alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Page 11 of 24 Exhibit 99(c) KEYCORP STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2000-A
OFFICERS CERTIFICATE JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ELT
    
    Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, IT4 New York Plaza, 6th Floor
    
    60 Wall Street, 26th FloorNew York, NY 10004
    
    New York, NY 10005Attn: ITS  Global Debt
    
    Attn: Structured Finance ServicesPhone: (212) 623-5427
    
    MailStop NYC60-2606Fax: (212) 623-5933
    
    Phone: (212) 250-8522Fax: (212) 797-8606KeyBank National Association
    
    MBIA Insurance Corporation800 Superior Avenue, 4th Floor
    
    113 King StreetCleveland, OH 44114
    
    Armonk, NY 10504Attn:
President, KER
Phone: (216) 828-4293
    
    Attn: Data
Administration
Phone: (914) 765-3772Fax: (216) 828-9301
    
    Fax: (914) 765-3810
 Pursuant to Section 3.08 of the Subservicing Agreement between KeyBank National Association,
successor in interest to Key Bank USA, National Association as Master Servicer and Great Lakes
Educational Loan Services, Inc., as Subservicer, dated as of June 1, 2000 (the Agreement), the
undersigned hereby certifies that (i) a review of the activities of the Subservicer from January 1,
2004, through December 31, 2004, and of its performance under the Agreement has been made, and (ii)
to the best of the undersigneds knowledge, based on the review, the Subservicer has fulfilled all
its obligations under the Agreement throughout such period. The undersigned also hereby certifies that the Subservicer has disclosed to the Master Servicer and
to the Trusts certified public accountants all significant deficiencies relating to the
Subservicers compliance with the minimum servicing standards in accordance with a review conducted
in compliance with the standard as set forth in the Agreement. Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc.,
SubservicerDate: February 15, 2005
    
    By:
    
    /S/ MICHAEL J. NOACKName:
    
    Michael J. NoackTitle:
    
    Chief Servicing Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           7,909
<SECURITIES>                                    33,307
<RECEIVABLES>                                   17,285
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,350
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                63,382    
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  77,400
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           38,786
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           111
<OTHER-SE>                                      36,498
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    77,400
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                18,280
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5,748
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                11,489
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   137
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,432
<INCOME-TAX>                                       501
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                931
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       931
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.08
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE QUARTER ENDED NOVEMBER 30, 1997, AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1997
<CASH>                                             575
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    407,776
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               461,537
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 461,537
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           18,737
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           157
<OTHER-SE>                                     267,303
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   461,537
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                46,910
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (5,637)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (52,547)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (52,547)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2617 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2617

  To amend the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 to postpone a scheduled 
       increase in the minimum wage applicable to American Samoa.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 2, 2015

Mrs. Radewagen introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 to postpone a scheduled 
       increase in the minimum wage applicable to American Samoa.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MINIMUM WAGE APPLICABLE TO AMERICAN SAMOA.

    Section 8103(b)(2)(C) of the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 (29 
U.S.C. 206(b)(2)(C) note) is amended by striking ``and 2014'' and 
inserting ``2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017''.
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lyle M. Bastian, Appellant.

— Mikoll, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schuyler County (Callanan, Sr., J.), rendered June 12, 1985, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of endangering the welfare of a child.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child, a misdemeanor, in satisfaction of four indictments charging defendant with sodomy in the second degree (two counts), patronizing a prostitute in the second degree (four counts), sexual abuse in the second degree (two counts) and endangering the welfare of a child (four counts). He was sentenced to an intermittent term of four months in Schuyler County Jail.

After a suppression hearing, County Court held that the complainant and her parents by their conduct consented to the tape recording of a telephone conversation between the 14-year-old female complainant and the 61-year-old defendant. No eavesdrop warrant had been obtained. County Court concluded that no warrant was required since the recording was made with the consent of one of the parties to the conversation *(see,*CPL 700.05 [1]; Penal Law § 250.00 [1]).

The only issue raised on this appeal is whether County Court erred in denying suppression of the tape-recorded conversation between the complainant and defendant. Defendant argues that the 14-year-old complainant was incapable of consenting to a waiver of her constitutional right to privacy in *910the absence of the consent of her parents, and that the finding that her parents consented was not supported in the record.

There should be an affirmance. The complainant did sign a waiver form giving permission to Deputy Philip C. Barnes of the Schuyler County Sheriff’s Department to overhear and tape-record her conversation with defendant. Her parents (her natural mother and stepfather) were present during the recording of the conversation. The Deputy had previously explained the plan to tape-record the conversation to the parents and had sought their cooperation in the matter. The parents did cooperate, and participated in arranging for the call to be made. There was ample evidence that the complainant and her parents freely and voluntarily, in a spirit of cooperation, consented to the tape recording. The ruling of County Court was thus proper *(see, People v McGee,*49 NY2d 48, *cert denied sub nom. Waters v New York,*446 US 942).

In view of our holding, we need not reach the issues of whether the complainant had the capacity to give a valid consent in the absence of her parents’ consent, or whether defendant could invoke the infant’s constitutional right to vitiate her consent.

Judgment affirmed. Main, J. P., Casey, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed July 6, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D20-310 Lower Tribunal Nos. F17-6712, F16-23195, F19-18684

________________ 

### Patrick Llanos, Appellant,
vs. 

### The State of Florida, Appellee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Andrea R. Wolfson, Judge. Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Andrew Stanton, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Joanne Diez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before SCALES, HENDON and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2639 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2639

   To amend title 38, United States Code, to provide for additional 
 qualification requirements for individuals appointed to marriage and 
family therapist positions in the Veterans Health Administration of the 
                    Department of Veterans Affairs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 3, 2015

  Mr. Peters (for himself, Mr. Takano, Ms. Bordallo, Ms. Brownley of 
 California, Mr. Gibson, and Mrs. Napolitano) introduced the following 
     bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title 38, United States Code, to provide for additional 
 qualification requirements for individuals appointed to marriage and 
family therapist positions in the Veterans Health Administration of the 
                    Department of Veterans Affairs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Marriage and Family Therapists for 
Veterans Act''.

SEC. 2. ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 
              THERAPISTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS.

    (a) In General.--Section 7402(b)(10) of title 38, United States 
Code, is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (A)--
                    (A) by inserting ``that is regionally accredited 
                or'' before ``approved''; and
                    (B) by striking ``; and'' and inserting a 
                semicolon;
            (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(C) have passed--
                            ``(i) the Association of Marital and Family 
                        Therapy regulatory board examination in marital 
                        and family therapy; or
                            ``(ii) an examination for a marriage and 
                        family therapy license given by a State board 
                        of behavioral sciences or its equivalent.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to the appointment of an individual to a marriage and family 
therapist position on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 23





Independent Auditors Consent





Board of
Directors and Shareholders


RMH Teleservices, Inc.





We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Numbers 333-40946, 333-58785, 333-59014 and 333-88292 on Form S-8 and Registration Statement Number 333-72318 on Form S-3 of RMH
Teleservices, Inc. (the Company) of our report dated January 20, 2003 (which report expresses an unqualified opinion and includes an explanatory paragraph relating to the restatement described in Note 23) appearing in this Annual Report
on Form 10-K of RMH Teleservices, Inc. for the year ended September 30, 2002.





Deloitte &
Touche LLP





Philadelphia, Pennsylvania


January 21, 2003
Exhibit 10.5


 


SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENT


 


TO:     The
Directors of TechStackery, Inc. (the “Company”).


 


The undersigned hereby subscribes for 7,187,500
shares of common stock, par value $0.0001 per share (the “Shares”) of the Company. In consideration for the issue of the Shares,
the undersigned hereby agrees and undertakes to pay $25,000 to the Company.


 


The undersigned agrees to take the Shares subject
to the Certificate of Incorporation of the Company and authorizes you to enter the following name and address in the stockholder ledger
of the Company:


 


	 	Name: 	 ShiftPixy
Investments, Inc.
	 	 	 
		Address:	501 Brickell Key Drive, Suite 300

Miami, FL 33131



 


ShiftPixy Investments, Inc.


 


	Signed:	/s/ Scott W. Absher	 
	Name:	Scott W. Absher	 
	Title:	Chief Executive Officer	 
	Dated:	February 18, 2021	 




 


Accepted:


 


TechStackery, Inc.


 


	Signed:	/s/ Scott W. Absher	 
	Name:	Scott W. Absher	 
	Title:	Chief Executive Officer	 
	Dated:	February 18, 2021
#### Hinz *v.*Starin.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.*

July 18, 1890.)

Contributory Negligence—Injuries at Bathing Place.

Plaintiff’s intestate, while diving from a trapeze on defendant’s beach, struck Ms head against a rock under the water, and was killed. The deceased had been sitting for about two hours in full view of the bathing place, while the water was filled with bathers, many of whom were wading in the water, which was not more than 3% feet deep. The trapeze was about 15 feet high. *Meld,*that deceased was negligent, and the complaint was properly dismissed. Following 8 N. *Y.*Supp. 890.

Appeal from special term.

At the conclusion of the testimony the court below dismissed the complaint, from which plaintiff appeals. For former reports, see 3 N. Y. Supp. 290, and 6 N. Y. Supp. 165.

*672Argued before Barnard, P. J., and Pratt, J.

*Martin J. Keogh,*for appellant. *Goodrich, Beady*<6 *Goodrich,*for respondent.

Pratt, J.

