alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5760 

To expand eligibility for Pell grants to certain students who are pursuing 

a postbaccalaureate professional certification or licensing credential required for employment as a teacher. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 15, 2010 

Mr. MELANCON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Education and Labor 

A BILL 

To expand eligibility for Pell grants to certain students who 

are pursuing a postbaccalaureate professional certification or licensing credential required for employment 

as a teacher. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PELL GRANT ELIGIBILITY FOR 

4 POSTBACCALAUREATE TEACHER CERTIFI5 CATION. 

6 Section 401(c)(4) of the Higher Education Act of 

7 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1070a(c)(4)) is amended by inserting be8 fore the period at the end the following: ‘‘unless there is 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 5760 IH

1 not an institution of higher education located within 45 

2 miles of the principal place of residence of the student that 

3 offers such a postbaccalaureate program but does not offer 

4 a baccalaureate degree in education’’. 

Æ 


tjames on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit 4.1






Exhibit 4.1



SEVENTH AMENDMENT TO RIGHTS AGREEMENT





	1.	 	GENERAL BACKGROUND. In accordance with Section 27 of the Rights Agreement between American Stock Transfer &
Trust Company, LLC (the “Rights Agent”) and Pennichuck Corporation (“Pennichuck” or the “Company”), as amended
from time to time (the “Agreement”), which Agreement was originally adopted on April 20, 2000, Pennichuck desires
to amend the Agreement to extend the expiration of the Rights under the Rights Agreement from April 19, 2010 to
November 1, 2010.






	2.	 	EFFECTIVENESS. This Amendment shall be effective as of March 24, 2010 (the “Amendment”) and all defined terms
and definitions in the Agreement shall be the same, and have the same full force and effect, in the Amendment
except as specifically revised by this Amendment.






	3.	 	REVISION. The paragraph in Section 1 of the Agreement, “Certain Definitions,” that defines “Final Expiration
Date” is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:






“Final Expiration Date” shall mean November 1, 2010.




	4.	 	This Amendment may be executed in one or more counterparts via facsimile, each of which will be deemed an
original copy of this Agreement, and all of which, when taken together, shall be deemed to constitute one and the
same agreement.






	5.	 	Except as otherwise amended hereby, the Agreement and all schedules, exhibits and amendments thereto shall remain
in full force and effect.





IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be executed in their names and on their behalf by
and through their duly authorized officers as of this 24th day of March, 2010.



	 	 	 
	PENNICHUCK CORPORATION

	 	AMERICAN STOCK TRANSFER & TRUST

COMPANY, LLC, as Rights Agent
	 
	/s/ Thomas C. Leonard

	 	/s/ Herb Lemmer
	 

	 	 
	By: Thomas C. Leonard

Title: Sr. Vice President, Chief

Financial Officer &

Treasurer

	 	By: Herb Lemmer

Title: Corporation Counsel
#### McCoy v. The State.

Appeal from Jefferson Criminal Court.

Tried before the Hon. Samuel E. Greene.

No counsel marked as appearing for appellant.

Charles G. Brown, Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion by

Tyson, J.

The appellant was indicted, tried and convicted for the larceny of money.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
#### Eduardo Zuleta CABRERA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-71127.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 5, 2011.*

Filed April 26, 2011.

Eduardo Zuleta Cabrera, Altadena, CA, pro se.

Rosanne Perry, Trial, Michael Christopher Heyse, Trial, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, CAC-District Counsel, Esquire, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: B. FLETCHER, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Eduardo Zuleta Cabrera, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings and review de novo its legal conclusions. *Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey,*542 F.3d 738, 742 (9th Cir.2008). We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to remand, *de Jesus Melendez v. Gonzales,*503 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir.2007). We deny the petition for review.

Cabrera testified that although he was never personally harmed by guerrillas, he feared harm if he returned to Guatemala. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Cabrera did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. *See Nagoulko v. INS,*333 F.3d 1012, 1017-18 (9th Cir.2003); *Ladha v. INS,*215 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.2000) (petitioner must provide credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record of facts *783that would support a reasonable fear of persecution).

Because Cabrera failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he necessarily fails to meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. *See Zehatye v. Gonzales,*453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir.2006).

We uphold the denial of Cabrera’s CAT claim because he failed to establish it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the Guatemalan government. *See Santos-Lemus,*542 F.3d at 747-48.

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cabrera’s motion to remand. *See Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft,*383 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for legal advice given prior to commencement of asylum proceeding because it did not pertain to the “actual substance of the hearing”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS AUSTIN

flonorable

‘Xhwo A. Wheet Oounty Attomeg UEerty, Texas Dear Mr. Wheat8

whioh raade as %tter of Jtaaw Be

ss, zs4tr b the AWe Prle% gors 6ufflolontfurKl6 m39er, shortly aft6r gtbbg pplrell ior a?& bemann, a tolun- ~n&hasbeeaditmhargi%d e UnIted State6Metrbt D46trl& of relcae. t6 eempany~fllsd

thldr o la boskrugtoylor the me hots 6how

that muHonorable 'i'hoxuas A. Wheat - page 2

the r;iving of ssid check becauee the mame &ght be a violationof Article ~IJ+B, that is, tho new *hot cheek' lau. The pertinent portion thereof,Seotion#2, mode a43follOWI

A6 we lnt%rpretpour inquiry,you desire to know whet&or the party xuimB%haotiolotodcmy portionOf the hot cheek law, being llrtiele 227b, aith ita 6ubd%vietoms, and eepoielly subdlv%slon2.

