IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

EDWARD STANCIL,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN MATEO COUNTY,

Respondent;

CITY OF REDWOOD CITY,

Real Party in Interest.

S253783

First Appellate District, Division Four

A156100

San Mateo County Superior Court

18UDL00903

May 3, 2021

Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 

Kruger, Groban and Jenkins concurred concurred.
1

STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT

S253783

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

Because tenants and landlords have differing interests, 

they can disagree sharply about the nature of their relationship

and sometimes engender disputes that end up in court. When 

that happens, certain sections of the Code of Civil Procedure —

commonly known as the Unlawful Detainer Act (Code Civ. Proc.,

§§ 1159–1179a1) — govern the procedures for resolving many of 

the most common legal disputes between landlords and tenants.

In particular, the Unlawful Detainer Act addresses a 

fundamental issue in the landlord-tenant relationship: a

tenant’s peaceful possession of real property leased from a 

landlord. Given society’s interest in swiftly resolving the

balance between a tenant’s right to enjoy leased real property 

without disturbance and a landlord’s right to ownership income, 

unlawful detainer actions advance quickly — and the relevant 

statutes impose shorter procedural timelines than the ones 

governing other civil actions. These proceedings are limited in 

scope and demand strict adherence to the statutes’ procedural 

requirements. At the center of this dispute is the use of a motion 

to quash service of summons under section 418.10 to challenge 

an unlawful detainer complaint. 

The landlord in this case is the City of Redwood City (the 

City), which operates Docktown Marina (Docktown). The City 

1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the 

Code of Civil Procedure. 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

3

filed a complaint in unlawful detainer against a tenant of 

Docktown, Edward Stancil. In response, Stancil filed a motion 

to quash service of summons, relying on Delta Imports, Inc. v. 

Municipal Court (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1036 (Delta 

Imports), in which the Court of Appeal concluded that a “motion 

to quash service is the only method by which the defendant can 

test whether the complaint states a cause of action for unlawful 

detainer and, thereby supports a five-day summons.” The City 

opposed the motion to quash, relying on a more recent case, 

Borsuk v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2015) 242 

Cal.App.4th 607 (Borsuk), which disagreed with this statement 

in Delta Imports. We granted review to decide whether a 

defendant may use a motion to quash service of summons 

pursuant to section 418.10 to challenge a complaint on the 

ground that it fails to state a cause of action for unlawful 

detainer. 

What we conclude is that a defendant may not use a 

motion to quash service of summons to dispute the truth of the 

allegations contained in an unlawful detainer complaint. 

Rather, a motion to quash under section 418.10, subdivision 

(a)(1) is a limited procedural tool to contest personal jurisdiction 

over the defendant where the statutory requirements for service 

of process are not fulfilled. In the unlawful detainer context, a 

defendant may contest personal jurisdiction where the five-day 

summons specific to unlawful detainer actions is not supported 

by a complaint for unlawful detainer. Such instances are 

unusual, and arise only where the summons is served alongside 

a complaint for a completely different cause of action (e.g., 

breach of contract) or a complaint that fails to allege the 

allegations necessary to assert the defendant is guilty of

unlawful detainer as specified in the relevant subdivision of 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

4

section 1161. In these rare and limited circumstances, a 

defendant may use a motion to quash to challenge the unlawful 

detainer five-day summons as improper. But no defendant may 

use a motion to quash service of summons as a means of

disputing the merits of the unlawful detainer complaint’s 

allegations or to argue the plaintiff failed to comply with the 

pleading requirements specific to unlawful detainer actions set 

out in section 1166. 

Here, the superior court correctly found that Stancil 

improperly lodged his motion to quash to dispute the truth of

the City’s allegations concerning its legal relationship with 

Stancil. A defendant who disputes the veracity of an allegation 

in a complaint can file an answer to the complaint. (§ 430.10, 

subd. (b).) But because a motion to quash is not the proper 

procedure to litigate the merits of an unlawful detainer claim, 

we affirm the Court of Appeal’s denial of writ relief from the 

superior court’s order denying Stancil’s motion to quash. 

I.

On September 21, 2018, the City filed a summons and 

complaint in unlawful detainer against Stancil. The complaint 

alleged that in July 2013, the City as operator and manager of 

Docktown, gave Stancil the right to use a berth for residential 

purposes. The original term of the “Live Aboard Rental

Agreement” was for 12 months; after expiration of the initial 

term, the agreement renewed on a month-to-month basis, 

terminable by the City upon 60 days’ notice. 

