### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 541 -CR

Ro be r to Al va r ado , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 299t h JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- DC-07 -30 2368 , HO NORAB LE CHARLES B AIRD , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N

Roberto Alvar ado wa s convicted of first-deg ree felony

injury to a child. See T e x. Pe na l Co de Ann. § 2 2. 04 (a )( 1) , ( e ) ( Wes t Su pp . 200 9). P un ish me nt w a s a sse sse d at te n y e a rs ’ imprisonment. Al vara do argues that the trial c ourt err ed by admitting insuffic iently

corr oborate d

acc omplice testimony , see Tex. Crim . Proc. Code Ann. art . 38.14 (West 2005), and by overr uling his ob je c tio ns to t

he State ’s c omm e nts duri ngc los ingargume nt. We w ill a ff ir m th e jud g me nt.

F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND T h e j u r y h e ar d e v i d e n c e t h a t o n S e p t e mb e r 6 , 2 0 0 7 , F e l i c i a S a l a z ar an d h e r t w e n t ymonth-old child, Sandra, we nt to visi t Felicia ’s g ran d m o t h er. Felicia ’s father wa s at the g randmother ’s house as well, and he notice d that Sandra w as cove red in bruise s, was missing patches of hair, a nd had cuts on he r leg s. Fe licia told h er fa t h er t h at Alvarado had inflicte d Sandra’ sAlvara do was Sandra’ s fathe r. Fe licia testified that she and Sandra lived with A lvara do 1 from January

of 2007 until the incident in question. 2 inj ur ie s. Fe li ci a’s f

ather noticed that F elicia ha d bruises and c uts on her ar ms as well. Fe licia’s 1 fathe r c a lle d 9 11 , a

nd e me rg e nc y

me dic a l pe rs on ne l tr ans po rt e d Sa nd ra and F e lic ia to a ho sp ita l. Alvara do was indi cted for first-deg ree felony injury to a child. See Tex. P enal Code § 22.04(a) (1), ( e). Fe licia was indicte d for injury to a child by

omission, under the theory that she allowe d Alvara do to injure Sandra. Se e id . § (a) (1). As a result, Fe licia was t reated as a n

acc omplice witness at Alvar ado’s tria l. Se e id . § (b )( 1) ; J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 2 3 4 S. W. 3 d 4 3 , 5 4 ( T e x. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.) (mother is acc omplice to her c hild’s assault if she does not protect her child from it). At trial, Fe licia testified that Alvarado inflicted Sandr a’s injuries by hitting her , pull in g o ut he r h a ir , a

nd sc ratc hin g he r w ithhis fi ng e rn a ils . T he Sta te c a lle d o the r w itn e sse s, inc lud ingthe do c tor s w ho tr e a te d San dr a , th e po lic e wh o e ve ntu a lly arr e ste d A lva

ra do , a nd the Chi ld Protective Service s (CPS) e mploy ees who investigated Sandra’ s abuse. But be cause Fe licia was the only witness who c l ai m ed to have persona lly seen A lvara do abuse Sandr a, her testimony

was the linchpin of the State’s c ase.

On cr oss-examination, defense counsel que stioned Fe lic i a about her history of psy chosis and para

noid ide ation (among other things). Fe licia denied be ing a war e of suc h mental illness or of having ever

discussed it with any one. De fense counsel did not impeac h Fe licia on the matter or introduce any evidenc e concer ning it. During closing argument, howeve r, defense c ounsel

r e p e a t e d l y

s u g g e s t e d

t h a tF e l i c i a ’ s p s y c h o s i s an d p ar an o i d i d e a t i o nw e r e e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t
. In response , the State ar g ued that there wa s no “re al evidenc e” that Felicia was psy chotic or ha dB oth sid e s h a d c op ie s of me dic a l re c or ds that ind ic a te d F e lic ia ha d b e e n d ia g no se d w ith 2 psy cho s is an d

