C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS

I N R E: E S T A T E O F B E R T H A M A Y R U S S E LL, DECEASED. § § § § § § No . 0 8- 07 -0 01 87 -C V

Appea l from 97th District Court of Montague County , Texas (TC # 04-01-0026M- CV)

O P I N I O N Be rtha May

Russell ex ecute d a will on Fe bruar y 20, 2002. Followingher de ath, the will was admitted to probate in Montague C o u n t y , T ex as. Afte r probate and the a ppointment of her son, Ke nn e th R

us se ll, a s th e ind e pe nd ent ex e c uto r, thr e e of Mr s. Rus se ll’ s g ra

nd da ug hte rs -- B e th B ri dg e ns , Co nn ie Wilk e rs on , a nd Ha rv a Kuy ken dall (c oll e c tiv e ly

Ap pe lle e s)

-- fi le d a

wi ll c on te st challeng ing he r testamenta ry capa city and alleg ing undue influence , lack of testamentar

y intent, and malicious tortious int erf

ere nce w ith inheritance . A jury found that Mrs. Russell had t estamenta ry capa city at the time she e x ec u t ed t he will, but it found undue influence , tortious interfer ence , and malice. The trial court ref used to uphold the punitive da mag es and that part of the ve rdict wa s set
a sid e . Ke nn e th Rus se ll br ing s this a pp e a l and , in f

ive po int s o f e rr or , c ha lle ng e s th e jur y ’s fi nd ing s. We a ff ir m. F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND Be cause of the fa

milial relationships, we shall ref er to the par

ties by their g iven names, f

or the most part. Be rtha May Russell was born in 1903 and died on N ovember 20, 2003. She and herhu sb and , E .P. Rus se ll, we re the pa re nts of Ke nn e th Rus se ll, Clo is Rus se ll, and Ev a L ou Kuy ke nd a ll. E.P. Russell died in 1984. Eva L ou is the mother of the Appe llees and she passed a way on Dec ember 19, 2001. Kenne th has t wo s ons, Danny and W illiam. Clois was described by Kenne th Russell as beingun ab l e to func tion without help, “he ca n’t rea d nor write, a

nd he has this saliva c ontrol problem, and he don’t understa nd about things.” Mrs. Russel l executed a w ill prior to 1998 with the assistance of a Texas attorney

named Gr e g Un de rw oo d. In p ro c ur ing the e xec uti on , K e nn e th c on ta c te d U nd e rw oo d, ins tr uc te d h im a s to the c ontent s o f t

he wi ll, and

the n to ok

his mot he r t o U nd e rw oo d’ s o ff

ic e to s ig n it . M rs . Ru sse ll executed a se cond will, dated July 6, 1998, and a third will, dated November 27, 2000, both of which
wer e dra fted by

attorney Br ian Powers. Mrs. Russell executed her final will on Fe bruar y 20, 2002. Powers pre pare d this one as well. SUF F ICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE In Points of Error One, Two, Thre e, and F our, Ke nneth cha lleng es both the leg al and f actua l
su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to s up po rt

the jur y ’s fi nd ing s. We a

pp ly the fo llo wi ngsta

nd ard s in evaluating his ar guments. Stand ards of Review A no evidenc e” or

leg al insufficie ncy

point is a question of law which c halleng es the leg al
s u ff i ci en cy o f t h e ev i d en ce t o s u

p p o rt a p art i cu l ar

fa ctfi n d i n g. Serrano v. Union Planters Bank , N.A. , 162 S.W .3d 576, 5 7 9 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2004, pet. de nied). The re a re two se parate “no evidenc e” c laims. Id. W h en th e p arty h av i n g th e b urd en o f p ro o f s u ff er s an un fa v o rab l e f

i n d i n g, the point of err or challeng ing the leg al sufficie ncy of the evidenc e should be that the f act or issue was established as “ a mat t er o f l aw.” Id. When the party without the burden of pr oof suffe rs an unfavor able f

inding, the c halleng e on appe al is one of “no evidenc e to support the finding .” Id.; I nre Estate of Livingston , 999 S.W .2d 874, 876 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1999, no pet.). An appe llate cour t wi ll s us ta in a

