Filed 7/23/24 P. v. Tate CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER TATE,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B332620

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. A645237)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Affirmed.

Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, 

Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney General, and Noah P. Hill, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Christopher Tate (Tate) appeals from an order denying his 

motion for a hearing under Penal Code section 1203.011 and People v. 

Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). After Tate submitted his opening 

brief, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Hardin (2024) 15 

Cal.5th 834 (Hardin). That decision controls the outcome here. We affirm 

the trial court’s order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Tate was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances in 

1988. He was 19. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 

In November 2022, Tate filed a motion for a hearing under section 

1203.01 and Franklin, seeking an opportunity to place information on the 

record for an eventual youth offender parole hearing. The trial court denied 

the motion, finding that Tate was not entitled to a youth offender parole 

hearing under section 3051. 

Tate timely appeals.

DISCUSSION 

Section 3051, subdivision (a)(1) provides that the Board of Parole 

Hearings (Board) must hold a hearing “for the purpose of reviewing the 

parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at 

the time of the controlling offense.” At that hearing, the Board’s decision 

“will be informed by youth-related factors, such as his cognitive ability, 

character, and social and family background at the time of the offense.” 

1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise 

stated.
3

(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 269.) However, prisoners convicted before 

2013, when section 3051 was enacted, may not have had a chance to make a 

record about those factors at their sentencing hearing. (Ibid.) Therefore, 

they may be entitled to a separate hearing where they have the opportunity 

to place information in the record for eventual use by the Board. (Ibid.)

Not all prisoners are entitled to a youth offender parole hearing. 

Section 3051, subdivision (h) specifically excludes “cases in which an 

individual is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a 

controlling offense that was committed after the person had attained 18 years 

of age.” Tate is covered by this exclusion. He argues that the exclusion 

violates the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution.

The California Supreme Court rejected that argument in Hardin. The

appellant in that case was “serving a life without parole sentence for a special 

circumstance murder he committed at age 25.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 

p. 839.) He filed a postjudgment motion to develop and preserve evidence for 

later use in a youth offender parole hearing. (Id. at p. 840.) The motion was 

denied because the appellant was ineligible for such a hearing under section 

3051, subdivision (h). (Ibid.) The appellant argued on appeal that the

exclusion violates the Equal Protection Clause in two ways: (1) it irrationally 

distinguishes between juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole and 

young adult offenders who receive the same sentence, and (2) it irrationally 

distinguishes between young adults who had committed murder with a 

special circumstance and those who had committed murder with no special 

circumstance. (Id. at pp. 840–841.)

The Court of Appeal accepted the second argument. (Hardin, supra, 15 

Cal.5th at pp. 840–841.) The California Supreme Court reversed. (Id. at p. 

839.) The Court held that, although the primary purpose of section 3051 was 
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to give “young persons the opportunity to obtain release based on 

demonstrated growth and rehabilitation,” the Legislature balanced that 

objective with “concerns about culpability and the appropriate level of 

punishment for certain very serious crimes.” (Id. at p. 854.) “It was not 

irrational for the Legislature to exclude from youth offender parole eligibility 

those young adults who have committed special circumstance murder, an 

offense deemed sufficiently culpable that it merits society’s most stringent 

sanctions.” (Id. at p. 864.)

Tate’s situation is the same. He is a young adult offender convicted of 

special circumstance murder and is not eligible for a youth offender parole 

hearing under section 3051. Under Hardin, that ineligibility does not violate 

the Equal Protection Clause. 

DISPOSITION 

The order of the trial court is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

MORI, J.