p ar an o id id e a ti o n . D e f

e n s e c o u n s e l a g r e e d

n o t t o o f f e r th e r e c o r d s in to e v ide nce, howeve r, bec ause, a s defe nse counsel admitted, Felicia ’s mental-he alth history was “ collater al to a g reat ext ent.” 3 suffe red f rom para noid ideation. Def

ense counsel objected, claiming that the State’s ar g ument was

“ un e thi c a l” be c a

us e the State kn e w that F e lic ia ha d b e e n d ia g no se d w iththo se a ilm e nts
. The c ourt 2

overr uled def ense c ounsel’s objec tion. De fe ns e c ouns e l ob

je c te d tw ic e mor e duri ngc los ingargume nts : on c e wh e n th e Sta te argued that an “innocent per son” would not have behave d the way Alvara do did following Sandr a’s transportation to the hospital, a nd once when the State, while discussing Fe licia’s shortcoming s as a witness, cla imed that “people like Roberto Alvar ado don’t usually pick [ partne rs] who would m ake g reat witnesses.” The court overr uled both obje ctions. The jury returne d a g uilty verdic t, and the

c ourt a sse sse d p un ish me nt at te n y e ars ’ i mpr iso nme nt. Al va ra do a pp e a ls.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW When review ing the sufficie ncy of evide nce of

fered t o corroborate acc omplice testimony , we “ eliminate the ac complice testimony from conside ration and the n ex amine the

re ma ini ngpo rt ion s o f t

he re c or d to se e if the re is any e vid e nc e that ten ds to co nn e c t the a c c us e d w ith the commission of the crime.” Ma lon e v . S tat e , 253 S.W

. 3 d 2 5 3 , 2 5 7 (T ex. C rim. App. 2008) (q u o t a t i o n o m i t t e d )

. S u f

f i c i e n t c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e n e e d n o t i t s e l f p r o v e t h e d e f e n da nt g uil ty bey o n d a r e a s o n a

b le d o u b t, b u t it mu s t li n k th e d e f e n d an t “ in s o me w ay to th e c o mm is s io n of the crime and show that rational jurors could conclude t hat t his evidenc e sufficiently tended to connect [t he ac cuse d ] t o the offe nse.” Id . ( qu otatio n o mit te d) . “ [S]uf fi c ie nt a c c omp lic e -w itn e ss

c o r r o b o r a ti o n ma

y b e f u r n is h e d b y th e s u s p ic io u s c o n d u c t o f a d e f

endant.” Br own v . S

tat e ,4

27 0 S. W.3 d 5 64 , 5 68 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 08 ). We e xami ne c or ro bo ra tin g e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t favor able to the ve rdict. Can te lon v . S tat e , 85 S.W .3d 457, 458 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (c i t i n g Kno

xv . S tat e , 934 S.W .2d 678, 686-87 (Te x . Crim. App. 1996), and Gi ll v . S tat e , 873 S.W .2d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).

When review ing a prosecutor’s c omments during c losing a rg ument, we a

re mindful that “[p] ermissible jury

argument g ener ally

falls into one of four

are as: (1) su mmation of the evidenc e; (2) r easona

ble deduc t i o n from the e vidence ; (3) an a nswer to the a

rg ument of opposing counsel; or (4) a plea

for law enfor ceme nt.” Be rry

v . S tat e , 233 S.W .3d 847, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). I f a pr osecutor’ s com m en t s fall outside these pe rmissible categ ories, we consider thr ee fac tors in a s s e s s in g th e r e s u lt in g h ar m: ( 1 ) th e s e v e r it

y o f th e p r o s e c u to r ’ s mi s c o n d u c t ( i. e., the mag nitude of the remarks’ prejudicia l eff ect) ; (2) the mea sures a dopted to cure the misconduct (i.e., the ef fica cy of any cautionar y instruction by the j udg e); and (3) the cer tainty of convic tion absent the misconduct (i.e., t h e s t reng th of the evide nce suppor ting the c onviction). Id . at 858-59. A prosec utor’s impermissible comments are g rounds for r ever sal only if they harm the de fenda

nt, i.e., aff ect his substantial rig hts. Id . at 859 (c iting Te x . R. App. P. 44.2(b)).

