Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Varnauskas, 2018 IL App (3d) 150654

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLNOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

STEVEN J. VARNAUSKAS, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-15-0654

Filed July 25, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry County, No. 14-CF-334; the 

Hon. Terence M. Patton, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Peter A. Carusona, and Andrew J. Boyd, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Matthew Schutte, State’s Attorney, of Cambridge (Patrick Delfino, 

Lawrence M. Bauer, and Jasmine D. Morton, of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justice Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice McDade dissented, with opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Steven J. Varnauskas, was convicted of two counts of 

controlled substance trafficking (720 ILCS 570/401.1(a) (West 2014)) and sentenced to two 

concurrent 40-year terms of imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm. 

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 On November 14, 2014, at 11 p.m., Illinois State Police Trooper Sean Veryzer was in his 

squad car in the center median of Interstate 80 (I-80) when defendant’s vehicle passed him 

traveling eastbound. Veryzer noticed that defendant’s rear license plate was obscured by an 

empty bicycle rack attached to the car. Based on the fact that the license place was obscured by 

the bicycle rack, Veryzer executed a traffic stop of defendant’s vehicle for a suspected 

violation of section 3-413(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2014)). 

At the time, section 3-413(b) provided: 

“Every registration plate shall at all times be securely fastened in a horizontal position 

to the vehicle for which it is issued so as to prevent the plate from swinging and at a 

height of not less than 5 inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of such 

plate, in a place and position to be clearly visible and shall be maintained in a 

condition to be clearly legible, free from any materials that would obstruct the visibility 

of the plate. *** Registration stickers issued as evidence of renewed annual registration 

shall be attached to registration plates as required by the Secretary of State, and be 

clearly visible at all times.” (Emphasis added.) Id. 

¶ 4 During the traffic stop, Veryzer’s canine partner (a drug detection dog) gave a positive alert 

for the presence of drugs in defendant’s vehicle. Based on the dog’s alert, Veryzer and another 

police trooper searched defendant’s vehicle on the side of the road. Due to the weather being 

below freezing at 20 degrees Fahrenheit and due to safety issues regarding oncoming traffic 

and low visibility because it was dark outside, the troopers decided to relocate defendant’s

vehicle to a nearby police station in order to continue the search. At the police station, Veryzer 

located two kilograms of suspected heroin and a kilogram of suspected cocaine wrapped in 

black material, in a void area of defendant’s vehicle located by the engine and below the car’s 

windshield. Preliminary field tests of the suspected drugs tested positive for heroin and 

cocaine. Defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of controlled substance 

trafficking (720 ILCS 570/401.1(a) (West 2014)), possession with the intent to deliver heroin 

(id. § 401(a)(1)(D)), possession with the intent to deliver cocaine (id. § 401(a)(2)(D)), 

unlawful possession of a controlled substance (heroin) (id. § 402(a)(1)(D)), and unlawful 

possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) (id. § 402(a)(2)(D)). 

¶ 5 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of 

his vehicle, arguing the traffic stop was initiated without probable cause or reasonable 

suspicion because the bicycle rack was not a violation of section 3-413(b) of the Vehicle Code 

because it was not attached to the license plate. In support of his motion to suppress, defendant 

cited People v. Gaytan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120217, ¶¶ 44-45, in which the Fourth District 

Appellate Court held that a trailer ball hitch on a vehicle did not violate the version of section 

3-413(b) of the Vehicle Code in effect at that time, which required license plates to be “free 

from any materials that would obstruct the visibility of the plate, including, but not limited to, 
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glass covers and plastic covers” (625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2010)). The Gaytan court 

reasoned that the trailer ball hitch did not violate section 3-413(b) of the Vehicle Code because 

the trailer ball hitch was not attached to the license plate and the example violations provided 

by the statute (license plate covers) were items attached to the license plate. Gaytan, 2013 IL 

App (4th) 120217, ¶ 44. 

¶ 6 In this case, on March 26, 2015, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, 

noting that the Fourth District’s decision in Gaytan was pending an appeal in the Illinois 

Supreme Court; although the appellate court in Gaytan held that the version of section 

3-413(b) applicable in that case only encompassed obstructions attached to the license plate 

itself, the statute had since been changed to remove the language referencing license plate 

covers; and the bicycle rack in this case was a distinguishable obstruction from the ball hitch 

obstruction in Gaytan because the ball hitch only slightly obstructed the license plate from 

certain angles, whereas the bicycle rack straps in this case went down vertically over the 

license plate to completely cover portions of the license plate. 

