Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1601-CT-177 | October 3, 2016 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

David W. Stone IV

Stone Law Office & Legal Research

Anderson, Indiana

Michael W. Phelps

Rom Byron

Nunn Law Office

Bloomington, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Matthew J. Jankowski

Kopka Pinkus Dolin PC

Carmel, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cynthia Brown and

Gregory Brown,

Appellants-Plaintiffs,

v.

The Boeing Company,

Appellee-Defendant

October 3, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A04-1601-CT-177

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Heather Welch, 

Judge

The Honorable Therese Hannah, 

Judge Pro Tempore

Trial Court Cause No.

49D01-1303-CT-8974

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1601-CT-177 | October 3, 2016 Page 2 of 8

[1] Cynthia and Gregory Brown sued The Boeing Company (Boeing) for 

negligence after Cynthia was injured in a car accident caused by a Boeing 

employee. The Browns appeal the jury verdict entered in favor of Boeing, 

raising two arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erroneously excluded 

evidence regarding alleged bias of a Boeing expert witness; and (2) the trial 

court erroneously excluded evidence that Cynthia was no longer able to 

continue working with special needs children. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[2] On April 27, 2012, Cynthia was driving a vehicle in Indianapolis and was 

stopped at a traffic signal. Another vehicle, operated by Eric Haugse, struck the 

rear of Cynthia’s vehicle. Cynthia incurred ongoing pain in her left shoulder, 

left arm, lower back, right leg, and right ankle, as a result of the accident. 

[3] On March 5, 2013, the Browns filed a complaint against Haugse and Boeing, 

seeking to recover damages as a result of the accident. Haugse was a Boeing 

employee, and Boeing eventually stipulated that Haugse was working in the 

course and scope of his employment1 and that Haugse’s negligence caused the 

accident. 

[4] A jury trial on the issue of damages took place from November 17 through 19, 

2015. At some point during the trial, Boeing filed a motion in limine, seeking 

 

1 After Boeing conceded that Haugse was working in the course and scope of his employment, Haugse was 

dismissed from the lawsuit.
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to prohibit the Browns from asking certain questions of Boeing’s expert witness, 

Dr. Alfred Bowles. Boeing also sought to exclude a number of documents that 

the Browns intended to submit into evidence. The trial court granted the 

motion.

[5] Before the trial began, the Browns stipulated that Cynthia’s claim for lost 

income had been withdrawn. At trial, however, the Browns attempted to 

introduce evidence that Cynthia was no longer able to teach special needs 

children as a result of her injuries. Boeing objected to the evidence, arguing 

that it was confusing and irrelevant as her claim for lost income had been 

withdrawn. The Browns argued that it was relevant because it showed the 

emotional loss she sustained by no longer being able to do the work she loved. 

The trial court sustained Boeing’s objection and excluded the evidence. On 

November 19, 2015, the jury awarded Cynthia $25,000 and awarded Gregory 

$0 for his claim of loss of consortium. The Browns now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Both of the arguments raised by the Browns on appeal amount to a contention 

that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence. Decisions to admit or 

exclude evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will 

reverse only where the ruling is against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the court. Flores v. Gutierrez, 951 N.E.2d 632, 637 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2011).
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I. Expert Witness

[7] First, the Browns contend that the trial court erred by excluding testimony and 

documents related to Dr. Bowles. The specific evidence sought to be admitted 

was as follows:

 Dr. Bowles works for a company called BRC and has been on BRC’s 

board of directors for approximately four years. 

 During the years 1990-2005, State Farm insurance companies had paid 

BRC over $10 million and Ford Motor Company had paid BRC over $14 

million for the services of BRC’s expert witnesses.

The trial court permitted evidence to be introduced regarding the identity of Dr. 

Bowles’s employer; the hourly rate paid to Dr. Bowles for his services; and any 

previous payments made to Dr. Bowles by the law firm for Boeing or Boeing’s 

insurance company (Ace American Insurance Company). The trial court 

excluded evidence regarding payments made by other corporations to BRC in 

the past.

[8] The trial court permitted the Browns to make an offer of proof regarding the 

substance of testimony they sought to elicit from Dr. Bowles. 

 First, they asked him about a document relating to payments made by 

State Farm to BRC between 1990 and 1995. He stated he was not 

employed by BRC during those years and had no personal knowledge 

regarding that information. 

 Second, they asked him about a document relating to payments made by 

State Farm to BRC between 1995 and 2000. Dr. Bowles testified that he 

had no personal knowledge of that information because, while he was a 

consultant with BRC during those years, he was not yet on the board of 
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directors, so had no means of knowing whether that information was 

true or not. 

