2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit 3-15-2004 

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w . vi l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/936NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT
No. 03-1495
JUDI TH DEWYER, Appellant

v. TEMPLE UNIVE RSI TY; RHONDA BLANT ON

ON APPE AL FROM THE UNIT ED STA TES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE

EA STE RN DIST RIC T O F PE NN SY LV AN IA (Dist. Court No. 00-cv- 01665) Distri ct Court J

udge: Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter Argued: Januar

y 12, 2004 Be for e: A LIT O, C HE RT OF F, an d B EC KE R, Circuit Judges
. (Opinion Fi led: March 15, 2004)

Richard J. Silver

berg (argued) Richard J. Silver

berg & Associate s 1500 Walnut Stre et Suite 15001 Rh ond a B lanto n is n ow kno wn as R hon da J enk ins. See Ap p. at 14 . To a void

con fus ion , we refe r to h er as Bla nto n. 2 Philadelphia, PA 19102 Attorneyfor Appell

ant James Bucci (argued) Spector, Gadon & R osen 1635 Market Stree t Seven Penn Center, 7th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 Attorneyfor Appell

ees

OPINI ON OF THE COURT
PER CU RIA M : I. Judith DeWyer (“DeWyer”) brought suit in t he United States Dist

rict Court for t

he Easte rn D istrict of P enns ylvania a gains t her fo rmer emp loyer, Tem ple U nivers ity (“Temple”), and her former supervi sor, Rhonda Blanton. 1 She alle ged that Temple and Blanton were l iable for dis ability and race di scri minati on, in vi olati on of the Americans wit h D isab ilities A ct (“A DA ”), T itle V II of the C ivil R igh ts A ct of 196 4, 42 U.S .C. § 2000e et seq ., 42 U .S.C . § 19 81, a nd t he P enn sylvan ia H um an R elatio ns A ct (“P HR A” ),2 “The PHRA and the ADA are ‘basica lly the same . . . in relevant res pects and “Pennsy lvania

courts . . . general ly

inter pret t he PHRA in accor d with it s federal counterpa rts.”’” Bu skirk v . Ap ollo M etals , 307 F.3d 160, 166 n.1 (3d Cir . 2002) ( citations omitt ed). Ther efore, in the por tions of this opinion conc erning di sabil ity discr iminat ion, we cite AD A precedents. 3 Pa. Cons. St at. Ann.§ 951 et seq . 2 Temple and Blanton moved t o dismis s, and t he Distr ict Cou rt granted the m otion in part and denied the motion in p art. The D istrict Court dismis sed DeWyer’s clai ms alleging discr iminat ion in publ ic accommodati ons under the ADA and PHRA , her cl aim all eging ai ding and abetting a vi olati on of the ADA, and her claim allegin g inten tional in fliction o f em otiona l distress. A fter disc over y, Tem ple
mo ved for sum ma ry judg me nt. T his m otio n w as a lso g ran ted in par t and den ied in par t. The Court enter ed summary j udgment agains t DeWyer on her clai ms of retal iati on and aidin g an d ab ettin g un der the P HR A. The remaining i ssues went to trial in front of a j ury . At trial, DeWyer object ed on several grou nds to the D istrict Court’s charge to the jury. After a four-da y trial, the jury return ed a v erdict in favo r of T emp le, and the D istrict Co urt ente red jud gm ent on its
ver dict. On appeal, DeWyer argues that she i s enti tled to a new tria l because the Dist rict Cou rt refused to ch arge the jury on sev eral of her claim s and that the D istrict Court abused it s discretion by excludi ng evidence of di scri minati on that oc curred after DeW yer’s suspension fro m w ork. Bec ause w e conclud e that the D istrict Court did not err in its jury instru ctions a nd d id no t abus e its discr etion b y exclud ing the evide nce in4

ques tion, w e aff

irm the Distric t Cou rt’s judg men t. II. In evaluating j uryinstructi ons, our overarching standar d of revie w is abuse of disc retio n. United States v. Fi schbach & Moore, Inc. , 750 F.2d 1183, 11 95 (3d C ir. 1984). However, a

tri al court

necessarily

abuses i ts di scret ion if it “miss tate s the pr oper legal standard,” so whe n a jury instruction is challenged on that basis, w e exercise plen ary
rev iew
. Hopp v. City

