* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Although the C ommissioner has been substituted for the Secretary in the caption, in th e text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

*** Honorable William F. Downes, District Judge, UnitedStates District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation

.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 1/9/97 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

WOODROW BURNS, JR.

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, *

Defendant-Appellant. No. 96-7048 (D.C. No. CIV-95-272-S) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before EBEL and HENRY, Circuit Judges, and DOWNES, *** District Judge.2--

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant appeals from a district court order affirm ing the Secretary’s decision to deny his application for social security disability benefits. Utilizing the applicable five-step sequential analysis, see Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988), the administrative law jud ge (ALJ) determined, at step five, that claimant has the residual functional cap acity to perform the full range of sedentary work and that, pursuant to the Secretary’ s Medical/Vocational Rules (the grids), he was not disabled. “This court reviews the Secretary’s decision to det ermine only whether [her] findings are supported by substantial evidenc e and whether the Secretary applied correct legal standards . . . .” Hargis v. Sullivan , 945 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1991). “Substantial evidence is such re levant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusi on.” Id. We will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary. Id. Claimant alleges disability because of the fusion o f his right ankle and a ruptured disc in his lower back. He assigns as err or the ALJ’s (1) failure to-3-

conduct a proper pain analysis; (2) improper relian ce on the grids; and (3) improper hypothetical questioning of the vocational expert. Claimant injured his right foot and ankle in 1988 and, after several surgeries, eventually underwent a fusion of his ank le. Claimant testified that the resultant limp causes pain in his back, Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 361. In addition, claimant was hospitalized in 1992 for bac k pain which was diagnosed as intervertebral disc disease, id. at 206. Claimant testified that he can sit only twenty minutes at a time, id. at 364, and needs to shift position because of bac k pain, id. at 363. Claimant argues that the ALJ failed to comply with the analytical process described by this court in Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387 (10th Cir. 1995), for cases involving credibility determinations of subje ctive complaints of disabling pain. We disagree. In Kepler , we discussed factors helpful to an ALJ in decidin g whether to believe claims of severe pain. Id. at 391. We ordered a limited remand for the purpose of requiring the ALJ to “exp lain why the specific evidence relevant to each factor led him to conclud e claimant’s subjective complaints were not credible.” Id. . Such action is unnecessary in this case because the ALJ has adequately explained the link b etween the evidence and his conclusion. See id.-4-

With respect to claimant’s ankle fusion, the ALJ no ted that, despite the numerous surgeries, a 1992 post-fusion arthroscopy resulted in “significant relief of symptomology.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 15. This conclusion finds support in the record. See id. at 204. Additionally, claimant’s treating physici an was of the opinion that, while claimant could not return t o his previous heavy occupation, he was a candidate for vocational rehab ilitation and could perform sedentary work, “not requiring prolonged walking orweight bearing.” Id. ; see also id. at 224 (opinion of Dr. Metcalf, apparently consult ed for purposes of claimant’s workers’ compensation claim, that claimant was a candidate for vocational rehabilitation); id. at 228 (consultative physician’s opinion that claimant can do sedentary work). The ALJ continued to explain his pain credibility c onclusion with reference to the fact that claimant takes only nonprescriptio n pain medication, can walk as much as one hundred yards at a time, and was found by a consultative physician to be free of any significant residual joint swelli ng and joint deformity. All of these observations find support in the record. With respect to claimant’s allegation of disabling back pain, the ALJ noted that claimant is able to perform some housework, go es fishing occasionally, can drive for as long as one hour at a time, and does n ot do anything for his back pain except to take over-the-counter medication. Id. at 15-16. While we acknowledge-5-

that there is some evidence in the record favoring claimant’s interpretation of this case, we reiterate that our task on appeal is not t o reweigh the evidence, see Hargis , 945 F.2d at 1486, but to review the record to ens ure that substantial evidence supports the decision of the ALJ. We conc lude that the credibility determination of the ALJ in this case was sufficiently thorough to comply with the Keplerrequirements and that substantial evidence support s the ALJ’s credibility determination on the issue of the sever ity of claimant’s pain. Further, it was not error for the ALJ to discount the opinion of disability rendered by Dr. Parano. That opinion was unsupport ed by objective medical evidence and was based exclusively on claimant’s su bjective complaints of pain.
See Thompson v. Sullivan , 987 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1993)(noting that subjective allegations of pain are insufficient by themselves to establish disability). Nor was the ALJ required to believe c laimant’s statements regarding his need to shift position frequently. As noted ab ove, at least three doctors found claimant able to do sedentary work without restrict ion. The only limit of record is Dr. Miller’s caution that claimant should not engag e in work activity requiring “prolonged walking or weight bearing.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 204. Because neither of those activities are implicated in sedentary work, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), these limitations do not demand a co nclusion that claimant is disabled. We hold, therefore, that substantial evi dence supports the ALJ’s-6-

conclusion that claimant did not have pain severe e nough to interfere with his ability to engage in a full range of sedentary acti vity. Claimant next argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the grids to find him not disabled, arguing that his nonexertional pain i mpairment prevented such reliance. “The mere presence of a nonexertional impairment[, however,] does not preclude reliance on the grids.” Thompson , 987 F.2d at 1488. Where, as here, there is substantial evidence that a claimant’s pai n does not interfere with an ability to work, and that a claimant can do the ful l range of activities required by sedentary work, reliance on the grids is appropriat e. Because we conclude that the ALJ properly relied on the grids to determine this case, we do not address claimant’s argument regarding the hypothetical ques tion posed to the vocational expert. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge