Opinion filed December 30 , 2016



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

____________ No. 11

- 15

- 00312

- CV

____________ IN THE INTEREST OF L.T.M., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 266 th District Court

Erath County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CV33419

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
K .M. , the mother of L.T. M

. , appeals from an order in which the tria l court
determined that L.T.M. could change his last name

. 1 K.M. asserts that the trial court
abused its discretion when it granted the petition of K.S., L.T.M.’s father, to change
their son’s last name because the trial court violated multiple constitutional rights
and had no basis for its order. We affirm.

1 This case is one of two appeals before this court that concern L.T.M.; the other case is our C ause No. 11

- 15

- 00311

- CV, which is an appeal of a child custody dispute.2 I. Evidence at Hearing
L.T.M.’ s father petitioned to change his son’s last name ( surname )

. L.T.M. wanted to change his last name and signed a consent form, which was attached to the petition

. L.T. M. ’s mother received the petition and answered p ro s e. Later, the
trial court held a final hearing on the name change ; K.S. and his attorney appeared
, but L.T .M.’s mother only appeared through her attorney of record. T he trial court conferred privately with L.T.M. about his wish to change his last name. K.S. also presented e vidence about L.T.M.’s reasons and desire to change his name and about why K.S. filed the petition. K.M.’s counsel cross

- examined K.S. but offered no other live testimony in opposition to the petition

. At the end of the hearing, the trial
court found that K.S. had shown good cause for L.T.M.’s name change and that such

a change was in L.T.M.’s best interest.
II. Standard of Review A trial court abuses its discretion if it rules in an arbitrary or unreasonable
manner or if it rules without reference to any guiding rules or legal principles. Iliff v. Iliff , 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W.2d 238, 241

–

42 (Tex. 1985). A trial court’s decision to change the name of a minor is guided by the child’s best interest. T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 45.004(a) (1) ( West 2014 ); In re Guthrie , 45 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2001, pet. denied) ; see also In re D.A. , 307 S.W.3d 556, 564 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2010, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it changes a child’s name without sufficient evidence that the name change would be in the child’s best interest. See In re H.S.B. , 401 S.W.3d 77, 88 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) ( holding that
trial court abused its discretion when it changed child’s name without evidence of the current name’s detriment or evidence of the proposed name’s benefit to the child).3 III. Analysis Although K.M. does not specifically identify the issues presented in her brief, we discern two issues from the arguments in her brief. K.M. asserts in her first issue
that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that her son could change
his last name

. K.M. claims in her second issue that the trial court violated mult iple constitutional rights when it ordered the name change. We will address K.M.’s
constitutional issues first
, followed by her abuse

- of

- discretion complaint

. A. K.M. waived her c onstitutional c omplaints because she failed to raise them with the trial court ; she also inadequately briefed those complaints

. On appeal, K .M. asserts constitutional claims concerning the state of L.T.M.’s custody dispute and requests both declaratory judgments and injunctions in her
favor

. However , K.M. never objected or raised t hese issues before the trial court, so
she has failed to preserve them for our review. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 33.1(a)(1); see also Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Sherry , 46 S.W.3d 857, 86 1 (Tex. 2001) ( holding that the appellant waived his constitutional challenge in a paternity case because he failed to raise those constitutional issues during trial ); Dreyer v. Greene , 871 S.W.2d 697 , 698 (Tex. 1993) (“ A s a rule, a claim, including a constitutional claim, must have been asserted in the tri al court in order to be raised on appeal .” ). Additionally
, K.M. provides no applicable case law or argument to
substantiate her constitutional claims

. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.1; s ee Republic
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Mex

- Tex, Inc. , 150 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Tex. 20 04) ( recognizing that Rule 38.1 requires appropriate citations) ; S an Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford , 171 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) ( holding that parties asserting error on appeal must put forth specific argument and
anal ysis showing the record and the law supports their contentions)

. K.M. ’s status as a pro se litigant does not relieve her of her duty to properly brief her claims for4

appellate review. See Wheeler v. Green , 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn
, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184

– 85 (Tex. 1978) ) ; Pando v. Quinonez , No. 11

- 13

- 00143

- CV, 2014 WL 3360141, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Eastland July 3, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.)

. Because of her failure to raise her constitutional
issues at the trial c ourt level and her inadequate briefing, K.M. has waived those
constitutional claims.
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered a name change for L.T.M.
W hen K.S. petitioned the trial court to change L.T.M.’s last name, K.S. had

to establish that the change was in the child’s best interest. See F AM

. § 45.004(a)(1)

. O ur sister courts have reviewed several facto rs to determine when th e child’s best
interest warrant s a name change

. In re H.S.B. , 401 S.W.3d at 84 ; Scoggins v.
Treviño , 200 S.W.3d 832, 837 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.); In re
M.C.F. , 121 S.W.3d 891, 897

– 98 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); In re
Guthrie , 45 S.W.3d at 725

. In three case s , In re Guthrie
, Scoggins , and In re H.S.B. , the court s outlined several factors that should be considered . A s applicable to the present case, those factors include : 1. H ow long had L.T.M. used his present surname and how did he identify with that surname ?

2. H ow old is L.T.M. and what did he want his surname to be ?

3. W ould L.T.M.’s proposed name change adversely affect the bond between him and his parents ?

4. W ould L.T.M.’s proposed name change help him identify with his family or would it adversely affect the bond between him and his family ?

5. W as K.S. motivated to change L. T.M

. ’s name to alienate L.T.M. from his mother ?5

6. W ould L.T.M.’s proposed name change avoid embarrassment, inconvenience, or confusion for him or his father ?

7. W ould the proposed name change increase or decrease the respect L.T.M. received in the community where he lived ?

8. W ould the proposed name change be easier or more convenient for L.T.M

. ’s father, who has custody of L.T.M. ?

9. W as there a delay in a request for the name change ?

See In re Guthrie
, 45 S.W.3d at 725

– 26 ; see also In re H.S.B

. , 401 S.W.3d at 84; Scoggins , 200 S.W.3d at 837

. With the number of factors outlined
, any review of the trial court’s ruling on the best interest of the child for a surname change is necessarily fact

- specific. In re Guthrie
, 45 S.W.3d at 725

– 26

. A court may order a change to a child’s name when the substantial welfare of the child requires the change. In re M.C.F. , 121 S.W.3d at 897

. K.S. did not present e vidence on every factor in L.T.M.’s case but
, instead,
focused on L.T.M.’s prefe rences , on how K.M.’s misconduct affected L.T.M. , and
on the fact that K.S. was not motivated by ill will toward L.T.M.’s mother

. L.T.M. , who at the time of trial was a fourteen

- year

- old boy, had used his mother’s surname for most of his life
, but he no longer identifie d with that sur name

. L.T.M. wa nted to change his name because of his mother’s publicized accusations that K.S. physically and sexually abus e d L.T.M

. L.T.M. was embarrassed by his mother’s
unsubstantiated accusations and did not want to be associated with her. L.T.M. also
wanted to have the same last name of his half sibling with whom he lived

— a clear indication of the desire for a stronger bond between stepbrothers and the family. Consequently, L.T.M. has gone by his father’s surname whenever possible. K.S.
testified that his desire for L.T.M. to change his las t name was not motivated by self

interest, and the record does not reflect any evidence to the contrary. Given these6

facts
, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted K.S.’s petition
because the evidence showed that change was in L.T.M.’s best interest. We overrule
K.M. ’s first and second issues on appeal

. IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.

MIKE WILLSON
JUSTICE

December 30 , 2016 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson, J., and Bailey, J.