¶ 7 On May 25, 2015, the trial court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court had issued its ruling 

in Gaytan (People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223) and asked whether defendant’s attorney needed 

additional time to review the Gaytan decision to decide whether the decision impacted 

defendant’s earlier motion to suppress. The defendant’s attorney noted that although the 

Illinois Supreme Court indicated the applicable version of section 3-413(b) could be read as 

only encompassing obstructions physically attached to the license plate, the Illinois Supreme 

Court also noted section 3-413(b) was ambiguous so that the officers in that case had an 

objectively reasonable belief that the trailer hitch violated section 3-413(b). The defendant’s 

attorney indicated that Gaytan, therefore, was not supportive of defendant’s motion to 

suppress. 

¶ 8 On June 4, 2015, defendant’s jury trial began. Veryzer testified that he executed a traffic 

stop of defendant’s vehicle on November 14, 2014, after he observed that defendant’s rear 

license plate was obstructed and that only two digits of the license plate could be read. 

Photographs entered into evidence showed that defendant’s license plate was obstructed by the 

straps of an empty bicycle rack. A video of the traffic stop entered into evidence showed that 

straps of the bicycle rack remained secured over the license plate, did not move as the car 

traveled on the highway, and obscured at least two digits of the license plate from every angle. 

¶ 9 Upon stopping defendant’s vehicle, Veryzer obtained defendant’s passport because 

defendant did not have his driver’s license with him. Veryzer also obtained a rental agreement 

for the vehicle. Defendant’s name was not on the rental agreement. The rental agreement 

indicated that the vehicle was due to be returned to Los Angeles two days later, on November 

16, 2014. Veryzer asked defendant to sit in the front passenger seat of his squad car so that 

Veryzer could speak with defendant and determine if defendant was authorized to drive the 

vehicle. At the same time, Veryzer checked for defendant’s driver’s license information via his 

telecommunications system. Veryzer received information that defendant had a valid driver’s 

license. Defendant indicated he was coming from Colorado and the vehicle had been rented by 

his friend, Daniel Melendez, in Los Angeles, California. Defendant also indicated that he had 

flown into Los Angeles and was traveling via the car to see his mother in Connecticut. 

Defendant was unable to specify which day he had flown into Los Angeles and was not sure if 

he was going to return the rental vehicle to California. Defendant told Veryzer that there was 

no bicycle on the bicycle rack because he had sold it in Colorado. Trooper Jarrod Johnson 
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arrived on scene and continued to fill out a warning ticket for defendant while Veryzer walked 

his canine partner around defendant’s vehicle. 

¶ 10 Veryzer testified regarding the procedure for walking the canine around a vehicle, which 

Veryzer had performed on defendant’s vehicle. Veryzer indicated that he attaches a six-foot 

lead to one of the canine’s two collars and brings the canine to the front of the vehicle (within 

three feet of the vehicle) and places the canine in the sit position. Veryzer would then give the 

canine the command to “seek, find dope,” which is the canine’s trained command to look for 

odors of narcotics that he was trained to alert on—cocaine, heroin, methamphetamines, crack 

cocaine, and cannabis. Veryzer would then walk the canine around the vehicle twice 

counterclockwise, returning to the front the vehicle. Veryzer testified that on the second 

rotation of walking his canine partner around defendant’s vehicle, his canine partner came to a 

sudden stop at the trunk area of defendant’s vehicle. Veryzer described the canine alerting to 

having found narcotics as when the canine has “slowed his process, snapped his head and body 

back to the left, and began taking short, quick breaths.” After alerting, the canine would then sit 

as a final response because he is trained to sit when he positively recognizes one of the five 

odors that he is trained in. 

¶ 11 After his canine positively alerted to the presence of drugs in defendant’s vehicle, Veryzer 

then informed defendant that the canine had alerted on his vehicle and a probable cause search 

would be conducted. For approximately 20 minutes, Veryzer and Johnson searched 

defendant’s vehicle. Veryzer testified that he and Trooper Johnson conducted a cursory search 

of defendant’s vehicle by checking all the bags and general locations of the vehicle where 

drugs have been found during other vehicle searches in the past, including searching inside the 

bags and luggage that were in the trunk of defendant’s vehicle, the interior, under the seats, 

under the dashboard, and inside the doors by Veryzer sticking a wedge into the doors to be able 

to see into the doors. 

