United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 22-2146

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jose Ignacio Sandoval

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Central 

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Submitted: March 15, 2023

Filed: July 24, 2023

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Before COLLOTON, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Jose Sandoval, known on the street as “Nacho,” was a methamphetamine

dealer in Iowa. While executing a warrant to search his home, officers found digital 

scales, drug paraphernalia, guns, and wads of cash. They also elicited several
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incriminating statements from him once he was in custody. The district court1

denied Sandoval’s motion to suppress this evidence, and Sandoval eventually 

pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. He then absconded 

to Mexico for almost eight years. When he finally faced sentencing, the district 

court2 applied an obstruction-of-justice enhancement and rejected his request for an 

acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. On appeal, Sandoval challenges the denials 

of his suppression motion and his request for an acceptance-of-responsibility 

reduction. We affirm. 

I.

On January 9, 2013, Eric Young, a Special Agent with the Iowa Division of 

Narcotics Enforcement, applied for a warrant to search Sandoval’s residence and 

three cars. In Young’s accompanying affidavit, he described five pieces of 

information about Sandoval that he gathered from various sources between May 

2012 and January 2013.

First, in May 2012, officers interviewed Joseph Stetz, a methamphetamine

user who knew Jimmy Morris, a methamphetamine dealer. Stetz told the officers 

that Morris told him that a Mexican man known as “Nacho” was his supplier and 

that this man transported methamphetamine in a white Cadillac Escalade. 

Second, in September 2012, officers interviewed Pedro Delatorre, a 

methamphetamine dealer who, like Morris, described selling drugs for “Nacho.” 

1

The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of Iowa, now retired, adopting the Report and Recommendation of 

the Honorable Leonard T. Strand, then United States Magistrate Judge for the 

Northern District of Iowa, now Chief Judge, United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Iowa.

2

The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Northern District of Iowa.
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Delatorre told the officers that he did not know Nacho’s real name but knew that he 

drove a white Escalade. 

Third, in December 2012, Young spoke with a police officer, Deputy Darren 

Robinson, who said that he knew from multiple informants that “Nacho” was Jose 

Sandoval. (Young did not identify or mention any details about these informants.) 

Deputy Robinson also provided Young with Sandoval’s home address. With this 

information, Young learned from state records that Sandoval owned two white 

Cadillac Escalades.

Fourth, later that December, officers interviewed Christopher Hawken and 

learned that he bought methamphetamine from Jeremy Roberts. Hawken said that 

Roberts’s supplier was a man called “JP,” who in turn was supplied by “Nacho.” 

Young knew JP to be James Poole. 

Finally, on January 8, 2013 (one day before Young applied for a warrant), 

Poole was arrested after officers found him with a quarter pound of meth. Once 

Mirandized, Poole identified “Nacho” as his supplier and described Nacho’s home 

and how to get there. According to Young, Poole’s directions were consistent with 

Sandoval’s address that Deputy Robinson provided earlier. Poole added that he had 

bought methamphetamine from Nacho at his home several times in the last month

and that Nacho had guns. Young considered Poole reliable because some of his 

information was corroborated by law enforcement and he had provided reliable 

information in two prior investigations. 

Concluding that Young’s affidavit established probable cause, an Iowa state 

judge issued a warrant to search Sandoval’s home and cars. Officers executed it the 

same day. 

During the search, officers found digital scales, drug paraphernalia, more than

$3,000 in cash, and various firearms. Sandoval was arrested at the scene and taken 

to jail. A few hours later, Sandoval requested to speak with Young. Once 
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Mirandized, he confessed to Young that he sold methamphetamine to Poole and 

others. Sandoval was indicted later that month. 

Sandoval moved to suppress the evidence seized from the search and the 

statements that he made to Young. He argued that Young’s affidavit relied on 

uncorroborated information and thus did not establish probable cause and that his 

subsequent, post-Miranda statements were therefore tainted. His motion was 

denied. He then conditionally pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, reserving the right 

to appeal the suppression ruling. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). 

Following his plea hearing, Sandoval was released from custody and ordered 

to self-surrender a few weeks later. When he failed to do so, the district court issued 

a warrant for his arrest. For nearly eight years, Sandoval lived in Tijuana, Mexico, 

managing to evade detection while running a grilled-chicken business and working 

as a mechanic. Eventually, though, he decided to face justice. He went to the border 

near Tecate and informed Mexican police that he was the subject of an arrest warrant 

in the United States. From there, he was seized by the Marshals Service and returned

to the Northern District of Iowa. 

At Sandoval’s much-delayed sentencing hearing, the district court applied a 

two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on his absconsion, see 

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and rejected his request for a two-level acceptance-ofresponsibility reduction, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Sandoval’s advisory sentencing 

guidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment, and the court sentenced him

to 188 months. He appeals.

II.

We start with Sandoval’s suppression motion. When considering the denial 

of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, 
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and we review its conclusion about whether the Fourth Amendment was violated de 

novo. United States v. Walker, 68 F.4th 387, 390-91 (8th Cir. 2023). 

The question is whether Young’s affidavit established probable cause to issue 

a search warrant for Sandoval’s home and cars. An affidavit in support of a warrant 

establishes probable cause when itsets forth “sufficient facts to lead a prudent person 

to believe that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will 

be found in a particular place.” United States v. Grant, 490 F.3d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 

2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, an affidavit’s showing of 

probable cause depends on information supplied by an informant, the “core 

question” is whether the information is reliable. United States v. O’Dell, 766 F.3d 

870, 874 (8th Cir. 2014). Information may be sufficiently reliable if the informant 

“has a track record of supplying reliable information” or if what he supplies is

independently corroborated. Id. Even the corroboration of “minor, innocent details” 

can establish reliability. United States v. Keys, 721 F.3d 512, 518 (8th Cir. 2013). 

Ultimately, the existence of probable cause depends on the “totality of the 

circumstances.” Grant, 490 F.3d at 631. We therefore examine the sufficiency of a 

search-warrant affidavit “using a common sense and not a hypertechnical approach.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Sandoval argues that Young’s affidavit failed to establish probable cause 

because, although Young stated that Stetz, Delatorre, Hawken, and Poole all 

described “Nacho” as a source of methamphetamine, Young identified Nacho as 

Sandoval only by way of Deputy Robinson, without providing any support for 

Deputy Robinson’s belief that Nacho was in fact Sandoval. We are unpersuaded. 

 

As Sandoval concedes, Young’s affidavit established a fair probability that

“Nacho” was a methamphetamine supplier who transported drugs in a white Cadillac 

Escalade and conducted drug deals at his home. True, Young did not specify how 

Deputy Robinson knew Nacho was Sandoval, other than mentioning that Deputy 

Robinson learned this from unnamed informants. But Young did indicate that the

address for Sandoval supplied by Deputy Robinson matched the description and 
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directions for Nacho’s home provided by Poole—an informant with a record of 

providing reliable information. See O’Dell, 766 F.3d at 874. The information from 

Deputy Robinson was thus independently corroborated. See id. On top of this, 

Young explained that state records revealed that Sandoval owned two white Cadillac 

Escalades—the same vehicle that Stetz and Delatorre reported that Nacho drove. 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Young’s affidavit established probable 

cause to believe that Sandoval was involved in methamphetamine distribution and 

that evidence of this crime would be found in his home and cars. Accordingly, the 

district court did not err in denying Sandoval’s motion to suppress. 

III.

We now consider the denial of Sandoval’s request for an acceptance-ofresponsibility reduction. “We give great deference to a sentencing judge’s denial of 

an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and review for clear error only.” United 

States v. Chappell, 69 F.4th 492, 494 (8th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), a district court may apply a two-level reduction 

where a defendant has shown “a recognition and affirmative responsibility for the 

offense and sincere remorse.” United States v. Cooper, 998 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 

2021). “Merely pleading guilty does not entitle a defendant to this reduction.” 

Chappell, 69 F.4th at 494. “Rather, § 3E1.1(a) is intended to distinguish a sincerely 

remorseful defendant from a defendant not manifesting penitence.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Thus, we have consistently affirmed denials of this 

reduction to defendants whose conduct belies their claims of contrition, even where 

that conduct was unrelated to the underlying offense . . . .” Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Further, it is “extremely rare and highly exceptional” for a defendant who 

receives an obstruction-of-justice enhancement under § 3C1.1, as here, to be eligible 

for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. United States v. Smith, 665 F.3d 951, 
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957 (8th Cir. 2011). There is no “magic formula” for identifying these 

“extraordinary case[s],” though they may be found where the obstruction was “an 

isolated incident early in the investigation,” where the defendant “voluntarily 

terminated his obstructive conduct,” or where he “admitted and recanted” the 

obstruction. United States v. Honken, 184 F.3d 961, 968-69 (8th Cir. 1999). A case 

is exceedingly unlikely to be “extraordinary” where the defendant obstructs justice 

after pleading guilty. Id. at 970.

Sandoval does not contest the obstruction-of-justice enhancement that he 

received for absconding to Mexico for nearly eight years before sentencing. He 

argues, however, that this is an “extraordinary” case where an acceptance-ofresponsibility reduction was also appropriate because he “attempted to right the 

wrong” by voluntarily surrendering to Mexican police. We disagree. 

If Sandoval’s case is “extraordinary,” it is because of the magnitude of his 

obstruction, not of his penitence. His absconsion was neither an “isolated incident”

nor “early in the investigation.” See Honken, 184 F.3d at 968. It was a nearly eightyear flight from justice that occurred post-plea. Meanwhile, the extent of his 

acceptance of responsibility is hardly overwhelming: though he pleaded guilty and 

ultimately turned himself in, Sandoval points to little else that would clearly entitle 

him to this reduction. See Chappell, 69 F.4th at 494. Accordingly, the district court

did not clearly err in finding that Sandoval’s case is not one of the “extremely rare

and highly exceptional” instances where an obstructionist defendant merits an 

acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. See Smith, 665 F.3d at 957. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Sandoval’s conviction and sentence. 

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