IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Allegheny County Prison : No. 1469 C.D. 2019

Employees Independent Union : Argued: October 13, 2020

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge 

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: November 19, 2020

The County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania (County) appeals the 

September 17, 2019 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial 

court) that denied the County’s Petition to Vacate an arbitration award entered under 

the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA),1that sustained a grievance filed by the 

Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union (Union) seeking 

reinstatement of a terminated corrections officer Union member. Upon review, we 

affirm.

The underlying facts of this matter are not in dispute. On the evening 

of June 3, 2017, Kenneth Goings (Goings) was working as a corrections officer on 

1 Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1011.101-1101.2301.
2

the medical unit of the Allegheny County Jail.2 See Arbitration Decision and Award 

dated December 12, 2018 (Arbitration Award) at 2. Among Goings’ duties as a 

corrections officer on the medical unit was a requirement that he perform guard 

tours3twice hourly. See Arbitration Award at 3. This guard tour requirement 

appeared in the medical unit’s post orders,4 which are orders posted in each pod that 

list all the required duties of the corrections officers assigned to the specific pod. 

See Arbitration Award at 3. Each corrections officer was required to read the post 

orders for their assigned pod on a daily basis and sign a sheet indicating they had

done so. See id. When Goings began as a corrections officer on the medical unit in 

mid-2015, the post orders at the time had been in effect since July 6, 2015, and 

required only one guard tour per hour. See Arbitration Award at 3. The medical 

unit post orders were amended effective February 22, 2017, however, to require two 

guard tours per hour instead of one. See id. Despite regularly certifying by signing 

a sign-in sheet, as required, that he had read the post orders, Goings remained 

unaware of the change in the number of required guard tours by virtue of not having 

read the amended post orders. See id.

Sometime between Goings’ 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. guard tours on the 

evening of June 3, 2017, an Allegheny County Jail inmate committed suicide in his 

2 The Allegheny County Jail employs a “pod” system in which inmates are placed in 

various pods – or groups of cells – based on the inmates’ security levels. See Arbitration Award 

at 2. Goings’ assigned pod, the medical unit pod, consisted of only 17 cells and was one of 

Allegheny County Jail’s smaller pods. Id.

3 Guard tours are walking rounds of assigned cell areas during which corrections officers 

visually check on cells and other areas under their supervision to ensure inmate safety and 

compliance with prison rules. See Arbitration Award at 3. Corrections officers press buttons 

throughout their pod during the guard tours that record the time they visit each area. See id.

4 The medical unit post orders listed the two guard tours per hour requirement as order No. 

8 on a list of 47 specific guard duties. See Arbitration Award at 3. 
3

cell on the medical unit. See Arbitration Award at 4. As he usually did, Goings had 

signed the post order sign-in sheet, thereby indicating that he had read the post orders 

on June 3, 2017, despite the fact that he had not actually done so. See id. at 3.

Following a disciplinary hearing conducted on June 6, 2017, the County 

discharged Goings for failing to complete mandatory guard tours and for falsifying 

post order sign-in sheets that indicated Goings had daily read the post orders as 

required. See Arbitration Award at 4 & 9; Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion dated 

January 6, 2020 (Trial Court Opinion) at 2. On June 7, 2017, the Union filed a 

grievance on Goings’ behalf that alleged the County lacked just cause to discharge 

Goings and seeking Goings’ reinstatement as a corrections officer with full back 

pay. See Arbitration Award at 2; see also Grievance filed June 7, 2017 (Grievance), 

Trial Court Reproduced Record (T.C.R.R.) at R133-34. After the Grievance was 

denied,5the Union sought to arbitrate the matter per the collective bargaining 

agreement in force between the County and the Union from 2014 through 2019 

(CBA). 

An arbitrator conducted a hearing on August 15, 2018, at which both 

Goings and the County were represented by counsel and presented evidence. See

Arbitration Award at 2. On December 12, 2018, the arbitrator issued the Arbitration 

Award, which sustained the Grievance in part. See Arbitration Award at 2 & 12-13; 

Trial Court Opinion at 2. The arbitrator found Goings guilty of violating the post 

order requirement that he conduct two guard tours per hour and of repeatedly 

5 The Grievance underwent multiple levels of review and, following hearings at all levels, 

was denied at Level 1 on June 12, 2017, at Level 2 on June 30, 2017, and at Level 3 on July 31, 

2017. See Letter of Simon Tyrone Wainwright dated June 12, 2017, Trial Court Reproduced 

Record (T.C.R.R.) at R135; Letter of Orlando Harper dated June 30, 2017, T.C.R.R. at R136; 

Letter of Steve Pilarski dated July 31, 2017, T.C.R.R. at R137-38.
4

falsifying the daily post order sign-in sheet indicating that he had read the post 

orders. See Arbitration Award at 9-12. The arbitrator determined that these 

violations represented significant misconduct that justified disciplinary action 

against Goings. See id. However, after examining multiple mitigating factors, the 

arbitrator determined that the County lacked just cause for terminating Goings’ 

employment and converted Goings’ termination to a 30-day unpaid suspension. See 

id. at 12. Accordingly, the arbitrator converted Goings’ discharge to a 30-day 

suspension without pay and awarded Goings back pay.6 See id. at 12-13.

The County filed a Petition to Vacate, which the trial court denied by 

order dated September 17, 2019. See Trial Court Order dated September 17, 2019 

(Trial Court Order). In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained that the 

Arbitration Award in this matter satisfied the essence test in that the issue presented 

– termination for just cause – was within the terms of the CBA, and that the 

arbitrator’s decision logically flowed from the terms of the CBA. See Trial Court 

Opinion at 4. Further, the trial court declined to invoke the public policy exception 

to the essence test, explaining that

[t]he facts of this case, including the remedy imposed by 

the arbitrator (i.e., mitigation of the discipline from 

termination to a thirty-day suspension and back pay), do 

not implicate a well-defined, dominant public policy 

warranting interference with the arbitrator’s decision. 

Moreover, the arbitrator’s decision in this case does not 

compel [the] County to violate any such policy.

6 The Arbitration Award specifically limited Goings’ back pay to his regular earnings less 

interim earnings and amounts received as unemployment compensation during the discharge 

period. See Arbitration Award at 12-13. The Arbitration Award expressly denied the Union’s 

request that Goings also receive compensation for missed overtime opportunities he may have 

received during the discharge period. Id. at 13.
5

Trial Court Opinion at 4. The County appealed the Trial Court Order to this Court.

On appeal, the County claims that the trial court erred by denying its 

Petition to Vacate. Specifically, the County alleges that Goings’ misrepresentations 

that he read post orders daily as required and his alleged false statements during 

testimony before the arbitrator represent violations of public policy that should have 

served as grounds for the trial court to vacate the Arbitration Award. See County’s 

Brief at 3, 11-24.

Appellate review of a grievance arbitration award is generally

conducted pursuant to the two-part “essence test.” Sch. Dist. of Phila. v. Phila.

Fed’n of Teachers, 164 A.3d 546, 552 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Under the essence test, 

[f]irst, the court shall determine if the issue as properly 

defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining 

agreement. Second, if the issue is embraced by the 

agreement, and thus, appropriately before the arbitrator, 

the arbitrator’s award will be upheld if the arbitrator’s 

interpretation can rationally be derived from the collective 

bargaining agreement. That is to say, a court will only 

vacate an arbitrator’s award where the award indisputably 

and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically 

flow from, the collective bargaining agreement.

State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Prof’l Ass’n (PSEANEA), 743 A.2d 405, 413 (Pa. 1999); see also Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 

v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 Classroom Assistants Educ. Support Pers. 

Ass’n, PSEA/NEA, 939 A.2d 855, 863 (Pa. 2007) (Westmoreland I). Thus, “[a]n 

arbitrator’s award must be sustained ‘if it is based on anything that can be gleaned 

as the ‘essence’ of the [collective bargaining agreement].’” Pa. State Sys. of Higher 

Educ. v. Ass’n of Pa. State Coll. & Univ. Faculties, 98 A.3d 5, 14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2014) (quoting Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Dist. Council 84, AFL–CIO 
6

v. City of Beaver Falls, 459 A.2d 863, 865 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983)). Further, “[t]he 

essence test does not permit this Court to vacate an arbitrator’s award even if we 

disagree with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the [collective bargaining 

agreement].” Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Dist. Council 87 v. Cty. of 

Lackawanna, 102 A.3d 1285, 1290 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citing Cent. Susquehanna 

Intermediate Unit Educ. Ass’n v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit # 16, 459 

A.2d 889, 890 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983)). “The essence test is an exceptionally deferential 

standard, because binding arbitration is a highly favored method of dispute 

resolution.” Dep’t of Corr., State Corr. Inst. at Forest v. Pa. State Corr. Officers 

Ass’n, 173 A.3d 854, 858 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (citing Northumberland Cty. Comm’rs 

v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., AFL–CIO Local 2016, Council 86, 71 

A.3d 367, 374 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)). The party challenging an arbitration award 

bears the “burden of proving the award does not draw its essence from the [collective 

bargaining agreement].” See Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 98 A.3d at 14.

However, even where an arbitration award satisfies the essence test, our 

Supreme Court has delineated a discreet exception whereby a reviewing court may 

still vacate the award if it violates public policy. See Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist. v. 

Millcreek Twp. Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 210 A.3d 993, 1007-11 (Pa. 2019); see 

also Westmoreland I, 939 A.2d at 865-66. The application of this public policy 

exception requires that “[s]uch public policy . . . must be well-defined, dominant, 

and ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general 

considerations of supposed public interests.” Westmoreland I, 939 A.2d at 866. 

Additionally, unlike the deferential standard of review employed to review 

determinations under the essence test, appellate review of the public policy 

exception “lies in the proper application of the public policy exception to the essence 
7

test. This is a pure question of law; [the] standard of review is de novo, and [the]

scope of review is plenary.” Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. 

Emps., Dist. Council 33, Local 934, 52 A.3d 1117, 1121 (Pa. 2012). Further, our 

Supreme Court has expressly recognized that

not only is the public policy exception “exceptionally 

narrow” in its own right, but it is also an exception to the 

essence test, which is itself a narrow exception to the 

doctrine that arbitration awards are final and binding. A 

baseline recognition that the public policy exception is a 

narrow exception to a narrow exception must guide a 

reviewing court’s analysis.

Millcreek, 210 A.3d at 1011 (internal citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has articulated a three-part test to determine the 

appropriate application of the public policy exception to the essence test. See 

Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 210 A.3d at 1011.

First, a reviewing court must identify precisely what 

remedy the arbitrator imposed. Next, the court must 

inquire into whether that remedy implicates a public 

policy that is well-defined, dominant, and ascertained by 

reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from 

general considerations of supposed public interests. 

Finally, the reviewing court must determine if the 

arbitrator’s award compels the employer to violate the 

implicated policy, given the particular circumstances and 

the factual findings of the arbitrator.

Id. (emphasis, internal citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). The 

Supreme Court further emphasized that “the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract 

controls during this entire analysis, which is only triggered upon the reviewing 

court’s determination that the award satisfies the essence test, and should be upheld 
8

absent a clear violation of public policy.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he burden is on the 

party that opposes the award to demonstrate that it violates public policy.” Id. 

The instant matter involves Article XVIII of the CBA, which states that 

“[t]he Employer has the right to discharge or suspend any employee for just cause.” 

CBA at 28, Supplemental Reproduced Record at R.2b. In reviewing the Arbitration 

Award, the trial court determined that the essence test was satisfied because the issue 

in this case was within the terms of the CBA and the Arbitration Award logically 

flowed from the terms of the CBA. See Trial Court Opinion at 4. Neither party 

disputes the trial court’s conclusion that the essence test has been met. Therefore, 

the only question presently before this Court is whether the public policy exception 

to the essence test applies to this case. To make this determination, we review the 

facts of this case pursuant to the three-part Millcreek test.

1. The precise remedy imposed by the arbitrator.

The arbitrator in this matter reduced Goings’ termination to a 30-day 

unpaid suspension with back pay. See Arbitration Award at 12-13. To the extent 

the County argues that the back pay awarded Goings in the Arbitration Award 

represents a “windfall payment of seventeen months of back pay” that should be 

considered part of the remedy fashioned in the Arbitration Award for purposes of 

the three-part Millcreek public policy exception test, we disagree. County’s Brief at 

17. The arbitrator concluded that the County had improperly terminated Goings’ 

employment and converted Goings’ discharge to the still significant penalty of a 30-

day unpaid suspension. See Arbitration Award at 12-13. The fact that the arbitration 

process required by the CBA to reach this determination took 18 months was beyond 

Goings’ control. Denying back pay for the entire period before the arbitration 
9

decision would have effectively converted the 30-day unpaid suspension remedy 

fashioned by the arbitrator into an unpaid suspension throughout the entirety of the 

arbitration process, in this case 18 months’ unpaid suspension. Here, the precise 

remedy imposed for consideration in this matter is the 30-day unpaid suspension 

with back pay.

2. Whether the remedy implicates a well-defined, dominant public policy.

Next, as the party that opposed the Arbitration Award, the County bears 

the burden of demonstrating that the Arbitration Award remedy implicates public 

policy. See Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 210 A.3d at 1011. As stated supra, in order 

for the public policy exception to the essence test to apply, the alleged public policy 

involved “must be well-defined, dominant, and ascertained by reference to the laws 

and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public 

interests.” Westmoreland I, 939 A.2d at 866.

Our Supreme Court found the public policy exception to the essence 

test appropriately employed in Philadelphia Housing Authority, a case involving an 

employee whose “lewd, lascivious and extraordinarily perverse” conduct toward a 

co-worker without question amounted to sexual harassment. See Phila. Hous. Auth., 

52 A.3d at 1124-25. The Supreme Court reviewed relevant federal sexual 

harassment case law and recognized the existence of an explicit, well-defined, and 

dominant public policy against workplace sexual harassment “grounded in both 

federal and state law against sex discrimination in employment, including Title VII

[of the Civil Rights Act of 1964], the regulations of the [federal Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission], and [the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act].” Id. at 1123, 

1127-28. The Court then found that the arbitration award reinstating the offending 
10

employee with full back pay violated that well-defined, dominant public policy 

against sexual harassment. See id. The Court noted:

To allow an arbitration award which finds that an 

employee engaged in “extraordinarily perverse” physical 

sexual harassment of a co-worker, yet then simply 

dismisses the conduct as unworthy of an employer 

response beyond initial “counseling,” and reinstatement 

with back pay, would eviscerate the ability of employers 

to enforce dominant public policy.

Id. at 1125. The majority concluded that, considering the “egregious” nature of the 

employee’s conduct, the arbitrator’s award reinstating him “[made] a mockery of the 

dominant public policy against sexual harassment.” Id. at 1128.

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Philadelphia Housing

Authority, this Court took up the Westmoreland I remand in Westmoreland 

Intermediate Unit # 7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 Classroom Assistants 

Educational Support Personnel Association, PSEA-NEA, 72 A.3d 755 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2013) (Westmoreland II). Therein, the Court determined that the arbitrator’s award 

that reinstated, with conditions, an elementary school teacher who had suffered a 

drug overdose while wearing a Fentanyl patch during the performance of her duties 

at school was in direct contravention of a well-defined, dominant public policy to 

protect school children from illegal drugs and drug use. See Westmoreland II, 72 

A.3d at 759. Accordingly, the Court vacated the arbitrator’s award as a violation of 

public policy. See id.

However, approximately six years later in Millcreek, the Supreme 

Court found that a school district failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that a 

specific duty to solicit subcontracting bids to present to a union in furtherance of 

good faith bargaining regarding subcontracting represented a dominant public policy 
11

that triggered the application of the public policy exception to the essence test. See 

Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 210 A.3d at 1012. The Supreme Court reviewed PERA 

and noted that section 701 of PERA, 43 P.S. § 1101.701, requires parties to a 

collective bargaining agreement to confer, in good faith, regarding multiple 

bargained-for aspects of collective bargaining agreements. See Millcreek Twp. Sch. 

Dist., 210 A.3d at 1011. The Supreme Court further noted that a proposal to 

subcontract union work is a mandatory subject for bargaining that triggers the duty 

of good faith bargaining, and that the failure to so bargain represents an unfair labor 

practice. Id. at 1011-12. However, the Supreme Court concluded that even though 

an employer’s duty to bargain in good faith may include a duty to provide a union 

with proposals submitted by subcontractors, this does not sufficiently demonstrate

the existence of a well-defined, dominant public policy ascertained by reference to 

the laws and legal precedents that encompasses any specific duty on the part of the 

school district to solicit subcontracting bids and provide them to the union. See id.

at 1012. The Supreme Court therefore determined that the school district failed to 

show “that any Pennsylvania statute or decision [] sets forth a clear requirement 

regarding the conduct at issue in this case[,]” and declined to employ the public 

policy exception to the essence test. Id.

To meet its burden in the instant matter, the County argues that, because 

Goings repeatedly signed the post order sign-in sheets indicating he had read the 

post orders on a daily basis when he had not, and because the arbitrator did not credit 

Goings’ explanation of his failure to read the post orders, the arbitrator’s remedy 

violates a “duty to provide truthful responses” and “precludes any expectation of a 

truthful discourse between employer and employee, much less a rational expectation 

of an honest exchange which must serve as the foundation for the employment 
12

relationship.” County’s Brief at 17 & 24. To support the argument that the 

arbitrator’s remedy violates a well-defined, dominant public policy requiring 

employee truthfulness, the County points to the existence of two offenses from 

Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code7 – tampering with public records or information, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 4911,8and unsworn falsification to authorities, 18 Pa.C.S. § 49049 – as 

7 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9546.

8 The Crimes Code defines the offense of tampering with public records or information as 

follows:

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if he:

(1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, any 

record, document or thing belonging to, or received or kept by, the 

government for information or record, or required by law to be kept 

by others for information of the government;

(2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing knowing 

it to be false, and with intent that it be taken as a genuine part of 

information or records referred to in paragraph (1) of this 

subsection; or

(3) intentionally and unlawfully destroys, conceals, removes or 

otherwise impairs the verity or availability of any such record, 

document or thing.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4911(a).

9 The Crimes Code defines the offense of unsworn falsification to authorities as follows:

(a) In general.--A person commits a misdemeanor of the second 

degree if, with intent to mislead a public servant in performing his 

official function, he:

(1) makes any written false statement which he does not 

believe to be true;

(2) submits or invites reliance on any writing which he 

knows to be forged, altered or otherwise lacking in 

authenticity; or
13

well as a provision of the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act10 that references 

these crimes as possible grounds for the forfeiture of a public employee’s pension 

benefits.11 See County’s Brief at 13-15. Effectively, the County argues that the 

existence of these criminal statutes and the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act 

evidences that a well-defined, dominant public policy of required truthfulness exists 

and condemns actions such as Goings’ continued, knowing false certifications – by 

signing the post order sign-in sheets – that he had read post orders that he had not, 

in fact, read. See id.

The trial court, on the other hand, determined that

(3) submits or invites reliance on any sample, specimen, 

map, boundary mark, or other object which he knows to be 

false.

(b) Statements “under penalty”.--A person commits a 

misdemeanor of the third degree if he makes a written false 

statement which he does not believe to be true, on or pursuant to a 

form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false 

statements made therein are punishable.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4904. 

10 Act of July 8, 1978, P.L. 752, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1311-1315.

11 Section 3(a) of the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act provides that 

no public official or public employee nor any beneficiary designated 

by such public official or public employee shall be entitled to receive 

any retirement or other benefit or payment of any kind except a 

return of the contribution paid into any pension fund without 

interest, if such public official or public employee is found guilty of 

a crime related to public office or public employment or pleads 

guilty or nolo contendere to any crime related to public office or 

public employment.

43 P.S. § 1313(a). The Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act includes both tampering with 

public records or information and unsworn falsification to authorities in the act’s definition of 

crimes related to public office or public employment. See 43 P.S. § 1312.
14

[t]he facts of this case, including the remedy imposed by 

the arbitrator (i.e., mitigation of the discipline from 

termination to a thirty-day suspension and back pay), do 

not implicate a well-defined, dominant public policy 

warranting interference with the arbitrator’s decision.

Trial Court Opinion at 4. We agree with the trial court that, under the facts of this 

case, the County has not met its burden to demonstrate that an alleged duty of 

employee/employer truthfulness constitutes a well-defined and dominant public 

policy ascertained by reference to laws and legal precedents. See Millcreek Twp. 

Sch. Dist., 210 A.3d at 1012.

Initially, while we appreciate that the arguable facial criminality of 

conduct may represent a consideration in determining whether a well-defined, 

dominant policy exists for the purpose of applying the public policy exception to the 

essence test,12 the existence of defined offenses under the Crimes Code that involve 

dishonesty that could arguably be applied to Goings’ behavior in the instant matter 

does not mandate the application of the public policy exception. The General 

Assembly did not enact the crimes of tampering with public records and unsworn 

falsifications to authorities to impose a strict requirement of honesty in all 

interactions between employers and employees or to otherwise control oversight of 

errors in employment paperwork, even where deliberate. The existence of the public 

policy the County identifies – a requirement of truthfulness between employee and

employer – simply cannot be gleaned from the mere existence of either these 

criminal provisions or the portion of the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act 

that references the crimes. Beyond blanket implications that the crimes of tampering 

12 See Phila. Hous. Auth., 52 A.3d at 1125 (noting that a public employer should have

power to impose consequences for extremely inappropriate, and facially criminal, conduct).
15

with public records and unsworn falsifications to authorities punish dishonesty, the 

County did not elaborate on how the listed crimes bear on Goings’ specific behavior 

of falsely filling out his employer’s paperwork.

Additionally, we note that Goings was not charged with, much less 

convicted of, any crimes in this matter. While the arbitrator did find that Goings 

repeatedly failed to read the post orders and repeatedly falsified the post order signin sheet, and further that such failures “provided just cause for significant 

disciplinary action[,]”13 the arbitrator in no way determined, as the County 

suggests,14 that Goings violated criminal law. Instead, the arbitrator ultimately 

concluded that Goings’ repeated falsification of post order sign-in sheets indicating 

he had read the post orders – although “significant misconduct” – amounted to 

negligence in attending to his employment duties, as opposed to any specific intent 

to commit the crimes of unsworn falsifications to authorities or tampering with 

public records. See Arbitration Award at 10 & 12. 

The arbitrator found that Goings violated a management directive by 

knowingly falsifying the post order sign-in sheets to indicate that he had read the 

post orders each shift. See Arbitration Award at 9. However, the arbitrator went on 

to state this was an aggravating factor to be considered “in determining the 

appropriate penalty for [Goings’] negligent actions.” Id. at 10. The arbitrator also 

13 Arbitration Award at 9.

14 The County states that the arbitrator “determined that Goings . . . [k]nowingly and 

intentionally violated not only Allegheny County Jail rules and regulations against falsification, 

but also criminal law prohibiting such conduct[.]” County’s Brief at 17. The County further states 

that the arbitrator made an “unqualified determination that Goings violated [] County policy and 

very likely the criminal code[.]” Id. These statements are not supported by the Arbitration Award, 

which makes no reference whatsoever to any criminal statute or violation and properly contains 

the conclusions therein to a discussion of the facts of this case. See Arbitration Award at 9-13.
16

noted several mitigating factors, including Goings’ 19 years of service with only two 

minor counseling sessions, the lack of supervisory oversight in Goings’ actions, and 

the lack of any discipline of the supervisors who were responsible for insuring 

Goings’ compliance with the post orders. Id. at 10-11. Given these factors, the 

Arbitration Award stated:

It is therefore concluded that [Goings’] engaged in 

significant misconduct that provided just cause for 

discipline. However, given the equivalent negligence of 

supervisory personnel in failing to catch [Goings’] error 

and the County’s failure to act against them, there was not 

just cause for discharge. 

Arbitration Award at 12. 

Also, despite largely basing its appellate argument on Goings’

falsification of the post order sign-in sheets, and despite the existence of a specific 

Code of Ethics provision allowing for discipline of prison employees for falsifying 

information on reports,15 the County did not list falsification of reports as a reason 

for the discipline imposed. See Letter of Matt Kohler dated June 5, 2017, 

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 26a; Letter of Matt Kohler dated June 6, 2017, R.R. at 

27a. Instead, Goings was charged with, and ultimately discharged for, violation of 

the requirement contained in Post Order No. 8, that guards in the medical unit 

conduct two guard tours per hour, as well as failure to comply with written directives 

15 Section 3.14 of the County’s Code of Ethics provides as follows:

Any employees found to have falsified information on reports, will 

be subject to severe disciplinary action inclusive of termination, 

regardless of when discovered. This includes pre-employment 

information (written and verbal).

Code of Ethics at 9, Reproduced Record at 42a.
17

(the post orders), and Code of Ethics Sections 2.1 and 2.3,16 which require that 

employees be familiar with, and carry out, their duties. See Letter of Matt Kohler 

16 The Code of Ethics Section 2.1 provides:

2.1 ALL EMPLOYEES SHALL:

a. Be thoroughly familiar with their duties and responsibilities. 

Employees are required to review all announcements, memos, [and] 

directives that were issued while they were off duty for any period 

of time.

b. Be knowledgeable of and enforce the rules and regulations 

governing the inmate population.

c. Be knowledgeable of and enforce the rules and regulations 

governing the jail staff and visitors.

d. Be friendly, but professional, maintaining an impersonal attitude 

and relationship toward all inmates, remaining always impartial.

e. Never strike an inmate, except in self-defense and then only using 

that degree of force necessary to control or contain the situation.

f. Never enter into any transaction or relationship with any inmate, 

or ex-inmate on parole or probation.

g. Never verbally abuse or agitate an inmate.

h. Never take anything for granted, always investigate and get all the 

facts.

i. Never overlook the potential of any situation and act affirmatively 

to report and/or eliminate conditions that could lead to serious and 

dangerous incidents. This includes potential safety risks due to 

personal grooming and/or attire.

Code of Ethics at 4, R.R. at 37a. Section 2.3 of the Code of Ethics provides as follows:

2.3 ALL EMPLOYEES SHALL CARRY OUT ALL ORDERS 

AND DIRECTIVES:

a. All employees will carry out all orders and directives issued or 

given them by a supervisor, in a prompt and efficient manner. 
18

dated June 5, 2017, R.R. at 26a; Letter of Matt Kohler dated June 6, 2017, R.R. at 

27a. The County cannot add, on appeal, a reason for discharge not presented to the 

arbitrator. See R.R. at 23a (Step 1 of Grievance Procedure requires citation to the 

CBA provisions believed to be violated); see also Pa. State Corr. Officers Ass’n v. 

Commonwealth, 976 A.2d 1236, 1239 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (“issues not raised before 

the arbitrator are waived on appeal before this Court”). 

