Filed 5/26/22 Alvarado v. S.D.S. Industries, Inc. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

MA IRMA ALVARADO,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.D.S. INDUSTRIES, INC. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B310732

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20STCV20856)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed.

Epstein Becker & Green, Richard J. Frey, Carlos A. 

Becerra, Alice Kwak, for Defendants and Appellants.

Pairavi Law, Edwin Pairavi, Joshua M. Mohrsaz, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ma Irma Alvarado sued her employers, 

defendants S.D.S. Industries, Inc. and Timely Industries, for 

wrongful termination and other claims. Defendants moved to 

compel arbitration, presenting an arbitration agreement in 

English that Alvarado signed on the day of her termination. 

Alvarado opposed the motion, stating in a declaration that she 

spoke and read only Spanish, and that a human resources 

employee had misrepresented the nature of the arbitration 

agreement to her before she signed it. With their reply, 

defendants submitted an opposing declaration stating that the 

arbitration agreement was accurately described to Alvarado 

before she signed it. The trial court held that the arbitration 

agreement was void due to fraud in the execution and denied 

defendants’ motion. 

We affirm. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

findings, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying defendants’ request for an evidentiary hearing. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Complaint

In June 2020, Alvarado filed a complaint asserting seven 

causes of action against defendants relating to age 

discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and wrongful 

termination. She alleged she was employed by defendants from 

February 2015 to June 2018, and she was a “loyal and hardworking employee who was abruptly fired . . . after reporting the 

on-going and relentless harassment she suffered . . . due to her 

age, which was fifty-two (52) at the time of her termination.” 

Alvarado alleged that another employee repeatedly harassed and 

threatened her, and although Alvarado complained to her 
3

supervisor, her concerns were dismissed. Alvarado alleged she 

“can only read and write in Spanish,” but the supervisor

nevertheless required her to sign a write-up in English that was 

“in direct retaliation for her numerous complaint[s] of 

discrimination.” Alvarado alleged she was fired on June 18, 2018 

for continuing to complain that the other employee was harassing 

her. 

B. Motion to compel arbitration

Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay 

the matter. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1280, 1281.4.) They asserted 

that on the day of her termination, Alvarado signed an 

arbitration agreement that “mutually obligates [Alvarado and 

defendants] to arbitrate any claims against the other arising out 

of the employment relationship.” The agreement stated, in part, 

“In consideration of Employee’s continuing employment with 

Employer, Employer and Employee agree to final and binding 

arbitration of any and all claims or disputes between Employer 

and Employee, whether or not relating to the employment 

relationship,” including common law disputes, “state and/or 

federal discrimination claims, [and] claims for wrongful 

termination.”

Defendants asserted that the agreement was governed by 

the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.), as well as 

the rules and procedures of the American Arbitration Association 

(AAA).1 They contended that under these rules the question of 

1 The arbitration agreement states in one section that “the 

Federal Arbitration Act governs the interpretation and 

enforcement of this Agreement.” But in another section, under 

the heading “Law Governing Agreement,” it states that the 

“Agreement will be governed and construed in accordance with 
4

arbitrability, as well as any objections as to the scope or 

admissibility of the agreement, must be decided by arbitrator. 

Defendants further asserted that the arbitration agreement was 

neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. 

C. Opposition

Alvarado opposed the motion to compel arbitration, 

asserting that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. She 

contended that she was induced to sign the arbitration 

agreement through fraud. Alvarado stated in her opposition and 

a declaration2 that she was unable to read, write, or speak 

English. She stated that throughout her employment with 

defendants, documents were either presented to her in Spanish 

or translated for her by an employee, such as Obdulia Michel 

Pelayo in human resources. Alvarado said that on the day she 

was terminated, June 18, 2018, Pelayo told her she was being 

terminated and gave her a termination letter. Pelayo also told 

Alvarado she was required to sign the arbitration agreement, 

which was written in English. Alvarado stated in her 

declaration, “I asked if there was a Spanish version of the 

document because I could not understand it. Ms. Pelayo told me 

there was no Spanish version, and that it did not matter because 

I had to sign the document anyway. [¶] I asked what the 

document said, and Ms. Pelayo told me it was just explaining 

that I would be receiving my final pay and vacation hours.” 

Alvarado also stated, “Ms. Pelayo further told me I needed to sign 

the document on that day in order to receive my final pay and 

the laws of the State of California.” This discrepancy is not 

important for purposes of the appeal. 

2 Alvarado’s declaration was presented in Spanish with an 

English translation. 
5

pay for my vacation hours. [¶] I did not have an opportunity to 

ask any other questions.” Alvarado stated that no one explained 

the arbitration agreement to her, she never received a copy in 

Spanish, and she did not understand the nature of the arbitration 

agreement when she signed it. 

Alvarado therefore asserted in her opposition that the 

arbitration agreement was procured through fraud and was 

unenforceable. She also argued that the arbitration agreement 

did not constitute a contract because it lacked consideration. She 

further asserted that the arbitration agreement was procedurally 

and substantively unconscionable, and the court, rather than the 

arbitrator, should determine arbitrability. 

D. Reply

In their reply, defendants asserted that the arbitration 

agreement was enforceable. They submitted a declaration by 

Pelayo, who stated that she gave Alvarado the documents in 

English, and “provided Alvarado with a description of each 

document in Spanish, including the Arbitration Agreement. I 

went through each section of the Arbitration Agreement and 

provided [Alvarado] with an oral translation in Spanish. I 

specifically recall informing [Alvarado] that by Signing the 

Arbitration Agreement, she would be waiving her right to pursue 

legal action against Defendants in court.” Pelayo also stated, “At 

no point during the discussion did I inform Alvarado that she 

must sign the Arbitration Agreement in order to receive her final 

pay. In fact, I informed Alvarado of the exact opposite—that 

signing the Agreement was entirely voluntary and optional.” 

E. Court ruling

There was no court reporter at the hearing on the motion to 

compel arbitration. Defendants later filed a proposed settled 
6

statement, which the trial court certified.

3 According to the 

settled statement, at the hearing the court “focused on the issue 

of the timing of the presentation and execution of the Arbitration 

Agreement (i.e. on the date of Plaintiff’s termination).” The 

settled statement said that “Defendants’ counsel requested an 

evidentiary hearing” to allow the court to assess Alvarado’s and 

Pelayo’s credibility. The court denied the request. Defendants’ 

counsel also asked to file additional briefing about the timing of 

the execution of the arbitration agreement, but the court denied 

that request as well. The court took the matter under 

submission. 

The court later issued a written ruling denying defendants’ 

motion. The court stated that defendants, as the moving party, 

had the burden to prove the existence of an arbitration 

agreement, and they had met that burden. The court also found

that Alvarado proved a defense to the enforcement of the 

agreement, stating, “The Court finds the arbitration agreement 

to be void as a result of fraud in the execution.” The court stated 

that Alvarado’s limited ability to read and understand English, 

and her statements that no one provided a Spanish translation of 

3 A settled statement is a “record of the oral proceedings in 

the superior court” when the “designated oral proceedings in the 

superior court were not reported by a court reporter.” (Cal. Rules 

of Court, rule 8.137(b)(1)(A).) An appellant’s proposed settled 

statement must include “a statement of the points the appellant 

is raising on appeal,” and “a condensed narrative of the oral 

proceedings.” (Id., rule 8.137(d).) A respondent may propose 

amendments to the proposed settled statement (id., rule 

8.137(e)(1)), and after addressing any disagreements about the 

content, the trial court certifies the settled statement for use on 

appeal. (Id., rule 8.137(h)).
7

the arbitration agreement, “suggests that she did not have a 

‘reasonable opportunity’ to discover the true nature of the 

writing.” 

The court further stated, “[Alvarado] had been employed by 

Defendants for three years, and had come to rely on the benefits 

of that employment. While Defendants presumably could have 

approached [Alvarado] at any time during her employment, they 

chose to present [Alvarado] with an arbitration agreement at a 

moment of acute economic pressure, i.e., termination. Faced with 

the economic uncertainty that termination brings, [Alvarado’s] 

access to her final pay and vacation payout was then expressly 

made conditional on her willingness to sign the arbitration 

agreement.” The court stated that the information in Pelayo’s 

declaration “does not change the undisputed fact that [Alvarado] 

was presented with the arbitration agreement on the same day 

that she was terminated, and the only arbitration agreement 

attached is an English language version.” 

The court therefore found that “the arbitration agreement 

is void due to fraud in the execution.” And because the entire 

agreement was void, the provision that the arbitrator would 

determine arbitrability was “nonbinding.” 

Defendants timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that Alvarado was not fraudulently 

induced into signing the arbitration agreement, and therefore the 

court’s order should be reversed. They also assert that the court 

erred in denying defendants’ request for an evidentiary hearing, 

the arbitrator should decide any issues regarding enforceability 

of the arbitration agreement, and the arbitration agreement is 
8

not unconscionable. Alvarado asserts that the trial court’s ruling 

was correct. We find no error and affirm.

