### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 630 -CV

Ci tyof Te m ple , Te xa s , A ppe lla nt

v. Steven Taylor , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 146TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 216, 776- B , HO NORAB LE RICKMO RRIS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N The City of Temple a

ppeals fr om a sum m ar y j u d gm ent g rante d in favor of Steven Tay

lor reg arding the computation of Taylor’s back- pay awa rd under the Fire Fig hters’ a nd Police Offic ers’ Civil Service Act (“ the Civil S ervic e Ac t”). See T e x. L o c . G o v ’ t Code Ann. §§ 143.001-.363 (West 2007). Ta y lor filed suit seekinga decla ratory judgme nt that he was e ntitled to t he fu ll amou

nt o f b a c k p ay

inc ur re d d uri ng the t ime he wa s su sp e nd e d f ro m e mpl oy

me nt w ith the City ’s police depar

tment. Both parties filed motions for summary judgme nt, a nd the trial cour

t g rante d Taylor’s m otion, declar ing that the City must pay the full amount of wa g es for the per iod of Ta y lor ’s su sp e ns ion

wi tho ut r e du c tio n for

c omp e ns a tio n h e e arn e d f ro m ot he r s ourc e s. Th e City appea ls, arg uing that the trial cour t ’s o rd er results in an improper windf all rec overy

for Ta y lor. Be cause we have dete rmined that Tay lor’s bac k-pay

awa rd must be re duced by

the a mount ofThe City stated in its resp o n s es t o interrog atories that a local ele ction to adopt the 1 Civil Service Act was h el d o n J anuar y 30, 1948. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 143.004 (West 2007). 2 compensation earne d from other source s during the per iod of suspension, we r ever se the judg ment of the trial court to the e x tent that it prohibits t he City from off setting the awa

rd with outside income.
BACK GR OUND On J une 27, 2005, Ta

y lor was indefinitely suspended from his employ ment with the City a s a po lic e of fi c e r. Ta y lor a pp e a le d th e su sp e ns ion

un de r the Civ il Se rv ic e Ac t, w hic h th e City ha s a do pte d f

or me mbe rs of

its po lic e and

fi re d e pa rtme nts
. See id. §§ 143.004, .053. After a 1 hear ing be fore a third-pa

rty hear ing e x aminer, see id. § 143.057(a) , the hea ring examiner reduc ed Taylor’s suspension to fiftee n day s and orde red that Taylor be reinstated to the police forc e. Taylor
r e qu e s t e d t h a tt h e C i t y p ay h i m c o mp e n s a t i o nf o r t h e p e r i o d

o f s u s p e n s i o n , l e s s t h e f

i f t e e nd a ys
u p h e l d b y t h e h e ar i n g e x a m i n e r , p u r s u an tt o s e c t i o n1 4 3
. 0 5 3 9 ( f ) o f t h e C i v i l S e r

v i c e A c t
. In
re sp on se , th e City

re qu e ste d a

n a c c ounti ngof

Ta y lor ’s e arn ing s f

ro m ot he r s ourc e s d

ur ingthe tim e of his suspension, in order to reduc e the back- pay awa rd by the amount of a

ny such compe nsation. Ta y lor re fu se d, fi lin gsu it t o s e e k a de c larator

y jud g me nt a

nd mand a mus re lie f r e qu ir ingthe City to p ay h i m t h e f

u l l am o u n to f b ac k

p ay i n cu rr edd

u ri n g h i s s u s p en s i o nwi t h o u ta r edu ct i o nfo r e arn i n gs from other

source s. The trial court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of Tay lor, dec laring that the City was re quired to pay

him the full compensation for time lost d u ri n g the suspension without offse ts for outside ea

rning s. The trial court also g rante d Taylor’s request for attorney ’s fe es, which the City does not cha lleng e on appe al. The pa rties ag ree that the full compensation Tay lor would have ear ned duringthe suspension, after

deductingcompensation for the 15-da y p e riod of unpaid suspension, is $32,405.35.3

T h e p art i e s a l s o a g r e e t h a t T ay l o r e ar n e d $ 1 5 , 1 1 9
. 4 0 f

r o m o t h e r s o u r c e s d u r i n g h i s s u s p e n s i o n . In its sole issue on appeal, the City argues that Tay

lor’s bac k-p ay aw ar d under the Civil Service Act should be reduc ed by the amount he ear ned from other sourc es, so that Tay lor is only entitled to an
awa rd of $17,285.95, while T aylor argues that he is entitled to the full amount of $32,405.35. The City has not y et paid Taylor any amount toward the compensation that he is entitled to rec eive unde r the Civ il Se rv ic e Ac t.
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW Summary judgme nts are r eviewe d d e n o v o. Va le nc e Op e ra tin g Co . v . D or se tt , 16 4 S. W.3 d 65 6, 661 ( Te x. 20 05 ). Whe n b oth pa rt ie s mo ve fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt o n th e same issues and the trial c ourt g rants one m o t ion and denies the other, the a ppellate c ourt consider s the summary -judg ment evidenc e pre sented by both side s, deter

mines all questions pr esente d, and if the
re vie wi ng cou rt fi nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d, re nd e rs the jud g me nt t he tr ia l c ourt

sh ou ld have r ender ed. Id
.

The fa cts of this case are undisputed and the sole issue on a ppeal is a matter of statutory construction. Statutory construction is a leg al question that we review de novo,
asce rtaining and g iving e ffe ct to the leg islature’s intent as e x presse d by the plain and c ommon meaningof the statute’ s words. State v. Shumak e , 199 S.W .3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006). We must read the statut e a s a

wh ole , r a the r t

ha n ju st isolate d p or

tio ns , g ivi ngme anin g to t he langua g e that is consistent with other provisions in the statute. Da l l a s C o u n ty Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton , 185 S.W .3d 868, 872-73 (Te x . 2005); Texas De p’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley , 146 S.W .3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2004).Section 143.053 applies onl y to municipalities with a population of less than 1.5 milli on. 2 The pa rties ag ree that the City

of Temple f

alls into thi s cate g ory . Under the C ivil Service Act, a suspe nded fire fig hter or police office r may elec t to appeal 3 to “an indepe ndent third party hear ing examiner,” rather than the Commiss ion, as Tay lor did in the prese nt case
. See id. § 143.057(a) (West 2007)
. W h en s u ch an e lection is made, “ the hea ring examiner has the same duties and powe rs as the [C] ommissi on.” Id. § 143.057(f)
. 4 DI SCU SSIO N The Civil Service Ac t allows a fire f ighte r or police office r who ha s been suspe nded fo r di sci pl inar

y re a so ns to a

pp e a l th e su sp e ns ion

to t he F ir e F ig hte rs ’ a

nd Pol ic e Of

fi c e rs ’ C ivi l Service Commi ssion. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code A n n . § § 143.003(1), .053. I f the Commission 2 finds, as it did in the prese nt case , that the per iod of suspension should be reduc ed, it may order a reduc tion in the period o f s u s p en s i on and re store the e mploy ee to the position or cla ss of servic e from which he was suspende d. Id. § 1 43 .0 53 (f ). A fir e fi g hte r o r p oli c e of fi c e r w ho is r e sto re d to his po sit ion or c la ss of se rv ic e is a lso e nti tle d to “ fu ll c omp e ns a tio n fo r the a c tua l tim e los t a s a re su lt of the suspension at the r ate of pay provided for

the position or class of ser v i ce fr o m wh i ch the person wa s suspended.” Id. § 143.053(f) (1). Be cause T ay lor’s appe al re sulted in a reduc ed suspension and reinstatement t o the pos ition from which he was suspended, he qualified for a ba ckpay awa rd under section 143.053(f

). 3 The Civil Service Ac t does not specific ally addre ss whether

back- pay awa rds under section 143.053(f

) ar e to be of

fset by income ea

rned f rom other sourc es duringthe suspension, but
mere ly states that the office r is “ entitled to .
. . full compensation” for the time lost. See id. Taylor, ci t i n g City of W

ac o v . B itt le , 167 S.W .3d 20 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denie d), ar g ues that the phrase “entitled to” ne cessa rily cre ates a rig ht to the full back-pa y amount without offsets. Howe ver, the cour t in Bi ttl e did not reac h the issue of off sets for o u tside ear

nings, holding only

that once aWhil e the City of Waco a

rg ued in Bittle that off

se ts sho uld be awa

rd e d “ fo r B itt le ’s int e ri m 4 ear nings from other source s,” the court did not addre ss this issue beca use it he ld that the City

was entitled to of

fset the back- pay awa

rd with be nefits Bittle rec eived during his suspension, and the total offse t amount for such be nefits ac tually exceede d the bac k-pay

