SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

769.1 

CAF 16-00175 

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF JAMIE J. 

------------------------------------------- 

WAYNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, OPINION AND ORDER

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT; 

 

MICHELLE E.C., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

LEGAL ASSISTANCE OF WESTERN NEW YORK, INC., GENEVA (KATHARINE F. WOODS

OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

GARY LEE BENNETT, LYONS, FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. 

SEAN D. LAIR, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, SODUS. 

JAMES S. HINMAN, P.C., ROCHESTER (JAMES S. HINMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR

INTERVENORS-RESPONDENTS.

ROBERT A. DINIERI, CLYDE, FOR INTERESTED PARTY DAVID URBAS. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Wayne County (Daniel G.

Barrett, J.), entered January 26, 2016 in a proceeding pursuant to the

Family Court Act. The order, inter alia, continued the placement of

the subject child with petitioner. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is affirmed

without costs.

Opinion by SCUDDER, J.: 

We review, as a matter of first impression at the appellate

level, whether Family Court retains subject matter jurisdiction to

conduct a permanency hearing pursuant to the provisions of Family

Court Act article 10-A where, as here, the petition pursuant to Family

Court Act article 10 alleging that the child is a neglected child has

been dismissed. We conclude that it does.

I

 On November 10, 2014, the court directed the temporary removal

of respondent mother’s one-week-old child from her care pursuant to

Family Court Act § 1022. Petitioner commenced a proceeding against

the mother pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, alleging that the

child was a neglected child on the ground that the child was at

imminent risk of harm based upon the mother’s alleged inability to
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CAF 16-00175 

provide proper care for the child due to, inter alia, a lack of

housing and the mother’s inability to care for her own medical needs. 

Following a permanency hearing in June 2015, the court granted

petitioner’s application for continued placement “until the completion

of the next permanency hearing or pending further orders of this

court” and directed that the mother remain under the supervision of

petitioner. The fact-finding hearing on the neglect petition was

conducted on December 1 and 2, 2015, more than one year after the

petition was filed. The court denied petitioner’s application to

amend the petition to conform the pleadings to the proof pursuant to

section 1051 (b) and determined that “any offer of proof beyond

November 10, 2014 would not be relevant in the fact-finding but may be

relevant at the Permanency Planning Hearing and/or Dispositional

Hearing.” The court dismissed the petition by decision dated December

21, 2015 and order entered January 19, 2016 on the ground that, with

respect to the one week in which the child was in the mother’s care,

“petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that the child’s physical, mental or emotional condition was impaired

or in imminent danger of being impaired. Even if that were proven[,]

[p]etitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that [the mother] failed to exercise a minimum degree of care.” 

Petitioner did not appeal from that order.

Thereafter, the parties engaged in correspondence with the court

with respect to whether the court had authority to proceed with the

permanency hearing scheduled for January 19, 2016 in light of the

order dismissing the neglect petition. The mother sought by order to

show cause an order dismissing the permanency petition and vacating

the temporary order placing the child with petitioner. That

application was opposed by petitioner, the child’s father, and the

Attorney for the Child on the ground that the court had jurisdiction

to conduct the permanency hearing pursuant to Family Court Act § 1088. 

The court denied the requested relief in the mother’s order to show

cause. After petitioner presented evidence at the permanency hearing,

the mother consented to an order continuing placement of the child

with petitioner on the ground that the best interests and safety of

the child would be served by continued placement because the child

would be at risk of neglect if returned to the mother. She

nevertheless reserved her right to challenge the court’s exercise of

subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a permanency hearing after the

neglect petition had been dismissed. We note in any event that “[i]t

is blackletter law that a[n order] rendered without subject matter

jurisdiction is void, and that the defect may be raised at any time

and may not be waived” (Lacks v Lacks, 41 NY2d 71, 75, rearg denied 41

NY2d 862). Thus, to that extent, this appeal is properly before us.

II

We reject the mother’s contention on appeal that the court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to conduct the permanency hearing

following dismissal of the neglect petition, based upon our

interpretation of the statutory language contained in article 10-A of

the Family Court Act. 
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CAF 16-00175 

Article 10-A of the Family Court Act was enacted in 2005 “to

establish uniform procedures for permanency hearings for all children

who are placed in foster care . . . pursuant to[, inter alia,] section

one thousand twenty-two . . . of this act . . . It is meant to provide

children placed out of their homes timely and effective judicial

review that promotes permanency, safety and well-being in their lives”

(§ 1086). It is clear that, in the event that the court dismisses a

petition alleging that a child is an abused or neglected child, the

court lacks jurisdiction to impose a dispositional remedy pursuant to

sections 1052 through 1057 (see Matter of Rasha B., 139 AD2d 962, 963;

see also Matter of Lebraun H. [Brenda H.], 111 AD3d 1439, 1440). 

Nevertheless, article 10-A, which applies only to those matters in

which a child has been placed in petitioner’s custody (see § 1086; cf.

Lebraun H., 111 AD3d at 1439; Rasha B., 139 AD2d at 963), explicitly

provides that “the court shall maintain jurisdiction over the case

until the child is discharged from placement” (§ 1088). It further

provides that the court “shall” make a determination whether the

placement shall be terminated or whether the permanency goal should be

approved or modified, based “upon the proof adduced [at the permanency

hearing] . . . and in accordance with the best interests and safety of

the child, including whether the child would be at risk of abuse or

neglect if returned to the parent” (§ 1089 [d] [1], [2] [i] [emphasis

added]). 

We note that there is no provision in Family Court Act article

10-A that provides for the termination of the child’s placement with

petitioner when a neglect or abuse petition is dismissed. We further

note that the authority cited by the dissent with respect to the

legislative scheme of article 10 predated the enactment of article 

10-A (see Matter of Edwin SS., 302 AD2d 754, 754-755; Matter of Amanda

SS., 284 AD2d 588, 589, lv denied 97 NY2d 606; Matter of Brandon C.,

237 AD2d 821, 822; Matter of Anthony YY., 202 AD2d 740, 741; Matter of

Dina V., 86 AD2d 875, 875), or did not implicate the provisions of

article 10-A (see Lebraun H., 111 AD3d at 1440). Thus, we

respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleagues that article 10-A

did not provide for the continuation of the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, despite the dismissal of the article 10 petition. 

We recognize that the silence of the Legislature with respect to

the scenario presented in this case may be interpreted in either of

two ways: if the Legislature had intended that the placement end upon

the dismissal of the article 10 petition, it would have said so; or,

based on the absence of a provision addressing the scenario at issue

here, the Legislature did not intend to overturn the long-established

rule of law with respect to article 10 that a temporary placement

under, inter alia, section 1022 ended with the dismissal of a neglect

or abuse petition inasmuch as the court lacked jurisdiction to impose

a dispositional order pursuant to article 10 (see McKinney’s Cons Laws

of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 74). Nevertheless, “[a] statute must be

read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not as the

court may think it should or would have been written if the

Legislature had envisaged all of the problems and complications which

might arise in the course of its administration” (Statutes § 73,
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CAF 16-00175 

Comment at 148; see Murphy v Board of Educ. of N. Bellmore Union Free

Sch. Dist., 104 AD2d 796, 798, affd 64 NY2d 856). We therefore

conclude, based upon the plain language of the provisions of Family

Court Act article 10-A, that the court obtains jurisdiction as a

result of a placement with petitioner pursuant to section 1022 (see

§ 1088), and that the court is required to make a determination

whether to return the child to the parent based upon the best

interests and safety of the child, including whether the child would

be at risk of abuse or neglect if the child were to return to the

parent (see § 1089 [d] [1], [2] [i]). Thus, we conclude that the

court retained jurisdiction to conduct the permanency hearing despite

the dismissal of the neglect petition. Moreover, our interpretation

of the statutory provisions of article 10-A comports with the

longstanding principle that “an overarching consideration always

obtains for children to be returned to biological parents, if at all

possible and responsible . . . When that cannot be done, the emphasis

shifts to securing permanent, stable solutions and settings” (Matter

of Dale P., 84 NY2d 72, 77). 

III

The mother also contends, inter alia, that her substantive due

process rights were violated by the continued placement of the child

with petitioner in the absence of a finding of neglect. Although we

share the concern of our dissenting colleagues that the mother’s right

to raise her child must be protected, that contention is not properly

before us on this appeal because the order was entered upon the

consent of the parties (see Matter of Adney v Morton, 68 AD3d 1742,

1742), and the mother retained the right to challenge on appeal only

the court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a

permanency hearing. If the mother’s contention was properly before

us, we would agree with our dissenting colleagues that the contention

was preserved for our review, but we would nevertheless reject it. 

Were we to review the mother’s contention that she cannot be deprived

of the right to raise her child in the absence of a finding of

neglect, we would conclude that her substantive due process rights

were protected by the provisions of Family Court Act article 10-A. 

It is well established that “[f]undamental constitutional

principles of due process and protected privacy prohibit governmental

interference with the liberty of a parent to supervise and rear a

child except upon a showing of overriding necessity . . . [T]he State

may not deprive a natural parent of the right to the care and custody

of a child absent a demonstration of[, inter alia], unfitness . . .

Legislation which authorizes the removal of a child from the parent

without the requisite showing of such extraordinary circumstances

constitutes an impermissible abridgement of fundamental parental

rights” (Matter of Marie B., 62 NY2d 352, 358; see Santosky v Kramer,

455 US 745, 753). Because the court was required to determine,

following a hearing, whether the child would be at risk of abuse or

neglect if returned to the mother (see Family Court Act § 1089 [d]),

and the evidence at the hearing clearly supported the court’s

determination that the child would be at such a risk, we would

conclude that the requisite “overriding necessity” was established
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CAF 16-00175 

here (Marie B., 62 NY2d at 358), and thus that the mother’s

substantive due process rights were not violated. 

