Filed 9/15/23 Russell v. Walsh CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

STEPHEN RUSSELL,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TARA WALSH,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A165356

 (City & County of San Francisco

 Super. Ct. No. CGC-18-570137)

Stephen Russell sued Tara Walsh for battery, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, and domestic violence (Civ. Code, § 1708.6, subd. (a)), and 

a jury found her liable for all three torts. Walsh, who represented herself at 

trial and does so again on appeal, argues that the evidence is insufficient to 

support the jury’s verdict. She also contends that the trial court erred in 

declining to continue the trial when she told the court about her mental 

health issues. Finding none of these arguments persuasive, we affirm the 

judgment.

The parties are familiar with the facts and our opinion does not meet 

the criteria for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We confine

our discussion to the information that is relevant to our conclusions and to 

our statement of the reasons that have led us to them. (See Cal. Const., 

art. VI, § 14; Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1262.)
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DISCUSSION

1. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Electing Not to 

Continue the Trial

Walsh argues that the trial court “erred in refusing to continue the trial 

when . . . Walsh expressed that she was having mental health issues.” We 

disagree.

“The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of 

good cause requiring the continuance.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).) 

“A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a continuance. 

[Citation]. It is the duty of the trial court to vigorously insist upon cases 

being heard and decided in the most timely manner possible, unless there are 

compelling reasons to the contrary.” (Midwest Television, Inc. v. Scott, 

Lancaster, Mills & Atha, Inc. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 442, 456.) “Unnecessary 

continuances are wasteful, nonproductive, time-consuming and a fertile 

ground for criticism by the public of the courts.” (County of San Bernardino 

v. Doria Mining & Engineering Corp. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 776, 781.) “A trial 

court has great discretion in the disposition of an application for a 

continuance. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the court’s determination 

will not be disturbed.” (Estate of Smith (1973) 9 Cal.3d 74, 81.)

According to Walsh, there was good cause to continue her trial because 

she told the court that she was “not mentally fit to go through the trial” and 

offered to “obtain[] a letter from her psychiatrist” to the same effect. 

However, when Walsh first made the request for a continuance, the jury had 

been sworn and she had just delivered an opening statement in propria 

persona. Having observed that opening statement, the trial court could 

reasonably conclude that Walsh was able to proceed despite any difficulties.
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The trial court buttressed that conclusion after Walsh faced direct 

examination: “[T]he Court is not precluding you from [presenting] the 

[psychiatrist’s] note, but I will also tell you that if you wish to continue this 

case in some form or fashion, that I will require under the law good cause. So

far I've not seen a good cause basis.” As the trial court observed, Walsh had 

“been able to withstand the examination by” opposing counsel, and “seem[ed] 

to have the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings, what’s going 

on, and to proceed with the case.” Moreover, even though the court made 

clear that Walsh could present a note from a psychiatrist to support her 

request and emphasized that she had not yet established good cause, Walsh 

never did so.

Under these circumstances, we cannot find an abuse of discretion in the 

trial court’s conclusion that Walsh’s oral statements concerning her mental 

health problems did not establish good cause to continue the trial and 

thereby override the courts’ vital interest in avoiding costly delays. 

2. Walsh’s Challenges to the Sufficiency of the Evidence Are 

Waived

Walsh argues that no substantial evidence supports a finding that she 

committed battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or domestic 

violence against Russell. Because she has not made the requisite showing in 

any of those respects, we disagree.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume that the 

“ ‘ record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.’ ” (Foreman & 

Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman).) It is the 

appellant’s burden to demonstrate that it does not. (Ibid.) “In furtherance of 

this burden, the appellant must fairly summarize all the facts in the light 

most favorable to the judgment.” (Burch v. CertainTeed Corp. (2019) 

34 Cal.App.5th 341, 349.) “Accordingly, if . . . ‘some particular issue of fact is 
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not sustained, they are required to set forth in their brief all the material 

evidence on the point and not merely their own evidence. Unless this is done 

the error assigned is deemed to be waived.’ ” (Foreman, at p. 881.)

Here, Walsh’s opening brief summarizes only her own testimony, not 

Russell’s. By neglecting Russell’s testimony—which described symptoms he 

experienced, how those symptoms would abate in Walsh’s absence, a blood 

test that revealed high levels of lithium in his body, and the statements of a 

nanny who had witnessed Walsh drugging his wine—Walsh failed “to set 

forth . . . all the material evidence” pertaining to the sufficiency of the 

evidence for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and domestic 

violence. (Foreman, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) Accordingly, her claims in 

those respects are waived. (Ibid.)

3. Even if Those Claims Were Not Waived, Substantial Evidence 

Supports the Jury’s Verdict to All Three Torts

Walsh’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence fail on the merits, 

as well. We explain below.

a. Standard of Review

In evaluating the record for substantial evidence, we determine 

whether the evidence, “contradicted or uncontradicted,” will support the 

judgment. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873–874.) 

“ ‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence 

that is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry

(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.) “ ‘ “The testimony of a [single] witness . . . 

may be sufficient” [to support a judgment].’ ” (In re Marriage of Slivka (1986) 

183 Cal.App.3d 159, 163.) “It is not our role as a reviewing court to reweigh 

the evidence or to assess witness credibility.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 

6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981 (Thompson).)
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b. Battery

First, Walsh challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for battery. “ ‘A 

battery is any intentional, unlawful and harmful contact by one person with 

the person of another. . . . A harmful contact, intentionally done is the 

essence of a battery. . . . A contact is “unlawful” if it is unconsented to. . . .’ 

[Citation.] The elements of a civil battery are: ‘ “1. Defendant intentionally 

did an act which resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s 

person; [¶] 2. Plaintiff did not consent to the contact; [and][¶] 3. The harmful 

or offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to the plaintiff.” ’ ”

(Fluharty v. Fluharty (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 484, 497 (Fluharty).)

Here, Walsh and Russell resided in New York City and San Francisco, 

respectively. They met in New York in 2015 and began a dating relationship. 

Russell testified that in 2016, after a visit from Walsh, he became “severely 

ill . . . to the point [he] was unable to get out of bed.” Soon after giving birth 

to their daughter in early 2017, Walsh came to San Francisco to stay with 

Russell. From that time through the middle of the next year, there were “at 

least a dozen times” when Russell suspected he had been drugged. During 

some of those times, he went “to the emergency room to get toxicology 

reports . . . .” According to Russell, “it felt like being knocked out,” like 

“you’re going to lose consciousness.” Such episodes would occur when Walsh 

was staying in the same city as Russell, but abate once the two had parted. 

In her own testimony, Walsh admitted that on at least two occasions 

during the same time period, she put the prescription drug Seroquel into 

Russell’s wine without asking his permission or telling him she was doing so. 

She then “put it on the coffee table” near him, intending that Russell ingest 

the drug. When a nanny later told Russell about Walsh drugging the wine, 

the revelation “[e]xplained . . . 90 percent of what [he] had been experiencing 
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that month”: “a very confusing set of symptoms” related to the drug’s onset, 

“the panic [he] would experience upon noticing [he] was drugged, and the 

subsequent “withdrawal and neuropathy.” 

A jury hearing that testimony could reasonably find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Walsh had battered Russell. Walsh 

admitted to drugging Russell’s wine and placing it near him, intending for 

him to drink it. And Russell explained the abnormal and unpleasant 

sensations he experienced around that time. On that basis, it is reasonable 

to infer that Walsh “ ‘ “intentionally did an act which resulted in a harmful or 

offensive contact with [Russell’s] person.” ’ ” (Fluharty, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 497.) That Russell “ ‘ “did not consent to the contact” ’ ” follows from the 

testimony showing that he was ignorant of Walsh’s conduct and panicked 

upon feeling the drug’s effects. (Ibid.) And Russell’s testimony regarding his 

symptoms supports a finding that Walsh’s actions “ ‘ “caused . . . 

harm . . . .” ’ ” (Ibid.)

As for Walsh’s contention that she drugged Russell in self-defense, it 

cannot survive the standard of review operative here. That affirmative 

defense requires the defendant to have “reasonably believed, in view of all the 

circumstances of the case, that the plaintiff was going to harm him or 

her. . . .” (J.J. v. M.F. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 968, 976.) Here, Russell 

testified that he never physically harmed Walsh or threatened her with 

physical harm. If that testimony is credited, then Walsh could not have 

reasonably believed Russell was going to harm her. As we have already 

observed, “[i]t is not our role as a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence or 

to assess witness credibility.” (Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) 

Accordingly, we defer to the jury in Walsh’s case, which apparently resolved 

this question of credibility against her.
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Finally, in arguing that Russell consented to being drugged, Walsh 

relies on two cases: Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483 and 

Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316. However, neither case is 

relevant to her argument. In both Piedra and Saxena, the defendants were 

medical doctors and the legal analysis in those cases related to signed 

consent forms by which the plaintiffs or their guardians expressly consented 

to medical treatment. (Piedra at p. 1496; Saxena at p. 321.) In contrast, 

Walsh argues only that Russell rendered implied consent. 

Unaided by Piedra and Saxena, Walsh’s argument challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence for battery comprises a series of assertions 

unsupported by any legal authority or citations to the record. For that 

reason, it does nothing to undermine our analysis supporting the verdict. 

(See Foreman, supra, at p. 881 [it is appellant’s burden to demonstrate the 

insufficiency of the evidence].)

c. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Second, Walsh challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. “The elements of the tort of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress are: ‘ “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by 

the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the 

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe 

or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the 

emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. . . .” Conduct to be 

outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually 

tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.] The defendant must have 

engaged in ‘conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the 

realization that injury will result.’ ” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 

54 Cal.3d 868, 903; see also Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)
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Here, Walsh’s extreme and outrageous conduct consisted of her 

drugging Russell’s wine without his knowledge or consent. Her reckless 

disregard for the probability of causing emotional distress can be inferred 

from the fact that she accompanied Russell on one of his trips to the 

emergency room for a toxicology report when he suspected he had been 

drugged. Walsh therefore had reason to know that Russell believed he was 

being drugged and that this belief was causing him distress, and she acted 

with that knowledge when, later, she admittedly drugged him herself. And 

Russell’s testimony regarding his feelings of panic upon feeling the effects of 

being drugged support the jury’s finding that Walsh’s conduct caused 

Russell’s emotional distress.

d. Domestic Violence

Third, Walsh challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for domestic 

violence. Civil Code section 1708.6, subdivision (a) provides: “A person is 

liable for the tort of domestic violence if the plaintiff proves both of the 

following elements: [¶] (1) The infliction of injury upon the plaintiff resulting 

from abuse, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 13700 of the Penal Code. 

[¶] (2) The abuse was committed by the defendant, a person having a 

relationship with the plaintiff as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 13700 of 

the Penal Code.” “ ‘Abuse’ means intentionally or recklessly causing or 

attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable 

apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself, or 

another.” (Pen. Code, § 13700, subd. (a).) 

Here, Walsh does not contest the jury’s finding that she and Russell 

had the requisite relationship for the tort of domestic violence; only the 

“injury” finding is contested. But Walsh committed abuse because she placed

Russell “in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to 
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himself” (Pen. Code, § 13700, subd. (a)) by inducing the panic Russell 

experienced upon noticing he had been drugged. That abusive conduct 

resulted in injuries that included Russell’s symptoms of “withdrawal and 

neuropathy.” Walsh offers another explanation for those symptoms—

Russell’s pre-existing “mental health issues”—but “[u]nder the substantial 

evidence standard of review, ‘where two or more different inferences can 

reasonably be drawn from the evidence, this court is without power to 

substitute its own inferences for those of the [trier of fact] and decide the case 

accordingly.’ ” (Escobar v. Flores (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 737, 752.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Russell is entitled to recover his costs on 

appeal.

GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, Acting P. J.

HIRAMOTO, J. *

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, assigned 

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.