UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA 

UNITED ST A TES COAST GUARD 

vs. 

MERCHANT MARINER LICENSE 

Issued to: Bruce Allen Spence 

DECISION OF THE 

VICE COMMANDANT 

ON APPEAL 

NO. 2 666 

This appeal is taken in accordance with 46 U.S.C. § 7701, et seq., 46 C.F.R. Part 

5, and the procedures in 33 C.F.R. Part 20. 

By a Decision and Order (hereinafter "D&O") dated July 6, 2004, an 

Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") of the United States Coast Guard at 

Norfolk, Virginia, revoked the license of Mr. Bruce Allen Spence (hereinafter 

"Respondent") upon finding proved one charge of violation of law or regulation and two 

charges of misconduct. 

The violation of law or regulation charge was based on the Coast Guard's 

allegation that Respondent, while serving as Master of the MN COMMANDER, 

submitted to a random alcohol test that revealed that Respondent had a Blood Alcohol 

Concentration (hereinafter "BAC") of .176%. The misconduct charges were based on 

allegations that Respondent wrongfully refused to submit to both a confirmation blood 

alcohol test and a random drug test. 
SPENCE NO. 2 66 6 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The Coast Guard filed its Complaint against, and sought revocation of, 

Respondent's Coast Guard issued merchant mariner license on February 19, 2003. [D&O 

at 2] After Respondent's counsel filed an Answer and requested several continuances in 

this matter, the hearing took place in Norfolk, Virginia, on January 27 and 28, 2004. [Id.] 

During the hearing, Respondent admitted to all jurisdictional allegations, but denied that 

he had been intoxicated on the date in question or that he had refused to provide 

additional samples for alcohol and drug testing. [Id.] At the hearing, the Coast Guard 

entered nine exhibits into the record and elicited the testimony of four witnesses. [Id.] 

Respondent objected to the validity of Investigating Officer (hereinafter "IO") Exhibit 8 

(the Report of the Initial Alcohol Test) and the ALJ reserved ruling on the exhibit. [Id.] 

Respondent entered seven exhibits into the record and elicited the testimony of four 

witnesses on his behalf. [Id.] Following the completion of the hearing, the ALJ admitted 

IO Exhibit 8 into the record. [D&O at 3] 

The ALJ issued the ID&O on July 6, 2004. Respondent filed his Notice of Appeal 

on July 23, 2004. On September 3, 2004, Respondent requested a 60-day extension of 

time within which to file his Appellate Brief. The Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center 

granted Respondent's request for such extension via a letter dated September 7, 2004. On 

November 7, 2004, Respondent requested a 120-day extension of time within which to 

file his Appellate Brief because Respondent's counsel was scheduled to be on active duty 

with the U.S. Navy. After being unable to contact Respondent's counsel regarding the 

duration of the extension, via a letter dated December 9, 2004, the ALJ Docketing Center 

granted Respondent a second 60-day extension of time upon finding that active military 

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SPENCE No.2 66 6 

duty in the Navy constituted good cause to allow such extension. Pursuant to a later 

agreement between the parties, Respondent was granted a further 30-day extension of 

time on February 10, 2005. Respondent filed his Appellate Brief in the matter on March 

10, 2005, within the time allotted by the final extension. The Coast Guard filed a Reply 

to Respondent's Appellate Brief on April 13, 2005. Accordingly, this appeal is properly 

before me. 

APPEARANCES: Respondent was represented by Mr. Robert K. Lansden, Esq., 

125 East Pine Street, P.O. Box 473, Ponchatoula, Louisiana. The Coast Guard was 

represented by LT Boris K. Towns and LTJG Robert S. Butts of U.S. Coast Guard 

Marine Safety Office Morgan City, Louisiana. 

FACTS 

At all relevant times, Respondent was the holder of and was acting under the 

authority of a Coast Guard issued merchant mariner license. [D&O at 3; Transcript 

(hereinafter "Tr.") Vol. 2 at 5; IO Exhibit 1] On September 11, 2001, Respondent was 

employed by Gulf Tran to serve as Master of the M/V COMMANDER. [D&O at 3; Tr. 

Vol. 1 at 44, 48; Tr. Vol. 2 at 40] The M/V COMMANDER is a 95 gross ton passenger 

vessel that is required, by its Certificate of Inspection, to be manned by a master, mate, 

and two deckhands. [D&O at 5; Respondent's Exhibits A & BJ The crew compliment 

may be reduced to one master and two deckhands if the vessel is away from a shore side 

dock for less than 12 hours. [Id.] 

On the evening of September 11, 2001, the M/V COMMANDER was ordered to 

return to shore. [D&O at 5] At that time, the vessel was offshore serving wells near the 

East Cameron 23 oil platform. [D&O at 5; Tr. Vol. 2 at 10-11] On September 12, 2001, 

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SPENCE NOQ 6 6 6 

the vessel arrived at Crane Brothers' Dock in Grand Cheniere, Louisiana. [Id.] At that 

time, Respondent had been aboard the vessel for nearly one month and had one more 

week until his tour was to be complete. The M/V COMMANDER was scheduled to 

undergo a crew change the following week. [D&O at 6; Tr. Vol. 2 at 13, 56, 64-65] 

On the evening of September 12, Respondent went ashore and had a few beers 

before returning to the vessel to sleep. [D&O at 6; Tr. Vol. 2 at 20-21] In the meantime, 

Eagle Consulting, the vessel's manager, arranged for Mr. J.L. Harrell, a company 

representative, and Mr. Monty W. Savoy, a certified drug and alcohol test technician and 

collector, to conduct unannounced drug and alcohol testing of the crew on board both a 

nearby vessel and the MN COMMANDER on the morning of September 13, 2001. 

[D&O at 8-9) 

During the early morning hours of September 13, 2001, Captain Cliff Fulton 

awoke Respondent and infonned him that there were people aboard the vessel. [D&O at 

7; Tr. Vol. 1 at 171) Shortly thereafter, Respondent met Mr. Harrell who informed 

Respondent that he was going to be required to take both drug and alcohol tests because 

he was aboard the vessel. [D&O at 7; Tr. Vol. 2 at 22-23] Respondent was the second 

person to be tested. [D&O at 9; Tr. Vol. 1 at 126-128; Tr. Vol. 2 at 67) An alcohol test 

administered to Respondent at 5:15 a.m. on September 13, 2001, revealed that 

Respondent had a BAC of .176%. [D&O at 9; Tr. Vol. 1 at 191, 245; Tr. Vol. 2 at 67; IO 

Exhibit 8] After Respondent was made aware of his test results, he refused to both take a 

confirmatory alcohol test and to provide a urine sample for drug testing purposes. [D&O 

at 9; Tr. Vol. l at 196-199, 202·; IO Exhibits 9 & IO] Shortly thereafter, Mr. KeJly Loupe, 

Safety Manager for Gulf Tran boarded the MN COMMANDER in an attempt to 

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SPENCE N0.2 6 66 

ascertain what had happened. [D&O at 9-1 O; Tr. Vol.1 at 40-45, 64, 66-73] Upon Mr. 

Loupe's arrival aboard the vessel, both Respondent and Captain Fulton informed him that 

they had "quit." [D&O at 1 O; Tr. Vol. 1 at 63] That being said, Respondent did not 

· notify Mr. Loupe that he had quit until after he refused the administration of the drug and 

alcohol tests. [D&O at 1 O; Tr. Vol. 1 at 60] In spite of his "quitting," Gulf Tran relieved 

Respondent of all of his duties because he had tested positive for alcohol. [D&O at 10; 

Tr. Vol. 1 at 67-68] 

BASES OF APPEAL 

This appeal has been taken from the ALJ's D&O, finding proved all charges and 

ordering the revocation of Respondent's mariner license. On appeal, Respondent raises 

the issues summarized below: 

I. The ALJ erred by finding the misconduct allegations proved because 

neither Linder Oil nor Eagle Consulting (the vessel's managers) should 

be considered Respondent's "marine employer" as defined in 46 C.F.R. 

§ 16.105; 

11. The ALJ's findings are arbitrary, capricious, clearly erroneous, and based 

on inherently incredible evidence; and, 

III. Revocation of Respondent's license was an unduly harsh sanction, in this 

case, given Respondent's record of no prior disciplinary actions. 

