PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. BRUCE MICHAEL LATORRE, Defendant - Appellant. No. 17-8066

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming (D.C. No. 2:17-C R-00024-SWS-1)

________________ _________________ Catherine M. Young, Student Director (Tom Fleener, Faculty Director, with her on the briefs), Defender Aid Program, University of Wyoming, La ramie, Wyoming, appearing for Appellant. Thomas Szott, Assistant United States A ttorney (Mark A. Klaassen, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United Stat es Attorney for the District of Wyoming, Cheyenne, Wyoming, appearing for Appellee.

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , KELLY , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ BRISCOE , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ Defendant Bruce M. Latorre appeals hi s marijuana trafficking convictions. Latorre flew a private aircraft from Califor nia to New York and was flying back to California when police detained him in Wyoming. Severa l law enforcement agencies— FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 21, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Illinois state police, United States Departme nt of Homeland Security, and Wyoming state police—cooperated to investigate and then st op Latorre’s aircraft at an airport in Wyoming, where they received Latorre’s c onsent to search his aircraft and found $519,935 in cash. A grand jury indicted Lato rre on two counts: (1) inte rstate travel in aid of racketeering, in violati on of 18 U.S.C. § 19 52(a); and (2) conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) . Latorre moved to suppress the eviden ce from the search of his aircraft, and the district court denied the motion. Latorre then entered a conditional gu ilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He now appeals that denial. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.
I This case involves a three-day investiga tion into Latorre’s air travel. Officer 1 Chris Weidler, an Illinois state trooper who s upervised the state po lice’s aviation unit, used a radar system to track aircraft flying over Illinois and other parts of the country. On December 7, 2015, he observed an aircraft flying through Illinoi s airspace without an active transponder. 2 Because the aircraft was flyi ng without an active transponder, Officer Weidler did not have any flight informa tion for the aircraft. That the aircraft was

1 The various law enforcement officials in this case bear specific titles. To help avoid confusion between state and federal official s, we refer to state officials as “Officer” and federal officials as “Agent.”

2 An active transponder transm its information, such as the aircraft’s location and altitude, to air traffic control. At the time, it was unclear to Offi cer Weidler whether the aircraft had a transponder that was broken or turned off, or simply lack ed a transponder.3 flying without a transponder raised Officer Weidler’s suspicions, so he continued to monitor the aircraft until it appear ed to land at an airport in Ohio. Officer Weidler called the airport and spoke to an airport employe e named John who had just refueled an aircraft. John told Officer Weidler that the pilo t: paid in cash; claime d to be on a trip to visit family in Buffalo, New York; and flew an aircraft with the tail number N511FT. Officer Weidler located the aircraft in a Federal Aviation Administration database, and discovered it was registered to Latorre in California. Officer Weidler had Officer Chad Foster, of the Illinois st ate police, check Latorre’s crim inal record. They learned that Latorre had previous arrests for distri bution and possession of marijuana, distribution of controlled substances, and weapons charge s. Officer Foster also called the United States Customs Air and Marine Operations Ce nter (“AMOC”), the agency responsible for monitoring airspace for crim inal activity. AMOC had a record of previous cases involving Latorre, and AMOC’s database al erted it whenever Latorre’s aircraft was identified on radar. AMOC gave Officer Foster the names and contact information of the federal agents who were attached to Latorre’s previous cases, and Officer Foster gave this information to Officer Weidler. Officer Weid ler continued to monitor Latorre’s aircraft, but the aircraft fell off of radar somewher e east of Cleveland. He called the federal agents identified by AMOC and provided details of his inve stigation to Special Agent Andrew Stewart, who was with Homeland Secur ity Investigations a nd based in Nebraska. The next day, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Officer Foster called Officer Weidler to inform him that