Further, we find unpersuasive the County’s argument that the public 

policy exception to the essence test should be employed in this case because the 

arbitrator refused to credit Goings’ proffered reason for his failure to read the post 

orders–that he lacked time–and, therefore, Goings was dishonest with his employer. 

See County Brief at 16-17. To conclude a well-defined, dominant public policy for 

truthfulness to one’s employer validates the use of the public policy exception to the 

essence test every time an arbitrator makes a credibility determination adverse to the 

employee would allow for an overly broad use of the exception. Such a result is 

completely contrary to Supreme Court precedent establishing that the public policy 

exception is an especially narrow exception to the already narrow exception to the 

DISREGARD OF ORDERS AND DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY A 

SUPERVISOR IN A WILFUL OR DILATORY MANNER WILL 

BE CAUSE FOR SEVERE DISCIPLINARY ACTION UP TO 

AND INCLUDING DISCHARGE.

b. Insubordination in any fashion will not be tolerated. All 

employees will render due respect to all supervisory staff and will 

carry out all orders and instructions given. No staff member will 

engage in making derogatory remarks or discrediting statements or 

slanderous gossip, concerning supervisors, nor their orders or 

instructions. Disregard of such, will be cause for severe disciplinary 

action up to and including termination. 

Code of Ethics at 5, R.R. at 38a.
19

doctrine that arbitration awards are final and binding. See Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 

210 A.3d at 1011. 

3. Whether the Arbitration Award compels violation of a well-defined, dominant 

public policy.

Even assuming the existence of the alleged well-defined, dominant 

public policy requiring truthfulness between employers and employees, the 

Arbitration Award in this case would not violate such a policy. An arbitrator’s award 

will be found in violation of a stated public policy where it makes a mockery of, or 

causes an employer to violate, an implicated public policy. See Phila. Hous. Auth., 

52 A.3d at 1125 (finding absurd and a mockery of the dominant public policy against 

sexual harassment an award that reinstated, with full back pay, an individual whose 

egregious conduct amounted to sexual harassment). The award in this matter does 

neither.

The arbitrator herein imposed a 30-day unpaid suspension based on 

Goings’ significant misconduct. See Arbitration Award at 12-13. In fashioning this 

remedy, the arbitrator considered certain aggravating factors: (1) the death of the 

inmate, and (2) the fact that Goings lacked sufficient excuse to justify his repeated 

misconduct. See Arbitration Award at 10. As mitigating factors, the arbitrator 

considered: (1) Goings’ employment longevity and clean work record; (2) the lack 

of supervisory oversight of Goings’ work performance; and (3) the lack of discipline 

of any superiors responsible for oversight of Goings’ work performance. See

Arbitration Award at 10-11. Despite the gravity of the tragedy of the inmate death 

in this matter, the imposition of a 30-day unpaid suspension represents a significant 

penalty for Goings’ actions, which the arbitrator ultimately characterized as 

negligent. See Arbitration Award at 12. As the trial court noted – in addition to not 
20

implicating any well-defined, dominant public policy – the arbitrator’s remedy 

would in no way, under the facts of this case, make a mockery of the alleged public 

policy of required truthfulness between employer and employee, if such a policy 

existed, nor would it require that the County violate such a policy. See Trial Court 

Opinion at 4.

We note further that Goings’ actions and the penalty imposed herein 

are simply not comparable to the actions of the employee or the remedy in 

Philadelphia Housing Authority. A 30-day unpaid suspension for employee 

dishonesty in an employment relationship in no way eviscerates the County’s ability 

to enforce any public policy. See Phila. Hous. Auth., 52 A.3d at 1125. The serious 

nature of the tragic death of the inmate in this matter notwithstanding, unlike the 

reinstatement without other consequences awarded in Philadelphia Housing 

Authority, the Arbitration Award does not require that the County violate public 

policy.

For the above reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the 

County’s Petition to Vacate the Arbitration Award.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Allegheny County Prison : No. 1469 C.D. 2019

Employees Independent Union :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 19th day of November, 2020, the September 17, 2019 

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge