alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4009

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KIRBY GLENN WORRELL, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan, Chief

District Judge. (7:06-cr-00060-FL-2)

Submitted: September 11, 2008 Decided: September 15, 2008

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard L. Cannon, III, CANNON LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Greenville, North

Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States

Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United

States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
 2 

PER CURIAM:

Kirby Glenn Worrell, Jr., pled guilty to larceny of

government property and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 641 (2000), and was sentenced to thirteen months in

prison. On appeal, Worrell argues that the district court erred by

denying him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, under

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("USSG") § 3E1.1 (2006), because

Worrell admitted to using cocaine at least two times while on pretrial release and missed at least six weeks of substance abuse

treatment. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review the district court's determination that Worrell

failed to accept responsibility for clear error. See United States

v. Kise, 369 F.3d 766, 771 (4th Cir. 2004). One of the factors the

court may consider in deciding whether to grant a reduction for

acceptance of responsibility is whether the defendant has

voluntarily terminated or withdrawn from criminal conduct. See

USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(b)). Worrell disputes the district

court's decision to deny him the adjustment because he argues that

his drug use is unrelated to the criminal conduct to which he pled

guilty. Most appellate courts have held that a sentencing court

does not clearly err if it chooses to deny an adjustment for

acceptance of responsibility based on the commission of criminal

conduct that is different from the crime to which the defendant

pled guilty. See United States v. Prince, 204 F.3d 1021, 1023-24
 3 

(10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 130-31

(3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Byrd, 76 F.3d 194, 197 (8th Cir.

1996); United States v. McDonald, 22 F.3d 139, 144 (7th Cir. 1994);

United States v. Pace, 17 F.3d 341, 343 (11th Cir. 1994); United

States v. O'Neil, 936 F.2d 599, 600-01 (1st Cir. 1991); United

States v. Watkins, 911 F.2d 983, 984 (5th Cir. 1990). In light of

these authorities, we are persuaded that the district court did not

clearly err in determining that Worrell was not entitled to a

reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

 AFFIRMED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN B. RAMIREZ, aka Johnny Rhondo,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Respondent - Appellee.

No. 12-56896

D.C. No. 8:12-cv-00986-JVS-RNB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 13, 2015** 

Before: LEAVY, CALLAHAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

John B. Ramirez, aka Johnny Rhondo, appeals pro se from the district

court’s order denying his petition to quash an Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

summons issued to a third-party financial institution. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for clear error, United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d

FILED

MAY 19 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
559, 563 (9th Cir. 2011), and we affirm.

The district court properly denied Ramirez’s petition to quash because

Ramirez failed to rebut the IRS’s showing that the summons was issued in good

faith. See id. at 564 (a taxpayer has a heavy burden to show an abuse of process or

lack of good faith once the IRS makes a prima facie showing that a summons was

issued for a legitimate purpose); see also Fortney v. United States, 59 F.3d 117,

121 (9th Cir. 1995) (a taxpayer is only entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he

presents evidence of a lack of good faith; legal conclusions, memoranda of law,

and allegations are insufficient).

We reject Ramirez’s contentions concerning the Fourth Amendment,

probable cause, and leave to amend his petition.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

Ramirez’s motions and requests for judicial notice, set forth in his opening

and reply briefs, are denied.

AFFIRMED.

2 12-56896
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND CASH
FLOWS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED WITHIN THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-KSB AS OF JUNE 30,
1999.
</LEGEND>
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                         136,058
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  288,499
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (32,000)
<INVENTORY>                                     55,539
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               616,495
<PP&E>                                         433,257
<DEPRECIATION>                               (255,707)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,268,379
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,880,396
<BONDS>                                        481,015
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       154,945
<OTHER-SE>                                   (766,962)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,268,379
<SALES>                                      1,533,922
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,533,922
<CGS>                                          499,766
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                9,250,551
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             489,552
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (8,140,487)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (8,141,287)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (8,141,287)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.96)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.96)


</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 75 (Tuesday, April 18, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20810-20811]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-9593]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 2722-008; Utah]


PacifiCorp Power Company; Notice of Availability of Final 
Environmental Assessment

April 12, 2000.
    In accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
and

[[Page 20811]]

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (Commission) regulations, 18 
CFR part 380 (Order No. 486, 52 FR 47897), the Office of Energy 
Projects has reviewed the application for a new license for the Pioneer 
Hydroelectric Project, and has prepared a Final Environmental 
Assessment (FEA). The project is located on the Ogden River near the 
City of Ogden, Weber County, Utah. The water to operate the project 
comes from the Pineview dam, via the Ogden Canyon Conduit. The dam is 
owned and operated by the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). However, a 
portion of the 5.5-mile-long flowline is located within the Cache 
National Forest, administered by the U.S. Forest Service (FS).
    On February 17, 2000, the Commission staff issued a draft 
environmental assessment (DEA) for the project and requested that 
comments be filed with the Commission within 30 days. Comments on the 
DEA were filed by the U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and 
Wildlife Service and PacifiCorp and are addressed in the FEA.
    The FEA contains the staff's analysis of the potential 
environmental impacts of the project and concludes that licensing the 
project, with appropriate environmental protective measures, would not 
constitute a major federal action that would significantly affect the 
quality of the human environment.
    Copies of the FEA are available for review in the Public Reference 
Room, Room 2A, of the Commission's offices at 888 First Street, NE, 
Washington, DC 20426.

Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-9593 Filed 4-17-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JU LY 31, 2013

NO. 03

- 10

- 00715

- CR

Nilda Iliana Rodriguez, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 426TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE JONE S, JUSTICES GOODWIN AND FIELD

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN ; CONCURRING OPINION B Y JUSTICE FIELD;

DISSENTING OPINION B Y CHIEF JUSTICE JONE S

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record of the court below, and the same being

considered, it is th e opinion of this Court that there was no error in the trial court’s judgment of

conviction : IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that the trial

court’s judgment of conviction is in all things affirmed; and it appearing that the appellant is

i ndigent and unable to pay costs, that no adjudication as to costs is made; and that this decision

be certified below for observance.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Harold Vandenburg, Respondent, v Saratoga Harness Racing et al., Appellants. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

— Kane, J.

Appeal from an amended decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed October 9, 1985, which found the carrier in violation of 12 NYCRR 300.23 (b) and imposed a penalty.

Claimant sustained a compensable injury to his left knee on June 19, 1975. Throughout the ensuing years, claimant was attended by numerous medical doctors who performed numerous surgical procedures on his knee and recommended a multitude of corrective and rehabilitative practices to alleviate his disability. None were entirely successful. Without waiting for an award by the Workers’ Compensation Board, the carrier made payments of benefits to claimant beginning June 25, 1976. On April 14, 1981, claimant was classified as permanently partially disabled and payments continued during the long and involved history of this case, which is not relevant to the issues presented on this appeal, until February 1, 1982, when the carrier unilaterally determined that the payments of benefits should be stopped. This decision stemmed from a letter to the Board by one of claimant’s physicians, dated February 8, 1982, who, in returning claimant to the care of his attending physician after surgery, stated that claimant "could return to normal activity as soon as possible *803without any expectation of further problem” and that "I think that he should be able to return to work in the immediate future without any danger to himself or others”. Subsequent hearings determined that claimant’s disability was continuous and payments were directed to be resumed on December 14, 1983 with an award for back payments due. The issue on this appeal is whether the Board is correct in finding the carrier in violation of rule C-22b (12 NYCRR 300.23 [b]) and imposing a penalty.

Under the provisions of the present rule, the continuation of payments of benefits pursuant to an award for temporary or permanent disability is mandatory until (1) the appropriate notice of intention to suspend payments is filed with the Board *and*(2) there is a determination *after a hearing*in favor of the carrier’s position (12 NYCRR 300.23 [b]). The carrier may not unilaterally suspend payments. The only exception provided by the rule requires legal proof of claimant’s return to work or medical evidence that claimant has no disability, both of which were lacking in this case (12 NYCRR 300.23 [b] [2]). Accordingly, the Board was correct in its determination of a violation of the rule by the carrier, and the imposition of the concomitant penalty was mandatory *(see,*Workers’ Compensation Law § 25 [3] [c]; *Matter of Surdi v Premium Coal & Oil Co.,*52 NY2d 860; *Matter of White v New York City Horn. Auth.,*83 AD2d 707).

Decision affirmed, with costs to the Workers’ Compensation Board. Mahoney, P. J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Levine, JJ., concur.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE O F FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME E XPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED J OSEPH JAMES RANKIN , A ppellant ,
v. Case No. 5D 21

- 2825 LT Case No. 2015

- CF

- 002943 STATE O F FLORIDA ,

Appellee

. ________________________________/ Decision filed April 12, 2022 3.850 A ppeal f rom the C ircuit C ourt for Osceola County , Keith A

. C arsten, J udge. Joseph J. Rankin, M oore Haven, pro se. No Appearance f

or Appellee. PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED.

LAMBERT , C.J. , HARRIS and NARDELLA , JJ., c oncur.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 12, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-41319

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MARIO PEREZ-SANCHEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:05-CR-354-ALL 

--------------------

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Mario Perez-Sanchez (Perez) appeals his guilty-plea

conviction and sentence for being an alien found unlawfully in

the United States after deportation and after having been

convicted of a felony. He was sentenced to 33 months of

imprisonment and three years of supervised release. 

Perez argues that the “felony” and “aggravated felony”

provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (2) are unconstitutional. 

Perez’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by
No. 05-41319

-2-

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). 

Although Perez contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly

decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule

Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.

466 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the

basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States

v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Perez properly concedes that his argument

is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit

precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further

review.

