IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30764

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellee

v.

EDDIE BERAUD, JR., also known as Eddie Berard, 

 Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:16-CR-148

Before DAVIS, HAYNES, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Eddie Beraud, Jr. (“Beraud”), appeals the imposition of a special 

condition of supervised released requiring him to participate in a cognitive 

behavioral therapeutic treatment program, arguing that, because the 

condition does not reasonably relate to the statutory factors governing special 

conditions of release, the district court plainly erred. Because the condition is 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 11, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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reasonably related to one of the factors set out by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the 

district court did not commit plain error, and we AFFIRM.

I.

In 2014, federal agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, and members of the New Orleans Police Department-ledMulti-City Gang Unit launched an investigation into acts of violence and 

narcotics trafficking linked to the New Orleans street gang known as the MidCity Killers (“MCK”). Among others, the investigation identified Beraud and 

Henry Frazier, Jr. (“Frazier”), as associates, though not members, of MCK. 

Beraud has a history of criminal convictions spanning twenty-three years, 

including, among others, the illegal carrying of a weapon, possession of cocaine, 

domestic assault, and aggravated battery.

In October of 2014, Beraud and Frazier agreed to break into the home of 

C.L.1 in New Orleans, Louisiana, intending to steal multiple pounds of 

marijuana and valuables they believed to be inside. Beraud targeted C.L.’s 

house in particular to steal marijuana and as “payback to get his stuff back.”2 

Beraud and Frazier scouted the location and determined that the best way to 

enter C.L.’s home would be through a rear window. On October 23, 2014, 

Frazier broke the window and hid the shards of glass under the house, leaving 

behind his fingerprints on the pieces. On October 24, Beraud, Frazier, and an 

unnamed individual known to the U.S. Attorney (“Individual A”) proceeded to 

the back of the house wearing ski masks and wielding firearms. Beraud and 

 

1 The government identifies C.L. and his wife only by their initials.

2 Though Beraud stipulated to this motivation in the limited factual basis he 

submitted with his guilty plea, the record sheds no further light on the origins of the 

antagonism between Beraud and C.L.

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Individual A entered the house, while Frazier remained outside, as did two 

other individuals who acted as lookouts during the burglary.

While Beraud and Individual A searched the home, C.L.’s wife, I.L., 

entered the front door. Beraud and Individual A pointed their guns at her, ziptied her, and covered her face to prevent her from identifying them. They 

demanded that I.L. direct them to the valuables in the house. With I.L.’s key, 

Individual A let Frazier into the house, and the three armed men continued to 

search the home, taking jewelry and a drug press. During their search, C.L. 

also returned to the house. Beraud, Frazier, and their companion moved I.L. 

to a bedroom to conceal her. One of the men fired a single shot at C.L., missing 

him, and the trio fled out of the back door of the house carrying the jewelry and 

drug press.

Pursuant to an investigation, Frazier and Beraud were named in a twocount Bill of Information filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Count one 

charged Frazier and Beraud with conspiring to use, carry, and brandish 

firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Count two charged 

them with conspiring to take and obtain personal property consisting of illegal 

drugs and proceeds of trafficking by means of actual and threatened force, 

violence, and fear of injury. On May 31, 2017, Beraud pleaded guilty to both 

counts and the district court accepted his plea. In his written plea agreement, 

Beraud agreed to waive his “right to appeal or contest his guilty plea, 

conviction, sentence, fine, [and] supervised release” unless the district court 

imposed “any . . . sentence in excess of the statutory maximum.” During his 

sentencing, the district court did not specifically ask whether Beraud 

understood “the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to 

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appeal,”3 but it did inquire as to whether Beraud understood the terms of his 

plea agreement and whether he had discussed the case with his lawyer.

The district court sentenced Beraud to eighty-six months of 

imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The supervised release

included several special conditions; the only one Beraud challenges is the 

cognitive behavioral therapy (“CBT”) condition. In the Pre-Sentence 

Investigation Report (“PSR”), the probation officer recommended that Beraud 

be required to undergo “cognitive programming,” as follows:

The defendant shall participate in an approved cognitive

behavioral therapeutic treatment program and abide by all 

supplemental conditions of treatment. The defendant shall 

contribute to the cost of this program to the extent that the

defendant is deemed capable by the United States Probation 

Officer.

The district court adopted the suggestion and ordered Beraud to “participate 

in an approved cognitive behavioral therapeutic treatment program.” The 

treatment program, the district court stated, would “help [Beraud] with social 

decision making.” Beraud did not object to the inclusion of the CBT condition 

in the PSR, nor did he object to its imposition at sentencing. 

Beraud timely appealed, challenging the inclusion of the CBT special 

condition as a plain error on the part of the district court.

II.

As a preliminary matter, the government argues that the express 

language in Beraud’s plea agreement waives his ability to appeal the 

reasonableness of imposing CBT as a condition of supervised release. But in 

the plea agreement, Beraud explicitly preserved the right to appeal a sentence 

“in excess of the statutory maximum.” 

 

3 FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 11(b)(N). 

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Special conditions of supervised release are considered part of a 

defendant’s sentence.4 As for whether the appeal waiver bars the instant 

appeal of the CBT condition, we pretermit the issue because, as described 

below, the district court committed no plain error.5

III.

The parties’ substantive disagreement concerns, as mentioned above, 

whether the imposition of the CBT condition amounted to plain error

warranting vacatur. This Court “typically reviews the imposition of a special

condition of supervised release for abuse of discretion.”6 But because Beraud 

failed to object either to the inclusion of the CBT special condition in the PSR 

or to its imposition at sentencing, we review for plain error, which requires 

“considerable deference to the district court.”7 

Plain error exists if (1) there is an error, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the 

error affects the defendant’s substantial rights.8 If these three prongs are 

satisfied, we have “the discretion to remedy the error—discretion which ought 

to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 

 

4 See United States v. Higgins, 739 F.3d 733, 739 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Because Higgins’s 

challenge to the conditions of [supervised release] in the written judgment is an appeal of his 

sentence . . . , it is covered by the waiver of appeal unless it constitutes a ‘punishment 

imposed in excess of the statutory maximum’ as provided in the appeal waiver.”). 

5 See United States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226, 230–31 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding that this 

Court’s jurisdiction is not dependent on the existence of a valid appeal waiver); see also

Higgins, 739 F.3d at 739 (“[A]n appeal regarding the conditions of [supervised release] must 

be reviewed under 18 U.S.C. § 3583.”). 

6 United States v. Gordon, 838 F.3d 597, 604 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. 

Rodriguez, 558 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2009)). 

7 United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2007); see FED. R. CRIM. PROC.

52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not 

brought to the court’s attention.”).

8 Gordon, 838 F.3d at 604 (quoting United States v. Garcia-Carrillo, 749 F.3d 376, 378 

(5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)). 

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reputation of judicial proceedings.”9 “Meeting all four prongs is difficult, ‘as it 

should be.’”10

IV.

Beraud argues first that the district court erred by failing to explain how 

the CBT condition was reasonably related to the statutory factors articulated 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). Second, he argues that because “there is absolutely 

no evidence that Mr. Beraud suffers from any psychological or psychiatric 

issues needing mental-health treatment of any sort, let alone[] ‘cognitive 

behavioral therapy,’” there is no reasonable relationship between the CBT 

condition and the statutory factors. 

The government counters that the reason given by the district court for 

imposing the CBT condition—to improve Beraud’s “social decision making”—

was reasonably related to Beraud’s characteristics, the nature of his offense, 

and the need to protect the public from further offenses.

District courts have broad discretion to impose special conditions of 

supervised release11 so long as they are “reasonably related” to the factors set 

forth in § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(b), (a)(2)(c), and (a)(2)(d):

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant, (2) the need to afford adequate 

deterrence to criminal conduct, (3) the need to protect the public 

from further crimes of the defendant, and (4) the need to provide 

the defendant with needed training, medical care, or other 

correctional treatment in the most effective manner.12

 

9 Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (internal quotation marks and 

alterations omitted). 

10 Id. (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 n.9 (2004)). 

11 United States v. Fernandez, 776 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 2015).

12 United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 164–65 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), 

(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D). 

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Additionally, supervised release conditions must not involve any “greater 

deprivation of liberty that is reasonably necessary” to achieve the purposes of 

the latter three factors.13 Finally, the conditions must be consistent with “any 

pertinent policy statement” issued by the Sentencing Commission.14

Though this Circuit has never specifically addressed CBT as an 

appropriate condition for the district court to impose, the Seventh Circuit, in 

United States v. Siegel, recognized it to be beneficial in appropriate 

circumstances.15 That court concluded that the imposition of CBT was proper 

in light of the defendant’s history of substance abuse.16 It explained that 

“[c]ognitive behavioral therapy isn’t just for the mentally ill; it can be an 

effective tool to help anyone learn how to better manage stressful life 

situations.”17 

Here, the district court’s reason for imposing the condition—to improve 

Beraud’s social decision making—is reasonably related to at least one of the 

four statutory factors courts consider in imposing special conditions.18 The 

nature of the home invasion, as well as Beraud’s lengthy history of substance 

abuse, domestic violence, and criminal behavior demonstrates anti-social 

behavior and characteristics that could be effectively addressed by CBT.19 The 

imposition of CBT, then, is related to both “the nature and circumstances of 

the offense and the history and characteristics” of Beraud.20 

 

13 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2); see Paul, 274 F.3d at 165; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b).

14 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3). 

15 See United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 716 (7th Cir. 2014).

16 Id. 

17 Id.

18 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(D).

19 See Siegel, 753 F.3d at 716.

20 See 18 U.SC. § 3553(a)(1).

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The facts in this case are not comparable to those in our unpublished 

opinions in either United States v. Mahanera21 or United States v. Garcia,22 as 

Beraud urges. In those cases, the district court gave no cogent explanation 

why the challenged mental health treatment condition was imposed.23 Here, 

the district court gave a reason—if somewhat perfunctory—for the imposition 

of the CBT condition: to “help the defendant with social decision making.”24 

Because the CBT condition is reasonably related to one of the factors set out 

by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and other circuit law supports the imposition of the 

condition, any error by the district court was not clear or obvious. 25 Therefore,

the district court committed no plain error.26 

V.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

 

21 611 Fed. App’x 201 (5th Cir. 2015).

22 638 Fed. App’x 343 (5th Cir. 2016). 23 In Mahanera, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking in and 

attempting to traffic in counterfeit goods. The district court there imposed special conditions 

requiring the defendant: (1) to “participate in a program of testing and/or treatment for 

alcohol and/or drug abuse as directed by the probation office”; and (2) to “not possess, ingest, 

or otherwise use a synthetic cannabinoid or other synthetic narcotic unless prescribed by a 

licensed medical practitioner.” 611 Fed. App’x at 202. Because the district court gave no 

explanation for the imposition of these conditions and because the record reflected no 

evidence of drug abuse, this Court vacated the challenged conditions and remanded the case 

to the district court. Id. at 203–04.

In Garcia, the district court imposed a mental health treatment, explaining only that 

“I considered all of the [§ 3553(a) factors] and think this would be the best possible deterrent 

and [will best] protect the public.” 638 Fed. App’x at 345 (second alteration in original). On 

appeal, this Court vacated the condition, reasoning that a mere recitation of the factors did 

not explain how the condition was reasonably related to them and that the record revealed 

no evidence supporting a mental health treatment condition. Id. at 346.

24 See Mahanera, 611 Fed. App’x at 202; Garcia, 638 Fed. App’x at 346.

25 See Paul, 274 F.3d at 164–65; Siegel, 753 F.3d at 716.

26 See Gordon, 838 F.3d at 604.

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