### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 7, 200 6 S es sio n STATE OF TENNESS EE v . KEVI N RUDD Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 04-07507 Chris Craft, Judge

No. W2005-02814-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Septem ber 13, 2007
Th e a pp e lla nt, Ke vin Rud d, wa s ind ic te d fo r the fi rs t de g re e mur de r o f h is w if e . A ft e r a jur y tr ia l, the appe llant was found g uilty of first deg ree murder and s entenc ed to life in prison. On a ppeal, the appellant a

rg ues: (1) the trial court impro p er l y ad mitted propensity evidenc e in violation of Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 404(b); (2) the trial court improperly denied a mistrial; and (3) the tria l court improper ly

denied a motion in l imine to ex clude testimony that indicated the a

ppellant eng ag ed in shooting at other

people. Be cause we deter mine that the trial cour

t improperly

admitted evidenc e in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidenc e 404(b) , we r ever se the judg ment of the trial court and rema nd for a new tria l. The re maining issues a re w ithout merit. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s R e ve r se d and Re m ande d. J ER R Y L. S M I TH , J
. , d el i v ere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined. Wil liam D. Massey

and L orna Mc Clusky , Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Kevin Rudd. Pa ul G . Summe rs , Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; B ri an Cl ay John so n, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and Willi am L . Gibbons, District At t o rney Gene ral; Robert Car

ter a nd Alonda Dwy er, A ssistant District Attorney

Gene ral,for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee .

OP IN ION On Novembe r 2, 2004, the Shelby County Gra nd J ury indicted the appe llant with first deg ree murder f or the shooting death of

his wife, Tra cey e Rudd.-2-

On Apr il 23, 2004, the victim was at her r esidenc e in Memphis with her thre e childre n, Se do nd ra , O c taviu s and

Ni ssa El lis . Se do nd

ra El lis , w ho wa s f

if te e n at th e ti me of th e inc ide nt, testified that on the nig ht of April 22, 2004, she we nt to bed at ar ound ten o ’clock. She was
awakened around midnight by the sound of “my momma screa ming [at the appe llant] , stop pulli ng my hair.” Sedondra e x plained th at s h e h ea rd things g et quiet, then hea rd her mother and the appellant “

just talking.” The n she hea rd some bumpi ng noises and sounds coming from the direction of her mother’s bedroom. She later hear d her mother and the appellant talking in the living room of t h e re s i d ence about her mother’s truc k. Acc ording to Sedondra the vic tim refused to let the appellant use her truc k. Sedondra he ard the appellant a sk the victim for a hug and kiss. Sedondra then desc ribed that it was quiet f or about five minutes before she heard her mother say , “I f y ou shoot me, I know wher e I ’m g oing, but do you know wher e y o u ’re g oing[? ]” Then Sedondra hear d a g unshot. W hen she he ard the shot, she ran to the living room wher e she saw the vic tim ly ing on the fl oo r. Se do nd

ra tr ie d to c a ll 9 11 fr om t

he te le ph on e , b ut t

he c or d h a d b e e n r ipp e d o ut o f t he wa ll. Sedondra w as able to call 911 from the f ax machine in the living r oom.
Octavius Ellis, who was ten y ear s old at the time o f t h e v i ctim’s death, a lso heard the appellant a

nd the victim fig hting that nig ht. Oct av i u s wa s awakened w hen he he ard his mother
scre am at the appellant to “ stop pulling [her] hair.” Octavius g ot out of bed and w alked down the hall to his mot her’ s bedroom whe re he saw the a ppellant on top of the victim pinning he r down. The appellant told Octavius to ge t his “ass out” of t he room. The victim told Octavius to g o back to be d. Th e vic timthe n c a me to O c taviu s’ roo m and tol d h im that e ve ry

thi ngwa s g oin g to b e a lr ig ht. Oc taviu s n ot ice d th at th e arm of the vic tim ’s sh ir

t w a s r ipp e d. Th e vic timle ft Oc taviu s’ ro om.-3-

Sometime later, Oc tavius also hear d the appe lla n t as k t h e v ictim for a hug . The victim ref used. Octavius he ard the appellant a sk the victim for the ke y s to her truc k and the victim ag ain re fused. Octavius, who w as in his room with the door open, sa w the appe llant walk by

and g o into the victim’s and the appellant’ s bedroom. Octavius hear d a draw er open and a “clicking noise” and saw the a pp e lla nt w a lk b a c k d ow n th e ha ll w ith the ba c k part of a g un sti c kin g up ou t of his p ants po c ke t.

Oc t av i u s h ea rdt h e ap p el l an twa l k i n t o t h e l i v i n g ro o m an d

aga i nas k t h e v i ct i m fo r a h u g. Octavius he ard the victim r efuse , then hea rd silence befor e he he ard the victim say , “I f y ou shoot me, Ikn ow wh e re I ’m g oin g , bu t do y ou kn owwh e re y ou ’r e g oin g [? ]” O c taviu s h e ard the vic timsay

thi s three ti me s . T h e n O c ta

v iu s h e ar d a g u n s h o t. H e r an o u t in to th e li v in g r o o m w h e r e he sa w the victim ly ing on the floor with blood coming from her mouth and nose. There was a lso blood on the victim’s shirt. Octavius ran outside a nd saw the a

ppellant running awa

y . Octavius thre w rocks at the appe llant as he wa s running awa y .

