IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-50327

Summary Calendar

ALICIA CLUCK, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

METROCARE SERVICES - AUSTIN, L.P., A subsidiary of MetroCare EMS, 

Incorporated, a subsidiary of Acadian Ambulance Services, Incorporated, and 

a subsidiary of Acadian Ambulance Services of Texas, L.L.C.; A Texas 

corporation; METROCARE EMS, INCORPORATED; METROCARE EMS, 

L.P., 

 Defendants - Appellees

************************************************************************

ALICIA CLUCK, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

METROCARE SERVICES - AUSTIN, L.P.; METROCARE EMS, 

INCORPORATED

 Defendants - Appellees

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 20, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 19-50327

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:16-CV-1216

USDC No. 1:17-CV-33

Before KING, GRAVES, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Alicia Cluck contests the district court’s award of attorney’s fees 

to defendant MetroCare Services – Austin, L.P. Because her arguments that 

the award was improper are meritless, we AFFIRM.

I.

This case began in state court in 2007. In 2012, while the state-court case 

was ongoing, MetroCare Services’ registration as a limited partnership was 

terminated. In 2016, the case was removed to federal court under federalquestion jurisdiction, as some of Cluck’s claims implicated the Employment 

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. In 2018, the 

district court granted partial summary judgment to MetroCare Services and 

remanded the case to state court for resolution of the remaining state-law 

claim. 

MetroCare Services then moved the district court for attorney’s fees 

under ERISA’s fee-shifting provision. The magistrate judge recommended 

assessing an award of attorney’s fees against Cluck and her attorneys, and the 

district court adopted the recommendation in part, assessing the attorney’s 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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fees solely against Cluck. Cluck then filed a motion, which the district court 

construed as a motion for reconsideration and denied. Cluck timely appealed.

II.

Under ERISA, the district court “in its discretion may allow a reasonable 

attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). The 

Supreme Court has interpreted this language to mean that a district court has 

discretion to award attorney’s fees “as long as the fee claimant has achieved 

‘some degree of success on the merits.’” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 

Co., 560 U.S. 242, 245 (2010) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 

680, 694 (1983)).

We review a district court’s award of attorney’s fees under this provision

for abuse of discretion. N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. 

Co., 898 F.3d 461, 485 (5th Cir. 2018). And we review a district court’s ruling 

on a motion for reconsideration under that same standard. See Life Partners 

Creditors’ Tr. v. Cowley (In re Life Partners Holdings, Inc.), 926 F.3d 103, 128 

(5th Cir. 2019).

On appeal, Cluck does not dispute that MetroCare Services achieved 

some degree of success on the merits. Rather, she argues first that MetroCare 

Services cannot seek attorney’s fees because it no longer exists and second that 

the award of attorney’s fees violated her due-process rights. Neither argument 

is persuasive.

MetroCare Services was organized under Texas law, which states that a 

terminated entity “continues in existence,” for certain enumerated purposes,

for three years from the date of its termination. Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. 

§ 11.356(a). Cluck argues that because MetroCare Services was terminated in 

2012, its 2018 request for attorney’s fees fell outside this three-year period and 

thus was improper. But Cluck ignores that the same Texas statute also

provides that if an action is brought by or against a terminated entity before 

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the three-year period elapses, the entity “continues to survive for purposes of 

. . . the action until all judgments, orders, and decrees have been fully 

executed.” § 11.356(c). Because this action has been ongoing since before 

MetroCare Services’ termination, Cluck’s first argument fails.

Cluck’s second argument is that the district court violated due process 

by ordering her to pay attorney’s fees without first determining her financial 

wherewithal. But we have previously said that, in the ERISA context, a district 

court “is not required” to consider “the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy 

an award of attorneys’ fees.” N. Cypress, 898 F.3d at 485 (quoting Iron Workers 

Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1266 (5th Cir. 1980)); accord Hardt, 

560 U.S. at 254-55.

In arguing to the contrary, Cluck relies on out-of-circuit caselaw 

pertaining to the imposition of sanctions. See, e.g., Martin v. Automobili 

Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen 

exercising its discretion to sanction under its inherent power, a court must take 

into consideration the financial circumstances of the party being sanctioned.”). 

Yet an award of attorney’s fees under ERISA is not a sanction. Such an award

is possible whenever one party achieves “some degree of success on the merits,”

Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255, and the availability of fees does not depend on the other 

side’s “culpability or bad faith,” id. at 249 n.1; see id. at 254-55. Cluck’s 

authorities are inapposite.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the district court are 

AFFIRMED.

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