The Honor able Joseph F. B ianco, of the United States District Court for the Easter n * District of Ne w York, sitting by desig nation. 0 7
- 5 3 2 7
- c v( L) T homas v . iStar

F inancial, I

nc. 

### UN ITED STA TES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS

F OR TH E 

### S ECOND 

### C IRCU IT

_____________________ August Term, 2008 (Argued: Fe bruar

y 24, 2009 Dec ided: Dec ember 17, 2010) Do c ke t N o. 07 -5 32 7- c v ( L ), 07 -5 51 0- c v ( XA P)

____________________ KEN NE TH J. T HOMAS , Plaintif f-Appellant-Cross-Appellee ,

— V .— I S T A R F I NANC I AL , I NC ., a Mar

yland cor poration and E D B AR ON , Defendants-A

ppellees- Cross-Appellant
.

____________________ B e fore : H A LL and L I VI NGS TON , Circuit Judges , and B I A N CO , District Judge
. *

_____________________ Kenne th J . Thomas appe als from orde rs of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York ( Marr ero, J .), inte r a lia : gr anting his and defe ndants iStar Financ ial, Inc. and E d Ba ron’s post-trial joint submissi on to reduc e the amount of punitive damag es aw arde d him by the jury ; and cor

rec ting a cler ical er

ror r eg ardingthe ca lculation of2

prejudg ment interest. We hold that Thomas is barr ed fr om contesting the re mitti tur of punitive damag es to which he voluntarily ag ree d. Additionally , we hold that the district cour t lacked jurisdiction to correc t its clerical mistake w ithout first obtaining leave fr om this C ourt to do so, but we now g rant that lea ve nunc pro tunc . B e c a

us e the re ma ini ngiss ue s r a ise d in bo th p art ie s’ appea ls are w ithout merit, we AF F IRM the district court’s judg ment in its entirety
.

A F F I RMED .

_____________________ D AVI D T. A ZR IN (David S. Douglas a nd Michelle P. Quinn on the brief ), Gallet Dr ey er & Be rkey

L L P, New Yor

k, NY, for

Plain tif f- Ap pe lla ntCross-Appellee
. B AR R Y A. G UR YAN (A. Jonathan Traf imow, on the brief

), Epstein B ecke r & G ree n, P.C., New York, NY , for De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lle es- Cro ssAppellant
.

_____________________ Per Curiam : In Augus t 20 03 , iS tar F ina nc ia l, I nc . ( “ iSta r” ) f ir e d K e nn e th T ho ma s. A ye ar a nd a ha lf later, Thoma s sued iStar and one of his supervisors ther e, Ed B aron, ( collectively “def endants” ) for va rious violations of Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , and para llel provisions of the New Y ork City Human Rig hts L aw ( “NYCHRL ”), N .Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. After a trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New Y ork (Ma

rre ro, J .) , a jur y fo un d th a t T ho ma s’ s te rm inatio n w a s in re ta liatio n f

or c omp la int s he had ma de about B aron, a nd it awar ded compe nsatory and punitive damag es. B oth sides now appea l numerous issues related to pre- trial, trial, and post-tria l proce eding s.3

Thomas appe als from orde rs, inte r a lia : gr anting his and defe ndants’ post-trial joint
s u b m i s s i o nt o re d

u ce th e a m o un to f p un i t i v e d am age s aw ar d edh i mb y th e j ury an d co rr ec t i n g a cler ical er ror in the c alculation of pr ejudg ment interest. We hold that Thomas is barr ed fr om contestingthe re mitti tur of punitive damag es, to which he voluntarily ag ree d. Additionally , we hold that the district court lac ked jurisdiction to corre ct its clerica l mist ake w ithout first obtaining leave from this Court to do so, but we now g rant that lea ve nunc pro tunc . Be cause the
rema inder of T homas’s and de fenda nts’ appea ls are w ithout merit, we AF F IRM the district
c o urt ’ s j u d g m e n ti ni t s e n t i r e ty. I. Bac kgr ound In his complaint, Thomas asserte d that defe ndants fire d him both because he is Afr icanAm e ri c an a

nd in r e ta liatio n f

or c omp la int s h e ma de a

bo ut r a c ist

tr e a tme nt at iSt ar. He a lso claimed that, while he was e mploy ed, def endants c reated a hostile work e nvironment. The dis tr ic t c ourt

g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt a g a ins t T ho ma s o n th e ho sti le wo rk e nv ir onme nt c la im but allowed his discriminatory termination and re taliation claims to go to trial. Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc. (“ Tho ma s I

