Filed 12/29/21 In re K.A. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re K.A. et al., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D079269

 (Super. Ct. No. J516600B,C)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Browder A. Willis III, Judge. Affirmed.

Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Lonnie J. Eldridge, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

This is the second appeal by J.G. (Mother) in juvenile dependency 

proceedings involving her two daughters (K.A. and S.G.). In the prior appeal, 

we affirmed the juvenile court’s orders declining to return K.A. and S.G. to 

Mother’s care following the six-month review hearing. Thereafter, Mother’s

threatening behavior caused emotional harm to the girls, leading the court to 

grant a petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881

to terminate all visits between Mother and the children pending a selection 

and implementation hearing. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in 

granting this petition both as a matter of law and by abusing its discretion in

finding the continued visits to be detrimental to the children. We conclude 

the juvenile court did not err in granting the petition and therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As discussed in our prior opinion, “[i]n October 2019, the San Diego 

County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned the 

juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d) on behalf of fiveyear-old K.A. and under section 300, subdivision (b) on behalf of one-year-old 

S.G. The Agency alleged that Mother was unable to protect the children from 

physical harm and that K.A. had been sexually abused.” (See In re K.A.

(Apr. 2, 2021, D078028) [nonpub.opn.].) At a jurisdiction and disposition 

hearing in February 2020, the juvenile court sustained the allegations of the 

petitions. 

Our prior opinion discussed the history of these proceedings up to the 

six-month review hearing, held on September 29, 2020. At that hearing, the 

juvenile court found that returning the children to Mother’s care would create 

a substantial risk of detriment. On appeal, we affirmed that order. 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.
3

The juvenile court ordered supervised phone and video visits with 

Mother and gave the Agency discretion to expand to supervised in-person 

visits. Thereafter, the Agency explained that due to the need for the case to 

be assigned to a new social worker after the previous social worker obtained a 

restraining order against Mother, it would need time to assess whether inperson visits were appropriate. In the meantime, the Agency continued to 

facilitate video visits. From October to December 2020, Mother participated 

in six video visits and one in-person visit with her daughters. The in-person 

visit went well, but Mother had to be repeatedly reminded not to talk about 

the case with her daughters. Due to Mother’s refusal to refrain from 

discussing the case, the Agency decided that further in-person visits would 

not be appropriate. The Agency also attempted to obtain a visitation coach 

for Mother, but no provider would accept Mother as a client given the 

multiple restraining orders against her arising from these proceedings. 

In March 2021, Mother requested a special hearing to obtain a court 

order to reinstate in-person visits. In a responsive report, the Agency noted 

that Mother had been incarcerated in February 2021 following an arrest for 

carrying a concealed 11 and a half-inch knife with a six-inch blade while 

casing vehicles. The Agency also reported that Mother was sending 

increasingly hostile emails, refusing to allow social workers inside her home,

and accusing the Agency of kidnapping the children to sell them for adoption. 

In the social worker’s assessment, she opined that the Agency was concerned 

Mother’s anger toward the Agency could lead to harm to both the children 

and Agency staff. Accordingly, the social worker recommended that the visits 

remain “virtual and supervised.” 

At the hearing on Mother’s petitions, minors’ counsel agreed with the 

Agency and opposed Mother’s request for in-person visits. However, the court
4

sought to balance the Agency’s concerns with Mother’s need for visits by

ordering the Agency to provide one in-person visit on the condition that 

Mother agree to not “utter a single hostile word or an angry word or 

aggressive word.” 

The in-person visit occurred in late March 2021.2 At the visit, Mother 

read aloud a letter she wrote to K.A. that mentioned the case, but otherwise 

the social worker noted that the visit “went well.” Due to concerns about 

Mother’s comments, the Agency continued to recommend that there be no 

additional in-person visits. 

