## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Wo rth

___________________________ No. 02

- 17

- 00299

- CR

_____ ______________________

On Appeal from County Criminal C ourt No. 10

Tarrant County, Te xas Trial Court No. 1478469

Before S udderth , C.J.; K err and B irdwell , JJ. Memorandum Opi nion by Justice K err 

### T RAVIS 

### B ELL 

### , Appellant

V


### .
T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMORANDUM OPINION As part of a plea bargain, Travis Bell pleaded g uilty to driving while intoxicated, misdemeanor repetiti on, and the trial court sentenc ed him to 60 days in the Tarrant County Jail. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § § 49.0 4(a), 49.09 (a) . On appeal, Bell attacks
the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress. Bell presents three issues: (1) Was his first interaction w i th the police an encounter or a detention? (2) Was his later detention supported by reasonable su spicion? (3) Was his warrantless arrest for driving while intoxicate d authorized under article 14.03(a)(1) of the code of cr iminal procedure?
We answer Be l l ’ s questions as follows: (1) the first intera ction between the police and Bell was an encounter , (2) th e police later had reasonable suspicion to de tain Bell , and (3) article 1 4.01(

b) o f the criminal

- p rocedure code authorized Bell ’ s warrantless arrest for public into xication even th ough the officer arrest ed Bell for driving while intoxicated

. We will therefor e a ffirm the trial court ’ s judg me nt. Evidence The parties stipulated that the arrest was without a warrant.
Offic er John Schram te stified that he was working the night shift w ith his patrol partne r , Victor Rucker, on November 26, 2016 , when he received a dispatch
around 2:30 a.m. to respond to an accident. On arriving at the scene, he saw a w hite3

seda n against the guardrail in th e left lane and another vehicle, an SUV with its hazard lights on , farther up the road

. Schram acknowledged t h a t he and Ruck er were initially respon ding to a 911 call
and had not seen any offense

. They pul led u p behind the white sedan in their fu ll y marked police vehicle ; its red

- and

- blue lights were on but not its siren

. Defense counsel questioned Schram about wh y he turned th e lights on: Q. When your red and blues come o n, is th at typicall y what you use to detain some body?
A. The red and blues come on because it was an accident and his vehicle was in a lane of traffic

. So for safety of the public, so no one runs int o the rear of Mr. Bell or us or anybody else, that’s w hy we u se the red and blues. Q. That’s also, to b e fair, the red and blues are also used when you pull people over, right? A. They are.
Schr a m later added that when making an arrest , he us e d different lights : Q. Why, in your esti ma tion, di d you need [the red

- and

- blu e lights] in thi s situation? A. Just for the accident, so to make sure that no one ran into Mr. Bell or his veh i cle or anything like that. That ’ s why we only us ed the

— the rear red and blues and not the front red an d bl ues
— Q. Was your

— A.

— like when we ’ re making an arrest.4

A ft er the officers pulled up behind Bell ’ s car , both Schram and R ucker , who were uniformed, g ot out of the patro l car. Schram checked on Bell ’ s car while Rucker
check e d on t h e S UV. Schram denied having approached Bell ’ s car with his gun drawn, denied ordering Bell to t h e ground, and denied handcuffing Bell. But Schram acknowledged
that if Bell had tri ed to run away on foot, Bell could have been “ on the ho ok for an evading c harg e.”
Schram encountered Bell outside t he sedan ’ s driver ’ s side and asked for his driver’s license and registration. B ell a dmitted to Schram that h e was the car ’ s only occupant and was also its driver

. Me dstar arrived and checked out the SU V ’ s occupants , wh o did not re quire h osp italiz ation ; Bell declined medical treatment.
Schram observed that Bell had watery eyes and slurre d speech, s wayed and was

un stead y when he wal k ed, and s melled of alcohol. Bell told Schram that he was coming from the Mule Bar and tha t he had drunk two beers. Schram then decided
that he needed to “ investigate a n offense. ”
T o co nduct a fiel d

- sobriety test at t he accident s ce ne would not have been safe ,

so Schram a n d Rucker took Bell in their patrol car to the nearest mall parking lot. Bell was not in handcuffs , and t he officers did not tell him that he was u nder arre st. On ce they were in the par ki ng lot, Schram administered the usual horizontal

gaze

- nystagmus, the walk

- and

- turn, an d the one

- l eg
- stand tests. When performing the
HG N te st, Bell showed six out of six clues ; he presented four of eight clues on the5

walk

- and

- turn t es t and one of four on the one

- leg

- stand test

. After Bell finished the tests, Schram determined that he had probable cause to arrest Bell.
Alth o ugh Schram n e ver saw Bell driving , S ch ram a rrested him for driving wh ile
intoxicated

. At the hearing, Schram denied having any exigent c ircumstances requi ring
the arrest

. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
The trial co urt d e nied Bel l ’ s motion to suppre ss and made wri tten factual finding s and leg al conclusions. The t rial court concluded that S ch ram ’ s and Bell ’ s i n itial interaction was an encounter , not a detention ; that after Sch ram en counter e d Bell, saw Bell ’ s condition, and heard Bel l admit that he ha d been drin k ing and driv

ing,
Schram had reason able suspicion to detain Bell for driving while intoxi c ated ; and that
after Be ll perf

orm ed the field

- sob riety test s, Sch ram had probable cause to arrest Bell for driving while intoxicated. The trial court also concluded th at S chram had the authority to arrest B ell without a warrant

. Bell’s Arguments
Bell contends that th e poli ce detained him from t he moment the officers arrived because their red

- and

- bl ue lights were on and because Schra m testified at the suppression hear i ng t hat if Bell had trie d to leave , he c ould have been charged with evading deten tion o r arrest. Bell also argues that Schram admitted not s eeing an
offense committ ed and that without exigent circumstances

— which Schram adm itted6

did not e xist

— art icle 14.03( a)(1 ) of the criminal proce dure code did not auth orize
Schram to ar rest h im. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.03(a)(1).
Standard of Review We apply a bifurcated stand ar d of review to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. Amador v. Stat e , 221 S.W. 3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2007);
G uzman v. State , 955 S.W. 2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We defer almost totally to a trial court’s rulings on question s of historical fa ct and to a trial court ’ s appl ying the
law to the facts when th e f acts turn on evaluating credibility and demeanor ; but when credibility and demeanor play no factual role , we review the trial court ’ s rulings de

nov o. Amador

, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. Sta te , 154 S.W.3d 6 04, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 005); Johnson v. State , 68 S.W.3d 644, 6 52

– 53 (Tex. Cri m. App. 2002). At a suppression hearing, the trial court alone judges the witnesses’ credibility
and the weigh t to be given their testimony. State v. Rudd , 255 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2008, pet . ref’d) (citing Wiede v. State , 214 S.W .3d 17, 24

– 25 ( Tex. Cr im. App. 2007)). Thus, the court may choose to believe all or only portions of a witness’s
testim ony, d isbelieving other portions. Id. (citing Garza v. State , 213 S.W.3 d 338, 346 (Tex. Crim. App . 2007)). We do not di stur b fact finding s that the reco rd supp orts Id. And we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s ruling. Id. at 297

– 9 8 (cit ing State v. Kelly , 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Cri m. App. 2006)). When, as here,
the trial c ourt makes factual fin ding s, we must det ermine whether the evi dence

su pports them. Id. at 298. We then review the trial court’s legal rulings de novo unless7

th e cour t’s findings are also dispositive of the legal ru ling. Id. Even if the trial court
gave the wrong reason f

or its ruli ng, we m ust up hold the ruling if i t is both supporte d by the record and correc t under any ap pl icable lega l theory. State v. Stevens , 235 S.W.3d 736, 7 40 ( Tex. C rim. App. 2007); Armendariz v. State , 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Cr im. App. 2003).
Dis cussion
Int eractions betw een police officers an d citizens fall into three possible categories:

• encounters,

• investigative det ention s, and

• arrests. State v. Priddy , 321 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing State v. Perez , 85 S.W.3d 8 1 7, 819 (Tex. Crim . App. 2002); State v. Bryant , 161 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)).
A n officer’s q uestio ning witnesses while investigating an accident is generally a

co nsensual encounter. Rudd , 255 S.W.3d at 29 8 (citing State v. Ste vens on , 958 S.W.2d 824, 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Stoutner v. State , 36 S.W.3d 716, 719

– 20 (Tex. App.

— Hous ton [1 st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d); Harper v. State , 217 S.W.3d 672, 6 75 (Tex. App.

— A marillo 2007, no pet)). The answers to the officer’ s questions a nd t he officer’s other
observations may then provide reasonable suspicion to believe that a driving

- while

in toxica ted offense h a s occurred. Id. (citing Stevenso n , 958 S.W.2d at 829; Stoutner , 368

S.W.3d at 719

– 20). If so, then the enco unter “ es calates to an inv estiga tory detention during which th e officer conduct s field sobriety tests. ” Id. (citing Arthur v. State , 2 16
S.W .3d 50, 55 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2007, no pet. ) ; Reynolds v. State , 163 S. W.3d 808, 810

– 11 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 20 05) , aff’d

, 204 S.W.3d 38 6 (T ex. Crim. App. 2006); Stoutner

, 36 S .W.3d at 719

– 20). The sobriety

- testing results may then lead to proba ble cause to arrest. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. State , 19 1 S.W.3d 428, 444

– 45 (Tex.
A pp.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg 2006, pet. ref

’d) ).
A
. Schram and Be ll i n itially engag e d in an encounter
. 1 . Applica ble Law
A n encounter is a consensual interac tion that a person ma y terminate at any
time , u nlike an invest

igative detent ion or an arrest , ei the r of which is a seizu re for
Fourth Amendm e nt purposes. Priddy , 3 21 S .W.3d at 86 (citing Gu rrol a v. State , 877
S.W.2 d 300, 302

– 03 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Bryant , 161 S.W.3d at 761 )

. A s lon g as the person remains fr ee to ignor e the officer ’ s questions and wa lk away , the enco unter is a consensual o ne that merits no furthe r co nstitut io nal analysis. Id. (ci ting J ohnson v.
State , 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ; State v. Woodard , 314 S.W.3d 86, 93 (Tex. App

. — Fort Wort h 2010) , aff’d , 341 S.W.3d 4 04 (

Tex. Crim. App. 201 1) )

. Without probable cause or reasonable suspic ion , l aw
- enforcement officers may approac h individua ls to ask questions or even to request a search. Id. at 87 (citing Florida v. Royer

, 460 U.S. 491, 497

– 98, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983 ) (plurality opinion) ; State v. Velasquez

, 994 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Tex. C rim. App. 1999); Woodard , 314 S.W.3d9

at 9 3 ) . S uch encounters req uire no justification. Id. (cit ing United Stat

es v. Mendenhall

, 446 U.S. 544, 5 53, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 187 6 ( 1980) (p lurality opinion) ; State v. Larue , 28
S.W. 3d 549, 553 (Tex. Cri m. App. 2 000); Wood ard , 314 S.W.3d at 93 )

. P olice off ice r s

are as fr ee as a nyone else to approach someone on the street and a sk fo r information.
Id. (citing State v. Garcia

– Cantu , 25 3 S.W.3d 23 6, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ; Woodard , 31 4 S.W.3d at 93 ) . Such interact ions m ay i nconvenience or embarrass, but the y d o not involv e offic ial coercion. Id. (citing Garcia

– Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 2 43; Woodard , 314
S.W.3 d at 93 )

. In contrast, a Fourth Amendment s eizure occu r s o nly when the
officer ’ s authority canno t be ignored, av oided , or e nded. Id. (citing Garcia

– Cantu , 253
S .W.3d at 2 43; Wood

ard , 31 4 S.W.3d at 93 )

. W hether a police

– citizen in terac tion is a consensual encounter depends on the totality of th e circumsta nces and on whether a reasonable person wo ul d feel free to
decl ine the off

icer ’ s requests or otherwise end the encou nter. Id. (citi ng Woodard , 314 S.W.3d at 93; St. George v. State , 197 S.W.3d 806, 819 ( Tex. App

. — Fort Worth 2006), aff ’ d , 237 S.W .3d 720 (Te x. Crim. App

. 2007); State v. Murphy , No. 0 2

- 06

- 00 267

- CR,
2007 WL 2405 120, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Aug. 23 , 2007 , no pet.) (mem . op., not designated for publication) )

. Circumst ances indicat

ing that a police

– citizen interaction is a seizure rather
than a consensua l encounter include

• the threa t ening presence of se veral off icer s,

• the officer ’ s display

ing a we apon ,10 • the officer’s p hysical ly touching the citizen,

• the officer ’ s word s or tone o f voice in dicating that the officer might compel com pliance wit h the office r ’ s requests,

• flashing light s , or

• blocking a suspect ’ s ve hicl e. Id. (citing Mendenhall

, 446 U. S. a t 554, 100 S. Ct. at 1877; Woodard , 314 S.W.3d at 94 )

. But without th is ty pe of evidence , otherwise inoffensive conduct betwee n the publi c and a poli ce officer cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that per son. Id. (citing Me ndenhall

, 446 U .S. at 555, 100 S. Ct. at 1877; Woodard , 314 S.W.3d at 94

)

. 2
. Applicati on Be ll emphasizes Schram’s statement that if Bell had run, Schram c ould have

ar rested him for eva ding deten tion or arrest

. Bell ’ s a rgument presup pose s that for
Sch r am ’ s statement to have been true, Schram must necessarily have detained Bell
first

. We dis agree . Leaving t he scene of a vehicular accident is potentially an offense.
See Tex. T ransp . Code Ann. § 550.021. And flight is an action from whi ch S chram (or
any other officer) c ould in fer guilt. See Devoe v. Sta te , 354 S.W.3d 457, 4 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 011). B y making th i s statement at the suppression hearing , Schra m was not conceding that he had already deta ined Bell.
V iewing the ev

id ence in its tot ality in the light most f avorable to the trial

court ’ s findings , Schram pu lled in behind Bell’s vehicle

— wh ich was still in th e left11

lane of traffic

— t o shield it from o ncoming traffic, and Schram put on his patrol car ’s

rear red

- and

- blu e lights to alert onc oming traffic of both his and Bell’s presence in the
left lane

. A reason able person would have perceived S chram’s actions as safety precautions and not as attempts to communicate to Be ll that Schram wanted to detain
him

. See Franks v. State , 241 S.W.3d 135 , 142 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2007, pet. re f

’d) (holding that when an officer turned on his patrol car’s overhead lights and pulled up behind a parked car, the officer’s initial interaction with the parked car’s occupant was an encounter because the patrol c ar d id not prevent the parked car from le a ving by simply pulling forward and because the officer used the overhead lights to illu minate an otherwise dark area) ; see also Hudson v. S tate , 247 S.W. 3d 780, 785 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 2008, no p et.) (holding that init ial interaction was a de tention when the
officer testified that tu rn ing on his patrol

- car lights communicat ed that he wanted a person to stop and because no other explanation factually justi fied the officer ’ s turning on his patrol

- car lights); State v. Car ter , No. 02

- 04

- 00063

- CR, 2005 WL
2699 219, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Wo rth Oct. 20, 20 05, pet. ref ’ d) (mem . op. , not designated fo r publi cation) (holding th at th e officer ’ s activ ating his patrol car ’ s overhead lights after the defendant started to drive awa y ma de the interaction a detention). And a reasonab le person would have similarly perceived Schram’s eff orts to find ou t wh o Bell was, whether Bell was the driver or an occupant of the car, and
whether Bell needed me dica l attention as part s of a consensu al enc ounter. We hold
that both the fa cts a n d the law support the trial court ’ s con clusi on that Schram and12

Bell ’ s in itial i nteraction was a consen sual encounter
. See Priddy , 321 S.W. 3d at 86

– 87 ; Rudd , 25 5 S.W.3d at 29 7

– 9 8

. We overrule Bell’s firs t issue.
B
. Aft e r Bell admit ted dri nking an d driv ing and after Sc hram s aw B ell ’ s physical condi t i on, Schram had reason able suspicion to detai n Bell. 1. Appl icable Law A detention, as distinguished from an arre st, may be justified on less than probable c ause if a p erson is reasonably suspe cted of c riminal activity based on specif ic, articulable facts. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U .S. 1 , 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968);
Carmouche v. State , 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2000). An officer conducts a lawful temp orary det en tion w hen he reasonably s uspects t hat an individual is violating

t he law. Crain v. State , 315 S.W.3d 43, 52 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ford v. State , 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Re asonable suspicion exists when, based on
the totalit y of the ci rcumst ances, the officer has speci fic, articulable facts that, whe n combined with ration al inferences from th ose f acts, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude that a particular person is, has be en, or soon will be engaged in
criminal acti vity. For

d , 158 S .W.3d at 492. This is an obj ective standard that disregards the detaining officer’ s subjective intent a nd lo oks solely to whether the officer has an objective basis for the stop. Id.
2. Applica tion Bell told Schram that he was his car ’ s on ly occupant and i ts d river , that he was
comin g from a bar , and that he had been drinking. In addition to what Bell told him ,13

Schram saw that Bell had watery eye s and slurred his speech . Finally, Bell swayed , walked unsteadily, and sm elled of alcohol. We ho ld tha t the facts and the law s upport the tri a l court ’ s conclusion tha t Sch ram had a r easona ble susp icion that Bell had been driving while intoxicated. See Rudd , 255 S.W.3d at 297

– 98

. We overrule Bell’s se cond issue.
C
. A f ter Be ll fail ed the field

- sobriety tests, Sch ra m ha d probable cause t o arrest h im for public into xicatio n. 1. Appl icable Law Under the Fourth Amendment, a war rantless arrest is unreasonable per se
unless it fits into one of a “ few specifically established and well [

- ] delineated exceptions. ” Minnesot

a v. Di ckerson , 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 (19 93);
Torres v. State , 18 2 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2005). A police officer may arrest
an individual without a warran t only if probable cause exists and if the arrest falls
within one o f the excep tions set out in the cod e of criminal procedure. Torres , 182 S.W.3d at 901; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. a rts. 14.01

– .06.
To have probable caus e for a warrantless arrest, an officer mus t reasonably
believe

— based o n facts and circumstance s within th e off i cer’s personal know ledge or
of which the of

ficer has reasonably trustworthy information

— that a person has

co mmitted an offense. Torr es , 182 S.W.3d at 901

– 02. The officer must base proba ble cause on specific, articulable facts rather than t he off icer’ s mere o pinion. Id. at 902.
W e use the “totality of t he circumstances” test to determine whether probable cause

ex isted for a warrantless arrest. Id.14

Schram did not see Bel l driving while intoxicated, so Schr am could not arrest
Bell for that off

ense under articl e 14.01(

b) of the criminal

- p rocedure code , which requires that the officer perso nally witne ss the offense or that the offender commit
the offense in the officer ’ s presence. Tex. Code Crim. P roc. Ann. ar t. 14.01( b). 1 Even though Schram had not see n th e dr iv in g
- while

- in tox icated offens e and was not present when it occurred , he p otentially could have arrested Bell without a warrant under ar ti cle 1 4.03(a)(1) if exigent circumstances existed

. See id. art. 14.03(a )(1) 2 ; Swain
v. State , 181 S.W.3d 359, 366 ( Te x. C rim. App. 2005) (requiring e xigent circumstances)

. 2 . B ackground

a. The trial court cites article 1 4.03 (a)(1)
. T he tria l court concluded that Schram had prope r ly arrested Bell without a warrant for driving w hile intoxicated under article 14. 03(a)(1) , d espite Sch ram ’ s

1 A r t icle 14.01(b) provides, “A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warra nt for any offense committed in his presence o r within his view.” Tex. Code Crim . P r oc. An n. art. 14.01( b)

.

2 Arti cle 14.03(a) (1) provides, (a) Any peace officer may arre st, without warrant: (1) persons fou nd in suspicious places and under circumstances whi ch reasonably show that such persons have bee n guilty of some felony, violation of T itle 9 , Chapt er 42, Penal Cod e, breach of the peace, or offense under Section 49.02, Penal Code, or threaten, or are abou t to commit some offense against the laws . . .

. I d. art . 14.03(a)(1).15

testimony that he did not have the r equired exi gent ci rcumstances when arresting Bell

. See Swain , 181 S .W.3d at 366

. On appeal, Bell leverage s this testimony to arg ue that his

arrest wa s improper under article 14.03(a)(1).

b. W e aba te the appe al for addi tional findi ngs and con clusions.
Becau se the trial court ’ s fi ndings of facts a nd conclusions of law di d not address exigent circumstances, we abated the appeal for the trial court to make

a dditional findings an d conclusions

. See Bell v. State , No. 02

- 17

- 00299

- CR, 201 9 WL
30 2448 1, at *3

– 4 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth July 11, 2019, order) ( mem. op., not designated for publication).

c. The tr ial court files supplemental finding s and co nclusions. We now have the trial court’s suppleme ntal finding s and concl usions

. In its

su ppleme nt, t he tri al court found that Schram arrested Bell after Bell failed the
standa rd field

- so briety tests, that Schram “repeatedly testified he had public safety concerns during the incident,” and that “t hose [public safety] concer ns e xis ted

. ” Regarding exigent circumstances, the trial cou rt found that Sc hra m had
misunde rstood the word “exigen t , ” and the trial court concluded that exi gent circumstances nevertheless existed when Officer Schram arrested Bell.
T he trial court made one ot her le gal conclusion of note: “Under the fa ctual
fi ndin gs set forth in this Court’s original and supplemental find ing s of fact, Defendant
Travis Bell committed the offense of public intoxication i n front of the Fort Wor th
Pol ice Department arresting office r.”16

3
. Application
I f the arre st was p roper on a bas is other than article 14.03(a)(1) , w e need not address the exi g ent

- c i rcumstanc es question

. For examp l e, if Schram saw Bell commit

anot her offe nse
— such as public intoxica tion

— exigent circum stances would not ha ve be en neces sary. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b)

. But because S chram

tes tified that he had arrested Bell for drivin g while intoxicated , can we rely on article 14.01(b) and public i ntoxication to determin e w hether the arrest was proper ? We

co nclude that we can .

“ P ublic intoxication” applies to a person who appears in a public place while
intoxicated t o the degree that the person may enda nger himself or another. S ee Tex.
Penal Code A nn. § 49 .02(a)

. Whenever an into xicated person is in an offi c er ’ s p resence and there is probable cause to make a public

- intoxication arrest , the officer
may do so without a warran t, even though a warrantless ar rest of that pers on for the
offense of drivin g while intoxicated mig ht be unlawful. Jones v. State , 9 49 S .W .2d 509,
515 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1997 , no pet. ) (citi ng Rey nolds v. State , 90 2 S. W.2d 558,
55 9

– 60 ( Tex. App.

— H ouston [1 st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref ’ d ) ) ; Collins v. S tate , 795 S. W.2d 777, 77 9 n.4 (

Tex. App.

—

Austin 1990, no pet.).
W hen sufficient evidenc e su pp ort s a probable

- ca use finding to arrest someone for the offense of public into xica tion co m mitted in the officer ’ s presence, the arrest is
not i nvalid merely because the officer labels the offens e “driving while intoxicated.” Jones , 949 S.W.2d at 515

– 16. W h e n the crime for w hich a per son is arrested (such as17

driving while intox icated ) is closely rel ate d to a crime that t here was probable cause to
believ e the person had committed (such a s public in toxication in and around a motor vehicle), the arrest is valid provided there i s no proof of sham or fraud

. Id. at 51 6 (citing Warrick v . State , 634 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. Crim. Ap p. [Panel Op.] 1982) ; Fletcher v . State , 298 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. Crim. App

. 1957); R eynolds , 902 S.W. 2d at
5 60 )

. An of

ficer ’s subj e ctive conclu sions about whether the defenda nt ’ s intoxication presented a danger to hims elf or others are not dete rminative. Id. (citing Collins , 795 S.W.2d at 779 n. 4

). We must independent ly and objec tively review the record ’ s facts
about the defend ant ’ s i ntoxic ation at the time the o fficer arrested him

. I d. Th e test for whether probable cause existed for a public

- intoxication arrest is whether the officer ’ s knowledge at the time of the a rrest would wa rrant a prudent person ’ s belief that an
intoxicated s usp ect wa s a danger to hims elf or others. I d.
The f acts be fore us show that Bell had admitted drinking and driv ing, had already be en in a car accident involv ing another vehicle that re sulte d in a Medsta r response to check the other vehicle ’ s occupants for in juries , and ha d failed s ob riety

tests. Under these circumstance s, Bell ’ s d riving home was not an o ption , and walking
home

— even assuming he lived nearby

— was potentially dangerous : i t was the middle
of the night , and Bell swayed and walk ed unsteadily. See Ba lli v. State , 530 S.W.2d 123,
12 6 (T ex. Crim. App. 1975) ( “ The evidence reflects that appellant in a state of
intoxication was walking in the middle of a p ublic st ree t in the city of Plainview after18

d ark , although at the moment the street was vaca nt. Thi s eviden ce was s ufficient to show [public intoxication]. ” ) , overruled on other grounds by Chudleigh v. S tate , 540 S.W.2d
314 , 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976 ). “ In asmu ch as an essential eleme nt of the offense is that appellant may endanger himself or others, a p ot ential danger, which nee d not be immediate nor apparent to the arresting officer,

. . . is sufficient to show the element. ”
Peddicord v . State , 942 S.W.2 d 100, 109

– 10 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 1997, no pet. ) (citing Dickey v. State , 552 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex. Cri m. App . 1 977 )). Viewing the evidence in the light m ost favorable to the trial court ’ s ruling, w e hold that Bell

— i n his
i ntoxicated state

—

was a d anger to hi mself and others and thus that the warrantles s

arrest wa s valid

. See id. at 515

– 16; Kelley v. Sta te , No. 02

- 06

- 00 339

- CR, 2008 WL
11051 7, at *2

– 3 (Tex. A pp.

— Fort Worth June 11, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Cervas v. State , N o. 02

- 04

- 00463

- CR, 2005 WL 794384 , at
*2 (Tex

. App

. — Fort Worth Apr. 7, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not design ated f or publicati on); Reynolds , 902 S.W.2d at 559

– 60 ; see also Stevens , 235 S.W.3d at 740 ; Armendariz

, 123 S.W.3d at 404

. We o v errule Be ll ’ s third i ssue . C onclusion Having overruled Bell ’ s thre e is sues, we affi rm the trial court ’ s judgment.

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr E li zabe th K er r J ust ice19

D o N ot P ublish Tex. R . App. P. 47.2(b)
D elivered : August 26, 2019