No. 13470 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1977 

STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, 

a corporation, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

HAROLD L. STURDEVANT, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

Honorable Edward Dussault, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Tipp and Hoven, Missoula, Montana 

Raymond Tipp argued, Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Raymond J. Fox argued, Missoula, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted: April 19, 1977 

Decided : ju~ 2 1 19n 
Xr. Zus'iice 3auiel 2. Shea delivered the dpinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal from a nonjury judgment of the district 

court, Missoula County, in an action to recover on a promissory 

note. 

Harold L. Sturdevant, appellant, entered into an agencymanager employment contract with Standard Insurance Company, 

respondent, in 1962. Under the terms of the contract, Sturdevant 

wds appointed manager of Standard's agency in Missoula, Montana. 

5e agreed to maintain the agency and recruit and train sub-agents, 

AS well as personally procure insurance applications. The parties 

diltered into similar contracts in 1963 and 1968 as to new business 

dZter those dates. Sturdevant also executed a promissory note in 

1968 to repay loans made to him by Standard. Income derived from 

~turdevant's contracts was to be applied to the note. 

Standard sued to collect the balance due on the note and 

Sturdevant counterclaimed seeking vested renewals under the conEracts, which he alleged were still in effect. In its reply 

TV he counterclaim Standard alleged termination of the contracts. 

The parties agreed to determine after trial the amount due 

each ~ther based upon the termination date found by the district 

court. Judgment was entered in favor of Standard establishing 

3eptember 15, 1969 as the termination date of the contracts and 

provided for further hearing, if the parties could not agree on the 

dinounts due. 

The only issue presented for review by Sturdevant is whether 

the district court erred in determining the agency-manager contracts were terminated on September 15, 1969. Sturdevant contends 

Lhe contracts extended through 1971. 
On August 14, 1969, Frank Burger, Sturdevant ' s supervisor 

with Standard, wrote this letter to Sturdevant: 

"Dear Harold: 

"This is to confirm our conversation of 

August 12, at which time you tendered verbal 

notice of intent to resign effective September 

15. It is the purpose of this letter to acknowledge your intent. 

"Once we have determined who the replacement will 

be, I will advise. I will appreciate very much your 

effort to make the transition a orderly and troublefree one from a service standpoint. 

"We ' 11 be in touch.' * * *" 

Burger testified that on August 12, 1969, Sturdevant told him he 

to resign and was "throwing in the and Burger 

accepted the resignation. 

Sturdevant, on the other hand, testified Burger and he had 

disagreements during the conversation, but when Burger asked if 

he intended to resign, Sturdevant merely replied it might come to 

that. Sturdevant testified he did not intend to resign and he 

did not think his contracts and position as manager were terminated. 

Therefore, he ignored the letter. 

Sturdevant's testimony was supported at trial by several 

agents in the Missoula office. Agent Swenson testified Sturdevant 

told him he would not resign; and agent Moffett testified Sturdevant showed him Burger's letter and said he did not resign. 

Sturdevant, however, did leave the office in September 1969 and 

according to Moffett, he never again worked/as manager. 

After Sturdevant left Standard's office, Burger testified 

he had no knowledge of any work performed by Sturdevant for Standard. 

Although Sturdevant took only personal family pictures when he 

left the office, Burger collected the rest of Sturdevant's property 

and later delivered it to him. 
After his departure from Standard, Sturdevant opened another 

insurance office, hired new agents and had contracts with and 

was licensed to sell for other companies. He testified however, 

that he kept Standard's insurance in force and serviced Standard 

policies at his new office. There is no evidence he sold more 

insurance for Standard, after opening his new office. 

In urging a different termination date than September 1969, 

Sturdevant makes three arguments: 

(1) The letter from Burger to Sturdevant did not comply 

with contract provisions allowing termination upon thirty days 

written notice since it did not specifically mention termination 

of the contracts, but only referred to intent to resign. 

(2) Since Standard obtained an agent's license for 

Sturdevant until 1971, the agency-manager contract could not 

have been terminated before 1971 when the license was not renewed. 

(3) The evidence was not sufficient to show the contracts 

were terminated by mutual consent. 

Concerning the first argument it is true that Burger's letter 

does not explicitly refer to "termination of the contracts1', but 

its meaning is clear and unambiguous, and constitutes adequate 

notice under the contracts. Clearly, Sturdevant understood its 

meaning enough to remove himself from Standard's offices and to 

open up another insurance business as an agent for other companies . 

In his second argument, Sturdevant misconstrues the application of Title 40, Chapter 33, R.C.M. 1947, concerning the 

licensing of insurance agents. This chapter provides, for 

purposes here, that an insurance license cannot be issued unless 

the recipient is appointed an agent by an authorized insurer. 

Since Standard somehow licensed Sturdevant until 1971, Sturdevant 
3rgues his agency-manager contracts with Standard could not be 

~erminated before 1971. But this licensing requirement is primarily for the protection of the public and is not meant to 

ereate private rights between the agent and insurance company 

as contended in this case. 16 AppLleman Insurance Law and PracWhile innocent third parties would be protected against any 

attempt by Standard or Sturdevant to repudiate its agency relationship between 1969 and 1971, this does not by itself entitle 

Sturdevant to assert a contractual right of agency-manager with 

Standard between the years 1969 and 1971. It is certainly a 

factor to be considered, but only in light of all the circumstances, 

and here there was evidence that Standard renewed the license 

because of a clerical oversight. 

Sturdevant is clearly wrong in his last argument that the 

evidence was not sufficient to establish a mutual rescission. 

Termination of a contract by mutual consent is a question of 

fact for the district court. Cruse v. Clawson, 137 Mont. 439, 

35.2 P.2d 989. In West River Equipment Co. v. Holzworth, 134 

Yont. 582, 587, 335 P.2d 298, we held that a written contract 

may be cancelled by mutual consent and the cancellation may be 

oral. The Court stated: 

It However, mutual cancellation must be clearly 

expressed and shown, and acts and conduct of 

the parties to be sufficient must be clear, 

convincing and inconsistent with the existence 

of the contract. [Citing cases] ." 

In support of his contention there was no mutual agreement 

to terminate the contracts, Sturdevant relies on evidence that 

he did not submit a written resignation; his license was ,. 

renewed until 1971; he ignored Burger's letter; he took only 
pictures from the office; he continued to keep the insurance in 

force and service policies; and, he told his agents he did not 

resign. While this evidence clearly put the issue in dispute, 

there was substantial evidence to the contrary sufficient to 

support the district court's determination the contracts terminated on September 15, 1969. The district court was justified 

in concluding that Sturdevant's departure from Standard's office 

also resulted in his departure from the agency-manager contract 

he had with Standard. 

We note that determination of the amount of money due was 

deferred until after trial and appeal, apparently pursuant to 

Rule 42(b), M.R.Civ.P. Multiple trials and appeals arising 

from a single dispute may create a severe burden in terms of 

increased cost to the litigants, delay in resolution of the 

controversy, and court congestion. Where there is no danger 

of prejudice and the issues are not complex the necessity of 

separate trials should be carefully weighed by the district court 

to ensure the rule is not abused. 

We affirm the judgment and remand this cause for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

We Concur: