# C_2022132EN.01007001.xml

| 24.3.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 132/70 |
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24.3.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 132/70

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P9_TA(2021)0410

The future of EU-US relations

European Parliament resolution of 6 October 2021 on the future of EU-US relations (2021/2038(INI))

(2022/C 132/07)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 2 December 2020 on a new EU-US agenda for global change (JOIN(2020)0022), |
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having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 2 December 2020 on a new EU-US agenda for global change (JOIN(2020)0022),

| — | having regard to the joint statement of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue of 24 August 2020 on EU-US relations, |
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having regard to the joint statement of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue of 24 August 2020 on EU-US relations,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions on EU-US relations of 7 December 2020, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions on EU-US relations of 7 December 2020,

| — | having regard to the testimony of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 19 January 2021, |
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having regard to the testimony of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 19 January 2021,

| — | having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 26 February 2021 on security and defence, |
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having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 26 February 2021 on security and defence,

| — | having regard to the joint press statement by President von der Leyen and US Secretary of State Blinken of 24 March 2021, |
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having regard to the joint press statement by President von der Leyen and US Secretary of State Blinken of 24 March 2021,

| — | having regard to the joint statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 24 March 2021, |
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having regard to the joint statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 24 March 2021,

| — | having regard to the statement by the US State Department of 26 April 2021 entitled ‘US Commitment to the Western Balkans’, |
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having regard to the statement by the US State Department of 26 April 2021 entitled ‘US Commitment to the Western Balkans’,

| — | having regard to the Council conclusions of 14 November 2016 on the Global Strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy, entitled ‘Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe’, |
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having regard to the Council conclusions of 14 November 2016 on the Global Strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy, entitled ‘Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe’,

| — | having regard to the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, signed in Warsaw on 8 July 2016 by the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, and the Secretary-General of NATO, |
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having regard to the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, signed in Warsaw on 8 July 2016 by the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission, and the Secretary-General of NATO,

| — | having regard to the exchange of views with the NATO Secretary-General during the joint meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Subcommittee on Security and Defence and the Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, held on 15 March 2021, |
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having regard to the exchange of views with the NATO Secretary-General during the joint meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Subcommittee on Security and Defence and the Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, held on 15 March 2021,

| — | having regard to the participation of the VP/HR in the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers of 17 and 18 February 2021, and in the meeting of the NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers of 23 and 24 March 2021, |
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having regard to the participation of the VP/HR in the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers of 17 and 18 February 2021, and in the meeting of the NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers of 23 and 24 March 2021,

| — | having regard to the Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels of 14 June 2021, |
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having regard to the Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels of 14 June 2021,

| — | having regard to the EU-US Summit Statement entitled ‘Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership’, issued on 15 June 2021, |
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having regard to the EU-US Summit Statement entitled ‘Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership’, issued on 15 June 2021,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 13 June 2018 on EU-NATO relations (1), |
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having regard to its resolution of 13 June 2018 on EU-NATO relations (1),

| — | having regard to its previous resolutions on transatlantic relations, in particular its resolution of 26 March 2009 on the state of transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the US elections (2), its resolution of 13 June 2013 on the role of the EU in promoting a broader Transatlantic Partnership (3) and its resolution of 12 September 2018 on the state of EU-US relations (4), |
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having regard to its previous resolutions on transatlantic relations, in particular its resolution of 26 March 2009 on the state of transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the US elections (2), its resolution of 13 June 2013 on the role of the EU in promoting a broader Transatlantic Partnership (3) and its resolution of 12 September 2018 on the state of EU-US relations (4),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy — annual report 2020 (5), |
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having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy — annual report 2020 (5),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2020 (6), |
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having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2020 (6),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on the ruling of the CJEU of 16 July 2020 — Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems (‘Schrems II’) — Case C-311/18 (7), |
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having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on the ruling of the CJEU of 16 July 2020 — Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems (‘Schrems II’) — Case C-311/18 (7),

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade, |
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having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0250/2021), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0250/2021),

| A. | whereas for 75 years the transatlantic partnership has stood for freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, for trade and economic cooperation and for security; whereas the US remains the EU’s closest and most important strategic partner; whereas this partnership is based on strong political, cultural, economic and historic links and shared values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and has a great potential of dialogue, cooperation and delivery on issues, objectives and priorities of common interest or concern across the policy spectrum; |
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A.

whereas for 75 years the transatlantic partnership has stood for freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, for trade and economic cooperation and for security; whereas the US remains the EU’s closest and most important strategic partner; whereas this partnership is based on strong political, cultural, economic and historic links and shared values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and has a great potential of dialogue, cooperation and delivery on issues, objectives and priorities of common interest or concern across the policy spectrum;

| B. | whereas the EU and the US share common values and a fundamental common interest in shaping a rules-based international environment that strengthens multilateralism and democratic values, defends human rights, upholds international law and promotes a rules-based international order, and equally promotes peaceful conflict resolution and sustainable development around the world; |
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B.

whereas the EU and the US share common values and a fundamental common interest in shaping a rules-based international environment that strengthens multilateralism and democratic values, defends human rights, upholds international law and promotes a rules-based international order, and equally promotes peaceful conflict resolution and sustainable development around the world;

| C. | whereas the election of Joe Biden as President of the United States and Kamala Harris as Vice-President has created new opportunities to further pursue and reinvigorate this essential transatlantic partnership, to restart work and innovation on all levels of this long-established cooperation and to better cooperate on multilateral issues, such as climate change, digital and green transition, democracy and international security; whereas both the EU and the US should take this renewed opportunity for close dialogue and cooperation to fulfil their standing obligations to the international organisations to which they both belong and to ensure greater coordination and burden sharing across a wide spectrum of geopolitical issues moving forward; whereas cooperation with the United States is a permanent objective of the EU, irrespective of the administration in office; |
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C.

whereas the election of Joe Biden as President of the United States and Kamala Harris as Vice-President has created new opportunities to further pursue and reinvigorate this essential transatlantic partnership, to restart work and innovation on all levels of this long-established cooperation and to better cooperate on multilateral issues, such as climate change, digital and green transition, democracy and international security; whereas both the EU and the US should take this renewed opportunity for close dialogue and cooperation to fulfil their standing obligations to the international organisations to which they both belong and to ensure greater coordination and burden sharing across a wide spectrum of geopolitical issues moving forward; whereas cooperation with the United States is a permanent objective of the EU, irrespective of the administration in office;

| D. | whereas the Biden administration has declared its intention to strengthen relations with the EU and other democratic allies; whereas President Biden’s first overseas visit was to Europe, during which he took part in the NATO Summit and the EU-US Summit in Brussels on 14-15 June 2021; whereas this confirms the US’s deep commitment to strengthening its relationships with the European Union and its Member States and to the future of common security and defence within the North Atlantic Alliance and with the European Union; whereas President Biden has proposed to organise a Summit for Democracy, which will seek joint commitments with the EU and other democracies in strengthening our democracies and fostering enhanced cooperation between democratic states, while fighting authoritarianism and human rights violations around the world; |
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D.

whereas the Biden administration has declared its intention to strengthen relations with the EU and other democratic allies; whereas President Biden’s first overseas visit was to Europe, during which he took part in the NATO Summit and the EU-US Summit in Brussels on 14-15 June 2021; whereas this confirms the US’s deep commitment to strengthening its relationships with the European Union and its Member States and to the future of common security and defence within the North Atlantic Alliance and with the European Union; whereas President Biden has proposed to organise a Summit for Democracy, which will seek joint commitments with the EU and other democracies in strengthening our democracies and fostering enhanced cooperation between democratic states, while fighting authoritarianism and human rights violations around the world;

| E. | whereas constant, constructive and balanced dialogue based on shared objectives is needed to build a strong and ambitious transatlantic agenda and to address any areas where there are transatlantic differences, through deeper cooperation, including in such areas as relations with China and Russia, defence commitments and capabilities, conflicts in the Middle East and other security and stability issues, and to identify common approaches where possible; whereas it is clear that the transatlantic alliance cannot be taken for granted and must be reinvigorated and constantly strengthened; |
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E.

whereas constant, constructive and balanced dialogue based on shared objectives is needed to build a strong and ambitious transatlantic agenda and to address any areas where there are transatlantic differences, through deeper cooperation, including in such areas as relations with China and Russia, defence commitments and capabilities, conflicts in the Middle East and other security and stability issues, and to identify common approaches where possible; whereas it is clear that the transatlantic alliance cannot be taken for granted and must be reinvigorated and constantly strengthened;

| F. | whereas, in pursuing and deepening transatlantic cooperation, the EU should strive for partnership in leadership with the US, focused on the pursuit of shared interests; whereas the EU should also foster its strategic autonomy in defence and economic relations as a means to pursue its own legitimate diplomatic, security and economic interests while strengthening the transatlantic bond and to increase the joint leverage of the EU and the US on the world scene, but also with a view to increasing its ability to take greater responsibility for addressing key global and regional challenges and decide and act autonomously, if needed, in foreign affairs and security and defence matters; |
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F.

whereas, in pursuing and deepening transatlantic cooperation, the EU should strive for partnership in leadership with the US, focused on the pursuit of shared interests; whereas the EU should also foster its strategic autonomy in defence and economic relations as a means to pursue its own legitimate diplomatic, security and economic interests while strengthening the transatlantic bond and to increase the joint leverage of the EU and the US on the world scene, but also with a view to increasing its ability to take greater responsibility for addressing key global and regional challenges and decide and act autonomously, if needed, in foreign affairs and security and defence matters;

| G. | whereas the EU and the US have the largest bilateral trade and investment relationship and enjoy the most integrated economic relationship in the world; |
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G.

whereas the EU and the US have the largest bilateral trade and investment relationship and enjoy the most integrated economic relationship in the world;

| H. | whereas both the EU and the US share a number of new common challenges such as the malign influence of authoritarian regimes, which undermine multilateral institutions, the socio-economic impact of the pandemic, the promotion of global health, climate change and the need to advance on climate mitigation measures, the pushback against a global wave of authoritarianism, the fight against global criminal networks and terrorism, making gender equality and anti-discrimination a reality, addressing the increasing division between metropolitan and rural areas and pursuing the digital and green transformations as a means of sustainable modernisation, the advance of technology, such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, tax avoidance, and broader challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy; |
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H.

whereas both the EU and the US share a number of new common challenges such as the malign influence of authoritarian regimes, which undermine multilateral institutions, the socio-economic impact of the pandemic, the promotion of global health, climate change and the need to advance on climate mitigation measures, the pushback against a global wave of authoritarianism, the fight against global criminal networks and terrorism, making gender equality and anti-discrimination a reality, addressing the increasing division between metropolitan and rural areas and pursuing the digital and green transformations as a means of sustainable modernisation, the advance of technology, such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, tax avoidance, and broader challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy;

| I. | whereas a renewed impetus in the transatlantic relationship would create a favourable political context to tackle the common challenges in a constructive manner and to address the issues where our positions diverge; |
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I.

whereas a renewed impetus in the transatlantic relationship would create a favourable political context to tackle the common challenges in a constructive manner and to address the issues where our positions diverge;

| J. | whereas in December 2020, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) presented a new EU cybersecurity strategy, which aims for ‘the EU to step up leadership on international norms and standards in cyberspace, and to strengthen cooperation with partners around the world to promote a global, open, stable and secure cyberspace, grounded in the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic values’ (8); |
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J.

whereas in December 2020, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) presented a new EU cybersecurity strategy, which aims for ‘the EU to step up leadership on international norms and standards in cyberspace, and to strengthen cooperation with partners around the world to promote a global, open, stable and secure cyberspace, grounded in the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic values’ (8);

| K. | whereas there is strong bipartisan support in the United States to work with democratic allies to increase the resilience of the transatlantic community against hybrid threats from authoritarian regimes; |
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K.

whereas there is strong bipartisan support in the United States to work with democratic allies to increase the resilience of the transatlantic community against hybrid threats from authoritarian regimes;

| L. | whereas the rules-based international order and democratic values are challenged by the rise of the assertive authoritarianism and the decline of democracy in third countries, as well as from within the EU and US through the rise of anti-democratic populist and far-right movements; |
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L.

whereas the rules-based international order and democratic values are challenged by the rise of the assertive authoritarianism and the decline of democracy in third countries, as well as from within the EU and US through the rise of anti-democratic populist and far-right movements;

| M. | whereas the departure of the UK from the EU might lead to a further fragmentation of the strategic landscape, not only in terms of EU-US relations but also in the UN Security Council, G7, G20 and other multilateral formats; |
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M.

whereas the departure of the UK from the EU might lead to a further fragmentation of the strategic landscape, not only in terms of EU-US relations but also in the UN Security Council, G7, G20 and other multilateral formats;

| N. | whereas Latin America is a region that shares many key values, interests, historical links and economic and human ties with the EU and the US; |
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N.

whereas Latin America is a region that shares many key values, interests, historical links and economic and human ties with the EU and the US;

| 1. | Welcomes the adoption of the new proposal of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for an EU-US agenda for global change in December 2020 as a blueprint for a renewed and strengthened transatlantic partnership; |
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1.

| 2. | Reconfirms its support for the strong EU-US transatlantic cooperation, partnership and friendship, which over the past 70 years has contributed to Europe’s development, prosperity and successful integration and is the basis for its stability and security since the end of the Second World War; underlines that the EU’s relationship with the US is built on common values; recalls that the political systems of both the US and the EU are founded on democratic principles, rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms; is convinced that through transatlantic cooperation we can best contribute to a peaceful, sustainable and constructive solution to existing global and regional challenges, including through focusing on a sustainable and environmentally friendly reconstruction of the economy, including carbon neutrality by 2050, and overcoming regional, social, race and gender injustice; insists that the renewed transatlantic partnership should be based on equality of partners; stresses in parallel that the EU’s strategic autonomy cannot be pursued without a qualitative improvement in the implementation of EU foreign and defence policy priorities and principles, and the EU’s ability to act autonomously, when needed, in pursuit of its legitimate interests, including an ambitious partnership and cooperation with the Union’s closest allies, such as the United States; |
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2.

| 3. | Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to reassert the continued relevance of the strategic transatlantic relationship for the rebuilding and reinvigoration of the multilateral rules-based international order, with the UN system and international law at its centre, the global strengthening of democracy and democratic values and the promotion of human rights, for addressing the malign influence and disinformation of authoritarian regimes, and for shaping the rules of the digital and technological future according to shared values, sustainable economic development and inclusive economic growth and jobs worldwide, a coordinated position vis-à-vis Russia and China and a common offer of investing in global infrastructure initiatives in line with the EU’s connectivity strategy; underlines the relevance of the EU’s connectivity strategy and calls for enhanced EU-US cooperation in the core field of connectivity; supports transatlantic efforts to avoid energy dependence by promoting energy diversification and, more broadly, connectivity through all possible mechanisms, as also reflected in the G7 communiqué entitled ‘Our shared agenda for global action to build back better’; |
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3.

| 4. | Notes and supports also the new transatlantic resolve on support to democracy across the globe through, in particular, the defence of media freedom, support to civil society and the protection and defence of journalists; welcomes the clear commitment of the US to strengthen and further expand the scope of transatlantic relations by the decision of the US President to travel to Europe during his first overseas trip and to participate in the EU-US Summit in June 2021; supports the operational conclusions of the Summit as detailed in the EU-US Summit Statement ‘Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership’, issued on 15 June 2021 and attesting to a strong commitment by both parties to pursue synergies and deepen transatlantic dialogue and cooperation; notes in particular the transatlantic resolve to address humanitarian needs and stand up for international humanitarian law as well as expand the resource base for humanitarian action; notes also and supports the intention to enhance transatlantic cooperation on the use of sanctions to pursue shared foreign policy and security objectives; |
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4.

| 5. | Calls for a new transatlantic agenda that pursues common interests and leverages collective strength, and promotes multilateral cooperation for a more equitable and healthier world, the fight against climate change and the peaceful and sustainable resolution of conflicts, including regional conflicts, based on the principles of international law, arms control, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament; stresses that this agenda should put our shared strategic goals at its centre, such as bolstering our supply chain for medicines and reforming the WHO, ensuring adequate access to vaccines for vulnerable countries, lowering our dependency on external energy reserves, increasing investment in advanced technologies, fighting inequalities, promoting ecological transformation, and cooperating together and with relevant third countries with, at the centre, the security and stability of the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, the Western Balkans and the African continent; |
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5.

| 6. | Underlines the need to deepen legislative cooperation and establish stronger structures for legislative cooperation and an inclusive transatlantic dialogue based on both the EU and US legislative branches, such as a transatlantic legislators assembly; notes that raising the awareness of structures such as the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue and organising more regular meetings and visits of Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee with their US counterparts, for example on the occasion of regular annual visits of the respective committees, would restore confidence in and the durability and efficiency of transatlantic cooperation; urges the US Congress to enhance the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue by authorising it as a formal body with permanent membership devoted to furthering United States-European Union relations and as the natural counterpart of the European Parliament interparliamentary delegation for relations with the US Congress; welcomes the relaunch of the European Union Caucus in the US Congress and underlines the importance of close cooperation and association with the activities of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue; reaffirms the importance of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue’s steering committee in ensuring coordination of all activities relating to transatlantic cooperation on legislative efforts in the European Parliament, with a view to strengthening parliamentary oversight; |
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6.

