NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

EDGE SYSTEMS LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED 

LIABILITY COMPANY, AXIA MEDSCIENCES, A 

DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

RAFAEL NEWTON AGUILA, AKA RALPH AGUILA, 

DBA HYDRADERMABRASION SYSTEMS,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2016-2189, 2016-2384, 2017-1030

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida in No. 1:14-cv-24517-KMM, 

Judge K. Michael Moore.

______________________ 

Decided: September 8, 2017

______________________ 

 RAFAEL NEWTON AGUILA, South Miami, FL, pro se.

 BRENTON R. BABCOCK, Knobbe, Martens, Olson & 

Bear, LLP, Irvine, CA, for plaintiffs-appellees. Also 

represented by ALI S. RAZAI. 

______________________ 
2 EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA

Before PROST, Chief Judge, WALLACH and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

STOLL, Circuit Judge. 

Rafael Newton Aguila appeals from the final judgement of the Southern District of Florida in a trademark 

and patent infringement suit filed by Edge Systems LLC 

and Axia Medscienes, LLC.1 Specifically, Aguila argues 

that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing 

one of his affirmative defenses, imposing Rule 11 sanctions, denying his motion to strike the expert report of 

Edge Systems’ patent infringement expert, and granting a 

protective order that reduced the number of depositions 

Aguila was allowed to take. Aguila also challenges some 

of the district court’s summary judgment determinations 

and the scope of the district court’s permanent injunction. 

Because the district court neither erred nor abused its 

discretion, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The district court’s apt summation of this case sets 

the stage on appeal: “Bootleg. Clone. Copycat. Imitation. 

Knock-off. Palm-Off. However one labels a peddled product that conspicuously capitalizes on another’s intellectual 

property rights, this case presents the quintessential 

example.” Edge Sys. LLC v. Aguila, 186 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 

1337 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (“Summary Judgment Order”).

Edge Systems was founded in 1997, and has continuously designed and sold products that improve skin 

health. Edge Systems’ best-selling product, the HydraFacial MD® hydradermabrasion system is covered by 

U.S. Patent Nos. 6,299,620, 6,641,591, 7,678,120, 

 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, we collectively refer to 

both Edge Systems and Axia Medscienes as Edge Systems.
EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA 3

7,789,886, 8,066,716, and 8,337,513 (collectively, “the 

Asserted Patents”). The ’620 patent, for example, discloses “[a] system for atraumatic removal of skin surface 

layers in a treatment to induce neocollagenesis in the 

dermis to reduce wrinkles and alter the architecture of 

the dermal layers.” ’620 patent, Abstract. Claim 1 of the 

’620 patent is reproduced below: 

1. A system for treating surface layers of a patient’s skin, comprising:

(a) an instrument body with a distal working end for engaging a skin surface;

(b) a skin interface portion of the working 

end comprising an abrasive fragment 

composition secured thereto; 

(c) at least one inflow aperture in said skin 

interface in fluid communication with a 

fluid reservoir; and

(d) at least one outflow aperture in said 

skin interface in communication with a 

negative pressurization source.

Id. at col. 9 ll. 54–63.

Edge Systems also has common law trademark rights 

in, inter alia, the following marks: (1) ACTIV-4; 

(2) ANTIOX-6; (3) BETA HD; and (4) DERMABUILDER 

(collectively, “the Serum Marks”).2

In 2014, Edge Systems learned that Aguila was 

selling a device similar to its HydraFacial MD® system on 

a website using the trademarks and trade name of Edge 

Systems’ competitor, Lumenis. Edge Systems and Lu-

 

2 Aguila does not challenge on appeal the district 

court’s determination that Edge Systems had valid common law trademark rights in the Serum Marks.
4 EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA

menis separately sent Aguila cease and desist letters, and 

Aguila subsequently changed the website and created an 

additional website, using Edge Systems’ trademarks and 

trade name. 

 At least two different customers purchased an accused 

infringing device from Aguila, thinking the device was 

made by Edge Systems. One of the customers called a 

number on Aguila’s website and spoke to an individual 

purporting to be the Regional Sales Manager for Edge 

Systems. When the customer asked why Aguila’s device 

had a different name than the HydraFacial MD®, she was 

informed that the device was Edge Systems’ newest 

upgrade of the HydraFacial MD®. A side-by-side comparison of Edge Sytems’ HydraFacial MD® and Aguila’s 

accused infringing device is shown below:

Summary Judgment Order, 186 F. Supp. 3d. at 1338.

Edge Systems, along with Axia Medsciences, the 

owner of the Asserted Patents, brought suit against 

Aguila in the Southern District of Florida, claiming both 

patent and trademark infringement. The district court 

swiftly granted Edge Systems a preliminary injunction, 

enjoining Aguila from infringing Edge Systems’ trademarks, trade dress, and the ’620 patent. Edge Sys. LLC v. 

Aguila, Case No. 1:14-cv-24517-KMM, 2015 WL 11233387 

(S.D. Fla. June 3, 2015). We affirmed the district court’s 

preliminary injunction on appeal. Edge Systems LLC v. 

Aguila, 635 F. App’x 897, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA 5

Edge Systems also moved for summary judgment. 

The district court granted Edge Systems’ motion for 

summary judgment and permanently enjoined Aguila 

from infringing Edge Systems’ trademarks and the claims 

of the ’620 patent. Summary Judgment Order, 186 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1363–64. Following the district court’s summary judgment order, Edge Systems filed a motion to 

voluntarily dismiss its remaining claims, which the 

district court granted and, thereafter, closed the case.

Aguila now appeals, and we have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

Aguila argues that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing one of his affirmative defenses, imposing Rule 11 sanctions, denying his motion to strike the 

expert report of Edge Systems’ patent infringement 

expert, and granting a protective order that reduced the 

number of depositions Aguila was allowed to take. Aguila 

also challenges some of the district court’s summary 

judgment determinations and the scope of the district 

court’s permanent injunction. We address each argument 

in turn.

I.

Aguila first challenges the district court’s dismissal of 

his affirmative defense of prior trademark use and imposition of Rule 11 sanctions based on Aguila’s repeated 

attempts to rely on two evidentiary items of dubious 

authenticity: (1) an invoice purportedly from 1996; and (2) 

an invoice purportedly from 2004. Aguila relied on the 

two invoices to support his prior use of trademarks affirmative defense. The district court was unconvinced 

that these invoices were authentic and had “grave concerns over [Aguila’s] willingness to manufacture evidence 

and abuse the judicial process.” Edge Sys. LLC v. Aguila, 

Case No. 1:14-cv-24517-KMM, 2015 WL 6447502, at *7 
6 EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA

(S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2015). The district court granted Edge 

System’s motion to strike Aguila’s prior use affirmative 

defense, holding that “[c]lear and convincing evidence has 

been presented that [Aguila] knowingly advanced a 

document of questionable authenticity and relied upon it 

in [his] pleadings.” Id.

Notwithstanding the district court’s order, Aguila 

continued to rely on these invoices throughout the summary judgment proceedings. As a result, the district 

court imposed Rule 11 sanctions in the form of attorneys’ 

fees and costs from the date the invoices were initially 

submitted during the preliminary injunction proceeding. 

The district court reasoned that “Aguila’s continued 

reliance on fraudulent documents clearly runs afoul of 

Rule 11[,] and sanctions—including the award of attorney’s fees to Edge—are appropriate for Aguila’s bad faith 

conduct.” Summary Judgment Order, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 

1345 n.10.

On appeal, Aguila argues that the district court 

abused its discretion by striking his prior use affirmative 

defense and imposing Rule 11 sanctions based on his 

reliance on the invoices. We disagree.

The imposition of sanctions under the district court’s 

inherent power or Rule 11 is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 

(1991) (inherent power); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 

496 U.S. 384, 409 (1990) (Rule 11). “When employing an 

abuse of discretion standard, ‘we must affirm unless we at 

least determine that the district court has made a clear 

error of judgment, or has applied an incorrect legal standard.’” Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 662 (11th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Alexander v. Fulton Cty., 207 F.3d 1303, 1326 

(11th Cir. 2000)). 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

striking Aguila’s prior use affirmative defense. The

striking of an affirmative defense falls within the ambit of 
EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA 7

the district court’s inherent powers. Chambers, 501 U.S. 

at 43. 

The district court questioned the authenticity of Aguila’s invoices based on findings that “[t]he quality of the 

purported invoices is extremely poor,” S.A. at 2102, and 

“[t]here is nothing inherent about the documents to 

suggest they are authentic,” id. at 2103. The court also 

emphasized Aguila’s contradictory testimony during the 

preliminary injunction hearing. For example, the 1996 

invoice purports to have sold a “HydraPeel system.” Id. at 

2222. Aguila testified, however, that he was selling a 

system called the Dermis Peel in 1996, and did not start 

selling the HydraPeel system until it was developed in 

2003. Id. at 2017–19 (“So I decided to start distributing 

some machines at that point in 1996 under the name --

the actual name of the machine was Dermis Peel . . . . By 

2003, we had started developing a liquid-based system 

that we would call . . . HydraPeel.”). Further, the 2004 

invoice purports to have sold, inter alia, the HydraDerm 

MD. Id. at 2224. Aguila testified, however, that in 2004, 

his system was “called [] the HydraDerm. Not the HydraDerm MD. That would come later. But HydraDerm.” 

Id. at 2020. 

On this record, considering Aguila’s untimely submission of the invoices, the invoices’ questionable authenticity, the lack of any corroborating evidence to support the 

authenticity of the invoices, and Aguila’s testimony contradicting the substance of the invoices, it was not an 

abuse of discretion for the district court to strike Aguila’s 

prior use affirmative defense based on those invoices. 

The district court likewise did not abuse its discretion 

in granting Rule 11 sanctions. Under Eleventh Circuit 
8 EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA

law,3 “where no evidence or only ‘patently frivolous’

evidence is offered to support factual contentions, sanctions can be imposed.” Thompson v. RelationServe Media, 

Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 665 (11th Cir. 2010).

Here, the district court determined that “Aguila only 

offered documents of an unquestionably fraudulent nature in support of his stricken defense of prior use dating 

back to 1996” and “Aguila’s continued reliance on fraudulent documents clearly runs afoul of Rule 11.” Summary 

Judgment Order, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 1345 n.10. On this 

record, the district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions 

in the form of attorneys’ fees and costs from the date 

Aguila introduced the invoices was not an abuse of discretion. 

II.

Aguila next argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his motion to strike the expert 

testimony of Edge Systems’ patent infringement expert, 

Gary L. Loomis. Aguila argues that Edge Systems’ untimely served Loomis’s expert report after the discovery 

deadline.

Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that a party must make its expert 

disclosures “at the times and in the sequence that the 

court orders,” and “[a]bsent a stipulation or a court order, 

the disclosures must be made . . . at least 90 days before 

the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D). Here, the court issued a 

 

3 “In deciding issues not unique to our exclusive jurisdiction, we apply the law of the regional circuit in 

which the district court sits.” Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew 

Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We 

therefore apply the law of the Eleventh Circuit to these 

issues. 
EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA 9

scheduling order requiring that “[a]ll discovery, including 

expert discovery, shall be completed one hundred (100) 

days prior to the date of trial.” S.A. 3576 (emphasis 

added). The scheduling order also set a trial date of 

February 22, 2016. Id. Thus, all expert discovery was 

due by November 13, 2015.

Edge Systems served Loomis’s report on November 

24, 2015—90 days before the February 22, 2016 trial date. 

Had the court not set its discovery deadline of 100 days 

before trial, Loomis’s report would have been timely 

under Rule 26(a)(2)(D)(i). Instead, Loomis’s report was 

served 10 days after the court’s deadline and, thus, was 

untimely. Determining that Edge Systems violated Rule 

26, however, comprises only half the inquiry. See OFS 

Fitel, LLC v. Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., 549 F.3d 

1344, 1363 (11th Cir. 2008). “Under Rule 37(c)(1), a 

district court clearly has authority to exclude an expert’s 

testimony where a party has failed to comply with Rule 

26(a) unless the failure is substantially justified or is 

harmless.” Id. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

declining to exclude Loomis’s report. Rule 37(c)(1) merely 

authorizes the district court to exercise its discretion to 

exclude untimely reports; it does not require the district 

court to do so. “A district court has inherent authority to 

manage its own docket ‘so as to achieve the orderly and

expeditious disposition of cases.’” Equity Lifestyle Props., 

Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 

1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. 

at 43). Indeed, “district courts enjoy broad discretion in 

deciding how best to manage the cases before them.” 

Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1366 

(11th Cir. 1997). In any event, we agree with Edge Systems that the ten-day delay here was harmless.

Aguila nonetheless argues that Edge Systems’ late 

disclosure was harmful because it “den[ied] him the 
10 EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA

possibility to schedule a deposition with [Loomis].” Appellant Br. 21. Such harm, however, is belied by the record. 

The day Loomis’s report was served, Aguila requested the 

opportunity to depose Loomis. Edge Systems responded, 

indicating an intent to make Loomis available for deposition. Aguila, however, did not make any subsequent 

effort to proceed with Loomis’s deposition. Because Edge 

Systems was willing to make Loomis available for deposition after its untimely disclosure, its failure to comply 

with Rule 26(a) was harmless, and the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying Aguila’s motion to 

strike Loomis’s report under Rule 37.

III.

Aguila also argues that the district court abused its

discretion in granting in part Edge System’s motion for a 

protective order, limiting his allowed number of depositions from ten to five. The district court’s determination 

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. McCarthy v. Barnett Bank of Polk Cty., 876 F.2d 89, 91 (11th Cir. 1989).

During a status conference on July 10, 2015, the 

district court warned Aguila that “what you don’t want to 

do is [to] be issuing your discovery requests so late that as 

a practical matter you make it impossible for the parties 

to complete discovery within that [November 24th] deadline.” S.A. 2652. The district court additionally cautioned 

Aguila that, “[i]f you want a 30(b)(6) deposition of [Edge 

Systems], notice it now. Follow the rules.” Id. at 2653. 

Three weeks before the November 13, 2015 discovery 

deadline, on October 23, 2015, Aguila served a notice 

requesting a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Edge Systems, 

identifying 90 separately identified topics. Two days 

later, Aguila served eleven more deposition notices: one 

Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Axia Medsciences on 

117 separately identified topics and ten individual depositions. Aguila subsequently agreed to reduce the number 

of depositions to ten pursuant to Rule 30(a). Aguila 
EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA 11

unilaterally scheduled these ten depositions during the 

last week of discovery, scheduling five for the last day 

before the discovery deadline. Edge Systems subsequently filed its motion for protective order.

The magistrate judge granted Edge System’s motion 

in part, allowing Aguila to take five of the ten noticed 

depositions. At a hearing on the motion, the magistrate 

judge repeatedly questioned Aguila as to the reasons for 

taking the various depositions. The magistrate judge 

determined that it was reasonable to reduce the number 

of depositions from ten to five. The magistrate judge 

explained his reasoning as follows:

So I think what’s reasonable to do here is to 

limit the depositions to -- the 30(b)(6) depositions 

of Edge and Axia and to the depositions of Shadduck, Cohen and Ignon.

I pick them, first of all, because the other depositions . . . honestly, Mr. Aguila, I am very unpersuaded that you have a decent basis to think 

that they could produce much at all in the way of 

meaningful evidence that relates to the claims or 

defenses.

So that’s a very to me a dubious thought. I 

don’t think you really know. I think you’re guessing. You’re going off of a . . . title and kind of --

I’m not hearing too much more than that.

And you really sprung those on the Plaintiff at 

the last minute. Shadduck, Cohen and Ignon, the 

Plaintiff has known for quite some time that those 

folks could be deposed. So in terms of their ability 

to, you know, foresee that there would be a deposition and to think about what the issues are and 

prepare I think the Plaintiffs [are] in a reasonable 

position to do that.
12 EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA

S.A. 2934–35. Aguila objected to the magistrate judge’s 

order, which the district judge implicitly denied when 

final judgment was entered. See Misabec Mercantile, Inc. 

De Panama v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette ACLI Futures, Inc., 853 F.2d 834, 840 nn.17, 19 (11th Cir. 1988); 

WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1268 n.1 (11th Cir. 1988).

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

provides that a “court may, for good cause, issue an order 

to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” The 

Eleventh Circuit “also require[s] the district court to 

balance the interests of those requesting the order.” 

McCarthy, 876 F.2d at 91. 

On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a protective order. We see no error in 

the district court court’s finding that Aguila had no basis 

for believing that five of his noticed depositions would 

result in any evidence related to the claims or defenses at 

issue. Likewise, we see no error in the district court’s 

determination that Aguila’s last-minute noticing of these 

five baseless depositions placed an undue burden on Edge 

Systems. In any event, even if the district court had 

abused its discretion in limiting Aguila’s depositions, such 

error would be harmless, as Aguila did not even take the 

five depositions allowed by the district court. 

IV.

Aguila next challenges the scope of the district court’s 

permanent injunction. The district court permanently 

enjoined Aguila from using, copying, simulating, or in any 

other way infringing, inter alia, the Serum Marks. This 

injunction followed the district court’s determination that 

Edge Systems has valid common law rights in the Serum 

Marks and that Aguila infringed those marks.

Aguila does not challenge these determinations on 

appeal. Rather, Aguila argues that the district court’s 
EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA 13

permanent injunction effectively invalidates Aguila’s 

similar registered trademarks, which Aguila sought from 

the United States Patent and Trademark Office on December 1, 2014, the same day the district court signed a 

temporary restraining order enjoining Aguila from infringing, inter alia, the Serum Marks. The PTO granted 

Aguila’s applications in July 2015, without knowledge of 

Edge Systems’ common law rights in the same Serum 

Marks. 

We reject Aguila’s contention that the district court’s 

injunction in this case invalidates its registered trademarks. The permanent injunction relates to the district 

court’s determination that Edge Systems had valid common law trademark rights in the Serum Marks and that 

Aguila had infringed these marks. That Aguila applied 

for and received federal registration of the Serum Marks 

during the pendency of this action—albeit under seemingly dubious circumstances—is of no consequence. Accordingly, in light of the district court’s determinations of 

ownership and infringement, which are unchallenged on 

appeal, the district court did not err in permanently 

enjoining Aguila from using, copying, simulating, or in 

any other way infringing Edge Systems’ common law 

rights in the Serum Marks.4

V.

Aguila next challenges the district court’s summary 

judgment of infringement of Edge Systems’ patents. 

Although we apply our own law to issues of substantive 

patent law, we review the grant of summary judgment 

using the standard of review of the relevant regional 

circuit. Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire 

 

4 Edge Systems has filed petitions for the cancellation of Aguila’s trademarks with the PTO, which are 

currently pending.
14 EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA

Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

The Eleventh Circuit “review[s] de novo the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment, drawing all inferences and reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Rodriguez v. Doral, 863 

F.3d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 2017). “A district court should 

grant summary judgment only if the movant establishes 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.

The district court granted summary judgment of 

infringement of the ’620 patent, determining that “[n]o 

reasonable jury could find that each limitation of Claim 1 

of the ’620 Patent is not literally present in Aguila’s 

accused products.” Summary Judgment Order, 186 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1355. The district court similarly granted 

summary judgment of infringement of the ’591 patent. Id. 

at 1356.

Without citation to any record evidence, Aguila argues 

on appeal that his accused products do not contain a “skin 

interface portion of the working end comprising an abrasive fragment composition secured thereto,” as required 

by claim 1 of the ’620 patent, or a “skin interface comris[ing] an abrading structure with substantially sharp 

edges for abrading tissue,” as required by claim 1 of the 

’519 patent. Apart from these conclusory arguments on 

appeal, Aguila presents no evidence to support his noninfringment argument. 

On the other hand, Edge Systems’ patent infringement expert, Gary Loomis, relied on, inter alia, statements from Aguila’s own website describing the accused 

infringing products and testified that these limitations 

are found in Aguila’s accused infringing products. Because Aguila fails to introduce any contrary evidence, we 

conclude, as did the district court, that Aguila failed to 

present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of 

material fact as to infringement of the ’620 and ’591
EDGE SYSTEMS LLC v. AGUILA 15

patents. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment in Edge Systems’ favor on these claims.5

VI.

Aguila finally argues that the district court’s permanent injunction should be barred by the doctrine of laches. 

We previously addressed and denied Aguila’s laches 

defense. Edge Systems, 635 F. App’x at 907. There, we 

held that Aguila’s laches defense was “ipse dixit, failing to 

provide any reasoned analysis of the applicable law to the 

facts of this case.” Id. Here, Aguila similarly fails to 

provide any reasoned analysis of the applicable law to the 

facts of this case. Accordingly, the district court did not 

err in barring the injunction based on Aguila’s propounded laches defense. 

CONCLUSION

We have carefully considered Aguila’s remaining 

arguments and determine that they lack merit. We 

affirm.

AFFRIMED

COSTS

Costs to Appellees. 

 

5 Following the district court’s summary judgment 

order, Edge Systems moved to voluntarily dismiss its 

remaining claims, which the district court granted, and 

subsequently closed the case. Aguila argues that the 

district court erred in closing the case because the infringement claims related to the ’591 patent remained 

unadjudicated. Aguila is mistaken. As discussed above, 

the district court granted summary judgment of literal 

infringement of the ’591 patent. Summary Judgment 

Order, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 1356.