If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

VIKING GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff/CounterdefendantAppellee,

UNPUBLISHED

May 7, 2020

v No. 347778

Kent Circuit Court

ROBERT BRUCKMAN, LC No. 15-004861-CK

Defendant/CounterplaintiffAppellant,

and

APRIL COREY,

Defendant/Counterplaintiff.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and JANSEN and BOONSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Robert Bruckman, acting in propria persona, appeals as of right the final 

judgment entered against him following a bench trial. We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Viking Group, Inc (Viking), defendant’s former employer, filed a complaint 

alleging, inter alia, that Bruckman breached the parties’ Confidentiality Agreement. Specifically, 

Viking alleged that around the time Bruckman resigned from his position as Viking’s Director of 

Manufacturing Engineering, he misappropriated confidential information by sending it to his own 

personal computer. Under paragraph 8 of the Confidentiality Agreement, Viking also sought 

attorney fees and other actual costs necessitated by its enforcement of the Confidentiality 

Agreement. 

The case proceeded to a bench trial. Dennis Quam, Viking’s Vice President of Human 

Resources, testified that Viking required Bruckman to sign the Confidentiality Agreement when 

he began his employment because he would have access to confidential and proprietary 
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information relating to new product development, manufacturing processes, strategic plans, capital 

projects, and business information. The Confidentiality Agreement provided, in relevant part:

3. Confidential Information:

“Confidential Information” includes any and all information related to the business 

of the Company or its customers, including but not limited to information 

concerning pricing, customers, products, processes, designs, materials, 

specifications, research, development, customer contacts, procedures, forms, 

marketing and sales strategies, etc. “Confidential Information” includes 

information that is in existence as of the date of this Agreement, and also includes 

information that is prepared, created or developed by Employee or any other person 

or entity after the date of this Agreement. Confidential Information is and will 

remain the sole property of the Company. Employee will treat all Confidential 

Information as strictly confidential. Employee will not, during or after Employee’s 

employment with the Company, disclose Confidential Information to any other 

person or entity, nor use Confidential Information for the benefit of Employee or 

any party other than the Company. In the event that Employee’s employment with 

the Company ends, Employee shall immediately return to the Company all 

documents or materials containing any Confidential Information.

* * *

8. Remedies:

Employee acknowledges that any breach of the terms of this Agreement by 

Employee will cause irreparable damage to the Company and that money damages 

would not be sufficient to provide a fully adequate remedy for such a breach. 

Therefore, in the event of a breach or threatened breach of any term of this 

Agreement, the Company will be entitled to temporary, preliminary and permanent 

injunctive relief without any requirement of bond, in addition to any other legal or 

equitable remedies to which the Company may be entitled. . . . Employee shall be 

responsible to pay for the actual costs and attorney fees incurred by the Company 

in the enforcement of this Agreement.

Quam testified that in February 2015, Viking’s management determined that Bruckman 

was no longer a good fit as the company’s director of manufacturing engineering. In exchange for 

working another 90 days to help facilitate a transition, Viking offered Bruckman a severance 

package. However, rather than working for the full 90-day period, Bruckman, who was vocal about 

his displeasure with management’s decision, accepted other employment and announced his 

intention to resign effective May 4, 2015. As a result, Quam determined that Bruckman was not 

eligible to receive the severance package. 

Bruckman responded by threatening litigation if he did not receive certain compensation, 

including additional vacation pay, bereavement time, the vesting of his 401k, and a discretionary 

bonus. At this point, conscious of the possibility of impending litigation, Quam began reviewing 

Bruckman’s e-mails and other correspondence pursuant to company policy and found that 
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Bruckman had sent numerous e-mails to his wife and to his personal e-mail address that Quam 

believed breached the terms of confidentiality. One e-mail was sent to Bruckman’s personal email address on May 3, 2015, and contained financial sales data and financial information. Quam 

considered this e-mail suspicious because it was sent in such close proximity to Bruckman’s 

departure. Another e-mail was sent to Bruckman’s wife on March 28, 2014, and contained details 

of a sprinkler assembly manufacturing process. A third e-mail was sent to Bruckman’s wife in 

February 2012 and contained specifics respecting a potential business acquisition. Quam 

considered these e-mails suspicious because their contents were highly confidential and there was 

no reason why Bruckman’s wife should have had access to them. Quam decided it was necessary 

to file this instant suit to protect Viking’s interests because disclosure of this information could 

cause great harm to Viking.

