No. 80-156 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1980 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

VS. 

ALVIN L. ROBINSON, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, 

In and for the aounty of Toole. 

Honorable R. D. McPhillips, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Randono, Lewis and Donovan, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Rae Kalbfleisch, County Attorney, Shelby, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: October 9, 1980 

Decided: &QV 1 ,"9 q$j& 
Mr. Justice John C. Harrison delivering the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Alvin Robinson was convicted of burglary and theft on 

June 19, 1975, in the Toole County ~istrict Court. He 

received ten-year sentences on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. The District Court suspended 

the defendant's sentence and placed him on probation. On 

December 5, 1979, the Toole County Attorney filed a petition 

for revocation of the 1975 suspended sentence. After a 

hearing on the revocation petition, the District Court 

revoked two of the remaining five years of Robinson's sentence. This appeal follows. We affirm. 

On the evening of October 29, 1979, a fight took place 

between two patrons of Bill's Bar in Sweetgrass, Montana. 

The Toole County Sheriff's Department was notified and two 

offi.cers, deputies Robins and Navratil, responded. When 

the officers arrived, Robinson and another man were standing 

outside the tavern. At the outset, Robinson indicated to 

Navratil that the officers were unwelcome and made it clear 

that he (Robinson) intended to take an active role in 

resisting police interference in the barroom fight. As 

Officer Navratil attempted to restrain one of the participants in the fight, the defendant began to pull the officer 

away. At that point, Navratil struck Robinson with his 

nightstick. Robinson's companion, Carl Brickel, threw a bar 

stool at Navratil and was placed under arrest. 

Outside the bar the officers had just put Brickel into 

the squad car when Robinson appeared stating that he would 

have Navratil's job. He was then arrested for interference 

with the arrest of the man inside the bar, who had resumed 

his fight when the officers arrested Brickel. The defendant 

was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the squad car. 

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He then proceeded to kick at the window of the car until 

Officer Navratil opened the door lest the window be broken. 

With the door open, Robinson rolled out of the car, and the 

officers placed him in the front seat. It is uncontroverted 

that defendant had back problems which had recently been 

treated, and he complained of the pain caused by having his 

hands cuffed behind his back. Navratil offered to handcuff 

his hands in front if he agreed to cease his hostilities. 

As the officer removed the right handcuff, Robinson leaned 

back on the seat and kicked Navratil in the left temple, 

breaking his glasses and causing various minor injuries. 

Robinson started to swing at the officer then pulled the 

door shut and locked it from the inside. Officer Navratil 

restrained Robinson after gaining access by means of the 

back door. 

During the course of his arrest and transportation to 

Shelby, Robinson damaged the police radio, spit on Officer 

Navratil and threatened to kill him. Based on the events of 

October 29, the District Court revoked two years of defendant's suspended sentence and ordered him incarcerated in 

the state prison at Deer Lodge. 

Robinson argues on appeal that the District Court was 

unwarranted, as a matter of law, in revoking his suspended 

sentence and abused its discretion in so doing. We do not 

agree. 

Section 46-18-203, MCA, provides: 

"Revocation of suspended or deferred sentence. 

A judge, magistrate, or justice of the peace 

who has suspended the execution of a sentence 

or deferred the imposition of a sentence of 

imprisonment under 46-18-201 or his successor 

is authorized, during the period of the suspended sentence or deferred imposition of senience, -- in his discretion, to revoke the suspension or impose sentence and order the person 

committed. He may also, -- in his discretion, 

order the prisoner placed under the jurisdiction of the board of pardons as provided by 
law or retain such jurisdiction with his court. 

Prior to the revocation of an order suspending 

or deferring the imposition of sentence, the 

person affected shall be given a hearing." 

(Emphasis added.) 

Alvin Robinson read and signed a copy of the Board of 

Pardons' Rules of Parole and Probation which reads in pertinent 

part : 

"The parolee and probationer shall respect 

and obey the law and at all times be a good 

citizen. " 

Further, the District Court ordered that sentence be suspended 

and conditional upon the good behavior of the defendant. 

The gist of defendant's claim before this Court is that 

the District Court abused its discretion when it found that 

Robinson violated the terms of his parole by and through his 

conduct on the night of October 29, 1979. Specifically, the 

District Court found that Robinson's 1975 suspended sentence 

was "conditioned upon said defendant's good behavior." 

Robinson argues that the "good behavior" language added 

nothing to the requirement that the probationer shall obey 

the law. 

The term "good behavior" as used in the order means in 

obedience to and conformity with the laws of this State; 

having the demeanor of a law-abiding citizen. State v. 

Millner (1954), 240 N.C. 602, 83 S.E.2d 546. It is apparent 

to this Court that a violation of the law, by a person who 

is at liberty by virtue of the mercy of the District Court, 

cannot be considered "good behavior." The District Court 

may, as a province of its discretionary powers, under section 

46-18-201, MCA, suspend a criminal sentence. It follows, 

therefore, that the court may, pursuant to section 46-18- 

203, MCA, revoke its benevolent decision when it becomes 

apparent that the defendant does not merit further liberty 

or beneficence. 
The District Court's initial decision to place Robinson 

on probation was a decision to forego complete denial of 

liberty in favor of a period of restricted and conditional 

liberty in hopes that the defendant's freedom would best 

serve the purposes of rehabilitation. The inquiry at any 

probation revocation hearing is whether the purposes of 

rehabilitation are being achieved, and whether, by virtue of 

subsequent criminal conduct or evidence that the defendant's 

behavior was not in compliance with the rules and objectives 

of his probation, the purposes of probation are best served 

by continued liberty or by incarceration. Barker v. Ireland 

(1964), 238 Or. 1, 392 P.2d 769. 

Robinson was expected to walk the "straight and narrow" 

and conduct himself in a manner which would justify the 

District Court's leniency. The facts presented to or coming 

before the district judge need not establish guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. All - that is required is that the facts 

before him be such that the judge is reasonably satisfied 

that the conduct of the probationer has not been what he 

agreed it would be if he were given liberty. See Scott v. 

State (1965), 238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575; Henry v. State 

(1974), 20 Md.App. 296, 315 A.2d 797; In Re Anonymous (1972), 

16 Ariz.App. 597, 494 P.2d 1342. A revocation proceeding is 

not a criminal adjudication and does not require proof of a 

new criminal offense to justify revocation since it merely 

cancels a prior act of grace. State v. Eckley (1978), 34 Or.App. 

563, 579 P.2d 291, cited with approval in State v. Oppelt (1979), 

Mont. , 601 P.2d 394, 36 St.Rep. 1832. See also 

State v. Baca (1969), 80 N.M. 527, 458 P.2d 602. Alvin 

Robinson's conduct on the night of October 29, 1979, was 

inexcusable, and his actions gave the District Court ample 

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reason to revoke his suspended sentence. 

We conclude, as we did in Petition of Meidinger (1975), 

168 Mont. 7, 539 P.2d 1185, that we cannot overturn a District Court's decision to revoke a suspended sentence without 

a showing that the court abused its discretion. No such 

showing has been made here. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

We Concur: 

,(?chief Justice 

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