No. 88-289 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

CAMERON LEE, 

Claimant and Appellant, 

-vsEUGENE LEE, d/b/a WILDERNESS RANCH 

AND LODGE, 

Employer, 

and 

STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: The Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable Timothy 

Reardon, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

John H. Bothe; Bothe & Lauridsen, Columbia Falls, 

Montana 

For Respondent : 

W. D. Hutchison, Agency Legal Services Bureau, 

Helena, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Aug. 26, 1988 

Decided: September 27, 1988 SF? 3 7 198% 

Filed: 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Workers' Compensation Court denied Cameron Lee's 

claim for compensation for a July 1986 injury, ruling that 

his claim is barred by his failure to give notice to his 

employer pursuant to S 39-71-603, MCA. Cameron Lee appeals. 

We affirm. 

The issue is whether § 39-71-603, MCA, requires a claimant to notify his employer that he believes his injury is 

work-related in order for the claim to be considered 

compensable. 

Eugene Lee owned an outfitting business, Wilderness 

Ranch & Lodge (Ranch) , near Rigfork, Montana. Cameron Lee 

(Claimant) is Eugene Lee's son. Claimant worked for the 

business as a packer-guide. On July 14, 1986, Claimant 

worked at the Ranch. At about 8 p.m., he and two of his 

friends who had been helping out at the Ranch left for Hungry 

Horse, Montana, where Claimant lived. Claimant drove his 

father's two-ton truck because he was to pick up a load of 

hay before returning to the Ranch in the morning. Claimant 

parked the truck at his home, then went out with his friends. 

He was injured at approximately 2 a.m. when he was thrown out 

of the back of his friend's pickup truck while returning home 

from a bar. Claimant's wife told Eugene Lee about the accident and injuries the next morning. In his deposition, 

Claimant stated that he never spoke directly to his father 

about his injuries. Approximately one year later, Claimant 

filed a claim for workers' compensation. 

The Workers' Compensation Court issued a summary judgment that Claimant did not give his employer the notice 

required under S 39-71-603, MCA. In making that judgment, 

the court had before it the depositions of Eugene Lee, Claimant, and Claimant's wife. The hearing examiner's proposed 
findings and conclusions, adopted by the court, stated that 

"[tlhere is nothing to inform an employer father that a son 

falling out of a pickup at 2:00 a.m. in the morning after 

closing a local bar, was engaging in any conceivable 

work-related activity. The claimant had every opportunity to 

supply such notice if he considered his actions work-related, 

but he failed to do so within the 60 days required in Section 

39-71-603, MCA." 

Does S 39-71-603, MCA, require a claimant to notify his 

employer that he believes his injury is work-related in order 

for the claim to be considered compensable? 

Section 39-71-603, MCA (1985), provided: 

No claim to recover benefits . . . may be considered compensable unless, within 60 days after the 

occurrence of the accident which is claimed to have 

caused the injury, notice of the time and place 

where the accident occurred and the nature of the 

injury is given to the employer . . . Actual knowledge of the accident and injury on the part of the 

employer . . . is equivalent to notice. 

(The statute was modified in 1987 to decrease to 30 days the 

time allowed to give notice.) 

Claimant argues that S 39-71-603, MCA, only requires 

that the employer be notified of the employee's accident and 

the resulting injuries within 60 days. He asserts that any 

questions about the employer's liability are properly addressed in the handling of a subsequent workers' compensation 

claim. He claims that he was talking with his friends about 

setting up a hunting trip at the Ranch for the following 

summer. In his deposition, he stated that recruiting of 

future clients was expected of him as part of his job. 

Claimant cites several Montana cases in arguing that the 

employer need only be notified that there has been an 
accident and that the employee has been injured, not that the 

injury is believed to be work-related. See Wight v. Hughes 

Livestock Co., Inc., (Mont. 1981), 634 P.2d 1189, 38 St.Rep. 

1632; rev'd on other grounds after remand, 204 Mont. 98, 664 

P.2d 303; Wilson v. Sun River Cattle Co. (1983), 206 Mont. 

63, 670 P.2d 931. We conclude that these cases do not address the issue presented here. In those two cases, as in 

the large majority of cases, notice of the place and manner 

of injury makes it obvious that the injury is claimed to be 

work-related. Not so for a case such as this, where the 

claimant, a packer-guide, is asserting that his activities 

around 2 a.m. in a bar were work-related. 

Eugene Lee stated in his deposition that he never expected Claimant to do any recruiting of future clients for 

the business. He also stated that he was a teetotaler and 

had made it clear to his employees, including Claimant, never 

to drink while on duty. Further, he stated that he had no 

idea that Claimant considered himself to be working that 

night until he was notified that a workers' compensation 

claim had been filed, over a year later. 

Constructive knowledge is not enough to satisfy the 

requirements of $ 39-71-603, MCA. Reil v. Billings Processors, Inc. (Mont. 1987), 746 P.2d 617, 623, 44 St.Rep. 1985, 

1993. The employer must have notice that the claimant considers his injury work-related. 

It is not enough, however, that the employer, 

through his representatives, be aware that claimant 

"feels sick", or has a headache, or fell down, or 

walks with a limp, or has a pain in his back, or 

shoulder, or is in the hospital, or has a blister, 

or swollen thumb, or has suffered a heart attack. 

There must in addition be some knowledge of accompanying facts connecting the injury or illness with 

the employment, and indicating to a reasonably 
conscientious manager that the case might involve a 

potential compensation claim. 

3 Larson, Workmans' Compensation Law, 5 78.31 (a) (2) pp. 

15-126 to 15-136 (1988). We adopt the above standard. 

We conclude that the Workers' Compensation Court did not 

err in ruling that Eugene Lee did not have adequate notice 

under 5 39-71-603, MCA. The facts before the lower court do 

not indicate that Eugene Lee had knowledge of accompanying 

facts connecting his son's injury with his employment so that 

the case might involve a potential compensation claim. Under 

these facts we hold that notice under 5 39-71-603, MCA, must 

have included Claimant's belief that his injury was 

work-related. 

We affirm.