United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 13-2742

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Eugene Carl De Boise, Sr.; T.E.R., a minor child by his next friend, Anneliese

Hubbard; A.N.D., a minor child by her next friend Sheena Marie Perry

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

Taser International, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

St. Louis County, Missouri; Bret Lively, Police Officer, in his individual capacity;

Joseph Percich, Police Officer, in his individual capacity

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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 Submitted: April 17, 2014

 Filed: July 28, 2014

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Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge. 
Appellants, the father and minor children of the deceased Samuel De Boise,

brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Officers Bret Lively and Joseph Percich

of the St. Louis County Police Department and a claim under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) against St. Louis County, Missouri. Officers Lively and

1

Percich moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and St.

Louis County moved for summary judgment, claiming no ADA violation occurred

due to exigent and unexpected circumstances. The district court granted both 2

motions, and we affirm. 

I.

De Boise suffered fromschizophrenia, which caused himto experience serious

psychotic episodes. On the evening ofJuly 7, 2008, De Boise became delusional and

left his home naked. The next morning, neighbors reported seeing De Boise roaming

the neighborhood, beating houses with a stick, and claiming to be God. That night,

De Boise returned home still naked and delusional. He continued to claim he was

God, demanded that his mother worship him, and held her head down to the floor. 

Eventually, De Boise headed to the back of the home, and his mother left the house

and called 911 from a neighbor’s phone. The St. Louis Police department dispatched

officers describing the call as a “violent OBS,” meaning that the subject was

emotionally disturbed, acted violently, or used physical force against people or

property. 

Appellants brought other claims against the Appellees that were dismissed

1

voluntarily.

The Honorable Terry I. Alderman, United States Magistrate Judge for the

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Eastern District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by

consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

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Officer Arthur Williams arrived on the scene first, and De Boise’s mother

immediately informed himof her son’s behavior and physical aggression toward her.3

Officer Williams heard a noise coming from the house and then observed De Boise

exiting the home naked and claiming to be God. De Boise suddenly re-entered the

house, tearing down the screen door upon his entry. Additional officers were called

to the scene along with an ambulance unit. 

While De Boise was still in the home, five more officers arrived on the scene:

Officers Joseph Percich, Bret Lively, Mike Kaemmerer, Jacob Maechling, and Chris

Money. De Boise’s mother informed the officers that she had a firearm in the house

and that De Boise was schizophrenic. Officer Percich heard extremely loud noises

coming from the home, including screaming, glass breaking, and heavy furniture

being thrown. De Boise then exited the house still naked and referring to himself as

God. Officer Percich took command of the scene and aimed his taser gun at De Boise

as he exited the home. Officer Maechling instructed De Boise to walk out on the

grass and lie face down on the ground. De Boise complied. Officer Percich holstered

his taser and began to approach De Boise to handcuff him. De Boise immediately

jumped to his feet, clenching his fist, and glaring in Officer Percich’s direction. 

Officer Maechling continued to instruct De Boise to lie on the grass, but De Boise did

not comply. Believing that De Boise posed a threat to the officers, Officer Percich

instructed De Boise several times to lie down. When De Boise refused, Officer

Percich yelled out “taser, taser, taser” and fired his Taser Model X-26 ECD in barb

mode. The darts penetrated De Boise’s chest and the taser delivered a five-second

electrical shock. De Boise immediately fell to the ground on his back with his arms

and fists clenched to his chest. 

While the parties dispute whether De Boise’s mother informed the officersthat 3

her son had tried to kill her, it is undisputed the officers were informed De Boise had

terrified his mother and held his mother’s head to the floor. 

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When an X-26 Taser trigger is pulled, two darts with wires attached are

deployed toward the target. Once the darts make contact, an electrical circuit is

completed and the device automatically cycles five seconds of electrical current,

immobilizing the subject. J.A. 440. 

After the first taser discharge, De Boise continued to struggle and ignore the

officers’ demands to remain on the ground, and Officer Percich followed with a

second five-second cycle. After the first two cycles, Officer Percich did not believe

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the officers could safely handcuff De Boise due to the position of his hands and taser

wires carrying the electrical charge. De Boise stood up again despite the demands,

and Officer Percich applied a third cycle, causing De Boise to fall to the ground face

down. Officers Percich and Money approached to handcuff De Boise when De Boise

rose to his knees and swung his arms around. Officer Percich then applied a fourth

taser cycle and De Boise fell to the ground with the wires tangled around his legs. De

Boise attempted to rise again, and Officer Percich delivered two more taser cycles,

the last of which appeared to be ineffective. De Boise arose to his feet and walked

toward the officers, and Officer Lively fired his taser, subjecting De Boise to another

five-second cycle. De Boise fell to the ground but rose to his feet again, this time

assuming a stance as if he were getting ready to charge or attempt to run. 

