UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 17-2124 (TJK) FRANCEL BELLINGER et al. , Plaintiffs ,

v. MURIEL BOWSER et al. , Defendants

.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs have filed suit agains t various District of Columbia public officials, alleging that they have unlawfully failed t o provide Capitol View Library, which serves a predominantly black neighborhood, with the same renovations and related servi ces provided to other public library branches that serve pr edominately white neighborhoods. Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for a Preliminar y Injunction, which requests tha t the Court order Defendants to provide additional resources to C apitol View Library, make chan ges to its renovation plans, and enjoin its re-opening, which is scheduled for December 18, 2017

. See ECF No. 19-1 (“Am. Mot.”). There is littl e doubt that Plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the way in which Capitol View Library’s renovation has proceed ed. That is unfortunate, but i t is not a basis to grant their motion. The Court finds that the y are not likely to succeed onthe merits of their claims here, nor will they suffer irreparable injury absent the injunctive relie f sought. Moreover, the balance of the equities and the public interes t weigh against the relief. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is
DENIED

.2 I. Background
A. Factual Background The District of Columbia Public L ibrary (“DCPL”) is a free publ ic library system that was created by Congress in 1896. See ECF No. 24 (“Def. Opp.”) at 2; D.C. Code § 39-101. DCPL is administered by a nine-m ember Board of Trustees, and co nsists of a central library and twenty-five branch libraries in neighborhoods throughout the Di strict of Columbia. Def. Opp. at 2; D.C. Code §§ 39-101, 39-104. The central library and all br anch libraries are open to all residents of the District of Col umbia, regardless of the neighb orhood in which they reside. Def. Opp. at 30; D.C. Code § 39-103. Capitol View Library is a DCPL branch library located in Ward 7 that serves a predomina ntly black neighborhood. Am. Mot . at 3; Def. Opp. at 2. Decisions related to DCPL’s capital and operations funding are made by the Mayor and the Council of the District of Colum bia (the “Council”) through the District of Columbia’s annual budget process. See Am. Mot. at 4; Def. Opp. a t 3; D.C. Code § 39-106. Since Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2008, thi s process has authorized fund ing for renovations at eighteen full-service DCPL branc h libraries throughout the District of Columbia. See Def. Opp. at 3. Renovations for two additi onal DCPL branch libraries wer e separately funded through another budget mechanism. Id. By early November 2017, renovati ons had been completed at fifteen of these DCPL branch libraries. Id. Five of these projects, inc luding the renovation of Capitol View Library, are still in progress. Id. In the FY 2015 budget, Capitol View Library’s renovation was in itially allocated $10.5 million in funding, but that amount was reduced to $4.5 million in the FY 2016 budget due to the overall reduction of the DCPL capital budget. Am. Mot. at 4; D ef. Opp. at 5. However, in the FY 2018 budget, the Council increa sed this project’s funding to $7.2 million, by adding $23 million for “exterior improvements” and $700,000 “to provide an interim library space.” Def. Opp. at 6. The project’s overall budget has since increased to approximately $7.9 million, after DCPL added $726,000 to the project from other sources. Id. Capitol View Library closed f or interior renovations on Februar y 25, 2017. See Am. Mot. at 3-4; Def. Opp. at 7. Whe n libraries are closed for ren ovations, DCPL must determine whether it will provide interim library services for the commun ity during the closure. See Def. Opp. at 4; ECF No. 27-7 (“Reyes- Gavilan Decl.”) ¶ 3. Interim l ibrary services can range from placing DCPL librarians at other si tes in the community—for exa mple, at schools—to providing interim facilities capable of of fering basic library services o n a temporary basis. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 4. DCPL considers the renovation’s scope and budget wh en deciding whether to provide interim services, because the cos t of those services comes out of the renovation’s budget. Id. ¶ 5. When deciding whether to provide an interim facility as part of those services, DCPL also considers the length of planned c losure and the library’s proxi mity to other branches. Id. ¶ 6. DCPL generally provides an inter im facility for library closure s lasting longer than one year and where there is no other DCPL br anch library within a mile. Id. In this case, DCPL provided interim services by assigning Cap itol View Library staff member s to nearby libraries, visiting neighborhood schools, and conducti ng outreach to daycare and early learning facilities. See Def. Opp. at 7; Reyes-Gavilan Decl . ¶ 7. DCPL attempted to open an interim library facility at a local church, albeit unsuccessfull y. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 7; s ee Am. Mot. at 7. DCPL also commonly provides what is known as “opening day colle ction” funding for DCPL branches that re-open aft er being closed for renovation. See Def. Opp. at 4; ReyesGavilan Decl. ¶ 8. This funding is designed to cover the one-t ime costs associated with “refreshing” a library’s existing collection. Reyes-Gavilan De cl. ¶ 8. Generally, the shorter the4 closure, the less dated the mat erials are upon the library’s re -opening, and the le ss “refreshing” its books and materials require. Id. ¶ 9. The amount of this funding is al so tied to the number of items the specific library circulates. Id. ¶ 10. Capitol View Library, which circulated 33,416 items in FY 2015 and was scheduled for a nine-month closure, re ceived an allocation of $50,000 for that purpose. Id. ¶ 11; Am Mot. at 9-10. The interior renovations at Cap itol View Library are now substa ntially complete. See Def. Opp. at 7. Accordingly, DCPL pl ans to re-open the libraryto the public on December 18,
2017. Id. ; Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 13. Afterwa rd, DCPL plans for Capitol Vi ew Library to undergo the design phase for ext erior renovatio ns, and to close the library agai n in the spring of 2018 to implement those renovations . Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 13. When Capitol View Library closes again, DCPL plans to open a n interim library facility onthe grounds of J.C. Nalle Elementary School, pursuant to an already-executed interagency Memorandum of Agreement.
Id. ¶ 13; ECF No. 27-21.
B. Procedural Background Plaintiffs filed suit on Nove mber 6, 2017, and simultaneously f iled a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 4. On November 20, the Court held a tel econference with the parties and established a briefing schedule for Plaintiffs’ anticip ated amended motion for injunct ive relief. On November 21, Plaintiffs filed an amended com plaint. ECF No. 20 (“Am. Compl. ”). On November 22, they filed the amended motion for a preliminary injunction, mooting their original motion for a temporary restraining order a nd preliminary injunction. Am. Mo t. On November 29, Defendants Yvette Alexander, Vincent Gray, and David Grosso (the “Council Defendants”) filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ amende d motion and moved to dismiss5 Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. See ECF No. 23-1 (“Cncl. Def. Opp.”). That same day, Defendants Muriel Bowser, Richard Reyes-Gavilan, and Gregory Mc Carthy (the “Executive Defendants”) also filed an oppositi on to Plaintiffs’ amended mo tion. See Def. Opp. On December 7, Plaintiffs filed a reply to each of these oppositio ns. See ECF No. 33 (“Reply to Def. Opp.”); ECF No. 34 (“Repl y to Cncl. Def. Opp.”). On Decem ber 13, Plaintiffs filed a notice attaching supplemental e xhibits in support of their moti on. See ECF No. 37. On December 14, Executive Defendants moved to file a surreply. See ECF No. 38 (“Def. Surrep.”). That same day Council Defendants filed a reply in support of th eir motion to dismiss, and the Court held a hearing on the motion. See ECF No. 39. On December 15, the Court granted Executive Defendants leave to file their surreply.
II. Legal Standard A preliminary injunction is “an e xtraordinary r emedy that may o nly be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitle d to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To warrant a preliminary injunction, Pl aintiffs must establish that (1) they are likely to succeed on the m erits; (2) they are likely t o suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; ( 3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. Historically, the D.C. Cir cuit has employed a “sliding scale” test, whereby “[a] district court must ‘balance the strengths o f the requesting party’s arguments in each of the four required are as.’ If the showing in one are a is particularly s trong, an injunction may issue even if the showings i n other areas are rather weak.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England , 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision , 58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) (citation omitted).6 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter , however, the D.C. Circuit has suggested that a more stringent test m ay apply, and that the likelihood o f success on the merits may be an “independent, free-standing requi rement for a preliminary injun ction.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (intern al quotation mark omitted ). In light of the above, the Court employs the “sliding scale” framework to evaluate Plainti ffs’ claims. Because Plaintiffs “cannot meet the less demanding ‘sl iding scale’ standard, [they ] cannot satisfy the more stringent standard alluded to by the Court of Appeals.” Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray , 956 F. Supp. 2d 230, 241 (D.D.C. 2013).
III. Analysis The Court finds that Plaintiffs are not at all likely to succee d on the merits of their claims, nor will they suffer irreparable injury absent the injunctive r elief sought. Moreover, the balance of the equities and the public int erest weigh against the relie f. 1

