If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

January 15, 2019

v No. 337190

Jackson Circuit Court

MARK EDWARD FEUSS, LC No. 15-004654-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and SAWYER and TUKEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by right his jury trial convictions of two counts of reckless driving 

causing death, MCL 257.626(4). The trial court sentenced defendant to 5 to 15 years’ 

imprisonment for each conviction. We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant’s convictions arose from a traffic accident that occurred on US-127 in Jackson 

County. Defendant was operating a 160,000-pound “gravel train” semitrailer truck when it 

collided with a Ford Focus that was waiting to turn left onto Liberty Road.

Robert Grant testified that he was riding as a passenger in Desiree Roberts’ vehicle on the 

day of the accident and that he observed defendant’s truck on US-12 driving “from one side of 

the road, off the shoulder, into oncoming traffic and then back on the road, repeatedly.” He saw 

the truck cross the “fog line” on the shoulder of the highway at least 10 times and cross the 

center line four or five times. At one point, Grant observed the truck cross into oncoming traffic 

and force a vehicle to veer onto a side road to avoid an accident. Grant testified that the vehicle 

he was in turned onto US-127 following defendant’s truck. After turning onto US-127, the truck 

continued to swerve “[n]ot as much over the center line, but he was still swerving real bad to the 

shoulder.” Grant saw defendant’s truck collide with the Ford Focus. Grant testified that 

defendant’s semitrailer truck as shown in photographs of the crash scene depicted the truck that 

he observed on the highway.
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Roberts testified that she drove behind defendant’s truck for a while on US-12 and then 

on US-127, and observed the truck veering to the right over the fog line. Roberts also testified 

that the truck at one point drifted over the centerline and caused an oncoming vehicle to leave the 

road to avoid a collision (although she testified that the other vehicle turned into a driveway 

rather than a side road). Roberts testified that she was afraid the truck would cause an accident 

and that she considered calling 911. Roberts saw defendant’s truck collide with a vehicle in 

front of the truck.

Susan Keunner testified that she was driving behind defendant’s semitrailer truck on US127 immediately before the accident. She saw the truck pull over onto the right shoulder of the 

road without stopping and then return to the right lane. Keunner testified that she passed the 

truck and that it then pulled into the passing lane behind her. She then noticed a small car ahead 

of her with its left turn signal activated, indicating that the vehicle was preparing to turn left onto 

Liberty Road. She began to slow down, but noticed that the truck was not slowing down and 

was overtaking her from behind; Keunner testified that she tapped on her brakes 10 to 20 times 

in an attempt to alert the driver of the truck to slow down. Keunner then decided to pull to the 

right to get around the small car that was turning left. After doing so, Keunner looked in her 

rearview mirror and saw the semitrailer truck collide into the back of the small vehicle.

Bradley Youtsey testified that he was driving in the opposite direction of the truck on 

US-127 when the accident happened. He testified that he saw Keunner’s vehicle “whipping 

around” a smaller vehicle that was turning left onto Liberty Road. Youtsey opined that that truck 

driver did not have time to react to avoid the smaller vehicle after Keunner’s vehicle left the lane.

Motor Carrier Officer Daryl Myers of the Michigan State Police testified that he 

inspected the truck after the accident and that the truck appeared to have been in good working 

mechanical order before the accident. Sergeant Alan Avery of the Michigan State Police 

testified as an expert in crash reconstruction. Sergeant Avery estimated that the speed of the 

truck was 59 to 63 miles per hour at the time that the truck’s driver applied the brakes, although 

he agreed that the outcome of the crash would not likely have been different if the truck had been 

travelling 55 miles per hour.

The prosecution also introduced into evidence a text message from defendant to his wife 

on the morning of the accident in which defendant informed his wife that he was “[r]eally tired 

today.” Defendant’s cellular phone records indicated that defendant placed a phone call about a 

minute before the accident. Defendant stated to police that he had used a hands-free device to 

place the call. A sheriff’s deputy testified that defendant’s cell phone records did not indicate 

whether defendant had done so.

A sample of defendant’s blood was taken shortly after the accident and was analyzed by 

the Michigan State Police Forensic Laboratory. At trial, Dr. Michele Glinn, PhD., testified for 

the prosecution as an expert in toxicology. Dr. Glenn testified that defendant’s toxicology report 

showed low levels of Valium and Vicodin in his blood. The levels were consistent with a single 

dose having been taken a day before the accident. She testified that Vicodin could cause nervous 

system and respiratory system depression, sleepiness, slowed reaction time, and drowsiness. Dr. 

Glinn testified that “anytime you have more than one drug together, you have the potential for 

the effects to be exaggerated or for the drug to persist in your system longer.” Dr. Glinn agreed 
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that taking Valium and Vicodin together would make a person less alert, more drowsy, less able 

to focus, and less able to concentrate.

Dr. Glinn reviewed part of defendant’s pharmacy record and concluded that defendant 

could not have taken the drugs chronically based on the amount that was prescribed and the date 

that it was prescribed. She testified that the effects of the drugs would be greater on someone 

who did not take the drugs on a regular basis.

On cross-examination, Dr. Glinn agreed that she had no personal knowledge of the actual 

impact that the medications had on defendant. Dr. Glinn testified that it was possible that the 

drugs did not impact defendant, but she stated that it did not seem likely that the drugs had no 

impact on defendant on the day of the accident. Dr. Glinn testified that both drugs were “within 

therapeutic range.”

Dr. Glinn concluded that, in her opinion, defendant “had levels of this drug in his system 

that potentially could have central nervous system effects on him.” She stated: “And the extent 

to which that was manifest, I cannot say for certain, but I would expect there to be some effects 

from these drugs.” She clarified that defendant “could have been” drowsy at the time of the 

accident, but she did not “know the extent to which he was showing effects of the drugs.” Dr. 

Glinn stated: “It is my opinion that he is likely feeling the effects, some effects. The extent to 

which he is feeling it I cannot say.”

Defendant presented several experts in his defense. His accident reconstruction expert, 

Rodney Sadler, testified that he believed the prosecution’s expert’s speed calculations “could be 

more accurate” if the expert had included more data points or conducted a drag factor test. 

Sadler opined that defendant was not driving in a “willful way to endanger other people on the 

road.” However, he agreed that defendant may have been “inattentive or distracted.” Defendant 

also presented the testimony of Larry Baareman, an expert in commercial trucking, who opined 

based on his review of the available information that defendant had been properly operating the 

“gravel train” truck. Baareman also testified that he had observed gravel trains frequently 

crossing the fog line in the area of US-127 where the accident occurred. Baareman opined that a 

vehicle flashing its brake lights would not be an effective way to alert a truck driver to slow 

down.

Defendant’s toxicology and emergency room medicine expert, Dr. Bryan Judge, testified 

that defendant’s blood level for Vicodin and Valium was below the therapeutic range. Dr. Judge 

opined that, based on the toxicology report, defendant had last taken Vicodin one or two days 

before the accident, and had last taken Valium at least 40 hours before the accident. He testified 

that the levels of these drugs in defendant’s blood were “very, very low levels, very minute 

amounts in a person that weighs 250 pounds.” Dr. Judge also testified that defendant had 

showed no indication of being under the influence of these drugs when he was taken to the 

emergency room following the accident. He concluded that the “minute amounts” of the 

prescriptions “did not contribute in the least at all” to the accident.

Defendant was convicted and sentenced as described. He moved for a new trial on the 

grounds that the evidence in support of his convictions was insufficient or that the verdict was 
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against the great weight of the evidence. The trial court denied his motion. This appeal 

followed.

II. ADMISSIBILITY OF DR. GLINN’S EXPERT TESTIMONY

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting the expert testimony of Dr. Glinn. 

We disagree. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to admit evidence. 

People v Bynum, 496 Mich 610, 623; 852 NW2d 570 (2014). We review de novo preliminary 

questions of law. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion when it admits evidence that is 

inadmissible as a matter of law. Id. We review unpreserved challenges to the admission of 

evidence for plain error affecting substantial rights. See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 752-

753; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

A. MRE 403

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by failing to exclude Dr. Glinn’s 

testimony under MRE 403, because Dr. Glinn’s testimony was of low probative value and the 

probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We disagree.

MRE 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the 

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 

less probable than it would be without the evidence.” In general, relevant evidence is admissible 

at trial. See MRE 402. But even if evidence is relevant under MRE 401, MRE 403 provides that 

relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”

“The ‘unfair prejudice’ language of MRE 403 refers to the tendency of the proposed 

evidence to adversely affect the objecting party’s position by injecting considerations extraneous 

to the merits of the lawsuit, e.g., the jury’s bias, sympathy, anger, or shock.” People v Cameron, 

291 Mich App 599, 611; 806 NW2d 371 (2011) (some quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that marginally probative evidence 

will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 

582 NW2d 785 (1998).

In this case, the jury was tasked with determining whether defendant was guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt of reckless driving causing death. The prosecution was required to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant operated his truck with willful and wanton disregard 

for the safety of persons or property. See MCL 257.626. Evidence that defendant had levels of 

narcotic medication in his system at the time of the accident was relevant to this determination, 

as it had at least some tendency to make a material fact “more probable or less probable that it 

would be without the evidence.” MRE 401. Dr. Glinn testified that Vicodin and Valium had 

adverse side effects including sedation, calming, sleepiness, slowed reaction time, and 

drowsiness. Although Dr. Glinn could not state with specificity the impact, if any, that the 

medication had on defendant at the time of the accident, she testified that the medication could 

impact people differently and opined that defendant would have been at least somewhat affected. 

This testimony was relevant in that it tended to support the prosecution’s theory that defendant 

operated the truck on the day of the accident despite knowingly be too tired to properly control it. 
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Dr. Glinn’s testimony was relevant to determining whether defendant may have been feeling 

sedated or drowsy as a result of his medications and, by continuing to drive, was acting with 

willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.

In addition to being relevant, the probative value of the evidence was not substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403. Dr. Glinn’s testimony did not inject 

into the proceeding extraneous considerations such as “jury’s bias, sympathy, anger, or shock.” 

Cameron, 291 Mich App at 611. Moreover, even if the evidence was only marginally probative, 

there was no danger that the jury would give Dr. Glinn’s testimony undue or preemptive weight. 

Crawford, 458 Mich at 398. On cross-examination, Dr. Glinn agreed that she did not know the 

extent to which the drugs may have impacted defendant. She testified that they “potentially 

could have central nervous system effects on him,” and agreed that if defendant was awake and 

alert in the emergency room it would potentially militate against her view that defendant had 

suffered adverse effects from the medication. Defendant’s emergency room medical records 

showed that he was awake and alert after the accident. Defendant’s expert also testified to the 

low levels of the medications present in defendant’s blood and opined that they had played no 

role in the accident. Dr. Glinn’s testimony was not unfairly prejudicial.

B. MRE 702

Defendant also argues that Dr. Glinn “misapplied standard principles and methods,” such 

that her testimony was inadmissible under MRE 702. However, defendant did not raise an 

MRE 702 objection or move for a Daubert1 hearing in the trial court. Instead, as noted above, 

defendant objected on MRE 402 and MRE 403 grounds. After the trial court ruled that Dr. 

Glinn’s testimony was admissible under MRE 402 and MRE 403, Dr. Glinn testified as an expert 

at trial. At the outset of her testimony, the prosecution tendered Dr. Glinn as an expert in the 

field of toxicology. The trial court asked defense counsel if he had any voir dire, and defense 

counsel stated: “No and I have no objection, Your Honor.” In doing so, defendant waived any 

MRE 702 objection to Dr. Glinn offering her expert opinion on the toxicology results. See 

People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000) (quotation marks and citations 

omitted) (“Waiver has been defined as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 

known right.”). Here, by affirmatively indicating that he did not object to Dr. Glinn being 

qualified as an expert, failing to request a Daubert hearing, and failing to challenge the methods 

and principles underlying Dr. Glinn’s testimony, defendant waived any objection under 

MRE 702.

Moreover, even if we were to treat the issue as unpreserved as opposed to waived, there 

is no plain error on the record. Carines, 460 Mich at 752-753. Defendant argued that Dr. 

Glinn’s opinion that the medications may have affected his cognitive abilities at the time of the 

accident was mere speculation, citing Dr. Judge’s testimony that the medications were below the 

therapeutic range. However, Dr. Glinn testified to the level of medications in defendant’s blood 

with reference to the “Winek scale.” Dr. Judge testified that the Winek scale is a reference that 

is used within the profession “to determine if a drug is therapeutic or possibly toxic.” Dr. Judge 

 1 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993).
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acknowledged the widespread use of the Winek scale and did not challenge the use of the scale 

itself, but rather opined that the state used “really sensitive instructions” in order to “pick up very 

small quantities of the drug.” Further, Dr. Glinn did not opine that defendant specifically was 

impaired by the levels of Valium and Vicodin in his system; in fact, she admitted that medication 

tolerance could reduce the drowsiness and sedating effects of these drugs. Dr. Judge and Dr. 

Glinn both acknowledged that there is wide variability in how individuals respond to these drugs. 

In short, both experts testified using the Winek scale, and agreed generally with regard to its 

shortcomings in determining the drugs’ effect on a specific person, although they reached 

different conclusions.

Based on the information presented to the trial court, there was no plain error in the 

admission of Dr. Glinn’s testimony under MRE 702. Carines, 460 Mich at 752-753. 

Defendant’s argument to the contrary does not concern admissibility, but rather witness 

credibility. Yet, “[w]itness credibility and the weight accorded to evidence is a question for the 

jury . . . .” People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 624; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). Defendant was 

free to (and did) argue that Dr. Judge was more credible and that Dr. Glinn’s testimony was not 

supported by the evidence. The jury was free to weigh Dr. Glinn’s testimony and determine her 

credibility.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We 

disagree. We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v 

Henderson, 306 Mich App 1, 8; 854 NW2d 234 (2014). When analyzing a claim of insufficient 

evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine 

“whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime 

charged were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Lundy, 467 Mich 254, 257; 650 

NW2d 332 (2002). “[C]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that 

evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” People v McKinney, 258 

Mich App 157, 165; 670 NW2d 254 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in 

original). “It is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may be 

fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences.” 

People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).

A conviction for reckless driving causing death requires the prosecution to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant operated a vehicle “upon a highway . . . or other place 

open to the general public,” (2) the operation was “in willful or wanton disregard for the safety 

of persons or property,” and (3) the defendant’s operation of the vehicle “cause[d] the death of 

another person.” MCL 257.626(2), (4). “[T]o show that a defendant acted in willful and wanton 

disregard of safety, something more than ordinary negligence must be proved.” People v Carll, 

322 Mich App 690, 695; 915 NW2d 387(2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “When 

willful and wanton behavior is an element of a criminal offense it is not enough to show 

carelessness. Rather, a defendant must have a culpable state of mind.” Id. (quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient 

evidence to allow a rational jury to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt of two counts 
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of reckless driving causing death. There was no dispute that defendant operated a vehicle on a 

highway open to the public and that defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused the death of two 

individuals. MCL 257.626(2), (4). The element at issue in this case is whether there was 

sufficient evidence to prove that defendant’s operation of his vehicle was with willful or wanton 

disregard for the safety of persons or property. Evidence at trial established that a short time 

before the accident, defendant was driving his vehicle in a manner that “willfully or wantonly 

disregarded a high risk of serious injury” to persons on the highway. For example, multiple 

witnesses observed that defendant’s truck repeatedly left its lane, both by crossing the fog line to 

the right and by driving into the oncoming traffic lane, which on one occasion forced an 

oncoming vehicle to abruptly leave the highway to avoid collision. Witnesses also testified that 

defendant’s truck moved into the passing lane behind Keunner’s vehicle and that it was 

following closely enough that it was unable to avoid the Ford Focus when Keunner’s vehicle left 

the passing lane. There was evidence that defendant was aware that he was “really tired” earlier 

that day, that he had some levels of Vicodin and Valium in his system, and that he placed a 

cellular call immediately before the accident. While defendant points to discrepancies and 

inconsistencies between witnesses’ testimony, the jury heard the testimony and was free to 

“determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight 

to be accorded those inferences.” Hardiman, 466 Mich at 428. A rational jury could have 

concluded that defendant drove while aware that he was extremely tired and possibly affected by 

his earlier use of narcotic medication, that defendant continued to drive after his truck repeatedly 

crossed the center and fog lines and forced an oncoming vehicle off the road, and that 

immediately before the accident defendant placed a cellular telephone call. These conclusions 

would support a finding that defendant operated his vehicle recklessly causing death. See Boos v 

Sauer, 266 Mich 230, 233; 253 NW 278 (1934) (noting, in the context of a driver that fell asleep 

while driving, that falling asleep while driving constitutes gross negligence if there was “such 

prior warning of the likelihood of sleep that continuing to drive constitutes reckless disregard of 

the consequences.”)

IV. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial 

on the ground that the jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree. 

“We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for a new trial on 

the ground that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.” People v Lacalamita, 

286 Mich App 467, 469; 780 NW2d 311 (2009). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial 

court chooses an outcome falling outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Id.

“The test to determine whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence is 

whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage 

of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” Id. “Generally, a verdict may be vacated only when the 

evidence does not reasonably support it and it was more likely the result of causes outside the 

record, such as passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some other extraneous influence.” Id. 

“Conflicting testimony, even when impeached to some extent, is an insufficient ground for 

granting a new trial.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Further, the resolution of 

credibility questions is within the exclusive province of the jury.” Id.
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In this case, the evidence did not “preponderate[] so heavily against the verdict that it 

would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” Id. There was no evidence that 

the jury’s verdict was more likely the result of causes outside the record. Instead, as discussed 

above, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions. Two witnesses testified 

that they observed defendant driving in an erratic manner shortly before the accident. Although 

defendant maintains that these witnesses were not credible because of discrepancies in their 

testimony, conflicting evidence is not sufficient to find that a verdict was against the great weight 

of the evidence. Id. Furthermore, the prosecution introduced other evidence to support 

defendant’s guilt, including a text message, evidence that defendant placed a phone call shortly 

before the accident, and evidence that there were prescription drugs in defendant’s system at the 

time of the accident. The jury’s verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence and the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial. 

Lacalamita, 286 Mich App at 469.

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

/s/ David H. Sawyer

/s/ Jonathan Tukel