J-A35002-14 

 2014 PA Super 290 

THE HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK, 

SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO SKY BANK,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

K-COR, INC., 

 Appellant No. 1265 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Order Entered July 12, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division at No(s): GD13-009199 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and ALLEN, J. 

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 31, 2014 

K-Cor, Inc. (Appellant) appeals from the order entered on July 12, 

2013, denying its petition to strike or open judgment entered by confession. 

We affirm. 

The following facts are not in dispute. This case involves guarantees 

on two commercial loans. In November 2000, Huntingdon National Bank’s 

predecessor, Sky Bank, entered into a loan agreement with Rock Airport of 

Pittsburgh, LLC (Airport LLC), pursuant to which the bank loaned $3,000,000 

to Airport LLC. Appellant guaranteed the loan. The guaranty provides for 

judgment by confession in the event of a default on the loan. 
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In June 2002, the bank and Airport LLC entered into a second loan 

agreement, pursuant to which the bank loaned an additional $370,000 to 

Airport LLC. Appellant guaranteed the loan. The guaranty provides for 

judgment by confession in the event of a default on the loan. 

Following default and notice, Huntingdon National Bank (hereinafter, 

the Bank) initiated this action in May 2013, filing a complaint in confession of 

judgment. Thereafter, judgment was entered in the total amount of 

$3,282,049.77. See Notice of Judgment, 05/22/2013. 

In June 2013, Appellant filed a petition to strike or open the judgment, 

comprised of a single paragraph averring that it had not voluntarily, 

intelligently, and knowingly given up its right to notice and a hearing prior to 

the entry of judgment. In July 2013, following argument, the trial court 

denied Appellant’s petition, concluding that Appellant had failed to raise a 

meritorious defense to the confessed judgment. The trial court further 

denied Appellant’s oral motion to amend its petition, concluding that the 

general rule permitting liberal amendment of pleadings does not apply to a 

petition to strike or open. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, 

attaching proposed amendments to its petition, which was denied thereafter 

by the trial court. Appellant timely appealed and filed a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court submitted a responsive 

opinion, addressing both the defect in Appellant’s initial petition as well as 

the substantive merit of Appellant’s proposed amendments. 
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Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: 

[1.] Whether or not the [trial] [c]ourt abused its discretion in 

failing to grant the motion for amendment of a petition, when 

good and cognizable defenses are presented at the time of the 

presentment of the petition and request for amendment and 

incorporation of allegations at related cases? 

[2.] Whether or not the [trial] [c]ourt abused its discretion in 

failing to grant reconsideration of the denial of the motion for 

amendment of a petition? 

Appellant’s Brief at “vi.” 

In its first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court should have 

permitted Appellant to amend its original petition and that its proposed 

amendments support opening the confessed judgment.1 We review a court’s 

order denying a petition to open a confessed judgment for an abuse of 

discretion. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Bluestream Tech., Inc., 14 A.3d 

831, 835 (Pa. Super. 2010). However, to the extent that Appellant 

challenges the lower court’s interpretation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 

Procedure, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is 

plenary. See Midwest Fin. Acceptance Corp. v. Lopez, 78 A.3d 614, 624 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Boatin v. Miller, 955 A.2d 424, 427 (Pa. Super. 

2008)); see also Pa.R.C.P. 127 (describing the manner in which we 

interpret rules of court); Pa.R.C.P. 129 (same). 

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1

 Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s decision to deny its petition to 

strike. In addition, Appellant concedes that its petition to open, as originally 

filed, is deficient. See Appellant’s Brief, at 2. 
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Petitions to strike or open judgment by confession are governed by 

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 2959 and 2960. 

Relief from a judgment by confession shall be sought by petition. 

Except as provided in subparagraph (2), all grounds for relief 

whether to strike off the judgment or to open it must be 

asserted in a single petition. 

Pa.R.C.P. 2959(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also Pa.R.C.P. 2959(a)(2) 

(permitting a further, limited request for a stay of execution on due process 

grounds); Pa.R.C.P. 2959(c) (“A party waives all defenses and objections 

which are not included in the petition or answer.”); Pa.R.C.P. 2960 (limiting 

the scope of proceedings upon opening of judgment). 

Appellant does not dispute the plain language of Rule 2959. Rather, 

Appellant maintains that there are meritorious defenses to the Bank’s 

complaint and that the absence of either factual allegations or defenses in its 

petition was merely an “administrative oversight,” easily cured through 

amendment. Appellant’s Brief, at 9. Appellant suggests its error became 

apparent at the outset of the hearing, prior to any determination by the trial 

court, notes the liberal policy of amendment that prevails in Pennsylvania, 

and argues that the Bank would have suffered no prejudice if Appellant had 

been permitted to amend. Id. at 11-12 (citing, inter alia, Pa.R.C.P. 126). 

Thus, Appellant concludes, the trial court erred. 

In contrast, the Bank contends that no amendment is permitted under 

the rules. The Bank notes that a party waives all defenses and objections 

that are not included in the petition, citing in support Pa.R.C.P. 2959(c), and 
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asserts that Pennsylvania courts have consistently applied our procedural 

rules to prohibit defendants from amending petitions to strike or open. 

For its part, the trial court concluded that Appellant’s petition could not 

be amended. In its opinion, the court stated it could not “ignor[e] the clear 

and unambiguous language of the [r]ules of [c]ourt.” Trial Court Opinion 

(TCO), May 14, 2014, at 5. The court offered no precedent in support of its 

decision, rejected Appellant’s plea to the equitable powers of the court, and 

found irrelevant the question whether amendment would prejudice the Bank. 