1 The Court acknowledges that Defen dants have argued that (1) as sociation plaintiffs Marshall Heights Civic Association and SE – NE Friends of the Capitol Vi ew Library lack standing and (2) all Plaintiffs lack standi ng for the claims against Council Defendants. See Def. Opp. at 13; Cncl. Def. Opp. at 12 n.11. While thi s Court recognizes that “ a party who seeks a preliminary injunction ‘must show a substantial likelihood of standing’” Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack , 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (inte rnal quotation marks omitted), Defendants have not challenged that the individua l plaintiffs have standing to sue the Executive Defendants, who are sued in their official capaci ties, which is the equivalent of a suit against the District of Columbia itself, see Atchinson v. District of Columbia , 73 F 3d. 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Thus, the Court proceeds to evalu ate whether Plaintiffs have sh own a likelihood of success on the merits. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n , 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) (collecting cases), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n , 558 U.S. 310 (2010); In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Because only one plaint iff must have standing, we have no need to c onsider either the Navy’s mo tion to dismiss certain retired and former chaplains from the appeal for lack of standing or wh ether the organiza tional plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims.”).7 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
1. Budget Autonomy Act (Count I) Plaintiffs allege that Defe ndants violated D.C. Code § 1-204.46 (d), which was enacted as part of the Local Budget Aut onomy Act of 2012 (the “Budget Auto nomy Act”), D.C. Act 19-321 (2013), by “reprogramming” $700,000 tha t was allocated for inte rim library space for the communities served by Capitol View Library. Am. Mot. at 8, 11- 12; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-36. The statute requires that, after the adoption of the annual budget for a fiscal year, “no reprogramming of amounts in the budget may occur unless the Mayor submits to the Council a request for such reprogramming and the Council approve s the request” and certainother conditions are met. D.C. Code § 1-204.46(d). As a threshold matter, Plainti ffs have not demonstrated a likel ihood of success on the merits on this count because it is unlikely that they have a pr ivate right of action to enforce the Budget Autonomy Act. The relevan t test to determine whether a D.C. statute creates an implied private right of action is set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See, e.g. , Dial A Car, Inc. v. Transp., Inc. , 132 F.3d 743, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In Cort , the Supreme Court stated: In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statut e not expressly providing one, several factors ar e relevant. First, is the pla intiff one of the class for whose especialbenefit the statute was enacted —that is, does the statute create a . . . right in favor of the plai ntiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, eith er to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underl ying purposes of the legislativ e scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? 422 U.S. at 78 (internal quotat ion marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). When dealing with statutes, such as this one, that do not expressly provide a private right of action, plaintiffs must meet a “rela tively heavy burden of demonstratin g that [the legislature]8 affirmatively or specifically contemplated private enforcement when it passed the relevant
statute.” Samuels v. District of Columbia , 770 F.2d 184, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Although the issue was not briefed e xtensively by the parties, it does not appear that Plaintiffs are likely to meet t his burden. The Budget Autonomy Act addresses the roles and responsibilities of the component s of the Distric t of Columbia’ s government in appropriating and spending local funds. See generally Budget Autonomy Act, D.C. A ct 19-321 (2013). The law was passed by the Council to provide greater control over local funds by the District of Columbia, as opposed to Congress . Council of the District of C olumbia, Committee of the Whole, Report on Bill 19- 993, at 1-5 (Dec. 4, 2012). The speci fic provision cite d by Plaintiffs is entitled “Enactment of local budget by council.” D.C. Code § 1 -204.46. And it is located in a subpart of the D.C. Code entitle d “Budget and Financial Managem ent.” D.C. Code §§ 1-204.41– 1-204.53. Plaintiffs cite nothing tha t suggests that the law w as passed to benefit a special class of persons, that the Council inte nded to create a private right of action when passing it, or that the underlying legislative scheme is consistent with such a rig ht. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not even address the relevant legal standard. See Am. Mot. at 11-12; Reply t o Def. Opp. at 5-6. They try to claim that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, s omehow obviates the need to demonstrate that the statute cont ains a private right of action . Reply to Def. Opp. at 5. But it is well settled that the Declarat ory Judgment Act does not provide a private right of a ction; it only authorizes a form of relief. See Ali v. Rumsfeld , 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Even if a private right to en force it existe d, however, Plainti ffs have still not demonstrated a likelihood that the law was in fact violated, be cause they fail to show that any funds have actually been—or even will be—unlawfully reprogramme d. Plaintiffs appear to allege that DCPL has not yet spent the $700,000 tha t has been a llocated for interim services, Am.9 Mot. at 11-12, and may never spe nd it. They further allege tha t DCPL may spend the funds on other community needs, citing a meeting on September 19, 2017, in which DCPL “presented a proposal that would give the commu nity a choice between getting an interim service modular trailer by Jan/Feb 2018 or keepi ng the $700K and investing the funds in other ways,” Am. Mot.
at 8. However, neither scenario suggest s that a violation of the Budg et Autonomy Act has occurred, or is even likely. F irst, the provision cited by Pla intiffs prohibits the unlawful reprogramming of funds, not fa iling to spend them. Second, und er the law, if the referenced proposal were accepted by the co mmunity, the Mayor could then s eek Council approval to reprogram the funds, consistentwith and as contemplated by D.C . Code § 1-204.46(d), during the nine or so months remaining in FY 2018. In any event, DCPL ’s current intention is not to reprogram the funds, but to use th em consistent with the purpos e for which they were allocated: to open an interim library facili ty in a school in Plaintiffs’ neighborhood when Capitol View Library closes in the spring. See Def. Opp. at 17-18; Reyes-Gav ilan Decl. ¶ 13. The relevant officials have executed a Memorandum of Agreement to that effec t. ECF No. 27-21. On this record, there is no basis for the Court to conclude that Plaint iffs are likely to demonstrate a violation of this statute.
2. Equal Protection Clause (Count II) Plaintiffs also allege that Defe ndants violated the Equal Prote ction Clause of the U.S. Constitution by discriminating against them on the basis of rac e when they failed to provide Capitol View Library with the s ame renovations and related serv ices afforded to those public libraries serving predominantly white neighborhoods. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-45; Am. Mot. at 12-17. The Equal Protection Clause applies to the District of Columbia through the Fifth10 Amendment. See Dixon v. District of Columbia, 666 F.3d 1337, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Bolling v. Sharpe , 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). This claim requires a showing of intentional discrimination bas ed on race. “[O]fficial action will not be held unconsti tutional solely because it resu lts in a racially di sproportionate impact. . . . Proof of racially dis criminatory intent or purpo se is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. , 429 U.S. 252, 264- 65 (1977). Discriminatory intent “implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney , 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citation omitted). “Determining whether invidious di scriminatory purpose was a mot ivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such cir cumstantial and d irect evidenc e of intent as may be available.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. To be sure, the Supr eme Court has held that “ [s]ometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerge s from the effect of the state action even when the governing le gislation appear s neutral on i ts face.” Id. However, the Court went on to hold that “such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick
Wo , impact alone is not determina tive, and the Court must look to other evidence.” Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot , 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins , 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). As part of this inquiry, the Court considers, among other thing s, (1) whether the impact of the action bears more heavily on one race than another; (2) the “historical background” of the decision, particularly if it dem onstrates other actions taken f or an invidious purpose; (3) any11 departures from normal procedures ; (4) any “substantive departures” from factors normally considered in reaching a decision; and (5) the administrative h istory of the decision. Arlington Heights , 429 U.S. at 266-68; see also Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray , 27 F. Supp. 3d 171, 184 (D.D.C. 2014). On the entire re cord before the Court, Plai ntiffs are not likely to succeed on this claim of intentiona l racial discrimination.

