UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

_________________________________

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Complainant

vs.

STEPHEN DAVID DETAR, 

Respondent

_________________________________

Docket Number 2012-0524

Enforcement Activity No. 4484754

DECISION AND ORDER

Issued: June 21, 2013

By Chief Administrative Law Judge: Honorable Walter J. Brudzinski

Appearances:

LT Robert W. Canoy, Jr.

Judge Advocate

Coast Guard First District, Boston, MA

and

PO1 Christopher D. Bains

Marine Casualty Investigator, Sector Boston

For the Coast Guard

STEPHEN DAVID DETAR, Pro se

For the Respondent
2

SUMMARY

The Coast Guard initiated these proceedings alleging Respondent violated 46 U.S.C. § 

7704(c) and 46 C.F.R. § 5.35. The Coast Guard’s evidence shows Respondent took a urinalysis 

drug test as directed by his employer. The test was conducted in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 

40 but was not in compliance with 46 C.F.R. Part 16. Respondent’s urine specimen tested 

positive for cocaine. Further, Respondent admitted use of drugs at or around the time of the drug 

test to the Medical Review Officer and at hearing. Respondent does not contest the positive drug 

test result; rather, he presented evidence showing he completed a substance abuse program and 

asks the undersigned to stay the revocation pending his completion of the cure process. The 

undersigned finds that while the Coast Guard is not entitled to the regulatory presumption, the 

preponderance of the evidence shows Respondent is a user of dangerous drugs. The undersigned 

therefore finds the Coast Guard’s case PROVED and ordered Respondent’s Merchant Mariner’s 

Credential REVOKED. Based on Respondent’s history of drug use and conduct surrounding a 

previous attempt at cure, the undersigned finds the evidence produced at hearing insufficient to 

warrant a stay of the revocation. Respondent’s request for a stay is therefore DENIED. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pleadings

In its Complaint of November 30, 2012, the Coast Guard charged Respondent with one 

count of Use of, or Addiction to the Use of Dangerous Drugs in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 7704(c) 

and 46 C.F.R. § 5.35. The Coast Guard alleged as follows:

1. On October 26, 2012 the Respondent took a drug test.

2. A urine sample was collected by Greg Carter of Concentra Medical Center in 

Philadelphia, PA.

3. The Respondent signed a Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control Form.

4. The urine specimen was analyzed by Quest Diagnostics using procedures 

approved by the Department of Transportation.
3

5. The specimen subsequently was verified positive for Cocaine Metabolites, as 

determined by the Medical Review Officer, Suzanne Steele.

6. In aggravation: On February 24, 2010, Respondent admitted to “use of, or 

addiction to the use of dangerous drugs,” to wit: Cocaine.

7. In aggravation: On April 30, 2012, Respondent successfully completed the 

terms of a Settlement Agreement for “Use of, or addiction to the use of dangerous 

drugs,” and his MMC was returned.

See Complaint at 2. 

In his Answer, Respondent admitted to allegations 1 through 6. Respondent admitted 

allegation 7 was “partially correct” in that “respondent agrees that on April 30, 2012 it was 

confirmed in writing that he had successfully completed the terms of a Settlement Agreement for 

‘Use of, or addiction to the use of dangerous drugs,’ and his MMC was returned.” However, 

Respondent disagreed with allegation 7 because “the respondent never completed the outlined 

requirements for completion of the aforementioned cure process due to the absence of 

enforcement of the agreement. As such, the respondent did not attend the Alcoholics 

Anonymous meetings and did not enter the 12 step program as was stated.” See Answer at 3-4. 

Pre-Hearing Motions

The Coast Guard moved for Summary Decision claiming no genuine issue of material 

fact existed regarding use of dangerous drugs. The undersigned determined a genuine issue of 

material fact did exist and denied the Coast Guard’s motion in an order dated February 26, 2013. 

Based on the undersigned’s denial of summary decision, Respondent moved to dismiss the 

Complaint which the undersigned denied on March 4, 2013. The Coast Guard subsequently 

sought clarification of the order denying summary decision which the undersigned interpreted as 

a motion for reconsideration. The undersigned then issued an Order clarifying the Order 

Denying Summary Decision dated March 6, 2013.

Prior to hearing, Respondent moved for a continuance and to combine the instant case 

with a previous Coast Guard case in which Respondent had entered into a settlement agreement 
4

after a positive drug test. The undersigned denied Respondent’s motions but referred the matter 

regarding Respondent’s previous case to the ALJ Docketing Center for appropriate action. The 

instant case then proceeded to hearing as scheduled. 

In Person Hearing

The undersigned conducted the hearing on March 19, 2013 in Boston, Massachusetts in 

accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) at 5 U.S.C. 551-559 and the 

regulations at 46 C.F.R. Part 5 and 33 C.F.R. Part 20. At the beginning of the hearing, 

Respondent tendered his credential to the undersigned pursuant to 46 C.F.R. § 5.521(a). The 

Coast Guard introduced testimony of five (5) witnesses and offered fourteen (14) exhibits into 

evidence.1

 Respondent introduced the testimony of two (2) witnesses, including himself, and 

offered five (5) exhibits which were admitted into evidence as Exhibits A through F. The 

witness and exhibit list is contained in Attachment A.

After Respondent testified in the Coast Guard’s case in chief, the Investigating Officer 

moved for decision that Respondent is a user of dangerous drugs. The undersigned denied the 

oral motion because the record was undeveloped regarding the drug test at issue and 

Respondent’s admissions of drug use. 

Post Hearing Briefs

After the hearing, the parties had the opportunity to submit post hearing briefs 

specifically to address the issue of whether the ALJ should stay the hearing until Respondent 

completed the cure process. The Coast Guard filed a post hearing brief concerning the case 

generally, and the issue of staying the hearing specifically. The Coast Guard included proposed 

findings of fact and conclusions of law which are ruled upon in Attachment B. Respondent did 

not timely file a post hearing brief with proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
5

After the record closed and the time for post-hearing briefs and reply briefs passed, 

Respondent sent three email communications. The first, sent on May 7, 2013, purported to 

respond to the Coast Guard’s post-hearing brief in which he made further argument that, among 

other things, Reality House is a federally funded veterans’ assistance program; and, he spent four 

months of his sobriety “at the reality house and concentrating on my recovery through AA and a 

sponsor.” Respondent did not submit any records or evidence to support his claims.

Respondent’s second email, dated June 3, 2013, requested the undersigned “find the coast 

guard in contempt” because it is “intentionally withholding vital information” and he feels he is 

being “singled out, and punished unfairly.” Respondent’s statements are unclear but it appears 

Respondent is saying his new employer apparently requested that he work on a tug boat and he 

took that position. It appears that position would require a Merchant Mariner’s Credential. 

When Respondent informed the Coast Guard of his situation “to find out if this was a sensitive 

position” he was directed to Dr. Steele and “forced to leave the boat.” To the extent that this is a 

properly laid motion for contempt, that motion is denied because the undersigned does not have 

contempt power and because Respondent has not clearly articulated his arguments. 

Respondent’s third email, dated June 5, 2013, requests a dismissal, but was not properly 

filed with the ALJ Docketing Center nor was it served on the Coast Guard. Respondent seems to 

assert that he cannot demonstrate substantial involvement in the cure process because the MRO’s 

office “will only work threw [sic] the USCG.” Respondent’s arguments are extremely 

incoherent and it is unclear what he is asking for and why. To the extent that this is a properly 

laid Motion to Dismiss, that motion is denied because Respondent’s unsworn, untimely 

statements are insufficient to show the undersigned that Respondent is entitled to a dismissal as a 

 1 The Coast Guard had initially proposed fifteen (15) exhibits but did not offer Exhibit CG 10 into evidence. The 

exhibits were not renumbered. Therefore, Coast Guard Exhibits 1 – 9 and 11 – 15 were entered into the record 

totaling 14 exhibits. The undersigned took official notice of the HHS list of approved laboratories, ALJ-1.
6

matter of fact or law. Respondent’s contentions are concerning events that have taken place after 

the close of the record and have no impact on the outcome of this case.

ISSUES

This case presents two issues:

1. Has the Coast Guard proved “use of, or addiction to the use of dangerous drugs” by a 

preponderance of the evidence?

2. If yes, should the ALJ stay the revocation to allow Respondent time to complete the cure 

process? 

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following Findings of Fact are based on a thorough and careful analysis of 

documentary evidence, testimony of witnesses, and the entire administrative record.

Facts Concerning Jurisdiction 

1. At all relevant times Respondent was a holder of a Coast Guard issued Merchant 

Mariner’s Document (MMD) #201522. See Coast Guard’s Complaint at 1, ¶ 1; 

Respondent’s Answer at 1; Tr. at 39; and Ex. 9.2

2. On October 26, 2012, Respondent was an employee of Great Lakes Dredge and Dock 

Company (Company) working under his MMD. See Tr. at 25, and 50.

Facts Concerning Whether the Coast Guard Proved “Use of a Dangerous Drug”

3. On October 26, 2012, Respondent submitted a urine sample in accordance with a 

Company ordered drug screening. See Ex. 4; Tr. at 50-1.

4. The Company ordered drug screening is not a drug test mandated by 46 C.F.R. Part 16. 

See Exs. 1 and 2; Tr. at 51-5. 

5. Greg Carter is a certified specimen collector trained in the standards and procedures of 49 

C.F.R. Part 40. See Ex. 3; Tr. at 73-5. 

 2 Citations referencing the transcript are as follows: (Tr. at ___); Coast Guard Exhibits are identified by number as 

follows (Ex. 1, Ex. 2, etc...); Respondent’s Exhibits are identified by letter as follows: (Ex. A, Ex. B, etc...). 
7

6. On October 26, 2012, Greg Carter collected Respondent’s urine specimen, ID number 

6440200. See Ex. 4; Tr. at 75-81.

7. On October 26, 2012, Respondent signed the Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control 

Form (CCF) for specimen ID number 6440200. See Exs. 4 and 15. 

8. Greg Carter sent Respondent’s urine specimen to Quest Diagnostics in Norristown, PA. 

See Tr. at 81.

9. Quest Diagnostics in Norristown, PA received Respondent’s urine specimen, ID number 

6440200, with all seals intact. See Tr. at 98-99. 

10. At all relevant times, Quest Diagnostics in Norristown, PA is a laboratory certified to 

analyze DOT drug screenings. See Tr. at 89-91; ALJ-1.

11. David Wallner is a qualified certifying scientist for Quest Diagnostics in Norristown, PA 

trained in the procedures and regulations set forth in 49 C.F.R. Part 40. See Tr. at 88-9.

12. Quest Diagnostics analyzed Respondent’s urine specimen, ID number 6440200, using 

immunoassay as the initial screening test and Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry 

(GC/MS) as a confirmation test. See Ex. 6; Tr. at 100-103. 

13. Quest Diagnostics determined Respondent’s urine specimen, ID number 6440200, tested 

positive for cocaine metabolites at 209 ng/ml. See Tr. at 103; Ex. 6 at 6. 

14. The confirmatory cutoff level for cocaine metabolites is 100 ng/ml. See Ex. 6 at 6; Tr. at 

103, 104 and 106. 

15. Dr. Suzanne Steele is a certified Medical Review Officer (MRO) with University 

Services trained in the standards and procedures of 49 C.F.R. Part 40. See Ex. 13; Tr. at 

114-6. 

16. Dr. Steele contacted Respondent concerning the results of his October 26, 2012 drug test. 

See Ex. 12; Tr. at 122-3.

17. During the interview with Dr. Steele, Respondent admitted to using cocaine 
8

approximately one week before the October 26, 2012 drug test. See Ex. 12; Tr. at 124-5 

and 175. 

18. Dr. Steele verified Respondent’s drug test as positive for cocaine metabolites. See Exs. 5 

and 11; Tr. at 126-7. 

Facts Concerning Whether the ALJ Should Stay the Revocation

19. In February 2010, Respondent entered into a settlement agreement with the Coast Guard 

following a positive drug test. See Ex. 7 at 2; Tr. at 136-9.

20. As a result of this settlement agreement, Respondent’s MMD #201522 was revoked, but 

the revocation was stayed to allow him to complete a drug rehabilitation program. See

Ex. 7 at 3. 

21. The Coast Guard subsequently determined that Respondent successfully completed the 

requirements of the February 2010 settlement agreement. See Exs. 8 and 15; Tr. at 144-

8, and 151-2. 

22. On April 30, 2012, the Coast Guard returned Respondent’s MMD #201522 to him. See

Ex. 8; Tr. at 147-8, and 150.

23. On November 21, 2012, approximately one month after the drug test at issue in this case, 

Respondent entered drug rehabilitation at Reality House with a diagnosis of cocaine 

abuse. See Ex. 14; Ex. E; Tr. at 35-37.

24. On December 31, 2012, Reality House released Respondent with a diagnosis of cocaine 

abuse in partial remission. See Ex. 14; Ex. E; Tr. at 35-37.

BURDEN OF PROOF

The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551-559, applies to Coast Guard Suspension 

and Revocation trial-type hearings before United States Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). See

46 U.S.C. § 7702(a). The APA authorizes sanctions if, upon consideration of the entire record as 

a whole, the charges are supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. See 5 U.S.C. 
9

556(d). Under Coast Guard procedural rules and regulations, the burden of proof is on the Coast 

Guard to prove that the charges are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See 33 

C.F.R. §§ 20.701, 20.702(a). “The term substantial evidence is synonymous with preponderance 

of the evidence as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court.” Appeal Decision 2477 (TOMBARI)

(1988); see also, Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 107 (1981). The burden of proving a fact by a 

preponderance of the evidence “simply requires the trier of fact ‘to believe that the existence of a 

fact is more probable than its nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the 

burden to persuade [the judge] of the fact’s existence.’” Concrete Pipe and Products of 

California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 

622 (1993) (citing, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-2 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring) (brackets 

in original)). Therefore, the Coast Guard must prove by reliable, probative, and credible 

evidence that Respondent more likely than not committed the violation charged. 

ANALYSIS

“The purpose of Coast Guard suspension and revocation proceedings is to promote safety 

at sea.” 46 U.S.C. § 7701(a). Under 46 C.F.R. § 5.19 (b), the Commandant of the Coast Guard 

“has delegated to ALJs the authority to admonish, suspend with or without probation or revoke a 

license, certificate or document issued to a person by the Coast Guard under any navigation or 

shipping law.”3 The administrative actions against a mariner’s credentials “are remedial and not 

penal in nature. These actions are intended to help maintain standards for competence and 

conduct essential to the promotion of safety at sea.” 46 C.F.R. § 5.5. It is within this context 

that the undersigned addresses the two issues in this case. 

A. Has the Coast Guard Proved “Use of, or Addiction to the Use of Dangerous Drugs?”

Title 46 U.S.C. § 7704(c) states “if it is shown that a holder [of an MMC] has been a user 

 3 The Coast Guard now refers to licenses, certificates of registry, and documents as credentials. 74 Fed. Reg. 11,216, 

11,196 (March 16, 2009). 
10

of, or addicted to, a dangerous drug, the license, certificate of registry, or merchant mariner’s 

document shall be revoked unless the holder provides satisfactory proof that the holder is cured.” 

Coast Guard regulations and case law provide a presumption that a mariner is a user of 

dangerous drugs if the following criteria are met: 1) that Respondent was tested for a dangerous 

drug; 2) that Respondent tested positive for a dangerous drug; and, 3) that the test was conducted 

in accordance with 46 C.F.R. Part 16. See Appeal Decision 2697 (GREEN) (2011); see also 46 

C.F.R. § 16.201(b). Part 16 requires compliance with the provisions in that Part as well as 

compliance with the provisions of 49 C.F.R. Part 40 concerning Department of Transportation 

drug tests. This regulatory presumption, however, is not the Coast Guard’s only means to prove 

that Respondent is a user of dangerous drugs.

In his Motion to Dismiss, Respondent argued that because the Coast Guard did not 

present any evidence or allegation that the test was in accordance with Part 16, he should prevail. 

Respondent re-raised this issue at hearing. See Tr. at 23 and 60-1. In the instant case, the Coast 

Guard does not seek to prove Respondent’s use of a dangerous drug solely based on a positive 

urinalysis drug test. The Coast Guard concedes that the drug test at issue did not comply with 

the provisions of 46 C.F.R. Part 16 even though it was conducted in accordance with 49 C.F.R. 

Part 40. The Coast Guard, therefore, is not entitled to the regulatory presumption but still has an 

opportunity to prove use of a dangerous drug.

The Coast Guard presented evidence and testimony that Respondent provided a urine 

specimen for a drug test which was positive for cocaine metabolites. Respondent’s employer 

ordered the drug test at issue but not for the reasons listed in Subpart B of 46 C.F.R. Part 16; 

however, the specimen was collected, analyzed and verified in accordance with the standards and 

procedures of 49 C.F.R. Part 40. The positive test result therefore has strong indicia of 

reliability. Further, the Coast Guard did not rely solely on the positive drug test result. It 

provided evidence and testimony that Respondent admitted using cocaine approximately one 
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week prior to the drug test. See Tr. at 124, 175-6; Ex. 12.

Respondent provided no evidence or testimony to show that the test result is unreliable. 

Nor does he provide any alternative explanation as to why his sample would test positive. 

Further, Respondent admits to drug use over the last several years including at or around the time 

of the drug test at issue in this case. See Tr. at 169-70. 

The undersigned therefore finds by the preponderance of the evidence Respondent is a 

user of dangerous drugs. The evidence demonstrates that Respondent tested positive on a 

reliable drug test and the reason for that positive test was use of cocaine. 

B. Should the ALJ Stay the Revocation to Allow Completion of the Cure Process?

“An ALJ may grant a continuance to the hearing if the Respondent has demonstrated 

substantial involvement in the cure process by proof of enrollment in an acceptable rehabilitation 

program.” Appeal Decision 2634 (BARRETTA) (2002) (emphasis added), (citing, Appeal 

Decision 2546 (SWEENEY) (1992)). The emphasized language above demonstrates the ALJ’s 

discretion to grant or deny a request to continue the hearing to allow Respondent additional time 

to complete the cure process. The “cure process” as detailed in SWEENEY requires that: 1) the 

Respondent must have successfully completed a bonafide drug abuse rehabilitation program 

designed to eliminate physical and psychological dependence; and, 2) the Respondent must have 

successfully demonstrated a complete non-association with drugs for a minimum period of one 

year following successful completion of the rehabilitation program. See Appeal Decision 2535 

(SWEENEY) (1992). Further, Coast Guard regulations require an MRO “to verify that the 

mariner is drug-free and that the risk of subsequent use of dangerous drugs by that mariner is 

sufficiently low to justify his return to work... .” Appeal Decision 2634 (BARRETTA) (citing 46 

C.F.R. § 16.201(f)).

Respondent submitted evidence demonstrating he attended and completed a drug rehab 

program at Reality House from November 21, 2012 to December 31, 2012. See Ex. E and Ex. 
12

14. The Coast Guard argues Respondent made no showing that Reality House is a “bonafide” 

program. In Appeal Decision 2535 (SWEENEY), the Commandant defined a “bonafide” 

program as “a program certified by a government agency, such as a state drug/alcohol abuse 

administration, or in the alternative, certified by an accepted independent professional 

association, such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations 

(JCAHO).” Respondent’s evidence describes Reality House as “a substance abuse outpatient 

treatment program” but provides no further details. In his May 7, 2013 email, he claims Reality 

House is a “veterans assistance program federally funded” but provides no supporting 

documentation other than his unsworn statement. No one from Reality House testified at hearing 

and Respondent submitted no evidence to suggest that it meets the criteria of a “bonafide” 

program as articulated in SWEENEY. 

Furthermore, Respondent’s history demonstrates to the undersigned that staying the 

revocation in these circumstances is not appropriate. Respondent tested positive on a drug test in 

February 2010. See Tr. at 137. That positive test resulted in a settlement agreement between the 

Coast Guard and Respondent to allow him to go through the cure process and regain his 

credential. See Exs. 7 and 8; Tr. at 137-48. Respondent submitted documents and materials 

sufficient to fulfill his duties under the settlement agreement. See Tr. at 144-7. The Coast Guard 

returned Respondent’s MMD on April 30, 2012. 

During the instant hearing, Respondent admits to using drugs while going through the 

cure process following his 2010 settlement agreement. See Tr. at 169. In fact, Respondent 

admits he “had been using drugs for quite a while” prior to his 2010 positive drug test. See Tr. at 

168. Respondent further admits that he continued to use drugs after the Coast Guard returned his 

license returned in April 2012. See Tr. at 169-70, 175. 

While completing a drug rehabilitation program is commendable, the undersigned cannot 

ignore Respondent’s admitted drug use during the last time he engaged in the cure process. 
13

Similarly, the undersigned cannot ignore the short time between Respondent’s two positive drug 

tests. Respondent testified that he has been drug free since he went to Reality House; however, 

there is no further evidence of Respondent’s disassociation from drugs. Respondent was 

released from Reality House on December 31, 2012 yet he did not submit any information as to 

what, if anything, he has been doing to proceed with the cure process such as participate in 

random, unannounced drug tests. Respondent seems to argue in his June 5, 2013 email that the 

Coast Guard and Dr. Steele are now somehow preventing him from participating in random 

unannounced drug tests. This argument, even if true, is irrelevant. The undersigned looks at 

what the Respondent did to involve himself in the cure process prior to the hearing, not after. 

Respondent did not argue he was prevented from participating in drug tests prior to the hearing; 

in fact, Respondent submits no evidence he even attempted to participate in drug testing 

following his release from Reality House. 

Moreover, Respondent argues at the hearing that: 1) the cure process he went through 

after his 2010 settlement agreement “was flawed;” 2) he frequently called LT Sullivan during his 

post settlement agreement cure process and told her that he “needed a therapist” and he was 

“having a lot of problems” but she told him “she can’t help me with that. That’s not her 

responsibility;” and, 3) prior to his 2012 positive drug test, he attempted to get time off work to 

deal with his personal problems including his drug problem but was denied. See Tr. at 153-7, 

167-71, and 175-8. These arguments all deflect responsibility rather than accept it. Finally, near 

the end of the hearing, Respondent stated as follows:

It’s going to make it easier for Stephen Detar if the hearing is stayed, that way the 

Coast Guard involvement makes it easier for companies to resolve it. It will be 

irrefutable. I already have like, as I’ve stated, the first settlement agreement, it 

was completed, yes. I did get the license back, but I wasn’t a hundred percent in 

it either, but it was still returned. If you get a hundred percent from me clearly 

this time they are going to be watching themselves. It’s going to be right.