| 7. | Welcomes the rich transatlantic dialogue at civil society level and calls on the EU and the US to further valorise such dialogue and to involve all social and economic stakeholders in the debate on the future of transatlantic relations; takes the view that a regular transatlantic civil society dialogue could be established for this purpose; stresses that EU-US citizen-to-citizen contacts contribute to the development of common values, trust and a mutual understanding between transatlantic partners; calls, therefore, for increased support for the promotion and facilitation of mobility and exchange programmes, such as Erasmus+, and internship exchanges between the Congress and the European Parliament; underlines the importance of enhancing people-to-people contacts in science, research and education; |
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7.

| 8. | Calls for strengthened interparliamentary cooperation between Members of the European Parliament, Members of Congress, members of the national parliaments of the EU Member States and members of the various State legislatures of the 50 US Federal States, in different thematic areas that could enable the exchange of best practices, including subnational dialogues such as the ‘Under2 Coalition’, and enhanced coordination on global, but also on shared, domestic challenges, such as addressing economic and social inequality, protection of human rights and democratic standards in the face of growing anti-democratic threats, both internal and external, the defence of international law and the safeguarding of legally binding agreements, the promotion of common strategic interests, universal health coverage, legislative convergence on human-centric AI in all its forms, support for cooperation between US and EU companies, innovation and other cutting-edge technologies such as 5G and 6G and biotechnologies, research, development and innovation, the taxation of technology companies, the responsibility and accountability of online platforms, including through providing the needed oversight to make sure that the policies of online platforms are in line with core democratic values, the fight against climate change, including as a security threat, and the objective of a just transition towards climate neutrality, protecting a free and independent media landscape and protecting our democratic elections from foreign interference; reiterates the importance of EU-US space cooperation and the EU-US Space Dialogue; welcomes the announced commitment to strengthen transatlantic cooperation on space by building on the Galileo-GPS Agreement; believes that EU-US cooperation on space could help promote space safety standards and best practices across the international community; |
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8.

| 9. | Urges the EU and the US to work together on global tax challenges, building on the work of the OECD, such as a reform of the international corporate tax system, with a view to eliminating the possibility for economic operators to use base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) strategies to avoid paying corporate taxes; supports, in this regard, the work of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS; underlines that reform efforts must include the elimination of tax havens; highlights that such measures can serve to reduce economic inequalities; affirms the EU’s commitment to fair taxation in the digital economy, as called for in the new EU-US agenda for global change; |
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9.

| 10. | Emphasises the importance of visa reciprocity between the EU and the US and encourages both sides to find a mutually acceptable solution through active diplomatic engagement that would enable a visa-free regime for all EU Member States; welcomes the inclusion of Poland in the US Visa Waiver Program and the confirmation that Croatia also meets all the requirements for inclusion; calls on the US to speed up the process of the accession of Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania to the Visa Waiver Program; |
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10.

Restoring multilateralism

| 11. | Welcomes the recommitment of the US to rules-based multilateralism and to the alliances with its partners, and emphasises that this provides an important opportunity to re-engage with the US in rebuilding, consolidating and further expanding the transatlantic relationship, including in areas such as multilateralism and human rights, and strengthening together, as equal partners, the global rules-based order in the spirit of our shared liberal democratic values; underlines the importance of close cooperation with the US and other like-minded states for the modernisation of multilateral organisations in order to make them fit for purpose and improve the promotion of global peace and security, fundamental rights, universal values and international law; emphasises also the need to include countries from the Global South in these efforts; stresses the need to closely cooperate and coordinate within the UN system, its agencies, organisations and missions, including with regard to staffing of leading positions; |
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11.

| 12. | Reiterates its commitment to international cooperation within the UN as an indispensable forum for multilateral solutions for global challenges and for policy outreach, policy dialogue and consensus-building across the international community; |
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12.

| 13. | Calls for increased EU-US joint funding of cutting-edge projects based on frontier technologies, increased joint investments in research and development, increased people-to-people academic exchanges in STEM, and increased joint support for technology start-ups and SMEs; |
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13.

| 14. | Welcomes the decision of the Biden administration to rejoin the Paris Agreement and the appointment of a Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, John Kerry; welcomes the announcement on establishing an EU-US High-Level Climate Action Group; urges the EU and the US to move forward concrete proposals to address climate change and greening trade, and to promote the operationalisation of green technology, including hydrogen, sustainable finance and biodiversity; |
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14.

| 15. | Stresses the importance of global cooperation on the transnational challenges of fostering education, science, youth and cultural diversity and dialogue; calls on the US to return to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO); |
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15.

| 16. | Welcomes the US’s decision to rejoin the World Health Organization; calls for transatlantic leadership on health diplomacy to coordinate the approach to stop COVID-19 at global level, as well as possible future health crises, and to strengthen global health security, notably the reform of the World Health Organization and the joint transatlantic effort to deliver equitable global access to and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccines, tests and treatments, in particular in lower-income countries; insists on fostering cooperation to establish better procedures for preparing for future pandemics, including through a coherent and consistent clinical and regulatory approach complementary to global supply chains to ensure flexibility and resilience; calls for an impartial independent investigation into the source and spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as its handling by the WHO at its onset; |
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16.

| 17. | Underlines the need for enhanced public vaccine diplomacy in which the EU and the US can play a leading role, as global vaccination is the only way to end the pandemic; welcomes the financial contributions of the EU and the US to the COVAX Facility and the promotion of international cooperation to improve the accessibility of vaccines worldwide, by taking a coordinated approach when addressing the proposal to ease intellectual property protection rules for vaccines; urges, in this sense, the transatlantic partners to work together to allow the rapid production and delivery of vaccines wherever needed; encourages an exchange of best practices between the US and the EU on vaccine rollout to ensure better preparedness and resilience for the future; |
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17.

| 18. | Calls for a concerted EU-US approach in the UN, including on the UN reform to strengthen its effectiveness as a multilateral organisation, bring more transparency to the institution and enhance its credibility; calls for coordinated efforts to achieve ambitious commitments at the UN summits on climate change and biodiversity in 2021 (COPS 26); calls for the EU and the US to play a leading role within the United Nations Framework on Climate Change and in other fora such as the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization; emphasises in this regard that cooperation in clean energy and research, development and innovation, and in low-carbon technologies and products is crucial, as well as cooperation on other pressing issues such as non-proliferation, conflict resolution and countering violent radicalisation and terrorism; expresses concern at the fact that over the past three decades China has tripled its carbon emissions and is now emitting 27 % of the world’s greenhouse gases, making EU and US efforts to address greenhouse gas emissions largely insufficient without a clear commitment and implementation by China; |
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18.

| 19. | Calls for the international law of the sea to be defended and, in this respect, reiterates its request to the US to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; calls on the US to join in the EU’s efforts to encourage the adoption of an international treaty on marine litter and plastic pollution in the sea at the next UN Environment Assembly; urges the US and the EU to strengthen their cooperation in the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated fisheries around the world; |
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19.

| 20. | Notes that President Biden has announced a new decarbonisation target of between 50 % and 52 % by 2030 compared with 2005 levels; notes also that President Biden held a virtual Leaders Summit on Climate to galvanise efforts of major economies on climate action; |
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20.

| 21. | Recognises the significant improvement of air quality within the US over the past few decades, largely driven by technological improvement and innovation in the energy sector; |
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21.

| 22. | Believes that the EU should reaffirm together with the US the centrality of the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as a framework for effective multilateral cooperation, involving also China whenever possible, provided there is a genuine commitment by China to pursue dialogue and cooperation in a non-adversarial fashion and with an agenda which reinforces the core structures and objectives of the 2030 agenda; |
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22.

| 23. | Calls for enhanced coordination on the use of restrictive measures, including human rights sanctions, and urges the Council to adopt a corruption component as part of the EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime; calls on the EU and the US to coordinate their sanctions policies whenever possible and useful; |
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23.