Bruckman testified at trial, and acknowledged that he signed the Confidentiality 

Agreement when he joined Viking in June 2011. He also acknowledged that he sent the e-mails 

in question. He maintained that he understood the importance of confidentiality, but that he and 

his wife had been married for 33 years, “[a]nd so with relaying information to her because I was 

short staffed and she did certain things for me like proofreading, and putting things in binders, and 

other things, that it was a reasonable expectation of mine that that was a maintenance of the 

confidential information that was being sent over” and that he would “totally trust her not to break 

confidentiality.” He denied that any additional disclosure to other persons occurred. He also 

denied that Viking suffered any harm as a result of his actions but again acknowledged that at least 

some of the information he disclosed to his wife was confidential.

At the end of the three-day trial, the trial court found in favor of Viking, and issued its 

findings of fact and conclusion of law in a written opinion. It recognized that it was undisputed 

that Bruckman had sent sensitive information to his home computer and to his wife’s personal email address. The trial court determined that by doing so, Bruckman breached his contractual 

restriction. Accordingly, the trial court found that Viking was entitled to (1) a permanent 

injunction prohibiting any further dissemination of confidential information belonging to Viking; 

(2) nominal damages; and (3) as a matter of contract, the “actual costs and attorney fees incurred”

as a result of the enforcement of the parties’ agreement. 

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the amount of costs and attorney fees incurred 

by Viking, and afterward issued a second opinion and order awarding Viking $254,657.50 in 

attorney fees, $345.70 in taxable costs, and interest on the award. The trial court entered a final 

judgment memorializing its decision concerning the amount of damages and also granted

injunctive relief prohibiting Bruckman “from retaining, disclosing to any person or entity, or using 

for any purpose any confidential information . . . obtained in the course of his employment with 

Viking.” The trial court denied Bruckman’s motion for relief from the judgment. This appeal 

followed. 

II. BREACH OF CONTRACT 

Bruckman’s first two arguments on appeal concern whether Viking sustained its burden to 

prove the elements for breach of contract. First, Bruckman argues that Viking did not prove that 

it sustained any damages as a result of the disclosure. Second, Bruckman argues that it is against 
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public policy for a disclosure to a spouse to constitute a breach of his Confidentiality Agreement. 

We disagree.

“Following a bench trial, this Court reviews findings of fact for clear error and conclusions 

of law de novo.” Florence Cement Co v Vettraino, 292 Mich App 461, 468; 807 NW2d 917 

(2011). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous if there is no substantial evidence to sustain it or 

if, although there is some evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Miller-Davis Co v Ahrens Constr, Inc, 495 

Mich 161, 172-173; 848 NW2d 95 (2014). “The legal effect of a contractual clause is a question 

of law that is reviewed de novo.” Quality Prods & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 

362, 369; 666 NW2d 251 (2003).

“A party asserting a breach of contract must establish by a preponderance of the evidence 

that (1) there was a contract (2) which the other party breached (3) thereby resulting in damages 

to the party claiming breach.” Miller-Davis Co, 495 Mich at 178. However, in cases where a 

breach occurs but does not cause any quantifiable harm, a plaintiff becomes entitled at least to 

nominal damages on account of the defendant’s breach. See Kolton v Nassar, 358 Mich 154, 158; 

99 NW2d 362 (1959); see also Vandenberg v Slagh, 150 Mich 225, 229; 114 NW 72 (1907) (“In 

actions for breach of contract, nominal damages are recoverable upon proof of the breach . . . .”); 

