alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of United Energy Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the year ending March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|(1) 
 The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                              
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                                                                                                         
|(2) 
 The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
|                                                                                                                                                         
|                                                                                                                                                         
|                                                                                                                                                         
|Dated: 
May 11, 2007                                                                                                                                     
|                                                                                                                                                         
|                                                                                                                                                         
|                                                                                                                                                         
|                                                                                                                                                         
|Dated: 
May 11, 2007                                                                                                                                     
|                                                                                                                                                         
|                                                                                                                                                         

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Sarah White, Appellant.

— Judgment unanimously modified, on the law, and a new trial granted in accordance with memorandum, and, as modified, affirmed. Memorandum: Following an unsuccessful attempt to cash food stamps at a local supermarket, defendant was arrested for verbally and physically assaulting a security guard and police officers. Defendant was charged with attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25 [1]) and related crimes for firing a gun at police officers who were trying to confine her to a jail cell. Defendant’s primary claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in disallowing proffered psychiatric testimony to establish the affirmative defense of "extreme emotional disturbance” (Penal Law § 125.25 [1] [a]). We agree.

*933Extreme emotional disturbance is an affirmative defense to attempted murder in the second degree, notwithstanding the absence of statutory language so indicating *(see, People v Tabarez,*113 AD2d 461, 463; *People v Lanzot,*67 AD2d 864, 865-866, *appeal dismissed*49 NY2d 796). The defense is provided only for the crime of murder *(see,*Penal Law § 125.25 [1] [a]; § 125.27 [2] [a]). It should apply to the crime of attempted murder as well, however, since there is no reason for affording a defendant who succeeds in killing his victim the mitigating benefit of the defense while denying that benefit to a defendant who is unsuccessful. The defense of extreme emotional disturbance relates solely to a defendant’s culpability. Since there is no difference in the intent required for murder or attempted murder, but only a difference in result, the defense should be available to a defendant charged with either crime.

Since liability for manslaughter in the first degree under Penal Law § 125.20 (2) requires a specific intent to cause the death of another, it is a crime which may be attempted within the meaning of Penal Law § 110.00. A defendant charged with attempted murder who successfully establishes an extreme emotional disturbance defense would be entitled to be found guilty of attempted manslaughter in the first degree under Penal Law § 125.20 (2) *(cf. People v McDavis,*97 AD2d 302, 303, n). Thus, the trial court should have permitted defendant to present psychiatric evidence in support of her defense of extreme emotional disturbance *(see, People v Aphaylath,*68 NY2d 945).

Inasmuch as defendant was improperly convicted of the class B felony of attempted murder, second degree, defendant’s conviction for criminal use of a firearm, first degree, may not stand (Penal Law § 265.09).

We have considered the remaining claims raised by the defendant and find that none requires reversal. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction for attempted murder in the second degree and criminal use of a firearm, first degree, is reversed and a new trial granted thereon and in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. (Appeal from judgment of Erie County Court, La Mendola, J. — attempted murder, second degree, and other offenses.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Green, Lawton and Schnepp, JJ.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2664 

To amend title 28, United States Code, to protect the right of a claimant 

in a civil action before a Federal court to retain a structured settlement 

broker to negotiate the terms of payment of an award, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 4, 2015 

Mr. HIGGINS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 28, United States Code, to protect the right 

of a claimant in a civil action before a Federal court 

to retain a structured settlement broker to negotiate 

the terms of payment of an award, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Structured Settlement 

5 Claimants Rights Act of 2015’’. 


srobinson on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2664 IH

1 SEC. 2. IN GENERAL. 

2 (a) FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS.—Chapter 111 

3 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at 

4 the end the following: 

5 ‘‘§ 1660. Right to retain structured settlement broker 

6 ‘‘A claimant in any civil action before a Federal court 

7 shall have the right to retain a structured settlement 

8 broker to act on behalf of that claimant for purposes of 

9 negotiating a schedule of payments or other terms of pay10 ment of a sum certain previously agreed to paid by or on 

11 behalf of the defendant in satisfaction of a judgment 

12 against that defendant or in accordance with the terms 

13 of a settlement. The court shall inform the claimant of 

14 this right at the appropriate time. The defendant shall 

15 provide timely notice of any professional relationship be16 tween the defendant and the broker if any such relation17 ship exists or has existed.’’. 

