UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. JOHN T. BOOKER, JR., a/k/a Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, Defendant - Appellant. No. 17-3167 (D.C. No. 5:15-CR-40030-CM-1) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , HOLMES , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ After accepting a plea agreement that incl uded a waiver of his right to appeal, John T. Booker, Jr., pleaded guilty to atte mpted use of a weapon of mass destruction and attempted destruction of government pr operty by fire or e xplosion. He was sentenced to concurrent 360- and 240-mo nth terms of imprisonment followed by a lifetime term of supervised release. Despite the waiv er, Booker filed an appeal challenging some of the conditions of his supervised release. The government has moved to enforce the appeal waiver. See United States v. Hahn , 359 F.3d 1315, 1328

* This panel has determined unanim ously that oral argument would not materially assist in the dete rmination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cas e is therefore ordered submitt ed without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding pre cedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It ma y be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 28, 2017 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (p er curiam). We grant the motion to enforce and dismiss the appeal. The sentencing court adopted the recomm endations in the presentence report and imposed the following special conditions of supervision: [Booker] must not participate in a ny anti-government or tax protesting activities, or associat e with individuals who are known members of these groups, or possess any literat ure advocating or supporting these groups during the term of supervision.

. . . . [Booker] must not possess, view, access, or otherwise us e material that reflects extremist or terro ristic views or as deem ed to be inappropriate by the U.S. Probation Office. R., Vol. 2 at 41-42, ¶¶ 131, 134. We need not reach the merits of Booker’s contentions that these conditi ons are impermissible, howeve r, because he waived his right to appeal his sentence, including th e special conditions above, under the express terms of the plea agreement. To evaluate a motion to enforce a waiver, we cons ider “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waiv ed his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Hahn , 359 F.3d at 1325. “[P]lea agreements are gover ned by contract principles.” United States v. Cooper , 498 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 2007). Nothing in the agreement supports B ooker’s contention that his appeal is outside the scope of the waiver simply b ecause he seeks to challenge his sentence on3 constitutional grounds. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Booker “knowingly and voluntarily waive[d] any right to appeal or collaterally at tack any matter in connection with . . . the co mponents of the sentence . . . including the length and conditions of supervised release . . . .” R., Vol. 1 at 66. Because he did not retain the right to appeal the conditions of supervised release, Booke r’s waiver of his right to appeal his sentence extends to the special conditions of his supervised release, and the first Hahn requirement is met. See United States v. Sandoval , 477 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 2007). Booker makes no assertion that his wa iver was not know ing and voluntary— Hahn’s second requirement. Our independent review of the record persuades us there is no basis for concluding that he did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to the waiver. Nor are we persuaded that enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice under Hahn ’s third requirement. We have he ld that a misca rriage of justice under Hahn occurs in only four narrow circ umstances, and Booker has not established that any of them apply such that the waiv er itself was unlawful. See Sandoval , 477 F.3d at 1208 (“Our inquiry is not whether the sentence is unlawful, but whether the waiver itself is unlawful because of some pr ocedural error or because no waiver is possible.”). Bo oker’s citations to cases where the sentencing court exceeded its statutory authority in senten cing a defendant are unavailing because that scenario did not occur here. See, e.g. , United States v. Hudson , 483 F.3d 707, 710 (10th Cir. 2007) (c oncluding waiver did not encomp ass right to appeal unlawful4 restitution order); United States v. Gordon , 480 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007) (same). Nor does Booker challenge the va lidity of his plea or waiver due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Cf. United States v. Cockerham , 237 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we grant the motion to enforce and dismiss this appeal.

Entered for the Court Per Curiam