### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Februar y 11, 2002 Se ssion
MICHAE L WHALE N, BR UCE E. POSTON , in their capaci ty as attor neys representing pretrial detainees in t he custody of Knox County Sheriff Timothy Hutchi son and on

behalf o f the pr etrial d etainee s in the c ustody of Knox Cou nty She riff Tim othy Hut chison an d all othe r person s similarl y situated, and KITA SWANDI and TOBY SILVERS v. TIMOTHY HUTCHISON In his capacity as Sheriff of Knox County, Tennessee
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County, sitting en banc No. 68942

Hon. Richar

d R. Baumgar

tner, Hon.

Ray L. Jenki ns and Hon. Mary Beth Leibowitz, Judges FILED APRIL 1, 2002

No. E2001-01504-COA-R3-CV

Plaintiffs obtained injunctive relief pursuant to USC §1983 and T.C.A. §29-14-103 and §46-14-704 against defendant, but the Trial Court refused to award da mages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, we vacate and rema nd on issue s of dama

ges and f ees.
Tenn. R. App. P.3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court Vacated and R

emanded.

H ERSCHEL P ICKENS F RANKS , J., deliv ered the opinion of

the cour t, in which H OUSTON M. G ODDARD , P.J., and C HARLES D. S USANO , J R ., J., joined.

Herber t S. Moncie

r and John

E. Eldridg e, Knoxvi lle, Tennessee, f or Appel lants.

John E. Owings , Chief De puty Law Director for Knox County, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

OPINION

In this actio n filed pu

rsuant to U.S.C. §1983 and Tenn. Code Ann. §29-14-103 and §40-14-104 the Trial Court denied recovery of damages a nd at to rney’s fees. Plaintiffs have-2-

appealed. We vacate and r emand as hereinafter explained.

In August of

1999 defendant

instituted a procedure restricting the ability of pre-trial detainees in the Kno x CountyJail to communicate with counsel. Plaintiffs brought this action in the capaci ty as attorn

eys repr esenting pre-tri al detain

ees and o n behalf of detai nees i n custody of the Sheriff of Knox County and others similarly situated, alleging violation of their c onstitution al rights and for injunctive and declaratory relief, damages and

attorney fees pursuant to U.S.C. §1983 and also Tenn. Co de Ann. §2 9-14-103 and §40- 14-104. T he compla

int also sou ght status a s a class action as to al l attorneys representing detainees and all detaine es in the Knox County Jail. The Complaint further asked that the matter be heard by the trial judg e s presiding over the trial cou rts en banc

. A Temporary Restraining O r der was entered enjoining the implementation of defendant’s policy. The en banc Court found that the defendant had:

unreason abl y infringe d on defe ndant’s r ight to cou

nsel as gu arante ed by the S ixth Amendment [U.S. Constitution], and Tenn. Code Ann. §40-14-104.

After the Restraining Order

was entered, plaintiffs amended their Complaint alleging retaliatory actions taken by def endant in response to the TRO, but before a final hearing for injun ctive relief, the part ies ente red an a greed Order on November 10, 1999, g

ranting p laintiff

s’ relief. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a Motion to set the case for final hearing to issue a permanent injunction, assess damages and award attorney’sfees an d costs. D efenda nt did not respo nd to this Motion. Subsequently, the Trial Court entered an Order making the previously entered temporary injunction permanent, pursuant to Tenn . R. Civ. P. Rule 65, and assessed costs to defendant, but denied all other

relief. No hear

ing was he

ld on plain

tiffs’ Mo tion befo

re the Tr ial Court sua sponte entered this Order.

Claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 19 8 5 may be tr ied in Ten

nessee s tate courts. Poling v. Goins , 713 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1986). If a party prevails in a §1983 action, then §1988 provides that they

may rec over an a

ward of attorne y’s fee s, whether

or not the

y specif ically pled or relied on §1983. Bloomingdale’s by Mail v. Huddleston , 848 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).

42 U.S.C. §1 988, as a

mended, p

rovides:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of . . . this title, the cour t, may, in i ts discreti on, allow

the prev ailing pa

rty other than the U

nited State s, a rea sonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.

Cases interpreting this provision establish that the prevailing party should receive a n award of a
reasona ble attorne

y’s fee , unless there ar

e “circ umstance s” that wo

uld render

an awar d unjust. Blanchar d v. Bergeron , 489 U.S. 87 (1989); Monroe v. County Bd. Of Education , 583 F.2d 263 (6 th Cir. 1978).-3- Plaintiffs are a “

prevaili ng party ” for attorney fee purposes if they succ eed on any significant

issue in litigation which achieved some of the benefits the parties soughtin bringing the action. Hensley

v. Ecke rhart , 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The extent of the plaintiff ’s succe ss is a “crucial factor

” in dete rmining wh at a rea sonable award is , but they need not r eceive all of the relief requested to be successful. Hensley , at 435. A party is considered to have prevailed when important rights are vindicated through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief. Northcross
v. Bd. Of Edu cation for

the Memp his City Schools , 611 F.2d 624, 633 (6 th Cir. 1979), cert. denied , 447 U.S. 911 (1980). Under these standards, pl aintiffs herein eventually achieved virtually all of the relief they sought on behalf of detainees in custody, since the TRO and the terms set for the agreed order w ere eve

ntually ma

de perma nent. Hensley emphasized that

the trial court had discretion in determining the amount of the award and that it was important “to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award” to demonstrate that the Court had considered the r elationship between

the amount

of fee awarded and results obtained. Id. at 437. The substance of the claim and the type of relief granted is more significant than form for purposes of awarding §1988 fe es. The legislative purpose behind the Attorney ’s Fee Aw ard Act o f 1976, 42 U.S.C. §198 8, as ame

nded, is to

encoura ge priva te enforcement

of the public intere st. It is to be “liberally construed to achieve the public purposes involved in the congressional enactment.” Monroe v. County Bd. Of Education , 583 F.2d 263 (6 th Cir. 1978). Con gress ex

pressly c ommanded

courts to use the br

oadest and most effective remedies availab le to achieve the goals of the civil rights laws when it passed the Act, stating that “the prevailing party should ordina rily rec over an a

ttorney’ s fees unless special circumst ances w ould render such an award unjust.” Hensley , also see Price v. Pelka , 690 F.2d 98 (6 th Cir. 1982), Hall v. Hall , 738 F.2d 718 (6 th Cir. 1984), and Seals v. Q uarterly County Cour

t of Madison

County , 562 F.2d 390 (6 th Cir. 1977).

Courts are re quired to

document

their decision-making process in making or denying 1988 fee awards, and followthe guiding principles for doing so. The findings and mod e of ana lysis must be sufficiently clear to permit intelligent appellate review. Northcross v. Board of Education for the Memp his City Sc

hools , 611 F.2d 624, 633 (6 th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980). The case of Morscott v. Ci ty o f Cleveland , 936 F.2d 271 (6 th Cir. 1991) is instructive and procedu rally similar to this case. Morscott involved a dispute between a landowner and the city over the zoning code. While the action was pending, the code wa s amended favorably to Morscott, rendering his suit moot, and the trial court dis missed his l awsuit sua sponte . Morscott filed a motion for attorne y’s fee s pursuan

t to §1988, but befor

e the City filed an answer, the court made a marginal entry denying the motion. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that such marginal interest will notsuffice for a de nial o f attorney’s fees. Reviewing other circuit and U.S. Supreme Court cases which have repeatedly held that the trial court must nece ssarily make findings on the record if the motion is denied , the Cour t said the trial cour t is required to articulate its reasons for denying the motion, identi fying any special circumstances that would make an aw ard unjust, so that an intelligent appella te review is possible. The tri al court may not de ny the motio n with nothing more, s imply because the statute grants the trial court discretion.1 Two individual detainees filed pe titions to in

tervene as plainti ffs. Def

endant di d not object to the petitions, nor did the Trial Court enter an order on these petitions.

2 Plaintiff ’s Reply Br

ief expl ains: Damages were not sough t by the c lass members, only the individuals inmates and attorne ys. By being individual plaintiffs and also members of the asserted class pleadings seeking d amages, attorne y fees a nd expen ses pert

ain in both

capaci ties.
-4- We vacate

the Tria l Court’ s Order and r emand fo r furthe r proce edings co nsistent w ith this Opinion.

Defendant contends that the fai lure of th e trial c ourt to ce rtify the case as a class action precludes any considera tion of an award f or damag es as a ma

tter for class re lief. A pa

rty seeking certification pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 23.01, has a burden to establish a basis for class relief and the decision whe

ther or n ot to cer

tify lies w ithin the so

und discretion o f the tria l court. Bohlinger v. American Credit Co. , 594 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

In this case, the comp laint asks for class action certification, but it was not further addressed in the record. However, the relie f grante d is consis tent with a class ac tion in its effect. 1 Either plaintiff or defe ndant may

move for a deter mination of

class sta tus, pursuant

to Rule 23, and the trial court may have an independent

obligation to decide the class action issue, even if neither party moves for a ruling. Gore v. Turner , 563 F.2d 159 (5 th Cir. 1977). In Bing v. Ro adway Exp ress, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5 th Cir. 1973), the plaintiff never moved for certification, the de fendant never objected, and the c ourt neve r ruled u pon cert ificatio n. On appe al, the appellate court ruled, however, that it was clear the action was seeking relief f or plaintiff

and all others similarly situated, and the action was susta

ined as a class wit hout a for mal, explicit determin atio n by the court, since it was implicitly treated as a class action. Id. at 446-447. Also see, Johnson v. General Motors Corp. , 598 F.2d 432 (5 th Cir. 1979).

The foregoing authorities establish that the court looks at how the litigation was actually handled and focuses upon substance over form, es pecially

where it is clear that the r elief is intended for and does affect a class of pe rsons, both present and future. Plaintiffs in this case have indicate d the y sought re

lief for themselve s and pre -trial de tainees in custody

and other s similarly situated. The TRO and final Order apply and will continue to apply to persons detained in the Knox County Jail pres ently and in the future. We hold th at plainti ffs are not to be denie d the oppo rtunity to present their just ificatio n to the court for d amages f or their fees ea rned pur suant to§1988 bec ause of any proc edural d

efect. 2 Accordingly, th e Trial Court should have provided plaintiffs a hearing and made specific findings o n the rec ord befo re denying an awa

rd of atto rney’s f ees.
The cause is remanded with the cost of the appeal assessed to the defendant, Timothy-5-

Hutchison, in his capacity as Sheriff of Knox County, Tennessee.

_________________________ H ERSCHEL P ICKENS F RANKS , J.