an aircraft without an activ e transponder had just left the Hamburg, New York airport, which is just outside of Buffa lo. The aircraft was traveling at the same4 speed as Latorre was traveling the day before, but going west this time. Officer Weidler found the quick turnar ound suspicious for such a lo ng-distance flight, especially considering Latorre had told John the purpose of his Buffalo trip was to visit family. The aircraft appeared and disappeared from radar several times as it flew through Ohio and Indiana into Illinois. The last time Officer We idler saw the aircraft on his radar that day, it was crossing the Mississippi River into Iowa. On the third day of the investigation, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Officer Weidler observed an aircraft without an active tr ansponder flying near Lincoln, Nebraska, traveling at the same speed as Latorre was tr aveling two days earlier and as the unknown aircraft the day prior. The aircraft appeared to land at an airport in Kearney, Nebraska, and depart soon thereafter. Officer Weidler called the air port and spoke with multiple airport employees. Officer Weidler learned an aircraft with the tail number N115FT— the same tail number noted the first day of the investigation and belonging to Latorre— had landed at the airport. He also learned th e pilot used a credit card belonging to Latorre and signed the receipt as La torre. The pilot to ld the employees he was heading to “Evanston.” Officer Weid ler began searching for c ities named Evanston between Nebraska and California, a nd found Evanston, Wyoming, which had an airport. This focus on the Evanston airport set off a series of communications between law enforcement officials. First, Officer Weid ler contacted Agent Stewart and updated him with the new information. Agent Stew art then contacted Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent Mathew Lowry, who was based in Salt Lake City, Utah, because he was closer to Ev anston, Wyoming. Agent Lowry began th e 45-minute drive5 to Evanston with Homeland Security Investigations Sp ecial Agent Ryan Weir. Anticipating that he would not reach the air port in time to intercept Latorre, Agent Lowry called Officer Chad Lichty, a ta sk force officer with the Wy oming Division of Criminal Investigation. Agent Lowry asked Officer Lich ty to stall Latorre’s aircraft until Officer Lowry arrived. Officer Lichty was busy, so he sent Officer Justin Mathson to the airport. Dressed in plain clothes, Officer Mathson arrived at the Evanston airport shortly before Latorre’s aircraft landed. After refu eling, Latorre entered the airport lobby, made eye contact with Officer Mathso n, and then began walking back to his aircraft. Officer Mathson followed Latorre to his plane, wher e Officer Mathson pulled his shirt and coat back to reveal his badge an d gun and asked to see Latorr e’s aircraft registration and pilot’s license. After Officer Mathson had e ngaged in a brief conversation with Latorre, Agents Lowry and Weir arrived. Latorre agreed to speak with Agents Lowry and Weir in side the airport lobby. Agent Lowry asked Latorre for permission to search his aircraft, and Latorre replied, “Yeah, I don’t mind.” App’x, Vol. II at 116. Officer Mathson then searched Latorre’s aircraft and found a vacuum-s ealed bag containing $519,9 35 in cash. Agent Lowry handcuffed Latorre and read him his Miranda rights. During subsequent interviews, Latorre admitted his role in a conspiracy to traffic marijuana to New York and bring money back to California. Six months later, on June 8, 2016, Latorre testified before a grand jury in Buffalo, New Yo rk, providing details concerni ng the marijuana trafficking conspiracy.6 After a Wyoming grand jury indicted La torre on January 12, 2017, he moved to suppress evidence from the search of his aircraft. The dist rict court held an evidentiary hearing on Latorre’s motion to suppress and issued an oral ruling a week later, denying Latorre’s motion to suppress. The district court concluded: (1) Officer Weidler had reasonable suspicion to stop La torre on the tarmac of the Evanston airport; (2) Officer Mathson’s stop was justified under the “co llective knowledge” doctrine; (3) Latorre consented to the search of his aircraft; a nd (4) even assuming the original search was tainted by an unconstitutional detention, La torre’s grand jury te stimony was freely and voluntarily given and un tainted by the unconstitu tional detention. Latorre entered into a cond itional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 24 months’ imprisonment on each count, conc urrent terms of 3 years of supervised release, and financial penalties totaling $2,000. Latorre timely appealed.

II “When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, accept the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate questi on of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Saulsberry , 878 F.3d 946, 94 9 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Lopez , 849 F.3d 921, 925 (1 0th Cir. 2017)). We conclude Latorre’s constitutional rights were not violated by either Officer Mathson’s detention of Latorre or his subsequent search of Latorre’s aircraft. As a result, we affirm7 the district court’s denial of Latorre’s motion to suppress. 3
A. Whether the detention was constitutional The Fourth Amendment prot ects persons “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. ame nd. IV. Although an arrest re quires probable cause, “a law enforcement officer may, in appropriate ci rcumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person to investigate possible crim inal behavior even if he lacks probable
cause to arrest.” United States v. Whitley , 680 F.3d 1227, 1232 ( 10th Cir. 2012). Such “[a]n investigatory detention is justified at its inception if the specific and articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime.” United States v. McHugh , 639 F.3d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). However, not all police encounters rise to th e level of an investigatory detention. See United States v. Lambert , 46 F.3d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir. 1995) (“If a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, the encounter is consensual and the Fourth Amendment is not implicated.” (quotation omitted)). But, when the police request, obtain, and keep a person’s identification documents, the police encounter becomes an investigatory detention. See id. at 1068 (“[W]hat began as a

3 Because we determine that both th e stop and subsequent search were constitutional, we need not reach the district court’s alternative holding that, assuming the original search was tainted by an unconstitutional stop, La torre’s eventual grand jury testimony was freely and volun tarily given and untainte d by the unconstitutional detention.8 consensual encounter quickly became an investigative deten tion once the agents received Mr. Lambert’s driver’s license a nd did not return it to him.”). Officer Mathson’s encounter with Latorre became an investigatory detention once he kept Latorre’s pilot’s license and registra tion. The government concedes that Officer Mathson’s encounter with Lato rre was an investigatory detention. Aple. Br. at 14 (acknowledging “the encounter ripened in to investigative dete ntion when Mathson continued questioning Latorre withou t returning his documents”). The government argues the investigator y detention was jus tified because: (1) Officer Weidler had reasona ble suspicion to stop Latorre , and (2) Officer Weidler’s reasonable suspicion was imputed to O fficer Mathson through the “collective knowledge” doctrine. We a ddress each point in turn. Cf. United States v. Chavez , 534 F.3d 1338, 1344 (10th Cir. 2008 ) (“We will analyze this initial issue in two steps, asking first whether the DEA task for ce agents had probable cause to believe [the defendant]’s vehicle contained narcotics. . . . Second, we query whether the DEA task force’s probable cause could be imputed to [the officer who stopped and searched the defendant’s vehicle].”). 1. Whether Officer Weidler had reason able suspicion to stop Latorre When conducting a reasonable suspicion anal ysis, we “must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for susp ecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quotation marks omitted). This approach “precludes [a] divide-andconquer analysis,” where the court views e ach factor that would support reasonable9 suspicion in isolation. Id. at 274. As a whole, reasonable suspicion requires “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). In this analysis, “the officer’s subjective motives are irrelevant.” Chavez , 534 F.3d at 1344. Instead , “we ask whether the facts available to the detaining offi cer, at the time, warranted an officer of reasonable caution in believing the action taken was appropriate.” Whitley , 680 F.3d at 1234 (quotation omitted). We “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu , 534 U.S. at 277. “[R]easonable suspicion may exist even if it is more likel y than not that the individual is not invol ved in any illegality.” McHugh , 639 F.3d at 1256 (quotation omitted). “[W]e defer to the ability of a trai ned law enforcement officer to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.” Id. (quotation omitted). The district court concluded: “Based on Mr. Latorre’s unusual and unsafe flying behavior, . . . the cross-country travel and quick turnaround, . . . and history of drug trafficking and AMOC’s listing of his aircra ft on the list, [Office r] Weidler reasonably suspected Latorre was transporting illegal drugs in his airplane.” App’x, Vol. II at 193. We agree. At least three factors, taken together, s upport reasonable suspicion here: Latorre’s unusual travel itinerary, the lack of an activ e transponder, and Latorre ’s criminal history. First, “[w]e have consistently held that implausible travel plans can contribute to reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Pettit , 785 F.3d 1374, 1381 (10th Cir. 2015). Latorre flew from California to New York, sp ent one night in New York, and began the two-day flight back to Califor nia the next morning. Traveling a long distance, only to10 stay one night at his destination, contributes to reasonable suspicion here just as it has in other cases. Cf. Sokolow , 490 U.S. at 9 (“While a trip fro m Honolulu to Miami, standing alone, is not a cause for any sort of suspici on, here there was more: surely few residents of Honolulu travel from that city for 20 hours to spe nd 48 hours in Miami during the month of July.”); United States v. Contreras , 506 F.3d 1031, 1036 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding unusual travel supported reasonabl e suspicion where the defendant drove “more than 1,200 miles to see her fa mily, only to turn around within a day and begin the 1,200- mile drive back”). Second, Latorre embarked on two cro ss-country flights without an active transponder. Officer Weidler fo und this type of behavior u nusual and suspicious because transponders add a level of safety for pilots, as they transmit the airc raft’s altitude to air traffic control to prevent collisio ns with other aircraft. App’x, Vol. II at 24, 26. Thus, by flying without an active transponder, Latorre was “forfeiting some of the safety . . . that a transponder provides” in exchange for “[d]iscreetness, so meone not being able to track [the] aircraft.” Id. at 48; see also United States v. Rosales , 687 F. App’x 135, 138 (3d Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (concluding that “turni ng off the plane’s transponder” supported reasonable suspicion because it showed the defendant “engage d in apparent efforts to attempt evasion”). Although this court has no t issued a published opinion addressing this specific factual scenario—reasonable suspic ion arising from flying a plane without an active transponder—we have held in other cont exts that behavior to avoid detection may contribute to reasonable suspicion. See, e.g. , United States v. Williams , 271 F.3d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding the presence of a two-way, short-range radio in a car11 during a traffic stop supported reasonable su spicion because “cars traveling in tandem and transporting drugs sometimes used such ra dios to avoid detection by law enforcement personnel”); United States v. Barbee , 968 F.2d 1026, 1028–29 (10th Cir. 1992) (“An agent’s belief that passengers are slouchi ng down to avoid detection may create reasonable suspicion.” (quotation omitted)). That logic applies as well in this case— flying without an active transponder contri butes to reasonable suspicion because it demonstrates an interest in avoiding detec tion even at the risk of increased danger. Third, Officer Foster informed Officer We idler that Latorre “had previous arrests for distribution and possession of marijuana, distribution of cont rolled substances, and weapons charges.” App’x, Vol. II at 37. Officer Weidler also learned that AMOC had previous cases involving Latorre and its database was set to alert AMOC if Latorre’s aircraft was ever identified on radar. 4 Id. at 38. “[W]hen viewed in conjunction with other factors that suggest criminal activity ma y be occurring, criminal history can be a powerful contributor to the reas onable suspicion analysis.” United States v. Moore , 795 F.3d 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 2015); but see United States v. Santos , 403 F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th Cir. 2005) (“To be sure, this Court has he ld that a prior criminal history is by itself insufficient to create reasonable suspicion.”).

4 This furthers the import of the second factor. It makes sense that an officer would be suspicious of an aircraft that is at tempting to be discreet, especially when that aircraft is on a watch list that alerts AMOC when the aircraft is identified in flight.12 Latorre argues that “many of the fa ctors relied upon were so innocent or susceptible to varying interpretations th at they should have been dismissed.” 5 Aplt. Br. at 13 (quotation omitted). But “reasona ble suspicion may exist even if it is more likely than not that the individual is not involved in any illegality.” McHugh , 639 F.3d at 1256 (quotation omitted). This is because reasonable suspici on requires “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a prep onderance of the evidence.” Sokolow , 490 U.S. at 7. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, Officer Weidler met the “minimal level of objective justification for making [a] stop.” Id. (quotation omitted). 2. Whether the collective knowledge doctrine imputes Officer Weidler’s reasonable suspicion to Officer Mathson Although Officer Weidler had reasonabl e suspicion to stop Latorre, Officer Weidler did not perform the actual stop—Offi cer Mathson did. The district court, however, concluded that it could rely on th e collective knowledge doctrine to impute Officer Weidler’s reasonable suspicion to Officer Mathson. We agree. “Under the collective knowledge doctri ne, the officer who makes a stop or conducts a search need not have reas onable suspicion or probable cause.” United States v. Pickel , 863 F.3d 1240, 1249 (10th Cir. 2017). “Instead, the reasonable suspicion or probable cause of one officer can be imputed to the acting officer.” Id.

5 The district court relied on more fact ors than the three we highlight here. See, e.g. , App’x, Vol. II at 193 (relying, in part, on Latorre’s “area of origin” and “unusual behavior” at the airports). Because we hold that Officer We idler had reasonable suspicion based on the three factors we de scribe, we need not determine whether additional factors would further support reasonable suspicion.13 There are two types of collective knowledg e—horizontal and vertical. “Under the horizontal collective knowledge doctrine, a num ber of individual officers have pieces of the probable cause or reasonable suspicion pu zzle, but no single officer has sufficient information to satisfy th e necessary standard.” Whitley , 680 F.3d at 1234 n.3. “Under the vertical collective knowledge doctrine, an a rrest or stop is justified when an officer having probable cause or reasonable suspici on instructs another o fficer to act, even without communicating all of the informat ion necessary to justify the action.” Id. at 1234. “Of course, the officer who has probab le cause may possess that information as a result of communication from other officers. Thus, the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ collective knowledge categories are by no means mutually exclusive.” Chavez , 534 F.3d at 1345 n.12. Here, there are four key knowledge relationships: (1) Officer Weidler to Agent Stewart; (2) Agent Stewar t to Agent Lowry; (3) Agen t Lowry to Officer Lichty; and (4) Officer Lichty to Officer Mathson. Our ruling in United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez , 550 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2008), is instructive regarding the application of the collec tive knowledge doctrine. In Rodriguez-Rodriguez , Officer Marquez observed a brown pickup and a red car driving in tandem, and pulled the brown pickup over for a tr affic violation. 550 F.3d at 1225. As Officer Marquez approached the brown pickup, he smelled marijuana and saw suspicious bundles scattered thro ughout the vehicle. Id. When he called for backup, the driver of the brown pickup fled on foot. Id. at 1226. Eventually, Officer Arellano arrived in response to Officer Marquez’s call for assi stance, and Officer Marquez “then told Arellano that he had seen a red four-door vehicle with a California license plate and14 tinted windows driving erratically that Marq uez concluded was trav eling in tandem with the brown pickup.” Id. at 1227. Officer Arellano then issued an alert for the red car; a third officer found and stopped the car. Id. at 1227–28. We acknowledged that, “[i]n the ordina ry case involving reliance on an alert issued by an officer with firsthand knowledge, the court analyzes whether the issuing officer had reasonable suspic ion to support a stop.” Id. at 1227. “Here, however, as described above, the officer who observed th e facts supporting prob able cause did not himself issue the alert.” Id. We concluded that “[t]his mi nor factual variation need not alter our analysis” because “the fact that Ar ellano rather than Marq uez actually sent the alert is immaterial.” Id. at 1228. As a result, “we ne ed only inquire whether Officer Marquez had probable cause to believe that [the driver of the red car] was committing a crime.” Id. In addition, Rodriguez-Rodriguez characterized its fact s as “a case of two ‘vertical’ collective knowledge relationships in which the first o fficer’s conclusion was conveyed twice to r each the officer who conducted the stop.” Id. at 1228 n.5. Even though Officer Marquez did not issue the alert himself, and instead simply told Officer Arellano some of the suspicious facts, Rodriguez-Rodriguez was not a horizontal collective knowledge case because it “d[id] not involve a . . . relationship in which the knowledge of several officers must be a ggregated to create probable cause.” Id. ; see also Chavez , 534 F.3d at 1347 (“Rather than a hori zontal pooling of discrete pieces of information, one officer here . . . had all the requisite probable cause components; the15 question then is whether that information ca n be imputed vertically to another officer . . . .”). Applying those principles here, this ca se involves multiple vertical collective knowledge relationships in which the first o fficer’s conclusion was conveyed four times to reach the officer who conducted th e stop. This is because, as in Rodriguez-Rodriguez , there is no “pooling” required—Officer Weidle r had within his own knowledge sufficient facts to support reasonable suspicion. It is true that neither Officer Weidler nor Agent Stewart issued an alert or a request to stop Latorre. But just as in Rodrgiuez-Rodriguez , “[t]his minor factual variation need not alter our analysis,” 550 F.3d at 1228. Accordingly, this court n eed only inquire whether O fficer Weidler had reasonable suspicion to believe that Latorre was commi tting a crime. Because Officer Weidler did have reasonable suspicion, Officer Ma thson’s investigatory stop was lawful. Latorre argues his stop was not supporte d by reasonable suspicion because Officer Mathson was too far removed from Officer Weidler, who we conclude had reasonable suspicion. Our prior collectiv e knowledge cases have involve d only one or two vertical relationships. This case arguably involves f our. Latorre cautions that this level of attenuation “would result in a significant e xpansion of the collective knowledge doctrine if applied to impute [Officer] Weidler’s kn owledge all the way down to [Officer] Mathson.” Aplt. Reply at 4–5. But the vertical collective knowle dge doctrine only requires “some communication between the officer or officers with probable cause and the officer who executes the stop or search,” because the co mmunication “confirms that the officers are16 functioning as a team.” Chavez , 534 F.3d at 1347 n.13. Here, there was significant communication between Officer Weidler and th e law enforcement officials who effected the stop and then questioned Latorre. Office r Weidler even stayed on the phone with federal agents as Latorre landed at the Evanst on airport, updating the agents on Latorre’s flight. App’x, Vol. II at 63–64. Although Officer Weidler never directly communicated with Officer Mathson, that is not unusual in vertical collective knowledge cases. See,

e.g. , Rodriguez-Rodriguez , 550 F.3d at 1227–28. Nor is it unusual for officers in different states to share collective knowledge. See, e.g. , Pickel , 863 F.3d at 1250 (applying the vertical collective knowledge doctrine where two Kansas detectives requested Nebraska highway patr ol stop a truck, and the Nebr aska patrol sergeant then conveyed the request to a Nebraska st ate trooper who performed the stop). The facts presented in this case dem onstrate that the Illinois state police, Homeland Security, and Wyoming state polic e all functioned as a team to stop and question Latorre. This type of interstate and interagency effo rt is necessary to pursue and complete an interstate inves tigation involving an aircraft in transit—that Officer Weidler did not directly communicate all facts s upporting reasonable suspicion to Officer Mathson does not negate the constitutionality of the stop. See United States v. Hensley , 469 U.S. 221, 231 (19 85) (“In an era when criminal suspects are increasingly mobile and increasingly likely to flee across jurisdictiona l boundaries, this rule is a matter of common sense: it minimizes the volume of info rmation concerning suspects that must be transmitted to other jurisdictions and enables po lice in one jurisdiction to act promptly in reliance on information from another jurisdiction.”).17 Latorre’s other arguments fare no better. For example, Latorre argues that “Mathson . . . did not believe that he could lawf ully detain Mr. Latorre.” Aplt. Br. at 27. But we consider the reasonableness of an o fficer’s actions using an objective standard. “The detaining officer’s subjec tive beliefs and intentions are, quite simply, irrelevant.” McHugh , 639 F.3d at 1256 (quotation omitted). In addition, Latorre makes a policy argume nt that condoning the officers’ actions here “would encourage an officer who lacks information sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause to ‘roll the dice and conduct the search anyway, in the hopes that uncommunicated information existed’ th at would justify it.” Aplt. Br. at 27–28 (quoting United States v. Massenburg , 654 F.3d 480, 494 (4th Cir. 2011)). This case does not implicate that concern. Officer Ma thson was not functioning as a rogue officer who was unaware of an ongoing investigation into Latorre. Rather, he was acting in direct reliance on information and requests fr om federal agents, whom he knew gathered information from the Illinois st ate police. And at bottom, Officer Weidler had reasonable suspicion, which supported Officer Mathson’s stop of Latorre and the basis for his reasonable suspicion had been conveyed to othe r agents and officers prior to the stop. In a prior unpublished decision, a pane l of this court endorsed the policy justifications behind the vertical collective knowledge doctrine, even in cases where the detaining officer knows little or nothing abou t the facts giving rise to the stop: The reasons for the “fellow officer” rule are obvious. Police officers do not often have the luxury of time and should be able to reasonably rely on the information provided by other officers without having to cross-examine them about the foundation for the transmitted information. The pub lic benefits as well when police18 officers are allowed to efficiently pe rform their duties. At the same time, the intrusion on a defendant’s personal security is minimal— little, if any, additional indivi dual freedom would result from requiring officers to set forth th eir grounds for reasonable suspicion or probable cause in their communi cations with other officers. Moreover, defendants . . . still have the opportunity to challenge the claimed reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment but must properly direct their challenges. United States v. Hawley , 660 F. App’x 702, 707 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (quotations and brackets omitted); see id. at 706 (applying the vertical collective knowledge doctrine where one officer had re asonable suspicion and instructed another officer to perform a stop with out telling the officer the fact s giving rise to reasonable suspicion). Because Officer Weidler had reasonable suspicion to stop Latorre, and because that reasonable suspicion is imputed to O fficer Mathson through the vertical collective knowledge doctrine, Officer Mathson’s investigatory stop was lawful. B. Whether the search was constitutional We must next determine whether Officer Mathson’s warrantless search of Latorre’s plane was constitutional. As a gene ral rule, a “warrantless search . . . is presumptively unreasonable, and evidence obtained from such a search is inadmissible, subject only to a few carefully established exceptions.” United States v. Harrison , 639 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2011 ). “Voluntary consent to sear ch is one such exception.” Id. The district court found: “During the lawf ul period of investigative detention, Mr. Latorre voluntarily consented to the search of his airplane.” App’x, Vol. II at 196. We
agree.19 We apply a two-part test for voluntary cons ent: “(1) the law enforcement officers must receive either express or implied consen t, and (2) that consent must be freely and voluntarily given.” United States v. Jones , 701 F.3d 1300, 1317 (10th Cir. 2012). Here, it is undisputed that Latorre gave the law en forcement officers express consent to search his aircraft. See App’x, Vol. II at 116 (A gent Lowry’s testimony); id. at 187 (district court finding Latorre gave oral consent); Aplt. Br. at 35–36 (limiting Latorre’s argument to whether consent was voluntarily given). Thus, we turn our focus to the second step. “[T]he question whether a consent to a sear ch was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implie d, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); see also Harrison , 639 F.3d at 1277 (“Whether c onsent was voluntarily given is a question of fact we review for clear erro r.”). In the totality-o f-the-circumstances analysis, we consider: physical mistreatment, use of violence, threats, promises, inducements, deception, trickery, or an aggressive tone, the physical and mental condition and capacity of the defendant, the number of officers on the scene, and the disp lay of police weapons. Whether an officer reads a defendant his Miranda rights, obtains consent pursuant to a claim of lawful author ity, or informs a defendant of his or her right to refuse consent al so are factors to consider in determining whether consent given was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.
Jones , 701 F.3d at 1318 (quoting Harrison , 639 F.3d at 1278 ). “Additionally, an individual may voluntarily consent to a s earch even though he is detained.” United States
v. Davis , 636 F.3d 1281, 1293 (10th Cir. 2011). “T he detention is only one factor to be20 considered in determining whether consent wa s voluntarily and freely given based on the totality of the circumstances.” Contreras , 506 F.3d at 1037. Latorre argues he did not freely and voluntar ily consent to the sear ch of his aircraft because: (1) “the agents di d not read Mr. Latorre his Miranda rights until they had obtained his consent and searched his aircraft,” Aplt. Br. at 35; (2) “the agents did not inform him of his right to refuse consent,” id. at 35–36; (3) “Agent Mathson also displayed his weapon to Mr. Latorr e prior to obtaining his consent,” id. at 36; and (4) “they only obtained his consen t after retaining his documents,” id. Those facts do not represent the “totality of the circum stances.” Although Officer Mathson had previously pulled his coat behind his badge and firearm to display them to Latorre on the tarmac, Officer Mathson never touched his firearm. App’x, Vol. II at 84; cf. United States v. Medlin , 842 F.2d 1194, 198 (10th Cir. 1988) (considering it “reasonable” the defendant “would have belie ved when faced by federal and state officers with guns drawn that he had no right to [refu se consent]”). During Latorre’s subsequent conversation with Agen t Lowry and Agent Weir, which took place in the public lobby of an airport, the agents wore street clothes an d did not display their weapons. App’x, Vol. II at 112–13, 123. Officer Mathson was pr esent, but he stood away at the door. Id. at 112. Agent Lowry and Agent Weir ha d a calm conversation with Latorre. Id. at 89. They did not threaten him or make any promises to him. Id. at 115. Latorre appeared to understand what the agents were talking about. Id. At the time Latorre gave consent, he was not handcuffed. Id. at 117. Latorre’s documents were on the chair between him and Agent Lowry. Id. at 112, 114. There is no evidence that the agents coerced Latorre’s21 consent to search his plane w ith a show of authority—in fact , Agent Lowry testified that he believed he told Latorre he was free to leave at any time. Id. at 114. Under these facts, “a reasonable person w ould believe he was free to leave or to deny the officer’s request to search.” United States v. Guerrero , 472 F.3d 784, 790 (10th Cir. 2007). The district court did not commit clear error when it fo und Latorre’s consent was freely and voluntarily given.
III Because both the investigatory stop and subsequent search of Latorre’s aircraft were constitutional, we AFFIRM the denial of Latorre’s motion to suppress evidence.