T he H o no rable E d m und A

. Sargus, J r. , U ni t ed S t at es D i st ri ct Jud ge f o r t he So ut hern D i st ri ct of O hi o , s i t t i ng * b y de si gnat i o n. RECOM M ENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pur suantto S ixth Cir cuit Ru le 2 06
File Na me: 08a 0325p .06 

### UNITED S TATES CO URT OF APPEALS

F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT

_________________

E L AI NE L. C HAO , Secre tary of L abor, Pe tit ion e r,

v.

O CC U PA T I O N A L S AF ETY AND H EA L TH R EVI EW C OMMI S S I ON , M A N G A N A S P AI NTI NG C O ., I NC ., Re sp on de nts

. X

- - - -> , - - - - N No. 07-3810

On Petition for Review of the Final Or der of the Occ upational Safe ty

& H ealth ReviewCommi ssion. Nos. 95-0103; 95-0104. Argued: J uly

22, 2008
Dec ided and F iled: Aug ust 29, 2008
Be fore : COL E and GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg es; SARGUS, District J udg e. *

_________________ CO UN SEL
ARG UED: Ronald J . Gottlieb, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LAB OR, Washington, D.C ., for Petitioner. O N B RI E F: Ron a ld J. G ott lie b, Cha rl e s F . Jam e s, U. S. D EPA RTM EN T O F L AB OR , Washington, D.C., for Petitioner.

_________________ OP IN ION

_________________ GRI FF I N, Ci r c u it Ju d g e

. T h e Se c r e ta r y o f L a b o r p e ti ti o n s th is c o urt f

o r r e v ie w o f a

final
or de r o f t he Oc c up a tio na l Sa fe ty and Hea lthRe vie w C omm iss ion . T he Commis sio n a ff ir me d in part a nd reve rsed in par

t a dec ision by

an Admini strative L aw J udg e, who aff irmed t he majority

of
c itatio ns iss ue d to re sp on de nt Mang ana s Pain tin g Co. , I nc . by the Oc c up a tio na l Saf e ty and He a lth Administration following a 1994 inspection of a w orksite on t h e sout hbound structure of the J ere miah Morrow B ridg e. Although the Commi ssion’s order a djudicated numer ous citations issued to Mang anas Painting , the Secr etar y ’s petition appea ls only three citations for unguarde d scaf folds that wer e vac ated by

the Commiss ion.

1No. 07-3810 Se c re tar yof L ab or

v . OSH RC, e t al

. Pag e 2

A t t h e ti m e o f t h e insp e c tio n in 1 9 9 4 , t h e re g u la tio n p ro v id e d in p e rtine n t p a rt: 1

( 4) G uar drai l s an d t oebo ar ds s hal l be i ns t al l ed on al l open s i des an d ends of pl at f orms mo r e t han t en ( 10) f ee t a bov e t h e g r ou n d or f l oor , e x ce pt n ee dl e bea m s ca f f ol ds a n d f

l oat s

. . . . Sc af

f ol ds f ou r ( 4) f eet t o t en ( 10 ) f

eet i n hei gh t , havi ng a mi ni mum hor i zont al d i mens i on i n e i t her di r ect i on of l es s t han 4 5 inc h e s, sh a ll h a v e sta n d a rd gu a rd ra ils i n sta lled o n a ll o p e n sid e s a n d e n d s o f t h e p la tfo rm

. In a 2-1 de cision, the Commis sion held tha t t h es e cit ations were barr ed by § 10(b) of

the Occ upational Safe ty

and He alth Act of 1970 (“the Act”) , 29 U.S.C. § 659(b), beca use a 1993 citation for the same unguar ded scaffold c ondition, arising out of a n inspection of the nor

thbound structure of the Morr ow B ridg e, wa s pendingbefor e the Commission at the tim e these 1994 citations were issued for the southbound bridg e. Commissi oner Rog ers dissented on the basi s t h at b ec ause the citations issued in 1993 and 1994 arose at sepa rate worksites and at differ ent times, § 10(b) did not bar the 1994 ung uarde d scaf fold citations. We ag ree with the rationale advocated by the dissent and th er ef o re gra n tth e p et i t i o nfo r r ev i ew , re v er s e th e C o m m i s s i o n , an d re m an d fo r f urt h er p ro ce ed i n gs reg ardingthe merits of the c itations at issue.
I.
M an gan as P ai n t i n g b ega nwo rkre m o v i n g l ea d -b as ed p ai n t o n th e J er em i ah M o rr o w B ri d ge in L ebanon, O hio in 1993, after it ente red into a c ontrac t with the Ohio Depar tmen t of Transpor tation. The Mo rrow Bridg e consists of two par allel bridg es: one struc ture running northbound; the other, sout h b o u n d

