alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GUSTAVO PEREZ-GARCIA, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-71032 

Agency No. A206-263-193 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 14, 2020**

Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges. 

Gustavo Perez-Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reconsider

the BIA’s prior order affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying 

cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We 

review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reconsider. Toor v. Lynch, 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 22 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-71032 

789 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015). We deny in part and dismiss in part the 

petition for review. 

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez-Garcia’s motion to 

reconsider, where he failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior 

determination that his acceptance of voluntary departure in 2010 was knowing and 

voluntary. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A); Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895

(9th Cir. 2003) (explaining requirements for motion to reconsider); Gutierrez v. 

Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2008) (departure was knowing and 

voluntary where petitioner testified that he knew he had an opportunity to see an IJ

in lieu of taking voluntary departure). We do not address Perez-Garcia’s other 

contentions regarding eligibility because a lack of continuous physical presence is 

dispositive. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004).

We lack jurisdiction to review the unexhausted contentions in PerezGarcia’s reply brief that the agency erred by placing the burden of establishing his 

departure was not knowing and voluntary on him and by using his responses to the 

IJ’s questioning to conclude that his departure was knowing and voluntary. See 

Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (the court “lack[s] 

jurisdiction to review legal claims not presented in an alien’s administrative 

proceedings before the BIA.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leonardo Gerardo GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-10966

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 21, 2007.

Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jason Douglas Hawkins, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Leonardo Gerardo Garcia appeals his guilty-plea conviction and sentence for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b) by illegally reentering the United States after being deported following an aggravated felony conviction. Garcia claims the district court erred, under the advisory Guidelines, by enhancing his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) based upon its determination that his 1995 convictions under Tex. Penal Code § 21.11(a) for indecency with a child were crimes of violence. Garcia contends that his convictions under § 21.11(a)(2) did not constitute “sexual abuse of a minor” under § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) because the Texas statute criminalizes consensual sex between minors of the same sex and sex between a 19-year old on the eve of his or her 20th birthday and a child two days shy of his or her 17th birthday.

The “sexual abuse of a minor” is a “crime of violence” under § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii). *United States v. Zavala-Sustaita,*214 F.3d 601 (5th Cir.2000), held that a violation of § 21.11(a)(2) is “sexual abuse of a minor” as that term is used in its “ordinary, contemporary, [and] *511common meaning.” Although *Zavala-Sustaita*involved an enhancement imposed under a previous version of § 2L1.2, its reasoning remains sound law and is applicable here. *See United States v. Izaguirre-Flores,*405 F.3d 270, 273-75 (5th Cir.) (quoting *Zavala-Sustaita,*214 F.3d at 604), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 253, 163 L.Ed.2d 231 (2005). Accordingly, the district court did not err in enhancing Garcia’s offense level pursuant to § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii).

Garcia also challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors, rather than elements of the offense that must be found by a jury. Garcia’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although he contends that *Almendarez-Torres*was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would now overrule *Almendarez-Torres*in light of *Apprendi v. New Jersey,*530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that *Almendarez-Torres*remains binding. *See United States v. Garza-Lopez,*410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Garcia concedes this claim is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres*and raises it here only to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

SYEEN HILL,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 629 MAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 27th day of December, 2017

, the Petition for Allowance of

Appeal is DENIED

.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Complainant

vs.

JASON MICHAEL JAMES

Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket Number: 2023-0473

MISLE Activity ID: 

CONSENT ORDER

Issued: January 05, 2024

By Order of Administrative Law Judge Administrative Law Judge:

Honorable Brian J. Curley

Appearances:

For the Coast Guard

Andrew Schmitt

Sector North Carolina

For the Respondent

Jason Michael James
CONSENT ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

On January 04, 2024, the parties in this case submitted a Motion for Approval of a 

Settlement Agreement and Entry of Consent Order to the Administrative Law Judge for approval 

under 33 C.F.R. § 20.502.

