21-6223

Singh v. Garland

BIA

Christensen, IJ

A208 419 125

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 

Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of April, two thousand twentythree.

PRESENT:

MICHAEL H. PARK,

STEVEN J. MENASHI,

ALISON J. NATHAN,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

MANDEEP SINGH,

Petitioner,

v. 21-6223

NAC

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, Dalbir Singh & Associates, New 

York, NY.
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FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director;

Sunah Lee, Senior Trial Attorney, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioner Mandeep Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a 

March 19, 2021, decision of the BIA affirming an August 17, 2018, decision of an 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re 

Mandeep Singh, No. A208 419 125 (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 2021), aff’g No. A208 419 125 

(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 17, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts and procedural history.

Under the circumstances, we have considered the IJ’s decision as 

supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 

2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. “[T]he 

administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator 

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 
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Accordingly, we review an adverse credibility determination “under the 

substantial evidence standard.” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 

2018). We treat Singh’s challenge to the agency’s adverse credibility 

determination as exhausted because the BIA considered that determination 

despite Singh’s failure to adequately challenge it in his brief on appeal. See RuizMartinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 112 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008). 

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a 

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between 

the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and 

whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the

statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the 

consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . without regard to 

whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the 

applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s 

credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain 

that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” 
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Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 

F.3d at 76. 

In this case, substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that 

Singh was not credible as to his claim that Dera Sacha Sauda members attacked 

him on account of his Sikh faith and refusal to join their religious organization. 

The agency reasonably relied on the following record inconsistencies: (1) Singh

testified inconsistently regarding whether he knew the individuals who rescued 

him from his attackers and took him to the doctor, (2) his father’s and neighbor’s 

statements that he knew his rescuers conflicted with Singh’s final testimony that 

he did not know them, (3) Singh’s testimony that only his father accompanied him 

to the police station was inconsistent with his friend’s affidavit stating that the 

friend had accompanied Singh, (4) his testimony that he told only his family and 

the police about the attack was inconsistent with his village leader’s affidavit that 

Singh told him about the attack, and (5) Singh’s application and testimony were 

inconsistent regarding how long he lived in Delhi after fleeing his village. See

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) 

(“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ 

was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude 
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even more forcefully.”). Singh did not compellingly explain these 

inconsistencies. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner 

must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to 

secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)). Contrary to Singh’s 

argument, the agency did not err in relying on direct inconsistencies between 

Singh’s statements and witness statements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 

Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency reasonably relied further 

on his failure to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. 

“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, 

because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to 

rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. 

Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). In addition to the inconsistent witness 

statements, the agency reasonably declined to credit a letter purportedly from the 

medical clinic where Singh was treated because it was not contemporaneous with 

his treatment and the clinic’s name was spelled inconsistently on the document. 

See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the 
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agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary 

evidence.”). 

The inconsistencies and lack of reliable corroboration constitute substantial 

evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145 n.8; Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165–66; 

Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of 

all relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk of Court