alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Bodyguard Records.com, Inc.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             56 Colfax Avenue
                                                             Clifton, NJ 07015
                                                             (973) 574-1315
March 29, 2002

Gable Investment Trust
31 Church Street
P. O. Box HM1564
Hamilton, HMFX, Bermuda

Re: Amendment to Loan Agreement

Gentlemen:

     This  will  serve to  confirm  our  prior  conversations  and  negotiations
concerning  the  parameters  of an amendment to the 12%, 13 month,  $25,000 loan
agreement  together with its annexed  promissory note of even date dated May 31,
2001 and due  June 31,  2002  (the  "Loan  Agreement"),  executed  by  Bodyguard
Records.com,  Inc., a Delaware  corporation  (the  "Company") and payable to the
order of Gable Investment Trust ("Gable").  In this regard, and in consideration
of the mutual  benefit  derived  herefrom,  the receipt and adequacy of which is
hereby  jointly and  severally  acknowledged  and  accepted,  we hereby agree as
follows:

1.   Amendment.  The Loan Agreement is hereby amended to extend the Due Date (as
     that term is defined in the Loan Agreement)  until the sooner of August 31,
     2002 or the closing date of the Company's initial public offering under and
     pursuant to Form SB-2 Registration Statement No. 333-40444.

2.   Confirmation  of  Agreements.  Except as herein  modified,  the Company and
     Gable  hereby  reconfirm  the  validity  and  enforceability  of  the  Loan
     Agreement.

     If the foregoing  correctly  sets forth our  agreement  and  understanding,
please  indicate  your  acceptance  by signing the enclosed  copy of this letter
agreement in the space marked  "Agreed to and Accepted" and returning the signed
document to the undersigned via facsimile.

Very truly yours

Bodyguard Records.com, Inc.


By: /s/John Rollo
    -------------
    John Rollo, President


AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED:

The Gable Investment Trust


By:/s/Hildeberto S. DeFrais
   ------------------------------
   Hildeberto S. DeFrais, Trustee

JR:nas
#### DE LONG v. DE LONG HOOK & EYE CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

July, 1896.)

Action by Frank E. De Long against the De Long Hook & Eye Company.

No opinion. Motion granted. See 41 N. Y. Supp. 201.
Exhibit 10.2


 


Amendment to Promissory Note


 


THIS AMENDMENT TO PROMISSORY
NOTE, entered into on March 11, 2021 (this “Amendment”), is made to the Promissory Note dated April 16,
2020 (the “Original Note”), executed by ONS Acquisition Corp., a Cayman Islands exempted company (“Maker”),
as maker thereof, payable to the order of ONS Acquisition Management LLC (“Payee”).


 


Recitals. Payee,
as the current legal and equitable owner and holder, and the payee, of the Original Note, and Maker desire to amend the Original Note
to extend the maturity date of the Note from September 30, 2020 to September 30, 2021.


 


NOW, THEREFORE, in
consideration of the premises, covenants and agreements herein contained, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which are acknowledged by the parties hereto, the Maker and Payee agree as follows:


 


SECTION 1. Definitions.
Capitalized terms used but not defined herein have the meanings and uses assigned in the Original Note; and the term “Note”
when used in this Amendment means the Original Note, as amended hereby.


 


SECTION 2. Amendment.
The date “September 30, 2020” in sections 1 and 3 of the Original Note is hereby amended and restated to read “September
20, 2021.”


 


SECTION 3. Governing
Law. This Amendment shall be governed by, and construed and interpreted in accordance with, the law of the State of New York.


 


SECTION 4. Confirmation.
Except as expressly set forth herein, the Original Note is ratified and confirmed in all respects and shall remain in full force and effect
in accordance with its terms.


 


SECTION 5. Successors
and Assigns. This Amendment is binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of Maker and Payee and their respective successors
and assigns permitted by the Note, except Maker may not assign or otherwise transfer any of its rights or obligations hereunder other
than as provided in the Note.


 


SECTION 6. Counterparts.
This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, and by each party hereto on separate counterparts, each of which counterpart
when so executed shall be an original, but all such counterparts taken together shall constitute one and the same instrument. A counterpart
signature page delivered by fax or internet transmission shall be as effective as delivery of an originally executed counterpart.


