UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Raheem G. GREEN, Corporal 

U.S. Marine Corps, Appellant 

No. 09-0133 

Crim. App. No. 200800005 

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 

Argued October 7, 2009 

Decided January 20, 2010 

ERDMANN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which 

EFFRON, C.J., and BAKER, STUCKY, and RYAN, JJ., joined. 

Counsel 

For Appellant: Lieutenant Michael E. Maffei, JAGC, USN 

(argued); Lieutenant Heather L. Cassidy, JAGC, USN (on brief). 

For Appellee: Captain Mark V. Balfantz, USMC (argued); Colonel 

Louis J. Puleo, USMC, and Brian K. Keller, Esq. (on brief); 

Captain Geoffrey S. Shows, USMC. 

Military Judge: Brian E. Kasprzyk 

This opinion is subject to revision before final publication. 
United States v. Green, No. 09-0133/MC 

2

Judge ERDMANN delivered the opinion of the court. 

At a contested special court-martial with members, Corporal 

Rayheem Green was convicted of a number of charges involving 

indecent and inappropriate contact with a female Marine, 

including the offense of indecent language.1 He was sentenced to 

confinement for four months, reduction to pay grade E-1, 

forfeiture of $867.00 pay per month for a period of four months, 

and a bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority approved 

the sentence and the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of 

Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings and the approved 

sentence. United States v. Green, No. 200800005, 2008 CCA LEXIS 

303, 2008 WL 3983317 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2008) 

(unpublished). 

 “‘Indecent’ language is that which is grossly offensive to 

modesty, decency, or propriety, or shocks the moral sense, 

because of its vulgar, filthy, or disgusting nature, or its 

tendency to incite lustful thought. Language is indecent if it 

tends reasonably to corrupt the morals or incite libidinous 

thoughts. The language must violate community standards.” 

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States pt. IV, para. 89.c, 

(2008 ed.) (MCM). We granted review in this case to determine 

whether the specification charging Green with indecent language 

 

1

 Green was convicted of failing to obey a lawful order, 

violation of a lawful general order, use of ecstasy, assault and 

battery, three specifications of indecent assault, and indecent 

language. 
United States v. Green, No. 09-0133/MC 

3

under Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 

934 (2000), was legally sufficient where the charged language 

was “mmmm-mmmm-mmmm.”2

 In the context of this case, we find that 

the specification was legally sufficient and therefore affirm 

the Court of Criminal Appeals. 

Background

 Corporal (Cpl) Green worked as an ammunition technician at 

the Las Pulgas ammunition supply point at Camp Pendleton, 

California. Corporal JL was also an ammunition technician but 

was assigned to another section in the ammunition company. Due 

to manpower shortages, Cpl JL occasionally assisted in Green’s 

section. The two Marines were not social friends but rather 

were workplace acquaintances. While working in an ammunition 

magazine one day, Cpl JL discovered a mistake on an ammunition 

can which was marked with Green’s initials. Cpl JL informed 

Green that “you f[.....] something up over here.” In response, 

Green came up behind Cpl JL and, pressing his chest against her 

back, said in her ear, “I didn’t f[...] anything up, but I could 

f[...] you real good.” Cpl JL told Green to back off and, 

hoping that it was a one time thing, went back to work. 

 

2

 We granted review of the following issue: 

WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT APPELLANT’S 

UTTERANCE OF “MMMM-MMMM-MMMM” WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO 

SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR INDECENT LANGUAGE. 

United States v. Green, 67 M.J. 408 (C.A.A.F. Apr. 17, 2009) 

(order granting review). 
United States v. Green, No. 09-0133/MC 

4

A week or two later Cpl JL and her husband and infant son 

were at a party with other Marines in the ammunition company, 

including Green. Cpl JL was dancing with her husband when Green 

came up to her and tried to pull her away from him. Cpl JL’s 

husband told Green to back off and a short time later Cpl JL and 

her family left the party. 

Several weeks later the two were again working together in 

an ammunition magazine and Green told Cpl JL that she had a bug 

on her shirt. Cpl JL began to “freak out” and Green told her to 

come over to him and he would help get it off. Cpl JL 

testified: 

I turned around, walked very quickly back to Corporal 

Green. He was sitting on a few cans of ammunition 

logging in the docs still, and he said, bend down, I’ll 

get it. So I bent at the waist towards Corporal Green, 

he then grabbed my shirt and my skivvy blouse –- or my 

skivvy shirt and my cammie blouse, pulled it down and 

said mmmm-mmmm-mmmm. 

Cpl JL knocked Green’s hand away, told him he was a disgusting 

pervert and ran out of the magazine crying. 

