# FILED
January 30, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON JANUA RY 1998 SESSION
CLARENCE WASHINGTON, ) ) NO. 02C01-9703-CC-00097 Appellant, ) ) LAUDERDALE COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. JOSEPH H. WALKER, JIMMY HARRISON, WARDEN, ) JUDGE ) Appellee. ) (Writ of Habeas Corpus)

FOR THE APPELLANT : CLARENCE WA

SHINGTON, pro se Number 97682 Cold Creek Correcti onal Facility P.O. Box 1000 Henning, TN 38041-1000 FOR THE APPEL LEE : JOHN KNOX WALKUP Attorney General and Repor ter KENNETH W. RUCKER Assistant Attorney Gener al Cordell Hull Buildi ng, 2nd Floor 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243-0493 ELIZABETH T. RICE District Attorney General 302 Market Street Somerville, TN 38068

OPINION FI LED:

AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE2 OPINION
The appellant, Clarence Washington, appeals as of right from an order entered in the Circuit C ourt of Lauderdale County deny ing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the tr ial court is affirmed.

I.
The appellant was convic ted in February 1983 of tw o (2) counts of robbery with a deadly weapon, which were Class X felonies at that time. Jury sentencing was stil l in effect, and he was sentenced by the jury to two (

2) tenyear sentences. The appellant was then found to be an habitual c riminal, and his sentences were enhanced to two (2) concurre nt life sentences. The appellant asserts that hav ing his sentences enhanced as an habitual offender after being convicted for Class X felonies violates double jeopardy principles. He claims the enhanced sentences ar e void; therefore, he should be released based on the original sentences.

II.
It is a settled principl e that an appellant is only entitled to habeas corpus relief if “it ap pears on the f ace of the jud gment or the reco rd of the proce edings upon which the judgment is rendered, that a convicti ng court was without jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a de fendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Archer v. State , 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). The appellant does not allege, nor does it appear that his judgment is void on its face. Nor does it appear that his sentences have expired. Theref ore, he is not entitled to h abeas co rpus re lief.3 III.

Habitual criminal statut es do not prescribe an additi onal sentence for one already convicted, or

punish offenders for crimes wher e sentences have been served. A finding of gui lt and the jury’s setting of sentence for the trigg ering offense prior to the jury’s habitual criminal designation does not violate dou ble jeopardy principles. State v. Archie , 639 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). Rather, the statutes r ecognized prior cr

iminal convictions and used them as a means to enhance the present sent ence for the triggering

offense. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1-801 et. seq. (1982). “Since habitual criminal ity is a status or a vehicle for the enhancement of punishment, incidental to and dependent on the most recent conviction, as opposed to an independent crime, jeopardy does no t attach.” Pearson v. State , 521 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tenn. 1975). Thus, the procedure for the habitual criminal designat ion and se tting of p unishme nt does n ot violate double je opardy.

IV.
The appellant contends he is entitl ed to relief under double jeopardy principles that prohibit

multiple punishments for a sing le offense. He claims that by being convicted of a Class X felony, he ori ginally receiv ed an enhanced punishment for his crimes. He argues the habitual cri minal enhancement he received was a second, distinct punishment for the same crimes. The appellant mischaracteriz es the sentence enhancement he receiv ed by virtue of his habitu al criminal designati on. He received one punis hment for each of the crimes as discussed above, albeit a much more sev ere punishment based upon his designation as an habitual criminal.

The judgment of the trial court i s affirmed.4 __________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE

CONCUR:

______________________________ JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JU DGE

______________________________ PAUL G. SUMM ERS, JUDGE