alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 235 Engrossed in House (EH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 235

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
          To permanently extend the Internet Tax Freedom Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Permanent Internet Tax Freedom 
Act''.

SEC. 2. PERMANENT MORATORIUM ON INTERNET ACCESS TAXES AND MULTIPLE AND 
              DISCRIMINATORY TAXES ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE.

    (a) In General.--Section 1101(a) of the Internet Tax Freedom Act 
(47 U.S.C. 151 note) is amended by striking ``during the period 
beginning November 1, 2003, and ending October 1, 2015''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to taxes imposed after the date of the enactment of this Act.

            Passed the House of Representatives June 9, 2015.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
114th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 235

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

          To permanently extend the Internet Tax Freedom Act.
```
# STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT 2022 CA 1042 JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES, LLC D/B/A HOPE MEDICAL GROUP FOR WOMEN, KATHALEEN PITTMAN, AND MEDICAL STUDENTS FOR CHOICE, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ITS MEMBERS VS. JEFF LANDRY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LOUISIANA,AND COURTNEY N. PHILLIPS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE NO. 720988

4: 1 On August 16, 2023, this court issued a decision that, for the reasons stated therein, reversed and remanded this matter. On August 16, 2023, the Appellants filed an Exception ofNo Right ofAction. 

## OnAugust 18, 2023,theAppellants filed anApplication for Rehearing astotheAugust 16, 2023 decision rendered in this matter. In consideration ofthe above, it appears that the assertions made in the August 

### 16, 2023 Exception ofNo Right ofAction are more properly addressed atthe trial court 

### on remand as ordered bythis court in its decision, andtherefore, we do not address the merits of the Exception of No Right of Action. 

### Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Exception of No Right ofAction is DISMISSED. Furthermore, 

### IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Application for Rehearing is DENIED. PMc GH HG Ordered this 

### day ofSeptember 2023.

DEPU Y ERK OF COURT
exv4w16






Exhibit 4.16




CERTIFICATE OF TRUST

OF

EVANS CAPITAL TRUST III




     THIS Certificate of Trust of Evans Capital Trust III (the “Trust”), is being duly executed and
filed by the undersigned, as trustees, to form a statutory trust under the Delaware Statutory Trust
Act (12 Del. C. § 3801 et seq.) (the “Act”).



     1. Name. The name of the statutory trust being formed hereby is Evans Capital Trust
III.



     2. Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the trustee of the Trust with a
principal place of business in the State of Delaware are Wilmington Trust Company, Rodney Square
North, 1100 North Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19890-0001, Attention: Corporate Trust
Administration.



     3. Effective Date. This Certificate of Trust shall be effective upon filing.



[Signature page follows]





 









 







     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the trustees of the Trust, have executed this
Certificate of Trust in accordance with Section 3811(a)(1) of the Act.




	 	 	 	 	 
	 	WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY,

not in its individual capacity but solely as

trustee

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ Geoffrey J. Lewis	 
	 	 	Name:  	Geoffrey J. Lewis	 
	 	 	Title:  	Senior Financial Services Officer	 
	 
	 	ADMINISTRATIVE TRUSTEES

 	 
	 	/s/ David J. Nasca
 	 
	 	Name: DAVID J. NASCA, 

not in his individual 	 
	 	capacity but solely as Administrative Trustee 	 
	 
	 	 	 
	 	                                                    /s/ Gary A. Kajtoch
 	 
	 	Name:  GARY A. KAJTOCH, 

not in his individual 	 
	 	capacity but solely as Administrative Trustee 	 
	 
	 	 	 
	 	                                                 /s/ John B. Connerton
 	 
	 	Name:  JOHN B. CONNERTON, 

not in his individual 	 
	 	capacity but solely as Administrative Trustee
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 74 (Monday, April 17, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 20457]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-9539]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[FRL 6567-4]


Proposed Administrative Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue Under 
Section 122(h) of CERCLA for the Lawton Property Superfund Site

AGENCY: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA).

