J-S24034-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BRADY COLLIN DISTEFANO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1365 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 11, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-32-CR-0000416-2017

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

BRADY COLLIN DISTEFANO

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1366 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 11, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-32-CR-0000416-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: September 17, 2024

At docket number 1365 WDA 2023, Brady Collin DiStefano (“DiStefano”) 

appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas 

of Indiana County following his plea of nolo contendere to the sole charge of 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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involuntary manslaughter, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a). Specifically, DiStefano 

challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

At docket number 1366 WDA 2023, the Commonwealth cross-appeals

averring the trial court erred in modifying the costs imposed upon DiStefano

from $5,146.92 to $2,646.92.

1

 After a careful review, we reverse the trial 

court’s reduction of costs and reinstate the costs in the amount of $5,146.92. 

In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: DiStefano, 

Caleb Zweig (“Zweig”), and Trevor King (“King”) were students at Indiana 

University of Pennsylvania and fraternity brothers. On February 3, 2017, the 

three men attended an off-campus party, and as they walked home, DiStefano

and Zweig engaged in a brief physical altercation, which resulted in Zweig’s 

death. 

The Commonwealth charged DiStefano with criminal homicide and 

aggravated assault. DiStefano filed an omnibus pretrial motion, which 

included a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which DiStefano alleged the 

evidence presented at the preliminary hearing did not suffice to state a prima 

facie case against him. The trial court agreed, and on November 13, 2017, 

the trial court entered an order dismissing both of DiStefano’s charges. 

____________________________________________

1 As indicated infra, this Court consolidated DiStefano’s and the 

Commonwealth’s notices of appeal.
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The Commonwealth appealed to this Court, which affirmed, in part, and 

remanded for further proceedings. Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 1785 

WDA 2017, 2018 WL 5076959 (Pa.Super. filed 10/18/18) (unpublished 

memorandum). Specifically, this Court held the trial court correctly concluded 

that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a 

prima facie case of criminal homicide against DiStefano but that the trial court 

erred in finding the Commonwealth failed to present a prima facie case of 

aggravated assault against DiStefano. 

On remand, DiStefano filed a motion in limine requesting that the trial 

court preclude the Commonwealth from presenting at his trial any evidence 

regarding Zweig’s death. In making this request, DiStefano noted the 

homicide charge had been dismissed, and he argued the probative value would 

be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. On November 14, 2019, the 

trial court granted, in part, and denied, in part, DiStefano’s motion. 

Specifically, the trial court indicated it would permit the Commonwealth to 

present evidence that Zweig is deceased “to explain his absence to the jury at 

trial and why the expert testimony from a forensic pathologist is being 

presented.” Trial Court Order, 11/14/19, at 3. However, the trial court ruled 

that, since it dismissed the criminal homicide charge, “no evidence shall be 

permitted to prove that [DiStefano] caused [Zweig’s] death.” Id. 

The Commonwealth appealed to this Court arguing the trial court abused 

its discretion in finding that any evidence concerning the causation of Zweig’s 
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death was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. This Court agreed with the 

Commonwealth, reversed the trial court’s order, and remanded for further 

proceedings. Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 236 A.3d 93 (Pa.Super. 2020), 

reversed, Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 265 A.3d 290 (Pa. 2021). 

DiStefano filed a petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court, 

which held this Court misapplied the relevant standard of review in reversing 

the trial court’s order. Thus, on December 22, 2021, the Supreme Court 

vacated this Court’s judgment, reinstated the trial court’s order, and 

remanded for further proceedings. See id.

Thereafter, following jury selection, the parties reached a plea 

agreement, and on March 21, 2023, DiStefano, represented by counsel, 

entered a plea of nolo contendere to an amended charge of involuntary 

manslaughter, a misdemeanor of the first degree.2 The plea agreement left 

sentencing to the discretion of the trial court. 

On June 16, 2023, DiStefano proceeded to a sentencing hearing at which 

the Commonwealth presented testimony from nine people, who made victim 

impact statements. Specifically, Jono Sirovatka, a friend of Zweig, described 

Zweig as “kind, loyal, compassionate, generous, loving, smart, ambitious, 

funny, athletic, thoughtful, and handsome.” N.T., 6/16/23, at 5. He testified 

____________________________________________

2 During the plea hearing, the Commonwealth moved to amend the 

information to replace the charge of aggravated assault with the charge of

involuntary manslaughter. Given the plea agreement, the trial court granted 

the motion to amend. N.T., 3/21/23, at 3.
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that Zweig’s death “had a profound and irreversible effect on [him].” Id. at 

7. Sirovatka indicated he has been diagnosed with “complicated grief or 

persistent complex bereavement disorder” resulting from Zweig’s unexpected 

death. Id. 

