alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Listen

# Public Briefings

Visit the Commission’s YouTube page to view recordings of all recent briefings.

----

The Civil Rights Implications of Eminent Domain Abuse
Event Date: August 12, 2011

Peer to Peer Violence and Bullying
Event Date: May 13, 2011

Disparate Impact in School Discipline
Event Date: February 11, 2011

Age Discrimination and Employment in the Current Economic Crisis
Event Date: June 11, 2010

-    First  
-    Previous  
-   ...  
-  3 
-  4 
-  5 

-  Event Calendar 
-  Public Briefings    -  Public Comments 
-  Commission Business Meetings 
-  Advisory Committees Meetings 
-  Archives
Exhibit 24


[Moore Stephens Cooper Molyneux LLP Letterhead]

April 13, 2005

Mr. Robert Mottern
Weizenecker, Mottern and Fisher, P.C.
1800 Peachtree Street, Suite 620
Atlanta, GA 30309

Dear Mr. Mottern,

     Re:  Silver Dragon Resources, Inc.
          December 31, 2004 Audited Financial Statements

We hereby provide our consent as independent accountants to the
incorporation of the above noted financial statements in the Company's
Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2004.

Yours truly,
MOORE STEPHENS COOPER MOLYNEUX LLP

/s/ Sandy A. Solecki
    Sandy A. Solecki
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Makeysha Dion ISAAC, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-11154

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 2, 2011.

Nancy E. Larson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Kevin Joel Page, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Dallas, TX, Sherylynn Ann Kime-Goodwin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Lubbock, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before WIENER, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Defendant-Appellant Makeysha Dion Isaac, presents arguments that she concedes are foreclosed by *United States v. Shabazz,*633 F.3d 342, 345-46 (5th Cir. 2011), which held that the phrase “on any such revocation” in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) does not impose an aggregate limit on imprisonment for revocation of supervised release but limits only the amount of imprisonment that may be imposed each time a court revokes a defendant’s supervised release. She raises the arguments solely to preserve them for further review. The government has moved for summary affirmance.

We grant the government’s motion for summary affirmance and deny the government’s alternative motions to dismiss the appeal or for an extension of time to file a brief. However, the written revocation order in this case reflects a revocation sentence of 18 months, which conflicts with the oral pronouncement of a sentence of 12 months. Accordingly, we “remand to the district court to amend the written judgment to conform to the oral sentence.” *United States v. Mireles,*471 F.3d 551, 557-58 (5th Cir.2006). We affirm in all other respects.

REMANDED FOR AMENDMENT OF REVOCATION ORDER AND AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS; MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIR-MANCE GRANTED EXCEPT AS TO MATTER REMANDED; MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR FOR EXTENSION OF TIME DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                      40,801,870
<SECURITIES>                                17,440,125
<RECEIVABLES>                            1,985,839,405
<ALLOWANCES>                               207,700,644
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                      24,873,747
<DEPRECIATION>                               4,434,101
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           1,885,350,885
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                    177,375,128
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       351,218
<OTHER-SE>                                 354,928,103
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>             1,885,350,885
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           364,406,787
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           136,466,414
<LOSS-PROVISION>                            31,188,870
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          57,469,158
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            139,282,345
<INCOME-TAX>                                52,927,291
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         86,355,054
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                86,355,054
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.59
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.32
        

</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE PHIL JONES, Defendant Below, Appellant,

v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. § § No. 337, 2015 § § § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware, § in and for New Castle County, § Cr. ID No. 140601333 § § § Submitted: September 11, 2015 Decided: September 14, 2015

ORDER

This 14 th day of September 2015, it appears to the Court that, on August 26, 2015, the Chief Deputy Clerk issued a no tice to show cause, by certified mail, directing the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for his failure to file an open ing brief and appendix on A ugust 14, 2015. The appellant has not responded to the notice to show cause within the required ten-day period

and therefore dismissal of this a ppeal is deemed to be unopposed. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDE RED, under Supreme Court Rules 3(b)(2) and 29(b), that this appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT: /s/ Randy J. Holland Justice
For more information about CGIS, visit our website at: 

https://www.uscg.mil/cgis

KEEPING COMMUNITIES SAFE

for Coast Guard personnel and their families 

isn’t only up to law enforcement—the 

Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) 

relies on you to provide tips on suspected 

crime and threats to the Coast Guard.

That’s why CGIS has launched CGIS Tips, a web-based and mobile 

means to submit tips anonymously to CGIS criminal investigators.

What kinds of tips should I report? Felony Level Criminal Violations to 

include: Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, Sexual Assault and/or Abuse, 

Homicide, Aggravated Assault, Cyber Crime, Illegal Drug Use,

Fraud/Waste & Abuse of Government Funds, Threatening Behavior, 

Lost or Stolen Government Property, etc. 

Download the CGIS Tips app from your 

mobile provider’s marketplace. 