ACTION: Proposal of Administrative Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue 
Under Section 122(h) of CERCLA with Hoskins for the Lawton Property 
Superfund Site.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (``CERCLA''), as amended, 42 
U.S.C. 9601 et seq., notice is hereby given that a proposed 
Administrative Agreement and Covenant Not to Sue Under Section 122(h) 
of CERCLA (``Agreement''), 42 U.S.C. 9622(h), for the Lawton Property 
Superfund Site located in Detroit, Michigan, has been executed by the 
Settling Party, Hoskins Manufacturing Company, Inc. (``Hoskins''). The 
proposed Agreement would resolve certain potential claims of the United 
States under Section 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9607, against Hoskins. 
The proposed Agreement would require Hoskins to pay the EPA Hazardous 
Substance Superfund $27,000 for reimbursement of response costs. No 
further U.S. EPA response actions are contemplated at this time.

DATES: Comments on the proposed Agreement must be received by U.S. EPA 
on or before May 17, 2000.

ADDRESSES: A copy of the proposed Agreement is available for review at 
U.S. EPA, Region 5, 77 West Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois 60604. 
Please contact Ms. Orelia E. Merchant at (312) 886-2241, prior to 
visiting the Region 5 office.
    Comments on the proposed Agreement should be addressed to Orelia E. 
Merchant, Office of Regional Counsel, U.S. EPA, Region 5, 77 West 
Jackson Boulevard (Mail Code C-14J), Chicago, Illinois 60604.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Orelia E. Merchant at (312) 886-2241, 
of the U.S. EPA, Region 5 Office of Regional Counsel.
    A 30-day period, commencing on the date of publication of this 
notice, is open for comments on the proposed Agreement pursuant to 
section 122(i) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9622(i). Comments should be sent to 
the address identified in this document.

Richard C. Karl,
Acting Director, Superfund Division, Region 5.
[FR Doc. 00-9539 Filed 4-14-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-M
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-7728

TIMOTHY EUGENE BROWN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Director,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga, 

District Judge. (1:10-cv-00773-AJT-JFA)

Submitted: February 28, 2011 Decided: March 9, 2011

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KING and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Timothy Eugene Brown, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Timothy Eugene Brown seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006)

petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice 

or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. We have independently reviewed the record 

and conclude that Brown has not made the requisite showing. 

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
3

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

DISMISSED
#### Young v. The State.

Appeal from Jefferson Criminal Court.

Tried before the Hon. Samuel E. Greene.

*656D. B. Anderson, for appellant.

Charles G. Brown, Attorney-Géneral, for the State.

Opinion by

McClellan, C. J.

The appellant was tried and convicted under the following indictment: “The grand jury of said county charge that before finding of this indictment, E. P. Decker, alias F. P. Dicker, alias F. P. Declcard, alias F. P. Dackart, whose Christian name is to the grand jury unknown, and James Young and Tom Bruce, feloniously took and carried away from or in the store house of Birmingham Arms and Cycle Co., a corporation under the laws of the State of Alabama, seven pistols of the aggregate 'value of one hundred and nine dollars, nine pairs of scissors, of the aggregate value of three and 60-100 dollars, ten pocket knives of the aggregate value of fifteen dollars,” &c., “all of the aforesaid, property being the personal property of the said Birmingham Arms and C3rcle Co., a body corporate as aforesaid, against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama.” •

This indictment was demurred to upon the following ground: It fails to allege that the storehouse from which the property is averred to have been stolen, was a storehouse and used as such, at the time the alleged offense was committed. This demurrer was overruled, and the defendant duly excepted.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jasper Walker, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Linakis, J.), rendered June 6, 1985, convicting him of assault in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The issue of the alleged bolstering testimony elicited from police witnesses at trial has not been preserved for appellate review as a matter of law *(see,*CPL 470.05). In any event, although there was error, it was harmless in light of the identification evidence produced at trial *(see, People v Johnson,*57 *NY2d 969; People v Williams, 109*AD2d 906; *cf. People v Green,*104 AD2d 451, 452). Because of the overwhelming evidence of identity, the court’s identification charge, although not as detailed as the defense requested, was proper as it provided an accurate statement of the law *(see, People v Whalen,*59 NY2d 273, 279; *People v Beasley,*114 AD2d 415, 416; *People v Smith,*100 AD2d 857, 858).

Finally, it was proper for the court to permit the prosecutor to elicit direct testimony of a witness through leading questions. The record indicates that the witness was an unwilling one and that there was little danger of her acquiescing in the prosecutor’s suggestions as to the perpetrator’s identity, since she had known the defendant prior to the incident *(see generally,*McCormick, Evidence § 6, at 11-12 [3d ed]). Rubin, J. P., Lawrence, Hooper and Spatt, JJ., concur.
# C_2021463EN.01001701.xml

| 16.11.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 463/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.11.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 463/17

---

Summary of European Commission Decisions on authorisations for the placing on the market for the use and/or for use of substances listed in Annex XIV to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH)

(Published pursuant to Article 64(9) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (1))

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2021/C 463/16)

Decision granting an authorisation

| Reference of the decision (2) | Date of decision | Substance name | Holder of the authorisation | Authorisation number | Authorised use | Date of expiry of review period | Reasons for the decision |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C(2021) 7884 | 9 November 2021 | 4-(1,1,3,3-Tetra methylbutyl)phenol, ethoxylated
  (4-tert-OPnEO)
  EC No: -, CAS No:- | Vetter Pharma-Fertigung GmbH & Co. KG, Schuetzenstrasse 87, 88212 Ravensburg, Germany | REACH/21/9/0 | As emulsifier in the siliconisation of glass containers used as primary packaging for two specific medicinal products (NutropinAq® and Lucentis®) of one pharmaceutical company. | 4 January 2026 | In accordance with Article 60(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, the socio-economic benefits outweigh the risk to human health and the environment from the use of the substance and there are no suitable alternative substances or technologies. |

Reference of the decision (2)

Date of decision

Substance name

Holder of the authorisation

Authorisation number

Authorised use

Date of expiry of review period

Reasons for the decision

C(2021) 7884

9 November 2021

4-(1,1,3,3-Tetra methylbutyl)phenol, ethoxylated

(4-tert-OPnEO)

EC No: -, CAS No:-

Vetter Pharma-Fertigung GmbH & Co. KG, Schuetzenstrasse 87, 88212 Ravensburg, Germany

REACH/21/9/0

As emulsifier in the siliconisation of glass containers used as primary packaging for two specific medicinal products (NutropinAq® and Lucentis®) of one pharmaceutical company.

4 January 2026

In accordance with Article 60(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, the socio-economic benefits outweigh the risk to human health and the environment from the use of the substance and there are no suitable alternative substances or technologies.

---

(1)  OJ L 396, 30.12.2006 , p. 1.

(2)  The decision is available on the European Commission website at: Authorisation (europa.eu)

---
EXHIBIT 10.1
                       EXTENSION OF PROMISSORY NOTE

$16,700.00                                            Santa Ana, California
                                                               May 18, 2001

     THE UNDERSIGNED promises to pay to the order of Mezzanine Capital Ltd.
at 1516 Brookhollow Drive, Suite D, Santa Ana, CA 92705, or at such other
place as the holder hereof may designate in writing, the sum of sixteen
thousand seven hundred dollars ($16,700.00), with interest thereon at the
rate of 10% per annum from the date of the original promissory note, May 18,
2000.  Principal and interest shall be due and payable one year from the date
hereof.  This note shall replace the promissory note for these funds
originally due on May 18, 2001.

     Prepayment of this note may be made at any time without penalty.

     In the event of commencement of suit to enforce payment of this note,
the undersigned agrees to pay such additional sum as attorney's fees as the
court may adjudge reasonable.

                                   Whitelight Technologies, Inc.

                                   By: /s/ Eric Bronk
                                       Eric Bronk, President
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jerry Stanley, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Rosato, J.), rendered December 3, 1984, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree and criminal *655possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence adduced at the trial in the light most favorable to the People, we find that the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to support the defendant’s conviction of the crimes charged *(see, People v Lewis,*64 NY2d 1111). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]).

In addition, we find that the trial court properly warned one of the People’s witnesses that he was subjecting himself to possible perjury or contempt charges due to his frequent lack of recall at trial *(see, People v Gottfried,*61 NY2d 617; *People v Lee,*58 NY2d 773). We reject the defendant’s contention that these admonitions coupled with the trial court’s allowing the witness to return to testify several days later denied the defendant a fair trial *(cf., Webb v Texas,*409 US 95; *People v Ramos,*63 AD2d 1009).

