NUMBER 13-18-00484-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

ROBERT K. NELSON, MAYOR; JULIE ESTLINBAUM,

COUNCILWOMAN, POSITION 1; BILL CORNMAN,

COUNCILMAN, POSITION 2; AND CITY OF BAY 

CITY, TEXAS, Appellants,

v.

ROBERT NEAL HEAD, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 23rd District Court

of Matagorda County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Perkes 

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes

This suit involves a challenge to the validity of a provision in a city charter and 

allegations of ultra vires conduct by city officials. Appellee Robert Neal Head filed suit 

against appellants, then-Mayor Mark A. Bricker, Councilwoman Julie Estlinbaum, 
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Councilman Bill Cornman, and Bay City, Texas, seeking declaratory, mandamus, and 

injunctive relief. The city and its officials appeal from an interlocutory order denying their 

plea to the jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(8). 

During the pendency of this appeal, Robert K. Nelson was elected as Bay City 

Mayor. Accordingly, he has been substituted as the proper party to this suit. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 7.2(a). However, for purposes of clarity, our opinion will refer to Head’s claims 

against “Mayor Bricker,” not Mayor Nelson.

In what we construe as four issues, appellants contend the trial court erred by 

denying their plea because: (1) Head lacks standing to bring any of his claims, (2) some 

of his claims are moot, (3) some of his claims are not ripe, and (4) appellants are 

otherwise entitled to governmental immunity. We reverse and render a dismissal for 

want of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

Bay City, a home-rule municipality, adopted a city charter in 1989 that provides for 

a strong-mayor form of mayor-council government. Under this form of municipal 

government, the mayor is not a member of city council; instead, he serves as the city’s 

chief administrator and executive officer with implied and express powers. Bay City’s 

five-member council serves as the legislative branch, exercising all other powers 

conferred to Bay City under its charter, the Texas Constitution, and the laws of the State. 

Under the Bay City Charter, the mayor presides over council meetings, but has no voting 

authority unless a deciding vote is required to break a tie.
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In 2013, the Bay City Charter was amended to limit councilmembers and the mayor

from serving more than three consecutive terms. On May 30, 2018, Head, a Bay City 

resident, filed suit alleging that, in addition to voter-approved term limits, non-voterapproved language was erroneously added to § 4.01 of the Bay City Charter that 

identified the mayor as a councilmember. To illustrate, the italicized language 

represents the portion Head is challenging as invalid and the underlined language 

represents the voter-approved amendment:

The Council shall be composed of five Councilmembers and the Mayor. All 

Councilmembers to be selected at large. Councilmembers No. 1 and 2 shall be 

elected one year and Councilmembers No. 3, 4, and 5 elected the following year. 

No Councilmember shall be elected to serve for more than three consecutive twoyear terms.

Head contends that this provision destroys the separation of powers between the 

executive and legislative branches of Bay City’s elected form of government. His petition 

seeks a declaration that § 4.01 is invalid as constituted and names Bay City as a 

necessary party under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA). See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.006(b). 

Head also alleges that Mayor Bricker engaged in ultra vires conduct by voting in 

council meetings in the absence of a tie vote. Head specifically alleges that Mayor 

Bricker cast an improper vote to block Bay City residents from voting on a charter 

amendment that would have changed Bay City to a manager-council form of government. 

Head alleges he has standing to bring his claims against Mayor Bricker because that 

particular vote deprived Head of his right to vote in an election, which he describes as “a 

particularized injury that is unique to him.” Head seeks to have all of Mayor Bricker’s 
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improper votes declared void, setting aside any action taken by Bay City that resulted 

from an improper vote; to enjoin Mayor Bricker from future voting violations; and 

mandamus relief compelling an election on the charter amendment. Additionally, Head 

seeks a declaration that Mayor Bricker is subject to the term limits adopted in 2013. 

Head also alleges that Councilwoman Estlinbaum and Councilman Cornman 

(collectively “Councilmembers”) were re-elected to serve a fourth term, beginning in June

2018, in violation of the three-term limit adopted in 2013. Although he specifically 

disclaims that he is seeking quo warranto relief (i.e., challenging their right to hold office), 

he seeks: (1) a declaration that each is subject to the three-term limit; (2) to enjoin the 

Councilmembers from casting votes during their fourth term; and (3) to compel Bay City 

to hold new elections for their offices. Head also alleges that he has taxpayer standing 

to challenge the Councilmembers’ compensation as an illegal expenditure of tax dollars. 

He seeks a declaration that Bay City does not have the authority to compensate the 

Councilmembers and an injunction enjoining the city from making any such expenditures

in the future. 

Appellants filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on standing, mootness, ripeness, 

and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea, and appellants filed their 

notice of interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(8).

In addition to electing a new mayor during the pendency of this appeal, Bay City

passed an ordinance striking the complained-of language from § 4.01 and voters elected 

to amend the Bay City Charter by changing from a mayor-council to a council/mayor-city 
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manager form of government.

1 Under this form of municipal government, the mayor 

became a voting member of city council and a city manager serves as the city’s chief 

administrator and executive officer.

The parties were invited to provide supplemental briefing on whether any of Head’s 

claims have become moot during the pendency of this appeal. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. 

v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993) (recognizing that an 

appellate court may consider its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte); TEX. R. APP. P.

38.7 (“A brief may be amended or supplemented whenever justice requires, on whatever

terms the court may prescribe.”). Head concedes that his declaratory judgment claim 

concerning the validity of § 4.01 is now moot. He also concedes that his claims for 

prospective injunctive relief against Mayor Bricker are moot but maintains that his claim 

to have Mayor Bricker’s former council votes declared invalid constitutes a viable ultra 

vires claim. Head also contends that the remainder of his claims are live, including his 

request for costs and attorney’s fees under the UDJA.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of 

Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004) (citing Tex. Nat. Res. 

Conservation Comm’n v. IT–Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002)). The plaintiff carries 

the initial burden to plead sufficient facts that demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction. Id. 

 1 An appellate court may take judicial notice of certain facts outside the appellate record, Office of 

Pub. Util. Counsel v. Public Util. Comm’n, 878 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1994), including city ordinances, TEX.

R. EVID. 204; Amarillo v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 511 S.W.3d 787, 794 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.), 

and the results of public elections. See TEX. R. EVID. 201(b); see also Corpus Christi Hous. Auth. v. 

Esquivel, No. 13-10-00145-CV, 2011 WL 2395461, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 9, 

2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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(citing Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 446). When, as here, a plea to the jurisdiction 

is based on the plaintiff’s petition, we liberally construe the petition in the plaintiff’s favor 

and take the allegations as true. Id. (citing Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 446).

III. ANALYSIS

By their first issue, appellants contend that Head lacked standing to bring any of 

his claims. 

A. General Principles 

“Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit.” Heckman v. Williamson County, 

369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012) (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Mktg. on Hold Inc., 308 

S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex. 2010)). “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim 

he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Andrade v. NAACP of 

Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734, (2008)). 

Without standing, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss any claims 

that do not meet the standing threshold. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150 (citations 

omitted). 

“No Texas court has ever recognized that a plaintiff’s status as a voter, without 

more, confers standing to challenge the lawfulness of governmental acts.” Brown v. 

Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. 2001). Instead, “[t]he plaintiff must be personally

injured—he must plead facts demonstrating that he, himself (rather than a third party or 

the public at large), suffered the injury.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155 (citing S. Tex. 

Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 307–08 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam)). Standing 

also requires a causal connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s 
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conduct and that the requested relief will likely redress the plaintiff’s injury. Id. (citations 

omitted). 

B. Claims against Mayor Bricker

Head sued Mayor Bricker in his official capacity, alleging the mayor engaged in 

ultra vires conduct by voting at Bay City Council meetings in violation of the Bay City 

Charter. Head seeks a declaration that any such vote was invalid, thus setting aside any 

action taken by Bay City that relied upon an ultra vires vote. Head identifies himself in 

his petition as “a Bay City resident and registered voter within the city limits of Bay City” 

and generally alleges that he “has standing to assert the claims and causes of action in 

this case.” 

In describing his claims against Mayor Bricker, Head alleges that:

Mayor Bricker has, on multiple occasions from 2013 to 2018, wrongfully 

exercised a vote on City Council matters without the presence of a tie, in a 

flagrant and despicable violation of the Texas Constitution and the City 

Charter of Bay City, Texas. . . . One such example occurred in January of 

this year, 2018, when Mayor Bricker voted to keep a proposition calling for 

a change in municipal government from a Mayoral form to a City Manager 

form of government off the ballot in May of this year. By exercising his 

“right” to vote on matters not resulting in a tie, Mayor Bricker singlehandedly 

disenfranchised the entire electorate of Bay City, Texas. This must be 

stopped.

Head also filed a supplemental petition seeking “emergency mandamus relief to force the 

Mayor to immediately place an item on the agenda at the next City Council meeting to 

enable the enactment of an election order calling for a charter change election in 

November of 2018.”

Head has failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating how Mayor Bricker’s ultra 

vires votes “on multiple occasions from 2013 to 2018” caused him concrete, particularized 
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injuries that are distinct from the general public. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155. 

The only vote Head ties to a specific injury was admittedly suffered by “the entire 

electorate of Bay City, Texas.” While qualified voters who sign an initiative petition 

“have a justiciable interest in the valid execution of the charter amendment election . . .

distinct from the general public,” Head does not allege that he signed an initiative petition 

in this case. See Blum v. Lanier, 997 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex. 1999); see also In re Hotze, 

No., 14-08-00421-CV, 2008 WL 4380228, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 10, 

2008, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (“Signers of an initiative petition have an 

interest in an election distinct from that of the general public.”). Thus, the only injury 

Head identifies as a result of Mayor Bricker’s ultra vires votes constitutes a generalized 

grievance that Head lacked standing to bring. See Blum, 997 S.W.2d at 262; Heckman, 

369 S.W.3d at 155.

Additionally, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Head’s 

mandamus claim because the Legislature has conferred subject matter jurisdiction over 

this claim to the supreme court and courts of appeals. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.

§ 273.061 (“The supreme court or a court of appeals may issue a writ of mandamus to 

compel performance of any duty imposed by law in connection with the holding of an 

election . . . .”). Moreover, Head’s mandamus claim is now moot because Bay City held 

an election on that very proposition during the pendency of this appeal, passing a charter 

amendment that changed Bay City from a mayor-council to a council/mayor-city manager 

form of government. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 162 (“Put simply, a case is moot 

when the court’s action on the merits cannot affect the parties’ rights or interest.” (citing 
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VE Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 860 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam))).

We also hold that Head’s ultra vires claim to have Mayor Bricker’s past votes 

declared invalid is barred by governmental immunity.2 The UDJA does not enlarge a 

trial court’s jurisdiction and the ultra vires exception to governmental immunity only affords 

prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 

366, 370, 376–77 (Tex. 2009) (citations omitted). Head’s claim for retrospective 

declaratory relief based on ultra vires conduct is not a claim for which governmental 

immunity has been waived. See City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 378–79 (Tex. 

2011) (“Heinrich clarified that only prospective, not retrospective, relief is available in an 

ultra vires claim.”); see also Hailey v. Glaser, No. 06-12-00065-CV, 2012 WL 5872869, 

at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 9, 2012, no pet.) (“The ultra vires exception only 

permits prospective declaratory relief and does not permit retrospective declaratory 

relief.” (citing Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 374–77)). In sum, the trial court never had subject 

matter jurisdiction over any of Head’s claims against Mayor Bricker.

C. Claims against Councilmembers

A quo warranto proceeding is the exclusive remedy for challenging a public 

official’s right to hold office and only the State of Texas, not a private litigant, has standing 

to bring such a claim. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 66.001(1), 66.002; Orix 

Capital Markets, LLC v. Am. Realty Tr., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 748, 754 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

 2 Head identifies Bay City as “a necessary party” to his ultra vires claims in his petition. However, 

“the governmental entities themselves—as opposed to their officers in their official capacities—remain 

immune from suit [on ultra vires claims].” City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372–73 (Tex. 2009). 

Accordingly, we also hold that Bay City was immune from Head’s ultra vires claims. See Heinrich, 284 

S.W.3d at 372–73.
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2011, pet denied); see, e.g., State v. Fischer, 769 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi–Edinburg 1989, writ dism’d) (“[T]he issue of whether a candidate has satisfied 

residency requirements is not a question to be determined by a political party’s executive 

committee, but should be judicially determined. Accordingly, the instant action had to be 

brought by the State in quo warranto . . . .”).

In this case, although he expressly disclaims that he is seeking quo warranto relief, 

Head seeks: (1) a declaration that the Councilmembers are subject to the three-term limit 

adopted in 2013; (2) to enjoin the Councilmembers from casting votes during their fourth 

term; and (3) to compel Bay City to hold new elections for their offices. All three claims 

constitute a clear attack on the Councilmembers’ right to serve a fourth term, and as such, 

Head did not have standing to bring them. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§§ 66.001(1), 66.002; Orix, 356 S.W.3d at 754. 

Head also alleges that he has taxpayer standing to challenge the Councilmembers’

compensation as an illegal expenditure. See Andrade v. Venable, 372 S.W.3d 134, 137 

(Tex. 2012) (per curiam) ([U]nder Texas law, a narrow, judicially-created exception exists: 

a taxpayer has standing to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds and need not 

demonstrate a particularized injury.” (citing Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 179 (Tex. 

2001))). The true nature of Head’s claim, however, is a quo warranto proceeding. See 

Murphy v. Russel, 167 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2005) (expressing the general concept that 

“a claimant cannot escape the Legislature’s statutory scheme by artful pleading” in the 

context of a healthcare liability claim). To prevail on his “taxpayer” claim, Head must 

necessarily prove that the Councilmembers are illegally holding office. See Lara, 52 
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S.W.3d at 179 (“Implicit in this rule are two requirements: (1) that the plaintiff is a taxpayer; 

and (2) that public funds are expended on the allegedly illegal activity.”). Only the State 

has standing to challenge the Councilmembers’ right to hold office; therefore, despite the 

label he placed on it, Head lacks standing to bring this claim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. §§ 66.001(1), 66.002; Orix, 356 S.W.3d at 754. 

Regardless, Head has failed to establish taxpayer standing because 

compensating the Councilmembers does not constitute an illegal expenditure. “A 

taxpayer does not have an interest direct enough to warrant standing unless the activity 

challenged involves an expenditure of public funds that would not otherwise be made.” 

Venable, 372 S.W.3d at 139. The money spent must be an “added expenditure—not 

one that would have been made in spite of the allegedly illegal activity.” Id. at 138 (citing 

Lara, 52 S.W.3d at 182. 

In this case, Head is not alleging that Bay City illegally created Position 1 and 

Position 2 on the Bay City Council or that the Councilmembers are receiving additional 

compensation above the other members. Instead, he alleges the Councilmembers 

should not receive the normal, appropriated compensation because they are not qualified 

to hold their offices. But Bay City would be making an identical expenditure regardless 

of who holds these offices. If the Councilmembers had not been elected to serve a fourth 

term or were removed in a quo warranto proceeding, their successors would be receiving 

the same compensation. Thus, Head has failed to plead facts demonstrating that “the 

activity challenged involves an expenditure of public funds that would not otherwise be 

made.” See Venable, 372 S.W.3d at 139. Head has not met the “narrow” taxpayer 
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exception to standing. See id. at 137.

D. Claim for Costs and Attorney’s Fees

Head challenged the validity of § 4.01 of the Bay City Charter under the UDJA. 

The UDJA expressly waives Bay City’s immunity from this claim by mandating that the 

city be a named party to the claim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.006(b) 

(“In any proceeding that involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, the 

municipality must be made a party and is entitled to be heard . . . .”); Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 

at 373 n.6 (“For claims challenging the validity of ordinances . . . the Declaratory 

Judgment Act requires that the relevant governmental entities be made parties, and 

thereby waives immunity.”). Although Head concedes this claim was rendered moot 

when Bay City struck the complained-of language by ordinance, Head’s request for costs 

and attorney’s fees under the UDJA3 survives as a live controversy if Head had standing 

to bring this claim in the first instance. See Camarena v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 754 

S.W.2d 149, 151–52 (Tex. 1988). 

We conclude Head did not have standing to challenge the validity of § 4.01. Like 

any other plaintiff, an individual challenging the validity of a city ordinance must 

demonstrate a concrete, particularized injury. See, e.g., Stop the Ordinances Please v. 

City of New Braunfels, 306 S.W.3d 919, 928 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (“By 

alleging that the Cooler & Container Ordinance restricted their use of their property, 

caused them to incur additional expenses, and damaged or destroyed their market for 

larger cooler rentals within the City limits, the Outfitter Plaintiffs have demonstrated the 

 3 Under the UDJA, “the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as 

are equitable and just.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009.
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required actual, concrete, and particularized infringement of their legally protected 

interests necessary for standing.”).

In this case, Head alleges that “Section 4.01 of Bay City’s Charter has purportedly 

been ‘changed’ to allow the Mayor of Bay City to cast votes in the same manner and 

substance as every other member of the City Council.” We have already determined 

that Head did not have standing to challenge Mayor Bricker’s prior votes because he 

failed to demonstrate that they caused him a concrete, particularized injury distinct from 

the general public. Consequently, Head also failed to allege a sufficient injury in fact with 

respect to his challenge to the validity of § 4.01. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155. 

Having concluded that Head did not have standing to bring any of his claims under the 

UDJA, we hold that Head does not have a live claim for costs and attorney fees. See

Camarena, 754 S.W.2d at 151–52.

IV. CONCLUSION

The trial court’s order is reversed, and we render a dismissal for want of 

jurisdiction.

GREGORY T. PERKES

Justice

Delivered and filed the

26th day of November, 2019.