alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 96-6736.

FOLSOM METAL PRODUCTS, INC., an Alabama Corporation, Plaintiff-Counter-DefendantAppellee,

RBOP Tools International Inc., Texas Corporation, Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TORUS EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant.

July 24, 1997.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (CV 94-L-988-S

SHL); Seybourn H. Lynne, Judge.

Before BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The petition for rehearing by RBOP Tools International Inc. asserts that the district court

addressed the issue of whether RBOP was subject to liability as a successor in interest to Folsom

Metal Products, Inc. and held it was not subject to such liability. Therefore, RBOP says, the panel

erred in holding that the district court had not addressed that issue and in remanding that issue for

consideration.

The district court referred to successor liability of RBOP in the context of its determination

of whether Folsom was responsible to Torus Equipment Co. for more than 5% of $2,100,000 (a 5%

that Folsom agreed it must pay). The district court's barebones order held Folsom had no further

contract obligation beyond the 5% and there were "no further contract obligations" owed to Torus

by RBOP or any other successor in interest.

We do not construe the district court's decision as a plenary determination that RBOP could

not be subject to successor liability for obligations of Folsom to Torus but rather as a limited

decision relating to Torus' claims for more than 5%, i.e., "Folsom doesn't owe anything more than

5% and RBOP can't have successor liability for something Folsom doesn't owe." If the district court

intended to confer on RBOP a status of freedom from any successor liability, the record does not
support such a ruling at the summary judgment stage.

Additionally the district court did not focus at all on whether if RBOP were a successor in

interest to Folsom it might be responsible for Folsom's obligation to pay 5% of $2,100,000.

We neither whisper nor hint what we think the determination should be on whether RBOP

has successor liability. But it is an issue alive and well to be considered on remand. If RBOP is

found to be a successor, it is for the district court in the first instance to decide whether it has

successor liability for the 5% of $2,100,000 that Folsom acknowledges it owes, or for additional

amounts, if any, found to be owed by Folsom, or both.

The petition for rehearing is DENIED. The summary judgments in favor of Folsom and

RBOP are REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings

not inconsistent with our opinion and with this order.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2533 

To amend the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 

1991 relating to local guard contracts abroad under the diplomatic security program, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 21, 2015 

Ms. FRANKEL of Florida (for herself and Mr. WEBER of Texas) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 

Years 1990 and 1991 relating to local guard contracts 

abroad under the diplomatic security program, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LOCAL GUARD CONTRACTS ABROAD UNDER 

4 DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROGRAM. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 136(c)(3) of the Foreign 

6 Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 

7 (22 U.S.C. 4864(c)(3)) is amended to read as follows: 


smartinez on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2533 IH

1 ‘‘(3) in evaluating proposals for such contracts, 

2 award contracts to technically acceptable firms offer3 ing the lowest evaluated price, except that— 

4 ‘‘(A) the Secretary may award contracts on 

5 the basis of best value (as determined by a cost6 technical tradeoff analysis); and 

7 ‘‘(B) proposals received from United 

8 States persons and qualified United States joint 

9 venture persons shall be evaluated by reducing 

10 the bid price by 10 percent;’’. 

11 (b) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date 

12 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 

13 submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen14 ate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 

15 of Representatives a report that includes— 

16 (1) an explanation of the implementation of 

17 paragraph (3) of section 136(c) of the Foreign Rela18 tions Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 

19 1991, as amended by subsection (a) of this section; 

20 and 

21 (2) for each instance in which an award is 

22 made pursuant to subparagraph (A) of such para23 graph (3), as so amended, a written justification and 

24 approval, providing the basis for such award and an 

25 explanation of the inability to satisfy the needs of 


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3 

•HR 2533 IH

1 the Department of State by technically acceptable, 

2 lowest price evaluation award. 

Æ 


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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD,

Complainant,

vs.

LATISHA SHANTA MANNS-PAIGE,

Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket Number: 2023-0371

Enforcement Activity ID: 7790867

CONSENT ORDER

Issued: October 26, 2023

By Order of Chief Administrative Law Judge: Hon. Walter J. Brudzinski

Appearances:

For the Coast Guard

LT Kyle Burns

USCG Sector Jacksonville

For the Respondent

Latisha Shanta Manns-Paige, pro se
CONSENT ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

On October 25, 2023, the parties in this case submitted a Motion for Approval of a 

Settlement Agreement and Entry of Consent Order to the Administrative Law Judge for approval 

under 33 C.F.R. § 20.502.

I have carefully reviewed the terms of the Settlement Agreement and find that it is fair, 

reasonable, and in substantial compliance with the requirements of 33 C.F.R. § 20.502.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the record, it is hereby ORDERED that the Settlement Agreement 

is APPROVED in full and incorporated herein by reference. This Consent Order shall 

constitute full, final, and complete adjudication of this proceeding.

______________________________________

Hon. Walter J. Brudzinski

Chief Administrative Law Judge

United States Coast Guard

Date: October 26, 2023
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2023-2770

_____________________________

RICHARD AUGUSTUS PATE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County.

Kelvin C. Wells, Judge.

April 2, 2024

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. 