4041-40 W Maple Condo Ass’n v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc, 282 Mich App 452, 460; 768 

NW2d 88 (2009) (stating “the law infers some damage—at least nominal damage—from the 

breach of a contract”). “Nominal damages are those damages recoverable where [the] plaintiff’s 

rights have been violated by breach of contract or tortious injury, but no actual damages have been 

sustained or none can be proved.” 4041-40 W Maple Condo Ass’n v Countrywide Home Loans, 

Inc, 282 Mich App 452, 460; 768 NW2d 88 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The trial court did not err by determining that Bruckman’s disclosure of confidential 

information to his spouse violated the terms of the Confidentiality Agreement. In support of is 

argument that disclosing confidential information to his wife, Corey, did not constitute a breach 

of the Confidentiality Agreement, Bruckman refers generally to the spousal testimonial privilege. 

Although spousal privilege bars a husband or wife from testifying against his or her spouse without 

that spouse’s consent, MCL 600.2162, Bruckman does not cite any legal basis for why that spousal 

privilege should be extended here. Indeed, we conclude that it does not have any application to 

this case.1 

 

1 Moreover, as articulated in Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 183, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959): 

It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert 

an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for 

his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for 

authority to sustain or reject his position. The appellant himself must first 

adequately prime the pump; only then does the appellate well begin to flow. 

Bruckman has therefore essentially abandoned this argument on appeal. See Woods v SLB Prop 

Mgt, LLC, 277 Mich App 622, 626-627; 750 NW2d 228 (2008), where this Court concluded that 
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We also reject Bruckman’s argument that the contested contractual language was somehow 

ambiguous or violated public policy. Our Supreme Court has articulated that it is a “bedrock 

principle of American contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts 

are to enforce the agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a 

contract in violation of law or public policy.” Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 51; 664 

NW2d 776 (2003). We conclude that the contractual language at issue here unambiguously 

prohibited disclosure of any confidential information to any other person, including Corey. 

Moreover, we find no basis for concluding that such a contractual provision violates Michigan law 

or public policy. 

Bruckman breached the Confidentiality Agreement willingly entered into the by parties by 

disclosing confidential information to his wife, Corey. Thus, the trial court did not err by entering 

a judgment in favor of Viking and awarding nominal damages. Kolton, 358 Mich 158. 

III. ATTORNEY FEES

Bruckman’s final two arguments concern the trial court’s award of attorney fees. First, 

Bruckman argues that the trial court should have adjusted the attorney fee award downward, and 

that the trial court inconsistently applied its own methodology when reviewing Viking’s attorney’s 

billing statements. Again, we disagree. 

This Court reviews a trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs for an abuse of 

discretion. Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 274; 884 NW2d 257 (2016). “An 

abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is outside the range of reasonable and 

principled outcomes.” Id. 

“A court may award costs and attorney fees only if specifically authorized by a statute, a 

court rule, or a recognized exception to the American rule (which mandates that a litigant be 

responsible for his or her own attorney fees).” Hackel v Macomb Co Comm’n, 289 Mich App 311, 

334; 826 NW2d 753 (2012). “An exception exists where attorney fees are provided by contract of 

the parties.” Fleet Business Credit, LLC v Krapohl Ford Lincoln Mercury Co, 274 Mich App 584, 

589; 735 NW2d 644 (2007). “The parties to a contract may include a provision that the breaching 

party will be required to pay the other side’s attorney fees and such provisions are judicially 

enforceable,” although any “recovery is limited to reasonable attorney fees.” See Zeeland Farm 

Servs, Inc v JBL Enterprises, Inc, 219 Mich App 190, 195-196; 555 NW2d 733 (1996) (emphasis 

added). 

