REVISED April 11, 2011

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50078

JAMES DEMOSS

Plaintiff - Appellant 

v.

CHRISTINA MELTON CRAIN, Chairman of the Texas Board of Criminal

Justice; NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION;

ED OWENS, Deputy Director of Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

Correctional Institutions Division; TEXAS BOARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE;

ROBERT EASON, Senior Warden Robertson Unit; RONALD WILLIAMS,

Captain of Corrections Officers; D SWEETIN, Senior Warden Eastham Unit;

FRANKLIN REESCANO, Assistant Warden Eastham Unit; VANCE DRUM,

Chaplin Eastham Unit; HAYWOOD TALIB, Chaplin Robertson Unit; BILLY

PIERCE, Director of Chaplaincy 

Defendants - Appellees 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

Before KING, DAVIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff–Appellant James DeMoss challenges several Texas Department

of Criminal Justice policies under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Following a bench trial, the district court

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 2, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 09-50078

2

entered judgment for the Defendants–Appellees. We AFFIRM the judgment of

the district court.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

James DeMoss is an inmate in the Texas state prison system, which is

administered by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). DeMoss

filed a lawsuit against TDCJ and several prison officials in their individual and

official capacities (collectively “Defendants”), alleging that several TDCJ policies

impermissibly interfered with his ability to practice his religion in violation of

the ReligiousLand Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. He also asserted several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that those same policies violated his constitutional rights under the

First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, DeMoss challenged the

following policies: (1) inmates who have been confined to their cells for

disciplinary infractions are prohibited from attending religious services (the “cell

restriction policy”); (2) all inmate-led religious services are tape recorded when

there is no prison staff member or outside volunteer present (the “recording

policy”); (3) inmates are not allowed to carry a pocket-sized Bible or Qur’an (the

“religious text policy”); (4) inmates must be clean-shaven (the “grooming policy”);

and (5) inmates may not stand for extended periods of time in prison dayrooms

(the “dayroom policy”).

Both DeMoss and Defendants filed motions summary judgment. In

evaluating these motions, the district court concluded that TDCJ’s unequal

enforcement of its cell restriction policy violated RLUIPA, and granted summary

judgment to DeMoss on that claim. Additionally, the district court dismissed

DeMoss’s challenge to TDCJ’s religious text policy for failure to state a claim.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(B)(ii) (stating that the district court should dismiss an

inmate’s civil rights claim if it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted”), 1915A(b)(1) (same).
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DeMoss’s remaining claims challenging the facial validity of the cell

restriction policy and the recording, grooming, and dayroom policies proceeded

to a bench trial. After the bench trial, the district court concluded that none of

TDCJ’s policies violated RLUIPA or DeMoss’s constitutional rights and entered

judgment in favor of the Defendants on all of DeMoss’s remaining claims.

II. DISCUSSION

DeMoss advances four arguments on appeal: (1) the district court

improperly denied his request for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief for

TDCJ’s enforcement of the cell restriction policy; (2) the district court erred in

dismissing his challenge to TDCJ’s religious text policy for failure to state a

claim; (3) the district court improperly concluded that TDCJ’s dayroom,

grooming, and recording policies did not violate RLUIPA; and (4) the district

courtimproperly concluded thatTDCJ’s recording policy did not violate the First

Amendment. We address each argument in turn. “Following a bench trial, we

review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings for

clear error.” Cerda v. 2004-EQR1 L.L.C., 612 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2010).

A. DeMoss’s RLUIPA Claims

1. RLUIPA

The bulk of DeMoss’s claims on appeal are derived from RLUIPA.

RLUIPA provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious

exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even

if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the

government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that

person—

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;

and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
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Under RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that “the

challenged government action ‘substantially burdens’ the plaintiff’s ‘religious

exercise.’ ” Mayfield v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 613 (5th

Cir. 2008). A government action imposes a substantial burden on religious

exercise if it “truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious

behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs.” Adkins v. Kaspar, 393

F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004). 

If the plaintiff meets this burden of proof, the burden shifts to the

government to “demonstrate that its action was supported by a compelling

interest and that the regulation is the least restrictive means of carrying out

that interest.” Mayfield, 529 F.3d at 613. In determining whether the

government has metits burden of proof, we give “due deference to the experience

and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary

regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline,

consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Cutter v.

