alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 9, 2016

t0308 

# Order

Clerk March 9, 2016

153085

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v SC: 153085

COA: 330390

Oakland CC: 2015

- 255117

- FH

BRANDON RENAR SMITH,

Defendant

- Appellee.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 22, 2016

order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.30 5(H)(1), in lieu of

granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for

consideration as on leave granted. We note that a similar issue is presented in People v

English (Docket No. 153084), which we remanded to the Court of Appeals f or

consideration as on leave granted by order dated March 9, 2016.
Exhibit 10.21



Amendment to Employment Agreement



This document is dated as of December 8, 2004, and amends the Employment Agreement dated August 8, 2000 between Stephen G. Kasnet and
Calypso Management LLC (as amended previously, Employment Agreement).



The first sentence of Section 1 of the Employment Agreement provides for Mr. Kasnets engagement by Calypso for the Term (as defined in the Administration and Liquidation Agreement).



The Administration and Liquidation Agreement has been amended to extend the Term
of the Administration and Liquidation Agreement until October 24, 2006.



The
parties wish to confirm that the Term of the Employment Agreement is correspondingly extended to October 24, 2006.



Therefore, for value received, including the exchange of $10 herewith paid and other good and valuable consideration, the parties confirm and agree that:



1. The Term of the Employment Agreement shall continue until
October 24, 2006;



2. References to the Administration and Liquidation
Agreement in the Employment Agreement mean the Administration and Liquidation Agreement as amended from time to time; and



3. Except as set forth above, the terms of the Employment Agreement are hereby ratified and affirmed.



Executed under seal.



|                       |  |                            |  |  |  |  |  |                         
|---------------------- |  | -------------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | ------------------------
|Calypso Management LLC |  |                            |  | 
|                       |  |                            |  | 
|By:                    |  | /S/    DONALD H. HUNTER    |  |  |  |  |  | /S/    STEPHEN G.
KASNET
|                       |  | Donald H. Hunter CFO & COO |  |  |  |  |  | Stephen G. Kasnet
EXHIBIT 32.1

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Advanced Engine
Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending
September 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the "Report"), I, Carroll Shelby, President of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

Date: November 14, 2003           /s/ Carroll Shelby
                                Carroll Shelby, President
#### McGUIRK, Appellant, v. HOUGH, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

October 2, 1896.)

Action by Mary McGuirk against Isaac Hough.

No opinion. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.
### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00484- CV

In t he M at te r of J. B.

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. J-24 ,643 , HO NORAB LE LEONARD RAY SAENZ , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
J .B. a ppeals f ro m his adjudication as delinquent ba sed on the off ense of criminal trespass. SeeTex. Pen. Code Ann. § 30.05 (West Supp. 2005). J.B. filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dism iss the petition based on the ar g ument that he should have be en cha rg ed with the more spec ific off

ense of trespass on sc hool grounds, a Class C misdemeanor ove r which the district court lac ked jurisdiction. SeeTex. Educ. C o d e An n . § 37.107 (West 1996). The tria l court
ov e rr ule d th e ple a to the jur isd ic tio n. Pur su ant to a wr itt e n ple a a g re e me nt, a pp e lla nt s tip ulate d to
c omm iss ion

of the of fe ns e of c ri min a l tr e sp a ss a

nd wa s pla c e d o n in -h ome pr ob a tio n f or six mo nth s. We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt. In a ca se squar ely

on point, this Court has overruled the same contention. Se e In re J.M.R. , 149 S
. W
. 3 d 289, 294-95 (Te x . App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). This Court held that the
c ri min a l tre sp a ss statut e and the sc ho ol t

re sp a ss s tatut e we re no t in p ar i m ate ria , th a t th e State c ou ld char g e the juvenile unde r either statute, and that the district c ourt had jurisdiction ove r the a lleg ation2

of cri m i n al t re s pass ag ainst the juvenile. Id ; In reM. A. L. , No. 03-04-00247- CV, 2005 Tex. App. L EX I S 55 09 , at *2 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin July 13 , 2 00 5) (m e m. o p. ); In re K.M. , No. 03-04-00315- CV, at *1-2 (T ex. App.—Austin J u n e 1 7 , 2 0 0 5, no pet.) (me m. op.). Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt .

W. Kenneth L aw, Chief Justice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: May

12, 2006
State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: June 25, 2015 520062 

________________________________

In the Matter of SAMUEL WEEKES, 

Petitioner, 

v

MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT

ALBERT PRACK, as Director of 

Special Housing and Inmate 

Disciplinary Program, 

Respondent.

________________________________

Calendar Date: May 5, 2015

Before: Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Lynch and Devine, JJ.

__________

Samuel Weekes, Marcy, petitioner pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Peter H.

Schiff of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this

Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in St. Lawrence

County) to review a determination of the Commissioner of

Corrections and Community Supervision which found petitioner

guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

Petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with

committing an unhygienic act after a search of his cell allegedly

uncovered the fingertip of a latex glove filled with urine. 

Following a tier III disciplinary hearing, petitioner was found

guilty and that determination was affirmed upon administrative

appeal. This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued. 

The misbehavior report and testimony from the correction

officer that petitioner, in fact, admitted that the liquid was
-2- 520062 

urine provides substantial evidence to support the determination

of guilt (see Matter of Haughey v Artus, 108 AD3d 956, 956

[2013]; Matter of Dushane v Fischer, 102 AD3d 1043, 1043 [2013]). 

Although petitioner testified that the substance was water and

denied that he made any incriminating admission to the correction

officer, this created a credibility issue for the Hearing Officer

to resolve (see Matter of Silverstein v Bezio, 65 AD3d 1424, 1425

[2009]). To the extent that petitioner asserts that there was a

violation of Department of Corrections and Community Supervision

Directive No. 4910A (VII) (c) because the substance was

improperly destroyed before the conclusion of the hearing,

petitioner has failed to preserve this issue for this Court's

review by not raising it at the hearing or on administrative

appeal (see Matter of Cayenne v Goord, 16 AD3d 782, 783 [2005]). 

Were we to consider such issue, we would find petitioner's

reliance on Matter of Clark v Fischer (114 AD3d 1116 [2014]) to

be misplaced, as the correction officer here testified that

petitioner admitted that the liquid was urine. 

Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur.

ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, without

costs, and petition dismissed.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court
EXHIBIT 31.1

   CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, James S. Osterman, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Blount International,
Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this quarterly report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

     (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

     (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     (c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors:

     (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

     (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls.

Date:  July 30, 2004

/s/ James S. Osterman
-----------------------
James S. Osterman
President and Chief Executive Officer
REQUEST A HEARING

NOTE: Whether you choose to submit your evidence by mail in lieu of a hearing, or attend a hearing, ALL 

evidence is considered by the Hearing Officer in the same way. It is given the same consideration 

and weight regardless of the method used to put the evidence before the Hearing Officer.

TIME LINE: Within 30 days of your receipt of our preliminary assessment letter

If you feel a written response will not adequately express your side of the 

incident, you may request a hearing in writing. The written request must 

include in detail the issues you want to raise and dispute at the hearing.

Hearing Officers may be precluded from considering issues you want to raise, if 

you do not comply with the requirement for prior written notice. 

Please send your issues in dispute to request your hearing to one of the following:

Email: HQS-SMB-CGHO-Response@USCG.MIL

Fax: (202)372-8422

Mail:

U.S. Coast Guard Hearing Office 

2703 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. SE. / STOP 7794 

Washington, DC 20593-7794 

Hearings are generally held by video-teleconferencing (VTC) at a site closest to 

you. Hearings are not routinely recorded or transcribed, but you may, at your 

expense, arrange for a court reporter to record and transcribe the hearing. 

You will be contacted shortly, after receipt of your hearing request that identifies 

the issues in dispute, to advise you of the location, date, and time of the VTC 

hearing. The location of the hearing will generally be at a Coast Guard District 

Office. 

Coast Guard District Offices are located at:

• Boston, MA

• Miami, FL

• Cleveland, OH

• New Orleans, LA

• Alameda, CA

• Seattle, WA

• Honolulu, HI.

• In-person hearings are held at our offices in Washington, DC

There is no VTC capability at the District Office in Juneau, AK. VTC hearings in 

Alaska may be scheduled in various locations if and when equipment is available. 

If VTC locations become available that are closer to you, we will advise you 
accordingly. Our goal is to schedule your hearing soon after we receive your 

request for a hearing. 

Except for the equipment, a video-teleconference hearing is no different than a 

hearing in which you appear in person. The only persons that can see and hear 

each other are the persons that should be at the hearing - you, your representative, 

witnesses and the Hearing Officer. The transmission is private. It makes no 

difference whether the hearing is by video-teleconference or in-person.
(76 Hun, 546.)

#### MANLEY v. DECKER.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department.

April 12, 1894.)

Authority of Agent—Warranty of Goods Sold.

In an action ■ for breach of warranty of goods sold by defendant’s agent, a conversation between defendant and the agent is not admissible to show that defendant did not authorize the agent to warrant the goods, since authority to sell includes an authority to warrant.

Appeal from Cattaraugus county court.