The Confidentiality Agreement allows for Viking to recover attorney fees expended in 

enforcing the agreement. The framework set forth by our Supreme Court in Smith v Khouri, 481 

Mich 519; 751 NW2d 472 (2008), remains the standard for determining the reasonableness of 

requested attorney fees. Pirgu, 499 Mich at 278-279. Under the Smith framework, the trial court 

begins its analysis by “determining the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 

 

“[a]n argument must be supported by citation to an appropriate authority or policy” and failure to 

do so constitutes an abandonment of the issue. 
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services” based on “reliable serveys or other credible evidence of the legal market.” Smith, 481 

Mich at 530-531 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.). Next, “[t]his number should be multiplied by the 

reasonable number of hours expended in the case[.]” Id. This calculation “should serve as the 

starting point for calculating a reasonable attorney fee.” Id. 

Finally, the trial court should consider the following list of non-exhaustive factors to 

determine whether an upward or downward adjustment of attorney fees is appropriate: 

(1) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the 

services; 

(2) the difficulty of the case, i.e., the novelty and difficulty of the questions 

involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, 

(3) the amount in question and the results obtained, 

(4) the expenses incurred, 

(5) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, 

(6) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that acceptance of the particular 

employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer, 

(7) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances, and 

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. [Pirgu, 499 Mich at 281-282.] 

“In order to facilitate appellate review, the trial court should briefly discuss its view of each of the 

factors above on the record and justify the relevance and use of any additional factors.” Id. 

The trial court here acknowledged its duties under the Smith framework, as well as its 

responsibility to evaluate the appropriateness of an upwards or downwards adjustment, and then 

followed the framework as instructed by our Supreme Court in a ten page Opinion and Order 

Awarding Attorney Fees, Costs, and Interest. In addressing whether an adjustment was 

appropriate, the trial court reasoned as follows: 

The [c]ourt’s computation of a reasonable attorney fee is subject to 

modification, either up or down, based upon eight factors. See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 

282. The [c]ourt finds, however, that none of those eight factors warrants any 

adjustments of the “baseline figure” in this case. The “experience, reputation, and 

ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services” has been adequately taken 

into account in the four attorneys’ approved hourly rates. See id. Although this 

case was protracted, “the difficulty of the case” does not support an upward 

adjustment. See id. Although the damages assessed by the Court were modest, the 

amount in question and the results obtained” do not justify a downward adjustment 

because Defendant Bruckman prolonged the litigation in every way possible. See 

id. The “expenses incurred” were not extraordinary. See id. Both the “nature and 

length of the professional relationship with the client” do not militate in favor of 
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any type of adjustment. See id. The record contains no evidence that Plaintiff 

Viking’s attorneys had to turn down other legal work to handle this matter. See id. 

The “time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances” were not 

unreasonable. See id. Finally, the attorneys billed by the hour, rather than through 

a fixed or contingent fee. See id. 

Our Supreme Court has explained that the eight considerations at the third 

step of the analysis should be regarded as illustrative, rather than exhaustive. See 

Pirgu, 499 Mich at 282. Indeed, our Supreme Court has noted that “the trial court 

may consider additional relevant factors,” id., and Defendant Bruckman has made 

two arguments predicated upon factors not mentioned in the Pirgu decision. First, 

Bruckman contends that Plaintiff Viking should not be rewarded for undertaking 

this vindictive litigation, which was designed simply to punish him. To be sure, 

animosity plainly exists between Bruckman and Viking, but the [c]ourt cannot find 

that Viking impermissibly sued Bruckman out of spite. Second, Bruckman faults 

Viking for unnecessarily dragging his wife, April Corey, into the litigation. To be 

sure, Viking ultimately opted to dismiss its claims against Corey, but she chose 

nonetheless to take part in the trial, where she unsuccessfully pursued 

counterclaims against Viking. In any event, Bruckman cannot vicariously assert 

this wife’s grievances in an effort to defeat Viking’s request for reasonable attorney 

fees and costs. Accordingly, the [c]ourt concludes that the “baseline figure” of 

$254,657.50 constitutes a “reasonable” attorney fee for Viking in this case. 