| 24. | Welcomes the Biden administration’s announced commitment to re-engage with the UN Human Rights Council, signalling the US’s renewed intention to promote human rights globally in the hope to strengthen efforts towards upholding human rights globally and to prevent the authoritarian redefinition of human rights as a state-centred concept; calls on the EU and the US, together with like-minded allies, to work to reform the Human Rights Council and in particular set clear criteria for its membership; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Calls for strengthening the EU-US commitment towards the promotion and protection of human rights globally, and towards combating the rise of authoritarianism and illiberal regimes; encourages the establishment of a comprehensive EU-US joint toolbox for tackling human rights abuses; calls on the EU institutions to work closely with fellow democracies to defend and promote fundamental human rights and democratic values at international level through a reinforced close collaboration with international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE; takes the view that Parliament and Congress could cooperate together on instances of human rights defenders and civil society representatives being persecuted and incarcerated without cause or to repress their actions; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Welcomes the lifting of the US sanctions on top officials of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the Biden administration; encourages the US to join the Rome Statute establishing the ICC and to engage constructively with the Court in its ongoing investigations and legal proceedings; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Reiterates its appeal to the US to abolish the death penalty and to reform its criminal justice system; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Urges dialogue and exchange of best practices between the EU and US on promoting racial and gender equality; calls on the EU and the US to take decisive steps to address systemic racism, as reflected in police violence that disproportionately targets ethnic and racial minorities, and entrenched inequalities that fuel legitimate peaceful protests; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Takes the view that the EU and the US together can advance equality and the respect for human rights and ensure that these are duly reflected and supported in the decision-making of multilateral fora; suggests, therefore, exploring a permanent platform for dialogue between the EU and the US to take concrete steps to combat racism, hate speech and discrimination, including discrimination against LGTBQI people, and calls for closer multilateral cooperation in this regard with international organisations such as the OSCE, the UN, the African Union, the OAS and the CoE; calls on the EU and the US to organise together a Global Anti-Racism Summit on combating global racism and discrimination; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Is deeply concerned by the Texas Legislature’s adoption of the Texas Heartbeat Act, de facto banning abortion, as a serious attack on women’s sexual and reproductive rights; regrets that by split decision the US Supreme Court declined to rule on the adoption of this unprecedented law; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Insists that increased efforts are needed on improving gender equality and women’s rights, including on gender-based violence and sexual and reproductive health and rights, among others; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Calls on the EU and the Member States to strengthen their cooperation with the US in promoting the freedom of religion or belief across the world; calls on the EU and the US to mutually protect and preserve Europe’s and the US’s cultural and historical heritage in the US and in the EU; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Encourages the Biden administration to swiftly carry out its announced plans to close the Guantanamo detention facility; regrets the fact that almost 20 years after the establishment of the facility, 40 prisoners remain detained, including five who were cleared for release under the Obama administration; calls on the EU and its Member States to offer their assistance to facilitate the process; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Encourages the US to guarantee fair and open access to essential services such as the healthcare system and social protection schemes to a larger share of the population; encourages the newly appointed Biden administration to take concrete actions to regulate possession of weapons among US citizens; |
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34.

| 35. | Highlights that the transatlantic community is faced with a broad array of unprecedented common challenges, ranging from the fight against terrorism to hybrid threats, climate change, disinformation, cyberattacks, emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) and a shifting global power balance, as well as the resulting challenge to the international rules-based order; |
| --- | --- |

35.

Enhanced cooperation on international trade and investments

| 36. | Stresses the need to work together with the US, building on positive momentum, on strengthening the multilateral trading system and reforming the World Trade Organization; welcomes the outcome of the EU-US summit of 15 June 2021‘Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership’ as a sign of a revived and constructive engagement; welcomes the Understanding on a Cooperative Framework for Large Civil Aircraft; takes note of the recognition in the EU-US summit statement that the US’s application of tariffs on imports from the EU under US Section 232 have led to tensions in the transatlantic relationship and salutes the explicit commitment in the same statement to resolve existing differences on steel and aluminium overcapacity before the end of the year; considers the establishment of several platforms for permanent discussion, such as the Trade & Technology Council and the EU-US Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue, essential as they will further enable transatlantic commerce, and urges the Commission to set up an efficient and inclusive structure on the EU side for the Trade & Technology Council as soon as possible; welcomes the establishment of a Joint EU-US COVID Manufacturing and Supply Chain Taskforce; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Stresses that the Trade & Technology Council is part of the positive transatlantic trade agenda, with its ultimate aim being to enshrine democratic values and ethics in new technologies in order to become a transparent institutional structure and lead the global digital transformation; welcomes in this regard the fact that the inaugural meeting has taken place as planned despite tensions which need to be discussed in an open and frank manner; points out that it would be possible to obtain some quick gains which would enhance bilateral trade, and therefore urges both sides to focus on concrete tangible outcomes; welcomes in this regard the outcomes of the first Trade & Technology Council meeting held on 29 September in Pittsburgh which adopted concrete themes for each of the 10 working groups; supports, among commitments, the commitment to cooperate on avoiding new and unnecessary barriers to trade in new and emerging technologies, on investment screening and the export of dual-use goods, as well as the commitment to improve the effectiveness of policies that address non-market and trade-distorting policies and practices; welcomes the identification of specific themes such as addressing the challenges posed by non-market economies, and cooperating on labour rights and trade-related climate policies in the Global Trade Challenges Working Group; underlines the importance of cooperation on international technology standard-setting; calls for the establishment of a Sub-Committee on Trade & Technology within the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue to complement the executive’s role in the Trade & Technology Council and in order to exercise democratic scrutiny over this Council; stresses that the Trade & Technology Council is not a forum for the negotiation of an EU-US trade agreement, without prejudice to future initiatives to do so; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Underlines that the European Union and the United States have the most integrated economic relationship in the world, which is also the largest and deepest bilateral trade and investment relationship, with trade in goods and services accounting for more than EUR 1 trillion per year; recalls that the EU and the US economies together account for more than 40 % of global GDP and for nearly a third of world trade flows; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Emphasises the importance of reinvigorating our Transatlantic trade relationship as historical allies and trading partners, not least given the current COVID-19 crisis, with the aim of promoting multilateralism, fostering an open, rules-based trading system and finding common solutions to pressing global challenges, including global health; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Takes note of the indications already provided by US counterparts and US Trade Representative Katherine Tai’s statements at the hearing on the Biden administration’s 2021 trade agenda; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Reiterates, in this context, its support for the EU’s new trade strategy, which aims, also through the Union’s transatlantic agenda, at synergies between domestic and external policy objectives in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Identifies trade policy as a strategic geopolitical tool for the transatlantic agenda; emphasises that the US is a crucial trading partner and therefore welcomes the positive signals from the Biden administration of its plans to strengthen bilateral relations with the EU, and calls for renewed cooperation that should bring lasting and concrete results in the years to come, taking into account that our economic relations are also impacted by security interests in the context of open strategic autonomy; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Highlights the need to identify joint actions based on shared interests and values as well as on shared risks and threats in order to contribute to a global sustainable and inclusive economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Emphasises the need to reform the global trading system, so that it ensures a global level playing field and to work together to develop new rules, in particular with regard to unfair trade practices, as unfair competition is heavily affecting our companies and workers; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Supports the approach of partnership in leadership with the US, including a coordinated stance vis-à-vis Russia and China, focused on the pursuit of shared interests in the green and digital transformations of our economies, as well as common initiatives as regards the provisions of global public goods; stresses that ‘workers and wages’, as well as more resilient, sustainable and responsible supply chains, are included in this agenda; in this regard, encourages both sides to coordinate their approach on forced labour and exploitative labour conditions and to cooperate on improving respect for workers’ rights and environmental standards in trade agreements, as well as at the multilateral level, including by building on each other’s experience to enforce these provisions more efficiently; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Underscores the need to demonstrate that improved trade relations between the EU and the US will benefit citizens, especially those left behind by globalisation, and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic; in that context, calls for the EU and the US to work together and align their strategies to create investment synergies, in particular to achieve sustainable and inclusive digital and green transitions of their economies; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Notes that EU-US common challenges are increasingly non-military in nature and lie within our economic partnership; calls, therefore, for a continued and enhanced transatlantic parliamentary dialogue on trade between the European Parliament and the US Congress via committee-to-committee interaction between the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade on the EU side and the Ways & Means Committee, its subcommittee on trade and the Senate Finance Committee on the US Side, as well as within the framework of the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Strongly welcomes the US support for the new Director-General of the WTO, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, and the US’s return to the Paris Agreement; welcomes the four-month temporary suspension of Airbus-Boeing tariffs, which had a disproportionate negative effect on EU agri-food products, as a positive step towards finding a lasting solution for civil aircraft subsidies; notes that the suspension of these tariffs will end in July 2021, and urges that a solution that leads to a permanent lifting of these tariffs be found; |
| --- | --- |

48.

| 49. | Welcomes the US’s willingness to open discussions to address the global steel and aluminium excess capacity; notes the decision by the Commission to suspend the increase of tariffs against US imports counterbalancing US measures; |
| --- | --- |

49.

| 50. | Also welcomes the swift conclusion of the WTO tariff rate quota agreement, which was the first agreement with the US under the new Biden administration and demonstrates the willingness of this new administration to seek agreements with the EU in the WTO framework; |
| --- | --- |

50.

| 51. | Recognises at the same time that some diverging interests remain; in this regard, urges both sides to resolve bilateral disputes; urges the US to remove unilateral trade measures and threats for additional measures on digital service taxes, to refrain from taking further ones, and to rather focus on what brings us together; attaches a lot of importance to the EU-US Summit in June 2021 as a stepping stone to continue mending our trade relationship and discuss untapped areas for greater cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

51.

| 52. | Urges the US, despite the ongoing talks, to remove immediately section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminium as European companies cannot be considered a national security threat by the US and emphasises the need to jointly address the concerns related to the steel and aluminium excess capacity from third countries; reiterates, inter alia, the EU’s ambition to eliminate tariffs for industrial goods between the EU and the US; |
| --- | --- |

52.

| 53. | While deploring the conclusion of the 301 investigations on digital taxes, welcomes the suspension of the six months of trade retaliation on economic sectors such as footwear in Member States that have implemented a digital services tax while negotiations are ongoing in the OECD framework; expresses concerns at the US Trade Representative’s preliminary list of retaliatory tariffs arising from the 301 investigations on the different EU digital services taxes, which include particularly sensitive manufacturing sectors such as footwear and leather industries, which could potentially end up being excluded from the US market if additional tariffs are adopted; urges the Commission and the Member States to speed up and conclude as soon as possible the negotiations in the framework of the OECD proposal on digital taxation and pursue all possible ways to avoid further economic damage to EU companies, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, especially in the context of the COVID-19 recovery strategies; considers that given the exclusive competence of the EU in the field of the common commercial policy and the US threats of retaliation with regard to digital taxation laws, a common EU approach is preferable to individual ones at national level, particularly in order to avoid further transatlantic tariff cross-escalation; |
| --- | --- |

53.

| 54. | Recognises that unexploited opportunities to remove significant red tape and strengthen the transatlantic economic partnership remain; in the context of the ongoing technological race, stresses the importance of a close transatlantic regulatory space for our businesses, especially for emerging digital, energy and climate-related technologies; expects both sides to address in a dialogue the EU’s concerns regarding the US Buy American Act and the Jones Act, including public procurement and access to markets for services; |
| --- | --- |

54.

| 55. | Advocates a joint approach on tackling the COVID-19 crisis by, among other measures, increasing the availability and affordability of vaccines; calls for the EU and the US to work together and lead efforts to address the issue of vaccine shortages to ensure that vaccines are delivered worldwide and to the greatest number as fast as possible; welcomes the announcement of the EU-US partnership to further the global COVID-19 vaccination effort by vaccinating 70 % of the world by next year’s UN General Assembly; recalls that the world is facing a global scarcity of vaccines; therefore, in order to achieve vaccine equity, calls for the EU and the US to work with manufacturers to increase global manufacturing capacity for vaccines and their components; calls for both sides to refrain from any export restricting measures, to ensure the proper functioning of supply chains, to secure the required technology transfers and to improve preparedness for future global health emergencies; encourages both sides to increase regulatory cooperation to facilitate essential access to medicines; |
| --- | --- |

55.

| 56. | Calls on the Commission and the Biden administration to actively support the new WTO DG’s initiatives concerning, in particular, health; points, in this context, to Parliament’s position on a potential waiver on the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) expressed in its resolution of 10 June 2021 (9); |
| --- | --- |

56.

| 57. | Considers, while recognising the importance of protecting European intellectual property rights to maintain businesses’ capacity to innovate, that it is relevant to examine all applicable flexibilities within the TRIPS agreement with the aim of increasing global manufacturing capacity of vaccines and vaccine components; stresses that finding solutions on intellectual property rights can only be one part of the common global response; |
| --- | --- |

57.

| 58. | Underlines that the WTO remains the cornerstone of a rules-based, multilateral system for trade; calls for enhanced cooperation on WTO reform, including the reform of its three core functions, which entails reforming and reinstating as a matter of urgency the appellate body and reinforcing the monitoring and deliberative functions of the WTO, by, among other means, promoting open plurilateral agreements; |
| --- | --- |

58.

| 59. | Urges both sides to cooperate on regulating trade in health products, developing rules for digital trade and setting an ambitious climate and environmental agenda, among other activities, by relaunching the negotiations on the Environmental Goods Agreement, and to work on common proposals, inter alia, on disciplines on subsidies and the phasing-out of fossil fuel subsidies; |
| --- | --- |

59.

| 60. | Expects both sides to agree on concrete deliverables for the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) to make the WTO ready for the green and digital transitions, including an agreement on fisheries, a declaration on trade and health, a work programme for reform of the dispute settlement system, a work programme on industrial subsidies and state-owned enterprises, and substantial progress on e-commerce negotiations; |
| --- | --- |

60.

| 61. | Encourages both sides to work jointly to update WTO rules on state-owned enterprises, industrial subsidies, overcapacity and technology transfer in order to efficiently make the organisation fit for the challenges of the 21st century; in this regard also supports expanding the trilateral initiative with Japan and calls for the EU and the US to lead a coalition of like-minded countries at the WTO with a view to agreeing on new rules, while also developing an autonomous instrument against unfair foreign subsidies; expects both sides to promote and strive for multilateral agreements; calls on the US to renew its commitments to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

61.

| 62. | Notes the result of the first high-level meeting of the EU-US dialogue on China, where the two sides reiterated that their trade relations with China are multifaceted and comprise elements of cooperation, competition and systemic rivalry; advocates, wherever possible, for a joint strategic approach towards China, as well as cooperation within multilateral frameworks on common challenges such as climate change, unfair trade practices that lead to market distortions and a lack of a level playing field; |
| --- | --- |

62.

| 63. | Draws attention to the importance of having a coordinated position to tackle distortive industrial subsidies — in particular as regards state-owned enterprises and overcapacity in critical sectors –, forced technology transfers, theft of intellectual property, compulsory joint ventures, market barriers and the banning of forced labour by including a discussion on the US’s Phase One agreement with China and the EU’s Comprehensive Agreement on Investments; |
| --- | --- |

63.

| 64. | Notes that such issues cannot be solved unilaterally or bilaterally and require a coalition of like-minded partners at international level within the framework of the WTO; |
| --- | --- |

64.

| 65. | Stresses the importance of including in the EU-US joint strategy and within the WTO respect for human rights, including in the operation of international businesses; points out in this regard the need for binding due diligence legislation and calls for the US to join and support this approach throughout the supply chain; |
| --- | --- |

65.

| 66. | Believes that the EU and the US should strengthen transatlantic cooperation on rules-based and sustainable connectivity as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and hopes for future cooperation with particular regard to upholding high quality standards; |
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66.

| 67. | Calls on the Commission, while promoting dialogue and common action, to assertively promote the EU’s interests and its open strategic autonomy and respond to unwarranted US duties, the exterritorial application of sanctions, which is contrary to international law, and market barriers; emphasises the need to strengthen the EU’s autonomous trade measures; |
| --- | --- |

67.

| 68. | Asks, in particular, the US to ensure that its public procurement procedures are transparent, open and predictable based on the principle of equal treatment; |
| --- | --- |

68.

| 69. | Calls on the Commission to draft its proposal on an instrument to deter and counteract coercive actions by third countries and legislation to support European companies targeted by these sanctions and that are operating in compliance with international law; |
| --- | --- |

69.

| 70. | Encourages both sides to engage in an ambitious dialogue and find a framework for joint action and to look for selective trade and investment agreements via the relaunch of a high level strategic dialogue; |
| --- | --- |

70.

| 71. | Calls for a stronger regulatory, green, sustainable and digital partnership through the Trade & Technology Council; calls for an agreement on conformity assessment, which will particularly benefit SMEs, a coordinated approach to setting international standards for critical and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, and regulatory cooperation for big tech companies as well as digital and global taxes; calls for the EU and the US to exchange information and cooperate on foreign investment screening in strategic sectors, including on potential hostile takeovers; |
| --- | --- |

71.