In December 2016, the City Council of Redwood City 

adopted the “Docktown Plan,” which provided relocation 

assistance to eligible Docktown residents through financial 

assistance and relocation advisory services, and also detailed 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

5

the process for terminating residential use at Docktown. Some 

Docktown residents accepted the relocation benefits and 

assistance, but others — including Stancil — remained. 

The City served Stancil a 60-day notice to quit and 

surrender possession of the premises pursuant to sections 1946 

and 1946.1. Stancil refused to surrender the premises during 

the 60-day period, so the City filed a complaint for unlawful 

detainer, requesting judgment for possession and damages for 

each day Stancil remained in the berth at the fair value rate of 

$17.19 per day. 

In response, Stancil filed a motion to quash under section 

418.10. Stancil argued only the port department — and not the 

City — had jurisdiction over Docktown and authority to sue him 

in unlawful detainer. Relying on Delta Imports, Stancil asserted 

that a motion to quash was the proper procedure to raise a 

challenge on these grounds. 

In its opposition, the City argued that a motion to quash 

may only be used to challenge personal jurisdiction and cannot 

be used to attack a complaint for failure to state a claim. The 

City maintained that Borsuk expressly disapproved Delta 

Imports and controlled. 

Following a hearing on the motion, the superior court 

denied Stancil’s motion to quash and concluded his challenge to 

the City’s complaint had to be raised on demurrer. Stancil

requested an immediate stay, which the Appellate Division of 

the Superior Court of San Mateo County denied. Stancil then 

filed a petition for writ of mandate and prohibition challenging

the superior court’s order in the Court of Appeal, which was 

summarily denied. He subsequently filed a petition for review 

with this court, which we granted, limiting the issue for our 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

6

determination to whether a motion to quash service of summons 

is the proper remedy to test whether a complaint states a cause 

of action for unlawful detainer. 

II.

The parties in this case disagree about how an unlawful 

detainer defendant may use a motion to quash service of 

summons under section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1). Stancil 

argues a defendant may use a motion to quash to challenge

personal jurisdiction where an unlawful detainer complaint is 

defective in any manner, including when an allegation in the 

complaint is not true. In contrast, the City contends a motion to 

quash is not the proper procedure to challenge whether an 

unlawful detainer complaint states a cause of action. We resolve 

this disagreement by first considering the distinctive role of 

motions to quash service of summons in our system of civil 

procedure, before turning to unlawful detainer actions.

A.

Ordinarily, a court gains jurisdiction over the defendant 

from the time the defendant is served with a copy of the 

summons and the complaint on which it’s based, as required 

under the Code of Civil Procedure. (§§ 410.50, 412.20; Honda 

Motor Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048 

(Honda Motor Co.); Stamps v. Superior Court (1971) 14 

Cal.App.3d 108, 110.) The summons provides the defendant 

notice that the action described in the accompanying complaint 

has been filed against them in court. A valid summons must 

contain information such as the title of the court in which the 

action is pending, the names of the parties, and a direction that 

the defendant file a written pleading in response to the 

complaint within 30 days after the summons is served. (§ 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

7

412.20, subd. (a).) In the distinctive context of unlawful 

detainer, the summons must also adhere to section 1167, which 

subjects defendants to a drastically abbreviated, five-day 

response time. (§ 1167, subd. (a).) 

Animating this dispute is the possibility that a motion to 

quash can interfere with the speedy adjudication of an unlawful 

detainer claim. Using such a motion, a defendant makes a 

special appearance for the narrow purpose of contesting 

personal jurisdiction where the summons is defective. (Greene 

v. Municipal Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 446, 451 (Greene); 2 

Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2020) Jurisdiction, § 217.) A 

plaintiff who files a claim for unlawful detainer has the 

substantial benefit of an expedited timeframe for the 

defendant’s response. For the defendant, a motion to quash 

offers a potential reprieve from this expedited procedure. 

Pursuant to section 418.10, filing a motion to quash extends the 

defendant’s time to respond to the complaint. (§ 418.10, subd. 