At the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court found that 

returning the children to Mother’s care would create a substantial risk of 

detriment and terminated Mother’s reunification services. The court set the 

matter for a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26 

and ordered that Mother was to have “liberal supervised visitation.”3 

However, three days later, the Agency filed a request to change the 

court’s order to allow for only supervised video visits and to obtain a 

temporary restraining order to protect the social worker assigned to the case 

from Mother. In a report, the Agency explained that the day after the 

12-month review hearing, Mother threatened to kill the social worker and 

then commit suicide. The police took Mother to a hospital, where she tested 

positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and alcohol and was 

thereafter placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold. The Agency also 

2 Mother mistakenly claims on appeal that the last in-person visit 

occurred in November 2020 and does not discuss this visit. 

3 Mother filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition in this court to 

challenge the juvenile court’s orders at the 12-month hearing, but no petition 

was filed after counsel was unable to find any viable issues for writ review. 
5

received reports that Mother had threatened a neighbor with a gun and 

another individual had obtained a restraining order against Mother in March 

2021. 

The juvenile court found the Agency had made a prima facie showing 

and suspended in-person visits. The court also issued a temporary 

restraining order as requested for the social worker. 

Thereafter, Mother posted on social media to suggest that she had been 

“ ‘[r]obbed’ ” of her daughters and that they were being sold into sex 

trafficking. At an evidentiary hearing, the social worker testified that 

although the girls enjoyed their in-person visits with Mother, she needed to 

be redirected to avoid discussing inappropriate matters with her daughters. 

The social worker opined that in-person visits were not safe for the children 

or supervisors given Mother’s threats and the inability to obtain supervising 

staff due to the restraining orders against Mother. In her own testimony, 

Mother explained that she was participating in therapy and had no desire to 

either kill herself or harm the social worker. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court granted a 

permanent restraining order on behalf of the social worker, but denied the 

Agency’s request to preclude in-person visits. The court found that Mother 

was not a threat to her daughters and the Agency would have to make efforts 

to facilitate visits every other week. However, the court admonished Mother 

that she was being given “one chance” to prove she could have appropriate 

interactions and refrain from threatening the social workers. As the court 

explained, any additional threats could lead the court to conclude Mother 

may “do something physical in the presence of the kids” that would require 

the court to restrict future visits. 
6

Approximately two weeks later, the Agency filed a new request to 

change the court’s order pursuant to section 388 to again request that inperson visits be suspended until Mother’s “mental health stabilizes and a 

secure guarded facility can be located.” The agency explained it was seeking 

a change in the court’s order because of Mother’s continued threatening social 

media posts, which accused the court and the Agency of child sex trafficking. 

A new social worker filed a report detailing the threats by Mother. Mother 

had called and sent text messages to K.A.’s former teacher and her school 

principal making various threats and accusations. Throughout the month of 

May 2021, Mother’s social media posts focused on her belief that the Agency 

is an “International Human Sex Trafficking ring” that had stolen her 

daughters. Mother had an outstanding arrest warrant for possession of 

methamphetamine. The Agency also noted that Agency offices did not have 

adequate security to accommodate a high-risk visitor like Mother. 

The juvenile court found the Agency had made a prima facie showing, 

temporarily suspended in-person visits, and set the matter for an evidentiary 

hearing. 

Thereafter, Mother sent text messages regarding the juvenile court’s 

participation in sex trafficking and referred to a summer camp that K.A. 

attended as an “ ‘illegal’ ” camp where children were molested. During a 

video visit, Mother told K.A. that she was stolen and referred to “that child 

abduction court.” 

Mother’s aggressive behavior began to affect her daughters. After the 

call ended, K.A. was crying and said she never wanted to talk to Mother 

again. S.G. and K.A. were crying when they returned to their caregiver’s 

home and had trouble sleeping for a few nights after the visit. At the next 

visit, Mother again became angry and yelled at K.A. and said she had been 
7

“ ‘stolen,’ ” “ ‘abducted,’ ” and “ ‘brainwashed.’ ” After the visit, K.A. was very 

upset. At another visit, Mother again told K.A. that she had been taken for 

money and was abducted. Mother began to talk to K.A. about sex trafficking, 

leading the social worker to terminate the visit. Throughout June 2021, 

Mother continued to post on social media, including photographs of guns. 

