1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 43024

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

WESLEY GENE STANDLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 387

Filed: February 11, 2016

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 

Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge. 

Order revoking probation and imposing a unified life sentence with fifteen years 

determinate for possession of heroin with intent to deliver, affirmed.

Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP; Dennis A. Benjamin, Boise, for 

appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge

Wesley Gene Standley appeals from the district court’s order revoking probation and 

imposing a unified life sentence with fifteen years determinate for possession of heroin with 

intent to deliver. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Standley pled guilty to possession of heroin with intent to deliver, Idaho Code § 37-

2732(a). The district court gave Standley the choice between a twelve-year sentence with four 

years determinate and a life sentence with fifteen years determinate that would be suspended in 

favor of ten years of probation. In doing so, the court emphasized the strict conditions that 

would be imposed on Standley if he chose probation. The court made the following statements 

throughout the sentencing hearing: “This is an all or nothing sentence for Wesl[e]y Standley;”
2

“You come back with a probation violation, you’re gone. You are locked up for a long time;”

“I’m not going to gamble with you;” and “I’m here to tell you, Mr. Standley, that is, in fact, a 

zero-tolerance probation.” The court also warned him that associating with unapproved persons

would violate his probation. The court stated, 

Here’s the things that will get you in trouble: . . . associating with people you 

shouldn’t associate with. I can’t tell you the number of times I see defendants 

come back in here, they’ve run into [an] old buddy, just like that. That’s your 

choice. Your probation officer has the authority to tell you who not to associate 

with. They can’t monitor you twenty-four hours a day. You’ve got to have the 

intelligence to know that if you put yourself back into that kind of environment, 

it’s just going to be a matter of time.

Despite the court’s admonitions, Standley chose probation.

Item (24) of the general conditions of Standley’s probation agreement provided, “The 

Defendant shall not associate with any person(s) designated by any agent of IDOC [the Idaho 

Department of Correction].” Special condition (e) of the probation agreement stated, “The 

defendant shall complete the Suboxone program that he is currently enrolled in through Dr. 

[D.R.H.’s] office. If the defendant quits the program prior to the completion date as 

recommended by Dr. [D.R.H.], such conduct shall constitute a probation violation.” General 

condition (15) required that Standley “meaningfully participate” in the Suboxone program.

The State subsequently charged Standley with two probation violations, alleging that he

had unapproved contact with Danielle Schreiner and Matt Lewis, both known felons under IDOC 

supervision, and failed to participate in and complete his treatment program by neglecting to take 

his Suboxone medication as prescribed. Standley conceded that there was unapproved contact 

with Danielle Schreiner and that this contact violated item (24) of the general conditions of his 

probation agreement. The court found Standley knew Schreiner was a felon under IDOC 

supervision and his contact with her was a willful violation of his probation. The court also 

found that Standley’s failure to take his Suboxone medication, as prescribed, violated special 

condition (e) of his probation agreement. Accordingly, the court revoked Standley’s probation 

and imposed his underlying sentence. Standley timely appeals.
3

II.

ANALYSIS

Standley argues the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation and 

imposing his underlying sentence. He also argues there was not sufficient evidence that he 

violated special condition (e) of his probation agreement. 

It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 

Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 

P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 

1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation 

is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. 

Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 

P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation 

has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 

834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). A 

decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court 

abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a 

probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court’s decision 

to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). 

Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the 

revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. Id.

Idaho Code § 20-222(2) provides that “the court may issue a warrant for violating any of 

the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested. 

Thereupon the court . . . may revoke the probation and suspension of sentence and cause the 

sentence imposed to be executed . . . .” Further, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f)1provides: 

The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the 

defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such action is 

proposed. . . . The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by 

the defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant 

willfully violated a condition of probation.

 

1

Effective July 1, 2015, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) was renumbered as I.C.R. 33(f). The 

current version of the rule was enacted on February 9, 2012. 
4

Standley argues that the district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and 

imposing his underlying sentence because it did not exercise reason or act consistent with 

applicable legal standards in reaching its decision. He asserts the court did not exercise reason in 

reaching its decision because text messages and a ten-minute conversation with a “drug user”

alone do not “amount to a rational basis to revoke probation.” He asserts the court did not act 

consistently with applicable legal standards by disregarding his rehabilitation and the protection 

of society in reaching its decision. According to Standley, the court’s statement that it had no 

evidence he used or distributed illegal drugs while on probation shows it disregarded his 

rehabilitation and the protection of society in revoking probation. Further, he claims the court’s 

assertion that he manipulated Schreiner is not supported by the record. 

Standley’s arguments fail because he willfully violated a condition of his probation. 

Standley conceded there was unapproved contact with Schreiner that violated his probation. 

Further, the district court found Standley knew Schreiner was a felon under IDOC supervision 

and his contact with her was a willful violation of his probation. Because Standley admitted his 

contact with Schreiner violated his probation and the court found the violation was willful, 

Standley’s contact with Schreiner alone provided a sufficient basis to support the district court’s 

order revoking probation and imposing his underlying sentence. Additionally, the court had 

made it clear to Standley that any violation, especially contact with unapproved persons, would 

violate his probation. At the sentencing hearing, the court emphasized to Standley that it would 

strictly enforce the terms of his probation and specifically warned him that any contact with

unapproved persons would violate his probation. Considering the strictures the court placed on 

Standley’s probation, his contact with Schreiner provided a sufficient basis for the court to 

revoke his probation and impose his underlying sentence. While Standley contends that there is 

no evidence the district court would revoke probation and execute his sentence based solely on 

the unapproved contact, the record belies this assertion. The district court expressly stated that 

unapproved contact would result in revocation. At the disposition hearing, the district court 

discussed, at length, the significance of the violation before revoking probation. Thus, we need 

not address Standley’s argument that there was not sufficient evidence that he violated special 

condition (e) of his probation agreement. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in revoking Standley’s probation and imposing his underlying sentence.
5

III.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Standley’s probation and 

imposing his underlying sentence. The district court’s order revoking probation and imposing 

Standley’s underlying sentence is affirmed.

Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.