alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2023167EN.01016901.xml

| 11.5.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 167/169 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.5.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 167/169

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P9_TA(2022)0412

‘Macro-Financial Assistance+’ instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023

European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 November 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +) (COM(2022)0597 — C9-0373/2022 — 2022/0371(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 167/34)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0597), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0597),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0373/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0373/2022),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 16 November 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 16 November 2022 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

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P9_TC1-COD(2022)0371

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 24 November 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +)

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2463.)

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Exhibit (10)(a)

    

    

    

    

    

    

    Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

    

    

    

    

    We consent to the reference to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in
      Post-Effective Amendment No. 64 to the 1933 Act Registration Statement (Form N-4 No. 333-27783) and Amendment No. 552 to the 1940 Act Registration
      Statement (Form N-4 No. 811-05721), and to the use therein of our reports dated (a) March 13, 2020, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company and (b) April 15, 2020, with respect to the financial statements of Lincoln National Variable Annuity
      Account H for the registration of interests in a separate account under individual flexible payment deferred variable annuity contracts.

    

    

    

    

    /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

    May 15, 2020
Exhibit 12.2  Section 302 Certification for Chief Financial Officer  I, Mark FitzPatrick, certify that:  1.I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Prudential plc;  2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;  4.The companys other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a- 15(f) and 15d- 15(f)) for the company and have:  (a)Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  (b)Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;  (c)Evaluated the effectiveness of the companys disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  (d)Disclosed in this report any change in the companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the companys internal control over financial reporting; and  5.The companys other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the companys auditors and the audit committee of the companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  (a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  (b)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the companys internal control over financial reporting.  Date: 22 March 2018/s/ Mark FitzPatrickName:
Mark FitzPatrickTitle:
Chief Financial Officer
<PAGE>
                                                                   Page 12 of 20


                                                                   EXHIBIT 99(e)

                        KEYCORP STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2000-A

                              OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE


Banker's Trust Company, Deutsche Bank      Key Bank USA, National Association
100 Plaza One, Mailstop: JCY03-6450        800 Superior Avenue, 4th Floor
Jersey City, NJ 07310                      Cleveland, Ohio 44114
ATTN: Corporate Trust & Agency Group       ATTN: Senior Vice President
      Structured Finance                   Key Education Resources
Phone: (201) 593-6776                      Phone: (216) 828-9342
Fax: (201) 593-6459                        Fax: (216) 828-9301

MBIA  Insurance Corporation
113 King Street
Armonk, NY 10504
ATTN: Data Administration
Phone: (914) 765-3772
Fax: (914) 765-3810


Pursuant to Section 3.09 of the Indenture between KeyCorp Student Loan Trust
2000-A, as Issuer, and Bankers Trust Company, as Indenture Trustee, dated June
1, 2000, the undersigned hereby certifies that (i) a review of the activities of
the Issuer from January 1, 2001, through December 31, 2001, and of its
performance under the Indenture has been made, and (ii) to the best of my
knowledge, based on such review, the Issuer has fulfilled all its obligations
under the Indenture throughout such period.


                                           KEYCORP STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2000-A,
                                           as Issuer
                                           By:   Bank One, National Association
                                                 as Eligible Lender Trustee


                                           By:    /S/ JEFFREY L. KINNEY
                                              ----------------------------------
Date:  March 8, 2002                       Name:  Jeffrey L. Kinney
                                           Title: Vice President
#### Virginia A. Waller, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of John R. Waller, Deceased, Appellant, v Joseph F. Kiebzek, Doing Business as Kiebzek’s Restaurant, et al., Defendants; Otto L. Nero et al., Doing Business as Nero’s Restaurant, Inc., Appellants, and General Accident Group, Respondent.

Judgment unanimously affirmed, without costs, for reasons stated at Special Term, Wolf, J. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Wolf, J.— declaratory judgment.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Green, Pine and Lawton, JJ.
(9 Misc. Rep. 154.)

#### CABLE v. BONNELL.

(Common Pleas of New York City and County, General Term.

June 4, 1894.)

Appeal—Weight op Evidence—Decision op Distbict Coubt.

A judgment of a justice of a district court on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.

Appeal from eighth district court.

Action by Sarah L. Cable against Roger V. Bonnell for rent. A judgment in favor of plaintiff was rendered by a justice without a jury, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before BOOKSTAVER and BISCHOFF, JJ.

.P. C. Taiman, for appellant.

Douglass & Minton, for respondent.

*26BISCHOFF, J.

