alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 99.3

**Certification of Chief Financial Officer pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002**

          I, Gary R. Wright, certify that the periodic report, to which this Statement is attached, fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the periodic report to which this Statement is attached, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the registrant at the dates and for the periods indicated.

          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed thisStatement as of the date first written below.

Dated February 11, 2003

|   | /s/  GARY R. WRIGHT    |
|--------|-----------------------------|
|   |                             |
|   | **Gary R. Wright**          |
|   | **Chief Financial Officer** |
#### In the Matter of Frank T. Della Badia, Respondent, v Antonia D’Apice et al., Respondents, and Mary C. Biloto et al., Appellants.

In a proceeding to invalidate a petition designating Mary C. Biloto as a candidate for the public office of Mayor of the City of New Rochelle, and Eileen G. Prunty and Alice P. Dooley as candidates for the public offices of Members of the Council of the City of New Rochelle in the Right-to-Life Party primary election to be held on September 15, 1987, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Dachenhausen, J.), entered August 5, 1987, which granted the application as to all candidates. The appeals of the candidates Biloto and Dooley bring up for review the denial of their motion to vacate their default in appearing.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The appellants are members of the Right-to-Life Party who have submitted a designating petition in support of their candidacies for various public offices in the City of New Rochelle. Following a finding by the Board of Elections of the County of Westchester that the petition contained a sufficient number of valid signatures, the objector commenced this proceeding to declare the petition null and void, alleging that subscribing witnesses had not circulated the petition and further alleging the existence of a forged signature. On the return date, two of the candidates, Biloto and Dooley, failed to appear, and the court granted the objector’s petition as to these two candidates on default. Their subsequent cross motion to vacate their default was denied. Upon the appeals of Biloto and Dooley we have reviewed only the denial of the vacatur of their default *(see, Katz v Katz,*68 AD2d 536), and conclude that denial of that relief was proper.

The appellant Prunty did, however, appear; she conceded that the objector was entitled to the requested invalidation of the petition, but submitted a cross petition seeking an opportunity to ballot as to all three candidates. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the court’s denial of the relief requested by the appellant Prunty constituted a proper exercise of its discretion. Although the court may direct the board of elections to provide for write-in ballots under appropriate conditions *(see, Matter of Hunting v Power,*20 NY2d 680, 681), it is not obligated to do so where the equities do not support that relief, such as here, where allegations of irregu*191larities, which include fraud, are not refuted by the candidate. Brown, J. P., Weinstein, Eiber and Hooper, JJ., concur.
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS DATED AS OF JUNE 30, 1999 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

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<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.69


              CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OMITTED AND FILED SEPARATELY
                  WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.
                       ASTERISKS (*) DENOTE SUCH OMISSIONS

                                  SUPPLEMENTAL
                                  AGREEMENT # 5
                             to Contract # 11-21-01
                             dated November 27, 2000

Khabarovsk                                                      January 15, 2002

Closed Joint-Stock Company "Forest-Starma", a legal entity, organized and
existing under the laws of the Russian Federation, (hereinafter referred to as
the Seller), in the person of Mr. David B.Daggett, General Director, and Mr.
V.A.Limarenko, First Deputy General Director, on the one side, and Rayonier,
Inc., USA, (hereinafter referred to as the Buyer), in the person of Mr. Robert
J.Cartano, Director Operations, have entered into the present Supplemental
Agreement to Contract # 11-21-01 dated November 27, 2000, including all its
revisions and individual addenda:

     1.  In addition to the volume specified in section 1 "Subject of the
         Contract", the Seller agrees to sell, and the Buyer agrees to buy, on
         the terms contained in the above mentioned Contract and all individual
         addenda to the Contract, logs produced by the Seller in the volume of
         *** cubic meters +/- 10%. The approximate value of this volume of
         exported logs is 2.000.000 USD.

     2.  Section 2.2 "Delivery" shall be revised to state as follows:
         The round logs produced under the present Contract must be delivered
         FOB vessel during the period of January 1, 2001 - March 1, 2002.

     3.  The other terms of the Contract remain without change.

     4.  Present Supplemental Agreement # 5 have been made in two (2) original
         copies in Russian and English, each of which shall have equal legal
         force. Both original and faxed signatures of the duly authorized
         representatives of the Parties shall be recognized as having equal
         legal force with regard to the execution of this Contract.

The present Agreement is signed and enters into force on January 15, 2002.

SELLER:

 /s/ David B. Daggett
------------------------------
David B.Daggett
General Director

 /s/ V. A. Limarenko
------------------------------
Limarenko V.A.
First Deputy General Director


BUYER:

 /s/ Robert J. Cartano
------------------------------
Robert J.Cartano
Operations Director
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2630 

To amend the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 to extend the 

moratorium on oil and gas leasing and related activities in certain areas 

of the Gulf of Mexico. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 3, 2015 

Mr. JOLLY (for himself and Ms. GRAHAM) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To amend the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 

to extend the moratorium on oil and gas leasing and 

related activities in certain areas of the Gulf of Mexico. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Preserving Florida’s 

5 Coastal Communities Act’’. 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2630 IH

1 SEC. 2. MORATORIUM ON COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL AC2 TIVITY IN CERTAIN AREAS OF GULF OF MEX3 ICO. 

