J. S02012/19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

MICHAEL HAMILTON, : No. 1246 EDA 2018

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, June 24, 2009,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at Nos. CP-51-CR-0008274-2007,

CP-51-CR-0009838-2007

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 15, 2019

Michael Hamilton appeals from the June 24, 2009 judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after he entered 

an open guilty plea to one count each of robbery and possession of an 

instrument of crime1 (“PIC”) at Case No CP-51CR-008274-2007 and one count 

of robbery at Case No. CP-51-CR-0009838-2007 in connection with his 

commission of multiple armed robberies. The trial court imposed an 

aggregate sentence of 8 to 18 years of imprisonment. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the following procedural history.

On July 1, 2009, [appellant] filed a pro se

post-sentence motion, claiming that he pled guilty 

under duress and asked the sentencing court to 

reconsider the sentence imposed This motion was 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii) and 907(b), respectively.
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denied on August 20, 2009. [Appellant] did not file a 

direct appeal. On February 24, 2010, [appellant] filed 

a pro se PCRA[2] petition, alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel for failure to file post-sentence 

motions and a direct appeal. Emily Cherniak, Esquire 

was appointed as PCRA counsel on April 1, 2011. On 

June 28, 2012, PCRA counsel filed an Amended PCRA 

petition and requested an evidentiary hearing as to 

whether [appellant] should have his post-sentence 

motion and appellate rights reinstated nunc pro 

tunc. On August 3, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a 

Motion to Dismiss, stating that it would agree to an 

evidentiary hearing regarding the reinstatement of 

[appellant’s] appellate rights but would not agree to 

reinstatement of [appellant’s] post-sentence motion 

rights as [appellant] had failed to show prejudice. On 

December 6, 2017, the Honorable Roger F. Gordon 

sent [appellant] a Notice pursuant to [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 

907, indicating that his petition would be dismissed 

as without merit. On January 12, 2018, the matter 

was reassigned to this Court for further proceedings.

On March 28, 2018, both parties appeared before this 

Court and stated that they had reached an agreement 

to reinstate [appellant’s] appellate rights, but not his 

post-sentence motion rights nunc pro tunc. PCRA 

counsel agreed to remain on appeal. On April 24, 

2018, [appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal. On 

April 25, 2018, he filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. 

On July 11, 2018, upon receipt of all notes of 

testimony, this Court ordered that [appellant] file a 

Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal 

[p]ursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and defense counsel 

did so on July 31, 2018.

Trial court opinion, 8/11/18 at 2-3.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Whether the 

appellant’s guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because 

 

2 Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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defense counsel misrepresented the nature of the guilty plea to the appellant 

and the appellant wanted to assert his innocence and have a trial?” 

(Appellant’s brief at 5; full capitalization omitted).

In reviewing this appeal, we are mindful that:

after the court has imposed a sentence, a defendant 

can withdraw his guilty plea only where necessary to 

correct a manifest injustice. [P]ost-sentence motions 

for withdrawal are subject to higher scrutiny since 

courts strive to discourage the entry of guilty pleas as 

sentencing-testing devices. . . .

To be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly, 

voluntarily and intelligently entered. [A] manifest 

injustice occurs when a plea is not tendered 

knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and 

understandingly. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 

Procedure mandate pleas be taken in open court and 

require the court to conduct an on-the-record colloquy 

to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his rights 

and the consequences of his plea. Under Rule 590, 

the court should confirm, inter alia, that a defendant 

understands: (1) the nature of the charges to which 

he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; 

(3) he is giving up his right to trial by jury; (4) and 

the presumption of innocence; (5) he is aware of the 

permissible ranges of sentences and fines possible; 

and (6) the court is not bound by the terms of the 

agreement unless the court accepts the plea. The 

reviewing Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea 

colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting plea by 

examining the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the entry of that plea. Pennsylvania law 

presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was 

aware of what he was doing, and the defendant bears 

the burden of proving otherwise.

Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 352 (Pa.Super. 2014) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014).
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Additionally, “a defendant is bound by the statements which he makes 

during his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163, 1167 

(Pa. 1997) (citations omitted). As such, a defendant “may not assert grounds 

for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he pled 

guilty,” and he cannot recant the representations he made in court when he 

entered his guilty plea. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, the law does not 

require that a defendant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to plead 

guilty. The law only requires that a defendant’s decision to plead guilty be 

made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See Commonwealth v. 

Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 528-529 (Pa.Super. 2007).

Here, appellant contends that “defense counsel misrepresented the 

nature of his guilty plea, claiming that defense counsel[] told him he had 

negotiated a 5 to 10 year sentence and had one of [appellant’s] friends meet 

with [appellant] to talk him into it.” (Appellant’s brief at 11-12.)

Contrary to appellant’s contention, the record demonstrates that 

appellant tendered his pleas knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and 

understandingly. Appellant read, completed, and signed a four-page written 

guilty plea colloquy for the crimes to which he pled guilty in both cases, which 

are part of the certified record. (Written guilty plea colloquies, 6/24/09.) On 

those two separate colloquies, appellant affirmed, in writing, among other 

things, (i) that he committed the crimes to which he pled guilty; (ii) that his 

lawyer explained to him the elements of the offenses to which he pled guilty
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and that the Commonwealth must prove those elements beyond a reasonable 

doubt in order to obtain a conviction; (iii) that appellant knew that he could 

go to jail for up to 221⁄2 to 45 years for the crimes he committed; (iv) that 

appellant did not need to enter a guilty plea, but was able to plead not guilty 

and go to trial; (v) that appellant had sufficient time to discuss his cases with 

his lawyer and was satisfied with his lawyer’s advice and services; (vi) that 

although he was assisted by counsel, the final decision to plead guilty was his 

and his alone; and (vii) that he read the colloquies, or they were read to him, 

and that he understood the colloquies. (Id.) 

The record further reflects that at the beginning of the oral guilty plea 

colloquy, the trial court took a great deal of time not only to explain to 

appellant his options – jury trial, bench trial, or entry of a negotiated or open 

plea – but to describe those options, as well as their potential ramifications,

in detail. (Notes of testimony, 6/24/09 at 6-14.) After the trial court did so, 

appellant expressed his desire to attempt to negotiate a plea, and the trial 

court recessed the proceedings so the parties could speak privately as they 

saw fit. (Id. at 14-15.)

When the proceedings reconvened, the record reflects that appellant 

agreed to enter an open guilty plea to two counts of robbery and one count of 

PIC in exchange for the Commonwealth’s nolle prossing the remaining 
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charges.3 (Id. at 15-17, 19.) During that colloquy, appellant affirmed that 

he understood the written guilty plea colloquies; that he went over them with 

his attorney; that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation; and that 

the signatures on the forms were his own. (Id. at 19-21.) Appellant further

affirmed that no one in any way forced or coerced him to enter a guilty plea 

on either case. (Id. at 21.) Appellant denied being under the influence or 

suffering from any mental illness and acknowledged his understanding of the 

maximum sentences he faced. (Id. at 21-23.) After the Commonwealth read 

the facts underlying the charges, appellant admitted to the factual basis of the 

charges and entered his open pleas. (Id. at 27-30.)

After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the totality of 

the circumstances surrounding appellant’s entry of his guilty pleas 

demonstrates that appellant fully understood the nature and consequences of 

his pleas and that he entered the pleas knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, 

and understandingly.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

 

3 The remaining charges included criminal conspiracy, in violation of 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1), graded as a first-degree felony; aggravated assault 

in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a), graded as a first-degree felony; 

firearms not to be carried without a license, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6105(a)(1), graded as a third-degree felony; together with six misdemeanor 

charges. (Criminal information, CP-51-CR-0009383-2007, 9/4/07.)
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/15/19