2021 IL App (1st) 171839-U

No. 1-17-1839 

Order filed February 5, 2021

Sixth Division 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v. 

JAMES DENT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 16 CR 4633 

Honorable 

Angela M. Petrone, 

Judge, Presiding. 

JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the judgment of the court.

Justice Harris concurred in the judgment. 

 Presiding Justice Mikva specially concurred.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant forfeited review of his claim that the State’s reason for striking 

prospective juror Dowdy violated Batson where he failed to object in the trial court; 

defendant waived any claims on review regarding the State’s reasons for striking 

prospective jurors Webb Hill and Williams Peck where he made no substantive 

arguments on those claims in his brief; the trial court’s finding that the State’s 

offered reasons for striking prospective jurors Meiley and Clesen were not racially 

motivated was not clearly erroneous where such reasons were not inherently 

discriminatory and therefore race-neutral. 
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¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant James Dent (defendant) was convicted of delivery of a 

controlled substance. Based on his criminal background, defendant was sentenced as a Class X 

offender to an eight-year prison term. On appeal, defendant contends that he is entitled to a new 

trial because the State violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) by using all of its 

peremptory strikes on five African-American venirepersons and providing pretextual reasons for 

striking three of them. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The evidence presented at trial reveals that defendant was arrested on February 25, 2016, 

and charged by indictment with two counts of delivery of less than one gram of a controlled 

substance. Defendant rejected a plea agreement for a five-year sentence from the State and instead 

elected to proceed to a jury trial. As defendant has only raised one issue on appeal related to jury 

selection, we will confine our discussion of the underlying facts relevant to those pretrial 

proceedings. 

¶ 5 The record reflects that the trial court conducted voir dire of prospective jurors on May 30, 

2017. There was a total of 34 prospective jurors separated into two groups and questioned for jury 

selection. The first group consisted of 26 persons: (1) Guiseppe Pallazzolo, (2) Silviane 

Magallanes, (3) Eva Gonzalez, (4) Ahmed Malik, (5) Charles Servidio, (6) Miss Dowdy1

, (7) 

Shelia Lufrano, (8) Edward Agase, (9) Maria Ramirez Dias, (10) Frances Ferro, (11) Glynnis 

Webb Hill, (12) James Janetopoulos, (13) Charles Grier, (14) Richard White, (15) Janet Lamorte, 

(16) Carla Labriola, (17) Richard Hawke, (18) Angela Whitten, (19) Dalvan Meiley, (20) LaToya 

Williams Peck, (21) Violet Potocki, (22) John Bobowski, (23) Paula Putziger, (24) Gloria 

1 The record does not indicate a first name for Miss Dowdy.
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Rodriguez, (25) Nicole Kaffel, and (26) Shantil Clesen. The second group consisted of eight 

persons: (27) Rolando Delgado, (28) Diana Fenway, (29) Hiram White, (30) Peter Pechona, (31) 

Travis McBride, (32) Sangar Sayyad, (33) Frances Tool Gray, and (34) Juan Alaniz. 

¶ 6 The trial court began voir dire of each group by asking each prospective juror general 

questions about whether they knew the defendant, the attorneys, police officers or other witnesses. 

Next, the court admonished the group on the procedures and conduct of the trial itself. The 

prospective jurors were then questioned about their ability to decide the case without sympathy, 

bias, or prejudice; whether they could follow the law even if they disagree; and whether they 

understood the presumption of defendant’s innocence. All of the prospective jurors indicated that 

they could do so and that they understood the admonishments. The trial court also questioned the 

prospective jurors about whether they could judge the testimony of police officers the same as 

other witnesses, and whether they would agree not to do any outside research on the case and 

instead wait until all the evidence was presented before making up their minds. All of the 

prospective jurors indicated that they understood and could do so. After prospective juror, Potocki, 

indicated that she was currently involved in a lawsuit, the trial court proceeded to question the 

prospective jurors individually.

¶ 7 Once the trial court finished questioning the first group of 26 prospective jurors, the State, 

defense counsel, and defendant joined the trial judge in her chambers to discuss the prospective 

jurors and whether any of them required further questioning by the parties. The State noted that 

prospective jurors Grier, Hawke, and Whitten failed to disclose convictions or arrests in their 

backgrounds. After further questioning of those prospective jurors by the trial court, the State 

moved to dismiss all three for cause. Prospective jurors Hawke and Whitten were dismissed for 
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cause over the defense’s objection. The State also moved to dismiss prospective juror Lamorte for 

cause. The defense moved to dismiss prospective juror Potocki for cause.

¶ 8 The record indicates that both the State and the defense used five peremptory strikes in the 

first group of 26 prospective jurors. The defense struck prospective jurors Pallazzolo, Lufrano and 

Agase without objection by the State. The State struck prospective jurors Dowdy and Webb Hill 

without objection by the defense. When the State struck prospective jurors Meiley and Williams 

Peck, the defense objected and raised a Batson challenge because they were African-American. 

The State responded by raising a Batson challenge to all of the defense’s peremptory strikes as all

of them were for White jurors. The trial court ultimately found that both sides raised a prima facie 

Batson challenge and asked for race-neutral reasons for the strikes. We begin by noting that neither 

the State or defense made a reference to race as a reason for striking the prospective jurors.

¶ 9 With respect to Meiley, the State indicated that he was vague as to his work history and 

was a shooting victim in a case where no arrest was made. The State expressed concern about his 

fairness to police because no arrest was made in his case. Upon objection, the trial court indicated 

that while it disagreed about the vagueness of Meiley’s work history, it found that concern about 

fairness to police was race-neutral. The defense made no further objection. 

¶ 10 With respect to Williams Peck, the State noted that her family member had a drug case, 

she visited prisoners in the county jail who had drug cases, and defendant was charged with a drug 

case. The trial court found the State’s reasons to be race-neutral. The defense made no further 

objection. 

¶ 11 With respect to Pallazzolo, the defense indicated that his brothers were police officers, and 

they did not like how he looked at defendant. The trial court found that the juror’s family being 
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officers was a race-neutral reason, but disagreed that the juror looked at defendant in any 

meaningful way. The State made no further objection. 

¶ 12 With respect to Lufrano, the defense indicated that her family and friends were police 

officers. The trial court found the reason to be race-neutral, although it did not agree with the 

reasoning. The State made no further objection. 

¶ 13 With respect to Agase, the defense stated that he knew police officers, had an interest in 

crime shows, and that they did not like how he looked at defendant. The trial court found that the 

strike was race-neutral because the juror knew police officers. The State made no further objection.

¶ 14 The court then asked the State to give race-neutral reasons for striking Dowdy and Webb 

Hill, even though the record does not indicate that the defense raised a Batson challenge to those 

strikes. With respect to Dowdy, the State expressed concern that she was a psychology major and 

watched The First 48 “a lot.” They reasoned that The First 48 was an inappropriate way to view 

how police actually worked. The trial court disagreed with their reasoning, but nevertheless found 

the reason to be race-neutral. The defense made no further objection. 

¶ 15 With respect to Webb Hill, the State noted that her ex-husband had been arrested for and 

convicted of several drug charges and that she might be biased against defendant. The trial court 

accepted the reason as race-neutral. The defense made no further objection.

¶ 16 From the final panel, the State struck prospective juror Clesen (26), an African-American 

female, and the defense raised a Batson challenge. The defense struck prospective juror Labriola 

(16), a White female, and the State raised a Batson challenge. 

¶ 17 The State noted Clesen’s statements that she was a theology student, visited the county jail 

for ministry work in the prior 15 months, and that she watched the television program Criminal 
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Minds. The State believed she would be sympathetic to defendant instead of basing a decision on 

the facts of the case. The trial court indicated that it understood the “theology business” and that 

she would be inclined to be more sympathetic. The court subsequently found the reason to be 

race-neutral. The defense made no further objection. 

¶ 18 The defense stated that Labriola had friends who were police officers and that her daughter 

had been previously charged with an offense. The defense believed she was possibly judgmental. 

The court found the reason to be race-neutral. The State made no further objection. 

¶ 19 The trial court noted that while it did not agree with either party’s reasoning for striking 

the jurors, particularly those that knew police officers, it nevertheless found that neither side 

violated Batson. At this point, the court concluded that, since each side had used five strikes, they 

each had two left. 

¶ 20 From the second group, the State and defense each struck one prospective juror. The State 

struck prospective juror Delgado (27), a Hispanic male, who was a security officer and was 

preparing to be a Chicago police officer. The defense struck prospective juror Pechona (30), a 

White male, whose daughter had a drug problem and had been arrested several times on drug 

charges. 

¶ 21 The final jury makeup was as follows: Magallanes, a White female; Gonzalez, a Hispanic 

female; Malik, an Indian male; Servidio, a White male; Ramirez Diaz, a Hispanic female; Ferro, a 

White female; Janetopoulos, a White male; R. White, a White male; Bobowski, a White male; 

Putziger, a Black female; Kaffel, a White female; and Fenway, a White female. The two alternate 

jurors were H. White, a Black male; and McBride, a White male. 
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¶ 22 The case proceeded to trial on May 31, 2017, and the jury subsequently returned a verdict 

of guilty. On June 22, 2017, defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or 

alternatively, a new trial. In the motion, defendant alleged evidentiary errors, reasonable doubt, 

errors in giving the State’s proffered jury instructions, and error in allowing the State to excuse 

Clesen over the defense’s objection. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, and the matter 

proceeded to sentencing. 

¶ 23 During sentencing, the court noted that defendant was eligible for Class X sentencing (6 to 

30 years) based on his background. As such, the court sentenced him to eight years based on the 

mitigating evidence and because it believed defendant had rehabilitative potential. Defendant’s 

motion to reconsider the sentence was denied and this appeal followed. 

¶ 24 ANALYSIS

¶ 25 On appeal, defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the State violated 

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by using all of its peremptory strikes on five AfricanAmerican venirepersons and provided pretextual reasons for three of them. In support of his 

contention, defendant asserts that the trial court committed clear error when it ruled that the State 

provided adequate race-neutral reasons for striking three African-American jurors, specifically 

Dowd, Meiley and Clesen. The defendant further maintains that the State did not accept a single 

African-American to serve on the jury. Defendant argues that the reasons provided by the State 

lacked credibility and were pretextual. He further alleges that the fact that the State accepted other 

jurors with the same characteristics raises an inference of purposeful discrimination. Defendant 

concludes that the State “purposely excused African-Americans so that not a single AfricanAmerican juror would decide his case.” 
No. 1-17-1839 

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¶ 26 Next, defendant contends that his claims were preserved in his posttrial motion. However, 

as noted above, defendant only challenged the State’s strike of Clesen in his posttrial motion. 

While failure to raise specific claims in posttrial motions, would ordinarily result in forfeiture of 

those claims on appeal, a Batson challenge preserves peremptory strikes that were timely objected 

to during voir dire for review. People v. Primm, 319 Ill. App. 3d 411, 419 (2000). As noted herein 

above, defendant did in fact object to Meiley during voir dire. Thus, defendant’s claims with 

respect to Meiley and Clesen were preserved for purposes of this appeal. 

¶ 27 We do note, however, that defendant has forfeited any claims regarding to the State’s 

peremptory challenge of Dowdy because no objection was raised during voir dire. See People v. 

King, 192 Ill. 2d 189, 196 (2000). Moreover, defendant raises no specific arguments on appeal 

with respect to Webb Hill and Williams Peck in his brief. Accordingly, any arguments related to 

the State’s strike of those prospective jurors are also waived for review. See Supreme Court Rule 

341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018). See also People v. Hobson, 117 Ill. App. 3d 191, 200 (1983) 

(defendant waived issues for which no argument was made in appellate brief even though he made 

general allegations as to such issues). As a result, we will confine our discussion to defendant’s 

claims related to the State’s strike of Meiley and Clesen. 

¶ 28 The purpose of voir dire is to ascertain sufficient information about prospective jurors’ 

beliefs in order to allow removal of those venirepersons whose minds are so closed by bias and 

prejudice that they cannot apply the law as instructed in accordance with their oath. People v. 

Hope, 168 Ill. 2d 1, 30 (1995). 

¶ 29 The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the State from using its 

peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified venire persons based solely on their race. 
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U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. In Batson, the United States Supreme Court set 

forth a three-step process for evaluating whether the State used a peremptory challenge in a racially 

discriminatory manner. People v. Payne, 2015 IL App (2d) 120856, ¶ 42 (citing People v. Easley, 

192 Ill. 2d 307, 323 (2000)). To establish a prima facie case, the defendant must demonstrate that 

“relevant circumstances” raise an inference of purposeful discrimination based on race. Batson, 

476 U.S. at 96. The threshold for making out a prima facie case under Batson is not high, “a 

defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to 

permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” Johnson v. California, 

545 U.S. 162, 170 2005); People v. Davis, 231 Ill. 2d 349, 360 (2008). 

¶ 30 Second, if the moving party makes a prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the 

nonmoving party to articulate a race-neutral explanation for excusing the venireperson. People v. 

Hogan, 389 Ill. App. 3d 91, 100 (2009). A race-neutral basis means “an explanation based on 

something other than the race of the juror.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991).

Once the non-moving party articulates race-neutral reasons for excusing the venireperson in 

question, the trial court must then move to the third step. Id.

¶ 31 At the third step, the trial court must evaluate both, the reasons the nonmoving party struck 

the potential juror, as well as the moving party’s claim that the proffered reasons are pretextual to 

determine whether the moving party has carried his burden of establishing purposeful 

discrimination. Id. The trial court’s finding of whether purposeful discrimination has been proved 

is a finding of fact and will not be overturned on review unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. 

¶ 32 The Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory 

purpose. Davis, 231 Ill. 2d at 360. However, the mere fact of a peremptory challenge to a black 
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venireperson who is the same race as defendant or the mere number of black venirepersons who 

are peremptorily challenged, without more, will not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 

Id. at 360-61. 

¶ 33 Turning to the case at bar, the record establishes that both the State and the defense had a 

total of seven peremptory challenges each. Both sides used five peremptory challenges prior to 

selecting the 12th juror, and both raised Batson challenges: the defense because the State struck 

three African-American venirepersons, and the State because the defense struck five White 

venirepersons. The trial court found that both sides established prima facie cases under Batson, 

and asked both sides to offer race-neutral reasons for striking the prospective jurors. 

¶ 34 Once the trial court determines that the State had an adequate race-neutral reason for 

exercising the peremptory challenges, our determination is whether the trial court erred in finding 

that the State’s explanation for striking the prospective juror was race-neutral and valid. See 

Payne, 2015 IL App (2d) 120856, ¶ 47. 

¶ 35 According to the record, the State indicated that it struck Meiley because he was vague 

about his work history and was a shooting victim in a case where no arrest was made. The State 

expressed concern about his fairness to police because no arrest was made in his case. The trial 

court reasoned that Meiley’s background as a shooting victim in an unresolved case was a raceneutral reason for excluding him as a prospective juror. 

¶ 36 Defendant, however, asserts that the State’s explanation was pretextual because it 

accepted non-African-American jurors who were similarly situated, namely Fenway and McBride. 

Both Fenway and McBride were victims of crimes where the offenders were never arrested. A 

review of the record establishes that defendant never made this argument before the trial court, 
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and raises it for the first time on appeal. Thus, it is waived. People v. Robinson ̧ 89 Ill. App. 3d

211, 213 (1980). 

¶ 37 With respect to Clesen, the State indicated that it struck her as a prospective juror because 

she was a theology student who recently visited the county jail for ministry work. The State 

believed she would be sympathetic to defendant instead of basing her decision on the facts of the 

case. The trial court found this to be a race-neutral reason for the strike. Defendant claims that the 

State’s reason was pretextual because other venirepersons with degrees were accepted and H. 

White, who was a pastor, was accepted as an alternate juror. The record establishes that defendant 

never made this argument before the trial court, and raises it for the first time on appeal. Thus, it 

is waived. Robinson, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 213. 

¶ 38 Waiver aside, we reject defendant’s arguments that the State’s proffered reasons for the 

strikes to Meiley and Clesen were not race-neutral. A race-neutral reason for peremptory strikes 

does not need to be persuasive, plausible or make sense, but rather is a reason that does not deny 

equal protection. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d at 324. Absent an inherently discriminatory intent in the 

State’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed to be race-neutral. Id. 

¶ 39 A determination is clearly erroneous when a review of the entire record leaves the 

reviewing court with the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People 

Bradshaw, 2020 IL App (3d) 180027, ¶ 37, (quoting People v. Payne, 2015 IL App (2d0 120856, 

¶ 43). 

¶ 40 Here, the record indicates that the State never indicated that it was striking any prospective 

juror based on race. Additionally, we find that the State’s offered reason for striking Meiley did

not establish an inherently discriminatory intent; he was the victim of a violent crime that caused 

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bodily injury whereas the other potential jurors experienced property damage. The level of 

potential bias or prejudice against the police may differ depending on the severity of the crime. 

We find that such reason is race-neutral. 

¶ 41 Similarly, despite defendant’s assertion, the State never indicated that it struck Clesen

because of her education. To the contrary, the record indicated that she was a theology student

who visited inmates at Cook County jail for ministry work during the prior 15 months. She also 

stated that she watched Criminal Minds. The alternate juror, H. White, who was also black and a

pastor, stated that he previously visited Cook County jail approximately 20 times over the years 

for pastoral counseling, the last time being approximately two years ago, and that he watched 

Grey’s Anatomy. The record also indicated other differences in their backgrounds related to 

employment history and prior jury service. Defendant has not cited, nor have we found, a case that 

stands for the proposition that the striking of a venireperson who is the same race and shares similar 

characteristics as an accepted venireperson will be susceptible to a Batson challenge. In this case, 

the State’s belief that Clesen would be inclined to be sympathetic towards defendant and not base 

her decision on the evidence is sufficiently race-neutral. 

¶ 42 We need not address defendant’s alternative contention that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to preserve this issue for appellate review as we have determined herein that it was in fact 

preserved for review.

¶ 43 Accordingly, the trial court’s decision that the State’s peremptory challenges were not 

based on race was not clearly erroneous.

¶ 44 CONCLUSION

¶ 45 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
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¶ 46 Affirmed. 

¶ 47 MIKVA, J., specially concurring:

¶ 48 I join in all aspects of this well-crafted opinion, other than the majority’s findings, 

supra ¶¶ 27, 36 and 37, that certain of Mr. Dent’s arguments were not preserved for appeal. 

¶ 49 First, as to juror Dowdy (supra ¶ 27), I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Mr. 

Dent had to raise a Batson challenge after the trial court had spontaneously asked the State for its 

race-neutral reasons for striking her. As our supreme court has recognized, “a trial court has the 

authority to raise a Batson issue sua sponte in appropriate circumstances.” People v. Rivera, 221 

Ill. 2d 481, 504 (2006). By asking the State for its race-neutral reason for striking Ms. Dowdy, the 

court had begun the first step of the three-step Batson inquiry, and I agree with Mr. Dent that it 

would have made little sense at that point for defense counsel to also raise an objection. I note 

however, that defense counsel would be well-advised for the future to specifically note their 

objections in these circumstances. 

¶ 50 I would reach the merits of the Batson claim as to Ms. Dowdy, and find, for the same 

reasons that the majority opinion has rejected the other Batson challenges, that this challenge 

should be rejected on appeal. As the court points out, supra ¶ 38, “[a] race-neutral reason for 

peremptory strikes does not need to be persuasive, plausible or make sense, but rather is a reason

that does not deny equal protection. [Citation.] Absent an inherently discriminatory intent in the 

State’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed to be race-neutral. [Citation.]” In this case, 

the State’s explanation for striking Ms. Dowdy was their concern that she was a psychology major 

and watched the television show “The First 48” “a lot.” They reasoned that “The First 48” was an 

inappropriate way to view how police actually worked. I would not disagree with the trial court’s 

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finding that the State’s asserted concern that “The First 48” might give Ms. Dowdy a negative 

view of the police was a “race-neutral” reason for striking her. 

¶ 51 As to prospective jurors Meiley and Clesen, the majority accepts (supra ¶¶ 36, 37) the 

State’s contention that Mr. Dent was required to object both to the preemptory challenge itself and 

then, again, as to the State’s proffered race-neutral reason for the challenge. According to the 

majority, Mr. Dent’s failure to do so resulted a forfeiture of his right to argue on appeal that the 

proffered race-neutral reason was pretextual. 

¶ 52 The State cites no case that holds that this second objection is required. To the contrary, 

Mr. Dent’s Batson challenge is a claim that the State intentionally used its preemptory challenges 

in a racially discriminatory matter. 476 U.S. at 93. That claim is made at the point that a party 

raises a Batson objection to a preemptory challenge and remains through all three steps of the 

Batson procedure. As our supreme court has made clear, “[w]e require parties to preserve issues 

or claims for appeal; we do not require them to limit their arguments [on appeal] to the same 

arguments that were made below.” Brunton v. Kruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 76. Mr. Dent made 

claims below that these two preemptory challenges were racially discriminatory. Mr. Dent can 

now make any argument he can muster in support of those claims. I would not find any forfeiture 

of his arguments that the reasons the State gave for striking these two jurors were a pretext for 

racial discrimination. However, I do agree with the majority that these arguments are, ultimately, 

not persuasive.