The trial court went on to explain in a footnote: 

To be sure, the “baseline figure” is an eye-popping number, but commercial 

litigation is not cheap. Plaintiff Viking’s attorney fees for this protracted legal 

battle must be paid by someone. The [c]ourt concludes that Defendant Bruckman 

agreed, as a matter of contract, to pay those attorney fees. In Michigan, our courts 

“enforce contracts according to their unambiguous terms because doing so respects 

the freedom of individuals to freely arrange their affairs via contract.” Rory v 

Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 468[; 703 NW2d 23] (2005). The [c]ourt cannot 

undo what the parities chose to do via contract. 

On appeal, Bruckman focuses only on the third Pirgu factor: the amount in question and 

the results obtained. Bruckman argues that it was “irrational and unreasonable” for Viking to 

spend such a significant amount of money litigating a case only to win nominal damages. 

Therefore, Bruckman argued, the trial court should have adjusted the amount of attorney fees 

downward. We disagree. 

Bruckman focuses too narrowly on the existence of the award of nominal damages, and 

essentially is reiterating his argument that Viking did not suffer “real” damages, so it is not entitled 

to attorney fees. Bruckman’s view is misguided. After terminating Bruckman’s employment, 

Viking became aware that Bruckman was disgruntled, and had misappropriated sensitive and 

confidential information in violation of the Confidentiality Agreement voluntarily entered into by 

both parties. In pursuing this litigation, Viking took the necessary steps to fully enforce the terms 

of the Confidentiality Agreement and safeguard its manufacturing schematics, financial data, and 
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the like. That same Confidentiality Agreement provided that Bruckman “shall be responsible to 

pay for the actual costs and attorney fees incurred by [Viking] in the enforcement of this 

Agreement.” Moreover, Bruckman prolonged this litigation by being less than forthcoming during 

the discovery process. During the course of trial, there was the overt suggestion that Bruckman’s 

“pride and dignity” caused him to dig in his heels and continue this dispute to the bitter end. 

The trial court ultimately concluded that there was no justification for a downward 

adjustment of reasonable attorney fees incurred by Viking. After reviewing the record before us, 

we conclude that the trial court’s determination not to adjust Viking’s attorney fees was within the 

range of reasonable and principled outcomes, and therefore not an abuse of discretion. 

Finally, Bruckman argues that the trial court inconsistently reviewed billing entries 

submitted by Viking’s counsel. Bruckman specifically argues that he “reviewed the [trial c]ourt’s 

opinion and Exhibit A methodology utilized by the court in careful detail,” yet was unable to 

“discern the [trial c]ourt’s approach to determining baseline billable hours in this case.” Bruckman 

submits a list of more than 100 billing entries that he believes cannot constitute reasonable attorney 

fees because they are too vague, redundant, unnecessary, or related to clerical or other support staff 

work. However, Bruckman does not identify or explain the methodology he believes the trial court 

used, or how the billing entries identified were analyzed using a second, unexplained methodology. 

Regardless, we have reviewed all of Viking’s counsel’s billing entries, and based on our 

review, conclude that it was not outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes for the 

trial court to have included the 100 entries identified by Bruckman in the attorney fee award. 

Bruckman argues that some entries were too vague, however he fails to appreciate that an attorney 

is not required to submit “an exhaustive and detailed list of the precise service provided at every 

moment.” McNeel v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 289 Mich App 76, 102; 795 NW2d 205 

(2010). Moreover, Bruckman fails to appreciate that a client is represented by each member of a 

law firm that the client employs, and it is unreasonable to assume that multiple attorneys working 

on a case together would not communicate or collaborate in an effort to advance the case. Attard 

v Citizens Ins Co of America, 237 Mich App 311, 328-329; 602 NW2d 633 (1999). Likewise, a 

trial court does not abuse its discretion by including the time spent on a case by support staff or 

clerical staff, as well as other overhead, as part of a reasonable attorney fee. Teran v Rittley, 313 

Mich App 197, 210-211; 882 NW2d 181 (2015). Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s attorney 

fee award did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 

Affirmed. Plaintiff may tax costs, having prevailed in full. MCR 7.219.

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra