[J-19-2014] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

WESTERN DISTRICT 

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee 

 v. 

DUANE JEMISON, JR., 

 Appellant 

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No. 17 WAP 2013 

Appeal from the Order of the Superior 

Court entered January 4, 2013 at No. 1588 

WDA 2011, affirming the Judgment of 

Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Allegheny County entered August 31, 2011 

at No. CP-02-CR-0009708-2010. 

ARGUED: April 8, 2014 

OPINION 

MR. JUSTICE McCAFFERY DECIDED: AUGUST 18, 2014 

In this case, we consider the continued viability of Commonwealth v. Stanley, 446 

A.2d 583 (Pa. 1982), wherein we held that the prosecution is not required to accept a 

defendant's offer to stipulate to the fact of a prior conviction when the conviction is an 

element of the offense charged. Concluding that Stanley remains the law of this 

Commonwealth, despite the United States Supreme Court's holding in Old Chief v. United 

States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), we affirm the Superior Court's order affirming the judgment 

of sentence imposed on Duane Jemison, Jr. ("Appellant"). 

In the early morning hours of May 16, 2010, a Pittsburgh police officer on foot 

patrol came upon Appellant's car which was parked improperly in a legally marked 

handicapped parking spot. Upon running the car's license plate number through his 

vehicle’s computer, the officer discovered that the car had been carjacked a few days 
[J-19-2014] - 2 

before. As other officers arrived at the scene, Appellant entered the car and started to 

drive away, but was immediately stopped by a police vehicle in his path. The officers 

ordered Appellant to get out of the car. He did not comply, but rather moved one of his 

hands downward toward the floorboard, where one of the officers then observed a gun. 

The officers apprehended Appellant from the vehicle, and recovered from the floorboard 

a gun with the hammer back, the safety off, and a round in the chamber. 

Appellant was charged with persons not to possess a firearm, carrying a firearm 

without a license, resisting arrest, and two counts of receiving stolen property.1

 He was 

tried by jury for persons not to possess a firearm, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), after this 

charge had been severed from the others. To establish Appellant's guilt of this charge, 

the Commonwealth was required to prove that Appellant had been previously convicted 

of a statutorily enumerated offense that barred him from possessing a firearm, and that he 

had, indeed, possessed a firearm.2

 It was undisputed that, in 2008, Appellant had been 

 

1

 Respectively, 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106, 5104, and 3925. 

2

 

§ 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or 

transfer firearms 

(a) Offense defined.-- 

(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in 

subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth, regardless of the 

length of sentence or whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) 

shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a 

license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in 

this Commonwealth. 

* * * * * 

(b) Enumerated offenses.--The following offenses shall apply to 

subsection (a): 

* * * * * 

(continuedF) 
[J-19-2014] - 3 

convicted of robbery, one of the statutorily enumerated offenses, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 

6105(b), and the Commonwealth sought to introduce at trial the evidence of this robbery 

conviction. However, Appellant sought to stipulate only that he had been convicted of 

one of the enumerated offenses, without stating that the specific offense was robbery. 

The trial court allowed the Commonwealth to introduce into evidence Appellant's 

certified conviction of robbery. See Notes of Testimony, Trial ("N.T."), 6/29/11, at 50 

(introducing Commonwealth's Exhibit 1). Immediately thereafter, the trial court 

instructed the jury "not to consider the defendant's prior conviction as evidence of his 

propensity to commit crime but only as proof of the element of this specific offense." Id. 

at 50-51. After both sides had rested, the trial judge repeated this instruction during her 

charge to the jury. Id. at 137. 

At the end of the one-day trial, on June 29, 2011, the jury found Appellant guilty of 

persons not to possess a firearm. On August 31, 2011, Appellant pled guilty to two 

additional charges, to wit, carrying a firearm without a license and resisting arrest.3

 The 

court sentenced Appellant as follows: for persons not to possess a firearm, not less than 5 

nor more than 10 years of incarceration; for carrying a firearm without a license, not less 

than 3 nor more than 6 years of incarceration; and for resisting arrest, not less than 1 nor 

more than 2 years of incarceration, with all sentences to be served concurrently. 

Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, contending that the trial court had 

abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior conviction for robbery when he 

 

(Fcontinued) 

Section 3701 (relating to robbery). 

18 Pa.C.S. § 6105 (emphasis in original). 

3

 The Commonwealth withdrew the two counts of receiving stolen property. Appellant 

also pled guilty to the summary offense of driving without a license, 18 Pa.C.S. 1501(a). 
[J-19-2014] - 4 

had been willing to stipulate to a statutorily enumerated conviction. The Superior Court 

affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence, concluding that the trial court had properly 

applied this Court’s binding precedent of Stanley, supra. See Commonwealth v. 

Jemison, 64 A.3d 271 (Pa.Super., 2013) (Table). Appellant filed a petition for allowance 

of appeal with this Court, which we granted. 

The sole issue before us, as stated by Appellant, is the following: 

Whether in a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a person not 

permitted to possess one, the prosecution should no longer be permitted to 

introduce the record of the disqualifying criminal conviction when the 

defendant is willing to stipulate that he is within the class of persons 

prohibited from possessing firearms. 

Commonwealth v. Jemison, 71 A.3d 248 (Pa. 2013). 

We also directed the parties to address whether Pennsylvania should henceforth 

follow the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Old Chief v. United States, 519 

U.S. 172 (1997), and overrule Commonwealth v. Stanley, 446 A.2d 583 (Pa. 1982). 

Jemison, supra. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 

art. VI, cl. 2,4 this Court, like all state courts, is bound by decisions of the U.S. Supreme 

Court with respect to the federal Constitution and federal substantive law. See, e.g., 

Council 13, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 986 A.2d 63, 77 (Pa. 2009). However, when resolving 

matters that involve no federal question, this Court is not bound by decisions of the U.S. 

 

4

 The U.S. Constitution art VI, cl.2 provides as follows: 

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 

Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 

the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 

and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 

Constitution or Law of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
[J-19-2014] - 5 

Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. McFeely, 502 A.2d 167, 169 (Pa. 1985). As 

will be made clear infra, the issue presented here involves no federal question, and thus, 

we are not bound by the high Court’s resolution of the issue. As both parties 

acknowledge, this Court addressed the question presented here approximately 30 years 

ago in Stanley, supra, and the trial court was bound by Stanley's precedent in the instant 

case. Appellant, however, urges us to overturn Stanley. The issue presented is a pure 

question of law and thus our standard of review is de novo and our scope is plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Dowling, 959 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. 2008). 

In Stanley, the defendant-appellant, who had previously been convicted of murder, 

was on trial for, inter alia, persons not to possess a firearm. At the time Stanley was 

decided, the statute barred an individual from possessing a firearm if he or she had been 

convicted of a "crime of violence," which was defined to include murder, rape, aggravated 

assault, robbery, burglary, entering a building with intent to commit a crime therein, and 

kidnapping. Id. at 588. Stanley offered to stipulate that he had a prior conviction for a 

“crime of violence,” but the prosecution refused to accept the stipulation. Instead, the 

prosecutor called a prison records custodian and an assistant district attorney to testify 

that Stanley had been convicted of first-degree murder several months before; there was 

no reference at trial to the facts underlying the prior murder conviction. On appeal, 

Stanley argued that the trial court erred in allowing this testimony because the mention of 

his murder conviction was unduly prejudicial in light of his offer to stipulate to a “crime of 

violence.” Id. This Court disagreed, concluding as follows: 

[Stanley's prior] murder conviction was undisputedly material and relevant 

to proving that he committed a "crime of violence." As such, it was "proper" 

evidence, squarely within Commonwealth v. Evans, 465 Pa. 12, 348 A.2d 

92 (1975)[,] which held that the Commonwealth may use any "proper" 

evidence to prove its case, and does not have to accept the accused's 

stipulations. 
[J-19-2014] - 6 

Stanley, supra at 588 (emphasis in original).5 

Although Stanley's holding is clear and controlling in the instant case, Appellant 

insists that Stanley has been "undermined" by the United States Supreme Court ruling in 

Old Chief, supra. Appellant's Brief at 11. In Old Chief, the defendant-appellant (Old 

Chief) was charged with assault and with possession of a firearm by an individual who 

has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).6 Before trial, Old Chief offered to stipulate that he had a 

prior conviction disqualifying him from firearms possession under § 922(g)(1), without 

identifying the specific offense of which he had previously been convicted. Old Chief, 

supra at 174-75. The prosecution refused to accept this stipulation, and instead 

 

5

 In Stanley, the defendant-appellant was acquitted of persons not to possess a firearm, 

although he was convicted of other charges, to wit, escape offenses, possessing an 

instrument of crime, and possessing a prohibited offensive weapon, respectively, 18 

Pa.C.S. §§ 5121 and 5122, 907, and 908. 

6

 The federal firearms statute under which Old Chief was charged is as follows: 

It shall be unlawful for any person-- 

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; 

* * * * * 

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or 

affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 

ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 

commerce. 

 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 

one year” does not include “antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, 

[and] similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices,” nor does it include 

“any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable 

by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” 
[J-19-2014] - 7 

introduced the order of judgment and commitment for Old Chief’s prior conviction, which 

disclosed that he had been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for assault resulting in 

serious bodily injury. Id. at 177. After the jury found Old Chief guilty on all counts, he 

appealed, contending that he had been unfairly prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to 

allow the stipulation. 

In its analysis of the case, the high Court first recognized that documentary 

evidence of Old Chief’s prior assault conviction was relevant to proving the § 922(g)(1) 

charge. Old Chief, supra at 179. However, citing Federal Rule of Evidence (“F.R.E.”) 

403, pursuant to which relevant evidence is properly excluded when its “probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of [inter alia] unfair prejudice,” the high Court 

concluded that “evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk 

of unfair prejudice to the defendant,” the degree of which will vary from case to case, “but 

will be substantial whenever the official record offered by the Government would be 

arresting enough to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning.” Old Chief, 

supra at 180, 185. The high Court noted that one “appropriate factor” for a court to 

consider when deciding whether to exclude evidence as unfairly prejudicial under F.R.E. 

403 is the “availability of other means of proof.” Old Chief, supra at 184. As viewed by 

the high Court, “Old Chief’s proffered admission would F have been not merely relevant 

but seemingly conclusive evidence of the [prior conviction] element.” Id. at 186. This 

was particularly true because “[t]he statutory language F shows no concern with the 

specific name or nature of the prior offense beyond what is necessary to place it within the 

broad category of qualifying felonies.” Id. 

The high Court also determined that, in a case such as Old Chief, where the issue 

was the defendant’s legal status, the general rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove 

its case by evidence of its own choice has no application. Id. at 186-90. The purpose of 
[J-19-2014] - 8 

the general rule is to allow the prosecutor to present a whole story and complete picture, 

uninterrupted by gaps, of the events surrounding the criminal offense for which the 

defendant is being tried. However, in the view of the high Court, the prosecution’s need 

for “evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story has [ ] virtually no application when the 

point at issue is a defendant’s legal status, dependent on some judgment rendered wholly 

independently of the concrete events of late criminal behavior charged against him.” Id. at 

190. 

Based on the above analysis, the high Court held in Old Chief as follows: 

In this case, as in any other in which the prior conviction is for an offense 

likely to support conviction on some improper ground, the only reasonable 

conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh 

the discounted probative value of the record of conviction, and it was an 

abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available. 

What we have said shows why this will be the general rule when proof of 

convict status is at issue, just as the prosecutor’s choice will generally 

survive a Rule 403 analysis when a defendant seeks to force the 

substitution of an admission for evidence creating a coherent narrative of 

his thoughts and actions in perpetrating the offense for which he is being 

tried. 

 

Id. at 191-92. 

The high Court in Old Chief was sharply divided.7 In a vigorous dissent joined by 

three other justices, Justice O’Connor expressed her disagreement with the 

determination that “it was unfairly prejudicial for the Government to establish an essential 

element of its case against petitioner with direct proof of his prior conviction.” Old Chief, 

519 U.S. at 193-94 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor looked to the “structure 

 

7

 Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, 

Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice O’Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice 

Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined. 
[J-19-2014] - 9 

of § 922(g)(1) itself” to conclude that “Congress envisioned jurors' learning the name and 

basic nature of the defendant's prior offense.” Id. at 194. As Justice O'Connor 

recognized, “Section 922(g)(1) does not merely prohibit the possession of firearms by 

‘felons,’ nor does it apply to all prior felony convictions,” as certain crimes are statutorily 

excluded from coverage; therefore, “under § 922(g)(1), a defendant's prior felony 

conviction connotes not only that he is a prior felon, but also that he has engaged in 

specific past criminal conduct.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 194 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 

Justice O'Connor then noted that F.R.E. 404(b) expressly contemplates the admission of 

prior crimes evidence for purposes other than “to prove the character of a person in order 

to show action in conformity therewith.” Among the purposes for which prior crimes 

evidence may be admissible, Justice O'Connor suggested, is that of proving a necessary 

element of the firearms offense with which Old Chief was charged. Old Chief, 519 U.S. 

at 196 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor’s criticism of the majority was sharp: 

To say, as the Court does, that it ‘unfairly’ prejudices the defendant for the 

Government to establish its § 922(g)(1) case with evidence showing that, in 

fact, the defendant did commit a prior offense misreads the Rules of 

Evidence and defies common sense. 

Id. 

In addition, Justice O'Connor emphasized that, even when the defendant 

stipulates to an element of the offense with which he or she is charged, the prosecution 

still bears the burden of proof on each and every element. Id. at 200. Because of the 

potential for juror confusion and speculation when the jury is not told the specific prior 

offense of which the defendant had been convicted in a § 922(g)(1) case, Justice 

O'Connor strongly disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the prosecution's need to 

tell a continuous story is not applicable when the issue is a defendant's legal status, 
[J-19-2014] - 10 

determined by a judgment independent of the current criminal charges. Old Chief, 519 

U.S. at 198-99 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 

Justice O'Connor summarized her dissent as follows:

The Court manufactures a new rule that, in a § 922(g)(1) case, a defendant 

can force the Government to accept his admission to the prior felony 

conviction element of the offense, thereby precluding the Government from 

offering evidence to directly prove a necessary element of its case. I 

cannot agree that it ‘unfairly’ prejudices a defendant for the Government to 

prove his prior conviction with evidence that reveals the name or basic 

nature of his past crime. Like it or not, Congress chose to make a 

defendant's prior criminal conviction one of the two elements of the § 

922(g)(1) offense. Moreover, crimes have names; a defendant is not 

convicted of some indeterminate, unspecified ‘crime.’ Nor do I think that 

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 can be read to obviate the well accepted 

principle, grounded in both the Constitution and in our precedent, that the 

Government may not be forced to accept a defendant's concession to an 

element of a charged offense as proof of that element. 

Id. at 201. 

In the case presently before us, Appellant urges us to adopt the high Court’s 

holding in Old Chief, based on the majority’s reasoning, and thus to overturn our prior 

holding in Stanley. Appellant asserts that Stanley was an “overextension” of 

Commonwealth v. Evans, 348 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1975), see Appellant’s Brief at 17, a case in 

which this Court applied the general rule that a party is not required to accept, in lieu of the 

presentation of specific evidence, a stipulation as to what that evidence would prove. 

Evans, supra at 94. In Evans, the defendant sought to stipulate to the testimony of a 

murder victim’s daughter, and this Court upheld the trial court’s refusal to compel the 

prosecutor to agree to this stipulation. In Stanley, supra at 588, we cited Evans for the 

principle that “the Commonwealth may use any ‘proper’ evidence to prove its case, and 

does not have to accept the accused’s stipulations.” (Emphasis in original). Relying on 

Old Chief, Appellant contends that this principle does not apply “when the point at issue is 
[J-19-2014] - 11 

a defendant’s legal status, dependent on some judgment rendered wholly independently 

of the concrete events of later criminal behavior charged against him.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 13 (quoting Old Chief, supra at 190). We cannot agree. 

We recognize first that the texts of the state and federal firearms statutes pursuant 

to which Appellant and Old Chief, respectively, were charged and convicted are not the 

same, but rather, differ in a highly relevant way. Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105, the offenses 

that bar an individual from possessing a firearm are set forth in a list that includes both the 

names of the offenses as well as the sections of the Criminal Code where they are 

defined. In contrast, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Congress chose not to include any 

listing of specific applicable offenses, but rather barred an individual from possessing a 

firearm if he or she has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 

exceeding one year. While the U.S. Supreme Court majority concluded that the 

“statutory language [of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)] shows no congressional concern with the 

specific name or nature of the prior offense beyond what is necessary to place it within the 

broad category of qualifying felonies,” we are unable to draw an analogous conclusion 

regarding the concern of our General Assembly in its enactment of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. 

Our General Assembly took considerable care to delineate the specific offenses 

that can support a conviction of the crime of persons not to possess firearms under § 

6105, and there is no question that the relevant specific enumerated offense is an 

essential element of that crime. Given the text of the Pennsylvania statute, we cannot 

conclude, as the U.S. Supreme Court majority did in interpreting the federal statutory 

counterpart, that “the name of the prior offense F addressed no detail in the definition of 

the prior-conviction element that would not have been covered by the stipulation” to an 

unspecified conviction. Old Chief, supra at 186. Thus, under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105, one 

element of persons not to possess firearms is a prior conviction of a specific, enumerated 
[J-19-2014] - 12 

offense, and this fact strongly supports the Commonwealth’s view, as well as our 

precedent in Stanley, that the prosecution should not be required to accept a stipulation 

which acknowledges that a prior conviction satisfies the element, but does not name or 

identify the specific prior offense. 

The Supreme Court of Louisiana has similarly distinguished Old Chief. See State 

v. Ball, 756 So.2d 275 (La. 1999). Like our General Assembly, the Louisiana legislature 

has enacted a statute that bars a person from possessing a firearm if he or she has been 

convicted of any crime included in a long, specifically enumerated list of felonies. In Ball, 

the defendant-appellant, who was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon, had offered to stipulate that he had a prior predicate conviction, without naming the 

offense, the date thereof, or the sentence imposed. The stipulation was not accepted, 

and at trial, the State introduced the bill of information and guilty plea transcript from his 

prior conviction. After he was convicted of the firearm charge, the defendant-appellant 

sought appellate relief, arguing, based on Old Chief, that he had been unfairly prejudiced 

because the name and nature of his previous felony conviction had been revealed to the 

jury. Id. at 275-77. Declining to grant relief, the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished 

Old Chief as follows. 

[B]ecause the Louisiana statute defines the crime by specific 

enumerated prior offenses, contrary to the broad definition in the federal 

statute, Old Chief is distinguishable. 

* * * * * 

[The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Old Chief] reasoned that 

because Congress had made it plain that distinctions among generic 

felonies were irrelevant for purposes of the crime charged, the most the jury 

needed to know was that the admitted conviction fell within the class of 

crimes that Congress felt should bar a convict from possessing a gun. To 

the contrary, under the Louisiana statute, “the statutory language in which 

the prior conviction requirement is couched” does show “concern with the 
[J-19-2014] - 13 

specific name or nature of the prior offense” and the name of the prior 

offense does address a “detail in the definition of the prior conviction 

element that would not have been covered by the stipulation.” Because 

proof of one of the enumerated felonies is an essential element of the crime 

under [the Louisiana statute], the probative value of the name and nature of 

the prior conviction is greater than the “generic” felony required by the 

federal statute. 