 


[Remainder of Page Left Intentionally Blank]


  




     


     


    

 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties
have caused this Amendment to be duly executed and delivered by their respective proper and duly authorized officers on, and effective
as of, the first date set forth above.


 


	 	MAKER:
	 	 
	 	ONS ACQUISITION CORP.
	 	 
	 	By:	/s/ Alexander Crutchfield
	 	Name: 	Alexander Crutchfield
	 	Title:	Chief Executive Officer
	 	 
	 	PAYEE:
	 	 
	 	ONS ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT LLC
	 	 
	 	By:	/s/ Frank Bachinsky
	 	Name:	Frank Bachinsky
	 	Title:	Manager


 


Signature Page to Amendment to


Promissory Note
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Northwest Pipe Company (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period
ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Stephanie J. Welty, Vice President, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                       
|---------------------------------------
|                                       
|/s/ STEPHANIE J. WELTY                 
|Stephanie J. Welty                     
|Vice President, Chief Financial Officer
|November 7, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 20
- 0440 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. JOSEPH FRANCIS SILVA,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including June 14 , 2021 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 10 2021

05/10/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0440
Whom do you charge if the boat owner is on board but is not operating the 

boat? 

Written By Author Unknown 

Civil penalty case processing officials take note recently the Coast Guard 

Appellate Authority dismissed a Coast Guard Hearing Officer-assessed 

Warning against an operator in circumstances where both the operator and the 

vessel owner had written to the Hearing Officer, stating that: 1) the operator 

was only temporarily conning the vessel while the owner was showing Coast 

Guard Boarding Officers around the vessel; and 2) the vessel owner was 

assuming full responsibility for the deficiencies revealed by the boarding 

(Activity No. 4037521). Both owner and operator had asked the Hearing 

Officer to dismiss the case against the operator. 

The Enforcement Summary had charged the operator, not the onboard owner. 

The vessel owner nevertheless supplied the Hearing Officer with proof of 

compliance (i.e. presented evidence of new flares, placard, registration, etc.). 

The Activity Summary Report (ASR) had described the vessel as a 38-foot 

recreational vessel with 16 people aboard. Both owner and operator were 

named in the report, and the words “Owner on board—not operator” appeared 

under “Owner Status.” The ASR made no mention of the operator 

“temporarily” operating the vessel while the owner escorted the Boarding 

Officers. 

The decision to charge a particular individual is up to the charging unit, based 

on the available evidence and the provision of law involved. Sometimes more 

than one person can be charged for the same violation. If, instead of charging 

everyone who might be liable, only one person is going to be charged, which 

person should it be? 

Tellingly, the Appellate Authority declined to state that it was unlawful to 

charge the operator, concentrating instead on the limited role the operator 

played in this case, and the owner’s stated willingness and ability, during the 

boarding and during the civil penalty phase, to assume all responsibility for the 

alleged violations and to correct the deficiencies. 
Although the appeal decision in this case seems to be limited to its particular 

facts, it serves as a reminder that civil penalty cases are submitted to achieve 

compliance with the law and to deter future violations, and that the charging 

decision can have an impaction how effective the case will be in achieving 

those objectives.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Phillip A. Montana, Appellant.

Memorandum: Defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree for an attack upon his estranged wife. She testified that he accosted her as she was about to enter her car to go to work, pulled off her glasses and threw sulfuric acid in her face, causing serious permanent injuries. Defendant denied that he was the assailant and testified that shortly before the incident he had received a telephone call from an unknown woman complaining about conduct of the victim with her husband. Defendant also claimed a loss of memory extending from the evening before the attack until he found himself *985riding a motorcycle to Syracuse in the early morning of the day of the attack. He testified to another episode of memory loss about a month earlier when he had inexplicably found himself in New York City. He said that he was on medication and under the care of two psychiatrists at the time his estranged wife was assaulted. No expert witnesses were called by defendant at trial.

His first retained attorney timely served a notice of intent to rely on a defense of mental disease or defect (Penal Law § 40.15, formerly § 30.05) but defendant changed counsel and the record does not indicate any followup of such defense by trial counsel.

Defendant now contends that failure to pursue such defense constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; however, the record before us is inadequate for review of such claim. While defense counsel’s representation was lacking in several respects, the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of the case, viewed together, show that there was meaningful representation (see, *People v Satterfield,*66 NY2d 796, 798-799).

We have examined the other issues argued by defendant and find them without merit. (Appeal from judgment of Oneida County Court, Darrigrand, J. — assault, first degree.) Present — Denman, J. P., Boomer, Green, Pine and Balio, JJ.
#### UNITED STATES v. Staff Sergeant Frank J. HAZZARD, FR [ XXX-XX-XXXX ] Headquarters, 15th Air Base Wing 15th Air Base Wing (PA-CAF).

ACM 21928.

U. S. Air Force Court of Military Review.

Sentence Adjudged 23 June 1975.

Decided 16 Jan. 1976.

*783Appearances: Appellate counsel for the Accused: Colonel Jerry E. Conner and Captain Rex L. Fuller III.

Appellate counsel for the United States: Colonel Julius C. Ullerich, Jr., and Captain Alvin E. Schlechter.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In consonance with his pleas, the accused was convicted of larceny, wrongful appropriation and negligently suffering the wrongful disposition of military property of the United States. The approved sentence extends to bad conduct discharge, confinement at hard labor for eight months, forfeiture of $250.00 per month for five months and reduction in grade to airman first class.

Initially, appellate defense counsel have invited our attention to an issue raised by counsel for the accused. In our opinion, however, the error asserted was adequately treated in the staff judge advocate’s post-trial review and was correctly resolved therein against the accused. Accordingly, further discussion thereof is unnecessary.

In addition, appellate defense counsel have assigned an error wherein they assert that the accused’s pleas of guilty were improvident because the military judge did not discuss the terms of a pretrial agreement between the accused and the convening authority.

We agree, of course, that the accused’s understanding of such agreement should have been ascertained by the military judge during his inquiry into the accused’s guilt-in-fact. *United States v. Avery,*50 C.M.R. 827 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975), affirmed, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 723 (1975). However, the military judge was not responsible for the omission since neither counsel advised him that such an agreement existed; and when asked whether anyone had made any promises to him concerning the sentence, the accused responded, “No, sir.” *

Nevertheless, notwithstanding our finding that the pretrial agreement should have been discussed for the purpose of ascertaining the accused’s complete understanding thereof, we perceive no possibility of prejudice to the accused. Of significance to us is the absence of any contention that the accused did not understand the terms of the agreement and the strong evidence in extenuation and mitigation that was “vigorously and forcefully presented” by the accused’s counsel. *United States v. Avery,*supra. Therefore, we find no reason for disturbing the findings and sentence imposed and approved below. *United States v. Avery,*supra.

The findings of guilty and the sentence are affirmed.

*

 The responsibility for failing to inform the military judge of the pretrial agreement must be shared equally by trial and defense counsel since “all parties” to a trial have “a duty to maintain the integrity of the judicial system.” See *United States v. Johnson,*23 U.S.C.M.A. 416, 50 C.M.R. 320, 321, 1 M.J. 36, 38 (1975); *United States v. Avery,*supra.
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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996             DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1996             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996             SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          15,338                  15,338
<SECURITIES>                                    20,613                  20,613
<RECEIVABLES>                                    9,789                   9,789
<ALLOWANCES>                                       858                     858
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                45,615                  45,615
<PP&E>                                           4,759                   4,759
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,048                   2,048
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  48,572                  48,572
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,215                   7,215
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
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<COMMON>                                        51,491                  51,491
<OTHER-SE>                                    (11,042)                (11,042)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    48,572                  48,572
<SALES>                                          9,013                  23,557 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 9,013                  23,557 
<CGS>                                            1,168                   2,690
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,168                   2,690
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 7,335                  20,272 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  86                     239
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    883                   1,579
<INCOME-TAX>                                       102                     172
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                818                   1,444
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.06                    0.11
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</TABLE>
COURT REPORTER

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD OF 

TRIAL 

I certify that the record of trial in the case of:

United States v. _______________________________________ 

contains all of the items required pursuant to RCM 1112(b) and that this record of trial 

was prepared in accordance with service regulations. 

