alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 In The



### Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

N O

. 09

- 20

- 00144

- CV

__________________

JODI MICHAEL SIMONEAUX , Appellant

V.

GLENN A. JOHNSON , Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 284th District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 20

- 01

- 00860

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The a ppellant

, Jodi Michael Simoneaux

, and the appellee

, Glenn A. Johnson

,

filed a joint motion to dismiss this accelerated appeal. This motion is voluntarily

made by t he agreement of the parties prior to any decision of this Court. See Tex. R.

App. P. 42.1(a)( 2 ). We grant the joint motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

PER CURIAM2 Submitted on September 9, 2020

Opinion Delivered September 10, 2020

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
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EXHIBIT 32

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of American  Southwest  Holdings,
Inc.  and  Subsidiaries  (the  "Company")  on Form 10-QSB for the period  ending
September 30, 2002 as filed with the  Securities  and Exchange  Commission  (the
Report),  I, Alan Doyle,  President  (Chief  Executive  Officer)  and  Treasurer
(Principal  Financial  Officer) of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002,  that the report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information  contained
in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.

Date:  October 24, 2003



/s/  Alan Doyle
---------------------------------------
Alan Doyle
President (Chief Executive Officer) and
Treasurer (Principal Financial Officer)
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Brandon Grable Fielding, * From the 91st District Court

of Eastland County,

Trial Court No. 23205.

Vs. No. 11-15-00316-CR * June 30, 2016

The State of Texas, * Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

(Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., 

Willson, J., and McCall, sitting

by assignment)

(Bailey, J., not participating)

 This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that the 

appeal should be dismissed. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, 

the appeal is dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED> 
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996             DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996             JUL-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996             SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                       5,376,601              10,337,010
<SECURITIES>                                 4,044,992                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0                       0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             9,430,712              10,337,864
<PP&E>                                         530,211                 204,224
<DEPRECIATION>                                  76,250                  58,979
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,023,400              10,604,739
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          392,073                 323,400
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                     46,000                  46,000
<COMMON>                                        83,246                  83,246
<OTHER-SE>                                   9,502,081              10,152,093
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,023,400              10,604,739
<SALES>                                              0                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0                       0
<CGS>                                                0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,681,669                 765,258
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,088                   1,205
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,511,531)               (741,164)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0                       0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,511,531)               (741,164)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.43)                   (.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.43)                   (.13)
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Secure Computing Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for
the period ending September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Timothy J. Steinkopf, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,
as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                                                               
|---------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Timothy J. Steinkopf                                       
|Timothy J. Steinkopf                                           
|Senior Vice President of Operations and Chief Financial Officer
|November 9, 2006
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

_________________________________

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Complainant

vs.

WALLACE DEAN HEINONEN, JR.

Respondent

_________________________________

Docket Number 2023-0404

Enforcement Activity No. 7807646

CONSENT ORDER

Issued: December 6, 2023

By Administrative Law Judge: Honorable Timothy G. Stueve

Appearances:

Jesse Garrant

Sector Buffalo

For the Coast Guard

Wallace Dean Heinonen, Jr., Pro Se

For Respondent
CONSENT ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

On or about November 21, 2023, the parties in this case submitted a Motion for Approval 

of Settlement Agreement and Entry of Consent Order to be approved as a settlement of the case 

under 33 C.F.R. § 20.502.

I have carefully reviewed the terms of the Settlement Agreement and find it is fair and 

reasonable and in substantial compliance with the requirements of 33 C.F.R. § 20.502.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the record, it is hereby ORDERED, the Settlement Agreement is 

APPROVED in full and incorporated herein by reference. This Consent Order shall constitute 

full, final, and complete adjudication of this proceeding.

Done and dated December 6, 2023, at

Alameda, California

 

_____________________

Timothy G. Stueve

Administrative Law Judge

U.S. Coast Guard
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00073-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A CHILD

----------

FROM THE 231ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant Robin Dumas filed her notice of appeal on February 22, 2012. 

On February 24, 2012, we notified Appellant of our concern that we lacked 

jurisdiction over her appeal because there is no signed, final order in this case 

and that her notice of appeal was premature. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a), 

27.1(a). We informed Appellant that unless she or any party desiring to continue 

the appeal furnished this court with a signed copy of the order that Appellant 

seeks to appeal, we would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We have received no response to our letter nor a 

copy of a signed order from the trial court in this case.

Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final orders or judgments 

unless a statute permits an interlocutory appeal. Cherokee Water Co. v. Ross, 

698 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. 1985). There is no signed order or judgment in this 

case. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: GABRIEL, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and DAUPHINOT, J.

