UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

_________________________________

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Complainant

vs.

NATHAN RILEY WILSON

Respondent

_________________________________

Docket Number 2021-0453

Enforcement Activity No. 7275325

DECISION AND ORDER

Issued: December 21, 2022

By Administrative Law Judge: Honorable Michael J. Devine

Appearances:

LT KYLE BURNS

Sector Jacksonville

and

ANDREW MYERS, ESQ.

USCG S&R NCOE

for the Coast Guard

NATHAN R. WILSON, Pro se

Respondent
2

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) initiated this case on August 25, 

2021, by filing a Complaint seeking revocation of Nathan R. Wilson’s (Respondent) 

merchant mariner credential (MMC). The Complaint contained two charges: 1) 

conviction under National Driver Register Act, under 46 U.S.C. § 7703(3), and 2) 

conviction that would preclude the issuance of an MMC, under 46 U.S.C. § 7703(2). 

Specifically, the Coast Guard asserted in Charge 1 that Respondent was convicted 

in a Florida state court of violating Florida statute “S316.193(1)(A), DUI – Under 

Influence of Alcohol or Chemical Substance; Faculties Impaired.”1 The Complaint also 

alleged Respondent’s conviction is an offense described in the National Driver Register

Act, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30304(a)(3)(A), as identified in 46 U.S.C. § 7703(3). 

Next, the Coast Guard asserted in Charge 2 that Respondent was convicted in a 

Florida state court of violating Florida statute “S784.03(1)(A), Battery - Cause Bodily 

Harm – Domestic.”2 The Complaint further alleged Respondent’s conviction is “an 

offense that would prevent the issuance or renewal” of an MMC, under 46 U.S.C. §

7703(2). 

On September 8, 2021, Respondent filed an Answer denying all jurisdictional and 

factual allegations. Respondent also set forth an “affirmative” defense, asserting 

“unrepeatable circumstances and extenuating” and requested a hearing and settlement 

discussions.

1 The citation to the statute is Fl. Stat. Ann. § 316.193(1)(a), but court documents show the conviction as 

“S316.193(1)(A).”

2 The citation to the statute is Fl. Stat. Ann. § 784.03(1)(a).
3

Thereafter, the ALJ convened several pre-hearing telephonic conferences. The 

general subject matter of those conferences was to discuss scheduling and other 

procedural matters. The Coast Guard filed a Motion for Partial Summary Decision on 

November 30, 2021, requesting the ALJ find both charges in the Complaint proved, 

leaving only the issue of an appropriate sanction to go to hearing. On December 29, 

2021, the ALJ issued an Order Partially Granting and Partially Denying Coast Guard’s 

Motion for Partial Summary Decision, finding Charge 1 proven, and finding the Coast 

Guard failed to present sufficient undisputed facts to prove Charge 2. 

On January 25, 2022, the ALJ conducted a hearing on Charge 2 and the 

appropriate sanction, using the Zoom for Government video-conferencing application. 

Andrew Myers, Esq., and LT Kyle Burns represented the Coast Guard. Respondent

appeared on his own behalf. During the hearing, the Coast Guard called two witnesses 

and offered eleven exhibits, seven of which were admitted and four were rejected. See

Attachment A “List of Exhibits and Witnesses.” Respondent testified on his own behalf 

and offered one exhibit, which was admitted.3 After the hearing, the ALJ issued a

briefing order providing a copy of the transcript and allowing both parties to file posthearing briefs. The Coast Guard submitted its brief on March 30, 2022. To date,

Respondent has not submitted a post-hearing brief. 

This matter is now ripe for decision. In the Order of December 29, 2021, the ALJ 

found Charge 1 proven, so this decision addresses the merits of Charge 2 and the

determination of an appropriate sanction. After considering the entire record as a whole, 

the ALJ finds the Coast Guard PROVED the allegations in Charge 2 of the Complaint by 

3 The Coast Guard’s objection to the exhibit was initially sustained but the exhibit was subsequently 

admitted when Respondent testified.
4

a preponderance of the evidence. After consideration of all of the evidence in the record,

including matters of aggravation and mitigation, I find that the appropriate sanction is

revocation of Respondent’s MMC, with the sanction of revocation STAYED for a 

period of 24 months’ probation, with an immediate outright suspension for the first 

12 months of the 24-month period.

FINDINGS OF FACT

After considering the record as a whole, including the hearing transcript and posthearing brief, the ALJ finds the following facts proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence: 

1. Respondent has held a Coast Guard-issued MMC since 2015. [Tr. at 23-24; 

Ex. CG-001].

2. Respondent currently holds MMC Number . [Tr. at 90; Ex. CG001].

3. On December 3, 2020, the Circuit Court for Duval County, Florida, convicted 

Respondent of driving under the influence of alcohol or chemical substance, 

under Florida Statute Ann. § 316.193(1)(a). [Tr. at 60; Exs. CG-007, CG008].

4. On January 16, 2020, the Circuit Court for Duval County, Florida convicted 

Respondent of battery (domestic) under Florida Statute Ann. § 784.03(1)(a). 

[Tr. at 60; Exs. CG-002, CG-004].

DISCUSSION

Coast Guard Suspension and Revocation (S&R) proceedings are remedial, not 

penal, in nature, and are intended to promote safety at sea. 46 U.S.C. § 7701(a); 46 

C.F.R. § 5.5. Pursuant to 46 C.F.R. § 5.19, an ALJ holds the authority to suspend or 

revoke a mariner’s MMC in a hearing for violations arising under 46 U.S.C. § 7703.
5

A. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is a question of fact and must be determined before the substantive 

issues of the case are decided. Appeal Decision 2620 (COX) (2001). For actions based 

on charges under 46 U.S.C. §§ 7703(2) (conviction of an offense that would prevent 

issuance or renewal of an MMC) and 7703(3) (conviction of an offense under 49 U.S.C. 

§ 30304(a)(3)(A) or (B)), the Coast Guard must establish the mariner was a holder of an 

MMC at the time he or she was convicted of the alleged offenses, and must demonstrate 

that the mariner was convicted of offenses within the scope of 46 U.S.C. § 7703(2) or 46 

U.S.C. § 7703(3). See e.g., Appeal Decision 2717(CHESBROUGH) (2017) and Appeal 

Decision 2563 (EMERY) (1995). 

As noted above, I found Charge 1 proven in the December 29, 2021 Order 

Partially Granting and Partially Denying Coast Guard’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Decision. In cases brought pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 7703(3), jurisdiction exists if the 

mariner is a holder of an MMC and the conviction occurred within the three-year period 

preceding the initiation of the S&R proceeding. See e.g., Appeal Decision 2563

(EMERY) (1995).

In regard to Charge 2, 46 U.S.C. § 7703(2) makes clear “[a]...merchant mariner’s 

document...may be suspended or revoked if the holder...is convicted of an offense that 

would prevent the issuance or renewal of [the document].” In cases brought under 46 

U.S.C. § 7703(2), jurisdiction exists if the respondent is a holder of an MMC at the time 

the alleged conviction occurred. See e.g., Appeal Decision 2717 (CHESBROUGH)

(2017).
6

At the hearing, the Coast Guard presented evidence of Respondent holding an 

MMC continuously from 2015 through the present. [Tr. at 23-24; Ex. CG-001]. The 

Coast Guard first issued Respondent MMC No. on June 11, 2015, with an 

expiration date of June 11, 2020. [Ex. CG-001]. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 

Coast Guard extended the deadline for renewal of MMCs, allowing Respondent’s MMC 

No. to remain valid for an additional year, i.e., through June 11, 2021. See

Marine Safety Information Bulletin No. 08-20, Change 5, issued Dec. 22, 2020 (attached 

as Enclosure 7 to Coast Guard’s Motion for Partial Summary Decision). The Coast 

Guard then granted Respondent renewal MMC No. on April 9, 2021, and this 

MMC remains valid until April 9, 2026. [Ex. CG-001]. Respondent did not raise any 

objection to this evidence and during the hearing verified he currently holds MMC No. 

, as required by 46 C.F.R. § 5.521. [Tr. at 90]. The Coast Guard initiated 

these proceedings within three years of the conviction alleged in Charge 1, and 

Respondent held an MMC when the state of Florida convicted him of the offenses 

specified in Charges 1 and 2. Therefore, jurisdiction is proper in this case.

B. Burden and Standard of Proof

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, applies to Coast 

Guard S&R hearings before United States ALJs. 46 U.S.C. § 7702(a). The APA 

authorizes sanctions if, upon consideration of the entire record as a whole, the charges are 

supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). “The term 

‘substantial evidence’ is synonymous with preponderance of the evidence as defined by 

the U.S. Supreme Court.” Appeal Decision 2477 (TOMBARI) (1988) at *3; see also

Steadman v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 U.S. 91, 107 (1981). Under 
7

Coast Guard procedural rules and regulations, the burden of proof is on the Coast Guard 

to prove the charges are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 33 C.F.R. §§ 

20.701, 20.702(a). Similarly, a respondent bears the burden of proof in asserting any 

affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 33 C.F.R. §§ 20.701, 20.702; 

Appeal Decisions 2640 (PASSARO) (2003), 2637 (TURBEVILLE) (2003). 

The burden of proving a fact by a preponderance of the evidence “simply requires 

the trier of fact ‘to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its 

nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade 

the [judge] of the fact’s existence.’” Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. 

Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (citing In re Winship, 397 

U.S. 358, 371–72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (brackets in original)). 

For Charge 2, 46 U.S.C. § 7703(2) specifies that a mariner’s credential may be 

suspended or revoked if that mariner was convicted of a criminal offense that would have 

prevented the original issuance or renewal of an MMC. Therefore, the Coast Guard must 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent was convicted of a criminal 

offense that would prevent the issuance or renewal of an MMC.

C. The Coast Guard Proved Respondent Was Convicted of an Offense that 

Would Prevent the Issuance or Renewal of an MMC

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 7703(2), “A license, certificate of registry, or merchant 

mariner's document issued by the Secretary may be suspended or revoked if the 

holder...is convicted of an offense that would prevent the issuance or renewal of a 

license, certificate of registry, or merchant mariner's document.” To help interpret § 

7703(2), the Coast Guard promulgated regulations addressing criminal history checks and 

issuance of MMCs. See 46 C.F.R. Part 10, Subpart B, including 46 C.F.R. §§ 10.211 and 
8

10.213.

4

 However, these regulations focus on applications for new credentials or renewal 

of credentials and do not provide specific guidance for a violation charged under 46 

U.S.C. § 7703(2). They are, however, instructive. 

A review of some Commandant Decisions on Appeal (CDOAs) provides limited 

information for charges under this provision. See e.g., Appeal Decision 1440 

(HANDLEY) (1964); Appeal Decision 2717 (Chesbrough) (2017). There are some ALJ 

decisions concerning this issue, which provide persuasive authority. See e.g., USCG v. 

