alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 31.3**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

**PURSUANT TO SARBANES-OXLEY ACT SECTION 302**

 

I, Timothy J.Steinkopf, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this Form 10-Q of Secure ComputingCorporation; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have: 

 

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b) designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under supervision, toprovide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; 

 

c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): 

 

a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

 

/s/ Timothy J. Steinkopf

 

Timothy J. Steinkopf 

Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer 

July 31, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

I N RE:

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS APPROVED

AS DEPOSITORIES FOR FIDUCIARY

ACCOUNTS :

:

:

:

:

:

: NO

. 179

DISCIPLINARY RULES

DOCKET

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 30 th day of May

, 201 9

, it is hereby Ordered that the financial

inst itutions named on the attached l ist are approved as depositories for fiduciary accounts

in accordance with Pa.R.D.E. 221.
REQUESTING AN EXTENSION

TIME LINE: As soon as possible, and within 30 days of your receipt of our 

preliminary assessment letter

• If you need more time to respond to the Hearing Officer’s preliminary letter,

you may ask for an extension.

• Any such request must be in writing, must be received within the original 30-

day period, and should explain why an extension is needed. Failure to submit

such a request within the 30 day period will result in the preliminary penalty

becoming final.

Send your Extenstion Request too: 

HQS-SMB-CGHO-Response@USCG.MIL

Fax: (202)372-8422

By Mail:

U.S. Coast Guard Hearing Office 

2703 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. SE. / STOP 7794 

Washington, DC 20593-7794 

When Sending a request by Email or Fax please allow the Hearing Officer 24-48 

hours to respond. Note: Weekend request will be reviewed on the next business 

day.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7173

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DAVID JONES, a/k/a Davey,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Raymond A. Jackson, District

Judge. (CR-98-10, CA-00-147-4)

Submitted: October 9, 2003 Decided: October 21, 2003

Before LUTTIG, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David Jones, Appellant Pro Se. Janet S. Reincke, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

David Jones seeks to appeal the district court’s order

dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. Jones cannot appeal

this order unless a circuit judge or justice issues a certificate

of appealability, and a certificate of appealability will not issue

absent a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A habeas appellant meets

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find

that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any

dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also

debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, ,

123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

534 U.S. 941 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and

conclude Jones has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND> THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM 
THE CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. 
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                             32
<SECURITIES>                                        0         
<RECEIVABLES>                                     535<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                       24
<INVENTORY>                                       587
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                1,262 
<PP&E>                                          1,544
<DEPRECIATION>                                    749
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  2,697
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             714
<BONDS>                                           901
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                           58
<OTHER-SE>                                        879
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    2,697
<SALES>                                         4,351 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                4,351
<CGS>                                           3,443         
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   4,208 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    1
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 68
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   143
<INCOME-TAX>                                       52
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                91
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0 
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0 
<NET-INCOME>                                       91
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    1.60
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    1.56

<FN> 
<F1> Gross
</FN> 
        

</TABLE>
#### Thomas E. Sullivan et al., Respondents, v Joy Manufacturing Company et al., Respondents, and J.W. Greer Company, Appellant. (And a Third-Party Action.)

— Order, insofar as appealed from, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and appellant’s motion granted, in accordance with the following memorandum: Plaintiff was seriously injured when a five-foot long ice chopper he was using to remove ice cream packages from a conveyor tray on a Greer harden*996ing machine came into contact with a blade of a high-speed vane-axial cooling fan, causing a piece of the blade to break off striking him in the left eye. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was standing on a 20- to 30-inch catwalk between the conveyor portion of the hardening machine and the vane-axial fans. Special Term erred in determining that a special relationship existed between defendant J.W. Greer, Inc. and plaintiffs employer which imposed a duty on Greer to warn plaintiffs employer of the dangers inherent in using high-speed vane-axial fans in conjunction with a Greer hardening machine. The only contact between defendant Greer, successor to the manufacturer of the Greer hardening machine, and plaintiffs employer was a single service call. This service call, approximately two years prior to the accident, was to inspect the equipment erected. When the inspection was made, neither the catwalk nor the fans was installed. This single contact by a serviceman is insufficient to create a special relationship and impose a duty to warn on defendant Greer *(see, Schumacher v Richards Shear Co.,*59 NY2d 239, 247-249). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Erie County, Fudeman, J. — dismiss cause of action and cross claims.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Boomer, Green, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 74 (Monday, April 17, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 20436]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-9413]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE


Office of the Secretary of Defense; Meeting of the DOD Advisory 
Group on Electron Devices

AGENCY: Advisory Group on Electron Devices, Department of Defense.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Working Group A (Microwave Devices) of the DoD Advisory Group 
on Electron Devices (AGED) announces a closed session meeting.

