[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

SAYLOR, C.J., EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF KEYSTONE HEALTH PLAN EAST, INC., Appellee

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF KEYSTONE HEALTH PLAN EAST, INC., Appellee

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF QCC INSURANCE COMPANY, : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 19 EAP 2014 Appeal from the order of Commonwealth Court entered on 11/18/2013, at No. 97 C.D. 2013 (reargument denied 01/07/2014), affirming the order dated 12/27/2012 of the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division, at Nos. 3671, 3672, 3675, 3678, January Term 2012.

ARGUED: March 10, 2015[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 2

Appellee

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF QCC INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF KEYSTONE HEALTH PLAN EAST, INC., Appellee

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF KEYSTONE HEALTH PLAN EAST, INC., Appellee : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 20 EAP 2014 Appeal from the order of Commonwealth Court entered on 11/18/2013, at No. 98 C.D. 2013 ( reargument denied 01/07/2014), affirming the order dated 12/27/2012 of the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division, at Nos. 3671, 3672, 3675, 3678, January Term 2012.

ARGUED: March 10, 2015[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 3

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF QCC INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF QCC INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellee

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF KEYSTONE HEALTH PLAN EAST, INC., Appellant

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellee : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 21 EAP 2014 Appeal from the order of Commonwealth Court entered on 11/18/2013, at No. 97 C.D. 2013 (reargument denied 01/07/2014), affirming the order dated 12/27/2012 of the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division, at Nos. 3671, 3672, 3675, 3678, January Term 2012.

ARGUED: March 10, 2015[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 4

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF KEYSTONE HEALTH PLAN EAST, INC., Appellant

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellee

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF QCC INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellee

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF QCC INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellee

v. : : : : : : No. 22 EAP 2014 Appeal from the order of Commonwealth Court entered on 11/18/2013, at No. 98 C.D. 2013 (reargument denied 01/07/2014), affirming the order dated[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 5

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF KEYSTONE HEALTH PLAN EAST, INC., Appellant

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellee

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF KEYSTONE HEALTH PLAN EAST, INC., Appellant

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellee

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF QCC INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellee

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA TAX REVIEW BOARD TO THE USE OF QCC : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 12/27/2012 of the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Civil Division, at Nos. 3671, 3672, 3675, 3678, January Term 2012.

ARGUED: March 10, 2015[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 6

INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant : : :

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE EAKIN DECIDED: December 21, 2015 These cross-appeals involve tax credits and refunds for ove rpayments of the City of Philadelphia’s Business Privilege Tax (BPT). 1 The City appeals from the Commonwealth Court’s decision affirming the award of cr edits to Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., and QCC Insurance Company (collectively, Taxp ayers), who appeal from the same decision affirming the denial of their refund req uests. In 1985, pursuant to the First Class City Business Tax Ref orm Act, 53 P.S. §§ 16181-16193, the City enacted the BPT, which taxes the gross receipts and net income of every person engaged in business within the C ity. Phila. Code § 19-2603. Under Philadelphia Code § 19-2601, “person” includes c orporations and “business” is defined as “[c]arrying on or exercising for gain or pro fit I any trade, business, I or commercial activity[.]” Id. As with federal income tax es, a tax return and payment are to be filed by April 15, which payment reflects the ta x due for the prior year, less

estimates and credits. Also due that date is an estimate d tax payment for the year ahead. See BPT Regulations (BPTR) § 202A; Trial Co urt Opinion, 12/27/12, at 2. Taxpayers, subsidiaries of Independence Blue Cross, engage d in business in the City and paid the BPT tax for years 2003 and 2004, i n April 2004 and 2005, respectively; they received extensions and filed the actual BPT retur ns for those years in September 2004 and 2005, respectively. In accordance with Philade lphia Code § 19-2601,

1 In 2012, the BPT was renamed the Business Income and R eceipts Tax; as this action was already begun, we will refer to the former name.[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 7

Taxpayers calculated their net income using their federa l taxable income, commonly referred to as Method II. Id., Net Income (a)(2); see also BPTR § 404(1)(a). In 2008, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited the feder al tax returns of Independence Blue Cross and its subsidiaries, including Taxpayers. The audi t was concluded in February 2009, and revealed Taxpayers understated their deducti ons, and thus overstated their net income, for tax years 2003 and 2004. As required by BPTR § 205, Taxpayers filed amended BPT returns, collectively requesting approximat ely $6.5 million in refunds. See id. (requiring taxpayer using federal method to file amended return within 75 days of “final determination of corrected net income” by IRS). The Philadelphia Department of Revenue agreed Taxpa yers overpaid their taxes, but denied the refund requests as untimely, citing Phil adelphia Code § 19-1703(1)(d), which provides: Every petition for refund of moneys collected by the D epartment on or after January 1, 1980, for or on behalf of the City or the School District of Philadelphia, including but not limited to any tax, I shall be filed with the Department within 3 years from the date of payment t o the City or the School District of Philadelphia or the due date, whiche ver is later.