She also sent text messages referencing her gang affiliation and stated she 

was “reach[ing] out” to convicted “lifers in [P]elican [B]ay” to assist her. A 

sheriff’s deputy searched her home and reported that although he did not 

locate the guns, he found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia and two 

known gang members were visiting with Mother. 

During the last video visit before the hearing, the social worker 

reported that Mother appeared “paranoid and aggressive.” Mother yelled at 

the social worker and continued to make remarks about her daughters being 

sexualized and trafficked. After the visit, K.A. stated that she did not want 

to see or talk to Mother again. K.A. told her caregiver that she was scared 

that Mother would come take them away and hurt the caregiver. 

In July 2021, the Agency filed a new request for a restraining order for 

the newest social worker after Mother sent a series of text messages 

threatening to kill the social worker. 

In two orders—one for K.A. and one for S.G.—the juvenile court 

granted the section 388 petitions and suspended all visits between Mother 

and her daughters. The court explained that it could understand Mother’s 

frustration and viewed her earlier behavior as “harassment that was brought 

on by the angst of the circumstances.” The court further noted that it 

attempted to place the parties in a position where the Agency was required to 

facilitate visits, but where Mother had a corresponding duty to act in a 

positive way and show good faith. Although the court believed the Agency 
8

could have done better in facilitating visits, it concluded that Mother’s 

escalating threats “creates a situation where . . . there has to be a line drawn 

in the sand as to what can be acceptable or what can be explained away or 

justified.” 

Regarding the section 388 petitions, the court summarized the evidence 

as establishing “a bad situation across the board because it is a terrible loop 

of unfulfilled promises and expectations that feed on each other. The Agency 

is afraid and Mother is frustrated. The caregivers are expressing concerns 

because the contact with Mother manifests itself in regressive behavior with 

the two girls where the girls have actually for their young age articulated a 

great deal of angst and frustration and fear. And, yes, they love their 

mother. That is clear. Mother loves her children, but the circumstances have 

become unmanageable and the court has to protect not only the girls but has 

to protect the Agency workers that are continuously under threat by 

[Mother].” 

Accordingly, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the 

visits were detrimental to the children and that it would be in their best 

interest to suspend all visits.

Mother appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Mother contends the juvenile court committed a “mistake of law” by 

granting the section 388 petitions because the orders denied Mother her right 

to visits with her daughters. She appears to assert she has a fundamental 

right, as a matter of law, to continued visits with her daughters, regardless of 

her own actions. She contends this court should review the juvenile court’s 

decision under the de novo standard of review. 
9

Mother fails to establish that she has an absolute right to visits with 

her daughters at this stage in the proceedings. After a minor has been 

adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court, as in this case, the court may 

limit a parent’s control over a child, including restrictions on the presumptive

right to visitation if the child has been removed from the parent’s physical 

custody. (§§ 361, subd. (a)(1), 362, subd. (a).) Although visits should 

generally be as frequent as possible, all orders for visitation must be 

“consistent with the well-being of the child” and may not “jeopardize the 

safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A)-(B).) 

These statutes vest the juvenile court with discretion to terminate all 

visits if necessary to protect a child. (See, e.g., In re Daniel C.H. (1990) 

220 Cal.App.3d 814, 838-839.) After a court has terminated reunification 

services and ordered a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 be held, it may 

suspend visitation between a parent and child if it finds, based upon a 

preponderance of the evidence,that visitation would be detrimental to the 

child. (§ 366.21, subd. (h); In re Manolito L. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 753, 

760-762.)

Mother correctly notes that visitation is an important aspect of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship and suspending visitation will 

likely make it difficult for a parent to establish the existence of the beneficial 

parent-child relationship exception to adoption at a selection and 

implementation hearing. (See, e.g., In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 

1497, 1504 [“Courts have long recognized that, in the context of dependency 

proceedings, a lack of visitation may ‘virtually assure[] the erosion (and 

termination) of any meaningful relationship’ between mother and child.”].) 