David Meit, a friend of the Zweig family, indicated he has watched 

Zweig’s father, as well as his siblings, suffer from depression and anxiety 

brought about by Zweig’s death. Id. at 11. Tracy Zweig Monaco, who is 

Zweig’s aunt, testified the death of Zweig has had an “immeasurable” impact 

on her life, and she now suffers from panic attacks. Id. at 30. She described 

Zweig’s father as “heartbroken” and “merely existing” since Zweig’s death. 

Id. at 31. 

Marisa Monaco, Erica Monaco, and Rachel Monaco, who are Zweig’s first 

cousins, testified that Zweig “radiated warmth, compassion, and kindness[.]” 

Id. at 12. After Zweig’s death, they observed Zweig’s father “existing as a 

shell of himself through life, in agonizing pain without his son[.]” Id. They 

also observed their mother, who is Zweig’s aunt, suffering from anxiety and 

stress after Zweig’s death. Id. at 13. They indicated that Zweig’s death left 

“inescapable emptiness and darkness in the family[.]” Id. at 17. They 

indicated they suffered from anxiety and depression after Zweig’s death. Id. 

at 27. 

Lily Zweig, who is Zweig’s sister, described Zweig as funny and 

described the pain she has suffered since his death. Id. at 34-35. David 
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Zweig, who is Zweig’s father, testified that the delay in his son receiving 

justice has caused the surviving family pain. Id. at 40. He testified he suffers 

from PTSD and depression with little joy in his life. Id. at 42. He asked the 

trial court to afford restitution for the financial hardship caused by DiStefano’s 

actions and noted the Commonwealth had restitution documents as evidence. 

Id. Vera Sabbah Luxner, a family friend, asked for justice for the Zweig 

family. Id. at 36.

After hearing the victim impact statements, the trial court entered into 

evidence several defense exhibits, including several statements written in 

support of DiStefano. Id. at 50. For instance, in the letters, DiStefano’s

National Guard leader described DiStefano as a “role model” and someone 

who followed direction. Id. at 69. DiStefano’s high school teacher described 

DiStefano as “a kind man.” Id. at 71. A family friend described DiStefano as 

a “respectful” visitor in her home. Id. at 72. A relative described DiStefano

as “a good student, peaceful, law-abiding, [and] a hardworking young man[.]” 

Id. at 73. DiStefano’s current work supervisor described DiStefano as 

dedicated, responsible, and considerate. Id. at 74. DiStefano also offered into 

evidence his record while he served his country via the National Guard. Id. 

Moreover, several people testified on behalf of DiStefano during 

sentencing. For instance, his mother, Deanna DiStefano, testified DiStefano

is “a kind, sweet man,” and he is “not a monster.” Id. at 53. She testified 

he has remorse and, if he could, he would change the events of February 3, 
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2017. Id. Sheri McCleester, who is DiStefano’s aunt, testified he is “a 

blessing to our family.” Id. at 54. She described him as kind and loving. Id. 

Donna Gillin, who is DiStefano’s grandmother, testified that he has done 

many “good things” in his life, and it is “unfortunate that something like this 

occurred.” Id. at 55. She indicated DiStefano is “not a threat to anybody.” 

Id. She noted his military service. Eric DiStefano, who is DiStefano’s father, 

testified that DiStefano is not a monster, but he is a “kind, loving, affection, 

and very unselfish human being.” Id. at 56. He noted that, after Zweig’s 

death, DiStefano was upset and had a hard time dealing with the loss of his 

friend. Id. He also noted that, after Zweig’s death, DiStefano continued to 

serve in the National Guard, married, fathered two children, and became a 

good provider. Id. at 57. He asked for leniency in sentencing.

Ryley Shriver, who is DiStefano’s wife, testified they have two children, 

and DiStefano works very hard to support the family. Id. She has watched 

DiStefano mature. Id. at 58. She described him as a “loving, supportive, and 

caring person” who “loves his children more than anything[.]” Id. 

DiStefano made a statement on his own behalf. He indicated that Zweig 

was “a very good friend [and]...very important to [him].” Id. at 59. He 

acknowledged the grieving process has been difficult for the Zweig family, and 

he indicated he was very sorry for their loss. Id. He noted that, now that he 

has children, he can’t imagine what the Zweig family is going through. Id. 

DiStefano acknowledged that he put himself in a “bad situation” the night of 
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Zweig’s death, and he is willing to accept whatever punishment the trial court 

imposes. Id. 

The Commonwealth reminded the trial court of the sentencing guidelines 

for involuntary manslaughter, as well as the criminal history of the case. Id. 

at 61. The Commonwealth noted that the defense’s exhibit regarding 

DiStefano’s service in the National Guard indicated that, as to DiStefano’s

reenlistment eligibility, it was a “RE-3.” Id. The Commonwealth indicated 

“RE-3” means “you’re not welcome back in the military. It is waivable, but 

you’re not welcome back.” Id. at 62. Further, the Commonwealth noted 

that, during his statement, DiStefano never faced the Zweig family or 

apologized for his actions. Id. 

Defense counsel reminded the trial court that, on the night of the 

incident, both Zweig and DiStefano were intoxicated. Id. Defense counsel 

noted that, after Zweig’s death, DiStefano cooperated with the police, he gave 

a statement, he allowed the police to take photographs of his body, and he 

voluntarily gave the police his phone. Id. at 64, 68. He indicated that 

DiStefano is a “God-fearing man,” and there is no evidence that he “was a 

violent person, a troublemaker, a person that liked to fight.” Id. at 66. In 

fact, he averred that DiStefano’s character is to the contrary. Id. 

Defense counsel indicated DiStefano has taken the justice system and 

his case very seriously. Id. at 67. He has always been respectful to the court 

and all parties involved. Id. Defense counsel indicated DiStefano is not a 
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violent person, and he has been a law-abiding citizen. Id. at 69. He noted 

that DiStefano never received any discipline, reports of misconduct, or 

detentions while in high school or college. Id. He served six years in the 

National Guard’s military police with no discipline, and, in fact, he received 

medals, badges, and commendations. Id. at 70. DiStefano explained the 

“RE-3” designation does not mean that he cannot reenlist with the National 

Guard; but rather, he would be ineligible to serve in the military police division 

because of his current plea. Id. 

Defense counsel requested the trial court impose a lenient sentence so 

that DiStefano can continue providing for his family. Id. at 71. He noted that 

DiStefano has no traffic violations or any other charges since Zweig’s death. 

Id. Also, DiStefano has not violated his bail conditions, including using 

alcohol. Id. Defense counsel pointed to DiStefano’s presentence investigation 

report, which reveals DiStefano has a long history of employment, and he 

currently works as a mail carrier for the United States Post Office. Id. at 72, 

74. Defense counsel informed the trial court that DiStefano underwent an 

alcohol assessment, and he abided by all recommendations. Id. at 78. 

Defense counsel argued that DiStefano is not a danger to the 

community, there is little risk of recidivism, and he is amenable to treatment. 

Id. at 75, 81. Regarding DiStefano’s rehabilitative needs, defense counsel 

argued there is nothing to be served by DiStefano being sentenced in the 

aggravated range. Id. at 75. However, defense counsel argued that many 
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factors call for a mitigated range sentence. Id. He noted DiStefano’s offense 

gravity score is 6, and his prior record score is 0. Id. 

Defense counsel asked that the trial court impose solely probation or 

county intermediate punishment. Id. at 77. He noted DiStefano desires to 

“save” his employment and remain a productive member of society. Id. He 

also noted that, if the trial court orders restitution, DiStefano needs to work 

to pay the restitution. Id. 

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced 

DiStefano to nine months to two years less one day in county jail to be 

followed by a consecutive term of two years of reporting probation. The trial 

court noted this was “within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines.” 

Id. at 88. Defense counsel asked whether DiStefano was precluded from 

applying for work release. Id. at 89. The trial court responded that “work 

release will not be granted in this matter. It’s [the trial court’s] intention that 

[DiStefano] serve the nine months.” Id. The trial court ordered DiStefano to 

pay the costs of prosecution, which totaled $5,146.92, as well as a $500.00

fine. Additionally, the trial court ordered DiStefano to pay $15,427.84 in 

restitution to David Zweig (the victim’s father) and $7,713.79 to the Victim 

Compensation Assistance Program. 

On June 26, 2023, DiStefano filed a timely, counseled post-sentence 

motion seeking a modification of his sentence. Specifically, as it pertains to 

his sentence of nine months to two years less one day in prison, to be followed 
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by two years of reporting probation, DiStefano alleged the trial court abused 

its discretion in imposing an excessive sentence without properly considering 

the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). DiStefano further suggested the 

trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider and/or not imposing work 

release, thus rendering the sentence unreasonable. As it pertains to the order 

of restitution, DiStefano alleged the award was excessive. He also averred 

the costs imposed by the trial court were not all “necessary expenses,” and 

he sought a modification of the costs.

The Commonwealth filed a brief in opposition to DiStefano’s postsentence motion, and on July 10, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on 

DiStefano’s post-sentence motions. By order and opinion filed on October 11, 

2023, the trial court granted, in part, and denied, in part, DiStefano’s postsentence motion. Specifically, the trial court granted DiStefano’s request for 

the modification of costs. In this respect, the trial court held the following:

[A] portion of the challenged [costs] is the $2,500.00 

consultation fee to Dr. Jennifer Hammers. The [trial] court finds 

that the Commonwealth has not met its burden to show, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the expense incurred as a fee 

to Dr. Hammers was a necessary cost of prosecution, as her name 

was not on the Commonwealth’s final witness list for trial. 

The [trial] court grants the motion to modify the sentence 

of costs. The [trial] court will amend the order dated June 16, 

2023, to reflect costs in the amount of $2,646.92.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/11/23, at 9. The trial court denied DiStefano’s

post-sentence motion in all other respects. The trial court’s October 11, 2023, 

order specifically provided the June 16, 2023, sentencing order was amended 
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to provide as follows: “The defendant shall pay costs of prosecution in the 

amount of $2,646.92; In all other respects, the [trial] court’s order dated June 

16, 2023, shall remain in full force and effect.” Trial Court’s Order, filed 

10/11/23, at 1. 

On November 6, 2023, DiStefano filed a timely counseled notice of 

appeal, and, on that same date, the Commonwealth filed a timely crossappeal.

3

 This Court consolidated the appeals. By orders entered on November

7, 2023, the trial court directed DiStefano and the Commonwealth to file Rule 

1925(b) statements, both parties timely complied, and the trial court filed a 

brief Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion indicating it was relying on its October 11, 

2023, opinion.

On appeal, DiStefano presents the following in his “Statement of the 

Questions Involved” (verbatim):

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a 

sentence of not less than 9 months nor more than 2 years less 

one day, followed by a consecutive probationary term of 2 years 

for the crime of involuntary manslaughter by ignoring 

[DiStefano’s] rehabilitative needs as provided at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9721(b), and so deviated from the fundamental norms of the 

sentencing code, and by categorically refusing work release 

notwithstanding that [DiStefano] was statutorily eligible for work 

release pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9813(d)?

DiStefano’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answer 

omitted).

____________________________________________

3 We note that, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 721, the Commonwealth was 

permitted to file an appeal in this matter. 
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In its cross-appeal, the Commonwealth presents the following issues in 

its “Statement of the Questions Involved” (verbatim):

I. [DiStefano] has failed to establish that a substantial 

question exists or that the sentencing court abused its 

discretion when the sentencing court imposed a guideline 

sentence of incarceration for a period of not less than 9 

months nor more than 2 years less one day, followed by a 

consecutive probationary term of 2 years for the crime of 

involuntary manslaughter and denied work release.

II. The Commonwealth submits that an error of law and an 

abuse of discretion occurred when the sentencing court 

modified [DiStefano’s] sentence of costs.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 8 (unnecessary capitalization and bold omitted).

Initially, we address DiStefano’s issue within which he intertwines two 

sentencing claims.

4 DiStefano contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

imposing a sentence of not less than nine months nor more than two years 

less one day, to be followed by a probationary term of two years, without 

consideration of DiStefano’s rehabilitative needs as mandated by 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9721(b). 

Further, DiStefano contends that, in imposing a term of total 

confinement without considering and/or permitting work release, the trial 

court abused its discretion in failing to impose an individualized sentence.

DiStefano specifically acknowledges that he is not entitled to work release; 

____________________________________________

4 The Commonwealth’s first issue is intertwined with DiStefano’s first issue. 

Essentially, the Commonwealth’s first issue is presented as a counter 

argument in the Commonwealth’s role as the appellee. 
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however, he requests we “remand for resentencing with direction [to the trial 

court] to consider work release pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.A. §] 9813(a).” 

DiStefano’s Brief at 19. In this vein, he avers:

[T]he [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion when, taking into 

consideration [DiStefano’s] lack of a criminal record, his 

employment history, his military service, and his family situation, 

it categorically refused to consider work release pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9813(a) even though that refusal abnegated his 

rehabilitation and mandate to pay restitution. Under such 

circumstances, the sentence of not less than 9 months nor more 

than 2 years less one day was unreasonable.

