IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

No. 81859 

FILE 

MAR 1 7 2022 

SARAH JANEEN ROSE, AN 

INDIVIDUAL, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

DAVID JOHN ROSE, AN INDIVIDUAL, 

Res • ondent. 

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, 

REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING 

This is an appeal from a district court order denying in part a 

special motion to dismiss pursuant to NRS 41.660 in a tort and contract 

action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Elizabeth Goff 

Gonzalez, Judge.1This action arises from appellant Sarah Rose and 

respondent David Rose's divorce proceedings, in which the parties entered 

a memorandum of understanding (MOL) and a subsequent stipulated 

divorce decree. In relevant part, the divorce decree provided that David 

would name Sarah as the irrevocable survivor beneficiary of David's 

pension (survivor benefits). David later filed the underlying complaint 

alleging a breach-of-contract claim based on his contention that Sarah and 

her attorneys improperly added the survivor benefits provision to the 

divorce decree.2Sarah then filed a special motion to dismiss under NRS 

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument 

is not warranted. 

2The complaint also included several additional claims against Sarah, 

her counsel, and David's former counsel, which are not at issue in this 

appeal. 
41.660, Nevada's statute allowing dismissal of strategic lawsuits against 

public participation (anti-SLAPP), which the district court denied as to the 

breach-of-contract claim. 

Sarah argues that the district court erred by finding that 

David's breach-of-contract claim did not fall under NRS 41.660. Reviewing 

de novo, see Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 11, 432 P.3d 746, 749 (2019) 

(clarifying that this court reviews the resolution of anti-SLAPP motions de 

novo), we agree. NRS 41.660(1) authorizes a litigant to file a special motion 

to dismiss when an action filed in court is "based upon a good faith 

communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free 

speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern." A district court 

must first determine if the challenged claim meets this definition and, if it 

does, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to show a probability 

of prevailing on the claim. NRS 41.660(3) (setting forth a two-prong 

analysis for the district court). 

We conclude that the district court erred on the first prong. 

David's breach-of-contract claim falls under NRS 41.660 because it is based 

on Sarah drafting a divorce decree with a term entitling her to survivor 

benefits, submitting that decree to the district court so that it becomes 

legally enforceable, and seeking to enforce the survivorship benefit. See 

NRS 41.637(3) (providing that a "Hommunication made in direct 

connection with an issue under consideration by a . . . judicial body" 

satisfies NRS 41.660(1)); Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 709 (Cal. 2002) 

(concluding that a claim for relief filed in federal district falls under 

California's anti-SLAPP law); Navarro v. IHOP Props., Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 

3d. 385, 391-92 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding that a plaintiffs claim that the 

2 
Parraguirre 

J. 

Stiglich 

defendant defrauded the plaintiff into signing a stipulated judgment was 

subject to California's anti-SLAPP statute); Dowling v. Zimmerman, 103 

Cal. Rptr. 2d 174 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding that claims stemming from 

negotiations of a stipulated settlement fell under California's anti-SLAPP 

statute); see also Shapiro v. Welt, 133 Nev. 35, 39, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (2017) 

(holding that California law is instructive on anti-SLAPP issues under 

Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes). Thus, the district court erred under NRS 

41.660s first prong in concluding that the breach-of-contract claim was not 

"based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to 

petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of 

public concern."3NRS 41.660(3)(a). 

We therefore reverse the district coures denial of Sarah's 

motion to dismiss the breach-of-contract claim and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this order. As the parties raise no other issues, 

we affirm the remainder of the district court's order. 

It is so ORDERED.4 

3As a result, we need not address the parties arguments under the 

second prong. 

4The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

SUPREME COURT 

Of 

NEVADA 

3 

(0) 1947A 4400. 
cc: Chief Judge, Eighth Judicial District Court 

Department 11, Eighth Judicial District Court 

M. Nelson Segel, Settlement Judge 

Bailey Kennedy 

Cohen Johnson, LLC 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

4 

(0) 1947A a42110