UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4192

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DELANTE ANTWYNE ROPER, a/k/a Puff,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey, 

Chief District Judge. (3:08-cr-00059-JPB-DJJ-1)

Submitted: June 3, 2010 Decided: June 24, 2010

Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Deirdre H. Purdy, Chloe, West Virginia, for Appellant. Paul 

Thomas Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney,

Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Delante Roper appeals his conviction and 322-month

sentence imposed after he pled guilty, pursuant to a plea 

agreement, to one count of distribution of more than five grams 

of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(B) (2006), and one count of using and carrying a firearm 

in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006). On appeal, counsel filed a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but 

questioning whether the district court abused its discretion in 

denying Roper’s motion to withdraw his plea, designating him as 

a career offender, and denying his motion for a variance 

sentence. Roper was advised of his right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief, but has not filed a brief. The Government 

has moved to dismiss Roper’s appeal based on a waiver of 

appellate rights in his plea agreement.

Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, 

through colloquy with the defendant, must inform the defendant 

of, and determine that the defendant understands the nature of, 

the charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum 

penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various 

rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b). “In reviewing the adequacy of compliance with Rule 11, 
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this Court should accord deference to the trial court’s decision 

as to how best to conduct the mandated colloquy with the 

defendant.” United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th 

Cir. 1991).

Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive 

the right to appeal if that waiver is knowing and intelligent. 

United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). 

The issue of whether a defendant validly waived his right to 

appeal is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. 

This court will enforce a valid waiver so long as “the issue 

being appealed is within the scope of the waiver.” United 

States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).

Here, the plea agreement contained a very broad 

appellate waiver as to Roper’s sentence. The waiver stated 

that:

[d]efendant is aware that Title 18, United States 

Code, Section 3742 affords a defendant the right to

appeal the sentence imposed. Acknowledging all this, 

and in exchange for the concessions heretofore made by 

the United States in this plea agreement, Defendant 

knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to appeal 

any sentence which is within the maximum provided in 

the statute of conviction or in the manner in which 

that sentence was determined on any ground whatever, 

including those grounds set forth in Title 18, United 

States Code, Section 3742. Defendant also waives his 

right to challenge his sentence or the manner in which 

it was determined in any collateral attack, including 

but not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28, 

United States Code, Section 2255 (habeas corpus).
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At the Rule 11 hearing, the Government summarized the 

negotiated terms in the plea agreement, including the appeal 

waiver. The district court confirmed that Roper understood the 

terms of the agreement, including the appeal waiver, and that he 

had reviewed it with his attorney. Thus, we conclude that the 

appellate waiver is valid and enforceable as to Roper’s 

sentence, and we grant the motion to dismiss as to the sentence. 

However, because the waiver provision does not preclude Roper’s 

challenge to the validity of his conviction, it does not 

foreclose our consideration of his claim that the district court 

erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

This court reviews the district court’s denial of a 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). A 

defendant may withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing if he 

“can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). A fair and just reason to 

withdraw a plea is one that essentially challenges the fairness 

of the Rule 11 proceeding. United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 

1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Lambey, 974 

F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992)). “The most important 

consideration in resolving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 

an evaluation of the Rule 11 colloquy at which the guilty plea 

was accepted,” and a properly conducted Rule 11 proceeding 
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“raises a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding” 

and “leaves a defendant with a very limited basis upon which to 

have his plea withdrawn.” United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 

408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003); see United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 

1300, 1307 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting “key” to whether motion to 

withdraw should be granted is “whether or not the Rule 11 

proceeding was properly conducted”).

We have articulated the following nonexclusive list of 

factors for consideration by the district court in deciding 

whether to grant a withdrawal motion: (1) whether the defendant 

has offered credible evidence that his plea was not knowing or 

not voluntary; (2) whether the defendant has credibly asserted 

his legal innocence; (3) whether there has been a delay between 

the entering of the plea and the filing of the motion; 

(4) whether the defendant has had the close assistance of 

competent counsel; (5) whether withdrawal will cause prejudice 

to the Government; and (6) whether it will inconvenience the 

court and waste judicial resources. United States v. Moore, 931 

F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991).

On appeal, Roper argues that his guilty plea was 

invalid because counsel failed to fully explain the rights he 

would waive by pleading guilty and counsel threatened and 

coerced him into entering his plea by advising that Roper had no 

defense and faced a potential life sentence absent a plea 
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agreement. Thus, Roper contends that his plea was not knowing 

and intelligent.

Roper has not presented any evidence or argument to 

demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. 

Indeed, the record before this court reveals that the district 

court substantially complied with the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 

requirements during the plea colloquy. The transcript of 

Roper’s Rule 11 hearing reveals that the district court ensured 

that Roper’s plea was knowing and voluntary, that he understood 

the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty and the sentence 

he faced, and that he committed the offenses to which he was 

pleading guilty. Roper also confirmed during the hearing that 

he fully understood the ramifications of his guilty plea, and 

that no one made promises to him outside those made by the 

Government in his plea agreement.

We conclude that Roper’s guilty plea was knowing and 

voluntary, and the district court did not abuse its discretion 

by denying Roper’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Accordingly, we grant the motion to dismiss with regard to 

Roper’s sentence, deny the motion as to his conviction, and 

affirm the conviction. We deny Roper’s motion for supplemental 

briefing. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 
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appeal. This court requires that counsel inform Roper, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Roper requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Roper. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART

AND DISMISSED IN PART