### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 504 -CV

Ci tyof Elg in, Te xa s, App e lla nt

v. John Wi lliam R eagan, as next friend of J. W. R., Jr., a c hild , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ASTROP COUNTY , 335TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 25,4 63 , HO NORAB LE TERRY L. F LENNIK EN , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lle e John Willi a m Re a g an su e d the City of El g in u nd e r t he Te xas T or

t Cla ims Act (TT CA), alleg ing that the C ity was neg lige nt and grossly neg lige nt in allowing Re ag an’s wif e to adopt a dogthat later attacked the couple’ s y oung son. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(2) ( West 2007). The City filed a joint plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgme nt, arguing that sovereig n immunit y barr ed Rea g an’s c laims. I n one orde r, t h e t rial cour t denied the ple a to the jurisdi ction and summary -judg ment motion. The City appea ls. Bec ause w e deter mine that sovere ign immunit y shields the City from suit, we re verse the trial cour t’s order and rende r judg ment dismiss ing Re ag an’s suit for w ant of subjec t-matter jurisdiction.
BACK GR OUND The e vidence submitt ed to the trial c ourt by both parties with re g ard to the City ’s joint plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgme nt establishes the following fac tual2

backg round: On August 19, 2003, Kar i Re ag an adopted an adult male Dober man from the City

of Elg in Animal Shelter. She first met the dog during a visit to the shelter a bout two weeks be fore the adoption. During her initial visit, she spoke with Animal C o n t ro l Of fi cer Ethel Spence about the do g . K ari te sti fi e d in

he r d e po sit ion

that Sp ence told h e r t

hat sh e kn e w the do g wa s g oo d w ith children beca

use the dog was broug ht into the shelter by children who had to move and could not take the dogwith them. Spence sa id that she was unsure how the dogwould behave around othe r dog s. Kari spe nt about fiftee n minutes petting a nd playing w ith the dog and observe d that he wa s “re ally friendly .” A c ou ple we e ks la te r, Spe nc e c a lle d Ka ri a t wo rk and

tol d h e r t hat sh e wa s g oin g to have to e uthanize the dog if Kar i or someone e lse did not a dopt him. Kar i left work a nd went to the shelter. The re, she told Spence that she w ould like to take the dogbut that she did not have the money for the a doption fee. Spenc e said that she would waive the f ee. K ari told Spence that she had two other dog s and four

y oung children at home. Spence reiter ated that she knew the dog was g ood with kids but that she was unsure of how i t behave d with other dogs. Spence told Kar i to take the do g ho me and

int ro du c e him

to h e r o the r dog s. She sa id that if the do g s g ot a lon g we ll, Ka ri sh ou ld keep the new dog , but if they did not ge t along , she should return him to the shelter
. Kar i signe d adoption paper s and took the dog home. She introduce d him to her other dog s and let them spend t i m e t o gether. She stay ed home f or four or five hour s and obser

ved the dog s, who play ed tog ether and see med to g et alongwell. At about 5: 30 pm, she l eft to pick up her children f rom day car e. B efor e she le ft, she put the new d o g o n a chain and tied him to a tree
. Shortly afte r she r eturne d with her c hildren, a f amily friend, D enni s W ad e, arr ived to wait for Ka ri ’s hu sb a nd

to g e t ho me fr om w or

k. Whil e Wad e wa ite d, he and Ka ri sat dow n at a p ic nic ta

bleI n October 2006, Reag an filed a n amende d petition, adding a n alleg ation that the City

was 1 strictly lia b l e fo r J .W.R .’s injuries bec ause the dog was “ unrea sonably dang erous.” Although the amende d petition was filed af ter t h e appea l, we tre at the ame nded petition as the a ctive plea ding beca use both parties do so in their br iefs. 3 and talked. K ari ke pt her y oung est child with her, but her three other children s catter ed in di ffe rent dir e c tio ns . M e anw hil e , th e ne w d ogwa s st ill tie d to a tr e e a bo ut f if te e n f e e t be hin d K ari . T he n, le ss than thirty

minutes after

Kar i and Wade sat down, the y hear d g rowling and screa m i ng from the direc tion of the dog . Kar i turned ar ound to see the dogattackingher f our-y ear -old son, J .W.R ., who she had just re cently

seen sitting on the g round playing with a truck. She ran to he r son, pushed the dog off of him, and laid on top of him to protec t him. Wade was just be hind K ari and either hit the dog to ge t i t aw ay o r gra b bed the dogby the collar , keepingit from g oing ba ck towar d Kar i and J .W.R
. J .W.R
. had blood on his f ace and wa s cry

