NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MISTY DANIELLE BROWN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

LOUIS DEJOY, Post Master General, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-17270 

D.C. No. 3:16-cv-06972-EDL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Elizabeth D. Laporte, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 16, 2021**

San Francisco, California

Before: PAEZ, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Brown brought a lawsuit under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 701 et seq., against the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) alleging that 

USPS discriminated against Brown on the basis of disability when it removed her 

from a letter carrier position and offered her a new position—one that Brown 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 19 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

found less desirable but nonetheless accepted. USPS successfully moved for 

summary judgment, arguing that Brown was not a “qualified individual” under the 

Act because she could not perform the original position’s “essential functions.” 

We affirm. 

To state a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the 

Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she is a “qualified individual.” 

See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). “The term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, 

with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of 

the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12111(8). The term “essential functions,” in turn, refers to the “fundamental job 

duties of th[at] employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); see id.

§ 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii) (describing why a “job function may be considered 

essential”); see also Dark v. Curry County, 451 F.3d 1078, 1087 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Summary judgment was proper because Brown failed to establish that she 

could perform the essential functions of her preferred letter carrier position—in 

particular, certain lifting and carrying duties. USPS argues that “[t]he essential 

functions of Brown’s position included . . . carrying mail weighing up to 35 

pounds, and handling containers of mail weighing up to 70 pounds.” Evidence in 

the record, such as a USPS job description, supports that argument, and Brown 

neither contests that these lifting and carrying duties are an essential function nor 
3 

points to any evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, Brown herself has repeatedly

admitted that she could not carry mail weighing up to 35 pounds or load or unload 

containers of mail weighing up to 70 pounds. Accordingly, it is undisputed that 

Brown could not perform an essential function of the employment position at issue

and therefore was not a qualified individual under the Rehabilitation Act.1

AFFIRMED. 

1 The parties dispute whether it would be appropriate to consider a new 

failure-to-accommodate argument on appeal, but we need not resolve that issue 

because, regardless, Brown’s failure to establish that she was a qualified individual 

under the Rehabilitation Act defeats her claim that she should still have her 

original mail carrier position.