United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 9, 2019*

Decided May 15, 2019

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 18‐3201

DONTA JENKINS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

DANIEL FRISCH, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin.

No. 16‐cv‐684‐bbc

Barbara B. Crabb,

Judge.

O R D E R

Donta Jenkins, a Wisconsin inmate, frequently saw his psychological clinicians at

Columbia Correctional Center for evaluation and treatment for one year. He believed

they did not provide appropriate treatment, so he sued the clinicians and their

supervisor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his mental health needs

and under Wisconsin law for medical malpractice. The district court entered summary

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18‐3201    Page 2

judgment for the defendants, ruling that Jenkins at most had established that different

medical professionals would have treated him differently. We affirm the judgment.

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to Jenkins and draw

reasonable inferences in his favor. Wilson v. Adams, 901 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2018). As

an initial matter, we address Jenkins’s argument that the district court improperly

disregarded his evidence. Jenkins often cited groups of medical records to support

conclusory and argumentative statements, despite the court’s order to identify

supporting evidence clearly and its admonishment that it would not search the record.

The district court therefore found that Jenkins had not complied with procedural rules,

and it considered his factual assertions and denials only to the extent that they were

supported by specific citations to the record. A court may require compliance with its

orders and local rules, even from a pro se litigant, and it did not err in doing so here.

See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006).   

Jenkins arrived at the prison in November 2015, and Dr. Daniel Frisch, a

psychology associate (a practitioner under the supervision of a licensed psychologist),

became his primary clinician. At his previous institution, Jenkins’s providers had

diagnosed him with delusional disorder, persecutory type, but they had alternated his

mental health classification between serious and non‐serious.

Jenkins told Dr. Frisch at their first meeting that he would rather be in

segregation than have a cellmate. He was not in segregation at that time, but within one

week, Jenkins formed a noose with his bedsheets and threatened to kill himself.

Dr. Frisch placed Jenkins on observational status for one day until he no longer had

suicidal thoughts. One week later, Jenkins made another noose and again was placed in

observation, but he soon reported that he was not suicidal and was removed. After

several meetings with Dr. Frisch, Jenkins had not vocalized delusional or persecutory

thoughts, and Dr. Frisch began to question Jenkins’s diagnosis of delusional disorder.

Dr. Frisch noted his concern that Jenkins was malingering to avoid having a cellmate

and considered administering a test to determine Jenkins’s reliability.

In December and January, Jenkins engaged in hunger strikes, and Dr. Frisch

evaluated him to ensure he understood the risks. Dr. Frisch met with Jenkins nearly

weekly to discuss Jenkins’s concerns, including his fears that his cellmate and staff were

manipulating him and his belongings and his desire to transfer to different facilities.

Dr. Frisch suggested that Jenkins consider medication, so Jenkins asked to see a

psychiatrist. Dr. Frisch scheduled an appointment for him the next day. Dr. Frisch also
No. 18‐3201    Page 3

developed a behavior‐management plan with Jenkins, in which Jenkins committed to

comply with institutional expectations and accept changes to his living situation.   

Dr. Frisch met with Jenkins monthly through the spring and summer, and he

confirmed at each session that Jenkins was not having suicidal ideation or thoughts of

self‐harm. In June, Dr. Frisch administered the MMPI‐2, a test that evaluates whether

the test taker is exaggerating psychological symptoms. The results showed that Jenkins

was, so Dr. Frisch changed his diagnosis to “Malingering Psychotic Symptoms.”   

Dr. Frisch saw Jenkins in October, and they discussed Jenkins’s thought patterns.

Dr. Frisch attempted to help him realign his “bad thoughts” and explained that therapy

could help him change his perspective and stay out of prison in the future. At the end of

the month, Jenkins changed housing units, and he was assigned to a new clinician.   

Also in October, Jenkins saw a psychiatrist, who believed that Jenkins’s reports

of auditory hallucinations were reliable. He diagnosed Jenkins with major depressive

disorder with psychotic features and with a personality disorder, and he changed

Jenkins’s medications. A different psychiatrist saw Jenkins in March 2017; he noted

Jenkins’s reports of hearing voices, sustained the diagnoses, and adjusted his

medications.

Jenkins also met four times with another Columbia psychology associate,

Dr. Daniel Norge. Each time, Dr. Norge evaluated him for thoughts of suicide or

self‐harm, discussed his concerns, if any, and recommended that he follow up with his

primary clinician, Dr. Frisch. Dr. Norge did not amend Jenkins’s diagnosis at any time.

Jenkins sued Drs. Frisch and Norge and their supervisor for deliberate

indifference to his mental health needs and for medical malpractice under Wisconsin

law. After filing suit, Jenkins was released from prison to extended supervision. He

soon violated the terms of his supervision, and a state administrative law judge revoked

his supervision and ordered reincarceration. Based on the ALJ’s review of a limited

record, she concluded that Jenkins needed mental health treatment. But, the ALJ noted,

Jenkins’s records were marked “no mental health concerns,” convincing her that

Columbia had “discounted and failed to address his mental health needs.”   

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Jenkins received

consistent and appropriate psychological treatment. Jenkins countered that the ALJ’s

decision, among other things, proved that his care had been substandard. The district
No. 18‐3201    Page 4

court agreed with the defendants and concluded that Jenkins did not present sufficient

evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that the defendants consciously disregarded

his needs or were negligent in providing him treatment. Jenkins appeals.

We review the entry of summary judgment de novo. Wilson, 901 F.3d at 820. To

survive a motion for summary judgment on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff

must provide some evidence that (1) he had an objectively serious medical need and

(2) the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health. Id; Holloway

v. Delaware Cty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1072 (7th Cir. 2012). Jenkins disputes only the

district court’s entry of judgment for Drs. Frisch and Norge; he therefore waives any

argument about their supervisor’s conduct. See Crestview Vill. Apartments v. HUD,

383 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 2004).   

Jenkins argues that because two psychiatrists diagnosed him with “serious

mental health issues” and deemed him reliable, the psychologist‐defendants must have

been deliberately indifferent to his mental health by not reaching the same conclusion

and treating him accordingly.1 And to show that he received inappropriate treatment,

he points to the restrictive housing records on which his psychologists noted “[n]o

mental health concerns.” Jenkins says that these notations prove that his clinicians

disregarded his mental health needs, and he emphasizes that the state ALJ cited the

same records when criticizing his care at Columbia. But the complete record contradicts

his assertion. The documents that Jenkins highlights address only his ability to adjust

psychologically to restrictive housing, not his complete mental health; they are not

medical reports. Other records detail the full scope of the care he received.   

Based on the evidence submitted on summary judgment, a reasonable jury could

not find that Dr. Frisch’s ongoing care for Jenkins amounted to deliberate indifference

to his serious health needs. He met with Jenkins almost weekly for three months and at

least monthly after that. Each time, Dr. Frisch evaluated Jenkins for thoughts of

self‐harm, and he later tested Jenkins to determine whether Jenkins’s diagnosis was

appropriate. He then established what he believed was a more appropriate diagnosis,

and he attempted to treat Jenkins with thought restructuring to help him cope with

                                                 

1 Jenkins does not say what care he should have received, but he alleged in his

complaint that the inadequate care led to worsening mental health and self‐harm, and

he sought compensatory damages for pain and suffering as well as punitive damages.

The former are not available for emotional or mental injuries without physical injury,

however. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
No. 18‐3201    Page 5

changes and difficulties. Dr. Frisch encouraged Jenkins to consider medication and

scheduled an appointment with a psychiatrist when Jenkins requested one. And when

Dr. Norge met with Jenkins, he answered Jenkins’s questions, evaluated him for danger,

and recommended that he follow‐up with his primary clinician.

In the face of this record, Jenkins did not marshal sufficient evidence to create a

triable issue on the adequacy of Dr. Frisch’s or Dr. Norge’s care. Jenkins presented no

evidence that the treatment was not the product of the clinicians’ medical judgment, so

a reasonable jury could not find deliberate indifference to Jenkins’s serious health

needs. See Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2017). Although Jenkins disagrees

with his treatment, the meaningful and ongoing assessment of his needs that occurred

here is the “antithesis of deliberate indifference.” Harper v. Santos, 847 F.3d 923, 927

(7th Cir. 2017). There is no evidence that Dr. Frisch or Dr. Norge persisted in treatment

they knew to be ineffective. See Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2005). Jenkins

argues they must have been deliberately indifferent because other providers evaluated

him differently, but disagreement among medical professionals does not alone establish

deliberate indifference. See Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014).   

As for Jenkins’s state‐law claim for medical malpractice, a district court generally

should relinquish supplemental jurisdiction when all federal claims are resolved before

trial, but the only requirement is that it makes “a considered determination” whether to

retain jurisdiction. Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2010). Although the

district court did not explain why it retained jurisdiction, no party complains, so in the

interest of judicial economy, we resolve the appeal on the merits. See Nightingale Home

Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 589 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2009). Expert

testimony is generally required to establish medical malpractice. Carney‐Hayes v. Nw.

Wis. Home Care, Inc., 699 N.W.2d 524, 537 (Wis. 2005). But Jenkins did not submit any

nor argue that a layperson could find negligence based on common knowledge.

See Christianson v. Downs, 279 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Wis. 1979). On the other side, the

defendants provided sworn testimony from their supervisor that all staff treated

Jenkins with the appropriate standard of care. With nothing to contradict the licensed

psychologist’s opinion, no jury could conclude that Dr. Frisch or Dr. Norge negligently

inflicted injury on Jenkins, so the district court correctly entered judgment on this claim.

AFFIRMED