” ), 43 8 F . Su

pp . 2 d 3 48 , 3 68 -6 9 ( S.D .N .Y . 2 00 6) . Ajur y su bs e qu e ntl y found that def

endants we re not motivated by rac ial animus when they

fired T homas, but that they did a c t in re ta liatio n f

or pr e vio us c omp la int s T ho ma s h a d lo dg e d a bo ut B aro n. I t awa

rd e d h im compensatory

damag es in the for

m of front-pa

y , back- pay , and non-e conomic pain a nd suffe ring damag es. The jur

y also assesse d punitive damag es ag ainst iSt ar in the a mount of $1.6 mill ion dollars. Post-trial, the district court dete rmined that the punitive dama g e aw ard w as unconstitutionally

excessive, Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc. (“ Thomas II ”), 508 F . Supp. 2d 252, 262-Th e dis tr ic t c ourt a lso g ra nte d th e de fe nd ants ’ R

ule 59 (a ) m oti on

wi th r e sp e c t to 1 damag es for

“fr ont-pay .” Thomas II

, 5 08 F . Su

pp . 2 d 2 64 -6 5. Th oma s d oe s n ot c on te st t his as p ec to f t h e c o urt ’s ru l i n g. 4 64 (S .D .N .Y . 2 00 7) , a

nd Th oma s a g re e d in

the fo rm of a joi nt s ub mis sio n to a

re mit tho se damag es, Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc. (“ Thomas III ”), 520 F . Supp. 2d 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The district cour

t also decide d to awar d Thomas pre judge ment interest on his bac k-pay damag es. Thomas II

, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 264. Althoug h Thomas ar g ued that the Ne w York statut or y int e re st r ate sh ou ld b e a

pp lie d to c a lc ulate that awa rd , th e c ourt

de te rm ine d th e int e re st should be ca lculated usingthe applica ble rate under

fede ral law
. Id. In a subseque nt order
re late d to Th oma s’ s r e mittit ur of punit ive dama g e s, ho we ve r, the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr on e ou sly direc ted the Clerk of

Court to calculate Thomas’s pre judgme nt interest using the New York rate. Orde r Gra

nting JointSubmis sion for Reduction of Punitive Dama g es, Nov. 21, 2007, Dkt. No. 89. When the district court re alized its m istake, it issued a cor rec ted orde r direc ting the Cler k of the Court to rescind the e arlier judgme nt and to calc ulate the pr ejudg ment interest usingthe fede ral rate, as set f

orth in Thomas II

. O rd e r C or

re c tin g Ca lc ulatio n o f P re jud g me nt I

nte re st, Dec . 7, 2007, Dkt. No. 96. B y the time the district court took this action, howeve r, Thomas ha d alre ady filed a notice of appe al. Notice of Appea l, Nov. 28, 2007, Dkt. No. 92. II. Discussion Rem ittitur of P uni tive Dam ages On September

7, 2007, the district court c onditionally g rante d defe ndants’ motion for a new tria l under F ed R. Civ. P. 59(a) on the issue of punitive damag es bec ause it dete rmined that the jur y ’s punit ive dama g e awa

rd wa s unc on sti tut ion a l. Thomas II , 508 F. Supp. 2d at 264-265. 1 I t or de re d th at a

ne w tri a l on

punit ive dama g e s w ou ld b e sc he du le d unle ss T ho ma s a g re e d to5

remit his punitive damag e aw ard f rom $1.6 milli on to $190,000—the maxi mum amount that the court found c onsistent with the Fifth Amendment’s D ue Proce ss require ment. Id. After
unsucce ssfully

moving f or re consideration of the Rule 59 motion, see Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc

. , 520 F. Supp. 2d 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) , Thomas and the de fenda nts filed a joint submiss ion askingthe district court to re duce, “ as a matter of law ,” his punitive damag e aw ard f rom $1.6 milli on to $190,000 without opti on for a new tria l. Thomas III

, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 485. The district court g rante d the re lief re quested in the joint submissi on, and Thomas now a ppeals the district court’s “ decision af ter trial to vac ate the jur

y ’s punitive damag e aw ard.” (PlaintiffAppellant-Cross-A

ppellee’ s Br . 39.) In Thomas II

, the district court off

ere d Thomas a r emittitur. Thomas could have a new trial on the issue of punitive dama g es, takinghis chanc es with a ne w jury ’s deter mination, or he could voluntarily

remit his damag es, re ducingthem to a known amount. It is settled law that “a plaintiff in fede ral c ourt, whethe r prose cuting a state or fede ral c ause of

action, may

not appea l from a r emittitur order he has ac cepte d.” Donovan v . Penn Shipping Co., Inc. , 429 U.S. 648, 650 (1 97 7) ; se e als o Wri g ht, Mil le r & Ka ne , F e de ra l Pr a c tic e and

Pr oc e dure : Civ il 2 d § 28 15 (“ [I ]t is now clea r that a pla intiff may

not appea l the propriety

of a r emittitur to which he ag ree d, whether under pr otest or not.”). The joint submissi on yielding the order in Thomas III

a pp e ars to h ave be e n a

n e ff or t to evade the rule ba

nning a ppeals of a cce pted re mitti turs. There is no real distinction, howeve r, be tw e e n a

pla int if f who a c c e pts a

re mittit ur rathe r t ha n f a c e the un c e rt a in o utc ome of an a pp e a l,
and po ssi bly a ne w tri a l, a

nd on e wh o p e tit ion s th e dis tr ic t c ourt to o rd e r a

n id e nti c a l r e du c tio n in damag es without the possibili ty of a ne w trial. More over, the re r emains the fa ct that Thomas6

himself moved for the reduc tion of his puniti ve dama g e aw ard. H e ca nnot now appea l the district court’s de cision to gr ant that motion. Be cause Thomas may

not now appea l the district court’s orde r in Thomas III , he has no mecha nism by which to cha lleng e the district cour t’s constitutional analy sis related to punitive damag es in Thomas II

. As such, we deny

the appe al without decidingwhether the jury ’s orig inal punitive damag e aw ard of $1.6 milli on was c onstitut ionally excessive. P rej udgme nt Intere st Th oma s a lso c la ims that th e dis tr ic t c ourt sh ou ld h ave or de re d p re

jud g me nt i nte re st o n h is compensatory

damag es to be c alculate d based on the New Y ork state inter est rate rathe r than the low e r f e de ra l inte re st r ate . F or

su pp or t he c ite s Ma rfi a v . T. C. Zi ra at B an k as i , 147 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1998), for

the proposition that “fe dera l law does not apply to the calc ulation of prejudg ment interest on supplementa l state law c laims.” Th is a rgume nt i s w ith out me ri t. Wh e re a s Ma rfi a c on c e rn e d d ama g e s o n s tate law c la ims alone ( the jury

havingfound for

the def endant on a ll feder al claims), id. at 85, Thomas re ceive d
an aw ard of

damag es that compe nsated for both fede ral a

nd state cla ims without distinguishing be tw e e n th e tw o. As the dis tr ic t c ourt state d, and

we no w h old , ju dg me nts that are ba se d o n b oth state and fe de ra l la w w ithre sp e c t to wh ic h n o d ist inc tio n is dr awn sh a ll h ave a

pp lic a ble int e re st calc ulated at the f

eder al intere st rate. See Thomas II , 508 F. Supp. 2d at 264. In so holding, we
a do pt t he pe rs ua siv e pr a c tic e of

a numbe r o f d ist

ri c t c ourt s in

thi s Ci rc uit

that ha ve pr e vio us ly considere d the issue. See Kup e r v . E mp ireBlueCro ss a nd

