United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Argued August 7, 2019 

Decided September 13, 2019 

Before 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 18-3728 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DEILY VERAS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 17-CR-158 

J.P. Stadtmueller, 

Judge.

O R D E R 

Deily Veras stole more than $2.7 million from the Treasury in a tax-fraud scheme 

involving the filing of false tax returns using the names of more than 500 Puerto Rican 

residents. He pleaded guilty to theft of public funds, 18 U.S.C. § 641, and aggravated 

identity theft, id. § 1028A. The district judge imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 

52 months in prison. 

Veras raises two claims of procedural error: the judge incorrectly said the scheme 

lasted four years (instead of 18 months), and the judge did not adequately consider his 

argument that he was less culpable than others who ran similar schemes. We reject 

these arguments and affirm the judgment. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 18-3728 Page 2 

Veras engaged in a tax-fraud scheme from January 2013 through June 2014, 

obtaining refunds from the Treasury using tax returns that were fraudulently filed 

using the names and identifying information of more than 500 Puerto Rican residents. 

He mailed the refund checks from New Jersey to a check-cashing business in 

Milwaukee and drove there to collect the money. In total he stole $2.76 million, though 

he estimates that he kept only $120,000 for himself—the rest went to others involved in 

the scheme. He pleaded guilty to theft of public funds and aggravated identify theft. 

 The Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 37 to 46 months for the 

theft of public funds, followed by a mandatory consecutive term of 24 months for 

aggravated identity theft. At sentencing Veras argued that he was less culpable than 

defendants in three other cases who used the same check-cashing business in schemes 

involving thefts of government funds totaling $4.6 million, $1.2 million, and 

$1.1 million, respectively. Those defendants were sentenced to prison terms of 

36 months, 28 months, and 15 months. 

The judge rejected the comparison, explaining that Veras was “the linchpin” of 

this scheme—“the glue or adhesive that made all of this work.” The judge continued: 

“And to victimize over 500 individuals over a period of four years with repeated travels to 

Wisconsin from New Jersey ... destroyed any suggestion [that Veras was] an otherwise 

law-abiding individual.” (Emphasis added.) The judge added that “a message needs to 

go out” to deter similar conduct. The judge then said that he was “going to impose” a 

52-month sentence. Veras’s attorney interjected that the offense conduct lasted only 

18 months, not four years. The judge responded, “The Court stands corrected.” Later 

the judge announced the “formal sentence of the Court”: a below-Guidelines sentence 

of 28 months for the theft of government funds, followed by the mandatory 24-month 

consecutive term for aggravated identity theft, for a total sentence of 52 months in 

prison. 

On appeal Veras raises two claims of procedural error, which we review de 

novo. United States v. Pennington, 908 F.3d 234, 238 (7th Cir. 2018). He first argues that 

the judge violated his right to be sentenced based on accurate information by stating 

that the scheme lasted four years when in fact it was only 18 months in duration. This 

argument doesn’t meet the threshold for procedural error. “A sentencing court relies on 

inaccurate information if it gives specific consideration to this information before 

imposing a sentence or imposes the defendant’s sentence at least in part on the 

misinformation.” See United States v. Spivey, 926 F.3d 382, 385 (7th Cir. 2019). 
No. 18-3728 Page 3 

Veras hasn’t established that the judge specifically relied on inaccurate 

information about the duration of the scheme in settling on the 52-month sentence. 

Veras interprets the judge’s initial reference to a four-year scheme as a genuine, if 

mistaken, belief; the government points out that the judge corrected himself before 

imposing sentence, confirming that he simply misspoke. 

“Reliance on misinformation occurs if the court gives explicit attention to it, 

founds its sentence at least in part on it, or gives specific consideration to the 

misinformation before imposing [the] sentence.” United States v. Miller, 900 F.3d 509, 513 

(7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). But a judge does not rely on inaccurate 

information if he corrects a mistake. See Pennington, 908 F.3d at 240. Here, the judge 

acknowledged his misstatement when Veras’s attorney brought it to his attention. 

Nothing suggests that the judge’s initial error influenced the sentencing decision. In any 

event, the judge also adopted the factual findings in the presentence report—including 

the correct 18-month duration of the offense—which assures us that his inadvertent 

misstatement did not affect the sentence. Id.

To be sure, the judge could have stated more explicitly that he was imposing the 

same sentence regardless of the duration of the offense. See United States v. Abbas, 

560 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). But he had already explained that the evidence 

“destroyed any suggestion” that Veras was a “law-abiding individual” and emphasized 

the need to deter similar schemes. It’s clear from the totality of the judge’s remarks that 

the initial misstatement of the duration of the offense was immaterial to the ultimate 

sentence. 

 Veras next argues that the judge did not adequately address his argument that he 

was less culpable than others who had leadership roles in comparable offenses. We see 

no error here either. It’s true that a judge’s failure to meaningfully address a principal 

argument in mitigation may warrant resentencing. See United States v. Cunningham, 

429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005). But the judge considered Veras’s argument. He 

acknowledged that Veras may have kept a smaller proportion of the funds than those 

other defendants, but he determined that the distinction was immaterial because Veras 

nevertheless was the operation’s “linchpin, ... glue or adhesive.” Given that the judge 

reviewed the defendant’s sentencing memorandum and imposed a below-Guidelines 

sentence, he did not need to address Veras’s argument further. See United States v. 

Graham, 915 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2019). 

AFFIRMED