Jon at h an R. St ei n ber g be ca me Chi ef J u dg e of

t h e Cour t a t n oon on Au g u s t 5, 2005. 1 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O . 04-0774
R OB E R T J. M AY , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. R. J A M ES N I C HOL S ON , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(De cided August 5, 2005 )
Robert May , pro se. R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , A ssi sta

nt G e ne ra l Co un se l; Carolyn F. W ashington, Deputy

Assistant Gene ral Counsel; and Nolan D. Paige , all of Washington, D.C., we re on the pleadingfor the appellee

. Be fore STEI

NB ERG, Chief Judge , and I VERS and SCHOEL EN, J ud ge s. 1
STEI NB ERG, Chief Judge : Veter an R obert J

. May , the pro se appe llant, seeks re view of a n April 26, 2004, dec ision of the Boa rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls (Boa

rd or B VA) that denied a claim of clea r and unmistakable err or (CUE) in a Marc h 7, 2003, Boa rd dec ision that, int er a lia, had denie d Depa rtment of Ve tera

ns Affa irs (V A) service c onnection for a bac k disability , and had de nied a rating highe r than 10% for his se rvice -conne cted sciatic nerve condition. Record (R.) at 1-11. T he

a pp e lla nt a nd the Se c re tary e a c h fil e d a bri e f. On Ma rc h 2 9, 20 05 , th e Se c re tary fi le d a mot ion to dism is s th e in s ta

n t a p p e a l, an d

o nth a t s a me d a te th e a

p p e ll an t f il e d ano p p o s it io nto th a t m o ti o n. F or the re a so ns se t for

th be low , the Court

wi ll v a c ate the Ap ri l 20 04 B VAde c isi on and wi ll d ism iss as moot the Secre tary ' s Marc h 29, 2005, motion.2 I. Re le va nt Bac kgr ound I n October

2002, the appe llant appea led to t h e Board seve ral VAreg ional office (RO) decisions t hat, i nter alia, had denied his claim for VA service c onnection for a bac k disability

and his increa sed-r ating claim for sciatic-ne rve disability . R. at 268-95, 317-20. On Ma rch 7, 2003, the Boa rd ag ree d with the VARO dec isions and issued a decision that (1) denied se rvice connec tion for deg ener ative disc disea se of the lumbar spine; (2 ) d en i ed service connec tion for a thora cic- spine disability ; and (3) de nied a disability rating highe r than 1 0% for the appe llant's se rvice -conne cted incomplete par aly sis of the sciatic ne rve. R at 321- 42. On J une 25, 2003, 110 day s afte r the date stamped on the Marc h 2003 BV A decis i o n , the app ell ant fi led wi th th e Boarda pl eadi ng ent it led "Mot io n fo r R evi si on and for Re con si dera ti on ". Secre tary ' s (Sec' y

) Motion (Mot.) Exhi bit ( Ex h.) 1. That plea ding inc luded (1) a motion for revision based on CUE a

nd (2) a motion for rec onsideration to be considere d "[a]lternatively and in the eve nt the Motion for Revision is denied"

. Ib id . After the B oard' s April 26, 2004, decision d eny ing the CUE claim, the appellant on May 5, 2004, timely filed a N otice of A

ppeal (NOA) with this C ourt as to that dec ision. On J une 3, 2004, the Bo ard D eputy Vice Cha irman denie d the motion for

rec onsideration of the Marc h 2003 BV A dec ision. S ec' y Mot. Ex h. 4. On J une 21, 2004, the appellant f

iled an NOAseekingdirec t review by this Court of the Mar ch 2003 B oard de cision. Henc e, the Court ha s on its doc ket two appea ls a s to the same essential matter : No. 04-1057, the direc t appea l of the Mar ch 2003 BVA decision, and No. 04- 0774, the appe al of the A pril 2004 BV A dec ision (here inafter the " CUE decision" ) that found no CUE in th e M ar ch 2 0 03 BV A decision. I t is only the l atter appea l that is befor e thi s panel, which was a ssigne d in order to r ule on the Secr etar

y ' s motion, dated November 24, 2004, to dismiss this a ppeal on the g round that the Court "la cks subject[-]matter jurisdiction over the CUE [decision]" (Sec ' y Mot. at 2). On D ece mber 10, 2004, the appe llant submit ted a r esponse in opp o sition t o the Secr etar y ' s dismis sal motion. On F e br ua ry 2, 2005 , th e Court

sta y e d p ro c e e din g s in

thi s c a se to a llo w the a

pp e lla nt t ime to o bta in

re pr e se ntatio n, in l ig ht o f t he Court ' s d e te rm inatio n th a t a pa ne l sh ou ld b e a ssi g ne d to c on sid e r t his appea l. To date, no c ounsel has ente red a n appea ranc e for the appe llant.3 II. Contentions on Appeal The issue be fore the Court in this appeal i s the Board' s jurisdiction to have issued the CUE de c isi on un de r t he c ir c ums tanc e s p re se nt he re
. As g ro un ds fo r opp os ingthe Se c re tary ' s mo tio n to dismiss the appe al of the CUE de cision, the appellant argues, inter alia, ( 1) that " at the time of the filing of t h e [C UE cla im] the Marc h 7, 2003, BV A dec ision was a fina l decision," and that " that de c isi on re ma ine d in e ff

e c t, ev e n thou g h ab a te d, un le ss sup e rc e de d by ano the r f ina l or de r" (M ot. in Opposition (Opp.) at 11); ( 2) that " the abatement proc ess under ly ing the Marc h 7, 2003, decision does not a ffe ct the collater al CUE attack or the [BVA] de cision tender ed as a r esult of that attac k" (Mot. Opp. at 10); a

nd (3) that the B oard' s adjudication of the CUE c laim on April 26, 2004, befor e denying his motion for re consideration on August 10, 2004, was nonpre judicial err or. Mot. Opp. at 15. The Sec reta

ry contends that the instant appe al as to the B oard' s April 2004 CUE decision should be dismissed because "[t]he March 7, 2003, [BVA] decision was not final" ( Sec' y Mot. at 1), and asse rts that the B oard, in Apr il 2004, had adjudicate d the appellant' s CUE claim " without

rec og nizi ng that [t he a]ppellant in J une 2003 had f iled a motion for re consideration". Mot at 2. The Secre tary contends further that "[b]ecause the Marc h 2003 decision of the B oard is cur rently pending befor e this Court, it i s not final and the Board and the C ourt lacks [ (sic)] subject[-]m atter jurisdiction

ov er t he C UE cl aim ." Ib id

.
III. App licable Law and Regulation A
. C U E C l a i ms Se c tio n 7 11 1 o f t itl e 38 , U .S. Cod e , p ro vid e s: § 7 11 1. Re vis ion of de c isi ons on g r ounds of c lear a nd unmistakable err or (a) A dec ision by

the B oard is subjec t to revision on the g rounds of clear a

nd unmistakable er

ror. I f evide nce e stablishes the err or, the prior

decision shall be r ever sed or r evised. (b) For the purposes of

authorizing be nefits, a r ating or other adjudicative de cision of the B oard t h at constitutes a re versa l or revision of a

prior dec ision of the Boa rd on t he g rounds of c lear and4 unmistakable er

ror ha s the same e ffe ct as if the d ecision had been made on the date of the pr ior dec ision. (c) Review to de termine whether clea r and unmistakable err or exi s ts in a c a s e ma

y b e in s ti tute d b y th e B o ar d o n th e B oard' s own mot ion or up on re qu e st o f t

he c la ima nt. (d) A r equest for

revision of a

decision of the B oard ba sed on clear an d unmistakable er ror may be made at any

time after

that decision is made.

38 U. S.C. § 7 11 1. Re g ulatio n § 20 .1 40 3( a ) d e fi ne s CU E i n a pr ior B VAde c isi on

a s f oll ow s: [C UE] is a very

specific and ra

re kind of e rror . I t is the kind of err or, of fa ct or of la

w, that when called to the attention of later revie wer s compels the c onclusion, to which rea sonable minds could not differ , that the re sult would have bee n manifestly differ ent but for the e rror
. Gene rally , either the corr ect facts, as the y wer e known at the time, wer e not bef

ore the Boa

rd, or the s tatutory and re g ulatory provisions extant at that tim e we re inc orre ctly applied. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a) (2004); s ee R u s s el l v. Principi , 3 Vet.App. 310, 313- 14 (1992) ( en banc ) (noting that "[CUE is] the sort of e rror which, had it not been made, would have manife stly chang ed the ou tc ome " ); se e als o Bu sto s v . W est , 179 F.3d 1378, 1380 ( Fe d. Cir. 1999) (expressly adopting t h e "ma nifestly chang ed the outcome " la ng uag e in Ru sse ll , su

pra )

. " Re v ie w f

o r [C U E ] in

a prior Boa rd decision must be based on the rec ord and the law that existed when that dec ision was made." 38 C.F .R. § 2 0. 14 03 (b ) ( 20 04 ); se e Ru sse ll , 3 Ve t.A pp . at 31 4. " I n o rd e r fo r the re to b e a va lid c la im of [CUE ],

. . . . [t]he c la ima nt, in sh or

t, mus t a sse rt mor e tha

n a dis a g re e me nt a s to ho w the facts

were w eighe d o r eva lu ate d. " Id

. a t 313; see 38 C.F .R. § 2 0. 14 03 (d )( 3) (2 00 4) ; Da mr e l v . B ro wn , 6 V e t.A pp . 2 42 , 2 46 (1 99 4) . M or e ov e r, a CU E cla im must ide nti fy the a lle g e d er ro r( s) wi th " ' so me deg ree of spec ificity ' ". Cri pp e n v . B ro wn , 9 Ve t

. Ap p
. 4 1 2 , 4 2 0 (1 9 9 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Fu go v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 40, 44 (1993) (conc luding that "to rea sonably raise CUE there must be some deg ree of specific ity

as to what the a lleg ed er ror is and . . . pe rsuasive r easons must b e given a s to why the result would have been ma nif estl ydif fe re nt" )) ; see 38 C.F.R. § 20.1404(a) , (b) ( 2004). As a thr e sh old ma tte r, a CU E c la im c ann ot be ra ise d fo r the fi rs t tim e be fo re thi s Court bu t, rathe r, such a

claim must have be en the subjec t of a fina l prior B VA ad j u d i cation. Se e Ru sse ll ,5

