alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Michael Personale, Appellant.

— Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant was convicted of arson in the second degree and other crimes as a result of a fire at the home of his former girlfriend and her family. He argues on appeal that an incriminating statement made to the police on September 30 should have been suppressed because earlier that day in a telephone conversation the police had been informed by his sister that he had retained counsel. Defen*1004dant’s statement was admissible "unless he had retained counsel on the matter under investigation to the knowledge of the police [citation omitted] or had unequivocally informed the police of his intention to do so” *(People v Rowell,*59 NY2d 727, 730). Since defendant does not contend that he informed the police that he intended to retain counsel, the only issue is whether he had in fact retained counsel and, if so, whether the police knew it. Neither defendant nor his attorney testified at the suppression hearing. Defendant’s mother testified that she thought an attorney was hired on September 26, and that she "assumed” her son had hired the attorney on September 27. This contradictory testimony is insufficient to establish representation by counsel. The only other testimony that counsel had been retained was hearsay testimony by defendant’s sister that she had been so informed by defendant’s mother. Thus, defendant has failed to prove that he was represented at the time he made the statement.

We have examined defendant’s other contentions and we find them to be without merit. (Appeal from judgment of Ontario County Court, Henry, J. — arson, second degree, and criminal mischief, second degree.) Present — Denman, J. P., Boomer, Pine, Lawton and Schnepp, JJ.
(November 12, 1986)

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Leon West, Appellant.

Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Levine, JJ., concur.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the amended annual report of Trycera Financial, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-KSB/A-1 for the year ended December 31, 2004, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned principal executive officer of the Company,
hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
          or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of
          operations of the Company.


Date:  May 23, 2005

/s/ Matthew S. Kerper
Matthew S. Kerper, President
(Principal executive officer)
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. John C. BARRETT, Specialist Four, U. S. Army, Appellant.

No. 29,937.

U. S. Court of Military Appeals.

July 11, 1975.

*Colonel Victor A. DeFiori, Captain John C. Carr,*and *Captain Robert D. Jones*were on the pleadings for Appellant, Accused.

*Lieutenant Colonel Ronald M. Holdaway, Captain Joel M. Martel,*and *Captain John F. Schmutz*were on the pleadings for Appellee, United States.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

In addition to the uncontested evidence of record, an unopposed and unrebutted post-trial affidavit from appellant’s mother indicates that the appellant elected to enter the Army in 1967 rather than serve a 4-year term in a Utah reformatory following his juvenile conviction for rape, breaking and entering, and assault.

As in *United States v. Catlow,*23 U.S.C.M.A. 142, 145, 48 C.M.R. 758, 761 (1974), appellant did not of his own volition seek out a recruiting officer to enlist. Rather, an Army recruiter contacted appellant while he was confined and advised him “to enlist in the Army or be removed from the detention center and sent to the reform school at Ogden, Utah.” For the reasons enunciated in *Catlow,*appellant’s enlistment was void at its inception.

Because an agent of the Government acted improperly in securing appellant’s enlistment, fairness prevents the Government from now relying upon a constructive enlistment as a jurisdictional base. *United States v. Brown,*23 U.S.C.M.A. 162, 165, 48 C.M.R. 778, 781 (1974). Additionally, the absence of evidence that the juvenile *75charges against appellant were dismissed following his enlistment would preclude reliance upon a constructive enlistment. *United States v. Catlow, supra*at 146, 48 C.M.R. at 762.

Government counsel maintain that a limited rehearing on the jurisdictional issue should be authorized. *United States v. Burke,*48 C.M.R. 246 (ACMR 1974); *cf. United States v. DuBay,*17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967). Unlike *Burke,*the void enlistment issue clearly was raised in the accused’s sworn testimony at trial. Thus, the Government had an affirmative obligation to establish jurisdiction over the accused. *Runkle v. United States,*122 U.S. 543, 556, 7 S.Ct. 1141, 30 L.Ed. 1167 (1887); *see United States v. Singleton,*21 U.S.C.M.A. 432, 45 C.M.R. 206 (1972). Neither at trial nor during the course of this appeal has the Government met that burden. The absence of controverting evidence on the jurisdictional question obviates the need for a limited rehearing.

The decision of the United States Army Court of Military Review is reversed. The findings of guilty and sentence are set aside, and the charges are ordered dismissed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Linwood Cola PARKER, a/k/a Lenny, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 10-7577.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 29, 2011.

Decided: May 16, 2011.

Linwood Cola Parker, Appellant Pro Se. Gurney Wingate Grant, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia; Darryl James Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Linwood Cola Parker seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion to recuse or disqualify. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Parker seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY

AND CASUALTY COMPANY,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

STEVE WAYNE CAMP,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 11-36079

D.C. No. 9:11-cv-00101-DWM

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 8, 2013**

Portland, Oregon

Before: SILVERMAN, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Steve Camp appeals the permanent injunction entered by the district court

following a jury verdict in favor of American National Property and Casualty

FILED

OCT 10 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Company in its action to enforce the parties’ non-compete and trade secret

agreements. We dismiss in part and affirm in part. 

Camp’s challenges to paragraphs one and two of the permanent injunction

are moot because by their explicit terms they expired on the same date – March 3,

2012 – as the non-compete agreement which they enforced. See Shell Offshore,

Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 2013) (challenges to an

injunction that has expired on its own terms are moot unless the “capable of

repetition yet evading review” exception applies). 

Contrary to Camp’s assertion, paragraph three of the permanent injunction,

which concerns trade secrets, does not impose on Camp a perpetual obligation to

preserve American National’s records. Rather, the plain language only prohibits

Camp from “using” American National’s trade secrets and “spoiling” American

National’s records, nothing more. 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART. 

2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In the Matter of : No. 1 6 1 DB 2022 (No. 11 RST 2023)

:

SUSAN IRENE STABLES : Attorney Registration No. 90652

:

PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT :

FROM INACTIVE STATUS : ( Out of State )

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 16 th day of February

, 202 3 , the Report and Recommendation of

Disciplinar y Board Member date d February 6 , 202 3

, is approved and it is ORDERED that

SUSAN IRENE STABLES

, who has been on Inactive Status

, h as demonstrated that s he

has the moral qualifications, competency

, and learning in law required for admission to

practice in the Commonwealth, shall be and is, hereby reinstated to active status as a

member of the Bar of this Commonwealth. The expenses incurred by the Board in t he

investigation and processing of this matter shall be paid by the Petitioner

.
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 5D23-23

LT Case No. 16-2019-CF-004412-AXXX

_____________________________

REQUAN JOSHUA JACKSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________ 

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. 

Tatiana Salvador, Judge. 

Jessica Yeary, Public Defender, and Kathryn Lane, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daren L. Shippy, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 

November 28, 2023 

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. 

JAY, EISNAUGLE, and KILBANE, JJ., concur. 
2

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
Exhibit 10.39


 


AGREEMENT EXTENDING TERM OF


PHANTOM STOCK AGREEMENT


 


THIS AGREEMENT EXTENDING TERM OF PHANTOM STOCK AGREEMENT
(the “Extension Agreement”) is made and entered into as of the 31st day of December, 2009 by and between Affinity
Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“AGI”) and [                         ]
(the “Executive”);


 


WITNESSETH


 


WHEREAS, AGI and Executive are parties to that certain
Phantom Stock Agreement dated as of January 1, 2007 (the “Agreement”); and


 


WHEREAS, AGI wishes to extend the term of the Agreement and
Executive is willing to have the term extended and to continue Executive’s
duties with AGI on the terms set forth in this Extension Agreement;


 


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and of the
mutual covenants contained herein and other good and valuable consideration,
AGI and Executive hereby agree as follows:


 


1.         The term of
the Agreement shall be extended and shall continue until such time as AGI and
the Executive have entered into an amended agreement or a replacement agreement
on terms that are mutually acceptable to AGI and the Executive.


 


2.         This
Extension Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which
shall be deemed to be an original without the production of the others, but all
of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument.


 


3.         This
Extension Agreement contains the entire understanding of the parties with
respect to the subject matter hereof and may not be varied, modified or amended
except by a writing signed by the parties to be charged.  The making, execution and delivery of this
Extension Agreement by the parties hereto have been induced by no
representations, statements, warranties or agreements of the other except those
herein expressed.


 


4.         Except as
otherwise specifically modified or amended hereby, all of the terms of the
Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the individual party has hereunto set
his hand and the corporate party has caused these presents to be executed by a
proper officer thereunto duly authorized all as of the day and year first above
written.


 


	
   

  	
  AFFINITY GROUP, INC.

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  By:

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
  Its:

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
    [“Executive”]

  
					



 


121
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           2,064
<SECURITIES>                                    30,054
<RECEIVABLES>                                   20,963
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,661
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                55,690
<PP&E>                                          36,493
<DEPRECIATION>                                  26,793
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  83,494
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           26,955
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            5,054
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        92,258
<OTHER-SE>                                    (46,431)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    83,494
<SALES>                                        159,106
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                          133,401
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,505
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 1,130
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 139
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 27,071
<INCOME-TAX>                                    11,239
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             15,832
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    15,832
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    $0.65
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    $0.62


</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-10366

Summary Calendar

 

LINZY E. LINCOLN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

GARY L. JOHNSON, Director, Texas

Department of Criminal Justice,

Institutional Division,

Respondent-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:98-CV-243

- - - - - - - - - -

October 20, 1998

Before JOLLY, SMITH and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Linzy E. Lincoln, Texas prisoner no. # 265570, requests a

COA to appeal the district court’s denial of his petition for

habeas corpus for failure to obtain permission from this court to

file a successive petition. Lincoln argues that (1) the trial

court “breached it[s] plea bargain agreement,” (2) the state

breached the plea agreement, (3) the trial court lost

jurisdiction when it amended the indictment, (4) the trial court

should have quashed the indictment, (5) the jury improperly 
No. 98-10366

-2-

considered parole laws, (6) Lincoln was denied a fair trial

because the jury foreman admitted to having been a robbery

victim, (7) the state improperly informed the jury of three prior

robberies, (8) Lincoln was improperly denied a good time credit,

(9) Lincoln was denied effective assistance of counsel for five

separately enumerated reasons.