a. Alleged Library Renovation Budget Disparities In seeking to demonstrate that D efendants engaged in intentiona l discrimination, Plaintiffs compare Capitol Vie w Library’s renovation budget to that of a single other branch library, Cleveland Park Librar y. They point out that Capitol V iew Library, which serves a neighborhood “cluster” that is 95% black and 1% white, had its renovation budget reduced from $10.5 million to $4.5 million in the FY 2016 budget. Am. Mot. at 3-4. Meanwhile, Cleveland Park Library, which serves an a rea that is 80% white and 4% bla ck, had its renovation budget hold steady at $18.5 million. Id. But Plaintiffs fail to mention that in the FY 2018 budget, th e Council increased Capitol View L ibrary’s renovation budget from $4.5 million to $7.2 million; DCPL then increased it by a nother $726,000, bringing the curren t renovation budget to approximately $7.9 million. See Def. Opp. at 6. The funding for C apitol View Library’s renovation, then, has increased by over 75% since the time Plaintiffs seek to use as a point o f comparison. Even using up-to-date funding tot als, however, this single libr ary-to-library comparison selected from a larger program of many library renovations acro ss the District of Columbia reveals next to nothing about wheth er Defendants have intention ally discriminated against Plaintiffs based on race. Moreove r, expanding the library-to-l ibrary comparison beyond Cleveland Park Library to all fi ve branch libra ry renovation pr ojects currently underway12 significantly undercuts Plaintiffs ’ allegations of racial discr imination. For example, the current budget for Capitol View Library’s renovation is virtually ident ical to (and in fact marginally greater than) that of Palisades Library, which Plaintiffs conce de serves a neighborhood “cluster” that is 4% black and 80% white. See Def. Opp. at 21; ECF No. 24-6; A m. Mot. at 3. In addition, the branch library with the l argest budget for an ongoing renov ation—$20 million—is Lamond Riggs Library, located in War d 5, which the 2010 census recorde d as being 77% black. See Def. Surrep. at 6; ECF No. 24-6. Expandi ng the data set even furthe r—to all branch library renovations completed over the last decade or so—the budget for Capitol View Library’s renovation is greater than the budget that was allocat ed for Chevy Chase Library loc ated in Ward 3, which the 2010 census recorded as being 5% black and 84 % white. 2 See Def. Opp. at
21. To be sure, these additional one-t o-one library comparisons are of limited analytic value, as well. They do not, for example, account for non-racial diff erences among these renovation projects—such as the size of the library to be renovated and th e number of items each circulates—that could expl ain funding disparities. They do, ho wever, expose Plaintiffs’ comparison between Capitol View Library and Cleveland Park Libr ary as a cherry-picked example that provides scant evid ence of discriminatory intent. In addition, Plaintiffs argue tha t Capitol View Library’s renov ation budget is well below the average budget for a DCPL library renovation. Am. Mot. at 4. Again, standing alone, this fact—even if accurate—does not demonstrate intentional racial d iscrimination. There could be

