Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

October 20, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice 126594 & (51) Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly FATEN YOUSIF, Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Plaintiff-Appellee, Stephen J. Markman,
Justices v SC: 126594 COA: 246680 Macomb CC: 02-001903-NO WALLED MONA, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

By order of May 13, 2005, this case wa s remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. On ord er of the Court, the Court of Appeals decision on remand having been filed, the applica tion for leave to appeal the June 8, 2004 judgment of the Court of Appeals is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

M ARKMAN , J., dissents and states as follows:
While at defendant’s—her brother’s—hom e, plaintiff tripped on a loose carpet thread loop and injured herself. As a result, she bro ught this action against defendant. The trial court subsequently granted summary disposition in favor of defendant, and the Court of Appeals reversed, conc luding that genuine issues of fact existed. This Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for it to articulate these genuine issues of fact. I dissented, indicating that I would reverse th e judgment of the Court of Appeals and
reinstate the order of the trial court.

On remand, the Court of Ap peals majority held that genuine issues of fact existed regarding “whether the carpet lo op at issue represented an unreasonable ri sk of harm about which defendant had a duty to warn pl aintiff.” The Court of Appeals dissent concluded that “plaintiff has fai led to show that defendant sh ould have realized that the carpet pull in question presented an unreasonable risk of harm requiring a warning by defendant to his guests.”

I agree with the dissent and would revers e the Court of Appeals judgment and
reinstate the order of the trial court for the reasons previously set forth in my dissenting statement, 472 Mich 900 (2005):_______________________________________ __ 2

Because a loose carpet thread lo op is not a “hidden danger,” James v
Albert , 464 Mich 12, 19 (2001), and b ecause a homeowner does not owe an obligation to an invitee to scour his or her premises to ensure that there are no loose carpet thread loops in his or her home, I do not believe that any
“unreasonable risk of harm” wa s posed to the plaintiff. Preston v Sleziak, 383 Mich 442, 453 (1970), ov erruled on other grounds by Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship , 462 Mich 591 (2000). A host “has no duty to reconstruct his premises . . . for t hose accepting his hosp itality. The guest assumes ordinary risks that come with the premises.” Stitt

, supra at 603. A loose carpet thread loop is an ordin ary risk in a carp eted home, and a homeowner has no duty to rid his or her home of every loose carpet thread loop before inviting another for a vis it. Social guests are licensees who “assume the ordinary risks asso ciated with their visit.” James, supra at 19.

As in Barrett v Discount Tire & Battery [472 Mich 9 02 (2005)], the Court of Appeals here lost sight of the fact that legal decisions are designed to increase the predic tability and certainty of ever yday life. Such decisions have practical consequences. What is the appropriate response to the Court of Appeals decision on the part of a reasonable home owner in Michigan (at least one who happens to have a rug or carpet somewhere within his or her premises) who wishes to av oid litigation? Must he or she remove all rugs and carpets from the premises? Must he or she inspect each rug or carpet loop by loop in or der to determine whether any are loose or of an excessive diameter? Must he or she apprise visito rs while they are on the front porch that there is carpeting within the home and that a guest enters at the guest’s own risk? Will a sign w arning of the possi bility of errant carpet loops be sufficient? Will Berber, but not P ersian, rugs and carpets subject homeowners to heightened liability? The Court of Appeals decision would expose homeowners to th e risk of litigation for accidents arising from the most mundane, th e most open and obvious, cond itions of the ordinary home, conditions regarding which there has been no unreas onable conduct at all on the part of the homeowners.

What is the rule of personal conduct and obligation th at the Court of Appeals would impose upon homeowners by its decision in this case?

Y OUNG , J., joins the statement of M ARKMAN , J.

t1017 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 20, 2005

Clerk