(b).) And a motion to quash offers defendants procedural 

advantages a demurrer or an appeal of an unlawful detainer 

judgment cannot. Writ review is generally unavailable to 

challenge a trial court’s decision denying a demurrer. (§§ 1086, 

1103; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 

Cal.4th 893, 912–913 & fn. 17.) But when a trial court denies a 

motion to quash service of summons, a defendant can file a 

petition for writ of mandate in the reviewing court, which 

effectively stays the action and extends the defendant’s time to 

respond until after the reviewing court rules on the petition, 

thereby granting the defendant additional time to remain in 

their residence. (§ 418.10, subd. (c); Butenschoen v. Flaker 

(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th Supp. 10, 14.) A defendant appealing an 

unlawful detainer judgment is not automatically entitled to a 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

8

stay of proceedings. (§ 1176, subd. (a).) If the court grants the 

stay, the defendant must also pay the monthly rental value to 

the court as a condition of issuing the stay. (Ibid.) In this way, 

a motion to quash — and the subsequent writ review of its denial 

— offers an appealing alternative procedure for defendants 

concerned that their stay request may be denied or that they are 

unable to make monthly payments to the court as a condition of 

the stay. 

What Stancil contends here is that any defect in a 

complaint renders the unlawful detainer five-day summons 

invalid. He urges this court to expand the scope of a motion to 

quash far beyond its typical application. But neither the

statutory language nor any other indicia of section 418.10’s 

purpose support Stancil’s broad assertion. 

A defendant may serve and file a motion to quash only for 

limited purposes. (§ 418.10, subd. (a)(1).) Nothing in the

statutory language turns a motion to quash into a handy allpurpose tool for taking on the factual support for particular 

causes of action or the merits of a complaint, as Stancil suggests. 

Why exactly we should understand section 418.10’s language or 

purpose to encompass challenges to any conceivable defect in an 

unlawful detainer complaint is not something Stancil 

persuasively explains. 

We find no support for such a construction. Before the 

Legislature enacted the statutory provisions governing motions 

to quash service of summons, litigants had to specially appear 

and carefully limit their personal jurisdiction challenges, or risk 

making a general appearance. In 1955, the Legislature enacted 

former section 416.1 et seq., which established a statutory 

motion to quash service of summons and provided an automatic 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

9

extension of time for the moving party to plead pending the final 

determination of the motion to quash before the trial or 

appellate court. (Stats. 1955, ch. 1452, § 1, p. 2639; Stats. 1955,

ch. 1452, § 3, p. 2640; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra,

Jurisdiction, § 217.) The purpose of this legislative action was 

to correct inadequacies in the law obstructing litigants from 

raising jurisdictional objections early in litigation. (McCorkle v.

City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252, 257; Note, Special 

Appearance in California (1958) 10 Stan. L.Rev. 711, 712.) 

The “obvious purpose” of former sections 416.1 to 416.3

was to permit the defendant to challenge personal jurisdiction 

without waiving the right to defend on the merits. (Hartford v. 

Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 447, 452.) Former sections 

416.1 to 416.3 were repealed in 1969 and their essential 

provisions were transferred to current section 418.10. (See 

Stats. 1969, ch. 1610.) At no point has the statutory procedure 

to quash service of summons included broad authorization to 

employ the statute to challenge defects in the complaint as 

opposed to the summons. Essentially, Stancil contends that in 

unlawful detainer cases, defendants can use a motion to quash 

for purposes not authorized by section 418.10’s language or 

purpose. We find no support for Stancil’s position under the 

statutory provisions or doctrine governing motions to quash, so 

we examine whether the Unlawful Detainer Act justifies 

Stancil’s rationale. 

B.

The Unlawful Detainer Act governs the procedure for

landlords and tenants to resolve disputes about who has the 

right to possess real property. (Losornio v. Motta (1998) 67 

Cal.App.4th 110, 113; Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT

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10

Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 480.) Given the need for quick,

peaceful resolutions of unlawful detainer actions, the statutory 

procedures must be strictly adhered to, including the stringent 

requirements for service, notice, and filing deadlines.2 (Larson 

v. City and County of San Francisco (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 

1263, 1297; Kwok v. Bergren (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 596, 599–

600 (Kwok).) As particularly relevant here, within five days of 

service of the complaint and summons, the defendant must 

respond to the complaint with an answer, motion to quash 

service of summons for lack of jurisdiction, motion to stay or 

dismiss the action for inconvenient forum, motion to dismiss, or 

demurrer. (§§ 1167, 1167.3, 1167.4, 418.10, 1170.) 

