United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 24, 2012*

Decided October 25, 2012

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 11‐3663

GARY LEE SMITH,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

WENDY J. ROAL,

Respondent‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Illinois.

No. 11‐cv‐676‐DRH

David R. Herndon,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Gary Smith is serving 19 years in federal prison for producing and distributing child

pornography. In August 2004 he was disciplined for assaulting a guard, refusing to obey an

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).
No. 11‐3663 Page 2

order, and possessing contraband. Smith had pushed away a guard who tried to handcuff

him, though he said he acted in self‐defense. After the scuffle, prison staff searched Smith’s

cell and confiscated pictures allegedly depicting nudity and sexual activity. Smith was

sanctioned with the loss of good time. Having exhausted his administrative appeals, he

petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asking that his good time be

restored (he also sought the return of a manuscript confiscated with his pictures, but the

district court properly rejected that demand as beyond the scope of § 2241). The court

understood Smith to claim that he was disciplined without due process because (1) he

received the disciplinary reports more than 24 hours after the scuffle and search, and (2) the

hearing officers were not properly certified. The court dismissed the petition on

preliminary review for failure to state a claim. See RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES IN THE

U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 1(b), 4. The court explained that the Due Process Clause does not

compel immediate disclosure of disciplinary reports or require that hearing officers be

anything other than impartial.

On appeal, Smith contends only that the district court failed to address his “claim of

actual innocence.” He maintains that he acted in self‐defense and possessed authorized

pictures. We understand him to mean that his right to due process was violated because the

hearing officers lacked sufficient evidence to find that he committed the charged

infractions. For purposes here we accept that Smith’s petition fairly can be read to include

that contention.

Prison discipline that results in forfeited good time must be supported by “some”

evidence to satisfy due process, but even a meager amount will suffice. Superintendent,

Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941

(7th Cir. 2007). Smith’s own statements supply some evidence that he disobeyed and

assaulted the guard. He admits that he spun around and “removed” the hand gripping his

shoulder—a hand belonging to the guard who had just told Smith he was about to be

handcuffed. Smith could be disciplined for assault even if he did think he was acting in self‐

defense. Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2011); 28 C.F.R. § 541.3, table 1, code

224 (2011). Furthermore, inmates lack a constitutional right to assert self‐defense in

disciplinary proceedings. Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 938–39; Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047, 1052

(7th Cir. 1994).

With regard to the contraband images, Smith has failed to develop an argument on

appeal. He has not explained why the pictures found in his cell could not satisfy the

standard of some evidence. See Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001).

AFFIRMED.