alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Aseriah Mims, Administrator, *v.*The United States.

*On the Proofs.*

*The claimant, as administrator, brings suit under the Act Marh 12,*1863, (12 Stat. L., p. *820,) for the net proceeds of two bales of cotton seized at Atlanta, and the proceeds paid into-the Treasury. Tie proves the ownei’ship and loyalty of his intestate.*

It is sufficient for an administrator to prove the ownership, and loyalty of his intestate to enable him to recover the net proceeds of cotton belonging to his intestate, and paid into the Treasury. See *Aubert's Case,*(3 C. Cls. K., p. 84.)

*522*Messrs. Hughes, Denver <& Deals,*for claimant:

The claimant in this case is the administrator of Jacob Red-wine, deceased, and brings action to recover the proceeds of two bales of cotton, weighing 695 pounds, belonging to his decedent, seized, with cotton belonging to many other persons, shortly after the occupation of Atlanta by the military forces of the United States.

The ownership of the cotton by Mr. Red wine, its seizure by the United States, and the loyalty of the owner and of the administrator, being proved, it is respectfully requested that the judgment of this honorable court be given in favor of the claimant, for the proceeds claimed in accordance with the returns furnished by the Treasury Department in the Atlanta cases.

• *Mr. R. 8. Hale,*special counsel of the Treasury, for the defendants:

The three sons of the intestate who were actually in service in the rebel army, two of them as officers, one a captain, are presumptively the parties in interest in this suit. It does not appear that there are any other parties entitled to share in the recovery if one shall be had here, either as distributees, creditors, or otherwise. The suit therefore stands in the name of claimant as naked trustee for these three rebel soldiers and officers. It is submitted that the statute authorizes no recovery on behalf of such parties through a trustee any more than in their own names.

Per Curiam:

This is a claim preferred under the 3d section of the act of March 12,1863, for the net proceeds of two bales of cotton. He proves his intestate was the owner, entitled to the proceeds, and never gave aid or comfort to the rebellion or to persons engaged therein, but did during said rebeUioh consistently adhere to the United States. The net proceeds amount to the sum of seven hundred and nineteen dollars and eighty-eight cents, and for this sum we enter judgment in favor of the claimant.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Secure Computing Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for
the period ending June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Timothy J. Steinkopf, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and result of operations of the Company.



|                                                               
|---------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Timothy J. Steinkopf                                       
|Timothy J. Steinkopf                                           
|Senior Vice President of Operations and Chief Financial Officer
|August 11, 2008
Alexa D., Grade 7, Home School, Staten Island, NY

Armeen J., Grade 4, Settlers Way Elementary, Sugar 

Land, TX

Gianna F., Grade 7, Seven Lakes Junior High School, 

Katy, TX

Giuliana T., Grade 1, Oak Knoll School of the Holy Child, 

Summit, NJ

Jalesah S., Grade 8, Maritime Academy Charter School, 

Philadelphia, PA

Jin Z., Grade 6, Milburn Middle School, Milburn, NJ

2019 Student Art Contest Finalists
Kai C., Grade 4. Weeksville Elementary School, Elizabeth, NC

Leilani C., Grade 1, Weeksville Elementary School, 

Elizabeth, NC

Lila R., Grade 5, Blackrock Elementary School, Coventry RI Tarrika A. Grade 6, Community Middle School, Plainsboro, NJ

2019 Student Art Contest Grand Prize Winners

Brent M., Grade 8, Art Club of Bishop Eldon School, Freeport, 

Grand Bahama Island, Bahamas Lucy Z., Grade 1, Collins Elementary School, Livingston, NJ
**EXHIBIT
10.20**
 **CCC
INFORMATION SERVICES GROUP INC.**
 **MANAGEMENT
INCENTIVE PLAN**
 
 **PLAN
SUMMARY**
 
 
 The
Management Incentive Plan (“MIP”) is an annual, cash incentive program that
applies to the Company’s non-sales, senior mangers who are in roles that have
clear “line of sight” impact on the financial results of CCC Information
Services Group Inc. (the “Company”). MIP participants who are not members of the
Executive Management Group (“EMG”) have fixed incentive targets ranging from 25%
to 35% of salary, based on salary grade. MIP participants who are members of the
EMG have a fixed incentive target of 50% of salary, except for the Chief
Executive Officer, whose target is 75% of salary. Incentives paid under the MIP
vary based on both Company results and an individual performance multiplier of
0% to 130% of target. Individual performance multipliers will be tied to
achievement versus objectives that are aligned with Company operating plan
goals.
 
 The
Compensation and Nominating Committee of the Board of Directors (the
“Committee”) approves the specific Company performance measures and objectives
for each calendar year on an annual basis. After the end of each calendar year,
performance on each component during such year is evaluated separately and the
aggregate, weighted average performance on all components is calculated to
determine overall MIP funding for such calendar year. Final MIP funding is
subject to approval by the Committee, which typically occurs during the first
quarter of following year, and any incentives by MIP participants are paid
following such approval.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Clayetta C. Gonyo, Appellant. Lillian Roberts, as Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

— Mahoney, P. J.

Claimant was employed by a corporation of which her husband was the sole shareholder, officer and director. Her duties included clerical and bookkeeping matters. In such capacity, she wrote most of the corporation’s checks. The business was seasonal and it was closed during the winter. During such period, claimant collected unemployment insurance benefits. Specifically, during the winters of 1980-1981, 1981-1982 and 1982-1983, claimant collected $7,375 in benefits. During the closed periods, claimant continued to write checks for the corporation. After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge found that (1) claimant had not been totally unemployed, (2) claimant had made a willful misrepresentation to obtain benefits, and (3) the benefits received as a result thereof were recoverable. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board affirmed such ruling and this appeal ensued.

The type of checkwriting activity done by claimant has been held to be employment for purposes of the Unemployment Insurance Law *(see, Matter of Valvo [Ross],*57 NY2d 116; *Matter of Barber [Roberts]*121 AD2d 767), such that the Board properly held that claimant was not totally unemployed.

Regarding the finding of false misrepresentation, this is generally a question of fact for the Board *(see, Matter of Maguire [Ross],*54 NY2d 965). In *Valvo*and *Barber,*it was held that certification of no employment where, in fact, some checkwriting had been done did not rise to the level of *885misrepresentation of fact. However, the instant case is distinguishable. The checkwriting was not occasional, but was consistent and routine. Further, it was not done once, but over all three "closed” periods. There is substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusions that willful false statements were made to obtain benefits, and that the benefits were recoverable.

Decision affirmed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Levine, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ramon Madera, Appellant.

— Appeal from judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Berkman, J., at suppression hearing; John A. K. Bradley, J., at trial and sentence), rendered May 6, 1985, which convicted defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree and criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree and sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment of from 2 to 6 years and of six months, is held in abeyance, the order denying defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence without a hearing reversed, and the matter remanded for a *Mapp*hearing.

It was error for the hearing court to summarily deny defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence without holding a *Mapp*hearing, as required by CPL 710.60 (4). Defendant’s motion papers alleged that the police had no reason to stop the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger, since it was being driven, with permission, by the brother of the vehicle’s owner, was being operated in a lawful manner, and defendant and the driver were not engaged in any unlawful or suspicious conduct. Accordingly, defendant argued, the physical evidence seized as a result of that illegal stop must be *239suppressed. The People’s affirmation in opposition asserted that, as a passenger, defendant lacked standing to challenge the stop of the car; he had failed to allege sufficient facts to support a ground for suppression; and, he and the driver were engaged in unlawful activity by riding in a car which had been confiscated by the police.

Assuming the truth of defendant’s claims that he and the driver were legally present in this car, that the car was being driven in a lawful manner and that they were not behaving in any manner which would arouse a police officer’s suspicion, he has raised sufficient facts to support the grant of suppression. *(See, People v Martinez,*111 AD2d 30.)

The People’s claim, that the car had been confiscated with respect to an arrest of other suspects and left parked in front of the 7th Precinct with its coil removed, raised a question of fact as to whether or not the car had in fact been stolen, which would justify the stop of this car and the arrest of its driver and passenger. This disputed issue, however, should have been resolved at an evidentiary hearing. *(See, People v Banks,*100 AD2d 780; *People v McNeil,*55 AD2d 573.)

Finally, defendant, a passenger in the car, had standing to contest the legality of the initial stop and his forcible removal from the car and arrest as an unreasonable seizure of his person subject to 4th Amendment protection. *(People v Abrams,*119 AD2d 682, 683; *People v Dawson,*115 AD2d 611, 612; *People v Smith,*106 AD2d 525, 526; *cf. Rakas v Illinois,*439 US 128, 150-151 [Powell, J., concurring].) Accordingly, we remand for a *Mapp*hearing and hold this appeal in abeyance. Concur — Sandler, J. P., Carro, Asch and Milonas, JJ.
Horn Audition

May 2019

Solo: 

Mozart, Concerto 2 or 4, mvt. 1, exposition only

Excerpts: 

Beethoven, Symphony 3, mvt. 3, horn 2 (Trio – m 205)

Beethoven, Symphony 9, mvt. 3, horn 4 (pick up to 83 – m 99 beat 3)

Bernstein, Overture to Candide, horn 1, (m 122 – m 201)

Brahms, Symphony 3, mvt. 3, horn 1 (F to m 110)

Mahler, Symphony 1, mvt. 3, horn 4 (13 – 15)

Mahler, Symphony 3, mvt. 1, horn 4 (pick up to 55 – five before 57)

Mendelssohn, Symphony 3, mvt. 2, horn 3 (m 189 – m 223) and mvt. 3, horn 3 (pick up 

to m 75 – m 95)

Mozart, Symphony 40, mvt. 3, horn 1 (m 68 – m 84)

Schumann, Symphony 3, mvt. 2 (m 32 – m 48, repeats are good) 

Shostakovich, Symphony 5, mvt. 1 horn 1 (two after 17 – 21)

Strauss, Till Eulenspiegel, horn 1 (m 6 – 1)

Wagner, Short Call (eight after 30 – twenty-nine before 31)

Williams, Superfeats from Superman, horn 1 (m 101 – m 114)

Ensemble Playing:

Beethoven, Symphony 8, mvt. 3, horn 1 and horn 2 (m 44 – m 78)

Hindemith, Symphonic Metamorphosis, mvt. 4, horn 3 (D – eight after E)

Tchaikovsky, Symphony 4, mvt. 1, horn 2 (m 1 – m 20)
Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 16, 2016.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-16-00592-CR

GREGORY HICKMON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 232nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1235748

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant entered a guilty plea to the offense of burglary of a habitation. The 

trial court deferred adjudication of guilt and sentenced appellant on February 9, 

2009, to three years’ deferred adjudication community supervision. The State 

subsequently filed a motion to adjudicate appellant’s guilt. In accordance with a 

plea bargain agreement with the State, the trial court sentenced appellant on May 

26, 2011, to two years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas 
2

Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant’s notice of appeal was not filed until 

July 13, 2016.

A defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after sentence is 

imposed when the defendant has not filed a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. 

P. 26.2(a)(1). A notice of appeal that complies with the requirements of Texas Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 26 is essential to vest the court of appeals with jurisdiction. 

Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). If an appeal is not 

timely perfected, a court of appeals does not obtain jurisdiction to address the 

merits of the appeal. Under those circumstances it can take no action other than to 

dismiss the appeal. Id.

Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Christopher.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>  5
<LEGEND>   This schedule contains summary financial information extracted
           from the Consolidated Balance Sheet and Consolidated Statement of
           Operations included in the Company's Form 10-K for the period ended
           December 31, 1997 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
           such Financial Statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                                         <C>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           Dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                              Jan-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                Dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-TYPE>                               12-MOS
<CASH>                                          5,310
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  12,111
<ALLOWANCES>                                    1,907
<INVENTORY>                                     3,795
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               19,664
<PP&E>                                          2,751
<DEPRECIATION>                                  1,228
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 22,882
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          20,820
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         1
<COMMON>                                           13
<OTHER-SE>                                     (2,353)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   22,882
<SALES>                                        34,202
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               34,202
<CGS>                                          35,712
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  35,712
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               27,840
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (29,021)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (29,021)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (29,021)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  ($2.75)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  ($2.75)


</TABLE>
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12** 
**- 60**  **67**

LARRY WILLIAMS ,

P laintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

OFFICER ROBERTSON; WARDEN MCCALL; MAJOR BUSH; CAROLINE LINDSEY, Staff Attorney; LT. WILLIAMS; LT. EARL; CAPT. ABSTEN; CAPT. TICH; DEBRA BARNWELL; MR. JON OZMINT, Director; STEPHEN R. CLAYTON, Warden ,
Defendants

- Appellee s
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Columbia

. Margaret B. Seymour , Chief District Judge. ( 3: 08

- cv
- 0 3867

- MBS )

Submitted : April 26, 2012 Decided: May 1, 2012

Before GREGORY, AGEE, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Larry Williams, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Larry Williams seeks to appeal the district court’s

text order in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) action , which denied

Williams’ motion for default judgment against Defendants. This
court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28

U.S.C. § 1291 (200 6 ), and certain interlocutory and collateral

orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (200 6 ); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 , 545

- 46 (1949). The

order Williams seeks to appeal is neither a final ord er nor an
appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and

arg ument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### MILLER MANUF’G CO., Appellant, v. KULINSKI et al., Respondents.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department.

September, 1896.)

Action by the Miller Manufacturing Company against Eugene ICulinski and others.

A. Loeser, for appellant.

L. Wertheimer, for respondents.

No opinion. Affirmed upon argument.
#### PEOPLE v. FLAGG.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

November 13, 1896.)

Action by the people against Jared Flagg, Jr.

PER CURIAM.

This is a motion to remit the judgment roll to the clerk of the court of general sessions for amendment. It appears that some of the criticisms upon the part of the appellant in respect to the contents of the judgment roll are well taken. As is claimed by the appellant, the judgment roll does not state the offense of which the defendant was convicted except by reference to the indictment, and such practice seems to have been condemned in the case of People v. O’Neil, 47 Hun, 155. Neither does it appear what disposition was made of the first, third, and fifth counts of the indictment. In all other respects the judgment roll seems to be a substantial compliance with the provisions of the Code. The motion should be granted so far as to remit the judgment roll for correction in the respects to which attention has been called, and denied as to the other matters suggested by the counsel for the appellant.
1 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, 

Complainant, 

vs. 

JEFFREY LOUIS RUDOLPH, JR., 

Respondent. 

_________________________________ 

Docket Number 2023-0398 

CG Enforcement Activity Number 7807314 

CONSENT ORDER 

Issued: December 12, 2023 

By: Honorable George J. Jordan, Administrative Law Judge 

Appearances: 

CWO Andrew Schmitt 

Sector North Carolina 

For the Coast Guard 

Jeffrey Louis Rudolph, Jr., Pro se

For the Respondent 
2 

CONSENT ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 

 On December 5, 2023, the parties in this case submitted a Motion for Approval of 

Settlement Agreement and Entry of Consent Order to be approved as a settlement of the case 

under 33 C.F.R. § 20.502. 

 I have carefully reviewed the terms of the Settlement Agreement and find it is fair and 

reasonable and in substantial compliance with the requirements of 33 C.F.R. § 20.502. 

ORDER 

 Upon consideration of the record, it is hereby ORDERED, the Settlement Agreement is 

APPROVED in full and incorporated herein by reference. This Consent Order shall constitute 

full, final, and complete adjudication of this proceeding. 

SO ORDERED. 

Done and dated December 12, 2023, 

Seattle, Washington 

_______________________________ 

George J. Jordan

Administrative Law Judge 

United States Coast Guard
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-40224

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROLANDO LOPEZ-HERNANDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. B-03-CR-317-ALL

--------------------

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Rolando LopezHernandez concedes that the arguments raised are foreclosed by

circuit precedent but seeks to preserve them for further review. 

The Government has moved for summary affirmance in lieu of filing

an appellee’s brief. The motion is GRANTED, and the judgment of

the district court is AFFIRMED.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 18, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Northwest Pipe Company (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period
ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Stephanie J. Welty, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                              
|----------------------------------------------
|/s/ Stephanie J. Welty                        
|Stephanie J. Welty                            
|Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer
|August 7, 2009