* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-20036

Summary Calendar

NORIS G ROGERS

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

KBR TECHNICAL SERVICES INC; THE UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD

SUPPORT COMMAND

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:06-CV-1389

Before KING, DAVIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Noris Rogers appeals the district court’s denial

of his motion to vacate an arbitration award, denial of his post-judgment motion,

and grant of Defendant-Appellee KBR Technical Services Inc.’s (“KBR”) motion

to confirm the arbitration award. We affirm.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 9, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-20036

2

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On August 25, 2005, Rogers entered into an employment agreement with

Service Employees International, Inc. (“SEII”) through KBR to work as an

electrician in Afghanistan. SEII and KBR were affiliated companies that were

both subsidiaries of Halliburton, Inc. Under the employment agreement, Rogers

agreed to submit any claims to arbitration in accordance with the Halliburton

Dispute Resolution Program (“HDRP”). Rogers worked at Camp Eggers, a U.S.

military installation in Kabul, Afghanistan. On September 29, 2005, he

complained to the U.S. Army inspector general’s office that KBR was in default

on several obligations, but his claims were found to be unsubstantiated. On

November 12, 2005, Rogers demanded that KBR arrange a non-stop flight from

Kabul to Houston so that he could demobilize, because, he claimed, KBR was in

violation of his contract and the living conditions were unsuitable. On November

20, 2005, he left Camp Eggers without authorization or military escort to visit

a travel agency and arrange for his trip home. Upon his return to the camp, he

was detained by U.S. military personnel. He was ordered removed from the

camp by the military commander, and his employment was terminated for

violating company policy. Rogers was subsequently sent to Bagram Air Field

before being flown back to the United States on a military flight. 

On April 21, 2006, Rogers filed a complaint pro se against KBR and the

U.S. Army Field Support Command alleging various claims arising out of his

employment in Afghanistan. The district court granted a motion by KBR to

compel Rogers to arbitrate his claims. On June 27, 2007, the arbitrator issued

a decision. The arbitrator ruled against Rogers on all claims except for two

“payment claims,” one for an unpaid work area differential and another for

reimbursement of postal expenses for the shipment of personal items. The

arbitrator awarded Rogers $252.84 for these claims. 
No. 08-20036

3

Rogers moved to vacate the decision. KBR moved to confirm it. On

November 8, 2007, the district court granted KBR’s motion and confirmed the

award. Rogers then filed a post-judgment motion, titled a “motion for

reconsideration,” which was denied. He sought leave to file an amended motion

for reconsideration, which was also denied.

Rogers timely appealed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A district court’s confirmation of an arbitrator’s award is reviewed de novo.

Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir. 1994). 

Our review of the arbitrator’s award itself, however, is very

deferential. We must sustain an arbitration award even if we

disagree with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the underlying

contract as long as the arbitrator’s decision draws its essence from

the contract. In other words, we must affirm the arbitrator’s

decision if it is rationally inferable from the letter or the purpose of

the underlying agreement. In deciding whether the arbitrator

exceeded its authority, we resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

A district court’s decision on a motion to alter or amend judgment under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is reviewed for abuse of discretion,

“[h]owever, [t]o the extent that a ruling was a reconsideration of a question of

law . . . the standard of review is de novo.” Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 763

(5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). “A district court abuses its

discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly

erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

III. APPLICABLE LAW

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., a district

court may vacate an arbitration award: 

(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue

means; 
No. 08-20036

4

(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the

arbitrators, or either of them;

(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to

postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to

hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any

other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been

prejudiced; or

(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly

executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the

subject matter submitted was not made. 

9 U.S.C. § 10(a). This Circuit has previously held that an arbitration award may

be vacated on non-statutory grounds when an arbitrator manifestly disregards

the law, which “is an extremely narrow, judicially-created rule with limited

applicability,” or if it is “contrary to public policy.” Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer

Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2003). 

The Supreme Court has recently held that the provisions of the FAA are

the exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification of an arbitration

award, which calls into doubt the non-statutory grounds which have been

recognized by this Circuit. See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128

S. Ct. 1396, 1403 & n.5 (2008). However, because we affirm the district court

and hold that the arbitration award is confirmed, there is no need in the instant

case to determine whether those non-statutory grounds for vacatur of an

arbitration award remain good law after Mattel. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Vacate

On appeal, Rogers challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to

vacate on four grounds.

(1) Contractually Provided Rules

In his motion to vacate, Rogers alleged that the “[a]rbitrator exceeded her

[a]uthority and showed [m]anifest [d]isregard in ruling that the [American
No. 08-20036

5

Arbitration Association (“AAA”)] Rules rather than the Halliburton Dispute

Resolution Program (HDRP) rules would apply to this dispute.” The HDRP

adopts the AAA rules. Thus, nothing in the record shows that the arbitrator

exceeded its powers or manifestly disregarded the law by applying the AAA rules

to the arbitration.

However, from the wording of the remainder of Rogers’s discussion of this

issue in his motion to vacate, it appears that he specifically claimed that the

arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in ruling that the July 1, 2006 AAA

rules, as opposed to earlier rules, applied to the proceedings. This interpretation

is confirmed by Rogers’s post-judgment motion, which clearly states Rogers’s

disagreement with the version of the AAA rules that was applied. As we

liberally construe the arguments made by a pro se litigant, we address this issue

under the standard of review for a motion to vacate an arbitration award, rather

than the standard of review for a post-judgment motion. See Andrade v.

Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating “[w]e must construe the

pleadings of pro se litigants liberally”).

Rogers relied on the HDRP’s provision that no amendment of the rules,

including AAA rules, could be applied to an already-initiated dispute. He

claimed that, because he had first invoked the terms of the HDRP in a letter on

October 18, 2005, the arbitrator was incorrect in determining that the

arbitration was initiated on August 14, 2006 and applying the July 1, 2006 AAA

rules. This claim fails because Rogers’s October 18, 2005 letter did not initiate

proceedings under the HDRP. The letter was a request for legal services

pursuant to a legal consultation plan provided by Halliburton. Rogers also

attempted to rely on the wording of the district court’s decision to compel

arbitration to establish that he had invoked the arbitration clause. Neither the

October 18, 2005 letter, nor the district court’s opinion compelling arbitration,

indicate thatthe arbitrator erred in determining thatthe arbitration proceeding
No. 08-20036

6

was initiated after July 1, 2006. In fact, the August 14, 2006 demand for

arbitration which led to the proceeding over which the arbitrator presided

initiated the arbitration. We hold that the arbitrator’s decision to apply the July

1, 2006 rules was rationally inferrable from the employment agreement and

rules. 

(2) Denial of Motion for a Judgment of Default

Rogers alleged that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by

failing to grant his motion for a judgment of default. He argued that Rule 3(E)

ofthe HDRP required KBR to submit an answering statement by a certain date.

KBR’s failure to do so, Rogers claimed, entitled him to a default judgment.

Although he correctly cited the HDRP rules, Rogers failed to cite any authority

in the employment agreement, the HDRP, or any law which required a default

judgment if a party failed to file an answering statement in a timely fashion.

The AAA case manager indicated that a failure to file an answering statement

would result in it not being considered by the AAA, but did not state that a

default judgment was a sanction for failing to file an answering statement in a

timely fashion. We conclude that the arbitrator’s decision to deny Rogers’s

motion for a default judgment could be rationally inferred from the HDRP. 

(3) Rules Regarding Travel to Afghanistan

Rogers claimed that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in

determining that KBR did not breach its contract with him by failing to obtain

an Afghan visa for him. He relied on a U.S. State Department Consular

Information Sheet entered into the record to show that KBR forced him to

perform an illegal act by flying him into Afghanistan without a visa. Assuming

arguendo that the State Department’s summary of Afghanistan’s requirements

are a reflection of governing law, the sheet only indicates that “[a] passport and

valid visa are required to enter and exit Afghanistan. . . . Americans arriving in

the country by military air usually have considerable difficulties if they choose
No. 08-20036

1

In his post-judgment motion, Rogers raised the issue of KBR failing to register him

with the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan. This was not alleged in his motion to vacate. Thus,

it will only be reviewed under the standard for a post-judgment motion. See infra.

2

In Rogers’s motion to vacate, he alleged that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded

the law pertaining to his personal injury and false advertising claims by not providing written

reasons for its award. In his post-judgment motion, this alleged error in failing to provide

written reasons was characterized as misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, as opposed to

a manifest disregard of the law. In his briefs on appeal, Rogers only claims that the

arbitrator’s failure to provide written reasons was misconduct, as he alleged in his postjudgment motion, not a manifest disregard of the law as he argued in his motion to vacate.

Thus, KBR reasonably argues that this Court should review the arbitrator’s failure to provide

written reasons under the standard for a post-judgment motion. However, as a pro se litigant,

7

to depart Afghanistan on commercial air, because their passports do not receive

stamps showing they entered the country legally.” In his motion to vacate,

Rogers selectively quoted the State Departmentinformation, failing to note that

the those arriving by military air were encouraged to legalize their status upon

arrival,“ifthere is any chance they will end up departing on anything other than

military air.” Because KBR arranged military transportation for Rogers to and

from Afghanistan, according to the information sheet, there was no need for

Rogers to obtain a visa for Afghanistan. 

Nothing in the information sheet, or elsewhere in the record, indicates that

Rogers was performing an illegal act when he entered Afghanistan on a U.S.

military-chartered aircraftto work on a U.S. military base in a war zone without

first obtaining a visa, or that his failure to obtain a visa after his arrival was an

illegal act. Rogers has not shown that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the

law in concluding that Rogers had the proper documents to work at Camp

Eggers in Afghanistan.1 The arbitrator’s decision was rationally inferrable from

the employment agreement and rules. 

(4) Failure to Provide Written Reasons

Rogers argued that the arbitrator failed to issue rulings on his personal

injury and false advertising claims. He claimed that this violated the HDRP

rules and the AAA code of ethics for arbitrators.2
No. 08-20036

we construe his briefs liberally and address the issue raised in the motion to vacate. See

Andrade, 459 F.3d at 543. 

8

The HDRP rules require that “[t]he arbitrator shall write a statement of

reasons for the award if requested to do so in the request to initiate proceedings

or in the answering statement.” In his motion to vacate, Rogers failed to cite any

request for a written statement of reasons in the request to initiate proceedings

or in an answering statement.

The AAA code of ethics only notes that “[t]he arbitrator should, after

careful deliberation, decide all issues submitted for determination.” The plain

language ofthis ethical rule does not require a written statement regarding each

claim. Clearly, the arbitrator decided Rogers’s tort and false advertising claims

by not awarding him anything for those claims.

It does not appear that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded those rules.

Even if the arbitrator had, there is nothing to show that a failure to provide

written reasons resulted in a “significant injustice”, which is required to grant

relief. Am. Laser Vision, P.A. v. Laser Vision Inst., L.L.C., 487 F.3d 255, 259 (5th

Cir. 2007). Furthermore, the arbitrator’s decision was rationally inferrable from

the employment agreement and rules.

B. Post-Judgment Motion

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a “motion for

reconsideration”in those words. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc.,

910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid

Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994). 

[A] motion [for reconsideration], provided that it challenges the

prior judgment on the merits, will be treated as either a motion “to

alter or amend” under Rule 59(e) or a motion for “relief from

judgment” under Rule 60(b). Under which Rule the motion falls

turns on the time at which the motion is served. If the motion is

served within ten days ofthe rendition of judgment,the motion falls
No. 08-20036

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under Rule 59(e); if it is served after that time, it falls under Rule

60(b).

Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 173 (footnotes omitted). Rogers’s motion for

reconsideration was filed within ten days of the rendition of judgment. Thus, it

falls under Rule 59(e). 

Motions under Rule 59(e) are not subjectto the same stringent limitations

as those under Rule 60(b). Id. at 173–74. 

[I]n order to reopen a case under Rule 59(e) on the basis of

evidentiary materials that were not timely submitted, the mover

need not first show that her default was the result of mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or that the evidence is

such as to show that the judgment was manifestly wrong.

Id. at 174. However, “a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e)

must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present

newly discovered evidence and cannot be used to raise arguments which could,

and should, have been made before the judgment issued.” Rosenzweig v. Azurix

Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). 

(1) Applying the July 1, 2006 Rules

This issue in Rogers’s post-judgment motion was simply a more explicitly

worded restatement of the same argument made in Rogers’s motion to vacate,

which is addressed above. There is no need to address it again. Rogers did not

submit any newly discovered evidence in his post-judgment motion, and the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rogers’s post-judgment

motion on this issue.

(2) Manifest Disregard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55

In his post-judgment motion, Rogers for the first time argued that KBR’s

failure to submit a timely answer to his demand for arbitration was a violation

of Rule 55. He claimed that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by not

granting his motion for a defaultjudgment. He could and should have made this
No. 08-20036

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argument in his motion to vacate. Thus, it could not be made in a Rule 59(e)

motion. Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 863. 

Even if he had made this argument in his motion to vacate, Rule 1 states

“[t]hese rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the

United States district courts.” Rule 55 does not apply to arbitration proceedings.

HDRP rules require the application of the “state or federal substantive law

which would be applied by a United States District Court” to arbitration

proceedings. However, that rule refers to substantive law, not procedural law

or rules. The arbitrator’s decision not to apply Rule 55 to the arbitration

proceedings was rationally inferrable from the employment agreement and rules.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rogers’s post-judgment

motion on this issue. 

(3) Rules Regarding Travel to Afghanistan

Rogers reiterated his argumentfrom his motion to vacate that KBR should

have obtained an Afghan visa for him. There is no need to address that issue

again. However, in his post-judgment motion, Rogers added a claim that KBR

failed to register him with the U.S. Embassy or Consulate when he entered

Afghanistan, citing that as a requirement under KBR’s contract with the U.S.

Army. Rogers could and should have made this argument in his motion to

vacate. It could not be made in a Rule 59(e) motion. See Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d

at 863. Even if properly made, Rogers presented no evidence to show that he

was not registered with the appropriate U.S. Embassy or Consulate when he was

working at Camp Eggers. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Rogers’s post-judgment motion on this issue. 

(4) Failure to Provide Written Reasons

In his motion to vacate, Rogers claimed the arbitrator manifestly

disregarded the law when it did not provide written reasons its decision

regarding each of his claims. In his post-judgment motion, he re-characterized
No. 08-20036

11

this claim as misconduct on the part of the arbitrator and cited items in the

record which he claimed were requests for written reasons. This is an argument

that Rogers could and should have made in his motion to vacate. Id. The

evidence he cited to show that he made a request for written reasons was not

newly discovered. Further, he cited a January 31, 2007 conference call which

was neither a requestto initiate proceedings nor an answering statement. Thus,

it was insufficient under the HDRP rules to require the arbitrator to provide a

written statement of reasons. Even if Rogers had raised this argument and cited

this evidence in his motion to vacate, he failed to show that the arbitrator was

guilty of misconduct that resulted in prejudice to him. He also failed to show

that the arbitrator’s decision was not rationally inferrable from the agreement

and rules. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rogers’s

post-judgment motion on this issue. 

V. CONCLUSION

The district court’s denial of Rogers’s motion to vacate the arbitration

award, denial of his post-judgment motion, and grant of KBR’s motion to confirm

the arbitration award are AFFIRMED.