alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Barry Crawford, Respondent, v Walter R. Kelly, as Superintendent of Attica Correctional Facility, et al., Appellants.

Memorandum: In this CPLR article 78 petition to annul a disciplinary determination, the petition failed to allege the two grounds of error argued by petitioner before Special Term and on this appeal: lack of substantial evidence to support the charge and failure of the written misbehavior report to give sufficient notice of the charge to enable petitioner to contest it. It is fundamental that the courts should not consider allegations not raised in the petition *(see, Geneva Gen. Hosp. Nursing Home Co. v Axelrod,*92 AD2d 739, 740). In any event, the form petition used here, which was attested to by petitioner’s attorney but which contained no factual allegations, was insufficient to raise any issues for resolution by Special Term *(see, Matter of Elliott v Kelly,*117 AD2d 1002; *Matter of Dennehy v Coughlin,*116 AD2d 1001). Additionally, we note that, even if a substantial evidence question had been properly raised in the petition, Special Term erred in passing on that issue instead of transferring it to this court (CPLR 7804 [g]). (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Wyoming County, Dadd, J. — art 78.) Present — Callahan, J. P., Denman, Pine, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
EXHIBIT 10.5

    Amendment #1 to Tandy Leather Factory, Inc. 2013 Restricted Stock Plan

    

       

    The Tandy Leather Factory 2013 Restricted Stock Plan (the “Plan”) is hereby amended as follows:

    

       

    	

             	1.	
            Section 5(a) of the Plan shall be amended and restated to read as follows:

          


    

       

    a.            Shares Available. The aggregate number of shares of Common Stock that may be subject to Awards granted under this
        Plan shall be 800,000 shares of Common Stock, which may be authorized and unissued or treasury shares, subject to any adjustments made in accordance with Section 9 below.

    

       

    	

             	2.	
            Section 20 of the Plan shall be amended and restated to read as follows:

          


    

       

    20.             Duration, Amendment and Termination.  No Award shall be granted more than ten years after the Effective Date; provided,
        however, that the terms and conditions applicable to any Award granted prior to such date may thereafter be amended or modified by mutual agreement between the Company and the Participant or such other persons as may then have an interest
        therein.  The Board or the Committee may amend the Plan from time to time or suspend or terminate the Plan at any time.  However, no action authorized by this Section 20 shall reduce the amount of any existing Award or change the terms and
        conditions thereof without the Participant’s consent, except as otherwise provided for in Section 9.  No amendment of the Plan shall, without approval of the shareholders of the Company, (i) increase the total number of shares which may be
        issued under the Plan; (ii) modify the requirements as to eligibility for Awards under the Plan; or (iii) otherwise materially amend the Plan as provided in Nasdaq Marketplace Rules or the rules of another public trading market on which shares of
        Common Stock are then listed or quoted.  Upon approval by the Company’s stockholders of this Plan or any amendment hereof extending the duration of this Plan, all grants of Awards approved by the Company’s Board of Directors prior to the date of
        such stockholder approval shall be deemed ratified by the stockholders.

    

       

    Other than the amendments set forth above, in all other respects the text of the Plan would appear as such document was filed as Annex 1 to the
      Company’s Notice and Proxy Statement for its 2013 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 23, 2013.

     

       

     

       

     

  

   
  105
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17

- 40278 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
VICTOR HUIJON

- LEON , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 5:11

- CR

- 1316

- 1

Before JONES, DENNIS, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Victor Huijon

- Leon has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Huijon

- Leon h a s not filed a respo nse. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED December 20, 2017 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 17-40278 Document: 00514279630 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/20/2017No. 17

- 40278

2 issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the
APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 17-40278 Document: 00514279630 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/20/2017
#### Enver Muriqi, Respondent, v Charmer Industries Inc., Respondent/Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, and P & P Construction and Painting, Appellant/Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.

