The Honor able Joseph M

. Ho od, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * Kentucky , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0015n.06 No. 08-4306 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

AMY L . SENZ ARI

N, ) ) Plaintif f-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED v. ) STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR ) THE NOR THE RN DI S TR I CT OF A B B O T T S E V E RA

N C E P A Y P LA

N F O R ) O H IO EM PL OY EE S OF KO S PH ARMA CEU TI CA L S; ) DI VI SI ONAL

VI CE PR ESI DENT, ) ) OPI

NI ON Defendants-A

ppellees . )

Before: K

ENNEDY and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge. * HOOD, District Judge . In th is a c tio n b ro ug ht un der th e Emp loy e e Re tir e me nt I nc ome Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. , Plaintiff-Appellant Amy L . Senzarin contends that Def endants Abbott Sever ance Pay Plan for Employ ees of Kos Pharmac euticals and the Divisional Vice President wrong fully denied he r cla im for seve ranc e bene fits. Finding that Def endants’ de nial of Pla int if f’ s c la im w a s n ot arb itr ary and c a pr ic iou s, the Di str ic t Co ur t up he ld t he de nia l of

be ne fi ts. For the re asons stated be low, we AF F IRM the de nia l of Pla int if f’ s c la im f

or se ve ra nc e be ne fi ts.

I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND2

Plaintiff was employ ed by Kos Pharmac euticals (“ Kos”) a s a phar mace utical sales ter

ritory manag er. O n or about De cembe r 15, 2006, Abbott L abora t o ri es (“ Abbott”) a cquire d Kos. Kos employ ees be came employ ees of Abbott or one of its subsidiaries. In connec tion with it s acquisition of Kos, Abbott ag ree d to maintain and adminis ter Kos’ s sever ance plan, which wa s renamed the Abbott Severa

nce Pay Plan for Employ ees of Kos Pharmac euticals (the “Plan”) . The Plan wa s administered by

Abbott’s Divisional Vice Preside nt of Employ ee a nd L abor Relations. By the Plan’s terms, a participa nt w as entitled to benef

its if, and only

if, prior to De cembe r 16, 2007, his or her e mploy ment was: (1) involuntarily termi n at ed , o ther than f or ca use; or (2)

vo lun tari ly

te rm inate d f

or “ g oo d r e a so n. ” Th e Pla

n d e fi ne d “ g oo d r e a so n” to i nc lud e : any chang e of the Participant’s principal place of employ ment to a location more than

. . . in th e c a s e o f

Pa rti c ip an ts w h o ar e s a le s p e r s o n n e l, 5 0 mi le s f r o m t he Participant’s princ ipal residenc e immediately prior to Dec ember

15, 2006. (Administrative Recor d, “AR,” at 40). The P lan di d not define “princ ipal place of employ ment,” as used i n defining “g ood rea son.” The Plan Administrator’s e ventual interpr etation of “ principal plac e of employ ment,” alongwith the methodology used t o calc ulate the mileag e from the principa l place of employ

ment to Plainti ff’ s residenc e, ar e the ba sis of the dispute in this action. On Fe bruar

y 28, 2007, Abbott rea ssigne d Plaintiff to the M ansfield, Ohio, territory

. Plaintiff resig ned fr om her positi on as Territory Manag er, effe ctive May 1, 2007, citing the distance f rom her residenc e to her

assign ed territory

as the re ason for

her r esig nation. On April 2, 2007, Plaintiff submitt ed a c laim for bene fits, claiming that she voluntarily terminated he r position with “good

rea son” beca

use her principal place of employ ment was g reater than fifty miles from her r esidenc e. I n s up po rt

of he r c la im, Pla int if

f i nc lud e d a ter

ri tor y ana ly sis wh ic h de ta ile d the dr ivi ngdis tanc e s,

u s i n g M a p q u e s t , t o t h e p h ys i c i an s ’ o f f i c e s s h e w o u l d

b e r e qu i r e d

t o c a l l o ni nh e r

n e w t e r r i t o r y.The c onsulting firm Abbott hired to c alculate the distance b et we en P l ai ntiff’s princ ipal 2 residenc e and pr incipal place of employ ment used the ge o gra p h i c ce nter of he r zip code as the pr inc ipa l r e sid e nc e , r e su lti ngin a dis tanc e of 46.7 mil e s f

