NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Appellee,

v.

ROY DEAN MEDLIN, 

Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 21-0506 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR202001140

The Honorable Billy K. Sipe, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Alice Jones

Counsel for Appellee

Harris & Winger, PC, Flagstaff

By Chad Joshua Winger

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 10-18-2022
STATE v. MEDLIN

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Roy Medlin appeals his felony conviction and sentence for 

second degree murder. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Medlin rented an extra bedroom in his Mohave County home 

to the victim and the victim’s wife. The victim’s stepson lived in a trailer in 

Medlin’s backyard. In October 2020, after a dispute over unpaid rent, 

Medlin shot and killed the victim. Medlin was indicted for second-degree 

murder, a class 1 felony. 

¶3 When discussing jury instructions on the first day of trial, the 

superior court asked whether the parties wanted to include a manslaughter 

jury instruction as a lesser-included offense. The prosecutor did not request 

a manslaughter instruction, and defense counsel answered that he was “not 

going to ask for” a manslaughter instruction. At that point, the court said, 

“Okay. So I don’t have to worry about that.”

¶4 After a five-day trial, the jury found Medlin guilty of seconddegree murder. The superior court sentenced Medlin to the minimum,

mitigated sentence of ten years. Medlin timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, 

and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶5 Medlin contends the superior court should have instructed 

the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, even though his 

attorney declined that instruction. He asks us to review for fundamental 

error. The State counters that any error was invited error because Medlin’s 

counsel declined the court’s offer to include a manslaughter jury 

instruction.
STATE v. MEDLIN

Decision of the Court

3

¶6 We review the superior court’s decision not to provide a jury 

instruction for an abuse of discretion. State v. Solis, 236 Ariz. 285, 286, ¶ 6 

(App. 2014). The court may issue a jury instruction “on any theory 

reasonably supported by the evidence.” State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 61, 

¶ 16 (1998). 

¶7 The superior court did not abuse its discretion. See Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (“[Counsel’s] strategic choices made 

after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options 

are virtually unchallengeable.”). As the Arizona Supreme Court stated: 

“When both parties object to a lesser included offense instruction, the trial 

court should be loath to give it absent compelling circumstances to the 

contrary.” State v. Gipson, 229 Ariz. 484, 487, ¶ 17 (2012). That decision is 

“best resolved . . . by permitting counsel to decide on tactics.” Id. at 487, ¶ 

15.

¶8 Even so, Medlin argues we should review for fundamental 

error. At most, however, any error was invited by Medlin’s defense 

attorney and Medlin cannot “profit[] from the error on appeal.” See State v.

Lucero, 223 Ariz. 129, 134, 135, ¶¶ 12, 17 (App. 2009); see also State v. Fish, 222 

Ariz. 109, 132, ¶ 79 (App. 2009). “A defendant is ordinarily bound by his 

or her counsel’s actions concerning the conduct of a trial,” including 

whether to “pursue particular arguments at trial.” State v. Emedi, 251 Ariz. 

78, 82-83, ¶¶ 16, 18 (App. 2021).

¶9 Lastly, Medlin contends the superior court should have 

treated his attorney’s strategic decision like a plea agreement, and asked

Medlin whether he “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” concurred 

with the decision to refuse a manslaughter instruction. We disagree. 

Medlin offers no authority for his argument, see ARCAP 13(a)(7), and 

defense counsel’s strategic decisions are not subject to the requirements of 

plea agreements.

CONCLUSION

¶10 We affirm Medlin’s conviction and sentence.