alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.15.4

Amendment No. 4 (the "Amendment") To
Employment Agreement between
Univision Communications Inc. and
Douglas Kranwinkle ("Employee") that
was assigned to Univision Management Co. ("Company") effective
January 1, 2003 (the "Employment Agreement")

Employee
and Company agree to amend the Employment Agreement as follows:

1.Term.The Term of the Employment Agreement is extended through December 31,
2005, unless earlier terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Employment Agreement.

2.Salary.The annual Base Salary rate will be: Six Hundred Thousand Dollars ($600,000)
for the annual period from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005.

3.Effective Date of Amendment.Upon execution by Employee and Company, this Amendment
will become effective as of January 1, 2003.

4.Notices.Any notice to Company shall also be sent to Company's General Counsel at
1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 3050, Los Angeles, California 90067, Fax (310) 556-1526; and to Company's Deputy General Counsel at Univision, 5999 Center Drive, Los Angeles,
California 90045, Fax (310) 348-3679.

5.Other.Except as provided in this Amendment, all other terms and conditions in the
Employment Agreement will remain in full force and effect, and the Employment Agreement, as amended hereby, is ratified and confirmed.

| |  | UNIVISION MANAGEMENT CO.
| |  | ------------------------
| |  | By:                     

|/s/DOUGLAS KRANWINKLEDouglas Kranwinkle |  |  |  | 
|--------------------------------------- |  |  |  | 

As
further inducement for Employee to enter into this Amendment, Univision Communications Inc. hereby guarantees all of Company's financial obligations under the Employment Agreement as
amended. Company acknowledges that Employee is relying on this guarantee in entering into this Agreement.

| |  | UNIVISION COMMUNICATIONS INC.
| |  | -----------------------------
| |  | By:                          

---

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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                10,725
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
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#### 150 Nassau Associates LLC, Appellant-Respondent, v RC Dolner LLC, Respondent-Appellant, and Kensington-Nassau, LLC, Appellant.

[948 NYS2d 40]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Judith J. Gische, J.), entered February 15, 2011, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiff 150 Nassau Associates LLC’s motion to compel discovery, denied the motions made by defendants RC Dolner LLC and Kensington-Nassau, LLC to compel the production of certain income tax records and to impose discovery sanctions against Nassau, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of granting the motion to compel production of tax records of certain entities insofar as the records relate to the entities’ interests in the property located at 150 Nassau Street, New York, New York, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

*677On this record, where the only documents responsive to Nassau’s document requests have been produced multiple times, the final time in a searchable PDF format, and where Nassau did not request documents in the “native” file format, read and written by Nassau’s spreadsheet and accounting software, until its reply on its own motion to compel, it cannot be said that it was an abuse of the court’s discretion to deny reproduction of the documents in their native format *(Miracle Sound v New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn.,*169 AD2d 468, 469 [1991]; *Autotech Tech. Ltd. Partnership v Automationdirect.com, Inc.,*248 FRD 556, 559-560 [2008]). This is especially true because Nassau has admitted that the only benefit of requiring RC Dolner to produce these documents again is Nassau’s convenience.

Defendants have, however, proved entitlement to the tax records of those entities that have an ownership interest in the subject property. Defendants have adequately shown that they have no other way of obtaining the profit information necessary to prove one of their claims, and the motion court erred in denying access to the records, despite recognizing that defendants’ argument had “traction,” and despite there being no substantive opposition from plaintiff.

Finally, the denial of defendants’ motion for sanctions was not improper. Such an award is discretionary *(Orner v Mount Sinai Hosp.,*305 AD2d 307, 311 [2003]), and we cannot say that, on a record where accusations of discovery abuse abound and neither party appears to have been fully cooperative, the court’s denial of sanctions was improvident *(id.).*

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments for affirmative relief and find them unavailing. Concur — Andrias, J.P., Friedman, Moskowitz, Freedman and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ. [Prior Case History: 30 Misc 3d 1224(A), 2011 NY Slip Op 50182(U).]
EXHIBIT 23.01


                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
                       ----------------------------------


     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
of  Gradall  Industries, Inc. on Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-40523 and 333-58129) of
our reports dated February 23, 1999, on our audits of the consolidated financial
statements  and  financial  statement  schedule  of Gradall Industries, Inc. and
Subsidiaries  as of December 31, 1998 and 1997, and for the years ended December
31,  1998,  1997  and  1996, which reports are included in this Annual Report on
Form  10-K.




PricewaterhouseCoopers  LLP

Cleveland,  Ohio
March  26,  1999

<PAGE>
1 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, 

Complainant, 

vs. 

MICHAEL GUIDO PEREZ, 

Respondent. 

_________________________________ 

Docket Number 2023-0452 

CG Enforcement Activity Number 7804025 

CONSENT ORDER 

Issued: December 12, 2023 

By: Honorable George J. Jordan, Administrative Law Judge 

Appearances: 

Michael Micucci 

Sector Miami 

For the Coast Guard 

Michael Guido Perez, Pro se

For the Respondent 
2 

CONSENT ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 

 On December 7, 2023, the parties in this case submitted a Motion for Approval of 

Settlement Agreement and Entry of Consent Order to be approved as a settlement of the case 

under 33 C.F.R. § 20.502. 

 I have carefully reviewed the terms of the Settlement Agreement and find it is fair and 

reasonable and in substantial compliance with the requirements of 33 C.F.R. § 20.502. 

ORDER 

 Upon consideration of the record, it is hereby ORDERED, the Settlement Agreement is 

APPROVED in full and incorporated herein by reference. This Consent Order shall constitute 

full, final, and complete adjudication of this proceeding. 

SO ORDERED. 

Done and dated December 12, 2023, 

Seattle, Washington 

_______________________________ 

George J. Jordan

Administrative Law Judge 

United States Coast Guard
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 23.3

                        Consent of Independent Auditors

The Board of Directors
Trigon Healthcare, Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No. 333-
22463) on Form S-8 of Trigon Healthcare, Inc. of our report dated April 19,
2002, relating to the statements of financial condition, with fund information,
of the Trigon Insurance Company 401(k) Restoration Plan as of December 31, 2001
and 2000, and the related statement of income and changes in plan equity, with
fund information, for each of the years in the three-year period ended December
31, 2001, which report is included in this Form 10-K/A No. 1 of Trigon
Healthcare, Inc.

/s/KPMG LLP

Richmond, Virginia
April 26, 2002
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**








**CERTIFICATION
      OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
      2002**





I,
      Phillip Michael Hardy, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly
      Report of eLinear, Inc. on Form 10-QSB/A (Second Amendment) for the quarterly
      period ended March 31, 2004, fully complies with the requirements of Section
      13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information
      contained in such Form 10-QSB/A fairly presents in all material respects the
      financial condition and results of operations of eLinear, Inc.





Date:
      April 3, 2006


By: /s/
      Phillip Michael Hardy


Phillip
      Michael Hardy


Principal
      Financial and Accounting Officer
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 29, 2016

No. 04-16-00469-CV

IN RE Howard Kerry GARNER

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

ORDER

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice, Dissenting

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

On July 27, 2016, relator Howard Kerry Garner filed a petition for writ of mandamus and 

a motion for temporary relief seeking to stay the trial court proceedings in the underlying suit 

pending a ruling on the mandamus petition. Real Parties in Interest filed a response, and Relator 

filed a reply. The court has considered the petition for writ of mandamus, the response and the 

reply, and is of the opinion that relator is not entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the 

petition for writ of mandamus and the motion for temporary relief are DENIED. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 52.8(a). The court’s opinion and the dissenting opinion will issue at a later date.

It is so ORDERED on July 29, 2016.

_________________________________

Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 29th day of July, 2016.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle, Clerk

 

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 13-03-11919-DCVAJA, styled Mike Weeks, Linda Weeks, and Weeks 

Environmental, LLC v. Howard Kerry Garner, pending in the 365th Judicial District Court, Dimmit County, Texas, 

the Honorable Amado J. Abascal, III presiding.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

July 29, 2016

No. 04

- 16

- 00469

- CV

IN RE Howard Kerry GARNER

Original Mandamus Proceeding 1

ORDER

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez , Justice , Dissenting

Luz Elena D. Chapa , Justice

On July 27, 2016

, relator Howard Kerry Garner filed a petition for writ of mand amus and

a motion for temporary relief seeking to stay the trial court proceedings in the underlying suit

pending a ruling on the mandamus petition. Real Parties in Interest filed a response, and Relator

filed a reply. The court has considered the petiti on for writ of mandamus , the response and the

reply, and is of the opinion that r elator is not entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the

petition for writ of mandamus and the motion for temporary relief are DENIED. See T EX

. R.

A PP

. P . 52.8(a). The court’s opinion and the dissenting opinion will issue at a later date.

It is so ORDERED on July 29, 2016

.

_________________________________ Karen Angelini, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 29th day of July, 2016

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle , Clerk

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 13

- 03

- 11919

- DCVAJA , styled Mike Weeks, Linda Weeks, and Weeks

Environmental, LLC v. Howard Kerry Garner , pending in the 365th Judicial District Court

, Dimmit County, Texas,

the Honorable Amado J. Abascal, III presiding.
<PAGE>

                                                               EXHIBIT 18


June 20, 2002

Sunterra Corporation
1781 Park Center Drive
Orlando, Florida 32835

Dear Sir/Madam:

We have audited the consolidated financial statements of Sunterra Corporation
and subsidiaries (debtor-in-possession) (the Company) as of December 31, 2001
and 2000, and for the years then ended included in your Annual Report on Form
10-K to the Securities and Exchange Commission and have issued our report
thereon dated May 15, 2002, (June 20, 2002 as to Note 33), which expresses an
unqualified opinion and includes paragraphs emphasizing the Company's filing for
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the
omission of supplementary selected quarterly financial data, and explanatory
paragraphs concerning the Company's ability to continue as a going concern and a
change in 2000 in the method of accounting for developer paid owners'
association fees and property taxes during the developer guarantee and subsidy
periods of real estate project developments. Note 10 to such consolidated
financial statements discloses that prior to 2000 the Company capitalized
homeowners' association fees and property taxes during the developer guarantee
and subsidy periods as inventory carrying costs in real estate and development
costs. You have evaluated this policy and determined that these costs should be
charged to expense as incurred once a project is substantially complete and
available for occupancy. In our judgment, such change is to an alternative
accounting principle that is preferable under the circumstances.

Yours truly,

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP

Orlando, Florida
JONATHAN PARKER

,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Respondent.

___________________________/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 17

- 0 483

Opinion filed March 3, 2017.

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

-- Original Jurisdiction

.

Jonathan Parker, pro se

, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. See Baker v. State , 878 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2004)

.

ROBERTS, C.J., WINOKUR and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Q.E.P. Co., Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ending February 29, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Marc P. Applebaum, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition, and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                 
|-------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Marc P. Applebaum                            
|Marc P. Applebaum                                
|Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|                                                 
|June 15, 2005                                    



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Q.E.P. Co., Inc. and will be retained by Q.E.P. Co., Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

January 31, 2014

s0127 

# Order

Clerk January 31, 2014

148003

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGA N,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 148003

COA: 310531

Oakland CC: 2011

- 237299

- FC

MELVIN VITO DALTON,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 10, 2013

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Gerald Frost, Appellant, v Andrew Meloni, as Monroe County Sheriff et al., Respondents.

Memorandum: Petitioner was served with a parole detention warrant on Thursday, May 15, 1986. He was not given written notice of the time, place and purpose of a preliminary parole revocation hearing until Monday, May 19, 1986. Executive Law § 259-i (3) (c) (iii) requires that such notice be given to an alleged parole violator "within three days of the execution of the warrant”. Since the three-day period ended on a Sunday, service on the next succeeding business day was timely *(see,*General Construction Law § 25-a [1]; *cf. Matter of Picciano v*
      *1033
      *Hammock,*92 AD2d 1043, 1044, *lv denied*59 NY2d 606; *People ex rel. Williams v Johnson,*116 Misc 2d 649).

Thus viewed, there is no need to address the other issues raised by petitioner. (Appeal from judgment of Monroe County Court, Celli, J. — habeas corpus.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Green, Pine, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
#### Luming Cafe, Inc., Respondent, v Henry Birman et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

— Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Elliott Wilk, J.), entered on September 3, 1985, which denoted defendants’ motion as one for reargument and denied the motion as untimely, is reversed, on the law, and the matter remanded for reconsideration in accordance with this memorandum, without costs or disbursements.

Following a trial held in connection with the instant case, the jury returned a special verdict. Based thereon, defendants moved for dismissal and judgment on the counterclaim, and plaintiff asserted that it was entitled to judgment in its favor. The court thereafter issued a decision supporting plaintiff’s position and directed the parties to settle judgment and order. Defendants then moved to renew the prior motion to set aside the verdict and for judgment on the counterclaim. The court, deeming the motion as one for reargument rather than renewal, declined to consider the substantive arguments advanced by defendants on the ground that the motion itself was untimely.

Since defendants’ motion raised no new facts, the court properly characterized it as a request for reargument. However, the court was in error in concluding that the motion was untimely. As the court declared in *Matter of Williamson v Shang*(73 AD2d 836): "Although CPLR 2221 which deals with motions for leave to reargue contains no time limitations, it is well settled that a motion to reargue may not be used by a *181party to extend its time to appeal and such motion must be made before the expiration of the time in which to appeal from the determination of the original motion *(Matter of Huie [Furman],*20 NY2d 568; *Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v Bero Constr. Corp.,*29 AD2d 627).” *(See also, Migliaccio v Phoenix Ins. Co.,*91 AD2d 821.) In that regard, when defendants made their motion to reargue, the time to appeal had not yet expired. This is because an appeal as of right must be taken within 30 days after service upon appellant of a copy of the judgment or order appealed from with notice of entry thereon. (CPLR 5513 [a].) At the time of defendants’ motion to reargue, no judgment or order had been settled or entered. Therefore, the motion was timely. While it is true that no appeal lies from an order denying reargument *(Alessi v County of Nassau,*100 AD2d 561; *Fluman v TSS Dept. Stores,*100 AD2d 838; *Matter of Williamson v Shang, supra),*the trial court’s denial of reargument in the present situation did not involve a determination on the merits. Rather, the court incorrectly concluded that it lacked the authority to entertain the motion. The matter should, therefore, be remanded for consideration of whether defendants’ moving papers make a sufficient showing to warrant the granting of reargument. Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Ross, Fein, Milonas and Ellerin, JJ.