. I n April 1993, OSHA per formed a n inspection of the pr oject while Mang anas Painting was wor king on the northbound bridg e. F ollowing the inspe ction, OSHA issued sever al citations to Mang anas Pain ti n g , including, inte r a lia , a citation alleg ing that Mang anas Painting had f

ailed to install gua

rdra ils on platforms that wer e located more than 10 fee t above the g ro un d le ve l, i n v iol a tio n o f 2 9 C. F .R. § 1 92 6. 45 1(a) (4 ) ( re pe a le d) . M ang ana s Pa int ingtim e ly appea led the citation, and it wa s ultimately aff irmed by the Commiss ion in 2000. Sec’ y of Labor v. Manganas Painting Co. , 19 O.S.H. C as

. (B NA ) 1102 (2000), aff’d by Manganas Painting Co. v. Sec’ y of Labor , 273 F.3d 1131 ( D.C. Cir. 2001).
In Dec ember

1994, while Mang anas Painting was wor king on the southbound bridge , OSHA perf ormed a nother inspec tion. At the conclusion of this inspection , OS HA is sued seve ral ne w citations, including, in ter alia , three alleg ed instance s of unguarde d scaf folds, in violation of 29 C.F .R. § 1 92 6. 45 1( a )( 4)

. Th e se c itatio ns a lle g e d th e fo llo wi ngvio latio ns : 1

I tem 13a. L o ca t ed u n d erand alongthe ea st side of the south bound bridg e dec k, approximate panel point betwe en U38- L 38, an employ ee w a s o b s e r v e d w o r king f rom a pic sc aff

old s p ray painting a

column and the uppe r cor d or steel a rea without sta nd ard g ua rd ra ils or e qu iva le nt, e xpos ingthe e mpl oy e e to p e ri me te r e xter ior fa lls in excess of 100’ and inter ior falls of a pproxi mately

30’.
I tem 1 3 b

. E mp lo y e e s w e r e e xp o s e d to a f a ll in e xc e s s o f 1 4 0 ’ w h il e u s in g the scaf fold pic adja cent to the ladder suspended over t he si de of the bridg e outside the containment ar ea south of pie r 4 in that there wer e no guard r ails on the pic.
I tem 13c. L ocate d u n d er and along the e ast side of the south bound bridg e dec k approximate panel point U34, employ ees w ere working from a pick sc aff old without sta nd ard g ua rd ra ils or e qu iva le nt e xpos inge mpl oy e e s to pe ri me te r e xter ior fa lls in excess of 100’ a

nd interior fa lls in ex cess of 30’.No. 07-3810 Se c re tar yof L ab or

v . OSH RC, e t al

. Pag e 3

T he A LJ al so hel d wi t h res p ect t o It em s 1 3 b and 1 3 c t hat O SH A had “ m ad e no s ho wi ng .

. . t hat t he p i cs were 2 inte n d e d o r u se d fo r a n y p u rp o se o the r tha n a c c e ss.” T h u s, the A L J re a so n e d , t h e c ited p ic s w e re no t “p la tfo rm s” w ithin the d e finiti o n o f t h e A c t. Mang anas Painting timely appea led, re sulting in a de cision by an administrative law judg e vac ating the citations on the basis that these violations we re duplicative of other c itations iss ued duringthe 1994 inspection of the southbound bridg e. 2

On r e v ie w , th e Co mm is s io n a f f ir me d th e A L J’ s d e c is io n , b u t o n d if f e r e n t g rounds. The Commi ssion majority

held that sec tion 10(b) of the A ct bar red the Secre tary

from citingMang anas Painting for

failing to gua

rd pick sca ffolds at the br idge worksit e bec ause a 1993 citation for the
same c on dit ion

re latin g to t

he no rt hb ound br idg e wa s p e nd ingbe fo re the Commis sio n at th e tim e the se a lle g e d v iol a tio ns we re c ite d in De c e mbe r 1 99 4. Th e Com mis sio n r e a so ne d:
As a re sult of the April 1993 inspection of the br idge works i t e, OSHA c ited Mang anas f

or a violation of § 1926.451(a)( 4), the same scaf folding standard c ited here

. The 1993 citation was based on Mang anas’ failure “to install gua rdra ils on a painter’ s pick.” Manganas Painting Co. , 19 BN A OSHC at 1103, 2000 CCH OSHD at p. 48,767. I t is undisput ed that at the time OSHA initiated the 1994 inspe ction and issued the re sulting citations, the 1993 citation had be en t i m ely contested by Mang anas a

nd a hea ringin the matter ha d y et to commence

. In fac t, the judge who presided ove r the 1993 matter did not issue his d ec i s i o n u n til after a decision wa s issued in the curr ent ca ses, and his dec ision did not become a fina l o rd er of the Commi ssion until 2000.
W hile the alleged sc aff

o l d i n g vi o lations cited in 1993 and 1994 were observe d at what we find t o be essentially tw o different worksites , th e c itatio ns “ c ov e re d th e same condition” in that eac h item was base d on Mang anas’ failure to gua rd the same ty

pe of pic k s c a ff

old us e d thro ug ho ut t

he br idg e wo rk sit e duri ngbo th p a int ingse a so ns

. (empha sis added)
The S ecr etar

y timely filed a pe tition for reviewwith this court, limi ted to the Commiss ion’s decision re g ardingthese c itations. Neither Mang anas Paintingnor the Commission has filed a responsive br ief in opposition.
II.
In revie wing an ag ency ’s interpre tation of a statute that it is charg ed with administering , we apply the familiar two-step proc ess announc ed by the S u p reme Court in Chevron U.S.A., I nc. v. NRDC , 467 U.S. 837 (1 9 84). “The initial question under step one of the Chevron fr ame wo rk is ‘whe ther Cong ress ha s directly spoken to the pre cise que stion at i s s u e’ b y employing pr ecise , unambig uous statutory languag e.” Al lia nc e for Com mu nit

yMe dia v . F

.C. C. , 529 F.3d 763, 776- 77 ( 6 t h C i r

. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842). I f th e te xt o f th e s tatute is un amb ig uous and, there fore , the “intent of Congr ess is c lear , that is the end of the matter; for the court, a s well as the ag ency , must give e ffe ct to the unambig uously expressed intent of Congr ess.” Jewish Hosp., Inc

. v. Sec ’y of He alth & Human Serv s

. , 1 9 F. 3 d

2 7 0 , 2 7 3 (6 thC i r. 1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842-43). I f, howe ver, “ we de termine that Cong ress ha s not directly addre ssed t he pre cise que stion at issue, that is, that the statute is s i l en t o r am biguous on the specific issue, we must deter mine ‘whe ther the ag ency ’s answer is based on a permissibl e construction of the statute.’ ” Battle Creek He alt h S y s. v . Le av itt , 4 9 8 F. 3 d

4 0 1 , 4 0 8 -0 9 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Jewish Hosp., Inc ., 19 F.3d at 273). Where the ag ency ’s interpre tation of the st atute does not take the for m of a re g ulation issuedNo. 07-3810 Se c re tar yof L ab or

v . OSH RC, e t al

. Pag e 4

Ski dm or e v. Swi

f t & Co. , 32 3 U

. S. 13 4 , 14 0 (19 4 4 ). 3 following notice and comment r ulemaking , but rather

is offer ed throug h an informa l medium – such as an opinion letter, policy statement, or ag ency manual – Chevron -style def ere nce is not wa

rra nted,
and we a pp ly the le ss d e fe re nti a l Sk idm or e revie w t o the ag ency ’s interpre tation. Id. at 409. See

3 als o inf ra at I I I .C.
The thre shold issue, then, is whether § 10( b) is ambig uous. Section 10(b) of the Act pr ovides in p e rt ine nt p art :
I f t he Se c re tary

ha s r e a so n to be lie ve that an emp lo y er h a s f a ile d to c or

re c t a violation for w hich a citati o n h a s b ee n issued wi thi n th e pe ri od pe rm itt e d f

or its
corr ection ( which period shall not begin to run until the entry of a final order by the Commission in the case of any review procee dings under this section initiat ed by the employe r in good fait h and not s o l el y f o r delay or av oidance of penalties ), the Se c re tary sh a ll n oti fy the e mpl oy e r by c e rt if ie d mai l of suc h fa ilure and of the pe na lty proposed to be a ssessed under section 666 of this title by rea son of such fa ilure, and that the employ er has fiftee n workingday s within which to notify the Secr etar

y that he wishes to conte st the Secre tary ' s notification or the pr oposed asse ssment of penalty

. 29 U.S.C. § 659(b) (empha sis added).
We c onclude that the statute is ambiguous r eg ardingthe meaningof “a violation for which
a citation has been issued.” § 659(b). We have explained previously that “[l] anguag e is ambig uous when ‘ to give th[ e] phrase meaning require s a specific fac tual scena rio that can g ive rise to two or
m o re diff ere nt meaning s of the phra se.’” Alliance , 5 2 9 F. 3 d at7 7 7 (q u o t i n g Bec k v. City of Cleveland , 390 F.3d 912, 920 (6th Cir. 2004) ). Her e, there are at least two possible construc tions of the pe rt ine nt p hr a se . It c ou ld r e fe r, a s th e Se c re tary ins ist s, to e a c h in sta

nc e in whic h a

n O HSA
r e g u l a t i o ni s b r e a c h e d

. T h e s t a tu t e ’ s u s e o f th e t e r m“ v i o l a t i o n ” c o u l d

a l s o b e r e a d

p l a u s i b l y, howeve r, to apply

only to the regul at i o n that was a lleg edly transg resse d, rathe r than to ea ch individual act. For example, unde r the forme r construc tion of the statute, three separ ate, individual vio latio ns of

29 C.F .R. § 1 92 6. 45 1( a )( 4) oc c ur ri nga t di ff

e re nt l oc a tio ns on

dif fe re nt d ay s w ou ld result in three “violations for which a c itation has been issued.” Under the latter r eading , howeve r, on e “ vio latio n f

or wh ic h a c itatio n h a s b e e n is su e d” wo uld re su lt, a s on ly a sin g le re g ulatio n w ou ld have be en alleg ed to have been br eac hed.
B e c a us e § 1 0( b) pe rm its a t le a st two po ssi ble int e rp re tatio ns , w e c on c lud e that th e statut e is
amb i g u o u s r e g ar d i n g t h e m e an i n g o f a “ v i o l a t i o nf

o r w h i c ha c i t a t i o nh a s b e e ni s s u e d

. ” A c c o r d i n g l y, un d e r o ur tw o
- s t e p an a l ys i s r e q u i r e d b y Chevron , we tur

n to the a g e nc y ’s int e rp re tatio n o f t he statut e for guidance

. III

. A. Finding “t h at personal injuries and illnesses ar ising out of wor k situations im pose a substantial burden upon . . . interstate commer ce in te rm s o f l o s t production, wag e loss, medical expenses, and disability

compensation pay

ments,” Cong ress e nacte d the Occ upational Safe ty and Hea lth Act in order to “ prov i d e fo r the g ener al welf are [by ] assur[ ing] so far as possible eve ry working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to prese rve our human re source s,” 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) -(b) . To ca rry out the objectives of the Act, Cong ress a llottedNo. 07-3810 Se c re tar yof L ab or

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. Pag e 5

responsibility for executing the Act to two administrative actor s: the Secre tary and the Commission, a thre e member

board a ppointed by

the President with the advice and conse nt of the Senate , assig ned to “ca rry out adjudicatory

functions” unde r the Ac t. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b)(3). See M artin v. Occ upational Safety and Health Rev iew Comm’n , 499 U.S. 144, 147-48 (199 1 ) (describing
a dmi nis tr a tiv e fr ame wo rk ); Chao v. Russell P. L e Frois Builder, Inc. , 291 F.3d 219, 221-22 (2d Cir. 2002) (same).
The Sec re t ar y i s authorized “to set mandatory occupational safety

and hea lth standards applicable to businesses aff ectinginterstate c ommerce ,” § 651(b) (3), a nd to enforc e these standards by “inspec t[ ing] and investig at[ing] during r egular wor king hour s and at other reasona ble t imes

. . . any such plac e of e mploy

ment and . . . question[i ng ] private ly any such employ er, owner, ope rator, ag ent or employ ee.” 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (2). I f, during such an inspection, the Secre tary (or his or he r r e pr e se ntativ e ) b e lie ve s th a t an e mpl oy e r h a s v iol a te d a n O SHAre g ulatio n, the S ecret ary is empower e d to is s u e a c it a ti o n to th e e mp lo y e r , d e s c r ib in g “ w it h p arti c u la

r it y th e n a tu

r e of the violation, including a r efe renc e to the provision of the [Act] . . . alleg ed to have been violated.” Id.
a t § 65 8( a ). Th e e mpl oy e r t he n h a s f if te e n d ay s, ru

nn ingfr om t

he date of re c e ipt of the c itatio n, to appea l the citation. Id. at § 659(a ).
I f the e mploy er f

iles a timely notice of its intent to challeng e the c itation, “the Commiss ion shall aff ord an oppor

tunity for a hear ing” and “sha ll therea fter issue a n order , based on f

indings of fac t, affir ming, modifying, or

vacat i n g t h e S ecretar

y ’s citation or propose d penalty . . . ,” id. at § 659(c)

. The initial re port by the AL J become s the final order of the Ag ency unless any

member of the Commission gra

nts discretionary

revie w of the A L J ’s dec ision. Id. a t § 6 61 (j ). Ei the r p art y – the Secr etar

y or the e mploy er c h ar ged with citations – may appea l the order

of the Commission to “any Unite d

St a te s c o urt o f

a p p e a ls f o r th e c ir c u it

in w h ic hth e v io lati o nis a ll e g e d to h ave occur red” or “in the Court of A ppeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,” id. at § 660(a ).
B.
I t is we ll- se ttl e d th a t a

pp e llate c ourt s o we defe renc e to a n a g e nc y ’s int e rp re tatio n o f i ts authorizing statute when the statute is ambiguous. Ramirez-Canales v. M ukasey , 517 F.3d 904, 907 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Chevron , 467 U.S. at 837). OSHA’ s dual-ac tor fra mework r aises the que stion
o f w h i c hO S H A e n t i ty –

th e S e c r e t ar

y o r th e C o m m i s s i o n

–

i s e n t i t l e d

t o d e f e r e n c e , an d , s i m i l ar l y, how much def

ere nce t hat entity

is entitled. I n Ma rti n , the Supreme Court c onsidered whether a revie wing court should def er to the Se cr et ar y o r t he Commissi on when the two a ctors provide d

“ re a so na ble but c on fl ic tin g int e rp re tatio ns ” of an ambi g uo us regulation under the Act. Ma rti n , 499 U.S. a t 1 4 9

. Re a s o n in g th a t b e c a u s e th e A c t a s s ign s th e Se c r e ta r y th e d u ty to p r o mu lg a te and enfor ce O SHA regulations, while the Commis sion is deleg ated “ nonpolicy -makingadjudi ca t o ry power s,” the Court conclude d that the Secre tary was in the “better position t han is the Commissi on to rec onstruct the purpose ” of O SHA regulations. Id. at 152-54. Ultimately , the Court held that whe r e b o th th e Co mm is s io n an d th e Se c r e ta r y o f f e r c o mp e ti n g r e a s o n a

b le inte r p r e tati o ns of an OSHA re g ulation, “the re viewingco urt may not prefe r the re asonable interpre tations of the Commi ssion to the reasona ble interpre tations of the Secr etar y . . . .” Id. at 158.
L e f tu n d e c i d e d

b y Ma rti n , howeve r, is to whom does a re viewingcourt de fer when the Secre tary and Commissi on offe r conf licting inter

pretations of a provision of the Act. The Sec ond Circuit Court of Appea ls’ opinion in R u s s e ll P

. LeF r o is B u il d er (“ Ru ssel l ” ) i s in str

uc tiv e on thi s question. I n Ru sse ll , the S econd Circuit fac ed competing interpretations of the Act conce rningthe Commi ssion’s ability

to ex er ci s e jurisdi ction over a n employ er’ s untimely

challeng e to OSHA citations. Ru sse ll , 291 F.3d at 221. I n decidingwhich ag ency act or’s interpr etation war rante d defe renc e, the Sec ond Circuit observed the Supreme Court’s holdingin United States v. Me ad Co r p o r a t ion , 5 3 3 U

. S. 2 1 8 , 2 2 6

- 2 7 ( 2 0 0 1 ) , th a t “ a dmi n is tr a ti v e im p le me n tati o no f

a p arti c u lar statutory provision qualifies for C

hevron d e f

e r e n c e wh e n

i t a p p e a r s t h a t Co ng re ss d e le g a te d a

uth or ityNo. 07-3810 Se c re tar yof L ab or

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T h e Se cr et ar y beg i n s h er di s cu s s i on of t h e s t an dar d of r ev i ew w i t h a c i t at i on t o t h e AP A, 5 U

. S. C. § 706, f or 4
t h e pr opos i t i on t h at t h e “ Commi s s i on ’ s l eg al c on cl u s i on s ma y be s et a s i de i f t h ey a r e ‘ ar bi t r ar y , c apr i ci ou s , a n a bu s e of di s cr et i on , or ot h er wi s e n ot i n ac cor dan ce wi t h l aw

. ’ ” T h e AP A pr ov i des t h at t h e ar bi t r ar y an d ca pr i ci ou s s t an dar d of revi ew i s t o be ap p l i ed t o “ agency act i o n. ” 5 U

. S.C

. § 7 0 6 (2). U nd er norm al ci rcum st ances, where t he agency s p eaks wi t h a s i ngl e vo i ce – when t he Se cret ary and t he C o m m i ss i o n agree o n an i nt erpret at i o n o f t he A ct , o r where (as i s t he case wi t h m o st agenci es) enf o rcem ent and ad

judicat i ve p o wers are co m b i ned i n a si ngl e ad m i ni st rat i ve aut ho ri t y – t he arbit rary and cap ri ci o us st and ard ca n be ap p l i ed co nsi st ent l y

. H ere, ho wever, ther e are two ad m i ni st rat i ve act o rs off eri ng conf l i ct i ng “ act s , ” a nd t he Supre me C our t has i ns t r uct ed t hat t he act or t o whom d ef er enc e i s owed i s t he Secr et ar y , r at her tha n the C o m m issio n

. M a rtin , 499 U

. S. at 152

- 53

. T hu s , i t woul d ru n c ount er t o bo t h t he s t at ut ory s che me of t he A ct and t he C o urt ’ s i nst ruct i o n i n M a rtin t o ap p l y t he d ef erent i al , arbi t rary , and cap ri ci o us st a n d ard o f revi ew t o t he C o m m i ss i o n’ s l egal de ci si o n, rat her t han t o de f er t o t he Se cret ary ’ s i nt erpret at i o n of § 10 (b). to the ag ency

g ener ally to make rule s car

rying the forc e of la

w, and th at t h e age n cy

interpre tation claimi n g d ef

erence was promulg ated in the e x erc ise of that author ity .” Ru sse ll , 291 F.3d at 226. Reasoningthat, as explained by the Court in Ma rti n , Congr ess deleg ated r u le

- ma k in g a uth ority under the Act to the Sec reta

ry , rathe r than the Commission, the Ru sse ll court held that “the Sec reta ry not the Commiss ion[ ] has authority to interpre t the s tatute .

. . and we should theref ore de fer to the views of the Sec reta

ry rathe r than the Commission.” Ru sse ll , 291 F.3d at 226-27.
We a g re e wi th the Se c on d Circ uit that the Se c re tary , r a the r t ha n th e Com mis sio n, wa

rr ants defe renc e in her

interpre tation of the Ac t. I n Ma rti n , the Court p o i n t ed o u t t h at Congr ess did not inv e s t th e C o m m i s s i o n w i th th e p o w e r t o m ak e l aw o r p o l i c y , 4 9 9 U

. S

. a t 1 5 4 , a ndre pe a te dly emphasized the Commi ssion’s r ole as limit ed to se rving as a “neutr al ar biter.” Id. at 152 (quoti ng Cuyahoga Valley Ry . Co. v. United Transp. Union , 474 U.S. 3, 7 (1985))

. In cont ra s t , t h e C ourt ob se rv e d th a t th e Se c re tary is e mpo we re d w iththe a

bil ity to p ro mul g a te OSH A r

ule s a nd sta nd ard s. Ma rti n , 499 U.S. at 152. M oreove r, as the Ma rti n Court no te d, be c a us e sh e is e mpo we re d to wr ite and enf orce OSHA standar ds, the S ec retary “come s into contact with a much greater number of
re g ulator y pr ob le ms tha

n d oe s th e Com mis sio n” and , a s a re su lt, “ the Sec re tary

is m or e lik e ly

to develop the e x pertise r eleva nt to assessing the eff

ect of a particular r egulatory interpre tation.” Id. at 152-53. Thus, a

pplying the Court’s opinion in Mead and Ma rti n , we choose to follow Ru sse ll and de fe r t o th e Se c re tary , r a the r t ha n th e Com mis sio n, in h e r i nte rp re tatio n o f t he Ac t. 4

C. Next, we must decide the de g ree of def ere nce ow ed the Secre tary ’s i nterpre tation of § 10(b)

– s p e c i f i c a l l y , w h e th e r w e s h o u l d g i v e fu ll C h evron defe renc e or r ather the more limited Sk idm or e d e f

e r e n c e

. In c o n tr a s t t o th e d e f e r e n t i a l r e v i e w r e qu i r e d

b y Chevron , under Sk

idm or e , we g ive an a g e nc y

int e rp re tatio n d e fe re nc e tha t “ de pe nd [s] up on

the thor ou ghne ss e vid e nt i n it s consideration, the validity of its rea soning, its consistency with e a r li e r a n d la te r pronounc ements, and all those fa ct o rs whi ch g ive it power to pe rsuade , if lackingpower to control.” 323 U.S. at 140. Be ca u s e t h e Secr etar

y ’s interpre tation of § 10(b) is not the produc t of notice-a nd-comment
ru le makin g , w e c on c lud e that th e le ss- de fe re nti a l Sk idm or e level of r eview is wa rra nted.
In Chr iste ns e n v . H

arris Cou nty , 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000), the Supre me Court explained that, althoug h Chevron re qu ir e s a r evie wi ngc ourt to g ive e ff

e c t to an a g e nc y ’s re a so na ble interpre tation (offe red in the f orm of an ag ency regulation) of an ambiguous statute, suc h defe renc e is not required where the interpre tation is offe red via an informal medium – such as an opini on letter, ag ency manual, policy

statement, or enfor ceme nt guideline – that lacks the forc e of law. Her e, the Secre tary has off ere d her inter

pretation of § 10(b) only

in her litigation posit ion; she has not pointed to any reg ulation or any

other for mat that car

ries the forc e of law which r efle cts her inter pretationNo. 07-3810 Se c re tar yof L ab or

v . OSH RC, e t al

. Pag e 7

B y c o n tra st, wh e re a n O S H A re g u la tio n is at issu e , ra the r th a n a p ro v isio n o f th e A c t, the S e c re ta ry’s 5 inte rp re ta tio n o f t h e re g u la tio n , ev e n if e x p re sse d fo r th e fi rs t t im e a s a litiga tio n p o sitio n , is n e v e rth e le ss e n tit le d to full Chev r on d e fer e n c e

. M a rtin , 499 U

. S. a t 156- 57. of § 10(b)

. Acc ording ly , under Christ ensen , we hold that the Secr etar y ’s interpre tation of § 10(b) 5 is entitled to defer ence only to the extent that it has the powe r to persua de.

I V.
A l th o u g ht h e S e c r e t ar

y i s e n t i t l e d

t o o n l y Sk

idm ore defe renc e re g ardingher position, we conclude that her inter

pretation o f § 10(b) is a compelling , rea sonable c onstruction of the statute. As the administrative a ctor c harg ed with enf orcingthe Act, the Sec reta ry is “‘in the best posit ion’ to d e v e lo p ‘ h is to r ic a l f

ami li ar it y an d p o li c y

ma k in g e xp e rti s e ’ ” in a

p p ly in g § 1 0(b). Ru ss e ll , 291 F. 3 d at 2 2 8 (q u o t i n g Ma rti n , 499 U.S. at 153). On this issue, the Secr etar y has re peate dly

advanc ed the int e rp re tatio n th a t § 1 0( b) do e s n ot p ro hib it h e r f ro m al legi ng multip le vio latio ns of the same regulati o n wh er e t he violations occur red at differ ent place s or diffe rent times. See, e .g., Sec’ y of Labor v. MJP Constr. Co., Inc. , 19 O.S.H. Cas. (B NA) 1638 ( 2001) (upholdingmultipl e violations
un d e r s am e r e g u l a t i o nw h e r e c i t a t i o ni t e m s a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s o c c ur