Id. (emphasis added). Taxpayers appealed to the Philadelphia Tax Review B oard, arguing the net income corrections effectively reset § 19-1703(1)(d)’s “du e date” since they had 75 days from the completion of the IRS audit to file the am ended returns. The Review Board rejected Taxpayers’ argument, determining “due date” referred to the date the returns were initially due — April 15, 2004 and 2005, respecti vely. Tax Review Board Decision, 4/11/12, at 3-4. Notwithstanding this denial of refu nds, the Review Board, sua sponte, awarded Taxpayers credits for their overpayments. Speci fically, the Review Board concluded that because Philadelphia Code § 19-2610 requ ires the Department to[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 8

establish regulations 2 for credits “to be granted on any overpayment of est imated tax payment,” the Department was required to credit Taxpa yers for overpayments for tax years 2003 and 2004. Tax Review Board Decision, 4/11/ 12, at 5 (quoting Phila. Code § 19-2610). Functionally, this meant Taxpayers receive d credits equal to their requested refunds. See N.T. Hearing, 12/29/11, at 8- 11.

The trial court affirmed the Review Board’s decision. The court agreed Taxpayers’ refund requests were untimely but, unlike th e Review Board, determined “due date” referred to the payment due date rather than the filing due date, finding § 19-1703(1)(d) was unambiguous because it did not me ntion returns. Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/12, at 6. While filing deadlines coul d be extended, and were here, the payment deadline remained April 15. The court furth er concluded no equitable exception to the three-year limitation applied becau se Philadelphia Code § 19-1703(1)(d) was a statute of repose, given that the provision delineated a period that began with a “definitively established event.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/12, at 8. Similarly, because the “plain, unambiguous language” o f § 19-2610 “clearly expresse[d an] entitlement to a credit for any overpayment with out providing” a limitations period, the

trial court affirmed the Review Board’s credit determi nation. Id., at 9. The court opined the dichotomy regarding a limitations period for refunds but not credits made sense because the City could prospectively budget for cr edits, whereas refunds constituted an immediate liability. Both parties appealed, and a divided three-judge pa nel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed. Like the trial court, the Commonweal th Court determined the relevant

2 Pursuant to § 19-2610, the Department enacted BPTR § 202A, which provides: “Any overpayment of the current tax year shall be applied first to the payment of an estimated tax for the tax year that follows or to other taxes d ue. A remaining balance, if any, shall be applied to future [BPT] years unless the taxpayer r equests a refund amount.” Id.[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 9

refund and credit provisions were unambiguous. The maj ority agreed the absence of “return” in § 19-1703(1)(d) supported the conclusion t hat “due date” referred to the payment due date; thus, Taxpayers’ refund requests were untimely since they were not filed within three years of the payment due dates. T he majority also agreed no equitable exception to the three-year limitation app lied, observing the trial court’s conclusion comported with case law. City of Philadelphia v. City of Phila. Tax Review Bd. ex rel. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., Nos. 97-9 8 CD 2013, unpublished memorandum at 8-9 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed November 18, 2 013) (citing City of Philadelphia v.

Tax Review Bd. ex rel. Phila. Fresh Food Terminal C orp., 945 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (concluding § 19-1703(1)(d) is statute of repose); Phila. Gas Works v. Commonwealth, 741 A.2d 841, 847 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (“Neither the Board nor this [c]ourt has power to alter the explicit time limitatio n I in the [t]ax [c]ode based on equitable principles.” (citation omitted)). The majority further held the trial court did not e rr in affirming the award of credits. Specifically, the court rejected the City’s argument th at since Phila. Gas Works stated credits and refunds were interchangeable, § 19-1703(1)( d) applied logically to credits, as well as refunds. The court noted the underlying statut e in Phila. Gas Works used the terms interchangeably, whereas the pertinent provisions in this matter used the terms distinctly. Moreover, as § 19-1703(1)(d) did not ment ion credits, the court reasoned the provision was unambiguous, and therefore, there was no need to ascertain legislative intent. And, even if the relevant provisions were am biguous, the court concluded ambiguities were to be construed in Taxpayers’ favor. Keystone Health, at 13 (citing Skepton v. Borough of Wilson, 755 A.2d 1267, 1270 (P a. 2000)). In dissent, President Judge Pellegrini agreed with the majority’s refund determination but disagreed with its credit conclusion, remarking there was no functional[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 10

difference between credits and refunds because “in both [instances], someone has more money or less[.]” Id., at 2 (Pellegrini, P.J., dissent ing). In his view, the majority’s position led to an absurd result since a party could seek credits in perpetuity, rendering the refund limitation period meaningless. Id., at 3 n.2. We granted allowance of appeal to address both the credit and refund issues:

Was President Judge Pellegrini correct in dissent that th e majority’s conclusion — that although there is a very strict three-ye ar statute of limitations on requests for tax refunds, there is no sta tute of limitations at all on requests for tax credits — is “absurd” in that it allow s taxpayers to pursue tax overpayments against the City “forever,” w ithout any limiting principles whatsoever? Whether, as a matter of law and equity, the Commonwe alth Court correctly upheld the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas by den ying Taxpayers BPT refunds [under the circumstances].

City of Philadelphia v. City of Phila. Tax Review B d. ex rel. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., 93 A.3d 803 (Pa. 2014) (per curiam) (alter ation in original). Taxpayers present three core arguments regarding refund s: (1) BPTR § 205 resets the three-year limitation; (2) any ambiguity a s to whether “due date” applies to a payment or a return should be construed against the C ity because § 19-1703(1)(d) is a taxing statute; and (3) even if the refund requests we re untimely, an equitable exception applies under the doctrine of recoupment. 3 First, Taxpayers aver BPTR § 205 when read in pari ma teria with § 19-1703(1)(d), dictates that the three-year limitation “must apply to all tax returns a taxpayer is required by law to file.” Taxpayers’ Brief, at 39. They subm it their refund requests are timely because the three-year limitation either commences on t he date the amended return is

3 The doctrine allows “a party litigating a tax claim i n a timely proceeding I [to] seek recoupment of a related, and inconsistent, but now tim e-barred tax claim relating to the same transaction.” United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 59 6, 608 (1990).[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 11

due or is extended until the amended return’s due dat e. As to their equitable argument, Taxpayers contend § 19-1703(1)(d) is a statute of limit ations since it begins to run from the time of an injurious occurrence, namely, the overpa yments, which they note were unknown until the IRS audit. Taxpayers maintain the net-income corrections and amended returns constitute a single transaction, see Hou sehold Consumer Disc. Co. v. Vespaziani, 415 A.2d 689, 694 (Pa. 1980) (observing r ecoupment claim and main tax claim must arise from single transaction or taxable eve nt to merit application of recoupment doctrine), and thus equitable relief is war ranted. Taxpayers’ Brief, at 53. Concerning credits, Taxpayers state applying the three-y ear limitation to claims for credits would effectively rewrite § 19-2610 and BP TR § 202A, as the former plainly allows a credit for any overpayment and neither provi sion provides a time limitation. Noting § 19-1703(1)(d) does not mention credits, they argue City Council could not have intended § 19-1703(1)(d) to apply to credits for over payments because both the BPT and the relevant credit provisions were enacted after § 19- 1703(1)(d). Finally, given that a taxpayer has a vested right to a refund but must contin ue to engage in business to actually receive a credit, Taxpayers submit credits and re funds are materially different. The City initially notes a party seeking a credit or re fund must strictly comply with the applicable provisions so as to prevent fiscal uncerta inty as both remedies arise from “legislative grace.” City’s Brief, at 25. The City a sserts the majority’s conclusion allows credit requests in perpetuity. Remarking the deci sions below placed too much emphasis on “any” in § 19-2610, the City argues the p rovision does not list a time limitation because it merely grants the Department a uthority to establish regulations for credits. Echoing President Judge Pelligrini, the City contends there is no meaningful

distinction between the net effect of a credit and refu nd. The City argues the trial court’s prospective budgeting distinction is flawed beca use the purpose of a time[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 12

limitation is to allow a governmental entity to conclu sively extinguish a claim for retroactive payment — regardless of whether it is terme d a credit or refund. As to refunds, the City states the argument that BPTR § 205 resets the “due date” in § 19-1703(1)(d) is erroneous since § 19-1703(1)(d) concerns payments, not returns, and even if it does apply to returns, there is no ind ication the provision applies to amended returns. Further, the City argues Taxpayers’ contention that BPTR § 205 and § 19-1703(1)(d) must be read in pari materia lacks meri t because: (1) the provisions do not relate to the same subject; (2) allowing BPTR § 2 05 to serve as an exception would swallow the three-year limitation since the regulation also applies to self-amended federal returns; and (3) Taxpayers should have known th ey overpaid the City. Lastly, whether § 19-1703(1)(d) is characterized as a sta tute of repose or a statute of limitations, the City asserts equitable relie f is foreclosed. The City avers denying such relief is consistent with DaimlerChrysler Co rp. v. Commonwealth, 885 A.2d 117, 120-21 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (concluding state refun d provision is statute of repose and thus rejecting refund request despite event giving rise to request occurring after time limitation lapsed), as well as then-Justice Saylor’s concur ring statement in our per curiam affirmance of that case, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v . Commonwealth, 927 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2007) (Saylor, J., concurring) (“[W]here a sta tutory limitation provision is not merely ‘one of general application spanning all simil ar actions, but rather, derives from a specific proviso within a statute giving rise to the righ t sought to be vindicated,’ a plaintiff must demonstrate that the action has been brought wit hin the time limit I regardless of whether the provision is described as a statute of repose .” (citation omitted)). As these issues involve matters of statutory interpretatio n, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Common wealth v. Hacker, 15 A.3d 333, 335 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). In interpreting local ordinances, we apply rules of[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 13

statutory construction. See Bailey v. Zoning Bd. of Ad justment, 801 A.2d 492, 502 n.19 (Pa. 2002). The primary goal of statutory interpret ation is to ascertain the intent of the enacting entity — presently, the Department and City C ouncil. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Where a statute is unambiguous, its plain te xt will not be disregarded in furtherance of its spirit. Id., § 1921(b). Ambiguit y arises where there are two or more reasonable interpretations. See Warrantech Consumer P rods. Servs., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 96 A.3d 346, 354-55 (Pa. 2014) (“A statute is ambiguous when there are at least two reasonable interpretations of the text under review.” (citation omitted)). Where ambiguity is found, a court may consider the fact ors listed in 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) to ascertain legislative intent. See id. Provisions im posing a tax are strictly construed, Id., § 1928(b)(3), with any ambiguity resolved again st the taxing entity and in favor of the taxpayer, Greenwood Gaming & Entm’t, Inc. v. Common wealth, Dep’t of Revenue, 90 A.3d 699, 710-11 (Pa. 2014). Where a limitations period begins with a definitely e stablished event that is independent of an injurious occurrence or discovery the reof, the statute is considered to be one of repose. See Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 9 81 A.2d 198, 211 (Pa. 2009). Unlike statutes of limitations, which are procedural, st atutes of repose are substantive and thus wholly extinguish a party’s cause of action upon the expiration of the time period. See id. (citation omitted). Considering these principles, we hold Taxpayers are not entitled to refunds since their requests were not filed within three years of t he date the BPT payments were due. As § 19-1703(1)(d) does not mention returns, we agree with the Commonwealth Court majority that the provision is unambiguous. The only reasonable interpretation is to confine § 19-1703(1)(d) to the later of (1) the date of payment or (2) payment due date. Applying § 19-1703(1)(d) to the return due date, mu ch less an amended return’s due[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 14

date, would insert words where they do not appear. See Sears v. Wolf, 118 A.3d 1091, 1104 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). Likewise, we reject Taxpayers’ argument that BPTR § 205 resets the three-year limitation. Statutes are considered in pari materia “ when they relate to the same I class of persons or things.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(a). If po ssible, statutes in pari materia “shall be construed together.” Id., § 1932(b). We con clude § 19-1703(1)(d) and BPTR § 205 do not relate to the same class of things or person s. Section 19-1703(1)(d) deals with a petition for a refund for any tax collected b y the City or the Philadelphia School District. See Phila. Code § 19-1703(1)(d). In contra st, BPTR § 205 encompasses the requirement to file an amended BPT return in limite d situations. Moreover, while § 19-1703(1)(d) deals with City taxpayers generally, BPTR § 205 applies to a discrete class of City taxpayers, i.e., Method II BPT filers whose net income was subsequently adjusted. Broadly, both provisions deal with City tax payers, but adopting Taxpayers’ logic would require every City tax provision and Depa rtment regulation to be read in pari materia — an untenable result given the diverse spectr um of taxes the City imposes. See generally Phila. Code, Title 19 (listing over 30 types of taxes). Further, even if statutes are in pari materia, constru ing them together is required only “if possible.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(b). As stated by the City, construing § 19-1703(1)(d) and BPTR § 205 as one provision would allow a narrow circumstance to swallow the general three-year limitation. As eviden ced by their suggestion that the three-year limitation either commences on the due date of the amended return or is extended until the amended return’s due date, even T axpayers cannot specify the precise result of reading the two provisions together. Under the former, Taxpayers would have had until 2012 to file their refund requ ests. Thus, we are unpersuaded by the argument that BPTR § 205 resets the three-year li mitation in § 19-1703(1)(d).[J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 15

