UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

vs.

MERCHANT MARINER LICENSE

Issued to: VLADIMIR SALAMON

DECISION OF THE

COMMANDANT

ON APPEAL

NO. 2686

This appeal is taken in accordance with 46 U.S.c. § 7701 ef seq., 46 C.F.R. Part

5, and the procedures set forth in 33 C.F.R. Part 20.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At all times relevant herein, Respondent was the holder ofthe Coast Guard issued

merchant mariner license at issue in this proceeding.

By a Decision and Order (hereinafter "D&O") dated May 2, 2008, Coast Guard

Chief Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "CALJ") Joseph N. Ingolia, dismissed the

Coast Guard Complaint against the Merchant Mariner License of Vladimir Salamon

(hereinafter "Respondent") upon finding that the Investigating Officer (hereinafter "10")

failed to follow required regulations. The Complaint from which the D&O resulted

alleged that on August 14,2007, Respondent committed misconduct by failing to report a

marine casualty as required by 46 C.F.R. § 4.05-I(a). Additionally, the Complaint

alleged he committed acts of negligence by failing to sound the proper sound signals and
SALAMON NO.

obtain early warning ofthe risk of collision as prescribed by 33 U.S.c. §§ 2035(c) and

2007(b).

On November 15,2007, Respondent executed a "Good Faith Deposit" with the 10

whereby the Coast Guard received possession of Respondent's license while the 10

continued his investigation into the marine casualty. The terms ofthe Good Faith

Deposit specified that ifthe Coast Guard did not issue a complaint in this matter, then the

license would be returned. If, however, a complaint was issued and an ALJ ordered a

suspension ofthe credential, the agreement specified that the Coast Guard would

recommend that the ALJ credit the time the license had been on deposit toward the

suspension.]

On March 10,2008, the Coast Guard filed a Complaint against Respondent's

license alleging one act of misconduct and one act of negligence. [Complaint at 2] The

Complaint was personally served on Respondent and a copy faxed to the ALJ Docketing

Center. [Appellate Brief at 3; Complaint at 5]2 On March 20, 2008, Respondent filed his

Answer, admitting all jurisdictional and factual allegations. [Answer] Respondent also

indicated that he agreed with the proposed order of a four-month outright suspension

against his Merchant Mariner's License. [Id.]

On March 24, 2008, (four months after the execution of the Good Faith Deposit

agreement and 13 days after filing the Complaint) the 10 returned Respondent's license.

[Receipt for U.S. Coast Guard Credential]

1 The agreement also stated that the AU was not bound by the agreement and could choose not to accept

the Coast Guard's recommendation.

2 The Complaint was date stamped as being received by the AU Docketing Center on March 11,2008 and

a second complaint was received by the AU Docketing Center on March 25, 2008. This second complaint

was marked in ink as "Amended." The record shows (consistent with the explanation ofthe Coast Guard

provided in fooroote 2 of its Appellate Brief at 3) that the two complaints are idenlical with the only

ditTerence being that the version received by the AU Docketing Center on March 25th contains

Respondent's signature acknowledging receipt.

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SALAMON NO.

On May 2, 2008, the CALJ issued the D&O dismissing the Complaint after

finding that the fO failed to follow required regulations. The CALl further ordered that

the Respondent's official record not reflect the marine casualty or the resultant fourmonth voluntary suspension and that the Coast Guard make certain that lOs are properly

trained and supervised. [D&O at 3]

The record contains no indicia that either the Coast Guard or Respondent filed a

motion to dismiss the action. Moreover, there is no indication that the CALJ conducted

any conferences with the parties. There appear to have been no factual disputes and the

CALl did not hold a hearing in the proceeding prior to issuing the D&O. On May 30,

2008, the Coast Guard filed a Notice ofAppeal in the matter and subsequently perfected

its appeal by filing an Appellate Brief on July I, 2008. Therefore, this appeal is properly

before me.

APPEARANCE: Respondent did not appear. The Coast Guard Investigating

Officer was LTJG Greg Loveless of Sector Los Angeles / Long Beach. LCDR Chris

Tribolet and LT lonathan Alexander ofthe Eleventh Coast Guard District Legal Office

filed the appellate brief.

BASES OF APPEAL

The Coast Guard appeals the CALl's Order dismissing the Complaint against

Respondent. After a thorough review ofthe Coast Guard's filings, the assignments of

error are summarized as follows):

3 Unfortunately, the Coast Guard did not specifically identify the issues they wished to appeal in their brief,

leaving it to me to divine the issues discussed herein. Appealing parties are encouraged to specifically

frame issues in their brief. Based on the outline of the Coast Guard's argument in its brief, the

assignments of error were identified as: I) The AU erred as a matter of law in asserting that the 10 failed

to follow the appropriate regulations (Appellate Brief at 4); 2) The ALl erred as a matter of law in asserting

that Good Faith Deposits require oversight by an AU (ld. at 6); 3) The ALl erred as a matter of law in

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SALAMON NO.

, 2686

I. The CAU abused his discretion in dismissing the Complaint after

declaring that the 10failed to follow the appropriate regulations

by accepting a goodfaith deposit ofa license;

II. The CALl abused his discretion by issuing an ultra vires order fa

have the Respondent's official record cleansed ofany menrion of

the marine casualty or the resultantfour-month voluntary

suspension period.

OPINION

1. The CAU abused his discretion in dismissing the Complaint after declaring that the 10

failed to follow the appropriate regulations by accepting a goodJaith deposit ofa license.

A.

The Coast Guard's appeal hinges on whether the CALl abused his discretion in

dismissing the Complaint at the stage ofthe proceeding where the action was taken. A

prior CDOA has outlined the test for abuse of discretion:

The standard of review for abuse of discretion is highly deferential. A

reviewing court conducting review for abuse of discretion is not free to

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, and a discretionary act or

ruling under review is presumptively correct, the burden being on the

party seeking reversal to demonstrate an abuse of discretion ... [A]buse of

discretion occurs where a ruling is based on an error of law or, where

based on factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support. 5 Am. lUR.

2D Appellare Review § 695 (1997) (footnotes omitted). Appeal Decision

2610 (BENNETT).

The CALl issued the D&O in this proceeding after Respondent filed his Answer,

but before any conferences or hearings were held. Actions available to an ALl are

discussed in 33 C.F.R. Subpart I. In particular, 33 C.F.R. § 20.902(a) states that" [a]fter

closing the record ofthe proceeding, the All shall prepare a decision containing ... [a]

asserting that the 10 failed to timely file the Complaint with the AU Docketing Center (/d. at 8); and 4)

The ALl's order to redact the marine casualty from respondent's record was ultra vires (/d.). The second

and third assignments of error are within the scope ofthe first, and the first assignment of error is actually

an argument for abuse of discretion vice an error of law. The assignments of error are summarized

accordingly.

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SALAMON NO. 2686

finding on each material issue of fact and conclusion of law, and the basis for each

finding ...." In addition, the regulations discuss ALJ orders as follows:

The Administrative Law Judge enters an order which recites the

disposition of the case. When the finding is not proved, the

Administrative Law Judge issues an order dismissing the proceeding with

or without prejudice to refile. When the finding is proved, the

Administrative Law Judge may order an admonition, suspension with or

without probation, or revocation." (Emphasis in original). 46 C.F.R. §

5.567(a).

A review ofthe CAD's D&O in the context ofthese regulations shows that the

D&O does not contain "a finding on each material issue of fact and conclusion of law,

and the basis for each finding" as required by 33 C.F.R. § 20.902. The ALl can choose

to accept the proposed order within the Complaint as agreed to within the Answer, or

determine his own, but first he must rule on whether the Complaint was proved. Here,

the CALl dismissed the Complaint without ever determining whether the Coast Guard's

allegations were proved or not proved. Contra., 46 C.F.R. § 5.567.

The only other way the ALl could have dismissed the action would have been a

ruling in response to a motion to dismiss by the Respondent, pursuant to 33 C.F.R. §

20.311(d), but there was no motion to dismiss the action filed by either party.4 While 33

C.F.R. § 20.311 (e) provides that "a dismissal resides within the discretion of the ALJ,"

that section must be read in the context of § 20.311(d). A motion must be filed before

the ALJ has authority to dismiss the action; it cannot be done sua ~ponte.

In the absence of a finding on the merits, a motion for withdrawal by the

Government or a motion to dismiss by the Respondent, the CALJ had no basis in law for

4 Rather than a motion to dismiss, the Coast Guard may file a "notice of withdrawal" pursuant to 33 CFR §

20.311(b).

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SALAMON NO. 2686

dismissing the Complaint. Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion for the CALl to issue

the D&O ordering dismissal.

Absent a motion from Respondent citing a basis for dismissal as well as evidence

to support it, the options available to the CALJ were limited to requiring a prehearing

conference between the parties to identify the issue (33 C.F.R. § 20.1207(c)0», hold a

hearing, or review the Complaint and Answer and issue a D&O finding the allegations

proved or not proved. None of these actions occurred. The case must be remanded.

B.

Even if the Respondent had filed a motion to dismiss, an ALl's discretion to dismiss an

action is limited. 33 CFR § 20.311(d) states that:

Any respondent may move to dismiss a complaint, the government may move to

dismiss a petition, or any party may lodge a request for relief, for failure of

another party to-

(I) Comply with the requirements ofthis part or with any order ofthe ALl;

(2) Show a right to relief based upon the facts or law; or

(3) Prosecute the proceeding.

The CALI dismissed the Complaint on the basis of his determination that the 10

"failed to follow the required regulations," presuming that the pre-Complaint "Good

Faith Deposit" of his license somehow prejudiced the Respondent, [D&O at 3], and in the

belief that dismissal was justified pursuant 33 C.F.R. 20.311 (d)(2) for the 10's failure to

"comply with the requirements ofthis part" because ofa perceived right to relief.s

'In analyzing this case under 33 C.F.R. § 20.311(d)(I), r note that the regulations for the surrender or

voluntary deposit of a license or document are found in Title 46 C.F.R., Part 5, §§ 5.201-03, not Title 33,

Part 20, e.g., not "this Part" for the purposes ofsuch an action. That would therefore present an obstacle to

finding noncompliance with Part 20 to the degree that those regulations are in question.

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SALAMON NO. 2.68(:

In order for the CALJ to dismiss the complaint under 33 C.F.R. § 20.311 (d)(2),

the Respondent upon moving to dismiss the complaint would have to "show a right to

relief based upon the facts or the law." In this case, that would mean that the Respondent

must show that his agreement to deposit his license in exchange for a specific

recommendation by the 10 at the hearing, which the CALJ characterized as voluntary,

was within the jurisdiction of the ALJ in the first instance, and if it was, that the deposit

was either specifically prohibited by law, and thus void ab initio, or the actions of the 10

in brokering the Good Faith Deposit were so violative of either due process or public

policy concerns that the complaint cannot stand. Even if the Respondent had moved to

dismiss here, and the CALJ had jurisdiction to consider the voluntary deposit, I cannot

conclude that the agreement between the Respondent and the Coast Guard violated the

law, due process, or public policy.

Coast Guard regulations allow for two types of deposits of licenses or documents.

First, "[a] holder may deposit a credential or endorsement with the Coast Guard in any

case where there is evidence ofmental or physical incompetence." 46 C.F.R. § 5.201 (a).

"A voluntary deposit is accepted on the basis of a written agreement ... which specifies

the tenns and conditions upon which the Coast Guard will return the credential or

endorsement to the holder." Id. Second, "Ia]ny holder may surrender a credential or

endorsement to the Coast Guard in preference to appearing at a hearing. 5 C.F.R.

§ 5.203(a). However, ifsuch action is taken, the license is surrendered permanently and

no hearing occurs. 5 C.F.R. § 5.203(b).

The agreement between the 10 and the Respondent does not precisely fall within

either ofthe actions described in the regulations. The present action most closely

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SALAMON NO. 2686

resembles the voluntary deposit described in 5 C.F.R. § 5.201, except the basis for the

deposit was not physical or mental incompetence (i.e., some medical disability), but

instead based on allegations of negligence and misconduct. 6 The fact that the basis for

the deposit differed from those affirmatively specified in the regulations does not make

such action prohibited where the regulations do not preclude such arrangements. The

Coast Guard and Respondent are free to come to terms on a proposed order prior to

submission of the Complaint and Answer, particularly where a respondent obtains a

perceived benefit. Moreover, there is no evidence that the surrender was other than

wholly voluntary.

This analysis should not however, be read to condone the la's decision to accept

a Good Faith deposit from Respondent prior to filing the Complaint. Because ofthe

potential for abuse, pre-complaint Good Faith Deposits should not be executed unless

specific procedures or regulations allowing for such action are promulgated by the Coast

Guard. However, in this case there is nothing in the record that indicates the

Respondent's rights were abused, or that a pre-Complaint Good Faith Deposit violates

the public policy ofmaintaining standards for competence and conduct essential to the

promotion ofsafety at sea' while preserving the due process rights ofthe mariner.s The

Respondent is entitled to the benefit of his bargain, which was obtaining the Coast

Guard's agreement in advance of the Complaint to seek no greater penalty at hearing.

The CAW indicates that by accepting a good faith deposit from Respondent and

holding onto the credential for most ofthe full four months ultimately agreed to by the

6 Likewise, the action here does not compare with a voluntary surrender under 5 C.F.R. § 5.203, as the

Respondent expected (I) to receive his license back at some point and (2) to attend a hearing.

7 See. 46 C.F.R. § 5.5

8See. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551, et. seq.

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SALAMON NO. 2686

parties prior to filing the complaint, the 10 prevented the CALJ from ensuring "the

[R]espondent received full due process." [D & 0 at 2-3]. On the facts here, I cannot

conclude that the Coast Guard's pre~Complaintactions and the wholly voluntary actions

ofthe Respondent implicated any due process issue. 1do not reach the question here

whether pre-Complaint actions of the Coast Guard might so infect the post-Complaint

proceedings, or so invade the prerogative ofthe ALJ that an AU could or should, upon

motion, dismiss the case.

ll. The CAU abused his discretion by issuing an ultra vires order to have the

Respondent's official record cleansed ofthe marine casualty and the resultant 4-

month voluntary suspension period.

The CALl's D&O ordered that "the [R]espondent's official record will not reflect

this marine casualty or the resultant four month voluntary suspension period respondent

completed on March 24, 2008." [D&O at 3] The Coast Guard interprets this order to

mean that all traces of the marine casualty must be erased from the Coast Guard's

"massive, cross-referenced database." [Appellate Brief at 9, including footnote 3] For

purposes of deciding this appeal it is not necessary to interpret the order so broadly.

Rather, the CALJ's order is interpreted to be limited in scope to Respondent's official

merchant mariner record maintained by the National Maritime Center (NMC). The issue

then becomes whether the CALJ abused his discretion or committed an error of law in

ordering that Respondent's NMC record not reflect this marine casualty or the associated

four-month "voluntary" suspension.

The Coast Guard cites Appeal Decision No. 2658 (ELSIK) to support the

proposition that sanctions awarded by an ALJ must be "specifically 'authorized by law. '"

[Appellate Brief at 8J The requirement that a sanction be "authorized by law" comes

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SALAMON 2686

from § 558(b) ofthe Admioistrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.c. § 551 el seq. The

Coast Guard argues that ordering the records to be redacted is ultra vires since this

sanction is not specifically authorized by law. [Id.] Black's Law Dictionary defines the

tenn "sanction" as "a penalty or coercive measure that results from failure to comply with

a law, rule, or order." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1341 (7'" ed. 1999). The

authorities cited by the Coast Guard are misplaced insofar as they pertain to sanctions

that can be taken against a respondent. See 5 C.F.R. §§5.567 - 69 (addressing sanctions

that can be taken against a mariner). The action in this case actually would benefit the

mariner by having his record appear "cleaner" than it actually is. This sanction is against

the Coast Guard, but sanctions against the Coast Guard can only be ordered for failure to

follow discovery rules. 33 C.F.R. § 20.607. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that the

order ofthe ALl was within his authority to make.

Moreover, the content of a merchant mariner's NMC record is a matter within the

jurisdiction of the Coast Guard, not the AU. Specifically, 46 U.S.C. § 7502 states that

"[t]he Secretary shall maintain computerized records on the issuances, denials,

suspensions, and revocations of licenses, certificates... documents, and endorsements... "

(emphasis added).9 As such, the CALl's order is better understood as an effort to

maintain the accuracy of the record (given his dismissal ofthe Complaint and refusal to

adopt the Coast Guard's proposed order for suspension) rather than a sanction against the

Coast Guard for failure to comply with the appropriate regulations.

However, neither the statutes governing maintenance of mariner's records, nor the

rules of practice and procedure for suspension and revocation proceedings allow for the

issuance of an order by an ALl requiring that a mariner's record be altered. Indeed, the

9 This authority has been delegated to the Coast Guard by Homeland Security Delegation No. 0170.1.

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SALAMON NO. .2686

ALJ has no mechanism or recourse for enforcing such an order. Instead, the D&O can

reflect that the mariner's record should be amended. 10 Ifthe NMC fails to do so, the

mariner can request that the records be corrected, and can appeal any action taken or not

taken in that regard to the Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy pursuant to 46

C.F.R. § 10.204. Also, in the interest ofmaintaining accurate records the Respondent's

NMC record must reflect the disposition of this case. A complaint was filed and a D&O

issued. Reflecting these facts in the Respondent's NMC record isappropriate.

CONCLUSION

The CALl's D&O is not supported by the record as it dismisses the Complaint

without a finding that the allegations were not proved and absent a motion from the

Respondent to dismiss, with sufficient evidence to support the motion. Therefore, the

CALI erred as a matter of law in ordering the Complaint dismissed at this stage of the

proceeding. The CALl also was without authority to order that Respondent's record not

reflect his involvement in a marine casualty or accurately reflect the administrative

proceedings that occurred.

ORDER

The D&O ofthe CAL! dated May 2, 2008, is VACATED. The case is

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the applicable regulations and this

decision. The Respondent is entitled to four months credit for the deposit of his license

in any order issued against the license.

l<J.rhe CALJ's order was that "respondent's official record will not reflect this marine casualty." [D&O at 3]

I note that the existence ofthe marine casualty is not at issue in this case, and in the interest of maintaining

accurate records, the Respondent's NMC record may reflect the existence of the marine casualty.

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SALAMON NO. 2686

Signed at Washington, D.C. this 22Jo.day of 2010.

1ud- ;2 ;jp~ D.P. PEkOSXE

Vice AdIliral. U.S. c:GlST QJARD

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