r i n g o nd i f

f e r e n td a t e s) ; S

ec’ y of Labor v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co. , 15 O.S.H. Cas. (B NA) 2201 ( 1993) (holdingthat the Secr etar y may appropr iately

cite sepa rate violations for ea ch individual i n s t an ce of improper f all protec tion wher e ea ch alleg ed instance of violation involves e ither a differ ent floor or a differ ent location on
eac h floor). Se e als o G oo d S am ar ita n H

os p. v . S ha lal a , 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993) (“ The c onsistency of an a g ency ’s position is a factor in a ssessing the weig ht that positi on is due”). Most importantly , the Secre tary ’s position i s consistent with the tex t of the Ac t. The text of § 10(b) speaks in te rms of a singula r, discrete violation – pr oviding that “ [i ]f the Secre tary has re ason to bel iev e th at an e mpl oy e r h a s f a ile d to c or

re c t a violation for whic h a citation h a s b e e nis s u ed

. . . . ” § 65 9( b) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he c itatio ns a t is su e in t his c a se we re lik e wi se wr itt e n in singula r terms, re fer

ringto individual viol ations of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(a )(4) by s p e cific Ma

ng anas Painting employ ees. H ad Cong ress intende d for the expansive interpre tation of “a violation” that the Commiss ion applied, i t is li kely that it would have re fer

red to a “ type of violation for whic h a citation has been issued” or a “prac tice for which a citation has bee n issued.” See A lden Leeds, Inc

. v. Occ upational Safety and Health Rev iew Co mm ’n , 298 F.3d 256, 262- 63 (3d Cir. 2002) (distinguishing citations alleg ing discrete violations and c itations alleg ing violative pr actice s, and pointing out t h at S ecr etar y could have cited employ er f or categ orica l prac tices, rather than f or dis c re te , in div idual viol a tio ns ). I ns te a d, the statut e re fe rs on ly to “ a vio latio n, ” and

we “ mus t presume that a legislature say s in a st atute what it means a nd means in a statute what it say s there.” Con n. Nat ’l

Ba nk v . G e rm ain , 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). Thus, we hold that the S ecretar y ’s interpre tation of § 10(b) is consistent with the text of the statute. Finally , we e mphasize the limi ts of our opinion. The Commissi on fou n d, and substantial
e vid e nc e su

pp or ts the fa c tua l fi nd ing , th a t th e 19 93 and 19 94 c itatio ns oc c ur

re d at tw o s e pa

rate worksites, one year

apar t from ea ch other . In this reg ard, w e re view for cl ea r er ro r t he fa ctual finding s made by

the Commiss ion. Fields Exc avating, Inc. v . Sec’ y of Labor , 38 3 F .3 d 4 19 , 4 20 (6 th Cir . 2 00 4) ; CMC Elec., Inc . v. OSHA , 221 F.3d 861, 865 ( 6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 0 ). We conc lude the Commi ssion’s finding of two differ ent worksites is s upported by substantial evidence

. See Nat’l Eng’g &Contracting Co. v. He rman , 181 F.3d 715, 721 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that

“ [s]ub sta nti a l e vid e nc e is su c h re le va nt e vid e nc e a s a

re a so na ble min d mi g ht a c c e pt a s a de qu a te to support a conc lusion.”) (interna l quotations omi tted). Thus, we a

re not called upon to dec ide, and e x press no opinion on the question, whethe r § 1 0( b) ba rs su c c e ssi ve pe na lti e s for the same vio latio n at the same wo rk sit e . Rathe r, we de c ide on lyNo. 07-3810 Se c re tar yof L ab or

v . OSH RC, e t al

. Pag e 8

that wher e an employ er c halleng es a c itation issued by the Secr etar

y , the Secr etar

y is not barre d by § 10(b) f rom issuing a second citation for a violation of t he same regulation that occur s at a diff ere nt worksite at a

subsequent time.
V.
For these re asons, we grant the pe tition for review , reve rse the de cision of the Oc cupational Safety and He alth Review Commission wit h respe ct to citation items 13a-13c, an d re m and for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.