¶ 12 The troopers then decided to relocate the search to a location where there would be more 

light to better see into various areas of the vehicle and where it would be safer and warmer 

because they could not see due to the darkness. Veryzer also indicated that it was dangerous on 

the side of the road and the temperature was about 20 degrees outside. They relocated 

defendant’s vehicle to the Geneseo Police Department and, after searching the vehicle for 10 or 

15 minutes, they found the drugs under the hood in the engine compartment in an area covered 

by a black piece of metal or plastic. 

¶ 13 During the search of the vehicle, receipts for fast food, gas, and a hotel room were found. 

The rental agreement and receipts showed that the vehicle was rented on November 9, 2014, at 

7:59 p.m. at the Los Angeles airport and stops were made in Los Angeles, at 6:32 a.m. on 

November 12, 2014; in Las Vegas, Nevada, on November 12, 2014; in St. George, Utah, at 

6:38 a.m. on November 13, 2014; overnight at a hotel located in the middle of Colorado 

(Frisco, Colorado); in Frisco, Colorado, at approximately 7 a.m. on November 14, 2014; in the 

northeast part of Colorado (Atwood, Colorado) on November 14, 2014; in Elm Creek, 

Nebraska, at 2:21 p.m. on November 14, 2014; in Shelby, Iowa, on November 14, 2014; and in 

Walcott, Iowa, at 9:51 p.m. on November 14, 2014. All purchases were made in cash. 

Defendant was stopped by Veryzer, in Illinois, at 10:59 p.m. on November 14, 2014. 

¶ 14 Veryzer testified that he had been employed as a certified canine handler with the Illinois 

State Police for four years and had been a trooper with the Illinois State Police for seven years. 

Veryzer had taken a 10-week certification course with his canine partner. He also completed 
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over 305 hours of criminal patrol training for the interdiction of terrorists and stolen vehicles 

and the seizure of narcotics, guns, and currency from trafficking of illegal narcotics, guns, and 

stolen vehicles. Veryzer had personally seized approximately 46 large loads of narcotics and 

was on scene with other officers during drug seizures, and he was able to see where different 

narcotics were hidden in the various vehicles. 

¶ 15 Veryzer testified, based upon his experience and training, that the cocaine and heroin drug 

trafficking flow originates on the west coast and travels toward the east coast via interstate 

highways, including I-80, and the currency for those drug transactions returns from the east to 

the west. Veryzer testified that it was common for people transporting the narcotics to be in 

third-party rental vehicles to allow the transporters to plausibly deny knowledge of the 

narcotics being in the vehicle. Veryzer also testified that it was common for narcotic 

transporters to pay for expenses using cash and to keep receipts to prove their expenses. 

¶ 16 Veryzer testified that once he began searching defendant’s vehicle at the police station, it 

took 10 to 15 minutes to find the drugs in the empty space located under the hood of the car and 

near the base of the windshield. He explained that finding the drugs took as long as it did 

because, once an “in-depth” search was undertaken, everything was done in “a methodical 

manner.” Once Veryzer had searched defendant’s luggage and other places in or around the 

vehicle where he had discovered drugs in other vehicle searches in the past, Veryzer continued 

searching other locations of the vehicle. He was not able to see the black packages of narcotics 

in the void compartment area under the windshield on the roadside by just shining a flashlight 

because a flat piece of plastic or metal covered it. That piece of metal or plastic could easily be 

removed by removing some clips that covered the compartment, which was part of the vehicle 

from the factory, was not modified, and could be easily accessed. Veryzer had never 

encountered a drug seizure with drugs hidden in that particular location of a vehicle. 

¶ 17 At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant made a motion for a directed verdict, 

arguing that the State was unable to prove defendant had knowledge of the drugs in the vehicle. 

The trial court denied the motion, finding that taking all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational fact finder could find the defendant 

guilty. Defendant chose not to testify. The jury found defendant guilty on all charged counts. 

Defendant was convicted on two counts of controlled substance trafficking and was sentenced 

to two concurrent 40-year terms of imprisonment. Defendant appealed. 

¶ 18 ANALYSIS 

¶ 19 I. Traffic Stop 

¶ 20 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because 

the initial stop of his vehicle was unlawful. The State argues the trial court properly denied 

defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. 

¶ 21 Both the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, applicable to the state 

through the fourteenth amendment (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); People v. James, 163 

Ill. 2d 302, 311 (1994)), and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 guarantee 

Illinois citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., 

amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6; Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 20. The constitutional 

safeguard of protecting citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures protects against 

unreasonable warrantless searches. People v. Stout, 106 Ill. 2d 77, 86 (1985). A stop of a 

vehicle based on a suspected violation of the law constitutes a seizure. Gaytan, 2015 IL 
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116223, ¶ 20. For a traffic stop to comport with the requirement of reasonableness under 

constitutional guarantees, the police officer conducting the stop must have at least a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that a violation of the law has occurred. Id. If reasonable 

suspicion is lacking, the traffic stop is unconstitutional, and any evidence obtained as a result 

of the stop will generally be inadmissible. Id. 

¶ 22 When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, a two-part test is 

applied so that (1) the trial court’s factual findings are upheld unless they are against the 

manifest weight of the evidence and (2) the trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion as to whether 

suppression is warranted is reviewed de novo. Id. ¶ 18. At a hearing on a motion to suppress 

brought by defendant claiming he was aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure, the burden is 

on that defendant to prove that the search and seizure were unlawful. Stout, 106 Ill. 2d at 88. 

¶ 23 Here, the State argues that the traffic stop in this case was lawful based on Veryzer’s 

reasonable suspicion that the empty bicycle rack on defendant’s vehicle was an obstruction to 

the license plate in violation of section 3-413(b) of the Vehicle Code. In construing a statute, 

the primary objective is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, with the presumption that the 

legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Gaytan, 2015 IL 

116223, ¶ 23. The best indication of the legislature’s intent is the language of the statute. Id. 

The construction of a statute is a question of law to which we apply de novo review. Id. 

¶ 24 The Illinois Supreme Court in Gaytan found that a prior version of section 3-413(b) was 

ambiguous, where the statute required that every registration plate shall be securely fastened to 

the vehicle “in a place and position to be clearly visible and shall be maintained in a condition 

to be clearly legible, free from any materials that would obstruct the visibility of the plate, 

including, but not limited to, glass covers and plastic covers” (625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 

2010)). Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶¶ 30-31, 39. The Illinois Supreme Court noted the word 

“materials” in section 3-413(b) could have been interpreted either as (1) prohibiting only items 

attached to the license plate itself because the only examples of the prohibited materials 

provided in the statute were license plate covers (an item attached to the plate itself) or 

(2) prohibiting any obstructing object whatsoever. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. Because the statute was 

deemed ambiguous in Gaytan, the Illinois Supreme Court invoked the rule of lenity and 

applied the more lenient interpretation of section 3-413(b) as prohibiting only those objects 

that obstructed the visibility and the legibility of the license plate that were physically 

connected or attached to the plate itself. Id. ¶ 39. Having concluded that section 3-431(b) was 

ambiguous, the Illinois Supreme Court “encourage[d] the General Assembly to revisit this 

statute,” noting that it would be helpful if the legislature clarified what equipment and 

accessories attached to a vehicle near the license plate were prohibited. Id. ¶ 40. Under the 

circumstances of that case, wherein the statute was found to be ambiguous, the Illinois 

Supreme Court further concluded that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe 

that the trailer hitch violated section 3-413(b) so that the vehicle stop was constitutionally valid 

under the fourth amendment. Id. ¶ 48. 

¶ 25 In 2014, at the time of the traffic stop in this case, section 3-413(b) of the Vehicle Code had 

been revised, so that the prohibition against “registration plate covers” was moved from 

subsection (b) to subsection (g). See 625 ILCS 5/3-413(b), (g) (West 2014). Subsection (b) did 

not reference license plate covers, mandating that every registration plate shall be securely 

fastened to the vehicle “in a place and position to be clearly visible and shall be maintained in 

a condition to be clearly legible, free from any materials that would obstruct the visibility of 
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the plate.” Id. § 3-413(b). Subsection (g) indicated, “[a] person may not operate any motor 

vehicle that is equipped with registration plate covers.” Id. § 3-413(g). The revised language of 

section 3-413(b) removed any ambiguity as to whether prohibited obstructions were only those 

attached to the license plate, making the statute clearly prohibitive of any materials that would 

obstruct the visibility of a license plate. 

¶ 26 In this case, the empty bicycle rack was affixed to the vehicle in such a way that at least two 

bars or straps of the bicycle rack were secured in a vertical position over the license plate, 

covering at least two digits of the license plate. The ends of the straps of the bicycle rack 

obstructed the license plate at times when the car was traveling and when the car was at a stop. 

