J-S15030-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L., A MINOR 

APPEAL OF: L.L., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 2831 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Order Entered October 23, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000722-2023 

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.L., A 

MINOR 

APPEAL OF: L.L., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 2833 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Order Entered October 23, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000724-2023 

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.L., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: L.L., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 2834 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the Order Entered October 23, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000725-2023 
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BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 6, 2024

L.L. (Mother) timely appeals1 from the orders adjudicating three of her 

children, J.L., then aged fourteen; N.L., then aged five; and M.L., then aged 

two (collectively, Children), dependent; removing them from Mother’s home; 

and committing them to the custody of the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (DHS). Mother argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

adjudicate Children dependent and to place Children in foster care. We affirm. 

Factual Background 

Mother resides in “a really big house” with four to seven bedrooms. 

N.T., 10/23/23, at 68, 71. On August 7, 2023, DHS filed dependency petitions 

for six of Mother’s minor children, three of whom are the subject of this 

appeal.2 See, e.g., Juvenile Ct. Certified Docket, CP-51-DP-725-2023, 

1/30/24, at 1, 3. For ease of reference, we refer to these six children as 

“Siblings.”3 At the dependency hearing on October 23, 2023, DHS withdrew 

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*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

1

 Mother’s three separate appeals were consolidated by this Court sua sponte

on November 21, 2023, as they involve related parties and issues. See Order, 

11/21/23, 2831 EDA 2023, 2833 EDA 2023, 2834 EDA 2023. 

2

 Specifically, DHS filed dependency petitions for the following children: A.L., 

S.L., Ny.L, J.L., N.L., and M.L. See Juvenile Ct. Certified Docket, CP-51-DP725-2023, at 3. 

3

 The testimony in this matter often references “children” without identifying 

which of the six Siblings was involved in the described incidents and 

conditions, which makes it difficult at times to identify whether Mother’s 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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its petition for the eldest of Siblings, A.L., as this child was no longer a minor. 

Id. at 4-5. Additionally, at the time of the hearing two of the Siblings, fifteenyear-old S.L. and eleven-year-old Ny.L. no longer resided with Mother. Id. at 

5, 13. 

At the October 23, 2023 dependency hearing, a DHS social worker and 

a Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) caseworker recounted their contacts 

with Mother’s household beginning in April 2023, including: three General 

Protective Services (GPS) reports,4 two Child Protective Services (CPS) 

reports, five DHS investigations in response to these reports, and weekly 

home visits to check in with Mother and Siblings. Trial Ct. Op., at 1-7; N.T. 

at 8-17, 22, 63; see also, e.g., Dependency Pet. for N.L., CP-51-DP-725-

2023, 8/7/23, at 2-8 (unpaginated). Mother, J.L., and Ny.L. also testified at 

the hearing. N.T. at 68-92, 92-99, 102, 110-116. 

It is undisputed that from April 2023 to October 2023, Mother had 

caused three Siblings to be involuntarily committed to inpatient psychiatric 

facilities.5 Trial Ct. Op. at 1-7; N.T. at 8, 11-13, 89-90. In June of 2023, S.L. 

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conduct applied to or was directed toward a specific child. Nonetheless, as 

Mother does not dispute that the testimony referencing “children” applied to 

all Siblings, we shall treat it as such. 

4

 The June 24, 2023 GPS report was validated, and the September 29, 2023 

GPS report was in the validation process at the time of the dependency 

hearing. N.T. at 8, 15. 

5

 Involuntary treatment of a person believed to be “severely mentally disabled 

and in need of immediate treatment,” and involuntary commitment of that 

person to an inpatient psychiatric facility, are governed by 50 P.S. §§ 7301-

7306. 
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disclosed to the DHS social worker that “[M]other would often lock [S.L.] out 

of the home. She would withhold food, [Siblings] were only being fed Oodles 

of Noodles and cereal, and [S.L.] essentially did not feel safe returning to the 

home when [S.L.] was discharged [from the psychiatric hospital].” N.T. at 

10. The report of this incident was determined to be valid. Id. Mother 

repeatedly refused to pick up S.L. from the psychiatric hospital when the 

facility was ready to discharge this child after an involuntary commitment 

initiated by Mother, and Mother only agreed to pick S.L. up after caseworkers 

met with Mother specifically to persuade her to do so. Id. at 8-9, 22-23. The 

DHS social worker testified that 

[M]other also did not want [S.L.] to return to the home. She 

preferred that S.L. be placed. 