[947 NYS2d 26]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Alison Y. Tuitt, J.), entered on or about October 24, 2011, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment as to liability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim as against defendant P & P denied P & P’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the section 240 (1) claim against it, and granted defendant/third-party plaintiff Charmer’s cross motion for summary judgment on its claim of common-law indemnification against P & P unanimously modified, on the law, to deny Charmer’s cross motion, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

*536Plaintiff made a prima facie showing of his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that P & P was a statutory agent of the owner or a general contractor liable under Labor Law § 240 (1). Indeed, the record shows that P & P had “plenary authority” over the work at the site, including the work being performed by plaintiff at the time of the accident *(see Naughton v City of New York,*94 AD3d 1, 9-10 [2012]). In opposition, P & P failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The testimony of its principal was riddled with internal contradictions and failures of memory. Indeed, although he and his brother both worked at the site, P & P’s principal could not recall whether P & P hired either another company or day laborers to assist them with the job. Further, while P & P’s principal denied knowing the company that plaintiff claims hired him, P & P offered no explanation as to how plaintiff came to be performing a portion of the work P & P had agreed to perform for Charmer.

Charmer, however, should not have been granted summary judgment on its claim for common-law indemnification against P & P since it made no showing that P & P was actively negligent, or that P & P exercised actual supervision or control over plaintiff’s work *(see McCarthy v Turner Constr., Inc.,*17 NY3d 369, 378 [2011]; *Naughton v City of New York,*94 AD3d 1, 10 [2012]). Concur — Andrias, J.P., Friedman, Sweeny, Manzanet-Daniels and Román, JJ.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22
- 0722 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. BRYAN NEIL ARVIDSON,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including September 18 , 2023 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

August 14 2023

08/14/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0722
# C_2022154DE.01002301.xml

| 8.4.2022 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 154/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.4.2022

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 154/23

---

Berichtigung der Bekanntmachung der Kommission — Leitlinien der Kommission über Einwegkunststoffartikel in Übereinstimmung mit der Richtlinie (EU) 2019/904 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über die Verringerung der Auswirkungen bestimmter Kunststoffprodukte auf die Umwelt

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union C 216 vom 7. Juni 2021
  )

(2022/C 154/09)

Seite 12, Abschnitt 4.1.1, letzter Absatz, Satz 3:

Anstatt:

„Aus Erwägungsgrund 12 geht hervor, dass Behälter, die Lebensmittel in Portionsgrößen für mehr als eine Person enthalten, oder Behälter mit Lebensmitteln in Portionsgrößen für eine Person, bei denen mehr als eine Einheit verkauft wird, zu Zwecken dieser Richtlinie als Einwegkunststoffartikel gelten.“

muss es heißen:

„Aus Erwägungsgrund 12 geht hervor, dass Behälter, die Lebensmittel in Portionsgrößen für mehr als eine Person enthalten, oder Behälter mit Lebensmitteln in Portionsgrößen für eine Person, bei denen mehr als eine Einheit verkauft wird, zu Zwecken dieser Richtlinie nicht als Einwegkunststoffartikel gelten.“

---
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 21, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-20646

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LUIS RODRIGUEZ-TERMINAL,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:04-CR-54-1

--------------------

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Luis Rodriguez-Terminal (Rodriguez) appeals his guilty-plea

conviction and sentence for illegal reentry following

deportation. Rodriguez argues that the sentencing provisions of

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (2) are unconstitutional in light of

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Rodriguez correctly

acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres

v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), but he seeks to preserve

the issue for Supreme Court review. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
No. 04-20646

-2-

489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir.

2000). 

Rodriguez also contends that the district court erred in

imposing a sentence pursuant to a belief that the Sentencing

Guidelines were mandatory, in violation of United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764-65 (2005). In the district court,

Rodriguez argued that his sentence was improperly enhanced on the

basis of his prior conviction for a crime of violence, in

contravention of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct.

2531 (2004). This court need not decide whether this objection

preserved a mandatory-sentencing-guideline argument for appeal,

as his claims would succeed even under plain error review.

Under a plain-error standard, the defendant bears the burden

of “establish[ing] that the error affected the outcome of the

district court proceedings.” United States v.

Valenzuela-Quevedo, 407 F.3d 728, 732-33 (5th Cir. 2005)(internal

quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

267 (2005); see also United States v. Cruz, 418 F.3d 481, 485

(5th Cir. 2005). In the instant case, the district court opined

that in the absence of the Sentencing Guidelines, it would have

imposed a lesser sentence than that called for under the

Guidelines. Rodriguez has shown that this error had a

substantial effect on his sentence. As a result, Rodriguez’s

sentence is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further

proceedings. See Cruz, 418 F.3d at 485.
In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

_________________

NO. 09-15-00262-CV

_________________

IN RE DAVID ELLIOTT

________________________________________________________________________

Original Proceeding

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

David Elliott petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the 356th 

District Court of Hardin County, Texas, to vacate the temporary orders signed on 

June 25, 2015, in a recently-commenced divorce case. See generally Tex. Gov’t 

Code Ann. § 22.221 (West 2004); see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. Elliott asks this 

Court to compel the trial court to sign temporary orders that provide for a standard 

possession order that includes summer visitation and additional “makeup 

visitation” in Virginia where he resides. Elliott filed a motion requesting that this 

Court award him a six-week visitation period in Virginia and additional visitation 

for missed Spring visitation previously agreed to by the parties, as temporary relief 
pending the determination of the merits of his mandamus petition. See generally 

Tex. R. App. P. 52.10(a).

Elliott contends there is insufficient evidence in the record of the hearing on 

temporary orders to rebut the presumption that a standard possession order should 

be entered. See generally Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 105.001(g); 153.252 (West 

2014). After considering the mandamus petition and the response filed by the real 

party in interest, the temporary nature of the orders at issue, and the records 

submitted by the parties for review by this Court (which does not include 

everything the trial court considered in reaching the decision regarding the 

temporary orders at issue), we conclude that the relator has not established that the 

trial court clearly abused its discretion. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.253 (West 

2014). Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus and the motion for 

temporary relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

PETITION DENIED. 

PER CURIAM

Submitted on July 15, 2015

Opinion Delivered July 24, 2015

Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
#### Jack D. MORRIS, Claimant-Appellant, v. R. James NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 2007-7040.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

June 28, 2007.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of Jack D. Morris’s motion to voluntarily dismiss his appeal,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The motion is granted.

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6705

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

RONNIE BUMPUS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, District

Judge. (CR-91-148, CA-94-500)

Submitted: December 19, 1996 Decided: December 31, 1996

Before ERVIN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit

Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronnie Bumpus, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Lee Keller, John Castle

Parr, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying his

motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate

judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss on the reasoning of the district

court. United States v. Bumpus, Nos. CR-91-148; CA-94-500 (S.D.W.

Va. Apr. 17, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

 

The Board of Directors 

    Dover Motorsports, Inc.: 

 

We consent to theincorporation by reference in the registration statement (No. 333-58779) on Form S-8 of Dover Motorsports, Inc. of our reports dated March 8, 2005, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Dover Motorsports, Inc. and subsidiaries as ofDecember 31, 2004 and 2003, and the related consolidated statements of earnings and comprehensive earnings and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2004, management’s assessment of the effectiveness ofinternal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2004 and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2004, which reports appear in the December 31, 2004 annual report on Form 10-K of DoverMotorsports, Inc. 

 

Our report with respect to the consolidated financialstatements refers to the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142, “Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets” as of January 1, 2002. 

 

KPMG LLP 

 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

March 8, 2005
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the *

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10TH CIR. R. 36.3.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined **

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(A)(2); 10TH CIR. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

F I LED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 22, 2006

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

KURT C. BALLENGER,

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 05-4315

v. (D. Utah)

VIRGINIA BALLARD and JOE

JOHNSON,

Defendants-Appellees.