We need not address the question of whether the flapping ends of the straps constituted an 

obstruction under section 3-413(b) because the video and photographs showed that black bars 

or straps of the bicycle rack lay securely over the license plate, obstructing the visibility of the 

license plate, and at least two digits of the license plate were not legible. Therefore, we 

conclude that the manner in which the bicycle rack was attached to the vehicle in this case 

constituted a violation of section 3-413(b) of the Vehicle Code. Thus, the trial court did not err 

in denying defendant’s motion to suppress where Veryzer reasonably believed the condition of 

defendant’s vehicle violated section 3-413(b). 

¶ 27 Defendant additionally argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by 

indicating that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Gaytan was not supportive of the 

argument in defendant’s motion to suppress that the traffic stop was unlawful. See Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (providing that claim of ineffective assistance has 

two elements: (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 

and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant). As we discussed above, the 

condition of defendant’s vehicle at the time of the traffic stop in this case violated section 

3-413(b) of the Vehicle Code. The Illinois Supreme Court in Gaytan held that the prior version 

of section 3-413(b) was ambiguous and concluded that it was objectively reasonable for the 

officers to believe that the trailer hitch in that case violated section 3-413(b). See Gaytan, 2015 

IL 116223, ¶¶ 30-31, 48. Under the Gaytan decision, even if the bicycle rack were not a 

prohibited obstruction, Veryzer’s understanding of the statute would have been objectively 

reasonable to provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to effectuate a lawful stop of 

defendant’s vehicle. Therefore, the decision of defendant’s counsel to refrain from presenting 

any legal arguments based on the Gaytan decision in support of defendant’s motion to suppress 

was reasonable, and his performance did not prejudice defendant. 

¶ 28 II. Dissipation of Probable Cause 

¶ 29 For the first time, on appeal, defendant argues that any probable cause developed during 

the course of the traffic stop dissipated after no illegal drugs were found in the vehicle during 

the roadside search and prior to the vehicle being moved to another location. Defendant 

concedes that he did not preserve this claimed error for appeal. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 

176, 186 (1988) (both an objection at the time of trial and the inclusion of the issue in a 

posttrial motion are required to preserve an issue for review). In light of his forfeiture of this 

claim for appellate review, defendant requests that we review the purported error for plain 

error or, in the alternative, as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

¶ 30 Under the plain error doctrine a reviewing court may consider unpreserved error when 
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“(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the 

error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the 

seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so 

serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity 

of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. 

Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007) (citing People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 

186-87 (2005)). 

Under both prongs of the plain error doctrine, the burden of persuasion remains with 

defendant. People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 124 (2009). The first step in a plain error analysis 

is for the reviewing court to determine whether any error occurred. Id.

¶ 31 The constitutional safeguards of article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution, and the 

fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, prohibit warrantless searches that are 

unreasonable. Stout, 106 Ill. 2d at 86 (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); 

People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11 (1960)). The critical issue is whether the situation that 

confronts the officer justifies the search. Id. What constitutes probable cause for a search or 

seizure must be determined from the standpoint of the arresting officer, with his skill and 

knowledge, rather than from the standpoint of the average citizen under similar circumstances. 

Id. Police officers often must act upon a quick appraisal of the data before them, and the 

reasonableness of the officers’ conduct must be judged on the basis of their responsibility to 

prevent crime and to catch criminals. Id. at 86-87. 

¶ 32 When an officer has sufficient facts to support probable cause that a vehicle contains 

contraband, the vehicle may be searched without a warrant, including any interior 

compartments of the vehicle that might reasonably contain the contraband. People v. 

Contreras, 2014 IL App (1st) 131889, ¶ 28. Probable cause is a fluid construct that is 

dependent upon the assessment of probabilities in a particular factual context, with the 

underlying principle being the reasonable belief of guilt. Id. ¶ 29. In determining whether 

probable cause for a search existed, a court examines the events leading up to the search or 

seizure viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer. Id. 

