ANNUAL REPORT OF THE

UNITED STATES COMMISSION 

ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

MAY 2004 
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 

800 North Capitol Street, NW 

Suite 790 

Washington, DC 20002 

202-523-3240 

202-523-5020 (fax) 

www.uscirf.gov 
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

Michael K. Young 

Chair 

Felice D. Gaer 

Nina Shea 

Vice Chairs 

Preeta D. Bansal 

Patti Chang 

Archbishop Charles J. Chaput 

Khaled Abou El Fadl 

Richard D. Land 

Bishop Ricardo Ramirez 

Ambassador John V. Hanford, III, ex officio 

Joseph R. Crapa 

Executive Director 
STAFF OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

May 2004 

Tad Stahnke, Deputy Director for Policy 

David Dettoni, Deputy Director for Outreach 

Christy Klaassen, Director of Government Affairs 

Anne Johnson, Director of Communications 

Carmelita Hines, Director of Administration 

Patricia Carley, Associate Director for Policy 

Eileen A. Sullivan, Deputy Director of Communications 

Dwight N. Bashir, Policy Analyst 

Jennifer Boese, Government Affairs Assistant 

Catherine Cosman, Senior Policy Analyst 

Deborah DuCre, Receptionist 

Scott Flipse, Policy Analyst 

Shahriar Hafizi, Communications Assistant 

Mark Hetfield, Immigration Counsel 

Mindy Larmore, Research Assistant 

Jacqueline A. Mitchell, Executive Assistant 

Danielle Simms, Assistant to the Deputy Director for Policy 

Stephen R. Snow, Senior Policy Analyst 
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

__________ 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Washington, DC, May 3, 2004

The PRESIDENT 

The White House 

 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s annual report, prepared in 

compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

 MICHAEL K. YOUNG 

Chair 

 

 Enclosure 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________ 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Washington, DC, May 3, 2004

Hon. COLIN L. POWELL 

Secretary of State 

Department of State

 DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s annual report, prepared in 

compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

MICHAEL K. YOUNG 

Chair 

 

 Enclosure 
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________ 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Washington, DC, May 3, 2004 

Hon. DENNIS HASTERT 

Speaker of the House 

U.S. House of Representatives

 DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s annual report, prepared in compliance with 

section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., 

P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

MICHAEL K. YOUNG 

Chair 

 

 Enclosure 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________ 

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Washington, DC, May 3, 2004

Hon. TED STEVENS 

President Pro Tempore 

U.S. Senate

 DEAR MR. STEVENS: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s annual report, prepared in compliance with 

section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., 

P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228. 

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

MICHAEL K. YOUNG 

Chair 

 

 Enclosure 
ABOUT THE COMMISSION

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) is an 

independent federal government agency created by the International Religious Freedom Act of 

1998 (IRFA) to monitor religious freedom in other countries and advise the President, Secretary 

of State, and Congress on how best to promote it. The Commission is the first government 

commission in the world with a mandate to review and report on violations of the 

internationally-guaranteed right to freedom of religion or belief worldwide. By publicly 

providing reliable information, analysis, and creative and responsible policy recommendations, 

the Commission gives the U.S. government and the American people the tools necessary to 

advance religious freedom and related human rights throughout the world. 

In the words of a key drafter of IRFA, the Commission was established for the purpose of 

ensuring “that the President and the Congress receive independent recommendations and, where 

necessary, criticism of American policy that does not promote international religious freedom.”1

The Commission, which began its work in May 1999, is not a part of the State 

Department and is independent from the Executive Branch. 

The Commission is composed of ten members. Three are appointed by the President. 

Three are appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate, of which two are appointed 

upon the recommendation of the Senate Minority Leader. Three are appointed by the Speaker of 

the House of Representatives, of which two are appointed upon the recommendation of the 

House Minority Leader. The system of appointments thus provides that leaders of the party in 

the White House appoint five voting members, and leaders of the other party appoint four. The 

Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom serves ex officio as a non-voting 

member. 

Commissioners bring a wealth of expertise and experience in foreign affairs, human 

rights, religious freedom, and international law; the membership also reflects the religious 

diversity of the United States. 

During the first part of the period covered by this report, May 2003 – April 2004, Felice 

D. Gaer served as the Chair and Michael K. Young served as the Vice Chair of the Commission. 

In July 2003, Michael K. Young was elected Chair, and Felice D. Gaer and Nina Shea were 

elected to serve as Co-Vice Chairs. Each voting member of the Commission is currently serving 

either a one or two-year term and can be reappointed. 

In carrying out its mandate, the Commission reviews information on violations of 

religious freedom as presented in the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights 

Practices and its Annual Report on International Religious Freedom. The Commission also 

consults regularly with representatives of religious communities and institutions, human rights 

groups, and other non-governmental organizations, academics and other policy experts, as well 

as the intelligence community and other U.S. government agencies. It also visits foreign 

countries to examine religious freedom conditions firsthand. The Commission holds public 

hearings, taking testimony from expert witnesses, victims of religious freedom violations, and 

U.S. government officials. 
The Commission has met with President Bush and senior members of his Administration, 

including the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, to discuss its findings and 

recommendations. The Commission also briefs Members of Congress, U.S. Ambassadors, and 

officials from international organizations and foreign countries. In addition, the Commission 

testifies before Congress, participates with U.S. delegations to international meetings and 

conferences, helps provide training to Foreign Service officers and other U.S. officials, and 

advises the Administration and Members of Congress and their staff on executive and legislative 

initiatives. 

The Commission also raises issues and brings its findings and recommendations to the 

American public, through its public speaking activities, other public events such as roundtables 

and briefings, media outreach, its publications and its Web site. During this reporting period, 

Commission opinion pieces appeared in the Washington Post, New York Times, and The Wall 

Street Journal. Commissioners reside throughout the United States, and the Commission has 

traveled around the country to hold public hearings, public meetings, and other activities to 

inform the American people of its work. 

While the work of the Commission is conducted year round, the Commission compiles an 

annual report of its policy recommendations in May to the President, the Secretary of State, and 

Congress. This report covers the period from May 1, 2003 – April 30, 2004. 

 

1 Congressional Record, S12999, November 12, 1998. 
2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

May 2004 

Table of Contents 

Introduction................................................................................................... 1

Ensuring the Rights of Every Person in Iraq and Afghanistan.................................... 5 

Countries of Particular Concern and the Commission Watch List...............................13 

Country Reports: Africa................................................................................. 19 

Eritrea.................................................................................................19 

Nigeria................................................................................................21 

Sudan.................................................................................................23 

Country Reports: East Asia..............................................................................27

Burma................................................................................................27 

China.................................................................................................29 

Indonesia.............................................................................................33 

Korea, People’s Democratic Republic of........................................................35 

Laos...................................................................................................39 

Vietnam..............................................................................................41 

Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia.................................................................47 

Advancing Religious Freedom and Combating Anti-Semitism in the OSCE...............47 

Belarus................................................................................................49 

France................................................................................................52 

Georgia...............................................................................................54

The Russian Federation............................................................................56 

Turkmenistan........................................................................................60

Uzbekistan...........................................................................................63 

Country Reports: Middle East...........................................................................69

The Exportation of Religious Intolerance from Saudi Arabia.................................69 

Egypt..................................................................................................72 

Iran....................................................................................................75 

Saudi Arabia.........................................................................................77 
Country Reports: South Asia............................................................................81 

India...................................................................................................81 

Pakistan.............................................................................................. 85 

Country Reports: Western Hemisphere................................................................89 

Cuba...................................................................................................89

IRFA and the U.S. Refugee and Asylum Programs..................................................91 

The State Department’s Annual Report on International Religious Freedom...................95 

Appendix 1: Biographies of Members of the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom.......................................................................................................99 

Appendix 2: The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Selected Provisions........107
INTRODUCTION

This annual report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom provides 

a comprehensive review of the Commission’s findings, recommendations, and achievements 

during the past year to promote the internationally enshrined right to freedom of thought, 

conscience, religion, or belief. It describes conditions for religious freedom and interrelated 

human rights in the countries of most concern to the Commission, describes the actions the 

Commission has taken with regard to those countries, and compiles the Commission’s policy 

recommendations to the U.S. government to make the promotion of freedom of religion or belief 

a more integral part of U.S. human rights policy. In the five years of its operation, many of the 

Commission’s recommendations concerning several countries that violate international norms of 

freedom of religion or belief have been implemented by the President, the State Department, and 

Congress, and have had a significant impact on the protection of human rights, including 

religious freedom, in those countries. 

In the past year, the Commission has been especially active on Afghanistan and Iraq, two 

countries where the United States has a particular responsibility to ensure that the newly formed 

governments are functioning democracies that protect human rights, including religious freedom. 

Focusing on the process of constitutional development, the Commission throughout the year 

vigorously acted to highlight the importance of guaranteeing that the right of every individual to 

freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief is protected in the recently adopted 

constitutions of these two important countries. The Commission raised the issue in several 

public statements, as well as in two separate opinion-editorial articles, in The Washington Post

and The New York Times. With regard to Iraq, the Commission worked successfully with senior

Administration officials, Members of Congress, and others to ensure that explicit guarantees of 

this right for every Iraqi is included in the country’s interim constitution, a document which 

potentially stands as a model for the region. Unfortunately, in Afghanistan, there was more 

limited success with respect to the constitution. Details about the crucial significance of 

individual rights in the protection of human freedom, as well as about the Commission’s 

numerous activities in this important effort, can be found in the following chapter on Ensuring 

the Rights of Every Person in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

One of the Commission’s chief responsibilities is to make recommendations to the 

Secretary of State on countries whose governments have engaged in or tolerated systematic and 

egregious violations of the internationally recognized right to freedom of religion or belief. 

Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), those countries that meet the 

statutory criteria must be designated by the Secretary of State as “countries of particular 

concern,” or CPCs. In February 2004, the Commission wrote to Secretary of State Colin L. 

Powell to recommend that 11 countries be designated as CPCs this year. It identified six 

countries not previously designated by the U.S. government: Eritrea, India∗

, Pakistan, Saudi 

 

∗

 Commissioners Bansal, Gaer, and Young dissented from the Commission’s recommendation 

that India be designated a country of particular concern (CPC). Their views with respect to India 

are reflected in a separate opinion, which can be found at the end of the section on India in this 

report. Commissioner Chaput also joins this separate opinion, and would place India on the 

Watch List rather than recommend that it be designated a CPC. 

1
Arabia, Turkmenistan, and Vietnam. It also recommended that five countries remain on the 

CPC list: Burma, China, the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, Iran, and Sudan, but 

that Iraq should no longer be designated a CPC. The simple designation by the U.S. government 

of a severe violator of religious freedom as a CPC is not sufficient action, however, as IRFA 

makes clear that the policy of the United States also must be to take active steps in response 

those countries deemed to be particularly egregious religious freedom violators. 

 In addition, the Commission wrote that Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Uzbekistan would 

remain on the Commission’s Watch List of countries where religious freedom conditions do not 

rise to the statutory level requiring CPC designation but which warrant close monitoring because 

of violations engaged in or tolerated by their governments, and that Belarus, Cuba, and Georgia 

would be added to that list. More information can be found in the chapter on the Commission’s 

CPC recommendations and Watch List countries. 

In its May 2003 report on Saudi Arabia, the Commission recommended that Congress 

authorize a study to determine whether, how, and the extent to which the Saudi government, 

members of the royal family, or Saudi-funded individuals or institutions are propagating globally 

a religious ideology that explicitly promotes hate and violence toward members of other 

religious groups, including disfavored Muslims. In November 2003, The Wall Street Journal

published a Commission opinion-editorial on the subject entitled, “Al Qaeda and Saudi Arabia.” 

In April 2004, the Commission’s recommendation was implemented when several Members of 

Congress wrote to the Comptroller of the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) requesting that 

the agency undertake a study to determine what the U.S. government is doing to identify and 

monitor sources of Saudi funding for institutions that advocate violence and intolerance, and 

what the U.S. government is doing to counter that influence. In pursuing this study, GAO was 

asked to seek information from relevant U.S. government agencies, including this Commission, 

as well as outside experts. More information on the problem of Saudi support for intolerance 

and the Commission’s recommended study can be found in the chapter entitled Country Reports: 

Middle East.

Throughout the past year, the Commission held public events highlighting critical 

religious freedom concerns. In March and in July 2003, the Commission hosted roundtables 

with members of the Administration, Members of Congress, academics, and representatives of 

religious groups and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to discuss U.S. efforts to 

advance freedom of religion or belief in China. In November 2003, the Commission held a 

hearing entitled Is Saudi Arabia a Strategic Threat?: the Global Propagation of Intolerance to 

explore Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the global spread of religious extremism. And in January 

2004, the Commission held a field hearing in Los Angeles entitled North Korea: Human Rights 

Ground Zero. The hearing focused on the human rights conditions in North Korea, the plight of 

North Korean refugees, and appropriate U.S. foreign policies on these issues and included 

witnesses from the Administration and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as from 

the local community. More detail about these and other events is found in the sections on the 

individual countries. 

As part of its extensive work on Afghanistan, which included the holding in January 2003 

of an international forum, “Reconstructing Afghanistan: Freedom in Crisis?” in cooperation with 

George Washington University Law School in January 2003, the Commission undertook a 

2
mission to Afghanistan in August 2003. The Commission delegation, which traveled to 

Afghanistan during a crucial period when Afghan experts were drafting the new constitution, met 

with senior officials of the Transitional Administration, the chairs and other members of the 

Constitutional, Human Rights, and Judicial Reform Commissions, representatives of NGOs, 

religious leaders, and others. In January 2004, the Commission traveled to Hong Kong to hold 

meetings with religious leaders, experts, and human rights advocates. In addition, during the 

past year the Commission participated on several U.S. delegations to human rights meetings of 

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including special meetings on Freedom

of Religion or Belief and on Anti-Semitism.

Commissioners testified before Congress on various issues in the past year. Commission 

Chair Michael K. Young testified in February 2004 before the House International Relations 

Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Human Rights at a hearing 

entitled the Status of International Religious Freedom: an Analysis of the State Department’s 

2003 Annual Report. Also in February, Chairman Young testified on Vietnam before the East 

Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Protecting 

Religious Freedom in Vietnam: Balancing Interests and Principles. In July 2003, Commission 

Vice Chair Felice D. Gaer testified at a hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China entitled Will Religion Flourish under China’s New Leadership?. In October, Commission 

Vice Chair Nina Shea was the initial speaker at a briefing held by the Congressional Caucus on 

Vietnam and the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on Vietnam entitled Vietnam: A People 

Silenced. The individual country reports below contain more information about these events as 

well as other Commission activities. 

3
4
ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF EVERY PERSON IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that every human being has the 

right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right includes the freedom of every 

person to hold, or not to hold, any religion or belief, and to manifest his or her religion or belief 

either individually or in community with others.1

 Protection of religious freedom also includes 

the principle that no one should be subject to coercion that would impair his or her freedom to 

have, to adopt, or to reject a religion or belief. 

The individual dimension to the right to freedom of religion or belief has all too often 

been neglected. Although the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion explicitly 

refers to the right of every individual, international attention has often been directed toward 

protecting the freedoms of religious groups or communities, including their freedom to worship, 

educate, and organize their affairs according to their own doctrines. Nevertheless, protecting 

religious freedom extends beyond guaranteeing the freedom of groups to engage in religious 

activities, as important as that freedom is, particularly for religious minorities. Advancing the 

right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion protects not only members of religious 

minorities from repression by the majority, but also individual members of a majority religion 

from suffering under the tyranny of a minority from their own faith. 

A major focus of the Commission in the last year and a half has been Iraq and 

Afghanistan, in particular encouraging the development of new constitutions in those countries 

that explicitly uphold the right of every person to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or 

belief. Concerned that this fundamental aspect of freedom was being ignored, the Commission 

has sought to concentrate the attention of U.S. policymakers on the need to ensure that these 

guarantees of religious freedom for each individual, fully consistent with international standards, 

are institutionalized in the new political structures. 

Iraq and Afghanistan present a unique set of circumstances because the United States is 

directly involved in nation-building and political reconstruction. Following U.S. military action, 

the U.S. government has been working with both of these countries to develop democratic 

political systems that will break from the extremely repressive and abusive regimes of the past. 

Systematic and egregious violations of religious freedom were committed by both the Taliban 

and Saddam Hussein’s regimes; both regimes used religion as a political weapon to eliminate 

political opponents and suppress women and disfavored religious communities and to restrict or 

destroy other basic human rights of the majority population. The Commission has recommended 

that U.S. policies should include, as a central feature, the goal of helping to establish 

governments capable of protecting and promoting the human rights of each individual. 

Recent events, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrate that promoting freedom

of thought, conscience, religion, or belief as a U.S. foreign policy objective is intertwined with 

the aims of combating extremism and terrorism on the one hand, and promoting stability, 

freedom, and democratic development on the other. Current U.S. policy seeks to promote 

freedom and democratic change in both Iraq and Afghanistan, for the benefit of all Iraqis and 

Afghans, to prevent these countries from reverting to becoming sources of instability and 

supporters of terrorism, and instead to become progressive models of reform to other countries in 

the Middle East and the Islamic world. In November 2003, President Bush affirmed that “the 

5
United States will complete our work in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Democracy in those two 

countries will succeed. And that success will be a great milestone in the history of liberty.”2 

Effective guarantees of the right of every person to freedom of thought, conscience, 

religion, or belief are essential parts of advancing reform in both Afghanistan and Iraq. These 

guarantees protect those who question prevailing orthodoxies and seek to debate key issues 

facing their societies, especially where law, politics, and religion intersect. These guarantees 

protect those working through democratic means for change and respect for human rights of their 

fellow citizens. They help to inhibit those who would use religion as a weapon to obtain and 

hold on to power through undemocratic means abusive of basic rights, such as by stifling debate 

and the efforts of political moderates and reformers, jailing opponents, and sowing fear. This is 

not a theoretical matter, but a very real issue in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as discussed below. 

Unfortunately, there are few positive models, either in law or in practice, among Iraq and 

Afghanistan’s neighbors. Freedom of religion or belief as an individual, as opposed to a group, 

right is not well protected in the Middle East or among countries where Islam is the religion of 

the state. Many constitutions of these states protect religious belief only, rather than both belief 

and practice, as required by international norms. Moreover, rights are usually expressed in 

general terms rather than in the form of explicit guarantees of rights for each person. 

Nevertheless, there are exceptions: Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Malaysia—states where Islam is 

the state religion—have constitutional guarantees that compare favorably with international 

standards, as do several other predominately Muslim countries such as Albania, Azerbaijan, 

Mali, and Senegal. 

Afghanistan 

Throughout the past year, the Commission met with numerous high-ranking U.S. 

government officials to articulate the importance of institutionalizing human rights guarantees in 

the Afghan constitution that adequately protect the rights of each individual. The Commission 

also briefed Members of Congress and relevant committee staff on its policy findings and 

recommendations. In January 2003, the Commission held an international forum,

“Reconstructing Afghanistan: Freedom in Crisis?” in cooperation with George Washington 

University Law School, which brought together key Afghan leaders, U.S. policymakers, and 

other experts to discuss ways of integrating adequate human rights protections into current 

judicial and legal reform processes. The Commission also raised the issue of religious freedom

in numerous public statements, as well as in two separate opinion-editorial articles, in The 

Washington Post and The New York Times, authored by Commissioners Michael K. Young, 

Felice D. Gaer, and Preeta D. Bansal. The Commission was cited on this issue in over a dozen 

editorials in major newspapers worldwide. 

After the Commission’s concerns were communicated to him during his February 2003 

visit to the United States, Afghan President Hamid Karzai publicly invited the Commission to 

see conditions first-hand. In August 2003, during the crucial period when Afghan experts were 

drafting the new constitution, Commissioners visited Afghanistan for an intensive series of 

discussions with senior officials of the Transitional Administration, U.S. officials, 

representatives of non-governmental organizations and of Afghan civil society, former President 

Burhanuddin Rabbani, religious leaders, and members of the diplomatic community, including 

6
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. In these discussions, the delegation 

reiterated the Commission’s concerns regarding the protection of the right to freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion for every Afghan, including in the new constitution, for Muslims and 

non-Muslims alike. The Commission delegation found that elements in Afghan society who 

would promote respect for internationally recognized human rights are currently on the 

defensive, and even under threat. These moderate elements continue to need U.S. support to 

counter the influence of those who promote an extremist agenda and those who would use 

prevailing religious orthodoxy as a weapon to stifle political dissent and democratic debate. 

In January 2004, Afghanistan adopted a new Constitution. The Constitution contains an 

explicit recognition of equality between men and women and a reference to Afghanistan’s 

commitment to its international human rights obligations. 

Yet, there is a crucial—and potentially fatal—flaw in Afghanistan’s new Constitution. 

Though the Constitution provides for the freedom of non-Muslim groups to exercise their 

various faiths, it does not contain explicit protections for the right to freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religion that would extend to every individual – particularly to individual 

Muslims in Afghanistan, the overwhelming majority of the country’s population. This flaw is 

compounded by a repugnancy clause that states that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and 

provisions of Islam,” as well as by provisions for a judicial system empowered to enforce the 

repugnancy clause and apply Hanafi jurisprudence to cases where there is no other law on point. 

With no guarantee of the individual right to religious freedom and a judicial system

instructed to enforce Islamic principles and Islamic law, the new Constitution does not fully 

protect individual Afghan citizens against, for example, unjust accusations of religious “crimes” 

such as apostasy and blasphemy. There are also fewer protections for Afghans to debate the role 

and content of religion in law and society, to advocate the rights of women and members of 

religious minorities, and to question interpretations of Islamic precepts without fear of

retribution. This could permit a harsh, unfair, or even abusive interpretation of religious 

orthodoxy to be officially imposed, violating numerous rights by stifling dissent, which is 

permissible within the Islamic tradition. 

These are not theoretical concerns. Afghanistan’s Supreme Court Chief Justice Fazl Hadi 

Shinwari has shown little regard for those who disagree with his hard-line interpretation of

Islam. He told the Commission delegation visiting Afghanistan that he rejects three crucial 

freedoms—those of expression, religion, and equality of sexes—all of which are protected under 

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A sitting Minister in the interim Afghan 

government was forced to resign after she was charged with blasphemy by Chief Justice 

Shinwari for questioning the role of Islamic law in the new Afghanistan. Journalists have been 

jailed on charges of offending Islam. As Afghanistan continues its transition process, the United 

States should take every opportunity to insist that individual human rights guarantees, to which 

Afghanistan is a state party, be fully protected. 

Iraq

The Commission continues to urge U.S. officials to work vigorously to ensure that what 

happened in Afghanistan—the acceptance of inadequate protection of the rights of every person 

7
in the Constitution—is not repeated in Iraq. Although the context for political reconstruction in 

Iraq is quite different from that in Afghanistan, the Commission has raised similar concerns. 

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, Iraqis, including the majority Shi’a Muslim

population, have experienced religious freedom for the first time in more than two decades. At 

the same time, however, some segments of the Shi’a community have demanded the 

implementation of Islamic law (Sharia) in a manner that reportedly threatens to preclude respect 

for freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief for others, in contravention of Iraq’s 

international commitments to protect human rights and individual freedoms. Moreover, there 

have been increasing reports indicating the growing influence of religious extremism stemming 

from some Iranian and Saudi Wahhabi groups. Because both of these elements are well 

organized and funded and because both are proponents of severe restrictions on human rights, 

the Commission is concerned that other more moderate Iraqi religious groups, including those 

that advocate multi-religious cooperation and respect for human rights, may be overwhelmed. 

Hard-line Islamic clergy have reportedly taken over courts, hospitals, neighborhoods, and towns. 

Therefore, the Commission has consistently urged the U.S. government to aid, advance, and 

protect those who stand for moderation and tolerance in Iraq. 

In the early stages of the drafting of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), the 

interim constitution that would apply after the turnover of sovereignty until a permanent 

constitution is drafted following national elections, the sections on fundamental freedoms and 

human rights did not include guarantees of the right to freedom of religion or belief for every 

Iraqi. A draft of the TAL released by the Arab press indicated that a limited group right to 

religious freedom was provided, and for non-Muslims only. Moreover, Islam was named the 

country’s “official religion” and given a privileged position as a source of legislation, while other 

sources of legislation were not identified. 

In response, as it had done in the case of Afghanistan, the Commission developed for 

senior U.S. policymakers a series of specific recommendations that would ensure in the TAL 

guarantees to the right to freedom of religion or belief for every Iraqi. The Commission had met 

previously with President Bush in October 2003 expressing its general concerns about the 

constitution in Iraq. The Commission also met or corresponded with other senior U.S. officials 

in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the State Department, and the National Security 

Council, to discuss the specific concerns and recommendations regarding the TAL. In February 

2004, the Commission wrote to Administrator L. Paul Bremer of the CPA expressing its concern 

about early drafts of the interim constitution. Also in February, the Commission advised on the 

content of House Resolution 545, introduced by Representatives Dana Rohrabacher and Carolyn 

Maloney, expressing the sense of the House that the TAL should ensure that every Iraqi should 

be guaranteed the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. 

In addition, Commissioner Nina Shea participated in a February 2004 news conference 

held by Senators Rick Santorum and Susan Collins to call for guarantees of human rights for 

individuals in the TAL. Commissioner Khaled Abou El Fadl briefed the staff of the House 

International Relations Committee on the Commission’s concerns. 

An important breakthrough occurred in Iraq. The CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council 

eventually embraced the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief and 

practice for every Iraqi in the March 8, 2004 public release of the TAL. This codified 

8
recognition is an historic step for Iraq and each Iraqi. It is potentially a model for the entire 

region. 

Upon its release, the Commission issued a statement commending the signing of the 

TAL, which included a bill of rights guaranteeing each Iraqi a wide range of international human 

rights protections. It was noted that the final version of the TAL expanded the definition of 

human rights from a narrow right of group worship to guarantee to every person the freedom of 

thought, conscience, belief, and practice. Importantly, several other articles in the TAL reinforce 

this guarantee, including a provision that no law should be contrary to human rights protections 

enshrined in the TAL, a prohibition on coercion in matters of the freedom of thought, 

conscience, and religious belief and practice, a prohibition on arrests and detention on account of

religious beliefs, prohibition on discrimination on account of gender or religion, and a 

recognition that Iraqis enjoy all of the rights stipulated in international human rights documents 

to which Iraq is a party. With such protections, the Iraqi people have in place a better framework 

for managing the inevitable future debates on contentious issues involving the role of religion in 

their society, such as the rights of women. Because the right to freedom of religion is protected 

throughout the document, no fair reading of the TAL would permit the creation of a state based 

solely on Islam and Islamic law and without protections of universally recognized human rights. 

The Commission has urged that these guarantees should in due course be enshrined in Iraq’s 

permanent constitution. 

The Commission remains concerned, however, by language in the TAL requiring that 

legislation not be contrary to the “universally agreed upon tenets of Islam.” This provision could 

potentially be used by judges to abridge the internationally recognized human rights of political 

and social reformers, including those voicing criticism of abusive policies such as those 

associated with the Ba’athist regime. The potential effects of this clause on human rights may be 

mitigated by the reference, in the same provision, that no law should contradict “the principles of 

democracy” or human rights as set out in the TAL. Furthermore, the Commission has 

recommended that, in addition to these safeguards, Iraq’s permanent constitution should contain 

a statement that the principles of democracy and the rule of law, as well as Iraq’s international 

obligations, are fundamental sources for legislation. 

The Commission considers that the success so far in institutionalizing the right to 

freedom of thought, conscience and religion in Iraq is an expression of the high priority that U.S. 

policymakers assigned to the issue as it engaged with the Iraqi Governing Council on the 

preparation of the TAL. Substantial work remains to establish conditions in Iraq whereby human 

rights guarantees can be put into practice by functioning government institutions operating for 

the benefit of all Iraqis. The United States has a major role to play in this regard, including in the 

period after the turnover of sovereignty currently scheduled for June 30, 2004. 

The Commission has made several recommendations on U.S. policy to address ongoing 

concerns in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Recommendations on Afghanistan 

The Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should: 

9
• improve security outside Kabul in order for Afghanistan’s political reconstruction to succeed, 

because without adequate security, the warlords will continue to hold sway over much of the 

country, undermining the rule of law and Afghanistan’s nascent democratic institutions; and 

encourage its NATO partners to increase their commitments to the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) and to expand ISAF’s presence in major urban centers outside 

Kabul; 

• insist that the right of every individual to freedom of religion and belief be respected in postTaliban Afghanistan, and be prepared to do everything possible to ensure protection of 

fundamental human rights, including religious freedom and the rights of women as outlined 

in international human rights instruments to which Afghanistan is a party; 

• use its influence to protect freedom of expression from charges used to stifle debate, such as 

blasphemy, “offending Islam,” apostasy or similar offenses to stifle debate, including on 

sensitive subjects such as the role of religion in society and the rights of women and minority 

groups; 

• act to bolster the position of those reformers who respect human rights, since elements in 

Afghan society who would promote respect for internationally recognized human rights are 

currently on the defensive—even threatened, and these elements need U.S. support to counter 

the influence of the warlords and those with an Islamist or extremist agenda; 

• assist Islamic legal experts to visit Afghanistan to engage their Afghan counterparts and to 

provide information to the Afghan public on the compatibility of Islam and universal human 

rights, including freedom of religion and belief; and expand existing programs to bring 

Afghans to this country to see how Islam and other faiths may be practiced in a free society, 

since, although most Muslim religious leaders and Islamic scholars affirm the compatibility 

of universal human rights standards and Islam, they must be provided with the information 

needed to counter influential figures who deny that compatibility; 

• strongly support the reconstruction in Afghanistan of a judicial sector operating under the 

rule of law and upholding international standards of human rights and work to ensure that: all 

judges and prosecutors are trained in civil law and international human rights standards; 

women are recruited into the judiciary at all levels; and all Afghans have equal access to the 

courts; 

• provide the leadership, sound policy, and resources needed to secure freedom for all in 

Afghanistan, which is still at a juncture from which it can either move forward to secure 

greater protections for the rights of its people or revert to Taliban-like practices; step up 

leadership and engagement in Afghanistan to preserve and consolidate the Afghan people’s 

gains in the protection of human rights, since no other nation or international institution can 

substitute for the United States in this daunting task, and failure will leave Afghanistan not 

only less free but also more unstable, thereby contributing to regional insecurity and 

potentially serving again as a future haven for global terrorism that threatens U.S. interests;

and 

10
• promptly assign to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and station in Afghanistan a person whose 

sole responsibility is carrying out a mandate to promote human rights, including religious 

freedom, including by coordinating U.S. participation in relevant international initiatives. 

Recommendations on Iraq 

With regard to Iraq, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• promote, in all of its reconstruction programs for Iraq and in its contacts with Iraqis, with 

coalition partners, and with other potential donors, including the United Nations, the idea of a 

future Iraqi political system that practices religious tolerance and respects the universal 

human rights of all Iraqis, including members of religious minorities and individual women; 

• ensure that human rights, including freedom of religion, and the promotion of religious 

tolerance have a prominent place in the next phase of U.S. policy towards Iraq, notably in 

U.S. actions, any UN mandates, and any ongoing judicial, legal, and democratic reform; 

• work to ensure that human rights are fully guaranteed in the permanent constitution, 

consistent with international human rights standards, a permanent constitution that should 

include: 

(1) an explicit guarantee that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, 

and religion” as affirmed in article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 

specified in article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to 

which Iraq is a party; 

(2) an explicit commitment to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of every Iraqi, 

without which the human rights of individuals, whether women or disfavored or nonconformist Muslims, will be at risk; 

(3) an explicit commitment that the state shall abide by the international treaties, 

conventions, and instruments to which Iraq is a party, including the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human 

Rights; 

(4) a statement that the principles of democracy, pluralism, social justice, rule of law, and 

Iraq’s international obligations are fundamental sources for legislation, in addition to 

Islam or to “the basic principles of Islam,” a formulation this Commission would 

recommend;

(5) a guarantee that every woman and member of a religious minority have equal rights 

and equal protection of the law to all other Iraqi citizens;

(6) a statement that no Iraqi should be detained or arrested because of his or her religious 

beliefs; and 

(7) an explicit commitment that no law should be contrary to the principles of democracy 

or the bill of rights in the permanent constitution;

11
• fund workshops and training sessions on religion/state issues and their ramifications on 

protections of internationally recognized human rights for Iraqi legal professionals, officials, 

and other key sectors of society who will have input on the permanent constitution; 

• urge the CPA Administrator to appoint a team of advisors in Iraq to advise on religious 

affairs and to monitor human rights violations, including freedom of religion; ensure that the 

monitoring and reporting of issues relating to religious freedom and other universal human 

rights and the promotion of these rights be adequately staffed in the new U.S. Embassy in 

Baghdad and its constituent posts and that U.S. personnel receive training in human rights 

and religious freedom issues, and on how to deal effectively with these issues in the Iraqi 

context; and assign to Embassy Baghdad and each of its constituent posts U.S. personnel 

specifically tasked with these responsibilities and having sufficient experience and rank to 

perform them; 

• urge the CPA, and following the handover of sovereignty, the U.S. Embassy, and USAID to 

identify and fund multi-religious and multi-ethnic efforts to meet human needs, rebuild

devastated communities, promote religious tolerance and understanding, and discuss values 

central to good governance and democracy; 

• ensure that U.S. policies and programs, both now and after the handover of sovereignty, be 

directed toward actively supporting those elements in Iraqi society that favor adherence to 

international standards of human rights with the understanding that democratic political 

parties, a vibrant civil society, and a free press and broadcast media are vitally important to 

sustaining human rights protections over the long term; and 

 • provide appropriate support to re-build Iraq’s domestic justice system in accordance with 

international standards, and to establish official institutions with the resources and mandates 

necessary to monitor, investigate, take action, and remedy human rights abuses.

 

1

 According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the freedom to manifest 

religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 

necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights or freedoms 

of others. 

2

 November 11, 2003 speech by President Bush at the Heritage Foundation. 

12
COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN AND THE COMMISSION WATCH LIST

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) established a number of 

interrelated mechanisms: an Office of International Religious Freedom in the Department of 

State headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom; an annual report 

by the State Department on the conditions of religious freedom in each foreign country and U.S. 

actions to promote religious freedom; and the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom. The Commission was created both to monitor the status of freedom of thought, 

conscience, religion or belief globally and to make recommendations to the President, the 

Secretary of State, and Congress as to how the U.S. government can further the protection and 

promotion of this freedom and related human rights in its relations with other countries. 

IRFA also established a requirement that the President single out and explicitly name

those countries that are the most egregious violators of religious freedom, and the Act contains a 

formal mechanism for doing so. Section 402(b)(1) of IRFA specifically directs the President at 

least annually to designate each country in which the government has engaged in or tolerated 

“particularly severe violations of religious freedom” as “a country of particular concern” or CPC. 

Particularly severe violations of religious freedom are defined as violations that are “systematic, 

ongoing, and egregious.”1

 In defining violations of religious freedom, IRFA explicitly refers to 

the “internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and religious belief and practice” as 

laid out in such international instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.2

Countries of Particular Concern: Commission Recommendations 

As stipulated by IRFA, the Commission reviewed evidence throughout the past year on 

countries whose governments may have engaged in or tolerated systematic, ongoing, and 

egregious abuses of freedom of religion. As a result of this review process, the Commission 

wrote to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in February 2004 and recommended that he designate 

as CPCs the following 11 countries: Burma, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), 

Eritrea, India

∗

, Iran, Pakistan, People’s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, 

and Vietnam. In reaching its findings and recommendations, the Commission reviewed 

information from victims, religious groups, human rights and other private organizations, the 

U.S. government, and others. The Commission also examined the State Department’s Annual 

Report on International Religious Freedom and the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. 

During last year’s designation process, Secretary of State Powell named Burma, China, 

Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Sudan as CPCs. The Commission concluded this year that nothing 

has changed to warrant the removal of any of these countries other than Iraq from the U.S. 

government’s CPC designations. 

 

∗

 Commissioners Bansal, Gaer, and Young dissented from the Commission’s recommendation 

that India be designated a country of particular concern (CPC). Their views with respect to India 

are reflected in a separate opinion, which can be found at the end of the section on India in this 

report. Commissioner Chaput also joins this separate opinion, and would place India on the 

Watch List rather than recommend that it be designated a CPC. 

13
In light of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq in April 2003 and the 

policies established under the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council, 

the Commission no longer recommends Iraq for CPC status. However, the Commission urges 

the U.S. government to remain highly engaged in the process of restoring freedom and building 

democracy in Iraq, including in the development of a new, permanent constitution for that 

country that will fully guarantee to every person the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 

religion, and other human rights that are inter-related to it. 

The Commission remains especially concerned about the situation in China, where 

repression of religious freedom continues to be a deliberate policy of the Chinese government. 

In the past year, Chinese authorities have intensified their violent campaign against religious 

believers, including Evangelical Christians, Roman Catholics, Uighur Muslims, Tibetan 

Buddhists, and other groups, such as the Falun Gong. This campaign has included 

imprisonment, torture, and other forms of ill treatment. Following up on an invitation to the 

Commission reportedly without conditions, the Commission attempted to travel to China twice 

in the past year but was thwarted both times by unacceptable limits imposed by the Chinese 

government. The Commission visited Hong Kong in early 2004, but continues to seek a visit to 

other regions of China. 

In addition to the five countries previously designated by the Secretary of State as CPCs, 

the Commission found that the governments of Eritrea, India*, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 

Turkmenistan, and Vietnam have engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom, and recommends that they be designated as CPCs this year. 

• The Commission emphasizes that according to the State Department, religious freedom does 

not exist in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government forcefully bans all forms of public religious 

expression other than that of the government’s interpretation of one school of Sunni Islam. 

There are numerous serious reports, which warrant official U.S. government investigation, that 

Saudis are funding efforts to propagate globally a religious ideology that promotes hate, 

intolerance, and other human rights violations toward non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. 

• The Commission points out that for the second year in a row, the State Department has 

reported that religious freedom has deteriorated in Turkmenistan. The Turkmen government 

effectively bans religious activity other than that of the government-controlled Sunni Muslim

Board and the Russian Orthodox Church. Religious freedom conditions in Turkmenistan are 

likely to decline even further after the passage of a religion law in November 2003 that 

criminalizes “illegal” religious activity. 

• Repressive policies to control religious activity continue in Vietnam, where key religious 

dissidents continue to be imprisoned and members of religious minorities in the northwestern 

provinces and Central Highlands face reportedly intensified official efforts to renounce their faith 

or face beatings, arrests, relocations, or the loss of government services. 

• In Pakistan, there continues to be an inadequate government response to vigilante violence 

frequently perpetrated by Sunni militants against Shi’as, Ahmadis, and Christians. Official 

government policies result in other religious freedom violations, including imprisonment under 

the anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy laws. 

14
• In India*, violence, including fatal attacks, against Muslims and Christians continues, and the 

government has yet to address adequately the killing of an estimated 2,000 Muslims in the state 

of Gujarat in 2002. Several central government ministers from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, 

or BJP, have publicly allied themselves with extremist Hindu organizations, known collectively 

as the Sangh Parivar, whose members regularly employ hate speech against religious minorities, 

have been implicated in violence against them, and seek legislation to prohibit the religious 

conversion of Dalits and others from Hinduism. 

• The government of Eritrea in the past two years has cracked down on members of various 

religious groups, including through the closure of all churches not belonging to officially 

recognized religious denominations, the arrest of participants at prayer meetings and other 

gatherings, and the imprisonment of armed forces members found in possession of certain 

religious literature. The State Department reports that over 300 persons are in jail for 

participating in the activities of unrecognized religious groups. 

Specific conditions in each country that support CPC designation are discussed in greater 

detail in the Country Reports chapters of this report. The Commission was unable to comment 

on this year’s designations because, as of the date that this report went to print, the Secretary of 

State had not made CPC designations for the current year. The Commission will comment 

further on the State Department’s designations once they have been made. 

Commission Watch List Countries 

In addition to its CPC recommendations, the Commission has established a Watch List of 

countries where religious freedom conditions do not rise to the level requiring statutory CPC 

designation but which require close monitoring because of the nature and extent of violations of 

freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief engaged in or tolerated by the governments. 

Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Uzbekistan remain on the Commission’s Watch List this year due 

to concerns about the serious abuses in these countries, and because their governments have 

either not halted repression and/or violence against persons amounting to severe violations of 

freedom of religion, or failed to punish those responsible for perpetrating those acts. Because 

freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief continues to be sharply curtailed in Cuba, and 

because of the deteriorating religious freedom conditions in Belarus and Georgia, the

Commission has decided to add those countries to its Watch List. 

In view of continuing government interference with and restrictions on all religious 

communities in Laos, the Commission has placed it on its Watch List. Problematic government 

policies remain in place in Laos, focused particularly on religions relatively new to the country. 

For example, Decree 92, the law on religion, reportedly is being used to impede the activities of 

certain religious groups. Since the Commission last issued its CPC recommendations, the 

situation has changed somewhat. Although periodic arrests by local officials continue in certain 

Lao provinces, those detained in two incidents in December 2003 were released in a matter of 

days. In these cases, the Lao government appears to have been responsive to concerns raised by 

the U.S. Embassy. 

The Commission has urged the State Department to monitor closely religious freedom in 

these eight countries and to respond vigorously to further violations that may merit CPC 

15
designation at any time during the year. Throughout the course of its interaction with these 

countries, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government press the governments of 

these countries to take steps to prevent further violations and to ensure accountability for those 

responsible for violations. Specific conditions in each country that support the Watch List 

designation are discussed in greater detail in the Country Reports chapters of this report. 

 The CPC Designation: an Important Policy Tool 

The Commission continues to emphasize that the process of CPC designation as outlined 

under IRFA and the implementation of meaningful policies in response to such designations 

should be considered among the most serious actions taken by the U.S. government in its human 

rights policy. The designation of CPCs brings into the spotlight those countries where the most 

egregious violations take place and the exercise of a person’s right to freedom of religion or 

belief is systematically repressed. The designation also guides important decisions in U.S. 

relations with these countries, particularly in the areas of foreign assistance, including security 

assistance, and positions that the United States should advocate in international financial 

institutions. 

At the same time, under IRFA, the Commission believes that the simple designation by 

the U.S. government of a severe violator of religious freedom as a CPC is not sufficient action. 

IRFA makes explicit that the policy of the United States is to take active steps against those 

countries deemed to be particularly severe violators of religious freedom. CPC designation 

carries an obligation that one or more of certain actions specified in §405 of IRFA be taken, 

unless the Secretary of State, as the President’s designee, determines that pre-existing sanctions 

are adequate or otherwise waives the requirement.3

 If a CPC designee is already subject to 

ongoing, multiple, broad-based sanctions “imposed in significant part in response to human 

rights abuses,” then one or more of these pre-existing sanctions can be designated as meeting the 

requirements of IRFA.4

The CPC designation is a flexible diplomatic tool. It provides the Secretary of State with 

a range of specific options to take to address serious violations of religious freedom. It does not 

automatically entail sanctions, but requires that the Secretary of State enter direct consultations 

with a country to find ways to improve the situation. To avoid economic sanctions, IRFA 

provides that countries can enter into a binding agreement with the United States that spells out 

specific actions they will take in the future. 

When used properly, the CPC designation: 

• sends the clear signal that U.S. interests include concern for human rights; 

• starts a dialogue where specific benchmarks on progress are agreed upon in order to avoid 

economic sanctions; 

• allows the Secretary of State in an incremental fashion to employ or use the threat of punitive 

actions to address egregious abuses of religious freedom; and 

• allows the Secretary of State to waive any specific actions if progress is being made toward 

addressing serious violations of freedom of religion or belief. 

16
However, since the passage of IRFA, despite the availability of a range of policy tools, 

for every country named a CPC the only official actions taken by any U.S. administration to 

meet IRFA’s requirement to oppose particularly severe violations of religious freedom have been 

to invoke already existing sanctions rather than to take any additional action pursuant to IRFA. 

In previous years, as permitted by Section 402 (c)(5) of IRFA, the Secretary has 

determined that the following pre-existing sanctions satisfied the IRFA requirements: 

Burma 22 CFR 126.1: prohibition on exports or other transfers of defense 

articles and defense services pursuant to §§ 2, 38 and 42 of the Arms

Export Control Act. 

China Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, P.L. 

101-246: restriction of exports of crime control and detection 

instruments and equipment. 

Iran Arms Export Control Act, §40: restrictions on United States security 

assistance. 

North Korea Trade Act of 1974, §§402 and 409 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment): 

restrictions on normal trade relations and other trade benefits. 

Sudan International Financial Institutions Act, §1621: use of the voice and 

vote of the United States to oppose any loan or other use of the funds of 

the International Financial Institutions to or for Sudan. 

 In addition, for the past five years, the State Department has not made public any actions 

it has taken under IRFA with respect to CPCs, despite provisions in the statute that require public 

dissemination of that information.5

 The Commission is also concerned that the State Department 

has not submitted to the Congress the required evaluation of the effectiveness of prior actions

against CPCs.6

This inadequate fulfillment of IRFA requirements represents a serious failure in U.S. 

foreign policy. While the reliance on pre-existing sanctions may be technically correct under the 

statute, it is unacceptable as a matter of policy. The designation of an egregious religious 

freedom violator as a CPC, followed by the implementation of a clear and directed policy 

response, is an essential tool to promote religious freedom, and one explicitly required by IRFA. 

As noted above, the potential responses themselves are outlined in the legislation. 

The State Department should use the full range of available policy tools to take additional 

action pursuant to IRFA with respect to those countries the Secretary names as CPCs. Reliance 

on pre-existing sanctions provides little incentive for CPC governments to reduce or end severe 

violations of religious freedom. The failure to take additional action under IRFA suggests that 

nothing further can, or will, be done by the U.S. government to those countries that are deemed 

the world’s worst violators of freedom of religion or belief. 

17
The Commission strongly urges U.S. policymakers to engage these governments in as 

many ways as possible in order better to promote religious freedom in these countries in a more 

coordinated, systemic, and coherent fashion. Use of the means outlined in IRFA is strongly 

encouraged. 

 

1

 IRFA § 402 (b)(1)(A). 

2

 IRFA § 3(13). 

3

 The authority to make these decisions has been delegated by the President to the Secretary of

State. 

4

 IRFA § 402(c)(5). 

5

 See IRFA §§102(b)(1)(F)(i) (requiring the executive summary of the State Department’s annual 

report include a description of actions taken to promote religious freedom and to oppose 

violations thereof), §408 (generally requiring publication in the Federal Register of a description 

of the actions taken as a result of designation as a CPC). 

6

 See IRFA §§402(c)(4), 404(a)(1)(B) (requiring the President to submit a report to Congress 

containing, among other information, an evaluation of the impact of the actions taken as a result 

of designation as a CPC). 

18
COUNTRY REPORTS: AFRICA 

Eritrea 

The government of Eritrea engages in particularly severe violations of freedom of 

religion and belief. It violates the rights of members of various religious groups, including by 

closing all churches not belonging to officially recognized religious denominations, arresting 

participants at prayer meetings and other gatherings, and imprisoning armed forces members 

reportedly found in possession of certain religious literature. In 2004, the Commission 

recommended that the State Department designate Eritrea as a “country of particular concern,” or 

CPC, the first year that the Commission recommended this designation for Eritrea. To date, the 

State Department has not designated Eritrea a CPC. 

Since gaining independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year war, Eritrea has 

struggled to implement political and economic reforms. Beset by internal political problems and 

violent confrontations with neighboring Ethiopia and Sudan, the ruling Popular Front for 

Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) has become increasingly repressive, targeting political opponents 

and members of religious groups it perceives as undermining national unity. Since the PFDJ 

cancelled the 2001 elections, it has moved to jail political dissidents and curtail free speech and 

free assembly. It has also imposed severe restrictions on religious freedom, and provisions of 

Eritrea’s 1997 Constitution guaranteeing religious freedom for all Eritreans have not been 

implemented. Public activities by non-traditional religions are currently banned, on the grounds 

that these groups have not gained government registration. 

The Eritrean government officially recognizes the Orthodox and Roman Catholic 

Churches, as well as the Lutheran-affiliated Evangelical Church of Eritrea and Islam. The 

government has close ties to the Orthodox Church and is suspicious of religious groups without a 

long history in the country—in particular, Protestant Evangelical, Pentecostal, and other nontraditional Christian denominations. Eritrea’s Jehovah’s Witnesses were the first religious group 

to experience the government’s repressive policies. Negative official and popular views about 

Jehovah’s Witnesses developed as a result of their refusal to take part in the 1993 independence 

referendum or to serve the obligatory tours of military service. The Eritrean government has 

made no provision for an alternative to military service. Jehovah’s Witnesses experience official 

harassment, including prolonged detention for refusing military service, the revocation of trading 

licenses, and dismissal from the civil service. Some Jehovah’s Witnesses who have refused to 

serve in the military have been imprisoned without trial for almost a decade; others cannot 

graduate from secondary school as the curriculum includes a mandatory military-training 

component. The number of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Eritrea, once approximately 1,600, has 

reportedly dropped sharply, reportedly to as few as 500. 

Relations among the four government-recognized religious communities are generally 

good. In recent years, however, Protestant evangelical and Pentecostal churches—or “Pentes” as 

they are collectively known in Eritrea—have faced inappropriate societal and government 

pressure. The Orthodox Church first expressed concern about the growth of what it considers 

“heretical” newer denominations, and the loss, particularly of its younger members, to these 

denominations. In 2001, Orthodox Church leaders sanctioned an attack on Pente prayer groups 

in which many people were beaten, their property vandalized, and Bibles and other religious 

19
material burned. In the interest of “maintaining national cohesion,” the PFDJ banned religious 

organizations from involvement in politics and from commenting in detail on political matters. 

Fear of the destabilizing effect of proselytism by either Muslims or Evangelicals also reportedly 

caused the government to impose serious restrictions on foreign faith-based humanitarian 

organizations with the result that they have all but ended their activities in Eritrea. Government 

spokespersons have cited Pentes, along with extremist Islamist groups, as threats to national 

security. 

In 2002, the Eritrean government issued a decree requiring registration of all religious 

groups, with the exception of the four government-sanctioned religious communities. By 

stipulating that without registration, no religious activities, including worship services, could be 

held, the decree effectively closed places of worship and prohibited public religious activities, 

including worship services, of all other religious communities in Eritrea. To date, no other 

religious groups have gained government registration, even though some groups submitted 

applications over one year ago, with the result that all except the four government-sanctioned 

religious groups operate without a legal basis. 

Government authorities have also informed Pente groups that they would not allow 

gatherings of more than five persons in private homes. According to some religious groups and 

aid workers, it is now almost impossible for Pente Christians to meet, even in private, without 

fear of arrest or harassment. In late January 2004, police arrested 38 persons, including minors, 

attending a Jehovah’s Witnesses religious service in a private home; two months later, 24 were 

still detained, without charge. In February 2004, over 50 persons affiliated with the Hallelujah 

Pentecostal Christian Church, including children, were arrested at a religious service in a private 

home. In March 2004, two leaders of the Rema Charismatic Church were arrested, along with 

their children and other family members. 

Religious repression is alleged to be particularly severe in the armed forces. During the 

war with Ethiopia, many Eritrean soldiers accepted various forms of Protestantism, reportedly 

alarming government officials and leading to the banning of prayer meetings among armed 

forces members. Attendance at such meetings is punishable by imprisonment. Moreover, any 

military personnel found in possession of a Bible reportedly face severe punishment. 

Estimates of those imprisoned for engaging in unauthorized religious activities is as high 

as over 300. The exact figure is difficult to determine, since an unknown number of soldiers and 

military conscripts are reportedly being held incommunicado. Pente Christians, Jehovah’s 

Witnesses, and members of Orthodox splinter groups have been jailed, beaten, and allegedly 

threatened with death by security forces. Those arrested reportedly are asked to sign a 

“commitment” to deny their faith in order to be released. Parents and family members have been 

refused access to the prisoners unless they agree to persuade them to sign the “confession.” 

According to U.S. State Department sources, only in recent months has the Eritrean 

government agreed to discuss religious freedom, following previous refusals to do, citing 

national security concerns. Although U.S. officials have raised religious freedom concerns with 

Eritrean government officials both in Washington and in Asmara, no change in government 

policy has been forthcoming. 

20
Nigeria 

The response of the government of Nigeria to persistent religious freedom concerns in 

Nigeria continues to be inadequate. These concerns include an on-going series of communal 

conflicts along religious lines; discrimination against minority communities of Christians and 

Muslims; and the controversy over the expansion of Islamic law (Sharia) into the criminal codes 

of several northern Nigerian states. Nigeria remains on the Commission’s Watch List and the 

Commission continues to monitor the actions of the Nigerian government to determine if the 

situation rises to a level warranting designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

In the last year, Nigeria continued to suffer from outbursts of violent communal conflict 

along religious and ethnic lines, pervasive mistrust among religious and ethnic communities, and 

serious lapses in the protection of human rights generally. The popular movement in several 

northern Nigerian states to expand the legal application of Sharia to criminal matters has sparked 

communal violence and is a source of continuing volatility and tension between Muslims and 

Christians at both the national and local levels. Serious outbreaks of Muslim-Christian violence 

in the last few years threaten to divide further the populace along religious lines and undermine 

the foundations of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief in Nigeria. Social, 

economic, and political conditions have deteriorated in the country, fostering a climate of 

increased tension. 

Several thousand people have been killed throughout the country since 1999 in a cycle of 

attacks or reprisals. Ethnic, religious, and sectarian violence continued in 2003 and the early part 

of 2004. In February and March 2004, religious violence and reprisal attacks between Christians 

and Muslims in Plateau state in the Middle Belt reportedly resulted in the deaths of more than 

200 people. 

President Olusegun Obasanjo has been criticized both inside and outside Nigeria for not 

responding more decisively to the religious violence and communal tensions brought about by 

the Sharia controversy. He has primarily played a mediating role, stressing political negotiations 

rather than ordering the government to intervene. Many Christians and Muslims have been 

identified as perpetrators of violence over the years, but very few, if any, have been prosecuted 

or brought to justice. 

Since October 1999, twelve northern Nigerian states have extended or announced plans 

to expand the application of Sharia. Although the particulars vary from state to state, each has 

adopted, or reportedly plans to adopt, a Sharia-based penal code and provisions to extend the 

jurisdiction of Sharia courts beyond personal status matters to include Sharia crimes and 

punishments. Punishments include amputation, flogging, or death by stoning, oftentimes after 

trials that fall short of basic international legal standards. Defendants have limited rights of 

appeal and sometimes no legal representation. These new codes also generally ban the sale and 

distribution of alcohol and criminalize adultery and gambling. Although it is permitted by the 

Constitution, several northern states continue to ban some public religious activities. A 2003 

ruling in Kano state in northern Nigeria imposes the wearing of headscarves on all females, both 

Muslims and non-Muslims. 

21
Two women facing death sentences under Sharia criminal codes for adultery were 

acquitted on appeal, following intense international pressure: One woman in Sokoto state won 

her appeal in March 2002; another, who lives in Katsina state, after her first appeal was denied in 

August 2002, was acquitted in September 2003 by a higher Islamic appeals court. Other cases 

are pending appeal after Sharia courts have handed down sentences of death by stoning to 

Muslims for various offenses. No stoning punishments have been carried out as of the time of 

this report. However, sentences involving amputation and flogging have been carried out in 

recent years.

 In November 2002, following controversy around the Miss World beauty contest held in 

Lagos, violence between Muslims and Christians broke out in the northern city of Kaduna, 

resulting in more than 200 deaths, most of them Christians. The violence occurred after the 

publication by a Lagos-based journalist of a newspaper article that some Muslims declared to be 

blasphemous. An attack by Muslims on a Kaduna newspaper office gave rise to a cycle of 

violent reprisals by both Muslims and Christians. Nigerian security forces reportedly failed to 

intervene in a timely manner; some reports indicated that the security forces contributed to the 

violence by injuring and even killing people who were not directly involved in the violence. A 

few days after the violence, the Deputy Governor of Zamfara state publicly endorsed a fatwa

calling on all Muslims to seek the death of the journalist in question. However, a spokesman for 

the Nigerian federal government said that the Deputy Governor’s judgment was “null and void” 

and would not be carried out because it contravened the rule of law in Nigeria. 

In addition to the Sharia controversy and the violence it has incited, Nigeria is plagued by 

a number of other serious problems regarding freedom of religion or belief. Christians in the 

northern states complain of what they view as discrimination at the hands of Muslim-controlled 

governments and describe their communities as having the status of “second class citizens.” 

Most complaints predate the recent initiatives regarding Sharia, and include allegations of 

official discrimination in the denial of applications for building or repairing religious institutions, 

access to education and state-run media, representation in government bodies, and government 

employment. Muslim communities in southeastern Nigeria, where Muslims are a small fraction 

of the population, echo some of the complaints of minority Christian communities in northern 

Nigeria. Southern Muslim leaders report official or officially sanctioned discrimination in the 

media, education, and representation in government institutions. 

The Commission wrote to President Bush in July 2003 urging him to raise with Nigerian 

President Obasanjo the need to take action to end Muslim-Christian violence. The Commission 

also recommended that President Bush urge President Obasanjo to take various actions to protect 

religious freedom, including condemning religious intolerance and discrimination and ensuring 

that the expansion of Sharia-based criminal law does not apply to non-Muslims. 

In September 2003, the Commission issued a statement welcoming the acquittal on 

appeal of the woman sentenced to death under the Sharia criminal code in Katsina state, noting, 

however, that the decision did not address larger concerns about the application of Islamic law in 

northern Nigeria and its reported interference with the freedoms of Muslims and non-Muslims 

alike. 

22
In February and March 2004, Commission staff hosted two separate briefings on the 

application of criminal Sharia law since 1999 and ongoing communal and sectarian violence, 

respectively. A Commission staff delegation undertook an extensive mission to Nigeria in 

August 2003 and met with numerous Nigerian government officials, religious leaders, and 

representatives of human rights and other non-governmental organizations. 

Sudan 

The government of Sudan continues severely and systematically to commit violations of 

freedom of religion or belief, particularly against Christians, disfavored Muslims, and followers 

of traditional African religions. The Commission has recommended that Sudan remain a 

“country of particular concern,” or CPC. The State Department has repeatedly adopted the 

Commission’s recommendation that Sudan be designated a CPC. 

Religious conflict has been a major factor in Sudan’s ongoing civil war, which began in 

1983. Since its inception, the Commission has identified Sudan as the world’s most violent 

abuser of the right to freedom of religion and belief and has drawn attention to the Sudanese 

government’s genocidal atrocities against civilian populations in the South and in the Nuba 

Mountains. In the Sudan Peace Act of 2002, Congress found that the Sudanese government had 

committed acts of genocide. In 2003, while peace efforts reportedly brought improvement 

elsewhere, government-backed militias committed similar atrocities against ethnically and 

culturally distinct civilian populations in Darfur, in what the top UN humanitarian official has 

described as “an organized campaign of forced depopulation of entire areas” and as “ethnic 

cleansing.” 

Current and previous governments in Khartoum have attempted forcibly to convert nonMuslims to Islam and to impose Sharia on Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Opposition to these 

coercive policies has fueled support for armed resistance by non-Muslim and non-Arab 

populations in the South, the Nuba Mountains region, and elsewhere. The current regime in 

particular has used appeals to Islam, including calls by senior government officials for “jihad,” to 

mobilize northern Muslim opinion in support of the war effort. Religious prejudice, incited by 

government officials, contributes to the horrific human rights abuses perpetrated by government 

security forces and government-backed militias. 

In the context of the civil war, which has resulted in approximately two million deaths,

predominantly of non-Muslims, government and allied forces have committed egregious human 

rights abuses, including forced starvation as a result of the denial of international humanitarian 

assistance; abduction and enslavement of women and children; the forcible displacement of 

civilian populations (e.g., from oil-producing regions); and aerial bombardment of civilians, 

church property, and humanitarian facilities. Sites bombed have included clearly identifiable 

hospitals, schools, churches, markets, and relief organization compounds. Many of these abuses 

appear to have been the result of deliberate government policies. The need for accountability for 

these crimes is not diminished by progress in the Sudan peace process, which has been

encouraged by the United States and other interested parties. 

23
In early 2004, the government of Sudan and the major rebel group, the Sudan People’s 

Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), appeared close to a comprehensive peace agreement. In 

the past, however, commitments have been violated by the government in Khartoum. Close U.S. 

monitoring of compliance, and sanctions for non-compliance, will be necessary to ensure a just

and lasting peace, as will resolution of other regional conflicts not addressed in the peace talks, 

such as that in Darfur. 

The government of Sudan continues severely and systematically to violate the religious 

freedom of Christians and followers of traditional African religions, as well as of Muslims who 

are associated with opposition groups or who dissent from the government’s interpretation of 

Islam. Public religious expression and persuasion of non-Muslims by Muslims is allowed in 

government-controlled areas, but that of Muslims by non-Muslims is forbidden. Conversion 

from Islam is regarded as apostasy, a crime punishable by death. In practice, suspected converts 

are reportedly subjected to intense scrutiny, intimidation, and torture by government security 

personnel. 

Religious organizations must be registered by the government to operate legally. 

Unregistered communities cannot build places of worship or meet in public. Approval can be 

difficult to obtain, and even registered groups face difficulties. Although permits are routinely 

granted to build mosques, permission to build churches is routinely denied. For over 30 years, 

the government has denied permission to construct Roman Catholic churches in areas under its 

control. 

Some children from non-Muslim families captured and sold into slavery by progovernment militias reportedly have been forced to convert to Islam. There are similar reports of 

coerced conversion in government-controlled camps for internally displaced persons, as well as 

among prison inmates, Popular Defense Force trainees, and children in camps for vagrant 

minors. The government has also allegedly tolerated the use of humanitarian assistance to 

induce conversion to Islam. In government-controlled areas, children who have been abandoned 

or whose parentage is unknown are considered by the government to be Muslims and may not be 

adopted by non-Muslims. 

The Commission has made a series of recommendations regarding U.S. policy toward 

Sudan, including that the U.S. government appoint a nationally prominent individual to bring 

about a peaceful and just settlement of the war in Sudan. In September 2001, President Bush 

appointed former Senator John Danforth as Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan, energizing the 

Sudan peace process. 

In 2003, diplomatic activity by the United States continued to follow several of the 

Commission’s recommendations. The U.S. government continues to support peace talks between 

the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, and grassroots, “intra-South,” reconciliation efforts. 

The United States supported the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, established as a result of 

Senator Danforth’s efforts, to monitor and investigate alleged abuses against civilians, such as 

aerial bombardment. The United States also supported the multinational Joint Military

Commission to monitor the cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains and the Verification Monitoring 

Team to monitor the cessation of hostilities between Khartoum and the SPLM/A. These 

24
monitoring efforts reportedly have reduced abuses of civilians in the South and the Nuba 

Mountains, encouraging displaced persons to return home. 

The Commission wrote a letter to Secretary Powell in April 2003 regarding the 

Administration’s upcoming report to Congress, required by the Sudan Peace Act, on the status of 

the peace negotiations. The Commission urged the Administration, among other things, to 

“frankly address the violations of the Sudanese government’s ceasefire commitments and clearly 

state consequences for non-compliance that will result from any future violations.” The 

Commission underlined its concerns regarding the need for respect for religious freedom and 

other universal human rights in Sudan in a May 2003 meeting in Washington, D.C. with 

SPLM/A leader Dr. John Garang, who in turn shared his views regarding the peace process. 

In July 2003, the Commission wrote to President Bush to ask that he urge African leaders 

to support the Sudan peace process. The Commission also submitted testimony to the House 

Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa at its May 2003 hearing, 

Reviewing the Sudan Peace Act Report, in which the Commission included further 

recommendations for U.S. policy. 

In addition to recommending that Sudan be designed a CPC, the Commission has 

recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• oppose the application of Sharia to non-Muslims wherever they may reside in the country 

and insist that national institutions such as the military, law enforcement, and the highest 

level of the judiciary be secular institutions; 

• urge the government of Sudan to (a) allow all religious groups to conduct their activities 

freely; (b) ensure that all religious groups are free to build, repair, and operate houses of 

worship and social service ministries without delay or harassment; and (c) repeal any laws 

that punish changing one’s faith or encouraging another to do so; 

• prevail upon the government of Sudan to provide needed humanitarian access to international 

relief organizations and increase U.S. humanitarian assistance delivered outside the 

Operation Lifeline Sudan system; 

• continue efforts to aid the suffering civilian population of Darfur, including by seeking an 

end to killing, ethnic cleansing, and forced displacement and Sudanese government 

impediments to the distribution of international humanitarian assistance; assisting refugees 

and internally displaced persons to return home in safety; and promoting a ceasefire as well 

as a peaceful and just resolution of the grievances that underlie the crisis; 

• quickly disperse funding for humanitarian purposes, to build civil society, and to promote 

economic development in southern Sudan; 

• hold the government of Sudan accountable for significant violations of agreements it has 

made with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army;

25
• continue to keep in place existing sanctions on Sudan and refrain from upgrading diplomatic 

relations; 

• build upon the work of the International Eminent Persons Group to combat and end the 

terrible practice of abduction and enslavement by government-sponsored militias; and 

• work to increase human rights and media reporting on abuses in Sudan and promote 

grassroots reconciliation among Sudanese. 

26
COUNTRY REPORTS: EAST ASIA

Burma 

Human rights abuses perpetuated by Burma’s military regime continue to be widespread, 

including severe violations of religious freedom. The Commission has recommended that 

Burma be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, for the past four years. The 

State Department has followed the Commission’s recommendation. In the last year, according to 

the State Department’s 2003 human rights report, the Burmese government's “extremely poor 

human rights record worsened.” 

The military junta that governs Burma, the State Peace and Development Council 

(SPDC), uses a pervasive internal security apparatus to monitor the activities of all religious 

organizations. The government imposes restrictions on certain religious practices, controls and 

censors all religious publications, and, in some areas of the country, forcefully promotes 

Buddhism over other religions. 

The SPDC is locked in decades long conflict with pro-democracy opposition in the cities 

and armed ethnic minorities in the countryside. It is faced with internal and external refugee 

problems, a flourishing drug trade, and the rampant spread of AIDS/HIV infection. The military

junta is suspicious of all organized, independent religious activity, in part because some clergy 

and religious followers of Buddhism and other minority religions are politically active in 

opposition to the regime. This includes members of ethnic minorities, for whom religion is a 

defining feature. 

 Members of minority religious groups, especially Muslims and Christians, face serious 

abuses of religious freedom and other human rights by the military. In some localities, military 

commanders forcibly conscripted members of religious minorities as porters, killing some who 

have refused. Christians and Muslims have been forced to engage in the destruction of churches 

and graveyards for the purpose of clearing sites for military camps. They reportedly have also 

been forced to “donate” labor to build and maintain Buddhist pagodas and monasteries. 

Among the Chin and Naga ethnic minorities, there are credible reports that government 

and military authorities actively sought ways to convert members from Christianity to Buddhism. 

The State Department’s 2003 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom stated that 

under the guise of offering free education, local officials separated children from their parents, 

with the children instructed to convert to Buddhism without their parents’ knowledge or consent. 

In Chin State, there are reports that government authorities offered troops financial and career 

incentives to marry Christian women. Among the Naga, refugees leaving Burma report that the 

army and Buddhist monks tried to force them to convert to Buddhism and closed churches in 

local villages. 

Christian and Muslim groups are routinely denied permission to hold public ceremonies 

and festivals. The government has also prohibited the public expression of Christianity among 

ethnic minorities. In at least one instance last year, Christian clerics were beaten to discourage 

their religious expression and persuasion activities. In Rangoon during 2001-2002, authorities 

closed more than 80 Protestant home-churches because they did not have proper authorizations 

27
to hold religious meetings. In the last year, Protestant clergy from Karen and Chin States 

reported that the SPDC officials continued this practice. 

The government of Burma severely discriminates against members of minority religious 

groups in education, publishing, building permits, and access to public sector services and jobs. 

Christian and Muslim groups continue to report difficulties in obtaining permission to build new 

churches and mosques. These groups also have had difficulties importing religious literature 

since the 1960s. 

In the last year, Muslims have also reported having difficulty constructing new mosques 

or re-building those previously destroyed. In 2002, authorities in Rakhine State destroyed 

thirteen mosques until international pressure forced them to stop further demolitions. Local 

authorities reportedly replaced the mosques with government owned buildings and Buddhist 

temples and have refused to issue the necessary permission for mosque construction on other 

sites. 

The Burmese military has instigated violence by the Buddhist majority against Muslims. 

Tensions between the Buddhist and Muslim communities resulted in several outbreaks of 

violence over the past several years. Members of the Buddhist community attacked shops, 

restaurants, and homes owned by Muslims. During one outbreak, police and soldiers reportedly 

stood by and did not halt the violence against Muslims until they began to fight back. In the last 

year, Muslim groups claimed that seven persons were killed and two mosques were destroyed in 

the violence near Mandalay. 

The SPDC shows public preference for Therevada Buddhism; however, even the majority 

Buddhist religion is not immune from government repression. According to the State 

Department’s 2003 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, members of the Buddhist 

“sangha” are subject to a strict code of conduct that is reportedly enforced by criminal penalties. 

Military commanders can try Buddhist monks in military court for "activities inconsistent with 

and detrimental to Buddhism." 

The government also prohibits all monks from being members of any political party. 

Throughout the 1990s, Buddhist monks have been active in the pro-democracy movement. The 

government imprisoned more than 100 Buddhist monks for advocating democracy and 

encouraging dialogue between the government and the pro-democracy forces. Many members of 

the Buddhist clergy remain in prison; though a precise number is unavailable, credible sources 

report that this number has risen since May 2003, when the Burmese government, after 

organizing an attack on her motorcade, placed Aung San Suu Kyi under “protective custody.” 

Until Aung San Suu Kyi is released, and the government enters into serious negotiations 

with the opposition, it is difficult to foresee major improvements in human rights, including 

religious freedom, in the near future. 

In 2003, the Commission staff met with exiled Burmese religious and ethnic leaders, 

including Buddhists, Christians, and Muslims, and with members of congressional and 

international delegations who visited Burma. 

28
China 

The Chinese government continues to engage in particularly severe violations of religious 

freedom. The State Department has stated publicly that conditions of human rights, including 

religious freedom, deteriorated in 2003. Moreover, the Chinese government has not fulfilled 

commitments it made during the December 2002 U.S.-China Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue. 

Chinese government officials control, monitor, and restrain religious practice, purportedly to 

protect national security or stability and public safety or health. However, the government’s 

actions to restrict religious belief and practice reportedly go far beyond legitimate protection of 

security interests and exceed what is permissible under international law. By most accounts, 

prominent religious leaders and laypersons alike continue to be confined, tortured, imprisoned, 

and subject to other forms of ill treatment on account of their religion or belief. For the last four 

years, the Commission has recommended that China be designated as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC. The State Department has followed the Commission’s recommendations and 

named China a CPC. 

In the last year, the Chinese government has expanded its campaign against “evil cults” 

and “heretical sects.” Since 1999, the Chinese government has labeled the Falun Gong and 

similar groups as “cults,” effectively banning them and “justifying” its ongoing brutal 

crackdown. There are allegations that hundreds of Falun Gong practitioners have been sent to 

labor camps without trial or been sent to mental health institutions for re-education. Falun Gong 

practitioners claim that 430 practitioners have been killed as a result of police brutality. 

According to the Falun Gong, the Chinese government has continued to pressure foreign 

businesses in China to discriminate against its followers. Many local officials in foreign 

countries have also stated that they have received warnings from Chinese diplomatic personnel 

to stop their advocacy on behalf of Falun Gong and its practitioners. 

The Chinese government’s campaign against evil cults has reportedly expanded beyond 

the Falun Gong and similar groups to those who are not part of the officially-sanctioned religious 

organizations. This includes both newer and long-established Protestant and Catholic churches 

and leaders who, for various reasons, refuse to register with the government. Religious leaders 

have been imprisoned and followers detained and fined for “cultist activity.” 

The Chinese government retains tight control over religious activity and places of 

worship in Tibet. In 2002-2003, several prominent Tibetan Buddhists were released from

imprisonment. However, neither those actions nor renewed contact between China and the Dalai 

Lama’s representatives have brought any significant changes to the government’s overall policy 

of control over religion. The Chinese government admits there are over one hundred Tibetan 

Buddhist monks and nuns being held in prison. Tibetan human rights groups agree with this 

figure and claim that the prisoners are subject to torture and other ill-treatment. In January 2003, 

at the conclusion of the December 2002 Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue, a local court 

sentenced Tenzin Deleg Rinpoche, a Tibetan Buddhist monk, and Lobsang Dondrup to death for 

their alleged involvement in a bombing incident in Sichuan province in April 2002. Tenzin 

Deleg Rinpoche’s death sentence was eventually suspended, but Lobsang Dondrup was 

executed, despite assurances to senior U.S. officials that the cases would be referred to China’s 

Supreme Court. In October 2003, another monk, Nyima Dragpa died, reportedly as a result of 

repeated torture while serving a nine-year sentence for advocating Tibetan independence. In 

29
addition, the Chinese government continues to deny repeated requests for access to the 15-year 

old boy whom the Dalai Lama designated as the 11th Panchen Lama. Government officials have 

stated that he is being “held for his own safety,” while also claiming that another boy is the true 

Panchen Lama. 

In largely Muslim Xinjiang province, freedom of religion and belief is reportedly 

severely curtailed by the government, which often alleges that Uighur Muslim religious 

expression is linked to “separatist” or “terrorist” acts. Since September 11, 2001, the 

government has used concerns about international terrorism as a pretext for an ongoing 

crackdown in Xinjiang, where Uighur Muslim clerics and students have been detained for 

“illegal” religious activities and “illegal religious centers” have been closed. The campaign 

against Muslims in Xinjiang intensified in January 2003, when the region’s Communist Party 

Secretary announced the government’s aim to “strike hard” against “religious extremists,” 

“splittists,” and “terrorists,” resulting in the arrest of many more Uighur Muslim clerics and lay 

leaders. Authorities reportedly prohibit the teaching of Islam to children under the age of 18 and 

have established prohibitions on minors entering mosques. In addition to the restrictions on 

minors, the government allegedly does not allow teachers, professors, university students, and 

Party members to practice their faith openly. 

The government also continues its repression of the Roman Catholic Church in China. 

Clergy in Fujian, Zhejiang, Jilin, and Jiangxi provinces were harassed, detained, and arrested 

during the past year. In July 2003, five priests affiliated with the Catholic Church were 

sentenced to three years in a labor camp after having been convicted of practicing “cult” 

activities. In October 2003, Hebei provincial officials reportedly arrested twelve Catholic priests 

and seminarians attending a religious retreat. There are at least ten Catholic bishops under arrest, 

including Bishop Su Zhimin, who has been in prison, in detention, under house arrest, or under 

strict surveillance since the 1970s. 

Conditions for unregistered Christian groups have worsened in the last year. According 

to the State Department, in some regions of China, members of Protestant house church groups, 

who refuse to register, are subject to intimidation, extortion, harassment, detention, and the 

closing of their churches. In the last year, Protestant house churches in Liaoning, Yunnan, and 

Henan provinces and in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region were raided, their congregants 

detained and fined, pastors arrested, and churches closed. In September, house church historian 

Zhang Yinan was arrested along with approximately 100 others in Nanyang, Henan Province. In 

addition, Pastor Gong Shengliang of the unregistered South China Church—sentenced to death 

after the adoption of the 1999 “evil cult” law—continues to languish in prison, and he is 

reportedly denied proper medical care. Many of his congregants and family remain in jail facing 

serious charges and are allegedly subject to torture and other ill treatment in prison. 

Chinese officials continue to engage in the destruction of “illegal” religious buildings, 

particularly in regions experiencing rapid religious growth or in areas with long-standing 

tensions between “official” and “unofficial” congregations, such as Hebei and Henan provinces. 

In the last year, local officials in Zhejiang province reportedly destroyed as many as 400 

churches, temples, and shrines. 

30
The Commission has been very active with regard to China. In March and July 2003, the 

Commission convened two China Religious roundtables with representatives of the 

Administration, Members of Congress, congressional staff, academic experts, and 

representatives of religious groups and other non-governmental organizations to discuss U.S. 

efforts to advance religious freedom in China. The July roundtable specifically focused on 

Uighur Muslims. 

In July, the Commission publicly criticized the proposed amendments to Article 23 of 

Hong Kong’s constitution, the Basic Law. If enacted, Article 23 would undermine Hong Kong’s 

autonomy by forcing its laws to conform to those in Mainland China, where the legal system has 

permitted the systematic misuse of “national security” concerns to suppress political dissent and 

religious activities. The Commission is concerned that implementation of Article 23 would 

threaten the human rights, including religious freedom, of all Hong Kong residents. 

Also in July, Commission Vice Chair Felice D. Gaer testified at the CongressionalExecutive Commission on China’s hearing on "Will Religion Flourish under China’s New 

Leadership?" 

In preparation for President Bush’s meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabo in 

December 2003, the Commission wrote the President urging him to raise the issue of religious 

freedom during the visit. Both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell referred 

publicly to religious freedom during their speeches and statements in conjunction with this visit. 

Commission visits planned for August and later December 2003 were both postponed due 

to unacceptable conditions placed by the Chinese government. In August, the Chinese 

government insisted that the Commission remove Hong Kong from its itinerary. In December, 

the Chinese government agreed to allow the Commission to visit Hong Kong, but insisted it hold 

no meetings. These conditions were unacceptable because both appeared to violate the “one 

country, two system” concept that ensures Hong Kong’s autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. 

In January 2004, a delegation of Commissioners and staff traveled to Hong Kong to hold 

meetings with religious leaders, experts, and human rights advocates. The Commission will 

continue to press for a visit to the People’s Republic of China. 

In March 2004, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed H.Res. 530, 

sponsored by Congressman Christopher Smith. The resolution urges that the appropriate 

representative of the United States to the 60th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights 

introduce a resolution calling upon China to end its human rights violations, including religious 

oppression. The forced cancellations of the Commissions’ two trips to China were mentioned in 

the congressional resolution and in several floor speeches during House passage of the 

legislation. 

The Commission has met with Chinese human rights and religious leaders including 

those representing Buddhists, Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, and various spiritual movements, 

including Falun Gong. 

In addition to recommending that China be designated as a CPC, the Commission has 

recommended that the U.S. government should: 

31
• ensure that efforts to promote religious freedom in China are integrated into the mechanisms

of dialogue and cooperation with the Chinese government at all levels, across all departments 

of the U.S. government, and on all issues, including security and counter-terrorism; 

• urge the Chinese government to end its current crackdown on religious and spiritual groups 

throughout China, including harassment, surveillance, arrest, and detention of persons on 

account of their manifestation of religion or belief; the detention, torture, and ill-treatment of 

persons in prisons, labor camps, psychiatric facilities, and other places of confinement; and 

the coercion of individuals to renounce or condemn any religion or belief;

• urge the Chinese government to change its system of laws, policies, and practices that govern 

religious and spiritual organizations and activities, and hold accountable violators of the right 

to freedom of religion and belief and the human rights of religious believers; 

• urge the Chinese government to respect fully the universality of the right to freedom of 

religion or belief and other human rights and ratify the International Covenant on Civil and 

Political Rights; 

• undertake to strengthen scrutiny by international and U.S. bodies of China’s human rights 

practices and the implementation of its international obligations; 

• prohibit U.S. companies doing business in China from engaging in practices that would 

constitute or facilitate violations of religious freedom or discrimination on the basis of 

religion or belief; 

• raise the profile of the conditions of Uighur Muslims by addressing religious freedom and 

human rights concerns in bilateral talks; by increasing the number of educational 

opportunities in the United States available to Uighurs; and by increasing radio broadcasts in 

the Uighur language; 

• endeavor to establish an official U.S. government presence, such as a consulate, in Lhasa, 

Tibet and Urumqi, Xinjiang, in order to monitor religious freedom and other human rights; 

• expand rule of law programs to include regular “dialogues” on religion and law with U.S. 

government representatives, academic experts, and members of the Commission with a 

commensurate delegation from China; 

• support exchanges between a diverse segment of Chinese government officials and academic 

experts and U.S. scholars, experts, representatives of religious communities and nongovernmental organizations regarding the relationship between religion and the state, the role 

of religion in society, international standards relating to the right to freedom of religion and 

belief, and the importance and benefits of upholding human rights, including religious 

freedom; and 

• continue to promote Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy under Chinese sovereignty by: 

32
--urge the Chinese government to uphold the “one country, two systems” concept by 

allowing the Hong Kong people and their elected government officials to have a voice in 

the determination of the pace and scope of advances toward direct elections and the 

protection of human rights, including religious freedom; and 

--opposing introduction of any “national security” provision to the Basic Law that would 

suppress internationally recognized human rights, including the right to freedom of 

religion or belief and freedom of expression. 

. 

Indonesia 

The Commission is concerned about serious abuses of freedom of religion in Indonesia. 

Though the situation has improved since 2001, the government of Indonesia has been unable to 

halt all religiously-related violence or to consistently punish those responsible for perpetrating 

acts amounting to severe abuses of religious freedom. The Commission has again placed 

Indonesia on its Watch List and continues to monitor the actions of the Indonesian government 

to see if they rise to a level warranting designation as “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

 For the past five years, Christian-Muslim violence in the regions of the Moluccas and 

Sulawesi has resulted in thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced 

persons. While many factors added fuel to these conflicts, the killings, destruction of places of 

worship, and forced conversions were also religiously motivated. Violence was perpetrated by 

both Christians and Muslims, but attacks on Christians escalated significantly in the Moluccas 

due to the May 2000 arrival of Laskar Jihad, an Islamic militant group with the stated aim of 

driving Christians from the area. In the case of the Moluccas, the government allowed 

unimpeded entry into the islands outside groups such as Laskar Jihad, resulting in some of the 

worst killing and destruction. In Sulawesi, swifter government action to stop the aggression of 

militant groups managed to prevent a serious escalation of fighting. 

As a result of efforts by the Indonesian government and security forces, peace agreements 

were signed in Sulawesi and the Moluccas in late 2001 and early 2002. Despite these 

agreements, violence has continued in some areas, especially in Sulawesi. In the last year, 55 

people were killed and almost 300,000 remain displaced. 

In 2003-2004, violence against religious groups in Sulawesi has been increasing, carried 

out by groups that oppose the peace agreements. After the most recent attacks, government 

authorities responded quickly to apprehend the perpetrators. Muslim and Christian leaders in 

Sulawesi joined together to call for calm. Despite the swift government response, there is 

disturbing evidence to suggest that Sulawesi may be a staging ground for a new violent Muslim

extremist organization. 

In Sulawesi, issues of judicial independence continue to fuel grievances that exacerbate 

religious tensions. In June 2003, Christian leader Rinaldy Damanik was sentenced to three years 

in prison for illegal weapons possession. The trial court itself acknowledged that there was little 

evidence to support the charges. The prison sentence given Damanik, and the earlier acquittal of 

Jaffar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad, whose group was responsible for killing thousands, 

33
suggest that serious inadequacies remain in the Indonesian judicial system. Damanik appealed 

his conviction in August 2003, but the local High Court upheld the verdict. 

Nevertheless, the Indonesian government has taken some important steps to root out 

domestic terrorist groups, particularly after the bombings in Bali and Jakarta. In the weeks 

following the October 2002 Bali bombing, a number of radical Islamist groups, including the 

Islamic Defenders’ Front, Jemaah Islamiah, and the Laskar Jihad, were pressured to cease their 

activities and disband. The dissolution of Laskar Jihad in particular was prompt and extensive, 

though they continue to operate in some areas. A number of militant leaders have been arrested 

and sentenced, including Abu Bakr Ba’asyir, the leader of Jemaah Islamiah, and 23 of his former 

students for their role in planning and carrying out the Bali bombings. Ba’asyir’s sentencing was 

seen as a “milestone” in Indonesia’s efforts to address Islamic militancy. However, Ba’asyir’s 

sentence was reduced on appeal, though fresh evidence of terrorist activity might forestall his 

scheduled release. 

A vocal and influential minority of Indonesians continues to call for implementation of 

aspects of Sharia. These demands are strongest in the secessionist-minded province of Aceh. As 

part of the process of addressing Acehnese demands for independence, former-President Wahid 

agreed to allow the province to implement Islamic law beginning in January 2002. Local 

officials have reportedly said that non-Muslims could not be prosecuted in the Islamic courts. 

After the government’s decision to allow Sharia in Aceh, several other provincial parliaments 

began debating whether to impose Islamic law. An August 2002 proposal to implement Sharia at 

the national level was withdrawn from consideration by the National People’s Consultative 

Assembly when it became clear it did not have sufficient support in the Assembly. Efforts to 

revive the legislation continue, and as Presidential and legislative candidates vie for votes in this 

2004 election year, the re-emergence of proposals for Sharia legislation is likely and bears close 

watching. 

In June 2003, Indonesia’s parliament passed a controversial education bill that would 

require public and private schools to provide religious education for all faiths if a student 

demands it. Many Christian schools have Muslim students and, as a result of this bill, will be 

required to provide classes on Islam. Although many moderate Muslim parties, organizations, 

and intellectuals opposed the legislation, it had considerable popular support. The bill has been 

challenged in court and as of this writing, has not yet been implemented. 

U.S. government assistance supports limited programs in conflict resolution, multireligious dialogue, and training of teachers from pesantrans, or Muslim religious schools, in line 

with recommendations of the Commission. These programs are small but important experiments 

in promoting religious freedom in a largely Muslim country. Congress included language in the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004 (H.R. 2673) which states that, among other conditions, 

funds for the “Foreign Military Financing Program” may be made available to Indonesia only if 

the President certifies that Indonesia is suspending and prosecuting those members of its military 

who have committed gross violations of human rights. A 2002 Commission recommendation 

called for the United States to ensure that, if resumed, U.S.-Indonesian military ties be directed 

toward reform of the Indonesian military, including upholding international human rights 

standards and holding members accountable for abuses. 

34
In the past year, Commission staff met with Indonesian political leaders, human rights 

activists, and religious leaders. The religious leaders included representatives of Muslim, 

Christian, and Hindu communities from the regions of Aceh, Papua, Sulawesi, Java, Bali, and the 

North Moluccas. 

With regard to Indonesia, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government 

should: 

• continue to press the government of Indonesia to fully disarm all outside militia forces on the 

Moluccas and Sulawesi and to hold the leaders and members of these groups accountable for 

the violence perpetrated by them; 

• commend the government of Indonesia for its efforts that led to the signing of peace 

agreements in both the Moluccas and Sulawesi and press the Indonesian government to 

deepen the reconciliation work already begun; 

• monitor the implementation of Sharia in Aceh and other regions to determine if individual 

rights and freedoms, including religious freedom, as outlined in international documents, are 

being guaranteed; 

• ensure that, if resumed, U.S.-Indonesian military ties be directed toward reform of the 

Indonesian military, including accepting civilian control, upholding international human 

rights standards, and holding members accountable for abuses; and 

• earmark funds for the training of Indonesian police and prosecutors in human rights, rule of 

law, and crime investigation. 

Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of 

North Korea is a humanitarian disaster of unimaginable proportions. As devastating as 

the physical toll has been, the deprivation of the human spirit must be even greater. The people 

of the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) are among the least free on earth, 

barely surviving under a totalitarian regime that denies basic human dignity and lets them starve 

while pursuing military might and weapons of mass destruction. By all accounts there are no 

personal freedoms of any kind in North Korea and no protection for human rights. 

Freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief remains essentially non-existent in 

North Korea, where the government severely represses public and private religious activities and 

has a policy of actively discriminating against religious believers. Despite the regime’s tight grip 

on information about conditions inside the country, there is a growing body of consistent reports 

from refugees that officials have arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and sometimes executed North 

Koreans who were found to have ties with overseas Christian Evangelical groups operating 

outside the country, as well as those who engaged in such unauthorized religious activities as 

public religious expression and persuasion. There is no evidence that religious freedom 

conditions have improved in the past year. The Commission continues to recommend that North 

35
Korea be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, which the State Department has 

done since 2001. 

The North Korean government has formed several religious organizations that it controls 

for the purpose of severely restricting religious activities in the country, although the government 

contends that they constitute proof of religious freedom in the country. For example, the Korean 

Buddhist Federation prohibits Buddhist monks from worshiping at North Korean temples. Most 

of the remaining temples that have escaped government destruction since the Korean War are 

portrayed by the government as cultural relics rather than religious sites. Similarly, the Korean 

Christian Federation restricts Christian activities. Following the reported wholesale destruction 

of over 1,500 churches during Kim Il Sung’s reign (1948-1994), two Protestant churches and one 

Roman Catholic church, without a priest, opened in Pyongyang in 1988. The absence of a 

Catholic priest means that mass and most sacraments cannot be celebrated. Construction of a 

Russian Orthodox Church was completed in 2003. 

According to South Korean pastors operating exchanges with the Korea Christian 

Federation, although some fraction of North Koreans who attend services at the Catholic and 

Protestant churches in Pyongyang are genuine in their faith, the majority reportedly attend 

services to monitor and report to the government on church activities. In January 2004, a former 

member of the North Korean National Security Agency testified before the Commission that 

these churches are directly controlled and operated by the National Security Agency. 

Researchers report that there is little evidence that the Catholic and Protestant churches meet for 

Sunday services when there are not foreigners in the city requesting to attend. While the North 

Korean government reports that some 500 house churches operate with government approval 

outside of Pyongyang for religious believers in rural areas, independent observers have 

questioned the existence of such facilities or gatherings. They cite consistent denials of repeated 

requests to visit such gatherings. 

Some evidence suggests that underground churches operate in secret under the extremely 

repressive conditions in North Korea. The Commission has received information that 

underground Christians meet in small groups and operate in complete secrecy inside North 

Korea. Researchers in South Korea have also reported on the existence of underground 

Christians, although there are no good estimates of the numbers of believers in these groups or in 

what areas of the country they might operate. 

Persons found carrying Bibles in public or distributing religious literature, or engaging in 

unauthorized religious activities such as public religious expression and persuasion, are arrested 

and imprisoned. There continue to be reports of torture and execution of religious believers. 

Although the practice of imprisoning religious believers is reportedly widespread, the State 

Department has been unable to document fully the number of religious detainees or prisoners. 

According to a South Korean press report cited in the State Department’s 2003 Annual Report on 

International Religious Freedom, an estimated 6,000 Christians are incarcerated in “Prison No. 

15” located in the northern part of the country. According to a study from the U.S. Committee 

on Human Rights in North Korea, several North Korean refugees have reported that Christians 

are serving long-term sentences in political prisoner camps on account of their religious beliefs 

or activities. The Commission was informed at a hearing held in January 2002 that such 

prisoners are reportedly treated worse than other inmates. For example, religious prisoners, 

36
especially Christians, are reportedly given the most dangerous tasks while in prison, where they 

are subject to constant abuse from prison officials in an effort to force them to renounce their 

faith. When they refuse, these religious prisoners are reportedly often beaten and sometimes 

tortured to death. 

The North Korean government forcefully propagates an ideology, known as “Juche,” 

based on the personality cult of the regime’s current leader, Kim Jong Il, and his late father, Kim

Il Sung. Korean law reportedly mandates that pictures of Kim Jong Il and his father be placed in 

every home and venerated. Institutes have also been opened in several locations around the 

country for the study and veneration of Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung 

Officials have stratified North Korean society on the basis of family background and 

perceived loyalty to the regime into 51 specific categories. Religious adherents are by definition 

relegated to a lower category, receiving fewer privileges and opportunities, such as education 

and employment, than others. An extensive report recently released by Amnesty International 

details evidence that persons in lower categories have in some cases been forcibly relocated to 

remote and desolate areas of the country and then systematically denied access to food aid and 

therefore left to starve. 

Thousands of North Koreans have fled to China in recent years. Refugees who are either 

forcibly repatriated or those who are detained after having voluntarily returned to the DPRK are 

accused of treason. All must undergo interrogation, and those found to have had contacts with 

South Koreans or Christian missionaries are subject to severe punishment, including the death 

penalty. 

In June 2003, the Commission submitted testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, recommending that the U.S. 

government launch a major international initiative to expose and raise awareness of human rights 

abuses in North Korea, including expanded U.S. government reporting, congressional 

engagement, and multilateral diplomacy. The Commission also participated in a June 2003 press 

conference held by Senator Sam Brownback, who announced his plans to introduce legislation 

on North Korea. That legislation, the North Korean Freedom Act of 2003 (H.R. 3573 and S. 

1903), includes a number of the Commission’s policy recommendations, such as an increase in 

broadcasting into North Korea, and would express the sense of Congress that any negotiations 

with the North Korean government by the United States should include human rights issues, 

including religious freedom. 

In January 2004, the Commission held a hearing in Los Angeles entitled “North Korea: 

Human Rights Ground Zero,” focusing on conditions of human rights, including religious 

freedom, the plight of North Korean refugees, and implications of these conditions for U.S. 

policy. Commissioners heard testimony from David Hawk of the U.S. Committee for Human 

Rights in North Korea; Roger Winter from the U.S. Agency for International Development; 

Suzanne Scholte of the Defense Forum Foundation; a North Korean refugee; and a South Korean 

pastor who works as a missionary inside North Korea. 

In March, 2004, the Commission wrote a letter to the U.S. delegation to the 60th session 

of the UN Commission on Human Rights recommending that the delegation support a resolution 

37
on the egregious violations of human rights in North Korea and advocate appointment of a 

Special Rapporteur on human rights in North Korea to monitor and report on these abuses. In 

April 2004, a resolution was introduced by the European Union with the support of the United 

States that included a call for a Special Rapporteur. This resolution passed on April 15, 2004. 

In addition to recommending that North Korea be designated a CPC, the Commission has 

recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• work to expand the agenda of the current Six Party Talks on nuclear security on the Korean 

Peninsula to include issues of human rights and refugees, ensuring that these issues receive a 

high level of priority in any discussion of security issues regarding North Korea; 

• use all available contacts to advance an agenda that includes the provision of humanitarian 

assistance, the protection of human rights, including the freedom of religion and belief, and 

the reuniting of Korean Americans with their family members in the DPRK, ensuring that the 

delivery of humanitarian assistance to North Korea is adequately monitored; monitors should 

be able to read, speak and understand Korean language; 

• use multilateral diplomacy to advance the protection of human rights in North Korea, 

including by raising human rights violations in North Korea in appropriate international fora, 

urging the Republic of Korea and Japan to press for improvements on religious freedom and 

other human rights in their talks with the DPRK, and urging the European Union to include 

religious freedom concerns as part of its human rights discussions with the North Korean 

government; 

• urge China, Russia, and other members of the international community to grant refugee 

status to North Koreans; 

• urge the Chinese government to allow South Korean and international non-governmental 

organizations greater access to northern China and greater capacity to serve the needs of 

North Korean refugees; 

• develop and support ways to provide information to the people of North Korea, particularly 

on religious freedom and other human rights issues, including by expanding or developing 

broadcasts that target a North Korean audience by the Voice of America and Radio Free 

Asia; and 

• work with the international community to urge the North Korean government to permit 

monitoring of human rights conditions by UN human rights mechanisms, and to lift 

restrictions on the freedom of movement by foreign diplomats, independent journalists, and 

others. 

In addition, the U.S. Congress should fund an objective and comprehensive study of 

human rights conditions in North Korea by a non-governmental source, establish a congressional 

caucus to focus on human rights in North Korea, and expand its funding for (a) organizations 

advocating the protection of human rights in North Korea and (b) activities that raise the 

awareness of human rights conditions in that country. 

38
Laos 

There continue to be serious religious freedom problems in Laos. The government 

interferes with and restricts the activities of all religious communities, in particular those 

religions that are relatively new to Laos. Several problematic government policies remain in 

place, including Decree 92, the law on religion, which reportedly is being used to impede the 

activities of certain religious groups, especially Protestant Christians. For the past two years, the 

Commission recommended that Laos be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

In 2003-2004, however, the situation changed somewhat: most known religious prisoners in Laos 

were released; forced renunciations of faith have reportedly largely ceased; and the government 

has re-opened a number of churches closed in recent years and pledged to reopen others. 

Although periodic arrests by local officials continue in certain Lao provinces, those detained 

have been released in a matter of days. In these cases, the Lao government appears to have been 

responsive to concerns raised by the U.S. Embassy and others. The Commission has placed Laos 

on its Watch List this year and will continue to monitor the actions of the Lao government to 

determine if they again rise to a level warranting CPC designation. 

Lao officials, primarily those at the provincial and local levels, have continued to harass, 

detain, and arrest individuals reportedly for participating in certain religious activities. In 

December 2002, 30 Christians were detained for a week in the Champhon and Saybouli Districts 

of Savannakhet province. In May 2003, local authorities arrested 21 Christians in Muang Nong 

District, Savannakhet province. All were released by October. In December 2003, another 

group of approximately 11 Christians were arrested in Attapue province. In response to U.S. and 

international pressure, all were released quickly. Laos released most of its known religious 

prisoners by the end of the year. However, recent reports from both Savannakhet and Attapue 

provinces allege that local officials have harassed Protestants, confiscated property, and detained 

some persons. 

Between 1999 and 2002, the State Department reported that campaigns of coerced 

renunciation of faith occurred in nearly every Lao province. The Commission, during its 

February 2002 visit to Laos, was told that Lao officials instructed Christians, especially those of 

the Khmu and Hmong ethnic groups, to sign documents renouncing their faith or face harsh 

penalties that included arrest, destruction of property, denial of educational opportunities for 

their children, and restrictions on access to other government services. Such reports have 

diminished significantly in the past year. However, during this time, there were isolated reports, 

mostly from the Saisomboun Special Zone and Luang Prabang, Attapue, and Savannakhet 

provinces, of local officials pressuring minority Christians to renounce their faith. There were 

also at least two new reports that villagers were being forced from their homes allegedly on 

account of their religious beliefs. 

Between 1999 and 2001, local authorities closed approximately 20 of Vientiane 

province’s 60 Protestant churches, primarily those in Hin Hoep, Feuang, and Vang Vieng 

districts, and approximately 65 Protestant churches in Savannakhet and Luang Prabang 

provinces. Many of these churches were allowed to reopen in the past year, especially in 

Vientiane and Luang Prabang provinces. For the most part, the churches in Savannakhet remain 

closed, though State Department officials have been given specific assurances that additional 

churches would be re-opened in the coming year. 

39
Laos is a one-party, communist authoritarian state that has suppressed the human rights 

of its citizens and foreigners. Restrictions on religious freedom are placed on all religious 

communities in Laos. The Lao government has forced its repression on members of nonBuddhist religious communities, especially religions that are relatively new to Laos. Though 

Theravada Buddhism has gained official support from the Lao authorities, its clergy remain 

under government control and, in some cases, surveillance. The Catholic Bishop of Luang 

Prabang is not allowed to travel to five of the six provinces in his diocese. The Lao government 

does not have relations with the Vatican, and church property confiscated in 1975 has not been 

returned. The government limits Baha’i religious activities to four recognized centers located in 

major cities; as a result, Baha’is in remote areas have not been able to practice their faith. 

An ongoing concern is the implementation of Decree 92, the Lao government’s 2002 

decree on religious activities. During its visit to Laos in February 2002, the Commission was 

assured that passage of the decree would improve religious freedom in Laos by legalizing 

religious activities and providing guidelines to local and provincial officials so that abuses by 

those officials would cease. However, the decree provides government officials a legal basis for 

control of, and interference with, religious activities. Many religious activities can be conducted 

only with government approval, and the decree contains a prohibition on activities that create 

“social division,” or “chaos,” codifying a vague rationale used by government officials to arrest 

and detain Christians in Laos. The Commission continues to monitor how the decree is 

implemented and whether the central government has made progress in controlling the alleged 

abusive acts of local officials. 

The Commission has met with U.S. officials, human rights activists, Lao government 

officials, religious leaders, and experts, and Commission staff have met with experts and LaoAmerican advocacy groups. The Commission traveled to Laos and issued a report on its findings 

in February 2003. House Resolution 402 was introduced in the 108th Congress and states in it 

the sense of Congress that the U.S. government should work to implement the Commission’s 

recommendations. Commission findings and accompanying recommendations were also cited in 

several letters from Members of Congress to the Administration in 2003. 

With regard to Laos, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government 

should: 

• make clear to the government of Laos that the cessation of practices which abuse religious 

freedom is essential to an improvement in and an expansion of U.S.-Laos relations and urge 

Lao officials to: 

--halt the harassment, arrests, and detention of persons on account of their religion or 

belief and release any who are so restricted; 

--end abusive practices such as the ill treatment in detention against such persons; 

--cease practices that coerce individuals to renounce any religion or belief; 

40
--refrain from implementing those elements of Decree 92 on religious activities that are 

inconsistent with international human rights law and to revise the decree to bring it into 

conformity with international standards; 

--respect and fully implement the freedoms of individuals and organizations to engage in 

religious and charitable activities in accordance with their own beliefs or doctrines and 

free from government interference; 

--provide access to all parts of Laos by foreign diplomats, humanitarian organizations, 

and international human rights and religious organizations, in particular, to Savannkhet, 

Attapue, and Saisomboune Special Zone; and 

--ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and invite the UN Special 

Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and other relevant rapporteurs to visit the 

country; 

• initiate a bilateral human rights dialogue with the government of Laos that would establish 

measurable goals related human rights concerns such as torture and other forms of illtreatment, unlawful arrest or detention and practical steps to eliminate violations of the right 

to freedom of religion or belief and, absence of due process, and violations of the rights of 

freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly; 

• expand support for Lao language broadcasts on Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free 

Asia (RFA), ensuring that the content of the Lao language broadcasts on VOA and RFA 

adequately includes information about the importance of human rights, including religious 

freedom, within expand assistance programs that support the goals of protecting human 

rights and religious freedom, including: rule of law programs that provide technical 

assistance in the drafting and implementing Laos; and 

• initiate or of laws and regulations; human rights training for specific sectors of Lao society, 

including government officials, religious leaders, academics, and representatives of 

international non-governmental organizations; education programs to combat intolerance of 

religious and ethnic minorities; and exchange programs that should increase the number and 

funding of educational, academic, government, and private exchange programs with Laos 

that will bring a broad cross-section of Lao society to the United States. 

 Vietnam 

Already poor religious freedom conditions have deteriorated in several key areas in 

Vietnam during the last 18 months. Religious dissidents leaders have been harassed, detained, 

and imprisoned and the Vietnamese government has continued its crackdown against religious 

minorities in the northwestern provinces and the Central Highlands, including beatings and the 

forced renunciation of faith. For the past two years, the Commission has recommended that 

Vietnam be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. The State Department has yet 

to name Vietnam a CPC. 

41
The government of Vietnam continues to restrict the activities of organized religious 

groups, particularly those deemed “to disrupt national unity,” such as the Unified Buddhist 

Church of Vietnam (UBCV), the Protestant house church movement, and ethnic minority 

Christian groups. In the past year, religious dissidents have been imprisoned or placed under 

house arrest and the government continued its crackdown on religious minorities in the 

northwestern provinces and Central Highlands. Abuses included harassment and surveillance, 

beatings, church closings, and reportedly a concerted campaign to force believers to renounce 

their faith. These abuses are authorized at the highest levels of the Vietnamese government, 

according to documents obtained by human rights and non-governmental organizations. 

According to these documents, the government of Vietnam seeks to “stamp out” those 

sponsoring “peaceful revolution,” including religious leaders and free speech and Internet 

advocates. 

In the last year, the UBCV faced severe repression. Despite promises by Prime Minister 

Pham Van Khai in March 2003 that arrests and harassment would decrease, 26 of the UBCV’s 

leaders were detained after an October 2003 meeting held to elect new officers. UBCV 

founders, the Most Venerable Thich Huyen Quang and the Very Venerable Thich Quang Do, 

were detained and are currently under house arrest at their pagodas in Qui Nhon and Ho Chi 

Minh City, respectively. They both face charges related to espionage, a charge increasingly used 

against religious leaders, which carries with it a possible death sentence. There is urgent concern 

for Thich Huyen Quang’s failing health and access to medical care while under detention. 

The Vietnamese government also broadened its campaign against the ethnic minority 

population. According to documents smuggled out of Vietnam, Hmong Christians in the 

northwestern provinces of Vietnam reportedly continue to face pressure to renounce their faith. 

The documents allege that government officials with the Ministry of Public Security have 

entered places of worship, denounced believers, and forced them to sign confessions and take 

part in traditional animist rituals. If they refuse, they reportedly face harassment, beatings, 

imprisonment, or loss of access to government services. For example, in December 2002, 

officials in Lai Chau province reportedly used noxious gas to attack Hmong Christians during a 

house church worship service. In August 2002, Hmong Protestant Mua Bua Senh of Lai Chau 

province died after being beaten several times by Vietnamese officials who attempted to force 

him to renounce his faith. In the last year, the State Department reported that between one and 

seven ethnic minority Protestants died in police custody or died as a result of beatings, including 

Hmong Protestant Vang Seo Giao of Ha Giang province, who died in July 2003. The 

government of Vietnam has failed to explain adequately the circumstances of these deaths. 

Information from Dak Lak and Gai Lai provinces indicates that the reported campaign of 

forced renunciation of faith continues in some areas of the Central Highlands. After public 

demonstrations in 2001 regarding land reform and religious freedom, the government of Vietnam

forcefully suppressed religious activity in that region. The Vietnamese government has justified 

this repression, which has included arbitrary arrests and detention, church closings, beatings of 

pastors and other religious leaders, and even some deaths, by the presence of a separatist 

movement in the region. The government views the rapidly growing Protestant house church 

movement as a potential threat, and as a source of sympathy and organization for the separatist 

movement. Vietnamese authorities have failed to make distinctions between separatists, who 

may be responsible for violence, and house church Protestants. Reports in April 2004 from Dak 

42
Lak and Gai Lai provinces indicated that over the Easter weekend, violence had flared up again 

between the Vietnamese government and the indigenous Montagnard populations and that there 

were several deaths, and possibly hundreds injured and arrested. 

Given the lack of judicial transparency, accurate figures on the number of religious 

prisoners in Vietnam is difficult to obtain, though there are reportedly over one hundred religious 

adherents in prison or under some form of detention. Hoa Hao Buddhists claim that at least 

eighteen Hoa Hao followers are in some form of detention. Twenty Hmong Protestants are 

reportedly in prison, along with dozens of Montagnard Christians in the Central Highlands, both 

groups having been detained in connection with the government’s crackdown on religious 

minorities in 2001. There are at least ten Catholic priests and lay adherents still imprisoned, 

including Father Thaddeus Nguyen Van Ly, who was detained after he submitted testimony to 

the Commission. Fr. Ly’s original 15-year prison sentence was reduced to 10 years in June 

2003. His niece and nephews were sentenced in September 2003 to between three and five years 

in prison for passing information to human rights organizations about their uncle’s arrest. 

Because of international pressure, Fr. Ly’s relatives were subsequently released. 

Vietnamese government officials harass, arrest, and detain individuals who practice their 

faith outside the government approved religious organizations. Unofficial house church 

Protestants, UBCV monks, and ethnic minority Protestants are three groups reportedly most 

subject to this type of harassment. For example, Montagnard Protestants in the Central 

Highlands have been detained or imprisoned for engaging in religious and other independent 

activities that are not permitted by government authorities. 

Communist party and government officials interfere in the internal affairs of all organized 

religious communities, registered or otherwise. For example, the government places restrictions 

on Roman Catholics by imposing limits on the number of candidates allowed to study for the 

priesthood and by confiscating church property. In addition, the government controls the 

appointment and assignment of Catholic clergy and also plays an active role in the selection of 

the bishops, effectively vetoing those papal appointments of which it disapproves. 

Commissioners and staff have traveled to Vietnam and met with Vietnamese government 

officials and religious leaders. In addition, the Commission has met repeatedly with officials in 

the Administration, Members of Congress, and congressional staff about current U.S. policy and 

the Commission’s policy recommendations. 

In February 2004, Commission Chair Michael K. Young testified before the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee’s hearing Trade and Human Rights: The Future of U.S.-Vietnamese 

Relations. He discussed Vietnam’s record on religious freedom, as well as the Commission’s 

recommendations for U.S. policy. In October 2003, Commission Vice Chair Nina Shea testified 

at a joint Congressional Caucus on Vietnam and Congressional Human Rights Caucus hearing 

on Vietnam entitled, Vietnam: A People Silenced. 

In November 2003, Commissioner Shea made a statement at a press conference by 

Representatives Zoe Lofgren, Loretta Sanchez, and Ed Royce, who unveiled new legislation, 

H.Res. 427. This Resolution cites the Commission’s latest report on Vietnam and urges that 

Vietnam be designated a CPC, and also advocates that the "Congress and the executive branch 

43
implement the recommendations of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom." 

The House passed H.Res. 427 on November 19, 2003. 

Other pieces of legislation introduced in the 108th Congress are the Vietnam Human 

Rights Act, H.R. 1587, and the Vietnam Freedom of Information Act of 2003, H.R. 1019. Both 

of these include references to Commission recommendations. The Commission has urged 

passage of both bills by the Congress. 

In addition to its recommendation that Vietnam be designated as a CPC, the Commission 

has also recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• make clear to the government of Vietnam that ending violations of religious freedom is

essential to the continued expansion of U.S.-Vietnam relations, urging the Vietnamese 

government to: 

--halt the arrest, detention, imprisonment, and intimidating surveillance of persons on 

account of their manifestation of religion or belief, including members of ethnic 

minorities in the Central Highlands and the northwestern provinces; 

--allow religious groups to govern themselves, select their own leaders, worship publicly, 

express and advocate their religious beliefs, distribute religious literature, and conduct 

educational, charitable, and humanitarian activities outside the government and statecontrolled religious organizations and eliminate controls on officially registered 

organizations; 

--establish a legal framework for religious groups to engage in religious activities and 

charitable work outside the officially recognized organizations; 

--pass a law in the National Assembly banning forced renunciation of faith and detailing 

penalties for those who carry out such practices; 

--repeal or amend the 1999 Administrative Decree on Religion and ensure that any new 

law on religion meets international standards; 

--return confiscated religious properties and cease undue interference with the 

construction of new religious buildings, the repair of existing ones, and the use of homes 

as places of worship; 

--re-open the churches or meetings points closed in 2001 in the Central Highlands and 

northwestern provinces; 

--investigate and publicly report on the beating deaths of Hmong Protestants leaders Mua 

Bua Senh and Vang Seo Giao and prosecute anyone responsible for their deaths; and, 

--halt the practice of diplomatic pressure, offering of bounties, or cross-border police 

incursions for the purpose of forcibly repatriating ethnic minorities from Cambodia and 

cease arbitrary detention of those who have returned to Vietnam from Cambodia; 

44
• withhold its support for loans to Vietnam from international financial institutions, except 

those providing for basic human needs, and withhold U.S. assistance from the Millennium

Challenge Corporation, until the government of Vietnam agrees to make substantial 

improvements in the protection of religious freedom; 

• urge the Vietnamese government to provide unhindered access to members of all religious 

communities in Vietnam, particularly those in the Central Highlands and the northwestern 

provinces; 

• expand funding to overcome jamming of Radio Free Asia broadcasts and increase 

Vietnamese language programming;

• expand exchange programs, such as the Vietnam Education Foundation, to individuals in 

Vietnam who advocate religious freedom, the rule of law, and legal reform, including 

individuals from Vietnam’s ethnic and religious minority communities in the northwestern 

provinces and the Central Highlands; 

• create exchange programs between the Vietnamese National Assembly and its staff and the 

U.S. Congress; and, 

• expand existing rule of law programs to include regular exchanges between international 

experts on religion and law and appropriate representatives from the Vietnamese 

government, academia, and its religious communities to discuss the impact on Vietnam’s 

laws and decrees on religious freedom and other human rights, to train public security forces 

of these issues, and to discuss ways to incorporate international standards of human rights in 

Vietnamese law and legal practice. 

45
46
COUNTRY REPORTS: EUROPE AND EURASIA 

Advancing Religious Freedom and Combating Anti-Semitism in the OSCE

The International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) explicitly mentions U.S. participation in 

multilateral organizations as a method to advance respect for the right to freedom of religion or 

belief, which is enshrined in numerous international human rights declarations and conventions. 

The 55 member states of the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 

i.e., all of Europe and the former Soviet republics along with the United States and Canada, have 

agreed to extensive and forward-looking standards in protecting freedom of religion or belief and 

combating discrimination, xenophobia, and intolerance, including anti-Semitism. These issues 

comprise part of what is called in the OSCE the “Human Dimension.” 

For several years, the Commission has participated in U.S. delegations to OSCE meetings 

and made recommendations relating to the work of the OSCE in both the general area of freedom

of protecting the right to religion or belief and also specifically on combating anti-Semitism in 

OSCE member states. Commission participation increased in the last year, as the OSCE held 

special meetings devoted to both religious freedom and anti-Semitism. 

In 2003, Commissioners participated with the U.S. delegations to the OSCE’s first-ever 

special meeting on anti-Semitism in June; a special meeting on freedom of religion or belief in 

July; and the OSCE’s annual human rights conference, the Human Dimension Implementation 

Meeting (HDIM), in October. Commission Vice Chair Felice D. Gaer made public statements 

on behalf of the Commission at each of these meetings. 

Advancing Freedom of Religion or Belief

The Commission had early input into the U.S. delegation’s official statements and 

recommendations at the July special meeting on religious freedom and the session devoted to 

that topic at the 2003 HDIM. The Commission sought to ensure that the U.S. statements named 

particular countries where the government had engaged in or tolerated serious violations of 

religious freedom. It also sought to highlight problems in several OSCE countries where (a) 

laws unduly restrict official registration or recognition, in some cases necessary in order to 

engage lawfully in organized religious activities, or (b) governments have established specific 

initiatives targeting so-called “sects” or “cults.” 

Working with representatives from the State Department’s Office of International 

Religious Freedom and the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the 

“Helsinki Commission”), U.S. statements at these meetings noted violations of the right to 

freedom of religion and belief in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Belarus, Russia, and 

Azerbaijan, as well as “burdensome registration requirements that hinder, instead of facilitate, 

religious freedom.” In addition, U.S. statements noted certain policies in Western European 

countries “that have resulted in the stigmatization of minority religions, usually as a consequence 

of their having been indiscriminately—and often inaccurately—identified with dangerous ‘sects’ 

or ‘cults.’” 

Consistent with Commission recommendations, the United States recommended that 

member states review OSCE commitments with a view toward developing a new OSCE 

47
commitment addressing the problem of discriminatory registration policies. The U.S. delegation 

also recommended that the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 

increase its monitoring and reporting on violations of OSCE commitments regarding the right to 

freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. 

At these OSCE meetings, Commissioners also led or participated in bilateral meetings on 

religious freedom issues with official delegations from Belarus, France, Russia, Turkmenistan, 

and Uzbekistan. The Commission also met with officials from the Netherlands, in its capacity as 

OSCE Chairman in Office, and other OSCE officials, as well as members of the Advisory Panel 

of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief. Commissioners also met with representatives of 

religious groups and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from throughout the 

OSCE region. While in Vienna for Special OSCE meetings in June and July, the Commission 

also met with government officials, representatives of religious communities and religious 

freedom advocates regarding the situation of freedom of religion in Austria. 

Combating Anti-Semitism in the OSCE Region 

Following visits to France and Belgium in the spring of 2002, the Commission drew 

specific attention to, and spoke out against, the rise in anti-Semitic violence taking place in both 

countries. The U.S. Congress introduced and unanimously passed resolutions in both the Senate 

and House concerning the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe. The Senate version cited the 

Commission’s findings and urged the Commission to continue documenting the issue. The 

Commission discussed this disturbing trend with President Bush during a private meeting in 

October 2003. 

Many, but not all, of the recent anti-Semitic incidents in Western Europe reportedly have 

been committed by disaffected, marginalized young members of North African Muslim 

immigrant communities. Like the United States, France and other Western European countries 

are becoming more and more nations of immigrants. However, another source of the violence 

and anti-Semitic rhetoric in Europe is the so-called “skinhead” gangs that target Jews with 

bombings and other violence and seek to inflame public opinion against them. In some 

countries, these gangs have targeted Arabs and other Muslim immigrants as well. Additionally, 

anti-Semitism by extremist nationalist groups in Eastern Europe and Russia is well documented. 

To compound the problem, anti-Semitic rhetoric emanating from some intellectual circles that 

goes uncontested by political and societal leaders has promoted an environment of intolerance 

toward Jews. The problem is widespread. As numerous studies attest, anti-Jewish sentiment is 

surfacing again; failure to hold the perpetrators to account is all too often the official response. 

Anti-Zionism and vilification of Israel can mask anti-Semitism. 

When burnings, beatings, and other acts of violence are directed at a particular group 

because of who they are and what they believe, it should be clear that they reflect degradations of

human dignity. Such violent acts should not be viewed merely as police problems, but as human 

rights violations. The U.S. government should be unequivocal in its position that anti-Semitism

is a human rights matter. 

The Commission has addressed anti-Semitism and related issues in the course of its work 

on several countries both inside and outside of Europe, including Belarus, Belgium, Egypt, Iran, 

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France, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. The Commission has also consulted with 

representatives of Jewish communities in several countries, other religious leaders, and NGOs. 

The Commission has recommended that the OSCE pay separate attention to the rise of 

anti-Semitism in the region. At the 2003 HDIM and afterwards, the Commission worked with 

the U.S. delegation to successfully urge member states to agree to hold the OSCE’s first-ever 

special meeting on anti-Semitism.

Addressing the OSCE at the July special meeting, as well as the 2003 HDIM, 

Commissioner Felice D. Gaer emphasized that acts of anti-Semitism must be seen not as 

hooliganism, but as a form of human rights abuse that states should vigorously combat by 

implementing their international human rights commitments. 

The OSCE Ministerial Council, at its December 2003 meeting in Maastricht, 

Netherlands, accepted the German government’s invitation to host a special meeting on antiSemitism in Berlin in 2004, scheduled for the end of April. The Commission participated in the 

preparations for that meeting, including a consultation by the U.S. government with the German 

government, and participated as part of the U.S. delegation to the meeting. 

Calling the recognition by the OSCE of a resurgence of anti-Semitism throughout the 

region a good first step, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government urge: 

• that concrete action be taken within the OSCE to ensure that all participating states are living 

up to their commitments to combat discrimination and intolerance, in particular to combat 

anti-Semitism, as detailed in the 1990 Copenhagen Document, action which should include 

adopting laws to protect against incitement to violence based on discrimination, including 

anti-Semitism, and providing the individual with effective remedies to initiate complaints 

against acts of discrimination; 

• the creation of a mandate within OSCE, perhaps in the Office of Democratic Institutions and 

Human Rights, with the responsibility to monitor and report regularly on anti-Semitic 

incidents and the implementation by member states of their Copenhagen commitments; 

• review of state compliance within the OSCE of commitments of member states on antiSemitism on a regular basis; and 

• acceptance of the German invitation to host an OSCE meeting on anti-Semitism in Berlin in 

2004. 

Belarus 

Violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief, by the 

government of Belarus became more pronounced in 2003. Implementation of a new law on 

religion has resulted in severe regulatory obstacles and bureaucratic and legal restrictions 

enforced by the Belarus government on several religious communities to inhibit their activities. 

Official intolerance and harassment of various denominations has grown, including of the Greek 

49
Catholic Church and the Belarusian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, as well as of religions 

relatively new to the country, including Pentecostals, Hindus, and Hare Krishnas. The 

Commission has placed Belarus on its Watch List and will continue to consider closely whether 

the government’s record rises to a level warranting designation as a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC. 

Belarus has a highly authoritarian government that does not respect the human rights of 

its citizens. According to the State Department’s 2003 Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom, respect for religious freedom worsened during the most recent period covered by the 

report. Almost all political power is concentrated in the hands of President Aleksandr 

Lukashenko and a small circle of advisors. The regime under Lukashenko has been widely 

accused of serious human rights abuses, including involvement in the “disappearances” of 

several opposition figures as well as the imprisonment of journalists and other controls on the 

media. The freedoms of speech, assembly, and association are heavily restricted, and the 

government has repressed the few institutions of civil society that had emerged after the country 

gained independence in 1991. In late 2003, the Belarusian authorities stepped up their campaign 

against all independent actors in their country, including media outlets, trade unions and nongovernmental organizations. 

Since coming to power in 1994, Lukashenko has constructed a set of regulatory and 

bureaucratic obstacles that make legitimate religious activities impossible for many religious 

communities. Some minority religious groups have been attacked in the state-run media and 

have experienced violent attacks against their persons and property. Police have dispersed 

religious services and religious leaders continue to face arrest, heavy fines, and other forms of 

harassment. In October 2002, Lukashenko signed new legislation on religion that led to further 

restrictions on religious freedom in Belarus. Although the law purports to codify protections for 

religious freedom, in fact, it provides government officials with tools to repress and control 

religious activities without providing any clear mechanisms to check abuses by these officials. 

Considered by many observers to be the most repressive religion law in Europe, the new 

law essentially prohibits all unregistered religious activity by organized groups; religious 

communities with fewer than 20 members; foreign citizens from leading religious activities; and 

religious activity in private homes, with the exception of small, occasional meetings. The new 

law accomplishes this in part by establishing a three-tiered system of registration, and restricting 

the activities of the groups on the lowest rung. The law also requires all religious organizations 

to apply for re-registration within two years. The registration criteria laid out in the law is vague, 

thus facilitating continued abuse by government officials. According to the new law, religious 

publishing and education will be restricted to religious groups that have 10 or more registered 

communities, including at least one that was in existence in 1982. This requirement of at least 

20 years existence in Belarus is particularly onerous, since the cutoff date of 1982 falls during 

the Soviet period of religious repression when few religious groups were able to operate openly. 

Moreover, all religious literature is now subject to compulsory government censorship, and most 

communities are denied the right to establish institutions to train clergy. 

Almost one year after the passage of the law, there are reports that only a small number 

of even previously registered religious groups have been able to re-register. According to the 

2003 State Department report, the Belarusian government reported that 110 religious 

50
communities, including 34 Protestant and non-traditional denominations, were registered before 

the new law went into effect in 2002. Because the new law bans registered religious 

communities from using residences as their legal addresses without specific authorization, many 

groups that currently meet in private homes because they are unable to rent or buy meeting 

space, such as some Greek Catholic and Pentecostal communities, face the risk of being unable 

to re-register. The Belarusian authorities continue to refuse to register some religious 

communities outright, such as the Hindu Light of Kaylasa and the Hare Krishnas. 

Attacks on Jews or Jewish property have been reported in Belarus, with little attempt 

made on the part of the authorities to hold perpetrators to account. Anti-Semitic literature is sold 

in government buildings and in stores and at events directly and indirectly connected with the 

Belarusian Orthodox Church. Memorials, cemeteries, and other property are regularly subject to 

violence; though President Lukashenko sometimes condemns the attacks, the perpetrators are not 

pursued. For example, in January 2004, Alexander Rosenberg, head of Judaic Religious Union 

in Belarus, reported that the ancient Jewish cemetery in Rahachow had been desecrated. Yakov 

Gutman, head of the New York-based World Association of Belarusian Jews, was detained in 

January 2004 for protesting the lack of protection of Jewish cultural sites in Belarus. According 

to one Belarusian Jewish leader, inaction on the part of the authorities enables those responsible 

to attack with impunity. In addition, there have been instances of violence directed against 

members of religious minorities, such as members of the Hindu minority. 

Since 1994, President Lukashenko has openly pursued a policy of favoring the Russian 

Orthodox Church, a policy that frequently results in discrimination against other religious 

communities. The relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Belarus 

government has created particular problems for many Protestant groups, which have sometimes 

been denied registration or permission to build a place of worship by regional authorities who 

have been influenced by local Orthodox leaders. Several “independent” Orthodox churches that 

do not accept the authority of the Orthodox Patriarch in Moscow have been denied registration, 

before and after the new law was passed. These churches include the Autocephalous Orthodox 

Church and the True Orthodox Church, a branch of the Orthodox Church that rejected the 

compromise with the Soviet government made by the Russian Orthodox Church in the 1920s. In 

June 2003, the Belarus government and the Russian Orthodox Church signed a concordat 

codifying the Orthodox Church’s influence in government affairs and other facets of public life. 

In January 2003, then-Commission Chair Felice D. Gaer and Commissioner Bishop 

William Murphy traveled to Belarus where they met with officials for the State Committee on 

Religious and Nationalities Affairs as well as with various religious and human rights groups. 

The Commission released a report on Belarus in May 2003 that presented findings and 

recommendations for U.S. policy. The Commission has led or participated in bilateral meetings 

with official Belarus delegations at human rights meetings of the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe in July and September 2003. 

With regard to Belarus, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government 

should: 

• use every measure of public and private diplomacy to advance the protection of human 

rights, including religious freedom, in Belarus, including enhanced monitoring and public 

51
reporting, especially in light of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s 

weakened monitoring mandate inside Belarus; 

• urge the Belarus government to take immediate steps to end repression, including: repealing 

the highly repressive religion law; ending to the practice of denying registration to religious 

groups and then erecting obstacles to religious practice because of that unregistered status; 

providing the right to conduct religious education and distribute religious material; halting 

government attacks on the persons and property of minority religious groups; ensuring a 

greater effort on the part of government officials to find and hold to account perpetrators of 

attacks on the persons and property of members of religious minorities; and providing free 

access of domestic and international human rights groups and others to sites of religious 

violence or destruction of houses of worship; 

• urge the Belarus government to ensure that no religious community is given a status that may 

result in or be used to justify the impairment of the rights of members of other religious 

groups; 

• continue to support, publicly and privately, persons and groups engaged in the struggle 

against repression in Belarus, including the group of religious and opposition activists who 

make up the Freedom of Religion Initiative that published the “White Book”; and 

• consistently raise religious freedom and other human rights concerns in Belarus with Russian 

government officials, due to the special relationship between Russia and Belarus, making 

clear that the human rights situation in Belarus is unacceptable and that the Russian 

government has some responsibility to use its influence to press for democratic change with 

respect to human rights, including religious freedom, in Belarus. 

In addition, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. Congress pass the Belarus 

Democracy Act, and that the activities to promote democracy outlined in the Act should include 

programs that explicitly promote the right to freedom of religion or belief. 

France 

The Commission has directed its attention to France because of several recent trends or

events that have affected conditions of religious freedom in that country. Official government 

initiatives and activities that target “sects” or “cults” have fueled an atmosphere of intolerance 

toward members of minority religious groups in France. There has been an upsurge in violence 

against Jewish persons and property. In addition, a new law banning certain religious garb in 

public schools threatens the religious freedom of many in France, especially Muslim women and 

girls, Jews, and Sikhs. 

The government of France has taken active measures targeting certain minority religious 

groups, pejoratively characterized as “cults” or “sects,” and the purported threats that these 

groups pose. These measures have taken a variety of forms, including the publication of official 

reports or lists characterizing specific groups as harmful or dangerous, and the creation of 

52
government agencies to investigate, monitor, and “fight” these groups. Among other 

consequences, these actions have created an atmosphere of hostility toward the members of 

several minority religious groups and threaten their right to religious freedom. These initiatives 

are particularly troubling because they are serving as models for countries in Eastern Europe and 

elsewhere where the rule of law and other human rights protections are much weaker than in 

France. In the past, French officials had traveled to several of these countries promoting its 

initiatives, although this practice reportedly has ceased. Other recent changes to French policy in 

this matter, including the restructuring of the main government agency concerned with this issue, 

have reportedly resulted in improvements in religious freedom protections. The Commission 

will continue to monitor the effects of these changes. 

Anti-Semitic violence and other acts of anti-Semitism in France continue to be of

concern. However, the French government appears to have taken several steps to address the 

problem since the spike in such incidents in the spring of 2002. For example, the government 

recently introduced a program to train French judges on ways to recognize hate crimes. More 

information about the Commission’s concerns and activities with regard to anti-Semitism in 

Europe more generally can be found in the report on the OSCE, found in the Europe and Eurasia 

section of the Country Reports chapter. 

In January 2004, the French government under President Jacques Chirac proposed a new 

law prohibiting students from wearing certain forms of religious clothing or symbols in French 

public schools. The proposal would ban dress or symbols that "conspicuously show religious 

affiliation," such as headscarves for Muslim girls, "plainly excessive" crosses for Christian 

children, skullcaps for Jewish boys, and turbans for Sikhs. Since many Muslims, Jews, and 

Sikhs consider it a religious obligation to cover one's head, there is concern that this law may 

violate France's international commitments, including the European Convention on Human 

Rights, under which each individual is guaranteed the freedom to manifest religion or belief, in 

public as well as in private. Under international law, the freedom to manifest one's religion or 

belief may be subject to limitation only as necessary to protect public order, health, safety, 

morals, and the rights and freedoms of others. 

President Chirac called the proposed law necessary to maintain the secular (lai'c) nature 

of French schools. The legislation passed both houses of the legislature by very large margins in 

February and March 2004. It was signed into law on March 15, 2004 by President Chirac and is 

due to go into effect with the start of the new school year in the fall. The impact of the new law 

is to be evaluated one year after it has gone into effect. Reportedly, there are plans for similar 

legislation to cover the wearing of religious garb and symbols in other public institutions. In 

addition, there are reports that Belgium and several states in Germany are considering similar 

legislation regarding schools. 

In February 2004, the Commission issued a public statement expressing concern over the 

proposed new law. The Commission expressed particular concern that the proposed restrictions 

may violate France’s international human rights commitments. The Commission also stated that 

though increased immigration in France in recent years has created new challenges for the 

French government, including integration of these immigrants into French society as well as 

problems of public order, these challenges should be addressed directly, and not by 

inappropriately limiting the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief. The 

53
French government’s promotion of its understanding of the principle of secularism should not 

result in violations of the internationally recognized individual right to freedom of religion or 

belief. 

In its February 2004 statement, the Commission recommended that the U.S. government 

urge the government of France to ensure that any state regulations on public expression of 

religious belief or affiliation adhere strictly to international human rights norms. The French 

government and legislature should be urged to reassess this initiative in light of its international 

obligations to ensure that every person in France is guaranteed the freedom to manifest his or her 

religion or belief in public, or not to do so. 

In addition, in July of last year, the Commission held meetings with senior French 

officials charged with religious affairs to discuss concerns about religious freedom in France and 

recent changes in official policies. 

Georgia

Georgia’s previous government under Eduard Shevardnadze maintained a slow and 

inadequate response to ongoing vigilante violence against some of the country’s religious 

minorities. In a welcome move in March 2004, the new Georgian government of Mikheil 

Saakashvili ordered the arrest and pretrial detention of seven leaders of mob violence against 

religious minorities. Following the ouster of Shevardnadze, officials reportedly permitted 

permitted the Jehovah’s Witnesses Watchtower Bible Society to operate legally in November 

2003. Nevertheless, other significant religious freedom issues remain unresolved, including the 

fact that only the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) has the right to register and gain legal 

status, giving the GOC precedence over other religious communities in official affairs, including

public education. The Commission placed Georgia on its Watch List in 2004. 

After Georgia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, popular protests 

forced its first president to flee, leading to civil war. During the same period, two violent 

separatist conflicts in the autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia displaced some

300,000 people. In 1992, former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was invited to 

return to Georgia. Although he was elected president in 1995 and again in 2000, Shevardnadze’s 

rule was marked by territorial disputes, rampant corruption, and poverty. In November 2003, 

faced with mass popular discontent over what were seen as rigged parliamentary elections, 

Shevardnadze resigned his office, and in January 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected 

president. Although Georgia has a lively civil society, with many non-governmental 

organizations, political parties and a largely free press, since 2000, the human rights situation has 

worsened, especially after the government’s repeal of judicial reforms. According to the 2003 

Religious Freedom report issued by the Department of State, religious freedom conditions 

“remained poor” in Georgia. 

The 1995 Constitution guarantees religious freedom and forbids “persecution of an 

individual for his thoughts, beliefs or religion.” In practice, however, violations of religious 

freedom do occur, especially at the regional level, where local officials restrict the rights of 

54
mainly non-traditional religious minorities, who in recent years have been subjected to societal 

violence. 

In the past three years, minority religious groups in Georgia, including Baptists, 

Catholics, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Orthodox churches that do not accept the 

primacy of the GOC Patriarchate have been subjected to more than 100 violent vigilante attacks. 

The Jehovah’s Witnesses have been especially singled out, as well as members of independent 

Orthodox churches. Pentecostals have also been attacked; adherents have been beaten and 

property has been vandalized or stolen. Local police are sometimes implicated in these attacks 

or often refuse to intervene to protect the victims. What began in 1999 as a series of isolated 

attacks in the capital of Tbilisi escalated into a nation-wide scourge of mob assaults against 

members of religious minorities treated with relative impunity. According to the Department of 

State, the number of such attacks continued to increase in 2002 and 2003. 

The main instigators of these attacks were “renegade” members of the GOC: defrocked 

priest Vasili Mkalavishvili and director of the Orthodox “Jvari” Union, Paata Bluashvili, who 

reportedly was supported by some in the GOC hierarchy. The Georgian government under 

President Shevardnadze did very little to punish those responsible for attacks on religious 

minorities. Few investigations were opened, although in many cases the perpetrators were 

known, and there was only one criminal trial connected to these attacks. Acting on a reported 

promise in March 2003 to bring to justice those responsible for violence against religious 

communities, Shevardnadze’s government initiated a trial against violent self-appointed 

Orthodox vigilante Paata Bluashvili and four associates in April. On November 4, 2003, two 

days after the disputed parliamentary elections, a court in Rustavi sentenced Bluashvili and four 

associates to conditional prison terms, ranging from two to four years. Although they have 

allegedly been involved in a series of violent attacks on Protestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses, the 

five men were sentenced only for their violent attacks on two Jehovah’s Witnesses meetings. 

 Similarly convoluted legal proceedings have marked the Georgian judiciary’s treatment 

of defrocked priest Vasili Mkalavishvili, another leader of mob violence against religious 

minorities. In June 2003, a court ordered that Mkalavishvili be held in preventive detention for 

three months, but he went into “hiding” and continued to act without consequence. Over 100 

police stormed Mkalavishvili’s church in Tbilisi in March 2004, where the priest and his 

followers had barricaded themselves. Mkalavishvili was taken at once into three-month pre-trial 

detention in conformity with the June 2003 court order. At a closed hearing on March 14, the 

judge ruled that seven of Mkalavishvili’s followers also be held for three months of pre-trial 

detention. 

The police raid against the violent priest caused a stir in Georgia. Immediately after the 

arrests, President Saakashvili denied that his government was undermining Orthodoxy and 

justified Mkalavishvili’s arrest as a way to “defend” the GOC. According to Saakashvili, 

“extremist religious groups threaten the Orthodox church.” The president declared, “My 

supreme goal, as an Orthodox Christian and as president, is to defend my religion.” He called on 

people to support his efforts, saying, “The State should protect the Church from negative foreign 

influence and the activities of extremist groups.” Meanwhile, the Georgian Orthodox 

Patriarchate issued a statement on March 12 pointing out that the GOC had defrocked 

Mkalavishvili in 1996, but condemned police violence during his arrest. 

55
The GOC, to which 65 percent of the country’s population claim adherence, is granted 

privileges and influence not given to other religions. Article 9 of the Constitution recognizes the 

“special importance of the GOC in Georgian history,” giving the GOC considerable influence in 

official affairs, particularly education. The GOC is the only religious organization to have been 

granted tax-exempt status. In October 2002, the Georgian government signed an agreement, or 

concordat, with the GOC. The agreement grants the Patriarch immunity, excludes the GOC 

clergy from military service, and gives GOC clergy the exclusive right to conduct religious 

services in prisons and the military. The agreement also grants the GOC approval authority over 

construction of religious buildings and publication of religious literature. Assyrian Chaldean 

Catholics, Lutherans, Muslims, Old Believers, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Roman Catholics have 

informed the Forum 18 News Service that the GOC Patriarchate has often acted to prevent them

from acquiring, building, or reclaiming places of worship. The GOC Patriarchate has also 

reportedly denied permission for Pentecostals, the Salvation Army, and the True Orthodox 

Church to print religious literature in Georgia, although Assyrian Chaldean Catholics, Baptists, 

Roman Catholics, and Yezidis (an ancient Kurdish religion) have not reported difficulties in this 

regard. While there is no obligatory religious education in public schools, the GOC has the 

authority to review textbooks and has sometimes banned certain materials. Indeed, leaders of the 

Assyrian Chaldean Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, True Orthodox, Roman 

Catholics and Yezidis have reported that they believe that school religion and culture classes are 

in fact obligatory and that the GOC has a monopoly in this regard. 

At present, Georgia is the only country of the former Soviet Union that does not have a 

religion law. Official drafts circulated in the parliament last year contain some problematic 

areas. For example, what is termed “improper proselytism” could give rise to criminal charges. 

The absence of a mechanism for obtaining legal status means that only one religious community 

in the country—the GOC—in effect has such status. In September 2003, the Roman Catholic 

Church failed to gain legal status in Georgia when the Georgian government suddenly cancelled 

plans to sign an agreement with the Vatican. The leaders of many religious minorities also seek 

recognized legal status, since that is a prerequisite for owning property and organizing most 

religious activities. 

The Russian Federation

Since its inception, the Commission has monitored and reported on the status of freedom

of religion or belief in the Russian Federation. Russia has consistently drawn the attention of the 

Commission not because of the severity of the country’s religious freedom violations, but 

because of the fragility of human rights, including religious freedom. Russia is also a model, 

especially for other former Soviet states and other nations struggling to establish democratic 

systems after a history of despotism. 

In its May 2003 report on Russia, the Commission expressed strong concern that the 

Russian government was retreating from democratic reform, thereby endangering the significant 

gains made for human rights, including freedom of religion or belief, in the dozen years since the 

collapse of the Soviet Union. Recent curtailments in media freedom and in the role of political 

parties, as well as proposed legislative restrictions on freedom of assembly, are indications that 

56
progress towards democracy is being halted, if not reversed. Most, if not all, of the concerns 

about freedom of religion or belief raised by the Commission in the past appear to be directly 

related to the growing influence of authoritarian, and perhaps even chauvinistic, strains in the 

Russian government. The country’s progress toward democratic reform based on rule of law and 

the protection of human rights is now in peril. 

Clearly, the practice of religion in Russia is freer than at any time in its history. Despite 

that improvement, problems remain. For example, a federal law on religious organizations 

enacted in 1997 contains provisions that have prevented some religious groups from registering 

and thus practicing freely. Regional governments have often passed ordinances that result in 

discrimination against minority religious groups, and acts of violence against members of 

religious minorities are widespread. What is more, foreign religious leaders and workers have 

experienced difficulty gaining entry or maintaining residence in Russia. The Russian Orthodox 

Church has sought preferential treatment from the state in a way that calls into question whether 

religious freedom will be guaranteed for all. Yet, in the late 1990s, the Russian government 

responded to some of these concerns, and Russian courts provided some protection against 

violations. Until recently, progress was continuing. 

In the past few years, however, trends have emerged that have raised serious questions 

about Russia’s commitment to democratic reform and protection of religious freedom. Russian 

authorities have denied registration efforts of certain religious communities, based on the 

allegedly insufficient time they have existed, despite a February 2002 Russian Constitutional 

Court decision that found that an active religious organization registered before the 1997 law 

could not be deprived of its legal status for failing to re-register. The government has meddled in 

the internal affairs of religious communities, including the Jewish and Orthodox Old Believer 

communities. 

 The March 26, 2004 Moscow court decision banning the Jehovah’s Witnesses in that 

city may mark a major shift in Russian official policy towards religious minorities. The 

protracted trial in Moscow took place even though 135,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses practice their 

faith in registered communities in many other parts of Russia. If that decision is upheld on 

appeal, the Jehovah’s Witnesses will become the first national religious organization to have a 

local branch banned under the 1997 law. The prosecutor’s claim that Jehovah’s Witnesses were 

inciting inter-religious conflict because they see their religion as having the sole claim to truth is 

especially troubling. 

Official efforts to portray “foreign sects,” mostly Evangelical Protestants, as alien to 

Russian culture and society appear to be escalating. In December 2003, state-controlled Kultura 

TV ran a film made in 1960 that reportedly portrays Pentecostals as practicing human sacrifice. 

This official campaign appears to be part of an increased effort by the Russian authorities to 

promote the “more equal” status of the state-approved forms of Russia’s purported “traditional” 

religions: Russian Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism. A “Law on Traditional 

Religions,” which was proposed in February 2002 and whose status remains unclear, would 

grant benefits, at varying levels, to these four religions. In March 2004, the Russian press 

reported that President Putin, while acknowledging the legal separation of church and state, said 

that he supports a legal initiative to “support the spiritual leaders of the traditional confessions,” 

including on property issues. 

57
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has played a special role in Russian history and 

culture. Nevertheless, there is continued concern that the ROC enjoys a favored status among 

many Russian government officials, a situation that sometimes results in restrictions on other 

religious communities. President Putin recently declared that Orthodoxy is part of Russian 

culture and that, regardless of the legal separation of church and state, “in the soul of the people 

they belong together.” Particularly on the local level, evidence suggests that the Orthodox 

Church has a very close relationship with officials and other state bodies. For example, there are 

frequent reports that minority religious communities must secure permission from the local 

Orthodox Church before being allowed to build a house of worship. Adherents of minority faiths 

in Russia, including Roman Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, and others, report that government 

officials often create barriers, and do so oftentimes at the behest of the Orthodox Church. 

Russian authorities have increasingly denied visas or residence permits for clergy and 

other religious workers. Since the beginning of 2002, a Catholic Bishop and several priests have 

been expelled from Russia, including those who had lived in Russia for years. In addition to the 

denials or revocations of visas for Catholic priests, there were reportedly numerous other cases in 

which foreign religious workers were denied visas to enter or re-enter the country, including 

members of the Protestant Christian, Buddhist, and Muslim faiths. The Buddhist community of 

Kalmykia continues to appeal to the Russian Foreign Ministry to reverse previous visa denials 

and allow its spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, to visit Russia. In late 2003, a court in Tatarstan 

denied a new residence permit to a Baptist missionary on the basis of the assessment of local 

security officials that his activities were “extremist.” 

Despite statements by President Putin decrying anti-Semitism and various government 

actions against extremist groups, violence against Jews continues. Jewish religious buildings 

have been subjected to vandalism and arson. The synagogue in Kostroma was vandalized in 

December 2003 and police have opened a criminal investigation. Three Molotov cocktails were 

thrown at a synagogue in Chelyabinsk in February 2004. In Moscow, an explosive device 

attached to a sign with an anti-Semitic slogan exploded in January 2004; police are investigating 

the incident. However, there are no reports of arrests in connection with similar incidents in 

Vladivostok, Moscow, and Kaliningrad. 

The Russian authorities often seem to turn a blind eye to societal violence directed 

against certain religious communities, especially at the local level. On the eve of a national 

conference in January 2004, the “Initiative” Baptist church in Tula was bombed. Arsonists have 

attacked Pentecostal churches in Podolsk, Chekhovo, Balashikha, Tula, Lipetsk, and Nizhny 

Tagil. No criminal investigations into these incidents have been launched. In addition, 

individuals of nationalities traditionally associated with Islam have been subjected to numerous 

attacks in Russia. Rarely is anyone held to account. A Muslim cemetery was desecrated in 

February 2004. 

Following a visit to Russia in January 2003, the Commission wrote to President Bush in 

May 2003 urging him to raise concerns about threats to religious freedom and democracy in 

Russia during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In July 2003, Commissioners 

took part in a special meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE) on Freedom of Religion or Belief at which they held bilateral meetings with Russian 

government officials. In September 2003, Commission Chair Michael K. Young made a 

58
presentation on the Commission’s religious freedom concerns on Russia to senior Administration 

officials and representatives of non-governmental organizations at the State Department’s 

Europe-Eurasia Religious Freedom Roundtable. 

In its May 2003 report, the Commission urged Congress to reinstate the Smith 

Amendment, which conditions certain foreign assistance to the Russian government on 

Presidential certification that the Russian government has not implemented any law or regulation 

that discriminated against religious groups in violation of international agreements to which the 

Russian Federation is a party. Congress included this provision in the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 2004, now Public Law 108-199. 

The Administration and several members of Congress have made clear their intention to 

seek the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. In March 2003, Congressman Charles Rangel 

introduced legislation to grant normal trade relations with Russia. The Rangel bill, introduced in 

the Senate by Senator Max Baucus, also included a requirement that the U.S. government should 

continue monitoring Russia’s compliance with human rights standards, including through an 

annual assessment by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom on whether 

Russia is adequately protecting freedom of religion or belief. 

With regard to Russia, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government 

should: 

• make clear its concern to the Russian government that efforts to combat terrorism should not 

be used as an unrestrained justification to restrict the rights, including religious freedom, of 

members of Russia's religious minorities;

• continue to press the Russian government to ensure that the views expressed in the leaked 

“Zorin” report, in which Catholics, Protestants, and others have been grouped together with 

Islamic extremists and collectively labeled as threats to Russia’s national security, are not 

adopted as Russian government policy; 

• urge the Russian government to ensure that any special role for the Orthodox Church or any 

other religious community does not result in violations of the rights of or discrimination 

against members of other religious groups; 

• continue to urge the Russian government to cease the practice of unfairly denying entry visas 

or residence permits to foreign clergy and other religious workers and to cease other forms of 

interference in the internal affairs of religious communities; 

• urge the government of Russia to monitor the actions of regional and local officials who 

interfere with the right to freedom of religion or belief, and to take steps to bring local laws 

and regulations on religious activities into conformity with the Russian Constitution and 

international human rights standards; 

• persistently urge the Russian government to take all appropriate steps to prevent and punish 

acts of anti-Semitism, including to condemn anti-Semitic acts, to pursue and prosecute the 

59
perpetrators of violent incidents of anti-Semitism, and, while vigorously protecting freedom

of expression, to counteract anti-Semitic rhetoric and other organized anti-Semitic activities;

• make clear its concern to the Russian government that hostile rhetoric against Muslims and 

the Islamic faith is fueling an atmosphere in which perpetrators believe they can attack 

Muslim or Muslim-appearing persons with impunity; 

• ensure that the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Chechnya remains a key issue in its 

bilateral relations with Russia and urge the Russian government to end, and prosecute acts of, 

torture, arbitrary detention, rape, and other abuses by members of the military in Chechnya 

and to accept a site visit to Chechnya from the UN Special Rapporteurs on Torture, 

Extrajudicial Executions, and Violence Against Women; 

• raise religious freedom and other human rights violations in multilateral fora, including the 

OSCE and the UN, and continue, on a bilateral basis, to encourage the government of Russia 

to agree to the request of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief to 

visit Russia; 

• use every possible means to engage and support the genuine democrats in the Russian 

government at the federal and local levels, and ensure that U.S. aid programs are not being 

used to support the activities in Russia of authoritarian-minded officials; and 

• advance human rights, including religious freedom, in Russia by continuing to provide 

assistance, as appropriate, to non-governmental organizations, public interest groups, 

journalists, and academic institutions, and expand programs aimed at encouraging religious 

tolerance and supporting international standards on freedom of religion and other human 

rights. 

In addition, the Commission recommends that if the Jackson-Vanik amendment is 

repealed with respect to Russia, the U.S. Congress should make certain that some other 

mechanism is in place to monitor the status of religious freedom and other human rights in 

Russia and report to Congress. 

Turkmenistan 

Turkmenistan is among the most repressive states in the world today and engages in 

particularly severe, ongoing violations of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief. 

Since 1985, the country has been ruled by President Saparmurat Niyazov, who, since 

Turkmenistan gained independence in 1991, has assumed total control of the country through a 

“cult of personality.” Niyazov’s all-pervasive authoritarian rule has effectively prevented any 

opposition from operating within the country. The Commission continues to recommend that the 

Secretary of State designate Turkmenistan as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. Despite 

the fact that religious freedom is severely proscribed in Turkmenistan, the Secretary of State has 

not yet named Turkmenistan a CPC. There is no evidence that the situation for religious 

freedom has improved in the past year. 

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The overall human rights situation in Turkmenistan deteriorated significantly after 

November 2002, when, in response to an alleged assassination attempt, Niyazov began arresting 

hundreds of relatives or associates of dissidents. Many have been sentenced to as many as 25 

years in prison. The status of religious freedom declined further after the passage of a new law 

on religion in November 2003. This law further codifies the Turkmen government’s already 

highly repressive policies that effectively ban most religious activity in Turkmenistan and calls 

for criminal penalties for those found guilty of participating in “illegal religious activity.” 

According to reports, the law also requires religious groups to coordinate any contacts with coreligionists abroad with the Turkmen government. Contradicting this law, Niyazov issued a 

surprise decree in March 2004 that religious communities may register “in the prescribed 

manner” and will no longer have to meet the requirement of 500 members in order to register. 

However, the decree only amends those portions of the law relating to the numerical 

requirements for registration and not the penalties for violating it. Turkmen officials have noted 

that this apparent easing of registration requirements does not mean that religious communities 

will be able to meet in private homes to conduct services. To date, no religious communities 

have been registered under the lower numerical requirements for registration. 

President Niyazov has promoted a state-controlled version of Islam as part of Turkmen 

identity. His monopoly of power and absolute control over Turkmen society renders any 

independent religious activity impossible and is treated as a potential threat to that control. Since 

independence in 1991, religious groups must register with the government in order to engage in 

religious activities. The earlier 1997 version of the religion law effectively banned all religious 

groups except the state-controlled Sunni Muslim Board and the Russian Orthodox Church, 

though religious instruction even for these two communities is severely limited. Niyazov has 

allowed only one madrassa, or Islamic school, to remain open. In late March 2004, he 

proclaimed that no new mosques should be built. Imams have been instructed by the 

government to repeat an oath of loyalty to the “fatherland” and to the President after each daily 

prayer. Niyazov bolstered his personality cult with the publication of a three-volume work, 

Ruhnama, containing his “spiritual thoughts,” which is required reading in all schools. Copies of 

Ruhnama are now reportedly required in mosques and Russian Orthodox churches, and given 

equal prominence with the Koran and the Bible. Opposition on religious grounds to this 

requirement is considered a grave affront to Niyazov’s power. Indeed, on March 2, 2004, the 

country’s former chief mufti, Nazrullah ibn Ibadullah, who had opposed the requirement to 

elevate the Ruhnama, was sentenced in a closed trial to 22 years in prison, reportedly on charges 

of treason for purported involvement in the alleged November 2002 assassination attempt against 

Niyazov. 

Even before the passage of the new law on religion, the 1997 version of the religion law 

made it all but impossible for religious minorities to register and function legally. Turkmen 

security forces routinely interrogate and intimidate believers, especially those attempting to 

fulfill the registration requirement. Members of unregistered religious communities—including 

Baha’is, Baptists, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, Seventh-day Adventists, 

Shi’a and other Muslims operating independently of the Sunni Muslim Board—have been 

arrested, detained, imprisoned and reportedly tortured, deported, harassed, and fined. In 

addition, they have had their congregations dispersed, services disrupted, religious literature 

confiscated, and places of worship destroyed. Members of some religious minority groups in 

Turkmenistan have reportedly been forced to renounce their faith publicly, swearing an oath on a 

61
copy of Ruhnama. Security officials regularly break up religious meetings in private homes, 

search homes without warrants, confiscate religious literature, and detain and threaten 

congregants with criminal prosecution and deportation. Family members of detained religious 

leaders have been subjected to harassment and internal exile. Even the registered Russian 

Orthodox community has been affected by the repressive policies of Niyazov, who in September 

2003 issued a decree banning residents of Turkmenistan from receiving Russian publications by 

mail, a ban that included the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. 

In January 2004, Commission Chair Michael K. Young met with Tracey Jacobson, U.S. 

Ambassador to Turkmenistan, to discuss bilateral relations, the status of human rights, including 

religious freedom, and possible steps the United States might take to ameliorate the situation. In 

December 2003, the Commission issued a statement outlining its concerns about the November 

2003 passage of Turkmenistan’s harshly repressive law on religion. The Commission has led or 

participated in bilateral meetings with official Turkmen delegations at human rights meeting of 

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in July and September 2003. As 

recommended by the Commission, the UN Human Rights Commission passed resolutions in 

2003 and 2004 condemning Turkmenistan for repression of religious and political rights, 

including through torture. 

In the 108th Congress, the Senate and House of Representatives introduced resolutions 

on human rights in Central Asia that concerned Turkmenistan, S.J.Res. 3 and H.Con.Res. 32. 

S.J.Res 3 calls upon the government of Turkmenistan to permit “the free exercise of religious 

beliefs and cease the persecution of members of religious groups and denominations that do not 

engage in violence or political change through violence.” H.Con.Res. 32 calls on the President, 

Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense to follow the Commission’s recommendation to 

designate Turkmenistan a CPC and includes additional provisions reflective of the Commission’s 

other recommendations on Turkmenistan. Over 30 Members of Congress concurred with the 

Commission’s recommendation on CPC status for Turkmenistan in a “Dear Colleague” letter, 

circulated by Representatives Christopher Smith and Ben Cardin and sent to Secretary Powell in 

October 2003. 

In addition to recommending that Turkmenistan be designated a CPC, the Commission 

has recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• suspend all non-humanitarian assistance to the government of Turkmenistan, with the 

exception of programs that serve specifically identifiable U.S. national security interests in 

connection with the current campaign against terrorism. This recommendation does not 

apply to U.S. assistance to appropriate non-governmental organizations, private persons, or 

cultural or educational exchanges; 

• scrutinize all aspects of any remaining assistance programs in Turkmenistan to ensure that 

these programs do not facilitate Turkmen government policies or practices that result in 

religious freedom violations. The United States should also examine its programs in 

Turkmenistan to determine if opportunities exist within those programs to promote the 

development of genuine respect for human rights, including religious freedom, in that 

country; 

62
• support efforts to facilitate Turkmenistan’s sale of natural gas on world markets, including 

support for the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, only if the Turkmen government takes definitive 

steps to improve substantially conditions for religious freedom in Turkmenistan; 

• identify specific steps that the government of Turkmenistan could take in order to have its 

currently suspended assistance reinstated and to avoid triggering further restrictions on 

assistance programs, steps which should include, but not be limited to, the lifting of 

oppressive legal requirements on religious groups and allowing all such groups to organize 

and operate freely, the end to harassment and deportation of religious leaders, and the halting 

of unjust arrest, detention, imprisonment, torture, and residential and workplace intimidation 

of religious leaders and their adherents (including releasing those currently in detention or 

imprisoned); 

• vigorously press the government of Turkmenistan: (a) to release immediately and 

unconditionally any persons who have been detained solely because of their religious beliefs, 

practices, or choice of religious association; (b) to ensure that all people in Turkmenistan are 

able to exercise their right to religious freedom without threat of harassment, detention, 

imprisonment, or torture; and (c) to permit all religious groups to organize and worship 

freely; 

• suspend state visits between the United States and Turkmenistan until such time as religious 

freedom conditions in the country have improved significantly; and 

• encourage scrutiny of religious freedom violations in Turkmenistan in appropriate 

international fora such as the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other 

multilateral venues and also raise the issue of religious freedom violations in Turkmenistan at 

those United Nations bodies that consider human rights questions, including the Commission 

on Human Rights. 

Uzbekistan 

Uzbekistan has a highly restrictive law on religion that severely limits the ability of

religious groups to function. The Uzbek government in recent years has also been harshly 

cracking down on Muslim individuals, groups, and mosques that do not conform to government 

policies on the practice and expression of the Islamic faith. As a result, thousands of people have 

been arrested, many of whom have been tortured in detention. The Commission has placed 

Uzbekistan on its Watch List and will continue to consider closely whether the government’s 

record rises to a level warranting designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. 

Since Uzbekistan gained independence in 1992, fundamental human rights, including 

religious freedom, have not been respected. The use of torture is widespread and, despite 

promises from the government to prevent it, is not declining. One human rights organization has 

documented 10 deaths from torture over a five-year period, including two prisoners in May 2003, 

one of whom was charged with belonging to a banned religious group, Hizb ut-Tahrir. 

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The Uzbek government continues to exercise tight control over all religious practice in the 

country. Despite the constitutional guarantee of the separation of religion and state, the 

government under President Islam Karimov strictly regulates Islamic institutions and practice 

through the officially-sanctioned Muslim Spiritual Board. Over the past 10 years and particularly 

since 1999, the Uzbek government has arrested and imprisoned, with sentences up to 20 years,

thousands of Muslims who reject the state’s control over religious practice. In some cases, piety 

alone is reported to result in state suspicion and arrest. Human rights organizations report that 

many of those in detention were arrested on specious drug charges or for possession of literature of

a banned religious organization. Once arrested, they frequently do not have access to a lawyer or 

are held incommunicado for weeks and sometimes even months. Many individuals detained for

offenses related to religious practice are treated especially severely in prison; those who pray or 

who observe Muslim religious festivals are reportedly subjected to further harassment, beatings, 

and even torture. 

The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, in his report on Uzbekistan released in February 

2003, concluded, “torture or similar ill-treatment is systematic” in Uzbekistan and that the 

“pervasive and persistent nature of torture throughout the investigative process cannot be 

denied.” The report also pointed out that “the practice of maintaining families in a state of

uncertainty with a view to punishing or intimidating them and others must be considered 

malicious and amounting to cruel and inhuman treatment.” 

The government of Uzbekistan does face threats to its security from certain groups that 

claim religious links, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has used violence in 

the past but whose membership reportedly declined significantly as a result of U.S. military 

action in Afghanistan in late 2001. Uzbekistan continues to be subject to violent attacks, though 

the perpetrators are not often apparent. In late March 2004, 47 people were reported dead after 

bombings and shootouts during several days of violence in the capital Tashkent and the ancient 

city of Bukhara, according to the Uzbek government. A female suicide bomber was allegedly 

involved in one incident. During a nation-wide broadcast on March 29, the BBC reported that 

President Karimov suggested that unnamed foreign forces were behind the violence. Uzbek 

Prosecutor-General Rashid Qodirov told the Russian news agency RIA-Novosti, “there are 

serious reasons to believe that the religious-extremist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of 

Liberation) and the Wahhabis are implicated in these crimes.” On March 29, Hizb ut-Tahrir

issued a press release denying any involvement in the March bombings and attacks, stating that it 

“does not engage in terrorism, violence or armed struggle.” In addition to expressing 

condolences to the families of the victims of the attacks, on March 30, Secretary of State Powell 

offered U.S. assistance to Uzbek investigations into the bombings. 

Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is banned in most Muslim countries, purports not to engage in

violence. However, it is intolerant of other religions and has sanctioned violence in some

circumstances. The group calls for the establishment of a worldwide caliphate in place of existing 

governments, and though it does not specify the methods it would use to attain that goal, it does,

according to the State Department’s 2003 Annual Report International Religious Freedom, reserve 

the “possibility that its own members might resort to violence” in the effort to achieve this aim. In 

addition, the State Department reports that the literature of the Hizb ut-Tahrir includes “strong antiSemitic and anti-Western rhetoric.” Alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir make up most of the

thousands in prison; however, in the majority of cases, the Uzbek authorities have presented no 

64
evidence that these persons have participated in any violent acts. According to the 2003 State

Department human rights report, there are an estimated 6,500 people imprisoned for political or 

religious reasons. Many of those arrested and imprisoned are not in fact affiliated with Hizb utTahrir but are only accused of membership or association, sometimes due to possession of the 

group’s literature when they are arrested. Some reportedly had the group’s literature planted on 

them at the time of arrest. Though security threats do exist in Uzbekistan, neither these threats 

nor the transitional state of development of democratic institutions can excuse or explain the 

scope and severity of the government’s ill treatment of religious believers. 

The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations passed in May 1998 

severely restricts the exercise of religious freedom. Through a series of regulations that are often 

subjectively applied, the law imposes what the State Department calls “strict and burdensome

criteria” for the registration of religious groups; criminalizes unregistered religious activity; bans 

the production and distribution of unofficial religious publications; prohibits minors from 

participating in religious organizations; prohibits private teaching of religious principles; and 

forbids the wearing of religious clothing in public by anyone other than clerics. As with Muslims,

pastors or other members of Protestant churches have been arrested on spurious drug or other 

charges. Several Christian leaders have in the past reportedly been detained in psychiatric 

hospitals, severely beaten, and/or sentenced to labor camps. In the past year, Christian groups 

continued to have their churches raided, services interrupted, Bibles confiscated, and the names 

of adherents recorded by Uzbek officials. Several Christian leaders were imprisoned for leading 

religious services in private homes. Some Christian groups in Uzbekistan have been forced to 

operate underground. 

In November 2003, the State Department did not certify that Uzbekistan was in 

compliance with the human rights provisions of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 

Agreement on military and human rights issues, and asked that the White House make that same

determination. However, on December 30, 2003, the White House found that the military 

components of CTR outweighed Uzbekistan’s lack of human rights compliance and waived the 

human rights requirement and released $1.2 million of military assistance to that country. 

The Commission has led or participated in bilateral meetings with official Uzbek 

delegations at human rights meetings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

in July and September 2003. 