 (D.C. No. 2:05-cv-00696-TS)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

*

Before HENRY, BRISCOE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.**

Kurt C. Ballenger, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte

dismissal of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) for failure to state claim upon which relief may be granted. Mr.

Ballenger has moved to proceed in forma pauperis. We grant his motion to
-2-

proceed in forma pauperis. However, upon de novo review and construing his

allegations liberally, see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991), 

we conclude for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court’s

order that Mr. Ballenger has failed to state a claim and that it would be futile to

allow him to amend his complaint. See Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corr., 165

F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999).

In his complaint, Mr. Ballenger alleges that he was unfairly treated and

eventually discharged by Little Caesar Enterprises, his former employer. The

district court construed his complaint as alleging discrimination under the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. However, as

the district court noted, the only defendants named in Mr. Ballenger’s complaint,

Virginia Ballard and Joe Johnson, are two individuals who allegedly worked as his

supervisors. “The ADA precludes personal capacity suits against individuals who

do not otherwise qualify as employers under the statutory definition.” Butler v.

City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999). 

Moreover, Mr. Ballenger “does not allege that the reason for his discharge

was the result of anything but the lack of his having a required permit and failing

to communicate with his employer while he was off work for not having the

permit.” Dist. Ct..Order, at 5-6. Thus, even if he had named his former employer

as a defendant, these allegations do not raise an inference that he was discharged
-3-

or suffered any other adverse personnel action because of a disability covered by

the ADA.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Ballenger’s

complaint.

Entered for the Court,

Robert H. Henry

United States Circuit Judge
#### VSL Corporation v Dunes Hotels and Casinos.

Motion (1) denied wherein it seeks reargument, and (2) granted wherein it seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, as indicated; and cross motion for, *inter alia,*dismissal of complaint denied. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Kassal, Rosenberger, Ellerin and Smith, JJ.
Exhibit 99.2

                              CERTIFICATION OF THE
                           CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF
                       ATLANTIC TECHNOLOGY VENTURES, INC.

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Atlantic Technology Ventures, Inc. on
Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Nicholas J. Rossettos,
Chief Financial Officer of Atlantic, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

(1)       the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)       the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of Atlantic.


                                         /s/ Nicholas J. Rossettos
                                         -----------------------------------
                                         Nicholas J. Rossettos
                                         Chief Financial Officer
                                         August 14, 2002
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 238 

To amend title 17, United States Code, with respect to the definition of 

‘‘widow’’ and ‘‘widower’’, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 9, 2015 

Mr. KILMER (for himself, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. POLIS, Mr. HANNA, Mr. 

SWALWELL of California, Ms. DELBENE, Mr. CONNOLLY, Mr. VARGAS, 

Mr. MURPHY of Florida, Ms. TITUS, Mr. LOWENTHAL, Mr. CICILLINE, 

Mr. MCDERMOTT, Ms. BROWNLEY of California, Mr. YARMUTH, Ms. 

MENG, Mr. HIMES, and Ms. WILSON of Florida) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 17, United States Code, with respect to 

the definition of ‘‘widow’’ and ‘‘widower’’, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Copyright and Mar5 riage Equality Act’’. 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 238 IH

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF WIDOW AND WIDOWER IN TITLE 17, 

2 UNITED STATES CODE. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 101 of title 17, United 

4 States Code, is amended by striking the definition of 

5 ‘‘ ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ ’’ and inserting the following: 

6 ‘‘An individual is the ‘widow’ or ‘widower’ of an 

7 author if the courts of the State in which the indi8 vidual and the author were married (or, if the indi9 vidual and the author were not married in any State 

10 but were validly married in another jurisdiction, the 

11 courts of any State) would find that the individual 

12 and the author were validly married at the time of 

13 the author’s death, whether or not the spouse has 

14 later remarried.’’. 

15 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

16 subsection (a) shall apply with respect to the death of any 

17 author that occurs on or after the date of the enactment 

18 of this Act. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS