alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IB 

Union Calendar No. 214 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2091 

[Report No. 114–282] 

To amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to clarify the ability to request 

consumer reports in certain cases to establish and enforce child support 

payments and awards. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 29, 2015 

Mr. POLIQUIN (for himself, Mr. ELLISON, Mr. DAVID SCOTT of Georgia, Mr. 

DUFFY, Mr. MURPHY of Florida, and Mrs. WAGNER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

OCTOBER 6, 2015 

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 

and ordered to be printed 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2091 RH

A BILL 

To amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to clarify the ability 

to request consumer reports in certain cases to establish 

and enforce child support payments and awards. 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 2091 RH

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Child Support Assist5 ance Act of 2015’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REQUESTS FOR CONSUMER REPORTS BY STATE OR 

7 LOCAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 

8 AGENCIES. 

9 Paragraph (4) of section 604(a) of the Fair Credit 

10 Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681b(a)(4)) is amended— 

11 (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘or deter12 mining the appropriate level of such payments’’ and 

13 inserting ‘‘, determining the appropriate level of 

14 such payments, or enforcing a child support order, 

15 award, agreement, or judgment’’; 

16 (2) in subparagraph (B)— 

17 (A) by striking ‘‘paternity’’ and inserting 

18 ‘‘parentage’’; and 

19 (B) by adding ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

20 (3) by striking subparagraph (C); and 

21 (4) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as sub22 paragraph (C). 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Union Calendar No. 214 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2091 

[Report No. 114–282] 

A BILL 

To amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to clarify 

ments and awards. cases to establish and enforce child support paythe ability to request consumer reports in certain 

OCTOBER 6, 2015 

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 

State of the Union and ordered to be printed 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
**EXHIBIT 8.1****SUBSIDIARIES**PETSEC ENERGY LTD.CONTROLLED ENTITIES           % OF  PLACE OF OWNER-CONTROLLED ENTITIES INCORPORATION SHIPPetsec Investments Pty. Limited Australia  100 Petroleum Securities Pty. Limited Australia  100 Najedo Pty. Limited Australia  100 Petroleum Securities Share Plan Pty. Limited Australia  100 Petsec America Pty. Limited Australia  100 Petsec (U.S.A.) Inc. U.S.A.  100 Petsec Petroleum Inc. U.S.A.  100 Petsec Energy Inc. U.S.A.  100 Osglen Pty. Limited Australia  80.7 Laurel Bay Petroleum Limited Australia  100 Ginida Pty. Limited Australia  100 Western Medical Products Pty. Limited Australia  100
#### PEOPLE ex rel. KENNEDY, Plaintiff, v. BUSH, Defendant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

December 8, 1896.)

Certiorari by Peter J. Kennedy against Wesley C. Bush, commissioner of the department of buildings, city of Brooklyn.

No opinion. Determination confirmed, with costs. All concur.
FINAL DECISION OPTIONS 

Written By CDR Evan Hudspeth

Generally 60 days after a preliminary assessment letter (PAL) and 

package has been sent to the charged party, the Hearing Officer will 

consider all of the evidence provided and make a final decision. In a 

final letter to the charged party, the following information is 

included regarding the charged party’s options:

You may appeal my decision to the Commandant of the Coast Guard. 

You have 30 days from the date you receive this letter to do so. If you 

decide to appeal my decision, address your appeal to the 

Commandant of the Coast Guard but mail it to me. I will then send 

the appeal forward with the official case file. Title 33, Code of 

Federal Regulations, Part 1.07-70, expressly limits matters on 

appeal to those issues that were properly raised before the Hearing 

Officer and jurisdictional questions. That is, aside from jurisdictional 

questions, matters on appeal are limited to those issues raised before 

me prior to my final decision in this case. If you find you have newly 

discovered evidence to be considered following my final decision, you 

may petition me to reopen your case. The petition to reopen must be 

in writing and explain why the evidence was not presented for my 

consideration during the course of the adjudication of your case. I 

may reopen your case if I find that the evidence will have a direct 

and material bearing on the issues and there is a valid explanation 

as to why the evidence was not and could not have been produced 

during the adjudication of your case. My decision regarding the 

petition to reopen will be rendered in writing. If you do not appeal 

my final decision within 30 days from receipt of this letter, my 

decision becomes the Coast Guard’s final action on this case 

(Emphasis added). 
So, there are four options at this point:

1. Pay the final penalty amount;

2. Appeal the decision based on the evidence already considered 

and in the case file;

3. Request to reopen the case to consider evidence not previously 

available and include a good reason why the evidence was not 

previously available; or

4. Do nothing, in which case the file will be forwarded to 

collections.

It is therefore in the charged party’s best interests to respond to a 

PAL in a timely manner, before a final decision is made. If one waits 

to respond with evidence in defense, extenuation, or mitigation after

a final decision has been made, then it is quite possible that the 

evidence will be considered untimely, and the final decision will 

stand.
EXHIBIT 32.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the quarterly report of eLinear, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-QSB/A  (First  Amendment)  for the quarter ended March 31, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jim
C.  Pyle,  Principal  Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  section  1350,  as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act  of  2002,  that  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/  Jim C. Pyle
-------------------------------
Jim C. Pyle,
Principal Accounting Officer
September 7, 2004


     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to eLinear, Inc. and will be retained by eLinear, Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


<PAGE>
#### Lawrence B. Root et al., Respondents, v Daniel A. Sanger et al., Appellants, and Rotterdam Ventures, Inc., Respondent.

— Yesawich, Jr., J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Walsh, Jr., J.), entered April 24, 1987 in Schenectady County, which, *inter alia,*denied a motion by defendants Daniel A. Sanger and Matthew S. Passamonte for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiff Lawrence B. Root (hereinafter plaintiff) was injured while receiving a ride to his office from a coemployee, defendant Daniel A. Sanger, on a private roadway owned by defendant Rotterdam Ventures, Inc., when the vehicle they were in collided with another driven by defendant Matthew S. Passamonte, also a coemployee. The accident occurred 15 minutes after the workday had ended for all of the employees involved. Passamonte was en route to pick up a coemployee for whom he was providing a ride home and Sanger was going to drop plaintiff at his office in the employer’s building and where plaintiff’s car was parked; Sanger was then continuing on to a dinner. Neither driver was under any direction or compulsion from the employer to provide transportation for their respective passengers.

Sanger and Passamonte moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action directed against them, claiming it was barred by Workers’ Compensation Law §29 (6). Supreme Court denied their motion and granted plaintiffs’ cross motion to strike this affirmative defense from Sanger’s answer and struck a similar defense from Passamonte’s answer. We affirm.

To invoke the protection of the exclusivity provision, a defendant must himself have been acting within the scope of *897his employment *(Maines v Cronomer Val. Fire Dept.,*50 NY2d 535, 543). Inasmuch as travel to and from work is not activity "in the course of employment” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 2 [7]), this defense is unavailable to either Passamonte or Sanger absent some spatial or temporal link to the employer *(see, e.g., Matter of Malacarne v City of Yonkers Parking Auth.,*41 NY2d 189, 194). Passamonte makes no such showing. And as for Sanger’s contention that his conduct was "in the course of employment” because plaintiff could not walk to his office due to a bowling ball and chain Sanger had attached to plaintiff’s leg as a prewedding prank, it suffices to note that this restriction is hardly work related. Beyond that, Sanger possessed the means of releasing plaintiff from the ball and chain and intended to do so once they had arrived at plaintiff’s office. Sanger obviously continued plaintiff’s incapacity to perpetuate his joke. Since at the time of the accident Sanger and Passamonte were rendering personal favors and not services for their employer, Supreme Court’s ruling was eminently correct.

Order affirmed, with one bill of costs. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Main, Casey and Yesawich, Jr., JJ., concur.
# C o u rt o f

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, 1 1 6 ( 6 4 0 S E2 d 6 8 8) (2 0 0 6 ); see OCGA § 5 -6 -3 5 (a) (8 ).

Hern an dez’ s fai l u re t o fo ll o w t h e r e q u i red ap p el l at e p ro ced u re d ep ri ves u s o f
ju ri s d i ct i o n

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p l y wi t h t h e d i s cret i o n ary ap p eal s pro ced u re. O C G A § 5

- 6

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$ 1 0 ,0 0 0

, a d i s cret i o n ary ap p l icat i o n w as req u i red fo r t hi s reas on as wel l

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Jen n in g s v. Mo s s , 2 3 5 Ga. Ap p. 3 5 7 , 3 5 7 (5 0 9 SE2 d 6 55 ) (1 9 9 8). September 10, 2019Becau s e H ern an d ez d i d n ot fo l l o w t h e p ro p er p ro ced ure fo r req u es t i n g

ap p el l at e r e v i e w i n th is cas e, t h is ap p eal i s h ereb y DISM ISSED fo r l ack o f
ju ri s d i ct i o n

.

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f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O f f i c e
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,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e is a t r u e e x t r a c t f r o m

t h e m i n u t e s o

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f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

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f s a i d c o u r t

h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 09/10/2019
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 02-6638
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus MANNY DELBORE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge. (CR-97-116) Submitted: June 20, 2002 Decided: June 28, 2002 Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Manny Delbore, Appellant Pro Se. Douglas Scott Broyles, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Manny Delbore appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for reduction of sentence. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Delbore , No. CR-97-116 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
# C_2021447EN.01000201.xml

| 4.11.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 447/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.11.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 447/2

---

Initiation of proceedings

(Case M.9987 – NVIDIA / ARM)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2021/C 447/02)

On 27 October 2021, the Commission decided to initiate proceedings in the above-mentioned case after finding that the notified concentration raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market. The initiation of proceedings opens a second phase investigation with regard to the notified concentration, and is without prejudice to the final decision on the case. The decision is based on Article 6(1)(c) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1).

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their observations on the proposed concentration to the Commission.

In order to be fully taken into account in the procedure, observations should reach the Commission not later than 15 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.9987 — NVIDIA / ARM, to the following address:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ’Merger Regulation’).

---
#### KIRBY, Appellant, v. CARROLL, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

December 8, 1896.)

Action by Joseph C. Kirby, as sole surviving partner of the late firm of Kirby & McBride, against Patrick Carroll.

No opinion. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. All concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                       EXHIBIT 8

                         CERTIFICATION OF ANNUAL REPORT
                                  ON FORM 40-F
                      FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2002

      1. The undersigned are the President and Chief Executive Officer and the
Vice President, Finance and the Chief Financial Officer of Meridian Gold Inc.
(the "Company"). This Certification is made pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This Certification accompanies the Annual Report on
Form 40-F of the Company, for the year ended December 31, 2002.

      2. We certify that such Annual Report on Form 40-F fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that
the information contained in such Annual Report on Form 40-F fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

      This Certification is executed as of April 10, 2003.



                                      /s/ Brian J. Kennedy
                                     -------------------------------------------
                                     Brian J. Kennedy
                                     President and Chief Executive Officer



                                      /s/ Peter C. Dougherty
                                     -------------------------------------------
                                     Peter C. Dougherty
                                     Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial
                                     Officer


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Meridian Gold Inc. and will be retained by Meridian Gold Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS RESTATED FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION
EXTRACTED FROM THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BLOUNT INTERNATIONAL, INC. FOR THE
PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1998, AS SET FORTH IN ITS FORM 10-Q FOR SUCH PERIOD
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                    JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         74,689
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 150,916
<ALLOWANCES>                                    4,647
<INVENTORY>                                   141,746
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              390,386
<PP&E>                                        384,500
<DEPRECIATION>                                198,315
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                731,612
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         178,605
<BONDS>                                       162,023
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                          389
<OTHER-SE>                                    338,856
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  731,612
<SALES>                                       404,854
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              404,854
<CGS>                                         281,276
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 281,276
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              6,724
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                44,666
<INCOME-TAX>                                   17,196
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            27,470
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                   27,470
<EPS-BASIC>                                    0.37<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    0.35<F1>
<FN>
<F1> RESTATEMENT REFLECTED HEREIN IS THE RESULT OF THE PRORATION AND STOCK
ELECTION PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE AUGUST 19, 1999 MERGER AS DESCRIBED IN
NOTE 2 OF NOTES TO CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN
BLOUNT INTERNATIONAL, INC.'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1999.
</FN>


</TABLE>
Court of Appeals 

First District of Texas 

BILL OF COSTS

No. 01-14-00937-CV

Deborah A. Beck and Nancy Beck-Deane 

v.

Dave Escobales

NO. 2013-07491 IN THE 125TH DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY

TYPE OF FEE CHARGES PAID/DUE STATUS PAID BY

RPT RECORD

MT FEE

CLK RECORD

STATEWIDE EFILING

FILING

$3,143.00

$10.00

$90.00

$20.00

$175.00

03/03/2015

03/03/2015

01/09/2015

11/26/2014

11/26/2014

PAID

E-PAID

PAID

E-PAID

E-PAID

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

ANT

The costs incurred on appeal to the First Court of Appeals Houston, Texas are 

$3,438.00.

Court costs in this case have been taxed in this Court’s judgment

I, Christopher A. Prine, Clerk of the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas, do hereby 

certify that this is a true statement of the costs of appeal in this case.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, witness my 

hand and the seal of the Court of Appeals for the 

First District of Texas, this May 29, 2015.
#### Julie Levine, Appellant, v Robert Levine, Respondent.

Submitted April 9, 2007;

decided June 7, 2007

Motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from the Appellate Division order modifying, and as modified, affirming Supreme Court’s April 25, 2005 judgment, denied; motion, insofar as it seeks leave to appeal from the Appellate Division order enforcing provisions of the divorce judgment and awarding attorneys’ fees in connection with the enforcement, dismissed upon the *1004ground that such Appellate Division order does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
EXHIBIT 99.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the quarterly report of eLinear, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-QSB  for  the  quarter  ended March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange  Commission  on  the  date  hereof  (the  "Report"),  I, Kevan M Casey,
President  and Principal Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act  of  2002,  that  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

(2)  The  information  contained  in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Kevan M. Casey
---------------------------------------
Kevan M. Casey, President and Principal
Accounting Officer
May 20, 2003


     A  signed  original  of  this written statement required by Section 906 has
been  provided  to  eLinear,  Inc.  and  will  be  retained by eLinear, Inc. and
furnished  to  the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


<PAGE>