21

- 6223 Singh v. Garland BIA Christensen , IJ

A 208 419 125 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

## SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APP ENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “ SUMMARY ORDER ” ). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 1 8 th da y of April , two thousand twenty t hree
. PRESENT: MICHAEL H. PARK, STEVEN J. MENASHI, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ MANDEEP SINGH , Petitioner ,

v. 21 - 6223 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND , UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent
.

_____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER : Dalbir Singh, Dalbir Singh & Assoc iates , New York , N Y

.2 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton , Acting Assistant Attorney General ; Cindy S. Ferrier , Assistant Director ; Sunah Lee , Senior Trial Attorney , Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D C. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is her eby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the petitio n for review is DENIED

. Petitioner Mandeep Singh , a native and citizen of India , seeks review of a March 19, 2021 , decision of the BIA affirming a n August 1 7 , 2018 , decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of
removal , and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)

. In re Mandeep Singh , No. A 208 419 125 (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 2021 ), aff’g No. A 208 419 125 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 17, 2018 ). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. Under the circumstances, we have considered the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales , 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B )

.3 Accordingly, we review an adverse credibility determination “ under the
substantial evidence standard

. ” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions , 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir.
2018 ). We treat Singh’s challenge to the agency’s adverse credibility
determination as exhausted because the BIA considered that determination despite Singh’s failure to adequately challenge it in his brief on appeal. See Ruiz

Martinez v. Mukasey , 516 F.3d 102, 112 n.7 (2d Cir. 2008). “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record

. . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim .” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain
that no reasonable fact

- finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”4 Xiu Xia Li n v. Mukasey , 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao , 891
F.3d at 76. In this case, s ubstantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh was not credible as to his claim that Dera Sacha Sauda members attacked him on account of his Sikh faith and refusal to join their religious organization. The agency reasonably relied on the following record inconsistencies: (1) Singh testified inconsistently regarding whether he knew the individuals who res cued him from his attackers and took him to the doctor, (2) his father’s and neighbor’s
statements that he knew his rescuers conflicted with Singh’s final testimony that he did not know them, (3) Singh’s testimony that only his father accompanied him
to th e police station was inconsistent with his friend’s affidavit stating that the friend had accompanied Singh , (4) his testimony that he told only his family and
the police about the attack was inconsistent with his village leader’s affidavit that Singh told him about the attack, a n d (5) Singh’s application and testimony were inconsistent regarding how long he lived in Delhi after fleeing his village. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr , 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude5 even more forcefully.”). Singh did not compellingly explain these
inconsistencies

. S ee Majidi v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitione r must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact

- finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)) . Contrary to Singh’s argument, th e agency did not err in relying on direct inconsistencies between Singh’s statements and witness statements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)

. Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency reasonably relied further

on his failure to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,
because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales , 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). In addition to the inconsisten t witness
statements , the agency reasonably declined to cre dit a letter purportedly from the medical clinic where Singh was treated because it was not contemporaneous with
his treatment and the clinic ’s name was spelled in consistently on the document

. See Y.C. v. Holder , 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“ We gene rally defer to the6 agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence.”).
The inconsistencies and lack of reliable corroboration constitute substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao , 968 F.3d at 145 n.8 ; Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 165

– 66 ; Biao Yang , 496 F.3d at 273

. T he adverse credibility determination i s dispositive of
all relief. See Paul v. Gonzales , 444 F.3d 148, 15 6

– 5 7 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED

. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED

. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O ’ Hagan Wolfe , Clerk of Court