The defendant contends that his conviction of the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree *(see,*Penal Law § 265.02 [4]) cannot be permitted to stand together with his conviction of criminal use of a firearm in the first degree *(see,*Penal Law § 265.09 [1]) and that his conviction of manslaughter in the second degree *(see,*Penal Law § 125.15 [1]) cannot be permitted to stand with his conviction of manslaughter in the first degree because they are inclusory concurrent counts *(see,*Penal Law § 125.20 [1]). However, the defendant has failed to preserve these contentions for appellate review *(see, People v Josey,*131 AD2d 699).

Our review of the record indicates that the court fairly marshaled the evidence *(see, People v Owens,*69 NY2d 585, 591). Also, the defendant’s claim that his sentence was excessive is without merit *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80, 85). Finally, we have reviewed the defendant’s remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Lawrence, J. P., Eiber, Spatt and Sullivan, JJ., concur.
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  Exhibit 10.109    
    


 Summary of Discretionary Bonus Program  


        The Named Executive Officers participate in the Company's Discretionary Bonus Program. Under the discretionary bonus program, each
named executive officer is given key performance metrics and key results area (or KRA's), such as the performance of the particular officer or the accomplishment of specific objectives by such officer
and may include such other objective factors as the Company's profitability, revenue, cash flow, customer generation, market share and industry position. If the named executive officer achieves his
KRA's he is eligible to receive a bonus. No bonuses under the Discretionary Bonus Program are paid unless the Company achieves certain financial objectives. Discretionary Bonuses, if any, are paid
after the Audit Committee receives the audited financial statements, are distributed within two and one-half months of the close of the Company's fiscal year and are subject to certain
clawback provisions. The existence of the Discretionary Bonus Program does not entitle any of participants to receive any bonus under the Discretionary Bonus Program. The Discretionary Bonus Program
may be terminated or amended in whole or in part at any time by the Board of Directors or the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors in its sole and absolute discretion. 











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Exhibit 10.109
EXHIBIT 99.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report of United Energy Corp. (the "Company")
on Form 10-K for the year ending March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ronald Wilen, Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.
1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, thAT:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

Dated:   June 30, 2003              By: /s/ Ronald Wilen
                                       -----------------
                                       Ronald Wilen
                                       Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

This certification accompanies this Report on Form 10-K pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required
by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
(8 Misc. Rep. 308.)

#### GREENWICH WAREHOUSE CO. v. MAXFIELD.

(Common Pleas of New York City and County, General Term.

May 17, 1894.)

Counterclaim—Breach op Contract.

In an action for storage, charges, defendant may counterclaim for damages to the goods, caused by improper storage.

Appeal from, first district court.

Action by Greenwich Warehouse Company against Charles E. Maxfield to recover storage charges. There was a judgment in favor of defendant on a counterclaim, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BOOKSTAVER, BISCHOFF, and PRYOR, JJ.

Sullivan & Cromwell, for appellant.

Abner C. Thomas, for respondent.

BOOKSTAVER, J.

This action was brought by plaintiff to recover $219.05 storage charges for storing defendant’s fruit, consisting of mandarins and tangerines. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that the fruit was damaged, and rendered worthless, by being improperly stored, and judgment was given in his favor for $260 damages and costs. The return does not show that any exceptions were taken by either party upon the trial of this action. But appellant contends that, notwithstanding this, the judgment should be reversed on two grounds: First, that the evidence shows that the defendant knew the temperature at which the room in the storehouse where his goods were placed was kept, and that they were placed there with his knowledge and consent, and that the plaintiffs were not liable for any damages resulting from the freezing; also that it was a very cold day when the fruit was brought to the storehouse, *733and that it received the injury complained of during transit from the steamer to the storehouse. The testimony on behalf of the defendant, however, we think clearly warranted the justice in finding, as he did, that the fruit was to be taken and stored at a temperature ranging from 35 to 40, and, by failing to do this, but placing it in a temperature which caused the fruit to freeze, and thus ruining it, the appellant failed to perform its contract, and consequently failed to earn any storage whatever. On the other hand, if the appellant failed to keep its contract with the respondent of safely storing and keeping the fruit, it would be liable to respondent for the damages which the latter sustained by reason of that breach, and consequently the court below had the right to render judgment in favor of the respondent for the amount of that damage up to the extent of his jurisdiction. The judgment should therefore be affirmed, with costs. All concur.