The victim’s childre n attempted to re suscitate her using CPR with the guida nce of the 911 operator. Ho we v er , when emerg ency personne l arrive d on the sce ne, the victim was pr onounced dead. Crime scene investigators rec overe d a spent .9 milli meter she ll casing in the living room. The g un was ne ver r ecove red.

Tere sa All en C ampbell, the Shelby County Medica l Ex aminer, pe rfor med an a utopsy on the victim and was able to establish that the victim s uffe red a g unshot wound to her lef t fac e that we nt-4-

throug h the edg e of her nose and into he r skull. Dr. Campbell opined that the victim was shot from a distance of two to three fee t.
On April 24, 2003, the appe llant turned himself in at the F ug itive Squad Office of the Shelby County Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment. At trial, the appe llant testified that he had been out of work for about three months prior to the incident. Both the v i ct i m and the a ppellant had wor

ked at Shar

p Manufa cturing . The victim continued to work and pay the bills while the appellant wa s out of work. The a ppellant explained that on the nig ht of the incident, he arr ived at his reside nce “ late . . . ar ound midnight.” The appellant ha d been out drinking beer and admitt ed that he was intox icated. When he g ot h ome that ni g ht, the a pp e lla nt at e so me c hic ke n an d took a bath be fo re g e tti ng int o b e d w ith the victim. The victim asked him if he ha d “the money .” The appellant told the victim he did not have the money

and the two star

ted arg uing. The appellant claimed that the t wo kicked e ach othe r and starte d fig hting f

or a f ew minutes bef

ore Octavius came into the room and turne d the light on
and saw the a pp e lla nt on top of

the vic tim , p inn inghe r d ow n. Th e a pp e lla nt t old Mr . E lli s to g e t hi s “ass” out of the room. The a ppellant testified that he the n g ot some blankets and a pillow and left the bedr oom to go slee p on the couc h in the living room. Acc ording to the appellant, the victim then
came into the living room and pointed a g un at him.

The appellant stated that the victim wa s pointing the g un at him and “hollering ” at him to g et
ou t of the ho us e . T he a

pp e lla nt c la ime d th a t he wa s “ sc are d” so he a sk e d the vic tim fo r the ke y s to her truc k. The victim told the appellant that he was not taking her truck. At that point, the appellant claimed that he asked the victim for a hug and kis s “bec ause [ he] was try ing to e ase up on he r so [he]-5-

could g rab the g un.” The appellant stated that he “ g ot up on her a nd . . . g rabbe d the g un.” The two “tussled” over the g un and the victim wa s saying something to the a ppellant when the g un fired. T he appellant state d that his finge r wa s not on the trig g er of the g un and that it we nt of f by itself, shooting the victim. The appe llant claimed that he did not intentionally shoot the vi ctim, but that the victim’s death wa s her own f

ault. The appellant started running from the house and stopped to throw the gun into a trash ca

n down the stree t. The appe llant w as u n ab l e t o ex p lain why he did not stay

at the house and try

to help save his wife
.

At the conc lusion of the proof, the jury found the a

ppellant g uilty

of first deg ree murder. A s
a re sult, the appellant wa s sentence d to life in pr ison. O n appea l, the appellant c halleng es seve ral
e vid e nti ary

ru lin g s ma de by

the tr ia l c ourt
.

An a ly sis
First, the a

ppellant contends that the trial court imprope rly allowed the State to introduc e evidenc e duringits case- in-chief that he had shot a woman in 1991 in Mississippi under circ umstances similar to the instant c ase. Specifica lly , the appe llant argues that the introduction of the 1991 killing enc ourag ed the jury to conv i ct h i m based on a n “improper

sug g estion that [t he appellant] had a ba d char acte r trait of shooting women with w ho[m ] he had a romantic re lationship.” The appellan t a ls o ar g u e s th a t th e e v id e n c e o f th e p r io r k il li n g w a s p r o p e n s it y e v id e n c e , th a t the testimony was not re levant, that the e vidence did not rebut the defe nse t heory that the shooting w as
an a c c ide nt, and

that th e re bu tta l pr ov isi on of Te nn e sse e Rul e of Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) wa s im

pr op e rl y-6-

a pp lie d to a dmi t th e e vid e nc e . T he S tat e con tends that th e a pp e lla nt’ s argume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t b e c a u s e t h e t r i a l c o u rtp r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d t h e t e s t i m o n y.
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in the t rial court to deter mine the admissibilit y

of the
a pp e lla nt’ s in vo lve me nt i n th e 19 91 sh oo tin g de a th o f S te ph anie Tr utt le in Mis sis sip pi. Th e State argued that the e vidence of the prior shooting wa s admissible to show premed i t at i o n an d that the shooting a lleg ed in t he current indictment was not ac cidental. The trial court he ld a pre trial hea ring in acc ordanc e with Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 404(b) to dete rmine the a dmissibi lity of the prior crime. A t the h ea ri n g, the State ca lled J ulius Tate, a c riminal investigator for the Coldwater, Mississ ippi Police Depa

