UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

DECISION OF THE 

VICE COMMANDANT 

v. 

ON APPEAL 

NO. 

MERCHANT MARINER LICENSE 

Issued to: WILLIAM TEE COFFY 

APPEARANCES 

For the Government: 

LT Gregory J. Knoll, USCG 

LT Jessica L. Bohn, USCG 

LT Eric L. Sumpter, USCG 

Coast Guard Sector Hampton Roads 

Respondent: 

Mr. William Tee Coffy, pro se 

Administrative Law Judge: Michael J. Devine 

This appeal is taken in accordance with 46 U.S.C. Chapter 77, 46 C.F.R. Part 5 and 

33 C.F.R. Part 20. 

By a Decision and Order (hereinafter "D&O") dated January 7, 2013, an Administrative 

Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") of the United States Coast Guard revoked the Merchant Mariner 

Credential of Mr. William Tee Coffy (hereinafter "Respondent") upon finding proved one 

specification of use of or addiction to the use of dangerous drugs. 

The specification found proved alleges that Respondent submitted to a random drug test on 

May 3, 2012, and that the specimen that he provided subsequently tested positive for the presence 

of cocaine metabolites. 
COFFY NO. 270 9 

FACTS 

At all relevant times, Respondent was the holder of a Merchant Mariner Credential issued 

to him by the United States Coast Guard. [D&O at 8] 

On May 3, 2012, Respondent was employed by MAERSK Line, Ltd., aboard the 

MN MAERSK VIRGINIA. [D&O at 8; Coast Guard Exhibits (hereinafter "CG Ex.") 2, 4] On 

that date, pursuant to employer direction, Respondent participated in a random drug test at 

Substance Abuse Testing of Savannah. [D&O at 8; Transcript of the proceedings (hereinafter Tr.) 

at 30, 59-68; CG Ex. 2] The collector who obtained Respondent's urine sample followed 

Department of Transportation (hereinafter "DOT") procedures. [D&O at 8] 

Following collection, Respondent's urine sample was sent to Quest Diagnostics, a 

laboratory certified by the Department of Health and Human Services to perform drug testing 

under federal regulations. [D&O at 9; Tr. at 92; CG Ex. 8] Upon arrival at Quest Diagnostics, the 

chain of custody for Respondent's urine specimen was intact and without flaws. [D&O at 9; Tr. at 

108; CG Ex. 7] Respondent's urine subsequently tested positive for cocaine metabolites. [D&O at 

9; Tr. at 107] 

A Medical Review Officer (hereinafter "MRO") interviewed Respondent on May 8, 2012. 

[D&O at 9] Although Respondent denied using cocaine during the interview, the MRO 

determined that there was no valid excuse or medical explanation for the positive test result and 

verified Respondent's result as positive. [D&O at 9; Tr. at 129-45, 168-70; CG Ex. 11] 

During his interview with the MRO, Respondent requested that his split sample be tested 

by a second laboratory. [D&O at 9, Tr. at 140] As a result, testing of Respondent's split specimen 

was conducted by Clinical Reference Laboratory, a DOT-approved laboratory in Lenexa, Kansas. 

[D&O at 9; Tr. at 140, 151-52] Testing at Clinical Reference Laboratory confirmed the presence 

of cocaine metabolite in Respondent's urine sample. [D&O at 9; CG Ex. 11] 

2 
COFFY NO. 270 9 

On May 18, 2012, after the results of the testing of Respondent's split specimen were 

returned, the MRO again verified Respondent's results as positive. [D&O at 9; Tr. at 131; CG Ex. 

11] 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On May 21, 2012, the Coast Guard filed a Complaint against Respondent's Merchant 

Mariner Credential. On July 10, 2012, the Coast Guard filed a Motion for Default in the matter 

because Respondent failed to file his Answer within the procedurally mandated timeframe. 

However, before the ALJ ruled on the Coast Guard's Motion for Default, on July 16, 2012, 

Respondent filed an Answer. Although the ALJ could have considered the Coast Guard's Motion 

for Default, he deemed it moot and protected the due process rights of the pro se Respondent by 

proceeding to address Respondent's case on the merits. [D&O at 3-4] 

In his Answer, Respondent admitted all of the Complaint's jurisdictional and f~ctual 

allegations, but requested to be heard on the proposed order and to commence settlement 

discussions. 

