alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### J. M. Seeberger v. The United States.

*On the Proofs.*

*The claimant furnishes hoard and rations to volunteers before muster-in. Some of the soldiers so subsisted are subsequently mustered into the service as enlisted men; others are not mustered in; others are mustered in as officers. He produces and offers in evidence vouchers, signed by persons claiming to be officers, but whose official character is not shown, and is disputed.*

I. Under tlie general orders of the AVar Department, issued at the beginning of the rebellion, one who furnished subsistence to volunteer soldiers *406Refore muster-in is entitled to recover for such as were ultimately mustered into the service as enlisted men, but not for those who were never mustered in, or who were mustered in as officers.

II. Vouchers given by persons claiming to bo military officers, but whose official character is disputed, and is not shown, are not competent evidence. The official character of an officer cannot be assumed by the court. Bule XXII imints out the evidence that will be required to estab- , lish it.

*Messrs. Biddle & Leslci*for tbe claimant.

*Mr. T. R.. Talbot*(with whom was tbe *Assistant Attorney General)*for the defendants.

Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In this case the court is of the opinion that the claimant may recover for the subsistence and lodging furnished to volunteer sol- " diers who were subsequently mustered into the sendee of the United States as enlisted men; but that he should not recover for subsistence or lodging furnished to men who were not subsequently mustered into the service, or who were, mustered in as commissioned officers. It is not necessary that the men be identified name by name, but will be sufficient if officers of the regiment or other credible witnesses satisfactorily show that a certain number of the men subsisted and lodged by the claimant were actually mustered into the service of the United States, specifying the time and place, and other circumstances.

There are also vouchers in the record signed by persons claiming to be military officers, but whose official character seems to be disputed by the War Department. This official character cannot be assumed by the court, and Buie XXII expressly forewarns parties of that fact and points out the evidence that will be required to establish it.

Judgment therefore cannot be. rendered, as the case now stands, for a larger amount than three hundred dollars, ($300;) but as the claimant appears to have furnished a much larger amount of subsistence to soldiers of the United States under what he believed to be the authority of their officers, and as, moreover, he appears to have suffered much from the neglect of disbursing officers to examine his accounts at the proper time, he may, if he so elect, within ten days, have the case remanded to the docket.
#### Mohammed Nagib, an Infant, by His Mother and Natural Guardian, Muyassar Nagib, et al., Respondents, v Francisca Tolette-Velcek, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the defendant Francisca Tolette-Velcek appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Clemente, J.), dated April 21, 1986, which, after a hearing, granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss her affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The sole issue at the hearing was whether or not the defendant Dr. Tolette-Velcek was personally served with process at her home in Englewood, New Jersey, on February 16, 1985. The process server, an officer in the Process Division in *73the Sheriff’s office in Bergen County, testified that he appeared at Dr. Tolette-Velcek’s home on the day in question and served her with a copy of the summons and complaint. Moreover, after refreshing his recollection with the affidavit of service, which was recorded contemporaneously with service, the process server offered a description of the individual served. This description more closely resembled that of Dr. Tolette-Velcek than her mother, who testified that she was the person served with process on February 16, 1985.

The court determined that Dr. Tolette-Velcek was personally served with process on the day in question. Inasmuch as this determination was made with the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor, it is entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed unless against the weight of the credible evidence *(see, Altman v Wallach,*104 AD2d 391, 392). We find that the court properly credited the testimony of the process server because the description of the person served more closely matched that of Dr. Tolette-Velcek and it was recorded contemporaneously with service *(see, Old Colony Furniture Co. v Fiegoli,*97 AD2d 790). Thus, under the circumstances, the court correctly held that Dr. Tolette-Velcek was personally served with process on February 16, 1985. Thompson, J. P., Lawrence, Fiber and Spatt, JJ., concur.
#### Dawson, Appellant, v. Egger.

Deed of Trust: redemption by grantor : statute. Under Revised Statutes, section 3298, providing that land sold under a deed of trust and bought in by the *cestui que trust*or his assigns shall be subject to redemption within a year from the date of sale, and section 3299, providing that no party shall have the benefit of the preceding section until he shall have given security for the payment of interest to accrue after sale, such security must be given at the date of the sale.

*Appeal from, Barton Circuit Court.*— Hon. Cuas. G-. Burton, Judge.

Affirmed.

*Buler & Timmonds*for appellant.

(1) The sale was September 15, 1883; full tender and demand to redeem was made about October 15, 1883 ; the statutory bond was given and approved November 28, 1883. This was in time. The statute does not limit the time in which the bond shall be given. R. S. sec. 3299 ; *Johnson v.*Atchison, 90 Mo. 48. The premature execution of the deed by the trustee did not impair the right to redeem. Jones on Mort. (2 Ed.) sec. 1051 ; *Johnson v.*Atchison, 90 Mo. 53. (2) This is a remedial statute; and, being enacted in behalf of the debtor, should be liberally and equitably construed in his favor. 1 Kent Com. [ 12 Ed.] 465 ; *State ex rel v.*Diveling, 66 Mo. 375. The purpose and object of this statute is, to permit the debtor to redeem his land ; and the courts will keep that in view. *Silver v.*Railroad, 78 Mo. 533 ; *Henderson v.*Railroad, 81 Mo. 607.'

*37*Chas. G. Burton*and *Thurman, Wray & Stephens*for respondent.

A party desiring to avail himself of the benefits of R. S. section 3299, should give notice of the fact to the trustee, not later than the conclusion of the sale, and he would be entitled to the current twenty-four hours to have executed and approved the necessary bond ; otherwise, the law requires the trustee to execute to the purchaser, a deed in the same manner and with the same force and effect, as if sections 3298 and 3299 of the Revised Statutes did not exist. *Updike v. Elevator Co.,*96 Mo. 160.

Sherwood, J.

-In order to avail himself of the provisions of section 3298, Revised Statutes, 1879, the person desiring to redeem must give the required security at the date of the sale; otherwise he need not give it until he redeems, when it would be a useless act, an idle ceremony, and leave the purchaser meanwhile without protection as to the subject-matter of his purchase; thus enabling the owner of the land to take his chances ; to remain silent until the last day of the given twelvemonth; and then, if he thought it profitable, to give bond and redeem. Such a construction of the statute would defeat the purposes for which the bond is given, and cannot be accepted as sound. This was the view taken in *Updike v. Elevator Co.,*96 Mo. 160, where sections 3298 and 3299 were discussed. Adhering to the ruling there made, it is decisive, of this cause, renders unnecessary the examination of other points made, and judgment affirmed.

All concur.
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 241 

To amend the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to impose notice 

and a compliance opportunity to be provided before commencement of 

a private civil action. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 9, 2015 

Mr. CALVERT (for himself, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. MCCLINTOCK, Mr. DENHAM, 

Mr. ROHRABACHER, Mr. ROYCE, Mr. LAMALFA, Mr. ISSA, Mr. VALADAO, 

Mr. COOK, Mrs. MIMI WALTERS of California, Mr. NUNES, Ms. JENKINS

of Kansas, Mr. SIMPSON, and Mr. WESTMORELAND) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to 

impose notice and a compliance opportunity to be provided before commencement of a private civil action. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘ACCESS (ADA Com5 pliance for Customer Entry to Stores and Services) Act 

6 of 2015’’. 


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2 

•HR 241 IH

1 SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS. 

2 Section 308(a)(1) of the Americans with Disabilities 

3 Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12188(a)(1)) is amended— 

4 (1) by striking ‘‘PROCEDURES.—’’ and all that 

5 follows through ‘‘The’’, and inserting the following: 

6 ‘‘PROCEDURES.— 

7 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subpara8 graph (B), the’’, and 

9 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

10 ‘‘(B) STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO ENTRY

11 INTO EXISTING PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS.—A 

12 civil action for discrimination under section 

13 302(b)(2) based on the failure to remove a 

14 structural barrier to entry into an existing pub15 lic accommodation may not be commenced by a 

16 person aggrieved by such discrimination un17 less— 

18 ‘‘(i) such person has provided to the 

19 owner or operator of such accommodation 

20 a written notice specific enough to allow 

21 such owner or operator to identify such 

22 barrier; and 

23 ‘‘(ii) beginning on the date such no24 tice was received and— 

25 ‘‘(I) before the expiration of 60 

26 days after such date, such owner or 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 241 IH

1 operator failed to provide to such per2 son a written description outlining im3 provements that will be made to re4 move such barrier; or 

5 ‘‘(II)(aa) before the expiration of 

6 60 days after such date, such owner 

7 or operator provided such description 

8 to such person; and 

9 ‘‘(bb) before the expiration of 

10 120 days after such description is pro11 vided, such owner or operator failed to 

12 remove such barrier.’’. 

13 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

14 This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall 

15 take effect on the 1st day of the 1st month beginning more 

16 than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2420 

To reduce administrative burdens on researchers. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 19, 2015 

Mr. BARTON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To reduce administrative burdens on researchers. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS OF RE4 SEARCHERS. 

5 (a) IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES TO REDUCE

6 ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS.—The Director of the Na7 tional Institutes of Health shall implement measures to 

8 reduce the administrative burdens of researchers funded 

9 by the National Institutes of Health, taking into account 

10 the recommendations, evaluations, and plans researched 

11 by the following entities: 

12 (1) The Scientific Management Review Board. 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2420 IH

1 (2) The National Academy of Sciences. 

2 (3) The 2007 and 2012 Faculty Burden Survey 

3 conducted by The Federal Demonstration Partner4 ship. 

5 (4) Relevant recommendations from the Re6 search Business Models Working Group. 

7 (b) REPORTS.—The Director of the National Insti8 tutes of Health shall submit to Congress a report on the 

9 extent to which the Director has implemented measures 

10 pursuant to subsection (a). 

Æ 


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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

Complainant 

VS. 

ARLAN TYRONE REEVES, 

Respondent 

Docket Number CG S&R 06-0596 

CG Activity No. 2813196 

ORDER GRANTING COAST GUARD'S 

MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

AND 

ORDER OF REVOCATION 

Issued : Aoril5.2007 

Issued by: 

ANTHONY B. CANORRO 

Administrative Law Judge 

Investieating Officer: 

LTJG Otis A. Barrett 

Sector Delaware Bay, Philadelphia, PA 

Piesoondent. 

Arian T. Reeves 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

- AND 

SANCTION OF REVOCATION 

On February 27,2007, Sector Delaware Bay filed a Motion for Default Order seeking 

revocation of the Respondent's Merchant Mariner's Document, which Motion is incorporated 

herein by reference and made a part hereof. A copy of the Motion for Default was sent to 

Respondent via DHL (express courier service) and received by Respondent as evidenced by the 

tracking history results of DHL. Coast Guard also submitted to the wurt a Return of Service for 

Default Motion and an accompanying statement that LTJG Otis Barrett of Sector Delaware 

confirmed service of the Motion of Default via a telephone call with Respondent on March 2, 

2007 and again when Respondent made a personal visit to Sector Delaware on March 19,2007 

where he signed a Lost LicenseIDocument AIEdavit. 

On March 28,2007, this S&R proceeding was assigned to undersigned for adjudication of 

the Motion for Default. The matter was taken under advisement and a complete review of this 

case was made. According to the case file, a copy of the original Complaint, dated December 13, 

2006, was served personally on the Respondent on that same date. 

To date, Respondent has neither filed an Answer as required by 33 CFR 20.308, nor a 

response to tbe Motion for Default as required by 33 CFR 20.310@). 

Upen consideration of the present record the Motion for Default is GRAIYTED. A 

default constitutes an admission of all facts alleged in the Complaint and a waiver of the 

Respondent's right to a hearing. (33 CFR 5 20.310(c)). 

Merefore, it is 
SANCTION 

ORDERED that your Merchant Mariner's Document is hereby REVOKED. You 

must deposit your document to the Coast Guard. If you knowingly continue to use your 

document, you may be subject to criminal prosecution. The court is in receipt of a Lost 

License/Document Aftidavit that Respondent has executed, dated March 19,2007, attesting 

to the loss of his Merchant Mariner's Document. 

Under 33 CFR 20.31O(e) for good cause shown, an Administrative Law Judge may set 

aside this finding of Default. You may file a motion to set aside the fmdiing with the ALJ 

Docketing Center, Baltimore. 

Service of this Order of Revocation upon you serves to notifl you of your right to appeal 

as set forth in 33 CFR Subpart J, Section 20.1001. (Attachment A). 

Dated: April 5,2007. 

& 

ANTHO B. CANORRO 

~dmingrative Law Judge
Modification Agreement (Commercial). ,

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loan number
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Modification Agreement dated March 28, 2003, by and between Patient Infosystems,
Inc. ("Debtor ") and Wells Fargo Bank, National Association,("Bank"),modifying a
note or contract  dated June 28,  2002,  in the original  principal  amount of $
3,000,000.00 ("Note").

The principal balance outstanding as of the date of this Modification  Agreement
is $ 3,000,000.

1.   The parties hereby agree to modify the Note as follows:

     A.   EXTENSION OF MATURITY.  Upon payment of accrued interest herewith of
          $14,842.25.

     X The maturity date of the Note is hereby extended to January 2, 2004, when
     the  entire  balance  of unpaid  principal  and  interest  shall be due and
     payable in full. Prior to such date,  borrower shall pay interest  pursuant
     to the terms of the Note.

2.   Each  provision  above  for  which  a box is  checked  forms a part of this
     Modification Agreement.

3.   Except  as  stated  above,  all  other  terms of the  Note and all  related
     documents including but not limited to contracts,  security agreements,  or
     mortgages shall remain unchanged and in full force and effect.

IMPORTANT:  READ BEFORE SIGNING THE AGREEMENT(S)  ACCOMPANYING THIS NOTICE.  THE
TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT(S)  SHOULD BE READ CAREFULLY  BECAUSE ONLY THOSE TERMS IN
WRITING ARE  ENFORCEABLE.  NO OTHER TERMS OR ORAL  PROMISES NOT CONTAINED IN THE
WRITTEN  CONTRACT(S)  MAY BE LEGALLY  ENFORCED.  YOU MAY CHANGE THE TERMS OF THE
AGREEMENT(S) ONLY BY ANOTHER WRITTEN AGREEMENT.  THIS NOTICE ALSO APPLIES TO ANY
OTHER CREDIT AGREEMENTS (EXCEPT CONSUMER LOANS OR OTHER EXEMPT TRANSACTIONS) NOW
IN EFFECT BETWEEN YOU AND THIS LENDER.

DEBTOR ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS MODIFICATION AGREEMENT.

Bank name: Wells Fargo Bank,          Debtor:  Patient Infosystems, Inc.
           National Association

By: /s/Elizabeth M. Emde               By: /s/ Kent A. Tapper
    --------------------------------      ---------------------------------

Its: Assistant Vice President          Its: Vice President
    --------------------------------       --------------------------------
#### WHEELER, Respondent, v. WATERTOWN ST. RY. CO., Appellant.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Fourth Department.

May 18, 1894.)

Action by Jane E. Wheeler, as administratrix, etc., against the Watertown Street Railway Company.

Argued before HARDIN, P. J., and MARTIN and MERWIN, JJ.

No opinion. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**








**CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
      2002**





I,
      Michael Lewis, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report
      of
      eLinear, Inc. on Form 10-QSB/A (Second Amendment) for the quarterly period
      ended
      June 30, 2005, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such
      Form
      10-QSB/A fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and
      results of operations of eLinear, Inc.





Date:
      April 11, 2006











By:
      _/s/  Michael Lewis_______


Michael
      Lewis


Chief
      Executive Officer
#### ROCHESTER DISTILLING CO. v. DEVENDORF.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department.

January 18, 1894.)

Action by the Rochester Distilling Company against Stewart L. Devendorf.

No opinion. Motion for reargument or for leave to appeal to the court of appeals denied. See 25 N. Y. Supp. 529.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">Reliable Wool Stock LLC, Petitioner-Landlord<br><br>against<br><br>117-119 Leasing Corp. Respondent-Tenant-Respondent.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Landlord appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County (John J. Kelley, J.), entered November 16, 2017, which (1) granted tenant's in limine motion to the extent of limiting issues at trial of alleged insurance defaults to the period of September 2013 to December 18, 2013, in a holdover summary proceeding and (2) denied landlord's in limine cross motion to limit the trial to the sole issue of whether tenant defaulted by violating the noncurable insurance coverage requirements of the governing lease and to preclude the tenant from offering at trial any evidence with regard to matters unrelated to the aforementioned noncurable insurance violations.</p><p>Per Curiam.</p><p>Order (John J. Kelley, J.), entered November 16, 2017, insofar as appealable, affirmed, with $10 costs.</p><p>Landlord's cross motion to limit the scope of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case at trial was properly denied. Required elements of landlord's prima facie case, including the validity and legal sufficiency of its termination of the lease, were not previously established. Supreme Court's determination denying tenant's application for <i>Yellowstone</i> relief on the ground that tenant's failure to obtain insurance was not curable (<i>see 117-119 Leasing Corp. v Reliable Wool Stock, LLC</i>, 2015 WL 1387856 [Sup Ct, NY County, March 25, 2015, Singh, J.], <i>affd </i>139 AD3d 420, 421 [2016]) was not an adjudication on the merits of the validity of landlord's termination of the lease and does not constitute law of the case (<i>see 875 W. 181 Owners Corp. v. KB Gallery, LLC</i>, 124 AD3d 549, 550 [2015]; <i>see also Curry v. 365 W. 19th St. Owners Corp.</i>, 249 AD2d 82 [1998]).</p><p>Landlord is not aggrieved by so much of the underlying order as granted tenant's motion to limit, by date, the scope of the alleged insurance defaults at issue, because that portion of the order indicates on its face that it was entered based upon landlord's concession (<i>see Matter of Brouwer v Pacicca</i>, 291 AD2d 448, 449 [2002]; CPLR 5511). To the extent that landlord argues that the order was not made on consent, its remedy is to move in Civil Court to vacate or resettle the order (<i>id.; Nayman v Remsen Apts</i>., 125 AD2d 378, 382 [1986], <i>lv denied</i> 70 NY2d 601 [1987]). Thus, landlord's appeal from that portion of the order must be dismissed.</p><p>THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.</p><br>I concur I concur I concur<br>Decision Date: July 02, 2018<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_1_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
#### Chaskie J. Rosenberg, Appellant, v Metlife, Inc., et al., Respondents.

Submitted December 18, 2006;

decided January 9, 2007

Motion by National Employment Lawyers Association/New York for an order permitting movant to participate in oral argument on consideration of the certified question denied.
[861 NE2d 102, 828 NYS2d 287]

#### Maria C. Cruz, Appellant, v New York City Transit Authority, Respondent.

Decided January 9, 2007

*826APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Ephrem J. Wertenteil,*New York City, for appellant.

*Wallace D. Gossett,*Brooklyn, and *Anita Isola*for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order affirmed, with costs, for the reasons stated in the memorandum by the Appellate Division (31 AD3d 688 [2006]).

Concur: Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott.
CERTIFICATION OF ANNUAL REPORT


     Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of
the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  each of the  undersigned  officers of Patient
Infosystems, Inc. (the "Company"), certifies that:

(1)  the Annual  Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended  December
     31, 2003 (the  "Report")  fully complies with the  requirements  of Section
     13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities  Exchange  Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.  78m or
     78o(d)); and

(2)  the information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Dated:   March 31, 2003      /s/Roger L. Chaufournier
      -----------------      ---------------------------------------------------
                                      Roger L. Chaufournier
                                      Chief Executive Officer


Dated:   March 31, 2003      /s/Kent A. Tapper
      -----------------      ---------------------------------------------------
                                          Kent A. Tapper
                                      Principal Accounting Officer

     This  certification  is made  solely for the  purpose of 18 U.S.C.  Section
1350, subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other
purpose.

NWK3: 681519.01