rtment to te stify that he investigated the 1991 death of Stephani e T ru t tle. Acc ording to Office r Tate , Ms. Truttle died from a single g unshot wound to the head in the r ight chee k. The appellant was the prime suspec t and, when inter viewed, inf

ormed the police that he and Ms. Truttle had bee n arguing at her house. They left the house a nd went down the stre et wher e the argument continued. At some point during t h e ar gu m en t , the appe llant shot her in the hea d. The appellant late r pled guilty

to manslaug hter. At the c onclusion of the hea ring , the trial cour

t ruled that if the appe llant raised the de fense of acc ident or mistake at trial, the evidenc e of the prior shooting could be a dmitted a fter a jury -out hear ing in a ccor dance with T ennesse e Rule of Evidence 404(b). Th e tr ia l c ourt

c on c lud e d tha t the fa c ts of the pr ior kil lin g “ wo uld he ig hte n [th e a

pp e lla nt’ s] se ns e of awa re ne ss” a nd

it w ou ld b e le ss l ike ly

that he wo uld have po int e d a g un in t he vic tim ’s fa c e he re in by a c c ide nt. Spe c if

ic a lly , th e tr ia l c ourt

iss ue d a n o rd e r h old ingtha

t:-7-

[T] he State alleg es t h at t h e def endant shot the victim . . . and a nticipates that the de fe ns e a t tr ia l w ill be tha t th e fi re arm

wa s d isc ha

rg e d unin te nti on a lly . T he State wished to put on proof of a prior 1991 ma

nslaug hter for

which the de fenda

nt was convicted, to show absenc e of ac cident or mistake. A fter e vidence prese nted at the hear ing, this cour

t fi n d s that a mater ial issue exis ts other than conduc t conforming with a cha

rac ter tra it of the defe nd an t , that of re buttal or absenc e of a ccide nt or mistake. Howe ver, unless this theory is in fac t offe red by the def ense, the dang er of
u n fa i r p re j u d i ce wh i ch at t ac h es t o t h i s p ri o r c o n v i c t i o n o rb adac two u l d o u t we i gh its probative value.

This court also finds that if the defe nse does offe r a theory or def ense of acc ident or mis take , t hat th e proba tiv e va lue of the pr ior ba d a c t on

the de fe nd ant’ s c ulp a

ble mental s tate, g iven the spec ific fa cts of both of these case s, is not outweighe d by the dang er of unfair pr ejudice.

I t is therefor e, ORDERED, AD J UDGED , and DECREED that the State is pre cluded fr om m e nti on ingor

of fe ri ngpr oo f o f t

his prio r b a d a c t du

ri ngjur y se le c tio n, its opening statement, or its ca se i n ch i ef, until and unless it fee ls the defe nse has “opene d the door” to this proof , and must then rene w its re quest outside the pre sence of the jury

and have an additional hea ring on this matter
. I f this c ourt finds that the de fe ns e or the or

y of a c c ide nt or mis take ha s bee n fa ir ly ra ise d, and

the re qu ir e me nts-8-

and saf eg uards of Tenn. R. Evid. 403 and 404(b) have been met, the additional proof of this bad ac t and conviction would be a llowed.
At trial, during opening statements, counse l for the a ppellant painted a

picture of

the sce ne for the jur

y in which the victim and the a ppellant wer e strug g ling f or the gu n wh en “[ t ] he g un exploded and it hit [t he victim ] in the face,” and “the g un exploded as [t he appe llant] fell aw ay from [the vic tim ].” I n li g ht of th e se state me nts by de fe ns e c ouns e l, t

he State re ne we d it s mo tio n to introduce the fac ts of the 1991 killing in order to rebut the de fense theory of ac cident. The trial court deter mined that the evidenc e wa s admissible to n ega te an innoce nt, neg lige nt, rec kless, or heat of passion state of mind and that the pr obative value of the e vidence was not outweig hed by the dang er of unfa ir prejudice . The S tate called Officer Tate who g ave testimony about t he 1991 killing. After the te sti mony , th e tr ia l c ourt g a ve the jur

y a le ng thy c ur a tiv e ins tr

uc tio n, statin g in p art :

We don’t use - - if

someone ha s done something befor e, we don’t use t hat as proof that they did it aga in later.

. . . .

I f fr om the proof y ou find that the defe ndant has committed a cr ime other than that for whic h he is on trial, y ou may not consider suc h evidenc e to prove his disposi tion to c omm it s uc h a

c ri me a s th a t on

tr ia l.-9-

This evidence if believe d by y ou may only be con s i d er ed b y y ou for the limited purpose of

deter mining whe ther it provides proof or l ack of proof of the def endant’ s
a lle g e d me nta l st a te a t th e a lle g e d ti me of the of fe ns e no w o n tr ia l.
You may never

under a ny circ umstances use this evidence as proof that the def

endant acte d intentionally

or with preme ditation.

