alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32

Certification

Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section
1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of FiberNet Telecom Group, Inc., (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:

The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2006 (the Form 10-Q) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                       |  |  |  |                              
|---------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------
|Dated: August 14, 2006 |  |  |  | /s/ Jon A. DeLuca            
|                       |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer      
|                       |  | 
|Dated: August 14, 2006 |  |  |  | /s/ Charles S. Wiesenhart Jr.
|                       |  |  |  | Chief Accounting Officer     

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will
be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit
4.7

     

    
      SUMMARY
OF DIRECTOR COMPENSATION

       

    

    The
following is a summary of the currently effective compensation of the
non-employee directors of Commtouch Software Ltd. (the “Company”) for services
as directors:.

    


    
      	
               
      

            	
              ·

            	
              Directors
      are granted stock options, with new directors receiving an initial grant
      of 50,000 options and continuing directors receiving an “evergreen” option
      grant of 16,667 options.  At the annual meeting in October 2009,
      shareholders approved a one-time increase of the evergreen option grant to
      30,000 options.

            


    

    
      	
               
      

            	
              ·

            	
              Through
      2008, directors did not receive cash compensation for their
      services.  However, at the annual meeting in December 2008,
      shareholders approved the payment of cash compensation, in addition to the
      stated options compensation, according to the
  following:

            


    

     

    
      	
               
      

            	
              1.

            	
              NIS
      31,700 base annually per director, as linked to the applicable Israeli
      consumer price index, payable in four equal installments at the beginning
      of each calendar quarter; and

            


    

    
      	
               
      

            	
              2.

            	
              NIS
      1,590 per director per face to face Board or committee meeting or NIS954
      (60% of NIS 1590) in case of telephonic participation at such meeting,
      payable at the beginning of each calendar quarter following the quarter
      during which a Board member participated in a meeting. No separate per
      meeting compensation will be paid for committee meetings that are held on
      the same day immediately prior or subsequent to a Board
      meeting.  In that event, a Board and committee meeting will be
      considered one meeting.

            


    

    
      	
               
      

            	
              3.

            	
              For
      non-Israeli based directors, the amounts set forth will be paid in United
      States dollars, according to the representative rate of exchange published
      by the Bank of Israel on the date of
payment.

            


    

     

    Other
than the foregoing option grants, cash compensation and reimbursement of
expenses, the Company does not compensate its directors for serving on its board
of directors.
#### Kiernas v. Wolff *et al.*

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.*

May 12, 1890.)

Deceit—Evidence.

In an action for deceit in the sale oí a horse, evidence of the condition of the animal after its death, 31 days after the sale, is irrelevant, unless followed up by proof that the horse was unsound at the time of the sale.

Appeal from Kings county court.

Action by Francis Kiernas against Armand Wolff and Jules Wolff, for deceit in the sale of a horse, originally brought in a justice’s court, where the complaint was dismissed upon the ground that there was no fraud shown in the sale. The justice excluded testimony offered by plaintiff to show the condition of the horse at its death, 3Í days after the sale. The county court reversed the judgment “for error in rejecting testimony.” From the judgment entered on the order of reversal, defendants appeal.

Argued before Barnard, P. J., and Dykman and Pratt, JJ.

*W. B. Hurd, Jr.,*for appellant. *James ff. Quigley,*for respondent.

Pratt, J.

