Filed 4/21/23 De Anda v. Guillen CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JOSEPHINE DE ANDA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LISA GUILLEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B318392

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC680492)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Affirmed. 

Law Office of Lorrie A. Walton and Lorrie A. Walton for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Park & Lim, S. Young Lim, Dennis McPhillips and 

Jessie Y. Kim for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
2

Defendant Lisa Guillen appeals from a judgment finding 

her liable for financial elder abuse and other torts and breaches 

against her grandmother, plaintiff and respondent 

Josephine De Anda. 

Guillen and De Anda agreed to live together in a house 

owned by De Anda, in exchange for Guillen paying to remodel the 

house and caring for De Anda as she aged. The trial court found 

Guillen deceived De Anda into believing De Anda had to grant 

Guillen a joint tenancy in the house to obtain a construction loan 

for the remodel. Guillen then misappropriated substantial 

portions of the construction loan to pay her personal expenses 

and debts and to support a failing restaurant business. By the 

time De Anda’s children discovered what Guillen had done, the 

construction funds were gone, the loan was in default, and the 

remodel was incomplete. 

The trial court noted that De Anda did not call an expert or 

otherwise provide evidence to establish the amount of her 

damages. The court nonetheless concluded the amount of the 

construction loan, $375,000, constituted an appropriate 

approximation of De Anda’s damages, in addition to certain 

smaller amounts to which the parties stipulated relating to 

Guillen’s other acts of malfeasance.

On appeal, Guillen argues the trial court’s factual findings 

were insufficient to establish financial elder abuse, and further 

argues the damages award cannot stand in light of De Anda’s 

failure to provide supporting evidence. We reject these 

challenges, and hold the evidence was sufficient to show financial 

elder abuse. Harm having been established, the trial court was 

entitled to approximate damages, particularly when Guillen’s 
3

own misconduct, including commingling funds and obfuscatory 

recordkeeping, impeded a precise calculation.

Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

De Anda, by and through Jo Anna De Anda, her guardian 

ad litem, and Melinda Wilson, successor trustee to De Anda’s 

living trust, filed a complaint against Guillen and others, and 

twice amended it. Against Guillen, the second amended 

complaint asserted causes of action for financial elder abuse, 

quiet title, fraud through intentional misrepresentation, 

rescission, conspiracy to commit fraud, fraud through 

suppression of fact, conversion, breach of contract, accounting, 

common count, cancellation of instrument, and declaratory and 

injunctive relief. 

Following a bench trial, the trial court issued a statement 

of decision. On appeal, Guillen largely does not challenge the 

trial court’s factual findings, instead disputing that those 

findings support the trial court’s legal conclusions. Accordingly, 

we deem it unnecessary to summarize the evidence presented at 

trial, and instead summarize the statement of decision in detail. 

To the extent evidence not included in the statement of decision 

is relevant to this appeal, we address it in our Discussion, post.

1. Findings of fact

In its statement of decision, the trial court found the 

following facts:

De Anda, born in 1931, is a widow who owned five or six 

properties “free and clear.” Before the events underlying the 

instant litigation, she had $240,000 in cash in a credit union 

account. She “was quite self-sufficient,” at times living on her 
4

own and at other times living with “one or another of her five 

children.” 

Guillen is De Anda’s granddaughter, and was employed as 

a bookkeeper. Guillen had lost a home to foreclosure and told De 

Anda she was being outbid whenever she tried to buy a new 

house. Guillen and De Anda then orally agreed to remodel and 

live together in one of De Anda’s homes in Pasadena (the 

Pasadena home) that had sat vacant for many years. As part of 

the agreement, Guillen would care for De Anda as she aged. Also 

agreed was that Guillen “would pay for all the costs of the 

remodel, the bills and utilities.” Guillen and De Anda also agreed 

that Guillen would be allowed to live in the home indefinitely, or 

that she would inherit the home entirely when De Anda died. To 

which of these options the parties specifically agreed was an 

issue of dispute at trial. 

Guillen “persuaded” De Anda that De Anda would not be 

able to obtain a loan to finance the Pasadena home remodel 

unless De Anda “deed[ed] half the house to [Guillen] as joint 

tenants in common with the right of survivorship.” Accordingly, 

De Anda executed a grant deed adding Guillen to the title in 

April 2013. A year later, Guillen applied for, and obtained a loan 

for approximately $375,000, with she and De Anda listed as coborrowers. 

