### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te mb er 9, 200 9

LI SA BASS COL LI NS v. ST EPHEN BUT LER COL LI NS

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Henry County No. 20,687 Ron E. Harmon, Chancellor

No. W2008-02660-C OA-R3-C V - Filed September 29, 2009

This case involves a divorce ending a one y ear marria g e. Husband appeals the tria l court’s va luation of marital pr operty , its decision not to include the incre ase in wif e’ s s ep arate prope rty

in the distribution of marital property and the a war d of tempora

ry support to the wife dur ing the pendenc y of the div or c e

. B e c a

us e the tr ia l court fa ile d to pr op e rl y de te rm ine the mari ta l va lue on so me ite ms of prope rty

we r ever se the trial c ourt’s dec ision as to those items and r emand for furthe r
c on sid e ratio n. We a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on a s to the va lue of the re ma ini ng ite ms of pr op e rt y and its awa

rd of tempor ary

support. Affir

med in part, re verse d in part and r emande d.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3. Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancer y Court Af firme d in Part, Reve rsed in Part and Remanded

J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., joined.

Ja me s H . Br a db e rry, Dr e sd e n, Te nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla nt, Ste ph e n Bu tle r C oll ins

.
Terry Jack Le onard, Camde n, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llee, Lisa Bass Collins.

OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound
The Appe llant Stephen Butler Colli ns (“Husba

nd”) a nd Appellee L isa Ba ss Coll ins (“Wife”)

wer e mar ri ed October

28, 2006. Prior to the marria g e, beg inning in Apr il of 2005, Husband and Wif e re sid e d to g eth e r i n th e Hu sb and ’s ho me in P ari s, Te nn e sse e . T he pa rt ie s se pa rate d in No ve mbe r 2 00 7. Wif

e fi le d f or div or c e on

De c e mbe r 1 3, 20 07 a lle g ing g ro un ds of ir re c on c ila ble differ ence s and inappropr iate marital conduct. Husband a nswere d and filed a

counter -complaint for div or c e on Decem ber

20 , 2 00 7 d e nyingina

pp ro pr ia te mari ta l c on du c t and a lle g ingir

re c on c ila ble differ ence s and inappropr iate mar ital conduct.W i f e r eque s t ed at t r i al t hat H us band’ s U PS r et i r em ent be nef i t s a cc r ued dur i ng m ar r i age be di vi ded. U pon 1

r evi ew of t he r ec or d, w e f i nd t hat t he t r i al cour t di d not addr es s t hi s i s s ue. H ow eve r , ne i t her pa r t y ha s r ai s ed t hi s i s s ue

o n a p p e a l an d th e re fo re w e d o n o t ad d re ss th e d iv isio n o f th e U P S re tire m e n t b e n e fits.

-2- Wif e , a g e tw e nty -n ine
, is a c oll e g e g ra du a te and ma int a ins a re a l e state lic e ns e

. At the tim e of the marria g e she was employ ed by Wesley Housing , but quit that job i n November 2006. Wife did no t ha ve ou tsi de e mpl oy

me nt duri ng the marr ia g e , b ut t e sti fi e d th a t sh e wo rk e d e xten siv e ly in t h e p ar t i es ’ l aw nb u s i n es s

. At t h e t i m e o f t h e m arri age s h e o wn eda p o n t o o nb o at an d a 2 0 0 4 Do d ge Neon , both with debts owing, some pe rsona l proper ty and a r etireme nt acc ount throug h Wesley Housing with a value of

$3, 3 6 9 .13. Subsequent to the marr iag e, wife cashe d in her re tirement

acc ount and deposited the a mount into a joint acc oun t wi th her Husba nd at Reg ions Bank. Wife testified that, af

ter taxes, the amount was $2,842.30. The debt on both the pontoon b o at and the Neon wa s paid during the marr iag e.
Husband, a g e t h irty -two, possesses a master’ s deg ree in ag riculture. A t the time of the marria g e, Husba

nd owned a

lawn business, Elite Lan d s capingand F arms (“ lawn business”) , and worke d for UPS. Prior to t h e m arriag e, Husba nd’s lawn business e ntere d into a contra ct with the Henr y County Boa rd of Educ ation for mowing and lawn service s. The initial contrac t was for a one y e ar p e ri od , b ut w a s su

