[Cite as State v. Reynolds, 2018-Ohio-4942.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

MADISON COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2018-02-005 

 : O P I N I O N 

 - vs - 12/10/2018 

 : 

WESLEY T. REYNOLDS, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. CRI20170041 

Stephen J. Pronai, Madison County Prosecuting Attorney, Rachel M. Price, Nicholas A. 

Adkins, 59 North Main Street, London, Ohio 43140, for plaintiff-appellee 

Beck Legal Services, Ltd., Robert J. Beck, Jr., P.O. Box 204, Marysville, Ohio 43040, for 

defendant-appellant 

 RINGLAND, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Wesley Reynolds, appeals his conviction and sentence in 

the Madison County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons detailed below, we affirm. 

{¶ 2} On December 1, 2016, appellant was indicted on three counts for his conduct 

involving the trafficking of drugs. On March 9, 2017, appellant was indicted on two additional 

counts of felony theft. 
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{¶ 3} Appellant was arraigned, and the matter was set for a jury trial. On the day of 

trial, appellant pled guilty to the three drug trafficking counts contained in the initial 

indictment: (1) trafficking in drugs in the vicinity of a juvenile in violation of R.C. 2925.03, a 

fourth-degree felony, (2) aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03, a fourthdegree felony, and (3) aggravated trafficking in drugs in the vicinity of a juvenile in violation of 

R.C. 2925.03, a third-degree felony. In addition, appellant pled guilty to an amended 

misdemeanor count of theft, a violation of R.C. 2913.02, a first-degree misdemeanor. The 

remaining theft count was dismissed. 

{¶ 4} The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report. Appellant failed to 

meet with probation staff for the report. Appellant reported that the failure was due to his 

incarceration due to a probation violation. 

{¶ 5} On January 23, 2018, the trial court sentenced appellant to 12 months 

incarceration on count one, 12 months incarceration on count two, and 30 months 

incarceration on count three.1 Appellant's aggregate sentence was four and one-half years. 

Appellant now appeals, raising two assignments of error for review. 

{¶ 6} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶ 7} THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR BY FAILING TO ADVISE THE DEFENDANT OF 

THE IMPACT OF A GUILTY PLEA ON DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE RIGHTS. 

{¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that his guilty plea was not 

knowing, intelligent, or voluntary because he was not advised of the impact of a guilty plea on 

his appellate rights. We find no merit to appellant's argument. 

{¶ 9} When a defendant enters a guilty plea in a criminal case, the plea must be 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. State v. Butcher, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-

 

1. Appellant was sentenced to "time served" on the remaining misdemeanor theft charge. 
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10-206, 2013-Ohio-3081, ¶ 8. "Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the 

plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution." 

State v. Payne, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-12-219, 2016-Ohio-5470, ¶ 7. To ensure that a 

defendant's guilty plea is knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made, the trial court must 

engage the defendant in a plea colloquy pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C). Id. 

{¶ 10} As relevant here, pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial court may not accept a 

defendant's guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally and: 

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea 

voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and 

of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the 

defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of 

community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. 

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the 

defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no 

contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may 

proceed with judgment and sentence. 

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights 

to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have 

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's 

favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant 

cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. 

{¶ 11} A guilty plea is invalid if the trial court does not strictly comply with Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(c), which requires the trial court to verify the defendant understands the 

constitutional rights he is waiving. State v. Shavers, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-05-119, 

2015-Ohio-1485, ¶ 9. However, the trial court need only substantially comply with the 

nonconstitutional notifications required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). Id. Under the 

substantial compliance standard, the appellate court must review the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the defendant's plea and determine whether the defendant 

subjectively understood the effects of his plea. State v. Givens, 12th Dist. Butler No. 
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CA2014-02-047, 2015-Ohio-361, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 12} On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to advise him of 

the impact of a guilty plea on his appellate rights. Thus, appellant maintains that he was not 

"fully informed of the consequences of his plea, and, as such, the plea was not valid." 

However, this court has previously held that the failure to inform a defendant that a guilty plea 

waives certain rights on appeal is not one of the specifically enumerated rights the trial court 

is required to discuss during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy. State v. Moxley, 12th Dist. Madison 

No. CA2011-06-010, 2012-Ohio-2572, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 13} Following review of the record, we find that appellant's plea was knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The record reveals that the trial court strictly complied 

with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and substantially complied with the nonconstitutional notifications 

required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). Appellant affirmatively stated that he understood his 

rights and entered his guilty plea. As a result, we find appellant's plea was knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently given. Furthermore, we note that appellant fails to identify any 

error in the proceedings that could have been remedied if properly advised of his appellate 

rights. This court has previously rejected claims where there is a failure to identify prejudice 

regarding the notification of appellate rights. See e.g., State v. Wolf, 12th Dist. Clermont No. 

CA2016-05-027, 2016-Ohio-8103, ¶ 10 (affirming denial of postconviction). As a result, 

appellant's first assignment of error is not well-taken and is overruled. 

{¶ 14} Assignment of Error No. 2: 

{¶ 15} THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR BY IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE PRISON 

SENTENCES. 

{¶ 16} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by 

imposing consecutive sentences. We disagree. 

{¶ 17} This court reviews felony sentences pursuant to the standard of review set 
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forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) to determine whether the imposition of those sentences is clearly 

and convincingly contrary to law. State v. Julious, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-12-224, 

2016-Ohio-4822, ¶ 8. Pursuant to that statute, an appellate court may modify or vacate a 

sentence only if, by clear and convincing evidence, "the record does not support the trial 

court's findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

State v. Harp, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-12-096, 2016-Ohio-4921, ¶ 7. A sentence is 

not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court considers the purposes and 

principles of sentencing as set forth in R.C. 2929.11, as well as the seriousness and 

recidivism factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, and sentences a defendant within the permissible 

statutory range. State v. Brandenburg, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2014-10-201 and CA2014-

10-202, 2016-Ohio-4918, ¶ 9. 

{¶ 18} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court must engage in a three-step 

analysis and make certain findings before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Dillon, 

12th Dist. Madison No. CA2012-06-012, 2013-Ohio-335, ¶ 9. First, the trial court must find 

that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish 

the offender. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Id. Second, the trial court must find that consecutive 

sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the 

danger the offender poses to the public. Id. Third, the trial court must find that one of the 

following applies: 

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses 

while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a 

sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 

2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control 

for a prior offense. 

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part 

of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two 

or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or 

unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses 

committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately 
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reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct. 

(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from 

future crime by the offender. 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c). 

{¶ 19} "A trial court satisfies the statutory requirement of making the required findings 

when the record reflects that the court engaged in the required analysis and selected the 

appropriate statutory criteria." State v. Setty, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2013-06-049 and 

CA2013-06-050, 2014-Ohio-2340, ¶ 113. In imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court 

is not required to provide a word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute or 

articulate reasons supporting its findings. Id. Nevertheless, the record must reflect that the 

trial court engaged in the required sentencing analysis and made the requisite findings. Id. 

The court's findings must thereafter be incorporated into its sentencing entry. State v. Ahlers, 

12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-100, 2016-Ohio-2890, ¶ 10. 

{¶ 20} Here, the record reflects that the trial court made the findings required by R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) when it ordered appellant's sentences to be served consecutively. The trial 

court noted that the offenses were more serious because they were committed as an offense 

for hire or as part of organized criminal activity and counts one and three were committed in 

the vicinity of a juvenile. The court also noted that appellant posed a high risk of recidivism. 

Appellant has a lengthy criminal history that includes several prior felony and misdemeanor 

convictions over the past 20 years. Appellant has not responded favorably to sanctions 

previously imposed for criminal convictions. The trial court also found that there were no 

factors that mitigated his conduct. 

{¶ 21} The trial court later memorialized the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings within its 

sentencing entry. From the trial court's statements at the sentencing hearing and the 

language used in the sentencing entry, it is clear that the trial court complied with the dictates 
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of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). As a result, we find appellant's second assignment of error to be 

without merit and it is hereby overruled. 

{¶ 22} Judgment affirmed. 

 HENDRICKSON, P.J., and PIPER, J., concur.