Id. at 6. 

To the extent the trial court determined it was powerless to permit 

amendment, we disagree. The language employed in Rule 2959 is not 

unlike that found in Rule 1028 governing preliminary objections. That Rule 

states, in relevant part: 

All preliminary objections shall be raised at one time. They shall 

state specifically the grounds relied upon and may be 

inconsistent. Two or more preliminary objections may be raised 

in one pleading. 

Pa.R.C.P. 1028(b) (emphasis added); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1032(a) (providing 

that objections not properly raised by preliminary objection are waived). 

The purpose of the requirement that a party raise all objections at one 

time is “to reduce the number of dilatory steps [available to a party] ... and 

thus expedite the reasonable disposition of the litigation.” Yentzer v. 

Taylor Wine Co., 186 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa. 1962); see also Wagner v. 

Wagner, 768 A.2d 1112, 1120 n.3 (Pa. 2001); Bowman v. Meadow 
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Ridge, Inc., 615 A.2d 755, 757 (Pa. Super. 1992). The single-petition 

requirement in Rule 2959 fulfills the same purpose. See generally 

Pa.R.C.P. 206.1 (Explanatory Comment – 2013). 

However, this Court has previously permitted amendment of 

preliminary objections. See Bowman, 615 A.2d at 757 (declining to find 

the trial court erred in ruling on amended preliminary objections, despite 

failure to secure the consent of the adverse party or leave court, where no 

action had been taken on the original preliminary objections and the 

amended motion did not delay the proceedings); see also Dep’t of Transp. 

v. Schodde, 433 A.2d 143, 145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) (“[A] court has the 

discretion to allow an amendment of preliminary objections in the absence of 

an error of law or prejudice to the adverse party.”). 

More generally, the purpose of our procedural rules is to facilitate the 

administration of justice, and our courts should apply them with that 

purpose in mind. 

The rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy 

and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding to 

which they are applicable. The court at every stage of any such 

action or proceeding may disregard any error or defect of 

procedure which does not affect the substantial rights of the 

parties. 

Pa.R.C.P. 126; see also In re Larsen, 812 A.2d 640, 650 (Pa. 2002) 

(“Pennsylvania law is well-settled that procedural rules are not ends in 

themselves, and are not to be exalted to the status of substantive 
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objectives.”) (citing McKay v. Beatty, 35 A.2d 264, 275 (Pa. 1944)); 

Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 186 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa. 1962). 

Finally, we conclude that the appellate decisions cited by the Bank are 

distinguishable from the matter currently before this Court. See, e.g., 

Davis v. Woxall Hotel, Inc., 577 A.2d 636, 638-39 (Pa. Super. 1990) 

(declining to address a defense raised on appeal, but not pleaded in 

appellant’s petition to open or strike); C-Rich Co. v. Davis, 556 A.2d 413, 

417-18 (Pa. 1989) (quashing as interlocutory an appeal from an order 

denying Appellant’s motion to amend its petition to open or strike); Mellon 

Bank v. Rafsky, 535 A.2d 1090, 1091-94 (Pa. Super. 1987) (affirming the 

trial court’s finding of waiver where petitioner in a related matter raised 

additional grounds to open a confessed judgment “during the course of the 

hearing,” testimony was adduced over several days, and no motion to 

amend was considered); J. M. Korn & Son, Inc. v. Fleet-Air Corp, 446 

A.2d 945, 947 (Pa. Super. 1982) (reversing the trial court’s decision 

granting leave to amend “after judgment had been opened”) (emphasis 

added). None of these cases addresses precisely a petitioner’s motion to 

amend prior to the adjudication of the original petition, and we are aware of 

no appellate decision that does so. 

Accordingly, we hold that no strict prohibition of amendments is 

warranted. In our view, the decision whether to permit a petitioner to 

amend a petition to open or strike a confessed judgment, presented prior to 
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adjudication of the merits of the original petition, is best left to the discretion 

of the trial court. In exercising this discretion, a trial court should examine 

the proposed amendments and consider whether amendment will unduly 

prejudice the opposing party. See, e.g., Horowitz v. Universal 

Underwriters Ins., 580 A.2d 395, 398-400 (Pa. Super. 1990) (discussing 

undue prejudice). 

That does not end our analysis, however, for we may affirm the trial 

court on any ground. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 988, 

994 (Pa. Super. 2005). It is not clear from the record when the trial court 

considered the substance of Appellant’s proposed amendments. There is no 

transcript of the argument, and Appellant did not submit written, proposed 

amendments until July 18, 2013, nearly a week after the court denied its 

initial petition.2 Nevertheless, it is clear that the court considered and 

rejected them. See TCO, at 7-9 (concluding that Appellant’s allegations of 

conspiracy and fraud were of questionable relevance, devoid of merit, and, 

at least in part, previously rejected by the court in a different case). We 

have reviewed the content of Appellant’s allegations and agree with the trial 

court. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of the court’s discretion in denying 

Appellant’s motion to amend its petition. 

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2

 Appellant attached its proposed amendments to its motion for 

reconsideration. 
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Appellant also contends that the Court should have granted its motion 

for reconsideration. “Pennsylvania case law is absolutely clear that the 

refusal of a trial court to reconsider, rehear, or permit reargument of a final 

decree is not reviewable on appeal.” Provident Nat’l Bank v. Rooklin, 

378 A.2d 893, 897 (Pa. Super. 1977) (citing McCready v. Gans, 89 A. 459 

(Pa. 1913)). Accordingly, the issue is not properly before this Court. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 12/31/2014