Yo u ma y us e thi s e vid e nc e in de c idi ng wh e the r or no t th e de fe nd ant a c te d k

no wi ng ly wi th a n aw a re ne ss that his all e g e d co nd uc t wa s re a so na

bly c e rt a in to ca

us e the de a th of the a lle g e d v ic tim
.

Y o um ay u s e t h i s e v i d e n c e i n d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r o r n o tt h e d e f e n d an ta c t e d

r e c k l e s s l y,
awa re of but consciously

dis re gar d ing a

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the alleg ed victim would be killed.

Th e ri sk mus t be of

su ch a natur e and

de g re e that it s d isr e g ard

c on sti tut e s a

g ro ss de viatio n f

ro m the sta

nd ard of c are that an or din ary pe rs on wo uld e xer c ise un de r a ll the c ir c ums tanc e s a s v ie we d f ro m th e a c c us e d p e rs on ’s sta nd po int
.

Yo u m ay us e thi s e vid e nc e in d e c idi ngwh e the r o r n ot t he de fe nd ant a c te d w ith criminal neg lige n ce . That he oug ht to have bee n awa re of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the alleg ed victim would be killed.-10-

The risk must be of suc h a nature and deg ree that the fa ilure to perc eive it constitutes
a g ro ss d e viatio n fro m th e stan da rd of c are that an o rd ina

ry pe rs on wo uld e xer c ise
un de r a ll the c ir c ums tanc e s a s v ie we d f ro m th e a c c us e d p e rs on ’s sta nd po int
.
Ag a in, if y ou fi nd th e defe nd ant c omm itt e d a c ri me oth e r t

ha n th a t f or wh ic h h e is now on trial, y ou may

not consider suc h evidenc e to prove his propensity or dispositi on to commit such a crime a s that on trial or that the of fense was intentional or pre meditated.

Such evidenc e of a

nother c rime if conside red by y ou for a ny purpose at all must not be conside red f

or any purpose other than to decide the def endant’ s mental state at the time of the alleg ed shooting as spec ifically set out above.

As we be g in our ana l y s i s , we n o t e w el l -e s t ab l i s h edp re ce d en tp ro v i d i n g “t h at t ri al co u rts have broad discr etion in determining the admissibili ty of evidenc e, and their ruling s will not be reve rsed absent a n abuse of that discretion.” State v. McL eod, 937 S.W .2d 867, 871 (Tenn. 1996). Moreove r, the Tenne ssee Rules of Evidenc e embody , and our c ourts traditionally have a cknowledg ed, “a

policy of libera lity

in the admission of evidenc e in both civil and cr iminal cases.” State v. Ba nks, 564 S.W .2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978) ; State v. Robinson, 930 S.W .2d 78, 84 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). To be admissible, evidenc e must satisfy the threshold de t er m ination of rele vancy mandated by Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 401. See, e.g., Ba nks, 564 S.W .2d at 949. Rule 401 define s “re levant-11-

evid e n c e ” a s b e in g “ e v id e n c e h a v in g an y te n d e n c y to ma k e th e e xis te n c e o f an y f a c t th at is of conseque nce to the de termin at i o n o f t h e action more probable or less proba ble than it would be wi tho ut t he e vid e nc e .” Te nn . R. Ev id. 40 1. Ho we ve r, re leva nt “ e vid e nc e may

be e xclu de d if

its probative va lue is substantially outweig hed by

. . . the dang er of unfair prejudice .” Te nn. R. Evid. 403; se e also Ba

nks, 564 S.W .2d at 951. A trial court abuses its discr etion i n re gar d s t o the admissibili ty of evidence only when it “applie[s] an incorrec t leg al s tandar d, or re ach[es] a dec ision which is ag ainst logic or re asoning th at cause[s] an injustice to the par ty complaining .” State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 19 9 9 ) (q u o ting State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tenn. 1997)).

Th e g e ne ra l rul e is that evi de nc e of a de fe nd ant’ s p ri or

c on du c t is ina dmi ssi ble , e sp e c ia lly when pr evious crimes or acts are of the same char acte r as the c harg ed off ense, be cause such evide nce is ir r e le v an t an d inv it e s th e “ f in d e r o f f a c t to in f e r g u il t f r o m p r o p e n s it

y . ” St a te v. Hallock, 875 S.W .2d 285, 2 9 0 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Tennesse e Rule of Evide nce 404( b) per mits t he admission of evidenc e of pr ior conduc t if the evidenc e o f other a cts is releva nt to a litigated issue such as identity , intent, or rebuttal of acc ident or mistake, and the probative va l u e o utweig hs the dang er of unfair prejudice
. See Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b) Advisory Comm’n Comments; State v. Parton, 694 S.W .2d 299, 303 (Tenn. 1985) ; State v. Hooten, 735 S.W .2d 823, 824 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Howe ver, “ [e] vi dence of other c rimes, wrong s, or ac ts is not admis sible to prove the char acte r of a person in or der to show a ction in conformity with the char acte r trait.” T enn. R. Evid. 404(b). B efor e admitting e vidence un d er r ule 404(b), the rule provide s that (1) upon re quest, the court must hold a hea

ring outside the jury ’s pre sence ; (2) the court must de termine that the evidenc e-12-

is probative on a material issue a nd must, if requested, state on the re cord the materia l issue and the
rea sons for admitting or

excluding the e vidence ; and (3) the court must exclude the evidenc e if the dang er of unfair pr ejudice outwe ighs its probative value. Te nn. R. Evid. 404(b).

Th e ratio na le un de rl y ingRul e 40 4( b) ’s e xclu sio n o f e vid e nc e of a de fe nd ant’ s p ri or

ba d a c ts is th at ad m i s s i o n of such e vidence car ries with it the inhere nt risk of the jury convicting the defe ndant of a

crime ba sed upon hi s bad cha rac ter or pr opensity

to commit a crime, rather than the conviction re sting upon the streng th of the evidenc e. State v. Rickman, 876 S.W .2d 824, 828 (Tenn. 1994). The r isk is gre ater

when the de fenda

nt’s prior bad acts are simil ar to the crime for whic h the defe ndant is on trial. I d.; see a lso St ate v. Mc Cary , 922 S.W .2d 511, 514-15 (Te nn. 1996).

We a g re e wi th the tr ia l c ourt that w he the r t

he re wa s a

n a c c ide nt o r m ist a ke wi th r e sp e c t to the dischar g e of the firea

rm was a materia l, contested issue at trial, and there fore the appe llant’s prior conviction was r eleva

nt to a materia l issue other than to show ac tion in conformity with a cha

rac ter trait. Howe ver, w e re cog nize, as pointe d o u t by the appe llant that beca

use openingstatements by
c ou n s e l ar e n o t e v i d e n c e , s u c h s t a t e m e n t s w i l l n o t a l o n e “ o p e n t h e d o o r ” f o r t h e p r o se c uti on to int ro du c e e vid e nc e of

o t h e r c r i me s b e c a

us e op e nin g state me nts pr ov ide no thi ngfo r t he State to r e bu t. State v. B or is Te rr e ll Tr ay lor , No
. 01 C01 -9 10 4- CC- 00 12 4, 19 92 WL14 14 0, a t *2 -* 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. App., at Na shville, J anuar y 31, 1992).

I n Bor is Terre ll Tr aylor, the defe ndant was indicted for robber y , ag g ravated kidnapping and ag g ravated ra

pe. Dur ing ope ning statements, defe nse counse l argued that the victim voluntarily g ot-13-

int o th e de fe nd ant’ s c ar. F ur the r, de fe ns e c ouns e l ar g ue d tha t the de fe nd ant wa s the vic timof fa lse
c ha rg e s. I n re sp on se to the op e nin g state me nt, c ouns e l fo r the State re qu e ste d that it b e a llo we d to of fe r p ro of of the de fe nd ant’ s p ri or

c on vic tio ns fo r k idn a

pp ing and a ssa

ult wi th t he int e nt t o c omm it rape during its case- in-chief beca use the de fense counsel ra ised consent a nd the def

endant’ s intent as an issue. The trial court a g ree d and allowe d the testimony during the State’s ca se-in-c hief. The defe ndant did not take the stand or prese nt any

proof. On appe al, this Court ex amined seve ral c ases fr om o the r jur isd ic tio ns and ult imate ly re ve rs e d an d re mand e d the de fe nd ant’ s c a se fo r a ne w tri a l, concludingthat
opening statements ar e ‘intende d mere ly to inform the trial j udg e and jur y , in a g e ne ra l w ay , o f t

he natur e of

the c a se and

to ou tl in e, gener a lly

the fa c ts e a c h p art

y intends to prove. Such stateme nts do not amount to st ipulations and cer tainly are not a substitute for the plea dings of evidenc e.

. . . .
Since opening statements by counsel a re not evidenc e, there was simply nothing f or the state to r e bu t w ith ou t th e int ro du c tio n o f ‘ oth e r c ri me s’ e vid e nc e . T he re fo re , th is amounted to t h e introduction of prope nsity or disposition evidence. . . . I f the op e n i n g s t a t e m e n ti nt h i s c a s e w o u l d j u s t i f y t h e i n t r o d

u c t i o no f ‘ o t h e r c r ime s’ evidenc e, virtually

no case would ever be tried without ‘other cr imes’ evidenc e being prese nted in the prosec ution’s case -in-chie f. De fense counsel a lmost alway s arguesA t l eas t one ot her pane l of t hi s Co ur t ha s conc l uded t hat a t r i al cour t er r ed i n det er mi ni ng t hat def ens e c ouns el 1 ha d “o p en ed t he d o o r” to ad m i ssi o n b y t he S t ate o f t he ap p ell an t ’ s p rior c o nv i cti o n f o r fail ure to a p p ea r wh en d efen se couns el as s er t ed i n op eni ng s t at ement s t hat he hoped t o devel op t hat t he def endan t was a “ decen t per s on, ” but , i n t hat cas e, ul t i mat el y det er mi ned t hat t he ev i dence was ad mi s s i bl e d ue t o t he l i mi t ed i s s ue bef ore t he j ur y . St at e v . N at han M c K i s s a c k , No. 01 C01