 Third, they asked him about a document relating to payments made by 

Ford Motor Company to BRC between 2000 and 2004. Dr. Bowles 

again testified that he had no personal knowledge of that information 

because, while he was employed by BRC during those years, he was not 

yet on the board of directors, so had no means of knowing whether that 

information was true or not.

During the offer of proof, the Browns were able to elicit certain information that 

they were permitted to introduce during cross-examination—but they elected 

not to do so. Specifically, Dr. Bowles testified that between 1995 and 2013, he 

or BRC had been retained by “insurance companies, corporations and defense 

lawyers” to give opinions “a couple of thousand times at least.” Tr. p. 401. He 

also testified that 75% of his work is done on behalf of defendants, while only 

25% is done on behalf of plaintiffs. Id. at 402.

[9] The Browns argue that the evidence regarding State Farm and Ford Motor 

Company should have been admitted because it “show[s] the bias of Dr. 

Bowles to give favorable defense testimony because of the large sums paid to 

BRC for defense work.” Appellants’ Br. p. 9. We disagree. We find that this 

evidence is wholly irrelevant to the issue of alleged bias on the part of Dr. 

Bowles. Payments made to his employer—not to him or for work he had 

done—over the course of nearly two decades by corporations that have 

absolutely nothing to do with this case, and about which Dr. Bowles had zero 

personal knowledge, in no way suggest that Dr. Bowles is a biased witness. 

The trial court properly permitted questions regarding the work done by Dr. 
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Bowles (as opposed to his employer) in the past, Dr. Bowles’s compensation, 

and the nature of Dr. Bowles’s work. The trial court also permitted questions 

regarding the specific parties and law firms involved in this case. But there was 

no reason to admit the overly broad, irrelevant evidence regarding past, 

unrelated payments by unrelated parties having nothing to do with Dr. Bowles 

or his work. Consequently, we decline to reverse on this basis.2

II. Cynthia’s Inability to Work

[10] Next, the Browns argue that the trial court should not have excluded Cynthia’s 

testimony regarding her inability to continue to teach children with special 

needs as a result of her injuries. As noted above, Cynthia withdrew her claim 

for lost income before the trial began. She argues that this evidence relates to a 

loss of the enjoyment she derived from working with the children rather than 

the lost income.

[11] Indiana Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a trial court may exclude relevant 

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of, 

among other things, confusing the issues or misleading the jury. In this case, 

because Cynthia had withdrawn her claim for lost income, the trial court was 

concerned that this testimony would confuse the jury: “once you put in 

 

2 The Browns complain that the trial court was inconsistent by permitting Boeing to question the Browns’ 

expert witness, Dr. Gregori, regarding the ongoing relationship between the Browns’ attorneys’ law firm and 

Dr. Gregori, pursuant to which Dr. Gregori receives almost $40,000 annually. This evidence, however, 

relates directly to the expert witness, a law firm involved in the case, and compensation received directly by 

the expert witness. As such, it is easily distinguishable from the evidence at issue with respect to Dr. Bowles.
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evidence about her inability to work, then there’s no instruction saying not to 

compensate her for it either. I’ll sustain the objection.” Tr. p. 243. We agree 

with Boeing that the trial court reasonably concluded “that the jury would be 

confused by the prospect that it was being encouraged to award damages for her 

alleged loss of ability to function as a whole person for the loss of those jobs, 

but was forbidden from awarding damages for the alleged loss of income that 

necessarily accompanied the loss of those jobs.” Appellee’s Br. p. 39. While 

we believe this to be a close call, we cannot say that the trial court erred by 

excluding this evidence based on concerns about jury confusion.

[12] Moreover, testimony and argument were presented to the jury highlighting 

Cynthia’s inability to work. Specifically, Cynthia testified that she is a 

substitute teacher and that, following the accident, she was unable to return to 

work full-time. Tr. p. 244. Following a sidebar, the trial court then 

admonished the jury that Cynthia was not making a claim for lost wages. 

Cynthia then testified that “I was talking about before when I used to do special 

care children. I can’t accept that job any longer because I can’t—I can’t run 

after them if they—if something happens. I can’t help lift them.” Id. at 247-48. 

Then, in the final argument to the jury, the Browns’ attorney stated, “What’s 

important is the way it’s affected her. The fact that she doesn’t get the joy of 

working with disabled children.” Id. at 452. While Cynthia did not get to 

testify fully regarding her inability to work and the loss of enjoyment she suffers 

as a result, it is apparent that there was sufficient evidence and argument before 

the jury to permit the jurors to consider the issue anyway. In any event, 
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therefore, even if there had been error in the exclusion of this evidence, it was 

harmless.

[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.