J-E03004-16

2017 PA Super 61

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

TYSHAWN PLOWDEN

Appellee No. 143 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order January 6, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0002528-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., OTT, J., 

STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., MOULTON, J., and RANSOM, J.

OPINION BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 08, 2017

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order1entered 

January 6, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County, that 

granted the motion filed by Tyshawn Plowden pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 600 and dismissed the charges against Plowden with 

prejudice. The Commonwealth contends the trial court abused its discretion

in granting the motion because the Commonwealth exercised due diligence 

in prosecuting Plowden who was incarcerated in another state outside the 

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth properly certified, in its notice of appeal, that “said 

order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution,” a 

prerequisite to this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). Notice 

of Appeal, 1/20/2015.
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control of the Commonwealth. For the reasons below, we reverse and 

remand for further proceedings.

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural history, as follows:

The parties have stipulated, in accordance with the record, that 

the Rule 600 time limits expired on December 27, 2014. A 

review of the record reveals that on June 9, 2014, [Plowden] 

filed a Petition for Nominal Bail Pursuant to Rule 600, and 

therein alleged that the 180-day time period for bringing him to 

trial expired on June 9, 2014. On June 19, 2014, the Honorable 

Gerard Long of this [c]ourt granted [Plowden’s] Petition and set 

bond at $1.00. On July 11, 2014, [Plowden] was released from 

the Cambria County Prison and was extradited to the State of 

New York, following an extradition hearing on July 3, 2014.

At the January 5, 2015 hearing [on the Rule 600 motion], the 

Commonwealth offered a written log and oral testimony from 

Detective Lia DeMarco relative to the Commonwealth’s efforts to 

secure [Plowden] from the State of New York from July 2014 to 

present. See 1/5/15 Com. Exhibit A. At [the] hearing, Detective 

DeMarco testified, in response to questioning by the Court, that 

when the Cambria County Prison, in July 2014, inquired with the 

Commonwealth as to whether [Plowden] could be extradited to 

the State of New York, the Commonwealth did not object to the 

extradition. N.T. 1/5/15 at p. 24. The Detective also admitted 

that prior to his release from the Cambria County Prison, no one 

scrutinized the charges ... pending in Cambria County.[2] N.T. 

1/5/15 at p. 24. However, she further testified that since this 

case, the Commonwealth’s protocol has changed. N.T. 1/5/15 at 

pp. 24-25. Additionally, counsel for the Commonwealth freely 

admitted that the Commonwealth should have known that there 

were charges pending against [Plowden], should have more 

closely taken action prior to his release to the State of New York, 

and are now attempting to rectify the errors. N.T. 1/5/15 at pp. 

29-30.

____________________________________________

2 On November 17, 2013, the Commonwealth filed charges of aggravated 

assault against Plowden for a shooting in the City of Johnstown. Plowden 

was also charged with drug and firearms offenses.
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Testimony was also presented at the January 5, 2015 hearing 

that the Commonwealth started proceeding pursuant to the 

Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”) on September 24, 

2014. N.T. 1/5/15 at p. 40. However, formal written demand 

was not filed until October 9, 2014. Id. Thereafter, on December 

12, 2014, as a “backup” plan, the Commonwealth also began 

proceedings pursuant to the Uniform Extradition Act, as 

Detective DeMarco learned from the State of New York that she 

needed to obtain a governor’s warrant from Harrisburg. N.T. 

1/5/15 at pp. 41-42.

On December 4, 2014, the last scheduled Jury Selection date 

prior to the Rule 600 run date of December 27, 2014, the [c]ourt 

specially set another Jury Selection date of December 16, 2014 

to accommodate the Rule 600 time frame. However, [Plowden] 

was not present on either December 4th or December 16th, 

given that he was incarcerated in New York. In fact, as of the 

January 5, 2015 hearing date, [Plowden] had still not been 

returned to Cambria County, but his trial date was set for 

January 8, 2015, and the Cambria County Sheriff’s Office had 

made arrangements to transport [Plowden] from upstate New 

York to Cambria County on January 7, 2015.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/2015, at 3–4. 