4 Section 104(a) of the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security 

5 Act of 2006 (43 U.S.C. 1331 note) is amended by striking 

6 ‘‘June 30, 2022’’ and inserting ‘‘June 30, 2027’’. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### In the Matter of Joseph J. Libra, Petitioner, v University of the State of New York et al., Respondents.

— Casey, J.

In December 1985, respondent Commissioner of Education implemented by order the decision of respondent Board of Regents finding petitioner, a veterinarian, guilty of gross *940negligence on more than one occasion in connection with petitioner’s treatment of five dogs. A penalty of suspension of petitioner’s license to practice veterinary medicine for two years was imposed. These findings were considered supported by substantial evidence which was used as the standard of proof. Following petitioner’s hearing, but prior to the report and recommendations of the hearing panel, Education Law § 6510 (3) (c) was amended to require proof of guilt by a "preponderance” rather than by "substantial” evidence *(see,*L 1984, ch 1018). In June 1986, following the commencement of petitioner’s CPLR article 78 proceeding to review the determination, respondents moved this court to remit the matter for reconsideration under the amended standard. Upon petitioner’s objection, we denied respondents’ motion and ordered that briefs answering petitioner’s proceeding be filed.

On petitioner’s proceeding, now before us, he argues that this court should conduct its own review of the proceedings and apply the proper standard. Respondents request remittitur to them for reconsideration.

The Legislature has clearly delegated the authority to supervise the practice of the professions which it licenses to the Board of Regents (Education Law §§ 6504, 6505). The scope of judicial review in such a proceeding is limited to issues of law and whether the evidence is sufficient to support the administrative determination. A court may not conduct its own review of the facts and substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body *(Matter of Pell v Board of Educ.,*34 NY2d 222). Beyond the boundary of permitted judicial review, courts must defer to the expertise of the professional administrative determination made after a quasi-judicial hearing *(Matter of Sherman v Board of Regents,*24 AD2d 315, 321). Contrary to petitioner’s claim and in accord with respondents’ request, remittal is necessary for reconsideration under the appropriate standard of proof *(cf. Matter of Cerminaro v Board of Regents,*120 AD2d 262 [decided herewith]).

Recognizing this possibility, petitioner argues that in this event he is entitled to a new hearing. We do not agree. As it stands, the record of the hearing is complete in regard to the specifications filed against petitioner. A new determination based thereon must be made by respondents under the proper standard of proof.

Determination annulled, without costs, and matter remitted to respondents for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Levine, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Anastasia Dublanica, Respondent, v Rome Hospital/Murphy Memorial Hospital et al., Appellants.

Memorandum: Claimant applied for, and was granted, an order permitting her to file a late notice of claim against the Rome Hospital/Murphy Memorial Hospital, a municipal corporation. The order provided for service of the notice of claim upon the hospital within 15 days from the entry of the order. The hospital appealed from that order and we affirmed *(Matter of Dublanica v Rome Hosp./Murphy Mem. Hosp.,*101 AD2d 717).

The 15-day period for service expired on January 19, 1984 *1043and, through inadvertence, claimant did not serve the notice of claim until July 13, 1984. Upon realizing his mistake, claimant’s attorney moved for an order modifying the prior order to correct the untimely service. Special Term granted the motion and ordered that the prior order be amended by deleting the requirement for service of the notice of claim within 15 days, and by providing instead, that the notice of claim submitted with the motion papers on the prior motion be deemed served on the hospital. In addition, Special Term declared that claimant had otherwise satisfied the notice requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e.

The hospital appeals, contending that the court was without power to further extend the time for service because the motion for a further extension of time was made more than one year and 90 days after the claim arose. Contrary to the hospital’s contention, we conclude that Special Term had the power to amend its order and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so.

"At any stage of an action, the court may permit a mistake, omission, defect or irregularity to be corrected * * * or, if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced, the mistake, omission, defect or irregularity shall be disregarded” (CPLR 2001). The case of *Valz v Sheepshead Bay Bungalow Corp.*(249 NY 122) provides an example of the court’s power to amend an order nunc pro tunc to correct a mistake. There the order of service by publication directed that the summons be published in a particular newspaper but by mistake plaintiff published the summons in another newspaper in the area. The Court of Appeals held that it was proper for Special Term to correct the mistake by amending the order to provide for publication in the newspaper in which the summons was published. By analogy, it was proper for the court in this instance to correct claimant’s mistake by amending its order to provide that the notice of claim attached to the notice of motion was deemed to be proper service of the late notice of claim. As in *Valz,*this was a direction the court could properly have made in its order in the first instance and the hospital has not been prejudiced by the amendment.

The hospital further contends that any action commenced hereafter will be time barred. That issue, however, is not before us on this appeal. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Oneida County, Stone, J. — notice of claim.) Present— Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Denman, Boomer and Schnepp, JJ.
#### NICHOLS, SHEPARD AND COMPANY *v.*MARSH.

ORIGINAL MOTION IN A CASE BROUGHT UP BY APPEAL.

No. 95.

Submitted March 18, 1889. —

Decided April 1, 1889.

M. filed a bill in equity against S. for tlie infringement of letters patent. S. answered and filed a cross-bill. The decree dismissed the original bill *402from which M. appealed. Thereupon S. took an appeal in the cross suit from rulings excluding evidence. In this court the clerk required S. to pay one half the cost of printing the record. This court, after argument, affirmed the decree dismissing the original bill, and dismissed the cross-appeal. 128 U. S. 605. *Held,*that S. was entitled to recover of M. the amount so paid.

After the entry of the decrees in *Marsh*v. *Nichols*and *Nichols*v. Marsh, 128 U. S. 605, the following motion was made, entitled in the two causes.

And now comes the said defendant, Nichols, Shepard *&*Co., by Charles F. Burton, their solicitor, and moves the court now here, that they, the said Nichols, Shepard & Co., do recover against the said Elon A. Marsh, Minard Lefever and James ■Scott, as costs to be taxed in their favor, one half of the amount required for printing the record and supervising the printing of the record in said causes, in addition to the amount, taxable and to be taxed in their favor, in the first above entitled cause.

This motion is based on the records in said causes and on the affidavit of Charles F. Burton, hereto attached, and will be brought on for hearing on Monday, the 25th day of February, at the opening of said court.

To R. A. Parker, Esq.,

*Solicitor for Marsh Lefever cmd Scott.*

Cí-iarles F. Burton, *Solicitor for Nichols, Shepard <& Co.*

State and Eastern District of Michigan, County of Wayne,

Charles F-. Burton, duly sworn, deposes and says, that he is the solicitor for Nichols, Shepard & Co., in the above entitled appeal and cross appeal, and that in response to a request from the clerk of this court, he sent to said clerk, on the 16th day of November, 1887, the sum of two hundred and seventy-five dollars, which the said clerk notified him was the amount of money required to defra)^ the portion of the expense properly *403to be borne in the first instance, by said Nichols, Shepard & Co;, as one half the cost of printing the record in said cases.

Charles F. Burton.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 21st day of January, 1889.

Charles H. Fisk, *Notary Public.*

Wayne County^ Michigan;

*Mr. Charles F. Burton*for the motion.

*Mr. R. A. Parker*opposing.

Per curiam:

On consideration of the motion for a retaxation of costs in this cause, and of the argument of counsel thereupon, had as well in support of as against the same:

It is now here ordered by the court that the amount advanced by the appellants in this cause towards printing the record be recoverable by them from the appellees herein.

[This order is entitled only in ,the cross-suit of *Nichols*v. *Marsh.]*
#### Den *ex dem.*Thomas Peterson, Dodo Peterson, Josiah Sparks and Wipe, and others *against*John Boqua and David Smith.

This court will not order the plaintiffs to give security for costs upon the ground that but one of the plaintiffs resides in this stale, and that he had several years before the commencement of the suit taken tlio benefit of the insolvent law.

*Á. L. Fakin,*in behalf of the defendants,

produced an affidavit showing that all the lessors of the plaintiff, except Josiah Sparks and wife, are residents of the states of Pennsylvania and Delaware, and that Sparks was insolvent, and had been discharged under the insolvent laws in 1820; and thereupon moved that the proceedings in the cause be stayed until security be given for the payment of costs. It was contended that although the case did not come within the words of tliS statute, yet ■ that it was within the equitable principles by which the action of ejectment is regulated.

*F. L.*Maecullobh,' for the plaintiff.

Although Sparks, one of the plaintiffs, may have been insolvent in the year 1820, yet he may be perfectly solvent at this time. The affidavit does not bring the case within the statute, and at this stage of the cause an ejectment is not within the especial control of the court, but is to be governed by the same rules as other actions.

*G. D. Wall*replied.

*228By the Court.

The fact of insolvency, if we are authorized to extend the provision of the statute, on principles of equitable construction, is not sufficiently made out. Though insolvent in 1820, the time to which the affidavit relates, Sparks may be quite otherwise in 1827, when this suit was commenced. In a case reported in *Penn. Rep.*866, this court overruled an application for security for costs, one of the several lessors of the plaintiff being a resident in the state.

Motion overruled.
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#### GRAY, Respondent, v. TOWN OF CANEADEA, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department.

January 18, 1894.)

Action by Farley W. Gray, administratrix, etc., against the town of Caneadea.

No opinion. Motion for a certificate that the case is of sufficient importance to make it advisable that the judgment of the court of appeals be taken before proceeding further denied. See 25 N. Y. Supp. 1134.
#### In the Matter of John Park, Respondent, v John A. Kapica et al., Appellants. In the Matter of John Park, Appellant, v John A. Kapica et al., Respondents.

Submitted January 8, 2007;

decided January 11, 2007

*835Motion by Police Conference of New York, Inc. for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeals herein granted. Three copies of a brief with amended caption may be served and an original and 24 copies filed within seven days.
#### Alexander Poole & Company, Inc., Respondent, v Mayne Miller, Appellant.

*914Casey, J. P., Weiss, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Levine, JJ., concur.