3 Vet.App. at 314-15. On appe al of a BV A deter

mination that there wa s no C UE i n a p ri or final B V A d e c i s i o n , t h e C o u rt ' s r e v i e w i s l i m i t e d t o d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r

t h e B o ar d ' s c o n c l u s i o ni s " ar b i t r a r y,
c a pr i c i o u s , ana

b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n , o r

o t h e r w i s e n o ti na c c o r d an c e w i t h l aw " , 3 8 U .S. C. § 7 26 1( a )( 3) (A ); s e e D a m r el , 6 Vet .App. at 24 6, and wh e the r i t is su

pp or te d b y an a de qu a te statement of " rea sons or bases" , 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1). Our re view is de novo (" not in accor dance with law" standard) as to whethe r a via ble CUE claim has be en pre sented, see Lane v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 78, 83 ( 2002), a ff 'd 3 3 9 F. 3 d 1 3 31, 1339 (F ed. Cir. 2003), a nd, if so, whether

an ap p l i ca b le law or

regulation was not applied or w as incorr ectly applied, s e e Ke n t v

. P r in cipi , 38 9 F .3 d 13 80 , 13 84 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 4) ; see Andre ws v. Principi , 18 Vet.App. 177, 180 ( 2004). The Court's c a se law p e rt a ini ngto B oa rd de c isi on s o n c la ims of

CU E i n p ri or

fi na l RO de c isi on s is equally applicable to Board d ec i s i ons reg ardingcollater al attac ks on prior B VA dec isions. See Jordan ( Timothy) v. Principi , 17 Vet.App. 261, 2 6 8 (2003), aff' d sub nom. Jordan v. Nicholson , 401 F.3d 1296 ( Fe d. Cir. 2005). B. F ina lit y of Boa rd De c isions As to t he fi na lity

of a B oa rd de c isi on , 3 8 C. F .R. § 2 0. 11 00 pr ov ide s: § 20.1100 Rule 1100. F inali ty of decision s of th e Board. (a) Gene ral

. Al l de c isi on s of the B oa rd wi ll be sta

mpe d w ith the date of

mailing on the f

ace of the decision. Unless the Chair man of the Boa rd order s rec onsideration, and with the exception of matters listed in parag raph ( b) of this sec tion, all Boar d decisions ar e fina l on the date stamped on the fa ce of t h e d ec i s ion. Wi th the exception of matters listed in para g raph ( b) of this section, the dec ision render ed by the re considera

tion Panel in a

n appea l in which the Chairman ha s or de re d r e c on sid e ratio n is fi na l. (b) E xc eptions . F ina l B oa

rd de c isi on s are no t su

bje c t to revie w except a s provided in 38 U.S.C. [ §§] 1975 and 1984 and 38 U.S.C. chapters 37 a

nd 72. A re mand is in the nature of a pre liminary order and does not c onstitut e a f inal decision of the B oard.
38 C.F .R. § 2 0. 11 00 (2 00 4) . A s to the a pp e a la bil ity of B oa rd de c isi on s to this Co urt , 38 U .S. C. § 7 26 6( a ) p ro vid e s:6 § 7 26 6. No ti c e of ap pe al (a ) I n o r d e r to o b ta in r e v ie w b y th e Co u rt o f A p peals for Ve te ra ns Cla ims of

a fi na l de c isi on

of the B oa rd of Vet eran s' Appea ls, a person a dverse ly aff ecte d by such dec ision shall file a notice of a

ppeal wi t h t he Court within 120 day s after the date on which noti ce of the decision is mailed pursuant to sec tion 7104(e) of this ti tle. 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). In other wor ds, even though section 7266(a) ref ers to a "final decision of the B oa rd " , any su c h " fi na l" B oa

rd de c isi on that is su

bje c t to re vie w in t

his Court , p ur su ant t o 3 8 U .S. C. § 7266 and our c asela

w (a s discussed i n part I V.A., below), is not truly final while it is "subjec t to" such re view or unde rg oing suc h revie w her e or the rea fter ( in the U.S

. C o u rt of Appe als for the Fe dera l Ci r c u it ( F e d e r a l Ci r c u it ) o r th e U

. S. Su p r e me Co u rt)

. M o r e o v e r , th e f in a li ty o f a B oard decisionfor the purposes of the availabilit y of judicial review

may be abate d. As to the abate ment of the fi na lity

of a B oa rd de c isi on , 3 8 U .S. C. § 71 03 (a ) p ro vid e s: § 7 10 3. Re c ons ide r at ion ; c or r e c ti on o f obv iou s e r r or s (a) T h e d ec i s i o n o f the B oard de termining a matter under se c tio n 7 10 2 o f t

his title is fi na l unle

ss the Chairman or ders rec onsideration of the decision in ac corda nce w i th subsection (b). Such an order m ay b e made on the Cha irman' s initi ative or upon mot ion of the c la ima

nt.
3 8 U

. S

. C

. § 7 1 0 3 ( a ) ( b o l d f a c e - i t a l i c e mp h a s i s a d d e d )

