# C_2022251EN.01006901.xml

| 30.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 251/69 |
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30.6.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 251/69

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P9_TA(2021)0504

Challenges and prospects for multilateral weapons of mass destruction arms control and disarmament regime

European Parliament resolution of 15 December 2021 on the challenges and prospects for multilateral weapons of mass destruction arms control and disarmament regimes (2020/2001(INI))

(2022/C 251/06)

The European Parliament,

| — | having regard to its resolution of 14 February 2019 on the future of the INF Treaty and the impact on the European Union (1), |
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having regard to its resolution of 14 February 2019 on the future of the INF Treaty and the impact on the European Union (1),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a framework of ethical aspects of artificial intelligence, robotics and related technologies (2), |
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having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on a framework of ethical aspects of artificial intelligence, robotics and related technologies (2),

| — | having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2020 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the preparation of the 10th Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) review process, nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament options (3), |
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having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2020 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the preparation of the 10th Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) review process, nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament options (3),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 entitled ‘The implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2020’ (4), |
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having regard to its resolution of 20 January 2021 entitled ‘The implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy — annual report 2020’ (4),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on autonomous weapon systems (5), |
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having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on autonomous weapon systems (5),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2013 on the recommendations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference regarding the establishment of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (6), |
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having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2013 on the recommendations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference regarding the establishment of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (6),

| — | having regard to its resolution of 27 October 2016 on nuclear security and non-proliferation (7), |
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having regard to its resolution of 27 October 2016 on nuclear security and non-proliferation (7),

| — | having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (8) (‘Dual-Use Regulation’), |
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having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (8) (‘Dual-Use Regulation’),

| — | having regard to the annual progress reports on the implementation of the European Union strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (in particular those of 2019 (9) and 2020 (10)), |
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having regard to the annual progress reports on the implementation of the European Union strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (in particular those of 2019 (9) and 2020 (10)),

| — | having regard to Council Decision 2010/212/CFSP of 29 March 2010 relating to the position of the European Union for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (11), |
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having regard to Council Decision 2010/212/CFSP of 29 March 2010 relating to the position of the European Union for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (11),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (12), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (12),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/901 of 29 June 2020 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (13), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/901 of 29 June 2020 on Union support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (13),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (14), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (14),

| — | having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542 of 15 October 2018 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons (15) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1480 of 14 October 2020 implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1542 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons (16), |
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having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2018/1542 of 15 October 2018 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons (15) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1480 of 14 October 2020 implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1542 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons (16),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/906 of 29 June 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (17), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/906 of 29 June 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (17),

| — | having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (18), |
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having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (18),

| — | having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Enters Into Force of 15 December 2020, |
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having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Enters Into Force of 15 December 2020,

| — | having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement on the Extension of the New START Treaty of 3 February 2021, |
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having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement on the Extension of the New START Treaty of 3 February 2021,

| — | having regard to the 16th Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of 10 November 2020, |
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having regard to the 16th Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of 10 November 2020,

| — | having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on Open Skies of 18 June 2021, |
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having regard to the North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on Open Skies of 18 June 2021,

| — | having regard to the statement by NATO Secretary-General of 2 August 2019 on the demise of the INF Treaty, |
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having regard to the statement by NATO Secretary-General of 2 August 2019 on the demise of the INF Treaty,

| — | having regard to the speech by NATO Secretary-General of 10 November 2020 at the 16th Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, |
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having regard to the speech by NATO Secretary-General of 10 November 2020 at the 16th Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,

| — | having regard to the 2018 UN Agenda for Disarmament entitled ‘Securing our Common Future’, |
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having regard to the 2018 UN Agenda for Disarmament entitled ‘Securing our Common Future’,

| — | having regard to the statement by UN Secretary-General António Guterres of 24 October 2020 on the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, |
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having regard to the statement by UN Secretary-General António Guterres of 24 October 2020 on the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,

| — | having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in particular to SDG 16 aiming at the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, |
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having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in particular to SDG 16 aiming at the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development,

| — | having regard to the decision of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention of 21 April 2021 on addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic, |
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having regard to the decision of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention of 21 April 2021 on addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic,

| — | having regard to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA — the Iran Nuclear Deal) of 2015, |
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having regard to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA — the Iran Nuclear Deal) of 2015,

| — | having regard to the E3 (19) statement of 19 August 2021 on the JCPOA, |
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having regard to the E3 (19) statement of 19 August 2021 on the JCPOA,

| — | having regard to the 64th IAEA General Conference, held from 21 to 25 September 2020 in Vienna, |
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having regard to the 64th IAEA General Conference, held from 21 to 25 September 2020 in Vienna,

| — | having regard to the speech by the President of the French Republic of 7 February 2020 on the French defence and deterrence strategy, |
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having regard to the speech by the President of the French Republic of 7 February 2020 on the French defence and deterrence strategy,

| — | having regard to the joint statement by the presidents of the United States and Russia of 16 June 2021 on strategic stability, |
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having regard to the joint statement by the presidents of the United States and Russia of 16 June 2021 on strategic stability,

| — | having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure, |
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having regard to Rule 54 of its Rules of Procedure,

| — | having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0324/2021), |
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having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A9-0324/2021),

| A. | whereas weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), in particular nuclear weapons, constitute a grave threat to long-term human security; whereas solid and comprehensive arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament architecture based on binding treaties and robust confidence-building mechanisms and reinforced by a reliable and transparent verification procedure are key to building and maintaining peace, stability, predictability, security, sustainable development and economic and social progress, de-escalating existing tensions between states and reducing the likelihood of armed conflict with unpredictable and catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, social and economic consequences; |
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A.

whereas weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), in particular nuclear weapons, constitute a grave threat to long-term human security; whereas solid and comprehensive arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament architecture based on binding treaties and robust confidence-building mechanisms and reinforced by a reliable and transparent verification procedure are key to building and maintaining peace, stability, predictability, security, sustainable development and economic and social progress, de-escalating existing tensions between states and reducing the likelihood of armed conflict with unpredictable and catastrophic humanitarian, environmental, social and economic consequences;

| B. | whereas in the current tense European and global geopolitical contexts, key arms control treaties that came into force at the end of the Cold War have recently been weakened or dismantled; whereas tensions and a lack of trust among the parties to the NPT have been increasing in recent years, exacerbated by a growing deterioration of bilateral US-Russian relations and the subsequent steps that Russia has taken to reassess the nuclear aspects of its military doctrine; whereas a new international climate based on increasing power struggles has emerged; whereas in this new environment, in which the necessary stability and predictability for European and global security architecture is not guaranteed, the EU has launched a reflection process on possible ways to strengthen its strategic autonomy; whereas, in a world of global interdependence, renewed global arms control and disarmament efforts are essential to the EU’s security; whereas the US and the Russian Federation committed to an integrated strategic stability dialogue on 16 June 2021; |
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B.

whereas in the current tense European and global geopolitical contexts, key arms control treaties that came into force at the end of the Cold War have recently been weakened or dismantled; whereas tensions and a lack of trust among the parties to the NPT have been increasing in recent years, exacerbated by a growing deterioration of bilateral US-Russian relations and the subsequent steps that Russia has taken to reassess the nuclear aspects of its military doctrine; whereas a new international climate based on increasing power struggles has emerged; whereas in this new environment, in which the necessary stability and predictability for European and global security architecture is not guaranteed, the EU has launched a reflection process on possible ways to strengthen its strategic autonomy; whereas, in a world of global interdependence, renewed global arms control and disarmament efforts are essential to the EU’s security; whereas the US and the Russian Federation committed to an integrated strategic stability dialogue on 16 June 2021;

| C. | whereas the EU aims to be a global actor for peace and supports the rules-based international order; whereas arms control and nuclear non-proliferation are at the very root of the EU project and have been from the start, notably through the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM); whereas the EU, through its strategy against proliferation of WMDs, contributes to WMD disarmament and preventing the use and proliferation of WMDs; whereas the strategy should also be focused on new threats such as autonomous weapon systems and other emerging and disruptive technologies; |
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C.

whereas the EU aims to be a global actor for peace and supports the rules-based international order; whereas arms control and nuclear non-proliferation are at the very root of the EU project and have been from the start, notably through the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM); whereas the EU, through its strategy against proliferation of WMDs, contributes to WMD disarmament and preventing the use and proliferation of WMDs; whereas the strategy should also be focused on new threats such as autonomous weapon systems and other emerging and disruptive technologies;

| D. | whereas in the more than 50 years of its existence, the NPT, with its three mutually reinforcing pillars, has proven to be and remains a cornerstone of global nuclear arms control architecture and an effective tool to uphold international peace and security by ensuring that the vast majority of signatory states comply with their non-proliferation obligations through the implementation of stringent safeguards and norms against the acquisition of nuclear weapons; whereas we expect Article 6 of the NPT to be fulfilled; whereas the 10th NPT Review Conference has been postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic; |
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D.

whereas in the more than 50 years of its existence, the NPT, with its three mutually reinforcing pillars, has proven to be and remains a cornerstone of global nuclear arms control architecture and an effective tool to uphold international peace and security by ensuring that the vast majority of signatory states comply with their non-proliferation obligations through the implementation of stringent safeguards and norms against the acquisition of nuclear weapons; whereas we expect Article 6 of the NPT to be fulfilled; whereas the 10th NPT Review Conference has been postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic;

| E. | whereas there is no international mechanism regulating the export of highly enriched uranium fuel for nuclear submarines; |
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E.

whereas there is no international mechanism regulating the export of highly enriched uranium fuel for nuclear submarines;

| F. | whereas the IAEA has been playing an instrumental role in the implementation of the NPT; whereas the additional protocol substantially expands the IAEA’s ability to check for clandestine nuclear facilities; |
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F.

whereas the IAEA has been playing an instrumental role in the implementation of the NPT; whereas the additional protocol substantially expands the IAEA’s ability to check for clandestine nuclear facilities;

| G. | whereas tensions and distrust among NPT parties have been increasing in recent years; |
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G.