2 The Court takes judicial noti ce of 2010 Census results for War d 3 maintained on the Government of the District of C olumbia’s Office of Planning web site at: https://planning.dc.gov/node/597402

. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta , 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[J]udicial notice may be tak en of public records and governme nt documents available from reliable sources.”); Fed. R. Evid. 201.13 many differences among these projects that explain why Capitol View Library’s renovations have a lower-than-average budge t. Plaintiffs allege nothing th at would connect this departure from the mean to racial discrimination. Finally, Plaintiffs cite a purported comparison of certain “fun ding streams” between libraries they identify as “east of the Anacostia River in pred ominantly African-American neighborhoods” and libraries elsew here in the District of Colum bia. Am. Mot. at 5. In response, Executive Defendants assert that over the course of the last de cade, the District of Columbia’s disproportionately black neighbor hoods have, in the aggregate, received above

- average funding for library renovations. Def . Opp. at 21. They attach exhibit s that cite publicly-available information illustrating that libraries in Wards 7 and 8—the tw o wards “east of the Anacostia River”—received more than the per-ward average of approximately $28 million during that time. 3 See ECF No. 27-5; ECF No. 27-6. Capito l View Library, as noted ea rlier, is located in Ward 7. This is, once again, hard t o square with intentional d iscrimination against them. In response, Plaintiffs argue t hat the Court should adopt a “we ighted average” approach that accounts for the number of libraries in each ward. Reply to Def. Opp. at 6. However, Plaintiffs do not indicate the sour ce for the data they cite, and they employ an unclear and inconsistent methodology in maki ng their calculations. In any event, their calculations are not illustrative of intentional racial discrimination. For example , it appears that they conclude that the ward with the highest per-branch library renovation funding is Ward 5, 4 which the 2010

3 In their supplemental exhibits , Plaintiffs appear to challenge this figure, instead calculating the per-ward average as $31.7 million. See ECF No. 37-1. Even accepting it as accurate, the libraries in the two wards eas t of the Anacostia River stillwould have received higher than average funding. See id. 4 This calculation excludes the budget for the renovation of DCP L’s central library, the Martin Luther King Jr. Library, which is located in Ward 2.14 census recorded as being 77% black. See ECF No. 33-2; Def. Surrep. at 6; ECF No. 37-2. Plaintiffs’ calculations do not com e close to illustrating a “p attern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo ” from which, without additional ev idence, the Court could infe r racially discriminatory intent on the part of Defendants. 5
b. Alleged Interim Library Services Disparities Plaintiffs turn to other servi ces connected with the Capitol Vi ew Library renovations to demonstrate intentional racial discrimination. But Defendants supply non-discriminatory reasons for their actions that effectiv ely negate Plaintiffs’ assertion s of discrimination. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant s’ failure to prov ide interim li brary services while Capitol View Library was closed for renovation is further evidence of i ntentional discrimination against them. See Am. Mot. at 3, 5, 6-9, 14; Def. Opp. at 23 n.13. They also as sert, in a conclusory fashion, that “the other libraries in the northwest quadrants o f the city, and with significantly more affluence and resources, w ere provided prompt interim serv ices,” including Georgetown Library, Tenley Library, Clevel and Park Library, West End Library, and Mount Pleasant Library. Am. Compl. ¶ 48. In response, Executive Defendant s assert that the decision to p rovide interim services is affected by whether the renovati on project’s budget includes su fficient funding for those services. Def. Opp. at 23; Rey es-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 5. So to som e degree, Plaintiffs’ argument about interim services simply reh ashes their unpersuasive argum ent concerning the size of

5 For example, “[i]n Gomillion . . . a local statute altered the shape of a city from a square to a 28-sided figure, which had the effect of removing from the cityall but four of its 400 African American voters, and not a single white voter.” In re Navy Chaplaincy , 928 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (D.D.C.), aff’d , 738 F.3d 425 (D.C. Cir. 2013). And in “ Yick Wo . . . a city board of supervisors denied building ordinance waiver s to over 200 Chi nese applicant s, but granted waivers to all but one non-Chinese applicant.” Id. Plaintiffs have shown not hing of the sort here.15 various branch libraries’ re novation budgets. In any event, Ex ecutive Defendants explain that DCPL did in fact provide interim services by assigning Capitol View Library staff members to nearby libraries, vis iting neighborhood schools, and conducting outreach to daycare and early learning facilities. See Def. Opp. at 7; Reyes -Gavilan Decl. ¶ 7. The real thrust of Plaintiffs’ ar gument is that Defendants fail ed to provide an interim library facility . But Executive Defendants provid e non-discriminatory reasons for not providing such a facility. They explain that whether an interim facility is provided by DCPL depends on the length of the lib rary’s closure and the library’s proximityto other branch locations. ReyesGavilan Decl. ¶ 6. They concede that they generally provide aninterim facility for library closures lasting longer than one year and where there is no oth er DCPL branch library within a mile. Id. But in this case, they assert , the budget for Capitol View Li brary’s renovation project did not account for an interim f acility, the library has been c losed for less than ten months, and it is within a mile of Benning Lib rary. Def. Opp. at 23. Theref ore, by their non-discriminatory criteria, the closing of Capitol View Library would not typical ly qualify for an interim facility. Even so, Executive Defendants maintain, they tried to establishan interim facility in a nearby church, but the church turned down their proposal. Reye s-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 7; see Am. Mot. at 7. Moreover, when Capito l View Library closes again, D CPL plans to open an interim facility on the grounds of J.C. Na lle Elementary School, pursua nt to an interagency Memorandum of Agreement that i s already in place. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 13; ECF No. 27-21. Finally, Executive Defendants cite numerous examples in which n eighborhoods served by libraries in Ward 8 (Anacostia Library) and Ward 7 (Benning Lib rary and Francis A. Gregory Library) that were close d for more than a year received interim library facilities, further undermining any claim of racial discrimination. Def. Opp. at 2 3-24.16 In their reply, Plaintiffs ar gue that the neighborhood served b y Palisades Library, which will be closed for a similar am ount of time, will get “more” interim library services—but do not elaborate further on the nature of these additional services. Reply to Def. at 8. And Defendants have proffered, and Plaintiffs have not disputed, that the Pali sades Library will not receive an interim library facility —the clear focus of Plaintiffs’ concern—because it will be clos ed less than a year. Def. Opp. at 24. In this critical respect, Palisades Library will be treated identically to Capitol View Library. Plainti ffs also rehash their allegation that it is somehow improper that the $700,000 allocated for interim servi ces for Capitol View Librar y in FY 2018 has not yet been spent, but fail to explain the re levance of this allegation to their racial-discrimination claim. Reply to Def. at 8. Finally, they argue that Benning Library i s in fact more than a mile away from Capitol View Library and is an unacceptable substitute lib rary for that and other reasons.
Id. Plaintiffs are clearly displea sed with the interim services t hat DCPL has provided—and the interim facility it plans to provide—for their neighborhood dur ing the Capitol View Library renovation process. But considere d collectively, this evidence of record does not remotely suggest intentional ra cial discrimination.

c. Alleged “Opening Day Collect ion” Budget Disparities Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to provide “o pening day collection” funding for Capitol View Library c ommensurate with such funding for branch libraries that serve predominantly white neighborhoods . Am. Mot. at 9-10. Again, P laintiffs rely heavily on a comparison with a single other branch: Cleveland Park Library . Id. Plaintiffs assert that Capitol View Library was allocated $50,000 for its “opening day collect ion,” yet Cleveland Park Library was allocated $500,000 . Id. Executive Defendants do not con test these funding amounts, bu t explain that, in general, thi s funding is tied to how long the library is closed: the longer the17 closure, the more dated its m aterials are upon reopening, and the more “refreshing” of these materials is necessary. See Def. Opp. at 24; Reyes-Gavil an Decl. ¶ 9. In addition, the am ount of this funding is tied to the number of items the specific library circulates. See Def. Opp. at 24; Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 10. Capitol View Library has been closed for ten months, and circulated 33,416 items in FY 2015. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 11. Cleveland Park Library will be closed for two years, and circulated 207,376 items in FY 2015. Id. Therefore, the disparity in funding for these two libraries’ “opening day collections ” appears wholly e xplainable by factors other than invidious racial discrimination. 6 Moreover, Executive Defendants note that, alth ough Capitol ViewLibrary has relatively low circulation rates, it has a relatively high demand for comp uter technology. Reyes-Gavilan Decl. ¶ 12. Therefore, post-re novation, DCPL has included fund ing in its budget to increase the number of computers there to f orty-four, more than double the c urrent amount, and to hire additional staff to manage these computer services. Id. Also, Capitol View L ibrary is slated to become the first renovated or r ebuilt DCPL branch to feature a dedicated computer lab for public technology training. Id. Although Plaintiffs apparently f avor a different mix of resou rces for Capitol View Library, it is hard to reconcile these notable imp rovements to their neighborhood library with intentional racial discrimination.