award. City

of W ac o v . B itt le , 167 S.W .3d 20, 30-32 (Te x . App.—Waco 2005, pet. de nied). Be cause the Bittle court make s this stateme nt in the context of allowing the City to offset 5 the appe llant’s back- pay awa rd with bene fits rec eived dur ing the suspension, we re ad the wor d “position” to r efe r to the employ ee’ s compensation and be nefits, rather than me rely rank or class of service
. See id. at 31. 5 suspended f

ire fig hter or police office r has be en re instated, the Commis s i on does not have jurisdiction to determine that a r einstated e mploy ee is entitled to a ny thing less than the full amount of an a wa rd un de r t he Civ il Se rv ic e Ac t. Id. at 30 (“ t h e [ C ] o mmissi on does not have exclusive 4 jurisdiction to deter

mine whether a reinstated firefig hter or police officer is entitled to compensation
and be ne fi ts und e r s ub se c tio n ( f) or the a mou nt o f s uc h c omp e ns a tio n and be ne fi ts” ). Con tr a ry

to Taylor’s asse rtions, Bi ttl e does not d i ct at e how an awa rd of f ull compensation is to be calc ulated, holding only

that a re instated offic er ha s a statutory rig ht to such an aw ard. Significa ntly , howeve r, the cour

t in Bi ttl e also states, “The purpose of subsection (f) is to restore a

firef ighte r or police office r who ha s been imprope rly suspended to the position he 5 would have oc cupied ha d the suspension not oc curr ed.” The parties ag ree that if Taylor’s suspension had not occ urre d, his earning s during that time would have be en $32,405.35. A ba ck-pa y awa rd of $32,405.35, when c oupled with the $15,119.40 Tay lor ea rned fr o m o u t side source s, would not
re sto re Ta y lor to the po sit ion he wo uld have oc c up ie d h a d th e su sp e ns ion no t oc c ur re d, bu t w ou ld instead re sult in a windfall rec overy that violates the purpose of subsection (f) as descr ibed by the court in Bi ttl e . I n City of T exark ana v. Finche r , 657 S.W .2d 842, 843 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1983,
wr it r e f’ d n .r .e .) , th e c ourt int e rp re te d th e pr e de c e sso r to se c tio n 1 43 .0 53 to a dd re ss f a c ts s imi lar t oSee City of W aco v. Ke lley , 226 S.W .3d 672, 677 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. g rante d) 6 (“A lthough the L eg islature did not reta in the same lang uag e when it codified the provisions of the Civil S er vice Ac t in the L ocal Gove rnment Code, no substantive cha ng e wa s intended there by .”). We note that our holding is lim i t ed to the fac ts of this case, r ecog nizi ng the common 7 prac tice of police office rs to eng ag e in off-duty law enf orce ment employ

ment. As Tay

lor points out in his brief, such of

f-duty em ploy

ment g ener ally

must be authorized by

the depa rtment. See Corbit t v . Ci ty

of T e mp le , 941 S.W .2d 354, 355 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1997, writ denied) ( “Unde r the rules and policie s of t he Te mple Police Depa rtment, the Chief of Police . . . ha s discretion to g rant 6 the pre sent ca se, whe re the appe llant argued that the tria l court er red in re ducing his back-pa y awa rd under the Civil Service Act by amounts ear

ned fr om other sourc es duringhis suspension. The c ourt
o f ap p ea l s af

fi rm edt h e r edu ct i o n , s t at i n g: [Appellant] contends Sec tion 18 of Article 1269m[] provides for his recove ry , and that be c a us e it s ta te s, “ the c ourt sh all order the City to pay

lost wag es” . . . , no of

fset is p e rm iss ibl e . Se c tio n 1 8 is si le nt a s to mit ig a tio n. Se c tio n 1 6, e ff e c tiv e a t th e tim e Se c tio n 1 8 w a s a dd e d, pr ov ide s that a wr on g fu lly su sp e nd e d e mpl oy e e sh a ll b e fu lly compen s ated. A rea ding of Section 18 with Section 16 convinces us that the leg islature intended to do no more than compensate the employ ee. The doctrine of mit ig a tio n o f d a ma g e s is a pp lic a ble to c omp uti nglos t w a g e s und e r A rt ic le 13 69 m.
Id. L ike the pre dece ss o r statute descr ibed in Fincher , section 143.053(f ) provides that
a wr ong fully

suspended e mploy ee sha ll be fully compensated, but rema ins silent on the issue of mitigation. We ag ree with the Fi nc he r c ourt that the le g isl a tur e , in e na c tin g the Civ il Se rv ic e Ac t, “int ended to do no more than compensate the employ ee.” Id. A s a r e s u l t , w e h o l d t h a t a 6
c a lc ulatio n o f “ fu ll c omp e ns a tio n” un de r se c tio n 14 3. 05 3( f) ne c e ssa ri ly inc lud e s o ff

se ts f or inc ome
ear ned fr om other sourc es duringthe per iod of suspension.