whereas tensions and distrust among NPT parties have been increasing in recent years;

| H. | whereas the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021 as a result of a movement spanning different countries and regions aiming to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons; whereas three EU Member States are states parties to the TPNW; whereas six EU Member States participated in the TPNW negotiations in the UN General Assembly and five voted in favour of the adoption of the new treaty; whereas no NATO members and no states possessing nuclear weapons are states parties to the TPNW; whereas there is no Council position on the TPNW; whereas the involvement and active participation of all states parties to the NPT and all nuclear states is desirable to achieve meaningful results in global disarmament efforts; |
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H.

whereas the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021 as a result of a movement spanning different countries and regions aiming to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons; whereas three EU Member States are states parties to the TPNW; whereas six EU Member States participated in the TPNW negotiations in the UN General Assembly and five voted in favour of the adoption of the new treaty; whereas no NATO members and no states possessing nuclear weapons are states parties to the TPNW; whereas there is no Council position on the TPNW; whereas the involvement and active participation of all states parties to the NPT and all nuclear states is desirable to achieve meaningful results in global disarmament efforts;

| I. | whereas the JCPOA is an achievement of multilateral diplomacy led by the EU; whereas the parties to the 2015 JCPOA — the EU, China, Russia, Iran and the US — have begun indirect negotiations for Iran and the US to restart the implementation of the JCPOA; whereas in 2018, the US reimposed sanctions and Iran removed limits on its production of enriched uranium; whereas Iran has ceased to apply the additional protocol and implement amended Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, while intensifying its programmes to enrich uranium to weapon-grade level; whereas this constitutes a threat to regional and international peace and security, and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts; whereas the Government and new president of Iran still have to demonstrate their intention to comply with the JCPOA and seek constructive and peaceful engagement with the EU; |
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I.

whereas the JCPOA is an achievement of multilateral diplomacy led by the EU; whereas the parties to the 2015 JCPOA — the EU, China, Russia, Iran and the US — have begun indirect negotiations for Iran and the US to restart the implementation of the JCPOA; whereas in 2018, the US reimposed sanctions and Iran removed limits on its production of enriched uranium; whereas Iran has ceased to apply the additional protocol and implement amended Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, while intensifying its programmes to enrich uranium to weapon-grade level; whereas this constitutes a threat to regional and international peace and security, and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts; whereas the Government and new president of Iran still have to demonstrate their intention to comply with the JCPOA and seek constructive and peaceful engagement with the EU;

| J. | whereas the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet been universally ratified; whereas ratification by eight states, including the US and China, is still needed for the CTBT to enter into force; whereas the EU has consistently promoted the contribution of the CTBT to peace, security, disarmament and non-proliferation; |
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J.

whereas the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet been universally ratified; whereas ratification by eight states, including the US and China, is still needed for the CTBT to enter into force; whereas the EU has consistently promoted the contribution of the CTBT to peace, security, disarmament and non-proliferation;

| K. | whereas the Conference on Disarmament, after 25 years of stalled progress, has still not formally launched negotiations on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; |
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K.

whereas the Conference on Disarmament, after 25 years of stalled progress, has still not formally launched negotiations on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

| L. | whereas following the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as a result of the US withdrawal from it in August 2019, after Russia had persistently failed to comply with its obligations under the INF Treaty by deploying a nuclear-capable SSC-8 missile system, the US and Russia are now no longer prohibited from building and deploying this category of weapons and from engaging in a new arms race, especially in Europe and Asia; whereas Russia’s aggressive behaviour in its neighbourhood has increased the threat of military confrontation; whereas Russia recently moved several nuclear-capable, ballistic missile systems believed to be capable of exceeding the range of 500 km close to its border with the EU; |
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L.

whereas following the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as a result of the US withdrawal from it in August 2019, after Russia had persistently failed to comply with its obligations under the INF Treaty by deploying a nuclear-capable SSC-8 missile system, the US and Russia are now no longer prohibited from building and deploying this category of weapons and from engaging in a new arms race, especially in Europe and Asia; whereas Russia’s aggressive behaviour in its neighbourhood has increased the threat of military confrontation; whereas Russia recently moved several nuclear-capable, ballistic missile systems believed to be capable of exceeding the range of 500 km close to its border with the EU;

| M. | whereas the US and the Russian Federation have agreed to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty by five years; |
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M.

whereas the US and the Russian Federation have agreed to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty by five years;

| N. | whereas the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), which are voluntary unilateral measures, have led to substantial reductions of both the US- and Russian-deployed arsenals; |
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N.

whereas the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), which are voluntary unilateral measures, have led to substantial reductions of both the US- and Russian-deployed arsenals;

| O. | whereas ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5 500 km are considered to be particularly dangerous due to their short flying time, lethality and manoeuvrability, the difficulty of intercepting them, and their ability to carry nuclear warheads; whereas in recent years, a new generation of cruise and tactical missiles has emerged; |
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O.

whereas ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5 500 km are considered to be particularly dangerous due to their short flying time, lethality and manoeuvrability, the difficulty of intercepting them, and their ability to carry nuclear warheads; whereas in recent years, a new generation of cruise and tactical missiles has emerged;

| P. | whereas in recent years, China has substantially stepped up the development of its conventional, missile and nuclear capabilities; whereas China has shown a lack of transparency and reluctance to engage in talks on its potential participation in multilateral nuclear arms control instruments, which has allowed it to stockpile unhindered a large arsenal of technologically advanced intermediate-range ballistic missiles, such as Dong-Feng 26s; whereas the EU should coordinate with like-minded partners to engage in intensive diplomacy with China, in order to develop functional arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, and protect EU security interests; |
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P.

whereas in recent years, China has substantially stepped up the development of its conventional, missile and nuclear capabilities; whereas China has shown a lack of transparency and reluctance to engage in talks on its potential participation in multilateral nuclear arms control instruments, which has allowed it to stockpile unhindered a large arsenal of technologically advanced intermediate-range ballistic missiles, such as Dong-Feng 26s; whereas the EU should coordinate with like-minded partners to engage in intensive diplomacy with China, in order to develop functional arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, and protect EU security interests;

| Q. | whereas France and the UK, as the only European countries with nuclear weapons, both share the view that minimum, credible nuclear deterrence is essential to Europe and NATO’s collective security; whereas since the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, France is now the only nuclear EU Member State and continues to modernise its nuclear arsenal; whereas in 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed launching a ‘strategic dialogue’ with willing European partners on the potential role that France’s nuclear deterrence plays in ‘our collective security’; whereas the UK has announced that it will raise the ceiling for its overall nuclear stockpile size by more than 40 %, to 260 operationally available warheads and that it will make its nuclear position more opaque by no longer declaring stockpile numbers; |
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Q.

whereas France and the UK, as the only European countries with nuclear weapons, both share the view that minimum, credible nuclear deterrence is essential to Europe and NATO’s collective security; whereas since the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, France is now the only nuclear EU Member State and continues to modernise its nuclear arsenal; whereas in 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed launching a ‘strategic dialogue’ with willing European partners on the potential role that France’s nuclear deterrence plays in ‘our collective security’; whereas the UK has announced that it will raise the ceiling for its overall nuclear stockpile size by more than 40 %, to 260 operationally available warheads and that it will make its nuclear position more opaque by no longer declaring stockpile numbers;

| R. | whereas Israel is not party to the NPT; |
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R.

whereas Israel is not party to the NPT;

| S. | whereas a number of other states have acquired the scientific, technological and industrial capabilities required to produce ballistic and cruise missiles; whereas India and Pakistan have declared themselves to be in possession of nuclear weapons; whereas both countries are not party to the NPT; |
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S.

whereas a number of other states have acquired the scientific, technological and industrial capabilities required to produce ballistic and cruise missiles; whereas India and Pakistan have declared themselves to be in possession of nuclear weapons; whereas both countries are not party to the NPT;

| T. | whereas the risk of a nuclear arsenal being captured by terrorist organisations is an issue of concern; whereas clandestine proliferation among rogue regimes remains a risk, as demonstrated by the Abdul Qadeer Khan network; |
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T.

whereas the risk of a nuclear arsenal being captured by terrorist organisations is an issue of concern; whereas clandestine proliferation among rogue regimes remains a risk, as demonstrated by the Abdul Qadeer Khan network;

| U. | whereas The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) has a missile non-proliferation dimension despite its legally non-binding nature; |
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U.

whereas The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) has a missile non-proliferation dimension despite its legally non-binding nature;

| V. | whereas the Open Skies Treaty, which has been in force since 2002, was intended to build trust, confidence and mutual understanding between Russia and the US and its European allies; whereas Russia has failed for many years to comply with its obligations under the Open Skies Treaty; whereas the US and Russia successively withdrew from the treaty; |
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V.

whereas the Open Skies Treaty, which has been in force since 2002, was intended to build trust, confidence and mutual understanding between Russia and the US and its European allies; whereas Russia has failed for many years to comply with its obligations under the Open Skies Treaty; whereas the US and Russia successively withdrew from the treaty;

| W. | whereas the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the world’s first multilateral disarmament agreement to provide for the verifiable elimination of an entire WMD category; whereas in the past decade, the legal norm against the use of chemical weapons has been violated several times, including by the Syrian Government and Russia; whereas the CWC needs to adapt to new industrial production processes, an innovative chemical industry and the emergency of new actors; |
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W.

whereas the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the world’s first multilateral disarmament agreement to provide for the verifiable elimination of an entire WMD category; whereas in the past decade, the legal norm against the use of chemical weapons has been violated several times, including by the Syrian Government and Russia; whereas the CWC needs to adapt to new industrial production processes, an innovative chemical industry and the emergency of new actors;

| X. | whereas the EU has been fully engaged in international efforts to improve biosecurity and biodiversity through the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); whereas 13 countries are not yet party to the BWC; whereas the BWC was agreed on without verification mechanisms to ensure compliance; whereas negotiations on a verification protocol were halted 20 years ago; |
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X.

whereas the EU has been fully engaged in international efforts to improve biosecurity and biodiversity through the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); whereas 13 countries are not yet party to the BWC; whereas the BWC was agreed on without verification mechanisms to ensure compliance; whereas negotiations on a verification protocol were halted 20 years ago;

| Y. | whereas the ballistic missile, nuclear and WMD activities and programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as the proliferation and export of these weapons, represent a serious threat to international peace and security, and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts; whereas the leadership of the DPRK frequently tries to use its nuclear weapons programme to extort political and economic concessions from the international community while it continues to peddle its small- and medium-range missile technology along with its nuclear know-how; |
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Y.

whereas the ballistic missile, nuclear and WMD activities and programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as the proliferation and export of these weapons, represent a serious threat to international peace and security, and to global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts; whereas the leadership of the DPRK frequently tries to use its nuclear weapons programme to extort political and economic concessions from the international community while it continues to peddle its small- and medium-range missile technology along with its nuclear know-how;

| Z. | whereas the emergence of humanitarian disarmament has positively challenged the traditional disarmament practices inherited from the Cold War; |
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Z.

whereas the emergence of humanitarian disarmament has positively challenged the traditional disarmament practices inherited from the Cold War;

| AA. | whereas the number of women involved in efforts aimed at eliminating WMDs remains alarmingly low, including in the areas of non-proliferation and disarmament diplomacy; |
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AA.

whereas the number of women involved in efforts aimed at eliminating WMDs remains alarmingly low, including in the areas of non-proliferation and disarmament diplomacy;

| AB. | whereas climate-related risks may negatively affect the EU’s strategic security environment; whereas WMD disarmament and non-proliferation efforts strongly contribute to sustainable development, global security, predictability, long-term stability and the protection of livelihoods, the environment and the planet; |
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AB.

whereas climate-related risks may negatively affect the EU’s strategic security environment; whereas WMD disarmament and non-proliferation efforts strongly contribute to sustainable development, global security, predictability, long-term stability and the protection of livelihoods, the environment and the planet;

| AC. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the need to increase EU chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRN) preparedness and awareness, increase cooperation between and investments in CBRN civil and military sectors, develop preventive response and recovery measures under the existing EU Civil Protection Mechanism, build an EU CBRN pool of expertise and foster the link between health and security; |
| --- | --- |

AC.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the need to increase EU chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRN) preparedness and awareness, increase cooperation between and investments in CBRN civil and military sectors, develop preventive response and recovery measures under the existing EU Civil Protection Mechanism, build an EU CBRN pool of expertise and foster the link between health and security;

| 1. | Reiterates its full commitment to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes as a cornerstone of global and European security; recalls its commitment to pursuing policies designed to move the reduction and elimination of all nuclear arsenals forward and to create conditions to achieve a world free of nuclear and CBRN weapons; calls for a renewed arms control and disarmament multilateral order that involves all players; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Is alarmed by the ongoing erosion of the global non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control architecture, which is worsened by the rapid development of new potentially destabilising systems, such as weapon systems enabled with artificial intelligence (AI) and hypersonic missile and drone technologies; highlights the need to address, in particular, the issue of hypersonic missile technology, which heightens the risk of nuclear weapons being used in response to an attack; fears that withdrawal from, or the non-extension of, major arms control treaties would seriously damage the international arms control regimes that have provided a certain stability, and would undermine relationships between nuclear-weapon states; underlines the urgent need to restore cross-border trust; is alarmed by and strongly opposed to any resort to WMDs as a means of resolving geopolitical disputes; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Is concerned about the reassessment decision taken by several states regarding the nuclear aspect of their military doctrines; calls on all nuclear states to live up to their responsibilities and consider decreasing the role and the salience of nuclear weapons in their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; welcomes the intention of the US to assess, as part of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review, possible ways to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Reaffirms its full support for the NPT and its three mutually reinforcing pillars, as one of the most universally accepted legally binding instruments and as a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; recalls that the NPT has contributed to the upholding of a broad set of norms related to disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while enforcing the nuclear non-proliferation norm; expects nuclear-weapon states to take steps in good faith to fulfil their treaty obligations to demonstrate their genuine commitment to nuclear disarmament by taking the concrete actions laid out in the final 2010 NPT and by strengthening the non-proliferation norm and expanding the IAEA’s safeguards capacity; warns that the future of the NPT should not be taken for granted and exhorts states parties to do their utmost to contribute to a successful and ambitious outcome of the upcoming 10th Review Conference in all its pillars — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy — by agreeing on a substantive final declaration that further strengthens the NPT and helps to preserve strategic stability and inhibit a new arms race; calls on all states to sign, accede to and remain committed to the NPT: calls on the 10th NPT to discuss the NPT loophole on exports of nuclear propulsion reactors for military purposes; calls on the EU Member States to send their highest-ranking politicians to the Review Conference; invites all NPT states parties to therefore constructively engage in the NPT framework and agree on realistic, effective, tangible, reciprocal and verifiable measures conducive to achieving the shared goal of nuclear disarmament; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Insists on the need to ensure that the EU plays a strong and constructive role in developing and reinforcing the global rules-based non-proliferation efforts and arms control and disarmament architecture with the long-term goal of eliminating all CBRN weapons by fully using all available instruments; welcomes the work of the EU Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation on this issue; calls on the Council to advocate that the EU speak with one voice in international disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control forums and to promote confidence-building measures among all parties to the NPT with the aim of easing tensions and reducing distrust; underlines the need to use the work undertaken through the ‘Strategic Compass’ process to fully incorporate WMD-proliferation questions into the joint understanding of threats and to achieve a common strategic culture on this issue; invites the European External Action Service (EEAS) to launch a reflection process on the implications of Brexit for its disarmament and non-proliferation policy; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Welcomes the EU’s significant continued financial contribution to, inter alia, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the IAEA, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM); |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Underlines the crucial importance of training and awareness raising; calls, therefore, for the available expertise in non-proliferation and arms control, including in the area of quantum computing in the EU, to be strengthened and the training of EU and Member State personnel to be improved; underlines the need to strengthen ties between the private and public sectors, academia, think tanks and civil society organisations; welcomes, in this respect, the continued financial support to the European Nuclear Education Network, the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium and the European Nuclear Security Training Centre; underlines the potential for cooperation in training and education projects with the European Security and Defence College; calls for further investment in disarmament education and facilitating youth engagement; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Underlines the widened mandate for transparency reporting, coordination and enforcement and the enlarged scope of obligations in the Dual-Use Regulation; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Calls on EU delegations to put the questions of global and regional disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control high on the agenda for political dialogue with non-EU countries, to ensure that the EU assists in efforts to universalise existing disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation treaties and instruments; asks the EEAS to work extensively on strengthening the training and capacity-building of our closest partners, particularly the neighbourhood and enlargement countries, in the areas of WMD disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control; welcomes the EU contribution to mitigating CBRN risks worldwide by providing assistance to partner countries and praises the EU CBRN risk mitigation centres of excellence initiative, funded under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls on the EU to strengthen its leadership on victim assistance and environmental remediation in response to the consequences of nuclear testing in affected areas; asks the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to propose actions that the EU and its Member States can carry out in order to strengthen the EU’s role in that respect; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Welcomes NATO’s support and facilitation of dialogue among allies and partners to enable them to implement their non-proliferation obligations; underlines that NATO allies must remain committed to creating the conditions for the further reduction and long-term elimination of the nuclear arsenal and to a world without nuclear weapons on the basis of reciprocity and legally binding and verifiable treaties; underlines that all states must engage in constructive and trustworthy dialogue on this matter in the relevant international and bilateral forums; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Stresses its full support for the work of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, for the UN Secretary-General’s ambitious Agenda for Disarmament and for the multilateral deliberative processes and negotiations carried out under the auspices of the UN; underlines the need to ensure the involvement of all stakeholders, civil society and academia and the meaningful and diverse participation of citizens in disarmament and non-proliferation debates; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Supports the confidence-building measures adopted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe as important contributions to limiting misunderstandings or miscalculations and ensuring greater openness and transparency; encourages all nuclear-weapon states to take the requisite measures to increase transparency on their nuclear arsenals; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Welcomes the EU’s commitment to helping to establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, in accordance with the resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the EU’s promotion of confidence-building measures in support of this process in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Is concerned about the DPRK’s continued nuclear and ballistic activities in violation of numerous UN Security Council resolutions, and its development of new capabilities; reiterates its desire to work towards achieving a complete, irreversible and verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and believes the EU should continue its efforts towards the elimination of all WMDs in the Korean peninsula; urges the DPRK to immediately abandon its nuclear and missile activities and other WMD and delivery-system programmes, fully comply with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, swiftly sign and ratify the CTBT and return to the NPT; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls on the states outside of the NPT framework in possession of nuclear weapons to refrain from the proliferation of any military-related nuclear technology and to become party to the NPT; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Notes the entry into force of the TPNW and recognises its vision for a nuclear-weapon-free world; recalls that the role of the NPT as an indispensable forum for pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament and ensuring international stability and collective security, must not be weakened; underlines the importance of the NPT, to which 191 states are party, and highlights the need to ensure it is effective invites all NPT states parties to therefore constructively engage in the NPT framework, and agree on realistic, effective, tangible, reciprocal and verifiable measures conducive to the achievement of the ultimate shared long-term goal of nuclear disarmament; is of the opinion that the TPNW should not weaken the security of the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Recalls the central role played by the IAEA as a guarantor of compliance by participating states with the provisions of the NPT; highlights that the IAEA’s verification activities are instrumental in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; calls on the states that have not yet done so to ratify and implement the IAEA additional protocol without delay; calls on states that have ceased to apply the additional protocol to return to compliance; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Highlights the IAEA’s crucial role in monitoring and verifying Iran’s compliance with the Safeguards Agreement, and praises in particular the key role it has been playing since 23 February 2021, by implementing a temporary bilateral technical understanding reached with Iran, which allows the IAEA to continue its necessary verification and monitoring activities; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Reaffirms its full support for the JCPOA as a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture; stresses that full implementation of the agreement is crucial for European security and for stability and security in the Middle East and worldwide; welcomes the EU’s continued engagement with Iran on issues related to civil nuclear cooperation, and the measures taken to implement projects to improve nuclear safety under Annex III of the JCPOA; exhorts Iran to immediately cease its nuclear activities that violate the JCPOA, which should go hand-in-hand with the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions; calls on all parties to return to the negotiations with a view to re-establishing full and effective compliance with the agreement; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Confirms that the entry into force and ratification of the CTBT as a strong trust- and confidence-building instrument continues to be an important objective of the EU’s strategy against the proliferation of WMDs; notes that the CTBT has been ratified by 170 states and points out that eight countries still have to do so for the CTBT to enter into force; welcomes the EU’s diplomatic efforts to reach out to non-signatory countries to solicit their commitment to the ratification of the CTBT and universal adherence to it; welcomes the EU’s support, including via financial contribution, for the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization aimed at strengthening its verification and monitoring capabilities; calls on all states that have not signed the CTBT to accede to it and urges all states that have signed but not ratified the CTBT to do so; calls on all states to refrain from nuclear tests; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Reiterates its long-standing support for the launch of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and calls on all nuclear-weapon states that have not yet done so to adopt an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Reiterates its deep regret at the withdrawal from the INF Treaty by the US and the Russian Federation following Russia’s persistent failure to comply with it, and at the lack of communication between the parties; is particularly concerned about the possible re-emergence of ground-based intermediate-range missiles in the European theatre of operations in the post-INF context and about a new arms race and remilitarisation in Europe; welcomes the commitment made by the US and Russia to continue working towards the achievement of their stated common goals of ensuring predictability in the strategic domain and reducing the risks of armed conflict and the threat of nuclear war; urges both sides to use this momentum to set an ambitious basis for re-launching negotiations about new arms control architecture and risk reduction measures that would take into account the changing geopolitical context and emergence of new powers; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Calls on all other countries, particularly China, in possession of or in the process of developing intercontinental and intermediate-range missile systems, to engage in efforts to multilateralise and universalise the successor treaty to the INF, taking into account the latest developments in weapons systems, and to actively participate in talks about any other arms control agreements; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Notes with concerns the current modernisation and broadening of China’s nuclear arsenal, including hypersonic nuclear-capable missiles; calls on China to engage actively and in good faith in international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Notes with concern Russia’s frequent violation of international norms and treaties along with its increasingly hostile nuclear rhetoric against Member States; urges Russia to abandon its hostile activities and return to compliance with international norms; is particularly concerned about Russia’s testing of nuclear weapons and building up of its fleet of nuclear- and conventionally-powered icebreakers in the Arctic; highlights that such activities go against the aim of maintaining stability and peace and can also be highly dangerous for the fragile environment in the Arctic; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Warmly welcomes the decision taken by the US and the Russian Federation to extend the New START Treaty as an important contribution to the upcoming 10th NPT Review Conference, and to the implementation of Article VI of the New START Treaty; highlights that its extension should provide the foundation for negotiations on a new arms control agreement that would encompass both deployed and non-deployed, as well as strategic and non-strategic, weapons; invites both signatories to thoroughly assess all options in relation to the scope, deployment and category of weapons to be covered, and calls for dialogue with other nuclear-weapon countries and their involvement in negotiations on any new arms control agreement, especially China, in the light of its continued increase and modernisation of its nuclear arsenal, and the UK and France; calls on all nuclear-weapon states to reaffirm the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Highlights the importance of the PNIs, which aim to reduce deployed short-range ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons; notes with concern Russia’s ongoing programmes to modernise its non-strategic nuclear weapons, which raise questions about its compliance with the objectives of the PNIs; recalls that the PNIs, despite their non-binding nature, have played an instrumental role in arms control architecture and calls on both the US and the Russian Federation to stick to their commitments in relation to non-strategic nuclear weapons and to increase transparency on arsenals, deployments and the status of their respective weapons, modernisation and new weapons developments; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Highlights that the international community must work on measures to counter the risk of missile proliferation; calls on states possessing significant numbers of cruise missiles to focus, as a first step, on confidence and transparency measures, including the negotiation and