This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A23-0779

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Rodney Donta Jackson, 

Appellant.

Filed March 11, 2024

Affirmed

Frisch, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-18-27618

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Gaïtas, 

Judge. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

FRISCH, Judge

Following remand from the supreme court, appellant argues that the district court 

abused its discretion because it did not comply with remand instructions and denied his 
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motion for a new trial. Because we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in 

its proceedings on remand or in denying appellant’s motion for a new trial, we affirm. 

FACTS 

Following a 2018 shooting, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant 

Rodney Donta Jackson with first-degree premeditated murder in violation of Minn. 

Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2018), and second-degree intentional murder in violation of Minn. 

Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2018). The matter proceeded to trial, and the jury found Jackson

not guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and guilty of second-degree intentional 

murder. 

After the jury returned its verdict, the district court received a juror evaluation form 

in which a juror, M.H., revealed that they may have provided extraneous information 

during the jury deliberations. In response to a question asking what one of the prosecutors 

could have done to improve their performance, M.H. wrote: 

Presented info on conceal [and] carry—responsibility of 

self defense should have explained what [Jackson] would have 

learned in conceal and carry class regarding MN law about 

obligation to retreat. This jury was going for self defense and 

[n]ot guilty before I shared what’s taught in permit class. Even 

regarding just discharging a weapon in [Minneapolis] even if 

he’d shot at ground or in the air! As you suggested. 

The district court notified the parties, and Jackson moved for a Schwartz hearing.1

 

The district court held a Schwartz hearing in two parts. During the first part of the hearing, 

1 See Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. 1960) 

(permitting a district court to examine a juror regarding alleged juror misconduct in the 

presence of the parties). 
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the district court closed the courtroom to the public during the testimony of two jurors,

including M.H., who testified as follows:

THE COURT: So do you recall any discussion during 

deliberations about classes or instruction on concealed carry or 

permit to carry? 

M.H.: Yes. 

THE COURT: Okay. Can you tell me specifically what you 

recall about that? 

M.H.: What I recall is that we had all gone around and talked 

about why we believed what we believed. We were each given 

a chance to share. And I brought it up. I asked if anybody else 

had a permit. Somebody else did. And I said: One thing that 

[Jackson] would have found out in his class is that it’s very 

dangerous to ever use your weapon because it will be held 

against you many times, even if you try to use it for good 

purposes. 

. . . .

Okay. And I said: The one thing that you learn is that if you 

have the option to get away, if you can safely get away, you 

get away instead of using a lethal weapon. You don’t kill 

somebody because you’re mad because they trashed talked to 

you or did something to you. It would be because you feel like 

your life is absolutely threatened and you didn’t have any other 

option. 

THE COURT: Okay. So you—your recollection is that you 

were the person that brought this up?

M.H.: I brought it up. 

THE COURT: Okay. And you shared it with the whole group 

or a few people or—

M.H.: I shared it with the group. I said that that’s—I said that 

he should have known that. But I said it was no different than 

what the prosecution had brought up, and that is that he had—

he was already in the car. He could already get away. And so 

we talk—we had talked about all those things. So I said it goes 

along with what he would have learned in class. 

THE COURT: Okay. And did that come up once or more than 

once? I know it’s hard because deliberations are not linear 
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particularly. But you recall this part when you were going 

around in a circle and it came up then. Did it then come up 

later as well, or was that just it? 

M.H.: I don’t recall it coming up later. 

THE COURT: Okay. Was there much discussion of that after 

you shared what you told us? 

M.H.: No. The only discussion was the other person who had 

a permit also said that that’s what she learned. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

M.H.: Except if you’re in Florida or Texas. 

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Those are the questions that I 

have.

The remaining ten jurors testified during a second hearing in a courtroom open to 

the public. Jackson then moved for a new trial, which the district court ultimately denied. 

Jackson appealed. 

In his first appeal, Jackson challenged in pertinent part the district court’s partial 

closure of the Schwartz hearing as a violation of his constitutional rights and the denial of 

his motion for a new trial. State v. Jackson, 964 N.W.2d 659, 664 (Minn. App. 2021), 

aff’d, 977 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 2022). We concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to a 

public trial extends to a Schwartz hearing and that the closure of that portion of the

Schwartz hearing violated Jackson’s Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 665-66. We 

concluded that the appropriate remedy was for the district court to repeat the closed portion 

of the Schwartz hearing with the two jurors and, if their testimony was materially different 

from their testimony in the first hearing, to recall the other ten jurors for additional 

testimony. Id. at 666-67. We did not reach the issue of whether the district court erred by 

declining to grant a new trial. Id. at 667. 
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Jackson appealed our decision to the supreme court, and the supreme court affirmed. 

State v. Jackson, 977 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Minn. 2022) (Jackson I). The supreme court 

instructed the district court to repeat the closed portion of the Schwartz hearing. Id. at 176. 

The supreme court also instructed the district court that “[i]f the two jurors testify in a 

manner that is materially different from how they testified in the original proceeding, then 

the district court should conduct a new, public Schwartz hearing involving the remaining 

10 jurors.” Id.

On remand, the district court conducted a public Schwartz hearing with the two 

jurors. Juror M.H. testified as follows:

THE COURT: . . . During deliberations on that case, was there 

any discussion of conceal carry? 

M.H.: At the very end after we had decided—okay. Two 

things. One thing, when we began I asked if anybody else had 

a conceal and carry permit, but we didn’t discuss it. At the very 

end after the jury had already made their decisions—do you 

want me to amplify? 

THE COURT: Yes. 

M.H.: Okay. So we talked about there’s different reasons for 

carrying a gun. It can be—it can be legal, you can be military, 

you can be hunting, or you can carry it as self-defense, which 

isn’t a bad idea today. But as self-defense, it means, then, that 

somebody—you are feeling like your life is threatened. It’s 

your life or their life. So we talked about that as a jury. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

M.H.: And the—do you want me to keep going?

THE COURT: Well, you’re telling me this was after the verdict 

form was signed? 

M.H.: After the verdict form was signed and we had already 

decided, we had gone around and what everybody had decided, 

then—okay. So there were three reasons—I believe there was 

three reasons why we came to the conclusion that we did, and 
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my comment was it would go along with the self-defense if he 

had a conceal and carry, which I didn’t know if he did. He had 

a permit—I didn’t know what kind of permit, if he got it in 

Texas or where he got it—but then he would have heard also 

what it meant to have self-defense. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

M.H.: When you’re allowed to kill somebody. 

THE COURT: Do you recall whether or not the Court gave you 

any instruction on self-defense under the law? 

M.H.: I do not recall about the Court giving—talking about 

self-defense. I think that it’s something that we all discussed, 

because you decide when it’s okay to kill somebody and not 

kill somebody. 

THE COURT: Do you recall any instruction regarding a duty 

to retreat? 

M.H.: No. 

Jackson argued that M.H.’s testimony was materially different than their testimony 

at the first Schwartz hearing and requested that the district court recall the remaining ten 

jurors for further testimony. The district court denied the request, determining that M.H.’s 

testimony was not materially different at the second hearing, stating that M.H.’s “statement 

was more expansive than [their] previous statement” and noting “that in the transcript of 

the previous hearing, [they] made comments about how nervous [they were]. [They] did 

not appear to be so nervous today.” The district court concluded that “the differences were 

not material” and denied Jackson’s motion for a new trial. 

Jackson appeals.
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DECISION

Jackson argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to comply with 

remand instructions and by denying his motion for a new trial. We disagree and address 

each argument in turn.

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its proceedings on remand.

The supreme court instructed the district court on remand to reconduct the portion 

of the Schwartz hearing that was improperly closed to the public and to conduct a public 

Schwartz hearing with the remaining ten jurors “[i]f the two jurors testify in a manner that 

is materially different from how they testified in the original proceeding.” Jackson I, 977 

N.W.2d at 176 (emphasis added). District courts generally have broad discretion to 

determine how to proceed on remand but must act consistent with the remand instructions 

provided. Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn., 895 N.W.2d 623, 633 (Minn. 

2017). Jackson argues that, during the proceedings on remand, M.H.’s testimony was 

materially different than their testimony at the first hearing, and therefore the district court 

was required to recall the remaining ten jurors back for additional testimony.

As a threshold matter, we agree that M.H. provided different testimony at the two 

hearings. At the first hearing, M.H. indicated that a discussion regarding Jackson’s permit 

to carry a concealed weapon occurred early in deliberations. M.H. also suggested that they 

knew what Jackson would have learned in obtaining such a permit and indicated that they

knew specifically what type of permit Jackson had. At the second hearing, M.H. stated 

that this discussion occurred after the verdict form was signed. And M.H. stated that they 
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did not know what type of permit Jackson had. M.H.’s testimony was therefore different 

at the two hearings. 

But we do not discern any abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that 

these differences in testimony were not material. Although the remand instructions did not 

specifically define what would constitute a material difference in testimony, as part of its 

remand instructions, the supreme court specifically rejected Jackson’s request to repeat the 

entire Schwartz hearing because Jackson had “not shown why it would be necessary to 

repeat the testimony from the 10 unaffected jurors.” Jackson I, 977 N.W.2d at 176. Like 

the circumstances in Jackson I, Jackson has not shown why the differences in M.H.’s 

testimony necessitate repeating the testimony from the remaining jurors. And Jackson has 

not identified how any difference in M.H.’s testimony would impact the basis for the 

district court’s decision denying his new-trial motion. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1170 

(11th ed. 2019) (defining “material” as “[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item 

would affect a person’s decision-making”). Even construing M.H.’s testimony at the 

second Schwartz hearing in Jackson’s favor, that testimony does not support his motion for 

a new trial because if, as M.H. testified, extraneous discussions occurred after the jury 

completed its deliberations, such discussions did not affect the verdict. See State v. Cox, 

322 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Minn. 1982) (stating considerations for reviewing the effect of 

outside influences on a jury verdict).

We also do not discern an abuse of discretion in the district court’s remand 

proceedings because the instruction to bring back the remaining ten jurors is permissive, 

not mandatory. The supreme court stated that the district court “should” bring back the 
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remaining jurors if it determined that the two jurors testified in a materially different 

manner during the second hearing. Jackson I, 977 N.W.2d at 176; see In re Jacobs, 802 

N.W.2d 748, 754 (Minn. 2011) (explaining that “should” is a permissive term (quotation 

omitted)). Because the district court properly determined that the testimony was not 

materially different and would not affect the new-trial motion, we see no abuse of 

discretion by the district court in its proceedings on remand.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jackson’s motion for 

a new trial.

Jackson argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for 

a new trial because the pertinent factors for determining whether he is entitled to a new 

trial weighed in his favor. We disagree. 

On appeal, “the proper procedure for reviewing a jury verdict is to determine from 

juror testimony what outside influences were improperly brought to bear upon the jury and 

then estimate their probable effect on a hypothetical average jury.” Cox, 322 N.W.2d at 

559. In so doing, we independently evaluate the verdict, considering (1) “the nature and 

source of the prejudicial material,” (2) “the number of jurors exposed to the influence,” 

(3) “the weight of the evidence properly before the jury,” and (4) “the likelihood that 

curative measures were effective in reducing the prejudice.” Id. These are known as the 

Cox factors.

We review a district court’s determination regarding a motion for a new trial based 

on jury exposure to improper outside material for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 560. “[T]he 
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district court is in the best position to evaluate whether prejudice, if any, warrants a 

mistrial.” State v. Marchbanks, 632 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. App. 2001).