Blackwell, Docket No. 2011-0047 (2011); USCG v. Mitchell, Docket No. 2016-0315 

(2017). With these authorities in mind, the ALJ turns to the case at bar to determine 

whether Respondent’s criminal conviction constitutes an “offense that would prevent the 

issuance or renewal of” an MMC. 49 U.S.C. § 7703(2).

1. Respondent’s Conviction for Battery (Domestic) Qualifies as an Offense 

Contemplated by 46 U.S.C. § 7703(2)

Many of the facts of Charge 2 were uncontested at the hearing. The Coast Guard 

presented a certified copy of the disposition record from the Circuit Court for Duval 

County, Florida, showing Respondent was convicted5on January 16, 2020, of battery 

(domestic), which is codified at Florida Stat. Ann. § 784.03(1)(a). [Ex. CG-002]. See

Miles v. State, 94 Co.3d 662, fn 2 (2012). The Coast Guard also presented a copy of the 

Arrest and Booking Report for the domestic violence incident that gave rise to the 

4 Attachment B includes a copy of Table 1 to § 10.211 and Table 1 to § 10.213.

5 Though the disposition record states “ADJUDICATION WITHHELD,” this action constitutes a 

conviction under 46 C.F.R. § 10.107, as “conviction” under the regulation includes instances where a 

defendant is granted deferred adjudication on the condition that he or she complete probation, attend 

classes, receive treatment, etc. The disposition record shows Respondent was originally ordered to submit 

to probation and attend parenting skills classes, but that he later violated probation and was sentenced to 43 

days in jail for this offense. [Ex. CG-002].
9

conviction. [Ex. CG-004]. Respondent did not dispute the authenticity of these records, 

nor did he deny that he engaged in the actions that led to the convictions. 

Florida Stat. Ann. § 784.03(1)(a) is a state law prohibiting the actual or intentional 

touching or striking of another person against that person’s will, and the intentional 

causation of bodily harm to another person. In general, the Coast Guard argued this 

Florida conviction qualifies under 49 U.S.C. § 7703(2) because it shows Respondent is an 

unsafe and unsuitable mariner, and indicates he is unwilling to conduct himself lawfully. 

Respondent argued he has been a safe mariner for 10 years and the conviction is not one 

that should affect his MMC. Respondent also argued the facts surrounding the conviction 

would not be repeated. 

In support of its case, the Coast Guard produced two witnesses during the hearing:

LT Kyle Burns, who obtained the documentation regarding Respondent’s convictions and 

other alleged aggravating matters; and Mr. Steven Baker, the Acting Supervisor of the 

Safety and Suitability Evaluation Branch at the Coast Guard’s National Maritime Center

(NMC), who performed a safety and suitability evaluation regarding Respondent.

LT Kyle Burns is a Coast Guard Investigating Officer (IO) and Chief of the 

Investigations Division at Coast Guard Sector Jacksonville. [Tr. at 21]. LT Burns is the 

IO who conducted a criminal background investigation on Respondent. [Tr. at 22-23]. 

In the course of the investigation, LT Burns obtained court records pertaining to 

Respondent from the Circuit Court for Duval County, Florida, as well as arrest records 

from the Sheriff’s office. [Tr. at 24-25; Exs. CG-002, CG-004, CG-007, CG-008, CG011].
10

Mr. Baker explained the Coast Guard NMC’s criminal record review process.

When an IO becomes aware that a mariner has a conviction that may be within 46 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(2), the IO requests NMC to undertake an analysis of whether the respondent 

would have been granted or denied an MMC had the respondent been convicted of the 

criminal offense at the time he or she applied for the original issuance or renewal of that 

MMC. [Tr. at 45-46]. Mr. Baker explained that the purpose of the criminal record 

review is to determine whether an applicant is a “safe and suitable” mariner. [Tr. at 43-

44]. 46 C.F.R. § 10.211(a).6 

Mr. Baker stated the Coast Guard relies on the definition of a “safe and suitable 

person” found in 46 C.F.R. § 10.107(b), which provides that a “safe and suitable person 

means a person whose prior record, including but not limited to criminal record and/or 

[National Driving Record], provides no information indicating that his or her character 

and habits of life would support the belief that permitting such a person to serve under the 

MMC and/or endorsement sought would clearly be a threat to the safety and security of 

life or property, detrimental to good discipline, or adverse to the interests of the United 

States.” This definition requires that the Coast Guard demonstrate a connection between 

the individual’s criminal record and the interest of the Coast Guard in maintaining good 

order, discipline, and safety at sea when determining whether a conviction is one that 

would prevent the issuance of an MMC.

Not all offenses qualify as one that would prevent the issuance or renewal of an 

MMC. Mr. Baker testified that the Coast Guard refers to 46 C.F.R. § 10.211 for 

guidance. That regulation includes Table 1 which lists major categories of criminal 

6 See also 46 U.S.C. §§ 7101 – 7706.
11

activity, along with minimum and maximum “assessment periods,” which are time 

frames during which the Coast Guard will not grant an application for a credential. 

Section 10.211(g) expressly provides that Table 1 “lists major categories of criminal 

activity and is not to be construed as an all-inclusive list. If an applicant is convicted of 

an offense that does not appear on the list, the Coast Guard will establish an appropriate 

assessment period using the list as a guide.”

Table 1 does not list “battery” as one of the offenses, but as discussed above, the 

list of criminal activity is not all-inclusive. Mr. Baker reviewed the court records from 

Florida that described the charge as battery (domestic) and considered the conviction in 

this case was comparable to simple assault, which is listed on Table 1. [Tr. at 47-48, 52-

55; Exs. CG-002 – CG-004]. Mr. Baker testified that he considered a 2017 fighting 

offense (mentioned in the Complaint as a matter in aggravation) along with the two 

offenses contained in Charges 1 and 2. Mr. Baker considered Respondent’s conviction

for domestic battery to be one that would be subject to the assessment period for simple 

assault (one to five years), and relevant to whether Respondent was a safe and suitable 

person for holding an MMC. [Tr. at 46-48, 52-55; Ex. CG-003]. In Mr. Baker’s view, 

Respondent’s record of convictions rendered him unable to be “entrusted with the duties 

and responsibilities of an MMC,” and the convictions “would prevent the issuance of an 

MMC.” [Ex. CG-003].

In its post-hearing brief, the Coast Guard argued that provisions of the Coast 

Guard’s Marine Safety Manual, including the factors described in Volume III (Marine 

Industry Personnel) and sanction guidance in Volume V (Investigation and Enforcement),

should be considered in this matter. The Coast Guard did not move for admission of any 
12

excerpts or parts of the Marine Safety Manual into evidence and did not provide copies of 

any of the referenced provisions of the manual in discovery to Respondent. As a matter 

of best practices, the Coast Guard should have provided excerpts of the Marine Safety 

Manual in discovery to a self-represented respondent if it was intended to be used as a 

reference. See e.g., Appeal Decision 2733 (SCHWIEMAN) (2020). Moreover, it is a

guidance document and does not have the force or effect of a statute or a regulation. See

Perez v. Mort. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 97 (2015). Internal guidance is not binding. 

See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).

Mr. Baker testified he considered Respondent’s 2017 violation of a Florida 

municipal ordinance prohibiting fighting when he was making his determination. [Tr. at 

47]. He also acknowledged he would need to consider it differently if the 2017 incident 

was only a civil matter and not a criminal offense. [Tr. at 51]. However, the conviction 

for battery may be considered separately as an offense that would preclude the issuance 

of an MMC. As discussed above, Respondent was convicted under Florida Statute Ann. 

§ 784.03(1)(a), which criminalizes the actual or intentional touching or striking of 

another person against that person’s will, and the intentional causation of bodily harm to 

another person. Mr. Baker concluded this conviction was akin to “simple assault” under 

the regulation at 46 C.F.R. § 10.211. 

The terms “battery” and “assault” are often used interchangeably when referring 

to the act of intentionally making contact with another person in order to inflict harm

(striking, shoving, etc.); however, the traditional common law defined assault as an

attempt to commit a battery, or an intentional act which puts another in apprehension of 

an immediate and harmful or offensive contact, while battery involves the actual harmful 
13

or offensive contact with another person and is sometimes thought of as the successful 

completion of common law assault. See Restatement (First) of Torts § 21 (1934); U.S. v. 

Dupree, 544 F.2d 1050, 1051 (1976); U.S. v. Delis, 558 F.3d 177, 181 (2009). Many 

jurisdictions have merged battery and assault in their criminal codes. For example, 18 

U.S.C. § 113(a)(5), the federal law criminalizing “simple assault” within maritime and 

territorial jurisdiction, prohibits actions that constitute both common law assault and 

common law battery, such as shoving, grappling, striking, etc. U.S. v. Delis, 558 F.3d at 

181. See also Appeal Decision 2512 (OLIVO) (1990). Therefore, the Florida statute 

under which Respondent was convicted for battery fits within the meaning of “simple 

assault” under 46 C.F.R. § 10.211.

After concluding the conviction would have prevented the issuance of a credential 

to Respondent, Mr. Baker also explained the Coast Guard would normally then employ 

an “assessment period” as a tool to evaluate that mariner’s suitability, in light of the 

regulatory criteria. [Tr. at 42-44]. This assessment period begins to run from the date of 

the applicant’s criminal conviction, or from the date the applicant is released from 

incarceration, whichever is later. [Tr. at 42-44]. Mr. Baker further explained that the 

Coast Guard evaluates the applicant’s record and any mitigating factors, including 

conduct during the assigned assessment period. [Tr. at 42-47, 50-55]. Given the offense 

in this case was akin to an assault, Mr. Baker noted the assessment period would have 

been a minimum of one year and a maximum of five years. 46 C.F.R. § 10.211(g). Id. 

Mr. Baker also indicated there is no guidance for non-criminal municipal violations, but 

having more than one offense could increase the assessment period. Id.
14

All mariners are bound to follow the laws and comply with regulations for the 

safety of others. The merchant marine industry is highly regulated for the benefit and 

safety of the public. Failure to comply with the law or regulations raises the risks of 

collisions, allision, or other problems, which may cause substantial harm to person’s 

property or the environment. See e.g., In re Complaint of the City of New York, As 

Owner and Operator of M/V Andrew J. Barberi, 534 F.Supp.2d 370 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 

(allision of the Andrew J. Barbieri in New York); Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker, 

128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008) (describing 1989 grounding which resulted in $507.5 million 

punitive damage award). While Respondent’s conviction was not for conduct that 

occurred while serving under his MMC, it is reasonable for the Coast Guard to consider 

such an offense to raise concerns regarding the safety of other persons. Moreover, 

Respondent’s conviction for battery (domestic) under Florida Statute Ann. § 784.03(1)(a) 

fits within the meaning of “simple assault” in Table 1 of 46 C.F.R. § 10.211, and is thus a 

conviction which would result in an assessment period of one to five years being applied 

if he were to apply for the issuance of an MMC. Upon considering the evidence as a 

whole, including reviewing this evidence, the materials cited in Mr. Baker’s testimony, 

and the court records for the conviction for domestic battery, I find Respondent’s 

conviction raises a concern of whether he is a safe and suitable person to be entrusted 

with merchant mariner credentials. Therefore, Respondent’s conviction is within the 

scope of 46 U.S.C. § 7703(2), and is an offense which would prevent the issuance or 

renewal of a license. 

