Rel: April 7, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 

may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

_________________________

CL-2022-0917

_________________________

K.H.

v.

Madison County Department of Human Resources

Appeal from Madison Juvenile Court

(JU-20-671.01)

_________________________

CL-2022-0918

_________________________

K.H.

v.

Madison County Department of Human Resources
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

2

Appeal from Madison Juvenile Court

(JU-20-671.02)

_________________________

CL-2022-0919

_________________________

K.H.

v.

Madison County Department of Human Resources

Appeal from Madison Juvenile Court

(JU-20-672.01)

_________________________

CL-2022-0920

_________________________

K.H.

v.

Madison County Department of Human Resources

Appeal from Madison Juvenile Court

(JU-20-672.02)

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

Two children, C.I., born in May 2011, and M.H., born in August 

2020, were born of the relationship of K.H. ("the mother") and D.I. ("the 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

3

father").1 When M.H. was born, that child tested positive for opiates. As 

a result, in September 2020, the Morgan County Department of Human 

Resources ("Morgan County DHR") filed in the Morgan Juvenile Court 

petitions seeking to have C.I. and M.H. ("the children") declared 

dependent. The Morgan Juvenile Court issued a pick-up order on 

September 2, 2020, and, also on that date, it ordered that the actions be 

transferred to the Madison Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court"), which it 

had determined was the proper venue for the dependency actions. The 

juvenile court assigned case number JU-20-671.01 to the dependency 

action concerning C.I. and case number JU-20-672.01 to the dependency 

action concerning M.H.; we refer to those two actions together as "the 

dependency actions." The children were placed in the custody of the 

Madison County Department of Human Resources ("DHR").

On November 4, 2020, the juvenile court entered orders in the 

dependency actions finding the children dependent and leaving the

children in the custody of DHR. Additional orders making similar 

findings were entered during the pendency of the dependency actions. On 

1The record does not explain why C.I. and M.H. have different last 

names.
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

4

May 5, 2021, the juvenile court entered orders continuing the award of 

custody of the children to DHR and ordering that the mother's visitation 

with the children be suspended because of her continued failure to comply 

with DHR's reunification efforts and services. Subsequent orders entered

in the dependency actions continued the suspension of the mother's 

visitation rights.

On September 16, 2021, DHR filed in the juvenile court petitions 

seeking to terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father. 

The juvenile court assigned case number JU-20-671.02 to the 

termination-of-parental-rights action pertaining to C.I. and case number 

JU-20-672.02 to the termination-of-parental-rights action pertaining to 

M.H. The juvenile court accepted ore tenus evidence at a hearing on the 

termination-of-parental-rights petitions over the course of two days, July 

14, 2022, and August 2, 2022. On August 15, 2022, the juvenile court 

entered judgments in the termination-of-parental rights actions in which 

it ordered that the parental rights of the mother and the father be 

terminated.

The mother filed notices of appeal in each of the dependency actions 

and from each of the August 15, 2022, judgments entered in the 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

5

termination-of-parental-rights actions. This court's clerk assigned appeal 

number CL-2022-0917 to the mother's appeal in juvenile-court case 

number JU-20-671.01, and appeal number CL-2022-0919 to the mother's 

appeal in juvenile-court case number JU-20-672.01; those two appeals 

pertain to the dependency actions. This court assigned appeal number 

CL-2022-0918 to the mother's appeal of the judgment entered in juvenilecourt case number JU-20-671.02, and appeal number CL-2022-0920 to 

the mother's appeal of the judgment entered in juvenile-court case 

number JU-20-672.02; those appeals concern the August 15, 2022, 

termination-of-parental-rights judgments.

The father did not participate in reunification services offered by 

DHR, and he did not take part in the dependency actions or the 

termination-of-parental-rights actions. The father did not appeal the 

judgments terminating his parental rights. Therefore, this opinion 

discusses facts pertaining to the father to the extent that they might be 

relevant to the arguments asserted by the mother in her appeals. 

The record reveals the following pertinent facts. After having 

rescheduled the termination-of-parental-rights hearing once before, the 

juvenile court, on May 11, 2022, again entered an order rescheduling that 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

6

hearing for July 14, 2022. The mother did not appear at the hearing on 

July 14, 2022. Instead, at the beginning of the hearing, the mother

addressed the juvenile court via Zoom, a videoconferencing service, and 

asked that she be allowed to participate in the termination-of-parentalrights hearing via Zoom because, she said, she had contracted the 

COVID-19 virus. On questioning by the juvenile court, the mother, who 

was not sworn in as a witness, represented to the juvenile court that she 

had tested positive for the COVID-19 virus one week earlier, although 

she admitted that she was experiencing no symptoms of that virus. The 

juvenile court expressed its concern that if the mother did not attend the 

hearing in person, she would be prevented from assisting and consulting 

with her attorney, who was present in the courtroom, during the hearing. 

The juvenile court informed the mother that it would allow her to 

participate in the termination-of-parental-rights hearing via Zoom until 

a break was taken to the portion of the hearing held on July 14, 2022 (i.e., 

the first day of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing). The juvenile 

court instructed the mother that, during the lunch break, the mother was 

expected to provide proof of a positive COVID-19 test for that day or she 

was expected to travel to the courtroom to attend the afternoon portion 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

7

of the hearing that day. The juvenile court also informed the mother that 

COVID-19 tests were available in the courtroom if she did not have a test 

or did not want to purchase one and that she would be allowed to 

participate via Zoom only if she tested positive for the COVID-19 virus.

The testimony of the witnesses at the hearing set forth the following 

facts. D'Koya Mathis, the DHR social worker assigned to the children's 

cases from February 2020 through March 2022, stated that she was not 

the initial social worker assigned to the children's cases. Mathis 

explained that because the mother was not initially compliant with DHR 

reunification services, a DHR supervisor had reassigned Mathis to the 

children's cases in the hope that Mathis might be able to work more 

effectively with the mother.

Mathis testified that following M.H.'s birth at a hospital in late 

August 2020, M.H. remained hospitalized because of complications 

resulting from having been born with opiates in her system. According to 

Mathis, in early September 2020, the mother left the hospital where M.H. 

had been born and "abandoned" M.H. by not returning to the hospital.

Morgan County DHR initiated the dependency actions on September 2, 

2020, and the children were placed in DHR's custody on that same date. 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

8

Mathis testified that when the children were first placed in foster 

care, DHR offered the mother reunification services that included 

substance-abuse treatment through the Aletheia House, a parenting 

assessment offered by the Aletheia House, random drug screens on a 

color-code system, and a psychological evaluation. In addition, DHR 

asked the mother to obtain and maintain stable housing and 

employment.

We note that the attorneys for the parties seldom asked, and the

two DHR witnesses did not testify, regarding the specific dates on which 

the mother attempted certain services. However, it is undisputed that 

between 2020 and 2021, the mother unsuccessfully attempted three 

substance-abuse programs. Mathis explained that the mother entered 

the Aletheia House in Huntsville and left that substance-abuse program 

before completing it. DHR then referred the mother to the Aletheia House 

program in Rogersville, and the mother failed to complete that program. 

The mother was then referred to the Aletheia House substance-abuse 

program in Birmingham, and, again, the mother left that program before 

completing it. Mathis testified that the three Aletheia House substanceabuse programs each offered the parenting assessment that DHR had 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

9

requested for the mother, but that the mother failed to take part in a 

parenting assessment during her time in those three substance-abuse 

programs. Mathis also testified that DHR referred the mother for a 

psychological evaluation with Dr. Barry Wood but that the mother did 

not complete that evaluation.

In total, DHR conducted nine individualized-service-plan ("ISP") 

meetings during the time that Mathis was assigned to the children's 

cases; those ISP meetings were held to address services to be offered to 

the mother. Mathis stated that the mother had at times seemed 

interested in obtaining help with her substance-abuse issues but that she 

did not follow through with reunification services. Mathis stated that 

when she was initially assigned to the children's cases, the mother 

communicated well with her, but, she said, that communication became 

less frequent because the mother moved often and frequently changed 

her telephone number. Also, the mother was briefly incarcerated twice 

during the time that Mathis was assigned to the children's cases, 

although the dates of those incarcerations and the reasons for those 

incarcerations are not set forth in the record. Mathis stated that during 

the time that she was assigned to the children's cases, the mother 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

10

remained noncompliant with DHR's reunification efforts and did not 

complete any reunification services. 

The mother initially attended her weekly, supervised visitations 

with the children. However, Mathis testified that the mother appeared 

at one visitation clearly under the influence of an intoxicant. Mathis 

testified that the mother initially asserted that she was sober at that 

visitation. However, Mathis stated that the mother later admitted to 

Mathis that she had taken some medications that, the mother had 

claimed, made her drowsy during that visitation. Mathis also testified 

that the mother did not appear intoxicated at any later visitations with 

the children.

At some point in the spring of 2021, possibly at a review hearing 

conducted in early May 2021, the children's guardian ad litem requested 

that the juvenile court suspend the mother's visitation with the children 

because the mother had failed to take part in reunification services. On 

May 5, 2021, the juvenile court entered an order suspending the mother's 

visitation with the children "until such time as the mother ... [is] 

compliant with [DHR] services as outlined" in the ISP agreements. The 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

11

mother's visitation remained suspended at the time of the terminationof-parental-rights hearing in these matters. 

In late 2021, the mother gave birth to a third child ("the halfsibling"), born of her relationship with I.P. ("the boyfriend").2 Following 

the half-sibling's birth, DHR placed that child in the custody of the 

boyfriend pursuant to a safety plan. Scott testified that the mother lives 

with the boyfriend and the half-sibling. Scott also stated that she did not 

have concerns about the mother's ability to care for the half-sibling. 

However, Scott stated, the terms of the safety plan required that the 

boyfriend not allow the mother to be alone with the half-sibling and to 

supervise the mother's interactions with the half-sibling.

Mathis also testified that although the mother reported being 

employed at various times after the children were placed in foster care, 

the mother never provided proof to DHR of her employment. Also, 

according to Mathis, during the time she was assigned to the children's 

2There is some confusion in the record concerning whether the 

mother has three or four children. Although one witness referred to the 

child born in 2021 of the mother's relationship with the boyfriend as the 

mother's "fourth" child, other references indicate that that child is the 

mother's third child. No fourth child of the mother's was ever identified 

in the record. However, the father has a child born of his relationship 

with a woman other than the mother.
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

12

cases, the mother was never able to maintain stable housing. Mathis 

testified that she inspected one of the mother's homes in 2022 and that it 

was clean and appropriate for the children. However, Mathis stated that

at the time she inspected that home, the mother and her boyfriend 

informed Mathis that they were in the process of relocating to yet another 

residence.

Jessica Scott, the DHR social worker assigned to the children's 

cases between March 2022 and the time of the termination-of-parentalrights hearing, testified that she had seen the mother's most recent 

residence, which was a two-bedroom apartment that the mother shared 

with the boyfriend and the half-sibling. Scott stated that the apartment 

was clean and appropriate for children. However, she said that she 

believed that the mother needed a larger home to accommodate the 

addition of the children if they were to be returned to the mother's 

custody. On cross-examination, Scott admitted that the children could 

share a bedroom with the half-sibling. However, even assuming that the 

mother's apartment was large enough, Scott stated, because the mother 

had failed to comply with reunification efforts, and especially because the 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

13

mother had consistently failed to submit to drug screens, DHR had not 

attempted to transition the children into the mother's home.

Scott testified that when she took over the children's cases in March 

2022, which was approximately six months after DHR had filed its 

termination-of-parental-rights petitions in these matters, the mother 

still needed to complete a psychological evaluation, substance-abuse 

treatment, and a parenting assessment. In addition, Scott said, the 

mother also needed to submit consistently to drug screens. Scott testified 

that the mother communicated with her regularly and began 

participating in reunification services in the late spring of 2022. We note 

that Scott admitted that she had not discussed a parenting assessment 

with the mother. Scott explained that the parenting assessment had been 

available through the Aletheia House substance-abuse programs, and 

that the mother had not availed herself of those services in her three 

attempts at substance-abuse treatment through the programs from the

Aletheia House.

The mother took part in a psychological evaluation with Dr. Lois 

Petrella on May 25, 2022. Dr. Petrella testified that the mother answered 

her questions appropriately and that the mother did not appear to be 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

14

under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of that psychological 

evaluation. However, Dr. Petrella also stated that the mother spent a 

great deal of time playing on her telephone during the psychological 

evaluation, although Dr. Petrella stated that the mother's doing so had 

not been a significant problem. According to Dr. Petrella, the mother's IQ 

is 92, and most of the mother's diagnoses were normal. However, Dr. 

Petrella testified that the mother exaggerated her parenting abilities and 

seemed to be overconfident in those abilities. In addition, Dr. Petrella 

stated that the mother had informed her that she had last used illegal 

drugs one year earlier. Dr. Petrella stated that she had wanted to conduct 

a more thorough parenting assessment on the mother, but, she said, the 

mother had to leave the psychological evaluation early to take a drug 

screen. Regardless, Dr. Petrella stated that she would not recommend 

that the mother be reunited with the children until the mother could 

demonstrate that she was substance free.

Although DHR recommended inpatient substance-abuse treatment

for the mother, the mother attended an outpatient program through 

Bradford, a substance-abuse-treatment program. She completed that 

program on June 22, 2022, which was approximately six weeks before the 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

15

first part of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. We note that 

during the pendency of the dependency actions, the juvenile court had 

ordered the mother to take part in a drug-court program. In response to 

questioning by the juvenile court, Scott testified that the mother had not 

complied with that earlier order and had not attended the drug-court 

program.

The record demonstrates that from late September 2020 through 

February 10, 2022, the mother failed to submit to any drug screens. The 

mother tested negative on seven random drug screens administered 

between February 11, 2022, through June 2, 2022. However, on June 6, 

2022, when she was attending the outpatient substance-abuse program, 

the mother tested positive for opiates. The mother tested negative for 

opiates on June 13, 2022, July 19, 2022, and July 25, 2022, but she failed 

to appear for drug screens on June 24, 2022, June 30, 2022, July 14, 2022, 

and August 1, 2022. The exhibit setting forth all except the last four of 

the mother's drug screens indicates that, during the 18 months that the 

children have been in foster care, the mother failed to appear for 78 of 

the 90 drug screens for which she was eligible on the color-code system, 

i.e., the mother failed to submit to 87 percent of the drug screens on the 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

16

color-code system. The mother also failed to appear for two of the final 

four drug screens immediately before the termination-of-parental-rights 

hearing.

According to Scott, even after the mother completed the outpatient 

substance-abuse program, the mother claimed to have been prescribed 

opiate pain medication for an unspecified injury to her back. Scott stated 

that she asked the mother several times for verification of that claim but 

that the mother never explained the exact nature of her pain and failed 

to produce a prescription for pain medication.

The mother has not paid any child support for the benefit of the 

children. Mathis testified that, when the mother had visitation with the 

children, the mother did not bring any supplies, clothes, or gifts for the 

children to the visits, and she did not send the children gifts on their 

birthdays or at Christmas.

Mathis testified that C.I. is an excellent student who, after being 

placed in foster care, entered the gifted program at her school. Mathis 

explained that C.I. experienced difficulties with the transition into foster 

care and that that child had had some behavioral outbursts. For that 

reason, DHR arranged for C.I. to have individual counseling. According 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

17

to Mathis, after approximately one year, C.I.'s behavioral issues 

improved, and DHR ended her individual counseling. However, Scott 

testified that C.I. was again in counseling at the time of the terminationof-parental-rights hearing because C.I. was upset about the possibility of 

being permanently separated from the mother. 

Dominique Dillard, the psychologist who was treating C.I. at the 

time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, testified that during 

her first session with C.I., C.I. disclosed that she was being physically 

abused in the foster home in which she was then residing. Dillard 

reported that allegation to Scott, and C.I. was immediately moved to 

another foster home. Dillard stated that after C.I. was removed from the 

allegedly abusive foster home, C.I.'s outlook and disposition became 

brighter and more normal. Dillard testified that C.I. is emotionally strong 

and articulate and that C.I. needs to continue with individual counseling

to assist her in moving forward, especially if the mother's parental rights 

were terminated. 

Scott testified that, at some point after she began working on the 

children's cases, it was discovered that C.I. had been communicating with 

the mother over social media, apparently on a computer, and by 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

18

telephone when she borrowed a foster sibling's telephone. Scott testified 

that DHR believed that the mother had remained in contact with C.I. 

from the time that the children had entered foster care, even after the 

juvenile court suspended the mother's visitation with the children; 

therefore, she said, that communication was in opposition to the juvenile 

court's orders. Scott and Dillard each stated that C.I. has a close 

relationship with the mother and that she wanted to be returned to the 

mother's custody. Scott stated that, in the new foster home in which C.I. 

resided at the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, C.I.'s 

internet access was closely monitored. She also stated that Dillard had 

agreed to supervise any further communication between the mother and 

C.I. if the juvenile court were to allow that communication to continue.

Dillard testified that she had recommended that DHR conduct a 

bonding assessment for C.I. and the mother to determine whether C.I. 

had a current, beneficial bond with the mother or whether the child's 

bond with the mother was based on memories of having lived with the 

mother. Dillard explained that, as is normal for children, C.I. tended to 

have only positive memories of the mother and that C.I. did not seem to 

recall the detriment and dysfunction she had experienced while she was 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

19

in the mother's custody. Scott testified that she had attempted to 

schedule a bonding assessment for the mother and C.I. but that she was 

unable to schedule that assessment before the termination-of-parentalrights hearing. 

On May 3, 2022, the mother filed in the dependency actions a 

request that she be allowed to resume visitation with the children. On 

July 1, 2022, the mother filed in the two termination-of-parental-rights 

actions a motion to have telephone visitation with C.I.; that motion 

appears to have been filed shortly after DHR discovered that the mother 

had been surreptitiously communicating with C.I. The juvenile court 

denied those motions on July 14, 2022, i.e., on the first day of the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing. 

Mathis and Scott testified that there were no relatives willing or 

able to provide a placement for the children. Mathis testified that the 

mother and the father provided DHR the names of a few relatives but 

that only one of those relatives, the father's brother, T.I., was either 

willing to serve as a placement or was deemed to be an appropriate 

placement for the children. Mathis explained that T.I. had expressed an 

interest in providing a home for the children but that he did not have 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

20

stable housing. Scott testified that when she was assigned to the 

children's cases, she inquired about relative resources but that the 

mother did not provide the names of any relatives who could serve as a 

possible relative placement for the children. Scott testified that she 

contacted T.I. to determine whether his housing situation had stabilized 

such that he could provide a placement for the children, but, she said, 

T.I. reported that his housing situation remained unstable.

Mathis and Scott testified that the permanency plan for the 

children is adoption, and Scott testified that both children are adoptable. 

Mathis testified that a previous foster mother was willing to adopt M.H.

but that that foster mother was not willing to adopt C.I. Both Mathis and 

Scott testified that, because of the close bond between the children, it was 

in the children's best interests that they be placed in the same adoptive 

home. For that reason, Mathis stated, DHR had decided not to allow the 

previous foster parent to adopt M.H. 

Instead, Mathis testified, DHR planned to allow the children to be 

adopted by another foster parent ("the prospective adoptive resource") 

with whom the children had not yet resided. Scott explained that the 

prospective adoptive resource "is willing to adopt these children, but she 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

21

would prefer that ... the parents' rights be terminated before she starts 

that relationship." Scott later reiterated that the prospective adoptive 

resource remained willing to adopt the children but that she wanted to 

ensure that there was a termination of parental rights first. Scott stated 

that the prospective adoptive resource could provide the children the 

individualized attention that they need. Scott also testified that, if for 

any reason the prospective adoptive resource did not adopt the children, 

the children's current foster parent was willing to adopt the children to 

ensure that the children remained together in the same home. However, 

Scott explained, the current foster parent preferred to allow the children 

to be adopted by the prospective adoptive resource because the current 

foster parent had other foster children in her home and could not give the 

children much individualized attention.

The mother presented no evidence at the termination-of-parentalrights hearing. 

At the close of the morning session of the portion of the terminationof-parental-rights hearing on July 14, 2022, the juvenile court again 

instructed the mother to obtain a COVID-19 test during the lunch break 

and either to appear for the afternoon session of the hearing or to provide 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

22

proof of her positive COVID-19 test. When court resumed after the lunch 

break, the mother had not appeared in the courtroom or provided proof 

of a positive COVID-19 test. The mother's attorney represented to the 

juvenile court that the mother had claimed to him, shortly before the 

hearing resumed, that she lacked transportation to travel to the 

courthouse. The juvenile court offered to wait for the mother and to pay 

for a ride share to transport the mother to the hearing. DHR's attorney 

stated that DHR was attempting to contact the mother to arrange 

transportation to bring the mother to the courtroom. The mother's 

attorney then stated that the mother had just informed him via text 

message that she was on her way to the courthouse at that time. Court 

was recessed to wait for the mother to appear.

The hearing resumed at approximately 3:00 p.m., and the mother 

was not in the courtroom and had not responded to the attempts made

by her attorney to contact her. The juvenile court then released DHR and 

its witnesses from the hearing, but it instructed the mother's attorney to 

wait an additional 30 minutes to see if the mother arrived in the 

courtroom. The juvenile court instructed the mother's attorney that if the 

mother did appear in the courtroom, the mother was to submit to both a 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

23

COVID-19 test and to a court-sponsored drug screen. The juvenile court 

also stated that it would consider the mother's failure to appear when 

assessing her credibility if she testified at a later portion of the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing. The mother did not appear.

The termination-of-parental-rights hearing resumed on August 2, 

2022. At the beginning of that part of the hearing, the mother's attorney 

stated that the mother had informed him that she would be attending 

that day's hearing, and, although the mother was not present at that 

time, he speculated that the mother might be on her way to the 

courtroom. The mother's attorney later checked the hallway outside the 

courtroom to see if the mother was waiting outside, but, he said, she had 

not appeared. The juvenile court received additional testimony on August 

2, 2022; that testimony is already set forth in this opinion. When the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing ended, the mother had still not 

appeared in the courtroom. 

As an initial matter, we note that in her notices of appeal filed in 

the dependency actions, the mother indicated that she was appealing 

judgments entered on August 15, 2022, in those actions. However, the 

record contains no August 15, 2022, judgments entered in the 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

24

dependency actions. The only orders entered in the dependency actions 

on August 15, 2022, scheduled a hearing via Zoom for February 23, 2023. 

On August 14, 2022, the juvenile court entered in the dependency actions 

orders allowing the parties to inspect certain records concerning the 

children and orders denying the mother's motions to resume her 

visitation with the children. Even assuming that the mother intended to 

appeal any or all of those orders, none of those orders is sufficiently final 

to support the mother's appeals. Moreover, the mother makes no 

argument concerning any of those orders in her appellate brief. Instead, 

the mother's arguments on appeal concern only the August 15, 2022, 

judgments entered in the termination-of-parental-rights actions. 

Accordingly, we dismiss appeal number CL-2022-0917 and appeal 

number CL-2022-0919, i.e., the appeals the mother filed in the 

dependency actions. as moot. Reeves v. Reeves, [Ms. 2200216, Oct. 1, 

2021] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2021); see also C.C. v. L.B., [Ms. 

2210410, Nov. 10, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2022). 

With regard to appeal number CL-2022-0918 and appeal number 

CL-2022-0920, which are the mother's appeals from the August 15, 2022, 

judgments entered in the termination-of-parental-rights actions, the 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

25

grounds warranting a termination of parental rights are set forth in § 12-

15-319, Ala. Code 1975, of the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act ("the AJJA"), 

§ 12-15-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Section 12-15-319 provides, in 

pertinent part:

"(a) If the juvenile court finds from clear and convincing 

evidence, competent, material, and relevant in nature, that 

the parents of a child are unable or unwilling to discharge 

their responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct 

or condition of the parents renders them unable to properly 

care for the child and that the conduct or condition is unlikely 

to change in the foreseeable future, it may terminate the 

parental rights of the parents. In a hearing on a petition for 

termination of parental rights, the court shall consider the 

best interests of the child. In determining whether or not the 

parents are unable or unwilling to discharge their 

responsibilities to and for the child and to terminate the 

parental rights, the juvenile court shall consider the following 

factors including, but not limited to, the following:

"....

"(2) Emotional illness, mental illness, or 

mental deficiency of the parent, or excessive use of 

alcohol or controlled substances, of a duration or 

nature as to render the parent unable to care for 

the needs of the child.

"....

"(7) That reasonable efforts by the 

Department of Human Resources or licensed 

public or private child care agencies leading 

toward the rehabilitation of the parents have 

failed.
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26

"....

"(9) Failure by the parents to provide for the 

material needs of the child or to pay a reasonable 

portion of support of the child where the parent is 

able to do so.

"(10) Failure by the parents to maintain 

regular visits with the child in accordance with a 

plan devised by the Department of Human 

Resources, or any public or licensed private child 

care agency, and agreed to by the parent.

"(11) Failure by the parents to maintain 

consistent contact or communication with the 

child.

"(12) Lack of effort by the parent to adjust his 

or her circumstances to meet the needs of the child 

in accordance with agreements reached, including 

agreements reached with local departments of 

human resources or licensed child-placing 

agencies, in an administrative review or a judicial 

review."

In addition to determining whether a child is dependent and 

whether grounds exist under § 12-15-319 that support a termination of 

parental rights, a juvenile court must also "properly consider and reject 

all viable alternatives to a termination of parental rights." B.M. v. State, 

895 So. 2d 319, 331 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (citing Ex parte Beasley, 564 

So. 2d 950, 954 (Ala. 1990)).
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27

"On appeal from ore tenus proceedings, this court 

presumes the correctness of the juvenile court's factual 

findings. See J.C. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 986 So. 2d 

1172 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). This court is bound by those 

findings if the record contains substantial evidence from 

which the juvenile court reasonably could have been clearly 

convinced of the fact sought to be proved. See Ex parte 

McInish, 47 So. 3d 767 (Ala. 2008) (explaining standard of 

review of factual determinations required to be based on clear 

and convincing evidence)."

C.C. v. L.J., 176 So. 3d 208, 211 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015).

In its August 15, 2022, termination-of-parental-rights judgments, 

the juvenile court set forth a number of detailed factual findings, 

including, in part:

"[DHR] afforded the parents reunification services, but 

those efforts were not successful. The father never 

participated in services. The mother was in and out of jail, 

would start services then stop, or have short periods of 

sobriety, then relapse. The mother failed to appear for most, 

if not all, of the hearings regarding the children. [DHR] 

continued to offer services to the mother throughout the case, 

including up to the time of the termination-of-parental-rights 

hearing. However, the mother failed to comply with those 

services. The mother did not visit with the children from 

January through May of 2022.[3] The mother started two drug3In response to questioning, Mathis stated that the mother had not 

visited the children in 2022 and that she then stated that there had been 

no visitation between January 2022 and April 2022. Other evidence in 

the record established that the mother had last visited the children in 

March 2021. 
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28

treatment programs and quit the programs without 

completing [them].[4] The Court requested that she participate 

in Family Drug Court, and she did not. The mother had 

periods of negative drug screens, then would relapse or stop 

complying with drug screens. She had missed the last two 

drug screens before the setting of th[e termination-ofparental-rights] hearing. The mother appeared at a visit with 

the children and appeared to be under the influence. She 

admitted to taking medicines that made her sleepy but has 

never presented a prescription to anyone involved in this case, 

even after numerous requests to do so. The mother finally 

completed Bradford substance-abuse program but has tested 

positive since completing that program,[5] and she admitted to 

being on pain medications in June 2022 to Scott, the social 

worker in the case at the time, but did not provide proof of the 

prescription or the underlying reason for the pain 

medications. 

"[DHR] did refer the mother for a psychological 

evaluation to determine if additional services could be offered. 

The psychologist noted that the mother was more preoccupied 

with her telephone than with engaging in the process. There 

was a second appointment that the mother left early and 

never completed testing. There were no significant findings 

which would show that the mother could not parent her 

children. However, the mother also told the psychologist that 

4The record shows that the mother had attempted three separate 

substance-abuse programs between 2020 and 2021; the error with regard 

to this finding is not material.

5The record does not contain any evidence indicating that the 

mother tested positive after she completed the Bradford substance-abuse 

program on June 22, 2022. Rather, the mother tested positive on June 2, 

2022, while still participating in that program, and she failed to 

participate in four drug screens scheduled between June 22, 2022, and 

August 1, 2022, which was the day before the last day of testimony in the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing.
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29

she had no drug issues and had not used drugs in more than 

a year. This is not what the evidence bore out in court.

"[T]he mother appeared through Zoom for the first four 

hours of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. The court 

did observe concerning behavior, such as moving around the 

residence a lot and points of inattention. Given some 

concerning behavior over the Zoom link, the failure of the 

mother to produce any screening or other medical paperwork 

on her claimed COVID issues, and the recent missed drug 

screens, the court ordered the mother to appear in court for 

the second part of the day. The mother was present on Zoom 

when ordered and stated she understood. The mother never 

appeared to the court thereafter."

In addition to the foregoing, in its August 15, 2022, judgments, the 

juvenile court found that the children remained dependent, that DHR 

had made reasonable efforts toward reunification, that the mother was 

unable or unwilling to adjust her circumstances to meet the needs of the 

children, that there were no viable alternatives to the termination of the 

mother's parental rights, and that the termination of the mother's 

parental rights would serve the children's best interests.

The mother first argues that the juvenile court erred in determining 

that the evidence in the record supports the juvenile court's 

determination that there were grounds under § 12-15-319 warranting the 

termination of her parental rights. We note that the mother does not

dispute that she has an extensive history of drug use, that she did not 
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30

comply with reunification services until six months after DHR filed its 

termination-of-parental-rights petitions, and that she missed 87% of her 

drug screens even when that failure to participate in those screens 

resulted in the continued suspension of her visitation with the children, 

and that she failed to rebut the results of her positive drug screens by 

producing evidence of prescriptions she claimed to have for opiate pain 

medication.

Instead, in her argument on this issue, the mother asserts that the 

juvenile court failed to consider "evidence of [her] current conditions or 

conduct" in determining that she was unwilling or unable to meet the 

children's needs. See D.O. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 859 So. 

2d 439, 444 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). The mother contends in her appellate 

brief that the evidence demonstrated that, at the time of the terminationof-parental-rights hearing, her circumstances were changing and she was 

making progress toward reunification. The mother alleges that she had 

stable housing at the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing 

and that she has demonstrated her ability to parent a child because she 

is currently living with the boyfriend and the half-sibling. We note, 

however, that the record indicates that the mother obtained her current 
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31

housing sometime after March 2022, and, therefore, at the time of the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing, she had had that housing, at 

most, for only four months.6 Further, the mother's youngest child, the 

half-sibling, is in the custody of the boyfriend, who is not the children's 

father, pursuant to a safety plan that specifies that the mother not be left 

alone with that child. Therefore, the record does not demonstrate that 

the mother is successfully parenting that child on her own or without 

supervision and assistance. 

The mother also contends that she completed some of the 

reunification services and that, beginning in the spring of 2022, she 

began communicating regularly with Scott about participating in those 

reunification services. The mother argues that the juvenile court failed 

to consider her current conditions, i.e., the completion of the 

psychological evaluation and the substance-abuse program. The mother 

also contends in her appellate brief that she has maintained employment, 

but the record contains no evidence concerning the mother's employment. 

We also note that the mother does not address her failure to attempt to 

6Scott testified that she had seen the mother's two-bedroom 

apartment, but she did not state the date on which she visited that home.
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32

contribute to the children's support. Regardless, the mother contends 

that the juvenile court improperly based its termination decision solely 

on her past conduct, i.e., the conduct she exhibited before the late spring 

of 2022.

This court has held that "[e]vidence of a parent's past conduct is 

admissible if it assists the juvenile court in assessing and weighing the 

evidence regarding current conditions, but evidence of past conditions 

cannot be the sole basis for finding a child to be dependent." J.P. v. D.P., 

260 So. 3d 862, 872 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018). As was pointed out during the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing, the mother attended an outpatient substance-abuse program rather than a recommended in-patient 

program. Further, the mother failed to appear for four requested drug 

screens between the time the mother completed the substance-abuse 

program and the conclusion of the termination-of-parental-rights 

hearing. Moreover, the mother did not appear at either day of the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing. The juvenile court expressly 

stated that it had wanted the mother to submit to a drug screen during

the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. The juvenile court could have 

interpreted the mother's failure to appear at the termination-of-parental-
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33

rights hearing, especially after she assured her attorney that she would 

be present, as an attempt to avoid submitting to a drug screen during the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing. The juvenile court noted in its 

judgment that the mother had had periods of sobriety followed by times 

when she would again relapse. Thus, the record and the juvenile court's 

findings in its judgments demonstrate that the juvenile court did not rely 

solely on the mother's past conduct in reaching its decision to terminate 

the mother's parental rights to the children. See J.C. v. State Dep't of 

Hum. Res., 986 So. 2d 1172, 1195 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (holding that the 

juvenile court did not err in considering a parent's past conduct when 

"[t]he evidence showed that the mother had a history of abstaining from 

drugs for extended periods of time only to use drugs again months later"); 

T.W. v. Shelby Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 293 So. 3d 386, 393 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 2019); and M.E. v. Shelby Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 972 So. 2d 89, 

101 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (plurality opinion). Moreover, in this case, the 

evidence supports a conclusion that the mother had failed, or was likely 

to have failed, to maintain her sobriety at the time of the termination-ofparental-rights hearing, and, therefore, that she was unable or unwilling 

to properly parent the children.
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34

We agree with the mother that the evidence indicates that, 

beginning approximately six months after DHR filed its termination-ofparental-rights petitions, she began making efforts to reunite with the 

children. However, the juvenile court could have considered those late 

attempts to cooperate with DHR reunification services to be merely 

unpersuasive, last-minute efforts intended only to forestall termination 

rather than legitimate efforts by the mother to change her circumstances. 

A.M.F. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 75 So. 3d 1206, 1213 (Ala. 

Civ. App. 2011); K.J. v. Pike Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 275 So. 3d 1135, 

1145 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018). This is particularly true here, where the 

mother had failed to appear for several drug screens shortly before the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing and where the juvenile court 

could have interpreted the mother's failure to attend either day of that 

hearing as an effort to avoid submitting to a court-ordered drug screen. 

Given the totality of the evidence, particularly that evidence that relates 

to the mother's substance-abuse issues, we cannot say that the mother 

has demonstrated that the juvenile court erred in determining that there 

were grounds under § 12-15-319 that served as bases for the termination 

of her parental rights. 
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35

The mother, citing J.C. v. Madison County Department of Human 

Resources, 293 So. 3d 901, 904 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019), argues that DHR 

failed to show that her substance-abuse issues impacted her ability to 

parent the children. In J.C., the Madison County Department of Human 

Resources ("Madison County DHR") failed to present evidence concerning 

the reason the child in that case had been removed from his mother's 

custody and placed in the custody of Madison County DHR. It was 

undisputed that the child in that case, who was a teenager, shared a close 

bond with the mother such that a social worker stated that any 

permanent placement for the child that was not with the mother was not 

likely to be successful. This court reversed the judgment terminating the 

mother's parental rights, concluding that "[Madison County] DHR 

presented no evidence that the mother's drug use, although longstanding and certainly not a desirable trait, has ever impacted her ability 

to rear the child." J.C. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 293 So. 3d 

at 909. This court further explained: 

"The record contains no evidence indicating the basis for 

[Madison County] DHR's initial involvement with the mother 

and the child. Although [Madison County] DHR established 

that the mother had a history of drug use, it did not present 

evidence indicating that the child suffered neglect or abuse at 

the hands of the mother as a result of her drug use. In fact, 
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36

the evidence [Madison County] DHR presented was to the 

effect that the child was generally polite and respectful and 

that he excelled in school, both at the time of his removal from 

the mother's custody and at the time of the trial."

J.C. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 293 So. 3d at 908-09 (footnote 

omitted). 

Similarly, the mother relies on another case in which the Jefferson 

County Department of Human Resources ("Jefferson County DHR") 

sought to terminate a mother's parental rights to her youngest child. See

P.S. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 143 So. 3d 792 (Ala. Civ. App. 