The Commission has recommended that U.S. aid to Uzbekistan be contingent on 

improvements in freedom of religion. Under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, the 

Congress conditioned funds to Uzbekistan on its “making substantial and continuing progress in 

meeting its commitments under the ‘Declaration of Strategic Partnership and Cooperation 

Framework Between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the United States of America,’ including 

respect for human rights and freedom of expression.” By April 2004, the State Department was 

to certify whether or not Uzbekistan was in compliance with the specified human rights 

requirements of the act. H.Con.Res. 32 expresses the sense of Congress that Uzbekistan “risks 

designation [as a CPC] if conditions in that country do not improve.” S.J. Res. 3 also expresses 

the sense of Congress that Uzbekistan should accelerate reforms to fulfill its human rights 

obligations, including religious persecution. 

65
With regard to Uzbekistan, the Commission has recommended that the U.S. government 

should: 

• continue to press forcefully its concern about religious freedom violations in Uzbekistan, 

consistent with the Uzbek government’s obligations to promote respect for and observance of 

human rights. The U.S. government should also encourage scrutiny of these concerns in 

appropriate international fora such as the Organization on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe and other multilateral venues; 

• press the Uzbek government to cease its abuse of those articles in its criminal code, including 

Articles 159 and 216, that impinge on religious freedom; 

• strongly encourage the Uzbek government to establish a mechanism to review the cases of 

persons detained under suspicion of or charged with religious, political, or security offenses 

and to release those who have been imprisoned solely because of their religious beliefs, 

practices, or choice of religious association, as well as any others who have been unjustly 

detained or sentenced; 

• instruct the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent to continue to every extent possible its policy of 

carefully monitoring the status of individuals who are arrested for alleged religious, political, 

and security offenses; 

• press the government of Uzbekistan to discontinue its practice of excessively regulating the 

free practice of religion in Uzbekistan, including the oppressive regulation of the Islamic 

clergy and the use of registration requirements to prevent minority religious groups from

practicing their faith; 

• press the Uzbek government to adhere to its international commitments to abide fully by the 

rule of law and to protect human rights ensuring due process of law to all; 

• press the Uzbek government to ensure that every religious prisoner has access to his or her 

family, human rights monitors, adequate medical care, and a lawyer, as specified in 

international human rights instruments, including Article 14 of the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights, and press the Uzbek government to ensure that all prisoners are 

allowed to practice their religion while in detention, to the fullest extent compatible with the 

specific nature of their detention; 

• make contingent all U.S. assistance to the Uzbek government, with the exception of 

assistance to improve humanitarian conditions and advance human rights, on that 

government’s taking a number of concrete steps to improve conditions for religious freedom

for all individuals and religious groups in Uzbekistan, including: a) releasing persons 

imprisoned solely because of their religious beliefs, practices, or choice of religious 

association; b) ending torture; c) halting the arrest and detention of persons because of their 

religious beliefs, practices, or choice of religious association; and d) refraining from using 

registration requirements to prevent religious groups from practicing their faith; 

66
• continue to develop assistance programs for Uzbekistan designed to encourage the creation 

of institutions of civil society that protect human rights and promote religious freedom, 

including training in human rights, the rule of law, and crime investigation for police and 

other law enforcement officials, conditioned upon fulfillment of specific goals; and 

• retain the reinstated Uzbek language program at the Voice of America (VOA), use VOA and 

other appropriate avenues of public diplomacy to explain to the people of Uzbekistan why 

religious freedom is an important element of U.S. foreign policy, and continue its practice of 

encouraging exchanges between the people of Uzbekistan and the United States, paying 

attention to opportunities to include human rights advocates and religious figures in those 

programs. 

67
68
COUNTRY REPORTS: THE MIDDLE EAST

The Exportation of Religious Intolerance from Saudi Arabia 

After it became known that 15 of the 19 hijackers who perpetrated the attacks of 

September 11, 2001 were Saudi nationals, urgent questions emerged about whether intolerant 

and repressive policies within Saudi Arabia were promoting extremism, violence, or terrorism

abroad. There have been a growing number of reports that funding originating in Saudi Arabia 

has been used to finance religious schools and other activities that allegedly support religious 

intolerance, and, in some cases, violence, associated with certain Islamic militant and extremist 

organizations in several parts of the world. Other reports have identified members of extremist 

and militant groups that have been trained as clerics in Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have denied 

these allegations, and U.S. government leaders have praised the Saudi government for its 

cooperation in the war on terror. Yet, these reports raise troubling questions about the Saudi 

government’s role in propagating worldwide an ideology that is incompatible with both 

internationally recognized guarantees of the right to freedom to religion or belief as well as the 

war against terrorism. This, in turn, raises questions about U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia. 

The Saudis fund mosques, university chairs, Islamic study centers, and religious schools 

known as madrassas all over the world, from New York to Nigeria. During the Afghan war 

against the Soviets, madrassas were established in Pakistan that were concerned less with 

scholarship than implementing an extremist agenda. These madrassas provided ideological 

training for some of those who went to fight in Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan—and many 

of these schools still do. The peaceful propagation of religious beliefs, including Islam, is a 

human right. However, there is concern that the Saudi government may be propagating an 

ideology that promotes violence against non-Muslims and disfavored Muslims. The line 

separating the form of Islam allegedly preached by Saudi clerics from the violence incited and 

perpetrated by radicals is a thin one, and it warrants investigation. 

After the events of September 11, 2001, Saudi leaders acknowledged that up to 10 

percent of their curriculum contained objectionable material, including language preaching 

hatred of other religious groups, and vowed to address the issue. Others allege the problem is far 

more extensive. Anti-Semitic, anti-Christian, and anti-Western sentiment is prevalent in the 

government-controlled media and in sermons delivered by clerics, who are under the authority of 

the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. Yet, little attention has been given to the extent to which these 

materials and practices are found in Saudi-funded religious schools and mosques outside the 

Kingdom—including in Islamic religious literature available in U.S. prisons and to the U.S. 

armed forces. 

In order to explore further Saudi Arabia’s reported export of religious intolerance and the 

implications for U.S. policy, the Commission held a public hearing on the matter in November 

2003. At the hearing, the Commission heard from four panelists: Dr. Mai Yamani, Research 

Fellow, Middle East Program, Royal Institute for International Affairs; Ambassador Martin 

Indyk, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution; Mr. Robert Baer, 

former CIA operative and author of Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold our Soul for 

Saudi Crude; and Mr. David Aufhauser, former General Counsel, Treasury Department and 

former Chair, National Security Council Policy Coordinating Committee on Terrorist Financing. 

69
The panelists agreed that several critical issues warranted greater attention by the Saudi 

government and as a matter of U.S. policy: Saudi exportation of religious intolerance; the need 

for reform in the Saudi education system; and the virulently inflammatory governmentcontrolled media in Saudi Arabia. 

Since September 11, 2001, and in particular since the May 2003 terrorist bombing in 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Saudi government officials, including Crown Prince Abdullah, have made 

an increasing number of statements regarding internal reform efforts. At the Commission’s 

November hearing, Aufhauser highlighted some of the Saudi government’s efforts thus far, but 

noted that if these kinds of reforms are indeed genuine, the Saudi government should expand its 

domestic efforts to regulate funding activities outside the Kingdom and address the propagation 

of intolerance by Saudi-trained clerics in various countries throughout the world. 

The Commission has noted discrepancies among Saudi official statements about reform 

initiatives and exportation. A recent example is the reported decision of the Saudi government to 

shut down the Islamic affairs departments in many of its embassies.1

 Several days after the 

initial press report quoted an unnamed Saudi official confirming the intended closings, the 

Minister of Islamic Affairs publicly said that an article in the Washington Post was incorrect and 

that “the [Islamic affairs] centers are working and they are part of the Kingdom’s message.”2

 It 

has been widely reported that Islamic affairs sections in Saudi embassies globally have 

distributed religious materials with inflammatory and hate-filled language toward non-Wahhabi 

religious groups. Saudi embassies have also provided diplomatic status to Muslim clerics, 

including non-Saudi clerics, some of whom have been known to preach hate and intolerance of 

other religious communities. 

Conditions inside Saudi Arabia, as well as the possibility that the Saudi government has 

played a role in spreading hatred, intolerance, and even violence against both Muslims and nonMuslims, have very significant implications for U.S. foreign policy. Human rights concerns, 

including religious freedom, have not heretofore been a public feature of the U.S.-Saudi 

relationship. The Commission has recommended strengthening and making public U.S. efforts 

to encourage the government of Saudi Arabia to comply with its international commitments to 

protect religious freedom. As with other countries where serious human rights violations exist, 

the U.S. government should identify these problems and publicly acknowledge that they are 

significant issues in the bilateral relationship. 

Witnesses at the November hearing endorsed the Commission’s 2003 recommendation 

that Congress should authorize a study to determine whether, how, and the extent to which the 

Saudi government, members of the royal family, or Saudi-funded individuals or institutions are 

propagating in many parts of the world a religious ideology that explicitly promotes hate and 

violence toward members of other religious groups, including disfavored Muslims. Ambassador 

Indyk testified that “Shining the light on Saudi practices is very important... I would only urge 

you to go beyond it, to shine the light not just on Saudi practices when it comes to exporting 

intolerance, but also on the Saudi education curriculum and the Saudi media, which continues to 

this day to trot out the most intolerant, racist, and anti-Semitic diatribes.”3

 

Aufhauser argued that the Saudis should not fund any religious activities abroad unless 

they are convinced that these teachings are not intolerant. He noted that while serving in the 

70
U.S. government, “more than one minister – prime minister – told me that they will not even let 

a Saudi cleric into their land anymore for fear that the preaching would be preaching of hate and 

revolt and violence rather than religion.”4 He added that “when you mix that [financing] with 

religious teachings and the thousands of madrassas that condemn pluralism and mark nonbelievers as enemies, you have a combustible compound that really needs to be addressed.”5

In a September 2003 press report, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud acknowledged that 

it is possible that individual Saudis have funded religious schools abroad that preach 

intolerance.6

 He has stated publicly that the Saudi government would welcome information 

about this funding, which he characterized as a crime in Saudi Arabia. However, Prince Saud 

has not addressed the possibility that members of the royal family or Saudi government also may 

have contributed funds to support these types of activities. 

Over the past year, the Commission continued to be attentive to developments in Saudi 

Arabia. In May 2003, it issued a report on Saudi Arabia with policy recommendations. On 

November 10, 2003, Commissioner Khaled Abou El Fadl published an opinion-editorial in The

Wall Street Journal addressing the urgent need for Congress to initiate and make public a study 

on Saudi exportation of intolerance. The Commission’s November hearing on Capitol Hill 

entitled, “Is Saudi Arabia a Strategic Threat?: the Global Propagation of Intolerance” was 

mentioned above. In April 2004, the Commission issued a country brief on Saudi Arabia with 

new and updated policy recommendations based on its November hearing. 

In its May 2003 report on Saudi Arabia, the Commission recommended that Congress 

authorize a study to determine whether, how, and the extent to which the Saudi government, 

members of the royal family, or Saudi-funded individuals or institutions are propagating globally 

a religious ideology that explicitly promotes hate and violence toward members of other 

religious groups, including disfavored Muslims. In April 2004, the Commission’s 

recommendation was advanced when several Members of Congress wrote to the Comptroller of 

the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) requesting that the agency undertake a study to 

determine what the U.S. government is doing to identify and monitor sources of Saudi funding 

for institutions that advocate violence and intolerance, and what the U.S. government is doing to 

counter that influence. In pursuing this study, GAO was asked to seek information from relevant 

U.S. government agencies, including this Commission, as well as outside experts. 

With regard to the exportation of religious intolerance from Saudi Arabia, the 

Commission has recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• continue efforts, along with those of the Congress, to determine whether and how—and the 

extent to which—the Saudi government, individual members of the royal family, or Saudifunded individuals or institutions are directly or indirectly propagating globally, including in 

the United States, a religious ideology that explicitly promotes hate, intolerance, and human 

rights violations, in some cases violence, toward members of other religious groups, both 

Muslim and non-Muslim; 

• request the Saudi government to provide an accounting of what kinds of Saudi support go to 

which religious schools, mosques, centers of learning, and other religious organizations 

globally, including in the United States; 

71
• urge the Saudi government to stop funding religious activities abroad until the Saudis know 

the content of the teachings and are satisfied that they do not promote hatred, intolerance, and 

other human rights violations;

• urge the Saudi government to monitor, regulate, and report publicly about the activities of 

Saudi charitable organizations based outside the Kingdom in countries throughout the world; 

and 

• urge the Saudi government to: a) stop providing diplomatic status to Islamic clerics and 

educators teaching outside the Kingdom; and b) close down any Islamic affairs sections in 

Saudi embassies throughout the world that have been responsible for propagating intolerance.

 

1

 Susan Schmidt and Caryle Murphy, The Washington Post, “U.S. Revokes Visa of Cleric at 

Saudi Embassy,” December 7, 2003, A1. For further developments on this issue, see Caryle 

Murphy and Susan Schmidt, The Washington Post, “U.S. Revokes Visas of 16 at Islamic 

Institute,” January 29, 2004, A10. 

2 Saudi Press Agency, “Saudis Deny Closing Religious Centers,” December 9, 2003. 

3

 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Hearing on Is Saudi Arabia a Strategic 

Threat? (Indyk testimony). 

4

 Ibid. 

5

 Ibid. 

6

 Lisa Beyer, “Inside the Kingdom,” Time, 51, September 15, 2003. 

Egypt 

Serious problems of discrimination and other human rights violations against members of 

religious minorities remain widespread in Egypt. The Egyptian government has failed to take 

effective steps to halt repression of and violence against religious believers, or, in many cases, to 

punish those responsible for severe violations of religious freedom. Egypt remains on the 

Commission’s Watch List and the Commission continues to monitor the actions of the 

government of Egypt to see if the situation rises to a level that warrants designation as a “country 

of particular concern,” or CPC. 

Egypt has a poor overall human rights record that includes repressive practices that 

seriously violate freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. The government maintains tight 

control over all Muslim religious institutions, including mosques and religious endowments, 

which are encouraged to promote an officially acceptable interpretation of Islam. Islamists, 

including groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who believe in or seek to establish an Islamic 

state in Egypt based on their political interpretation of Islamic law, may be subjected to 

harassment, arrest, systematic torture and/or prolonged detention. Although some of these 

72
groups advocate and have used violence to achieve their aims, including the assassination of 

President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 and the murder of foreign tourists, the government’s campaign 

against Islamists has sometimes resulted in the arrest, detention, and ill-treatment of persons not 

affiliated with any group and not accused of perpetrating violence. 

Coptic Christians face ongoing violence from vigilante Muslim extremists, including 

members of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of whom act with impunity. Egyptian authorities 

have been accused of being lax in protecting the lives and property of Christians. Christians are 

rarely promoted to high levels in the government or military and are frequently discriminated 

against by private employers in hiring and promotion. For all Christian groups, government 

permission must still be sought to build or repair a church, and the approval process for church 

construction is time consuming and inflexible. In January 2004, four Coptic Christian youths 

were arrested, reportedly for possessing religious material and literature. They were released in 

early April and all charges were dropped. 

At the end of December 1999, communal violence in the village of al-Kosheh resulted in 

the deaths of 20 Coptic Christians and one Muslim. In February 2001, a criminal court acquitted 

92 of 96 defendants, Muslims and Christians, suspected of crimes committed while participating 

in that violence. None of the four convicted, all Muslim, was convicted of murder. Coptic 

religious leaders and families of the victims criticized the verdict and the General Prosecution 

quickly lodged an appeal. In July 2001, the Court of Cassation ordered a retrial of all the 

defendants, which opened in November 2001. In February 2003, the Sohag Court again 

acquitted 92 of the 96 defendants arrested in connection with the Al-Kosheh killings. Of the 

other four who were convicted, one was sentenced to 15 years for the killing of the sole Muslim

victim, while the other three men, all Muslims, received either one or two year sentences. 

According to the State Department, in March 2003 the public prosecutor appealed the verdict, 

citing “misapplication of the law and inadequate justification of the verdict.” The case is 

ongoing. 

During the past two decades, including incidents as recently as late in 2003, several 

dozen Christians who have been accused of proselytizing or had converted from Islam have been 

harassed by police or arrested for violating Article 98(F) of the Penal Code, which prohibits 

citizens from ridiculing or “insulting heavenly religions” or inciting sectarian strife. Neither the 

Constitution nor the Civil and Penal Codes prohibit proselytizing or conversion. Nevertheless, at 

least two couples who had converted to Christianity were charged and imprisoned in 2003. 

According to Amnesty International, several Egyptians who converted to Christianity over the 

past year reported arbitrary detention and torture or ill treatment. Particular problems often arise 

in the case of Christian women or girls who convert to Islam. 

Also in 2003, authorities charged several converts from Islam to Christianity with 

violating laws prohibiting the falsification of documents. In such instances, converts, who fear 

government harassment if they officially register the change from Islam to Christianity, have 

reportedly altered their own identification cards and other official documents to reflect their new 

religious affiliation. In October 2003, 20 Egyptians were arrested for allegedly bribing local 

government authorities to alter their civil records to identify them as Christians. Several of those 

arrested were converts from Islam to Christianity. As of this writing, two remain in detention. 

73
Members of other religious minorities, including Jews and Baha’is, face discrimination 

and even violence. All Baha’i institutions and community activities continue to be banned by the 

government. Over the years, Baha’is have been arrested and imprisoned because of their 

religious beliefs, often charged with insulting Islam. 

Material vilifying Jews and Baha’is appears frequently in the state-controlled and semiofficial media. In November and December 2002, Egypt aired on state television a series based 

on the forged and notorious anti-Semitic tract, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Clerics in 

state-run mosques continue to spread virulently anti-Semitic views. In December 2003, a senior 

UNESCO official publicly denounced the display of the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” at the 

Egyptian Alexandria Library as being anti-Semitic. The display was subsequently removed. 

In recent years, there have been an increased number of arrests of members of small 

Muslim groups accused of defaming Islam. In March 2002, a State Security Emergency Court 

convicted eight Muslims from the city of Mataria near Cairo of holding “unorthodox Islamic 

beliefs and practices.” Sentences ranged from three years in prison to a one year suspended 

sentence. In September 2002, a State Security Emergency Court in Nasr City in greater Cairo 

convicted another 21 persons of “insulting religion due to unorthodox Islamic beliefs and 

practices.” One person was sentenced to three years in prison, another to one year, and the rest 

to one year suspended sentences. In December 2003, state security forces arrested and detained 

eight Shi’a Muslims without charge. They were reportedly interrogated about their religious 

beliefs and physically abused. As of this writing, three remain in detention. 

All mosques must be licensed by the government, which seeks to control them in an 

official effort to combat extremism. The government appoints and pays the salaries of imams in 

mosques and also monitors their sermons. In June 2002, the Minister of Awqaf (Religious 

Endowments) announced that of the more than 80,000 mosques in Egypt, the government 

administratively controls 60,000 regular mosques and 15,000 mosques located in private 

buildings. The Minister said that the government hoped eventually to control and administer all 

mosques in the country. 

The Commission has urged the State Department to monitor closely religious freedom in 

Egypt and to respond vigorously to further violations. In January 2004, the House introduced the 

Egyptian Counterterrorism and Political Reform Act (H.R. 3725) which, among other things, 

highlights the victimization and discrimination by the Egyptian government of the Coptic 

Christian community in Egypt. Commissioner Khaled Abou El Fadl traveled to Egypt in 

October 2003 and held a series of meetings with U.S. Embassy officials and representatives of 

several Egyptian religious communities and non-governmental organizations on behalf of the 

Commission. In April 2004, the Commission wrote to President Bush urging him to raise with 

Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak at their April meeting that the Egyptian government should 

implement democratic and human rights reforms, including enhanced protections for the right to 

freedom of religion or belief and an end to messages of hatred, intolerance, or incitement to 

violence on the basis of religion in the educational system and government-controlled media. 

74
Iran 

The government of Iran engages in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of

religious freedom, including prolonged detention, torture, and executions based primarily or 

entirely upon the religion of the accused. Since 1999, the State Department has designated Iran 

as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. The Commission continues to recommend that 

Iran be designated a CPC. 

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran proclaims Islam, particularly the 

doctrine of the Twelver (Shi’a) Jaafari School, to be the official religion of the country. It 

stipulates that all laws and regulations, including the Constitution itself, be based on Islamic 

criteria. The Head of State, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic 

Revolution and has direct control over the armed forces, the internal security forces, and the 

judiciary. The Council of Guardians, half of whose members are appointed by the Supreme 

Leader, reviews all legislation passed by the Majles (parliament) for adherence to Islamic and 

constitutional principles. The Constitution grants the Council of Guardians the power to screen 

and disqualify candidates for elective offices based on an ill-defined set of requirements, 

including candidates’ ideological and religious beliefs. In recent years, dozens of prominent 

Muslim activists and dissidents advocating political reform have been sentenced by the 

Revolutionary Court to up to 10 years in prison, ostensibly on charges of seeking to overthrow 

the Islamic system in Iran; others have been arrested and detained for blasphemy and criticizing 

the nature of the Islamic regime. 

Iranian Sunni leaders have reported widespread abuses and restrictions on their religious 

practice, including detentions and torture of Sunni clerics and bans on Sunni teachings in public 

schools and Sunni religious literature, even in predominantly Sunni areas. Sunni and Sufi 

Muslims also report widespread official discrimination. Even Shi’a clerics are affected. A 

number of senior Shi’a religious leaders who have opposed various religious and/or political 

tenets and practices of the Iranian government have also reportedly been targets of state 

repression, including house arrest, detention without charge, unfair trials, torture, and other 

forms of ill treatment. 

The primacy of Islam and Islamic laws and institutions also adversely affects the rights 

and status of non-Muslims. While all religious minorities reportedly suffer, severe violations are

principally directed towards the 300,000 to 350,000 followers of the Baha’i faith in Iran. Baha’is 

are often viewed as “heretics,” and may face repression on the grounds of apostasy. Since 1979,

Iranian government authorities have killed more than 200 Baha’i leaders in Iran, and more than 

10,000 have been dismissed from government and university jobs. Baha’is may not establish 

houses of worship, schools, or any independent religious associations. In addition, Baha’is are 

denied government jobs and pensions as well as the right to inherit property, and their marriages 

and divorces are not recognized. Their cemeteries, holy places, and community properties are 

often seized and some have been destroyed. Members of the Baha’i faith are not allowed to 

attend university. Despite some reported improvements in 2000 and 2001, according to the State 

Department, restrictions on the Baha’i community intensified after the UN Commission on 

Human Rights ended formal monitoring of the human rights situation in the country in the spring 

of 2002. Though several Baha’i prisoners have recently been released, Baha’is in Iran continue 

to face harsh treatment.

75
The Constitution of Iran formally recognizes Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians as 

protected religious minorities who may worship freely and have autonomy over their own 

matters of personal status (e.g. marriage, divorce, and inheritance). However, members of these 

groups are subject to legal and other forms of discrimination, particularly in education, 

government, and the armed services. Over the past 15 years, at least eight evangelical Christians 

have reportedly been killed at the hands of government authorities and between 15 and 23 are 

reported missing or “disappeared.” According to the 2001 report of the UN Special 

Representative on Iran, some are said to have been convicted of apostasy. In addition, 

evangelical Christians in Iran continue to be subject to harassment and close surveillance; many 

are reported to have fled the country. Jews have reportedly been singled out on the basis of their 

“ties to Israel,” whether real or perceived. The July 2000 conviction of 10 Jews on widely 

disputed charges of espionage in secret revolutionary (closed) courts that did not afford minimal 

due process guarantees raised concerns in the international community about the future of the 

Iranian Jewish community. By February 2003, all had been released after having served reduced 

sentences or being pardoned, although in some cases the releases may have been conditional. 

Non-Muslims may not engage in public religious expression and persuasion among Muslims; 

some also face restrictions on publishing religious material in Persian. 

The government’s monopoly on and enforcement of the official interpretation of Islam, 

as well as other abuses of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief, 

negatively affect the fundamental rights of women in Iran, including their right to freedom of 

movement, association, religion, and freedom from coercion. 

In 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security began to deny increasing numbers of 

Iranian Christians and Jews refugee status, arguing that their treatment in Iran did not rise to the 

level of persecution. Concerned by its growing population of Iranian religious minorities denied 

refugee status by the United States, the Austrian government stopped issuing visas to Iranian 

Christians. Senator Arlen Specter proposed legislative language that would assist such 

applicants by extending the “Lautenberg Amendment” to cover their cases. The Lautenberg 

Amendment has eased the burden of proof for Jewish and Christian refugee applicants from the 

former Soviet Union since 1989. In September 2003, when the Specter language was in danger 

of being withdrawn due to State Department objections, the Commission recommended passage 

of the language proposed by Specter and made its decision known to the White House and the 

State Department. The State Department withdrew its opposition and the language passed the 

Senate and became law in January 2004 (P.L. 108-199, Division E, Title II, Sec. 213).

In October 2003, both the Senate and the House introduced resolutions (S.Con.Res. 78 

and H.Con.Res. 319, respectively) expressing concern regarding the continued repression of the 

Baha’i community in Iran by the Iranian government. 

In January 2004, the Commission held a meeting with members of the Iranian American 

community in Los Angeles to discuss religious freedom and human rights conditions in Iran and 

implications for U.S. policy. 

76
Saudi Arabia 

The government of Saudi Arabia engages in systematic, ongoing and egregious violations 

of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief. The Commission continues to 

recommend that Saudi Arabia be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. While 

the State Department’s 2003 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom again notes that 

freedom of religion “does not exist” in Saudi Arabia, the country still has not been designated a 

CPC. 

The Saudi government has engaged in an array of severe violations of human rights as 

part of its official repression of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief. These 

violations include: torture and cruel and degrading treatment or punishment imposed by judicial 

and administrative authorities; prolonged detention without charges and often incommunicado; 

and blatant denials of the right to liberty and security of the person, including coercive measures 

aimed at women and the broad jurisdiction of the religious police (mutawaa), whose powers are 

vaguely defined and exercised in ways that violate the religious freedom of others. 

The government of Saudi Arabia continues vigorously to enforce its ban on all forms of 

public religious expression other than the government’s interpretation and presentation of the 

Hanbali school of Sunni Islam. This policy violates the rights of the large communities of nonMuslims and Muslims from a variety of doctrinal schools of Islam who reside in Saudi Arabia, 

including Shi’as, who make up 8-10 percent of the population. The government tightly controls 

even the restricted religious activity it permits—through controls on the building of mosques, the 

appointment of imams, the regulation of sermons and public celebrations, and the content of 

religious education in public schools—and suppresses the religious views of Saudi and nonSaudi Muslims that do not conform to official positions. Prominent Shi’a clerics and religious 

scholars continue to be arrested and detained without charge for their religious views; several 

remain in prison and reportedly have been beaten or otherwise ill-treated. Several imams, both 

Sunni and Shi’a, who have spoken in opposition to government policies or against the official 

interpretation of Islam, have been harassed, arrested, and detained. In the past and reportedly 

until now, spurious charges of “sorcery” and “witchcraft” have been used by the Saudi 

authorities against non-Wahhabi Muslims. Saudi authorities occasionally have arrested and 

detained Ismaili clerics for allegedly practicing sorcery. 

Restrictions on public religious practice, for both Saudis and non-Saudis, are enforced in 

large part by the mutawaa, public enforcers of religious behavior. The mutawaa conduct raids 

on worship services, including in private homes. They have also harassed, detained, whipped 

and beaten, and meted out extrajudicial punishments to individuals deemed to stray from

“appropriate” dress and/or behavior, including any outward displays of religiosity, such as 

wearing non-Wahhabi Muslim religious symbols. 

Although the government has publicly taken the position that it permits non-Muslims to 

worship in private, the guidelines as to what constitutes “private” worship are vague. Many 

persons worshipping privately continue to be harassed, arrested, imprisoned, tortured, often 

deported, and generally forced to go to great lengths to conceal private religious activity from the 

authorities. Even diplomatic personnel from Western countries report difficulties in their 

religious practice. Foreign contract workers without diplomatic standing and little or no access 

77
to private religious services conducted at diplomatic facilities face even greater difficulties. 

Moreover, the Saudi government does not allow clergy to enter the country in order to perform

private religious services for foreigners legally residing in Saudi Arabia. 

A series of arrests of Christian foreign contract workers in Jeddah in 2001 and 2002 cast 

doubt on Saudi policy regarding private worship rights. Between June and September 2001, 14 

Christians were arrested for worshipping privately, and all were deported by the end of March 

2002. In April and May 2002, more than 30 Christian foreign workers were detained in raids on 

religious worship services, and by September, most had been deported. 

In April 2003, two Christian foreign workers, Eritrean and Ethiopian expatriates, were 

arrested for worshipping privately. In June 2003, the Ethiopian was deported, followed by the 

Eritrean in July. In September 2003, the mutawaa arrested 16 foreign workers for practicing 

Sufism; their status is unknown. In October 2003, two Egyptian Christians were arrested and 

jailed on religious grounds and released three weeks later. Also in October, several Protestant 

foreign workers were arrested by the civil police and released the same day without charge. In 

December 2003, a foreign worker was arrested and charged with apostasy; in early March 2004, 

a press report indicated that the charge had been reduced to blasphemy and that he had been 

sentenced to two years in jail and 600 lashes. In March 2004, an Indian Christian foreign worker 

was reportedly arrested and tortured for “preaching Christianity,” among other charges. As of 

this writing, he remains in prison. 

The government’s monopoly on the interpretation of Islam and other violations of 

freedom of religion adversely affect the fundamental rights of women in Saudi Arabia, including 

freedom of speech, movement, association, and religion, freedom from coercion, access to 

education, and full equality before the law. For example, women must adhere to a strict dress 

code when appearing in public and can only be admitted to a hospital for medical treatment with 

the consent of a male relative. Women need to receive written permission from a male relative 

to travel inside or outside the country and are not permitted to drive motor vehicles. Religiouslybased directives limit women’s right to choose employment by prohibiting them from studying 

for certain professions such as engineering, journalism, and architecture. In addition, the Saudi 

justice system does not grant women the same legal status as men.

The Commission issued a report on Saudi Arabia with recommendations in May 2003. A 

number of Commission recommendations have been included in legislation in the 108th 

Congress. H.Con.Res. 244 urges that Saudi Arabia be named a CPC and calls for human rights, 

including religious freedom, to be raised during bilateral meetings with the government of Saudi 

Arabia. H.Con.Res. 242 calls for reform of educational curriculum that promotes and 

encourages extremism, including anti-American, anti-Semitic, and anti-Western views. The 

Saudi Arabia Accountability Act, S. 1888 and H.R. 3643, calls upon Saudi Arabia to cooperate 

with the United States and to permanently close all charities, schools, and other institutions 

which fund, train, and incite terrorism. In October 2003, in line with the Commission 

recommendation, more than 30 Members of Congress called for CPC designation for Saudi 

Arabia in a letter circulated by Representatives Christopher Smith and Ben Cardin and sent to 

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. 

78
In November 2003, The Wall Street Journal published an opinion-editorial by 

Commissioner Khaled Abou El Fadl entitled, “Al Qaeda and Saudi Arabia.” Eight days later, the 

Commission held a public hearing entitled, “Is Saudi Arabia a Strategic Threat?: the Global 

Propagation of Intolerance” to explore Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the global spread of 

religious extremism. In April 2004, the Commission issued a country brief on Saudi Arabia with 

new and updated policy recommendations based on its November hearing. The Commission’s 

findings and recommendations regarding the alleged Saudi support for the spread of religious 

extremism are included in a separate section of this report. 

In addition to naming Saudi Arabia a CPC, the Commission has recommended that the 

U.S. government should: 

• press for immediate improvements in respect for religious freedom, including: (1) 

establishing genuine safeguards for the freedom to worship privately, (2) entrusting law 

enforcement to professionals in law enforcement agencies subject to judicial review and 

dissolving the mutawaa, (3) permitting non-Wahhabi places of worship in certain areas and 

letting clergy enter the country, (4) reviewing cases and releasing those who have been 

detained or imprisoned on account of their religious belief or practices, (5) permitting 

independent non-governmental organizations to advance human rights, (6) ending state 

prosecution of apostasy, blasphemy, criticizing the government, and sorcery, (7) ceasing 

messages of hatred, intolerance, or incitement to violence against non-Wahhabi Muslims and 

members of non-Muslim religious groups in the educational curricula and textbooks, as well 

as in government-controlled mosques and media, and (8) ratifying international human rights 

instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 

cooperating with UN human rights mechanisms; and 

• use its leverage to encourage implementation of numerous Saudi government statements to 

carry out political, educational, and judicial reforms in the Kingdom by: (1) raising concerns 

about human rights, including religious freedom, both publicly and privately in its antiterrorism dialogue with the Saudi government, (2) institutionalizing a high-level ongoing 

dialogue on the Saudi reform agenda, (3) expanding human rights assistance, public 

diplomacy and other programs and initiatives, such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative, 

to include components specifically for Saudi Arabia, and (4) taking steps to overcome 

obstacles to broadcasting Radio Sawa. 

The U.S. Congress should hold biannual hearings at which the State Department reports 

on what issues have been raised with the Saudi government regarding that government’s 

violations of religious freedom and what actions have been taken in light of the Saudi 

government’s response. 

79
80
COUNTRY REPORTS: SOUTH ASIA 

India 

In India, the government’s response to violence against religious minorities in Gujarat 

and elsewhere continues to be inadequate. In addition, several government leaders have publicly 

allied themselves with extremist Hindu organizations that have been implicated in that violence. 

In 2003, the Commission again recommended that India be designated a “country of particular 

concern,” or CPC.∗

 To date, the State Department has not named India a CPC. 

Unlike other countries recommended for CPC designation, India has a democratically 

elected government, is governed essentially by the rule of law, and has a tradition of secular 

governance that dates back to the country’s independence. Despite these democratic traditions, 

religious minorities in India continue to be subject to violent attacks, including killings, in what 

is called “communal violence.” Those responsible for the violence are rarely held responsible 

for their actions. This violence against religious minorities has coincided with the rise in 

political influence of groups associated with the Sangh Parivar, a collection of Hindu extremist 

nationalist organizations that view non-Hindus as foreign to India and aggressively press for 

national governmental policies to promote the "Hinduization" of culture. The ascent to power 

in 1998 of the Sangh Parivar’s political wing, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the current ruling 

party in the national government coalition, has helped to foster a climate in which extremists 

believe that violence against religious minorities will not be systematically punished. 

At the end of February 2002, in the town of Godhra, a mob of Muslims set fire to a train 

resulting in the death of 58 Hindus. Within days, hundreds of Muslims were killed across 

Gujarat by Hindu mobs. In addition, hundreds of mosques and Muslim-owned businesses and 

other kinds of infrastructure were looted or destroyed. More than 100,000 fled their homes and, 

in the end, as many as 2,000 were killed. Many Muslims were burned to death; others were 

stabbed or shot. India’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), an official body, found 

evidence of premeditation in the killings by members of Hindu extremist groups; complicity by 

Gujarat state government officials; and police inaction in the midst of attacks on Muslims. The 

NHRC also noted “widespread reports and allegations of well-organized persons, armed with 

mobile telephones and addresses, singling out certain homes and properties for death and 

destruction in certain districts—sometimes within view of police stations and personnel,” 

suggesting the attacks may have been planned in advance. Christians were also victims in 

Gujarat, and many churches were destroyed. There have been cases of retaliatory violence 

against Hindus, including in September 2002, when Muslim gunmen opened fire at a Hindu 

temple in the town of Gandhinagar, killing 32 people. Unlike in Godhra, however, after this 

incident the Indian government called on citizens to refrain from taking the law into their own 

hands and further violence was averted. In August 2003, bombings in Bombay killed over 50 

 

∗

 Commissioners Bansal, Gaer, and Young dissented from the Commission’s recommendation 

that India be designated a country of particular concern (CPC). Their views with respect to India 

are reflected in a separate opinion, which immediately follows this report. Commissioner 

Chaput also joins this separate opinion, and would place India on the Watch List rather than 

recommend that it be designated a CPC. 

81
people; those arrested in connection with the bombings claimed that they carried out their actions

“in revenge for the state-assisted killings of Muslims in Gujarat.” 

The BJP-led state government in Gujarat led by Minister Narendra Modi has been widely 

accused of being reluctant to bring the perpetrators of the killings of Muslims to justice. After 

more than two years, few persons have been arrested and held to account for the deaths; most of 

those initially arrested were released without charge. What is more, state officials have been 

accused of failing to protect witnesses in cases against Hindu extremists believed to have taken 

part in the attacks. In one instance, 21 Hindu defendants accused of killing 14 men, women, and 

children in a bakery store were acquitted in June 2003, after the main prosecution witness 

changed her evidence after receiving several death threats. In spite of the alleged failures of the 

Gujarat government, the Gujarat High Court later upheld the acquittals. In October, India’s 

Supreme Court, after declaring that it had “no faith left” in the state’s handling of the 

investigations, instructed the Gujarat state government to appoint new prosecutors to examine 

the religious violence of the previous year. Finally, in April 2004, in what was described as an 

indictment of Modi’s Gujarat government, the Supreme Court overturned the acquittal of the 21 

accused in the bakery store case and ordered a new trial of those indicted. India’s highest court 

also ordered a transfer of that trial to neighboring Maharashtra state and directed both state 

governments to provide protection to witnesses and victims, appoint a new public prosecutor, 

and institute new police investigations into the case. 

In other developments, in October 2003, police in Gujarat registered a case against a state 

BJP legislator and four others for allegedly intimidating witnesses in the incident. In November, 

a court in Gujarat convicted 15 Hindus of the murder of 14 Muslims during the anti-Muslim

rioting. 

Since 1998, there have been hundreds of attacks on Christian leaders, worshippers, and 

churches throughout India. These attacks have included killings, torture, rape and harassment of 

church staff, destruction of church property, and disruption of church events. In January 2003, 

armed members of a Hindu extremist group attacked an American missionary and seven others 

with swords; two activists from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a part of the Sangh 

Parivar, were later arrested in the state where the attack took place. In a noted development, in 

September 2003—after years of reported stalling by the prosecutors involved—Dara Singh was 

found guilty, along with 12 others, of the 1999 murder by an extremist mob of Graham Staines, a 

Christian burned to death in his car along with his children. 

Though there have been some convictions of a few perpetrators of the Gujarat violence 

and attacks on Christians, and though the BJP-led central government may not be directly 

responsible for instigating the violence against religious minorities, it is clear that the 

government does not do all in its power to pursue the perpetrators of the attacks and to 

counteract the prevailing climate of hostility against these minority groups. India’s two most 

senior leaders, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna 

Advani, are both members of the RSS and have never renounced its militant Hindu ideology. 

The severe violence in Gujarat provided the national government with adequate grounds—under 

the Constitution and existing laws to counteract communal violence—to invoke central rule in 

the state, yet the BJP government did not do so, despite many requests and the fact that the 

killing of Muslims continued on a lesser scale for many weeks. Prime Minister Vajpayee did not 

82
condemn the massacre of Muslims unequivocally until more than one year after the violence 

occurred. Quicker action to forestall Hindu-Muslim violence was taken by the Vajpayee 

government in October 2003, when police arrested 1,500 members of a militant Hindu group 

rallying in the town of Ayodhya and demanding a temple on the site where a mosque once stood, 

until it was torn down by a Hindu mob in 1992. 

In March 2003, the Gujarat government passed a bill limiting certain religious 

conversions. The bill, which is modeled on similar laws in the states of Tamil Nadu and Orissa, 

requires government officials to assess the legality of conversions and provides for fines and 

imprisonment for anyone who uses force, fraud, or “inducement” to convert another. Though 

worded to prohibit only “forced” religious conversions, observers contend that the bill is targeted 

against conversions generally of Hindus to Christianity and Islam. To date, however, there are 

no reports of persons having been arrested under this law. Though Article 25 of India’s 

Constitution provides for “the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion,” in 1977, 

the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional right to propagate religion did not include 

a right to convert (or attempt to convert) another. 

Throughout the past year, Commission staff conducted personal interviews with members 

of non-governmental organizations representing various religious communities in India, as well 

as human rights organizations, academics, and other India experts. 

In addition to recommending that India be named a CPC, the Commission has 

recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• urge the BJP leadership to denounce RSS militancy that supports violence and discrimination; 

• make clear its concern to the BJP-led government that virulent nationalist rhetoric is fueling 

an atmosphere in which perpetrators believe they can attack religious minorities with 

impunity; 

• persistently press the Indian government to pursue perpetrators of violent acts that target 

members of minority religious groups; 

• urge the government of India to oppose any attempts to interfere with or prohibit ties between 

religious communities inside India and their co-religionists outside the country, and any 

government efforts to regulate religious choice or conversion; 

• urge India to allow official visits from foreign government agencies concerned with human 

rights, including religious freedom; and 

• take into account, in the course of working toward improvements in U.S.-Indian economic 

and trade relations, the efforts of the Indian government to protect religious freedom, prevent 

and punish violence against religious minorities, and promote the rule of law. 

83
Separate Opinion of Commissioners Bansal, Chaput, Gaer, and Young with Respect to 

India 

We remain deeply concerned over incidents of religiously-based violence in Gujarat and 

other parts of India that have resulted in loss of life, physical abuse, displacement, and other 

abuses. Moreover, we are very concerned that justice has not been done for the victims of the 

violence against Muslims that took place in Gujarat in early 2002, and that incidents of mob 

violence against Christians, Muslims, and other religious minorities have continued in parts of 

the country, but we respectfully dissent from the decision to recommend that India be named a 

CPC. 

As noted in the dissent last year, India, unlike the other countries on the Commission’s 

recommended CPC or Watch List, is a respected constitutional democracy with manifold 

religious traditions that coexist and flourish under extreme economic and other conditions; has a 

judiciary which is independent, albeit slow-moving and frequently unresponsive, that can work 

to hold the perpetrators responsible; contains a vibrant civil society with many vigorous, 

independent non-governmental human rights organizations that have investigated and published 

extensive reports about the Gujarat government's handling of the situation and the rise of 

religiously-motivated violence; and is home to a free press that has widely reported on and 

strongly criticized the situation on the ground in Gujarat and the growing threats to a religiously 

plural society within India. In fact, some of the most vociferous critics of the Gujarat 

government’s handling of the 2002 situation and the prosecutions thereafter have been Indian 

governmental bodies – including the National Human Rights Commission, the National 

Commission on Minorities, and the National Commission for Women, and much of the source 

material for critical analysis of the state of religious freedom in India derives from publications 

of the Indian media and of non-governmental and other civil society groups within India. 

Moreover, since last year, national governmental bodies have taken a number of 

significant steps to reign in excesses or to correct insufficient action at the state level. The Indian 

Supreme Court has forcefully denounced Gujarat state authorities’ handling of certain 

prosecutions, halted key trials, and paved the way for changes of venue to ensure justice. With 

such visible and proactive intervention, the Supreme Court has made clear that it will take action 

to ensure justice. In addition, initial convictions and life sentences for a dozen perpetrators of the 

Gujarat violence have been handed down recently. Justice has been done this year in the state of

Orissa in the widely reported case involving the 1999 murder of an Australian missionary and his 

sons, with a death sentence having been rendered against the main perpetrator of that violence. 

Perhaps most notably, a series of actions by Indian officials during the past year have 

prevented similar outbreaks of large-scale religiously motivated violence in several volatile 

locales. In August 2003, twin deadly bombings in Mumbai by groups seeking to avenge the 

previous year’s violence in Gujarat were followed by official statements seeking to defuse 

potential violence, and silent, rather than violent, marches in response. Most recently, arrests 

and diversion of thousands of demonstrators and deployment of troops in Ayodhya in October 

2003 prevented a widely-expected potentially violence-inciting rally by religious nationalists. 

We remain very concerned about growing threats to the religiously plural foundations of 

Indian society. The pace of prosecutions against individual perpetrators of the Gujarat and other 

84
religious violence is slow. This is a moment when Indian government officials need to act in 

defense of religious freedom by forcefully denouncing and taking concrete steps to redress 

religious-based violence in order to preserve their own legitimacy with respect to human rights. 

Nonetheless, despite our concerns, we feel that adding India to the CPC list of nations is 

inappropriate at this time. India has the legal and democratic traditions to deal with religious 

intolerance and should be strongly encouraged to do so. 

Pakistan 

The response of the government of Pakistan to persistent sectarian and religiously 

motivated violence in Pakistan continues to be inadequate. In addition, official government 

policies, such as the anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy laws, frequently result in imprisonment and 

other violations of freedom of religion or belief. The Commission continues to recommend that 

Pakistan be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. To date, the State Department 

has not designated Pakistan a CPC. 

Successive governments have severely violated religious freedom in Pakistan. 

Discriminatory legislation has fostered an atmosphere of religious intolerance and eroded the 

social and legal status of religious minorities. Government officials provide fewer protections 

from societal violence to non-Muslims than to members of the majority Sunni Muslim 

community. Perpetrators of attacks on minorities are seldom brought to justice. Belated efforts 

to curb extremism through reform of Pakistan’s thousands of Islamic religious schools appear to 

have had little effect thus far. Many of these schools continue to provide ideological training and 

motivation to those who take part in violence targeting religious minorities in Pakistan and 

abroad. 

Sectarian and religiously-motivated violence, much of it committed against Shi’a 

Muslims by Sunni militants, is chronic in Pakistan. Religious minorities such as Ahmadis and 

Christians have also been targeted by Sunni extremist groups. Attacks on Shi’a worship services 

in February and July 2003 produced multiple fatalities; the July attack alone resulted in over 50 

deaths. In October 2003, gunmen fired on a bus carrying Shi’a Muslims, killing at least five, and 

in March 2004, armed men opened fire on Shi’a worshippers during a religious procession 

commemorating Al-Shura in the town of Quetta, leaving 45 dead and 160 wounded. In the last 

two years, there has been an upsurge in anti-Christian violence, including fatal attacks on 

churches and other Christian institutions. In September 2002, armed men killed seven people on 

the premises of a Christian charitable organization; in December, three children were killed and 

14 injured in a grenade attack on a Christian church in Chianwala village in Sialkot; and in 

January 2004, a church compound that includes a Christian school for girls was bombed. Police 

protection appears ineffective, and no one has yet been successfully prosecuted for these crimes. 

Perpetrators of attacks on minorities are seldom brought to justice. The case of the brutal murder 

of American journalist Daniel Pearl in early 2002, whose Jewish background was highlighted in 

a video of his decapitation by his Islamic extremist killers, is not yet fully resolved. 

Ahmadis, who number 3-4 million in Pakistan, are prevented by law from engaging in the 

full practice of their faith. The Constitution of Pakistan declares members of the Ahmadi 

85
religious community to be “non-Muslims,” despite their insistence to the contrary. Barred by 

law from “posing” as Muslims, Ahmadis may not call their places of worship “mosques,” 

worship in non-Ahmadi mosques or public prayer rooms (otherwise open to all Muslims), 

perform the Muslim call to prayer, use the traditional Islamic greeting in public, publicly quote 

from the Quran, or display the basic affirmation of the Muslim faith. These acts are punishable 

by imprisonment of up to three years. It is also illegal for Ahmadis to preach in public, to seek 

converts, or to produce, publish, and disseminate their religious materials. These acts are also 

punishable by imprisonment of up to three years. Ahmadis have been arrested and imprisoned 

for all of the above acts, and they are reportedly subject to ill treatment from prison authorities 

and fellow prisoners. Because they are required to register to vote as non-Muslims, a policy that 

was reaffirmed by Pakistani government officials in February 2004, Ahmadis who refuse to 

disavow their claim to being Muslims are effectively disenfranchised. There is no indication that 

the current government intends, or has even seriously considered, changes to the anti-Ahmadi 

laws. 

Prescribed penalties for blasphemy include death for whoever “defiles the sacred name of 

the Holy Prophet Muhammad” and life imprisonment for whoever “willfully defiles, damages, or 

desecrates a copy of the holy Quran.” Blasphemy allegations, which are often false, result in 

lengthy detention of and sometimes violence against Christians, Ahmadis, and members of other 

religious minorities, as well as Muslims on account of their religious beliefs. The negative 

impact of the blasphemy laws is further compounded by the lack of due process involved in these

proceedings. In addition, during blasphemy trials, Islamic militants often pack the courtroom

and make public threats about the consequences of an acquittal. Such threats have proven 

credible, as they have sometimes been followed by actual violence. Although no one has yet 

been executed by the state under the blasphemy laws, some persons have been sentenced to 

death. Several accused under the blasphemy laws have been attacked, even killed, by vigilantes, 

including while in police custody; those who escape official punishment or vigilante attack are 

sometimes forced to flee the country. Others have died in police custody under allegedly 

suspicious circumstances. Following an abortive attempt in 2000 at introducing procedural 

reforms, the government of President Pervaiz Musharraf has made no further effort to reform, 

much less repeal, the blasphemy laws. 

Pakistan’s Hudood Ordinances, Islamic decrees introduced in 1979 and enforced 

alongside the country's secular legal system, provide for harsh punishments such as amputation 

and death by stoning for violations of Islamic law. Although these extreme corporal 

punishments have not been carried out in practice due to high evidentiary standards, lesser 

punishments such as jail terms or fines have been imposed. Rape victims run a high risk of 

being charged with adultery, for which death by stoning remains a possible sentence. In October 

2003, the National Commission on the Status of Women in Pakistan issued a report on the 

Hudood Ordinances that stated that as many as 88 percent of women prisoners, many of them

rape victims, are serving time in prison for violating these decrees, which make extramarital sex 

a crime and adultery a state offense. The Hudood laws apply to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 

The work of the Commission has been instrumental in bringing about breakthroughs on 

several religious freedom issues in Pakistan. The Commission’s May 2001 report on Pakistan 

played a key role in highlighting to U.S. and Pakistan government officials the un-democratic 

nature of the Pakistani separate electorate system for religious minorities. In January 2002, the 

86
Pakistan government abolished the system of separate electorates. The requirement for voters to 

identify themselves as Muslims or non-Muslims, however, continues to disenfranchise many 

Ahmadis. The Commission also pushed for action against militant religious extremist groups 

and religious schools that promote violence in Pakistan. This issue came to the forefront of U.S. 

policy only after the events of September 11, 2001, and the United States responded by urging 

the Pakistani government to curtail the repressive activities of extremist groups and schools, and 

authorized funding for education reform in Pakistan. 

In an April 2003 letter to President Bush, the Commission outlined its concern that 

extremists could portray U.S. military action against Iraq as part of an alleged U.S. attack on 

Islam, and that retribution would be sought against Christians, Jews, and others in Pakistan and 

throughout the Islamic world, as well as in the West. In advance of a scheduled June 2003 

meeting with Pakistani President Musharraf, the Commission wrote to President Bush again to 

ask that he raise these concerns during his meeting. In May 2003, the Commission hosted a visit 

to the United States by Mr. Shahbaz Bhatti, President of the All-Pakistan Minorities Alliance and

an advocate for religious freedom in Pakistan. 

In addition to recommending that Pakistan be designated a CPC, the Commission has 

recommended that the U.S. government should: 

• take the position that the existence and enforcement of laws targeting Ahmadis that 

effectively criminalize the public practice of their faith violate the right to freedom of 

religion guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 

• urge the government of Pakistan to implement procedural changes to the blasphemy laws that 

will reduce and ultimately eliminate their abuse; 

• urge the government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent sectarian violence and 

punish its perpetrators, including disarming militant groups and any religious schools that 

provide weapons training; and 

• support, in conjunction with other donors: (a) improvements in the public education system; 

(b) judicial reform and law enforcement training; (c) legal advocacy to protect the right to 

freedom of religion; and (d) educational programs in religious tolerance. 

87
88
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

Cuba 

Religious belief and practice continue to be tightly controlled in Cuba. As a result of the 

recent government crackdown on democracy activists, religious freedom conditions may decline 

further as part of a generally deteriorating situation. In 2004, the Commission placed Cuba on its 

Watch List. The Commission will continue to monitor conditions of freedom of religion or 

belief in Cuba to determine if they rise to a level warranting designation as a “country of 

particular concern,” or CPC. 

Cuba remains a hard-line Communist state, with a poor record on human rights that 

deteriorated significantly in 2003. Since seizing power in 1959, President Fidel Castro has 

maintained strong, centralized control of all facets of life in Cuba. While parliamentary, judicial, 

and executive institutions exist in name, all are under his control, and there is no legal or political 

avenue of dissent. Individuals who engage in dissent are beaten, harassed, and jailed. In 

February 2003, the Cuban government initiated a massive crackdown on independent journalists, 

leaders of independent labor unions and opposition parties, and other democracy activists, 

including those supporting the Varela Project and the Christian Liberation Movement. One 

human rights activist called the recent crackdowns and executions “the most intense wave of 

repression in the history of Cuba.” 

Since Castro came to power, the government has sought to suppress religion as being 

“counterrevolutionary.” Though the Cuban government seeks to project an image to the outside 

world of religious freedom in that country, in fact, government authorities have long feared the 

influence of religion as a threat to the government’s pervasive ideology. In the early years of the 

Castro regime, government and Communist Party officials forced priests, pastors, and others into 

labor camps or exile and systematically discriminated against those who openly professed their 

faith by excluding them from certain jobs or educational opportunities. In the past decade, 

however, the state instituted a limited rapprochement with religious believers. For example, the 

government abandoned its official policy of atheism in the early 1990s, Castro welcomed a visit 

from Pope John Paul II in 1998, and after 2000, the Christmas holiday was reinstated. The 

Pope’s visit sparked great hopes inside the religious communities in Cuba, as well as among 

democratic activists who viewed these steps as a softening of past government policies. 

Despite optimism that religious freedom would improve, violations have continued, as 

has the government’s strong degree of control and generally hostile attitude toward religion. In 

early 2001, the Communist Party in Havana prepared a report that criticized inroads made by 

churches, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, into Cuban society, and asserted that the 

social work of the churches violated laws and regulations. Communist Party officials reportedly 

apologized to the Catholic Church hierarchy after the report was leaked. Nevertheless, Havana’s 

Catholic Cardinal gave an interview in 2003 in which he asserted that “restrictions on religious 

freedom are returning” in Cuba, representing a “return to the ideology” of repression. 

The government's main interaction with, and control of, religious denominations is 

through the Office of Religious Affairs of the Cuban Communist Party. The Cuban government 

also requires churches and other religious groups to register with the provincial Registry of 

89
Associations within the Ministry of Justice. Currently, there are approximately 50 staterecognized religions, primarily Christian denominations, half of which are members of the 

government-recognized Cuban Council of Churches. Reportedly, the government in recent years 

has not granted recognition to any new denominations, although it has tolerated the presence of 

various new faiths, such as the Baha’is. 

The government does not permit the construction of new churches. Thus, those churches 

that are not recognized or those without adequate space are forced to meet in private homes or 

other similar accommodations, commonly known as “house churches.” Permission for such 

meetings may be granted from the state if the church is from one of the recognized or official 

faiths, but permission is usually denied to those the government deems to be “an independent 

religious movement” (i.e. not recognized). Members of house churches outside the recognized 

religious faiths feel the brunt of this regulation; because they are not registered, their meetings 

are in violation of the law. If a complaint is made against a house church meeting, it can be 

broken up and the attendees imprisoned. 

In the past year, both registered and unregistered religious groups continued to 

experience varying degrees of official interference, harassment, and repression. There are 

reports that house church pastors are routinely questioned and detained for several days by police 

and security forces. The U.S. Department of State also reports that Cuban Interior Ministry 

officials engage in efforts to control and monitor the country's religious institutions, including 

through surveillance, infiltration, and harassment of religious professionals and laypersons. 

Other means by which the government restricts religion include: enforcement of a 

regulation that prevents any Cuban or joint enterprise (except those with specific authorization)

from selling computers, facsimile machines, photocopiers, or other equipment to any church 

other than at the official—i.e. exorbitant—retail prices; an almost total state monopoly on 

printing presses; a prohibition on private religious schools; and a requirement that religious 

groups receive permission from local Communist Party officials before being allowed to hold 

processions or events outside of religious buildings. Refusal of such permission is often based 

on the decision of individual government officials rather than the letter of the law.

In the past year, Commission staff has met with Cuban human rights activists, regional 

experts, and religious leaders. 

90
IRFA AND THE U.S. REFUGEE AND ASYLUM PROGRAMS 

The United States has a long tradition of welcoming those seeking religious freedom. The 

flow of refugees and religious persecution are inextricably linked, and this is acknowledged 

throughout Title VI of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). 

The Commission has called on the Administration to improve the institutional linkages 

between efforts to promote religious freedom and to provide access to the U.S. Refugee and 

Asylum Programs. Specifically, the Commission has recommended: (1) a systematic effort to 

improve access to resettlement for those who have fled “countries of particular concern,” or 

CPCs, and other countries where there are severe violations of religious freedom; (2) better 

training of refugee and consular officers in the field of refugee and asylum adjudications and 

human rights, particularly religious freedom, as required by sections 602 and 603 of IRFA; and 

(3) the implementation of certain operational requirements imposed on the refugee and asylum

programs by IRFA. 

Over the last year, the Administration has made some progress in these three areas. More 

remains to be done, however, before it can be said that the refugee and asylum provisions of 

IRFA have been implemented. 

For example, consistent with sections 601 and 602(d) of IRFA, the State Department’s 

2003 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, like those that preceded it, includes a 

refugee section. Likewise, the FY2004 Refugee Admissions Report to Congress, coordinated by 

the Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), contains sections on 

religious freedom. Neither document, however, sufficiently details the response of the refugee 

program to those who have fled religious persecution abroad, or from CPCs in particular.1

In part, these reports do not adequately explain the linkage between access to the U.S. 

Refugee Program and the promotion of international religious freedom because, in practice, that 

linkage remains weak. For example, the FY2004 Refugee Admissions document indicates that 

only nationals fleeing religious persecution from one CPC—Iran—may apply for refugee status 

(under Priority Two) without a referral from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR). Nationals of Burma and Sudan are also permitted to apply under the Priority Three 

designation, but only if they have a spouse, child or (in some circumstances) parent in the United 

States who has already been granted asylum or refugee status. 

Moreover, the State Department’s 2003 Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom inaccurately characterized U.S. Refugee Program processing of religious minorities 

from Iran. According to the Report, “Iranian refugees who belong to religious minorities are 

able to apply directly for U.S. resettlement.” In fact, an Iranian may not “directly” apply to the 

United States for resettlement without first obtaining a visa to Austria. In 2003, however, 

Austria stopped issuing visas to Iranian Christians, citing the high denial rate of this group by 

U.S. refugee adjudicators. In September 2003, the Commission endorsed the Specter 

Amendment, which would provide relief to the situation by clarifying the adjudication standard 

for refugee applications from members of Iranian religious minorities. In January 2004, the 

Specter Amendment was enacted (P.L. 108-199, Division E, Title II, Section 213), and the U.S. 

Refugee Program is currently developing guidance on its implementation. 

91
To strengthen the linkage between the U.S. Refugee Program and the promotion of 

religious freedom, the Commission recommended in November 2003 that the Department of 

State more systematically consider categories to allow refugees who have fled religious 

persecution to apply for resettlement. Specifically, the Commission recommended that the 

Department “use its expertise to carefully consider each CPC designation and deliberate how the 

U.S. refugee program could strategically re-enforce U.S. policy to promote religious freedom, 

and to protect those who seek to exercise this fundamental human right.” 

While the State Department has yet to adopt the Commission’s recommendation 

regarding the U.S. Refugee Program, PRM has invited the Commission to participate in the 

recently revitalized regional working groups on refugee admissions. The working groups, which 

consist of representatives of the Departments of State and Homeland Security, UNHCR, and 

various non-governmental partner organizations, provide one appropriate framework to improve 

access to the U.S. Refugee Program for those who have fled religious persecution. 

As mentioned earlier, sections 602 and 603 of IRFA also mandate training requirements 

on religious persecution and other issues relating to the refugee and asylum programs for asylum

officers, immigration judges, refugee officers, immigration inspectors, and consular officers. 

The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice have complied, to varying degrees, with 

these requirements. The Asylum Division, in particular, has developed and implemented 

specific training on religious freedom issues. The Commission itself has participated in training 

sessions for U.S. Immigration Judges. 

The Commission, however, would like to draw attention to the need for greater effort by 

the Department of State to bring itself into compliance with IRFA training requirements for 

consular officers vis-à-vis the U.S. Refugee Program. According to Appendix C of the 2003 

Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, the State Department has implemented its 

training requirements under Section 602(b) of IRFA by including “a lecture” entitled “Working 

with INS (sic – INS was dissolved on March 1, 2003, with its functions subsumed into the 

Department of Homeland Security).” The lecture is said to incorporate the discussion of refugee 

and asylum issues as they pertain to consular officers. The Commission questions whether such 

a fraction of a lecture is sufficient to comply with section 602(b) of IRFA.2

 

While consular officers do not adjudicate refugee applications, they are authorized to 

refer individuals in need of protection to the U.S. Refugee Program.

3

 A recent draft report by 

Professor David Martin at the University of Virginia, commissioned by PRM and made available 

for public comment, recommended that the Department of State provide new foreign service 

officers with more systematic instruction on refugee and humanitarian programs generally and 

on the specific opportunities and procedures for referrals. 

Finally, IRFA also contains broader requirements for the Refugee Admissions program, 

including: (1) guidelines for addressing hostile biases in personnel retained at refugee processing 

posts; (2) guidelines to ensure uniform procedures for establishing agreements with overseas 

processing entities and personnel; and (3) uniform procedures for such entities and personnel 

responsible for preparing refugee case files for refugee adjudications. There is no mention of 

any of these requirements by the State Department in the relevant Appendices of the 2003 

Annual Report on International Religious Freedom. 

92
While the State Department has developed a “Worldwide Refugee Admissions 

Processing System” (WRAPS) to promote uniformity in the preparation of refugee case files, 

WRAPS does not provide any substantive guidance in two central aspects of the preparation of 

refugee case files: the preparation of each refugee applicant’s persecution story and the filing of 

requests for reconsideration of denied refugee applications. Similarly, while PRM has inserted 

language into its cooperative agreements with overseas processing entities (OPEs) to promote 

compliance with IRFA, uniform procedures for addressing hostile biases in interpreters and other 

personnel retained at processing posts have not yet been developed. 

PRM, however, has expressed its intention to establish a working group on OPEs similar 

to the regional working groups it has revitalized. The Commission urges the U.S. Refugee 

Program to make further progress in complying with IRFA. 

Finally, section 605 of IRFA authorizes the Commission to appoint experts on refugee 

and asylum law to study the impact of Expedited Removal procedures on asylum seekers. With 

the dissolution of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the absorption of asylum

responsibilities into the Department of Homeland Security, the Commission determined that it 

would be important to perform such a study at the current time. Consequently, in 2003, the 

Commission designated its experts and has been working with the Department of Homeland 

Security and the Department of Justice to collect data for the study. The Commission expects to 

complete and release the study by the end of 2004.

 

1

 For a brief analysis on the Annual Report’s “Overview of U.S. Refugee Policy,” please see the 

chapter on the State Department’s Annual Report on International Religious Freedom. 

2

 IRFA section 602(b) requires that: 

The Secretary of State shall provide sessions on refugee law and adjudications 

and on religious persecution to each individual seeking a commission as a United 

States consular officer. The Secretary shall also ensure that any member of the 

Service who is assigned to a position that may be called upon to assess requests 

for consideration for refugee admissions, including any consular officer, has 

completed training on refugee law and refugee adjudications.... 

3

 This is an important function, as individuals fleeing persecution may not submit an application 

for refugee status unless they either (1) receive such a referral from an Embassy or the United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or (2) fall into one of the narrowly defined processing 

priorities of “humanitarian concern” to the U.S. Refugee Program. 

93
94
THE STATE DEPARTMENT’S 

ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (Annual Report), the only U.S. 

government account of religious freedom conditions worldwide, continues to be an important

reporting tool. In addition to providing a description of country conditions, the report is 

mandated to be a source of information on U.S. policies in support of religious freedom 

throughout the world, as well as what the U.S. government is doing to promote religious 

freedom. This reporting on policy is vital because through the International Religious Freedom

Act (IRFA), Congress sought to ensure that advancing international religious freedom was an 

integral part of the U.S. government’s foreign policy agenda. IRFA required the Administration 

to report to Congress and to the public on its ongoing efforts to pursue this goal. 

As described in the chapter on Countries of Particular Concern in this report, IRFA also 

requires that the U.S. government take active steps to promote religious freedom and to respond 

to religious freedom violations in all countries where such violations occur. The Annual Report 

is the place where Congress stipulated that those actions be described, along with the specific 

policies that they are intended to further. However, in contrast to the relative wealth of

information on religious freedom conditions, far less attention has been paid by the State 

Department to this requirement to describe U.S. actions. A better balance is needed, since 

underreporting on policies weakens the report’s usefulness as a policy tool. The Commission 

has raised this serious issue previously and continues to highlight it in the hope that the State 

Department will take steps to strengthen this portion of the Annual Report. 

