IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 12–1758

Filed August 16, 2013

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellant,

vs.

JEFFREY K. RAGLAND,

Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, 

Timothy O’Grady, Judge. 

The State appeals the district court’s refusal to sentence defendant 

in accordance with the Governor’s commutation order. AFFIRMED. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant 

Attorney General, Matthew D. Wilber, County Attorney, and Margaret J. 

Popp-Reyes, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant. 

Jon M. Kinnamon of Kinnamon, Kinnamon, Russo, Meyer & 

Keegan, Cedar Rapids, for appellee. 
2

CADY, Chief Justice. 

In this appeal, we must decide if the district court erred in 

resentencing a defendant who was convicted as a juvenile of first-degree 

murder and mandatorily sentenced to life without parole after he claimed 

his sentence violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and 

unusual punishment and after the Governor of Iowa commuted the 

sentence to sixty years without parole. We conclude the district court 

properly resentenced the defendant. We affirm the sentence imposed by 

the district court. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

Jeffrey Ragland was seventeen years old in 1986 when he and two 

friends attacked another group of boys in a grocery store parking lot in 

Council Bluffs. Ragland instigated the fight by making aggressive 

comments, while the boys in the other group attempted to avoid a 

conflict. Moments before the confrontation turned tragic, Ragland yelled 

either “Let’s do it” or “We’re gonna fight.” One of the boys with Ragland 

then promptly swung a tire iron he was carrying and struck one of the 

boys in the other group, Timothy Sieff, in the head. Sieff fell to the 

ground and subsequently died from the blow. 

Ragland was charged with first-degree murder for Sieff’s death and 

was prosecuted as an adult. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of 

first-degree murder under the felony-murder doctrine. The district court 

then sentenced Ragland to a term of life in prison without parole. The 

sentence was mandatory under Iowa law. See Iowa Code § 902.1 

(2013).1 

 

1The version of the Code in effect at the time of the homicide was the 1987 Code. 

However, no relevant, substantive changes have been made, and for purposes of this 

opinion, we will refer to the 2013 Code unless otherwise indicated. 
3

Ragland has been incarcerated in the state penal system since his 

conviction. Now forty-four years old, he has pursued numerous 

postconviction relief actions in state and federal court during his 

imprisonment, including an application to correct his sentence. In 2012, 

we responded to this application by directing the district court to 

consider whether the mandatory life sentence without parole Ragland 

was serving constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the State 

and Federal Constitutions. We remanded the case to the district court to 

conduct a hearing on the question.2 State v. Ragland, 812 N.W.2d 654, 

659 (Iowa 2012). 

On June 25, 2012, shortly after our directive for the district court 

to consider the constitutionality of Ragland’s sentence, but prior to the 

hearing, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 

U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). The Court held the 

Eighth Amendment prohibited “a sentencing scheme that mandates life 

in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Id. at ___, 

132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424. The Court found that 

defendants who committed homicide crimes as juveniles and faced a 

sentence of life without parole were entitled to a sentencing hearing that 

would permit the sentencing court to consider the individual 

characteristics of the defendant and the individual circumstances of the 

crime as mitigating factors for a lesser sentence. See id. at ___, 132 

S. Ct. at 2475, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 418. 

 

2In Veal v. State, we determined a challenge to a sentence of life without the 

possibility of parole is a challenge to an illegal sentence and thus not subject to the 

three-year statute of limitations for postconviction relief actions. 779 N.W.2d 63, 65 

(Iowa 2010). In State v. Bruegger, we held a defendant may now mount an as-applied 

challenge to his or her sentence as cruel and unusual. 773 N.W.2d 862, 884 (Iowa 

2009). 
4

The district court scheduled a hearing on the application for 

resentencing filed by Ragland for August 28. On July 26, however, the 

Governor of Iowa commuted Ragland’s sentence, as well as the sentences 

of thirty-seven other inmates in Iowa’s prison system who, like Ragland, 

had received statutorily mandated sentences of life without parole for 

crimes committed as juveniles. For all thirty-eight defendants, the 

Governor commuted the sentences to life with no possibility for parole for 

sixty years and directed that no credit be given for earned time. The full 

text of the commutation provides: 

WHEREAS, in the recent case of Miller v. Alabama the United 

States Supreme Court ruled that states cannot 

mandate life sentences without the possibility of parole 

for murderers who committed their crimes before the 

age of eighteen; and 

WHEREAS, now after the Court’s ruling, up to 38 dangerous 

juvenile murderers will seek resentencing and more 

lenient sentences; and 

WHEREAS, it is a serious violation of federalism for the 

federal supreme court to throw out long-standing Iowa 

sentences; and 

WHEREAS, the Eighth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual 

punishments,” which allows the Court to ensure the 

method of punishment does not violate constitutional 

rights, but does not allow them to substitute their own 

judgment for that of the duly-elected legislature on 

issues of proportionality and public safety; and 

WHEREAS, in the Miller v. Alabama opinion the Court used 

“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 

of a maturing society” to justify their decision, but 

ignored the fact that first degree murder itself violates 

the most fundamental right of a free society—the right 

to live; and 

WHEREAS, unlike elected and accountable Iowa legislators, 

the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to 

hear from the friends and family members of the 

victims of first degree murderers, nor do they live in 

the Iowa communities affected by their ruling; and 

WHEREAS, first degree murder is an intentional and 

premeditated crime and those who are found guilty are 
5

dangerous and should be kept off the streets and out 

of our communities; and 

WHEREAS, the penalty for second degree murder, a lesser 

offense, is fifty years in prison; and 

WHEREAS, an appropriate sentence for first degree murder 

is life in prison, evidenced by the fact that when the 

General Assembly changed criminal penalties for other 

crimes committed before the age of eighteen the 

sentence for first degree murder was not changed; and 

WHEREAS, after the decision in Miller v. Alabama, the 

decision about whether a juvenile first degree 

murderer will be released, or remain in prison, is 

taken away from the legislature, and given to judges, it 

is imperative that action is taken to ensure our public 

safety. 

KNOW YE, that by virtue of the authority vested in me by the 

laws of the Constitution of the State of Iowa, I, Terry E. 

Branstad, Governor of the State of Iowa, do hereby 

COMMUTE the sentence of Jeffrey K. Ragland 

#0803013, who after being found guilty of the crime of 

Murder in the First Degree in violation of Iowa Code 

section 707.2 from events occurring on or about 

August 16, 1986 was transferred by order of the 

Pottawattamie County Court to the custody of the Iowa 

Department of Corrections for a term of imprisonment 

of life without opportunity for parole, to a term of life 

with no possibility for parole or work release for sixty 

(60) actual years, with no credit for earned time. 

At the hearing before the district court on August 28, Ragland 

argued he should still be resentenced under Miller. He claimed the 

commutation of his sentence by the Governor was unconstitutional 

because it failed to follow the individualized considerations mandated by 

Miller. 

Several persons testified at the resentencing hearing that they 

believed Ragland’s sentence should be lessened. John Nelson Sr., owner 

of a business called SilverStone Group, testified he had hired one of 

Ragland’s codefendants, Robert Lamkins, following the incident. 

Lamkins worked in Nelson’s office, and Nelson helped Lamkins pay for 

college. Nelson considered Lamkins a successful rehabilitation. Nelson 
6

testified he would gladly hire Ragland upon release from prison. Patrick 

Hanafan, Mayor of Council Bluffs, also voiced testimony supportive of 

Ragland’s release from prison. 

Ragland’s brother, Ronald Ragland Jr., testified that a support 

network would be in place for Ragland upon Ragland’s release, as well as 

living arrangements and a vehicle. Additionally, he testified that he has 

developed a friendship with the victim’s older brother, Ben. 

Ragland’s companions during the fateful fight in 1986, Matt Gill 

and Robert Lamkins, sent letters to County Attorney Matt Wilber. Gill’s 

letter is particularly poignant. Gill wrote that he was “solely responsible 

for the death of Timothy Sieff.” He expressed remorse for causing Sieff’s 

death and stated that he pled guilty to second-degree murder and served 

just three years in prison. He continued: 

As I understand it, part of the rationale for [charging 

Ragland with first-degree murder] from the prosecutor at the 

time is that Jeff Ragland was painted as the “Ring Leader” 

and the prosecutor believed that the fight would not have 

happened if it were not for Jeff being there. At times they 

made it sound like the rest of us that were there that night 

were somehow victims of being in the wrong place at the 

wrong time and had the bad luck of being with Jeff Ragland 

who was just out looking for a fight. This is just absolutely 

not true. Jeff was not a “Ring Leader” who somehow caused 

us to be willing and ready to get into a fight that we would 

have otherwise never engaged in. The time and place in 

which we grew up coupled with the fact that we were young, 

impulsive 17 year olds with poor judgment are the reasons 

we were willing to engage in a fight, not because we were 

unlucky enough to be with Jeff Ragland. In fact, looking 

back on it now it is glaringly obvious that it was Jeff who 

was unlucky to be with me that night, not the other way 

around. Jeff had only been with us for less than 30 minutes 

that night, yet he is still in prison 26 years later because of 

the terrible decisions I made. 

Gill closed by conveying gratitude for the second chance he 

received. He also expressed hope that Ragland would receive a similar 

opportunity for rehabilitation. “Keeping Jeff Ragland in prison will . . . 
7

not bring back Timothy Sieff or undo what was done on that terrible 

night in 1986,” Gill wrote. “How can it be that I, the person who is 

actually directly responsible for Timothy Sieff’s death was given a second 

chance and am allowed to live freely in society, but Jeff Ragland is not?” 

After considering the testimony provided at the hearing, the district 

court found the Governor exceeded his authority by commuting the 

sentence because the commutation circumvented the individualized 

sentencing required under Miller and deprived Ragland of a meaningful 

opportunity to demonstrate his maturity and rehabilitation. The district 

court resentenced Ragland to life in prison with the possibility of parole 

after twenty-five years.3 Consequently, the new sentence imposed by the 

district court made Ragland immediately eligible for parole. 

The State sought discretionary review, which we granted. On 

review, the State argues that the Governor was authorized to commute 

the sentence and the district court was required to accept the commuted 

sentence as the launching point for the application for resentencing. 

Thus, the State argues Ragland was no longer serving a life sentence 

without parole at the time of resentencing, and the individualized 

sentencing considerations of Miller, accordingly, were no longer 

applicable to him. As a result, the State contends resentencing was 

improper because the sentence that Ragland was serving was no longer 

illegal. Ragland argues the Governor had no authority to use his 

 

3The district court also found the legislature had amended section 902.1 in 2011 

to require that juveniles be eligible for parole after twenty-five years. 2011 Iowa Acts 

ch. 131, § 147 (codified at Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(a) (Supp. 2011)). Thus, the district 

court reasoned, “The Commutation of Sentence to Ragland exceeds the Governor’s 

authority.” Consequently, the district court refused to give effect to the commutation 

order and held that Ragland’s December 15, 1986 sentence violated the Eighth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa 

Constitution. 
8

commutation powers to circumvent the constitutional requirements of 

Miller that entitled him to be resentenced by the court under a process 

that would consider and account for the individualized attributes of 

youth in mitigation of punishment. Ragland, however, did not challenge 

the new sentence imposed by the district court. 

II. Scope of Review. 

A challenge to an illegal sentence is reviewed for correction of legal 

errors. State v. Valin, 724 N.W.2d 440, 444 (Iowa 2006); see also Iowa R. 

App. P. 6.907. When, as here, the defendant mounts a constitutional 

challenge to an allegedly illegal sentence, the standard of review is

de novo. State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Iowa 2012); State v. 

Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 869 (Iowa 2009). 

Ragland challenges his sentence under both the Eighth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution4 and article I, section 17 of 

the Iowa Constitution.5 Ragland does not suggest application of a 

standard under article I, section 17 other than the standard employed by 

the United States Supreme Court under the Eighth Amendment. 

Accordingly, we use the federal substantive standard of cruel and 

unusual punishment but reserve the right to apply the standard in a 

more stringent fashion than federal precedent. See Bruegger, 773 

N.W.2d at 883. 

 

4The Eighth Amendment reads, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. 

amend. VIII. 

5Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution provides, “Excessive bail shall not 

be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and unusual punishment 

shall not be inflicted.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 17. 
9

III. Discussion. 

The State argues Miller does not apply to Ragland because the 

Governor commuted the sentence to a term less than life without parole. 

Ragland argues both his original sentence and his sentence, as 

commuted, are unconstitutional. Ragland’s argument is built on the 

premise that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review of other 

mandatory life-without-parole sentences for defendants who committed a 

homicide as a juvenile. Thus, we must first determine if Miller applies 

retroactively. 