I have carefully reviewed the terms of the Settlement Agreement and find that it is fair, 

reasonable, and in substantial compliance with the requirements of 33 C.F.R. § 20.502.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the record, it is hereby ORDERED that the Settlement Agreement 

is APPROVED in full and incorporated herein by reference. This Consent Order shall 

constitute full, final, and complete adjudication of this proceeding.

__________________________________

Brian Curley

Administrative Law Judge

Date: January 05, 2024
Exhibit 10.42









Exhibit 10.42




EXTENSION OF OFFICE BUILDING LEASE




This Extension of Office Building Lease (“Extension”) is entered into this 19th day
of October, 2009, by and between Sorrento West Properties, Inc., (“Landlord”) and Oceanic
Exploration Company (“Tenant”).



WITNESSETH:




WHEREAS Landlord and Tenant entered into that certain Office Building Lease dated September 1, 2000
as amended by an Amendment to and Extension of Office Building Lease dated October 20, 2005, a
Second Amendment to Office Building Lease dated January 1, 2008, and a Third Amendment to Office
Building Lease dated October 22, 2008 (collectively referred to herein as the “Lease”); and



WHEREAS Landlord and Tenant wish to extend the term of the Lease;




NOW THEREFORE in consideration of the mutual promises, covenants and agreements contained herein,
the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenant agree as follows:



1. The Term of the Lease shall be extended for a one (1) year period commencing November 1,
2009 and terminating October 31, 2010 (the “Third Extended Term”).



2. Tenant acknowledges that it currently pays monthly Minimum Rent at the rate of $16.50 per
square foot. During the Third Extended Term the monthly Minimum Rent shall be increased at the
rate of increase of the Consumer Price Index as set forth in Section 1.05 of the Lease.



All other provisions of the Lease not expressly modified herein shall remain unchanged and the
Lease shall continue in full force and effect. In the event of any inconsistency between the
provisions of the Lease and this Extension, the provisions of this Extension shall be deemed
controlling.



This Extension of Office Building Lease is entered into on the day first written above.



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	TENANT:	 	 	 	LANDLORD:
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Oceanic Exploration Company	 	 	 	Sorrento West Properties, Inc.
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	By:

	 	/s/ Janet Holle
	 	 	 	By:
	 	/s/ Bart Brundage
	 

	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	Janet Holle
	 	 	 	 	 	Bart Brundage
	 

	 	Vice President
	 	 	 	 	 	Vice President
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-50210 Summary Calendar

SHERRY KING, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. SA-96-CV-1281

- - - - - - - - - - December 23, 1998 Before DAVIS, DUHE’, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Sherry King appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the denial of her application for supplemental security income. She argues that the administrative law judge failed to consider her ability to maintain employment and “failed to give proper weight to the testimony of the vocational expert (VE), that in his opinion, the Appellant would not be able to maintain employment should she return to her past relevant work.” KingNo. 98-50210 -2- argues that because of this error, the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed. King argument lacks a factual basis. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2484 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2484

 To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide that certain 
aliens who are pregnant are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible 
      to be admitted to the United States, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 20, 2015

Mr. Rohrabacher (for himself, Mr. Conaway, Mr. Gohmert, Mr. Jones, Mr. 
DesJarlais, Mr. Zinke, Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas, Mr. Carter of Georgia, 
 Mr. King of Iowa, Mr. Gosar, and Mr. Olson) introduced the following 
       bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide that certain 
aliens who are pregnant are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible 
      to be admitted to the United States, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Stop Birth Tourism Act of 2015''.

SEC. 2. RESTRICTION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN ALIENS WHO ARE 
              PREGNANT.

