In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-2930

In the Matter of:

Mary Anne Zurn,

Debtor-Appellant

Aldo E. Botti, et al.,

Creditors-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 00 C 4356--John W. Darrah, Judge.

Argued February 11, 2002--Decided May 15, 2002

 Before Easterbrook, Ripple, and Diane P.

Wood, Circuit Judges.

 Easterbrook, Circuit Judge. "Only a

belief that bankruptcy is forever could

produce a case such as this." That

sentiment, which opens the opinion in

Pettibone Corp. v. Easley, 935 F.2d 120,

121 (7th Cir. 1991), is equally

applicable to this long-running dispute.

 Aldo Botti and his former client, Mary

Anne Zurn, have spent the last decade

debating the quality of legal work Botti

provided to Zurn during divorce

litigation, and torts that Zurn believes

Botti to have committed during the course

of his representation. Zurn’s suit in

Illinois was met by a request for

sanctions; Botti also argued in

acountersuit that Zurn still owed money

for legal fees. When the dust settled in

the state’s trial court, Botti emerged

with a judgment of about $180,000. To

avoid paying, Zurn filed a federal

bankruptcy proceeding. It soon became

clear that the bankruptcy court would not

allow Zurn to retain the stakes without

accruing interest during an appeal in

state court, nor would the bankruptcy

court take over the appellate function

and decide the matter itself. After the

bankruptcy court formally decided to

abstain from any role in the ongoing

state litigation, Zurn filed a plan
promising full payment to all creditors,

including Botti. She paid the sums he

claimed as a creditor, her plan was

approved, and the federal proceedings

were dismissed in April 1996.

 Meanwhile the litigation continued in

Illinois. In March 1998 the state’s

appellate court reversed the judgments to

the extent that they had required Zurn to

pay Botti. With respect to Zurn’s claims

against Botti, the appellate court

decided three in Botti’s favor but held

that Zurn’s claim for battery had been

dismissed improperly. At this point Botti

should have returned the money Zurn had

paid to satisfy the judgments. Buzz

Barton & Associates, Inc. v. Giannone,

108 Ill. 2d 373, 381-82, 483 N.E.2d 1271,

1275 (1985). See also Richardson v.

Penfold, 900 F.2d 116, 118 (7th Cir.

1990); Palmer v. Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316,

1319 (7th Cir. 1986). Yet he did not do

so, though it is hard to see how he could

be entitled to keep the money after the

reversal. The appellate decision left

each side with unresolved legal claims

against the other, but neither took

timely steps to resume the litigation in

the trial court. Illinois requires a

litigant that wants to continue the

proceedings after an appeal to act within

a reasonable period after the appellate

mandate (which issued in November 1998).

See Ill. S. Ct. R. 369(c); Illinois v.

Eidel, 319 Ill. App. 496, 745 N.E.2d 736

(2d Dist. 2001). Botti has never

attempted to reinstate his suit seeking

legal fees. Apparently Botti believes

that, because he holds the money paid

under the reversed judgment, it is no

longer necessary to establish a legal

entitlement to these funds.

 For her part, Zurn allowed 13 months to

pass and then moved to reopen, not the

state litigation, but the bankruptcy

proceeding. She asked the bankruptcy

judge to order Botti to return the money

that had been paid under the plan. A few

weeks later (in January 2000) she tried

to reinstate the litigation in the

state’s trial court. Both the bankruptcy

judge and the state judge said no. The

state judge concluded that Zurn’s request

was untimely, and after initially

granting some of the relief Zurn had

requested the bankruptcy judge changed

his mind. The details of events in the

bankruptcy court do not matter.
Ultimately, Bankruptcy Judge Wedoff

concluded that Zurn had not supplied

adequate cause to reopen the proceedings

under 11 U.S.C. sec.350(b), that it was

not possible to "enforce the plan" (as

Zurn had requested in a separate motion)

because the plan had been carried out to

the letter, and that state rather than

federal tribunals offer the right forums

for final resolution of the disputes

between Zurn and Botti.

