In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-1831

Michael Hakim,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Payco-General American

Credits, Inc. and OSI, Inc.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 99 C 1904---Ruben Castillo, Judge.

Argued November 7, 2001--Decided November 29, 2001 

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Posner and

Kanne, Circuit Judges.

 Flaum, Chief Judge. The district court

granted defendants’ motion to enforce a

binding settlement agreement between

Hakim and Payco-General/OSI. Hakim

appeals. For the reasons set forth below,

we affirm. 

I. Background

 Until his March 1, 1999 resignation,

Michael Hakim was a debt collector at the

Schaumburg, Illinois facility of

Outsourcing Collection Services, Inc.

(formerly Payco-General American Credits,

Inc.) ("Payco"), a subsidiary

ofOutsourcing Solutions, Inc. ("OSI").

Soon after he left Payco, Hakim filed a

charge with the Cook County Commission on

Human Rights ("CHR"), claiming

discrimination on the basis of perceived

sexual orientation. In July 1999, Hakim

joined an existing Title VII lawsuit,

claiming retaliation, assault and

battery, and discrimination. Hakim and

OSI began settlement discussions in

December 1999, when Hakim requested a

$95,000 settlement. OSI, believing

Hakim’s claims to have little merit,

refused to settle under those terms. On

March 30, 2000, after a settlement

conference, Hakim again offered to
settle, this time reducing his demand to

$12,500. Again OSI rejected the offer and

told Hakim’s attorney, Marshall Burt,

that it was not willing to pay Hakim

anything. Meanwhile, on March 26, Hakim

sent the district court an affidavit

prepared for Katrina Malone, an OSI

employee, alleging that she had been

coerced into giving false witness

statements during OSI’s investigation of

Hakim’s co-plaintiff’s allegations, and

false deposition testimony at trial. The

district court held an evidentiary

hearing on the issue on April 26, 2000.

Attorneys for both sides were present. 

 After the hearing, on May 4, 2000, Burt

telephoned OSI’s attorney, Beth Golub,

further pursuing settlement. Golub

suggested a settlement whereby Hakim

would voluntarily dismiss his federal

claims as well as his charge pending

before the CHR in exchange for OSI’s

agreement to forgo its right to seek

reimbursement of litigation costs. On May

18, the parties agreed to the terms of

the settlement. During the conversation

agreeing to the settlement, Burt

requested that OSI sign a stipulation for

the dismissal of Hakim’s claims in

federal court, stating that each party

would pay its own costs. Golub agreed,

and Burt mailed the prepared stipulation

as well as the dismissal to Golub later

that day. 

 On May 17, the day before the parties

agreed to the terms of the settlement and

unbeknownst to either party, the district

court determined that OSI knowingly and

intentionally coerced fraudulent

statements and testimony from Malone, and

entered default judgment against OSI in

favor of all four plaintiffs, including

Hakim. When the parties learned of this

judgment on May 19, Hakim, through Burt,

attempted to withdraw his offer to

settle. OSI replied that the parties had

already reached a binding settlement

agreement. 

 On May 30, OSI moved to vacate the

default judgment and enforce the

settlement agreement. The district court,

without holding an evidentiary hearing,

granted the motion. 

II. Discussion 

 The law of this Circuit is clear that we
review a district court’s decision to

enforce a settlement agreement for abuse

of discretion. Carr v. Bloom, 89 F.3d

327, 331 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Given that the

power to implement a settlement agreement

between the parties inheres in the

district court’s role as supervisor of

the litigation, the exercise of that

power is particularly appropriate for

deferential review."); Wilson v. Wilson,

46 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 1995)

("[Enforcement of a settlement agreement]

is precisely the type of determination

that normally receives a deferential,

abuse of discretion review."). Hakim

inartfully argues that a de novo standard

applies when the reviewing court must

determine whether or not a material issue

of fact concerning the existence of a

settlement exists, requiring an

evidentiary hearing. Our case law holds

otherwise. "[I]n considering a district

court’s decision whether to enforce a

settlement agreement, including its

threshold determination of whether the

parties actually entered into a valid and

enforceable agreement, we will not

reverse unless the lower court abused its

discretion." Carr, 89 F.3d at 331

(emphasis added). Therefore, we must ask

not whether we agree with the district

court’s ruling, but whether that ruling

was reasonable. Id. (citing Antevski v.

Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 4 F.3d

537, 539-40 (7th Cir. 1993)). We find

that it was. 

 The district court was presented with

ample evidence on the record to support

its finding, without holding a hearing,

that a binding settlement agreement

existed. "If . . . a court can have

reasonable confidence that it knows what

the contract means, it ought not put the

litigants (and the trier of fact) to the

bother, expense, and uncertainty of a

trial or other evidentiary hearing."

Overhauser v. United States, 45 F.3d

1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1995). The district

court’s finding that the parties entered

into an executory contract was well

supported by the facts presented to it.

That the parties agreed that OSI would

not seek recovery of costs and Hakim

would voluntarily withdraw his case from

both federal court and the CHR is

supported by Burt’s directions to Golub

to sign the stipulation he mailed to her,

with no discussion of any condition

precedent, as well as by the fact that
Hakim had been actively pursuing a

settlement agreement. Three settlement

agreements had been negotiated between

OSI and the plaintiffs in the Title VII

case. The district court, after

considering the briefs, affidavits, and

record evidence, determined that,

although one did warrant an evidentiary

hearing, Hakim’s did not. This finding

was in no way unreasonable. 

 Moreover, we cannot accept Hakim’s

arguments that the settlement agreement

is void for lack of consideration./1

Forbearance of a right to a legal claim

constitutes valid consideration. E.g.,

Kapoor v. Robins 573 N.E.2d 292, 297

(Ill. Ct. App. 1991). Even if, in

hindsight, the legal claim was improbable

or nonexistent, "it would be enough if at

the time of settlement [the party]

believed in good faith it was vulnerable

to a claim by [the other party.]"

Intamin, Inc. v. Fingley Wright

Contractors, Inc., 605 F.Supp. 707, 711

(N.D. Ill. 1985). Hakim decided to settle

with OSI to obtain certainty that he

would not be liable for OSI’s court costs

and attorney fees. He decided that he

would rather have this certainty than the

chance to obtain a favorable judgment

from the district court. It turns out

that his chances of receiving such a

judgment were better than he had thought.

This does not make the agreement invalid,

however, and the district court was well

within its discretion to enforce it. 

 Lastly, Hakim cannot avoid the

settlement agreement by contending that

OSI acted fraudulently or in bad faith by

coercing false testimony of a witness.

Hakim did not show that he relied on

OSI’s false statements or bad faith

conduct in entering into the settlement

agreement. In fact, as the district court

explained, Hakim requested and witnessed

the evidentiary hearing on the issue of

OSI’s coercion of Malone. He pursued the

settlement notwithstanding his belief

that OSI acted in bad faith, and with

full knowledge that, if he did not

settle, the court had the authority

toenter a default judgment in his favor.

Again, the district court’s decision was

reasonable. 

III. Conclusion

 Because the district court, in its role
as supervisor of the litigation, may

summarily enforce a settlement agreement,

and because the court had abundant record

evidence to support its conclusion, we

find no abuse of discretion. We AFFIRM.

FOOTNOTE

/1 Although the parties argued the issue below, the

district court made no specific finding as to

consideration. The finding of consideration is

implicit, however, in the court’s enforcement of

the settlement agreement.