    Section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1182(a)) is amended by inserting at the end the following:
            ``(11) Pregnancy.--
                    ``(A) In general.--In the case of an alien seeking 
                admission to the United States as a nonimmigrant under 
                section 101(a)(15)(B), a consular officer or the 
                Secretary of State may require that the alien provide a 
                certification from a healthcare provider that the alien 
                is not pregnant, or, if the alien is pregnant, as to 
                the status of the pregnancy.
                    ``(B) Inadmissibility.--An alien seeking admission 
                to the United States as a nonimmigrant under section 
                101(a)(15)(B) who a consular officer or the Secretary 
                of State determines under subparagraph (A) is pregnant, 
                and if admitted to the United States, is likely to give 
                birth in the United States, is inadmissible.''.
                                 <all>
```
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 2, 2020

No. 04-20-00236-CV

Lesley WENGER, City of Castle Hills Alderman Place 4 and Sylvia Gonzalez, City of Castle 

Hills, Place 3 (Cross-Appellee),

Appellants

v.

The STATE of Texas, ex. rel.,Mike Flinn, Bonnie Hokpe, Vince Martinez, Scott Gray, Ginger 

Magers, and Robbie Casey (Cross-Appellant),

Appellees

From the 438th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019-CI-15722

Honorable Larry Noll, Judge Presiding

ORDER

On August 12, 2020, we dismissed this appeal for want of prosecution. Appellants have 

filed a motion requesting this appeal be reinstated on the docket of the Court.

The memorandum opinion and judgment issued in this case on August 12, 2020 are 

WITHDRAWN. We ORDER that this appeal is reinstated on the docket of this court. We 

further ORDER that appellants’ brief shall be filed on or before October 2, 2020. Appellees’ 

combined appellees’/cross-appellants’ brief is due thirty days after the filing of appellants’ brief.

_________________________________

Irene Rios, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 2nd day of September, 2020.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
#### Anthony Bujas, Respondent, v Michelle Katz, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

In an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, the defendant Katz appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Roberto, J.), dated January 12, 1987, which denied her motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed as against the defendant Katz.

The plaintiff, an unlicensed home improvement contractor, entered into an agreement to perform demolition, carpentry, masonry, heating, plumbing and electrical work on the appellant’s premises. The plaintiff completed the work, but claimed a portion of the contract price was still due. After due de*731mand, he filed a notice of mechanic’s lien and then commenced this action to foreclose the lien. The appellant’s answer included the defense that the plaintiff was unlicensed, in violation of section 21-11.2 of the Nassau County Administrative Code. The appellant subsequently moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on this ground.

The authorities are clear that an unlicensed home improvement contractor cannot recover for services rendered either on the contract or in quantum meruit *(Richards Conditioning Corp. v Oleet,*21 NY2d 895; *Millington v Rapoport,*98 AD2d 765; *George Piersa, Inc. v Rosenthal,*72 AD2d 593; *Segrete v Zimmerman,*67 AD2d 999). In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff contends that since the ordinance prohibiting home improvement contractors from operating without a license is aimed at prohibiting abusive practices of contractors, it does not bar recovery on the contract or in quantum meruit where there is no evidence that any abusive practices occurred. However, this court has barred recovery regardless of "whether the work was performed satisfactorily or whether the failure to obtain a license was willful” *(Millington v Rapoport, supra,*at 766).

The plaintiff’s other contentions have been considered and have been found to be without merit. Niehoff, J. P., Mangano, Eiber and Harwood, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1



Informational Addendum to Report on Form 10-K

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



Not Filed Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934



The undersigned Chief Executive Officer of OYO Geospace Corporation does hereby certify as follows:



Solely for the purpose of meeting the requirements of Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and solely to the extent this certification may be applicable to this Report on Form 10-Q, the undersigned hereby certify that this Report on Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in this Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of OYO Geospace Corporation.



/s/    Gary D. OwensName:

Gary D. OwensTitle:

Chief Executive OfficerFebruary 10, 2004
----

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, **

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 **

**OF      THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 **

|   | 1. | The                Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of Section                13(a) or                15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));                and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The                information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in                all                material respects, the financial condition and results of operations                of                the Company. |
|--------|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | /s/                Daniel R. Baty      |
|--------|----------------------------------------|
|   | Daniel                R. Baty          |
|   | Chief                Executive Officer |
|   | August                9, 2006          |
##### 



Premier Foods plc Exhibit 13.2 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 USC. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I,
Paul Thomas, as Finance Director of Premier Foods plc (the Company),
hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:  (1)
    
    the accompanying Annual Report on Form 20-F for the period ending
December 31, 2003, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company. Date: June 30, 2004
    
    By:
    
    /s/ Paul ThomasName:
    
    Paul ThomasTitle:
    
    Finance Director
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Premier Foods plc and will be retained by Premier Foods plc and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
##### 



Page 24 of 24 Exhibit 99(h) KeyBank National Association, formerly
    
    Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americasknown as Key Bank USA, National Association
    
    formerly known as Bankers Trust Company800 Superior Avenue, 4th Floor
    
    as Indenture TrusteeCleveland, OH 44114
    
    60 Wall Street, 26th Floor  MS NYC60-2606New York, NY 10007JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., formally
    
    MBIA Insurance Corporationknown as Bank One, National Association
    
    as Securities Insureras Eligible Lender Trustee
    
    113 King Street4 New York Plaza, 6th Floor
    
    Armonk, NY 10504New York, NY 10004
 Independent Accountants Report
For KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2000-A We have examined managements assertion, included in its representation letter dated March 9, 2005
that KeyBank, National Association (KBNA), formerly known as Key Bank USA, National Association, a
wholly owned subsidiary of KeyCorp, complies with sections 4.04, 4.08(a), 4.08(b), 4.08(c), 5.05,
5.06, 5.07 and 5.08 of the KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2000-A Sale and Servicing Agreement and
sections 1.(a)(xx), 1.(b)(iii), 2 and 3 of the KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2000-A Administration
Agreement (collectively, the Agreements) as of December 31, 2004 and for the year then ended.
Management is responsible for KBNAs compliance with those requirements. Our responsibility is to
express an opinion on managements assertion about KBNAs compliance based on our
examination. Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and, accordingly, included examining, on a test
basis, evidence about KBNAs compliance with those requirements and performing such other
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances, except that in accordance with Section
5.05 of the Sale and Servicing Agreement, our examination assumed the accuracy of reports prepared
by KBNAs student loan processor. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for
our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on KBNAs compliance with the
specified requirements. In our opinion, assuming the accuracy of reports prepared by KBNAs student loan processor,
managements assertion that KBNA complied with the aforementioned requirements as of December 31,
2004 and for the year then ended is fairly stated, in all material respects. /s/ Ernst & Young LLP Cleveland, Ohio
March 9, 2005
<PAGE>   1
                                                                     EXHIBIT 2.9

                                PROMISSORY NOTE
                                     NO. 2

$55,000                    SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA           September 10, 1999

For VALUE RECEIVED, RNETHEALTH, INC., a Colorado corporation ("Maker"), promises
to pay to GEORGE HENRY ("Holder"), the principal sum of FIFTY-FIVE THOUSAND
DOLLARS, ($55,000.00), with interest from the date above first written at the
rate of TEN percent (10%) per annum on the balance from time to time remaining
unpaid.

The said principal and interest shall be payable in lawful money of the United
States of America at SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA or at such place as may hereafter
be designated by written notice from the holder to the maker hereof, on the date
and in the manner following:

The principal balance of this Note and all accrued interest hereon shall be due
and payable, in full (the "Maturity Date"), on the earlier of either of (i)
January 31, 2000, or (ii) immediately upon the closing by Maker of a debt and/or
equity financing.


MAKER                                       HOLDER
By:                                         By: /s/ GEORGE HENRY
   -----------------------                     ---------------------------
RnetHealth.com, Inc.                        George Henry
1411 Fifth Street, Suite 200
Santa Monica, California 90401
(310) 393-3979