of Pitt sburgh , 194 F.3d 434, 440 (3d Cir. 1999). I n evaluat ing instructi ons, we ask “whether the char ge, t aken as a whole and vi ewed in the l ight of t he evidence, fairly and ade quatel y submi ts the issue s in the case t o the jur y. ” Fischbach & Moore, Inc. , 750 F .2d at 1 195 ; see also , Limbach v. Sheet Metal Workers Int ’l Assoc. , 949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n. 15 (3d Cir. 1991). I f we conclude that an inst ructi on was
erroneous on a non-const itutional ground, we revers e unless we are able t o saythat t he “jury would have reached t

he same result had it

been inst

ructed a ccording to the corr ect legalstandar d.” Hopp , 194 F.3 d at 4 40 ( inter nal q uot ation ma rks a nd c itatio n om itted ). Where a party

fail ed to pres erve it s objection to t he inst ructi on in quest ion, we revi ew for plain erro r. Fashauer v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operat ions , 57 F.3d 1 269, 128 9 (3d C ir. 199 5). On the questi on of the admis sion or e xclusi on of evidence, we apply an abuse-ofdisc retio n sta nda rd. See Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc. , 292 F.3d 375, 382 -83 (3d C ir. 200 2); In re Merri tt Logan, Inc. , 901 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[E]r rors in the5

admissi on or exclus ion of evi dence can not be grounds for r eversalor a new tri al if they
con stitute har mle ss er ror.” ). III. A. De Wyer first argu es that th e D istrict Co urt erred by failing to cha rge the jury with respect to her cl aims that

Temple did not provide her wit h a reasonabl e accommodation for her known d isabili ties. A party who presents e nough evidence t o support a parti cular c laim i s enti tled to a jury instruc tion on the cla im, an d if su ch an instruc tion is n ot give n and the pa rty prope rly preserved the objection, the p arty is entitl ed to a rem and fo r a new trial unless the failure to g ive th e ins truc tion wa s ha rmle ss. See Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, I nc. , 831 F.2d 119 1, 11 97 ( 3d C ir. 19 87)
. See also , e.g ., Cigna Insur ance Co. v. Oy Saunatec , 241 F.3d 1, 8 (1 st Cir. 20 01); Wil sonv. Uni on Pa ci fi c R. R. , 56 F.3d 1 226, 123 0 (10th C ir. 1995);
see also , Brown v. Gray , 227 F .3d 12 78, 12 91 (1 0th C ir. 2000 ); Trejo v. D enve r & R io Gra nde W. R. R. , 568 F.2 d 18 1, 18 4 (1 0th Cir . 197 7). In this c ase, ou r review of the record leads u s to co nclud e that D eW yer failed to present suffici ent evi dence concerning her accommodati on clai m. If any thing, the evide nce s ugg ests tha t Tem ple attem pted to acco mm odate her lim itations. A ccord ing to DeW eyer’s testi mony, when she first approached Ed Price to ask whether she could use the handi cap parki ng in front of the WIC building, Pri ce li stened t o her reques t and6

obtained an answer from his supervisor, Chris Kent. Price said t hat she could indeed use the h and icap ped par kin g sp ot if s he h ad a han dica ppe d pl aca rd o r lice nse . Ap p. at 1 16. After DeWyer’s suspensi on for parki ng in the handicapped spot , she pr esented Rhonda Blanton with a doctor’ s note stating t hat she r equired handicapped par king, and Blanton then allow ed h er to par k in the h and icap ped spo t. Id. at 143. After revi ewing the re levant evidence, we hold that

DeWeyer fail ed to pres ent suffi cient evidence t o requir e the Dis trict C our t to ch arg e the jury on the q ues tion of r eas ona ble a cco mm oda tion
. M oreo ver, ev en if su ch an instruc tion w ere ne cessa ry, we are conv inced that the failure to instr uct o n th is po int w as h arm less. B. De Wyer n ext arg ues th at the D istrict Co urt erred by not ch arging the jury w ith respe ct to he r claim that the Tem ple fa iled to e ngag e in the interac tive pro cess d espite not ice o f he r disa bilitie s. Th is arg um ent fails a s w ell. The evidence showed that Temple engaged in the interact ive proce ss. For example, DeWyer ’s super visors request ed informat ion regarding her l imit ations and alle ged disabi lit

y, and they

consider ed her reque st for accommodation. In the end, when DeWyer present ed Blanton wit h a doctor’ s note conce rning her medical condition s he was allowed to park in t he handicapped parking spot . We note that bri ef disagr eements or misunderstandings do not rise to t he level of a failure t o engage in the interacti ve process, wh ich r equ ires o nly rea son able nes s, no t per fec tion
. We hold that DeWeyer did not off

er7

suffici ent evi dence to r equire t he charge at

issue and that t

he failure to gi ve the charge
wa s, in a ny ev ent, h arm less. C. DeWyer next cont ends that the Dist rict Court err ed in fai ling t o charge the jury on the question of perc eived di sabil ity . Under the ADA, a disa bili ty means: (1) “a phys ical or mentalimpairment

that s ubstant ially l imit s one or more of t he major l ife activities of such indi vidual; ” (2) “a r ecord of havi ng such an impai rment;” or (3) “ being regarded as havin g suc h an im pairm ent.” 4 2 U .S.C. § 121 02(2 ). A p erson is rega rded as disa bled if the pers on: (1) Has a phy sicalor mentalimpairment that doe s not substantially l imit

major li fe acti viti es but i s tre ated by the covered ent ity

as const ituting such l imit ation; (2) H as a p hysical or m ental im pairm ent tha t substa ntially limi ts major

life acti viti es only

as a res ult of t

he att itudes of others toward such i mpairment; or (3) Has [no such impairment] but is treat ed by a c overed entity as ha ving a sub stantially limiting impa irmen t. Tayl or v. Pat

hmark Stores , 177 F.3 d 18 0, 18 7 (3 d C ir. 19 99) (qu otin g 29 C.F .R. § 1630.2(l)). In order for a case to fall under t he “regarded as prong,” an employer must “regard t he employ ee to be suf

fering from an impairment within t he meaning of the stat utes. ” Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc. , 292 F.3d 375, 381 (3d Cir. 2002) (i nternal quo tation m arks o mitted ). It is not en oug h that th e “em ployer be lieved the em ployee to8

be somehow disabled. ” Id. In thi s case, DeWeyer did not offer suffi cient

evidence t o requir e an inst ructi on on this point, and in any event, t he failure to charge was harmless. Among other things , the record s hows that Blanton never noti ced DeWyer having any diffi culty

walking and that Kent was surpri sed at DeWyer ’s reque st for handicapped par

king because he had never not iced anyth ing wr ong wit h he r. A pp. a t 29 4, 55 1. D. DeWyer’s fi nal argument is that the Distri ct Court e rred i n excludi ng evidence of discr iminat ion occurring aft er DeWyer’s suspensi on on April 6, 1998. She cl aims that the evidence i s rel evant t o show Blanton, an African American, harbored r acialprejudi ce against D eW eyer, who is w hite, and that this eviden ce tends to sh ow tha t Temp le’s pro ffe red reas on for h er su spe nsio n w as p retex tual. De termin ations o f relev ancy an d the e xclus ion o f evid ence are ge nerally committed to the broad di scret ion of the Distri ct Court. This case i s no differ ent. Here, we can see no reason why the Dist rict Court’s de termination, that t his evi dence lacke d relevancy, was an abuse of dis creti on. Accordingly, we will not di sturb t he Distr ict Co urt’s de termin ation o n this p oint. IV. We have reviewed allof DeWyer’s arguments, and under the a pplica ble le gal standar ds, we see no gr ound for rever sal. We therefore af firm the judgement or der of theDistric t Cou rt.

De Wy er v. Temple Univers ity , No. 03-1495 Becker, Circuit J

udge , dis senti ng. I agree wit

h the res ult r eached bythe majority on all t he questi ons present ed except wh ether th e acc om mo dation claim shou ld hav e gon e to the jury. In view of the relatively summary nat

ure of our di sposition of thi s appeal, I willsayno more than t hat I r ead the record di fferent ly

from the majority . While t hings may

ultimately

have got st

raight ened out, I think that for qu ite some time T emple a nd M s. Blanton treated Ms . DeW yer very shabbily and t

hat a re asonable j urycould fi nd that during that period of time DeWyer was categ orically den ied the acco mm odatio n of a han dicap ped p arking spac e w hich c ould
eas ily hav e be en m ade ava ilabl e to h er. N or d o I th ink that t he e rror w as h arm less. I woul d va cat e an d r eman d fo r anew t ri al on De Wye r’ s f

ai lure to acc ommod at io n cl ai m.