6 Plaintiffs dismiss this explanation in their reply, and assertthat these two lib raries cannot be compared because of disparities i n their collections that preda te the renovations. See Reply to Def. Mot. at 9. But it was Plaintiffs who cited this comparison in s upport of their motion in the first place. Am. Mot. at 3-4, 9- 10. Moreover, this lack of co ntext further illustrates why the Court cannot conclude that any s ingle library-to- library compar ison cited by Plaintiffs is evidence of intentional racial discrimination.18 d. Other Potential Indicia of Inten tional Racial Discrimination Plaintiffs also attempt to addre ss other criteria that the Supr eme Court referenced as being potentially probative of di scriminatory intent in Arlington Heights . Am. Mot. at 14-16. Again, they come up well short of the mark. Plaintiffs argue that library “funding patterns bear [a] historical dimension that tr acks the development and gentri fication across the city.” Id. at 14. But development and gentrificati on are not at issue here, and this conclusory statement says nothing about the “historical b ackground” related to the fundin g of DCPL’s branch libraries, which, as discussed above, is not helpful to them. Plaintiffs also contend that the “sequence of events” in securi ng funding for renovations at Capitol View Library has been “sporadic and piecemeal.” Id. at 14. But Plaintiffs offer nothing beyond this conclusory sta tement, and fail to explain h ow this “sequence” was inconsistent with Defendants’ us ual practice. For instance, th ey repeatedly emphasize that Capitol View Library’s capital improvements funding was cut by $6 million in the FY 2016 budget. Id. at 4; Reply to Def. Opp. at 2. B ut the funding for Palisades Library was also cut by $13.5 million in the same budget. Def. Opp. at 5-6. These red uctions appear to have been made because “[t]he library, like all district agencies, was asked t o absorb some reductions to its [FY 2016] budget to address a projecte d citywide shortfall of close to 200 million dollars.” ECF No. 33-4, at 1. Plaintiffs also allege that Defe ndants made a “substantial departure” from their “procedures” by not including enlar ged windows in their planned renovations of Capitol View Library, as suggested in DCPL’s “Building Program” for Capitol View Library’s renovation. Am. Mot. at 6, 8-9, 15. However, the program expressly provide s that it is intended to be used only “as a guide ” and that the “requirements n eed to be adjusted to fit within the envelope of the19 existing library while meeting th e budget and adhering to all c ode required upgrades.” Def. Opp. at 26 (quoting ECF No. 19, at 4) (em phasis in original). Plaintiffs’ displeasure with the manner in which Capitol View Library’s windows have been renovated is plain. But this change to the renovation plans does not represent a procedural departure at a ll, let alone one that is suggestive of discriminatory intent. 7 Finally, Plaintiffs argue that “the administrative history of the project has not been transparent and remains incons istent with the funding and plann ing of other DCPL libraries.” Am. Mot. at 15. To a large extent , here Plaintiffs simply re-s tate claims advanced elsewhere, as well as recount their unhappiness with the renov ation process f or Capitol View Library

. See id. at 15-16. They also allege that DCPL is violating a rule that branch library closures of ten months or more warrant interim library facilities, but they do not provide any evidence of such a rule

. See id. at 16. Finally, they allege tha t in renovating Capitol View L ibrary in the manner described, DCPL is violating its mission, as set forth in its s trategic plan. Id. at 16-17. But it is difficult to comprehend how compl etion of this library renovati on, even in light of the ways in which Plaintiffs are dissatisfie d, is genuinely contrary to tha t mission. In summary, none of these additiona l criteria demonstrate any e vidence of racially discriminatory intent on the partof Defendants. As a result, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of this claim.
3. Substantive Due Process (Count III) Plaintiffs also allege that thei r substantive due process right s under the Fifth Amendment were violated. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46- 50. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the

