UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

_______________________________ 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

Complainant 

vs. 

STEPHEN A. SHIVER 

Respondent 

_______________________ 

Docket No: 08-0543 

CG Enforcement Activity No: 3381251 

 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Issued: January 29, 2009 

Issued by: HON. BRUCE T. SMITH, 

 Administrative Law Judge 

Investigating Officers: 

LT Charlotte Keogh 

USCG MSU Paducah 

CWO3 Tim Smith 

USCG Sector Ohio Valley 

Respondent: 

Stephen A. Shiver, pro se
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

This is an action arising under 46 U.S.C. § 7702(d) resulting from the Coast 

Guard’s temporary suspension of Stephen A. Shiver’s (Respondent) certificate and 

merchant mariner’s document. (See CG Ex. Pre-1, 1128289, Issue No. 2). Coast Guard 

regulations, 33 C.F.R. § 20.1201(a), et seq., dictate that whenever the Coast Guard 

suspends a merchant mariner’s license or documents without a hearing, expedited hearing 

procedures are triggered. 

On December 17, 2008, the Coast Guard seized Respondent’s merchant mariner’s 

credentials and served him with a copy of the Complaint on the same date. On January 7, 

2009, the Coast Guard filed an Amended Complaint which was substantially similar to 

the original. The undersigned granted leave to Amend, there being no apparent prejudice 

to the Respondent. 

On December 23, 2008, at 10:00 a.m. (CST) the undersigned conducted the first 

of two expedited pre-hearing telephone conferences with the parties pursuant to 33 

C.F.R. §20.1207. LT Charlotte Keogh and CWO3 Tim Smith appeared for the Coast 

Guard. Despite service of notice of the telephone pre-hearing conference, the 

Respondent did not attend or participate. Following that pre-hearing conference, the 

undersigned issued a Memorandum and Order reflecting the substance of the pre-hearing 

conference and containing a discussion of Respondent’s rights and responsibilities in an 

expedited temporary suspension hearing. That Memorandum and Order was served on 

Respondent. 

2
On January 8, 2009, at 10:00 a.m. (CST) the undersigned conducted a second 

expedited pre-hearing telephone conference with the parties pursuant to 33 C.F.R. 

§20.1207. LT Charlotte Keogh and CWO3 Tim Smith appeared for the Coast Guard. 

Again, Respondent was absent, despite the repeated efforts of my paralegal and 

LT Keogh to contact Respondent to notify him of the second pre-hearing telephonic 

conference. Several efforts were undertaken to notify Respondent both via telephone and 

in writing using the methods of service prescribed in the rules. See generally, 33 C.F.R. 

§ 20.304. 

On January 7, 2009, LT Keogh orally informed Respondent of the second 

telephone. At that time, Respondent apparently expressed his intention to participate and 

provided LT Keogh with a telephone number where he could be reached. That number 

was communicated to my paralegal and, in turn, to the telephone-conference operator. 

However, when telephoned by the conference operator on January 8, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. 

(CST), the number provided by Respondent proved to be a non-working number. 

 Because Respondent was absent from both pre-hearing conferences, he filed no 

Answer to the Coast Guard’s Amended Complaint. Thus, to ensure Respondent’s due 

process rights were protected, the undersigned entered a general denial of the allegations 

in the Amended Complaint on Respondent’s behalf. 

During both pre-hearing conferences, the undersigned reiterated the expedited 

nature of a temporary suspension hearing—and explained that the hearing must

commence not later than thirty (30) days after the seizure of Respondent’s license or 

merchant mariner’s documents. 33 C.F.R. § 20.1207(c)(1)(iii). Because the Coast Guard 

3
took possession of Respondent’s license on December 17, 2008, the hearing in this matter 

commenced on January 16, 2009 as described more fully, below. 

During both telephone pre-hearing conferences, the undersigned reminded the 

parties to become familiar with the procedural rules set forth in 33 C.F.R. Part 20 and 46 

C.F.R. Part 5. 

Additionally, by various written Orders properly and timely served on the 

Respondent, the undersigned advised Respondent of all of his procedural rights, 

including: the right to counsel (at Respondent’s expense); the right to have witnesses and 

documents subpoenaed and the right to offer relevant evidence into the record; the right 

to see all documents and evidence the USCG would use in the hearing; the right to know 

the names of adverse witnesses in advance of the hearing and to cross-examine those 

witnesses at the hearing; the right to call witnesses on Respondent’s behalf; and the right 

to testify on his own behalf. 

Respondent was further advised, in writing, that an expedited hearing is a 

procedure designed to benefit and protect his rights. Respondent, however, had an 

obligation to communicate with the court and the Coast Guard and to participate 

meaningfully if his rights were to be given a full measure of protection. 

At 10:00 a.m., (CST), on January 16, 2009, the undersigned convened the 

expedited hearing in the County Courthouse, Paducah, Kentucky, in accord with the 

provisions of 33 C.F.R. § 20.1201. LT Charlotte Keogh, USCG MSU Paducah and 

CWO3 Tim Smith, USCG Sector Ohio Valley represented the Coast Guard. Respondent 

did not appear, despite having received timely notice to do so. 

4
While suspension and revocation hearings are not typically held in absentia, the 

unique procedural requirements of a temporary suspension case dictate that these 

proceedings go forward—even without Respondent present. The expedited hearing 

process is a protection which insures to the benefit of Respondent, because a respondent’s 

license (and thus, his livelihood) is in the possession of the Coast Guard and a respondent 

is entitled to a prompt hearing to determine the validity of the Coast Guard’s charges 

levied against him. 

The expedited procedure was put in place to ensure that an Administrative Law 

Judge makes a determination whether the facts alleged in a complaint are true, so as to 

justify the seizure and retention of the Respondent’s license. 

The Coast Guard called three witnesses to testify. Likewise, the Coast Guard 

offered six (6) documentary items into evidence, albeit not in seriatim numerical order. 

All six (6) items were admitted. The Coast Guard also asked the undersigned to take 

official notice of several provisions from the United States Code, Code of Federal 

Regulations, the Federal Register and Commandant’s Decisions on Appeal. (Tr. 61 - 64). 

That request was granted and the referenced materials were officially noticed. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Findings of Fact are based on a thorough and careful analysis of the 

testimonial and documentary evidence and the entire record taken as a whole. 

1. At all relevant times mentioned herein and specifically on December 14 - 17, 

2008, Respondent, Steven A. Shiver, was the holder of Coast Guard issued 

5
merchant mariner's license and merchant mariner's document, 112829, Issue 

No. 2. (CG Ex. Pre-1). 

2. On December 14, 2008, Steven A. Shiver served aboard the M/V Dewey R. as 

a trip pilot, in the employment of WMS, Inc., Greenville, MS and under the 

command of the ship’s Master, Captain Larry Worbington. (Tr. 19 - 21). 

3. On December 14, 2008, Steven A. Shiver, as pilot, served in a safety sensitive 

function aboard the M/V Dewey R. 

4. During the morning hours of between 0400 and 1100 on December 14, 2008, 

Steven A. Shiver, as pilot, was intoxicated by alcohol and his blood alcohol 

level exceeded .134. (Tr. 54, CG Ex. 4). 

5. At or near 0400 on December 14, 2008, Steven A. Shiver, as pilot, was in 

control of the M/V Dewey R. when barge(s) in his tow collided with barge(s) 

under tow of the M/V Lydia Cenak, resulting in damages exceeding $200,000. 

(Tr. 9 – 10, CG Ex 1,5). 

DISCUSSION

The purpose of Coast Guard suspension and revocation proceedings is to promote 

safety at sea. See 46 U.S.C. § 7701. Title 46 CFR § 5.19 gives Administrative Law 

Judges authority to suspend or revoke a license or certificate in a hearing for violations 

arising under 46 U.S.C. § 7703. Under section 7703(1), a Coast Guard issued credential 

may be suspended or revoked if the holder of that credential violated any law or 

regulation intended to promote marine safety. 

Title 46 U.S.C. § 7702(d) provides that the Secretary of Transportation, or his 

delegee, may, temporarily, for not more than 45 days, suspend and take possession of a 

6
mariner’s license or document. However, in the case of a temporary suspension, an 

expedited hearing under subsection (a) shall be held within 30 days after the temporary 

suspension. 

Burden of Proof 

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, applies to Coast 

Guard Suspension and Revocation hearings before United States Administrative Law 

Judges. 46 U.S.C. § 7702(a). The APA authorizes imposition of a sanction if, upon 

consideration of the entire record as a whole, the charges are supported by reliable, 

probative, and substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). Under Coast Guard procedural 

rules and regulations, the burden of proof is on the Investigating Officer to prove the 

charges are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Title 33 CFR §§ 20.701, 

20.702(a). “[T]he term ‘substantial evidence’ is synonymous with ‘preponderance-ofthe-evidence’ as defined by the Supreme Court.” Appeal Decision 2477 (TOMBARI)

(1988). The burden of proving a fact by a preponderance of the evidence “simply 

requires the trier of fact ‘to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its 

nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade 

the [judge] of the fact’s existence.’” Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. 

Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) 

(citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Therefore, 

the Coast Guard must prove by credible, reliable, probative, and substantial evidence that 

Respondent more-likely-than-not committed the violation charged. 

Temporary suspension cases are unique among Coast Guard Suspension and 

Revocation procedures. Title 46 U.S.C. §7702(d) permits the Secretary (through his 

7
delegee, the Coast Guard) to seize and temporarily suspend a mariner’s license upon 

proof of very narrowly defined circumstances. Namely, that: 

1. That individual performs a safety sensitive function on a vessel, 

as determined by the Secretary, 

and

 2. There is probable cause to believe that the individual has either: 

 

(a) performed the safety sensitive function in violation of 

law or Federal regulation regarding use of alcohol or a 

dangerous drug; or 

(b) been convicted of an offense that would prevent the 

issuance or renewal of the license, certificate, or document; 

or 

(c) within the 3-year period preceding the initiation of a 

suspension proceeding, has been convicted of an offense 

described in section 30304(a)(3)(A) of title 49; or 

(d) is a security risk that poses a threat to the safety or 

security of a vessel or a public or commercial structure 

located within or adjacent to the maritime environment. 

 

Moreover, a temporary suspension case must proceed under expedited time 

standards. Congress’ intent is plain: if the government is allowed to seize a mariner’s 

license, it may do so under expedited circumstances and the mariner must be allowed 

quick access to a due process hearing for resolution of the allegations against him/her. 

All other allegations of misconduct or negligence, which form the basis of 

ordinary Suspension and Revocation cases, are adjudicated under the purview of 46 

C.F.R. Part 5 and 33 C.F.R. Part 20 – with more expansive time standards. 

In the instant case, 46 U.S.C. §7702(d) requires the Coast Guard to prove by 

substantial evidence that Respondent performed a safety sensitive function aboard the 

M/V Dewey R. and that there is/was probable cause to believe that Respondent had, 

8
while acting under the authority of his license, certificate, or document, performed that 

safety sensitive function in violation of law or Federal regulation regarding the use of 

alcohol or a dangerous drug. In the Amended Complaint, the Coast Guard curiously 

alleged both Misconduct and a Violation of Law or Regulation: only the latter of which is 

a required element of proof in a temporary suspension case.1

 

Otherwise, the established facts of this case are straightforward and were, by 

virtue of his absence, uncontested by Respondent. 

a. Respondent performed a “safety sensitive function” aboard the M/V 

Dewey R. 

In its post-hearing brief, the Coast Guard noted its Marine Safety Manual, Vol. V: 

“Investigations and Enforcement, Part C, Chapter 6, Section A.4.b,” which provides, in 

part: “Crewmembers in a safety sensitive position include those who...Are required by 

law or regulation to hold a Coast Guard license to perform their duties; [or who] Perform 

duties and functions directly related to the safe operation of the vessel.” 

The Coast Guard further defines a “safety sensitive” position aboard a vessel to 

include: control, navigation or management of a vessel; operation of propulsion, pump, 

 1

 The Coast Guard alleged that on December 14, 2008, Respondent committed Misconduct by 

violating his employer’s alcohol policy in that he failed a post-casualty chemical test. (CG Ex. 6). This 

allegation of Misconduct is problematic in light of the unique circumstances contemplated by the 

temporary suspension provisions of 46 U.S.C. §7702(d). First, “misconduct” or “violation of an employer’s 

alcohol policy” are not a required elements of proof under 46 U.S.C. §7702(d). Second, the Amended 

Complaint alleges a violation of §7702(d)(B)(i), i.e., that Respondent, while acting under the authority of 

his license, certificate, or document, performed the safety sensitive function in violation of law or Federal 

regulation regarding the use of alcohol or a dangerous drug. But, the Amended Complaint also alleges that 

Respondent violated his employer’s alcohol policy, “as required by 46 C.F.R. §4.06-3.” A violation of an 

employer’s “alcohol policy” does not constitute a “violation of law or Federal regulation” as described in 

the temporary suspension statute. Moreover, it is inappropriate to allege that Respondent violated 46 C.F.R. 

§4.06-3, because that regulation imposes obligations upon a marine employer—NOT an individual mariner. 

Thus, the factual allegation of Misconduct brought against this Respondent is inapplicable to the 

requirements of proof set forth in 46 U.S.C. §7702(d)(B)(i). 

 

9
electrical and related mechanical systems; lifesaving, firefighting, and communication 

equipment; mooring, anchoring, and towing cargo; and fuel handling, vessel stability or 

watertight integrity. See generally, 

http://www.uscg.mil/d5/dapi/programs.asp. (Emphasis added.) 

I take official notice of these publications and accept for purposes of the instant 

proceedings that the Respondent, as a licensed pilot, was performing a safety sensitive 

function aboard the M/V Dewey R. at the times alleged. 

b. Respondent, while acting under the authority of his license, certificate, or 

document, performed the safety sensitive function in violation of law or 

Federal regulation regarding the use of alcohol. 

In the Amended Complaint, the Coast Guard alleged that on December 14, 2008, 

Respondent committed a Violation of Law or Regulation when he: a) failed to report a 

marine casualty: to wit, the grounding of his vessel; and, b) found to be intoxicated at the 

time he was piloting the MV Dewey R. 

Failure to Report a Marine Casualty 

The Coast Guard’s Amended Complaint is inarticulate in light of the requirements 

of the temporary suspension statute, 46 U.S.C. §7702(d)(B)(i). Whether Respondent 

failed to report a marine casualty is immaterial to the charge that Respondent’s conduct 

violated the proscriptions of the temporary suspension statute. Moreover, in the instant 

case, the Coast Guard’s proof of whether a marine casualty or grounding ever occurred is 

questionable. Indeed, the Coast Guard’s chief witness, Captain Larry Worbington, 

Master of the M/V Dewey R., testified that the vessel never grounded; that it only 

“bumped” the river bottom, and that it was never grounded or rendered immobile. (Tr. 26 

10
– 27, CG Ex. 1).2

 Even if the “bump” constituted a “grounding” and even if it were 

established that Respondent failed to report the “bump” as a marine casualty: the result is 

the same. Such allegations are immaterial to the legal basis for a temporary suspension. 

That is, failing to report a marine casualty is not the basis for a temporary suspension 

under 46 U.S.C. §7702(d)(B)(i). 

Intoxication in Violation of Law or Regulation 

The Coast Guard alleged that Respondent violated 33 C.F.R. §95.020 and 33 

C.F.R. §95.045. 

Title 33 of the Code of Federal Regulations § 95.020 provides in pertinent part: 

An individual is under the influence of alcohol or a dangerous drug 

when:... (b) The individual is operating a vessel other than a 

recreational vessel and has an alcohol concentration of .04 percent 

by weight or more in their blood; ... 

(Emphasis added) 

Likewise, 33 C.F.R. §95.045 provides: 

While on board a vessel inspected, or subject to inspection, under 

Chapter 33 of Title 46 United States Code, a crewmember 

(including a licensed individual), pilot, ...(b) Shall not be 

intoxicated at any time; ... 

(Emphasis added) 

Proof, here, Respondent violated both, or either, of these regulatory provisions 

would constitute proof of a violation of 46 U.S.C. §7702(d)(B)(i). 

Toward that end, the Coast Guard presented Captain Worbington, who 

testified that after a collision between the M/V Dewey R and the M/V Lydia 

 

2

 In it post hearing brief, the Coast Guard cited numerous cases, treatises and policy letters for the 

proposition that even a “bumping” constitutes a reportable marine casualty. 

11
Cenac, Respondent was subjected to a post-casualty, on-board alcohol test.3

Captain Worbington testified that he personally administered two “Alco-Screen 

Test 02” alcohol tests to the Respondent, at approximately 0700 hours on 

December 14, 2008 -- three hours after the collision with the M/V Lydia Cenak. 

(Tr. 27 – 28, CG. Ex 2). An Alco-Screen 02 screening test is among those 

approved for alcohol testing by the United States Department of Transportation 

(DOT). See Vol. 72, Fed. Register, No. 20, Wed., Jan 31, 2007at 4559. (CG 

Ex.6). 

Captain Worbington testified that he administered an initial “strip saliva” 

test to Respondent, then waited 15 minutes before administering a confirmatory 

“strip saliva” test. Both tests resulted in a “positive” indication of alcohol in 

Respondent’s bloodstream. (Tr. 29 – 30, CG Ex. 2). 

The Coast Guard also presented the testimony of Mr. John Crivello, an 

employee of Western Kentucky Drug Screen, Paducah, KY. (Tr. 50 -51). Mr. 

Crivello testified that he has been an employee of Western Kentucky Drug Screen 

for approximately six years and in that time has performed over one-thousand 

breathalyzer tests for the presence of alcohol in the human body in the past year. 

(Tr. 51 – 52). 

Mr. Crivello testified that on December 14, 2008, he was called to perform 

a breathalyzer test on the Respondent aboard the M/V Dewey R. (Tr. 53). Mr. 

Crivello testified that he used a breath-testing apparatus called an “Alco-Sensor 

 

3

 Although not mentioned in the Amended Complaint, a collision between barges towed by the M/V Dewey 

R. and the M/V/ Lydia Cenak resulted in a significant marine casualty. The collision, which occurred at 

approximately 0400 on December 14, 2008, caused a 175-foot-by-6-foot fracture to the hull plate of the 

12
IV4” which is connected to a companion testing instrument, called an “RBT 4,” 

manufactured by Intoximeters, Inc., of St. Louis. (Tr. 52). An Alco-Sensor IV 

and RBT 4 are among the list of DOT-approved devices for “evidential breath 

measuring devices.” See Vol. 72 Fed. Register, No. 241, Mon., December 17, 

2007 at 71481. (CG Ex. 6). The apparatus is commonly referred to as a gaschromatography testing device. (Tr. 58). 

Mr. Crivello further testified that he administered two tests to Respondent 

at approximately 1100 on the morning of December 14, 2008. (Tr. 54, CG Ex. 4). 

He testified that the initial test on the Respondent’s breath revealed a blood 

alcohol concentration .137 and a second, confirmatory test resulted in a blood 

alcohol concentration of .134. (Tr. 54, CG Ex. 4). 

Mr. Crivello further testified that Respondent signed Coast Guard Exhibit 

4, the document which bears the written results of Mr. Crivello’s chemical testing. 

It is noteworthy that Respondent’s confirmatory blood alcohol testing 

occurred at 1100 on the morning of December 14, 2008 – nearly seven hours after 

the collision between the barge(s) in the tow of the M/V Dewey R. and the 

barge(s) towed by the M/V Lydia Cenak. 

Blood alcohol levels of .137 and .134 exceed the legal levels prescribed by 

law. Title 33 C.F.R. §95.020 prohibits operating a commercial vessel with an 

alcohol concentration of .04 percent by weight or more in a person’s blood. 

Likewise, 33 C.F.R. §95.045 proscribes intoxication by a crewmember aboard an 

inspected vessel. (The undersigned takes official notice that a barge is an 

 

tank barge, Apex 3509; the last barge in the M/V Dewey R.'s tow. The repair cost was estimated to exceed 

$200,000. The Coast Guard was then notified of the collision. (Tr. 9 – 10, CG Ex. 5). 

13
inspected vessel.) Here, Respondent’s reported levels clearly exceeded the limits 

set forth in both 33 C.F.R. § § 95.020 and .045. 

Therefore, the Coast Guard’s allegation Respondent did, while acting under the 

authority of his license, certificate, or document, perform the safety sensitive function in 

violation of law or Federal regulation regarding the use of alcohol, is PROVED. 

ULTIMATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Respondent and the subject mater of this hearing are properly within the 

jurisdiction of the United States Coast Guard and the Administrative Law Judge 

in accordance with 46 U.S.C. §§ 7702 - 7703, 46 C.F.R. Part 5, and 33 C.F.R. 

Part 20, particularly § 20.1201(a). 

2. At all relevant times mentioned herein and specifically on December 14-17, 2008 

Respondent, Steven A. Shiver, was the holder of merchant mariner's license and 

merchant mariner's document, 1128289, Issue No. 2. 

3. At all relevant times mentioned herein, and specifically on December 14, 2008, 

Respondent performed a safety sensitive function (pilot) aboard the M/V Dewey 

R. 

4. At all relevant times mentioned herein, and specifically on December 14, 2008, 

Respondent did, while acting under the authority of his license, certificate, or 

document, perform the safety sensitive function (pilot) while in violation of law 

or Federal regulations regarding the use of alcohol. 

5. At all relevant times mentioned herein, and specifically during the morning hours 

between 0400 and 1100 on December 14, 2008, Respondent did, while acting 

14
under the authority of his license, certificate, or document, perform the safety 

sensitive function (pilot) while his blood alcohol levels exceeded .134. 

6. Both the initial screening and the confirmatory testing performed on 

Respondent’s breath were conducted using devices approved by the United 

States Department of Transportation. 

 

SANCTION

The Coast Guard proposes Revocation as a sanction for Respondent’s violation. I 

am mindful that 46 C.F.R. § 5.569 (Table of Suggested Range of an Appropriate Order) 

might be read to suggest a suspension of 1 to 3 months for failure to comply with U.S. 

laws or regulations pertaining to intoxication on the waterways. However, I am also 

mindful that 46 C.F.R. §5.61(b) provides: 

An investigating officer may seek revocation of a respondent's license, 

certificate or document when the circumstances of an act or offense found 

proved or consideration of the respondent's prior record indicates that 

permitting such person to serve under the license, certificate or document 

would be clearly a threat to the safety of life or property, or detrimental to 

good discipline. 

(Emphasis added.) 

Here, the evidence reveals that at approximately 0400 on December 14, 

2008, and while in control of the M/V Dewey R., Respondent’s blood alcohol 

levels exceeded .134. The evidence further reveals that while under Respondent’s 

control, one of the M/V Dewey R.’s barges collided with a barge(s) tied to the 

M/V Lydia Cenak, resulting in over $200,000.00 in damage to one of the M/V 

Dewey R.’s barges. (Tr.9 – 10, CG Ex 1,5). Most egregious is the fact that 

Respondent’s blood alcohol levels were not tested until seven hours after the 

15
collision; raising the strong inference that at the time of the collision, 

Respondent’s blood alcohol level far-exceeded the reported .134 level. A further 

inference is raised that Respondent had been drinking heavily for some time 

before the collision and while standing at the wheel of the Dewey R., with barges 

in tow, as she proceeded in the dark December waters of the Mississippi. One can 

only speculate how many drinks Respondent would have consumed as he piloted 

the vessel in order to achieve a blood alcohol level of .134, four hours after the 

collision with the M/V Lydia Cenak. 

Revocation is appropriate when it is shown that a Respondent poses a 

clear threat to safety or life or property on the waterways. Such is plainly the case, 

here. Revocation is the appropriate sanction. 

CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of the testimony and documentary evidence offered at 

the hearing, and of the entire record, I find that the Coast Guard’s allegation that 

Respondent did, while acting under the authority of his license, certificate, or document, 

perform a safety sensitive function in violation of law or Federal regulation regarding the 

use of alcohol or a dangerous drug, is PROVED. 

WHEREFORE, 

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Merchant Mariner’s Documents, Merchant 

Mariner’s Licenses, and all other credentials issued by the U.S. Coast Guard to Steven A. 

16
Shiver are REVOKED, per the requirements of 46 U.S.C. § 7703(1)(A), commencing on 

the date they were in the possession of the Coast Guard. 

 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Steven A. Shiver is to tender any other 

valid Merchant Mariner’s Documents, Merchant Mariner’s Licenses, and all other 

credential issued by the Coast Guard in his possession immediately to the nearest Coast 

Guard Marine Safety Office or mail those credentials to the following offices: USCG 

Sector Ohio Valley, 2732 River Green Circle, Louisville, KY 40206 or the United States 

Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit, 225 Tully Street, Paducah, KY 42003-0170. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Steven A. Shiver is hereby prohibited 

from serving aboard any vessel requiring a Merchant Mariner’s Document or Merchant 

Mariner’s License issued by the U.S. Coast Guard. 

PLEASE TAKE NOTE that issuance of this Decision and Order serves as the 

parties’ right to appeal under 33 C.F.R. Part 20, Subpart J. A copy of Subpart J is 

provided as Attachment B. 

Done and Dated on this 29th day of January, 2009 

New Orleans, LA 

 

__________________________ 

 Honorable Bruce Tucker Smith 

 Administrative Law Judge 

 United States Coast Guard

17
ATTACHMENT A

EXHIBIT LIST 

Coast Guard Witnesses 

1. Larry Worbington, Master of MV Dewey R. 

2. John (NMI) Rigney, Personnel Manager, WMS, Inc. 

3. John Crivello, Western Kentucky Drug Screen, Inc. 

Coast Guard Exhibits (There was no CG Ex. 3)

Pre-1. Respondent’s USCG-issued license, 1128289 

1. M/V Dewey R. log 

2. Alcohol Testing Form 

4. Alcohol Testing Form 

5. Report of Marine Casualty, Injury or Death 

6. WMS Marine Drug and Alcohol Policies and various Fed. Register and C.F.R. 

exerpts. 

Respondent Witnesses 

None 

Respondent Exhibits 

None 

18