Under the faots stated, it is our o#xdon that **the question**  shouldbe adi im anar~d ~OID



### --&L-73- ee0.1. am Amdetent
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the annual report on Form 40-F of Cumberland Resources Ltd. for the year ended December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.  The annual report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



2.  The information contained in the annual report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.





Date:  May 14, 2004





/s/ Kerry M. Curtis



President and Chief Executive Officer









A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Cumberland Resources Ltd. and will be retained by Cumberland Resources Ltd. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED March 7, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-41016 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus ALFREDO AVALOS-RODRIGUEZ, also known as Alfredo Rodriguez-Correa, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:06-CR-124

-------------------- Before KING, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Alfredo AvalosRodriguez raises arguments that are foreclosed by AlmendarezTorres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
#### Robert G. Lamb, Jr., as Administrator of the Estate of Joseph Vergo, Deceased, Respondent, v Charles Vergo, Appellant-Respondent, and Mary Kruppenbacher, Respondent-Appellant.

— Order unanimously modified on the law and as as modified affirmed without costs, in accordance with the following memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to SCPA 2103 by serving a copy of the citation and petition upon respondent Vergo’s attorney. Unless a court order is obtained authorizing a form of substituted service, personal service is required to commence a proceeding in Surrogate’s Court (SCPA 307; *Matter of Marko,*56 Misc 2d 138). Petitioner did not seek an order of the court before resorting to substituted service; therefore, personal jurisdiction over respondent Vergo was not obtained in this proceeding. Consequently, the petition must be dismissed. We pass on no other issues. (Appeals from order of Monroe County Surrogate’s Court, Ciaccio, S. — dismiss cause of action.) Present— Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Boomer, Pine and Lawton, JJ.
#### Decatur Land Co. v. Cook, Exec.

Appeal -from Morgan Chancery Court.

Heard before the Hon. W. H. Simpson.

Harris & Eyster, for appellant.

E. W. Godbey, for appellee.

The bill in this case was filed by the appellee against the appellants, and prayed for the appointment of a receiver of a partnership to which the complainant and some of the defendants were members, and for the conservation of the assets of the partnership and for the settlement of it between the complainant and the defendants.

On the final submission of the cause on the pleadings and proof, the chancellor fully sustained the equities of the bill, and decreed that the complainant was entitled to the relief prayed for.

On the present appeal the decree is corrected and as corrected is affirmed.

Opinion by

Haralson, J.
#### Smith v. The State.

Appeal from Bibb County Court.

Tried before the Hon. W. L. Pratt.

J. M. McMaster, for appellant.

Charles G. Brown, Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion by

Dowdell, J.

The appellant was indicted, tried and convicted for selling spirituous, vinous and malt liquors, without license and contrary to laAV.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Honorable James A. Evans Opinion No. c-651 County Attorney Iavaca County Re: Whether a constable who Hallettsville,

Texas refuses to physically appear at the scene of traffic accidentsis neglectinga duty of Dear Mr. Evans: his office.

In your opinion requestyou state that there is a constablewho has given public notice that he will no longer work any traffic accidents in his jurisdiction, Your question: Is the constableneglectinga duty of his office? The answer to this question is no. The publication of such a notice Is not a neglect of his duty of office; however,Article 6885 of Vernon's Civil Statutesprovides:

"Each constable shall execute and return according to law all process,warrantsand precepts to him directed and deliveredby any lawful officer.attend unon all .Tustice courts held In his precinct and-perform-allsuch other duties as may be required of him by law." 7Emphasls added.) Article 2.13 of the 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure provides:

ful means. He shall in every case where he Is authorizedby the provisionsof this Code, interferewithout warrant to prevent or.suppress crime. He shall execute all lawful nrocess issued to him by any magistrateor court. He Ll give nbticb

-3155--.

Honorable James A. Evans, Page 2 (c-651)

,

taken before the proper magistrateor court and be trleo." (Emphasisadded.) When reading the last part of Article 6885, Vernonrs Civil Statutes, togetherwith Article 2.13, 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure,It seems clear that the constabledoes have a duty to work trafficaccidents,when he has good reason to believe that there has been a violation of the penal law Involved in such accidents,which occur within his jurisdiatlon. Therefore,It Is the opinion of this office that while the mere publicationof an Intentionnot to work traffic accidentswithin his jurisdiction would not be a neglect of a constable's duty of office, his actual refusal to investigatesuch an accident,when he has good reason to believe that there has been a violation of the penal law, would be a neglect of his duty of office. SUMMARY The publicationof a notice of Intention that a constable

will no longerwork any traffic accidentsIn his jurisdictionis not a neglect of a constable's duty of office. A constabletsrefusal to work a traffic accident where he has good reason to believe there has been a violationof the penal law involved in such accident is a neglect of a constablers duty of office. Yours very truly, WAGGONER CARR Attorney General of Texas

AssistantAttorney General REO/er APPROVED: OPINICN COMMITTEE W. V. Genpert,Chairman Charles Gwanner ~Larry ~Craddook John Ranks Howard-Fender
-31ST-t

. 4

Honorable James A. Evans, Page 3 (c-651)

APPROVED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL By: T. B. Wright

-3157-
# CI2021032EN.01000101.xml

| 29.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CI 32/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CI 32/1

---

Summary of European Union decisions on marketing authorisations in respect of medicinal products on 29 January 2021

(Published pursuant to Article 13 or Article 38 of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1))

(2021/C 32 I/01)

| — | Issuing of a marketing authorisation (Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council): Accepted













  Date of the decision | Name of the medicinal product | INN (International Non-Proprietary Name) | Holder of the marketing authorisation | Number of the entry in the Community Register | Pharmaceutical form | ATC code (Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Code) | Date of notification |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 29.1.2021 | COVID-19 Vaccine AstraZeneca | COVID-19 Vaccine (ChAdOx1-S [recombinant]) | AstraZeneca AB |
| 151 85 Södertälje, Sverige |

—

Issuing of a marketing authorisation (Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council): Accepted

Date of the decision

Name of the medicinal product

INN (International Non-Proprietary Name)

Holder of the marketing authorisation

Number of the entry in the Community Register

Pharmaceutical form

ATC code (Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Code)

Date of notification

29.1.2021

COVID-19 Vaccine AstraZeneca

COVID-19 Vaccine (ChAdOx1-S [recombinant])

AstraZeneca AB

151 85 Södertälje, Sverige

EU/1/21/1529

Suspension for injection

J07BX03

29.1.2021

Anyone wishing to consult the public assessment report on the medicinal products in question and the decisions relating thereto is invited to contact:

| European Medicines Agency |
| --- |
| Domenico Scarlattilaan 6 |
| 1083 HS Amsterdam |
| NETHERLANDS |

European Medicines Agency

Domenico Scarlattilaan 6

1083 HS Amsterdam

NETHERLANDS

---

(1)  OJ L 136, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

---
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 19

- 00457

- CR

Ruben Nunez Jr. v. The State of Texas
On Appeal from the 430th District Court of Hidalgo County , Texas Trial Court Cause No. CR

- 5021

- 18

- J

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered th is cause on appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed . The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED

. We further order this decision certified below for observance. March 18 , 2021
Exhibit 31.2



CERTIFICATIONS



I, Donald H. Hunter, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Harbor Global Company Ltd.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial
statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying
officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be
designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is
being prepared;



b) [paragraph omitted
pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986];



c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and



d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant
role in the registrants internal controls over financial reporting.



|Date:    March | 16, 2006
|-------------- | --------



|                                        
|----------------------------------------
|/s/    DONALD H. HUNTER                 
|Donald H. Hunter Chief Financial Officer
#### People *ex rel.*Goodwin *v.*Martin *et al.*

*(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.*

June 6, 1890.)

Police Commissioners—Certiorari.

Where the police commissioners accept the voluntary resignation of a police officer, no proceedings having been instituted by them for his removal, their action cannot be inquired into on *certiorari.*

*Certiorari*to police commissioners.

Proceedings by the people, on the relation of John W. Goodwin, against James J. Martin and others, to inquire into the cause of the removal of the relator from the police force.

Argued before Van Brunt, P. J., and Brady and Daniels, JJ.

*512
      *Ambrose H. Purdy,*for relator. *E. H. Howke, Jr.,*for respondents.

Brady, J.

The relator has mistaken his remedy. He was not removed from the force by virtue of any proceeding against him by the respondents. He resigned, and, as appears from the paper which lie signed, voluntarily. The respondents accepted the resignation, not as a judgment, or in a proceeding of any kind against him, but in accordance with his expressed wishes. If the charge can be made against any member of the force, whoever it may be, whether captain or sergeant, that the relator was forced to resign, that would doubtless furnish a good and sufficient reason why he should be reinstated on a proper application to the respondents for that purpose, and which, if denied, might be the subject of review in a proper proceeding; but that is not this case. The relator has proceeded upon the theory of his removal, while in fact the respondents acted upon his resignation, presented in the usual form, and containing the usual statements, one of. which was that the resignation was not caused by any threat of punishment or act of coercion from his superior officer, or any other person connected with the police department. The writ charges the respondents with having removed the relator in a proceeding before them for that purpose; and the pleader knew, therefore, that a determination in a proceeding, and a hostile one, was necessary. There must be a determination by a body or officer, (sections 2122, 2129, Code Civil Proc.,) and a person aggrieved by it, (section 2127.) There is no such person, and there is no record to return, therefore. For these reasons the writ must be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.

Van Brttnt, J„ concurs.

Daniels, J.

There was no determination made by the commissioners, and no case which can be reviewed by the writ of *certiorari.*I therefore agree that the writ should be dismissed.