Id. at 18.

As it pertains to DiStefano’s claim that the trial court imposed an 

excessive sentence without consideration of his rehabilitative needs as 

mandated by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), this is a challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of DiStefano’s sentence. Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 

991 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

Moreover, as it pertains to DiStefano’s claim the trial court erred in 

failing to permit work release, we note that work release is a sentencing option

set forth in the Pennsylvania County Intermediate Punishment Act (“the PCIP 

Act”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9801-9813. Specifically, the PCIP Act relevantly 

provides the following:

§ 9813. Work release or other court order and purposes

(a) Generally.--Notwithstanding any provision of law, if any 

offender has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment in a county 

jail for a term of less than five years, the court, at the time of 

sentence or at any time thereafter upon application made in 

accordance with this section, may enter an order making the 

offender eligible to leave the jail during necessary and reasonable 
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hours for the purpose of working at his employment, conducting 

his own business or other self-employed occupation, including 

housekeeping and attending to the needs of family, seeking 

employment, attending an educational institution, securing 

medical treatment or for other lawful purposes as the court shall 

consider necessary and appropriate.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9813(a) (bold in original).

Here, assuming, arguendo, Appellant is statutorily eligible for work 

release,

5

it is well-settled that the grant of work release is within the trial 

court’s discretion. See id. (“...the court,...may enter an order making the 

offender eligible to leave the jail during necessary and reasonable hours for 

the purpose of working at his employment....”). See also Commonwealth 

v. Williams, 868 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa.Super. 2005) (explaining that it is within 

the trial court’s discretion to permit work release to a statutorily eligible 

offender). Accordingly, DeStefano’s claim that the trial court erred in failing 

to consider and/or permit work release, thus failing to impose an 

____________________________________________

5 The PCIP Act further sets forth what constitutes an “eligible offender.” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9802 (definitions). Specifically, the PCIP Act provides an “eligible 

offender” is “a person convicted of an offense who would otherwise be 

sentenced to a county correctional facility, who does not demonstrate a 

present or past pattern of violent behavior and who would otherwise be 

sentenced...to total confinement pursuant to section 9725 (relating to total 

confinement).” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9802. Also, the PCIP Act provides that “eligible 

offender” does not include an offender with a current conviction or a prior 

conviction within the past ten years for certain enumerated crimes. See id. 

However, involuntary manslaughter, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a), is not included 

within this list.
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individualized sentence, raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of 

DiStefano’s sentence. 

“[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle 

an appellant to review as of right.” Derry, 150 A.3d at 991 (citation omitted). 

Rather, before reaching the merits of such claims, we must determine:

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether [the] [a]ppellant 

preserved his issues; (3) whether [the] [a]ppellant’s brief includes 

a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of 

appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and 

(4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question 

that the sentence is inappropriate under the sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation 

omitted). Here, assuming, arguendo, all of these requirements have been 

met, we conclude DiStefano’s sentencing claims are meritless. 

Our standard of review concerning the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Pa.Super. 2005).

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) offers the following guidance to the trial court’s 

sentencing determination:

[T]he sentence imposed should call for confinement that is 

consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the 
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offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on 

the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). 

Furthermore,

Section 9781(c) specifically defines three instances in which the 

appellate courts should vacate a sentence and remand: (1) the 

sentencing court applied the guidelines erroneously; (2) the 

sentence falls within the guidelines, but is “clearly unreasonable” 

based on the circumstances of the case; and (3) the sentence falls 

outside of the guidelines and is “unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9781(c). Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d), the appellate courts must 

review the record and consider the nature and circumstances of 

the offense, the sentencing court’s observations of the defendant, 

the findings that formed the basis of the sentence, and the 

sentencing guidelines. The weighing of factors under 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9721(b) is exclusively for the sentencing court, and an appellate 

court may not substitute its own weighing of those factors. The 

primary consideration, therefore, is whether the court imposed an 

individualized sentence, and whether the sentence was 

nonetheless unreasonable for sentences falling outside the 

guidelines, or clearly unreasonable for sentences falling within the 

guidelines, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c).

Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 875-76 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider the 

particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the 

defendant. In considering these factors, the court should refer to 

the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics 

and potential for rehabilitation. Where presentence reports exist, 

we shall...presume that the sentencing judge was aware of 

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory 

factors. 

