[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-16655

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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-01366-CAP

CHEMENCE MEDICAL PRODUCTS, INC.,

 Plaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellant,

CHEMENCE, INC., 

 Consol Plaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellant,

 versus

JAMES QUINN, 

 Defendant - Counter Claimant - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(April 12, 2017)

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Before WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,* Judge.

PER CURIAM: 

Chemence, Inc. (Chemence) and Chemence Medical Products, Inc. (CMPI) 

appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law, its 

denial of their motion for a new trial, and certain of its evidentiary rulings in this 

litigation against Dr. James Quinn. After consideration of the parties’ briefs, and 

with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.1

Chemence and CMPI (together, the Chemence Parties) raise seven issues in 

this appeal. First, they contend the district court erred in granting judgment as a 

matter of law because the oral contract between CMPI and Quinn was barred by 

the statute of frauds. Second, they assert the district court erred in excluding the 

testimony of the Chemence Parties’ attorney, Robert Wilson. Third, the Chemence 

Parties argue the district court erred in refusing to grant judgment as a matter of 

law to them on Quinn’s corporate alter ego theory. Fourth and fifth, they submit 

 * Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, 

sitting by designation.

1 This Court reviews de novo a motion for judgment as a matter of law, and must 

determine whether a reasonable jury would have had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find 

for the non-moving party on that issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), (b); Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 

1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2000). “[T]he court must evaluate all the evidence, together with any 

logical inferences, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” McGinnis v. Am. Home 

Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 817 F.3d 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). The motion 

will be denied if “reasonable minds could reach differing verdicts.” Abel, 210 F.3d at 1337.

A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Proctor v. 

Fluor Enter., Inc., 494 F.3d 1337, 1349 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007). Finally, this Court reviews a ruling 

on a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. McGinnis, 817 F.3d at 1255.

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that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded their damages witness 

and permitted Quinn’s damages witness to testify. Sixth, they contend Quinn’s 

future damages were not recoverable under Georgia law and the district court 

should have granted judgment as a matter of law on that basis. Finally, the 

Chemence Parties assert the district court should have granted their motion for a 

new trial on Quinn’s claim that the Chemence Parties acted in bad faith in bringing 

an action against him for violation of the Georgia Trade Secrets Act.2

I. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Frauds

The Chemence Parties acknowledge there was an oral agreement with Quinn 

but contend that agreement was unenforceable under Georgia’s statute of frauds. 

See O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30. Their argument consists primarily of two points. First, 

Quinn argued at trial that the oral agreement included the terms of his prior written 

agreement with CMPI. According to the Chemence Parties, some of those terms

could not have been performed within one year. See id. § 13-5-30(5) (statute of 

frauds applies to “[a]ny agreement that is not to be performed within one year from 

the making thereof”). Second, the Chemence Parties insist Quinn cannot avail 

himself of the part performance exception to the statute of frauds because his 

actions must have been both “consistent with the presence of [the alleged oral]

 2 We discuss only the first and second issues in this opinion and affirm the remaining 

issues without discussion.

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contract and inconsistent with the [absence] of [it].” Morgan v. Am. Ins. 

Managers, Inc., 521 S.E.2d 676, 678 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (quotation omitted); see 

O.C.G.A. § 13-5-31(3) (statute of frauds does not apply “[w]here there has been 

such part performance of the contract as would render it a fraud of the party 

refusing to comply if the court did not compel a performance”).

We need not determine whether the contract could have been performed 

within one year because the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find 

that Quinn rendered part performance and thus the oral agreement was removed 

from the statute of frauds. It is undisputed that Quinn continued to perform his 

duties, which the Chemence Parties accepted—indeed, they continued paying him 

his $4,000 consulting fee, consistent with the terms of the alleged oral agreement. 

Quinn provided medical and scientific advice, conducted testing to support the 

Chemence Parties’ submissions to the FDA, answered customers’ questions, and 

met with FDA representatives, all after the written agreement had expired. In 

addition, the jury was permitted to credit Quinn’s testimony that when he was 

solicited to perform consulting work for a competitor, he refused and continued to 

put his best efforts into his work for the Chemence Parties because he was entitled 

to commissions. According to Quinn, he notified the Chemence Parties of the 

solicitation immediately and they expressed concern that he would leave. These 

and other facts recounted by the district court show there was sufficient evidence 

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on which a reasonable jury could find the oral contract fell within the part 

performance exception to the statute of frauds. See Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. 

Mid-S. Capital, Inc., 690 F.3d 1216, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The question of 

whether there has been part performance sufficient to warrant application of this 

exception to the statute of frauds is generally one for the jury.” (citing Hathaway v. 

Bishop, 449 S.E.2d 318, 320 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994))).

B. Exclusion of Wilson

The Chemence Parties also contend the district court erred when it excluded 

Robert Wilson, the Chemence Parties’ general counsel, from serving as a witness 

at trial. Our review of the district court’s decision here is “sharply limited to a 

search for an abuse of discretion and a determination that the findings of the trial 

court are fully supported by the record.” Mee Indus. v. Dow Chem. Co., 608 F.3d 

1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). We find no such abuse of 

discretion. The district court accurately assessed the history of the case, including 

the Chemence Parties’ multiple representations to the court that Wilson would not 

serve as a witness, resulting in the court’s permitting him to continue as litigation 

counsel over Quinn’s objection. As a result, Wilson participated in all subsequent 

discovery in the case. The district court was within its discretion to grant Quinn’s 

motion to exclude Wilson as a witness.

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II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

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