The trial court noted evidence that De Anda could have 

obtained the loan without adding Guillen to the home’s title, 

contrary to Guillen’s assertions to De Anda. De Anda presented 

evidence at trial of four loans for which she qualified “without her 

having to forfeit half her equity in the property to [Guillen.]” 

De Anda’s expert witness opined that deeding the property to 

Guillen in fact “made no economic sense.” The court further 
5

implied that De Anda was in a stronger economic position to 

obtain a loan than Guillen. In support of this conclusion, the 

trial court compared De Anda’s ownership of multiple properties 

and hundreds of thousands of dollars in the bank to Guillen’s 

foreclosure, multiple debts, a prior judgment against her, and 

virtually no cash or assets other than the joint tenancy she had 

persuaded De Anda to grant her. Although Guillen claimed she 

had assets of $192,000 from her deceased husband’s life 

insurance payment, the court found the money “either never 

existed or was spent before the period of time involved in this 

matter,” noting, inter alia, that it was not listed as an asset on 

the loan application. 

Guillen called her own loan broker as an expert witness. 

Although the broker testified De Anda would not have qualified 

without Guillen’s help, the court found his “conclusion and his 

overall testimony” to be “suspect,” noting that the broker had 

admitted he had not explained to De Anda the legal effect of 

granting Guillen a joint tenancy, and the broker further stated he 

was not sure if he had worked on the actual loan. The court also 

noted Guillen’s misrepresentations on the loan application, in 

which she omitted her foreclosure and claimed to be the full 

owner of the Pasadena home. 

In any event, Guillen and De Anda obtained the loan and in 

May 2014, the lender issued a check made out to Guillen and 

De Anda for $358,920.55. Guillen “immediately obtained 

[De Anda’s] signature and deposited [the check] into an 

individual account she opened just days earlier.” Guillen “then 

went on a spending spree,” using funds drawn from the account 

for “vacations to Las Vegas, Palm Springs, Lake Havasu, 

Temecula, Arizona, Hawaii, the Dominican Republic, and three 
6

weeks in Italy.” It is not clear whether there were funds in the 

account apart from the construction loan funds—at a minimum, 

Guillen commingled the loan funds with her other funds. Guillen 

also used the construction loan proceeds to pay off her personal 

debt and a prior judgment against her. 

All or most of Guillen’s vacations were taken between June 

and December 2014, a period in which regulators had “ ‘redtagged’ ” the remodel waiting for Guillen to take further action. 

During this same time, Guillen used the loan proceeds to pay the 

monthly loan payments. 

In addition to the remodel, Guillen “was intensely involved 

in saving a failing business with her mother-in-law.” The 

business was called “Taco Factory.” Guillen “cajoled” De Anda 

into loaning her $30,000 to help save Taco Factory. Guillen later 

“misallocate[ed] thousands more of [De Anda’s] money” to 

support Taco Factory, which ultimately went bankrupt in 

March 2015. 

The court found, “Without any accounting, [Guillen] 

commingled construction money, Taco Factory money, her 

personal funds, [and] personal and business loans.” “Money was 

transferred between different bank and credit union accounts, 

and commingled amongst so many unrelated business interests 

and private spending, the transactions were not meant to be 

followed by anyone but the most sophisticated forensic 

accountant. Unfortunately, [De Anda] did not retain an expert 

[and thus] provid[es] little guidance as to damages. However, 

ballpark estimations and balances show that two-thirds of the 

[remodel] loan money had been spent before building permits had 

been pulled.” 
7

Without De Anda’s knowledge, Guillen also borrowed 

$65,000 from Walt Marrs for Taco Factory, using the Pasadena 

home as collateral. Guillen executed a deed of trust on the 

Pasadena property to Marrs, on which Guillen forged De Anda’s 

signature. 

Guillen ultimately obtained the necessary permits and 

resumed the remodel. Rather than rehiring the original 

contractor, Guillen and her then-boyfriend, Jason Smith, an 

electrician without a contractor’s license, took over the 

construction. At trial, Guillen testified Smith had given her 

receipts and a weekly accounting of construction expenditures, 

but Guillen had not kept them. At some point Guillen borrowed 

$56,000 from Smith to fund the remodel, and executed a deed of 

trust on the Pasadena home to Smith. The deed was signed by 

Guillen only, not De Anda. 

The court surmised that Guillen’s “end game was to borrow 

whatever money she could get to finish the remodeling so she 

could refinance the entire house to cover all the various loans and 

debt, [while] trying to avoid being discovered.” The court found 

“substantial evidence” that Guillen kept her actions secret so her 

aunts and uncles, De Anda’s children, would not know what she 

was doing. 

In April 2016, De Anda’s children discovered the 

Walt Marrs trust deed on which Guillen had forged De Anda’s 

signature. They then checked De Anda’s credit union account 

and discovered De Anda’s ATM card was missing as was over 

$200,000. They further discovered that checks had been written 

out of De Anda’s Chase bank account, which De Anda said were 

forgeries, including one for $26,000. 
8

Confronted with these discoveries, Guillen refused to sign 

the Pasadena home back to De Anda. De Anda’s children notified 

the police, who arrested Guillen. Guillen ultimately pleaded 

guilty to two counts arising from the forgery of the Marrs grant 

deed. The district attorney chose not to proceed on the 

allegations of the forged $26,000 check. The bank, however, 

reimbursed De Anda the $26,000. 

Guillen never paid back the construction loan as she had 

agreed with De Anda. As noted, Guillen initially paid back the 

loan with the loan proceeds themselves, but later defaulted when 

she missed payments in February and March 2017. At the time 

of the trial court’s decision, the remodel still was incomplete and 

De Anda and her children were making the loan payments. 

Guillen and Smith had moved out of the Pasadena home. 

De Anda had a stroke in 2018, and now suffers from dementia. 

An architect testified that the $358,000 check from the 

construction loan lender could have been enough to complete the 

entire remodel, including a pool and fireplace that were never 

built. This estimate assumed “cheap” materials were used, and 

indeed the portion of the remodel that was complete used “cheap” 

materials. The architect estimated the remodel would take an 

additional $120,000 to complete. 

2. Conclusions of law

The trial court found De Anda had established financial 

elder abuse, because the evidence showed Guillen “wrongfully 

misappropriated her elderly Grandma’s monies and interest in 

real property with an intent to fraudulently conceal that 

misappropriation and by exerting undue influence on Grandma.” 

The court found Guillen was in material breach of her oral 

agreement with De Anda, in particular because Guillen “did not 
9

pay for the remodel, and [De Anda] is forced to repay the loan for 

the construction.” 

The trial court also found Guillen liable for fraud, based on 

her forgery convictions and other evidence. The court concluded 

Guillen also had a fiduciary duty to De Anda “by way of promises 

of future care, seizure and distribution of her construction loan 

monies, and control over her bank and credit union accounts. 

[Citation.] As such, [Guillen] clearly owed a duty to disclose 

material facts concerning her commingling of monies and 

manipulation of the Pasadena house interests, and her failure to 

do so was done with the clear intent to defraud.” 

The trial court restored title in the Pasadena home to 

De Anda alone, and cancelled any deeds bearing Guillen’s, 

Smith’s, or Marrs’s names. 

As to the question of money damages, the trial court stated, 

“There is no doubt the construction added value to [De Anda’s] 

Pasadena house.” The court then explained the difficulties in 

determining that added value. The court rejected a “drive-by 

exterior-only appraisal” by an expert called by Guillen, because 

“there was no reliable baseline prior to the commencement of the 

project,” and “[a]ll properties in the area have increased 

substantially in value.” Further, the appraisal assumed the 

home was in a saleable condition, which it was not, and evidence 

at trial indicated completing the remodel would cost an 

additional $120,000. The court stated, “[Guillen] cannot prevail 

by leaving Grandma having to advance more money and complete 

more work.” 

Although Guillen offered her own accounting purportedly 

establishing she “ultimately deposited more money [towards the 

remodel] than she withdrew,” the trial court stated it was 
10

“unpersuaded by [Guillen’s] ex post facto re-creative accounting 

and wild extrapolations about what she likely spent in cash on 

the construction.” The court found Guillen not credible, noting 

she admitted commingling funds, she misappropriated 

construction money for other purposes, the timing of the 

expenditures did not correlate with the construction work, the 

balances in the accounts ran prematurely low relative to progress 

on the remodel, Guillen was convicted of forgery, and she “left no 

audit trail and to the contrary actively worked to prevent 

financial oversight.” 

The trial court noted that De Anda herself had “provided 

almost nothing” to calculate the amount of her damages. 

“Grandma has serious losses, but the Court is not in a position to 

take out a calculator, cull through thousands of pages, get 

receipts from third-party vendors, and make a spreadsheet.” 

“However,” stated the trial court, “[M]aybe this is the 

wrong approach.” Apparently implying that Guillen should not 

be able to offset De Anda’s damages with the costs actually 

expended on construction, the court noted that if Guillen and 

Smith had themselves brought an action against De Anda to 

recover for the construction costs, as unlicensed contractors they 

would be ineligible to do so under Business and Professions Code 

section 7031. 

The trial court acknowledged lawsuits by unlicensed 

contractors might be a “poor analogy.” “[W]hat might be more 

compelling is Grandma did not want any debt, and now she is 

responsible for repayment of the $375,000 construction loan, 

more than $90,000 of [which] was misappropriated to Taco 

Factory. But for [Guillen’s] malfeasance, Grandma would not 

have this debt that [Guillen] agreed to cover but is not and 
11

cannot.” The court continued, “What is the cost to Grandma, 

age 90, to be encumbered with debt she never wanted in the first 

place? While Grandma struggled through her testimony, she 

made it very clear she did not want to have to pay any money.” 

Accordingly, the court awarded De Anda $375,000 plus bankcharged interest. 

The trial court awarded additional monetary damages 

based on stipulations by the parties: $30,000 for the loan 

De Anda had given Guillen for Taco Factory, and $13,000 for 

money Guillen withdrew from De Anda’s credit union account 

without permission. The total award therefore was $418,000, 

plus interest of $218,250. 

The trial court entered judgment consistent with its 

statement of decision, and Guillen timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of 

decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law 

de novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of 

review to the trial court’s findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this 

deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally 

construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all 

reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (Thompson v. 

Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) “It is not our role as a 

reviewing court to reweigh the evidence or to assess witness 

credibility.” (Ibid.)
12

DISCUSSION

A. The Finding of Financial Elder Abuse Is Supported 

By Substantial Evidence

Guillen’s first contention on appeal is that substantial 

evidence does not support the trial court’s finding of financial 

elder abuse.1

Financial abuse of an elder occurs when a person or entity 

“[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, or retains” the “real or personal 

property of an elder” “for a wrongful use or with intent to 

defraud, or both,” or “by undue influence.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 15610.30, subds. (a)(1), (3).) An “elder” is a person 65 years or 

older. (Id., § 15610.27.)

The evidence cited in the statement of decision indicates 

that Guillen deceived De Anda into granting Guillen a joint 

tenancy in the Pasadena home by convincing De Anda, falsely, 

that this grant was necessary to secure a construction loan. 

Guillen then encumbered that property with a $375,000 loan, 

some of which the trial court found Guillen misappropriated, 

using it for her own personal expenses and debts or to aid her 

failing restaurant business. Guillen also used De Anda’s ATM 

card to withdraw funds from De Anda’s credit union account 

without De Anda’s permission. These findings are sufficient to 

establish the Guillen took or appropriated De Anda’s property for 

1 Guillen does not challenge the findings that she also was 

liable for fraud and breach of contract. 
13

wrongful use and with intent to defraud, thus establishing 

financial elder abuse.2 

Guillen argues statements in the introduction of the trial 

court’s statement of decision, entitled “Overview,” undercut the 

trial court’s conclusion that Guillen appropriated De Anda’s 

property in bad faith.

Guillen notes the following sentence from the introduction 

to the statement of decision: “What may have started quite 

innocently as using one account to pay expenses for another, with 

the idea that everything would work out in the end and nobody 

would ever know or care, ended in hundreds of thousands of 

dollars missing and misappropriated with friends and family 

suffering the losses.” Guillen argues this amounts to a finding 

that her conduct in obtaining the joint tenancy and the 

construction loan was innocent, as opposed to wrongful or with an 

intent to defraud. 

Also in the introduction, the trial court wrote, “As is often 

the case, Guillen did not sneak away with the hundreds of 

thousands of dollars that grandma and other friends are missing, 

but through gross mismanagement and poor business decisions, 

the money has likely been squandered.” Guillen argues this 

finding “is more akin to a finding of negligence,” and precludes “a 

finding that the taking was for a wrongful use or with the intent 

to defraud or by undue influence.” 

Guillen’s interpretation of these introductory statements 

overlooks the rest of the statement of decision, which makes clear 

the trial court’s conclusion that Guillen deliberately 

2 Because either intent to defraud or wrongful use is 

sufficient to establish financial elder abuse, we need not address 

whether there was substantial evidence of undue influence. 
14

misappropriated De Anda’s property for her own personal use, 

which would be “for a wrongful use” by itself. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 15610.30, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court’s remarks quoted 

by Guillen may have given her the benefit of the doubt that she 

intended, at least initially, to restore the funds she 

misappropriated so that no harm was done and none were the 

wiser. That does not obviate the fact that she misappropriated 

the funds and never returned them. If you deceive someone into 

giving you funds, or take the funds without permission, it is no 

excuse that you eventually intended to return the money, nor 

does it matter that the reason you cannot return the money is 

because of poor financial decisions as opposed to malice. The 

misappropriation is still “for a wrongful use” and therefore 

constitutes financial elder abuse. (Ibid.) Guillen cites no 

authority to the contrary.

Guillen relies on another sentence in the statement of 

decision in which the trial court stated that the construction loan 

was “highly controversial and is financial elder abuse in and of 

itself.” Guillen argues the taking out of the loan by itself “does 

not establish every element of ‘Financial Elder Abuse.’ ” Other 

than this conclusory statement, Guillen does not explain why the 

quoted sentence was in error. In any event, in the text following 

that sentence, the trial court explains that its reference to the 

taking out of the loan included Guillen convincing De Anda to 

grant Guillen a joint tenancy in order to obtain that loan, which 

as we have explained supports a finding of financial elder abuse.

Guillen argues the evidence that she was included as a coborrower on the loan with De Anda and promised De Anda she 

would repay the loan, and that she, in fact, made some payments 

on the loan, negate any possible finding of bad faith. She notes 
15

the trial court concluded her “end game” was to finish the 

remodel so she could refinance and pay off all outstanding debts 

before she was discovered, which Guillen claims also establishes 

she was acting in good faith. Again, that Guillen may have 

intended to pay back the money eventually does not change the 

fact that she misappropriated it in the first place. Adding herself 

as co-borrower, promising to pay off the loan, and paying off some 

of the loan does not as a matter of law establish good faith—a fair 

contrary inference is that she was doing this to persuade 

De Anda to grant her the joint tenancy, and to cover up her 

misappropriation. Guillen misconceives our standard of review 

in ignoring these fair inferences. 

Guillen argues the following purported testimony 

establishes there was no trickery on her part: (1) it was 

De Anda’s idea that Guillen and she move in together; 

(2) De Anda, as owner of five properties, was “well versed in real 

property law” such that she would understand the consequences 

of a joint tenancy; and (3) De Anda had a similar joint tenancy 

arrangement with one of her sons. These arguments again 

misunderstand the standard of review. So long as there is 

sufficient evidence to support the judgment, we “defer[ ] to the 

trier of fact’s determinations as to the credibility and weight of

the evidence,” and “disregard evidence contrary to the judgment.” 

(Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582.)

We note, even assuming arguendo the joint tenancy 

initially was proper—that is, Guillen and De Anda entered into it 

in good faith with eyes wide open—there is no dispute De Anda 

agreed to the joint tenancy in exchange for a promise that Guillen 

would pay for the remodel herself and would care for De Anda. 

The trial court found Guillen breached that agreement by
16

squandering the construction loan funds, defaulting on the loan, 

and moving out of the house. Guillen does not dispute the trial 

court’s finding of breach of contract, nor does she challenge the 

voiding of the joint tenancy on that basis.

We further note, even if Guillen obtained the joint tenancy 

properly, the evidence that Guillen misappropriated the 

construction loan would itself supply sufficient evidence of 

financial elder abuse.3

B. The Award of Damages Was Proper

Guillen contends De Anda failed to establish she was 

harmed by Guillen’s alleged malfeasance, thus precluding an 

award of damages. 

The damages award had three components, not including 

interest or attorney fees: $375,000 for the construction loan 

Guillen failed to repay, $30,000 for the Taco Factory loan, and 

$13,000 for money Guillen took from De Anda’s credit union 

account. Although on appeal, Guillen argues she repaid some of 

the Taco Factory loan, and moved money from the credit union 

account with De Anda’s permission, she does not address or 

contest the trial court’s finding that the parties had stipulated to 

those two items of damages. We therefore do not discuss those 

two damages items further.

As to the $375,000 for the construction loan, the crux of 

Guillen’s argument is that at least some of that loan was spent on 

3 Guillen argues reversal of the financial elder abuse 

finding also requires reversal of any attorney fees award. There 

is no attorney fees award in the record; the judgment recited that 

award was yet to be determined. Regardless, because we do not 

reverse the elder abuse finding, Guillen’s argument fails.
17

the remodel, thus increasing the value of the Pasadena home. 

Guillen notes, as did the trial court, that De Anda did not provide 

a forensic accounting or other evidence to establish how much of 

the construction loan funds were misappropriated, or to show 

that De Anda’s losses exceeded her gains. Thus, claims Guillen, 

in setting damages the trial court “had to rely on rank 

speculation.” (Boldface & italics omitted.) 

To the extent Guillen suggests De Anda had to provide an 

exact accounting to establish damages, this is unsupported by the 

case law. “ ‘Where the fact of damages is certain, the amount of 

damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty. 

[Citations.] The law requires only that some reasonable basis of 

computation of damages be used, and the damages may be 

computed even if the result reached is an approximation.’ 

[Citations.]” (Tufeld Corp. v. Beverly Hills Gateway, L.P. (2022) 

86 Cal.App.5th 12, 32.) “This is especially true where, as here, it 

is the wrongful acts of the defendant that have created the 

difficulty in proving the amount of loss . . . .” (GHK Associates v. 

Mayer Group, Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 856, 874 (GHK 

Associates).)

Here, the fact of damages is certain. Guillen argues the 

value she added to the Pasadena home through the remodel 

exceeds any losses De Anda suffered, or at the very least De Anda 

did not prove to the contrary. Guillen does not dispute, however, 

the trial court’s finding that De Anda is now saddled with the 

construction loan, which Guillen failed to pay off as promised. 

Further, the remodel is incomplete and requires De Anda to 

expend an additional $120,000 to finish. We agree with the trial 

court when it stated, “[Guillen] cannot prevail by leaving 
18

Grandma having to advance more money and complete more 

work.” 

Accordingly, the trial court was entitled to approximate the 

damages, and the amount of the construction loan was a 

reasonable basis to compute an award. This is particularly so 

when, as the trial court found, Guillen’s commingling funds and 

obfuscatory recordkeeping “created the difficulty in proving the 

amount of loss.” (GHK Associates, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 874.) 

Guillen argues although she commingled construction 

funds with other funds, De Anda provided no evidence as to what 

money was spent on construction as opposed to other 

expenditures, thus failing to prove that Guillen misappropriated 

more money than she contributed to the remodel. The evidence 

showed, however, that Guillen had spent two-thirds of the loan 

funds before pulling any permits, which is strong circumstantial 

evidence that she was spending the funds on something other 

than the remodel. Guillen argues the remodel costs were more 

expensive than anticipated, but contrary evidence from the 

testifying architect established that the entire remodel could 

have been accomplished with the $358,000 obtained from the 

construction lender, including remodel features that never were 

completed. 

Guillen contends she herself provided an adequate 

accounting of expenditures. The trial court rejected her 

accounting as not credible, a finding we cannot disturb on appeal. 

(Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, 

Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 804–805 [“[W]itness credibility is 

a matter within the exclusive province of the trial court, not 

us.”].) Guillen argues the trial court “shockingly refused to take 
19

the time to review [the] evidence that supported [Guillen’s] claim 

that the monies she obtained from the loan in fact went into the 

remodel of the house.” Apart from stating it would not engage in 

a detailed forensic analysis to calculate De Anda’s damages, there 

is no indication the trial court did not consider Guillen’s evidence. 

Guillen cites marriage dissolution cases for the 

requirement of adequate recordkeeping and record tracing when 

commingled funds are at issue, and suggests that requirement 

applies to the commingled funds in the instant case. The cited 

cases involved determinations whether portions of commingled 

funds were separate as opposed to community property for 

purposes of distributing assets upon divorce where the law 

imposes a tracing requirement. (See v. See (1966) 64 Cal.2d 778, 

784; In re Marriage of Ficke (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 10, 25; In re 

Marriage of Stoll (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 837, 841.) The cases 

have no application here, where the issue is not community 

versus separate property in a family law action, but damages in a 

tort action. Guillen cites no authority applying a recordkeeping 

or tracing requirement in the latter context.

Guillen also cites cases in which parties utilized forensic 

accountants, in arguing, “The law is clear—an accounting or 

tracing of commingled funds is mandated under cases such as 

this.” Apart from citing the cases and indicating, briefly, how 

forensic accountants were used in each (e.g., to trace commingled 

funds), Guillen identifies nowhere in the cases in which the 

courts held that forensic accounting was “mandated” such that a 

court could not assess damages without it. Such a rule, 

moreover, would place the burden on De Anda to untangle the 

web of Guillen’s commingling and recordkeeping, which would 

contravene the principle that a court is entitled to approximate 
20

damages, particularly when the defendant’s own conduct renders 

a precise calculation impracticable. (GHK Associates, supra, 

224 Cal.App.3d at p. 874.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Josephine De Anda 

is awarded her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

WEINGART, J.