The plaintiff made out no case, either upon a warranty or for deceit. What he might have done if permitted to put in his testimony cannot be determined. The case is so badly reported that it is impossible to say whether or not any material evidence was rejected. Ko question is asked or offer of proof made as to any evidence that we are able to say was material. Sending for a surgeon after the horse was dead, or proving his age, had no tendency to prove fraud, unless it was followed up by proof that would show that the horse was unsound at the time of the purchase. The question put to the witness Finnegan, to-wit, “Did you examine the horse that day?” was only important if preliminary to some further inquiry, of which no indication is given by the printed case. The presumption that the original judgment was properly rendered cannot be lightly overthrown. Much takes place on every trial of which the reviewing court must necessarily be ignorant. The discussions of counsel, upon which courts largely depend, and the tacit concessions which take place in all trials, cannot be fully represented upon the record. To require every word spoken upon a trial by court, counsel, and witnesses to be reproduced in the appeal-book would be an intolerable burden. The only practicable rule is that the appealing party must assume the task of showing clearly that the judgment rendered was based upon error. The appeal-book must be so prepared as to bring out the points upon which error is predicated, and the appellate court must be able to see wherein error took place, or the judgment should be affirmed. The county court seems to have held that the respondent was bound to show affirmatively that no errors were committed. By that rule, very few judgments could stand. The judgment of the county court must be reversed, and the judgment of the justice of the peace affirmed, with costs. All concur.
CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT
                        --------------------------------

I,  Daniel R. Baty, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Emeritus Corporation
(the  "Company"),  certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxely Act of
2002,  18  U.S.C.  Section  1350  that:

(1)     the  Quarterly  Report  on  Form  10-Q  of the Company for the quarterly
period  ended  June 30, 2002 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements
of  Section  13  (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78m  or  78o(d));  and

(2)     the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results of operations of the Company.

Dated:  August  14,  2002


     /s/  Daniel  R.  Baty
     -----------------------
     Daniel  R.  Baty
     Chairman  and
     Chief  Executive  Officer
#### Julio Cesar URRUTIA GAVIDIA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-71475.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.*

Filed March 28, 2011.

Julio Cesar Urrutia Gavidia, Las Vegas, CA, pro se.

OIL, Ari Nazarov, Blair O’Connor, Assistant Director, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Julio Cesar Urrutia Gavidia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”). We have jurisdiction under *7138 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, and review de novo constitutional claims and questions of law. *Khan v. Holder,*584 F.3d 773, 776 (9th Cir.2009). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination where Urrutia Gavidia’s testimony was materially inconsistent with the statements he made to the asylum officer during his NACARA interview concerning his service with the civil defense unit (“CDU”) in El Salvador. *See Li v. Ashcroft,*378 F.3d 959, 962-63 (9th Cir.2004).

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Urrutia Gavidia assisted in the persecution of others on account of their political opinion where he provided the names of suspected guerilla sympathizers to the local leader of the CDU and as a result those individuals were beaten and killed. *See Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales,*449 F.3d 915, 927-30 (9th Cir.2006).

The agency therefore did not err in concluding that as a persecutor of others Urrutia Gavidia was ineligible for special rule cancellation under NACARA, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1240.66(a), and Temporary Protected Status, *see*8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)®, 1254a(c)(2)(B)(ii).

Urrutia Gavidia’s remaining contentions are unavailing. *See Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.2000) (requiring error and substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process claim).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Magdaleno Gonsales CAMPOS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-14087

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 22, 2011.

Anne R. Schultz, Kathleen M. Salyer, Wifredo A. Ferrer, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, William T. Zloch, United States Attorney’s Office, West Palm Beach, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Brenda G. Bryn, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Kathleen M. Williams, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before BARKETT, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Magdaleno Gonsales Campos appeals his 36-month sentence, imposed after he pled guilty to illegal reentry after previously being deported in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). Campos argues that he should not have received a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) for having previously been deported after a felony conviction for a drug trafficking offense. He argues that his prior state conviction was not for a “drug trafficking offense,” as defined by the Sentencing Guidelines, because “intent to distribute” is not an element of the North Carolina statute under which he was convicted.1

The district court properly held that Campos’s objection to the 16-level enhancement was foreclosed by this Court’s decision in *United States v. Madera-Madera,*333 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir.2003), in which we expressly rejected the argument that § 2L1.2’s definition of “drug trafficking offense” requires that intent to distrib*907ute be an element of the statute of conviction, and held that “federal law [ ] permits an inference of intent to distribute from a defendant’s possession of a significantly large quantity of drugs.” *Id.*at 1233 (citation omitted). *See also United States v. James,*430 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir.2005) (relying on *Madera-Madera*to hold that intent to distribute can be inferred from the defendant’s possession of between 200 and 400 grams of cocaine).2

Campos was previously deported after a felony conviction for “trafficking in cocaine” by possessing “200 grams or more, but less than 400 grams,” in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90-95(h)(3)(b). Accordingly, under *Madera-Madera*and *James,*the district court did not err in applying a 16-level enhancement to Campos’s guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b).