Mother relies on our Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Caden C. (2021) 

11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.), to support her claim regarding the importance of 
10

visitation in this context. (See, e.g., id. at p. 625 [parental-benefit exception 

applies “where the parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with 

the child”].) Although we agree with the importance of visitation and the 

Agency does not dispute that a parent’s regular visitation with a minor is a 

relevant factor at a selection and implementation hearing, nothing in 

Caden C. supports Mother’s claim to a fundamental, absolute right to 

visitation here. 

Similarly, Mother relies on this court’s decision in In re Valerie A. 

(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987 (Valerie A.) to suggest she has a due process right 

to visitation to preserve her ability to establish an exception to adoption, but 

that decision does not support her claim. In Valerie A., we recognized the 

importance of visitation, but also noted that a parent’s due process rights are 

“ ‘compromised’” only when visitation is suspended “ ‘through no fault’ ” of 

the parent. (Id. at p. 1006.) Here, the court did not arbitrarily suspend 

visits, but rather acted in response to Mother’s own actions that were 

detrimental to her daughters. Mother fails to cite any authority establishing 

that she must be provided visits with her daughters following termination of 

reunification services even if her own actions led the juvenile court to 

conclude those visits would be detrimental to her daughters.

Thus, both the statutes applicable to juvenile dependency proceedings 

and existing case authority support a juvenile court’s ability to limit or 

terminate visitation upon a proper showing that doing so is in the child’s best 

interest. Mother fails to demonstrate that the juvenile court lacked such 

discretion and we see no basis to reverse the court’s orders on this ground.

Mother also argues the juvenile court could not “cover up” the Agency’s 

violation of court orders to provide visits by subsequently terminating all 

visitation. She asserts that “[t]he Agency’s blatant refusal to follow the 
11

court’s repeat visitation orders during the majority of the dependency case” 

infringed on her fundamental rights. 

The record, however, does not support Mother’s assertion that the 

Agency violated the court’s visitation orders. At the six-month review 

hearing, the juvenile court ordered only virtual visits but gave the Agency 

discretion to allow in-person visits. The Agency complied with this order and 

voluntarily facilitated an in-person visit. 

Thereafter, in March 2021, Mother requested an order requiring 

additional in-person visits, which the court granted by ordering the Agency to 

provide one in-person visit. The Agency complied by facilitating an in-person 

visit that same month. Mother implies on appeal that this visit never 

occurred and that her last in-person visit was held in November 2020, but 

she provides no evidence to undermine the direct evidence in the record 

regarding the March 2021 in-person visit. Absent evidence to the contrary, 

we accept that the visit occurred and that the Agency complied with the 

juvenile court’s order. 

The juvenile court made subsequent orders requiring in-person visits, 

but each was closely followed by temporary orders suspending visits after the 

Agency filed section 388 petitions seeking such a suspension based on 

Mother’s escalating threats and actions. Although there were short periods 

of time in which the juvenile court’s orders requiring in-person visits were in 

effect before the Agency obtained temporary orders suspending visits, the 

record suggests that any absence of visits in these interim periods was not 

the result of the Agency’s intentional violation of court orders. Instead, the 

juvenile court could reasonably conclude that the absence of visits in these 

intervals was caused by the Agency’s need to assign a new social worker 

following the issuance of restraining orders prohibiting contact between 
12

Mother and assigned social workers based on Mother’s threats. Then, in May

2021, when a new social worker attempted to contact Mother regarding 

visitation, Mother did not answer her telephone and her voicemail box was 

full. Mother then resumed her threatening behavior, leading the Agency to 

seek a new court order to suspend visits. Thus, the record before the juvenile 

court establishes that any failure to provide visits was not the result of the 

Agency’s “blatant refusal” to follow court orders, but rather due to Mother’s 

own actions. We therefore reject Mother’s claim that the Agency acted in bad 

faith and violated the court’s visitation orders. 

