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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RAYMOND TUCKER

(AC 38935)

Alvord, Prescott and Mihalakos, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been on probation in connection with his conviction

of the crime of conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree, appealed

to this court from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation

and committing him to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction.

During his probation, the defendant was arrested and charged with

assault in the third degree for allegedly punching the victim in the face,

causing her to suffer certain injuries. Following a hearing, the trial

court found that the defendant committed assault in the third degree

in violation of statute (§ 53a-61), thereby violating a general condition

of his probation, and sentenced him to sixty-two months incarceration,

execution suspended after three years, followed by three years probation. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court

erred in admitting into evidence a 911 recording allegedly made by the

victim. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 911 recording

into evidence: that court properly overruled the defendant’s lack of

foundation objection to the admission of the 911 recording, as the court,

to authenticate the recording, identified the unique numbering system

of the recording to link it to the incident and properly considered the

contents of the recording, which identified the victim, her address, the

defendant both by name and physical description, and the nature of the

victim’s injuries, and because strict admissibility rules do not apply to

probation hearings, it was within the trial court’s discretion, as the

trier of fact, to assess the reliability of the evidence in light of the

circumstances reflected in the recording; moreover, the defendant failed

to sustain his burden of providing this court with an adequate record

to review his claim of a due process violation resulting from the admission of the recording, as he failed to request that the trial court conduct

a balancing test under State v. Shakir (130 Conn. App. 458) to determine

whether good cause existed for not allowing the defendant to confront

the victim, and the defendant did not demonstrate an error so obvious

that it required reversal under the plain error doctrine.

2. The trial court’s finding that the defendant had violated his probation

was not clearly erroneous and was supported by sufficient evidence

and testimony in the record, including the defendant’s statement to his

probation officer that he had been in an altercation with the victim, the

victim’s medical records, which described her swollen, bloody lip and

loose teeth, and the authenticated 911 recording in which the victim

identified the defendant as the person who had assaulted her.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s

probation and sentencing him to a period of three years incarceration;

that court properly considered the testimony of the defendant’s probation officer, who indicated that he believed that the defendant was

inappropriate for probation, as well as the testimony of the victim, who

did not dispute that the defendant had hit her, and it also heard testimony

concerning the defendant’s extensive criminal record, prior probation

violations and noncompliance with the conditions of his probation.

Argued October 18, 2017—officially released January 23, 2018

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

violation of probation, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the matter

was tried to the court, Devlin, J.; judgment revoking

the defendant’s probation, from which the defendant

appealed to this court; thereafter, the court, Devlin, J.,

denied the defendant’s motion for articulation; subse-
quently, the court, Devlin, J., issued a memorandum of

decision regarding the violation of probation. Affirmed.

James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender,

for the appellant (defendant).

Bruce R. Lockwood, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state’s

attorney, and Margaret E. Kelley, supervisory assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

MIHALAKOS, J. The defendant, Raymond Tucker,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court finding him

in violation of probation pursuant to General Statutes

§ 53a-32. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

(1) erred in admitting a 911 recording into evidence,

(2) erroneously found that the defendant had violated

his probation, and (3) abused its discretion in imposing

a sentence of three years incarceration. We disagree

and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the issues on appeal. On July

20, 2012, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to

commit assault in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-59 (a) (4), and sentenced to

six years incarceration, execution suspended after ten

months, followed by five years of probation. On June

23, 2015, during his period of probation, the defendant

punched the victim1

in the face, causing her to suffer

a swollen and bloody lip, as well as loose teeth. The

victim called 911, reported the incident and requested

an ambulance. Bridgeport Police Officer Minerva Feliciano was dispatched to the victim’s home to investigate

a domestic violence assault. When Feliciano arrived,

the victim had already been transported to Bridgeport

Hospital. Feliciano drove to the hospital, and found the

victim crying with a swollen and bloody lip. On the

same day, the defendant called his probation officer,

Patrick Higgins, and told him that he had gotten into

an altercation with the victim and that she had possibly

called the police. On August 1, 2015, the defendant was

arrested for this incident and charged with assault in

the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a61. Rather than charge the defendant with a violation

of probation immediately, Higgins arranged for him to

attend anger management classes, but the defendant

did not attend. On October 6, 2015, the state obtained

an arrest warrant for the defendant for violation of

probation pursuant to § 53a-32 on the basis of the

domestic violence incident.

Following the violation of probation hearing on

December 1, 2015, the court found by a preponderance

of the evidence that the defendant, by assaulting the

victim, violated a criminal law, § 53a-61, thereby violating a general condition of his probation. As a result

of this violation, the court revoked the defendant’s probation and sentenced him to sixty-two months incarceration, execution suspended after three years, followed

by three years of probation. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court erred in

admitting the 911 recording into evidence at the violation of probation hearing. Specifically, the defendant
argues that ‘‘[t]he trial court erred in admitting the 911

tape as reliable hearsay, as it was unreliable and uncorroborated, not admissible under any applicable hearsay

exception, and admitted in violation of the defendant’s

due process rights.’’ The defendant also argues that the

911 recording was not properly authenticated. To the

extent this claim is not preserved, the defendant seeks

review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233,

239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), or, alternatively, reversal

as plain error. The state counters that the trial court

reasonably exercised its discretion in overruling the

defendant’s objection to the admission of the recording

of the victim’s 911 call. The state also argues that the

defendant cannot prevail on his due process claim

because the record is inadequate to review that claim.

We agree with the state.

The following additional facts are necessary for the

resolution of this claim. At the violation of probation

hearing, the state presented the testimony of Feliciano

and Higgins. The state also introduced a copy of the

victim’s medical records into evidence and sought to

introduce an audio recording of the victim’s 911 call.

The defendant objected to the admission of the 911

recording, stating the grounds for his objection as a

‘‘lack of foundation.’’ The court overruled his objection

and allowed the 911 recording to be admitted into evidence as a full exhibit.2

In the 911 recording, the victim

reported to the dispatcher that the defendant had ‘‘hit

[her] and put his hands on [her] and . . . [her] teeth

. . . [were] messed up’’ and that ‘‘[h]e hit [her] in [her]

mouth.’’ The victim identified the defendant both by

name and physical description, and also gave her own

name and address to the dispatcher. Officer Feliciano

testified that she was dispatched to the victim’s address

and later identified the victim by the same name at the

hospital. While at the hospital, Feliciano also noticed

that the victim had the injuries described in the 911

recording.

We turn to the defendant’s claim that the trial court

erred in admitting the 911 recording because it was not

properly authenticated.3 The state concedes that the

defendant’s authentication claim was properly preserved by the defendant’s timely ‘‘lack of foundation’’

objection.

We first set forth our standard of review. Challenges

to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings in a probation revocation hearing ‘‘will be overturned on appeal only where

there was an abuse of discretion and a showing by the

[defendant] of substantial prejudice or injustice. . . .

In reviewing claims that the trial court abused its discretion, great weight is given to the trial court’s decision

and every reasonable presumption is given in favor of

its correctness. . . . We will reverse the trial court’s

ruling only if it could not reasonably conclude as it did.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Young, 81
Conn. App. 710, 714, 841 A.2d 737, cert. denied, 269

Conn. 901, 852 A.2d 733 (2004); see also State v. Bullock,

155 Conn. App. 1, 38, 107 A.3d 503, cert. denied, 316

Conn. 906, 111 A.3d 882 (2015).

At the outset, we emphasize that the Connecticut

Code of Evidence does not apply to proceedings involving probation. Section 1-1 (d) (4) of the Connecticut

Code of Evidence specifically provides: ‘‘The Code,

other than with respect to privileges, does not apply in

proceedings such as, but not limited to the following

. . . [p]roceedings involving probation.’’ See also State

v. Megos, 176 Conn. App. 133, 147, 170 A.3d 120 (2017)

(‘‘The evidentiary standard for probation violation proceedings is broad. . . . [T]he court may . . . consider

the types of information properly considered at an original sentencing hearing because a revocation hearing is

merely a reconvention of the original sentencing hearing.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). Furthermore,

‘‘[i]t is well settled that probation proceedings are informal and that strict rules of evidence do not apply to

them.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Shakir, 130 Conn. App. 458, 464, 22 A.3d 1285, cert.

denied, 302 Conn. 931, 28 A.3d 345 (2011).

‘‘Both courts and commentators have noted that the

showing of authenticity is not on a par with the more

technical evidentiary rules that govern admissibility,

such as hearsay exceptions, competency and privilege.

. . . Rather, there need only be a prima facie showing

of authenticity to the court. . . . Once a prima facie

showing of authorship is made to the court, the evidence, as long [as] it is otherwise admissible, goes to

the jury, which will ultimately determine its authenticity. . . . Of course, once this prima facie showing has

been made, the opposing party may present evidence

to dispute it. The test for the admission into evidence

of sound recordings is the laying of a proper foundation

to assure the authenticity of the recordings.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Peay, 96 Conn. App. 421, 434–35, 900 A.2d 577, cert.

denied, 280 Conn. 909, 908 A.2d 541 (2006).

On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude

that the trial court properly overruled the defendant’s

‘‘lack of foundation’’ objection to the admission of the

911 tape. The court identified the unique numbering

system of the recording to link it to this incident, as

well as the contents of the recording and circumstances

surrounding the incident, in order to authenticate that

the recording was what the prosecutor claimed it to

be. The defendant never questioned that the voice on

the 911 recording was anything other than the victim’s

voice. Moreover, because strict admissibility rules do

not apply to probation hearings; State v. Quinones, 92

Conn. App. 389, 392, 885 A.2d 227 (2005), cert. denied,

277 Conn. 904, 891 A.2d 4 (2006); and the trier of fact

was the court, not a jury, it was within the court’s
discretion upon listening to the audio recording to

assess the reliability of the evidence in light of the

circumstances reflected in it. See State v. Shakir, supra,

130 Conn. App. 465. In order to authenticate the

recording, the court properly considered the contents

of the recording, which identified the victim, her

address, the defendant both by name and physical

description, and the nature of the victim’s injuries. See

State v. Valentine, 255 Conn. 61, 77, 762 A.2d 1278 (2000)

(‘‘[t]elephone conversations may be authenticated by

circumstantial evidence, if the party calling, in addition

to stating his identity, relates facts and circumstances

that, taken with other established facts, tend to reveal

his identity’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Thus,

we cannot conclude that it was an abuse of discretion

to allow the 911 recording into evidence.

The defendant also claims that the court improperly

admitted the 911 recording into evidence in that it violated his right to due process by failing to accord him

the right to confront and cross-examine the adverse

witnesses against him. The defendant argues that his

objection, paired with the state’s reference to Shakir in

answering the objection; see footnote 3 of this opinion;

served to preserve this matter in part. The defendant

appears to concede, however, that, under our precedent

in Shakir and State v. Polanco, 165 Conn. App. 563,

571–72, 140 A.3d 230, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 906, 139

A.3d 708 (2016), his due process claim is unpreserved.4

To the extent the defendant’s due process claim is

unpreserved, he seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40, as modified by In re

Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015), or,

alternatively, reversal under the plain error doctrine,

codified at Practice Book § 60-5.

We begin by setting forth the relevant legal principles.

Pursuant to Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a

claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only

if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record

is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2)

the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the

violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the

defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless

error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond

a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Polanco, supra, 165

Conn. App. 572. ‘‘[U]nless the defendant has satisfied

the first Golding prong, that is, unless the defendant has

demonstrated that the record is adequate for appellate

review, the appellate tribunal will not consider the merits of the defendant’s claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 572–73.

It is well established that the defendant is entitled to

limited due process rights in a probation revocation
proceeding. ‘‘Probation revocation proceedings fall

within the protections guaranteed by the due process

clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. . . . The revocation proceeding must comport with the basic requirements of due process because

termination of that privilege results in a loss of liberty.

. . . [T]he minimum due process requirements for

revocation of [probation] include written notice of the

claimed [probation] violation, disclosure to the [probationer] of the evidence against him, the opportunity

to be heard in person and to present witnesses and

documentary evidence, the right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses in most instances, a neutral

hearing body, and a written statement as to the evidence

for and reasons for [probation] violation. . . . Despite

that panoply of requirements, a probation revocation

hearing does not require all of the procedural components associated with an adversarial criminal proceeding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Barnes, 116 Conn. App. 76, 79, 974 A.2d 815, cert.

denied, 293 Conn. 925, 980 A.2d 913 (2009).

This court established in State v. Shakir, supra, 130

Conn. App. 458, that where hearsay evidence is offered

in a probation revocation proceeding, due process safeguards require that the court must balance the defendant’s interest in cross-examination against the state’s

good cause for denying the right to cross-examine. Id.,

467. ‘‘In considering whether the court had good cause

for not allowing confrontation or that the interest of

justice [did] not require the witness to [appear] . . .

the court should balance, on the one hand, the defendant’s interest in confronting the declarant, against,

on the other hand, the government’s reasons for not

producing the witness and the reliability of the proffered hearsay.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Polanco, supra, 165 Conn. App. 571, citing State

v. Shakir, supra, 468.

This court has determined, however, that where the

defendant does not request that the court conduct the

Shakir balancing test or make a good cause finding,

the record is inadequate for review of a due process

claim under the first prong of Golding. See State v.

Shakir, supra, 130 Conn. App. 468 (‘‘[T]he factual underpinnings for the minor complainant’s not being produced to testify that might amount to good cause were

not developed via evidence on the record demonstrating

whether producing her would cause great difficulty,

expense or risk of harm. . . . [W]e conclude that the

record is inadequate for our review under Golding.’’);

see also State v. Polanco, supra, 165 Conn. App. 576

(‘‘[T]he record is silent as to the state’s reasons for not

producing [the witness] at the probation revocation

hearing and as to whether those reasons amount to

good cause. Accordingly, we decline to review the

defendant’s unpreserved claim on the basis of an inadequate record.’’).
The defendant in the present case failed to sustain

his burden of providing this court with an adequate

record to review his claim of a due process violation.

The defendant did not request that the court conduct

the Shakir balancing test to determine whether good

cause existed for not allowing the defendant to confront

the victim. The state had no notice of the defendant’s

due process claim, and, accordingly, did not present

evidence regarding its reasons for not producing the

victim at this phase of the hearing. The record is silent

as to the state’s reasons for producing the 911 recording

in lieu of the victim’s testimony in the evidentiary phase

of the probation revocation hearing, when she testified

at the dispositional phase of the hearing later that day,

and whether those reasons amounted to good cause.

Under these circumstances, the state was not responsible for the gap in the evidence, and it would be patently

unfair to address the defendant’s due process claim on

the basis of this record. See State v. Polanco, supra,

165 Conn. App. 575. Accordingly, we decline to review

the defendant’s unpreserved due process claim on the

basis of an inadequate record.

The defendant similarly cannot prevail under the

plain error doctrine. ‘‘[The plain error] doctrine, codified at Practice Book § 60-5, is an extraordinary remedy

used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at

trial that, although unpreserved, are of such monumental proportion that they threaten to erode our system

of justice and work a serious and manifest injustice on

the aggrieved party. . . . [T]he plain error doctrine is

reserved for truly extraordinary situations [in which]

the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects

the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in

the judicial proceedings. . . . Plain error is a doctrine

that should be invoked sparingly.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Sease, 147 Conn. App. 805, 815

n.7, 83 A.3d 1206, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 932, 87 A.3d

581 (2014). On the basis of our review of the record,

we conclude that the defendant has not demonstrated

an error so obvious that it requires reversal under the

plain error doctrine.

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court’s finding that he had violated his probation was erroneous,

as the only evidence to support this finding was the

911 recording, which was improperly admitted. The

state argues that there was ample evidence to support

the trial court’s finding. We agree with the state.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the legal principles and standard of review pertinent to our discussion.

‘‘With respect to the evidentiary phase of a revocation

proceeding, [t]o support a finding of probation violation, the evidence must induce a reasonable belief that

it is more probable than not that the defendant has
violated a condition of his or her probation.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Megos, supra, 176

Conn. App. 139. ‘‘This court may reverse the trial court’s

initial factual determination that a condition of probation has been violated only if we determine that such

a finding was clearly erroneous. . . . A finding of fact

is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed. . . . In making this determination, every reasonable presumption must be given in

favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . . A fact is more

probable than not when it is supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Sherrod, 157 Conn. App. 376, 382,

115 A.3d 1167, cert. denied, 318 Conn. 904, 122 A.3d

633 (2015).

The record reveals sufficient evidence from which the

court reasonably could have found that the defendant

violated his probation. The state elicited testimony from

Higgins, who testified that the defendant called him on

June 23, 2015, to tell him that the defendant had gotten

into an altercation with the victim and that she had

possibly called the police. The state also offered into

evidence the victim’s medical records describing her

swollen, bloody lip and loose teeth. Feliciano testified

that she was dispatched to the victim’s address following the 911 call; she later interviewed the victim at

the hospital and observed her injuries. The court also

properly considered the authenticated 911 call, in which

the victim identified the defendant as the person who

assaulted her. Accordingly, we conclude that it was not

clearly erroneous for the court to find that the defendant

had violated his probation on the foregoing basis.

III

The defendant also claims that the court abused its

discretion by revoking his probation and imposing an

additional three years incarceration. Having already

determined that the state presented sufficient evidence

to find a violation of probation, we now turn to the

dispositional phase of the revocation of probation hearing. In the dispositional phase, ‘‘[i]f a violation is found,

a court must next determine whether probation should

be revoked because the beneficial aspects of probation

are no longer being served.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 185, 842 A.2d

567 (2004); see also State v. Preston, 286 Conn. 367,

375–76, 944 A.2d 276 (2008). In making the determination of whether a defendant’s probation should be

revoked, ‘‘the trial court is vested with broad discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sherrod, supra, 157 Conn. App. 382. ‘‘In determining whether

there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable

presumption should be given in favor of the correctness
of the court’s ruling; reversal is required only where

an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice

appears to have been done.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Shakir, supra, 130 Conn. App. 464.

In the dispositional phase of the hearing, the court

properly considered the testimony of Higgins, who indicated that he believed that ‘‘at [that] time [the defendant] [was] inappropriate for probation,’’ as well as the

testimony of the victim, who did not dispute that the

defendant had hit her, but requested that he not be

punished or convicted. The court also heard testimony

concerning the defendant’s extensive criminal record

and prior probation violations, as well as the defendant’s noncompliance with the conditions of his probation.

After consideration of these factors, the court concluded that the defendant was not a suitable candidate

for continued probation, stating: ‘‘I gave you a pass on

the operating under suspension. I gave you a pass on

the larceny six. I’m not giving you a pass on this . . . .

[The victim] needs to get somebody else to be her boyfriend because you’re going to jail because you’re a

batterer, you’re controlling this woman and it’s got to

stop. . . . You’re not a suitable candidate for probation. . . . Maybe you will be, but not right now.’’ On

the basis of this record, we conclude that the court did

not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s

probation and sentencing him to a period of incarceration.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through

whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-

86e.

2 The following exchange occurred when the prosecutor offered the 911

recording into evidence as a full exhibit:

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: I’m going to object, Your Honor, for lack

of foundation.

‘‘The Court: Okay. State’s position on the objection?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: State’s position is that the markings on the item one

for identification correspond to the same file number. Whether or not this

witness has personal knowledge of the call is not the issue, it’s whether or

not it can be authenticated. And I think that 911 calls traditionally [are]

allowed into evidence. And I cite State v. Shakir, 130 Conn. App. [458, 22

A.3d 1285, cert. denied, 302 Conn. 931, 28 A.3d 345 (2011)] . . . . It was a

violation of probation hearing in which the state sought to introduce . . .

a video interview of the minor complainant . . . claiming that [the tape]

constituted reliable hearsay for the less rigid evidentiary standards in violation of probation hearings. The court allowed the video to be entered as

evidence, again acknowledging that strict admissibility rules do not apply

during violation of probation hearings, and indicated it would allow it for

what it was, the victim’s statement of the complaint. So, I think under those

grounds, the state . . . can introduce it.

‘‘The Court: So, this 096 number, is that a unique number that just applies

to that case?

‘‘[Feliciano]: Yes, sir.

‘‘The Court: Okay, so if you went on a different call, it would have a

different number?

‘‘[Feliciano]: Every call has a different number.

‘‘The Court: Okay. I’m going to overrule the objection. I think the unique
file number is sufficient to authenticate it for this case. So, the exhibit

number one is admitted as a full exhibit for this hearing.’’

3 The defendant also claims that the court improperly admitted the 911

recording into evidence because it was unreliable and uncorroborated hearsay. Our review of the record indicates that the 911 recording was admitted

after the defendant objected to its admission solely on the basis of a ‘‘lack

of foundation.’’ Both the state and the court understood the defendant’s

objection as pertaining to the authenticity of the recording. In denying a

motion for articulation that the defendant filed during the pendency of this

appeal, which requested, inter alia, that the court specify the evidence

underlying the conclusion that the 911 tape was admitted as reliable hearsay,

the court stated that ‘‘[l]ack of authentication was the only ground advanced

in support of the [defendant’s] objection to the admission of the 911 tape.’’

The standard of review for a claim alleging an improper evidentiary ruling

at trial is well settled. Appellate courts are ‘‘not bound to consider claims

of law not made at the trial. . . . In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling

for review, trial counsel must object properly. . . . In objecting to evidence,

counsel must properly articulate the basis of the objection so as to apprise

the trial court of the precise nature of the objection and its real purpose,

in order to form an adequate basis for a reviewable ruling. . . . Once counsel states the authority and ground of [the] objection, any appeal will be

limited to the ground asserted.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Jorge P., 308 Conn. 740, 753, 66 A.3d 869 (2013). We conclude that because

the defendant did not make a hearsay objection at trial, his hearsay claim

is not preserved, and we decline to review it.

4 This court has held that a defendant’s due process claim is unpreserved

where the defendant never argued to the trial court that it was required to

balance his interest in cross-examining the victim against the state’s good

cause for not calling the victim as a witness. See State v. Polanco, supra,

165 Conn. App. 571; see also State v. Shakir, supra, 130 Conn. App. 465.

To the extent that the defendant’s argument suggests that our holdings

in Shakir and Polanco should be overruled as conflicting with United States

and Connecticut Supreme Court precedent, that is not within the province

of a three judge panel of the Appellate Court. We note that ‘‘this court’s

policy dictates that one panel should not, on its own, [overrule] the ruling

of a previous panel. The [overruling] may be accomplished only if the appeal

is heard en banc.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Diaz v.Commissioner

of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57, 68 n.9, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied,

299 Conn. 926, 11 A.3d 150 (2011).