The plaintiff sued for rent due under a written lease, and defendant set up a counterclaim of $250 “for work done under orders of the board of health.” By the terms of the lease, defendant was to make “ordinary repairs” upon the premises. The landlord assumed the duty of complying with the orders of the municipal authorities with regard to the condition of the same. It appears that defendant has been dispossessed from the premises at the expiration of the two months for which rent was claimed. The justice gave judgment for the plaintiff, disallowing the counterclaim; and, upon the evidence, we find no ground for disturbing his determination. Defendant failed to establish the fact that the repairs which he testified to having made were required by order of the board of health, conflict of testimony appearing with regard to the single item of expense of $15 claimed by him to have been actually so incurred. Upon such conflict the justice’s finding as to the fact is not, in this case, to be questioned. Weiss v. Strauss (Com. Pl. N. Y.) 14 N. Y. Supp. 776. And in so far as the other evidence given by defendant, with regard to repairs to the roof, plumbing, etc., may be of concern, it formed no basis for a recovery, under the pleadings. The one exception relied upon by appellant does not call for a reversal, since the verbal agreement sought to be established by the evidence excluded, with reference to the meaning of the words “ordinary repairs,” was, if to be regarded in any way as admissible, entirely immaterial to the issues presented for litigation.

The fact that appellant remained in possession of the premises-until dispossessed disposes of the claim of eviction. There cannot be a constructive eviction without a surrender by the tenant. Boreel v. Lawton, 90 N. Y. 293. Judgment affirmed, with costs.
#### VILAS NAT. BANK OF PLATTSBURGH v. BARNARD et al.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department.

May 8, 1894.)

Negotiable Instruments—Accommodation Paper.

An answer which alleges that the note sued on was accommodation paper, and was made and delivered on condition that defendants should not be held liable thereon, provided there was delivered to plaintiff good business paper of the person accommodated, is insufficient, because it does-not allege that the agreement to replace such note with other paper was made with plaintiff.

Appeal from special term, Clinton county.

Action by the Vilas National Bank of Plattsburgh against Henry E. Barnard and Benton Turner on a promissory note. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff for $5,116.71 damages and costs, and from an order overruling defendants’ answer as frivolous, and ordering that plaintiff have judgment in the action for damages and costs as above stated, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before MAYHAM, P. J., and PUTNAM and HERRICK, JJ.

Foote & Stokes (Wallace T. Foote, Jr., of counsel), for appellants.

Shedden & Booth (L. L. Shedden, of counsel), for respondent.

*923HERRICK, J.

The defendants allege that the note in question was for money loaned and advanced by the plaintiff to’ benefit of a third person, and that said money was not loaned to the defendants, or either of them, and that they did not have the same; which facts the answer alleges the plaintiff well knew when said note was made, indorsed, and delivered to it. The answer then proceeds to allege as a defense that the note was made and delivered upon the express condition that the defendants were not to be called upon to pay the same at maturity, provided there was delivered to the plaintiff good business paper of such third party to the amount of the note, which good business paper was the paper received by such party for merchandise sold. There is nothing in the answer to show with whom such agreement was made. While the answer carefully sets forth that the plaintiff knew that the defendants were accommodation indorsers, and received no benefit from said note, it does not state that the agreement to replace such note at its maturity with good business paper belonging to the maker of the note, and received for merchandise, was made with the plaintiff; and, if it was not made with the plaintiff, of course it would be no defense to this action. The answer should plainly and clearly set forth all the facts which constitute the defense relied upon. None should be left for guess or inference. Here the very important fact whether this agreement or condition was made with or known to the plaintiff is not made known to the court. The agreement itself is uncertain. The character of the paper is perhaps sufficiently described, but its terms, conditions, and length of time for which it was to run are uncertain, and the agreement could not be enforced for that reason. Van Schaick v. Van Buren (Sup.) 24 N. Y. Supp. 306; Milliman v. Huntington (Sup.) 22 N. Y. Supp. 997. Judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
(9 Misc. Rep. 157.)

#### BAUMILLER v. WORKINGMAN'S CO-OPERATIVE ASS’N.

(Common Pleas of New York City and Comity, General Term.

June 4, 1894.)

Insurance—Premature Action on Policy—Pleading.

An objection that an action on a policy was premature because brought" before the expiration of the time fixed by the policy is an affirmative defense," and must be pleaded.

Appeal from district court.

Action by George Baumiller against the Workingman’s Co-onerative Association on a policy of insurance. There was a judgment, in favor of plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before BOOKSTAVER, BISCHOFF, and PRYOR, JJ.

W. B. Donihee, for appellant.

Joseph Steiner, for respondent.

PRYOR, J.

In an action on a policy of insurance in the Workingman’s Co-operative Association, for “sick benefits,” the plaintiff had judgment, to reverse which the defendant urges the present appeal. He challenges the judgment upon three grounds:

*27First. That the action was brought prematurely, because before expiration of the 30 days allowed by the policy. The fact is not apparent, and it was an affirmative defense, of which the appellant could not avail himself under his general denial.

Second. That no sufficient proof of plaintiff’s claim was presented to the association. We think otherwise. At all events, the defect, if any, was waived by the omission of a seasonable and specific objection.

Third. That the plaintiff defaulted in proof of compliance with the condition of the policy. But this, too, was a defense which the appellant should have alleged and established. Richmond v. Insurance Co., 79 N. Y. 230; Insurance Co. v. Ewing, 92 U. S. 377. Another answer to the appeal is that the motion to dismiss the complaint omitted to specify the particulars of nonperformance of conditions. Webb v. Odell, 49 N. Y. 583.

The judgment consists with the justice of the case, and is not invalidated by any legal error. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE SIX
MONTH FINANCIAL STATEMENT AS OF JUNE 30, 1999 AND SIX MONTH FINANCIAL STATEMENT
AS OF JUNE 30, 1998, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1998             DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1998             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                    JUN-30-1998             JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                            3,135,170               6,779,372
<SECURITIES>                              0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                        38,659                  33,744
<ALLOWANCES>                              0                       0
<INVENTORY>                               0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                  3,173,829               6,974,886
<PP&E>                            1,392,572              10,441,752
<DEPRECIATION>                       11,922                  29,793
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                    4,972,478              19,647,968
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>             1,372,887               2,496,748
<BONDS>                                   0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                     0                       0
<PREFERRED>                              80                 200,000
<COMMON>                             16,000                  16,352
<OTHER-SE>                        3,527,767               2,447,647
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>      4,972,478              19,647,968
<SALES>                                   0                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                          0                       0
<CGS>                                     0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                     1,121,461               3,182,121
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                          0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                          0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        0                 245,232
<INCOME-PRETAX>                    (947,498)             (3,294,401)
<INCOME-TAX>                              0                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       0                       0
<DISCONTINUED>                            0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                           0                       0
<CHANGES>                                 0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                       (947,498)             (3,294,401)
<EPS-BASIC>                         (0.06)                  (0.21)
<EPS-DILUTED>                         (0.06)                  (0.21)


</TABLE>
#### Thomas Francesconi et al., Appellants, v Thomas Nutter et al., Respondents, and Robert K. Donnelly et al., Intervenors-Respondents.

— In an action for specific performance of a contract to sell real property, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Stolarik, J.), dated April 18, 1985, which, *inter alia,*granted the intervenors’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint. The appeal brings up for review so much of an order of the same court, dated July 10, 1985, as, upon renewal and reargument, adhered to the original determination (CPLR 5517 [b]).

Ordered that the appeal from the order dated April 18, 1985, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order granting renewal and reargument; and it is further,

Ordered that the order dated July 10, 1985, is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,

Ordered that the intervenors-respondents are awarded one bill of costs payable by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs’ tender of a deposit and the procuring of a mortgage commitment and a title insurance search do not constitute such "part performance” as to overcome the requirements of the Statute of Frauds *(see,*General Obligations Law § 5-703). These actions are not "unequivocally referable” *364to a contract, but rather can be explained as preliminary steps which contemplate the future formulation of an agreement *(see, Grade Sq. Realty Corp. v Choice Realty Corp.,*305 NY 271; *Cooper v Schube,*86 AD2d 62, *affd*57 NY2d 1016; *S.S.I. Investors v Korea Tungsten Min. Co.,*80 AD2d 155, *affd*55 NY2d 934). Mollen, P. J., Bracken, Brown and Sullivan, JJ., concur.
**EXHIBIT 23.01**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We have issued our reports dated May 7, 2007, accompanyingthe consolidated financial statements (which report expressed an unqualified opinion and contains an explanatory paragraph about Design Within Reach, Inc.’s adoption of Statement No. 123R, “Share-Based Payment”) andmanagement’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting (which report expressed an unqualified opinion on management’s assessment, and an adverse opinion on the effective operation of internal control overfinancial reporting) included in the Annual Report of Design Within Reach, Inc. on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 30, 2006. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said reports in the previously filed RegistrationStatements of Design Within Reach, Inc. on Form S-8 (File No. 333-117190, effective July 7, 2004). 

/s/ GRANT THORNTON LLP 

San Francisco, California 

May 7, 2007
Minimum Civil Penalties for Failure to Heave-To and for Hazardous 

Materials Transportation Violations

Written by: Hearing Office Staff

Within the table of civil penalty amounts in 33 CFR Part 27, there 

are at least two penalty amounts that are identified as minimum 

civil penalties. One is the $1,000.00 minimum civil penalty for 

failure to heave-to, in violation of 19 USC § 1581(d), and another is 

the $300.00 minimum civil penalty for violating requirements for 

transportation of hazardous materials, authorized by 49 USC § 

5123(a)(1). When considering whether or not to charge someone with 

failing to heave-to, it is important to keep in mind that, if the 

violation is proved, the Hearing Officer is required to assess the 

minimum penalty, at least. If the violation is proved, the Hearing 

Officer cannot assess a warning or any penalty less than a civil 

penalty of $1,000.00. Accordingly, when a Coast Guard unit forwards 

a case including a charge of failing to heave-to, in violation of 19 

USC § 1581(d), the unit should not recommend a warning or a civil 

penalty less than $1,000.00. The same is true for violations of the 

hazardous materials transportation regulations, although the 

minimum $300.00 civil penalty for those violations is less likely to 

raise concerns about whether the penalty fits the violation. Making a 

recommendation that is inconsistent with the minimum civil penalty 

is clearly not effective, because the Hearing Officer must follow the 

law, and it gives the appearance that the unit making the 

recommendation is not fully aware of the consequences of the charge 

it is asserting. The decision to seek a civil penalty should always 

take account of material factors involved in the case, including any 

minimum civil penalty.