21-1441 

Talandar v. State of Vermont

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 31st 3 day of January, two thousand twenty-three.

4

5 PRESENT:

6 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

7 REENA RAGGI,

8 MICHAEL H. PARK,

9 Circuit Judges.

10 _____________________________________

11

12 Draxxion Talandar,

13

14 Plaintiff-Appellant,

15

16 v.

17

18 State of Vermont, 21-1441

19

20 Defendant-Appellee.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Cabot R. Teachout, 

24 DesMeules Olmstead & 

25 Ostler, Norwich, VT.

26

27 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Rachel E. Smith, Deputy 

28 Solicitor General, Office of 

29 the Attorney General, 

30 Montpelier, VT.

31
2

1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont

2 (William K. Sessions, J.).

3 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

4 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

5 Draxxion Talandar filed a declaratory judgment action in the district court, seeking a 

6 judgment that the State of Vermont violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 7 In December 2019, Vermont charged Talandar 

8 with, inter alia, multiple counts of felony sexual assault in two cases. Talandar’s efforts to raise 

9 Speedy Trial Clause challenges in state court were unsuccessful. One of his state cases has now 

10 been tried, while the other remains pending. The district court dismissed the present action

11 without prejudice, holding that it was required to abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 

12 (1971). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of 

13 the case, and the issues on appeal.

14 The Younger doctrine recognizes that “only exceptional circumstances . . . justify a federal 

15 court’s refusal to decide a case in deference to the States,” one of which is to avoid “federal 

16 intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 

17 69, 78 (2013) (cleaned up). We review the application of Younger abstention de novo. See 

18 Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2002). Talandar does 

19 not argue that his case falls outside the scope of Younger but instead that it qualifies for an 

20 exception to that doctrine. The relevant exception requires the plaintiff to show “(1) that there 

21 [is] no state remedy available to meaningfully, timely, and adequately remedy the alleged 

1 Talandar’s civil complaint was combined with his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 

U.S.C. § 2241. He voluntarily dismissed the habeas portion of this case after his release on bail to home 

detention. 
3

1 constitutional violation; and (2) . . . that the litigant will suffer great and immediate harm if the 

2 federal court does not intervene.” Id. at 201 (cleaned up). This case meets neither requirement.

3 First, the Vermont courts are capable of adjudicating Talandar’s constitutional claims and 

4 have done so several times. In fact, Talandar has had some success in the state-court litigation, 

5 including obtaining his release on bail—the same relief he initially sought from the district court

6 here. Talandar’s lack of complete victory does not show the state courts’ inadequacy. “[T]he 

7 question whether the state’s procedural remedies could provide the relief sought does not turn on 

8 whether the state will provide the relief sought by the plaintiff before the federal court.” Kirschner 

9 v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 235 (2d Cir. 2000). 

10 Second, Talandar has not shown that he will be irreparably harmed absent federal 

11 intervention. He points to his “prolonged incarceration” and the delay in scheduling trial, 

12 Appellant’s Br. at 13, but those issues have since been substantially remedied, and “the threat to 

13 the plaintiff’s federally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense 

14 against a single criminal prosecution,” Younger, 401 U.S. at 46. This Court has previously 

15 applied Younger to criminal defendants who experienced considerably longer pretrial detention

16 than Talandar. See, e.g., Jordan v. Bailey, 570 F. App’x 42, 44-45 (2d Cir. June 19, 2014) 

17 (applying Younger abstention in a case involving a criminal defendant who “ha[d] been detained 

18 for some 52 months”). The district court here also properly declined to entertain Talandar’s case.

19 We have considered all of Talandar’s remaining arguments and find them to be without 

20 merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

21 FOR THE COURT: 

22 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

23