past.

• Father testified that he had traded drugs to “[c]ustomers” for old, broken 

electronics but denied that he had supplied Mother with her 

methamphetamine.

• Father was prescribed medication for anxiety/depression and posttraumatic stress disorder, but he stopped taking his medication in 2003 

because he “felt like [he] didn’t need it.” He resumed taking his medication

in 2007 before stopping again in 2021 because he could not pay for it and 

was “[j]ust being irresponsible.”

• Father admitted to self-medicating with methamphetamine.

Giving due deference to the trial court’s findings, In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 

108 (Tex. 2006), we conclude that based on this evidence, the trial court could

reasonably have formed a firm conviction or belief that Father had endangered S.D. by 

placing her—or by allowing her to remain—in a dangerous environment, see In re C.H., 

89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Thus, the 

evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court’s Subsection (D) finding. See 

C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19. Accordingly, we deny Father’s counsel’s request to modify the 

termination order by deleting the Subsection (D) finding, and we affirm the order as-is.

Father’s counsel remains appointed in this case through proceedings in the 

Texas Supreme Court unless otherwise relieved from his duties for good cause in

accordance with Family Code Section 107.016(2)(C). See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24,
7

27–28 (Tex. 2016) (order); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(2)(C).

/s/ Dabney Bassel

Dabney Bassel

Justice

Delivered: July 11, 2024