A. Retroactive Application of Miller. We recognize an absence 

of definite authority addressing whether Miller applies retroactively to 

cases on collateral review. Yet, we primarily focus our inquiry on the 

Miller decision itself because equal justice requires that when a new 

substantive rule is applied to a defendant in the case announcing the 

new rule, the rule must “be applied retroactively to all who are similarly 

situated.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1070, 

103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 349 (1989). Thus, it is important to carefully 

scrutinize the Miller decision when considering whether it applies 

retroactively because a new rule announced by the Supreme Court does 

not become retroactive by subsequent decisions of other courts, but by 

the action taken by the Supreme Court in the case announcing the new 

rule. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663, 121 S. Ct. 2478, 2482, 150 

L. Ed. 2d 632, 642 (2001). 

The competing arguments over the retroactivity of Miller essentially 

narrow the inquiry to whether the decision merely established a new 

penalty-phase procedure for courts to follow before imposing a life 

sentence without parole for crimes committed by juveniles or whether the 

decision established either a substantive rule of law or one that 
10

implicates fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. 

See Teague, 489 U.S. at 307–10, 109 S. Ct. at 1073–75, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 

353–56 (discussing two situations in which new constitutional rules will 

be given retroactive application). Normally, procedural changes do not 

apply retroactively, while substantive rules of law and watershed rules of 

criminal procedure have retroactive application. See Perez v. State, 816 

N.W.2d 354, 358 (Iowa 2012). 

In Miller, the Court held that mandatory sentences of life without 

parole are unconstitutional for juveniles prosecuted as adults. 567 U.S. 

at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424. The decision is rooted 

in the Eighth Amendment and built primarily on the Court’s prior 

jurisprudence in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 

L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 

161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005); and Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 

S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1988). See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 

S. Ct. at 2463, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 417–18. These decisions identified “two 

strands of precedent” reflecting a need for “proportionate punishment.” 

Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2463, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 417. 

The first strand of cases involved “categorical bans on sentencing 

practices based on mismatches between culpability of a class of offenders 

and the severity of a penalty.” Id.; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 

S. Ct. at 2034, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 850 (“The Constitution prohibits the 

imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who 

did not commit homicide.”); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446, 

128 S. Ct. 2641, 2664, 171 L. Ed. 2d 525, 555 (2008) (holding the Eighth 

Amendment forbids imposition of the death penalty for crimes in which 

the offender did not kill the victim or intend the victim to die); Roper, 543 

U.S. at 578, 125 S. Ct. at 1200, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 29 (“The Eighth and 
11

Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on 

offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were 

committed.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 

2252, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335, 350 (2002) (“[W]e . . . conclude . . . the 

Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take 

the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 

U.S. 399, 405, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2599, 91 L. Ed. 2d 335, 344 (1986))); 

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838, 108 S. Ct. at 2700, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 720 

(“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a 

person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense.”). 

The second strand of cases prohibited mandatory capital 

punishment by “requiring that sentencing authorities consider the 

characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before 

sentencing him to death.” Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64, 

183 L. Ed. 2d at 418; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 

S. Ct. 2954, 2964–65, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 990 (1978) (“[W]e conclude that 

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all 

but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as 

a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and 

any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 

basis for a sentence less than death.” (Footnote omitted.)); Woodson v. 

North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L. Ed. 2d 

944, 961 (1976) (“[W]e believe that in capital cases the fundamental 

respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires 

consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and 

the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally 

indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” 

(Citation omitted.)). 
12

To implement its substantive constitutional prohibition against 

mandatory life-without-parole sentences, Miller requires courts to 

establish a procedure providing for an individualized sentencing hearing 

tailored to the unique attributes of juveniles when prosecuted as adults 

for homicide and facing a sentence of life without parole.6 See 567 U.S. 

at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2471, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 426. While Graham flatly 

prohibits the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence for a 

nonhomicide crime committed by a juvenile in order to afford the juvenile 

a meaningful opportunity to gain release in the future based on maturity 

and rehabilitation, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 

846, Miller prohibits mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 

juveniles, but would seemingly permit life-without-parole sentences that 

are not mandated by statute if the sentencing court has the power to 

consider the attributes of youth in the mitigation of punishment, see 567 

U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 423–24. 

From a broad perspective, Miller does mandate a new procedure. 

Yet, the procedural rule for a hearing is the result of a substantive 

change in the law that prohibits mandatory life-without-parole 

sentencing. Thus, the case bars states from imposing a certain type of 

punishment on certain people. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 

352, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442, 448 (2004) (recognizing 

 

6In Miller, the Court described the factors that the sentencing court must 

consider at the hearing, including: (1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the 

features of youth, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks 

and consequences”; (2) the “family and home environment” that surrounded the youth; 

(3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the youth’s] 

participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected 

[the youth]”; (4) the “incompetencies associated with youth—for example, [the youth’s] 

inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or 

[the youth’s] incapacity to assist [the youth’s] own attorneys”; and (5) “the possibility of 

rehabilitation.” Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2468, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 423. 
13

rules placing certain groups beyond the power of the state to punish are 

given retroactive application). “Such rules apply retroactively because 

they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant’ . . . faces a 

punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” See id. at 352, 124 

S. Ct. at 2522–23, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 448 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 

523 U.S. 614, 620, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828, 838–39 

(1998)). 

More specifically, the cases used by the Court in Miller to support 

its holding have been applied retroactively on both direct and collateral 

review. See In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 261–62 (5th Cir. 2011) 

(indicating Graham was made retroactive on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court as a matter of logical necessity under Tyler); see also 

Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669, 121 S. Ct. at 2486, 150 L. Ed. 2d at 646–47 

(O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing the syllogistic relationship between 

Teague’s exception to nonretroactivity for rules placing certain conduct 

beyond the power of the state to proscribe and subsequent cases that fit 

into Teague’s exception); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330, 109 S. Ct. 

2934, 2953, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256, 285 (1989) (“[T]he first exception set 

forth in Teague should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding 

criminal punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules 

prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants 

because of their status or offense.”), abrogated on other grounds by 

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S. Ct. at 2252, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 350. We 

joined this discourse three years ago when we held Graham applied 

retroactively. Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 700–01 (Iowa 2010). 

This practical observation of the treatment of the underlying authority of 

Miller is instructive. If a substantial portion of the authority used in 
14

Miller has been applied retroactively, Miller should logically receive the 

same treatment. 

The procedural posture of the Miller decision further supports 

retroactive application. Miller involved the companion case of Jackson v. 

Hobbs. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2461–62, 183 L. Ed. 2d 

at 415–16. Miller was a direct appeal, but Jackson involved a petition for 

habeas corpus brought after the conviction had been affirmed on direct 

appeal. See id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court specifically held the 

new rule applied not only to the defendant in Miller, but also to the 

defendant in Jackson on collateral review. See id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 

2475, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 430. The Court directed that the defendant in 

Jackson be given an individualized hearing. See id. There would have 

been no reason for the Court to direct such an outcome if it did not view 

the Miller rule as applying retroactively to cases on collateral review. We 

also recognize that the dissent in Miller suggested the majority’s decision 

would invalidate other cases across the nation. See id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. 

at 2479–80, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 433 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Again, the 

dissent would not have raised this concern if the Court did not believe its 

holding applied to cases on collateral review. 

Some courts in other jurisdictions agree that Miller applies 

retroactively to defendants whose direct appeals have been exhausted. 

See People v. Williams, 982 N.E.2d 181, 196–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); State 

v. Simmons, 99 So. 3d 28 (La. 2012); Jones v. State, ___ So. 3d ___, ___, 

2013 WL 3756564, at *5 (Miss. 2013). A panel for the Eighth Circuit 

permitted a prisoner to raise a second or successive challenges to his 

sentence based on Miller, reasoning the prisoner successfully made out a 

prima facie case that Miller articulated “a new rule of constitutional law, 

made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that 
15

was previously unavailable.” See Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720,

720 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2006 & 

Supp. III 2010) (permitting prisoners to file second or successive 

challenges to their sentences when their sentence is in violation of “a new 

rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review 

by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable”). Other 

jurisdictions have held Miller applies retroactively in a temporal sense at 

least to cases currently on direct appeal, without further considering 

whether Miller applies retroactively to all defendants. Commonwealth v.

Lofton, 57 A.3d 1270, 1276 & n.2 (Pa. 2012) (holding Miller created a new 

rule and applies to all cases pending on direct appeal); People v. Banks, 

___ P.3d ___, ___, 2012 WL 4459101, at *20 (Colo. App. 2012) (same). In 

contrast, other jurisdictions have held Miller does not recognize a new 

substantive rule of law under the Eighth Amendment but simply requires 

a new procedure; accordingly, those courts have held Miller is not 

retroactive. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1367–68 (11th Cir. 

2013); Craig v. Cain, No. 12–30035, 2013 WL 69128, at *2 (5th Cir. 

Jan. 4, 2013) (unpublished opinion); Geter v. State, 115 So. 3d 375, 385 

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685, 715 (Mich. Ct. 

App. 2012). 

On balance, we think the best analysis of the issue is found in an 

article by Dean Erwin Chemerinsky. He stated: 

There is a strong argument that Miller should apply 

retroactively: It says that it is beyond the authority of the 

criminal law to impose a mandatory sentence of life without 

parole. It would be terribly unfair to have individuals 

imprisoned for life without any chance of parole based on the 

accident of the timing of the trial. 

. . . .
16

. . . [T]he Miller Court did more than change 

procedures; it held that the government cannot 

constitutionally impose a punishment. As a substantive 

change in the law which puts matters outside the scope of 

the government’s power, the holding should apply 

retroactively. 

Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case 

Means Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A. J. Law News 

Now, (Aug. 8, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 

news/article/Chemerinsky_juvenile_life-without-parole_case_means_ 

courts_must_look_at_sen/.

Accordingly, we hold Miller applies retroactively. We next consider 

whether Ragland’s sentence, as commuted by the Governor, rendered 

Miller inapplicable to Ragland. 

B. Effect of Commutation. Ragland primarily argues he is 

entitled to the constitutional benefits of Miller because the Governor was 

not authorized to commute his sentence so as to avoid Miller’s 

application. The State responds by claiming the district court 

unconstitutionally intruded on the authority of the Governor by refusing 

to give effect to the commutation. 

It is a fundamental principle that one branch of government is not 

permitted to intrude upon the powers of another branch of government. 

This principle is inscribed in article III, section 1 of our Iowa 

Constitution. Yet, we have also recognized that the separation of powers 

doctrine is not drawn with “rigid boundaries.” Klouda v. Sixth Judicial 

Dist. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 642 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Iowa 2002). “Instead, 

some acts can be properly entrusted to more than one branch of 

government, and some functions inevitably intersect.” State v. Hoegh, 

632 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2001). This observation underscores an 

often overlooked, but important, principle of good governance, which is 
17

that “harmonious cooperation among the three branches of government 

is fundamental to our system of government.” Webster Cnty. Bd. of 

Supervisors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Iowa 1978). The construct 

of the separation of powers doctrine reveals that two branches of 

government can both be properly exercising their powers while working 

in the same arena. 

Our constitution grants the Governor broad authority concerning 

commutations and pardons. Article IV, section 16 specifically provides 

that “[t]he governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations 

and pardons, after conviction, for all offences except treason and cases of 

impeachment, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law.” 

Iowa Const. art. IV, § 16. 

A commutation, the action taken by the Governor in this case, is 

“[t]he executive’s substitution in a particular case of a less severe 

punishment for a more severe one that has already been judicially 

imposed on the defendant.” Black’s Law Dictionary 318 (9th ed. 2009); 

see also People v. Mata, 842 N.E.2d 686, 691 (Ill. 2005) (“[I]t is axiomatic 

from the plain language of this constitutional provision that the Governor 

cannot use the commutation power to increase a defendant’s 

punishment.” (Emphasis added.)); Lee v. Murphy, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 789, 

798 (1872) (“A commutation is the substitution of a less for a greater 

punishment . . . .”). The power to commute sentences includes the 

power to impose “conditions which do not in themselves offend the 

Constitution, but which are not specifically provided for by statute.” 

Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 264, 95 S. Ct. 379, 384, 42 L. Ed. 2d 430, 

437 (1974). Yet, the power to commute a sentence is not without 

limitation and does not foreclose legal challenges. See Arthur v. Craig, 48 
18

Iowa 264, 268 (1878); see also Iowa Const. art. IV, § 16 (stating the 

power to commute is subject to regulations provided by law). 

Nevertheless, we do not believe it is necessary to traipse into this 

constitutional thicket. If possible, we should avoid constitutional 

confrontation between two branches of government. See, e.g., 

Schwarzkopf v. Sac Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 341 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 1983) 

(“We must, of course, guard against overextension of legislative powers; 

we must also, however, avoid our own infringement upon the 

constitutional powers of the legislature in our efforts to protect our 

own.”). 

Even if we accept that the Governor had the authority to exercise 

the power to commute under the circumstances of this case, the 

question remains whether the commuted sentence amounts to 

mandatory life without parole. If so, Miller applied, and the district court 

was required to resentence Ragland after providing the individualized 

sentencing hearing. 

Miller applies to life sentences without parole that were 

mandatorily imposed. Thus, we must consider if Ragland is serving a life 

sentence without parole and if his sentence was mandatory. We first 

consider the mandatory nature of the sentence. 

Murder in the first degree is a class “A” felony in Iowa. Iowa Code 

§ 707.2(6). The only sentence provided by our legislature for a class “A” 

felony is for the offender to be committed to the department of 

corrections “for the rest of the defendant’s life.” Id. § 902.1(1). No other 

sentencing option is available. See id. The sentencing court has no 

power to defer the judgment, defer the sentence, suspend the sentence, 

or reconsider the sentence. Id. Additionally, the defendant cannot “be 

released on parole unless the governor commutes the sentence to a term 
19

of years.” Id. This sentencing scheme was in place when Ragland 

received his sentence, just as it is today. Compare Iowa Code § 902.1 

(1987), with id. § 902.1(1) (2013). 

Clearly, the original sentence imposed on Ragland by the district 

court was a mandatory sentence. The sentencing court had no other 

option but to impose the one sentence provided by law. This result is 

important in the analysis because it goes to the heart of Miller, which 

states that “children are constitutionally different from adults for 

purposes of sentencing,” and a mandatory life sentence without parole 

imposed on juveniles means young offenders “die in prison even if [the 

sentencing judge] would have thought that his youth and its attendant 

characteristics . . . made a lesser sentence . . . more appropriate.” Miller, 

567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2460, 2464, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 414, 418. 

Importantly, the mandatory penalty component totally precludes the 

sentencing court from taking the critical aspects of youth into account in 

the imposition of a sentence. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2466, 183 L. Ed. 2d 

at 420. 

The commutation by the Governor of Ragland’s sentence to a term 

of years did not affect the mandatory nature of the sentence or cure the 

absence of a process of individualized sentencing considerations 

mandated under Miller. Miller protects youth at the time of sentencing. 

See id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2468, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 422–23 (explaining the 

factors that must be considered by the sentencing court at the time of 

sentencing). Even with the commutation in 2012 by the Governor, 
20

Ragland has been deprived of the constitutional mandate that youths be 

sentenced pursuant to the Miller factors.7 

Having concluded Ragland is serving a mandatory sentence, we 

next analyze whether the sentence, as commuted, remains a life-withoutparole sentence targeted by Miller. One question that has clearly 

emerged following Miller is whether its mandates apply not only to 

mandatory life sentences without parole, but also to the practical 

equivalent of life-without-parole sentences. This is an issue that has 

been presented to us in various forms in other recent cases in which we 

have attempted to develop the proper constitutional framework for the 

sentencing of juvenile offenders as adults. See State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 

41, 45–77 (Iowa 2013); State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 89–98 (Iowa 

2013). 

Ragland must serve sixty years of his sentence before he may be

considered for parole. While this sentence is not a life term, Ragland will 

not be eligible for parole until he is seventy-eight years old. Under 

standard mortality tables, his life expectancy is 78.6 years. Ragland 

argues his sentence is the functional equivalent of life without parole. 

The State responds that the dictates of Miller do not apply because 

 

7The upshot of Miller was to render state statutes such as Iowa Code section 

902.1 unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders tried as adults and convicted of 

a class “A” felony because of the mandatory nature of the life-without-parole sentence 

imposed by the statute. The Miller procedure cures the unconstitutional aspect of such 

statutes as applied to juvenile offenders until amended by the legislature to establish a 

different constitutional procedure. See Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d 987, 998 (Miss. 

2013). The Iowa legislature amended section 902.1 in 2011 to make juveniles eligible 

for parole after twenty-five years. See 2011 Iowa Acts ch. 131, § 147(2)(a). By its 

terms, section 902.1(2)(a) does not apply to juveniles convicted of first-degree murder, 

such as Ragland. Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(c). The impact of this amendment is not before 

us in this case. 
21

Ragland has a chance of becoming eligible for parole during his natural 

lifetime under the commuted sentence. 

The precise question we now consider is one not many other courts 

have confronted. It is unique and comes before us due to the post-Miller

intervention of a commutation of the sentence from life without parole to 

life without parole for sixty years. Thus, we look to analogous 

circumstances to help decide the question. 

Some courts in other states have observed in addressing the new 

sentencing process following Miller that the mere possibility of parole for 

a juvenile offender sentenced by the court to life without parole, provided 

by the overall sentencing scheme through clemency or commutation, 

does not mean the sentence avoids the mandates of Miller as a life 

sentence with parole. See Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d 987, 997 (Miss. 

2013) (holding a life sentence with an opportunity for “conditional 

release” on parole at age sixty-five falls within Miller); Bear Cloud v. State, 

294 P.3d 36, 45 (Wyo. 2013) (holding a life sentence that provides an 

opportunity for parole only upon commutation of the sentence to a term 

of years by the governor is practically identical to life imprisonment 

without parole). The mere possibility of commutation or clemency is 

fundamentally distinct from the eligibility for parole and does not leave a 

juvenile offender a meaningful opportunity to avoid a lifetime of 

incarceration. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01, 103 S. Ct. 