OPINION 

I. 

The ALJ erred by.finding the misconduct allegations proved because neither Linder Oil 

nor Eagle Consulting should be considered Respondent's "marine employer,, as defined 

in 46 C.F.R. § 16.105. 

Respondent first argues that the ALJ erred by finding the allegations of 

misconduct proved because neither Linder Oil, nor Eagle Consulting- the parties who 

arranged for the chemical testing of the individuals aboard the MN COMMANDER5 
SPENCE NO. 2 6 6 6 

were Respondent's "marine employer" as used in 46 C.F.R. part 16 ("Chemical Testing"). 

I disagree. 

Title 46, C.F.R. § 16.105 defines "marine employer" as "the owner, managing 

operator, charterer, agent, master, or person in charge of a vessel, other than a recreational 

vessel." The definition extends far beyond the company that employs and pays a mariner, 

but includes the company that charters the vessel on a particular occasion. Appeal 

Decision 2641 (JONES). 

In his Findings of Fact, the ALJ concluded that Respondent's actual employer, 

Gulf Tran, had a contract to charter the vessel with Linder Oil Company, which had 

subcontracted several charter responsibilities to Eagle Consulting. (D&O at 3-5) On that 

issue, in the "Findings of Fact" portion of his D&O, the ALJ found as follows: 

9. At the time of the incident in question, Eagle Consulting was the 

company in charge of managing Linder Oil Company's day-to-day field 

operations on the oil platforms. Eagle Consulting determined when and 

how the vessels that Linder Oil Company had contracted for with Gulf 

Trans were used .... 

10. Eagle Consulting' s duties also included drug and alcohol testing for 

what Linder Oil perceived its obligations to be under the rules and 

regulations. 

[Id. at 4-5, citations to transcript omitted) Therefore, as charterers of the MN 

COMMANDER, both Linder Oil and Eagle Consulting met the Coast Guard's definition 

of "marine employers". As a result, the ALJ did not err in concJuding that either 

company acted within the scope of the Coast Guard's drug testing regulations when they 

directed Respondent to submit to random drug and alcohol testing. In this context, 

Respondent's argument that neither Linder Oil nor Eagle Consulting were his employers 

is without merit. 

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SPENCE NO. 2 6 6 6 

n. 

The ALJ's findings are arbitrary, capricious, clearly erroneous, and based on inherently 

incredible eviden.ce. 

On appeal, Respondent argues that there was an insufficient factual basis for the 

ALJ's findings and conclusions. As such, he contends that the findings in the ALJ's 

D&O were clearly erroneous and must be set aside. Once I have concluded that 

Respondent had done nothing wrong, he argues, I should restore his Coast Guard license. 

It is well-settled that I may only reverse the ALJ's decision if his findings are 

arbitrary, capricious, clearly erroneous, or based on inherently incredible evidence. See, 

e.g., Appeal Decisions 2584 (SHAKESPEARE), 2570 (HARRIS), aff' NTSB Order No. 

EM-182 (1996), 2390 (PURSER), 2363 (MANN), 2344 (KOHAJDA), 2333 (AYALA), 

2581 (DRIGGERS), and 2474 (CARMIENKE). A review of the record shows that there 

are two factual questions important to a proper resolution of this matter: (1) was the 

evidence, including the observations of the witnesses and the results of Respondent's 

breath alcohol test (hereinafter "BAT"), accurate and reliable such that it shows that 

Respondent was "intoxicated" at the time of the test; and (2) did Respondent "refuse" to 

give a second breath sample for confinnatory alcohol testing and a urine sample for drug 

testing? Respondent contends that the ALJ came to the wrong conclusions on each of 

these questions based on a misunderstanding of the relevant facts and the applicable law. 

I disagree. 

The first question of fact is whether the evidence establishes that Respondent was 

"intoxicated" or ''under the influence of alcohol" at the time of the test. See 33 C.F .R. 

§ 95 .045(b ); Appeal Decision 2551 (LEVENE). The test for determining whether the 

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SPENCE NO. 2666 

Coast Guard has statutory and regulatory grounds for removing a mariner's license for 

violation of a regulation is a "preponderance of the evidence." 33 C.F.R. § 20. 701; See 

Decision on Appeal 2637 (TURBEVILLE). "Acceptable evidence of when a vessel 

operator is under the influence of alcohol ... includes, but is not limited to: (a) Personal 

observation of an individual 's manner, disposition, speech, muscular movement, general 

appearance, or behavior; or (b) A chemical test." 33 C.F.R. § 95.030(b). 

The relevant regulation reads as follows: "An individual is under the influence of 

alcohol ... when . . . [t]he individual is operating a vessel other than a recreational vessel 

and has an alcohol concentration of .04 percent by weight or more in their blood." 

33 C.F.R. § 95.020(b). A review of the record shows that there is considerable evidence 

to support the ALJ's conclusion that Respondent was intoxicated, including Respondent's 

admission that he had been drinking beer for "three or four hours" into the early morning 

hours on the date of the incident. [Tr. Vol. 2, at 20] Moreover, the testing official 

testified that he had "smelled alcohol" on Respondent's breath before administering the 

initial BAT. [Tr. Vol. 1, at 183-84] Moreover, the record contains Respondent's initial 

BAT results which show that he recorded a BAC level of 0.176%. [IO Exhibit 8] 

Although that key exhibit, IO Exhibit 8, contains what Respondent acknowledges to be 

his signature, he contends that he never was infonned as to his actual BAC level, having 

signed the fonn before the comments section was completed. [Tr. Vol. 2, at 27-30] 

While those assertions could be true, they do not substantially undennine the ALJ's 

conclusion that Respondent was intoxicated. Respondent admitted, and his counsel 

stipulated, that he had participated in that BAT. [Tr. Vol. 2, at 51, Vol. 1, at 194] 

hnmediately after administe·ring the test to Respondent, the certified collector recorded a 

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SPENCE NO. 2 66 6 

BAC of 0.176%, or more than four times the maximum level permitted by regulation. 

The testing official testified that he had calibrated the machine properly and followed all 

of the other procedural requirements. [Tr.Vol. 1at181, 186-89, 223] He also testified 

that he signed the fonn immediately after Respondent did, after notifying Respondent that 

he had failed the test and advising him of the results. [Id. at 238-39] Indeed, Respondent 

admitted being told that he had failed the test, and that he would have to leave the vessel 

as a result. [Tr. Vol. 2 at 31-32, 50-52, 58] Based upon this evidence, the ALJ did not err 

in concluding that Respondent was intoxicated. 

Throughout the course of the hearing, Respondent also contended that he never 

refused to give a confirmatory DOT BAT or a urine test for illegal drugs. Indeed, he 

stated that he was never asked to do so. [Tr. Vol. 2 at 28] Instead, he testified that after 

the initial BAT, and after being infonned that he had failed the initial BAT, he took his 

bags, left the vessel, and caught a ride to Florida. [Id. at 32, 36] A review of the record 

shows that Respondent's testimony, in this respect, is directly contradicted by the 

testimony of Mr. Savoy, the testing technician, Mr. Harrell, his employer's representative, 

and documents filled out at the time of the refused tests. [IO Exhibit 9 and 10] While it 

is true that neither of these refusal forms contain Respondent's signature, each contains 

the signatures of the other two persons officially present at the time. [Id.] 

The ALJ, who saw and heard the witnesses, clearly did not believe Respondent 

when he testified, under oath, that he was not intoxicated and never refused to provide 

additional samples on the morning in question. [D&O at 1 O] Prior Commandant 

Decisions on Appeal make clear that "[q]uestions of fact are for the [ALJ] to decide." 

Appeal Decision 2609 (DOMANGUE). In this case, the ALJ concluded that the 

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SPENCE NO. 2 66 6 

Government had met its burden of proving both that Respondent was intoxicated and that 

he refused to participate in the additional tests as alleged. [D&O at 1 OJ Because the 

ALJ's determinations, in this regard, are supported by substantial evidence in the record, 

they will not be disturbed. 

III. 

Revocation of Respondent's license was an unduly harsh sanction, in this case, given 

Respondent's record of no prior disciplinary actions. 

Respondent cites 46 C.F.R. § 5.569 to support his argument that a sanction of 

revocation is inappropriate in this case. [Respondent's Appellate Brief at 4-5] To that 

end, Respondent contends that the applicable regulations make clear that an appropriate 

sanction for "refusal to provide specimens for chemical tests" is a suspension of a 

mariner's credential for a period of 12-24 months. [Respondent's Appellate Brief at 4-5] 

To further support his arguments in mitigation, Respondent notes that he has an otherwise 

unblemished record as a merchant mariner, is well respected as a master, and has never 

used illegal drugs or failed a previous drug test. [Id.] 

In his D&O, the ALJ addressed the severity of the sanction as follows: 

I find that a mariner's refusal to take a chemical test for drugs and alcohol 

when ordered to do so by a marin~ employer, as part of the required Coast 

Guard drug testing program, must result in the revocation of that 

individual's Coast Guard issued license and/or document regardless of the 

type of test involved (post accident, pre-employment, random, probable 

cause, or periodic). There can be no distinction between the type of DOT 

drug test involved and the sanction issued. Each type of test is an integral 

part of the Congressional and Coast Guard's effort to root out substance 

abuse in the merchant marine. All refusals raise the specter of the 

mariner's illicit drug use and place in doubt the ability of a mariner to 

safely carry out his/her duties and responsibilities of the vessel. Therefore, 

revocation is the appropriate sanction. 

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SPENCE NO. 2 666 

[D&O at 20] Prior Commandant Decisions on appeal make clear that the selection of an 

appropriate order is the responsibility of the ALJ and he has wide discretion as to the 

choice of the appropriate sanction. See 46 C.F.R. § 5.569(a); Appeal Decisions 2640 

(PASSARO), 2618 (SINN), 2609 (DOMANGUE), and 2543 (SHORT). While the ALJ 

may look to the Suggested Range of an Appropriate Order Table, 46 C.F.R. Table 5.569, 

for information and guidance as to the typical order associated with a particular charge, he 

may increase or decrease the sanction as he sees fit. 46 C.F.R. § 5.569; Appeal Decisions 

2640 (PASSARO) and 2618 (SINN). As such, it has long been held that an ALJ's order 

will only be modified on appeal if it is clearly excessive or an abuse of discretion. See, 

e.g., Appeal Decisions 2640 (PASSARO), 2422 (GIBBONS), 2391(STUMES),2362 

(ARNOLD), 2313 (STAPLES), 2256 (BURKE) and 2245 (MATHISON),. 

Upon a thorough review of the record, I believe that the sanction imposed by the 

ALJ is neither excessive nor an abuse of discretion. Indeed, as the ALJ notes in his 

D&O, "[r]efusal to submit to a chemical test raises a serious doubt about a mariner's 

ability to perform safely and competently in the future." [D&O at 19] This fact is 

amplified by the prevailing rationale that, "if a mariner could refuse to submit to chemical 

testing and face a lesser Order [than revocation], it is difficult to imagine why anyone 

who may have used drugs would ever consent to be tested." [D&O at 19-20, citing 

Appeal Decision 2578 (CALLAHAN).) As a consequence, many Executive Branch 

agencies involved in transportation safety consider refusal to take a test for alcohol or 

illegal drugs to ·equate to a positive (adverse) test result. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. 

Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1294 (3rd Cir. 1996)(dicta). In this case, 

Respondent, after being found to be intoxicated, refused not only to take a confirmatory 

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SPENCE NO. 2 666 

alcohol test, but also a requested drug test. Under such circumstances and with the 

rationale articulated above in mind, I find that the ALJ did not abuse his discretion in 

assessing a sanction of revocation in this case. 

CONCLUSION 

The actions of the ALJ had a legally sufficient basis and his decision was not 

arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous. Competent, reliable, probative, and substantial 

evidence existed to support the findings and order of the ALJ. Therefore, I find 

Respondent's bases of appeal to be without merit. 

ORDER 

The Decision and Order of the Administrative Law Judge is AFFIRMED. 

V.S.CREA 

Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard 

~Commandant 

Signed at Washington, D.C. this of ~£ , 2007. 

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