FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 06-10181 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR-05-00796-DCB

IGNACIO MEDINA-BELTRAN,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 15, 2008—San Francisco, California

Filed September 5, 2008

Before: Eugene E. Siler, Jr.,* M. Margaret McKeown and

Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

*The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge

for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

12367
COUNSEL

Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, Saul M. Huerta,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Tucson, Arizona, for the

appellant. 

Paul K. Charlton, United States Attorney for the District of

Arizona, Christina Cabanillas, Appellate Chief, George Ferko,

Assistant United States Attorney, Tucson, Arizona, for the

appellee. 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Ignacio Medina-Beltran (“Medina-Beltran”) appeals the

sentence imposed following his guilty plea to illegal re-entry

after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We reject

his various challenges to his sentence and affirm. 

[1] Medina-Beltran disputes the district court’s refusal to

grant him a third-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).1

 We have previously recog1We review for clear error a district court’s decision to reduce a defendant’s sentence for acceptance of responsibility, but review de novo

UNITED STATES v. MEDINA-BELTRAN 12369
nized that “the government has been vested with broad discretion to determine when the [§ 3E1.1(b)] adjustment is appropriate.” United States v. Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d 1126,

1137-38 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. MorenoTrevino, 432 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that

§ 3E1.1(b) confers on the government “a power, not a duty”)

(quoting Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992)).

Nonetheless, the government cannot refuse to file a motion

for the reduction on the basis of an unconstitutional motive or

arbitrarily, i.e., for reasons not rationally related to any legitimate governmental interest. Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d at

1136. Medina argues only that the prosecutor acted arbitrarily

in refusing to move for the additional reduction. 

[2] Although Medina-Beltran pled guilty and avoided a trial

on the substantive offense, he objected to his sentencing

enhancement and rejected the government’s proposed appeal

waiver. The government anticipated and defended his appeal

of his sentence. Under these circumstances, the government’s

decision not to move for the additional level reduction was

not arbitrary. See United States v. Newson, 515 F.3d 374, 378-

79 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the government’s failure

to move for reduction was not arbitrary where the defendant

refused the appellate waiver provision in a proposed plea

agreement). 

[3] In the alternative, Medina argues that the Feeney

Amendment violates the separation of powers principle by

shifting from the judiciary to the executive branch the power

to decide whether an additional level reduction is appropriate.

This amendment, which is part of the Prosecutorial Remedies

and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today

(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(g), 117

whether it misapprehended the law with respect to acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.

2006) (citation omitted). 

12370 UNITED STATES v. MEDINA-BELTRAN
Stat. 650, 671-72 (2003), requires the government to make a

motion in order for the defendant to receive the additional

offense-level decrease under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). We agree

with our sister circuits who have considered this identical

challenge; the Feeney Amendment does not usurp judicial

power by shifting this sentencing responsibility to the executive branch, and does not violate the separation of powers.

See, e.g., Newson, 515 F.3d at 376; United States v. Delk, 132

F. App’x. 448, 449 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). 

[4] The Supreme Court has recognized that federal sentencing “never has been thought to be assigned by the Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of the three

Branches of Government.” United States v. Mistretta, 488

U.S. 361, 364 (1989). In evaluating a similar separation of

powers argument with respect to substantial assistance

motions under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, we observed that the sentencing process “is not inherently judicial, and that, even if it

were, the government’s authority to recommend a reduced

sentence [i]s not impermissibly obtrusive.” United States v.

Ayarza, 874 F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United

States v. Severich, 676 F. Supp. 1209, 1212-13 (S.D. Fla.

1988), aff’d, 872 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1989)). 

[5] We are not persuaded by Medina-Beltran’s procedural

challenges. The record reflects that the court reviewed his

sentencing memorandum, in which Medina-Beltran discussed

application of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and considered

his arguments in favor of a lesser sentence. See United States

v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

Although brief, the court’s explanation of the sentence, which

was at the low end of the Guidelines range, was sufficient.

See id.

[6] Medina-Beltran finally argues that the 46-month sentence was substantively unreasonable. A “correctly calculated

Guidelines sentence will normally not be found unreasonable

on appeal.” Id. at 988. There is “nothing unusual about

UNITED STATES v. MEDINA-BELTRAN 12371
[Medina-Beltran]’s circumstances to compel a lower sentence

than the low-end of the Guidelines range.” See id. at 996. 

AFFIRMED. 

12372 UNITED STATES v. MEDINA-BELTRAN