. InRosler v. De rwinski , this Court held, as to f ina lity : [A] lthough t h e judi cial re view per iod beg ins to run, as to a final

a dmi nis tr a tiv e a g e nc y

de c isi on , o n th e date on

wh ic h th a t de c isi on

is final, its final

ity is defeate d and that

judicial appeal period i

s erased when a timely motion for ad m i nistrative re consideration is filed within the judicial appea l pe riod and a ne w, full judicial appe al per iod as to the under ly ing a g ency decision is t ri gg ere d when the a g ency denies the r econside ration motion.
Rosler , 1 Vet.App. 241, 249 ( 1991) (e mphasis added) . Thus, Rosler established that fina lity

for the purposes of the availability of judicial revie w is a

bated by the filing, with the Boa rd Chairman, of a motion for re consideration. I n W ac hte r v . Br own , the Court also discussed this issue:7 Essentially , as long as t he motion for re consideration of the dec ision re ma ins pe nd ingbe fo re the Cha ir man , th ere is a lw ay s a

po ssi bil ity that the motion will be gra nted, an event whic h would rende r judicial revie w unn ec essary
. Se e Be llS ou th C or p. v . F .C. C. , 17 F.3d 1487, 14 89 (D .C. Ci r. 19 94 ). Con se qu e ntl y , w he n th e ve te ra n f ile s a motion for rec onsideration of a BV A dec ision and, at t he same time, fi le s an NO A w iththe Court , th e de c isi on of the B VAis nonfin al

for purposes of j udicial revie w. A par ty cannot be in "two plac es at the sam e ti me. " Id. at 1489.

W achter , 7 Vet.App 396, 3 9 7 (1 9 9 5) (boldfa ce- italic emphasis adde d). Rosler and W achter bo th

a dd re sse d f ina lity in t e rm s o f a

c la im that is fi

nal but ap pe ala ble

. Th a t is the on ly wa y that a c la im could potentially

be " in two places at t h e s ame time" and is the re ason that a motion for

rec onsideration renders a claim "nonfinal for purposes of judicia l review ". Ib id . Henc e, in Rosler , the Court conclude d that when the BV A rec eives a motion for rec onsideration, the c ase is withdra wn from the f

in a l- b u t- a p p e a la b le s ta g e ( th a t i s , th e d e c is io nb e c o me s n o n f in a l f o r p u r p o s e s o f the availability of j udicial review) because the Board has not "disa ssociate[d] itself from the c ase" , Clay v. United States , 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003); the Chairman mus t rule on the motion and the B oard ma y ultimately

rec onsider the outcome

.

IV . A nal ys is

A. Fin ality of the March 2003 BV A Decision

" F in a li ty is v a r io u s ly d efine d; like many

leg al terms, its prec ise meaningdepends on c ontext ." Cla y , s up ra . I n Clay , the U.S. S upreme Court describe d two basic c oncepts of f inality : For the purposes of the availability of judicial revie w, finality

attache s "w hen the district cour t disassociates itself from the c ase, le aving nothi n g t o b e d o n e at the cour t of first instance save e x ecution of the ju dgmen t. " Cla

y , s up ra (c i t i n g Quack

enbush v. Allst ate Ins. Co. , 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996), and R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F J UD GME NT S § 13 , Com me nt b ( 19 80 )) . F or oth e r p ur po se s, su c h a s a
c oll a te ra l a tta c k on an oth e rw ise fi na l de c isi on , fi na lity a tta c he s a t a dif fe re nt s ta g e . A" c oll a te ra l" att ack i s d efi nedas "anatt ack on a j ud gment in a di fferen t p roce edi ng." B LACK ' S L AW D I CT I O N A RY , 25 5 ( 7th e d. 19 90 ). I n ter

ms o f p os tc on vic tio n- re lie f c oll a te ra l a tta c k in a c ri min a l c a se , th e Sup re me Court has stated: "[F]inality has a long- rec og nized, clear meaning : Finality

attache s when this Court8

[(the Supreme Court)] a ffirms a convic tion on the merits on direct re view or de nies a pe tition for a wri t o f cert io rari , o r wh en t he t im e for fi l i n g a c e r t i o r a r i p eti ti on ex pi res ." Clay , 537 U.S. at 528 (d ef i n i n g fi n al i t y

fo r s t at u t e p ro v i d i n g "h ab ea s [ -] l i k e re l i ef " i nac co rdwi t h S u

p re m e C o u rt 's

" c on sis te nt u

nd e rs tand ingof

fi na lity in t he c on te xt of

c oll a te ra l r e vie w" ). Th a t is, for the purp os e of a ha be a s- c or pu s c oll a te ra l a tta c k, fi na lity a tta c he s w he n a

c la im b e c ome s unappealable on di rect revie w . I ndeed, this same de finition of finality perta ins to decisions render ed b y t h i s C o urt. See 38 U.S.C. § 7291(a) (pr oviding that de cision of this Court "shall bec ome final upon the e x piration of the time allowe d for filing . . . a notice of appea l from such de cision, if no such notice is duly filed wi thi n s uc h ti me " ); se e als o 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)( 2)(G) (def ining " final judg ment" f

or purpose s of initiating 30-da

y period unde r sec tion 2412(d)( 1)(B ) during which application for f ees a nd expenses

un de r E qu a l A c c e ss t o Just ic e Ac t (( EA JA) may be fi le d)