le g a l su ff

ic ie nc y or “ no -e vid e nc e ” c ha lle ng e if th e reco rd sh ow s: ( 1) the c omp le te absenc e of a

vital fac t, (2) the court is ba rre d by rules of law or evidenc e from g iving weig ht to the only evidenc e off

ere d to prove a

vital fac t, (3) the e vidence offe red to prove a vital fa ct is no more than a sc intill a, or ( 4) the e vidence establishes conc lusively the opposite o f t h e v i tal fac t. City of Keller v. W

ilson , 1 68 S.W. 3d

80 2, 81 0 ( Te x. 20 05 ); El Paso Indepe ndent School District v. Pabon, 214 S.W .3d 37, 41 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2006, no pet.). In conductingour re view, we consider the
e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht mos t favo ra

ble to t he ve rd ic t and

ind ulg e e ve ry

re a so na ble inf e re nc e that w ou ld support it. City

of K e lle r, 168 S.W .3d at 822. Even if e vidence is undisputed, it i s the province of the tr ie r o f f

a c t to dr aw f

ro m it wh ate ve r i nf

e re nc e s it wi sh e s so long a s mor e tha n one inf e re nc e is possible. Id. at 821. B ut if the evidenc e allows only one inferenc e, neither the trier of fa ct nor the revie wing court may

disreg ard it. Id. We are also mindful that the trier of fac t is the sole judge of the cr edibility

of the witne s s es and the weig ht to give the ir testimony
. Id. a t 81 9. Whe n th e re is conflictingevidenc e, it is the province of the trier of

fa ct t o re s o l v e s u ch conf licts. Id. at8 2 0
. In
e v e r y c i r c u m s t an c e i nw h i c h a r e a s o n a b l e tr i e r o f f a c tc o u l d r e s o l v e c o n f

l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e e i th e r

w ay, the re viewingcourt must presume it did s o in favor of the pre vailing pa

rty , and disreg ard the conflictingevidenc e in i t s sufficie ncy revie w. Id. at 82 1. I f t he e vid e nc e at tr ia l w ou ld e na ble
rea sonable a

nd fair- minded people to diffe r in their conc lusions, then the trier of f act must be allowed to do so. Id. at 82 2. So l on g a s th e e vid e nc e fa lls wi thi n th is zo ne of re a so na ble disag ree ment, we may not substitute our judgme nt f or that of the trier -of- fac t. Id. Th e ult imate te st fo r l e g a l su ff

ic ie nc y is whe the r t

he e vid e nc e a t tr ia l wo uld

e na ble re a so na

ble and fa ir -m ind e d p e op le to rea ch the ve rdict under revie w. Id. at 827. Fa ctual suff

iciency complaints conce de conf licting e vidence on an issue, but maintain theevidenc e ag ainst the jury ’s findin g i s so g reat as to make the f inding e rrone ous. Ra w H ideOi l & Gas, Inc. v . Maxus Ex

ploration Co. , 766 S.W .2d 264, 275 (Tex.App.--Ama rillo 1988, writ denied). We may set aside a

ver d i ct o n l y i f t he evide nce is so we ak, or is so ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, that it is clear ly wrongand unjust. Do w Ch e mi c al C o. v . F ra nc is, 46 S.W .3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). We are not permitted to pass upon witness cre dibilit y , nor will we
s u b s t i t u t e o u r j udg ment for that of the jury even if the evidenc e would cle arly support a diffe rent result. Rather, we will sustain the cha lleng ed findingif the there is competent evide nce of probative forc e to support it. The fa ct that we ma y conclude that the evid en ce preponde rate s toward a n aff irmative answe r base d on our re view of the rec ord is not an appr opriate ground for reve rsal. Undu e Infl uence Appellant first a

rgues there was no e vidence or insufficient evidenc e supporting the setting aside of the 2002 will based upon undue influenc e. Undue influence implies the ex istence of testamentar

y capa city in the testator that wa s subject ed to and controlled by a dominant power

or influence
. Rothermel v . Duncan, 36 9 S. W.2 d 9 17 , 9 22 (T e x. 19 63 ); Gr e e n v. Ea rn est, 840 S.W .2d 119, 121 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1992, wr it denied). B efor e a w ill may be set a side on the gr o u n d of undue influenc e, the c ontestant must prove:

• the exist ence and exertion of an inf luence ;

• the ef

fec tive use of that influe nce to subve rt or over power the mind of the testator at the time the will was executed; a nd

• the execution of a w ill which the testator would not h av e ex ecute d but for such influence
. Rothermel , 3 69 S.W. 2d

at 92 2; Gree n, 840 S.W .2d at 121.