Officer Lively delivered another taser cycle, after which Officers Percich and

Money attempted to handcuff De Boise. De Boise kicked at the officers, and Officer

Lively took the cartridge out of his taser and applied the taser on De Boise’s leg

twice, this time in drive stun mode. Officers Percich and Money were then able to 5

Importantly, Appellants do not dispute the reasonableness of the initial two 4

tasings.

Deploying the taser in drive stun mode means that an officer removes the

5

cartridge from the taser and applies the taser so as to make direct contact with the

subject’s body. When the taser is in drive stun mode, it only causes discomfort and

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hold De Boise’s arms and shoulders to the ground while the paramedic and EMT

injected De Boise with a sedative. While being transferred to a gurney, De Boise

went into cardiac arrest. Attempts to revive De Boise were unsuccessful, and he was

pronounced dead upon his arrival at the hospital. 

Appellants filed suit, alleging excessive force against Officers Lively and

Percich under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations of the ADA against St. Louis County. 

Officers Percich and Lively moved for summary judgment on the excessive-force

claim based on qualified immunity. St. Louis County also moved for summary

judgment on the ADA violation claim. The district court granted the officers’ motion,

finding the use of force objectively reasonable in light of the fact that De Boise

repeatedly failed to comply with the officers’ commands to submit and continued to

actively resist arrest. The court found it undisputed that De Boise continued to get

up despite the officers’ instructions to lie down, walked toward the officers, and

kicked and flailed his arms when the officers attempted to arrest him. The court

further determined that even if the officers’ actions amounted to excessive force in

violation De Boise’s Fourth Amendment rights, the law at the time of the incident

would not have placed a reasonable officer on notice that multiple tasings under the

circumstances violated a clearly established right. 

The district court also granted St. Louis County’s motion for summary

judgment, finding that no violation of the ADA occurred because the officers were

faced with unexpected and exigent circumstances to which no reasonable

accommodations could be made until after the scene wassafely secured. This appeal

followed. 

does not incapacitate the subject. 

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II.

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a § 1983

action unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional or

statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Brown v. City of

Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2009). We review a district court’s order

granting summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to

the nonmoving party and giving the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable

inferences. Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133

S. Ct. 955 (2013). 

To determine the question of qualified immunity, we engage in the following

two-part inquiry: “(1) whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation

of a constitutional orstatutory right, and (2) whether thatright was clearly established

at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Brown, 574 F.3d at 496. Courts

have discretion to decide which part of the inquiry to address first. Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Here, we begin with second inquiry. Though

the outcome of this encounter was tragic, and even if the reasonableness of the

officers’ actions was questionable, Appellants cannot defeat the officers’ defense of

qualified immunity unless they are able to show that a reasonable officer would have

been on notice that the officers’ conduct violated a clearly established right. 

“When determining whether an action was a clearly established constitutional

violation, we look to the state of the law at the time of the incident,” Shekleton v.

Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 2012); the relevant time here being July 8,

2008. The pertinent inquiry is “‘whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that

his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Id. at 367 (quoting Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). Particularly, the contours of De Boise’s right to

be free from excessive force must be so sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer

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would know that the multiple tasings under the circumstances were a violation of that

right. See Roberts v. City of Omaha, 723 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 2013). 

Although we have determined that non-violent, non-fleeing subjects have a

clearly established right to be free from the use of tasers, see Brown, 574 F.3d at 499-

500, we have yet to determine whether a violent subject, acting aggressively toward

officers, has a clearly established right to be free from multiple tasings. See Clark v.

Ware, 873 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (holding that the court could not

determine as a matter of law that the repeated use of a taser on a subject that was

physically resisting the police violated a clearly established right as of November

2009). Indeed, in 2008, case law related to the use of tasers wasstill developing. See

McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F. 3d 354, 361-62 (8th Cir. 2011) (Murphy, J.

concurring). And, Appellants point to no previous case that could be said to have

clearly established the unconstitutionality of the officers’ actions here. Accordingly,

the state of the law would not have placed “an officer on notice that he must limit the

use of his taser in certain circumstances, even though the subject continues to struggle

and resist.” Clark, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. 

Appellants are correct that the particular action in question need not have been

previously held unlawful in order for a court to determine that a government official

has indeed violated a clearly established right. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741

(2002) (“[A] general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may

apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the very

action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.” (second alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In support of their claim, Appellants

rely on Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 2009). In Oliver, the Eleventh

Circuit concluded that the multiple tasings of a mentally ill subject was excessive

force and violated the subject’s clearly established right. 586 F.3d at 908. Although

the court acknowledged that there was no prior decision in which a court had

determined such acts violated a clearly established right, the court, nonetheless,

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reasoned the right was clearly established because the subject was tased multiple

times without warning, he was not suspected of any crime, did not act belligerent or

aggressively, and had complied with most of the officers’ commands. Id. at 907-08. 

The court determined, based on the facts alone, no reasonable officer would have

believed that the repeated tasings were constitutionally permissible under the

circumstances. Id. at 908. 

Although Oliver and the case before us both involve the tasing of an

emotionally disturbed individual, the facts of the two cases are not sufficiently

aligned. Similar to Oliver, De Boise suffered from a mental illness of which the

officers were aware. However, unlike in Oliver, the officersin this case observed De

Boise aggressively approaching one of the officers, his continued noncompliance

with the officers’ instructions to lie on the ground, and his violent and aggressive

behavior, which included kicking and swinging his arms at the officers once they

approached to subdue him. These important distinctions lead us to conclude that no

reasonable officer, observingDe Boise’s behavior, would have understood the actions

taken to be so disproportionate and unnecessary as to amount to a violation of De

Boise’s rights. Accordingly, Oliver does not support the Appellants’ argument that

the right in this case was clearly established. 

6

The dissent cites Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 1993) to support its

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contention that it was unreasonable for the officers, in July 2008, to have believed

their actions were unlawful. We find this case and the dissent’s application of it

unpersuasive for three reasons. First, the question before us is whether the

application of multiple tasings on a subject actively resisting arrest in the

circumstances faced by the officers amounts to a clear violation of his constitutional

rights, not whether the initial use of a taser/stun gun on a nonviolent inmate to

enforce a housekeeping order is unconstitutional. See Hickey, 12 F.3d at 758-59

(determining whether the type offorce used was an unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment). Here, the Appellants do not dispute

the initial taser application but take issue with the subsequent taser shocks

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Appellants also claimthat the officers’ training placed themon notice that their

actions violated a clearly established right. We disagree. Certainly, the officers

training manual instructed that “[Emotionally disturbed persons] . . . may not comply

with verbal commands following the TASER cycle” and were informed that “[e]ach

cycle should be used as a ‘window of opportunity’to attempt to establish control/cuff

while the subject is affected by the TASER cycle.” However, the training manual

further instructed officers to “[m]ove in and control the subject while TASER device

is cycling and the subject is incapacitated when it is reasonably safe to do so.” 

Officer Percich testified that, due to the placement of De Boise’s hands and the

placement of the taser wires, it was not safe to handcuff De Boise after the initial

tasings. We are not persuaded that a reasonable officer, having the same training,

administered to De Boise. Appellants’ Br. 21-22. Second, in Hickey, we gave

significant weight to the fact that the inmate was nonviolent and tased due to his

failure to comply with a housekeeping order to sweep his cell. Hickey, 12 F.3d at

758-59. Here, officers observed De Boise’s irrational behavior and repeated acts of

aggression towards the officers, actions absent from the circumstances in Hickey. 

Finally, in Hickey, the fact that the officersfailed to “take advantage of [the inmate’s]

incapacitation to neutralize any perceived theat to their safety” was relevant to the

officer’s subjective state of mind in using the stun gun. Id. at 757. That is, we noted

that the lack of any attempt to “remove, isolate, or restrain” the inmate demonstrated

that the motive in using the stun gun was not based on any fear for the safety of the

officers. Id. at 757-58. Here, the motive for using the taser is not at issue. See

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397-98 (1989) (acknowledging the absence of a

subjective state of mind inquiry under Fourth Amendment claims). Moreover the

officers, after having made a few attempts, did successfully subdue De Boise when

it was safe to do so, though we recognize that officers may not always have the

opportunity to subdue a subject hands-on, particularly when such action poses a risk

to the safety of the officers on the scene and when split-second decisions must be

made. See McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d 354, 360 (8th Cir. 2011); see also

Johnson v. Carroll, 658 F.3d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[P]olice officers are often

forced to make split-second judgments about the amount of force that is necessary in

a particular situation.”).

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would be on notice that using his discretion to forgo the “window of opportunity” due

to the unsafe conditions violated the subject’s clearly established right. We,

therefore, hold that even if Officers Percich’s and Lively’s repeated tasings of De

Boise amounted to excessive force in violation of De Boise’s Fourth Amendment

rights, such rights were not clearly established at the time of the incident. 

III.

Next, the Appellants argue that because Officers Percich and Maechling had

received Crisis Intervention Teamtraining along with the Taser training, the officers’

failure to utilize such training denied De Boise of reasonable accommodations in

violation of the ADA. The ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability . . . be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any

such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To prevail on an ADA claim in this context, a

plaintiff must demonstrate “that he is a qualified individual with a disability denied

participation in, or the benefits of, the services, programs, or activities of a public

entity because of his disability.” Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir.

1998). We have said that inquiry into whether officersreasonably accommodated the

individual is “highly fact-specific and varies depending on the circumstances of each

case, including the exigent circumstances presented by criminal activity and safety

concerns” and that “we will not second guess [an officer’s] judgments, where . . . an

officer is presented with exigent or unexpected circumstances.” Bahl v. Cnty. of

Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778, 784-85 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Tucker v. Tennessee, 539

F.3d 526, 536 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e rely on and expect law enforcement officers to

respond fluidly to changing situations and individuals they encounter. Imposing a

stringent requirement under the ADA is inconsistent with that expectation, and

impedes their ability to performtheir duties.”); Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801

(5th Cir. 2000) (“Title II does not apply to an officer’s on-the-street responses to

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reported disturbances or other similar incidents, whether or not those calls involve

subjects with mental disabilities, prior to the officer’s securing the scene and ensuring

that there is no threat to human life.”). 

Important here, the officers received information that De Boise had assaulted

his mother and observed De Boise’s aggressive and irrational behavior and his

continued non-compliance with their demands. Due to the unexpected and rapidly

evolving circumstances, the officers were not required “to hesitate to consider other

possible actions in the course of making such split-second decisions.” Hainze, 207

F.3d at 801-02. Moreover, the “use of force” on De Boise was “not by reason of [De

Boise’s] disability, but because of [his] objectively verifiable misconduct.” Bates ex

rel. Johns v. Chesterfield Cnty., Va., 216 F.3d 367, 373 (4th Cir. 2000). Accordingly,

the facts before us do not contemplate any violation of the ADA.

IV.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the

individual officers and St. Louis County.

BYE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I disagree the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the tasing death of

De Boise. Instead, I believe a jury should determine whether the officers violated

De Boise’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force by continuing

to tase De Boise without attempting to handcuff him. I therefore respectfully dissent

from Part II of the decision affirming the district court.

The court analyzes only the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. 

See Fourte v. Faulkner Cnty., Ark., 746 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting two-

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part test for qualified immunity). The court concludes the state of the law in 2008

would not have placed an officer on notice he must limit the use of his taser. I believe

the law placed an officer on notice he could not continuously tase a suspect when

safer alternatives were reasonably available to constrain De Boise in order to

effectuate an arrest.

First, construing the facts in the light most favorable to De Boise, I would find

a sufficient showing has been made to present to a jury whether the officers violated

De Boise’s constitutional rights by continuing to tase him until his eventual death. 

The use of a taser is not unlimited in scope when dealing with a suspect, even one

who is actively resisting. De Boise disobeyed officers’ orders and made some

threatening moves. However, De Boise was not carrying a visible or concealed

weapon, did not make advances at the officers, and was naked. A jury could

conclude, with six armed officers at the scene, it was an unreasonable use of force to

continuously tase De Boise rather than handcuff him during the time period De Boise

was debilitated during and after each tase. Particularly because De Boise did not

have shod feet or any other weapon, a jury could conclude the officers were

unreasonable to not make further effort to handcuff De Boise, even if he were

swinging his arms or kicking his legs.

Second, I would find the officers were put on notice in 2008 that continuously

tasing a suspect until his death was unlawful. To determine whether an action was

a clearly established constitutional violation, we look to the state of the law at the

time of the incident, and the correct inquiry is whether it is clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful. Shekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 366-

67 (8th Cir. 2012). The test does not require “there be a case with materially or

fundamentally similar facts,” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 499 (8th

Cir. 2009), but rather merely whether “‘it would be clear to a reasonable officer that

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his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Id. (quoting Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).

“The right to be free from excessive force in the context of an arrest is clearly

established under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches

and seizures.” Brown, 574 F.3d at 499. A reasonable officer would know only

reasonable force can be used to effect an arrest. Although tasing a suspect can be

reasonable force in certain circumstances, tasing risesto a “significant level offorce.”

McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d 354, 364 (8th Cir. 2011) (Murphy, J., concurring). 

Even without a case decided on materially or fundamentally similar facts, a

reasonable officer in 2008 would have known “the use of tasers requires sufficient

justification for their use to be reasonable.” Id. There are, and long have been, limits

on officers tasing suspects. In Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1993),

we found an Eighth Amendment violation where a jailor applied a stun gun, and there

were six or seven officers present, but the officers failed to “take advantage of [the

inmate’s] incapacitation to neutralize any perceived threat to their safety.” We also

noted, as relevant to the Eighth Amendment analysis, the officers failed to “remove,

isolate, or restrain” the inmate. Id. In this case, the officers were on notice they

should have attempted to handcuff De Boise as a safer alternative to tasing De Boise

with fifty seconds of electrical shock in just over two minutes of time. It would be

clear to a reasonable officer that failing to seize De Boise with reasonable force was

unlawful.

Because the officers’ actions are not protected by qualified immunity, I would

remand this case for trial where a jury can determine whether it was reasonable the

officers continued to tase De Boise until his death and seemingly without taking the

available opportunities to handcuff and restrain De Boise.

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