adoption of codes of conduct for the deployment and use of cruise missiles; calls on the VP/HR to engage in dialogue with exporting states to ensure they fully adhere to and coordinate efforts through the Missile Technology Control Regime, the only existing multilateral arrangement that covers the transfer of missiles and missile-related equipment; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Welcomes the efforts made by the VP/HR to promote the universalisation of the HCoC, the only multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument focusing on the proliferation of ballistic missiles, in order to further contribute to efforts to contain the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMDs; calls on the VP/HR to lead efforts for greater alignment between the HCoC and other arms control instruments; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Stresses the crucial role played by the Open Skies Treaty in transatlantic relations and its valuable contribution to global arms control architecture, trust-building, transparency about military activities carried out by signatory states, and long-term European and global stability; highlights that the Open Skies Treaty provided smaller European states with the capacity to monitor their neighbours and hold them accountable for their military activities; regrets the Russian State Duma’s recent adoption of a bill of withdrawal and the US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty; calls on the remaining signatories to continue implementing the treaty; urges the US and the Russian Federation to resume talks with a view to returning to the treaty and to its full, effective and verifiable implementation; urges the remaining states to further strengthen the treaty as a confidence-building measure by extending its scope to include scientist-to-scientist exchanges, emergency response cooperation, environmental monitoring and other missions; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Is alarmed at the threat posed by chemical warfare following the most significant and sustained use of chemical weapons in decades; is particularly worried by the increased capability of some state and non-state actors to produce forbidden chemical agents more rapidly, and with limited detection indicators; insists on the need to uphold the global ethical norm against chemical weapons by preventing impunity for their use; calls for the newly adopted EU global human rights sanction regime to be used effectively in order to uphold this norm; welcomes the Council’s adoption of a horizontal sanctions regime to address the growing violations in the production, storage, use and proliferation of chemical weapons; reiterates its grave concern at the attempted assassinations of Alexei Navalny and Sergei and Yulia Skripal, with the banned nerve agent Novichok, considered a chemical weapon under the CWC; welcomes the sanctions imposed on Russian officials on 14 October 2020 in response to this blatant violation of international norms and Russia’s international commitments; urges Russia to provide critical answers about the poisoning of Kremlin critic, Alexei Navalny, as requested by a group of group of 45 Western countries under the rules of the OPCW; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Praises the instrumental role that the OPCW has played in the verified destruction of chemical agents; condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the development and large-scale use of chemical weapons by states that are members of the CWC, and condemns the numerous human rights violations and atrocities committed by the regime of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian Arab Republic; underlines that accountability for such serious violations of the CWC must be ensured; welcomes the decision taken at the 25th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC to suspend certain rights and privileges of Syria under the OPCW; welcomes the EU’s continued support to the UNSGM, while underling the importance of safeguarding its accountability; condemns attempts to undermine the independent nature of the UNSGM by subordinating it to the UN Security Council; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Reiterates its full support for the BWC, which outlaws the use of dangerous viruses, bacteria and toxic substances against humans; welcomes the financial contribution provided by the EU directly to the BWC and in support of strengthening biosecurity outside the EU; calls on the VP/HR to continue his efforts to promote the universalisation of the BWC; points to the need to step up efforts to put in place a legally binding mechanism to verify compliance with the BWC; calls on all parties, including the US, to return to negotiations through the BWC ad hoc group; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Underlines the important work carried out by the EU Satellite Centre in using space assets, satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence to monitor compliance with WMD disarmament and non-proliferation commitments; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Points to the rapid advances in the development of AI-enabled systems in the military domain; reiterates, therefore, its call for the EU to take the lead on international regulatory efforts to ensure that the development and application of AI for military uses adhere to the strict limits set in international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law; call for the EU to also pave the way for global negotiations to update all existing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, so as to take AI-enabled systems used in warfare into account; underlines that emerging technologies not covered in international law should be judged by the principle of humanity and the dictates of public conscience; calls on the VP/HR, the Member States and the European Council to adopt a joint position on autonomous weapons systems that ensures meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapons systems; insists that the EU support the efforts of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, whereby the High Contracting Parties contribute to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies relating to lethal autonomous weapons systems, to reach a consensus on a legally binding instrument that would prohibit fully autonomous weapons without meaningful human control; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Calls on the EU to increase its investments in AI capabilities matched to Member States’ operating concepts; underlines that the growing significance of AI also requires enhanced cooperation with like-minded partners; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Stresses the need to ensure and mainstream the equal, full and meaningful participation of women in disarmament and non-proliferation conferences and forums, including disarmament diplomacy and all decision-making processes related to disarmament; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Points to the need to take additional measures to fight the financing of the proliferation of WMDs in order to disrupt technological and knowledge transfer to hostile non-state actors, and points to the potential threat that CBRN terrorism represents for our collective security; points to the need for the EU to foster responsible science, in order to prevent the misuse of scientific research and experimentation; underlines the need to combat CBRN material smuggling and illicit trafficking and to prevent diversion risks; invites the EEAS and the Commission to tackle this issue in their expected joint communication on a strategic approach to support the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Stresses the need to increase efforts to further strengthen the EU’s preparedness and actions against CBRN threats through the development of decontamination, stockpiling and monitoring capabilities under the existing EU Civil Protection Mechanism; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European External Action Service, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council and the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

41.

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(1)  OJ C 449, 23.12.2020, p. 149.

(2)  OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 63.

(3)  OJ C 404, 6.10.2021, p. 240.

(4)  OJ C 456, 10.11.2021, p. 78.

(5)  OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 86.

(6)  OJ C 440, 30.12.2015, p. 97.

(7)  OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 202.

(8)  OJ L 206, 11.6.2021, p. 1.

(9)  OJ C 341, 13.10.2020, p. 1.

(10)  OJ C 298, 26.7.2021, p. 1.

(11)  OJ L 90, 10.4.2010, p. 8.

(12)  OJ L 372 I, 9.11.2020, p. 4.

(13)  OJ L 207, 30.6.2020, p. 15.

(14)  OJ L 149, 7.6.2019, p. 63.

(15)  OJ L 259, 16.10.2018, p. 12.

(16)  OJ L 341, 15.10.2020, p. 1.

(17)  OJ L 207, 30.6.2020, p. 36.

(18)  OJ L 19, 22.1.2019, p. 11.

(19)  France, Germany and the UK.

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