alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> BD
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE COMPANY'S ANNUAL
REPORT ON FORM 10-K AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          50,032
<RECEIVABLES>                                  296,748
<SECURITIES-RESALE>                                  0
<SECURITIES-BORROWED>                                0
<INSTRUMENTS-OWNED>                             66,739
<PP&E>                                          13,167
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 537,917
<SHORT-TERM>                                     8,365
<PAYABLES>                                     285,393
<REPOS-SOLD>                                         0
<SECURITIES-LOANED>                                  0
<INSTRUMENTS-SOLD>                              16,056
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       103,320
<OTHER-SE>                                     123,392
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   537,917
<TRADING-REVENUE>                              100,628
<INTEREST-DIVIDENDS>                            11,840
<COMMISSIONS>                                   37,682
<INVESTMENT-BANKING-REVENUES>                  154,272
<FEE-REVENUE>                                   55,317
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,447
<COMPENSATION>                                 198,613
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                127,067
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     127,067
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    88,601
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     3.27
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     3.27
        

</TABLE>
#### Walnut Place LLC et al., Appellants, v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et al., Respondents, et al., Nominal Defendant.

[948 NYS2d 580]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara R. Kapnick, J.), entered on or about March 29, 2012, which, in this action alleging breach of representations and warranties made by defendant sellers in pooling and service agreements (PSAs), granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The court correctly held that plaintiff certificate holders’ action is barred by the “no-action” clause in the PSAs, which plainly limits certificate holders’ right to sue to an “Event of Default,” which, under section 7.01 of the PSAs, involves only the master servicer *(cf. Sterling Fed. Bank, F.S.B. v DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc.,*2010 WL 3324705, *4, 2010 US Dist LEXIS 85771, *14 [ND Ill, Aug. 20, 2010, No. 09-C-6904]). Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, section 2.03 of the PSAs does not render the no-action clause ambiguous, nor does it permit plaintiffs’ to bring this action. That section merely provides for a remedy in *685the event of a breach, and does not reference or contemplate actions by certificate holders to achieve that remedy. Plaintiffs’ argument that the “Event of Default” provision does not apply in this case is unavailing. Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the “no-action” clause would improperly excise the “Event of Default” provision and distort the plain meaning of the clause *(see Bailey v Fish & Neave,*8 NY3d 523, 528 [2007]). Nor are plaintiffs excused from complying with the “Event of Default” provision because of the alleged impossibility of showing such an event. The “prevention/impossibility” doctrine, upon which plaintiffs’ argument relies, only applies, where, unlike here, nonperformance of a condition precedent was caused by the party insisting that the condition be satisfied *(see Ellenberg Morgan Corp. v Hard Rock Cafe Assoc.,*116 AD2d 266, 271 [1986]).

We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Saxe, J.P., Friedman, Renwick, DeGrasse and Richter, JJ. [Prior Case History; 35 Misc 3d 1207(A), 2012 NY Slip Op 50601(U).]
# C_2023047EN.01029501.xml

| 7.2.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 47/295 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.2.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 47/295

---

P9_TA(2022)0294

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Temporary measures concerning driver documents issued by Ukraine ***I

European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 July 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down specific and temporary measures, in view of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, concerning driver documents issued by Ukraine in accordance with its legislation (COM(2022)0313 — C9-0201/2022 — 2022/0204(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

(2023/C 47/31)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0313), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2022)0313),

| — | having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 91 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0201/2022), |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 91 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9-0201/2022),

| — | having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

| — | after consulting the European Economic and Social Committee, |
| --- | --- |

—

after consulting the European Economic and Social Committee,

| — | after consulting the Committee of the Regions, |
| --- | --- |

—

after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

| — | having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure, |
| --- | --- |

—

having regard to Rules 59 and 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

| 1. | Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments. |
| --- | --- |

3.

---

P9_TC1-COD(2022)0204

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 7 July 2022 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2022/... of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down specific and temporary measures, in view of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, concerning driver documents issued by Ukraine in accordance with its legislation

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2022/1280)

---
#### Malrite T.V. of New York, Inc., et al., Appellants, v *994Phillip Licciardi et al., Respondents.

— Judgment affirmed, without costs, for the reasons stated in the decision at Special Term, Tillman, J. All concur, except Boomer, J., who dissents and votes to reverse and grant the petition in the following memorandum.

Boomer, J.

(dissenting). Respondent landowners, having knowingly acquired the land for a use prohibited by the zoning ordinance, could not thereafter have a variance on the ground of special hardship *(see, Matter of Clark v Board of Zoning Appeals,*301 NY 86, *cert denied*340 US 933; *Matter of Romanelli v Bonvouloir,*102 AD2d 872; *Repicci v Sharpe,*96 AD2d 727, *lv denied*60 NY2d 556; *Ames v Palma,*52 AD2d 1077; *Matter of Kenyon v Quinones,*43 AD2d 125, 127; *Matter of Everhart v Johnston,*30 AD2d 608; 2 Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice § 23.30 [3d ed]). Moreover, the landowners failed to submit sufficient dollars and cents proof to justify the grant of a variance. The Court of Appeals "has consistently rejected as insufficient to justify a grant of a use variance the bare conclusory testimony of witnesses that the property could not yield a reasonable return” *(Matter of Village Bd. v Jarrold,*53 NY2d 254, 259). If the landowners can, by proper proof, show that the property cannot be used for any purpose permitted by the zoning ordinance, they may have a remedy by way of an action to declare the zoning ordinance unconstitutional as to their property. But on the record before us they are not entitled to a use variance. Accordingly, I vote to reverse the order appealed from and to grant the petition (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Tillman, J. — art 78.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Boomer, Green, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
#### Muriel Siebert & Co., Inc., Appellant, v Intuit Inc., Respondent.

Submitted January 8, 2007;

decided January 11, 2007

Motion by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York for leave to file a brief amicus curiae on the appeal herein granted and the proposed brief is accepted as filed.
#### BARTLETT, Respondent, v. DOWD, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department.

March 27, 1894.)

Action by Daniel Bartlett against Thomas H. Dowd, as administrator, etc.

Argued before DWIGHT, P. J., and LEWIS, HAIGHT, and BRADLEY,

No opinion. Motion to strike case from the calendar. Granted.
<PAGE>
                                   EXHIBIT 32

       CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
           PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the amended annual report of Capital Growth Systems,
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2003, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Lee Wiskowski, Co-Chief Executive Officer of the Company, I,
Douglas Stukel, the Co-Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and I, Derry L.
Behm, the Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify to the best of my
knowledge, pursuant to l8 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Dated:  September 8, 2005


                                      By:  /s/ Lee Wiskowski
                                           -------------------------------------
                                      Name:    Lee Wiskowski
                                      Title:   Co-Chief Executive Officer

                                      By:  /s/ Douglas Stukel
                                           -------------------------------------
                                      Name:    Douglas Stukel
                                      Title:   Co-Chief Executive Officer

                                      By:  /s/ Derry L. Behm
                                           -------------------------------------
                                      Name:    Derry L. Behm
                                      Title:   Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

The foregoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as an exhibit to the Report and is
not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.
(8 Misc. Rep. 76.)

#### DUDLEY v. BRINCK.

(City Court of New York, General Term.

April 23, 1894.)

J udgment—Opening Default—Conditions.

Requiring defendant to give a bond with sureties to pay any judgment which plaintiff may recover as a condition of opening a default will not be disturbed where the motion was not made until after the granting of an order to examine defendant in supplementary proceedings, and after defendant had resisted the taxation of costs.

Appeal from special term.

Action by Augustus P. Dudley against Caroline Brinck. From an order imposing conditions on opening a default, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before NEWBURGER, McCARTHY, and CONLAN, JJ.

E. F. James, for appellant.

Shepard & Prentess, for respondent.

CONLAN, J.

This is an appeal from an order entered March 1894, opening a default upon the terms that the defendant, within three days after the service of a copy of the order, give a bond in the sum of $1,000, with two sufficient sureties, conditioned for the payment of any judgment the plaintiff may recover in the action; said bond to be approved, as to form and sufficiency, by a justice of this court, and the sureties to justify on two days’ notice, if excepted to; said notice to be given within two days after notice of exception; and, on failure to justify, new sureties to be substituted, and justify as aforesaid, and also pay $10, costs of this motion. In case of failure to give bond as required, motion denied, with $10 costs. If bond given, and sureties justify, then the order in supplementary-proceedings to be vacated, and cause to be placed on calendar for trial. In this case the default was taken January 18, 1894, and the costs taxed January 23, 1894. The defendant’s attorney appeared on the taxation, and objected to certain items in the bill, and judgment was entered on that day for $863.65. Execution was thereupon issued, and returned unsatisfied on March 1, 1894, 36 days after entry of judgment. An order to examine the defendant in supplementary proceedings was granted, returnable the 3d day of March, 1894, and was served on the defendant on the 1st day of March, 1894. The motion to open the default was not made until after the granting of the order in supplementary proceedings. The claim on the part of the attorney for the defendant that the default was the result of business engagements and inadvertence appears to exist more in imagination than in fact. The time occupied in opposing taxation could be more usefully employed in moving to open the default. If the terms imposed appear harsh to the defendant, they are the natural and reasonable result of what appears to be inexcusable delay. We think the justice at special term fairly exercised his discretion in making the order of March 5th, and also in denying the application for a resettlement of said order March 8, 1894. Both orders affirmed, with costs. All concur.
MUCH ADO ABOUT RING LIFE BOUYS 

Written by CDR E. Hudspeth

The Coast Guard Commandant’s approval and associated number, 

the amount, size, length of attached line, color, markings, 

availability, and condition are all requirements for ring life buoys on 

board commercial fishing industry vessels. This article will briefly 

identify where exactly these requirements are found in Title 46, 

Code of Federal Regulations, Part 28 (46 CFR 28).

According to 46 CFR 28.105(b), lifesaving equipment must be 

approved by the Commandant of the Coast Guard. However the 

acceptable approval numbers; whether a buoyant cushion, ring life 

buoy, or no throwable flotation device is required; the amount; the 

size; and the color are all specified in 46 CFR 28.115 on Table 

28.115, and depend on the length of the vessel. A copy of the table is 

provided below.

Table 28.115--Throwable Flotation 

Devices

Vessel length Devices 

required

Less than 16 feet (4.9 

meters) None.

16 feet (4.9 meters) or more 

but 

less than 26 feet (7.9 

meters)

1 buoyant 

cushion, or 

ring life 

buoy (Type 

IV PFD). 

26 feet (7.9 meters) or more, 

but 

1 ring life 

buoy 
less than 65 feet (19.8 

meters)

approval 

number 

starting 

with 

160.009 or 

160.050; 

orange; at 

least 24 

inch 

(0.61meters) 

size.

65 feet (19.8 meters) or 

more 

3 ring life 

buoys, 

approval 

Number 

160.050; 

orange; at 

last 24 inch 

(0.61 

meters) 

size. 

In addition to the above table, 46 CFR 28.115 (a) describes the 

length of line (60 feet or 90 feet) needed for at least one life ring buoy 

on board, again depending on the length of the vessel (less than 65 

feet, or 65 feet and greater). 

Also, according to 46 CFR 28.115 (b), if certain conditions are met, 

the size of the ring life buoy may be 20 inches or larger, instead of 

the 24 inch or larger size described in Table 28.115.

Markings for ring life buoys are covered in 46 CFR 28.135, Table 

28.135, and include the requirement for the name of the vessel to be 

in block capital letters, and the requirement that Type II 

retroflective material be arranged to meet IMO Resolution 

A.658(16).
Finally, the requirement for the ring life buoys to be readily 

accessible and in good working order is covered in 46 CFR 28.140.

When it comes to ring life buoys, it seems apparent from the 

applicable regulations that the smaller the vessel, the fewer the 

requirements.
claimed loss and the actual costs incurred to replace your claimed loss or documentation to 

establish reasonable estimates of replacement costs based on your pattern of subsistence use).

 

Request for Reconsideration

On 4 January 2012, the NPFC received a request for reconsideration of the 17 November 2011 

determination. 

Claim Submission and Documentation

To support your reconsideration request, you provided a single handwritten letter which stated 

that you wished to resubmit your claim. Your letter stated that you had only received your initial 

determination letter via email on 21 December 2011 due to a change of address. You provided 

no other information or documentation to support your reconsideration request. Despite 

attempted correspondence acknowledging this lack of documentation and informing you of the 

necessary information previously addressed in the initial determination letter, no further 

information was received by the NPFC1

.

Reconsideration of NPFC determinations

Under the claim regulations at 33 C.F.R. §136.115(d), claimants may make a written request for 

reconsideration of an NPFC determination. The reconsideration must be received by the NPFC 

within 60 days of the date of the determination and must include the factual or legal basis of the 

request for reconsideration. Reconsideration will be based upon the information provided and a 

claim may be reconsidered only once. Your request for reconsideration was received within the 

required 60 day period.

NPFC Determination

After careful review of the original claim, absent any additional information submitted with your 

request for reconsideration, the NPFC finds that you have not provided sufficient documentation 

to support your claimed loss of subsistence food. You still have not:

1) Established that you suffered a loss of subsistence use of natural resources as a result of 

the spill (i.e., you provide no evidence to support your claim that you had a pattern of 

subsistence use of natural resources, and that you suffered subsistence use losses due to 

the oil spill); nor

2) Explained or documented how you determined your claimed loss of $15,000 (i.e., the 

period of your claimed loss and the actual costs incurred to replace your claimed loss or 

documentation to establish reasonable estimates of replacement costs based on your 

pattern of subsistence use).

1 Telephone correspondence on 12 January 2012 and 17 February 2012 to indicate missing documentation

 
Due to the deficiency in facts to support your claim, the NPFC denies your claim upon 

reconsideration. The determination of this request for reconsideration constitutes final agency 

action. If you have any questions or would like to discuss the matter, you may contact the NPFC 

at the above address and phone number. 

Sincerely,

Natural Resource Damage Claims Division

National Pollution Funds Center

 U.S. Coast Guard
**EXHIBIT 10.9**

 

**SUMMARY OF COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS WITHEXECUTIVE OFFICERS**

 

Coleman Orr serves as the President of our Care Entrée division.  Mr. Orr receives a base salary of $120,000per year.  We will consider thedevelopment of a commission plan for Mr. Orr such that he would receiveadditional compensation of cash and securities for actual improvements tocertain operating metrics.

 

Eliseo Ruiz III serves as our Vice President, General Counsel, andSecretary.  Mr. Ruiz receives a basesalary of $150,000 per year and is eligible for participation in our managementincentive plan.  He has received optionsto purchase 100,000 shares of our Common Stock. Those options become exercisable in increments of 25,000 shares.  The first increment became exercisable in December 2004.  The remaining increments become exercisablein December 2005, 2006, and 2007.

 

Both Mr. Orr and Mr. Ruiz are eligible for all benefits that we offerto our employees, including: participation in our 401K plan, health coverage, ahealth reimbursement account, participation in our tax-favored flexiblespending accounts, and membership in our Care Entrée program.

 

----