3001, 3015, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637, 656 (1983) (distinguishing the 

constitutional impact of parole eligibility and the possibility of 

commutation because “[p]arole is a regular part of the rehabilitative 

process,” but a “[c]ommutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise 

of executive clemency”). 
22

Yet, an early split in authority has emerged among other courts 

over the question of whether Graham applies to long sentences that are 

less than life without parole. In People v. Caballero, the California 

Supreme Court held a 110-year-to-life sentence contravened the 

mandate of Graham that the Eighth Amendment requires a “ ‘meaningful

opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 

rehabilitation.’ ” 282 P.3d 291, 296 (Cal. 2012) (quoting Graham, 560 

U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845–46). The court 

found the bar on life-without-parole sentences under Graham included 

sentences for a term of years that amounted “to the functional equivalent 

of a life without parole sentence.” Id. at 295. In People v. Rainer, a 

Colorado court held a sentence for a term of years that does not offer the 

possibility of parole until after life expectancy also violates the mandate 

in Graham for a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. ___ P.3d ___, 

___, 2013 WL 1490107, at *4 (Colo. App. 2013). 

On the other hand, in Bunch v. Smith, the Sixth Circuit Court of 

Appeals held that Graham did not apply to a juvenile sentence to 

consecutive terms totaling eighty-nine years. 685 F.3d 546, 550–51 (6th 

Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013). The Sixth 

Circuit simply employed a strict reading of Graham and limited the 

holding in Graham to scenarios dealing with life-without-parole 

sentences. See id.; see also State v. Kasic, 265 P.3d 410, 414–16 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting juvenile defendant’s argument that thirty-two 

consecutive sentences, which in the aggregate exceeded the defendant’s 

normal life expectancy, constituted a de facto life sentence); Henry v. 

State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (rejecting 

defendant’s argument that nine sentences, which in the aggregate 
23

constituted 107 years of incarceration without the possibility of parole, 

constituted a de facto life sentence). 

We acknowledge the Court denied certiorari in Bunch; however, the 

Court in Bunch was confined to a very narrow standard of review. The 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 allowed the Court 

to grant habeas corpus relief only if the state court decision on review 

was contrary to clearly established federal law or was an unreasonable 

application of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). The 

acknowledged split of authority reveals that the argument made by the 

defendant in Bunch for a virtual life sentence was not clearly established. 

See Bunch, 685 F.3d at 552; see also Rainer, ___ P.3d at ___, 2013 WL 

1490107, at *9–10 (reviewing and summarizing the split of authority over 

the question of whether Graham should apply to sentences for a term of 

years that are not materially distinguishable from life without parole). 

Thus, the narrow standard of review would not have permitted the 

United States Supreme Court to fully address the issues on certiorari. 

For all practical purposes, the same motivation behind the 

mandates of Miller applies to the commuted sentence in this case or any 

sentence that is the practical equivalent to life without parole. See Miller, 

567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424 (recognizing 

children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change 

make the harshest penalty appropriate in only certain and uncommon 

instances). Graham requires a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release 

based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” during the offender’s 

expected lifetime, and Miller requires an individualized consideration of 

youth as a mitigating factor at a sentencing hearing if such a realistic, 

meaningful opportunity will not be available. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 

132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424; Graham, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 
24

S. Ct. at 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845–46. After all, “[l]ife without parole 

‘forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.’ It reflects ‘an irrevocable 

judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in society,’ at odds with a 

child’s capacity for change.” Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 

183 L. Ed. 2d at 419–20 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct. at 

2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845). 

Thus, the rationale of Miller, as well as Graham, reveals that the 

unconstitutional imposition of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence 

is not fixed by substituting it with a sentence with parole that is the 

practical equivalent of a life sentence without parole. Oftentimes, it is 

important that the spirit of the law not be lost in the application of the 

law. This is one such time. The spirit of the constitutional mandates of 

Miller and Graham instruct that much more is at stake in the sentencing 

of juveniles than merely making sure that parole is possible. In light of 

our increased understanding of the decision making of youths, the 

sentencing process must be tailored to account in a meaningful way for 

the attributes of juveniles that are distinct from adult conduct. At the 

core of all of this also lies the profound sense of what a person loses by 

beginning to serve a lifetime of incarceration as a youth. 

In the end, a government system that resolves disputes could 

hardly call itself a system of justice with a rule that demands 

individualized sentencing considerations common to all youths apply 

only to those youths facing a sentence of life without parole and not to 

those youths facing a sentence of life with no parole until age seventyeight. Accordingly, we hold Miller applies to sentences that are the 

functional equivalent of life without parole. The commuted sentence in 

this case is the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole. 
25

Ragland was originally sentenced without the benefit of an 

individualized sentencing hearing. The commutation lessened his 

sentence slightly, but without the court’s consideration of any mitigating 

factors as demanded by Miller. While such a review process might still 

permit a life-without-parole sentence to be imposed in a murder case, it 

might also result in a sentence far less than life without parole. Thus, 

Ragland was entitled to be sentenced with consideration of the factors 

identified in Miller. Additionally, he was entitled to be resentenced under 

the individualized process because Miller applies retroactively. 

Accordingly, Ragland’s commutation did not remove the case from 

the mandates of Miller. The sentence served by Ragland, as commuted, 

still amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of 

the Iowa Constitution. Consequently, the district court properly 

resentenced Ragland in light of Miller. Because the new sentence was 

not challenged on appeal, we do not address it in any way except to 

reiterate that Miller requires individualized resentencing. 

IV. Conclusion. 

We affirm the new sentence imposed by the district court following 

the Governor’s commutation of the defendant’s sentence. 

AFFIRMED. 

All justices concur, but Wiggins, J., writes separately to concur 

specially; Mansfield, J., joined by Waterman, J., writes separately to 

concur specially; and Zager, J., writes separately to concur specially. 
26

#12–1758, State v. Ragland

WIGGINS, Justice (concurring specially).

I join in the majority opinion but write separately to point out some 

observations concerning whether the Governor has the constitutional 

authority to commute Ragland’s sentence.

After the United States Supreme Court held that sentencing a 

juvenile to mandatory life in prison without parole is unconstitutional, a 

question emerged as to whether the Governor can commute such a 

sentence. In this situation, is the Governor commuting a void sentence 

or sentencing the defendant for the first time in violation of the 

separation of powers doctrine? See Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643, 

654–55 (Tenn. 1977) (Brock, J., dissenting); Stanley v. State, 490 S.W.2d 

828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (Onion, P.J., dissenting); cf. Klouda v. 

Sixth Judicial Dist. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 642 N.W.2d 255, 263 (Iowa 2002) 

(holding the statute granting administrative law judges, who are part of 

the executive branch, the power to revoke probation violated article III, 

section 1 of the Iowa Constitution). 

Another observation is that the Governor’s imposition of a sentence 

might constitute a denial of due process—such as the right to present 

evidence at the sentencing stage under article I, section 9 or the right to 

be informed of accusations, the right to a jury trial, the right to 

compulsory process, and the right to counsel under article I, section 10 

of the Iowa Constitution. See Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 26–27, 96 

S. Ct. 175, 179–80, 46 L. Ed. 2d 162, 168 (1975) (Brennan, J., 

dissenting) (“If respondents were ‘sentenced’ by the Governor, were they 

denied due process when not afforded [the] opportunity [to present 

evidence] . . . ?”); Collins, 550 S.W.2d at 655 (Brock, J., dissenting) 

(arguing the commutation procedure deprived the defendant of the right 
27

to a jury trial under Tennessee common law); Whan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 

275, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (Onion, P.J., dissenting) (“To permit the 

Governor . . . such authority, under the circumstances of this case, 

would allow them to intervene and prevent a retrial and substitute their 

idea of what punishment should be assessed rather than a jury . . . .”). 

My third observation is that a prisoner could also challenge a 

commutation that required the prisoner to waive his or her 

constitutional, civil, fundamental, or human rights prospectively. Cf.

State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 803 (Iowa 2013) (holding parolee’s 

signature on parolee agreement did not establish prospective consent to 

searches under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution). 

My final observation is that the Governor’s action may have 

violated article IV, section 16 of the Iowa Constitution. This provision 

grants the Governor commutation power, subject to regulations provided 

by law. Iowa Const. art. IV, § 16. The legislature has regulated the 

Governor’s power to commute a person’s sentence by enacting certain 

legislation regulating his power to commute. The Code provides that 

“[p]rior to the governor granting a reprieve, pardon, or commutation to an 

offender convicted of a violent crime, the governor shall notify a 

registered victim that the victim’s offender has applied for a reprieve, 

pardon, or commutation.” Iowa Code § 915.19 (2013). The Code also 

provides a specific procedure the Governor must follow to commute the 

sentence of a person who receives a life sentence without the possibility 

of parole. Id. § 902.2. This procedure involves referring the matter to 

the Iowa Board of Parole before the Governor can commute. Id. The 

record is devoid of any evidence showing the Governor followed any of 

these legislative enactments. 
28

However, we need not reach these important constitutional issues 

today and leave them for another day. 
29

#12–1758, State v. Ragland

MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring specially).

The court decides this case on the ground that a mandatory life 

sentence where the defendant will not be eligible for parole until he has 

served sixty years in prison is the practical equivalent of mandatory life 

without parole (LWOP) and thus violates Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 

132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). I agree with that conclusion 

and therefore join the court’s opinion. I write separately to respond to 

the observations in Justice Wiggins’s special concurrence regarding the 

Governor’s commutation authority.

First, I do not believe the Governor lacked authority to commute 

Ragland’s sentence after Miller had been decided. We have never said 

that the Governor’s article IV, section 16 power to grant commutations 

goes away when a sentence is subject to legal challenge based on a 

United States Supreme Court decision. Section 16 states the Governor 

“shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after 

conviction.” If anything, this means that the Governor can commute a 

sentence at any time, so long as it is “after conviction.”

When the Governor issued his order of commutation, Ragland’s 

LWOP sentence was still in place. No judgment had set it aside. 

Ragland could not have taken a copy of Miller, showed it to the warden, 

and walked out of Anamosa State Penitentiary. Miller was not selfexecuting, and as the court observes, it was an open question whether 

Miller was retroactive and applied to cases like Ragland’s or not. I 

happen to agree with the court that it was, but this is one matter that 

needed to be addressed before Ragland’s LWOP sentence would be 

invalidated.
30

Also, I do not believe the Governor’s reasons for granting 

commutation are subject to judicial scrutiny. From the perspective of 

the courts, it matters not whether the Governor’s motivation was to 

preserve the legislature’s previous sentencing scheme as much as 

possible, or to show leniency toward Ragland.

Section 16 makes this clear. It provides that the Governor “shall 

report to the general assembly . . . each case of reprieve, commutation, or 

pardon granted, and the reasons therefor.” Iowa Const. art. IV, § 16. By 

expressly providing that the Governor would provide his reasons to the 

legislature, this tells me our framers intended that any check on the 

Governor’s clemency authority would be in the political process. Article 

III, section 16 provides an analogue. It states that when the Governor 

vetoes legislation, he or she shall return it to the legislature “with his [or 

her] objections.” Generally speaking, the objections are for political 

purposes, for the benefit of the legislature, not to enable judicial review. 

The same is true with the reasons for commutation that are also 

provided to the legislature under our constitution.

Furthermore, there is precedent for what the Governor did here. In 

1972, the United States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia, 

which invalidated the death penalty as imposed in a number of states. 

See 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972). Before 

certain death row inmates in Nevada, Texas, and Tennessee could receive 

a resentencing, however, their sentences were commuted to life in prison. 

Bean v. Nevada, 410 F. Supp. 963, 964 (D. Nev. 1974) (upholding the 

pardon board’s commutation of the petitioner’s sentence from death to 

LWOP after Furman struck down death-sentence statutes similar to 

Nevada’s), aff’d, 535 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1976); Collins v. State, 550 

S.W.2d 643, 646, 650 (Tenn. 1977) (upholding, on rehearing, the 
31

governor’s commutation of the petitioners’ sentences from death to life 

imprisonment after the state supreme court held the death-sentence 

statute unconstitutional); Stanley v. State, 490 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1972) (upholding the governor’s commutation from death to 

life imprisonment of an inmate’s sentence after his case was remanded 

by the U.S. Supreme Court along with Furman). Life in prison was less 

severe than the death penalty but more severe than some other 

sentencing options that would have been available under a resentencing. 

See Bean, 410 F. Supp. at 964 (noting that the petitioner had originally 

been sentenced under a statute allowing for imprisonment “with or 

without the possibility of parole” (internal citation and quotation marks 

omitted)); Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tenn. 1977) (noting that 

a jury would resentence on remand “with punishment to be fixed in each 

case from twenty years to life imprisonment”); Stanley, 490 S.W.2d at 

831–32 (Onion, J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant, in a new trial, 

would have been subject to a “full range of alternative penalties”). 

Presumably, in all three states, the purpose of the commutation was to 

come as close as constitutionally possible to the original sentence. In 

addition, the defendants opposed the commutations. See, e.g., Bean, 

410 F. Supp. at 964; Bowen v. State, 488 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tenn. 1972)

(“[T]his commutation became effective without the consent of the 

defendant . . .”).

Still, in all three states, the commutations were upheld. See Bean, 

410 F. Supp. at 965; Mears v. Nevada, 367 F. Supp. 84, 86 (D. Nev. 

1973) (upholding the pardon board’s commutation of the petitioner’s 

sentence from death to LWOP after Furman struck down death-sentence 

statutes similar to Nevada’s); Collins, 550 S.W.2d at 650; Bowen, 488 

S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tenn. 1972) (recognizing the governor’s ability to 
32

commute the petitioner’s sentence from death to ninety-nine years 

imprisonment in response to the Furman line of cases); Stanley, 490 

S.W.2d at 830; Whan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1972) (upholding the Governor’s commutation of the appellant’s sentence 

from death to life imprisonment, which the governor issued while the 

case was pending in state court on remand from the United States 

Supreme Court); see also Hartfield v. Quarterman, 603 F. Supp. 2d 943, 

950 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (stating that the governor may commute a 

defendant’s sentence while the case is on remand, as long as “there [is] 

no final judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing [the] 

conviction.”); People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 804 N.E.2d 546, 558–60 

(Ill. 2004) (upholding the Illinois governor’s authority to commute a death 

sentence to life regardless of the pendency of a resentencing hearing); 

People v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d 788, 789–90 (Ill. 2002) (acknowledging the 

governor’s ability to commute a sentence while the defendant’s case 

awaited rehearing on appeal because the “defendant remained under an 

existing sentence”). To my knowledge, no court has held that a Governor 

lacks authority to commute an inmate’s sentence where that specific 

sentence has not previously been vacated by a court.

Additionally, I do not see anything in the Governor’s commutation 

order requiring a waiver of “constitutional, civil, fundamental, or human 

rights.” In any event, we said earlier this term: “[W]e have held the 

governor may impose conditions on the defendant in exchange for his 

clemency as long as the conditions themselves are not illegal, immoral, 

or impossible to be performed.” Lowery v. State, 822 N.W.2d 739, 741 

(Iowa 2012) (stating also that “[i]n Iowa, the governor’s constitutional 

clemency power may be exercised with broad discretion”). We then cited 

Arthur v. Craig, which long ago upheld the Governor’s authority to issue 
33

a conditional pardon that allowed the inmate to be summarily arrested 

and reincarcerated, without judicial review, if he violated any of the 

conditions. See 48 Iowa 264, 267–69 (1878).8

Nor am I aware of any legislation that would have limited the 

Governor’s authority here. Iowa Code section 902.2 provides a procedure 

by which inmates serving life terms or the director of the department of 

corrections may apply for commutations, but does not appear to limit the 

Governor’s authority to grant commutations. See Makowski v. Governor, 

829 N.W.2d 291, 296 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing a similar 

provision in Michigan and concluding that it “in no way limit[s] the 

Governor’s absolute discretion with regard to commutation decisions”). 

Likewise, I read section 915.19, requiring the Governor to notify 

registered victims before he or she grants an application for commutation 

to an offender convicted of a violent crime, as potentially giving rights to 

victims, not the offender. See Iowa Code § 915.19(1) (2013). There is no 

indication that a victim had registered here. Also of note is section 

914.1, which provides, “The power of the governor under the 

Constitution of the State of Iowa to grant a . . . commutation of sentence 

. . . shall not be impaired.” Id. § 914.1.

One final note. Neither Ragland nor the State claims the district 

court’s resentencing of Ragland to life with eligibility for parole after 

twenty-five years was improper if the sixty-years-without-parole sentence 

cannot stand. The district court imposed that sentence because it was 

the legislature’s post-Graham v. Florida9 fix for class “A” felonies 

 

8See also Lowery, 822 N.W.2d at 742–43 (resolving the question of how a 

prisoner whose sentence had been commuted would accumulate earned time credit by 

interpreting the commutation order, rather than deciding the matter through statutory 

interpretation).

9560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010).
34

committed by juveniles other than first-degree murder. See 2011 Iowa 

Acts ch. 131, § 147 (codified at Iowa Code § 902.1(2)(a)). For now, I 

would simply emphasize that we are not approving, or disapproving, this 

life sentence with a twenty-five-year minimum in other cases affected by 

Miller. Because no one has challenged the district court’s new sentence 

for Ragland, it should stand in this case without serving as a precedent 

elsewhere.

For the foregoing reasons, I join in the court’s opinion but also 

write separately.

Waterman, J., joins this special concurrence. 
35

#12–1758, State v. Ragland

ZAGER, Justice (concurring specially).

I join the majority opinion in affirming the resentencing ordered by 

the district court. However, I write separately because I disagree with the 

majority’s conclusion that a commuted prison sentence of life without 

parole for sixty years is the functional equivalent or de facto life without 

parole (LWOP). I also disagree with the majority’s holding that Graham v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), and 

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 

(2012), apply to a term-of-years sentence, as I note in my dissent in State 

v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 84–88 (Iowa 2013). Accordingly, I would affirm 

the district court for other reasons.

I agree with this court’s remand for resentencing under a cruel and 

unusual punishment analysis due to Ragland’s original sentence of 

LWOP for a homicide committed while he was a juvenile. See State v. 

Ragland, 812 N.W.2d 654, 659 (Iowa 2012). Under the circumstances 

and under Graham then Miller, the district court properly performed an 

individualized assessment of Ragland, taking into consideration the 

appropriate factors, including age and other circumstances surrounding 

the crime.

Prior to the evidentiary hearing, however, Governor Branstad 

issued his commutation of sentence to Ragland and numerous other 

juvenile offenders who were serving LWOP sentences. I agree that the 

Governor has the constitutional authority to commute sentences to life 

without parole for a term of years, as he did here. However, as noted by 

Justice Wiggins in his concurring opinion, the commutation power is not 

without limitation.
36

I believe the Governor exceeded his constitutional authority when 

he attempted to remove Ragland’s ability to earn good time credit against 

this commuted sentence, as authorized by statute. See Iowa Code 

§ 903A.2 (2013). Awarding earned good time credit would have allowed 

for the possibility of Ragland’s release after forty-two and one-half years, 

which I would not consider to be the functional equivalent of LWOP. 

Under these circumstances, and for the reasons set forth in Justice 

Wiggins’s concurring opinion, the district court was correct in refusing to 

give effect to the Governor’s attempt to commute Ragland’s sentence. 

The district court was correct in then applying Miller in this case, and I 

would affirm Ragland’s sentence.