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 761 (Pa.Super. 2014) 

(quotation marks and quotation omitted).
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Moreover, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9725 sets forth the following regarding a 

sentence of total confinement:

§ 9725. Total confinement

The court shall impose a sentence of total confinement if, having 

regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the 

history, character, and condition of the defendant, it is of the 

opinion that the total confinement of the defendant is necessary 

because:

(1) there is undue risk that during a period of probation or partial 

confinement the defendant will commit another crime;

(2) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be 

provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or

(3) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the crime 

of the defendant.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9725 (bold in original).

Regarding work release, this Court has explained:

The Legislature’s intent [behind the PCIP Act] was: “to give judges 

another sentencing option which would lie between probation and 

incarceration with respect to sentencing severity; to provide a 

more appropriate form of punishment/treatment for certain types 

of non-violent offenders; to make the offender more accountable 

to the community; and to help reduce the county jail overcrowding 

problem while maintaining public safety.”

Williams, 868 A.2d at 534 (citations omitted).

In the case sub judice, to the extent DiStefano contends the trial court 

abused its discretion in failing to consider the imposition of work release, we 

find no merit. Simply put, the record reveals that, upon DiStefano’s request 

regarding work release, the trial court responded that “work release will not 

be granted in this matter. It’s [the trial court’s] intention that [DiStefano] 
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serve the nine months.” N.T., 6/16/23, at 89. Thus, the trial court considered, 

but rejected, DiStefano’s request for work release. 

Moreover, as it relates to the reasons the trial court imposed a sentence 

of not less than nine months nor more than two years less one day, to be 

followed by a probationary term of two years, as well as the reasons it rejected 

DiStefano’s request for work release, the trial court relevantly stated the 

following on the record in imposing DiStefano’s sentence:

[T]he offense of involuntary manslaughter has an offense 

gravity score of 6 and [DiStefano] has a prior record score of zero. 

And, therefore, the standard range of sentencing guidelines 

provide for a sentence of 3 to 12 months in that standard range. 

Now, I’m confident that all of the parties knew all of those facts 

and knew that standard range.

***

I firmly believe that justice is found by giving the parties the 

certainty that they bargained for, which is sentencing in the 

standard range of the sentencing guidelines. 

Id. at 84.

Additionally, in denying DiStefano’s post-sentence motion regarding his 

claims the trial court imposed an excessive sentence without consideration of 

his rehabilitative needs, as well as failed to impose an individualized sentence 

in denying his request for work release, the trial court indicated the following:

Prior to sentencing, the Indiana County Probation Office 

prepared a presentence investigation report at the request of the 

[trial] court; the report was received and reviewed by the [trial] 

court. It is important to note that the standard range of the 

sentencing guidelines, as set forth in the presentence report, 

provided for a minimum period of incarceration of 3-12 months. 

The [trial] court also notes that numerous impact letters were 

received and reviewed by the [trial] court prior to sentencing. The 
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impact letters were authored by family members and friends of 

Caleb Zweig. The [trial] court also received and reviewed letters 

authored by family members and friends of [DiStefano].

A sentencing hearing was conducted by the [trial] court on 

June 16, 2023. During the hearing, [the trial] court received 

additional letters and documents from the Commonwealth and 

[DiStefano]; the [trial] court also received oral statements from 

family members and friends of the victim and family members and 

friends of [DiStefano]. After careful consideration of all matters 

presented, the [trial] court ordered that [DiStefano] undergo a 

period of incarceration in the Indiana County Jail of not less than 

9 months nor more than 2 years less 1 day followed by a 

consecutive probationary term of 2 years.

***

[DiStefano] challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. [DiStefano] pled nolo contendere to Involuntary 

Manslaughter, a misdemeanor of the first degree. [DiStefano] has 

a prior record score of 0. Therefore, the Basic Sentencing Matrix, 

as applied to this matter, provides for a minimum period of 

incarceration of 3-12 months within the standard range of the

sentencing guidelines. The [trial] court’s sentence of incarceration 

for a period of not less than 9 months nor more than 2 years less 

1 day is clearly within the standard range of the sentence 

guidelines. And when the [trial] court imposes a sentence that is 

within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines, the 

“aggrieved party” must demonstrate that the sentence is clearly 

unreasonable. See Commonwealth v. Drumgoole, 491 A.2d 

1352 (Pa.Super. 1985)[.]

The [appellate court], in the case of Drumgoole, stated the 

following:

In determining whether a particular sentence is 

‘clearly unreasonable’ or ‘unreasonable,’ the [] court 

must consider the defendant’s background and 

characteristics as well as the particular circumstances 

of the offense involved, the trial court’s opportunity to 

observe the defendant, the presentence investigation 

report, if any, the Sentencing Guidelines as 

promulgated by the Sentencing Commission, and the 

‘findings’ upon which the trial court based its 

sentence.

Id. at 1354.
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Further, the [appellate] court has stated that “[w]here the 

sentencing judge had the benefit of a presentence investigation 

report, it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the 

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those consideration along with mitigating statutory 

factors.” Commonwealth v. Finnecy, 135 A.3d 1028, 1038 

(Pa.Super. 2016)[.] 

[DiStefano] requests that the [trial] court modify the 

[length] of the sentence imposed and approve work release. The 

[trial] court must deny this motion. As stated above, the [trial] 

court had the benefit of a presentence investigation [report]. The 

[trial] court carefully considered all of the information provided 

prior to the sentencing hearing and at the sentencing hearing, and 

the [trial] court set forth its reasoning and basis for the 

sentence[.] The [trial] court acknowledges that from the date of 

the incident until the date of the sentencing hearing, [DiStefano] 

has made positive changes; for example, [DiStefano] obtained 

gainful employment, he got married, and he had children. 

However, the [trial] court cannot ignore that 

[DiStefano’s]...actions led to the death of Caleb Zweig. Therefore, 

the [trial] court firmly believes that a sentence of a period of total 

confinement must be ordered because “a lesser sentence will 

depreciate the seriousness of the crime of the defendant.” See 

42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 9725(3). The [trial] court finds that the sentence 

imposed remains appropriate.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/11/23, 1-5 (some citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

We find no abuse of discretion. Specifically, contrary to DiStefano’s

assertion, in imposing a sentence of not less than nine months nor more than 

two years less one day, to be followed by a probationary term of two years,

as well as in denying DiStefano’s request for work release, the trial court 

considered DiStefano’s rehabilitative needs under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). 

Further, the trial court, which acknowledged DiStefano’s presentence 

investigation report, considered the mitigating circumstances, including
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DiStefano’s lack of a criminal record, employment history, military service, 

and family situation. The trial court imposed an individualized sentence, and 

we conclude the sentence is not “clearly unreasonable.” See Bricker, supra.

Thus, we find no merit to DiStefano’s sentencing challenges.

Next, we turn to the Commonwealth’s issue presented in its crossappeal. The Commonwealth submits the trial court erred in modifying the 

costs for which DiStefano was responsible. Specifically, the Commonwealth 

contends that, pursuant to 16 P.S. § 1403, it proved, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, that the fee of Dr. Jennifer Hammers, who is a forensic 

pathologist, was necessary to the prosecution under the facts and 

circumstances of this case. 

Relevantly, our Legislature has provided the following: “Expenses 

incurred by district attorney...In any case where a defendant is convicted 

and sentenced to pay the costs of prosecution and trial, the expenses of the 

district attorney in connection with such prosecution shall be considered a part 

of the costs of the case and be paid by the defendant.” 16 P.S. § 1403 (bold 

in original).

6

 

____________________________________________

6 We note that, on May 8, 2024, effective in 60 days, our Legislature repealed 

16 P.S. § 1403 and replaced it with 16 Pa.C.S.A. § 14303, which relevantly 

provides: “If a defendant is convicted and sentenced to pay the costs of 

prosecution and trial, the expenses of the district attorney in connection with 

the prosecution shall be considered a part of the costs of the case and shall 

be paid by the defendant.” 16 Pa.C.S.A. § 14303. See PA LEGIS 2024-14, 

2024 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2024-14 (S.B. 945). In the case sub judice,

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Costs of prosecution attributable to the defendant “are those which are 

necessary for prosecution when considered in light of the peculiar facts and 

circumstances of each case[.]” Commonwealth v. Cutillo, 440 A.2d 607, 

609 (Pa.Super. 1982). The Commonwealth must provide the defendant with 

“a reasonably specific bill of costs and show how the costs were necessary to 

the prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Coder, 415 A.2d 406, 410 (Pa. 1980).

The Commonwealth bears the burden of justifying, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that the imposition of costs on a defendant is proper. See

Commonwealth v. Gill, 432 A.2d 1001, 1004 (Pa.Super. 1981).