- 98 04

- CC- 00 19 0, 19 99 W L 77 84 6, a t * 7 ( T e n n . Cr i m. App
. , a t N a s h v i l l e , F e b. 19 , 19 99 ) , pe r m. app. de n i ed con cu r r i n g i n r es u l t s on l y ( T en n . O ct
. 4, 1999)
. H owe v er , t h e T en n es s ee Su pr eme Cour t de n i ed per mi s s i on t o app eal i n t hi s cas e a nd s t at ed t hat t hey conc ur r ed i n t he r es ul t s onl y . Co ns equen t l y , t he hol di ng of N at han M cK i s s ack is li m ited to the p e c u liar fac ts o f t h a t ca se a n d ina p p lica b le to the c a se he re in. -14- that th e vic timor

the wi tne sse s ar e mis take n or unt ruthf ul an d tha t the de fe nd ant i s the ‘victim of fa lse cha

rg es.’

Bor is Terre ll Traylor, 1992 WL 14140, at *3 (interna l citations omit ted). 1

I n State v. Copenny , 888 S.W .2d 450 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), the defenda nt was cha

rg ed with first deg ree murder. A fter a trial, he wa s convicted of second deg ree murder. There wer e no wi tne sse s to the sh oo tin g that c la ime d th e lif e of the vic tim . D ur ingop e nin g state me nts , th e de fe ns e argued that the victim wa s the first ag g ressor. The State introduced the testimo n y o f L awa nda Hug hley at trial, who spent the wee kend prior to the murder w ith the victim. Ms. Hughley testified that she and the victim were walking to their ca r that we ekend w hen someone called the victim’s
name a nd fired shots at their

car . Ms. Hug hley

stated that the victim wa s not c arr y ing a g un at the tim e , no r ha d sh e e ve r kn ow n him to c arr y a g un be fo re . Ms. Hu g hle y e xpla ine d that th e vict im purcha sed a gun afte r that incident. The defenda nt later introduced testi mony about an incide nt that
occur red f our we eks prior to the shooting t h at indicated that the victim entere d a loung e and confr onted the appe llant. Accor din g t o t he testimony of a w itness, the victim brandished a gun, threatened the appellant and later attacke d him. On appeal, t he defenda nt argued that the trial cour t imp ro pe rl y

a dmi tte d M s. Hu g hle y ’s te sti mony . Th e State argue d th a t th e te sti mony wa s a dmi ssi bleT enness ee R ul e o f E vi d ence 4 0 4 (a)( 2 ) governs t he i nt rod uct i o n of evi d ence regarding t he ch a ra c t er of t he 2 vi ct i m and provi des t hat whi l e not gen er al l y adm i s s i bl e f or t he pur po s e of provi ng act i on i n conf ormi t y wi t h t he cha r act er or t r ai t on a part i cul ar occas i on, “ [ e] vi dence of a per t i nen t ch ar act er t r ai t of t he vi ct i m o f

cr i me of

f er ed by an ac cus ed o r b y the p ro se c u tio n [is a d m issib le ] to re b u t t h e sa m e , o r e v id e n c e o f a c h a r a c te r tra it o f p e a c e fuln e ss o f t h e vic tim o ff e re d b y the p ro se c u tio n in a ho m ic id e c a se to r e b u t e v id e n c e th a t th e v ic tim w a s the first a g g re sso r [is a d m issib le ].” -15- to rebut the def

ense the ory

that the victim was the fir st ag g ressor. T his Court determined that the testimony of Ms. Hug hley

was improper ly

admitted under Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 404(a) (2) 2 to rebut evidence that the victim was the first ag g ressor at the time it was admitted, as the def endant had y et to proff

er a ny evidenc e that the victim was t h e fi rs t agg ressor. H oweve r, this Court conclude d that the admission of the evi d e n c e wa s harmless bec ause it conta ined no spec ific re fer ence to the appellant a s the person f iring the shots and the ev i d en ce wo u ld have c ome in afte r the defe ndant ra ised the is s u e of self-def ense dur ing his testimony . I d. at 455. We deter mine that Co p en n y is disti ng uishable as it dea ls with the chara cter of the victim under T ennesse e Rule of Evidence 404(a) (2), rather than the introduction of prior ba d acts of the defe ndant under Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Not only was ther e no spec ific re fer ence to the defe ndant, this latter ty pe of evidenc e espec ially when it involves a crime simil ar to the one at bar car ries with it a heig htened potential for unf

air pre judice.

