alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Gary F. Cirillo, Petitioner, v Board of Education of the Herkimer Central School District, Respondent.

*1004Memorandum: There is substantial evidence to support the determination that petitioner, a custodian employed by respondent, failed to maintain two boilers, misused his sick leave on two occasions and unnecessarily disrupted a kindergarten orientation program. Given the potential danger to the school pupils and personnel created by petitioner’s failure to maintain the boilers, the penalty of dismissal is not so disproportionate to the charges as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness *(see, Matter of Pell v Board of Educ.,*34 NY2d 222, 233-234). (Article 78 proceeding transferred by order of Supreme Court, Oneida County, O’Donnell, J.). Present — Doerr, J. P., Denman, Green, Pine and Schnepp, JJ.
Filed # C14597-97
                                                                    Feb 15, 2002
                                                                In the office of
                                                  Dean Heller, Secretary of Sate



                           Certificate of Amendment to
                          Articles of Incorporation for
                               Vanstar Films, Inc.
                      (Pursuant to NRSD 78.385 and 78.390)




1.       Name of Corporation: Vanstar Films, Inc.

2.       The Articles have been amended as follows:

         Paragraph First of the Articles of Incorporation,  relating to the name
         of the  Corporation,  is hereby  amended  to read in its  entirety,  as
         follows:

         "First: The name of the Corporation is Garuda Capital Corp."


3.       Pursuant to a resolution of the Corporation's  Board of Directors,  the
         foregoing  Certificate of Amendment was duly approved by an affirmative
         vote of the holders of a majority of the Corporation's 1,247,575 shares
         of  common  stock  outstanding  and  entitled  to vote on the  proposed
         amendment,  and therefore  sufficient  for approval,  all in accordance
         with the General Corporation Law of Nevada and the existing Articles of
         Incorporation and by-laws of the Corporation.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, VANSTAR FILMS, INC. has caused this Certificate of Amendment
of be signed by its President as of the date below.

VANSTAR FILMS, INC.


By: // John Curry, President//

Dated: February 14, 2002
#### PEOPLE ex rel. O’CONNOR, Appellant, v. ROOSEVELT et al., Respondents.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

December 11, 1896.)

Certiorari by William W. O’Connor against Theodore Roosevelt and others.

R. J. Robeson, for appellant.

T. Farley, for respondents.

No opinion. Proceedings affirmed, with costs.
#### In re FAIRCHILD. In the matter of objections to the certificate of nomination of Ben L. Fairchild for representative in congress for the Sixteenth congressional district.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

October 29, 1896.)

No opinion. Order appealed from affirmed, with costs and disbursements.
EXHIBIT
      32.1








**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








In
      connection with the quarterly report of eLinear, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form
      10-QSB/A (Second Amendment) for the quarter ended March 31, 2005, as filed
      with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
      Michael Lewis, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
      18
      U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.










/s/ Michael
      Lewis


Michael
      Lewis,


Chief
      Executive Officer


August
      12, 2005








A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      eLinear, Inc. and will be retained by eLinear, Inc. and furnished to the
      Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Arroyo, Appellant.

Despite the fact that burglary in the second degree may be committed by either entering *or*remaining unlawfully on the premises (Penal Law § 140.25), the instant indictment charged that the defendant had "entered and remained unlawfully” (emphasis supplied). The trial court did not err, however, in instructing the jury that they could render a verdict of guilty upon either finding (see, *People v Charles,*61 NY2d 321; *People v Rooney,*57 NY2d 822). Nor did it abuse its discretion *(see, People v Reising,*106 AD2d 522) in refusing to adjourn the imposition of sentence, since the information in the presentence report which the defendant sought to controvert had no effect on the sentencing decision. The sentence imposed does not warrant modification on appeal *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Lazer, J. P., Thompson, Weinstein and Eiber, JJ., concur.
#### NASSOIY v. TOMLINSON et al.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department.

January 18, 1894.)

Action by J. Felix Nassoiy against David H. Tomlinson and others.

No opinion. Judgment and order appealed from affirmed on the former opinion written in this case. 65 Hun, 491, 20 N. Y. Supp. 384.
#### Theodore Frois v. William H. Mayfield.

The plaintiff has the right to take a non-suit at any time before the jury retires from the bar. . (Paschal’s Dig.,. Art. 1464, Note 562.)

Even after the defendant has pleaded in reconvention the plaintiff may take a non-suit, especially if the plea present no cause of action. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3446, Note 797.)

Appeal from Karnes. The case was tried before Hon. George W. Scott, one of the district judges.

The suit was on a note. The plea in reconvention was frivolous.

*L. S. Lawhan,*for plaintiff in error.

Ho brief for the defendant in error has been furnished to the *Reporter.*

Latimer, J.

—This suit was instituted by the appellant *367against the appellee and one R-oehuck upon a promissory note signed by said Roebuck and appellee.