Here, the trial court originally directed DiStefano to pay a total of 

$5,146.92 for the costs of prosecution. DiStefano filed a timely post-sentence 

motion challenging the imposition of costs, and on July 10, 2023, the trial 

court held a hearing on DiStefano’s post-sentence motion. 

During the post-sentence hearing, Alexis Rieger, the office manager at 

the District Attorney’s Office, testified she documented the costs incurred by 

the prosecution in this matter. N.T., 7/10/23, at 42. As it pertains to Dr. 

Hammers, Ms. Rieger testified Dr. Hammers, who is a forensic pathologist, 

reviewed “material pertinent to forming medicolegal opinions[.]” Id. at 48. 

____________________________________________

DiStefano was sentenced prior to the effective date of 16 Pa.C.S.A. § 14303. 

The parties do not dispute that 16 P.S. § 1403 is applicable to the instant 

matter. 
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Dr. Hammers billed the District Attorney’s Office $2,500.00 for her services. 

Id. Ms. Rieger provided this bill to the Clerk of Courts as part of the necessary 

costs associated with the prosecution. Id. She provided the bill well before 

the time of sentencing. Id. at 49.

Moreover, during the post-sentence hearing, District Attorney Robert F. 

Manzi, Jr., who was the prosecuting attorney in this matter, asked DiStefano 

whether he would stipulate that all of the witnesses named did appear and 

were necessary witnesses for the prosecution. Id. at 55. The District Attorney 

indicated that, if DeStefano would not so stipulate, he would put the witnesses 

on the stand or otherwise provide testimony to that effect. Id. DiStefano’s 

attorney indicated “Yes” to the stipulation. Id. The trial court took notice of 

the parties’ stipulation. Id. at 57. Specifically, the trial court noted “[c]osts, 

we’re talking about fact witnesses, expert witnesses, stipulation that those are 

necessary.” Id. 

Thereafter, in ruling on DiStefano’s post-sentence motion, the trial court 

relevantly indicated the following regarding costs:

A portion of the challenged amount is the total cost of 

transportation and lodging of the witnesses who were subpoenaed 

to testify at trial; this amount is $2,162.92. The [trial] court finds 

that these costs were necessary costs of prosecution, as these 

witnesses were subpoenaed to testify. The [trial] court notes that 

the plea in this matter was entered on the day after jury selection 

and just prior to the beginning of trial, therefore the transportation 

and lodging costs were actually and understandably incurred.

Another portion of the challenged amount is the $2,500.00 

consultation fee to Dr. Jennifer Hammers. The [trial] court finds 

that the Commonwealth has not met its burden to show, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that the expense incurred as a fee 
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to Dr. Hammers was a necessary cost of prosecution, as her name 

was not on the Commonwealth’s final witness list for trial. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/11/23, at 9. 

Accordingly, the trial court granted DiStefano’s post-sentence motion to 

modify costs and, subtracting the $2,500.00 consultation fee to Dr. Hammers, 

directed DiStefano to pay $2,646.92 in costs. 

The Commonwealth argues the trial court has misconstrued the record. 

Specifically, the Commonwealth notes the docket entries reveal that on March 

13, 2023, which is prior to the day DiStefano’s trial was set to commence and 

his plea of nolo contendere occurred, the Commonwealth filed an amended 

pretrial statement and amended witness list, which added Dr. Hammers as an 

expert witness for trial. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 22. 

Our review of the certified record confirms the Commonwealth’s 

assertion. Specifically, the Commonwealth filed the following on March 13, 

2023:

Commonwealth’s Amended Pretrial Statement

AND NOW, comes the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by and 

through Robert F. Manzi, Jr., District Attorney, and respectfully 

submits the following Amended Witness List:

Commonwealths’ Amended Witness List

The Commonwealth’s amended witness list add[s] [an] expert 

witness as follows:

Doctor Jennifer Hammers

**** 8th Avenue

Beaver Falls, PA 15010
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Commonwealth’s Amended Pretrial Statement and Witness List, filed 3/13/23, 

at 1 (underline in original). 

Accordingly, since the sole reason provided by the trial court for holding 

Dr. Hammers’ fee was not a necessary cost of prosecution, i.e., her name was 

not on the Commonwealth’s final witness list for trial, is not supported by the 

record, we reverse the trial court’s October 11, 2023, modification of costs 

and reinstate the original amount of costs, $5,146.92, which includes Dr. 

Hammers’ fee. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s reduction of 

costs and reinstate the original costs in the amount of $5,146.92. In all other 

respects, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence reversed, in part, and affirmed, in part. 

DATE: 09/17/2024