I n the ca se he re in, we conc lude that the admission of the testimony of Off icer Tate w as imp ro pe r. T h e e v i d e n c e w a s a d m i t t e d d u r i n g t h e S t a t e ’ s c a s e - i n - c h i e f i nr e s p o n s e t o d e f

e n se counsel’s a ssertion during opening statements that the g un “exploded” while the appellant and the victim wer e arg uing. The ope ning statement of de fense counsel wa s not evidence , so at the time the testimony of Off icer Tate w as admitted, there was no e vidence of ac cid en t o r mistake to re but, as is th e r e qu ir e me n t f

o r a d mi s s io n o f p r io r b a d a c ts u n d e r T e n n e s s e e Ru le o f E v id e n c e 404(b)
.-16-

Consequently , it was err or for the trial court to a dmit the testim ony of Off icer Tate dur ing the State’s
case -in-chie f. M o re o v er , althoug h the appe llant later testified that the killing was a ccide ntal, we find that the err or was not ha rmless. Prior crimes evidenc e such as that involved in this case ca rries with it such a high potential for undue prejudice that, in our opi nion, the admission of such evide nce must be i n s trict compliance with the standards se t forth in Rule 404(b) a nd the dec isions of the appellate courts. This is espec ially true in ca ses wher e the pr ior bad a ct or c rime is essentially the only proof use d to rebut the defense such as a ccide nt or mistake. Consequently , we must reve rse the appellan t ’s conviction and remand f or a ne w trial. On re mand, if the State see ks to introduce the testimony of Off icer T at e and the evidenc e of the appellant’ s prior cr ime afte r the a ppellant introduces e vidence that the shooting was an acc ident, the trial cour t should then determine whe ther the e vid e nc e is a dmi ssi ble un de r T e nn e sse e Rul e of Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) to re bu t the the or y of a c c ide nt, keepingin mind the remoteness in time of the Mississippi conviction and the hig h potential for undue pre judice due to the similarities betwee n the Mississi ppi incident and the pr oof in the instant
case . Although unne cessa ry to the dispositi on of this appea l, we will address the re maining issues in the event of

further appea l to the Supreme Court of Te nnessee .

Denial of Mistrial

The a ppellant ar gues that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial a fter the te sti mony of Of fi c e r T a te wh e rei n cou ns e l f or the State re fe rr e d to the 19 91 de a th o f S te ph a nie Truttle as a

“murde r. ” S p ec i fi cally , the appe llant argues that the improper statement by

the-17-

pr os e c uto r w a s p re

jud ic ia l and

a ff e c te d th e ve rd ic t. T he State argue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt pr op e rl y denied the motion for mistrial bec ause the State did not intentionally use the wor d murder, the jury was instructe d that statements of counsel are not evidenc e, and the t rial cour t immediately

g ave the jury a cur ative instruction.
At trial, the following exchang e occur red betwee n the prosec utor and witness Of fice r Tate
.

PRO SEC UT OR : Whi le on the Col dw a te r P oli c e De pa rtmen t, d id you

c ome to investigate the murde r of a Stephanie Truttle? WI TNESS: Yes, Idid. DE F EN SE C OU

NSE L : Y our h on or , I

ob je c t. THE COURT: All rig ht. Woul d y ou all approa ch the be nch for a sec ond? PROS ECUTOR: I ’m sorry . I ’ll rephr ase that. Imeant to say homicide. T H E C O U R T : N o . W e n e e d t o s ay t h e [ w o r d ] d e a t h
. O k ay? DEF ENSE COUNSEL : I ’ll ask to the Court to instruct the j u ry t o d isreg ard that state me nt o f c ouns e l.

I mme diate ly

the re a ft e r, the tr ia l c ourt

ins tr uc te d th e jur

y a s f oll ow s:

I ’ve a lrea dy

told y ou that questions of attorney s are not proof. [The prosec utor] used the wo rd mur de r w hic h w a s an im pr op e r w or d. We’ re g oin g to use the wo rd de a th of this other per son instead. I n no way should y ou assume that this person wa s-18-

murdere d. Does e very

body understand that? This person died if the re is proof to that
a ff e c t.

At the conclusion of Officer Tate’ s testimony , defe nse counsel rene wed their motion for a mistrial on the basis of the prose cutor’s use of the wor d “murde r.” D efe nse counse l argued that the statement “put murd er in [ the juror’ s] m ind[ s]” even thoug h the trial cour t ga ve a c urative instruction. The trial cour t deter mined that the curative instruction was satisfactory and denie d the mot ion fo r m istri a l. O n a

pp e a l, t he a pp e lla nt a rgue s th a t th e c ur a tiv e ins tr uc tio n w a s “ wh oll y ineffe ctive” a

nd that the conduc t of the prose cutor wa s “ana logous to improper prosec utorial argument to the jury .”

Th e purp os e of

a mis tr ia l is to c or

re c t th e da

ma g e do ne to t

he ju di cia l pro c e ss w he n s ome event ha s occur

red w hich would pre clude a n impartial verdic t. See Arnold v. State, 563 S.W.2d 792, 7 9 4 (T en n . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 7 7 ). T h e d ec i s i o nwh et h er t o gra n ta m i s t ri al i s wi t h i nt h e t ri al co u rt 's disc r e ti o n an d w il l n o t b e d is tu r b e d a b s e n t an a

b u s e o f th a t d is c r e ti o n . St a te v . M il lb r o oks, 819 S.W. 2d 4 4 1 , 4 4 3 ( T e n n . C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 1 )
. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , ana

p p e l l a t e c o u rt ’ s r e v i e w s h o u ld provide considerable defe renc e to the t rial court’s ruling in deter mining whether a

n occur renc e or
e ve nt at tr ia l ha s so pr e

jud ic e d th e de fe nd ant o r t he State a s to pr e c lud e a fa ir and imp art ia l ve rd ic t. State v. Wil liams, 929 S.W .2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)
.