DATES: The meeting will be held at 0900, Friday, April 28, 2000.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held at Palisades Institute for Research 
Services, Inc., 1745 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 500, Arlington, VA 
22202.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Cox, AGED Secretariat, 1745 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Crystal Square Four, Suite 500, Arlington, 
Virginia 22202.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The mission of the Advisory Group is to 
provide advice to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E), and through the DDR&E to the Director, Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and the Military Departments in 
planning and managing an effective and economical research and 
development program in the area of electron devices.
    The Working Group A meeting will be limited to review of research 
and development programs which the Military Departments propose to 
initiate with industry, universities or in their laboratories. This 
microwave device area includes programs on developments and research 
related to microwave tubes, solid state microwave devices, electronic 
warfare devices, millimeter wave devices, and passive devices. The 
review will include details of classified defense programs throughout.
    In accordance with Section 10(d) of Pub. L. No. 92-463, as amended 
(5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 10(d) (1994)), it has been determined that his 
Advisory Group meeting concerns matters listed in 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(1) 
(1994), and that accordingly, this meeting will be closed to the 
public.

    Dated: April 11, 2000.
L.M. Bynum,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 00-9413 Filed 4-14-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-10-M
#### Mark Sherman, Respondent, v Helene Spielman Sherman, Appellant.

Submitted March 26, 2007;

decided April 3, 2007

Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that the order appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
#### Vivian Ankenbrand, Appellant, v City of New York et al., Defendants, and Robert Schauder, Doing Business as Carvel No. 1351, Respondent.

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lerner, J.), dated October 7, 1986, which granted the motion of the defendant Robert Schauder, doing business as Carvel No. 1351, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims as against him.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when she fell "in the middle” of the public sidewalk about six feet from the entrance of the premises located at 54-28 Myrtle Avenue in Ridgewood, Queens. The plaintiff’s fall was purportedly precipitated by a defect in the sidewalk, to wit, one square of concrete was raised above the adjoining square, which caused an "indentation” in the sidewalk. The defendant Robert Schauder, doing business as Carvel No. 1351 (hereinafter Schauder), was the franchised owner of a Carvel store doing business at the premises. While the owner of a store "is charged with the duty of providing the public with a reasonably safe premises, including a safe means of ingress and egress” *(Gallagher v St. Raymond’s R. C. Church,*21 NY2d 554, 557), the plaintiff has failed to set forth any triable issues of fact concerning Schauder’s conduct upon which a breach of this duty could be found *(see, Blais v St. Mary’s of Assumption R. C. Church,*89 AD2d 653; *Sacco v City of Buffalo,*78 AD2d 1000). Mangano, J. P., Thompson, Lawrence and Harwood, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>



                                                                      Exhibit 23


CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

    We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement
on Form S-8 of RockShox, Inc. of our report dated April 25, 1997 on our audits
of the consolidated financial statements and the financial statement schedule of
RockShox, Inc. as of March 31, 1996 and 1997 and for the year ended December 31,
1994, the three month period ended March 31, 1995 and the years ended March 31,
1996 and 1997.





                                                        COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.

San Jose, California
June 25, 1997






                                          42
IIB 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2505 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 18, 2015 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

AN ACT 

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to require 

the annual reporting of data on enrollment in Medicare 

Advantage plans. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 2505 RFS

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Medicare Advantage 

3 Coverage Transparency Act of 2015’’. 

4 SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT FOR ENROLLMENT DATA REPORT5 ING FOR MEDICARE. 

6 Section 1874 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 

7 1395kk) is amended by adding at the end the following 

8 new subsection: 

9 ‘‘(g) REQUIREMENT FOR ENROLLMENT DATA RE10 PORTING.— 

11 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than May 1 of 

12 each year (beginning with 2016), the Secretary shall 

13 submit to the Committees on Ways and Means and 

14 Energy and Commerce of the House of Representa15 tives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate 

16 a report on enrollment data (and, in the case of part 

17 A, on data on individuals receiving benefits under 

18 such part) for the plan year or, in the case of part 

19 A and part B, for the fiscal year or year (as applica20 ble) ending before January 1 of such plan year, fis21 cal year, or year. Such enrollment data shall be pre22 sented— 

23 ‘‘(A) by zip code, congressional district, 

24 and State; 

25 ‘‘(B) in a manner that provides for such 

26 data based on enrollment (including receipt of 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

HR 2505 RFS

1 benefits other than through enrollment) under 

2 part A, enrollment under part B, enrollment 

3 under an MA plan under part C, and enroll4 ment under part D; and 

5 ‘‘(C) in the case of enrollment data de6 scribed in subparagraph (B) relating to MA 

7 plans, presented in a manner that provides for 

8 such data for each MA–PD plan and for each 

9 MA plan that is not an MA–PD plan. 

10 ‘‘(2) DELAY OF DEADLINE.—If the Secretary is 

11 unable to submit a report under paragraph (1) by 

12 May 1 of a year for data of the plan year, fiscal 

13 year, or year (as applicable) ending before January 

14 1 of such year, the Secretary shall, not later than 

15 April 30 of such year, notify the committees de16 scribed in such paragraph of— 

17 ‘‘(A) such inability, including an expla18 nation for such inability; and 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
4 

HR 2505 RFS

1 ‘‘(B) the date by which the Secretary will 

2 provide such report, which shall be not later 

3 than June 1 of such year.’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives June 17, 2015. 

Attest: KAREN L. HAAS, 

Clerk. 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
(78 Hun, 378.)

#### FLOOD v. CAIN et al.

(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.

May 18, 1894.)

1. Gifts Causa Mortis—Burdex of Proof.

Where plaintiff seeks to set aside a deed on the ground that it was intended as a gift causa mortis, the burden of proof is on her to prove that fact.

2. Appeal—Statement that Record Contains All the Evidence.

A question of fact will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a. statement in the case that it contains all the evidence.

Appeal from special term, New York county.

Action by Rosa Flood against Sarah Cain, individually, and as guardian of Nellie Cain, Sarah Cain, Rosa Cain, Julia Cain, and Annie Cain, infants; Michael Cain and Patrick Rooney, as executors of Peter Cain, deceased; and said Nellie Cam, Sarah Cain, Rosa Cain, Julia Cain, and Annie Cain, infants,—to set aside a deed. From a judgment dismissing the complaint on the merits, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and FOLLETT and PARKER, JJ.

Brooke, O’Sullivan & Brooke, for appellant.

James O’Neill, for respondents.

FOLLETT, J.

By a deed dated September 30, 1881, acknowledged November 19, 1884, and recorded January 27, 1885, the plaintiff conveyed certain real estate in the city of New York to Peter-Cain for the recited consideration of one dollar. From that time-on, the grantee retained the title, and collected the rents, through, the plaintiff, until January 7, 1890, when he died, devising the property to the defendants in this action. On the 15th of October, 1890,. this action was begun, seeking to set aside the conveyance upon tbeground that it was executed by the grantor in apprehension of death, and that the grantee agreed to reconvey it to her in case she survived. It will be observed that nearly six years elapsed between the date of the deed and the death of the grantee, and no proceedings were taken to compel a reconveyance. The only question in this action is one of fact,—whether the conveyance was a deed of gift in anticipation of death. The parties to the deed were *157brother and sister, and it appears from the record that for several years preceding the death of Peter Cain they had various transactions in respect to their property,—conveyances from one to the other. The burden of establishing that this was a conveyance causa mortis was upon the plaintiff. The learned judge at special term held that, upon the evidence, the plaintiff failed to establish the cause of action alleged in her complaint. Assuming that all of the evidence given upon the trial is contained in the record, we cannot say that this decision is contrary to the weight of evidence. But there is an insurmountable difficulty in considering the question as to whether the decision is contrary to the weight of evidence. So far as we can discover, the case contains no statement that it contains all of the evidence, and, in the absence of such a statement, this court will not review a question of fact. The case does not seem to have been settled and ordered filed by the trial judge, and, no error appearing in the judgment roll, the judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.