¶ 33 In this case, the evidence of the canine alerting to an odor of drugs provided probable cause 

for the troopers to believe that defendant’s vehicle contained drugs and to support a search of 

defendant’s vehicle. After searching all readily accessible areas of the vehicle, the troopers 

decided that continuing to search the vehicle in the dark, alongside the highway, in freezing 

temperatures, was unsafe and impractical. Under the circumstances of this case, the probable 

cause that supported the search did not dissipate when the troopers decided to relocate the 

vehicle so that a complete and thorough search of the vehicle could be executed in a safer 

location with better lighting. See id. ¶ 37 (a delay in searching a vehicle until it is relocated to a 

police station does not diminish the original justification for the warrantless search); People v. 

Parker, 354 Ill. App. 3d 40, 46 (2004) (the justification for a warrantless search does not 

diminish upon relocation of the vehicle to a police station; holding that officers were not 

required to obtain a search warrant before moving a car a short distance prior to searching the 

vehicle). The troopers had probable cause to search the vehicle without a warrant based on the 

canine’s alert and Veryzer’s knowledge that illegal drugs are typically transported from the 

west coast to east coast on interstate highways, including on I-80 where defendant was 

stopped, often times in vehicles rented by third parties, such as was the case with defendant. 

The probable cause that supported the warrantless roadside search of defendant’s vehicle 
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continued to exist after the vehicle was relocated to a nearby police station to allow the 

troopers to conduct a thorough search of the vehicle. 

¶ 34 In arguing that the probable cause in this case had dissipated after the troopers failed to find 

contraband during the roadside search, defendant cites the decision set forth by another panel 

of this court in People v. Pulido, 2017 IL App (3d) 150215. In Pulido, defendant’s vehicle was 

stopped for speeding by an Illinois state trooper. Id. ¶ 14. Two minutes later, another trooper 

arrived on scene with his canine partner, and the canine performed a free-air sniff of 

defendant’s vehicle, which resulted in the canine alerting to the driver’s side door. Id. ¶¶ 15, 

17. Both troopers searched the inside of the vehicle and the engine compartment, and they 

found no narcotics. Id. ¶ 21. Police relocated the defendant’s vehicle to a nearby police station 

to further search the vehicle because it had begun raining and for safety concerns. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. 

Tubes containing methamphetamines wrapped with black tape were removed from the air 

filter of the defendant’s vehicle. Id. ¶ 26. On appeal in Pulido, a panel of this court held the 

officers had improperly transported defendant’s vehicle to the police station because the 

probable cause that had been developed during the traffic stop had dissipated when no drugs or 

hidden compartments were found during the roadside search of the vehicle. Id. ¶ 43. 

¶ 35 We decline to follow Pulido. Based on probable cause, the officers conducted a roadside 

search of readily accessible areas in the vehicle and areas of the vehicle where drugs are 

typically hidden by drug traffickers. Inclement weather, the time of day with respect to the 

available lighting, and safety concerns due to being alongside the highway in the dark led to 

the decision to continue the search of defendant’s vehicle by relocating the vehicle to a 

better-suited location. We do not believe that probable cause had dissipated just because the 

drugs were so well hidden and certain surrounding conditions made completing a thorough 

roadside search of the vehicle impractical. As discussed above, probable cause continued to 

exist after the vehicle was relocated. Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying 

defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. Absent any error, there could be no plain error 

requiring a review of defendant’s forfeited claim. 

¶ 36 Additionally, in light of our holding that probable cause had not dissipated, we cannot say 

that defendant’s counsel was ineffective for failing to assert such an argument in defendant’s 

motion to suppress. People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 438 (2005) (to establish prejudice 

from counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress evidence, a defendant must show a 

reasonable probability that the motion would have been granted and the outcome of the trial 

would have been different). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

¶ 37 CONCLUSION 

¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Henry County is affirmed. 

¶ 39 Affirmed. 

¶ 40 JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting: 

¶ 41 The majority has affirmed the conviction of defendant, Steven Varnauskas, on two counts 

of controlled substance trafficking and his two concurrent 40-year sentences. In reaching that 

decision, the majority found that (1) the officer had probable cause to make the initial traffic 

stop because he had a reasonable belief that the statute pursuant to which he acted prohibited 
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what it, in fact, did not and (2) the probable cause generated by the canine drug alert was 

sufficient to allow the police to move the car from the highway to the police station to continue 

the previously abortive search for drugs. For the reasons that follow, I disagree with both 

findings and respectfully dissent. 

