alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       4,745,208
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,745,208
<PP&E>                                          17,245
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,917,804
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          170,527
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,340
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,744,937
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,917,804
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               393,434
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (393,434)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (393,434)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (393,434)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.23)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.23)
        


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                           8,362
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    9,383
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     43,731
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                61,476
<PP&E>                                          16,729
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,622
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  83,407
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           60,490
<BONDS>                                         11,859
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                       7,101
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    83,407
<SALES>                                        236,194
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               236,194
<CGS>                                          198,702
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  198,702
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                30,899
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               3,088
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,505
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,310
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,195
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,195
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .22
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .22


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2



PERICOM SEMICONDUCTOR CORPORATION



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with this quarterly report of Pericom Semiconductor Corporation (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the three months ended December 27, 2003 (the Report), I, Michael D. Craighead, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify as of the date hereof, solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter
63, Section 1350 of the United States Code, that to the best of my knowledge:



(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company at the dates and for the periods indicated.



|                  |  |  |  |  |  |     |  |                                                                               
|----------------- |  |  |  |  |  | --- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|February 10, 2004 |  |  |  | 
|                  |  |  |  | 
|                  |  |  |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ Michael D. Craighead                                                      
|                  |  |  |  |  |  |     |  |                                                                               
|                  |  |  |  |  |  |     |  | Michael D. Craighead Chief Financial Officer Pericom
Semiconductor Corporation
United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted March 24, 2010

Decided March 26, 2010

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

                   ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

                              JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐3724

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

REGINALD J. BALLARD,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 09‐CR‐66‐C‐01

Barbara B. Crabb,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Reginald J. Ballard pleaded guilty to a two‐count indictment for bank robbery

(“Count I”), 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and knowing and intentional brandishment of a firearm

during a crime of violence (“Count II”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and the district court sentenced

him to 130 months’ imprisonment.  Ballard appeals, but his appointed lawyer moves to

withdraw because she believes that his appeal is frivolous.  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738 (1967).  Ballard has not responded to counsel’s motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), and so we limit

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 09‐3724 Page 2

our review to the potential arguments identified in counsel’s facially adequate brief, see

United States v. Cano‐Rodriguez, 552 F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2009).

Ballard has not indicated that he wishes to challenge his plea, and so counsel

properly refrains from considering the adequacy of Ballard’s plea colloquy or the

voluntariness of his plea.  See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–72 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel considers only one potential argument—whether Ballard could challenge

his sentence.  We agree with counsel that any such challenge would be frivolous.  At

sentencing, the district court properly calculated the advisory guidelines range of 57 to 71

months for Count I (based on a total offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of V)

and a seven‐year mandatory minimum for Count II.  Based on the government’s request for

a sentence reduction for Ballard’s substantial assistance, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), the district

court imposed a below‐guidelines sentence of 46 months for Count I and a consecutive

seven‐year sentence for Count II.  The below‐guidelines sentence the court

chose is presumptively reasonable, see United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877, 885 (7th Cir.

2008), and counsel suggests nothing to rebut that presumption.  Moreover, the district court

adequately examined the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), considering, among other things,

Ballard’s struggles with heroin addiction, his history of petty crimes, the seriousness of his

crime that put “many, many people in distress,” and the need to protect the community

from further crimes by Ballard.

Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
#### WELLS, Appellant, v. CITY OF BROOKLYN, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

October 27, 1896.)

Action by Jane Wells against the city of Brooklyn.

No opinion. Order resettled and signed. See 38 N. Y. Supp. 309, and 41 N. Y. Supp. 143.
Exhibit 23.1


INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Post-Effective Amendment No. 2
to Registration Statement No. 333-12619 of Hyperion Telecommunications, Inc. on
Form S-3 (formerly Form S-1), Amendment No. 1 to Registration Statement No.
333-36461 of Hyperion Telecommunications, Inc. on Form S-4, and Registration
Statement No. 333-38965 of Hyperion Telecommunications, Inc. on Form S-4 of our
report dated June 10, 1998, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of
Hyperion Telecommunications, Inc. for the year ended March 31, 1998.





/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP
     Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania


June 29 1998
Exhibit 32.2



Dover Motorsports, Inc.

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Annual
Report of Dover Motorsports, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company), on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Patrick J.
Bagley, Senior Vice President-Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                              
|------------------------------
|Dated: March 11, 2005         
|/s/ Patrick J. Bagley         
|Patrick J. Bagley             
|Senior Vice President-Finance,
|and Chief Financial Officer   



This certification
shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act), or incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the
Exchange Act, except as shall be expressly set forth by specific reference in such a filing.
CURRANT TUNNEL DIVERSION TO STRAWBERRY AQUEDUCTLatitude: 40.216Longitude: -111.106Elevation: 7609

CURRANT TUNNEL DIVERSION TO STRAWBERRY AQUEDUCT

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Hobble Creek Site Page...



Hobble Creek

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Currant Creek Site Page...



Currant Creek

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Daniels-Strawberry Site Page...



Daniels-Strawberry

Courtesy NRCS - Go to Strawberry Divide Site Page...



Strawberry Divide
1

John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by

assignment.

NO. 07-02-0022-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL E

SEPTEMBER 16, 2002

______________________________

HORACE CHESTER, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY;

NO. 82603; HONORABLE LARRY GIST, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before QUINN and JOHNSON, JJ., AND BOYD, S.J.1

Appellant Horace Chester has given notice of appeal from a conviction and

sentence in Cause No. 82603 in the Criminal District Court of Jefferson County, Texas (the

trial court), for possession of a controlled substance. The appellate court clerk has

received and filed the trial court clerk’s record and the trial court reporter’s record.

Appellant has been previously granted an extension of time to file his brief. By letter dated
2

August 19, 2002, the appellate clerk advised counsel for appellant that appellant’s brief

was due on July 15, 2002, and that neither the brief nor a motion for extension of time for

filing of the brief had been received. Counsel for appellant was further advised by such

letter that if no response to the letter was received by August 30, 2002, the appeal would

be abated to the trial court for hearing pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b). No response

to the clerk’s letter of August 19th has been received.

Accordingly, this appeal is abated and the cause is remanded to the trial court. TEX.

R. APP. P. 38.8(b)(2). Upon remand, the judge of the trial court is directed to immediately

cause notice to be given of and to conduct a hearing to determine: (1) whether appellant’s

present counsel should be replaced; and (2) what orders, if any, should be entered to

assure that the appeal will be diligently pursued. If the trial court determines that the

present attorney for appellant should be replaced, the court should cause the clerk of this

court to be furnished the name, address, and State Bar of Texas identification number of

the newly-appointed or newly-retained attorney. 

The trial court is directed to: (1) conduct any necessary hearings; (2) make and file

appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations, and cause them to

be included in a supplemental clerk’s record; (3) cause the hearing proceedings to be

transcribed and included in a supplemental reporter’s record; (4) have a record of the

proceedings made to the extent any of the proceedings are not included in the

supplemental clerk’s record or the supplemental reporter’s record; and (5) cause the

records of the proceedings to be sent to this court. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b)(3). In the

absence of a request for extension of time from the trial court, the supplemental clerk’s
3

record, supplemental reporter’s record, and any additional proceeding records, including

any orders, findings, conclusions and recommendations, are to be sent so as to be

received by the clerk of this court not later than October 16, 2002. 

Per Curiam

Do not publish.
```

[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 174 (Monday, September 13, 2021)]
[Notices]
[Page 50931]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2021-19671]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 11534]

Proposal To Extend and Amend Cultural Property Agreement Between 
the United States and Cyprus

AGENCY: Department of State.

ACTION: Public notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Proposal to extend and amend the Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus Concerning the Imposition of 
Import Restrictions on Pre-Classical and Classical Archaeological 
Objects and Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Period Ecclesiastical and 
Ritual Ethnological Materials.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chelsea Freeland, Cultural Heritage 
Center, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs: 202-632-6301; 
[email protected]; include ``Cyprus'' in the subject line.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to the authority vested in the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and 
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 2602(f)(1), an extension and amendment of the 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus Concerning the 
Imposition of Import Restrictions on Pre-Classical and Classical 
Archaeological Objects and Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Period 
Ecclesiastical and Ritual Ethnological Materials is hereby proposed.
    The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has requested that the 
agreement be amended to include additional categories of archaeological 
and ethnological material.
    A copy of the Memorandum of Understanding, the Designated List of 
categories of material restricted from import into the United States, 
and related information can be found at the Cultural Heritage Center 
website: http://culturalheritage.state.gov.

Allison Davis,
Executive Director CPAC, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2021-19671 Filed 9-10-21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
```
**Exhibit32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF**

**THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACTOF 2002**

 

 

 

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Blount International, Inc. (the “Company”)on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2007 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,James S. Osterman, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of theCompany, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(i)            TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(ii)           Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of thedates and for the periods expressed in the report.

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 hasbeen provided to Blount International, Inc. and will be retained by BlountInternational, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission orits staff upon request.

 

 
| Date:  November 9, 2007   |
|---------------------------|
|                      |
| /s/ James S. Osterman     |
| James S. Osterman         |
| Chairman of the Board and |
| Chief Executive Officer   |

 

 

----
#### KAISER, Respondent, v. LATIMER, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

December 22, 1896.)

Action by Henry M. Kaiser against Frederick B. Latimer.

No opinion. Motion for reargument denied,- without costs. See 41 N. Y. Supp. 94.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 22-0663

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Appellee, 

v. 

JOSEPH EUGENE GARCIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, 

and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including October 5, 2023, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 29 2023

08/29/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0663
SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT
Exhibit 21.1
Wilsons Wilsons The Leather Experts Inc. (Minnesota corporation)Wilsons Center, Inc. (Minnesota corporation)Rosedale Wilsons, Inc. (Minnesota corporation)River Hills Wilsons, Inc. (Minnesota corporation)Wilsons Leather Direct Inc. (Delaware corporation)Wilsons Leather of Alabama Inc. (Alabama corporation)Wilsons Leather of Arkansas Inc. (Arkansas corporation)Wilsons Leather of Connecticut Inc. (Connecticut corporation)Wilsons Leather of Delaware Inc. (Delaware corporation)Wilsons Leather of Airports Inc. (Delaware corporation)Chicago O’Hare Leather Concessions Joint VentureAirport Leather Concessions LLC (Delaware LLC)Houston Airport Leather Concessions LLC (Delaware LLC)Wilsons Leather of Florida Inc. (Florida corporation)Wilsons Leather of Georgia Inc. (Georgia corporation)Wilsons Leather of Indiana Inc. (Indiana corporation)Wilsons Leather of Iowa Inc. (Iowa corporation)Wilsons Leather of Louisiana Inc. (Louisiana corporation)Wilsons Leather of Maryland Inc. (Maryland corporation)Wilsons Leather of Massachusetts Inc. (Massachusetts corporation)Wilsons Leather of Michigan Inc. (Michigan corporation)Wilsons Leather of Mississippi Inc. (Mississippi corporation)Wilsons Leather of Missouri Inc. (Missouri corporation)Wilsons Leather of New Jersey Inc. (New Jersey corporation)Wilsons Leather of New York Inc. (New York corporation)Wilsons Leather of North Carolina Inc. (North Carolina corporation)Wilsons Leather of Ohio Inc. (Ohio corporation)Wilsons Leather of Pennsylvania Inc. (Pennsylvania corporation)Wilsons Leather of Rhode Island Inc. (Rhode Island corporation)Wilsons Leather of South Carolina Inc. (South Carolina corporation)Wilsons Leather of Tennessee Inc. (Tennessee corporation)Wilsons Leather of Texas Inc. (Texas corporation)Wilsons Leather of Vermont Inc. (Vermont corporation)Wilsons Leather of Virginia Inc. (Virginia corporation)Wilsons Leather of West Virginia Inc. (West Virginia corporation)Wilsons Leather of Wisconsin Inc. (Wisconsin corporation)Bermans The Leather Experts Inc. (Delaware corporation)Wilsons Leather Holdings Inc. (Minnesota corporation)Wilsons International Inc. (Minnesota corporation)Wilsons Leather of Canada Ltd. (Minnesota corporation)Wilsons Leather of Hong Kong Ltd. (Hong Kong company)Wilsons (UK) Limited (United Kingdom company)Wilsons Leather Gatsland Limited (United Kingdom company)Wilsons Leather Gatsair Limited (United Kingdom company)WWT, Inc. (Delaware corporation)Florida Luggage Corp. (Puerto Rico corporation)
#### Dunn *v.*O’Keefe.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department.*

May 26, 1890.)

L Justices of the .Peace—Procedure—Absence of Defendant.

Where the summons in a justice’s court is returnable at 9 a. m., and the justice calls the case at 9:45, and, in the absence of defendant, waits until 10 before proceeding, it is a compliance with Code Civil Proc. N. Y. § 2893, requiring the justice to wait one hour after the hour specified in the summons for its return, unless the parties sooner appear.

2. Negligence—Evidence—Offer to Settle.

Where defendant, after driving into and breaking plaintiff’s wagon, requests plaintiff to have the wagon repaired, and promises to pay the cost thereof, and plaintiff acts on the promise, it is a substantial confession by defendant of his negligence, and an agreement as to the measure of damages.

Apppeal from Washington county court.

Action by James Dunn against John O’Keefe, originally commenced in a justice’s court, to recover -damages from defendant for negligently running into and breaking plaintiff’s wagon. The justice rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff for $16.10, the amount it cost to repair the wagon, and $2.15 costs. The county court affirmed the judgment, and defendant again appeals. Code Civil Proc. ÍT. Y. § 2893, provides that, upon the return of a summons duly served, the justice must wait one hour after the hour specified therein for its return, unless the parties sooner appear.

Argued before Learned, P. J., and Landon and Mayham, JJ.

*C. R. Patterson,*for appellant. *F. A. Pratt,*for respondent.

Landon, J.

The defendant did not appear in the justice’s court. The summons was returnable at 9 a. m. The justice called the case at 9:45 a. m., but waited until 10 before proceeding with it. This was a compliance with the statute, which requires the justice to wait one hour. Code Civil Proc. § 2893.

The plaintiff’s testimony tended to prove his case. The circumstances detailed justified the inference that the plaintiff was free from negligence, and that his wagon was broken by means of the defendant’s negligence. The defendant, in his subsequent conversation with plaintiff, requested him to have the wagon repaired, and promised to pay the cost thereof. This was a substantial confession of his negligence, and an agreement as' to the measure of damages. The plaintiff acted upon it. Substantial justice was done. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.