ro m he r p ri nc ipa l pl a c e of e mpl oy me nt. (AR 4 8 , 6 7 ). T h e denial letters Plaintiff rec eived state that the distance was c alculate d to be 48 miles. (AR 51, 62). 3 Plaintiff based he r distance calc ulations on her “assig ned targ eted phy sicians and the f reque ncy that

was re quired for

eac h phy sician base d upon the number of sales ca lls

. ” (AR at 53). Ba sed upon Plaintiff’s weig hted ca lculations, her “ principal plac e of e mploy ment” wa s more t h an fifty miles from her residenc e. Ne ither the Plan nor the Plan Administrator disputed the accura cy of Plaintiff’s calc ulations, ho we v er, the Plan Administ rator did not adopt Plaintiff’s methodolog y in defining “princ ipal place of employ ment” or in c alculatingdriving distances. On May 21, 2007, Abbott’s Severa nce Commi ttee denied Plaintiff’s claim fo r severanc e be n e f it s , f in d in g th a t s h e h a d n o t te r mi n a te d h e r e mp lo y

me n t w it h “ g o o d r e a s o n ” b e c a

u s e her assig ned ter

ritory was 46.7 or 48 miles fr o m h er pr incipal re sidence

. Plaintiff appea led the 2 Commi ttee’s de cision to the Plan Administrator. On Marc h 10, 2008, the Plan Administrator denied Plaintiff’s appea l, finding that beca use her principal re sidence was not more tha n fifty miles from her principal pl ace of employ ment, she had not voluntarily terminated he r employ

ment with “g ood

rea son.” I n revie wing Plaintiff’s appea l, the Plan Administr a to r r e c o gn ized that the Plan did not define “princ ipal place of employ ment” for a sale s employ ee a

nd did n o t p rovi de a me thodology for deter mining the distanc e fr om a par ticipant’s principa l residenc e to her principal plac e of employ ment. The Plan gave discretion to the P lan Administrator to interpre t the terms of the Plan. (A R a t 14 ). Th e Plan A dmi ni str a tor hir e d a thi rd -p art

y c on su lta nt, Z S As so c ia te s, to a id i n formulating a uniform method f or dete rmining the principal plac e of e mploy ment for sa les4

e mpl oy e e s and

fo r c a lc ulatin g the dis tanc e fr om an e mpl oy e e ’s pr inc ipa l pla c e of e mpl oy me nt t o h is or her principal re sidence

. I n order to acc ommodate the fa ct that sales e mploy ees do not wor k in a discre te location, the Plan Administ rator used a weig hted aver ag e of wher e Plaintiff’s sales activities took place , termed the “wor kload ce nter,” to de termine her principal place of employ ment. The wor

kload ce nter wa s calc ulated by

(1) a ssigningeac h phy sician within Plainti ff’ s sales terr itory a wor kload value, de fined

as the fre quency

of sales me eting s times the volume of sales ove r a 12- month period; (2) providing

a wor kload t otal in eac h zip code inc luded in the sales ter ritory by adding the workloa d values for all phy sicians in that zip code; and (3) f inding the w orkload c enter throug h the weig hted ave rag e of all workload va lues for e ach zip code. ( AR at 50). The Plan Administrator next decided that the dis t an ce b etween the wor kload ce nter a

nd Plaintiff’s principal re sidence should be d e te r mi n e d b y me a s u ring the straig ht-line ea

rth-ar c distance betwee n the two points. The Plan Administrator rea soned that deter mining the distance “as the cr ow flies,” a s opposed to by driving miles, w ould c reate a “uniform and straig htforwa rd application of the Plan’s t er m s , ” wh er eas dr iving distanc e could va ry dependingon the route a nd method of transportation. Using this method, the Plan Adm i n i s t ra t o r dete rmined that the distance betwee n Plaintiff’s workload c enter and her principal re sidence was 48 mi l es. Ac cording ly , the Plan Administrator upheld the de nial of Plaintiff’s cla im for bene fits, finding that the chang e in her sales territory did not qualify for a “g ood rea son” vol untary termination. Plaintiff timely filed t he instant appea l, essentially

arguing that the Plan Ad m i n i s t rator’ s decision was a rbitrar y and ca pricious be c a u s e t h e m e t h o d o l o g y e mp l o y e d i n m a k i n g th e d e c i s i o n w a s t o o c o mp l e x an d d i f f ic ultto understand.5 II. AN AL YSI S Th is C ourt

re vie ws de novo the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on to uph old the de nia l of

be ne fi ts. Cooper v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 486 F.3d 157, 164-65 (6th Cir. 2007)

