[Cite as Williams v. Foster , 2019-Ohio-4601.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

TRAVIS LANIER WILLIAMS Plaintiff-Appellant

v. SAMUEL FOSTER Defendant-Appellee : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 28416

Trial Court Case No. 2018-CV-4086 (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 8th day of November, 2019.

. . . . . . . . . . . TRAVIS LANIER WILLIAMS, 1955 Kipling Drive, Dayton, Ohio 45406 Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro Se SAMUEL FOSTER, 45 Perrine Street, Dayton, Ohio 45410 Defendant-Appellee, Pro Se

. . . . . . . . . . . . .-2-

FROELICH, J. {¶ 1} Travis Lanier Williams, pro se, appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court of Commo n Pleas, which concluded that Williams did not have a valid mechanic’s lien on Samuel Foster’s property and entered judgmen t in favor of Foster. For the following reasons, the tr ial court’s judgment will be a ffirmed. {¶ 2} On August 31, 2018, Williams brought an action to quiet title t o residential property owned by Foster. Williams claimed that, in July 2018, he performed work on the property, including cutting the grass, trimming trees, and picking up trash, the value of which he claimed was $500. Williams asserted that he had a mechanic’s lien on the property. {¶ 3} After Foster failed to respond to the complaint, Williams sough t a default judgment. A magistrate denied the motion, stating that the par ties had indicated that they were discussing a settlement. {¶ 4} A trial before a magistrate was held on February 1, 2019. The record does not contain a transcript of that hearing, but the record reflec ts that Williams testified on his own behalf and Foster did not appear. On March 4, 2019, Wi lliams filed a “notice of Revised Code 5303.01 Judgement default [in] accordance with Rev ised Code 5309.72.” {¶ 5} On March 20, 2019, the magistrate issued a decision, finding in favor of Foster. The magistrate made the following factual findings: The short of it is the parties had no contract for Plaintiff to perform any work at the property. Defendant never agreed to pay Plaint iff any money to do any work at the property. While Plaintiff claims D efendant said he would just give the house to Plaintiff, the only eviden ce of this is-3- Plaintiff’s testimony, which was less than credible. Plaintiff scattered his testimony with different legal verbiage, that upon questioning, it was clear he did not understand the meaning of the words he chose to empl oy. There was not [sic] written or oral agreement between the parti es that Plaintiff was to be paid for any work he completed at the prope rty. The magistrate concluded that, in the absence of a contract tha t Williams was owed anything for the work he did at the property, “no mechanic’s li en can follow.” {¶ 6} Following the magistrate’s decision, Williams filed a “motion f or judges and magistrate decision,” which the trial court construed as object ions to the magistrate’s decision. The court set a briefing schedule on the objections, following which Williams filed an “affidavit of truth,” an “affidavit of trust,” and a “ plaintiff brief.” Williams generally asserted that he was entitled to Foster’s property due to the a lleged mechanic’s lien and was entitled to judgment against Foster due to Foster’s non-res ponsiveness. Foster did not file any responsive memoranda. {¶ 7} On May 24, 2019, the trial cour t overruled Williams’s objection s and granted judgment to Foster. The trial court reasoned:

The Court first finds that Plaintiff does not have a valid mech anic’s lien. Plaintiff did not have an express or implied contract wi th Defendant regarding the work done around the property or the value of tha t work. The Court cannot find that a meeting of the minds took place betwee n Plaintiff and Defendant regarding not only the value of the work performe d, but even if the work should have been performed to begin with. A contra ct is not formed unless all the essential elements of the contract are ag reed to by-4- the parties. Plaintiff testified that he was the one who deter mined the value of his work with no input from Defendant. Therefore, there is no valid implied contract. The only evidence of any possible contract is Plaintiff’s own testimony and the hearsay that it contains. The Court cannot f ind Plaintiff’s testimony credible based upon the trial that was held in this m atter. It appears to this Court that Plaintiff sought to own the property in question and is attempting to gain ownership through a mechanic’s lien. Plaintiff stated that he did not even ask Defendant for payment prior to filing the mechanic’s lien. Plaintiff also stated that he attempted to fi le a notice of commencement before the work was completed. As the parties did not enter into a contract, and even if there was [sic] a contract, Defendant was never given an opportunity to perform under said contract, ther e can be no

mechanic’s lien in this matter. {¶ 8} Williams appeals from the trial court’s judgment. Williams’s a ppellate brief does not include assignments of error as required by App.R. 16( A), but he claims that the trial court should have granted him judgment due to Foster’s fa ilure to respond to his complaint and because he (Williams) has a valid mechanic’s lien

. {¶ 9} At the outset, we emphasize that the record does not contain a written transcript or video recording of the February 1, 2019 hearing. Williams did not request the preparation of a transcript as part of his appeal, nor did he request the preparation of a transcript in the trial court. {¶ 10} Under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii), the party objecting to a magistr ate’s decision-5- is required to provide a transcript when it asks the trial cour t to review the factual findings of a magistrate. See also Price v. Combs , 2d Dist. Darke No. 2015-CA-17, 2016-Ohio429, ¶ 16. In the absence of a written transcript of the heari ng before the magistrate, we have no record of the evidence presented to the magistrate, and we cannot speculate what the testimony was at that hearing. Miller v. Tye , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26277, 2015-Ohio-199, ¶ 9. We must presume that the magistrate’s and the trial court’s findings were supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. {¶ 11} Accepting the trial court’s findings, we find no error in the t rial court’s conclusion that Foster was entitled to judgment on Williams’s c laim. R.C. 1311.02, which governs liens upon improvements to real property, provides: Every person who performs work or labor upon or furnishes mater ial in furtherance of any improvement undertaken by virtue of a contract, express or implied , with the owner * * * has a lien to secure the payment therefo r upon the improvement and all interests that the owner, part own er, or lessee may have or subsequently acquire in the land or leasehold to wh ich the improvement was made or removed. (Emphasis added.) R.C. 1311.011 further allows for a lien by a contractor, subcontractor, material supplier, or laborer in connection with a home construction contract or home purchase contract. See R.C. 1311.011(B)(1). {¶ 12} The trial court expressly found that there was no implied or ex press contract between the parties. In the absence of a contract between the property owner and the contractor -- in this case, Foster and Williams -- no mechanic’ s lien is permitted. In addition, the trial court found, based on Williams’s testimony, that even if a contract-6- existed, Foster was never given an opportunity to perform under the alleged contract before the filing of the mechanic’ s lien. The trial court ther efore properly granted judgment to Foster on Williams’s claims based on an alleged mec hanic’s lien. {¶ 13} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur.

Copies sent to:

Travis Lanier Williams Samuel Foster Hon. Dennis J. Adkins