Mayfield, who appears to have been the only real defendant in the court below, pleaded that he was only the security for Roebuck, and that he was damaged in the sum of $3,000 by the failure of the plaintiff to use diligence in the collection of the debt from Roebuck. When the case came .on for trial the plaintiff offered the note in evidence, and the defendant objected to its introduction on the ground of variance. The court sustained the objection.

The plaintiff then proposed to take a non-suit. The court would not allow the non-suit, and the case proceeded, resulting in a verdict and judgment for the defendant. It is not necessary for us to determine whether the court ruled correctly or not upon the objection to the admissibility of the note in evidence.

If there was any real difficulty, it can easily be removed on another trial, and the judgment must be reversed for error in refusing the motion of the plaintiff to take a non-suit.

The judge below no doubt proceeded upon the idea that the plaintiff could not take a non-suit because the defendant had pleaded in reconvention. The proper and better practice would have been for the plaintiff to have excepted to the plea of reconvention, but he was not bound to do so. The former decisions of this court have allowed much lattitude to the plea of reconvention, but it has never been allowed to a defendant to plead damages to a suit upon his own promissory note. Thé' plea of reconvention must aver what would be a good cause of action. (Woodward v. Rogers, 20 Tex., 178.) In the present case the plea set forth no cause of action. This being so, the plaintiff had a right to suffer a non-suit at any time before the jury retired from the box, or at least at any time before the judge had committed the case to them. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1464.) The judgment is reversed, and the cause

Remanded.
#### RICH et al. v. SARGENT GRANITE CO.

(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.

May 18, 1894.)

Action by Percy Rich and others against the Sargent Granite Company. .

Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and FOLLETT and PARKER, JJ.

No opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements.
#### In re PETERSON’S ESTATE. In the matter of the estate of Eugene Peterson, deceased.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

June, 1896.)

No opinion. Motion granted, with $10 costs.
EXHIBIT 99.1


         Written Statement of the President and Chief Executive Officer
                       Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350


Solely for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, I, the
undersigned President and Chief Executive Officer of Ridgestone Financial
Services, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge,
that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the quarter ended
September 30, 2002 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Paul E. Menzel
-------------------------------------
Paul E. Menzel
President and Chief Executive Officer
November 13, 2002
#### Deborah Hayes, Appellant, v Tatsios Vasilios et al., Respondents. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[947 NYS2d 550]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Taylor, J.), dated August 10, 2011, as, upon renewal, in effect, vacated its prior order dated May 19, 2011, which denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident, and thereupon granted the defendants’ motion.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination, upon re*1011newal, that the defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident *(see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345 [2002]; *Gaddy v Eyler,*79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]), albeit for different reasons. The plaintiff alleged that she suffered, inter alia, injuries to the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar regions of her spine as a result of the accident. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, and the Supreme Court’s finding, the report from the defendants’ examining neurologist, Dr. Maria DeJesus, was sufficient to satisfy the defendants’ prima facie burden as to the alleged injuries to the regions, even though Dr. DeJesus did not review the plaintiffs medical records, since she performed objective tests showing full range-of-motion in the regions of the plaintiff’s spine *(see e.g. DeJesus v Paulino,*61 AD3d 605, 607 [2009]; *see also Staff v Yshua,*59 AD3d 614 [2009]; *Rodriguez v Huerfano,*46 AD3d 794, 795 [2007]).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The plaintiff relied on the medical report of her treating radiologist, Dr. Linda Harkavy, based on an examination. This report, while in admissible form, merely revealed the existence of a disc bulge at L3-4, and a “tiny . . . disc protrusion” at L4-L5. The mere existence of a bulging disc, in the absence of objective evidence as to the extent of the alleged physical limitations resulting from that injury and their duration, is not evidence of serious injury *(see Scheker v Brown,*91 AD3d 751, 752 [2012]).

Accordingly, upon renewal, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, vacated its prior order dated May 19, 2011, denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and thereupon properly granted the motion. Skelos, J.E, Dickerson, Hall, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.
#### WINKEMEIER v. WINKEMEIER.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

December 22, 1896.)

Divorce—Judgment fob Plaintiff—Allowance fob Plaintiff’s Appeal.

Where plaintiff has a final judgment dissolving the marriage, giving her the custody of her child, and awarding alimony for her and its support, a motion for counsel fees, to enable her to have the question of alimony reviewed, must be supported by a meritorious showing.

Appeal from special term, Kings county.

Action by Maud B. Winkemeier-against Christian F. Winkemeier for divorce. From an order awarding to plaintiff’s attorneys a counsel fee of $500 to prosecute plaintiff’s appeal from a judgment in her favor, defendant appeals.

Reversed.

*584' Argued before BROWN, P. J., and CULLEN, BARTLETT, HATCH, and BRADLEY, JJ.

James C. Cropsey, for appellant.

James R. Soley, for respondent.

BRADLEY, J.

