alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Hon. Timothy G. Stueve

U.S. Administrative Law Judge

Alameda, California

Department of Homeland Security

United States Coast Guard

Judge Stueve (STEE-vee) serves as a Coast Guard 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in Alameda, California. The

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security appointed

Judge Stueve to this position in 2020. He hears and decides 

Merchant Mariner Credential suspension and revocation cases, 

as well as other cases initiated by the Department of 

Homeland Security and other federal agencies as assigned by 

the U.S. Office of Personnel Management.

Prior to serving as an ALJ for the U.S. Coast Guard, Judge 

Stueve served as an Social Security Administration (SSA) ALJ 

for twelve years. His positions included service as Hearing 

Office Chief ALJ and as the SSA National Cadre Lead for ALJ 

training.

Judge Stueve’s judicial career began in 2004 with his appointment as a Courts-martial 

Military Judge for the U.S. Coast Guard.

Judge Stueve’s previous experience as an attorney with the U.S. Coast Guard includes service 

in a variety of positions including: Assistant Legal Officer at the Thirteenth Coast Guard 

District; Defense Counsel at Navy Legal Service Command-Northwest; Assistant Professor

of Law, Principal Assistant Legal Officer, and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney at the U.S. 

Coast Guard Academy; and Principal Assistant Legal Officer at Maintenance & Logistics 

Command Pacific, Eleventh Coast Guard District, and Pacific Area. 

Prior to attending law school, Judge Stueve served tours in the Coast Guard as a Deck 

Watch Officer, Commanding Officer of two patrol boats, Marine Inspector, and an 

Investigating Officer. In his final tour on active duty, he served as Executive Officer of U.S. 

Coast Guard Training Center Petaluma.

Judge Stueve is a 1988 graduate of the United States Coast Guard Academy, with high 

honors, and a 1997 graduate of the Washington University School of Law, where he was 

elected to the Order of the Coif.
#### Bartlett *v.*Sutorius.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.*

June 6, 1890.)

Assumpsit—Complaint.’

Complainant alleged that plaintiff shipped goods to defendant, his agent, to sell, and that defendant collected the proceeds, and converted same to his own use. An order of arrest founded on such complaint was vacated upon appeal because the complaint did not allege, as required by Code Civil Proc. N. Y. § 549, that defendant converted money received “in a fiduciary capacity. ” 9 N. Y. Supp. 8. *Held,*that the complaint stated a good cause of action, though not for money received in a fiduciary capacity, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint.

Appeal from circuit court, *New*York county.

Action by Stephen L. Bartlett against Edward Sutorius for the proceeds of certain sales alleged to have been made by defendant as plaintiff’s agent. An order of arrest, granted on the ground that defendant converted money received “in a fiduciary capacity, ” was vacated by the general term on the ground that the complaint did not allege that defendant received the money “in a fiduciary capacity.” At the trial the court dismissed the complaint under the decision of the general term vacating the order of arrest. See 9 N. Y. Supp. 2. Plaintiff appeals.

Argued before Van Brunt, F. J., and Brady and Daniels, JJ.

*Daniel D. Sherman,*for appellant. ■ *Davison & Chapman,*for respondent.

Van Brunt, P. J.

The learned judge in the court below evidently mistook the purport of the decision heretofore made in this case upon the application to vacate the order of arrest. All that the court decided upon that appeal was that, as the complaint did not contain the allegations required by section 549 of the Code, the order of arrest could not be sustained. It did not decide that the complaint does not state a good cause of action. On the contrary, the complaint contains a cause of action, but not for money recel ved in *801a fiduciary capacity. The learned court therefore erred in dismissing the complaint, and the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event. All concur.
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<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 99.2

CERTIFICATION PUSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of H-Quotient, Inc., on Form 10-QSB for
the quarter ending June 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, the Executive Vice President of
Finance and the Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to and
solely for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

       (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.


Date:  August 13, 2003

/s/ Douglas A. Cohn

-----------------------------------
(Douglas Cohn, Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Financial Officer)



                                       10


<PAGE>
EXHIBIT
10.23


 


Severance Arrangements with Executive Officers


 


Pursuant to resolutions adopted by the Board
of Directors of PLC Systems Inc. (the “Company”) on January 20, 2010,
Kenneth J. Luppi, the Company’s Vice President of Operations, and Vincent C. Puglisi,
the Company’s Managing Director, International, are entitled to receive
payments equal to 26 weeks of base salary in the event that they are terminated
for any reason without cause on or before July 20, 2011.


 


Mark R. Tauscher, the Company’s President and
Chief Executive Officer, and James G. Thomasch, the Company’s Senior Vice
President of Finance and Administration, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer,
are separately entitled to receive severance payments pursuant to the terms of
their respective employment agreements with the Company.
## IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS District of St. Croix
People of the Virgin Islands v. Darnley Petersen Case Number:SX-2021-CR-00199 Charges: 14 V.I.C. 2253(a) - Possession Of An Unlicense Firearm 14 V.I.C. 2253(E) - Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm in a Vehicle 14 V.I.C. 2256(a) - Possession Or Sale Of Ammunition 

## NOTICE of ENTRY

of Memorandum Opinion and Order To : Robert J. Pickett, Esq. Ronald E. Russell, Esq.

Please take notice that on April 29, 2024 a(n) Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Suppress dated April 26, 2024 was/were entered by the Clerk in the above-titled matter. Dated : April 29, 2024 Tamara Charles Clerk of the Court By:

Iris Cintron

Court Clerk Supervisor
#### June Hammond, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Richard C. Hammond Deceased, Respondent, v Walter A. Minaert et al., Appellants.

Memorandum: Special Term erred in granting plaintiff’s motion to change the venue of this medical malpractice action from Jefferson County to Onondaga County. Jefferson County is where the parties reside, where the cause of action arose, where the hospital records are filed and where plaintiff initially chose to venue the action. The convenience of plaintiff’s medical witnesses is not controlling and is an inadequate offsetting circumstance *(see, Chung v Kivell,*57 AD2d 790). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Shaheen, J. — change of venue.) Present— Doerr, J. P., Boomer, Green, Pine and Balio, JJ.
#### Ralph Bucci, Jr., Respondent, v Madeline Bucci, Appellant.

— In an action to determine title to real property, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, West-*287Chester County (Benson, J.), dated June 3, 1985, which denied her motion for summary judgment and granted plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In 1965, Ralph Bucci, Sr., and the defendant purchased certain real property, taking title "as tenants by the entirety”. At the time, Ralph Bucci, Sr. was legally married to another, with whom he had a son, the plaintiff herein. In 1976, after the death of Mr. Bucci’s wife, he and the defendant were married. Ralph Bucci, Sr. died intestate in 1978, survived by the plaintiff, the defendant, and a daughter by the defendant. The issue is the ownership of the subject property and, more particularly, whether -EPTL 6-2.2 (c), effective September 1, 1975, applies to the facts at bar. We agree with Special Term that it does not.

At the time this property was purchased by the decedent and the defendant, a conveyance to two persons who were not legally married "as tenants by the entirety”, was deemed to create only a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared to be a joint tenancy *(see, Place v Cundaro,*34 AD2d 698). In 1975, this presumption was reversed by statutory amendment so that a joint tenancy would be created (L 1975, ch 263, § 1). EPTL 6-2.2 (c) provides: "A disposition of real property to persons who are not legally married to one another but who are described in the disposition as husband and wife creates in them a joint tenancy, unless expressly declared to be a tenancy in common”. However, this amendment does "not affect dispositions of real property made prior to its effective date” (L 1975, ch 263, § 3). Since the disposition to the decedent and the defendant occurred in 1965, EPTL 6-2.2 (c) does not apply and the conveyance to them created no more than a tenancy in common. Upon the decedent’s death then, in 1978, the defendant remained a tenant in common with the decedent’s distributees. Were we to accept the defendant’s argument that the key "disposition” is the passage of title upon the decedent’s death in 1978, after the effective date of section 6-2.2 (c), the defendant would have had her interest in the property suddenly transformed by operation of law from that of a tenant in common to that of a joint tenant with right of survivorship. This argument is without merit. Mollen, P. J., Bracken, Lawrence and Hooper, JJ., concur.
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#### In the Matter of Gaetano L. Colozzi, an Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee of the Fifth Judicial District, Petitioner.

Fourth Department,

February 27, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Paul J. Ginnelly*for petitioner.