See Tr. at 186.
14

Respondent continues to demonstrate he does not fully comprehend that completing the 

cure process is his responsibility, not the Coast Guard’s. Therefore, staying the Revocation 

would neither benefit him or the Coast Guard, nor would it promote safety at sea. Whether 

Respondent completes the cure process rests solely upon Respondent.

After considering and weighing all the evidence and testimony, the undersigned finds that 

safety at sea is best protected by requiring Respondent to prove that he is cured of his drug use to 

the Coast Guard through the clemency process. This course of action requires Respondent to 

satisfy the criteria to prove cure on his own. The undersigned therefore denies Respondent’s 

request to stay the revocation. 

 ULTIMATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Respondent Stephen David Detar and the subject matter of this hearing are 

properly within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Administrative Law Judge in 

accordance with 46 U.S.C. § 7704; 46 C.F.R. Part 5; and 33 C.F.R. Part 20.

2. Greg Carter collected Respondent’s urine sample in substantial compliance with 

49 C.F.R. Part 40.

3. Quest Diagnostic Laboratory in Norristown, PA and David Wallner handled and 

analyzed Respondent’s urine sample in substantial compliance with 49 C.F.R. Part 40.

4. Dr. Suzanne Steele, MRO conducted her verification of Respondent’s urine 

specimen in substantial compliance with 49 C.F.R. Part 40.

5. Respondent’s urine sample tested positive for cocaine metabolites.

6. Cocaine is a “dangerous drug” as contemplated by 46 U.S.C. § 7704(c) and 46 

C.F.R. § 5.35.

7. Respondent’s positive drug test and admissions of drug use sufficiently amount to 

a violation of 46 U.S.C. § 7704(c) and 46 C.F.R. § 5.35.

8. Respondent is a “user of dangerous drugs” and his credentials must be revoked.
15

9. Respondent’s evidence showing completion of a substance abuse rehabilitation 

program, in the totality of circumstances, is insufficient to warrant a stay of the revocation. 

DECISION

After careful review of the entire record, including witness testimony, applicable statutes, 

regulations, and case law, I find the Coast Guard PROVED by a preponderance of reliable, 

probative, and credible evidence that Respondent, Stephen David Detar, is a user of dangerous 

drugs in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 7704(c) and 46 C.F.R. § 5.35. 

WHEREFORE, 
16

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Merchant Mariner’s Credential issued by the Coast 

Guard to Stephen David Detar, is REVOKED. The undersigned tendered Respondent’s 

credential to the Coast Guard Investigating Officer at the hearing’s conclusion.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent’s request to stay the revocation pending 

his completion of the cure process is DENIED. 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that service of this Decision and Order on the parties and/or 

parties’ representative(s) serves as notice of appeal rights set forth in 33 C.F.R. §§ 20.1001 –

20.1004, attached hereto as Attachment C.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that the regulations concerning administrative 

clemency following revocation of a credential due to use of dangerous drugs are located at 46 

C.F.R. § 5.901(a) and (d). 

__________________________________________________

Hon. Walter J. Brudzinski

Chief Administrative Law Judge

United States Coast Guard 

Date: June 21, 2013
17

ATTACHMENT A

WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS

Coast Guard’s Witnesses:

1. Stephen David Detar – Respondent

2. John Francis “Jack” Graham – Human Resources Manager at Great Lakes Dredge and Dock 

Company

3. Gregory John Carter – Medical Assistant at Concentra Urgent Care – Urine Specimen 

Collector

4. David M. Wallner – Lead Certifying Scientist at Quest Diagnostic

5. Dr. Suzanne Steele, M.D. – Medical Review Officer at University Services 

Respondent’s Witnesses:

1. Maricela Bowers – Employee at Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company

2. Stephen David Detar – Respondent, testified on his own behalf.

Coast Guard’s Exhibits:

Exhibit 1: Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company drug and alcohol policy (10 pages).

Exhibit 2: Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company employee safety handbook receipt form (1 

page).

Exhibit 3: Drug Screen Collector Qualification Training, Certificate of Completion for Greg 

Carter (1 page).

Exhibit 4: Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control Form, Collector’s Copy (1 page).

Exhibit 5: Medical Review Officer, Final Report (1 page).

Exhibit 6: Documentation Package concerning Respondent’s drug test analysis from Quest 

Diagnostics (66 pages).

Exhibit 7: Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement between U.S. Coast Guard and 

Stephen D. Detar dated February 8, 2010 (5 pages).

Exhibit 8: Notice of Completion of Settlement Agreement between U.S. Coast Guard and 

Stephen D. Detar dated April 30, 2012 (1 page).

Exhibit 9: Copy of Merchant Mariner’s Document issued to Stephen David Detar (1 page).
18

Exhibit 10: There is no Exhibit 10. The proposed Exhibit 10 was not offered or admitted into 

evidence. However, because the Coast Guard Exhibits were not remarked at hearing a place 

holder will be entered into the record to avoid confusion.

Exhibit 11: Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control Form, Medical Review Officer Copy (1 

page). 

Exhibit 12: Medical Review Officer Worksheet (2 pages).

Exhibit 13: Medical Review Officer Certification Document for Suzanne L. Steele, M.D. (1 

page).

Exhibit 14: Letter from Reality House, Inc. to Scott Winters [sic] concerning Stephen Detar 

dated December 31, 2012 (1 page) (this exhibit is identical to Respondent Exhibit E).

Exhibit 15: Respondent’s Answer (4 pages). 

Respondent’s Exhibits:

Exhibit A: Letter from Jack Graham of Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company dated October 

15, 2012 (1 page).

Exhibit B: Letter from Stacey C. Conroy to Lieutenant Christina D. Sullivan dated February 18, 

2010 (1 page).

Exhibit C: Letter of Recommendation for Stephen Detar from Scott A. Winter, President and 

Business Manager of the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 25, Marine Division 

dated January 3, 2013 (2 pages).

Exhibit D: Letter to Stephen Detar from Robert Bruner of the National SAP Network dated 

January 14, 2013 (1 page).

Exhibit E: Letter from Reality House, Inc. to Scott Winters [sic] concerning Stephen Detar dated 

December 31, 2012 (1 page) (this exhibit is identical to Coast Guard Exhibit 14).

Exhibit F: Non-Injury Work Status Report from Concentra Medical Centers regarding 

“Regulated UDS Collect Random” drug test for Respondent dated October 26, 2012 (1 page).

ALJ’s Exhibits

ALJ-1: Official notice of the current list of laboratories approved by the Department of Health 

and Human Services (2 pages).
19

ATTACHMENT B

Coast Guard Proposed Findings of Fact

1. The Respondent entered into a settlement agreement for the use of dangerous drugs in 

February 2010. [Exhibit CG-07; Hearing Transcript (TR) at 138.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

2. The Respondent had his MMD # 201522 returned on April 30, 2012, after completing all 

requirements of the settlement agreement. [Exhibit CG-08; TR at 147-148.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

3. The Respondent admitted under oath that he should not have had his MMD returned to him in 

April 2012 because he was not cured and was still using drugs at that time. [TR at 37-38.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

4. The Respondent entered Drug Rehabilitation at Reality House on November 21, 2012, with a 

diagnosis of cocaine abuse and was released on December 31, 2012, with a diagnosis of cocaine 

abuse in partial remission. [Exhibit CG-14; TR at 35-37.]

ACCEPTED AND INCOPRPORATED.

5. On October 26, 2012, the Respondent was an employee of Great Lakes Dredge and Dock 

working under his MMD # 201522. [TR at 25.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

6. On October 26, 2012, the Respondent submitted a urine sample in accordance with a 

Company ordered drug screening. [Exhibit CG-04; TR at 50-51.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

7. Mr. Carter is a qualified drug collector and trained in 49 C.F.R. Part 40 standards. [Exhibit 

CG-03; TR at 73]. 

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

8. On October 26, 2012, Mr. Detar’s urine sample was collected and handled in accordance with 

49 C.F.R. Part 40. [Exhibit CG-04; TR at 82.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

9. Mr. Wallner is a qualified certifying scientist trained in procedures and regulations set forth in 

49 C.F.R. Part 40. [TR at 89.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

10. Quest Diagnostics was a certified laboratory in the Federal Register during October 2012. 

[TR at 91.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

11. The Respondent’s urine sample was analyzed at Quest Diagnostics in accordance with 49 

C.F.R. Part 40. [Exhibit CG-06; TR at 91-111.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.
20

12. The Respondent’s sample tested positive for cocaine metabolites at a level of 209 ng/ml. 

The cutoff for cocaine is 100 ng/ml. [Exhibit CG-06; TR at 103.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

13. On October 29, 2012, Quest Diagnostics Laboratory certified the urine sample positive for 

cocaine metabolites. [Exhibit CG-06; TR at 104-106.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

14. Dr. Steele is a certified Medical Review Officer trained in the requirements of 49 C.F.R. Part 

40. [Exhibit CG-13; TR at 114-115.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

15. Dr. Steele verified the Respondent’s sample as positive for cocaine metabolites. [Exhibits 

CG-05; CG-11; TR at 113-115.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

16. Dr. Steele spoke with the Respondent on October 30, 2012 and the Respondent admitted 

using cocaine the week prior to taking the drug test. [Exhibit CG-12; TR at 124.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

17. LT Sullivan, USCG was the investigator in charge of the Respondent’s case from February 

2010 – April 2012. [TR at 137-147.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

18. Based on the information relayed to LT Sullivan, in April 2012 the Respondent had 

completed all requirements of the settlement agreement he had entered into with the U.S. Coast 

Guard. [Exhibit CG-08; TR at 147-148.]

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

19. The Respondent did not inform LT Sullivan on April 30, 2012 that he was not cured or that 

he should not have his MMD returned. [TR at 150.] 

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

Coast Guard Proposed Conclusions of Law

1. Cocaine is a “dangerous drug” as contemplated by 46 U.S.C. § 7704(c).

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

2. While the holder of a Coast Guard Document, Respondent was the user of dangerous drug 

(cocaine).

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.

3. As Respondent is a proven user of dangerous drugs, his MMD must be revoked.

ACCEPTED AND INCORPORATED.
21

ATTACHMENT C

TITLE 33 - NAVIGATION AND NAVIGABLE WATERS

CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

PART 20 RULES OF PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND EVIDENCE FOR 

FORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COAST GUARD

SUBPART J - APPEALS

§ 20.1001 General.

(a) Any party may appeal the ALJ's decision by filing a notice of appeal. The party 

shall file the notice with the U. S. Coast Guard Administrative Law Judge Docketing 

Center; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk; Room 412; 40 S. Gay Street; Baltimore, 

MD 21201-4022. The party shall file the notice 30 days or less after issuance of the 

decision, and shall serve a copy of it on the other party and each interested person.

(b) No party may appeal except on the following issues:

(1) Whether each finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence.

(2) Whether each conclusion of law accords with applicable law, precedent, and 

public policy.

(3) Whether the ALJ abused his or her discretion.

(4) The ALJ's denial of a motion for disqualification.

(c) No interested person may appeal a summary decision except on the issue that no 

hearing was held or that in the issuance of the decision the ALJ did not consider 

evidence that that person would have presented.

(d) The appeal must follow the procedural requirements of this subpart.

§ 20.1002 Records on appeal.

(a) The record of the proceeding constitutes the record for decision on appeal.

(b) If the respondent requests a copy of the transcript of the hearing as part of the record 

of proceeding, then, --

(1) If the hearing was recorded at Federal expense, the Coast Guard will provide 

the transcript on payment of the fees prescribed in 49 CFR 7.45; but,

(2) If the hearing was recorded by a Federal contractor, the contractor will 

provide the transcript on the terms prescribed in 49 CFR 7.45.

§ 20.1003 Procedures for appeal.

(a) Each party appealing the ALJ's decision or ruling shall file an appellate brief with the 

Commandant at the following address: U.S. Coast Guard Administrative Law Judge 

Docketing Center; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk; Room 412; 40 S. Gay Street; 

Baltimore, MD 21201-4022, and shall serve a copy of the brief on every other party.
22

(1) The appellate brief must set forth the appellant's specific objections to the 

decision or ruling. The brief must set forth, in detail, the --

(i) Basis for the appeal;

(ii) Reasons supporting the appeal; and

(iii) Relief requested in the appeal.

(2) When the appellant relies on material contained in the record, the appellate 

brief must specifically refer to the pertinent parts of the record.

(3) The appellate brief must reach the Docketing Center 60 days or less after 

service of the ALJ's decision. Unless filed within this time, or within another 

time period authorized in writing by the Docketing Center, the brief will be 

untimely.

(b) Any party may file a reply brief with the Docketing Center 35 days or less after 

service of the appellate brief. Each such party shall serve a copy on every other party. 

If the party filing the reply brief relies on evidence contained in the record for the 

appeal, that brief must specifically refer to the pertinent parts of the record.

(c) No party may file more than one appellate brief or reply brief, unless --

(1) The party has petitioned the Commandant in writing; and

(2) The Commandant has granted leave to file an added brief, in which event the 

Commandant will allow a reasonable time for the party to file that brief.

(d) The Commandant may accept an amicus curiae brief from any person in an appeal of 

an ALJ's decision.

§ 20.1004 Decisions on appeal.

(a) The Commandant shall review the record on appeal to determine whether the ALJ 

committed error in the proceedings, and whether the Commandant should affirm, 

modify, or reverse the ALJ's decision or should remand the case for further 

proceedings.

(b) The Commandant shall issue a decision on every appeal in writing and shall serve a 

copy of the decision on each party and interested person.