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

2. TDCJ’s Cell Restriction Policy

a. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

DeMoss first challenges the district court’s refusal to grant him a

preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the cell restriction policy and

its failure to issue a declaratory judgment stating that the policy violates

RLUIPA. The Defendants respond that this claim is now moot because the cell

restriction policy was voluntarily changed before the bench trial, so that “all

general population offenders are allowed to attend religious services while on

cell restriction.” In its summary judgment order, the district court concluded

that TDCJ’s unequal enforcement of the cell restriction policy violated RLUIPA,

but did not reach a decision as to the validity of the policy itself. The policy was
No. 09-50078

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subsequently abandoned before the bench trial, but, despite being urged to

dismiss the claim as moot by the Defendants, the district court concluded that

the policy itself did not violate RLUIPA or § 1983.

On appeal, this court reviews determinations of mootness de novo.

Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2009). A claim

is moot when the parties are no longer “adverse parties with sufficient legal

interests to maintain the litigation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lares–Meraz,

452 F.3d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). In Sossamon, this court

addressed an identical challenge to the cell restriction policy and concluded that

TDCJ’s abandonment of the policy mooted the plaintiff’s RLUIPA challenge to

that policy. Id. at 326. In reaching that conclusion, this court noted that,

although “a defendant has a heavy burden to prove that the challenged conduct

will not recur once the challenged conduct is dismissed as moot, government

actors in their sovereign capacity and in the exercise of their official duties are

accorded a presumption of good faith because they are public servants, not selfinterested private parties.” Id. at 325. We therefore stated that, “[w]ithout

evidence to the contrary, we assume that formally announced changes to official

governmental policy are not mere litigation posturing” and concluded that an

affidavit from the Director of the TDCJ stating that the cell restriction policy

had been changed satisfied the government’s burden of making “ ‘absolutely

clear’thatthe cell-restriction condition cannot ‘reasonably be expected to recur.’

” Id.

DeMoss’s challenge to the cell restriction policy is factually

indistinguishable from that this court dismissed as moot in Sossamon. As in

Sossamon, the Defendants submitted an affidavit from the TDCJ Director

stating that the cell restriction policy had been abandoned and that all inmates

on cell restriction would be allowed to attend religious services. Id.

Furthermore, DeMoss has presented no evidence from which this court can
No. 09-50078

1 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Sossamon on the limited issue of

“ ‘[w]hether an individual may sue a State or state official in his official capacity for damages

for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc

et seq. (2000 ed.).’ ” Sossamon v. Texas, — U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 3319 (2010). Despite the grant

of certiorari, we continue to follow Sossamon as binding precedent. See, e.g., Wicker v.

McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 157–58 (5th Cir. 1986).

6

concludeTDCJ’s “voluntary cessation is a sham for continuing possibly unlawful

conduct.” Id. Therefore, TDCJ’s abandonment of its cell restriction policy moots

DeMoss’s claim for injunctive and declaratory relief. See id. at 326; see also

Harris v. City of Houston, 151 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e find it beyond

dispute that a request for injunctive relief generally becomes moot upon the

happening of the event sought to be enjoined.”). Accordingly, we vacate the

district court’s judgment, insofar as it held that the cell restriction policy did not

violate RLUIPA or DeMoss’s constitutional rights. See Sossamon, 560 F.3d at

326 & n.15 (“When . . . a party who has prevailed below makes the case moot by

his unilateral action, a vacatur must be granted.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

b. Monetary Damages

DeMoss seeks monetary damages “for the times he was denied access to

religious services” under the cell restriction policy, which the district courtfound

violated RLUIPA to the extent that it had been unequally enforced by TDCJ

staff. Although this claim is not mooted by Defendants’ change to the cell

restriction policy, see Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 326, DeMoss is not entitled to

damages from the unequal enforcement of the cell restriction policy. RLUIPA

does not create a cause of action for damages against “Texas and the defendants

in their official capacities,”1 nor does it create a “cause of action against

defendants in their individual capacities.” Id. at 331 & n.51. Furthermore, to

the extent DeMoss seeks compensatory damages stemming from the unequal

enforcement of the policy, that claim is also barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
No. 09-50078

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because he has not alleged any physical injury stemming from the cell restriction

policy. Mayfield, 529 F.3d at 605–06.

3. TDCJ’s Religious Text Policy

DeMoss next argues that the district court improperly dismissed his

challenge to TDCJ’s religious text policy, which forbids inmates from carrying

a pocket Bible or Qur’an in certain locations. In his complaint, DeMoss stated

that the policy against allowing a Bible or Qur’an at medical appointments

deprived him of his ability to read them while he sought medical care. In his

response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, DeMoss stated that he

had twice been denied his pocket Qur’an during medical visits and that TDCJ

policies also prevented him from carrying a pocket Bible or Qur’an while on job

assignment, while in the recreation yard, and while in transit. The district court

determined that DeMoss had failed to state a claim because he had failed to

prove that “a temporary lack of access to reading material places more than a de

minimis burden on his right to free speech or the exercise of his religion.” See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1).

This court employs the same de novo standard to review the dismissal of

a claim pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act as it uses to review

dismissal pursuantto Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Black v. Warren,

134 F.3d 732, 733–34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). A complaint will survive a

motion to dismiss if it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, — U.S. —,

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). A plaintiff meets this standard when he “pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendantis liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Id.

We agree with the district court and conclude that DeMoss failed to state

a claim entitling him to relief regarding TDCJ’s religious text policy. There is
No. 09-50078

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no dispute that reading the Qur’an is part of DeMoss’s religious practice. In his

complaint and response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, DeMoss

emphasized the importance ofthe Qur’an to those ofthe Muslim faith and stated

that reading the Qur’an provided him with “useful studies and development

toward proper morality.” However, DeMoss’s complaint was deficient because

the facts, as pled, did not demonstrate a plausible conflict between TDCJ’s

policies and his religious practice. DeMoss alleged that the TDCJ policies had

prevented him from carrying a pocket Qur’an with him out into the recreation

yard, on two medical visits, and while on job assignment. Crucially, DeMoss did

not allege that these restrictions required him to “act in a way that violated his

religious beliefs,” Adkins, 393 F.3d at 570, by forcing him to abandon his study

of the Qur’an. Nor did his complaint allege facts that suggested he was forced

to choose between studying the Qur’an as his faith required and a generally

available, non-trivial benefit. See id. Based on how DeMoss characterized his

religious practice, therefore, he did not allege facts from which the district court

could conclude that the TDCJ policies “truly pressure[d] him to significantly

modify his religious behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs.” Id.

On appeal, DeMoss characterized his religious practice as requiring him

to “read Qur’an daily as well as to memorize and recite,” and claims that TDCJ’s

transit policy denied him access to his Qur’an for five days after the conclusion

of his bench trial. These factual allegations were not in his original complaint

or response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, so we do not consider

them. See, e.g., Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491 n.26 (5th Cir.

1999) (“An appellate court . . . may not consider facts which were not before the

district court at the time of the challenged ruling.”). Therefore we affirm the

district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim.
No. 09-50078

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4. TDCJ’s Dayroom Policy

DeMoss next challenges the district court’s ruling regarding TDCJ’s policy

against allowing inmates to stand for long periods of time in prison dayrooms.

As explained to the district court, inmates must sit in the dayrooms to ensure

thatthe roving security officer has an unobstructed view of inmate conduct while

they use the dayrooms. After the bench trial, the district court concluded that

this policy did not violate RLUIPA because it did not impose a substantial

burden on DeMoss’s religious exercise and was the “least restrictive means of

addressing a compelling governmental interest.” There is no dispute that

DeMoss’s religious practice requires him to pray five times a day at set times for

anywhere from four to twenty minutes, during which time he must stand, kneel,

and bow. Therefore, we consider first whether DeMoss has met his burden of

proving that the dayroom policy imposes a substantial burden on his ability to

pray.

DeMoss argues that TDCJ’s dayroom policy imposes a substantial burden

on his religious practice because it requires him to choose between praying in a

timely manner or standing during prayer in violation of the dayroom policy,

which could result in further disciplinary action. This argument does not give

a complete picture of the burden the dayroom policy imposes on DeMoss’s ability

to pray. DeMoss’s ability to stand, kneel, and bow is not restricted in the

recreation yard or in his cell, and he has hourly access to these locations from

the dayroom. Thus, DeMoss is not faced with a choice between timely saying his

prayers and violating TDCJ policy, but rather must choose between using the

dayroom during certain hours and praying. Although the dayroom policy

burdens DeMoss by requiring him to anticipate when he mustleave the dayroom

to pray, this burden is not substantial because it does not pressure him to

significantly modify his religious behavior or significantly violate his religious

beliefs. Therefore, DeMoss is not entitled to relief on his claim that the dayroom
No. 09-50078

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policy was a substantial burden on the exercise of his religious beliefs, and we

need not address whether this policy advances a compelling state interest and

is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.