DI SCU SSIO N Alvara do raises two ba sic issues in four points of er ror. We will addre ss them in turn. Issue One: Whether Felicia’s Testim ony Was Su fficie ntly Corr oborated The trial court proper ly

instructed the jury

that Fe licia was A lvara do’s ac complice. See Te x. Pe na l Co de § 2 2. 04 (b )( 1) ; J o h n s o n v . Sta te , 2 3 4 S

. W .3d at 54. As a r esult, Fe licia’s testimony could support Alvar ado’s c onviction only if it was co rrobor ated. See Tex. Crim . Proc.F or e xamp le , A lva

ra do tol d th e po lic e that hi s n a me wa s Ra y Ca br e ra wh e n th e y

c a me to 3 his house to arre st him. S imilarly , Alvara do initiall y t o l d a C P S case worke r that his name wa s Roberto Alvar ado, but he chang ed his story and tol d the ca se worke r that his name wa s Ray Cabrer a afte r she a sked him about Sandra. 5 Code art. 38.14. Alva

rado argues that Fe licia’s testimony was insufficiently corr oborate d and that the re fo re his c on vic tio n w a s e rr on e ou s.

I n response , the State cites seve ral piec es of e vidence that it claims corrobor ated Fe licia’s testimony . First, the State n o te s th a t A lva rado “ repe atedly

used fa lse names whe n contac ted by police or CPS personnel re g ardingthe injuries to Sandra.” Second, the State notes that Alvara do 3 “attempted to a

void contact with the police ”; when the police knocke d on his doo r t o ex ec u t e an

arr est war

rant, he answe red only after the police e mploy ed a r use by calling out that they

wer e looking f or someone na

med “Ma rio.” The State is cor

rec t that this evidence c orrobor ates F elicia’ s t es timony

. See Fe lde r v . S

tat e , 8 48 S.W. 2d

85 , 9 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ) ( pr ov id in g o ffi c e rs wi th f a lse ide nti fi c a tio n ind ic a te s “ c on sc iou sn e ss of g uil t” ); Fo ste r v . S

tat e , 779 S.W. 2d 84 5, 85 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 89 ) (

jur y may inf e r g uil t f ro m de fe nd ant’ s f

lig ht f ro m po lic e ). Al va

ra do argue s th a t be c a

us e he wa s an il le g a l im mig ra nt w itha c ri min a l r e c or d, he ha d r e a so ns to u se a ps e ud on y

m and a vo id contac t with police reg ardle ss of whether he a bused Sandra ; thus, his us e of a pseudony m and fa ilure to answer the door do not nec essar ily sug g est that he a

bused Sandra

. Cf. Gi ll , 873 S.W .2d at 48 (c or ro bo ratin g evide nc e mus t c on ne c t de fe nd ant t o s pe c if ic of fe ns e a lle g e d in

ind ic tme nt) . T his argument is unavailing . Whil e Alvarado had rea sons to use a pse udony m and avoid the police that

we re un rel ate d to Sand

ra , th os e re a so ns did

no t ne g a te the fa c t th a t th e jur y c ou ld c on str

ue his actions as e vincing consciousness of g uilt. “[W ]hen there a re two pe rmissible views of the e videnceWe r e c og nize that th is t e sti mony wa s n ot ne c essa ril yc or ro bo rativ e , b ut w e mus t vi e w i t 4 as cor roborative beca

use the jury

voted to convict. Se e Sim mo ns v . S tat e , 2 8 2 S. W. 3 d 5 0 4 , 5 0 8 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2009) (“[W] hen there are two permissible views of the evidenc e (one tending to connec t the defe ndant to the offe nse and the other not te nding to c onnect the defe nd an t t o t h e offense) , appellate courts should defe r to that view of the evidenc e chose n by the fa ct-finde r.”)