A court shall order arbitration “if it determines that an 

agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 1281.2.) Under the FAA and California law, an arbitration 

agreement is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 

grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract. (9 U.S.C. § 2; 

Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.) “The petitioner bears the burden of 

proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the 

preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition 

bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 

any fact necessary to its defense.” (Engalla v. Permanente 

Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.) 

When a court’s order denying a motion to compel 

arbitration is based on a decision of fact, we review the order 

under a substantial evidence standard. (Avila v. Southern 

California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835, 839-

840; see also Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 

Cal.App.5th 541, 544.) “[I]f there are material facts in dispute, 

we must accept the trial court’s resolution of such disputed facts 

when supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We also 

must presume the court found every fact and drew every 

permissible inference necessary to support its judgment or order, 

and we must defer to the court’s determination of credibility of 

the witnesses and weight of the evidence in resolving such 

disputed facts.” (Jones v. Jacobson (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1, 12.)

A. Fraud in the execution

The trial court found that the arbitration agreement was 

void due to fraud in the execution. Fraud in the execution of a 

contract “‘“goes to the inception or execution of the agreement, so 
9

that the promisor is deceived as to the nature of his act, and 

actually does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to 

enter into a contract at all, mutual assent is lacking, and [the 

contract] is void.”’” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities 

Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 415 (Rosenthal); see also Najarro v. 

Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 871, 885-886 (Najarro).) 

To establish fraud in the execution, a plaintiff must show 

that his or her signature on a contract “is negated by fraud so 

fundamental” that the plaintiff was “deceived as to the basic 

character of the documents” signed, and the plaintiff “had no 

reasonable opportunity to learn the truth.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 

Cal.4th at p. 425.) In Rosenthal, for example, 24 plaintiffs 

invested in mutual funds with defendant Great Western 

Financial Securities Corporation (GWFSC). Most plaintiffs 

mistakenly believed the GWFSC employees worked for Great 

Western Bank (GWB), with which the plaintiffs had an existing 

banking relationship. One plaintiff, Greco, stated in a 

declaration that she was “an 81-year-old Italian immigrant, who 

speaks ‘only a few words of English’ and ‘cannot read English at 

all.’” (Id. at p. 427.) GWFSC representatives convinced Greco 

and her daughter, Kasbarian (another plaintiff with limited 

English proficiency), to sign documents without telling the 

plaintiffs that they were agreeing to arbitration or giving up any 

rights. (Id. at pp. 427-428.) 

The Supreme Court stated that the two plaintiffs’ 

“declarations, if believed (and interpreted, where ambiguous or 

self-contradictory, in plaintiffs’ favor), would establish facts 

sufficient to show reasonable reliance as an element of fraud in 

the execution of the client agreements. In light of plaintiffs’ prior 

relationship with GWB, which they were led to believe was also 
10

the employer of [the GWFSC representatives], their limited 

ability to understand English, and [GWFSC’s] representations 

that their oral recitals accurately reflected the terms of the 

agreements, plaintiffs would not have been negligent in relying 

on the GWFSC representatives instead of reading the 

agreements themselves.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 

428.) “Under these circumstances, we conclude, the alleged fraud 

of GWFSC's representatives, if true, would have deprived Greco 

and Kasbarian of a reasonable opportunity to learn the character 

and essential terms of the documents they signed. (Rest.2d 

Contracts, § 163.)” (Ibid.) Because the trial court did not 

determine factual disputes in the case, however, the Supreme 

Court remanded the matter. 

Similarly, in Najarro, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 871, eight 

employees sued their employer, and after the employer moved to 

compel arbitration, the employees contended that the defendant 

used coercive tactics to induce the employees to sign the 

arbitration agreements. (Id. at p. 878.) One plaintiff, Serrano,

only spoke Spanish; her ability to read Spanish was limited and 

she could not speak or read English. (Id. at p. 887.) A 

representative for the employer had Serrano sign documents 

without telling her what they were, saying they were “nothing 

important.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal stated, “Given Serrano’s 

inability to read either Spanish or English, the fact she was told 

that her arbitration agreement and other agreements were 

unimportant, statements pressuring her to sign (‘do you want to 

work or not?’), a lack of an explanation as to what she was 

signing despite her professed inability to understand, and an 

omission of any factual dispute as to these issues, we conclude 
11

that Serrano has adequately established fraud in the execution.” 

(Ibid.)

