NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM ROBERT DIXON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

ROBERT LeGRAND, Warden; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-16728

D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00586-RCJ-VPC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 14, 2017**

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

Nevada state prisoner William Robert Dixon appeals pro se from the district 

court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional 

claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. 

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 1 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 15-16728

basis supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 

2008), and we affirm.

Summary judgment on Dixon’s access-to-courts claim was proper because 

Dixon failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’

alleged refusal to request Dixon’s legal materials from Ohio in a timely manner

caused his injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-49 (1996) (access-tocourts claim requires actual prejudice to contemplated or existing litigation, such 

as inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim); see also Harper v. City 

of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In a § 1983 action, the 

plaintiff must . . . demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the actionable 

cause of the claimed injury.”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dixon’s claim 

alleging denial of mail because Dixon failed to raise a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether he properly exhausted administrative remedies or whether 

administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See Woodford v. 

Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . 

means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the 

agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (emphasis, citation, and internal 

quotation marks omitted)); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 

2015) (a prisoner who does not exhaust administrative remedies must show that 
 3 15-16728

“there is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally 

available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him . . . .”). 

We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. See United 

States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised 

in the opening brief or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. 

See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied. 

AFFIRMED.