2013). In P.S., Jefferson County DHR had been involved with the mother 

regarding her older children, and, upon the child's birth, Jefferson 

County DHR filed a dependency petition alleging that the mother could 

not take care of the child based on her past conduct with regard to her 

older children. The Jefferson Juvenile Court relieved Jefferson County 

DHR of its obligation to provide reunification services for the mother and 

the child in that case. Later, Jefferson County DHR filed a petition 

seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights, and the Jefferson 

Juvenile Court granted that petition. This court reversed, explaining:

"[Jefferson County] DHR failed to present evidence 

indicating that the mother was unwilling to parent the child 

or describing the conduct or condition that made the mother 
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37

unable to parent the child. In other words, [Jefferson County] 

DHR never revealed the mother's parenting defect. Although 

we understand that, according to [Jefferson County] DHR, at 

some point in 2008 the mother failed to protect K.F. [(another 

of the mother's children)], our review of the record reveals no 

evidence presented to the juvenile court that supports 

[Jefferson County] DHR's assertion regarding K.F. Even 

assuming that [Jefferson County] DHR's assertion is correct, 

the record contains no evidence presented by [Jefferson 

County] DHR regarding the mother's inability or 

unwillingness to discharge her parental responsibility to the 

child."

P.S. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 143 So. 3d at 797. In that case, 

this court also held that "[Jefferson County] DHR did not provide the 

mother the opportunity to correct any conduct or condition that might 

have been a barrier to reunification with the child." P.S. v. Jefferson 

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 143 So. 3d at 798.

The mother in this case contends that the facts of her case are 

similar to those of J.C., because, she says, the evidence demonstrates that 

C.I. is an intelligent child with whom she shares a close bond. The mother 

also argues that because she had parented C.I. before DHR's 

involvement, there is no evidence in the record that her substance-abuse 

issues would prevent her from successfully parenting the children. The 

mother also contends that, as in P.S., DHR in this case did not identify 
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38

the "parenting defect" that would prevent her from reuniting with the 

children.

In this case, however, unlike in J.C., there is no evidence in the 

record indicating the longevity of the mother's substance-abuse issues. 

Therefore, although the record in this case shows that the mother was 

perhaps successfully parenting C.I. before DHR's involvement with the 

family, the record does not show when the mother began abusing drugs 

and whether the mother was abusing drugs during a period while C.I. 

was in the mother's custody.

More significantly, unlike in J.C., and P.S., the record in this case 

does contain evidence demonstrating how the mother's substance-abuse 

issues impacted her ability to parent. For example, when M.H. tested 

positive for opiates at the time of her birth, the mother checked herself 

out of the hospital, leaving M.H. at that hospital, and the mother did not 

return; Mathis testified that the mother had "abandoned" M.H. Thus, the 

evidence supports a conclusion that the mother's substance-abuse 

problem resulted in her instinct being to protect herself or her ability to 

continue to abuse drugs, rather than to attempt to care for her 

hospitalized infant. Also, the social workers in J.C., had not seen the 
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39

mother in that case under the influence. In this case, Mathis testified 

that the mother appeared under the influence at a DHR-supervised 

visitation with the children and that the mother eventually admitted to 

have taken medications that made her sleepy during that visitation. The 

juvenile court could have determined that that side effect the mother 

described was a result of the opiates the mother was taking, i.e., 

sleepiness, would impact the mother's ability to parent the children. Such 

a conclusion would be concerning especially with regard to the mother's 

ability to parent M.H., who was 22 months old at the time of the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing. Furthermore, Dr. Petrella 

testified that she recommended that the mother demonstrate that she 

was maintaining her sobriety before reuniting the mother with the 

children. Given the foregoing, it is clear that DHR presented evidence 

that the children were removed from the mother's custody because of her 

use of illegal drugs or abuse of prescription medication and that the 

mother's substance abuse impacted the mother's ability to properly and 

safely parent the children and was the primary bar to the mother's 

reunification with the children. We cannot say that the mother has 

demonstrated that the evidence did not support a conclusion that her 
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40

substance-abuse issues impacted her ability to care for and parent the 

children.

The mother also argues on appeal that the juvenile court erred in 

concluding that DHR had made reasonable efforts toward reuniting her 

with the children. As the mother contends, DHR has the responsibility to 

provide services designed to reunite a parent and his or her child or 

children. H.H. v. Baldwin Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 989 So. 2d 1094, 

1104-05 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (plurality opinion). 

"The natural starting point in any fair and serious 

attempt to rehabilitate the parent and to reunite the parent 

with the child is identification of that characteristic, conduct, 

or circumstance that renders the parent unfit or unable to 

discharge his or her parental responsibilities to the child. 

Once DHR identifies the source of parental unfitness, the 

overarching goal of family reunification requires DHR to 

communicate its concerns to the parent and to develop a 

reasonable plan with the parent that is tailored toward the 

particular problem(s) preventing the parent from assuming a 

proper parental role. DHR should use reasonable methods to 

achieve its plan of removing or reducing the identified 

obstacle(s) to family reunification 'as quickly and as safely as 

possible.' Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-1(3). Finally, at the 

termination of any rehabilitation process, DHR should 

determine the success of its efforts, using reasonable 

evaluation tools. See In re Vincent B., 73 Conn. App. 637, 644-

47, 809 A.2d 1119, 1124-25 (2002) (holding that the burden is 

on state child-protection agency to make 'reasonable efforts to 

achieve reunification by engaging the [parent] and making 

available services aimed at instilling in him [or her] healthy 

parental skills,' to give the parent 'a window of opportunity 
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41

during which reasonable efforts at reunification should have 

been made,' to apprise the parent of the steps to be taken to 

achieve rehabilitation, and to give the parent feedback on his 

or her progress in reaching that goal)."

H.H. v. Baldwin Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 989 So. 2d at 1105 (footnote 

omitted). 

As part of her argument on this issue, the mother contends that 

DHR, through Scott, should have offered her a parenting assessment in 

spring 2022, when she began to comply with DHR reunification efforts. 

In asserting that argument, the mother overlooks that on May 25, 2022, 

Dr. Petrella attempted to conduct a parenting assessment during the 

psychological evaluation, but that the mother left that evaluation early 

and did not return to complete that assessment. 

The mother also criticizes DHR for not arranging for the bonding 

assessment recommended by Dillard for C.I. and the mother. However, 

Scott testified that she had attempted to schedule that bonding 

assessment but that no appointments had been available before the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing. The mother only truly began to 

attempt reunification services six months after DHR filed its 

termination-of-parental-rights petitions, and only approximately three or 

four months before the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. However, 
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42

Dillard, who recommended the bonding assessment, had only been 

counseling C.I. for approximately three or four weeks before the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing began, and it appears that 

Dillard's recommendation for the bonding assessment was made only 

shortly before that hearing began. Thus, the juvenile court could have 

determined that the delay in identifying the possible need for a bonding 

assessment, and DHR's inability to schedule that assessment before the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing, was not the fault of DHR social 

workers. Moreover, Scott testified that because it was undisputed that 

the mother and C.I. have a close bond, the bonding assessment was not 

truly necessary to establish that fact. Thus, the juvenile court could have 

determined that the failure to conduct the bonding assessment, if it were 

error on the part of DHR, was harmless.

The mother also argues that DHR could have offered her 

counseling, as was recommended by Dr. Petrella in her recommendations 

set forth after the mother's psychological evaluation in late May 2022. 

However, it is not clear whether such counseling could have been 

implemented in the approximately seven weeks between that 

psychological evaluation and the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. 
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43

We also note that the juvenile court could have considered that the 

mother's earlier refusal or failure to attempt to complete DHR 

reunification services resulted in the recommendation for individual 

counseling being made so late in the process that if it had been possible 

to schedule counseling for the mother immediately, only a few sessions 

could have been held before the termination-of-parental-rights hearing 

was conducted. Further, the juvenile court could have determined that 

individual counseling for the mother would have been beneficial only if 

the mother had established that she could maintain sobriety. 

According to the mother, DHR did not offer her the ability to 

undergo drug screening following her completion of the substance-abuse 

program in late June 2022. That allegation is not supported by the 

evidence in the record, which demonstrates that the mother twice tested 

negative for drug use after her completion of the substance-abuse 

program and that she failed to appear at four additional, DHR-requested 

drug screens. More significantly, the mother's failure to appear at the 

termination-of-parental-rights hearing prevented the mother from 

submitting to a drug screen ordered by the juvenile court.
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DHR offered the mother a number of services for 18 months before 

the mother began to seriously attempt reunification with the children, 

and those efforts began, at most, 3 or 4 months before the terminationof-parental-rights hearing began. DHR did implement services for the 

mother in late spring 2022, well after the termination-of-parental-rights 

petitions had been filed, and the mother participated in some services 

immediately before the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. 

However, the record supports a conclusion that those services were not 

successful in assisting the mother in adjusting her circumstances to meet 

the needs of the children. "'At some point, ... the child[ren]'s need for 

permanency and stability must overcome the parent's good-faith but 

unsuccessful attempts to become a suitable parent.'" H.H. v. Baldwin 

Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 989 So. 2d at 1105 n.5 (quoting M.W. v. 

Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 773 So. 2d 484, 487 (Ala. Civ. App.

2000)). We cannot say that the juvenile court erred in determining that 

DHR made reasonable efforts to reunite the mother with the children.

The mother last argues that the juvenile court erred in determining 

that there were no viable alternatives to the termination of her parental 

rights. The mother cites a plurality opinion for the proposition that a 
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45

viable alternative to termination would be to place the children with a 

"third party." See M.E. v. Shelby Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 972 So. 2d 89

(Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (plurality opinion). In that case, the plurality 

opinion stated:

"Although it appears that the mother may never 

rehabilitate to the point that she can reunify with her 

children, termination of parental rights is not the only 

potential alternative. Placement with third parties, such as 

willing and suitable relatives, see Ex parte J.R., 896 So. 2d 

416 (Ala. 2004), foster parents, but see R.L.B. v. Morgan 

County Dep't of Human Res., 805 So. 2d 721 (Ala. Civ. App.

2001) (asserting that foster care is not a viable alternative 

when there is no opportunity for rehabilitation and 

reunification), or group homes, see State Dep't of Human Res. 

v. A.K., 851 So. 2d 1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), with varying 

degrees of parental visitation rights, may be a reasonable and 

less drastic alternative to termination of parental rights."

M.E. v. Shelby Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 972 So. 2d at 103. 

In relying on M.E., supra, the mother contends that DHR failed to 

consider placing the children in the home she shares with her boyfriend. 

The mother contends that because she is successfully parenting the halfsibling while under the boyfriend's supervision, the children could also 

be placed in the home under the boyfriend's supervision. However, the 

mother did not identify to DHR or to the juvenile court the possibility of 

the boyfriend serving as a placement alternative for the children. Thus, 
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46

she is raising that argument for the first time on appeal. See Andrews v. 

Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992) ("[An appellate court]

cannot consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal; rather, 

[its] review is restricted to the evidence and arguments considered by the 

trial court.").

Moreover, under the AJJA, a "relative" is

"[a]n individual who is legally related to the child by blood, 

marriage, or adoption within the fourth degree of kinship, 

including only a brother, sister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, 

grandparent, great grandparent, great-aunt, great-uncle, 

great great grandparent, niece, nephew, grandniece, 

grandnephew, or a stepparent."

§ 12-15-301(14), Ala. Code 1975. The boyfriend is not the children's 

relative, and there is no indication in the record that the children know 

or have met the boyfriend. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the 

mother may not have been sober even while she has been living with the 

boyfriend and the half-sibling. Therefore, the evidence supports a 

conclusion that, if the mother has not maintained her sobriety, the 

boyfriend has not noticed or has failed to notify DHR.

Although we recognize that the mother and C.I. share a close bond, 

the record also demonstrates that C.I. and M.H. are closely bonded and 

should remain in a placement together. DHR presented evidence that the 
CL-2022-0917, CL-2022-0918, CL-2022-0919, and CL-2022-0920

47

children are adoptable and that there is an adoptive resource for the 

children that would allow them to remain together in the same home. "In 

a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the paramount consideration 

of the trial court, and of this court, is the best interests of the children 

involved." A.R.E. v. E.S.W., 702 So. 2d 138, 140 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997). 

Given the evidence in the record, we cannot say that the juvenile court 

erred in determining that there were no viable alternatives to the 

termination of the mother's parental rights and that the best interests of 

the children were served by the judgments terminating the mother's 

parental rights. 

CL-2022-0917 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.

CL-2022-0919 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.

Moore, Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur

CL-2022-0918 -- AFFIRMED.

CL-2022-0920 -- AFFIRMED.

Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

Moore, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.