alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995             DEC-26-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995             DEC-26-1996
<CASH>                                           5,497                  14,300
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    5,439                   5,988
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                      5,288                   5,039
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                31,712                  34,860
<PP&E>                                         180,437                 149,587
<DEPRECIATION>                                (34,395)                (14,611)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 332,847                 388,046
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          142,691                  90,596
<BONDS>                                         27,502                 218,497
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                             0                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     152,601                  68,811
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   332,847                 388,046
<SALES>                                        505,619                 490,987
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               505,619                 490,987
<CGS>                                                0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  473,594                 476,558
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 4,116                 (5,441)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              16,515                  22,338
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 11,394                 (2,468)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     6,670                   2,620
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,724                 (5,088)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,724                 (5,088)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0                       0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0                       0
        

</TABLE>
#### Vanessa Benavides et al., Appellants, v 30 Brooklyn, LLC, Defendant, and G&C Plumbing and Sewer Services, Inc., Respondent. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[946 NYS2d 513]

*890In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), dated May 25, 2011, as, upon an order of the same court entered April 21, 2011, granting that branch of the motion of the defendant G&C Plumbing and Sewer Services, Inc., which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, is in favor of that defendant and against them, dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against that defendant.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

“Because a finding of negligence must be based on the breach of a duty, a threshold question in tort cases is whether the alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to the injured party” *(Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs.,*98 NY2d 136, 138 [2002]). In addition, “ ‘[a] contractual obligation, standing alone, will generally not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party’ ” *(Stiver v Good & Fair Carting & Moving, Inc.,*9 NY3d 253, 257 [2007], quoting *Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs.,*98 NY2d at 138; *see Church v Callanan Indus.,*99 NY2d 104, 111 [2002]). An exception to the general rule exists where the contractor launches an instrument of harm or creates or exacerbates a hazardous condition *(Wheaton v East End Commons Assoc., LLC,*50 AD3d 675, 677 [2008]; *see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs.,*98 NY2d at 140).

*Here, the*plaintiff alleged facts in her bill of particulars in support of her allegation that the defendant G&C Plumbing and Sewer Services, Inc. (hereinafter G&C), created or exacerbated the alleged dangerous condition. Thus, in support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, G&C was required to establish, prima facie, that it did not create or exacerbate the alleged dangerous condition *(see Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp.,*76 AD3d 210, 214 [2010]). G&C met this burden and established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it neither created nor exacerbated the dangerous condition that allegedly caused the injured plaintiff to sustain injuries *(id.*at 214). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether G&C’s alleged negligence created or exacerbated the hazard which was a proximate cause of the injuries allegedly sustained so as to establish G&C’s duty to the injured plaintiff *(see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs.,*98 NY2d at 141-142; *Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp.,*76 AD3d 210 [2010]).

*891In light of our determination, we need not address the plaintiffs’ remaining contention regarding proximate cause. Balkin, J.P., Eng, Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.42

                             FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE
                     CALL CENTER SERVICES AGREEMENT BETWEEN
       UNITED PARCEL SERVICES OASIS SUPPLY CORPORATION ("UPS") AND RMH
                              TELESERVICES, INC.

     COME NOW United Parcel Services OASIS Supply Corporation ("UPS") and RMH
Teleservices, Incorporated ("RMH"), and in consideration of the mutual
provisions contained herein and other good and valuable consideration, the
receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, hereby agree to amend
the Call Center Services Agreement, as follows:

     This Amendment is entered into effective October 22, 2001.

1.   Schedule C, Section 1 RMH PRICING of the Agreement is amended by adding the
following:

     1.2  Outbound Customer Service Survey Program

     1.2.1  RMH shall be compensated as follows:

            [REDACTED DUE TO REQUEST FOR CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT] per System Hour
            ("Base Rate")

            [REDACTED DUE TO REQUEST FOR CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT] Program set up
            fees

            [REDACTED DUE TO REQUEST FOR CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT] per hour will
            apply for any changes to the program requiring new programming.
            These charges will be approved in writing by UPS prior to any
            programming changes.

2.   Except as otherwise expressly set forth herein, the terms and conditions
     contained in the Agreement are unchanged.

3.   This Amendment, together with the Agreement (together the "Agreement"),
     constitutes the entire Agreement between the Parties with respect to the
     subject matter hereof and all prior agreements and representations of the
     Parties related to these matters, whether written or oral, are merged
     herein and shall be of no further force or effect. This Agreement cannot be
     changed or modified except in writing signed by both Parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, RMH and UPS have caused this Amendment to be signed and
delivered by their duly authorized officers, as of the date first written above.

United Parcel Services OASIS Supply        RMH Teleservices, Inc.
Corporation ("UPS")

By: /s/ Linda F. Skyrme                    By: /s/ Paul J. Burkitt
   -----------------------------              --------------------------
Name:  Linda F. Skyrme                     Name: Paul J. Burkitt
       -------------------------                ------------------------
Title: Vendor Relation Manager             Title: EVP Sales & Marketing
       -------------------------                 -----------------------

                                       1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Complainant

vs.

WESLEY JAMES ARNAUD

Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket Number: 2023-0476

MISLE Activity ID: 

CONSENT ORDER

Issued: January 12, 2024

By Order of Administrative Law Judge Administrative Law Judge:

Honorable Brian J. Curley

Appearances:

For the Coast Guard

Keith Watters

Marine Safety Detachment Lafayette

For the Respondent

Wesley James Arnaud
CONSENT ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

On January 05, 2024, the parties in this case submitted a Motion for Approval of a 

Settlement Agreement and Entry of Consent Order to the Administrative Law Judge for approval 

under 33 C.F.R. § 20.502.

I have carefully reviewed the terms of the Settlement Agreement and find that it is fair, 

reasonable, and in substantial compliance with the requirements of 33 C.F.R. § 20.502.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the record, it is hereby ORDERED that the Settlement Agreement 

is APPROVED in full and incorporated herein by reference. This Consent Order shall 

constitute full, final, and complete adjudication of this proceeding.

__________________________________

Brian Curley

Administrative Law Judge

Date: January 12, 2024
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.1
 CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Access Plans USA, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange
Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a.
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b.
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andc.
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most
recent fourth quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting;
and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors:
 a.
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; andb.
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting.
 Date: April 2, 2007
    By:
    /s/ PETER W. NAUERTPeter W. NauertChairman of the Board of Directors,
President and Chief Executive Officer
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2349 

To ensure receipt of all health insurance benefits to which a member of 

a union is entitled. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 15, 2015 

Mr. GRAYSON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Education and the Workforce 

A BILL 

To ensure receipt of all health insurance benefits to which 

a member of a union is entitled. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. GUARANTEED RECIPROCITY OF ALL MONIES 

4 DESIGNATED FOR HEALTH INSURANCE BEN5 EFITS REGARDLESS OF PLACE OF EMPLOY6 MENT. 

7 For the purpose of collective bargaining agreements, 

8 all monies designated for health insurance plans or funds 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2349 IH

1 shall be, without exception, fully reciprocated to a worker’s 

2 home health plan or fund. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-4882

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus ALFREDO RIOS, a/k/a Alfredo Rios Perez, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge. (CR-04-142) Submitted: October 12, 2005 Decided: November 8, 2005 Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Leslie Carter Rawls, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Alfredo Rios pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute approximately five kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000). Rios was sentenced to 126 months in prison. He now appeals, arguing that his sentence violates the Sixth Amendment. We affirm. Rios’ presentence report assigned a base offense level of 34 based on more than fifteen kilograms of cocaine. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(3) (2003). Three levels were subtracted for acceptance of responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1. With a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of III, Rios’ guideline range was 135-168 months. At sentencing, the district court considered Rios’ objections based on Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 246 (2004), to the calculation of the base offense level. The court concluded that Rios was responsible for at least five but less than fifteen kilograms of cocaine and assigned base offense level 32. With the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Rios’ guideline range was 108-135 months. The court sentenced him to 126 months in prison. On appeal, Rios objects under Blakelyand United States v. Booker , 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), to the district court’s determination of the base offense level. Rios contends that his base offense level should have been 30, representing the actual- 3 - weight of cocaine (4.8 kilograms) seized from the trunk of his car at the time of his arrest. He notes that he pled guilty to possessing with intent to distribute approximately five kilograms of cocaine. We discern no Sixth Amendment error. Even if Rios is correct and his base offense level should be 30, his guideline range would be 121-151 months. Because his sentence of 126 months does not exceed the maximum authorized by the facts admitted, there is no Sixth Amendment violation. See United States v. Evans , 416 F.3d 298, 300 (4th Cir. 2005). We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### ORVIS v. CURTISS.

(Common Pleas of New York City and County, General Term.

May 17, 1894.)

Judgment—Rendition after Time Limited by Law.

A judgment rendered by a justice of the district court will be reversed where it was rendered after the time limited by law.

Appeal from eleventh district court.

Action by Charles E. Orvis against William H. Curtiss. There was a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Argued before BOOKSTAVER, BISCHOFF, and PRYOR, JJ.

H. G. Harris, for appellant.

F. G. Gedney, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The justice had no jurisdiction to render the judgment he did in this case, because he rendered it after the time limited by law for his doing so. This appears from the return itself. Therefore, the judgment must be reversed, with costs.
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-40430 Summary Calendar

__________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus ROBERT EARL SEGEADA, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 1:94-CR-119
- - - - - - - - - - November 30, 1995 Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Robert Earl Segeada appeals his conviction for being a felon in the unlawful possession in a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Segeada maintains that the district court erroneously refused to give a requested jury instruction and that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. Our review of the briefs and record reveals no reversible error; we AFFIRM.
#### Wayne County Department of Social Services, Appellant, v Harold Titcomb, Respondent.

The presumption of legitimacy was adequately rebutted by the mother’s testimony that she had intercourse solely with respondent during June and July of 1982, that she did not have sexual intercourse with her husband following their physical separation in February of 1982 and that she saw her husband once during June of 1982 when he came to the house and said "hi and good-bye” while exercising visitation away from the residence. Contrary to the findings of Family Court, there is no evidence in the record that the mother had intercourse with her husband once a week during July. Indeed the only indication in the record that she had intercourse with her husband at all during July was an equivocal response to a loaded question. At this stage, any inference to be drawn from that response should be viewed favorably to petitioner *(see, Wessel v Krop, supra).*

Given the testimony as to nonaccess, and considering the mother’s testimony regarding sexual intercourse on two specific dates within the critical period as well as other sexual activity with respondent in July of 1982, her testimony that respondent admitted he was the father after the child’s birth, the use of respondent’s surname as part of the child’s given *990name, and the results of two HLA tests indicating a 98.4% and 97.5% probability that the respondent is the father, we conclude that the petitioner made out a prima facie case of paternity *(cf. Niagara County Dept. of Social Servs. v Powell,*120 AD2d 980; *Matter of Duquette v Edward FF.,*106 AD2d 694, *lv denied*65 NY2d 602; *Matter of Wayne County Dept. of Social Servs. v Williams,*96 AD2d 724, *affd*63 NY2d 658).

We further conclude that the court abused its discretion when it precluded petitioner from calling the husband as a witness. Respondent’s demand for the names and addresses of witnesses did not request the names of witnesses to nonaccess, there is no proof that petitioner deliberately withheld the husband’s name or whereabouts to prevent discovery, and the likelihood that the husband would be a witness should not have come as a surprise to respondent *(see,*Family Ct Act § 531; *Matter of Mannain v Lay,*33 AD2d 1024, *affd*27 NY2d 690). Upon continuation of the hearing, petitioner’s case should be reopened to permit the testimony of the husband as to nonaccess. (Appeal from order of Wayne County Family Court, Maas, J. — paternity.) Present — Denman, J. P., Boomer, Green, Pine and Balio, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Tommy Nelson, Appellant.

— Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Leahy, J.), rendered May 24, 1983, convicting him of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree (three counts), and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial (Chetta, J.), after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress a confession he allegedly made to police officers.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s arrest was properly predicated on probable cause. Although the informant was not a "disinterested public-spirited citizen”, her reliability could still be established *(see, People v Rodriguez,*52 NY2d 483, 489), since her information constituted an admission against her own penal interest *(see, People v Comforto,*62 NY2d 725). In contrast to *People v Johnson*(66 NY2d 398), the informant admitted to being in possession of a .25 caliber automatic pistol, which she lent to the defendant knowing it would be used to "make some money”; this makes out a case against her of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree *(see,*Penal Law § 265.01), and certainly constitutes evidence of criminal facilitation in the fourth degree *(see,*Penal Law § 5.00). Moreover, the information was to some degree corroborated by information already known to the police about the crime *(see, People v Rodriguez, supra).*

As the informant’s statement was based upon personal knowledge, the basis-of-knowledge prong of the *Aguilar-Spinelli*test is satisfied *(see, People v Johnson,*66 NY2d 398, 403, *supra).*

Nor did the hearing court err in concluding that the defendant’s confession should not be suppressed as involuntary. "[T]he People are required to come forward and explain the existence of injuries on a defendant only in cases where the injuries are objectively verifiable and where they are consis*340tent with the defendant’s claim of police brutality” *(People v Sommer,*34 AD2d 817). Here, the medical evidence submitted did not bear out the defendant’s claim.

We have reviewed the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Mangano, J. P., Weinstein, Lawrence and Hooper, JJ., concur.