And due to [S.L.] being declined placement, myself and CUA came 

out to [M]other’s home and we had a discussion, and in a sense, 

[M]other finally made contact with the case manager at the 

hospital, and [M]other picked [S.L.] up from the hospital. 

But if we did not have that conversation with [M]other, I don’t 

think [M]other would’ve been compliant with picking [S.L.] up 

from the hospital because [M]other wanted [S.L.] in placement. 

N.T. at 23 (some formatting altered). Mother testified that she did not want 

S.L. to return to her care as S.L. was self-harming and also harming N.L. and 

M.L. Id. at 83-84. 

The police have been called to Mother’s house “at least 50 times.” Id.

at 79, 89. Mother often called the police due to conflicts between herself and 

Siblings. Id. at 11, 79. Ny.L. and the CUA caseworker testified about Mother’s 
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physical abuse of Siblings, such as beating them with cords, stomping on their 

heads, and attempting to attack Ny.L. with a screwdriver. Id. at 15, 59, 95-

96. 

Testimony from the DHS social worker, J.L., and Ny.L described living 

conditions where while Siblings were not malnourished, Mother did not 

adequately feed them; that Mother withheld food from Siblings as a form of 

discipline or punishment; and that there was little nutritious food in the house 

during DHS visits. Id. at 10-11, 24-25, 33, 35, 95-97, 111. The DHS social 

worker, the CUA caseworker, Ny.L., and J.L. testified that in June 2023 Mother 

had disposed of Siblings’ mattresses and did not replace them, thereby forcing 

Siblings to sleep on the floor, sometimes with no pillows or blankets.6 Id. at 

16-18, 25, 57, 59-62, 64-67, 95, 116. When caseworkers informed Mother 

that these sleeping conditions for Siblings were unacceptable, Mother 

responded she had the means to purchase new bedding and would do so. Id.

at 16-18, 66-67. However, Mother did not purchase new bedding, and when 

the CUA caseworker gave J.L. an air mattress for his use, Mother returned the 

air mattress the following week. Id. Mother testified that she had disposed 

of the mattresses because they were soiled; that N.L. and M.L. sleep with her 

on a California king-sized bed; and that she does not force J.L. to sleep on the 

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6

 Ny.L. testified regarding sleeping conditions that, “We sleep on the floor[,]” 

and that “we sometimes get blankets. . . . Sometimes; not all the time.” N.T. 

at 95. 
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floor, but that he chooses to sleep on the floor instead of on a couch.7 Id. at 

70-72, 90. The juvenile court found Mother’s testimony that she does not 

force Siblings to sleep on the floor was not credible. Trial Ct. Op. at 8, 10-11. 

Both the DHS social worker and the CUA caseworker testified about their 

concerns with J.L.’s school attendance, noting that J.L. had already been 

absent 19 days in the first two months of the 2023-2024 school year. N.T. at 

18-19, 53-54. The CUA caseworker testified that J.L. had explained to her 

that “he was not attending because he was told to go wash up, and when he 

would come down – back downstairs, his mom was gone[,]” and that Mother 

had stated that “[J.L.] could walk” to school. Id. at 53-54. 

The DHS social worker testified that she had concerns about Mother’s 

and J.L.’s mental health, and recommended evaluations to identify any 

developmental delays for N.L. and M.L.; that Mother appeared to view 

Siblings, especially the older children, as her peers, and throughout the 

investigation Mother directed anger and aggression towards Siblings; that 

Mother had declined DHS’ offers of mental health therapeutic services; that 

Mother needed domestic violence counseling and a behavioral health 

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7

 In response to Mother’s testimony, Ny.L. testified: “When [Mother] said that 

we had the choice to sleep in the family room – no, we didn’t. She would 

force us to go upstairs. So, she would lock us out of the room and keep the 

babies in there[.]” N.T. at 93-94. J.L., when asked where he sleeps in 

Mother’s house, stated that he sleeps on the floor and that he does not have 

a choice about it, although he generally has a pillow and a blanket, and that 

he cannot sleep on the couch, as Mother testified, as Mother slept on the 

couch. Id. at 110-11. 
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evaluation before she could appropriately care for Siblings; and that Mother 

lacked adequate ability to care for Siblings’ daily basic needs. Id. at 20-28. 

The CUA caseworker ultimately testified that Siblings’ needs were not being 

met in Mother’s home and that Siblings were not safe in Mother’s home. Id.

at 61-62. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated Siblings 

dependent and ordered that Siblings be placed in foster care. As the juvenile 

court was issuing its ruling, Mother stated that she was not guilty of “any 

abuse or neglect on my children[,]” and that she “didn’t do anything wrong.” 

Id. at 107, 114-115. 

Mother filed timely notices of appeal from the order adjudicating 

Children dependent. Mother and the juvenile court both complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Mother raises the following issues on appeal: 

1. Whether the [juvenile] court erred in deciding the evidence 

having been sufficient for a finding of adjudication regarding 

J.L., M.L. and N.L. 

2. Whether the [juvenile] court erred in deciding the evidence 

having been sufficient for the removal of J.L., M.L., and N.L. 

from the family home. 

Mother’s Brief at 7 (some formatting altered). 

Finding of Dependency 

In her first claim, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in 

concluding that Children were dependent because DHS failed to prove by clear 
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and convincing evidence that Children were without proper parental care. Id.

at 11. Specifically, Mother contends that the evidence did not establish there 

was any threat to Children’s safety or health related to bedding. Id. at 13. 

Mother asserts that J.L. has adequate bedding but J.L. “elected to sleep 

somewhere else in [Mother’s] home.” Id. (citations omitted). Mother also 

claims there are no concerns for bedding for M.L. and N.L., who sleep in 

Mother’s bed. Id. Mother notes that the DHS social worker testified that 

Children were not malnourished. Id. Mother states that two-year-old M.L. 

and five-year-old N.L. “did not require mental health services” but is silent on 

this matter with regard to J.L., and does not address that the DHS social 

worker recommended early intervention and developmental evaluations to 

assess the status of M.L.’s and N.L.’s mental health. Id.; N.T. at 27-28. 

Our standard of review for dependency cases is to accept the findings 

of fact and credibility determinations of the juvenile court if they are supported 

by the record. In re E.B., 83 A.3d 426, 430 (Pa. Super. 2013). We are not, 

however, required to accept the juvenile court’s inferences or conclusions of 

law. Id. We therefore review for an abuse of discretion. Id. 

Dependency matters are governed by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 

6301-6375, which defines a “Dependent child,” in relevant part, as: 

A child who [] is without proper parental care or control, 

subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control 

necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. 

A determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or 

control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent, 

guardian or other custodian that places the health, safety or 

welfare of the child at risk[.] 
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42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. 

This Court has explained: 

The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care or 

control so as to be a dependent child encompasses two discrete 

questions: whether the child presently is without proper 

parental care and control, and if so, whether such care and 

control are immediately available. 

The burden of proof in a dependency proceeding is on the 

petitioner to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a 

child meets that statutory definition of dependency. 

In re G., T., 845 A.2d 870, 872 (Pa. Super. 2004)) (some formatting altered 

and emphasis added), see also E.B., 83 A.3d a 431 (same). “Moreover, a 

child should not be found to be dependent merely because a sibling has been 

adjudicated dependent.” G., T., at 845 A.2d at 872. 

 The G., T. Court affirmed dependency for a physically unharmed child, 

based on the severe harm that befell that child’s sibling who had also been 

adjudicated dependent. See id. at 873-74. In G., T., the harm to a sibling 

was caused by the parents’ “lack of knowledge and/or awareness of [the 

sibling’s] obvious and serious medical needs.” Id. The G., T. Court found 

that the parents’ ability to care for their children placed both children at risk, 

and the harm that had already been inflicted on the sibling could also happen 

to the child, as the conditions that led to that harm still existed. Id. 

In assessing whether a child is presently without proper parental care 

and control and, if so, whether such care and control are immediately 

available, “the [juvenile] court must consider ‘not only what sort of parental 
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care the child received in the past, but also what sort of parental care the child 

will receive if custody is given to the parents.’” In re Swope, 571 A.2d 470, 

472 (Pa. Super. 1990) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). Noting that 

evidence of “whether specific acts of abuse had occurred [] was sharply 

contested,” that no testimony addressed “what sort of care [child] would 

receive in the future if returned to [the parent,]” and that the record lacked 

sufficient evidence regarding the parent’s “abilities and shortcomings as a 

parent” or “whether [the parent’s] alleged acts were isolated incidents or were 

likely to recur[,]” the Swope Court remanded to determine whether the 

parent “would be incapable of rendering proper parental care in the future.” 

Id. at 473 (emphasis added; citation omitted). 