ing. K ari c arr ied J .W.R . inside the house, whe re she used a towel to try

to stop the bleeding . Meanw hile, J ohn Wil liam Reag an, Ka ri’s husband a

nd J .W.R .’s father, a

rrived home and discove red w hat happe ned. Within m inutes of his arr ival, he shot the dog in the head, killing it. He and Kar i the n took J.W .R. to a hospital in Taylor, wher e hospital staff c leane d J .W.R .’s wounds and stopped the bleedi n g. Ka ri an d Reag an we re the n told to take J .W.R . to another hospital to g et his wounds stitched, which they did. I n Aug ust 2005, Reag an filed suit, individually and on behalf of J.W .R., ag ainst the City of Elg in, alleg ing that the City was ne g lige nt and g rossly neg lige nt in failing to de stroy the dog and in allowing Kar i to adopt it. R eag an later filed a motion to nonsuit his individual c laims, which the trial court g rante d. I n April 2006, the City filed a joint motion for summary judgme nt and plea to the jurisdiction, which was de nied by the trial cour

t. This appeal f

ollowed. 14 STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW I n Texas, sovereig n immunit y deprive s a trial cour

t of subject-matter jurisdiction for laws uit s in

wh ic h th e state or

c e rt a in g ov e rnme nta l un its have be e n s ue d unle ss t he state c on se nts to suit. Texas De

p’t of Parks & W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3 d 2 1 7 , 2 2 4 (T ex . 2004). Thus, a g overnme ntal unit properly raises the i s s u e by

a plea to the jurisdiction. Se e id
. a t 2 2 5
- 2 6
. We revie w de novo the trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. Id
. at 226. I n revie wing a ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction, we do not weig h the merits of the c laim but consider only the plaintiff’s p l e a d i n g s , c o n s t r

u e d i n t h e p l a i n t i f

f ’ s f a v o r , an d t h e e v i d e n c e p e rt i n e n tt o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i n qu i r y. Cou nty of C am e ro n v . B ro wn , 80 S.W .3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). When a plea to the jur isdiction challeng es the pleading s, we deter mine if the plea der has alleg ed facts t hat affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the ca use. Miranda , 1 3 3 S.W .3d at 226. I f a pla intiff fails to plead f acts suff icient to establish jurisdiction, but the petition does not affirmatively demonstrate inc urable defe cts i n j u ri sdiction, the issue is one of pleadingsufficie ncy , and the plaintiff should be aff orded an opportunity

to amend. Id . at 226-27. I f t he pleadings affirmatively neg ate the exis tence of j urisdiction, a plea to the jur isdiction may be g rante d without allowing the pla intiff an opportunity to amend. Id . at 227. I f a ple a to the jurisdiction chal le n g e s th e e xis te n ce of jurisdictional fac ts, we consider rele vant evidenc e submitted by the parties when necessa ry to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised, as the trial c ourt is require d to do. Id . I f the e vidence cre ates a fa ct question reg ardingthe jur isd ic tio na l is su e , th e n th e tr ia l c ourt c ann ot g ra

nt the ple a to the jur isd ic tio n, and the fa c t is su e wi ll be re solved by

the fa ct-finde r. Id . at 227- 28 . H ow e ve r, if the re le va nt e vid e nc e is u

nd isp ute d o r f

a ils5

to raise a fac t question on the jurisdictiona l i s s u e, t h e t ri al cour t should rule on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id . at 228.

DISCUSSIO N Gove rnm ental or Proprietary Fu nction

Citi e s r e ta in i mmunit

y fr om su it f

or tor ts c omm itt e d in

the pe rf or manc e of the ir g overnme ntal functions unless the leg islature has expressly , by clea r and unambig uo u s l an guag e,
w a i v e d t h a ti m m u n i t y. Se e City of L aP or te v . B ar

fie ld , 898 S.W .2d 288, 291 (T ex . 1 995). Go ve rnme nta l f

u n c tio ns are a c ts i nv olv ingpure ly g ov e rnme nta l matte rs so le ly fo r t he pu bli c be ne fi t. Too k e v . Ci ty of M e x ia , 197 S.W .3d 325, 343 (Tex. 2006). I n contra st, cities are not immune from suit for torts c ommitt ed in the perf ormanc e of their proprieta ry functions. Id . Proprietar y functions
are tho se the c ity

c on du c ts i n it s p ri vate c a pa c ity fo r t he b enef it on ly of tho se wi thi n it s corpor ate lim its, and not as an arm of the g overnme nt. Id
. The leg islature spec ifically desig nates
sever al ac tions as gove rnmental func tions. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.0215(a) (West 2007). Th e City

c on te nd s th a t a llo wi ngme mbe rs of the pu bl ic to a do pt a

nim a ls f ro m it s sh e lte r i s a g ov e rnme nta l fun c tio n be c a us e the a c tiv ity

is a c omp on e nt o f a

nim a l c on tr ol, wh ic h is one of the activities expressly desig nated a s a g overnme ntal function by th e l egi s l ature. See id . § 10 1. 02 15 (a )( 33 ). Court s hav e re pe a te dly re c og nize d tha t a c tiv iti e s th a t are c los e ly re la te d to
or ne c e ssa ry fo r t he pe rf or manc e of g ov e rnme nta l f

un c tio ns are a lso g ov e rnme nta l f un c tio ns . See City of Houston v. Pe troleum Traders Corp. , 261 S.W .3d 350, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (pur chase of fue l b y city was g overnme ntal function bec ause f uel wasReag an also argues that the act of allowing the adoption of animals from the City ’s shelter 2 is a proprieta

ry function because “ the adopting out of a vicious dogis an ultrahazar dous activity .” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.0215(b) (3) ( West 2007) (cha rac terizing a s proprieta

ry function “a

ny activity that is abnormally

dang erous or

ultrahazardous” ). Howe ver, in c onsidering whether the City ’s ac tivity

here was propr ietary , we n ee d n o t make a f actua l determination of whether the dog in this ca s e wa s “vicious,” a nd we de cline to cha

rac terize the City ’s ac tivity as allowing the adoption of “ vicious” dogs. Fur ther, Reag an does not cite to, and we have not f ound, any leg al au t h ority

in support of his contention that allowing the adoption of a nimals is an ult ra ha zar do us a c tiv ity . We the refore m a int a in o ur c on c lus ion

that th e City ’s a c tiv ity is a g overnme ntal function for which the City

reta ins imm unity

from suit absent an e x press wa iver of immunity
. 6 n e c e s s ar y t o p e r f o r m d e s i g n a t e d

g o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n s , s u c h a s p o l i c e an d f i r e p r o t e c tio n) ; Ci ty of San Antonio v. Butler , 131 S.W .3d 170, 177-78 (Te x . App.—S an An t o nio 2004, pet. denied) (eve n though it produc ed prof it for city , city ’s sale of

alcohol at conce rt was g overnme ntal function be c a us e it w a s a sso c ia te d w ithde sig nate d g ov e rnme nta l f un c ti on of op e ra tin g c ivi c c e nte rs , convention ce n t ers, or

coliseums). He re, a

n animal-c ontrol ordinance in place at the time Kari adopted the dog stated that any animal “not cla imed by

its owner within the time period de signated in this section shall become the pr operty of the c ity ,” and that the City “may then either

sell the animal or humanely

dispose of it.” See Elg in, Tex., Ordinance 93- 26 (Aug . 18, 1993). We conc lude th at allowi ngthe a do pti on of anim a ls f

ro m th e City ’s sh e lte r i s an a c tiv ity so c los e ly

re la te d to animal control that it is a g overnme ntal function. Se e Pe tro le um Tra de rs , 261 S.W .3d at 357; 2 Butler , 131 S.W .3d at 177-78.
Wa iv e r o f I mm unity W e now turn to a

n analy sis of Reag an’s plea dings a nd pertinent jurisdictional evidenc e to deter

mine whether

the fa cts alleg ed esta

blish a waiver

of sover eig n immunit y

under the TTCA. I n his petition, R eag an alleg es that the City waived immunity

under se ction 101.021(2) of7

the Texas Civil Pract i ce an d Remedies Code, whic h states that a g overnme ntal unit is l iable for “per sonal injury

and dea th so caused by a condition or use of tang ible persona l or rea l property if the g overnme ntal unit would, were it a private person, be liable t o the claimant accor ding to Te x as law.” See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(2). Thus, Reag an must first alleg e fa cts that show
a “ us e ” by the City that r e su lte d in

pe rs on a l in

jur y to J.W. R. Th e te rm

“ us e ” in t

his c on te xt is define d as “to put or br i n g into action or ser vice; to employ

for or apply to a g iven purpose.” See San Antonio State Hosp. v. Cowan , 12 8 S.W. 3d 24 4, 24 6 (T e x. 20 04 ). Re a g an a sse rt s th a t th e City

“ u s e d ” t h e a d o p t i o n p r o c e s s , an d t h u s “ u s e d ” t h e d o g i t s e l f , i n o r d e r t o a v o i d p u t t i n g t h e do g to death. The City counter s that the use of a proce ss c annot be conside red the use of “ tang ible persona l
or re al prope rty .” We ag ree with the C ity
. Reag an does not cite to, and we have not found, any leg al authority to suppor

t the proposition that use of a pr oc ess constitutes use of pr op e rty under the TTCA. Even if we assume that the adoption proce ss constituted a “use ” of the dog itself, the use must have actua lly cause d the injury
. See Texas De p’t of C r iminal Justice v. M

iller , 51 S.W .3d 583, 588 (Tex. 2001). Her e, the adoption of t he dog occurre d hours before the dog a ttacked J.W .R. Thus, the most that could be alleg ed is that the dog ’s a d o p t i o n furnished the condition that made the injury p o s s ib le , w h ic h h a s b e e n d e e me d in s u f f ic ie n t to c o n s ti tute a “ u s e ” un d e r th e s tatute
. See id
. (no waiver wher e use of

medical tre atment suppresse d sy mptoms of meningitis and patient late r died); Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley , 968 S.W .2d 339, 343 (Tex. 1998) ( n o w a iv e r

w h e r e p a ti e n t e s c a

p e d thr o u g h u n lo c k e d

h o s p it a l d o o r s an d late r

c o mm itte d

s u ic id e )
. We there fore reje ct Reag an’s f irst argument. I n a sec ond argument, Reag an contends that this c ase is simi lar to those holding that8

the provision of tang ible proper ty lackingan “integ ral saf

ety component” c onstitut es a w aiver of immunit y . S

e e R o b i n s o n v . C

e n tr a l T e x . MH MR Ctr

. , 780 S.W .2d 169, 171 (Tex. 1989) (no immunity

for menta l health fa cility

that provided swimming attire t o epileptic patient but did not pr ov ide lif

e pr e se rv e r) ; Lowe v

. Texas Tech Univ. , 5 40 S.W. 2d 29 7, 30 0 ( Te x. 19 76 ) ( no immun ity for u n iv e r s it

y th a t p r o v id e d u n if

o r m an d e qu ip me n t to f

o o tb a ll p la

y e r b u t f a il e d to provide kne e br a c e ). Re a g an a sse rt s th a t th e do g ’s la c k o f a n a pp ro pr ia te di sp os it io n to be a fa mil y do g is equivalent to a lack of an integ ral safety component such as a life preserve r or knee brac e. Howe ver, nothing in Loweor Robinson su g g e sts that an int ang ibl e c on c e pt su c h a s a do g ’s te mpe ra me nt w ou ld fa ll w ith in t

he su pr e me c ourt ’s lim ite d ho ldi ng s, and Re a g an do e s no t c ite to a ny oth e r l e g a l a

uth or ity in s up po rt of his po sit ion . F ur

the r, the su

pr e me c ourt

ha s sp e c if

ic a lly state d th a t ca se s suc h a s Lowe and Robinson re pr e se nt “ the ou te r bo un ds ” of wh a t th e c ourt

ha s d e fi ne d a s “ us e ” of tang ibl e p er s o nal prope rty
. See Tex as A& M Univ. v . Bishop , 1 5 6 S. W. 3 d 5 8 0 , 5 8 4 ( T e x. 2 0 0 5) (c iting Ke rrv ill e Sta te Ho sp . v . Clar k , 923 S.W .2d 582, 585 (Tex. 1996) ). Thus, we de cline to extend the principle of Loweand Robinson to this case.

I n a thir d ar g ume nt, Re a g an c ite s San Antonio State Hospital v . Cowan and conte nds that the City

waived immunity

beca use it provided Ka

ri wi t h a dog that was inher ently unsafe
. 128 S.W .3d at 245. I n Cowan , the supreme court he ld that merely providing someone with per sonal proper ty that is not it self inher ently unsafe was not a “ use” w ithi n t he mea ning of the TTCA. Id
. Re a g an a rgue s th a t th e imp lic a tio n o f t he ho ldi ngis its o pp os ite : th a t pr ov idi ngso me on e wi th pe rs on a l pr op e rt

y that is inh e re ntl y

un sa fe is a

“ us e ” wi thi n th e TT CA . We dis a g re e that Cowan implies such a proposition, and Reag an does not c ite to any other leg al authority

as suppo rt . The9

supreme c ourt stated in Cowan tha t “ a g ov e rnme nta l un it d oe s n ot ‘ us e ’ p e rs on a l pr op e rt y me re ly by allowing someone e lse to use i t and nothi ng more.” Id . at 246. Th e g ov e rnme nta l un it mus t it se lf be the use r. Id . at 24 5- 46
. Th e on ly c ir c ums tanc e in wh ic h a g ov e rnme nta l unit ha s b e e n f ound to have “ used” pr operty

mere ly by providing it is when the prope rt y provided lac ks an integ ral safe ty component, and w e have alre ady found that exception inapplicable to this case . We theref ore reje ct this arg ument.

I n a fo ur th a rgume nt, Re a g an a lle g e s th a t th e City ha s w a ive d so vereig n im mun ity be c a us e it w ou ld b e str ic tly

lia ble fo r J.W. R.’ s in

jur ie s if it were a

pr ivate pe rs on

ba se d o n it s de c isi on to a llo w the a do pti on

of a “ vic ious” d ogwi th “ da

ng e ro us pr op e ns iti e s a

bn or ma l to its class.” See M

arshall v. Ranne , 511 S.W .2d 255, 258 (Te x . 1 9 7 4 ) (s t ati ng that suits for damag es
cause d by vicious animals are g overne d by principles of stric t liabilit y ); Restat em en t (S econd) of Torts § 509 (1977) ( stating that strict liabilit y applies whe n an i m al har ms someone and possessor of animal kne w or ha d rea son to know that animal had dang erous pr opensities abnorma l to its class). I n arguing that the City

knew of the dog ’s alleged d an gerous pr opensities, Reag an re fer ence s an article r e g ar d in g th is c a s e f r o m a lo c a l E lg in

n e w s p a p e r , in w h ic h a r e p o rte r s tate d th a t “ Spe nce repor ted she told the fa

mily repe atedly

that the animal wa s ag g ressive towa rd other a

nimals.” Howeve r, eve n if the City could be he ld strictly

liable as a

private pe rson base d on Spence’ s alleg ed knowledg e of the dog ’s dang erous pr opensit i es , Reag an must still establish that the City waived im mu n it y b y “ u s in g ” p r operty
. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(2). We have
a lr e a dy de te rm ine d th a t Re a g an h a s n ot d on e so he re . F ur the r, a t le a st two of

our s ist e r c ourt sOne Te x as ca se, City of Da lla s v . H e ar d , 252 S.W .3d 98, 112 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, 3 pet. denied) , found a waiver of immunit y based on a theory of strict liability wher e a g orilla at the Dallas Z oo esca

ped fr om its enclosure and attacke d zoo vis itors. The cour t held that the city

waived immun ity un de r s e c tio n 10 1. 02 1( 2) of the Te xas Civ il Pr a c tic e & Re me die s Co de be c a us e the c ity
“ us e d” the g or ill a

a s an attr a c tio n to g e ne rate re ve nu e and be c a us e the c ity

wo uld be str ic tly

lia ble as a pr ivate p er s o n b as ed on its possession of a wild animal. Id
. at 110, 112. He ar d is distinguishable f

rom this case f

or two rea sons: ( 1) unlike the c ourt in He ar d , we have dete rmined that Reag an did not alleg e a “ use” of proper ty ; and (2) the He ar

d court ba sed its decision in part on the fa ct that the g orilla was a wild animal, a fa ctor not pre sent in this case. Se e id
. a t 11 2; se e als o Marshall v. Ranne , 511 S.W .2d 255, 258 (Tex. 1974) ; Re statement (Second) of Torts § 507 (1977) (stating that possessor of wild animal is subject to liability for ha rm done by

animal to another , even if possessor exerc ised utmost care to confine a nimal or otherwise preve nt it from doing ha rm). S ec t i o n1 0 1
. 0 5 6 i s t i t l ed“D i s cr et i o n ary P o we rs ” a n d

s t at es t h e f

o l l o wi n g: 4 This chapter

does not apply

to a claim base d on: (1 ) t he fa ilure of a g ov e rnme nta l unit to pe rf or m an ac t th a t th e un it is not required by

law to per form; or (2 ) a g ov e rnme nta l un it’ s d e c isi on no t to pe rfo rm an ac t or on its failure to make a decision on the per formanc e or nonpe rfor mance of an ac t if the law lea

ves the performa

nce or nonperf

ormanc e of the act to the discretion of the g overnme ntal unit. Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.056 (West 2007). 10 have he ld t

hat th e TT CA do e s n ot w aiv e so vere ign immun ity

fo r s tr ic t- lia

bil ity c la ims
. See

3 EP GT T e x . P ipe lin e, L. P. v . H

arris Cou nty Fl oo d Cont ro l D ist
. , 176 S.W .3d 330, 339 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 04 , p et. dis m’ d) ; University of N. Tex. v . Harve y , 124 S.W .3d 216, 224 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2003, pet. denied). Be cause Reag an has not established that the City waived immunity , we r ejec t his strict-liabilit y argument. I n a fina l argument, Reag an conte nds that the City ’s failure to e uthanize the dog and its decision to allow the adoption of the dogwer e ministerial functions, for which a g overnme ntal
e nti ty is n ot immune . I n sup po rt of his a sse rt ion , Re a g an c ite s se c tio n 1 01 .0 56 of the Te xas C ivi l Pr a c ti c e an d Re me d ie s Code and qu ote s f ro m University of Texas at San Antonio v. Trev ino , 411

153 S.W .3d 58, 61 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.), in which the court s tated that “[i] f the injury results from the f

ormulation of policy , the g overnme ntal en t i t y is imm une . . . [but] [i ]f the injury results from the ne g lige nt implementation of policy , the g overnme ntal entity is not im mune.” Howeve r, the Trevino court specifica lly stated t hat s ection 101.056 is an exc eption to the waiver of immunit y and that its purpose is “to avoid judicial r eview of g overnme ntal policy

decisions.” 153 S. W
. 3 d at 6 1 . I n other wor ds, even if a plaintiff establishes a

waiver of immunity

under the TTCA, the g overnme ntal entity still maintains immuni ty

under se ction 101.056 unless the entity ’s action wa s minist eria l. Id . As a re sult, we rea ch an a naly sis under sec tion 101.056 only afte r a plaintiff has e stablished a waiver of immunit y , which we have alre ady conclude d Reag an did not do here . Thus, beca

use Reag an has not e stablished that t he City waived its sover eig n immunit y , we need not de cide whe ther the City ’s ac tivity was discr etionary

or ministerial. Op po rtun ity to A mend Reag an also re quests that we a llow him an opportunit y to amend his petition to assert
a c la im fo r br e a c h of c on tr a c t. Re a g an c ite s City of T exark ana v. City of New Boston , 141 S.W .3d 7 7 8 (T ex . Ap p . — T ex ar k an a 2 0 0 4 , n o p et
. ), i nar gu i n g t h at a m u n i ci p al i t y d o es n o ten

j o y s o v er ei gn immunit y for c ontrac t claims. I n City of T exark ana , the cour

t held that lang uag e in t he Te x as L ocal Gover nment Code stating that a municipality “may plead a nd be impleade d” in any

court c onstitut ed
a wa iver of immunity

from suit. Id
. a t 7 8 9
. H o w e v e r, C ity of Texarkana wa s su bs e qu e ntl y
o v e rtu r n e d in Tooke , which held that the “ plead a nd be impleade d” languag e in the code does not by itself waiv e im munity
. Tooke , 197 S.W .3d at 342-43. Thus, e ven if we g rante d Reag an’s
re qu e st t o a dd

a br e a c h o f c on tr a c t c la im t o h is p e tit ion , th e pe tit ion sti ll w ou ld n ot b e su ff

ic ie nt.12

Se e T exas A& M U niv . S y s. v . Ko se og lu , 2 33 S.W. 3d 83 5, 84 0 ( Te x. 20 07 ) ( statin g that me re ly pleading more fac ts in support of bre ach of contra ct claim will not overc ome g overnme ntal entity ’s immunit y from suit). Reag an would still need to show a waiver of immunit y , which he ha s not done and ca nnot do give n the fa cts of this case . Acc ording ly , we ove rrule Re ag an’s r equest.
CO NC LU SION B e c a us e the ple a din g s and ju risd ic tio na l e vid e nc e de mon str a te that Re a g an’ s su it incu ra b l y falls outside any

waiver of sover eig n immunit y , we r ever se the trial c ourt’s orde r and rende r judg ment dismiss ing Re ag an’s suit for w ant of jurisdiction.

________________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Reverse d and Rende red Filed: F ebrua

ry 26, 2009