¶ 42 The facts make clear that this was not a traffic stop effected to protect the safety of other 

drivers on the road; it was a criminal investigation followed by a search without formal fourth 

amendment protections. Officer Veryzer testified that he was specially trained for criminal 

“interdiction” patrols for the purpose of trolling the highway to discover and seize terrorists, 

stolen vehicles, narcotics, guns, and the currency derived from the sale of such contraband. He 

had completed over 305 hours of such training and had personally seized about 46 large loads 

of narcotics and participated in seizures by others. See generally supra ¶¶ 14-16.

¶ 43 Veryzer also explained that he had completed 10 weeks of training with his canine partner, 

he had been a certified canine handler for four years, and he and his dog had a procedural 

routine for a sniff. He did not explain why his dog wears two collars, what the purpose of the 

second collar might be, or why his trained dog did not alert the first time around defendant’s 

vehicle but did on its second rotation. 

¶ 44 While sitting in the median of I-80 during his November 14, 2014, patrol, Veryzer 

observed defendant’s vehicle pass by. Although it was 11 p.m. and allegedly too dark on scene 

to find narcotics in the vehicle even at close range, he was able to see that the license plate was 

partially obscured by an empty bicycle rack on the back of the car. He executed a traffic stop 

for this suspected violation of section 3-413(b) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) 

(West 2014)). Ostensibly because of something about this traffic violation, he walked his dog 

around the car for a drug sniff. The dog alerted the second time around, and Veryzer and a 

fellow officer who had arrived at the scene unsolicited began a search. During this search, 

characterized by the majority as “cursory” (supra ¶ 11), they examined general locations 

where they had found drugs stashed in earlier searches of other cars. These included the inside 

of all bags and all luggage in the trunk, the interior of the car, under the seats, under the 

dashboard, and inside the doors—an area accessed through Veryzer’s use of a wedge to pry the 

doors apart and expose their interiors. Then, deciding it was too cold, too dark, and too unsafe 

to continue the search on the side of the highway, they moved the car to the Geneseo Police 

Department and quickly—within 10 to 15 minutes—discovered two kilograms of heroin and 

one kilogram of cocaine by the engine below the windshield. 

¶ 45 Defendant was charged, his motion to suppress evidence was denied, and he was tried and 

convicted by a jury. His two convictions and resultant 40-year sentences are the subjects of this 

direct appeal. 

¶ 46 With regard to the first issue, I disagree with the majority’s finding that the trial court 

properly denied the motion to suppress evidence based on the supreme court’s decision in 

People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223. That decision analyzed the version of section 3-413(b) in 

effect at the time Gaytan had been arrested, not the amended version in effect when 

Varnauskas was stopped. The supreme court’s analysis in Gaytan agreed with the analysis of 

the Fourth District, concluding that (1) the statute’s language was ambiguous; (2) applying the 

rule of lenity, the statute, properly interpreted, only prohibited obstruction by materials 

actually attached to the license plate; and (3) the defendant had not actually violated the 

statute. However, the court also found that, because of the ambiguity, the officer’s belief that 

Gaytan was in violation was objectively reasonable and the stop was, therefore, valid. 
- 11 - 

¶ 47 In the instant case, the majority has considered the language of the amended statute in 

effect at the time Varnauskas was stopped and has concluded 

“[t]he revised language of section 3-413(b) removed any ambiguity as to whether 

prohibited obstructions were only those attached to the license plate, making the statute 

clearly prohibitive of any materials that would obstruct the visibility of a license plate.” 

Supra ¶ 25.

I agree that the revised language, construed in its totality and in context, does remove the prior 

version’s ambiguity, but I would find the amended statute clearly and unambiguously 

establishes that the only obstructions prohibited by the statute are those caused by materials 

actually affixed to the license plate. 

¶ 48 The statute in effect at the time Veryzer stopped Varnauskas on November 14, 2014, was 

the version as amended by Public Act 97-743 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013). It provided, in relevant part, 

as follows. Additions are shown in italics, and deletions are stricken through. 

“§ 3-413. Display of registration plates, registration stickers, and drive-away permits; 

registration plate covers.

 ***

 (b) Every registration plate shall at all times be securely fastened in a horizontal 

position to the vehicle for which it is issued so as to prevent the plate from swinging 

and at a height of not less than 5 inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of 

such plate, in a place and position to be clearly visible and shall be maintained in a 

condition to be clearly legible, free from any materials that would obstruct the visibility 

of the plate, including, but not limited to, glass covers and plastic covers. A registration 

plate on a motorcycle may be mounted vertically as long as it is otherwise clearly 

visible. Registration stickers issued as evidence of renewed annual registration shall be 

attached to registration plates as required by the Secretary of State, and be clearly 

visible at all times. 