Based upon these facts, the trial court granted Plowden’s Rule 600 

motion and dismissed the criminal charges pending against him with 

prejudice. The trial court also denied as moot Plowden’s objection to the 

court conducting the January 5, 2015 hearing in his absence. Trial Court 

Order, 1/6/2015, at 2 (unnumbered).

A divided panel of this Court affirmed the order of the trial court. 

Thereafter, the Commonwealth sought en banc review, which this Court 

granted. The matter is now ready for our review. 

In evaluating a Rule 600 issue:
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[O]ur standard of review of a trial court’s decision is whether the 

trial court abused its discretion. Judicial discretion requires 

action in conformity with law, upon facts and circumstances 

judicially before the court, after hearing and due consideration. 

An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if 

in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or 

the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result 

of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence 

or the record, discretion is abused.

The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the 

record of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the findings of 

the [trial] court. An appellate court must view the facts in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party.

Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court 

is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule [600]. 

Rule [600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the 

protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the 

protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right 

to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given 

to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both 

to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those 

contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule 

[600] was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from 

good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the 

Commonwealth.

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the 

Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy 

trial rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a 

manner consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime. 

In considering [these] matters . . . courts must carefully factor 

into the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the 

individual accused, but the collective right of the community to 

vigorous law enforcement as well.

Commonwealth v. Watson, 140 A.3d 696, 697–698 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, ___ A.3d ___ [2016 Pa. LEXIS 2924] (Pa. 

Dec. 28, 2016).
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Rule 600, as amended July 1, 2013,3 provides, in pertinent part, that 

“[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the 

defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the 

complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). For purposes of computing 

when trial must commence, “periods of delay at any stage of the 

proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has 

failed to exercise due diligence shall be included.... Any other periods of 

delay shall be excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). 

“When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods set 

forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the defendant’s attorney, or 

the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that 

the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has 

been violated.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1).

The Comment to the Rule explains the computation of time, in relevant 

part, as follows:

For purposes of determining the time within which trial must be 

commenced pursuant to paragraph (A), paragraph (C)(1) makes 

it clear that any delay in the commencement of trial that is not 

attributable to the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has 

exercised due diligence must be excluded from the computation 

of time Thus, the inquiry for a judge in determining whether 

there is a violation of the time periods in paragraph (A) is 

____________________________________________

3 All relevant actions in this case took place after the effective date of the 

amendment.
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whether the delay is caused solely by the Commonwealth when 

the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence. If the 

delay occurred as a result of circumstances beyond the 

Commonwealth’s control and despite its due diligence, the time 

is excluded. In determining whether the Commonwealth has 

exercised due diligence, the courts have explained that “[d]ue 

diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does 

not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a 

showing the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment (citations omitted). 

The trial court, in the order under appeal, made the following findings:

1) Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties and in 

accordance with the record, the Court finds that Rule 600 

time limits expired in this case on December 27[,] 2014.

2) Having considered Commonwealth Exhibits 1 and A,[4]as 

well as the testimony relative thereto, the Court finds 

that the Commonwealth has failed to prove due diligence 

on its part sufficient to extend the parameters of Rule 

600. The lack of due diligence is further exemplified by 

all of the following matters of record:

a) On June 9, 2014, [Plowden] filed a Petition for Nominal 

Bail Pursuant to Rule 600, and alleged therein that the 

180-day period expired on June 9, 2014. Thereafter, 

on June 19, 2014, the Honorable Gerald Long granted 

[Plowden’s] Petition and set bond at $1.00. Therefore, 

the Commonwealth was on notice that Rule 600 again 

would be violated in 180 days, absent any proper 

defense continuances.

____________________________________________

4 Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1, presented to the court on December 4, 2014, 

the date initially set for jury selection, is a document prepared by Detective 

Lia DeMarco, showing her activity on Plowden’s case from July 3, 2014, to 

November 20, 2014. Commonwealth’s Exhibit A, admitted at the Rule 600 

hearing on January 5, 2015, is the same document with additional entries 

that end on December 12, 2014. 
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b) [Plowden] was released from the Cambria County Prison 

to the State of New York, with the knowledge of the 

Cambria County District Attorney’s Office, on July 11, 

2014. The Commonwealth did not request a stay from 

extradition.

c) On December 4, 2014, the last scheduled Jury Selection 

date prior to the Rule 600 run date of December 27, 

2014, the Court specially set another Jury Selection 

date of December 16, 2014 to accommodate the Rule 

600 time frame. However, [Plowden] was not present 

on either December 4th or December 16th, given that he 

was incarcerated in New York.

d) As of the January 5, 2015, hearing date, [Plowden] had 

still not been returned to Cambria County, but his trial 

date was set for January 8, 2015, and the Cambria 

County Sheriff’s Office had made arrangements to 

transport [Plowden] from upstate New York to Cambria 

County on January 7, 2015.