LEWIS, ROWE, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Richard Augustus Pate, pro se, Appellant.
2

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 74 (Monday, April 17, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20507-20508]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-9403]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

[Docket OST-99-6150]


Application of Smokey Bay Air, Inc., for Certificate Authority

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Notice of order to show cause (Order 2000-4-7).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation is directing all interested 
persons to show cause why it should not issue an order finding Smokey 
Bay Air, Inc., fit, willing, and able, and awarding it a certificate of 
public convenience and necessity to engage in interstate scheduled air 
transportation of persons, property, and mail using no more than three 
aircraft with no more than nine passengers seats each.

DATES: Persons wishing to file objections should do so no later than 
April 27, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Objections and answers to objections should be filed in the 
Docket OST-99-6150 and addressed to the Department of Transportation 
Dockets, US Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Room 
PL-401, Washington, DC 20590, and should be served upon the parties 
listed in Attachment A to the order.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mrs. Kathy Lusby Cooperstein, Air 
Carrier Fitness Division (X-56, Room 6401), U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 
366-2337.


[[Page 20508]]


    Dated: April 10, 2000.
Robert S. Goldner,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs.
[FR Doc. 00-9403 Filed 4-14-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-62-P
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 238 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 238

 To amend title 17, United States Code, with respect to the definition 
         of ``widow'' and ``widower'', and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 9, 2015

 Mr. Kilmer (for himself, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Polis, Mr. Hanna, Mr. 
  Swalwell of California, Ms. DelBene, Mr. Connolly, Mr. Vargas, Mr. 
    Murphy of Florida, Ms. Titus, Mr. Lowenthal, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. 
   McDermott, Ms. Brownley of California, Mr. Yarmuth, Ms. Meng, Mr. 
Himes, and Ms. Wilson of Florida) introduced the following bill; which 
             was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 17, United States Code, with respect to the definition 
         of ``widow'' and ``widower'', and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Copyright and Marriage Equality 
Act''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF WIDOW AND WIDOWER IN TITLE 17, UNITED STATES 
              CODE.

    (a) In General.--Section 101 of title 17, United States Code, is 
amended by striking the definition of ```widow' or `widower''' and 
inserting the following:
            ``An individual is the `widow' or `widower' of an author if 
        the courts of the State in which the individual and the author 
        were married (or, if the individual and the author were not 
        married in any State but were validly married in another 
        jurisdiction, the courts of any State) would find that the 
        individual and the author were validly married at the time of 
        the author's death, whether or not the spouse has later 
        remarried.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to the death of any author that occurs on or after 
the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
UNITED STATES OF AMI,RICA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD,

Complainant,

vs

NILTON ADRIAN RETAMOZO BOGARIN,

Respond€nt.

Docket Number 2023-0079

Enforcement Activity Number 7620604

CONSENT ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND

ORDER CANCELING HEARING

By: Honorable Walter J, Brudzins ki. Chief Administrative Law Judse

Issued: June 9 2023

Appearances:

MS. JENNIFER A. MEHAT'FEY, ESQ.

USCG Suspension and Revocation

National Center of Expertise

For the Coast Guard

CWO JOSEPH QUITUGUA

USCG Sector New York

For the Coast Guard

WILLIAM HEWIG, III, ESQ.

KP LAW, P.C.

Attorneys for the Respondent
CONSENT ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND

ORI)ER CANCELING HEARING

The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) initiated this administrative proceeding

by filing a Complaint on March 21, 2023, against NILTON ADRIAN RETAMOZO

BOGARIN (Respondent) for one count of violation of law or regulation under 46 U.S.C. $

7703(l)(A) and 46 C.F.R. $ 5.33. The Coast Guard proposed a sanction offour (4) months

of outright suspension.

The Coast Cuard and Respondent agreed to settle this matter. Therefore, on June 8,

2023, the Coast Guard submitted the parties' Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement

and Entry ofConsent Order to be approved as a settlement of this case under 33 C.F.R. $

20.502. I have carefully reviewed the terms ofthe Settlement Agreement and find that the

agreement is fair and reasonable and in substantial compliance with the requirements of33

c.F.R. $ 20.502.

WHEREFORE,

,)
lr

ORDER

Upon consideration of the record, it is hereby ORDERED that the Settlement

Agreement is APPROVED in full and incorporated herein by reference.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, this Consent Order shall constitute ful[, final, and

complete adjudication of this proceeding.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERtrD, the hearing scheduled to commence on August 15,

2023 in New York. NY is CAITICELED.

Done and dated June 9,2023

New York, NY 7t*-/ .34..HHON. WALTER J. BRUDZINSKI

CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ruDGE

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Listen

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-6088

JOSEPH MICHAEL BURNS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

RONALD J. ANGELONE, Director of the Virginia

Department of Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry C. Morgan, Jr., District

Judge. (CA-93-283-N)

Submitted: September 26, 1995 Decided: January 11, 1996

Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph Michael Burns, Appellant Pro Se. Linwood Theodore Wells,

Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's orders denying

relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) petition and denying reconsideration thereof. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinions adopting in material part the magistrate judge's

recommendation and denying reconsideration and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of probable cause to appeal and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court.