Fa ctors which must be considere d in determining whether improper pr osecutoria l conduct aff ecte d the jury

verdic t to the prejudice of the defendant are ( 1) the c onduct complained of viewed-19-

in conte xt a

n d in li g h t o f th e f a c ts an d c ir c u ms ta

n c e s o f th e c a s e ; ( 2 ) th e c u r a ti v e measure s undertaken by

the Court and the prosecution; (3) the intent of the prose cutor in making the improper statement; (4) the cumulative ef fec t of the improper c onduct and a ny other e rror s in the rec ord; and, (5 ) t he re la tiv e str e ng th o r we a kn e ss of the c a se . Judg e v. State , 5 39 S.W. 2d 34 0, 34 4 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1976).

L ooking to the f

actor s and applying the m to the ca se her ein, it is clear that the prosec utor should not have use d the word murde r to descr ibe the 1991 death during the questioning of Off icer Tate, e specia lly

when the a

ppellant was on tria l for a c rime with similar fac ts. H o we v er , t h e trial
c ourt imm e diate ly

un de rt oo k to ins tr

uc t th e jur

y that th e y we re no t to c on sid e r t he wo rd mur de r i n the context of the 1991 death. Furthe r, the prose cutor immediately rec og nized he r mistake and fr om that point forwar d ref

err ed the “ death” of Stephanie Tr uttle in 1991. The rec ord bef ore us doe s not support a conc lusion that a miscarri age of justice occ urre d by continuing the trial afte r the prosec utor’s improper

ref ere nce to the de ath as a murder. See State v. McPher son, 882 S.W .2d 365, 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . Ag ain, the dec ision to gra nt a mistrial is withi n the sound discre tion of the trial c ourt. No clear abuse of discretion appea rs on the fa ce of

the re cord, a

nd, there fore , we will not dis turb the trial cour t’s decision to deny

the appe llant’s motion for a mistrial. I d.

Denial of Motion in L imine

L a stl y , th e a

pp e lla nt co nte nd s tha t the tr ia l cou rt imp ro pe rl y

de nie d h is m oti on

in l imi ne to exclude testimony

by Octavius Ellis that h e had se en the a ppellant shoot at people be fore
.-20-

Spe c if ic a lly , th e a

pp e lla nt ar g ue s tha t th e te sti mony c on sti tut e d e vid e nc e of

a pr ior ba d a c t and

a g a in was prohibited by

Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 404(b) be cause it was not re levant to a mate rial issue in the case “other than propensity of t he defenda nt to commit bad acts.” The S tate disag ree s, arguing that any err or is attributed to the appellant beca use def ense c ounsel elicited the te stimony in question.
Prior to trial, the trial cour t stated that Octavi u s E l l i s co u l d testify that the appe llant had a g un, if based on pe rsona l knowledg e, but not that he sawthe appe llant shooting at other people. Ho we ve r, the tr ia l c ourt

ult imate ly

ru le d th a t it

wa s n ot g oin g to grant t he mot ion

in l imi ne to pr oh ibi t th e te sti mony

of Oc taviu s E lli s r e g ard ing the a pp e lla nt’ s o wn e rs hip of a gun. At tr ia l, duri ngthe c ro ss- e xami natio n o f O c taviu s Elli s, the fo llo wi ng e xch ang e oc c ur re d b e tw e e n d e fe ns e
c ouns e l and

Oc taviu s E lli s.

DEF ENSE COUNSEL : Octavius, I want to talk to y ou about this gun. Y ou didn’t kn owwh e re thi s g un

wa s k e pt? WI TNESS: No, sir. DEF ENSE COUNSEL : Did y ou ever see the g un befor e? W IT N E S S : Y e s , s i r . I s aw i tw h e nh e [ t h e a p p e l l an t ] w a s s h o o t i n g a ts o m e b o dy. DEF ENSE COUNSEL : I ’m sorry , Ican’ t hear y ou? W IT N E S S : W h e nh e [ t h e a p p e l l an t ] w a s s h o o t i n g a ts o m e b o dy. T H E C O U R T : W h e nh e [ t h e a p p e l l an t ] w a s s h o o t i n g a ts o m e b o dy. DEF ENSE COUNSEL : Okay . You had se en this g un befor e at a nother time? WI TNESS: Yes, sir.-21-

Thus , d e fe ns e c ouns e l e lic ite d th e te sti mony fr om t he wi tne ss.
From looking at the r ecor d, it is obvi ous that the State did not elicit the testimony here in. T h e t e s t i m o n y w a s e l i c i t e d b y d e f e n s e c o u n s e l o n c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e w i t n e s s . C o n s e qu e n t l y,
any e rr or re g ard ingthe te sti mony

is attr ibute d to the de fe nd ant. Se e Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 6( a ). Th is issue is without m erit.

Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of t he trial court is reverse d and re manded f or a ne w trial.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE