alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Wiley W. Scott v. The State.

The rules of this court require an assigment of errors, and in civil cases that rule will be enforced. (Paschal’s Dig . Art. 1591, Note 618.) But although there be no assignment of errors, in a case affecting the life or liberty of the citizen we feel hound to see at least that the court had jurisdiction of the case; and where there was a motion for a new trial, on the ground that there was no evidence to convict, the court will treat this as an assignment of errors, and examine the facts. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3210.)

Where a party was convicted of manslaughter, and the statement of facts did not show that there was any proof that the homicide took place in the county, a new trial ought to have been granted.

Appeal from Houston. The case was tried before Hon. Samuel L. Earle, one of the district judges.

There were several points and a full statement of facts in the case, but it is enough to say that the statement of facts showed no proof that the homicide was proved to have been committed in anyplace; and for that reason the points of counsel are useless.

*Stewart S¡-*Nunn, for appellant.

2?. *B. Turner, Attorney General,*for the staté.

Hamilton, J.

—This was an indictment by the grand jury of Houston county against Martin Scott and the defendant, Wiley W. Scott, for the murder of Leroy D. Scarborough. There was a trial of Wiley W. Scott at the September term, 1868, of the district court for Houston county, and a verdict of manslaughter and two years’ confinement in the penitentiary returned by the jury. There was a motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment, which *410were overruled, and an appeal prosecuted to this court, which we are now to consider. There is no assignment of errors, as is required by the rules of this court, and we would not feel bound in an' ordinary civil case to look through the record to discover errors not formally complained of. But in a ease affecting the life or liberty of the citizen, we feel bound to see at least that by the facts proved the court below had jurisdiction of the case. Among other causes assigned for a new trial the third ground is, *“*There is no evidence to support the verdict of the jury,” which motion we feel constrained in this case to treat as an assignment of errors.

In this motion several grounds are assigned for a new trial, but none need be noticed except the one referred to. The question therefore for our determination is whether the evidence justified the verdict; and from the record we are bound to say that it did not. The statement of facts does not disclose whether the killing happened in the county of Houston, in the State of Texas, or in some other state or country. Whether this important and necessary fact was by oversight omitted in making up the statement of facts, or was not in proof, we cannot determine. We can only deal with the record as it is presented to us, and from the record no fact appears giving the district court of Houston county jurisdiction of the offense charged in the indictment. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                      19,810,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               15,934,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   917,000
<INVENTORY>                                    825,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            39,778,000
<PP&E>                                       9,374,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               5,854,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              46,176,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       10,560,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       162,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  85,343,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                46,176,000
<SALES>                                     27,300,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            27,300,000
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                9,426,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              (57,000)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (7,013,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (617,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (6,396,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (6,396,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      (.40)
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</TABLE>
Exhibit 99.1

   CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, James S. Osterman, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Blount International,
Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this quarterly report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

     (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision to
ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

     (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     (c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most
recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of
an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financing reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

     (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

     (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls.



Date: November 19, 2004


/s/ James S. Osterman
-------------------------------------
James S. Osterman,
President and Chief Executive Officer
#### BERGER, Appellant, v. MEANEY, Respondent.

(City Court of New York, General Term.

December 12, 1896.)

Action by Henry Berger against John Meaney. J. G. Ritter, for appellant K. Powell, for respondent

No opinion. Order appealed from affirmed, with costs.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Benjamin Finch, Appellant.

[946 NYS2d 378]

Appeal from a judgment of the Cattaraugus County Court (Larry M. Himelein, J.), rendered September 20, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of arson in the third degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting *1486him upon his plea of guilty of arson in the third degree (Penal Law § 150.10 [1]). We reject defendant’s contention that County Court made an insufficient inquiry regarding his waiver of the right to appeal and thus that the waiver is invalid. “The court need not engage in any particular litany regarding a waiver of the right to appeal, so long as the court ‘make[s] certain that a defendant’s understanding of the terms and conditions of a plea agreement is evident on the face of the record’ ” *(People v Miller, 87*AD3d 1303, 1303 [2011], *lv denied*18 NY3d 926 [2012], quoting *People v Lopez,*6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]). Here, the record establishes that defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary *(see Lopez,*6 NY3d at 256; *Miller, 87*AD3d at 1303).

Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that his plea was not voluntarily entered “because ... he failed to move to withdraw the plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction” *(People v Connolly,*70 AD3d 1510, 1511 [2010], *lv denied*14 NY3d 886 [2010]). In any event, that contention lacks merit. The record of the plea colloquy establishes that defendant stated that he understood the nature of the rights that he was relinquishing by pleading guilty, that he had not been coerced into entering the plea, and that he was not promised anything in exchange for his guilty plea. Indeed, he expressly stated that he was entering the plea voluntarily after having sufficient time to consult with his attorney. “[T]he record [thus] establishes that defendant understood the nature and consequences of his actions” *(People v Watkins, 77*AD3d 1403, 1403-1404 [2010], *lv denied*15 NY3d 956 [2010]). Defendant’s challenge to the validity of his waiver of his *Miranda*rights is encompassed by his waiver of the right to appeal *(see People v Kemp,*94 NY2d 831, 833 [1999]; *People v Mitchell,*93 AD3d 1173, 1174 [2012]).

Finally, we agree with defendant that his challenge to the jurisdictional requirements of the waiver of indictment and the superior court information need not be preserved for our review *(see People v Boston,*75 NY2d 585, 589 n [1990]; *People v Waid,*26 AD3d 734, 734-735 [2006], *lv denied*6 NY3d 839 [2006]), and that his challenge is not precluded by his valid waiver of the right to appeal *(see Waid,*26 AD3d at 734-735; *People v Verrone,*266 AD2d 16, 18 [1999]). Nevertheless, we conclude that defendant’s contention lacks merit. Present — Smith, J.P., Fahey, Carni, Sconiers and Martoche, JJ.
**Exhibit32.2**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF**

**THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACTOF 2002**

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Blount International, Inc. (the “Company”)on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2006 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,James S. Osterman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(i)            The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

(ii)           The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the datesand for the periods expressed in the report.

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to BlountInternational, Inc. and will be retained by Blount International, Inc. andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

Date:November 9, 2006
| /s/ Calvin E. Jenness     |   |
|---------------------------|--------|
| Calvin E. Jenness         |
| Senior Vice President and |
| Chief Financial Officer   |

 

----
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-30249 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus PATRICK D. LOMAS, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 97-CR-42-1

- - - - - - - - - - June 17, 1999 Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Patrick D. Lomas was convicted of distribution of cocaine base, conspiracy to tamper with a witness, tampering with a witness, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. On appeal he asserts that his counsel was ineffective for opening the door to unfavorable evidence. Generally, this court declines to review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal and has “undertaken toNo. 98-30249 -2- resolve claims of inadequate representation on direct appeal only

in rare cases where the record allowed [this court] to evaluate fairly the merits of the claim.” United States v. Higdon , 832 F.2d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1987). This is not such a case and we will not review this matter in this appeal. Lomas also argues that the district court clearly erred in its calculation of the amount of drugs included in his relevant conduct. See United States v. Mergerson , 4 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 1993). Lomas contends that the information in the PSR was unreliable because it stemmed from multiple hearsay from a questionable source. The presentence report (PSR) is considered reliable evidence for sentencing purposes. United States v. Vital , 68 F.3d 114, 120 (5th Cir. 1995). A district court may adopt facts contained in the PSR without further inquiry if the facts have an adequate evidentiary basis and the defendant does not present rebuttal evidence. United States v. Puig-Infante , 19 F.3d 929, 943 (5th Cir. 1994). A defendant who objects to the sentencing court’s consideration of information in the PSR bears the burden of proving that the information is "materially untrue, inaccurate or unreliable." United States v. Angulo , 927 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir. 1991). Lomas has submitted no evidence to rebut the findings of the PSR. The district court specifically found that the information in the PSR regarding the amount of cocaine base attributable to Lomas was reliable and Lomas has not produced anything to show that the finding was clearly erroneous.
AFFIRMED.
### SCWC-11-0000579
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI # I

MEGGAN MARIE AYAD, aka, MEGGAN MARIE PHARMER,

Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs. AMR ELSAYED AYAD, Respondent/Defendant-Appellee.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-11-0000579; FC-D NO. 08-1-0154)

ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ( B y : R e c k t e n w a l d , C
. J
. , N a k a y a m a , M c K e n n a , a n d P o l l a c k , J J
. , a n d C i r c u i t J u d g e W i l s o n , i n p l a c e o f A c o b a , J
. , r e c u s e d ) 

### The application for a writ of certiorari, filed on October 11, 2012, is hereby rejected.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, November 20, 2012. /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald /s/ Paula A. Nakayama /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Richard W. Pollack /s/ Michael D. Wilson Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-11-0000579 20-NOV-2012 08:35 AM
##### 



EXHIBIT 32(a) CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report of The Dial Corporation (the Company) on
Form 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Herbert M. Baum, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company. /s/ Herbert M. BaumHerbert M. BaumChief Executive OfficerMarch 10, 2004
 This written statement is being furnished to the SEC as an exhibit to the
Report. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906
or other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to The Dial
Corporation and will be retained by The Dial Corporation and furnished to the
SEC or its staff upon request.
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# Guidance on Use of Videoconferencing in the Court

                                      - Permission from the presiding judge or special master is required.
                                      - The court uses enterprise-level videoconferencing, such as Polycom, Cisco, and Lifesize. The court does not support consumer-level videoconferencing, such as Skype or FaceTime.
                                      - The court usually begins proceedings between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time. Technical staff at the remote conference location must be available to assist at this hour.
                                      - The court generally requires at least one month's advance notice for videoconferencing for scheduling and testing purposes.

**Once a videoconference has been approved by the presiding judge or special master, please note the following:**
                                      - The court will send the requesting party a form to elicit information needed to set up a system test. Among other things, this form requests technical information such as connection speed and the type of videoconferencing system that is available at the remote conference site. The technical information must be completed by remote site technical staff.
                                      - The test must be conducted in the room and with the system that will be used for the scheduled proceeding. It is recommended that someone from the requesting party be present for the test. Alternatively, the requesting party may survey the room prior to the test to establish where people will sit to ensure the proper placement of equipment and microphones.
                                      - To ensure a seamless experience on the day of the event, it is important that the room is free of clutter and noise.

**On the day(s) of the videoconference, please note the following:**
                                      - The court will connect the videoconference at least 15 minutes before the start of the scheduled proceeding to allow time to work through any unexpected connection problems. The court will also test all microphones and camera angles. It is important that technical staff at the remote conference site be present at this time.
                                      - While the proceeding is in progress, technical staff at the remote conference site must remain available by telephone in case of a problem.
                                      - If the proceeding spans multiples days, the court will connect at least 15 minutes early each day.

Howard T. Markey National Courts Building • 717 Madison Place, NW, Washington, DC 20439 • 202-357-6400
The Honorable Terry I. Adelman, United States Magistrate Judge for th e 1 Eastern Dis trict of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition b y consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994). United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-3534

___________ Stephen A. Marino, * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the N.H.P. Property Management, Inc.; * Eastern District of Missouri. National Corporation for Housing * Partnerships; Cindy Brandebura, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: July 24, 1997 Filed: August 18, 1997

___________ Before FAGG, BOWMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Stephen A. Marino appeals the grant by the District Court of summar y judgment 1 to the defendants. Having reviewed the record and the p arties' briefs, we conclude that-2-

the judgment of the District Court is correct. Accordingly, we affirm. See8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy.

Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit 23 

 

****Independent Auditors’ Consent****

 

The Board of Directors 

RMH Teleservices, Inc.: 

 

We consent to theincorporation by reference in Registration Statement Numbers 333-40946, 333-58785, 333-59014 and 333-88292 on Form S-8 and Registration Statement Number 333-72318 on Form S-3 of RMH Teleservices, Inc. of our report dated January 22, 2004 appearingin this Annual Report on Form 10-K of RMH Teleservices, Inc. for the year ended September 30, 2003. 

 

Deloitte & Touche LLP 

 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

January 22, 2004