7 Plaintiffs also contend that Def endants engaged in improprietyin connection with the contracting process. Am. Mot. a t 15-16. But this claim is so vague and conclusory that it does not help Plaintiffs meet their burden.20 U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . dep rived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” To succeed on a substantive due p rocess claim, a plaintiff must prove “egregious government misc onduct” that deprives him of a liberty or property interest. George Wash. Univ. v. District of Columbia , 318 F.3d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Substantive due process “prevents governme ntal power from being used for purposes of oppression, or abuse of government power that shocks the conscience, or action that is legally irrational [in that] it is not sufficiently keyed to any leg itimate state interests.” Wash. Teachers’ Union Local #6 v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C. , 109 F.3d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (alterations in original) (quoting Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan , 859 F.2d 929, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). The standard also incorporates a “pr esumption that the administrati on of government programs” and “[d]ecisions concerning the allocat ion of resources” are “based on a rational decisionmaking process that takes account of c ompeting social, political, and economic forces.” Fraternal Order of Police Dep’t of Corr. Labor Comm. v. Williams , 375 F.3d 1141, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (alteration in or iginal) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights , 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992)). Plaintiffs are not likely to be successful on this claim. Theydo not have a constitutionally recognizable pr operty interest in Capitol View Library’s renovations and related services that are the focus of their lawsuit. See Boykin v. Gray , 895 F .Supp. 2d 199, 220 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that plai ntiffs had no property interestin homeless shelter slated for closure). And even if they did, a s discussed above, they have not demonstrated conduct on the part of Defendants that comes c lose to the required showing of egregious government misconduct. Rather, the conduct atissue in this case consists of run-of-the-mill decisions about how to allocate government resourc es, and as such is entitled t o a presumption of rationality that Plaintiffs have not overcome.21 4. District of Columbia Human Rights Act (Count IV) Finally, Plaintiffs allege that De fendants have violated the Di strict of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA” ), D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 et seq ., by discriminating against them on the basis of their place of residence. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-53; Am. Mot. at 19-20. The DCHRA states in relevant part: Except as otherwise provided f or by District law or when otherw ise lawfully and reasonably permitted, it shall be an unlawful discriminatory pr actice for a District government agency or office to lim it or refuse to provide any f acility, service, program, or benefit to any indivi dual on the basis of an indivi dual’s actual or perceived: . . . place of residence . . . . D.C. Code § 2-1402.73. The DCHRA’s “effects clause” states tha t “[a]ny practice which has the effect or consequence of violating any of the provisions of thi s chapter shall be deemed to be an unlawful discriminatory practice.” Id. § 2-1402.68. This “effects clause” imports into the DCHRA “the concept of disparat e impact discrimination developed by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 401 U.S. 424 (1971).” Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ ., 536 A.2d 1, 29 (D.C. 1987) (parallel citations omitted); see also 2922
Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia , 444 F.3d 673, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Accordingly, “despite the abse nce of any intention to discrimin ate, practices are unlawful if they bear disproportionately on a pr otected class and are not indepe ndently justified for some nondiscriminatory reason.” Gay Rights Coal. , 536 A.2d at 29. On the record before the Court , Plaintiffs are no more likely t o succeed on this claim than on the others, for reasons similar to those set forth in Boykin . In that case, the district court dismissed a place-of-residence discrimination claim under the D CHRA based on the District of Columbia’s closure of a homel ess shelter in one neighborhood, w hile leaving similar shelters intact in other neighborhoods. See Boykin , 895 F. Supp. 2d at 217-218. The court concluded that:22 [I]t cannot be that Section 2-1402.73 is violated simply becaus e the District closes a public assistance facility in one part of the city while fail ing to close similar facilities in a different part of the city. Under that reasoni ng, virtually any decision by the District limiting or restricting services of an y kind in one quadrant, ward, or neighborhood cou ld be challenged as discrimi natory under the DCHRA. The same logic would s eemingly allow individuals to sue over a failure to construct facilities or provi de services in one part of the city where such facilities or services are avai lable elsewhere. This broad int erpretation, which would subject an unimaginable num ber of routine policy decision s to litigation, cannot credibly be derived from a provision that bars discrimin ation ‘on the basis of’ place of residence or ei ghteen other protected traits. . . . [T]he language of Section 2-1402.73 signals a foc us on the selective denial of be nefits to certain persons, based on their place of residence, while those benefit s remain available to other persons. The conduct ch allenged here by the plaintiff s simply is not encompassed within that definition. Boykin , 895 F. Supp. 2d at 218 (citation omitted). The same is true here. There ha s been no “selective denial of benefits to certain persons” while those benefits remain a vailable to other persons. Id. The entire DCPL system of branch libraries remains open to all resi dents of the District of Colu mbia, no matter the neighborhood or ward in which they live. See Def. Opp. at 30; D.C. Code § 39- 103. Plaintiffs are therefore free to “request materials from, vis it, and enjoy any library in the city,” including two in Ward 7 (where Plaintiffs reside) and t hree in Ward 8, each of which wa s recently renovated. Def. Opp. at 30; see ECF No. 27-5. Moreover, to interpr et the statute to encompass Plaintiffs’ claims here would allow “individuals to sue ove r a failure to construct fac ilities or provide services in one part of the city where such facili ties or services are availabl e elsewhere . . . , subject[ing] an unimaginable number of routine policy decisions to litigation.” Boykin , 895 F. Supp. 2d at 218; see also Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray , 27 F. Supp. 3d 142, 166-67 (D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing place of residence di scrimination claim under the D CHRA based on the District of Columbia’s construction of a facility in a particular neighborh ood).23 Finally, even assuming Plainti ffs’ claims are cognizable under the statute, Defendants actions appear to be justified by non- discriminatory reasons. As discussed at length above, it appears that renovations of va rious library branches in many di fferent neighborhoods, including Capitol View Library, are being completed while taking into acc ount budgetary restrictions, the characteristics of each librar y, and the needs of each neighborhood. That is not to say, however, that all residents of each nei ghborhood necessarily agree with each of those policy decisions. Plaintiffs point to Mitchell v. DCX, Inc. , 274 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2003), in support of their DCHRA argument. But in tha t case, a taxi company was found liable because it was “significantly less likely t o pick up a person requesting servi ce from Anacostia than it [was] to pick up a person requesting service from another part of the ci ty,” resulting in awholesale denial of benefits to certain persons the re while those benefits remai ned available to others. Id. at 49. Nothing of the sort has occurr ed in connection with Capitol Vie w Library’s renovation.
B. Irreparable Harm The irreparable injury require ment sets a “very high bar” for a movant seeking a preliminary injunction. Coal. for Common Sense in Gov’t Procurement v. United States , 576 F. Supp. 2d 162, 168 (D.D.C. 2008). To be entitled to such relief , a plaintiff must show injury that is “certain, great, actual, and imminent.” Mylan Labs. Ltd. v. FDA , 910 F. Supp. 2d 299, 313 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Wis. Gas. Co. v. FERC , 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Plaintiffs must show that the harm will “dir ectly result from the action w hich the movant s eeks to enjoin.”