bs e qu e ntl y

re ne we d. Duri ng the marr ia g e , th e lawn bu sin e ss a lso e nte re d in to

a mow ingc on tr a c t w iththe Da na Cor po ra tio n. Hu sb and

a lso a c c ru e d r e tir e me nt be ne fi ts w ithUPS

. 1 At the time of the mar

riag e, husband ow ned a house and re al estate on which the c ouple re sided, a 73 20 JohnDe e re Tr a c tor , a Ne w Ho lla nd Tr a c tor and a se pa

ra te fa rm

. Duri ng the marr ia g e pa y me nts

wer e made on the debts owe d on all of these a ssets.

O nJ an u ar

y 7 , 2 0 0 8 t h e t r i a l c o u rtaw ar d e d W i f e t e m p o r ar

y s u p p o rto f $ 1 0 0 p e r w e e k

. It appea rs from the br iefs that this was b y agr ee m en t. The re cord doe s not contain an orde r memorializing this ag ree ment. On J anuar y 29, 2008, Husband filed a mot ion to set aside the temporar y support awa

rd conte nding that he was pressure d into a g ree ing to the awa rd and that the documents supporting Wife’s motion conta ined misrepre sentations. After a conf ere nce c all with the court on Apr il 11, 2008, the parties enter ed an order reduc ing temporar y support to $50.00 per w eek. Husband, a dmittedly , made no f urther pa y ments after

April 11, 2008.
On September

4, 2008, the trial cour

t declar ed the pa

rties di vorce d, finding fault on the pa rt of both Husband and Wife. The trial court f ound that the lawn business ha d incre ased in va lue by $16,000 during the marr iag e and a war ded the business in its entirety to the Husband. The trial court further found that the Husba

nd’s house a

nd rea l estate, fa

rm, 7320 J o h n Dee re Tr actor and Ne w Ho lla nd Tr a c tor ha d in c re a se d in va lue $3 3, 02 0 duri ng the marr ia g e and awa rd e d th e Wif

e on e -h a lf of t he increase d value or $16,510. Wife was aw arde d all the per sonal proper ty she broug ht into the

marr ia g e . T he tr ia l c ourt

a lso fo un d th a t th e To ro mow e r, pic ku p, we e d e a te rs , tr a ile r, c ott on tr a ile rs , disc mower, a

nd J ohn Dee re ba iler we re ow ned by Husband at the time of the marr iag e and ha d incre ased in va lue $16,089.59 during the marr iag e. The entire inc rea se in va lue on these items was

awa rded to the H usband. The tr ial cou rt al s o found that the husband sold 1,200 ba les of straw at $2.00 per ba le during the marria g e. The Wife was awa rded a one-ha lf interest in the straw sold orI n th e ir b rie fs , b o th p a rtie s sta te th a t t h e trial c o u rt fo u n d th e m a rita l i n c re a se in H u sb a n d ’s se p a ra te p ro p e rty 2

t o be $3 3, 02 1. 47

. H ow ever , t he Fi nal D ecr ee s t at es t hat t he m ar i t al i ncre as e i n H usband’s s epar at e pr op er t y w as $ 3 3 ,0 2 0

. -3- $1,200. Finally , Wife was g rante d a judgme nt a g ainst Husband for $1,000 repr esenting the ar rea rs owed in tempora

ry spousal support.

On appe al, Husband pr esents five issues for our r eview:

1. Whether the trial court err ed in f inding that Elite L andsca

ping and Fa

rms was owne d jointly

by the pa rt ie s? 2. Whe the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in e sta

bli sh ing $3 3, 02 0 a s th e mari ta l in c re a se in s e pa rate pr op e rt

y owned by the Husband pr ior to marria g e? 2 3. Whe the r t

he tr ia l court e rr e d in est a

bli sh ing the va lue of

$1 6, 08 9. 59 a s th e va lue of mari ta l a sse ts? 4. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in not considering the incre ase in the e quity of the wife ’s pre marital

a sse ts? 5. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in setting temporar y s u p p o rt i n the amount of $100.00 pe r we ek i n i t i a l l y w i t h a r e d u c t i o no f $ 5 0

. 0 0 p e r

w e e k a f t e r n i n e t y d ay s ?