Ball, supra at 278-79 (one citation omitted; quoting Old Chief, supra at 186; emphases in 

original). 

We consider the Louisiana Supreme Court’s analysis distinguishing Old Chief on 

the basis of the text of the state statute to be persuasive, and we similarly distinguish Old 

Chief on the basis of the text of our own state statute.8,9 

 

8

 This analysis was augured by Justice O’Connor’s Old Chief dissent, wherein she 

concluded, based on the structure of § 922(g)(1), that Congress had envisioned that a 

jury hearing a § 922(g)(1) case would indeed learn the name and basic nature of the 

defendant’s prior offense. See discussion of Old Chief in text, supra. 

9

 We note that other states have adopted the holding in Old Chief, but many of these 

states were interpreting state statutes that, like the federal statute at issue in Old Chief, 

did not set forth a list of enumerated predicate prior offenses. See Anderson v. 

Commonwealth of Kentucky, 281 S.W.3d 761, 763, 765-66 (Ky. 2009) (adopting the 

“limited holding” of Old Chief in the context of a state statute that bars the possession of 

firearms by persons who have been convicted of a felony, but does not specifically 

enumerate applicable felonies); People v. Walker, 812 N.E.2d 339, 350, 353 (Ill. 2004) 

(adopting the holding of Old Chief in the context of a state statute that, “like the federal 

statute in Old Chief, does not require proof of a specific felony conviction,” and does not 

list predicate felonies, but requires only that the prosecutor establish the defendant’s 

status as a felon); Carter v. State, 824 A.2d 123 (Md. 2003) (adopting the holding of Old 

Chief in the context of a state statute that bars an individual from possessing a firearm if 

he or she has been convicted of a crime of violence or any felony); Ross v. State, 614 

S.E.2d 31 (Ga. 2005) (similar holding); Brown v. State, 719 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1998) (similar 

holding). 

However, in State v. Lee, 977 P.2d 263 (Kan. 1999), the Kansas Supreme Court adopted 

the holding of Old Chief even though its analogous firearm possession statute did set 

forth a listing of specific enumerated predicate felonies. 
[J-19-2014] - 14 

We recognize that, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded “if 

its probative value is outweighed by a danger of F unfair prejudice.” In a Comment to 

Rule 403, unfair prejudice is defined as “a tendency to suggest decision on an improper 

basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence 

impartially.” We are unable to conclude that, in a § 6105 persons not to possess firearms 

case, a defendant suffers unfair prejudice merely by the admission into evidence of his or 

her certified conviction of a specific, identified, predicate offense, which has been offered 

by the Commonwealth to prove the prior conviction element of § 6105. 

Any possibility of unfair prejudice is greatly mitigated by the use of proper 

cautionary instructions to the jury, directing them to consider the defendant's prior offense 

only as evidence to establish the prior conviction element of the § 6105 charge, not as 

evidence of the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit crime. Here, the trial 

judge appropriately instructed the jury twice regarding the proper use of the prior offense 

evidence, once immediately after the Commonwealth introduced the certified conviction, 

and again just before the jury began its deliberations. We reiterate that here, as in so 

many other contexts, the jury is presumed to follow the court's instructions. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 37 (Pa. 2008) (recognizing that when evidence of 

a defendant’s other crimes is admitted for a relevant purpose under Rule 404(b), the 

defendant is entitled upon request to a limiting jury instruction, which the law presumes 

the jury will follow). 

For all of the reasons that we have discussed above, we decline to overturn our 

precedential holding in Stanley, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court's order 

affirming Appellant's judgment of sentence. 
[J-19-2014] - 15 

Mr. Chief Justice Castille, Mr. Justice Eakin, Madame Justice Todd and Mr. Justice 

Stevens join the opinion. 

Mr. Justice Baer files a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Saylor joins.