2. Respondent’s Defenses

Respondent argued he is not a risk to safety at sea. [Tr. at 64-68]. He contended 

he pursued rehabilitation treatment and that the aggravation evidence offered by the 
15

Coast Guard should not be considered in regard to his retention of his MMC. [Tr. at 64-

75]. In support of his argument, Respondent relies on his own testimony and the 

unsigned July 23, 2021 letter from Beaches Recovery which was admitted into evidence

as Exhibit A. [Tr. at 64-67; Ex. R-A]. Respondent’s testimony primarily stated efforts in 

rehabilitation regarding substance abuse and anger management. [Tr. at 64-72]. 

Respondent’s testimony and evidence does not present any facts to dispute Respondent’s 

convictions as stated in Charges 1 and 2 and is therefore not a defense. However, matters 

that do not constitute a defense may be considered in mitigation. See e.g. Appeal 

Decision 2308 (GRAY) (1983); Appeal Decision 2730 (BLAKE) (2020).

As discussed above, the Coast Guard proved in its case-in-chief that Respondent’s 

conviction under Florida Statute Ann. § 784.03(1)(a) is an offense that would prevent the 

issuance or renewal of an MMC. Respondent’s testimony and proffered exhibit did not 

provide any facts to negate that conclusion, however his testimony and Exhibit A can be 

considered in regard to mitigation of the sanction.

After considering the entire record as a whole, the ALJ finds the Coast Guard 

PROVED the allegations in Charge 2 of the Complaint by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Having now determined the Coast Guard met its burden to prove both Charge 

1 and Charge 2, I now turn to the appropriate sanction in this case.

SANCTION

Title 46 U.S.C. § 7703(2) provides that a mariner’s credential may be suspended 

or revoked if the holder is convicted of an offense that would prevent issuance or renewal

of a credential. Likewise, under 46 U.S.C. § 7703(3), a mariner’s credential may be 
16

suspended or revoked if the holder is convicted of an offense described in the National 

Driver Register Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30304(a)(3)(A) or (B). 

The authority to impose sanctions at the conclusion of a case is exclusive to the 

ALJ. 46 C.F.R. §§ 5.567; 5.569(a); Appeal Decision 2362 (ARNOLD) (1984). The 

nature of this remedial, non-penal administrative proceeding is to “promote, foster, and 

maintain the safety of life and property at sea.” 46 U.S.C. § 7701; 46 C.F.R. § 5.5; 

Appeal Decision 1106 (LABELLE) (1959). 

The Coast Guard seeks revocation of Respondent’s credential. In determining an 

appropriate sanction for offenses for which revocation is not mandatory, an ALJ should 

consider: 1) any remedial actions undertaken by a respondent; 2) respondent’s prior 

record; 3) and evidence of mitigation or aggravation. 46 C.F.R. § 5.569(b)(1)-(3). 

A. Remedial Action Undertaken by Respondent

Respondent asserted he has attended treatment for substance abuse and anger 

management, and should retain his MMC. [Tr. at 64-67]. In this case, Respondent 

testified on his own behalf regarding his recent efforts in rehabilitation and his years of 

service as a mariner without prior discipline. [Tr. at 64-67, 85-86]. I have considered 

Respondent’s evidence and given it some weight in determining the sanction. See

Appeal Decision 2730 (BLAKE) (2020). 

B. Respondent’s Prior Record and Mitigation

The Coast Guard did not provide any evidence of previous adverse Coast Guard 

S&R proceedings in relation to Respondent’s record before this case. Respondent 

testified he has not had any S&R matters with the Coast Guard in the almost ten years he 

has held an MMC. [Tr. at 85]. Lack of prior S&R actions is considered in Respondent’s 
17

favor when determining an appropriate sanction. 46 C.F.R. § 5.569(b)(2). In summary,

Respondent’s testimony regarding his treatment for substance abuse and anger 

management, the Beaches Recovery letter, and his service as a mariner with no previous 

S&R proceedings, has been considered in mitigation and given some weight in

determining the sanction.

C. Aggravation

The Coast Guard alleged matters “[i]n aggravation” in both Charges 1 and 2 of 

the Complaint, and attempted to enter court and arrest records related to these allegations

into evidence. During the hearing, I found the Coast Guard’s aggravation exhibits were 

not admissible in the case-in-chief and noted that there were limits on what the Coast 

Guard may present in keeping with 33 C.F.R. §§ 20.1309 and 20.1315. Additionally, 

these matters essentially are allegations of bad acts that fit within the prohibition of 

Federal Rule of Evidence 608, which limits when character evidence should be 

considered. Exhibits 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11 were not admissible as evidence in the Coast 

Guard’s case-in-chief. Such evidence may only be considered relevant if Respondent 

testifies as a witness or presents a proper basis within 33 C.F.R. §§ 20.1309 and 20.1315. 

After a witness testifies, the matter may be inquired on in cross-examination, but the use 

of extrinsic evidence is not permitted. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). 

In Charge 1, the Coast Guard alleged, as a matter in aggravation, that Respondent 

was convicted on March 22, 2021, of “Florida Court Statute S322.03, Knowingly Drive 

While License Suspended, Cancelled or Revoked.” In support of that allegation, the 

Coast Guard offered as an exhibit an Arrest and Booking Report dated January 29, 2021
18

(Ex. CG-009); a Florida Uniform Traffic Citation dated January 29, 2021 (Ex. CG-010); 

and a disposition record from the Circuit Court for Duval County, Florida (Ex. CG-011).

I determined that Ex. CG-009, which is as an arrest and booking report for alleged 

offenses that had not yet been adjudicated at the time of the hearing, could not be used as 

aggravation evidence. Mere charges or arrests cannot be used as aggravation evidence. 

Appeal Decision 2454 (LYON) (1987). Pursuant to 33 C.F.R. § 20.1315(a)(4), only 

“final judgment[s] of conviction in Federal or State courts” are proper as aggravation 

evidence; an arrest or pending charges do not qualify as a final judgment of conviction. 

Therefore, Ex. CG-009 remains rejected. Similarly, the Florida Uniform Traffic Citation 

is not a final judgment of conviction, and thus Ex. CG-010 remains rejected. Therefore,

neither of these exhibits were considered in determining the sanction. 

Coast Guard’s Ex. CG-011 was not admissible in the Coast Guard case-in-chief. 

However, after Respondent testified, the Coast Guard again requested admission of Ex. 

CG-011. At that point, the exhibit is properly presented to the record for consideration as 

impeachment and rebuttal evidence under 33 C.F.R. §§ 20.1309(c) and 20.1315(c).

Therefore, Ex. CG-011 is admitted to the record and has been considered in aggravation 

regarding Respondent’s efforts in rehabilitation and his contention that he remains a safe 

and suitable mariner.

The Coast Guard also sought to use Exs. CG-005 and CG-006 as evidence in aggravation. 

Exhibit CG-005 is a probation order, and Ex. CG-006 is a disposition record showing 

Respondent’s 2017 violation of “M614.123,” which is Jacksonville Municipal Code § 

614.123. This evidence is rejected because it is not proper aggravation under Coast 

Guard regulations. Under Florida law, this is only a municipal ordinance violation, and 
19

as such, is not a “conviction” within the meaning of the Coast Guard’s regulations. 46 

C.F.R. § 10.107; 33 C.F.R. § 20.1315; Jacksonville Mun. Code § 614.123; Fl. Stat. Ann. 

§ 775.08(2). Therefore, Exs. CG-005 and 006 have not been considered in determining a 

sanction.

D. Selection of an Appropriate Order

As noted above, the authority to impose sanctions at the conclusion of a case is 

exclusive to the ALJ. The Coast Guard regulates the maritime industry on behalf of the 

people of the United States and public safety. The safety and suitability considerations 

contained in 46 C.F.R. §§ 10.211 and 10.213 are used by the Coast Guard to determine

whether to approve an application for an initial issuance or renewal of an MMC. 

Whether to suspend or revoke an MMC is a separate matter under 46 C.F.R. Part 5. The 

charges in this case are based on self-executing parts of 46 U.S.C. § 7703. The 

regulations include Table 5.569 of 46 C.F.R. § 5.569, which provides a range of sanctions 

for violations listed in the table but does not provide any specific guidance or range of 

sanctions for violations under 46 U.S.C. § 7703(2) or 46 U.S.C. § 7703(3). However, 

some of the violations listed in Table 5.569 may be considered comparable. 

Domestic battery is comparable to violent actions against other persons in Table 

5.569, with a sanction range of 4 months’ suspension to revocation; and the DUI 

conviction would be comparable to misconduct by failure to comply with U.S. law or 

regulations, with a sanction range of 1 to 3 months’ suspension. Id. 

The question of whether to suspend or revoke Respondent’s credential is the sole 

province of this ALJ, subject to further review by the Commandant of the Coast Guard on 

appeal, and the NTSB, before reaching the federal judiciary. Respondent’s conduct 
20

underlying his criminal convictions may be considered in regard to a determination of 

whether he is a safe and suitable person for renewal of his credentials. The same 

evidence is considered in regard to 46 C.F.R. Part 5 proceedings, but revocation is not 

mandated and an appropriate sanction must be based on the evidence in the record. The 

regulations provide that these proceedings are remedial and not punitive. 46 C.F.R. § 5.5. 

The primary question is what sanction will meet the regulations’ intent to maintain 

standards of conduct and safety at sea, without being punitive. Considering all of the 

evidence presented, I find that the appropriate sanction under the circumstances is

revocation of Respondent’s MMC, with the sanction of revocation stayed for a 

period of 24 months’ probation, during which Respondent’s MMC will be suspended 

outright for the first 12 months, and will then be returned to Respondent, subject to the 

probationary terms, for the last 12 months. If Respondent successfully completes the 24-

month probationary period, the sanction of revocation shall be remitted. 

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, all Merchant Mariner Credentials issued by the 

U.S. Coast Guard to Nathan Riley Wilson are hereby REVOKED; however,

REVOCATION IS STAYED and will be remitted pending successful completion of a 

period of TWENTY-FOUR (24) MONTHS’ PROBATION. Respondent’s MMC shall 

be SUSPENDED OUTRIGHT for the first TWELVE (12) MONTHS of the 

probationary period, and will be returned to Respondent for the remaining twelve (12) 

months, subject to the probationary terms.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, during the probationary period, Respondent shall

not engage in any conduct that would serve as a basis for the revocation or suspension of 
21

his credentials under 46 U.S.C. § 7703 or 7704, or the regulations of 46 C.F.R. Part 5. 

Further, Respondent shall not be found guilty, or proven to have violated, any law listed 

in Table 1 of 46 C.F.R. § 10.211 or Table 1 of 46 C.F.R. § 10.213(c). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, during the probationary period, Respondent shall 

attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings twice per month and shall provide 

documentary evidence to the Investigating Officer of attendance at such AA meetings for 

the initial twelve (12) months of the probationary period.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, if the Coast Guard determines Respondent has 

violated the terms of probation within the probationary period, the Coast Guard may 

provide notice of intent to execute the stayed revocation of Respondent’s credentials. 

Within ten (10) days of service of the Notice of Violation of Probation, Respondent may 

submit a written request to the ALJ Docketing Center, with a copy to the Coast Guard 

Investigating Officer, for an ALJ hearing solely to determine whether the terms of 

probation have been violated. Failure to submit a written request within ten (10) days of 

service of the Notice will result in waiver of the opportunity to request a hearing, and the 

Coast Guard may execute the order to revoke. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, Respondent shall immediately deposit his 

credentials with LT Kyle Burns, Coast Guard Sector Jacksonville, 10426 Alta Drive, 

Jacksonville, Florida 32226. If Respondent knowingly continues to use the credentials

before completion of the period of outright suspension, he may be subject to criminal 

prosecution. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, Respondent is prohibited, commencing on the 

date of this Order and continuing for the entire period that the Coast Guard retains 
22

custody of his credentials, from serving aboard any vessel requiring a Merchant Mariner 

Credential issued by the U.S. Coast Guard.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, service of this decision and order on the parties 

and/or parties’ representative(s) serves as notice of the appeal rights set forth in 33 C.F.R. 

20.1001 – 20.1004. (See Attachment C).

__________________________________

Michael J. Devine

Administrative Law Judge

United States Coast Guard

Done and dated December 21, 2022

Baltimore, MD
23

ATTACHMENT A

List of Exhibits and Witnesses

Coast Guard’s Witnesses

1. LT Kyle Burns

2. Steven W. Baker

Coast Guard’s Exhibits

Ex. CG-001: Merchant mariner credentials issued to Nathan R. Wilson (admitted)

Ex. CG-002: Florida court record for Jan. 16, 2020 battery conviction (admitted)

Ex. CG-003: Memorandum re: Mariner Safety and Suitability Evaluation from

Steven W. Baker (admitted)

Ex. CG-004: Arrest and Booking Report dated Jul. 20, 2019 (admitted)

Ex. CG-005: Order Placing Defendant on Probation dated Aug. 21, 2017 (rejected)

Ex. CG-006: Florida court record for Aug. 21, 2017 conviction for fighting 

(rejected)

Ex. CG-007: Arrest and Booking Report dated April 21, 2020 (admitted)

Ex. CG-008: Judgment and Sentence dated Dec. 3, 2020, for DUI conviction 

(admitted)

Ex. CG-009: Arrest and Booking Report dated Jan. 29, 2021 (rejected)

Ex. CG-0010: Florida Uniform Traffic Citation dated Jan. 29, 2021 (rejected)

Ex. CG-0011: Florida court record for Mar. 22, 2021 conviction for “no valid 

driver’s license” (admitted)

Respondent’s Witness

1. Nathan R. Wilson (Respondent)

Respondent’s Exhibit

Ex. R-A: Beaches Recovery letter dated Jul. 23, 2021 (admitted)
24

ATTACHMENT B

TABLE 10.211(G)—GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING APPLICANTS FOR MMCS WHO 

HAVE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS

Crime1

Assessment periods

MinimumMaximum

Assessment Periods for Officer and Rating Endorsements

Crimes Against Persons:

Homicide (intentional) 7 years 20 years.

Homicide (unintentional) 5 years 10 years.

Assault (aggravated) 5 years 10 years.

Assault (simple) 1 year 5 years.

Sexual Assault (rape, child molestation) 5 years 10 years.

Robbery 5 years 10 years.

Other crimes against persons2

Vehicular Crimes

Conviction involving fatality 1 year 5 years.

Reckless Driving 1 year 2 years.

Racing on the Highways 1 year 2 years.

Other vehicular crimes2

Crimes Against Public Safety

Destruction of Property 5 years 10 years.

Other crimes against public safety2

Dangerous Drug Offenses345

Trafficking (sale, distribution, transfer) 5 years 10 years.

Dangerous drugs (Use or possession) 1 year 10 years.

Other dangerous drug convictions6

Assessment Periods for Officer Endorsements Only

Criminal Violations of Environmental Laws

Criminal violations of environmental laws involving improper 

handling of pollutants or hazardous materials

1 year 10 years.
25

Crimes Against Property

Burglary 3 years 10 years.

Larceny (embezzlement) 3 years 5 years.

Other crimes against property2

1Conviction of attempts, solicitations, aiding and abetting, accessory after the fact, 

and conspiracies to commit the criminal conduct listed in this table carry the same 

minimum and maximum assessment periods provided in the table.

2Other crimes will be reviewed by the Coast Guard to determine the minimum and 

maximum assessment periods depending on the nature of the crime.

3Applicable to original applications only. Any applicant who has ever been the user 

of, or addicted to the use of, a dangerous drug shall meet the requirements of paragraph 

(f) of this section. Note: Applicants for reissue of an MMC with a new expiration date 

including a renewal or additional endorsement(s), who have been convicted of a 

dangerous drug offense while holding a license, MMC, MMD, STCW endorsement or 

COR, may have their application withheld until appropriate action has been completed by 

the Coast Guard under the regulations which appear in 46 CFR part 5 governing the 

administrative actions against merchant mariner credentials.

4The Coast Guard may consider dangerous drug convictions more than 10 years old 

only if there has been another dangerous drug conviction within the past 10 years.

5Applicants must demonstrate rehabilitation under paragraph (l) of this section, 

including applicants with dangerous drug use convictions more than 10 years old.

6Other dangerous drug convictions will be reviewed by the Coast Guard on a case by 

case basis to determine the appropriate assessment period depending on the nature of the 

offense.
26

TABLE 10.213(C)—GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING APPLICANTS FOR MMCS WHO 

HAVE NDR MOTOR VEHICLE CONVICTIONS INVOLVING DANGEROUS DRUGS OR 

ALCOHOL1

Number of 

convictions

Date of 

conviction Assessment period

1 Less than 1 

year

1 year from date of conviction.

1 More than 1, 

less than 3 

years

Application will be processed, unless suspension, or 

revocation2is still in effect. Applicant will be advised 

that additional conviction(s) may jeopardize merchant 

mariner credentials.

1 More than 3 

years old

Not necessary unless suspension or revocation is still in 

effect.

2 or more Any less than 3 

years old

1 year since last conviction and at least 3 years from 2nd 

most recent conviction, unless suspension or revocation 

is still in effect.

2 or more All more than 3 

years old

Application will be processed unless suspension or 

revocation is still in effect.

1Any applicant who has ever been the user of, or addicted to the use of, a dangerous 

drug shall meet the requirements of paragraph (f) of this section.

2Suspension or revocation, when referred to in table 10.213, means a State 

suspension or revocation of a motor vehicle operator's license.
27

ATTACHMENT C

Notice of Appeal Rights

33 CFR 20.1001 – General.

(a) Any party may appeal the ALJ's decision by filing a notice of appeal. The

party shall file the notice with the U. S. Coast Guard Administrative Law

Judge Docketing Center; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk; Room 412; 40 S.

Gay Street; Baltimore, MD 21201-4022 . The party shall file the notice 30 days

or less after issuance of the decision, and shall serve a copy of it on the other

party and each interested person.

(b) No party may appeal except on the following issues:

(1) Whether each finding of fact issupported by substantial evidence.

(2) Whether each conclusion of law accords with applicable law,

precedent, and public policy.

(3) Whether the ALJ abused his or her discretion.

(4) The ALJ's denial of a motion for disqualification.

(c) No interested person may appeal a summary decision except on the issue that no

hearing was held or that in the issuance of the decision the ALJ did not consider

evidence that that person would have presented.

(d) The appeal must follow the procedural requirements of this subpart.

33 CFR 20.1002 – Records on appeal.

(a) The record of the proceeding constitutes the record for decision on appeal.

(b) If the respondent requests a copy of the transcript of the hearing as part of the

record of proceeding, then, --

(1) If the hearing was recorded at Federal expense, the Coast Guard will

provide the transcript on payment of the fees prescribed in 49 CFR

7.45; but,

(2) If the hearing was recorded by a Federal contractor, the contractor will

provide the transcript on the terms prescribed in 49 CFR 7.45.

33 CFR 20.1003 – Procedures for appeal.

(a) Each party appealing the ALJ's decision or ruling shall file an appellate brief

with the Commandant at the following address: U.S. Coast Guard

Administrative Law Judge Docketing Center; Attention: Hearing Docket

Clerk; Room 412; 40 S. Gay Street; Baltimore, MD 21201-4022, and shall

serve a copy of the brief on every other party.
28

(1) The appellate brief must set forth the appellant's specific objections to

the decision or ruling. The brief must set forth, in detail, the –

(i) Basis for the appeal;

(ii) Reasons supporting the appeal; and

(iii) Relief requested in the appeal.

(2) When the appellant relies on material contained in the record, the

appellate brief must specifically refer to the pertinent parts of the record.

(3) The appellate brief must reach the Docketing Center 60 days or less

after service of the ALJ's decision. Unless filed within this time, or

within another time period authorized in writing by the Docketing

Center, the brief will be untimely.

(b) Any party may file a reply brief with the Docketing Center 35 days or less

after service of the appellate brief. Each such party shall serve a copy on every

other party. If the party filing the reply brief relies on evidence contained in

the record for the appeal, that brief must specifically refer to the pertinent

parts of the record.

(c) No party may file more than one appellate brief or reply brief, unless –

(1) The party has petitioned the Commandant in writing; and

(2) The Commandant has granted leave to file an added brief, in which

event the Commandant will allow a reasonable time for the party to file

that brief.

(d) The Commandant may accept an amicus curiae brief from any person in an

appeal of an ALJ's decision.

33 CFR 20.1004 – Decisions on appeal.

(a) The Commandant shall review the record on appeal to determine whether the

ALJ committed error in the proceedings, and whether the Commandant should

affirm, modify, or reverse the ALJ's decision or should remand the case for

further proceedings.

(b) The Commandant shall issue a decision on every appeal in writing and shall

serve a copy of the decision on each party and interested person.