Division of Marital P ropert y

Th e div isi on

of mari ta l pr op e rt

y , in c lud ing

its c la ssi fi c a tio n a

nd v a l u a t i o n a r e f i n d i n g s o f f

a c t. Wo od word v . W oo dwo rd

, 240 S W 3 d 8 2 5, 828 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). T rial cour ts have “ wide latitude in fashioning an equitable division of marital proper ty .” Al tma n v . Al tm an , 1 8 1 S.W .3d 676, 683 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). A ccor dingly , the trial cour t’s decisions re g ardingclassifi cation, valuation and division of prop erty are revie wed de novo wi th a pr e su mpt ion

of c or re c tne ss u nle ss the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise

. Farrar v. Farrar , 553 S.W .2d 741, 743 (Tenn. 1977)

.
W h e nm a k i n g i t s d i v i s i o no f p r o p e rt y, t h e t r i a l c o u rtm u s tf i r s tc l a s s i f

y t h e p r o p e rt y. Te nn e sse e re c og nize s t wo di stinc t ty pe s o r c la sse s o f p ro pe rt

y : “ mari ta l pr op e rt

y ” and “ se pa rate proper ty .” The distinction is important beca use Tenn. Code Ann 36-4- 121(a) “provide s only for the division of marit al p ro perty .” See also Batson v. Batson , 769 S.W .2d 849, 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 88 ). Te nn . Co de . Ann § 36- 5- 12 1( b) (1 )( B ) pr ov ide s tha t any inc re a se in v a lue to s e pa

rate pr op e rt

y may be conside re d m arital property if ea ch par

ty contributed to its preser

vation and appr eciation. I n marria g es of short dur ation, like this one, the trial court should divide the prope rty so as to place the par ties in a position as close as possible to wher e they would have be en had the marria g e neve r taken plac e. Id. at 859.

Di vid ing a ma r i t a l e s t a t e i s n o ta m e c h an i c a l p r o c e s s ; t h e g o a l i s t o f a s h i o nane qu i t a

b le

reme dy consideringthe non-e x clusive fa ctors set for in Tenn. Code. Ann § 36- 4-121(c ):

1. The duration of the marr iag e;-4- 2. Th e a g e , p hy sic a l and me nt a l he a lth , v oc a tio na l sk ill s, employ ability , ear

n i n g capa city , estate, f

inancial liabilities

and fi na nc ia l ne e ds of

e a c h o f t he pa rt ie s; 3. The tang ible or intang ible contributions by one par t y to the education, t ra i n ing or

incre ased e arningpower of the other p art y; 4. The re lative ability of ea ch p arty

for f uture a cquisition of capital a ssets and income; 5. The c ontribution of eac h p a r ty to th e a cquisition, preservation, appre ciation, depr eciation or dissipation of the marital or separ ate property , including the contribution of a party to the marria g e as homemaker
, wag e ear ner or pare nt w it h the contribution of a part y as hom emake r or wa g e ea rner to be g iven the same weig ht if eac h party has fulfilled his role; 6

. T h e v a l u e o f

t h e s e p ar a t e p r o p e rt y o f

e a c h p art y; 7. The e state of e ach pa rty at the time of the ma

rriag e; 8. The e conomic cir cumstance s of eac h party at the time of the marria g e; 9. The tax consequenc es to eac h party associate d with the

re a so na bly fo re se e a ble sa le of the a sse t and

oth e r r e a so na

bly fo re se e a ble e xpe ns e s a sso c ia te d w iththe a sse t; 10. The am o u nt of social sec urity benef its available to ea ch spouse; 11. And such other

fac tors as ar e nec essar y to co nsider the equities betwe en the pa

rties.
The division of marital prope rty is rooted in equity
, and a divisi on of marital pr operty is not render ed inequitable mere ly

beca use it is not precisely

equal, Cohen v. Coh en , 937 S.W .2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996 ); Elli

s v . El lis , 7 4 8 S. W. 2 d 4 2 4 , 4 2 7 ( T e n n

. 1 9 8 8 ) o r b e c a u s e e a c h p arty d o e s n o t r ece ive a share or portion of e ach m ar i t al asset. Cohen , 9 3 7 S

. W

. 2 d at 8 3 3 (c i t i n g Bro wn v

. Br own , 913 S.W 2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994))

.
We must first p o in t o u t th a t n e it h e r H u s b an d n o r Wi f

e p r o v id e d th is Co u rt w it h a ta b le as
re qu ir e d b y

Rul e 7 o f t

he Rul e s o f t

he Court of Ap pe a ls. Rul e 7 s ta te s:
(a) I n any domestic relations appea l in which either party takes issue with the classification of proper ty or debt or with the m anner in which the trial cour

t divided or allo ca t ed t he mar ital property or debt, the brief of the par ty raising the issue shall contain, in the st atement of fac ts or in a

n appendix, a table in a form substantially simil ar to the fo rm a tta c he d h e re to. Th is t a ble sh a ll l ist

a ll p rop ert y

and de bts considere d by

the trial court, including: (1) all separ ate pr operty , (2) all marital prope rty , and (3) all separ ate a nd marital debts.-5- (b) Ea ch entr

y in the table must include a c itation to the r ecor d wher e
eac h party ’s evidenc e reg arding the classification or valuation of the proper ty or debt c an be f

ound and a c itation to the recor d wher e the trial court’ s decision reg arding the classific ation, valuation, division, or allocation of the proper ty or debt c an be f

ound.
(c) I f co unsel disag ree s with any entry in the opposing c ounsel’s ta ble , c ouns e l mu st i nc lud e in h is o r h e r b ri e f.

.. a sim il ar t a

ble containing counsel’s ve rsion of the fa cts.
This Court has previously h eld “‘where an appe llant fails to comply with this rule, that appellant

wa i v es al l such issues re lating to the r ule’s re quirements.’” Slaughter v. Slaughter , No. W2007- 0 1 4 8 8 -C OA -R 3 -C V, 2 0 0 8 W L 1 9 7 0 4 9 1 , at * 2 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 8 )( qu o t i n g Stock v . Stock, No. W2005-02634-COA-R3-CV, 206 WL3804420, at *5, n.3 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2006)(quoti n g Ho we ll

v . H owe ll , No. W2001-01167-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL1905307, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2002)(citing Bean v . Bean , 40 S.W .3d 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)). “This Court is under no duty to searc h a trial court recor d in order to disce rn the va luation of the couple ’s prope rty .” Slaughter
, 2008 WL 1970491 at *2 (c itations omi tted). F or g ood cause , this Court m ay suspend t h e requirements of the se rules in a par ticular c ase. Tenn. R. App. Ct. Rule 7. The intent of the Rules is for all case s to be dec ided on the merits if possible. Wit h this in mind we have c onducted a tedious and meticulous re view of the par ties’ briefs and the rec ord and have be en able to determine the evidenc e of va lues prese nted

a t tr ia l and the fi nd ing s by the tr ia l court . Cons e qu e ntl y , w e wi ll p ro c e e d w ithour r e vie w d e sp ite the par ties’ fa ilure to comply

with the rules of this Court.

Husband fir st contends that the trial court err ed in deter mining that Elite L andsca ping Company was owne d by

both of the parties. Upon our re view of the rec ord, we find that the F inal Dec ree states, “I t is further or dere d, adjudg ed, and de cre ed that the business of the Husband known

a s El ite L and sc a

pin g and F arm s h a s a

mari ta l in c re a se in v a lue of $1 6, 00 0. 00 wh ic h c omp any in i ts

e nti re ty is aw ard e d to the Hu sb and .” I t a pp e ars c le ar t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt

awa rd e d th e bu sin e ss s ole ly to the Husband. In revie wing the transc ript, the trial cour t did make a state ment wher e it might be inferr ed that the l awn business was owned by both parties. However , it is well settled that the court speaks through its order s and not t ransc ripts. In Re Ado ption o f E .N .R. , 42 S.W .3d 26, 31 (Tenn. 2001); see a lso Palm er v. Palm er , 562 S.W .2d 833, 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). There fore , we f ind thi s is su e to b e wi tho ut m e ri t.

Husband a lso submit s that the trial cour t erre d when it deter

mined the incre ase in the va lue of the law n bu s i n es s d u ri ng the marr iag e and f ound the incre ase to be marital prope rty . Both the

c la ssi fi c a tio n a

nd va lue s of mari ta l pr op e rt y are qu e sti on s of fa c t to be de te rm ine d b y the tr ia l c ourt

. Wo od ward v . W oo dwa rd , 240 S.W .3d 825, 828 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p

. 2 0 07). The tr ial court’s deter mination will not be disturbed unless the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst it. Id. Duri ngthe he ari ng bo th Hu sb and and Wif e te sti fi e d to the ro le Wif

e pla y e d in the bu sin e ss during the marr iag e. Wife testified that she worke d extensively
, often more than forty hours a we ek in the busi n es s an d t h at it became full time employ ment for he r. She fur

ther testified that theI t s houl d be not ed t hat ne i t her pa r t y t ake s i s s ue w i t h cl as s i f yi ng t he i ncr ea s e i n va l ue as m ar i t al pr oper t y a nd 3
th e re fo re w e d o n o t re v ie w th a t i ssu e o n a p p e a l.

-6- business g rew to perf

orm both residential and commerc ial lawn ser vices duringthe marr iag e. Proof

was a lso presente d that the mowing contra ct executed with Da na Corporation and with the Henr y County Scho o l Bo ar d we re renew ed duringthe marr iag e. The trial court a lso had proof a s to the value of these c ontrac ts and the prof it and loss of the business. We have r eviewe d the re cord a nd find that the evide nce doe s not preponder ate ag ainst the trial court’s finding s that the incre ase in the value of the Husband’ s lawn business was ma rital proper

ty and that the i ncre ase in va lue was e qual to $16,000.

Husband a lso contends that the trial c ourt err ed in esta b l i s hing a value of $33,020 for the marital incre ase in Husba

nd’s pre marital proper

ty , which included Husband’s house and r eal e state, far m, 7 3 2 0 J o hn Dee re Tr actor and Ne w Holland Tra ctor. Specifica lly , Husband a sserts that the 3 trial court e rre d in not considering the cur re nt value of the se items, but only the amount of de bt reduc tion during ma

rriag e. At trial, Husba

nd testified as to the c urre nt value of the se asse ts along with the amount of debt reduc tion during marria g e. Wife prese nted onl y evidenc e of the amount of debt re duction on eac h of these as s et s . The proof from Husba

nd and Wife diffe red on the amount of debt pa id on some of these items. The trial court acc redited the testimony of the Wife re g arding the amount of debt reduc tion and found that the m arital value equale d the amount of debt re duction during marria g e.

The valuation of a marital asset is a question of fa ct to be dete rmined consider ing a ll releva nt evidenc e. Kina rd

v . Ki nard , 986 S.W .2d 220, 230 (Tenn. 1998) (citations om itted). The trial court is instructed to value the pr operty as close to the f

inal hear ing as rea sonably possible. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121( b)(1) (A). T he par ties have “ the bur d en of bring ing f orth evidenc e re g ardingthe value of marital asse ts, and they

are bound by

the evidenc e they

prese nt, o r.

. . d i d not present.” Be lv ins v . Be lv ins

, No.M2002-02583-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 23094162, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec 30 , 2 00 3)

. “ I f the e vid e nc e of va lue is c on fl ic tin g , the tr ia l jud g e may a ssi g n a va lue that is wi thi n the rang e of va lues supported by the evidenc e.” Kin ard, 986 S.W .2d at 230. W e ar e to pre sume the trial court’ s determinations ar e cor rec t unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. Id

.

W e fi n d th at t h e tr i al co u rt erre d i n u s i n g o n l y t h e am o u n t o f de b t re d u ct i o nd u ri n g m arri age to e sta bli shthe mari ta l va lue of

the se ite ms. Th e re are tw o way s in whic h p ro pe rt y may inc re a se in value. “ T h e fa ir marke t value of the proper ty , itself, may

incre ase, f

or example, throug h marke t conditions, renovations or ad d i t i o n s, or debts on the prope rty may be paid, suc h that equity in the proper ty incre ases. Be lv ins , 2003 W L 23094162 a t *5 . L ike wi se , p ro pe rt y may also de c re a se in value dur ing marriag e. I f t he fa ir marke t value of pr operty declines dur ing the marria g e, equity does not nece ssarily

incre ase a s pay

ments are made. Id.

Be cause the t rial court only considere d the amount of debt reduc tion, it did not determine a value within the ra

ng e of va lues supported by the evidence. The ref

ore w e re verse the trial cour t’sT ra n sm u t at i o n o ccu rs w h en p art i es t reat separat e p rop ert y i n such a w ay as t o refl ect an i n t en t i o n th a t i t 4
b e c o m e m a rita l p ro p e rty . W h e n t h is d o n e , se p a ra te p ro p e rty c a n b e c o m e m a rita l p ro p e rty

. Lan gsc hm i dt v. Langs chmi dt , 8 1 S .W 3 d 7 4 1 , 7 4 7 (T e n n . 2 0 0 2 ).

W e not e t h at i n t h e Fi n al D ec r ee t h e t r i al cou r t f i n ds t h at t h es e i t ems wer e own ed by H u s ban d a t t h e t i me of 5

marr i age

. T he proof

at t r i al i ndi cat es t hat b ot h par t i es bel i eve many of t hes e i t ems wer e a cqui r ed po s t mar r i age , howev er

n e ithe r p a rty tak e s issu e w ith the trial c o u rt’s c la ssifica tio n . T h e re fo re , w e d o no t ad d re ss th is issu e o n a p p e a l.

A n o w n e r o f p ro p e rty is co m p e te n t t o tes tify a s to th e v a lu e o f h is o r h e r p ro p e rty

. St i ns on v

. St i ns on , 161 6

S. W

. 3d 438, 446 ( Tenn. Ct

. A pp. 2004) ( ci t i ng H aynes v. Cu m ber l an d B ui l der s I nc. , 5 4 6 S .W .2 d 2 2 8 , 2 3 4 (T e n n . C t. A p p

. 19 7 6 ).

-7- deter mination and remand t o make a deter mination using the corr ect a naly sis of value, incor

porating both evidence of fa ir marke t value of the proper ty and debt r eduction, whe re a ppropriate

.
Hu sb and fu rt her argues that

the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y no t takin g int o a c c ount t he us e of his separ ate pr operty

during the marr iag e. Specif icall y , H u s b a

n d c o nte n d s th a

t i n d eter mining the mar ital incre ase in sepa

rate proper

ty , the trial cour

t should have taken into c onsideration the utiliz ation of approximately $15,000 he had in a bank ac count at the time of ma rriag e, and some machiner y and a loade r which de prec iated during mar riag e. The trial court is direc ted to only divide marital proper ty . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121( a)( 2). Husband a dmits t hat the bank a ccount, mac hinery and loader wer e his separ ate pr operty . Acc ording ly , thes e i t em s would not be subject to division as

m arital prope rty unless the court found that they had become marital proper ty either t h ro u gh transmutation or by both pa rties substantially contributing to the prese rvation and a pprec iation of 4 these items. See Langschm idt v. Langschm idt , 81 S.W 3d 741, 747 (Tenn. 2002) and Te nn. Code A n n

. § 3 6

- 4

- 1 2 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( B )

. B e c a u s e t h e t r i a l c o u rtd i d n o t c l a s s i f y t h e s e i t e m s a s m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y, we f ind that the trial court did not er r in excluding them fr om consideration.

T h e trial court a lso found that the following items had a mar ital increa se in value of $16,089.59: Toro mower , pickup, wee d eate rs, trailer , cotton trailers, disc mowe r, and J ohn Dee re Ba iler. The items alongwith their marital incr ease i n value we re a war ded to the Husba

nd. 5 Husband, a g ain, contend s that the trial cour t erre d in only

consideringthe debt re duction when deter mining their inc rea se in value dur ing the marria g e.

We first addre ss the Toro mower, w eed e ater s, trailer a nd cotton trailer. Wife te stified that she plac ed the prese nt value of the Toro mower at $6,500, the weed eaters at $150, the t railer at $500 and the two cotton trailers at $400. Husband, on the othe r hand, te stified that based on the prese nt 6 value a nd debt paid, the Toro mower was worth $3,500, the weed eaters $100, the tra iler $2,400, and the two cotton trailer s $400. The value of a ma rital asset is a que stion of f act to be deter

mined by the trial cour

t and t h at d etermination will be upheld a s long a s it is wit hin the rang e of va lues supported by

competent e vidence

. Kina rd

, 986 S.W .2d at 230. I n this case, both par ties prese nted evidenc e as to the value of those items. O ther than his own testimony , Husband doe s not offer any proof that the Wife’ s assessment of va lue is inacc u ra te. We find that the evide nce doe s not preponde rate ag ainst the values deter mined by the trial court on the Tor o mower, w eed e ater s, trailer and cotton tra iler. We aff irm the trial cour

t’s valuation of these items.-8-

Ne xt we a dd

re ss t he va luatio n o f t

he dis c mow e r. Wif

e te sti fi e d th at sh e va lue d th e dis c
mower at $700. Husband fa iled to present a ny evidenc e as to the va lue of the mowe r. The pa rties

are bound by

the evidenc e th ey p re s en t or do not prese nt on the issue of valuation. Belvins v. Be lv ins

, No.M2002-02583-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 23094162, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec 30, 2003). Consequently , we must find that the evidenc e does not pr eponder ate ag ainst the trial court’s f inding of value for the disc mower.
We find, howeve r, that the tr i al court e rre d in determiningthe value of the bailer

and the pic ku p. Wif e te sti fi e d th a t th e ba ile r w a s w or th $ 4, 98 0. 80 sin c e thi s w a s th e a mou nt o f d e bt p a id on it during ma

rriag e. Husba

nd testified that consider ing the prese nt value and t h e d eb t p ai d , the bailer w as worth $1,500. As t o t h e p i ckup, the e x hibit presented by the wife indicates a

value of $2,858.79. There is no testimony from the wife as to how she ar rives at this fig ure a

nd it appear s that the fig ure r epre sents the pay ments made on the truc k during the marr iag e. Husband, howe ver, testified that the truc k had a $0 ma rital incr ease in value. He bases this deter mination on the de c re a se in v a lue of

the ve hic le and the de bt pa id. Eq uit y do e s n ot n e c e ssa

ri ly inc re a se jus t be c a

us e pay ments are made. Be lv ins , 2003 W L 23094162 at *5. By failing to consider the f air mar ket value of both the bailer

and the pickup, the trial court e rre d in determining the incre ase in mar ital value. We reve rse the tr ail court’s de termination of v al u e fo r t he bailer and pick up a

nd rema nd for valuation using the cor

rec t standard.

I n sum, we af

firm the trial c ourt’s finding of value for the T oro mower , wee d eate rs, trailer
, cotton trailers, a

nd disc mower. We, howe ver, r ever se and r emand f or dete rmination of value of the house and la

nd, far m, 7320 J ohn Dee re Tr actor , New H olland Trac tor, pickup and ba iler
Finally , Husband contends that the trial court err ed in f ailing to c onsider the incr ease in value of the Wife’s pr emar i t al as s ets. On appe al, Husband a rg ues that fa ilure to consider the marital incre ase in Wife’s prema

rital proper

ty is “unfa ir.” The trial court found that approximately $600 of marital funds wer e uti liz ed to pay the debt owing on Wife’s pontoon boat and $3,600 of ma rital funds wer e utiliz ed to pa

y the debt owing on Wife’s Neon. Upon revie w of the r ecor d, we f ind that Wife testified and off

ere d proof that the mone y from her retire m en t ac co u n t went to pay off he r Neon. Wife fur

ther testified that the pontoon boat was a lso paid off duringthe marr iag e. Husba nd testified that both the Neon a nd pontoon boat wer e paid off dur ing the marria g e, using both marital funds and Wife’s r etireme nt acc ount. Husband did not specify whether Wife ’ s r e ti reme nt funds went towards the de bt owing on the pontoon b o at o r t he Ne on. There fore , we f ind that the evidenc e preponde rate s ag ainst the trial court’s finding and we remand thi s issue to the trial court to dete rmine what portion of the de bts were paid with marital funds a nd divide appropr iately

.

I n dividing property
, the t rial cour t must first classify

and value the proper

ty

. Ow e ns
v . O we ns , 241 S.W .3d 478, 489–90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). After classification and valuation, the trial court is to equitably

divide all marital prope rty

. Id. As a re sult of our holding that the tr ial court

err ed in deter

mining the va lues of cert ai n marital prope rty , we must also re mand so that the trial court may deter

mine whether the division of proper ty is e quitable af

ter re valuing the prope rty . “Our finding nece ssitates a re mand of the e ntire prope rty division, si nce a

signific ant shift in the value of-9-

one asse t could impact the over all apportionment.” Silvey v. Silvey , E2001-02007-COA- R3-CV, 20 02 WL44 50 62 a t *2 (r e mand ingfo r r e va luatio n a nd div isi on a ft e r f ind ingins uf

fi c ie nt p ro of

to

s u p p o rt th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s d e te r mi n a ti o n o f

value) ; S ee also Langschm idt

, 81 S.W .3d at 750 and Be lv ins , 2003 WL 23094162 at *4 (finding no proof a s to value of c erta in marital proper ty rema nded for va luation and equitable division).

Al im ony

As a fina l issue on a

ppeal, Husba

nd contends that the tria l court er red in setting temporar

y spousal support at $100 per wee k initially

and then r educingit to $50 a week a fter the April 11, 2008 hear ing. H usband first take s issue with the “Cons en t Orde r,” se tting tempora ry support at $100 a

wee k. Neither

the orde r nor a

transcr ipt of t h e J an uary 7, 2008 proce eding appea rs in the re cord. Husband a lso takes issue with the April 11, 2008 modification of the temporar y support to $50 a

wee k. An orde r wa s filed re flec ting this modification on May 15, 2008. I t merely

states “that pending a fina l hear ing or succe ssful mediation the temporar y support obligation of the [Husband] shall be re duced f

rom $100.00 per w eek to $50.00 pe r we ek.” T he re cord doe s not contain a tr ans c ri pt of the Ap ri l 11 , 2 00 8 h e ari ng . H us ba nd ha d a du ty to “ pr e pa re a re c or d w hic h c on ve y s a fair a ccur ate a

nd complete a ccount o f what transpired in the trial cour t with respec t to the issues which for m the basis of the a

ppeal.” Nic ka s v

. Ca pa da lis

, 954 S.W .2d 73 5 , 7 4 2 (T en n . Ct. App. 1997). Be cause the rec ord befor e us does not c ontain a tra nscript or stateme nt of the evide nce f rom these procee dings, “we must assume that the record, had it been preser ved, would have c ontained sufficie nt evidence to support the trial court' s fac tual finding s.” She rro d v . W ix , 849 S.W .2d 780, 783. (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). We must affirm the tria l court’s a war d of tempora

ry spousal support to the Wife.

Conclusion

For the af oreme ntioned rea sons, we af firm the trial court’s a ssessment of value on the Toro
mower, w eed e ater s, trailer, c otton trailers and disc mower. We re verse the finding of value on the Husband’s house and land, f arm, 7320 John Deere Trac tor, New Holland Trac tor, pickup and ba iler and re mand for f

urther c onsideration in a ccor dance with this opinion. We r ever se the trial c ourt’s deter mination of marital funds used to pay off W ife’s N eon and pontoon boat and re mand for f urther consideration. Further , we a ffirm the trial court’s awar d of t empora ry support to the W ife. Cos ts of thi s a pp e a l are ta xed

e qu a lly to A pp e lla nt, Ste ph e n B utl e r C oll ins , a nd his sure ty , an d App e lle e , L isa B a s s C o l l i n s , f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

_____________________________ J. STE VE N ST AFF OR D, J.