IV

Accordingly, we conclude that the order determining that the best

interests of the child would be served by continued placement in

petitioner’s custody on the ground that the child was at risk of abuse

or neglect in the event she was returned to the mother should be

affirmed.

NEMOYER and CURRAN, JJ., concur with SCUDDER, J.; WHALEN, P.J.,

dissents and votes to vacate the order in accordance with the

following Opinion, in which SMITH, J., concurs:

We respectfully dissent. Petitioner commenced this proceeding

pursuant to Family Court Act article 10 alleging, inter alia, that the

subject child was neglected by respondent mother. Following a factfinding hearing, Family Court concluded that petitioner failed to meet

its burden of establishing neglect by a preponderance of the evidence

and dismissed the petition. It is well established that, “[i]f the

court finds that the facts adduced at the hearing are insufficient to

support the petition, as was the case here, that is the end of the

matter” (Matter of Rasha B., 139 AD2d 962, 962 [emphasis added]). 

Pursuant to the legislative scheme of article 10, absent a finding of

abuse or neglect, the court lacks any jurisdictional basis to block,

delay, or impose conditions on the return of the child (see Matter of

Amanda SS., 284 AD2d 588, 589, lv denied 97 NY2d 606; Matter of

Brandon C., 237 AD2d 821, 822; Matter of Dina V., 86 AD2d 875, 875;

see also Matter of Lebraun H. [Brenda H.], 111 AD3d 1439, 1440; Matter

of Edwin SS., 302 AD2d 754, 754-755; Matter of Anthony YY., 202 AD2d

740, 741).

We cannot agree with the majority that the enactment of Family

Court Act article 10-A abrogated that settled law and extended the

subject matter jurisdiction of Family Court beyond the dismissal of

the neglect petition. The jurisdictional provision of article 10-A,

section 1088, provides in relevant part that, “[i]f a child is placed

pursuant to section . . . one thousand twenty-two . . . of this act, 

. . . the case shall remain on the court’s calendar and the court

shall maintain jurisdiction over the case until the child is

discharged from placement and all orders regarding supervision,

protection or services have expired.” It is undisputed that the child

was placed pursuant to section 1022, and we agree with the majority

that the events triggering the termination of the court’s article 10-A

jurisdiction did not occur, i.e., the child was not discharged from

placement (see § 1089 [d] [1]), and pursuant to a prior permanency

hearing order the mother was under the supervision of petitioner,

subject to an order of protection, and receiving services. 

The language of section 1088, considered in isolation, appears to

confer continuing jurisdiction regardless of the outcome of the

underlying article 10 proceeding. We are mindful that, in accordance

with established rules of statutory construction, we must construe the
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CAF 16-00175 

language of the statute “so as to give effect to the plain meaning of

the words used” (Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v City

of New York, 41 NY2d 205, 208). At the same time, however, we

conclude that, under the circumstances here, giving effect to the

“plain language . . . would require us to interpret the statute in a

manner that would render it unconstitutional” (Pines v State of New

York, 115 AD3d 80, 92, appeal dismissed 23 NY3d 982; see People v

Couser, 258 AD2d 74, 80, affd 94 NY2d 631; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY,

Book 1, Statutes § 150 [c]). The majority’s application of the plain

language of Family Court Act § 1088 effectively sanctions the use of

the temporary order issued in an ex parte proceeding (see § 1022 [a]

[i]) as the jurisdictional predicate for petitioner’s ongoing, openended intervention in the parent-child relationship after the neglect

petition was dismissed on the merits. 

We agree with the mother that, under these circumstances, the

court’s exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to article 10-A resulted in

the violation of her fundamental right to raise her child. As a

preliminary matter, we do not agree with the majority that the

mother’s due process contention is not properly before us. Throughout

the Family Court proceeding, the mother consistently and repeatedly

argued that, following the dismissal of the neglect petition, the

failure to terminate the subject child’s foster care placement and

return her to the mother’s care constituted a violation of the

mother’s due process right to raise the child without interference

from petitioner or the court.

As the majority acknowledges, “ ‘the interest of parents in the

care, custody and control of their children . . . is perhaps the

oldest of the fundamental liberty interests,’ and any infringement of

that right ‘comes with an obvious cost’ ” (Matter of Brooke S.B. v

Elizabeth A.C.C., 28 NY3d 1, 10, quoting Troxel v Granville, 530 US

57, 64-65). Moreover, “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural

parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not

evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost

temporary custody of their child to the State” (Santosky v Kramer, 455

US 745, 753). Here, the subject child was removed from the mother’s

care pursuant to a temporary ex parte order, following which a hearing

was conducted, no adjudication of neglect was made, and the neglect

petition was dismissed on the merits. Construing article 10-A as

authorizing the continued placement of the subject child, premised

entirely upon the initial removal without the requisite showing of

neglect or other extraordinary circumstances (see Matter of Bennett v

Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543, 546), clearly results in an abridgment of the

mother’s fundamental parental rights (see Matter of Marie B., 62 NY2d

352, 358).

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the permanency

hearing order on appeal, and the order therefore should be vacated. 

Entered: November 10, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court