NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of: 

TIFFANY MARIE SCHEIRER, 

Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

JERRY SCHEIRER, 

Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0272 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FN2019-095698

The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Julie Gunnigle, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Julie R. Gunnigle

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Bautista Law Group, PLLC, Chandler

By Lindsay Bautista

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

The Murray Law Offices, PC, Scottsdale

By Stanley D. Murray

Co-Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 2-1-2022
SCHEIRER v. SCHEIRER

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Jerry Scheirer (“Husband”) appeals from the family court’s 

dissolution decree ending his marriage to Tiffany Marie Scheirer (“Wife”). 

He contests the court’s characterization and division of debts and assets, 

and denial of his request for attorney fees. We find no error and thus affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Husband and Wife married in November 2006. In December 

2019, thirteen years later, Wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage and 

vacated the marital home. Husband remained in the home and continued 

to live there. He assured Wife he would purchase her share of the home’s 

equity after he refinanced the mortgage. 

¶3 Two months later, Wife moved for a temporary order 

directing Husband to vacate the home so it could be sold. The family court 

denied Wife’s motion, awarding Husband temporary use of the home.

¶4 The dissolution action was tried in February 2021. Husband 

had still not refinanced the mortgage. The court heard testimony from 

Husband, Wife and a loan officer who corresponded with Husband. A 

week later, the court issued the dissolution decree, ordering the parties to 

sell the marital home and share the proceeds equally. The court also 

divided Husband’s retirement account, apportioned the community’s 

credit card debt, and denied attorney fees to either party because no 

financial disparity existed and both parties had “acted unreasonably in the 

litigation.” The court denied Husband’s motion to alter or amend the 

decree. Husband appeals. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Division of Community Property

¶5 Husband appeals the family court’s division of community 

property. We review the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion,
SCHEIRER v. SCHEIRER

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Boncoskey v. Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. 448, 451, ¶ 13 (App. 2007), and will affirm 

the decision unless it is unsupported by record evidence or the court legally 

erred, Boyle v. Boyle, 231 Ariz. 63, 65, ¶ 8 (App. 2012). We view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the court’s rulings, deferring to its factual 

findings unless clearly erroneous. See Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 

346, ¶ 5 (App. 1998).

The Marital Home

¶6 Husband argues the family court abused its discretion by 

ordering the parties to sell the marital home and equally divide the 

proceeds because he wanted to refinance and acquire the home.

¶7 A family court must divide the community property 

“equitably, though not necessarily in kind.” A.R.S. § 25–318(A). To 

facilitate an equitable distribution, the court can order the sale of 

community property. See Lee v. Lee, 133 Ariz. 118, 121 (App. 1982) (“The 

trial court’s broad discretionary powers include the power to order a sale 

of community property when it will facilitate the equitable division of the 

property.”).

¶8 No abuse of discretion occurred here. After hearing the 

evidence and argument, the court ordered the parties to sell the marital 

home and equally share the sales proceeds, which meant that Husband 

needed to move out. The court heard testimony from Husband, Wife and 

a loan officer who corresponded with Husband. More than a year after 

Wife petitioned for dissolution, she remained a couch nomad; and because 

her debt-to-income ratio was tied to the marital home, she could not buy a 

new home until the marital home was sold. Wife also testified that an 

immediate sale would maximize the community’s return on the marital 

home. She works as a real estate loan officer. The record includes 

reasonable evidence to support the court’s distribution. See Baum v. Baum, 

120 Ariz. 140, 142 (App. 1978) (“[T]he distribution of marital property is left 

to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless 

clearly erroneous.”). 

¶9 Husband also argues we should reverse the order because the 

court punished him in violation of A.R.S. § 25-318(A). This argument fails, 

too. Section 25-318(A) only requires the family court to apportion

community property “without regard to marital misconduct,” which the 

court did here. Nor was Husband punished because he possessed no right 

to refinance the mortgage or acquire the home. See A.R.S. § 25-318(A); Lee, 

133 Ariz. at 121 (explaining “[t]he only inherent limitation on the power of 
SCHEIRER v. SCHEIRER

Decision of the Court

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the trial court to apportion community property” is that the division be 

substantially equal).

Retirement Account

¶10 Husband next challenges the family court’s division of his 

retirement account assets. The decree ordered an equal division of 

$56,192.51 in the retirement account, which represented the total retirement 

assets when the petition for dissolution was served.

¶11 Husband argues the court distributed an inflated sum, 

$56,192.51, and should have “deduct[ed] the funds” he spent “for the 

ongoing payment of community expenses from the retirement account 

balance at the time of termination of the community.” But Husband waived 

this argument when he asked the court to distribute the same amount—

$56,192.51—both in his pretrial statement and testimony.

Credit Card Debt

¶12 Husband contends the court erroneously held the community 

responsible for $2,000 in credit card payments made to Wife’s attorney in 

the weeks and months before she petitioned for dissolution.

¶13 Arizona law presumes that debts incurred during marriage 

are community debt unless clear and convincing evidence shows one 

spouse did not intend to benefit the community when he or she incurred 

the debt. See Cardinal & Stachel, P.C. v. Curtiss, 225 Ariz. 381, 383-84, ¶¶ 6-7 

(App. 2010). 

¶14 Because Husband never rebutted the presumption, we affirm.

Husband presented no evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence,

that Wife did not intend to benefit the community when she incurred the 

attorney fees. See Schlaefer v. Fin. Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 196 Ariz. 336, 339, ¶ 10

(App. 2000) (clear and convincing evidence is required to overcome

presumption pre-petition debts are intended to benefit the community and 

thus community obligations). And we have recognized that a spouse’s prepetition expenditure of attorney fees may benefit the community by 

facilitating “the orderly and lawful division of assets.” Id. at 384, ¶ 10.

“[T]he fact that attorney fees may benefit the client spouse more than the 

community as a whole is not determinative; rather, there need only be some 

intent to benefit the community. If such intent exists, the attorney fees can 

be a community debt, despite the fact the proceeding in which they are 

incurred ultimately will divide the community assets and terminate the 

community.” Id.
SCHEIRER v. SCHEIRER

Decision of the Court

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II. Attorney Fees

¶15 And last, Husband appeals the family court’s denial of his 

request for attorney fees, arguing he deserved fees because Wife enjoys a 

substantial financial disparity and he never took unreasonable positions. 

We review for an abuse of discretion. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 

286, ¶ 29 (App. 2019). The family court has discretion to grant attorney fees 

“after considering the financial resources of both parties and the 

reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout the 

proceedings.” A.R.S. § 25-324(A). 

¶16 The court did not abuse its discretion. It found “no 

substantial disparity of financial resources between the parties,” and 

concluded that both parties “acted unreasonably in the litigation.” The

record has reasonable evidence to support both findings. See In re Marriage

of Williams, 219 Ariz. 546, 549, ¶ 14 (App. 2008) (noting the determination 

of the parties’ financial resources and reasonableness is left to the sound 

discretion of the family court). A “trial court may consider a party’s 

settlement position in determining reasonableness under” this statute. 

Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 351, ¶ 34.

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm the decree of dissolution. Both parties request an 

award of attorney fees on appeal under A.R.S. § 25–324. We exercise our 

discretion to deny both requests after considering the resources and 

reasonableness of the parties. Wife is awarded her costs on appeal upon 

compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.