We agree with Jackson that certain Cox factors weigh in favor of a new trial. The 

number of jurors exposed to the extraneous information—all 12 jurors—weighs in favor 

of a new trial. We also agree that a curative instruction could have reduced the prejudicial 

effect of extraneous information. But the district court did not give a curative instruction 

because it learned that the jury was exposed to extraneous information after it was 

dismissed. This factor therefore weighs in favor of a new trial. State v. Mallick, No. A18-

0756, 2019 WL 1104820, at *5 (Minn. App. Mar. 11, 2019) (reasoning that because a 

curative instruction could not be given when the district court became aware of the issue, 

this factor “necessarily weighs in favor of a new trial”).2

 

We do not, however, discern an abuse of discretion by the district court in weighing 

the remaining Cox factors against granting a new trial. Jackson first argues that the district 

court abused its discretion in not weighing the nature and source of the prejudicial material 

in favor of granting a new trial because M.H.’s comments were not subject to crossexamination, suggested that Jackson was irresponsible and acted in an unlawful manner, 

suggested that Jackson knew or should have known certain information based on what he 

would have learned in a permit class, and diverted attention to topics not presented to the 

jury. Given the nature and source of the extraneous information, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion by weighing this factor against granting a new trial. 

2 We cite nonprecedential opinions for their persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. 

P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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It is significant that another juror was the source of the extraneous information. The 

district court had instructed the jury to disregard such extraneous material in deliberations. 

The district court specifically instructed the jury that “[t]he evidence that you are to 

consider in this case is the testimony you hear from the witness stand and any exhibits that 

are entered into evidence” and that “[n]othing you hear or see outside this courtroom is to 

be considered by you.” The district court further instructed the jury to “disregard anything 

you may have seen or heard elsewhere about this case.” We presume that jurors follow the 

district court’s instructions. State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 675 (Minn. 1998). These 

instructions effectively notified the jury to disregard any extraneous information offered 

by M.H.

We also note that the substance of the extraneous information was not necessarily 

inconsistent with the substance of the district court’s instructions defining self-defense. 

The district court instructed jurors that Jackson was only entitled to the defense if his

decision to defend was “as a reasonable person would have made in light of the danger 

perceived and the existence of any alternative way of avoiding the peril” and if “there was 

no reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid the danger.” M.H. told the other jury members 

that Jackson could only assert self-defense if his life was threatened and he was without 

another option. This characterization of the duty to retreat is not necessarily inconsistent 

with the law as instructed by the district court. In light of instructions given by the district 

court, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by determining that this 

factor did not weigh in favor of a new trial. 
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Jackson next argues that the weight of the evidence properly before the jury favors 

granting a new trial because this was a “close case,” Jackson presented circumstantial 

evidence that the victim had a gun and that the victim’s friend hid the gun, and the jury 

asked to review video evidence during deliberations and asked if they could get closer to 

the screen. We do not agree that the district court abused its discretion in weighing this 

factor against granting a new trial.

It is true that Jackson presented evidence showing that he told the investigator that 

he believed that the victim had a gun and his girlfriend testified that the victim and the 

victim’s friend made death threats toward her and may have made gestures indicating that 

they had a gun. And defense counsel elicited testimony suggesting that people had 

removed or could have removed a gun from the victim’s body. But the state elicited 

testimony from seven witnesses, including Jackson’s girlfriend, that they did not see the 

victim or anyone with a gun. The state also elicited testimony from six witnesses that they 

did not see anyone tamper with the victim’s body. The medical examiner’s supervisor 

testified that the victim had an entrance gunshot wound in the back of his head and a partial 

exit gunshot wound on his face and forehead. And the state presented evidence that 

Jackson shot the victim while pulled over on the street, across from the gas station, and 

drove off following the shooting. This testimony was corroborated by multiple videos 

depicting the shooting and its aftermath, and the district court emphasized the strength of 

this particular evidence in its evaluation of this factor. We therefore see no abuse of 

discretion by the district court in its determination that the weight of the evidence properly 

before the jury did not weigh in favor of a new trial.
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Affirmed.