Moreover, assuming arguendo § 19-1703(1)(d) is ambiguo us, we are not required to construe the statute in Taxpayers’ favor. Only ambi guous provisions that impose a tax are to be construed in a taxpayer’s favor. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(3); Greenwood Gaming, at 710-11. Rather than imposing a tax, § 19 -1703(1)(d) defines a time limitation for seeking a refund. Relatedly, we conclud e § 19-1703(1)(d) is a statute of repose and thus reject Taxpayers’ equitable argument. The Commonwealth Court has previously addressed this issue. See Phila. Fresh Food, at 805 (“[S]ection 19-1703(1)(d) is a statute of repose.”). As mentioned supra, a statute of repose delineates a defined time that begins with a definite ly established event, independent of the injury or its discovery. Abrams, at 211; see also Phila. Fresh Food, at 805. Contrary to Taxpayers’ position, the three-year limit ation does not commence with the overpayments they claim are an injurious occurrence or d iscovery thereof. Instead, § 19-1703(1)(d) begins with a definite and independe nt event — the later of the payment date or the payment due date — and runs for three yea rs. Hence, Taxpayers’ ability to pursue refunds was extinguished in 2007 and 2008, respe ctively, and relief under the recoupment doctrine is unwarranted. See Taxpayers’ Bri ef, at 58 n.12 (conceding argument under recoupment doctrine would be “affected” if § 19-1703(1)(d) is statute of repose). Applying these same principles to credits, we hold the C ommonwealth Court did not err in affirming the Review Board’s award of cred its to Taxpayers. Ambiguity here is found only if credits and refunds are the same thing, and whatever their similarities, they are not. “Store credit” is not the same as “your money back.” The pertinent provisions discuss terms of “credits” and “re funds” distinctly. Section 19-1703(1)(d) discusses refunds. Section 19-2610 a nd its progeny, BPTR § 202A, see n.2, supra, discuss “credits to be granted on any overpayment of [an][J-4A-2015, J-4B-2015, J-4C-2015 and J-4D-2015] - 16

estimated tax payment.” Phila. Code § 19-2610. Whe reas a refund involves an immediate liability to be paid by the City, a credit is an offset against future liability owed to the City. Stated otherwise, a refund must be pai d promptly, while a credit allows the City to prospectively budget the liability — a differe nce we find material. There being no time limitation listed within the credit provisions, it is unreasonable to impute § 19-1703(1)(d)’s three-year limitation on claims for refunds to claims for credits — to do so would impermissibly rewrite the relevant provisions t o insert a term where it does not exist. See Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 529 A.2d 546, 551 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (“[J]udicial rewriting I however well int ended [is] not legally warranted.”). Accordingly, as there is no ambiguity, there is no need to consider the matters listed in 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) to further ascertain legislative in tent. See Keystone Health, at 12 n.6 (“Here, there is no need to ascertain City Council’ s intent. The word ‘credit’ is not present.”). 4 Discerning no ambiguity within the relevant provisions, which provide a time limitation only for refunds, we affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court in full. Order affirmed; jurisdiction relinquished. Madame Justice Todd and Mr. Justice Stevens join the opi nion. Mr. Chief Justice Saylor files a concurring and dissentin g opinion in which Mr. Justice Baer joins.

4 To the extent the panel majority opined that even if the provisions were ambiguous, they were to be construed in Taxpayers’ favor, id., a t 13, the court erred. Like § 19-1703(1)(d), neither § 19-2610 nor BPTR § 202A imposes a tax, and thus, there is no requirement the provisions be construed in Taxpayers’ favor.