J-S33014-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

E. R. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3391 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 4, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-64-CR-0000369-2016

BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2018

E.R.1 appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his jurytrial conviction for crimes committed against his adopted daughter, K.R. E.R. 

claims insufficient evidence supported the verdict because the Commonwealth 

failed to establish a date on which the alleged crimes occurred and that the 

reasonable doubt jury instruction was erroneous. We affirm the judgment of 

sentence, but vacate the order finding E.R. to be a sexually violent predator 

(“SVP”) and remand for the trial court to give E.R. notice of his correct 

reporting requirements.

K.R. testified that when she was 12 and 13 years old, E.R. improperly 

touched her, including touching her breasts, kissing her body, and putting his 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We redacted the defendant’s name to help protect the privacy of K.R., the 

minor victim. 
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fingers and tongue inside her vagina. K.R. testified that E.R. began touching 

her breasts and underwear, and that in “[r]oughly May of 2015” the touching 

progressed and he began to put his fingers inside her vagina. N.T. 5/11/17, 

at 35. She knew it was May 2015 because she was hospitalized at the end of 

May because she was suicidal. Id. at 35-36. She stated that a week after she 

returned from the hospital, the abuse started again. Id. at 36. When asked 

how often the abuse occurred she said “[s]ome weeks it would be every night, 

other weeks it’d be one or two nights a week. It varied on the week.” Id. at 

39. She was unable to provide an estimate of the number of times E.R. 

inappropriately touched her, but agreed that it was more than 20 times when 

she was 12 and more than 20 times when she was 13. Id. at 40-41. She 

further agreed it happened more than 100 times. Id. at 43. The abuse stopped 

when she disclosed the acts to her mother in August 2016. Id.

K.R.’s mother testified and confirmed various aspects of K.R.’s 

testimony. Trooper John Strelish also testified regarding his interview of E.R. 

Further, Ann Cook, a certified social worker who specializes in sexual trauma 

of children, testified as to children’s reactions to abuse, including why there 

often is a delay in disclosing the abuse.

The trial court issued the following reasonable doubt instruction to the 

jury:

It is not the defendant’s burden to prove that he is not 

guilty. Instead, it is the Commonwealth that always has the 

burden of proving each and every element of the crime 

charged and that the defendant is guilty of that crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The person accused of a crime 
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is not required to present evidence or prove anything in his 

or her own defense. If the Commonwealth’s evidence fails 

to meet its burden, then your verdict must be not guilty. On 

the other hand, if the Commonwealth’s evidence does prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, then 

your verdict should be guilty. 

Although the Commonwealth has the burden of proving 

that the defendant is guilty, this does not mean that the 

Commonwealth must prove its case beyond all doubt and to 

a mathematical certainty, nor must it demonstrate the 

complete impossibility of innocence. A reasonable doubt is 

a doubt that would cause a reasonably careful, sensible 

person to pause, hesitate and restrain[] himself or herself 

before acting upon a matter of importance in his or her own 

affairs.

A doubt to be reasonable must be one which fairly strikes 

a conscientious mind and clouds the judgment. It is not such 

a doubt as one might dig up, conjure up or summon up out 

of nowhere for the purpose[] . . . of escaping or avoiding 

the consequences of an unpleasant or unwanted verdict; but 

it is a doubt which is reasonable and honest, a real doubt 

arising out of the evidence that was presented with respect 

to some element of the crime. 

Further, a reasonable doubt is something different and 

much more, much more serious than a possible doubt. 

During the course of acquisition of worldly knowledge in our 

day-to-day living, all of us can safely and logically conclude

that a possible doubt exists in all things, and that it is almost 

impossible to possess any human knowledge or come to any 

conclusion to a certainty beyond a possible doubt. 

Therefore, the Commonwealth is not required to prove its 

case beyond all doubt.

So, to summarize, you may not find the defendant guilty 

based on a mere suspicion of guilt. The Commonwealth has 

the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. If it meets that burden, then the 

defendant is no longer presumed innocent and you should 

find him guilty. On the other hand, if the Commonwealth 

does not meet its burden, then you must find him not guilty.

N.T., 5/11/17, at 202-203.
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A jury convicted E.R. of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”)

with a child; two counts of IDSI of a complainant less than 16 years of age;

and one count each of aggravated indecent assault of a complainant less than 

13 years of age, aggravated indecent assault of a complainant less than 16 

years of age, indecent assault of a complainant less than 13 years of age, and 

indecent assault of a complainant less than 16 years of age.2

On August 3, 2017, the trial court found E.R. to be an SVP. N.T., 8/3/17, 

at 21; Order, filed Aug. 23, 2017.3 That same day, it sentenced E.R. to an 

aggregate sentence of 144 to 360 months’ incarceration. E.R. filed a postsentence motion, which the trial court denied. He then filed a timely Notice of 

Appeal.

E.R. raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Whether[] the jury verdict in this matter was against the 

sufficiency of the evidence because the Commonwealth 

failed to establish the date of the offense with any 

reasonable certainty?

2. Whether[] the lower court created a lower burden of proof 

required by the constitution when it gave an improper jury 

instruction regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt[?]

E.R.’s Br. at 7.4

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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b), 3123(a)(7), 3125(a)(7), 3125(a)(8), 3126(a)(7), 

and 3126(a)(8), respectively.

3 The order finding E.R. to be an SVP was dated August 3, 2017, but docketed 

on August 27, 2017.

4 Although E.R. preserved his claim that the verdict was against the weight of 

the evidence, and presented the argument to the trial court, he abandoned 

that claim in our Court. 
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E.R. first maintains the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient 

evidence to support the verdict because it failed to establish the date of the 

offenses. He alleges that, although K.R. maintained she was abused over the 

course of a number of years, she was unable to name a specific date for any 

of the abuse. 

E.R. relies on Commonwealth v. Devlin, which held that due process 

requires the Commonwealth to fix the date of the commission of the offense 

with reasonable certainty. 333 A.2d 888, 890 (Pa. 1975). There, the 

Commonwealth charged the defendant with one count of sodomy of an 

intellectually disabled individual, where the assault could have occurred at any

time during a fourteen-month period. Id. at 892. The Supreme Court 

concluded this broad time frame violated the defendant’s due process rights 

because it substantially denied him an opportunity to present an alibi defense 

and to attack the victim’s credibility. Id. at 891. The Court, however, noted 

that:

[t]he pattern of due process is picked out in the facts and 

circumstances of each case. Due process is not reducible to 

a mathematical formula. Therefore, we cannot enunciate 

the exact degree of specificity in the proof of the date of a 

crime which will be required or the amount of latitude which 

will be acceptable. Certainly the Commonwealth need not 

always prove a single specific date of the crime. Any leeway 

permissible would vary with the nature of the crime and the 

age and condition of the victim, balanced against the rights 

of the accused.

Id. at 892 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Following Devlin, this 

Court has held that “the Commonwealth must be allowed a reasonable 
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measure of flexibility when faced with the special difficulties involved in 

ascertaining the date of an assault upon a young child.” Commonwealth v. 

Groff, 548 A.2d 1237, 1241 (Pa.Super. 1988); Commonwealth v. Luktisch, 

680 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa.Super. 1996). Further, the Commonwealth “must be 

afforded broad latitude when attempting to fix the date of offenses which 

involve a continuous course of criminal conduct.” Groff, 548 A.2d at 1242; 

Commonwealth v. Benner, 147 A.3d 915, 921 (Pa.Super. 2016). We have

held that “the due process concerns of Devlin are satisfied where the victim 

. . . can at least fix the times when an ongoing course of [abuse] commenced 

and when it ceased.” Commonwealth v. G.D.M, Sr., 926 A.2d 984, 990 

(Pa.Super. 2007); Benner, 147 A.3d at 921.

Here, K.R., a child victim, alleged a continuous course of conduct, where 

E.R. abused her several times a week for over a year. She further pinpointed 

the start of the incidents of digital penetration to May 2015, the same month 

in which she was admitted to the hospital, and the end of the abuse to August 

2016, when she told her mother. Here, the Commonwealth presented 

sufficient evidence to support the verdict. See G.D.M., Jr., 926 A.2d at 990 

(finding sufficient evidence where victim testified abuse began 

contemporaneously with his start of kindergarten and ended when defendant 

was arrested).

E.R. next challenges the reasonable doubt jury instruction issued by the 

trial court. E.R. maintains that the court’s instruction that a reasonable doubt 

is “much more serious” than possible doubt, coupled with the superfluous 
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language in the instruction, suggested a higher degree of doubt than

reasonable doubt. E.R.’s Br. at 14.

The certified record does not contain an objection to the jury instruction 

at trial and, therefore, E.R. has waived the claim. Commonwealth v. 

Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 825 (Pa.Super. 2008) (finding claim waived where 

review of record failed to disclose objection and appellant did not direct court’s 

attention to where in record objection was raised); Pa.R.A.P. 302(b) (“[a] 

general exception to the charge to the jury will not preserve an issue for 

appeal. Specific exception shall be taken to the language or omission 

complained of”). Further, even if he had not waived the claim, we would 

conclude it lacks merit.

Trial courts are vested “with broad discretion in crafting jury

instructions, and such instructions will be upheld so long as they clearly and 

accurately present the law to the jury for its consideration.” Commonwealth 

v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 274 (Pa. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Rainey,

928 A.2d 215, 242–43 (Pa. 2007)). When reviewing a challenge to the jury 

instructions, “we consider the challenged instruction in its entirety, rather than 

isolated fragments.” Id.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in defining reasonable doubt 

as “much more serious” than possible doubt. As E.R. acknowledges, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has “consistently rejected challenges to a trial 

court’s description of reasonable doubt as ‘much more serious than a possible 

doubt.’” Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 631 (Pa. 2008). The trial 
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court’s use of the language was therefore not error. Further, E.R. fails to 

explain how the charge as a whole—the much more serious terminology 

coupled with the remainder of the charge, as set forth above—created a lower 

standard for the Commonwealth to meet to establish guilt. Read as a whole, 

the charge accurately described reasonable doubt.

We must now address an issue not raised by the parties—whether the 

trial court had the authority to find E.R. to be a SVP. Although E.R. did not 

challenge the trial court’s finding that he was an SVP under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9799.24, a section of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act 

(“SORNA”), we may raise the issue on our own motion. The issue presents a 

question as to the legality of E.R.’s sentence, which cannot be waived and 

which this Court may raise sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 

1212, 1215 (Pa.Super. 2017); Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800, 801 

(Pa.Super. 2014).

Our Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 

(Pa. 2017), that the registration requirements set forth under SORNA 

constitute criminal punishment as opposed to a mere civil penalty, and 

therefore their retroactive application violates the Ex Post Facto clause of the 

U.S. Constitution. Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017)

(OAJC), cert. denied sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 138 S.Ct. 925 (U.S. 

Jan. 22, 2018). 
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In the wake of Muniz, we concluded in Commonwealth v. Butler that 

SORNA’s SVP procedure is subject to the constitutional requirement that the 

factual findings be found by a fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt. 173 A.3d 

at 1217-18;

5 see also Commonwealth v. Tighe, 184 A.3d 560, 583 

(Pa.Super. 2018). The Court held that, because 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(e)(3) 

permitted the trial court to determine whether a defendant is an SVP “by clear 

and convincing evidence,” rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, SORNA’s 

SVP procedure was unconstitutional. Butler, 173 A.3d at 1217-18. The Court 

in Butler concluded:

As the sole statutory mechanism for SVP designation is 

constitutionally flawed, there is no longer a legitimate path 

forward for undertaking adjudications pursuant to section 

9799.24. As such, trial courts may no longer designate 

convicted defendants as SVPs, nor may they hold SVP 

hearings, until our General Assembly enacts a constitutional 

designation mechanism. Instead, trial courts must notify a 

defendant that he or she is required to register for 15 years 

if he or she is convicted of a Tier I sexual offense, 25 years 

if he or she is convicted of a Tier II sexual offense, or life if 

he or she is convicted of a Tier III sexual offense.

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5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted a petition for allowance of appeal 

to address the following issue:

Whether the Superior Court of Pennsylvania erred in 

vacating the trial court’s Order finding [Respondent] to be 

[a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”)] by extrapolating the 

decision in [Commonwealth v. Muniz, 640 Pa. 699, 164 

A.3d 1189 (2017),] to declare SVP hearings and 

designations unconstitutional under 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9799.24(e)(3).

Order, No. 47 WAL 2018 (Pa. filed July 31, 2018).
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173 A.3d at 1218 (citation and footnote omitted).

In light of Butler, E.R.’s SVP designation constitutes an illegal sentence. 

Therefore, we vacate the finding that E.R. is an SVP, and, pursuant to Butler,

remand to the trial court to issue a revised notice to E.R. pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.23 (governing reporting requirements of sex offenders). See 

Butler, 173 A.3d at 1218 (vacating SVP order and remanding for sole purpose 

of issuing appropriate notice).

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Order finding Appellant to be an SVP 

vacated. Remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

P.J.E. Stevens joins the Memorandum.

Judge Ott files a Concurring Statement.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/15/18