AFFIRMED.

1

. We review "questions of law arising under the Sentencing Guidelines *de novo.” United States v. Crawford,*407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir.2005) (quotation omitted). "Federal law, not state law, controls the application of the Sentencing Guidelines.” *Madera-Madera,*333 F.3d 1228, 1231 n. 2 (11th Cir.2003).

2

. We recognize that the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits disagree with our analysis in *Madera-Madera.*However, *Madera-Madera*and *James*are binding precedent in this Circuit, which we are bound to follow unless and until they are overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court. *See United States v. Smith, 122*F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir.2000).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

_________________________________

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Complainant

vs.

ROBERT RYAN BOUDREAUX

Respondent

_________________________________

Docket Number 2018-0071

Enforcement Activity No. 5748463

ORDER MODIFYING BENCH DECISION

Issued: December 06, 2018

By Administrative Law Judge: Honorable Dean C. Metry

On December 6, 2018, the undersigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) convened a 

post-hearing telephonic conference to address Robert Ryan Boudreaux’s (Respondent) Request 

for Temporary Merchant Mariner Credentials (MMC). See 46 C.F.R. § 5.707. Lineka Quijano, 

Esq., appeared on behalf of the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard). David Kish, Esq., 

appeared on Respondent’s behalf. 

During the conference, the ALJ and parties discussed whether, in lieu of granting a 

temporary credential under 46 C.F.R. § 5.707, the undersigned could amend the sanction set 

forth in the Court’s bench decision, memorialized on October 18, 2018. After discussing the 

various avenues of relief, the Coast Guard and Respondent mutually agreed to amend the 

sanction in the October 18, 2018 Order as follows: 

MMC 000385169 and all other existing Coast Guard licenses, certificates, credentials and 

documents issued to Respondent are SUSPENDED OUTRIGHT FOR NINETY (90) 

DAYS, COMMENCING ON OCTOBER 18, 2018. HOWEVER, THIRTY (30) 

DAYS OF THE NINETY (90) DAYS’ SUSPENSION IS REMITTED, AND 
RESPONDENT SHALL NOT SERVE THE FINAL (30) DAYS UNTIL 

ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION OF ALL APPEALS OF THIS DECISION. 

AFTER ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION, RESPONDENT SHALL SERVE 

THE FINAL 30 DAYS OF SUSPENSION, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED. 

THE COAST GUARD SHALL RETURN ANY TEMPORARY CREDENTIAL TO 

RESPONDENT ON DECEMBER 18, 2018. BEGINNING OCTOBER 18, 2018, 

RESPONDENT SHALL BE ON PROBATION FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR. 

DURING THE PROBATION PERIOD, IF THE USCG PROVES BY 

PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT VIOLATED ANY 

FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL LAW OR REGULATION, HIS MMC SHALL 

BE SUSPENDED OUTRIGHT FOR AN ADDITIONAL PERIOD OF NOT MORE 

THAN EIGHT MONTHS. 

All other provisions of the October 18, 2018 Order remain in full effect. 

Either party may request another post-hearing telephone conference to discuss this Order 

by contacting Paralegal Specialist Janice Emig at 409-765-1300 or Attorney Advisor Tommy 

Cantrell at 480-249-6471. 

WHEREFORE, 

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Order Memorializing Bench Decision is amended as 

set forth above. 

__________________________________________________

Dean C. Metry

U.S. Coast Guard Administrative Law Judge

Date:
* Pursuant to 5

TH CIR.R.47.5,we have determined that this opinion should not be published and

is not precedent, except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 97-11084

Summary Calendar

_________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JUSTIN C. HOWARD,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:92-CR-300-R)

February 11, 1999

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Justin C. Howard, Jr., who pled guilty to a single count of wire fraud in 1993, appeals the

district court’s order denying his motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to correct a

clerical error in his conviction. He argues that the district court’s written judgment does not reflect

accurately the sentence actually imposed by the district court at his sentence hearing. Specifically,

he contends that the written judgment fails to reflect that the district court ordered his federal

sentence to run concurrently with his ten-year state sentence.

We note initially that Howard filed an untimely notice of appeal under Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4(b), because he filed it more than ten days after the district court denied his

Rule 36 motion. We elect to treat Howard’s Rul e 36 motion, however, as a motion to correct

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Hunt, 940 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir.

1991)(treating pro se defendant’s Rule 35 motion as a § 2255 motion for jurisdiction purposes);
-2-

United States v. De Los Reyes, 842 F.2d 755, 757 (5th Cir. 1988). Treating it as such means that

Howard filed his notice of appeal within the applicable sixty-day appeal period of Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4(a).

After reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we hold that the district court did not

err in denying Howard’s motion. Howard’s contention that the district court ordered his federal

sentence to run concurrently with his ten-year state sentence is refuted by the transcript of the

sentence hearing. See United States v. McAfee, 832 F.2d 944, 946 (5th Cir. 1987)(“When the oral

pronouncement ofsentence does not resolve whether a sentence runs consecutively or concurrently,

the clearly expressed intent of the sentencing judge discerned from the entire record controls.”).

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
RAYMOND MARK LEE

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 14

- 1022

_______ ______________________/

Opinion filed July 22, 2016.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Taylor County

. Gregory S. Parker , Judge

.

Diana L. Johnson of Johnson and Lufrano, P.A., Jacksonville , for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Matthe w Pavese, Assistant Attorney

General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS

, WETHERELL

, and WINSOR

, J J

. , CONCUR.
# C_2021076EN.01002101.xml

| 5.3.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 76/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.3.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 76/21

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.9926 — ADI/Maxim)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2021/C 76/07)

1.

This notification concerns the following undertakings:

| — | Analog Devices, Inc. (ADI, USA), |
| --- | --- |

—

Analog Devices, Inc. (ADI, USA),

| — | Maxim Integrated Prodcuts (Maxim, USA). |
| --- | --- |

—

Maxim Integrated Prodcuts (Maxim, USA).

ADI acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control of the whole of Maxim.

The concentration is accomplished by way of purchase of shares.

2.

| — | for ADI: ADI designs, manufactures and markets a broad portfolio of solutions, including integrated circuits, algorithms, software and subsystems that use analogue, mixed-signal and digital signal processing technologies. ADI’s products serve customers across the globe in a number of sectors, including the industrial, communications, automotive and consumer sectors. |
| --- | --- |

—

for ADI: ADI designs, manufactures and markets a broad portfolio of solutions, including integrated circuits, algorithms, software and subsystems that use analogue, mixed-signal and digital signal processing technologies. ADI’s products serve customers across the globe in a number of sectors, including the industrial, communications, automotive and consumer sectors.

| — | for Maxim: Maxim designs, develops, manufactures and markets a broad range of analogue, mixed-signal and digital integrated circuits. Its products serve customers in diverse geographic locations in the automotive, communications and data centre, computing, consumer and industrial sectors. |
| --- | --- |

—

for Maxim: Maxim designs, develops, manufactures and markets a broad range of analogue, mixed-signal and digital integrated circuits. Its products serve customers in diverse geographic locations in the automotive, communications and data centre, computing, consumer and industrial sectors.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

4.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. The following reference should always be specified:

M.9926 ADI/Maxim

Observations can be sent to the Commission by email, by fax, or by post. Please use the contact details below:

Email: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu

Fax +32 22964301

Postal address:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

1

---
#### Alice Laraine Dimery, Appellant, v Ulster Savings Bank, Respondent.

Submitted February 5, 2007;

decided March 27, 2007

Motion for reconsideration of this Court’s December 21, 2006 dismissal order denied *[see*7 NY3d 920]. Cross motion for the imposition of sanctions denied.