This general term has passed upon this case at two prior sittings, and what was stated in the opinions then rendered covers all the questions now raised. The evidence is substantially the same as upon the former appeals, and the judgment must be affirmed upon those opinions. The first may be found in 46 Hun, 526, and the last was rendered at the December general term, 1888, and reported in 3 N. Y. Supp. 290.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Guy Coe, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Rockland County (Edelstein, J.), rendered April 9, 1984, convicting him of attempted burglary in the second degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Miller, J.), of those branches of the defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress certain identification evidence, physical evidence and statements made by him to law enforcement officers.

*166Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s detention by the arresting officer was proper, since the defendant fit the description relayed over the police radio and was observed only a short distance from the crime scene within minutes of the crime’s occurrence. Under these circumstances, the police had a sufficient basis to stop and detain the defendant pending an identification by the complainant *(see, People v Hicks,*68 NY2d 234, 242; *People v De Bour,*40 NY2d 210, 222; *People v Francheschi,*128 AD2d 723).

The denial of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony was proper. Although all showups are, by their very nature, suggestive, the standard to be applied is whether a particular showup is, in any way, impermissibly suggestive *(see, People v Love,*57 NY2d 1023, 1025; *People v Brnja,*70 AD2d 17, 23, *affd*50 NY2d 366; *People v Francheschi, supra).*The Court of Appeals, as well as this court, has consistently held that showup identifications which take place in close physical and temporal proximity to the crime, as occurred here, are permissible *(see, People v Love, supra,*at 1024-1025; *People v Rivera,*121 AD2d 408, *lv denied*68 NY2d 772). In any event, the in-court identification was correctly permitted as the evidence established that the complainant had a sufficient independent basis upon which to make an identification *(see, People v Rivera, supra).*

While the trial court should have made a complete record of its *Sandoval*ruling *(see, People v Sandoval,*34 NY2d 371), under the circumstances herein, remittitur is not warranted. The court’s ruling, which precluded cross-examination with respect to certain prior crimes, clearly occurred after a review of the defendant’s criminal history *(see, People v Williams,*56 NY2d 236; *People v Anderson,*124 AD2d 851).

We note that, after the jury returned a guilty verdict, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 290.10. This court, on appeal, ordered the jury verdict reinstated *(see, People v Coe,*99 AD2d 516). We now find that, contrary to the defendant’s contentions, he was not deprived of the right to present witnesses at the trial nor was he denied the effective assistance of counsel *(see, People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 146).

We have considered defendant’s other contentions and find them either to be without merit or not preserved for review. Mangano, J. P., Thompson, Kunzeman and Sullivan, JJ., concur.
Dissenting Opinion Filed August 28 , 2019.

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 18
- 01227
- CV GREG GUTMAN , Appellant

V. RICHARD WAYNE WELLS AND REAL ESTATE ARBITRAGE PARTNERS, LLC , Appellees

On Appeal from the 95th District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC
- 18
- 06158 

### DISSENTING OPINION Before Justices Whitehill, Partida

- Kipness, and Pedersen, III Dissenting Opinion by Justice Partida

- Kipness I withdraw my prior dissent, and respectfully dissent to the new opinion issued today

. The claims made by Greg Gutma n do not fall within the parameters of the Declaratory Judgment s Act

. See T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE §§ 37.0 01

– .011. The declaratory re lief sought by Gutman will not terminate the controv ersy or remove an uncertainty. See id. § 37.003(c); s ee also Bonham State Bank v. Beadle , 907 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex. 1995) ( “[a] trial court has discretion to enter a declaratory judgment so long as it will serve a useful purpose or will terminate the controversy between the parties.” ); City of Richardson v. Gordon , 316 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2010, no pet.) ( a declaratory judgment action does not give a court jurisdiction “to pass upon hypothe tical or contingent situations, or to determine questions not then essential to the decision of an actual controversy, although such questions may in the future require adjudication.” ) (internal– 2

–

citations omitted). As all parties concede, there was nothing at issue about the lower court’s decision in the previous case , and the parties agree no judgment was entered against Wells in the previous case

. There is, thus, no uncertainty to resolve. Further , a fair reading of Gutman’s petition, and the majority’s characterization of it, shows his claims are for civil harassment and , to the extent such a cause of action exists, sound in tort

. See Tort, B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY ( 11 th ed. 2019 ) (tort is “[ a ] civil wrong . . . for which a remedy may be obtained, usually in the form of damages.” )

. Any declaration regarding the parties’ rights to seek , or duties to provide , a release of judgment would, therefore, not terminate the controversy. Under no circumstances is this a proper declaratory judgment action, and I do not agree with the majority’s expansion of the statute. T he trial court properly dismissed Gutman’s action pursuant to r ule 91a. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 91a. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

181227DF.P05 /Robbie Partida

- Kipness ROBBIE P ARTIDA

- KIPNESS JUSTICE