Burns v. Angelone, No. CA-93-283-N (E.D. Va. Oct. 21 & Dec. 22,

1994). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Complainant

vs.

SELINA MARIE RUBIO

Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket Number: 2023-0380

ORDER OF ADMISSION

On November 1, 2023, the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) issued a Complaint 

against Selina Marie Rubio (Respondent) alleging misconduct pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 

7703(1)(B). The Coast Guard proposed a sanction of three (3) months outright suspension.

The ALJ Docketing Center received Respondent’s Answer, dated November 1, 2023, 

admitting all jurisdictional and factual allegations and agreeing to the proposed sanction.

WHEREFORE,

Based on consideration of the record, I hereby ORDER that the allegations in the 

Complaint are PROVED BY ANSWER. I have carefully reviewed the Complaint and Answer 

and find that the proposed sanction is appropriate under the provisions of 46 C.F.R. § 5.569.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's Coast Guard issued Merchant Mariner 

Credentials are Suspended Outright for three (3) Months, commencing on the date Respondent’s 

credentials are deposited with the USCG San Francisco. Respondent shall immediately deposit, 

by mail or in person, her Merchant Mariner Credential and any other Coast Guard issued 
credentials to: USCG Sector San Francisco, 1 Yerba Buena Rd., Bldg. 26, San Francisco, CA 

94130. Further, Respondent shall immediately cease using all Coast Guard issued credentials, 

including his Merchant Mariner Credential.

SO ORDERED.

Brian Curley

Administrative Law Judge

Date: December 5, 2023
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Jack H. MILLER, Private First Class, U. S. Army, Appellant.

No. 31,314.

U. S. Court of Military Appeals.

March 19, 1976.

*Colonel Alton H. Harvey, Major Richard J. Goddard,*and *Captain Ronald Lewis Gallant*were on the pleadings for Appellant, Accused.

*Lieutenant Colonel Donald W. Hansen, Major John T. Sherwood, Jr., Captain Gary F. Thorne,*and *Captain Regis J. McCoy*were on the pleadings for Appellee, United States.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

We granted accused’s petition for review on a question relating to the sentence that was then pending disposition in *United States v. Mosely,*1 M.J. 350 (1976).

Represented by civilian counsel, the accused pleaded guilty to, and was found guilty of, assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. In argument as to the sentence, defense counsel urged, primarily, that no punitive discharge be imposed. Reviewing the factors that the court members might consider in their deliberations on the sentence, he referred to “deterrence.” Counsel remarked that society should exact “its pound of flesh” in a way that the sentence would operate as a deterrent against the accused and make him “realize how important it is” to rehabilitate himself. Responding to these remarks, trial counsel expanded the concept of deterrence to include the interests of society. He entreated the court members to “help . . . prevent some other soldier from doing this same thing again,” and he asked them to adjudge a dishonorable discharge and an “extremely substantial period of confinement.” Later, although he made no direct reference to deterrence as a factor that the court members could consider, the trial judge instructed them that *358they “should consider all matters . heard today in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation.”

In *Mosely,*we held improper a similar argument by trial counsel as to deterrence of others by imposition of a more severe sentence upon the accused than might otherwise be adjudged. To avoid the consequence of trial counsel’s error, the Government contends that the accused waived the right to appellate review of it because no defense objection was interposed at trial. The failure to object, however, does not stand alone. The judge’s instruction that the court members could consider all matters in aggravation “heard today” emphasized trial counsel’s error, and impels us to the conclusion that sole responsibility for what occurred at trial should not be borne by the accused. *United States v. Heflin,*23 U.S.C.M.A. 505, 50 C.M.R. 644, 1 M.J. 131 (1975).

The decision of the United States Army Court of Military Review as to the sentence is reversed, and the sentence is set aside. A rehearing thereon may be ordered.

Judge PERRY did not participate in the decision of this case.
**EXHIBIT 23.1** **CONSENT    OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**     We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the    Registration Statement on    Form S-3(No. 333-39457)    and    Form S-8    (Nos.    333-23821,333-23823,333-23825,333-23827,333-43447,333-52807,333-52809**,**333-39780    and    333-105711)    of Ingram Micro Inc. of our report dated February 26, 2008    relating to the consolidated financial statements, financial    statement schedule and the effectiveness of internal control    over financial reporting, which appears in this Annual Report on    Form 10-K. /s/  PricewaterhouseCoopers    LLP     Orange County, California    February 27, 2008
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ronald W. Prible, Appellant.

Memorandum: Defendant raises on appeal the same issues raised by his codefendant on an earlier appeal to this court *(see, People v Riddell,*115 AD2d 986). Our memorandum decision on the *Riddell*appeal is dispositive of those issues and a reversal is required. We add only that defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient as a. matter of law to support the convictions is without merit and that except as otherwise held in our memorandum decision in *Riddell,*it was not error to permit cross-examination of defendant on his prior bad acts. (Appeal from judgment of Cattaraugus County Court, Crowley, J. — robbery, first degree, and reckless endangerment, first degree.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Doerr, Boomer and Schnepp, JJ.