Wis. Gas Co. , 758 F.2d at 674. And the harm must be “beyond remediation.” CFGC v. England , 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The availability of “ad equate compensatory or other corrective relief” in th e ordinary course of litigation “ weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Va. Petrol. Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC , 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).24 Plaintiffs do not come close to de monstrating the type of harm required to obtain a preliminary injunction. They a llege that if an injunction does not issue they will suffer such harm as a result of (1) the lac k of interim library services at Capitol View Library; (2) DCPL’s purported failure to install, or to plan for, windows at Capito l View Library tha t are large enough to let in sufficient natural light; (3) the lack of funding for Capitol View Library’s “opening day collection,” and (4) a “noise disturbance” from using Capitol V iew Library when the library’s exterior renovation occurs . Am. Mot. at 20-21. Simply put, it is self-evident that none of these allegations e ven approaches the irreparable harm standard. Whatever harm might be suffered by Plaintiffs as a result of allegedly suboptimal interim library servi ces, the library’s window desig ns, or inadequate “opening day collection” funding for Capitol Vi ew Library is speculative and not of sufficient severity to warrant a preliminary injunction. See Comm. of 100 on Fed. City v. Foxx , 87 F. Supp. 3d 191, 203-04 (D.D.C. 2015) (declining to h old that “a temporary closure of a park or recreation area” constituted irreparable harm). T he same is true for any allege d “noise disturbance” that could result from the renovation of the library’s exterior. See City of Tempe v. FAA , 239 F. Supp. 2d 55, 63 (D.D.C. 2003) (declining to fi nd irreparable harm where plaintiffs did not establish that emissions from an airport runw ay project were “anything more th an minimal”). In addition, the alleged lack of interim librar y services and concerns about noi se disturbances in the library during its renovation cannotbe the basis for any imminent harm at all. If the injunction does not issue, Capitol View Library, upon re-opening, will provide full services until the spring of next year, and no interim services will be necessary until then. Mo reover, the library’s external renovation is not planned to begin until the spring, at which t ime DCPL plans to close it. ReyesGavilan Decl. ¶ 13. Finally, there is no obvious reason why an y of these harms, if later proven,25 could not be the subject of adequa te compensation or other corr ective relief in the normal course of this litigation. Plaintiffs appear to argue that they will suffer irreparable harm merely because some of these factual allegations are grounded in an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Am. Mot. at 21. But “merely raising a constitutional claim is insufficient to warrant a presumption of irreparable injury.” Sweis v. U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Comm’n , 950 F. Supp. 2d 44, 48 (D.D.C. 2013). And even assuming that all of P laintiffs’ factual—as opposed to merely conclusory—allegations a re true, they do not sufficientl y demonstrate irreparable injury on the record here. See Incantalupo v. Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15 , 652 F. Supp. 2d 314, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding no i rreparable injury for a F irst Amendment claim because the factual allegati ons plead were insuffi cient). At any rate, even assuming that every Equal Protection Clause allegation const itutes an irreparable injury, see Mills v. District of Columbia , 571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he loss of constituti onal freedoms, ‘for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably cons titutes irreparable injury. ’”) (quoting Elrod v. Burns , 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opini on)), the other factors r elevant for a preliminary injunction—the likelihood of success on the merits, balance of the equities, and public interest— weigh so heavily against Plaintiffs that they cannot prevail. Finally, in their reply, Plainti ffs allege a further basis for irreparable harm: a small pool of standing water that has collected near Capitol View Library’ s entrance that they allege is dangerous for children. See Reply to Def. Opp. at 1-2; ECF No. 33-1; see also ECF No. 37-4. At oral argument, counsel for Ex ecutive Defendants explained th at this is likely the result of a faulty sump pump, which is fail ing to adequately remove water f rom a bio-retention pond that was built to collect stormwater runoff.26 Again, on the record here, any harm that might be suffered by P laintiffs as a result of this small pool of water is highly sp eculative, as oppo sed to certai n, actual, and imminent. In addition, the requested relief will obviate little, if any, all eged harm connected to this pool. As explained above, Plaintiffs must show that the harm will “direc tly result from the action which the movant seeks to enjoin.” Wis. Gas Co. , 758 F.2d at 674. But re-opening the Capitol View Library building—which has been i ssued a Certificate of Occupan cy by the District of Columbia—will not substantiall y affect any speculative harm pos ed by the pool of water on its grounds. See ECF No. 27-20. Finally, Plainti ffs’ allegations concerning th e pool were not pleaded in the amended complaint and do not appear connected to any of Plaintiffs’ causes of action. The Court “lacks jurisdi ction over a motion when it ‘r aises issues different from those presented in the complaint.’” Sai v. TSA , 54 F. Supp. 3d 5, 9 (quoting Adair v. England , 193 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D.D.C. 2002)); accord Stewart v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv ., 762 F.2d 193, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1985).
C. The Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest In determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction, “courts must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the re quested relief.” Winter , 555 U.S. at 24. “In exe rcising their sound discretion, courts . . . s hould [also] pay part icular regard fo r the public consequences in employing the extraordina ry remedy of injunction.” Id. In this case, the balance of the equities and the public interest weigh str ongly against injunctive relie f. In their motion, Plaintiffs argue that the public interest woul d be served by providing their community with much neede d library resources, including c omputer resources. Am. Mot. at 21-22. But enjoining the re- opening of Capitol View Librarywould prevent the public from27 having access to those resour ces. Indeed, upon re-opening, Cap itol View Library is slated to become the first renovated or r ebuilt DCPL branch to feature a dedicated computer lab for public technology training. Reyes-Gav ilan Decl. ¶ 12. To date, DCPL has spent $4.5 million to renovate its interior. Def . Opp. at 33. And going forward, DC PL has included funding in its budget to more than double the number of computers in the lab ( to forty-four) and to hire additional staff to manage com puter services. Reyes-Gavilan D ecl. ¶ 12. For these reasons, the balance of the equities and the public interest weigh strongly in favor of allowing Capitol View Library to re-open for the bene fit of the entire neighborhood i t serves, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ dissatisfaction with it. Finally, the other relief sought by Plaintiffs, such as orderin g additional resources for Capitol View Library, mandating that its windows be renovated i n a particular manner, and requiring that Defendants incorpor ate Plaintiffs’ input into th e renovation process, would change, rather than maintain, the statu s quo, and therefore represents “an even more extraordinary remedy.” Abdullah v. Bush , 945 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2013) (citations omitted). More importantly, ordering suc h relief would plunge the Court i nto the political process through which the Mayor, the C ouncil, and other public official s allocate limited resources for all residents of the District of C olumbia. Ordering this relief wo uld likely force them to reprogram funds designated for other projec ts, and could encourage piecem eal private litigation over the District of Columbia’s budget. E specially on the record here, the balance of the equities and the public interest weigh strongly aga inst this course, for which the Court is especially ill-equipped. See, e.g., Nat’l. Wildlife Fed’n v. United States , 626 F.2d 917, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[T]he public interest dictates . . . res traint is necessary where, as here, [plaintiffs] ask us to intervene in wrangling over the . . . budget a nd budget procedures. Such ma tters are the archetype of those28 best resolved through bargaining a nd accommodation between the legislative and executive branches.”) (citation omitted) . And even assuming such a remed y could be justifi ed, Plaintiffs have utterly failed to demonstrat e how the public interest woul d be better served by awarding such relief now, through the extra ordinary measure of preliminary equitable relief, as opposed to at the end of the case should they prevail.
IV. Conclusion and Order For all of the above reasons, Pla intiffs’ Motion for a Prelimin ary Injunction is DENIED

.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: December 15, 2017