Perez also argues that the district court erred in ordering

him to cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample as a condition

of supervised release and, therefore, that this condition should

be vacated. As Perez concedes, this claim is not ripe for

review. See United States v. Riascos-Cuenu, 428 F.3d 1100, 1102

(5th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed (Jan. 9, 2006) (No. 05-

8662). Accordingly, this portion of the appeal is dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART.
Exhibit 24.1

POWER OF ATTORNEY

Know All Men by These Presents, that the undersigned constitutes and appoints Denis McGlynn and Patrick J. Bagley, each and
individually, as his true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent. with full power of substitution, in any and all capacities to sign filings by Dover Motorsports, Inc. of Form 10-K and any and all amendments thereto, and to file the
same, with all exhibits, and any other documents in connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission, granting unto said attorney-in-fact and agent, full power and authority to do and perform each and every act and thing requisite
or necessary to be done in and about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as he might or could do in person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that said attorney-in-fact and agent, or his substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be
done by virtue hereof. This Power of Attorney may be signed in counterparts.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Power of Attorney, in the capacities indicated, as of this 7thday
of March, 2008.



/s/ Kenneth K. ChalmersKenneth K. ChalmersDirector/s/ Jeffrey W. RollinsJeffrey W. RollinsDirector/s/ John W. Rollins, Jr.John W. Rollins, Jr.Director/s/ R. Randall RollinsR. Randall RollinsDirector/s/ Henry B. TippieHenry B. TippieDirector/s/ Eugene W. WeaverEugene W. WeaverDirector
REFUSAL TO PERFORM FIELD SOBRIETY TEST AND CHEMICAL TEST

Written by: Hearing Office Staff

Often times in BUI cases the party refuses to cooperate with any 

field sobriety tests (FST). This alone does not create a presumption 

of intoxication. 

33 CFR 95.040 states: “If an individual refuses to submit to or 

cooperate in the administration of a timely chemical test when 

directed by a law enforcement officer based on reasonable cause, 

evidence of the refusal is admissible in evidence in any 

administrative proceeding and the individual will be presumed to be 

under the influence of alcohol or a dangerous drug.”

33 CFR 95.040 expressly requires that the chemical test be directed

by the law enforcement officer. Refusal to perform FSTs, along with 

the observations that make the administration of FSTs appropriate, 

can provide reasonable cause to direct a chemical test. But, if the 

boarding officers do not specifically direct a party to submit to 

chemical testing, after the refusal to perform FSTs, the refusal to 

perform FSTs by itself will not give rise to a presumption of being 

under the influence as provided for in 33 CFR 95.040.

Boarding officers must not assume that refusal to perform FSTs 

means the party is also refusing to submit to a chemical test. If a 

party refuses to perform FSTs and the boarding officer has 

reasonable cause to suspect the individual of being in violation of the 

standards in 33CFR 95.020 or 95.025, the boarding officer must 

specifically direct the party to conduct a chemical test in order for a 

refusal to raise the presumption under 33 CFR 95.040.
#### Margarita Rivera, Respondent, v Katte Anilesh, D.D.S., et al., Defendants, and Indu Anilesh, D.D.S., Appellant.

Submitted March 26, 2007;

decided March 29, 2007

Motion by New York State Trial Lawyers’ Association for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted. Three copies of the brief may be served and an original and 24 copies filed within seven days.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2573 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2573

   To amend title 38, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of 
 Veterans Affairs to furnish headstones and markers for the graves of 
 dependents of veterans buried in county, private, or other cemeteries.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 22, 2015

 Mr. Norcross introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title 38, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of 
 Veterans Affairs to furnish headstones and markers for the graves of 
 dependents of veterans buried in county, private, or other cemeteries.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS FURNISHED HEADSTONES AND 
              MARKERS FOR GRAVES OF VETERANS' SPOUSES.

    (a) In General.--Section 2306 of title 38, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``section 
                2402(a)(4), (5), and (6)'' and inserting ``section 
                2402(a)(4) and (6)''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``section 
                2402(a)(5)'' and all that follows through the period 
                and inserting the following: ``paragraph (5) or (9) of 
                section 2402(a) of this title who is buried in any 
                cemetery in the United States.''; and
            (2) in subsection (d)--
                    (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, (4),'' after 
                ``paragraph (2)''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (4), by inserting ``, or as a 
                dependent of a veteran'' after ``status as a veteran''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to deaths occurring on or after November 11, 1998.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the quarterly report of eLinear, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-QSB  for  the  quarter  ended March 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange  Commission  on  the  date hereof (the "Report"), I, Kevan Casey, Chief
Executive  Officer  of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350,
as  adopted  pursuant  to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
the  best  of  my  knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

(2)  The  information  contained  in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects,  the  financial  condition  and  results of operations of the Company.



/s/  Kevan Casey
------------------------------------
Kevan Casey,
Chief Executive Officer
May 24, 2004


     A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to eLinear, Inc. and will be retained by eLinear, Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


<PAGE>