The plaintiff having recovered judgment for divorce, giving to her the custody of her child, and awarding an annual allowance of $2,400 for herself and child, appealed from the judgment; and thereafter the plaintiff moved for the allowance of, $800 for the payment of expenses theretofore incurred, and the sum of $500 for the payment of counsel fees and other expenses necessary to prosecute the appeal. The court could not properly allow against the defendant any sum to the plaintiff to pay her past expenses. Code Civ. Proc. § 1769; Beadleston v. Beadleston, 103 N. Y. 402, 8 N. E. 735; McCarthy v. McCarthy, 137 N. Y. 500, 33 N. E. 550. Assuming that the amount awarded by the order was to enable the plaintiff to prosecute her appeal, the question arises whether it can, in that view, be supported. She had her final judgment dissolving the marriage and granting her the other relief before mentioned. Some reason must be made to appear fairly requiring or justifying the claim for the allowance. If the appeal had been taken by the defendant, it might he seen, from that fact, that the plaintiff would require pecuniary means to defend her judgment against the attack of the appeal. McBride v. McBride, 119 N. Y. 519, 23 N. E. 1065. Our attention is called to no case in which allowance has been made to the wife as an appealing party from a judgment recovered by her. Without holding that there may not be cases in which such relief might be permissible, those in which it would be allowed must present a meritorious reason for it. The purpose of the appeal from the judgment, as indicated in the motion, is to review the determination of the court upon the question of alimony. The evidence upon that subject, given on the trial, is not, nor is the record upon which the appeal may be heard, before us; and, so far as facts are presented by the affidavits and papers upon which the motion was heard, we arp unable to see any well-founded support for the allowance made for the expenses by the order.

The portion of the order appealed from should be reversed, and the motion denied, without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to renew the motion at special term on showing some merit in its support. All concur.
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 20-2661

___________________________ Jeremiah Preston Trapp lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v. Dat Tran, Acting United States Secretary of Veterans Affairs 1

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin

____________ Submitted: February 3, 2021 Filed: February 11, 2021 [Unpublished]

____________ Before KELLY, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM.

1 Dat Tran has been appointed to serve as Acting Secretary of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, and is substituted as appellee pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c).In this Title VII action, Jeremiah Preston Trapp appeals the district court’s 2

adverse grant of summary judgment on his retaliation claim. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Trapp, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, see Findlator v. Allina Health Clinics , 960 F.3d 512, 514 (8th Cir. 2020) (de novo review), we conclude Trapp did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation, see AuBuchon v. Geithner , 743 F.3d 638, 641 (8th Cir. 2014) (elements of prima facie case). The judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. 3

______________________________

2 The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

3 We have not considered the matters Trapp raises for the first time on appeal, see Stone v. Harry , 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (declining to consider pro se appellant’s allegations, arguments, or claims not raised before the district court); or the exhibits he offers which were not part of the summary judgment record, see Barry v. Barry , 78 F.3d 375, 379 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting this court considers only evidentiary materials before the trial court when the summary judgment ruling was made). -2-
Exhibit 21.1

Subsidiaries of Edgewater Technology, Inc. as of December 31, 2008. Edgewater Technology, Inc. owns one hundred percent (100%) of the issued and outstanding shares of each of the following subsidiaries.



|                                                                           |  |                           
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | --------------------------
|Subsidiary                                                                 |  | State or Country of Origin
|Edgewater Technology (Delaware), Inc.                                      |  | Delaware, USA             
|                                                                           | 
|Edgewater Technology (Europe) Limited                                      |  | United Kingdom            
|                                                                           | 
|Edgewater Technology Securities Corp.                                      |  | Massachusetts, USA        
|                                                                           | 
|Edgewater Technology-Ranzal, Inc.                                          |  | Delaware, USA             
|                                                                           | 
|Edgewater New York Metro, Inc. (formerly National Decision Systems, Inc.)* |  | New Jersey, USA           
|                                                                           | 
|Edgewater Technology-Lynx, Inc.                                            |  | Delaware, USA             



|    |  |                                                                                                                      
|--- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|* - |  | Edgewater New York Metro, Inc. was legally merged into Edgewater Technology (Delaware), Inc. as of December 31, 2008.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM (A) THE
COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE FORM 10-K FOR THE
YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH (B) FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
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<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                      67,617,743
<SECURITIES>                                 1,240,749
<RECEIVABLES>                               61,361,714
<ALLOWANCES>                                 4,944,213
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           151,222,328
<PP&E>                                      59,387,684
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             244,210,969
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       85,390,511
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<COMMON>                                        52,075
<OTHER-SE>                                 151,602,300
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               244,210,969
<SALES>                                    333,351,852
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           333,351,852
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              217,140,803
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           112,035,849
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                              4,323,056
<INCOME-TAX>                                10,326,225
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (6,003,169)
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<NET-INCOME>                                (6,003,169)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.12)
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</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1997
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