Our holding today

is consistent with the ge nera l rule of em p l oy ment law re quiring
wro ngfully

te rm inate d e mpl oy e e s to mit ig a te dama g e s. See, e .g. , Gu lf Co n s o l. I n t’ l v

. M u r phy 7or deny

an o ff i ce r p ermission to eng ag e in off- duty employ ment that require s an off

icer to wear a po lic e un if

or m and re pr e se nt t

he po lic e de pa

rtme nt. ” ). I n situ a tio ns wh e re an off ic e r h e ld p art -t ime e mpl oy me nt p ri or

to a su sp e ns ion , a

ba c k- pa y awa rd un de r the Civ il Se rv ic e Ac t ma y no t ne c e ssa

ri ly require reduc tion for income e arne d at the same part-time e mploy ment during the suspension. Fe dera l employ

ment law sug g ests, for example, that the doctrine of mitigation of damag es do e s n ot r e qu ir e an e mpl oy e e ’s ba c k- pa y awa rd to b e re du c e d b y

a mou nts e arn e d f

ro m a pa rt -t ime job that the employ ee held prior to beingwrong fully terminated. See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. , 360 F.2d 569, 573- 74 (5th Cir. 1966) (pe rmitting “non- deduction o f s u p p l em en t al ea rn i n gs . . . wh er e a n em p l o y ee wh o h ad s p ar e- t i m e e arn i n gs p ri o r t o d i s ch ar ge from his regular job continued in the same spare -time job during his pe riod of discharg e,” a nd further holding that a s long a s employ ee w as “moonlig hting be fore his unlawful dischar g e, ” a mo u nts e arne d in any“spar e time employ ment” should not be used to re duce ba ck-pa y awa rd). 7 658 S.W .2d 565, 566 (Tex. 1983) (“The corre ct m easur e of damag es for wrong ful dischar g e of a n employ ee is the pr esent c ash value of the c ontrac t if it had not been bre ache d, less any amounts that the e mpl oy e e sh ou ld .
. . be abl e to e arn thr ou g h o the r e mpl oy

me nt. ” ); Gr e ate r F

or t W or th & T arrant Count

y Cmty. Ac tion Agency

v. Mims , 6 2 7 S. W. 2 d 1 4 9 , 1 5 1 ( T e x. 1 9 8 2 ) ( in proving damag es for

wrong ful dischar g e, “a

ny income a ct u al l y

ear ned duringthe per iod in question was pr op e rl y a dmi ssi ble a s r e bu tta l e vid e nc e ” ); Smith v. Hamilton , 237 S.W .2d 774, 777 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1 9 5 1 , no writ) (“ By the weig ht of Texas authority , . . . the measur e of
rec overy is the profits that would have be en ear ned under the contra ct, less what the e mploy ee e arne d in other employ

ment . . . .”). This doctrine of mitigation of damag es was a pplied to a police of

fice r’s claim for lost wa g es re sulting fr om an i m p roper suspension in City of L aredo v. Rodrigue z , 791 S.W .2d 567 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1 9 9 0 , writ denied) , althoug h the bac k-pay awa rd provided by

the Civil S ervic e Ac t was not at issue. Comparing an i n d efinit e suspension to a
wr on g fu l te rm inatio n, the c ourt state d, “ I n a wr on g fu l dis c ha rg e fr om e mpl oy

me nt c a se , th e ru le is that a discha

rg ed employ ee must use r easona ble dilige nce to mitigate his damag es by seekingother employ ment.” Rodriguez , 791 S.W .2d at 571.8 The g ener al rule that a wrong fully terminated e mploy ee’ s back- pay awa rd should be reduc ed by

the amount of any interim ear nings is similarly

ref lected in f eder al ca se law. See, e .g. , Heinrich Motors, Inc . v. National L ab o r Relations Bd. , 403 F.2d 145, 148 ( 2d Cir. 1968) (“T he g ener al rule in ba ck pay case s is that a wrong fully discharged employ ee is e ntitled to the differ ence betwee n what he woul d have e arne d but for the wr ong ful dischar g e and his a ctual int e ri m e arn ing s f

ro m the tim e of

dis c ha rg e un til he is o ff

e re d r e ins ta te me nt. ” ); FlorencePrinting Co. v

. National

Labor Relations Bd. , 376 F.2d 216, 219 ( 4th Cir. 1967) (desc ribing the “c ommon law ‘loss of e arning s’ rule, under which the measur e of a n employ ee’ s rec overy

is the ear nings w hich he has lost, less any

other e arning s which he ha s obtained or wilfully ref used to obtain”). I n light of Fincher

and the g e ne ra l r

ule tha t a wr on g ful ly

dis c ha rg e d e mpl oy e e is entitled to no mor e and no less than “c ompensation for the loss he has sustained,” Sm ith , 237 S.W .2d at 777, we hold that a

n awa rd of “ full compensation” unde r s ec t i o n 1 4 3
. 053(f) of the loca l g overnme nt code should be of fset by income ea

rned f rom outside source s during the period of suspe nsion.

The City does not r aise a point of err or on appea l reg ardingthe awa rd of attorney ’s fee s to Taylor. I n a dec laratory -judg ment action, a party need not pr evail on its c laim in or der to be entitled to an attorne y ’s-fe e aw ard. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.009 (West 2007) (in dec laratory

judgme nt action, “the c ourt may awa rd costs and r easona

ble and ne cessa

ry attorney ’s fe e s a s are e qu ita

ble and jus t” ); Ba rsh op v . M

e din a Co un ty

Un der wa ter Cons e rv ati on Di st. , 92 5 S. W.2 d 6 18 , 6 37 (T e x. 19 96 ); Ne e le yv . W est O ra ng e-C ov e Con so l. I nd e p. Sc h. Di

st. , 228 S.W .3d 864, 866 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pe t. de nied). Fur thermore , reve rsal of a trial court’ s decision on a de clar atory j u d gm ent does not necessar ily require reve rsal of a

n awa rd of9

attorney ’s fe es to the par ty who pre vailed in the t ri al court. See Sav a Gumarska v . Advanc ed Polyme r Sci., Inc. , 128 S.W .3d 304, 324 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pe t.) (holding that while cour t of a ppeals ma

y re mand a tto rn e y ’s -f

e e awa rd fo r r e c on sid e ratio n w he n d e c larator y jud g me nt i s
re ve rs e d, “ [w]e are no t r e qu ir e d to do so ” ); see also Vince nt v
. Bank of Ame rica, N.A. , 109 S.W .3d 856, 864 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pe t. denied) ( stating that reve rsal of de clar atory judgme nt does not require reve rsal of attorney ’s-fe e aw ard where complaining party fails to establish that trial court abused its discre tion in gra nting a war d). A trial cour

t’s g rant or denial of attorney ’s fee s in a decla ratory -judg ment action nee d
no t be re ve rs e d o n a

pp e a l “ un le ss t

he c omp la ini ngpa

rt y c le arl y sh ow s th e tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d iscretion.” State Farm Lloyds v. Borum , 53 S.W .3d 877, 893-94 (Te x . App.—Dallas 2001, pet. d en i ed ). In the pre sent ca se, the City has not only

failed to de monstrate that the tria l court abused its discre tion, but has asserted no point of er ror on a ppeal c halleng ing the awa rd of attorney ’s fee s and there fore has wa ived all complaints in this reg ard. See State v . Biggar , 873 S.W .2d 11, 14 (Tex. 1994).
CO NC LU SION

Be cause we have deter

mined that Taylor’s back- pay awa rd under the Civil S ervic e Act wa s subject to a reduction for income ear ned from other sourc es duringthe per iod of suspension,
we re ve rs e the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r t o th e e xten t it de c lare s th a t ( 1) the Ci ty fa ile d to c omp ly

wi th section 143.053(f

) of the loc al g overnme nt code and (2) Ta y lor is entitled to mandamus relief
re qu ir ingthe City

to p ay him a to tal sum o f $ 32 ,4 05 .3 5, and we re nd e r j ud g me nt t

hat T ay lor

is entitled to mandamus relief requiringthe City

to pay him a total sum of $1 7 , 285.95, repr esenting10

o ff sets for income ear

ned fr om outside sources. We af firm the re mainder of

the trial
c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med in part; Rever sed and Rende red in pa rt Filed: August 27, 2008