5. TDCJ’s Grooming Policy

DeMoss next challenges the district court’s ruling that TDCJ’s grooming

policy did not violate RLUIPA. This policy states that all inmates, except those

who have been issued medical exemptions, must be clean shaven. Although the

Defendants disputed whether DeMoss’s religious practice requires him to wear

a beard of some length before the district court, they have not reurged this

argument on appeal. Nor do the Defendants here challenge DeMoss’s assertion

thatthe grooming policy imposes a substantial burden on that religious practice.

Therefore, this issue turns on whether the district court properly concluded that

Defendants met their burden of proving that the grooming policy served a

compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive means of serving

that interest.

a. Compelling Interest

The district court identified several compelling interests that TDCJ’s

grooming policy served: it ensures rapid identification of inmates, it prevents

the concealment of dangerous contraband, and it reduces TDCJ’s operational

costs. Based on the evidence the district court heard during the bench trial, its

findings of fact regarding each of these concerns were not clearly erroneous.

The district court heard testimony from prison officials stating that the

grooming policy ensures inmates can be properly identified at security

checkpoints in the prison. Security staff at checkpoints rely on being able to

match the inmate’s face with the photograph on his identification card, which

shows him clean-shaven. Security staff cannot identify inmates by memory

because the staff size is small in comparison to the number of inmates, staff is

frequently rotated throughout different areas of the prison, and staff turnover
No. 09-50078

11

is frequent. Officials also testified that speedy identification issues are

exacerbated when an inmate has escaped because the public may not be able to

quickly identify an escaped inmate based on his identification picture if he has

grown a beard. Additionally, a TDCJ official testified that the grooming policy

enabled security staff to identify gang affiliations that could be covered by a

beard, which would frustrate efforts to administratively segregate gang

members with violent histories from the rest of the prison population. Finally,

the district court heard testimony from several prison officials thatthe grooming

policy ensures that inmates are not able to conceal bits of razor, cell phone SIM

cards, and other contraband in their beards. Based on these prison safety and

public safety concerns, the grooming policy furthers compelling state interests.

See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n.13 (stating that “prison security is a compelling

state interest”); Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 904 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding

that a grooming policy regarding hair length is related to prison security and

advances a compelling state interest); cf. Green v. Polunsky, 229 F.3d 486, 490

(5th Cir. 2000) (concluding that, in context of a § 1983 claim, a prison’s beard

prohibition advances the legitimate penological interest of inmate identification).

b. Least Restrictive Means

DeMoss also disputes the district court’s conclusion that the compelling

state interests advanced by the TDCJ’s grooming policy could not be advanced

by any different or lesser means. The district court heard testimony from

several prison officials explaining why neither of DeMoss’s proposed alternatives

to the grooming policy—allowing a religious exemption or allowing all inmates

to grow one-quarter-inch beards—satisfied the prison’s compelling security

concerns. As noted above, testimony from TDCJ officials uniformly stated that

allowing either a religious exemption or allowing all inmates to grow onequarter-inch beards would exacerbate the difficulty in identifying inmates at
No. 09-50078

2 With respect to this claim and his recording policy claim, DeMoss also argues that the

district court failed to issue a “proper pretrial order defining the remaining issues for trial”

because its order regarding the motions for summary judgment led him to believe that he had

been granted summary judgment on whether these policies imposed a substantial burden on

his practice of Islam. He avers that this mistaken belief prevented him from presenting

evidence at trial to meet his burden of proof on those issues, but the record below hints at no

such confusion. First, the district court explicitly stated that neither DeMoss nor Defendants

were entitled to summary judgment on either of DeMoss’s claims. Second, DeMoss presented

evidence at trial on the alleged burden these policies imposed on his religious exercise.

Therefore, this argument is without merit.

12

checkpoints, increase the burden of searching for contraband, and complicate

identification in the event of escape.

Furthermore, the district court’s finding that a partial, or total, repeal of

the grooming policy would impose additional costs on TDCJ is not clearly

erroneous. The district court heard uncontroverted testimony that allowing a

religious exemption would impose a significant administrative burden on prison

chaplains, who already spend the vast majority of their time on administrative

duties. A general repeal of the grooming policy to allow for one-quarter-inch

beards would avoid imposing an administrative burden on the chaplaincy, but

would require TDCJ to purchase additional grooming equipment and hire more

barbers thereby increasing administrative costs. Controlling these costs is a

compelling state interest of its own. See Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 125

(5th Cir. 2007) (stating that a TDCJ policy related to maintaining order and

controlling prison costs involves a compelling governmental interest).

Additionally, the district court heard testimony that TDCJ security would be

unable to ensure inmates’ beard length did not exceed one-quarter inch because

the number of inmates who would wish to grow beards would likely be sizeable.

Therefore, Defendants have met their burden of proving that the grooming policy

is the least restrictive means of serving the compelling interests of prison

security and controlling costs, and it does not violate RLUIPA.2
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6. TDCJ’s Recording Policy

DeMoss’s final RLUIPA challenge is to TDCJ’s recording policy. Muslim

religious services, unlike those of all other religious groups, may be held without

prison staff or volunteers present because of a TDCJ consent decree allowing

that exemption. Therefore, TDCJ tape records all inmate-led Muslim religious

services to ensure the religious services take place and to aid in investigating

potential disciplinary violations. The district court concluded that this policy did

not impose a substantial burden on DeMoss’s exercise of religion because he had

not shown any “real burden to the exercise of the Muslim religion as a result of

the recording policy, much less a substantial one.”

On appeal, DeMoss contends thatthe policy imposes a substantial burden

on his religious exercise because Muslims “can be threatened by prison officials

for preaching the tenets of our faith, using the tape as evidence.” The district

court wholly rejected this contention, noting that this allegation was

unsupported by evidence in the record and “contradict[s] the testimony of every

TDCJ official who testified.” Prison officials unanimously testified that tape

recordings are not used to discipline inmates for the discussion of religious

topics. DeMoss disputed this evidence by testifying to a lone incident in which

an inmate was threatened with discipline for disparaging other religions during

a Muslim service. None of his witnesses stated that he had personally been

disciplined for discussing religious topics at inmate-led gatherings, that the

recordings of religious services had ever been used to discipline him, or that the

recording policy prevented him from discussing religious topics at inmate-led

services. Therefore, the district court’s finding of fact that Muslim inmates could

not be threatened with disciplinary proceedings for participating in religious

discussion was not clearly erroneous. Because DeMoss has not identified how

the recording policy pressures him to significantly modify his religious behavior,
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14

we agree with the district court’s conclusion that TDCJ’s recording policy does

not impose a substantial burden on DeMoss’s religious practice.

B. DeMoss’s § 1983 Claim

DeMoss’s final argument is thatthe district court erred in concluding that

the TDCJ recording policy does not violate his First Amendment rights.

Although DeMoss asserted many constitutional claims under § 1983 before the

district court, on appeal, he has explicitly disclaimed all save his challenge to the

recording policy. After the bench trial, the district court rendered judgment in

favor of Defendants on this claim, stating that the recording policy did not

dissuade inmates from attending or participating in Muslim religious services

and was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in security.

Prison regulations thatlimit an inmate’s fundamental rightto free speech

are valid if they are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Satisfying the Turner test requires the

court to determine: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection between

the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to

justify it”; (2) whether “there are alternative means of exercising the right that

remain open to prison inmates”; (3) what“impact accommodation ofthe asserted

constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates”; and (4) whether

there is an “absence of ready alternatives.” Id. at 89–90 (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

DeMoss argues that the recording policy is irrational and does not serve

any legitimate TDCJ interest. As noted above, the recording policy ensures that

TDCJ is able to investigate into possible disciplinary violations that may have

occurred during inmate-led religious services and, relatedly, ensures that

services stay on religious topics. TDCJ officials first became aware of the need

to record inmate-led religious services when a tape was shown at an

unmonitored religious service that contained anti-government rhetoric,
No. 09-50078

15

promoted violence, and disparaged other religious groups. Thus, the district

court correctly concluded that the recording policy had a rational connection to

the legitimate governmental interest in prison safety.

Additionally,TDCJ’s recording policy did notforeclose alternative avenues

of religious expression. DeMoss presented scant evidence that the recording

policy stifled his ability to express his religious beliefs at religious services; as

discussed above, the overwhelming evidence in the record stated that religious

service recordings were not used to punish inmates for religious discussion. See

Mayfield, 529 F.3d at 609 (asking “whether the regulation entirely stifles the

prisoner’s religious expression”(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Furthermore, the Defendants point out that the only alternative to

recording religious services would be to have staff or approved outside volunteers

present, or, as with other religious groups, cancel services when no staff or

volunteers are available. Either alternative would saddle TDCJ with additional

administrative costs,take staff away from other postings in the prison, or reduce

the number of services available for Muslim inmates. See Mayfield, 529 F.3d at

610 (noting that “prison security could be seriously compromised by the need to

remove personnel from their usual security posts”). Thus, DeMoss has failed to

point to “an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de

minimis cost to valid penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the judgment ofthe district courtis AFFIRMED.

All pending motions are DENIED.