Action by Wilbur J. Manley against Albert L. Decker, as treasurer of the North Leon Cheese Factory. From a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Argued before DWIGHT, P. J., and LEWIS, HAIGHT, and BRADLEY, JJ.

E. A. Nash, for appellant.

William H. Henderson, for respondent.

BRADLEY, J.

The action was brought to recover damages for an alleged breach of warranty in the sale of a quantity of cheese to William E. Smith & Co. The plaintiff is assignee of the claim He made the purchase of the cheese for them through Harrison Franklin, who was authorized to make the sale. The evidence on the part of the plaintiff is: That, in the interview or negotiation between Franklin and the plaintiff, the latter inquired of him about the quality of the cheese, and Franklin said that the defendant had “told him to guaranty the cheese fine.” Thereupon, the plaintiff said to Franklin that, if the quality of the cheese was “fine,” he would give 7|- cents’ per pound for it. The offer was afterwards accepted, the sale made, the cheese paid for and delivered. That upon inspection the cheese was found to be, in quality, of a lower grade than fine, and consequently not worth as much as it would have been if of that specified quality. On the *182defense, Franklin testified that he did not say to the plaintiff that the defendant had told him to guaranty the cheese fine. He was then asked, “Did Mr. Decker tell you to do so?” The objection to this, on the ground that any matter of conversation between the witness and Decker, the defendant, was incompetent, was overruled, and exception taken. The witness answered, “No.” This evidence was not material between the parties to the action on the question of the authority of Franklin to warrant the cheese. His power to sell carried with it, as against the plaintiff, in behalf of the purchaser, the authority to warrant. It evidently was offered in corroboration of the evidence of the witness, and may have had some effect upon the question of fact presented by the conflict in the evidence of the two witnesses, and of their credibility. The evidence whether or not such conversation was had between Franklin and the defendant was not competent in behalf of the latter for any purpose; and, as it may have been prejudicial to the plaintiff upon that question, the error cannot be disregarded. No other question seems to require consideration. The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted; costs to abide the event All concur.
#### In the Matter of Thomas B., an Infant. Chautauqua County Department of Social Services, Appellant; Lisa B., Respondent.

Submitted March 5, 2007;

decided April 3, 2007

*937Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution. Motion for a stay pending disposition of the appeal dismissed as academic.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Arthur Sullivan, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Corrierro, J.), rendered March 12, 1985, convicting him of grand larceny in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed *(see,*CPL 210.45 [5] [b]; *People v Friscia,*51 NY2d 845; *People v Taranovich,*37 NY2d 442). Mangano, J. P., Brown, Weinstein and Spatt, JJ., concur.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY DIXON,

a.k.a. Greg Jerome Dixon,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

ROBERT L. AYERS, Jr., Warden,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 09-56242

D.C. No. 2:08-cv-07189-SGL

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen G. Larson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 26, 2012** 

Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Gregory Dixon appeals from the district court’s

judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as untimely. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we vacate and remand.

FILED

JUL 03 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 09-56242

Dixon contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of

limitations through September 2007 due to schizophrenia that prevented him from

timely filing a federal habeas petition. The uncontested evidence that Dixon

submitted in the district court was sufficient to support the inference that his

mental illness was severe and continued throughout the limitations period, so as to

entitle him to an evidentiary hearing to determine his entitlement to equitable

tolling. See Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010); Laws v.

Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003). The evidence further suggested that

Dixon acted with diligence in pursuing his legal remedies once the burden of

mental illness was lifted. See Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100-01. Accordingly, we remand

for an evidentiary hearing.

VACATED and REMANDED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Vincent McWhinney, Appellant.

The evidence of the defendant’s guilt was established by two of his inculpatory statements as well as the medical examiner’s testimony which tended to disprove the defense of justification. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620). Moreover, the prosecution’s case cannot be said to have been based on hopelessly contradictory testimony *(cf. People v Reed,*40 NY2d 204).

Finally, while the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant and his remarks during summation were not exemplary, it cannot be said that the prosecutor’s conduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial *(see, People v Arce,*42 NY2d 179). Mollen, P. J., Brown, Niehoff and Kooper, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Southern Copper Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, J. Eduardo Gonzalez Felix, Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)          The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
|              | /s/ J. Eduardo Gonzalez  Felix                     |   |
|-------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------|
|              | J. Eduardo Gonzalez Felix                          |   |
|              | Vice President, Finance and ChiefFinancial Officer |   |
| Date: May 2, 2006 |                                               |   |

 

 

A signed original of this written statement required by section 906 has been provided to Southern Copper Corporation and will be retained by Southern Copper Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

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