. Th e ins tant c a se inv olv e s b oth of the se
conce pts of finality

– finality of a Boa rd decision for the purposes of a ppeala bility and fina lity

of a Boa rd dec ision for the purpose s of collater al attac k afte r all ave nues for direc t appea l are fore closed. 1. Fina lit y fo r the Pur po se s o f A pp e ala bil ity . In the ins tant ca se , the Se c re tary a pp e a rs to

asser t that th e ap p el l ant's submitti ng of the motion for re consideration abated the f inality of the Marc h 2003 Boa

rd dec ision, and, that, there fore , the B oard ha d adjudicate d the CUE claim in er ror. Sec' y Mot. at 2. The Court ag ree s that the B oard e rre d by adjudicatingthe CUE claim. Howe ver, to the extent that the Secre tary ' s argument is pr emised on his be lief that the appellant' s CUE motion and the motion for r econside ration we re f iled concur

rently , we disag ree with his a rg ument beca

use, inter alia, it d o es n o t appea r to the Court that the appe llant's motion for r econside ration wa s filed befor e, or c oncurr ently

with, the CUE claim. Se e Los h v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 87 (1993) ( holding that simult aneous f

ilings of motion for r econside ration and N OA will rende r ag ency action nonfina l). Rather, the a

ppellant' s pleading in this case expressly stated that the motion for rec onsideration wa s being file d " in th e e v e n t th a t th e CU E c la im w a s d e n ie d "

. Se c ' y M o t. E xh

. 1

. I n s u c h c ase, the

m o t i o nf o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o nw o u l d

b e c o m e o p e r a t i v e o n l y if and wh en th e B o ar d d e n ie d the CUE

c la im; he nc e , th e CU E c la im w a s not eff ectively filed at a point in time when a motion for

rec onsideration had r ender ed the c laim nonfi n al fo r the purpose s of the ava ilability of judicial revie w.9

Although i t m ay

appea r at fir st that the CUE claim was va lidly filed, if it wer e, a que stion would have the n arisen a s to whether the filing of the CUE claim re ndere d the B VA dec ision nonfinal (by

the same me chanism by

which a motion for reconsider ation would have a bated f inality), or whe ther, c onverse ly , the 120-da y judicial appea l period expired during the time that the B oard w as consideringthe CUE claim. An a ffirmative answe r to the latter que stion would leave the a ppellant at a g reat disadvantag e; having by passed direc t a

ppeal, his only

avenue for r eview of

the Marc h 2003 BV A dec ision woul d b e handic apped by the heig htened bur dens of pr oof and ple ading that are char acte ristic of a c ollatera l CUE attack. Howeve r, an answe r in the neg ative would leave the Court with the anomalous result that it now fac es – re view of the same B oard de cision via direc t review

and via re vie w o f a B oa

rd de nia l of re vis ion on the g ro un ds of CU E (th e la tte r be ing a CU E c la im that, a s dis c us se d be low , is e xpre ssl y pr oh ibi te d by 38 C.F .R. § 20 .1 40 0)

. Th e re a so n that this quandar y is created, as we conclude below, is that the question pre sented n ev er s h o u ld have be en asked in the first place . That is, a CUE cla im (or any collater al attac k) cannot lie as to a decision tha t is sti ll o pe n to dire c t re v ie w. Th e so le purp os e of a CU E c la im i s to pr ov ide a VAc la ima

nt w ith

an o pp or tun ity to c ha lle ng e a

de c isi on that is oth e rwi

se fi nal and unap pe ala ble

. Henc e, althoug h the C ourt conclude s that the m otion for reconsider ation had no bea ring on whether the CUE claim wa s proper ly filed in this case, w e agr ee that the 2003 BV A dec ision's lac k of " finality " at the t i m e t h at the CUE cla im was filed is the dispositive issue in the instant matter. As discussed above , althou g h a motion for re consideration does aff ect " finality " to the e x tent that that term implies finality

for the pur

poses of the a

vailability

of judicial re view – that is , a cla im that isfinal bu t appealable to this Court – "f inality " f or the purpose s of the ava ilability of judicial re view is not the same " finality " that enable s an appe llant to file a CUE cla im or any other c ollatera l attack. 2
. Fin ality for the Purposes of Collat eral Attack

