In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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Nos. 03-2254 & 03-3180

ARBEN KUQO, MAHIRE KUQO, ERA KUQO,

EMEA KUQO and KEJT KUQO,

Petitioners,

v.

JOHN ASHCROFT,

Respondent.

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On Petitions for Review of an Order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Nos. A75 320 496, A79 562 042-44, A72 413 389

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ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2004—DECIDED DECEMBER 7, 2004

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Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Arben Kuqo, a 41-year-old Albanian

citizen, entered the United States in 1997 and, at a removal

hearing in 1998, applied for asylum, withholding of removal,

and protection under the United Nations Convention Against

Torture. The applications were denied by an immigration

judge in 1999, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
2 Nos. 03-2254 & 03-3180

1 Arben Kuqo is the lead petitioner for his family members

Mahire, Era, Emea, and Kejt Kuqo, who base their claims for

relief on his application.

affirmed in 2003. In these consolidated petitions for review,

Kuqo and his family seek review of the final orders issued

by the BIA.1

 We affirm.

In his application for asylum, Kuqo alleged that he had

been persecuted by leaders of a nongovernmental political

organization called the Association of the Formerly Politically Persecuted (AFPP), a group in which he was a member. The persecution resulted, he claimed, from his complaints about corruption and cigarette smuggling involving

members of the group’s leadership. At his hearing before

the immigration judge, he testified that he was threatened

with death and beaten up, requiring hospitalization, after

he spoke out about corruption at a group meeting. He also

testified that he was shot at while driving in a car and

claimed that he was the subject of libel charges resulting

from his efforts to expose corruption at the AFPP. The immigration judge was not convinced, however, finding that

Kuqo’s fear of persecution was really only a fear that members of a private organization were trying to keep him from

blowing the whistle on their extracurricular activities. The

judge also discounted Kuqo’s stated fears of persecution in

light of the fact that Kuqo had voluntarily returned to

Albania in 1997. In light of these and other reasons, Kuqo’s

application for asylum and other relief was denied.

The review before us, however, pertains not to the merits

of Kuqo’s application but rather to a matter of procedural

concern, namely, the dialect spoken by his interpreter during the first day of his two-day hearing before the immigration judge. Immediately prior to Kuqo’s February 17, 1999

asylum hearing, his counsel informed the judge that the
Nos. 03-2254 & 03-3180 3

court-appointed interpreter spoke the Gheg dialect of the

Albanian language rather than the Tosk dialect spoken by

Kuqo. Kuqo and the interpreter had conducted a sort of dry

run in advance of the hearing, however, which satisfied

Kuqo that, despite the difference in dialect, he was able to

communicate effectively with the interpreter. Kuqo’s attorney told the judge that Kuqo “has advised me that he

believes that he understands this gentleman perfectly, and

thus wishes to continue.” Kuqo confirmed this on the record

in a colloquy with the judge.

The hearing proceeded smoothly until Kuqo’s counsel noticed an unidentified man in the rear of the room gesticulating with his hands, which counsel took to mean that the

interpreter was not translating accurately. Counsel asked

the judge whether the individual might be able to assist in

determining where the translation went awry. The judge

denied the request, stating that “I can’t have somebody in

the back of the room—I don’t even know if he’s second-guessing because you’re just talking about some hand gestures

now.” The judge further stated: “I don’t see any sign that

[Kuqo] doesn’t understand my questions, and so until I do,

until I’m presented with more concrete indication . . . that

there’s . . . miscommunication happening I’m just going to

observe, carefully observe what happens and see if there is

a problem.” The hearing proceeded and counsel made only

one other minor objection to the translation. A second day

of testimony occurred on September 10, 1999, this time with

an interpreter who spoke Kuqo’s dialect of Albanian.

Kuqo now contends that he was denied due process

because his interpreter’s inability to speak his dialect prevented Kuqo from meaningfully participating in his asylum

hearing. We have no doubt that due process requires a competent interpreter to assist an alien who does not speak

English in presenting evidence on his own behalf.

Nazarovna v. INS, 171 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 1999). But
4 Nos. 03-2254 & 03-3180

2 The difference between the two dialects is a matter about which

we are neither prepared nor qualified to opine. According to some

sources, the two dialects are of “limited mutual intelligibility.” See

http://www.geocities.com/language_directory/languages/

albanian.htm. Others suggest that the dialects “have been diverging for at least a millennium, and their less extreme forms are

mutually intelligible.” See http://www.britannica.com/eb/

article?tocId=74918. Here, Kuqo confirmed on the record that he

could communicate adequately with the translator; the objection

came later, based on the intervention of an unidentified onlooker

in the hearing room. This suggests that in this instance at least

the dialect variances were more subtle than petitioner now alleges.

Kuqo’s claim founders on his inability to demonstrate either

that the translation was actually flawed or that he was

prejudiced by the allegedly ineffective translation.2

At the hearing Kuqo testified about his allegations of

persecution in some detail and appeared fully capable of

making his case for relief. Nowhere does he show that the

interpreter caused any kind of material misunderstanding,

either on the judge’s part or Kuqo’s. At oral argument

Kuqo’s counsel admitted that a recording of the hearing was

available and that another translator could have listened to

the tape and documented any instances of faulty translation. That was not done. Nor are there any affidavits in the

record explaining where the interpreter deviated from what

was actually said. Given the absence in the record of any

evidence of an erroneous translation, there is no basis to

evaluate Kuqo’s claim that he was denied due process

because of inadequate interpretation at the hearing.

For these same reasons, Kuqo is unable to demonstrate

prejudice. Immigration hearings, like trials, are not reviewed

for perfection; a reviewing court will not order a new hearing without a showing that a party’s rights were actually
Nos. 03-2254 & 03-3180 5

affected by the error alleged. Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d

1075, 1087 (7th Cir. 2004). In Ambati v. Reno, 233 F.3d

1054, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 2000), for example, the petitioner

claimed that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to

present his case because the immigration judge denied his

request for a continuance to allow new counsel more time to

prepare. We rejected the claim, because even assuming a

due process violation had occurred, the petitioner had not

“come forward with evidence that the violation affected the

outcome of the hearing.” Id. at 1062.

The same is true here. A generalized claim of inaccurate

translation, without a particularized showing of prejudice

based on the record, is insufficient to sustain a due process

claim. The decision of the BIA is AFFIRMED. The consolidated petitions for review are DENIED.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—12-7-04