### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14

- 51259

HAROLD L. RYALS , Plaintiff

- Appellant

v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS; MIDLAND COUNTY; CHERYL BECKER , Defendant s
- Appellee s

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 7:14

- CV

- 4

Before KING, JOLLY, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Harold L. Ryals, Texas prisoner # 1940539, moves this court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in his appeal of the district court’s dismissal of his complaint und er 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to state a claim . In the district court, Ryals consented to having his § 1983 complaint adjudicated before a magistrate judge. In relevant part, the magistrate judge determined that Ryals’s claims against the Attorney General of Texas regarding his two

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED June 26, 2015 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 14-51259 Document: 00513094887 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/26/2015No. 14

- 51259

2 prior convictions for failing to register as a sex offender were barred by the rule established in Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Further, as to Midland County, the magistrate judge f ound Ryals’s allegations insufficient to support a claim of municipal liability under § 1983. Finally, as to Cheryl Becker, the magistrate judge concluded that she was entitled to qualified immunity, in part because Ryals failed to demonstrate any constit utional violations. By filing in this court a motion for leave to proceed IFP, Ryals is challenging the magistrate judge’s determination that his appeal was not taken in good faith

. See Baugh v. Taylor , 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997)

. A motion for lea ve to proceed IFP on appeal “must be directed solely to the trial court’s reasons for the certification decision.” Id. This court’s inquiry into Ryals’s good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and ther efore not frivolous).” See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotatio n marks and citation omitted). If it is apparent tha t an appeal would be meritless, w e may dismiss the appeal as frivolous. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2; Baugh , 117 F .3d at 202 n.24.
In support of his motion for leave to proceed IFP, Ryals contends, inter alia , that his claims fall within an exception to the rule established in Heck

. He also asserts that his conviction has been “called into question” by a state district court. Finally, he claims that habeas relief is unavailable, and t hus his § 1983 complaint is the only avenue left for him to pursue his claims. Ryals’s arguments here are unavailing, as no exception to the Heck rule applies in this case. Ryals cites a number of cases in support of his argument that an exception applies. However, the cases are entirely inapposite to the present issue, and , indeed , the cases make no me ntion of the Heck rule. In addition, Ryals’s assertion that his conviction has been “called into question,” thus satisfying the Heck condition, is entire ly without support. Thus, because Case: 14-51259 Document: 00513094887 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/26/2015No. 14

- 51259

3 there is no evidence showing that Ryals’s convictions have been rev ersed or otherwise called into question, save for his unsupported assertions, Ryals’s claims are barred by Heck

. See Clarke v. Stalder , 154 F.3d 186, 190

- 91 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Finally, this court has rejected Ryals’s argument that his asserted in ability to obtain habeas relief is an exception to the Heck rule. See Randell v. Johnson , 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that inability to obtain habeas relief did not serve as an exception to the Heck rule). Moreover, Ryals has only alleged an inability to obtain habeas relief; he has not asserted that he has no procedural vehicle to challenging his convictions. See id. Addressing the dismissal of his claims against Midland County based on the failure to allege municipal liability, Ryals argues that the magistrate judge was wrong to apply a heightened pleading sta ndard to his pro se complaint

. Even liberally construed, Ryals fails to state a claim of municipal l iability as to Midland County. Put simply, Ryals’s challenge to Midland Coun ty’s enforcement of the Texas Sex Offender Registration Program is an indirect challenge to his convictions for failing to register as a sex offender, and accordingly, the challenge is barred by Heck

. See Heck , 512 U.S. at 486

- 87

. Next, as to the magistra te judge’s dismissal of his § 1983 suit against Becker, Ryals makes no argument challenging the magistrate judge’s conclusion that qualified immunity precluded the claim against Becker that she unlawfully denied him access to documents in his juvenile case . Thus, Ryals does not address the “trial court’s reasons f or the certification decision.” See Baugh , 117 F.3d at 202

. Although p ro se briefs are afforded liberal construction, see Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993), when an appellant fails to identify any error in the district court’s analysis, it is the same as if the appellant had not appealed that issue. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Case: 14-51259 Document: 00513094887 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/26/2015No. 14

- 51259

4 We need not address Rya ls’s remaining arguments, which are directed at the magistrate judge’s alternative holdings. The balance of Ryals’s remaining arguments necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions for failing to register as a sex offender. Thus, his claims are ba rred by Heck and are not cognizable in a § 1983 action until the Heck condition is satisfied. See
Heck , 512 U.S. at 486

- 87; Cronn v. Buffington , 150 F.3d 538, 541 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1998)

. Additionally, Ryals fails to address the district court’s reasoning for dismissing his Eighth Amendment claim, thus raising no issue for appeal. See Brinkmann , 813 F.2d at 748. In view of the foregoing, Ryals has not shown that he will raise a nonfrivolous issue for appeal. See Howard , 707 F.2d at 219

- 20. Accordingly, his motion to proceed IFP on appeal is denied , and his appeal is dismissed as frivolous. See Baugh , 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Our dismissal of Ryals’s appeal as f rivolous and the district court’ s dismissal of his civil rights suit count as two strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v.
Hammons , 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). We warn Ryals that if he accumulates a third strike pursuant to § 1915(g) he will be barred from

pr oceeding IFP while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g). MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED. Case: 14-51259 Document: 00513094887 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/26/2015