DELIVERED: May 3, 2012
(October 20, 1987)

#### In the Matter of Daniel A. Fogarty, Jr., Respondent, v George Wolf et al., Respondents, and Ruth Oliva, Appellant.

—In a proceeding, *inter alia,*seeking a judgment directing that a new Conservative Party primary election be held for the nomination of candidates of that party for the public offices of members of the Town Board of the Town of Southold, Ruth Oliva appeals from a resettled judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Dunn, J., on the decision; Tanenbaum, J., on the resettled judgment), dated October 13, 1987, which granted the petition and ordered a new primary election for the aforementioned public offices on October 21, 1987. The notice of appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, *795Suffolk County (Dunn, J.), dated October 2, 1987, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the resettled judgment.

Ordered that the resettled judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the Suffolk County Board of Elections is directed to certify the results of the September 15, 1987 Conservative Party primary election for the nomination of candidates of that party for the public offices of members of the Town Board of the Town of Southold.

Assuming, without deciding, that the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, possessed the requisite jurisdiction to review the validity of the absentee ballot in issue, we nevertheless determine that the petitioner has failed to sustain his burden of proof in this proceeding. A new primary election may not be held unless the petitioner proves that the irregularities are sufficiently large in number and are of such a nature as to establish the probability that the election results would be changed absent the irregularity *(see, Matter of Lisa v Board of Elections,*40 NY2d 911; *Matter of Henry v Mahoney,*105 AD2d 1159). On the record before us the petitioner has not met that burden. Niehoff, J. P., Weinstein, Eiber and Harwood, JJ., concur.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 November 24, 2015

p1116

Order 

Clerk

November 24, 2015

150855

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 150855

COA: 323572

Wayne CC: 78-813217-FM

JAMES R. THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 25, 2014 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
PREFERRED CITE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL “RULES 

OF THE ROAD.” 

Written By Mr. Robert Bruce

Navigation rules, or “Rules of the Road,” apply to all vessels of the United 

States or any vessels navigating on waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 

Depending on where the vessel is operating, either the inland or international 

navigation rules will apply. International rules apply seaward of the 

demarcation line for inland waters. The President of the United States was 

given authority by 33 U. S. Code Chapter 30 to proclaim the “International 

Regulations” in the Federal Register, and a civil penalty may be assessed 

against vessels violating the International Regulations. The International 

Regulations are commonly referred to as “COLREGs.” 

After the President proclaimed the COLREGs in the Federal Register, they 

were for a time reproduced in both the Code of Federal Regulations and in the 

U.S. Code. A note at the end of 33 USC § 1602 indicates, however, that the 

Coast Guard removed the text of the COLREGs from the Code of Federal 

Regulations in 1996, because the text was duplicated in the U.S. Code. The 

note states that subsequently the editors of the Code decided to no longer 

include the COLREGs text. As a result, the text of the COLREGs is now 

neither available in the U.S. Code nor the Code of Federal Regulations. 

The fact that the COLREGs themselves do not appear in either the U. S. Code 

or the Code of Federal Regulations presents a problem in terms of deciding 

how best to cite an alleged violation of the COLREGs. We have seen cases 

where units have cited 33 USC § 1602 and the COLREGs rule that was 

allegedly violated. However, this cite is unacceptable because 33 USC § 1602 

only authorizes the President to proclaim the COLREGs and publish them in 

the Federal Register. Section 1602 does not require compliance with the 

COLREGs or include any other requirement that a person could violate. A 

more appropriate cite for a violation of the COLREGs is 33 USC § 1608, which 

states that a civil penalty can be assessed for operation of a vessel in violation 

of 33 USC Chapter 30 (including 33 USC §§ 1601-1608). Within Chapter 30, 

33 USC § 1603 requires compliance with the COLREGs by vessels subject to 
the jurisdiction of the U.S. Section 1603 would also be an acceptable cite for 

violations of the COLREGs. 

The case file should also specifically identify the COLREGs rule that was 

allegedly violated. The charged party should be able to determine from this 

information how s/he is alleged to have failed to comply with the Rules of the 

Road. If the violation is proved, Hearing Officers are authorized by 33 USC § 

1608 to assess a civil penalty.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-2055

In Re: STUART WAYNE TOMPKINS, 

 Petitioner. 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (1:08-cv-00322-GCM) 

Submitted: January 21, 2009 Decided: February 19, 2009 

Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Stuart Wayne Tompkins, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

 Stuart Wayne Tompkins, a North Carolina prisoner, 

petitions for a writ of mandamus. Tompkins asserts that he has 

had difficulty sending and receiving mail at Mountain View 

Correctional Institution, and he seeks an order compelling a 

federal investigation. We deny the petition. 

 A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy to be used only 

in extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. United States Dist. 

Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Relief under this writ is 

available only when there is no other means for obtaining 

relief. In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987). The 

party seeking relief carries the heavy burden of showing that he 

has “no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires” 

and that his right to such relief is “clear and indisputable.” 

Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980). 

 Tompkins has not made such a showing in this case. 

Accordingly, we deny the petition. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

PETITION DENIED
# C_2021027EN.01000701.xml

| 25.1.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 27/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.1.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 27/7

---

Notice for the attention of the persons subject to restrictive measures provided for in Council Decision 2011/72/CFSP, as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/55 , and in Council Regulation (EU) 101/2011, as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/49 , concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Tunisia

(2021/C 27/04)

The following information is brought to the attention of the persons that appear in the Annex to Council Decision 2011/72/CFSP (1), as amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/55 (2), and in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) 101/2011 (3), as implemented by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/49 (4) .

The Council of the European Union, after having reviewed the list of designated persons, has decided that the persons that appear in the abovementioned Annexes should continue to be included in the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2011/72/CFSP and Regulation (EU) 101/2011.

The attention of the persons concerned is drawn to the possibility of making an application to the competent authorities of the relevant Member State(s) as indicated in the websites in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 101/2011, in order to obtain an authorisation to use frozen funds for basic needs or specific payments (cf. Article 4 of the Regulation).

The persons concerned may submit a request to the Council before 1 September 2021, together with supporting documentation that the decision to include them on the abovementioned list should be reconsidered to the following address:

| Council of the European Union |
| --- |
| General Secretariat |
| RELEX.1.C |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

RELEX.1.C

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Email: sanctions@consilium.europa.eu

Any observations received will be taken into account for the purpose of the Council’s next review, pursuant to Article 5 of Decision 2011/72/CFSP and Article 12(4) of Regulation (EU) No 101/2011, of the list of designated persons.

---

(1)  OJ L 28, 2.2.2011, p. 62.

(2)  OJ L 023, 25.1.2021, p. 22.

(3)  OJ L 31, 5.2.2011, p. 1.

(4)  OJ L 023, 25.1.2021, p. 5.

---
#### PROCTOR v. SOULIER.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

September 29, 1896.)

Action by Frederick F. Proctor against Henry P. Soulier.

No opinion. Order of confirmation and report of referee modified by reducing the damages, as found by the referee, to the sum of $393.20,—being the sum of $250 for counsel fees, and the sum of $143.20 for costs and expenses of the referee; and, as so modified, affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. All concur. See 40 N. Y. Supp. 459.
#### In the Matter of Avelino Perry, Appellant, v City of New York, Respondent.

In a proceeding for leave to serve a late notice of claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5), the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), dated May 12, 1986, which denied the petition.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court, Kings County, properly exercised its *693discretion in denying the petitioner’s application for leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the City of New York *(see, Matter of Malla v City of New York,*129 AD2d 580).

In deciding whether leave to file a late notice of claim should be granted, the key factors are whether the petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failure to serve a timely notice of claim, whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose (General Municipal Law § 50-e [1]) or a reasonable time thereafter and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining its defense on the merits *(Braverman v City of White Plains,*115 AD2d 689, 690).

In the instant case, the petitioner has failed to adequately explain the delay in filing the application for leave to serve a late notice of claim approximately 14 months after the date of his accident. The petitioner failed to provide any medical records and the medical affidavit submitted was inadequate in that it accounted for only two months of the petitioner’s delay *(see, Fox v City of New York,*91 AD2d 624; *Klobnock v City of New York,*80 AD2d 854).

Nor may the petitioner claim that the City of New York had notice of the accident by reason of police "Aided Report” made immediately after the accident since police reports are insufficient to satisfy the requirement of actual knowledge *(Braverman v City of White Plains,*115 AD2d 689, *supra; Caselli v City of New York,*105 AD2d 251; *Matter of Morris v County of Suffolk,*88 AD2d 956, *affd*58 NY2d 767). Likewise, the petitioner’s failure to identify the city employee to whom he allegedly reported his accident in February 1985 negates the claim that the city had notice of the incident *(Matter of Raczy v County of Westchester,*95 AD2d 859).

Finally, although the respondent did not clearly demonstrate prejudice due to the 14-month delay *(Matter of Bensen v Town of Islip,*99 AD2d 755, *appeal dismissed*62 NY2d 798), there is a very real danger that changed conditions would prevent an accurate reconstruction of the circumstances existing at the time the accident occurred *(see, Kravitz v County of Rockland,*112 AD2d 352, *affd*67 NY2d 685). The petitioner’s contention that the premises remain unchanged does not negate this principle *(see, Mazza v City of New York,*112 AD2d 921; *Matter of Malla v City of New York, supra; Martire v City of New York,*129 AD2d 567). Mangano, J. P., Bracken, Brown and Niehoff, JJ., concur.