*John R. Rinaldi*for respondent.

*59OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law by this court on December 10, 1979. He was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York on September 23, 1986, upon his plea of guilty to one count of conspiracy to make a false and fraudulent statement on petitions to be filed with a Federal agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in violation of 18 USC § 371.

On October 14, 1986, this court found that respondent had been convicted of a "serious crime” within the meaning of Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (d) and pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (f) suspended respondent from practice and directed him to show cause why a final order of censure, suspension or disbarment should not be entered.

Respondent requested a reference in mitigation of whatever discipline this court might order pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (h). Subsequent to that request, respondent retained a new attorney who, along with respondent, entered into a stipulation with the principal attorney for the Fifth District Grievance Committee to vacate the order of reference and requested the court to administer discipline based upon the record.

In mitigation, respondent asserts that his involvement in the conspiracy was minimal and that he was heavily involved in substance abuse for which he has undergone a three-month treatment at a community treatment center. Respondent’s acts were reprehensible and without justification or excuse.

Accordingly, the stipulation is approved, the order appointing a Referee is vacated and respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years effective as of October 14, 1986 and until further order of the court.

Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Doerr, Denman and Green, JJ., concur.

Final order of suspension entered pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (h).
**Basin Data****  % Median Precipitation      **  % Median SWE      **Reservoir Data****  Storage      **  Pool Elevation      **  Inflow      **  Release              Updated: June 03, 2024 14:11**  Uinta Basin
#### In the Matter of Amanda Reid, a Suspended Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee for the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts, Petitioner.

Second Department,

February 17, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Robert H. Straus*for petitioner.

*Amanda Reid,*respondent *pro se.*

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

The respondent was admitted to practice by this court on July 29, 1981. By order of this court dated April 7, 1986, the respondent was suspended from the practice of law pending the outcome of a disciplinary proceeding. The petitioner now moves to strike the respondent’s name from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law on the ground that she has been disbarred by virtue of a felony conviction.

*24On August 28, 1986, the respondent was convicted after a jury trial in the Supreme Court, New York County, of perjury in the first degree, a class D felony (Penal Law § 210.15).

Pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4), upon her conviction of a felony, the respondent ceased to be an attorney and counselor-at-law in this State.

Accordingly, the petitioner’s motion is granted. The respondent is disbarred and it is directed that the respondent’s name be stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law forthwith.

Mangano, J. P., Thompson, Bracken, Niehoff and Weinstein, JJ., concur.
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM 10K - F
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# C_2021459EN.01003601.xml

| 12.11.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 459/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.11.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 459/36

---

EURATOM SUPPLY AGENCY

Publication of the final accounts for the financial year 2020

(2021/C 459/36)

The complete version of the final accounts may be found at the following address:

https://euratom-supply.ec.europa.eu/about-esa/financial-autonomy_en

---
Voluntary Reduction of Compensation letter signed by Bruce W. Taylor



 Exhibit 10.25 
 November 9, 2009 
 Compensation Committee of 
 The Board of Directors 
 Taylor Capital Group, Inc.

 9550 West Higgins Road 
 Rosemont, IL
60018 
  

	RE:	Voluntary Reduction in Compensation (Continuation) 

 Dear Fellow Board Members, 
 As you know, we have engaged in aggressive cost-cutting efforts at all levels of our organization in
response to the continuing challenging economic conditions. These initiatives have led to significant savings and thereby enhanced our ability to preserve capital and execute on our growth strategy. 
 With your oversight, management has specifically focused on ways in which to reduce our overall compensation expense. As part of our efforts in this area, I
have evaluated my own compensation and believe that it would be appropriate for me to forego certain elements of my compensation until market conditions and our performance improves. To that end, I hereby offer and agree to a 20% reduction in my
base salary (from $525,200 to $420,000) and to forego my auto allowance and reimbursements for country club expenditures (with the exception of expenses directly associated with customer events). 
 I am requesting that you re-evaluate these voluntary reductions of compensation each fiscal quarter after TCGI achieves a positive net income available to
common shareholders. 
 Thank you for your continued leadership and please let me know if you have any questions or would like to discuss this
matter further. 
  

	
	Very truly yours,
	
	 /s/ Bruce W. Taylor

	Bruce W. Taylor
	Chairman