United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 21, 2013*

Decided February 22, 2013

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 12‐1794

ROBERT L. HOLLEMAN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CHARLES PENFOLD, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:09‐cv‐1510‐TWP‐DKL

Tanya Walton Pratt,

Judge.

O R D E R

Robert Holleman, an Indiana prisoner, appeals the grant of summary judgment in

favor of guards and employees of the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility in this suit under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Because Holleman

failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliation, we affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).
No. 12‐1794 Page 2

At the outset we note that the district court was within its discretion to adopt the

defendants’ version of the facts, because Holleman failed to comply with the court’s local

rules by not supporting his “statement of material facts in dispute” with appropriate

citations to admissible evidence. See S.D. Ind. L.R. 56.1 (b), (e); Patterson v. Ind. Newspapers,

Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 359–60 (7th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, our version of the facts mirrors the

one adopted by the district court.

In March 2008, Holleman was assigned to the G‐House unit at Wabash. He noticed

that, despite a Wabash policy allowing prisoners to leave their cells for up to twenty

minutes to finish their meals, guards in G‐House gave prisoners between only six and

eleven minutes to eat. Holleman decided during several meals to remain out of his cell for

the full twenty minutes—even after guards ordered prisoners to lock up. When one guard,

Amanda Pirtle, saw Holleman outside his cell, she accused him of holding up “her chow

line” and told him he would be would be eating last from then on. Pirtle and another guard

then searched Holleman’s cell and, during one lunch, did not allow him to eat with the

other prisoners in the common room. Holleman twice sent written complaints about Pirtle’s

actions to Marty Hale, a case manager in G‐House. Holleman believes that, in retaliation for

these letters as well as his refusals to lock up, the defendants denied him a job as the G‐

House barber (despite his barber’s license); caused several of his library passes, commissary

orders, and grievances to “disappear”; and charged him with—and found him guilty

of—disorderly conduct.

The district court concluded that Holleman did not present sufficient evidence to

make out a prima facie case of retaliation under the First Amendment. See Kidwell v.

Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2012). The court determined that, though Holleman’s

letters to Hale were protected by the First Amendment, see Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859,

866–67 (7th Cir. 2012); Hasan v. U.S. Depʹt of Labor, 400 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2005), his

actions in remaining outside his cell to eat after being told to lock up were not. The court

concluded that Holleman provided no evidence to establish that his protected conduct

caused the defendants to retaliate against him.

On appeal, Holleman denies that his remaining outside his cell to finish meals was

not activity protected by the First Amendment; in his view he was opposing his conditions

of confinement and merely following the policy that allotted prisoners up to twenty minutes

to eat. But Holleman may not use § 1983 to challenge a violation of state law or prison rules;

§ 1983 protects plaintiffs only from constitutional violations. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d

752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 485 n.1

(7th Cir. 2011). Holleman did, however, have a First Amendment right to complain about

his conditions of his confinement. See Gomez, 680 F.3d at 866–67; Hasan, 400 F.3d at 1005. But

his confrontational approach in opposing the guards’ actions and disobeying orders to lock

up was inconsistent with the guards’ legitimate penological interests in maintaining order
No. 12‐1794 Page 3

and discipline, and thus unprotected by the First Amendment. See Watkins v. Kasper, 599

F.3d 791, 797–98 (7th Cir. 2010); Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 741 (7th Cir. 2006).

Holleman next challenges the district court’s conclusion that he provided no

evidence that his protected activity motivated the defendants to retaliate against him. He

contends that he provided such evidence in the form of testimony from a hearing under

Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008), and that the district court erred when it

adopted the defendants’ version of the facts rather than considering that testimony. At the

Pavey hearing his former cellmate, Ray Milano, testified to being told by one officer at

Wabash that he had not received a job in G‐House because he was sharing a cell with

Holleman. Also at that hearing, Holleman’s classification supervisor, Mathew Loehr,

testified that retaliation by Wabash staff had occurred “at times.” Holleman asserts that he

was unable, through no fault of his own, to cite this information in his statement of material

facts because the district court, during the relevant period, made the transcript available

only via its Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system, which Holleman could not

access.

Because Holleman received notice that failing to provide proper citations could lead

to the admission of the defendants’ version of the facts, see Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833,

841–42 (7th Cir. 2001); Houston v. Sidley & Austin, 185 F.3d 837, 838 n.1 (7th Cir. 1999), the

district court was entitled to require strict compliance with its local rules, see, e.g., McNeil v.

United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Schmidt v. Eagle Waste & Recycling, Inc., 599 F.3d 626,

630–31 (7th Cir. 2010); Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006). Holleman did not

even try to provide citations to the materials that were available to him (his affidavit or the

defendants’ discovery responses), nor did he file an appropriate motion under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(d), supported by an affidavit, to explain his need for the transcript to

the court and request further time to respond to the defendants’ submission. See Deere & Co.

v. Ohio Gear, 462 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir.2006); Edgenet, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 658

F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2011). And even if we take into account the testimony of Milano and

Loehr, or for that matter Holleman’s affidavit, he still cannot establish that the defendants

took any actions because of his protected activities. See Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 964; Greene v.

Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 978–80 (7th Cir. 2011). Holleman’s statements in his affidavit and

Milano’s testimony about what officers at Wabash told them are inadmissible hearsay.

See Cortezano v. Salin Bank & Trust Co., 680 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2012); Gordon v. FedEx

Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2012). And Loehr’s testimony that retaliation has

occurred at Wabash tells us nothing about what motivated these particular defendants in

their interactions with Holleman.

  AFFIRMED.