In In re R.W.J., this Court recognized that 

a finding of dependency can be made on the basis of prognostic 

evidence and such evidence is sufficient to meet the strict burden 

of proof necessary to declare a child dependent. In [re] Black, 

417 A.2d 1178 (Pa. Super. 1980) (holding prognostic evidence 

sufficient for finding of dependency of newborn infant where 

parent’s two previous children died because of parent’s improper 

care and failure to take necessary precautions). The [juvenile] 

court must make a comprehensive inquiry into whether proper 

parental care is immediately available or what type of care [a 

parent] could provide in the future. [In re] DeSavage, 360 A.2d 

237 (Pa. Super. 1976) (rejecting argument that child cannot be 

adjudicated dependent unless child is actually in custody of 

parents and they are shown unable to render care or control as 

defined by statute). In this regard, the DeSavage Court 

reasoned: 

. . . [T]he broad definition [of “dependent child”] 

enables the experienced juvenile court judge to apply 

his training and compassion to the unique facts of 

each case. 
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Id. at [] 242. 

In re R.W.J., 826 A.2d 10, 14-15 (Pa. Super. 2003) (emphasis added). 

Applying this approach to the question of dependency, R.W.J. approved of 

the juvenile court’s “full consideration of whether proper parental care is 

immediately available to [child] and what type of care [parent] can provide in 

the future.” Id. at 15 (citations omitted). 

 Here the juvenile court explained: 

Because of . . . Mother’s failure to provide mattresses for children, 

Children’s lack of mental health treatment, Children repeatedly 

being sent to mental health hospitals, Children’s truancy, and 

Mother’s failure to ensure Children’s basic needs are being met, 

this court does not believe Mother can provide Children with 

proper parental care and control. Accordingly, this court found 

sufficient evidence to adjudicate Children dependent pursuant to 

42 Pa. C.S.[] § 6302(1). 

Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10 (some formatting altered). 

 Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the juvenile court in adjudicating Children dependent. See E.B., 83 A.3d at 

430. The record shows that in a span of six to seven months in Mother’s 

household, Mother caused three of Children’s siblings to be involuntarily 

committed to psychiatric hospitals. N.T. at 8-9, 22-23. Mother refused to 

pick up one sibling from the psychiatric hospital until caseworkers intervened. 

Id. The police have been called to Mother’s home at least 50 times to 

intervene in frequent conflicts between Mother and Siblings, including conflicts 

which included allegations of Mother’s physical abuse of Siblings. Id. at 79, 

89, 95. Mother withheld food from Siblings as a form of discipline or 
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punishment, and when Mother did feed Siblings it was frequently noodles and 

cereal; additionally, the DHS social worker and the CUA caseworker reported 

finding little food in the house during visits and were concerned about whether 

Siblings were properly nourished. Id. at 10-11, 24-25, 33, 35, 95-97, 111. 

With regard to sleeping conditions, Mother testified that “[my two 

youngest children, M.L. and N.L.,] sleep with me in my California king-size 

bed.” Id. at 71. Ny.L., however, testified that “[Mother] would force us to go 

upstairs. So, she would lock us out of the [family] room and keep the babies 

in there, and be on the phone . . . . ” Id. at 93-94. J.L. testified that he slept 

on the floor and did not have a choice about it, and when asked whether he 

slept on the couch in the family room as Mother had testified, J.L. responded, 

“No, [Mother] sleeps on the couch.” Id. at 110-11. When the CUA 

caseworker gave J.L. an air mattress, Mother returned it to the caseworker 

the following week. N.T. at 64-67. The juvenile court found that Mother’s 

testimony that she does not force Siblings to sleep on the floor to be not 

credible, and that Mother forced Siblings, specifically including J.L., to sleep 

on the floor, even after caseworkers advised Mother that bedding was a 

necessity for Siblings and despite Mother having the means to obtain new 

bedding. Trial Ct. Op. at 8, 10-11. 

J.L. had missed 19 days of the 2023-2024 school year by October 23, 

2023. N.T. at 18-19, 53. When the CUA caseworker asked Mother about 

J.L.’s absences from school, Mother stated that J.L. could walk to school. N.T. 

at 53-54. The DHS social worker recommended a behavioral health evaluation 
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for J.L. as he “often comes across very withdrawn . . . [and because] he’s not 

attending school – just to find out what’s going on with him, to see if he’s 

willing to open up.” Id. at 27. 

It is unclear from this record whether M.L. and N.L. were themselves 

subject to physical abuse by Mother, but it is clear that they resided in 

Mother’s household when frequent incidents of conflict, including incidents in 

which physical abuse were alleged and police intervention occurred. Id. at 

79, 89, 95. The DHS social worker testified that she believed M.L. and N.L. 

would benefit from early intervention and developmental evaluations. Id. at 

27-28. 