The district court denied Lincoln’s petition because it was

successive and Lincoln had failed to receive permission from this

court to file it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). After

the district court’s order dismissing the instant case, this

court denied Lincoln’s request to file a successive petition to

assert errors which allegedly occurred during his trial. In re

Lincoln, No. 98-00137 (5th Cir. Apr. 15, 1998). This court,

however, denied as unnecessary Lincoln’s request that he be

allowed to file a petition concerning calculation and/or denial

of his parole. Id.; see In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir.

1998) (challenge to disciplinary proceedings that became final

subsequent to a prior habeas petition is not "second or

successive" petition).

Because Lincoln did not need permission to file his petition

regarding the issue of calculation of his parole, the district

court erred in dismissing the petition as it related to that

issue. See Murphy v. Johnson, 110 F.3d 10, 11 (5th Cir. 1997)

Lincoln, however, has failed to make a credible showing that the

district court erred in dismissing his other habeas claims.

COA is DENIED as to all issues involving allegations of

errors occurring at Lincoln’s trial. COA is GRANTED as to
No. 98-10366

-3-

Lincoln’s arguments regarding parole and good time credit

calculation, and the district court’s decision regarding

Lincoln’s parole claim is VACATED AND REMANDED for consideration

of this claim on the merits.

COA GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; PAROLE CLAIMS

VACATED AND REMANDED.
#### Samuel J. HASTINGS, Petitioner—Appellant, v. Gregory KNOWLIN, Warden, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 10-7459.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 29, 2011.

Decided: April 18, 2011.

Samuel J. Hastings, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, James Anthony Mabry, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Samuel J. Hastings seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appeal-able unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Hastings has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in *201the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A24I0219. JERIDA FACILITIES MANAGEMENT, LLC et al. v. POST OAK

GROUP, LLC.

In this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, equitable accounting, and

breach of contract or unjust enrichment, Jerida Facilities Management, LLC, and

Jeffrey A. Keebler (“Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial

court entered an order on May 2, 2024, denying Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment and reopening discovery; on May 10, 2024, the court certified its order for

immediate review. On May 21, 2024, Defendants filed this application seeking to

appeal the court’s order. We, however, lack jurisdiction.

It is the duty of this Court to inquire into its jurisdiction. Radio Sandy Springs,

Inc. v. Allen Rd. Joint Venture, 311 Ga. App. 334, 334-335 (715 SE2d 752) (2011).

Under OCGA § 5-6-34 (b), a party may request interlocutory review if the trial court

certifies within ten days of entry of the order at issue that immediate reviewshould be

had. The application to this Court then must be made “within ten days after such

certificate is granted.” Id. The requirements of OCGA§ 5-6-34 (b) are jurisdictional,

and if a party seeking interlocutory review does not comply with these requirements,

the party must wait until final judgment to appeal. See Islamkhan v. Khan, 299 Ga.

548, 551 (2) (787 SE2d 731) (2016).

Here, because Defendants filed this application 11 days after the trial court

entered its certificate of immediate review, it is untimely. See Graves v. Dean, 166 Ga.

App. 186 (303 SE2d 751) (1983).

June 11, 2024
Accordingly, this application is hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office,Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

06/11/2024
exv10w3xcy





Exhibit
10.3(c)



	 	 	 
	Citigroup Managed Futures LLC	 	T 212-559-2011
	55 E. 59th Street - 10th Floor

	 	F 212-793-1986
	New York, NY 10022
	 	 






June 9, 2009









John W. Henry & Company, Inc.

301 Yamato Road, Suite 2200

Boca Raton, Fl. 33431-4931




Attn: Mr. Ken Webster




          Re: Management Agreement Renewals




Dear Mr. Webster:



We are writing with respect to your management agreements concerning the commodity pools to which
reference is made below (the “Management Agreements”). We are extending the term of the Management
Agreements through June 30, 2010 and all other provisions of the Management Agreements will remain
unchanged.





	 	•	 	Smith Barney Westport Futures Fund L.P.
	 
	 	•	 	JWH Master Fund LLC
	 
	 	•	 	Citigroup Diversified Futures Fund L.P.
	 
	 	•	 	CMF Institutional Futures Portfolio L.P.




Please acknowledge receipt of this modification by signing one copy of this letter and returning it
to the attention of Ms. Jennifer Magro at the address above or
fax to 212-793-1986. If you have any
questions I can be reached at 212-559-5046.




Very truly yours,




CITIGROUP MANAGED FUTURES LLC




	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	By:  	/s/
Jennifer Magro
 	 	 
	 	Jennifer Magro 	 	 
	 	Chief Financial Officer & Director 	 	 



JOHN W. HENRY & COMPANY, INC



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	By:  	/s/
Kenneth S Webster
 	 	 
	 
	Print Name: 	Kenneth S Webster 	 	 




JM/sr