. Be cause the Plan g ave the Plan A dmi nis tr a tor

dis c re tio n to int e rp re t th e te rm s o f t he Pla n, the de nia l of b e ne fi ts i s r e vie we d to deter mine if the dec ision was arbitra ry and ca pricious. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch , 489 U. S. 1 01 (1 98 9) ; Cooper , 486 F.3d at 164-65. Th e Plan s ta te s th a t th e Plan A dmi nis tr a tor “ ha s th e dis c re tio na

ry a ut ho rity to i nte rp re t a ll P l anp r o v i s i o n s an d

t o d e t e r m i n e a l l i s s u e s ar i s i n g u n d e r t h e P l a n , i n c l u d i n g i s s u e s o f

e l i g i b i l i t y,

c ov e ra g e and be ne fi ts. ” (A R at 14)

. Pla int if f c on c e de s th a t th e Plan A dmi nis tr a tor ha d a uth or ity to interpre t the terms of the Plan; howe ver, she argues, as she did before the di strict court, that the Plan Administrator’s fa ilure to interpre t the terms of the P l an as an or dinary person would, r ender s the denial of be nefits ar

bitrary and ca pricious. Plaintiff bear s the burden to demonstrate that the denial of benefits was arbitrary

and ca pricious. Rochow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 48 2 F .3 d 86 0, 86 5 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Under the ar bitrary and ca pricious standar d of re view, the Plan Administrator’s de cision should be upheld if it is “the r esult of a de liberate , principled re asoning proce ss” and “ supported by substantial evidence .” Gl e nn v . M e tLif e , 461 F.3d 660, 666 (6th Cir. 2006), aff ’d su b n om . M

e t. L ife Ins. Co. v . Glenn , 128 S.Ct . 2343 (2008). Where there exis ts any ambig uity

in the terms of the Plan, the Court mus t “ g ra

nt p lan a dmi nis tr a tor s wh o are ve ste d w ithdis c re tio n in de te rm ini nge lig ibi lity fo r be ne fi ts g re a t le e wa

y in int e rp re tin g a mbi g uo us te rm s, ” so lon g a s th a t in te rp re ta tio n is ratio na l. Moos v. Square D Co. , 72 F .3 d 39 , 42 (6 th Cir

. 19 95 ). Ev e n if the Court

wo uld no t ha ve c ome to the s ame conclusion as t he P lan Admi nistrator, as long as the re is a r easona ble basis for the decision,6

it must be upheld. Moon v. U num Provident Corp. , 405 F.3d 373, 379 ( 6th Cir. 2005). As the district court spe lled out in a thorough, well-written opi nion, the Plan Administ rator’ s decision to deny

benef its was not arbitrar

y and ca pricio u s . T h e P l an did not define the term

“ p r in c ip a l p la c e o f e mp lo y me n t” an d d id n o t p r o v id e a me th o d o lo g y f o r d e te r mi n in g th e distance from a Plan pa

rticipant’s princ ipal place of employ ment to his or her principal residenc e. The Plan Ad min ist rat or hir e d Z S As so c ia te s to fo rm ulate a me tho d th a t c ou ld c on sis te ntl y be us e d to deter mine a sa l es empl oy ee’ s principal plac e of e mploy ment - a diff

icult task, g iven that sales employ ees tr a v e l t

h r o u g h o u t t

h e ir a s s ig n e d te r r it o r y an d d o n o t h a v e a

b r ic k an d mo rta r p r in c ip al place of employ

ment. The Plan A dminist rator then adopted the me thod, known as the “ workload cente r,” de veloped by

Z S Associates. While the workload cente r concept i s a somewhat complex method fo r determining a sales employ ee’ s principal plac e of e mploy ment, it is “the result of a deliberate, principled r easoningproce ss” and “ supported by substantial evidence .” Glenn , 461 F.3d at 666. The workload center approac h uses t he location of eac h phy sician ca lled on, the number of sales ca lls per y ear , and the volume of sales to e ach phy sician to de termine Plaintiff’s principal plac e of employ ment. This method provides a we ll-rea soned basis for making a complex determination,

an d i s f ar f r o m ar b i t r ar y. Simi larly , the Plan Administrator’s use of straig ht line ear

th-arc distance to calculate the miles betwee n Plaintiff’s workload c enter and her p ri n ci p al residenc e wa s not arbitrar y or capr icious. Using stra ight line distanc e re moves numerous variables fr om the mileag e ca lculation, including dif

fer ent routes, va

rious methods of transpor tation, road c onstructi o n o r closure, a nd persona l prefe renc e. Straig ht line ear th-arc distance provides a reasoned me thod for ca lculating theI n differ ent contexts, other courts have found i t appropr iate to use the stra ight line method 3 o r “as the crowflies” in mea suring distance be tween two points. Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co. , 5 94 F.2d 412, 417- 18 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that 100-mile distance under former Fe d. R. Civ. P . 4(f) is t o b e me a sure d “ a s th e c ro w f lie s” ); United States ex

rel. Shee hy v. J

ohnson , 12 App.D.C. 92, 1898 WL15 58 1, 6 ( D. C. C ir . Jan . 4 , 1 89 8) (h old ing , r e g ard ingstatut or y int e rp re ta tio n, “ We mus t take it to be the g ener al rule, that, unless some ot h er mode of mea surement is pre scribed or indicated, dis tanc e is a lw ay s to be me a sure d in a str a ig ht lin e , on a ho ri zon ta l pl ane .” ); Sc hwa rtz v . M arrio tt Hotel Serv ices, Inc

. , 186 F. Supp. 2d 245, 251 (E.D. N .Y. 2002) (noting that 100-mile trave l r ule of Rul e 45 is m e a sure d b y

str a ig ht l ine ); c

f. United States v. Johnson , 46 F.3d 1166 (D.C. C ir. 1995) (joining othe r circ uits and holding that unde r 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), “ a per son ma y be convic ted of possessing w ith intent to di stribute cra ck coc aine within 1000 fe et of a school eve n if the distance by str e e t is ov e r 1 00 0 f

e e t, a s lo nga s th e str a ig ht l ine dis tanc e be tw e e n th e sit e of the po sse ssi on

wi th intent to dist ribute and the school is within 1000 feet”)

. This conclusion is limit ed to the facts of t his case . For example, if a par

ticipant employ ee 4 s er v i ced a

n are a alongthe Mississi ppi River wher e ther e ar e limited crossing points, use of the str a ig ht- lin e e art

h- arc me tho d mi g ht b e arb itr ary and c a pr ic iou s. 7 miles betwee n Plaintiff’s workload c enter and her principal re sidence

. 3 Plaintiff sugg ests that the Plan Administrator should have use d Mapque st to calculate the distance. While Plaintiff supplied the Plan Administ rator w ith an alternative method of ca lculation, that me tho d int

ro du c e s th e ve ry

a mbi g uit ie s th a t us ingthe str a ig ht l ine e art h- a rc me tho d e lim inate s. F ur the rm or e , this Court

“ mus t a c c e pt a

pla n a dmi nis tr a tor ’s ratio na l in te rp re ta tio n o f a pla n e ve n in the fa ce of an equally

rational interpr etation offe red by the par ticipants.” Morgan v. SKF USA, I nc. , 385 F.3d 989, 992 ( 6th Cir. 2004). 4 Pla int if f c ite s Sh e lby

Cou nty He alt h Car e Cor

p. v . S ou the rn Cou nc il o

f I nd us tri al W or k e rs Health and W

elfare Trust Fund , 203 F.3d 926, 933-34 (6th Cir. 2000), a s support for he r conte ntion that the Plan Administrator’s use of the workload cente r conce pt a nd the use of stra ight line e arth-a rc distance w ere bot h ar b i trary and ca pricious interpre tations of the Plan’s terms. The Plan Administrator’s interpr etations o f t h es e t erms ar e consistent with the plain mea ning that could be

a ssi g ne d to the m by

an o rd ina ry pe rs on (e ve n th ou g h the y

are no t th e on ly

su c h inte rp re ta tio ns ), so8

the pla n admin istrator ’s de c isi on is not arb itr ary or c a pr ic iou s. He re , w e have a t le a st two po ssi ble plain meaning s – as measur ed “a s the crow flies” or as mea sured using any road or the shortest roa d

o n the quickest route . The most uniform of these would be the one selec ted b y the Plan Ad min istrator

– a s th e c ro w f

lie s. Se le c tio n o f t

his int e rp re ta tio n is no t arb itr ary or c a pr ic iou s. III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the Plan Administrator’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s claim for be nefits.