18 (b) ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS.—Section 554 of 

19 title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 

20 end the following: 

21 ‘‘(f) In the case of any proceeding under this section, 

22 a party to that proceeding shall have the right to retain 

23 a structured settlement broker to act on behalf of that 

24 party for purposes of negotiating a schedule of payments 

25 or other terms of payment of a sum certain previously 

26 agreed to paid by or on behalf of another party in satisfacVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:09 Jun 05, 2015 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2664.IH H2664

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3 

•HR 2664 IH

1 tion of a decision against that party or in accordance with 

2 the terms of a settlement between the parties. The agency 

3 shall inform the claimant of this right at the appropriate 

4 time. The defendant shall provide timely notice of any pro5 fessional relationship between the defendant and the 

6 broker if any such relationship exists or has existed.’’. 

Æ 


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**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 7329** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appellee ,
v. STEPHANIE RENE POWERS , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro
. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. ( 1:06

- cr - 00200

- NCT

- 2; 1:09

- cv - 01012

- NCT

- PTS )

Submitted : February 9 , 2012 Decided: February 14, 2012

Before WILKINSON, A GEE, and FLOYD , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Stephanie Rene Powers, Appellant Pro Se. Angela Hewlett Miller, Terri

- Lei O’Malley, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Stephanie Rene Powers seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on her 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (2006) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatabl e, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Powers has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials3 before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

DISMISSED
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5702 

To amend the District of Columbia Home Rule Act to reduce the waiting 

period for holding special elections to fill vacancies in the membership 

of the Council of the District of Columbia. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 1, 2010 

Ms. NORTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To amend the District of Columbia Home Rule Act to reduce 

the waiting period for holding special elections to fill 

vacancies in the membership of the Council of the District of Columbia. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. TIMING OF SPECIAL ELECTIONS FOR COUNCIL 

4 OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 

5 (a) REDUCTION OF WAITING PERIOD.—Section 

6 401(d)(1) of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act (sec. 

7 1–204.01(d)(1), D.C. Official Code) is amended by strikVerDate Mar 15 2010 00:09 Jul 07, 2010 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H5702.IH H5702

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2 

•HR 5702 IH

1 ing ‘‘one hundred and fourteen days’’ and inserting ‘‘sev2 enty days’’. 

3 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

4 subsection (a) shall apply with respect to vacancies occur5 ring on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

U.S. COAST GUARD 

POLLUTION INCIDENT DAILY RESOURCE REPORT

CONTRACTOR EQUIPMENT

CLIN ITEM DESCRIPTION RATE 

BASIS

EMPLOYED

FRM TO

# UNITS RATE/ 

UNIT

RATE 

CHARGES

NON-RATE 

CHARGES

TOTAL 

COST

FPN/CERCLA NUMBER DATE

CONTRACTOR: PO/CONTRACT NO:

If information described below is documented separately, in a form or format previously reviewed and found acceptable by the National Pollution 

Funds Center and the Contracting Officer, this form need not be completed.

TOTAL PERSONNEL COSTS FOR THIS DATE

CONTRACTOR'S CERTIFICATION:

I certify that this report is a true and complete record of 

the materials, labor,equipment and subcontractors 

provided by the contractor on the date listed above for 

the project number cited above:

Contractor's Authorized Representative

ON SCENE COORDINATOR'S/LEAD TRUSTEE'S REVIEW:

I certify that inspection and acceptance of the listed items has been made by 

me or under my supervision, except as noted herein or on supporting 

documents.

FOSC/Lead Trustee

CG-5136E-2 (03/20) Page 1 of 2
POLLUTION INCIDENT DAILY RESOURCE REPORT -- CG5136E-2 

CONTRACTOR EQUIPMENT

This form should be completed for contractor equipment costs incurred for each day of removal activity.

How to complete form:

1. FPN/CERCLA Number: The FPN or CERCLA case number assigned to the incident.

2. Date: Report the date costs were incurred.

3. Contractor: Name ofcontractor; indicate if supporting documentation is attached.

Contractor Equipment

Provide the following information for each piece of equipment used in removal activities.

4. CLIN: The applicable contract line item number.

5. Item Description: Description of the equipment used for removal activities.

6. Rate Basis: The basis used for charging equipment costs (i.e., hourly, daily, weekly).

7. Employed From/To: The period of time equipment was used.

8. Units: The number of units the equipment was used for expressed in terms of the rate basis (i.e., numbers of 

hours,days,weeks).

9. Rate/Unit: The rate charged per unit.

10. Rate Charges: The rate per unit multiplied by the number of units.

11. Non Rate Charges: Total charges related to the equipment, not charged on a per unit basis (i.e., mileage, fuel, 

setup/take down charges).

12. Total Cost: The sum of the Rate Charge and the Non-Rate Charges.

13. Total Equipment Costs For This Date: The sum of the amounts entered in the Total Costs column.

14. Contractor's Certification: Contractor's certification of the validity of the information presented.

15. FOSC/Trustee Signature: Certification by FOSC/Lead Trustee. The FOSC certifies the equipment listed was 

authorized for the date reported. The FOSC does not certify contract rates or costs.

CG-5136E-2 (03/20) Page 2 of 2
# C_2022030EN.01000201.xml

| 20.1.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 30/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.1.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 30/2

---

Corrigendum to INFORMATION NOTICE – PUBLIC CONSULTATION – Geographical Indications from El Salvador to be protected as Geographical Indications in the European Union

(Official Journal of the European Union
  OJ C 522 of 28 December 2021
  )

(2022/C 30/02)

On page 20, fourth paragraph, second sentence:

for:

‘Statements of opposition should be sent to the following e-mail address: AGRI The Americas@ec.europa.eu’,

read:

‘Statements of opposition should be sent to the following email address: AGRI-The-Americas@ec.europa.eu’.

---
#### Fitch *v.*Broadway & S. A. R. Co.

*(Superior Court of New York City, General Term.*

June 27, 1890.)

Damages—Excessive.

The injury to plaintiff, 63 years old, consisted in a fracture of the neck of the/e*rrmr,*causing her the most intense pain. At the time of the trial she was not able to attend to her household duties, or to dress herself without the assistance of others. The evidence went to show that the injury resulted in a shortening of the leg, that plaintiff would never be free from pain, and that she would never recover the full use of her leg. *Meld,*that a verdict of $7,000 was not excessive.

Appeal from jury term.

Action by Emeline L. Fitch against the Broadway & Seventh-A venue Railroad Company, for personal injuries sustained by falling from defendant’s car. The injury sustained was a fracture of some kind of the neck of-the *femur,*which resulted, as the evidence tended to show, in the shortening of the leg, and caused plaintiff the most intense suffering. At the time of the trial plaintiff was unable to attend to her household duties, or to dress herself without the assistance of others, and the evidence went to show that she would never be free from pain, nor recover the full use of her leg. Plaintiff was 63 years old at the time of the accident. Judgment was given for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Argued before Freedman and Ingraham, JJ.

*Root <& Clarke,*for appellant. *Lexow & Haldane,*for respondent.

Freedman, J.

The only point presented by the appellant is that upon the whole case the judgment should be reversed because the damages awarded by the jury were excessive. The action is for personal injuries. I have examined the evidence with care, and I fail to see how, considering the nature of the injuries, and the amount of pain and suffering endured by the plaintiff, the verdict, which is for $7,000, can be held to be excessive. Cases are to be found in large numbers in which larger recoveries have been sustained for similar injuries. The judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs.
FILED

January 26, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

STEVE HENLEY, ) FILED: January 26, 1998

)

Appellee, ) JACKSON CRIMINAL

)

v. ) Hon. J. O. Bond, Judge

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Supreme Court

) No. 01S01-9703-CC-00056

Appellant. )

ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR

A petition for rehearing has been filed on behalf of appellee, Steve Henley. After

due consideration, the petition to rehear is denied. The members of this Court continue to

adhere to their respective opinions.

PER CURIAM
#### Idania Maybeli ROSALES-PICEN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 07-72562.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 18, 2011.

Filed March 25, 2011.

Zachary Miller Nightingale, Avantika Shastri, Van Der Hout, Brigagliano & Nightingale, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

John Blakeley, Senior Litigation Counsel, Kiley L. Kane, Esquire, Trial, Kathryn Mckinney, OIL, Emily Anne Radford, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: WALLACE, NOONAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Idania Rosales-Picen (“Rosales-Picen”) petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo and findings of fact regarding counsel’s performance for substantial evidence. *Lin v. Ashcroft,*377 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir.2004). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims require a showing of prejudice to succeed. *Id.*Upon review of the record, we conclude that Rosales-Picen did not demonstrate prejudice arising out of prior counsel’s failure properly to investigate and present Rosales-Picen’s asylum claim based on her fear of persecution by the guerrillas in Guatemala. The new evidence RosalesPicen offered in support of her motion to reopen does not undermine the agency’s prior conclusions that (1) Rosales-Picen did not establish past persecution, and (2) Rosales-Picen failed to prove that she could not reasonably relocate to a place within Guatemala where she would be safe from the guerrillas.

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that “it was not clear that a claim based on domestic violence [was] sustainable in 1999.” Accordingly, the BIA did not err when it concluded that prior counsel Miguel Gadda’s failure to present a domestic-violenee based asylum claim in 1999 did not amount to ineffective assistance.

The petition for review is DENIED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-311.
Exhibit 10.4


 


Undertaking to Avoid Horizontal Competition


 


In view of the fact that Jinko
Solar Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Issuer”) intends to apply for an initial public offering of shares
and listing on the STAR Market in the PRC, the Company, as the Controlling Shareholder of the Issuer, undertakes to avoid horizontal competition
as follows:


 


I. The Company and its wholly-owned
or controlled subsidiaries (other than the Issuer and its subsidiaries) do not currently have, and will not in the future control, directly
or indirectly, in any way, within or outside the PRC, any business or activity that results or may result in direct or indirect competition
with the main business of the Issuer or its subsidiaries, nor does the Company or each wholly-owned or controlled subsidiary (other than
the Issuer and its subsidiaries) engage in any business that is identical or similar to, or substitutable for, the business of the Issuer
or its subsidiaries;


 


II. If the Issuer considers
that the Company or each wholly-owned or controlled subsidiary (other than the Issuer and its subsidiaries) is engaged in a business that
competes with the business of the Issuer or its subsidiaries, the Company will be willing to transfer such assets or equity to the Issuer
or its subsidiaries at a fair and reasonable price, or to terminate such business;


 


III. If any business opportunity
may exist in the future which competes directly or indirectly with the main business of the Issuer or its subsidiaries, the Company shall
immediately notify the Issuer and endeavor to cause such business opportunity to be first offered to the Issuer or its subsidiaries on
terms and conditions reasonably acceptable to the Issuer, with the Issuer or its subsidiaries having the right of first refusal in respect
of such business;


 


IV. The Company undertakes
to compensate the Issuer and other shareholders for all losses, damages and expenses suffered as a result of any breach of any terms of
such letter of undertaking;


 


Undertaking to Avoid
Horizontal Competition


 






     


     


    

 


V. The guarantees and
undertakings made by the Company in this letter of undertaking are made on behalf of the Company and other enterprises directly or
indirectly controlled it;


 


VI. This letter of undertaking
shall take effect from the date of signature and seal of the Company until the Company ceases to be the controlling shareholder of the
Issuer.


 


Undertaking to Avoid
Horizontal Competition


 






     


     


    

 





(There is no text in this page. It is the signature
page of Undertaking to Avoid Horizontal Competition)


 


Undertaken by: JinkoSolar
Investment Limited (Seal)


 


By: /s/ Li Xiande


 


Date: June 21, 2021


 


Signature Page of
Undertaking to Avoid Horizontal Competition