| 72. | Encourages both sides to exchange best regulatory practices; urges the EU and the US to pursue their negotiations on conformity assessment to remove financially burdensome non-tariff barriers; stresses the importance for both sides to align and lead a coalition of like-minded partners to enhance the use of transatlantic standards by international standards organisations; |
| --- | --- |

72.

| 73. | Calls on both sides to use trade as a means to fight climate change and achieve upward convergence; in this regard urges both sides to cooperate on pricing carbon and in particular to coordinate on the development of a carbon border adjustment mechanism, and on effective measures against illicit arms trade and enhancing the transparency and accountability of arms trade, including US and EU Member States’ arms exports; |
| --- | --- |

73.

| 74. | Calls for the US and the EU to work together on a global corporate tax in the framework of the OECD, welcoming in particular the deal reached by the G7 countries on global tax reform and highlighting the agreement on a minimum global corporate tax rate of at least 15 %, and to cooperate in fighting fraudulent and harmful trade practices; |
| --- | --- |

74.

| 75. | Underlines that stronger trade and economic partners make for stronger alliances; welcomes efforts being made by both sides to make their supply chains more resilient, especially with regard to critical raw materials; |
| --- | --- |

75.

| 76. | Calls for enhanced EU-US cooperation in the Arctic, considering the opening up of new navigation routes and the possible availability of natural resources due to climate change and taking into account the growing economic interest in the Arctic by other countries, such as China; calls on the Commission to also address these possibilities and challenges in its upcoming Arctic Strategy; |
| --- | --- |

76.

| 77. | Urges the Commission, as common practice, to be transparent in its cooperation with the United States by, inter alia, publishing all proposals sent to the US and by guaranteeing the involvement of Parliament and civil society in the development of these proposals so as to enhance consumers’ and citizens’ trust; |
| --- | --- |

77.

Facing security and defence challenges together

| 78. | Underlines that the transatlantic alliance remains fundamental for the security and the stability of the European continent, as NATO is the foundation of Europe’s collective defence and is a key pillar of European security; reaffirms further that NATO allies and partners as well as the European Union collectively must do more to meet fair expectations as credible and equal transatlantic partners that are able and willing to defend themselves and to manage crises in their own neighbourhoods, while taking the lead when necessary, but in close coordination with the United States; supports a rebalancing of the responsibilities in the transatlantic security relationship by fostering greater self-reliance for EU Member States in matters of defence as a way to lessen the burden on the US and in a way that will create synergies between NATO membership and EU defence capabilities; stresses that EU-NATO cooperation is based on 74 commonly agreed actions in specific areas; recalls that both organisations have different tasks and priorities, with NATO being in charge of collective territorial defence of its members, and the EU aiming for military crisis management abroad, with a potential for further dialogue and cooperation on security challenges and strategic partnership built on common support for the core values of democracy, freedom and the promotion of peace; stresses that more in-depth cooperation, pooling and sharing and an efficient and transparent European defence sector also strengthens the capabilities available for NATO; underlines that creating a strong EU industrial base and stronger military capabilities at EU level and investing in military mobility and interoperability will not only strengthen the EU but would also simultaneously reinforce the transatlantic alliance and be synergic with the role and relevance of the EU and its Member States in NATO; expresses, therefore, its full commitment to the European defence initiatives, in particular the EDF, PESCO and the EPF, among others; underlines that the transatlantic partnership can only be successful if all Member States fulfil their commitments, including defence investment pledges, and engage in mutual support and pursue a more balanced burden-sharing; underlines the need for all the NATO allies to invest financially in developing, acquiring and maintaining the capabilities that NATO needs to defend its citizens; points also to the ongoing drafting process of the EU Strategic Compass, which will be a milestone for stronger European defence and security cooperation, and underlines that the Strategic Compass should be closely linked with the drafting of NATO’s Strategic Concept, and expresses its conviction that these parallel processes offer a unique opportunity to significantly advance and update the transatlantic political and security partnership and make it fit to address the current global challenges that both the EU and the US are faced with; stresses that the ambition of European strategic autonomy by no means undermines NATO but is complementary to it; calls for the conclusion of an administrative arrangement between the European Defence Agency and the United States and welcomes the commitment by the EU and the US, as reflected in the statement issued at the end of the EU-US summit on 15 June 2021, to begin discussions as soon as possible; promotes the setting up of foreign policy and security and defence policy coordination processes between the US, the EU and the UK; |
| --- | --- |

78.

| 79. | Welcomes the positive decision by the Council of 6 May 2021 authorising the coordinator of the Military Mobility project, the Netherlands, to invite the US, Canada and Norway, following their respective requests, to participate in the PESCO project on military mobility; stresses that this participation will enhance the coherence of EU and NATO capabilities and the interoperability, preparedness and resilience of transatlantic forces; |
| --- | --- |

79.

| 80. | Calls for enhanced cooperation between the EU, US and NATO with our eastern neighbours, in particular, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, in security and defence-related matters, including through support for these countries’ territorial integrity, and to strengthen their resilience against cyber, informational, espionage and other threats directed at them; |
| --- | --- |

80.

| 81. | Welcomes the US decision to reverse the withdrawal of US forces from the EU and to step up its military presence in EU Member States as a sign of commitment to transatlantic security cooperation; expresses its gratitude to the many US service personnel who helped protect the security and safety of Europe and its citizens in past decades; |
| --- | --- |

81.

| 82. | Urges the EU and the US to foster close cooperation not only on traditional security threats, but also on emerging ones such as hostile foreign technological dominance, hybrid threats, disinformation campaigns and malign interference in electoral processes; urges the EU and the US to develop close cooperation in the field of cybersecurity; urges the EU to develop more efficient cyber capabilities to bolster its ability to defend itself against cyber threats; welcomes the Commission’s new Cybersecurity Strategy as a basis for the setting of international norms and standards in cyberspace; calls for the necessary capabilities to be developed, acquired and maintained, also within NATO, including in terms of intelligence sharing, and for stronger coordination between EU agencies, such as the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), and their American counterparts; recognises that, to a certain degree, cyber defence is more effective if it includes some offensive means and measures as well, provided their use is compliant with international law; stresses the need for a common approach as regards banning lethal autonomous weapons without meaningful human control, regulating autonomy of weapons systems at global level, and restricting the export and proliferation of cyber tools and mass surveillance technology; underlines that global arms control needs to be updated to be able to face cyber and AI challenges; calls on the transatlantic partners to support and actively contribute to the UN Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire; |
| --- | --- |

82.

| 83. | Takes the view that the protection of democratic and electoral processes is a matter of global security; suggests in this regard the joint development of a structured framework for responses to interferences in electoral processes, based on a Transatlantic Code of Practices for Free and Resilient Democratic Processes, which seeks structural and comprehensive measures to respond to the hybrid nature of interferences, collaborating closely with international organisations such as the OSCE; calls on the EU and the US to promote closer and more ambitious international cooperation on election observation, jointly with all relevant partners, especially with the endorsing organisations of the ‘Declaration of Principles for international election observation’, in order to counter growing public security threats to electoral processes; stresses the need to jointly counter the growing phenomenon of fake domestic election observation, which undermines public trust in election observation overall, and to assess in depth the opportunities, challenges and risks involved in the growing use of new electoral information and communication technologies; insists on the need to reinforce the necessary cooperation with relevant domestic election observation organisations at all levels, as well as their protection within the framework of their activities; |
| --- | --- |

83.

| 84. | Underlines the importance of achieving quantum computing capabilities, and stresses the need to enhance EU-US cooperation in this area to ensure that quantum computing is first realised among partners with close relations and who share supporting objectives; |
| --- | --- |

84.

| 85. | Stresses the strategic importance of the submarine telecommunications cables in the North Atlantic that provide over 95 % of international telecommunications; reiterates the importance of strengthened transatlantic cooperation in protecting and ensuring respect for the international instruments that govern submarine cables, including the UNCLOS; |
| --- | --- |

85.

| 86. | Supports the creation of the EU-US Security and Defence Dialogue and calls on the VP/HR to launch it as soon as possible; points to the importance of also including NATO representatives in this dialogue in order to promote synergies with the ongoing cooperation in the EU-NATO framework and avoid any duplications of policy responses; underlines that the EU-US Security and Defence Dialogue should include cooperation on security and defence initiatives, crisis management, military operations and bilateral security matters, as noted in the EU-US agenda for global change; highlights that information-sharing would form an important part of this dialogue; |
| --- | --- |

86.

| 87. | Stresses the common need for our societies to engage in an introspective process on our common democratic values, and on respect for the other and for the diversity of opinions, in order to reinvigorate and defend global democracy against rising authoritarianism, as promoted by both Russia and China, but also within the transatlantic community, inter alia by strengthening the accountability and resilience of our democratic systems, by countering extremist views and racism that provide a fertile ground for anti-democratic movements to thrive, by standing up with one united voice against the malign influence of authoritarian actors geopolitically and by engaging in transatlantic dialogue and fostering inclusive social and economic policies that address the root causes of inequalities; underlines the value of transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on policies supporting democracy, human rights and the rule of law and combating disinformation and foreign interference; underlines the need on both sides to address the drivers of declining public trust in policy and institutions; stresses that efforts in this direction should include building trust in science and facts, expanding a safety net of non-discrimination policies, and rejecting and addressing racial and religious discrimination; |
| --- | --- |

87.

| 88. | Further calls upon the EU and the US to jointly provide economic, political and operational support to existing regional organisations based in Africa, such as the African Union, the G5 Sahel Force and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); |
| --- | --- |

88.

| 89. | Underlines that the EU and the US must synergise their efforts to combat terrorism and radicalisation and ensure that the efforts made are supported by the necessary resources and commensurate with the threats posed; takes the view that both partners should strive to improve current practices of intelligence-sharing among Member States, with particular emphasis on achieving better, common situational awareness in key areas, including emerging safe havens and terrorists’ use of EDTs, as well as hybrid tactics; |
| --- | --- |

89.

| 90. | Encourages strong EU-US collaboration in deradicalisation and counterterrorism efforts, including establishing joint training activities, shared counterterrorism courses, exchange programmes for officers, tactical drills and education initiatives; |
| --- | --- |

90.

| 91. | Underlines the fundamental importance of democratic principles, which are the basis of our social and economic progress and our free societies; supports the proposal of President Biden to hold a Summit for Democracy to promote universal values; calls on the US to draw on the experience of the EU’s Conference on the Future of Europe, and calls on the Commission and the Council to support the initiative of the Summit both politically and practically; takes the view that the proposed Summit for Democracy should aim at promoting value-based multilateralism and solidarity between democracies when they are under pressure, strengthening democracy internally and globally, in particular increasing citizens’ participation in democratic governance, voicing concerns and seeking peaceful solutions to ongoing crackdowns on democratic movements and protecting the human rights defenders, including environmental defenders, around the globe, in addition to addressing the growing influence of authoritarian regimes; emphasises in this regard that such an effort could help chart a clear course forward to counter populism and authoritarianism and to protect fundamental democratic and human rights values; proposes that the EU establish, together with the US, a transatlantic alliance to defend democracy globally and devise a democracy defence toolkit, which should include joint actions on sanctions, anti-money laundering policies, rules on the conditionality of economic and financial assistance, international investigations, and support for human rights activists and defenders of democracy; calls for better communication with and between citizens on both sides on the enduring importance of the transatlantic bond and its relevance today; reaffirms in this regard the value of exchanges between legislators, businesses and civil society; |
| --- | --- |

91.

Closer foreign policy coordination

| 92. | Believes that the EU should engage more with the US and renew the strategic partnership in relation to countries of the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans in order to build resilient, prosperous, democratic multi-ethnic societies there, capable of resisting the disruptive influence of both local and external authoritarian forces; recalls that the stability of the Western Balkans and countries of the Eastern Partnership is a matter of peace and security for the region, as well as for the EU; welcomes the highly increased coordination of the US with the EU in supporting the countries of the Western Balkans on their path to European integration and EU membership; takes the view that regular, institutionalised coordination between the Foreign Affairs Council and the US Secretary of State on this and on other foreign policy matters would enhance transatlantic dialogue and cooperation on foreign policy matters of common concern and foster further convergence of policy stances at transatlantic level; recalls its suggestion to create a Transatlantic Political Council (TPC) for systematic consultation and coordination on foreign and security policy, which would be led by the VP/HR and the US Secretary of State and underpinned by regular contact with political directors; calls for strong EU leadership and effective coordination with the US in order to push back against initiatives aiming at redrawing borders, and similar sub-national initiatives to deepen ethnic divide and segregation, as well as the issue of Chinese investment and financing across the region and its impact on democratic governance and the environment; stresses the importance of close EU-US cooperation and coordination on fighting state capture, corruption, organised crime, foreign interference and attacks on media freedom, and promoting the rule of law, in-depth reforms, good neighbourly relations and reconciliation, and the objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; underlines the EU’s leading role in the process of normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo; |
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92.

| 93. | Stresses the common interest in supporting long-term sustainable peace, stability, security, resilience, democracy and respect for human rights in the South Caucasus; welcomes the US engagement in the region, in cooperation with the EU, including through mechanisms such as the OSCE Minsk Group; |
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93.

| 94. | Calls on the EU and US to collaboratively address the consistent and growing threats to the protection and preservation of cultural heritage, including cultural smuggling, especially in conflict zones; urges the embracing of a strategy that includes robust public awareness campaigns, universal condemnation of trafficking in unprovenanced antiquities, the establishment of a single code of conduct on the protection of cultural sites, fostering of greater cooperation among different law-enforcement agencies that includes immediate information-sharing among national intelligence agencies, and increased cooperation between law enforcement and the art and archaeological communities; |
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94.

| 95. | Notes that China’s economic influence, geopolitical power and various forms of Chinese power projection, as well as military strength, have brought its system of authoritarian governance into conflict with Western systems of governance that are based on liberal democratic values; recalls China’s increased presence on the international stage and in Europe through its Belt and Road Initiative, and its activities in cyberspace, in the Arctic regions and in Africa; stresses in this regard that China has become a systemic rival and competitor, but that it should also be an important partner in tackling many global problems; is convinced that a joint transatlantic approach to engage with China is the best way to ensure a peaceful, sustainable and mutual beneficial long-term relationship with China; welcomes in this context the recent relaunch of a comprehensive EU-US high-level strategic dialogue on China and takes the view that this should provide a key mechanism for advancing our interests and managing our differences and explore possibilities for EU-US engagement with the People’s Republic of China in multilateral frameworks on common and global challenges, such as climate change, health-related risks, respect for human rights, cyberspace, arms control, non-proliferation and emerging disruptive technologies; emphasises the need for a strong parliamentary dimension for this dialogue; calls for the development of a broad range of policy instruments and, where possible, a search for transatlantic synergies for dealing with China; emphasises in this regard that the EU and the US share very serious concerns over systematic human rights violations in China, with particular regard to the Uyghur community; strongly believes that relations with the PRC, both bilateral and otherwise, must always include the safeguarding and the promotion of shared democratic values and that any multilateral agenda must have at its core the notion of full compliance with international law and the protection of human rights; |
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95.

| 96. | Underscores the need to explore areas of convergence, possible cooperation and better coordination and consultation between the US and EU on China, in order to avoid transatlantic tensions, such as those that followed the adoption of the trilateral US-UK-Australia security deal known as AUKUS, without consultation of EU allies, notably regarding the protection of human and minority rights and de-escalation of tensions in the South and East China Seas, Hong Kong and across the Taiwan Strait; emphasises the relevance of UNCLOS as a legal basis for resolving conflicts; reiterates its support for shared connectivity initiatives, also within the framework of the EU’s newly announced ‘Global Gateway’ strategy; |
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96.

| 97. | Welcomes the recent progress on the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy; calls for its swift and comprehensive implementation as it is in the EU’s interests and would promote its values, and highlights the relevance of this geo-strategic region, which is home to common transatlantic democratic friends and partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, as well as Taiwan, and calls for an enhanced EU-US partnership and coordination on the Indo-Pacific region; recalls the importance of fostering strategic ties with the ASEAN members and with the Pacific Island Forum (PIF); |
| --- | --- |

97.

| 98. | Highlights that non-democratic regimes such as China increasingly use technology to control and repress their citizens, restricting the exercise of fundamental, social and political rights; calls for increased EU-US cooperation in developing human-centric technology that respects privacy and reduces biases and discrimination; |
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98.

| 99. | Recognises that China’s acquisitions of intellectual property and technological advances by leading research centres are often used to propel its military aims, and stresses, therefore, that the EU should work to develop a long-term strategy to counter China’s military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy in Europe; |
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99.

| 100. | Recognises that the EU and the US should coordinate on issues where China’s actions are contrary to Euro-Atlantic security interests; stresses that priority should be given to challenges in the cyber, hybrid, EDT, space, arms control and non-proliferation areas; |
| --- | --- |

100.

| 101. | Is concerned by China’s economic coercion against Member States and third countries; supports the idea of collective economic defence via collaboration with like-minded democracies against China’s economic coercion; |
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101.

| 102. | Is concerned about the close ties between the Chinese Communist Party and industry in China, particularly security companies; recommends that Member States undertake an internal audit of procurement practices to ensure that products integrated into their national networks and defence institutions are free of technologies coming from companies in China; |
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102.

| 103. | Calls for close cooperation to work towards a common plan of engagement with the Russian Federation and, in parallel, to jointly address the range of threats emanating from the Russian Federation, such as the continued destabilisation of Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, support for Lukashenka’s illegitimate rule in Belarus, Russia’s role and influence in the Western Balkans and in the Black Sea, the deplorable interference in democratic processes in the EU and the US, including elections, the financing of extremist political parties and the revisionist policies, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, while at the same pursuing selective cooperation in the areas of shared transatlantic interest, notably in the area of arms control architecture, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, as well as climate diplomacy, the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the stabilisation of Afghanistan; welcomes the decision taken by the current US administration to extend the new START arms control treaty; emphasises the need to revitalise the arms control talks between the key global players, such as the US and Russia, that have a direct impact on European security, as well as to include China in future arms control negotiations; stress the need for urgent rebuilding of the conventional arms control architecture, to limit the scope for arms races and unforeseen incidents; welcomes the readiness of the Biden administration to re-establish dialogue and negotiations with Russia and supports the plan by the EU and the US to establish an EU-US high-level dialogue on Russia; takes the view that the EU and its Member States should actively support the search for ways to further dialogue and should contribute to the rebuilding of mutual trust; stresses the importance, in parallel, of dialogue with civil society and support for civil society organisations in Russia that seek to advance dialogue on political pluralism, agency and the legitimate democratic aspirations of the Russian people; |
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103.

| 104. | Considers that the EU and the US must coordinate their dual-track approach of deterrence and dialogue with Russia within the parameters agreed at the Wales and Warsaw Summits; |
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104.

| 105. | Calls on the EU and the US to act in a timely manner and with resolve against disruptive actions of Russian intelligence services on the territory of the EU; recommends that Member States enhance counter-intelligence services cooperation and information sharing; |
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105.

| 106. | Calls on the VP/HR and the Council to devise a new strategic approach for the EU’s relations with Russia, which must better support civil society, strengthen people-to-people contacts with the citizens of Russia, draw clear red lines for cooperation with Russian state actors, use technological standards and the open internet to support free spaces and restrict oppressive technologies, and demonstrate solidarity with the EU’s Eastern Partners, including on security issues and peaceful conflict resolution; underlines that any dialogue between the EU and US with Russia must be based on respect for international law and human rights; |
| --- | --- |

106.

| 107. | Underlines the importance of and calls for US-EU cooperation and coordination vis-à-vis the African continent, its different regions and countries with a view to ensuring sustainable development and promoting security, stability and prosperity; stresses the urgent need for a strong and fair partnership between the US, the EU and Africa, taking into account the challenges of climate change and its demographic implications, the collapse of biodiversity, China’s exploitation of Africa’s natural resources, sustainable socio-economic development education, digitalisation, the rule of law, democracy promotion and the strengthening of human rights, civil society and gender equality; believes that any security assistance should be based on the human security approach and needs of local populations, fully comply with international law and include strong accountability and democratic and parliamentary oversight mechanisms; welcomes the Biden administration’s commitment to strengthen cooperation with the International Coalition for the Sahel; urges the US and the EU to work together to tackle the increase in violent extremism, terrorism by ISIS and al-Qaeda offshoots, and the humanitarian, economic and governance challenges in the Sahel and in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region in general; calls for enhanced dialogue and coordination regarding the positioning of transatlantic partners vis-à-vis the challenges faced by countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Iran and Libya; |
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107.

| 108. | Calls for better cooperation in the Arctic, taking into account the growing interest in the Arctic by other countries such as China and the activities and military build-up by Russia in the Arctic; welcomes the decision by the EU and the US, as attested by the statement issued after the EU-US Summit on 15 June 2021, to work together to retain the Arctic as a region of peace and stability and collaborate through the Arctic Council; |
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108.

| 109. | Highlights the need to maintain and, where applicable, deepen structural strategic relations between the EU, the US and the UK, capitalising on our shared values, interests and challenges, including in regard to security matters, while ensuring the autonomy of EU decision-making; |
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109.

| 110. | Deplores the violent takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban following the withdrawal of US and European forces, and the ensuing widespread violations of human rights, particularly of girls, women, and ethnic and religious minorities, as well as the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the country; reiterates its position that the transatlantic community must redouble its efforts to work for long-term peace, stability and progress in Afghanistan by supporting Afghan civil society, human rights defenders, particularly women’s rights defenders, political activists, journalists, academics, artists and other groups and persons at risk; calls for robust transatlantic coordination and consultation in order to gain, preserve and share intelligence concerning the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan, notably from ISIS, Al-Qaeda and their affiliates; calls for a concerted transatlantic approach combining the need for operational engagement with the Taliban for humanitarian and counter-terrorism purposes with clear conditions for engagement with the Taliban-led government in the future, which should include commitment to respecting human rights and fighting terrorism; calls for deep transatlantic reflection on the lessons from the mission in Afghanistan, with the aim of drawing the necessary conclusions for future efforts to promote stability, security and good governance in the world; calls on transatlantic partners, further, to engage with all of Afghanistan’s neighbours, bearing in mind the plight of the Afghan people who have sought refuge there and the need to help them; |
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110.

| 111. | Welcomes the US’s renewed engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly with the Eastern Mediterranean Act of 2019, which authorises new security assistance for Cyprus and Greece, and strengthens energy cooperation among regional actors; welcomes the decision by the EU and the US, as attested by the Statement issued after the EU-US Summit on 15 June 2021, to work hand in hand for sustainable de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, where differences should be settled through dialogue in good faith and in accordance with international law; supports the statement by the EU and the US that they intend to aim for a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with a democratic Turkey; |
| --- | --- |

111.

| 112. | Supports closer cooperation with the US and Latin American countries in promoting multilateralism, democratic values, sustainable development, human rights and international law standards, economic growth, the fight against inequalities, the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime, biodiversity and the fight against climate change; underlines the need for the EU and the US to engage more actively with Latin America and the Caribbean region as vital allies in international fora and as strategic partners in the defence of multilateralism; calls for an EU-US-Latin America ‘Atlantic Triangle Alliance’ that allows both regions to jointly further progress in areas such as democracy, security and drug trafficking, the fight against inequalities and development cooperation; highlights, in this regard, the importance of ensuring that this cooperation with the US and the Latin American countries is reflected in joint efforts to support the opponents and dissidents facing retribution in various countries for defending the values of democracy and protection of human rights; calls, in this regard, on the US and the EU to cooperate with one another and with other countries to restore human rights and democracy in Venezuela through elections that are truly free, credible, inclusive, transparent and entirely democratic, and through support for the legitimate political forces recognised by the European Parliament; further reiterates its commitment to promote democracy and human rights in all Latin American countries; calls for greater EU-US coordination on sanctions; reiterates its suggestion that the US and the EU should engage in regular exchanges of views regarding their respective summits with Latin American countries, namely the EU-CELAC summits and the Summit of the Americas held by the Organization of American States; |
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112.

| 113. | Points to the importance of the MENA region for European, and hence also transatlantic, security and stability; calls, therefore, for enhanced dialogue and coordination regarding the positioning of transatlantic partners vis-à-vis the MENA region, including by taking action against severe violations of human rights and international law that have been occurring in the region; urges the US to rejoin the JCPOA as a cornerstone of a global non-proliferation regime and a foundation for de-escalation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region; supports the US’s call for a ‘longer and stronger’ nuclear agreement with Iran and urges transatlantic collaboration in this matter as the next step; welcomes the decision by the US to renew its financing for UNRWA; calls for renewed transatlantic efforts to meaningfully revive and bring to a successful conclusion the Middle East Peace Process, leading to a viable two-state solution; welcomes the signing and implementation of the Abraham Accords and encourages transatlantic cooperation on deepening those ties; |
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113.

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| 114. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and, for information, to the US Department of State and the US Congress. |
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114.

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(1)  OJ C 28, 27.1.2020, p. 49.

(2)  OJ C 117 E, 6.5.2010, p. 198.

(3)  OJ C 65, 19.2.2016, p. 120.

(4)  OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 89.

(5)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0012.

(6)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0013.

(7)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2021)0256.

(8)  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_2391

(9)  European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2021 on meeting the global COVID-19 challenge: effects of the waiver of the WTO TRIPS Agreement on COVID-19 vaccines, treatment, equipment and increasing production and manufacturing capacity in developing countries (Text adopted, P9_TA(2021)0283).

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