U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

_______________________________ 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, 

Complainant, 

vs. 

AARON LOUIS CHRISTIAN, 

Respondent. 

_______________________ 

Docket No: 09-0171 

CG Enforcement Activity No: 3468937

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Issued: November 13, 2009

Issued by: HON. BRUCE TUCKER SMITH 

 Administrative Law Judge 

Appearances:

For Complainant

Bruce Davies, Esq. 

MSTC Christina L. Jeanes 

USCG Marine Safety Unit Port Arthur 

For Respondent

Craig Schexnaider, Esq. 

Conley & Schexnaider 
2

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) initiated this administrative action 

seeking 12 months outright suspension, followed by 24 months probation, of Respondent 

Aaron Louis Christian’s (Respondent) Coast Guard-issued Merchant Mariner’s 

Document (MMD) and Coast Guard-issued Merchant Marine License (MML) 

(hereinafter, collectively referred to as Coast Guard-issued credentials). This action is 

brought pursuant to the legal authority codified at 46 U.S.C. §§7703 and the underlying 

regulations contained in 46 C.F.R. §5.27 and §5.33. 

The Coast Guard’s Original Complaint, filed on May 6, 2009, alleged, inter alia, 

that Respondent committed misconduct and violated a law or regulation by testing in 

excess of the Department of Transportation’s Breath Alcohol Test standards on October 

14, 2008, during a random drug and alcohol test ordered by his employer, Higman 

Marine Services. On May 21, 2009, Respondent filed an Answer to the Original 

Complaint wherein he denied the jurisdiction and factual allegations made therein and 

posited several affirmative defenses. 

On August 5, 2009, the Coast Guard filed an Amended Complaint removing 

Allegation No. 13 (allegation relating to a third breath alcohol test) and Count 2 

(allegations relating to violation of law or regulation). On August 18, 2009, the Coast 

Guard filed a second Amended Complaint ostensibly removing the second charge, 

violation of a law or regulation, from the Amended Complaint; however, Factual 

Allegation 15 therein still pleads a violation of 49 C.F.R. Part 40. On September 8, 2009, 

Respondent filed an “Original Answer to Amended Complaint and Counter-Claim” 

wherein he denied both the jurisdictional allegations and factual allegations of the 
3

Amended Complaint. Respondent pled numerous affirmative defenses to the Second 

Amended Complaint.1

 

On September 22, 2009, this matter came on for hearing at the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont Division in Beaumont, Texas. 

The proceeding was conducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, as 

amended and codified at 5 U.S.C. §§551-59 and Coast Guard procedural regulations 

located at 33 C.F.R. Part 20. Bruce L. Davies, Esq. and Investigating Officer MSTC 

Christina L. Jeanes, United States Coast Guard Marine Safety Detachment Port Arthur, 

appeared on behalf of the Coast Guard. Respondent was present through counsel Craig 

Schexnaider, Esq. 

Three (3) witnesses testified as part of the Coast Guard’s case-in-chief and the 

Coast Guard offered twelve (12) exhibits into evidence, all of which where admitted. 

Respondent cross-examined the witnesses offered by the Coast Guard and offered one (1) 

exhibit into evidence, which was admitted.2

At the outset of the second day of the hearing of this matter, Respondent filed a 

Motion to Dismiss (Motion) asserting the Coast Guard had failed to establish that the 

random drug and alcohol screen at issue herein was truly random. The court ordered 

briefs or responses in opposition to Respondent’s Motion, if any, were to be filed not 

later than October 9, 2009. Respondent was ordered to file his rebuttal thereto, if any, not 

later than October 23, 2009. The court thereupon recessed the hearing pending ruling on 

 

1

 The full procedural history of the instant matter is not reviewed herein. 2

 Citations referencing the transcript are as follows: Transcript followed by the volume number and page 

number (Tr. at __ ). Citations referring to Agency Exhibits are as follows: Investigation Officer followed 

by the exhibit number (CG Ex. 1, etc.); Respondent’s Exhibits are as follows: Respondent followed by the 

exhibit letter (Resp. Ex. A, etc.); ALJ Exhibits are as follows: ALJ followed by the exhibit Roman numeral 

(ALJ Ex. I, etc.). 
4

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The court has received and reviewed the parties’ 

respective briefs and affidavits. 

Upon due consideration, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED

for the reasons described infra. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Drug and alcohol testing for maritime personnel is mandated and defined in 46 

C.F.R. Part 16, subpart B and 49 C.F.R. Part 40.3

 In particular, both 46 C.F.R. subpart B, 

and the Higman Marine (Respondent’s employer’s) “Policy and Procedures Manual,” 

(Manual) specify five clearly-defined circumstances under which a marine employee is 

subject to drug and alcohol testing4: 

1. Pre-employment: 46 C.F.R. §16.210; 

2. Periodic: 46 C.F.R. §16.220; 

3. Random: 46 C.F.R. §16.230; 

4. Post-Serious Marine Incident: 46 C.F.R. §16.240; and 

5. Reasonable cause: 46 C.F.R. §16.250 

Drug testing of marine employees is clearly justified based upon the federal 

government’s compelling interest in protecting public safety and ensuring safety in an 

often-hazardous maritime work environment. However, the court notes with particularity 

that neither 33 C.F.R. Part 95, nor 49 C.F.R. Part 40 make provision for a “voluntary” 

urinalysis or blood-alcohol test. Neither does Higman’s own Manual identify a 

“voluntary” alcohol or blood test. Rather, that Manual only lists the same five types of 

 

3

 The Coast Guard did not allege, nor was there proof that Respondent operated a vessel while under the 

influence of alcohol. Hence, 33 C.F.R. Part 95 “Operating a Vessel While Under the Influence of Alcohol 

or Dangerous Drugs” is inapplicable. Rather, the Coast Guard’s second Amended Complaint, dated August 

18, 2009, alleged Respondent violated 49 C.F.R. §40.285(b), apparently in contravention to the rule in 

Appeal Decision No. 2659 (Duncan) (2006). Thus, reference to 49 C.F.R. Part 40 is apt. 4

 Although 33 C.F.R. Part 95 is inapplicable, I note that regulation contains no reference to the bases for 

selection for alcohol testing; i.e., “random,” “pre-employment,” “post-casualty,” etc. 
5

employee drug/alcohol testing as mandated in 46 C.F.R. Part 16, subpart B. (CG Ex. 1 at 

6-20; CG Ex. 4 at 2). 

Here, the Coast Guard’s second Amended Complaint, filed August 18, 2009, 

alleges that Respondent was chosen at random for testing on November 14, 2008. 

Because 33 C.F.R. Part 95 is both inapplicable to the facts at bar and because it is silent 

regarding the means by which a mariner is selected for alcohol testing, the provisions of 

46 C.F.R. §16.230 provide guidance5: 

The selection of crewmembers for random drug testing shall be made 

by a scientifically valid method, such as a random number table or a 

computer-based random number generator that is matched with 

crewmembers’ Social Security numbers, payroll identification numbers, or 

other comparable identifying numbers. Under the testing frequency and 

selection process used, each covered crewmember shall have an equal 

chance of being tested each time selections are made and an employee’s 

chance of selection shall continue to exist throughout his or her 

employment. As an alternative, random election may be accomplished 

by periodically selecting one or more vessels and testing all 

crewmembers covered by this section, provided that each vessel 

subject to the marine employer’s test program remains equally 

subject to selection. 

(emphasis added).6

 Plainly, 46 C.F.R. §16.230(c) requires that the means by which random selections 

are made must be by a scientifically or mathematically valid method and that each 

crewmember or vessel must have a mathematically equal chance of selection. 

 “Randomness” is essential to a fair drug and alcohol testing process in the 

maritime industry. Absent true “randomness,” the drug and alcohol testing regimen is 

 

5

 In Appeal Decision No. 2559 (Duncan) (2006), the Commandant cites the Final Rule implementing 33 

C.F.R. Part 95, saying in part, “the acceptability of a particular test required by a marine employer will be 

established during an administrative or judicial hearing.” In essence, Duncan creates an ad hoc standard, to 

be determined on a case-by-case basis for the admissibility of a given alcohol test. Absent specific 

guidance, an ALJ must, therefore, draw on other sources of the law for guidance regarding admissibility. 

Thus, even IF 49 C.F.R. Part 40 or 46 C.F.R. Part 16 are not specifically controlling, the provide, in the 

absence of specific guidance to the contrary, compelling guidance. 6

 October 1, 2008 revision.
6

subject to criticism of favoritism. Absent true “randomness” marine employees might 

reasonably believe they are subject to individuous discrimination or targeting by an 

employer or that they have been victimized by a subterfuge to justify a warrantless search 

of the mariner’s bodily fluids. 

 Testimony and evidence adduced at the hearing of this matter reveal that John 

Barber Frye (Frye) is Higman’s corporate drug and alcohol representative. In that 

capacity, Frye oversees Higman’s random drug and alcohol testing policies and 

procedures. (Tr. at 6). (All citations to testimony are contained in the stand-alone 

transcript of Frye’s testimony.) 

 According to Frye, Higman has three offices and fifty vessels. (Tr. at 7; 16). 

Frye testified that, “on a random day, we choose a random vessel, and that vessel and/or 

office will be selected for a drug screen and everybody at that facility will be tested.” (Tr. 

at 6). Frye further testified that he rolls dice to determine the vessel or the office to be 

tested and then he compares the number rolled on the dice to a company telephone list. 

(Tr. at 7). 

 Frye was clear that he uses a “physical die” – two dice in fact – which are thrown 

to produce a number. He explained that if he was throwing dice for Higman offices, “a 1 

or a 2 would indicate our Houston office or Channel view office; a 3 or a 4 would be our 

Orange office, a 5 or a 6 would be our Mobile office.” (Tr. at 7). 

 Conversely, he explained that if he threw a “1 and a 5, it would be Boat 15 on the 

phone list.” (Tr. at 7 – 8). He then testified that once a number was thrown and a 

corresponding vessel or office was identified from the company phone list, everyone 

“oncoming” to a vessel during a crew changeover would be selected for chemical testing. 
7

(Tr. at 8). Frey did not explain how me made the initial decision to throw one die 

(offices) or two dice (boats/crews). 

 Frey testified that on November 14, 2008, the Higman office in Orange, Texas, 

was randomly selected for alcohol and drug testing of all oncoming crewmembers. (Tr. at 

9).7

 Thereafter, Respondent was administered multiple breath alcohol tests which 

resulted in a finding leading to the instant charges. 

 Frey’s testimony, however, revealed a variety of mathematical impossibilities 

inherent to the “dice” method when selecting vessels and crews for testing as evidenced 

by his testimony on cross-examination: 

Q. By throwing two dice, how do you pick which boat out of 50? 

A. I use a phone list, and I count down the phone list. If I roll the dice and 

I get a 15, I go down to the 15th boat and I select that vessel. 

* * * 

Q. How do you do Boat 17? You roll a 7? 

A. Well, basically, it will end up evening out. If I do those boats and I 

randomly select them through the dice roll. 

Q. Well, how would you . . . How do you—how do you get to Boat No. 

28? Dice only have 1 through 6 on it. 

A. Oh, I see what you’re saying. If for some reason I’ve rolled a boat that 

I’ve done recently, I will actually roll again. And if I can get a 2-8, I will 

get it. 

* * * 

Q. How do you get to Boat No. 28? 

A. If—using the dice, that’s usually how I get it, sir. 

* * * 

Q. Id’ like to know. How do you get to Boat No. 18? 

A. If I roll a 1 and a 5, I will get 15. 

Q. How do you get to No. 18, 1 – 8? 

A. I’ll roll – excuse me. Sir, I just have to say that’s the way I’ve always 

done it. 

Q. So you don’t ever test Boat No. 18? 

A. Yes, sir. I would have to say that I did test Boat No. 18. 

 

7

 Contrary to Respondent’s assertions, the court is satisfied Respondent was a Higman “crewmember” for 

the purposes of random drug testing. (Tr. at 29-31). 
8

Q. Okay. How do you get to Boat No. 18 with two dice. 

A. Sir, I don’t think I’ve ever explored that before. 

* * * 

Q. Do you understand that a dice only has 1 through 6 on it... 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. On either sides of the dice. There’s no zero. There’s no 7, there’s no 8, 

there’s no 9. How do you get to Boat No. 10? 1 – 0? 

A. There’s actually a website too that I use that will select random – it’s 

called random. org. 

* * * 

Q. ...When you select the boat to be tested, you throw two dice? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. How do you select Boats 1 through 9 or 1 through 10 with two dice? 

A. You either add the two dice or – I’ve used random.org which I’ve used 

dice and/or I have used a random selection between 1 and 50. 

Q. What helps you make the decision for you to use the physical throw or 

the dice or go to random.org? What is that decision criteria? 

* * * 

Q. Why would you go to a website as opposed to throwing the physical 

dice is my question. What is the decision-making criteria you use to either 

physically throw the dice or go to the website? 

A. Because the website has a set of dice on it, and you can click – you can 

pick five dice, you can pick two dice. 

Q. Do you physically pick up the dice and throw them, or do you use 

electronic dice on that website? 

A. I use an electronic device. 

Q. So you don’t really throw dice? 

A. I can use either one. I’ve used real dice or I’ve used random.org. 

Q. How do you know the mathematical reliability of random.org? 

A. I’ve read through their website and they stand on their statistics as far 

as their program. 

* * * 

Q. Apart from reading the website where they declare they are truly 

mathematically random, do you have any kind of verification of that? 

A. No, sir. I don’t. 

Q. Just by way of education and training, what is your education post high 

school? 

A. I have a BA in agriculture economics. 

Q. Any specific training in mathematics beyond that? 

A. No, sir. 
9

(Tr. at 16 – 20; 32-33). 

 The problems inherent to the “two dice method” are obvious. Recall that Frye did 

not explain his decision to throw one or two dice. That is, he did not explain how he 

decides to test either offices (1 die) or vessels (2 die). Hence, at the outset, he admits 

exercising personal choice or discretion in choosing to throw one or two die. This initial 

decision vitiates the notion of true randomness vis-à-vis the entire pool of Higman 

employees. 

 Next, Frye’s testimony reveals that the process by which he selects a given 

vessel/crew is fraught with human intervention. He could not explain, for instance, how 

“Boat 28” could be selected by throwing two, six-sided die. Nor could he explain how 

“Boats 1 – 9” could ever be selected using the same two die. (Query: if two dice were 

thrown and a “1” and a “4” came up, would that mean “Boat 14” or “Boat 41” or “Boat 

5” would be selected?) Again, there is too much human discretion and intervention in 

this process to ensure a random selection could ever be made. 

 Under the Higman “two dice” selection method, neither “Boats 10, 20, 30, 40, nor 

50” could ever be selected for crew testing, because there is no “zero” on a six-sided die. 

Likewise, neither could “Boats 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 37, 38, 39, 47, 48, 49” ever be 

selected either, because there is no “seven,” eight,” or “nine” on a six-sided die. It is 

problematic whether Boats 1 through 9 could ever be chosen using two dice, either. Thus 

it is apparent that at least seventeen boats out of a fleet of fifty could never be selected for 

testing, absent human intervention and discretion. 

 Frye’s alternate explanation during his testimony that he also used an Internet web 

site, “random.org,” does not alleviate the dilemma, either. Again, Frey could not 
10

articulate the basis for his decision to use either physical dice or the website. Moreover, 

Frey could not establish an evidentiary foundation for the scientific reliability of the 

website he used. Nor does Frey have a sufficient academic background in mathematics 

or computer science to establish an evidentiary foundation for his reliance upon the 

website. 

The regulatory protections contained in 46 C.F.R. §16.230(c) require that the 

selection of crewmembers for random drug testing shall be made by a scientifically valid 

method. Hence, it was incumbent upon the Coast Guard at the hearing of this matter to 

establish an appropriate foundation that either the “dice” method or the “website” method 

met the criteria of scientific or mathematical validity, free of human intervention or 

discretion. 

The factual obstacles revealed by Frye’s testimony, his own involvement with the 

selection process, the numerical impossibilities inherent to the “two dice” method and the 

absence of any proof that random.org is mathematically/scientifically valid rendered this 

an impossible burden for the Coast Guard to meet. The Higman selection process was 

simply too fraught with human intervention and caprice. Hence, the test was not a 

“random” selection as contemplated by the Department of Transportation (DOT) 

regulations contained in 46 C.F.R. subpart B. 

Federal courts have recognized that DOT drug-testing administrative regulations 

do not exist in a vacuum. “Once the government requires an employer to administer 

random...tests to a certain class of workers, the Fourth Amendment is implicated; thus 

the ‘search’ effected by a ...test is subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 

requirement.” Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 615-617 
11

(1989); Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Util.Workers, Local 132, 265 F. 3d 787, 796 (9th Cir. 

2001) (emphasis added). Such is clearly the case here. 

The courts have held that to excuse non-compliance with DOT regulations or to 

adopt a ‘substantial compliance’ standard would undercut an individual’s Fourth 

Amendment rights. Because the employer is responsible for ensuring compliance with the 

DOT regulations, failure to comply with those regulations renders the testing procedures 

invalid. Util.Workers, Local 132, supra at 795-796. Appeal Decision No. 2659 (Duncan) 

(2006) apparently renders 49 C.F.R. Part 40 inapplicable to the facts at bar. Duncan cites 

the Final Rule implementing 33 C.F.R. Part 95, which reads in part, “The acceptability of 

a particular test required by a marine employer will be established during an 

administrative or judicial hearing.” (emphasis added) See 52 Fed. Reg. 47,526 and 47, 

530 (Dec. 14 1987). Whether the selection process at bar is “acceptable” is measured 

against the Constitutional dictates of Skinner, supra, and its progeny. Even IF 49 C.F.R. 

Part 40 and/or 46 C.F.R. §16.230 are not specifically controlling in light of Duncan, they 

are, in the absence of any guidance from 33 C.F.R. Part 95, certainly persuasive. 

 Therefore, the court specifically finds that the selection methods employed by 

Higman, were not scientifically or mathematically valid. Each vessel in the Higman fleet 

was not equally subject to selection. Accordingly, the court further finds that Higman 

crewmembers did not have an equal, random chance of being tested each time selections 

were made. Thus, Respondent’s employer indubitably violated the clear requirements of 

46 C.F.R. §16.230,8

 if not the “reasonableness” requirement imposed by the Fourth 

Amendment. 

 

8

 October 1, 2008 revision. 
12

The second Amended Complaint did not allege that Respondent consented to the 

alcohol test. Hence, that issue was not before the undersigned nor did Respondent have 

notice of, nor an obligation to defend against such an allegation. That issue only arose in 

the Coast Guard’s post-hearing brief, where it argued that because Respondent did not 

protest the testing, he essentially provided a “voluntary” sample. In support of this 

position, the Coast Guard filed post-hearing three witness affidavits. For the limited 

purposes of the pending Motion, the court accepts as fact that Respondent did not protest 

the drug and alcohol test imposed upon him by his employer. However, given the facts 

of this case, acquiescence does not equate to voluntariness. Both Appeal Decision No.

2668 (Merrill) (2007) and Appeal Decision No. 2545 (Jardin) (1992) discuss the 

voluntariness of a chemical test. Both cases are factually distinguishable from the facts at 

bar. As an aside, it is questionable whether Respondent’s participation in the test was, in 

fact, “voluntary.” Higman’s clearly-stated corporate drug testing policy is that “Any 

personnel...who refuses to cooperate with the...tests included in this policy shall be 

terminated.” [sic] (CG Ex. 1 at 6-20; CG Ex. 4 at 2, CG Ex. 7 at 68). See, Bolden v. 

SEPTA, 953 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1991). 

To reiterate, there is no circumstance or category of test called “voluntary” in the 

regulatory scheme described in 46 C.F.R. §§16.210-.250 or in the Higman corporate drug 

and alcohol policy. 

Interestingly, the Coast Guard relies upon Administrator v. Boyle, 7 NTSB 616 

(1990), which is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In Boyle, a helicopter pilot 

was asked to submit to an alcohol breath test upon reasonable suspicion by his employer 

that the pilot had been drinking. Evidence in that case suggested that co-workers 
13

observed the pilot had alcohol on his breath, which, in turn, triggered the request for what 

was, essentially, a “reasonable cause” alcohol testing. 

In the instant matter, there was no such evidence of Respondent’s impairment 

which would have supported a request for a “reasonable cause” test under 46 C.F.R. 

§16.250 or the Higman drug and alcohol policy. (CG Ex. 1 at 6-20; CG Ex. 4 at 2). Had 

there been any such evidence, such as evidence of alcohol on Respondent’s breath, 

slurred speech or instability while walking, a “reasonable cause” breath/blood test might 

have been authorized.9 

The court is mindful, on the one hand, of the serious consequences to employees 

precipitated by random drug and alcohol testing; and, on the other hand, of the need to 

take steps to ensure that drug or alcohol related impairment does not result in potentially 

serious workplace accidents. Independent Oil Workers Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 777 F. 

Supp. 391 (D. N.J. 1991). However, the dictates of the pertinent regulations, due process 

and the considerations inherent to the Fourth Amendment outweigh any risk Respondent 

may have posed on the waterways. 

 

9

 See also 33 C.F.R. §95.030. The Higman “Alcohol and Drug Screen Consent” form Respondent signed on 

September 6, 2005 is noteworthy. (CG Ex. 5 at 14). There, Respondent plainly indicated his agreement to be tested for 

alcohol or drugs “at any time” while he was employed by Higman. He agreed to participate in “any such test,” knowing 

that the use of liquor is inconsistent with health and safety considerations. On its face, CG Ex. 5 seems to indicate that 

Respondent consented to be tested at any time, any place and for any reason—without reference to the five clearlydefined circumstances identified in 46 C.F.R. subpart B or Higman’s alcohol policy. In short, the Coast Guard may 

assert that Ex. 5 constitutes Respondent’s “waiver” of any rights inherent to 46 C.F.R. Part 16, subpart B and 49 

C.F.R. Part 40. 

The classic definition of waiver, however, is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 

privilege.” Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 544-545 (1976). Exhibit 5 was signed more than three years prior to 

the November 14, 2008 “random” test at issue, here. Hence, Exhibit 5 cannot be asserted as Respondent’s “intentional 

relinquishment or abandonment of known rights or privileges” or of any rights he may have held three years later. 

Moreover, Exhibit 5 cannot be now advanced as evidence of “substantial compliance” with the clearly-defined and 

limited alcohol testing regimen set forth in either 46 C.F.R. subpart B or Higman’s alcohol policy. Util.Workers, Local 

132, Id. At 795-796. 

Simply stated, if either the DOT or the Coast Guard or Higman wanted to impose a blanket requirement that mariners 

be subject to drug and alcohol testing “at any time” then they were free to do so by the appropriate administrative rulemaking process. 

 
14

III. CONCLUSION 

After careful consideration of the testimony and documentary evidence offered at 

the hearing, and there being good legal cause therefor, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. 33 C.F.R. §20.311(d)(2). 

WHEREFORE, 

 ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is 

GRANTED and the Coast Guard’s Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

PLEASE TAKE NOTE that issuance of this decision serves as the parties’ right 

to appeal under 33 C.F.R. Part 20, Subpart J. A copy of Subpart J is provided as 

Attachment B. 

Done and dated this the 13th day of November, 2009, 

at New Orleans, Louisiana 

_S/BRUCE TUCKER SMITH 

HON. BRUCE TUCKER SMITH 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
15

ATTACHMENT A_ – EXHIBIT & WITNESS LIST

COAST GUARD EXHIBITS 

1. Higman Marine Policy & Procedures Manual 

2. Affidavit of Aaron Christian 

3. Aaron Christian MMLD Information Screen Shot

4. Drug, Alcohol and Contraband Policy 

5. Aaron Christian application for employment with Higman Marine—

Excluding page 27 

6. Policy & Procedures Manual Amendments

7. Higman Marine Policy & Procedures Manual, 2003

8. Active Employee Total Report

9. Crew Change Report

10. Higman Marine Policy & Procedures Distribution 

11. Vessel Logs

12. Crew Change Calendar 

COAST GUARD WITNESSES 

1. Kyle Shaw, Higman Marine 

2. Kayla McAda, Higman Marine Services 

3. John Frye, Higman Barge Lines 

RESPONDENT EXHIBITS 

W. E-mail from David Duvall to Kyle Shaw 

 

RESPONDENT WITNESSES 

 None offered 

ALJ EXHIBITS 

 None 

ALJ WITNESS LIST 

None