alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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                                                                   EXHIBIT 99(c)

                        KEYCORP STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2000-A
                              OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE


Bank One, National Association                  Banker's Trust Company
One Bank One Plaza, Suite 0126                  Four Albany Street
Chicago, Illinois 60670                         New York, New York  10006
ATTN: Corporate Trust Administration            ATTN: Corporate Trust & Agency
                                                      Group Structured Finance
Phone:   (312) 407-0192                         Phone:  (212) 250-6501
Fax:     (312) 407-1708                         Fax:    (212) 250-6439

Key Bank USA, National Association              MBIA Insurance Corporation
800 Superior Ave, 4th Floor                     113 King Street
Cleveland, OH   44114                           Armonk, NY 10504
ATTN:   Senior Vice President                   ATTN: Data Administration
         Key Education Resources                Phone:  (914) 765-3772
Phone:   (216) 828-9342                         Fax:    (914) 765-3810
Fax:     (216) 828-9417




Pursuant to Section 3.08 of the Subservicing Agreement between Key Bank USA,
National Association as Master Servicer and Great Lakes Educational Loan
Services, Inc., as Subservicer, dated as of June 1, 2000 (the "Agreement"), the
undersigned hereby certifies that (i) a review of the activities of the
Subservicer from the inception of the Trust through December 31, 2000, and of
its performance under the Agreement has been made, and (ii) to the best of the
undersigned's knowledge, based on the review, the Subservicer has fulfilled all
its obligations under the Agreement throughout such period





                                   Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc.,
                                   Subservicer
Date:    3/13/01                   By:  /s/ Michael J. Noack
     ------------------------         ---------------------------------------
                                   Name: Michael J. Noack
                                   Title: Secretary
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


      In connection with the amended annual report of Trycera Financial, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-KSB/A-4 for the year ended December 31, 2004, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), the undersigned principal executive officer of the Company, hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

Date:  December 12, 2005


/s/ Matthew S. Kerper
-----------------------------
Matthew S. Kerper, President
(Principal executive officer)
#### GRAVES et al., Appellants, v. BRADLEY, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

April, 1896.)

Action by Maurice A. Graves and another, as executors, etc., against Christopher C. Bradley.

No opinion. Motion to dismiss appeal denied, without costs to either party.
#### Dunn *v.*Herbs *et al.*

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department.*

May 26, 1890.)

Mortgages—Foreclosure—Release of Purchaser.

A purchaser at a foreclosure sale should be relieved from his purchase where the lot sold contains only 8 or 9 acres instead of 89 acres, as described in the notice of sale, and he made his bid in the honest belief it contained the larger quantity.

Appeal from special term, Columbia county.

This is an appeal by A. Paul Dunn from an order vacating a sale in foreclosure proceedings instituted by him, and directing the referee to repay to the purchasers, Frederick C. Herbs and Magnus D. Herbs, the amount paid by them on account of their purchase.

Argued before Learned, P. J., and Landon and Mayham, JJ.

*William Lounsbery,*for appellant. *Chancellor Hawver,*for respondents.

Learned, P. J.

This order should be affirmed. The purchaser bid off two pieces of property, sold together,—one of a little less than three acres, the other described to be 89 acres. By an honest misapprehension, he supposed *35the piece of 89 acres to be one which belongs to the plaintiff, but which was in fact not sold. The piece which the purchaser in fact bought is of much less value than that which he supposed he was buying, and contains, as would seem, 8 or 9 acres, not 89. The utmost fairness must be observed in judicial sales; and a purchaser will not be compelled to complete his sale when he has bid, under an honest misapprehension, and discovers that he has not bought the property for which he thought he was bidding, and at once applies for relief. We do not say that the plaintiff intended to deceive, but probably the selling of the two pieces together tended to lead the purchaser into the mistake which he made. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and printing disbursements. All concur.
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#### CONSPIRATORS v. Dr. Chandan S. VORA, Appellant.

No. 11-1032.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 April 28, 2011.

Opinion filed: May 18, 2011.

Chandan S. Vora, Johnstown, PA, pro se.

Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Dr. Chandan S. Vora appeals from the orders of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying her motion to file a motion for rehearing of the court’s prior order dismissing her petition for removal.

Dr. Vora filed a petition for removal, which the District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and as otherwise frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This Court dismissed Dr. Vora’s appeal under § 1915(e)(2)(B). *Conspirators v. Vora,*367 Fed.Appx. 296 (3d Cir.2010). On November 22, 2010, Dr. Vora filed a motion for an extension of time to file a motion for rehearing of the District Court’s dismissal of her removal petition, which the District Court denied as moot in light of our judgment dismissing Dr. Vora’s related appeal, and pursuant to a pre-filing injunction issued in 2008. *See In re Chandan S. Vora,*Misc. No. 08-mc-00104 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 21, 2008) (prohibiting Dr. Vora from filing “any motions and pleadings and other documents in cases that have been dismissed and closed by the district court and that subsequently have been appealed” to this Court). Dr. Vora filed this timely appeal.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Upon de novo review of the record and careful consideration of Dr. Vora’s notice of appeal and other submissions, we conclude that there is no substantial question presented on appeal and that summary action is warranted. *See*LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. We need not decide whether the pre-filing injunction comports with *Abdul-Akbar v. Watson,*901 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir.1990). Assuming without deciding that the prefiling injunction does not apply here, the District Court properly denied Dr. Vora’s motion for an extension of time as moot based on our dismissal of her appeal of the same court order upon which she ultimately sought a rehearing.

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court judgment.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Edward Skrine, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Glass, J., at trial; O’Dwyer, J., at sentencing), rendered December 18, 1981, convicting him of criminally possessing a hypodermic instrument, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial (Sherman, J.), after a hearing, of the defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence, and the denial (O’Dwyer, J.), of his motion to dismiss the indictment.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the defendant’s motions to suppress physical evidence and to dismiss the indictment are granted, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for the purpose of entering an order in its discretion pursuant to CPL 160.50.

*508The statute which authorizes the appearance of a person before a Grand Jury that is investigating his conduct explicitly provides that the right to appear may be exercised by giving the appropriate notice at any time prior to the filing of the indictment, even if the charges have already been submitted to the Grand Jury (CPL 190.50 [5] [a]). Here, although the indictment had been voted, it had not yet been filed at the time the defendant notified the District Attorney of his intention to testify. Thus, the defendant was entitled to, and was deprived of his statutory right to appear, and the indictment should have been dismissed *(see,*CPL 190.50 [5] [c]; *Matter of Borrello v Balbach,*112 AD2d 1051; *People v Gini,*72 AD2d 752).

Further, the defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence should have been granted. The arrest that ultimately resulted in the discovery of a hypodermic needle in the defendant’s possession occurred following an alleged purchase of narcotics by an undercover officer. The arresting officer saw the undercover officer approach a group of people, but did not observe the actual transaction. Instead, his action was predicated upon the undercover officer’s radio transmission that he had just made the purchase from a "male black wearing a blue hat, blue jacket, dungarees [and] red sneakers”. The defendant met that description, but the arresting officer testified that there were other male blacks and numerous blue hats and blue jackets in the group, and he could not recall at the hearing whether the defendant was the only person who met the complete description given by the undercover officer. In these circumstances, although the arresting officer was entitled to rely upon the radio transmission by the undercover officer *(see, People v Reddick,*107 AD2d 721, *affd*65 NY2d 835; *People v Bowdoin,*89 AD2d 986) and there was no need for that officer to testify at the hearing *(see, People v Petralia,*62 NY2d 47, *cert denied*469 US 852), the information transmitted was insufficient to show it was more likely than not that the defendant was the person who had committed the crime *(see, People v Henley,*53 NY2d 403; *People v Lane,*102 AD2d 829, *appeal dismissed*63 NY2d 865; *People v Gordon, 87*AD2d 636). Lazer, J. P., Mangano, Bracken and Kooper, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Alonzo Smith, Appellant.

*1054Tamara Smith, the bank teller who cashed the check on which the first two counts of the indictment were based, did not testify at trial. We find that the prosecutor’s improper remarks during summation that the defendant could have called her as a witness, and his suggestion that Tamara Smith’s testimony would have corroborated the evidence presented by the People, constituted reversible error with respect to the convictions on those two counts *(People v Mirenda,*23 NY2d 439, 457; *People v Grice,*100 AD2d 419, 422). The court’s charge that defendant was not required to testify nor present witnesses, and that the jury could not consider that against him, was inadequate to cure the harm from the prosecutor’s error *(People v Murray,*64 AD2d 916). We do not agree with defendant’s further argument that this burden shifting tainted the whole trial, since the jury acquitted the defendant on counts seven and eight of the indictment.

The court erred in refusing defendant’s request for a missing witness charge with respect to Tamara Smith on the ground that the witness was equally available to the defense. The burden was on the prosecution to account for the bank teller’s absence in order to avoid the charge *(People v Dillard,*96 AD2d 112, 115), and the witness was not necessarily unavailable simply by reason of her presence in Utah *(People v Jenkins,*41 NY2d 307, 310, n 2, *rearg denied*42 NY2d 825; *People v Jackson,*122 AD2d 566).

The convictions on counts one and two must be reversed, the sentences vacated, and those counts dismissed. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. (Appeal from judgment of Monroe County Court, Celli, J. — criminal possession of forged instrument, second degree, and other offenses.) Present — Doerr, J. P., Boomer, Green, Pine and Balio, JJ.
II 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2496 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 21, 2015 

Received 

AN ACT 

To extend the authorization for the replacement of the existing Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in 

Denver, Colorado, to make certain improvements in the 

Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 2496 RDS 

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Construction Author3 ization and Choice Improvement Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION FOR MAJOR MED5 ICAL FACILITY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT 

6 PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Veterans Affairs 

8 may carry out the replacement of the existing Department 

9 of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Denver, Colorado, 

10 in fiscal year 2015, in an amount not to exceed 

11 $900,000,000. 

12 (b) LIMITATION ON OBLIGATION OF FUNDS.—Not13 withstanding section 8104(c) of title 38, United States 

14 Code, or any other provision of law, funds may not be obli15 gated or expended for the project described in subsection 

16 (a) in an amount that would cause the total amount obli17 gated for that project to exceed the amount specified in 

18 the law for that project (or would add to total obligations 

19 exceeding such specified amount). 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

HR 2496 RDS 

1 SEC. 3. CLARIFICATION OF DISTANCE REQUIREMENT FOR 

2 EXPANDED AVAILABILITY OF HOSPITAL 

3 CARE AND MEDICAL SERVICES FOR VET4 ERANS THROUGH THE USE OF AGREEMENTS 

5 WITH NON-DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AF6 FAIRS ENTITIES. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 101(b)(2) of the Veterans 

8 Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 (Public 

9 Law 113–146; 38 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended— 

10 (1) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ‘‘(as cal11 culated based on distance traveled)’’ after ‘‘40 

12 miles’’; and 

13 (2) in subparagraph (D)(ii), by striking sub14 clause (II), and inserting the following new sub15 clause (II): 

16 ‘‘(II) faces an unusual or exces17 sive burden in traveling to such a 

18 medical facility of the Department 

19 based on— 

20 ‘‘(aa) geographical chal21 lenges; 

22 ‘‘(bb) environmental factors, 

23 such as roads that are not acces24 sible to the general public, traf25 fic, or hazardous weather; 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
4 

HR 2496 RDS 

1 ‘‘(cc) a medical condition 

2 that impacts the ability to travel; 

3 or 

4 ‘‘(dd) other factors, as de5 termined by the Secretary.’’. 

6 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

7 subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of the enact8 ment of this Act and apply with respect to care or services 

9 provided on or after such date. 

Passed the House of Representatives May 21, 2015. 

Attest: KAREN L. HAAS, 

Clerk. 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT 99.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of IDX Systems Corporation
(the "Company") for the period ended September 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, Richard E. Tarrant, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and
John A. Kane, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

(1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
        15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
        respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
        Company.





                                   /S/ RICHARD E. TARRANT
                                 -----------------------------------------------
Dated:  November 12, 2002        Richard E. Tarrant
                                 Chief Executive Officer





                                  /S/ JOHN A. KANE
                                 -----------------------------------------------
Dated:  November 12, 2002        John A. Kane
                                 Sr. Vice President, Finance and Administration,
                                 Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
BRIAN QUINN

Chief Justice

JAMES T. CAMPBELL

Justice

MACKEY K. HANCOCK

Justice

PATRICK A. PIRTLE

Justice

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas

Potter County Courts Building

501 S. Fillmore, Suite 2-A

Amarillo, Texas 79101-2449

www.txcourts.gov/7thcoa.aspx

VIVIAN LONG

Clerk

MAILING ADDRESS:

P. O. Box 9540

79105-9540

(806) 342-2650

March 18, 2015

Jeffrey S. Ford

Assistant Criminal District Attorney

P.O. Box 10536

Lubbock, TX 79408

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

Julie Goen Panger

THE KIECHLER LAW FIRM PLLC

619 Broadway

Lubbock, TX 79401

* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *

RE: Case Numbers: 07-14-00389-CR, 07-14-00410-CR

Trial Court Case Numbers: 2013-437,920, 2013-400,018

Style: Steven Regalado v. The State of Texas

Dear Counsel:

State’s brief is filed Tuesday, March 17, 2015.

Very truly yours,

Vivian Long

VIVIAN LONG, CLERK

FILE COPY
#### Robert J. Lee, Respondent, v Ranko Caric, Appellant.

—In an action to compel specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, the defendant appeals from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kassoff, J.), dated July 8, 1985, which, after a nonjury trial, *inter alia,*granted judgment to the plaintiff, and directed the defendant to execute a deed and surrender possession of the premises in the manner set forth in the contract, and (2) an order of the same court, dated February 4, 1986, which, *inter alia,*directed the Sheriff of the City of New York, Queens County, to convey to the plaintiff title to the subject property.

Ordered that the judgment and order are affirmed, with costs.

The defendant’s argument that the contract of sale is illegal and unenforceable is without merit. The fact that the contract could conceivably be used by the plaintiff in an attempt to mislead a third party as to the actual purchase price of the property is an insufficient basis for the avoidance of the contract.

Absent evidence of an intent to violate the law, "a contract that may be performed both lawfully and unlawfully should be construed in favor of its legality” *(Galuth Realty Corp. v Greenfield,*103 AD2d 819). Nor is the contract unenforceable under the facts of this case because the plaintiff failed to tender payment prior to instituting the action for specific performance *(see, Huntington Min. Holdings v Cottontail Plaza,*96 AD2d 526, *affd*60 NY2d 997).

Also without merit is the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in extending the plaintiff’s time to comply with the judgment awarding specific performance. Pursuant to CPLR 2004, the court was empowered to extend the time for payment set forth in its prior order. Bracken, J P., Niehoff, Fiber and Sullivan, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Secure Computing Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for
the period ending September 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Daniel P. Ryan, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/ Daniel P. Ryan                   
|Daniel P. Ryan                       
|President and Chief Executive Officer
|November 4, 2008
exhibit_10-1.htm






AMENDMENT NUMBER TWO


to the


WALGREEN CO. PROFIT-SHARING RESTORATION PLAN


 




 


Effective January 1, 2010, the Walgreen Co. Profit-Sharing Restoration Plan (the “Plan”) is amended as follows:







1.   Section 4.2(c) (Payment for Tax Burden on Taxable Secular Trust Earnings) is deleted in its entirety.







2.   Section 4.3 (Recapture of Excess Payments) is deleted in its entirety and subsequent Sections are renumbered accordingly.
#### Elsibeth Brandee MCCOY, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Steve CANTERBURY, Administrative Director for Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, Defendant—Appellee, and Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia; Cabell County Courthouse; Barbra Wills, Courthouse Administrator, Defendants.

No. 11-1017.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: May 2, 2011.

Decided: May 5, 2011.

Elsibeth Brandee McCoy, Appellant Pro Se. John Michael Hedges, Stephanie Shepherd, Byrne, Hedges & Lyons, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Elsibeth Brandee McCoy appeals the district court’s order dismissing her action filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the district court. *McCoy v. Canterbury,*No. 3:10-cv-00368, 2010 WL 5343298 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 20 & 21, 2010). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.