* On February 4, 2005, Alberto R. Gonzales became the United States

Attorney General. In accordance with Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, Mr. Gonzales is substituted for John Ashcroft as the

Respondent in this action.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

MAY 2 2005

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

CARLOS CRUZ-FUNEZ and JOSE

ENRIQUE VALLADARESCASTELLANOS,

Petitioners,

 v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney

General,*

Respondent.

No. 03-9619

PETITION FOR REVIEW

FROM THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

(Nos. A 78-046-589 & A 78-046-591)

Submitted on the briefs:

Shelley Wittevrongel, Boulder, Colorado, for Petitioners.

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Mark Walters, Assistant Director,

Anh-Thu P. Mai, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S.

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination

of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

1 Analogous to 10th Cir. R. 28.2(A), a petitioner in an immigration case

should attach both the Board’s decision and the IJ’s decision to his opening brief. 

-2-

Before TACHA, Chief Judge, HENRY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

HENRY, Circuit Judge.

Petitioners Carlos Cruz-Funez and Jose Enrique Valladares-Castellanos

petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or

Board) denying their claims for asylum and for withholding of removal under

both the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the United Nations

Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction to review the agency’s

decision under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we deny the petition for review. *

I. Procedural History and Issues on Appeal

The immigration judge (IJ) consolidated petitioners’ cases. According to

the IJ’s decision, 1

 petitioners are natives and citizens of Honduras who were and

are business partners. They entered the United States illegally on or about

June 28, 2000. They were noticed to appear on June 28, 2000, and were charged
2 Although the Board actually issued separate decisions for

Mr. Valladares-Castellanos and Mr. Cruz-Funez, the administrative record

contains the Board’s decision for only Mr. Valladares-Castellanos. Admin. R.

at 2. In the Board’s transmittal letter, however, Mr. Cruz-Funez is identified by

his “A number” as a “rider” to Mr. Valladares-Castellanos’s claim. Id. at 1. We

take judicial notice that the Board’s decision for Mr. Cruz-Funez, which appears

on the website of the Executive Office of Immigration Review under

Mr. Valladares-Castellanos’ “A number,” is identical in all respects pertinent to

this appeal, and we therefore refer to the Board’s decision as singular in this

decision. 

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with entering the United States without inspection under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the

INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Petitioners applied for asylum and withholding

of removal, asserting that they fear persecution or torture if they return to

Honduras. They claimed that their business debt to an unscrupulous creditor,

Pedro Trejo, put them in the particular social group of small businessmen ruined

in 1998 by Hurricane Mitch who are indebted to private creditors connected to the

corrupt Honduran business and political system. The IJ analyzed their claims and

denied them both asylum and withholding of removal. 

Petitioners appealed to the Board, which issued a decision through a single

Board member. See Admin. R. at 1. 2

 That decision, in pertinent part, states:

The respondent has appealed from the Immigration Judge’s decision

dated January 08, 2002. We have reviewed the record and we agree

that the respondent failed to meet his burden of establishing past

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one

of the statutorily protected grounds, or that it is more likely than not

that he will be persecuted or subjected to torture upon his return to

Honduras. See section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
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502 U.S. 478 (1992); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987);

INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Matter

of Y-L-, A-G-, & R-S-R, 23 I&N Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002); Matter of

S-V-, 22 I&N Dec. 1306 (BIA 2000). The respondent has presented

no arguments on appeal which persuade us that this decision should

be disturbed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Admin. R. at 2. The Board member’s cited authorities are different, except for

one case, from those the IJ relied on. And that one case, INS v. Stevic , 467 U.S.

407 (1984), was cited by the IJ only for a general standard of asylum law. See

Admin. R. at 142. The Board member did not mention any of the other authorities

the IJ relied on, including the five cases the IJ cited in his discussion about what

constitutes a particular social group for purposes of asylum and withholding of

removal. See id. at 148-50. The Board member’s citation of different authorities

suggests that he analyzed this case differently than the IJ did.

Petitioners contend that: (1) the Board’s decision is neither a summary

affirmance nor a reasoned decision, and it therefore violates administrative law

and their due process rights; (2) they were eligible for asylum because of their

status as persecuted members of the refugee category, “particular social group,”

see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); and (3) they proved the Honduran government’s

acquiescence in torture and are therefore entitled to relief under the CAT. 
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II. The Board’s Streamlining Procedures

The first question before us is whether we should review the Board’s

decision or the IJ’s decision in this case. “[T]he INA grants us general

jurisdiction to review a ‘final order of removal.’” Tsegay v. Ashcroft , 386 F.3d

1347, 1353 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)). Because an alien

facing removal may appeal to the Board as of right, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3),

1003.38(a), 1240.15, and because the Board has the power to review the IJ’s legal

conclusions de novo and his factual findings for clear error, see id.

§ 1003.1(d)(3), there is no “final order” until the Board acts. In light of the

Board’s “streamlining” procedures under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1, however, the Board’s

decision denying an alien relief from removal may constitute the final order of

removal, or the Board’s decision may be “the agency action that makes the IJ’s

decision the final order of removal,” Tsegay , 386 F.3d at 1353; see also 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(e)(4)(ii). Although the IJ’s decision in this case was issued before the

expanded streamlining procedures were enacted on August 26, 2002, the 2002

amendment was expressly made applicable to pending cases. 67 Fed. Reg.

at 54898-54899. As a result, the amended streamlining regulation governs the

Board’s December 10, 2003 decision. 
-6-

III. The Board’s Decision

The Board’s streamlining procedure was expanded in 2002 to allow an

individual Board member to issue a brief written opinion in certain cases, see

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5), as an option to affirming without opinion, see id.

§ 1003.1(e)(4), or referring the case to a three-member panel, see id.

§ 1003.1(e)(6). It is clear that the Board member who issued the decision before

us did not affirm without opinion under § 1003.1(e)(4)(i)–he did not use the

language mandated by § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) or include the mandatory reference to the

regulation. As a result, the IJ’s decision does not constitute the final agency

determination under § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii). 

It is apparent from the Board member’s decision, rather, that he acted under

§ 1003.1(e)(5). As the Third Circuit has pointed out: “If the case is more

significant than an (e)(4) case and less significant than an (e)(6) case, the single

BIA member will decide the merits of the appeal by himself and issue ‘a brief

order, affirming, modifying or remanding’ under § 1003.1(e)(5).” Smriko v.

Ashcroft , 387 F.3d 279, 293 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting § 1003.1(e)(5)). 

In Gjyzi v. Ashcroft , 386 F.3d 710, 715-16 (6th Cir. 2004), the Sixth

Circuit considered both the BIA’s and the IJ’s decisions. There, the BIA

repudiated the IJ’s credibility findings, yet affirmed the IJ’s conclusions under

§ 1003.1(e)(5). See id. at 715. The court attempted a meaningful review of the
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IJ’s decision, but was thwarted because the IJ provided no underlying

determination regarding whether there was past persecution. See id. at 715-16. 

Thus, the Sixth Circuit remanded, stating: “Although the BIA need not write

extensively on every issue–indeed, we have joined our sister circuits in holding

that ‘the BIA’s streamlining procedures,’ such as summary affirmances of IJ

decisions, ‘do not themselves alone violate an alien’s right to due process,’ Denko

v. I.N.S. , 351 F.3d 717, 730 (6th Cir. 2003)–the failure of the BIA to explain its

decision in this case unnecessarily frustrates our review.” Id. at 716.

Here, we face similar problems, in that the Board clearly affirmed the IJ’s

decision under § 1003.1(e)(5), but did not follow its own procedures pursuant to

that section. Rather, its citation of cases is somewhat mystifying and does not

allow us to provide a meaningful review of the Board’s judgment. Given this

situation, we may remand for clarification or for the Board to follow its own

procedures, or we may consider the IJ’s report, as did the Sixth Circuit in Gjyzi ,

to determine whether the IJ has provided an adequate basis for meaningful

review. Cf. Fisher v. Bowen , 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.)

(“No principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a

case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand

might lead to a different result.”); Illinois v. ICC , 722 F.2d 1341, 1348 (7th Cir.

1983) (Posner, J.) (“ Chenery [SEC v. Chenery Corp. , 332 U.S. 194 (1947)] does
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not require futile gestures.”). In this case, we find that the IJ’s report provides an

adequate basis for our review.

