* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-10330

Summary Calendar

 

STUART JEFFREY HARRIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

STATE OF TEXAS; DALLAS COUNTY; L. L. BEATTIE, Dallas Police

#5504; JOHN VANCE, District Attorney, Dallas County; R.

GALVIN, Dallas Sheriff’s Department; BERRY, Dallas Police

Department; ALF GUNN, Federal Bureau Investigation; JEFF

SHAW, Dallas County District Attorney Office; DEBORAH

MARLOWE, Dallas County District Attorney Office; JIM BOWLES,

Dallas County Sheriff; JIM PEOPLES, Dallas County Sheriff

Department, #200; RICK PERRY, Governor, Texas; HENRY

CUELLAR, Secretary of State, Texas; SYLVIA GALINDO,

Extradition Coordinator, Austin, Texas; JOHN DOE, District 

Attorney, Dallas County; MARIE BRINER, Assistant District 

Attorney, Dallas County; WILL E. PHILLIPS, Court Appointed

Attorney, Texas,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:01-CV-1591-G

--------------------

October 22, 2002

Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Stuart Jeffrey Harris appeals the district court’s dismissal

of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against defendants L. L. Beattie,
No. 02-10330

-2-

R. Galvin and Alf Gunn as time-barred. Federal courts apply the

forum state’s personal-injury statute of limitations to § 1983

actions. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989). The applicable

Texas period limitations period is two years. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (West 2001). This period begins to run when

“plaintiff is in possession of the critical facts that he has been

hurt and who has inflicted the injury....” Moore v. McDonald, 30

F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994). 

The actions taken by Beattie and Galvin took place in 1993,

while Gunn’s conduct took place in 1996. Harris does not allege

that as of June 24, 1996, the date on which the State of Washington

dismissed the fugitive charge against him, he did not know of the

injury that is the basis of these claims, or that if not tolled,

the limitations period did not begin to run as of June 24, 1996.

Accordingly, because the claims against these defendants are over

two years old they are time-barred by the statute of limitations.

Harris also argues that the district court erred in dismissing

his complaint against defendant Will E. Phillips, his courtappointed counsel, as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. We

review § 1915 dismissals for abuse of discretion. Black v. Warren,

134 F>3d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1998). 

Here the district court did not abuse its discretion.

Harris’s § 1983 claim against Phillips lacks “an arguable basis in

law” because Phillips was not acting under color of state law for

purposes of § 1983 liability. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
No. 02-10330

-3-

312, 325 (1981) (holding that public defender does not act “under

color of state law” for § 1983 purposes).

Harris has not provided any argument challenging the district

court’s dismissal of his other claims against the other defendants.

Those issues are deemed abandoned on appeal. See Yohey v.

Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993).

AFFIRMED.