BlueSh ie ld , No. 99 Civ. 1190, 2003 WL23350111, at *3-*5 (S.D.N.Y . Dec . 18, 2003) (c iting ca ses), adopted by 2004 WL97685 (S .D .N .Y . Jan . 2 0, 20 04 ); see also Press v . Concord Mortg. Corp. , N o . 0 8 Ci v . 9 4 9 7 , 2 0 0 9 WLThe c ases c ited in Genao that applied the Ne w York pr ejudg ment interest rate rather 2 tha n th e fe de ra l r ate are dis tin g uis ha ble . B oth inv olv e d th e c a lc ulatio n o f p re jud g e me nt i nte re st for da mag es under

the FL SA and New

York L abor L aw whe re the plaintiff re ceive d liquidated damag es in addition to lost wage s. Heng Chan v. Sung Yue Tung Corp. , No. 03 Civ. 6048, 2007 WL13 73 11 8, at *1 (S .D .N .Y . M ay 8, 20 07 ); Doo Nam Y

ang v. ACBL Corp. , 427 F. Supp. 2d 32 7, 34 0- 41 (S .D .N .Y . 2 00 5) . B e c a us e the F L SA d oe s n ot a llo w f or any pr e jud g me nt i nte re st wher e plaintiffs a lso rece ive liquidated damag es, Brock v . Superior Care, Inc. , 840 F.2d 1054, 1064 (2d Cir. 1988), these courts aw arde d prejudg ment interest solely on the basis of the N ew York L abor L aw. Heng Chan , 2 00 7 WL 13 73 11 8, a t *9 ; Doo Nam Y ang , 427 F. Supp. 2d at 342. In other wor ds, these ca ses ar e more in line with Ma rfi a than with any of those cited a

bove. Th e y sta nd fo r t he pr op os iti on

that w he re pr e

jud g me nt i nte re st c an o nly be awa rd e d o n th e ba sis of what is solely

a state c laim, it is appropr iate to use the state interest rate. 7 6758998, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. D ec. 7, 2009) ; K i n n e a r yv . C i t yo f N
. Y. , 536 F. Supp. 2d 326, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d on other grounds by 60 1 F .3 d 1 51 (2 d Ci r. 20 10 ); cf
. Genao v . Blessed Sacrame nt Sch. , No. 07 CV 3979, 2009 WL3171951, at *10 & n.21 (E.D.N.Y . Oct. 1, 2009) (stating that “whe re liability exis ts under both the [Fair L abor Standa rds Act] and Ne w York L abor L aw, it is more appr opriate to [use] the feder al intere st rate” for pr ejudg ment interest, but noting that at least two district courts have used the state inter est rate in FL SA case s). 2 Thomas ar g ues that eve n if the fe dera l rate should have applied, the district cour t was without jurisdiction t o impose that rate by corr ecte d order

in Dece mber 2007 be cause an appe al from the c ase ha d alre ady been doc keted. Thoma s is corre ct in this respec t. Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedur e 60(a ) does in fa ct re quire a district court to seek le ave f rom this Court for the
corr ection of a

cler ical mistake whe re a

n appea l is already

pending . Thus, unless we g rant permission for the district c ourt to corr ect its mistake, the De cembe r orde r is without effe ct. Cooper v. Coregis Ins. Org. , No. 96-9250, 1997 WL589907 at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 23, 1997) (u np ub lis he d o pin ion ); see also Burger King Corp. v. Horn &Hardart Co. , 893 F.2d 525, 527 (2 d Ci r. 19 90 ); Leonhard v. United States , 633 F.2d 599, 609- 10 (2d Cir. 1980). That said,There can be no question that the err or wa s g enuinely cler ical. The district court’s orde r 3 dir e c tin g a

pp lic atio n o f t

he Ne w Y or

k r a te c ame mor e tha

n tw o mo nth s a ft e r i t e xpre ssl y deter mined that the fe dera l rate should apply
. Com pa re Thomas II

, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 264, with Orde r Gra

nting JointSubmis sion for Reduction of Punitive Dama g es, Nov. 21, 2007, Dkt. No. 89. 8 howeve r, we now g rant the district c ourt leave to corre ct its clerica l mist ake nunc pro tunc . 3 Cooper , 1997 WL589907, at *2. Pa rt i es ’ O th er Cl a i ms In a dd iti on

to t he c la ims a lr e a dy

a dd re sse d, the pa

rt ie s r a ise a

va ri e ty of oth e r c la ims , which re quire only

brief disc ussion. Thomas asserts that the district cour t erre d by : (1) dec iding his ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt c la im o n s umm ary jud g me nt; and

(2 ) d ir e c tin ga

ve rd ic t a g a ins t h i mo nth e i s s u e o f

c e rt a i nc o n s e qu e n t i a l d am a g e s . T h e d e f e n d an t s c l a i mth e c o urti mp r o p e r l y: (1) r efuse d them summary judgme nt or judg ment as a matter of law on Thomas’s re taliation
c la im; (2 ) a llo we d th e iss ue of punit ive dama g e s to re a c h th e jur y ; ( 3) a dmi tte d c e rt a in te sti mon ia l e vid e nc e , in c lud ingthat f ro m T ho ma s’ s e xpe rt

wi tne ss; and

(4 ) a llo we d th e jur

y to deter mine Thomas’s lost wag es rather than de termining the issue itself. Wit h respe ct to Thomas’s cla ims, the district court did not err. It corre ctly g rante d summary judgme nt on his hosti le work e nvironment claim bec ause no r easona ble jury could have found the “ occa sional and isolated” e vents Thomas complaine d of, Tho ma s I , 438 F. Supp. 2d at 363, wer e seve re or

perva sive enoug h to cre ate a n abusive wor

k environment. See H

arris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). L ikewise, e vidence that Thomas had a sked for an advanc e on his bonus some eig ht months before he was fir ed wa s an insufficie nt basis for a
rea sonable jury

to find that damag es re lated to Thomas’s inability to close on a house wer eAlthough w e have never addre ssed the issue, def

endants may

be cor rec t that fede ral 4 courts should also treat as equitable da mag es for violations of pendent state la w claims that ar e “virtually identical” to Title VI Iclaims. Saunders v. M adison Square Garden, L.P. , 06 Civ. 589, slip op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2007) (Ly nch, J .). B eca use the de fenda

nts consented to a jur

y trial on this aspect of da

mag es, howe ver, w e nee d not resolve the issue he re.

9 rea sonably

fore seea ble to the def

endants. Se e Ha dle

yv . B ax e nd

ale , 9 Ex ch 341, 156 ER 145 (Eng . 1854). De fe nd ants ’ c la ims on

a pp e a l are a lso wi tho ut m e ri t. A s th e dis tr ic t c ourt no te d in its denial of summar

y judgme nt on the reta liation claim, Thomas offe red e vidence from which a jury could infer

that Ba ron har bored a reta liatory

animus and wa s involved in the company ’s dec ision to fire Thoma s. Tho ma s I , 438 F. Supp. 2d at 366-67. Similarly , the re cord r evea ls sufficient evidenc e for

a jury find that iStar was re ckless—and thus susce ptible to puniti ve dama g es—by allowing Ba

ron to participate in the dec ision to t erminate Thomas when se nior offic ials at the
c omp any kn e w the tw o me n d id n ot g e t a lon g . It is a lso c le ar t hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a bu se its discretion with respec t to the testimony it allowed—expert, see Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael , 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999), or othe rwise, see O ld Chief v. United States , 5 19 U. S. 172, 174 n.1 (1997). F inally , while def endants a re c orre ct that lost wag es under Title VI Iare
e qu i t a b l e an d , th e r e f

o r e , n e e d n o tb e tr i e d

b y a j ur y, Robinson v. Me tro-North Commuter R.R. 4 Co. , 2 67 F .3 d 1 47 , 1 57 -5 8 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 1) , e c on omi c dama g e s und e r t he statut e may

ne ve rt he le ss be tried by

a jury if both sides consent. Tse v. UBS Fin. Se rvs., Inc
. , 568 F. Supp. 2d 274, 295-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ( Ly

nch, J .). Such conse nt may

be express or implied. Id. at 296 (“[D]efenda

nt’s silence in the f

ace of plaintiff’s pr oposed cur e [give s] rise to a constructive consent to try

the claims to the jury .”). B eca use the de fenda

nts cannot point to any

wher e in the
rec ord whe re the y

objected to the district c ourt submitti ng the issue of ba ck-pa y damag es to the10

jury , they have c onstructively

consente d to the jury

trying that issue and have waived a ny
c ha lle ng e to i t. III . C onc lusi on F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED
.