Stancil asserts a motion to quash service of summons is 

the proper procedure to challenge personal jurisdiction where

an unlawful detainer complaint contains any defect or its 

allegations are not true. Neither the purpose nor the provisions 

of the Unlawful Detainer Act support Stancil’s broad contention. 

A plaintiff may file an unlawful detainer complaint under 

certain circumstances detailed in section 1161. (Bawa v. 

Terhune (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 5 [“A tenant is guilty of 

an unlawful detainer and may be properly evicted only when the 

landlord proves the tenant falls within at least one of the 

enumerated circumstances” set forth in § 1161].) Section 1161 

specifies a tenant of real property is guilty of unlawful detainer 

2

In contrast to general civil proceedings, the normal 

pretrial time periods prescribed by the unlawful detainer 

statutes are shorter for a variety of procedures, including the 

time to file a responsive pleading to the complaint, respond to 

motions to quash and for summary judgment, conduct discovery, 

and set the action for trial. (§§ 1167, 1167.3, 1167.4, 1170.5, 

1170.8.) 
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only in specific circumstances, where the tenant: fails to vacate 

after their termination as an employee, agent, or licensee (§ 

1161, subd. 1; Vargas v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 902, 

906–907); is in default for nonpayment of rent (§ 1161, subd. 2; 

Kruger v. Reyes (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10, 16); breaches 

a material term of the lease (§ 1161, subd. 3; Boston LLC v. 

Juarez (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 75, 80); commits waste, allows a 

nuisance on the premises, or uses the premises for an unlawful 

purpose (§ 1161, subd. 4; Freeze v. Brinson (1991) 3 Cal.App.4th 

Supp. 1, 3–4); or fails to deliver possession to the landlord after 

having given written notice of their intention to terminate (§ 

1161, subd. 5). For a complaint to sound in unlawful detainer, 

it must allege the tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer under

section 1161.

The Unlawful Detainer Act also sets out pleading 

requirements specific to unlawful detainer claims. The 

complaint must be verified; set forth the facts on which the 

plaintiff seeks to recover; describe the real property with 

reasonable certainty; state the amount of rent in default, if 

applicable; and specifically state the method of service of notice 

of termination. (§ 1166, subd. (a)(1)–(5).) 3 

3 A lessor must provide the tenant a three-day notice to pay 

rent or quit, and proper service of that notice is an essential 

prerequisite to a judgment in the lessor’s favor pursuant to 

section 1161, subdivision 2. (Palm Property Investments, LLC v. 

Yadegar (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425.) The plaintiff may 

not obtain judgment for possession absent evidence the notice 

was properly served in compliance with the requirements of 

section 1162. (Liebovich v. Shahrokhkhany (1997) 56 

Cal.App.4th 511, 513.) 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

12

No provision of the Unlawful Detainer Act expressly 

authorizes a defendant to use a motion to quash to challenge any 

defect contained in an unlawful detainer complaint, such as 

failure to comply with section 1166’s pleading requirements. 

Even section 1167.4, which pertains to motions to quash service 

of summons, specifies only the time restrictions for a defendant 

to make, file, and serve the motion. This provision expressly 

references motions as provided for in section 418.10, subdivision 

(a), but does not set forth any alternative grounds on which a 

defendant may file a motion to quash to challenge any defect in 

an unlawful detainer complaint. (§ 1167.4.) We find no support 

in the Unlawful Detainer Act for Stancil’s broad assertion that 

a motion to quash service of summons affords a defendant a 

means through which to challenge any conceivable defect on the 

face of an unlawful detainer complaint, let alone the veracity of 

the plaintiff’s allegations. 

C.

The unique context of unlawful detainer does not 

transform a motion to quash to encompass challenges to the 

merits of a complaint, as Stancil suggests. Instead, the motion 

to quash remains a limited procedural tool appropriate where 

the court lacks personal jurisdiction because the statutory 

requirements for service of process are not fulfilled or the

summons is defective. (§§ 410.50, 412.20; Honda Motor Co., 

supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048.) A defendant may not use a 

motion to quash service of summons under section 418.10, 

subdivision (a)(1) to contest any conceivable defect or the merits 

of the allegations contained in an unlawful detainer complaint. 

A defendant may instead make use of other motions: a 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

13

demurrer, motion to strike, or answer.4 Our conclusion is 

grounded in a sensible reading of the relevant statutes and the 

case law addressing motions to quash in the unlawful detainer 

context. 

What we also conclude is that a defendant may file a

motion to quash under section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1) for lack 

of personal jurisdiction where the unlawful detainer five-day 

summons is defective because it is not supported by the 

accompanying complaint. Personal jurisdiction is conferred only 

where the statutory requirements for service of process are 

fulfilled, so an unlawful detainer defendant may use a motion to 

quash a defective summons. (See MJS Enterprises, Inc. v. 

Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 555, 557 [explaining that 

“[s]ervice of a substantially defective summons does not confer 

jurisdiction over a party”].) Valid service of process in an 

unlawful detainer case requires that the plaintiff serve on the 

defendant the five-day summons unique to unlawful detainer 

cases alongside a complaint that pleads a claim for unlawful 

detainer as defined in section 1161. No unlawful detainer

summons — and no five-day response timeline — is possible if 

4 For example, a defendant who decides to waive the 

opportunity to contest personal jurisdiction may instead file a 

demurrer or answer to challenge a complaint for failure to state 

facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (§ 430.10, subd. 

(e).) More specifically, a defendant may object to a complaint 

that does not adhere to the pleading requirements of section 

1166 by demurrer. (§ 430.30, subd. (a).) A defendant seeking to 

challenge the factual allegations contained in an unlawful 

detainer complaint may do so with an answer. (§ 430.30, subd. 

(b).) And, a defendant who does not consent to the court’s 

jurisdiction may file a motion to quash and simultaneously 

answer, demur, or move to strike the complaint. (§ 418.10, subd. 

(e).) 
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it’s supported by a complaint that, for example, only alleges a 

completely different cause of action, such as a contract or tort 

claim rather than an unlawful detainer claim. 

The abbreviated five-day summons period obviously 

provides a great benefit to the unlawful detainer plaintiff. But 

the statute conferring that benefit also constrains. A plaintiff 

who does not assert an unlawful detainer action in accordance 

with the requirements of section 1161 may not take advantage 

of the accelerated summons period exclusive to unlawful 

detainer claims. (See Greene, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d 446, 451–

452 [explaining the unlawful detainer five-day summons was 

inappropriate in that case “because the complaint, if it states a 

cause of action at all, states it on a theory other than unlawful 

detainer”].) An unlawful detainer action “ ‘is a statutory 

proceeding and is governed solely by the provisions of the 

statute creating it’ ” so a plaintiff’s action to recover possession 

of real property is only an action for unlawful detainer where 

the plaintiff strictly follows the statutory requirements. (Kwok, 

supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 600.) Where a complaint lacks even 

the allegations minimally necessary to meet the requirements 

for unlawful detainer claims under section 1161, the complaint

cannot support the five-day summons unique to unlawful 

detainer actions. Because the use of the unlawful detainer fiveday summons would then be unauthorized, such summons, even 

if properly served, would not confer personal jurisdiction. In 

these circumstances, the defendant may decide to use a motion 

to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction to challenge the 

unlawful detainer five-day summons as improper because it was 

served alongside a complaint that does not allege an unlawful 

detainer claim as defined in section 1161. What a defendant 

may not do is deploy a motion to quash to dispute the merits of 
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the complaint’s allegations or argue the complaint fails to satisfy 

the requirements of section 1166.

Our conclusion also harmonizes the existing case law 

addressing challenges to personal jurisdiction based on defects 

in an unlawful detainer complaint or summons. Stancil urges 

us to conclude that Delta Imports authorizes his expansive 

interpretation that a motion to quash may be used to challenge 

any defect in an unlawful detainer complaint. We decline to 

adopt Stancil’s position and instead conclude a defendant may 

choose to use a motion to quash to challenge an unlawful 

detainer five-day summons served alongside a complaint that 

does not allege an unlawful detainer claim under section 1161.

Delta Imports and other subsequent appellate decisions 

approved of defendants using motions to quash service of 

summons to challenge unlawful detainer complaints. (Parsons 

v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1; Garber v. 

Levit (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1.) But commentators and 

practitioners alike have addressed the tension between Delta

Imports and the more recent decision in Borsuk, which expressly 

disagreed with Delta Imports’ holding that a “defendant can test 

whether the complaint states a cause of action for unlawful 

detainer and, thereby supports a five-day summons.” (Delta 

Imports, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 1036; Weil & Brown Cal. 

Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) 

4:417.) 

In Delta Imports, the defendants filed a motion to quash 

service of summons arguing the complaint could not support the 

five-day unlawful detainer summons. (Delta Imports, supra, 

146 Cal.App.3d at p. 1035.) The Court of Appeal explained that 

where a plaintiff claims the defendant breached the lease, the 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

16

unlawful detainer complaint must also allege the plaintiff’s 

compliance with the notice requirements of section 1161, 

subdivision 3. (Delta Imports, at p. 1036.) The Court of Appeal

examined the face of the complaint and determined it did not 

contain any of the allegations regarding notice as required by 

section 1161, subdivision 3. (Delta Imports, at p. 1036.) Under 

the circumstances of that case, the Court of Appeal concluded 

the complaint was not one for unlawful detainer, and therefore 

could not support the five-day summons. (Id. at pp. 1035–1036.) 

The Court of Appeal remanded the case and directed the 

superior court to issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing 

the municipal court to quash service of process on the plaintiffs. 

(Id. at p. 1037.) 

What the Court of Appeal reasoned in its brief opinion is 

that “[a] motion to quash service is the only method by which 

the defendant can test whether the complaint states a cause of 

action for unlawful detainer and, thereby, supports a five-day 

summons.” (Delta Imports, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 1036.) 

Stancil erroneously reads this statement as other unlawful 

detainer defendants sometimes have: as authorizing a 

defendant to challenge a complaint using a motion to quash. 

This abridged reading erroneously focuses on testing the 

complaint and ignores the Court of Appeal’s conclusion

regarding the propriety of the five-day summons. A careful 

reading of Delta Imports reveals the Court of Appeal deemed the 

motion to quash appropriate because the underlying complaint

did not adhere to the requirements set forth in section 1161, 

subdivision 3. The complaint at issue was not one for unlawful 

detainer and could not support issuance of the unlawful detainer 

five-day summons. 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

17

Delta Imports relied on Greene, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d 446. 

The Court of Appeal in Greene held that an unlawful detainer 

five-day summons did not confer personal jurisdiction when the 

accompanying complaint — though labeled as a complaint for 

unlawful detainer — in fact alleged nothing more than a claim 

for breach of a contract for the purchase of real property. (Id. at 

p. 449.) The Greene court reasoned the plaintiff improperly used 

the section 1167 unlawful detainer five-day summons alongside 

a complaint that pled something “other than unlawful detainer.” 

(Id. at pp. 451–452.) The court deemed the summons 

“substantially defective in illegally purporting to shorten 

defendants’ time to plead” and concluded the court did not 

acquire personal jurisdiction over the defendants. (Id. at p. 452.) 

Relying on Greene, the Delta Imports court concluded that 

“[i]f the underlying complaint fails to state a cause of action for 

unlawful detainer, then use of the five-day summons is improper 

and the defendant is entitled to an order quashing service as a 

matter of law.” (Delta Imports, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 

1035, citing Greene, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d at pp. 451–452.) 

Greene and Delta Imports clarify that where a five-day summons 

is served with a complaint that fails to allege the defendant is 

guilty of unlawful detainer as defined in section 1161 or alleges 

a completely different cause of action, the summons is defective 

and may be challenged by a motion to quash under section 

418.10, subdivision (a)(1). 

Thirty-two years later, the Court of Appeal decided 

Borsuk. There, the defendant filed a motion to quash, asserting 

the court lacked jurisdiction over her because the lessor failed 

to properly serve her with the three-day notice to pay or quit. 

(Borsuk, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 610.) The court held that 

a defendant may not use a motion to quash to contest whether a 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

18

landlord properly served the requisite three-day notice to pay or 

quit. (Id. at pp. 609–610.) In reaching that conclusion, the 

Borsuk court rejected the reasoning of Delta Imports, explaining 

the case had created confusion among practitioners and finding 

its “broad declaration that a motion to quash is the proper way 

to contest whether an unlawful detainer complaint states a 

cause of action, and to challenge service of a notice to pay or quit, 

is not supportable.” (Borsuk, at p. 612.)

What these appellate courts held is not in conflict: under 

Delta Imports, a defendant may use a motion to quash to 

challenge service of summons on the ground the accompanying 

complaint lacks even the minimal allegations required under 

section 1161. Under Borsuk, a defendant may not use a motion 

to quash service of summons to contest the truth of the 

complaint’s allegations. The Borsuk court was unduly 

dismissive of the reasoning in Delta Imports and conflated the 

absence of a minimally-necessary allegation under section 1161 

with the truth of the allegation. But because the defendant did 

not challenge the unlawful detainer five-day summons as 

defective and unsupported by the complaint, the Borsuk court 

correctly deemed her motion to quash improper. 

Delta Imports had a more specific holding, supported by a 

more narrowly tailored logic, than what the appellate court in 

Borsuk understood: the defendant used a motion to quash to

contest the unlawful detainer five-day summons as defective

because the accompanying complaint did not allege the 

defendant was guilty of unlawful detainer as defined in section 

1161, subdivision 3. The complaint at issue in Delta Imports 

lacked the necessary notice allegations required under section 

1161, subdivision 3, so the complaint was not one for unlawful 

detainer. In contrast, the defendant in Borsuk sought to 
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

19

challenge the truth of the plaintiff’s notice allegations with a 

motion to quash. (Borsuk, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 610.) 

Having reviewed these cases, we glean two related 

conclusions. First, a motion to quash service of summons under 

section 418.10 is as limited in unlawful detainer actions as it is 

in other civil actions: to challenge the service of process as 

improper or the summons as defective. These cases do not 

support Stancil’s contention that if the complaint is faulty in any 

conceivable way, the five-day summons cannot confer personal 

jurisdiction. Nor do they expand the scope of a motion to quash 

in the unlawful detainer context. A more sensible conclusion is 

that proper service of process under sections 412.20 and 1167, 

providing a copy of the summons and complaint to the 

defendant, confers personal jurisdiction in an unlawful detainer 

case. (§ 410.50.) 

These cases also support a second, equally important 

conclusion: that a defendant may properly use a motion to 

quash to challenge personal jurisdiction in an unlawful detainer 

case. Section 418.10 authorizes a motion to quash only where 

the summons is improper, or the service of process is defective. 

Accordingly, an unlawful detainer defendant may properly file 

a motion to quash to contest a summons. The accelerated fiveday summons required under section 1167 is applicable only in 

unlawful detainer cases. So where the summons instructs the 

defendant to respond in five days but is not accompanied with a 

complaint for unlawful detainer, the summons is improper and 

may be challenged via a motion to quash. A complaint that fails 

to even allege the defendant is guilty of unlawful detainer, as 

defined in the relevant subdivision of section 1161, cannot 

support the five-day summons exclusive to unlawful detainer 

cases. In those limited circumstances, which we expect to arise 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

20

infrequently, an unlawful detainer defendant may choose to use 

a motion to quash to challenge the summons as improper. Our 

holding does not foreclose a defendant from consenting to the

court’s jurisdiction and responding to the five-day summons 

using a different procedural tool, like a demurrer or answer

(§§ 430.10, 430.30). Nor does it stop a defendant from 

simultaneously challenging personal jurisdiction and the 

sufficiency of the complaint by filing a motion to quash as well 

as a demurrer, answer, or motion to strike (§ 418.10, subd. (e)).

D.

Stancil’s arguments in this case underscore the need for 

clarity about the statutory requirements for unlawful detainer 

complaints. Stancil does not allege that the City’s complaint 

cannot support the unlawful detainer five-day summons. Nor 

does he identify a defect with the summons or service of process. 

Instead, he challenges the truth of the City’s allegation that it 

has the right to terminate his rental agreement. Stancil’s 

challenge to the City’s complaint is therefore improperly raised 

on a motion to quash. We conclude that a motion to quash 

service of summons is not the proper procedure for Stancil to 

challenge the merits of the allegations contained in the City’s 

unlawful detainer complaint. 

Under the relevant statutory provisions, the speedy 

adjudication of unlawful detainer cases for lessors is balanced 

by ensuring their strict adherence to the rigorous requirements 

for service and notice. But a motion to quash or set aside the 

summons pursuant to section 418.10 does not, and cannot 

address every issue with an unlawful detainer complaint. In the 

context of unlawful detainer, as in other proceedings, a motion 

to quash remains a procedural tool to challenge personal 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

21

jurisdiction. A defendant may use a motion to quash where the 

unlawful detainer five-day summons is unsupported by the 

accompanying complaint because it is not one for unlawful 

detainer. 