. 6 (one te nding to c onnect the de fenda nt to the offense and the other n o t t en d i n g to connec t the defe ndant to the offe nse), a ppellate c ourts should defe r t o that view of the evidenc e chose n by the fac t-finder .” Sim mo ns v . S tat e , 28 2 S.W. 3d 50 4, 50 8 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 09 ). I n o th er wo rd s, beca use the jury

found Alvara do g uilty , we must view his use of a pse udony m and avoidanc e of the police as e vincing consciousness of gu i l t , there by

tending to corrobor ate F elicia’ s testimony

. See Cantelon , 85 S.W .3d at 458 (c orrobor ating evidenc e viewe d in light most favora ble to verdic t). Thoug h Alvara do’s use of a pse udony m and avoidanc e of the police we re suf ficient to corrobor ate F elicia’ s testimony , the State offe red a dditional evidence that the j u ry co u ld have found cor roborative. For example, the S tate’s medical experts testified that Sandra ’s injuries wer e consistent with Felicia ’s desc ription of how Alvar ado abuse d Sandra, a nd a police of

fice r testified that F e lic ia ’s arm s w e re c ut a nd br uis e d s imi larl y

to S and ra ’s

. These f

acts c orrobor ate F el i ci a’s 4 testimony to support a conviction. See Simmons , 2 82 S .W .3 d at 51 1 ( a c c omp lic e te sti mony is sufficie ntly

corro b o rated when a ll non-acc omplice testimony , viewed c umulatively , could allow

ratio na l juro r t o f

ind t hat e vid e nc e te nd e d to c on ne c t a pp e lla nt t o o ff e ns e ); Cas til lo v . S

tat e , 22 1 S. W.3 d 6 89 , 6 91 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ) ( fo r a c c omp lic e te sti mo ny to b e su ff

ic ie ntl y

corr oborate d, “ther e must simply be some n o n -a cc o mp l i ce ev i dencewhich tends to c o nn ect a ppellant to the commission of the offe nse alleg ed in the ind i ct m en t ”) . Thus, we ove rrule A lvara do’s first issue.7

Iss ue Two : W he the r the Trial Cour

t Erre d b y Ov e rru ling

Alv arad o’ s O bje c tio ns D urin

g Cl os ing Arg ument Alvara do argues that the trial c ourt sho u l d have sustaine d his objections to severa l statements the prose cution made dur ing c losing a rg ument. We addres s t hose statements, a nd Alvara do’s ar g uments conce rning them, in turn. Statem ent One: No “Real Evidence ” of Felicia’s Psyc hosis or Paranoid Ideation Al va ra do c on te nd s th a t g ive n it s k nowl edge of Fe lic ia ’s me dic a l hi sto ry , th e State could not leg itimately

claim t here was no “re al evidence” of Felicia’s psy chosis or par anoid ideation. At tr ia l, A lva

ra do ob je c te d to the State ’s c omm e nt o n th e ba sis that it wa s “ un e thi c a l.” On

a pp e a l, Al va ra do a lso a rgue s th a t th e c omm e nt r e pr e se nte d a n im perm is sib le a sse rt ion

of fa c ts n ot i n evidenc e. Se e Bo rja n v . S tat e , 787 S.W. 2d 53 , 57 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ) (p ro se c uto r may no t r a ise

ne w f a c ts d ur ingc los ingargume nt) . T he la tte r a rgume nt i s wa ive d be c a

us e it wa s not m a de a t tr ia l. See Te x. R. A

pp . P. 33 .1 (a )( 1) (A ); Ste rli ng v . S tat e , 800 S.W .2d 513, 520-21 (Te x . Crim. App. 1990) (“G ener ally , err or must be pre sented at trial with a timely and spec ific objec tion, and any objection at trial w h i ch d i ffe rs from the c omplaint on appeal pr eser ves nothing for r eview.” ). The former argument is unavailing beca use unet hicalness is not a prope r basis for objection. See ge ne ra lly Texas R u l es o f E vidence . I n any event, the State’ s comment was litera lly true—no aff irmative evide nce of Fe licia’s psy chosis or par anoid ideation wa s offe red dur ing tr ial—so it was not “unethica l.” We overr ule Alvara do’s second issue as it pertains to the State’s no “ rea l evidence ”

c omm e nt. Sta te ment T

wo: An “I

nnoc e nt P

e rso n” W oul d N ot H av eBe hav e d the Wa

y Alv arad o D id Al va ra do argue s th a t th e State imp e rm iss ibl y a ssume d f

a c ts n ot i n e vid e nc e wh e n it commented that a

n “innoce nt person” w ould not have used a n alias and trie d to avoid the police.8

I n r e sp on se , th e State a dmi ts that “ the re wa s no pro ff e re d e vid e nc e of

ho w a n inno c e nt p e rs on

wo uld act when confr onted by police office rs or CPS caseworke rs.” I t argues, howe ver, that its “innocent person” comment “wa s proper as a r easona

bl e inferenc e fr om the evidenc e and a s a matter of common knowledg e.” See Be rry , 233 S.W .3d at 859 (duringclosing arg ument, prosec ution may dr aw re a so na

ble inf e re nc e s fr om e vid e nc e ); Ma rti ne z v . S tat e , 17 S.W .3d 677, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (c ommon knowledg e is exception to prohibition aga inst arg uing f acts outside the r ecor d). Whil e an inn oc e nt pe rs on mig ht c ho os e to us e an a lia s a nd a vo id t he po lic e , it

is a lso

rea sonable to infer

that such ac tions sugg est g uilt. See F elder , 848 S.W .2d at 98 (providingoffice rs wi th f a lse ide nti fi c a tion in di cat e s “ c on sc iou sn e ss o f guil t” ); Foster , 779 S.W .2d at 859 (jury may

re a so na bly inf e r guil t f ro m de fe nd ant’ s f

lig ht f ro m po lic e ). Th e State is a llo we d to make re a so na ble infere nces dur ing c losing a rg ument. Be rry , 233 S.W .3d at 859. Alvara do contends that the State’ s infere nce vi o l at ed h is right to re main silent b ec au s e it was a

nalog ous to a comment on his decision not to testify at trial. S

e e C ru z v . S tat e , 2 2 5 S

. W

. 3 d 5 4 6 , 5 4 8 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 7 ) (p ro s ec u t o r vi o l at es Fi ft h Am en d m e n t p r i v i l ege

a g a ins t se lf

-i nc ri min a tio n if she c omm e nts on de fe nd ant’ s fa ilure to te sti fy ). He c ite s n o a

uth or ity th a t s u p p o rts th is c o n te n ti o n , h o w e v e r , an d in f a c t th e T e xa s Co u rt o f Cr im in a l A p p e a ls ha s repe atedly

stated that it is permissible to infer guilt from ac tions li ke Alvar ado’s. See, e .g. , Felder , 84 8 S. W.2 d at 98 ; Foster , 7 79 S.W. 2d a t 85 9. Thus , w e ov e rr

ule Al va ra do ’s se c on d is su e a s it pe rt a ins to t

he State ’s “ inn oc e nt p e rs on ” c omm e nt. Statem ent Three: What People “Like” Alvarado “Usually” Do Finally , Alvara do argues that the State impermissibly assumed fa cts not in evidence when it stated that “ peop l e li ke Roberto Alva rado don’ t usually

pick [partners] who would makeAl va ra do a c tua lly

lod g e d h is o bje c tio n a ft e r t he pr os e c uto r be g an a

fo llo w- up c omm e nt: 5 “People who sta

y with battere rs—”. Thus, it is not clea r from the record whether A lvara do meant to object to the comment about what peopl e “l i ke” him “usua lly ” do or to the c omment c ha ra c te ri zing him

a s a “ batte re r. ” Al va

ra do ’s a pp e llate br ie f f

oc us e s o n th e fo rm e r c omm e nt, howeve r, so we will assume that his objection was directed at it (and was timely ). In any event, the State does not contest the matter

. 9 g reat witnesses.” Al va

ra do argue s tha t this co mme nt harm e d him be c a us e it s ug g e ste d th a t un le ss 5 juries wer e g ener ally

willing to ig nore w itnesses’ cr edibility problems, child abuse rs would neve r be c on vic te d— in o th er wor ds, th a t th e jur y sh ou ld c on vic t e ve n if

the e vid e nc e did

no t e sta bli sh Al va ra do ’s g uil t be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. I n re sp on se , the State argue s that its c omm e nt w a s a

rea sonable infe renc e fr om the evidenc e.

We ag ree with A lvara do that the State’s comment assumed fa cts not in evidence ; the State put on no evidence reg ardingwhat kind of pe ople Alvar ado wa s “like,” w hat kind of par tners such people “pick,” or what kind of witnesses suc h partne rs make. N ever theless, we c onclude that the State ’s c omm e nt i s n ot a ba sis fo r r e ve rs a l be c a

us e it d id n ot a ff

e c t A lva ra do ’s su bs tanti a l r ig hts

. Be rry , 233 S.W .3d at 859.

We consider thre e fa ctors in making t h is assessment: (1) the se verity of the misconduct (i.e., the mag nitude of the re marks’ pr ejudicial ef fec t); (2) the me asure s adopted to cur e the mis c on du c t ( i.e ., the e ff ic a c y of any c a uti on ary ins tr uc ti on by the j ud g e ); and (3 ) t he c e rt a int

y of conviction absent the misconduct (i.e., the streng th of the evidenc e supporting t h e c o nviction). Id . at 858-59. He re, the judge did not issue a cautionar y instruction, and the evide nce suppor ting Alvara do’s conviction wa s not espec i al l y strong . Neve rtheless, we conclude that the State’s misconduct was not seve re e noug h to affe ct Alvar ado’s substantial rig hts.10 First, eve n though the prosec utor ref err ed to “pe ople like” Alva rado, s h e did not specify what kind of people Alvara do was “ like.” Thus, to the extent that the prosec utor’s comment sug g ested something neg ative about Alva rado, it did not sug g est something g erma ne to the char g es ag ainst him (unlike, say , a refer ence to “child abuse rs like Alvar ado” or something similar). Sec ond, we do not see how Alvar ado could have bee n prejudice d by the sug g estion that he wa s apt to select a par tner who w ould make a poor witness. Such a s u g g estion does not imply that Alvara do was g uilty of abusingSandra or

committing any

other bad act (or eve n having poor cha rac ter g ener ally

). Third, the prose cutor’s c omment included a f rank admission that the State’s key witness was a

poor one. That admission could only have he lped Alvar ado. On the whole, the n, we conclude that Alvara do’s substantial rig hts were not affe cted by the State ’s c omm e nt t

hat “ pe op le lik e Rob e rt o A lva ra do do n’ t usua lly

pic k [pa rt ne rs ] wh o w ou ld make g reat wi t n es s es .” Id . at 859. We also note that, as discusse d above, A lvara do’s complaint

a bo ut t he State ’s c omm e nt ste ms f ro m hi s b e lie f t

hat th e c omm e nt i nv ite d th e jur y to c on vic t de sp ite a lac k of evide nce. T o the extent Alvarado is cor re ct , t h e j u ry charg e re ctified this problem by instructing the jury

to convict only

on evidenc e bey ond a re asonable doubt. Alvara do does not contend that the jur

y ignor ed this inst ruction. Se e Hu tc h v . S tat e , 9 22 S.W. 2d

16 6, 17 0 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1996) (a

bsent contra

ry evidenc e, appe llate cour ts presume jury

fo l lowed law pr ovided by char g e). Finding

th at Al v ar ad o ’s s u

b s t an t i al ri gh t s we re n o taf fe ct edby the State’s “pe ople like Al va ra do ” c omm e nt, we ov e rr ule Al va ra do ’s se c on d is su e a s it

pe rt a ins to t

hat c omm e nt.11 CO NC LU SION F or the re a so ns state d a

bo ve , w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Jul y

1, 2010 Do No t Pu

bli sh