You can also use this QR code to quickly 

access CGIS Tips using your smart device.
# C_2021136EN.01000601.xml

| 19.4.2021 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 136/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.4.2021

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 136/6

---

COMMISSION COMMUNICATION

(2021/C 136/05)

The European Capitals of Culture 2025 are Chemnitz (Germany) and Nova Gorica (Slovenia).

---
<Page>


                                  EXHIBIT 24.1

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

         We consent to the incorporation by reference in this amended Annual
Report on Form 10-KSB/A, in the Registration Statement on Form S-3 (No.
333-83692), the Registration Statement on Form S-3 (No. 333-83490), the
Registration Statement on Form S-3 (No. 333-83808), Registration Statement on
Form S-3 (No. 333-75780), Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-75792),
and Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-75788) of our report dated
March 13, 2002, on our audits of the financial statements of Precis, Inc.


MURRELL, HALL, McINTOSH & CO., PLLP.

Norman, Oklahoma
June 7, 2002
1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

_________________________________

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD,

Complainant,

vs.

RANDY THOMAS PEARSON,

Respondent.

_________________________________

Docket Number 2023-0443

CG Enforcement Activity Number 7824005

CONSENT ORDER

Issued: January 4, 2024

By: Honorable George J. Jordan, Administrative Law Judge 

Appearances:

LT John Crow

Sector Virginia

For the Coast Guard

Randy Thomas Pearson, Pro se

For the Respondent
2

CONSENT ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

On December 14, 2023, the parties in this case submitted a Motion for Approval of 

Settlement Agreement and Entry of Consent Order to be approved as a settlement of the case 

under 33 C.F.R. § 20.502.

I have carefully reviewed the terms of the Settlement Agreement and find it is fair and 

reasonable and in substantial compliance with the requirements of 33 C.F.R. § 20.502.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the record, it is hereby ORDERED, the Settlement Agreement is 

APPROVED in full and incorporated herein by reference. This Consent Order shall constitute 

full, final, and complete adjudication of this proceeding.

SO ORDERED.

Done and dated January 4, 2024, 

Seattle, Washington 

_______________________________

George J. Jordan

Administrative Law Judge

United States Coast Guard
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                         502,846
<SECURITIES>                                     2,364
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                    24,133
<INVENTORY>                                     73,399
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,599,182
<PP&E>                                       4,867,896
<DEPRECIATION>                                 859,115
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,023,551
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,203,474
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        32,933
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,985,232
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,023,551
<SALES>                                        171,551
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,143,645
<CGS>                                          155,636
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  155,636
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,547,396
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                (1,354)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              46,377
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 85,149
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             85,149
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    85,149
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .03


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 233 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 233

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 24, 2015

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
                           and Urban Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
    To allow reviews of certain families' incomes every 3 years for 
   purposes of determining eligibility for certain Federal assisted 
                           housing programs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Tenant Income Verification Relief 
Act of 2015''.

SEC. 2. REVIEWS OF FAMILY INCOMES.

    (a) In General.--The second sentence of paragraph (1) of section 
3(a) of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437a(a)(1)) 
is amended by inserting before the period at the end the following: ``; 
except that, in the case of any family with a fixed income, as defined 
by the Secretary, after the initial review of the family's income, the 
public housing agency or owner shall not be required to conduct a 
review of the family's income for any year for which such family 
certifies, in accordance with such requirements as the Secretary shall 
establish, which shall include policies to adjust for inflation-based 
income changes, that 90 percent or more of the income of the family 
consists of fixed income, and that the sources of such income have not 
changed since the previous year, except that the public housing agency 
or owner shall conduct a review of each such family's income not less 
than once every 3 years''.
    (b) Housing Choice Voucher Program.--Subparagraph (A) of section 
8(o)(5) of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 
1437f(o)(5)(A)) is amended by striking ``not less than annually'' and 
inserting ``as required by section 3(a)(1) of this Act''.

            Passed the House of Representatives March 23, 2015.

            Attest:

                                                 KAREN L. HAAS,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          FEB-28-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               FEB-28-1997
<CASH>                                         544,077
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  236,571
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    342,504
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,185,421
<PP&E>                                         890,153
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,323,200
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,576,056
<BONDS>                                        678,484
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    389,047
<COMMON>                                         4,149
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,675,464
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,323,200
<SALES>                                      6,661,679
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,661,679
<CGS>                                        6,148,820
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  674,199
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                25,513<F1>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             308,255<F2>
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (495,108)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    16,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (511,108)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (511,108)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.20)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>Includes $78,980 charge related to implementation of an accounting standard.
<F2>Includes $100,000 related to implementation of an accounting standard.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 23.2



                        Consent of Independent Auditors



The Board of Directors
Trigon Healthcare, Inc.:


We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statement (No.
333-26187) on Form S-8 of Trigon Healthcare, Inc. of our report dated April 24,
1998, relating to the statement of financial condition of the Trigon Healthcare,
Inc. Employee Stock Purchase Plan as of December 31, 1997, and the related
statement of income and changes in plan equity for the period from May 1, 1997
(inception) through December 31, 1997, which report is included in this Form
10-K/A No. 1 of Trigon Healthcare, Inc.



/s/ KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

Richmond, Virginia
April 29, 1998
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tyrone Clark, Appellant.

*1024Memorandum: Although the comments of the prosecutor in summation which defendant claims denied him a fair trial were intemperate and would have been better left unsaid, they were isolated and could not have affected the outcome. "In view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, there is no likelihood that a new trial would produce a different result and any errors committed are deemed to be harmless” *People v Davis,*112 AD2d 722, 724). (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Celli, J. — criminal possession of forged instrument, second degree.) Present — Doerr, J. P., Green, Balio, Lawton and Schnepp, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7370

In Re: JOHN PATRICK MCSHEFFREY,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CA-03-663)

Submitted: November 19, 2003 Decided: December 5, 2003

Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John Patrick McSheffrey, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

John Patrick McSheffrey petitions for a writ of mandamus,

alleging that the district court has refused to file his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 (2000) petition. He seeks an order from this court directing

the district court to file his petition. The district court’s

docket reflects that the district court filed and dismissed the

petition by order entered on August 29, 2003. While we grant

McSheffrey’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny

his mandamus petition. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
#### Edward Thompson, Adm’r de bonis non v. Forbes J. Houston.

A note payable twelve months after a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the United States cannot be recovered upon the simple averment that it is due and has not been paid. (Shaw v. Trunsler, 30 Tex., 390.) Courts judicially know the public statutes and general laws and customs of their own country.

Appeal from Leon. The case was tried before Hon. 2L H. Davis, one of the district judges.

The plaintiff declared on a note in these words:

“ Twelve months after the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the United States, for value received, I promise to pay Michael McCrate one hundred and fifty dollars, with ten per cent, per annum from date till paid.

“Leon County, Texas, *March*28,1864.

“Forbes J. Houston.”

And he declared that “the same had long since been due and unpaid,” &c. The court sustained a special exception to the petition, and gave judgment to the defendant. Plaintiff appealed.

*W. D. Wood,*for appellant,

argued that a “ treaty of peace” meant the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace; that the promise to pay was absolute, and the contingency susceptible of a possible interpretation. (2 Pars. on Cont., 4th eel., 500, and notes.)

*Forbes J. Houston,*for himself,

insisted that the note was a kind of gambling consideration, and the payment depended upon a contingency, without the happening of-which the note would never be due.

Morrill, C. J.

—Suit founded on an instrument calling *611for $150, payable twelve months after a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the United States.

There is no distinct allegation that the treaty has been made, except inferentially by the charge of non-payment, though the time for payment had long since passed.

The defendant’s answer puts in issue the existence of the transaction upon which the payment depended.

Courts judicially know the public statutes and general laws and customs of their own country. (1 Greenl. on Ev., § 5.)

We know of no such treaty as the one referred to; at least no such treaty has been made public. Had the plaintiff averred- in his petition the time when such treaty was made, and proved the truth of the allegation, and had it appeared that twelve months had elapsed since the treaty and before the suit was instituted, he would have shown a cause of action upon which the district court could have pronounced a judgment.

The exceptions to the petition were well taken, and the district court did not err in sustaining it.

Judgment affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Sincere McKinley, Also Known as Charles Atkins, Appellant.

The evidence was legally sufficient to support the verdict. In ascertaining the sufficiency of the proof of the element of forcible compulsion, it is the victim’s perceptions that govern *(People v Coleman,*42 NY2d 500, 505-506), and given the marked discrepancy in size and strength between the 11-year-old victim and the defendant, the trier of fact could have reasonably found that the forceful pushing and restraining of the victim by the defendant constituted an implied threat that placed the victim in fear of serious injury *(see, People v Bermudez,*109 AD2d 674).

Moreover, the court’s clear preclusive ruling pursuant to *People v Molineux*(168 NY 264) with respect to the evidence of prior bad acts sought to be offered by the People did not prevent the court from ultimately determining the defendant’s guilt. A Judge is presumed to have considered only the competent evidence adduced at trial in reaching his verdict *(People v Brown,*24 NY2d 168; *People v Lombardi,*76 AD2d 891; *see also, People v Murdocca,*120 AD2d 682; *People v Reyes,*116 AD2d 602), and there is absolutely no indication in the record that the Trial Judge’s verdict was based on anything other than competent evidence.

Finally, we note that the court did not err in refusing to *753admit into evidence that portion of the victim’s hospital record that revealed his history since there was no testimony that the patient’s history was in any way relevant to his diagnosis and treatment *(see, People v Davis,*95 AD2d 837; *People v Richardson,*38 AD2d 990; *People v Conde,*16 AD2d 327). Brown, J. P., Rubin, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.