1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

_________________________________

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Complainant

vs.

OLIMPIO BORGES SCOTO Jr. 

Respondent

_________________________________

Docket Number 2010-0049

Enforcement Activity No. 3648094

DECISION AND ORDER

Issued: November 07, 2011

By Hon. Parlen L. McKenna

Presiding

For Complainant:

Gary F. Ball, Esq.

James P. Fink

Suspension & Revocation National Center of Expertise

100 Forbes Drive

Martinsburg, WV 25404

For Respondent:

Terrence S. Cox, Esq.

Courtney M. Crawford, Esq.

Cox, Wooten, Griffin, Hansen & Poulos, LLP

190 The Embarcadero

San Francisco, CA 94105
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Preliminary Statement .............................................................................................. 3

II. Procedural History................................................................................................. 4

III. Findings of Fact...................................................................................................... 7

A. The Rebel II/Islander and Crew ....................................................................... 7

B. Captain Scoto Laid Down in the Rack during the Return Transit ............. 13

C. Multiple Factors Made it Difficult for Respondent and his Lookout to Spot 

the Sanchez Bayliner................................................................................................... 15

D. The REBEL II’s Radar.................................................................................... 17

E. The VTS Service, VTS Data, and the Precautionary Area Near LA/LB Port

............................................................................................................................ 18

F. The Sanchez Bayliner .......................................................................................... 20

G. The CAPT. T LE .............................................................................................. 22

H. The Collision between the ISLANDER and the Sanchez Bayliner.............. 24

I. The “Re-Creation” of the Collision.................................................................... 26

IV. Principles of Law.................................................................................................. 28

A. Burden and Standard of Proof........................................................................ 28

B. Jurisdiction ....................................................................................................... 29

C. Misconduct – Relinquishing Direction and Control of Tug to Unlicensed 

Person........................................................................................................................... 31

D. Negligence – Failure to Maintain an Adequate Lookout under Rule 5....... 39

E. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at Conclusion of Coast Guard’s Case..... 46

V. Analysis................................................................................................................. 47

A. Captain Scoto Relinquished Direction and Control of the REBEL II during 

the Transit from Catalina Island to LA/LB Port..................................................... 47

B. Captain Scoto Maintained a Proper Lookout under Rule 5 ........................ 51

VI. Ultimate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.......................................... 60

VII. Sanction................................................................................................................. 61

VIII. Order ................................................................................................................. 66

Attachment A – Witness and Exhibit List.................................................................... 68

Attachment B – Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact............................................... 72

Attachment C – Notice of Appeal Rights...................................................................... 82

Certificate of Service...........................................................................................................
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I. Preliminary Statement

Just after midnight on October 2, 2008, a tragic collision occurred between a 29 foot 

Bayliner and the barge ISLANDER that was being towed by the tug REBEL II. The REBEL 

II/ISLANDER was returning from delivering cargo to Catalina Island. The Bayliner was 

traveling from Alamitos Bay in a straight line to Catalina Island, with its wheel locked and 

traveling at a high rate of speed (20 knots). The Bayliner struck the front of the ISLANDER and 

was run over by the barge. Neither Respondent nor his deckhand ever saw the Bayliner and both 

were unaware that a collision had occurred. The Bayliner refloated after being run over by the 

barge and sank after about 20 minutes. The two people aboard the Bayliner died as a result of 

the collision. This accident occurred in the precautionary zone approximately three miles from 

the breakwater outside of Los Angeles/Long Beach Port. 

The United States Coast Guard investigated the incident and brought a negligence charge 

against Respondent. Specifically, the Coast Guard alleged Respondent failed to keep an 

adequate lookout in violation of Rule 5 of the International Rules of the Road. By this charge, 

the Coast Guard‘s argument is akin to the legal theory of strict liability – the Bayliner should 

have been seen by a proper lookout prior to the collision and therefore Respondent was 

negligent. Subsumed therein, the Coast Guard argues that Respondents‘ posting of his lookout in 

the lower wheelhouse of the REBEL II was improper because the REBEL II‘s upper wheelhouse 

offered a better location for such a lookout.

Additionally, during the course of the investigation, the Coast Guard discovered that 

Respondent had strained his back during the cargo off-load at Catalina Island and spent 

approximately 30-45 minutes resting his back in a bunk located in the REBEL II‘s lower 

wheelhouse while en route back to Los Angeles/Long Beach. While there was clearly no causal 

connection between Respondent lying in the rack and the collision with the Bayliner, the Coast 

Guard nevertheless charged Respondent with misconduct for inappropriately relinquishing 
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direction and control of the REBEL II to his unlicensed deckhand, the only other crewmember 

on the REBEL II.

For the reasons given in this Decision and Order, the undersigned finds the charge of 

misconduct proven. Respondent‘s actions in lying down where he could not see the surrounding 

waters, nor monitor the vessel‘s radar for a block of time amounting to 30-45 minutes, was 

imprudent and constitutes legal misconduct.

The negligence charge is a much closer case, but ultimately must be found not proven. 

First, Rule 5 does not specify any particular location for a lookout. The Coast Guard‘s reliance 

on there being an allegedly better position for a lookout on the REBEL II with a 360-degree view 

misses the mark and is contrary to precedent. Indeed, Respondent maintained an adequate 

lookout under the particular facts and circumstances as they existed at the time in compliance 

with Rule 5.

Furthermore, the Bayliner crossed approximately 4/10ths of a mile in front of another 

vessel before colliding with the ISLANDER shortly thereafter. The CAPT. T LE‘s crew did not 

see the Bayliner visually or on radar. The failure of both the REBEL II (a master and his 

dedicated lookout) and the CAPT. T LE (a master and his dedicated lookout) to see the Bayliner 

is difficult to explain in the abstract. But not every collision necessitates a finding of an 

inadequate lookout and Respondent offered several credible reasons why the Bayliner was not 

picked up on radar or visually. None of these reasons had anything to do with Respondent being 

negligent. Weighing the entirety of the record evidence leads to the conclusion that 

Respondent‘s lookout was not improper.

II. Procedural History

On January 27, 2010, the Coast Guard filed a Complaint against Respondent. The 

Complaint alleged three violations in connection with Respondent serving as Master aboard the 
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vessel REBEL II on October 1-2, 2008. The Complaint charged Respondent with two counts of 

misconduct and one count of negligence.

Specifically, Charge I alleged that Respondent committed a violation of 46 U.S.C. § 

7703(1)(B) and 46 C.F.R. § 5.27 (misconduct) in connection with Respondent‘s alleged failure 

to maintain direction and control of the REBEL II and the tow ISLANDER as required by 46 

C.F.R. § 15.610. Charge II alleged that Respondent committed a violation of 46 U.S.C. § 

7703(1)(B) and 46 C.F.R. § 5.29 (negligence) by failing to maintain a proper lookout, which 

contributed to a collision with a 29 foot Bayliner pleasure craft (the Sanchez Bayliner). Charge 

III alleged that Respondent committed a violation of 46 U.S.C. § 7703(1)(B) and 46 C.F.R. § 

5.27 (misconduct) in connection with Respondent failing to alter his vessel‘s navigational 

display when reducing his tow to less than 200 meters in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 2024(a).

On February 19, 2010, Respondent filed his Answer, in which he admitted all 

jurisdictional allegations but denied the substantive bases for the three charges. Respondent‘s 

Answer also asserted affirmative defenses to all three charges, with the defense to Charges I and 

III being that the offense, if proven, was not relevant to the casualty asserted in Charge II. 

Additionally, for Charge II, Respondent asserted that the proximate cause of the collision with 

the Sanchez Bayliner ―was entirely the fault of the recreational vessel . . . and others and not the 

fault of Respondent.‖ Answer at 1.

The affirmative defense relating to the charged conduct not being relevant to the casualty 

must be rejected outright. Nothing requires a marine casualty as an antecedent to finding proved 

charges of negligence or misconduct. See 46 C.F.R. §§ 5.27, 5.29 (definitions of ―misconduct‖ 

and ―negligence‖). The issue is not whether the charges of misconduct were related to the 

eventual collision with the Sanchez Bayliner, but rather whether Respondent‘s actions complied 

with the relevant statutory and regulatory requirements.
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For the three alleged violations, the Coast Guard sought 12 months outright suspension of 

Respondent‘s Merchant Mariner‘s License.1 At the first day of hearing, the Coast Guard moved 

to withdraw Charge III. Tr. at 6:10-16.2 The Coast Guard‘s Motion was granted. Id. at 6:18-19. 

On the second day of hearing, the undersigned accompanied the parties on a site visit to 

Catalina Freight Company, during which, the undersigned went aboard and examined the 

REBEL II, including accessing both the upper and lower wheelhouses, the aft bridge, and the 

deck. See Tr. at 461:2-462:16.

The Coast Guard offered 6 witnesses and 28 exhibits in support of its case. Respondent 

offered 8 witnesses and 76 exhibits in rebuttal. The parties‘ witnesses and exhibits entered into 

evidence are identified in Attachment A.

On March 8, 2011, the Coast Guard submitted its Closing Brief, which included Proposed 

Findings of Fact. On March 8, 2011, Respondent filed his Post Hearing Brief without any 

Proposed Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law. Rulings on the Coast Guard‘s Proposed 

Findings of Fact are found in Attachment B. On March 15, 2011, corrections to the hearing 

transcript were ordered. On March 15, 2011, Respondent filed his Post Hearing Reply Brief and 

the Coast Guard filed its Reply Brief.

The record of this proceeding, including the transcript, evidence, pleadings and other

submissions, has now been reviewed and the case is ripe for decision. The findings of fact and 

conclusions of law that follow are prepared upon my analysis of the entire record, applicable 

regulations, statutes, and case law. Each exhibit entered, although perhaps not specifically 

mentioned in this Decision, has been carefully reviewed and given thoughtful consideration.

 

1 Despite dropping one of the three charges against Respondent, the Coast Guard nevertheless maintained in its posthearing briefing that a 12 months outright suspension remained an appropriate sanction.

2 References to the hearing transcript are indicated by ―Tr. at [pg.]:[line #s]‖ with the exception of the testimony of 

Captain Pancho, whose testimony is indicated as ―Feb. 15, 2011 Tr. at [pg.]:[line #s]‖ due to the fact that the 

transcript of Captain Pancho‘s testimony was not kept in sequence with earlier hearing transcripts and began at page 

1 anew.
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III. Findings of Fact

A. The Rebel II/Islander and Crew

1. Between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. on October 1, 2008, the tug REBEL II and the barge 

ISLANDER departed the Catalina Freight Lines (―Catalina Freight‖) facility in the Port of Los 

Angeles, California bound for Santa Catalina Island (―Catalina Island‖). Tr. at 80:19-82:4.3

2. The REBEL II‘s voyage from Catalina Freight‘s dock to the dock at Catalina Island takes 

approximately four hours. Tr. at 84:22-85:2.

3. The REBEL II is depicted in the photographs in Coast Guard Exhs. 1- 5. Tr. at 72:11-25; 

74:21-75:8; 76:5-76:20; 77:12-19; 77:24-78:6.

4. The REBEL II is a 61.8-foot towing vessel that was originally constructed in 1969. 

Coast Guard Exh. 11; Resp. Exh. EE.

5. The barge ISLANDER is a 128-foot cargo barge used by Catalina Freight to transport 

cargo between Catalina Island and the Port of Los Angeles and was originally constructed in 

1964. Tr. at 79:19-80:20; Coast Guard Exh. 12; Resp. Exh. GG.

6. The barge depicted in Coast Guard Exh. 2 is the ISLANDER. Tr. at 75:24-76:2.

7. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the REBEL II was operating in waters governed 

by the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (72 COLREGS; 33 

U.S.C. §§ 1601-1608). See Coast Guard Exhs. 25, 27; Tr. at 678:6-14. 

8. There were two crewmembers on the REBEL II during the transit to and from Catalina 

Island on October 1-2, 2008 – Captain Scoto was the master and licensed operator and Mr. John 

Amstutz was the unlicensed deckhand. Tr. at 71:25-72:5; 80:3-18. 

9. At all times relevant to this matter, Captain Scoto was the holder of a Coast Guard-issued 

credential as a master of steam or motor vessels of not more than 1600 gross registered tons 

 

3 This run will be referred to in this Decision and Order as the ―LA/LB Port-Catalina run‖.
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(Domestic tonnage), 3,000 gross tons (ITC tonnage) upon oceans, master of towing vessels upon 

oceans, and radar observer (unlimited). Tr. at 8:19-9:19; Coast Guard Exh. 10. 

10. Captain Scoto was first licensed by the Coast Guard in 1973 and has extensive experience 

in the ocean-going tug industry spanning approximately 40 years. Tr. at 435:14-449:4; Resp. 

Exhs. C, E, F.

11. Deckhand Amstutz did not hold any Coast Guard-issued credentials, radar endorsements, 

or radar observer certifications. In this regard, Deckhand Amstutz had no formal training in the 

use of radar, but had received years of practical training in the use of radar by Captain Scoto and 

another captain. Tr. at 131:17-19; 133:6-11; 491:11-15; 533:14-18. 

12. At the time of the accident, Deckhand Amstutz had worked as a deckhand on two towing 

vessels (the REBEL II and another vessel) for approximately 10 years. Tr. at 70:19-71:9; 71:21-

23.

13. Deckhand Amstutz made the LA/LB Port-Catalina run approximately three to five times 

a week. Tr. at 81:4-10.

14. Deckhand Amstutz usually works with Captain Scoto on the LA/LB Port-Catalina runs 

and had done so for approximately 6 years at the time of the accident. Tr. at 81:11-16; 139:11-

13; 502:12-15.

15. Captain Scoto made the LA/LB Port-Catalina run approximately four times a week for 

approximately six and half years without incident prior to the collision with the Sanchez 

Bayliner. Tr. 449:20-450:19.

16. Captain Scoto admitted that because of the heavy commercial and recreational traffic in 

the precautionary zone, he has had a lot of close calls and that ―[w]e always have a problem with 

small boats.‖ Tr. at 450:18-21.
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17. On October 1, 2008, Deckhand Amstutz‘s duties during the trip to Catalina Island 

included checking the tow wire to be sure it was not slipping, conducting engine room checks 

and performing lookout duties. Tr. at 85:3-18; 87:3-5.

18. On October 1, 2008, Deckhand Amstutz performed his lookout duties from the lower 

pilot house on the transit to Catalina Island. Tr. at 86:5-24.

19. The REBEL II was originally constructed with only one wheelhouse. Tr. at 472:4-8; 

588:7-17; 934:2-933:7.

20. The original REBEL II tug design (i.e., with only one wheelhouse) was a standard design 

in the tug industry for decades. Tr. at 472:9-24; 933:7-18.

21. Because of this industry standard of one wheelhouse, all of the steering and navigational 

equipment was necessarily contained therein.

22. The lower wheelhouse of the REBEL II had a forward visibility toward the bow through 

five forward-facing windows, which were separated by support stanchions. This configuration 

provided approximately 180-degree visibility out the front of the vessel. Coast Guard Exh. 1; 

Resp. Exh. RR; Tr. at 375:5-15; 503:5-12. 

23. With the wheelhouse doors closed, visibility out of the port and starboard sides of the 

lower wheelhouse was through one square window in each of the doors. These door windows 

were smaller than the large forward-facing wheelhouse windows. Coast Guard Exhs. 1, 2, 5. 

24. Historically, because of the one wheelhouse design of this type of tug, it was industry 

practice for operators to station their lookouts in the wheelhouse, except where circumstances 

dictated otherwise. Tr. at 935:11-936:9

25. In order to comply with Rule 5, it was industry practice (including Captain Scoto‘s) for 

designated lookouts to move to different locations in the wheelhouse to ensure that a 360-degree 
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lookout was maintained. Tr. at 142:15-19; 143:2-8; 509:14-21; 732:15-733:17; 1062:11-25; 

1052:2-1057:24; 1337:2-13; Resp. Exh. N at 31-37, 38-39; Resp. Exh. O at 7-8, 39-40.4

26. The REBEL II‘s upper wheelhouse was not original to the tug but was a later add-on for 

navigating the tug when in the harbor and when breaking the barge because the operator needs 

visibility down the side and over the tow. Tr. at 472:4-8; 473:3-6; Resp. Exh. O at 37.

27. The lower wheelhouse‘s autopilot and the GPS, allows the operator to put the vessel on 

autopilot and pay more attention to navigation duties including watching out for incoming 

vessels. Tr. at 474:8-23; 476:1-5; 476:15-477:1. 

28. With the exception of autopilot and GPS, the upper wheelhouse had the same compliment 

of navigational equipment as the lower wheelhouse, thus allowing the operator to have two 

locations from which the REBEL II could have been operated. Tr. at 473:10-474:4; 475:19-

476:5.

29. Once set, the autopilot on the REBEL II could not be disengaged from the upper 

wheelhouse, and the operator would be required to manually steer the vessel from that location 

assuming that the autopilot was not engaged. Tr. at 487:15-24.

30. For tugs that were modified with an upper wheelhouse, the record evidence does not 

support a finding that it was industry practice to use the upper wheelhouses for stationing a 

lookout. Tr. at 934:7-935:2.

31. The lower wheelhouse of the REBEL II is normally used by Captain Scoto for his 

lookout while the vessel is underway in the transit between Catalina Island and the Port of L.A. 

Tr. at 119:9-11; 120:10-13; 374:4-8.

 

4 The undersigned specifically finds that Captain Scoto and Deckhand Amstutz testimony to be credible with respect

to the maintenance of their lookout during the time within the precautionary zone (i.e., visually scanning the waters 

around the REBEL II and Captain Scoto observing the radar). Furthermore, the undersigned finds Captain 

Johnson‘s and Captain Hickey‘s testimony on this subject to be credible as well. The undersigned cannot accept the 

premise that an experienced licensed mariner like Captain Scoto and a trained, experienced lookout like Deckhand 

Amstutz simply stayed glued to one spot throughout the time the REBEL II/ISLANDER traversed the precautionary 

zone and neglected to look out of the REBEL II‘s available points of view to deal with design obstructions.
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32. Captain Scoto stations his lookout in the lower wheelhouse because he can more easily 

work with and confer with the lookout. Tr. at 477:20-25; Resp. Exh. O at 6-7.5

33. The wheelhouse doors could be left closed, opened, or cracked. Leaving the doors fully 

open would increase visibility out of the port and starboard sides of the lower wheelhouse. Coast 

Guard Exh. 1; Resp. Exh. RR.

34. On the transit from Catalina Island on October 1-2, the wheelhouse doors of the REBEL 

II were neither fully opened nor closed, but were cracked open. Tr. at 534:14-536:7, 588:5-6. 

35. The view out of each side of the lower wheelhouse aft of 90 and 270 degrees relative 

bearing was restricted by steel bulkheads that extended on each side of the lower wheelhouse 

from the side doors to the aft bulkhead. Coast Guard Exh. 1; Tr. at 125:24-128:2; 129:1-131:10; 

257:20-258:5; 544:6-545:3. 

36. The view aft from the lower wheelhouse of the REBEL II was provided through a 

window on the starboard-aft bulkhead and a small, round porthole window on the aft-port 

bulkhead. These windows were contained within the lower wheelhouse‘s aft steel bulkhead. 

This aft bulkhead obstructed the view aft from the lower wheelhouse. The view aft out of the 

starboard-aft window was further obstructed by a gray, plastic garbage can positioned against the 

railing just outside the window. Coast Guard Exhs. 3, 4; Tr. at 76:5-77:19, 126:5-131:10 

37. The presence of the bulkheads in the Rebel II‘s lower wheelhouse creates blind spots. Tr. 

at 121:10-16, 126-131, 257:20-258:5, 354:4-11, 589:5-12; 1062:11-25. 

 

5 Captain Tilford testified that Captain Scoto‘s placement of his lookout in the lower wheelhouse constituted 

negligence. This expert testimony is specifically rejected. The undersigned finds Captain Johnson‘s and Captain 

Hickey‘s testimony on this subject to be more credible. Indeed, both of these experts testified that the placement of 

the lookout in the lower wheelhouse was proper. In particular, Captain Johnson‘s greater experience in running tugs 

like the REBEL II in similar conditions as opposed to Captain Tilford‘s lack of experience in ocean going and 

coastwise tugs (with tows on the line from the rear) makes his opinion concerning the placement of the lookout in 

this particular case questionable. For the reasons given in this Decision and Order, however, Captain Johnson‘s 

opinion about the appropriateness of Captain Scoto resting in the rack is rejected.
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38. Assuming a target is acquired from the lower wheelhouse, the blind spots in the lower 

wheelhouse of the REBEL II can be eliminated by moving around to maintain tracking of such a 

target. Tr. at 123:4-16; 140:12-141:2; 141:8-23.

39. Most tugboats in the industry are configured like the REBEL II‘s lower wheelhouse with 

forward 180-degree views and as a result, watchstanders and lookouts move around while on 

watch to maintain effective scanning of the horizon around the vessel due to obstructions within 

the wheelhouse (particularly aft). Tr. at 930:4-931:14.

40. The upper wheelhouse of the REBEL II provides an unobstructed, 360-degree view of the 

horizon, as there are no bulkheads in the upper wheelhouse and with the exception of narrow 

window support stanchions there are no blind spots or significant impairments. Coast Guard 

Exhs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; Tr. at 120:19-121:5, 353:15-354:3; 534:8-13, 589:13-15, 1062:4-8. 

41. At all times material to this case, the REBEL II was towing the ISLANDER astern at a 

distance of between 1,100 and 1,200 feet. Tr. at 91:7-12; 541:20-23. 

42. During the transits to and from Catalina Island on October 1-2, 2008, Deckhand Amstutz 

had no responsibility or authority to adjust the REBEL II‘s radar or alter the REBEL II‘s course 

or speed and did not do so. Tr. at 117:4-10; 133:12-16; 134:5-11, 146:22-147:4, 150:8-10; 

552:18-553:11. 

43. During the REBEL II‘s transit to Catalina Island on October 1, 2008, Captain Scoto 

permitted Deckhand Amstutz to take a nap in the lower wheelhouse rack of the REBEL II, and 

Deckhand Amstutz spent approximately thirty minutes lying in the rack. Tr. at 87:6-88:5; 88:21-

25; 538:18-25; 551:20-22.

44. The REBEL II and ISLANDER arrived at Catalina Island at approximately 8:25 p.m. on 

the night of October 1, 2008. Coast Guard Exh. 14; Tr. at 89:18-22. 
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45. The REBEL II and ISLANDER departed on the return trip from Catalina Island at 

approximately 9:55 p.m. on the night of October 1, 2008. Coast Guard Exh. 14; Tr. at 483:15-

484:4. 

46. The weather for the return trip from Catalina Island was clear and calm, and the seas 

consisted of an approximately one-foot slow swell of approximately one-half minute duration 

with visibility of six miles plus. Tr. at 92:12-93:12.

47. Deckhand Amstutz performed the same duties on the voyage back from Catalina Island 

as he did on the transit to Catalina Island. Tr. at 93:14-16.

B. Captain Scoto Laid Down in the Rack during the Return Transit

48. At approximately 10:30 pm on October 1, Captain Scoto laid down in the rack of the 

lower wheelhouse of the REBEL II after the REBEL II got up to speed and its tow wire was fully 

out on the return voyage. Tr. at 93:20-25.

49. Captain Scoto told Deckhand Amstutz that his back was hurting him and ―he wanted to 

get off his feet for a little bit.‖ Tr. at 94:3-8.

50. Captain Scoto believed that by resting his back while his vessel/tow was in open sea, he 

could stand a better watch upon nearing the precautionary area. Tr. at 567:20-23.

51. The record does not establish the degree of pain that Captain Scoto was experiencing, but 

it was sufficient that he felt that he wanted to rest it before entering the precautionary area. Tr. at 

1040:18-1041:2.

52. Before lying down in the rack, Captain Scoto instructed Deckhand Amstutz to keep a 

lookout. Tr. at 94:9-13.

53. Before lying down in the rack, Captain Scoto: (1) called the Vessel Traffic Service 

(―VTS‖), which reported no traffic in the area; (2) checked the radar at ranges of six and twelve 

miles and determined there were no contacts on the radar; and (3) did a visual check. Tr. at 

145:3-9; 485:9-486:12.
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54. When Captain Scoto lay down in the rack, the radar was set to six mile range. Tr. at 

492:8-11.

55. Captain Scoto remained in the rack for a continuous period of between thirty and fortyfive minutes, lying with his head to the port side of the REBEL II, and arose from the rack at 

between 11:00 and 11:15 p.m. Tr. at 94:14-18; 94:25-95:8; 97:1-3; 490:1-11, 498:7-11.

56. Captain Scoto‘s position in the rack was a ―little bit on his back and a little bit on his 

side.‖ Tr. at 96:11-15.

57. During the time Captain Scoto was in the rack, Deckhand Amstutz served as lookout, 

maintaining visual lookout and monitoring the radar. Tr. at 94:19-24; 502:6-11; 502:18-503:3.

58. While Captain Scoto was in the rack, Deckhand Amstutz tried to leave Captain Scoto 

alone so he could rest his back and so while Captain Scoto was in the rack, there was minimal 

conversation between Captain Scoto and Deckhand Amstutz. Tr. at 97:4-8; 145:12-24; 612:2-8.

59. Captain Scoto periodically asked Deckhand Amstutz if there was anything on the radar 

while he was lying down in the rack. Tr. at 488:12-21.

60. Captain Scoto was approximately 2-3 feet away from Deckhand Amstutz while he was in 

the rack. Tr. at 97:12-23.

61. Captain Scoto did not go to sleep while in the rack and appeared to Deckhand Amstutz to 

be alert during this period. Tr. at 145:25-146:10; 146:18-21; 490:13-21.

62. From his prone position in the rack, Captain Scoto was unable to see the waters around 

the REBEL II and would not have been able to see approaching vessels. Tr. at 354:15-355:12; 

561:7-9. 

63. From his prone position in the rack, Captain Scoto was unable to monitor the REBEL II‘s 

radar. The radar screen in the lower wheelhouse was located on the starboard side of the bridge 

next to the operating station located amidships. Resp. Exh. RR; Tr. at 561:10-12. 
15

64. Captain Scoto admitted that while he was in the rack, he was not in a position to give 

informed helm commands. Tr. at 561:4-6.

65. It was a violation of Catalina Freight company policy for either Captain Scoto or 

Deckhand Amstutz to lie in the rack during the transit between Catalina Island and the LA/LB 

Port. Tr. at 551:20-25, 567:4-17.

66. After getting out of the rack, Captain Scoto took up his watch position on the starboard 

side of the wheelhouse in front of the REBEL II‘s radar. Deckhand Amstutz was posted as a 

lookout on the port side of the wheelhouse as the REBEL II transited through the precautionary 

area. Tr. at 98:4-23; 99:10-12; 142:20-23; 149:1-3, 1348:10-18.

C. Multiple Factors Made it Difficult for Respondent and his Lookout to Spot the Sanchez 

Bayliner

67. As the REBEL II approached the precautionary area that night near Buoy 1, Deckhand 

Amstutz was actively engaged in performing his lookout duties and Captain Scoto was observing 

the radar and performing visual scans of the water surrounding the REBEL II. Tr. at 148:13-22; 

520:15-522:20.

68. The background lighting on the approach of Buoy 1 toward the LA port is bright and can 

cause difficulties in observing lights from vessels on the water at night but such backscatter 

lighting decreases as one looks away from the LA/LB Port and would be less of a concern from

the direction the Sanchez Bayliner approached the REBEL II when compared to the LA/LB Port 

lights. Tr. at 149:8-16; 523:22-524:16; 576:10-17; 582:6-583:12; 644:8-645:7; 646:9-15; 

647:19-649:16; 1012:6-13; 1322:13-1323:7; Coast Guard Exh. 27.

69. At approximately 2 miles from the REBEL II/ISLANDER, the Sanchez Bayliner would 

have been approaching at 036 degrees from the REBEL II and approximately 034 from the 

ISLANDER. Tr. at 779:20-780:5; 781:9-14.
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70. When the Bayliner and the ISLANDER collided, the Bayliner was at a relative bearing of 

180 degrees from the REBEL II. Tr. at 781:15-18.

71. The Sanchez Bayliner would have traversed from 036 degrees relative to the REBEL II to 

180 degrees relative to the REBEL II within 4.5 minutes over the course of the two miles from 

the time its white light would have been visible at 2 miles until the time of the collision with the 

ISLANDER. Tr. at 781:19-22.

72. The masthead light on the Bayliner was within visual range of the REBEL II at a distance 

of two miles and passed through a relative bearing arc from the REBEL II starting at 036 degrees 

relative and ending at 180 degrees relative. Coast Guard Exh. 9. When the Bayliner was one 

mile away from the REBEL II, at least one of the Bayliner‘s sidelights was within the visual 

range of the REBEL II. As the Bayliner passed abeam of the REBEL II, its green starboard 

sidelight and its all-around white masthead light were within the visual range of the REBEL II. 

See Coast Guard Exh. 8 at 16 of 17; Coast Guard Exh. 9; Tr. at 50:8-24. 

73. Immediately prior to the collision, the REBEL II was making way at approximately 8 

knots and the Bayliner was travelling at 20 knots. Given their relative angles of approach, the 

closing speed of the vessels was 26.4 knots. Tr. at 735:10-736:7. 

74. At a closing speed of 26.4 knots and a visibility range of two miles, the all-around 

masthead light on the Bayliner was within the visual range of the REBEL II for at least four 

minutes and forty-six seconds. At least one of the running lights on the Bayliner was within the 

visual range of the REBEL II for at least two minutes and twenty-eight seconds. Tr. at 741:3-21; 

745:5-8; 777:9-24. 

75. Prior to the collision between the ISLANDER and the Bayliner, the Bayliner passed 

within 300-600 feet directly off the starboard beam of the REBEL II. Coast Guard Exh. 8 at 16; 

Tr. at 237:14-23; 543:20-23.
17

76. Captain Scoto admitted that if someone was standing inside the REBEL II‘s lower 

wheelhouse and looked just aft of the beam on the starboard side, that person would see a solid 

steel bulkhead and it would not be possible to see the Sanchez Bayliner approximately 300-600 

feet just aft the REBEL II‘s starboard beam; whereas someone positioned in the upper 

wheelhouse would have the Sanchez Bayliner in his field of view. Tr. at 544:6-545:18. 

77. At a closing speed of 26.4 knots, the Bayliner passed directly abeam of the REBEL II 

between twenty-six and twenty-eight seconds before the collision with the ISLANDER. See Tr. 

at 541:11-23 (distance between REBEL II and ISLANDER between 1,100 and 1,200 feet); Coast 

Guard Exh. 11 (length of REBEL II- 61.8 feet); Coast Guard Exh. 8 at 16 of 17 (showing 

Bayliner passing abeam of REBEL II).

78. Respondent‘s expert – Captain Hickey – speculated that the Sanchez Bayliner‘s lights 

would not be moving relative to the REBEL II‘s course because it would be maintaining a 

constant bearing and this would make the Bayliner more difficult to see because the lights would 

not seem to be moving. Tr. at 734:4-735:10; 736:11-737:7. This assertion has merit and is 

partially accepted. However, its validity is tempered by the fact that the constant 

bearing/decreasing range of the Sanchez Bayliner was with the ISLANDER and not the REBEL 

II that was 1100-1200 feet in front of the actual collision. Tr. at 779:5-10.

D. The REBEL II’s Radar

79. At 12:18 a.m. on October 2, 2008, the REBEL II‘s barge ISLANDER and the Bayliner 

collided. Coast Guard Exh. 8 at 17; Resp. Exh. M. 

80. At the time of the collision, the REBEL II‘s radar was set on three miles range. Tr. at 

392:25-393:5; 394:20-395:10. 

81. On the night of the collision, the REBEL II‘s radar was turned on and functioning 

properly. Tr. at 361:14-25. 
18

82. However, the REBEL II‘s radar on the night of the collision was not compliant with 33 

C.F.R. § 164 due to: (1) an insufficient screen size and (2) compatibility with current technical 

standards. Tr. at 362:12-16; 362:23-363:8.

83. The radar on the REBEL II during October 1 and 2, 2008 had four range settings: one 

mile; three miles; six miles; and twelve miles. Tr. at 491:16-20.

84. During the REBEL II‘s approach to LA/LB Port, Captain Scoto had his radar optimized 

to detect buoys so that he could line up his approach in the channel. Tr. at 525:21-526:25, 

527:22-25; 786:3-787:2, 856:2-13.

85. Small recreational vessels have posed a frequent hazard to Captain Scoto when operating 

with a tow between Catalina Island and the port of LA/LB. If Captain Scoto became aware of a 

vessel that was going to attempt to cross his towline, he would have used a handheld spotlight to 

draw attention to the barge and signal the other vessel. Tr. at 450:10-21; 519:5-15; 520:15-23; 

521:1-10; 531:7-8; 584:22-585:19; Resp. Exh. N at 19; Resp. Exh. O at 30, 35-36.

E. The VTS Service, VTS Data, and the Precautionary Area Near LA/LB Port

86. VTS is responsible for the approaches to the port of LA/LB and covers the waters 25 

miles seaward of Point Fermin, which includes Catalina Island. The REBEL II was within this 

charted Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) during its entire transit to and from 

Catalina Island. Tr. at 156:15-21; Coast Guard Exh. 25 at Note [D].

87. Vessels are categorized into three groups by VTS: 1) covered vessels that include (a) 

commercial vessels 131 feet or more; (b) passenger ferries certified to carry 50 or more 

passengers for hire; and (c) tugs 26 feet or more engaged in towing; (2) mandatory passive 

participants that include (a) any vessel over 100 gross tons; (b) any vessel 65 feet or more in 

length, but not 131 feet; and (c) dredges and floating plants; and (3) passive participants that 

monitor VTS‘ VHS radio channel. Tr. at 157:7-158:16.
19

88. Except in times of low visibility (i.e., 1 mile or less), VTS is not responsible for acquiring 

and tracking recreational vessels. Tr. at 166:4-11.

89. Even in clear visibility, however, VTS would inform a covered vessel if VTS noticed that 

a recreational boat was coming towards such a covered vessel. Tr. at 166:18-25.

90. The precautionary or regulated navigation area near LA/LB Port is where the northern 

and southern traffic lanes terminate and is an area of congestion or an area where vessels are 

coming from more than one direction. Tr. at 161:20-162:2; 162:17-164:22; Coast Guard Exh. 25 

(Note B). 

91. Because the charted precautionary area outside LA/LB Port is an area of increased vessel 

traffic density, vessels are advised to ―proceed with extreme caution‖. Tr. at 164:4-24; Coast 

Guard Exh. 27 at Note E.

92. The REBEL II/ISLANDER would be a covered vessel or mandatory user, which required 

that the REBEL II check in with VTS when leaving Catalina Island. In addition, it would be 

required to provide the vessel‘s designation and ETA. VTS would tell the REBEL II to check 

back when it was entering the precautionary zone and again when checking out at the L.A. or 

Long Beach breakwater entrance. Tr. at 158:17-159:14.

93. The REBEL II checked in with VTS at 10:10 pm on October 1, 2008 when leaving 

Pebbly Beach, Catalina Island en route to Lost Angeles Port with an ETA to Los Angeles 

Raycon Buoy at 12:40 am on October 2, 2008. Tr. at 161:14-19; Coast Guard Exh. 6.

94. When a collision occurs in the area covered by VTS, VTS generates an incident report. 

Such a report was generated for the collision between the ISLANDER and the Sanchez Bayliner. 

Tr. at 168:1-169:9; Coast Guard Exh. 7.

95. The VTS incident report for the collision indicates that the collision occurred .32 nautical 

miles from Los Angeles Buoy 1 with the REBEL II proceeding at 8.1 kts. and the recreational 

vessel (i.e., the Sanchez Bayliner) travelling at 20 kts. Tr. at 169:19-25; Coast Guard Exh. 7 at 1.
20

96. Respondent‘s Exhibit M is a replay of the VTS data from early in the morning on 

October 2, 2008. Tr. at 627:12-628:3.

97. While VTS does not monitor recreational vessels in ideal weather situations, if VTS 

identifies a possible close quarters situation, it would have tried to contact the REBEL II. VTS 

never contacted the REBEL II to inform it that an unidentified vessel was approaching. Tr. at 

208:19-209:8.

98. Captain Scoto‘s practice was to contact VTS upon entering the precautionary area, which 

is approximately three to four miles from LA Buoy No. 1, which normally takes the REBEL II 

approximately 40-45 minutes to transverse. Tr. at 396:15-397:6.

99. Captain Scoto did not receive information from VTS that there was a small vessel in the 

area when the REBEL II entered the precautionary area. Tr. at 397:7-11.

F. The Sanchez Bayliner

100. The boat occupied by Mr. Sanchez and Ms. Avila was a 1989 28.66-foot Bayliner Avanti 

model (―the Sanchez Bayliner‖). Coast Guard Exhs. 15, 16, 22, 23; Tr. at 44:24-45:2; 45:11-20; 

46:2-47:12.

101. The picture and specifications of the Bayliner 2950/2955 Avanti Sunbridge depicted in 

the upper right of Coast Guard Exh. 16 represent a similar model to the Sanchez Bayliner. Tr. at 

47:11-23.

102. Small fiberglass boats, like the Sanchez Bayliner, are difficult to pick up on radar because 

fiberglass does not present a radar signature and the radar can only pick up non-fiberglass 

elements of such boats. Tr. at 889:11-14; 1111:8-18; 1323:25-1324:10; 1325:2-11.

103. The Sanchez Bayliner‘s light switch had three positions – (1) ANC – in which the allaround white light would be on; (2) NAV – in which the red and green running lights and the allaround white light would be on; and (3) OFF – in which no lights would be on. Tr. at 290:6-18; 

292:13-293:4; 776:6-19.
21

104. Mr. Michael Avila, Ms. Avila‘s son, owned the Sanchez Bayliner. Tr. at 41:16-19.

105. On October 1, 2008, Mr. Avila picked up his mother and Mr. Sanchez at Ms. Avila‘s 

home around 8:00 pm. Tr. 41:19-42:5.

106. Mr. Avila, Mr. Sanchez and Ms. Avila arrived at the boat (located at 261 Bayshore Drive 

in Alamitos Bay, Long Beach) around 9:30 pm. Tr. at 43:1-2.

107. Mr. Avila saw Mr. Sanchez climb up onto the Sanchez Bayliner‘s bench seat and place 

an all-around white light on the canopy area of the boat near the radar dome. Tr. at 48:21-49:22.

108. When Mr. Sanchez put the light into its socket, Mr. Avila saw the white light illuminate. 

Tr. at 50:8-12.

109. Mr. Avila also saw from the dock that the Sanchez Bayliner‘s red and green running 

lights (located toward the front of the boat) were illuminated. Tr. at 50:13-20.

110. As the Sanchez Bayliner left the dock and made its way under the two bridges out of 

Alamitos Bay, Mr. Avila followed the boat in his car, stopped on the first bridge, got out of his 

car to watch the Sanchez Bayliner go under that bridge and then saw it proceed to and under the 

second bridge (i.e., the 2nd Street bridge). Tr. at 53:16-55:1. 

111. As the Bayliner passed under the bridge at 2nd Street, the Bayliner‘s navigation lights 

(port and starboard running and all-around white) remained on and visible. The all-around white 

light was brighter than the port and starboard running lights. The Bayliner passed under the 2nd 

Street Bridge at approximately 11:40 p.m. Coast Guard Exh. 9; Tr. at 54:16-55:4; 55:19-56:6; 

57:24-58:2.

112. Mr. Sanchez was driving the boat that night. Ms. Avila never drove the Sanchez 

Bayliner. Tr. at 55:5-13.

113. Mr. Avila had been out on the Sanchez Bayliner with Mr. Sanchez approximately 10 or 

more times. Tr. at 62:4-9.
22

114. Mr. Avila was not aware of any reason Mr. Sanchez would have for turning off his 

running lights at night. Tr. at 65:8-16.

115. The Coast Guard obtained video evidence from cameras near Alamitos Bay to try to 

determine whether the Sanchez Bayliner had its lights on when it left the dock. Tr. at 258:23-

262:22; 266:22-24; 269:20-270:9; Coast Guard Exhs. 9, 24.

116. The Sanchez Bayliner had both its navigation lights and its white and green navigation 

light lit as it left Alamitos Bay. Coast Guard Exh. 9; Tr. at 282:13-283:2.

117. From the time the Bayliner left its dock in Alamitos Bay to the time of the collision with 

the ISLANDER, it is more likely than not that the Bayliner‘s navigation lights were turned on 

and were operating properly. Coast Guard Exh. 9; Tr. at 65:9-16.

118. Consistent with the requirements of Rule 22 of both the Inland and International Rules of 

the Road, the Bayliner‘s all-around masthead light had a visibility range of at least two miles and 

each of the Bayliner‘s sidelights had a minimum visibility range of one mile. See Coast Guard 

Exhs. 9, 15; Navigation Rules, Inland, 33 C.F.R. § 83.22 (c) and International, U.S. Coast Guard 

COMDINST M16672 (Rule 22).

G. The CAPT. T LE

119. On the night of October 1, early morning of October 2, 2008, the CAPT. T LE, a 

crewboat that runs back and forth from Long Beach to the oil platforms was transiting the area 

outbound from the LA/LB PORT. Tr. at 176:12-17; Coast Guard Exh. 8 at 7; Resp. Exh. EEE.

120. The Sanchez Bayliner passed directly in front of the CAPT. T LE at a speed of 

approximately 20 knots after emerging from behind the anchored tanker BALTIC at a range of 

approximately .388 nautical miles. Tr. at 233:3-16, 379:13-380:2; Coast Guard Exh. 8 at 7-10.

121. Captain Pancho was the master of the CAPT. T LE on the night of October 1/early 

morning of October 2, 2008. Feb. 15, 2011 Tr. at 6:19-20; 7:17-25.
23

122. Captain Pancho did not at the time have a radar endorsement but had practical training on 

the use of radar. Feb. 15, 2011 Tr. at 8:15-9:7; 10:1-5.

123. Captain Pancho‘s statement provided to the Coast Guard indicates that he did not see a 

small boat crossing ahead of the CAPT. T LE visually or on radar. Captain Pancho further 

speculated that based on the conditions that night, he believed he should have seen such a small 

vessel even if the vessel did not have its lights on. Tr. at 323:2-9; Feb. 15, 2011 Tr. at 19:21-23; 

Resp. Exh. TT.

124. Captain Raymond Blakeslee was serving as the CAPT. T LE‘s engineer and lookout on 

the night of October 1 and early morning of October 2, 2008. Tr. at 964:25-965:13; 908:23-

981:23.

125. Captain Pancho was maintaining a visual lookout and monitoring the CAPT. T LE‘s 

radar. Tr. at 989:2-8; Feb. 15, 2011 Tr. at 22:4-21.

126. Visibility was good and Captain Blakeslee recalled that he could see at least eight miles 

with calm seas of 2-3 feet. Tr. at 979:11-18; Feb. 15, 2011 Tr.at 20:14-23.

127. From the direction the CAPT. T LE was proceeding outbound from the LA/LB Port, 

there would be no background lighting forward of the vessel. Tr. at 651:22-652:5; 978:18-979:6; 

1010:12-1011:5.

128. Neither Captain Blakeslee nor Captain Pancho saw any recreational craft cross the 

CAPT. T LE‘s bow as it was heading out of LA/LB Port – despite the fact that the Sanchez 

Bayliner clearly passed within visual range of Captain Blakeslee‘s lookout position for 

approximately 2.5 minutes. Tr. at 983:4-9; 997:22-998:2; Feb. 15, 2011 Tr. at 21:12-16.

129. Captain Pancho had his radar set at a one-mile range during the transit out of LA/LB 

Port. Feb. 15, 2011 Tr. at 23:11-17.
24

130. Captain Blakeslee believed he probably would have seen the Sanchez Bayliner at a range 

of approximately 4/10ths of a mile under the conditions of that night even if Bayliner‘s lights 

were off. Tr. at 1005:19-1006:15.

131. Captain Pancho also believed that he should have seen the Sanchez Bayliner cross the 

CAPT. T LE‘s bow, even if the Bayliner‘s lights were not illuminated because of the amount of 

light coming off the anchored ships in the area. Feb. 15, 2011 Tr. at 28:4-24.

132. The CAPT. T LE (not while Captain Pancho was master) was involved in an accident in 

November 2008 in which the vessel struck bow first into a lighted aid to navigation. Feb. 15, 

2011 Tr. at 31:24-33:1.

133. Because streaked and dirty windows were identified as a contributing factor in the CAPT. 

T LE‘s accident, the owner of the vessel put procedures in place to ensure that the CAPT. T LE‘s 

windows were kept clean; Captain Pancho recalled that the windows were clean on the night of 

October 1/early morning of October 2, 2008 per his usual practice of making sure the windows 

are clean. Feb. 15, 2011 Tr. at 35:7-36:17.

134. Charges against Captain Pancho of the CAPT. T LE were not brought for failing to see 

the Sanchez Bayliner because there was no collision between the two vessels. Tr. at 390:13-21.

135. The Coast Guard stated that it did not conduct an extensive follow up with Captain 

Pancho regarding this incident because the area where the Sanchez Bayliner crossed the bow of 

the CAPT. T LE had a lot of deep-draft vessels at anchor and ―a near miss wouldn‘t even be 

considered a near miss until a quarter of a mile, and this was beyond that.‖ Tr. at 423:12-16.

H. The Collision between the ISLANDER and the Sanchez Bayliner

136. The parties stipulated that the collision between the ISLANDER and a recreational boat 

with two people on board (Mr. Henry Sanchez and Ms. Penny Avila) occurred on the morning of 

October 2, 2008. Tr. at 6:21-7:13.
25

137. The collision between the ISLANDER and the Sanchez Bayliner took place within the 

LA/LB precautionary area. Tr. at 164:2-3; 188:3-6.

138. The Sanchez Bayliner maintained a straight-line course toward the Isthmus of Catalina 

Island until it collided with the ISLANDER. Tr. at 641:21-642:6.

139. At approximately 12:18 am on October 2, 2008, the VTS data shows the ISLANDER and 

the Sanchez Bayliner merging into one radar signature, indicating a close quarters or a collision 

between the two vessels. Tr. at 187:11-22; Coast Guard Exh. 8 at 17.

140. The Sanchez Bayliner passed very close by Los Angeles Buoy 1 before striking the 

ISLANDER. Tr. at 207:19-208:18; Coast Guard Exh. 8 at 17.

141. An examination of the ISLANDER following the collision indicated that the collision 

was likely a very strong, hard impact and that the Sanchez Bayliner might have gone under the 

barge. Tr. at 253:3-254:9.

142. The Bayliner remained afloat for at least nineteen minutes after the collision with the 

REBEL II/ ISLANDER. Resp. Exh. M; Coast Guard Exh. 19 at 3, Coast Guard Exh. 20 at 3; Tr. 

at 642:13-644:2. 

143. The crew of the REBEL II made no attempt to render aid after the collision to the Penny 

Avila or Henry Sanchez onboard the Bayliner. Tr. at 529:12-530:13. 

144. Both Penny Avila and Henry Sanchez died of ―probable drowning‖ and other 

unestablished factors. Coast Guard Exhs. 19, 20.

145. Neither Captain Scoto nor Deckhand Amstutz ever became aware of the presence of the 

Sanchez Bayliner at any time before, during, or after the collision between the REBEL II/ 

ISLANDER and the Bayliner. Tr. at 100:4-12; 110:15-20; 151, 517:10-15; 529:18-25. 

146. The damage to the Sanchez Bayliner was significant, with the driver seat at the steering 

station sheared off the deck. Tr. at 286:6-287:19; Coast Guard Exhs. 17, 18.
26

147. The control switch panel of the Sanchez Bayliner suffered significant damage. Tr. at 

297:11-19; 299:6-15; Coast Guard Exh. 26.

148. The light switch on the Sanchez Bayliner was found in the ANC position when the boat 

was recovered. Tr. at 293:8-14.

149. The switches of the Sanchez Bayliner were of a type that not much force is required to 

move the switch from one position to another. Tr. at 289:5-14.

150. The Sanchez Bayliner‘s wheel was recovered after the collision in the locked position, 

which would have prevented Mr. Sanchez from turning the wheel more than 2-3 degrees, and 

there is no reason to think the wheel was not locked at the time of the accident given the 

consistent course of the Sanchez Bayliner as revealed in the VTS data. Tr. at 401:11-403:7; 

Resp. Exh. VV.

151. The Sanchez Bayliner sank as a result of the collision with the ISLANDER and was 

sitting on the ocean floor, keel up, for seven days before it was recovered and brought to the 

surface. Tr. at 409:4-19.

152. Having the REBEL II‘s radar set to pick up the channel buoys in LA/LB Port should have 

also allowed the radar to pick up the Sanchez Bayliner. Tr. at 884:23-885:7.

153. Captain Scoto‘s practice and procedure while in the precautionary zone was generally 

two minutes scanning visually and one minute observing radar. Tr. at 521:2-17.

I. The “Re-Creation” of the Collision

154. One of the parties of interest conducted a ―re-creation‖ of the collision under similar 

conditions, comparing the efficiency of the REBEL II‘s radar on the night of the collision with a 

federally compliant radar unit. Tr. at 362:5-12.

155. The law firm conducting the ―re-creation‖ chose a night with similar conditions as the 

night of the collision to conduct the ―re-enactment‖ and the conditions were substantially similar 
27

other than the fact that on the night of the collision there was a little more wind. Tr. at 840:4-

841:1.

156. One of Respondent‘s experts – Prof. Pecota – participated in the ―re-creation‖ of the 

REBEL II/Sanchez Bayliner incident. Tr. at 839:2-9.

157. Prof. Pecota was conducting a test during the ―re-enactment‖ to see if the REBEL II‘s 

radar that existed on the October 1 and 2, 2008 could pick up a Bayliner similar to the Sanchez 

Bayliner under similar conditions with a new, federally compliant radar installed as well for

comparison purposes. Tr. at 842:8-23.

158. Prof. Pecota did not know what settings Captain Scoto used for his radar at the time of 

the collision, except for possibly the range setting, but knew that he was going to be looking for a 

fiberglass Bayliner on radar and optimized his settings to pick up such a vessel. Tr. at 842:2-7.

159. During the ―re-creation‖, both the REBEL II‘s existing radar and a federally compliant 

radar unit were able to pick up a 26-foot fiberglass Bayliner similar to the Sanchez Bayliner 

under similar conditions. Tr. at 363:23-365:8.

160. The ―re-creation‖ Bayliner was 26 ft. whereas the Sanchez Bayliner 28 ft. 8 inches in 

length. Tr. at 368:19-25.

161. Prof. Pecota noted no material difference in the performance of the two radar units 

installed on the REBEL II and was able to pick up the Bayliner used in the ―re-creation‖ with the 

radar. Tr. at 847:15-848:1.

162. The radar unit on the REBEL II on the night of the collision was capable of detecting the 

Bayliner. Tr. at 364-365, 368, 392, 493-494, 861.

163. Prof. Pecota knew approximately from what direction the Bayliner would be approaching 

the tug during the ―re-creation‖. Tr. at 843:10-20.

164. The Bayliner used in the ―re-creation‖ had normal running lights (red and green) and an 

all-around white light. Tr. at 844:9-20.
28

165. Prof. Pecota found it difficult to pick out the lights of the Bayliner used in the ―recreation‖ from the background lights even though he knew in what direction to look for it, 

having acquired it on radar, and only picked it up within about a mile of the REBEL II and 

especially noticed it as it approached within a quarter of a mile (i.e., 1500-2000 feet) as the 

bearing drift of the light began to move more rapidly. Tr. at 861:16-864:9.6

IV. Principles of Law

The purpose of Coast Guard Suspension and Revocation proceedings is to promote safety 

at sea and to maintain standards of competence and conduct. See 46 U.S.C. §7701; 46 C.F.R. 

§5.5. Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations §5.19 authorizes an Administrative Law Judge 

(Judge) to conduct hearings and to suspend or revoke a license or certificate for violations arising 

under 46 U.S.C. §§ 7703 and/or 7704.

Determining the weight of the evidence and making credibility determinations as to the 

evidence is within the sole purview of the Judge. See Appeal Decision 2640 (PASSARO) (2003). 

aff‘d sub nom., Collins v. Passaro, NTSB Order No. EM-199, 2004 WL 817119 (N.T.S.B. 

2004). Additionally, the Judge is vested with broad discretion in resolving inconsistencies in the 

evidence. Moreover, findings may have some inconsistencies with the evidence of record as 

long as there is sufficient evidence to reasonably justify the findings reached. Id.; Appeal 

Decision 2639 (HAUCK) (2003).

A. Burden and Standard of Proof

The Coast Guard bears the burden of proof to establish the requisite facts mandated by 46 

U.S.C. §7703(2) and the implementing regulations, 46 C.F.R. Part 5; Part 10, Subpart B; 33 

C.F.R. Part 20. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§551-559, applies to Coast 

Guard Suspension and Revocation hearings before United States Administrative Law Judges. 

 

6 The undersigned finds Prof. Pecota‘s testimony on this subject to be credible. Clearly, visually picking up a vessel 

very similar to the Sanchez Bayliner during conditions similar to the night in question is problematic.
29

The APA authorizes imposition of sanctions if, upon consideration of the entire record as a 

whole, the charges are supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence. See 5 U.S.C. 

§556(d). The Coast Guard bears the burden of proof to establish the charges are supported by a 

preponderance of the evidence. 33 C.F.R. §§ 20.701; 20.702(a). ―The term substantial evidence 

is synonymous with preponderance of the evidence as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court.‖ 

Appeal Decision 2477 (TOMBARI) (1988). 

The burden of proving a fact by a preponderance of the evidence ―simply requires the 

trier of fact  ̳to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before 

[he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade the [judge] of the fact‘s 

existence.‘‖ Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. 

Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970). (Harlan, J., 

concurring) (brackets in original)). At the hearing, the Coast Guard therefore had to prove by 

credible, reliable, probative and substantial evidence that Respondent more-likely-than-not 

committed the violations charged.

B. Jurisdiction

―The jurisdiction of administrative bodies is dependent upon the validity and the terms of 

the statutes reposing power in them.‖ Appeal Decision 2620 (COX) (2001) quoting Appeal 

Decision 2025 (ARMSTRONG) (1975). Where an administrative forum acts without 

jurisdiction its orders are void. Id. Therefore, establishing jurisdiction is critical to the validity 

of a proceeding. Appeal Decision 2677 (WALKER) (2008). Jurisdiction is a question of fact 

that must be proven. Appeal Decision 2425 (BUTTNER) (1986). See also Appeal Decision 

(ARMSTRONG) (stating ―jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown and will not be presumed‖).

Here, the Coast Guard charged Respondent with both Misconduct and Negligence, i.e., 

46 C.F.R. § 5.27 (misconduct) and 46 C.F.R. § 5.29 (negligence). The Complaint alleged that on 

or about October 1 and 2, 2008, Respondent, while as serving Master aboard the tug REBEL II, 
30

failed to maintain a proper lookout as required by Rule 5 of the Inland Navigation Rules. The 

Complaint alleges that Respondent‘s alleged failure to maintain a proper lookout constitutes 

negligence under 46 C.F.R. §5.29. The Coast Guard also alleged that during the transit from 

Catalina to LA/LB Port, Respondent relinquished direction and control of the REBEL II to his 

unlicensed deckhand contrary to 46 C.F.R. 15.610.

To establish jurisdiction in both negligence and misconduct cases under the authority of 

46 U.S.C. § 7703, the actions (or inactions) constituting the alleged negligence and misconduct 

must be proven to have occurred while the mariner was ―acting under the authority‖ of his 

merchant mariner‘s license or credential. See Appeal Decisions 2516 (DALE) (2000) 

(negligence), 2677 (WALKER) (2008) (misconduct). The term ―acting under the authority‖ is 

defined at 46 C.F.R. §5.57 and states, in part, ―[a] person employed in the service of a vessel is 

considered to be acting under the authority of a license, certificate or document when the holding 

of such license, certificate or document is (1) [r]equired by law or regulation; or (2) [r]equired by 

an employer as a condition for employment.‖ If neither one of these two criteria is met, then the 

Coast Guard has no jurisdiction to pursue a Suspension and Revocation proceeding. Appeal 

Decision 2620 (COX) (2001). 

Whether Respondent was acting under the authority of his license at all relevant times 

was not a point of contention at any time during the case. In his Answer, Respondent admitted 

he was indeed acting under the authority of his MML on October 1-2, 2008, by serving as Master 

aboard the REBEL II as required by law or regulation. Moreover, the weight of the evidence 

clearly proves that Respondent was serving aboard the REBEL II as a Master on or about 

October 1-2, 2008, during the transit from Catalina to LA/LB Port: (1) during which Respondent 

laid down in the rack for 30 to 45 minutes (the facts constituting the alleged misconduct) and (2) 

during which the collision with the Sanchez Bayliner occurred (the facts constituting the alleged 
31

negligence). Therefore, Respondent is found to have been acting under the authority of his Coast 

Guard-issued license at all relevant times.

C. Misconduct – Relinquishing Direction and Control of Tug to Unlicensed Person

To prove misconduct under 46 C.F.R. § 5.27, the Coast Guard must establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated: ―some formal, duly established rule. 

Such rules are found in, among other places, statutes, regulations, the common law, the general 

maritime law, a ship‘s regulation or order, or shipping articles and similar sources. It is an act 

which is forbidden or a failure to do that which is required.‖ 

It is well established under 46 U.S.C. § 8904(a)7that a towing vessel at least 26 feet in 

length (like the REBEL II) ―shall be operated by an individual licensed by the Secretary to 

operate that type of vessel in the particular geographic area, under prescribed regulations‖ and 

that an operator who relinquishes direction and control of a vessel to an unlicensed person is 

liable for misconduct. See Appeal Decisions 2292 (COLE) (1983), 2566 (WILLIAMS) (1995), 

aff‘d sub nom. Kime v. Williams, NTSB Order No. EM-181 1996 WL 30281 (N.T.S.B. 1996); 

aff‘d Williams v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 121 F.3d 720, 1997 WL 458606 (9th Cir. 1997).

Here, the Coast Guard charged a violation of 46 C.F.R. § 15.610(a), which provides:

Except as provided in this paragraph, every towing vessel of at least 8 meters (at 

least 26 feet) in length, measured from end to end over the deck (excluding sheer), 

must be under the direction and control of a person holding a license or MMC 

officer endorsement as master or mate (pilot) of towing vessels or as master or 

mate of vessels of greater than 200 gross register tons holding either an 

endorsement on his or her license or MMC for towing vessels or a completed 

Towing Officer‘s Assessment Record (TOAR) signed by a designated examiner 

indicating that the officer is proficient in the operation of towing vessels.

(emphasis added).

Several Commandant Decisions on Appeal have addressed the direction and control 

issue. A leading case is Appeal Decision 2058 (SEARS) (1976) in which the Commandant held 

 

7

Formerly 46 U.S.C. 405(b)(2).
32

that the ―temporary absence from the wheelhouse of the licensed operator (officer of the watch) 

on an uninspected towing vessel is not, in every case, and absolute violation of 46 USC 

405(b)(2), as this absence does not necessarily constitute relinquishment of  ̳actual direction and 

control‘ over the vessel.‖8 Indeed, SEARS stands for the proposition that the licensed master of 

a tug may leave the wheelhouse under certain circumstances:

If the circumstances are such than an unlicensed crew member can temporarily 

steer the vessel, without any appreciable increase in risk to its safe navigation then 

the licensed operator may momentarily leave the wheelhouse (after giving 

appropriate instructions to the crewman) and still maintain ―actual direction and 

control.‖ (emphasis added).

SEARS articulated several factors that would allow an unlicensed mate to take the wheel for 

training purposes – i.e., the course is straight, the visibility good, and the traffic sparse. 

Furthermore, SEARS made a distinction where the ―proven navigational competence of the 

crewmember is high‖ so that in such instances, ―the licensed operator might briefly leave the 

wheelhouse and still maintain actual control of the vessel.‖

The particular facts of SEARS, however, led to an affirmed finding of misconduct on the 

basis that the operator was ―operating with a reduced degree of control when he himself was at 

the wheel‖ since the evidence indicated that his view was partially obstructed by his tow and he 

had not posted a lookout or used radar to compensate for the partial obstruction. Furthermore, 

SEARS found that the operator ―left the wheelhouse without offering any instructions to the 

deckhand‖ about approaching obstacles extending into the river. These conditions of ―increased 

navigational risk‖ made it improper for the operator to leave the wheelhouse in the hands of an 

unlicensed deckhand ―unqualified to operate under the prevailing conditions.‖ The sanction 

imposed, as modified by the Commandant to effect only the operator‘s license – not his merchant 

 

8

In SEARS, the master apparently left the wheelhouse for a period of approximately 15 minutes so that he could use 

the restroom.
33

mariner‘s document, was suspension of 3 months outright with 6 months remitted on 12 months‘ 

probation. 

Several cases following SEARS further refined the ―direction and control‖ standard. For 

example, Appeal Decision 2122 (RODIECK) (1978) dealt with an operator of an uninspected tug 

who left the wheelhouse in the hands of an unlicensed crewmember for a few moments so that he 

could go to the restroom. In RODIECK, the situation involved a tug towing a 230 foot oil barge 

on a 100 foot hawser from Crystal River to Port Manatee, Florida, with clear weather and wind 

at 10 to 15 miles per hour and seas running three to four feet. Visibility was unlimited except for 

some glare from the water which hampered vision from directly ahead of the tug to a few 

degrees on the starboard bow. The unlicensed crewmember had previously been the master of a 

73 foot shrimp boat that ran between Tampa, Florida and South America for 10 years prior to his 

employment on the tug and ―therefore Appellant and the captain often permitted [him] to take 

over the watch for a few minutes during clear weather so that they could leave the wheelhouse 

for a short period of time.‖ 

Before leaving the wheelhouse, the operator ―informed [the unlicensed crewmember] of 

the course, speed, and weather, and checked the radar‖, which had a range of 24 miles and did 

not indicate any vessels in the area. The tug was proceeding at a speed of 8 knots. During the 

operator‘s absence, a small 20 to 21 foot white, fiberglass, motor-powered boat appeared within 

50 yards of the tug‘s starboard bow. A collision between the recreational boat and the tug‘s tow 

ensued and the three persons on the motorboat were killed. 

As RODIECK instructs, the key questions for determining who in fact is directing and 

controlling the operation of the towing vessel are fact specific and involve a range of questions 

like: 1) who is at the wheel?; 2) where was the licensed operator?; 3) what was the operator 

doing?; 4) what was the makeup of the tow?; and 5) what was the weather? RODIECK

nevertheless emphasized the ―precise time or the precise duration of an interval [of the operator‘s 
34

absence] are not of the essence‖ because ―time is a factor, but it is only one of several that can 

contribute to the formation of a judgment as to the nature of the  ̳direction and control‘ of the 

vessel‖. RODIECK also clearly stated that SEARS does not stand for the proposition that any 

one factor or set of factors necessarily defines the whole of determining the direction and control 

issue, but rather the articulated questions ―do not individually determine  ̳direction and control,‘ 

nor does any predetermined number of factors necessarily establish compliance with the law.‖ 

Rather, 

―[a] pragmatic approach to the question must go with the reading of the law.‖

Indeed, RODIECK states:

The range of possibilities is broad, however, moving across from a concept of 

negligence tested by the common prudent practice of peers to a statutory mandate 

which, however much light is needed for its ascertainment, sets up a definite limit 

to acceptable conduct beyond which there must be found a violation of the statute.

Whatever may be passable, or allowable, or tolerable, as exercising ―direction and 

control‖ of a tow, it cannot be said, when a tow is navigated with the sole 

statutory qualified person below deck in an enclosed compartment, whether he be 

asleep or using toilet facilities, that he is in direction and control of the towing 

vessel at the time. This would be true no matter how many, if any, other 

unlicensed persons were up and about and on deck, doing whatever. There were 

in fact two licensed operators aboard ADMIRAL LEFFLER on this occasion. 

The one who was, at the time, in the head, was no more directing and controlling 

the operator of the vessel than was the one who was asleep in his quarters; the 

only difference was that one was charged with the immediate responsibilities of 

the person on duty while the other was not.

The length of time of absence ―from the wheelhouse‖ then is not only of itself 

controlling, it is in some instances not even a consideration when the other end of 

the line - ―Where was person during the absence?‖ renders the duration of no 

significance.

In RODIECK, the misconduct violation was affirmed, as well as the sanction of 

suspension for a period of 3 months remitted on 12 months‘ probation. 

In Appeal Decision 2264 (McKNIGHT) (1981), the Commandant affirmed a 

proven charge of negligence against a tug operator who ―negligently absented himself 

from the wheelhouse‖ of the tug, leaving the tug‘s navigation to an unlicensed deckhand, 
35

which contributed to a collision with a bridge. McKNIGHT thus did not involve a charge 

of misconduct and instead concentrated on the operator‘s negligence related to the 

collision with the bridge. 

The tug was pushing a barge which was fitted with a crane that had a 62.5 foot 

boom attached. Approximately one mile from the bridge where the collision occurred, 

the operator decided to check his computations about the clearance for passage under the 

bridge. The operator therefore left an unlicensed deckhand at the wheel, with another 

deckhand stationed on the barge itself to provide steering directions by hand signal 

because vision was obstructed from the pilothouse. The operator went to the barge‘s 

deckhouse to confirm his calculations regarding clearance for the bridge and remained in 

the deckhouse to study charts of the area beyond the bridge. The operator‘s calculations 

were incorrect, however, and the crane‘s boom struck the bridge and holed the bridge 

span. The boom bent under the force of the impact and fell upon the stern of the tug with 

no injuries resulting.

The Commandant affirmed the charge of negligence and noted that the operator 

had ―only had a limited view of the flotilla, its components, and the bridge the flotilla was 

approaching.‖ Communications with the vessel‘s wheelhouse was also limited and the 

operator only gave general instruction to the unlicensed helmsman when he left the 

wheelhouse. Indeed, the Commandant concluded the direction and control aspect of 

McKNIGHT by stating:

Licensed operators are required aboard vessels such as HOLLY to insure that a 

minimum level of experience and competence is possessed by the person actually 

directing and controlling the movements of the vessel. As prior decisions have 

stated, this does not mean that the operator must physically steer the flotilla; it 

does mean he must be in a position to provide timely corrective action if a 

hazardous situation develops. In light of this, Appellant‘s action in departing the 

pilothouse for 5 to 10 minutes as the flotilla approached a bridge, with minimally 

experienced personnel actually controlling the movement of the vessel, is not 

explicable by his ―gut feeling‖ that he should check his clearance computations 
36

again. Given the circumstances of this case, and the layout of the barge, I 

conclude that Appellant could not execute his duty as operator after placing 

himself in a position where he could not observe the progress of the flotilla as it 

approached the bridge. Since Appellant could not direct and control the vessel 

from his remote position, and made no pretense of doing so, he had relinquished 

direction and control of the vessel to unlicensed personnel.

McKNIGHT thus emphasized that an operator does not physically have to steer the 

vessel, but must be in a position to ―provide timely corrective action if a hazardous 

situation develops‖ and that an operator‘s position clearly has an effect on that operator‘s 

ability to maintain direction and control over the tug. The sanction of 2 month 

suspension remitted on 9 months‘ probation was thus affirmed.

Appeal Decision 2292 (COLE) (1983) further refined the SEARS standard 

particularly with respect to jurisdictional issues. The administrative law judge found the 

operator guilty of misconduct and negligence in connection with a tug operator 

wrongfully undertaking a voyage in excess of twelve hours with only a single, licensed 

operator on the boat and also wrongfully absenting himself from the wheelhouse. The 

operator at one point during a journey in the Intercoastal Waterway, Halifax River, 

Florida left the wheelhouse for approximately an hour and a half, during which time a 

collision occurred between the tug‘s tow and a motorboat, resulting in loss of life. The 

unlicensed mate had more than 48 years of tow boat experience. The administrative law 

judge imposed a sanction of 2 month suspension, plus an additional 6 months remitted on 

12 months‘ probation.

On appeal, the Commandant cited to SEARS and upheld the decision of the 

administrative law judge, including the sanction. Importantly, COLE rejected the 

operator‘s appeal on a jurisdictional ground and held that the operator‘s conduct in 

relinquishing control of the vessel in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 405(b)(2) provided the 

based for the Coast Guard‘s jurisdiction.
37

Appeal Decision 2312 (HITT) (1983), represents an appeal of an adverse Equal 

Access to Justice Act (EAJA) claim. The underlying case in HITT involved the dismissal 

of a misconduct charge against an operator of an uninspected tug. Respondent filed an 

EAJA claim to recover attorney fees and costs, which the Commandant denied on the 

basis that the Coast Guard was substantially justified in bringing the misconduct charge. 

The Coast Guard had brought the charge of misconduct based on the fact that the 

operator had left the wheelhouse to go to the head for four to five minutes in conditions 

where the weather was clear and the visibility was good and there was no close quarters 

situation with any other vessels. The operator further instructed the unlicensed crew 

member to hold a straight course to a distant landmark. 

Reading SEARS, the administrative law judge dismissed the misconduct charge, 

even though at the hearing the unlicensed crewmember admitted that, while he could 

steer the tug, he had no navigational experience and could not read a nautical chart. 

Furthermore, the record indicated that the crewmember passed a black buoy off his 

starboard side instead of his port side – a violation of one of the most basic piloting rules.

In Appeal Decision 2387 (BARRIOS) (1985), a specification of misconduct 

against the licensed operator of an uninspected tow was found proved in connection with 

the operator relinquishing the actual direction and control while the tug was underway, 

which contributed to the tug‘s allusion with a bridge. In BARRIOS, the licensed operator 

relinquished control of the tug to the unlicensed mate and ―went to his cabin, and went to 

bed.‖ The mate had no formal training in the operation of that type of vessel and was not 

given any instructions or directions about how to navigate the river before the operator 

left the wheelhouse. BARRIOS reiterated that the operator of an uninspected towing 

vessel is ―responsible for the safe operation of that vessel during the time that he is on 
38

watch.‖ The appeal was denied and the sanction of 1 month suspension plus an 

additional 3 months remitted on 12 month‘s probation was affirmed.

In Appeal Decision 2566 (WILLIAMS) (1995), aff‘d sub nom. Kime v. Williams, 

NTSB Order No. EM-181, 1996 WL 3028 1(N.T.S.B. 1996),9the operator of an 

uninspected tug called an unlicensed deckhand to the wheelhouse so that the operator 

could go to the head. At that time, the tug was travelling on autopilot in a vessel traffic 

lane and a 56 foot fishing vessel was about 100 to 250 yards away from the tug. The tug 

was overtaking the fishing vessel at the time and the operator left the wheelhouse to use 

the restroom for approximately three minutes. During the time the operator was absent 

from the wheelhouse, the tug collided with the fishing vessel, which sank with no loss of 

life. At the time of the collision, the weather was sunny with seas at 1-2 feet and 

unlimited visibility.

WILLIAMS reconfirmed that ―a licensed operator‘s temporary absence from the 

wheelhouse of a towing vessel is not in every case an absolute violation of 46 U.S.C. § 

405(b)(2) (or its successor, § 8904) because the mere absence might not constitute 

relinquishment of  ̳actual direction and control‘ over the vessel.‖ (citing SEARS). 

Unlike SEARS, WILLIAMS involved ―risks to safe navigation . . . on all sides‖ –

with a close-quarters situation existing at the time the operator left the wheelhouse with 

the autopilot engaged. WILLIAMS clearly indicated that a significant part of the 

problem was while the operator was in the head, he ―was unable to perceive either course 

changes or the rapidly closing distance between the vessels.‖ Furthermore, the mere fact 

 

9 The NTSB noted that the operator ―entrusted the helm to a crewmember of little or no navigational experience.‖ 

NTSB Order No. EM-181 at n.9. The NTSB further noted that it read an affirmative obligation under SEARS for an 

operator ―only to entrust the wheel to a crewmember of demonstrated navigational ability. The proper discharge of 

that obligation was especially important in this incident, as appellant wanted to leave the wheel at a time of obvious

navigational risk, in that his tug was steadily closing on another vessel, albeit apparently then on a parallel track, 

whose immediate future directional intentions were unknown.‖ Id. (emphasis added).
39

that there was a collision during his absence ―makes it plainer that the risks were high and 

getting worse‖. Finally, WILLIAMS noted that the deckhand‘s navigational competence 

was not high and that the deckhand was ―oblivious to the apparent risks‖ at the time that 

the operator went to the rear of the wheelhouse to check the chart.

The charge of misconduct was affirmed and the sanction of 4 month suspension, 

plus a further 3 month suspension remitted on 12 months‘ probation was also upheld.10 

Even though two of the three specifications in WILLIAMS were dismissed, the total 

sanction imposed by the Administrative Law Judge was upheld because the misconduct 

charge was aggravated by the facts supporting those charges – even though those two 

charges were dismissed on appeal.

D. Negligence – Failure to Maintain an Adequate Lookout under Rule 5

To prove negligence under 46 C.F.R. §5.29, the Coast Guard must establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence: 

(1) That Respondent is a holder of a merchant mariners license; 

(2) That Respondent was acting under the authority of his license on October 1-2, 2008, 

when the alleged violation occurred; and 

(3) That Respondent either (a) committed an act which a reasonable and prudent 

person/mariner would not commit under the same circumstances; or (b) failed to perform an act 

which a reasonable and prudent person/mariner would have taken under the same circumstances.

As discussed above, there is no dispute Respondent is the holder of a merchant mariners 

license and that he was acting under the authority of that license on October 1-2, 2008. 

Therefore, the first two (2) elements listed above are found PROVED. The dispute to be 

resolved in this case concerns the third element. Hence, the question is whether Respondent‘s 

 

10 WILLIAMS notes that the misconduct charge (relinquishing direction and control) is ―in the nature of a failure to 

perform a duty related to vessel safety, or alternatively, improper performance of duties related to vessel safety, 

namely, ensuring a qualified relief at the con, for which the suggested range of orders in Table 5.569 is 2-6 months‘ 

suspension.‖
40

actions or omissions were that which a reasonable and prudent mariner of the same station would 

have taken under the same circumstances. See 46 C.F.R. § 5.29. 

In suspension and revocation proceedings, a violation of a navigation rule itself is 

negligence. See Appeal Decisions 2386 (LOUVIERE) (1985); 2358 (BUISSET) (1984). 

Whether or not a respondent‘s actions actually caused the collision is not an element of 

negligence because it is not the function of suspension and revocation actions to determine such 

liability. Appeal Decision 2277 (BANASHAK) (1982); see also Appeal Decisions 2395 

(LAMBERT) (1985); 2358 (BUISSET) (1984); 2261 (SAVOIE) (1981); 2174 (TINGLEY)

(1980), aff‘d sub nom. Commandant v. Tingley, NTSB Order EM-86 (1981). Proximate cause, 

although needed to establish civil liability for damages, is not an element of negligence for the 

purposes of 46 C.F.R. §5.0520-(a)(2). The purpose of this proceeding was not to establish fault

for the collision, but solely to determine whether Respondent failed to maintain a proper lookout 

with respect to Charge II.

Indeed, the consequence of the negligence, i.e., a collision or an allision, ―though 

unnecessary to support a decision finding negligence, may be an aggravating factor; or the lack 

thereof may be a mitigating factor . . . .‖ Appeal Decision 2639 (HAUCK) (2003) (quoting

Appeal Decision 2415 (MARSHBURN) (1985)). Furthermore, ―[c]ontributory negligence is not 

a defense in suspension and revocations proceedings‖ as these proceedings are remedial in nature 

and ―[t]he only issue is whether Respondent‘s actions and omissions were negligent.‖ Appeal 

Decision 2639 (HAUCK) (2003). The focus of the inquiry must thus firmly remain on whether 

Respondent‘s actions complied with the applicable rules – not whether someone else‘s actions 

were compliant.
41

Rule 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (72 

COLREGS)11 pursuant to 33 C.F.R. § 80.1114 (San Pedro Bay – Anaheim Bay demarcation) 

defines the standard by which a reasonable and prudent mariner would conduct himself in 

maintaining a proper lookout for this case. Rule 5 states: 

Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as 

well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and 

conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of 

collision. 

72 COLREGS, Rule 5.

Congressional history, as expressed in Senate Report No. 96-979 (1980), which 

accompanied Inland Rule 5,12 helps illuminate the scope of Rule 5. The commentary permitted 

the watch officer or helmsman to serve as the sole lookout in certain circumstances. However, 

the Report states in pertinent part:

On vessels where there is an unobstructed all-round view provided at the steering 

station, as on certain pleasure craft, fishing boats, and towing vessels, or where 

there is no impairment of night vision or other impediment to keeping a proper 

lookout, the watch officer or helmsman may safely serve as the lookout. 

However, it is expected that this practice will only be followed after the situation 

has been carefully assessed on each occasion, and it has been clearly established 

that it is prudent to do so. Full account shall be taken of all relevant factors, 

including but not limited to the state of the weather, conditions of visibility, traffic 

density, and proximity of navigational hazards. It is not the intent of these rules 

to require additional personnel forward, if none is required to enhance safety.

S. Rep. No. 979, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.

NEWS 7068, 7075.

This observation indicates that the question of an all-around 360-degree view is 

particularly relevant when a single operator (i.e., a watch officer or a helmsman) serves as both 

the navigator of the vessel and the lookout at the same time. See, e.g., Appeal Decision 2474 

 

11 See 33 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq.

12 Because Inland Rule 5 is worded the same as International Rule 5, commentary on the purpose of Inland Rule 5 is 

applicable to interpreting the intent behind the International Rule.
42

(CARMIENKE) (1988) (tug operator held not to have maintained an adequate lookout himself 

from upper wheelhouse where there was an obstruction caused by the elevator from the lower to 

the upper wheelhouse despite the operator‘s claim that he could lean around and get a 360-

degree view). Where there is a dedicated lookout, whose sole duty to perform lookout functions, 

this Congressional history is less relevant to the adequacy of the lookout. 

All things being equal, is it preferable for the lookout to have an unobstructed 360-degree 

view? Certainly. But does Rule 5 require such unobstructed 360-degree view from any one, 

particular location where the dedicated lookout is positioned? The answer must be no for the 

reasons more fully discussed in the Analysis section of this Decision and Order.13

The duty to maintain a proper lookout aboard a vessel underway has been a constant 

throughout the history of American maritime jurisprudence. ―The duty of the lookout is of the 

highest importance . . . . In the performance of this duty the law requires indefatigable care and 

sleepless vigilance. The rigor of the requirement rises according to the power and speed of the 

vessel in question.‖ The Ariadne, 80 U.S. 475, 478 (1872). Moreover, ―it is the risk of collision, 

not the collision itself, that masters must avoid.‖ Ocean S.S. Co. v. United States, 38 F. 2d. 782, 

784 (2d Cir. 1930). ―Performance of lookout duty,‖ the court declared in Anthony v. 

International Paper Co., 289 F.2d 574, 580 (4th Cir. 1961), ―is an inexorable requirement of 

prudent navigation.‖ 

The adequacy of a lookout on board a vessel underway is a question of fact to be 

determined in light of the existing facts and circumstances. Numerous Commandant Decisions 

on Appeal have held that the Administrative Law Judge is in the best position to determine 

whether the facts and circumstances of the case permitted a given respondent to serve as a proper 

 

13 As the Fourth Circuit recently noted, ―since all boats have blind spots, Congress could not have intended that the 

mere presence of a blind spot would serve as a condition automatically requiring an additional lookout, we see 

nothing incongruous about taking into consideration—the size of the blind spot when conducting a Rule 5 analysis.‖ 

Vulcan Materials Co. v. Massiah, 645 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2011).
43

lookout. See Appeal Decisions 2581 (DRIGGERS) (1996); 2576 (AILSWORTH) (1996); 2503 

(MOULDS) (1990), aff‘d sub nom. Kime v. Moulds, NTSB Order No. Em-172, 1993 WL 

171349 (N.T.S.B. 1993); 2474 (CARMIENKE) (1988); 2421(RADER) (1986); 2390 (PURSER)

(1985), aff‘d sub nom. Commandant v. Purser, NTSB Order No. EM-130, 1986 WL 82417 

(N.T.S.B. 1986); 2319 (PAVELEC) (1983); 2302 (FRAPPIER) (1983); 2294 (TITTONIS)

(1983).

―In order to determine the adequacy of the lookout, the presiding Administrative Law 

Judge must carefully consider all of the surrounding circumstances faced by the lookout and 

determine whether those circumstances permitted the lookout to adequately perform lookout 

duties.‖ Appeal Decision 2576 (AILSWORTH) (1996). Expert testimony on the issue, while 

potentially helpful, is not binding upon the court. Appeal Decisions 2581 (DRIGGERS) (1996); 

2319 (PRAVELEC) (1983), 2390 (PURSER) (1985), 2474 (CARMIENKE) (1988). 

Furthermore, the appropriate standard for evaluating a respondent‘s conduct and 

compliance with Rule 5 is what the rule itself provides, not what industry custom or standards 

recommend as the proper course of conduct. Simply put, ―[w]hat the industry does, or does not 

do, is not the standard imposed by the navigation rules; a custom in violation of a positive 

statutory enactment will not be enforced.‖ Appeal Decision 2581 (DRIGGERS) (1996).

Several Appeal Decisions hold that the existence of a blind spot or visual obstruction may 

require posting a lookout in areas other than the wheelhouse where such obstructions are present. 

See Appeal Decisions 2482 (WATSON) (1989); 2421 (RADER) (1986); 2414 (HOLLOWELL)

(1985).

Other Appeal Decisions establish that the failure to see what reasonably ought to be seen 

is conclusive evidence of a deficient lookout. Appeal Decisions 2046 (HARDEN) (1976) (no 

lookout posted on river tug pushing barge ahead, thus creating a significant blind spot, and 

negative evidence of collision resulting from such failure to post a lookout indicating negligence 
44

as it was inconceivable under the circumstances that the collision would have occurred, absent 

malicious intent, had there been such a lookout); 1007 (POWELL) (1958) (failure to keep an 

adequate lookout found where ―there [was] no apparent reason why a vigilant lookout, properly 

stationed, would not have seen the other motorboat‘s lights in time to avoid a collision on a clear 

night‖).

Rule 5 is silent as to the actual placement of the lookout and speaks more in terms of the 

lookout‘s function to avoid collisions. See Appeal Decision 2581 (DRIGGERS) (1996) (―Rule 5 

does not specify a location for the lookout, [but] the overwhelming weight of authority . . . 

suggests that lookouts should ordinarily be on the bow and that a pilot steering the vessel is not a 

proper lookout unless a bow lookout would add no additional information‖). Indeed, ―[p]ersons 

in charge of the vessel‘s navigation are obligated to position a lookout at a point best suited for 

that purpose, having due regard for the circumstances of the case and the conditions of the 

weather.‖ Nicholes v. M/V Maya, 949 F. Supp. 391, 398 (D.S.C. 1996) (emphasis added).

Long-standing precedent holds that a lookout generally should be placed as low to the 

water and as far forward as possible under prevailing conditions. See, e.g., The Ottowa, 70 U.S. 

268 (1865). However, where circumstances do not dictate such placement, the fact of a 

lookout‘s placement in another location does not render the lookout necessarily ineffective. See

Inland Oil and Transport Co. v. Ark-White Towing Co., 696 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1983) 

(refusing to overturn district court‘s rejection of the argument that lookout stationed in tug‘s 

wheelhouse constituted negligence) (abrogated on different grounds by City of Milwaukee v. 

Cement Div., Nat. Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189 (1995)); The Mamei, 152 F.2d 924, 929 (3d Cir. 

1946) (lookout stationed on bridge of tug, where visibility was excellent and lookout had 

unobstructed view forward was not improper); Great American Ins. Co. v. Tug Cissi Renauer, et 

al., 933 F. Supp. 1205, (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (no violation of Rule 5 where the tug‘s lookout 

positioned on the bridge; the tug was traveling at a slow speed; the accident occurred during 
45

daylight hours; and there was no risk of sudden collision, given that the tug was following a 

narrow passage through the ice created by a Coast Guard); but see G. B. Zigler Co. v. Barker 

Barge Line, 167 F.2d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 1948) (finding that the deckhand in question was not 

performing the duties of a dedicated lookout and that a pilot house ―over four hundred feet from 

the head of the craft‖ not a proper lookout location in any event).

A lookout in the wheelhouse is thus not per se negligent. See In re: Diamond B. Marine 

Services, Inc., 2001 WL 1164914, Sept. 28, 2001 (E.D.La. 2001) (finding that vessel maintained 

proper lookout where lookout stationed in the wheelhouse and doors were open to allow lookout 

and master to listen for fog signals and/or other sounds from other vessels and rejecting claim 

that lookout should have been posted outside the wheelhouse because stationing lookout on deck 

(1) ―raises obvious safety concerns‖ and (2) stationing lookout in the wheelhouse reduced the 

noise from the vessels‘ own engines). Furthermore, ―[i]t is well-settled, however, that the watch 

officer or helmsman may, under appropriate circumstances, serve as lookout from the 

wheelhouse of a tug in addition to performing other duties.‖ Marport, Inc. v. Stabbert and 

Assoc., Inc., 771 F.2d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (finding that at time of 

accident, the tug was in calm and uncrowded waters and no evidence was introduced to show 

lookout from the wheelhouse was improper). 

A key question for this case is whether, under all the circumstances existing at the time of 

the collision, Respondent‘s positioning of his dedicated lookout in the REBEL II‘s lower 

wheelhouse was negligent as a matter of law. Clearly, under certain, exceptional conditions 

(e.g., unavoidable blind spots, compromised weather conditions, traffic, etc.), placement of the 

lookout in the wheelhouse can be improper, but absent such conditions, the danger exists of 

second-guessing a captain‘s judgment of his positioning of the lookout simply based on the 

particular facts of a collision. See, e.g., Illinois Constructors Corp. v. Logan Transp., Inc., 715 F. 

Supp. 872, 884 (N.D.Ill. 1989) (noting that tug captain need not post a lookout where night was 
46

clear, waters calm, and the trip uneventful, and no prior notices or warnings of any problems 

along the river prior to approaching the area); Mystic S.S. Corp. v. S.S. Amalfi, 307 F. Supp. 

885, 886 (D.C.Va. 1969) (noting that placement of the tug‘s lookout in the wheelhouse 

appropriate where the lookout had ―fast and reliable communication‖ with the operator and 

because ―the pilothouse was only 15 feet aft of, and somewhat higher than, the bow, the 

lookout‘s visibility was better than from the bow‖). 

E. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at Conclusion of Coast Guard’s Case

At the close of the Coast Guard‘s case, Respondent made a Motion to Dismiss the 

charges. See Tr. at 432:7-434:12. The undersigned reserved ruling on the motion and for the 

reasons given below hereby DENIES the Motion to Dismiss. A motion to dismiss will only be 

granted if no evidence is introduced in support of at least one of the required elements of the 

government‘s case. See Appeal Decisions 2603 (HACKSTAFF) (1998); 2461 (KITTRELL)

(1987); 2321 (HARRIS) (1983).

As discussed above, a determination of what constitutes a proper lookout is based on the 

examining the particular facts and circumstances of each case. In making out a prima facie case 

that Respondent violated Rule 5, the Coast Guard ―was only required to submit evidence that 

some circumstances existed which indicated that Appellant was not maintaining a proper 

lookout.‖ Appeal Decision 2581 (DRIGGERS) (1996).

Here, the Coast Guard introduced enough such evidence during its case in chief (and 

prior to Respondent‘s rebuttal) that Respondent failed to maintain an adequate lookout. First, the 

Coast Guard demonstrated that a collision between the Sanchez Bayliner and the REBEL II 

occurred. Second, the Coast Guard offered credible, reliable evidence that the Sanchez Bayliner 

had its navigational lights properly lit. Third, the Coast Guard provided evidence that neither 

Captain Scoto nor his deckhand saw the Sanchez Bayliner from their positions in the REBEL II‘s 

lower wheelhouse, which had several obstructions impeding a 360-degree view from any one 
47

position. Therefore, the Respondent‘s Motion to Dismiss Charge II is properly denied despite 

the fact that Respondent‘s rebuttal results in a finding of the negligence charge not proved.

With respect to the misconduct alleged in Charge I, the Coast Guard presented evidence 

that during the transit from Catalina to LA/LB Port, Captain Scoto laid down in the rack, located 

in the wheelhouse, for a period of 30-45 minutes. For the reasons discussed below in finding 

Charge I proved, Respondent‘s arguments that there was no functional difference between 

Captain Scoto laying in the rack for 30-45 minutes and standing within arm‘s reach are rejected. 

See, e.g., Tr. at 432:8-433:12 (articulating basis for dismissal of Charge I). Captain Scoto‘s 

failure to get up from a position of compromised situational awareness for a single, uninterrupted 

period of 30-45 minutes while leaving an unlicensed deckhand, who was unqualified on radar 

and who was not authorized to make any course corrections or changes, to maintain situational 

awareness for him, is unacceptable and represents a clear case of misconduct. The Coast Guard 

certainly presented enough evidence in its case in chief to withstand Respondent‘s Motion to 

Dismiss.

V. Analysis

Many of the facts of this case are undisputed. Captain Scoto does not deny the fact of the 

collision with the Sanchez Bayliner. Nor did Captain Scoto deny that he spent 30-45 minutes 

lying in the rack during the transit between Catalina and LA/LB Port. The central questions 

concern whether Captain Scoto committed the alleged acts of Misconduct and Negligence 

asserted in Charges I and II.

A. Captain Scoto Relinquished Direction and Control of the REBEL II during the Transit 

from Catalina Island to LA/LB Port

The record establishes that Captain Scoto chose to lie down in the lower bunk of the 

REBEL II‘s lower wheelhouse for a period of 30-45 minutes during the transit from Catalina 

Island to LA/LB Port. See Findings of Fact (FoF) Nos. 48, 55. Prior to lying down because of 
48

his sore back, Captain Scoto took the precautions of checking with VTS to establish whether 

there was traffic in the area; monitoring his radar at various ranges (up to 12 miles); and 

performing a visual scan of the waters surrounding the REBEL II. FoF Nos. 49-50, 53. 

Furthermore, Captain Scoto directed his deckhand to maintain a visual lookout while he rested 

his back. FoF No. 52.

Captain Scoto also never went to sleep, remained physically present in the Rebel II‘s 

wheelhouse at all times, and maintained minimal conversation with Deckhand Amstutz. FoF No. 

58-59, 61. However, Captain Scoto never once got up from the rack to visually check the waters 

around the REBEL II or to check the radar or make any adjustments to the six mile range upon 

which it had been set prior to his lying down. Instead, Captain Scoto relied upon (1) the 

autopilot to steer the REBEL II and maintain the proper course and (2) Deckhand Amstutz to 

maintain a proper lookout both visually and on radar, even though Deckhand Amstutz was not 

qualified as a radar observer and could make no changes to the radar‘s setting. FoF Nos. 11, 42.

Captain Scoto would have one believe that there was no practical difference between his 

position in the rack and his standing in the wheelhouse and being 2-3 feet away from his 

deckhand. See Respondent‘s Post Hearing Brief at 5-6; Reply Brief at 1-3. In both instances, 

Captain Scoto argued that he would have been ready and able to address whatever situation arose 

within seconds. Indeed, Captain Scoto argued that because neither statute nor regulations 

explicitly define ―direction and control‖ under 46 C.F.R. § 15.610(a), one should look to 

definitions of ―direct supervision‖ and ―directly supervising‖ taken from other sources within the 

regulations. See Reply Brief at 3-4. However, these definitions and terms are clearly contained 

in contexts other than the absolutely clear mandates of 46 C.F.R § 15.610(a), which addresses 

specifically the kind of vessel Captain Scoto was operating (i.e., a tug over 26 ft. in length). 

Furthermore, the CDOAs on the subject discussed above also specifically define the contours of 

what constitutes direction and control. Nowhere in any of those cases has the Commandant 
49

affirmed the proposition that simply because a deckhand is under the operator‘s ―direct 

supervision‖, the mandates of Section 15.610(a) have been met.

Captain Scoto is correct in the sense that nothing in the CDOAs indicate that an operator 

must at all times be ever vigilant to the degree that one may never turn one‘s back, e.g., to 

consult a chart while operating a tug like the REBEL II. Indeed, as fully discussed above, the 

CDOA‘s permit an operator even a brief absence from the wheelhouse without necessarily losing 

direction and control of the vessel.14

However, a magnitude of difference exists between (1) temporarily absenting oneself 

from the wheelhouse for a brief period of time (per SEARS and its progeny), (2) briefly checking 

a chart, or (3) having one‘s back turned for a moment versus the situation in which Captain Scoto 

placed himself and the REBEL II. Even though the REBEL II‘s course was straight, the 

visibility was good, and the traffic sparse, there was certainly an ―appreciable risk to [the 

REBEL II‘s] safe navigation‖ under these circumstances. See Appeal Decision 2058 (SEARS).

The REBEL II was on autopilot and no one but an unlicensed deckhand, who had no 

authority to alter direction or make adjustments to the radar, was left to maintain any kind of 

direct situational awareness of the vessel while Captain Scoto laid down. There was effectively 

nobody at the REBEL II‘s wheel available to make any necessary course changes or even ensure 

that the REBEL II stayed on course. See, e.g., Appeal Decision 2122 (RODIECK) (highlighting 

key questions including who was at the wheel and under what conditions); see also Appeal 

Decision 2264 (McKNIGHT) (operator must be in position to take timely corrective action if a 

hazardous situation develops).

 

14 The undersigned agrees with the Coast Guard‘s questioning of Respondent‘s reliance on Appeal Decision 1887 

(VIGILANT) (1972). See Complainant‘s Reply Brief at 4-5. At the time, there was no statutory/regulatory 

requirement for the vessel in question in that case to be under the ―direction and control‖ of a licensed operator. 

Here, the clear mandates of 46 C.F.R § 15.610(a) and CDOAs thereunder provide the proper frame of analysis for 

Captain Scoto‘s actions.
50

Even though Captain Scoto never physically left the wheelhouse, he absented himself 

from the navigational situation of the REBEL II by lying down in the rack without any means to 

directly observe the radar or surrounding conditions. This situation held for 30-45 uninterrupted 

minutes, which distinguishes this case from the situation presented in Appeal Decision 2312 

(HITT) (absence of only 4-5 minutes). While no one factor can be controlling, the extreme 

length of time involved here is of particular import. Captain Scoto did not once get up to check 

the radar himself or make a visual scan of the waters around the REBEL II and admitted that he 

was unable to issue effective navigational commands from his position in the rack. FoF No. 64.

Instead, Captain Scoto chose to absent himself from effective control of the vessel and 

put himself in a position from which he could neither monitor the radar nor even observe the 

horizon. FoF Nos. 62-63. The situation surrounding the REBEL II easily could have changed 

during the 30-45 minutes Captain Scoto was in the rack. A vessel, like the Sanchez Bayliner, 

coming toward the REBEL II at 20 knots, easily could have traversed the 12 mile radar range 

that Captain Scoto checked on his radar before lying down in the rack. Given the length of time 

Captain Scoto absented himself from direct navigational and situational observations, an 

appreciable risk to the safe operation of the vessel existed during that time.15 As in Appeal 

Decision 2566 (WILLIAMS), Captain Scoto would have been unable to perceive either any 

course changes or rapidly closing distance between the REBEL II and a possible approaching 

vessel or other hazard.

No matter how experienced the deckhand or how much faith Captain Scoto placed in 

him, such a lengthy absence from directing and controlling the REBEL II and attending to his 

navigational duties is unacceptable and unquestionably violated 46 C.F.R. § 15.610(a). Just 

 

15 Captain Scoto also admitted that his actions were contrary to Catalina Freight‘s unwritten policy, which in itself, 

possibly could have been charged as misconduct. However, for the reasons given at the hearing (see Tr. at 569:18-

574:9), the undersigned rejected any such attempt to conform the charges to this fact and Captain Scoto‘s admission 

on this point will not serve as an independent basis for finding misconduct.
51

because nothing occurred during Captain Scoto‘s time in the rack and the situation around the 

REBEL II remained steady and without incident does not mean that his failure to maintain the 

required amount of direction and control can be condoned.16

B. Captain Scoto Maintained a Proper Lookout under Rule 5

The record evidence reveals that Captain Scoto posted a dedicated lookout while en route 

from Catalina Island to LA/LB Port. FoF Nos. 57, 66. At the time of the collision with the 

Sanchez Bayliner, Deckhand Amstutz was stationed next to Captain Scoto in the REBEL II‘s 

lower wheelhouse performing lookout duties. FoF No. 66, 67. Whether Captain Scoto himself 

could effectively serve as his own lookout while engaged in navigation duties from the lower 

wheelhouse is thus not an issue because he had a dedicated lookout – in addition to himself. 

Indeed, the REBEL II has no specific manning requirements while underway on the run in 

question, other than the REBEL II must be operated by a licensed operator while underway (i.e., 

as an uninspected tug, there is no Coast Guard COI and the length of the run did not require a 

second licensed mariner to assume a second shift).

Furthermore, in addition to having a dedicated lookout, Captain Scoto was essentially 

performing lookout duties in addition to his navigation responsibilities at the time of the collision 

with the Sanchez Bayliner. FoF No. 66, 67. Captain Scoto was observing the radar and 

performing visual scans of the water surrounding the REBEL II as he approached Buoy No. 1 

outside LA/LB Port. Id., FoF No. 153. Given Captain Scoto‘s navigational duties, it is not 

accurate to say that Captain Scoto had two fully dedicated lookouts. However, there certainly 

 

16 See Respondent‘s Post Hearing Brief at 8. The Coast Guard never alleged that there was a causal connection 

between Respondent lying in the rack and the collision with the Sanchez Bayliner. While the REBEL II‘s situation 

did not change during Captain Scoto‘s time in the lower bunk, the crucial point is whether Captain Scoto complied 

with his duties under 46 C.F.R. § 15.610(a), which he did not.
52

were more than one set of eyes performing lookout duties around the time of the 

collision.17 With these basic facts in mind, several important points must be addressed to 

evaluate Captain Scoto‘s conduct in connection with the collision with the Sanchez Bayliner.

1. Positioning the Lookout in the Lower Wheelhouse was not Per Se Negligent under 

the Prevailing Conditions

The record reveals that the prevailing conditions at the time of the collision were clear 

weather, light swell, and good visibility (ca. 6 miles). FoF No. 46. This was not a situation 

where weather was an issue (e.g., no fog). VTS had reported no conflicting traffic. Captain 

Scoto and his deckhand were experienced with this particular run and the approach toward 

LA/LB Port. FoF Nos. 13-14.

The precautionary zone, in which the collision took place, certainly required heightened 

attention to duty and Captain Scoto was aware that small boats were often a problem in this area 

and had experienced close quarters situations there. See FoF Nos. 85, 90-92, 137. Nothing in 

the record indicates that Deckhand Amstutz was doing anything other than performing his 

lookout duties at the time. In this regard, I so find.

The visibility from any one spot in the lower wheelhouse certainly would be obstructed 

by bulkheads and a lack of all-around windows. FoF Nos. 35-37. Such a problem would not be 

an issue in the REBEL II‘s upper wheelhouse. FoF No. 40. A lookout stationed there would 

have had the advantage of an unobstructed 360-degree view around the REBEL II. Id.

However, having his lookout stationed in the upper wheelhouse conceivably could have 

compromised direct communications between Captain Scoto and Deckhand Amstutz. FoF No. 

32. For example, the ambient noise from the engines is greater in the upper wheelhouse when 

 

17 Given that neither Captain Scoto nor Deckhand Amstutz were aware of the collision, it is impossible to know with 

certainty what exactly they were doing at the precise moment of collision. However, one can legitimately surmise 

from pattern and practice and what both crewmembers recalled generally that Captain Scoto was more likely than 

not monitoring the REBEL II‘s radar, navigating the vessel, and visually scanning the horizon; while Deckhand 

Amstutz was performing his usual lookout duties.
53

compared to the lower wheelhouse. See Resp. Exh. OOO.18 Additionally, one of Respondent‘s 

experts opined that prudent bridge management techniques caution against separating the bridge 

crew, which the undersigned finds to be credible. FoF No. 38.

Assuming that the visibility problems in the lower wheelhouse could be adequately 

addressed by moving about the lower wheelhouse and not remaining stationary, the benefits of 

placing the lookout in the lower wheelhouse could outweigh the benefits of placing the lookout 

in the upper wheelhouse.

Nothing in Rule 5 mandates a particular position for the lookout as long as the lookout 

duties are able to be performed under the prevailing conditions. One of the problems with the 

Coast Guard‘s position in this case, is that it is attempting to use ex post judgments to question 

the adequacy of the lookout‘s placement in the lower wheelhouse. Despite denials to the 

contrary, the Coast Guard consistently argued that because there was a better location for the 

lookout (i.e., the upper wheelhouse), failure to post the lookout in that spot when a collision 

results constituted negligence.

However, why would it not be equally negligent for Captain Scoto to have operated the 

REBEL II from the lower wheelhouse during the transit from LA/LB Port to Catalina Island 

during the time he allowed Deckhand Amstutz to nap in the rack? Apparently, Captain Scoto 

(and any other single operator tug captain who maintains a watch while at the helm without a 

dedicated lookout in a tug constructed similarly to the REBEL II) was properly operating the 

vessel at this time. Otherwise, why was no charge of negligence filed for failing to maintain a 

proper lookout on the transit to Catalina?

 

18 Respondent‘s noise readings indicate a level of 80db in the lower wheelhouse and 85db in the upper wheelhouse. 

See Tr. at 1286:25-1291:6. While these readings were taken by Respondent himself and not an independent 

examiner, the undersigned accepts as more likely than not that these readings accurately reflect that there would be 

differences between the two locations in terms of noise levels with the boat running. This fact is supported from the 

undersigned‘s inspection of the REBEL II, which confirmed that the lower wheelhouse was constructed of steel; 

whereas the upper wheelhouse was wooden construction. As a side note – an exposure to 85db over an eight hour 

period can require employee notification and preventive action under OSHA regulations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95.
54

As discussed above, a collision is not an element of a negligence charge. The only 

question is whether Captain Scoto‘s lookout was inadequate. Making a legal distinction between 

the two instances is thus problematic, especially when the former (i.e., the transit without a 

dedicated lookout) demonstrates arguably a lesser degree of vigilance.19 Finally, Rule 5 of the 

72 COLREGS only requires a vessel to ―maintain a proper lookout.‖ Except in unusual 

circumstances, which were not present here, the lookout requirement on a vessel like the REBEL 

II is singular (i.e., a single dedicated lookout could perform the duties). Captain Scoto not only 

had such a designated lookout (i.e., Deckhand Amstutz), but also an additional set of eyes 

(himself), scanning the radar and visually scanning the waters. Captain Scoto‘s actions thus far 

exceeded the mandates of Rule 5.

2. The Sanchez Bayliner’s Lights were Properly Lit at the Time of the Collision

During the hearing, much time and effort was expended arguing about whether the 

Sanchez Bayliner was properly lit at the time of the accident. As explained above, under Coast 

Guard precedent, contributory negligence is not an issue in these proceedings. However, it is 

incontrovertible that to evaluate the adequacy of the REBEL II‘s lookout, the prevailing facts 

and circumstances must be considered. Such facts and circumstances unquestionably include the 

degree to which the Sanchez Bayliner should have been seen by the REBEL II‘s lookout. Part of 

that analysis must address whether the Sanchez Bayliner had its lights (both its all-around white 

light and its red and green running lights properly lit).

The record establishes that the Sanchez Bayliner had its lights properly lit when it left 

Alamitos Bay. FoF Nos. 107-111, 114-117. The collision occurred approximately 25 minutes 

following video evidence that the Sanchez Bayliner had its all-around light lit as it passed under 

 

19 One distinguishing element is that the collision occurred in the precautionary zone where heightened vigilance is 

required. However, Captain Scoto apparently laid down in the rack on the way to the precautionary area because he 

knew he would need to be more vigilant in that area and in bringing the REBEL II/ISLANDER to dock at LA/LB 

Port. This observation is not to be viewed as excusing Captain Scoto‘s behavior, but does serve to mitigate the 

impact of his imprudent decision-making.
55

the 2nd Street Bridge heading toward San Pedro Bay. The Coast Guard cites precedent for the 

proposition that when a vessel leaves a dock with her lights on, it can be presumed that the lights 

remained on. See Closing Brief at 29-30 (citing Hess Tankship Co. v. S.S. M. L. Gosney, 230 F. 

Supp. 1, 4 (D.C. Va. 1963); Clary Towing Co., Inc. v. Port Arthur Towing Co., 367 F. Supp. 6, 9 

(D.C. Tex. 1973)). These cases lend further support to the fact that the Sanchez Bayliner‘s lights 

were more likely than not properly lit at the time of the collision.

Indeed, the only ―evidence‖ to support Captain Scoto‘s claim that the lights were off 

involve pure speculation based on: 1) the fact that neither the crew aboard the CAPT. T LE or 

the REBEL II saw the Sanchez Bayliner; 2) the idea that a recreational boat operator generally 

prefers to see, rather than be seen and given the glare from the all-around white light, Mr. 

Sanchez turned off the navigational light; and 3) the Sanchez Bayliner‘s light switch was found 

in the ―off‖ position.20 See Respondent‘s Post-Hearing Brief at 2 (―the 360 degree light and/or 

navigation lights . . . had either been turned off or were . . . extremely difficult to see, as 

supported by the testimony of both independent witnesses Captain Blakeslee and Captain 

Pancho‖); 25, 27-29. Indeed, one of Respondent‘s experts (CDR Larson) opined that the lights 

either were off or were so dim as not to be seen, but he had not viewed the videotape evidence 

showing the lights lit as the vessel left Alamitos Bay. See Tr. at 1132-34.

The fact that the Sanchez Bayliner‘s light switch was found in the ANC position does not 

alter this analysis. See FoF No. 103. Despite Respondent‘s speculations that Mr. Sanchez might 

have turned off his lights to avoid the glare effects from his all-around white light, there is 

simply no credible evidence to suggest that Mr. Sanchez switched the Sanchez Bayliner‘s lights 

 

20 Respondent is simply incorrect that the switch was found in the ―Off‖ position. As explained below – the switch 

was found in the ANC position, which – even assuming the position of the switch on the recovered panel indicates 

the state of the switch at the time of the collision – indicates that the all-around light – and not the navigational 

red/green lights – would have been lit.
56

to the ANC position prior to the collision or incapacitated the all-around white light.21 First, the 

ANC position would not have turned off the all-around white light, but merely would have 

turned off the red/green running lights. Second, given the catastrophic nature of the collision; 

the fact that the Sanchez Bayliner‘s control panel was severely damaged;22 and the toggle nature 

of the switches,23 the position of the light switch on the Sanchez Bayliner after being recovered 

from the ocean floor seven days after the collision is not indicative of how the switch was 

positioned at the time of the accident. See FoF Nos. 141, 146-149, 151.

3. The Background Lighting from the Shore while Entering LA/LB Port

Captain Scoto argued that the Sanchez Bayliner might have been difficult to spot from 

the REBEL II due to the backscatter effect of the lights from the shore as the REBEL II 

approached the LA/LB Port. The record establishes that the shore lights in the general area of 

LA/LB Port generally become less of a problem as one looks away from LA/LB Port toward 

Alamitos Bay (from where the Sanchez Bayliner approached the REBEL II/ISLANDER). FoF 

No. 68. The precise degree of difference between looking directly into the LA/LB Port and more 

toward Alamitos Bay is not sufficiently clear. However, the record shows that the background 

lighting in the direction of Alamitos Bay can make picking out a small vessel‘s white light and 

navigation lights (similar to the Sanchez Bayliner) difficult – even where an observer knows 

there is a vessel coming from that precise direction. Id., FoF Nos. 154-156, 163-165.

4. The CAPT. T LE’s Failure to See the Sanchez Bayliner

 

21 Respondent‘s discussion of Mr. Sanchez‘s prior incident of being stopped by harbor police for failing to have 

adequate lighting is simply too remote to be any kind of reliable evidence indicating the state of the Sanchez 

Bayliner‘s lights at the time of the collision with the ISLANDER. There are no details about when or where this 

reported incident occurred. The record clearly reveals affirmative, positive evidence that the Sanchez Bayliner‘s 

lights were lit upon leaving Alamitos Bay on October 1, 2008.

22 The state of other switches on the control panel indicates that such switches were more likely than not impacted 

by the collision and put in positions different from what one would have expected given the conditions (e.g., 

windshield wipers ―on‖ and control panel lights ―off‖).

23 Additionally, the Sanchez Bayliner‘s light switch was a three-position toggle-type switch, with an OFF position 

that would have eliminated all the lights. Only the running lights would have been turned off in the ANC position. 

The idea that Mr. Sanchez would have manually taken the all-around white light out of its socket on top of the 

vessel while underway is simply too incredible to credit as a possibility. 
57

The record indicates that the CAPT. T LE failed to see the Sanchez Bayliner as it crossed 

its bow at a range of less than 4/10ths of a mile. FoF Nos. 119-135. The CAPT. T LE should 

have had good visibility through its forward facing windows, was proceedings outbound from 

LA/LB Port toward essentially open water with no background lights to interfere with vision, 

and yet neither the CAPT. T LE‘s dedicated lookout nor its master saw the Sanchez Bayliner. Id. 

Captain Pancho also did not pick up the Sanchez Bayliner on the CAPT. T LE‘s radar, which 

was set to 1 mile range. Id.

The CAPT. T LE‘s failure to see the Sanchez Bayliner can be partially explained by the 

fact that the Sanchez Bayliner emerged from behind a large, anchored vessel and was proceeding 

at a relatively high rate of speed (ca. 20 knots) when it passed in front of the CAPT. T LE. FoF 

No. 20. Nevertheless, the failure of two experienced mariners to see the Sanchez Bayliner as it 

crossed the CAPT. T LE‘s bow at such a distance is difficult to explain. Indeed, both Captain 

Pancho (the captain at the time) and Captain Blakeslee (Captain Pancho‘s lookout) stated that 

they should have seen the Sanchez Bayliner under the prevailing conditions even if the Sanchez 

Bayliner did not have its lights illuminated.

The Coast Guard offered numerous explanations why the CAPT. T LE might not have 

seen the Sanchez Bayliner. See Closing Brief at 30-34. Such proffered reasons included: 1) they 

were not looking in the Sanchez Bayliner‘s direction as it passed; 2) they did not have good 

visibility out of the streaked and dirty windows of the CAPT. T LE; 3) their view was obstructed 

by one or more anchored vessels; 4) they were focused on navigating their way through a 

crowded anchorage and were not looking ahead of them for vessels on non-conflicting courses; 

5) the radar image of the Sanchez Bayliner was obscured by nearby vessels; 6) Captain Pancho 

was not looking at the radar as the Sanchez Bayliner passed within the one-mile range; 7) the 

CAPT. T LE‘s radar was not optimally tuned; and 8) they might have seen the Sanchez Bayliner 

but simply not have recalled it after the fact. Id.
58

Some of these arguments are supported by the record; whereas others are pure 

speculation. For example, some record evidence indicates that the CAPT. T LE (while being 

operated by a different captain) struck a lighted aid to navigation a few weeks following the 

collision accident between the ISLANDER and the Sanchez Bayliner. FoF No. 132. A 

contributing factor to the CAPT. T LE‘s accident was a failure to keep the forward windows 

clean and possibly ineffective radar usage. FoF No. 133. However, Captain Pancho claimed that 

he always kept the CAPT. T LE‘s windows clean. Id.

The CAPT. T LE certainly was proceeding through a crowded anchorage when the 

Sanchez Bayliner crossed its bow and the Sanchez Bayliner more likely than not was obscured 

for some time by a large anchored vessel. However, the VTS data indicates that the dedicated 

lookout had approximately 2.5 minutes to see the Sanchez Bayliner from the time it emerged 

from behind the anchored vessel and proceeded across the CAPT. T LE‘s bow and out from its 

starboard side.

Other explanations indicate that the CAPT. T LE might not have been maintaining an 

adequate watch (e.g., not paying attention to vessels on non-conflicting headings; not looking in 

Sanchez Bayliner‘s direction; not having the radar ―optimally tuned‖; Captain Pancho paying 

more attention to his navigational duties). The question becomes whether such explanations 

might apply with at least some similar force to Captain Scoto. And yet – there were no charges 

filed for the CAPT. T LE‘s failure to see that which should have been seen.

The Coast Guard seems to be at great pains to explain away the CAPT. T LE‘s failures as 

attributable to anything other than negligence. While the charging decisions of the Coast Guard 

are not the subject of this proceeding, one must question what distinction exists (other than the 

fact of the collision)24 to hold Captain Scoto as negligent and so vigorously explain away the 

 

24 LCDR Waddington provided the fact of collision as the reason for treating the CAPT. T LE and the REBEL II 

differently.
59

circumstances leading to the CAPT. T LE‘s failure to see the same vessel under arguably better 

conditions (i.e., proceeding out of the harbor with the Sanchez Bayliner passing directly 

forward).

The Coast Guard makes much of the idea that not seeing what should have been seen 

evinces an inadequate lookout. While the general proposition is valid, a combination of nonnegligent factors could have led to the REBEL II not seeing the Sanchez Bayliner during the 

approximately 4.5 minutes the REBEL II could have seen the approaching recreational vessel.

First, the radar signature of a small, fiberglass boat without a radar reflector (like the 

Sanchez Bayliner) is not good. See FoF No. 102. Captain Scoto had his radar tuned primarily 

for navigational purposes, but such a setting would not have markedly affected the ability to pick 

up the Sanchez Bayliner.25 FoF 152. Second, the background lights could have negatively 

impacted the ability of a lookout to see the lights of the Sanchez Bayliner. Third, a lookout is 

responsible for maintaining a watch all around a vessel and it is unlikely that Deckhand Amstutz 

was only looking in the area from which the Sanchez Bayliner was approaching for the full 4.5 

minutes the lights could have been visible.26 Fourth, another vessel with both a master and a 

dedicated lookout failed to see the Sanchez Bayliner either visually or on radar, even though the 

Sanchez Bayliner passed right across the bow of that vessel at less than 4/10ths of a mile, which 

indicates the difficulty of spotting the Sanchez Bayliner on that night. Fifth, Captain Scoto had a 

dedicated lookout positioned in the lower wheelhouse for a variety of reasonable reasons in 

 

25 Respondent also argued that the probability of detection in search and rescue operations for similar types of boats 

is so small that to impute negligence because such a boat was missed by a lookout is not reasonable. Respondent‘s 

argument on this point must be rejected as inadequately founded and too speculative. The material Respondent 

relied upon is simply too dissimilar to the particular facts and circumstances at issue here to make a meaningful 

comparison much less impute any kind of percentage to the REBEL II‘s chances of seeing the Sanchez Bayliner.

26 The fact that the Sanchez Bayliner would have had traversed 036-180 relative to the REBEL II before striking the 

ISLANDER mitigates this factor somewhat, but clearly, given the rate of approach, the closer the Sanchez Bayliner 

got to the ISLANDER, the quicker it would have passed through this 144-degree arc of visibility relative to the 

REBEL II. Indeed, the Sanchez Bayliner would have gone from 036-90 degrees of unobstructed view even 

assuming the lookout did not move as the REBEL II had an unobstructed view of approximately 180 degrees 

forward.
60

conditions where visibility was good and there were no adverse weather conditions (such 

as fog or rain, or obstructions forward) that would recommend placing the lookout in the bow. 

One cannot impute negligence simply on the basis that a collision occurred under these 

circumstances, and therefore the charge alleging such negligence must be found NOT

PROVED.

VI. Ultimate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

1. Respondent was acting under the authority of his Coast Guard issued Merchant Mariners 

License when he was operating the tug REBEL II on the night of October 1 and early 

morning of October 2, 2008.

2. No other licensed mariner was present on the REBEL II during this voyage.

3. The only other crewmember on the REBEL II at the time was an unlicensed deckhand 

who had no formal training or endorsements in radar observations and was not authorized 

to make any course corrections.

4. During this voyage, Respondent laid down in the rack located in the REBEL II‘s lower 

wheelhouse while transiting from Catalina Island to LA/LB Port for an uninterrupted 30-

45 minutes.

5. From his position in the rack, Respondent could neither monitor the radar nor the waters 

surrounding the REBEL II and effectively ceded situational awareness responsibilities for 

his vessel, the REBEL II, and its tow, the ISLANDER, to an unlicensed deckhand.

6. Respondent‘s actions violated 46 C.F.R. § 15.610(a) because, for all practical purposes, 

the REBEL II was left without a licensed mariner in direction and control of the vessel 

for the period during which Respondent absented himself from his duties and laid down 

in the rack for 30-45 minutes.
61

7. Respondent had a dedicated lookout at the time of the REBEL II/ISLANDER‘s collision 

with the Sanchez Bayliner on October 2, 2008 stationed in the lower wheelhouse of the 

REBEL II.

8. Respondent‘s lookout comported with the requirements of Rule 5 of the 72 COLREGS 

and no negligence can be found proven.

VII. Sanction

The authority to impose sanctions at the conclusion of a case is exclusive to the 

administrative law judge. 46 C.F.R. §§ 5.567; 5.569(a); Appeal Decision 2362 (ARNOLD)

(1984). The nature of this non-penal administrative proceeding is to ―promote, foster, and 

maintain the safety of life and property at sea.‖ Appeal Decision 1106 (LABELLE) (1959); see 

also, 46 U.S.C. §7701; 46 C.F.R. §5.5. 

Here, Respondent committed an act of misconduct by relinquishing direction and control 

of the REBEL II while he lay down in the rack for 30-45 minutes on the night of October 1, 

2008. The Coast Guard seeks a 12 month suspension of Respondent‘s Coast Guard-issued 

credentials pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 7703.

Title 46 C.F.R. §5.569 provides the Table of Suggested Range of Appropriate Orders 

(Table) for various offenses. The purpose of this Table is to provide guidance to the judge and 

promote uniformity in orders rendered. 46 C.F.R. §5.569(d); Appeal Decision 2628 (VILAS)

(2002), aff‘d, sub nom. Collins v. Vilas, NTSB Order No. EM-197, 2004 WL 557602 (N.T.S.B. 

2004). An administrative law judge‘s sanction will be upheld on appeal/review unless obviously 

excessive or an abuse of discretion. Appeal Decision 2450 (FREDERICKS) (1987), aff‘d, sub

nom. Commandant v. Fredericks, NTSB Order No. EM-129, 1988 WL 250833 (N.T.S.B. 1988); 

Appeal Decision 2414 (HOLLOWELL) (1985). 

It is well-established that the Judge is not bound by the range of appropriate orders found 

in 46 C.F.R. § 5.569(d). Appeal Decisions 2680 (McCARTHY) (2008), 2423 (WESSELS)
62

(1986). The table of suggested sanctions at 46 C.F.R. § 5.569(d) suggests a sanction of 1-3 

months for a failure to comply with U.S. law or regulations and 2-5 months for improper 

performance of duties related to vessel safety. As Appeal Decision (2566) WILLIAMS (1995) 

instructs, improper relinquishing direction and control of a vessel falls most appropriately in the 

improper performance of duties related to vessel safety.27

The original Coast Guard Complaint alleged two counts of misconduct and one count of 

negligence and sought a 12 month suspension of Respondent‘s Merchant Mariners License. The 

Coast Guard did not indicate what it was suggesting for each of the three alleged violations. 

Thus, the undersigned is left to surmise whether the Coast Guard was proposing 4 months for 

each count or some other combination, for the 3 counts equaling 12 months.

At hearing, the Coast Guard orally moved to dismiss one of the two misconduct counts, 

leaving the allegations of one count of negligence and one count of misconduct in place. Yet, in 

its post-hearing submission, the Coast Guard still seeks a 12 month suspension for the two 

remaining counts. The Coast Guard‘s post-hearing brief does not account for the dropping of 

one of the charges in maintaining the 12 month requested sanction.

1. Aggravating Factors

Respondent‘s Misconduct was a significant lapse in judgment. The single most 

aggravating factor related to Captain Scoto‘s conduct that night involves the length of time 

Captain Scoto absented himself from the REBEL II/ISLANDER‘s situational awareness, i.e., for 

a period of 30-45 minutes, without once observing the radar or performing a visual scan of the 

horizon for navigational hazards.28

 

27 The Coast Guard also argued that the Misconduct charge as a ―failure to perform duties related to vessel safety‖ 

under Table 5.569. See Complainant‘s Closing Brief at 41, n.17.

28 This fact alone readily distinguishes this case from HITT, where the operator was only absent from the 

wheelhouse for 4-5 minutes.
63

Captain Scoto knew that small, recreational vessels, could present problems during the 

LA/LB Port-Catalina run. While he checked for possible contacts and hazards with both radar 

(at a maximum of 12 mile range) and visually before lying in the rack, the speed of the REBEL 

II (8 knots) and the speed of a possible recreational vessel (e.g., 20 knots like the Sanchez 

Bayliner) renders the single observation of radar during this period ineffective. At a converging 

speed of 26.4 knots over the course of even 30 minutes, the vessels would cover 15.18 miles 

(well within the 12 mile radar range), and if one assumes Captain Scoto was in the rack for 45 

minutes, the vessels would have covered 22.77 miles.29 Captain Scoto‘s reliance on the 12 mile 

radar check before lying down in the rack was thus imprudent. Importantly, in this case where 

Captain Scoto hurt his back, had he arose every 15 minutes and performed his duties, it was very 

unlikely that any vessels could have entered his proximity without being detected and he would 

have maintained situational control. Conversely, because he did not get up, no adjustments were 

made to the radar from the time Captain Scoto lay down in the rack until he resumed his position 

at the helm and he did not have situational awareness of his surroundings.

Additionally, the REBEL II was on autopilot and Deckhand Amstutz was not authorized 

to make any course changes (or changes to the radar). Captain Scoto did not once get up from 

the rack during the 30-45 minute period to ensure the autopilot was operating properly and the 

REBEL II maintained its course and speed. Captain Scoto‘s complete reliance on Deckhand 

Amstutz to maintain navigational awareness was inappropriate. 

2. Mitigating Factors

A number of mitigating factors are present that must be considered when assessing the 

proper sanction for Captain Scoto‘s proven Misconduct. First, the area he chose to lay down in 

 

29 1 knot = 1.15 miles per hour (rounded to the nearest hundredths). Notably, Captain Scoto placed the REBEL II‘s 

radar back on 6 mile range before lying down in the rack. Thus, the 12 mile range (and associated calculations here) 

does not account for this reduced range at the time Captain Scoto was actually in the rack. Captain Scoto relied on 

Deckhand Amstutz to monitor the radar and tell him about any contacts that were within this 6 mile range (as 

Deckhand Amstutz had no authority to alter the radar settings).
64

the rack was not within the precautionary zone, which requires heightened vigilance. Captain 

Scoto lay down only after the ISLANDER was fully out on its tow line and the REBEL II was in 

open waters where the general risk of encountering other vessels was less than in the 

precautionary area and the more crowded anchorage near one of the nation‘s busiest ports.

Second, Captain Scoto ascertained through available means the immediate traffic 

situation of his vessel. Captain Scoto called into the VTS and provided his ETA to LA/LB Port; 

performed a visual scan of the waters around the REBEL II (and had Deckhand Amstutz do the 

same; and used his radar to scan out to a distance of 12 miles (which for the reasons given above 

cannot be deemed adequate for the length of time he actually remained in the rack, but 

nevertheless, evinces an attempt to evaluate possible risks to the vessel before laying down in the 

rack).

Third, the sea was calm and the night was clear, with visibility for at least 6 miles. There 

were no inclement weather or sea conditions that cautioned enhanced vigilance.

Fourth, Captain Scoto directed Deckhand Amstutz to maintain a lookout while he was in 

the rack, never went to sleep, and maintained communication with Deckhand Amstutz during 

that time, including asking him if all was clear. Compare SEARS, for example, where the 

operator left the wheelhouse for 15 minutes, a collision resulted between the tow and a pier, 

partially as a result of no lookout being posted and the operator was given a 3 month‘s 

suspension with 6 months on 12 months‘ probation.

Fifth, Captain Scoto and Deckhand Amstutz had made the LA/LB-Catalina run hundreds 

of times together. Captain Scoto clearly had full confidence in Deckhand Amstutz‘s ability 

through (1) practical experience and (2) the training he had given him during the hundreds of 

LA/LB- Catalina runs, to properly perform his watch duties and observe the radar on the REBEL 

II.
65

Sixth, Captain Scoto remained in the REBEL II‘s wheelhouse the entire period, was 

within 2-3 feet of Deckhand Amstutz and could have addressed a hazardous situation in seconds 

should one have arisen.30 While not equivalent to standing at his post at the helm, such 

proximity does distinguish this case from others. Compare Captain Scoto‘s actions with the 

situation in BARRIOS (where the operator left the wheelhouse and went to his cabin and went to 

bed and was given a sanction of 1 month suspension plus 3 months remitted on 12 months‘ 

probation).

As indicated in the CDOAs addressing charges of misconduct related to relinquishing 

direction and control, the range of penalties assessed for such proven violations often involve 

sanctions of a few months, with some period of probation, even where a marine casualty or 

actual loss of human life was involved in connection with the misconduct. See, e.g., RODIECK

(operator‘s misconduct led to collision with a small boat and 3 people were killed and operator 

given 3 months suspension on 12 months‘ probation); COLE (operator left the wheelhouse for an 

hour and a half, during which time a collision occurred with loss of life and operator given 2 

month suspension with an additional 6 months on 12 months‘ probation); McKNIGHT

(operator‘s negligence in leaving the wheelhouse contributed to collision with bridge and 

operator given 2 month suspension remitted on 9 months‘ probation); and WILLIAMS

(operator‘s leaving the wheelhouse contributed to collision with fishing vessel, which sank with 

no loss of life, and operator given 4 month suspension with an additional 3 months remitted on 

12 months‘ probation).

Indeed, the cases discussed above dealt with marine casualties resulting from the 

operator‘s misconduct in relinquishing direction and control of the vessel. Here, there is no 

 

30 To be clear, none of these mitigating factors can possibly excuse Captain Scoto‘s imprudent choice to lay down in 

the rack, but they do highlight the overall conditions and situation that need to be considered when evaluating the 

appropriate sanction.
66

connection between Respondent‘s proven misconduct and the tragic collision between the 

ISLANDER and the Sanchez Bayliner. One must therefore be careful to cabin the proven 

Misconduct charge from the unproven Negligence charge and not allow the collision with the 

Sanchez Bayliner (which was clearly separate and apart from Captain Scoto‘s Misconduct) to 

color the tenor of the sanction. A sanction on the lower end of the suggested range is therefore 

appropriate in light of Coast Guard precedent and considering the aggravating and mitigating 

factors present in this particular case.

Captain Scoto‘s actions in relinquishing situational responsibility to an unlicensed 

deckhand for 30-45 minutes certainly cannot be condoned and some sanction is appropriate. 

Captain Scoto effectively relinquished direction and control over the REBEL II/ISLANDER for 

an unacceptably long period of time. Nevertheless, Captain Scoto‘s misconduct was not related 

to any actual marine casualty, unlike the leading CDOAs on the topic. Therefore, given all the 

facts and circumstances, a one month outright suspension of Respondent‘s Merchant Mariners 

License is an appropriate and sufficient sanction.

VIII. Order

WHEREBY:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the allegation of Misconduct (Charge I) in the 

Complaint filed against Respondent Olimpio Borges Scoto, Jr. is found PROVED.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the allegation of Negligence (Charge II) 

in the Complaint filed against Respondent Olimpio Borges Scoto, Jr. is found NOT PROVED.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent Olimpio Borges Scoto, Jr.‘s 

Coast Guard-issued Merchant Mariners License is suspended outright for one month. 
67

PLEASE TAKE NOTE, that issuance of this Decision and Order serves as notice of the parties‘ 

right to appeal under 33 C.F.R. Part 20, Subpart J. A copy of Subpart J is provided as

Attachment C. 

SO ORDERED,

__________________________________________________

Hon. Parlen L. McKenna

US Coast Guard Administrative Law Judge

Date: 

November 07, 2011
68

Attachment A – Witness and Exhibit List

Coast Guard Witnesses

1. Mr. Michael Avila

2. Mr. John Amstutz

3. Mr. William Law

4. LT James Serber

5. LT CDR Randy Waddington

6. Cpt. Mark Tilford

Respondent’s Witnesses

1. Cpt. Olimpio Scoto

2. Mr. Reid Crispino

3. CPT Eugene Hickey, ret.

4. Prof. Sam Pecota

5. Cpt. Russell Johnson

6. Cpt. Raymond Blakeslee

7. CDR Paul Larson, ret.

8. Cpt. John Pancho

Coast Guard Exhibits

1. Picture of the REBEL II

2. Picture of the REBEL II and barge ISLANDER

3. Picture of the REBEL II

4. Picture of the REBEL II

5. Picture of the REBEL II

6. VTS Vessel Identification Sheet dated October 1/2, 2008

7. VTS LA/LB Incident Report

8. VTS data screen shots

9. Videos from bridge cameras

10. Copy of Respondents Merchant Mariners License

11. REBEL II‘s Certificate of Documentation

12. ISLANDER‘s Certificate of Documentation

13. ISLANDER‘s Certificate of Inspection

14. REBEL II‘s Tug Log from Catalina Island Freight Line dated October 1, 2008

15. Registration information for the Sanchez Bayliner from the Los Angeles Port Police

16. Specifications of Bayliners similar to the Sanchez Bayliner

17. Picture of the Sanchez Bayliner after recovery

18. Picture of the Sanchez Bayliner after recovery

19. Coroner‘s Report for Ms. Penny Avila

20. Coroner‘s Report for Mr. Henry Sanchez

21. Radar Re-Enactment Videos

22. Picture of the Sanchez Bayliner at the dock (at a date prior to the collision)

23. Picture of the Sanchez Bayliner at the dock (at a date prior to the collision)

24. Partial nautical chart of Alamitos Bay
69

25. Nautical Chart of San Pedro Channel (Chart No. 18746)

26. Video of Sanchez Bayliner after recovery operations

27. Nautical Chart of San Pedro Bay (Chart No. 18749)

28. Curriculum Vitae of Captain Mark A. Tilford

Respondent’s Exhibits

A. USCG License Issued to Captain Scoto on May 23, 2007

B. Endorsement to USCG License Issued to Captain Scoto on May 23, 2007

C. Safety Training and Certificates Issued to Captain Scoto from July 20, 2001 through 

January 8, 2002

D. Armed Forces Report of Transfer of Captain Scoto, April 1, 1967

E. Personal Background of Captain Scoto

F. List of Vessels Worked by Captain Scoto

G. Letter Supporting High Moral Character of Captain Scoto, written by Anthony Tirro, 

Senior Superintendant at Warren George, Inc.

H. Letter Supporting High Moral Character of Captain Scoto, written by Captain Randy 

Hilliard

I. Letter Supporting High Moral Character of Captain Scoto, written by Captain Peter R. 

Hicks

J. Capn Voyager Portion of Chart 18746 with Approximate Vessel Courses

K. DRMSolver Spreadsheet Showing Ship, Target and Solution Figures

L. VTS Radar Screen Shots Depicting the REBEL II and the Bayliner on October 1, 2008

M. VTS Radar Screen Shots Depicting the near miss between the CAPT. T LE and the 

Bayliner on October 1, 2009

N. Transcript of Audio Recording of John Amstutz Conducted by the USCG on December 

15, 2008

O. Transcript of Audio Recording of Captain Scoto Conducted by the USCG on December 

15, 2008

P. Withdrawn

Q. Withdrawn

R. Transcript of Audio Recording of Michael Avila Conducted by the USCG on December 

16, 2008

S. Statement of VTS Watchstander on Duty the Evening of October 1, 2008

T. Documents Describing the Function and Capacity of a Furuno 1832 Radar

U. Letter Supporting High Moral Character of Captain Scoto, written by Captain Donn Dill

V. Letter Supporting High Moral Character of Captain Scoto, written by Captain Gerald 

Allen

W. Letter Supporting High Moral Character of Captain Scoto, written by Captain David 

Selga

X. Excel Worksheet ―Exhibit 1 to the Expert Report of Captain Eugene Hickey, Jr.‖

Y. Two photographs of the radar aboard the vessel CAPT. T LE

Z. Certificate of Inspection of the vessel CAPT. T LE

AA. Radar Detectability and Collision Risk, S.W. Bell, Nautical Briefing, Supplement to 

SEAWAYS, The Journal of The Nautical Institute, January, 1994

BB. Service documents for the Furuno 1832 Marine Radar aboard the REBEL II

CC. Documents related to USCG inspections of the REBEL II in August and September, 

2007

DD. Certifications and Documentations for the REBEL II at the time of the subject incident
70

EE. Report of Survey for the REBEL II , 28 November, 2008

FF. Certifications and Documentations for the ISLANDER at the time of the subject incident

GG. Report of Survey for the ISLANDER, 28 November, 2008

HH. ISLANDER General Arrangement and Tank Plan

II. Documents related to the USCG inspections of, and work performed on, the ISLANDER 

and REBEL II in mid-2008

JJ. Complete GPS Locations of REBEL II Recorded by USCG at time of incident

KK. Withdrawn

LL. ―The Law of Marine Collision‖ 1st ed., Nicholas J. Healy and Joseph C. Sweeney, 

Cornell Maritime Press, not attached, mutually accessible

MM. ―Farwell's Rules of the Nautical Road‖, 8th ed., Craig H. Allen, Naval Institute Press, 

not attached, mutually accessible

NN. Vessel Traffic Safety and Marine Exchange Manual, entered into evidence at December 

16, 2008 interview of LCDR Hennigan, not attached, mutually accessible and already in 

the possession of the USCG

OO. Report #9: Running Lights, Foundation Findings, pages 43-45

PP. Aqua Signa, Hell, and Perko Win Nav-Light Shine-off, Powerboat Reports, May 1993, 

pages 15-19

QQ. Withdrawn

RR. 6 Photographs of vessel inspection on September 1, 2010 taken by expert, Captain 

Eugene Hickey

SS. Lieutenant Surber‘s handwritten notes from his October 5, 2008 telephone conversation 

with Captain John Pancho

TT. Typed statement of Captain John Pancho addressed to Lieutenant Surber

UU. USCG Activity Summary Report for October 27, 2006 boarding of Sanchez Bayliner

VV. Photographs of steering wheel lock from Sanchez Bayliner, taken by Respondent‘s 

Expert Captain Eugene Hickey during hearing on October 15, 2010

WW. Curriculum Vitae of Respondent‘s Expert Captain Eugene Hickey

XX. From the Masthead: Fading Out, September/October 1994

YY. Transport Canada Bulletin No.:04/1992 entitled Subject: The Fitting of Radar Reflectors 

on Small Vessels

ZZ. Performance Investigation of marine radar reflectors on the market, Steve Luke, March 

2007, QinetiQ Ltd.

AAA. Davis Echomaster Superior In SRI Radar Reflector Tests, Practical Sailor, September 

1995

BBB. Curriculum Vitae of Respondent‘s Expert Samuel R. Pecota

CCC. Curriculum Vitae of Respondent‘s Expert Captain Russell Johnson

DDD. NOAA Chart 18746 Portion Showing Location of Oil Platforms Serviced by SoCal Ship 

Services and the CAPT. T LE

EEE. Two Photographs of the vessel CAPT. T LE

FFF. Merchant Mariner Credential Information for Respondent‘s Expert Captain Russell 

Johnson

GGG. Towing Vessel Designated Examiner Letter for Respondent‘s Expert Captain Russell 

Johnson

HHH. USCG Port State Information Exchange Search Results for Vessel GENUS STAR II

III. Marine Safety Manual, Vol. III, pages 22-1, 22-5 and 22-6

JJJ. Pilothouse Visibility QAT, Final Report, 24 July 1998

KKK. Towing Safety Advisory Committee (TSAC) Task Statement, Task #05-03

LLL. USCG Requirements for Uninspected Towing Vessels, Change 1, March 2009
71

MMM.Curriculum Vitae for USCG Expert Mark A. Tilford

NNN. Mariner‘s Guide to the Inland and International Rules (Revised), Mark A. Tilford and 

William D. Kline, 2008, selected pages

OOO. Towing Vessel Incline and Noise Recordings and EXTECH Digital Sound Meter User‘s 

Guide

PPP. Video of Backscatter Lighting Taken by Captain Scoto from the wheelhouse of the 

REBEL II, to be produced when as soon as possible after completion

QQQ. Reserved

RRR. Photographs showing visibility from the wheelhouse of the REBEL II, December 31, 

2010

SSS. Collision between the Danish fishing vessel METTE ELIASEN and the Malteseregistered tanker FREYJA in the North Sea on 15 March 2003, CASUALTY REPORT, 

February 19, 2004

TTT. USCGC HEALY INSTRUCTION M1603.1C, June 10, 2006

UUU. Appendix H to COMDTINST M16130.2E, pages H-29 and H-30

VVV. Selected Navigation safety Advisory Council Resolutions, 2005, page 655

WWW. USCG Addendum to the United States National Search and Rescue Supplement, 

full 631 page document is not attached as it is also in the possession of the Complainant, 

page H-75 only is attached for ease of reference

XXX. Google Earth View of Point of Collision

YYY. Will the Look-Out Be Redundant?, Capt. Joseph P. Brusseau and Lt. Cmdr. Brian 

J. Peter, the EXPERT, Fall 1998

ZZZ. Bridge Watchkeeping Safety Study, Marine Accident Investigation Branch, July 2004

AAAA. Radar Images showing the ―Effects of sea on PPI displays of radars having 

different wavelengths‖, RADAR NAVIGATION MANUAL, Second Edition, 1975

BBBB.Radar Reflectors, A good way to prevent collisions, USCG Office of Boating Safety, 

March 9, 2000

CCCC.Curriculum Vitae of Commander Paul Larson
72

Attachment B – Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact

United States Coast Guard’s Proposed Findings of Fact31

1. Between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. on October 1, 2008, the Tug REBEL II and the barge 

ISLANDER departed the Catalina Freight Lines (―Catalina Freight‖) facility in the Port of Los 

Angeles, California bound for Santa Catalina Island (―Catalina Island‖). Tr. at 80-82. 

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated.

2. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the REBEL II was operating in waters governed by 

the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (72 COLREGS; 33 U.S.C. 

§§ 1601-1608). See Coast Guard Exh. 27; Tr. at 678. 

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated.

3. There were two crewmembers on the REBEL II during the transit to and from Catalina Island 

on October 1st and 2nd, 2008. Respondent was the master and licensed operator and Mr. John 

Amstutz was the deckhand. Tr. at 80.1

1

The only transits of the REBEL II addressed in this brief are the transit to Catalina Island on the 

evening of October 1, 2008 and the return transit from Catalina Island to the Port of Los 

Angeles/Long Beach on the night of October 1, 2008 and into the early morning of October 2, 

2008. Within this brief, the trip ―to Catalina‖ references the former and those to the trip ―from 

Catalina‖ refer to the latter. Both alleged offenses occurred on the trip from Catalina Island.

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated.

4. At all times relevant to this matter, Respondent was the holder of a Coast Guard-issued 

credential as a master of steam or motor vessels of not more than 1600 gross registered tons 

(Domestic tonnage), 3,000 gross tons (ITC tonnage) upon oceans, master of towing vessels upon 

oceans, and radar observer (unlimited). Tr. at 8-9; Coast Guard Exh. 10. 

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated.

5. Deckhand Amstutz did not hold any Coast Guard-issued credential or any type of radar 

endorsement or radar observer certification. Deckhand Amstutz had no formal training in the 

use of vessel radar. Tr. at 131, 133, 433, 491. 

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated. As noted in this Decision and Order, Deckhand 

Amstutz was an experienced deckhand and had been informally trained by Captain Scoto and 

another captain on radar observations.

 

31 The Coast Guard submitted its Proposed Findings of Fact as part of its Closing Brief. The Coast Guard did not 

file any separate Proposed Conclusions of Law. Respondent filed neither Proposed Findings of Fact nor 

Conclusions of Law. The Coast Guard had several footnotes in its Proposed Findings of Fact, which have been 

retained. Any footnotes in the rulings were made by the Court.
73

6. The REBEL II is a 61.8-foot towing vessel. The REBEL II was originally constructed in 

1969. Coast Guard Exh. 11. 

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated.

7. The REBEL II had two locations from which the vessel could have been operated – an upper 

wheelhouse and a lower wheelhouse. With the exception of autopilot and GPS, the upper 

wheelhouse had the same compliment of navigational equipment as the lower wheelhouse. Tr. at 

476. 

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated. As noted in this Decision and Order, the upper 

wheelhouse‘s steering station was more limited than the lower wheelhouse in that one would 

have to manually steer the REBEL II from the upper wheelhouse. Furthermore, the upper 

wheelhouse was an add-on construction whose purpose per industry standards was for 

maneuvering the REBEL II in docking situations and where visibility was compromised by 

position of the tow.

8. Once set, the autopilot on the REBEL II could not be disengaged from the upper wheelhouse. 

If the master of the REBEL II were to operate the REBEL II from the upper wheelhouse, he 

would be required to manually steer the vessel. Tr. at 487. 

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated.

9. The lower wheelhouse of the REBEL II had visibility toward the bow through five forwardfacing windows. The windows were separated by support stanchions. Coast Guard Exh. 1; 

Resp. Exh. RR; Tr. at 375, 503. 

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated.

10. With the wheelhouse doors closed, visibility out of the port and starboard sides of the lower 

wheelhouse was through one square window in each of the doors. These door windows were 

smaller than the large forward-facing wheelhouse windows. Coast Guard Exhs. 1, 2, 5. 

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated. As noted in this Decision and Order, while visibility 

from any one spot within the lower wheelhouse is compromised, moving around the wheelhouse 

(as is industry standard and Captain Scoto and Deckhand Amstutz‘s practice) can eliminate the 

blind spots created by the lower wheelhouse‘s configuration. 

11. The wheelhouse doors could be left closed, opened, or cracked. Leaving the doors fully 

open would increase visibility out of the port and starboard sides of the lower wheelhouse. Coast 

Guard Exh. 1; Resp. Exh. RR.

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated.

12. On the transit from Catalina Island, the wheelhouse doors of the REBEL II were neither 

fully opened nor closed, but were cracked open. Tr. at 534-536, 588. 

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated.
74

13. The view out of each side of the lower wheelhouse aft of 90 and 270 degrees relative bearing 

was restricted by steel bulkheads that extended on each side of the lower wheelhouse from the 

side doors to the aft bulkhead. Coast Guard Exh. 1; Tr. at 125-127, 129, 257-258, 544-545. 

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated. As noted in this Decision and Order, while visibility 

from any one spot within the lower wheelhouse is compromised, moving around the wheelhouse 

(as is industry standard and Captain Scoto and Deckhand Amstutz‘s practice) can eliminate the 

blind spots created by the lower wheelhouse‘s configuration.

14. The view aft from the lower wheelhouse of the REBEL II was provided through a window 

on the starboard-aft bulkhead and a small, round porthole window on the aft-port bulkhead. 

These windows were contained within the lower wheelhouse‘s aft steel bulkhead. This aft 

bulkhead obstructed the view aft from the lower wheelhouse. The view aft out of the starboardaft window was further obstructed by a gray, plastic garbage can positioned against the railing 

just outside the window. Coast Guard Exhs. 3, 4; Tr. at 76-77, 126-129. 

RULING: Accepted and Incorporated. As noted in this Decision and Order, while visibility 

from any one spot within the lower wheelhouse is compromised, moving around the wheelhouse 

(as is industry standard and Captain Scoto and Deckhand Amstutz‘s practice) can eliminate the 

blind spots created by the lower wheelhouse‘s configuration.

15. The presence of the bulkheads noted in Findings 13 and 14 above creates blind spots from 

any one location in the lower wheelhouse. Tr. at 121, 126-131, 257-258, 354, 589, 1062. 

RULING: As noted in this Decision and Order, while visibility from any one spot within the 

lower wheelhouse is compromised, moving around the wheelhouse (as is industry standard and 

Captain Scoto and Deckhand Amstutz‘s practice) can eliminate the blind spots created by the 

lower wheelhouse‘s configuration.

16. The upper wheelhouse of the REBEL II provides an unobstructed, 360-degree view of the 

horizon. There are no bulkheads in the upper wheelhouse and, with the exception of narrow 

window support stanchions, there are no blind spots or significant impairments to the all-around, 

360-degree view from the upper wheelhouse. Coast Guard Exhs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; Tr. at 120-121, 

353-354, 534, 589, 1062. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED AS MODIFIED. As noted in this 

Decision and Order, while visibility from any one spot within the lower wheelhouse is 

compromised, moving around the wheelhouse (as is industry standard and Captain Scoto and 

Deckhand Amstutz‘s practice) can eliminate the blind spots created by the lower wheelhouse‘s 

configuration. To the extent this Proposed Finding of Fact is suggesting that it was improper to 

station Deckhand Amstutz in the lower wheelhouse – as compared to the upper wheelhouse – it 

is REJECTED for the reasons given in this Decision and Order.

17. The barge ISLANDER is a 128-foot cargo barge used by Catalina Freight to transport cargo 

between Catalina Island and the Port of Los Angeles. The ISLANDER was originally 

constructed in 1964. Tr. at 79-80; Coast Guard Exh. 12. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.
75

18. At all times material to this case, the REBEL II was towing the cargo barge astern at a 

distance of between 1,100 and 1,200 feet. Tr. at 91, 541. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

19. The average transit time, dock to dock, between Catalina Freight in the Port of Los Angeles 

and Catalina Island is approximately four hours. Tr. at 84-85. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

20. During the transits to and from Catalina Island on October 1st and 2nd, 2008, Deckhand 

Amstutz had no responsibility or authority to adjust the REBEL II‘s radar or alter the REBEL 

II‘s course or speed. Tr. at 117, 133-134, 147, 150, 552-553. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

21. During the REBEL II‘s transit to Catalina Island on October 1, 2008, Respondent permitted 

Deckhand Amstutz to take a nap in the lower wheelhouse rack of the REBEL II. Deckhand 

Amstutz spent approximately thirty minutes lying in the rack during the transit to Catalina 

Island. Tr. at 87-88, 538, 551. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

22. The REBEL II and ISLANDER arrived at Catalina Island at approximately 8:25 p.m. on the 

night of October 1, 2008. Coast Guard Exh. 14; Tr. at 89. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

23. The REBEL II and ISLANDER departed on its return trip from Catalina Island at 

approximately 9:55 p.m. on the night of October 1, 2008. Coast Guard Exh. 14; Tr. at 483-484. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

24. The weather for the return trip from Catalina Island was clear and calm. The seas consisted 

of an approximately one-foot slow swell of approximately thirty-second duration. Visibility was 

at least six miles. Tr. at 92-93. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

25. At approximately 10:30 p.m., Respondent lay down in the lower rack of the lower 

wheelhouse of the REBEL II. Respondent remained in the rack for a continuous period of 

between thirty and forty-five minutes. During his time in the rack, Respondent was lying with 

his head to the port side of the REBEL II and his feet to the starboard side. R espondent arose 

from the rack at between 11:00 and 11:15 p.m. Tr. at 490, 498. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.
76

26. It was a violation of Catalina Freight company policy for either Respondent or Deckhand 

Amstutz to lie in the rack during the transit between Catalina Island and the port of Los Angeles/ 

Long Beach (―LA/LB‖). Tr. at 551, 567.

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

27. While Respondent was in the rack, Deckhand Amstutz made an effort to leave Respondent 

alone so he could rest his back. For the period of time Respondent was in the rack, there was 

minimal conversation between Respondent and Deckhand Amstutz. Tr. at 97, 145, 612. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

28. From his prone position in the lower rack, Respondent was unable to see the waters around 

the REBEL II and would not have been able to see approaching vessels while he was in the rack. 

Tr. at 354-355, 561, 607. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

29. From his prone position in the rack, Respondent was unable to monitor the REBEL II‘s 

radar. The radar screen in the lower wheelhouse was located on the starboard side of the bridge 

next to the operating station located amidships. Resp. Exh. RR; Tr. at 561. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

30. The Vessel Traffic Service (―VTS‖) responsible for the approaches to the port of LA/LB 

covers the waters 25 miles seaward of Point Fermin and includes Catalina Island. The REBEL 

II/ ISLANDER was within this charted Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) during its 

entire transit to and from Catalina Island. Tr. at 156; Coast Guard Exh. 25 at Note [D]. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

31. Small recreational vessels have posed a frequent hazard to the Respondent when operating 

with a tow between Catalina Island and the port of LA/LB. If Respondent became aware of a 

vessel that was going to attempt to cross his towline, he would have used a handheld spotlight to 

draw attention to the barge and signal the other vessel. Tr. at 100-101, 115-118, 450, 518-519, 

521-522, 584-585, 740; Resp. Exh. N at 19. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

32. At approximately 11:30 p.m. on October 1, 2008, Mr. Henry Sanchez and Ms. Penny Avila 

departed from a dock at 261 Bayshore Drive, in Alamitos Bay, Long Beach, California on a 

twenty-nine foot Bayliner en route to Catalina Island. Tr. at 42-43, 56. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

33. The boat occupied by Mr. Sanchez and Ms. Avila was a 1989 28.66-foot Bayliner Avanti 

model (―the Bayliner‖). Coast Guard Exhs. 15, 16; Tr. at 47. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.
77

34. On October 1, 2008, the Bayliner was equipped with red and green navigation lights on the 

bow and an all-around white navigation/anchor light. On the night of October 1, 2008, both the 

bow running lights and the all-around white light on the Bayliner were operable and turned on[, 

when it departed its mooring and when it passed under the 2nd Street Bridge]. The all-around 

white light was observed to be brighter than the bow running lights when Mr. Sanchez and Ms. 

Avila departed the dock in Alamitos Bay. Tr. at 48-50. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED AS MODIFIED.

35. While transiting from its dock at 261 Bayshore Drive to San Pedro Bay, the Bayliner passed 

under automobile bridges at Appian Way and 2nd Street. Tr. at 56, 263; Coast Guard Exhs. 9, 

24.

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED. 

36. As the Bayliner approached the bridge at Appian Way, the port and starboard running lights 

and the all-around white light were visible. The all-around white light on the Bayliner was 

visible from the aft of the vessel as it passed under the bridge at Appian Way. Tr. at 54. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

37. As the Bayliner passed under the bridge at 2nd Street, the Bayliner‘s navigation lights (port 

and starboard running and all-around white) remained on and visible. The all-around white light 

was brighter than the port and starboard running lights. The Bayliner passed under the 2nd 

Street Bridge at approximately 11:40 p.m. Coast Guard Exh. 9; Tr. at 56. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

38. From the time the Bayliner left its dock in Alamitos Bay to the time of the collision with the 

REBEL II/ ISLANDER, the Bayliner‘s navigation lights were turned on and were operating 

properly. Coast Guard Exh. 9; Tr. at 65. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

39. Consistent with the requirements of Rule 22 of both the Inland and International Rules of the 

Road, the Bayliner‘s all-around masthead light had a visibility range of at least two miles and 

each of the Bayliner‘s sidelights had a minimum visibility range of one mile. See Coast Guard 

Exhs. 9, 15; Navigation Rules, Inland, 33 C.F.R. § 83.22 (c) and International, U.S. Coast Guard 

COMDINST M16672 (Rule 22).

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

40. During the return trip from Catalina Island, Respondent got up out of the rack at 

approximately 11:00-11:15 p.m., after lying down for approximately thirty to forty-five minutes. 

Tr. at 97, 498. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.
78

41. After getting out of the rack, Respondent took up his watch position on the starboard side of 

the wheelhouse in front of the REBEL II‘s radar. Deckhand Amstutz was posted as a [dedicated] 

lookout on the port side of the wheelhouse as the REBEL II transited through the precautionary 

area. Tr. at 98, 142, 1348-1349. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED AS MODIFIED.

42. The charted precautionary area outside LA/LB harbor is an area of increased vessel traffic 

density. Vessels are advised to ―proceed with extreme caution‖ in the precautionary area. Tr. at 

164, 518; Coast Guard Exh. 27 at Note E. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

43. When the Bayliner was two miles away from the REBEL II, the Bayliner was at a relative 

bearing of 036 degrees from the REBEL II. Tr. at 779. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

44. When the Bayliner and the ISLANDER collided, the Bayliner was at a relative bearing of 

180 degrees from the REBEL II. Tr. at 781. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

45. The masthead light on the Bayliner was within visual range of the REBEL II at a distance of 

two miles and passed through a relative bearing arc from the REBEL II starting at 036 degrees 

relative and ending at 180 degrees relative. Coast Guard Exh. 9; Tr. at 781; see also Findings of 

Fact 24, 39. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

46. When the Bayliner was one mile away from the REBEL II, at least one of the Bayliner‘s 

sidelights was within the visual range of the REBEL II. As the Bayliner passed abeam of the 

REBEL II, its green starboard sidelight and its all-around white masthead light were within the 

visual range of the REBEL II. See Coast Guard Exh. 8 at at 16 of 17; Coast Guard Exh. 9; Tr. at 

50; Findings of Fact 24, 39. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

47. Immediately prior to the collision the REBEL II was making way at approximately eight 

knots and the Bayliner was travelling at twenty knots. Given their relative angles of approach, 

the closing speed of the vessels was 26.4 knots. Tr. at 735-736. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

48. At a closing speed of 26.4 knots and a visibility range of two miles, the all-around masthead 

light on the Bayliner was within the visual range of the REBEL II for at least four minutes and 

forty-six seconds. At least one of the running lights on the Bayliner was within the visual range 

of the REBEL II for at least two minutes and twenty-eight seconds. See Findings of Fact 24, 39.2
79

2 These calculations are slightly larger than those by Respondent‘s expert, Captain Hickey. See

Tr. at 745, 777 (finding 135 seconds at one mile and 270 seconds at two miles). At 26.4 knots 

relative speed, two vessels would close a distance of one mile in 137.4 seconds or 2 minutes 17.4 

seconds. Two miles would be closed in 4 minutes 34.8 seconds. This minor discrepancy 

appears to be the result of Captain Hickey rounding numbers. See Tr. at 738. Also, Captain 

Hickey appears to have conducted his calculations as if the Bayliner were on a course directly at 

the REBEL II. It was not. Because the Bayliner came within 300-600 feet of the REBEL II then 

proceeded another 1,100 to 1,200 feet to the ISLANDER, any calculation of time that the 

Bayliner‘s lights were visible to the REBEL II must be increased by the time it took the Bayliner 

to travel 1,100-1,200 feet to the ISLANDER minus the 300-600 feet it had remaining if it were 

on a course directly at the REBEL II (i.e., an additional travel distance of 500-900 feet). This 

would mean the Bayliner‘s lights were within the visual range of the REBEL II for an additional 

eleven to twenty-one seconds. Complainant has used the most conservative number of eleven 

seconds.

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

49. Prior to the collision between the ISLANDER and the Bayliner, the Bayliner passed within 

300-600 feet directly off the starboard beam of the REBEL II. CG-08 at 16; Tr. at 237, 542. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

50. At a closing speed of 26.4 knots, the Bayliner passed directly abeam of the REBEL II 

between twenty-six and twenty-eight seconds before the collision with the ISLANDER. See Tr. 

at 541 (distance between REBEL II and ISLANDER between 1,100 and 1,200 feet); Coast 

Guard Exh. 11 (length of REBEL II- 61.8 feet); Coast Guard Exh. 8 at 16 of 17 (showing 

Bayliner passing abeam of REBEL II).3

3

This calculation uses ―abeam‖ to indicate a position off the starboard side of the REBEL II at

the fore and aft midpoint of the REBEL II. Therefore, the time and distance calculations were 

based on distances of 1,130.9 feet and 1,230.9 feet at a speed of 26.4 knots. This calculation is 

consistent with the time indications on CG-08 at 16 & 17. The elapsed time between those 

images is twenty-two seconds. Given the timing calculations, CG-08 at 17 likely represents a 

period of time before the collision indicating a close-quarters situation in which the radar images 

have merged seconds before the actual collision. See TR at 185.

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

51. At 12:18 a.m. on October 2, 2008, the REBEL II‘s barge ISLANDER and the Bayliner 

collided. Coast Guard Exh. 8 at 17; Resp. Exh. M. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

52. At the time of the collision, the REBEL II‘s radar was set on the three-mile range. Tr. at 

392-393. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.
80

53. On the night of the collision, the REBEL II‘s radar was turned on and functioning properly. 

Tr. at 361. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

54. The radar unit on the REBEL II on the night of the collision was capable of detecting the 

Bayliner. Tr. at 364-365, 368, 392, 493-494, 861.

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED. As noted in this Decision and Order, 

small fiberglass vessels like the Sanchez Bayliner can be difficult to acquire on radar and no 

finding is made that Captain Scoto failed to operate his radar in the manner of a prudent mariner. 

Having his radar optimized to detect the channel buoys would not have compromised his ability 

to pick up the Sanchez Bayliner and any implication by this Proposed Finding of Fact that 

Captain Scoto was negligent in his radar operation is REJECTED.

55. During the REBEL II‘s approach to LA/LB harbor, Captain Scoto had his radar optimized to 

detect buoys. Tr. at 526, 786-787, 856. 

RULING: As noted in this Decision and Order, small fiberglass vessels like the Sanchez 

Bayliner can be difficult to acquire on radar and no finding is made that Captain Scoto failed to 

operate his radar in the manner of a prudent mariner. Having his radar optimized to detect the 

channel buoys would not have compromised his ability to pick up the Sanchez Bayliner and any 

implication by this Proposed Finding of Fact that Captain Scoto was negligent in his radar 

operation is REJECTED.

56. Neither Respondent nor Deckhand Amstutz ever became aware of the presence of the 

Bayliner at any time before, during, or after the collision between the REBEL II/ ISLANDER 

and the Bayliner. Tr. at 151, 529-530. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

57. The Bayliner remained afloat for at least nineteen minutes after the collision with the 

REBEL II/ ISLANDER. Resp. Exh. M; Coast Guard Exh. 19 at 3, Coast Guard Exh. 20 at 3; Tr. 

at 642-644.4

4

The video that comprises Resp. Exh. M was not played start to finish at the hearing. When 

viewed in its entirety, the image of the Bayliner intermittently appears on the VTS radar until the 

end of the video. Resp. Exh. M. The Bayliner continues to appear on the VTS radar after the 

REBEL II is well past the Los Angeles RACON (No. 3) buoy. See Resp. Exh. M at time 37:00 

(RACON indicated by three yellow/green dashes- TR at 513); Coast Guard Exh. 27. The 

REBEL II was due to arrive at the RACON buoy at forty minutes after midnight- twenty-two 

minutes after the collision with the Bayliner. Tr. at 144, 161; Coast Guard Exh. 6.

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

58. The crew of the REBEL II made no attempt to render aid after the collision to the Penny 

Avila or Henry Sanchez onboard the Bayliner. Tr. at 529-530. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.
81

59. Both Penny Avila and Henry Sanchez died of ―probable drowning‖ and other unestablished 

factors. Coast Guard Exhs. 19, 20. 

RULING: ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.
82

Attachment C – Notice of Appeal Rights

33 C.F.R. Part 20

Subpart J—Appeals

§ 20.1001 General.

(a) Any party may appeal the ALJ‘s decision by filing a notice of appeal. The party shall file the 

notice with the U. S. Coast Guard Administrative Law Judge Docketing Center; Attention: 

Hearing Docket Clerk; Room 412; 40 S. Gay Street; Baltimore, MD 21201–4022. The party 

shall file the notice 30 days or less after issuance of the decision, and shall serve a copy of it on 

the other party and each interested person.

(b) No party may appeal except on the following issues:

(1) Whether each finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence.

(2) Whether each conclusion of law accords with applicable law, precedent, and public policy.

(3) Whether the ALJ abused his or her discretion.

(4) The ALJ‘s denial of a motion for disqualification.

(c) No interested person may appeal a summary decision except on the issue that no hearing was 

held or that in the issuance of the decision the ALJ did not consider evidence that that person 

would have presented.

(d) The appeal must follow the procedural requirements of this subpart.

§ 20.1002 Records on appeal.

(a) The record of the proceeding constitutes the record for decision on appeal.

(b) If the respondent requests a copy of the transcript of the hearing as part of the record of 

proceeding, then,—

(1) If the hearing was recorded at Federal expense, the Coast Guard will provide the transcript on 

payment of the fees prescribed in 49 CFR 7.45; but,

(2) If the hearing was recorded by a Federal contractor, the contractor will provide the transcript 

on the terms prescribed in 49 CFR 7.45.

§ 20.1003 Procedures for appeal.

(a) Each party appealing the ALJ‘s decision or ruling shall file an appellate brief with the 

Commandant at the following address: U.S. Coast Guard Administrative Law Judge Docketing 

Center; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk; Room 412; 40 S. Gay Street; Baltimore, MD 21201–

4022, and shall serve a copy of the brief on every other party.
83

(1) The appellate brief must set forth the appellant‘s specific objections to the decision or ruling. 

The brief must set forth, in detail, the—

(i) Basis for the appeal;

(ii) Reasons supporting the appeal; and

(iii) Relief requested in the appeal.

(2) When the appellant relies on material contained in the record, the appellate brief must 

specifically refer to the pertinent parts of the record.

(3) The appellate brief must reach the Docketing Center 60 days or less after service of the ALJ‘s 

decision. Unless filed within this time, or within another time period authorized in writing by the 

Docketing Center, the brief will be untimely.

(b) Any party may file a reply brief with the Docketing Center 35 days or less after service of the 

appellate brief. Each such party shall serve a copy on every other party. If the party filing the 

reply brief relies on evidence contained in the record for the appeal, that brief must specifically 

refer to the pertinent parts of the record.

(c) No party may file more than one appellate brief or reply brief, unless—

(1) The party has petitioned the Commandant in writing; and

(2) The Commandant has granted leave to file an added brief, in which event the Commandant 

will allow a reasonable time for the party to file that brief.

(d) The Commandant may accept an amicus curiae brief from any person in an appeal of an 

ALJ‘s decision.

§ 20.1004 Decisions on appeal.

(a) The Commandant shall review the record on appeal to determine whether the ALJ committed 

error in the proceedings, and whether the Commandant should affirm, modify, or reverse the 

ALJ‘s decision or should remand the case for further proceedings.

(b) The Commandant shall issue a decision on every appeal in writing and shall serve a copy of 

the decision on each party and interested person.