On August 13, 2012, the Coast Guard submitted a Motion for Summary Decision 

contending that there were no genuine issues of material fact based on Respondent's Answer. 

However, in view of perceived ambiguity in Respondent's Answer, including the fact that he had 

indicated a desire to have a bearing, and mindful of Respondent's status as a prose party, the ALJ 

denied the Coast Guard's Motion for Summary Decision and reconfirmed the hearing that had 

previously been scheduled. [Order dated September 5, 2012] 

The hearing took place on October 23, 2012, at Norfolk, Virginia. The Coast Guard 

offered the testimony of six witnesses and entered fourteen exhibits into the record. Respondent 

testified on his own behalf and entered two exhibits into the record. 

Following the hearing, the record was left open for one week to allow Respondent to 

submit additional documents, subject to objection by the Coast Guard. Respondent subsequently 

3 
COFFY NO. 27 0 9 

offered eleven exhibits into the record and filed a "Motion to Exclude," apparently attempting to 

change his Answer to the Complaint. The Coast Guard objected to both Respondent's "Motion to 

Exclude" and the admission ofhis post-hearing documents. While the ALJ admitted Respondent's 

post-hearing documents into the record, he denied his "Motion to Exclude" as untimely and 

meritless, and noted that Respondent was provided the opportunity to fully contest the matter at the 

hearing. [D&O at 5] 

The ALJ issued his D&O on January 7, 2013. Respondent filed his Notice of Appeal on 

January 10, 2013 and his Appeal Brief on February 13, 2013, thus perfecting his appeal. The 

Coast Guard filed a Reply on March 20, 2013. This appeal is properly before me. 

BASES OF APPEAL 

Respondent appeals from the ALJ's D&O, which found proved a charge of use of or 

addiction to the use of dangerous drugs, and ordered the revocation of Respondent's Merchant 

Mariner Credential. From Respondent's filings, I discern the following four issues: 

I. Whether the drug test at issue in the proceedings was among those 

authorized by 46 C.F.R. Part 16; 

II. Whether the AL.J was correct to find that the Coast Guard established a 

prima facie case even though it failed to submit a full litigation package; 

III. Whether the AL.J was correct to find that the Coast Guard established a 

prima facie case absent the testimony of two witnesses who, although 

placed on the Coast Guard's initial witness and exhibit list, were not called 

at the hearing; 

IV. Whether the record contains evidence of ''judicial misconduct" to warrant 

the overturning of the AL.J's D&O. 

4 
COFFY 

OPINION 

I. 

NO. 

27 0 9' 

Whether the drug test at issue in the proceedings was among those authorized by 46 C.F.R. Part 16 

Respondent, for the first time on appeal, complains that he was subjected to drug testing: 

... without any workplace post-accident or any reasonable suspicions called into 

play in the execution of my shipboard duties aboard the MN MAERSK 

VIRGINIA that called for such test to be conducted, excluding [a] majority of the 

other seamen that I made the trip with who were allowed to pay-off and leave at the 

first port of call on our arrival to the shores of the United States. 

Respondent's Appeal Brief at 1. 

Respondent implies that because the drug test was not a ''post-accident" test or a test 

resulting from a "reasonable suspicion" of drug use, the test was not conducted in accordance with 

46 C.F .R. Part 16 and the ALJ erred in finding that the Coast Guard had established a prima facie 

case of drug use. This issue is without merit. 

It is well settled that under 46 C.F.R. Part 16, employers are required to conduct five 

specific types of drug testing: I) Pre-employment testing; 2) Periodic testing; 3) Random testing; 

4) Serious marine incident testing; and 5) Reasonable cause testing. 46 C.F.R. §§ 16.210-16.250; 

Appeal Decision 2704 (FRANKS) (2014) at 5; Appeal Decision 2697 (GREEN) (2011) at 3. 

In this case, the "Factual Allegations" portion of the Coast Guard's Complaint alleged that 

Respondent took a random drug test. Respondent admitted the Complaint's factual allegations, 

including that he had submitted to a random drug test, in his Answer to the Complaint. 

More importantly, even though the "randomness" of Respondent's drug test was not 

contested by his Answer, testimony and evidence were presented at the hearing to show that 

Respondent was selected for testing via a scientifically valid method (in accordance with 46 C.F .R. 

§ 16.230). [Tr. at 20-37; Coast Guard Ex. 2] Thus, there was substantial evidence to support the 

ALJ's third finding of fact: "Respondent submitted to a random drug test conducted in accordance 

5 
COFFY NO. 2709 

with 46 C.F.R. Part 16." [D&O at 8] Respondent's aspersions notwithstanding, there was no 

impropriety in subjecting him to drug testing or in using the results against him in this proceeding. 

II. 

Whether the AL! was correct to find that the Coast Guard established a prima facie case even 

though it failed to submit a full litigation package 

Respondent's second basis of appeal centers on what he calls a lack of "laboratory proof' 

to support a prima facie case of drug use. Respondent asserts that in allowing for the establishment 

of a prima facie case of drug use without the inclusion of a full laboratory "litigation package" in 

the record, the ALJ has allowed "someone's career to be destroyed ... without any proof." 

[Respondent's Appeal Brief at 2] Respondent's assertion stems from a question raised by the ALJ 

at the close of the hearing and answered in the Coast Guard's post-hearing brief. 

At the close of the hearing, the ALJ asked the Coast Guard to explain why it had not 

presented "documentation from the lab," in addition to the testimony of the Lab Director, in its 

attempt to establish aprimafacie case. [Tr. at 191] The Coast Guard addressed this issue in its 

post-hearing submission, stating: "First, the Respondent admitted to all factual allegations in his 

Answer, at a prehearing conference and again at the hearing. Absent issues in dispute, the 

laboratory litigation package was not necessary to prove the prima facie case that the Respondent 

is a user of dangerous drugs." [Appeal Brief at 2] The Coast Guard further asserted that because it 

had presented substantial evidence, including the testimony of the urine collector, Lab Director 

and MRO, as well as the Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control Forms and the MRO's Final 

Report, to support the establishment of a prima facie case of drug use, the submission of a 

laboratory litigation package was unnecessary. The ALJ accepted the Coast Guard's assertions 

and found a prima facie case of drug use, without a litigation package. Respondent now contends 

that such finding was in error. I do not agree. 

To establish a prima facie case of drug use based solely on a urinalysis test result, the Coast 

Guard must prove three elements: (1) that Respondent was tested for a dangerous drug, (2) that 

6 
COFFY NO. 27 0 

Respondent tested positive for a dangerous drug, and (3) that the test was conducted in accordance 

with 46 C.F.R. Part 16. Appeal Decision 2704 (FRANKS) (2014) at 5-10. 

In his D&O, the ALJ specifically addressed each of the three elements of a prima facie 

case. With regard to the first element, that Respondent was tested for a dangerous drug, the ALJ 

noted: that Respondent admitted talcing a drug test in his Answer; that the DTCCF verified that 

Respondent submitted to a drug test; and that the collector of Respondent's urine sample testified 

that Respondent provided a properly obtained urine sample on the relevant date. [D&O at 13] 

With regard to the second element, that Respondent tested positive for a dangerous drug, the ALJ 

noted: that Quest Diagnostics, a certified laboratory, tested Respondent's urine sample and found 

it to be positive for the presence of cocaine metabolites; that the Coast Guard presented testimonial 

evidence (the Lab Director's testimony) and eight exhibits (CG Ex. 6-12; CG Ex. 14) to support a 

conclusion that the laboratory met all DOT requirements in its operation and practices; that a 

confirmatory test, conducted by a second DOT-certified laboratory, Clinical Reference 

Laboratory, confirmed the presence of cocaine metabolite in Respondent's urine sample1

; and that 

a MRO verified Respondent's test results as positive. [D&O at 14] Finally, in addressing the third 

element, that the drug test was conducted in accordance with 46 C.F .R. Part 16, the ALJ found that 

Respondent was properly selected for random drug testing in accordance with 46 C.F .R. 

§ 16.230(c). [D&O at 14-15] Based upon these conclusions, the ALJ found: "The United States 

Coast Guard has established each of the three factors necessary for a prima facie case by a 

preponderance of the evidence. They are entitled to the presumption that Respondent is a user of 

dangerous drugs." [D&O at 15] 

These findings are supported by the record. Even though the Coast Guard did not introduce 

a full laboratory "litigation package" into evidence, the testimony and exhibits presented support 

the ALJ's conclusion that a prima facie case of drug use was established. 

1 Respondent also contends that the confirmatory test is insufficient to support a prima facie case of drug use because 

the confirming laboratory is told that a sample has tested positive before it actually tests the sample, and hence the 

confirmatory test does not establish anything other than what it is told, that the sample is positive. Respondent's 

contention is unpersuasive, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the confirming laboratory failed to 

properly conduct independent testing of Respondent's sample. Rather, the record shows that such testing was 

conducted in accordance with the applicable DOT regulations. 

7 
COFFY NO. 2709 

In its Reply Brief, the Coast Guard argues that the introduction of a full "litigation 

package" is unnecessary in these proceedings and requests that I hold that "the laboratory report, 

itself, once it was signed by the MRO, constitute[ s] proof adequate to shift to appellant the burden 

of going forward with evidence." Reply Brief at 4-5. In arguing that position, the Coast Guard 

cites Commandantv. Sweeney, NTSB OrderNo. EM-176, 1994 WL475814, in which the 

National Transportation Safety Board observed, "[I]t seems to us that the laboratory report itself, 

once it was signed by the MRO, constituted proof adequate to shift to appellant the burden of going 

forward with evidence that the positive finding of marijuana metabolites in his urine was not the 

product of a wrongful use of the drug." The context of this statement was the appellant's argument 

that the Coast Guard's case against him, alleging use of a dangerous drug, was deficient because it 

did not establish the qualifications of various individuals involved in the testing and analysis of his 

urine sample. 

I understand the Coast Guard to be proposing that an MRO-signed laboratory report would 

fulfill the second element and part of the third element of the prima facie case. 

The Coast Guard is correct that the introduction of a full laboratory "litigation package" 

was unnecessary here to establish a prima facie case of drug use, given that the Coast Guard's 

extensive presentation of witnesses and other evidence so abundantly satisfied its burden. The 

Coast Guard's evidentiary strategy in a case like this with a prose Respondent who has contested 

whether discovery was adequate, and who submitted an ambiguous answer, served the interests of 

fairness although it may have exceeded the minimum showing required for a prima facie case. It is 

the ALJ in the first instance who must consider the evidence and decide whether it is sufficient in 

the circumstances to prove the Coast Guard's case and I am reluctant to impose a heavy hand on 

the ALJ's discretion, as the Coast Guard suggests. In this case, a preponderance of the evidence 

established a prima facie case of drug use without the introduction of a "litigation package," but 

with a number of witnesses and exhibits, just as occurred in Appeal Decision 2546 (SWEENEY) 

(1992), the case cited above by the Coast Guard. The same might not be true in another case where 

different testimony and exhibits are introduced and different issues are joined. The Coast Guard 

should prepare a legally sufficient case in each proceeding, by whatever combination of witnesses 

8 
COFFY NO. 2.7 0 9 

and exhibits may be available and convenient to meet the modest burden that is required to prove a 

prima facie case. 2 

III. 

Whether the ALI was correct to find that the Coast Guard established a prima facie case absent 

the testimony qf two witnesses who, although placed on the Coast Guard's initial witness and 

exhibit list, were not called at the hearing 

Respondent next argues that the AU erred in allowing the Coast Guard to amend its 

Witness List and request telephone testimony outside the timelines established within the 

applicable procedural regulations. 

The hearing in this matter was set for October 23, 2012. On October 15, 2012, the Coast 

Guard filed an amended witness list and Motions for Telephonic Testimony. Pursuant to 

33 C.F .R. § 20.309( d), a party is afforded ten days to respond to all motions filed by the opposition 

in these proceedings. Since the Coast Guard's motions were filed less than ten days prior to the 

hearing, Respondent was not afforded the full ten-day time period to respond to the Coast Guard's 

motions. Moreover, the AU responded to the Coast Guard's motion just two days later, without 

affording Respondent any significant response time. The AU acknowledged this defect but 

nonetheless granted the Coast Guard's motions via Order dated October 17, 2012. 

Although the Coast Guard's motions were filed "late," the AU was well within his 

discretion to grant them. The use of telephonic testimony has long been allowed in these 

proceedings, at the ALJ's discretion. See, e.g., Appeal Decisions 2662 (VOORHEIS) (2007) and 

2657 (BARNETT) (2006). Moreover, the record shows that Respondent did not object to either 

the Coast Guard's initial requests for telephonic testimony or the subsequent requests (until he 

filed his Appeal), despite the ALJ's invitation to do so when he granted the motions. 

2 The Coast Guard asserts that a litigation package can cost between $200 and $500. A litigation package might well 

obviate the need for some testimony that the Coast Guard might otherwise elect to use to establish a prima facie case. 

It might also preempt some issues, as demonstrated by this case. However, apparently a litigation package costs more 

than nwnerous telephone witnesses. 

9 
COFFY NO. 

27 0 9 

Beyond general umbrage with the late filing of the Coast Guard's Motions for Telephonic 

Testimony, Respondent contends that when the Coast Guard changed its witness list (deleting two 

witnesses previously listed and adding four others), ''the respondent could not get the opportunity 

to subpoena these 2 most important and critical components". [Appeal Brief at 3] Respondent 

argues that he suffered injustice because he could not "subpoena" the witnesses that the Coast 

Guard had elected not to call. This argument is meritless. Respondent did not have a right to have 

the Coast Guard call witnesses whose testimony he desired. If he wanted the testimony of certain 

witnesses to be obtained, it was incumbent upon him to call them himself, as was his right. No 

doubt the ALJ would have accommodated a late request by Respondent, in view of the Coast 

Guard's late change to its witness list. 

The record shows that the ALJ provided Respondent with a copy of the applicable 

procedural rules on July 31, 2012, when he scheduled the hearing in the matter. [Scheduling 

Order-Notice of Hearing dtd July 31, 2012] The record also shows that the ALJ explained these 

rules to Respondent and, more importantly, that the ALJ was constantly mindful of Respondent's 

status as a pro se litigant throughout the course of these proceedings. Although the AI..J explained 

the process to Respondent, he elected to call no witnesses and failed to file a witness and exhibit 

list prior to the hearing. Although Respondent could have sought the help of the ALJ in calling or 

subpoenaing witnesses, he did not do so. Having failed to avail himself of the full extent of his 

procedural rights, Respondent cannot now assert error where there was none. 

IV. 

Whether the record contains evidence of ''judicial misconduct" to warrant the overturning of the 

ALJ'sD&O 

Respondent's final basis of appeal addresses what he calls "judicial misconduct." 

However, rather than referring to the conduct of the ALJ, that which would be considered judicial 

in nature, Respondent challenges the behavior of the Investigating Officer (hereinafter "IO") who 

commenced proceedings against him. Respondent argues that one IO in particular participated in a 

''wanton sinister scheme" to take away his mariner credential based on baseless allegations. 

[Appeal Brief at 1] Respondent goes so far as to suggest that the IO engaged in a "ploy to ensure 

10 
COFFY NO. 

[his] absence at the hearing." [Id.] Respondent's complaints in this regard are unsupported by the 

record and meritless. 

While it may very well be true that an IO and Respondent failed to engage in productive 

discussion prior to the hearing, Respondent has presented no evidence to support a conclusion that 

he suffered any harm as a result of any misunderstanding or failure to communicate. The record 

shows that the AU went to great lengths to ensure that Respondent received a full and fair hearing 

in this matter. Respondent's argument to the contrary is unsupported by the record and 

unpersuasive. 

CONCLUSION 

The AU's findings and decision were lawful, based on correct interpretation of the law, 

and supported by the evidence. The AU did not abuse his discretion. There is no reason to disturb 

the ALJ's Order. 

ORDER 

The ALJ's Decision and Order dated ary 7, 2013, is AFFIRMED. 

Signed at Washington, D.C., this __ 

~rd day of_~ 

-=- "' ----' 2015. 

11