The Commission thus continues to conclude that while the Annual Report remains a 

substantial source of information on conditions of religious freedom, it could be significantly 

improved as a tool for developing, explaining, and implementing policy. In order to do this, the 

Annual Report should specify, for each foreign country in which religious freedom violations 

occur: 

– the U.S. government’s goals and objectives to promote respect for religious freedom in that 

country, along with the relative priority of these objectives; 

– U.S. policies that have been adopted and are being implemented to advance religious 

freedom; 

– U.S. concerns that have been raised with foreign governments, as well as the response of 

those foreign governments; 

– the results, or lack thereof, of specific actions taken by the U.S. government; and 

– the nature of foreign aid, public diplomacy, and other programs sponsored by the U.S. 

government to promote religious freedom.

For example, as part of IRFA implementation, Congress stressed that U.S. government 

missions in violator countries should develop a strategy to promote respect for religious freedom, 

as part of their annual program planning.1

 Yet, it is not apparent from the lists of actions 

presented in the Annual Report that the State Department has conducted its activities with 

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respect to religious freedom in a coordinated and deliberate fashion, or used all of the available 

policy tools to advance religious freedom in countries where violations occur. 

In addition to potential punitive actions, IRFA also encourages the U.S. government to 

take positive steps to promote religious freedom.

2

 This aspect of the law is less recognized, and 

judging from the information presented in the U.S. policy section of the Annual Report, appears 

to be underutilized. For example, IRFA articulates a policy for the United States “to make a 

priority of promoting and developing legal protections and cultural respect for religious freedom

in the provision of foreign assistance.”3

 To that end, Congress recommended that in countries 

where religious freedom violations occur, U.S. missions allocate funds to programs “deemed to 

assist in the promotion of the right to religious freedom.”4

Accordingly, the Commission recommends that the Annual Report include a detailed 

description of foreign aid, public diplomacy, educational and cultural exchanges, and other 

programs sponsored by the U.S. government that seek to promote respect for religious freedom

or other related human rights, as well as religious tolerance. Some information of this type is 

scattered throughout the Annual Report; however, the reports on several important countries that 

receive substantial funding allocations under the democracy and governance programs of the 

U.S. Agency for International Development contain very little of this type of information, giving 

the reader the impression that religious freedom concerns have not been integrated into the 

mission’s program planning. Where appropriate, activities designed to promote rule of law, 

effective law enforcement, and accountability for religious freedom and related human rights 

violations should be a significant component of U.S. efforts to promote religious freedom, and 

they should also be described in the Annual Report, together with any evaluation of their 

impact.5

 

The 2003 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 

Like previous international religious freedom reports, the State Department’s 2003 

Annual Report on International Religious Freedom is a noteworthy achievement demonstrating 

the hard work and dedication of foreign-service officers in American embassies around the 

world. Many of the individual country reports in the 2003 Annual Report are comprehensive and 

up to date, for example, those on India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Russia. 

In some cases, however, questionable conclusions have been reached. For example, in 

the cases of Russia and Bangladesh, the report states that “there has been no change in the 

overall respect for religious freedom during the period of this report.” Similar language is used 

for China. The reports on Russia, Bangladesh, and China conclude that religious freedom

conditions have essentially remained the same, yet the reports themselves appear to belie that 

conclusion. In the case of Egypt, the report concludes that the situation has improved, with little 

evidence to back up such a claim.

Other individual reports, while adequate on the whole, nevertheless contain significant 

errors or omissions. For example, in the report on Sudan, there continues to be no mention of the 

role of oil development in the government’s previous policies of forced displacement of people 

from oil areas. The report on Saudi Arabia states that “the local press rarely printed articles or

commentaries disparaging other religions,” although numerous reports demonstrate that the 

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government-run media in Saudi Arabia regularly vilifies other religions and members of other 

religions, including Jews, Christians, and non-Wahhabi Muslims. A particularly glaring 

omission in that report is the absence of any mention of reports of the Saudi export of an 

intolerant and hate-filled religious ideology. The report on Uzbekistan downplays the problem

of torture in Uzbekistan, despite the fact that there has been no indication that the problem,

described in detail last year by a report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, has improved 

to any degree. Similarly, the executive summary of the report on Turkmenistan, a country run by 

a despotic dictator, seems to suggest that there is some validity to President Saparmurat 

Niyazov’s concerns about political dissent as a justification for his repressive religious freedom

policies. 

The Commission was also concerned about Appendix E of the report, the “Overview of 

U.S. Refugee Policy.” One function of the Annual Report is to serve as a resource for officials 

adjudicating refugee and asylum claims.

6

 Appendix E, however, contains information that can 

mislead these officers, and does not adequately explain the linkage between the refugee program

and religious freedom. One example is the East Asia paragraph of this year’s report, which 

simply states “Most countries in the region permit freedom of worship.” There is no mention at 

all of Burma, China or North Korea—each of them a CPC—nor of Vietnam, which the 

Commission has recommended for CPC status. 

In other regional sections, there is little indication of the serious problem of intrareligious oppression, but there is instead an almost exclusive focus on inter-religious strife. 

Moreover, there is no mention at all of refugee-source countries such as Eritrea and Afghanistan, 

where serious religious freedom problems persist. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which the 

Commission has recommended be designated as CPCs, are cited in the refugee section for their 

mistreatment of religious minorities. However, the section does not indicate how the U.S. 

Refugee Program has been responsive to this mistreatment. Indeed, the U.S. admitted only 18 

refugees from Pakistan last year and none from Saudi Arabia. For more information on IRFA 

and U.S. refugee policy, see the chapter on IRFA and the U.S. Refugee and Asylum Programs in 

this report. 

Commission Recommendations 

With regard to the State Department’s Annual Report on International Religious 

Freedom, the Commission has recommended that: 

• the State Department should expand and strengthen its reporting on U.S. policies and actions 

to advance religious freedom;

• the Annual Report should describe the policies that the U.S. government has adopted and is 

implementing to oppose religious freedom violations, as well as to promote religious 

freedom, on a worldwide, regional, and individual country basis, including policies regarding 

foreign aid, public diplomacy, multilateral organizations, and international financial 

institutions; 

• the Annual Report should specify, for each foreign country in which religious freedom

violations occur: the U.S. government’s objectives to advance religious freedom; U.S. 

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policies that have been adopted and are being implemented to advance religious freedom; the 

religious freedom concerns that the U.S. government has raised with the foreign government, 

and the response of that government, including any specific actions taken; and the results, or 

lack thereof, of the actions taken by the U.S. government; 

• the State Department should describe in the Annual Report the specific actions taken 

pursuant to IRFA in response to the designation of a country as a “country of particular 

concern” or in response to a finding that a foreign government has engaged in or tolerated a 

violation of religious freedom; 

• where appropriate, activities designed to promote rule of law, effective law enforcement, and 

accountability for religious freedom and related human rights violations should be a 

significant component of U.S. efforts to promote religious freedom, and they should be 

described in the Annual Report.

 

1 IRFA § 106, 22 U.S.C. § 6415. 

2

 See IRFA § 106, 22 U.S.C. § 6415. In addition, section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act 

of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(e), as amended by IRFA § 501, encourages that not less than $3 

million in foreign assistance funds be allocated for programs and activities to “encourage or 

promote increased adherence to civil and political rights, including the right to free religious 

belief and practice”. 

3

 IRFA § 501(a)(2). 

4

 IRFA § 106, 22 U.S.C. § 6415. 

5

 The Commission made recommendations to this effect in reports on Afghanistan in June 2002 

and May 2003, Laos in March 2003, Indonesia and Uzbekistan in May 2002, China in February 

2002, Turkmenistan in March 2002 and in its May 2001 Annual Report chapters on India, 

Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Vietnam.

6

 IRFA § 601, 22 U.S.C. § 6471. 

98
APPENDIX 1: BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 

Michael K. Young 

Michael K. Young is the current Chair of the Commission. He also served as the Commission’s 

Chair from September 2001 to June 2002 and as its Vice Chair from June 1999 to June 2000, and 

from June 2002 to June 2003. Young joined the George Washington University Law School as 

Dean in the summer of 1998. Prior to that, he was the Fuyo Professor of Japanese Law and Legal 

Institutions at the School of Law of Columbia University. At Columbia, he also served as 

Director of the Center for Japanese Legal Studies, the Center for Korean Legal Studies, and the 

Project on Religion, Human Rights and Religious Freedom. Dean Young has been a Visiting 

Professor and Scholar at the Law Faculties of the University of Tokyo, Waseda University and 

Nihon University. He has also been a Japan Foundation Fellow. 

During the Administration of President George H.W. Bush, he served as Ambassador for Trade 

and Environmental Affairs, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, and 

Deputy Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State. In 1996, Dean Young also served as 

Counsel to the Select Subcommittee on Transfers of Iranian Arms to Bosnian Muslims of the 

U.S. House of Representatives. He is also a member of the Committee on International Judicial 

Relations of the Judicial Conference of the United States, as well as a Fellow of the American 

Bar Foundation. 

Dean Young has published extensively, including articles and books on the Japanese legal 

system, dispute resolution, mergers and acquisitions, labor relations, the legal profession, 

comparative law, industrial policy, international trade law, the North American Free Trade 

Agreement (NAFTA), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), international 

environmental law, and international human rights and freedom of religion. 

He is a graduate of the Brigham Young University (B.A., summa cum laude with highest honors, 

1973) and Harvard Law School (J.D., magna cum laude, 1976), where he served as Note Editor 

of The Harvard Law Review. Before beginning his teaching career, Dean Young served as Law 

Clerk to Supreme Court Justice William H. Rehnquist and to Justice Benjamin Kaplan of the 

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 

Commissioner Young was appointed by Senate Majority Leader William Frist (R-TN). 

Felice D. Gaer 

Felice D. Gaer is currently a Vice Chair of the Commission. She served as Chair from June 2002 

to June 2003, and on the Commission’s Executive Committee from September 2001 to June 

2002. Ms. Gaer is the Director of the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human 

Rights of the American Jewish Committee. She is a member of the Committee Against Torture, 

a 10-person United Nations expert body that reviews reports by governments on their 

compliance with the Convention Against Torture, a treaty ratified by over 130 countries. 

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Nominated by the United States, elected in 1999, and again in 2003, she is the first American to 

serve on the Committee. Ms. Gaer was appointed as a public member of nine U.S. delegations to 

UN human rights negotiations between 1993 and 1999, including the UN Commission on 

Human Rights, the World Conference on Women, and the World Conference on Human Rights. 

She is also a member of the steering committee of Human Rights Watch/Eurasia, and Vice 

President of the International League for Human Rights. Ms. Gaer is a frequent author on 

international human rights topics. In 1995, she was awarded the Alumnae Achievement Award 

from Wellesley College.

Commissioner Gaer was appointed by House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). 

Nina Shea 

Since 1999, Nina Shea has served as a Commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International 

Religious Freedom and, in 2003, she was elected a Vice Chair of the Commission. 

Ms. Shea has been an international human rights lawyer for 25 years, and for 18 years she has 

focused specifically on the issue of religious persecution as the director of the Center for 

Religious Freedom, a division of Freedom House, America’s oldest human rights group. 

She is the author of a widely acclaimed book on anti-Christian persecution around the world 

entitled In the Lion’s Den (Broadman & Holman Publishers). Ms. Shea has been one of the 

activists at the forefront of a movement to make religious freedom abroad a U.S. foreign policy 

priority. It was a conference that Ms. Shea organized under Freedom House auspices in January 

1996 that brought 100 top Christian leaders together for the first time to address the issue of 

worldwide anti-Christian persecution. This marked the beginning of a Church mobilization that 

has turned into a nationwide movement to advance religious freedom worldwide. In a profile of 

her, Newsweek magazine credited her with “making Christian persecution Washington’s hottest 

cause.” The Far Eastern Economic Review cited Nina Shea as one of the “leading voices in the 

fight to put religious persecution at the center of U.S.-China relations.” 

Since 1998, she has coordinated an interfaith coalition of churches and religious groups to press 

the United States to bring a just peace in Sudan, where over two million persons, mostly from the 

non-Muslim south of the country, have been killed in a rebellion against forced Islamization. 

This coalition has been instrumental in bringing about the creation of a U.S. Special Envoy post 

for Sudan, the Sudan Peace Act and the southern ceasefire that has largely held over the past 

year. 

Ms. Shea currently directs a Mid-East Democracy and Freedom Project to promote a U.S. 

foreign policy that advances religious pluralism in Muslim countries. Ms. Shea has organized 

and sponsored numerous fact-finding missions to Iraq, Sudan, Nigeria, China, Egypt and 

elsewhere and has testified regularly before Congress on these and other governments. 

In 2001, Ms. Shea was appointed by President Bush to serve on the U.S. delegation to the UN 

Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. During the Clinton Administration, she had also 

100
served on the Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad to the U.S. Secretary of State 

and for one year as a U.S. delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights. 

She has written and contributed to articles in The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los 

Angeles Times, National Review, The Weekly Standard, The New Republic and numerous other 

publications. She has been a guest on hundreds of talk shows on Christian radio and has 

appeared on CBS, ABC and PBS news programs, as well as numerous religious broadcasts. 

She graduated from Smith College and American University Law School and has an honorary 

degree from Alvernia Franciscan College in Reading, PA. She is a dame of the Knights of Malta. 

Commissioner Shea was appointed by Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-IL). 

Preeta D. Bansal 

Preeta D. Bansal is a constitutional lawyer whose career has spanned government service, private 

law practice, and academia. She served as the Solicitor General of the State of New York from

1999 through 2001, during the first three years of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s 

administration. As Solicitor General, Ms. Bansal helped supervise a staff of six hundred lawyers 

in the New York Department of Law and directly oversaw 45 lawyers in the Solicitor General’s 

Office who handle appeals for the State of New York and its agencies in state and federal courts, 

write Attorney General opinions to state and municipal agencies on issues of state law, and 

provide advice and counsel to state agencies on constitutional and statutory matters. Ms. Bansal 

argued cases in the United States Supreme Court, the en banc Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 

and the New York Court of Appeals on behalf of New York state; implemented managerial and 

administrative reforms to enhance the credibility and quality of written and oral advocacy 

performed by the office; and helped to formulate and articulate a vision for a proactive 

enforcement role for state attorneys general nationwide in the wake of the Supreme Court’s “new 

federalism” jurisprudence. 

Ms. Bansal is a magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Harvard-Radcliffe College, 

and a magna cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School, where she was Supervising Editor of 

The Harvard Law Review. She served as a law clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens of the United 

States Supreme Court (1990-1991) and to Chief Judge James L. Oakes of the United States Court 

of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1989-1990). Prior to her appointment as New York Solicitor 

General, Ms. Bansal practiced appellate, constitutional, and media law with private law firms in 

Washington, D.C. and New York City. She also served in the Clinton Administration (1993-

1996) as Counselor in the U.S. Justice Department and as Special Counsel in the Office of the 

White House Counsel. 

Ms. Bansal has been a regular speaker and lecturer on constitutional law, First Amendment, and 

intellectual property issues in the United States and abroad, and has authored and co-authored 

pieces published in The Harvard Law Review, Yale Law Journal, The Fordham Intellectual 

Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal, and The Villanova Law Review, among other 

publications. She has been profiled in many national news and legal publications, including The 

New York Times and The New York Law Journal, in which she has been referred to as a “legal 

101
superstar” and “one of the most gifted lawyers of her generation, who combines a brilliant 

analytical mind with solid, mature judgment.” She has taught constitutional law and served as a 

public policy fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. 

Ms. Bansal is Of Counsel at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom in New York City. 

Commissioner Bansal was appointed by Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD), 

Patti Chang 

As President and CEO of the Women’s Foundation of California, Patti Chang is responsible for 

the Foundation’s vision and for setting the tenor and momentum of fundraising, which has had a 

profound impact in increasing the operating budget and funding opportunities for women and 

girls in California. 

Patti’s interests and passion lie in her search for solutions to the many complex and difficult 

political, social, and economic barriers faced by women and girls, in particular women and girls 

of color and immigrants. As such, her employment and volunteer history reflect her tireless 

efforts toward achieving justice and equality for all women and girls. 

In 2003, Patti oversaw the merger of the Women’s Foundation (San Francisco) and the Los 

Angeles Women’s Foundation, which became the Women’s Foundation of California. Over the 

past 25 years, the two organizations have awarded a combined $13 million in grants and 

scholarships to more than 1,000 community-based organizations in every region of the state. The 

Foundation pursues a vision of women and girls thriving in an environment of political, social, 

cultural, civil, and economic justice. The Foundation invests in social change work that supports 

the human rights of women and girls by providing community-based organizations with funding, 

technical assistance, and opportunities to convene for dialogue and collaboration. The 

Foundation has also been known for its cross-border work in California and Mexico and for its 

international funding in China and Afghanistan. 

Patti serves on the board of the Women’s Funding Network of which she is the former chair, is 

the co-founder of The Women’s Leadership Alliance, and is on the National Advisory Board for 

Gender Public Advocacy Coalition. Patti has served on the board of the National Committee for 

Responsible Philanthropy (NCRP) and is an Advisory Board member of the Women’s Institute 

For Leadership Development (WILD) for Human Rights and EMERGE, a political leadership 

training program for Democratic women in Northern California. She serves on the Council on 

Foundation’s Strategic Planning Committee. She is a former President of the San Francisco 

Commission on the Status of Women, a past Commissioner with the San Francisco Commission 

on the Environment, and is a current member of the Justice and Courage Domestic Violence 

Oversight Panel of the San Francisco Department on the Status of Women. 

Patti has a B.A. from Stanford in International Relations with a concentration on China, and a 

J.D. from Stanford Law. She is originally from Hawaii. 

Commissioner Chang was appointed by House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). 

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The Most Reverend Charles J. Chaput 

The Most Reverend Charles J. Chaput, Archbishop of Denver, was born September 26, 1944, in 

Concordia, Kansas, the son of Joseph and Marian DeMarias Chaput. He attended Our Lady of 

Perpetual Help Grade School in Concordia and St. Francis Seminary High School in Victoria, 

Kansas. He joined the Order of Friars Minor Capuchin, St. Augustine Province, in 1965. 

After earning a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy from St. Fidelis College Seminary in Herman, 

Pennsylvania, in 1967, Archbishop Chaput completed Studies in Psychology at Catholic 

University in Washington, D.C., in 1969. He earned a Master of Arts in Religious Education 

from Capuchin College in Washington, D.C., in 1970 and was ordained to the priesthood on 

August 29, 1970. 

Archbishop Chaput received a Master of Arts in Theology from the University of San Francisco 

in 1971. He served as an instructor in theology and spiritual director at St. Fidelis from 1971-

1974 and as executive secretary and director of communications for the Capuchin Province of St. 

Augustine in Pittsburgh from 1974-1977. 

In 1977, Archbishop Chaput became pastor of Holy Cross Parish in Thornton, Colorado, and 

vicar provincial for the Capuchin Province of Mid-America. He was named secretary and 

treasurer for the province in 1980, and he became chief executive officer and provincial minister 

three years later. 

Archbishop Chaput was ordained Bishop of Rapid City, South Dakota, on July 26, 1988. Pope 

John Paul II appointed him Archbishop of Denver on February 18, 1997. 

Archbishop Chaput was appointed by President George W. Bush. 

Dr. Khaled M. Abou El Fadl 

Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl has been described as the most important and influential Islamic 

thinker in the modern age. He is currently a Visiting Professor at Yale Law School, where he 

teaches National Security law, Islamic law and Immigration law. He is also a Full Professor of 

Law at the UCLA School of Law. Dr. Abou El Fadl holds degrees from Yale University, 

University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Princeton University. An Islamic jurist and scholar, 

Sheikh Abou El Fadl received formal training in Islamic jurisprudence in Egypt and Kuwait. 

A world-renowned expert in Islamic law and an American lawyer, Dr. Abou El Fadl is a strong 

proponent of human rights and is on the Board of Directors of Human Rights Watch. He 

regularly serves as an expert in a wide variety of cases ranging from human rights and political 

asylum to international and commercial law. 

103
Dr. Abou El Fadl is a prolific author and prominent public intellectual on Islamic law and Islam

and is most noted for his scholarly approach to Islam from a moral point of view. He writes 

extensively on universal themes of morality and humanity, and the notion of beauty as a moral 

value. Dr. Abou El Fadl is a staunch advocate and defender of women’s rights, and focuses 

much of his written attention on issues related to women. As the most critical and powerful 

voice against puritan and Wahhabi Islam today, he regularly appears on national and 

international television and radio, and is published and cited extensively in all media venues. 

His most recent works focus on issues of authority, terrorism, tolerance, Islam, and Islamic law. 

His latest book is entitled, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, published by Princeton 

University Press in January 2004. 

Other books by Dr. Abou El Fadl include: Conference of the Books: The Search for Beauty in 

Islam (University Press of America/Rowman and Littlefield, 2001); And God Knows the 

Soldiers: The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourses (UPA/Rowman and 

Littlefield, 2001); Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic law, Authority and Women (Oneworld 

Press, Oxford, 2001); Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 

2001); and The Place of Tolerance in Islam (Beacon Press, 2002). Other books include: 

Reasoning with God: Rationality and Thought in Islam (Oneworld Press, Oxford, 2003) and 

Jihad in Islam (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 

Commissioner Abou El Fadl was appointed by President George W. Bush. 

Dr. Richard D. Land 

Richard D. Land, D. Phil. (Oxon.), is President-Treasurer of the Ethics & Religious Liberty 

Commission, the Southern Baptist Convention’s agency for “applied Christianity” (social and 

moral concerns). He has served in this position since his election in October 1988. 

Prior to becoming the Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission’s President, Dr. Land served as 

The Criswell College’s Vice-President for Academic Affairs from 1980 to 1988. He had taught 

as Professor of Theology and Church History at that institution since 1975. 

Dr. Land graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree (magna cum laude) from Princeton 

University and with a Doctor of Philosophy degree from Oxford University in England. He also 

received a Master of Theology degree from New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, where 

he served as student body president and received the Broadman Seminarian Award as the 

outstanding graduating student. 

While on leave of absence from The Criswell College, Dr. Land served from January 1987 to 

May 1988 as Administrative Assistant to the Honorable William P. Clements, Jr., Governor of 

Texas. Dr. Land was the Governor’s senior advisor on church-state issues and areas relating to 

“traditional family values,” as well as anti-drug, anti-pornography, and anti-abortion legislation. 

In addition to these issues, Dr. Land had senior staff responsibility in the areas of public higher 

education, mental health and retardation, the physically handicapped, and AIDS. After Dr. 

Land’s return to The Criswell College in May 1988, he continued to serve as a senior consultant 

to the Governor on these issues. 

104
Dr. Land has spoken on college campuses, in churches, and in media forums across America 

concerning the crucial issues facing American society. He also hosts two nationally syndicated 

radio programs, “For Faith & Family” and “Richard Land Live!” 

Dr. Land has authored several books, including For Faith and Family: Changing America by 

Strengthening the Family (Nashville: Broadman and Holman, 2002) and Real Homeland Security

(Nashville: Broadman and Holman. 2004). He is an ordained Southern Baptist minister and has 

pastored churches in Texas, Louisiana, and England. Dr. Land is married and has three children. 

Commissioner Land was appointed by President George W. Bush. 

The Most Reverend Bishop Ricardo Ramírez, C.S.B.

The Most Reverend Ricardo Ramírez, C.S.B., is currently Bishop of Las Cruces, New Mexico. 

He was ordained to the priesthood in 1966. Bishop Ramírez was named Titular Bishop of 

Vatarba and Auxiliary Bishop of San Antonio in 1981. In 1982 he became the first Bishop of the 

Diocese of Las Cruces, New Mexico. He holds a B.A. from the University of St. Thomas, in 

Houston, Texas, an M.A. from the University of Detroit, Michigan, a Doctor of Laws honoris 

causa from Neumann College, Wichita, Kansas, a Doctor of Divinity honoris causa from the 

University of St. Michael’s College, Toronto, Canada, and a Doctor of Humane Letters honoris 

causa from Siena Heights University, Adrian, Michigan. Bishop Ramírez attended St. Basil’s 

Seminary in Toronto, Canada, Seminario Conciliar in Mexico City, Mexico, and the East Asian 

Pastoral Institute in Manila, Philippines. 

Bishop Ramírez currently serves as a Member of the New Mexico Advisory Committee to the 

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; the Catholic Church Extension Society Board; Episcopal 

Advisor of the Institute for Hispanic Liturgy; Episcopal Moderator of the Asociación Nacional 

de Sacerdotes Hispanos (ANSH); Member of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops’

(USCCB) International Policy Committee; USCCB Committee for Migration and Refugee 

Services; Member of the Committee on the Catholic Common Ground Initiative; and Consultant 

of the USCCB Committee on Hispanic Affairs. He has also served as a member of the U.S. 

State Department Advisory Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad; chairman of the 

USCCB’s Catholic Campaign for Human Development; and chairman of the USCCB Committee 

for the Church in Latin America. He served as administrative secretary for the Comisión para el 

Estudio de la Historia la Iglesia en Latinoamérica (Commission for the Study of the History of 

the Church in Latin America). Bishop Ramírez was also elected as delegate for the United States 

at the 1997 Synod for America. 

Bishop Ramirez was appointed by Senate Minority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-SD). 

Ambassador John V. Hanford III 

Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom

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In May 2002, John V. Hanford III, was sworn in as the second U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for 

International Religious Freedom. This position, created by the International Religious Freedom

Act of 1998, is charged with promoting religious freedom worldwide, promoting reconciliation 

in those areas where conflict has been implemented along religious lines, and making sure that 

this issue is woven into the fabric of U.S. foreign policy. Amb. Hanford serves as an Ex-Officio 

member of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. 

Amb. Hanford, originally from Salisbury, North Carolina, attended the University of North 

Carolina at Chapel Hill on a John Motley Morehead Scholarship (BA in Economics) and holds a 

Master of Divinity degree from the Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary in South Hamilton, 

Massachusetts. 

For the past 14 years, Hanford has served as an expert on international religious freedom while 

working as a Congressional Fellow on the staff of Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana). During 

that time, he worked at the forefront of efforts to mobilize strong and compassionate intervention 

through U.S. governmental channels on behalf of persons persecuted for their religious beliefs. 

Amb. Hanford and Sen. Lugar have led numerous efforts in Congress to address some of the 

world’s most severe problems of religious persecution. Their initiatives have rallied Senators, 

Members of Congress, Presidents, and Secretaries of State in successful interventions to halt 

execution orders, secure the cessation of torture or harassment on religious grounds, gain the 

release of religious prisoners, or oppose the policies of governments which repress religious 

freedom. 

In 1998, Amb. Hanford spearheaded a bipartisan congressional effort to develop a strong and 

responsible U.S. policy on international religious freedom. Amb. Hanford organized and led the 

group of offices that co-authored the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA). He 

worked closely with the IRFA’s chief sponsor, Senator Don Nickles, and his staff in guiding 

IRFA through the legislative process to a unanimous (98-0) Senate vote and a unanimous voice 

vote in the House of Representatives. IRFA ensures U.S. vigilance and an ongoing process of 

effective action in addressing religious persecution overseas. IRFA is regarded as one of 

Congress’s most significant legislative achievements in human rights. Since the passage of 

IRFA, the U.S. government’s attention to problems of religious persecution has increased 

significantly. On this and other projects, Amb. Hanford has worked closely with a broad 

spectrum of human rights and religious organizations at home and abroad. 

Prior to his work in the Senate, Amb. Hanford served in pastoral ministry on the staff of West 

Hopewell Presbyterian Church in Hopewell, Virginia. Hanford is married to Laura Bryant 

Hanford. 

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APPENDIX 2: THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 19981

Selected Provisions 

Section 3. DEFINITIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6402) 

(11) PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term

``particularly severe violations of religious freedom'' means systematic, ongoing, egregious 

violations of religious freedom, including violations such as— 

(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 

(B) prolonged detention without charges; 

(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of those 

persons; or 

(D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons. 

(13) VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—The term ``violations of religious freedom''

means violations of the internationally recognized right to freedom of religion and religious 

belief and practice, as set forth in the international instruments referred to in section 2(a)(2) and 

as described in section 2(a)(3), including violations such as— 

(A) arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for— 

(i) assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, including 

arbitrary registration requirements; 

(ii) speaking freely about one's religious beliefs; 

(iii) changing one's religious beliefs and affiliation; 

(iv) possession and distribution of religious literature, including Bibles; or 

(v) raising one's children in the religious teachings and practices of one's choice; or

(B) any of the following acts if committed on account of an individual's religious belief or 

practice: detention, interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, forced 

mass resettlement, imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, 

enslavement, murder, and execution. 

Section 402. PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO PARTICULARLY SEVERE 

VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (22 U.S.C. § 6442) 

(b) DESIGNATIONS OF COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR RELIGIOUS 

FREEDOM.—

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(1) ANNUAL REVIEW.—

(A) IN GENERAL.— Not later than September 1 of each year, the President2 shall review the 

status of religious freedom in each foreign country to determine whether the government of that 

country has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom in that 

country during the preceding 12 months or since the date of the last review of that country under 

this subparagraph, whichever period is longer. The President shall designate each country the 

government of which has engaged in or tolerated violations described in this subparagraph as a 

country of particular concern for religious freedom. 

Section 405. DESCRIPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS (22 U.S.C. § 6445) 

[With respect to each country named a “country of particular concern” (CPC), the President 

shall, according to section 402(c)(1)(a) and, in general, following an attempt to carry out 

consultations with the foreign government in question, carry out one or more of the actions 

described in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a), as determined by the President. The 

President may substitute a commensurate action. IRFA § 405(b).] 

405(a)(9) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States development assistance in 

accordance with section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 

405(a)(10) Directing the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private 

Investment Corporation, or the Trade and Development Agency not to approve the issuance of 

any (or a specified number of ) guarantees, insurance, extensions of credit, or participations in 

the extension of credit with respect to the specific government, agency, instrumentality, or 

official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 

or 402; 

405(a)(11) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United States security assistance in 

accordance with section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 

405(a)(12) Consistent with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, 

directing the United States executive directors of international financial institutions to oppose 

and vote against loans primarily benefiting the specific foreign government, agency, 

instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations 

under section 401 or 402; 

405(a)(13) Ordering the heads of the appropriate United States agencies not to issue any (or a 

specified number of ) specific licenses, and not to grant any other specific authority (or a 

specified number of authorities), to export any goods or technology to the specific foreign 

government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be 

responsible for violations under section 401 or 402, under— 

(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979; 

(B) the Arms Export Control Act; 

(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or 

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(D) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government 

as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services; 

405(a)(14) Prohibiting any United States financial institution from making loans or providing 

credits totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month period to the specific foreign 

government, agency, instrumentality, or official found or determined by the President to be 

responsible for violations under section 401 or 402; and/or 

405(a)(15) Prohibiting the United States Government from procuring, or entering into any 

contract for the procurement of, any goods or services from the foreign government, entities, or 

officials found or determined by the President to be responsible for violations under section 401 

or 402. 

[In lieu of carrying out action as described above, the President may conclude a binding 

agreement with the respective foreign government that obligates such government to cease, or 

take substantial steps to address and phase out, the act, policy, or practice constituting the 

violation of religious freedom. IRFA § 402(c)(2). Moreover, “[a]t the time the President 

determines a country to be a country of particular concern, if that country is already subject to 

multiple, broad-based sanctions imposed in significant part in response to human rights abuses, 

and such sanctions are ongoing, the President may determine that one or more of these sanctions 

also satisfies the requirements of this subsection.” IRFA § 402(c)(5).] 

SEC. 407. PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER. (22 U.S.C. § 6447) 

(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the President may waive the application of any of the 

actions described in paragraphs (9) through (15) of section 405(a) (or commensurate action in 

substitution thereto) with respect to a country, if the President determines and so reports to the 

appropriate congressional committees that-- 

(1) the respective foreign government has ceased the violations giving rise to the Presidential 

action; 

(2) the exercise of such waiver authority would further the purposes of this Act; or 

(3) the important national interest of the United States requires the exercise of such waiver 

authority. 

(b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than the date of the exercise of a waiver under 

subsection (a), the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the waiver 

or the intention to exercise the waiver, together with a detailed justification thereof. 

1

 P.L. 105-292, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 6401, et seq. The full text of IRFA can be found on the 

Commission’s Web site, www.uscirf.gov. 

2

 The authority to make decisions and take actions under IRFA has been delegated by the 

President to the Secretary of State.