___________________________________ 

Court Reporter signature

___________________________________

Name, Rank/Rate/Grade
CHILD WEAR OF PERSONAL FLOTATION DEVICES (PFDs) 

FEDERAL VERSUS STATE REQUIREMENTS 

Written by Mrs. Danielle Davis

There seems to be confusion when using cites 33 CFR 175.25 

and 33 CFR 175.15(c). Both cites discuss the requirement for child 

wear of personal floatation devices (PFDs). When determining the 

proper cite, keep in mind that only when a State has failed to 

establish a State requirement for children to wear a PFD, does the 

federal requirement found at 33 CFR 175.15(c) apply. When a State 

has established a State requirement for child wear of a PFD, the 

federal cite 33 CFR 173.15(c) is not applicable. The state law takes 

precedence over the federal regulation. 

33 CFR 175.15(c) provides that no person may operate a recreational 

vessel underway with any child under 13 years old aboard unless 

each such child is either wearing an appropriate PFD approved by 

the Coast Guard or below decks or in an enclosed cabin. If the child 

is observed above deck without a PFD, then a violation has occurred. 

If the child was below decks with no PFD, then no violation has 

occurred. 

33 CFR 175.25 provides that where a State has established by 

statute that children aboard a recreational vessel of a certain age 

wear an appropriate PFD approved by the Coast Guard, that 

requirement applies on the waters subject to the State’s jurisdiction. 

For example, the State of Ohio has established by statute that 

children under the age of 10 years old wear a PFD. A violation would 
not exist if a child of 11 years was not wearing a PFD aboard a 

recreational vessel on waters subject to Ohio jurisdiction. So 

knowing if a State requirement exists is the first factor in 

determining what cite is applicable. Secondarily, knowing the child’s 

age and location on the vessel when observed without a PFD is 

critical. 

A narrative for an alleged violation for a child not wearing a PFD 

should indicate if the State has established a requirement for child 

wear of a PFD. If so, then 33 CFR 175.25 is applicable and the 

evidence should then support violation of the State requirement. 

Remember it is 33 CFR 175.25 that gives the authority for Coast 

Guard enforcement of the requirements of the State’s statute. If the 

wrong cite is used, the case will most likely be dismissed. 

When submitting a case don’t just indicate there were children on 

board and not wearing a PFD. This is insufficient evidence. Boarding 

teams should always ask questions, seek evidence or document how 

they determine the age of the child and provide that information in 

the violation case. Evidence to support a conclusion that the child 

was of an age that required wear of a PFD, is almost always 

necessary to find a violation occurred. Similarly important is a good 

description as to where the child was located on the vessel when 

observed without a PFD and whether the vessel was underway at 

the time.
#### LORD v. NEW YORK EL. R. CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

November 13, 1896.)

Action by John T. Lord against the New York Elevated Railroad Company.

M. W. Gallway, for appellant.

W. R. Page, for respondent.

No opinion. Judgment affirmed on the defendant’s appeal. Judgment affirmed on the plaintiff’s appeal.

PATTERSON, J.,

dissenting on the ground that the amount awarded for fee damages is not sufficient. No costs to either party.
#### POLLATSCHEK et al. v. GOODWIN.

•(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,. First Department.

October 29, 1896.)

Action by Pollatschek and others against Goodwin. Motion for leave to appeal to the appellate division for reargument.

See 40 N. Y. Supp. 682.

PER. CURIAM.

Every point made by the appellant’s counsel upon the argument of the appeal was fully noted and discussed in the opinion handed down, and this motion seems to be no more than an effort to secure further discussion of well-established principles of law in their application to the facts of the particular case. The main contention of the appellant’s counsel is that the plaintiffs were not mere middlemen, but brokers intrusted with discretionary powers. The contention is wholly with regard to a question of fact; hence this motion cannot J>e said to come within the rules laid down in Lynch v. Sauer, 16 Misc. Rep. 363, 38 N. Y. Supp. 1, as governing motions for leave to appeal to the appellate division. Motion denied, with $10 costs.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AUGUST 24, 2016

NO. 03-16-00072-CV

Jorge Falcon, Appellant

v.

Texas Public Safety Commission, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 126TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PEMBERTON, AND FIELD

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE PURYEAR

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the trial court on January 8, 2016. Having 

reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error 

in the judgment. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment. Appellant shall pay all 

costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court below.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Marvin Screen, Appellant.

— Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (John Leonforte, J.), rendered on August 21, 1984, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted. *(See, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous points which could be raised on this appeal. Concur — Murphy, P. J., Sandler, Sullivan, Asch and Lynch, JJ.