Order, 1/6/2015, at 1–2. 

In its Rule 1925(b) opinion, the trial court reiterated:

[I]t is clear that once [Plowden] was granted nominal bond on 

June 19, 2014, the Commonwealth was on notice that Rule 600 

would again be violated in 180 days, absent any proper defense 

continuances. The record also reveals that, despite having 

knowledge of New York’s extradition proceedings, at no time did 

the Commonwealth request a stay from extradition. In fact, the 

Commonwealth waited until October 9, 2014 to file any formal 

written documents to initiate [Plowden’s] return. Again, as of 

January 5, 2015, the Commonwealth still had not transported 

[Plowden] for trial.

Accordingly, we find that the Commonwealth did not act with 

due diligence in procuring [Plowden’s] person for trial, and that 

the circumstances occasioning the delay in trial were not beyond 

the Commonwealth’s control. Consistent with the aforesaid, and 

in consideration of the entire record, the appeal should be 

dismissed.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/2015, at 4–5.
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The Commonwealth’s position on appeal is that the trial court’s 

decision to grant Plowden’s Rule 600 motion was based on the trial court’s 

disapproval of the Commonwealth’s initial failure to contest Plowden’s 

extradition to New York in July of 2014. The Commonwealth claims the trial 

court “perceived allowing [Plowden] to be extradited [to New York] as a fatal 

flaw.” Commonwealth Brief at 11. The Commonwealth asserts because 

December 27, 2014, was the stipulated Rule 600 time limit and Plowden was 

set to be transported and brought to trial on January 8, 2015, it needed to 

prove only 12 days of excludable time relating to its diligent efforts to 

transport Plowden from New York for trial. See Commonwealth Brief at 12. 

The Commonwealth argues the 91-day period from October 9, 2014, when 

the Commonwealth made a formal request for Plowden’s transfer pursuant 

to the Interstate Agreement Detainers (“IAD”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9101 et seq.,

5

until jury selection on January 8, 2015, should be excluded from the Rule 

600 computation based on its efforts to bring Plowden from New York to 

Pennsylvania. See id. at 16. The Commonwealth also argues that delay 

caused by Plowden contesting extradition, from October 17, 2014, to 

December 19, 2014, the earliest possible date the Commonwealth could 

____________________________________________

5

“The IAD is a compact among 48 states, the District of Columbia and the 

United States. The IAD establishes procedures for the transfer of prisoners 

incarcerated in one jurisdiction (the ‘sending state’) to the temporary 

custody of another jurisdiction (the ‘receiving state’), which has lodged a 

detainer against them.” Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 281 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (footnote and citations omitted). 
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transfer him, constitutes redundant excludable time of 63 days. See id. at 

17–18.

Plowden counters that it is of paramount importance that, while the 

Commonwealth had notice of the potential speedy trial problems as of June 

19, 2014, the date of the nominal bail hearing, and of the New York 

detainer, the Commonwealth did not request the Governor of Pennsylvania 

to hold Plowden until disposition of the Cambria County charges. Plowden 

argues that the detective’s testimony at the Rule 600 hearing that the 

Commonwealth had no notice of the pending charges against Plowden is of 

no avail in light of the Commonwealth’s own records and its access to search 

resources such as JNET [Justice Network] and the UJS [Unified Judicial 

System] portal. In support, Plowden cites Commonwealth v. Browne, 

584 A.2d 902, 905 (Pa. 1990), wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that “it would be unduly harsh to 

require the office of the district attorney to monitor cases being returned to 

the court in order to unearth ‘problem cases’ under Rule [600].” See 

Plowden’s Brief at 7–8.6

____________________________________________

6

In Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693 (Pa. 2012), the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained its decision in Browne, stating:

In Browne, the defendant was issued a Notice of Arraignment 

by the district justice at the conclusion of the preliminary 

hearing. Under the system of arraignments and criminal trials in 

the relevant county, the trial date that corresponded to the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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At the Rule 600 hearing, Detective Lia DeMarco, of the Cambria 

County District Attorney’s Office, who was responsible for extradition 

requests, detailed her efforts to secure Plowden’s return from New York. 