Re le v an t F

ac ts Appellant off

ers the f ollowing a

rguments with reg ard to undue influence :• Th e re wa s n o e vid e nc e of op po rt un ity to i nf lue nc e his mot

he r;

• Th e re wa s n o e vid e nc e or ins uf fi c ie nt ev ide nc e to s ho w M rs . Ru sse ll’ s su sc e pti bil ity to i nf lue nc e ;

• There was no showingthat Mrs. Russel l’s mind and desires w ere overpow ere d or su bv e rt e d at th e tim e of

the wi ll e xec uti on ;

• Th e re wa s n o s ho wi ngtha t Mrs . Ru sse ll w a s in c a

pa ble of c ha ng ingthe 20 02 wi ll; and

• Th e 20 02 wi ll d isp os iti on wa s n ot u

nn a tur a l c on sid e ri ngthe c ir c ums tanc e s.

• Ap pe lle e s r e sp on d w ithre fe re nc e to t he fo llo wi nginc ide nts
. The Und e r wood W ill : Kenneth a dmitted that prior to 1998, he contac ted Gre g Under wood, ins tr uc te d h im as to the wi ll’ s conte nts , a nd the n to ok his mot he r t o U nd e rw oo d’ s o ff

ic e . H e wa s, in fac t, “the one that dictated what to do and what we wanted.” Q
. O k ay . Y o ur

m o th e r w a s th e r e ? A. Well, she said y ou take c are of it befor e we ever went up there -- be fore we ever went to his office
. Said, now , y ou do -- if they don’t want to o ff er any thing, you take c are of it be cause I can’ t. She said she couldn’t func tion e no ug h to -- sh e di dn ’t kn ow e no ug h a bo ut i t, i n o the r w or ds , h owto f ix it and eve ry thing. Q
. O k ay . H a d

s h e v i s i t e d

w i thU n d e r

w o o d p r i o r t o th a t ? A. No. He a lso c on fi rm e d th at hi s mo the r d e fe rr e d to him “ on a ll m a tte rs ,” inc lud ingfi na nc ia l matte rs . Clois’ P ower of Attorney : There wer e numerous contra dictions be tween the testimony of Ke nn e th a

nd B ri an Po we rs . Po we rs te sti fi e d th a t Clo is h ad th e me nta l w he re wi tha l to le g a lly execute the power o f at t o rn ey and under stood that he nee ded help. Power s thought that he might have re c omm e nd e d to Clo is that he sign a po we r o f atto rn e y . H e c ou ld no t recall Ke nn e th instructing him to cr eate the document a nd he doubted that ha d occur red.Kenne th, on the other ha nd, cast doubt on Powers’ attorney /client safe g uards a

nd descr ibed
a re lations h i p in which Kenne th called the shots, Power s draf ted the docume nts, and then Powers pr oc ur e d th e e xec uti on

in Ke nn e th’ s abs e nc e . Ke nn e th expl a ine d that he ca lle d Po we rs and tol d h im that E va L ou ha d a po we r of atto rn e y ov e r Clo is and that he wa nte d to “ un do ” he rs and

g ra nt o ne in his fa vo r. Ke nn e th t

he n d ra ft e d a c he c k f ro m Clo is’ a c c ount m a de pa y a ble to P owe rs, an d Cl ois end o r s e d it
. Cl o is h a d n o id e a w h at th e d o c u me n t w a s , h e c o u ld n o t h av e un d e r s to o d what the document wa s, and “[he] just s igne d it because [P ower s] asked him to si g n it.” Cl ois ’ W ill : Kenne th and Powers c reated another leg al document on behalf of Clois and for Ke nn e th’ s b e ne fi t. P ow e rs te sti fi e d th a t Clo is ha d the re qu isi te me nta l c a pa c ity to e xec ute the wi ll,
and un de rs too d th e bo un ty

of his a sse ts, and

wa nte d to e xec ute it. Ke nn e th t e sti fi e d Cl ois or ig ina lly had a w ill divi ding his e state betwe en siblings Kenneth and Eva L ou. When Kenneth be came upset with Eva L ou, he ca lled Powers bec ause he “nee ded to c hang e the will to me beca use I could divide wi th h e r b ut s he wo uld

n’ t di vid e wi th m e .” A ne w w ill wa s d ra ft e d, le avin g a ll o f C loi s’ e state to Ke nn e th. As wi th t

he po we r o f atto rn e y , Cl ois e nd or se d th e c he c k to Pow e rs . Dec edent’s F ile wi th Brian Powers : Powers testified that Mrs. Russell’s file c on t ained three sticky , Post-I t ty

pe notes. The se we re the only items in the file except for unsigne d copies of the first three wills (1998, 2000, and 2002). One of t he notes bore K enneth’ s phone number, but the file did not contain a phone number for Mrs. Russell. The next note ref ere nced a power of attorne y that was to be pr epar ed on beha lf of Mrs. Russell a nd it listed Kenne th’s addre ss and phone number
. The third note r ead: Kenne th Russell, m o t h er ’s wil l, add, quote, the r ound dining r oom table I am pr e se ntl y us ingis t o g o to my g ra

nd so n, Willi am D. Rus se ll, that’ s B ill y , and the n h is social sec urity

number is on it also. This specific g ift was denote d in the 1998 will and all subsequent wills.Decedent ’s Qua lit y o f F air ne ss : K e nn e th, Da nny Rus se ll, and

Connie Wilk e rs on

a ll te sti fi e d th a t Mr s. Rus se ll wa s f a ir and e qu a l w he n it

c ame to h e r f

amil y . Po we rs te sti fi e d th a t w ith the exception of the 2002 will, all previous wi l l s were set up to distribute her e state in equa l proportion to eac h of her

children, a

nd then to their dec edents, per stirpes
. An aly sis There is a mple evidenc e to show (1) the exist ence and extension of an undue inf luence by Ke nn e th in the pr oc ur e me nt of the 20 02 wi ll; (2 ) the e ff e c tiv e op e ratio n o f s uc h in fl ue nc e so a s to
su bv e rt or ov e rp ow e r t

he Mr s. Rus se ll’ s mind wh e n exec uti ng the do c ume nt; and (3 ) M rs . Ru sse ll
wo uld no t ha ve e xec ute d th e wi ll b ut f or Ke nn e th’ s in fl ue nce. I nd eed, som e of the str on g e st testimony came from Ke nneth himself. We overr ule Point of Error O ne. Disinh erit ance Kenne th next complains that there was no e vidence or i nsufficie nt evidenc e to support the jury ’s finding that Mrs. Russell did not i ntend to disinherit her g randda ug hters. Historica lly , Texas courts have t re at ed q u estions of intent as uniquely within the rea lm of the fac t finder be cause the deter mination of an individual’s intent in taking a particula r action is so depende nt on an eva luation of witnesses a

nd cre dibilit y . Se e City of Da lla s v . J

e nn ing s, 14 2 S. W.3 d 3 10 , 3 14 (T e x. 20 04 ); Sta te Farm Fire &Cas. Co. v. S.S., 85 8 S.W.2 d 3 74 , 3 78 (T e x. 19 93 ); Spoljaric v. Perc ival Tours, Inc., 70 8 S. W.2 d 4 32 , 4 34 (T e x. 19 86 ); s ee also In reEstate of Steed, 152 S.W .3d 797, 804 (Tex.App.-- Texarkana

2004, pet. denied)(in t he contex t of answering the l eg al questi on of a pa rty ’s domicile,
an in div idu a l’ s inte nt to make a loc atio n a pe rm ane nt ho me is a fa c t qu e sti on ); Gu thr iev . S uite r, 934 S.W .2d 820, 831 (Tex.App.--Houston [1 s t D is t. ]1 9 9 6 , n o wr it) (summary judgme nt prec luded by

fac t qu e sti on re g ard ing te stator ’s c a

pa c ity and int e nt fo llo wi ng br a in s ur g e ry ); Russell v. City of Bryan, 79 7 S. W.2 d 1 12, 1 15 (T e x.Ap p. -- Ho us ton [14t h D ist .] 19 90 , w ri t de nie d) (gra nto r’ s inte nt i ne xec uti ng de e d is a fa c t qu e sti on ); Turbo ff v . G e rtn e r, Ar on &Le de t I nv estm e nts , 763 S.W .2d 827, 83 0 ( Te x.Ap p. -- Ho us ton

[14t h D ist .] 19 88 , w ri t de nie d) (i n c on tr a c t la w, the qu e sti on of

the pa rt ie s’ int e nt in signin g a do c ume nt is on e fo r t he fa c t f ind e r) ; Lee-Em mert v. M

acatee , Inc., 410 S.W .2d 489, 490 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1966, no writ)( intent to waive a defe nse in e stoppel context i s a fa ct qu e sti on ); Ma nz ie l v . W

ill iam s, 26 2 S. W.2 d 4 37 , 4 38 (T ex .C iv. Ap p. -- Te xar ka na 19 53 , n o w ri t) (whe ther pa

rty possessed the r equire d intent to dece ive for purposes of establishing f raud c ause of action is a fa ct question). Testamenta

ry intent does not depend on the testator’ s rea liz ation that he is makinga will, but rathe r i n his intent to express his testamentar y wishes i n the i nstrument offe red for probate. Luker v. Y oungmey er , 36 S.W .3d 628, 630 (Tex.App.--Ty ler 2000, no pe t.). To deter mine whether

the testator intended a

particula r docume nt to be a te s tamentar y dispositi on of his proper

ty , the cour

t may consider the fac ts and circ ums t an ces surrounding the instrument’s execution. Id., citing Shiels v. Sh ie ls, 109 S.W .2d 1112, 1113 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1937, no writ). Appellee s point out that the prior wills established their grandmother ’s intent that they share in he r estate . They

would have inhe rited pe r st irp es under e ither of the pr evious wills had they been of fe re d to pr ob ate
. F ro m a ll the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d, a fa ir -m ind e d ju

ry c ou ld c on sid e r t

he 20 02 wi ll

“ unnatur a l” in t

he c on te xt of

the te sti mony

re g ard ingthe fa ir

and e qu ita ble tr e a tme nt M rs . Ru sse ll showed he r childre n and g randc hildren. Consequently , we reje ct Kenne th’s argument that the mere execution of the 2002 wil l i s s u ff icient to establish Mrs. Russell’s intent reg ardingher g randda ug hters’ inhe ritance . We overrule Point of Error Two.

Tortious Interference wi th Inh erit ance Kenne th next complains that a directed verdict should have be en g rante d with reg ard to the tor tio us int e rf

e re nc e c la im. Tex a s r e c og nize s a c a us e of a c tio n f or tor tio us int e rf

e re nc e wi thinheritanc e rig hts. King v. Acke r , 725 S.W .2d 750, 754 (Tex
. Ap p . -- Ho u s ton [ 1st Dist.] 1987, no

wr it) . In s o h old ing , th e c ourt re lie d u po n th e Re state me nt ( Se c on d) of To rt s, § 7 74 B (1 97 9) : One who by

fra ud, duress or othe r tortious means intentionally preve nts another f

rom rec ei v in g f

r o m a th ir d p e r s o naninh e r it an c e o r g if t t h a t h e w o u ld

o th e r w is e h ave re c e ive d is su

bje c t to lia

bil ity to t he oth e r f or los s o f t he inh e ri tanc e or

g if t. Id . App e lle e s r e sp on d that Ke nn e th, in c on c e rt wi th P ow e rs , e sta

bli sh e d a his tor y of int e rf e ri ngwi th famil y i n h eritanc es that inured to Ke nneth’s bene fit at Eva L ou’s expense. The c onflicting and contra dictory

testimony

betwee n Kenne th

a n d Po w e r s c r e a

te d a r e a s o n a b lee xp ectation that the jurors would discredit testimony of one or

the other. We a g ree with Ap p el l ee s t h at the evidenc e wa s sufficie nt to enable a rea sonable and fair- minded jury to c onclude that (1) ther e w as an intended inheritanc e, and ( 2) Ke nneth tortiously interfe red w ith it. W e over rule Point of Error