 * * *

 (g) A person may not operate any motor vehicle that is equipped with registration 

plate covers. A violation of this subsection (g) or a similar provision of a local 

ordinance is an offense against laws and ordinances regulating the movement of 

traffic. 

 (h) A person may not sell or offer for sale a registration plate cover. A violation of 

this subsection (h) is a business offense.

 (i) A person may not advertise for the purpose of promoting the sale of registration 

plate covers. A violation of this subsection (i) is a business offense. 

 (j) A person may not modify the original manufacturer’s mounting location of the 

rear registration plate on any vehicle so as to conceal the registration or to knowingly 

cause it to be obstructed in an effort to hinder a peace officer from obtaining the 

registration for the enforcement of a violation of this Code, Section 27.1 of the Toll 

Highway Act concerning a toll evasion, or any municipal ordinance. Modifications 

prohibited by this subsection (j) include but are not limited to the use of an electronic 

device. A violation of this subsection (j) is a Class A misdemeanor.” Pub. Act 97-743 

(eff. Jan. 1, 2013) (amending 625 ILCS 5/3-413). 
- 12 - 

As can be seen, new subsections (g)-(i) replaced and amplified the clause concerning 

registration plate covers, which had been deleted from subsection (b). New subsection (j) 

prohibited any modification of the mounting location of the rear registration plate so as to 

conceal or obstruct the view of the registration plate. 

¶ 49 There are three reasons why I believe the modified statute unambiguously addresses only 

the proper placement and display of license plates, registration stickers, and drive-away 

permits and penalizes only their improper placement and display. First is the plain language of 

the section’s title and provisions, which conspicuously makes no mention of obstructions 

caused by attaching foreign objects to the vehicle itself. 

¶ 50 My second reason derives from perceived skepticism of the Gaytan court about the reach 

of the statute suggested by the State in that case. The court noted how far-reaching such a 

restriction would be: “even a public bus equipped with a bicycle rack on its front would be 

unlawful under the State’s reading of section 3-413(b) if the rack were to obstruct the license 

plate.” Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 36. The court also said that it was reasonable “to conclude 

that the General Assembly did not intend to put companies who rent trailers out of business and 

did not intend to further burden the physically disabled by making it illegal for them to use 

wheelchair and scooter carriers—particularly when the statute says nothing about these 

matters.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 38.

¶ 51 The third reason is that, even if the statutory language were ambiguous, the legislative 

history indicates the amendment was proposed because the Illinois State Police approached the 

legislature with some issues regarding registration plate covers. Representative Lisa Dugan 

stated on the date that the bill passed both houses that “this actually makes multiple 

Amendments to the Vehicle Code with respect to registration plate covers and motorcycles 

based on some issues that the State Police have seen around Illinois to just make things safer 

and to make [the] roads safer.” (Emphasis added.) 97th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, 

May 1, 2012, at 14 (statements of Representative Dugan). 

¶ 52 For these reasons I would find (1) that the amended version of section 3-413 in effect at the 

time Veryzer stopped Varnauskas did not prohibit or criminalize the placement of the bicycle 

rack, (2) that Varnauskas was not in actual violation of the statute under which he was charged, 

and (3) that it was not objectively reasonable for Officer Veryzer to believe that the empty 

bicycle rack on the back of the vehicle was a violation of that statute. I would find the stop was 

without probable cause and therefore unjustified and improper and that the motion to suppress 

should have been granted. 

¶ 53 Even though, based on my analysis of the first issue, there is no need to reach the second, I 

feel compelled to briefly address the majority’s expressed refusal (supra ¶ 35) to follow this 

court’s earlier decision in People v. Pulido, 2017 IL App (3d) 150215. In the instant case, when 

the decision was made to move defendant’s vehicle to the Geneseo Police Department, the 

trooper had obviously completed any traffic mission he claimed to have had. Even if it had not 

been at the beginning, this was now nothing more than a drug investigation. If the officer 

believed he had probable cause for a search, he needed to get a warrant. Defendant had that 

right under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Whatever urgency or 

exigency existed for a warrantless search on the side of the road dissipated once the vehicle and 

defendant were removed to the safety and less pressing conditions of the police station. For all 

of the reasons set out in its analysis, I believe Pulido to have been properly decided, and I 

dissent from the majority’s contrary holding.