Filed 4/17/13 In re Luis V. CA2/7 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION SEVEN 

In re LUIS V., 

a Person Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law. 

 B238829 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. FJ48648) 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

LUIS V., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Shep 

Zebberman, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed. 

 Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback 

II and Sonya Roth, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

________________________ 
2 

INTRODUCTION

 Appellant Luis V. appeals from an order of the juvenile court committing him to 

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice 

(DJJ). He contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it ordered the DJJ 

commitment. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Appellant’s DJJ commitment resulted from two delinquency petitions, the first 

concerning an incident in Orange County that occurred when appellant was 14 years old, 

and the second concerning an incident occurring two years later in Los Angeles County, 

when appellant was 16 years old. However, the Los Angeles County delinquency 

petition was adjudicated prior to the earlier Orange County delinquency petition. 

 In January 2009, Rafael N. and Jonathan M. were in Rafael’s car in Santa Ana, 

when they were approached by appellant and two companions. Appellant demanded 

Rafael’s keys at gunpoint, and his companions assaulted Jonathan M. After Rafael 

surrendered his car keys, wallet and cell phone, appellant and his companions fled in 

Rafael’s car.1 Jonathan suffered multiple lacerations and bruising to his face. 

 On March 17, 2011, Norma Martinez was on a street in Los Angeles when 

appellant and a companion snatched her purse and fled, causing injury to her finger. The 

Los Angeles District Attorney filed a delinquency petition alleging appellant had 

committed robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). In a negotiated disposition, appellant waived his 

 

1 Because this case was resolved by negotiated disposition, the facts of the 

underlying offenses are taken from probation officers’ reports, which we reviewed after 

granting appellant’s motion to augment the record on appeal with the Los Angeles 

County Superior Court file. 
3 

constitutional rights and admitted he had committed grand theft person (id., § 487, 

subd. (c)). The juvenile court declared appellant a ward of the court, ordered him into a 

six-month camp community placement program, and dismissed the robbery allegation on 

the People’s motion. 

 On August 26, 2011, the Orange County District Attorney filed a delinquency 

petition alleging as to count 1, appellant had committed carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, 

subd. (a)), with a special allegation he had personally used a firearm to commit the 

offense (id., § 12022.53, subd. (b)). As to counts 2 and 3, the petition alleged 

respectively appellant had committed the offenses of receiving stolen property (id., 

§ 496d) and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (id., § 245, 

subd. (a)(1)). 

 On October 14, 2011, appellant was transferred from the camp community 

placement program to the juvenile court in Orange County for a jurisdiction hearing on 

the August 26 petition. In a negotiated plea, appellant waived his constitutional rights 

and admitted he had committed carjacking and had personally used a firearm to commit 

the offense. The juvenile court found true the allegations as to count 1 and the 

enhancement, calculated the maximum term of confinement as 19 years, dismissed the 

remaining counts and ordered the case transferred back to Los Angeles County for 

disposition. 

 Before entertaining arguments by counsel at the January 11, 2012 disposition 

hearing, the juvenile court in Los Angeles indicated it had read and considered 

appellant’s “entire” juvenile court file, and its tentative ruling was to order appellant 

committed to the DJJ.2

 

2 Specifically, the juvenile court stated it had read and considered appellant’s entire 

juvenile court file, including the April 5, 2011 psychological assessment by Dr. Haig 

Kojian, the April 7, 2011 pre-plea report, the camp progress reports, the Santa Ana Police 

Department’s reports, the December 22, 2011 probation officer’s disposition report, 

which recommended camp community placement, and the January 11, 2012 report of 

appellant’s conduct in juvenile hall pending the disposition hearing.
4 

 Defense counsel argued that appellant should be ordered into a nine-month camp 

community placement program. Counsel noted that, apart from two recent episodes at 

juvenile hall, appellant had behaved well and was on the verge of successfully 

completing the six-month camp community placement program. However, on the date of 

his release, appellant was served with a no-bail arrest warrant and transferred to Orange 

County to face allegations relating to three-year old offenses. Counsel maintained that 

had the carjacking and related allegations been resolved prior to the grand theft person 

allegation,3 appellant would likely have been ordered into a nine-month camp community 

placement program, which is a suitable less restrictive alternative to a commitment to the 

DJJ and an appropriate disposition in this case. 

 The prosecutor argued in favor of a commitment to the DJJ, in light of the serious 

nature of the carjacking offense, the personal use of a firearm, and the beating suffered by 

one of the victims. 

 Following argument, the juvenile court stated it was aware appellant was 14 years 

old at the time of the carjacking and his current age was 17 years 8 months, and the 

carjacking predated the grand theft offense. Of concern to the court was the serious 

nature of appellant’s criminal conduct, and his history of self-admitted gang involvement 

and of marijuana and methamphetamine use. The court was also troubled by appellant’s 

behavior in juvenile hall before the disposition hearing: He was disciplined for flashing 

gang signs and for using a telephone without permission. The juvenile court found that 

“[t]he mental and physical condition and qualifications of [appellant] render it probable 

that [he] will benefit from the reformatory discipline or other treatment provided by the 

[DJJ].” The court ordered that appellant remain a ward of the court and be committed to 

the DJJ for a period not to exceed 19 years, which it calculated as nine years for 

carjacking, plus 10 years for the firearm-use enhancement. 

 

3 During argument, defense counsel repeatedly referred to the offense appellant had 

committed in Los Angeles County as robbery. The juvenile court noted the robbery 

allegation had been dismissed after appellant had admitted committing grand theft person 

as part of a negotiated disposition. 
5 

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

 “The decision of the juvenile court to commit a juvenile offender to [the DJJ] may 

be reversed on appeal only by a showing that the court abused its discretion. [Citation.] 

‘[D]iscretion is abused whenever the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the 

circumstances being considered.’ [Citation.]” (In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 

423, 431-432.) “A decision by the juvenile court to commit a minor to the [DJJ] will not 

be deemed to constitute an abuse of discretion where the evidence ‘demonstrate[s] 

probable benefit to the minor from commitment to the [DJJ] and that less restrictive 

alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Pedro 

M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556, disapproved on another ground in People v. 

Gonzales (2013) 56 Cal.4th 353, 375, fn. 6.) “Although the DJJ is normally a placement 

of last resort, there is no absolute rule that a DJJ commitment cannot be ordered unless 

less restrictive placements have been attempted. [Citations.]” (In re M.S. (2009) 174 

Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250.) Moreover, “[i]n evaluating the [juvenile] court’s exercise of 

discretion in committing a minor to [the DJJ], we now do so with punishment, public 

safety, and protection in mind.” (In re Luisa Z. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 978, 987-988.) 

 “An appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that rendered by the 

juvenile court. We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the 

juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to 

support them. [Citation.]” (In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395.) “The 

term ‘substantial evidence’ means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is evidence which is reasonable in nature, 

credible, and of solid value. [Citation.]” (In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1433.) 

B. The DJJ Commitment Was Not an Abuse of Discretion 

Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion because there was 

insufficient evidence to support the finding that the less restrictive alternative disposition 
6 

of the nine-month camp community placement program would be ineffective or 

inappropriate compared to a commitment to the DJJ. We disagree.

 The record before the juvenile court supports the court’s decision to commit 

appellant, who was nearly 18 years old at the time of disposition, to the DJJ. The court 

carefully considered the less restrictive alternative urged by defense counsel in light of 

appellant’s history of delinquency, his gang involvement, drug use and criminal conduct. 

Of particular significance to the court was that appellant still self-identified as a gang 

member and violated rules, despite having recently completed a six-month camp 

community placement program. While the court was also aware appellant had done well 

at camp, it could reasonably find that another camp commitment would be ineffective in 

his rehabilitation. 

DISPOSITION 

 The order is affirmed. 

 JACKSON, J. 

We concur: 

 WOODS, Acting P. J. 

 ZELON, J.