Filed 4/14/23 P. v. Banuelos CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JONATHAN BANUELOS,

Defendant and Appellant.

D079842

 (Super. Ct. No. JCF004767)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, 

Christopher J. Plourd, Judge. Affirmed; remanded with directions.

Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Erica A. 

Swenson and Teresa Torreblanca, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent. 
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The People charged Jonathan Banuelos with inflicting corporal injury 

on a girlfriend (Pen. Code,1 § 273.5, subd. (a); count 1), false imprisonment by 

violence (§ 236; count 2), and misdemeanor interference with a wireless 

communication device (§ 591.5; count 3). He pleaded no contest to infliction 

of corporal injury on a girlfriend and, in exchange, the People dismissed the 

remaining charges. 

The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Banuelos on

three years of formal probation on several terms and conditions, including 

that he be subject to warrantless searches, and that he “[n]ot own, possess, or 

purchase any firearms, ammunition and/or any other dangerous weapons.” It 

also ordered him to pay various fees and fines, including that he reimburse 

presentence investigation and probation supervision costs under section 

1203.1b, subdivision (e).

Banuelos contends: (1) the warrantless search condition must be 

stricken as invalid; and (2) under Assembly Bill No. 1869, the court’s order 

that he reimburse costs under section 1203.1b, subdivision (e) must be 

vacated. The People correctly concede the second argument has merit;

accordingly, we will affirm the judgment, but remand with instructions set 

forth below.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

In June 2021, Banuelos and his girlfriend got into an argument over a 

video that someone sent to Banuelos’s cell phone. When Banuelos became 

upset, his girlfriend asked him to take her home. Banuelos then pushed her 

in the chest, causing her to fall into a chair and hurt her toe. Banuelos was 

going to drive her home, but she refused to get in his truck. Banuelos

followed her in his truck, and she threw a rock at his vehicle. Banuelos

exited the truck, dragged her by the neck, squeezing it, and slapped her face

three to four times while trying to put her in his truck. Eventually, she 

managed to get out of the vehicle and started running; however, Banuelos 

caught up to her, grabbed her by the hair, said he was taking her back to his 

house instead, and pushed her back into the vehicle. When she refused to sit 

in the passenger seat, Banuelos again pulled her hair, pushed her face into 

the seat and hit her three or four times in the thigh. Banuelos drove away 

while she continued to tell him that she wanted to go home. He then took her 

cell phone to prevent her from calling the police. He later threw the phone at 

her, and drove her home. When she got home she called police. A police 

officer arrived at her house and observed that she “appeared to have watery 

eyes, and a scratch on the right side of her cheek.” She told the officer that 

when Banuelos grabbed her by the neck, she felt like she needed air. 

Banuelos was 20 years old at the time of the incident. 

The probation officer, evaluating the possible circumstances in 

aggravation under California Rules of court, rule 4.421 (a)(1), stated: “The 

2 At the change of plea hearing, the court accepted the parties’ 

stipulation that the factual basis for Banuelos’s plea was contained in the 

Imperial County Sheriff’s Office report. We rely on that report for our 

statement of facts.
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crime involved great violence/great bodily harm/threat of great bodily

harm/other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or 

callousness.” The reporting officer added: “It is always in the best interest of 

the community that this sentence aid not only in the rehabilitation of the 

defendant, but also in the prevention of any further criminal activity. It is

imperative that the defendant learns to manage his anger, control his 

behavior and understand the severity of his offense.” The probation officer

recommended Banuelos take a 52-week anger management course, and that 

the court impose the standard warrantless search probation condition limited 

to Banuelos’s person and property, as well as a condition that Banuelos not 

own or possess any firearms, ammunition, or dangerous weapons.

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel objected to the search 

condition, arguing that no basis existed for it as Banuelos did not have or use 

any weapon during the offense. 

The prosecutor argued the domestic violence condition carried a noweapons clause; therefore, the warrantless search condition was necessary to 

ensure compliance with a no-weapons condition. 

The court sentenced Banuelos based on the probation officer’s report.

and ruled “it would be very productive and necessary for the probation officer 

to be able to monitor the defendant’s possession of weapons and, therefore, a 

Fourth [waiver is] appropriate.”

DISCUSSION

I. Warrantless Search Condition

Banuelos contends the search condition requiring him to submit to 

warrantless searches of his person and property is not reasonably related to 

preventing future criminality under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 

(Lent) and In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.). 
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Trial courts have broad discretion to impose reasonable conditions of 

probation that foster rehabilitation and protect the community.

(§ 1203.1 subds. (a) and (i); People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) 

“[A] reviewing court will disturb the trial court’s decision to impose a 

particular condition of probation only if, under all the circumstances, that 

choice is arbitrary and capricious and is wholly unreasonable.” (People v. 

Bryant (2021) 11 Cal.5th 976, 984.)

In order to invalidate a probation condition under Lent, the defendant 

must make three showings: 1) the condition has no relationship to the crime; 

2) the condition is related to conduct that is not itself criminal; and 3) the 

condition is not reasonably related to his or her future criminality. (Lent, 

supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) In Ricardo P., the California Supreme Court 

explained that the test of reasonableness involves a balancing of factors. 

“Lent’s third prong requires more than just an abstract or hypothetical 

relationship between the probation condition and preventing future

criminality.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1121.) Specifically, a 

probation condition cannot be justified solely on the basis that it enhances 

the effective supervision of the probationer without regard for the burden 

it places on the probationer. (Id. at pp. 1122, 1125.) Rather, the 

“requirement that a probation condition must be ‘ “reasonably related to 

future criminality” ’ contemplates a degree of proportionality” between the 

burden imposed by the condition and the legitimate interests it serves. (Id. 

at p. 1122.) 

It may be appropriate to impose a probation condition that, although 

not directly connected to the crime for which probation is granted, is related 

to the probationer’s personal and criminal history. In Ricardo P., the 

Supreme Court reasoned “that ‘conditions of probation aimed at 
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rehabilitating the offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise 

crime’ [citation] so long as they are ‘reasonably directed at curbing [the 

defendant’s] future criminality.’ ” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122.) 

Indeed, the court noted that “ ‘courts may properly base probation conditions 

upon information in a probation report that raises concerns about future 

criminality unrelated to a prior offense.’ ” (Ibid.) This court has stated, 

“probation conditions authorizing searches of a probationer’s person, 

property, and vehicle are ‘routinely imposed.’ ” (In re I.V. (2017) 11 

Cal.App.5th 249, 261.) 

A. Analysis

In imposing the warrantless search condition, the trial court made an 

individualized determination based on the facts of this case. The probation

officer was sufficiently concerned about the seriousness of this crime and the 

rapidity with which Banuelos’s attack on his girlfriend escalated, to 

recommend a year of anger management classes, the warrantless search 

condition, and condition that he “[n]ot own, possess, or purchase any 

firearms, ammunition and/or any other dangerous weapons.” The 

warrantless search condition is reasonably related to Banuelos’s future 

criminality as it ensures compliance with the uncontested prohibitions on his 

gun ownership. The burden on Banuelos is slight. “ ‘The level of intrusion is 

de minimis and the expectation of privacy greatly reduced when the subject 

of the search is on notice that his activities are being routinely and closely 

monitored. Moreover, the purpose of the search condition is to deter the 

commission of crimes and to protect the public, and the effectiveness of the 

deterrent is enhanced by the potential for random searches.’ ” (People v. 

Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 506.)
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Banuelos is adequately protected in the enforcement of the search 

condition by the Fourth Amendment, which requires that warrantless 

searches carried out pursuant to involuntary search conditions not be 

arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. (People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 

752 [a search carried out pursuant to a parole or probation search condition 

“is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as it is 

not arbitrary, capricious or harassing”].) Further, “[w]arrantless searches 

are justified in the probation context because they aid in deterring further 

offenses by the probationer.” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795.)

II. Imposition of Reimbursement Costs

We accept the People’s concession that the court erred by imposing the 

reimbursement order under section 1203.1b. The ameliorative changes of 

Assembly Bill No. 1869 apply retroactively to make any unpaid portion of the 

identified assessments, as they existed on June 30, 2021, unenforceable and 

uncollectible as of July 1, 2021. (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, §§ 11, 62.) The plain 

language of Government Code section 6111 and Penal Code section 1465.9, 

subdivision (a) mandates we vacate a portion of the judgment for the purpose 

of striking the now-unauthorized costs here, the unpaid balance of the 

probation supervision and criminal justice administration costs. (People v. 

Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 626.)
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed and the matter remanded to the superior 

court, which is directed to correct the December 29, 2021 minute order to 

reflect that Banuelos is not required to reimburse costs pursuant to section 

1203.1b, subdivision (e).

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.