Here, the facts follow a similar pattern. Alvarado spoke 

and read only Spanish, but the arbitration agreement was

presented to her in English while she was in the process of being 

terminated. Alvarado stated that she did not know what the 

document was, so she asked Pelayo, whom Alvarado had relied 

upon in the past to translate documents for her. Pelayo told 

Alvarado that the document only explained that she would be 

receiving her final paycheck and vacation pay, and if she did not 

sign the document, she would not receive her final paycheck or 

vacation pay. Alvarado stated that she relied on Pelayo’s 

statement and signed the document. This evidence was sufficient 

to show that Alvarado was deceived as to the nature of her act, 

and did not know what she was signing. (Rosenthal, supra, 14 

Cal.4th at p. 415; Najarro, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 885-886.)

Defendants assert that Alvarado is bound by the agreement 

even though she did not read it before signing it. They cite 

Ramos v. Westlake Services LLC (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 674, 686

(Ramos) for the proposition that “‘“one who accepts or signs an 

instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to 

all its terms, and cannot escape liability on the ground that he 

has not read it. If he cannot read, he should have it read or 

explained to him.”’” Defendants also cite Rosenthal, in which the 

Supreme Court stated, “one party’s unreasonable reliance on the 

other’s misrepresentations, resulting in a failure to read a 

written agreement before signing it, is an insufficient basis, 

under the doctrine of fraud in the execution, for permitting that 

party to avoid an arbitration agreement contained in the 

contract.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 423.)
12

Indeed, Rosenthal stated that “California law, like the 

Restatement [Second of Contracts], requires that the plaintiff, in 

failing to acquaint himself or herself with the contents of a 

written agreement before signing it, not have acted in an 

objectively unreasonable manner. One party’s 

misrepresentations as to the nature or character of the writing do 

not negate the other party’s apparent manifestation of assent, if 

the second party had ‘reasonable opportunity to know of the 

character or essential terms of the proposed contract.’ (Rest.2d 

Contracts, § 163.)” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 423.) 

Relying on this principle, in Ramos the Court of Appeal held that 

fraud in the execution occurred when a car buyer reasonably 

relied on an inaccurate Spanish translation of an English 

contract. (Ramos, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 690.) 

According to Alvarado’s declaration, she had no opportunity 

to discover the character of the document—she asked Pelayo 

what it was, because Pelayo had translated documents for 

Alvarado in the past. Pelayo misrepresented the nature of the 

document, and told Alvarado she had to sign it in order to receive 

her final pay. Substantial evidence therefore supported the trial 

court’s finding that Alvarado’s reliance on Pelayo’s statements 

was not unreasonable. 

Defendants further assert that they presented evidence to 

contradict Alvarado’s version of events. However, “under 

California law, the testimony of a single witness, even a party, 

may alone constitute substantial evidence.” (Chase v. Wizmann

(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 244, 257.) Moreover, we do not disturb the 

court’s factual determinations. “Even though contrary findings 

could have been made, an appellate court should defer to the 

factual determinations made by the trial court when the evidence 
13

is in conflict. This is true whether the trial court’s ruling is based 

on oral testimony or declarations.” (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 

44 Cal.3d 474, 479.)4

B. No evidentiary hearing was required

At the hearing on the motion, the court denied defendants’ 

request to hold an evidentiary hearing. Defendants assert that 

the court abused its discretion by doing so. Notably, they do not 

contend that any new or different evidence would have been 

presented at such a hearing. We find no abuse of discretion. 

A petition to compel arbitration “shall be heard in a 

summary way in the manner and upon the notice provided by law 

for the making and hearing of motions.” (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 1290.2.) Thus, “the facts are to be proven by affidavit or 

declaration and documentary evidence, with oral testimony taken 

only in the court’s discretion.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 

pp. 413-414.) The Supreme Court in Rosenthal rejected the 

4 In their reply brief, defendants argue that Alvarado 

“concedes” certain issues as defendants presented them in the 

settled statement, and they assert that Alvarado 

“mischaracteriz[es] evidence in the Settled Statement,” 

“introduce[es] evidence not included in the Settled Statement,” 

and “improperly relies on evidence outside of the Settled 

Statement.” These arguments misapprehend both the nature of 

appellate review and the purpose of a settled statement. The 

burden is on defendants, as the appellants, to demonstrate that 

the trial court erred (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-

609); Alvarado does not have a burden to disprove defendants’ 

contentions of error. In addition, a settled statement is a 

summary of oral proceedings in the trial court (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.137(b)(1)(A)), and is only one part of an appellate 

record. A respondent is not barred from relying on the entire 

record in contending that the trial court’s ruling was correct. 
14

contention that a “summary bench trial” must be held where the 

evidence relating to an arbitration agreement is in conflict, 

stating, “There is simply no authority for the proposition that a 

trial court necessarily abuses its discretion, in a motion 

proceeding, by resolving evidentiary conflicts without hearing 

live testimony.” (Id. at p. 414.) The court continued, 

“Nonetheless, we agree that where—as is common with 

allegations of fraud such as are made here—the enforceability of 

an arbitration clause may depend upon which of two sharply 

conflicting factual accounts is to be believed, the better course 

would normally be for the trial court to hear oral testimony and 

allow the parties the opportunity for cross-examination. As the 

trial court here remarked, ‘it’s pretty difficult to weigh credibility 

without seeing the witnesses.’” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p.

414.) 

Here, although some facts were disputed, the issues were 

relatively simple. The court relied on the undisputed evidence 

before it, noting, for example, that even though Alvarado had 

been employed with defendants for three years, they waited to 

present her with an arbitration agreement (in a language she 

could not speak or read) until she was in the process of being 

terminated. The parties do not agree about how the arbitration 

agreement was explained to Alvarado, in that Alvarado stated 

that Pelayo misrepresented the nature of the document to her, 

and Pelayo stated that she accurately represented the nature of 

the document. However, defendants do not suggest that any 

additional or different evidence would have been presented at an

evidentiary hearing. The court acted within its discretion in

determining that the declarations provided sufficient information 
15

to determine the issues, and additional testimony on the matter

was unnecessary. 

Thus, this case is different than Ashburn v. AIG Financial 

Advisors, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 79 (Ashburn), which 

defendants cite. There, the trial court granted the defendants’

petition to compel arbitration without holding an evidentiary 

hearing. The Court of Appeal reversed, stating, “there was 

significant dispute about what appellants signed, how they came 

to sign it, and what they signed said—not to mention extensive 

evidence of the significant relationship [one defendant] had with 

each appellant before they signed anything,” and “the parties do 

not even agree as to what the pertinent documents are even 

called.” (Id. at p. 98.) The court held that the trial court should 

have conducted an evidentiary hearing, stating, “In light of the 

record here, we do not understand how the trial court could have 

made such a finding without an evidentiary hearing.” (Id. at p. 

95.) 

Ashburn relied on Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. 

(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754 (Hotels Nevada), in which the trial 

court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The 

trial court stated that a hearing eventually would be necessary to 

address the disputed facts, but it denied the motion based on 

allegations of fraud asserted in the pleadings instead of receiving 

evidence on the matter. (Id. at pp. 760-761.) The Court of Appeal 

reversed, stating that the trial court erred when it “denied 

appellant’s motion to compel arbitration without the benefit of 

any evidence. Rather, it relied on the allegations contained in 

Hotels Nevada’s unverified complaint in declining to find a valid 

and enforceable agreement to arbitrate. . . . Although the trial 

court appropriately foresaw that the issues raised by the 
16

complaint ‘may require something in the nature of a hearing or 

trial in this court,’ it erred by denying the motion to compel 

arbitration on the basis of the complaint’s allegations instead of a 

factual determination made after such a hearing.” (Id. at pp. 

762-763.) 

Here, the issues were not as complicated as those in 

Ashburn or Hotels Nevada, and unlike Hotels Nevada, the trial 

court made an appropriate factual finding. As Rosenthal stated, 

often the “better course” is to hold an evidentiary hearing in cases 

in which potential fraud is at issue. However, the evidence 

presented on the relatively straightforward issues here was 

sufficient to allow the court to determine that a decision could be 

made without additional testimony. We find no abuse of 

discretion. 

C. The court properly decided enforceability

Defendants further contend that the issue of arbitrability 

should have been decided by the arbitrator, because under AAA 

rules the arbitrator has the power to decide his or her own 

jurisdiction. However, “claims of fraud in the execution of the 

entire agreement are not arbitrable under either state or federal 

law. If the entire contract is void ab initio because of fraud, the 

parties have not agreed to arbitrate any controversy,” and it is 

appropriate for the trial court to determine arbitrability.

(Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 416; see also Hotels Nevada, 

supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 763-764 [where “the entire contract 

is void at its inception because of fraud, then the parties have not 

agreed to anything, including the arbitration of any 

controversy”]; Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 

Cal.App.5th 748, 774 [same].) Here, because Alvarado alleged 
17

fraud in the execution of the contract, the trial court did not err 

in determining arbitrability.

5

DISPOSITION

The court’s order is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to 

costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, ACTING P.J.

CURREY, J.

5 Because we affirm the court’s order, we do not address the 

parties’ alternative arguments regarding unconscionability of the 

arbitration agreement.