. I n 3 8 U

. S.C. § 7111, Cong ress ha s provided VA claimants a reme dy of collater al attack so that they may have a vehicle f or attac king a fina l Boa

rd dec ision. The Supreme Court has revie wed other forms of c ollatera l attack, suc h as hab e a s - c orpus petitions, and rec og nized that such petitions are " not desig ned as a substitut e for

direc t revi ew. " Teague v. Lane, 4 8 9 U. S

. 2 8 8 , 3 0 6 (1 9 8 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Mack ey v . United States , 401 U.S. 667, 683 (1970) (Ha

rlan, J ., concur

ring )). Rather, such forms of collate ral attack provide "a n avenue for upsetting judg ments that are otherwise f inal". Mack

ey , su pra .10

The statute of

limit ations for habeas- corpus petitions presc ribes when a collateral attack may be filed. Similarly , in prescr ibing the r eg ulations to provide for CUE attacks on BV A decisions, the Secre tary explained that a CUE cha lleng e could be made " [o] nce a VA decision has bec ome final

– whether by completion or abandonme nt of the appea ls pr ocess." 63 Fe d. Reg . 2 7 , 5 3 4 , 27,535 (M ay 1 0 , 1 9 9 8) (notice of propose d rulemaking ). Unde r this Court's e nabling statute, a B VA de c isi on be c ome s fi

nal and unap pe ala ble t o t h i s C o u rtw h e nanN O A i s n o tf i l e d w i t h i n1 2 0 d a ys
a ft e r the date of ma ili ng of no tic e of the B oa rd de c isi on , 3 8 U .S. C. § 72 66 (a ), and no ba sis e xists for tolling the 120-day

judicial appea l period. Se e Ro sle r, su pra ; se e als o Ir

win v. De p't of Veterans Af fai rs , 4 98 U. S. 8 9, 96 (1 99 0) ; Arbas v. Nicholson , 40 3 F.3 d 137 9 ( F e d. Cir . 2 00 5) ; Ba rre tt v. Principi , 3 63 F .3 d 1 31 6 ( F e d. Cir . 2 00 4) ; Ev an s ( Bi lly ) v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 396, 399 (1999) ( citing Ba ile yv . W est , 160 F.3d 1360, 1365 (1998), a nd other c ases r eg ardingequitable tolling ofNOAfiling pe riod under cer

tain circ umstances)

. Although no statute of limitations ex ists for the filing of

a CU E c la im, the c on c lus ion that su c h a

c la im c ann ot p ro pe rl y be fi le d w hil e that c la im i s st ill

a pp e a labl e on dir e c t r e vie w i s su pp or te d b y the de fi nit ion

of " fi na lity " a s to CU E c la ims that is pr ov ide d in

38 C.F .R. § 2 0. 14 01 (a ), wh ic h s ta te s: § 20.14 01 Rul e 14 01 . D e finit ion s.

(a) Issue . Unless otherw ise specif ied, the ter

m "issue" in this subpart me ans a matter upon which the B oard ma de a final dec ision (o ther than a decision under

this subpart). As u s e d in th e p r e c e d in g s e n te nce, a "final decision " is one whichwas appeal ab l e under [c] hapter 72 of title 38, United States Code, or which woul d ha v ebe e n so appea lable if such provision had bee n in effe ct at the time of the decision.

38 C

. F.R. § 20.1401(a) (2004) (boldfac e-italic e mphasis added) . As noted by the emphasized lang uag e, under

this reg ulation a " final dec ision" is define d as " one which was ap pe ala ble " pursuant to the statutory

provisions providing f

or judicial re view of B VA dec isions in t his Court (including the 120-da

y judicial-appe al per iod), or which " woul d ha v ebe e n so a

pp e a la ble " if jud ic ia l r e vie w i n this Court had been available at the tim e o f t h e d ecision. Ib id

. (e mp h as i s ad d ed ). Al t h o u gh 38 U.S.C. 7111(d) provides that " [a] reque st f or re vision of a dec ision of the Boa rd base d on [C UE] may be made at any time afte r t hat decision is made" , that provision cannot be interpre ted to mean11

that a CUE claim may

lie when the unde rlying B oard de cision may be directly appea led bec ause suc h

an in te r p r e tati o n w o u ld n o t c o mp o rt w it h th e e s s e n ti a l n a tu

r e o f a c o ll a te r a l a tt a c k

. Rather, wha t

se c tio n 7 11 1( d) me ans is that a CU E c la im m ay be fi le d for a s long a s any c la ima nt h a s st and ingto file such a cla im, without reg ard to how longag o the VA de cision beca me final a nd unappea lable. Fur thermore , g ener al principles of limit ed revie w in c ases of collater al attack a re r efle cted in the require ments for a

collater al attac k based on CUE – r equire ments that emphasize that CUE collater al attac ks are not matters on direc t r eview. The sec tion 7111 statutory provision for a CUE attack on a fi n al BV A d ecision provides in subsection (b) that " a re versa l or revision of a prior decision of the Board on the grounds of [C UE] has t he same eff ect a s if the dec ision had been ma de on the date of

the prior B oard de cisio n
. " 3 8 U. S.C. § 7111(b). The implementing VA re g ulation spells out that "[r]eview for [C UE] in a prior B oard de cision must be ba se d o n the

re c ord a nd t

he la w t h at existed when th at decision was m ade ", a nd that CUE does not in clude the oth e rw ise

corr ect application of a statute or regulation w here , subsequent to the Boa rd decision ch al l en ged, there has bee n a c hang e in the i nte rp re tat

ion of the statut e or

re g ulatio n. " 38 C.F .R. § 20.1403(b)( 1), (e ) (e mphasis added)

. Se e Ru sse ll , 3 Vet.App. at 314 (holding that "[r]eview for [C UE ] i n a p ri o r Boa

rd dec ision must be base d on the re cord a nd the law that e x isted when that de c isi on wa s ma de " ); Teague , 489 U.S. at 310 (holding that in habea s petitions, gene rally , new r ules should not be applied re troac tively). Moreove r, a V A claimant' s ability to bring a C UE claim as t o a Board decision that has bee n d i r e c t l y a p p e a l e d t o t h i s C o u rti s a l r e a dy v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l l y l i m i t e d

b y r e g u l a t i o n
. S p e c i f

i c a l l y,
re g ulatio n § 20 .1 40 0, pr ov ide s in pe rt ine nt p art : § Rul e 14 00 . M ot ion s t o r e vis e Boa r d de c isi ons

. . . . (b ) Al l f

ina l B oa rd de c isi on s are su

bje c t to re vis ion

un de r t his su bp art e xce pt: (1) De cisi o n s on issues which have been a ppeale d to and decide d by

a cour t of compete nt jurisdiction; and (2) De cisions on

is s u e s wh ic h

h a v e s ubsequently

been decide d by a cour t of compete nt jurisdiction.12

38 C.F .R. § 2 0. 14 00 (b ) ( 20 04 ). Th e ratio na le fo r thi s lim itatio n is that " it wo uld be ina pp ro pr ia te for a n inferior tribunal to review

the ac tions of a superior [t ribunal]." 64 F ed. Reg . 2134, 2135 (J an
. 1 3 , 1 9 9 9 ) ( a d o p t i o n o f f i n al C UE re gu l at i o n s ) ( ci t i n g Smith (W illiam A.) v . Brown, 35 F.3d 1516 (F ed. Cir. 1994), a

nd Du ra n v . B ro wn , 7 Ve t

. App. 216 (1994)) . I n Disabled Americ an Veterans v . Gober

( DAV v. G ober), 234 F.3d 682 ( Fe d. Cir. 2000), the F eder al Circuit noted that this reg ulation "pr events the B oard from revie wing a pre vious Boar d decision on an issue f or CUE when the pr evious issue has been appea led to, or decide d by , a cour t of compete nt jurisdiction, such as the Court of Appe als for V eter ans Claims, and that revie wing co u rt h as d ec ided the issue the cla im ant seek s t o rev iew for CU E. " Id

. at 693. Fur

thermore , the Fe dera l Circuit noted the following pr oc e dura l ju sti fi c a tio n f

or the § 2 0. 14 00 (b )( 1) pr e c lus ion : I f a su pe ri or c ourt , suc h a s th e Court of Ap pe a ls f

or Ve te ra ns Cla ims , aff irms the deter

mina t i o n of the B oard on a particula r issue, that Boa rd dec ision is replace d by the Court of Appe als for V ete rans Claims decision on that issue. Thus, t here i s no longer any decision by the Board that

can be subject to revision.
Ibid. (empha sis added). The Fe dera l Circuit revisited this iss ue in W insett v. Principi , in

th e c o n te xt of an a ppellant who had submitted to the Bo ar d a C UE claim as to a BVA de cision that had bee n appea led to and af

firmed by this Court. W

ins e tt , 341 F.3d 1329 ( Fe d. Cir. 2003), cert. de nied , 540 U.S. 991 (2003). The Fe dera l Circuit upheld t his Court's affirma nce of the B oard' s dismis sal of that CUE claim, and c oncluded:

Th is a pp e a l is no t an att empt to r e []ope n a

c la im p ur su ant t o 38 U.S.C. § 5108 on the g round that newand mater ial evidenc e has been found

. M o r e o v e r , it is n o t a n e w is s u e , d if

f e r e n t f r o m t h e one a dju dic a te d p re vio us ly . Ins te a d, thi s app e a l is on e in wh ic h the fa c ts have pr eviously

been r eviewe d by

a cour t in light of the re levant law on the same claim. I f t here had bee n CUE, then it surely would have bee n, or sh ou ld h a ve be e n, ra ise d b e fo re . In f a c t, [the a

pp e lla nt] would have be en oblig ated to ra ise an y er ro r that wa s clea r and unmistakable whe n she brough t h er ear lier appe als. Be cause the ear lier ca se has been decided, and all appea ls ex hausted, we conclude that there could n o t h av e been CUE as a matter of la

w. That conclusion is what is embodied in § 20.1400(b) , which the [C ourt of Appea ls for Ve tera

ns Claims] proper ly

interpre ted.13

Id . at 1332. The Fe dera l Circ uit thus rec og nized that a claimant is fore closed fr om (and c ould not p o s s ibly benef it from) bring ing a

CUE claim as to a B oard de cision on a matter that had bee n revie wed pr eviously

in this C ourt. Hen c e , in th e in s ta n t c a s e , o n c e th is Co u rt r e v ie w s th e d ir e c t a p p e a l o f th e M ar c h 2 0 03 decision

–the ca se pendinghere in No. 04-1057 – and e nters fina l judgment in that appe al, the appellant' s CUE claim as to the same matter de alt with by the Court in that appea l would be bar red by § 20.1400(b). In light of the action that the Cour t i s taking here to vacate the B oard' s CUE de c isi on , th e Se c re tary ' s mo tio n to dis mis s th e ins tant a pp e a l w ill be re nd e re d mo ot a nd wi ll there fore be dismissed.

B . B V A S t a y s P e n d i n g C o u r t C o n s id e r a t i o n o f C U E C l a i ms The Court notes that 38 C.F.R. § 20.1410 (" Stay s pending court a ction") , which provide s that the B oard " will stay

its consideration of a [C UE claim] upon rece iving notice that the B oard de cision that is the subject of the [CUE cl ai m ] h as been appe aled to a c ourt of compe tent jurisdiction" (38 C .F.R. § 20.1410 (2004)) , may be read as imply ing that a CUE claim may proper ly be filed wi th the Boar d

d u r in g th e 1 2 0

- d ay

ju d ic ia l a

p p e a l p e r io d

f o r a p p e a ls to th is Co u rt, o r

d u r in g any
a pp lic a ble a pp e a l pe ri od fo r an a

pp e a l fo llo wi ng a de c isi on by thi s Court – that is , b e fo re the c la im has bec ome final a

nd unappea l ab l e. Such a r eading , howeve r, would be inc onsistent with the collater al nature of a C UE cl ai m as envisioned by section 7111 and not in ac corda nce w ith the Court's holding in this case. As so interpre ted, the Court w ould ha ve to inva lidate the re g ulation as ult ra vir e s. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3) (C) (pr oviding that Court shall " hold unlawful and se t aside" regulations of Secre tary

found to be "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, a uthority , . . . or in violation

o f a s t a tu t o r y r ig ht" ); Oz er v. Principi , 14 Vet.App. 257, 264 ( 2001) (holding that § 21.3046(c) (2000) " cannot stand" beca use it "imposes a

1 0 -y ear limit ation . . . that was not conta ined in or

a uth or ize d b y

38 U. S.C. § 3 51 2, or any

oth e r p ro vis ion s o f t itl e 38 [, U .S. Cod e ]" ); Cole v. De rwinski , 2 Vet.App. 400, 401- 02 (1992) ( invalidating subpa rag ra phs (2) a

nd (3) of 38 C.F.R. § 3.812(f) (1 99 1) a s " in e xce ss of statut or y a uth or ity " ). I n ord e r to avo id s uc h a re su lt, the Court

c on str ue s th is

re g ulatio n a s p ro vid ingtha t up on re c e ipt

of a pr e ma tur e CU E c la im the B oa rd mus t ho ld t

he c la im and not file it at that time, and then, upon the expirati o n o f t he 120-da y judicial appea l period without an NOA' s having been filed, file t he C UE claim, or, i f an NOA is filed within that appea l14

pe ri od , th e n, up on

the c on c lus ion

of c ourt a c tio n, de c ide wh e the r f

ili ngthe mot ion a t tha t ti me wo uld be consistent with §§ 20.1400( a) a nd 20.1400(b). Se e Fe lto n v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 276, 279 (1994) (treating pr emature ly

submitt ed EAJA application as having be en filed imm ediately following entry

o f fi n al j u d gm en t(c i t i n g Sti llwe ll v . B ro wn , 6 Ve t.A pp . 2 91 , 3 00 (1 99 4) )) . In th a t r e g ard , w e no te that § 20.1400(b) a

ppear s to permit a CUE claim to be pr operly filed af ter the c ompletion of judicial revie w if that cla im is brought as to a matter that wa s not the subject of suc h judicial revie w. See DAV v. Gober , 23 4 F .3 d a t 69 4 (c on c lud ing that § 20 .1 40 1( a ) " make s it po ssi ble fo r a

c la ima nt t o bring a separate CUE claim wit h respe ct to eac h distinct claim addresse d in a B oard de cision") ; c f. 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400(b)( 1), 20.1401(a ).

V. Conclusion On c on sid e ratio n o f t

he fo re g oin g , th e Court

ho lds that a

CU E c la im may no t be fi le d a s to

a ma tte r t hat is sti ll a

pp e a la ble to t his Court , o r is pen di ng on app e a l he re or a t a hig he r C ourt

. Acc ording ly , the Court (1) va cate s the April 26, 2004, B VA decision deny ing the CUE claim and

rema nds the matter to the B oard f or it to hold the CUE claim in abey an ce i n ac co rdance with the

c on st ruct ion of

§ 2 0. 14 10 se t f

or th a bo ve , a nd (2 ) d ism iss e s a s mo ot t

he Se c re tary ' s mo tio n to dismiss the ap p ea l

. The Court notes that the a ppellant' s direct a

ppeal c ase, N o. 04-1057, re mains pending befor e the Court for dispositi on. VACATED A

ND REMANDED

.