N.T., 1/5/2015, at 10, 14–28; see also Commonwealth’s Exhibit A, 

1/6/2015, at 1–4 (unnumbered). Detective DeMarco testified that prior to 

the extradition hearing, the Commonwealth relied on information from 

Cambria County Prison that indicated “there’s nothing else that’s holding him 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

defendant’s arraignment date resulted in a situation where the 

trial would not commence until well beyond the mechanical run 

date under Rule 1100 [now Rule 600]. Relevant to our ultimate 

decision, under the local county rules applicable in Browne, the 

district attorney was responsible for conducting the 

arraignments. Id. at 904. When the potential Rule 1100 

violation became apparent, the Commonwealth sought an 

extension of the run date, which was denied by the trial court, 

resulting in the eventual grant of the defendant’s Rule 1100 

motion. The Superior Court reversed and reinstated the charges, 

finding that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence and that 

the delay was due to the district justice’s scheduling of the 

arraignment.

We reversed, concluding that the Commonwealth failed to 

exercise due diligence. We stated that to act with due diligence, 

“prosecutors must do everything reasonable within their power 

to see that the case is tried on time.” Id. at 905 (internal 

citation omitted). We determined that the district attorney’s 

actions were not reasonable in Browne: “Particularly in light of 

the Lancaster County District Attorney’s heavy responsibility 

under Local Rule 303 (with respect to conducting arraignments) 

..., it is not unreasonable or erroneous to expect the District 

Attorney’s Office to track arraignment dates on a routine basis.” 

Id. at 905–06.

Bradford, supra, at 703-704.
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at our facility.” Id. at 13. Detective DeMarco admitted that based on this 

information, the Commonwealth took no steps to delay or oppose New 

York’s extradition request.7 See id. She further testified that “before we 

even had the hearing, ... we realized that ... we would need [] to bring 

[Plowden] back here.” Id. at 14. 

Detective DeMarco stated her initial telephone contact with Plowden’s 

New York parole officer was on July 3, 2014 — the same date as the 

extradition hearing. Id. at 15. She discussed her efforts to communicate 

with New York authorities, and testified that, on October 9, 2014, she 

formally started the process to transfer Plowden to Pennsylvania pursuant to 

the IAD. Id. at 15–16, 40. See also Commonwealth Exhibit A. 

Following Detective DeMarco’s initiation of the IAD process, she was 

informed on October 17, 2014, by her contact in New York that Plowden was 

contesting his detainer and demanding a Cuyler hearing.8 See 

Commonwealth Exhibit A. On October 20, 2014, Detective DeMarco learned 

____________________________________________

7 The Commonwealth’s attorney acknowledged that “[o]ur office should have 

known there were charges pending against Mr. Plowden. We should have 

known that.” N.T., 1/5/2015, at 29.

8

“In Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S. Ct. 703, 6 L. Ed. 2d 641 

(1981), the United States Supreme Court held that prisoners involuntarily 

transferred by detainer pursuant to the IAD were entitled to the same pretransfer rights as those prisoners transferred under the Uniform Criminal 

Extradition Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9121 et seq., i.e., a pretrial hearing.” 

Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1267 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2008).
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the IAD paperwork she had mailed to Harrisburg over two weeks earlier had 

been received by her Harrisburg contact on that date. See id. On October 

23, 2014, Detective DeMarco was advised by her Harrisburg contact that 

IAD paperwork “Form V” should have been mailed directly to New York, and 

Detective DeMarco sent a new Form V to New York by overnight mail. See 

id. New York authorities received the paperwork on October 27, 2014, but 

Plowden was not served with the IAD paperwork until November 12, 2014. 

See id. On November 20, 2014, Detective DeMarco was notified that New 

York authorities had scheduled a Cuyler hearing for December 10, 2014. 