 Several hours later Cpl JL went back to work in the 

magazine while Green was still working inside. Green walked up 

behind Cpl JL and began grinding his pelvic area across her 

buttocks. Cpl JL testified that she felt something hard like an 

erection. She punched Green in the chest. In response Green 

punched her in the arm, laughed and walked away. Cpl JL 

reported the incidents to her chain of command. 
United States v. Green, No. 09-0133/MC 

5

 On appeal to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal 

Appeal, Green argued that the evidence was legally and factually 

insufficient to support the finding of indecent language and 

also argued that the charge of sexual harassment and the three 

specifications of indecent assault coupled with the charge of 

indecent language constituted an unreasonable multiplication of 

charges. In affirming the convictions, the lower court held 

that in regard to the indecent language charge, there was no 

requirement that the language at issue be an actual word. 

United States v. Green, 2008 CCA LEXIS 303, at *2-*3, 2008 WL 

3983317, at *1-*2. 

That court went on to find that the language, “mmmm-mmmmmmmm,” was sufficient under the facts of this case to constitute 

indecent language, noting that any utterance which meets the 

Manual’s definition of indecency was sufficient. Green, 2008 

CCA LEXIS 303, at *3-*4, 2008 WL 3983317, at *1-*2. The Court 

of Criminal Appeals concluded that: 

[T]he sound clearly related to the appellant’s nonconsensual and assaultive viewing of his co-worker’s 

breasts. In this context, we are hard-pressed to 

think of any possible meaning for the appellant’s 

expression that is not “grossly offensive to modesty, 

decency, or propriety . . . because of its vulgar, 

filthy, or disgusting nature. 

Green, 2008 CCA LEXIS 303, at *4, 2008 WL 3983317, at *1 

(alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). 

Discussion

The challenged specification reads as follows: 
United States v. Green, No. 09-0133/MC 

6

Specification 5: In that Corporal Raheem G. Green, U.S. 

Marine Corps, on active duty, did, on board Marine Corps 

Base Camp Pendleton, California on or about 10 August 2006, 

orally communicate to [Cpl JL] certain indecent language, 

to wit: “mmmm-mmmm-mmmmmm,” or words to that effect, while 

looking down her blouse at her breasts. 

This court reviews the issue of legal sufficiency de novo. 

United States v. Chatfield, 67 M.J. 432, 441 (C.A.A.F. 2009). 

In reviewing for legal sufficiency of evidence, this court must 

determine, “whether, considering the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable fact-finder could 

have found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” United States v. Young, 64 M.J. 404, 407 (C.A.A.F. 

2007) (citations omitted). The elements of indecent language 

under Article 134, UCMJ, are as follows: 

(1) That the accused orally or in writing communicated 

to another person certain language; 

(2) That such language was indecent; and 

 

(3) That under the circumstances, the conduct of the 

accused was to the prejudice of good order and 

discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to 

bring discredit upon the armed forces.3

MCM, pt. IV, para. 89.b. 

Green argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

support the charge of indecent language under two theories: the 

sound “mmmm-mmmm-mmmm” is just that -– a sound or an utterance, 

and does not constitute language as contemplated under the 

offense of indecent language; and, in any event, the utterance 

is not “indecent” as that term is defined in the Manual and this 

court’s jurisprudence. The Government responds that there is no 

 

3

 Green does not challenge this element of the offense in his 

legal insufficiency argument. 
United States v. Green, No. 09-0133/MC 

7

requirement that the language used be a word and that in the 

context of this case, the utterance was indecent. 

Green initially argues that while “mmmm-mmmm-mmmm” is a 

sound, it is not a word and it is impossible to determine what 

he intended to convey by making the sound. Green points out 

that all of this court’s prior cases discussing the offense of 

indecent language have only involved “words.” We agree with 

Green that our prior decisions addressing the legal sufficiency 

of “indecent language” charges are limited to an examination of 

the “words” used by the appellants. However, that is easily 

explained by the fact that a situation where the alleged 

“language” is not a “word” is an issue of first impression 

before this court. 

The term “language” is not defined in the Manual under the 

indecent language offense of Article 134, UCMJ. In the absence 

of any evidence to the contrary, this court has held that 

“ordinary definitions suffice.” United States v. Roller, 42 

M.J. 264, 265 (C.A.A.F. 1995). The term is defined in Black’s 

Law Dictionary 958 (9th ed. 2009), as “[a]ny organized means of 

conveying or communicating ideas, esp. by human speech, written 

characters, or sign language.” Here “mmmm-mmmm-mmmm” meets that 

definition of “language.” It need not be a word. It was an 

audible sound that, as discussed below, was meaningful under the 

circumstances of this case. Green next argues that even if 

“mmmm-mmmm-mmmm” is considered “language” under the offense, it 
United States v. Green, No. 09-0133/MC 

8

does not meet the definition of “indecent” in the Manual or our 

previous case law. The President has provided a definition of 

“indecent” language for this offense: 

[T]hat which is grossly offensive to modesty, decency, 

or propriety, or shocks the moral sense, because of 

its vulgar, filthy, or disgusting nature, or its 

tendency to incite lustful thought. Language is 

indecent if it tends reasonably to corrupt morals or 

incite libidinous thoughts. The language must violate 

community standards. 