IV. The IJ’s Decision

The IJ reviewed several cases and decided that petitioners had not defined a

“particular social group” for purposes of asylum and withholding of removal

under the INA. See Admin. R. at 148-51; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A);

§§ 1208.13(b)(1), 1208.16(b). What constitutes a particular social group is a pure

question of law that we review de novo. Elien v. Ashcroft , 364 F.3d 392, 396

(1st Cir. 2004); Hernandez-Montiel v. INS , 225 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The INA does not define the phrase “particular social group.” 

Hernandez-Montiel , 225 F.3d at 1091. The term “comes directly from the United

Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . [but] [w]hen Congress

ratified the Protocol on October 4, 1968, it did not shed any further light on the

definition.” Id. The Board has decided that a “particular social group” is “a

group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic . . . that

the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to

change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.” 

In re Acosta , 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA 1985). The agency’s reasonable

interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference. See Tapia Garcia

v. INS , 237 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). But the

Board left it to be decided on a case-by-case basis what “particular kind of group

characteristic . . . will qualify under this construction.” Acosta , 19 I. & N. Dec.

at 233. 

The courts are struggling to set the parameters for the definition of a

“particular social group” in light of Acosta . The circuit courts are not in

agreement on a test. See Castellano-Chacon v. INS , 341 F.3d 533, 546-48

(6th Cir. 2003) (joining the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits in adopting the

Board’s immutability analysis, but noting that the Ninth and Second Circuits have

settled on a different test from the Board and from each other) . 

This court has not yet addressed the question of what group characteristics

qualify to define a particular social group. In this case, however, we can

confidently state that petitioners cannot prevail under any of the circuit courts’

tests. Being indebted to the same creditor (unscrupulous or not) is not the kind of

group characteristic that a person either cannot change or should not be required

to change. Indeed, petitioners’ debt was settled by a court, which ordered them to

pay their creditor back. Admin. R. at 146. As such, we need not adopt a

particular test in this case, and we need not remand for the Board to clarify its

reasoning. 
-10-

V. Petitioners’ Claim for Relief Under the Convention Against Torture

“Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture prohibits the [return] of an

alien to a country where it is more likely than not that he will be subject to torture

by a public official, or at the instigation or with the acquiescence of such an

official.” Matter of G-A- , 23 I. & N. Dec. 366, 367 (BIA 2002) (en banc)

(citations omitted). A claim under the CAT differs from a claim for asylum or

withholding of removal under the INA because there is no requirement that the

petitioners show that torture will occur on account of a statutorily protected

ground. 

The Board said nothing about petitioners’ CAT claim except to advert to

petitioners’ failure to meet the standard for that relief. The IJ, on the other hand,

explicitly found petitioners credible when they testified that their lives have been

threatened by Mr. Trejo and men who work for him. Admin. R. at 147-48, 151. 

But the IJ concluded that the threats were part of Mr. Trejo’s private vendetta and

were not made with the “acquiescence of any public official or person acting in a

governmental position.” Id. at 153. “Acquiescence of a public official requires

that the public official, prior to the activity constituting the torture, have

awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to

prevent such activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). However, “Congress made its

intent clear that actual knowledge, or willful acceptance, is not required for a
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government to ‘acquiesce’ to the torture of its citizens.” Zheng v. Ashcroft ,

332 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003). Rather, “[w]illful blindness suffices to

prove acquiescence.” Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft , 303 F.3d 341, 354 (5th Cir.

2002) (quotations omitted). 

Petitioners argue that the IJ erred by concluding that they failed to show

government acquiescence in the torture they expect from Mr. Trejo if they return

to Honduras. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) prescribes a deferential standard for

judicial review of administrative findings, which “are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 

We have reviewed petitioners’ brief on the CAT issue and their cursory

references to the administrative record. Petitioners produced evidence of

corruption in the Honduran government and underfunding of police. They failed,

however, to show that “any reasonable adjudicator,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B),

would be compelled to find a connection between Mr. Trejo and the Honduran

government, or awareness by any public official that Mr. Trejo has threatened

petitioners’ lives. Therefore, we are not compelled to conclude that any actions

that Mr. Trejo might take against petitioners will be with the acquiescence of the

Honduran government.

The petition for review is denied.