See id. See also N.T., 1/5/2015, at 51–52. On December 11, 2014, 

Detective DeMarco learned the IAD hearing had failed, and she would need 

to obtain a Governor’s Warrant.9 N.T., 1/5/2015, at 41. She sent the 

paperwork for the Governor’s Warrant by overnight mail to Harrisburg on 

December 12, 2014. See id. at 41. See also Commonwealth Exhibit A.

Despite New York authorities’ requirement for a Governor’s Warrant, 

transfer was subsequently effectuated pursuant to the IAD. Id. at 42. 

Detective DeMarco testified that on December 22, 2014, and December 29, 

2014, the Cambria County District Attorney’s Office overnighted IAD forms 

to Pennsylvania authorities for transmission to New York. Id. at 42–43. 

Detective DeMarco further testified she did not know when Cambria County 

____________________________________________

9 See Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9121–9148.
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was informed that Plowden was available to be picked up from New York 

authorities because she was not there when the call came to confirm the 

transfer. Id. at 53. She had gone on maternity leave on December 19, 

2014. Id. at 19. She testified that the call from New York to transfer 

Plowden came “after the 19th.” Id. at 54. She stated Cambria County 

deputies would be going to pick up Plowden “pursuant to the IAD based 

upon the materials that were sent out on December the 29th [2014].” Id. at 

43. Commonwealth counsel informed the trial court Plowden was scheduled 

to be picked up in New York on January 7, 2015. Id. at 7. The 

Commonwealth filed a request that the case be set for jury selection on 

January 8, 2015. Id. at 6.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Plowden’s attorney argued that the 

Commonwealth “knew or should have known of the situation here ... on 

June 24th when [New York’s] extradition request was received,” and that “all 

of the steps that were taken afterwards were obviated or negated by letting 

[Plowden] go [to New York authorities] on July 3rd without ... asking the 

governor to exercise discretionary power, not to extradite until the pending 

prosecution was completed.” N.T., 1/5/2015, at 55–56. Plowden’s attorney 

further argued that the delay “from the month of July to the month of 

October,” when the Commonwealth initiated formal proceedings for 

Plowden’s transfer, was “not due diligence.” Id. at 57. Plowden’s counsel 
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asserted the Commonwealth “should have taken action in July or in August.” 

Id. at 59.

The Commonwealth argued that 12 days elapsed between the 

expiration of the Rule 600 date, December 27, 2014, and the date for jury 

selection, January 8, 2015, and that based on the record there were at least 

12 days of excludable delay because “certain things ... happened here that 

were beyond our control even though we attempted and tried to get 

[Plowden] back.” Id. at 60. The Commonwealth argued that while “we 

probably should have acted sooner than October when we finally and 

formally instituted [IAD] proceedings[,] ... [t]here would have been sufficient 

time to bring [Plowden] back and try him ... before the 365 days transpired 

[sic].” Id. at 61–62. The Commonwealth urged that the additional delay 

“was out of our hands.” Id. at 63.

“It is generally held that Rule [600] is tolled where the Commonwealth 

shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it has acted with due 

diligence in seeking extradition to bring the defendant to trial.” 

Commonwealth v. McNear, 852 A.2d 401, 406 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). A criminal defendant who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction is 

unavailable within the meaning of Rule 600 if the Commonwealth 

demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that it exercised due 

diligence in attempting to procure the defendant’s return for trial. 

Commonwealth v. Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2008), citing 
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McNear, 852 A.2d at 404. See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment (“[T]he 

defendant should be deemed unavailable for the period of time during which 

the defendant contested extradition, or a responding jurisdiction

delayed or refused to grant extradition.") (emphasis added).

As stated in our case law, and reiterated in the Comment to Rule 600, 

“[d]ue diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does not 

require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the 

Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.” Commonwealth v. 

Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083, 1088 (Pa. 2010); Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment, 

citing Selinski. The Commonwealth has the burden of demonstrating by a 

preponderance of the evidence that it exercised due diligence. Selinski, 

994 A.2d at 1089. 

Based on our review of the record, we find the trial court abused its 

discretion in determining that “the Commonwealth did not act with due 

diligence in procuring [Plowden’s] person for trial, and that the 

circumstances occasioning the delay in trial were not beyond the 

Commonwealth’s control.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/2015, at 4–5. While we 

agree with the trial court that the time from July 3, 2014, up to October 9, 

2014, is attributable to the Commonwealth,10 we conclude the 

____________________________________________

10 Although we recognize Detective DeMarco communicated with New York 

officials about the need to bring Plowden to Pennsylvania for trial, beginning 

on July 3, 2014, and attempted to continue communication during the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Commonwealth’s IAD transfer request evidences due diligence, and that the 

IAD process was not within the control of the Commonwealth. As such, the 

time from October 9, 2014, to January 7, 2015, represents excludable delay. 

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) and Comment; Booze, supra.

Whereas in Browne, cited by Plowden, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court found a lack of due diligence due to the district attorney’s failure to 

maintain a recordkeeping system to keep track of cases for Rule 600 

purposes, 584 A.2d at 905–906, the present case involves the 

Commonwealth’s immediate recognition — on or before the July 3, 2014, 

extradition hearing — of its oversight and its need for Plowden’s return. 

The record reflects Detective DeMarco contacted New York authorities 

on July 3, 2014, maintained contact with them, and ultimately made a 

formal request pursuant to the IAD, on October 9, 2014, for Plowden’s 

return from New York. Although this request was made over three months 

after the July 3, 2014, extradition hearing, there remained more than two 

and one-half months before the date of December 27, 2014 — the stipulated 

Rule 600 time limit. The record demonstrates that from October 9, 2014, 

the IAD process was stymied mainly by New York authorities. The testimony 

of Detective DeMarco described, inter alia, (1) an unexplainable delay of 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

months of July and August, the unresponsiveness of New York officials 

should have prompted the Commonwealth to act earlier in accordance with 

the IAD. See Commonwealth Exhibit A, at 1 (unnumbered). 
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approximately two weeks for IAD papers to be received by Detective 

DeMarco’s contact in Harrisburg, (2) a more than two-week delay by New 

York authorities in serving Plowden with the IAD paperwork, (3) a threeweek delay by New York authorities in holding the Cuyler hearing, and (3) 

New York authorities’ requirement — on December 11, 2014 — that the 

transfer be done instead pursuant to a Governor’s Warrant, yet confirming 

Plowden’s transfer at some point after December 19, 2014, and proceeding 

pursuant to the IAD. As a result, Plowden was set to be picked up in New 

York on January 7, 2015, and jury selection scheduled for January 8, 2015 

— 12 days beyond the Rule 600 time limit. 

Here, the Commonwealth demonstrated affirmatively that it proceeded 

pursuant to the IAD process to achieve Plowden’s timely return and 

continued to communicate with New York authorities, and that its goal was 

foiled by circumstances over which it had no control. Because there was no 

misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth to evade the fundamental trial 

rights of Plowden, see Watson, 140 A.3d at 698, we conclude the 90-day11

delay during the period of the IAD process, from October 9, 2014, to 

____________________________________________

11 The Commonwealth’s calculation of 91 days of excludable delay included 

January 8, 2015. However, we have not included that date since Plowden’s 

transfer to Pennsylvania was scheduled for January 7, 2015.
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January 7, 2015, is excludable from the Rule 600 calculation.12 See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1); Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment (“If the delay occurred 

as the result of circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s control and 

despite its due diligence, the time is excluded.”). See also Booze, 953 

A.2d at 1275 (where detective initiated involuntary IAD procedures on July 

29, 2004, New Jersey officials delayed process, and defendant was 

transferred to Pennsylvania on April 20, 2005, 256 days between July 29, 

2004, and April 20, 2005, were properly excluded from Rule 600 

calculation). We therefore reverse the order of the trial court and remand 

for further proceedings.

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/8/2017

____________________________________________

12 Even if we were only to consider New York authorities’ two weeks’ lapse in 

serving Plowden with the IAD paperwork (October 29, 2014, to November 

12, 2014), and nearly three weeks’ lapse in scheduling the Cuyler hearing 

(November 20, 2014 to December 10, 2014), the excludable delay would 

amount to 34 days, making the Rule 600 time limit beyond the date of the 

court’s January 6, 2015 order that dismissed the charges against Plowden 

with prejudice.