The superior court was right when it found Stancil

improperly used a motion to quash to argue the City didn’t have 

the right to terminate his rental agreement. Unlawful detainer 

is a special procedure available only for a limited purpose, but 

so is a motion to quash. Had the trial court concluded otherwise, 

it would have effectively countenanced the use of a motion to 

quash as a means of disputing the truth of the allegations in the 

complaint. Instead, a motion to quash service of summons 

permits a defendant to challenge the court’s jurisdiction where 

the service of process is defective, or the unlawful detainer fiveday summons is accompanied by a complaint that is not one for 

unlawful detainer because it fails to allege the defendant is 

guilty of unlawful detainer pursuant to the relevant subdivision 

of section 1161 or alleges a different cause of action, like breach 

of contract. This holding does not foreclose an unlawful detainer 

defendant from using other procedural tools like a demurrer to 

challenge the sufficiency of an unlawful detainer complaint. 

Nothing compels a defendant to challenge personal jurisdiction 

using a motion to quash. And a defendant may simultaneously 

file a motion to quash, contesting the court’s jurisdiction, and a 

demurrer, without making a general appearance. (§ 418.10, 

subd. (e).) We therefore decline to adopt Stancil’s position that 

a motion to quash service of summons may be used to dispute 

the truth of the allegations in an unlawful detainer complaint.
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Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

22

III.

Motions to quash service of summons provide defendants 

with an important tool to quickly challenge personal jurisdiction 

without waiving the right to defend on the merits or risking 

entry of default. The unlawful detainer statutes reflect the 

importance of resolving landlord-tenant disputes quickly. 

Rather than expanding the limited scope of motions to quash in 

the unlawful detainer context, the purpose and rationale of 

these statutes reinforces the need for such limitations. We 

therefore conclude that a motion to quash service of summons 

can’t be used to challenge any conceivable defect or the truth of 

the allegations contained in an unlawful detainer complaint. A 

motion to quash service of summons permits a defendant to 

challenge personal jurisdiction where the summons is improper 

or the statutory requirements for service of process are not 

fulfilled. In the context of unlawful detainer, a defendant may 

properly file a motion to quash to challenge an unlawful 

detainer five-day summons accompanied by a complaint that 

fails to include even the minimal allegations necessary to justify 

an unlawful detainer action as defined in section 1161. 

Defendants still have at their disposal a variety of other 

procedural tools, such as a demurrer, a motion to strike, an 

answer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or a motion for 

summary judgment. A defendant is free to use those procedural 

tools instead of a motion to quash to challenge the complaint as 

inadequate or contest the truth of the complaint’s allegations.

We affirm the Court of Appeal’s denial of writ relief from 

the superior court’s order. We conclude the superior court was 

correct in its determination that Stancil’s motion to quash was 

not the proper procedure to argue the City is not a proper 

plaintiff. We deny Stancil’s writ and request for relief, and we 
STANCIL v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J.

23

discharge the order to show cause. The case is remanded to the 

First District Court of Appeal with directions to remand to the 

superior court for further proceedings.

CUÉLLAR, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Stancil v. Superior Court

__________________________________________________________________ 

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding XX

Review Granted (published) 

Review Granted (unpublished) 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________ 

Opinion No. S253783 

Date Filed: May 3, 2021

__________________________________________________________________ 

Court: Superior

County: San Mateo 

Judge: Susan L. Greenberg 

__________________________________________________________________ 

Counsel:

Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire, Vincent J. Bartolotta, Jr., Karen R. 

Frostrom, Neal A. Markowitz, David E. Kleinfeld; Madden Law Office 

and Alison Madden for Petitioner.

Matthew Warren, Madeline Howard, Crystal Sims and Richard A. 

Rothschild for Western Center on Law & Poverty as Amicus Curiae on 

behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Michelle Marchetta Kenyon, Kevin D. 

Siegal, Randall G. Block and Maxwell Blum for Real Party in Interest.

Heidi Palutke; Dowling & Marquez and Curtis F. Dowling for 

California Apartment Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real 

Party in Interest.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 

publication with opinion):

Karen Frostrom

Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire

2550 Fifth Ave., #1100

San Diego, CA 92103

(619) 236-9363

Madeline Howard

Western Center on Law & Poverty

3701 Wilshire Blvd., #208

Los Angeles, CA 90010

(213) 235-2628

Kevin D. Siegel

Burke, Williams & Sorensen, LLP

1901 Harrison St., Ste. 900

Oakland, CA 94612-3501

(510) 273-8806

Curtis F. Dowling

Dowling & Marquez, LLP

625 Market St., 4th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94105

(415) 977-0444