FIFTH DI VISI ON May 28, 2010

No. 1-08-2436 GARY PAL

M, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 2800 LAKE SHORE DRI VE CONDOMINI

UM ASSOCIATI ON, an Illinois Not-for-Profit Corporation, BOARD O F DIRECTORS of t he 2800 L

AKE SHORE CONDOMI

NIU M ASSOCI

ATIO N, and KA

Y S. GROSSMAN, Individually and as President of the Board. Defendants-Appellants, (The City of Chicag o, Intervenor-Appe llee.) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County

No. 00 CH 0679

Honorab le Sophia Ha

ll, Judge Presi ding.

JUSTICE FIT ZGERAL D SMITH deliver

ed the opi nion of the

court: This cause of action arose when Gary Palm (Palm) sought production of various books and rec ords fro m 2800 L ake Shor e Drive C ondominium

Associat ion (Assoc iation), p

ursuant t o the City of Chicago Condominium Ordinance (Chicago Municipal Code, §13-72-080 (2009)) (the Ordinance). The Association did not comply . Palm subsequently brought suit ag ainst the Association, the board of directors of 2800 L ake Shore Condominium Association (Board), and Ka y S. Gr os sm an (G ro ss ma n) , i nd iv id ua ll y an d a s p re si de nt of th e B oa rd (c ol le ct iv el y, defendants). Defendants claimed that the Associa tion did not have to comply with the Ordinance becaus e it co nflic ted wi th ex isti ng Illin ois l aw and, theref ore, wa s inv alid. The Ci ty of Chi cagoNo. 1-08-2436

2

(City ) interve ned, alle ging that the Or

dinance was valid

ly e nacted a ccordin g to its ho me rule power. The trial court granted Palm’s and the City’s (collectively

plaintiffs’) motion for summary judgme

nt in regards to the production of various recor ds, finding that the Ordinance was valid and did not conflict with Illinois law. The trial court also g ranted interim attorney

fees to Palm’s attorney. Def

endants now appeal, alleging that ( 1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgmen t to plainti ffs bec ause the Ordinance is inva

lid, (2) th e trial c ourt impro perly awarded attorney

fees at a rate of $300 per hour, (3) trial court erred in refusing to consider defendants’ motion for sanctions, and (4) the trial court er red in granting Palm’s request for documents pursuant to the Association’s declaration. For the following reasons, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND The 2800 Lake Shore Dr

ive building is a condominium building. There are more than 700 units in

the assoc iation. Gr

ossman ha

d served as a memb er of the

Board s ince 1982

and also as president of the Board. Palm is a unit owner and serve d on the Board from 1992 to 1998. While serving on the Board, Palm allegedly became aware of various improprie ties and departures from association by laws, including (1) Grossman exceeded her a uthority by

taking action without authorization from the Board, (2) Grossman and the Association’s c ounsel did not allow Board members access to Association docume nts, (3) Board members discussed condominium business, voted, and took action without giving proper notice to or opportunity for input from unit owners, (4) Grossman and management did not re quire bids on all contracts, (5) management awarded contr acts to relatives or entities owned by relatives without proper notifica tion to the B oard, an

d (6) manageme

nt did not ho ld “inside

r” contr actors li able for

faultyNo. 1-08-2436

3

workmanship. Accordingly , Palm requested access to certain Association rec ords. Grossman and the Association counsel denied him access to such documents, claiming that he did not have the right to inspect association records. Palm subsequently filed suit. Palm filed

his orig inal comp laint on Janu ary 13, 2000, naming th e Associa tion as the

sole defendant. Palm’s single-count complaint asked the trial cour t to grant an order requiring the Association to allow him to inspect certain records, declaring members of the Board exempt from having to state a proper purpose in orde r to obtain records, and declaring that the B oard may not take ac

tion except at an open meeting. The Association filed a motion to dismiss Palm’s complaint, alleging in part that his pray er for relief was inconsistent with I llinois’s Condominium Property Act (765 I

LCS 605/1 et seq . (West 2004)) and the Ordinance. The trial court g ranted the Association’s motion to dismiss the complaint, without prejudice. Palm then filed a first amended complaint against defenda nts. Count IV, the only

count at issue in this appeal, alleged that the Association failed to produce books and records under the Ordinance, the Condominium Property Act, the General Not For Profit Corporation Act of 1986 (805 IL CS 105/101.01 et seq . (West 2004)), and the Association’s declaration. Defenda nts filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court entered an order requiring the parties to submit supplemental briefs on whether the City properly e

nacted the Ordinance under its home rule authority , or whether state law preempts the Ordinance. T he parties filed supplemental briefs rega rding such issue. The trial judge, Judge Sidney Jones, entered a memorandum opinion and order on December 11, 2000, finding that I llinois law preempted the City’s home rule a uthority to enactNo. 1-08-2436

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the Ordinance, and thus, the Ordinance was inva lid. Palm then filed a motion to reconsider, and defendants filed a re sponse. Soon thereafter, the City filed a petition to intervene in support of Palm’s position. The trial cour t allowed the City to intervene, but denied Palm’s motion to reconsider. Plaintiffs then e ach filed a second motion to reconsider, and defendants responded. A new t rial j udge gran ted th e plai ntiff s’ seco nd mo tion to reco nsid er. Th e new t rial j udge vacated the prior dismissal order and found that neither the Condominium Property Act nor the General Not for Profit Corporation Act preempts the Ordinanc e. On January 31, 2003, the trial cour t entered summary

judgment in favor of Palm on count IV and ordere d the Association to immediately produce the requested documents to Palm. Palm then petitioned the court for an award of interim attorney fees. Palm submitted that an hourly ra

te of $300 was reasonable and appropria te. Palm noted that he paid his attorney $200 an hour, which was a reduced hourly rate. Palm alleged that it is ty pical in litigation where attorney fe es are recoverable pursua nt to statute for an attorney and client to enter into a fee agreement where the c lient pays a re duced hourly r ate, with the reasonable attorney fees to be determined upon th e conclu sion of the case. Pa lm filed a n affida vit of ret ired Judg e Kenne

th Gillis in support of his contention that $300 was a reasonable hourly rate, based on the market value of the work done. I n respons e to Palm’s

petition, d

efenda nts arg ued that t he court should not enter tain issue s rega

rding a ttorney fees unt il the conclusion of

the litig ation and

that Palm was not necessarily

the “prevailing plaintiff” under the ordinanc e. Defendants filed a motion for sanction s again st Palm for violation o f the tria

l court’s January 20, 2006, order by

disclosing

inNo. 1-08-2436

5

public filings the billing rate for the Association’s reg ular counsel. Defendants requested that, as a sanction, Palm’s request for interim attorney fees be denied. The trial court refuse d to consider defendants’ motion for sanctions and continued such motion gener ally. On August 26, 2008, the trial court granted Palm’s petition for interim attorne y fees a nd found him t

o be the pr

evailing party under the Ordinance. The

trial cou rt awar ded Palm f

ees at a rate of $300 per hour for the period of time fr om November 1, 2001 to January 31, 2003. Defendants now appeal the January 31, 2003, order granting Palm summary judgment, and the August 26, 2008, order granting interim attorney fe es. II. AN ALYS IS On appeal, defendants claim that (1) the trial cour t erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiffs because the Ordinance is invalid, (2) the trial cour t improperly awa

rded attorney

fees at a rate of $300 per hour, (3) the trial cour t erred in refusing to consider defe ndants’ motion for sanctions, and (4) the trial court erred in g ranting Palm’s request for certain docume nts pursuant to the declaration. A. Ordinance a Valid Exercise of City ’s Home Rule Power Defendants’ first argument on appe al is that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiffs because the Ordinance upon whic h plaintiffs relied on is invalid. Specifically, def

endants allege that the portion of the Ordinance relating to the production of a condominium association’s financial records is in direct conflict with both the Condominium Property Act a

nd the Illinois General Not for Profit Corpora tion Act. Plaintiffs respond that the Ordinance’s pr

ovision au

thorizing inspection of assoc iation re cords by unit owne

rs is a va lidNo. 1-08-2436

6

exercise of the City’s home rule power. We agree with the plaintiffs. The tria l court’s ruling t hat the Or

dinance was an a ppropria te exerc ise of hom e rule authority present s a questi on of law , which th is court r eviews de novo

. People v. Whitney , 188 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1999). Under th e Ill inois Consti

tution, a mu

nicipalit y with a popul ation exce eding 2 5,000 is deemed a “home rule unit” and is gra nted authority to enact laws relating to the rights and duties of its citize

ns: “[A] home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any

function pertaining to its gov ernment

and aff airs incl uding, b ut not limite d to, the power to re gulate for the protection of the pu blic hea lth, safe ty, morals an

d welfar e; to lice nse; to tax; and to incur debt.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI I, §6(a). There is no debate that the City of Chicago is a home rule unit. The above provision was intended to give home rule units like Chicago the broade st powers possible to regulate matters of local concern. Scadron v. City of Des Plaines , 153 Ill. 2d 164, 174 (1992). I n addition, the Illinois Constitution provides that the “[p]owers and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally.”

Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI I, §6(m). Here, de fendants do not argue that the City did not have home rule power to enact the Ordinance. Rather, they argue that I llinois law conflicts with the Ordinance and thus preempts the Ordinance . We disagree. The Ordi nance st ates in pe rtinent pa rt: “No person shall fail to allow unit owners to inspect the financial books and rec ords of th e condomi nium assoc iation with

in three business d

ay s of the timeNo. 1-08-2436

7

written request for examination of the records is receive d.” Chicago Municipal Code §13-72-080 (2009). The two pr

ovisions th at defe

ndants cl aims are

in conflic

t with the O rdinanc e are f ound in the Condom

inium Prope

rty Act and the Gener

al Not for Profit Cor

poration Act. The provision

in the Condom

inium Prope

rty Act authorizes any

member o f a condominium asso ciation to inspect, examine, and make copies of certain association rec ords at any re asonable time, at the association’s principal office, when the reque st is made in writing and with particularity , and provides that the association’s failure to make the recor ds available within 30 days of r eceipt of the request constitutes a denial. 765 IL CS 605/19(b), (e) (West 2008). The General Not for Profit Cor

poration Act allow s any

member o f such a c orporat ion who is e

ntitled to v ote to inspect the corporation’s books and records “for any proper

purpose at any

reasonable time.” 805 IL CS 105/107.75 (West 2008). Defendants argue that these two provisions are in dire ct conflict with the Ordinance and, therefore , the Ordinance is invalid. Howeve r, “[a] sta tute inten ded to limit

or deny home rule

powers mu st contain

an expres s statement to that effect,” Scadron , 153 Ill . 2d at 187, q uoti ng Stryker v. Villag e of Oak Park , 62 Ill. 2d 523, 529 (1976). Unless a state law “ specifically

states tha t a home r

ule unit’s power is limited, then the authority of the a home r ule unit to act concurrently with the State cannot be considered restricted.” (Emphasis in Origina .) Scadron , 153 Ill. 2d at 188. “‘Comprehensive’ legislation is insufficient to declare the state’s exercise of pow er to be exclusive.” City of Chicago v. Roman , 184 Ill. 2d 504, 517 (1998). To meet the require ments of section 6(h) of the Illinois Constitution, legislation must contain “express language that the a rea covered by

theNo. 1-08-2436

8

legislation is to be exclusively controlled by the State.” Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co . of I llinois , 158 I ll. 2d 133, 1 38 (1994) . “I t is not eno

ugh tha t the State comprehensively

regulates an area whic

h otherwise would fall into home rule power.” Citizens Utilities , 158 I ll. 2d at 13 8. “The G eneral Assembly

cannot express an i

ntent to e xercise exclusive control over a subject through coincidental compre hensive regulation.” American Health Care Providers, Inc . v. County of Cook , 265 Ill. App. 3d 919, 928 (1994). Moreove r, “[w]hen

the Gene ral Asse mbly intends to

preempt or exclude

home rule

units from exercising power over a matter, that body knows how to do so.” Roman , 184 Ill. 2d at 517. “In many statutes that touch on countless areas of our lives, the legislature ha s expressly stated that, pur suant to se ction 6(h ) or 6(i) , or both, o f articl e VI I of t he I llinois Cons titution, a statute is declared to be an exclusive exercise of power by the state and that such power shall not be exercised by home rule

units.” Roman , 184 Ill. 2d at 517. Applying these

principles to the case at bar, neither the Condominium Property Act nor the General Not for Profit Corporation Act specifica lly excludes home rule units from gove rning the manner by w

hich a unit owner can gain acc ess to a condominium association’s financial books and records. Although the Ordinance doe s not contain the exact same language a s the Condominium Property Act and the Gene ral Not for Profit Corporation Act, that by no means renders it invalid. See, e.g. , Scadron , 153 Ill. 2d at 194 (“‘[t]he fact that the state has occ upied some field of governmental endeavor, or that home rule ordinances are in some way inconsistent with state statutes, is not in itself sufficient to invalidate the local ordinances’”), quoting D. Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part II): L egislative Control, TransitionNo. 1-08-2436

9

Problems, and Intergove

rnmental Conflict , 1972 I ll. L. F. 559, 57 2 ; Roman , 184 Ill. 2d at 519 (conflicting provisions of the Illinois Criminal Code and the Unified Code of Corrections did not preempt home rule

ordinanc e prescribing more strin gent min imum prison

sentenc e for as sault against the elderly

where General Assembly did not specifically limit home rule power ); Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove , 103 Ill. 2d 483, 505-06 (1984) (state statutes reg ulating firearms did not preempt more restrictive local laws prohibiting posse ssion of handguns where statutes did not specifically state that f irearms control was the subject of exclusive state control); City of Evanston v. Create, I nc. , 85 Ill. 2d 101, 104-09 (1981) (state reg ulation of landlord-tenant relation ship did not

preempt authority of home r

ule munic ipalities

to regu late that relation ship differently or

more strictly). Accord ingly , becau se we fin

d that nei ther the Illinois Condomin

ium Act nor

the I llinois General Not for Profit Corporation Act specifically prohibits a home rule unit from governing the process by w hich a uni t owner ma

y g ain acc ess to a c ondominium associa tion’s financial r

ecords, the Ordinance’s provisions regarding this subject are valid. Defendants’ reliance on City of Oakbrook Terrace v. Suburban B ank & Trust Co. , 364 Ill. App. 3d 506 (2006), does not convince us otherwise. In Oakbrook Terrace , the court concluded that the a city ordinance that provided for a two-y ear amo rtization p eriod fo r existing nonconf orming a dvertisin g sign s was an in

valid exercise of home rule authority because it precluded the remedy of just compensation under the Illinois Eminent Domain Act (735 I LCS 5/7-101 (West 1998)). Oakbrook Terrace , 364 Ill. App. 3d at 516- 18. The c ourt foun d this to be

the case despite the fact that there was no Illinois law

inNo. 1-08-2436

10

existence which expressly prec luded the exercise of home rule authority in this area. Instead, the court stated that ordinances which contravene sta te statutes have been deemed invalid exercises of home rule authority. Oakbrook Terrace 364 Ill. App. 3d at 518. We disagree with the majority opinion in Oakbrook Terrace and instead choose to follow our supreme court’s precedent. As the dissent in Oakbrook Terrace noted, “Our supreme court has instru cted tha t, to limit home rule powers, the legisla ture must s ay

specific ally

the ‘stat ute constitutes a limitation on the power of home rule units to enact ordinances that are c ontrary to or inconsistent with the statute.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Oakbrook Terrace , 364 Ill. App. 3d at 522 (Call um, J ., di ssent ing), q uoti ng Roman , 184 I ll. 2d at 52 0. The dis sent wen t on to say : “The supreme court has decided that a g eneral reference to municipalities in a state statute is not sufficient to preempt home rule powers. I n Scadron , the supreme court he ld that the

legisla ture did n ot specif ically express its

intention t

o limit a home rule unit’s concurrent power to regulate advertising signs where the statute in question, which regulated outdoor advertising ne ar federally funded highway s, referred simply to municipal zoning authorities. [Citation.]T he statutory provision in that case re ad, in relevant part: ‘I n zoned commercial and industrial areas, whenever a State, county or municipal zoning authority has adopted laws or ordinances, which include reg ulations with respect to the size, lighting and spacing of signs *** the provisions of Section 6 [containing size, light, and spacing limitations] shall not apply to the ere ction of signs in such areas.’ [Citation.] Given this language, the issue in the case wa s not whether theNo. 1-08-2436

11

legisla ture had specific ally

declar ed that th e State ha

d exclusive

power to regula te signs - the quoted section gave municipalities the power to regulate signs - but whether it had spe cifical ly li

mited home

rule units ’ power

to concur rently regula te outdoor advertising signs along with the state. The c ourt was not persuaded that the statut ory langua ge was sufficie ntly specific to include

home rule municipa lities. No ting tha

t ‘[t]he legislature

is perfe ctly

capable of being specific when it wants to be’ [citation], the court held that the statute did not preempt the authority of home rule municipa lities to regulate - including via more restrictive regula tions that i

ncluded a total ban on signs u

nder ce rtain cir cumstanc es - outdo or ad

vert ising sign s in ar

eas subje ct to t

he sta tutor y provis ion. [C itati on.]” (Emphasis omitted.) Oakbrook Terrace , 364 Ill. App. 3d at 522. We agree with the dissent in Oakbrook Terrace and note that the majority opinion in that case failed to cite to any

of our supreme court cases we discussed a bove. Accordingly , we are unpersuaded by

defendant’s reliance on Oakbrook Terrace and maintain that the provisions of the Or di na nc e a t i ss ue co ns ti tu te d a va li d e xe rc is e o f t he Ci ty’ s h om e r ul e a ut ho ri ty. Defendants also allege, howeve r, that the portion of the Ordinance allowing for a ttorney fees to a unit owner who successfully obtains records from an association is preempted by existing Illinois law and is therefore invalid. Plaintiffs respond first that this issue is waived, and second, that the City has home rule authority beca

use there is no existing state law that spec ific ally

limits the r emed ies th at a h ome r

ule u nit ma y e nact in pa rticular circ umsta nces . We agree with plaintiffs.No. 1-08-2436

12

Initially we note that “[i]t is well settled that issues not raised in the trial court are deemed waived and may

not be raised for the first time on appeal.” Haudrich v. Howmedica, I nc. , 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996). Although defe ndants raised the issue of whether the ordinance provision s rega

rding r ecords i nspectio n by

condomini

um owner s were o

utside the City ’s home rule power, they

failed to raise the issue of whether the ordinance provisions regarding attorney fees were also outside the City ’s home rule power. Accordingly , defendants have waived such issue on review. However, even if we were to nevertheless reach this issue, we would find that the attorney fe es provision in the Ordinance would not be preempted by state law and would be a valid exer cise of the City ’s home r

ule powe r. As note d above, home rule units have

the same power as the sovereign, except where such powers are specifically limited by the Genera

l Assembly. Roman , 184 I ll. 2d at 51 3; City of Evanston , 85 Ill. 2d at 115. There is no question that I llinois has the powe r to provi de for a

n award of attorn ey fees to prevailing plaintiffs. See Taghert v. Wesley , 343 Ill. App. 3d 1140, 1147-48 (2003) (court upheld Illinois Condominium Property Ac t’s provision for attorney f ees where a plaintiff succeeds in an action against a condominium association to compel disclosure of books and record s); Becovi c v. Ci ty of Chi cago , 296 Ill. App. 3d 236 (1998) (upholding attorne y fees provision under Illinois Human Rights Act). Thus, the City of Chicago, as a home rule unit, has the same power to provide f or attorney

fees to a prevail ing par

ty, as long a s it is not spe cifical ly preempted by sta

te legislature. See Atkins v. City of Chicago Comm. on Human Relations , 281 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1077 (1996) (upholding award of attorney ’s fees by Chicago Commission onNo. 1-08-2436

13

Human Relations where Illinois Human Rights Act’ s provision for attorney f ees in state matter did not limit that remedy by “denying or restricting the same right to local matters” ). None of these Illinois statutes contradicts the fee pr ovision in the Ordinance. Defendants nevertheless rely on City of Naperville v. Lerch , 198 Ill. App. 3d 578 (1990), and Village of Glenview v. Zwick , 356 Ill. App. 3d 630 (2005), to support their proposition that state law preempts the Ordinance’s provision on attorney fees. In Lerch , the court noted that the general rule is that absent a statute or a greement of the parties, the parties g enerally pa y their own attorney fe es. Lerch , 198 I ll. App. 3d at 583-84 . The cou

rt went on

to hold tha

t a home r

ule ordinance is not a statute, so a home rule unit’s ordinance that provided f or an attorney

fee award contrary to the general rule was unauthorized. Lerch , 198 Ill. App. 3d at 583-84. The court noted, “we have found no case law, nor ha s plaintiff provided any, tha t raises an ordinance of a municipality *** to the level of a statute of the General Assembly .” Lerch , 198 Ill. App. 3d at 584. We agre e with pla intiffs, however , that this h olding c annot be r

econcil ed with se ction 6(i) of the article VII

of the Illinois Constitution. As stated by our supreme court in Roman eight years a fter Lerch , a home rule unit’s ordinance is elevated to the level of a statute so long as (1) the ordinance pertains to the unit’s government and a ffairs, and (2) the subject matter of the ordinance was not excluded or preempted. See Roman , 184 I ll. 2d at 51 3; Zwick , 356 Ill. App. 3d at 638. As noted above, defendants do not contend that the Ordinanc e does not pertain to the City’s gover

nment and affairs. Additionally , the subject matter of attorney ’s fees has not been specifically pr

eempted by the State. Accordingly , we are unpersuaded by defendants’ reliance onNo. 1-08-2436

14

Lerch

. In Zwick , Glenview (a home rule unit), filed a complaint ag ainst the defendant alleging that defendant had violated its refuse ordinance. Zwick , 356 Ill. App. 3d at 631-32. Glenview sought a ttorney fees und er a villa ge ord inance w hich prov ided: “‘If the Villag e proceeds in any court of record to enforce a nd/or defend any provision s of the Mu

nicipal Co de of the

Village of Glenview, as f

rom time to

time amended, and is successful in either the enforc ement or defense proceeding s as refer red to he rein, the village shall rec over its r

easonab le attorney [] fees and costs incurred in the course of those proceeding s from the person and/or entity who has been found to have violated the Municipal Code of the Village of Glenview and/or who has initiated proceedings.’” Zwick , 356 Ill. App. 3d at 632, quoting Glenview Municipal Code, Ch. 1, §1.13 (eff. June 21, 1994). The trial court held that the fee-shifting ordinanc e was an improper exercise of Glenview’s home rule authority and the reviewing court affirme d. Zwick , 356 Ill. App. 3d at 641. The court found that the ordinance did not pertain to its local gove rnment and affairs because it discour

aged th ose who r eceive d a citati on from Gl enview f rom chal lenging

it in state court for fear that they

would have to pay Glenview’s attorney fees if they

lost. This therefore impacted access to the state court sy stem. See Zwick , 356 Ill. App. 3d at 641. The court noted, “Glenvie w’s fee -shifting

ordinanc e repre sents a r

eal and i mmediate dange r to a citi zen’s rig

ht to challenge a Glenview ordinanc e he or she finds doubtful, as it discourages litigation conc erning the validity of any

of its ordinances.” Zwick , 356 Ill. App. 3d at 641.No. 1-08-2436

15

Conversely in the ca se at bar, the Ordinance provision in question states that “[i]n any action brought to enforce any provision of [the Ordinance] *** the prevailing plaintiff shall be entitled to recover, in addition to any other remedy

available, his reasonable attorney fees.” Chicago Municipal Code §13-72-100 (2009). The Ordinanc e does not state, as it did in Zwick , that if the plaintiff who brings the case does not preva il, he must pay the City ’s attorney f ees. Therefore, the Ordinance’ s attorney fe e provision is a consumer protection provision allowing plaintiffs to bring a meritorious action to enforce the Or dinance without fearing a financia l loss. This provi sion in no w ay

discoura ges litig ation con

cerning the valid ity o f the Ord

inance, as it did in Zwick . See Zwick , 356 Ill. App. 3d at 641. I llinois courts have routinely upheld state a nd local attorney f

ees provisions that serve this purpose, as noted above. See also Pitts v. Holt , 304 Ill. App. 3d 871, 873 (1999) (upheld attorney fee provision in city’s landlor d-tenant ordinance because such “at torney fees pr ovisions a

re mean t to give a financ ial incen

tive to att orney s to litigate on behalf of those clients who have meritorious case s but who, due to the limited nature of the controver sy, would not normally consider litigati on as bein

g in thei r client’ s financ ial best interest ); Page v. City of C hicago , 299 Ill. App. 3d 450, 467-68 (1998) (upheld attorne y fee provision in city’s human rights ordina nce and noted that “an award of a ttorney fee s is required to ensure that individuals filing complaints, who are often economically disadvantaged, receive proper representation and to enforce the public policy g oals behind the legislation”). Accord ingly , we find

defenda nts’ arg ument tha t the fee provision

in the Ord

inance i s invalid is without merit. B. Amount of Attorney FeesNo. 1-08-2436

16

Defendants’ next contention on appeal is that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees at a rate g reatly in excess o f the amo

unt of attorney

fees inc urred by Palm. Def

endants allege that Palm contracted with his attorney to pay $200 per hour , and that Palm did in fact pay his attorney $200 per hour for his legal services, y

et the trial court awarded Palm’s attorney fees at a rate of $300 pe

r hour. Pa

lm responds that the

$200 hour

ly r ate was a reduce d rate hi s attorney allowe d him to pay, but that $300 is the reasonable r ate based on the market value of the work It is well settled that the party seeking attorney

fees alway s bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence from which the trial court ca n render a decision as to their reasonablene ss. LaHood v. Couri , 236 I ll. App. 3d 641, 648 ( 1992). An

appropr iate fee consists o f reasonable charges for reasona

ble services; however, to justify a fee, more must be presented than a mer e compilation of hours multiplied by a fixed hourly rate or bills issued to the client, since this type of data, without mor

e, does not provide

the cour t with suff

icient inf ormation a s to their reasonableness. LaHood , 236 Ill. App. 3d at 648. Rather, the petition for fee s must specify the service s perfor

med, by whom they

were pe rformed , the time e

xpended the

reon, an d the hour

ly rate charged there for. LaHood , 236 I ll. App. 3d at 648-49 . Beca

use of the importanc e of thes e factors, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to present detailed records maintained dur ing the course of the litigation containing facts and c omputations upon which the charges are pre dicated. LaHood , 236 Ill. App. 3d at 648-49. Once presented with these facts, the trial cour t should consider a variety of additional factors such as the skill and standing of the attorney , the nature of the case, the novelty and/or difficulty of the issues and work involved, the importance of the matter, the degr ee ofNo. 1-08-2436

17

responsi bility require d, the usua

l and cust omary charg es for c omparab le servic es, the be nefit to the client, and whether there is a reasona ble connection between the fees and the a mount involved in the litigation. LaHood , 236 I ll. App. 3d at 649. Th e decisi on of the t rial cou rt will not be reversed absent an abuse of discr etion. LaHood , 236 Ill. App. 3d at 649. In the case at ba

r, Palm provided the trial court with detailed records containing f acts and computations upon which he predicated his charge for attorney

fees. He also presented the court with information about his attorney’s skill and standing , the nature of the case, the usual and customar y charge s for com

parable service s, and an

affida vit of a re tired judg e in suppor

t of his petition f or attorney

fees. The trial c ourt cons idered a ll these f acts and found tha

t the rea sonable fee wa s $300 an hour for s ervice s render ed. We do not find tha

t the tria l court a bused its discretion in coming to such conclusion. C. Motion for Sanctions Defendants’ next contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in re fusing to consider their motion for sanctions alleging that Palm violated an order of the court. Defendants argue that if the trial court had considered the motion, the trial court would have struck dow n Palm’s request for attorney

fees based on his “blatant disregard f or the court’s January

20, 2006, order establishing the procedure for consider ing attorney ’s fees in this case.” Palm responds that the motion for sanctions is not a part of this appeal, as it was continued in the trial court. The trial court’s January

20, 2006, order provided in pertinent part that “[t]he scope of discovery re lated to Plaintiff’s pending interim fee petition, presented to the Court on or about September 19, 2005, will be governed by N.D. Ill. L ocal Rule 54.3 (‘the Rule’), including theNo. 1-08-2436

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confidentiality provisions of that Rule.” The c onfidentiality provisions of Rule 54.3 provide as follows: “All information furnished by a ny party under this section shall be treated as strictly confidential by the pa

rty rec eiving the information. The information shall be used solely for purposes of fee litig ation and

shall be d

isclosed to other p ersons, i f at all, only in Court fi lings or

hearing s relate d to the fe e litiga tion. That

party receiving such information who proposes to disclose it in a Court filing or hearing shall provide the par ty furnishing it with prior written notice and a reasonable opportunity to request an appropriate protective order.” N.D. I ll. Local R. 54.3(d). The parties then confidentially exchanged billing records relating to the time spent by each side on the matter, including hourly rates. Thereafter, Palm filed a motion for par tial summary judgmen t, which d isclosed the assoc iation’s g eneral counsel’ s hourly

rate. De fendant s then filed a motion for sanctions arguing that bec ause the motion for partial summary judgment was a pleading unrelated to the fee litigation and not filed under seal, it constituted a violation of the trial court’s January 20, 2006, or der when it included general counse l’s hourly rate. Defendants contended that the trial court should sanction Palm for such a violation by vacating his interim attorney fee

award and requiring Palm to pay defendants’ reasonable attorney fees incurred in preparing and pre senting the motion for sanctions. The trial court ordered that any issues related to the motion for sanctions were continuedNo. 1-08-2436

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generally , and then it issued its order granting Palm’s request for attorney fe es. Defendants argue that had t he trial c ourt cons idered t heir motion for san

ctions, it would have

struck Pa lm’s requ est for interim fees based on his disregard f or the January 20, 2006, orde r. We first note that this section of defendants’ brief contains absolutely no citations to legal authority whatsoe ver. Supr eme Court

Rule 341(

h)(7) pr ovides tha

t an appe llant’s br

ief must contain “the contentions of the appellant and the reasons ther efor, with citations of the authorities and the pages of the recor d relied on.” 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7). F urthermore, if a point is not argued, it is waived and cannot be ra ised in a reply brie f, oral argument, or petition for rehea ring. 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7). “The we ll-established rule is that mere contentions, without argument or citation of authority, do not merit consider ation on appeal.” People v. Hood , 210 Ill. App. 3d 743, 746 (1991). “Contentions supported by some a rgument but by a

bsolutely no authority

do not meet the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341([h])(7).” Hood , 210 Ill. App. 3d at 746. “A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clea rly defined w

ith pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository into which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.” Hood , 210 Ill. App. 3d at 746. According ly, we may treat the issue raised as having been waived for failure to cite authority

. Waiver aside, we find that this issue is not a final, appealable order a nd is therefore not properl y be fore this

court at this time. A

t trial, th e court c ontinued t he motion f

or sanct ions, choosing not to rule on it before granting plaintiffs partial summary judg ment. Accordingly , the trial cou rt’s con tinuance was not a

final and appea

lable or der bec ause the

order di d not fina

lly determine the re spondent’ s rights and statu s as to the

matter of sanction s, and it wa s subject toNo. 1-08-2436

20

further determination by

the court. See In re

Guzik , 249 Ill. App. 3d 95, 99 (1993). D. Declaration Provisions Defendants’ final contention on appeal is that the trial court er red in allowing production of certain documentation pursuant to the association’s declara tion. Defendants note that the trial court found that Palm was entitled to records based on both the Ordinance and section 6.05 of the declaration. They

argue that the trial court should not have allowed doc ument requests based on section 6 .05 of the

Declar ation bec ause tha

t section c onflicts w

ith section 19 of the

Illinois Condominium Property Act (the Act) ( 765 IL CS 605/4.1 (b) (West 2004)), and therefore Palm’s requests for certain documents should have been de nied. Specifically, de fendants argue that section 6.05 of the declaration does not require a plaintiff to state a proper purpose for requests of financial records, while section 19 of the Act re quires a plaintiff to state a proper purpose for requests of financial records. We must fir st note tha

t defend ants have again f ailed to c ite to a sin

gle poin t of autho rity in support of their proposition. As noted above, Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) provides that an appella nt’s brie f must con

tain “the contenti ons of the

appella nt and the reasons theref ore, with citations of the authorities and the pages of the rec ord relied upon.” 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7)

. “Contentions supported by some arg ument but absolutely no authority do not meet the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341([h])(7).” Hood , 2 10 Ill . A pp . 3 d a t 7 46 . A cc or di ng ly, we may tre at this issue as waived for failing to cite to authority

. Waiver aside, we note that section 4.1(b) of the Act, which de fendant relies on, provides that exce pt to the e xtent other

wise prov ided by the decl aration

or other condomini

um instrume

ntsNo. 1-08-2436

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recorded prior to the effective da te of this Act, “in the event of a conflict between the pr ovisions of the de clarati on and the byl aws or other condominium instr uments, th e decla

ration pr evails except to the extent the declaration is inconsistent with this Act.” 765 IL CS 605/4.1(a)(6)(b) (West 2004). Defendants claim section 6.05 of the declara tion is inconsistent with section 19 of the Act and, therefore, the trial court er red permitting financial records to be produc ed to Palm. Section 6. 05 of the d

eclara tion state s: “The Bo ard shal l keep fu ll and cor rect boo ks and re cords in chronological order of the rec eipts and expenditures affecting the Common Elements, specifying a nd itemizing the maintenance and repair expenses of the Common Elements and any other expenses incurre d. Such re cords an d the vouc

hers aut horizing the pay ments shall be a vailable for inspe ction at th e offic e of the A ssociation, if any, by any Unit Owner

or any holder

of a first mortgage lien on a Unit Ownership, at such reasonable time or times during normal business hours as may be r equested by the U

nit Owners. Upon ten (10) days notice

to the Board and pay

ment of a reasonable fee, any Unit Owner shall be furnished a statement of his account setting forth the amount of any

unpaid assessments or other charges due a n owing from such Unit Owner.” Defendants point to section 19(a)(9) and section 19(e) of the Act as being inconsistent with the above provision. Such sections provide that an association member shall have the rig htNo. 1-08-2436

22

to inspec t the books

and rec ords of a

ccount f or the as sociation ’s curr

ent and te n immediat

ely preceding y

ears, only for

a proper purpose stated in writing. We do not find that the Act and the declaration are inconsistent just because one re quires a proper purpose to be stated and one does not, before inspecting financial rec ords. And even if we were to find that the Act super ceded the declar ation and Palm was r

equired to state a proper p urpose in writing , we would

find that he did so. I n his orig inal lette

r to the a ssociation, Palm sta ted that h e was se eking d ocuments to establish fraud, mismanagement, or self-dea ling. It has been he ld that a proper purpose for inspectin g books a nd recor ds under t he Act is t

o establish corpor

ate misma

nageme nt, and thi s court has held that “where a unit owner asse rted a good-faith fear of

mismanagement of financial matters by the assoc iation, he established a proper purpose to inspect the recor ds of the condominium association’s delinquency r eports and itemized bills.” Taghert v. Wesley , 343 I ll. App. 3d 1140, 1146-47 (2003). Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in granting Palm’s request for financial records. III. CONCL USION For the foregoing r

easons, we affirm the judgment of the circ uit court of Cook County. Judgment affirmed. TOOMIN, P.J., and HOWSE, J., concur.