alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6498

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ARTHUR ALAN OUTLAW,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Danville. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior

District Judge. (4:00-cr-70114-jlk-1)

Submitted: June 10, 2008 Decided: June 18, 2008

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Arthur Alan Outlaw, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Ray Wolthuis, OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Arthur Alan Outlaw appeals the district court’s order

reducing his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2000). Outlaw

seeks further reduction of his sentence pursuant to United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The relief Outlaw seeks is

unavailable under § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Goines, 357

F.3d 469, 473 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that § 3582(c)(2) authorizes

a “district court to reduce the sentence imposed on a defendant who

has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing

range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing

Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)”); see also United States

v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Booker is

inapplicable to § 3582(c)(2) motions.”). Accordingly, we affirm

the order of the district court. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Margaret J. Sansone, Individually and as Mother and Natural Guardian of James Jordan, Appellant, v James A. Lake et al., Defendants, and Town of Hamburg, Respondent. (And Another Action and a Third-Party Action.)

(Appeal No. 4.)

Present — Denman, J. P., Boomer, Green, Pine and Balio, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Secure Computing Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for
the period ending March 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Timothy J. Steinkopf, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as
adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                                                               
|---------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Timothy J. Steinkopf                                       
|Timothy J. Steinkopf                                           
|Senior Vice President of Operations and Chief Financial Officer
|May 8, 2008
#### LANT v. RASINES et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department.

November 6, 1896.)

Action by Frank P. Lant against Antonio Rasines and others. Second motion by defendants to resettle order reversing an affirmance by the city court, general term, of a judgment of that court.

See 38 N. Y. Supp. 975, and 40 N. Y. Supp. 64.

Alexander & Ash, for appellants.

Geo. W. Sandford, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

By the order entered by the plaintiff (respondent) May 27, 1896, the judgment appealed from was reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs “to the appellant” to abide the event. The defendants (appellants) thereupon moved to resettle the order by making it read as follows: “Ordered, that the said judgment of affirmance [of the city court) be, and the same hereby is, reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs of this court and the court below- to abide the event.” The plaintiff (respondent) consented to the granting of the motion, and a new order in accordance with the application and consent was accordingly made on June 6, 1896. The new trial has been had in the city court, and there is again a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendants find that the amended order of reversal which they induced the court to enter is not as favorable to them, in view of the result of the new trial, as the original order would have been, and they now move to again resettle it by restoring it to its original form, with costs “to the appellant” to abide the event. The defendants (appellants), having, by their own voluntary act, induced the plaintiff (respondent) to consent to change the order by adopting their own phraseology, are not in a position to require the court to nullify such act and consent by a third order restoring the one originally made. Not only is the defendants’ present application of too irregular a character to merit approval, but the first amendment obtained upon the consent of the plaintiff made tire second order one essentially by consent, and in the nature of a stipulation binding on the parties to it. In re New York, L. & W. R. Co., 98 N. Y., at page 453; Smith v Barnes, 9 Misc. Rep. 368, 29 N. Y. Supp. 692. To relieve from such a stipulation would be to invite a repetition of the practice attempted. The application must be denied, but without costs.
Listen

# Contemporary Civil Rights Challenges: A View from the State Advisory Committees

November 17, 2022

This report examines the work of the Commission’s 56 Advisory Committees, capturing data on persistent civil rights issues; identifying emerging ones; and capturing how perspectives differ cross the United States.

Report

Press Release

-  All Reports 
-  Annual Statutory Enforcement 
-  Briefing Reports 
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Motions Granted, April 6, 2012 Order Withdrawn, and Order filed April 26, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-12-00121-CV

____________

AGBOLADE O. ODUTAYO, Appellant

V.

JASPER EMERGENCY MEDICINE ASSOCIATES, P.A. and 

THE SCHUMACHER GROUP OF TEXAS, INC., Appellees

On Appeal from the 55th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2011-01829

O R D E R

This is an appeal from two orders granting summary judgment signed August 1, 

2011, and January 5, 2012. The clerk’s record was filed February 22, 2012. A reporter’s 

record from the hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial was filed March 27, 2012, by a 

substitute court reporter, Marijane Stomberg. Appellant has notified this court in his 

docketing statement that the official court reporter, Gina Wilburn, had reported this case. 

Accordingly, on April 6, 2012, this court ordered Gina Wilburn to file the record in this 

case. On April 10, 2012, Gina Wilburn advised this court that she did not report this case 
and that the only record was reported by Marijane Stomberg. Accordingly, we 

WITHDRAW the court’s order issued April 6, 2012, for Gina Wilburn to file the 

reporter’s record. Our appellate record is complete and appellant’s brief is due 30 days 

after the record was filed.

On April 23, 2012, appellant filed an unopposed motion to substitute counsel Lee 

Van Richardson, Jr. for Anna Goodwin Benn. The motion is GRANTED. Appellant 

also requested a 30-day extension of time to file his brief. The motion is GRANTED. 

Appellant’s brief shall be due on or before May 29, 2012.

PER CURIAM
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         541,464
<SECURITIES>                                    91,011
<RECEIVABLES>                                7,589,096
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             9,748,989
<PP&E>                                         500,821
<DEPRECIATION>                                  72,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              11,795,660
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,399,141
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        40,000
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                11,795,660
<SALES>                                     23,284,991
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            23,284,991
<CGS>                                       22,254,261
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               23,009,719
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               102,416
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              52,309
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                175,359
<INCOME-TAX>                                    54,600
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            120,759
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   120,759
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2

Dover Motorsports, Inc.

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Dover Motorsports, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company), on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Patrick J. Bagley, Senior Vice President-Finance, Chief Financial Officer and Director of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                    
|------------------------------------
|Dated: March 13, 2006               
|                                    
|/s/ Patrick J. Bagley               
|Patrick J. Bagley                   
|Senior Vice President-Finance,      
|Chief Financial Officer and Director

This certification shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act), or incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except as shall be expressly set forth by specific reference in
such a filing.
#### Security Pacific National Bank, Respondent, v Tracie Evans, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

Submitted January 2, 2007;

decided January 11, 2007

Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that the order appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
#### William Osmin Serrano GUILLEN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 10-71937.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.*

Filed March 28, 2011.

Frank P. Sprouls, Esquire, Law Office of Ricci and Sprouls, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

Paul Cygnarowicz, Trial, OIL, Daniel Eric Goldman, Esquire, Senior Litigation Counsel, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

*702Before: FARRIS, LEAVY and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

William Osmin Serrano Guillen, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Because Guillen’s opening brief has not “specifically and distinctly argued and raised” challenges to the untimeliness of his asylum application and the denial of CAT relief, he has waived those claims. *Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency,*261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir.2001); *Castro-Perez v. Gonzales,*409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir.2005).

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s denial of withholding of removal because Guillen failed to show his alleged persecutors threatened him on account of a protected ground. His fear of future persecution based on an actual or imputed anti-gang or anti-crime opinion is not on account of the protected ground of either membership in a particular social group or political opinion. *Ramos Barrios v. Holder,*581 F.3d 849, 854-56 (9th Cir.2009); *Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey,*542 F.3d 738, 745-46 (9th Cir.2008); *see Ochave v. INS,*254 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir.2001) (“Asylum generally is not available to victims of civil strife, unless they are singled out on account of a protected ground.”) We decline to address Guillen’s unexhausted contention that gang members targeted him for persecution on account of his membership in a family social group. *Ontiveros-Lopez v. INS,*213 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.2000) (declining to consider a claim that Board did not have first opportunity to consider).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of ILEX Oncology, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2003 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Jeffrey H. Buchalter, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Jeffrey H. Buchalter
Name: Jeffrey H. Buchalter
Title: President and Chief Executive Officer
Date: November 13, 2003
- 2012 PNM Endorsement 07-19-12
- BHP Endorsement for 2013-2016 Agrmt_9.26.2012
- bloomfield
- FarmersEndorsement
- Farmington Endorsement
- Hammond 2013-2016 Endorsement
- jewett
- Jicarilla Endorsement & Agreement
- NAPI_Endorsement
- Navajo endorsment 2013-2016
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-6061

In Re: GARY L. DETEMPLE, Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CV-99-145, CV-00-84, CV-00-63, CV-00-64, CV-00-149, CV-00-116) Submitted: May 18, 2001 Decided: June 1, 2001 Before WIDENER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Gary L. DeTemple, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Gary DeTemple has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that this court recuse the district court judge acting in his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2000) motion and several bankruptcy actions, grant him release pending resolution of his § 2255 motion, and reverse the district court’s orders dismissing specified civil actions. He also moves for stay and to compel the Bureau of Prisons to comply with the law. The writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy to be used only in extraordinary circumstances. In re Beard , 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Kerr v. United States Dist. Court , 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976)). It is available only when there are no other means by which the relief sought could be granted. Id. The party seeking mandamus relief thus carries the heavy burden of showing that he has no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires and that his entitlement to such relief is clear and indisputable. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc. , 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980). Addressing DeTemple’s requests for recusal, while mandamus is a proper avenue to seek judicial recusal, Beard, 811 F.2d at 826- 27, we find no facts warranting recusal. As to DeTemple’s requestthat this court reverse several of the district court’s orders mandamus is not a proper substitute for appeal. In re Catawba Indian Tribe , 973 F.2d 1133, 1135 (4th Cir. 1992). Turning to DeTemple’s request that he be granted release on bond pending the resolution3 of his § 2255 motion, we deny the request because other avenues ofrelief remain available him. Accordingly, we deny DeTemple’s petition for mandamus and all pending motions. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
**Exhibit
      32.1**





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION 906
      OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with China Kangtai Cactus Bio-Tech Inc.’s (the “Company”) Annual
      Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
      Jinjiang Wang, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
      18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:




(1)
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
                15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
                and




(2)
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents in all material
                respects the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, another
      document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature
      that
      appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
      required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company. and will be
      retained by the Company. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
      or its staff upon request.




Dated:
      February 5, 2008




/s/
                Jinjiang WangJinjiang
                WangPresident, Chief Executive Officer, Director and Principal Executive Officer
----

|   | 1. | The      Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));      and |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The      information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of      the Company. |
|--------|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |    /s/  Granger      Cobb |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------|
|   | Granger      Cobb                                  |
|   | Co-Chief      Executive Officer                    |
|   | August      6, 2009                                |

----
#### Dana M. Thackeray, Individually and as Natural Parent of Michael J. Madonna, an Infant, Appellant, v Jeffrey J. Novak, Respondent.

— Main, J.

Plaintiff’s son was injured when, in attempting to climb over a fence to retrieve a ball from defendant’s property, he tried to balance himself against defendant’s garage, slipped and put his hand through a window of defendant’s garage. The parties disagree as to whether the window pane previously had been broken or was whole. Following examinations *947before trial, defendant moved for summary judgment contending that, as a matter of law, defendant owed no duty to plaintiff since the accident was unforeseeable. Special Term granted the motion, and plaintiff appeals.

A landowner is not an insurer of the safety of those using his property *(see, Paul v Kagan,*92 AD2d 988). His liability for injuries suffered by persons while on his property depends upon whether he has " 'act[ed] as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk’ ” *(Basso v Miller,*40 NY2d 233, 241, quoting *Smith v Arbaugh’s Rest.,*469 F2d 97, 100). Thus, foreseeability is the measure of liability in a case such as this *(see, id.).*"In all but the most extraordinary instances, whether a defendant has conformed to the standard of conduct required by law is a question of fact” *(Kiernan v Hendrick,*116 AD2d 779, 781, *appeal dismissed*68 NY2d 661).

In light of the standard applicable in this case, we are of the opinion that this is one of those rare cases in which summary judgment is warranted. While it might have been foreseeable that plaintiff’s son might climb over the fence, and while it might have been foreseeable that a child standing on the ground could be injured by a broken window pane that was within his reach, we do not believe that a reasonable person would foresee that a child would climb onto the fence and put his hand through a garage window located in close proximity to the fence. Accordingly, the order should be affirmed.

Order affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Main, Weiss, Mikoll and Harvey, JJ., concur.
#### United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc., Respondent, v General Electric Company, Appellant.

— In an action by an insurance company, *inter alia,*to recover from its insured the amount of a deductible paid by the insurer to a third-party claimant, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated September 4, 1985, which, *inter alia,*granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on its first cause of action, denied the defendant’s cross motion to dismiss that cause of action, and awarded the plaintiff judgment in the principal amount of $1,750,000.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs, for reasons stated by Justice Lonschein at Special Term. Weinstein, J. P., Rubin, Kooper and Sullivan, JJ., concur. *[See,*129 Misc 2d 466.]