Three
. Malice Kenne th next attacks the jury ’s finding that his inter fer ence with Appellees’ inheritanc e wa s malicious. Malice is def

ined to mean a specific intent by the defendant to cause substantial injury
or h ar m to the claimant. T EX .C IV .P R AC .&R EM .C ODE ANN . § 41 .0 01 (7 )( Ve rn on 20 08 ). Spe c if

ic intent means th at t

h e a c to r d e s ir e s to c a

u s e th e c o n s e qu e n c e s o f h is a c t, o r

h e b e li e v e s the conseque nces a

re substantially

cer tain to result from it. Ree d Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W .2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1985). Malice may be prove n by

direc t or circ umstantial evidence
. See M obil Oil Corp.
v . E lle nd e r, 96 8 S. W.2 d 9 17 , 9 21 (T e x. 19 98 ); Mi ssi on Re so urc es, In c . v . Ga rza En e rg yTru st, 166 S.W .3d 301, 314 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 2005, pet. filed). On c e a g a in w e a g re e wi th A pp e lle e s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s suffic ien t to e na ble re a so na

ble
and fa ir -m ind e d ju

ro rs to c on c lud e that ( 1) the re wa s an inte nd e d inhe ri tanc e , a nd (2 ) K e nn e th tor tio us ly int e rf e re d w iththe inh e ri tanc e , (3) kn owin g the c on se qu e nc e s, and (4 ) h e sp e c if

ic a lly intended to ca

use substantial injury

or har m to Appe llees by

way of his actions. Ke nneth’s ac tionsthere fore constituted a show of ma lice. We over rule Point of Error

Four
. COSTS OF COURT In his final issue, Appellant ar g ues that abse nt the requisite “g ood faith and just ca use” finding , the final judg ment incorre ctly allows for r ecove ry

of costs, and A

ppellees should not and cannot r ecove r their c osts of this sui t. We disagr ee. Rul e 13 1 p ro vid e s th at “ [t]he su c c e ssf ul p art y to a su it s ha ll re c ov e r of his a dv e rs ary a ll c os ts incurre d there in, e x cept wher e otherwise pr ovided.” T EX .R.C IV .P. 131. Kenne th directs us to the Texas Probate Code to support his argument Appellee s cannot re cover costs without a finding that the y have pr os e c ute d thi s pr oc e e din g in g oo d f a ithand wi th s uf fi c ie nt c a us e . Se c tio n 2 43 pr ov ide s: When any

p e r s o nd e s ign ate d

a s a e xe c u to r in a w il l o r ana ll e g e d

w il l, o r as administrator with the will or al l ege d will annexed, defe nds it or prosecute s any proce eding in g ood faith, and w ith justcause , for the pur pose of having the will or alleg ed will admitted to pr obate, whether succe ssful or not, he shall be allowe d out of the e state his ne c e ssa

ry e xpe ns e s a

nd dis burs e me nts , in c lud ingre a so na ble attorney ’s fe es, in such proc eeding s. T EX .P R OB .C ODE ANN . § 243 (Ve rnon’s 2003). As Appellee s point out, the judgment mer ely taxed court c osts; it did not gr ant attorne y s’ fe es or other expenses. Appellee s did not seek f ees pur suant to the Probate Code a

nd wer e not re quired to plea d for c osts u nder Rule 131. City of Irving v. Dallas/Fort W

orth Int’l A i r

p ort Bd. , 894 S.W .2d 456 (Tex.App.--F ort Worth 1995, writ denied). Moreove r, the judg ment taxed costs ag ainst Kenne th and Clois individually . I t makes no re citation that the costs ar e to be pa id from the estate. Consequently , the orde r does not violate se ction 243, and si nce costs wer e properly awa rded pursuant to Rule 131, a finding of “g ood faith and just cause”
was unne cessa

ry . We overrule Point of Error F ive. Havingoverr uled a l l issues for re view, we aff irm the judg ment of the c ourt below.
November

18, 2009ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, J ustice

B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d R i v e r a , JJ.