MCM pt. IV, para. 89.c. In United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136 

(C.A.A.F. 2004), we discussed the application of this 

definition: 

One final matter invites further attention. Because a 

rehearing is authorized, it is necessary that we also 

address the confusion, apparent in this case, perhaps 

arising from this Court’s decision in Brinson, regarding 

the definition of “indecent” applicable to charges of 

indecent language. The President in Part IV of the MCM 

has provided that the use of certain expressly defined 

language is punishable for the offenses of indecent 

language and depositing obscene matter in the mail. 

MCM, Part IV, para. 89.c, provides two alternate 

definitions of “indecent language.” The use of the 

disjunctive in this paragraph makes clear that either 

definition of indecent language may be the legal 

authority for a conviction. In addition to 

criminalizing language that is grossly offensive because 

of “its tendency to incite lustful thought,” the 

President made punishable indecent language that “is 

grossly offensive to modesty, decency, or propriety, or 

shocks the moral sense, because of its vulgar, filthy, 

or disgusting nature.” Simply stated, paragraph 89.c 

presents two different definitions to measure speech 

that may be a crime, dependent on the context in which 

it is spoken. We adopt and will apply this plain 

language of the Manual prospectively to cases tried 

after the date of this decision. See United States v. 

Moore, 28 M.J. 366, 367 (C.M.A. 1989). 

 

Id. at 144. 
United States v. Green, No. 09-0133/MC 

9

 As this case was tried after Negron was issued, we will 

rely on the President’s definition in the Manual, recognizing 

that the Manual definition incorporates portions of our earlier 

decisions.4

 As Negron makes clear, the President’s definition 

of “indecent language” has two alternative definitions, either 

of which may be relied upon under the offense: (1) grossly 

offensive to modesty, decency, or propriety, or shocks the moral 

sense, because of its vulgar, filthy, or disgusting nature; or 

(2) grossly offensive because of its tendency to incite lustful 

thought. Id. We take this occasion to clarify that the final 

two sentences of the definition: “[l]anguage is indecent if it 

tends reasonably to corrupt morals or incite libidinous 

thoughts. The language must violate community standards[,]” do 

not create separate definitions but rather modify and further 

explain the two definitions identified in Negron. 

 Turning to whether the utterance “mmmm-mmmm-mmmm” 

constitutes “indecent” language, as we noted in United States v. 

Brinson, 49 M.J. 360, 364 (C.A.A.F. 1998), we cannot make this 

determination in isolation. We must “examine the entire record 

of trial to determine the precise circumstances under which the 

charged language was communicated.” Id. at 364. See also

 

4

 See United States v. French, 31 M.J. 57 (C.M.A. 1990); United 

States v. Hullett, 40 M.J. 189 (C.M.A. 1994); United States v. 

Coleman, 48 M.J. 420 (C.A.A.F. 1998); United States v. Brinson, 

49 M.J. 360 (C.A.A.F. 1998). Our reliance on the Manual

definition does not vitiate the discussions in these cases 

related to nondefinitional issues. 
United States v. Green, No. 09-0133/MC 

10

Negron, 60 M.J. at 141. Green argues that the Court of Criminal 

Appeals held that the utterance was indecent simply because it 

was “related” to the indecent assault of Cpl JL. However, the 

lower court correctly noted that the indecency of a word or 

sound must be evaluated in the context in which it is made. 

Green, 2008 CCA LEXIS 303, at *3, 2008 WL 3983317, at *1. That 

court correctly reviewed the surrounding circumstances to 

establish the context of the utterance. 

 Green and Cpl JL were not social friends and this is not a 

case involving conduct that reflects a common, accepted practice 

in the workplace. Cf. United States v. Brown, 55 M.J. 375 

(C.A.A.F. 2001); Hullett, 40 M.J. 189. The record clearly 

reflects that Green demonstrated his sexual predatory nature in 

a number of encounters with Cpl JL. We cannot ignore Green’s 

actions when he uttered “mmmm-mmmm-mmmm” -– he had grabbed and 

pulled Cpl JL’s shirt down and was looking at her breasts. Nor 

can we ignore Cpl JL’s immediate reaction in calling him a 

“disgusting pervert.” 

 The Court of Criminal Appeals found that in the context of 

this case, the language met the Manual definition of “indecent 

language” by being “grossly offensive to modesty, decency, or 

propriety . . . because of its vulgar, filthy, or disgusting 

nature.” Green, 2008 CCA LEXIS 303, at *3, 2008 WL 3983317, at 

*1 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). 

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
United States v. Green, No. 09-0133/MC 

11

prosecution, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that a 

reasonable factfinder could have found all the essential 

elements of the specification alleging “indecent language” 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Decision

 The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court 

of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.