Mother disavowed any abuse or neglectful conduct, and further asserted 

that she did nothing wrong. Id. at 107, 114-15. 

There is sufficient basis in the record to conclude that Mother is 

incapable of managing conflicts with Siblings without resorting to extreme 

measures such as having them involuntarily committed to psychiatric 

institutions, withholding food and bedding, and calling the police to intervene 

in parent-child conflicts in her household. Id. at 8-13, 6-18, 24-25, 33, 35, 

57, 59-62, 64-67, 89-90, 95-97, 111, 116. While it is unclear whether all of 

Mother’s harmful behaviors described in the record applied to all three 

Children, Mother’s disavowal of any problem with her management of conflict 

with Siblings is a prognostic factor which the juvenile court may take into 

account to conclude that Mother would likely apply the same treatment to 

Children when conflicts arise. See R.W.J., 826 A.2d at 14-15. 
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We conclude on this record that the juvenile court was within its 

discretion to find that the welfare, safety, and health of Children “continues to 

be jeopardized due to Mother’s forms of discipline[,]” that Mother is presently 

unable to provide Children with proper parental care and control, and that 

such care for Children is not immediately available. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302, 

E.B., 83 A.3d at 430-31; R.W.J., 826 A.2d at 14-15. Therefore, Mother is 

not entitled to relief on this issue. 

Foster Care 

In her second claim, Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order 

removing Children from Mother’s care and placing Children in foster care. 

Specifically, Mother argues that 

[e]ven assuming J.L. had bedding insufficiency, the issue could 

have been corrected and the child allowed to remain in the home 

were a bed ordered. With regard to M.L. and N.L. absolutely no 

evidence was provided supporting adjudication let alone removal 

of [M.L. and N.L.] from the family home. 

Mother’s Brief at 14.8 

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8

 Mother has not developed her argument for this issue beyond bald 

assertions, and failed to support her argument with citations to the record. 

See Mother’s Brief at 14. This Court has held that “[w]here an appellate brief 

fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or 

fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, 

that claim is waived.” In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citations omitted); see also Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 

2018) (explaining that this Court will “not develop an argument for an 

appellant, nor shall we scour the record to find evidence to support an 

argument” (citation omitted)); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (c) (providing that the 

argument section of appellate brief shall contain discussion of issues raised 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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After finding a child dependent, the juvenile court may enter an order 

of disposition that is “best suited to the safety, protection and physical, 

mental, and moral welfare of the child[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a). In crafting 

such a disposition, the juvenile court should only separate a child from a 

parent “when necessary for [the child’s] welfare, safety or health or in the 

interests of public safety[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(3). Before removing a 

dependent child from the care of a parent, the juvenile court must establish 

that such removal is a “clear necessity,” that is, that “alternate services that 

would allow a child to remain with his [or her] family are unfeasible.” A.N. v. 

A.N., 39 A.3d 326, 334 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted); see also 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6351(b). It is within the province of the juvenile court, “as fact 

finder, to determine whether [a child’s] removal from [his/]her family was 

clearly necessary.” A.N., 39 A.3d at 331 (citation omitted). 

 Here Mother does not acknowledge harm to Children in withholding food 

and bedding as a form of discipline, and failing to provide bedding for Children 

even after DHS informed her that this was necessary. Mother also does not 

acknowledge the harm that Children experienced due to frequent parent-child 

conflicts that routinely result in police intervention at Mother’s behest, and 

from Mother habitually managing such conflicts by having her children 

involuntarily committed to psychiatric hospitals. Mother has refused DHS’s 

____________________________________________ 

therein and citation to pertinent legal authorities and to the record). However, 

because we can discern Mother’s argument with respect to the juvenile court’s 

disposition of Children, we decline to find waiver in this instance. 
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offers of services such as domestic violence counseling and therapy to address 

her anger and aggression towards her children, and returned the air mattress 

provided to J.L. to address his lack of bedding. On this record, we find that 

the juvenile court had sufficient basis to conclude that alternate services that 

would allow Children to remain in Mother’s care were unfeasible and that 

removal was therefore necessary for Children’s welfare, safety, and health. 

See N.T. at 20-21, 67; 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a); A.N., 39 A.3d at 331, 334. We 

discern no abuse of discretion by the juvenile court in entering a disposition 

order that removed Children from Mother’s care. See E.B., 83 A.3d at 430; 

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a). 

Accordingly, Mother is not entitled to relief of her claims, and we affirm 

the juvenile court’s orders. 

Orders affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Date: 8/6/2024