 Zurn did not appeal within the state

system, but she did ask a district judge

to review the bankruptcy judge’s

decision. The district judge agreed with

the bankruptcy judge’s bottom line but

gave different reasons. He concluded,

first, that reopening is barred by the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and,

second, that Zurn has no remaining state

remedies and thus is not entitled to

restitution. Bankruptcy courts implement

entitlements under state law, see Butner

v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979), and

if as a matter of Illinois law Zurn has

lost her right to restitution then there

is no claim to vindicate in bankruptcy.

Dismayed by this turn of events--the

bankruptcy judge sent her claim to state

court, while the district judge wiped it

out--Zurn has appealed to us.

 The district court characterized its

decision as one affirming the bankruptcy

judge’s decision to abstain rather than

interfere with state litigation. If that

is the right understanding, then 28

U.S.C. sec.1334(d) blocks appellate

review. But the district judge’s use of

language was imprecise. The bankruptcy

judge discussed abstention (particularly

the consequences of the 1995 decision to

abstain), but his judgment in these

proceedings was not one of

abstention.Instead the bankruptcy judge

denied Zurn’s motion to enforce the plan,

a decision that is not abstention of any

flavor. Indeed, it would have been

possible to abstain in 2000 only after

first reopening the bankruptcy. Judge

Wedoff rescinded his initial act of

reopening; the district court affirmed.

That is incompatible with abstention.

Moreover, by the time this dispute

returned to the district judge, all

proceedings in state court were over.
There was nothing to abstain in favor of-

-nor was there any pending bankruptcy

case that would proceed while the state

courts handled the matters from which the

federal court had abstained. The

questions on the table in 2000 concerned

the consequences of decisions the state

courts already had rendered. Because the

federal court was not asked in 2000 to

interfere with or take over a pending

state suit in order to value a claim in

bankruptcy, it also could not "abstain"

within the meaning of sec.1334(c). What

the court actually did was decline to

reopen a bankruptcy proceeding under

sec.350(b) and hold that the plan did not

need "enforcement" because no one had

departed from its provisions. Because

that decision ended the litigation in the

district court, we have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. sec.158(d).

 Neither of the district judge’s

substantive reasons is correct. The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine instantiates the

principle that only the Supreme Court of

the United States may modify a judgment

entered by a state court in civil litiga

tion. Zurn did not ask the federal court

to review or alter the state courts’

decisions; she argued, instead, that the

appellate decision has a particular legal

consequence (that Botti must make

restitution). That may be right or wrong,

but deciding whether it is right does not

transgress Rooker-Feldman. Federal law

does not undercut efforts to enforce

state judgments. Nor was it right to say

that Zurn’s delay in attempting to

reinstate her suit obliterated her

opportunity to obtain restitution.

Illinois entertains independent actions

for restitution, when a judgment that has

been satisfied later is reversed. See

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Zambole,

141 Ill. App. 3d 803, 491 N.E.2d 132 (2d

Dist. 1986). Whether such an independent

suit would be appropriate in light of

other circumstances that are not in the

record (such as whether Zurn has made a

timely demand of Botti for restitution)

is something on which we offer no

comment. It is enough to say that Zurn

retains at least a potential for

restitution under state law.

 Although neither of the district judge’s

reasons is convincing, its judgment

nonetheless is correct, for the reason

given by the bankruptcy judge. Zurn’s
bankruptcy ended in 1996. The plan of

reorganization has been fully

implemented; there is nothing to

"enforce" and no reason to reopen and

alter the plan. Zurn’s belief that anyone

who has been a debtor in bankruptcy has

eternal access to federal court for all

disputes related in some way to the debts

handled in the bankruptcy proceeding is

incompatible not only with Pettibone but

with many other cases, none of which Zurn

discusses. E.g., Maytag Corp. v. Navistar

International Transportation Corp., 219

F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 2000); In re

Xonics, Inc., 813 F.2d 127, 130-32 (7th

Cir. 1987); In re Chicago, Rock Island &

Pacific R.R., 794 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (7th

Cir. 1986). Suppose that a Chapter 13

plan called for a debtor to pay in full

for a car, and thus retain title, and

that after the confirmation of the plan a

warranty dispute occurred. Would the

bankruptcy judge be called on to

determine whether the car’s transmission

had been repaired to the debtor’s

satisfaction? Certainly not; the federal

role ended with the decision that the car

would be paid for and retained rather

than abandoned. Other disputes concerning

the car belong to state tribunals. So too

with leaseholds, we held in Chicago, Rock

Island & Pacific. Zurn conceded at oral

argument that disputes of this kind could

not be brought back to federal court but

argues that her dispute differs because

the state litigation was ongoing at the

time of the federal bankruptcy. But that

was equally true in Pettibone, where the

bankruptcy court abstained and left

resolution of the parties’ dispute to

state tribunals. After the bankruptcy

ended, the parties could not agree on the

effect in the state cases of the

automatic stay in bankruptcy; even though

this dispute (unlike the Zurn-Botti

imbroglio) was related to federal law, we

held in Pettibone that jurisdiction once

relinquished stays relinquished. When a

bankruptcy court abstains and permits

state courts to handle pending

litigation, the parties must thereafter

look to the state courts to handle their

complete dispute and may not drag

selected issues back to the bankruptcy

forum years later.

 Section 350(b) allows a district judge

to reopen a bankruptcy proceeding, but

use of that power is reserved for matters

such as the correction of errors (see In
re Shondel, 950 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir.

1991)), amendments necessitated by

unanticipated events that frustrate a

plan’s implementation, and the need to

enforce the plan and discharge (see In re

Bianucci, 4 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993)).

Reversal of a civil judgment that created

a claim against the estate does not

warrant reopening; reversal affects the

amount of a given claim, not the plan’s

provisions for satisfying claims. Zurn’s

plan promised payment in full; and if

events mean that "in full" is less than

the debtor anticipated, still this does

not call the plan itself into question.

It just provides an occasion for the use

of whatever remedies Zurn has under state

law.

 It is unfortunate that Botti’s obduracy

has prolonged this dispute. Lawyers

should comply with their legal duties--

including the duty to make restitution

identified in Buzz Barton & Associates--

rather than compel former clients to

resort to still more litigation to

vindicate their rights. Behavior such as

Botti’s brings the legal profession into

disrepute. See also Dale M. v. Board of

Education, 282 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2002).

If litigation must continue, however, the

right forum is state court, just as the

bankruptcy judge concluded.

Affirmed

 RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The

majority rests its decision on a ground

that never was raised by the parties in

this court or in the earlier stages of

the litigation. Indeed, Mr. Botti

conceded in his brief to this court that

the bankruptcy court had the authority to

reopen this case and properly had done

so. Moreover, the majority’s

characterization of the bankruptcy court

proceedings cannot be supported by the

record. In my view, the appropriate

course is to take the bankruptcy court at

its word; it said that it was abstaining

from exercising jurisdiction over the

state cases just as it had done in 1996,

leaving Ms. Zurn and Mr. Botti free to

pursue their state remedies. Thus, the

bankruptcy court abstained under 28

U.S.C. sec. 1334(c)(1), and we lack

appellate jurisdiction to review such a

decision under sec. 1334(d). I therefore
would dismiss this appeal for lack of

appellate jurisdiction.

1.

 The majority writes that "[t]he details

of events in the bankruptcy court do not

matter." Maj. Op. at 3. I respectfully

disagree. Indeed, careful attention to

the course of those proceedings reveals

that the majority’s characterization of

them cannot be supported by the record.

 On December 16, 1999, Ms. Zurn filed a

motion to reopen her bankruptcy case

under 11 U.S.C. sec. 350(b), which

provides that "[a] case may be reopened

in the court in which such case was

closed to administer assets, to accord

relief to the debtor, or for other

cause." 11 U.S.C. sec. 350(b). On January

10, 2000, Mr. Botti filed a memorandum in

opposition to Ms. Zurn’s motion to

reopen. In that memorandum, Mr. Botti

argued that the common-law doctrine of

laches barred reopening because of Ms.

Zurn’s delay and the prejudice such a

delay would cause Mr. Botti. On January

18, 2000, the bankruptcy court

nevertheless granted Ms. Zurn’s motion

and reopened the bankruptcy. In doing so,

the bankruptcy court considered the terms

of sec. 350, as well as our decision in

In re Bianucci, 4 F.3d 526 (7th Cir.

1993). It held that "[i]n this case I

found nothing that indicates that there’s

prejudice to the Botti firm by any delay

in actions involved in this case."

January 11, 2000 Bankr. Tr. at 3. The

court further stated that "the merits are

a completely separate issue from the

question of whether the case ought to be

reopened. In the absence of the showing

of any prejudice to the Botti firm . . .

the case ought to be reopened pursuant to

the authorities that were cited in the

Bianucci case." Id. at 4-5. Thus ended

the litigation over the question of

reopening. Mr. Botti did not ask the

bankruptcy court to reconsider its

decision.

 The parties then turned their attention

to the merits of Ms. Zurn’s request that

the bankruptcy court order Mr. Botti to

reimburse Ms. Zurn the funds she had paid

earlier in compliance with her bankruptcy

plan. Ms. Zurn characterized her motion

for repayment as a motion to enforce the

original Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan
confirmed in 1996. Under Ms. Zurn’s

reading of the plan, the bankruptcy court

had the authority to order Mr. Botti to

repay Ms. Zurn because the plan had

contemplated continued state proceedings

subsequent to the plan’s confirmation. In

reply, Mr. Botti filed a motion for

abstention and remand. He urged the

bankruptcy court to deny Ms. Zurn’s

motion for enforcement of the plan.

 After the parties submitted further

briefing on the merits, the bankruptcy

court ordered Mr. Botti to repay Ms. Zurn

for the funds she had paid to satisfy the

state court judgment in the so-called

"Zurn" case, in which Ms. Zurn, as

plaintiff, alleged that Mr. Botti and his

law firm had mishandled her divorce

action. A default judgment dismissing the

claims for failure to state a cause of

action and imposing sanctions and

attorneys’ fees on Ms. Zurn had been

entered by the trial court. However, that

judgment subsequently was reversed by the

Illinois Appellate Court, and Ms. Zurn

therefore had been relieved of the

obligation to pay that judgment.

 By contrast, the bankruptcy court denied

Ms. Zurn’s motion for reimbursement with

respect to the so-called "Botti" case. In

this action, Mr. Botti and his law firm,

as plaintiffs, had sought fees for

representing Ms. Zurn in the divorce

action. A default judgment had been

entered in favor of Mr. Botti, awarding

him the requested attorneys’ fees.

However, this judgment had been reversed

on appeal.

 The bankruptcy court had reached

different results in the two requests for

reimbursement because it determined the

state appellate decision to be final in

the Zurn case but non-final in the Botti

case. As to the Zurn case, the bankruptcy

court explained that the Illinois

Appellate Court had determined that Ms.

Zurn had stated a cause of action;

therefore Botti’s claim for sanctions

could not stand. Because the Chapter 11

payment was only provisional as to this

claim, reasoned the bankruptcy court, Ms.

Zurn was entitled to a return of the

amount that she had paid to Botti on this

claim. Contrary to this characterization,

in the Botti case, Mr. Botti’s claim for

attorneys’ fees was still alive, and he

ultimately might prevail and be entitled
to the funds Ms. Zurn had paid through

the Chapter 11 plan. In sum, the

bankruptcy court granted in part and

denied in part Ms. Zurn’s motion to

enforce the plan and to order repayment

of those funds.

 After the bankruptcy court’s oral ruling

on March 16 and while that court was

considering whether and at what rate to

impose interest on the funds at issue,

the DuPage County Court denied Ms. Zurn’s

motion to reinstate the Zurn case in that

court. Mr. Botti brought a motion to

amend the earlier order in light of this

new development and what he submitted

were manifest errors of law in the

bankruptcy court’s characterization of

the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision

reversing the Zurn case. Ms. Zurn also

brought a motion to reconsider with

respect to the Botti case. As the

bankruptcy court characterized the

situation, "the legal issues raised by

both parties are essentially of the same

nature[:] that the court has misperceived

the law that’s applicable here and that

to reconsider the order that’s previously

been entered." June 8, 2000 Bankr. Tr. at

2. Specifically, Mr. Botti maintained

that the bankruptcy court’s order

incorrectly perceived the nature of

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137, which is

analogous to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 11, the provision under which

Ms. Zurn had been sanctioned in the Zurn

case. In its order, the bankruptcy court

had reasoned that, because Ms. Zurn could

no longer be sanctioned under Rule 137,

the Appellate Court’s ruling on that

issue was final and the bankruptcy court

could order Mr. Botti to repay Ms. Zurn.

 Upon reconsideration, the bankruptcy

court agreed with Mr. Botti that its

earlier ruling was incorrect. "I have re

viewed again the plan of reorganization

of this case. . . . It does not say that

there is any right to a refund in the

event of a discharged judgment. It simply

leaves the debtor in the position of

pursuing her rights in state court." June

8, 2000 Bankr. Tr. at 4. The court

continued: "I made a decision to abstain,

and that determination is reflected in

the plan of reorganization that was

actually confirmed." Id. at 6. "And if we

are talking about enforcing that plan of

reorganization, I don’t think that I can

change my mind as to the appropriateness

of abstention. All I can do in enforcing
the plan is to put its terms into effect.

And I don’t think that those terms would

allow me to intrude into the state court

proceedings." Id. at 6. At no time did

the bankruptcy court suggest that its

initial decision to reopen the case

pursuant to sec. 350 was incorrect or

that it had reconsidered that decision.

Nor did either Ms. Zurn or Mr. Botti ask

the court to reconsider. At issue on June

8 was Mr. Botti’s motion asking the court

to amend its earlier ruling in favor of

Ms. Zurn on her motion to "enforce the

plan," by which she meant ordering Mr.

Botti to pay restitution. As the

bankruptcy court had made clear in its

decision to reopen the bankruptcy, the

issue on June 8 was the "merits"

question, distinct from the initial

decision to reopen. In its June 8, 2000,

ruling, the court decided to "grant Mr.

Botti’s motion [and] . . . deny

enforcement of the plan." See id. at 7.

In short, Ms. Zurn’s motion to enforce

the plan was the "merits" question,

distinct from the "reopening" question.

The bankruptcy court did not revisit its

decision to reopen this bankruptcy.

2.

 Mr. Botti also expressly waived any

objection to the bankruptcy court’s

decision to reopen this case. In his

brief to this court, Mr. Botti

acknowledged that the bankruptcy court

had "accepted jurisdiction by reopening

the bankruptcy as it clearly had the

authority to do under 11 U.S.C. sec.

350." Appellee’s Br. at 12. Nowhere in

his brief to this court does Mr. Botti

suggest that he is challenging the

bankruptcy court’s decision to reopen Ms.

Zurn’s bankruptcy proceeding. When Mr.

Botti opposed Ms. Zurn’s motion to reopen

in the bankruptcy court, he did so on the

ground of the equitable doctrine of

laches. He did not appeal the bankruptcy

court’s adverse ruling./1

3.

 The majority states that "because the

court had not been asked to interfere

with or take over a pending suit, it also

could not ’abstain.’" Maj. Op. at 4.

Under the permissive abstention rule of

sec. 1334(c)(1), however, a court may

abstain "in the interest of justice, or

in the interest of comity with State
courts or respect for State law." 11

U.S.C. sec. 1334(c)(1). Nowhere does the

statute require that a state proceeding

must be commenced before a bankruptcy

court may invoke this provision. In

contrast, sec. 1334(c)(2) requires a

district court to abstain from hearing

state law causes of action "related to a

case under title 11 but not arising under

title 11 or arising in a case under title

11 . . . if an action is commenced, and

can be timely adjudicated, in a State

forum of appropriate jurisdiction." 28

U.S.C. sec. 1334(c)(2). The presence of

such a requirement in (c)(2) and its

absence in (c)(1) indicates that a

bankruptcy court may abstain under sec.

1334(c)(1) without pending state

proceedings./2 The bankruptcy court here

abstained in favor of whatever state

remedies Ms. Zurn was entitled to seek.

 The bankruptcy court’s decision was a

decision to abstain from exercising

jurisdiction over the Zurn and Botti

cases. The bankruptcy court had abstained

in 1995 because, inter alia, the two

cases were dominated by uncertain

questions of state law. It abstained this

time because the original plan did not

permit Ms. Zurn to return to bankruptcy

court to vindicate only a portion of her

state law rights; to enforce the plan was

to persist in abstaining./3

4.

 The bankruptcy court’s record cannot be

read so as to conclude that the

bankruptcy court’s decision on June 8,

2000, reversed its original decision to

reopen the case. The parties litigated

the reopening issue and then proceeded to

the merits. We are asked to review the

bankruptcy court’s decision on the

merits. That decision was to abstain from

exercising jurisdiction over the state

cases and we are barred from reviewing

such decisions by 28 U.S.C. sec. 1334(d).

There is no reason to reach out and

decide unnecessarily an issue not

addressed by all of the parties and other

courts in this case. I would dismiss this

appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction

and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

/1 The issue that the majority chooses to decide

without the assistance of briefs or the argument
of counsel is a difficult one whose resolution is

not clear-cut. Although the majority chides the

parties for not discussing Pettibone Corp. v.

Easley, 935 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1991), the majority fails to reckon sufficiently with the reasoning of In re Bianucci, 4 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993)

and In re Shondel, 950 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1991),

which both take a more permissive approach to

reopening under sec.350(b) than that taken by the

majority here. In re Shondel held that the bankruptcy court acted properly in reopening the

bankruptcy case to modify a permanent injunction

issued as part of the original plan. See In re

Shondel, 950 F.2d at 1304. In re Bianucci held

that the bankruptcy court properly declined to

reopen a bankruptcy case two years after it was

closed to determine the status of a lien, but

made clear that the decision whether to reopen a

bankruptcy decree rests within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court. See In re Bianucci,

4 F.3d at 527-28. Denial of the motion to reopen

in In re Bianucci was proper because the nonmoving party would be prejudiced by the act of

reopening itself. See id. at 528. Indeed, both

Bianucci and Shondel emphasized that the decision

whether to reopen a bankruptcy is left to the

broad discretion of the bankruptcy court. See In

re Bianucci, 4 F.3d at 528; In re Shondel, 950

F.2d at 1304; see also 3 Lawrence P. King, et

al., Collier on Bankruptcy, para. 350.03 (15th

ed. 2002). Given the importance of the question,

a case in which the issue has neither been raised

nor briefed is an inappropriate vehicle for a

sweeping assertion that "[r]eversal of a civil

judgment that created a claim against the estate

does not warrant reopening." Maj. Op. at 6. It

would be advisable to decide that issue in case

in which it is raised and we have the benefit of

briefing and oral argument from the parties.

/2 There are other abstention doctrines that do not

require pending state proceedings for their

application. For example, "[f]ederal court abstention is required when state law is uncertain

and a state court’s clarification of state law

might make a federal court’s constitutional

ruling unnecessary." Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal

Jurisdiction, at 737 (3d ed. 1999); see also

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,

716-23 (1996) (describing the various formulations of the abstention doctrine). Pullman abstention thus applies even in the absence of a

pending state action; it applies in anticipation

of state court action. So too in this case. The

bankruptcy court abstained in anticipation of Ms.

Zurn’s bringing a future claim in state court

seeking restitution.

/3 The majority contends that "Judge Wedoff rescinded his initial act of reopening . . . . That is
incompatible with abstention." Maj. Op. at 4. It

further states that the judgment of the bankruptcy court was to deny "Zurn’s motion to enforce

the plan, a decision that is not abstention of

any flavor." Maj. Op. at 4. In the majority’s

view, then, the bankruptcy court’s judgment

simultaneously denied Ms. Zurn’s motion to enforce the plan and revoked the court’s decision

to reopen. In my view, the best way to view the

bankruptcy court’s judgment is that it denied Ms.

Zurn’s motion to enforce the plan because it was

abstaining in conformity with the dictates of the

1996 plan. The bankruptcy court denied Ms. Zurn’s

motion not because it thought that she did not

deserve restitution but because it believed that

it was compelled to abstain because of the 1996

plan. That determination is a decision to abstain

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. sec. 1334(c).

 The bankruptcy court made what I believe to be

a sound distinction between the question whether

to reopen the bankruptcy "for cause" under sec.

350(b) and the merits question, whether Ms. Zurn

was entitled to the relief she sought. The court

was clear that what was at issue on June 8 was

the "merits" question, whether Mr. Botti was

violating the terms of the plan by refusing to

return the funds to Ms. Zurn. The majority’s view

seems to be that the merits question and the

reopening question are one in the same, that in

order for a bankruptcy court to reopen a bankruptcy, the party seeking such action must demonstrate that he is also entitled to relief. This

is an unwarranted narrowing of a bankruptcy

court’s broad discretion to reopen a bankruptcy

under sec. 350(b).