Alternatively, Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion 

in granting the section 388 petitions because the Agency failed to establish 

any changed circumstances or that it was in the best interests of her 

daughters to suspend visitation. Pursuant to section 388, subdivision (a)(1), 

“[a]ny parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent 

child,” may petition the court “for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside 

any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the 

court.” The moving party must establish (1) there has been a change of 

circumstance or new evidence; and (2) the modification is in the child’s best 

interests. (Ibid.; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) A petition 

under section 388 “is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, 

and its decision will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of a clear 

abuse of discretion.” (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.) The 

appellant has the burden on appeal to affirmatively show that the juvenile 

court abused its discretion. (Ibid.)

As applied to orders regarding visitation, this court has held that a 

juvenile court’s finding of detriment to support a suspension of visits is 

reviewed under the substantial evidence standard of review. (In re Mark L. 
13

(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 581, fn. 5 (Mark L.), disapproved on other grounds 

in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) As our Supreme 

Court has recently explained in a different context, we review the juvenile

court’s factual determinations to consider whether they are supported by 

substantial evidence, but review the juvenile court’s balancing of those 

factual determinations to determine whether terminating visits would be in 

the child’s best interest under the abuse of discretion standard of review.4 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 640-641.) 

Here, the juvenile court concluded that Mother’s escalating threats and 

erratic behavior constituted a changed circumstance. Although Mother had 

made many threats and acted erratically before the section 388 petitions

were filed, her behavior further escalated before the last hearing, leading the 

court to impose “a line drawn in the sand as to what can be acceptable or 

what can be explained away or justified.” More importantly, the juvenile 

court focused on the real and substantial effect of Mother’s most recent

actions on her daughters as establishing a change in circumstance. Whereas

Mother’s earlier behavior mostly targeted the social workers, the court found 

Mother’s actions during the latest visits “have upset and traumatized the two 

girls and that manifests itself . . . in emotional outbursts.” As discussed 

above, the social worker’s reports regarding the girls’ adverse reaction to 

Mother’s behavior supports these findings. 

For the same reason, the record supports the juvenile court’s conclusion 

that contact with Mother was detrimental to the girls, such that it was not in 

4 The Agency discusses in its respondent’s brief that juvenile courts have 

applied a variety of standards in granting orders affecting visitation and 

appellate courts similarly offer varying standards for review. The juvenile 

court’s rulings here are correct under any of these standards. 
14

their best interests to continue visitation. (See In re Jacob P. (2007) 

157 Cal.App.4th 819, 829 [observing in a different context that “ ‘The two 

standards [best interest and detriment]“are basically two sides of the same 

coin. What is in the best interests of the child is essentially the same as that 

which is not detrimental to the child.’ ”].) The social worker reported the 

children were frightened during their calls with Mother and had significant 

periods of time after visits during which they cried and were unable to sleep. 

The girls reported they were afraid of Mother and relieved when they did not 

have to visit with her. Moreover, K.A. expressed concern that Mother would

harm her current caregiver and take her away from her current placement.

This evidence supports the court’s finding of detriment.

Mother suggests that instead of ordering a full suspension of all visits 

between Mother and her daughters, the court should have permitted visits to 

continue “in a therapeutic setting or by a neutral monitor, in person or by 

video.” The record, however, establishes this was not possible: a social 

worker testified that given the multiple restraining orders against Mother, no 

visitation coach or visitation center would accept Mother and the Agency was 

concerned for the safety of any person who may be tasked with supervising 

visits. 

Moreover, the juvenile court’s orders suspending all visitation were

focused on the effect of Mother’s actions during visits on her daughters. 

Additional visits, either in person or by video, would present identical risks to 

the girls’ emotional well-being. The juvenile court correctly determined all 

visitation would be detrimental to the girls and we will not second-guess that 

finding.

Considered altogether, the evidence establishes that Mother’s behavior 

was causing significant harm to the girls in the form of emotional trauma. A 
15

juvenile court may properly suspend visitation when “forced contact” might 

lead to emotional harm. (Mark L., supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 581; In re D.B. 

(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1090.) Here, the emotional harm was 

detrimental to the girls such that the juvenile court reasonably concluded it 

was not in their best interests to continue visits with Mother. Accordingly, 

the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Agency’s 

section 388 petitions to protect the children by ending their visits with 

Mother. 

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

GUERRERO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.