Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-14-00236-CR

Troy CURTIS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 227th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2009CR0800A

Honorable Philip A. Kazen, Jr., Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: February 11, 2015

AFFIRMED

Troy Curtis was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision after pleading 

guilty to the offense of aggravated robbery. Curtis appeals the trial court’s judgment adjudicating 

his guilt and revoking his community supervision. On appeal, Curtis challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that he violated the conditions of his probation by 

committing the offenses of: (1) criminal trespass; and (2) tampering with evidence. We affirm the 

trial court’s judgment. 
04-14-00236-CR

BACKGROUND

Deputy Pete Gamboa was acting in his off-duty capacity as a security officer for the 

Springhill Apartments when he was notified by the apartment manager that Curtis was on the 

property without permission. Deputy Gamboa approached Curtis and asked Curtis whether he 

knew he was not permitted on the property. Curtis acknowledged that he did not have permission. 

Deputy Gamboa informed Curtis of the criminal trespass signs at the entrance, and then asked if 

Curtis had anything illegal on him that would poke or prick Deputy Gamboa if he conducted a patdown. Curtis stated that “he had bought something” and was willing to show Deputy Gamboa 

where he purchased the drugs. Before Deputy Gamboa had an opportunity to pat-down Curtis, 

Curtis pulled a substance out of his right sock, pushed Deputy Gamboa back, and swallowed the 

substance. After Deputy Gamboa secured Curtis, Deputy Gamboa asked him to open his mouth, 

but Curtis had already swallowed the substance. Based on Deputy Gamboa’s experience and 

training in the identification of narcotics, the substance had the appearance of crack cocaine. 

Deputy Gamboa arrested Curtis for tampering with evidence. 

Based on the arrest, the State filed a motion to enter an adjudication of Curtis’s guilt and 

to revoke his probation. Curtis entered a plea of not true, but the trial court found that Curtis 

violated the conditions of his probation and adjudicated him guilty of aggravated robbery. Based 

on its findings, the trial court revoked Curtis’s probation, and Curtis appeals the judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Appellate review of an order revoking probation is limited to abuse of the trial court’s 

discretion.” Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The burden of proof 

in probation revocation cases is preponderance of the evidence. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 

763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). If the greater weight of credible evidence creates a reasonable belief 

that a defendant has violated a condition of his probation, a trial court’s order revoking the 

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04-14-00236-CR

defendant’s probation is not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 763–64 (citing Scamardo v. State, 517 

S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)). Violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient 

to support revocation. Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). 

When a motion to revoke alleges several violations of probation, the trial court’s order revoking 

probation will be affirmed if the proof on any one of the allegations is sufficient. Moore v. State, 

605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). 

DISCUSSION

In his second point of error, Curtis contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial 

court’s finding that he violated a condition of his probation by tampering with evidence. Curtis 

asserts he was unaware that an investigation was in progress or pending when he swallowed the 

evidence.

A person commits the offense of tampering with evidence if he knows that an investigation 

is pending or in progress, and he alters, destroys or conceals any record, document, or thing with 

the intent to impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 37.09(a)(1) (West Supp. 2014); Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 

In order for Curtis to commit the offense, the evidence destroyed does not need to be evidence 

relating to the investigation in progress as long as the “thing” Curtis destroyed was with the intent 

to impair its availability as evidence. See Williams, 270 S.W.3d at 145. Here, Deputy Gamboa 

had already approached Curtis and was asking him questions about whether he knew he did not 

have permission to be on the property. Deputy Gamboa notified Curtis that he indeed did not have 

permission and specifically made reference to the criminal trespass signs posted at the entrance to 

the property. In response to questioning, Curtis admitted he did not have permission to be on the 

property. This evidence is sufficient to establish that Curtis was aware that Deputy Gamboa was 

in the process of investigating his criminal trespass on the property and to show Curtis swallowed 

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04-14-00236-CR

the substance with the intent to impair its availability as evidence. Accordingly, the evidence 

supports the trial court’s finding that Curtis violated a condition of his probation by tampering with 

evidence, and Curtis’s second point of error is overruled.

In his first point of error, Curtis asserts that there was also insufficient evidence to show 

that he violated his probation by committing criminal trespass. We have held the evidence is 

sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Curtis violated his probation by committing the 

offense of tampering with evidence. See Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871 (holding one probation 

violation is sufficient to support the trial court’s order revoking probation). 

CONCLUSION

Because the greater weight of the evidence created a reasonable belief that Curtis violated 

a condition of his probation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating Curtis’s guilt 

and revoking his probation. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763–64. The trial court’s judgment is 

affirmed. 

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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